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Advocating for Themselves:
Seeking Security Through Women's Peacebuilding Organizations in Cote d'Ivoire

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Carrie Reiling

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Cecelia Lynch, Chair
Professor Kristen Monroe
Associate Professor Keith Topper
Associate Professor Kristin Peterson

2017

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Curriculum Vitae

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Abstract of the Dissertation

Advocating for Themselves:
Seeking Security for Women's Peacebuilding Organizations in Côte d'Ivoire

By

Carrie Reiling

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2017

Professor Cecelia Lynch, Chair

Advocating for Themselves: Seeking Security Through Women's Peacebuilding Organizations in Cote d'Ivoire, is a study of the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda and how it is implemented in Côte d'Ivoire. I examine local and national women's security and peacebuilding organizations' understandings of security and the ways they establish and advocate for their priorities while working with the United Nations, transnational NGOs, and the national government. Much of the prior research on this topic suggests that international efforts to implement this agenda clash with national and local priorities. But I demonstrate that the reality is more complex: while multiple international and transnational discourses have sometimes-competing, sometimes-cooperating effects on the local implementation, Ivorian women's understandings of security also shape the agenda' implementation. To understand the local dynamic of women's advocacy, I interviewed local NGO, government, and UN representatives and conducted participant observation over eleven months in Cote d'Ivoire, funded by a Fulbright Fellowship. I make three central arguments. The first is that two kinds of global actors—international and transnational—try to shape the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, but they do so in distinctive ways: through the state and bypassing it, resulting in poorly coordinated directives. The second is that this agenda in Côte d'Ivoire has narrowed to a focus on security sector reform at the national level, with the assistance of international actors, which privileges mechanisms of traditional security and co-opts women into existing structures

of power. Third, local women's organizations perform a pragmatic skepticism, working with international, transnational, and national actors to achieve their own goals, reclaiming some of the essentializing discourses told about them. With insights from African feminism and critical feminist peacebuilding literatures, my findings call into question the assumptions of women's roles in international security policies and the interrelation of actors in policy implementation.

Chapter One:
Introduction

In the name of human security and greater protection of women, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325 on October 31, 2000. This date marked the first time that the UN Security Council fully engaged with ideas of women's peace, security, and equality. UNSCR 1325, or simply "1325," as it has become known, called for women's increased participation in initiatives to prevent and resolve conflict, as well as their protection during conflict and post-conflict situations. The key provisions of Resolution 1325 are:

a) increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making;
b) attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict;
c) a gender perspective in post-conflict processes;
d) a gender perspective in UN programming, reporting, and Security Council missions; and
e) a gender perspective and training in UN peace support operations (Cohn et al. 2004).

The ultimate effect of the resolution was to make gender a required component of every Security Council action (UNSC 2000). Spearheaded by a number of transnational women's nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that formed the Women, Peace, and Security Working Group (WPSWG), the resolution was acclaimed by numerous transnational NGOs as well as by states as an unprecedented sign of progress in gender equality that would lead to greater security for and participation of women, ultimately producing a more peaceful world. The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, a WPSWG founding member, noted that Resolution 1325 was "a historic watershed political framework that shows how women and a gender perspective are relevant to negotiating peace agreements, planning refugee camps and peacekeeping operations, and reconstructing war-torn societies" (WILPF 2001).

Seven more resolutions were adopted over the following fifteen years, extending the scope of 1325 and usually meeting similar praise. These subsequent resolutions each focused on a few issues to clarify or reinforce Resolution 1325. Resolution 1820 (UNSC 2008) recognized sexual violence as a weapon and tactic of war, which had not been an official designation prior

to the resolution. Resolutions 1888 and 1889 (UNSC 2009a; UNSC 2009b) were adopted to strengthen elements of the two previous resolutions, calling for the appointment of a Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict and requesting the development of indicators to measure the implementation. Resolution 1960 (UNSC 2010) returned to the theme of sexual violence in outlining steps in the prevention of and protection from sexual violence in conflict. Similarly, Resolution 2106 (UNSCR 2013a) focused on sexual violence, but rather than creating new initiatives, it provided more operational detail. Resolution 2122 (UNSC 2013b) created stronger measures to include women in peace processes and pushes for UN missions to increase attention to gender equality and female empowerment. The most recent resolution, 2242 (UNSC 2015), again had little new to add but highlighted the necessity to integrate women and gender concerns across security actions and country situations. Collectively, this set of resolutions is known as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)[1] agenda.

The founding members of the Women, Peace, and Security Working Group did not intend their work to be simply rhetorical, although they also certainly recognized the power that rhetoric could have in shifting norms in international politics (Cohn et al. 2004). As a necessary part of the WPS agenda, the UN Security Council also urged national governments to establish National Action Plans, and to do so in collaboration with local women's networks and organizations. Each of these features—the UN Security Council's establishment of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, the National Action Plans, and the incorporation of local women's organizations—is notable. Each also demonstrates links in the WPS agenda chain that can reveal expectations, strengths, and weaknesses for efforts to prioritize women's participation in security.

1. Because Resolution 1325 was the first and the broadest resolution pertaining to women, peace, and security, whenever the Women, Peace, and Security agenda is discussed, it is often referred to by this first resolution's number: 1325. Since I am focusing on the set of resolutions, not just the first one, I refer to the agenda's acronym, WPS, unless I am specifically citing Resolution 1325.

Conditions for women in what has become known as "the Global South" have become a subject of major concern for both scholars and the international community,[2] who increasingly treat them as critical components of global security (e.g., Stern 2001; Rai and Waylen 2008; MacKenzie 2012; Tripp 2015; Karim and Beardsley 2017). Yet, to the extent that the Security Council has set international priorities for women, there has been little examination of exactly how women themselves in post-conflict societies conceptualize security and act to secure it.

My dissertation addresses this gap by examining the role of local women's community organizations addressing peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, I seek to understand how Ivorian women's groups interact with national politics and international priorities in assuring security for women. I ask, in other words, what are the ways in which local women's advocacy of peace and security, both for women and for their communities, becomes an integral part of the implementation of the WPS agenda. This central question requires examining as well whether and how local women's organizations empower women in post-conflict areas, and whether and how women have been effective peacebuilders in post-conflict West Africa. Taken together, these questions allow us to find out whether UN gender mainstreaming policies for women have had the intended effects of increasing women's security as well as the prospects for peace. Such findings, in turn, have significant theoretical as well as policy implications. The first is that stereotypes of women and particularly women in West Africa influence international imaginings of women in post-conflict, which shapes policy implementation. The second is that in defining "security" narrowly and sidelining "peace," the status quo is centered, privileging international security priorities, allowing national governments to make only cosmetic changes, and neglecting local understandings of security that are often broader and more nuanced.

2. For the purposes of this dissertation, "international community" is defined as then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan defined it in 1999, as a collection of governments and civil society working together toward a common goal. Annan acknowledged that some believe that the "international community" is a vehicle of convenience or has no basis in fact. Shepherd (2008) contends that the international community is constructed by UN discourse as "the repository of knowledge concerning the procedures and practices necessary to achieve and consolidate … authority" (166–167). This debate is explored further in Chapter 4. What is relevant here is that "international community" is defined by the United Nations for its own purposes.

Finally, certain efforts by women within their communities to achieve peace and security are sometimes not recognized as such by researchers and policymakers, which allows stereotypes and assumptions to be perpetuated.

International discourses about women in West Africa, in particular, have developed into two antithetical, though not contradictory, representations. Each of these—that of women as victims and that of women as peaceful actors—underlies and complicates the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda. First, women are discursively conceived of as victims (predominantly of sexualized violence) (Baaz and Stern 2013; Meger 2016). Second, women, following for example the activism of Leymah Gbowee and the other women in Liberia and Sierra Leone, are represented as powerful activists who can use their very womanhood to effect change (Tripp et al. 2008; Medie 2016; Tripp and Badri 2017). The former discourse is focused on protection of these women from the harms of the outside world, especially of the men who might victimize them. The latter has garnered considerable publicity for local women's activism as it becomes a model of women's ability to secure peace. Both of these discourses and the international attention that sustains them are based on a few illustrative cases. Specifically, until recently, the twin effects of violence and activism in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were taken as representative of the security situation in the whole of the African continent because of either their great successes in ending conflict, or the extreme level of women's victimization they perpetuated. The focus on these three countries, however, can lead policymakers to generalize about women in conflict and women's peacebuilding movements. Generalizations following from these cases, in turn, occlude the awareness of other political, historical, and cultural factors that impact the implementation of the UN Security Council's international security policy. For example, the experiences of colonialism and continued international presence varies across African countries, as does the length of conflict and complexity of the solution.

In studying Côte d'Ivoire, I am both expanding the range of cases used to understand the effects of the WPS agenda, as well as developing a contrast case to uncover the underlying

assumptions of women's activism. At least as important, I do so in a way (and with a critical case) that also allows theorizing about how local history, culture, politics, and conflict contexts, among other factors, can have differing effects on the local politics of policy implementation. In its multiple and shifting relationships with the international community, individually and collectively, Côte d'Ivoire becomes a site where actors from the Global North can project ideas of conflict, Africa, and women, while pointing to the fact that the country was once and is on track to re-become a paragon of development and progress. Since achieving independence, Côte d'Ivoire has continued good relations with France, other countries in the Global North, and its regional neighbors. The country did not fall into all-out civil war, though the conflict was enough to establish a UN peacekeeping mission. There are more than sixty ethnic groups with no one dominant, so the conflict was based less on ethnicity itself than on political instrumentalization of ethnicity. Many Ivorian women are educated and socially active, but not so much as to become a nuisance to the structures of power. It was the first African country to develop a NAP to implement the WPS agenda, but the NAP was not outstanding in any way, nor were its implementation efforts. In other words, Côte d'Ivoire is a "typical" case at the same time that it is unique. Context matters, but lessons can be drawn from this country that are instructive for other cases of WPS implementation.

Central to my project is understanding how international peace and security policy is implemented at a national level and becomes the work of implementing organizations at a local level, as well as how the local implementing organizations incorporate and push back against international policies. Thus I investigate how the key implementers of policies aimed at reducing the effects of and eliminating international and national conflict interpret those very policies. As international policies are mediated through national laws to be enacted and enforced at a local level, it is necessary to understand how international human rights and security goals are translated and influence local actions, goals, and ideas about women's security and how they are challenged. A policy agenda itself defines how people think about a topic, including policymakers, policy implementers, targeted populations, and academics.

Therefore, it is important to consider how devotion to the policy as written affects its implementation as well as whether it is appropriate for the targeted community. Through an analysis of the potentially competing narratives of women's security locally and internationally, my dissertation probes how local and regional women's nongovernmental organizations translate and localize international agendas and work with local women to achieve peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire. I interrogate whether these organizations prioritize their security and empowerment goals the same way that their national governments and the international community define them. In the process, I uncover some of the ways in which women's peace and security organizations work through post-conflict requirements and realities in order to advocate for themselves and for their communities to national and international policymakers.

In studying these groups, I investigate two essential questions: First, as women navigate the post-conflict politics and peacebuilding, what do they prioritize? Second, as the local women's organizations respond to the priorities and pressures of the international community, their national government, and transnational donors, can they emphasize their priorities and advocate for themselves? Not only does my dissertation answer questions about how women working through organizations in Côte d'Ivoire advocate for their own security, it also addresses larger questions about how women's organizations empower women in post-conflict areas, whether they believe that UN gender mainstreaming policies for women have had the intended effects, and whether and how women have been instrumental peacebuilders in post-conflict West Africa. Gender mainstreaming efforts at the international and national levels use Security Council resolutions and other human rights laws to set their agendas, and if essentialized depictions of women are reinforced in governments and intergovernmental bodies, these portrayals become even more entrenched. I contend that the women who work in these local and regional groups both challenge and reinforce such essentialization.

The in-depth research that I undertook in Côte d'Ivoire over eleven months allows me to draw conclusions at three levels of analysis about local women's security activism in the country: macro- (international and transnational), meso- (national), and micro- (community and

local organization) level lenses (Milliken 1999). These three levels provide insight into the effects that multiple actors have on the implementation of the WPS agenda in Côte d'Ivoire and how women working on these issues have dealt with multiple actors, which include national governments, international governmental organizations, and transnational NGOs. In this way, I focus on how the international impacts the local, and also how the local influences the international. Addressing these three levels of analysis also opens the way to understanding the sometimes-complimentary, sometimes-competing discourses that produce and reproduce effects in each direction. Ultimately, I aim to explore how women's narratives of peace and security form a part of or potentially subvert dominant international discourses on women's roles and experiences in conflict as well as refine or change discourses on the relationship between women and peace.

The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

Women in civil society have long campaigned for peace and security. Reardon and Hans's edited volume (2010) examines militarized security and how gender perspectives can build an alternative human security paradigm; Charlesworth (2005) addresses international legal responses to the unequal position of women; and Confortini (2012) analyzes the post-World War II tensions within the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in its efforts to advance peace in the process of decolonization, vis-à-vis the Middle East and in the midst of the Cold War nuclear arms race. Moreover, for nearly four decades, the United Nations has highlighted women's roles as peacebuilders, though it wasn't until the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women that the United Nations incorporated gender mainstreaming into its policies and programs (Beijing Declaration 1995).[3] The United Nations

3. The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action that came out of the Fourth World Conference on Women emphasized gender equality and women's empowerment, particularly in formal governance programs and processes. Specifically, the framework noted that "Governments and other actors should promote an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective in all policies and programmes, so that, before decisions are taken, an analysis is made of the effects for women and men, respectively" (Beijing Declaration 1995).

further explicated gender mainstreaming in its 1997 report of the Economic and Social Council, mandating that all UN agencies and bodies assess the implications for women—and men—of any planned UN action at all levels (United Nations 1997). The late 1990s saw all of the UN agencies and bodies developing gender mainstreaming policies with the help of the UN's Division for the Advancement of Women and the Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (True-Frost 2007). Yet these efforts did not represent the attempted institutionalization of an agenda to promote women in peace and security issues. The Security Council was one of the last UN bodies to incorporate gender mainstreaming, which it did in Resolution 1325.

International women's activism sparked by the World Conferences on Women and codified in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action prompted the Security Council to engage with women's peace and security more seriously (Hill et al. 2003). In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325, signaling a major transition in human rights law. Resolution 1325 was wide-reaching, covering the impact of armed conflict on women and calling for their increased participation in conflict prevention and resolution initiatives, ultimately necessitating that gender be a component of every Security Council action, from statements to sanctions to interventions. Subsequent to 1325, the Security Council has passed seven complementary resolutions, which became collectively known as the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, with the most recent resolution—2242, which calls for integration of WPS strategies and funding across all country situations and highlights the importance of collaboration with civil society— passed in October 2015.

However, the mechanisms of governance on women's issues through the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, despite being now more or less institutionalized at the international level, are still regularly shifted to civil society at the national and local levels, particularly in the Global South (True 2003). The hard work of advocacy, interpretation, and and implementation, in other words, is done by local NGOs and community organizations. Bernal and Grewal (2014), for example, point out NGOs provide space for women to make claims and represent them

because they are "a recognized form of public engagement that is legible to states, donors, other NGOs, and wider publics." Moreover, while the international discourse around these resolutions acclaims women's activism in the Global South, it still puts forth a limited perspective of "women's needs" in post-conflict, focusing on recovery and reparations from sexualized violence (Ní Aoláin et al. 2011). This perspective reflects the "liberal feminism" of women (mainly in the West) who have the resources and education to participate in civil society (Desai 2005; Thayer 2009; Zwingel 2012). Because liberal feminism often echoes and incorporates the illustrating the logics and mechanisms of neoliberal economics (Bernal and Grewal 2014; Prügl 2015), it is imperative to examine whether the workings of the emergent international agenda reflect or not the needs of women in post-conflict societies themselves.

Resolution 1325 has been criticized by a number of feminist scholars and activists (particularly Natalie F. Hudson and Laura Shepherd) for its conventional assumptions regarding what constitutes security and its essentialized, gendered vision of women as simultaneously victims and peacemakers, reinforcing the biological and reproductive functions of women. Hudson (2010) argues that the framework of international security in discourse and practice limits women's rights and gender equality, while Shepherd (2008) analyzes the discursive construction and text of Resolution 1325 to reveal partial and problematic understandings of women's security. These and other studies demonstrate that, while Resolution 1325 addressed wartime and post-conflict sexualized violence—"all parties to armed conflict [are called upon] to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict" (Para. 10)—this kind of violence did not form the bulk of the original WPS resolution. Nevertheless, four of the seven subsequent resolutions have focused on the protection of women and girls from sexualized violence. Resolution 1820 from 2008 "stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict" (Para. 1) and "notes that

rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a constitutive act with respect to genocide" (Para. 4). The next resolution, 1888, from 2009, reaffirms resolution 1820 and "reiterates its demand for the complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence with immediate effect" (Para. 2). Resolution 1960, from 2010, reaffirms and reiterates resolutions 1820 and 1888, and additionally "encourages the Secretary-General to include in his annual reports … detailed information on parties to armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence" (Para. 3), which establishes a "naming and shaming" mechanism. Resolution 2106, from 2013, closely echoes these three prior resolutions and additionally "recognizes the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations … and expresses its intent to employ, as appropriate, all means at its disposal to ensure women's participation in all aspects of mediation, post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding and to address sexual violence in conflict" (Para. 5).

The Security Council's attention to sexualized violence while remaining silent on other security and human rights threats women face—such as inability to address social and economic needs—reveals the serious limitations of international legal frameworks and the UN community to understand women's rights through any lens broader than sexual victimization (Shepherd 2011). Sexualized violence is but one of a host of inequalities that women encounter, among other forms of physical violence, access to economic opportunities, and discrimination of legal rights. Meger (2011) asserts that the language of "rape as a weapon of war" recasts these threats against women into threats against the state. This phrase makes what is a personal crime with individual effects into a political crime upsetting legitimate structures of power. While the most recent resolution reiterates the necessity of women's participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the set of WPS resolutions still prioritizes the prevention of sexualized violence as the greatest threat women face in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, effectively muting women's other security and human rights concerns. As Baaz and Stern (2013) state, "Despite its progressive appeal, political purchase and success in bringing attention to

many who suffer, the newly arrived accomplishment of recognizing rape as a weapon of war thus may also cause harm" (2). The increasing attention to women's security from the international community, particularly the UN Security Council, comes about in large part because of women's activism; however, the "awareness raising" in the international community does not extend to hearing the multiple perspectives from the women advocates themselves. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how women—both as individuals and in groups—define their own security and rights, especially in conflict and post-conflict zones marked by increased violence against women.[4]

While the rhetoric of Resolution 1325 was powerful, providing a set of principles around which to coordinate women's rights activism, little effort or funds were devoted to implementing it. An October 2004 statement by the President of the Security Council on the theme of "Women and peace and security" recognized "the important contribution of civil society to the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) and encourages Member States to continue to collaborate with civil society, … including the development of national action plans" (S/PRST/2004/40). A similar 2005 statement reiterated and expanded upon this call; however, this instruction to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) has been both widely praised and broadly ignored. In theory, NAPs should detail how national governments intend to incorporate the WPS resolutions into national laws and how, specifically, governments will expand gender mainstreaming throughout given countries. In practice, adoption of a National Action Plan does not necessarily mean more than a rhetorical commitment to the implementation of the WPS resolutions, as Fuijo (2008) and Hudson (2010) have shown in their analyses of the language of the resolutions and the emergent NAPs and the discourses around them. Without governmental adherence to their own NAPs, women's organizations in

4. Though this raises the question of how to define which women are speaking and for which groups they are claiming the mantle of "women," self-definition in women's community organizations is key to their membership, though still subject to the same logics that are defining them externally. This is something I will explore in the theory section.

individual countries often shoulder the burden of ensuring women's rights and security, usually without the promised national support.

Transnational NGOs played a key role in setting the agenda for the WPS resolutions. The National Action Plans, however, were shaped by both transnational and especially local NGOs, in processes that varied somewhat depending on the country. The implementation of the NAPs, however, requires the commitment of local and regional NGOs (El-Bushra 2007). Through navigating international, national, and local politics, these NGOs interpret, transform, implement, and realize human rights laws with implications for women at the local level. Sally Engle Merry (2006), for example, has demonstrated that grassroots feminist organizations insist on framing international human rights laws in local terms so that these laws are accepted and effective. Women's NGOs must contend with both human rights and human security discourses in this process, and which discourse they prioritize affects the way they address their local communities.

The WPS agenda is unique in its content: it marries traditional security concerns and mechanisms with already-established programs for women's rights and empowerment around the world. This policy agenda also aims to change norms, but such norms must also be in sync within countries and organizations for the agenda to be adequately implemented. Because few, if any, studies of the implementation process focus on multiple levels of analysis, I examine not only how multiple factors, including existing donor–recipient relationships, domestic politics, cultural norms, and militarization, impact the agenda's implementation but also how the three levels (international, national, local) are tightly intertwined.

Understanding Côte d'Ivoire

Policies and academic literatures on the WPS agenda have not yet accounted for the effects of multiple levels of intervention in the agenda's implementation. Côte d'Ivoire provides a particularly important case study, as detailed below. Cote d'Ivoire was the first country in Africa and the first developing country to develop its National Action Plan for the WPS agenda

in 2007. Unlike other countries in the region that developed NAPs later, civil society in Côte d'Ivoire was not formally consulted during the document's development (Miller et al. 2014). By examining the country at multiple levels of analysis—national, international, and local—the processes, practices, and understandings of peacebuilding can be explored in depth.

After Côte d'Ivoire's independence from France in 1960, the country's president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, kept close ties to France, which supported him politically. France held (and still holds) at least 50 percent of the currency used in Côte d'Ivoire (the West African CFA franc) in reserves, and it established a military base on the outskirts of Abidjan. The monetary ties, in particular, have been criticized as a neocolonial device, which limits economic sovereignty, where the countries in the CFA zone cannot set their own monetary policies (fluctuating interest rates, for example) because the CFA is pegged to the euro. Under Houphouët-Boigny, the economy boomed through exports of cocoa and coffee. To support the cash crop economy, agricultural immigration that had started during the colonial period increased. Southern plantations in particular imported labor from Burkina Faso (O'Bannon 2014). Once the cash crop economies crashed in the late 1970s, however, Côte d'Ivoire lost its position as an African success story, and Houphouët-Boigny was forced to buy into the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programme (Almas 2007). Along with the difficulties the country faced in repaying its debts, when Houphouët-Boigny died in 1993, a brief succession struggle ensued. As a result, politics were redrawn along ethnic lines, though ethnicity was not at the root of the political struggle; instead, politics instrumentalized ethnicity to define who was a citizen of Côte d'Ivoire and who was not (Bah 2010).

By 1998, 26 percent of Côte d'Ivoire's population was foreign, with over half from Burkina Faso (National Population and Housing Census 1998). Rising tensions between immigrant groups and local-born populations, largely over land use and ownership, triggered violent clashes in the mid- to late-1990s, which were then exploited by politicians struggling over power after Houphouët-Boigny's death. Henri Konan Bédié, Ivorian president from 1993 to 1999, developed the doctrine of Ivoirité, a concept of citizenship that quickly morphed into

nationalism and xenophobia. Bédié and other politicians manipulated the economic inequality between wealthy plantation owners, local subsistance farmers, and landless immigrant labor to claim that citizenship was based on being born in the country to two Ivorian-born parents (Bellamy and Williams 2011). Though the conflict was not based on religion, the economic disparities between the poorer Muslim-dominated north and wealthier Christian-dominated south mapped onto ethnicity and religion (Bah 2010). But because many of the Burkinabé immigrants had moved to the south to work as agricultural laborers, there were large numbers of Muslims in the south as well. Additionally, migration to Abidjan, the country's commercial capital in the south on the coast, also meant that both northern Ivorians and some Burkinabé were residents there (McGovern 2011).

Bédié was overthrown in a 1999 military coup, and Robert Guéï, a retired army general who had been called out of retirement, became president of the military junta. Guéï disallowed all opposition candidates for the 2000 election except Laurent Gbagbo, who won the election by a considerable margin, though Guéï refused to accept this result. After several days of protests, Gbagbo was sworn in as president. Under Gbagbo, the doctrine of Ivoirité became part of the Ivorian constitution (Bah 2010). In 2002, government troops led an armed insurrection alongside two other armed groups, which all together became the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro[5], a northerner against Ivorité, that took control of the north. Gbagbo requested French assistance, resulting in a 2004 United Nations Mission (UNOCI) to protect civilians and restore unity to the country (Akindès 2004). Gbagbo, however, continued to attack the Forces Nouvelles, resulting in a strained relationship between the Gbagbo government and France. Eventually, the Ouagadougou agreement ended the civil war in 2007; however, peacekeepers stayed on to monitor and keep order during the 2010 presidential election (the 2005 elections had been postponed indefinitely).

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5. Soro is now the president of Côte d'Ivoire's National Assembly and is considered to be the frontrunner for the presidency in 2020.

The first round of elections in October 2010 went smoothly, but the run-off, held a month later, again raised disputes about citizenship and ethnicity. The challenger, Alassane Ouattara, had long been accused by his opponents of not being an Ivorian citizen, even after he produced papers certifying his parents' birth in northern Côte d'Ivoire. Though Gbagbo had affirmed in 2007 that Ouattara was allowed to stand for election, Gbagbo's supporters once again questioned his citizenship in order to garner greater support for the incumbent. The Constitutional Council, comprising Gbagbo supporters, declared the results from several northern areas—Ouattara territory—as unlawful and called the election for Gbagbo, though the Electoral Commission had already certified Ouattara's win. The UN Security Council formally declared that the election had been rigged by Gbagbo and that his challenger, Alassane Ouattara, was the elected president. Government forces helped Gbagbo retain power through violence against demonstrators and Ouattara's backers in the north, while in the west, indigenous and immigrant groups clashed in violence that was again coopted by government and rebel armies (Bellamy and Williams 2011). After several months of heavy fighting, in which an estimated 3,000 people were killed, Gbagbo and his wife, Simone, were arrested by pro-Ouattara forces, which were backed by the international community.

Though estimates are difficult to obtain, Human Rights Watch noted that during the post-electoral conflict, more than 150 women were raped by forces loyal to Gbagbo, though this number likely undercounts the crimes (Human Rights Watch 2011). Additionally, militias and quasi-military groups who supported Ouattara were responsible for a similar number of rapes and other forms of sexual violence. The number of rapes that were committed by state forces and reported to UNOCI was much lower: 54 cases. This number came from the country's first female brigadier general, who spoke at a conference on "Women, Leadership, and Security" held in Abidjan on June 2015. She stated that this number came from the UN's Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Violence in Conflict and noted that many of the violations were not investigated. None of the crimes were addressed by transitional justice mechanisms, nor did any of the cases investigated end in a conviction, though a few cases are

working their way through the courts. Many members of the non-government forces were also integrated into the Ivorian military. This means that many of those responsible for what happened during the conflict now comprise part of the government forces. Yet because they were not part of the government forces at the time, they are not being prosecuted for the crimes they committed.

