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Interdenominationalism, Clericalism, Pluralism: The Zentrumsstreit and the Dilemma of Catholicism in Wilhelmine Germany

MARGARET LAVINIA ANDERSON

I. THE INVENTION OF TRADITION

In April 1909 Emil Schüler, a Jew of Lippstadt, a small town in Catholic Westphalia, died. The passing of this otherwise unremarkable man was noted in a number of newspapers because Schüler was known to be both a good “Israelite” and a loyal supporter of the Center Party—a party denounced as “ultramontane” by its enemies and acknowledged even by its friends to have a constituency almost entirely Catholic. The Jüdische Rundschau commented, however, that it considered this Lippstadt Jew’s political allegiance “absolutely worth considering,” opining that recent proceedings in the Reichstag had shown that at least the religious interests of Jews found better representation within the Center than with, for example, either Liberalism or Social Democracy.1

This was not the first time a Jewish paper had expressed sympathy for the Center Party. In January 1907, during the vehemently anti-Catholic “Hottentot” Reichstag election campaign, both the Deutsche Israelitische Zeitung and the Israelitische Familienblatt had given the Center their endorsements. The former commented that every religious Jew would greet the Center’s return to the Reichstag in full strength with great joy, while the latter noted that experience had

Earlier versions of this essay (see note 71) were given at a conference on Christian Democracy in Europe in Lingen, the Federal Republic of Germany, September 1987, and at the American Society for Church History, Washington, D.C., December 1987. I am indebted especially to Noel Cary for allowing me to read his dissertation on the problem of interconfessionalism in German political Catholicism (cf. note 13), to Ellen L. Evans, for her incisive comments at the American Society for Church History, and to the stimulating ideas of my Swarthmore colleague in Political Science, James R. Kurth.

shown that respect for Jewish claims to civic equality was more deeply rooted in the consciences of Center Party members—aside from certain exceptions—than among National Liberals.2

Perhaps as remarkable as this praise by Jewish newspapers for the Center Party was the fact that Carl Bachem, a leading figure in the party and its unofficial archivist, so very carefully clipped these notices and saved them. After all, Catholics and Jews have historically not been noted for their warm relations, and German Jews, with roughly one percent of the population, made up an insignificant portion of the electorate. Their favor was not something the Center need court.3

But Carl Bachem was deeply committed to a conception of the Center as an “interdenominational”4 party, one devoted to issues concerning the entire nation and open to anyone pledged to religious freedom. Just as he saved press clippings documenting any Jewish support he could discover (and wondered naively why there wasn’t more of it),5 so too he kept a list of the Protestants who had belonged to the party’s parliamentary Fraktion in the 1870s, during its heroic resistance to Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. (There were eight.)6 Ludwig Windthorst, the Center’s first and most popular leader, had once offered a toast to “the Center’s future Protestant majority”7—a salute much quoted in party apologetics. Yet few outside the party, Bachem


3. A fact not lost on others in the party, with different convictions and priorities than Bachem. Thus the Gladbacher Merkur, edited by Joseph Schlesinger, had on 3 December 1892 criticized the Bachem family’s Kölnische Volkszeitung for its articles on behalf of the Jews and had recommended to its readers the Bonn newspaper, Deutsche Reichszeitung, edited by a priest and doctor of theology, as an antidote. On 20 March 1894 Carl Bachem, in the name of the entire Center Party, defended the Jews in the Gladbacher Merkur against the attacks of the anti-Semite Liebmann von Sonnenberg ten days earlier. The Merkur responded by criticizing Bachem and accusing the KV of Judenfreundlichkeit. “Abgeordnete Carl Bachem und die Juden,” HASTK, Bachem Nachlass, 1006, no. 65b.

4. The German term “confessional,” and its variants, I will translate variously as “denominational” and “confessional,” depending on context.

5. In “Mosse und Ullstein,” Oct. 1906, and “Juden und Zentrumsfraktion 1906,” Bachem Nachlass, 1006, folder 65c, HASTK.

6. Bachem Nachlass, 1006, folder 54, HASTK.

knew, took the Center’s repeated assertions that it was a “nondenominational” party seriously. What better proof of the Center’s claim to confessional neutrality than the endorsement of religious Jews?

During the decade before the First World War, a number of influential Catholics sought to turn the Center’s professions of confessional neutrality into practical interdenominational cooperation. The Windhorstbund, the Center’s youth organization, voted in 1905 to open its membership to Protestants. In 1907 Carl Bachem’s cousin Julius, a veteran leader of the Rhenish Center Party and publisher of the Kölnische Volkszeitung, its most important daily, called on the Center press to broaden its appeal: “Just once we would like to see a paper that is also for non-Catholic people.”8 The nondenominational Christian Trade Union movement, which the Center supported, was growing. And in 1908 the publishing house of the powerful Catholic social and educational agency, the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland, released an “Index of Social Literature” that deliberately omitted works with any theological or denominational slant, especially those recommending specifically Catholic organizations for women, youth, retail clerks, and workers. The same year Volksverein functionaries sponsored the interdenominational Union of Düsseldorf Artisans.9

These developments were bound to arouse anxieties in a society like Germany’s, where confession was still the primary expression of social identity and where social identity was still largely articulated through denominational organizations. If such interdenominational initiatives ever took hold, their impact on society could be revolutionary. Not surprisingly, some Catholics took a dim view of any retreat from Catholic, and towards merely “Christian,” organizations, and the bishops particularly were inclined to suspect “nondenominational” as a code word for “secular.” But such misgivings became the focus of public attention within the Center Party itself only in March 1906, when Julius Bachem published an article under the provocative headline: “Wir müssen aus dem Turm heraus!”—“We must come out of the tower!”

In the Tower article, as it came to be known, Bachem argued that the popular logo depicting the Center Party as an impregnable fortress, although once an important symbol of resistance to oppression, was

now—along with the mentality it symbolized—an obstacle to the party’s mission. Catholics would never overcome the prejudices against them if they remained behind barricades. It was time for them to “come out of the tower,” and indeed to take the initiative in demonstrating to outsiders that the Center was in fact a political, not a denominational, party. It would be good politics, for example, to offer a number of safe Center Party seats to non-Catholics who were on good terms with the party. Naturally such candidates must stand up for religious freedom, but otherwise social issues, not religion, would be decisive for election support. The Christian Socials,10 who without such help seemed unlikely to win even a single mandate, would make promising candidates.11

What precisely Julius Bachem had in mind with the Tower proposal is difficult to pin down, not least because, from its title on, the proposal was expressed almost entirely in metaphors. Some contemporaries, such as Chaplain Edmund Schopen, thought Bachem hoped to attract enough Protestants to transform the Center into a Christian People’s Party12—a metamorphosis that, as Noel Cary has recently pointed out, would necessarily have transformed the entire German party system.13 Bachem’s paper, the Kölnische Volkszeitung, gave credence to such a reading when it declared, a year later, that it would welcome the presence of fifty to a hundred Protestant deputies in the Center’s parliamentary fraction.14 As the fraction was precisely one hundred

10. A small party founded by the Protestant pastor Adolf Stöcker to address the social question from a Christian standpoint. Its support outside Berlin lay mainly among the Protestant clergy. Its initial anti-Semitism became much less evident after Friedrich Naumann replaced Stöcker in 1900.


13. Differing interpretations of the Tower proposal and the systemic changes each interpretation would require or facilitate are analyzed cogently in Cary’s “Political Catholicism and the Reform of the German Party System 1900-1953,” (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1988.)

men strong, it is not surprising that some Catholics thought Bachem was out to sell the farm. Yet as the tempest mounted, Bachem's supporters claimed that he was merely calling for election alliances with other parties, such as actually took place with the Conservatives in 1912.15

Whatever his ultimate aim, Bachem wanted first of all what he said he wanted: to establish among Protestants the credibility of the Center's "national," nondenominational credentials as "a genuine state party" — even if it meant, as he said, "exercising considerable self-denial."16 Such credentials would make the Center a more acceptable legislative partner for what Ellen Evans has called the "Protestant Ascendancy,"17 and for its representatives, the Conservatives and National Liberals.

