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The Discourse of Decolonization and Popular Memory: South Korea

Chungmoo Choi

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear. — Antonio Gramsci¹

I begin this essay by invoking Antonio Gramsci's image of an interregnum, a space of crisis, which is pregnant with morbid grotesquery. This is the space from which I present the problems of "postcolonial" South Korea. I do not purport simply to identify the predicament of South Korea as such, although inevitably this issue will be discussed in order to locate the problems I am planning to address. In this essay, I intend to examine critically the South Korean discourse of decolonization and offer an occasion to rethink its subversive strategies so that the new can be born.

When Is Postcolonial?—The Permanence of Colonialism in South Korea

When is postcolonial in South Korea? The official history written in South Korea denies the legitimacy of this rhetorical question because the physical absence/removal of Japanese colonial rule after 1945 defines South Korea as essentially postcolonial. However, assuming South Korea to be postcolonial eludes the political, social, and economic realities of its people, which lie behind that celebrated sign “post” of periodization, without considering the substantive specificity of Korean histories. The actual landscape of the postcolonial space is a contestatory one. This very contestation tests our sensibilities and demands that we rethink the “postcolonial” realities of the (ex-)colonies. As I will attempt to illustrate throughout this essay, “postcolonial” South Korea is a space lying between the empty signifier, “postcolonial,” and the reality that it (mis)represents.

I do not intend here to echo Anne McClintock’s and Ella Shohat’s recent critique of postcolonialism, in which they contend that the term “postcolonial,” does not correspond to the social and historical realities of many Third World countries where imperial powers vibrantly exercise colonial and neocolonial practices.² We may extrapolate from the arguments of McClintock and Shohat that the term “postcolonialism” is impregnated with a universalizing character that privileges the subjective position of the Western imperial powers. That is, the term “postcolonial” does honor the colonial masters’ *de jure* loss of sovereignty over their former colonies, while it disregards the deferred postcoloniality in many of these former colonies. Shohat actually points out that the term “postcolonial” is a diluted replacement of the term “Third World” that once proffered revolutionary possibilities. While insisting that “postcolonial” is a politically vacuous term created in the increasingly depoliticized climate of U.S. academia, Shohat concludes with a rather predictable suggestion that we should consider historical, geopolitical, and cultural contexts.

I would like to take this debate further. In essence, what is at issue here is not the matter of rethinking or reinventing a term that may universally represent the realities of the “postcolonial” Third World, but the necessity of the decolonization discourse in the true sense of the word so that the cause of this discomfort with the term itself can be made obsolete. As a

contribution to this project I will offer a strategy that revises the old notion of decolonization that emphasizes the restoration of the political and ideological sovereignty of a nation. Locating the decolonization discourse in the arena of national sovereignty alone buries the intractable ambiguities of the postcolonial subject position with split loyalties, allowing a colonization of consciousness. By colonization of consciousness I mean the imposition by the dominant power of its own world view, its own cultural norms and values, on the (colonized) people so that they are compelled to adopt this alien system of thought as their own and therefore disregard or disparage indigenous culture and identity.³ Colonization of consciousness thus perpetuates cultural dependency and colonial subjectivity. I will argue that the strategy of the decolonization discourse in the largely “postcolonial” era requires a self-reflective examination of this ambiguity that deters decolonization from within, beyond the more palpable material conditions and hegemonic forces from without. In this light, the discourse of decolonization cannot safely rely on the self/other formula of the anticolonial discourse, although the two share a certain common property in their causal relationship. I suspect that JanMohamed’s strategic formula of Manichaean struggle,⁴ for instance, risks significant oversight of the constant slippage in the binary opposition of self/other, which the decolonization discourse attempts to overcome. Homi Bhabha’s⁵ notion of colonial mimicry may be more productive in that it can be extended to that of mutual mimicry, and thus offers an alternative view: the notion of ambivalence, which may ease the rigidity of the binarism. JanMohamed criticized Homi Bhabha’s notion as the unity of colonial subject that dissolves the conflictual relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. I remain sympathetic to JanMohamed’s conviction in the critique of the colonial discourse in that the Manichaean struggle maintains the sharpness of colonial subjectivity to unseat the authority of colonial discourse. However, I find Bhabha’s formulation quite accommodating in that it opens up the possibility of self-reflective criticism by suggesting the possibility of mutual mimicry between the colonizer and the colonized beyond the inflexible rigidity of self and other. The self-reflective positionality rescues the colonized subject from the trap of being a victim, which often (and dangerously) slips into self-glorification. Such glorification of victimhood often engenders an

effect of Manichaean theology founded on binarism. Moreover, holding the imperial powers responsible for (neo)colonization, one not only minimizes one's own decolonizing potential but may also fail to activate the bottled-up subversive energy. I shall develop this point later in my conclusion.

It is against this backdrop that I will address the issues of colonization of consciousness and explore the epistemological landscape of postcoloniality in South Korea. The project to decolonize consciousness will inevitably interrogate the issue of historical consciousness or lack thereof, which, in complicated alliances with the material forces of imperialism, often causes internal displacement among a colonized people culturally, socially, and psychologically.

The point of departure is Korea's official historical narratives: of the liberation, the national partition,⁶ and the subsequent disenfranchisement of a nongovernmental Korean subjective position from history. The dominant narrative of South Korean history long acknowledged liberation as a gift of the allied forces, especially of the U.S.A., since Koreans were excluded in the liberation process itself. This narrative not only justified Korea's position as restrained by the sovereign power of the former Soviet Union and the U.S. on the issues of Korean partition, but also is responsible for admitting Cold War ideology as the ruling ideology of both Koreas. Such a narrative has delegitimated the Koreans as valid agents of both nation-building and the subsequent military and economic dependence on the Cold War superpowers, although to a differing degree in the North than in the South. The transitive verbs "to liberate" and "to partition" presuppose a subject (or subjects), who is external to the action and yet administers it, and a passive receiver (the object) upon which such actions are performed. This differential positionality between subject and object may also extend to the performative consequences of the terms "national liberation" and "independence." This very breach between the subject-object positions illustrates the historical circumstances of "postcolonial" Korea. Although the debate on this subject shifted to a discourse of the Korean contribution, crediting the relentless Independence Movement of the Koreans for winning U.S. recognition, which in turn granted the liberation of Korea,⁷ it required a tragedy before the Koreans would revise their

analytic framework, which had uncritically privileged the centrality of the West in the shaping of their own fate.

