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Spatial Mobility, Hybrid Subjects and National Identity in 21st Century Urban China:

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in Asian Studies

by

Qiaoqi Chen

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
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January 2018

Spatial Mobility, Hybrid Subjects and National Identity in 21st Century Urban China:

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Spatial Mobility, Hybrid Subjects and National Identity in 21st Century Urban China:

Wenzhouren's Identity Negotiation in New Shanghai

by

Qiaoqi Chen

China's economic reforms have brought remarkable achievements in terms of its modern and urban development. As a result, Chinese people's lives are undergoing a dramatic transformation, especially during the country's drastic social transitions in 21st century. Relocation in cosmopolitan megacities like Shanghai brings migrants unprecedented opportunities to experience China's regional diversity as well as to receive global influence, thus turning them into fragmented and shifting subjects. At the meantime, the state's production of nationalist discourse has cultivated a strong sense of national identity in average Chinese. My thesis attempts to catch a glimpse of the unfolding social exchange brought by the large-scale spatial mobility in contemporary Chinese society. The general objective of this research is to explore the specific history of monolithic Chinese national identity and fragmentation and shifting identity in 21st century urban China.

To address my objective, in the summer of 2017 I conducted an anthropological study that aims at investigating the identity construction of Chinese middle-class urbanites who re-territorialized from one of China's second-tier cities, Wenzhou, to its cosmopolitan megacity, Shanghai. By applying post-modern and post-structuralist theories of identity and subjectivity, I explore how Wenzhou urban middle-class migrants have undergone identity contestation within a multitude of competing discourses in a new migrant context

through everyday linguistic, cultural and social practices. I used participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews as my main research tools. The interview participants consist of 15 adult Wenzhou middle-class urbanites of different age, gender, education level, occupation, wealth and income. The subjects of the observation also incorporate their family and friends, altogether making up approximately 30 respondents in my study.

This research shows that in a continuous negotiation between linguistic and cultural maintenance and assimilation, Wenzhou urban middle-class migrants become hybrid subjects constituted by Wenzhou regional identity and New Shanghai multi-regional/cosmopolitan identity. The Wenzhou identity retention is more profoundly discerned in the elder generation; by contrast, the younger generation shows substantial loss of Wenzhou identity and strengthening of national identity. The findings appear ironic when compared to Wenzhou people's better preservation of regional identity during the socialist China, as back then the penetration of the state was ubiquitous. This study also suggests that an inclusive Chinese nationalist discourse-unity in diversity-is able to legitimize and unite China's regional identities; moreover, the empowering nationalist discourse of "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴) has enabled fragmented and hybrid subjects to restore a sense of certainty, belonging, security as well as daguo (大国 great nation) pride.

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Introduction

Since its economic reforms in 1978, China has witnessed rapid economic growth and urban development. One noticeable social change induced by China's urbanization is large-scale spatial mobility. Driven by the aspiration for better living conditions and career advancement, many Chinese migrate from less developed to more developed regions. With superb resources and exuberant lifestyles, metropolitan regions become many Chinese people's preferred places for relocation. From the onset of China's economic reforms, a great number of Wenzhouren (温州人, namely, Wenzhou people) have migrated from Wenzhou to various domestic regions in China in search for better opportunities; some have relocated in foreign countries such as Italy, France, Netherlands and the United States. Wenzhouren have also migrated in large numbers to Shanghai, one of the post-modern cosmopolitan cities in contemporary China. Through fieldwork and interviews, this thesis undertakes an anthropological examination of Wenzhouren's negotiation between linguistic and cultural maintenance/assimilation in their new environment of Shanghai. This thesis explores the impact of migration on Wenzhouren's regional identity as well as national identity within the broader context of globalization.

Nation-states are often perceived by scholars (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Deutsch,1953; Gellner,1983) as a 19th-century social construct created by the demands of modernity. The fabrication of shared language and race (ethnicity) has minimized a nation's internal divisions, thus creating a sense of belonging for its people under the grand narrative of cultural homogeneity (Anderson, 1983; Deutsch,1953; Gellner,1983). In this sense, we may simply view national identity as a product of constructed national culture. Yet, nation-states are not only cultural entities, but are fundamentally sovereign on their own territories. Therefore, national identity also gets consistently confirmed by

one's boundary consciousness, that is, through one's allegiance to a particular geopolitical entity circumscribed by its borders. However, as humanity shifts from the age of modernity to post-modernity, the world has increasingly become "placeless" under global integration. The compression of time and space as a result of technological advancement has redefined the very notion of boundary as well as problematized the establishment of identity in our contemporary time.

In *The Question of Cultural Identity*, Hall (1992) proposes three possible consequences on identity brought by globalization: (1) the absorption of national identity by global-wide cultural homogenization, which is witnessed by global currency and lingua franca. As nation-states surrender parts of their sovereignty to supra-national organizations in multiple affairs, it allows international themes be cultivated into one's national consciousness (Billig,1995); (2) the strengthening of national identity and/or other particularistic identity (such as regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious identity) that is represented by attachment to particular histories, places, groups and symbols. It should not be hard for us to understand such resisting trend towards globalization as the world recently has seen more and more identity politics taking place. For instance, amid contemporary migrant crisis and economic recession, Europe has witnessed the rise of nationalism, with a typical example being the 2016 Brexit referendum for United Kingdom (UK) to withdraw from European Union. The quest for nationalism and particularistic identity shall also be substantiated by the growing power of far-right parties in a number of European nations as well as by numerous ongoing secessionist movements in Europe. For example, Scotland, Catalonia, Lombardy and Veneto, all aspire to form their own sovereign states to split from UK, Spain, and Italy respectively; (3) new identities of hybridity, which may require further elaboration below.

Hall's notion of hybridity is deeply rooted in postmodern theories. As global capitalism transforms the modern city into a "place of flows" (Castells & Henderson, 1987), goods and services traverse freely across national borders, providing access to various patterns of consumption; people are thus free to determine their lifestyles within the "global cultural flow" (Appadurai, 1990). Alongside with advanced technology, international travel and spatial mobility, boundaries become porous; as a result, people "are located simultaneously inside and outside a culture and society" (Gardner & Osella, 2003: preface), turning into dislocated and fragmented subjects. It is fluidity that gives birth to this new type of postmodern hybrid condition of human identity.

The breakaway from essentialist cultural identity has also been closely examined by Bhabha, a distinguished scholar in postcolonial cultural studies. Bhabha's notions of *hybridity* and the *third space* (1990, 1994, 1996, 2004) may further contribute to our comprehension of hybrid identity. In postcolonial discourse, cultural hybridity emerges from the encounters between one's original culture and the culture of the other[1]. Such encounters create "something different, something new and unrecognizable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and representation" (Bhabha,1990, p. 211) known as a "third space", where essentialist cultural identity is questioned by the ambivalence of subject positions. Third space is thus a place of hybridity for individuals to negotiate their fractured subjectivities in a deterritorialised world.

In addition to nationalist movement in contemporary Europe, we also discern the rise of nationalist sentiment in contemporary China. China's striking achievements of economic reforms and elevation of international position have cultivated a strong sense of national pride for the average Chinese (Zheng, 1999). It is in this context that in the

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[1] Bhabha originally proposed the notion of "cultural hybridity" to imply the interweaving of cultural elements of the colonizer and the colonized, as a way to split from binary colonial thinking. Yet the concept of "cultural hybridity" has been adopted by many subsequent scholars as a general critique towards essentialist cultural identity.

18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in November 2012, China's President Xi Jinping proposed the nationalist slogan "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation[2]" (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing 中华民族伟大复兴, or referred to as the "Chinese Dream" 中国梦) to elaborate on his vision for China's great national resurgence. The importance of this vision was also reiterated in the 19th Party Congress in November 2017 that captured global attention.

However, identity issue in contemporary Chinese society[3] is complex. Despite China is unified by shared race known as 'Chinese nation' (Zhonghua minzu 中华民族) and by its common language Mandarin Chinese, the fragmentation of identity has been discerned in contemporary China, as a result of increased exposure to diversity induced by spatial mobility and China's integration into the world. Since the economic reform[4], China has undergone remarkable social transitions. Large-scale population mobility, an inevitable consequence of China's urbanization and modernization, has brought about unprecedented inter-regional contacts in urban China. In 2016, the number of China's floating population[5] has amounted to 24.5 million, which accounts for nearly 17.7 percent of China's total population (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2017). It is expected that this number will continue to grow with China's comprehensively deepening reforms. Driven by aspirations for upward social mobility, many Chinese relocate themselves from lower-status localities, including cities, towns

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[2] The saying of the rise of great nation (daguo 大国), or the rise of great power, has frequently appeared in the mainstream media.

[3] My following discussions primarily touch upon two Chinese historical periods, which are modern Chinese history (1840-1949) and contemporary Chinese history (1949 to present).

[4] In 1978, Deng Xiaoping, a prominent leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) crafted a radical reformist path known as the policy of economic reform and opening-up.

[5] *Floating population* is a social category constructed under China's hukou (household registration) rule (Zhang, 2001) to indicate temporary migrants without local hukou within the population. Hukou rule is an institutional regulation imposed by the Chinese state to differentiate rural and urban residents as well as to constraint permanent settlement of migrants in one area. Statistics show that rural migrants (also called peasant migrants) have composed the majority of China's floating population.

and rural areas, to higher-status metropolises such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, from which they are exposed to China's regional diversity as well as global influence than ever before.

Dwelling in post-modern metropolises with large migrant population strengthens both the supra-national and sub-national consciousness among urban Chinese. Broadly speaking, this spatial mobility could be understood as a response to global capitalism since market economy allows optimized employment and human resource configurations. A number of migrants move to international hubs to engage in transnational business, or to work for transnational corporations and other international organizations. It is thus unlikely for them to be immune to the penetration of global forces from above the level of nation-state. At the meantime, day-to-day social encounters have greatly strengthened people's awareness of China's internal linguistic, regional and ethnic divisions. Competition for scarce resources gives rise to regional protectionism, as regional policymaking is often skewed towards the interests of its native residents. In everyday linguistic, cultural and social practices, one cannot avoid but to engage in constant process of displaying different modes of subjectivities in various contexts, either consciously or subconsciously. Through continuous identification and counter-identification[6] (Hall & Du Gay,1996; Weedon, 2004) in a place of cultural hybridity, a Chinese may realize 'Chinese nation' is not simply a monolithic identity as they previously "imagined[7]".

Reflecting upon Chinese people's fragmented identities in the context of globalization, as well as responding to the seemingly growing sense of Chinese national

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[6] In *Identity and culture: Narratives of difference and belonging*, Weedon (2004) gives a detailed illustration of "identification". Reflecting upon Althusserian (1971) theory (knowing subjects) and the Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (self-recognition and mis-recognition in the mirror stage), Weedon has recognized identification and counter-identification as central mechanisms for subject/identity formation.
[7] Anderson (1983) sees nations as "imagined communities". This will be further explained later in this section.

identity by the Chinese public, I decided to present the specific history of monolithic Chinese national identity and fragmentation and shifting identity in 21st century China. The central questions I address in this thesis are: What has happened to regional identities during China's social transitions, especially under the circumstances of large-scale spatial mobility? Has the post-Mao economic reform brought more consolidation or fragmentation of national identity in contemporary urban China?

Construction of Chinese National Identity

In what follows, I briefly engage a discussion on the history of the construction of Chinese national identity. It should be noted that Chinese national identity is actually a relatively modern concept. The formation of Chinese national identity is seen as a reaction to anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movement[8] in search for China's modernity in the 20th century (Wang, 1995). Wang states that:

> The idea of nationalism itself was an inspiration for all Chinese who felt humiliated by the successive military defeats that led to unequal status for Chinese everywhere, to extraterritorial privileges for foreign residents within China, and to the increasing dominance of foreign enterprises on Chinese soil." (as cited in Zheng, 1999, p. 47).

The founding of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 upon its victory in the Chinese Civil War. Since then, the state has embarked on a long and tortuous process of nation-building. National identity was built up with great vigor through language unification (Dong, 2010; Spolsky, 2014; Zhou, 2004, 2015), state education and propaganda work. In the reform era, the state has highly prioritized economic modernization to consolidate its national

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[8] According to Anderson (1983), global imperialism and decolonization have laid bases for the rise of national consciousness in colonial territories.

power (Chow, 2004; Zheng, 1999). China's economic modernization has led to rapid domestic development and brought enormous economic benefits to its citizens, which in turn expands China's influence in international affairs, cultivates a strong sense of national pride for the Chinese public (Zheng, 1999). Yet, the opening-up has fostered unprecedented inter-regional contacts within China, cultivating a growing sense of the country's diversity among Chinese; as a timely ideological response, the Chinese state has adopted an inclusive model of "one nation with diversity" (Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti 中华民族多元一体)[9] proposed by Fei Xiaotong (1991,1999) to facilitate nation-wide cultural assimilation since 1991. The education of the 'unified Chinese nation' has been an integral part of the state Patriotism Education Campaign, combined with the education on the invasion and humiliation by the imperialist states in the 20th century, are substantially underscored in China's public-school system.

However, Duara (1995) suggests that the projection of monolithic Chinese national identity by the centralized state in fact dissolves other alternative histories as well as downplays the significance of China's regional/ethnic identity. Well known for his critique in the linear "History" of nation (see "forge a continuous national subject", 1995, p. 49), he proposes that the history of the nation is a site of contestation of conflicting views of the nation within which boundaries and identities of the local are constantly redefined/reshaped by major historical actors to justify national uniformity. His argument is further consolidated by China's centralized statist nationalists' repression of the early 20th century history of federal self-government movement[10] and anti-Manchu republican revolution[11] (Duara, 1995). These voices of China's regional

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[9] Fei Xiaotong's original concept was named "The Pattern of Diversity in Unity of the Chinese Nation" (*Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju*).

[10] The federalist movement brought the regional consciousness (provincialism) to its culmination.

