I would like to begin by referring to a song on the record, “Tropicália 2” (1993), by Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil, the two most prominent figures of Brazilian popular music for the last twenty-five years. In a slow rap, provocatively entitled “Haiti,” Caetano describes witnessing state-sponsored violence at the thirteenth FEMADUM, the annual festival of the Grupo Cultural Olodum in the Pelourinho district of Salvador, Bahia:

Quando você for convidado pra subir no adro
Da Fundação Casa de Jorge Amado
Pra ver do alto a fila de soldados, quase todos pretos
Dando porrada na nuca de maldros pretos
De ladrões mulatos e outros quase brancos
Tratados como pretos
Só pra mostrar aos outros quase pretos
(E são quase todos pretos)
E aos quase brancos pobres como pretos
Como é que pretos, pobres e mulatos
E quase brancos quase pretos de tão pobres são tratados.

When you are invited to ascend the steps
Of the Casa de Jorge Amado Foundation
To see from up high the line of

soldiers, almost all black
Beating on the napes of black rogues
Of mulato thieves and other almost-whites
Treated like blacks
Only to show the other almost-blacks
(Who are almost all black)
And the almost-whites poor like blacks
How it is that the blacks, the poor and the mulatos
And almost-whites almost-blacks from poverty are treated.

Veloso’s privileged point of view from the stage allows him to witness the brutal police repression of Afro-Brazilian youth stigmatized as much by their blackness as by their poverty. Despite the group’s considerable efforts to discourage aggressive behavior, Olodum’s public rehearsals and festivals in Pelourinho square have long been sites of petty crime, fist fights and violent confrontation with baton-wielding police who operate in groups of ten or more. But this time Veloso has drawn attention to the “eyes of the whole world watching the square,” especially when he says:

Não importa nada: Nem o traço do sobrado
Nem a lente do Fantástico, nem o disco de Paul Simon
Ninguém, ninguém é cidadão
Nothing matters: Not even the outline of the sobrado
Not even the lens of Fantástico, not even Paul Simon’s record

Nobody, nobody is a citizen.

References to the majestic colonial villa housing the museum of Bahia’s most consecrated novelist, the presence of the film crew of a very popular nationally-televised human interest program, and finally Olodum’s acclaimed collaboration with Paul Simon, underline the group’s relation to persons and institutions which wield large amounts of both economic and symbolic capital on the local, national, and international levels. This network of media contacts, who have celebrated, sponsored, and appropriated Olodum’s work, has done very little to change prevailing attitudes and practices which degrade Afro-Brazilian youth.

The refrain compares Bahia, and later in the song, Brazil in general, to contemporary Haiti which is controlled by a small elite of light-skinned mulâtres who are allied with a mostly black military regime at the expense of the population:

Se você for ver a festa do Pelô, e se você não for
Pense no Haiti, reze pelo Haiti
O Haiti é aqui—O Haiti não é aqui

And if you go to see the party in Pelô, and if you don’t go
Think of Haiti, pray for Haiti
Haiti is here—Haiti is not here.2

By calling attention to Haiti, regularly cited as “the poorest nation in western hemisphere,” Veloso denounces the contradictions of Bahian society. Over eighty percent of Salvador’s population is Afro-Brazilian, but the city is dominated politically and economically by a small white elite, which relies on a mostly black police force to “maintain order.” Nevertheless, this same power elite celebrates the symbols of Afro-Bahian culture as emblems of local identity in relation to the rest of Brazil and to the world.