During the Cold War era, this alienation or exteriorization of the South Koreans from their own history was reinforced and internalized in the name of liberty and protection from the North and demonized by the Cold War discourse of wilderness and of poverty.⁸ For more than two decades after the national partition, South Korean schoolchildren visually depicted North Koreans literally to be red-bodied demons with horns and long fingernails on their hairy, grabbing hands, as represented in anti-Communist posters and widely distributed propaganda materials, such as *Friends of Liberty*, a lavishly printed magazine distributed free to book-hungry Koreans in the war-devastated South. Once the dizzying frenzy of propaganda subsided and the demonic image of the Northern brothers faded, the question that haunted South Koreans was whether their Northern relatives were starving (as they have repeatedly assumed without any verifiable evidence). Understandably, the discourse of poverty has been deployed by both the North and the South as an effective technique of disciplining its people. Korean Americans are now allowed to travel to North Korea. The messages of the North Korean citizens to their kin in the South, conveyed through their relatives from across the Pacific, often express satisfaction with their material comfort. As the discourse of poverty has created a sense of crisis and, proportionally, promoted material fetishism, it has effectively sustained the South Korean military and economic dependence on the U.S.

The materials of indoctrination also instilled a false sense of prosperity and a fetishism for what was out of reach, and this in turn engendered a pathology of self-pity occasioned by the lack of material goods. I remember once, in my childhood, seeing a picture of a roller-skating Korean couple in ballet outfits featured in one of these magazines. Nothing could have been further from the reality of starving, war-torn South Korea. Yet the picture captured my imagination and kindled my envy. Soon American mass culture towered over Korea's desolate cultural landscape as South Korea became one of the most heavily armed fortresses of the vast American empire. To live in this state of internal displacement and external dependency is to live in a state of colonialism. This "postcolonial" colonialism is not simply an expansion of the borders of the capitalist superpowers into the

devastated former colonies. It cannot be confined to the arena of economics that neocolonialism often connotes. It is a colonization of consciousness, which results in a broad range of cultural expression, values, and behavior, and the production of knowledge in an environment of tremendous material and cultural disparity. These symptoms are, in a sense, a product at once of the politics of assimilation and of separatism: the reproduction of the contradictory colonial double discourse. As I will illustrate later, colonial double discourse has created for colonized people an illusion of living in the same social and cultural sphere as that of the metropolis, while it ruthlessly exercises a discriminatory politics of hierarchy. Under these circumstances a (post)colonized people continues to live at the edge of the metropolis. In this borderland, as Vicente Rafael put it, "(a colonized) people constantly recasts, even as it appropriates identities and languages: those of its real or imagined ancestors as well as those imposed on it by the colonial state or imputed to it by other ethnic groups. With these efforts, it seeks a place in social hierarchy, even as it struggles to project alternative conditions for future empowerment."⁹ The negotiation that Rafael observes may manifest itself crudely as a collaboration or as a more subtle cultural assimilation.

South Koreans have lived on the same edge of both colonial and (post)-colonial borderland. As the people of South Korea acquired a detailed sense of distinction according to the property of Western symbolic capital,¹⁰ which South Koreans have neither the resources to produce nor the cultural taste to appreciate, they adopted Western cultural ancestry as their very own. This is to adopt the logic of modernization which privileges Western culture. For those who adopt such a world view, the lack of material resources to produce it is tantamount to an admission of one's own cultural inferiority. In this subaltern climate, the "postcolonial" Korean elite distinguish themselves as members of the privileged class by meticulously acquiring Western, that is, American, culture. The educational policy of the American military government (1945–1948)¹¹ institutionalized such a cultural dependence. It was based, it should be noted, not on liberalism but on the structure of the Japanese-style educational system, which was originally designed to implement obedience and complacency toward the colonial rulers. Throughout their school years, South Korean children

learn that competence in English, the most powerful of the colonial languages, and a knowledge of world history, that is, Western civilization, are not only the signs of enlightenment but also their symbolic capital. In other words, (post)colonial South Koreans have continued to mimic Western hegemonic culture and have reproduced a colonial pathology of self-denigration and self-marginalization, which have long blinded the South Koreans from critically assessing their “liberator-benefactor” as a colonizing hegemon.

In the following I will illuminate the workings of colonial double-talk, using three metaphors: Raymond Williams’s country and the city, Baudrillard’s simulacrum, and Lévi-Strauss’s critique of totemism. This is a strategy to replace the older monotonic decolonization discourse that failed to predict the tenacity of colonialism in the “postcolonial” era. The shortfalls of the older discourse, I believe, stem partially from its failure to interrogate the truth claim of the colonial discourse and its hidden agenda, and from the broad and deep-seated impact of colonialism upon the social and cultural landscape of the ex-colonies, especially the lasting colonization of consciousness. The metaphor of the country and the city is helpful for understanding the power relationship between the metropolis and the “postcolonial” colony. Raymond Williams, in *The Country and the City*,¹² maps the relationship between the country-colony and the city-metropolis as a system that perpetuates material disparity by calling attention to the differences of the two locations that are interconnected through the patriarchal power hierarchy. In this relationship, I am attempting to show that the metropolitan discourse lies external to the lives of the indigenous people, and the internal hegemonic discourse not only reproduces the discourse of the former colonial master but also transmits and, moreover, simultaneously reinforces the neocolonial metropolitan superpower. This is what I mean by colonial double-talk. This discontinued interconnectedness between the metropolitan discourse and the internal(ized) hegemonic discourse is what the (post)colonial discourse must interrogate.

