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HOBBS'S NATURAL MAN IS A FATALIST:  
IMPLICATIONS OF CULTURAL THEORY FOR INTERPRETING HOBBS  
AND HIS CRITICS

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Hobbes's thought must be valuable, for so many modern theorists lay claim to ownership. Hobbes's thought must be pliable, for so many theorists claim it is diametrically different from so many others. Yet it is Hobbes's claim to certitude and precision that has led to continuing interest in his work. We all know that political theory, like history, is written backwards. So it shouldn't surprise anyone that Hobbes, regarded by many as the preeminent theorist of all time, is subject to reinterpretation to suit his critics.

Perhaps it is less obvious that the critics of Hobbes can be divided neatly into the three active cultural biases: egalitarianism, individualism, and hierarchy. This classification brings some order into the otherwise helter-skelter character of trends in Hobbes's criticism. Least obvious, Hobbes's construction of human nature, viewed from a cultural perspective as part of a rationale for a hierarchical-collectivist commonwealth, turns out to be fatalistic and not individualistic as commonly assumed.

The differences in interpretation stem in significant part from Hobbes's use of individualistic premises, sometimes called methodological individualism, to reach collectivistic conclusions, the need for a sovereign, via an egalitarian construct, the state of nature. This split between methodological means and substantive ends enables critics to eat their Hobbesian stew any way they like. From the top down, if Hobbes's preference for obedience is primary, his individualistic and egalitarian premises may be deemed inadequate in reaching the correct collectivist solution. Or from the bottom up, if his individualistic and egalitarian methodology is what matters, his institutional conclusions may be shown to have been incorrectly inferred from these premises. Given three ways of life to choose from, critics can credit Hobbes with (take your pick) whatever collectivist, individualist, or egalitarian outcome they prefer.

Hobbes's theory is incoherent, we contend, but not in the way his critics claim. It is not his competitive individualist human nature that is incompatible with his hierarchical, collectivist commonwealth, as his critics allege, but rather that his construct of human nature is fatalistic rather than individualistic, and therefore cannot support the anarchic egalitarianism of his state of nature, which requires both noncooperation *and* incessant striving. We will show that this provides an incoherent cultural base for his collectivist commonwealth.

The pervasive misunderstanding of Hobbes's human nature as individualistic rather than fatalist has its roots, we think, in a centuries long poverty of theoretical imagination.<sup>1</sup> Only two types of political cultures have been recognized and analyzed—market individualism and hierarchical collectivism. Whether the story moves from status to contract, or organic to mechanical solidarity, or *gesselshaft* to *gemeinschaft*, the fault line is always the same, running from the hierarchies of the middle and earlier ages to the market individualism associated with capitalism. Until Mary Douglas' grid-group typology of cultures derived fatalism and egalitarianism from the same matrix as individualism and hierarchy,<sup>2</sup> these cultures were largely neglected.<sup>3</sup> If mentioned, they were not accorded equivalent status to the usual markets versus hierarchies dichotomy. "Bringing fatalism back into social thought," as it might be phrased today, should enlarge our sense of political possibilities.

We begin by outlining the five human, physical, and institutional natures that cultural theorists claim human beings construct,<sup>4</sup> concentrating on the fit between these constructs and the shared values and preferred patterns of social relations with which they must cohere for each way of life to be livable. Then we briefly describe the conflicting versions of what Hobbes had to say, paying special attention to the relationship he postulated between human nature, the state of nature, and the form of

government he advocated. Against both Hobbes and his critics, we shall argue that constructions of human, physical, and institutional nature are designed to support a particular culture (or way of life), not the entire society.

By the same token, we shall show that the elements of Hobbes's theory do not cohere when held up against the criterion of cultural viability, not merely to be thought about, but to be lived in. Once we disabuse ourselves of the misleading notion that there is or can be only a single culture, with only one correct view of human nature, and move toward cultural pluralism, Hobbes's theory (and not only his) will look quite different. When we recognize in Hobbes's description of human nature not all humanity but rather a particular cultural variety, fatalism, Hobbes's expectations about the infamous war of all against all and his choice of a sovereign to control its hostilities, becomes more understandable, though, of course, not more desirable.

#### **Cultural Pluralism Contains at least Five Human, Physical, and Institutional Natures**

Cultures, in the mode we have adopted from Mary Douglas,<sup>5</sup> are composed of people who share values justifying their preferred pattern of social relations, the relations and the justifications always taken together. In order to be socially viable, the views of human, institutional, and physical natures in each culture must be mutually reinforcing, and supportive of its particular pattern of social relationships. We will ask how this coherence cultures require place limits on the kinds of human, physical, and institutional natures adherents of a culture can construct, that, at the same time, will prove socially viable.

According to cultural theory, there are five viable ways of life: egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchy, fatalism, and autonomy. Each culture having their specific

pros and cons under different conditions, none being ultimately superior in every respect to the other. The fifth way of life, autonomy, is constituted by a withdrawal from all the other ways of life; the cost of its adherents (we call them hermits) neither coercing nor being coerced, is nonintervention.

Egalitarians believe that man is born good but corrupted by evil (i.e., inequalitarian) institutions, be they hierarchical or competitive. Thus egalitarians distrust any attempt to structure or stratify the institutional environment (unless it is explicitly marked by equality of power) because it means inequalities among people. Hence these institutions should be attacked. They construct an image of cooperative man to argue for their way of life. Nature is fragile, egalitarians believe, because oppressive institutions use technology to harm people as they do animals and nature.

Individualists believe in man's inherent potential for creating new and better things, and in his inherent reasonability. By competition, this potential—self-regulation as opposed to authority—can be released and harnessed to the benefit of the individuals who constitute society. Thus they believe physical nature is cornucopian; there is always more for creative people. Most men are reasonable; strangers are seen as potential friends and collaborators in an individualists network. Institutions are good if they enhance competition and bad if they restrict it. This is the heroic self that individualists construct to reinforce their view that it is not resources or coercion that makes human beings and their societies great, but their very own creativity.

Hierarchs believe that humans are born bad and can be made better only by good institutions. If man were already good (no original sin), there would be no need for the heavy hand of hierarchy. As hierarchies are holistic, a hierarchist is someone who can both give and take orders; he identifies with the institution and sees himself as a part of that greater whole. Consequently, he recognizes that sometimes the parts must sacrifice

for the whole and adjusts his behavior accordingly. This is the institutionalized self for whom rules, regulations, and other restrictions on the individual are desirable in order to prevent humankind from devouring its own progeny. Both the safety of the system and the fulfillment of its promises—obey the rules and you and your community will do better—are safeguarded by following the advice of the experts who have the credentials and hence the knowledge to work with nature's laws.