The contradictions of Brazilian, and particularly Bahian, society might be understood in light of the paradoxes of multiculturalism in the U.S. described by Hazel Carby in her essay, “The Multi-Cultural Wars” (1992). Carby raises questions about the “cultural and political need” which is satisfied by raising up black women literary subjects to the status of “cultural and political icons” in a society which has failed to integrate and provide equal opportunities for educational and social ascension to minority groups, particularly African-Americans (192). She argues that black cultural texts and discourses on “difference” have become convenient substitutes for social and political practices which might transform apartheid-like social and economic structures which are sustained without recourse to segregationist legislation (192,195). Discourses on “difference,” which celebrate the diversity of cultural practices with the aim of challenging and reformulating the dominant literary canon, tend to emphasize individual or group identity while ignoring structures of inequality and exploitation (193). Carby’s discussion is particularly relevant to this essay in that it shows how subaltern groups are readily commodified and symbolically appropriated by elite discourses on “diversity” and “multiculturalism,” which often serve as cornerstones for the construction of inclusionary local and national identities. While the discussion of American hybridity is a relatively recent phenomena—which obviously could not have begun to take place within dominant institutions until after the abolition of legal apparatuses premised on the conviction that whites and blacks were radically different and therefore constituted separate “nations”—, it has been the central feature of the “grand narrative” of brasilidade since the 1920s.3
tion, race, ethnicity, and region were subsumed under a universalist national identity as a matter of official policy under the authoritarian-populist government of Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945). At the same time, the ideology of "racial democracy" emerged as a point of national pride and distinction in relation to a segregated United States. From then on, any challenge to this "regime of truth" was interpreted as an attack on the very foundation of "Brazilianess."  

In this paper, I will discuss the field of Afro-Bahian popular music, particularly those groups, like the blocos afro, which emerged in the 1970s to challenge prevailing notions about Brazilian racial equality and harmony. I will follow their historic trajectory, from renegade carnival entities to cultural producers for an international mass market. In this process, the blocos afro have gained emblematic status as authentic representatives of Bahia's "pluri-cultural, participative" carnival (Gomes 182). A significant portion of Brazilian popular music is produced for, or related to, carnival. In Rio, samba composers and interpreters often begin their careers as participants in large escolas de samba and then later establish themselves as individual artists. Yet they occupy a subaltern position in relation to Rio-based artists producing eclectic, cosmopolitan pop (a category known as MPB—Música Popular Brasileira) for the national and international markets. In Bahia, the career trajectories of carnival artists are very similar, with the difference that nearly all musical production relates to the field of carnival. Bahian artists are famous for producing a very distinctive regional sound that is readily associated with Afro-Bahian culture.

French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, argues that art must be understood as a "manifestation of the field" in which agents, institutions, critics and consumers produce the meaning or value of the work ("The Field" 37). A sociology of art must analyze not only the material production, but also the symbolic production of the work. The meaning of any work is not a given; it is, rather, a process involving both producers and consumers and all of the other mediating agents in between, such as distributors, critics, promoters, official tourist agencies, etc. With this in mind, I would argue that the field of popular music in Bahia ought to be studied with an eye on carnival—an event that provides the single largest source of income for most local musicians—and one which receives wide coverage by the electronic and print medias.

The carnival season extends more or less from early December until Lent, and includes a host of neighborhood and religious festivals. Most musicians and groups which participate in carnival activities are subsidized by state and local government agencies (such as Bahiatursa, the state tourist organization), or are sponsored by large local businesses, or by political office-holders and seekers.

The Bahian carnival is widely defined by producers and consumer-participants in opposition to the super-produced, internationally famous carnival of Rio de Janeiro. Bahians distinguish their own "participative carnival" from the "show" in Rio (Gomes 172), where spectators pay to enter the Sambódromo stadium to watch the top escolas de samba parade down the artificial "avenue." This is not just a matter of local pride or parochial rivalry between two historic cities. Both are vying for the lion's share of domestic and foreign tourism which is crucial to local economies. This competition reached new heights in 1993 when the mayors of each city engaged in a fair share of mudslinging, with racist subtexts, in the weeks leading up to carnival. The Bahian promoters tend to emphasize "participation" and "authenticity," while those from Rio tout the "sophistication," "grandeur," and "comfort" of their carnival.