But before I discuss this postcolonial reproduction of colonialism in the (post)colonies, I would like to consider Baudrillard’s notion of simulacrum as another metaphor for colonialism, especially Japan’s colonization of Korea and the further mimicry of this colonization by the military government of

South Korea. Baudrillard explains simulacrum as the generation by models of a real without origin or reality. Baudrillard explains that “the simulacrum is never that [which] conceals the truth. Rather it is the truth which conceals that there is none. It is the map that precedes the territory. It is more real than real, hyperreal.” Baudrillard proposes this notion of simulacrum to reveal that the hyperreal is what holds power and dominates modern culture, especially the culture of late capitalism. According to Baudrillard, the so-called real can easily be produced from “miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks and command models. It is a form of pastiche that can be reproduced indefinitely and which needs not appear rational, since it is not measured against any idea or ‘negative instance.’”¹³

This pastiche may be interrogated historically, of course, because it left its traces in the genealogy of imperial discourses. As modern history has witnessed, Western colonialism was morally justified by the legitimacy of the “scientific knowledge” on race and the linear evolution of civilization. This “scientific knowledge” stabilizes racial hierarchy and firmly establishes the self/other binary opposition. However, the Enlightenment narrative authorizes “scientific knowledge” as the universal truth. Given the authority of the universal truth claim, scientific knowledge is endowed with the power to “mark off” the Other and to justify colonial conquest in the name of the Enlightenment obligation. When the “scientific” discourse invests the Other in this way, it turns the Other into a totem. As Lévi-Strauss’s study of totemism attests, totemism never existed as a social institution but as an explanatory principle in defense of the Western moral universe. The “science of man” in the service of the Enlightenment has simply been a scholarly construct to mark off alterity, and thus to reproduce the self/other binary opposition. This opposition, as Albert Memmi would insist, enables the objectification and even thingification of Other (un)humans, while the colonizers themselves shed the humanity that they inscribed on themselves and over which they had claimed a preemptive monopoly.

While the European colonial discourse claimed scientific truth for its views on race and human institutions, and thus legitimized the Enlightenment obligation toward the Other, Japanese imperialism reproduced the fictionality of the European colonial discourse. It was a pastiche of the

European Enlightenment. Japanese imperialism simulated and reproduced this grand but empty narrative, in yet another form of colonialism, not with any Enlightenment pretense but through a pastiche of colonization. The Japanese annexation of Korea was unmitigated capitalist expansionism. The colonization of Korea bred an archaic sense of subjugation with terrorism and military discipline. This was the real face of colonialism under the thinly disguised mask of European Enlightenment, we must remember.

一体
内鮮一体
國体

Replacing the Enlightenment project in their discourse of colonization, the Japanese in Korea grafted the language of the political economy of colonialism onto a language of body. The colonial technique of separating while at the same time connecting “the country and the city” was repeated here in the body politic. It was imperial Japan’s double discourse of assimilation that constructed an illusion of “one-body” (*ittai*), the bodily connection of Korea to metropolitan Japan. However, the assimilation of Korea under the banner of the “one-bodiment of [civilized] inner land [that is, Japan] and [the uncivilized, hinterland] Korea” (*Naisen ittai*) was not really a democratic “one-bodiment” but an em-bodying of Korea into the national body of Japan, represented by the heavenly body of the Japanese emperor, the *kokutai* (literally, national body).¹⁴ This em-bodying of Korea, however, simultaneously dis-membered the Korean people from the national body of Japan. Korea was embodied as a part of Japan’s national body only to extract human and natural resources from the former so that it could satisfy the needs of metropolitan Japan as a capitalistic body—but never be nurtured with the fruits harvested through the body’s accumulation of capital. Colonized Korea became the organs without a body, and Japan the body without organs.¹⁵ Thus the colony as organs was dismembered from the body, under the schizophrenic reality of colonialism, the capitalistic machine operating in a dismembered yet interconnected relationship.

The grotesqueness of this type of interconnectedness is characteristic of imperialism: power flows only in one direction in a vain attempt to satisfy the insatiable desire of capitalism. The imperialist power structure is simulated and reproduced locally in the form of state capitalism, as exemplified in South Korea and its Southeast Asian neighbors. Today the colonial relationship has an added dimension; it represents the double subjugation of the formerly colonized Third World countries. They carry the tenacious

legacy of colonial experience and power relationships that govern post-colonial realities, and the commanding presence of neocolonial power.

What is remarkable is that, beyond the violence that this empty sign allowed the colonizers to inflict upon the colonized, in the so-called post-colonial era, the political elite of this former Japanese colony have mimicked the same techniques of terror that the colonizers had used to subjugate Korea and reproduced it in the form of an authoritarianism, especially under the patronage of the Cold War superpower. In fact, the late President Park Chung Hee and his cohorts had been trained at a Japanese military academy in Manchuria during the colonial period. Interestingly, according to a military source, Park Chung Hee compared himself to the young officers active in the cause of the Showa Restoration (1932), which had helped to accelerate prewar military fascism in Japan. As William Pietz writes in his article "The Post Colonialism of Cold War Discourse,"¹⁶ the Cold War discourse itself was a reproduction of colonial discourse, based on the geopolitical binary opposition of East/West, good/evil, civilized/primitive, in its construction of the Soviet Union as a "mythical," "oriental," evil empire.

It must be Baudrillard's myopia that kept him from seeing the real political consequences of his light-hearted mockery of modernity. This playfulness is an avoidance of interrogating the pastiche that has permitted the indefinite reproduction of colonialism, and a refusal to measure this pastiche against negative instances.

South Koreans did not awaken to the fact of their own subaltern condition until the popular uprising in Kwangju in 1980 led to a massacre of up to two thousand people by the military, allegedly connived or authorized by the U.S. commander, who led the UN forces.¹⁷ Frantz Fanon had already warned that simply transferring the colonial legacy into the hands of the natives might result in the mimicking of the colonial discourse by local bourgeois nationalists, because "the national bourgeoisie identifies itself with the Western bourgeoisie, from whom it has learnt its lessons."¹⁸ From this we may infer that the people of the former colony might have assumed a false sense of security created by the hegemonized bourgeois nationalists. This is exactly what blinded South Koreans to the reality of their subaltern status.

A South Korean "postnational-partition" (*pundan sidae*)¹⁹ writer, Pok

Kō-il, has been critical of this blindness and its accompanying inertia, which can be seen especially in the comfortable assimilation of the Korean middle class in the colonial realities of present-day Korea. In his novel, *In Search of an Inscription: Keijō, Shōwa 62*²⁰—*Shōwa 62* (1987) refers to the reign of Hirohito, the late heavenly emperor of shining peace (*shōwa*), and Keijō was the Japanese name given to the city of Seoul during the colonial period—the author criticizes the collective Korean amnesia with regard to their cultural and ethnic identity in the face of a sustained and then suspended colonialism. The novel allegorizes South Korea's present condition by imaginatively stepping outside the official history. In his fictional emergent history, the author writes that Japan continues to rule Korea today; gone are the history and language of the colonized *Handōjin*, the peninsular people. *Handōjin* was a name the Japanese gave to the Koreans during the colonial period (1910–1945) in order to mark off Korea's distinct hinterland status; it was colonial double-talk for an imperial citizenry set off against the civilized inner land, or *Naichi*.²¹ Ironically, the novel's protagonist, a totally assimilated middle-class poet who aspires to a Japanese readership, falls in love with a Japanese woman who happens to be a direct descendant of the daimyo of Satsuma, who had subjugated Okinawa. The novel's hero admires this woman's (unquestioned) glorious ancestry. However, because of his status, this assimilated peninsular man with a Japanese surname, Kinoshita, has to give her up to an American representative of a multinational corporation. In the novel, the colonized Koreans, denied their history and culture, and doubly subjugated by a colonial master and a neocolonial superpower, are subjected to exploitation and oppression.