While reported sexualized violence was not as extensive in Côte d'Ivoire as in other conflicts in West and Central Africa, the country's former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and his wife, Simone, were both accused of crimes against humanity for indirectly perpetrating such violence. Simone Gbagbo was convicted in March 2015 by an Ivorian court of destabilizing state security (rather than committing crimes directly against individuals). This sentence essentially declared her crimes to be human security violations that threatened national security (Piccolino 2015). Though she was indicted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity,[6] Côte d'Ivoire declined to transfer her to the ICC in order to try her again in a national criminal court for crimes against humanity and war crimes (Human Rights Watch 2016). Laurent Gbagbo, however, is standing trial before the ICC. His trial began in February 2016, alongside his ally Charles Blé Goudé, for crimes against humanity.[7]

In 2015, Ouattara won reelection handily, an expected result. And in 2016, a new constitution was approved by the National Assembly and confirmed by a national referendum, with 93 percent of the voters approving the changes, which included removing the controversial nationality clause from the presidential requirements. Many scholars and civil society groups are pleased with this move and the anticipated stability of the country in the coming years; however, some are also concerned about what has been seen as "victor's justice," investigations

6. Specifically, four counts: murder, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, and other inhuman acts. Judges found it reasonable to believe that President Gbagbo coordinated with his inner circle, including Simone Gbagbo, to commit crimes, and the inner circle exercised joint control over the crimes. (ICC)

7. Laurent Gbagbo is accused of four counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape, other inhuman acts or—in the alternative—attempted murder, and persecution. Blé Goudé is also charged with being individually criminally responsible for the same four counts of crimes against humanity. (ICC)

and trials that focus more on the politicians than on the crimes committed against civilians (Corey-Boulet 2012; Kersten 2016; Rosenberg 2017).

Moreover, international money is pouring into the country, particularly Abidjan, for improved infrastructure to attract industry and manufacturing so that the country is not as reliant on cash crops like cocoa (Fick 2015). This effort is widely hailed, but quiet criticisms heard in my research highlighted the uneven distribution of development in the urban and rural areas, as well as a concentration on grand projects that benefit the elite, rather than food, education, and health (see also Straus 2015). O'Bannon (2014) has called Côte d'Ivoire's previous economic miracle "a house of cards," and some, even those who generally support Ouattara, are concerned that the country's economy—and current political stability—could collapse under the weight of this inequality.

Despite the long years of crisis and stagnation, Côte d'Ivoire fought to hold onto a colonial-era narrative of itself as the jewel of West Africa—the playground for the French elite—and its post-independence title of the region's most prosperous and stable country (Chirot 2006). In 2014, when it seemed that the country was stabilized, with defectors actually being integrated into society, the Ivorian government began promoting a narrative of "emergence" (the same word is used in French and English) – which connotes a dual meaning, first of coming out of a long dark era, and second of becoming an exemplar of an emerging economy through achieving rapid economic growth. According to the World Bank, the GDP growth rate was 7.7 percent in 2016, though the World Bank is cautious about a high rate of growth in the next few years. The national government and outside observers hope that this new economic force, like the old one prior to the 1990s, will prove to be powerful enough to gloss over the political problems of the country so that it will regain its former position as the economic powerhouse of West Africa.

Regardless of these efforts, the new economy is doing little to address inequalities between rural/urban and rich/poor that were exacerbated by the conflict. Between 1985 and 2011, "the depth and severity of poverty increased considerably, moving from approximately 10

percent to 51 percent of the population," though a 2015 survey indicated that the poverty rate had gone down to 46 percent (World Bank). The Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2016) ranked Côte d'Ivoire 34th of 54 African countries in gender equality in 2015, a rise from 49th in 2013. This is due to the emergence of the country out of more than a decade of conflict, as well as the 2013 reform in the marriage laws to put women on equal footing as men; however, the urban–rural divide for women is stark. Still, in the country's push to remake itself out of nearly fifteen years of political and economic turmoil into an investment-friendly emerging economy, it is paving over many of its problems and inequalities, which centrally affect women. Globally, women are disproportionately affected by development discrepancies (Kabeer 1994, Momsen 2008), and as such, in Cote d'Ivoire, women's needs are often left out of the country's push toward economic "emergence."

Though several scholars have examined the future of Côte d'Ivoire's political and economic stability, particularly in light of continuing nationalism and periodic French intervention in the region,[8] there has been little to no acknowledgement of the roles women take on in working toward (or against) stability. Neither has there been an analysis of how the efforts to achieve stability have affected women beyond passing mentions of victimhood. While my dissertation does not directly examine stability and the political and economic factors that contribute to it, my analysis centers on women to demonstrate how they might be fruitful actors in this process and how their concerns might reveal aspects of stability that have previously been unexamined. Local organizations also act as intermediaries between people in conflict and post-conflict situations, states, and international organizations. Because Côte d'Ivoire was the first African country to develop a NAP, it is a good case to illustrate the implementation progress of the WPS agenda. Furthermore, because women's activism there has not been held

8. See Banégas 2014 on local nationalist reactions to French intervention; Förster 2013 on the specifics of Côte d'Ivoire's nationalism; Piccolino 2011 on nationalism and global governance; and Speight 2014 on local governance and state building.

up as an exemplar, as it has been in Sierra Leone and Liberia[9], it is somewhat more fruitful to explore their activism without the spotlight of international attention.

The narrative that Côte d'Ivoire is promoting about itself—emergence—alongside persistent discourses about Africa in conflict and as victim of political, economic, and natural forces echo the coexisting international discourses about women. These international discourses push women's victimhood, especially of sexual violence, at the same time that they are held up as strong women who hold the fate of their families and their communities on their capable shoulders, whose presence reduces violent incidence (Anderlini 2007), and who make peace treaties last longer. This dissertation examines these discourses in tandem, as a metaphor for each other. Côte d'Ivoire is emerging out of conflict and into economic growth, while women are rising from victimhood and into actors with full human rights. However, the old discourses persist—Côte d'Ivoire is an impoverished and conflict-ridden African country, and women there are at the mercy of those who would prey upon them. Dichotomous portrayals of an African country and African women—places and people with unbridled opportunity or near ruination—reinforce ideas that Africans and women (and particularly African women) need international interventions to either save themselves or become better versions of themselves.[10]

9. When choosing a country in which to conduct my research, I sought a post-conflict state with a National Action Plan, yet I had to ensure that it was safe enough for a granting agency to give me money for research there. With the Fulbright, this narrowed down my choices, and combined with the contacts I already had in West Africa from pre-dissertation fieldwork and the fact that Côte d'Ivoire's UN mission was still active and the status of its NAP, Côte d'Ivoire became an ideal choice. In fact, because of the country's instability, the Fulbright Student Research program had not granted anyone to Côte d'Ivoire for several years; my grant there was the first since 2008. While French, Côte d'Ivoire's official language, is also one of the two main languages of the United Nations, in English-speaking NGO, policy, and academic circles, language barriers make it a little-known case.

10. My goal is not to idealize or freeze African cultures, social arrangements, and gender relations as they had been prior to missionaries and colonization. What is important, however, is to understand that the gender relations that are present in modern Ivorian society are a product of prior, "traditional" arrangements, religious conversion into both Islam and Christianity, French colonization, and pan-African decolonization, all mapped onto the current practices of governance and peacebuilding that have been pushed by the international community and embraced by the national government. The gender mainstreaming policies and the assumptions that create those policies must be mediated through these aspects of social life in Cote d'Ivoire.

Chapter Outline

My dissertation makes three central arguments, contributing to security, peacebuilding, and feminist literatures. The first is that two kinds of global actors—international and transnational—try to shape the WPS agenda, but they do so in very different ways, through the state and bypassing it. These two sets of actors share language and perceptions of women in Africa; however, they have different goals as a result of their composition. International actors, both states and international organizations with states as members, pursue the interests of states. By contrast, transnational NGOs prioritize civil society and work toward development and human rights. Both international and transnational organizations use top-down policies and funding mechanisms to achieve their goals. The second is that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in Côte d'Ivoire has been narrowed to a focus on security sector reform at the national level, with the assistance of international actors. The government does implement the WPS agenda to some extent, but in a way that privileges traditional mechanisms of state security and that superficially integrates gender into existing processes. This indicates how national governments are critical actors in implementation of the WPS agenda and can both take up and limit the role of women. The third argument is that women at the local level have overlapping perspectives on WPS but differ in critical ways from international actors and national actors. Women define security more broadly than it is often defined for them, and I use contributions from African feminist literature to theorize their stance of "pragmatic skepticism." Ivorian women use concepts of vulnerability, motherhood, and community as spaces of solidarity and as tools to use and challenge international and national discourses.

To build these arguments, in the next chapter I outline the theories upon which I am drawing. I will expand on the discussions in this chapter of the WPS agenda as it is addressed by literatures of international security, peacebuilding, development, feminist international relations, and African feminism. Insights from African feminism in particular have been largely ignored in international relations, even in scholarship that includes postcolonial feminist

thought from other regions. In general, African feminist scholarship foregrounds communities over individuals and challenges gender binaries inherent in much Western feminism. Additionally, African feminists reprioritize motherhood as a biological role and as an experience separate from the biology of giving birth. My contribution to each of these literatures is in their intersection—how each is limited in its scope and how each can adapt insights from the others. International security and peacebuilding literatures do not adequately address the roles women play in politics, and feminist international relations and African feminism tend to neglect the interplay between multiple political actors in implementing one policy. I contribute an understanding of the practices of governance and peacebuilding as local activist women interpret them. With the insights of African feminism, I have developed a conceptual apparatus that is critical to situate and explain my empirical findings.

In Chapter Three, I detail my research methodology, critical interpretive feminism, and the specific feminist methods—interviews and participant observation. My analysis is built through feminist theory, a recursive interpretation of my data that reveals ties between disparate data collected. I have followed feminist and critical methodologies as they can be enacted in peacebuilding research, focusing on local actors and the meanings they give to the work they do.

The three empirical chapters that follow are each devoted to a level of analysis. Chapter Four explores the national level, particularly Côte d'Ivoire's National Action Plan and how the national government attempts to address women's security. Women's security is largely addressed by incorporating women into ongoing security sector reform, rather than holistically, as articulated by local women's organizations in the country. This mode of security is a traditional, bureaucratized one that relies on instrumentalizing women and using easy indicators to achieve a particular level of success of the NAP. Local women activists, even those supportive of security sector reform, noted that the government's focus limited the funds available for other women's programs in the country.

Chapter Five focuses on international-level implementation of the WPS agenda in the country. I illustrate two models of international intervention that local women's groups must contend with: an international peacebuilding model, where the state implements international policies and instructs local actors to follow and further implement the directives. The other model is a development one that largely bypasses the state; international directives start at international governmental organizations, funnel through transnational NGOs, and end up at local NGOs to implement the projects. The nature of the WPS agenda (in that it deals with women and gender) means that the more established ways of addressing security policies for women are in tension with the more established ways of addressing other security concerns. As a result, the implementation of the agenda is hectic and uneven, burdening the local women's organizations.

For the local-level chapter, Chapter Six, I focus on how local women's groups have worked with international, transnational, and national actors to achieve their own goals. Oftentimes, these activists are supportive of the agenda and the empowerment message behind it but question the discourses about them and the ways that the project funding limits their capabilities. I have categorized this as a form of skepticism that is pragmatic, allowing them to make claims for themselves and other women in the country, instrumentalizing some of the essentializing discourses about them. This chapter gets to the heart of how local women conceptualize security, the differences between what security means for them and the national and international/transnational directives and trends, and how African feminist concepts help us to understand both the acceptances and challenges posted by local women's groups to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

Finally, I conclude with thoughts analyzing what the case of Côte d'Ivoire has taught us about international relations and about considering all three levels of analysis. More specifically, I refer to other cases in the region and how we can more fully understand the WPS agenda and what changes could be made to the policies and their implementation with this knowledge.

While I discuss the implementation of the WPS agenda, allow interviewees to make judgments about it, and draw conclusions from my data, I do not directly address effectiveness. My intention is not to evaluate the quality of the National Action Plan or the implementation efforts but to allow the women who implement related programs to state their (or their organizations') opinions on the agenda, the implementation, and the actors involved. My intervention here is to understand the appropriateness of the implementation efforts to the Ivorian context as has been articulated to me. Much of the literature on the advocacy for and establishment of Resolution 1325 and the push for adoption of National Action Plans has centered on celebrating its groundbreaking recognition of women's security needs while also questioning the narrow, conventional portrayals of women. These policy analyses lead to my project, which extends the concerns of academics and activists about the resolutions themselves to consider whether those analyses are still relevant when the NAPs have been established and the policies are entering the full implementation phase.

My dissertation addresses how the WPS agenda by the UN Security Council is implemented in CIV. I am focused on Côte d'Ivoire and effects of international policies there, but what happens in the country doesn't stay there. I demonstrate how the international is connected to the local through and around the national level. In other words, we cannot speak of politics within a country without talking about the international, especially in post-conflict, postcolonial societies. We also cannot talk about the international without gender. Ultimately, what does the WPS agenda do for women, and what does it do for Côte d'Ivoire? And what does the Ivorian case tell us about the WPS agenda?

Chapter Two:
Literatures, Theories, and Methodologies

In order to understand the issues behind the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda's implementation in Côte d'Ivoire, it is necessary, first, to examine the contributions of feminism to two strands of international relations literature: (1) international security and (2) peacebuilding and international organizations, and second, to understand the overlooked contributions that African feminists make to international relations. As originally conceived, this dissertation relied on security literatures to assess the WPS agenda, principally because the resolutions are framed as solutions to the problem of security. However, in the process of analyzing the evidence and writing up my findings, my research data kept revealing a shift in institutional language about this agenda, one that moved from security to peacebuilding. In the academic literature, I note that the proliferation of peacebuilding studies and their connection to broader issues of security remains under-theorized, and this is particularly the case in analyses of the WPS agenda (Olonisakin et al. 2010; Pratt 2013; Thakur 2016). While each of these broad areas of inquiry incorporates multiple mainstream as well as critical perspectives (given that both are important in the field of international politics), it is clear that security and peacebuilding intersect in significant ways in the body of research on the WPS agenda, although this intersection remains mostly implicit.

As a result, I position my own contribution to expose the relationship between security and peacebuilding. If feminist security studies decenters conventional security studies' focus on the state and feminist peacebuilding studies decenters conventional peacebuilding and developmentalist logic's implicit accord with neoliberalism, then the state and neoliberal logics are largely absent from both theoretical standpoints. Therefore, I move beyond these contemporary feminist IR theories to give a central place to African feminist theory. Only in this way, by listening to African women and incorporating African feminist theorists, I argue, can

we open up space for Ivorian women's voices and analyze their words and actions vis-à-vis state structures and international discourses.

Feminist Perspectives on Security and Security Governance

Traditionally, the primary referent for security studies is "the phenomenon of war" (Walt 1991, 212), with a conceptualization of security as chiefly concerned with the stability or instability of the state, as well as possible threats to that stability. This dominant, narrowly defined approach to security compels its practitioners to "not see other forms [of violence]" (Smith 2004, 506). Though the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, emerged out of World War II in order to mitigate state conflict, the introduction of the concept of human security in the late 1980s shifted the focus of security away from states (UNDP 1994). In particular, within the United Nations, human security paradigms reoriented security toward individual and communal levels of analysis (Thomas and Tow 2002; Bellamy and McDonald 2002; Paris 2001). Human security norms then began to be taken up by the United Nations at large (MacFarlane and Khong 2006).

Human security scholars urged traditional security scholars and policymakers to look beyond the nation-state framework toward a human-based framework, one attentive to the economic, social, and cultural aspects of wellbeing and security (see Linklater 2005; Debiel and Werthes 2006; Kaldor et al. 2007). Recognizing that "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" are critical (Kaldor et al. 2007, 279), human security studies use individual and communal security and suffering as the referent while still advocating for state-based solutions to security threats. The field of human security studies was influenced by international human rights scholarship, and the two remain simultaneously complementary and competing regimes. "The narrow view of human security proposes stronger enforcement mechanisms for the international community to remedy extreme human rights violations, whether interstate or intrastate," yet "the broader vocabulary of human security does not improve on the national laws, principles, and policies meant to protect, promote and fulfill human rights, nor does it

improve on the international human rights legal regime" (Howard-Hassmann 2012, 98, 101). These norms were not fully embraced by the Security Council, which remained focused on state-based notions of peace and security (Axworthy 2001). The United Nations Commission on Human Security, created in 2001, maintained that in post-conflict societies the human security model can empower individuals and communities, promote change, recast social, political, and economic bases of power, and provide "opportunities for including the excluded, healing fragmentation, and erasing inequalities" (UN Commission on Human Security 2003, 58). This commission recognized that some states not only fail to secure their citizens but are also the cause of their citizens' endangerment. Economic development, rule of law, good governance, human rights, social equity, and sustainable development were also put forward as issues of human security (Axworthy 1997). The Commission suggested two general human security strategies post-conflict: protection and empowerment.

Critical security studies challenged human security and held that the emergence of human security is nothing new; rather, critical and feminist theorists were advocating many of these notions before the 1994 UN Human Development Report (Nuruzzaman 2006). Critical security studies also criticized human security's concern for the preservation of the status quo. It critiqued the approaches of both security studies and human security for its uncritical use of major concepts and assumptions (see Krause and Williams 1997; Booth 2005; Nuruzzaman 2006; Barkawi and Laffey 2006). Critics of human security note that a broad definition can be expanded to include just about anything that might be a threat to a group's survival (Paris 2001). Increasingly, however, understandings of human security are more related to particular modes of governance and development rather than to a transformation of individuals' lives. In many ways, human security is simply recasting state-based security through the lens of humanitarianism; while the goals appear different, the means and results are the same. Critical security studies called for a shift in understanding security as territorial security, state behavior, and military might to that of securing individuals and communities (Krause and Williams 1997).

Feminism shares many of the concerns of human security while expressing an explicit commitment to emancipatory projects and normative convictions (Tickner 2004). Feminist scholarship is not merely interested in academic scholarship and theorizing, but also on critically understanding the everyday experiences women encounter (Enloe 2000). It brings to light many of the omissions, manipulations, and silences of women in the study of international security (see Sjoberg and Martin 2010; Shepherd 2011; Wibben 2010) because, historically, women's lives and their contributions tended to be excluded from dominant narratives (Peterson 1992). Feminist scholars have echoed the need to broaden the narrow definitions of security and human rights, arguing that the public/private and political/social rights distinctions that mark debates of security and human rights exclude women's experiences, both during war and everyday lived violence (Caprioli 2004; Enloe 2000; Peterson 1992; Tickner 2001).

Feminists' contributions to security studies have been described providing insights into four separate categories:

1) where IR feminists "question the supposed nonexistence of and irrelevance of women in international security politics,"
2) interrogate "the extent to which women are secured by state 'protection' in times of war and peace,"
3) contest "discourses wherein women are linked unreflectively with peace," and
4) critique "the assumption that gendered security practices address only women" (Blanchard 2003, 1290).

Their specific empirical concerns—particular issues, technologies, geographies, activities, and political situations—are present in the broader field of security studies, yet feminist work is rarely included in traditional understandings of security theory and security policy. Feminist scholars suggest that if we put on "gendered lenses" we get quite a different view of international politics (Peterson and Runyan 1999, 21).

From the beginnings of feminist IR, there was a focus on security and sovereignty, though this focus departed significantly from the statist realist paradigm (see Elshtain 1995; Enloe 1983; Peterson 1992; Sylvester 1987; Tickner 1992). Early feminist security scholarship also

focused on essentialized notions of association of men with war and women with peace. This eventually evolved into a broader and more nuanced account of gender and security issues. A scholarly focus on masculinities and femininities, combined with a recognition of the narrow and myopic nature of the realist security paradigm, compelled feminists to theorize themes of war, military, and violence in a broader and more critical fashion (Reardon 1985; Tickner 1992, 2001). For example, Betty Reardon (1985) illustrated how states interact within a "war system" that allows and creates sexism and violence. As a result, she held that the foundations of sexism and violence are intertwined, and therefore, one cannot end without the ending of the other. Sara Ruddick (1989) linked an aversion to violence with motherly child rearing or "maternal thinking," a mother's desire to protect their children from hurt and from violence, as well as women viewing opposing soldiers as children of other mothers. Subsequently, Ruddick contended that women are more likely to stand against war and violence than men. Judith Stiehm (1982) suggested that while men plan and fight war, women—who are nowhere to be found in the planning or preparations of war—are relegated to a mere reactionary role, reacting to the consequences of fighting and war. Consequently, the (perceived) ability of men to protect women constitutes the foundation of the idealized masculinization of war.

Similar to both human security and critical security studies, feminist security studies is also characterized by a multitude of differing perspectives. Sjoberg (2006) focuses on "the contribution of different feminisms" (41) rather than the disagreements between them to provide a more complete understanding of their effects on political knowledge. This diversity is reflected in the multiple types of feminist approaches—liberal, Marxist, realist, constructivist, poststructuralist, critical, Black, and post-colonialist, to name a few. Feminist scholars began making their mark on IR in the late 1980s with the premise that IR was inherently a gendered discourse (Runyan 1992; Peterson 1992). The concepts IR is built on are framed through the lens of masculinity. For instance, the notion of "sovereign man" is premised on the exclusion of female participation in political affairs (Steans 1998). Diverging from the realist security paradigm, it is not anarchy that needs to be tended to; rather, it is the intrinsic gendered social

inequality that motivates international relations. Two aspects that pervade feminist security studies are gender equality and the attentiveness to women's experiences of insecurity in analysis (Nuruzzaman 2006).

The field of feminist security studies is varied and includes work that speaks to mainstream security studies (Sjoberg and Martin 2010; Tickner 2001; Hansen and Olsson 2004; Sjoberg 2009a, 2009b), human security (Hudson 2005; Truong et al. 2007), the practice of security (Enloe 2000, 2004; Peterson 1992), post-conflict reconstruction and transitional justice (Hudson 2009; MacKenzie 2009), wartime rape (Hansen 2001; Engle 2005), militarism (Stiehm 1982; Elshtain 1995; Cohn 1987; Jacoby 2007), gender mainstreaming (True 2003; Cohn 2008; Shepherd 2008), and terrorism (Sylvester and Parashar 2009). Scholarship in this field has explored security themes in ways that bring to light the significance of gender in theorizing security, encompassing issues such as female terrorist suicide bombers (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007), the use of sexual violence as a weapon of warfare (Card 1996), women as soldiers (Enloe 1983; MacKenzie 2009; McEvoy 2009), anti-war activism (Cook and Kirk 1983; El-Bushra 2007), peacekeepers (Mazurana 2002; Mazurana et al. 2005), refugees (Yuval-Davis and Werbner 2006; Indra 1987), noncombatants in war-fighting (Elshtain 1995; Gardam and Charlesworth 2000; Sjoberg 2006), and war narratives (Stern 2006). For example, McEvoy (2009) argues that in Northern Ireland, ending the conflict proved difficult because of women who were members or supporters of paramilitary organizations; the assumption that only men fought limited the British and Irish governments' ability to understand the conflict. Mazurana et al. (2005) describe gender as an analytical tool with which to interpret the establishment of peacekeeping operations, peacekeeping practices' effects on women, and the effects of women on the success of peacekeeping; this edited volume speaks to the linkages between international security and women's lives. Stern (2006) listens to the narratives of Mayan women as they secure their identity, individually and collectively; her analysis pays attention to individuals and challenges mainstream definitions of security.

Feminist security studies urges paying attention to gender as an important analytical component to understanding security with three assumptions:

1) It provides a richer conceptual understanding of security than either conventional or non-feminist critical security studies;
2) it is critical for analyzing and theorizing causes and outcomes; and
3) it is necessary to imagine and fashion new solutions and positive change (Sjoberg and Martin 2010).

Although women experience security and insecurity differently (Jacoby 2006), men also experience insecurity on account of their gender; therefore, it is important to understand how gender can affect both women's and men's understandings of security. When such understandings are incomplete, "a 'gender perspective' can be mapped onto existing ways of doing business without questioning any of the bases upon which peace, security or even the category 'woman' is understood" (Orford 2002, 281). Orford notes that such mapping further contributes to essentializing both men and women in security analyses and maintains the status quo of militarization, victimization, and peace.

Feminist Perspectives on Peacebuilding

Largely separate from security studies, the gender and peacebuilding literature has grown in stature and scope (Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998; Anderlini 2007; Porter 2007; Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011; Olonisakin and Okech 2011; and Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). This literature reflects a greater attention to women's individual needs and bodies in conflict and brings to light issues that include ethics, reconciliation, governance, and development. The gender and peacebuilding literature overlaps with feminist security studies in questioning assumptions of who is a victim, perpetrator, and actor (Moser and Clark 2001; Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011). But more often than not, gender acts as a proxy for women, especially because we are continuously reminded that women must be included in all peacebuilding efforts due to the fact that they make up more than half of the population and because war and its aftermath affect them differently. The feminist contention that the

separation of the private (informal) and the public (formal) is false in a way vindicates analyses of the binary between global (universalist) norm diffusion and everyday peacebuilding practices. The public/private dichotomy that feminist scholarship challenges is echoed in the distinction between global norm diffusion—which takes place through formal institutions—and everyday peacebuilding practices—which are thought to belong to the household and "private" realm, women's domain. This state of affairs is symptomatic of the broader dilemmas surrounding local ownership and how locals are represented in peacebuilding processes. Séverine Autesserre (2014), for example, in tracing the everyday practices and routines of diplomats, donors, NGO staff, and military peacekeepers involved in peacebuilding, finds that not much has changed on the ground in terms of the promotion of local ownership.

As an alternative, Oliver Richmond (2010) proposes the notion of "everyday peacebuilding." For him, the everyday refers to a "culturally appropriate form of individual or community life and care" (Richmond 2009, 558) with everyday peacebuilding described as a local–global hybrid around which both international and local actors are mobilized to deal with everyday issues, such as setting up representative institutions. The concept is held up as returning autonomy to the locals to find contextualized solutions on the ground, with the help of internationals. He argues that everyday peacebuilding enables the liberal peace to reconnect with the subjects on the ground (Richmond 2010). However, I assert that simply reconnecting with liberal peacebuilding by depoliticizing the local will not make for a re-visioning of gender equality if the everyday is not recognized as fundamentally gendered and fundamentally political. In fact, it reinforces liberal-feminist additive approaches to gender mainstreaming in the name of sameness. In this way, the local or everyday loses its potential to become a site where top-down liberal assumptions about peace can be subverted.