I would like to briefly outline the history of Bahia's carnival, with special attention to the last twenty years. Carnival was essentially a celebration for middle-class and elite
families until the 1950s. The working-class and poor blacks participated in loosely organized *batucadas*, which were later constituted as *afoxés* and *escolas de samba* (modeled after the famous *escolas* of Rio). The most famous *afoxé*, the Filhos de Gandhi, ‘The Sons of Gandhi’ was founded in 1949 by striking black dock workers sympathetic to the Indian anti-colonialist movement against the British Raj. The white middle class and elite minority participated in *cordões*, featuring full marching bands and satiric allegorical floats, or celebrated in private clubs. These domains were separated and confined to distinct geographical spaces in the city. Bahian carnival was transformed in the 1950s largely due to the emergence of the *trios elétricos*, flatbed trucks with battery-powered speakers, which have since evolved into sophisticated, loud, and mobile sound stages. Observers have noted how the *trios* served to “democratize” the Bahian carnival since they created open “free zones” behind the truck where rich and poor, black and white mixed together (Risério 113). In the late 1960s, a new carnival entity, the *blocos de índio* was created by working class black youth. The *blocos de índio* were more loosely organized, required less discipline and offered revelers more mobility in comparison with the *afoxés* and the *escolas* (Godí 55). The costumes were modeled after Hollywood representations of North American Indians from westerns which were constantly aired on TV and shown at local movie theaters.7 Observers have suggested that black youth identified with these stereotypical representations based on common marginality in relation to white society (Risério 67; Godí 56–57). The *blocos de índio* subverted Romantic notions of the “noble savage” (as portrayed in nineteenth century Indianist novels) by presenting an aggressive, rebellious version of the Indian.8 By the 1970s, elite critics were openly calling for rigorous police control of the *blocos de índio*, which were perceived to be a threat to public safety (Godí 64; Gomes 178).

In the meantime, the *trios* had been transformed from highly participatory, “democratic” groups to privatized associations which charged participants substantial fees. Most *trios* were informally restricted to whites, while employing black youths to secure a cordoned-off area around the truck. The “free zone” of the *trios elétricos* had become a “safe area” for the middle and upper classes.

The 1970s saw the development of what Antônio Risério has called the “reafricanization” of the Bahian carnival (17). This transformation was heralded by new type of carnival entity, the *bloco afro*. Many of the organizers and participants of the first *blocos afro* had come from the *blocos de índio*, which were going out of style by the late 1970s. The first *bloco afro*, Ilê Aiyé (in Yoruba, the “House of Life”), was founded in 1974. The North American soul and black power movements, along with the independence of Lusophone Africa are cited by the group’s president, Antônio Carlos dos Santos, as crucial influences on the group. Ilê Aiyé comes from Liberdade, the most populous neighborhood in Salvador, with a predominantly black, relatively stable and prosperous working-class population.

Unlike the *afoxés*, Ilê Aiyé utilized symbols of africanity as a form of “cultural resistance” to dominant norms in the Bahian carnival. Their first appearance in 1975 met with widespread criticism in the mainstream Bahian press on the grounds that it “introduced” racial politics into carnival. The participants carried signs referring to black power and proudly affirmed their black identities (Gomes 179). The leadership of the organization, which quickly grew into one of the largest carnival entities, maintained an exclusionary policy which paralleled some of the whites-only *trios elétricos*, such *Os Internacionais*. It barred entry to whites in order to underscore a resolutely Afrocentric aesthetic. They developed a hybrid beat which mixed samba with *ijexá*, a rhythm from the Afro-Brazilian religion, *candomblé*. If, on one hand, Ilê Aiyé’s black aesthetic situated the group in opposition to
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dominant white-controlled groups, it also set the limits for political intervention. Their strategy, which went so far as to exclude Afro-Brazilians who weren’t “black enough,” ultimately proved to be ineffective in terms of protest and actually hastened the group’s assimilation into the official discourse on Bahia’s “pluri-cultural” carnival (Gomes 180). Their Afrocentric symbolic gestures were pushed into the realm of the aesthetic and ceased to have much political or social impact (Gomes 180). By the 1980s, Ilê Aiyê was celebrated by the media and local authorities as a symbol of Bahia’s connection to a mythic Africa.9

In 1983, core members of Ilê Aiyê broke away and revived the Grupo Cultural Olodum (founded in 1979) based in Pelourinho, the historic center of Salvador. The Pelourinho community is much poorer and less stable in terms of social structure compared with Liberdade. Until quite recently, it was a site of drug dealing, prostitution and petty theft. Pelourinho is also the most popular site for tourists who come to see the largest complex of colonial buildings in Latin America.10