Through this novel Pok Kō-il urges his readers to rethink radically the current South Korean situation from the perspective of the colonial subject and not to slide into the comfortable misconception that they are “postcolonial.” He attributes South Koreans' confusion between the colonial and the postcolonial to a number of factors, including the elimination of Leftist intellectuals, represented in the novel as critical historians, and the silencing of dissenting voices by the authoritarian political structure. The voiceless people of the novel, the language-deprived *Handōjin*, are today's South Koreans, the author maintains. The novel concludes with a pro-

phetic ending. The protagonist, Kinoshita, who is awakened to Korea's colonial reality, takes a fugitive's journey to Shanghai, where the Korean Provisional Government (1919–1945) is engaged in its sole activity—compiling a Korean-language dictionary. The determination of this colonized subject to recuperate the lost language here is a determination to restore the lost voice, the discourse of decolonization.

Interestingly, Pok Kō-il opens a debate on the issue of writing as a political act by critically invoking the writer Yi Kwang-su and the playwright Pak Yōng-hi, the infamous nationalists-turned-collaborators under Japanese colonial rule. The author, however, seems to credit revisionist history as the foremost catalyst in the awakening of a people's historical consciousness. The author's depiction of the division of intellectual labor in the novel parallels the scene in the 1970s and 1980s in South Korea, which saw a surging intellectual movement qua social movement.

Countermemory and the Theater of Protest

For the past decade or so, South Korean intellectuals have been actively engaged in—even as they have marveled at—the explosion of critical studies in a wide range of disciplines, the more active ones being history, literary criticism, and the social sciences. Much of this energy has been spent on debating the cause of the national partition and the impact of continuing foreign domination, which has nurtured the monster that is the political culture of South Korea. This activity has led to a shift in the prevailing analytic paradigm from the universalizing Western-master narrative to that of the Third World, especially from the perspective of South Korea, whose decolonization has thus far been denied. While the national literature debate, cast in the framework of Third World literature, paved the way to this critical rethinking in the 1970s, the immediate catalyst for this intellectual movement was the publication in 1979 of the first volume of what was to become a six-volume series, *Haebang chōnhusaŭi insik* (Understanding pre- and postliberation history), at the deathbed of the nearly twenty-year-old Park Chung Hee regime (1961–1979). The 1980 massacre of the citizens of Kwangju who rose up against the subsequent military coup was a watershed event. As noted earlier, at issue was the fact that for the su-

preme command of the South Korean armed forces to order a military action such as the one that took place in Kwangju, the approval of the U.S. army commander was mandatory. South Koreans began to question the role of the U.S. in the massacre, especially when the American commander had played a key role in anointing the orchestrator of the massacre, Chun Doo Hwan, to the South Korean presidency. To the Korean public, the U.S.'s brusque military interests in South Korea above and beyond humanitarian concerns became all too transparent. Many South Koreans began reassessing the relationship between South Korea and the U.S.A. and concluded that their country was nothing more than an American military fortress.

At this dramatic moment of historical clairvoyance, Bruce Cumings's monumental work, *The Origins of the Korean War*, was published in 1981. It administered a "fresh shock" to South Korean intellectuals, who had been groping for a language to define Korea's deferred postcoloniality, and opened a new door to the critical discourse of decolonization.²² In *The Origins of the Korean War*, Cumings courageously challenged the dominant discourse and declared that Korea had been denied its liberation. He insisted that the removal of Japanese rule from Korea was an insignificant event that gave way to the American domination of Korea. The "post-colonial" designation, then, is the faded signpost that marks this insignificant event in Korean history.

Throughout the 1980s an avalanche of critical studies ensued, many of which adopted Marxist or Neo-Marxist methodologies, recasting the role of South Korea in the totality of the internationalization of capitalism and its complicated domestic manifestations. For instance, in the social sciences, a critique of the dependence of Korean scholarship on Parsonian sociology and its dominant modernization theories ignited a heated Neo-Marxist debate on economic and social formation in the mid-1980s. The critique of these modernization theories is not simply directed to the fact that they have privileged "modernization" and capitalistic accumulation, and thus have set the agenda for many countries that are relegated to underdeveloped status. Critical sociologists argue that the American-dependent social sciences were responsible for the South Korean military government's implementation of its aggressive modernization policy, in the form of state capi-

talism, at the cost of enormous social problems, including the widening of class gaps and furthering the proletarianization of the underprivileged class. However, the sudden torrent of Marxist analyses that arose as a consequence often ran off without seeping into the hardened terrain of a South Korea sterilized against Communism. This may be attributable to the uncritical and indiscriminate application of classic Marxism or to the orthodox state doctrines of some socialist countries, especially North Korea, and this accounts for the diminution of the insurgency's persuasive power in a formidably capitalistic South Korea.

These intellectual developments have evolved in tandem with a broadly cast popular movement, known as the *minjung* movement, which began in the wake of the popular April 19 Revolution in 1960 and developed into an anticolonial national unification movement by the end of the 1980s. Its proponents considered it an extension of Korea's long tradition of popular nationalist movements, from the 1894 Tonghak Peasant War and the 1919 March First Independence Movement to the April 19 Revolution, which toppled the U.S.-sponsored Syngman Rhee regime (1948–1960). For the past three decades this movement has embraced a considerable agenda. The anti-authoritarian democracy movement, the labor movement, and the national unification movement have been some of the more prominent features of this broadly cast movement. Although its leaders have included various political dissenters from all walks of life, it is students that have always been at the center as the most active agents. The South Korean government, actively collaborating with its neocolonial masters and their disguised program of hegemony, and with the Cold War militarists, has brutally repressed any sign of the Left, and sweepingly labeled every organized protest as an act of Communist infiltration. Nevertheless, the *minjung* movement has constituted a site of collective resistance against the politics of terror and the larger hegemonizing forces which have nurtured that terror.