[11] The distinction between Han and barbarian (Hu) has been long presented throughout the Chinese history. Heavily influenced by social Darwinism, the Revolution strived to resurge the power of Han ethnicity/race (zulei) and establish a national community that was composed exclusively by the Han.

and ethnic dissonance were not new; actually, Naquin and Rawski (1987) has given a full account of the regional variations in terms of geography, distribution of population and resources, language, religion, and customs in the eighteenth-century Chinese society. It should be pointed out, while acknowledging one's loyalty to a monolithic Chinese nation, it is difficult for any Chinese to ignore that throughout history China has been characterized by its internal ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic diversity.

The history of the construction of monolithic Chinese national identity as well as the fragmented identities can be further understood by theories of nationalism as I discuss below. While some scholars (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Deutsch,1953; Gellner,1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2012) emphasize the constructedness of homogenized national identity, others (e.g. Connor, 1972, 1994; Duara,1995, 1999; Hall, 1992) underscore the fragmentation of identity by looking at regional and ethnic dissonance within the unified national discourse.

Constructedness of National Identity

Distinguished theoreticians on nationalism such as Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm and Ranger (2012) have emphasized the constructedness of national identity as well as the constructive or invented nature of the nation. Gellner (1983) contends that nations are in nature an imposed invention and "nationalism" likewise an invented concept. Anderson (1983) sees a nation as a socially constructed "imagined community". He articulates that although national consciousness is imagining in its nature, it creates a sense of naturalism for citizens because of their deep immersion in material realities such as borders, national flags, print culture and revolutions. These material realities were further being explored by Hobsbawm and Ranger (2012) as the strategy/technique (referred as "invented traditions") for national identity construction, more specifically, traditions have been invented through national symbolic

constructions, such as national anthems, flags, monuments, languages, or state rituals/ceremonies to legitimize the continuity of a nation's tradition and history. It is these cultural representations that help establish national identity which unify people into the same national family (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 2012).

Scholars (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Deutsch,1953; Gellner,1983) also have linked the construction of nation and national identity to the process of modernization. From their perspectives, nations were the result of pressures created by the demands of the modernity. As a result of print technology and industrial capitalism, the emergence of common language[12] produced unified fields of communication, which enabled the dissemination of ideas, thoughts and culture in the vernacular communities, and thus created the conditions under which national identity got emerged and cultivated (Anderson, 1983). The significant weight of mass communication in facilitating cultural homogeneity (assimilation), a prerequisite for nation-building, is also recognized by Deutsch (1953) and Gellner (1983). In *Nationalism and Social Communication*, a central figure in nation-building school, Karl Deutsch (1953), is convinced that modernization, urbanization, the growth of markets, nationwide social institutions, modern communication and increased inter-regional contacts help to generate national assimilation. In a similar fashion, Gellner (1983) proclaims that cultural differentiations that were once salient among classes in agrarian societies were eventually homogenized by unprecedentedly frequent communication in industrial societies, combined with the achievement of universal literacy through the establishment of centralized, standardized modern national education system, help to finalize the birth of the nation.

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[12] This was realized via assembling a variety of spoken European vernaculars into far fewer print vernaculars beyond the previous Latin hegemony.

However, the idea of a unified national identity may seem to be problematic. Perceiving all modern nations as "cultural hybrids", Hall (1992) claims that such homogeneity can only be attained through repressing internal cultural divisions and differences within the nation as well as through self-identification with the constructed homogenized national culture. In Duara (1995)'s account, "Nationalism is often considered to override other identities within a society-such as religious, racial, linguistic, class, gender, or even historical ones-to encompass these differences in a larger identity." (p.10).

In response to this debate, scholars have been interested to explore the implication of region/locality and ethnicity (e.g. Connor, 1972, 1994; Duara,1995, 1999; Hall, 1992) within the 'unified' nationalist discourse. For example, Hall (1992) sees regions as the common source of one's allegiance and identification in pre-modern societies, but admits that regional differences have gradually diminished beneath the cultural diffusion of modern nation-state. As Duara (1999) perceives, locality[13] is a naturally evolved geological formation within the nation-state that is represented by its distinctiveness, namely, unique and authentic characteristics and customs. While admitting certain historical forces exist to tie regions/localities to larger formations of territories (nation-state), Duara (1999) contends that such tie is nevertheless deterministic.

With regards to the issue of ethnicity, Connor uses "*ethnonationalism*" to refer to the ethnic basis of the nation. According to Connor (1972, 1994), the illusion of homogeneity has long been challenged by ethnic mobilization. In the history, through national self-determination and secession, self-differentiating ethnic groups have

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[13] Duara (1999) writes that "the modern preoccupation with the 'hometown' or 'native-place' (guxiang, xiangtu in Chinese) is a significant component of the modern representation of the local or the regional (xiangtu, difang)." (p.161).

successfully expressed their counter-assimilation into an assumed uniformity and identified with their own distinctive ethnic identities. He asserts that nation is essentially a self-conscious ethnic group that is united by its members' conviction of their inherent psychological bond. Therefore, when ethno-nationalism ceases to be a secessionist discourse, the dominant ethnic group often projects their ethnic identities as the hegemonic national identity that all other groups must share and respect.

Subjectivity, Identity and Discourse

My discussions concerning the construction of identity/subjectivity in this thesis are largely shaped by post-modern and post-structuralist theories of subject and discourse. Subjectivity and identity are two common concepts one encounters in the study of the "self". Due to their blurry conceptual distinctions, they are often used interchangeably in social science. It is not my intention to further distinguish their distinctions in this thesis. However, I use subjectivity to describe the fragmentation of self, or hybrid, self-contradictory subject; and use identity to indicate the "temporary fixing" (Weedon, 2004, p. 19) of a person's self-understanding.

Despite their differences in historical roots, the theorization of subjectivity and identity has seen a paradigm shift from an essentialist framework to a constructionist approach, which can be briefly summarized as a turning away from a modern humanist, essential, fixated and unified self to a post-modern/post-structuralist constitutive, discursive and fragmented, decentered self. Developing from Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, which emphasizes the role of culture, social interaction and language in the constitution of the subject (Grosz,1990), poststructuralist theory proposes a subjectivity that is "precarious, contradictory, and in process, constantly being reconstituted in discourse each time we think or speak" (Weedon, 1987, p.33). Similar to Lacan, subsequent scholars recognize the significance of linguistic, social interactions (e.g.

Butler 1990; Bucholtz & Hall, 2005; Goffman, 1981) and cultural practices (Weedon, 2004) in the development of the self, and thus treat identity construction as a performative process. Likewise, the concept of identity from a post-modern lens is generally perceived as transient, dislocated, fractured, and being "formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us" (Hall, 1992, p.227).

In social science, the concept of discourse largely derives from the work of French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault (1969). Weedon (1987) interprets Foucauldian notion of discourse as "ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them" (p. 108). It is discourse that defines and produces subjectivity and identity. As Weedon (1987) illustrates, discourses "constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern" (ibid). In a similar fashion, Hall and Du Gay (1996) states that "identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse, we need to understand them as produced in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive formations and practices" (p. 4). Furthermore, since Foucault believes that knowledge and meanings are being perpetually contested in competing and antagonistic discourses (being illustrated in detail in his concept of "discursive field"), discourse offers a possibility for different, or even quite contradictory "modes of subjectivity" (Weedon, 1987) and "multiple forms of identity" (Hall, 1992) at different moments.

Shanghai, New Shanghairen and Wenzhouren

This thesis is an anthropological research that looks at the 21st century Chinese urban history of national identity and regional identity under the impact of spatial mobility within the broader context of globalization. I decided to conduct my field

research in Shanghai for several reasons. In 1842, the treaty of Nanjing opened Shanghai's gate to modernity. The arrival of foreigners and establishment of concessions in this treaty port developed the very first nationalist awareness in modern China. With rich colonial and imperialist history, Shanghai has now undeniably become the most urbanized and cosmopolitan metropolis in contemporary China (Bergère, 2009). Thus, studying Chinese national identity in this globalized spot will shed light on our critical reflection of nation-state in a postmodern discourse. Also, characterized by its mass domestic and international population inflows, Shanghai would make it ideal for me to examine migrants' fragmentation of subjectivity under the impact of spatial mobility.

Shanghai is a place with a long tradition of population mobility. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Shanghai had seen an influx of domestic migrants (mostly from the lower Yangzi area) contributing to its urban development with their labor and talent; in the late 19th century, migrants made up more than half of Shanghai's population (Yeh, 2007, p. 212). During the colonial period, Shanghai also underwent an unprecedented demographic transformation due to its settlement of foreigners. Since the opening-up, Shanghai's progress, innovation, dynamism and new lifestyles have attracted both domestic and international migrants for opportunities, ventures and fulfillment. It thus gives rise to a new group of people known as *New Shanghairen*[14] (new Shanghai people 新上海人), which refer to both Shanghai's domestic and international migrants (xin yimin 新移民), and particularly emphasize on China's internal migrants that make up the majority of the population inflows. In 1992, Shanghai's Pudong area became a

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[14] However, "New Shanghai" is not as commonly used as "New Shanghairen" in mainstream media. My speculation for this is most people view Shanghai's population mobility and cosmopolitanism as its rebirth. In his article, Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (2003) once distinguished New Shanghai from the pre-1949 Old Shanghai. But in this thesis, I consider "New Shanghai" as a certain historical product of the Open Door Policy since it is in the context of China's rapid modernization that New Shanghai has made striking accomplishments in terms of its urbanization, innovation and cosmopolitanism.

special economic zone; the word "New Shanghairen" thus appeared as a response to this reform policy and has got widely exposed in Chinese mainstream media since the 1990s.

Wenzhouren have become one of the visible migrant communities in Shanghai. Coming from a medium-sized second-tier city[15] located in the southeast coast of China called Wenzhou, Wenzhouren are well known for their mercantile consciousness and entrepreneurial spirits (Zhang, 2001). With the dispersal of business and commercial activities within and outside China, they have earned a reputation of "Oriental Jews" and are well known for their economic model, namely "Wenzhou model (Wenzhou moshi)". Along with Wenzhou's private economy, Wenzhouren' sense of self-determination and autonomy has become a distinctive variation for scholars to understand China's state-society relationship (Parris, 1993; Zhang, 2001).

Outsiders of Wenzhou often view Wenzhouren as a distinctive social group characterized by its acumen, insight, courage, wealth, and strong value for kinship[16]. Outsiders tend to stereotype Wenzhouren as 'diligent, smart and rich[17]'. Apparently, there is too much generalization attached to this stereotype; but as a Wenzhou native myself, I deeply know this widely-accepted assumption has boosted Wenzhouren's regional pride. It is true most Wenzhouren do have a strong sense of regional pride because of their self-autonomy and wisdom; while possessing fairly limited resources, Wenzhouren somehow achieved prosperity and success without relying much on the state. Being self-contained and self-determined truly makes them feel special, not to

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[15] Wenzhou was for a long time considered as a third-tier Chinese city. Its status as a second-tier Chinese city was very recently acknowledged in May 2017 in a notable magazine called *The First financial weekly*. Yet, its newly-adopted status has not been referred in any government official source. Actually, Wenzhou is still perceived by most Chinese people, especially by Wenzhouren themselves, as a third-tier city.

[16] China's social transitions have seen kinship decay in Wenzhou younger generation.

[17] Wenzhouren are generally stereotyped by other Chinese as 'diligent, smart and rich' due to their mercantile consciousness and success in business.

mention their eccentric mother tongue, Wenzhou dialect[18]. Some Wenzhouren consider it is the eccentricity of Wenzhou dialect that has shaped their distinctiveness. However, for the past two decades, Wenzhou's linguistic landscape has been increasingly transformed by the state language unification project. Wenzhouren's regional identity is also undergoing dramatic shifts under China's ongoing social transformation. It may not be hard to assume that their identity shift will be even more profound under the impact of spatial mobility.

Nowadays, it might be better to perceive Wenzhouren as a distinctive social group that transcends regional territory; this group reflects all the overseas Wenzhou immigrant communities and domestic migrants all over the country. Large-scale spatial mobility by Wenzhouren can be traced back to the onset of China's economic reforms, when many risk-taking Wenzhouren decided to leave their hometown in search for better business opportunities. As part of that population outflows, some relocated to Shanghai for economic gains; now most of them have become successful entrepreneurs who live an upper middle-class lifestyle in Shanghai. Being a booming innovation hub, Shanghai's labor market provides exceedingly rich opportunities for career progression. This has recently attracted educated and talented Wenzhou younger generation, particularly those who obtained graduate degrees from western countries to pursue their

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[18] Regional languages in China are referred to as "fangyan 方言" in Chinese, or "dialects" by linguists. Please note that the English term "dialect" implies mutual intelligibility among languages, so the degree of mutual unintelligibility between many Chinese regional dialects has actually made it controversial for them to be treated as "dialects" from a western linguistic perspective. Although both Shanghai dialect and Wenzhou dialect are sub-variations of Wu dialect, one of the seven major dialects spoken by ethnic Han Chinese, they are mutual unintelligible, like the way French is different from German and Spanish. Although I use the term "Wenzhou dialect" in this thesis to adhere to the linguistic norms, I would like to add a postcolonial perspective: The Europeans preferred to call other peoples' languages "dialects", just like they called the gigantic landmass of India a mere "subcontinent", and Europe gets to be a whole "continent" (this does not even include Great Britain or Ireland), but in fact Europe is much smaller than India. The Wenzhou dialect is notable for its eccentricity by all the Chinese language speakers; its unintelligibility to nearly all Wenzhou outsiders can certainly validate its role as a 'distinct language' when compared to Mandarin Chinese. It is in this context that I have engaged the theory of language contact to discuss language phenomena such as language loss, language shift, code-alteration and code-switching in Chapter 1.

careers. Because of Wenzhouren's distinctiveness, social influence, and regional pride, I hope by probing their experience of spatial mobility, I could provide a better insight of the construction of national identity and fragmentation and shifting identity in 21st century China.