Olodum has also celebrated and disseminated Bahia’s historic connections with Africa, but it has constructed a counter-cultural discourse rooted more in the diasporic experience and local struggles against violence, poverty and racial discrimination. In the 1980s the group developed a new rhythm, samba-reggae, which was heavily influenced by the arrival of reggae music in Bahia in the late 1970s. If Ilê Aiyê represented the “reafricanization” of Bahian carnival, we might say that Olodum represented a moment of pan-diasporic hybridization. Olodum’s hybridity refers not only to its syncretic rhythmic innovations, but also to its use of modern technologies, marketing strategies, and transnational media networks to promote its music and its message. It has followed a trajectory of what Néstor García Canclini has called “cultural reversion,” a process by which symbolic patrimony is transferred “from one site to another in order to conserve it, increase its yield, and better the position of those who practice it” (32). Olodum also resists the kind of narrow identity politics postures associated with Ilê Aiyê. Olodum’s leadership perceives race as one variable in addition to social position, gender, and region as determinants of power relations in Bahia and in Brazil. Of all the blocos afro, Olodum is most involved with community organization and education, and most active in protest movements against police violence, poverty, and political corruption. In the late 1980s, Olodum emerged as the preeminent bloco afro in Salvador, and has since become a well-known and powerful cultural institution which regularly tours Brazil, Europe, and the United States.11

I will briefly analyze key developments in the present field of Bahian carnival beginning with Pierre Bourdieu’s premise that “no cultural product exists by itself, i.e. outside the relations of interdependence which link it to other products” (32). The various carnival entities and the genres they represent compete for legitimacy and consecration, both in the market for popular music and in officially-sponsored competitions during carnival. No group or genre monopolizes the field—which would be nearly impossible given class, race, and geographic distinctions—indeed, they depend on each other to the degree that they define themselves in relation to (if not in opposition to) each other. Bourdieu reveals the artistic field to be rife with struggle over legitimacy, consecration, and/or market success. In recent years, the most visible opposition and antagonism has been between the blocos afro and the trios elétrico, the two most dominant genres in the field of Bahian popular music. Within the context of carnival, the blocos and the trios compete for both physical space and “audio space” in an extremely haphazard and contentious parade through the downtown area. The trios enjoy a clear advantage due to the sheer volume of their amplified moving stages which transport full bands. Outside of car-
nival, they compete for the domination of the recording market, where again the *trios* have an advantage with their slick, highly produced, “FM-friendly” songs. Many of the *trios* have achieved market success by producing orchestrated covers of *bloco* hits, often paying little or nothing for authorial rights. The *blocos* are disadvantaged since their harmonic range is somewhat limited by the genre itself which is based solely on a drum corps and a solo voice. In recent years, Olodum has attempted to strategically preempt *trio* appropriations by recording their local, street-consecrated hits with highly orchestrated and stylized arrangements for a mass market. Olodum’s recent successful incursions into the local and national pop markets notwithstanding, the *blocos afro* continue to occupy a subaltern position in relation to the *trios*. On the other hand, the *blocos afro*—especially the consecrated ones like Ilê Aiyê, Olodum, Muzenza and Araketu which have all produced records—enjoy more “symbolic capital” and legitimacy as the original producers of Afro-Bahian music.