The *minjung* movement has been conducive to a radical rereading and recuperation of histories. Its discourse constantly crosses over the boundaries between politics and culture, and between the present and the imagined past, to suggest an alternative future, while invoking a deep-seated popular sentiment for resistance. Such a blurring of boundaries and issues has misled scholars by permitting them to glimpse only fragmented pictures of

the overall movement. Those who have speculated that the popular movement is a form of class struggle between the capitalist state and opposition groups infused with the North Korean version of socialism (known as *Chuch'e sasang*) find a certain satisfaction. However, a classical Marxist interpretation does not seem to embrace many other aspects of the movement, especially the pervasive conflation of the reputed international goal of socialism²³ and a nationalism which strives to recuperate or imagine anew the Korean identity.

As an alternative to the materialistic confines of a Marxist analysis, I offer to recast the *minjung* movement within the purview of decolonization: the emancipatory struggle from a colonial past and a neocolonial present which denigrates, if it does not abnegate, the Korean identity. The *minjung* discourse in South Korea has been the major contending voice aspiring to disrupt and subvert the dominant language, the language of the state and, by extension, of the neocolonial forces. In its subversive struggle, the *minjung* discourse has deployed counter-hegemonic emergent history in its discursive field. The alternative history or radical reinterpretation of history reaudits the silenced history of “the people.”

Foucault has suggested that a counter-memory, which may become visible only through the Nietzschean notion of genealogy hidden under the orthodox history, may be an option for an alternative discourse. The hushed-up, erased social memory, he suggests, would contest the validity of the official, canonized memory, the orthodox history. The people of South Korea, deprived of their voice for almost a century, have carefully kept their memories alive, in the form of chilling nightmares, hushed personal narratives, or memories invoked through shamanic visions of terror, nursing their *han* (literally, pent-up resentment) so that one day the spark will be ignited. It is no accident that the metaphor of fire has often found its way into the novels and short stories written in recent times. For instance, the novelist Cho Chŏng-nae titled the first part of his multivolume novel *T'aebaek Sanmaek* (The T'aebaek Mountains), “The Hearth Fire of *Han*.” This novel casts the Korean War and the partisan guerrilla movement in the purview of a peasant protest against the delay in instituting land reform in South Korea. This is an alternative view to the official interpretation that sees the resistance movement as a Communist insurgency. In

this light the novel is an attempt to narrate an alternative history as remembered not by the state but by the actual participants in historical events. Through this kind of rememorization, South Koreans have begun to rescue their history and have finally been able to situate South Korea in the context of the postwar capitalist world system. It is during this moment in Korean history that the main focus of the movement has begun to shift from the discussion of domestic issues, contained within the boundaries of an imposing Cold War ideology, to imagining a national unification which could finally transcend ideological differences.

The subversive reconstruction of the past has also involved appropriating and even inventing popular culture. The new theater genre called *madang guk*, the people's theater, has been one of the most effective means to recapture dangerous memories. It is a powerful instrument that is used to politicize and mobilize a large segment of the population in South Korea. The theater is an effective medium for delivering the movement's propaganda messages, but not by way of raw slogans. Rather, it narrates the problematized realities of marginalized people within the framework of folk theater and shamanic ritual, and thus successfully attracts public attention. The term *madang* refers to a space where communal activities take place. The reinvested meaning of this space, however, invokes a utopian plentitude of the imagined non-periodized prelapsarian past and alludes to the advent of a postcapitalist unity in which the division between production and consumption collapses. *Madang guk*, then, is seen as a site where this utopia is to materialize through a carnivalesque communal festival and through a collective struggle against the ruling bourgeoisie as the commoners of the pre-rupture period are imagined to have carried it out. In addition to reintroducing this idea of classic utopian socialism, the ideology of *madang guk* adds an important historical dimension to the movement in that it constantly re-memembers the people's history or social memory as a part of discourse.

The dramaturgy and aesthetics of *madang guk* animate this counter-memory. *Madang guk* reaches beyond the Aristotelian tradition in Western drama, which purports to create an illusion and separates the play from its audience, and even beyond Brechtian theater, in which the spectators are informed of the theater's double yet delegate analytic power to the actors.

Madang guk rather posits itself as a rehearsal of revolution, as Augusto Boal has suggested.²⁴ It appropriates a shamanic ritual format so that ancient time, space, and characters can be freely exchanged with those of the present through the mechanism of ritual ecstasy. This technique not only creates the effects of allusion and allegory, but also reunites them at different moments in history. Here the linear-progressive narrative is disrupted in a manner of “magical realism,” which Homi Bhabha recognizes as the language of the emergent postcolonial world.²⁵ In this supratemporal theater, the linear progression of the plot loses its illusionary power, and the division between the actors and the spectators disappears. In this framework the theater opens up a discursive field, and the everyday-life stories of the participants are woven into the intended scenario of the play. This assemblage of semifictional life histories of people, who are disenfranchised at the edge of a “miraculous” economic development, draws the contours of life in the Third World today. The polysemous layers of metaphor invested in *madang guk* have enriched and elevated the popular movement from the pursuit of a legitimate form of government or legal rights for workers to the pursuit of a romantic revolution as well, and this has fostered in the movement a great staying power.

Discourse, as Bakhtin observes,²⁶ presupposes dialogical heteroglossia. By this he implies dialogic interaction in which the prestigious languages, such as the language of the privileged, try to extend their control; and the subordinated languages, such as the language of the deviant subcultures, try to avoid, negotiate, or subvert that control. Discourse, then, is an area of agonistic, linguistic combat to achieve the intention of the word deployed to stratify and to advertise the social positioning of the speakers. Bakhtin’s recovery of linguistic heterogeneity extends beyond sociolinguistics into the realm of social dialectics. Dialogism, in this sense, not only relativizes the universal claim of being the norm but also rescues the people whose voice has been silenced due to their nonnormative “low” language, the language of the margin. As such, *madang guk* is a language which represents the life of the oppressed. Moreover, the theater is at once a representation of and a process for narrativizing a people’s history. Its precapitalistic, ritual-like open structure, as opposed to a capitalistic, rigid, closed structure, allows constant invocation and adumbration of social memories and realities, a

process which rescues silenced histories and offers possibilities for constructing an alternative history.