Fatalists do not believe anyone or anything is trustworthy enough to be invested in. Because they believe they cannot control their environment, physical nature works at random and human nature is unpredictable, fatalists constructs a selfish self, who is socially, morally and politically passive, to rationalize their way of life. They "accept" that life and people are as they are and that there is nothing to do about it. Hence, rational action is egocentric action aimed at survival in the short run. It is not that all humans are bad, but there are enough bad ones around so that no one can be trusted except, possibly, within the family. They are pessimistic about social action, but not necessarily about individual action. Strangers are seen as a potential threat; since people cannot be trusted—they could help but just as likely would put a knife into you—and one cannot outguess Mother Nature, there is no rationale for long-term cooperation, only for local short-term action.

The search for the single correct construction of human nature is as futile as it is instructive. The futility comes from assuming either that human nature is singular and palpable, out there like the Holy Grail, if only a champion can find the one and only true version. Whereas we know that human natures are within us, socially constructed to do battle in the culture wars, demonstrating that each of our contradictory certainties is the right one.<sup>6</sup>To the denizens of each culture, the nature constructed by the others appears irrational, contradicting the way the world "really is," and what

people are "really like." Without being embedded in a set of relations and its accompanying justifications, human nature is meaningless.

### How the Active Cultures Regard the Fatalists

A different way of describing political cultures is to say that there are three active cultures –egalitarianism, individualism, hierarchy– that want to act on the world, and two inactive cultures –fatalists, who believe they cannot succeed in social action, and hermits, from the autonomous culture, who see the truth and falsity in all of the other cultures but who would lose this ability if they were to join the human "rat race." All three active cultures must deal with fatalism as a phenomena and fatalists as people they want either to expel from their group or to join them. Reviewing the relationship between the active cultures and fatalism should help us understand the problems Hobbes encountered in giving his universal human nature a fatalistic cast. It should also illuminate the difficulties his critics have in coming to grips with fatalistic human nature.

To egalitarians, fatalists stand as perennial proof of a corrupt (because inequalitarian) political system whose individualist and hierarchical institutions keep poor people subservient. A free society, they believe, cannot be built on such unpromising material. The existence of substantial numbers of fatalists is, to them *prima facie* evidence that democracy and justice do not exist. The romance, indeed, the unrequited love, that egalitarians manifest toward fatalists is an old time story. Who else, but fatalists, could stand in for the perennially oppressed, suppressed, and repressed? The failure of egalitarians to win over the fatalistic peasantry or proletariat has been a source of constant consternation and lamentation.<sup>7</sup> But fatalists, nonetheless, despite their



stubborn failure to live up to their billing as eagerly awaiting liberation into an egalitarian way of life, have important rhetorical uses. "Claims to know about human persons," as Mary Douglas states, "are part of the rhetoric of political coercion...to be able to invoke the self is an indispensable forensic resource for living in society."<sup>8</sup>

Individualists, on the other hand, pretend that fatalists are not there. Most people, they believe, can do well if they are willing to work; those who lack the ability or the desire are dismissed as incompetent. Their motto is "out of sight, out of mind." The language of New Guinea anthropology—the Big Men versus the Rubbish Men—is expressive. In too large numbers, and too visible, as "the homeless" in contemporary society, fatalists are an embarrassment to the enterprise system, for their existence suggests that a rising tide does not lift all boats.

Hierarchs, finally, view fatalists in one of two ways: inclusive hierarchies can place fatalists among their lowerarchs who require special education and socialisation so they will be prepared to sacrifice for the collectivity. Alternatively, exclusive hierarchies, narrower and more doctrinaire, may push fatalists out of their way of life so they can be treated as slaves or enemies, i.e., people outside the protective shell with none or few of the benefits the system has to offer for those who fall on hard times. Education or expulsion are quite different choices. They mark the difference between hope of conversion and despair of improvement. Enamored of education, and believing each person equal as entitled to life, Hobbes obviously preferred the inclusive approach.

### Hobbes's Human Nature and State of Nature

Hobbes constructed a model of human nature in which individuals are inherently incapable of peaceful coexistence with each other. Actually he constructed two distinct

images of man—natural man and civilized man.<sup>9</sup> Natural man is Hobbes's description of man's "original" nature. As he writes: "All men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society."<sup>10</sup> The inherently "bad" natural man can be converted into the "good" civilized man only by strong restraining institutions.<sup>11</sup> The bad guy, we will see, is fatalistic, while the good guy is hierarchical.

Hobbes's psychology is an attempt to justify the kind of political system (he called it commonwealth) that would avoid the endless wars that made civilization difficult-to-impossible. In the following we will refer to his psychology and his political philosophy as his "system of ideas"<sup>12</sup>; this amounts to about half the text in *Leviathan*.

For Hobbes, "desires" are the prime force of human motivation in which men always act to satisfy their desires. The single most important desire is the fear of death. In the state of nature, human nature is unmodified by culture, education, and all behavioral patterns that might override the fear of death, hence it becomes the ultimate rational for human behavior. Accordingly, reason is, in Hobbes's hands, instrumental rationality, the process of determining what desire out of several possible we should act upon. "Will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating."<sup>13</sup> For Hobbes, reason is only an instrument for man to fulfill his desires.

This image of a pre-societal human nature as a rational power-seeker leads to a state where men continuously seek more and more power by assaulting others in order to prevent others from doing the same to them. "He cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more...So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire for Power after power, that ceaseth only in Death."<sup>14</sup> Though human beings are not necessarily entirely evil, they are so gifted at dissembling that one cannot tell them apart from their moral betters "the wicked are fewer than the righteous," Hobbes



contends, "yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditions."<sup>15</sup>

True, Hobbes's political theory requires that most men are concerned with their own welfare, but that does not mean that they cannot be concerned with others' welfare at the same time. He observed that men have desires for other people's good: "Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to a man generally, GOOD NATURE."<sup>16</sup> Indeed, he must have been so often misunderstood that he put his recognition in capital letters.

When Hobbes denies an undifferentiated natural benevolence, he does not deny that we naturally love some other human beings, he merely indicates that he is only concerned with humans as strangers.<sup>17</sup> Political institutions, we must not forget, primarily govern relations between strangers. Hobbes is stating that love of others is limited and cannot serve as a foundation for a large scale civil society. There are some naturally good people, but not enough of them to be able to rely on them for the foundation of a state. Because no one can rely on the good will of others, each person must act as if others would take the opportunity to do him in.

The state of nature is a rhetorical device, a "conceptual artefact,"<sup>18</sup> that Hobbes used to show us how individuals would interact if they could be stripped of all culturally acquired behavioral patterns. As if we were to "consider men as if but even now sprung out of earth, and suddenly, like mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other."<sup>19</sup> Hobbes tells us to think away all personal relationships, all knowledge of contractual arrangements and political institutions, and to consider all individuals as being mutually indifferent.