Bourdieu defines two principles of hierarchization in the cultural field: heteronomy, which denotes a greater dependency on the market in accordance to degree of success; and autonomy, which denotes degree-specific consecration—usually by otherdisinterestedness producers in the field or by critics—and freedom from the laws of the market (“The Field” 37–38). Artists with a greater degree of autonomy stake their claims to authenticity on their material. For example, avant-garde experimentalists and producers of folklore both regularly claim material disinterestedness, the former for the sake of originality—“art for art’s sake” or “make it new”—and the latter on behalf of “tradition” and “cultural preservation.” Both groups position themselves against “sell outs” to the market. It is important to note that groups as diverse as Olodum and Agbeokuta (an Afro-Bahian jazz fusion band) emphasize a commitment to “research” both for the sake of originality and cultural preservation. Both of these groups are connected to *oficinas* (workshops for building instruments and for teaching percussion, quite often to foreign students and researchers) which occupy relatively autonomous positions. Bourdieu argues that intellectuals (for our purposes, we may substitute the broader category of “cultural producers”) are “more responsive to the seduction of the powers that be, the less well endowed they are with specific capital” (“The Field” 39). At this point we might examine more closely the group designated as the “powers that be.” This category includes a very diverse range of agents and institutions with varying amounts of economic capital and different kinds of symbolic capital. Within the context of Bahian musical production the “powers that be” might include local political office holders or seekers, owners of local radio and TV stations, local and trans-national recording executives and producers, consecrated national and foreign artists, etc.—in short, a group which represents a wide variety of positions within the field of power and the artistic field. Therefore the circuits of power which distribute and exchange both symbolic and economic capital in the field of cultural production form a multi-layered palimpsest of relationships. These relationships constitute what García Canclini refers to as an “oblique organization of power” which involves a great deal of mediation, instead of top-down imposition (34). There is a wide range of economic, political, and cultural motivations of the various agents representing the “powers that be.” Artists also occupy a variety of positions in the field, based on possession of both symbolic and economic capital. These variations determine the type of relationship between the artist and the sponsor, which in turn will determine the artist’s degree of autonomy/heteronomy within the cultural field.

The case of Paul Simon’s “collaboration” with Olodum in 1990 on his record “Rhythm of the Saints,” provides an interesting case for demonstrating my point.
Simon's 1986 production of "Graceland," mostly featuring South African artists, was very successful in the international market. Its impact on the internal developments of South African music and on the growth of "world music" had contradictory effects. On an artistic level, his relationship with Olodum followed a similar, unilateral pattern. Simon used Olodum as an exotic background for songs which had nothing to do with his experience in Bahia and which evidenced little understanding of the social and historical contexts of the music he was appropriating. This being said, it would be naive (and paternalistic) to argue that Olodum was merely "exploited" by Paul Simon. The directors of Olodum have considerable experience in dealing with local patrons and with pop musicians in uneven "collaborations" which involve exchanges of political, symbolic and economic capital. Within the fields of class relationship and of power Olodum occupies a subaltern position in relation to its patrons and "collaborators," but it has considerable room for strategic maneuvering. Our task here is to examine how "hegemony is allied to subalternity" (García Canclini 34), or rather, how agents of popular culture negotiate their position in the artistic field by engaging in these mutually-beneficial, albeit lopsided relationships. In this case, it must be recognized that Olodum has been extremely successful at utilizing local and international media networks to improve their position in the field of Bahian, and by extension, Brazilian popular music.

Bourdieu's notion of the \textit{habitus} is very useful here. The \textit{habitus} is a system of socially constituted dispositions, or "generative schemes" ("Structures" 54-5) which allow human agents to assess the field of social relations—which here I take to be hierarchical formations based on class, ethnicity, and gender, which determine access to power—and to act strategically to transform this field according to individual and collective interests. More than any other carnival entity, Olodum has demonstrated a savvy "feel for the game" (Bourdieu, "Fieldwork" 9) which has allowed the group to transform the field of cultural production. The asymmetrical relationship between Paul Simon and Olodum, therefore, must be seen in relation to the Bahian field of cultural production and how it changed Olodum's position within the field.

I will argue that Olodum's connections with the multi-national recording industry—which would, according to Bourdieu's model, bring it closer to a heteronomous position—actually afford the group a higher degree of autonomy within the specific field of Bahian cultural production because it is able to depend less on local patronage. In "The Field of Cultural Production," Bourdieu briefly mentions commission bestowed by a patron which in addition to the autonomous market constitute two distinct forms of demand giving rise to heteronomy (45-46). Here, I am less interested in commission, a form of patronage which usually benefits producers of elite culture (i.e., the Symphonic Orchestra of Bahia), than in the more binding forms of patronage which directly bear upon political "position-taking" within the field of power. Bourdieu, however, drops the category of patronage altogether in order to pursue an analysis of market forms of heteronomy. The market and patronage represent two distinct spheres of heteronomy whose effects on "position-taking" within the field of cultural production vary greatly. The laws of the market are defined quite simply by what sells, while patronage involves binding inter-personal relationships based on mutual interest, despite the fact that patrons and clients occupy different positions in the field of power. This dynamic, by the way, is one reason why horizontal political mobilization based on class interests or racial solidarity is so difficult in patrimonial societies like Brazil.