The Hawk of Changsan'got, by Hwang Sög-yong (now living in exile for having “illegally” visited North Korea), is framed as a shamanistic ritual and interrogates the neocolonial penetration of Korea by the capitalist superpowers and the collaboration of the Korean government. In this drama, foreign traders, symbolically described as Westerners and Japanese, are protected by corrupt Korean officials who are in pursuit of their own interests by trading goods that they have extorted from the peasants. The Japanese traders eventually demand as tribute the guardian spirit of the village, the Hawk of Changsan'got. This demand incites a peasant rebellion. In the end, the intruders shoot the Hawk and the rebels are persecuted. At this moment of danger, the villagers dance their communal dance and solidify their will to overcome the tragedy, a will to revolt. The present-day threat of capitalist penetration is allegorically projected into the remembered past, and thus this drama at once invokes and preserves the “dangerous memory” of the people. Furthermore, it seeks to achieve a subversive power for the oppressed.

Here *madang guk* attempts to reaudit the popular memory in order to dedoxify (borrowing Linda Hutcheon's shorthand)²⁷ the orthodox claim of the state, the mere machinery of an invisible Big Brother in the international capitalist patriarchy. This alternative process of historicization makes lucid the acute symptoms of Korea's neocolonial realities, which are shaped by today's world capitalist system, namely, the epic of economic growth which confers sole legitimacy to the power of the incumbent South Korean government.²⁸ The polyphonic history of the people as constructed in *madang guk* leads us beyond the ideological façade that masks human sentiment and behavior, and disturbs the celebrated epic of capitalism.

Not quite accidentally one of the most controversial *madang guk* (controversial because it crosses the line between theater and ritual), *The Divination*, attempts just that: it recuperates the repressed social memory, challenging the myth of the benevolent American liberators. *The Divination* reinterprets the American involvement in the national partition, the Korean War, and the Kwangju massacre. It is presented in the form of a shamanic death ritual of the historically marginalized Chölla Province

(where the city of Kwangju is located), in which the genealogy of two families is invoked in the shaman's vision. In the drama, the two families—a Northern family, who lost their daughter during the Korean War, when she was raped and killed by an American soldier because of her Northern (Communist) origin, and a Southern mother, who has lost her son in the Kwangju massacre—marry the spirits of the two young people, and in so doing, they overcome not only differences created by more than a forty-year time span but a spatial and ideological division as well. This spirit marriage not only symbolizes national unification, but attempts to realize it through efficacy of the ritual. The play challenges the vested interests of superpowers which insist on maintaining the status quo of a partitioned nation.

The Divination thinks the unthought, not only to counter the hegemonic authority but to rescue the utopian vision of independence from the forces of colonization. It is an attempt to liberate Koreans from the psychology of the colonized, from self-pity and degradation—a condition which JanMohamed might refer to as a Manichaean struggle—to overcome the Korean subaltern reality. What lies in the way of decolonization? The bleeding wound of history that has not been healed and the stories of *han* that have been stifled. In *The Divination*, the marriage ceremony is halted due to a violent repulsion between the spirit dolls, and once again the shaman has to divine the cause of this violence. Through the shaman's vision, the long-suppressed tale of a resentful rape victim (a metaphor for a feminized nation dominated by a patriarchal militarism) is narrated, and a silenced history regains its voice. Reauditing the erased history here has a healing power, and the collective sharing of a silenced tragedy strengthens the communal solidarity. At this moment of revelation the present and the past are reconciled. This moment of ecstasy is also a moment of *communitas* in which the lonely soul of an oppressed individual unites with the subaltern collectivity, that energizes the will for a collective struggle.

In this *minjung* history, past is surrealistically grafted to present. The supratemporality of history, or magical realism in this strategic construction of history, becomes the very fountainhead of the popular imagination that inspires revolution and decolonization. This faculty of popular imagination may be what Walter Benjamin²⁹ envisioned in his thesis on the faculty of mimesis. With his typical utopian appeal, Benjamin attempts to rescue the

“nonsensuous similarity,” which may be understood as a “nonsensuous iconicity of the sign.” Benjamin believes that language is far from being a mere system of signs as has been conventionally thought. Drawing from the early forms of such occult practices as magic and astrology, Benjamin suggests the possibility of conferring on language the power to “read what was never written.” This capacity of language, or shall we say hermeneutic urge, he calls mimetic faculty. This mimetic faculty may be mobilized to counter the endless reproduction of simulacrum and its hidden violence.

The discourse of decolonization, it is increasingly clear, is ever more relevant in the postcolonial era, simply because the pastiche of colonialism continues to be reproduced, especially in the present-day realities of many former colonies. However, and this is my point, in interrogating the *minjung* movement, those involved have not challenged the universalizing authority of Western discourse with counter-hegemonic “negative instances” of their own in order to reveal the “real-lessness” of the colonial discourse. Moreover, in the discourse of modernity itself, the moral bankruptcy of the colonizers (that is, the colonizers’ self-destructive metamorphosis into, or their mimicry of, the very [un]human that they have dehumanized) has never been called to account. This is because *minjung* intellectuals have never questioned the absence of the real or the rational in the construction of a racial hierarchy. The truth, which conceals the fact that there is no “real” in the rationale justifying the colonization of the Other, shares the empty property of simulacrum. As the simulacrum reproduces, that is, while the absence of the real remains uninterrogated, the colonial discourse will continue and colonialism will continue to be reproduced. The “postisms”—poststructuralism, deconstructionism, postmodernism—all of which seek to displace self-contained, seamless, transparent, “scientific” knowledge, cannot be completed without interrogating the discourse of colonization, but with the critique of mutual mimicry fully deployed.

The Problem of Representation

It is in this spirit of self-reflective criticism that I offer a critique of South Korea’s *minjung* movement as a discourse of decolonization. While I totally endorse the *minjung* movement’s critique of the imperialistic hege-

mony of the capitalist superpowers, I am suspicious of the movement's discourse strategy. I am especially uncomfortable with their mode of representation.