On the face of it, this seems an unexceptionable project — especially since the Center had been cooperating with Conservatives and Liberals in both the Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag for some time. Yet, as a bemused Social Democrat noted, the Tower article aroused an uproar within the Catholic community of "absolutely inconceivable proportions."18 By 1910, the Munich Catholic periodical, the Historisch-Politische Blätter, was lamenting: "We treat each other as the most wicked enemies, in some circumstances, even worse."19 The Zentrumsstreit (quarrel over the Center), as the dispute was called, was even more bitter than the controversy over Revisionism then exercising the SPD. The Social Democrats debated and then defeated their minority. The Center's minority — Bachem's opponents, as it turned out — were censured, muzzled, and finally, expelled. Yet the historian, viewing the controversy from afar, confronts a puzzle: the intensity of the quarrel seems matched only by the elusiveness of its substance. All sides agreed that at issue was the nature of the Center Party and its relationship to Catholicism. Yet since both Bachem's supporters and

15. Cf. Karl Hoeber, Der Streit um den Zentrumscharakter (Cologne, 1912), 6. The problem with such an interpretation is that election alliances were common practice in the party; if that were all that Bachem had wanted, then why would he confess that his suggestion would sound like "political heresy?" Such a gloss made the whole initiative pointless, as Hermann Roeren, Bachem's most prominent critic, noted: Veränderte Lage, 60ff. Noel Cary, "Political Catholicism," chap. 2, 28, 65, argues that Bachem's article was deliberately ambiguous.
his opponents claimed to agree that the Center had always been and should always remain “non-denominational,”20 one wonders what was really at stake here?

Could differences over the Tower article have masked unresolved differences on specific legislative policies, as Ellen Evans has suggested?21 If so, how to get behind the mask? Theoretically the way to proceed would be to see how divisions on Bachem’s Tower proposal correlate with party divisions apparent in parliamentary roll calls. Unfortunately for the historian, differences within the Center almost never show up in roll calls. And unlike the SPD, where differences in theory as well as policy were thrashed out and voted up or down in public congresses, the Center had no such formal mechanism for registering the results of party debate. (As for the Center’s electorate, how it felt about any given issue is almost impossible to tease out.22) The parliamentary party would, of course, occasionally take a stand, as it did as soon as the Tower article became a source of public scandal, closing ranks (with three or four exceptions that I shall discuss below) behind Bachem.23 But aside from its clear intention not to leave the author of the Tower article out on a limb, the party’s action was ambiguous. The Reichstag fraction’s famous declaration of 28 November 1909, signed also by the Prussian Landtag fraction and Party Committee (Landesausschuss), was calculated to obscure rather than

21. “. . . The Zentrumsstreit was more than an argument about correct religious policy. It coincided with, and perhaps helped to conceal or camouflage, a much more fundamental controversy about the political and social program that the party should follow.” The German Center Party (Carbondale, Ill., 1981), 202.
22. The Center’s electoral losses in 1912, when many Catholics voted SPD or stayed home, may have been, as Stanley Suval has suggested, a protest against their leadership’s using them as pawns in its election agreements with Conservatives and thus indirect evidence for the contention of Bachem’s opponents that unless voting Center meant voting Catholic, Catholics would have no reason to vote Center. Suval, Electoral Politics in Imperial Germany (Chapel Hill, 1986), 77f. But the accuracy of Bachem’s opponents’ electoral analysis tells us nothing about their inner-party support.
23. According to Carl Bachem (hardly a disinterested observer) the majority were eager supporters of the Turm article. Bachem to Joseph Dahlmann, 1 June 1906, cited in Brose, Christian Labor, 206. Perhaps. But Georg Hertling and Felix Porsch—both influential party leaders—had misgivings, fearing that the interconfessional initiative would anger the pope and undermine the solidarity of the Catholic electorate. Hertling to Julius Bachem, 6 April and 10 April 1906, also cited by Brose, ibid.
reveal party opinion. On the one hand, its resounding affirmation of the Center’s nondenominational status seemed a victory for Bachem. On the other hand, his specific scheme to offer safe seats to Christian Socials was passed over in silence. And the declaration’s retort to Bachem’s critics that “the fact that almost all of the Center’s voters and deputies belong to the Catholic Church offers sufficient guarantee that the party will represent most emphatically the justified interests of German Catholics. . . .” suggests that, at least for some, Bachem’s proposal to court Protestant membership was acceptable only to the degree that Protestants could be counted on to decline the honor.

But beyond such general inferences, one cannot go. Whatever implications the inner-party struggle over the Tower proposal might have had for the Center’s stance on specific policy issues—tax reform, suffrage, naval expansion, for example—must remain a matter of speculation. Since “hard” evidence (opinion polls, roll-call analysis, etc.) of the kind that might satisfy social scientists is missing, most historical accounts, of which there have been many, have confined themselves to analyzing the pamphlet war. And the distinguishing feature of this contest is that it was absolutely silent about legislative policy.

Instead of debating current and concrete political issues, each side draped itself in the mantle of Windthorst and accused the other of betraying the Center’s tradition. Yet traditions are often invented, as Eric Hobsbawm has reminded us; and they are almost always ambiguous. Windthorst’s twenty-year reign had ended only fifteen years ago; plenty of disciples were still around with first-hand—and varying—accounts of what the great man had done and said. In a “war of quotations”—the editor of the Düsseldorfer Tageblatt’s sobriquet for the Zentrumsstreit—no battle is ever final.

25. Cary, “Political Catholicism,” chap. 2, 68, notes aptly that had Bachem emulated Windthorst’s toast, “it would have been to the party’s future Protestant minority.” (Emphasis his.)
27. Quoted by Heinz Brauweiler, “Der Kern und die Bedeutung des Zentrumsstreits,” in Hochland 11 (1914), in Cary, “Political Catholicism,” chap. 2, 33. Cary argues that “the Zentrumsstreit became more and more an introspective struggle, a preoccupation with interpreting the meaning and current relevance of the party’s past,” and concludes, p. 45, that “the tendency to lapse into historical defenses was the hallmark of the debate, the prime symptom of its nature as an exercise in self-image.”
The opponents of the Tower article had every justification in supposing that Windthorst was spinning in his grave at the suggestion that safe Center seats should be deliberately relinquished to another party. When similar proposals had been made by the chairman of the Center’s delegation to the Prussian Landtag, Baron Burghard von Schorlemer-Alst, Windthorst had responded contemptuously: “Only the world’s dumbest calves would elect their own butcher.” Even in the Catholic diaspora, where the party’s own candidates could not hope to win, Windthorst had been chary about delivering the Center’s voters to a Conservative. “I am glad,” he had written regarding a run-off election, “that we stood firm with our [candidate] Preisburg. I’m convinced that it makes a good impression on the entire rural population. . . .” Schorlemer’s attempt in 1888 to force Windthorst to move the Center into an election alliance with the Right had resulted in the Baron’s own abrupt resignation.28

Bachem’s supporters, on the other hand, could justifiably claim that, as pragmatists, they were the legitimate heirs of the tradition of Windthorst. These men, advocating what became known as the “Cologne line” (Kölner Richtung), could also point to the fact that the irenic Windthorst had always been allergic to the kind of integralism espoused by “the Berlin line”: men such as Franz von Savigny, associated with the Berlin branch of the (decidedly denominational) Catholic worker associations (Arbeitervereine), and the reactionary—and increasingly unbalanced—Prince Bishop of Breslau, Cardinal Georg Kopp.29 Indeed, since Kopp, as all the initiated knew, had been a personal enemy of Windthorst and had used every means at his disposal to thwart and discredit him, it must have seemed prima facie ludicrous that anyone connected with Kopp should lay claim to Windthorst’s legacy. Yet political lineages are more tangled than familial ones. A party comrade who had died in 1887—when Windthorst’s struggle with Kopp was at its height—and returned in 1906 would have been startled to find two of Windthorst’s closest comrades-in-arms, Father Adolf Franz and Michael Felix Korum,

28. Quotations: Ludwig Windthorst to Clemens Perger, 18 Sept. 1888, Bistumsarchiv Trier, Abteilung 1574, p. 40v; Windthorst to a priest, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Kleine Erwerbung, Nr. 596.