Overview of this Research

In the summer of 2017, I conducted an anthropological study that aims at investigating the identity construction of Chinese middle-class[19] urbanites who re-territorialized from one of China's second-tier cities, Wenzhou, to its cosmopolitan megacity, Shanghai. I look at how Wenzhou urban migrants have situated themselves in an ongoing negotiation within the discursive field of discourses, which is contained by three major types of discourse, including regional, nationalist/state and global discourse. I explore whether Wenzhou migrants retain their regional (native-place) cultural distinctiveness or submit themselves to cultural assimilation in a metropolis characterized by increased inter-regional contacts and frequent global exposure.

My ethnographic research combines participant observation and in-depth semi-structured interviews as my primary research tools. For interviews, I choose 15 adult urban Wenzhou middle-class, including 8 male participants and 7 female participants, who currently live in Shanghai with different period of residence. They are people of different age, education level, occupation, wealth and income (one half of them belong to upper middle socio-economic status[20]). As it comes to participant observation, the

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[19] Since the economic reforms, China has seen the expansion of a swiftly evolving new social stratum, i.e., middle class (or middle income class). According to a report by Economist Intelligence Unit (2016), by 2030, China will become a middle-class society with three-quarters of its population be defined as middle-income (though income levels will distinctly vary). It is believed that this emerging middle class will cause a wide range of economic, social and political impacts in China's transitional period.

[20] This sample demographically reflects the current economic and social conditions of Wenzhou urban middle-class migrant population in Shanghai. National Bureau of Statistics of China qualifies Chinese middle class as households with an annual income ranging from $7,250 to $62,500. However, since my study incorporates many single middle-class professionals, I use McKinsey Global Institute's categorization, which defines the Chinese middle class as people earning between $13,500 to $53,900

actual subjects of the observation not only comprise of these 15 interviewees but also their family and friends (mostly Wenzhouren), altogether making up approximately 30 informants in my study. The participants are chosen through my network such as my friends, relatives, and schoolmates, as well as my family's friends and co-workers. They are all native-born Wenzhouren whose family has inhabited in Wenzhou for at least three generations.

My research consists of the following two stages:

Stage 1 – *participant observation*:

This stage is designed to understand subjective identification and formation of identities through observing my participants' linguistic, communicative, social and cultural practice in their association with other Wenzhouren (including myself). The participant observation took place in two major types of research sites. Firstly, my participants' homes are an ideal domain to obtain rich data of their linguistic, social and cultural practice. Identities are produced, articulated and negotiated through various activities and communication at this domestic space such as cooking, eating and sharing food, displaying habits, retaining/discarding customs and traditions, raising and educating children, having friend get-togethers and family reunions and doing various types of communication, etc. The research sites also include public space in Shanghai like restaurants, café, shopping malls, metro stations, and city avenues, etc. These places create condition for participants to negotiate their identity in a national as well as a global discourse. However, this demarcation of domestic and public space is not always clear-cut since boundaries could be crossed and blurred depending on the degree of one's reflexive awareness in the process of self-representation in a particular context.

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annually in terms of purchasing power (see Wang, 2010). The participants in this study range from lower to upper middle-class.

While observing my participants' linguistic, social and cultural practice, I also continuously engaged in on-going communication with my respondents, actively listened and collected their narratives and stories. Some of the data were recorded manually during the observation, or by memory and then recorded in writing after the observation.

Stage 2 – *Interview:*

The second stage of this study consists of a follow-up in-depth interview with an aim to invite participants' accounts and perceptions of their linguistic, communicative, social and cultural practices. The designed questions revolve around their language practice, cuisines, customs, cultural interactions, social relations, hukou acquisition and their self-perception of identity in Shanghai. A list of main interview questions (both Chinese and English versions) are attached in the appendix. I use in-depth (semi-structured) interviews to collect my primary data and these interviews are casual conversations conducted in participants' homes, offices; or in public space such as café and restaurants. Most interviews are conducted in Mandarin Chinese, but Mandarin-Wenzhounese code-switching commonly occurs during the interview.

One thing worth clarifying is the stance I adopt in this research. As an urban Wenzhou middle-class who currently live in Shanghai myself, I position myself as both an insider and an outsider to the urban Wenzhou middle-class migrant community. I have to always be critical and reflective about myself while constantly crossing boundary between "subject" and "object" in my research.

Before I discuss my findings, I shall provide a brief overview of my research participants. The age of my respondents ranges from 25 to 62. It should be noted that their age is significantly correlated with their occupation. This reflects the history of Wenzhou migration to Shanghai which I will further elaborate in my subsequent

chapters. I divided my participants into three categories: 1) young adult professionals[21] who work in Chinese companies or transnational corporations; 2) middle-aged entrepreneurs[22] who engage in domestic or (and) international business; and 3) elder retirees[23] from government agencies or public institutions who migrated to Shanghai to live with their adult children (referring to category 1). Entrepreneurs generally have the longest period of residence in Shanghai; they have averagely dwelled in Shanghai for 10 years. The average period of residence for professionals and retirees in my study is 3 years. In my discussion chapters, I have referred entrepreneurs and retirees as the elder generation in contrast to the younger generation[24], meaning the young adult professionals. As for education level, younger generation is more educated compared to the elder generation. The age also correlates with participants' socio-economic conditions. The elder generation owns property in Shanghai and live in their own houses. Yet, despite their decent income, young professionals often have little accumulation of personal wealth so they cannot afford to buy any property in Shanghai by themselves at this moment. In Shanghai, they either live in their parents' house, or rent an apartment.

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[21] Most of the young adult professionals belong to the post-80s generation. In china, the post-80s generation is a term which refers to anyone who were born between 1980 and 1989.
[22] The entrepreneurs in my study were born in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
[23] In China, the retirement age for women in government agencies and public institutions is age 55, as for men the retirement age is age 60.
[24] It should be noted that the elder generation was born and raised in socialist China, and the younger generation was the first to grow up entirely within China's reformist era. Being aware that age is a relative concept, I use generalized terms "younger/elder generation" and "young (and elder) respondents/migrants" in my thesis only for the sake of convenience.

Chapter 1

The Construction of National Identity through Chinese Language

Standardization and the Vicissitudes of Wenzhou Dialect

A. History of National Language Construction

The crucial role of common language in nation-building has been previously discussed in the Introduction. Though the history of Chinese National Language Movement can be traced back as early to the late Qing dynasty (Li, 1940), below I will only outline the institutionalization of speech[25](as oppose to scripts) in PRC China without engaging its intricate historical trajectory. The complexity of China's linguistic landscape is characterized by its rich regional language diversity, especially in terms of speech level. In addition to numerous minority languages spoken by ethnic minority people in China, linguists often categorized seven major Sinitic languages (dialects) for ethnic Han Chinese, including Guan (官 also known as Mandarin), Wu 吴, Xiang 湘, Gan 赣, Kejia 客家, Min 闽 and Yue 粤 (Huang & Liao,1991). For the purpose of protecting national sovereignty and strengthening national unity (see China 2001: Article 5), the Chinese state has embarked on institutional measures, including constitutional design and language policy[26], to standardize and promote the national common language[27] in the wake of its establishment (Spolsky, 2014; Zhou, 2004,

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[25] Although the standardization of scripts cannot be ignored in the process of the state's language management, my discussion will only touch upon the speech level.

[26] Language policies are generally implemented by a specialized government agency called Chinese State Language Commission (国家语言文字工作委员会), which is affiliated to the Ministry of Education.

[27] I use "national common language" to refer to both Putonghua (common speech) and guojia tongyong yuyan (national common language). Since 1950s, the term Putonghua has been used to refer to the standard form of Chinese language; this term has evolved to guojia tongyong yuyan (though not commonly used by average Chinese citizens) along with the promulgation of Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongyong yuyan wenzi fa (中华人民共和国通用语言文字法 The Law of the national common language of the People's Republic of China) in 2000.

2015). Being the "national model for pronunciation" (Dong, 2010), the national common language helps to eliminate the phonological divergence created by regional dialects [28] and is used in official and public discourse nationwide, such as in government agencies, schools, media and public places (Zhou, 2004, 2015). Learning and using the national language has been regarded as a basic citizen rights and responsibility as stated in Article 3 of the law (see China 2001). Drawing on Bourdieu (1991)'s concept of "symbolic power", Dong (2010) argues that Putonghua has established symbolic dominance over Chinese people's social life and she sees the Chinese national language as a representation of state power. Undeniably, China's institutional language management holds heavy weight in its nation-building project, yet at the meantime, it poses a threat to regional linguistic diversity (referred by Anderson as "fatality of human linguistic diversity" p.43), precipitating the endangerment and perhaps even more severely, the extinction of regional dialects (Li, 2014; Zhou, 2004).

B. The Wenzhou Dialect and Shifting Linguistic Subjectivities

1. Code Alternation and Code-Switching in Shanghai

Linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have devoted plenty of studies to demonstrate bilinguals/multilinguals' construction of identities through linguistic processes and strategies in communicative exchanges (e.g. Chew, 2013; Heller, 2011). Two common strategies that are discerned in bilinguals' interactional events include code-switching and code alternation. Code-switching can be subdivided into intersentential switching[29], and intrasentential switching (often called code-mixing)

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[28] Although regional languages (dialects) and the national linguistic standard (Putonghua) slightly differentiate in syntax and lexicon, the most salient differences nevertheless exist in phonological dimension.

[29] Some linguists use the term 'code-switching' to only refer to intersentential switching.

(Thomason, 2001). Though code-switching can be treated as a linguistic deficiency (Myers-Scotton, 1993), it is more often perceived by functional linguists as a communicative strategy through which bilinguals can make their subject positioning options to convey intentional meaning or establish social identities[30] (Gumperz, 1982). Unlike code-switching, code alternation occurs in different conversations with different speakers, when "bilinguals use one of their languages in one set of environments and the other language in a completely different set of environments" (Thomason, 2001, p. 136); it is also considered by linguists as a strategy for identity management (see McClure, 1977; Georgalidou, Kaili, & Celtek, 2010).

Being bilinguals (or multilinguals), my respondents claim that most of the time they consciously engage themselves in code-alteration depending on the context of communication. Generally speaking, no longer living in their native-place, their use of Wenzhou dialect is restricted to private settings such as home or social gatherings with other Wenzhouren. Whereas in public, they speak Putonghua with other Chinese with whom they do not share the same place of origin. However, different generations have demonstrated different code alternation patterns.

The shift in linguistic environment has induced a dramatic change in elder generation's linguistic practice. Elder respondents used to speak Wenzhou dialect in almost every communication setting[31] back in their hometown, but now in Shanghai they are compelled to communicate in Putonghua whenever they are in public or official context. A retired Wenzhou native told me: "Speaking Wenzhou dialect generates a feeling of closeness and naturalness. Such feeling is totally irreplaceable when compared to speaking Putonghua. But now whenever I go outside I have to speak

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[30] Chew (2013) has observed Singapore's multilingual residents' use of code-switching as a way to express their hybrid identities.
[31] I was told that Wenzhou dialect is a preferred working spoken language used by elder Wenzhouren in Wenzhou government agencies.

Putonghua, otherwise outsiders (waidiren 外地人) won't be able to understand what I say." In Shanghai, the chances for elder generation to speak Wenzhou dialect gets substantially confined to the following circumstances such as when they are at home with their spouse and children, when they associate with other Wenzhouren who speak the same language variation[32], or when they talk to Wenzhou relatives and friends over telecommunication devices.

By showing clear signs of Wenzhounese-Mandarin code alteration, elders switch subject positions between regional (private) and national (public) discourses. By insisting to exclusively choose to speak Wenzhou dialect with in-group members, they have strengthened the sense of regional distinctiveness and attachment, as well as constructed Wenzhou linguistic subjectivity. On the other hand, through code alternation to Putonghua in public or national discourse, they develop Chinese national language subjectivity while identifying with a larger formation of territories (PRC). Within this process, they also identify with the vast domestic migrant community which uses Putonghua as its common tool for communication so they simultaneously develop another form of subjectivity as New Shanghairen. The construction of this new type of identity, namely, New Shanghai identity[33], is a result of migration.

Compared to the elder generation, migration brings minimal change to younger generation's everyday linguistic practice. Putonghua is treated as their preferred means

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[32] Broadly speaking, the term "Wenzhou dialect" (温州方言) comprises all local language variations. Yet Wenzhou dialect can also narrowly refer to Ou yu (瓯语), the most widely used language in Wenzhou region, as well as in overseas Wenzhou immigrant communities. Other Wenzhou dialect variations, for example, Minnan yu (闽南语) , Man hua (蛮话), and Sheke hua (畲客话), are spoken in counties that are geographically close to Fujian (福建) province, such as Cangnan (苍南) and Taishun (泰顺).

[33] The notion of New Shanghai identity I propose in this thesis actually implies both multi-regional and cosmopolitan identity. I use "multi-regional" to position New Shanghai as a locality characterized by the fusion of China's various regional language and culture, as a result of the culture integration between native Shanghai community and the vast domestic-migrant community. The word "cosmopolitan" refers to Shanghai's foreign residents of different nationalities and the merging of their native language and culture. I avoid using "multicultural" here because "multicultural" is often regarded as synonymous with "cosmopolitan" in the discourse of globalization. New Shanghai identity will be further explored in my subsequent discussions.

for communication both in public or in private, largely because of their long-existing habit to speak Putonghua since childhood, not to mention the lack of immersion in Wenzhou dialect environment as they have been staying away from home for so many years for education and for work. Due to their language attrition, speaking Wenzhou dialect creates too much 'cognitive load' (as mentioned by a young respondent) so they prefer to pick an easier way (Putonghua) to talk with family, relatives and Wenzhou friends. Thus, they merge linguistic boundaries, and create emotional and cultural separations as they consciously choose to speak Putonghua with in-group members.

