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A Revolutionary Wave:

Dutch and American Patriots in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in History

by

Matthijs Tobias Tieleman

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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This dissertation examines the transatlantic entanglements between the Dutch and American Patriots during the eighteenth century. Between 1747 and 1787, the American and Dutch Patriot revolutions shared ideological origins in classical republicanism, early liberalism, and Enlightenment thought. Based on this shared political ideology, revolutionaries in both countries created similar and interconnected institutions as well as initiated reforms that hearkened back to an imaginary past of ordered liberty. In addition, the Dutch and American Patriot revolutions were contemporaneous moments in history and intimately connected in political and commercial networks. They were thereby embroiled in interconnected events that moved each revolution forward. In thought and practice, through extensive transatlantic networks, and for more than four decades, the Atlantic Patriots formed the first phase in the Age of Revolution.

The dissertation of Matthijs Tobias Tieleman is approved.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Matthijs Tobias Tieleman holds a B.A. in history (2013) from the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam and an M.Sc. in American history (2014) from the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of "'No Intrigue is Spared': Anglo-American Intelligence Networks in the Eighteenth-Century Dutch Republic", *Itinerario,* Volume 45 (1): 99-123.

Introduction: Patriotism in the Atlantic World

The Age of Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a watershed period in Atlantic history. A new world emerged from the convulsions caused by the Atlantic revolutionaries. They changed the relationship between the government and the governed, rearranged social and cultural norms, placed concepts such as equality and freedom at the center of public discourse, and laid the foundations for today's nation-states and empires. As a result of its supposed role in ushering the modern era, the Age of Revolution is often understood as the founding moment for liberal democracy, Romanticism, and the modern nation-state.

Between 1747 and 1787, a set of ideas and practices called Patriotism dominated the revolutionary Atlantic World, straddling the early modern and modern. Some of these Patriot revolutions are well-known and well-researched in their own right, especially the American Revolution (1765-1783). Other, lesser-known Patriot revolutions took place in the Atlantic World as well. The most notable among these were two revolutions in the Dutch Republic, the Orangist Revolution in 1747/1748 and the Dutch Patriot Revolution (1781-1787). The period before the 1790s also saw the establishment of the Corsican Republic (1755-1769) and the Irish Patriot Revolution of 1782.

All these Patriot revolutions had far-reaching consequences for the Atlantic World and beyond. The Patriot revolutionaries experimented with political reforms and institutions, such as limited elections, written constitutions, and people's militias, which they believed restored a virtuous and balanced social contract. They risked their fortunes in smuggling enterprises and challenged imperial authorities. They started wars on both sides of the Atlantic that threatened the lives of themselves and others. They tore down old alliances and built new ones in search of

liberty and prosperity. And, most importantly, they unintentionally unleashed a century-long wave of revolutions that would engulf Europe, the Americas, and eventually the entire globe with a message of freedom and self-government.

The Patriots were the first of the Atlantic Revolutions, but much remains unexplored about their entanglements. Scholars have yet to recognize the Patriot Atlantic as a separate phase of the Age of Revolution. Though they share the most obvious connections in the period, even the linkages between the American and Dutch Patriots have remained barely explored in the historiography. This thesis aims to rectify this gap in the historiography and unravel this overlooked but foundational period in the Age of Revolution.

In the Netherlands and Dutch historiography, the knowledge gap on the Patriot Atlantic and its connections to the Netherlands has largely been the result of how scholars have approached the history of the revolutionary Dutch Republic. The Orangist Revolution of 1747/1748 has not been seriously studied in decades. It is often dismissed as an event that did not lead to more liberty and popular sovereignty but merely strengthened the Dutch political and aristocratic establishment. Meanwhile, the Dutch Patriot Revolution of the 1780s is primarily explained through the lens of the French Revolution, the arrival of modernity, and the birth of democracy. Among scholars of European history, the French Revolution is broadly accepted as the dividing line between the early modern and modern periods. In this light, scholars have viewed the Dutch Patriot Revolution as an unsuccessful initial attempt at creating a 'modern' society, like the French and others eventually did. The Dutch Patriots, scholars generally agree, were simply a failed part of a wave of revolutions that democratized and modernized Europe, lasting from the 1780s to 1848.

In this way, scholars have presented the Dutch Patriots as virtually indistinguishable from the Batavians, their immediate successors. In 1795 and with the help of French revolutionary forces, the Batavians exiled the Stadtholder, dissolved the Dutch Republic, and established their own Batavian Republic. The Patriots and the Batavians are considered so much alike that scholars have even bundled the Patriot and Batavian Revolutions together as simply *de Nederlandse Revolutie* (the Dutch Revolution). This thesis not only neatly fits the broadly understood arc of European history bending towards modernity and nationhood. It has also allowed many scholars of Dutch history to designate the eighteenth century as the dark ages, between the Golden Age of the seventeenth century and the arrival of modernity in the revolutionary period, and to confirm the broadly understood notion that the eighteenth century was a period of decline in Dutch history.[1]

Initially, the historiography of the American Revolution had a similar character to that of the Dutch Patriot Revolution. Up until the 1960s, histories of the American Revolution were primarily focused on explaining the founding of the United States strictly within the boundaries of American history. But over the last sixty years, scholars of the American Revolution - and American history in general - proved increasingly susceptible to critiques on this nationalist discourse. Early Atlantic historians like Caroline Robbins and Bernard Bailyn changed the historiography in profound ways when they linked the American Revolution to historical developments in Great Britain, rather than seeing the American Revolution as an insulated

[1] N.C.F. van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar moderniteit, 1750-1900* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2004); S.R.E. Klein, *Patriots Republikanisme: Politieke cultuur in Nederland (1766-1787)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 1995); Joost Rosendaal, *De Nederlandse Revolutie: Vrijheid, volk en vaderland, 1783-1799* (Nijmegen: Uitgeverij van Tilt 2005); Annelien de Dijn, *Freedom: An Unruly History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2020).

'American' event.[2] In subsequent decades, both Neo-Whig and Neo-Progressive scholars have gradually unraveled the complexity of the American Revolution using a variety of perspectives, including transatlantic ones.

Despite increasing scholarly interest in the Atlantic Revolutions and their transnational entanglements, scholars of the American Revolution have nevertheless largely overlooked the connections between the Dutch and American Patriots as well. Research on their linkages has remained largely confined to sweeping narratives of the revolutionary Atlantic, such as Jonathan Israel's recent monograph on the Age of Revolution, or has been limited to their diplomatic connections.[3] A more thorough analysis of their entanglements remains elusive, mostly because of the relative obscurity and ultimate failure of the Dutch Patriot Revolution as well as the language barriers that prevent easy access to the source material.

The chapters that follow will provide an in-depth analysis of the connections between the American and Dutch Patriot Revolutions. They will demonstrate how the Dutch and the American Patriots became entangled in longer, deeper, and more complex ways than has been previously argued. The American and Dutch Patriot revolutions shared ideological origins in classical republicanism, early liberalism, and Enlightenment thought. Based on this shared political ideology, revolutionaries in both countries created similar and interconnected institutions as well as initiated reforms that hearkened back to an imagined past of ordered

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[2] Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen: Studies in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstances of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1959); Bernard Bailyn, *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776*, Volumes I and II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1965).

[3] Jonathan I. Israel, *The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2017); Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, *Voorbeeld in de verte: de invloed van de Amerikaanse revolutie in Nederland* (Baarn: In den Toren 1979); Friedrich Edler, *The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution* (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific 1911).

liberty. More than that, the Dutch and American Patriot Revolutions were contemporaneous moments in history and intimately connected in political and commercial networks. They were thereby embroiled in interconnected events that moved each revolution forward. In thought and practice, through extensive transatlantic networks, and for more than four decades, the Atlantic Patriots formed a distinct phase in the Age of Revolution.

A close study of the Patriot Atlantic compels a readjustment of the chronology of the Age of Revolution. The deep entanglements between the American and Dutch Patriots - and that of the larger Patriot Atlantic - demonstrate that the Atlantic World embraced revolution decades before the Stamp Act in 1765, which is generally considered the start of the Age of Revolution. In 1747, Patriotism's revolutionary potential was already apparent in the Dutch Republic. The Orangist Patriots rose in revolt against the established political order on similar principles - popular sovereignty and virtuous government, among others - that sustained their ideological brethren in the 1780s and the American colonies in the 1760s and 1770s. In this way, the history of the Atlantic Patriots shows that the Age of Revolution at large should be considered a century-long phenomenon, spanning roughly 1747 to 1848.

Beyond pushing the boundaries of periodization, the history of the Patriot Atlantic also reimagines several core concepts of the Age of Revolution. The period - and, indeed, even the term 'revolution' itself - is often associated with radical politics and the continual drive to expand its democratic aims. But the American and Dutch Patriots demonstrate that a moderate form of revolutionary politics dominated the first phase of the Age of Revolution. The Dutch and American Patriots did not necessarily seek to overthrow the political order of old and establish a fundamentally new political order. Rather they sought to restore and preserve a mythologized original form of government, supposedly conceived in liberty.

As in all revolutionary movements, a fairly broad range of interpretations existed of Patriotism in the Patriot Atlantic, ranging from the moderate to the radical, with some interpretations more prominent in particular years and places than others. In the 1790s, the wide range of interpretations would create a crack and ultimately a split in the Patriot movement on both sides of the Atlantic under pressure of the radicalizing French Revolution. Between 1747 and 1787, however, the consensus among Atlantic Patriots was that the term "revolution" meant a return to a mythologized original order rather than the start of a new world that radically diverged from it. Patriot revolutionary ideals, political and economic practices, as well as cultural expressions operated under the assumption that history was a cyclical process in which different generations sought to restore the original liberty when it was suppressed by one force or another. The Atlantic Patriots understood "revolution" primarily as a return to these principles rather than a linear movement of history towards progress. They crafted their revolutions in pursuit of a return to that original, mythologized governmental compact.

Similarly, the terminology used by virtually all revolutionaries between 1747 and 1848, such as "liberty" and "aristocracy", had a distinct meaning in the Patriot Atlantic that is related but not entirely the same as those of later movements in the Age of Revolution. Liberty was not intended to be an inclusive category of empowerment of various groups in society, such as the enslaved and women or even poor white men. Rather, the Patriots understood liberty to be the maintenance and rejuvenation of existing privileges, from medieval guilds to consent to taxation, that they believed were under threat. Aristocracy had a different meaning for the Patriots as well. Whereas the French revolutionaries would ultimately turn against the literal institution of the aristocracy, the Dutch and American Patriots had a largely abstract understanding of it. They conceptualized aristocracy as the nepotism of the political establishment and tyrannical

entrenchment of power. Unlike in France, blue-blooded aristocrats held little to no power in the Dutch Republic and the American colonies. Aristocrats often were Patriots, literally so in the Dutch case and arguably so in the American colonies if one considers the Southern planter class a form of American aristocracy. On both sides of the Atlantic, Patriots did attack some of the vestiges of literal aristocratic power, as in Thomas Jefferson's campaign against primogeniture and Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol's essays against the medieval *drostendiensten.* Still, the Atlantic Patriots seldom advocated for the wholesale overthrow of the system of privilege of which they generally formed an integral part.

In addition to contributing to the broader historiography on the revolutionary Atlantic, the following chapters also engage the historiography on republicanism in several key ways. In the historiographies of both the American and Dutch Patriot revolutions, scholars have traditionally used the term "republicanism" or "republican" political culture to denote the ideology of the Patriot revolutionaries. Especially in the 1980s and 1990s, historiographical debates among scholars such as J.G.A Pocock, Gordon Wood, and Joyce Appleby centered around the contemporary meaning of republicanism. While the following chapters do lean on the conclusions of these debates to a certain extent, this dissertation seeks to synthesize them in the larger concept of transatlantic Patriotism rather than republicanism.

Patriotism departs from republicanism as a concept in that it more accurately describes the first phase of the revolutionary Atlantic in its own right. Republicanism is often strongly connected to preceding as well succeeding eras, on the one hand to ancient Rome and Greece and the Renaissance, and the revolutionary nineteenth century on the other. When uncovering historical trends in the *longue durée*, republicanism can be a useful conceptual tool. In contrast to

republicanism, however, Patriotism denotes the ideological orientation of the revolutionary Atlantic specifically in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Patriotism also differs from republicanism in that the latter specifically calls to mind a dedication to the idea of a republic as a political entity. Republicanism was therefore a logical concept when studying the American Revolution on its own. After all, the American colonies became a republic after repudiating a monarchy, which suggested broad support for republicanism among the American revolutionaries. The history of the Patriot Atlantic, however, demonstrates that the idea of a republic - a government without a monarch, in the narrowest of terms - was a much more complicated question for the eighteenth-century Patriots than the isolated history of the American Revolution would suggest. Arguably up until 1775, the Patriot movement on both sides of the Atlantic was largely supportive of monarchy or, more basically, at least a powerful centralized executive. After the American Declaration of Independence in 1776, this idea of a Patriot king unquestionably lost popularity among some transatlantic Patriots. But it did not disappear entirely, as it continued to inform the U.S. Constitution, Dutch Patriot political thought and practice, as well as other Patriot revolutions, such as the Irish Patriot Revolution of 1782. In this way too, Patriotism is a more accurate term than republicanism to describe the ideas and practices of the Atlantic Patriots, both in its content and temporal accuracy.

The first four chapters largely cover the Patriot Atlantic before American independence in 1776, considering its origins, primordial connections, as well as its monarchial and pro-British character. Chapter 1 explores the shared ideological origins of the Dutch and American Patriots as well as the similar and interconnected histories of the Dutch Republic and the American colonies. It demonstrates how a certain mixture of political thought and practice gradually came

to dominate the Dutch Republic and American colonies. Chapter 2 examines the Orangist Revolution of 1747/1748 in the Dutch Republic, the first instance of a Patriot revolution in the Atlantic World. This chapter concludes that the Orangist Revolution proved the revolutionary potential of Patriotism and foreshadowed other Patriot Revolutions in the next four decades. Chapter 3 discusses the rise of American Patriotism, examining its development before, during, and immediately after the Seven Years' War. The third chapter shows the imperial crisis was the product of a similar kind of ideological current that had been foundational to the Orangist Patriots in 1747/48. Based on the primordial connections between the Dutch and American Patriots, Chapter 4 explores how the first concrete entanglements between the Dutch and the American colonists came into existence through Atlantic trade. The chapter demonstrates that these economic linkages not only started earlier than previously have been suspected but proved foundational for much deeper connections in the 1770s and 1780s.

The last four chapters examine how the Dutch and American Patriots became increasingly entangled after American independence and how they sought to reform their republics based on Patriot principles. Chapter 5 explores the road to American independence and how the ideology of Patriotism transformed under pressure of that moment in the Patriot Atlantic. The sixth chapter then demonstrates how the American revolutionary war and American independence greatly intensified the preexisting entanglements between the Americans and the Dutch. As the Americans sought diplomatic, political, and economic support in Europe, they exploited deep divisions in the Dutch Republic, which allowed the opposition to the Stadtholder to align itself with the American revolutionary cause. These entanglements between the American Patriots and the Dutch political opposition primed the Dutch Republic for a revolutionary confrontation in the early 1780s when the American revolutionary war expanded

to the Dutch Republic in the form of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1781-1784). Chapter 7 explores the consequences of these entanglements in the Dutch Republic and demonstrates how the transatlantic linkages with the American revolutionaries shaped the Dutch Patriot Revolution during the 1780s. Finally, Chapter 8 discusses how the 1780s unfolded in the United States, especially in regard to the creation of the federal constitution. It demonstrates how a difference of interpretation of the practical meaning of Patriotism marked the debates surrounding the framing of the United States Constitution.

Chapter One: 'Seeds of Patriotism': Origins of the Patriot Atlantic

> [I consider myself] rather as proposing a Renovation of old Friendships than the Formation of new ones, as the Americans have ever been good and faithfull Allies of [the Dutch Republic] … [The United States are] confident they have a better title to [this alliance than Great Britain], as they have adhered stedfastly through every Trial to those principles which formed and supported this Republick, while others have wantonly abandoned them. [I consider myself] particularly fortunate to be thus accredited to a Nation, which has made such memorable exertions in favour of the Rights of Men, and to a Prince, whose illustrious line of Ancestors and Predecessors have so often supported in Holland and England those Liberties for which the United States of America now contend

So wrote the American revolutionary John Adams to the Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic William V in 1781.[4] In his attempt to convince Dutch politicians to recognize American independence, Adams sketched a shared Anglo-Dutch history, united in devotion to liberty and the rights of man. As Adams wrote in a memorial to the States General, the origins of the United States and the Dutch Republic "are so much alike, that the History of one seems but a Transcript from that of the other".[5]

When Adams wrote these memorials in 1781, Patriot understanding of an entangled Dutch-American history undoubtedly contained many myths, was politically motivated, and did

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[4] Memorial to William V, Prince of Orange, April 19, 1781, in *The Papers of John Adams*, *vol. 11,* Gregg L. Lint, Joanna M. Revelas, Richard Alan Ryerson, and Celeste Walker eds. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press 1996) p. 282–284.

[5] Memorial to the States General of the Dutch Republic, April 19, 1787, *Papers of John Adams*, *vol. 11*, p. 272-282.

not include much analytical nuance. Yet was Adams merely flattering Dutch statesmen with convenient myths for political gain? Or did the Dutch and the Americans before the late eighteenth century truly share an entangled history of political events and thought, as Adams suggested?

Over the past few decades, much secondary scholarship has traced the ideological origins of the American Revolution in its own right, starting with the publication of Caroline Robbins' work on the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen in 1959 and Bernard Bailyn's book on American revolutionary pamphlets in 1965.[6] Few scholarly debates in American historiography were as enduring and significant as the debate between the scholars, such as Joyce Appleby and Isaac Kramnick, who emphasized the importance of liberalism to the founding of the United States and those, such as John Pocock, who regarded so-called classic republicanism rooted in the Renaissance as the primary intellectual inspiration for the American revolutionaries.[7]

In contrast to historiographical debates on the origins of American revolutionary thought, only a few scholars have investigated the ideological history of the Dutch Patriots. In *The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution*, Leonard Leeb mirrored Bailyn's groundbreaking monograph on the American Revolution when he sought to untangle the history of political thought of the Batavian revolutionaries of the 1790s. Leeb's work was published in 1973 and

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[6] Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen: Studies in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstances of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1959); Bernard Bailyn, *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750-1776*, Volumes I and II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1965).

[7] Joyce Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1978); Joyce Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1992); Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990); J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1975).

focused predominantly on Dutch political theorists. More recently, Wyger Velema - a student of Pocock's - has contributed to this debate. Velema has argued that the Dutch Patriots were, in contrast to what the historiography on the Dutch Patriots suggests, ideologically separate from their Batavian revolutionary successors in the 1790s.[8]

During these debates, however, few scholars have considered transatlantic connections in political thought between American and Dutch Patriots. As a result, scholarship has overlooked how the study of these entanglements can crystallize the origins of their shared ideology. While Pocock did consider the influence of Renaissance and classical thought from the European continent, he mostly traced these ideas directly from Renaissance Italy to the seventeenth and eighteenth-century British Isles. Gordon Wood, Bailyn, Kramnick, Appleby, and others also largely confined their research to the history of Great Britain to which the Americans had the most obvious connections. Recently, scholars have made valuable contributions to this debate. Craig Yirush, for example, has demonstrated in his *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire* how the colonial experience shaped American political thought. Yet the scholarly debate has remained largely framed around the larger British Atlantic, arising from the broader idea that the history of the United States only had British antecedents.[9] Only Wyger Velema has forayed into the unexplored territory of American connections to Dutch Patriot thought. According to Velema, the Dutch Patriots swam in the same intellectual current as the American revolutionaries.

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[8] Leonard Leeb, *The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution* (The Hague: Nijhoff 1973); Wyger Velema, 'Jonathan Israel and Dutch Patriotism', *De Achttiende Eeuw* 41 (2009), p. 152-159.
[9] Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2011); C. Bradley Thompson, *America's Revolutionary Mind: A Moral History of the American Revolution and the Declaration That Defined It* (New York: Encounter Books 2019).

Mirroring the arguments made by his mentor Pocock, Velema placed the Dutch Patriots firmly in a classical republican tradition.[10]

Surveying political, economic, and intellectual developments of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Atlantic demonstrates that a mixture of events and thinkers, rather than one single philosophical current, created the political thought of both the American and Dutch Patriots. Foreshadowed by Enlightenment thinkers during the first half of the eighteenth century, a transatlantic ideology of Patriotism materialized that fused essential elements of early liberalism with classical republicanism. To the eighteenth-century Patriots, classical republicanism and liberalism were not opposites or even coexisting philosophies. Rather they constituted a single current of thought that explained the political world and its history. Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a body of literature emerged - on political virtues and vices, on balance in government, on natural law, on popular consent, on standing armies and citizen's militias - that the American and Dutch revolutionaries treated as the definitive source material for political truths. It formed a Patriot canon, in other words. The cooptation of the Patriot canon combined with the aggressive use of the liberal printing press would ultimately enable Patriotism to become part of mainstream political discourse during the eighteenth century and would allow the Patriot revolutions to unfold in the Netherlands and North America.

At the same time, the history of the Dutch Republic and the American colonies reveals that they shared a broadly similar political culture in which they valued liberty and consensual rule and in which the free press was a critical instrument of political debate. The Dutch and the Americans shared significant parts of this political culture with Great Britain during the

[10] Wyger R. E. Velema, 'Conversations with the Classics: Ancient Political Virtue and Two Modern Revolutions', *Early American Studies* 10 (2012), p. 415-438.

seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. But the British Empire's rise to power during the eighteenth century would confront the Dutch and the Americans with their inferior status vis-a-vis the British. This power imbalance combined with their strong ties to Great Britain reinforced the notion that malignant forces - corruption, tyranny, foreign powers, or a combination of these - perpetually endangered the fragile state of their rights and liberties. Meanwhile, a deep-seated awareness of their own - largely mythologized - history as a continuous struggle between tyranny and liberty amplified the effects of this inferiority complex. As a result, the Patriot canon captivated the minds of Dutch and American elites considerably more so than those in Britain where Patriotism remained a fringe ideology even within the opposition to the Whig-government. The political theories espoused in the Patriot canon explained the inferiority complex that haunted both the Dutch and the Americans as well as a justification for a vigorous defense of their liberty against powerful forces that seemed to undermine a political culture they had built over the last few centuries.