Gender analysis delivers legitimacy and substance to a wider security concept because it offers a different kind of bottom-up logic. We can learn a great deal about global processes by looking at the private, the informal, the local, and the personal, but we should not treat these categories in isolation. A fundamental part of decolonizing the local is locating

> ethnographic gender analyses within the larger framework of debates shaping academic understanding of contemporary wars. It is not enough to know what is happening to men, women, and children in war—and how those experiences differ—we should strive to know why, and how these various experiences are tied to political and economic structures, opportunities, and incentives at local, national, and international levels. (Mazurana and Proctor 2013, 11)

The fields of peacebuilding and feminist IR/security studies all require decolonization, some more than others. Thus, in order to disrupt this state of affairs, liberal and post-liberal peacebuilding should be analyzed in the context of how they fit into an entangled global coloniality that is at once radicalized, patriarchal, Western-centric, colonial, and capitalist (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2014).

Meera Sabaratnam argues that critiques of the liberal peace, useful as they may be, have "largely failed to dislodge the liberal peace as the central subject of inquiry," because neoliberal governance has over time become more "politically correct," while critics have failed to come up with viable decolonial alternatives (Sabaratnam 2011, 796–797; Sabaratnam 2013, 259–260). Additionally, a concern for the everyday (Richmond 2009) and the local may reproduce, albeit unintentionally, a sanitized picture of the local/traditional as gender-neutral and depoliticized, for example where chiefs or educated urban women speak on behalf of rural women and other marginalized people. Moreover, I contend, along with Fiona Robinson (2011), that some scholars hold up everyday peacebuilding and empathy/care principles as new and progressive directions, with little if any acknowledgement of the contribution of a maturing feminist body of scholarship on the ethics of care. Such studies also neglect understanding the "everyday" aspects of war and peace as both personal and political. Even critics of the liberal peace do not give enough credit to feminist work that is already troubling the international (Mohanty 2003; Jabri 2013). For instance, although Sabaratnam (2011; 2013) provides instructive suggestions on how to dismantle the liberal peace, with the example of Mozambique, without using the "master's tools," her contribution does not employ a gender lens or address the impact of gender.

Feminist critics of the liberal peace have concentrated on the oppressive ways in which the liberal peace project uses liberal-inspired gender discourses of gender equality to help reinforce its norms and inform its practices on the ground. For example, Shepherd (2008) discusses the binary constructions of domestic/international and women/men and the ways in which these binaries underpin the development of Resolution 1325. Similarly, Pratt and Richter-Devroe (2011), editing a special issue on Resolution 1325, highlight assumptions about the links between conflict and gender. The critique of the neoliberal underpinnings of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (see Shepherd 2008; Cohn 2008; Cohn, Kinsella, and Gibbings 2004) maintains that rights-based discourses of equality help sustain liberal democracy and a free-market economy as the only rational alternative to war and underdevelopment. Feminist norms and women's rights are thus hijacked to serve international development and security interests (True 2011). Cohn et al. 2004 argue, moreover, that the dominance of a liberal–feminist UN discourse leads to an overemphasis on gender equality and an almost exclusive focus on women.

The UN discourse on gender and peacekeeping, for instance, treats gender and women or gender equality and women's rights as one and the same. The language of Resolution 1325 shifts between "gender" and "women" (or "women and girls"), never mentioning "men"; for example: the Secretary-General should "include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls" (Para. 17). This discourse has two consequences. First, when women are differentiated from men, "the possible performative construction of gender" is ignored in favor of essentialist and biological binaries, with men occupying the public space of the protector and women the private/civilian space of protected (Kinsella 2013). Women therefore "trade" their possible combatant roles for a particular type of agency, namely as the leaders of informal peacebuilding (Väryrnen 2004), ignoring combatant and other roles that Laura Sjoberg (2007) highlights. Second, even though gender norm diffusion is assumed to be intrinsically good, it can produce harmful outcomes. Hudson (2010) points out that the

connection made between women's presence and positive change in the WPS agenda is problematic. States include women in peacekeeping operations because they assume it will socialize actors to behave "better," thereby making a normative and policy link between the inclusion of women and more democratic, accountable governance and the goal of more peace and security (True 2011). When heteronormative institutions and practices continue to guide women's inclusion as not-so-equal citizens by adding them through quotas, power relations are left unexamined.

Unlike security studies, international development studies and development practices have incorporated the field of peacebuilding (Uvin 2002). Additionally, it seems as if peacebuilding developed into a separate field from security studies because peacebuilding holds a major role for development theories and actors (Mats 2013). Mac Ginty (2010) and Mac Ginty and Sanghera (2012) argue that "hybridity" best describes the relationship between peacebuilding and development in conflict and post-conflict states. Hybridity is the interaction between top-down (international organizations, bilateral donors, and transnational NGOs) and bottom-up (local actors) forces in a country, and it also encompasses the practices of both peacebuilding and development (Mac Ginty and Sanghera 2012). However, none of these studies examine gender in any meaningful way, even though development studies has long incorporated a gender perspective (Kabeer 1994; Visvanathan 1997; Jackson and Pearson 1998).

Furthermore, the everyday practices and the embodiment of these practices are insufficiently taken into account by liberal peacebuilding and liberal feminist analyses. Everyday practices, in particular, open the way to understanding the issue of vulnerability—which is not, however, synonymous with the concept of victimization that liberal discourses emphasize. Väryrnen (2016), for example, highlights the mundane practices of peace, which is a commitment to living with a certain kind of vulnerability to others, as vulnerability is a way of indicating one's dependency on another and be acknowledged by others. She notes that though the "local turn" and "everyday peacebuilding" have shifted the focus of critical peacebuilding studies, there is a special economy of the "local turn," where the "everyday" is coupled with the

"local"—fixating on a "subaltern other." This local turn, then, has not been translated into sustained considerations of the productiveness of mundane practices, practices that include a bodily ontology—the fleshy realities of the human body (Wilcox 2015)—[11]upon which a nonviolent realization of mutual dependence and exposure can be built.

The symbiotic relation between the liberal peace and a peace shaped by liberal feminism has led to a situation in practice where liberalism has become so embedded within mainstream discourses about gender and peacebuilding that it is very difficult to challenge—especially since calling out the status quo goes against the grain of widely held assumptions about gender mainstreaming on the basis of equal opportunities. Primary of these assumptions is the "add women and stir" method of gender mainstreaming; making room for women in political processes will make the processes more effective and more democratic (Walby 2005). Mainstreaming gender into existing peacebuilding processes will perpetuate the gendered practices, even if women are policy-makers and actors. Prügl (2011) argues that feminist knowledge has been adapted so that it works for governance practices, rather than the transformation of those practices, what Elgström (2000) describes as fighting its way into institutional thinking. And since liberal-feminist approaches as a rule do not analyze gender issues within a broader context of oppression and consequently do not view gender as a product of and productive of security practices, power structures are left unexamined and untransformed (Sa'ar 2005, 689).

Yet, despite this strong feminist critique, mainly poststructuralist feminists have not succeeded in dislodging the liberal-feminist stranglehold over peacebuilding. For instance, much of the Foucauldian feminist works on gender and governmentality, although instructive, have largely drawn their critiques from Western roots (Shepherd 2008; Prügl 2011). In response, feminists from the Global South have alerted us to how the colonial cuts through our notions of

11. Wilcox (2015) argues that International Relations theorizes bodies as outside of politics; therefore, it cannot see how violence impacts bodies and creates political subjects. Peacebuilding theories and practices, which she does not address, have similarly overlooked the needs and effects of bodies.

gender (Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Mama 1995). Viewed from this perspective, a gender-inclusive peace therefore forms part of the "entanglement of multiple heterogeneous global hierarchies and of sexual, national, and racial identities" (Grosfoguel 2007, 31). In addition to a global gender hierarchy, this entanglement comprises labor based on class and core/periphery; particular political and military configurations; privileging of Western and Christian people over non-Western, non-Christian people; languages; and "an epistemic hegemony that privileges Western knowledge and cosmology over non-Western knowledge and cosmologies" (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013). But including gender in the entanglement of identities also means that beyond postcolonial feminist writing on peacebuilding (Chisolm 2014; Welland 2015), there has to be serious acknowledgement of the limitations within the emerging field of decolonialism. Theories of decolonialism offer scathing critiques of modernity and its liberal projects but lack an integral gender perspective (Mignolo 2007, 2011a; Escobar 2004). A gender perspective would, first, support women's claims that their experiences of decolonialization and social relations are different from men's, that independence was not as liberating in some ways for women as it was for men. In peacebuilding studies, incorporating a holistic gender perspective also demands that an examination of the effects of international interventions, governance, and economics requires the inclusion of women. Other than scholars such as Maria Lugones (2010), who shows how white Western women have tended to benefit from the coloniality of gender, a gender perspective in postcolonial and decolonial examinations of peacebuilding is rather thin. The lack of gender inclusion in otherwise emancipatory perspectives is therefore running the risk of entrenching public/private and gender binaries. The exploration of gender and decolonialism in relation to peacebuilding remains underrepresented and under theorized, with the literature instead focused on gender in colonialism (Luguones 2008, 2010; Schiwy 2007).

Studies of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

Several studies have addressed the movement that successfully advocated for Resolution 1325 (see Hill et al. 2003; Cohn et al. 2004; Cohn 2008; Hudson 2010). None of these

recount sexualized violence as a significant discussion point in the motivations for or the creation of the original resolution. They do, however, include sexualized violence, but only as one aspect of the broader goal of gender mainstreaming.[12] In general, feminist scholars who examined Resolution 1325 were cautiously optimistic that the Security Council was beginning to consider women as part of peace and security. They also noted, however, that the extent and quality of the international and national implementation would ultimately demonstrate the resolution's overall merit (Anderlini 2007; Cohn 2008; Shepherd 2008; Whitworth 2004). The development of the WPS resolutions, in other words, would require "translating the demands of local women's groups into language that could be 'heard' within the UN system" (Whitworth 2004, 138).

What actually happened after the instantiation of Resolution 1325 mirrors the reception of feminism into security analyses in international relations; feminist concepts tend to be approached in ways that address only physical and sexual violence against women. Women activists pressured the UN Security Council to set international priorities by developing resolutions regarding Women, Peace, and Security, and these priorities, in turn, were designed to determine national responses to violence around the world. However, the WPS resolutions have subsequently been criticized by a number of feminist scholars and activists for their overly conventional assumption of what constitutes security and their essentialized, gendered vision of women in post-conflict as simultaneously victims and peacemakers. Each of these tendencies, feminist scholars point out, reinforces the emphasis on women's biological and reproductive functions (Hudson 2010; Shepherd 2008). When women's roles in conflict are narrowed to a choice between victims and peacemakers, women cannot access any possible action outside these roles. Even if being involved in peacemaking is a normative good, this role disallows women from having anger or resentment and constructs them as always making the right

12. Sexualized violence serves as a barrier for women's participation in public and private activities and is a human rights violation. Addressing it as part of gender mainstreaming efforts in human rights institutions, development programs, and security policies allows for women's full participation in politics, economics, and society.

choice. Victimhood restricts women from pushing back against structures of power and demands they accept any offered aid.

With the constraint of possible identities for women, the absence of the "other half" of gender in the WPS resolutions—i.e., men and boys—becomes all the more noteworthy. In each of the resolutions, for example, men are seldom described as at risk. Resolution 1325 expresses "concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict" (Preamble para. 4). The omission of men from the WPS resolutions, however, is beginning to be corrected in some of the more recent resolutions (Kirby and Shepherd 2016). Resolution 2106, though it focuses on sexualized violence, does include men and boys as victims as well: "Noting with concern that sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations disproportionately affects women and girls, as well as groups that are particularly vulnerable or may be specifically targeted, while also affecting men and boys and those secondarily traumatized as forced witnesses of sexual violence against family members" (Preamble para. 6).

Even feminists who supported the UN Security Council's decision to address sexualized violence as part of a panoply of issues for women in global governance were disappointed by the trajectory of the resolutions and their emphasis on women as victims of sexualized violence. True (2011) captured these sentiments as follows:

> Perhaps the most dramatic example is the way in which the goals of gender mainstreaming have been shrunk to fit in with the recent mandate to make protection from and prevention of sexual violence in international conflict a priority. … Focusing on sexual violence in the context of state insecurity and conflict, while seemingly appropriate given its gravity, risks perpetuating the invisibility of various other forms of violence against women. … UN mainstreaming of sexual violence tends to reinforce embodied gender norms that view women as inherently victims of violence—and thus, objects of protection—and men as the power holders. (True 2011, 86)

The problem, then, concerns the narrowing of women's roles when they are considered to be primarily victims and the narrowing of conceptions of security when their views are not heard. In post-conflict states, research has shown that while women experience security and insecurity differently (Jacoby 2006), sexualized violence is but one of a host of inequalities that

women encounter. The language of "rape as a weapon of war" recasts these threats against women into threats against the state (Meger 2011). "The use of rape as a weapon of war makes sense only in terms of patriarchal assumptions about the meaning of rape as an instrument for hurting and undermining, not the victims themselves as individuals, but their male relations and compatriots who comprise the 'enemy'" (Hutchings 2000). Additionally, widespread sexual violence does not necessarily imply that sexual violence is used as a "weapon of war" (Cohen et al. 2013). Baaz and Stern (2013) have also focused attention to the problem of hyper-politicization of sexualized violence with the language in global policy of rape as a weapon of war. In addition, sexualized violence has been over-emphasized in scholarship and hyper-politicized in policy (Charlesworth 2008; Harrington 2010; Henry 2014). Jacqui True (2012) notes that many of the pillars of the WPS resolutions, including women's political representation, violence against women, and sexualized violence in conflict and post-conflict, are not contextualized within the broader political economy and economic inequality that women face. Even feminist analyses of these resolutions and of women's broader insecurities, she observes, do not fully take into account the systematic structural inequalities confronted by women. True encourages scholars who use a feminist lens on security to also take political economy into account, as the intersection of security studies, political economy, and feminism is much greater than what is accounted for in any of these three fields separately. In addition, many feminist international relations scholars agree that women's security and economic status can each be improved by addressing both simultaneously (see Prügl 2011; Hudson 2015; True 2015).

UN delegates, often from privileged backgrounds, often men, often not belonging to groups highly vulnerable to a conflict, might misrecognize what security really is or might mean for women in non-Western conflict areas. By essentializing women, representatives misrecognize women's multiple roles in their own societies, replicating "traditional" or "Western" notions of security, or "traditional" or "Western" notions of who women are and their roles, depending on the political agenda being served at a particular time. For example, Kinsella (2011) writes that categorizing women as civilians and not as combatants in

international law requires the public–private divide between men and women to be recognized in order to create a distinction between the civilian and the combatant. For the Security Council to make this distinction in its resolutions is to deny agency to women. In particular, the "women and children" language present in most of the WPS resolutions conflates the two categories and positions them both as vulnerable and defenseless. Women's agency is thus subsumed under ideas of victimization, making their protection crucial.

The Security Council's attention to sexualized violence while remaining silent on other security and human rights threats women face—particularly significant threats to life and livelihood—reveals the serious limitations of international legal frameworks and the UN community to understand women's rights through any lens broader than sexual victimization. This critique applies to the areas of both security and peacebuilding, and in both theory and policy, underscoring why the two lenses must be considered mutually constitutive rather than separate fields. While the most recent resolution, 2242, passed in 2015, reiterates the necessity of women's participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, the set of WPS resolutions still prioritizes sexualized violence as the greatest threat women face in conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, effectively elevating its status and muting women's other security and human rights concerns. Additionally, sexualized violence does not start or end with any given conflict. Wars, like other acts of impunity, including sexualized violence, typically do not have definite boundaries. This highlights the difficulty of addressing sexualized violence by the Security Council, whose purview is to address conflict and conflict-related crimes. Crimes that are often considered personal/domestic and that are committed both in the lead up to and cessation of conflict are difficult to address, even when adequate legal frameworks are in place (Wood 2015) This is not to reinscribe the public–private distinction, but to illustrate how violence is a continuum, rather than having bright boundaries (Moser 2001). Most of the follow-up resolutions to Resolution 1325 focus solely on women as victims of sexual violence and the establishment of accountability measures to address sexual violence during armed conflict and not in peacetime (Otto and Heathcote 2014). Feminist work also indirectly reinforces this

silence, as it tends to explain sexual and gender-based violence and other forms of male violent behavior through the lens of hyper masculinity and militarism (e.g., Leatherman 2011).

The WPS resolutions rely on norms of protection without challenging the masculinized logic upon which international law is organized (Young 2003). "Placing women in a position of vulnerable victims privileges established military and security actors and sidelines participation and empowerment. The logic of patriarchal protection and women's subordination is reinstalled" (von Braunmühl 2013). Women and men are both central to addressing sexualized violence, yet women's political, social, and economic empowerment should not just be attached to the issue of sexualized violence. There is no need to invoke sexual violence to justify women's political, social, and economic empowerment (MacKinnon 2007).

Sexualized violence is committed against women, but it is only one dimension of gender-based violence. Additionally, men are also victims of sexualized violence. The narrow framing of women, peace, and security juxtaposes sexualized violence as the only gender-based form of conflict against all other conflict, which is represented as gender-neutral. The WPS resolutions are at least partially developed by UN experts, adopted by the UN Security Council, and implemented through the proddings of the UN; that is, they are "embedded within UN understandings" of gender (Whitworth 2004, 137).

Prior to the end of the Cold War, sexualized violence was an issue that was not generally considered a traditional security threat, but more of a "private crime" or the "unfortunate behavior" of renegade soldiers (Seifert 1996). Carol Harrington (2010) traces how sexualized violence moved from being considered a by-product of war to a war crime during the 1990s. Rather than simply a result of successful feminist transnational networks, Harrington argues that medical and psychological research into trauma converged with international governmental practices and discourses of human rights, which allowed "sexual and gender-based violence" to become a mainstream policy field. Once sexualized violence became part of the achievement of international peace and security (at least on paper), it also became a "metaphor for vulnerable/victim in war" (Charlesworth 2008, 358).

The discourse that allowed the creation of the sexually victimized woman in international law stems from the civilian–combatant distinction in just war theory. Helen Kinsella (2011) shows that while women, children, and the elderly are all generally considered civilians, "only the category of women is accepted as already civilian … bounded by their sex" (16). The two UN treaties that distinguish between a combatant and a civilian, the 1949 Geneva Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocols, invoke characteristics to classify the two roles: "reproductive capability and sexual vulnerability—two attributes that only women are said to possess" (Kinsella 2011, 22). The set of WPS resolutions that I am examining reinforces women's sexuality because it reflects a broader discourse that distinguishes between combatant and civilian in the modern age. Much of the language in the set of resolutions focuses on "women and children." As Cynthia Enloe (1990) notes, "womenandchildren" highlights the lack of women's agency—and adulthood—that occurs when collapsing women and children into the same category. Despite the fact that women are combatants (MacKenzie 2012; Turshen and Twagiramariya 1998), despite the fact that women can build peace, not just be peaceful (Anderlini 2007), despite the fact that some women face other risks that might be more threatening to their lives and livelihoods than their sexuality, the WPS resolutions increasingly include the "women and children" language, suggesting that women are "innocent" and to be protected from conflict.

This focus on sexualized violence is related to broader trends in international organizations, especially the development of indicators to measure the efficacy of programs designed to increase attention to gender and to reduce human rights violations. Since "number of rapes" can be quantified—even though such quantifications can be problematic—this and similar measures are used to prove that human rights and gender mainstreaming efforts have been successful (True 2011; 2012). Laura McLeod has noted in a 2016 working paper that quantitative indicators are part of the technocratic governance process, and while development and critical peacebuilding scholarship has sometimes included discussions of indicators,

security studies has not; additionally, nearly all work on indicators in these fields argues to make the indicators more useful or appropriate, rather than challenging their vary existence.

While sexualized violence was sorely missing from security and human rights efforts for decades and has rightly been integrated (Zarkov 2007), the present emphasis on sexualized violence is now often the chief way the terms "women" and "gender" are marked in security and human rights laws and literatures (Henry 2014). Acts of sexual violence can allegedly be counted (as shown by the accepted provision that rapes are typically "underreported") and have a specific perpetrator, even if the offender(s) remain(s) unidentified. By contrast, structural violence that women might face during war can come from any number of parties, both as a direct result of the war or through historical or cultural influences, and is virtually impossible to chart in a way that can shown an increase or decrease over time.

The trope of victimization is central to feminist critiques of studies of conflict and post-conflict, particularly around sexualized violence. Smart (1990) argues that law, a discourse of power, reproduces women in a sexualized and subjugated form, while their bodies become sites of power and a mode of political identity. Buckley-Zistel and Zolkos (2011) contend that the fixation on wartime rape "reduces women to targets of one particular crime and constructs them as perpetual victims, fixing their social positions and political identities in the newly emerging society as passive, inferior, vulnerable, and in need of (male) protection" (10). Henry (2014) asserts, "the figure of the victim [should be] revised in feminist and other discourses so that victims are not simply reduced to a sexed, injured and incapacitated body but are instead recognized, represented and respected as complex and diverse agents with differing justice needs" (106–107). But despite scholarly attention to how limiting the focus on sexualized violence is for feminist scholarship and in international policy, Jacoby (2015), in a study of victimhood and victimization in conflict zones, finds that NGOs that work in transitional justice domains often incorporate victimhood or victim-based identities in their work to attract the attention of the international community.

How sexualized violence and other forms of victimization are integrated into international policies is based on global indicators, a quantified measurement system that transforms nebulous concepts into neat categories. Merry (2016) has tied the rise of indicators in human rights, gender violence, and sex trafficking to what is often called "evidence-based governance," a mode that will yield perfect solutions if only adequate data is collected. This form of governance is especially seductive in international policy-making, whether governmental or nongovernmental, because the "experts" are far removed from the context yet still need information to make policy. The Women, Peace, and Security agenda became part of this effort when it called for gender mainstreaming at all levels to address security needs on the basis of gender. Gender mainstreaming—or mainstreaming a gender perspective—was defined in 1997 by the UN Economic and Social Council,[13] but in short, "gender mainstreaming is the tool, and gender equality the goal" (Cohn et al. 2004). For the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, gender mainstreaming had the potential to radically transform the inclusion of women in the prevention and resolution of conflict, as well as counteracting inequality and violence based on gender (Cohn 2008). However, what resulted looked more like the old "add women and stir" approach, discussed previously, that had been criticized a decade earlier by feminist economists and development scholars (Krook and True 2012; True and Mintrom 2001).

"Add and stir" forms of gender mainstreaming are attractive for many governments of post-conflict states striving to meet criteria of statebuilding set by the UN and other international actors (Ní Aoláin et al. 2011). As these criteria can take the form of indicators (McCandless et al. 2012), what was a valid intent of international policy-makers to integrate women in reconstruction and statebuilding turns into a numbers game because of the very policies they have developed. Even though gender experts at the international level offer

13. "Mainstreaming a gender perspective is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality" (ECOSOC 1997).

guidance on how to avoid such techniques, evidence-based governance comes into conflict with the complex processes of more genuine gender mainstreaming, because it focuses on asking governments how many women they have included, what percentage of women have participated, the statistics on crimes reported, investigated, and prosecuted, and, certainly, the reduction of crimes of sexual violence over time (Shepherd 2008).

These trends speak to Enloe's (2013) caution against using women as "instruments" in achieving the goals of others, including states and international organizations. "Anything that is used instrumentally can be put back on the shelf once its users no longer find that instrument useful for their own ends" (14). This instrumentalization is two-fold. On the one hand, women are seen to matter only to the extent that they are related to or the object of security frameworks, which have tended to be designed by men. As such, their victimization is what matters, rather than their agency. On the other hand, women are used as a tool—an instrument, if you will—to achieve particular goals. Within the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, feminist scholars have cautioned that the resolutions can be used to reinscribe hierarchies of gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc., in order to justify foreign interventions, whether military, political, or social, and/or to continue conventional security practices that serve others' interests (Martín de Almagro 2017 working paper; Aroussi 2011; Gibbings 2011; Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Pratt 2013).

Yet another issue that critical for understanding the complexity of gender, security, and peacebuilding in West Africa is how international discourses exemplify the "dark continent." There is a long history of representing Africa as the paradigm of difference (Mudimbe 1994). Whether sexualized violence is considered a particularly African issue is up for debate. Certainly, the International Criminal Court, where the UN Security Council can refer cases for investigation and which has the ability to prosecute widespread sexualized violence, has only indicted individuals from African states, many of them for incitement of rape or widespread sexualized violence. Within the language of the Security Council resolutions, no region or country was highlighted as an example or problem area—that is, not until Resolution 2122,

which “Expresses its intention to increase its attention to women, peace and security issues in all relevant thematic areas of work on its agenda, including in particular ... Peace and Security in Africa” (UNSCR 2122, article 3, emphasis in original). While Resolution 2122 was the most recent resolution and emphasized conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding rather than sexualized violence, the fact that one of the WPS resolutions highlighted Africa as a region of concern moves the set of issues to become more of an “African problem.”

A 2013 U.S. Institute of Peace report refutes the assertion that wartime rape is an “African problem,” using U.S. State Department human rights reports to show that the majority of war-affected countries are affected by high levels of rape, and in fact, conflicts in Eastern Europe are more likely to report rape on a massive scale than conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa (Cohen et al. 2013). Nevertheless, this data reports three times the number of conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa than Eastern Europe (twenty-eight versus nine) and two-and-a-half times the number of conflicts characterized by wartime rape (ten in sub-Saharan Africa versus four in Eastern Europe). Sheer count alone, therefore, sustains the misconception that conflicts in Africa are more likely to include sexualized violence because there is more conflict.

Studies on WPS National Action Plans thus far have been limited to mostly cursory (though insightful) examinations and comparisons of multiple NAPs (Miller et al. 2012). Caitlin Ryan and Helen Basini have written two comprehensive accounts of the NAPs in Liberia and Sierra Leone to illustrate the plans’ shortcomings in framing and implementation. Basini and Ryan (2016) argue that without NAPs, the international community cannot understand how peace for women should be implemented. Prior to the NAPs in the two countries, women were freer to define their needs of insecurity and peace. Now, the NAPs, despite their intent, are ineffective at creating meaningful local ownership because they are driven by a bureaucratic approach to peacebuilding. In their second article, Ryan and Basini (2017) push against Mac Ginty’s (2010) model of hybridity. By asking who implements the NAPs and how in Liberia and Sierra Leone, they argue that international intervention relies on the “femeninization” of local

actors. Framing Resolution 1325 as a "soft" issue because it relates to women, it is taken less seriously than other hybrid forms of peacebuilding.