In the state of nature the Hobbesian individual is aware of others almost entirely from the standpoint of the harm they might do him. With the possible exception of members of his family, the individual is indifferent to the fate of others except as his might be tied to theirs. It is a condition of ruthless individual competition where there is no room for cooperation, unless the goal is to seek more power.

In fact, "Men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deal of grief), in keeping company, where there is no power to over-awe them all."<sup>20</sup> The implications are that men will cooperate only if they are forced. Apparently, in a Hobbesian world, the individual must either be at odds with his fellows (the state of nature) or at peace with them (society bound together via the hypothetical social contract).

It is important to traverse the ground of Hobbes's view of human nature in more minute detail, assumption by assumption. In the state of nature equality is inherent among men. By birth, Hobbes postulates, man is in every respect equal to any other man. It is both a physical and mental equality, but perhaps more physical than mental; the crucial notion is that no one is so strong that he by nature can come to over-awe all others. Either by force or by trickery, and with the help of other men, every man has the potential capacity to kill any other man. "Nature has made men so Equal," Hobbes tells us, that "the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest."<sup>21</sup> Yet Hobbes goes further than he has to by pinning inequality not on individual ability but on society. "As if Masters and Servant were not introduced by consent by men, but by difference of wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience."<sup>22</sup> No egalitarian, no Pelagius, no Winstanley, could say it better. Yet Hobbes does not follow through. Equality is not a positive political principle for Hobbes, only a premise in his argument, for he does not complain that in civil society men are no longer equal.

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing...they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end...endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another. So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first maketh men invade for Gain; The second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation.<sup>23</sup>

As long as there is no power of which they are more afraid of than they are of one another, these causes for quarrel are inherent in human nature and will, according to Hobbes, necessarily lead men into a state of war. Thus even if some men are satisfied with what they have, they must seek to increase their power to be able to hold on to what they have. If they did not, many others would gain more power than they have and they would in the end have to face invasion.<sup>24</sup>

From this construction of the state of nature, Hobbes derives the principle that all men have the right to do everything by virtue of their own survival: "The Right Of Nature...is the Liberty each man hath, To use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of...any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto."<sup>25</sup> Should the Sovereign be unable to guarantee the necessary protection, therefore, it follows that the individual is not obliged to obey. This line of argument justifies a wait-and-see attitude, not wonderful for loyalty but, by the same token, not conducive for fighting to the last man. Has the Vicar of Bray, one wonders, become Hobbes's everyman?

His conception of the state of nature is, according to Hobbes himself, an inference from desires he believes to be inherently human.<sup>26</sup> In strong words, he asks believers to "have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doores...and this when he known there be lawes...Does he

not there as much accuse mankind by his actions as I do by my words?"<sup>27</sup> True but not all the truth. An individualist might perceive the same situation as an opportunity to provide protection for a fee, an egalitarian as a condemnation of a society whose oppressiveness makes humans into criminals.

By arguing that his conception of natural, pre-social man was a scientific description of human nature, thus exposing man as he would be stripped of all culturally acquired qualities (verify it for yourself, he challenged) and that the state of nature was logically derived from that notion, Hobbes tried to alter people's self-understanding in a way that would legitimize hierarchical institutions. Hobbes is trying to convince his readers that it is in their rational self-interest to conform to and internalize the dominant hierarchical social norms as the laws of nature so they can continue to live as civilized beings.

For the laws are "but Conclusions, or Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves."<sup>28</sup> They "oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place: but in foro externo; that is, to the putting them to act, not alwayes."<sup>29</sup> That is why the laws "themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."<sup>30</sup> It would be best if people could put constraints on their own behavior, Hobbes reasons, but since there will be in any larger group a few bad people there must be a backing force to enforce the rules.<sup>31</sup> There may be small communities where law enforcement might be unnecessary, Hobbes admits, but as soon as we are confronted with a large group of people there will always be someone who will not obey the law if he is not threatened by violence. "[I]f we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other

laws of nature, without the common power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need be a civil government, or commonwealth at all; because there would be peace without subjection."<sup>32</sup>

The civil wars Hobbes witnessed, which it was his purpose to avoid, led him to believe that any peace was preferable. Hobbes describes most human beings as ignorant rebels who hardly understand the way the world works and to whom every day must appear as if it were different from every other. Particularly concerned about superstition, Hobbes was ever fearful that most people would not conceive correctly of their own interests, i.e., as he conceived them.<sup>33</sup> He set himself to devise a commonwealth that would be proof against this madness multiplied. Hence his combination of mistrustful human nature and all-powerful sovereign.

In order to live a safer, more productive life, Hobbes claims that each individual enters into an implied contract to follow the Sovereign's will without too much fuss and bother. Whether or not the individual actually signs something is, for the safety of all, to be considered as immaterial.<sup>34</sup> When Hobbes's interpreters say that he develops a theory of obligation they mean that, according to his view of the social contract, each individual is morally obliged to keep it. Of course, both individuals and sovereigns do bad things. Hobbes does not approve of bad behavior. Hobbes remonstrates with the Sovereign but he does not and cannot command. Well aware of the abuses committed by rulers, Hobbes nevertheless felt that those of civil war and anarchy were worse.

Hobbes answers the question of how the good man ought to behave by arguing that the good obeys the law made by his Sovereign. Because human beings would break the law if it were in their interest to do so,<sup>35</sup> the institution of the Sovereign is Hobbes's solution of the divergence between individual and collective rationality.

By making man's needs appear to his intelligence to coincide with his duty, Hobbes hoped first to deflect and then, if necessary, to overcome the brute that lay within man's passions. By rooting deference to existing authority in logic, in human nature, and in obligation, Hobbes sought to make his pro-monarchical position appear inexorable. He succeeded in giving theorists of disparate views the feeling that, if only they cured some defect, logic, reason, and obligation would somehow compel assent to their differing points of view.

If Hobbes picked and chose from different traditions, it follows that there is great potential for differing interpretations. Next we will show that three different schools of thought are equivalent to the three active cultures, egalitarian, individualistic and hierarchical. In the following we have defined a school of thought as a system of consistent ideas that have some specified qualities in common. This exercise entails extracting the core argument, and showing how several interpretations can be conceived of as a single approach.