However, this does not mean they have entirely disidentified with their native-place language community. The spontaneous and sporadic Wenzhounese-Mandarin code-switching during their interaction with in-group members can be a contested site for them to negotiate between different modes of linguistic subjectivities. During my fieldwork and interviews, although for ninety percent of the time, my conversations with the young migrants are conducted in Putonghua, I have observed three occasions when they make spontaneous code-switching from Putonghua to Wenzhou dialect: (1) when describing a particular Wenzhou food, street, restaurant, or architecture. Based on their explanation, these nouns, pronouns are reminiscent of particular past memories and resonate deep emotional attachment; (2) when referring to adjectives, adverbs, proverbs, or metaphors that have no alternatives in Putonghua. Often in this case, the use of Wenzhou dialect help respondents to reveal intended meanings in a more accurate and vivid way; (3) when giving critiques and complaints about Shanghai/Shanghairen in public. I noticed that when my respondents started to comment on the unfavorable traits of Shanghairen, they would immediately switch to Wenzhou dialect, and they claimed this is a good way to avoid eavesdropping in public. Below I show three specific examples of code-switching between Wenzhou natives

based on my observation. All interlocutors speak Wenzhou dialect and they know that they can use Wenzhou dialect to communicate. In the transcription, the underline shows Wenzhou migrants switched from Mandarin to Wenzhou dialect.

Example 1:

Researcher: Haochi ma? (好吃吗?)　　　Translation: Tasty?
Respondent: <u>Nao hhu guo</u>! (冇话讲!)　　Translation: Extremely good!

Example 2:
Respondent: Wo jide, <u>sume'v bbo'moe'ggi nongmeiva</u>, xiaoxue de shihou zaocan jingchang chi. […] Na fujin, <u>ssengseiga ggi guoduo,</u> lishi hen youjiu. (我原来住在蝉街。我记得，<u>纱帽河那里的糯米饭</u>，很好吃；小学的时候早餐经常吃。那附近，<u>城西街的教堂</u>，历史很悠久。)

Translation: I lived in the Cicada Street. I remember, sticky rice in ShamaoHe was really delicious; When (I was) at primary school (I) often ate for breakfast. […] Close to that area, the church in the West Street has a long history.

Example 3:
Respondent: Yi kaishi, wo ma hui gei wo ji henduo wenzhou de haixian, <u>ngoe'beng'a</u>, <u>zissei'a</u>, <u>mengfugü'a</u>, wo juede tai mafan, rang ta buyao ji. Haiyou Wenzhou de fen'gan. <u>Ng bbei ggi kuo'hha silei coe a'hhuo</u>, <u>hhuobbi xi hhuobbi</u>. Waidi de fan'gan wo chiguo, bu haochi.　 (一开始，我妈会给我寄很多温州的海鲜，<u>鱼饼啊、子鲚啊、螟蛹干啊</u>。我觉得太麻烦，让她不要寄。还有温州的粉干。<u>我把它放在水里淬掉</u>，<u>方便兮方便</u>。外地的粉干我吃过，不好吃。)

Translation: At the beginning, my mom would send me a lot of Wenzhou seafood, (such as) fish cake, anchovy, dried octopus. I thought this troubled her too much, and asked her not to send again. Also, (she sent me) Wenzhou-style rice noodles. I put them in the (hot) water for a very short time, then immediately took them out and let them cool off, (it is very) convenient. I've tasted rice noodles from other regions, they are not tasty.

It is during code-switching that younger generation has simultaneously separated from and connected with their regional culture, constructing hybrid linguistic subjectivities within the competition of regional and national discourse. The construction of hybrid linguistic subjectivities can be also proved by migrants' acquisition of Shanghai dialect. Due to the great influx of domestic and international migrants, Shanghai dialect has been seriously endangered and is now no longer a socioeconomically and even numerically dominant language (dialect) in New Shanghai. In fact, nowadays even native Shanghairen are assimilating themselves to the New Shanghai linguistic landscape, which is multilingual in nature yet is dominated by Mandarin-English bilingualism that is pervasively present in public areas such as

restaurants, malls and transportation hubs. This accounts for Wenzhou migrants' reluctance of active linguistic assimilation to native Shanghainese community. However, inevitable to be exposed to Shanghai dialect in everyday life, some migrants' acquisition of simple everyday Shanghainese expressions can be regarded as a passive assimilation caused by a long period of residence.

With long years of residence in Shanghai (some over 10ys, a few over 15ys), many respondents can understand most part of the Shanghai dialect; some are able to speak short Shanghainese phrases and expressions used in everyday situations, mostly in environments like local stores, markets and workplace with native Shanghairen. However, migrants with short residential period in Shanghai often feel offended and alienated when being greeted in Shanghai dialect in public. With longer period of inhabitance, most no longer feel uncomfortable when being exposed to a Shanghainese-speaking environment any more. These language behaviors demonstrate how the passive language assimilation affects migrant's linguistic subjectivity.

2. Dialect Attrition among the Younger Generation in Shanghai

In immigration context, language has been recognized as a crucial factor for maintaining ethnic identity in multilingual situations (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor, 1977). Language loss is often seen as a negative individual experience which associates with one's loss in heritage culture and identity (Wong Fillmore, 1996; Park, 2010). According to Thomason (2001), language loss is a tragic consequence of contact-induced language change characterized by drastic reduction of lexicon and syntax. Attrition is "the loss of linguistic material that is not replaced by new material" (p.227) and occurs as the language speakers undergo the change of linguistic environment and language habits (Schmid, 2011). Language loss/attrition usually accompanies with language shift, meaning that languages with higher socioeconomic status often stabilize

and assimilate other lower-status languages during the language contact (Thomason, 2001). Like heritage language loss, language shift also represents ethnic or national identity change among individuals and groups (see Bhavna, 1996; Tánczos, 2012). While language loss is found to be prevalent in immigrant communities, young immigrants are generally more vulnerable to language loss compared to their adult counterparts (Wong Fillmore, 1991; Hinton, 1999).

During my fieldwork, I tried to test my respondents' dialect proficiency by communicating with them in Wenzhou dialect. I found that elder respondents in general have preserved their native-speaker Wenzhou dialect proficiency; yet the decline in Wenzhou dialect proficiency is fairly noticeable among younger generation. While speaking Wenzhou dialect with young respondents, I have continually experienced communication breakdowns due to their lack of fluency, as well as loss of vocabularies and syntax structures. For the sake of convenience, the conversation always needs to be switched to Putonghua. As heritage language proficiency is a vital component of immigrants' ethnic and cultural identity (see Cavallaro, 2005; Wong Fillmore, 1996; Otcu, 2010; Park, 2010), I argue that regional identity retention is more significantly found in elder migrants who have retained Wenzhou dialect vitality. By comparison, the observation of dialect attrition and language shift in younger generation shows signs of weakening of their regional identity.

Younger generation's asymmetrical Wenzhounese-Mandarin bilingualism is in fact mainly an outcome of China's state centralized language institutionalization as well as shift in language environment accelerated by mass communication and migration. I learnt that younger migrants' Wenzhou dialect proficiency had started to dramatically decrease since they attended universities away from home. But some claimed that, their Wenzhou dialect were not even perfectly fluent before college. Actually, their

language shift from Wenzhou dialect to Putonghua can be primarily accounted for by the state promotion of Putonghua in schools and public domains. In 1990s and 2000s, most of Wenzhou public schools barred students from speaking Wenzhou dialect at school; it thus cultivated younger generation's long-existing habit to speak Putonghua. Young respondents claim that it is overall much easier to communicate in Putonghua, especially when it comes to complex, academic, profession-related matters.

Compared to elders who retain relatively strong tie with their native-place language community, young migrants' extensive immersion in Putonghua-speaking environment in everyday life also accounts for their Wenzhou dialect attrition. All of them have been staying away from their hometown for nearly ten years, during which they were compelled to use the dominant Putonghua as the main tool for everyday communication with other Chinese. Now, mostly living by themselves in Shanghai with very few Wenzhou friends around, they only get very limited time to sporadically practice Wenzhou dialect over phone calls with their parents back home. However, during these intimate conversations, post-80s respondents often give simple greetings in Wenzhou dialect, and then swiftly switch to Putonghua for the rest of the conversation. The above evidences prove the encroachment of younger generation's Wenzhou identity caused by the state discourse of institutionalized monolingualism.

Wenzhou dialect attrition is particularly pronounced in young adults who have overseas studying experience and are currently working in bilingual language environment (Mandarin Chinese and English) such as transnational companies. Being multilinguals[34], young migrant professionals' regional identity also gets negotiated as

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[34] Unlike elder migrants who are Wenzhounese-Mandarin bilinguals, young adult Wenzhou migrants are multilinguals who can at least speak Wenzhou dialect, Mandarin and English. The emphasis on English education in Chinese national education system has emerged after China's adoption of the Open Door Policy. Though the level of proficiency profoundly varies, the vast majority of Chinese youth are able to speak English. Since my young respondents overall come from a very good educational background, they are proficient in English. I should note that this is prevalent among young Wenzhou

a response to forces of globalization. For those who work in transnational environment, they no longer steadfastly value language as a symbol of identity that one must strive to preserve, but gradually treat language as a commodified technical skill (Heller, 2011). This shift in identity is essentially driven by their aspirations for upward social mobility. A Wenzhou native in his thirties, who works as a financial analyst, said this to me in July 2017, "Wenzhou dialect is not really important for me anymore because the chances of speaking Wenzhou dialect in Shanghai is quite limited. The fluency of Putonghua and English is enough for me to handle my daily work in Shanghai." A female Wenzhou friend who works as a Japanese language interpreter told me in an interview in July 2017, "Instead of practicing Wenzhou dialect, I'd rather hone my Japanese language skill or learn a new foreign language because they are useful to my professional development." For these young adult professionals, the emotional value of Wenzhou dialect has been increasingly supplanted by the marketability of foreign language(s). Rather than committing to a fixed regional or national identity, the fragmentation of subjectivity is seen in self-positioning themselves as commodities in the labor market, as free-flowing human capitals in the global capitalist system.

3. Wenzhou Dialect Maintenance in Shanghai

Scholars (see Cavallaro, 2005; Wong Fillmore, 1996; Otcu, 2010) have agreed that heritage language maintenance plays a significant role in maintaining immigrants' ethnic/cultural identities. Perceiving both Wenzhou dialect and accent as symbols of regional distinctiveness, Wenzhou migrants see regional dialect maintenance as an indispensable way to retain their regional identity, tradition and culture.

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migrant professionals in Shanghai, since professionals with low human capital are quite unlikely to survive the competition in Shanghai's labor market. Many prestigious positions in Shanghai's job market demand fluency in English as a basic work skill.

Based on my findings, my respondents have primarily shared two thoughts on the significance of Wenzhou dialect maintenance. Firstly, they perceive Wenzhou dialect as the most pronounced marker of native-place differences since the distinction between 'us' and 'other' among Han Chinese is less likely to be identified through other means such as physical appearance. In a comment regarding migrants' language practice, Dong and Blommaert (2009) write that: "The migration results in more complicated sociolinguistic environments, in which regional accents and dialects become salient markers of identity, and project prestige and opportunity, or stigma and inequality." (p. 3). When Wenzhouren, especially elder generation speaks Putonghua, their accent is fraught with regional distinction that is noticeable for other in-group members. In fact, many respondents successfully identified other Wenzhouren that they did not previously known in various circumstances while living in Shanghai. Elder respondents who speak Putonghua in heavy Wenzhou accent[35] do not feel embarrassed about the failure to articulate the 'prestigious' phonetic standard. Rather than feeling uneducated or indecent, they think their accent cultivates a sense of pride and confidence since it is a marker of group distinction which implies wealth and social status.

Secondly, my respondents consider Wenzhou dialect as an important traditional and cultural asset. They are proud of its 'eccentricity' and many have mentioned its historical contribution in programming military code during Sino-Vietnamese War. From their point of view, regional dialect maintenance is indispensable for them to retain their regional identity. Although the post-80s respondents have experienced a prominent decline of regional dialect proficiency, they have expressed their feeling of

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[35] Since the elder generation was raised during the socialist period, despite that the state had embarked on its national language unification project, the strong influence of Wenzhou dialect still prevailed in Wenzhouren's everyday life. These elder people's parents and teachers by that time also could not speak phonetically standardized Mandarin. Growing up in such a linguistic environment, many elder Wenzhouren, especially less educated, thus speak Mandarin with a heavy Wenzhou accent.

emotional attachment while speaking or hearing Wenzhou dialect; they also recognize the importance for their future children to acquire Wenzhou dialect. As for the elder generation, regional dialect maintenance has been deeply penetrated into their heart. Elder generation insists on cultivating a monolingual Wenzhou dialect environment at their new home in Shanghai, not only due to their own linguistic habit, but because they want to create more opportunities for their children and grandchildren to practice. Those who are less rigid do not force yet would strongly encourage their children and grandchildren to speak Wenzhou dialect with them. Language varieties are regarded as emblems of group identity (Jacquemet, 1992; Gal, 1993). As a response to the severe endangerment of their regional dialect by the state's language policy, migrants' endeavor to facilitate Wenzhou dialect maintenance is a solid proof for their strong regional identity as to combat the state symbolic dominance (Dong, 2010).

Chapter 2

Cultural Interaction, the Diversification of

Cuisines and the Assimilation of Customs in the City

A. Cuisines

As it comes to the food culture, migrants' regional identity has been retained through maintaining their Wenzhou dining habits, despite such retention is more significantly found in the elder generation. By contrast, younger generation has developed preferences to more diversified cuisines. Informants of both age groups prefer when possible eat Wenzhou cuisine, and they have identified seafood and mild flavor of dishes as its two indispensable characteristics. Elder generation likes to cook seafood while dining at home; while dining-out, they order seafood for every meal. Most of them would take fresh seafood (put them in a portable freezer), dry seafood, local seasonal vegetables[36] and even locally produced seasoning (such as soy sauce and sesame oil) from Wenzhou to Shanghai when they drive back to hometown. Dwelling in Shanghai, they either purchase seafood in local market or online. Various sorts of seafood are now available in Shanghai's local market such as yellow croaker, pomfret, hairtail and shrimp, although they do not taste as fresh and delicious as the local seafood in Wenzhou, my informants think their taste is acceptable. Ordering seafood from e-commerce platforms like Tmall or Taobao is becoming a new trend. The service is convenient[37] and the quality of seafood[38] is guaranteed. Unlike the elder Wenzhouren, young single professionals seldom cook at home. Although their dining

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[36] For example, vegetables such as turnip (pan cai 盘菜) and octagonal luffa (baleng gua 八棱瓜) are not available in Shanghai's local market.