In their practice of magical realism, opposition intellectuals emerge as the authorized representatives of the disenfranchised people and as the prophets of utopia. The new society that they envision would advance only through the struggles of the people, and this would make the hitherto oppressed people subjects of history. In order to prepare (educate) people to assume a role in revolution, these intellectual representatives of *minjung* attempt to instill a new epistemology and raise historical consciousness. In other words, the agenda of the representatives of the people is to shape the people they are representing; this implies the process of othering, while simultaneously representing and constructing "the people."

In the alternative histories, whether they take the form of literary narratives or the conventional genre of historiography, peasants are often depicted as people who have risen up and emancipated their fellow sufferers from powerful rulers both within and without. In these heroic epics the people are re-membered into history as larger-than-life tragic heroes.

The alternative histories are, then, hagiographies of idealized people inverting and ideologizing the trope, *minjung*, the people. In this hagiography, what would ordinarily be a negative quality of *minjung*—because of the association with backwardness according to the rationalizing logic of modernization—is emblemized in the intellectual discourse of resistance. For instance, the characters in the *madang guk* speak almost exclusively the dialect of Korea's most exploited and marginalized region, the Chölla Provinces. The Chölla dialect has long been a stigma that signified a speaker's debased status. In the discursive space of resistance, however, the people of Chölla Province now have become allegorical icons.

Bourdieu argues that this emblemization of stigma or idealization of the underprivileged class exalts symbolic power at the cost of promoting class ethnocentrism, and this tends to disguise the effect of domination. Popular language, which, from the point of view of the dominant language, appears as uneducated and vulgar, forces its speakers to fall victim to the logic that leads stigmatized groups to claim the stigma as a sign representing their identity. Bourdieu further asks: "when the dominated

quest for distinction leads the dominated to affirm what distinguishes them, is this resistance? Conversely, if the dominated appropriate for the purpose of dissolving what marks them, is this submission?"³⁰

This paradox *impassé*, which is inscribed in the very logic of symbolic domination and resistance, calls the act of representation into question. To be more specific, how effective is the work of the spokesperson in liberating the subaltern from this contradiction? Or does the discourse, which seems to lie largely external to the people, serve the interest of the people or their representatives? Is not the consecration of the people as the ideal subject of history or the representative's claim on the preemptive ties with the people a way of constructing a metonymic link with the people so that the entire project of representation is in essence a strategy for self-serving self-consecration? In fact, the self-serving end of such representation becomes clearer when we recall that the delegates of the people are inscribing their ideology in the epistemology of the people whom they represent and are therefore constructing the group in the service of certain interests within the movement, granting that the *minjung* movement is not a single unified movement. Could this be a form of hegemony in the Gramscian sense or even a colonization of consciousness?

The workings of hegemony could be disguised in the structure of representation, especially in the act of self-abnegation, to embody the people that it represents. This ostentatious selflessness presupposes the moral superiority of the delegate. This is most often manifested in the institutionalization of religion, as Nietzsche pointed out in his *Antichrist* with regard to the embodiment of the representative in the Catholic ministry.³¹

As we reexamine the act of representation among opposition intellectuals in this light, we find a certain affinity in Korea's *minjung* movement. When the newly emerged left-wing journal *Sahoe P'yŏngnon* held a symposium in July 1991 to reassess the *minjung* movement, focusing on the issue of its decline, many concerned critics voiced two seemingly contradictory views. One argument was that the movement needs to establish its power base in real politics. Critics attributed the weakness of the movement to the fact that the leading actors of the movement are students whose transitional status frees them from real social responsibilities. At the same time, the absence of social responsibility is privileged to claim the

moral superiority of the movement. The underlying implication is that responsibility-free students are less susceptible to corruption and moral contamination than the older generation. In other words, privileging the representatives relies on appropriating the social valorization of innocence and, by extension, of purity, which confers on them an almost religious claim. This valorization of purity engenders an oracle-like effect on the increasingly monolithic *minjung* discourse that is replete with stories of superhuman self-victimization, as shown by the series of self-immolations in the streets of South Korea in 1991. The symbolic power of the powerless thus cashes in on this vested social faith to seduce the masses into their romantic venture. In fact, the second line of criticism is directed at the romantic nature of the *minjung* movement and its failure to embrace a larger populace, a charge of exclusionism. A former student activist and currently a political analyst, Yi Sin-bŏm, summarized the latter view as follows:

The student movement in the 60s was couched in a revolutionary romanticism that attracted wide public support. However, the *minjung* movement, being forged during the struggle against the brutal oppression of the 70s and 80s, has become an exclusive one led by a handful of professional revolutionary groups. A student movement is energized when the older generation subscribes to this romanticism and acknowledges their patriotic motivation. Radical activism loses the supportive masses.³²

Despite a vehement denial of the charges of romanticism or exclusionism by *minjung* intellectuals, criticism of the *minjung* movement has confirmed some of its problems, which both the public and scholars have long deferred to express in precise terms. Why the public felt compelled to hold back is the issue here, because the invisible power that silences the critical voice itself shows the symptoms of dominance, a lesson for liberal intellectuals to learn, especially when we think of the intractable colonial nature of romantic Third Worldism and the precarious nature of Western humanism, which Spivak aptly criticized in her influential essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”³³ There is no glory in suffering. Resistance or struggle has real-life consequences beyond intellectual imagination. How we read what is not written needs to involve these practical considerations.

Notes

- 1 Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 276.
- 2 Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Post-Colonialism,'" *Social Text* 31/32 (Summer 1992): 84–98; Ella Shohat, "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial,'" *Social Text* 31/32 (Summer 1992): 99–113. Curiously, Korea was not on the authors' extensive list of world-class former and present colonies. Presumably, Korea was not a European colony and thus is disqualified from being an entry in this Western self-critique of the universalizing theoretical framework. I hope this was a technical oversight. However, the fact that the authors consistently failed to recognize Korea as well as Taiwan, Manchuria, Okinawa, and the South Pacific islands as prominent former colonies of Japan may imply the lasting impact of privileging even the Western colonialism.
- 3 For a related discussion, see John and Jean Comaroff, "The Colonization of Consciousness," in *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992).
- 4 Abdul JanMohamed, "The Economy of Manichaean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature," in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., *"Race," Writing, and Difference* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1985).
- 5 Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28 (Spring 1984): 125–133. See also "The Other Question . . .," *Screen* 24 (November/December 1983): 18–36.
- 6 Although the Korean term *pundan* does not differentiate between "partition" and "division," an increasing number of South Koreans use the word in its passive meaning in order to indicate that Korea was not divided by the will of the people but partitioned by external forces.
- 7 There has been a series of debates among historians and social scientists on this issue in both South and North Korea. Central to this debate is to determine whether the liberation was "given" by the U.S. or "achieved" by the Koreans. Bruce Cumings, in *The Origins of the Korean War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), denies the liberation itself on the ground that the sovereignty of Korea has not been restored. For a comprehensive review of the discourse, see Yi Wan-böm, "Haebang 3 nyönsaüi chaengjööm" (Issues of debate on the history of the three years after the liberation), in Pak Myöng-nim et al., eds., *Haebang chönhusaüi insik* (Understanding pre- and postliberation history), vol. 6 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1989).
- 8 For the discourse of wilderness see, for example, Rey Chow, "Violence in the Other Country: China as Crisis, Spectacle and Woman," in Chandra T. Mohanty et al., eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). William Pietz discusses the demonization of the USSR as the evil empire in Western Cold War discourse. See W. Pietz, "The 'Post-Colonialism' of Cold War Discourse," *Social Text* 19/20 (Spring 1988): 55–75. I thank James Hevia for directing my attention to this article by Pietz.