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Bishop of Trier, now acting as Kopp’s agents and allies in the Cardinal’s quarrel with the interdenominational Christian Trade Unions (the Gewerkschaftsstreit).

Most historians have followed the “Cologners” in labeling all opponents of the Tiumartikel as the “Berlin line,” thus identifying Bachem’s adversaries inside the party with the efforts of Savigny and Kopp on the outside to get Pius X to ban the interdenominational Christian trade unions. But a number of considerations argue against equating the Gewerkschaftsstreit with the Zentrumsstreit—the most important being that interdenominationalism had entirely different consequences for Catholic power in the two organizations. Given the demonstrated success of the Social Democratic “Free Unions” in recruiting Protestant workers, interdenominationalism in the Catholic-sponsored Christian Trade Union movement could only add clout to Germany’s Catholic minority, without threatening its dominance of the organization itself, where Catholics made up five-sixths of the membership. A truly interdenominational Center Party, on the other hand, in a country 63 percent Protestant, would dilute the ability of Catholics, qua Catholics, to articulate their interests.

Consequently, in the remarks that follow, I shall ignore the parallel trade union controversy and deliberately confine myself to those identifiable critics of the Cologne line who actually represented the Center in parliament: Hermann Roeren, Franz Bitter, Count Hans Eduard von Oppersdorff, and, at least for several years, the young Matthias Erzberger. Who were these men? A number of ties connected them with each other and set them apart from those associated with “Cologne.” Perhaps by unraveling these ties and seeing where they lead we can get closer to the heart of the controversy.


31. Ideally this list would also include the Landtag Deputy Hubert Underberg, who also signed the Easter Tuesday Resolutions (see below), and is quoted by Ross, Beleaguered Tower, 132, as saying “An alliance with the Conservatives promises no permanence.” But other than his occupation as an industrialist and his ownership of a noble estate, I could find no information on Underberg. Still, even this information casts doubt on the characterization of the Zentrumsstreit by Herbert Gottwald as “nothing but the expression of the struggle between those forces fully affirming capitalism [Bachem orientation] against . . . predominantly petty bourgeois conceptions.” Cf. his “Zentrum,” in Dieter Fricke, ed., Die bürgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland: Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderer bürgerlicher Interessenorganisationen vom Vormärz bis zum Jahre 1945 (Leipzig, 1970), 2: 901.
Hermann Roeren, the chief critic of the Tower article, had served in Prussian or German parliaments almost continuously since 1882. On matters of principle, he had no compunction about embarrassing the government, even at the risk of damaging its relations with his party. Thus in early 1906 he had submitted an interpellation to Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow about duelling in the officer corps that evoked a response (“As long as duelling is recognized by wide circles of society as a means of rehabilitating one’s honor, the officer corps will be unable to tolerate in its ranks anyone who is not prepared to defend his honor with weapon in hand”) that cast a flood of light on the distance between Catholic mores and those of good society. In 1910 Roeren led backbenchers in deserting the party leadership and supporting SPD and Left Liberal efforts to strengthen the powers of the Reichstag, submitting a motion (Antrag Roeren) that would have allowed no-confidence votes to be introduced in interpellation debates. In the Tower controversy, his most sensational intervention had occurred in 1909, when Roeren had joined the rookie Franz Bitter and several members of the clergy in formulating the “Easter Tuesday Resolutions,” a series of statements that defined the Center as a political party, representing the entire people—but in harmony with the principles of the Catholic Weltanschauung (my emphasis).

Matthias Erzberger, although not present at the Easter Tuesday Conference, was associated with Roeren both temperamentally and politically. A controversialist of Chestertonian vigor, his delight in championing precisely those elements of Catholicism most offensive to Protestants and most embarrassing to “Cologne”—as in his pamphlet defending the antimodernist oath the hierarchy required of the clergy in 1909—showed how little he valued a low confessional profile. Roeren and Erzberger had acquired national reputations in

33. Winfried Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich: Der politische Katholizismus in der Krise des wilhelminischen Deutschlands (Düsseldorf, 1984), 188. Roeren was also known as a spokesman for laws to enforce public decency, culminating in the so-called Lex Heintze of 1900. Evans, The Center Party, 139.
35. Erzberger, Der Modernisteneid: Den Katholiken zur Lehr und Wehr, Andersdenkenden zur Aufklärung (Berlin, 1911).
1906 by relentlessly exposing the scandal of government mismanagement and inhumanity in its African colonies and especially in its crushing of the Herero uprising. These exposés—which were based on unauthorized access to the confidential reports of disaffected subalterns in the imperial bureaucracy as well as those of Catholic missionaries—had been scarcely more welcome to the Center’s Prominenz than they had been to Chancellor Bülow. The Tower article appeared only two weeks before Erzberger’s attacks on the government had reached their first climax and Peter Spahn, the party’s Reichstag leader, had disavowed the young hotspur on the Reichstag floor.

Erzberger, in turn, was close to Count Oppersdorff, a man who had embarrassed both the government and his own party’s leadership in 1909 by assailing the cozy new tax bill they were arranging with the Conservatives as an intolerable burden on consumers. In 1910 Oppersdorff’s name appeared on a brochure attacking the admission of Peter Spahn’s son, the Strassburg historian Martin Spahn, into the parliamentary party; but it was an open secret that the real author of Oppersdorff’s diatribe was Erzberger. The pamphlet pilloried the younger Spahn, already well-known for his hypernationalism and governmentalism, as alien to the Center’s true traditions. As evidence, it cited Spahn’s support for the undemocratic Prussian franchise, his hostility to Germany’s Polish minority, and his questionable commitment to denominational schools and the repeal of the exceptional law banishing the Jesuits: a revealing combination of sins and, by extension, a revealing definition in reverse of what constituted the Center Party’s true traditions. The attack is important for our purposes because Spahn, in addition to his obvious paternal connection, had publicly supported the Tower article and was seen as a “close comrade-in-arms” of Julius Bachem. Count Oppersdorff’s own distance from

36. The fact that one of the informants had the Polish-sounding name of Wistuba may have contributed to the widespread feeling that neither Erzberger and Roeren nor their informants were true Germans.
37. Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich, 177.
39. The phrase is Walter Ferber’s, “Der Weg Martin Spahns: Zur Ideengeschichte des politi-
the growing nationalism of the “Cologners” can be seen from the fact that after he was expelled from the party in 1911 for his continued “obstructionism,” he was re-elected to the Reichstag as an Independent by the heavily Polish-speaking district of Fraustadt-Lissa in Poznań.  

By conflating contemporary controversies within German Catholicism—the Zentrumsstreit, the controversy over the Christian unions, and, sometimes, the modernism quarrel—the “Cologners” succeeded in tarring all of their opponents with the “Berlin line” of Cardinal Kopp and Franz von Savigny, portraying them all as anti-labor and as integralist reactionaries, longing for theocracy. And since historians, for the most part, have no love for reactionaries and even less for integralism, so far as they understand it, the “Cologners” have tended, at least in the literature, to have everything their own way.