Finally, let us compare Olodum with the Filhos de Gandhi, that highly consecrated \textit{afọxé} established in 1949 by Afro-Bahian dock workers. Olodum produces music for local, national, and international markets, in
addition to their annual participation in carnival. Their revenue comes primarily from these market-related sources which include record sales, performances, and workshops. Market success affords Olodum a relative degree of artistic and political autonomy compared to the Filhos de Gandhi. The historic afoxe, which has no recent recordings for the consumer market, is instead totally implicated in clientelistic networks involving important local political figures, which considerably limits their “space of possibles” in terms of artistic and political “position-taking.” The Filhos de Gandhi enjoys the greatest amount of symbolic capital in the carnival of Bahia based on its longevity, its status as a symbol of Bahia’s “participatory” and “pluri-cultural” carnival, as well as a symbol of “peace” and “social/racial harmony.” The first bloco afro, Ilê Aiyê continues to celebrate an Afro-centric aesthetic, but has had little political impact, partly due to its dependence on local political patrons. On the other hand, Olodum, a relatively recent upstart with extensive ties to international cultural producers and a large consumer audience for its recordings, has much more room for maneuver within the cultural and political spheres. Outside the patronage economy, Olodum must confront other types of restraints and conform to different rules which affect its artistic and political “position-takings.” Yet, I would argue that market dependence offers the group more choice compared to groups who depend on patrons. At present, Olodum stills supports black left-wing candidates from the left-wing Workers’ Party (PT), organizes rallies against state-sponsored racial violence, and participates in broad-based protest manifestations, while the Filhos de Gandhi, and to a lesser extent Ilê Aiyê, continue to publicly or privately endorse the status quo.

We have seen how potentially subversive, counter-cultural manifestations in the Bahian carnival have been appropriated by local authorities and patrons as symbols of Bahia’s “exotic” cultural identity, and thus have been a great asset to the local tourism industry. Olodum seems to have resisted this pattern by generating revenue through record sales and performances. Furthermore, its songs go beyond the narrow, essentializing celebrations of Africa and blackness typical of other blocos afro. Olodum’s carnival tributes have dealt with a wide range of themes from the New World African Diaspora (i.e. Cuba) to the impoverished Brazilian Northeast. Yet, we have also examined the contradictions of a society which celebrates and commodifies Afro-Bahian culture, while continuing to maintain black people “in their place.” How has Olodum’s entry and ascension in the local, national, and international pop markets transformed its role as an institution of social and cultural activism? Has Olodum forfeited its claim to “cultural resistance” on behalf of poor Afro-Bahians, or has it expanded the range and efficacy of its critical interventions?

Notes

Salvador is the capital city of the state of Bahia. However, Bahia is commonly used to refer to the capital. In this paper, I will use the two names interchangeably. For example, when I speak of the field of carnival production in Bahia, I am referring only to the capital.

The refrain is an ironic parody of Caetano’s own 1979 hit “Menino do Rio,” in which he expresses his affectionate admiration for a young, tattooed surfer in Rio de Janeiro. The dreamy refrain goes, “O Havai, seja aqui, tudo o que sonhares” ‘Let Hawaii be here, all that you dream of.’

In the 1920s and 1930s young Brazilian intellectuals like Gilberto Freyre and Mário de Andrade called for Brazilians to acknowledge and take pride in their multi-ethnic heritage.
Discourses on the “contributions” of Africans and indigenous peoples toward the creation of a “national soul” emerged and slowly were assimilated by political elites.

4“Brazilianess” is like Foucault’s term “regime of truth,” since it denotes a whole intellectual, political and social apparatus which allows for a concept like “racial democracy” to “make sense” to the overwhelming majority. Foucault defines a “regime of truth” in terms of those discourses which society “accepts and makes function as true.” See Foucault 131-133.

5In his essay Bourdieu discusses the field of mid-nineteenth-century French literary production. Obviously, the field of contemporary Bahian carnival is quite different and requires other considerations. Nevertheless, I have found his theoretical formulations of the artistic field, its struggles over legitimacy, and its relation to social and political formations to be very useful.