### The Egalitarian Perspective: The Social Actor

Wishing to make use of Hobbes's egalitarian man in a state of nature, the first group of interpreters we will discuss claims that Hobbes's conception of man as an anti-social power-seeker captures only those qualities of human nature that man has acquired in a special sociocultural setting. Generalization from a special case, the argument that people need an absolute sovereign to create social peace loses widespread applicability. "While his propositions are not universally valid, they are more nearly valid for his and our time."<sup>36</sup>



According to these critics, Hobbes's argument rests on premises that are created by the very same society the theory was supposed to explain. Since it is impossible to explain the emergence of a phenomena by referring to qualities of that very phenomena, his conclusions that a steep inequality is required for social peace cannot be supported. This school of critics might agree that Hobbes's conclusions follow from his premises, and agree that the theory is an attempt to understand the creation of the state. But his premises, and more specifically his conception of human nature, are false; thus it follows that his conclusions are false.<sup>37</sup>

Further, these critics are anti-individualistic. An individual cannot be conceived of outside a social setting since all her basic features are products of an interaction with other human beings, they are all "interactive" qualities. The only inherent quality that can be assumed is some kind of sociability as a presupposition for the social interaction to start in the first place. Since man is a product of his environment he is also malleable. This holds up the promise for social change as a means to change humans. If this is true, the society must have more than purely instrumental value for the individual. These egalitarians view society as the foundation for an individual's identity.

The argument has appeared in several forms of which the most famous is that of C. B. Macpherson who calls Hobbes's description of human nature "an unpleasantly accurate analysis not of man as such, but of man since the rise of bourgeois society... Hobbes's analysis of human nature, from which his whole political theory is derived, is really an analysis of bourgeois man"<sup>38</sup> Macpherson saw Hobbes notion of man as inherently glory-seeking, as an attribution of a human quality that is "largely a product of the social relationships set up among members of the upper classes by the Renaissance encroachments of capitalism on the older order."<sup>39</sup> Of Hobbes's other basic postulate, the idea that "the competitive search for gain is a constant drive dominating

the whole character of the individual...[and] is clearly derived from the behavior of man in bourgeois society...in contrast to pre-capitalist society."<sup>40</sup>

David Gauthier argues that Hobbes's conceptions of social relationships as "contractual," human activity as "appropriative," and human rationality as "utility-maximizing," form the "deep structure" of Western Culture. How, then, Gauthier asks, has Western society kept from disintegrating? This remarkable feat of holding a society based on individual selfishness together, Gauthier answers, has been accomplished by "The centripetal force of a cohesive bourgeois class within the society... The real opiates, in contractarian society, have been love and patriotism."<sup>41</sup>

We are, Gauthier contends, currently moving towards a society with only contractual relationships. As we get closer to a state where all relationships are based on contracts, the centripetal forces will disappear and "lead to the destruction" of society. Then "we may see that this way of thinking is, from a practical point of view, bankrupt, and indeed that it will destroy us if we remain its adherents."<sup>42</sup>

It is possible, James Glass asserts, to interpret Hobbes's conception of human nature as a mere mirroring of a narcissistic pathology. In his view there is an "uncanny resemblance between Hobbes's description of the natural condition, the paranoid mentality of natural man, and pathological narcissism." But what does this have to do with capitalist man? Market activity, Glass continues, "aggravates narcissistic personality disturbances...What Hobbes then discovered in his concept of the natural condition... [was] a pathological internality transforming the ego into a deadly battlefield."

If Hobbes's view is perverse, Glass prefers "The Freudian vision of an autonomous self capable of love and work [that] points toward a theory of individualism premised on respect for the other, a sensitivity to internal needs and feelings, and a healthy



skepticism of all forms of authority."<sup>43</sup> Hence Glass concludes that Hobbes failed to give correct credit for the inherently good human nature that resides within us all.<sup>44</sup>

The last example of this egalitarian school of thought is Michael Taylor's criticism of Hobbes's line of argument in that "it takes individual preferences as given and fixed. In particular, it is assumed that the state itself has no effect on these preferences...Such a conception of 'human nature' is inappropriate...[for] theories which are supposed to provide a justification for the state."<sup>45</sup> These assumptions, Taylor continues, tend to be self-fulfilling, because "if they were not true before the introduction of the state...they would in time become true as a result of the state's activity...The more the state intervenes in such situations, the more 'necessary'...it becomes." Voluntary altruism and voluntary cooperative behavior, Taylor continues, "atrophy in the presence of the state and grow in its absence... The state exacerbates the conditions which are supposed to make it necessary...The state is like an addictive drug: the more of it, the more we 'need' it and the more we come to 'depend' on it"<sup>46</sup>

Looking back at these critiques, we see that they share common elements: they all see Hobbes's human nature as a misconception of an originally good but, through history, corrupted, human nature. Both hierarchy, i.e., the Sovereign, and individualism, whether as competition or egoism or worse still, narcissism, are bad; the source of corruption, not its cure. What is good is pre-capitalist society, neither so competitive nor greedy, love of one's fellow man, and challenges to authority. All this adds up to an egalitarian critique.

### The Individualistic Perspective: The Rational Actor

An opposite approach, based on rational choice theory, supports individualism. The basic feature of this school is its commitment to instrumentalism, individualism, and subjectivism. Hobbes is interpreted as being a psychological egoist, and man is seen as instrumentally rational and always acting in his own self-interest. Hence there is no moral inter-subjective standards that could be the basis for a doctrine of moral obligation except for allowing each person to pursue his own plans.

The individualistic critique leads to the conclusion that man in the state of nature doesn't need an absolute sovereign. Because man is rational, he realizes that armed conflict is not the best strategy. Hence he seeks mutual agreement to protect himself by protecting others against coercion.

The individualist school tries to do the same thing as Hobbes stated he intended to do, which is to derive the principles of the creation of society from certain premises about human nature. Only this school would like to improve on Hobbes in providing, as Brown states it, "a system where the political conclusions followed in an indisputable manner from propositions about human nature."<sup>47</sup> At the same time, however, they would like to purge Hobbes's thought of its statist implications. By cleaning up the details, viz. state worship, Ripstein concludes that "the Hobbesian project holds out the promise of providing a foundation for political institutions—an unjustified justifier that cannot be called into question because it does not presuppose any controversial political principle."<sup>48</sup>

Along with Kavka and others, Jean Hampton uses game theory to suggest that Hobbes's account of conflict "does not generate sufficient conflict in the state of nature to ... derive the necessity for an absolute sovereign." Hobbes's explanation for conflict

based on rationality, she claims, "dictates cooperative behavior rather than warfare." For if people are unable to keep their covenants in the state of nature, they could never agree on instituting a common sovereign. "The conclusions themselves [i.e., the Sovereign], she concludes, "do not follow from those premises."<sup>49</sup>