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schen Rechtskatholizismus,” Hochland 82 (1970): 218–29; quotation: 224. Spahn saw in the Tower initiative an opportunity for Catholics to become more national and to adopt a “manner of thinking more oriented towards the state [staatliche Denkweise].” Ibid., 223f.  
40. Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich, 191.  
41. A good example of this conflation can be found in Epstein, “Erzberger’s Position,” 1–16, which manages to discuss the Zentrumsstreit and its historiography without once mentioning the Tower article and thus ignores the very initiative that, according to the embattled Roeren and Bitter, caused the whole quarrel. See Bitter, Koblenz speech, in: Bergsträsser, Der politische Katholizismus, 2: 371. Bachem’s opponents are often referred to wholesale as “integralist.”  
42. A commonly used definition: “Integralism is the name for a religious totalitarianism that wants to infer from faith (alone) the answer to all questions of private and public life, consequently denies to the various branches of knowledge and culture not only absolute but also a relative autonomy. . . .” Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Integralismus,” in Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 5, col. 717f., quoted in Kiefer, Bachem, 130, n. 10. In fact the term “integralist” is almost as loose as “ultramontane” and like the latter is used more often as a weapon than as a tool in historical argument. It is perhaps best confined to the allies of Msgr. Umberto Benigni (1862–1936) and his secret society “Sodalitium Pianum.” Even within this group there were profound differences of opinion. Cf. Roger Aubert, “Eingriff der kirchlichen Obrigkeit und die integralistische Reaktion,” in Hubert Jedin, ed., Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte (Freiburg i. Br., 1983), 4: 475–500, esp. 490.  
43. The victory of the Bachemites historiographically is especially clear in the numerous accounts that discuss the Roeren group as the ones departing from party tradition. Cf. Lill, “Der deutsche Katholizismus,” 523; Epstein, “Erzberger’s Position,” 7f., 15; Deuerlein, “Verlauf und Ergebnis,” 117f. (which cites as its source for Roeren’s views Josef Dietz’s biography of Adam Stegerwald, rather than Roeren’s own pamphlets). Karl Josef Rivinius so identifies with the Richtung Bachem that he often describes the Zentrumsstreit in their very words. See “Die Indizierung Theodor Wackers: Streit um den Charakter der Zentrumspartei im Kontext der Auseinandersetzungen um die christlichen Gewerkschaften,” Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 24 (1983): 211–35. Rolf Kiefer, writing in Bachem, 134, that “the Zentrumsstreit and the trade union quarrel, considering the content of their ideas and the line-up of the two sides, are not separable from one another,” is only the most recent echo of this consensus. Ellen Evans and Noel Cary are, I believe, unique in refusing to equate the Bachemites with progress and the
Yet Erzberger had been a founder of the interdenominational Christian union movement and had cut his political teeth working for the Volksverein, that movement’s most vociferous advocate. In 1910 he had wanted the party to come publicly to the defense of the Christian unions, but more cautious voices—most certainly supporters of “Cologne”—had prevailed. Roeren and Bitter also rejected the anti-unionist label and complained vigorously against the conflation of the two controversies, noting that a motion to condemn the Christian unions had been explicitly offered at their “Easter Tuesday Conference” and explicitly rejected.

Moreover, if one accepts the usual description of these critics of the Tower proposal as integralist fanatics, then the ironies abound. One would assume, for example, that any deputy who stressed the Center’s Catholic character, as opposed to its interdenominational potential, would have represented one of the party’s seventy-three safe seats with a solid Catholic majority. But no: Deputy Bitter was returned by Bersenbrück-Osnabrück, a hotly contested Hanoverian district with a Protestant majority. And his victory there had been no mere fluke, for this Protestant district returned Center Party candidates in eleven of its eighteen prewar election contests. Yet except for Bitter, all of the victorious Center candidates in Bersenbrück had been Lutherans. If any district demonstrated the advantages for the party in interdenominational cooperation, it was this one. It is inconceivable that Bitter could have been the kind of intolerant integralist the “Cologners” depicted and have been returned by this constituency.

Roerenites with reaction, but even Evans, The German Center Party, 198, sees the Kölner Richtung as wanting the Center “to continue” as before.

44. Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy (Princeton, 1959), 12, 401–4; Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich, 240.

45. Cf. Roeren, Zentrum und Kölner Richtung, 2; Bitter in: Bergsträsser, Der politische Katholizismus, 2: 364.

46. → Klaus Epstein, on Roeren: “unbalanced fanatic.” “Erzberger and the German Colonial Scandals, 1905–1910,” English Historical Review, no. 293 (Oct. 1959): 637–64, quotation on 656. “Integralist” is most accurate when applied to Oppersдорff, but even he may have become more extreme in the course of his quarrels with a party determined to muzzle him. Eventually he was declared persona non grata in Rome. Loth, Katholiken im Kaiserreich, 269.

47. Though Catholic districts sometimes returned Protestant candidates for the Center, I know of no other case where a Protestant district returned a Catholic candidate for the Center. I am following the party designations for Wahlkreis 4. Hannover: Bersenbrück given in: Max Schwarz, MdR: Biographisches Handbuch der Reichstage (Hanover, 1965), 183. These are corroborated in Fritz Specht, Die Reichstags-Wahlen von 1867 bis 1897: Eine Statistik der Reichstags-Wahlen nebst den Programmen der Parteien und dem Verzeichnis der gewählten Kandidaten (Berlin, 1898).
I would argue that the Roerenites differed from the Bachemites less in their stance towards labor or towards non-Catholics than in their attitude towards the social and political status quo. The Roerenites were critical of the government and the institutions of the Reich: of the high-handed and irresponsible administration of its colonies; of Prussia’s plutocratic franchise; of the unfair treatment of its Polish minority; and of the absence of full autonomy for the churches and equality between the confessions twenty years after the end of the Kulturkampf. They saw few reasons to be any more sanguine about the future. Moreover, in the “Cologners” increasing ease in Zion the Roerenites detected signs of embarrassment about their own unfashionable Catholicism. As a supporter of Roeren remarked: “I’m always hearing it said, ‘we are Catholic and we want to be Catholic. But please! one should just not say it publicly.’” And Franz Bitter complained: “We should in any case have more pride and show more self-confidence; we Catholics should not be so nervous whenever someone mentions the word Catholic in the same breath as the word politics.” For the Roeren group, Bachem’s call for real inter-denominationalism could only signify an undignified willingness to mute unpopular Catholic demands, such as repeal of the Jesuit Law, in exchange for social acceptance within the national consensus. And Roeren’s suspicions found support in the wording of the Turmartikel itself. For there Bachem had expressly stated that consideration for Germany’s tense denominational relations must govern Center Party decisions “in any kind of political action on ecclesiastical issues, indeed already at the point of deciding whether any action on ecclesiastical issues should even be undertaken at all. . . . [emphasis added].”

The longing for social integration was naturally strongest among those Catholics already closest to the line of separation—men such as

Specht’s list, p. 201, of winners of the 4th Hanoverian district awards only five of these victories to the Zentrum. Unaccountably, from 1884 on he ceases to list Freiherr von Schele as “Cent (luth Welfe)” and describes him as “Welfe (Cent).” This seems, however, to be a distinction without a difference. It is worth noting that the participation rates in Bersenbrück were extremely high and that nine of the fifteen contests between 1867 and 1907 were decided by run-offs.

48. Roeren had opposed the government’s Germanization policies as early as 1903, arguing that attempts to suppress the Polish nationality amounted to attacks on their Catholicism. Ross, Beleaguered Tower, 37. Windthorst had used precisely the same argument in the 1870s and 1880s.

49. The first quotation, from Prince Löwenstein, is given in Roeren, Kölner Richtung, 5; Bitter, Koblenz speech, in Bergstrasser, Der politische Katholizismus, 2: 374.

50. Tower article, in Bergstrasser, Der politische Katholizismus, 2: 337.
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the young professor of history, Martin Spahn, against whom Oppersdorff and Erzberger had inveighed so loudly. (In 1921 Spahn crossed over to the German Nationalist Party [DNVP] and later joined Hitler’s National Socialists.) The Kölnische Volkszeitung, Bachem’s paper, agonized over what it perceived as a mass flight of educated Catholics, particularly in the higher civil service, from the Center’s ranks. Such an exodus of the elite seemed only to demonstrate once again that membership in a Catholic party was a badge of social inferiority, and it naturally made the social position of those remaining in the party seem even less attractive. The Roerenites, however, put a moral gloss on the same data and the misgivings they inspired: “We have too many unprincipled careerists in our fraction and too few men with character,” Bitter complained.