- 9 Vincente L. Rafael, "Anticipating Nationhood: Collaboration and Rumor in the Japanese Occupation of Manila," *Diaspora* 1 (1991): 67.
- 10 Pierre Boudieu's fine analyses of the socialized sense of hierarchization of taste, in his *Distinction* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), is most instructive here. Symbolic capital is, of course, what cashes into symbolic power based on the social sense of taste and the acquisition thereof.
- 11 For detailed discussions, see Chong Hak-chu, "Haebanghu Han'guk kyoyug'güi kujojök kaldüng" (The structural tension in postliberation Korean education), in Kim Chin-gyun and Cho Hüi-yön, eds., *Han'guk sahoeron* (Korean society) (Seoul: Hanul, 1990); Han Chun-sang, "Miguküi munhwa ch'imt'uwa Han'guk kyoyuk" (American cultural invasion and Korean education), in *Haebang chönhusaiü insik* (Understanding pre- and postliberation history), vol. 3 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1987); Yi Kwang-ho, "Migunjön'güi kyoyukchöngch'aek" (The education policy of the American military government), in Kang Man-gil et al., eds., *Haebang chönhusaiü insik* (Understanding pre- and postliberation history), vol. 2 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 1985).
- 12 Raymond Williams, "The New Metropolis," in *The Country and the City* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).
- 13 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1983).
- 14 For the discussion of Japanese nationalism and its signifier, the "national body," i.e., the emperor's body, see Norma Field, *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1991), pp. 33–104.
- 15 I am borrowing this metaphor from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).
- 16 William Pietz, "The 'Post-Colonialism' of Cold War Discourse."
- 17 For a detailed account in the English language, see Donald Clark, "Bitter Friendship: Understanding Anti-Americanism in South Korea," in Donald Clark, ed., *Korea Briefing, 1991* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 147–167.
- 18 Frantz Fanon, "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness," in *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1963), p. 153.
- 19 *Pundan sidae*, or the period of (national) partition, was a term first coined by a South Korean historian, Kang Man-gil, in the mid-1970s. Not only does this term invoke all the contradictions that have been created due to the national partition, it also indicates the absence of a Korean voice in international affairs that marks postwar periodization, e.g., postindependence or postcolonial. Yet postwar is equally inadequate, since Koreans were only forced to participate in the war qua conscripts from the colony—including eleven-year-old elementary-school girls who were drafted to serve Japanese imperial soldiers at the Pacific War fronts.
- 20 Pok Kō-il, *Pimyongul ch'ajasō: Keijō Showa 62* (Seoul: Munhakkwa Chisöngsa, 1987).
- 21 These are the terms which defined Korea as Japan's naturalized exteriority. The colonizers

referred to Japan itself as “*Naichi*,” or inner land. However, Korea was not conferred the privilege of being defined by a comparable cultural term but was simply referred to as a peninsula, an undefined other specifiable only in its natural geographical configuration. Japan’s border is defined as “inner land” only in the context where Japan needs to differentiate itself not only from Korea, but also from Okinawa or Hokkaido, the ethnic (Korean, Okinawan, Ainu, respectively) and territorial margin of the phalocentric “Nippon,” rather than “Nihon.” The peninsula, in this sense, is not used to define Korea’s exteriority but Japan’s ethnocentrality. It is Japan’s practice of self-identification by the image mirrored in the marginalized self/other. If we were to borrow the Lacanian notion of the dynamics of the imaginary, namely, a child’s identification of self with the specular image of himself in the mirror and the child’s experience imbued with aggression toward this self/other, the colonial violence toward the Koreans and the Okinawans may be explainable.

- 22 By the time two unauthorized translations appeared in 1987, *The Origins* had been widely used as reading material in underground reading circles on university campuses in South Korea.
- 23 Shlomo Avineri argues that Marxism does not address the issue of nationalism evenhandedly. As a result, Avineri argues that the relationship between Marxism and nationalism has been inconsistent. See Shlomo Avineri, “Marxism and Nationalism,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, nos. 3/4 (1991): 637–657.
- 24 Augusto Boal, *The Theatre of the Oppressed*, trans. Charles A. and Maria-Odilia LeanMcBride (New York: Theatre Communications Group, 1985), p. 122.
- 25 Homi K. Bhabha, “Introduction,” in Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 7.
- 26 M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).
- 27 Linda Hutcheon, *The Politics of Postmodernism* (London: Routledge, 1989).
- 28 The South Korean government underplays the facts of its enormous trade imbalance. In 1990, the South Korean trade deficit with Japan alone exceeded 90 million dollars, which was approximately 3.5% of Korea’s GNP in 1990. The American trade deficit, 420 million dollars, was about 0.75% of the American GNP.
- 29 Walter Benjamin, “On the Mimetic Faculty,” in *Reflections* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978).
- 30 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Uses of the ‘People,’” in *In Other Words* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 155.
- 31 Pierre Bourdieu, “Delegation and Political Fetishism,” *Thesis Eleven* 10/11 (1984/1985): 56–70; reprinted in *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991). I thank Ann Anagnost for directing me to this article.
- 32 *Hangyōre sinmun*, June 1991.
- 33 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Cary Nelson and L. Grossberg, eds., *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 271–313.