In seeking how feminists can best read discourses from the international, Hilary Charlesworth (1999) details two methodological strategies. The first is a search for silences, a seeking out that which has been deemed irrelevant or of little significance. For so long, women's concerns were not a part of the Security Council's work, and Resolution 1325 gave voice to many of those silences, of which sexualized violence was one; however, the WPS resolutions, in their narrowing focus on sexualized violence, paper over some of the silences that were never uncovered. The second methodological strategy is world traveling, a way of understanding and responding to differences among women. Charlesworth notes that even constructions like "Western women" or "Third World women" are difficult to justify (383). As Chandra Mohanty (1988) points out, "women are constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion and other ideological institutions and frameworks. They are not 'women'—a coherent group—solely on the basis of a particular economic system or policy" (74). Regarding this strategy, the Security Council is struggling. With the state-centered frameworks of human security and masculinist protectionism for women in conflict, the WPS resolutions have not incorporated other, more expansive conceptualizations of gender relations that could address women's access to social services, men's socialization into militarism, uneven gendered economic capacities, to name a few—thus producing more silences. Certain discourses about who women are, their level of security and agency, and their ability to participate fully in public and private life become fictions as they are codified—especially when the Security Council is primarily considering women in post-colonial and post-conflict regions. This international legal agenda built through discursive imaginings has constructed "women" as a category needing the Security Council's aid and protection.

African Feminism's Place in International Relations

Situating the language of victimization and sexualization within feminist postcolonial theories emphasizes the insidiousness of international discourses. African feminists, writing in voices distinct from other forms of postcolonial feminism, foreground community formations over individuals as activists and challenge liberal Western feminism with its historical focus on a gender binary. Additionally, African feminists reprioritize motherhood as a fundamental role for women, yet one they reclaim from gender binaries. Finally, though African feminists differ from each other just as Western feminists do, they encourage using the structures set up by the Western-led donor community and transnational women's groups to enact their own agency and attain their own ends.

Postcolonialism focuses on the subordination of colonies under imperial rule and relates that relationship to current events and attitudes. Because European colonial powers constituted, both materially and discursively (Doty 1996; Grovogui 2000), their colonial territories as inferior, those cultures are still seen as less civilized. Postcolonial feminists reject the stereotypes and challenge the discursive frames imposed on former colonial subjects, particularly women. Just as feminists assert that society exists with knowledge primarily set forth by men, postcolonial feminists find fault with knowledge solely based on the experiences of privileged Western women. In particular, Chandra Mohanty (1988) argues that feminists cannot consider "female" a homogenous category. The culture, class, race, and geography experienced by individual women changes their perceptions of the world (Crenshaw 1989; Collins 2000). Gayatri Spivak (1988) describes how the colonizers dismiss the voices and experiences of the "subaltern," challenging assumptions about what constitutes women's oppression. She also describes colonial relations in terms of "white men saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak 1988, 92). Certain forms of modernist or emancipatory feminist theory that use a universalized lens through which to view women are heavily criticized by postcolonial feminists because of the set of assumptions upon which the ideas of "women" and "humanity"

are based (Charusheela 2009). International discourses on women, peace, and security are often premised on these assumptions, principally the conflation of civilian with women and the experiences of threat and insecurity that women encounter.

In making claims for and about women, some Western feminists have often fallen into the "ventriloquist's fantasy" (John 1996, 22), projecting a white, Western voice and view onto a silenced subaltern subject. Chandra Mohanty (1988) characterized forms of "ethnocentric universalism" as structural domination that suppresses the heterogeneity of women in the Global South. The risk of the WPS resolutions is that they "re-legitimize ('white') masculinist protection of women and girls in conflict zones, [and] pathologize men in conflict zones as perpetrators of sexual violence" (Pratt 2013, 777). Because the sites of so many conflicts addressed by the Security Council are in the Global South, sexualized violence in conflict (rather than domestic violence or acquaintance rape) becomes an issue that is seen by well-meaning activists and policy-makers as belonging to women in "Other cultures" (Narayan 1997, 100). Ultimately, the issue is not whether sexualized violence is or is not committed against a particular community (or an individual woman). It is that the WPS resolutions and their focus on sexualized violence produces discourses about women that are made to seem universal (Grewal 2005). Charlesworth (1999) notes that even constructions like "Western women" or "Third World women" are difficult to justify (383). As Chandra Mohanty (1988) points out, "women are constituted as women through the complex interaction between class, culture, religion and other ideological institutions and frameworks. They are not 'women'—a coherent group—solely on the basis of a particular economic system or policy" (74).

The postcolonial feminism that is known in feminist IR circles generally has its roots in South Asia: Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Gayatri Spivak, Uma Narayan. And while their contributions are certainly relevant, the specific colonial experiences of the Indian subcontinent requires us to ask whether postcolonialism manifests itself differently in Africa (Williams 1997), especially in relation to the ongoing state-building projects and effects of economic and security policies. Many African feminists have argued that the situation of women in Africa cannot be

addressed by prioritizing gender alone (Nnaemeka 1998). In Nigeria, for example, notions of gender and gender relations were changed by waves of missionaries and colonization. The concept of "woman" as "the other" was not native to Nigeria but was imported by the British. As Oyewumi (1997) argues, feminist theory is based on two fundamental, yet paradoxical, assumptions: that gender is socially constructed and that the subordination of women is universal; therefore, social reality should be dependent on culture and context. The colonial-era exporting of Western gender relations and the binaries it rests upon to places where gender and other social phenomena are constructed differently is echoed in the current diffusion process of "modern" gender norms (Krook and True 2012; Zwingel 2012). This push toward a universalizing concept of modernity is one-sided, "with the Western so-called 'developed world' serving as the model for achievement" (Arnfred 2011, 107).

Tamale (2006) argues that African women can inherit and shape traditions of their own that go beyond the discourse of rights imposed from above. In a study of women's empowerment strategies in post-war Sierra Leone, Abdullah and Fofana-Ibrahim (2010) write that the discourse from feminists and feminist-led organizations is that empowerment is achieved through group effort, based in communal forms of social transformation. The discourse coming from the UN Development Programme and the UN Security Council, however, is based on opportunities for individual women to access the current system rather than transform the system into entities more congenial to groups and societies. Shepherd (2015) notes that, in the UN's peacebuilding architecture, national civil society has been discursively constructed so as not to have agency over domestic and international peacebuilding processes while simultaneously having responsibility for them. To make empowerment and peacebuilding more appropriate for their communities, then, Abdulla and Fofana-Ibrahim (2010) advocate for African women to reclaim the international peacebuilding agenda and liberal feminist conceptions of women's empowerment.

Shiera S. el-Malik (2014) uses Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power to examine ways that gender interacts with dualisms produced by power (e.g., imperial/colonial, virtue/vice).

She recalls the suffragette movement to explain that gender combined with other binaries in a political project to extend British women the right to vote. In doing so, the suffragettes' cause was based on a Victorian Christian version of femininity, one that did not extend to British colonies and the women who lived within them. What was ostensibly a liberal and liberating political goal was restrictive for all but a narrow group of women. A similar construction and promotion of a particular type of womanhood can be seen in the implementation of the WPS agenda. Liberal feminists who champion the WPS agenda have determined the type of women who will be helped (victims), have outlined the type of women who can do the work (activists), and have described the approaches best suited for the women (individualistic). El-Malik argues that gendered hierarchies are not simply between men and women but can also be between different groups of women in articulating their notions of femininity. Martin de Almagro (2017) specifically describes the hierarchies of raced and classed women in the Burundian civil society implementation of the WPS agenda. Perception of women's power depended on their intersecting identities, which affected their abilities to work on WPS implementation.

African novelist and feminist Chimamanda Ngozi Adiche asserted in a 2009 TED talk that there is "danger in a single story." This is not only the story told about African women by liberal feminists or by actors in peacebuilding, but also by postcolonial feminists themselves without allowing African feminists to speak about their own social cultures and circumstances. African feminists write of many of the same concerns as do postcolonial feminists who have been better integrated into IR: being spoken for by others and being considered a monolithic entity (Mohanty 1998). Though African feminists often share the same concerns as other postcolonial feminists, particularly those from South Asia, African feminists also need to be allowed the opportunity to articulate their perspectives without being considered the same as other postcolonial feminists. At the same time, as has been discussed at the African Feminist Forum, advocates and scholars need to recognize the issues that arise in the construction of "African" as an all-encompassing term in itself and in opposition to other forms of feminism.

In particular, many African feminists emphasize the need to resist cultural imperialism (Nkealeh 2016) and establish "identity through resistance" (Nnaemeka 2005, 32). This emphasis on resistance draws on pan-Africanist activism during mid-20th century independence movements on the continent, shared goals of decolonization alongside developing new governance systems. Though men were almost exclusively the public faces of pan-Africanism (Nyabola 2016), women built on that activism toward their own goals. However, only recently have African women been widely labeling themselves as feminist (for examples, see the African Feminist Forum). Because African women's experiences exist at the margins of internationally practiced liberal and Marxist feminisms (Kolawole 1997), the feminist-minded activists had not found the label fruitful. For these women, non-African-based feminisms lacked the social activism that had been built on generations of activists for independence and solidarity.

Unlike the liberal feminism that is central to peacebuilding policies and practices and that institutionalizes motherhood, African feminism writ large embraces motherhood as an experience, as a practice, and as an identity (Nnaemeka 1997). This embrace of motherhood is revealed in cultural artifacts, in literature, in history, and in contemporary politics. Acholonu (1995) conceptualizes "motherism" in African feminism as a concept that puts rural women as the nurturers of society. While African women accept the vulnerability of their bodies in various stages of motherhood, they also see the vulnerable body as an empowering experience of strength. When it came to accounting for motherhood in various external interventions in women's lives, however, donors found it difficult to square the importance of child-bearing and rearing in women's lives with their own accountability and economic growth goals. Development projects that targeted women in the 1980s and 1990s tended to look at the productive aspects of women's lives to measure how much the women were contributing to the economy and toward economic growth, while minimizing the reproductive parts of women's lives (Kabeer 1994). Social welfare policies, then, referred to motherhood as a burden, standing in direct contrast to African feminism's focus on motherhood as empowering and productive.

African women contend with an economic imperialism that has echoes of the colonial days that often make a postcolonial identity more salient than one based on gender. "The side effects of the International Monetary Fund are often more real to her suffering than gender division" (Kolawole 1997, 12), though gender divisions also sharpen the point of the economic effects. African feminists consider intersectionality, but gender is not always the lynchpin that holds it together. In general, African feminists collaborate with men and eschew gendered dichotomies. Instead, men and women play complementary roles in society (Acholonu 1995). At the center of much of African feminism is a privileging of familial and social relations and interdependence, with a strong emphasis on community and sociability/conviviality (Nyamnjoh 2015b; Kolawole 2002).

In traditional discussions of international security, Africa is marginalized[14]. Conversely, however, "the continent is central to discourses on 'new' security issues that focus on the environment, women's bodies, human welfare, and sustainable development" (Dunn and Shaw 2001, 3). These discourses are not based on dialogue between relatively equal parties, however, but are often directed by the international community vis-à-vis African national, regional, and local societies that are supposed to imbibe directives from international governmental organizations. Grovogui (2009), while not explicitly writing about gender, observes that "'innocence' and 'victimhood' have emerged as authorizing tropes of intervention" in discussions of Africa (273). The language of victimization that is endemic in much of the discourse around the WPS resolutions is also the justification for imposition of modes of governance more broadly. Good governance norms have been widely accepted by Western states, multilateral donors, and international NGOs (Abrahamsen 2000), and Gallagher (2014) argues that these norms have produced splits "between the donor and the recipient; between the recipient state and society; and between individual actors within the recipient state" (342). Gallagher's argument does not extend to gender analysis, but it does echo some feminist

14. An emerging exception might be a focus on Islamic or anti-Western terrorism across the Sahara and Sahel.

thought that critiques the dichotomous morality that shapes international discourses on gender. She notes that the good governance discourse requires that African states be portrayed as “decayed, corrupt, and incapable” (342) and that individual Africans and civil society be characterized as virtuous or victims. “Civil society is seen as the sphere capable of generating the solutions to problems of conflict or to the barriers to development or democracy” (Chandler 2010, 385). Governance on women’s issues, though institutionalized at the international level, is still regularly shifted to civil society at the national and local levels, particularly in the Global South (True 2003). While international discourses praise women’s activism in the Global South, they still put forth a particular perspective of “women’s needs” in post-conflict as recovery and reparations from sexualized violence (Ní Aoláin et al. 2011; Pratt 2013).

Much of the research on sexualized violence in conflict and post-conflict comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been erroneously described by sensationalists as “the rape capital of the world.”[15] Because of the sexualized violence that many Congolese women have experienced in Eastern Congo, Congolese women sometimes use discourses related to sexualized violence as a resource to access international funding, especially funding from NGOs; particular victims’ claims are valued, and this construction of victimhood becomes valuable to others (Jean-Bouchard 2013). Again, this is not to discount any form of violence that women have faced, but this does illustrate that because the international community—UN and NGOs both—place a greater emphasis on sexualized violence, local communities will follow suit. Whether this strategy has been employed outside the DRC is unknown, though it is certainly plausible if local women’s organizations recognize the donor money that could be gained through a tactic.

Resolution 1820, the second of the WPS resolutions, was passed primarily because of advocacy related to sexualized violence in the DRC, “the poster child” (Steinberg 2011, 128).

15. For discussions on this problematic framing, see http://africacheck.org/reports/why-it-is-wrong-to-call-s-africa-or-any-country-the-rape-capital-of-the-world/ and http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/a-needed-controversy-over-sexualized-violence-in-democratic-republic-of-con.

The ambassadors to the Security Council were lobbied by advocates and watched films on sexualized violence, including The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo, a documentary about survivors of rape in the DRC (Steinberg 2011). Reports from Syria detail widespread sexualized violence (Di Giovanni 2013), yet the mainstream narrative focuses on President Bashar Al-Assad, the civil war, and possible bleed-over into (or support from) other states in the region. By contrast, narratives about ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo highlight the rape of the women and the "rape" of the country's mineral wealth (Autesserre 2012).

When Resolution 2106, which focused on sexualized violence, was passed in June 2013, Angelina Jolie addressed the Security Council in the debate preceding the resolution. By contrast, the speaker who addressed the Security Council for Resolution 2122—which focuses on including women at all phases of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding—in October 2013 was Brigitte Balipou, a lawyer and member of the Constitutional Court of Central African Republic. Notwithstanding Balipou's accomplishments in advocating for women in CAR and internationally, the effect of using celebrity activism in urging the Security Council to pass a resolution addressing sexualized violence is clear. Jolie's visible presence at the Security Council lends legitimacy to this resolution and its focus on sexualized violence as an issue that those who might not otherwise pay attention to the United Nations should care about. Balipou's advocacy, while vital in guiding the Security Council to pass the resolution, signals that women's peacebuilding and governance roles are significant in African conflict regions but have much less importance to donors or casual observers. Celebrities reinforce stratification and hierarchfication that was present before.

At the June 2014 Global Summit to End Sexual Violence, a "mock trial" was held to illustrate the effectiveness of the WPS resolutions. In this "trial," the six "judges" were white, dressed in full robes and white wigs, and the "witnesses" were four women from Africa, dressed in traditional clothing (Gowrinathan 2014). The mock trial served as visual rhetoric, both to support the aims of the summit and to underscore the racialized and colonialized understandings of sexualized violence. "Africa … has been a testing ground for a number of

approaches aimed at redressing gender inequality," which present an opportunity to transform the debate (Olonisakin and Hendricks 2013, 2), though the opportunity for engaging more fully with women's lives outside of superficial imagery of African women in conflict has not been grasped. Olonisakin and Hendricks point out that despite the WPS resolutions' focus on sexualized violence, the crimes persist in conflict. They ask whether "feminist perspectives advocating a more radical approach" than one gender perspective placed on top of traditional militarized solutions to conflicts might work (Olonisakin and Hendricks 2013, 6).

To use African feminism as a lens through which to examine the WPS resolutions and women's activism for them is to foreground the women's own social contexts and formations rather than external assumptions about them. This dissertation explores how the relationships of Ivorian women to their communities, the state, and the international community in the post-conflict context might be informed by African feminist voices that are rarely heard in international relations.

Chapter Three:
Feminist Methodologies and Fieldwork Methods

While Chapter One provides a political history of Côte d'Ivoire and the conflicts there, I include in this chapter a justification of Côte d'Ivoire as my primary site for research, including the actors involved in the WPS agenda's implementation there. I also describe the feminist methodology I used to collect and analyze my data. Throughout the chapter, I remain focused on the WPS agenda and the women I am highlighting so that they remain at the center of analysis. By doing so, I contribute to understanding how security policies affect the people they are intended to help and how individuals, groups, and communities can productively contribute to international policies and international relations.

Côte d'Ivoire was the first African country and the first post-conflict country to establish a National Action Plan (NAP) to implement the WPS resolutions. In contrast to its neighbors, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire did not receive the same level of international attention during the conflicts, nor did it receive the vast amounts of humanitarian assistance in the post-conflict peacebuilding period. Similarly, though women's peace activism in Côte d'Ivoire emerged during its conflicts, this activism did not garner the same international attention as Sierra Leone and Liberia. In Côte d'Ivoire, then, it became easier to ask about women's activism, as well as the tensions in the work done by the international community, without the baggage of being held up as an example for women in other countries to follow.

In many ways, feminist scholarship in the past twenty years has opened International Relations to questions of gender; however, insights from feminist methodologies and theories have not been well incorporated into even closely related subfields. While both feminist and critical approaches to peace and conflict studies have engaged in a "local turn" in peacebuilding that pays greater attention to power and highlights emancipation and agency (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; McLeod 2015), critical peacebuilding methodologies continue to privilege objectivity, even when they build on post-positivist methodologies, and do not fully consider

how gender is a central element of social life. Fieldwork practices, already a complex undertaking, can be more complicated for highly reflexive feminist researchers who aim to avoid exploitation and the pretense of objectivity (Jacoby 2006; Stern 2006).

Feminist methodologies do not simply incorporate gender. They privilege subjectivity, avoid exploitation, and consider gender even though gender might not initially be seen as important. Feminist methodologies also allow for the potential for meaningful engagement and empowering women (Ackerly 2000; Ackerly et al. 2006; Ackerly and True 2010; Confortini 2012). In my research, I have attempted to incorporate all these aspects of feminist methodologies, both in the research design and analysis and in the fieldwork itself. I focused on three particular aspects of feminist methodologies that were appropriate to my project: reflexivity in my own research process, sharing knowledge and mobilizing collectively, and understanding data relationally across organizations, sites, and crises. Incorporating reflexivity, or self-reflection on ontological and epistemological assumptions in my choice of research questions and methods (Ackerly et al. 2006), pushed me to consider how my identity as a white, female, American researcher with not-perfectly-fluent French and how that might influence how research participants responded to my presence and my questions. Collective mobilizing was central to the work of the women I spoke with, and they informed me how collaboration between civil society groups was vital to continuing their work. Similarly, as a body of knowledge is developed collectively (Weldon 2006), my interview participants and I co-developed knowledge about the language of the resolutions, the limits of activism, and the practices of related local organizations. With my expertise in feminist theory and deep knowledge of each of the resolutions in the WPS agenda and my respondents' extensive practices of implementing processes and programs, we unpacked possibilities of ideal implementation and how the Ivorian state might support women better. This dissertation furthers that process, and I will share an executive summary and portions of the research regarding techniques and potential linkages between women's organizations with my research participants. Finally, I focused on relationality between crises and contexts, between ideas and

experiences, echoing what the women's organizations were doing in their work. I pushed myself to consider the effects of actors on one another and the relationship between theories and practices (Robinson 2006). I asked how theories of security, peacebuilding, and feminism might explain the relationships between an organization and its donors, and then I asked myself whether the techniques my respondents described could push that theory further.

I chose to focus my research on local women's organizations working on peace and security because women in Côte d'Ivoire—like in many other areas of the world—have been largely excluded from formal peacebuilding processes. It is often the women in post-conflict contexts who act as bridge-builders between local and security policy communities. They tend to have greater access to the community and thus enhanced intelligence-gathering capacities. Women inhabit the intermediate and mediated spaces from where under theorized and empirically understudied discursive and material dimensions of peacebuilding from a gender perspective can be investigated. They also become the narrators of a dynamic and fluid Africa that actively engages with global culture but which is also able to generate its own authoritative representations in multiple locations of difference. Facing male-dominated post-conflict reconstruction, many women are instead working through civil society—with the help of the international community—to set security and peacebuilding priorities for women.

Because local organizations must negotiate their positions within their communities, within the state, and within the international community, they may reveal or mask the contradictions between international human rights efforts and the people whose rights are violated (Anheier & Salamon 1998; Carpenter 2007; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Anderlini (2007) finds that the participation of NGOs, particularly women's NGOs "strikes at the very heart of the Westphalian system and principles of noninterference and state sovereignty in international relations" (2007, 193). While they are not considered true actors in security, NGOs, both local and transnational, are on the front lines of providing support to individuals and groups and are vital for executing international law in local contexts. NGOs have problems of their own of power and positionality (Shepherd 2015), which I fully recognize, yet they are also the

organizations tasked to be the bridge between the international community and the people. Community organizations are seen to be indispensable interlocutors between civilians (especially women), national governments, and international organizations and are often responsible for translating a rhetorical commitment at the UN level into concrete progress on the ground, a position that allows the organizations and their members to interpret agendas differently from those developed at the UN. Because the work of local women's organizations does happen in large part in local communities, it was necessary to observe how these organizations navigate the international community's demands within local contexts. In the case of the WPS agenda, it is important to understand this activism and the role that local women's organizations play in the WPS implementation. Governance on women's issues, though institutionalized at the international level, is still regularly shifted to civil society at the national and local levels, particularly in the Global South (True 2003). Therefore, it is these local understandings and practices that must be explored in order to explain how the agenda is actually implemented and the factors that comprise the implementation.

I generally use the terminology of "local women's organizations" rather than "non-governmental organizations (NGOs)" or "civil society organizations (CSOs)." Although all of the organizations I encountered were officially registered as NGOs (as far as I was able to assess), representatives from women's organizations and governmental officials referred to transnational NGOs as "NGOs" and drew a distinction between them and women's organizations, which are usually more loosely formed and definitely more poorly funded. In speaking to these local organizations, my goal was to center the agency and the efforts of the local actors rather than once again centering the international community and expat cultures (i.e., the "Global North" and the "West") in my analysis. I wanted to make these women's organizations the primary actors in my study, rather than seeing how the "we" (typical in both policy and scholarship as either the international community or a cosmopolitan international) does things "over there." Even though my intention throughout the research and writing process was not to directly compare Côte d'Ivoire to other West African countries that have

been the focus of policy-oriented studies (see, among others, Caesar et al. 2010; Swaine 2011), nor did I aim to compare the efficacy of local organizations versus international and transnational ones in security and peacebuilding, I did want to discover and illustrate the tensions between local women's organizations and other actors working on these issues in the country.

In order to understand how the conceptions of security put forth by women's community organizations often come into tension with the Ivorian government's ideas of security and of self-presentation as well as how women's organizations work with and push back against international and transnational discourses of African women, I conducted interviews and participant observation in the country, primarily Abidjan, from October 2014 through July 2015 and from September through November 2015. Most government organizations, foreign agencies, and NGOs are headquartered in Abidjan, the commercial capital, rather than Yamoussoukro, the official political capital. My research included semi-structured interviews with multiple representatives of twelve women's community organizations working on the WPS agenda. I asked my interview participants about how their organizations implement the WPS agenda and the Ivorian and what types of security are the most important to them and the women they serve in order to understand the varying conceptualizations of security and how closely aligned they are with international discourses. In addition, I asked about the sources of their technical and financial support and how involved these donors are in the organizations' programming, as well as the organizations' relationships with other local organizations, with the national government, and with international partners, both governmental organizations and transnational NGOs. I conducted further interviews with Ivorian government officials and with UN representative about how they relate to and support local women's organizations in peacebuilding and reconstruction in the country. Of all my interview participants, I asked whether the interviewee believed women's efforts are successful and whether they perceived that women believe that their own activism is successful and recognized by the government. I also asked which interventions they believed would provide

the greatest return. In the case of government and international officials, their responses were often close to the "party line" of their organization; however, it was fruitful to compare the use of particular words and phrases across interview participants.

In addition, I conducted participant observation at four workshops and trainings led by the women's community organizations and attended a public conference on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The participant observation allowed me to gain insight into the strategies that the local organizations employed in their communities according to international funding and governmental mandates. Watching the organizations at work often reinforced what they had articulated to me in interviews and showed me how communities respond to the organizations. This observation also revealed how the organizations mediate the varying concepts of security and the priorities given to them by the multiple financial and technical partners.

The majority of this research was conducted in French, with a few interviews in English; however, because many of the people I spoke with had advanced education and had worked extensively with international partners, they spoke some English, even if they were not fluent. This was especially helpful when I needed to clarify a point or ask a detailed question, that we could use some Franglais to ensure mutual understanding. French is widely used in Côte d'Ivoire, rather than a dominant local language, so I rarely needed an interpreter. The few times I attended an event where a language other than French was spoken, an attendee or program assistant would offer to summarize the discussion.

Each interview and public meeting or workshop was recorded and transcribed, and I also took extensive field notes after each recorded interview and meeting and throughout my field research to capture the themes that arose. Though I did not wish to foreclose interpretive possibilities in my fieldwork that would guide me to unexplored issues, I did adapt my research process to slightly adjust for what I had previously learned. In analyzing the material from my interviews, I relied on how women spoke about security and the work that their organizations

did. I pulled out key themes from my notes and the interviews and noted how often those themes came up or if some research participants had a strong devotion to a particular concept.

Out of this analysis, I realized that the best way to organize my findings was along three levels of analysis so that I could compare the patterns that occur across various modes of women's security and peacebuilding. Understanding what is happening for women's security in Côte d'Ivoire at the macro level (international and transnational actors), meso level (national actors), and local level (local organizations) allow for understanding the effects that multiple actors have on the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in the country. These three levels of analysis—and of actors—have not been adequately examined by feminist security, feminist peacebuilding, or WPS literatures. Interpreting my data through these three levels of analysis exposes the discourses about African women and the forces that impact the implementation of the WPS agenda and, more importantly, reveals how women themselves advocate for themselves and their communities.

Outlining actors and mechanisms by which the WPS agenda is implemented as well as describing women's priorities and how they constitute alternative forms of security was the driving factor in my research. In the chapters that follow, I bring insights from African feminist scholarship to enlarge conceptions of security, improve feminist theorizing, and specify processes of post-conflict peacebuilding as well as problems inherent in implementing the WPS agenda. Specifically, Chapter Four addresses the Ivorian government's implementation of the WPS agenda through security sector reform. Chapter Five examines the models of intervention for security and peacebuilding and considers how they sometimes conflict when putting them in practice, especially in gender issues. Chapter Six attends to Ivorian women themselves to understand their conceptions of security and how they perform their activism in conjunction with external advocates and donors as well as their own communities. I conclude in Chapter Seven with a call for further research on how women conceptualize their security in various political contexts, as well as how they might work together cross regionally without transnational or international organizations as an intermediary.