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The foundations of Patriotism were laid in the peculiar political developments that the Dutch and the Americans shared in the early modern period. These developments would define the historical consciousness of the eighteenth-century Patriot revolutionaries and how they would read the body of literature that would ultimately constitute the Patriot canon. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, both the Dutch and the American colonists gradually developed a political culture of consent between public officials and the governed supported by a strong devotion to the concept of liberty and the emergence of a free press.

In the Dutch Republic, this political culture of consent and liberty had its origins in the High Middle Ages. Starting around the year 1000, the various principalities of the Low Countries

gradually developed into urbanized trading hubs of the European economy. Lacking fertile soil for staple agricultural products like wheat, the inhabitants and settlers of the Low Countries depended on merchant trade for their livelihood and survival. The centrality of the trading economy combined with the lack of demand for labor in agriculture forced inhabitants of the Low Countries into cities, from which their feudal lords increasingly demanded revenue and manpower.[11]

The cities, in turn, depended on their lords for economic and military protection and sought to gain city rights as a way to strengthen their economic and political position against competing cities. The rights and duties of both the suzerain and the governed were explicitly enumerated in city charters. They limited the lord's power over that city in a contract. Burghers - the citizens of the cities - placed great value in their charters, because they specified a wide range of political and economic rights, such as the right to build city walls, to establish a university, and to create and protect guilds. At the same time, their charters outlined the limits on the lord's powers regarding the judicial system and legislation. In this tradition of mutual obligations and consent, it became customary for new suzerains to commit to a ceremonial entry into each city over which they ruled. This so-called *Blijde Inkomst* or 'Joyous Entry' was a gesture of the suzerain to the people of the city that symbolized the lord's respect for the city charters - with its enumerated rights and privileges - and thus the contract he had entered when he assumed his position as suzerain. As a result of this political culture, medieval suzerains in the Low Countries who wanted to collect taxes or raise an army needed consent from local institutions. These

[11] Oscar Gelderblom, *Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2013); Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and the Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1997).

institutions, in turn, were governed by intense negotiations between various factions.[12] It was King Philip II's disregard of this deeply rooted political culture – demonstrated when he failed to visit the Low Countries after his ascent to the throne, when he imposed authority on religious matters without negotiation, when he demanded taxes rather than customarily 'requesting' them - that prompted the Dutch to revolt against Catholic Spain and ultimately become an independent republic in the late sixteenth century.[13]

As the Dutch Republic rose to prominence during the seventeenth century, political power concentrated somewhat in the Grand Pensionary of Holland - a powerbroker in the Republic's richest province - and the Stadtholder, a quasi-monarchical office and a remnant of the position of viceroy under Habsburg rule over the Low Countries in the late Middle Ages. Despite their relatively large degree of political influence, however, these centralized offices remained in perpetual negotiation and conflict with a vast array of local interests, much like their medieval predecessors. The constitutional structure of the Dutch Republic only solidified a preexisting political culture in which governments needed consent from society at large for government action.[14]

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Dutch increasingly came to understand the establishment and maintenance of this system as a state of liberty or *vrijheid* as opposed to a disregard of rights and privileges, which was framed as *tirannie* or *dwingelandij* (tyranny). Especially after the Dutch Revolt in the late sixteenth century and the rising threat that

[12] Wim Blockmans and Walter Prevenier, *The Promised Lands: The Low Countries under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2010); Charles Tilly and Wim Blockmans (eds.), *Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994).
[13] H.G. Koeningsberger, *Monarchies, States Generals and Parliaments: The Netherlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2001).
[14] Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995), p. 129-233.

King Louis XIV of France represented in the seventeenth century, this rhetoric of liberty became strongly linked to Protestantism and anti-Catholicism. Under banners with the phrase *Pro religione et libertate* - For the [Protestant] religion and liberty - Louis XIV's nemesis Stadtholder William III invaded England and took the English throne from a Catholic monarch in 1688.[15]

Similar to public officials in the Dutch Republic, the monarch in England had historically been required to negotiate with Parliament - England's legislative body that housed various societal interests - to enact legislation. Especially after the implementation of the Magna Carta in the thirteenth century, it became English custom for the monarchs to call forth a Parliament when they needed to raise revenue, especially for warfare. Kings and queens did not always adhere to this custom, however. English monarchs regularly attempted to rein in Parliament's power of the purse. In the seventeenth century, these power struggles turned violent when King Charles I sought to rule without Parliament. Charles raised revenue without Parliamentary approval by invoking ancient statutes and took controversial decisions regarding religion, such as appointing an Arminian confidant as Archbishop of Canterbury and imposing religious uniformity in both Scotland and England. As a result of his attempts to concentrate power in court, Charles antagonized various powerful factions throughout England. The dispute between Charles and Parliament led to the English Civil War and Charles' decapitation in the middle of the century.[16]

The restoration of the monarchy in 1660 formally ended the Civil Wars, but the conflict between Parliament and the Crown continued under the rule of Charles II and particularly James II. These two monarchs likewise challenged the rights that Parliament claimed. To make matters worse, both kings had Catholic sympathies which were associated with the autocratic absolutism

[15] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 233-958.
[16] Austin Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004); Jonathan Scott, *England's Troubles: Seventeenth-Century English Political Instability in European Context* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2000).

and "tyranny" of France's Louis XIV. As in the Dutch Republic, concepts such as liberty, rights, and Protestantism became increasingly central to English - and by extension American colonial - political culture.[17]

Stadtholder William's rise to power in England - the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 - signaled a definitive curtailment of monarchical power and Catholicism in England.[18] The Bill of Rights that William and his wife Mary Stuart accepted as a condition for ascending the throne specified the limits of the monarch's power and the supremacy of Parliament over various important matters, such as taxing powers. It was also in many ways similar to the city charters and political customs of the Dutch Republic.[19] William's Glorious Revolution solidified Parliamentary power, at least in England and Wales, and firmly established a political culture that required a peaceful but constant negotiation between different factions and interests to rule effectively.[20]

The English colonies in North America largely inherited England's government by negotiation and consent as well as its political discourse of 'liberty' and attachment to rights. In this way, they gradually developed as semi-autonomous regions in the periphery of the English and British Empire during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The North American

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[17] Anna Keay, *The Magnificent Monarch: Charles II and the Ceremonies of Power* (London: Bloomsbury Academic Publishing 2008); Scott Sowerby, *Making Toleration: The Repealers and the Glorious Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2013); Frank Bate, *The Declaration of Indulgence 1672: A Study in the Rise of Organised Dissent* (Liverpool: University Press of Liverpool 1908); Tim Harris, *Revolution: The Great Crisis of the British Monarchy, 1685-1720* (London: Penguin Books 2007).
[18] More information on the Glorious Revolution and its global aftermath can be found in: *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact,* ed. Jonathan I. Israel (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2003); Luc Panhuysen, *Oranje tegen de Zonnekoning: De strijd tussen Willem III en Lodewijk XIV om Europa* (Amsterdam: Atlas Contact 2016); Steven Pincus, *1688: The First Modern Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press 2009).
[19] *The English Bill of Rights 1689,* retrieved from the Yale Avalon Project, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp.
[20] Jonathan Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), p. 796-863 and Pincus, *1688.*

colonies were settled for a variety of reasons and under various colonial schemes, but all colonies retained a degree of legislative autonomy and developed largely self-governing institutions in their respective territories. American colonial interests were often at odds with those in England, but strong attachments to the mother country prevented the rise of any separatist notions, even during the English Civil Wars. Instead, seventeenth-century historical developments gave birth to the American conception of their relationship with England as an interdependent, yet negotiable contract between the colonists and the monarchy in England. This process was in many ways similar to the one in the Dutch Republic where cities and provinces were considered simultaneously independent from and dependent on the national government.[21]

All North American colonies would eventually share this sense of partial autonomy from the metropole, but arguably the best example of this phenomenon was the colony of Massachusetts where the first stirrings of the American Revolution would eventually take place. Massachusetts was founded as a charter colony in 1629 and its colonists took their charter with them to America, as opposed to leaving it in London. Unlike other early modern stock companies, the board of governors of the Massachusetts Bay Company resided in the colony. Therefore, shareholders' meetings of the Company were held in Massachusetts, an unprecedented degree of autonomy in the early-modern colonial world. Mark Peterson has even argued that Boston, the political and economic heart of Massachusetts, was effectively an early modern city-state in the mold of ancient Athens or Venice. Boston possessed a kind of autonomy that even Dutch cities did not have.[22]

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[21] Alan Taylor, *American Colonies: The Settling of North America, Volume 1* (New York: Penguin Books 2001), p. 117-300.
[22] Mark Peterson, *The City-State of Boston: The Rise and Fall of an Atlantic Power, 1630-1865* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2019), p. 1-188.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the relative autonomy of the American colonies was largely condoned in England as long as they continued to benefit England economically and chose the right side in England's domestic struggles, a status that Edmund Burke famously called "salutary neglect". Attempts at establishing more direct and centralized control over the colonies, such as James II's ill-fated Dominion of New England in the late 1680s, created much resentment among the colonists.[23] As a result, many American colonists were eager to support William's Glorious Revolution, prompting significant political shifts in the North American colonies. In Boston, a mob arrested Dominion governor Edmund Andros and declared for William. Meanwhile, in New York - likewise a part of James' Dominion - a rebellion broke out under the leadership of militia commander Jacob Leisler who unsuccessfully attempted to rule the colony without royal approval. In 1691, royal control over the colony was restored to William's government and Leisler was executed.[24]

The creation of a relatively free printing press in the Dutch Republic, Great Britain, and the American colonies broadened the reach of the discourse associated with the political culture of consent and liberty and provided a crucial platform for intellectuals to discuss political, cultural, and scientific ideas. Starting in the late sixteenth century, the Dutch Republic gradually became the global center of printing due to its lack of official censorship, sophisticated information networks, high literacy rates, as well as its unique capacity to publish in a multitude of languages. The Dutch Republic lacked a central authority with the power to censor printed works. Even if an individual city used its powers to censor a certain publication, an abundance of alternative cities existed with printers who were willing to publish controversial works,

[23] Taylor, *American Colonies*, p. 117-300.
[24] Carla Gardina Pestana, *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2010), p. 128-158; David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press 1987).

effectively creating a free press in the Dutch Republic. Meanwhile, due to the sophisticated information networks of the Netherlands that came with its burgeoning global economy, information was available from all over the world. The Republic's unique position in Europe in terms of the press and its highly literate domestic market made the demand for Dutch printing - newspapers, pamphlets, and books - insatiable, both in the Netherlands and the Atlantic World more broadly.[25]

During a large portion of the seventeenth century, the printing press in England was subjected to censorship laws with varying degrees of success, in contrast to the free press of the Dutch Republic. At the start of the Civil War in 1642, the press was initially relatively free when Parliament abolished the Court of High Commission. Yet Parliament quickly subjected the press to its censorship with the Licensing Order of 1643. After the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Charles II kept the Licensing Order intact. He also strengthened English censorship with the Printing Act of 1662, which specifically designated a limited number of printers who were allowed to operate in Great Britain. In the American colonies, printing was likewise limited during most of the seventeenth century, although mostly resulting from the lack of presses available there rather than any particular censorship laws.[26]

The Glorious Revolution of 1688 heralded the beginning of a freer age in the printing press on the British Isles and ultimately the Empire at large. William's acceptance of the limits of his political power with the Bill of Rights and his familiarity with the relatively open Dutch

[25] Woodruff D. Smith, 'The Function of Commercial Centers in the Modernization of European Capitalism: Amsterdam as an Information Exchange in the Seventeenth Century,' *The Journal of Economic History* 44 (1984), p. 985-1005; Jacob Soll, *The Information Master Jean-Baptiste Colbert's Secret State Intelligence System* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2011) p. 1-33; Jan de Vries, *The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1976), p. 147-175.

[26] Randy Robertson, *Censorship and Conflict in Seventeenth-Century England: The Subtle Art of Division* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press 2009), p. 1-162.

press meant that he was considerably more tolerant of diverging public opinions than his predecessors had been. Although there were no formal free speech laws, the freer press naturally resulted from Parliamentary opposition, an essential part of English political culture after the Glorious Revolution. Partisans preferred their own printing outlets. They used these outlets to attempt to shape public policy and their political movements. After the expiration of the Licensing Order in 1693, printing on the British Isles exploded in volume and diversity. As the eighteenth century progressed, printing became increasingly important to political, cultural, and scientific debates.[27] In the first half of the eighteenth century, the English printing boom also found its way to the American colonies. Larger cities such as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston transformed into prominent centers of knowledge production and dissemination. It was partially through this boom in printing and wide consumption of written materials that a figure like Benjamin Franklin could rise to prominence.[28] Though the Dutch Republic would remain the European center of the printing press, Britain and its colonies also became an important source of information in the eighteenth-century Atlantic.

Part of this culture of a free press was the increasing interest in history - global, ancient, as well "national" - by the reading public at large, building a historical consciousness in the minds of the Dutch and the American colonists. The sheer number of histories being published in the Dutch Republic and Great Britain especially during the eighteenth century suggests that consumer appetite for historical works was virtually insatiable. Printers published every kind of history imaginable from local to global, from short histories to multivolume works. Some of these works were even shared across the Atlantic. The massive works of a historian like Thomas

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[27] Robertson, *Censorship*, p. 163-208.

[28] Stephen Botein, "'Meer Mechanics' and an Open Press: The Business and Political Strategies of Colonial American Printers", *Perspectives in American History* 9 (1975), p. 127-225.

Salmon were originally published in Great Britain, but they also found their way to the Dutch Republic as well as North America. Moreover, although these works were, by and large, meant simply to inform the readers, especially "national histories" contained many positive references to what the printers and translators believed to be the country's founding principles. In the Dutch Republic, editors appropriated the works of Thomas Salmon to include narratives that spoke positively of Dutch history and the Dutch commitment to liberty.[29]

By 1700, both the Dutch Republic and the American colonies had developed a political culture that regarded negotiation between societal factions and public officials as the regular mode of politics. At the same time, both had become linked to each other through their relationship with Great Britain and accompanying historical events, especially the Glorious Revolution of 1688. During William III's reign as King of Great Britain, between 1688 and 1703, the American colonies and the Dutch Republic were even in a personal union. Moreover, the concept of liberty was properly understood as the respect of local rights that were either political customs or enumerated rights in a charter or both. Finally, a relatively free press in the Dutch Republic and the British Atlantic allowed the creation of a free, transatlantic conversation on the nature of politics as well as a broad appreciation for history, laying the foundations for the birth of Patriotism.

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[29] *Verhandeling over den oorsprong en historie der vaderlandsche rechten, inzonderheid van Holland en Zeeland* by Laurens van der Spiegel (1769), University Library of the University of Amsterdam, henceforth referenced as UvA, W 117 775; *Vaderlandsche historie verkort*, by Jan Wagenaar, UvA O 80-410; *Hedendaagsche historie, of Tegenwoordige staat van alle volkeren*, multiple parts and various editions published throughout the eighteenth century, by Thomas Salmon; *Historie van Holland, zedert het bestand van het jaar 1609, tot den vreede van Nimmegen. Vervolgt tot den vreede van Ryswyk 1697. En verder tot aan dien van Utrecht in 1713* by Adriaen Baillet (1725), UvA O 63-5479-5480; *Beknopte vragen uit de staat-kundige historie tot op desen tijd vervolgt,* by Johann Hübner (1719) UvA OK 80-676 and OK 05-79 and Dutch National Library in The Hague (Koninklijke Bibliotheek), henceforth referred to as KB 3064 G 3-18; *Historie der regeringe van Lodewyk den XIV* by Henri Philippe de Limier (1718) UvA 62-6353-6359; *Historie van leven des heeren Huig de Groot* by Caspar Brandt (1732) UvA 2319 B 12; *Historie van het stadhouderschap, sedert deszelfs oorspronk tot op den tegenwoordigen tyd* by Guillaume Thomas François Raynal (1749) UvA O 63-9672.

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During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the centers of the free press in the Atlantic World - the Dutch Republic, Great Britain, and the American colonies - generated a vast stream of publications and became increasingly interconnected, providing the lifeblood of Patriot political thought. As participants in national and transnational conversations, intellectuals in the early modern Atlantic world produced a wide variety of works on science, politics, and philosophy. These works were often in conversation with each other. A significant number of these books would become critical works of study for the elites, who would subsequently participate in transnational and transatlantic conversations about them. They forged and expanded the intellectual community that would be called the Republic of Letters.[30]

Patriotism, as it would develop in the eighteenth century, was the product of a specific subset of these works circulating in the seventeenth and eighteenth-century Atlantic. These works promoted ideas on political consent, rights, virtue, and liberty, which deeply resonated with the historical consciousness of the Dutch and the American colonists. The Patriot canon - composed of works from authors such as John Locke, John Trenchard, and Francis Hutcheson - came from both classical republican and liberal intellectual traditions, which eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers started to present as mutually reinforcing ideas. As a whole, the Patriot canon sketched an idealized political system of liberty, balance, and virtue grounded in natural law while critiquing a corrupted one that had fallen from its original principles. It was the combination of these widely available ideas that would collide with historical events and

[30] Norman Fiering, "The Transatlantic Republic of Letters: A Note on the Circulation of Learned Periodicals to Early Eighteenth-Century America", *William and Mary Quarterly* 33 (1976), p. 642-660; Margaret C. Jacob, *Strangers Nowhere in the World: The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Early-Modern Europe* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2006).

ultimately produce the ideology of Patriotism and its associated political movements across the Atlantic between 1747 and 1787.

Liberal thinkers were the earliest contributors to what would be considered the canon of transatlantic Patriotism in the latter half of the eighteenth century. Joyce Appleby and Isaac Kramnick have already effectively traced the origins of liberal thought to seventeenth-century England. They have demonstrated the importance of John Locke's ideas, especially concerning the rise of capitalism and a rapidly changing mercantile society. Rather than strictly adhering to the gloomy perception of the world held by the classical republicans, Appleby and Kramnick argued that Locke's - and later Adam Smith's - optimism and belief in individualism represented a strong undercurrent in American Patriot thought, especially that of Thomas Jefferson, that came to complete fruition during the polarized early American republic of the 1790s. Although they did not deny the significance of classical republican thought to the revolutionary generation, Appleby and Kramnick revealed how Locke and Smith - as well as Francis Bacon and Isaac Newton by extension - laid the foundations for the American individualist mindset in which liberty "could be construed as a universal liberation wherein [ordinary] men - and of course it was a white male vision - were free to define and pursue their own goals."[31]

In addition to the individualist and optimistic elements of liberalism that Appleby and Kramnick demonstrated, liberalism's marriage to natural law theory also proved foundational to transatlantic Patriotism. The famous Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius was arguably among the most influential for later liberal natural law theorists. Published in 1625, Grotius' greatest impact on

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[31] Joyce Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts", *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986), p. 33; Isaac Kramnick, *Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism: Political Ideology in Late Eighteenth-Century England and America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1990); For more information on Newton's influence in the British Atlantic, see: Margaret C. Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1976).

natural law theory was his work *De jure belli ac pacis* (*On the Law of War and Peace*). Like Grotius' magnum opus *Mare Liberum*, *De jure* was largely dedicated to international law and specifically its implications for declaring war and making peace. However, *De jure* also made salient points on man in the philosophical state of nature. In *De jure*'s so-called "Prolegomena", or "Preliminary Discourse", Grotius explained how man in the state of nature - the state humans found themselves in before the establishment of government and society - possesses a certain sociability. He, therefore, seeks to create a society that is good both for himself and others. According to Grotius, mankind's universal sociability embedded in the laws of nature would allow for the making of peace between people who do not share transcendent values, an argument intended to provide a philosophical justification to end Europe's religious wars, especially the contemporary and gruesome Thirty Years' War (1618-1648). More importantly, Grotius made the controversial argument that this natural law would still exist, "even if we should concede … that there is no God", emphasizing the universal and perpetual state of natural law.[32]

Samuel von Pufendorf, a German jurist and political theorist during the seventeenth century, built upon Grotius' ideas. Pufendorf's work would prove critical in amplifying Grotius' ideas for liberal and Patriot thinkers in the following decades. Pufendorf largely substantiated Grotius' assessment of mankind's sociability and the universal application of natural law in his most famous work *The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature*. At the same time, Pufendorf also responded to Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*, which had been published in 1651, right between Grotius' *De jure* (1625) and Pufendorf's *Whole Duty* (1673). Pufendorf refuted Hobbes's assessment on the circumstances of the state of nature, which Hobbes had famously

[32] Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres: Prologemena* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1925).

framed as a chaotic *bellum omnium contra omnes* ("war of all against all"). In contrast, Pufendorf regarded the state of nature as peaceful but insecure, thus leading to the establishment of society and government. Unlike Hobbes - who favored an absolute sovereign who would bring peace to the chaotic state of nature - Pufendorf was decisively neutral on what kind of government he preferred. Instead, Pufendorf largely provided a theoretical framework of the different types of government that could emerge from the peaceful yet feeble state of nature he envisioned.[33]

Arguably, the ideas of John Locke were liberalism's most significant contribution to the Patriot canon, especially his reinterpretation of Hobbes' social contract that supplanted the state of nature and his idea of a civic government that ruled by consent of the people. Building on Grotius and Pufendorf's interpretations of natural law, Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1689) - the version which would be predominantly read in the American colonies - was in part a reinterpretation of Hobbes' social contract in *Leviathan*. The chaos of the English Civil War had inspired Hobbes to view the social contract as an obligation of the people to sacrifice their liberties found in a chaotic state of nature for the security provided by an absolute government. In contrast, Locke echoed Grotius and Pufendorf. He argued that the state of nature was not as chaotic as Hobbes imagined. The social contract that resulted from the state of nature was one of mutual obligation between the government and the people in which the people gave up some of their liberty for the security of themselves and their property by the state. The civic government that emerged from this social contract could only govern with the consent of the people through a representative institution. If the government sought to rule without that consent, the people

[33] Samuel von Pufendorf, *The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature*, trans. Andrew Tooke, ed. Ian Hunter and David Saunders, with Two Discourses and a Commentary by Jean Barbeyrac, trans. David Saunders (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2003), https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/888.

would have the right to alter the government to one which respected that social contract grounded in natural law.[34]

Like their liberal counterparts, classical republican works that would prove critical to the Patriot canon emerged from the political, legal, and economic controversies of the seventeenth century. Of particular importance were the works written by the so-called Commonwealthmen. They were a relatively small group of reformers who sought to root out what they believed to be corruption in British society that had materialized after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Commonwealthmen leaned heavily on the ideas of ancient thinkers like Aristotle and Cicero as well as Renaissance intellectuals, especially Niccolò Machiavelli, and emphasized the value of virtue and balance to politics. The Commonwealthmen - and the so-called "Country Party" opposition they supported in Parliament - are often associated with the early eighteenth century and the writings of John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon in particular. But their movement was already on the rise during the 1690s.