[37] The online order guarantees one-day delivery.

[38] Some informants purchase seafood from Zhoushan aquatic products companies online. Located in the East China Sea, Zhoushan city is well known for its supply of high-quality seafood products in China.

choices are less conservative, most of the time they still prefer to order seafood and light dishes while dining out. Apparently getting seafood is not a problem for Wenzhou migrants in Shanghai, however, most informants have expressed their craving for typical Wenzhou xiaochi during my fieldwork. As they say, there is no way to eat local Wenzhou food such as fishball (yu'yuan 鱼圆), chopping fish (qiaoyu 敲鱼), dengzhangao (灯盏糕), maibing (麦饼) in Shanghai, not even through express delivery service.

I was generously invited to several banquets hosted by my respondents during my study, sharing meals with their family and Wenzhou friends at their homes. I observed authentic homemade Wenzhou dishes in the dining table such as steamed yellow croaker (qingzheng huangyu 清蒸黄鱼), jellyfish (haizhe 海蜇), fish cake (yubing 鱼饼), tofu crab soup (doufu xietang 豆腐蟹汤), dried salted marine eel (manxiang 鳗鲞), duck tongues (yashe 鸭舌), stir-fried rice noddle (chaofengan 炒粉干). My respondents said that if they invite Wenzhouren home, they would prefer to cook native-place cuisine; and in normal times, they just prepare some simple Wenzhou-style dishes when they eat at home with family members.

While dining out with my informants, I observed that seafood was always their top choices of orders. Elder generation preferred to eat in Chinese restaurants so they typically ordered light Chinese-style seafood dishes. Some younger informants who are more open to foreign-style food ordered seafood dishes which include seafood salad, lobster sandwich, clam chowder soup, sushi, sashimi, unagi don (grilled eel rice bowl) and seafood paella.

Younger generation overall shows a great adaptability to non-native-place food culture, which are not restricted to Chinese food of diversified regional specialties but various categories of foreign-style food that has gained a growing popularity in

Shanghai. Although their favorite food is in general seafood dishes, their dining habits actually started to change since college [39]. Many can eat spicy food; a female professional even mentioned about her sporadic craving for water boiled spicy fish (shuizhu yu 水煮鱼). Young adult professionals who have studied abroad are particularly more adaptable to various food culture. A 29-year-old respondent who studied in the USA explained what Wenzhou cuisine means to him personally: "It does produce a sentiment of nostalgia. But if I don't eat them, it makes no big deal. Actually, my favorite food is Mexican food." By simultaneously lingering on and forsaking Wenzhou dining habits, my respondent has constructed very contradictory subjectivities. While dining out with their colleague and friends in Shanghai, young migrants would like to explore numerous types of cuisines include Korean, Japanese, Thai, Vietnamese, Italian, Spanish, Mexican and American dishes. Western-style brunch and afternoon tea (xiawu cha 下午茶）is becoming a growing trend among the young adult professionals, especially for females. Many young female informants have told me their obsession with dishes like eggs Benedict, pancake and waffle. Pastry and dessert, such as tiramisu, macaroon, croissant, chocolate, are seen as pleasant energy boost during the day.

One must be aware that restaurants can be a site of overlapping discourses through which migrants can simultaneously locate inside and outside a specific category of culture. It is in various types of restaurants that they experience multi-regional and cosmopolitan food cultural fragments that are manifested in cooking techniques and ingredients, flavor of food, tableware and interior design. Eating food such as water boiled spicy fish, shrimp dumplings[40], seafood salad, clam chowder soup, and sushi are

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[39] None of them stayed in Wenzhou for college.
[40] Shrimp dumplings are one of the most recognizable Cantonese dim sum.

important signs of multi-regional and multicultural identification; but at the meantime, since the preference for seafood is an important marker of Wenzhou identity, consuming these non-Wenzhou style seafood dishes also offers migrants a *"in-between space"* (Bhabha, 1994) to negotiate their contradictory subjectivities between the regional, multiregional and cosmopolitan discourse. It is worth mentioning that, though actively assimilating themselves to Shanghai's cosmopolitan food culture, Wenzhou migrants in my study overall are not favorable towards native Shanghainese cuisine. Regardless of age difference, my informants have complained that Shanghai cuisine is too sweet, salty, and greasy[41].

B. Customs

Speaking of customs, this study demonstrates the emergence of homogenized national culture brought about by mass communication and modernization (Deutsch, 1953; Gellner, 1983). Most respondents have told me they celebrate the traditional festivals just as "the rest of the Chinese people in other regions" (a short quotation from an interviewee). A Wenzhou native in his 60, commented that, "Nearly all the customs are identical all over the country now, I believe that fewer and fewer Wenzhouren know about Wenzhou customs now, especially we urbanites." There are at least two implications when Wenzhou migrants say they celebrate traditional festivals as other Chinese do. Firstly, what they imply is that the exposure to unified cultural representations in media and in school, combined with their frequent contact with Shanghairen and other migrants, all help to dissolve the distinctiveness of Wenzhou customs. Secondly, by self-redefining the boundary between the regional and national culture, they celebrate an "imagined" (Anderson,1983) as well as homogenized social construct that is continuously reshaped by social institutions (Hobsbawm and Ranger,

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[41] Northerners in China would never consider Shanghainese cuisine as salty and greasy.

2012) to justify the centralized nationalist discourse. In fact, this self-imposed and imagined cultural uniformity gets abysmally invalidated when Wenzhou migrants with strong boundary awareness identify with distinctive features of regional culture. In the course of my research, I only found one 45-year-old female entrepreneur who showed substantial familiarity with the Wenzhou customs. During our conversation, she excitedly enumerated several distinctive Wenzhou customs such as eating mustard rice (jiecai fan 芥菜饭) on Feburary 2rd of the lunar calendar, eating sesame balls (maci 麻糍) on the winter solstice, and eating rice dumplings, baobing[42](薄饼), goose eggs and peach in dragon-boat festival. She also underscored, "I take the Wenzhou customs quite seriously. In Shanghai, I'd prepare Wenzhou traditional food for my son at each festival. I hope he can remember these customs because this is an important part of our tradition." Even if this counter-example is statistically trivial as discovered in my study, the very endeavor to celebrate traditional festivals in Wenzhou style and to teach these customs to her child brings challenge to the homogenized state discourse.

Nevertheless, it has been hard to clearly demarcate the boundary between China's regional and national culture in the contemporary time. By returning to hometown to worship ancestors in tomb-sweeping day as well as to attend family reunion in spring festival, Wenzhou migrants have constructed subjectivities both as a Wenzhouren and a Chinese. Searching for one's 'roots' and going 'home' are the most significant symbolic meanings of these two important Chinese traditional festivals. Thus, when some migrants consciously choose to celebrate spring festival in places other than hometown, they more or less create separations to disidentify with their own national and regional culture. As my findings show, nowadays it is common for Wenzhou upper

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[42] Baobing (薄饼) is a type of Wenzhou xiaochi. It is a thin roll stuffed by leek, bean sprouts, shredded mushrooms, shredded carrot, shredded pork and shredded egg.

middle-class family to travel abroad during the spring festival. A small proportion of elder generation who live with their family even decide to deliberately stay in Shanghai for spring festival, mostly because they want to avoid the 'exhaustive' social activities back in hometown. A retired government administrator in his early sixties told me in July 2017, "If I return, I have to attend numerous banquets. It is very fatiguing. Friends and relatives in Wenzhou get together to feast. Too much food, drink and entertainment! It brings no good influence for my grandchildren. I also find it hard to integrate myself into that environment now. I find Shanghai to be more 'civilized' in this respect." Yang (1994) believes banquets are an indispensable part of guanxi tactics that cultivate personal relationships. Traditionally, it was seen as important to preserve kinship ties and personal relationships through visits (chuanmen 串门) and banquets in Wenzhou. Thus, discarding the rules of etiquette substantially diminishes one's Wenzhou identity.

The transformation of Wenzhou identity also gets manifested in migrants' attitude towards the Wenzhou-style and Shanghai-style weddings and funerals. Wenzhou is well known for its natives' lavish spending on "hongbai xishi" (红白喜事 weddings and funerals). In Wenzhou, it is normal for a new couple to spend averagely hundreds of thousand yuan on their wedding. Likewise, Wenzhouren's excessive spending on red envelope (renqing 人情) may appear as inconceivable for outsiders. The amount of lucky money for one wedding ranges from 1,000 to 20,000 yuan, depending on how closely the person is related to the new couple. Apparently, this cost can be a real burden for youth who have just entered the job market without much personal savings. Similar to weddings, Wenzhou-style funerals are also extravagant. During the interview, most informants have criticized the extravagance and waste of Wenzhou-style weddings and funerals, and they hope these customs would experience some positive change in the future. In contrast, they speak highly of Shanghai-style weddings and funerals, which

as they claim, are simple and practical. In particular, single young respondents told me they would prefer to have simple future weddings.

C. Cultural Interactions

1. Interactions with other Chinese in Shanghai

Migration provides Wenzhou migrants unprecedented opportunities to experience the country's ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic diversity, which previously can only be imagined or exposed from the mass media. In Shanghai, entrepreneurs associate with business partners, clients and employees from China's variegated regions. Young professionals told me that, besides Shanghainese employees, domestic migrants make up more than half of the employees in their workplace. I was informed that non-Shanghainese have occupied the city's upscale labor market, but menial jobs such as cleaners, laborers, food or package delivery service are also widely taken by non-Shanghainese who are mostly peasant migrants seeking out fortunes in Shanghai. These migrant workers from diverse regions have become an indispensable component of Shanghai's city life, and they are constantly seen in metro stations, streets, office buildings, residential areas and construction sites. The multiregional atmosphere also prevails in informants' neighborhood. Despite living in different residential districts, they noticed that nearly half of the households in their own residential areas are non-Shanghainese migrated from regions all over China.

Inevitably, Putonghua has become the common tool for people's everyday communication in this multiregional environment. However, within the seemingly monolithic linguistic landscape, the complexity of sociolinguistic environments is in fact characterized by migrants' diversified regional accents (Dong & Blommaert, 2009). Accents reveal regional identities by helping people to phonetically identify or disidentity with their regional distinctiveness. In a conversation regarding regional

accent, a respondent said to me, "Sometimes I can simply tell others' native-place from their accents. For example, Dongbeiren (Northeasterners 东北人) speak Putonghua with strong retroflex[43] sound, but Wenzhouren never speak like that. Strong retroflex sounds quite funny. Even though we are all speaking Putonghua, but I certainly perceive myself as different from Dongbeiren."

In my fieldwork, I also asked how frequent my informants were exposed to Shanghainese-speaking environment; they told me that it is quite common to hear Shanghai dialect in downtown old city areas, especially in local stores and markets, since there are more native Shanghairen living in those areas. Professionals told me they often hear Shanghainese colleagues speaking Shanghai dialect to each other during the lunch break. During the first few months in Shanghai, they often feel offended and alienated when being greeted in Shanghainese, but now with longer period of inhabitance, this does not bother them anymore. Moreover, now they have got used to different accents spoken by people from diversified regions in China. Spatial mobility helps Wenzhou migrants to develop a deep awareness of China as a "cultural hybrid" (Hall, 1992), just as a retired government administrator said, "Migration makes me become so aware of China's diversity; this obviously did not happen when I was in Wenzhou." But, at the meantime, cultural interaction between different regional groups also opens great opportunities for their assimilation.

Although Shanghai's ethnic diversity may not be as visible as its linguistic diversity, I still want to share an observation of cultural behavior and a meaningful conversation relevant to China's ethnic issues. One evening in early August 2017, when I was walking with a Ph.D. graduate who now works in an investment company close to his

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[43] The retroflex ending -er (儿), commonly known as erhua (儿化), is a very important phonetic feature of Putonghua.

neighborhood after dinner, we saw Uygurs roadside barbecue stand. Adult Uygurs' Putonghua were not so fluent, their children were eating nan bread and talking in Uygur language that we obviously both failed to comprehend. Nevertheless, this is a powerful evidence showing how regional distinctiveness is being dissolved by state language unification and cultural assimilation.

I asked my friend how he thinks of Uygurs. He said, " They are Chinese (Zhongguoren 中国人)." I asked, "Do you think Chinese and Chinese nation are the same?", he replied, "Chinese is a nation-state concept, and Chinese nation is an ethnic concept. But in today's China, many people seem to conflate these two terms." He also told me, "I would first categorize myself as a Han Chinese before I claim I am part of the Chinese nation. I definitely see myself having closer emotional attachment to Han ethnicity." Then he shared a piece of news he recently read in Chinese social media that he thought I may be interested. He told me that now the state regards the Uprising of the Five Barbarians[44] (wuhu luanhua 五胡乱华; literally: Five Barbarians throw China into disorder) as an obsolete historical view. Recent Chinese publicans with such wording all got censored because of their inappropriateness; and the publication bureau asserted that the wording must be replaced by "The Southward Move of Minority Groups" (shaoshuminzu nanxia 少数民族南下). He doubted if this would be truly adopted by Chinese history textbooks. Just like the repression of the history of anti-Manchu nationalist movement in the early 20th century (see Duara, 1995), this is a 21st century example of how ethnic dissonance gets once again quelled by centralized statist nationalism. Reviewing Chinese history, it is not difficult to notice that Chinese nation as a homogenized ethnic group only got quite recently emerged as a result of identity

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[44] In Chinese history, five barbarians (wu hu 五胡) is a term which refers to ancient non-Han Chinese peoples from Northern China. My friend and I both learnt the particular ancient Chinese history of the Uprising of the Five Barbarians when we were students at Chinese public schools.

deployment that had successfully mobilized all people within China into anti-colonialist movement. By integrating Hobsbawm and Ranger (2012)'s theory of "invented traditions", we see the "Chinese nation" is essentially a social construct not different from other national symbols such as the national anthem, flag and language, that help consolidate national identity.