Similarly, Gregory Kavka argues that Hobbes does not offer an explicit justification for the transition "from the observation that persons in the state of nature must fear violence from others, to [the] claim that anticipation [as a violent strategy] is the most reasonable way for such persons to attempt to protect themselves ... It is clear that it is fallacious."<sup>50</sup> How so? Pursuing a strategy of anticipatory violence against potential enemies, he answers, exposes the individual to three special dangers: exposure to defensive violence, identification as a dangerous person that in turn must be attacked, and exposure to glory-seekers wanting to show how powerful they are.<sup>51</sup> The most rational strategy, according to Kavka, would be "to form defensive coalitions by making and keeping mutual aid pacts."<sup>52</sup> The creation of these would rely on rational agents understanding that "if you aid a coalition partner today, you can expect him to aid you tomorrow to increase the chances that you and others will aid him the day after tomorrow ... The fear of losing credibility and hence future opportunities for beneficial cooperation can suffice to motivate rational self-interested parties in the state of nature to keep their agreement with one another."<sup>53</sup>

In this avowedly individualist school of thought, Neal informs us, subjectivism means that the problem of value is treated in "a way consistent with the tenets of instrumentalism and individualism, that is, the good for the individual is constituted by the content of his or her preferences, the object of his or her desires."<sup>54</sup> Instrumentalism is the assumption that sociopolitical relations and institutions should be understood as the result of actions taken by mutually disinterested and rationally self-interested

agents that precede the institutions in time, hence "instrumentalism must deny that human beings are in an inherent or intrinsic sense social beings."<sup>55</sup> It also follows that individuals do not need an absolute sovereign to do for them what they can better do for themselves.<sup>56</sup>

It is generally agreed that rational egoists would need either an internal or external force to create the institutions that would compel people to keep their promises. An example of an internal force would be trust, "but" as Patrick Neal says, "trust is a social relation between individuals, and cannot be presupposed without violating the tenets of rational choice theory,"<sup>57</sup> which tries to explain just this kind of relations, namely, social relations as a problematic phenomena. Hobbes's absolute sovereign is a good example of an external force instituted to secure binding agreements. In the state of nature, such an external force would be needed in the initial phase of the creation of a state, but the catch is that "if such a body existed ... the agents would not need to create one."<sup>58</sup> A priori, we observe, egalitarians and individualists find opposing foundations to be self-evident.

Critics differ over whether or not Hobbes failed to give an adequate account for how people instituted the state, that is, how people actually exited the state of nature.<sup>59</sup> How can people involved in a constant war with each other agree to give up all their rights and institute a sovereign? The first approach, which is implied by both egalitarian and individualistic critics, argues that Hobbes used the geometrical method to give the appearance of deriving the institutions of the state from principles grounded in human nature. The second approach takes the question of how people leave the state of nature and form a state as misguided. Hobbes's point, according to these interpreters, was to explain to already civilized people "how they can keep themselves from winding up in the state of nature, not one of explaining to uncivilized beings how to get out of it."<sup>60</sup>

Interpreting Hobbes this way makes a case for the early market proponents who were his contemporaries. They would object to the absolutism of the sovereign, but the core of his argument would still be attractive to them. What about the supporters, if not of absolutism, at least of a highly stratified society with a sovereign at its apex?

### **The Hierarchical Perspective: The Irrational Actor**

The third approach appreciates the holistic-hierarchical parts of Hobbes's system of thought. The fact that his state of nature-argument fails to explain the exit procedure doesn't have to be seen, as the individualistic critics maintain, as a flaw. On the contrary, it can be argued that Hobbes's argument for obedience to the regime would be even more persuasive if "his readers concluded that exit from the state of nature is inexplicable."<sup>61</sup> For it could be used as a most powerful argument for obedience to the prevailing regime when the alternative is the horrifying state of nature, impossible to exit once entered.

During the twentieth century there have been several attempts to show that Hobbes's moral philosophy must be treated as prior to, and more important than, the rest of his work. By separating this part of his philosophy from its alleged foundations in his psychology, it can be treated as a whole on its own terms. Even if his psychology were to be false, his moral-cum-political doctrine, it is asserted, would still be of value. The main discussion has circled around his theory of obligation. His system, according to this interpretation, can be seen as a way to justify and explain his ethical ideas, rather than as a foundation for them. One can even say that his theory of obligation and hence his political philosophy are saved by separating them from their uncertain foundations in egoism as self-interest. As Macpherson tells the story:

Hobbes's theory of human nature has seemed so unacceptable, at least as the universal theory Hobbes claimed it to be, that unless the political theory could be logically detached from it, the political theory did not seem worth serious consideration; yet the political theory continues to haunt Hobbes's critics as worthy of serious consideration.<sup>62</sup>

Searches are still made for some other basis for his conclusions about political obligation.

It is easy for a reader to believe that self-interest is a central part of his theory of obligation, Howard Warrender contends, since Hobbes talked so much about it but, "This is so far from being the case that it is not a part of that theory as such, but an empirical postulate employed in its application. A denial of Hobbes's psychology, therefore, merely poses a new problem of application, but leaves his theory of obligation, in the proper sense, unaffected."<sup>63</sup> without obligation of course, there can be no collective interest.

Michael Oakshott identifies four different kinds of obligation—physical, rational, moral, political.<sup>64</sup> The interesting distinction is between moral and rational obligation. Rational action restrains voluntary action through a "combination of rational perception and fear."<sup>65</sup> Moral obligation implies a restriction on natural right and can be explained by the covenant that is the cause of the restraint.<sup>66</sup> No obligation, no social constraint on individual behavior.

One of the first modern interpreters to suggest an ethical approach, Leo Strauss, held that the basis of Hobbes's political philosophy was formed before he discovered geometry as a method for analyzing politics. "The foundation of Hobbes's political philosophy...are objectively as well as biographically 'prior' to the mathematical scientific founding and presentation of that philosophy."<sup>67</sup> From here it is but a small jump to the belief that Hobbes's system served to justify his ethical ideas, rather than being the foundation of them. Thus David Johnston holds that Hobbes had a political



agenda as much as or more than a moral doctrine. The actual connection between his egoistic psychology and his philosophy was "at the most a...slim thread...[and] no more than one of analogy." In *Leviathan*, Hobbes finally established a relationship between the two in which "the basis of this relationship was not logical deduction, but polemical effect."<sup>68</sup> By writing a highly polemical work, Hobbes tried to change people by "enlightening" them.<sup>69</sup>

Many interpreters disagree with the common interpretation of Hobbes as a psychological egoist. Bernard Gert, for instance, argues that "there was a continuous development in Hobbes's works away from an egoistic psychology."<sup>70</sup> This might either be ascribed to the carelessness of Hobbes the scientist or to the brilliance of Hobbes the rhetorician. If Hobbes did not assert that man's behavior was motivated only out of self-interest, another interpretation becomes plausible. Gert claims Hobbes believed "that human nature was malleable, that one could train, educate, and discipline people into good citizens...through such training man could become quite different from what he was originally."<sup>71</sup> It is therefore possible to "understand [Hobbes's] teaching as an integrated set of symbols aimed at influencing his reader's cognitive processes."<sup>72</sup> If Hobbes held this view, he must also have held a view of the state as something more than just a mechanism to keep man's egoistic behavior in check. Or as Hobbes expressed it, "Man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education."<sup>73</sup>