6Cesar Maia, the mayor of Rio, quipped that “the tourist who goes to Salvador for carnival has a one-hundred percent chance of getting mugged and a great chance of being attacked.” Given the fact that Salvador has the largest black population of any Brazilian capital, the implication of his statement was quite clear. Bahia’s mayor, Lidice da Mata replied by affirming that in the previous year there were forty-two murders in Rio and two in Salvador during carnival. She concluded: “The happiness of the people is the principal attraction of Bahian carnival. Our carnival is not for the Englishman to see.” Here, Mata uses a very common Brazilian expression, “para inglês ver,” which connotes artifice and inauthenticity. See Mayrink and Gabriel de Lima 35.

7Godí counted no less than thirteen Bahian movie theaters featuring westerns during one week in 1968! See Godí 61.

8In this sense, the blocos de índio followed a similar strategy of appropriation as the Brazilian Modernists of the 1920s. The “cannibalist” group celebrated an aggressive “savage” Indian as a symbol of national autonomy in relation to Europe. Cultural cannibalism was a strategy proposed by elite intellectuals of São Paulo for the critical “digestion” of foreign cultural products. Obviously, the Bahian youth were coming from a completely different social and historical position, but it is worth noting how they also utilized the Indian as a symbol of autonomy and resistance to white domination.

9Brazilian anthropologist, Olivia Gomes, has noted that the most commonly used words to describe and praise the blocos afro are “magic,” “force,” and “tradition” (182). Groups like Ilê Aiyê are quite compatible with dehistoricized and exotizing celebrations of Bahia’s “afrikanity.”

10During the last year Pelourinho has been the site of massive state-sponsored renovation. To this end, a considerable segment of the population was reimbursed and relocated, mostly to poor neighborhoods on the city’s periphery. Olodum no longer has a local grass-roots constituency, yet continues to provide alternative educational and social programs for the city’s youth.

11The Grupo Cultural Olodum is no longer just a bloco afro. Its institutional apparatus includes an alternative school, a children’s band, a theater group, a workshop for producing consumer items, and a boutique for selling them.

12Olodum’s last two albums and its traveling group feature bass, guitar, keyboards, trap set and chorus which make for a much more “marketable” sound.

13As of 1994, Olodum has released six records in Brazil and one compilation for the international market; Ilê Aiyê and Muzenza have each released two records; and Araketu released two before dissolving as a bloco and becoming a professional band which has recorded and marketed two CDs.

14Neil Lazarus has shown how Simon’s endeavor actually contributed to the underdevelopment of black South African music by setting an anachronistic standard for South African pop based on dominant international consuming interests. See Bourdieu, “The Field” 142-43.

15Of course, I am referring to Bourdieu’s terms here. A large portrait of the current governor and grand patriarch of Bahian politics,
Antonio Carlos Magalhães, a civilian collaborator with the military regime, hangs prominently on the wall of the Filhos de Gandhi’s headquarters in Pelourinho. The building was donated to the group by Magalhães in 1983 during his previous tenure as governor.

The carnival themes of Olodum and Ilê Ayê for 1994 indicate the degree of divergence in their trajectories in the last decade. Ilê Ayê celebrated “Uma Nação Africana Chamada Bahia” (An African Nation Called Bahía), which seems to suggest the bracketing of black culture from contemporary Bahian and Brazilian social reality. Olodum, meanwhile, paid homage to Tropicalismo, a late 1960s vanguard cultural movement led by Caetano Veloso and Gilberto Gil which embraced and “cannibalized” foreign pop music and technologies. One of their hits songs “Alegria Geral,” from their latest album O Movimento, proclaims: “Olodum is hippie, Olodum is pop, Olodum is reggae, Olodum is rock, Olodum has freaked out.” This refrain sums up the new Olodum. As an internationally-acclaimed pop phenomenon, the group tends to emphasize its hybridity and universalism. For a more detailed discussion of the lyrics and carnival of the blocos afro up through 1990, see my article, “Afro Bahian Carnival: A Stage of Protest.”

Discography