However, the nationalist slogan "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" actually presupposes the continuity of the Chinese nation. Being critical about the continuity of a nation's history, Connor (1994) expounds the confusion between ethnic descent and real biological descent; he also insists that national loyalty is not always based on one's rationality. During the time when China was a civilization nation (before it became a modern nation-state), China was not ethnically unified; but now under the centralized nationalist discourse, not only the saying of "barbarians" is seen as derogatory, but the very wording of "uprising" truly becomes inappropriate because it undermines the legitimacy of ethnic minority groups' membership to the monolithic Chinese nation.

As I continue to discuss China's ethnic diversity with my friend, he told me, "I know I am part of the Chinese nation and Uygurs are also part of the Chinese nation so in this way we all belong to the grand Chinese family." He also admitted the slogan "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" really stirs his sense of national pride. In one of his definitions of nation, Connor (1994) writes that nation is "the largest group that can command a person's loyalty because of felt kinship ties; it is, from this perspective, the fully extended family" (p. 202). So ethnic mobilization based on "one unified Chinese nation" can be quite an inclusive power to untie China's dispersed ethnic strains. I argue that it is under this inclusive nationalist discourse that Wenzhou migrants have identified with the state-designated psychological bond and cultivated a

sense of naturalism (Anderson, 1983) for national (ethnic) cohesiveness. Their Wenzhou identity would not in any case become a counterbalance to their national identity because any regional identity can be legitimized by the inclusive idea of "one nation with diversity" (Fei,1991,1999) as well as be de-differentiated within the discourse of a unified Chinese nation.

2. Exposure to Shanghai's Cosmopolitanism

Shanghai's cosmopolitan atmosphere gets constantly reminded by numerous foreign tourists and restaurants, transnational business activities, busy port traffic, as well as ceaseless international flights. Since half of my interviews were held in Lujiazui and the Bund, my interviewees and I could see numerous post-Mao modern skyscrapers in the financial and commercial district in Lujiazui (陆家嘴) standing in contrast to the semi-colonial architectures along the Bund. From our conversation, I have learnt these new constructions in New Pudong Area have become powerful visual representations for their national pride. Walking inside the then French concession and the then British consulate, we encountered many foreign tourists and some even said "xiexie (谢谢 thank you)" to us after we helped them direct the way. It is common to hear foreign waiter and waitress who greet Chinese customers in Mandarin at Shanghai's foreign restaurants.

Informants who work in transnational companies also told me most of their foreign colleagues can speak some Chinese, or at least know how to say some simple Chinese expressions. Moreover, foreign colleagues tend to treat them nicely and have showed some degree of interest in learning Chinese culture. Policy-wise, their companies are closely following China's recent ambitious initiative 'One Belt, One Road' so they feel their foreign managers really take China seriously. A 60-year-old Wenzhou native who just spent the summer in Europe in 2017 talks about Europe's "backwardness" and

inconvenience when being compared to Shanghai's flourishing online-shopping and express delivery service, the wide acceptance of mobile payment in stores, as well as bilingual road signs and public radios in metros, high-speed rails and airport.

In the 20th century, Shanghai had experienced the shift of several different regimes. Its international status was once threatened and degraded along with the wars, occupation and the communist revolution in the age of turbulence. However, after the establishment of the People's Republic of China, the policy of economic reforms and opening-up created a chance for Shanghai's renaissance[45]. Nowadays, Shanghai has unarguably become the emblem of urbanization, commercialization and cosmopolitism in contemporary China (Bergère, 2009). Its accumulation of vast amount of economic, political, social, cultural, educational, and linguistic capitals[46] become a constant reminder of China's reform achievements. This has aroused Wenzhou migrants' national pride than ever before, which is particularly true for the elder generation who has lively remembrance of their poor childhood and the country's humiliating past. The sense of pride gets felt in their everyday encounter with foreigners in Shanghai who come to do business, work, study, travel, and at the same time show respect and enthusiasm for Chinese language and culture. The commitment to Chinese identity empowers them with a sense of security and voice to negotiate with foreign executives, colleagues and business partners, as well as to feel respected and valued when they travel and study abroad.

Their national pride is further consolidated by the state discourse of national rejuvenation. It is true that the word "rejuvenation" can implicitly arouse subtle emotion of embarrassment in average Chinese since national rejuvenation takes place on the

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[45] Shanghai was one of the major beneficiaries of this policy.
[46] Bourdieu (1984, 1990, 2011)'s concept of different forms of capitals implies resources a person acquires in different facets of life. Bourdieu argues that these capitals can be converted to personal power.

historical context of the Hundred Years of Humiliation [47]; yet, more powerfully speaking, this word is reminiscent of China's great civilization and its past long-standing geopolitical role in the world history, as well sets expectations and stirs hopes for China's bright future. Now the world has seen a rapid transformation of China into a global economic superpower (as the world's second largest economy); accompanied by its rise of power in politics, military and technology, China has gradually restored its historical status as a powerful influence in the international stage (Zheng, 1999). Although with experience of spatial mobility, Wenzhou migrants have developed cosmopolitan identity, but as China is increasingly playing a significant and influential role in the world, most would find their national pride too powerful to be jeopardized by global identity. In fact, it is hard to imagine that any Chinese would reject his/her national identity which can empower him/herself with security, prosperity and enormous pride.

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[47] This refers to the period from the mid-1800s to the foundation of the PRC in 1949. It was the century when China was subjected to invasion and exploitation by imperialist powers as well as went through numerous uprising and revolutions.

Chapter 3

Spatial Mobility, Residential Identity and the Hukou System

A. Hukou Acquisition

Living in a metropolis can be a dramatically different experience compared to living in a medium-sized city such as Wenzhou. My respondents all believe that Shanghai possesses China's or even the world's top-level infrastructure such as road construction, public transportation, high-speed rail, urban green space and parks. Moreover, Shanghai offers a variety of superb options for consumption, entertainment and leisure, through which one is able to gain the most mind-blowing sensory experience. It is also easy to connect to global resources, as there are a large number of multinational organizations, international companies and offices of foreign consulates in Shanghai. Being a booming innovation hub, Shanghai's labor market provides exceedingly rich opportunities for young adult professional's career progression. Entrepreneurs claimed that Shanghai government has given them lots of favorable benefits and opportunities policy-wise to propel their business, in a way that Wenzhou government can never be able to afford. In contrast, when being asked what it feels like to live in Wenzhou, most of my respondents commented about its disorder, inconvenience, boredom and even "backwardness". In particular, the younger generation told me that they have been so adapted to the dynamic and glamourous life in this magic city (modu 魔都, the nickname of Shanghai in China), and they seriously doubt if they can ever readapt to the life in hometown.

However, living in Shanghai does not guarantee their free access to its resource. With wealth, power, education and talent, migrants can enjoy a certain amount of resources that circulate freely in the market. But, without acquiring Shanghai hukou, some informants are still impeded from the most valuable resources that are harnessed

by the state. These include the rights to purchase a house, to register personal vehicles, to get benefits and subsidies in the local healthcare and social welfare programs, to gain access to public services, as well as their children's rights to study in local public schools and to partake in the college entrance exam. The labor market also shows a certain degree of discrimination against employees without Shanghai hukou status.

According to Wang (2005), the PRC hukou system[48] is an institutional regulation that requires all citizens to be officially registered to a geographical location from birth. Citizens can only enjoy locality-based rights, privileges, and opportunities in their registered locations. The uneven institutional allocation of resources and opportunities has spawned spatial hierarchy[49], regional disparities, socioeconomic, political stratification as well as discriminations that "not only directly challenge social justice and equity but also potentially call China's political cohesion and national unity into question." (Wang, 2005, p.114).

A decade ago, being less troubled by the huge population, Shanghai government exerted a less strict management control on the city's hukou relocation. By then, many Wenzhouren who came to Shanghai investing on the local economy (either set up their private companies and business, or invested in real estate) succeeded in relocating their hukou. However, many Wenzhou entrepreneurs hold no college degree failed to meet the requirement for hukou relocation, instead, they obtained long-term residence permit. But most entrepreneurs somehow managed to relocate their children's hukou and they underscored its crucial role in their children's education in Shanghai during the interview. They told me that overall Shanghai's public schools are not only less costly,

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[48] Unlike the imperial versions of China's *hukou* system, the PRC version is more rigid in terms of its enforcement and regulation. PRC hukou system was decided upon at the first PRC public security conference in November 1950. The dual-hukou structure differentiates rural residents and urbanites (two hukou types).
[49] Wang (2005) calls it "a metropolitan-city-town multi-layer hierarchy" (p. 24).

but also provide a better quality education than private schools. Shanghai possesses a great number of superb higher-education resource, and the competition for college entrance exam in Shanghai region is profoundly less competitive as compared to that in Wenzhou. Their children can either choose to go to domestic universities, or study abroad. A few entrepreneurs who failed to obtain Shanghai hukou for their children, however, can only send them to private schools. During the interview, they addressed complaints about the expensive private high school tuition and fees (averagely 160,000 yuan per year) as well as their worry for children's future university study.

At the current stage, Shanghai government is implementing a very strict hukou relocation rule. The government offers preferential policy for the powerful, the wealthy, the educated and the talented to process their hukou relocation. But the procedure is rigorous, complicated and time-consuming (it could take many years). Throughout my study, I only met two young adult professionals who have currently become Shanghai hukou holders, one being a Ph.D. graduate from a renowned Shanghai university, another a M.A. graduate from a prestigious American university. A female M.A. graduate missed her chance of relocation because she failed to submit an application to Shanghai government agency within her grace period. Having worked in Shanghai for four years, now she has lost hope in marriage. She said it is difficult to find a right partner, since without Shanghai hukou and a house, one is treated as a less "desirable" commodity in Shanghai's marriage market. Because of this reason, young male migrants who plan to get married could endure more pressure. I am especially surprised to learn that some young migrants[50] in Shanghai even try to obtain the rights to purchase houses through sham marriage, because they see no hope to relocate hukou in the immediate future and they fear that Shanghai's house prices will be less and less

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[50] Here does not refer to Wenzhou young adult migrants.

affordable. Under this rigorous hukou control, many young Wenzhou migrants are compelled to return to their hometown, or move to other big cities such as Hangzhou and Shenzhen, where local hukou is comparatively easy to obtain.

Ironically, Hukou system, as an institutional mechanism for population management does not seem to fit in with the monolithic Chinese nationalist discourse. Rather, it produces a secessionist discourse that reinforces China's regionalism and its citizen's regional identity. The journey towards hukou acquisition is fraught with alienation and discrimination from which migrants have deeply experienced Shanghai's regional protectionism. Even long-term residence permit induces a sense of insecurity, as if their residential status is not yet entirely validated. The absence of Shanghai hukou status also helps to raise boundary consciousness that consolidates migrants' Wenzhou identity from a legal perspective. While discussing about this legal demarcation, a Wenzhou native in his thirty said, "Only if one acquires Shanghai hukou can he/she be truly regarded as a New Shanghairen, or Shanghairen." In addition to that, regional protectionism also strengthens their migrant identity, as my respondents claimed that psychologically they would prefer to identify with the vast migrant community that contributes to Shanghai's ongoing transformation in all aspects.

B. Spatial Mobility

It is inevitable to bring attention to the hukou system as we discuss spatial mobility within China. For long, the state has put a strict control of Hukou relocation to impede the cross-regional migration. This was especially true during the socialist China. In the 1950s, the restriction of population mobility was considered by Chinese bureaucrats as an effective way to guarantee the stabilization of the new country (Zhang, 2001). I was informed by elder Wenzhouren that during the Maoist era they needed a letter of introduction (jieshao xin 介绍信) to legally leave their registered location. Constrained

by resource scarcity, food and other living necessities at that time were proportionately distributed by the state to households based on registered population, which further implies that, any "illegally" spatial mobility might put one's life at risk. A 58-year-old female Wenzhou native told me, "Migration within the country in Maoist era was never easy. For a long time, we were bound by the strict hukou rule and the state-distributed food supplies; some people even could not leave their counties because obviously there was no way to get food once you left home. Most uneducated women never got a chance to leave Wenzhou to see the world outside. The life in Wenzhou back then was simple, rural, backward (luohou 落后).We communicated in Wenzhou dialect in everyday life. We even categorized people on the basis of their registered counties. Honestly speaking, the economic reforms change everything."

Since the opening-up, the state has implemented a less strict rule regarding spatial mobility. Benefited by China's economic reforms, risk-taking Wenzhou entrepreneurs have transformed themselves from ordinary people in a small coastal city to upper middle-class urban residents in one of the world's most recognizable metropolises. Modernization also make it possible for younger Wenzhou generation to grow up in a stable middle-class family living condition, receive good educatation and migrate to Shanghai in search for better life chances and choices. Shanghai's urbanization, exuberance, innovation has aroused Wenzhou migrants' national pride than ever before. This sense of pride has largely derived from the satisfaction about their stable and prosperous personal life. Overall, Shanghai offers better lenses for Wenzhou migrants to witness China's great power and potential. Although, on one level, migration also enables them to see the vast regional disparities, not only between Wenzhou and Shanghai, but also among various regions of China, their confidence in the rise of China as a great nation (daguo 大国) do not seem to easily waver. They believe that through

the state's wiser institutional management and policy reform, all Chinese people's life condition will be improved as well as social inequality gradually minimized.

Concerning the incentive for migration, it is important to understand that Wenzhou migrants primarily regard spatial mobility to a higher-status location like Shanghai as a strategy to attain upward social mobility. This upward social mobility can be also realized by their next generation. In my fieldwork, I learnt that Wenzhou entrepreneurs without college degrees desperately wish their children receive the country's or even the world's best education, hoping that with the knowledge capital, their next generation could join the elite class. Wenzhou migrants generally perceive hukou as a powerful tool to access to the country's scarce high-quality resources, but not as an emotional investment. For them, Shanghai hukou guarantees accumulation of more economic, educational, social and even political capitals, which thereby can be converted into personal wealth and power, thus, essentially speaking, Shanghai hukou helps to consolidate their socio-economic (class) identity in Shanghai.