If Hobbes sees his Sovereign as the grand educator, David Johnston might well be right in contending that "The argument of *Leviathan* is united by a single political aim that underlies the entire work." It was, "designed to initiate a transformation in the culture of Hobbes's time, to undermine a set of beliefs he considered inimical to political authority and replace them with 'enlightened' views of God, the universe, and the self."<sup>74</sup> Johnston points to Hobbes's "deep concern for the political consequence of ignorance,

superstition, and magic."<sup>75</sup> This irrationality (Hobbes had plenty of examples in his long lifetime) is due to factors that are "ultimately rooted in a dark side of human nature" that, as Hobbes pointedly remarks, can never be completely "abolished out of human nature."<sup>76</sup> Because irrationality is an unabolishable factor in human nature, such that man can be deceived into irrational action, Hobbes concludes that a commonwealth cannot be founded on human ability to reason alone; it must be based on a rival and opposing passion, the fear of death.

Finally, pointing to the distinction Hobbes made between man and citizen, Daniel writes that the "task for Hobbes's political science is not to deny the existence of the communal base of society ... [it] is to specify how civil government contributes, in a determinate way, to removing the obstacles to communal existence."<sup>77</sup>

These interpreters hold that Hobbes was trying to construct a theory of obligation, i.e., that he worked backward from the idea of a positive state; that Hobbes held a positive notion of the state grounded in communal morality; and that Hobbes used his system of ideas as a means of persuasion toward the desirability of making man fit for society through the active agency of the Sovereign. Hobbes clearly thought that man acted in his own interest but not, in his interaction with others, in his own good.

The conception of social relations in which man is born such that, unaided he cannot secure his own good and therefore requires educative institutions to enable him to live peaceably in society, is hierarchical. The critics who emphasize the obligation of the parts, the individual to support the whole, the society, or the Sovereign which embodies the governing arm of the collective, are measuring Hobbes's work against a background in which hierarchy is the norm.



### Fatalists Do Not Cooperate, Individualists Do.

In his own time, as Quentin Skinner has amply demonstrated, Hobbesian doctrine was part-and-parcel of contemporary disputes. "All his followers ... were concerned to emphasize the obligation to obey any successfully constituted political power." His contemporaries believed Hobbes to be telling them that "'all right of dominion is founded only in power' and 'all moral righteousness is founded only in the positive law of the civil magistrate'"<sup>78</sup> Thus those who claim that Hobbes grounded his views of obligation as commanded by God support a view that none of his contemporaries in his lifetime thought he supported.<sup>79</sup> Needless to say, those who believed in doctrines that required the continuous assent of citizens, who considered kings to be usurpers or, like Winstanley, that all power grounded in inequality corrupted itself, or who had republican notions, were unhappy with Hobbes. Only later, in our time, has it been conceived possible to raise quite a different edifice on the grounds of Hobbesian self-interested and egoistic universal human nature.

The fallacy, we think, lies in viewing cooperation as something that must be organized from a center and avow a collective common purpose. Spontaneous institutions, as Frederick Hayek calls them, have been left out. Yet how could the wonders of capitalism over which Marx and Engels marveled in their *Communist Manifesto* have taken place, no less the vast industries and structures seen in the modern world be possible, if capitalists-cum-individualists couldn't cooperate?

Another way to tackle the question of whether individualists can cooperate is to show that another way of life, a culture we call fatalism, disavows cooperation both in principle and in practice and that its construction of human, physical, and institutional nature is markedly different from that of individualism. Where individualists conceive of

human beings as self-interested, fatalists conceive of each person as unpredictable. It is not that they believe each person will necessarily try to do them in, as Edward Banfield's brilliant study of southern Italian peasants demonstrates,<sup>80</sup> but that fatalists believe they cannot count on lawful or helpful behavior, that characterizes their view of human nature. For they believe that human nature is unpredictable and physical nature correspondingly is random. It follows that they believe they are unable to intervene in social life in expectation of gain. Hence they would behave as Hobbes describes them, but not as his individualistic critics predict. No fatalist need have read Hobbes for us to note that this view of human nature is almost exactly coincidental with that held by the great political geometrician.

Put differently, if one wanted to create human beings who would be opposed to cooperation in principle, one would wish them to believe that both human and physical nature were indeterminant so that there was no point in intervening to better one's position. Where individualists believe that physical nature is cornucopian, so that the more ingenuity human beings apply to it the more there will be for all, especially the most creative, thus encouraging them to seek cooperation among consenting adults, fatalists hold that physical nature operates at random, so that they cannot expect to outguess mother nature, thus disinclining them to get together with others.

This, not surprisingly, is the mirror image of the view that individualists have of human nature: when human beings do what comes naturally by pursuing their self-interest, they achieve the greatest collective benefits for the society or group as a whole. But when they intend to procure the good of others by acting altruistically, this "do good" behavior messes everything up. "Rational selfishness," as Ayn Rand put it, "works for the greater good because the system depends onto each on doing what he thinks is best for himself."<sup>81</sup>

Individualists have a bifurcated view of institutional nature, wonderful if it is competitive, terrible if it restricts competition. Thus they don't like hierarchies that impose rules beyond the sanctity of contract and they dislike egalitarian efforts to limit the results of competition. Where individualists approve at least of market-like institutions and egalitarians approve at least of institutions marked by considerable equality of power and other resources, however, fatalists consider all institutions oppressive. They have no hope that if their ideal institution were somehow to be realized on earth that they would do better. They could imagine, perhaps, getting rich by winning a lottery or obtaining a legacy from a long-lost aunt or receiving an institutional favor by mistake meant for someone else, but the regular workings of human, physical, and institutional natures would prevent them from doing better through their own actions. As Banfield's account shows, fatalists might prefer the regularity of an avowedly oppressive government to the oppression of those they believe only pretend to help, but they would not expect to be treated well. If Hobbes's absolute Sovereign fits any view of human and institutional nature, it is fatalism.

#### **Hobbes and His System of Thoughts in Cultural Perspective**

Now we can better understand the individualist's complaint against Hobbes; he does not explain why, in principle and practice, rational individuals would not by reason or by observation, or both, step outside their dilemma by devising an institutional mechanism for enforcing agreements that could be altered by experience. Thus a Hobbesian Sovereign, with unlimited power and scope, would be unnecessary.