Chapter Four:
Does Gender Inclusion Equal Security Sector Reform?
Implementing UNSCR 1325 in Côte d'Ivoire

How do United Nations directives to include women in peacebuilding—the notable UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions—become implemented in post-conflict states? To answer this question, I examine the development and implementation of Côte d'Ivoire's National Action Plan to enact the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. In particular, I assess the contours of the role that the Ivorian state itself plays in the agenda's implementation. Such an assessment is important because: a) it is imperative to examine implementation strategies at the state level to determine whether and how women's security needs are incorporated into internationally mandated peacebuilding strategies and norms, and b) Côte d'Ivoire provides a critical case for understanding how women's inclusion does—or does not—happen, both because of the nature and attention given to its conflict and because it was one of the first countries to develop a plan to implement the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, known as a National Action Plan (NAP). In examining Côte d'Ivoire's NAP, moreover, I address how action (or inaction) at the national level supports or does not support international norms and directives. My findings suggest that, first, that at the national level, Côte d'Ivoire's National Action Plan has been implemented only partially, with the country devoting much of its attention to security sector reform (SSR). Though the United Nations and other members of the international community have pushed a peacebuilding agenda after the immediate security threat was contained, the Ivorian government translates this into addressing militarized security structures, thus conflating security and peacebuilding. Second, this partial implementation, ironically, can be traced in part back to the UN and international donors, who work with Ivorian authorities to prioritize security sector reform. Ultimately, implementation of

the Ivorian NAP represents an inadequate response that focuses on the easiest ways to define and measure international priorities at the national level.

In terms of women's security, the Ivorian implementation of the NAP translates into an emphasis on sexualized violence, giving primacy to achieving easily measurable indicators, while privileging traditional security mechanisms. In particular, in Côte d'Ivoire, women have been instrumentalized by the Ivorian state, with the support of the UN and donors, to fulfill the international community's demands for SSR in the transition out of the UN peacekeeping mission. In other words, women's security has become collapsed into security sector reform in Côte d'Ivoire. My research confirms warnings from feminist scholars about the potential outcomes of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, both in terms of its content and in the processes and channels involved in implementation. My insights are critical for pinpointing where processes become conceptually narrowed and how they might be revised.

In this chapter, I focus on the implementation of the NAP at the state level. (International influences are discussed in the following chapter.) I detail the content of the country's National Action Plan to implement the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda, exploring the successes and failures within Côte d'Ivoire regarding both incorporating women's organizations into the drafting of the NAP and implementing the plan itself. Next, I describe the Ivorian security sector reform programs and connect them to theories of the sexualization of violence against women and the instrumentalization of women in security, as well as the increasing use of "measurable" indicators for international policymaking. I then analyze the interviews and participant observation that I conducted during my research, exploring how the conceptions of security put forth by women's community organizations often come into tension with the Ivorian government's ideas of security and of self-presentation. My research demonstrates that women's security, with the collusion of national and international actors, ultimately becomes a bureaucratized form of security, relying heavily on protection and inclusion into the existing governmental and

security systems, without being transformative and attending to the full range of security needs and human rights.

Development and Implementation of Côte d'Ivoire's National Action Plan

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1325, which marked the first time that the Council seriously engaged with women's peace and security. As stated in Chapter One, the key provisions of Resolution 1325 are: a) increased participation and representation of women at all levels of decision-making; b) attention to specific protection needs of women and girls in conflict; c) ensuring a gender perspective[16] in post-conflict processes; d) incorporating a gender perspective in UN programming, reporting, and Security Council missions; and e) including a gender perspective and training in UN peace support operations (Cohn et al. 2004). Seven other resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security followed, at times expanding, extending, narrowing, and defining Resolution 1325.[17] Resolution 1889 called for a set of indicators to track implementation of 1325, which were to be used for UN programming but which are now also used by member states. The indicators, developed through a consultation process with UN Member States, UN agencies, and civil society and detailed in a report by the Secretary-General, condensed the above provisions to prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery—now called the four pillars of implementation (S/2010/498).

In 2004, four years after Resolution 1325 was passed and three years *before* the subsequent resolutions were developed, the President of the Security Council made a statement encouraging member states to develop National Action Plans (NAPs) in the process of implementing Resolution 1325 at the national level (S/PRST/2004/40). The purpose of the plans was to outline the challenges a given country faced and to detail how it would address

16. See footnote 10.
17. These resolutions are 1820 (2008), 1888 and 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 and 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015).

these challenges. The NAPs are generally divided into two categories: donor countries and conflict-affected countries.

In 2007, Côte d'Ivoire developed its NAP under the lead of the Ministry of Family, Women and Social Affairs with the collaboration of several other ministries. While seven European countries had previously developed their own NAPs, starting in 2005, Côte d'Ivoire was the first African country, the first Global South country, and the first conflict-affected country to have a NAP. As of late 2017, sixty-eight countries have established NAPs, including many of Côte d'Ivoire's neighbors in West Africa (WILPF n.d.). Côte d'Ivoire's NAP has four priority areas:

1) Protection of women and girls against sexual violence, including female circumcision
2) Inclusion of gender considerations in development policies and programs
3) The participation of women and men in the reconstruction and national reinsertion processes
4) Strengthening of the participation of women in the decision-making process

These priority areas generally align with the WPS agenda's four pillars of implementation (though these pillars were not specified until two years after Côte d'Ivoire's NAP was developed). Each priority area details long-term and immediate results, with action-based indicators to achieve these results. The NAP is relatively detailed, considering it was somewhat of a "guinea pig" for similar countries; however, UNOCI, UN Development Programme, UNICEF, UN Development Fund for Women (the precursor to UN Women), UN Population Fund, and the government of Norway provided technical (NAP design and plans for future assessment, monitoring, and evaluation) and financial support (DCAF 2011). A comprehensive resource framework, or budget proposal, is given at the end of the NAP, though there is no information given about where the funds would come from. In the acknowledgements section

of the NAP, the then–Minister of Family, Women and Social Affairs did thank UNDP[18] for "its financial and technical support for the completion of this work" (Côte d'Ivoire NAP 2007, 9).

Civil society was not officially consulted at all in the NAP's development (Miller et al. 2014). In other NAPs, both later ones in other African countries and in countries in the Global North, specific civil society partners are named and are responsible for various aspects of implementation. They are also often thanked as partners in the development of the document, and this recognition typically brings an ongoing partnership with the government and with bilateral and international partners (e.g., Norway NAP 2006; Senegal 2011; Sierra Leone 2009).

However, though specific civil society partners were not officially involved in the development of Côte d'Ivoire's NAP nor listed as official partners, the national government and the international community definitely relied on the engagement of women in civil society in the NAP's implementation. One organizational leader said, "I had heard that it was happening because I know someone at UNIFEM [the predecessor to UN Women] who was working on it. I made a few inquiries and offered the help of [my organization], but no one ever contacted me" (interview, April 2015). Asking for women to do the work of a plan they had not contributed to instrumentalized them and civil society, using the perception of their legitimacy without providing space for their input (recalling Enloe's [2013] caution about using women as instruments to achieve the goals of others). This instrumentalization is evident in the range of responses my interlocutors gave to the question of why Côte d'Ivoire was the first African and first conflict-affected country to develop a NAP.

Because of the government upheaval since 2007, much of the institutional memory in the Ministry of Solidarity, Women, Family and Children had been lost, whether to personnel turnover or to selective amnesia. A few leaders of women's organizations speculated that

18. Much of the front matter is only available in the English version of the NAP, which could be a result of the version that was made available, or it could be a matter of in preparation for an international audience, the NAP's authors gave priority to the English version, incorporating statements from the then-president, prime minister, and gender minister, showing that it was an outwardly directed document "for show" rather than a guideline that the government would take seriously alongside civil society.

creating the NAP quickly was a move by the Gbagbo government to appease the international community. A national representative from a regional women's organization stated her clear preference for the current president Ouattara over Gbagbo. "Gbagbo wanted to do just enough to stay in power," she said. "Of course he did something 'easy' to make the UN like him so maybe they would ignore other problems" (interview, April 2015). A NAP would show that the government was committed to implementing international human rights norms. A representative from an organization of former women parliamentarians and ministers said, "The women's ministry asked me personally for what I thought should be in the National Action Plan. I went there and told them. But when it was time to have meetings with the UN and the Norwegian embassy to make the formal plan, I was not invited. I think they [the ministry] wanted my contribution but then wanted to say they had designed it themselves" (interview, June 2015). She did not know why the Ivorian government was developing a NAP at this particular time, but she thought it had something to do with international and transnational actors rather than anything happening in the country itself.

One respondent described Côte d'Ivoire as a good test case for creating a national plan at that time; the country was still in conflict, though much of the widespread fighting had ceased by 2004, which meant that the UN could show how to begin developing a NAP in a conflict-affected country. "I don't know if this is what actually happened," said a program officer at a national umbrella organization, "but Côte d'Ivoire was a good place to start for a National Action Plan. We had a war, but not as bad as the war in Liberia. We had Muslim and Christian women who had worked for peace. We knew what peace and prosperity looked like in our past. Maybe it seemed like we were doing okay, so our government could handle it" (interview, March 2015). In this group interview, a program assistant speculated that because "the government thought that it could handle it [the NAP]," then they didn't need the help of women's NGOs, even if everyone knew that the government did not have the technical capacity or political will to capably develop and implement a NAP.

In addition to this skepticism toward the government's effectiveness in working on women's security, some respondents believed they had been deceived by the government. They felt that just about everyone, even the women's ministry, only paid lip service to women's rights and security. "Gender is easy," noted one woman, "because no one takes it seriously, so our government didn't have to take it seriously either" (interview, April 2015). Her meaning was not that policies on gender issues were actually easy to develop and implement but that anything having to do with women is low-hanging fruit. No one with any real power, whether in the national government or international community, will pay attention to gender policies, so these policies could be adopted and then neglected. It could be more of a signal, again, by the Ivorian government to the international community that the state would abide by international norms, including gender norms. However, she intimated that both the Ivorian government and the international community would be generally satisfied once the policies and plans were established; the bare minimum would achieve the government's and the United Nations' goals. "No follow-through," she said. Likewise, another representative of a national organization took a longer but still cynical view: "Côte d'Ivoire has always been forward-looking, not wanting to dwell on mistakes. When our leaders see that the UN says women are important for the future, they [the leaders] say that women are important for the future. This is part of us wanting to be 'modern,' like we always have wanted to be" (interview, March 2015).

Côte d'Ivoire's Security Sector Reform

In rebuilding Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the conflict, UNOCI and international policy analysts called for security sector reform (SSR) as a way to reestablish order and rebuild trust in the country (Boutellis 2011). The 2007 Ouagadougou Accords that ended the first civil war spelled out a number of necessary aspects of SSR, and in 2012 the government's Interministerial Working Group for Security Sector Reform completed a comprehensive national strategy that took into account both official military and unofficial militia and rebel forces. SSR is a process that aims to reform the justice and security sectors of a country—including the armed forces,

law enforcement, courts, and prisons—to better ensure security for the state and for its people (Bastick and de Torres 2010). SSR can stand in for good governance and respect for human rights in a post-conflict country, especially if the reform has taken into account all actors in the conflict and aims to implement accountability, transparency, and democratic participation (Hänggi 2004). It means making security provision, oversight, and management more effective and more accountable within a framework of democratic civilian control, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Even when the process is well-conceived and well-funded, SSR often suffers from a lack of local ownership, where groups at all levels of the process are not committed to the good governance principles. SSR processes are also often limited to the security and sometimes the justice sectors, rather than working with the broader governmental and societal structures to change systemic norms.

Since about 2007, gender considerations have been increasingly incorporated into SSR because of the recognition that men and women have different security needs and that policies need to be developed to properly address these needs. Like most policies with a gender component, SSR focuses on women and girls and neglects gender-based violence against men and boys.[19] SSR is explicitly mentioned in half of the Women, Peace, and Security resolutions. Most of the resolutions that include SSR give direct reference to it as key to addressing sexual violence (1820; 1888; 2106). For example, Resolution 1888 emphasizes "the importance of addressing sexual violence issues from the outset of peace processes and mediation efforts," in particular in SSR arrangements. By contrast, resolution 2122 gives broader reasons to include gender in SSR, namely eliminating obstacles to addressing women's access to justice and increasing women's participation in political and reconstruction processes. SSR is implicit in the rest of the resolutions, however, which call for acknowledgement of women and thorough

19. Such violence includes sexual violence, forced conscription, and sex-selective massacre, acts that most scholars believe go hand-in-hand with violence against women and girls (Carpenter 2006; Davies and True 2015).

gender mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping missions and in national security, justice, and political processes.

Because Côte d'Ivoire's National Action Plan was developed in the interim period of the civil war and the post-electoral crisis, the Ivorian government had the opportunity to use the NAP as a tool for prevention of conflict (using women to help pacify communities), for the protection of women in conflict, and for their participation in resolving the conflict and in peacebuilding. The NAP rarely came into play during the post-electoral crisis, however. In the 57 UN Security Council resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire since 2000, about half mentioned Resolution 1325, though that number began to increase after 2007, the year the NAP was developed. Starting in 2010, the resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire occasionally referenced the later WPS resolutions, becoming more detailed about protection of women from sexual violence, calling for justice for perpetrators of such violence, and mainstreaming a gender perspective in the UN peacekeeping mission. This increasing attention was always limited to one preamble paragraph, however, and never stipulated any connection with one of the action items. Despite the increasing attention to women's security, of the thirty-two Security Council resolutions on Côte d'Ivoire passed since the Ivorian NAP was adopted in 2007, only four cited the NAP. The first of these four was passed in 2012, five years after the NAP's adoption and a full year after the end of the post-electoral crisis. Just as referencing the NAP to reinforce civilian and state security was not a priority for the UN Security Council—whether to prevent or resolve the long-simmering conflict or to protect the civilians from gender-based violence—the NAP seemed equally not to be a priority to the national government, no matter which party was in power.

As part of Cote d'Ivoire's National Action Plan, integrating women into the military and the police was one of the aspects that was seen as the most achievable. At the UN mission, few had a devoted gender portfolio; rather, officials responsible for an issue area were required to mainstream gender into their activities.[20] A UNOCI official who had worked with the national

20. While it is vital to mainstream gender in all mission activities, it is also important to have gender expertise as part of the mission. At UNOCI, then, few officials had extensive knowledge of gender issues

government on supporting gender mainstreaming said, "We can't change the culture and their ideas about women, but we can make sure that the military and the police lead the way in including women" (interview, May 2015). SSR has been a priority of UNOCI for a number of years. Especially since a May 2015 report by the UN Secretary-General found that Ivorian security forces continue to commit crimes such as sexual violence, illegal detention, and extortion with impunity (United Nations 2015), UNOCI has been reinforcing SSR efforts in the final two years of the mission. With this redoubled focus for the national government to implement SSR, adding gender mainstreaming to the SSR programs would effectively kill two birds with one stone. The Ivorian government could say it had implemented the NAP, and the SSR program would be given more legitimacy because it had incorporated the WPS agenda. Multiple government and UNOCI officials reported that current SSR training mandated sensitization of military and police to "gender concerns," including education about protection of women and girls and establishing swift medical and legal assistance to victims of gender-based violence. A representative of Côte d'Ivoire's National Security Council asserted that the incorporation of gender as a principle of governance and human rights was essential to "improve institutional and operational efficacy; to assure optimal representation and participation of all; to highlight democratic principles and good governance in terms of equality, non-discrimination, respect for human rights, transparency, and presentation of accounts; and to ensure the international, regional, and national compliance. … The government cannot function without the leaders being secure and the people feeling secure. That could be from rebels who are unhappy to members of the army who want more" (interview, June 2015). He implied that good governance was based on the security sector, so

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and mechanisms of gender mainstreaming, so when they did address it in their programs, it was often cursory. Even the Women's Protection Advisor at the mission, a position established with the 2004 Security Council presidential statement that also instituted NAPs, only focused on sexualized violence rather than the protection of women from all forms of violence and certainly did not address gender mainstreaming.

incorporating gender into government structures was best achieved through reform of the military and police.

For Côte d'Ivoire, like most other post-conflict states, the practice of addressing gender within SSR means dealing with and preventing sexual violence (Bastick and de Torres 2010; Mobekk 2010; Kunz 2014). In mid-2014, a military-headed Committee of National Experts on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence was established to "combat impunity for sexual violence crimes and build the capacity of its security forces to prevent conflict-related sexual violence" (United Nations 2014). This committee appears to have not fulfilled its mandate, however, as UNOCI and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights document a high number of rapes, particularly against children, crimes that were not fully investigated or prosecuted (Belczyk 2016) This report calls for further security sector and judicial sector reform, though what might be needed instead is further commitment to the reforms that have already taken place.

While access to justice is a necessary part of SSR, prevention through inclusion of women into the military and law enforcement as well as military and police sensitization are considered more important. Much of this work involves training the military and police to respect the rights of women and to avoid committing sexualized violence (Hudson 2010). A military representative at the June 2015 "Women, Leadership, and Security" conference reported that training on sexual violence in conflict had been incorporated in all military schools, and specialized training had been given to about 200 defense personnel through the support of UNFPA and UNOCI.[21] When asked later about the type of training that was offered, the military representative was vague, only reiterating that the training was being extended to all new members of the military and to most new police officers. Multiple panelists at this conference also asserted that more women were being recruited to the army and the national

21. It is important to note that this training does not include UN peacekeepers, which had been found in the mid-2000s to be trading sex for food with underage girls in and near the city of Bouaké—crimes reported both by the media and mentioned to me in a group interview with Save the Children.

police force, but few specifics were given. This work, they claimed, would not only prove women's effectiveness to the prosperity of the country, but it would also bring credibility to SSR and improve human security around the country.

For the four pillars of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda—prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery—Côte d'Ivoire has found its answer in SSR. The first three pillars in particular are being addressed by its SSR program: prevention of sexual violence, protection through investigation and prosecution of gender-based crimes, and participation of more women into the military and police. One member of a national women's legal association agreed that Côte d'Ivoire's attention to SSR has been primarily focused on the military and police and has neglected the justice sector. One reason, she said, was that inclusion of women into the military could be quantified: a certain number of women were recruited and a certain number of people attended training sessions. "This makes it easy for us to report successes to UNOCI and UN Women and other donors" (interview, July 2015). This quantifiable gender inclusion is a prime example of the power of indicators that Merry (2006) describes. This interviewee was exasperated when discussing the reports she had to produce for her donors. Instead of being able to train police about the necessity to incorporate legal assistance and health care when collecting evidence in a case of gender-based violence, she said that she had only a short time to teach them about proper evidence and witness testimony for trial. Another trainer for the police on gender issues agreed: "I would like to spend more time to demonstrate for program attendees how to be conscientious of victims' needs. It's also necessary that men and women police officers work together to talk to different people to understand a crime. But I can't teach that because I have to focus on the materials we are given [developed by UNOCI]" (interview, July 2015).

In Côte d'Ivoire, SSR has become shorthand for how gender concerns can be addressed. As an example, the majority of panelists at the "Women, Leadership, and Security" conference, including all of the representatives from various government ministries and agencies, discussed SSR as synonymous with the title of conference. Women's leadership in the military was

valorized, along with the inclusion of women in almost all levels of the police and military, where they were supposed to be examples of strong women in public life. An implicit characterization followed of non-military women as victims, who the military and police women were to help. By contrast, the representatives of local women's organizations did not discuss the security sector, except in passing as a necessary but not sufficient program to implement the WPS agenda. Even the then-minister for Solidarity, Family, Women, and Children gave a conservative presentation, noting that the government was making remarkable progress in its reconstruction. "The Ivorian government is doing everything it should be doing; Côte d'Ivoire just needs to include more women in its existing structures and it will be an example for Africa," she said. The only progressive note of the conference came from a Senegalese political leader, who discussed how transformative women could be in both SSR and in the government as a whole. She pushed the other panelists and the audience to consider how the government could better include women and women's perspectives, to reconsider whether the government really works for women.

Côte d'Ivoire's version of incorporating gender into its reconstruction, then, becomes heavily bureaucratized, a "'technical-administrative' exercise" in liberal statebuilding (Jackson 2011), relying on how the state can simply add women to its existing structures and reform efforts. Globally, security sector reform has become part of what Doucet (2016) has called a "global assemblage of security governance," where particular forms of knowledge about security and insecurity coalesce, often taking the form of numbers, to develop a governance system to identify, manage, and solve the security problem. In forming the knowledges upon which Côte d'Ivoire's SSR is based, the government and security actors have constructed an edifice that makes permanent certain forms of knowledge about women's security, most notably their victimization through sexual violence. In doing so, the SSR program fails to transform the way the security sector addresses gender-based violence, women's integration into the police and military, and other forms of inequality in the security sector based on inequality. In essence, SSR in Côte d'Ivoire represents a way to ensure national governmental

movement on 1325 that is "measurable" and fits within existing state priorities, instead of doing the work (including outreach to and inclusion of women's groups in the conceptualization, planning, and implementation of the NAP) to ensure women's participation in peacebuilding and security.

Women's Voices in the Implementation

As in the development of the NAP, in Ivorian security sector reform, there has been little discussion between civil society and the government, producing an evident lack of mutual understanding of why certain types of implementation were chosen over others. In my interviews with leaders and employees of women's community organizations that address security and peacebuilding, when I asked about SSR, each person stated that SSR in Côte d'Ivoire was necessary. Because the unstable political situation had lasted more than a decade, the military, police, and courts were all poorly trained, full of corruption, and generally not accountable to civilians, much less the needs of women. For these interviewees, while the progress of SSR was debatable, the consensus was that SSR was vitally necessary to bring about the stability for democracy, economic growth, and future elections. "We really do need better police, because when violence happens against a woman, it's the police who come to answer," one woman said. She continued, "I really hope we don't need the military much anymore; now that *la crise* is over, we can go back to our lives, and the police can handle most things" (interview, September 2015).

Nevertheless, the vast majority of the women from community organizations disagreed with the government's apparent insistence on implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and the NAP solely through SSR. One respondent insisted that SSR would not transform the country because it would not prevent conflict: "To avoid conflict, we have to address a lot of factors, which is more domestic politics rather than the inclusion of gender in the military. Gender is an important aspect of development and security and growth, but reforming security isn't the answer to preventing conflict. It just allows conflict to be a little

safer" (interview, June 2015). Another organizational representative noted that by implementing the NAP through SSR, the government is able to effectively control all efforts toward gender and security in the country, leaving little room and little funding for civil society to work. "All the ministries said, 'We're already doing it!' when we ask about the NAP. The ministries of justice, defense, reconstruction, human rights, even women and family! They all told me that women in civil society are important, and two minutes later they tell me that they are addressing women by including them in the military, by helping women report crimes. They would get to other priorities when they finish these things" (interview, March 2015). An activist who has worked in West Africa specifically on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda since its inception summed up the ambivalence of most of my interviewees toward SSR:

> Prevention might be the best outcome of this, at least as far as the possibility of crimes committed if there's future fighting. Women are included in police and armed forces, and the men might be thinking that there's someone watching who will report them if they commit rape. The government's work here isn't wasted, I don't think, though it should be diversified. SSR can check the boxes of number of people trained or how many women are included, but it doesn't ensure that perpetrators are arrested, tried, convicted, and jailed, whether in the military or police or outside of it. Justice is long, not just one action but multiple that need follow-through. Unfortunately, the government has put all of its eggs in one basket with SSR, and even though it is needed, there's no space for anything else. (interview, July 2015)

Yet another activist became angry when talking about SSR: "The government is using us. It holds meetings with NGOs to say that women are included, but it will do what it wants to do" (interview, April 2015). It became evident that most of my interview participants were frustrated by the lack of seriousness with which the government handles women's concerns. The NAP allowed the national government to do business as usual by working on the SSR process with the international community and then simply fold in a few aspects of the WPS agenda.

When asked how the government should implement the NAP, rather than just focusing on SSR, the responses were wide-ranging, allowing for varying definitions of security and of what is needed in national reconstruction and peacebuilding. Some women wanted a role in formal peacebuilding and reconstruction system, especially locally where they have

considerably more power to influence the process. A representative of a small women's organization in the west of the country discussed how her group had organized to establish local peacebuilding workshops to improve dialogue in their communities. These had been funded by a few transnational NGOs, but some of the groups did not have the support of the local government, despite direction that women were to be full members of the committee.[22]. She said, "Our male elders who were the leaders of community reconciliation committees sometimes did not allow women to get involved. But we worked with the women to show that they could speak and asked the men to listen to their wives and their sisters" (interview October 2015).

The needs of children—education, nutrition, prevention of early pregnancy or violent activity—were at the forefront for many of the interviewees. Many of the interview participants emphasized that women had a special role as mothers, while others simply noted that the majority of women in the Côte d'Ivoire were mothers, especially in rural areas, where gender and income inequality are burdensome.[23] An activist who worked for multiple NGOs in northern Côte d'Ivoire said that she had discussed what she saw as women's needs with multiple government ministries, and they all nodded, but none really listened. "I talk about employment, food security, domestic violence, education, basically all forms of women's autonomy. All they hear is the violence part, but even domestic violence is kept quiet because it is thought to be a private affair" (interview, April 2015).

Some of the women had forgotten (or had never been aware) that development was one of the priority areas of the NAP, since it had rarely been addressed by government or UN programs.[24] Many of the respondents highlighted the need for women to be better integrated

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22. Women are often key to "early warning" of impending conflict because of their knowledge about weapons caches in the home, changes in household employment patterns, and increase in domestic violence (Hill 2003).

23. The role of mothers in peacebuilding will be addressed in chapter five when I discuss the work local women do in the WPS agenda's implementation.

24. A previous Women's National Action Plan, in effect from 2003 to 2007, separate from the Women, Peace, and Security NAP, had been established to address women's development needs. It had been largely ignored because of the conflict, so it was folded into the WPS NAP development priority area

into the Ivorian economy. A report from Organisation des Femmes Actives de Côte d'Ivoire (Organization of Working Women of Côte d'Ivoire) detailed the violence committed against women during the post-electoral crisis. Alongside physical and sexual violence, OFACI included "cessation of business" because of the violation of the right of social security, the violation of the right to work, and the violation of the right to an adequate standard of living, as well as the violation of the right of private property ownership—in short, economic violence. The report notes that these violations have worsened the financial situation of these women, resulting in increased poverty. Because so many of these businesses were in the informal economy (hairdressers, kiosks, sewing), reestablishing the businesses can rarely be done through more formal means like those taken by men who own businesses. According to this report these restrictions to economic opportunity affected a greater number of women than what is typically thought of as violence against women, though the vandalism, destruction of property, looting, and threats usually did have a gender component. The women were seen as easier targets because they might be more fearful of physical and sexual violence, because they might fight back, and because they would not want to risk losing even more of the support they bring to their families. After losing economic independence, women become more vulnerable to other violations both in and out of conflict (Enloe 2000).

Despite the importance of holistically addressing women's security needs in and out of conflict, though, the Ivorian government concentrates its efforts in military and police reform. This is not to deny how women's businesses could have been protected by a more responsive police force or how pursuing justice through the courts could allow women to seek financial compensation. However, the manner by which Ivorian SSR is taking place focuses predominantly on sexual violence, pushing for a traditional, militarized form of security, rather than seeking security through peacebuilding, through communities, and through families, as many of the women have been asking to do.