III. WAS THE CENTER CLERICAL?

If it is ironic that one of the most vociferous champions of the continued Catholic character of the Center represented a Protestant election district, then another irony surely lies in the fact that many of the most vigorous spokesmen for the “interdenominationalism” of the “Cologners” were priests. Take the Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland, an important bulwark of the Center Party between elections. The Volksverein was an object of increasing suspicion among conservatives in the episcopate because of its vigorous support for the Christian unions, its sympathy for Bachem’s Tower proposal, and its own interdenominational initiatives. Less known publicly, but no less pronounced, was the Volksverein’s hostility to episcopal interference in any of its activities. Yet the Volksverein was itself a monument to the “clericalism” of the Catholic milieu. Hostile Protestants made it one of their chief charges against the organization that most of its speakers were clergy. Of its twenty assistant directors, nearly half were

51. Meerfeld, Zentrumsparitei, 8.
52. Quoted in Jean Meerfeld, Kaiser, Kanzler, Zentrum: Deutscher Verfassungsjammer und klerikaler Byzantinismus (Berlin, 1911), 27. Hoeber’s version of Bitter’s term is slightly different: “mandatstüchtige Streber.” Der Streit, 34.
54. Ross, Beleaguered Tower, 63. Heitzer, “Krisen des Volksvereins,” 230, n. 84, points to the irony of the Volksverein’s position when he writes that to Archbishop von Hartmann of Cologne “it must have appeared even less comprehensible when precisely the clerical leaders of the Volksverein asserted its ‘adult’ status [‘Mündigkeit’].”
priests, as were all three of the directors of its Zentralstelle: Franz Hitze, Heinrich Brauns, and August Pieper. Would the declericalization of the Catholic subculture, the replacement of clerical with lay leadership in its organizations, have furthered interdenominationalism in public life? Probably the reverse is true.

And yet potential Protestant allies could have legitimate concern about the locus of Center authority. Although the “Cologners” were stiff in their insistence that the ecclesiastical and political spheres must be kept sharply separate, they protested rather too much. The Roerenites, in pointing out that Catholic issues, which the Center must always champion, ultimately came under the authority of the Church, were more candid. It was therefore yet another irony of the Zentrumsstreit that when the bishops of the Lower Rhine Church Province issued a warning to their clergy in February 1914 to refrain from any polemics that might divide the Catholic community (reminding them of instructions from the pope and declarations of the Bishops’ Conference), those in the know recognized the warning as a move to silence Roeren and his associates. The Archbishop of Freiburg was sorry that his confreres had not seen fit to express an even more “energetic repudiation” of the Roerenites. Carl Bachem and Felix Porsch, both laymen, expressed their pleasure at this invocation of episcopal—and papal—authority against the critics of the Cologne line.55

Such “Cologners” were furious that the participants at the Easter Tuesday Conference had forwarded their resolutions to the episcopate, seeing in this an attempt “to make the bishops into tools of their still

55. Bachem to Porsch, 15 Feb. 1914, quoted in Karl Josef Rivinius, ed., “Die Streit um die christlichen Gewerkschaften im Briefwechsel zwischen Carl Bachem, P. Pankratius Rathscbeck und Bischof Döbbing vom Erscheinen der Enzyklika ‘Singulari quadam’ bis zum Tod Kardinal Kopp (1912–1914),” Jahrbuch für Christliche Sozialwissenschaften 23 (1982): 129–216; quotation on 211, n. 90. Cf. also Porsch to Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, 15 Feb. 1914, as well as the quotation from the Archbishop of Freiburg, Thomas Nörber, in idem, “Indizierung,” 217, and nn.10 and 11. Rivinius reveals Carl Bachem in continual touch with Bishop Bernhard Döbbing, unselfconsciously feeding this ally in the Zentrumsstreit confidential inner-party information, including plans against his colleagues Count Oppersdorff and “sonstige Quertreibern.” Bachem conveyed tactful instructions about appropriate episcopal support and his comments imply that he received similar instructions from Döbbing to him. In this Bachem was of course following directly in the tortuous footsteps of Windthorst, that is: insisting on Zentrum autonomy from any interference from the hierarchy and yet soliciting the hierarchy’s instructions—and imparting instructions and advice to them on his own. Rivinius relates Bachem’s correspondence with Döbbing with no apparent recognition of its ironies. Nor does he suggest anything improper in Porsch’s communications with the Imperial Chancellor on inner-party matters.
secret machinations.”56 But their own practice was no different. As early as 1903 Bachem had responded to Franz von Savigny’s efforts against the Christian unions by immediately appealing to Rome. “It would of course be best of all,” he wrote to his ally, Father Franz Hitze, “if such a step [seeking Vatican support] proceeded from one of the bishops. . . .” —a broad hint for Hitze to apply to Their Graces to intervene.57 For both sides of the quarrel, therefore, the issue was not the role of priests, but whose priests.

The most outspoken opponent of a clerical, confessional Center was Father Theodor Wacker, pastor in Zähringen and the virtual boss of the Baden Center Party from 1888 until 1917.58 Wacker managed to condemn the Roeren group’s suggestion that the Center work more closely with the hierarchy at the same time that he demanded that they end their obstructionist intrigues by reminding them of the hierarchy’s admonition of February 1914 to cease polemics.59 Thus we have the unlikely spectacle of a priest attempting to muzzle lay defenders of clerical authority by invoking the directives of bishops. But the irony does not stop there. It was a personal tragedy, but surely poetic justice, that Wacker’s political brochure, “The Center and Ecclesiastical Authority,” was immediately put on the papal index of forbidden books. And this boss of Baden’s Center, of course, submitted. Wacker’s case shows how very careful one must be when trying to establish the Center’s precise relationship to ecclesiastical authority, since this was a relationship which—as Windthorst’s justly acclaimed and deliber-

56. Hoeber, Der Streit, 34.
59. Wacker’s famous speech, while demanding independence for the Zentrum from clerical authority and rejecting all demands for a confessional Zentrum, resembled Windthorst’s Gürzenich speech (see note 60) in leaving the Zentrum’s ultimate relationship to clerical authority ambiguous. Wacker appealed to his listeners, as Catholic men, to make (ablegen) a clear affirmation (Bekenntnis) of their Church and above all of ecclesiastical authority “as represented by the supreme shepherd and represented by the shepherds, our bishops, subordinate to him.” Rivinus, “Indizierung,” 222, 224.
ately ambiguous Gürzenich Speech in 1887 had shown—it was in the interests of all sides to leave as obscure as possible.

Indeed, it was not confessionalism, the defense of specifically Catholic interests, but "clericalism," the complicated relation of party to clergy, that was the most difficult part of the Center tradition for outsiders to get right. One of our most respected historians of Catholic Germany has recently declared that "research has established quite clearly that the Center was not a clerical party." Yet if clericalism meant the political prominence of priests, the Center was a clerical party. Twenty percent of its Reichstag deputies were priests in 1903, and as late as 1912, the figure was still 11 percent. The clergy were even more numerous in the state parliaments, and the heads of both the Bavarian and the Baden Center Parties were priests. Most important of all was the role of the clergy locally. "For the ordinary Catholic citizen in the countryside," wrote a protégé of Wacker, "the priest was and remained the representative of the Center Party. And the priest considered himself as such. Inquiries and assignments from the district and central party leadership, leaflets and election newsletters to be distributed, requests for funding these and other campaign activities, all went to him." To say, as David Blackbourn does, that "the driving force in the Center was lay, not clerical" sets up "lay" and "clerical" as alternatives, when what was peculiar about the prewar Center was the blurring, in the workaday relations of the party, of precisely this distinction. Moreover, identifying the Center's "driving force" as "lay" leaves unspoken what every contemporary, Protestant and Catholic, knew: no clergy, no Center. When Franz Bitter warned, "Just

60. In 1887 Leo XIII leaked to Bismarck, with permission to publish, a confidential Vatican note to the Center, instructing it to vote for the government's military budget—a directive that the party had ignored. When, in the ensuing election campaign, the "secret" Vatican instructions appeared in all the newspapers, Windthorst was forced both to defend his party's failure to comply with Rome's wishes (to the Catholic electorate) and to assert its independence from Rome's directives (to the Protestants). He did this in Gürzenich hall in Cologne. Cf. Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Windthorst: A Political Biography (Oxford, 1981), 335–58.