Andrew Fletcher, a Scottish politician and intellectual in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, was one of the more prominent early Commonwealth thinkers whose ideas on citizen's militias would prove foundational to Patriotism. Fletcher's rise in the politics and political discourse of England and Scotland was largely the result of his opposition to James II, acting as the Duke of Monmouth's commander of the cavalry during the latter's ill-fated rebellion in 1685. When Monmouth's rebellion failed, Fletcher placed his bets on Stadtholder William's successful invasion of Britain in 1688. Fletcher's support for William led to his

[34] John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Thomas Hollis (London: A. Millar et al., 1764), consulted last on February 5, 2021 on Liberty Fund website: https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/hollis-the-two-treatises-of-civil-government-hollis-ed.

appointment as Commissioner in Scottish Parliament.[35] Though initially a supporter of the Glorious Revolution, Fletcher became increasingly disenchanted with the new King, particularly regarding his policies towards Scotland. William kept a standing army in England and Scotland after the Revolution, primarily to preserve the balance of power against France. Fletcher, however, regarded the presence of the English standing army in Scotland - a place in which the English at this time believed resided large numbers of pro-French Jacobites - reminiscent of James II's absolutism and oppression of Scottish liberty.[36]

Using the recently established free press on the British Isles, Fletcher argued against standing armies and in favor of the use of citizen's militias in a pamphlet titled *A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias,* published in Edinburgh in 1698. Intellectually, Fletcher's pamphlet leaned on the civic humanist tradition of the Italian Renaissance. He sought to adapt their ideas to contemporary circumstances. Like Machiavelli and other classical thinkers, Fletcher argued that a "well regulated militia" - as opposed to a standing army and mercenaries - would create virtuous soldiers who were motivated to fight for their country. By extension, these militias would forge a virtuous social and political order. Fletcher echoed early Renaissance thinkers with his scathing attack on standing armies and mercenaries, but he effectively fused these ideas with the contemporary Protestant ethic of frugality - equating the thrift of militias with manliness and virtue - to critique Renaissance Italy. The Italian Republics, he claimed, had destroyed "their frugal and military way of living, and addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined and expensive pleasures". In addition to Renaissance Italy, Fletcher deployed a variety of other historical examples to disentangle the laws of history. Fletcher's historicist arguments

[35] W.C. Mackenzie, *Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun: His Life and Times* (Edinburgh: The Porpoise Press 1935).
[36] John Robertson, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue* (Edinburgh: J. Donald Publishing 1985).

covered ancient Rome, the Middle Ages, and English history to prove how standing armies led to the decline of liberty, in contrast to the institution of militias which would ostensibly preserve it.[37]

Robert Molesworth was another prominent classical republican thinker who would earn an important place in the Patriot canon. Like Fletcher, Molesworth rose to power as a supporter of William III's Glorious Revolution. As a result, he was granted a position as England's ambassador to Denmark to counter Louis XIV's influence at the Danish court. Molesworth soon discovered, however, that Denmark had fallen victim to the absolutism of France, despite its supposed history of freedom. Denmark's case proved that even free societies - like Denmark and England - can fall victim to the tyranny of absolutism. In his *Account*, Molesworth penned a largely imaginary history of Denmark fused with contemporary Commonwealth rhetoric of freedom and ancient constitutions, a type of political thought that Pocock has called "Gothic Liberty".[38] Unlike Fletcher - whose *Discourse* would not be published in the Dutch Republic or translated into Dutch until the 1770s - Molesworth's *Account* was published in Dutch and French in the Dutch Republic throughout the 1690s. Molesworth's account on Denmark also arrived in the American colonies; Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, among others, all owned a copy of Molesworth's *Account,* attesting to his influence in America.[39]

During the 1720s and at the height of the South Sea Company controversy – a financial scheme with corruption and economic collapse at its core - Country Party voices similar to

[37] Andrew Fletcher, *Selected Discourses and Speeches: A Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias* (Edinburgh 1698). Consulted last on November 5, 2020 on Liberty Fund website: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/fletcher-selected-discourses-and-speeches.
[38] Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 388-494.
[39] Robert Molesworth, *An Account of Denmark, With Francogallia and Some Considerations for the Promoting of Agriculture and Employing the Poor*, ed. Justin Champion (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2011)

Fletcher and Molesworth came to the fore who would likewise wield a significant influence on Dutch and American political thought. The most prominent Commonwealth voice in this period was John Trenchard, a writer who had already established himself as a prominent Commonwealthman during the 1690s. Like Fletcher, Trenchard expressed his distrust of standing armies in a 1697 pamphlet titled *An Argument, shewing that a Standing Army is inconsistent with a Free Government, and absolutely destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy*. Trenchard's *Argument* detailed what he believed to be a free government, which was a political system - a 'Constitution' - balanced between the monarch, the aristocrats, and the people. Under this constitution, Trenchard reasoned that

> the King enjoys all the Prerogatives necessary to the Support of his Dignity, and Protection of his People, and is only abridged from the Power of injuring his own Subjects: In short, the Man is loose, and the Beast only bound; and our Government may truly be called an Empire of Laws, and not of Men; for every Man has the same Right to what he can acquire by his Labour and Industry, as the King hath to his Crown, and the meanest Subject hath his Remedy against him in his Courts at *Westminster:* No Man can be imprisoned, unless he has transgressed a Law of his own making, nor be try'd but by his Neighbours.[40]

Basing his argument on Machiavelli, James Harrington's utopian *Oceana* republic, and Francis Bacon, Trenchard sketched an imaginary global history of standing armies suppressing liberties. Like Molesworth and Fletcher, Trenchard deployed historicist arguments and reasoned that "if

[40] John Trenchard, *An Argument, shewing that a Standing Army is inconsistent with a Free Government, and absolutely destructive to the Constitution of the English Monarchy* (London 1697), p. 6. Consulted last on June 20, 2020, on Liberty Fund website: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/trenchard-a-collection-of-tracts-vol-i.

we look through the World, we shall find in no Country, Liberty and an Army stand together". He recounted over a dozen instances in the history of Asia and Europe in which people supposedly either suffered under slavery or lived in liberty depending on the presence of a standing army. Even in the Dutch Republic - ruled by Trenchard's beloved William - people were free because the standing armies were garrisoned in the "conquered Countries" of Brabant and Flanders. Moreover, the Dutch had their city charters. Therefore, Trenchard reasoned, the Dutch could never be "conquered by their own Forces, their Country being so full of strong Towns, fortified both by Art and Nature, and defended by their own Citizens, that it would be a fruitless Attempt for their own Armies to invade them; for if they should march against any of their Cities, 'tis but shutting up their Gates, and the Design is spoiled."[41] As the history of the Dutch and other nations proved, militias would solve the liberty-oppressing problem of standing armies, because they would provide a proper common defense, would be more dedicated to the cause than their mercenary counterparts, and would reflect the perfect balance of an ideal political system; the King would be the general, the aristocrats would be the commanders, and the "freeholders" would be the soldiers.

In the early 1720s, Trenchard made his most significant contribution to classical republican thought and the Patriot canon with the *Cato Letters*, a series of essays in the *London Journal* that he coauthored with Thomas Gordon. The *Cato Letters* reiterated the arguments made by Trenchard in the 1690s regarding standing armies. But the economic consequences of the failure of the South Sea Company in 1720 loomed in the minds of Trenchard and Gordon. Unlike Trenchard's rather positive assessment of the English constitution in his *Argument*, the *Cato Letters* were gloomier and especially obsessed with corruption and the decline of virtue in

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[41] Trenchard, *An Argument,* p. 13-14

Great Britain, mirroring Machiavellian sentiments. Though the "constitution of England is yet sound and vigorous[,] … if some vigorous and bold resolutions are not there taken … in redressing all sorts of publick corruptions, the liberty of Great-Britain—my heart can speak no more."[42] Like Fletcher, Trenchard and Gordon also infused their thinking with contemporary Protestant sensibilities, especially the merits of frugality. It was the maxims of "virtue, moderation, and frugality" that kept the "union of several little aristocracies" called the Dutch Republic together, even though Cato considered the United Provinces not a pure "commonwealth".[43]

During the first half of the eighteenth century, Enlightenment thinkers built upon the legacy of classical republican and liberal thought of the previous decades. They fused the two philosophies into one current of political thought to be deployed by the Patriot revolutionaries in the latter half of the eighteenth century. During the 1690s, Algernon Sidney's *Discourses of Government* (1698) had already somewhat bridged the divide between Locke's liberalism and the classical republican thinkers and would ultimately be rediscovered later in the eighteenth century, especially by the American revolutionaries after independence.[44] Sidney's radical repudiation of monarchy as an institution and his earlier attempts to undermine William III as Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic made him more of a fringe thinker in the years after the Glorious Revolution and therefore limited the reach of his ideas in his own time.

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[42] John Trenchard, "Address to the Freeholders, &c. about the Choice of their Representatives" (No. 69) in *Cato's Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects*, *vol. 3,* ed. Ronald Hamowy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995).
[43] John Trenchard, "Britain incapable of any Government but a limited Monarchy; with the Defects of a neighbouring Republick" (No. 85), in *Cato's Letters, or Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects*, *vol. 3,* ed. Ronald Hamowy (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1995).
[44] Algernon Sidney, *Discourses Concerning Government,* ed. Thomas G. West (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1996).

Arguably, the Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson was the first and most influential Enlightenment thinker to merge the ideas of the classical republicans and the liberals and convey them to a wider audience. His seminal work *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* was published for the first time in 1726 and republished several times in Great Britain and the Netherlands in French during the eighteenth century. Hutcheson's reverence for the concept of virtue, his fear of the dangers of corruption, as well as his intimate knowledge of John Locke's ideas, provided his *Inquiry* with several political implications, even though it was mostly a philosophical work. Especially in the second treatise of his *Inquiry*, Hutcheson underlined the importance of virtue to the political realm and even explicitly cited Robert Molesworth's arguments that justified the "Right of Resistance in Defence of [Rights and] Privileges".[45]

At the same time, based on the Aristotelian and Lockean philosophy that government existed to promote the common good, Hutcheson married the 'resistance' arguments of the Commonwealthmen to Locke's universalism and social contract theory. Echoing both Locke and the Commonwealthmen, Hutcheson argued that

> it follows that all human Power, or Authority, must consist in a Right transferr'd to any Person or Council, to dispose of the alienable Rights of others; and that consequently, there can be no Government so absolute, as to have even an external Right to do or command every thing. For wherever any Invasion is made upon unalienable Rights, there

[45] Francis Hutcheson, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises*, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004).

must arise either a perfect, or external Right to Resistance …

Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations in all Governments.[46]

In a similar vein as Hutcheson, Henry St. John, the 1st Viscount of Bolingbroke explicitly connected liberal to classical republican thought. Unlike Hutcheson, Bolingbroke's works focused entirely on the political realm. Scholars have traditionally considered Bolingbroke, a controversial British politician in the early eighteenth century, closely aligned with classical republican thinkers like Trenchard and Gordon.[47] Yet his most prominent works - *On the Spirit of Patriotism* and *The Idea of a Patriot King* - reveal that Bolingbroke's ideas contained strong connections to both classical republican and liberal intellectual traditions.

Bolingbroke's works, largely published between the 1720s and 1750s, were marked by his opposition to Robert Walpole, a prominent Whig Prime Minister between 1721 and 1742. *On the Spirit of Patriotism* was written in 1736 but published only in 1749 in England and 1750 in the Dutch Republic. Similar to Trenchard and Gordon's *Cato Letters*, *The Spirit of Patriotism* advanced Bolingbroke's cause against Walpole through the lens of classical republican thought. In *The Spirit of Patriotism*, Bolingbroke railed against what he regarded as Walpolean corruption and framed opposition to Walpole's government as the duty of educated and honorable men to defend liberty. It was through this devotion to liberty that Bolingbroke defined what a "*real patriot*" is, namely a man "who bends all the force of his understanding, and directs all his thoughts and actions, to the good of the country", especially the defense of liberty.[48] To

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[46] Hutcheson, *An Inquiry.*
[47] Isaac Kramnick, *Bolingbroke and His Circle: The Politics of Nostalgia in the Age of Walpole* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1968); David Armitage, "A Patriot for Whom? The Afterlives of Bolingbroke's Patriot King", *Journal of British Studies* 36 (1997), p. 397-418.
[48] Henry St. John, Lord Viscount of Bolingbroke, *The Works of the Late Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount of Bolingbroke with the Life of Lord Bolingbroke* (London, 1809) p. 31.

Bolingbroke, the lack of the spirit of patriotism in British politicians - and also the people at large - allowed corruption to fester and slowly undo Britain's liberty in the process.

While *The Spirit of Patriotism* leaned more or less exclusively on classical republican thought, Bolingbroke's *The Idea of a Patriot King* explicitly linked classical republican to liberal ideas, especially Locke's universalist natural law and social contract theories. *The Idea of a Patriot King* complemented *The Spirit of Patriotism* and explained how a prince dedicated to the spirit of patriotism was as necessary for the preservation of liberty as a patriotic people. In this sense, *The Idea of a Patriot King* had classical republican overtones. Citing Machiavelli, Bolingbroke posited that a prince who dedicated himself selflessly and disinterestedly to liberty, the constitution, his people, and his country could potentially counteract the corruption in government, as Bolingbroke argued was the case in Britain under Robert Walpole.

Yet Bolingbroke also demonstrated his intimate knowledge and great appreciation for Locke's social contract and natural law ideas, citing him on various occasions in *The Idea of a Patriot King*. Bolingbroke regarded Locke's ideas on natural law - that the individual was free in the state of nature and that it voluntarily sacrificed some of its liberties to create a common government to live in security - as the "*first and true principles* of *monarchical* and indeed *of every other* kind of government". Bolingbroke also linked this implicitly to balance in government, a critical element of classical republican thought. Like Locke and Hutcheson, Bolingbroke subscribed to an Aristotelian understanding of the common good. He argued that, because the people established government voluntarily in the state of nature,

> the ultimate end of all government is the *good* of the *people*, *for whose sake* they were made, and *without whose consent* they could not have been made … Is government incompatible with the full enjoyment of

> *liberty?* By no means. But because popular liberty without government will degenerate into *licence*, as government without sufficient liberty will degenerate into *tyranny*, they are mutually necessary to each other, good government to support legal liberty, and legal liberty to preserve good government.[49]

The underlying implications of the Lockean social contract and natural law theory for Bolingbroke's *Idea of a Patriot King* was the concept of a limited monarchy. According to Bolingbroke, a monarch with limited powers was embedded in natural law to such a degree that even God Himself was a limited monarch. Though God possessed infinite power, Bolingbroke argued somewhat vaguely that He had made Himself into a limited monarch "by the rule which infinite wisdom prescribes to infinite power". According to Bolingbroke, the main objective of a prince was to rule within the limits imposed upon him by the people and dedicate himself to a patriotic spirit in his limited role as "the common father of his people". Within the role of a limited monarch and a common father of the people, a Patriot King could be most effective. Like Machiavelli and other classical republican thinkers, Bolingbroke argued that if a free nation has been corrupted, it should be restored to its original principles and original constitution; a Patriot King should be the person to lead this restoration of the original constitution, according to Bolingbroke. If the people and government officials had lost the spirit of patriotism, a Patriot King, Bolingbroke reasoned, would lead by example and restore the original principles and constitution of the country by sheer force of his patriotic spirit.[50]

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[49] Henry St. John, Lord Viscount of Bolingbroke, *The Works of the Late Right Honourable Henry St. John, Lord Viscount of Bolingbroke with the Life of Lord Bolingbroke* (London, 1809), p. 117-120.
[50] Bolingbroke, *The Works*, p. 117-140.

Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, likewise reconciled Locke's individualism, universalism, and natural law theory with the classical republican emphasis on balance and virtue in government in his seminal work *De l'esprit de lois* (*The Spirit of the Laws*), first published in 1748. The foundations of *The Spirit* were laid in Locke's natural law tradition. Similar to Pufendorf, Hutcheson, and Bolingbroke, Montesquieu railed against Hobbes' notion that the "natural impulse … [of man is] subduing one another". Like Locke, he argued instead that mankind sought to organize a government fearing the insecurity of the state of nature.[51]

Montesquieu's clearest link to classical republicanism is his interpretations of republics, specifically the effects luxury and virtue have on its perfect state. According to Montesquieu, "the less luxury there is in a republic, the more it is perfect", while he also acknowledged that "the principle of [republican] government is virtue".[52] Montesquieu followed in the footsteps of the Commonwealthmen by deploying historicist arguments, littering his analysis with references to historians and global historical examples. In addition, like the classical republicans, Montesquieu underlined the importance of corruption to the downfall of societies, dedicating a full section of his book to the topic. Though he discussed the theoretical nature of democracies, aristocracies, and monarchies in-depth, Montesquieu's classical republican sympathies are revealed when he argued that only a balanced, "moderate" government could achieve political liberty, regardless of its form. According to Montesquieu, the defining characteristic of the "Constitution of England" was political liberty, meaning "a right of doing whatever the laws permit". Based on the British Constitution as it existed since 1688, Montesquieu famously argued that only a separation of powers could guarantee political liberty since it would pit the

[51] Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, *The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu*, *vol. 1, Book I, Chapter* II (London: T. Evans, 1777). Consulted last on January 5, 2019 on the Liberty Fund website: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/837.
[52] Montesquieu, *The Complete Works*, *Vol. 1, Book VII, Chapter II and Book V, Chapter XIX.*

ambitions of the various government institutions against each other. In this way, the separation of powers achieved a balance of power within the state and prevented arbitrary government and corruption.[53]

At the same time, Montesquieu supported Locke's ideas on the centrality of the consent of the governed. He concluded that "in a country of liberty, every man … ought be to his own governor". Reasoning that being your own governor "is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves." To support this argument, Montesquieu even cited Algernon Sidney to point out that when the representatives "represent a body of the people, as in Holland, they ought to be accountable to their constituents." Montesquieu's famous *trias politica* was, in this sense, a mixture of both classical republican and liberal ideas.[54]

Emmerich de Vattel's *The Laws of Nations* was the final addition to the canon of Patriotism, combining the ideas of several preceding classical republican and liberal works. Published in 1758, Vattel's *Laws* - read in the Dutch Republic in the original French and translated into English in 1760 - is mostly known for its implications of natural law theory for international law. Echoing Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke, Vattel considered nations as existing in a state of nature similar to individuals and, like individuals, all nations were created equal. However, unlike individuals who give up some of their liberty in exchange for the security of the state, "the nation, the state, remains absolutely free and independent with respect to all other

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[53] Montesquieu, *The Complete Works*, *Vol.1*, *Book XI.*
[54] Montesquieu, *The Complete Works*, *Vol.1*, *Book XI.*

men, all other nations, as long as it has not voluntarily submitted to them".[55] Vattel's *Laws* was also steeped in classical republican thought. He praised the balanced British constitution, warned of the dangers of corruption and luxury, and highlighted the significance of virtue and the defense of rights to politics.[56]

Vattel's largest contribution to Patriot thought came through his application of Locke's social contract theory and the classical republican 'right to resistance' to international law. In 1776, these ideas would prove especially meaningful for the Americans contemplating independence. Vattel agreed with the liberal idea that "if the nation is uneasy under its constitution, it has a right to change it". Yet, what happens, Vattel asked if "the people [of the nation] are divided" and the majority of "a free people, after the example of the Jews in the time of Samuel, are weary of liberty, and resolved to submit to the authority of a monarch"? Vattel reasoned that in the case that a minority is still dedicated to liberty - "so invaluable to those who have tasted it" - they would be under no obligation "to suffer the [will of the] majority" and "may quit a society which seems to have dissolved itself in order to unite again under another form". Building on both the liberal and classical republican thinkers, Vattel essentially provided the philosophical justification for secession in the name of liberty and the creation of a new nation "among the powers of the Earth".

Certain works in the Patriot canon unquestionably shaped individual Patriot thinkers more than others. In 1813, John Adams admitted to Thomas Jefferson that he had read Bolingbroke's works "more than fifty years ago, and more than five times in my Life, and once

[55] Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury*, eds. Béla Kapossy and Richard Whitmore (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008).
[56] Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations*, Chapters II and XI.

within five years past."[57] Meanwhile, Jefferson called Locke one of the greatest men to have ever lived and regarded Andrew Fletcher's ideas "the political principles of [a patriot] … worthy of the purest periods of the British constitution".[58] Similar to Jefferson, the Dutch revolutionary Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol was much enamored with Fletcher's *Discourse*, translating and publishing it in the Dutch Republic during the 1770s.