True, possibly, in general, we would reply, but false to what Hobbes actually says about human nature. For fatalists who believe that any effort at human cooperation

outside the family is bound to be counterproductive (for them, at least), would not believe it possible to achieve fair enforcement of contracts. And, in an anarchic polity, without law and/or law enforcement, they might feel that avoiding harm by non-involvement was infeasible. On such an understanding, they might seek survival by attacking others first.

Hobbes had certainly given individuals a human nature appropriate to his call for a Sovereign. His institutional solutions fit the fatalistic human nature required to live under it. But Hobbes's construction of physical nature as amenable to mankind's institutions through science, as well as his belief in the value of education in making mankind fit for society, suggest that Hobbes himself adhered to one of the active cultures, namely hierarchy. In his own way, Hobbes does teach the sacrifice of the parts for the whole, except that the parts remain unequal. He urges both king and country to behave legally; he warns them against their usual depravities, and he even praises those who help others, especially when they are not obliged to do so. In the end, however, Hobbes identifies "the whole" with the Sovereign and the "parts" with the populace so we know, in the last instance, it is that, who has to sacrifice for whom.

Stripped to its barest essential, Hobbes's system of ideas consists of (1) a single human nature—fatalistic; (2) a state of nature—egalitarian; and (3) a Sovereign—hierarchical. The parts, institutionally speaking, do not cohere. The Sovereign goes well with the fatalistic construction of human nature as unpredictable-to-hostile. If individuals are constitutionally disposed against cooperation, they might engage in preemptive strikes against one another. But egalitarian and individualistic men and women, would abhor a sovereign. True believers, they might be exterminated but not persuaded.

The anti-social state of nature fits only fatalism. For fatalists and fatalists alone believe in principle in noncooperation. Hierarchs construct cooperation from the top down; egalitarians arrange cooperation by incessant discussion from the bottom up; individualists cooperate through networks formed by bilateral bargaining among consenting adults. Absolutist states do not fit any construct of human nature that includes the possibility of cooperative action, however organized.

Hobbes's corpus fills the cultural horizon: human beings will not cooperate to protect themselves against the depredations of others because they do not believe that other human beings can be accounted on to be trustworthy; they attack first for material gain, for reputation, and for self-defense. Here we see the principle of noncooperation of fatalists conflated with the desire to out-compete others, characteristic of individualists.

Never mind; Hobbes is able to shape a human nature that suits his purposes, one that will not engage in bilateral bargaining in order to gain mutual advantage, as individualists do, but will, like these self-same individualists, seek to outdo others so that only mutual fear of a Sovereign will deter them from preemptive attack. Hobbes's human natures exist in a kind of social limbo, in society and therefore doing awful things to each other, but not yet figuring out how to put a stop to their mutual carnage.

In his state of nature, that peculiar presocial state in which human beings apparently act in the knowledge that there are others but are not yet affected by social relations, Hobbes constructs the appearance of equality. Human beings are immensely self-important, so Hobbes is able to take advantage of their ridiculous claims to superiority by pointing out that all human beings are very much alike in their mortality, in their ability to do in others, and in their vanity. Home truths.

Hobbes's evident disdain for the untutored and unreconstructed human being, however, has been mistaken for a belief in the desirability of greater equality of condition in real society. Hobbes's belief in equality extends just far enough to make the state of nature sufficiently awful so that his only slightly less awful alternative, the Absolute Sovereign, should appear not only necessary but even desirable.

With the Sovereign who Hobbes thinks ought to be just but is acceptable if powerful enough to prevent his subjects from devouring themselves, Hobbes has brought together four of the five ways of life that cultural theory claims are socially viable—individualists, fatalists, egalitarians, and hierarchs. What about the autonomous culture whose hermits see the strengths and weaknesses of the other four ways of life? Why they are present in the perfection of Hobbes's geometric method, which has both of the desired qualities—outside the contention of social life and yet superior in that it cannot be contradicted. In Hobbes's hands, the geometric method (now called "public choice" or "rational choice") is not used for illumination of the other ways of life but to indicate a preference for hierarchy. But this move violates the rule of nonengagement; the autonomy that brings a broader vision is possible for human beings if and only if they seek neither to have power exerted over them nor to exert power over others. This enlightenment function proved too limiting for Hobbes's tastes.

So it is only appropriate that adherents of the three active cultures have sought to use one or another element in his system of ideas for their own political purposes. And if we were to pay attention not only to the written literature but to the oral tradition ("Don't vote; the government always gets in") whose voices say that no matter what the pretence, people like them always get it in the neck, the fatalists he wishes to place under state tutelage, too, are Hobbes's heirs.

The protean character of Hobbes's work continues to fascinate because it gives supporters of the three active cultures something to value. Rather than try to create a coherent theory out of Hobbes's incompatible elements, critics have wisely focused on the egalitarian, individualistic or hierarchical elements that works best with their own cultural preferences. Thus egalitarians choose Hobbes's state of nature because it contains elements of equality; thereby rejecting both the individual and the Sovereign. Individualists choose self-interested human nature because it promises to limit regulation by suggesting that individuals will do what is necessary for themselves; hence they adopt the individual but put down the Sovereign. Hierarchs, though not necessarily enamored of absolutism, choose Hobbes's Sovereign as representing the holism they wish to inculcate; they take the Sovereign, but downplay the individual. Thus all have hope that, improved to their liking, Hobbes can provide a grounding for their contemporary preferences.

### Cultural Theory and Political Philosophy

By analyzing Hobbes through a variety of cultural lenses, we also hope to have driven home several points of general interest in the study of political cultures. Human natures are social constructs. Hence these constructs serve as an important part of the many arguments about the good life. Though there is no transcendental culture superior to others for all purposes and under all conditions, or these inferior ways would have died off long ago, theorists can appraise them from the standpoint of internal coherence and evaluate the consequences of living in them. Or they can construct models of alliances among the various cultures. What they cannot do is "mix and match" elements from different cultures. This is why impossibility theorems (what cannot cohere with what) should become an important part of the theorist's kit bag.



No culture can long survive if its cultural biases and desired set of social relations contradict each other. How might such unviability claims be refuted? By showing, for instance, that there are ways of life whose adherents claim that nature is cornucopian but who keep practicing egalitarian social relations, and who last more than a few years. By abandoning the view of a single human nature, and by abandoning the assumption, perhaps more deeply buried, that all parts can be combined any which way the theorist chooses, large-scale theories of the ideal polity and its relationship to the good life may be appraised through a cultural approach designed to relate values to actions.

The study of political philosophy is suffused with disembodied values without people to hold them or patterns of social relations without justification to uphold them. Realization that values and relations must cohere should introduce a necessary element of constraint—not everything goes—into political theorizing.