62. Heinrich Köhler, quoted in Zangerl, "Courting the Catholic Vote," 227–28. Zangerl adds: "As if to dramatize its reliance on the clergy, the Center's election committee [in Baden] issued a secret circular to all priests during the 1905 Landtag campaign urging them to combat antireligious influences, from the pulpit if necessary."

once let the clergy remain neutral in an election campaign, and the Center will be smashed," he said nothing that the "Cologners" would not, at least privately, have acknowledged.  

If, however, clericalism meant the determination of party policy by the hierarchy, then the Center was no clerical party. No Center deputy, Roeren no more than Bachem, wanted any bishop or pope to tell him how to vote in the Reichstag. On the other hand, if clericalism meant the inclusion of religious demands on a political agenda, then the Center was certainly a clerical party. And as long as there was such a thing as Kirchenpolitik, as long as the legal position of the Church was dependent upon the makeup of the Landtag, asserted the suffragan bishop of Freiburg, then the Church's organs had a vital interest in party politics—and no one in the Center contradicted him. No Center deputy, Bachem no more than Roeren, would have repudiated an instruction from Rome or the episcopate on an ecclesiastical matter.

Just as both sides solicited episcopal support, so too did both sides appeal to Windthorst's policy on the party's relation to the hierarchy to justify their position. The Bachemites repeatedly invoked the first Center leader's refusal to follow Leo XIII's instructions to vote for Bismarck's military budget (the Septennat) in 1887 to argue that temporal and ecclesiastical spheres could and should be kept separate, carefully tailoring their accounts of this famous incident to support their own appropriation of the "Windhorst tradition." Roeren and

64. Bitter quoted in Meerfeld, Zentrumspartei, 5. The importance of the parish priest during election campaigns should not, however, be taken to mean that he, ex officio, determined the party's political positions. Cf. Suval, Electoral Politics, 70.

65. Roeren: "Only in rare cases, where doubts about permissibility arise and are not to be solved with certainty, does one turn, as precedents show, to the ecclesiastical and theological authorities, but even in these cases only for orientation...by no means however in order to give up the independence of one's own decision..." (Emphasis his). Veränderte Lage, 54; cf. also his Zentrum und Kölner Richtung, 30-31, 34-36.

66. Quoted by Zangerl, "Courting the Catholic Vote," 220.

67. It is revealing that adherents of the "Cologners" did their best to obscure the fact that, in spite of Windthorst's brave words, after the publication of the Vatican's note the Center fraction followed Leo's instructions to support Bismarck's Septennat, insofar as it reversed its opposition to the bill and decided instead to abstain on the crucial vote—and seven fraction members actually voted for it. Thus Carl Bachem's comment, in his role as party historian, about Windthorst's famous speech in Gürzenich hall—it "brachte die Entscheidung in dem grossen Septennatskampfe"—is simply not true. Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei (Cologne, 1927-32), 4: 195. Eduard Hüsgen's biography of Windthorst (Cologne, 1907) is even more misleading, since its account of the Septennat crisis ends with the fraction's vote of confidence in Windthorst, leaving the reader to assume, falsely, that the fraction then followed the line he had advocated and voted against the Septennat.
Bitter, however, could quote *expressis verbis* from Windthorst’s speech in Münster in 1885 before the annual Assembly of Catholic Organizations [Katholikentag] to point up the inevitable connection between them:

. . . When we . . . see Their Graces the bishops present here, then the question is always brought home to us: are we in full and complete conformity with the teachings of the Church and with the authorities? [Bravo] The moment we deviated even one iota from them, we would be irretrievably lost [Bravo], and our consciences would bear a heavy burden. [Bravo!] That’s why I have said it is so important for Their Graces the bishops to have been here and have heard us. . . .68

Throughout his career, moreover, Windthorst demonstrated, with his actions as much as his words, his awareness of the necessity of maintaining constant touch with the hierarchy and of assuring himself of their assent to all of the party’s actions on issues affecting the church. He thought he knew where to draw the line between *politisch* and *kirchenpolitisch*, but it sometimes took all of his authority to get his colleagues, both on the hustings and in the sacristy, to agree. It was Windthorst’s complicated legacy—freely exploiting the resources and authority of the Church as the apparatus for his lay party, yet keeping the essential decision-making of this party in his own hands—that neither the Roerenites nor the Bachemites, in practice, wished to give up.

These distinctions were subtle ones, difficult enough for Catholics to get right—as the irritated pronouncements of the integralist press on the one side and the indexing of poor Father Wacker on the other demonstrate.69 One can hardly be surprised that Protestants, who had not been born into this world, often failed to perceive them. The clusters of black cassocks at Center Party gatherings, a sight so familiar to Catholics and serving to domesticate the world of high politics for

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68. Bitter, in Bergsträtter, *Der politische Katholizismus*, 2: 367; Roeren, *Zentrum und Kölner Richtung*, 36, and a more complete version in *Veränderte Lage*, off. Julius Bachem’s rebuttal in *Das Zentrum, wie es war, ist und bleibt* (Cologne, 1913), 49, arguing that Windthorst was speaking at the *Katholikentag* as a Catholic to Catholics rather than as a party leader to voters, is disingenuous, as Roeren demonstrated by supplying the following lines from the same speech: Windthorst: “Wir haben aber auch in Berlin im Reichstag und im Landtag immer Vorsorge, dass wir Kontrolleure haben.” *Veränderte Lage*, 10ff., 12.

69. The cases of Pieper and Otto Müller, both priests who eventually left their leading positions in the Volksverein because of difficulties with the hierarchy and its demands for “Verkirchlichung,” are equally poignant examples. Cf. Heitzer, “Krisen des Volksvereins,” 248f.
them, was a large part of what made the Center’s milieu so sinister to outsiders. Precisely because the lines of authority between clergy and laity within the Catholic community were so very important and yet so nearly invisible, Protestants felt menaced.

IV. THE PROTESTANT RECEPTION

And this brings me to my next theme. Inter-denominationalism obviously requires the cooperation of at least two denominations. If Catholics followed Julius and Carl Bachem out of the tower, who would be there to meet them on the ground? The Emil Schülers of Lippstadt were hardly sufficient to constitute a welcoming committee. The question of interdenominationalism in the Center Party was fought out between two sides that each passionately claimed to be Windthorst’s heirs. And yet can one even imagine any contemporary Protestant who would willingly have accepted that label, “Windthorst’s heir,” for himself? Friedrich Naumann, who as a pastor and the leader of the Christian Social Party was just the sort of Protestant Bachem was aiming to recruit, declared the fight against the Center to be “the greatest and most difficult party-political task of democracy. It is precisely a fight pro patria, for the fate of Germandom [des Deutschtums] hangs on it.” Every indication we have shows that for Protestants, the Center Party was beyond the pale.

Take elections. Voting behavior in the Kaiserreich was remarkably orderly. When a voter’s own preferred party failed to put up a candidate in his district, that voter regularly chose the party “next” to it, on a clear, right-left continuum: Conservative, Free Conservative, National Liberal, Left Liberal, Social Democratic. The Center, however, fell entirely outside this spectrum of choices. A statistical study by a group of American political scientists has shown that for all intents and purposes no voters from other parties chose the Center when candidates from their own party were unavailable. Stanley Suval’s

70. Meerfeld, Zentrumsparlent, 49, expresses a view not confined to fellow Social Democrats when he refers to “that art of dominating men . . . wherein clericalism has, through a thousand years of practice, achieved such mastery.”