C. Residential Identity

Ninety percent of the Wenzhou informants in my study have decisively identified themselves as Wenzhouren. I should note this identification is pervasively found in the elder generation, without any exception. Such identification is anchored by their strong emotional attachment to the birthplace combined with a great regional pride. In Shanghai, being a Wenzhouren implies social distinction such as competence, wealth and status. A 45-year-old entrepreneur told me that being Wenzhouren have helped him to earn lots of respect in Shanghai: "Some snobbish Shanghai natives often despise new migrants, but they in general do not look down upon Wenzhouren." For the elder generation who lived in Wenzhou for almost two to three decades, Wenzhou reflects the values and beliefs they learnt, their kinship ties and social relations, as well as

memories associated with (important) life experiences. These have, either consciously or unconsciously, become an integral part of their subjectivities. A female entrepreneur said to me, "Wherever I go, I say I am a Wenzhouren, because I was born and raised in Wenzhou. There, I have my parents, relatives and old friends."

Not a single Wenzhou informant has showed any interest to be identified as Shanghairen, and most are reluctant to be addressed as New Shanghairen. This conscious choice of counter-identification is mainly a result of their bad impression on native Shanghairen's common traits (though being stereotyped), which are mentioned by my informants as thrifty, conservative, inflexible, and unfriendly[51], almost being portrayed as opposite traits compared to Wenzhouren's attributes. They claim that they enjoy Shanghai's urban multiregional and cosmopolitan culture, its dynamism and innovation, as well as all its resources that can be consumed, but this does not mean they like Shanghairen or want to become Shanghairen.

It should be noted that identification can be both a conscious and unconscious act. Even if we have seen their assertion as Wenzhouren, rejection to be addressed as Shanghairen, or 'reluctance' to accept the identity as New Shanghairen, in reality these self-perceived identity will nevertheless be able to challenge their formation of hybrid subjectivity as a result of spatial mobility, which is a hybridity of Wenzhou native-place identity and New Shanghai multiregional and cosmopolitan identity. One of my interviews even helped a 30-year-old male respondent to reflect on his multiple and conflicting subjectivities by himself. In this interview, he told me, "My relationship with Shanghai is based on interests (liyi 利益). I don't have any emotional affiliation to this city."; however, in another account, he said, "I truly love my friends, my music

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[51] Most respondents stressed the unfriendliness and arrogance of elder Shanghai natives during the interview.

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club, and brewing culture in this city. Shanghai creates wonderful opportunities for you to identify with different groups of people; no matter how special you are, you always can find your kindred spirits in this place." I was a little surprised that he could assertively claim about his lack of emotional connection to Shanghai after addressing his "emotional affiliation" to Shanghai in so many ways. His ambivalent account thus totally fits in with the poststructuralist theory of contradictory subjectivities (Weedon, 1987). Despite meeting self-unknowing conflicting subjects, I did talk to respondents who complained about their "identity crisis". They told me their contradictory and fractured subjectivities have made them feel like nomads, which is due to their failure to readapt to the life in Wenzhou as well as the sense of economic and psychological insecurity they endure to live in Shanghai.

While capitalism unleashes people from traditional lifestyles and turns them into fragmented and hybrid subjects, many may experience identity crisis and are overwhelmed by feelings of insecurity; thus, the psychological retreat to a simplified form of solid national identity often comes as a powerful remedy (Billig, 1995; Fromm, 1942). A further elaboration is seen in Julia Kristeva's account-"The values crisis and the fragmentation of individuals have reached the point where we no longer know what we are and take shelter, to preserve a token of personality, under the most massive, regressive common denominators: national origins and the faith of our forebears" (1993, p.2). For Wenzhou migrants in my study who engage in a continuous negotiation among different forms of subjectivities, they may eventually rely on national loyalty to consolidate their psychological security. Similarly, those who experience a loss of regional identity will find the psychological investment in "Chinese nation" as an ideal way to restore certainty.

Although submitting to the monolithic Chinese national identity appears to be a common choice for most Wenzhou migrants, there are two cases (not to mention their statistical scarcity) in which national loyalty does become undermined. Self-identified flexible subjects and global citizens have reconceptualized the meaning of national identity with a more liberal apprehension on boundaries and locations. Overseas studying experience has equipped some young adult Wenzhou migrants with flexible[52] mentality, and they believe that identity is based on the location one is constantly travelling towards in life journey. This enables them to embrace the fluid and fragmented nature of post-modernist identity without suffering from much negative psychological effect. I only find one respondent who identifies herself as a "global citizen". This is a liberal-minded female in her late thirties who used to partake in several international missions for the United Nation and has traveled extensively abroad. It may seem plausible that for subjects of supra-national identity, their strong identification with the international community can weaken the emotional bond with their own nation.

However, does the supra-national identity or flexible identity truly counterbalances people's national identity? Regardless of the fast-growing global integration in our contemporary age, the proliferation of identity politics is seen in global-scale regional conflicts, populist and separatist movement and in religious conflict. In a world that increasingly underlines diversity and differentiation, isn't it possible that these liberalists will be inclined to submit to a homeland that empowers them with great security, prosperity and enormous pride? Actually, the self-asserted "global citizen" in my study did express her "patriotic heart (aiguoxin 爱国心)" and the intense

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[52] In her research, Ong (1999) shows that in order to seek political security and economic gain, Asian investors become multiple-passport holders involved in constant travel and migration. Ong sees these Asian investors as transnational subjects with "flexible citizenship".

nationalist sentiment she felt during the time when China's president paid them a visit over the U.N. mission. It may be true that some nation-states are in decline while being assaulted from below and above (Billig, 1995), however, I argue that when it comes to a great nation-state (daguo) such as China, national identity will be a safe harbor for its citizens to restore a sense of belonging. Those who struggle with bewildering identity will particularly be more susceptible to embracing an empowering national identity.

Chapter 4

Native-place Social Networks and Organizations

A. The History of Native-place Networks

The history of native-place social networks can be traced back to the late Qing Dynasty. Due to the economic exchange in the late imperial China, numerous peasants, workers and merchants left home in search for fortunes and opportunities beyond their own regions. Such unprecedented population mobility had resulted in the proliferation of native-place networks, which served as "grounds of affiliation and assistance" (Naquin and Rawski, 1987, p. 47) for migrants in an alien environment. However, it should be noted that boundaries of the common place origin are flexible because native-place has a "hierarchically cumulative nature" (ibid, p.48) and can be contextualized by village, township, city, province (see Crissman, 1967; Naquin & Rawski, 1987, Zhang, 2001). One's native-place is not only regarded as a symbol of loyalty and solidary, but also a marker for identification in terms of language, cuisine, customs and socioeconomic status and power (Goodman, 1995; Honig, 1992; Naquin & Rawski, 1987). Late imperial Shanghai had seen innumerable native-place associations-guildhalls (huiguan 会馆) and public offices (gongsuo 公所)-that provided social and ritual services as well as handled general civil affairs for sojourners; whereas merchants widely associated as a guild since their occupational and regional identities often overlapped (Brook, 1997; Goodman,1995; Honig, 1992). In contemporary China, native-place networks have brought substantial benefits to migrants' economic and social lives, with regards to job recruitment, trade, business/work skill learning and access to urban services and information (see Honig, 1992, 1996; Mobrand, 2006; Zhang, 2001). Migrants of the same place origins also form residential and commercial enclaves in the new environment to create a sense of community, security and access

to capital (Goodman,1995; Honig, 1992). To accentuate the deep native-place attachment and solidarity, Honig (1992) has even identified Subei (苏北) people[53] in Shanghai as a distinct "ethnic" group.

B. Instrumentality of Native-place Entrepreneur Associations

My findings suggest that, although the native-place entrepreneur association still to some extent serves to consolidate migrant entrepreneurs' group solidarity, its emotional value is being incrementally undermined by its utilitarian value as now migrant entrepreneurs have primarily utilized native-place networks for their own economic gains and resource accumulation. Wenzhou entrepreneurs that I have interviewed all have participated in their native-place entrepreneur associations ("entrepreneur association" abbreviated as "EA" henceforth). Many call this social practice "baotuan qu'nuan" (literally meaning "hold together for warmth", is a metaphor that implies for establishing alliances) and believe cooperation is a good way to aggrandize their power and influence so that they can obtain Shanghai government's attention and support. Entrepreneurs who partake in these native-place EAs primarily expect to extract valuable information, opportunities and market resources that can bring them economic gain; this finding resonates with previous scholarship that in contemporary society, native-place networks bring great advantage to migrants' economic and social lives (see Honig, 1992, 1996; Mobrand, 2006; Zhang, 2001). Yet, in the meantime, they understand the alliance is based on reciprocity which requires not only gains but contributions.

These native-place EAs can be further categorized by province, city and county. My informants include members from the Zhejiang Entrepreneurs Association (ZEA) (provincial level), Wenzhou Entrepreneurs Association (WEA) (city level), Yueqing

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[53] Subei people are people who from the north of Jiangsu province.

Entrepreneurs Association, Cangnan Entrepreneurs Association, Longwan Entrepreneurs Association and Fengxian Wenzhou Guild (county level). The membership to ZEA[54] is the most competitive and only accessible to enterprises with certain scales and assets. A 50-year-old female entrepreneur explained why she joined the ZEA in an interview, "ZEA is a prestigious organization. Its voice is effective and powerful. Shanghai government takes its members seriously and has provided us numerous support and opportunities for investment. These are not members from other (either Wenzhou city or county level) entrepreneur associations can easily obtain." Despite the fact that Wenzhou city and county level EAs are quite ignored by Shanghai government, they are in good connection with the Wenzhou government, who regularly invites entrepreneurs' investment back home and often dispatches cadres to attend their annual symposiums in Shanghai. Though many entrepreneurs have invested in Wenzhou municipal construction projects, they have stressed a demand for a more agreeable investment climate back home. Furthermore, I also find that the city and county level EAs function as vital networks that facilitate Wenzhouren back home to access to Shanghai urban services such as hospitals and schools.

These native-place EAs hold many events and activities, including symposiums, formal meetings, banquets, celebration of major traditional festivals and national holidays. Entrepreneurs who have close relationships sometimes gather informally in (business) clubhouse, restaurants rather than homes[55]. The topics of their conversations over formal or informal gathering mostly revolve around current economic affairs so overall entrepreneurs find these events helpful to their own business. However, few entrepreneurs complain about the bad environment (such as feasting and entertainment)

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[54] ZEA is acknowledged as China's most influential non-profit regional commercial organization. Its current chairman is Jack Ma.
[55] Entrepreneurs who have a very close relationship may visit each other's houses.

as well as a lack of instrumentality of their EAs so they seldom participate in such events and activities. It is also worth to mention that, instead of traditional face-to-face interactions, the development in information and communications technologies (ICTs) has contributed to a growing popularity in virtual interactions. Today it is quite common for an EA to have its own WeChat group[56], offering updated news, events, activities for members online. Due to the flexibility, convenience and effectiveness of virtual encounter, many entrepreneurs prefer to be virtually associated with their native-place entrepreneur communities. However, the substitution of physical gatherings with virtual contact has actually deprived the opportunities for important ritual performance, through which they can represent crucial markers of Wenzhou identity. Most Wenzhou entrepreneurs now only attend events and activities that they find personally useful or interested while taking consideration of their busy schedule. Yet they still gather for major events and activities to negotiate and discuss important matters as well as to strengthen their emotional bond.

Wenzhou entrepreneurs in my study agree that a shared place of origin can generate a sense of familiarity, as well as consolidate loyalty and mutual trust. This is particularly true for some entrepreneurs who already have established long-existing connection with each other (some knew each other even before they migrated to Shanghai). But they claimed native-place bond in no way guarantees trust or friendship. They said their business partner or friend can be anyone who is honest, reliable and competent, regardless of a shared place of origin. Entrepreneurs expect native-place EAs to be primarily a platform that offers opportunities for progression in business and economic gain; the feeling of emotional connection is only a pleasing by-product one extracts during the social interaction, as they portrayed. Actually, a more serious threat to

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[56] Wechat is one of China's largest social networking platforms.

native-place loyalty is seen in entrepreneurs' participation in non-native-place EAs as driven by economic interests. During the interview, some entrepreneurs told me that due to their business contact with foreign countries and Taiwan, they are also members of the Overseas Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Taiwan Entrepreneur Association. Most entrepreneurs' social networks expand way beyond their native-place EAs. Their contact with non-Wenzhou entrepreneurs is frequent and common. Any social connection which can help them gain business opportunities, improve corporate reputation and expand corporate influence is worth the effort.

According to Durkheim (1893/2014;1897/1951)'s inquiry, industrialization and urbanization cause the decline of traditional community in our modern time. While social solidarity tends to operate on the basis of likeness and shared sentiments in traditional community (usually organized by kinship affiliations), social cohesiveness in modern society is based on economic interdependence in work (Durkheim, 1893/2014). As native-place social networks can be regarded as an extension of kinship ties, the emphasis on its utilitarian value can be accounted for by migrants' quest for mutual economic dependency in modern economic life.

C. Social Relations Based on Shared Values, Hobbies, Lifestyles

Modernization has fostered a more radical change on young adult migrants' social relations. By only maintaining infrequent contact with a very small number of Wenzhouren (often old connection such as classmates) in Shanghai, yet primarily socializing with Shanghainese and people from other regions of China, and even foreigners, the younger generation has demonstrated a weakening of commitment to native-place community. Unlike entrepreneurs who partake in native-place EAs, young adult professionals seldom associate with native-place social networks. Few of them

participated in the events hold by the Wenzhou Talent Association in Shanghai[57], but soon dropped out when they discovered their lack of "practical" value. A Wenzhou native in his thirties, who received his Ph.D. in a Chinese prestigious university and now works in an investment company told me, " There is no need for us (professionals) to baotuan to seek out business collaboration as Wenzhou entrepreneurs. Our professional development largely depends on our own personal attitude and competence, so we do not expect native-place social networks give us much assistance in terms of career progression." On the other hand, the same birthplace does not guarantee emotional connection for them because it is rather shared values, hobbies and lifestyles that play the pivotal factors in sustaining a good relation. As a 29-year-old male respondent who earned his M.A. degree from the United States explained: "The barrier to social connectedness often comes from the inability to communicate with the heart.". This can be further proved by younger Wenzhouren's occasional social contact with Wenzhou friends in Shanghai. I was informed that some meet their Wenzhou friends less than three times a year, primarily because they do not feel close to each other and do not share much common interest. All the young respondents admit that they do not have any intention to look for other Wenzhouren in Shanghai. In fact, from my fieldwork I also discerned a growing devaluation of family ties and kinship bonds in young migrants, which convincingly proves their dissolution of Wenzhou identity.