Yet it was not just individual works, but the combined ideas of the Patriot canon as a whole that deeply penetrated the political and cultural discourse of the Dutch Republic and the American colonies. Though it remains difficult to reconstruct the exact degree to which ideas play a role in the thought of any political movement, the sheer number of citations and literal quotations, as well as the documented presence of translations and volumes in both the American colonies and the Dutch Republic point towards a broad appreciation of classical republican as well as liberal ideas and especially the mixture of the two. Although scholarship has yet to appreciate their influence in the Dutch Republic, scholars have documented the prominence of the *Cato Letters* in the American colonies.[59] But the *Cato Letters* are just one example. Nearly all works in the Patriot canon were translated into Dutch and (re)published several times in the Dutch Republic while also widely consumed in the American colonies. Francis Hutcheson's *Inquiry* was published in the Dutch Republic around 1750 but also used as a textbook at Harvard

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[57] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, 25 December 1813, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, Retirement Series, vol. 7, *28 November 1813 to 30 September 1814*, ed. J. Jefferson Looney (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2010), pp. 73–78

[58] Thomas Jefferson to John Trumbull, 15 February 1789, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 14, *8 October 1788–26 March 1789*, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1958), p. 561; Thomas Jefferson to the Earl of Buchan, 10 July 1809, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 40, *4 March–10 July 1803*, ed. Barbara B. Oberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2013), p. 708–710.

[59] Peter Karsten, *Patriot-Heroes in England and America: Political Symbolism and Changing Values over Three Centuries* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press 1978).

College and the College of Philadelphia throughout the eighteenth century.[60] John Locke, Samuel von Pufendorf, Hugo Grotius - all their works on natural law were readily available for readers in the Dutch Republic as well as in the American colonies in places such as the Library Company of Philadelphia, booksellers in New York, the College of New Jersey, among others.[61] Emmerich de Vattel's *The Laws of Nations* was even republished in the Dutch Republic by ardent Patriot and American agent Charles Dumas, who sent several copies to the Continental Congress in 1775. While two of Dumas' copies ended up in prominent libraries - the public library in Philadelphia and the library of Harvard - the third was passed around among the delegates of the Congress. As Benjamin Franklin noted, the delegates were "much pleased" with the book, because "the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations".[62]

By the mid-eighteenth century, educated elites in the American colonies and the Dutch Republic consumed a shared body of literature written by liberal, classical republican, and Enlightenment thinkers that spoke to their broadly similar historical and political sensibilities. These works not only provided an intellectual framework for the political culture of consent and liberty they knew. They also underlined the value of the defense of virtuous government and

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[60] Norman Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1981); Caroline Robbins, "'When It Is That Colonies May Turn Independent': An Analysis of the Environment and Politics of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)", *The William and Mary Quarterly* 11 (1954), p. 214-251.

[61] *A catalogue of books, sold by Rivington and Brown, booksellers and stationers from London, at their stores, over against the Golden Key, in Hanover-Square, New-York: and over against the London Coffee-House, in Philadelphia. At both which places will be found, a constant supply of books …* (1762), Early American Imprints, Archive of Americana, Series 1, no. 9259; *A catalogue of Mein's Circulating Library; consisting of above twelve hundred volumes … in Boston …* (1765), Early American Imprints, Archive of Americana Series 1, no. 10069; *The charter, laws, and catalogue of books, of the Library Company of Philadelphia* (1765), Early American Imprints, Archive of Americana, Series 1, no. 9794; *A catalogue of books in the library of the College of New-Jersey, January 29, 1760. Published by order of the trustees* (1760), Early American Imprints, Archive of Americana, Series 1, no. 8683.

[62] Benjamin Franklin to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas, 9 December 1775, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,* vol. 22, William B. Wilcox ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1982), p. 287-291.

local rights in the face of an ever-looming tyranny. Although Patriotism may have had disparate roots in both the liberal and classical republican traditions, the eighteenth-century Patriots did not regard the ideas of, for instance, John Locke and John Trenchard to be contradictory. Rather, they considered these ideas mutually compatible. Enlightenment thinkers had gradually merged the classical republican and liberal thought into a single current of political thought that made the two traditions virtually indistinct to the Atlantic Patriots. The historical consciousness of events of the past century and a half greatly amplified the authority of these thinkers and the validity of their conclusions for American and Dutch audiences; many of the authors referred to major historical events directly or were reacting to these events, entangling political thought with - a real though mythologized - history.

This particular current of political thought remained largely theoretical in the first half of the eighteenth century. But historical events in the second half of the eighteenth century in both the Netherlands and the American colonies would force these ideas into mainstream political discourse. Under the pressure of the war-torn decades of the 1740s, ’50s, and ‘60s, the Americans and the Dutch developed the political ideology of Patriotism to protect their liberty they perceived to be under assault by outside forces and corruption. In 1747, the first step from Patriot thought to political practice would be made in the Dutch Republic, jumpstarting the era of the Patriot Atlantic and the first phase of the Age of Revolution.

Chapter Two: The Orangist Revolution and the Failure of a Patriot Prince

In May 1747, the States of Holland declared William IV of Orange-Nassau Stadtholder of Holland, the Dutch Republic's richest and most powerful province. After the other six provinces had individually declared for William earlier in the spring, the States' declaration finalized William IV's elevation to the office of Stadtholder of the entire Republic.

The Orangist Revolution - as the events in 1747 and 1748 following William's rise to power would be called - transformed the Dutch Republic. The revolution placed the Stadtholder at the center of the Dutch political system and ended the so-called Second Stadtholderless Period of the last four decades. At the same time, the revolution made the position of Stadtholder hereditary and drastically expanded its formal powers. In terms of the changes made to the internal political structure of the Dutch Republic, the Orangist Revolution was even more significant than the lynching of the de Witt brothers and William III's coup d'état of the 1670s.

Despite its significance, scholarship has largely overlooked the Orangist Revolution, especially in the context of the Age of Revolution and Atlantic history. Leonard Leeb, one of the few scholars who investigated the revolution, placed the Orangist revolutionaries outside of R.R. Palmer's so-called "age of the democratic revolution", the historiographical lodestar when Leeb published his book on the ideological origins of the Batavian revolutionaries of the 1790s.[63] Rather than promoting a political program of democratization, Leeb argued that Stadtholder William IV and his supporters deployed the term 'Patriot' to present the Stadtholder as the savior of the people, as during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[64] Jonathan Israel has similarly argued that the Orangists did not share a political ideology with their successors in the 1780s,

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[63] R.R. Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Political History of Europe and America, 1760-1800* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1959).

[64] Leonard Leeb, *The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution: History and Politics in the Dutch Republic 1747-1800* (New York: Springer Publishing 1970), p. 58-97.

though he acknowledged the Orangists were partially inspired by the writings of John Locke. Israel even called the events in 1747/1748 the *Second* Orangist Revolution, with the coup d'état of Stadtholder William III in 1672 representing the first.[65] Scholarship has not found any linkages between the Orangist Revolution and similar transatlantic events, ideologies, or movements. Generally, scholars of the Age of Revolution consider the American Revolution as the start of the wave of revolutions that swept across the Atlantic in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. No likeminded revolution preceded the American one, with perhaps the exception of the Corsican Revolution of the 1750s.[66]

Was the Orangist Revolution merely the empowerment of an aristocrat and a medieval office in the style of the seventeenth century, only relevant to Dutch history, as scholars have argued? Or did the Orangist Revolution foreshadow a larger wave of Patriot revolutions that took place in the Atlantic during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries?

Surveying the political pamphlets and correspondence from the Dutch Republic during the 1740s demonstrates that the Orangist Revolution had strong ideological connections to the American and Dutch Patriot Revolutions that followed it, starting the first phase of the Patriot Atlantic as well as the Age of Revolution more broadly. Even compared to what would ultimately become the American and Dutch Patriot Revolutions, the Orangist Revolution was a relatively moderate event. The Orangists' fervent belief in the empowerment of the Stadtholderate was in many ways a retrenchment of the aristocracy rather than a full-throated repudiation of it. Yet their faith in the political benefits of a 'patriotic' prince and other ideas on government were deeply embedded in the Patriot canon that circulated in the Atlantic in the

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[65] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 1067-1078.
[66] Brendan Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat: The Rise and Fall of the First British Empire, 1714-1783* (New York: Basic Books 2009), p. 556-571 and 676.

eighteenth century. Before at least 1776, both American and Dutch Patriots viewed a disinterested, patriotic prince as an essential element to fight corruption and protect the liberties of the people regardless of its aristocratic roots.

Though it may seem like a paradox to the modern eye, the Orangist revolutionaries regarded the empowerment of the people through representative government in conjunction with a powerful Stadtholder as essential to combating corruption. These ideas were based in part on the principles of early liberalism, especially John Locke's social contract theory. The transformative goals of the Orangist revolutionaries ultimately did not materialize as a result of a misalignment of political goals between the movement and the Stadtholder. The Orangist Revolution did not inspire "an expanding blaze" of revolutions in the way that the American revolutionaries ultimately would. Nevertheless, the principles and ideas of the Orangists fundamentally transformed Dutch politics, demonstrated the revolutionary potential of Patriotism, and foreshadowed the imperial crisis in North America during the 1760s and 1770s that would ultimately bring about the American Revolution.

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Various factions in the Netherlands had long complained of the nepotism as well as the ineffectiveness of Dutch politics, especially during the 1720s and 1730s when the Dutch economy declined and the Republic's military power waned. But it was the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) that transformed these melancholic sentiments into a revolutionary movement. What supposedly started as a war about the illegitimacy of Maria Theresa as the duchess of Austria in 1740, was in actuality a series of conflicts about competing geopolitical goals among the powers of Europe. The war started in 1740 when King Frederick the Great of Prussia invaded Austrian-controlled Silesia. The war soon expanded east and west to include all

major European powers. France joined the Prussian coalition against Austria before the Prussian invasion of Silesia. Together, France and Prussia sought to undermine Austria and its allies in western Europe, which included Great Britain and the Dutch Republic.[67]

Though the Dutch participated in the war, they were not enthusiastic participants. The Dutch public increasingly viewed their country's participation in Europe's wars as the core cause of the Republic's geopolitical and economic decline. William III's rise to power in the Dutch Republic in 1672 and Great Britain in 1688 brought the Netherlands more or less permanently in a state at war in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Even when the Dutch Republic was formally at peace, its government had to employ large standing armies to protect its borders from a possible invasion and keep up a significant navy to protect its mercantile interests. The public increasingly regarded the expenses of war and border defenses as detrimental to the Dutch economy. The Dutch Republic's treasury was a particularly problematic subject since it was funded through increasingly larger debts held by Dutch creditors who often simultaneously occupied important government positions. In the late seventeenth century, the tax burden doubled to finance the war against France and never returned to its pre-1672 levels during the eighteenth century. Meanwhile, as a result of the so-called *contracten van correspondentie*, vacancies in public offices in the Dutch Republic were largely filled through familial connections. During the eighteenth century, increasingly fewer families controlled many of the country's key government positions and financial expenditures. Public resentment against

[67] M.S. Anderson, *The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740-1748* (London: Routledge 1995); Christopher Clark, *Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2009), Chapters 4 – 6.

this political system, as well as the war it enabled, became ever more present during the 1740s, especially when famine and natural disasters plagued the Dutch Republic.[68]

These opposition voices became stronger after 1744 when 90,000 French forces invaded the Austrian Netherlands, an exclave the archduchy of Austria controlled since the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713. As in 1672, French forces threatened to overrun the Dutch Republic through the southern Netherlands. Fearing a complete collapse of the Dutch state during the French invasion, the British sent warships, men, and ammunition to the province of Zeeland to support the Dutch Republic.[69] In early 1747, with spring underway, French troops marshaled at the Dutch border and opposition mounted against the oligarchic regents who many feared were incapable of properly defending the Netherlands against a French invasion.

Expecting a violent scenario similar to the end of the De Witt rule in 1672, the regents could no longer ignore the clamors of the political opposition. The latter increasingly aligned itself with William IV of Orange Nassau, the Stadtholder of the Republic's northern provinces, a distant relative of Stadtholder-King William III, and claimant to the disputed title of Prince of Orange. The political opposition, now styling themselves "Orangists" and "Patriots", argued that the incumbent regents had become corrupted. They were the cause of the Dutch Republic's declining economy and military prowess over the last few decades. The Orangist Patriots reasoned that the Stadtholderate had to be reinstated in all provinces of the Dutch Republic, including all powers and privileges that William III had during his reign in the late seventeenth century. Moreover, they argued that the position should be made hereditary rather than one appointed position by the provincial states. The various provincial states conceded to the

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[68] Jan A. F. de Jongste, "The Restoration of the Orangist Regime in 1747: The Modernity of a 'Glorious Revolution.'" In *The Dutch Republic*, ed. Jacob and Mijnhardt, p. 32–59.
[69] Secretaries of State: State Papers Foreign, Holland (henceforth referred to as SP) 84/429, April 25, 1747, National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew, henceforth referred to as NA.

opposition's demands. In May 1747, the States of the province of Holland, the most important province in the Republic, was the last to proclaim William IV as Stadtholder.[70] In addition to the Stadtholderate, William IV also secured a powerful position in the Dutch East India Company as *opperbewindhebber* (supreme managing director) in charge of the daily management of the global trading company.[71]

Having placed the Stadtholder at the head of the Dutch Republic's government, the Orangist revolutionaries sought to restructure Dutch politics further and placed the ideology of Patriotism at the heart of their reforms. The revolution's ideology combined a personality cult of the Stadtholder as a disinterested leader with liberal conceptions of popular sovereignty as a solution to classical republican concerns about corruption and societal decay. What Leonard Leeb has called "Dutch Whigs" were various local reform movements inspired by the Patriot canon that saw the Stadtholder's rise to power as a unique moment to reform the nepotistic system of governance in the Dutch Republic.[72]

In response to classical republican concerns of the loss of corruption and virtue, the Orangist Patriots espoused a government model of popular sovereignty in their localities mixed with a "Patriot Stadtholder" in the Bolingbrokean mold who would act as a disinterested arbiter. The Stadtholder would defend local rights and privileges without concern for party and would simultaneously reverse the Republic's decline. In practice, this meant that the Patriot Stadtholder would serve in part as a procedural tool to root out the Dutch Republic's much-hated nepotism. He would rid the localities of their supposed anti-patriotic corruption while unifying the polarized country. Finally, the Orangists believed that a

[70] Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 1067-1078.
[71] Julia Adams, *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2005), p. 155-160.
[72] Leeb, *Ideological Origins*, p. 58-67.

fusion of "interests" between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic would complement this larger political reform to restore Dutch greatness on the global stage.[73]

And so even though the supposedly patriotic Stadtholder had been elevated to a position of power, the Orangist movement did not consider its revolutionary goals completed. The power of the Stadtholder had to be leveraged to complete the revolution and restore Dutch liberty. In the summer of 1747, a pro-Stadtholderian Patriot movement emerged in Amsterdam, both in writing and in political activism, that sought to outline the intellectual foundation of the Orangist Revolution. Of particular importance was the popular periodical called *The Patriot,* widely distributed throughout the Dutch Republic. Writing under the pseudonym "the Patriot", a self-proclaimed merchant called J. Wassenaar described the goals of the Orangist Patriot movement and the means to achieve them. In his arguments, Wassenaar leaned on the classical republican, liberal, and Enlightenment ideas that had been formulated in the Patriot canon and circulated in the Atlantic during the eighteenth century. Like many of the thinkers who preceded him, Wassenaar was a historicist and especially intrigued with the "histories of my Fatherland", as well as "the best Dutch … [and] foreign authors".[74]

The Patriot echoed classical republican, early liberal, and Enlightenment thought in other ways as well. Wassenaar argued that the burghers of the Dutch Republic were the crucial means to reform the country's corrupt political system and restore the country to its former glory. Every weekly edition of *The Patriot* started with a quotation from a classical author - such as Tacit, Cicero, and Horatio - that usually exalted virtue in strong leadership

[73] Leeb, *Ideological Origins*, p. 58-67.
[74] *De Patriot, of de politike bedenkingen, over den staat der vereenigde Nederlanden in 't jaar MDCCXLVII*, 1747-1748, Amsterdam UB, henceforth referred to as UvA, O 63-9514, p. 1-9.

and selfless republican citizenship. In this way, Wassenaar alluded to a model of government that demanded selfless participation from its citizens combined with a patriotic executive. In the seventh issue of *The Patriot*, entitled "the Character of a Patriot", Wassenaar described a true Patriot as someone who acts selflessly in service of the fatherland, regards "himself and his countrymen as Parts of one Body". He sacrifices his own money and labor "to the service and satisfaction of his countrymen". Wassenaar's description of Patriotism was remarkably similar to Bolingbroke's, whose works were written a decade earlier but were yet to be published, suggesting that they based their ideas on similar literature. Meanwhile, Wassenaar reasoned that Dutch burghers had an essential role in reversing the economic decline that haunted the Republic too, especially by abjuring luxury and embracing a frugal lifestyle, likewise ideas that were crucial among the thinkers of the Patriot canon.[75]

Central to *The Patriot* periodical was the importance of the Stadtholder, especially his ability to restore the Dutch Republic's glory and its republican political culture. In *The Patriot,* Wassenaar described "dreams" he had about a fictitious republic in wartime called *Vryekeur* ("Free Choice"). The people of *Vryekeur* clamored for a strong, disinterested leader that would lead them out of the darkness, directly referring to the need of the Stadtholder's leadership during the War of the Austrian Succession. As in Wassenaar's dream, the "noble" Prince William IV, with the help of Great Britain, would be the vehicle through which the corrupt nature of the Republic could be transformed into a country of "peace, freedom, and security".[76] Wassenaar also believed that the Stadtholder could solve - or had already solved - the intense *tweedracht* (polarization) that had haunted the Republic since its founding. According to Wassenaar, the Stadtholder's unanimous elevation to power in the spring of

[75] *De Patriot*, p. 168-176.
[76] *De Patriot*, p. 98.

1747 and his supposed patriotic disposition to treat all the Dutch Republic's citizens equally demonstrated his success in creating *eendracht* (unity) in the formerly polarized Republic.[77]

In addition to viewing the combination of patriotic citizens and a patriotic prince as the key to rooting out corruption in government, Wassenaar was obsessed with the ancient "rights and privileges" that governed the political system of the Republic. This fascination had historical as well as ideological precedent and would become an essential element of Patriotism in the succeeding decades. Wassenaar dedicated the entire twenty-fourth issue of *The Patriot* to the "origins and privileges" of the Amsterdam citizen's militia. He described the Amsterdam militia as an organization that developed organically from participatory citizenship and the wisdom of William the Silent, the Dutch Republic's first Stadtholder. Wassenaar included a discussion on what the limits were of government power and the citizen's liberties, essentially arguing for a balanced government that simultaneously protected and respected citizens' ancient rights.[78]

The importance of the Stadtholder as a Patriot prince was repeated in many other publications during the Orangist Revolution as well, which raised expectations of broad societal renewal and empowerment of the people through the Stadtholder. Instead of lamentations that dominated Dutch discourse in the early 1740s, printers widely published poems, plays, songs, and other writings praising the Stadtholder William IV and his abilities to act as a disinterested Patriot prince. In 1747, the imagined possibilities of Stadtholderian reform among the Dutch population were endless. William could defeat the French with the help of the British and negotiate a peace favorable to the Dutch.[79] It was even argued that William could curb the power

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[77] *De Patriot,* p. 81-89.
[78] *De Patriot*, p. 201-209.
[79] *De gevoelens van een Hollands Patriot*, 1747, UvA Pfl. O z 28.

of Amsterdam, a city supposedly filled with supporters of the unpopular oligarchy, not to mention “whores from top to bottom”.[80] The Orangist Patriots were mixing the pessimism of the classical republic corruption of the past with the optimistic elements of liberalism for the future.

Wassenaar realized, however, that the popular will and the Stadtholder’s interests could ultimately clash. He, therefore, proposed a political culture of deference to the Stadtholder’s ultimate authority, a mode of thinking that would come to dominate the Patriot Atlantic in the decades preceding 1776. Rebelliousness against the Stadtholder was a vice in the eyes of the Orangist Patriots. According to Wassenaar, a true Patriot does not criticize the Stadtholderian government when it “tramples the liberty of the people, when it does so only once in a while”, especially with a patriotic prince at the helm. Instead, a Patriot citizen must “temper the fits of its mutineering countrymen” and still their hotheaded emotions.[81] The passion of the people must always be guarded against and the Stadtholder would provide this necessary check on the unruly mob.