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without much elaboration (MFAS/PNUD 2007). Thus, it continued to be ignored after the conflict.

Conclusion

In Côte d'Ivoire, security sector reform has been pushed by the international community as the way to improve governance and security in the country. Along these lines, the implementation of the country's National Action Plan for the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda is primarily taking place through SSR, rather than a more integrated approach with the collaboration of civil society and other areas of the government. In doing so, Côte d'Ivoire is relying on outmoded concepts of gender and national security—the old "add and stir" method—and is echoing the UN's considerable focus on sexualized violence as the primary threat to women in the country. Therefore, women are not central to the SSR process and are instrumentalized and coopted into the existing governmental and security systems. To be sure, SSR is vital for moving the country out of over a decade of conflict, but this is only one part of the peacebuilding and reconstruction that need to take place in the country, especially pertaining to women.

While not the only country where SSR is at the forefront or where the NAP is only partially implemented, Côte d'Ivoire is a prime example of how security directives from the UN and other international and transnational actors collide. These actors are simultaneously pushing for security sector reform, gender equality, adherence to indicators, and improvement in statebuilding norms, and the Ivorian government is largely accepting of these mandates and fulfilling them (to the letter, if not to the spirit), all the while attempting record economic growth. The following chapter will detail how the Women, Peace, and Security agenda pushes for adherence to these security directives on top of directives that come from older development and newer peacebuilding interventions. These two external forces that affect Ivorian women create tensions in the implementation of the WPS agenda.

Chapter Five:
Two Models, One Goal:
Competing Paths to Implementing Gender Security

As examined in the previous chapter, the implementation of the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda at the national level in Côte d'Ivoire has been largely confined to security sector reform. Even though the national government has devoted attention to SSR on a broad scale and has conceptualized the WPS agenda and the country's National Action Plan through SSR, the gender inclusion and mainstreaming efforts in the reform of the military and police have been cursory. In this chapter, I focus on the effects that the international community has had on the agenda's implementation in the country. While a number of scholars have stressed gender as a critical component of global security (Enloe 2000; Tickner 2001; Sjoberg 2009), prior studies of the WPS resolutions and the few studies of the NAPs to implement the WPS agenda thus far have not assessed the multiple global discourses at work. These discourses impact local implementation of the WPS agenda, and local women's organizations must cope with and respond to these discourses in their work on WPS implementation. Therefore, this chapter asks: What are the mechanisms/pathways by which global actors (institutional and informal) attempt to realize gender security in post-conflict states? In other words, what happens when international security and peacebuilding policies and programs—represented by the Security Council—meet international liberal feminism—typically development programs run by large NGOs? Can these multiple global agendas be reconciled by local actors?

This chapter explores how two models of international intervention influence the work of local women's organizations in Côte d'Ivoire when implementing the Women, Peace, and Security resolutions. The international security model develops policies at the international level and is premised on the expectation that the state will implement these policies and then instruct local government and civil society actors to follow and further implement the

directives. The international peacebuilding model, which follows the mechanisms established by international development policies, largely bypasses the state because of the assumption that the state has already failed to provide for its citizens; implementation efforts therefore emerge from international governmental organizations or countries in the Global North, funnel through transnational NGOs, and end up at local NGOs or specific government projects funded by international grants.

These models are both based in directives from the top, and they often resemble each other. However, these models are at times also contradictory, since implementing the WPS resolutions necessitates action from institutions that are designed to take either the security angle or the peacebuilding/development approach. Prior to the Women, Peace, and Security resolutions, women's issues had usually been addressed as a development concern; UN country offices and transnational NGOs assume responsibility here. Peacebuilding programs in recent years have also incorporated local ownership of international policies. By contrast, traditional militarized security policies, essential to state sovereignty, are enacted at the national level and then tasked to sub-national agencies—still with an eye on state security, unity, and legitimacy. With the Security Council's development of the WPS resolutions, it rhetorically assumed responsibility to address gender security yet did not seem to consider how its approach functionally differed from prior work for women's empowerment. Because the WPS resolutions are premised on a state-centric notion of security that assumes gender security will be achieved through the state (Whitworth 2004), achieving security for women through the UN necessitates the state's active participation in the policy's implementation.

As a result, Ivorian women are incorporated into concrete, internationally driven projects, policies, and mechanisms, whether through their own advocacy or being spoken for by others. In some international relations literature, the relationships between local actors and global actors are framed around the concept of norms, particularly by asking how norms set the agenda for multiple parties to take up the idea of women's rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Krook and True 2010; Zwingel 2012). While I address this literature in this chapter, I do not

frame the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda as a question of norms alone. Instead, I detail how the practices that stem from these norms are enacted, how singular policies and policy agendas consist of at-times contradictory norms, and how normative concepts and agendas cannot fully account for the extent of policy implementation.

To do so, this chapter first details the mechanisms of international security and international peacebuilding and development, while also addressing international norms. Then, I explain the two models and consider the commonalities and contradictions between the two, reflecting why local organizations struggle with the directives they're given in the WPS agenda. Next, while this study concurs with research that finds that this "serving two masters" is endemic to local NGO work in post-conflict countries, I argue that the way policies are gendered makes a significant difference in the attention and support that is given to their implementation.

The Forces of the International

To understand the international community's role in the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security resolutions, it is necessary to consider the academic literatures on the how international security policies are implemented, as well as how international peacebuilding and, similarly, development policies are carried out.

Implementation of International Security

The Security Council was established post-World War II to address inter-state conflict, and the Cold War fit well into this paradigm. Because of the membership makeup of states in the United Nations and because of the mandate of the Security Council, states were the primary actors in security across the board. Until the late 1990s, the United Nations Security Council rarely considered "thematic" issues, such as Women, Peace, and Security, as part of its work. Instead, the Security Council focused on specific conflicts and passed resolutions to address them (Tryggestad 2009).

Near the very end of the 20th century, however, as many states globally considered human security norms in the aftermath of the Cold War, broad thematic resolutions were more often considered in the Security Council. True-Frost (2007) calls these TIPS (thematic issues of peace and security) resolutions; they are non-geographic and non-situation-specific, address broad themes or issues, and include consideration of entities or individuals outside the UN's state-based system (138). Though these resolutions have been deemed to be non-coercive (not legally binding), they do have a normative force to influence behavior, particularly of international actors (True-Frost 2007).

When the Security Council acts, whether to trigger diplomatic declamation of a state actor, authorize punitive sanctions, or authorize peacekeeping troops, it does so with the majority approval of its fifteen members—and unanimous approval of the five permanent members—and most of the actions are conducted at the state level. Therefore, when the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1325, as with other human security–type thematic resolutions,[25] it remained the obligation of the states to follow through with the resolution (Cohn et al. 2004; True-Frost 2007). However, because TIPS resolutions are characterized by their universality and non-specificity, they are also extremely difficult to concretely implement beyond their normative power. There are no terms for states to negotiate between themselves, the resolutions do not have significant diplomatic force, and they must be implemented by incorporating them into other Security Council resolutions and broader United Nations efforts. The resolutions also must be incorporated into domestic laws and policies in order for them to have any practical effect.

Even though the consideration of thematic resolutions and human security norms in the Security Council expanded at the same time as the Council's post-Cold War shift from mediating interstate conflict to meddling in and authorizing incursions into intrastate conflict (Weiss 1993), the development of mechanisms to implement these types of resolutions was not

25. Prominent examples include HIV/AIDS as well as children and armed conflict.

analogous. Situation-specific resolutions on one country's internal conflict did require a shift in diplomatic and peacekeeping practices (Evans 1994), but the actions were based on established processes within the United Nations and lessons learned from other international actors. Thematic resolutions, on the other hand, rarely have a triggering event; they suggest norm change and actions to be taken—a list of "should"s—but hold few concrete recommendations. Because of the precedent in the Security Council and the broader norm of the state monopoly on violence (Weber 1913), states are therefore the key actors in developing domestic security policies and actions that adhere to the WPS resolutions. For thematic resolutions like the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, ones which have normative force behind them rather than a set of concrete steps to take action, they are still intended to be taken up by the state and then imposed on local actors.

With Resolution 1325, states and other actors had few guidelines to make the resolution work. In fact, it took a statement by the President of the Security Council in 2004, in response to the slow implementation progress, to specifically request development of National Action Plans as national policy documents for Resolution 1325. "The Council welcomes the efforts of Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including the development of national action plans, and encourages Member States to continue to pursue such implementation" (UNSC 2004). National Action Plans then became both a guiding mechanism for national and sub-national security practices to incorporate gender (Swaine 2013). NAPs also were a way for states to signal gender norm uptake (True 2014). In Côte d'Ivoire, as described in the previous chapter, developing the NAP was an easy way for the country to signal that it had become "modern," moving beyond the decade of conflict to join the so-called international community.

When the Security Council passed Resolution 1325, it did so as a result of the activism and pressure by a network of local and transnational women's groups, and these groups have sustained the momentum of Resolution 1325 (Anderlini 2007) and the development of the later resolutions. Tryggestad (2009) asserts that "the issue [WPS] area was seen by the members of

the Council at the time as having low priority and few, if any, serious implications for them in practice" (544). Individual member states were also pressed by the same groups to develop National Action Plans. The TAN developed around women, peace, and security, which set the WPS agenda and continues to sustain it, has little official role in the agenda's implementation (Harrington 2011). Despite civil society advocacy, the ultimate responsibility for the work lies in the hands of the states, both as a security/peacebuilding norm and as written into the resolutions. Civil society is vital to the WPS agenda, but as participants and advisers, not as responsible actors. Members of civil society who participate in the agenda are often the eager recipients of WPS programs, sometimes loosely organized grassroots groups that have little direct influence on the agenda. They do, however, provide feedback to various NGOs that work on the WPS programs. While UN agencies, governments, and governmental organizations are technically responsible for the implementation of the agenda, transnational NGOs as the most powerful members of the TAN pressure policymakers yet can only make changes to the agenda insofar as they can advocate in the interests of the states. Furthermore, local NGOs come out of civil society and are assumed to retain those ties. These local NGOs are also members of the TAN but only insofar as they provide local experiences and voices. They are not even advisors on the entire agenda but are only experts on their particular contexts. Ultimately, then, as a security policy, the partial implementation of the WPS resolutions are caught between lack of will and lack of established mechanisms, both of which can be partially explained by norm-setting and -evolution literature but cannot be fully accounted for by them.

Peacebuilding and Development Interventions

The growth of the NGO sector in development aid in the late 20th century coincided with the ending of Cold War–era power politics and multiple economic and governance problems in many African states. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment programs led some indebted African countries with declining capacity to address the social welfare of their citizens to cede some state responsibilities to transnational NGOs,

accepting them, often reluctantly, as surrogate partners in development and service delivery (Anheier and Salamon 1998; Smillie 1997). The difficulties that triggered this transition stemmed from IMF policies put into place in the 1970s and 80s and an increasing neoliberalization of the global economy. Additionally, increased international interventionism after the end of the Cold War allowed for development programs to multiply, both as a humanitarian project and as a cynical way to increase spheres of influence. In the Global North, states and multilateral organizations provided funds for transnational organizations to combat development challenges. The result is the way NGOs have emerged or been constructed as a solution to political problems in Africa. Donors have bypassed what has been seen as inefficient and corrupt states and channeled resources to local and domestic NGOs instead (Ferguson 2006), though often with the state's tacit assent.

Because of structural adjustment policies, states had to devote large portions of their GDP to servicing IMF debt, leaving little money for social services for their citizens. Côte d'Ivoire, for example, received six structural adjustment loans between 1989 to 1993 but had negative economic growth, which was most felt by the poor, women, and rural populations (Easterly 2006; Grootaert 1995). Per-capita spending in health declined between 1990 and 1995, with "user fees" introduced into the public health care system, as demanded by the World Bank and the IMF (Labor Rights 2001). A law in 1991 cut in half the starting salaries of all teachers (U.S. Department of State 2001). Furthermore, Côte d'Ivoire's total debt rose from 73.3 percent of the GDP in 1980 to 164.3 percent in 1990. The reduction of social services that was a result of repaying these loans hit women particularly hard, both in maternal health, provisions for children's health and welfare, and as the de facto caretakers of the home and community (Weekes-Vagliani 2016).

With the state's reduced role in social services, transnational NGOs stepped in to provide social services to needy populations. They were frequently encouraged to do so by donor states to take over the work of governmental aid organizations after the end of the Cold War (IRC 2007). Transnational NGOs are allowed to operate in countries with the agreement of

the governments and are obligated to abide by the national and local laws. National governments are often eager for the presence of transnational NGOs because they bring much-needed services (and the money for such services), particularly in rural areas where service provision is more difficult. Therefore, because the governments can delegate responsibility for these services to NGOs, they do not have to pay for the services directly and can use the national budget for infrastructure projects and security. Côte d'Ivoire does not have a government-sponsored national network of of NGOs, whether transnational or local, nor does it demand that NGOs register with the state.

The implications of these arrangements for power relations are profound. Donors—and international organizations like the United Nations—can act much more directly through the NGOs that they fund than they would be able to do with government institutions. The flourishing of civil society is too often taken as a hallmark of an active citizenry, or a way for women to enter political processes (Shaw 1994). This problematic representation of the power of civil society may mask growing fissures in the national political arena where local NGOs are held accountable to fully implement international policies and the national governments face less pressure to do so or are lauded for their limited efforts. Transnational NGOs, alongside churches and mosques, became the main service providers for development assistance in the 1990s in some African states, including Côte d'Ivoire. Though NGO services are sporadic and highly selective, depending as they do on donor preferences and standard operating procedures, NGOs did, in many areas, provide a bridge for impoverished communities when the government failed to supply goods and services. As donor states, recipient states, and transnational development NGOs deepened these relationship, this model of financing certain social services to certain populations became replicated in post-conflict contexts.

Whether because of political will or because of low capacity in recipient states, peacebuilding institutions in low-income and post-conflict countries echo the above-described development NGOs and their relationships with donor and recipient states. Peacebuilding as a bureaucratic process has been broadly premised on "conformity with the international system's

prevailing standards of domestic governance" (Paris 2002). More recently, however, Donais and McCandless (2017) describe how peacebuilding has shifted from formal top-down institution building to strengthening state–society relations. Prior unsuccessful international interventions to create sustainable peace proved unable to restructure governments, especially because of power struggles. But more-nimble NGOs, which often work with local partners and sometimes claim "local ownership" of development projects became the partners of the international communities. The strengthening of state–society relations, however, necessitates that society is an integral part of peacebuilding processes, and the state continues to take a back seat to local buy-in to programs developed by the international community. Therefore, in newer forms of peacebuilding processes, in contrast to security-framed interventions, the state still largely stays out of the way. Echoing development processes, funding and efforts start with bilateral donors (for example, the United States or the European Union), the United Nations, transnational NGOs, or some combination of these. Depending on the specific arrangement and the strength of local civil society, the actions are implemented by local branches of the transnational NGOs (the International Rescue Committee, for example) or by local community and grassroots organizations.

The Women, Peace, and Security agenda was developed by transnational advocacy groups and is sustained by local groups—a transnational advocacy network (TAN)—and these groups are also vital to the agenda's implementation (El-Bushra 2007). The local inclusion norm pushes against linear, top-down understandings of norms (e.g., Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Cortell and Davis 2000; Acharya 2004) and the necessity of official recognition for the norms to be considered diffused. Donais and McCandless (2017) seek complexity in understanding peacebuilding norms. Beyond norm diffusion, scholars should recognize that norms can really only be understood through policy implementation; ideas are only changed when they appear in practice. TANs are cited in norm literature as the ways by which disparate actors come together on the same issue, negotiate for a shared meaning of a norm, and provide space for less-powerful actors to be heard (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Beyond TANs, however, presumed

accountability and responsibility for actual implementation of norm-based policies still lie with official actors rather than civil society actors.

The United Nations relies on NGOs to implement the WPS agenda in two ways. First, NGOs are premised on the notion that they are reflective of civil society movements, the wishes of local communities. Women are often considered to be carriers of their "culture" and to have had front-row seats to the conflicts in their communities. Women's organizations are therefore thought to be the most reflective of women's peace and security needs and are called upon to demonstrate it to outsiders (Merry 2006). Second, continuing from the close ties women have to their communities, these organizations are then ideal actors to localize international and national policies, as well as train community members—ultimately becoming the implementers of the policies. This dual role relies on the local organizations to simultaneously do the work of the government and of their communities, actively working from outside the government yet bound to it, subject to donors, to laws, to communities, and to their own missions, marked by what they are not (non-governmental) yet pushed to be a jack-of-all-trades.

As local NGOs in post-conflict areas take over many of the social activities that governments are unwilling or unable to do, like provide basic food, medicine, and education, they then become responsible for implementing the NAPs. The governments then continue to give low priority to these social activities, including gender issues. NGOs fill the gaps that state authorities leave, pushing for support from all parties and providing feedback as special consultants. These multiple roles provide further disincentives for national governments to act because local women's organizations are committed to the work and thus perform it more thoroughly with fewer resources. Anderlini (2007) observes a catch-22 regarding how security is the responsibility of states, yet it is up to states to choose to comply with the UN and integrate UN policies into their domestic laws. While the UN Security Council still demands that states develop and implement NAPs, national governments can starve these initiatives through budgetary deprivation. Instead of funding NAP programs, governments frequently "outsource" gender security to NGOs, once again sidelining women's issues by paying lip service to them.

The Two Models

The interview responses and observations about the nature of international interventions in the WPS agenda—as seen by the local NGO representatives—can be generally classified into two models: security interventions and peacebuilding and development interventions. The international security model develops policies at the international level and is premised on the expectation that the state will implement these policies and then instruct local government and civil society actors to follow and further implement the directives. Security, and by extension, peacebuilding, is a central function of the state, vital to the state's continued existence. It is presumed that the national government will take the lead in the implementation of the WPS agenda and will report the status and effectiveness of the implementation back to the Security Council and other international bodies. Through this model, the state has the incentive to develop easily achievable goals that will meet metrics established by the United Nations and related organizations. Accordingly, in Côte d'Ivoire, as the previous chapter demonstrates, the state has focused on implementing the WPS agenda through security sector reform.

In fact, the Ivorian national government provides little support to local women's organizations for projects outside security sector reform and women's business development at the upper income levels. The leader of one national umbrella organization with a sole focus on the implementation of the WPS agenda said that they had received government support only once, more than ten years prior, but they are still expected to participate in women's meetings and be leaders in empowerment workshops for women. "After a certain amount of experience in a certain amount of years, a civil society organization can acquire the quality of a public utility and benefit from state subsidies because civil society supports the implementation of government programs or projects. So there is no reason for the government not to support us, but still there is no support."

Other organizations, especially those that participate in election monitoring, have a more amicable relationship with the national and local governments. An organization with a membership of women business leaders and former government representatives has close connections with multiple government offices, and the group's early warning projects as well as electoral education and monitoring are taken seriously by the government. The president of this organization said:

> After the last elections, we met with the president of the republic to tell him that he was the father of the nation and that strong actions had to be taken to appease the opposition. So he made a solemn commitment to do what he was told. Really, we are listened to. Just being someone who has assumed responsibilities, having been with the president, having known all the party leaders, gives me the opportunity to meet them and talk to them. That is important. (interview, July 2017)

Despite the close relationship, however, this organization does not receive funds that have been promised by the government, despite the fact that the organization supports government projects. Both election monitoring and deploying women as early-warning markers of impending conflict are allegedly essential components of the international security and conflict prevention agendas. This organization's president said that even though its funding comes from UN Women, an international democracy-promotion NGO, and two foreign embassies, the national government collaborated and integrated the organization's work. She noted that election monitoring and early warning were priorities for the government because they were prerequisites for investment stability. This statement echoes the importance of SSR in Côte d'Ivoire that was described in the previous chapter. The priorities for the Ivorian government are set by the priorities of the international community.

The other model that is simultaneously in practice with the security model in implementing the WPS agenda is a development (and peacebuilding) model. This model largely bypasses the state because of the assumption on the part of the donor community and NGOs that the state has already failed to provide for its citizens. Implementation efforts therefore emerge from international governmental organizations or countries in the Global North, funnel through transnational NGOs, and end up at local NGOs or specific government projects funded

by international grants. In Côte d'Ivoire, many of these projects have been long running and only recently been officially linked to peace and security, particularly at the national level. The types of projects supported by international NGOs include everything from agriculture to education to violence prevention. With the growth of the WPS agenda, these projects are rebranded as programs to address women's empowerment and women's peace and security. In search of funding, Ivorian NGOs have also tied their earlier missions of women's development to peace and security, though many of the women interviewed noted that they have stressed the link between the two in their work for years, some even prior to Resolution 1325.

Here again, as other studies have described, local NGOs/implementing partners are obligated to implement the projects funded by transnational NGOs and bilateral and international donors. According to a project manager at one regional peace organization with a national office, the group keeps a list of potential projects but often does not begin to develop the plans until the organization sees calls for funding. "If we have projects that do not fit into [transnational NGOs] plans of action, it is complicated to have funding. So what we do first is to find out the financial plan of action to check if it fits with our priorities. When it conforms, it is at this moment that we make projects to send them" (interview, May 2015). Plans that do not work with any open requests for proposals are usually put aside until the opportunity does arise, or pieces of the project are added to other projects for which there is funding. I asked all of the interview participants from local organizations about dream projects if a large pot of money was offered with no strings attached. Every representative had a dream project at the ready that built on current projects. These projects demonstrated the expertise of each organization. One representative told me, "If we don't get to fulfill these projects because of money, then our knowledge and skills are wasted" (interview, April 2015).

Ivorian women's groups have become savvy with the language they use in their funding documents, knowing that donors also have obligations to their own funders. Reports delineate how their activities fit within the four WPS pillars—prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery—and make sure their projects address "women and girls" and "men and

boys" in gender-specific projects and programs. These reports are vital to the organizations' continued access to project funding. Interviewees from several organizations complained that very little of the project funding was allocated for overhead and management, yet money was granted only to those organizations that had the capacity to manage large amounts of money and large projects, to be accountable for the money they receive. Oftentimes, depending on the grants the local organizations were able to access, staff were active on projects but would be unpaid for several months, and basic operational needs were purchased with personal funds.

More often than not, government-initiated projects were paid for indirectly with transnational NGO grants, through the work of local women's organizations, as described previously for election monitoring and early warning projects. In contrast to prior development-focused projects, however, WPS projects continue to be theoretically premised on the centrality of the state to security, and thus, the state takes the lead in (and the credit for) implementing the projects.

Commonalities and Contradictions

The WPS agenda at the international level, though it draws significantly on input from civil society and requests that civil society remain partners with national governments, is formally premised on the assumptions of security as a state-based mechanism. However, once the agenda is at the point of implementation in post-conflict states like Côte d'Ivoire, the operative mechanism shifts. The responsibility for women's issues becomes shared between security professionals and the development sector. "Hard" security reforms such as security sector reform (as detailed in the previous chapter) still remains with the national government, but any projects that engage non-military security are outsourced to local women's peace and security organizations, who are given the responsibility—and therefore the accountability—for the success of implementation but not granted the success itself if there is any. Given these two competing global pressures on local women's organizations in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, how can we understand their effects?

These two implementation models are alike in some ways. Liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal development approaches are individualistic. They are based in the understanding that certain forms of political and economic structures—democracy and market-based capitalism—will lead to preferred outcomes for individuals as well as states. Much like the international liberal feminism that has pushed for international women's rights (Prügl 2015), the power of each individual is paramount (rather than collective organization), and the transformation of the individual is sufficient to bring about change. The effect of development and security policies working closely together in insecure environments is an overarching emphasis on security at the expense of the harder, more long-term process of development (Jackson 2011).

The practices of peacebuilding and development also align in the tight donor hold on projects. Merry (2016) analyzes how the reliance on measurable indicators to record social problems and their solutions has stripped human variation of context and meaning. For academics, indicators present a form of objectivity that can provide a more clear analysis of a problem. For donors, indicators mean that the success of their programs can be measured, cost effectiveness compared, "best practices" developed, and "lessons learned" transferred to other contexts (observation at UN Women, July 2013). Those implementing the WPS resolutions—states and local NGOs—compete for technical and financial support and struggle with the directives they are given and the strategies they use in the implementation. For local organizations in particular, the international pressures they face come from the United Nations, from the state, and from transnational NGOs, each with its own expectations for paperwork, monitoring, evaluation, and program requirements.

The development of UN Women in 2010 out of four distinct parts of the UN system brought together women's security and women's development under one agency, though did not necessarily integrate the two. UNIFEM was by far the largest of the agencies that UN Women replaced, and it brought its organizational structure, funding commitments, projects, and gender expertise. UNIFEM dwarfed the other three agencies under the new umbrella, and

UN Women was born as a rebranded version of UNIFEM. Yet because of the increasing attention given to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in the Security Council and beyond, certain parties within UN Women pushed to increase resources given to women's security. Therefore, when UN Women established itself as a hybrid institution and a powerful locus of gender expertise, gender mainstreaming, and women's empowerment, the WPS agenda received broader-based technical and financial support. Despite this growth of security discourses in addressing women's needs and rights at the United Nations, the fulfillment of the WPS agenda—designed as a security tool—still relies on the institution of development.

A recent turn in both development and peacebuilding prioritizes local "implementing partners" rather than national offices of large transnational NGOs. This does not mean, however, that using a local implementing partner will make such development programs more appropriate or successful. In fact, interview respondents in Côte d'Ivoire from a variety of local NGOs, both official "implementing partners" and organizations without continuous external support, noted that the more closely a local organization worked with a transnational one, the more "professionalized" the local staff became. Mid-level Ivorian staff of local peacebuilding organizations and Ivorians in local offices of transnational NGOs all described their daily work as "professional," by which they meant that they completed evaluation reports, budgets, grant proposals, and planning documents in the way they were directed to by their donors. A program assistant for a women's organization that was occasionally certified as a local partner said, "They tell us what they need, what to do, and we do it. We don't usually design ourselves the way we work on a project if they are giving us money for it" (interview, May 2015). Professionalization signaled to a transnational NGO that the local staff was more committed to its principles, independent of the success of the project or the appropriateness to the community. Even with "local ownership" of projects, the staff, individually and collectively, operated as if they worked for a transnational NGO. Not only do bilateral, multilateral, and transnational donors drive the agenda for the local organizations, but the donors also drive their day-to-day tasks and interactions.