Durkheim (1893/2014) articulates that, the very collapse of traditional community has resulted in the rise of individualism. While urbanism provides urban residents with multiple lifestyles[58] (Gans, 1968), young migrants are not encapsulated within their native-place networks, but rather have acquired their sense of solidarity in various other

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[57] This association is affiliated to Wenzhou Entrepreneurs Association.
[58] In his research for urban American city life, Herbert Gans (1968) proposes a typology of five types of urban residents: cosmopolites, singles, ethnic villagers, the deprived, and the trapped.

types of networks which enable them to share common interest, lifestyle[59] and values. Wellman (1999)'s research findings also show that contemporary urbanites' social circles go far beyond their kinship ties; they actually belong to a cluster of networks that help them access to diverse resources.

In replacement of the native-place social networks, Wenzhou young adult professionals have found their sense of community in organizations such as alumni association and music club. They make friends with people from places all over China in Shanghai; not to mention that a few respondents also hang out with foreigners. Nowadays, the innovation of technology and the busy lifestyle in the metropolis have accelerated the expansion of virtual communities. In addition to seeking connectedness in the physical world, younger Wenzhouren also finds their sense of belonging in discrete virtual communities related to their profession and hobbies. Compared to the traditional face-to-face communication, virtual communication now makes up a large proportion of their daily social communication. While young Wenzhou migrants perform different modes of subjectivity in variegated networks such as cultural, educational and professional clubs, as well as discrete virtual communities, their identity is being continuously reconstructed and redefined in the discourse of fluidity and multiplicity.

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[59] Bellah et al. (1985) have discussed "lifestyle enclaves" and "communities of interest" in their research on community life in modern American society.

CONCLUSION

The story of Wenzhou migrants in Shanghai continue to unfold under China's drastic social transitions. In spite of the unpredictability of their future, I still attempt to highlight the important findings and issues related to their identity in this conclusion. First, I shall provide a brief summary of my main chapters.

Chapter 1 discusses the vicissitudes of Wenzhou dialect as a result of Chinese state language unification, as well as Wenzhou migrants' construction of shifting linguistic subjectivities through code-alternation, code-switching, dialect attrition and dialect maintenance. Chapter 2 introduces the diversifications of their cuisines and the assimilation of customs, their cultural interaction with native Shanghairen and the vast migrant community in Shanghai. Cultural assimilation, combined with migrants' rising national pride, has strengthened their national identity. Chapter 3 shows that the struggle for hukou acquisition gives rise to migrants' awareness of China's regional protectionism and this in turn consolidates their Wenzhou identity from a legal perspective; although spatial mobility turns migrants into fragmented and hybrid subjects, the psychological retreat to a simplified form of solid national identity is seen to be a remedy to restore their sense of belonging. Chapter 4 describes that, instead of serving to consolidate migrants' group solidarity, native-place social networks and organizations gradually shift their role to cater to migrants' practical need. In addition, modern lifestyles and technological development have substantially transformed migrants' social relations and networking.

Below I outline the main findings of this thesis.

A) This study has redefined Shanghai as a locality characterized by culture hybridization between native Shanghai culture and the domestic and international migrant culture. Considering the scale of migration and the extent of hybridization, the

colonial-period cosmopolitan Shanghai cannot be, in any sense, comparable to contemporary New Shanghai as a behemoth developed in China's reformist era. In this sense, New Shanghai identity itself is a hybrid form of identity mixed with local, multi-regional and cosmopolitan characteristics.

B) Migration has transformed Wenzhou urban middle-class migrants into hybrid subjects constituted by Wenzhou regional identity and New Shanghai multi-regional and cosmopolitan identity. Through their everyday linguistic, cultural and social practices, they have constructed, transformed and reconfigured their identity within the discursive field of discourses, which is contained by three major types of discourse, including regional discourse, state/nationalist discourse and global discourse.

C) Their Wenzhou identity retention is demonstrated by Wenzhou dialect maintenance, cultural retention on dining habits and customs as well as association with native-place networks and organizations. However, their regional identity has been to varying degrees undermined by state language unification project, public school education and propaganda work; it also gets dissolved during the frequent contact with native Shanghairen, domestic and international migrants. Obtainment of Shanghai hukou status does not erode their sense of Wenzhou identity but does consolidate their socio-economic (class) identity; the struggle for hukou acquisition raises awareness of their regional identity from a legal aspect.

D) My study discerns generational differences among Wenzhou migrants. Wenzhou identity is better retained in the elder generation, who compared to the younger generation, have stronger emotional attachment to Wenzhou, deeper awareness of their regional distinctiveness, as well as more association with native-place community. Yet, many counter-examples also prove the dissolution of their Wenzhou identity, which is particularly seen in a major discovery: the utilitarian

function of native-place entrepreneur association is incrementally overriding its traditional role which serves to consolidate regional solidarity. By contrast, younger generation's Wenzhou identity has been more hybridized with New Shanghai identity. This is mainly demonstrated by their Wenzhou dialect attrition and language shift into Mandarin*, great adaptability to non-native-place food culture, and most significantly, a profound weakening of commitment to native-place networks, yet at the meantime, belonging to a cluster of social networks based on personal interest, lifestyle, values and need.

E) This study also catches a glimpse of the historical shifts of Wenzhouren's sense of regional identity. Ironically, despite the heavier state discourse during the socialist China, with less influence of industrialization and urbanization, less education, no travel and migration, most Wenzhouren were kinship-oriented and better preserved their regional dialect and identity. But in the 21st century, with so much education, modern technology, travel, and aspirations for upward social mobility, there is more loss of regional identity and strengthening of national identity in the younger Wenzhouren, who grew up entirely within China's reformist era.

F) I argue that an inclusive Chinese nationalist discourse-unity in diversity- is able to legitimize and unite China's dispersed regional identities by integrating them into the unified extended Chinese family. Besides, China's striking achievements of economic reforms and elevation of international position has made the nationalist discourse of "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" appealing to the Chinese public; as a result, those with strong cosmopolitan identity, or struggle with bewildering identity such as hybrid identity, flexible identity, or a loss of regional identity, will submit to a solid and empowering Chinese national identity to restore a sense of certainty, belonging, security as well as daguo (great nation) pride.

It is important to understand that my attempt to understand the history of monolithic Chinese national identity and fragmentation and shifting identity in 21st century China is based on a case study of Wenzhou middle-class urbanites who relocate from a newly-acknowledged second-tier Chinese city to a world-class cosmopolitan megacity. Considering the sense of self-determination, autonomy (Parris, 1993; Zhang, 2001), regional pride as well as relatively superior living condition of my research subjects, my findings may not be generalizable to other urban Chinese migrants. Due to the limited sample of my study, this research is only a preliminary investigation on Chinese migrant identity construction in contemporary urban China.

However, this research does to some extent contribute to our understanding of the sense of national identity among Chinese middle-class in the context of China's rapid social transformation and its global rise as a great nation (daguo). My study also reveals an ever-increasing sense of individualism among China's post-80s generation, accompanied by a substantial weakening of commitment to kinship bonds, partly as a result of migration. I also speculate that, China's growing domestic migration trend will enable its citizens to redefine and reconceptualize places and boundaries; as their regional identity gets continuously hybridized with newly-adopted identities in the new living environment, increasingly gets dissolved in an inclusive and empowering Chinese nationalist discourse, the loss of regional identity may give rise to better awareness of their socio-economic (class) identity. I recommend more studies be conducted to explore migrant's socio-economic (class) identity and its implication to China's social equity and social cohesion. Also, it would be significant to explore the rise of individualistic values in Chinese younger generation, its social repercussions as well as what this means to their sense of national identity.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ENGLISH VERSION)

Part I: Language

1. Do you speak Shanghainese?
2. If not, would you like to learn? Why/why not?
3. Under what circumstances do you speak Mandarin, Wenzhou dialect (or Shanghai dialect) in Shanghai?
4. Please describe how you feel when you speak each language/dialect?
5. Will you teach your future children to speak Wenzhou dialect? Why/why not?

Part II: food

1. Describe your daily diet in Shanghai, such as the food you often eat, the type of restaurants you prefer to go, and the cooking style at home, etc.
2. Do you keep your Wenzhounese dining habits? If yes, in which way? If not, why?
3. Do you love Wenzhounese cuisine more than anything else?
4. How do you like Shanghainese food?

Part III: Customs

1. Can you tell the difference between Wenzhou and Shanghai customs?
2. Do you keep your native-place customs? Or familiarize yourself with and adjust to Shanghai customs?

Part IV: connection with Wenzhou

1. Describe your connection with friends and relatives in Wenzhou.
2. Do you pay special attention to news about Wenzhou and Wenzhouren? Why/why not?
3. How often do you go back to Wenzhou? When do you go back? What do you often do when you are in Wenzhou?
4. Have you provided any kinds of support for Wenzhou's development?
5. Do you know any Wenzhouren who have supported Wenzhou's development?

Part V: Making friends

1. In terms of your network of Chinese friends in Shanghai, which part of China do they come from?
2. How many Wenzhouren do you know in Shanghai?
3. How did you get to know them? How is your relationship with them? How often do you contact with each other?
4. When do you usually contact each other? What do you usually do when you hang out?
5. Do you feel anything different while comparing your association with Wenzhou friends to your friends from other places? How is it different?

6. Do you have any preference to be friends with Wenzhouren in Shanghai?

Part VI: native-place networks
1. Do you know any Wenzhou native-place networks in Shanghai, including formal organizations and informal groups, such as merchant guilds, native-place associations (tongxianghui)?
2. Have you ever joined these organizations/groups and(or) participated in related activities? Please share some of your experiences with me.
3. What is the reason that you (do not) join these native-place networks?
4. Why do you think other Wenzhouren in Shanghai would like to join these native-place networks?
5. What impact does the practice of (not) joining native-place networks have on your Wenzhou identity?

Part VII: hukou
1. What do you think about Shanghai's hukou system?
2. In your opinion, what is the relation between one's hukou and his/her identity?

Part VIII: Identity
1. How do you perceive your own identity? Are you a Wenzhouren or a new Shanghairen?
2. Are you eager to assimilate into the life in Shanghai?
3. Do you feel a sense of belonging in Shanghai now? Where does this (lack of) sense of belonging come from?
5. Would you like to settle down in Shanghai? Why/why not?
6. Do you want your offspring to have a strong Wenzhou identity? Why?

Part IX: Nationalism and regionalism
1. As a Chinese citizen, how does living in Wenzhou different compared to living in Shanghai?
2. What do you think about China's regional distinction?
3. Do you think economic development, technological progress, cultural and information exchange will make China's regional distinction less apparent?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (CHINESE VERSION)

第一部分：语言
1. 您会说上海话吗？
2. 如果您不会说上海话，您愿意去学吗？为什么愿意/不愿意？
3. 在上海您一般在什么情况下使用普通话、温州话（或上海话）？
4. 您在说这几种不同的语言（方言）时有什么不同的感受？
5. 如果将来您的孩子在上海出生，您是否会教孩子说温州话？为什么(不)？

第二部分：饮食
1. 请描述一下您在上海的日常饮食，例如平时大都吃什么、喜欢去的餐馆类型以及家里的烹饪风格等等。
2. 您是否保留温州的饮食习惯？如果有，在哪些方面？如果没有，为什么？
3. 您是否最钟爱温州菜？
4. 您觉得上海菜怎么样？

第三部分：风俗习惯
1. 您觉得温州和上海的风俗习惯有哪些区别？
2. 您是否在上海保留温州的一些风俗习惯？还是入乡随俗，接受上海的风俗习惯？

第四部分：和温州的联系
1. 请和我分享一下平时和温州亲朋好友的联系情况。
2. 您是否关注同温州和温州人有关的信息咨询？为什么？
3. 您多长时间回一趟温州？一般什么时候回温州？回温州会做些什么事？
4. 您是否曾经或者正在以某种形式支持家乡温州的建设？您是否知道在上海的其他温州人正在做或做过类似的事情？

第五部分：交友
1. 在上海，您的朋友圈以哪里人为主？
2. 在上海认识多少温州人？
3. 你们如何认识？关系如何？联系是否频繁？
4. 一般什么时候会联系？聚会时一般做什么？
5. 比起和来自其他地方的朋友相处，和温州朋友在一起是否感觉不一样？哪里不一样？
6. 在上海是否更倾向于和温州人做朋友？

第六部分：同乡关系网
1. 您是否知道上海的一些和温州人有关的正式或非正式团体组织？如商会、同乡会等？
2. 您是否有加入这些团体组织并参加相关活动？请和简单我分享您的一些经历。
3. 为什么（不）加入这些同乡关系网？
4. 您觉得在上海的温州人为什么要加入这些同乡关系网？
5. 您觉得（不）加入这些同乡关系网对您的温州人身份有什么影响？

第七部分：户口
1. 您如何看待上海的户籍制度？
2. 您认为户籍和一个人的身份认同之间有什么关系？

第八部分：身份认同：
1. 您对自己的身份是如何定位的？ 温州人、新上海人、或者其他？
2. 您是否迫切希望融入上海？
3. 您现在对上海有归属感吗？为什么(没)有归属感？
4. 您是否愿意长期定居上海？为什么(不)？
5. 您是否希望您的后代有强烈的温州人身份认同意识？为什么？

第九部分：国家主义和地区主义
1. 作为中国公民，在温州生活和在上海生活有什么不同的体会？
2. 您如何看待中国的地区差异？
3. 您觉得经济发展、科技进步和文化信息交流是否会削弱中国的地区差异？