As political pamphleteers were crafting an ideological foundation for the Orangist Patriot movement in the fall of 1747, frustrations with government nepotism and feverish Orangism continued to provoke discontent. Despite the Stadtholder’s ascent to power, louder and more violent calls for a republic free of corruption and nepotism spread through the Netherlands. Local governments had not yet been purged of the nepotistic regents. The first larger-scale and violent reform movement was the so-called *Pachtersoproer* (“Tax Tenant Uproar”). This tax rebellion started in the northern provinces of Groningen and Friesland. The leaders of the rebellion sought to undo the rampant nepotism of private tax collectors who supposedly represented the

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[80] *Boere schuit-praatje, gehouden tusschen Lou, Maarten en Aagt; Varende na Amsterdam,* 1747, UvA Pfl O Z 37.
[81] *De Patriot*, p. 65-72.

corruption of the Republic as they charged - in the eyes of the protesters - exorbitant rates for their services.[82]

The unrest of the *Pachtersoproer* soon spread to Amsterdam where a much larger and more radical movement emerged. These revolutionaries garnered the attention of the entire Republic and determined the ultimately disappointing outcomes of the Orangist Revolution. A group of politically engaged merchants and intellectuals from Amsterdam, especially Daniel Raap and Jean Rousset de Missy, sympathized with the rioters' arguments that Dutch tax collectors were corrupt and insufficiently dedicated to the Orangist cause. In the latter half of 1747, both Rousset, a Huguenot, historian, jurist, and pamphleteer, and Raap, a porcelain merchant, were at the forefront of the Amsterdam reform movement. They were closely associated with the Orangists, the Stadtholder, and the British. Rousset, in particular, had been eager to print anti-French pamphlets during the War of the Austrian Succession in collusion with the British agent Richard Wolters and the Earl of Sandwich, the British ambassador to the Dutch Republic.[83]

Rousset viewed the revolution and its subsequent popular uprisings as an ideal time to implement Patriot ideas on government in the local towns and cities of the Dutch Republic. Based on his reading of history and his knowledge of natural law theory, especially Locke, Grotius and Pufendorf, Rousset's political thought had longstanding connections to the Patriot canon.[84] A history of the revolution Rousset had published represented an archetypical

[82] Margaret C. Jacob, "In the Aftermath of Revolution: Rousset de Missy, Freemasonry, and Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* ", in *L'età dei Lumi: studi storici sul settecento europeo in onore di Franco Venturi* (Napels: Casa Editrice Jovene 1985), p. 487-452.
[83] SP 84/415, NA.
[84] J. Rousset de Missy, *Recuiel historique d'actes, negotiations, memoires et traitez. Depuis la paix d'Utrecht,* Part 1 through 21; J. Rousset de Missy, *Les interêts presens et le prétensions des puissances de l'Europe, fondez sur les traitez depuis ceux d'Utrecht,* UvA OG 63-820-822.

intellectual defense of Orangist Patriotism. In his *An historical account of the great revolution which happened in the republick of the United Provinces in 1747*, published in Dutch and French in Amsterdam and English in Dublin, Rousset explained that the Stadtholder's rise to power was the result of the popular will. He reasoned that the wide celebrations of citizens and citizen's militias that accompanied the Stadtholder's reinstatement were signs of the people's endorsement. Much like American and Dutch Patriot revolutionaries in later decades, Rousset viewed the Orangist Revolution as one in a long history of uprisings that restored liberty to its original order after the onset of corruption. Liberty and the Stadtholder went hand in hand, according to Rousset, because the "blood of Nassau destroys tyranny", as it had during the Dutch Revolt and in 1672, in protection of "liberty and religion" (*vrijheid en godsdienst*). In addition to the Patriotic message deeply embedded in the text, Rousset also literally cited early classical authors such as Plato as well as liberal thinkers like Grotius. In this way, Rousset demonstrated how his analysis was steeped in the intellectual current of early Patriotism and regarded these ideas as applicable to revolutionary politics.[85]

Raap made similar arguments to Rousset, likewise focusing on the patriotic leadership of the Stadtholder and its positive effects. Raap's works had decisively more middle-class and religious overtones, most likely the result of his mercantile background. Raap's pamphlets argued that the Stadtholder was God's chosen leader and that "He provides an example to the Regents with the abandonment of selfishness" and the embrace of patriotic leadership.[86] Though

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[85] J. Rousset de Missy, *An historical account of the great revolution which happened in the republick of the United Provinces in 1747*, British Library 1578:5505:7; J. Rousset de Missy, *Echt verhaal van de groote staatsverwisseling voorgevallen in de Republyk der Vereenigde Nederlanden, in den jaare MDCCXLVII*, UvA O 60-3950, J. Rousset de Missy, *Relation sincére de la grande révolution arrivée dans la Republique des Provinces Unies, en cette année M.DCC.XLVII,* UvA O 94-23.
[86] Daniel Raap, *Nut der tegenspoeden, of 't altyd wel,* 1747, The Hague Royal Dutch Library, henceforth referred to as KB, pflt 1 17734.

he supported the anti-French sentiments of the revolution, Raap argued that Dutch Protestants should refrain from becoming anti-Catholic. Raap argued for tolerance towards the Catholic population of the Dutch Republic because they too could prove to be reliable anti-French citizens.[87] Like Rousset and Wassenaar, Raap also emphasized the value of ancient citizen's rights (*burger rechten*), but, as a porcelain merchant, gave an economic twist to the concept. Raap strongly defended the rights of local merchants and guilds. He argued for the Stadtholder's intervention in protection of the ancient privileges of the middle class. Later, in 1749, Raap even argued for the elimination of taxation on regular consumption goods, such as food. Raap reasoned that poor people bore the brunt of this tax burden while the rich lived in luxury that, as thinkers like Montesquieu saw it, was the scourge of any republic.[88]

Patriotism and the spread of the *Pachtersoproer* from the northern provinces to Holland provided Raap and Rousset with sufficient political capital to start a broader political reform movement in Amsterdam. This movement addressed a far larger set of grievances than mere tax reform.[89] Rousset and Raap's Orangist movement in Amsterdam started to attract a broad range of revolutionaries, including a large group of radicals who published a tract titled *Eleven Articles* in 1748. The tract contained eleven reforms to fight nepotism in government based on a mix of increased popular sovereignty and empowerment of the Stadtholderate. They demanded, among other things, the nationalization of the post offices, the "restoration of all the burghers' old Rights and Privileges", the right of the burghers to elect an independent council of war

[87] Daniel Raap, *Aan alle welmeenende Nederlanderen en beminnaars der vryheid,* 1748, KB pflt 17974.
[88] Daniel Raap, *Zedige overweging wegens de afgeschafte middelen der consumptie,* 1747, UvA O 06-8008:31.
[89] Jacob, "In the Aftermath of Revolution", p. 487-452.

(*krijgsraad*) of the city, and the election of all the city's sheriffs (*Schepenen*) by the "good burghers" (*gegoede Burgerij*) with approval of "His Serene Highness our Stadtholder".[90]

Despite attempts to distance himself from their objectives, the political ideology of the Orangist Patriots thrust Stadtholder William into the heart of the controversies in Amsterdam. All Orangist Patriots, radical and moderate alike, were united in their worship of the Stadtholder. William and Princess Anne of Hanover - William's wife and daughter of King George II of Great Britain - sided with the moderates, however, in part because they believed that the civil unrest that the radicals created reflected badly on their rule. Additionally, the Stadtholder's newfound power depended to a large degree on the nepotism that the radicals sought to undo. The ability to manipulate appointments in local councils, the so-called *contracten van correspondentie,* was the key to holding political power in the decentralized system of the Dutch Republic. If William agreed to reform the government based on the ideas of his supporters, such as the proposed sale of offices and the election of sheriffs, he would lose leverage on local politics and therefore limit his ability to govern the Republic as a whole. Even more problematic for William was that nepotism in government ran so deep that filling dozens of local positions with people who were not in some way connected to regent families and simultaneously loyal to the new Stadtholder proved impossible. The goals of the revolution, however, especially the centralization of power in the Stadtholder and the accompanying personality cult, made William's lack of support for his most radical supporters all the more peculiar. William, as it turned out, was not a disinterested Patriot prince after all.

Meanwhile, the British also protested against the nationalization of the post offices, as this specific demand posed a threat to their geopolitical interests. The British intelligence

[90] *Elf Articulen, gegrond op de handvesten van Amsterdam, door de Burgeren aldaar in 't Ligt gebragt,*1748, UvA Pfl. P d 6.

network overseen by Richard Wolters depended on the Dutch post offices to intercept letters as well as to communicate securely with its spies across Europe and with the British government. Before the revolution, Wolters had been able to manipulate post office appointments through the nepotism that was rampant in the local regent class, the group ultimately in charge of local post office appointments. In a letter to Laurens van der Meer, the Stadtholder's delegate to Amsterdam sent to moderate the reformers' demands, Wolters explained that he was concerned about the plans of the radicals to give control over the post offices to the burghers.[91] Burgher control of the postal system would make it difficult for Wolters to place his spies in post office positions, which he needed to secure his communications and spy on the communications of others.[92]

Faced with pressure from moderates, radicals, and British agents in addition to an increasingly unruly population in Amsterdam, the Stadtholder was eventually forced to join the political discussion. In the chaos, William saw compromise and chicanery as the only way to mitigate the unrest. In response to the radicals' *Eleven Articles*, William's delegate to Amsterdam Van der Meer proposed three moderate reforms, or the *Three Articles*, to address the city's political upheavals. Possibly in part due to pressure from the British, postal reform was the first of three reforms. Instead of the unspecified "burgher control" over the post offices, Stadtholder William proposed to nationalize the post offices under his control, "for no other

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[91] F.J.L. Krämer, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der omwenteling in 1747 en 1748 te Rotterdam en Amsterdam" *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 23 (1902), p. 431.
[92] For more on Richard Wolters's intelligence network, see: Matthijs Tieleman, "'No Intrigue Is Spared': Anglo-American Intelligence Networks in the Eighteenth-Century Dutch Republic", *Itinerario* 45 (2021), p. 99-123.

purpose than to the betterment of country and city".[93] This political move satisfied demands from reformers and the British while enlarging the Stadtholder's power to appoint civil servants.

Though all parties, even the besieged Amsterdam *vroedschap* (city government), were keen to accept the Stadtholder's reform for the postal system, the fundamental problem of a dysfunctional government steeped in nepotism was not resolved. The regents, such as the burgomasters, sheriffs, and other functionaries, that held office before William's ascent to power were still in their respective positions. Reformers rejected William's two other proposals in the *Three Articles*, instituting a method of redress for future grievances and the ability of burghers to elect officers for the city watch.[94]

The conflicting goals of the radical Orangist Patriots, espousing populist reform on the one hand and worshipping a supposedly disinterested "Patriot Stadtholder" on the other, became apparent after William proposed his reforms. The Amsterdam reform movement was able to reject the Stadtholder's *Articles* because it had become more organized and gained national popularity in the summer of 1748. The reformers started calling themselves *Doelisten,* roughly translated as "Targeters". This title referred to the Kloveniersdoelen, a building for citizen's militias where they started holding their meetings and to which they claimed they had an ancient right. The Doelisten meetings acted like a proto-revolutionary committee of the Amsterdam burghers and were a popular spectacle; the meetings were so busy that the floors of the building had to be strutted out of fear that it would collapse under the weight of all the attendees.

Each district (*wijk*) of Amsterdam sent delegates to the Doelen and reports from the meetings suggest that a significant portion of the delegates were radicals who considered the

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[93] As printed in N.J.J. de Voogd, *De Doelistenbeweging te Amsterdam in 1748* (Utrecht: H. de Vroede 1914), p. 111-113 and also Knuttel No. 17978.
[94] De Voogd, *Doelistenbeweging*, p. 114-161.

Stadtholders' *Three Articles* insufficiently based on popular sovereignty. Meanwhile, the minority moderate faction of the Doelen, under the leadership of Daniel Raap, was considerably more deferential to the Stadtholder's authority, essentially putting Wassenaar's politics of deference to the Stadtholder into practice. Raap tried to suspend the Doelen's activities and had even signed off on the Stadtholder's *Three Articles.* Raap and his moderate allies considered these concessions a sufficient reform of Amsterdam's government. The split between the radicals and the moderates caused a bitter divide in the Doelen meetings, where delegates and onlookers alike even threatened to throw each other from the windows.[95]

As the crisis continued and became increasingly adversarial, the sole point on which the radical and moderate Doelisten agreed was that only William's personal and "disinterested" intervention could end the crisis. After much political pressure and under the escort of the city's devoted Orangist ship carpenters - nicknamed the *Bijltjes* or "little axes" - the Stadtholder eventually arrived in Amsterdam in August 1748. William's presence temporarily soothed both the radicals and the moderates. While in Amsterdam, however, William ended up satisfying only the moderate Doelisten whose political positions aligned with his. Reluctantly, William agreed to fire all the regents of the city and replace them with others who, according to the radicals, were just as nepotistic as and often related to their predecessors. Dissatisfied with this bureaucratic overhaul, radical Doelisten woke up the Stadtholder at his residence in the middle of the night. They demanded more sweeping reforms of the government. William, who confessed to his wife how tired he already was, conceded to the radicals. The Stadtholder proclaimed he would allow

[95] De Voogd, *Doelistenbeweging*, p. 114-161.

burghers to elect the members of Amsterdam's war council (*Krijgsraad*), provided these members held other offices in the Amsterdam government.[96]

The communication of the Stadtholder's concession to the Doelen was so unclear and haphazard, however, that William's reputation as an effective leader and neutral arbiter suffered greatly. William's concession proved just enough to satisfy a sufficient number of radicals to have the Doelen disbanded peacefully. On September 16, in a stunning act of political mismanagement and only hours after he departed from Amsterdam, William issued a public statement in which he retracted his promise that the Amsterdam burghers were allowed to elect their own war council. Intimidations and threats to voting for certain officers accompanied the elections in several of Amsterdam's districts. Therefore, William argued, the free election of the war council in the way the radicals demanded would be compromised. The election intruded upon the "ancient rights and privileges" of the city's war council.[97]

Resistance against the government subsided temporarily, but William's declaration and his brief tenure in the succeeding years ensured that the dissatisfaction that brought him to power would remain in the Dutch Republic. In the following years, the Stadtholderate remained mired in corruption scandals and started to lose support from moderates and radicals alike.[98] In 1749, Boudaud, a prominent leader among the virulently Orangist ship carpenters, penned a crushing indictment of the Stadtholder's "slowness" in addressing the many grievances that started the

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[96] The Prince of Orange to Princess Anne of Hannover, September 1748, *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau*, henceforth referred to as AMON, p. 243-274 and De Voogd, *Doelistenbeweging*, p. 114-161.
[97] As published in De Voogd, *Doelistenbeweging*, p. 204-208.
[98] Ab Visser, *Rudolf de Mepsche, het monsterproces van Faan* (Rotterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar 1945). The scandals surrounding the court of the Stadtholderate would continue throughout the 1750s and '60s. The incest case against Onno van Zwier van Haren is perhaps the most prominent and shocking of the era, see: Pieter van der Vliet, *Onno van Zwier van Haren (1713-1779): Staatsman en dichter* (Hilversum, NL: Verloren 1996).

revolution. Boudaud's analysis also revealed how burghers dissatisfied with the outcomes of the revolution were scattered and disorganized.[99] It was largely the disorganized nature of the opposition, not the efficacy of William's governance, that successfully secured William's coup d'état and the relative political stability of the Dutch Republic in the next decade and a half.

Even after William died in 1751 and despite the unfulfilled promise of meaningful political reform, the governance of the Dutch Republic remained stable. This stability was in part the result of a closer relationship with the British government, one of the few revolutionary goals that the Stadtholderate accomplished. William's heir, William V, was only three years old in 1751 and needed a regent to oversee the greatly expanded affairs of the Stadtholderate. The British and Dutch governments both viewed Princess Anne, William IV's widow and daughter of the British King George II, as a fit regent for the young Stadtholder. As a woman, however, Anne was not allowed to fulfill the military functions of the Stadtholderate. The Dutch and the British agreed to appoint the Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel to this task. Brunswick was William IV's trusted and only advisor seasoned in battle and owed his rising career in large part to the Anglo-Dutch alliance. The German Duke had proven himself worthy to the British, Dutch, and Austrian cause during the War of the Austrian Succession and had subsequently befriended William IV. Within a period of a few years, Brunswick not only had gained significant influence at the increasingly powerful court of the Stadtholder. With the death of William IV, Brunswick also became the commander of one of the largest navies and armies on the European continent.[100]

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[99] *Rapport de ce qui a été dit par Boudaud sur l'état des esprits à Amsterdam*, AMON serie 4, p. 303-304.
[100] N. A. Bootsma, *De hertog van Brunswijk, 1750-1759* (Assen, NL: Van Gorcum Historische Bibliotheek 1962).

Meanwhile, the Stadtholder's death coincided with the appointment of the new British ambassador, Sir Joseph Yorke, whose appointment was a deliberate attempt to incorporate the Dutch further into the renewal of a British-led anti-French alliance that the British called the System. Like the Orangist Revolution, the creation of the System was a result of the War of the Austrian Succession, especially the related Jacobite invasion of Great Britain, and had been decades in the making. During the early eighteenth century, the British government was focused on the Jacobites - political exiles who sought to restore the Catholic Stuart monarchy that William III had overthrown in 1688 - and regarded them as the greatest threat to its legitimacy. The Glorious Revolution in 1688 had compelled James II and his supporters to live in exile on the European continent in places such as France, Russia, and the Dutch Republic. James II's descendants had a more direct claim to the throne than the Hanoverians that succeeded Queen Anne in 1714. Moreover, France backed the Jacobite claim, which gave the Jacobites a powerful supporter on the European continent.

The War of the Austrian Succession presented the Jacobites and France with an opportunity to overthrow the British monarchy and restore the rule of the francophile and Catholic Stuarts. To accomplish this goal, Charles, the grandson of James II and nicknamed "the Young Pretender", landed with a small force of supporters in Scotland. In the summer of 1745, he rallied the overwhelmingly Catholic Highland clans to his cause. At the same time, French forces in Dunkirk were preparing an invasion of England to assist Charles in his rebellion. The British were well informed of the French invasion preparations; one of their greatest intelligence assets on the European continent, Britain's agent in the Dutch Republic Richard Wolters, kept the government informed of any developments in Dunkirk. The French invasion, intended to reinforce Charles' military campaign plagued by a series of tactical mistakes, failed to

materialize. In April 1746, the Duke of Cumberland, a younger son of King George II, defeated "the Young Pretender" at the Battle of Culloden and neutralized the Jacobite threat.[101]

The failure of the Jacobite rebellion led to the rise of the Duke of Newcastle - the Secretary of State of the Southern Department during the Jacobite rebellion - who engendered a more outward-looking and proactive foreign policy on the European and North American continents.[102] As Secretary of State of the Southern Department, Newcastle had been responsible for British foreign policy regarding Europe's Catholic countries and Britain's colonies. In this position, Newcastle had become increasingly hostile towards France, considering the country as Britain's only true geopolitical rival, and proved a key figure in crushing the Jacobite threat at the Battle of Culloden of 1746. His elevated position of power in the Cabinet after the battle, as well as his new position as Secretary of State of the Northern Department, allowed Newcastle to forge a new British foreign policy in Protestant Europe that sought to broaden and strengthen the anti-French alliance, which the Dutch Republic had been a part of since 1688.[103]

The Jacobite invasion and its subsequent failure galvanized the - still disorganized - anglophile political opposition in the Dutch Republic. The Orangists argued that the interests of the Dutch Republic and Great Britain should be united. While Dutch society was overwhelmingly melancholic before 1747, pamphlet material on British resistance to the Jacobites was supportive of the British cause. Several pamphlets underlined the common

[101] Paul Kleber Monod, *Jacobitism and the English People, 1688–1788* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1993), Harris, *The Great Crisis*; SP 84/415, 24 December 1745 / 4 January 1746 in Wolter's attached disbursements for secret service, NA.
[102] Jacqueline Riding, *Jacobites: A New History of the '45 Rebellion* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing 2016).
[103] Reed Browning, *The Duke of Newcastle* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1975); J.V. Beckett, "Introduction: Stability in Politics and Society, 1680-1750" in *Britain in the First Age of Party 1680-1750,* ed. Clyve Jones (London: The Hambledon Press 1987), p. 1-18; SP 84/415, December 23, 1745, NA.

Protestant cause that the British and the Dutch shared against France and their supposed Jacobite stooges. The aim of the Jacobites and the French monarchy, they reasoned, was to tear down the Anglo-Dutch alliance. One pamphlet suggested the Pretender - "a wandering knight" and "a sad figure"- wanted to rape "the Reformed faith and Freedom".[104]

The defeat of the Jacobites allowed the opposition to the oligarchic rulers of the Netherlands to seize political momentum and position themselves as positive reformers of the Republic and victors in the war against France. In 1746, with France threatening to invade the Netherlands and the Republic's army's abysmal performance, the opposition argued that the Dutch should be "edified" by the glorious example of Great Britain as the protector of liberty and Protestantism.[105] It was through the avenue of pro-British sympathies among the Orangist Patriots as well as the British monarchy's familial connections to the Stadtholders that the British managed to renew and ostensibly strengthen the old Anglo-Dutch alliance.