72. Demokratie und Kaisertum, 3d ed. (Berlin-Schöneberg, 1904), 132.

comparisons of the additional votes each party was able to pick up in run-off elections also demonstrates the Center’s pariah status. After the Kulturkampf ended in 1887, the party’s ability to attract run-off support actually declined. The Center was even less attractive than the SPD, increasing its count in run-offs over that of the first election (Hauptwahl) by an average of only 7.6 percent in 1903 and less than one percentage point better in 1912.74

The Protestant milieu was suffused with anti-Catholicism. The wisecrack of a Catholic (convert) that he was convinced that a club such as “a Pastor’s Auxiliary for the Promotion of Bee-Keeping” would include “the struggle against Rome” as the chief article among its statutes, and its first general assembly would surely occupy itself with the serious problem of the founding of a Protestant apiary,” was only half facetious.75 Bachem’s bold call for interdenominational cooperation was followed, within less than a year, by an outbreak of anti-Catholic fury, the Hottentot election campaign of 1907, equalled only by the Kulturkampf itself.76

Not everyone was surprised. While Bachemite optimists had been encouraged by the growth of the interdenominational Christian trade unions, Roerenite pessimists could cite the even more impressive growth of the “Evangelical League for the Preservation of German-Protestant Interests,” a group especially strong among Protestant clergy in the Catholic West77 and including among its members figures high in government and society. The Evangelical League, as a modern historian has recently noted, monitored “with hysterical zeal. . .[the appearance of] every new teaching nun, every new clergyman, and above all every Catholic who rose to a high post in the bureaucracy, not to mention the cabinet. . . .”78 The Evangelical League’s prewar

74. Suval, Electoral Politics, 89, 123. A mere comparison of the percentage of votes won by the different parties in run-off elections can be misleading. By this criterion, the Center appeared to do very well. Cf. Gerhard A. Ritter, Wahlgeschichtliches Arbeitsbuch (Munich, 1980), 125. But such a comparison does not take into account how close to an absolute majority the party had come in the first balloting (Hauptwahl). Where it was already very close to a majority in the Hauptwahl, the percentage of run-off votes may not be an important indicator of the Center’s marginal acceptability to non-Catholics.

75. Quoted in Hoeber, Der Streit, 12.


77. Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League 1886–1914 (Boston, London, Sydney, 1984), 199.

78. Dieter Langwiesche, “Das Deutsche Kaiserreich—Bemerkungen zur Diskussion über
membership of 510,000 was nearly double that of the Christian Trade Unions.\textsuperscript{79} In October 1906 it was joined in its struggle against the "hereditary Roman enemy" by the "Anti-ultramontane Reichs-Association," led by Admiral von Knorr and founded specifically to combat the "worst parasite in our [public] life," the Center Party. The fact that the AUR had its greatest strength among students, and that the "Young Liberals" were even more anticlerical than their parent Liberal party organization, suggests that hostility towards Catholicism was actually increasing in the decade before World War I.\textsuperscript{80}

Political hostility reflected the isolations and estrangements of everyday life. Catholics lived apart from Protestants in imperial Germany. In the Ruhr their enclaves were called "nigger towns" (Negerdörfer) by the surrounding Protestants. Organizations founded for "national" purposes, and hence ostensibly open to all, nevertheless consistently demonstrated that Catholics were unwelcome. Thus the "Imperial Association against Social Democracy" invariably discouraged Catholic membership. General August Keim, General Manager of the Navy League, was discovered to be "hounding Catholics out of the Navy League and even proposing electoral alliances with Social Democrats to defeat candidates of the Center Party in run-offs." The various veterans' associations (Kriegervereine) refused to institute a non-denominational oath, thereby effectively excluding Catholics.\textsuperscript{81} The distaste for Catholics was not confined to the Right. Although doing so would have freed them from church taxes, less than one-tenth of


\textsuperscript{80} Figures for the Evangelischer Bund and the Christian Trade Unions in the articles by Gottwald, in: Fricke, Die bürgerlichen Parteien, 1: 787, and 2: 114.

\textsuperscript{81} "Römische Erbfeinde": Willibald Beyschlag, Der Friedensschluss zwischen Deutschland und Rom, Flugschriften des Evangelischen Bundes, 4 (Leipzig, 1890), quoted in Langwiesche, "Das Deutsche Kaiserreich," 641. "Schlimmste Schädling": from an announcement of the administrative committee for the 1912 Reichstag election, quoted in Berliner Tageblatt, no. 658, 28 Dec. 1911, in Gottwald, in Fricke, Die bürgerlichen Parteien, 1: 41. The Antiultramontaner Reichsverband became notorious in 1916 when it sent a memorandum to its members asking "whether, through taking the entire Belgian population into the body of Germany [deutsche Völkskörper], the ultramontane Catholic Center Party element is not strengthened in such a manner that the gradual expropriation and expulsion of at least the Walloon part of the Belgian population . . . must be ruthlessly encouraged."

\textsuperscript{81} The description of General Keim is Chickering's, We Men Who Feel Most German, 258; see also 138, 203. The Kriegerverein was no insignificant force. By 1912, even in the Regierungsbezirk Arnsberg, the heart of the Ruhr, there were five members of the Kriegerverein for every dues-paying Social Democrat. Suval, Electoral Politics, 138, 145.
one percent of the German population chose to register religious nonaffiliation.\textsuperscript{82} Even SPD voters, whose Marxism presumably implied religious unbelief, were unwilling to relinquish their status as Protestants.\textsuperscript{83}

The \textit{Zentrumsstreit} was passionate and bitter. Although the actual character of the Center as a Catholic party did not change, Roeren, Bitter, and Oppersdorff, who loudly insisted on noting that fact, were forced out of its ranks, while Erzberger beat a well-considered retreat. And yet what strikes the historian is that the two camps nevertheless had more in common with each other than either did with the other political groups of their day. Within the context of imperial Germany both sides were irenicists and pluralists, hoping for cooperation with Protestants, yet working for a Reich in which their coreligionists could hold up their heads, as Germans and as Catholics.

An inner acceptance of difference—the recognition that in the Vaterland there were many mansions—was part of the heritage of the old Holy Roman Empire, with its elements of universality and its protection of particularism. It was this older German tradition that had formed the bedrock of Windthorst’s philosophy and the heart of Center tradition. The Bachems were no less committed to pluralism than were Roeren, Bitter, and Erzberger. Indeed, it was this commitment that made Carl Bachem so \textit{proud} to find support for his party among Jews such as Emil Schüler.\textsuperscript{84}

But the Bachemites had a longing for integration, for a public acceptance of the Catholic community as citizens of the nation, that made them psychologically less capable of seeing what to Roeren, Bitter, and Erzberger was plain: that outside the Center, pluralism had slender support; that within an unreformed \textit{Kaiserreich}, pluralism could be protected only by insisting on one’s own particularism—by proudly asserting the Catholic \textit{difference}, even if it continued to be a stumbling block to the Jews and to the Protestants a foolishness. The Roerenites knew that the real Catholic offense—beyond papal authority and Jesuits and even Reichstag votes—was this “scandal of particu-

\textsuperscript{82} Suval, \textit{Electoral Politics}, 64f., 79.


\textsuperscript{84} But we have no reason to believe that Roeren, Bitter, and Erzberger were any less committed than the Bachems to “working together with non-Catholics” or to equality of rights for all religions. Cf. Roeren, \textit{Zentrum und Kölner Richtung}, 29, 40, and \textit{Veränderte Lage}, 7, 22, 55–56.
It was thus the burden of the Center to have to function both as an interest group and as a political party, asserting and protecting the particular interests of Catholics, yet accepting responsibility for the well-being of the whole: to be both Catholic and universal. By and large the party performed these two, not always harmonious, tasks rather well. The record, although far from perfect, is an honorable one: Windthorst’s stand against the anti-Socialist law; Ernst Lieber’s attacks on anti-Semitism; Erzberger’s shouldering responsibility for a realistic armistice and an unpopular Versailles peace; the party’s continual compromises to keep the unhappy Weimar Republic afloat.

The Bachemites had hoped to lay down part of that burden, in order, so they thought, better to discharge the rest. The Roerenites knew better. They knew that within the imperial German context, with its hostility to pluralism, the health of the whole could only be preserved by fierce attention to the rights and interests of the particular parts. This situation was only marginally altered in the Weimar Republic. A genuine opportunity to lay down the confessional burden could come only after 1945. And then only for reasons having little to do with either the proposals or sentiments of politicians.

The replacement of the Catholic Center by an interdenominational Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in 1945 was not, ultimately, the result of a change of policy, either in the party or in the Church. No doubt an earlier aggiornamento could have helped confessional relations.