All of these markers of international intervention in the late 20th and early 21st centuries are indicative of speedy, cost-effective, results-driven projects, where technical expertise is prized over contextual knowledge. Even with this externally driven agenda, however, local staff do have a say in programming and can influence their partners. In fact, their influence is subtle and transformative, both for the projects themselves and on an interpersonal level with international staff. “The people we serve are ourselves,” said a project manager from a national women’s organization. “So even if they don’t want to listen, we tell our donors what we need” (interview, June 2015). Many individual international staff, especially those working in national offices in post-conflict countries like Côte d’Ivoire, realize that contextual knowledge is important for their work. Despite this, the international staff must be responsible for priorities and budgets coming from their donors. They are also products of their own backgrounds and training, holding a desire to “fix” things with a tidy solution. The issue for local implementers of the WPS agenda is to figure out how to remain central to the process so that local contexts are not subsumed under international pressures—since women’s groups also see themselves as better representatives of their cultures than the government—while demanding that official bodies take the lead.

Where the security and peacebuilding/development models align in the case of Côte d’Ivoire is not at the grassroots level to help the population whose communities and livelihoods were damaged by the conflict. Instead, the national peacebuilding process has become a means to achieve economic growth, protecting capitalism through national security. Not only is the country proud of its rapid stabilization, as briefly discussed in the previous chapter, but it is especially proud of its quick, high economic growth. The national government takes advantage of international efforts produced through the security model so that the country can stabilize and continue to grow, becoming an emerging economy. In this way, security becomes part of the neoliberal state, pushing for democracy and economic development at the top and assuming that it will trickle down to the population at large. Côte d’Ivoire, therefore, is a paragon of how

security apparatuses can be restructured to protect economies, not populations, and how peacebuilding and development can be co-opted for the same ends.

The question then is whether these two models are somewhat complementary at national levels but not for the broader population. With institutions designed in the interests of the elites, the first priority is to protect those interests before developing such protections for everyone else. The WPS resolutions were not the radical departure that some made them out to be (Shepherd 2008; Hudson 2010). Instead, the WPS agenda is reflective of the neoliberal economic and security contexts in which they were developed, as well as a product of the UN Security Council's roots in preserving sovereignty (Shepherd 2008b). As a sovereign state, Côte d'Ivoire has the authority to direct security and peacebuilding efforts to protect its economic interests. For states, there appears to be little difference in the traditional forms of security, peacebuilding, and development. The country's people, on the other hand, are subject to the decisions and actions of the state, as well as external actors.

Local women's organizations, then, as the most committed implementors of the WPS agenda, struggle with the process and priorities of the agenda's implementation. The capacity to reconcile security, peacebuilding, and development that the national government enjoys is not shared by these organizations. Representatives of women's organizations blame their frustration about the WPS agenda in part on the fact that the government pushes projects requiring social and behavioral change by the local population onto these organizations. The president of an organization devoted to the WPS agenda said, "The government has neither the expertise nor the political will. It prefers to pay attention to grand economic projects rather than long-term development. Politicians like things that are big and new rather than something that takes work and does not show immediate results" (interview, February 2015). Because of the differing priorities and the ways that both the national government and the global actors transfer the daily hard work of ensuring women's security and peace onto local women's organizations, the representatives seem to find no way to reconcile the two models.

Gender Makes a Difference

Human security's definition as "freedom from want, freedom from fear" in itself ties together security and development, yet the tensions in the concept of human security do not fully account for the difficulties in implementing the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Given that local NGOs of all types are obligated to be responsive to their own governments who assent to the work and to the donors that make the work possible, what is unique to women's organizations in the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda? Why does gender matter to the difficulty of implementing these two models?

The answer to the first question is in how power dynamics in politics and outside of it are gendered. The international community often fetishizes the grassroots as truly local and authentic, but in fetishizing these organizations, it is really fetishizing powerlessness. This is where the desire to work with women's NGOs comes into play. Women are seen as less corrupt—like NGOs in contrast to the state, as detailed previously—and because they have limited access to power, they are less tainted by it. As a result, they are perceived as more worthy of being turned into beneficiaries. Women have little role in the corrupt governments that brought about the conflict, so women's organizations are seen as less political and more engaged in bringing change to their communities. Shut out of traditional decision-making and governing processes, professional Ivorian women often found a home in the NGO sector. The implementation of the NAPs by the NGOs then is seen as a community move and less as a political one. NGOs can more "purely" implement the international policies. They are stepping in to take care of items where the government has abdicated responsibility, thus making the government less willing to make efforts.

Another issue is one of accountability. While the local NGOs generally want to be faithful to the needs of their communities, they realize that money and power to fulfill these needs come from the donors and the international community. When governments do not coordinate social services for local communities or women's participation in peacebuilding and

do not hold themselves responsible for serving their communities, then communities hold organizations accountable. But, in turn, the organizations hold the government accountable. An example of this in WPS implementation is when women demanded a role in the peace accords. "Women are included as representatives but at such a low level and parallel to the [peace] process itself," said one woman who had been an unofficial part of the peace process in 2011. Because the government was only paying lip service to women's participation, a few representatives from women's organizations physically moved into the official space. They held the government accountable for sidelining them simply by being present. "Women leaders put themselves near the president of the regional initiative to reclaim their rights, earning observer status, which allowed them to give testimony at the peace accords" (interview, June 2015).

Furthermore, human security is gendered by making women its "face." The Women, Peace, and Security agenda is one of the few thematic issues taken up by the Security Council. Women are half the population, and the phrase "women and children" is everywhere in policy documents and academic studies in human security (Enloe, Kinsella). Until recently in many areas of the world, women were barred from serving in the armed forces, and traditional security structures were closed or hostile to women. Women have also not been seen as important to the workings of the state, nor to public life in general (Enloe, Tickner). In security (as seen in the previous chapter), women's needs are seen by the international community as invariably the needs of victims, especially victims of sexual violence. A former women's minister who now works broadly on women's empowerment programs both inside and outside the government invoked the two pillars of human security in noting government failure on women's issues:

> It is not only that the presence of women in security and defense forces brings [men] to change their comportment and their attitudes, but also that it creates new structures so that women are at ease. Outside the security and defense forces, there is the administration itself, which can take up the other pillar of human security that is the fight against poverty and the fight against need. (interview, February 2015)

Development policies adopted by the Ivorian government focus on large-scale changes ("emergence," see chapter one), rather than the needs of the most impoverished. Little attention is devoted to making sure poor and rural women's needs are addressed; instead, entrepreneurship trainings are provided for women already with some level of economic sufficiency and education. This professionalization training does help a particular sector of women, and many of the interviewees had participated in such an individual empowerment training; however, some, like this woman in her late 20s who was a project manager, noted the contradiction:

> I wanted to learn how I could start my own business in a few years. This was important to my career and my personal development, but I could only do it because I already knew how to work. For the rural women we work with at [my organization], this makes no sense to them. We're trying to do economic empowerment for women's collectivities, where women learn how to read and manage money in spaces where they are also working. But the government only supports women like me, not the women I work with now. (interview, November 2015)

The tension between individual change and societal change was palpable for many of my interviewees. The messages they heard from international donors and partners have been ones of an internationalized liberal feminism that relies on the individual to make change.

Francis Akindès, professor of sociology at the University of Bouaké in Côte d'Ivoire, spoke at a conference of the role of women in the route toward emergence. He asked:

> How can the rural world and local development be put back at the heart of the strategies? …Development-centered planning that began in 1965 was abandoned with the structural adjustment plans. This management principle that disappeared is at the root of the non-distribution of resources across the territory. When we look at the increase in the level of poverty from 1981, we see the link between this increase and the fact that we no longer invest in the rural world. One, it is this world that has made the strength of this country. So it is also in this world that there are the most women who are in the food sectors and who do not have the dividends of their growth. So, will we continue not to look at this aspect of local development? (presentation, October 2015)

A former minister for women and social affairs who is no longer part of the government summed up the tension between security and development approaches for women like this:

> The context of particularly uninterrupted crises in West Africa meant that few resources were allocated for the development of women. But the crisis does not explain everything, the failure is as much due to the erroneous conceptual

approaches of women's programs to the prejudices towards them, as to the type of development in which they were wanted to integrate them. The real problem is that of the nature of the economic system and the type of development that can truly take care of the interests of women. Deep economic, social, and ideological changes are needed to achieve a structural transformation of their position within society. (interview, April 2015)

When it comes to the central duty of the state, i.e., the protection of citizens, the Ivorian government has failed by many metrics, especially when it comes to women. When the government is tasked with resolving its failure and given an itemized list to work from, as in Resolution 1325, it outsources at least part of the task to women's civil society organizations because of these organizations' expertise in creating solutions for women. This process, therefore, creates a cycle in which the policies geared toward mainstreaming gender in peacebuilding and reconstruction in national governments does not resolve the source of the problem, which is the exclusion of women from the decision-making processes (Zwingel 2012; Towns 2010). By outsourcing "women's issues" to women's organizations, the governments can then continue to overlook these issues. The intent of gender mainstreaming policies designed at the international/global level is to bring a gender perspective into the systems of power; the actual development of the National Action Plans appears to be contravening this goal.

Conclusion

This chapter argues that implementation of the WPS resolutions has been incomplete and, at times, problematic because it is based on two competing top-down models of international intervention: on the one hand, a international peacebuilding model that typically moves from the United Nations to the national governments, and on the other hand, a development model where the national government gives permission and outlines priorities but does not control the international involvement. When these two models operate simultaneously, it poses particularly severe problems for both the conception of the policies and their implementation. The WPS resolutions were designed through the Security Council, which works in a top down, international to national to local way, though because of the input from

civil society, discussions of civil society were in there. However, because these deal with gender and "softer" forms of security, the mechanisms that a Security Council resolution usually triggers do not happen, and thus the efforts are delegated to agencies that have a tradition of working outside or alongside of the state, rather than working with national agencies and structures. Thus, the incoherence of the implementation of the WPS resolution is a result of the inconsistency in international intervention models. This results in each institution at the international, national, and local levels devoting attention to one piece of the WPS resolutions while other aspects are shortchanged, resulting in a patchwork of policies that do not holistically address fundamental issues of gender security.

Women have not been key to governing and have often been excluded from the governments, except in token positions that pertain to their embodiment as women. Therefore, women access power in novel ways (as will be seen in the next chapter). So in the WPS resolutions, they are emblematic of how difficult it is to implement gender policy (because of the competing models) and how poorly stuff gets implemented (because it's gender) and block access of women to power (because they are spending so much time mediating between the two models).

If the WPS agenda has been developed and is being implemented through two pathways that occasionally work complementarily but more often than not require that women's organizations implementing the agenda and advocating for peace and security develop different programming and a multiplicity of strategy depending on the technical and financial partner, how can these organizations remedy this? How might local women's organizations implement the policy that in ways that they feel are appropriate to their communities? How might women develop their own security and peacebuilding policies in this environment? What does African feminist theorizing tell us about how to conceptualize security, and how do their perspectives align or not with the perspectives of those I interviewed? What are their local practices of implementation? These questions are addressed in the following chapter.

Chapter Six:
Re-centering the Policy Recipient: Women's Pragmatic Skepticism Toward International Discourses

Sexualized violence is a facet of many, though not all (Cohen et al. 2013), armed conflicts around the world, but other forms of gender-based violence are also present in conflict, including violence against men (Carpenter 2006). Additionally, women's exclusion from peacebuilding processes and formal politics, difficulties in accessing remunerated work, and lack of voice in decision-making at all levels are all features of women's insecurity. In the WPS resolutions, the Security Council has thrown its considerable weight behind sexualized violence while pulling focus away from the other issues that women—and men, on the basis of their gender—face in international peace and security. This emphasis on sexualized violence reveals the limitations of the resolutions and their ability to address issues of gender in conflict, and it also uncovers representations of women as intrinsically peaceful and as perpetual victims within armed conflict (Basu 2010).

While the previous two chapters have discussed how women are co-opted by the state and by international actors to achieve other goals, this chapter describes how Ivorian women working on peace and security respond to dominant international discourses. As the previous two chapters have also demonstrated, the key implementers of the WPS agenda in West Africa, local women's organizations with peace and security central to their mission, must contend with international, transnational, and national discourses, priorities, and funding sources. Here, I examine how local women's organizations in Côte d'Ivoire contend with the sometimes-competing, sometimes-marginalizing and victimizing discourses at the same time that they actively work for peace in their communities and pursue a seat at the table in national peacebuilding and reconstruction processes. Women define security in ways that describe their own needs as well as the needs of their communities, and they construct techniques of working

on the WPS agenda out of these articulations that co-opt the international discourses. Through techniques not often recognized by the international community, Ivorian women develop alternative forms of peacebuilding in tandem with internationally sanctioned practices of promoting peace and security. Because of women's preexisting community networks and their knowledge of what their communities need, their local practices of implementation are often skeptical of international policy. However, they recognize that international and transnational actors support their work through technical and financial means. Likewise, though the national government can easily be criticized for devoting little attention to women's security, many women feel that national identity is important to the population at large and is a point of solidarity in working toward peace.

Thus, I claim in this chapter that local women's organizations perform a "pragmatic skepticism," working with international, transnational, and national actors to achieve their own goals, reclaiming some of the essentializing discourses told about them. They take on the stereotypes of womanhood, victimhood, and peacefulness with a suspicion about the motives behind the discourses and then co-opt those discourses to do the work they want to do. Pragmatic skepticism is a stance that allows women to question the discourses, tools, and financial support they are given while still using these items for the work they must do now. Many of the women I spoke with allowed that stereotypes about them were based on some grain of truth, so they want to use what they feel is true while throwing away what they don't want. This term comes out of analyzing my interviews and observations with insights from African feminism. The marginality African women experience and the duality they eschew allows women activists to work within their ascribed roles while attempting to transform existing structures of power. The women I spoke with strive to reclaim the international agendas targeted at them to incorporate the complexity of their lives. This chapter, then, will delve into the pragmatic skepticism that women have toward the WPS agenda and its implementation, an attitude that helps them work with and against the international

community—including state actors and transnational NGOs—and advocate the best they can for their communities.

First, I build upon what has been detailed in the previous two chapters with what women who work for peace and security have described as their security needs. My interviews reveal that these women's ideas and practices of security are often broader than standard definitions of international security, national security, and human security because they incorporate development, education, and the environment, as well as different ideas about women and gender. The first section in this chapter brings in women's own roles and deliberations about their lives to demonstrate the complexity of security. The second task in this chapter is to consider the multiple frames that the women use to articulate and organize around to seek their own security, including vulnerability, motherhood, and community. Each of these frames is dually developed, first by the identities that Ivorian women claim and embody, additionally as expressed in African feminist scholarship. Additionally, I ascribe the frames to a co-optation and pragmatic skepticism of international discourses that Ivorian women working in local organizations hear and use instrumentally.

Alternative Definitions of Security

As detailed in chapter three, women in civil society who work for peace and security in Côte d'Ivoire envision security for women beyond militarism and beyond basic protection from external threats of physical violence. In fact, not one of my interviews with a local women's organization focused on a more traditional, narrow definition of security. All the NGO representatives I interviewed acknowledged that women are victims of conflict and are often more vulnerable because of lack of economic and political power, lower physical strength compared to men, and their roles as caretakers of children, another vulnerable group. Their understandings of security also include physical violence not related to conflict (like domestic violence) and basic social and economic welfare as essential to individual and community security as well as national security. Most organizations that the women work for connect these

issues to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda for reasons beyond the pragmatism of funding and international attention. They have seen the conflicts in communities that stem from inequality and citizenship issues threaten women and threaten state stability.

The descriptions of security offered by my interview participants work in two ways. The first is how women themselves experience security and insecurity, which goes beyond the way these concepts have been accepted in international discourses. Second, women's participation in promoting and achieving security for their communities leads to greater national security, particularly if the women individually have been able to access civil and political rights and security needs. Women describe this second aspect of security in an instrumental way, and it is unknown whether this is a belief that stems from what they have observed in their own communities or the instrumentalizing language used by the international community. Many studies over the past two decades have connected human security to national and international security (Stern 2005; Hudson et al. 2012; Paris 2001; Pain 2014; Gupta et al. 2012; Winterbotham and Pearson 2016; Giscard d'Estaing 2017). What all interview participants described was a desperate need for others—whether local men, elected officials, or well-meaning foreigners—to listen and actually hear what the women articulate.

An illustration of the need to listen to women's ideas of their needs in security was illustrated by a story told by the president of the Ivorian office of a regional women's organization:

> There was a village where men had decided to build a well for women because they said that the poor women walked kilometers to get water. Digging a well in the village would save them from walking for hours, so they dug the well. But every morning there was debris in the well, and the men held a meeting to find out who was putting debris there. The women said that because while men made the decision, there had been no woman to make sure it was a priority and a good decision. The women had other priorities, like wanting to have a market. So the women put debris in the well. Half an hour or one hour of walking allowed them to discuss their marital problems, their children, so the women wanted to protect these discussions that they could only have at that moment and instead build a market for their economic needs [with the money that was spent digging the well]. This means that if we take into account the concerns of women and if they are present where decisions are made, we can better make the right decision. (Interview, June 2017)

In describing their needs of security and experiences of insecurity, about half of my interviews with representatives of women's organizations explicitly named and linked types of violence: physical, sexual, economic, and psychological. A program officer of one local organization said, "Physical violence is complementary to economic violence. In the prolongation of economic violence, one can find physical violence. There is first moral [psychological] violence, and it is followed by physical violence" (interview, March 2015). She went on to describe women's security at the national level as resolving the causes of sexual and physical violence in the domestic sphere. For her and others of this organization present in the group interview, the biggest threat to women in the country was violence in multiple forms in the home and community, violence that was implicitly ignored and allowed by the state and that was present prior to, during, and after the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.

Even organizations that focused on sexual and physical violence approached these concerns with a holistic understanding of the causes and effects of the violence. The president of a recently formed organization with a mission of access to health care and justice to victims of sexual violence stated that they worked toward broad access to medical care to be able to collect evidence after sexual assault or rape. Without medical care, women also have difficulties recovering from an assault and pursuing prosecution, she said. But, she added, "Our underlying goal in providing government-supported medical care so that women do not have to pay for their own tests after a rape is for poor women who have not seen this violence to also have medical care" (interview, October 2015) Her organization especially advocates for maternal health support from the government for all women, using the terms of women's security to perform this advocacy (George 2014). "Women who have been raped have to be looked after, and if they have children, everyone has to be healthy. Mothers in general must be healthy to provide for their families and raise healthy children. So we cannot say women are secure if they do not have their health; we cannot help them work for peace if they do not have their health" (interview, October 2015). Echoing these links between security and health, a representative of the national chapter of a regional organization told me that someone from the

Ministry of Health asked her and other members of her organization to accompany the ministry representatives in raising awareness of family planning and cervical cancer control. Given that this organization explicitly works on the WPS agenda and has "peace and security" in its name, it recognizes that a holistic approach to security through a holistic approach to health care is necessary, and it promotes itself as such.

More than health care, though, women's security necessitated attention to individual and local economic development for most of the women's organizations. This is usually described as autonomisation ("empowerment"), which is the language typically used by UN agencies and transnational NGOs, rather than "development" (Porter 2013). Closely tied to this concept of empowerment, though, is women's psychological strength, self-confidence in their capacity to contribute economically to their households and to be autonomous, separate from their identities as wives and mothers. The president of the nascent organization focused on sexual violence stated:

> You know gender-based violence is multi-faceted and not just physical violence. There is psychological violence. There are women in homes who are suffering from economic violence. There are husbands who do not want their wives to work; they deprive them of work so that they do not become self-sufficient and do whatever they want on their own. The awareness campaigns we are doing are just telling women not to stay at home and do nothing, because if that is the case you are a slave to the husband. If he does not give you anything, you do nothing, and there are men who want that. So it's not just physical violence. There is also psychological violence, to say that we are not only focusing on rape cases. Recently, we have been training all members of our NGO on cases of economic violence (depriving women of a source of income) because it is somewhat the policy of some men to say that she stays at home and prevents him from doing anything, so it all encompasses gender-based violence. (Interview, October 2015)

She noted in addition that this psychological empowerment often comes from receiving an education, both in the sense that women know they can do it and have the skills to do it: "The question of security depends on the women who have been able to take responsibility for themselves, who have been able to go to school." On the whole, the people I spoke with asserted that when women have economic independence and education, they can avoid violence against them personally and become preventers of and solutions to conflict.

In linking development to women's individual security, interview participants often expanded their analyses of the conditions of women's lives to consider how women's insecurity threatened security in their countries. In many of the interviews, participants again used similar language to discourses of the international community; however, the representatives also made a much more explicit linking of individual security and national security. Many claimed that if national and international policies on development did not change, then security for women and for the country could not be achieved. Even if international and transnational discourses have influenced how women's organizations describe and advocate for women's security, my interview participants added specificity from their own experiences and those of the communities they work with. Their local knowledge and advocacy can also inform and influence international discourses, though in translation to the WPS agenda, it has been diluted.

The president of one of the country's most prominent women's organizations that served as an umbrella for many small organizations around the country summed up the connection between development and security:

> The link between economic security and security in a global way is a question of empowerment. There is a link between empowerment and security. It is often said that poverty is a source of conflict and insecurity. At one point, [our organization] worked on all issues related to income-generating activities because we realized that if we do not empower women to be economically autonomous and independent, they cannot ensure their own safety (be it personal or global security). (Interview, June 2015)

A former representative of this organization who was present for part of this interview added specificity from her community in northern Côte d'Ivoire:

> We say that moral, physical, and economic security are linked. … Imagine a woman when her life depends on you. Even if you are not aware of it, you can exploit her and she would be obliged to submit. … I cannot say what I think and I cannot do what I want; that's why empowerment is linked to security. The moment a girl engages in prostitution, it is an economic violence. That is to say, that the lack of empowerment leads to prostitution, and with that, there is every kind of insecurity and violence to accompany it. (Interview, June 2015)

The organization president then added that with all of the discussion of women's needs and victimization in conflict, contributions to peacebuilding, and participation in decision-making

that takes place in Resolution 1325 and the later related resolutions, there is need for a link between what is written and discussed and the empowerment of women.

> What support should institutions, international organizations, and states provide to women with autonomy, especially in under-developed countries? Because this is where there are still problems of women who no longer have the right to work because they are married. Young girls in early marriage who no longer have the chance to continue their studies and thus must submit to their husbands. Women who own assets but whose spouses refuse to allow any trade or economic activity. … But we have learned that when women are more stable, their families are more stable. (Interview, June 2015)

Sarcastically, the second woman interjected, "You know what helps protect women from sexual violence? Providing economic independence" (interview, June 2015) They both noted that they were attempting to use Côte d'Ivoire's focus on "emergence"—as emerging from the conflict and establishing itself as an emerging economy (detailed in chapter one)—in order to promote women's empowerment and leadership. Though this organization did not specifically promote leadership and entrepreneurial skills to middle-class women in Abidjan or other cities, they did mention how since the end of the conflict several new local NGOs had cropped up to promote women as professionals and business owners. Those organizations did not make the link to women's security, but this umbrella organization was attempting to make that link. They sought to attract support from women who were better off in order to conduct work on the WPS agenda for poor and rural women, as well as make the case to government officials whose wives, daughters, and daughters-in-law were the women organizing for economic empowerment at a higher social class.

This is not to say that women with access to power focus only on their own empowerment. The president of a women's association of former parliamentarians, government ministers, and prominent community leaders discussed her role in high-level yet unofficial talks where she advocated for marginalized women's security and their roles in peacebuilding:

> We made a plea to the political actors so they would reestablish the dialogue between the government and the opposition. We talked about the preservation of peace because it was threatened. We discussed development because it was necessary to help women become more or less economically independent, because a woman who is dependent is not free. There are activities they can do. They must be supported so that these activities can help them increase their

> income and be independent and have access to positions of responsibility, at least in local governance. (Interview, April 2015)

She continued:

> All the women we are working with are convinced that they have the duty to preserve peace, and we are working on the project for the [2015 presidential] elections. We realized that there were many problems of rape, inheritance, land rights, politics. We have everything in our report. We realized that the election is only an excuse for the problems; it is the little match that sets fire to the problems. So we have to deal with the problems for calm elections. The source of conflict is far away; it is not the elections. All it takes is a little trick in the elections, and the conflict is awakened. (Interview, April 2015)

An example of how citizenship and open elections impacts women's security is in UNHCR's year-long drive in 2014–2015 to provide identity cards to everyone living in Côte d'Ivoire classified as stateless. UNHCR estimates 675,000 people living in Côte d'Ivoire are officially stateless (UNHCR Côte d'Ivoire Factsheet 2015). This population consists of economic migrants, refugees from other conflicts in the region, and people born in the country with questionable citizenship because of the debate over citizenship classification (described in detail in chapter one). UNHCR's program attempted to develop a more accurate estimate of the stateless population, and the identity cards would also provide access to government and UN agency services, such as health care and education. UNHCR worked with local civil society organizations to identify this population and to persuade the people that receiving identity cards was necessary and would benefit them. Several of these organizations were human rights and anti-poverty initiatives run by women, organizations under the umbrella of a larger organization based in Abidjan that worked for women's peace and security. The director of this umbrella organization emphasized the need for women to claim their citizenship when it was available to them and to obtain legal identification for themselves and their children to attend school. The conflict had threatened women's individual security not just because of physical violence but also because they were not able to be educated or have access to the justice or health systems.

One final aspect of how development was revealed as a security issue was when three interview participants described environmental degradation as a cause of women's insecurity.

The president emerita of one of the local offices of a regional organization noted that she was pushing the organization to further consider this link. "A project close to our hearts is in environmental issues. Desertification and greenhouse gases are environmental issues, and deforestation has to be reduced" (interview, April 2015). The current president of the same organization in a separate interview reinforced this linkage as well as education and national security:

> Security is development issues, [as well as] education issues related to development issues. Because those who are well educated never go to war. You see our warlords, they are all academics, but they do not even know how to throw a pebble. It is the young people they take. It is the young people who are idle. They have nothing to do because there are no more trees for livestock, there is no more pasture, there is no rain, there is no job. There is absolutely nothing. (Interview, May 2015).

Frames of Articulation

How, then, do women frame their advocacy in seeking security for themselves and their communities? In many ways, women are skeptical of the international discourses told about them as peaceful victims, as strong yet vulnerable women. They dismiss the reification that comes with these discourses, and a few of my interviewees even had skeptical or cynical looks on their faces when they were asked about the stereotypes. But women who advocate for peace and security are also pragmatic, understanding that with these discourses comes support—rhetorical, financial, technical, and normative—from many international actors. In this pragmatic skepticism, women simultaneously claim and reject stereotypes about themselves to be able to access potential resources. Though women's organizations admitted to me that they performed the push–pull work strategically depending on their audience, I also saw in my observation of various workshops and trainings that grassroots women also used the stereotypes told about them as "third world women" while pushing against them. The "truth" of the international discourses cannot be determined and, of course, depends on the particular woman at a particular time and place, but for most of the women, there are aspects of these discourses that ring true to women's experiences and practices of security.