Sir Joseph Yorke's appointment to ambassador was an attempt to forge this stronger alliance between the anti-French Newcastle ministry and the Orangist Patriots. Yorke had served in the Low Countries during the War of the Austrian Succession, became an aide-de-camp to the Duke of Cumberland, and fought together with Cumberland at the famed Battle of Culloden in 1746. At the same time, Yorke's father, Philip Yorke, was Lord Chancellor and a confidant of the Duke of Newcastle, both of whom secured Yorke's prestigious new job as ambassador to the Dutch Republic. Yorke's experiences in the war and his personal allegiances made him the ideal

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[104] *De gevoelens van een Hollands patriot of Redevoering nopens het nodig besluit tot zekerheid der Republiek te nemen*, 1746, UvA Pfl. O z 39, *Straet Praetje, tussen Rooje Hein en Kreupele Bram, over de Bataille by Piacensa en de ontvlugte jonge Pretendent*, 1746, KB pflt 17526, and *Britlands Processi of the Gevaar der Pretendent: Aan alle Liefhebbers der Gods-dienst en Vryheyt,* 1746, KB pflt 17493a.
[105] *De gevoelens van een Hollands patriot*, p. 27.

candidate to keep the Dutch in the anti-French camp and transform them into active participants in Newcastle's System.[106]

Yorke's instructions reveal British intentions to coopt Dutch elites which they perceived as critical to achieving these geopolitical goals. British influence on Princess Anne's regency, in particular, would ensure control over the institution of the Stadtholderate. Yorke's "Private and Very Secret Instructions" show the degree to which the British sought to find out in whom "the Princess [Anne] … places Her chief Confidence and which Ministers of the Republick are most consulted in Affairs of Consequence". Yorke's duty was to send information on these advisors and "to conduct yourself towards them (whoever they may be) in such manner as may best dispose them to promote the most perfect Union … between Us and the Republick". In addition, Yorke was to make sure that the Princess "act in Concert with Us in Everything that relates to the Affairs of Europe, and to concur in those Measures, which may best tend to the Maintenance of the System". The sudden elevation of William's advisors, such Willem Bentinck, Hendrik Fagel, and the Duke of Brunswick, to positions of power after the Stadtholder's death worried the British since they might attract other people who sought to gain influence with them. Yorke was advised to ensure "proper Managements for other persons" who might influence the Princess' advisors "to prevent them from using their Influence and Credit to overturn the present System". Moreover, Yorke was supposed to do all of these things in secret to "avoid giving any Handle to ill-disposed Persons" that the British were wielding influence over Dutch politics.[107]

During the first half of the 1750s, British cooptation of Dutch elites through Princess Anne and ambassador Yorke went smoothly. Sources from this period demonstrate a successful

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[106] H.M. Scott, 'Sir Joseph Yorke and the Waning of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance, 1747-1788', in *Colonial Empires Compared: Britain and the Netherlands 1750-1850,* eds. R. Moore and H. van Nierop (Surrey: Aldershot 2003), p. 11-31.
[107] SP 84/ 458, "Private and Very Secret Instructions", NA.

integration of Dutch and British policy. “Everything”, as Yorke put it in 1751, “seems to go on with the greatest quiet”. The establishment of the Prussian *Emder Ostasiatischer Handelskompanie* (or Emden Company) and the Anglo-Dutch resistance against it is a prime example of close cooperation between the Dutch and the British in attempting to prevent the rise of a rival East Asian trading company. Dealing with the Austrians’ lack of enthusiasm for maintaining the Barrier fortresses was also a key area of cooperation.[108] In Dutch public discourse, the rise of Anne’s, and thereby British, power in the Netherlands was presented as a “consolation” during the “mourning” of the Dutch people over the death of the much-venerated Stadtholder William IV.[109]

With the help of the British and the support of the Dutch Orangist elites, Anne successfully succeeded her husband. She ensured political stability in the Dutch Republic after the War of the Austrian Succession and the Orangist Revolution that had nearly plunged the country into civil war. Yet the stability that Anne and the System provided would soon be tested in a global war that was about to start in America.

[108] SP 84/458, December 10/21, 1751, NA.
[109] *Holland in den rouw - en Holland getroost, begreepen in twee leer-reedenen. D’eene over de dood van Willem de IV. En d’andere over d’aanstelling van Anna van Engeland als gouvernante,* Utrecht University Library, henceforth referred to as Utrecht UB: E qu. 509M:11-12.

Chapter Three: 'Join, or Die': The Rise of American Patriotism

Scholarship has long argued that the Seven Years' War fundamentally changed the imperial relationship between the American colonies and Great Britain. British attempts to pay back its war debts prompted the imperial regulations and taxes that ultimately birthed the American Patriot movement, scholars have reasoned. Yet much like in the Dutch Republic and before the 1760s and 1770s, early manifestations of Patriotism were present in the American colonies. Scholars have overlooked how the American revolutionary movement was conceived in the transatlantic current of Patriotism that had also spawned the Orangist Patriot movement in the Netherlands in 1747/8.

Like in the Dutch Republic, the Patriot canon had created a "great hinterland" of political and cultural dogmas in the American colonies. And, as in the Netherlands in the 1740s, the fundamental concepts of this intellectual sphere resonated with the political, cultural, and economic realities in the American colonies of negotiated political relations and deep adherence to the concept of political liberty.[110] During the eighteenth century, both the Netherlands and the American colonies increasingly found themselves within the periphery of a rising British Empire.[111] And so, similar to the situation in the Netherlands, war between the competing powers of France and Great Britain was the immediate cause that transformed American Patriotism from a widespread but dormant ideology into an active, and eventually revolutionary, political movement.

As in the Dutch Republic, war with France and its aftermath created momentum for political reform in the American colonies based on Patriot thought. During the war, the Albany

[110] Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1968).
[111] Eliga H. Gould, "Entangled Atlantic Histories: A Response from the Anglo-American Periphery", *The American Historical Review* 5 (2007), p. 1415-1422.

Congress of 1754 presented an early attempt to preserve American colonial autonomy within the rapidly changing British imperial structure. These attempts were based loosely on the kind of Patriotism that had been present in the American colonies in the preceding decades. Though ultimately unsuccessful, American colonial attempts at reform - and enthusiasm for the Empire as an entity and the monarchy as an institution - foreshadowed the resistance of the American colonists against Britain's attempts to reform the Empire on British terms. It also demonstrates how American colonial interests had diverged in some ways from British imperial goals.

An in-depth examination of sources between 1754 and 1775 demonstrates that Patriotism formed the ideological backbone of the American colonial enthusiasm for the Empire during the Seven Years' War as well as against the British government's reform plans after the war. In turn, these developments set events in motion that led to armed conflict between the American colonies and Great Britain and ultimately a tectonic shift in the Patriot Atlantic in 1775 and 1776. Before 1775, the political agenda of the American Patriots largely aimed to restore an imagined government compact in which the colonist believed their rights and liberties were respected while also maximizing the potential for westward expansion and ensuring protection from French and Indian powers under the umbrella of the British Empire.

Like their Dutch counterparts in 1747/8, American Patriot aims before 1775 were relatively moderate, even decisively monarchist and in favor of a powerful, expanding British Empire. Instead of aiming to destroy or even fundamentally transform their relationship with Britain and its monarch, the American Patriots between 1754 and 1775 sought to restore the balance of power between the colonial legislatures and the imperial government in Britain, similar to the aims of the Orangist Patriots in 1747. They erroneously believed that their political aims would not undermine but strengthen the Empire to which they belonged.

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American Patriotism had its origins in the first half of the eighteenth century, born in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Whigs in both Great Britain and the American colonies had initially hailed the Glorious Revolution as a restoration of a political balance in Great Britain. Similar to Dutch thinkers like Hugo Grotius, their idealized vision of balanced politics was based on the instability of the English Civil War and the religious wars of seventeenth-century Europe that had thrown the continent into chaos. By the 1680s, Whigs considered a restoration of balance by enacting constitutional limits on the power of the monarch - in the mold of early liberal thinkers - as the solution to this chaos. It was within the context of the contentious political history that liberal thinkers like John Locke theorized about an ideal political society in which the people's representatives would provide a counterbalance to the power of the monarch. The representatives could enact several political measures and reforms without getting rid of the monarchy in its entirety or turning it into an absolutist institution.

Many subjects in both Britain and its North American colonies widely celebrated the Glorious Revolution and its Whiggish results as the restoration of balance, but the American and British experiences with the politics of the victorious Whigs diverged in subsequent decades. British political power largely coalesced around the Whigs with limited opposition in the form of the Tories and the radical Whigs, the latter of which were also called the Country Party or Patriots at various times. Generally, both the monarch and the Whig-dominated Parliament cooperated fruitfully. This cooperation not only consolidated Whig power. It also underlined the idea that the Glorious Revolution secured the balance the Whigs had sought before 1688 for the long term.[112] It is within the context of these historical struggles that various authors contributed

[112] Pincus, *1688,* p. 437-486.

to the Patriot canon, especially the classical republican thinkers such as John Trenchard and Andrew Fletcher.

In contrast to Great Britain, American colonial politics remained considerably more adversarial. It was not characterized by balance and cooperation, but rather dispute, even after 1688. Colonial assemblies were regularly divided and, more importantly, were often at odds with the Crown's representatives in the colonies, especially their governors. These political tensions supported the notion in early eighteenth-century America that the Glorious Revolution had not secured a balance between power and liberty or that at least this was a permanent struggle. As a result, divisive oppositional politics was the norm in the American colonies.[113]

American Patriotism - or at least its early eighteenth-century version - emerged from this contentious political environment. As Amy Watson and Steve Pincus have demonstrated, Patriotism became a potent political force in the American colonies as the eighteenth century unfolded. In contrast to the Whigs that dominated British political life, the Patriots "took issue with the Whig Party's increasingly Anglocentric imperial policy" as well as their supposed disregard for British subjects on both sides of the Atlantic, seen in their treatment of such issues as habeas corpus, due process, and free speech.[114] In this way, British and American Patriots acted as a kind of Whig fundamentalist. They thought that their ideological brethren of the establishment, most prevalent in Great Britain itself, had relaxed their Whiggish principles after the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian Succession in exchange for power and privilege.

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[113] Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, p. 22-93.
[114] Amy Watson, "The New York Patriot Movement: Partisanship, the Free Press, and Britain's Imperial Constitution, 1731-9", *The William and Mary Quarterly* 77 (2020), p. 33-64; Steve Pincus and Amy Watson, "Patriotism after the Hanoverian Succession" in *The Hanoverian Succession in Great Britain and Its Empire*, eds. Brent S. Sirota and Allan I. Macinnes (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press 2019), p. 155-174.

Though primarily a local opposition movement before the Seven Years' War, Patriots in both Great Britain and the American colonies proved nevertheless very supportive of the Whig government's efforts to defeat France during the Seven Years' War. Enthusiasm for the war and embrace of the British Empire mixed well with American Patriot political thought and practice in addition to colonial economic interests. The Seven Years' War originated in disputes between various European and Native powers over competing claims of sovereignty over the Ohio territory. After land surveyors revealed the economic potential of the Ohio territory in the early 1750s, American colonial interest in the lands beyond the Appalachian Mountains had grown. Yet the large number of claims to the territory complicated matters. The French sought to keep Ohio out of colonial American hands, knowing that the greater population of British North America and their hunger for land would bring British settlements too close to strategic centers of New France. In addition, the French government was concerned that British settlement deeper into the continent could cut off the land connection between French Canada in the north and French Louisiana in the west. The British, meanwhile, supported American colonial expansion and claimed indirect sovereignty over the Ohio territory through Britain's supposed sovereignty over the Iroquois Confederacy, a Native confederation of six separate nations who themselves claimed sovereignty over the Ohio River Valley. In reality, however, various local Native tribes unrelated to the Iroquois controlled the Ohio River Valley and tried to play the larger factions against each other to preserve their autonomy.[115]

The American colonial leaders, who had a considerably larger financial stake in the Ohio territory than their British overlords, sought a much more aggressive policy against the French

[115] Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2001), p. 110-236; Alfred P. James, *The Ohio Company: Its Inner History* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 1959).

than the British government wanted, which initially advocated for more defensive measures against the French colonists.[116] In late 1753, Lieutenant Governor of Virginia Dinwiddie used a broad interpretation of his instructions to "defend" British territory against the French, moving confront the French colonists in Ohio. He commissioned George Washington, then a young Virginian gentleman, to carry a letter to the French commander at Fort LeBoeuf, a recently constructed French fort near Lake Erie in what is now northwestern Pennsylvania. The Virginian legislature eventually raised ten thousand pounds to send two hundred men, under Washington's command, to enforce British sovereignty and drive the French out of Ohio.[117]

Due to a series of military blunders by the Virginians, this colonial military endeavor proved the opening salvo of a war with global consequences. The Virginian assault failed to expel the French out of Ohio and only strengthened French resolve. Contrecoeur seized an Ohio Company trading post and fortified it, naming it Fort Duquesne. He also sent a scouting party under the command of Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville to assess the position of Washington's troops. Washington and his forces subsequently ambushed Jumonville's encampment and killed a host of men including Jumonville. Some French soldiers escaped and made it back to Fort Duquesne. They reported that Jumonville's skull had been brutally split in two by a Native ally of Washington's after Jumonville had been asked whether he was French or English. The subsequent Battle of Fort Necessity, where French troops sought to take revenge for Jumonville's death and simultaneously expel Washington's forces from the Ohio territory,

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[116] G.F.G. Stanley, *New France: The Last Phase, 1744-60* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968); William R. Nester, *The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press 2014), p. 1-150; Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 2000), p. 1-41.
[117] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, p. 42-50 and Nester, *French and Indian War,* p. 145-150.

proved to be more politically consequential. Signing the terms of surrender he could not comprehend, Washington unknowingly admitted to murdering Jumonville.[118]

The British government became convinced that Washington's defeat in Ohio was a result of colonial autonomy and incompetence. The controversies in the Ohio territory made the Duke of Newcastle aware of the potential dangers colonial autonomy posed to the fragile peace between France and Britain and British sovereignty in Europe and North America at large. If left too much to their own devices, as Virginia's belligerence and Washington's defeat proved, the American colonists would soon provoke the French to war without having the capacity to defend British sovereign territory. Only increased centralized control over the colonies, British statesmen reasoned, could prevent an all-out war with France.[119]

To establish more control over the colonies and solve the tensions with France, Newcastle sought help from the Duke of Cumberland, a move that would signal the beginning of the end of Newcastle's tenure as prime minister. Newcastle sought out Cumberland, the famous military commander at the Battle of Culloden and King George II's son, because of his influence at court and his military expertise. Newcastle and the Duke devised a military plan to assist the colonies to take several French forts in Ohio in phases. The phased plan allowed for negotiation with the French along the way. More importantly, all colonial governors would be subordinated to the commander-in-chief of these British forces, who would also set up a common colonial plan of defense. A show of force with battle-hardened troops from Europe would, the British government reasoned, overwhelm the French in North America, ensure a quick surrender of Ohio, and force the French to cede sovereignty over Ohio to Britain.[120]

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[118] Anderson, *Crucible of War,* p. 50-65.
[119] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, p. 66-73.
[120] T.R. Clayton, "The Duke of Newcastle, the Earl of Halifax, and American Origins of the Seven Years' War", *The Historical Journal* 24 (1981), p. 571-603; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, p. 86-93.

As the British were implementing new policies to establish more centralized control over their North American colonies and push the French and Natives from the Ohio territory, the premise of a more unified and integrated British Empire to counter France found supporters across the Atlantic during the Albany Congress of 1754, albeit in a different way than the British government intended. The reforms that the colonists proposed at the Albany Congress and the reactions to these reforms reflect how the colonists and the British viewed the proper place of the colonies within the Empire. More importantly, the proposed colonial reforms reveal that forms of Patriotism had already begun to shape American politics.

The Earl of Halifax, the President of the Board of Trade, had initiated the Albany Congress to renew the Covenant Chain, a string of alliances of the British and their colonies in North America with various Native tribes on their borders, as an essential bulwark against French forces and their Native allies. The concept of the Covenant Chain stemmed from the Dutch colony of New Netherland, the colonists of which had set up loose alliances and trade relations with the Iroquois in the seventeenth century. After their conquest of New Netherland in the late seventeenth century, the English continued these relations and expanded upon them with various degrees of success.[121]

While plagued with intercolonial disputes and unresolved grievances between the Natives and the colonists, the Albany Congress was successful in renewing the Covenant Chain. The Congress secured Native support in a possible war with France, at least so it seemed at the time. In the summer of 1754, the delegates from the majority of the British North American colonies

[121] Timothy J. Shannon, *Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000), p. 1-82; The influence of the Dutch on Native relations in the northern part of America was so large that it even spawned a variety of creole languages, most importantly Mohawk Dutch. See: Nicolien van der Sijs, *Cookies, Coleslaw, and Stoops. The influence of Dutch on the North American languages* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press 2009).

and the several tribes of the Iroquois Confederacy assembled at the *Stadthuys* ("city hall" in Dutch) of Albany to resolve their disputes and to set new parameters for the alliance. Colonial disunity, however, plagued the Congress. New York, the colony that hosted the Congress and the only colony with a royal governor present, took the lead. New York tried to use the Congress to advance its own interests. Other colonial delegations, dissatisfied with New York's leadership in the Covenant Chain negotiations, made separate treaties with the Iroquois, as eventually did New York.[122]

Though all the delegates sought to renew the Covenant Chain, some also came to Albany hoping to achieve colonial union and closer integration with the British Empire. These expectations demonstrate how the American colonists imagined their role in the Empire in the 1750s and what role Patriotism played in those imaginings. Benjamin Franklin, one of Pennsylvania's delegates to the Congress, was the biggest proponent of such a union. Franklin - a respected scientist, printer, and deputy postmaster general of the northern colonies - had been toying with the idea of a unified colonial government under the authority of the British Crown for years. In 1751, he published two essays on the colonies and their possible future development in population growth as well as their political position within the British Empire.[123] Timothy Shannon describes Franklin's early support for a colonial union as arising from "provincial anxiety", a term that illustrates the insecurity among the colonists about their perceived inferior status within the British Empire compared to the King's subjects living in Great Britain.[124]

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[122] Beverly McAnear," Personal Accounts of the Albany Congress of 1754", *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 39 (March 1953), pp. 727-746.
[123] One of the essays was on American demography, *Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind*, and the other was on colonial union, in Archibald Kennedy's *The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians to the British Interest*.
[124] Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, p. 89-105.

In addition to provincial anxiety, Franklin's background also explains why he was well aware of the opportunities and pitfalls of the British North American colonies in their disunited state, a sentiment that similarly haunted politicians in the Dutch Republic during the eighteenth century. As a well-read, well-traveled printer of books, pamphlets, and newspapers, Franklin had gained a keen understanding of the interior and transatlantic politics of the colonies. Newspapers in the eighteenth century, and American colonial newspapers in particular, would often reprint stories from other newspapers in the colonies and abroad. This circulation of knowledge made Franklin aware of political developments on both sides of the Atlantic. In this position, Franklin understood what he believed to be the pettiness of intercolonial politics. Visible during the Albany Congress and many other instances in the past, local interests, rather than the interests of all the colonies and the British Empire more broadly, dominated intercolonial politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Based on these assumptions, Franklin reasoned that a unified colonial government that closely cooperated with the British imperial government would not only improve the standing and reputation of the American colonies within the British Empire. It would also result in a more effective defense of the colonies against French absolutism, an argument that closely resembles those of the Orangist Patriots a few years earlier.[125]

The Albany Congress provided the ideal moment for Franklin to unfold his plans for a united colonial government. London's orders to make a "general Treaty" of all colonies with the Iroquois and the problems with the French in Ohio seemed to indicate that there was enough political momentum in Britain and the colonies to propose such a plan. In the same way that the Orangist Patriots saw the empowerment of the Stadtholder as the ideal moment to reform the

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[125] J.A. Leo Lemay, *The Life of Benjamin Franklin, Volume 2 Printer and Publisher, 1730-1747* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2005).

corrupt politics of the Dutch Republic, the British government and colonial reformers like Franklin regarded the coming conflict with France as an opportune moment to push for a more centralized colonial government.

In May 1754, Franklin exploited the French capture of Fort Duquesne to launch a propaganda campaign in favor of colonial union in anticipation of the Albany Congress a month later. The May 9th edition of the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, Franklin's newspaper, published a piece that presented the French as a threat to the "British Interest, Trade, and Plantations in America". French confidence in their undertaking to subdue the British American colonies, Franklin argued, was "well grounded on the present disunited State of the British colonies, and the extreme Difficulty of bringing so many different Governments and Assemblies to agree in any speedy and effectual Measures for our common Defence and Security". Meanwhile, the French "have the very great advantage of being under one Direction, with one Council, and one Purse."[126] Franklin's infamous political cartoon of the snake divided into eight pieces, with the caption "Join, or Die", accompanied the *Gazette's* piece. The cartoon suggested that the American colonies had to unite to keep France at bay and protect British interests in North America. Franklin's call to unity was in many ways similar to the Orangist Patriot call for *eendracht* (unity) issued when they likewise regarded disunity in the Republic as a fundamental obstacle to Dutch greatness as well as to the ability to effectively fight French tyranny and secure liberty at home.

During the negotiations with the Iroquois at the Albany Congress, a separate set of debates ensued regarding colonial union behind closed doors at the *Stadthuys*. Franklin was the main proponent behind the motion "that the Commissioners deliver their Opinion whether a

[126] *Pennsylvania Gazette*, May 9, 1754, America's Historical Newspapers Database, p. 2.

Union of all the Colonies is not at present absolutely necessary for their security and defence". Franklin had already composed a draft of a possible colonial union earlier that year, called "Short hints towards a scheme for uniting the Northern colonies", and carried it with him to Albany. Given the threat of war with France and unsolved issues with the Natives, Franklin was able to convince the rest of the Congress to consider a plan of union. Franklin's motion passed unanimously. Subsequently, the Congress created a union committee, consisting of one delegate from each colony, tasked with designing a plan of union for the American colonies.[127]

The final draft of what came to be known as the Albany Plan of Union was largely based on Franklin's "Short hints" and was imbued with many elements of early American Patriotism. The Plan sought to centralize governance in the colonies while leaving colonial charters and the local powers of colonial assemblies intact. As in the Dutch Republic, these powers were much valued in the colonies as ancient rights and privileges. The unified colonial government could only come in force by an act of Parliament, revealing the Congress' realization that such far-reaching reforms of the colonial political system could only be changed with permission from Britain's supreme legislative body. The Albany Congress also agreed, to the dismay of Franklin, that the Plan of Union would have to be submitted to a vote in the colonial legislatures to give the plan more legitimacy and receive consent from colonial elites.[128]

If Parliament and the colonial legislatures voted for the Plan, the new colonial government would consist of a Grand Council, that acted as a colonial House of Commons, and a President-General, an executive authority that resembled a royal governor for all the colonies. The colonial government would be subordinated to the British Crown, but only the unified colonial government, not Parliament or the King, would be able to raise revenue and collect

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[127] Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, p. 141-173.
[128] Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, p. 141-173.f

taxes for common defense. At the same time, the King had the legal authority to veto any laws passed by the Grand Council within three years of their enactment.[129] In this way, the King functioned like the "Patriot King" in the imagination of Bolingbroke as well as the Orangist Patriots; distant and disinterested but maintaining the power to block legislation in the interest of all.