- <sup>1</sup> Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), Chapter 6-11, pp. 109-214.
- <sup>2</sup> See Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970), "Cultural Bias," in Douglas, In the Active Voice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 183-254; Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986); Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1982). See also Chapter 12, "The Missing Ways of Life: Egalitarianism and Fatalism," pp. 223-232, in Cultural Theory. The grid-group typology follows:

		Group	
		Weak	Strong
Prescriptive	Strong	Fatalists	Hierarchs
Grid	Weak	Individualists	Egalitarians

- <sup>3</sup> Edward C. Banfield's The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958) is a meritorious exception. But Banfield neither followed up his superb book nor connected fatalism to other cultures.
- <sup>4</sup> Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990)
- <sup>5</sup> Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, and "Cultural Bias."
- <sup>6</sup> The evocative term is Michael Thompson's
- <sup>7</sup> See Isiah Berlin's essay on the Russian Populist in Berlin, ed., \_\_\_\_\_.
- <sup>8</sup> Mary Douglas, Thought Styles Exemplified: The Idea of the Self (in press, Cambridge University Press).
- <sup>9</sup> Bernard Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 28 (1967), p. 514.
- <sup>10</sup> Hobbes, cited in Gert, *ibid.*
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 515.
- <sup>12</sup> Davis Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 50.
- <sup>13</sup> Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 128.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.
- <sup>15</sup> Cited in Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism," p. 513.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.
- <sup>17</sup> Stephen H. Daniel, "Civility and Sociability: Hobbes on Man and Citizen," Journal of the History of Philosophy, Vol. 18 (1980), p. 211
- <sup>18</sup> Tricaud, Francois, "Hobbes's Conception of the State of Nature," in Perspectives of Thomas Hobbes, ed. by G.A.J: Rogers and Alan Ryan, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1988), p. 111.
- <sup>19</sup> Hobbes cited in Tricaud, p. 111

- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 185.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., p. 183.
- <sup>22</sup> Hobbes quoted in Sanford A. Lakoff, Equality in Political Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 70.
- <sup>23</sup> Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 184-185
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p. 189.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 186.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid., pp. 216-17.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 214.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 215.
- <sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 214.
- <sup>32</sup> Cited in Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism," p. 513.
- <sup>33</sup> This is only to say of Hobbes what he said of Aristotle and others who pretended superiority over ordinary people. If the tendency toward superstition were part of human nature—in Leviathan Hobbes goes back and forth on this matter—then he had only the same remedies to offer, namely, the hope that irrationality might be seized upon by the Sovereign to promote obedience and, if not, the Sovereign could induce fear to overcome irrationality.
- <sup>34</sup> Aaron Wildavsky, "Indispensable Framework or Just Another Ideology? The Prisoner's Dilemma as an Anti-Hierarchical Game," Rationality and Society, vol. 4, no. 1 (1992), ff. 8-23..
- <sup>35</sup> Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, p. 98. Around the same time as Hobbes wrote, in the 1640s, the maxim that "interest will not lie," meaning that the actions of nations could be predicted by ascertaining their interest in preservation and material advantage, and, to some, that national interest was the best guide to policy, came to England from the continent. As the Marchamont Needham put it in his Interest Will Not Lie, "...If you can comprehend wherein a man's interest in any particular game on foot doth consist, you may surely know, if the man be prudent, whereabout to have him, that is, how to judge of his design." (J.A. Gunn, "Interest Will Not Lie' A Seventeenth-Century Political maxim," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXIX, October/December 1968, p. 557.) Hobbes' use of the interest argument to give regularity and predictability to his doctrine was certainly in the air during his lifetime. It helps especially to suggest that the self-interest of the Sovereign led him to prefer the good (or, at least the peace) of his subjects.
- <sup>36</sup> C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 13.
- <sup>37</sup> David Gauthier, The Logic of Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 1-2.
- <sup>38</sup> C.B. Macpherson, "Hobbes' Bourgeois Man" in K.C. Brown ed., Hobbes Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), p. 173.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>40</sup> Ibid., pp. 172-74

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- <sup>41</sup> David Gauthier, "The Social Contract as Ideology," Philosophy and Public Affairs (1977, p. 162.
- <sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163-64.
- <sup>43</sup> James M. Glass, "Hobbes and Narcissism," Political Theory, Vol. 8 (1980), p. 359. It has been pointed out by several critics, among them Chapman, Schochet, Brennan, and Ashcraft that Hobbes was not totally committed to human equality, because he recognized an inequality between men and women in the necessity of a patriarchy within the family. It follows that it is men who fight, since they are the head of the family, and men that institute the embodiment of an absolute sovereign among themselves. Women were excluded from this process.
- <sup>44</sup> See also Lewis P. Hinchman, "The origins of Human Rights: A Hegelian Perspective," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1984), P. 17.
- <sup>45</sup> Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation, (John Wiley & Sons: London, 1976), p. 134.
- <sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- <sup>47</sup> K.C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), p. 58.
- <sup>48</sup> Arthur Ripstein, "Foundationalism in Political Theory," p. 115.
- <sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 206.
- <sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 298.
- <sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>52</sup> Gregory S. Kavka, "Hobbes' War of All Against All," Ethics (January 1983), p. 310.
- <sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 299.
- <sup>54</sup> Neal, "Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory," p. 638
- <sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>56</sup> Gauthier, "Social Contract as Ideology," p. 138
- <sup>57</sup> Hampton, Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, p. 6.
- <sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 643
- <sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>61</sup> C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, p. 12.
- <sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>63</sup> Howard Warrender, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), p. 93.
- <sup>64</sup> Michael Oakeshott, "Introduction," in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by M. Oakeshott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962) pp. viii-xi.
- <sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. ix
- <sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, x.
- <sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.
- <sup>68</sup> David Johnston, The Rhetoric of Leviathan, p. xix.

- <sup>69</sup> Richard Peters, Hobbes (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1956), p. 35.
- <sup>70</sup> Bernard Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism", P. 503
- <sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 519.
- <sup>72</sup> Neal, "Hobbes and Rational Choice Theory," p. 643.
- <sup>73</sup> Hobbes quoted in Gert, "Hobbes and Psychological Egoism," p. 515
- <sup>74</sup> Johnston, Rhetoric of Leviathan, p. xix-xx.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xx.
- <sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.
- <sup>77</sup> Stephen H. Daniel, "Civility and Sociability, Hobbes on Man and Citizen," P. 215.
- <sup>78</sup> Quentin Skinner, "Ideological Context of Hobbes's Political Thought," *The Historical Journal*, IX, 3 (1966), pp. 314.
- <sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, inter alia.
- <sup>80</sup> Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society, New York: Free Press, 1958).
- <sup>81</sup> This paragraph is adapted from Aaron Wildavsky, "Why Self-Interest is an Empty Concept: Cultural Constraints on the Construction of 'self' and 'interest,'" in process. The quotation is from Aayn Rand, The Virtues of Selfishness (New York: American Library, 1964), p. 21.

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