The frames that women use are strategies that provide agency for the women to continue their activism and still question the discourses and directives from the international community. The frames follow on from women's own definitions of security, considering women's vulnerability, their familial and cultural roles as wives and mothers, and their attachment to their communities. Much of the work that the organizations do is simply in the realm of listening to the women they serve and allowing them to speak about violence or rights violations that they might not publicly discuss because of fear of retribution or ostracization. These organizations allow women to speak for themselves while often training them, educating them, providing them spaces to build networks alongside their already-established networks along familial and community ties. Through building these spaces and networks, the women are able to articulate their needs, which the local organizations then attempt to design their programs around. The problem of education and class hierarchies is still present in this work (Nagar and Raju 2003; Giymah-Boadi 1996), but the process does provide a venue for women to be heard and to feel heard.

External funders and policymakers also want the stories from these women. One local representative lamented that these organizations wanted the "local color but don't want the advocacy when it does not fit into their ideas of us" (interview, September 2015). The frames that the women use sometimes do often align with the discourses of the international community, but the women re-appropriate them in a productive way, a way that plays upon the discourses while also asserting independence and their specialized knowledge of their own lives and communities.

Vulnerability as a Strength

As discussed in chapter two, the discourses around wartime sexualized violence create binaries between victims and saviors, the vulnerable and the strong. The Women, Peace, and Security agenda has largely been based on women's vulnerability, particularly noticeable in the "womenandchildren" discourses (Enloe 1990). Women in Côte d'Ivoire hear these discourses

and perform their own version of instrumentalization, using these discourses to achieve their own ends. They reject the essentialist nature of the vulnerability discourses while simultaneously claiming it. Ahmed (2004) states that "vulnerability is a bodily relation to the world" (69) based on fear, a fear that Lisle (2017) says "results in interventions aimed at neutralizing vulnerability's troubling power" (428). While Lisle is speaking of approaches and methodologies within the sub-discipline of International Political Sociology, these insights can also be applied to international policies. The WPS agenda was based on fear; it is an intervention that was aimed at neutralizing women's assumed vulnerability. The resolutions were not adopted to reduce the vulnerability through anti-war or anti-militarism efforts, nor was their goal to stop the vulnerability by fundamentally remaking the system of gender relations in much of the world. Instead, the agenda unquestioningly highlights women's vulnerability in ways to address it superficially.

But Ivorian women both claim and reject these discourses of vulnerability. They know they are "pre-emptively coded as vulnerable" (Lisle 2017, 428) and reproduce the vulnerability to achieve their own ends, using it as a strategy to claim their agency. The vulnerability, then, is reconfigured from being based on fear to being a place of strength from which they can organize. In a group interview at the national office of a regional organization, part of our conversation focused on how the vulnerability of women, both individually and overall, provided opportunities for the organization to fulfill its mission. One representative of this organization said, "The [reason for] weakness of women in leadership is their lack of confidence in public. This is socio-cultural, but it has an effect on women's participation. But because of this weakness, we can use empowerment programs to show them how they could imagine another way of involvement in politics and employment" (interview, April 2015). It is not that the organization saw women as "clean slates" that they could indoctrinate. Rather, they understood that women who were economically and politically vulnerable and who had been cast as vulnerable by the international community could be brought to understand how they could

work with their own vulnerability. The women could be coached by the organization to overcome their "weakness" to advocate for their needs in the public sphere.

Ivorian women also organized around their vulnerability and victimhood as places of solidarity. In workshops or trainings run by local women's organizations and usually funded by the United Nations or transnational NGOs, women from towns and rural areas learned about their rights or were trained in income-producing activities, among other programs, but they also were provided space many times to give witness to their struggles both during and after the conflict. I attended a rights awareness training held in Divo, a mid-sized city in south-central Côte d'Ivoire. There, women who came from multiple ethnic groups were taught about their right to access legal and medical resources in their communities, as well as who to approach in the instance of domestic violence. A variety of more-or-less mutually intelligible languages were used among the women, along with some French (particularly by the trainers from Abidjan); I was generally able to follow the contours of the conversation and met a woman willing to make clarifications for me when necessary. In the formal training session, some women asked questions and occasionally provided anecdotes. There did not appear to be much distrust in the room, but because many people (and groups) were strangers, there was also not a strong sense of community.

In the afternoon toward the end of the training, however, the attendees were asked to reflect on how what they had learned might be applied to a situation in their own lives. The more outspoken, often older, women began, telling stories of how the police had not taken them seriously when they had reported violence in their neighborhoods. Gradually, more women spoke, offering their stories and pushing back when others made derogatory comments about their religion or ethnic group. The more the women spoke, the more they relaxed, trusting each other in the realization that the problems they saw crossed religious and ethnic boundaries. In the sharing of their stories as victims, they allowed themselves to be vulnerable and allied with each other around their vulnerability. The national and local NGOs had provided a place for

this openness and vulnerability, but it was the women themselves who established solidarity despite their differences and empower each other to be strong in their lives.

Not all the workshops and trainings were like this, however, particularly if men were present. Women did not always find solidarity with each other because of their womanhood, and they did not always come to a realization themselves that they could use their vulnerability as empowerment. Sometimes women only lamented their victimization and asked the workshop trainers—local or international—to help them. But in most of the workshops I attended, expressions of solidarity were forthcoming. In the words of one participant, "Women need to help women because it is only us who know what each other is experiencing" (participant observation, October 2015).

Women also use their vulnerability in an instrumental way. Research has shown that in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, women use the international discourses of sexualized violence as a way to obtain international attention and funding (Baaz and Stern 2013; Freedman 2014). Likewise, in some circumstances, Ivorian women's organizations advocate on the basis of vulnerability to the national government or transnational NGOs. These organizations use the language of vulnerability stemming from sexualized violence from the WPS resolutions, particularly 1820 and 1888, to ask for increased funding for their work. Their use of these discourses establishes them as needing assistance and services offered by international representatives of UN agencies and transnational NGOs. Vulnerability is a pathway to access funding for some of these organizations, and women allow themselves to be vulnerable to establish their credentials as at-risk and open to the intervention of the international community. One organization that works primarily with victims of sexualized violence is at the forefront of this advocacy. The president said, "We are asking for medical and judicial services for women who have been raped, with rape exams paid for by the government. But when we can achieve this [level of health care], these [reproductive] services will be available to other poor women" (interview, October 2015).

Regionally, women leaders and advocates for women's security use the language of the resolutions even more prominently in their advocacy, particularly since they are in closer contact with high-level UN and governmental officials. The president of a regional West African women's organization based in Dakar, Senegal, was ambivalent about the WPS agenda as it had been discursively constructed in Africa. "In places like Sierra Leone before and DRC now, yes, rape is a major problem. But not all conflicts have this problem, especially the smaller ones that women see every day in too many parts of West Africa. At the UN, some people think Africa is all the same, a big war, and the thing women have to be most scared of is African men" (interview, September 2013). Her comments echo Gayatri Spivak's now-famous phrase—"White men saving brown women from brown men" (Spivak 2008). However, in the case of the WPS agenda in West Africa, it is, at times, Western feminists who are doing the saving.

Motherhood as an Identity

Another frame produced by international discourses but that women in Côte d'Ivoire adapt and work from is motherhood. This identity is often collapsed with ideas of vulnerability for multiple reasons: women's specific health needs, mother-only caring responsibilities for very young children, and an international discourse of "womenandchildren" (Enloe 1990). As outlined in chapter two, motherhood in many African societies is not just a biological role but is also a social one. According to the World Bank, the country's fertility rate is 4.94, down from 5.86 in the year 2000 and lower than all of its neighbors except Ghana (World Bank 2015). The default assumption is that women have children, even high-achieving professional women. Even if a woman does not have children for medical or other reasons, she has likely cared for relatives or neighbors; familial roles such as "sister" or "aunt" are liberally given and come with nurturing duties. Motherhood, then is not only taken on by those who have birthed and raised children but is claimed by a majority of women in Côte d'Ivoire. Large families result in the need for other women and older girls to assume caretaker roles—sisters, aunts, cousins, neighbors. "Motherhood" is then naturalized for all women (Woman 2015; Dieu-donne 2016).

As with vulnerability, women are pragmatic about their mothering roles, noting that there are specific ways that they can work with identity as a mother but also instrumental ways to sell motherhood as necessary to security.

The president of an umbrella organization described how women were central to family life, giving them power in working toward peace and security:

> It is not a question of being in a high position but being represented in the whole chain of the process. In Africa, women are a central axis, and the family revolves around them; she is the key element of a family. It is she who comes to gather, to carry all the children, to feed them, finally it is she who puts the chain around all the world to constitute a family. Everyone revolves around her, that is, husband, children, parents, friends, everyone converges on her. The woman morally maintains the family, so she is essential in the process of social peace. As much as she unites the family, she unites society and the nation at the same time. That is why we are involved in the process. We have said that peace in the minds of men can only come from women, because women are made to build, gather, and give life. So women will never support a war or a conflict. (Interview, June 2015)

This explicit claim of women as peaceful actors in their families and communities was made by several interview participants. However, in other parts of the same interviews, I was told how women contributed to long-standing feuds, supported fighters, and sometimes fought themselves. Sjoberg and Gentry (2007) have argued that narratives about violent women are based in three myths: they are mothers, monsters, or whores. The vengeful mother narrative, think Medusa, seems to contradict the characterizations of peaceful mothers in much of peacebuilding literature and the WPS agenda (El-Bushra 2007; Ahall 2012). Despite this apparent contradiction, within each interview and taken as a whole, the women I spoke with consistently identified motherhood as fundamental to almost all women's political activities. At the core of the activism by the local women's groups was a commitment to security, peace, or anti-violence. They therefore leaned toward highlighting the peace activities or potential of women's security in Ivorian society. For the women working for local women's NGOs, implicit in all of our discussions was that women either supported peace or contributed to conflict because of their identity as mothers.

In particular, it was the attachment to their children through birth and caretaking that provided women power in their communities and compelled them to act publicly. Especially

for poor women, who have little formal power or access to resources, motherhood provides them with the capacity to act, as the executive director of an Ivorian organization working for peace in rural areas asserted:

> We say we will not give up. Every day that the good God gives us, it is our children who are dying. It is never the son of a rich man who dies. The rule of the poor of who dies—our children are dying. … The women can solve the problem because they are the women who gave birth to these children. A woman, child, there is not a more horrible pain than giving birth. Do you think she can give birth to her child and then let her child die like this? Maybe he's going to die because you can do nothing. If you can do something, you will snatch your child from death. (Interview, May 2015)

For her, motherhood meant fighting for peace. Even when women act in anger, she said, they are still seeking a secure, peaceful future for their children. Later, she further linked poverty with a need for peace, saying that in some places, women's only value was as mothers; when they advocated for peace and development in their communities, they were willing to give up whatever they had for their children.

Similarly, at workshops I attended, women spoke of working together as mothers and allying across ethnic and religious lines. As in most of the world, mothers told stories—funny, sad, horrifying—about childbirth. This experience bonded them to each other and allowed them to start from this experience to develop trust upon which they could base further cooperation. Biological motherhood created solidarity among women, and since it is a social norm to have children, few of the participants in the workshops did not have children. Those who did not were not excluded, however. Since the social norm of motherhood is so strong, they had already developed techniques to talk about their lack of children and to perform that role in other contexts. In families with many children, older married sisters or aunts brought one or two children into their households for a few years, and they would refer to those children as "my little one." In communities where extended families lived quite near each other, women would co-parent, including feeding, disciplining, and caring; women who did not have biological children often performed the same tasks and appeared to garner the same respect from the children.

Like the frame of vulnerability discussed previously, women used motherhood instrumentally to attract attention and funding to their cause of peace and security. Women's organizations often premised their programs on women's roles in their families and their communities. Conflict management programs in particular relied on women's domestic management and intimate knowledge of their families. "They are assumed to be the principal actors in this field; at home, in homes with children, they are better able to manage conflicts but they do not have professional knowledge of the procedures," said a representative from a regional peacebuilding organization. "We support them in building capacity" (interview, July 2015). A male program officer at the same organization continued:

> In the vision of [our organization], it is said that when there is crisis or conflict, women are the first victims, but they are much more successful in preventing conflict. When a woman is trained in conflict prevention, she succeeds better. In our early warning programs, women are involved in the collection of information. … There must be women in it because when a woman wants to talk to her children or her husband to stop an action, it succeeds much more than us men. (Interview, July 2015)

Similarly, at the UN-sponsored conference I attended on Women, Leadership and Security in Abidjan (June 2015), one speaker from the audience discussed how mothers are important to countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, in that they know everything that is happening in their households. This male representative from the justice ministry told how sometimes the ministry relies on women to report if their adolescent sons or husbands are coming and going from the house at odd hours, if there are weapons or large amounts of cash in the house, and if there are new people in the community.

As has been shown in other studies of women's participation in CVE (e.g., Ní Aoláin 2016; Giscard d'Estaing 2017), the international community working in Côte d'Ivoire has also come to depend on women's participation in CVE programs, especially in regard to Islamic terrorism that has begun to take hold in the north of the country. While some women disagreed with these international efforts—"What, are we going to report our husbands and sons and brothers so they are taken away and then we have no money?" (interview, October 2015)—others admitted that they could use the international money to train women in conflict

resolution programs and techniques to create community solidarity against conflict rather than pitting families against each other.

Community as a Tool

The third frame that women re-appropriate is of positioning themselves as part of a community, rather than promoting their ideas of security as individuals and for individuals. In the previous two frames I identified, women created solidarity through experiences of vulnerability in conflict and their daily lives and of motherhood and caring roles throughout their lives. But communities for these women are multiple and overlapping, and communities become more or less salient over time for the women, depending on goals and contexts. Some of these communities are formed organically, arising around identification of family, ethnicity, religion, and social class. Other communities are more planned, with affinities coming from vulnerability and motherhood, as previously mentioned, as well as the type of activism that the women working for local NGOs perform. All these communities can be large or small with a stable, relatively unchanging membership or with a dynamic membership. Though a stereotype persists of women globally working horizontally rather than vertically (forming networks where all members are equal rather than a hierarchy), in much of the work on peace and security, women in Côte d'Ivoire rarely operate as individuals. Rather, their work is as a community of activists, and they promote it through communities of women who have been affected by conflict.

As discussed in the previous section, women often identify themselves through motherhood roles, central to family life and to their communities. Older women often play "queen mother" to their neighborhoods or villages, and though they might not have formal, public power, they often exercise their clout behind the scenes in both matriarchal and non-matriarchal cultures (Toman 2015). The affinities in these communities, in turn, branch across towns and regions and can consist of entire ethnic groups.

Non-family communities women have formed in Côte d'Ivoire are sometimes linked to various political movements, and for many of them the basis of their work was on them being women. In 1949, a multiethnic coalition of approximately 2000 women marched from Abidjan to Grand Bassam (about 30 miles) to demonstrate in front of the jail where political leaders in prison were holding a hunger strike (Toungara 1994). During the 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis, peace activist Aya Virginie Touré led thousands of women in peaceful protest at multiple times to warn about coming militias and to protest Gbagbo's government (Abiet 2011). One of the protests she led, in March 2011 in the Abobo district of Abidjan, included about 15,000 women who were clothed in black, wearing leaves, or marching naked as a curse or taboo against the Gbagbo army. The women thought security forces were coming to support and protect them, but instead, those Gbagbo-aligned soldiers in tanks shot at the women, killing seven and injuring 100. A few days later, on International Women's Day, Touré organized 45,000 women in peaceful protest, but again the army and youths sympathetic to Gbagbo attacked the women (BBC 2011).

The history of women's activism in Côte d'Ivoire does not, however, mean that when women organize, they do so around the same goals. Rather, like women around the world, Ivorian women linked themselves to disparate independence efforts, political parties, militant or peace movements, religious groups, professional associations, and issues of food, development, and entrepreneurship. For women whose primary concern was not peace and security, the conflicts retrenched certain ethnic and political identities, but it also produced opportunities for women to be activists in spaces they had not had access to previously. A former representative from the Ivorian ministry for solidarity, women, and family named several organizations and coalitions, noting that the conflicts led to "an awaking of women's consciousness" (interview, June 2015). Though the groups are all formed by women and largely restrict their membership to women, these groups are organized around other identities or motives beyond gender. Though these coalitions formed in 2002 and 2003 to train and educate women around topics not necessarily related to the country's politics, according to the former

ministry representative, the women in the coalitions publicly participated in promoting Resolution 1325. And after the 2010–2011 post-electoral crisis, she said, “women’s involvement was at its peak. Non-political women’s organizations worked on diplomacy between the belligerent parties for a return to lasting peace. Women’s political organizations were engaged in fighting, sometimes even on the battlefront” (interview, June 2015). Therefore, these organizations work along two lines—identity as women and identity of some other form—but they share the same goal—women’s empowerment. These findings concur with some African feminists who note that examining intersecting identities are important in understanding the activism of African women but that gender is not always the identity that matters most to them (Tamale 2006; Acholonu 1995).

Many of the organizations that I visited see their activist communities reaching beyond their national borders and beyond ethnic and cultural boundaries. A few of the organizations I spoke with were national chapters of larger West African or pan-African women’s organizations, and they privileged the sense of community activism that they shared with women doing similar work in other countries. A representative of one such organization said, “We would like our network to be [formally] revitalized. Ten years ago was the last conference, and since then there has been little formal collaboration. Twice we wanted to revitalize the regional network with the support of UNFPA, so we could train all the ministers on Resolution 1325, but it was not funded. We also wanted to discuss achieving the Millennial Development Goals with the use of 1325, including public lectures with governments and regional organization members, but it was not possible” (interview, October 2015). Women from multiple organizations asked if I knew people with the U.S. Embassy or the United Nations who could fund such collaboration with their “sisters” in other countries, especially when there was a language barrier. They saw this collaboration and community-building as vital to their work so that they might share techniques and contacts from the international community.

Though the women that I spoke with who are working on issues of women’s peace and security have chosen to be in a community of women activists, they also recognize stronger

bonds within other communities that they and all women in the country belong to. In many West African countries, griots play an important role in communication and solidarity among communities. Griots can be both male or female and are storytellers, singers, musicians, and keepers of oral tradition (Hale 1997). For Ivorians, griots can stand outside many traditions to make jokes or tell truths that they otherwise might not. One of the national women's organizations has used the power that griots have in society to educate communities on how women's security can be achieved. Though the organization often uses grants from Western embassies and UN and transnational NGO programs to conduct its own programs on women's empowerment in villages across the country, it also asks griots to reinforce the education. Because griots are a separate caste, said the program chair from this organization, they are sometimes more sympathetic to efforts to empower women than are other community leaders, and communities in general are socialized to listen to them. "Within the framework of our consultations, we have our offices in various cities where there are teachers, traditional communicators, … women who are models for young girls to prepare their future" (interview, April 2015). The girls especially listen to the griot's message, she said, and understand how to work for their own empowerment. But even for men, the griot's words are important. A long-time peace activist from the north of the country whom I met when leaving an interview related that some men would not listen to women in their communities, even when the women had de facto power. She said that griots, then, were the best way to reach these men: "It is necessary to identify the resistances on the part of men and to overcome them" (interview May 2015).

Every interview with a representative of a local women's organization and every workshop or training I observed—whether they included or not representatives from the government, the United Nations, or transnational NGOs—revealed how women saw each of their communities as giving them strength to continue their work. Even when women identified with their ethnic group across national borders, they mentioned the support they receive from their "sisters" and how they could not achieve anything without this support. No matter the issue or identity around women coalesced, women drew strength from each other and

described for me and each other how important it was to sustain these connections so that they might achieve security for themselves and peace in the country, echoing Abdullah and Fofana-Ibrahim's (2010) thesis of empowerment achieved through communal forms of social transformation. As one Ivorian activist put it, "We're not rich. We are not government. We're nothing. But our solidarity is what counts for us. Today you will find women [working] on the ground. There are women who die every day on the ground. It is we alone who weep" (interview, October 2015).

Conclusion

In Côte d'Ivoire, women's local organizations working for peace and security provide women space to articulate their own security needs. The women who work in these organizations recognize the international discourses told about them and reproduce those discourses both because they believe the discourses and because the women use the discourses as tools to achieve their own ends. However, they also simultaneously push against the international discourses to reject a frame of victimhood, recasting themselves as actors. In this simultaneous push–pull, which I have called here pragmatic skepticism, Ivorian women use their physical and economic vulnerability and their traditional motherhood roles to provide spaces of advocacy and solidarity, while they also keep their connections with their multiple other communities to further peace and security for women in the country.

This chapter's goal is not to reify women in Africa and specifically in Côte d'Ivoire as motherly or "natural" but to note and understand their experiences in their work, as they operate in their own contexts, both as vulnerable and as actors in conflict and post-conflict. Because the WPS resolutions are based on assumptions of women, especially women in Africa, allowing Ivorian women to put forth their own conceptions of security is a way for the women to both push back against the assumptions and to redefine security for themselves, through their own advocacy.

Chapter Seven:
What's Next for Women, Peace, and Security in Côte d'Ivoire?

In this dissertation, I have examined the implementation of the UN Security Council's Women, Peace, and Security agenda as it has so far been implemented in Côte d'Ivoire. Each empirical chapter was dedicated to a level of analysis—national, international, and local—to illustrate how actors at each of these levels is key to the agenda's implementation in the country. Additionally, each chapter analyzes the interconnectedness between the actors at the three levels to show that the discourses of each impact the work of the others. I primarily used in-depth interviews to understand the perspectives of those who work for and represent local women's organizations and how they perceive their work in relation to their governments and donors. With an eye to three levels of analysis—macro- (international and transnational), meso- (national), and micro- (community and local organization)—I have found that multiple actors affect the implementation of the WPS agenda in Côte d'Ivoire and that women working on these issues must interact with the actors at all of these levels to implement the policy.

Therefore, with my findings from my field research, I make three central arguments. The first is that two kinds of global actors—international and transnational—try to shape the WPS agenda, but they do so in very different ways, through the state and bypassing it. These two sets of actors share language and perceptions of women in Africa; however, they have different goals as a result of their composition. International actors, both states and international organizations with states as members, pursue the interests of states. By contrast, transnational NGOs prioritize civil society and work toward development and human rights. Both international and transnational organizations use top-down policies and funding mechanisms to achieve their goals. The second is that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda in Côte d'Ivoire has been narrowed to a focus on security sector reform at the national level, with the assistance of international actors. The government does implement the WPS agenda to some

extent, but in a way that privileges traditional mechanisms of state security and that superficially integrates gender into existing processes. This indicates how national governments are critical actors in implementation of the WPS agenda and can both take up and limit the role of women. The third argument is that women at the local level have overlapping perspectives on WPS but differ in critical ways from international actors and national actors. Women define security more broadly than it is often defined for them, and I use contributions from African feminist literature to theorize their stance of "pragmatic skepticism." Ivorian women use concepts of vulnerability, motherhood, and community as spaces of solidarity and as tools to use and challenge international and national discourses.

My findings contribute to security, peacebuilding, and feminist literatures in international relations. To further this scholarship, I have relied on feminist and other critical aspects of these literatures, but I have also brought in insights from African feminism, which is rarely incorporated into mainstream or critical international relations theorizing. This was not simply an academic exercise to match the backgrounds of the theorists with that of my research participants. Rather, I have been able to gain purchase on the political activities of Ivorian women in advocating for themselves, as vulnerable women in mothering roles as part of larger communities. Only through African feminist scholarship could I develop a perspective on Ivorian women's relationships with each other and their communities as well as with the state and international and transnational actors. My methodological stance of critical interpretive feminism, then, rather than pre-defining categories, allowed me to have open discussions with research participants and develop deeper realizations and understandings of specific events.

While I center local women's organizations in my research, I have also drawn the connections from these organizations and the women who work for them to state structures, international and transnational institutions, and global forces, all of which influence each other in myriad ways. Throughout all this, I point out that while these structures, institutions, and forces are continuously present, questions of gender relations suffuse policies and practices at all levels. I specifically wanted to know what is unique to women's organizations in the

implementation of the WPS agenda that other organizations working with other agendas might not experience.

Across West Africa, leaders of local, national, and regional women's organizations communicate both agreement and ambivalence toward the WPS resolutions. One director whose organization spans the entire West and Central Africa region characterized the WPS resolutions as positive on the whole. She commented that sexualized violence was important enough to most women that it needed to be highlighted by the international community: "The long-term physical and psychological effects of sexual violence really take their toll. This is a women's issue that must be combatted through formal resolutions" (interview 2013). Her reservations about the resolutions were primarily about the lack of focus on refugees and internally displaced populations, which are often subject to increased threats of sexualized violence. Her organization, which has offices in several post-conflict countries, is at the forefront of implementing the WPS resolutions in the region but does not focus solely on sexualized violence. "Our activities are holistic. Women need support when they have been raped, but they also need shelter and water. They need space for markets, and their children need education" (interview 2013). Every one of my interviewees emphasized structural reasons—stemming from colonialism, structural adjustment policies, and domestic political corruption and incompetence—as the source of conflict. Yet on the whole, even when they disagreed with the politics and quality of the implementation or the specific contours of the resolutions, each participant supported the WPS agenda in principle and asserted that it needs to be supported and implemented by the international community and national governments.

My few interviews with government officials demonstrated how limited government engagement was with the WPS agenda. Additionally, I did not include in my interviews representatives of transnational NGOs, nor did I speak to many people who worked for UN agencies. The reason for this was because voices of donors and others who represent the "international community" tend to dominate policy analyses and academic studies of policy implementation and global civil society movements—speaking for the people they intend to

serve. By contrast, I wanted to privilege those who are the primary beneficiaries of these policies and who are also fundamental actors in the agenda's implementation. In focusing on these women, their efforts, and their meaning-making, I most certainly overlooked some of the activities performed by actors in the other levels of analysis, especially the international/ transnational level. Largely, the women I spoke with were generous in their interpretations of the work by transnational NGOs and bilateral donors, even if they were candid about the limitations, but it stands that paying attention to actors at this level of analysis could provide a richer understanding of the development of the NAP and the localization of the WPS agenda.

This dissertation also points to two ways that my research could be expanded. First, focusing on one country, though instructive, raises the question of whether the same mechanisms are in play in other countries or whether the context of Côte d'Ivoire makes WPS implementation there unique. To answer this, I conducted field research in 2016 in Guinea and Mali with similar methodology and goals as the research discussed in this dissertation. The three countries share somewhat similar colonial histories and cultures, though their politics have diverged since independence. I also had the opportunity to conduct interviews over several days in Sierra Leone to compare my other case studies with a country that has received a great deal of international attention. In each place, my preliminary research reveals that though the national contexts are different in each case, the international pressures on each country remain the same. Additionally, local women's activists use techniques similar to those of their Ivorian neighbors, though they are, of course, adapted to their national context.

The second way this dissertation could be expanded is to understand the real intersections between security, peacebuilding, and development. These three processes are often examined separately; however, their mechanisms and effects are co-constituted. Though I argue here that the WPS agenda reveals that gender makes a difference in policy implementation, there is a question of whether other issues related to human security might impact security, peacebuilding, and development in similar ways.

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