The Albany Plan would not only reform the government in the colonies but also redefine the relationship between Great Britain and the American colonies. The Plan's primary aim was to organize a common defense against the French and their Native allies and its secondary aim was an improved organization of westward expansion. The unified colonial government would have the authority to make land purchases "from Indians, for the crown, of lands not now within the bounds of particular Colonies" and to "make new settlements on such purchases, by granting lands in the King's name". The colonial government could also make laws "for regulating and governing such new settlements, till the crown shall think fit to form them into particular governments". In addition, the colonial government would have the power to "make peace or declare war with Indian nations" and "build forts for the defence of any of the Colonies, and equip the vessels of force to guard the coasts".[130] With these measures, the Albany Plan fundamentally reimagined the relationship between Britain and its American colonies. The Plan argued for colonial autonomy regarding strictly American affairs. Only the Crown, common ancestry, and shared interests would connect Great Britain to the American colonies.

At the same time, the Albany Plan was a celebration of the British Empire, an essential characteristic of early American Patriotism before 1775. The claim to autonomy was not an

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[129] The Albany Plan of Union of 1754, Yale University's Avalon Project, Government Printing Office, 1927, House Document No. 398, Selected, Arranged and Indexed by Charles C. Tansil.
[130] The Albany Plan.

appeal to separatism, but rather a recognition of equal partnership between the American colonies and Great Britain in the larger framework of the Empire. The Plan was an indictment of contemporary dysfunctional colonial governments, presenting them as incapable of advancing common British interests. A unified colonial government, the Plan's proponents argued, would be considerably more capable of united action than the current, ineffective colonial legislatures.

In many ways, the Albany Plan mirrored the Patriot reforms during the Orangist Revolution of 1747/8. Both the proponents of the Albany Plan and the Orangist reforms argued for closer integration with the British government while fundamentally reordering political representation and carving out important powers for a disinterested executive. Much like the Orangist Patriots, Franklin and other proponents of the Albany Plan deemed the current form of governance in the colonies ineffective, petty, and rife with particularistic interests. The grievances and proposals for political reform in a pamphlet like Wassenaar's *The Patriot* bears an uncanny resemblance to Benjamin Franklin's essays on colonial politics. Both the American colonists and the Dutch operated within the periphery of the British Empire and felt increasingly uneasy about the role of junior partner in their relationship vis-a-vis the British. But, at the same time, they were convinced that the path to equal partnership was a closer integration and unification of "interests" with the British. In the American colonies, as in the Netherlands, the driving forces behind their integration with Britain were their respective relationship to the British Crown and perceived shared interests. Both the Albany Plan and the Dutch reforms of 1747/8 proposed various political reforms aimed at crushing ineffective governance while creating new avenues for political representation in line with early liberal and classical republican thought.

Both reform initiatives were also met with opposition from local politicians and British indifference for remarkably similar reasons. Local politicians saw the Albany Plan, as the Dutch reforms before it, as an infringement on their powers. The appeal of these plans was therefore relatively narrow. The Congress sought to prevent local colonial opposition to the plan with certain provisions, such as the prohibition of the central colonial government to press men into military service without the consent of each legislature. Nevertheless, colonial legislatures either ignored it or voted against it, some even referring to it as a "Destruction of the Rights and Liberties of his Majesty's Subjects". Others, like Lieutenant Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia recognized the appeal and necessity of colonial union but rather deferred to London for any decision on a possible union. This response mirrored the deference of Dutch reformers to the supposed disinterested authority of the Stadtholder.[131]

In London, the Albany Plan was met with indifference rather than disinterest, in large part because the British government's imperial reforms were already underway. By the time the Plan arrived in London, General Braddock had already left for America and he was given extraordinary powers over colonial governors and legislatures. The British government was pleased with the renewal of the Covenant Chain, the original purpose of the Congress. If anything, the Plan was simply a confirmation to the British government that the colonies were desperate for some form of centralization of political power under British guidance.[132] As during the Dutch reforms in 1747/8, there was significant indifference and misunderstanding on the part of the British government towards the needs and motives of the reformers at the Albany Congress. As long as the elites in power remained in support of the British government and were

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[131] Shannon, *Indians and Colonists*, p. 212-220.
[132] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, p. 86-92.

willing to promote British interests, any kind of political reform that would address local issues was dismissible to the British government.

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The end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 confronted the British government with economic and ethnic chaos in its Empire, caused and exacerbated by the territorial expansion that accompanied British victory in the war. Much of Britain's territorial expansion took place in territories formerly held by France, which greatly diversified the subjects of Britain's enlarged Empire, especially in terms of Native peoples and Catholic subjects. At the same time, the government regarded the massive war debts as a burden on the Empire's ability to maintain control over its expanded territories. The increased debt, disorder, and diversity after the Seven Years' War provided the impetus for a reorganization and centralization of the Empire. These centralization efforts would prove contentious in the American colonies where they would bring the early stirrings of Patriotism in the American colonies to the fore.

The problems of governing an increasingly multi-ethnic Empire became apparent to the British government with the outbreak of Pontiac's War in 1763, which unleashed a wave of ethnic violence and general conflict between Native Americans and European colonists in North America.[133] Pontiac's War and similar postwar imperial issues forced the British government to recognize the necessity of more control over the interactions between diverse population groups in Britain's enlarged North American Empire. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the first

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[133] Anderson, *Crucible of War,* p. 219-373 and 387-557; Richard Middleton, *Pontiac's War: Its Causes, Course, and Consequences* (New York: Routledge 2009), p. 17-48; Gregory Evans Dowd, *War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2004) p. 22-90; Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009); Middelburgse Courant No. 118, Tuesday October 2, 1764, Delpher Online Archive and Leydse Maandagse-Courant No. 148, Monday December 10, 1764, Delpher Online Archive.

attempt to regulate these interactions. It was primarily intended to segregate the living spaces of the peoples of the North American continent who formally lived under British rule to prevent instability in its expanded Empire.[134]

After 1763 and in addition to the ethnic conflict and colonial chaos, the lack of government revenue was another significant issue on the British government's agenda. Similar to its approach to the ethnic and migration problems of the Empire, the British government viewed centralization of authority and reform as an effective method to tackle the problems of government debt which it had accumulated during the Seven Years' War. In 1764 and 1765, the British government reasoned that only a significant increase of government revenue could pay for the war debts and the defense of its enlarged Empire. Part of the increase in government revenue would be accomplished through a reform of tax collection in the British colonies, where the colonists had historically paid considerably lower taxes than subjects on the British Isles. However, many American colonists, shaped by the Patriot canon, viewed these attempts at taxation not only as unlawful but as proof of the lack of virtue and the increasingly corrupt nature of the British government. Similar to their Dutch predecessors in 1747, the American colonists regarded these taxation efforts as a violation of an ancient and balanced social compact of liberty between the American colonies and Great Britain. To the American colonists, taxation represented the forcible requisitioning of property for the benefit of the Empire. It was also considered a usurpation of power by Parliament over the rights and privileges of colonial assemblies. The Sugar and Stamp Acts, the new British tax laws that were designed to raise revenue, represented to the American colonists a decline in virtuous and balanced government founded on natural law.

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[134] The Royal Proclamation of 1763, Yale Avalon Project. Last consulted on August 7, 2018 at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/proc1763.asp.

The British government in 1763 and 1764 initially sought to update existing trade laws to relieve the burden of debt on government finances. Under the leadership of the Secretary of State of the Northern Department and Prime Minister George Grenville, Parliament passed the Sugar Act in 1764. The Sugar Act essentially renewed the Molasses Act of 1733, a law that was set to expire in 1763 and that had seldom been enforced. Grenville's ministry predicted that the end of the Seven Years' War would produce an increase in demand for sugar, particularly in Britain's North American colonies that mostly used sugar in the rum industry. The new Sugar Act of 1763 halved the import tariffs that were set in the Molasses Act but significantly increased enforcement of the law. Given that the Molasses Act was never truly enforced, merchants from the American colonies, the Dutch Republic, and others who traded non-English Caribbean sugar in English port experienced the Sugar Act as a *de facto* tax increase.[135]

The Sugar Act elicited intellectual resistance in the American colonies, especially in the New England colonies where the Act had the largest economic impact. Many of the rum and sugar merchants in the American colonies lived in New England and depended heavily on cheap sugar and molasses from the West Indies. In May 1764, Samuel Adams and James Otis Jr, two prominent activist politicians in the Massachusetts colonial assembly, argued against the legality of the Sugar Act. They made the case that taxing sugar was illegal and that it set an unwelcome precedent. And much like his contemporaries in the Dutch Republic, Adams reasoned that the American colonial system of government and taxation was based on a negotiated social contract. Adams argued in the Massachusetts Assembly that the Sugar Act annihilated "our Charter Right

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[135] Anderson, *Crucible for War,* p. 557-633 and The Sugar Act of 1764, last consulted on April 14, 2018 at: http://ahp.gatech.edu/sugar_act_bp_1764.html

to govern & tax ourselves" and that the Act undermined "our British Privileges".[136] Soon, Adams and Otis argued, Parliament might pass other taxes on Massachusetts as well.

The Sugar Act also provoked debates in the American colonial public sphere. These publications demonstrate that, even in the early phases of the imperial crisis, resistance to Parliament was based on the ideological tenets of early American Patriotism. In 1763, Otis wrote a pamphlet that sought to provide an ideological foundation to the political opposition to the Sugar Act. Invoking Locke, Pufendorf, and de Vattel, Otis praised the balanced "civil constitution of Great Britain" that was founded on natural law. Similar to how the Dutch Patriots viewed their Stadtholder in 1747, Otis idealized the British monarch as a Patriot King. Otis underlined the necessity of the "parental love" of the British King "who neither slumbers nor sleeps, but eternally watches for our good". Otis argued that since the "deliverance under God wrought by the prince of Orange" during the Glorious Revolution of 1688, "not one man in an hundred (except in Canada) who does not think himself under the best national civil constitution in the world".[137]

Despite the glorious nature and history of the British constitution, the Sugar Act proved to Otis how the constitution had become imbalanced, edging towards tyranny, and how the enactment of the law signaled the loss of virtue. According to Otis, the "law of nature, was not of man's making … He can only perform and keep, or disobey and break it". If a government breaks the law of nature, it will quickly find itself denigrated from the "rank of a virtuous and

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[136] Samuel Adams, "Instructions to Boston's Representatives", May 24, 1764, *A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing Boston Town Records, 1758-1769*, vol. 16 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill City Printers 1886) p. 120-122.
[137] James Otis Jr., "The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and proved", Archive of Americana, *Early American Imprints*, Series 1, no. 9773.

good man to that of a brute; or to be transformed from the friends, perhaps father of his country, to a devouring Lion or Tyger".[138]

Like other Patriot authors, Otis leaned heavily on classical republican and early liberal thought. In the introduction of the pamphlet (*Of the Origin of Government*) Otis drew on the seventeenth-century history of Great Britain, as well as the classical history of Rome and Greece, to explain how tyrannical power had threatened the rights and liberties of the people in various times. In this historical narrative, Otis framed the American colonial situation as a transatlantic phenomenon. Otis compared the American colonies with that of the "seven poor and distressed provinces" in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, who had "asserted their rights against the whole Spanish monarchy". According to Otis, the long transatlantic history of tyrannical and imbalanced governments proved that only a restoration of the government to its original balanced state could prevent the rise of tyrannical power and the suppression of liberty, demonstrating his familiarity with classical republican theory.[139]

Though the Sugar Act may have seemed especially consequential to many New England colonists in 1764, the British government considered the Act a part of a larger post-war imperial reorganization that sought to protect and maintain Britain's imperial gains. Taking these larger concerns of imperial reform and challenges to British power into account, Parliament disregarded New England's protests to the Sugar Act and passed the Stamp Act of 1765. The Stamp Act of 1765 constituted a crucial development in the imperial crisis because it expanded the initial conflict that had been mostly fought between New England merchant elites and the British government to one that eventually involved all of Britain's North American colonies and affected a larger population within those colonies. The size and the geographical dispersion of

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[138] Otis, "The Rights".
[139] Otis, *Of the Origin of Government* in "The Rights".

the protests revealed the broadly shared displeasure with British centralization and taxation efforts. It also demonstrates the degree to which, by the 1760s, Patriotism appealed to American colonial communities beyond New England elites and intellectuals, widely disseminated by the burgeoning printing press and printing culture.

The Stamp Act was considered relatively uncontroversial in Great Britain itself because it had a historical and legal precedent there. Since William III's reign in the 1690s, stamp acts had functioned effectively in the British Isles to raise revenue. The first Stamp Act of 1694 was in many ways a product of the Anglo-Dutch alliance and personal union forged in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The model of taxation, taxing legal documents in the form of an official stamp, had been widely used in the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century and the 1694 English act was largely modeled on the Dutch one.[140] The Stamp Act of 1694, as well as the Stamp Act of 1712 that expanded the taxation to newspapers and other printed materials, were confined to Great Britain, however, and did not extend to the American colonies.[141] Both the Bute and Grenville ministries had considered a stamp act for the American colonies during the Seven Years' War to pay for war expenses, but proposals were never made with much detail and thus never came to fruition.

The idea of a stamp act for the colonies resurfaced in the spring of 1764 in Grenville's ministry. But at its very inception, the tax was met with intellectual opposition from American colonial leaders. In 1764, Connecticut Governor Thomas Fitch and the Connecticut colonial assembly offered one of the first protests to Grenville's proposed Stamp Act in a pamphlet.

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[140] David Lee Russell, *The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company 2000), p. 20-30.
[141] J.A. Downie, *Robert Harley and the Press: Propaganda and Public Opinion in the Age of Swift and Defoe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), p. 149-161.

Fitch, the author of the pamphlet, argued that Parliament had no right to impose so-called "internal taxes" on the colonies - as opposed to "external" tariffs to regulate the trade - since the colonists were not represented in Parliament. In this way, Fitch provided a practical political argument in contrast to the more philosophical objections of James Otis earlier that year. Fitch posited that Parliament retained the right to regulate the commerce of the Empire through tariffs. Passing a general tax to raise revenue without colonial consent, however, would constitute a violation of the social and political compact that existed between the American colonies and Great Britain.[142] Meanwhile, resistance to the Stamp Act, more so than the Sugar Act, was framed in historical terms as a necessary struggle to restore the balanced order of the English constitution. Similar to other Patriots active in earlier decades, Fitch underlined that the British "rights" and "privileges" were of an "ancient Date" and that "whenever it hath been encroached upon, has been claimed, struggled, and recovered, as being essential for the Preservation of the Liberty, Property, and Freedom" of the people.[143]

The proposed Stamp Act faced opposition from colonial agents in London as well. In February 1765, Benjamin Franklin met with Grenville and other colonial agents to discuss a possible alternative to the Stamp Act for raising the revenue with colonial contributions. Franklin reasoned that the only alternative for the Stamp Act was that the colonial assemblies would raise the revenue themselves in a manner that they deemed fit. Grenville dismissed the idea as unrealistic because similar methods of taxation had been tried during the Seven Years' War and the colonies had proven unable to raise enough money to sustain the war effort. According to Grenville, Franklin's alternative plan would put too much autonomy in the hands of the colonies

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[142] Thomas Fitch, *Reasons why the British colonies, in America, should not be charged with internal taxes, by authority of Parliament; humbly offered, for consideration, in behalf of the colony of Connecticut,* 1764, Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 9658, Archive of Americana.
[143] Thomas Fitch, *Reasons.*

and would undermine Britain's centralization efforts, which had already proven effective during the war.[144]

In March 1765, Parliament passed a comprehensive Stamp Act that taxed a variety of goods from paper to playing cards, generating large-scale protests in the colonies supported by Patriot arguments. The Virginian legislature was one of the first in the colonies to protest formally against the Stamp Act, passing the so-called Stamp Act Resolutions in May 1765. The Resolutions declared the Stamp Act unconstitutional because it broke with historical rights and privileges that the colonies had retained since their settlement. The Virginian House of Burgesses echoed Otis and Fitch and by extension the Patriot canon. The delegates argued that taxation could only take place with consent from the Virginian legislature and that consent by the legislature had always belonged to the "ancient colony" of Virginia. Like Otis and Fitch, the Virginian legislature emphasized the radical historical departure that the Stamp Act represented, violating the historical and "eternal rights" of the Virginia colony and its people.[145]

In response to the intellectual and popular resistance against the Stamp Act in many of Britain's North American colonies, the Massachusetts Assembly sent a letter to the assemblies of all the colonies to convene in a congress and discuss the problem of the Act. The governors of some colonies, such as Virginia's, blocked their colonial assembly's attempts to send delegates to Massachusetts' so-called Stamp Act Congress, but a significant majority of nine colonies sent delegates regardless of their governor's wishes.[146]

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[144] Robert Middlekauf, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), p. 53-97.
[145] "Virginia Resolves on the Stamp Act", May 30, 1765, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, *Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 November 1813 to 30 September 1814* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2010), p. 496–497.
[146] Clinton A. Weslager, *The Stamp Act Congress: With an Exact Copy of the Complete Journal* (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press 1976).

The Stamp Act Congress' lack of official minutes has obscured the historical record of the debates, but the Congress did craft a Declaration of Rights, signed by only six colonial delegations, which outlined their grievances while simultaneously underlining their faith in the British monarch. Similar to the Virginia Resolves and steeped in the ideology of Patriotism, the Declaration of Rights and Grievances of 1765 underlined the value of the "inherent rights and privileges" of the colonists as well as their continued deference to the British Crown.[147]

The size and scope of the Stamp Act protests enabled more coordinated political action amongst the colonists, such as street violence in some parts of the colonies as well as economic resistance in the form of non-importation agreements. During the summer of 1765, street protests erupted in Boston primarily among the merchant and middle classes that the Stamp Act most affected. Immediately after the passage of the Act, Grenville's ministry appointed stamp distributors in the colonies to administer the tax. Given the unpopularity of the act, protestors chose these distributors as their primary targets. Protestors employed intimidation tactics against the stamp distributors such as hanging them in effigy, tarring and feathering them, and forcing them to resign. Meanwhile, street protestors and colonial politicians in Boston formed underground groups and called themselves the Sons of Liberty. These groups organized street protests and threatened stamp distributors. In late August, the continuing protests in Boston took a turn for the worst when a mob attacked the house of Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson, an expression of dissatisfaction with the Stamp Act as well as years of public resentment against the ruling classes of Boston.[148] Broadly shared dissatisfaction with the Stamp Act gave enormous

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[147] Weslager, *Stamp Act Congress* and "Declaration of Rights of the Stamp Act Congress", October 19, 1765, *Foundational Documents of American Constitutionalism at the UW-Madison Center for the Study of the American Constitution*. Consulted last on May 10, 2021 at: https://csac.history.wisc.edu/document-collections/foundational-documents-of-american-constitutionalism/.

[148] Gary Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (2006), p. 45-58.

weight to the protests, which provided merchants in various colonies, most opposed to the Stamp Act, to agree to a boycott of British goods until the Stamp Act would be repealed.

The news of the convening of the Stamp Act Congress, the non-importation agreements, and the riots in Boston reached Europe in October, shocking the British political class. During the summer of 1765, Lord Rockingham had replaced Grenville as Prime Minister, who proved considerably more sympathetic to American colonial protests than his predecessor. Still, the violence of the protests and the convening of the Stamp Act Congress raised concerns in Parliament, as well as in Rockingham's new Cabinet. The Lords of the Board of Trade saw the convening of an assembly "without the Authority of the Crown … [a] dangerous Tendency in itself".[149] The non-importation agreements among American colonial merchants, however, allowed the Rockingham government to put pressure on Parliament. Rockingham's secretary Edmund Burke urged British merchants to contact their representatives in Parliament about the economic consequences of the non-importation agreements. While many in Parliament and the Rockingham ministry recognized the problems of the boycotts that the Stamp Act created, many considered the American constitutional argument invalid and recognized the necessity of a tax on the American colonists. In the eyes of many in the ministry and Parliament, revenue had to be raised in some form to sustain Britain's expanded empire from which the American colonists benefited too.[150]

In early 1766, Parliament considered the repeal of the Stamp Act and questioned Benjamin Franklin, among other colonial agents, to understand the American side of the debate. The interrogation of Franklin not only demonstrates how Patriot ideas undergirded American resistance to the Stamp Act. It also shows how American Patriotism had started to mix with

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[149] Weslager, *Stamp Act Congress*, p. 120.
[150] Middlekauf, *Glorious Cause*, p. 110-115.

physiocratic critiques of luxury consumption and ideas on political economy.[151] Prolonged colonial resistance to the Stamp Act fascinated the Parliamentary interrogators and they were particularly inquisitive about the extent to which the American colonists could afford to boycott British products and maintain their resistance. Franklin argued that colonial resistance to the Stamp Act stemmed in part from the "internal taxation" that the Stamp Act represented as opposed to the "external taxation" on traded goods. According to Franklin, an internal tax like the Stamp Act was the worst kind of tax, because paying it was unavoidable. To the question from Parliament whether an alternative external tax on "the necessaries of life imported into" the colonies would be the same thing as an internal tax, Franklin argued that American virtue, frugality, and industriousness would provide the colonists with an opportunity to choose not to purchase these products. In making this claim, he echoed Patriot economic ideas. The personal virtue of the American colonists, Franklin contended, would ultimately triumph over Britain's attempt to tax them, which was a statement that well expressed the Patriot view of the conflict, but was not designed to reassure imperial policymakers who wanted to raise revenue.[152]

Since the colonists objected to the idea of the "internal" stamp tax, the British government sought to enact "external" taxes, meaning a tax on trade, to raise revenue for paying off the debt and maintaining its armed forces in North America Given the evasion of British tariffs in the past, raising revenue through trade also required stricter enforcement of the Empire's trade laws, however. This stricter enforcement meant that American colonial merchants would now be scrutinized and subjected to taxes in contrast to the looser regulations of decades

[151] Drew R. McCoy, "Benjamin Franklin's Vision of a Republican Political Economy for America", *The William and Mary Quarterly* 35 (1978), p. 605-628.
[152] "The Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin, before an August Assembly, relating to the Repeal of the Stamp-Act, &c.", February 13, 1766, *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin,* vol. 13 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1969), p. 124–162.

past. Dutch merchants, who had significant economic interests in the Atlantic trade that included the North American colonies, would likewise be scrutinized under the new British laws and, in some cases, even shut out of the North American colonial trade altogether.