85. This phrase is of course borrowed from the Swiss theologian Emil Brunner’s well-known analysis of Christianity.
86. Roeren: “Only those who hold their own beliefs high can also give the religious confession of others the respect due it.” Zentrum und Kölner Richtung, 8.
87. Ross’s description, Beleaguered Tower, 131, of the Zentrumsstreit as a choice between political party or religious interest group is too crude to capture the Center’s situation. His judgment on 137f. —“A creature of circumstance and opportunity, the Centrum pursued its own interests unconcerned about the commonweal”; it “unashamedly pursued the interests of the Roman Catholic Mittelstand at the expense of the German people”—cannot explain the Center’s two years in the political wilderness after December 1906, a fate the party could have avoided simply by disavowing Erzberger and Roeren and cooperating with Bülow on the colonial question. Even Meerfeld, the Social Democratic deputy from the Rhineland who produced a compelling indictment of Center opportunism in 1911 (“those political mercenaries [Landsknechte]... who for a suitable wage will sell themselves to everyone and anyone...” in Kaiser, Kanzler, Zentrum, 23), saw the Center in a much more favorable light by 1918. Cf. Meerfeld, Zentrumspartei, passim.
But had the Roerenites and the hierarchy been angels of ecumenicism, they could not have converted the Catholic Center into an inter-denominational Christian Democratic Union. The Aufhebung of the Center into the CDU was also not the consequence, primarily, of the experience of living under Hitler’s emphatically un-Christian dictatorship,88 for all it may have finally taught Christians of both denominations the hard lesson of what they had in common. Nor was it even the product of a change in regime, a natural spin-off of the Europe-wide Christian Democratic movement in the postwar world, important as this movement was.

The Center Party’s historical moment coincided with that of Bismarck’s kleinadtsch empire. In that Germany, and in its Weimar successor, the Center Party provided Catholics—just as the SPD had provided working-class Protestants—a recognition and validation they could not find in society at large. But while Social Democrats, both Marxist and Revisionist, could envision a future in which class divisions were dissolved, the Catholic analogue of such a vision had expired in the ashes of the Thirty Years’ War. For Catholics, the happy ending of Germany’s confessional division could only be an event beyond history, to be placed with the proverbial conversion of the Jews; a sign, not of the mundane overcoming of confessional hostilities, but of the eschaton.

Except, of course, under one, far less happy, case: that of the assimilation of their minority culture into the culture of the majority. However improbable a “Lutheranization” of Germany may have been, the danger of a distinctive Catholicism dissolving into the post-Protestant secularism of the majority population (Kulturprotestantismus, in contemporary parlance) was a silent but ever present pressure. Thus the purpose of the Center “Tower” was not just, as Bachem supposed, Catholic defense (which would be obviated once Protestant hostility ceased), nor even Catholic parity; but Catholic integrity. In the final analysis the Center was there in order that Catholics themselves not “disappear.” And for a minority religious culture not to disappear into the majority requires constant effort, assertion, organization, articulation.89

89. Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser would say also that it requires “conflict.” Cf. Coser, The
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Yet this was a mission for which it was impossible for the majority population—even those most tolerant—to feel much sympathy. And to the degree that Catholics met this imperative with ever higher levels of articulation and purposeful organization, the Protestant majority—itself loose, unarticulated, and disorganized, with diminishing religious commitment and fragmented into competing parties and groups—responded with distaste and fear.

The striking success of German Catholics in meeting the modern challenges of secularization, industrialization, and even “democratization” naturally provokes the question: why did not German Protestants do the same? Where was their religious revival, their organization of sociability, their engagement with the social question? But the Protestants were condemned to looseness by their very hegemony.\(^90\) The same confessional demography that spurred the Catholic minority on to ever higher levels of organization and effectiveness (causing Protestants to feel threatened and hostile) ensured that this majority, enjoying unselfconscious hegemonic status, would remain disorganized and diffuse. The situation that nourished a Catholic party—and prevented an interdenominational CDU—would thus disappear only when the geographical dismemberment of Bismarck’s *kleindeutsch* Empire in 1945 established the bases for confessional equality in its most literal—because demographic—sense.\(^91\)

V. AN INTERDENOMINATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY?

The final irony in the struggle over the Center’s denominational character, a conflict that tore Catholics apart, was that nobody cared but themselves. Non-Catholics on both Left and Right followed the *Zentrumsstreit*, if at all, with *Schadenfreude* over the Catholics’ distress,

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*Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, Ill., 1956). Such articulation need not take a political form, of course—as I have argued earlier when tracing the consolidation of the majority of German Catholics into a single political party in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Cf. Anderson, *Windhorst*, chap. 6, and “The Kulturkampf and the Course of German History,” *Central European History* 19, no. 1 (Mar. 1986): 82–115. But when the majority is already hostile to the minority, such minority articulation may well end in a political party. The process is self-reinforcing.


91. I owe much general clarification on this issue to a conversation with my colleague James R. Kurth.
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not with hopes for an interdenominational party and what that might mean for their own agendas for Germany. And this indifference on the part of those on whom the whole issue ultimately turned is mirrored, over and over again, in the literature on the Second Empire.

One can see this by a quick look at the indexes of the most recent general surveys. Both the Revisionist controversy within imperial Germany’s largest party, Social Democracy, and the Zentrumsstreit within its second largest party revolved around the same issues: the competing claims of subcultural solidarity versus integrationist potentialities. Both illuminate structural problems in the Imperial and indeed the Weimar political systems. Gordon Craig’s German History (1978) lists under “Revisionism” three references; Dietrich Orlow’s new textbook (1987) lists two; Michael Stürmer’s Ruhelose Reich (1983) lists seven. The Zentrumsstreit is mentioned by none.

Another example will make the same point. In January 1901 a “Society for Social Reform” convened in Berlin, an interdenominational gathering attended by prominent representatives of every major non-Socialist organization for social reform in Imperial Germany: e.g., Lujo Brentano and Gustav Schmoller, of the Verein für Sozialpolitik; the Protestant pastors, Adolf Stöcker and Friedrich Naumann; Catholic leaders of the Christian Trade Union movement, August Brust and Johannes Giesberts; and the Catholic priests, Franz Hitze and August Pieper, directors of the Volksverein. Although Orlow’s brief book does not list Brentano or Schmoller, it has two references each for Stöcker and Naumann. Stürmer gives two references each for Schmoller, Brentano, and Stöcker, three for the Verein für Sozialpolitik, and six for Naumann. Craig’s index gives five references each for

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92. Both Bernsteinians and Bachemites hoped for an integration that was impossible within existing German society. In the Weimar Republic, the two subcultures were able to make political alliances with each other—not, nota bene, the political alliances the integrationists in either camp had hoped for—and were able, better than other political groupings, to preserve their integrity against National Socialist election competition. But the very subcultural solidarity that helped insulate Social Democracy and political Catholicism against National Socialism, it could be argued, made the defense of democracy on a broader basis difficult.


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Schmoller, Brentano, and the Verein für Sozialpolitik, seven for Stöcker—and fourteen for Friedrich Naumann.95

None of these respected scholars lists in any place Brust, Giesberts, Hitze, or Pieper. And yet the Christian trade unions boasted a prewar membership of 335,000, and that of the Volksverein, which gets no mention in any of these books, exceeded 805,000 in 1914: that is, more than twice as many supporters as the Navy League, more than thirty-eight times as many supporters as the Pan-German League, and more than all the supporters of Stöcker, Naumann, and Schmoller put together.96 Has Bismarck won the Kulturkampf? If historiography is a reflection of Kultur, the answer is surely yes. For in the works of synthesis that are the benchmarks of scholarly progress, Catholics are as marginalized as they once were in the Kaiserreich—perhaps even more so. A truly interdenominational history of Germany is still a very distant goal.

95. As James Sheehan once wrote: Naumann has attracted so much scholarly attention that soon he will have acquired more monographs than his party did supporters. German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago and London, 1978), 361, n. 46.

96. Statistics on the Pan-Germans, the Navy League (individual memberships), and the Volksverein in Fricke, Die bürgerlichen Parteien, 1: 1, 432; 2: 811.