These new taxes on trade, collectively called the Townshend Acts, came about during a shift in government in Britain, from the Rockingham ministry to the Chatham ministry, and were designed almost immediately after the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766. Under the new leadership of William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, Charles Townshend became Lord of the Exchequer, the minister in charge of British government finances. Townshend had served under several administrations and in Parliament since the late 1740s, even taking part in the interrogation of Benjamin Franklin on American colonial resistance to the Stamp Act.[153]

As Lord of the Exchequer, Townshend had Franklin's resistance to "internal taxes" in mind when he set out to create a new set of tax laws to raise revenue for the new Chatham ministry. Townshend considered several possible products to tax and subsequently designed a bill, called the Revenue Act, that comprised a broad set of taxes on various products such as tea, wine, fruits, and lead. In addition to these taxes on trade, Townshend also hoped to help the British East India Company, an expanding enterprise that sought to get rid of its excess tea. Consumption of tea in the American colonies was relatively high - about 1 million pounds per year - but a large portion of that tea was purchased from Dutch rather than British merchants. Townshend's Indemnity Act, passed in conjunction with the Revenue Act, essentially halved the duties on tea to undercut the prices of smuggled tea while boosting the trade of the East India Company. The implementation of these new taxes, as well as the halving of duties on tea, were relatively mild and could be considered conciliatory towards the American colonists. The

[153] "Examination of Doctor Benjamin Franklin".

Townshend Acts would not raise as much revenue as the Stamp Act, although Townshend intended the Acts to set a precedent for taxation of Parliament over the American colonies. He intended to pursue additional taxes once the American colonists accepted Parliament's authority to tax them.[154]

Another significant element of the Townshend Acts were its enforcement measures, which were arguably more expansive than its relatively mild and incremental taxes. After the repeal of the Stamp Act in 1766 and with the Declaratory Act, Parliament had already reaffirmed its legislative authority in tax matters over the colonies. Townshend embedded a similar element in the Revenue Act of 1767 that reaffirmed the legality of so-called writs of assistance, essentially the use of search warrants by customs officers in colonial ports, much hated by American merchants.[155]

After the passing of the Revenue and the Indemnity Acts in 1767, Townshend also sought to reform customs collection in America. Townshend and many others in the British government were well aware of American colonial evasion of customs duties. Moreover, reports from America indicated that already existing trade duties, such as the Sugar Act, proved hard to implement. American colonial merchants would often sue customs officers in colonial courts, which favored the merchants and tended to fine and even imprison the accused officers. Townshend asked the British Board of Customs, formally the customs authority in American colonial ports, to recommend changes to facilitate the effort to raise revenue. Townshend

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[154] T.H. Breen, *The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), p. 195-293; Robert J. Chaffin, "The Townshend Acts of 1767", *The William and Mary Quarterly* 27 (1970), p. 90-121; Peter David Garner Thomas, *The Townshend Duties Crisis: The Second Phase of the American Revolution 1767-1773* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987).

[155] Breen, *Marketplace*, p. 195-293; Chaffin, "The Townshend Acts", p. 90-121; Thomas, *The Townshend Duties*.

accepted their proposals, which effectively encompassed the creation of a separate American Board of Customs answerable to the British government with its own staffed bureaucracy. While the bureaucracy would cost more than the current system, the British Board of Customs warned Townsend that "without such a System" of customs, raising revenue in America through trade duties would have to be "abandoned in a short time", because they would not "yield Sufficient [revenue] … to defray the Salaries of Officers". In addition to an American Board of Customs, the Chatham ministry sought to create separate Vice Admiralty Courts in the colonies to enforce trade disputes. While there was already a Vice Admiralty Court in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Chatham's cabinet expanded the courts and, in many ways, facilitated the legal enforcement of the Townshend duties.[156]

As the Townshend Acts and its enforcement and intelligence gathering measures were being implemented, intellectual resistance against the Acts grew in the American colonies. The most eloquent and influential defense of American colonial resistance against the Townshend Acts came from John Dickinson in his pamphlet series called *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania*. Dickinson, a lawyer in Philadelphia, joined many of his fellow colonists in their view of the Stamp Act as a great infraction on the ancient rights and liberties of the American colonies.

Dickinson's *Letters* exemplified the American colonial argument made during the Townshend Acts crisis, deeply informed by the ideological tenets of transatlantic Patriotism. In his letters, Dickinson exalted the supremacy of the British monarch and his role as "a good prince" that is without party or interest. Dickinson regarded the British monarch as a Patriot

[156] Robert J. Chaffin, "The Townshend Acts crisis, 1767-1770", in *A Companion to the American Revolution,* eds. Jack P. Greene and J.R. Pole (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishers 2000), p. 134-150, especially p. 137.

King, much like his intellectual predecessors. At several points, Dickinson even analogized the American colonies to the role of "dutiful children", who are receiving "unmerited blows [from] a beloved parent." The American colonists, Dickinson argued, should respectfully protest the beatings from their parent, but they should also let their "complaints speak at the same time the language of affliction and veneration".[157]

Dickinson connected the American colonists' role of "dutiful children" to individual virtue, which he claimed consisted of a united colonial defense of their shared ancient rights and privileges as well as putting public interests before personal interests, an archetypical Patriot argument. Dickinson reasoned that the crisis between the American colonies and Great Britain was the result of a mother country "blinded by […] passions" and its politicians only seeking to "increase their own wealth, power, and credit", a classical republican argument. The American colonists, who have "true magnanimity of the soul, that can resent injuries, without falling into rage", personified a personal virtue that the corrupt British government did not possess and should rediscover.[158]

In his *Letters,* Dickinson also protested the levying of a tax of any kind on the colonies without the consent of the legislature, an argument that had its roots in the liberal branch of the Patriot intellectual tradition. Dickinson viewed all acts of Parliament - including the Quartering Act - primarily through the lens of taxation and revenue. In his first letter, Dickinson argued that Parliament had no right to suspend the colonial legislature and that the Quartering Act effectively functioned as a kind of taxation without consent, since it mandated that the colonies provide housing and provisions to British troops. Similarly, central to Dickinson's objections to the

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[157] John Dickinson, *Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, Empire and Nation: Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania (John Dickinson). Letters from the Federal Farmer (Richard Henry Lee)*, ed. Forrest McDonald (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 1999), Letter III.
[158] Dickinson, *Letters*, Letter X.

Townshend Acts was that internal and external imposition was constitutional, but not internal or external taxation. Dickinson argued that, while the British had to right to regulate the trade for the good of the Empire through the use of external financial impositions, the British now abused that power to levy taxes for revenue. When a particular act had the purpose of raising the revenue, it became a tax, not an imposition, and it remained therefore unconstitutional of British Parliament to raise taxes through external means. At the same time, Dickinson emphasized that these taxes were a new form of power, unprecedented in American colonial history. They, therefore, broke the ancient social compact between Great Britain and the American colonies.[159]

Dickinson's argument and his distrust of the Townshend Acts resonated in the American colonies, particularly among the merchant and urban classes in the colony of Massachusetts. In February 1768, the Massachusetts Assembly, which the merchant class dominated through political leaders such as Samuel Adams and James Otis Jr., issued the Massachusetts Circular Letter inspired by Dickinson's arguments. The letter was sent to the other colonies and intended to form common resistance against the Townshend Acts. Samuel Adams, who most likely authored the letter, repeated Dickinson's argument that, since the purpose of the Townshend Acts were the raising of revenue and not the regulation of trade, the Acts should be seen as an illegitimate form of taxation, lacking the consent of the people.[160]

The British response to the Circular Letter worsened tensions in Boston. Lord Hillsborough, appointed to the new position of Secretary of State for the Colonies, ordered the Massachusetts Assembly to rescind the Circular Letter, which the Assembly refused to do. Francis Bernard, the Governor of Massachusetts, subsequently dissolved the Massachusetts Assembly, causing uproar in the colony. Like during the Stamp Act controversy, riots broke out

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[159] Dickinson, *Letters*, Letter I.
[160] Middlekauf, *The Glorious Cause*, p. 115-161.

in Massachusetts. In response, Hillsborough dispatched four regiments to the colony to quell the unrest.[161]

As these events unfolded in Boston, other colonies also reacted to the Townshend Acts and the more radical developments in Massachusetts. In 1769, the Virginian House of Burgesses passed a resolution to create the Virginia Association, a series of non-importation agreements aimed at Great Britain. The Virginia Association was not only an economic measure to pressure British merchants to plead for the American cause. It also sought to improve the domestic economy of the Virginia colony with the abjuration of luxury, a form of economic Patriotism that went hand-in-hand with political Patriotism on both sides of the Atlantic. The House of Burgesses hoped, much like Franklin did when speaking to Parliament in 1767, that these agreements would "induce the good People of this colony to be frugal in the Use and Consumption of British Manufactures". Even the first resolve stated that "the Subscribers, as well by their own Example, as all other legal Ways and Means in their Power, will promote and encourage Industry and Frugality, and discourage all Manner of Luxury and Extravagance".[162] Much like Franklin and Dickinson, the Virginia House of Burgesses supported their resistance to the Townshend Acts with Patriot notions of virtue and dispassion, practiced economically through non-consumption and frugality.

Patriot political-economic ideas on frugality, virtue, and self-reliance went beyond resolutions of colonial legislatures and manifested themselves in colonial society more broadly. They quickly spread into public discourse across the North American colonies. In *The Providence Gazette* in 1768, the author, "a Friend of this Colony", complained about the loss of

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[161] Middlekauf, *The Glorious Cause*, p. 115-161.
[162] "Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions", May 17, 1769, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, vol. 1, *1760–1776*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1950), p. 27–31.

virtue in the American colonies due to the continuous importation of British goods since their founding, as had their Dutch counterparts did in the 1740s. "The cause of the downfall of America", the author argued, was the colonists' infatuation with the "phantoms of grandeur". Consequently, Americans had "rejected the benevolent offers of nature, and chose to buy of foreigners what might have been had, in greater perfection, among themselves." The author instructed American colonial readers to take the example of the Dutch who "fixed the bounds and extent of human possibility, and almost exceeded, in their thirst for liberty, the sages of fable and romance. Condemned to a speck of soil, in want of almost everything the American enjoyed, and bereft of every friend, safe heaven, their own virtue, and the British Queen, they [the Dutch] secured their territory, erected manufactories, and have ever since made a figure on the map, and in the history of Europe."[163]

While the non-importation agreements rallied many colonists around a common cause, they failed to induce the British government to compromise as it had during the Stamp Act Crisis. Protests to the Townshend Acts in the early 1770s coincided with another change in the British government. By late 1769, the Duke of Grafton, the Prime Minister since 1768 who oversaw much of the implementation of the Townshend Acts, had become a controversial figure in British politics. Weak British support for the Corsican Republic, a state that had declared itself independent from Genoa in 1755, as well as a propaganda campaign directed against him by an anonymous author called Junius, brought down the Grafton ministry.[164]

Lord North, Grafton's replacement, sought a conciliatory approach to the American colonists. He proposed to repeal some of the duties, but, during the repeal, Lord North

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[163] *The Providence Gazette and Country Journal*, April 30, 1768, published in Providence, Rhode Island, America's Historical Newspapers Database.
[164] Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, p. 555-578.

underlined the principle that Parliament retained the right to tax the American colonies. This principle was the main issue on which the American colonists based their resistance. In addition, North did not repeal the reforms of the Board of Customs, leaving many of the despised enforcement reforms in place. He also did not repeal the tax on tea, which would prove significant in the last phase of the imperial crisis.[165]

By the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763, the American colonies had become more closely integrated with the British Empire than ever before. The developments during the war in America were fundamental to its closer integration into the Empire. Before 1754, American colonial participation in the British Empire had remained largely on the fringes, even in times of war. But the American colonies now became central to Britain's grand strategy to counter French global power, much like the Netherlands had in the preceding decades.

The internal politics of the American colonies in the 1750s also in many ways mirrored the situation in the Dutch Republic. Particularistic conflicts dominated colonial politics, which several of its elites saw as problematic to the future of the American colonies. Centralized authority would not only provide better governance and self-defense. It also would better regulate Native alliances and westward expansion and put the American colonial governments on equal footing with the government in Britain. Like their Dutch counterparts, American colonial attempts at reform did not go as planned. Grievances about the fundamental nature of their relationship in Britain, as well as internal political problems lingered, to be solved after the war. Ehen these grievances and problems came to the surface, however they revealed the flaws of Britain's closer integration of the American colonies into the Empire. After 1763, these flaws

[165] Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, p. 555-578.

would soon cause cracks in the System, a crisis in the Empire, and the start of revolutionary entanglements between the Dutch and the American colonists.

The Sugar and Stamp acts of the mid-1760s revitalized and broadened an American Patriot movement that was decades in the making. While it was unquestionably a recalcitrant movement acting against the British government after 1763, its fundamental convictions remained staunchly in favor of the Empire. More specifically, the American Patriots reveled in the supremacy of the British monarchy and the balanced constitution of Great Britain as a whole. The American colonists, like their Dutch predecessors in 1747/8, viewed contemporary events within a larger historical narrative of repeated infringements upon longstanding rights and privileges. According to the American colonists, these rights and privileges were "ancient" and thereby unalterable. Rooted in the Patriot concepts of a balanced government found in natural law and the supremacy of local historical rights, the American colonists saw the Sugar Act and particularly the Stamp Act as an infringement of their liberties. They imbalanced the "perfect" British constitution. As the imperial crisis developed, Patriotism would not only find sure footing in the American colonies. Through merchant and political networks, the American Patriots would also become increasingly entangled with the Dutch Republic, revitalizing a dormant Patriot movement there.

Chapter Four: The Atlantic Trade and Early Patriot Entanglements

In 1759, Princess Anne - regent for the young Stadtholder William V and a considerable force for political stability in the Dutch Republic - died from dropsy. The regency of the Stadtholder formally and briefly passed to Anne's mother-in-law Marie Louise of Hesse-Kassel. Power over the Dutch Republic's internal politics gravitated towards the Duke of Brunswick, already in charge of the military functions of the Stadtholderate since the death of William IV in 1751.

The change of control over the Stadtholderate - and the lack of stable leadership it would produce - could not have come at a worse time for the Dutch government. The merchant trade, the heart of the already weak economy of the Republic, had become increasingly dependent on intra-imperial trade in the Atlantic. Brunswick inherited a sclerotic government and a mercantile economy deeply entangled in the imperial politics of other empires. These political issues and economic entanglements would almost immediately draw the Dutch Republic into the imperial crisis in America, creating trade disputes between the Dutch and the British as well as exacerbating internal division in Dutch politics.

As the Anglo-Dutch trade controversies developed, debates on the political economy emerged in Dutch society at large that were connected to the ideology of Patriotism and eventually the American Patriot movement. The decline of the Dutch economy and its geopolitical prowess prompted intellectual discussions on Dutch decline and the methods to restore it. Like the political discussions that preceded it in 1747/48 and the American colonies during the 1760s and 1770s, these political-economic debates contained a strong mix of classical republican, liberal, and Enlightenment ideas, especially the faith in an international system of commerce grounded in natural law, the abjuration of luxury, and adherence to diplomatic neutrality.

While paralysis in Dutch politics prevented meaningful reform based on these principles, illicit trade between the Netherlands and the American colonies between 1763 and 1775 made the Dutch accomplices in American evasion of Britain's navigation laws in peacetime. The increasing involvement of Dutch merchants in the Atlantic trade - and by extension the trade to the American colonies - led to British covert attempts to manipulate the Dutch Republic's politics and control its trading networks. Between 1763 and 1775, overt resistance to the British remained largely muted in the Netherlands. Dutch governments, merchants, and consumers silently defied Britain's "search for sovereignty" across the Atlantic, progressively undermining the once unbreakable Anglo-Dutch alliance. Meanwhile, public controversies in the same period, driven in part by Dutch mercantile involvement in the American trade, propelled the American colonies towards revolution. In this way, the Anglo-Dutch disputes concerning Dutch trade with the American colonies combined with intellectual debates on economic Patriotism laid the foundations for deeper connections between the Dutch and the Americans in the following decade.

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Dutch involvement in the imperial crisis - the conflict between Great Britain and its North American colonies between 1763 and 1775 - originated in the transformation of the economy and geopolitics of the Dutch Atlantic during the eighteenth century. Starting around 1680, after the Dutch Republic lost its colonies of Brazil and New Netherland, the Dutch Atlantic underwent a tectonic economic and geopolitical shift. Instead of predominantly competing outright with rival empires, Dutch merchants increasingly integrated themselves into the British, Spanish, and French imperial systems. The Dutch acted as vital intermediaries within and between the Atlantic powers. They allowed "the various mercantilist systems to function

better, plugging holes and adding lubricants wherever possible".[166] Meanwhile, the remaining Dutch colonies in the Atlantic – Suriname, the various Caribbean islands, as well as the West India Company forts on the African coast - were also drawn into the other imperial systems, transforming into autonomous trading posts. The integration of Dutch merchants and colonies into the trading systems of other empires made them much more likely to be considered "smugglers" in the eyes of the British, French, or Spanish governments, especially in the Americas. At the same time, they served as convenient middlemen when it suited the geopolitical and economic goals of these Atlantic empires or their colonists. As Alan Karras has demonstrated, consumers in the colonized Americas were often forced to rely on illicit trade if official channels proved unreliable or provided certain goods at too high a price. During the eighteenth century, the Dutch became crucial middlemen in these economic exchanges in the Atlantic world.[167]

As a result of these economic and geopolitical shifts, Dutch attitudes towards foreign policy and trade broadly changed from the aggressive pursuit of imperial monopolies to disentanglement from Europe's wars and support for the principle that "free [neutral] ships make free goods". When the Dutch were newcomers to European imperial competition in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, they strongly advocated for their right to break up the then-dominant Spanish and Portuguese trading monopolies. In his seminal work *Mare Liberum*

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[166] Wim Klooster and Gert Oostindie, *Realm Between Empires: The Second Dutch Atlantic, 1680-1815* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2018). For quotation, see p. 255-256.

[167] Jan de Vries, "The Dutch Atlantic Economies", in *The Atlantic Economy During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel,* ed. Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press 2005), p. 1-25; Victor Enthoven, "An Assessment of Dutch Transatlantic Commerce, 1585-1817", in *Riches from Atlantic Commerce: Dutch Transatlantic Trade and Shipping, 1585-1817*, eds. Johannes Postma and Victor Enthoven (Leiden/Boston: BRILL 2003), p. 441; Jan de Vries, "The limits of globalization in the early modern world", *The Economic History Review* 63 (2010), p. 710-733, especially p. 728; Alan L. Karras, *Smuggling: Contraband and Corruption in World History* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2009), p. 57-59.

from 1609, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius famously linked the right to break up Spanish and Portuguese monopolies to his conception of the seas as free for all nations to traverse rather than for any one nation to dominate, an argument based on natural law theory. Aggressive military campaigns supported this model of empire and commerce. The Dutch Republic and its East and West India Companies regularly waged war to - paradoxically – demand and subsequently defend Dutch trading privileges across the globe.[168]

As their economic and military prowess atrophied during the eighteenth century, however, the Dutch increasingly resented their involvement in global conflicts for the rising fiscal burden and other economic consequences of war, both in intellectual circles and society at large. Already in the late seventeenth century, per capita taxes in the Dutch Republic rose sharply due to the cost of sustaining war with France. As Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude have demonstrated, the tax burden nearly doubled between 1672 and the 1690s and would not return to pre-1672 levels during the eighteenth century.[169] Meanwhile, the rentier class's persistent mismanagement of public debt during the eighteenth century contributed significantly to the Dutch government's inability to wage war effectively as well as to the Republic's economic decline. The Republic's reduced military strength combined with the lackluster economy made the Dutch more desperate to boost their existing trading enterprises - illicit or not - as a neutral power. In 1751, Stadtholder William IV even toyed with – though never implemented - the idea of transforming the Republic into a 'limited freeport 'to improve the economy. While political-economic reform remained elusive in the eighteenth-century Dutch

[168] Pepijn Brandon, *War, Capital, and the Dutch State (1588-1795)* (Leiden/Boston: Brill 2015), especially p. 1-138; Jonathan Scott, *How the Old World Ended: The Anglo-Dutch-American Revolution, 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press 2019), p. 1-214.
[169] De Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy,* p. 81-128.

Atlantic as a result of the Dutch Republic's sluggish government, Grotius 'idea of *Mare Liberum* justified a significantly less assertive imperial policy than it had in the seventeenth century.

In contrast to the waning Dutch Republic, the British Empire expanded its geopolitical and economic footprint in the Atlantic during the eighteenth century, creating tension within the Anglo-Dutch alliance. Since the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the Dutch and the British had formed a strong alliance that blocked an expansion of France's power on the European continent. Though this strategy proved successful in its goal of containing France and was broadly supported in both countries in the early eighteenth century, the Republic's lack of enthusiasm for war made it an increasingly unreliable partner in the eyes of the British who continuously sought to make new imperial conquests as the century progressed. Especially during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the Dutch were reluctant to join the fight; Dutch diplomats even sought to make a separate peace with France before the war ended. The British government perceived the reinstatement and empowerment of the Stadtholderate in 1747 – the so-called Orangist Revolution - as a positive development that could reverse Dutch political inertia and ensure a more stable alliance with Britain. Stadtholder William IV was married to the British Princess Anne, daughter of King George II, who became regent for the infant William V when her husband died in 1751. Especially after William IV's death, the British government reasoned that through Anne they could restore the alliance that William III had created in 1688 and sway the Dutch to support British imperial goals.[170]

Yet the British government grossly overestimated the extent to which the Dutch could be manipulated to support its imperial ambitions and viewed Dutch reluctance to go to war with Britain largely as a consequence of French manipulation of Dutch public officials. Influencing

[170] SP 84/458, "Private and Very Secret Instructions", NA.

the Republic's politics through Anne worked reasonably well in the early 1750s. Yet the limits of British influence on the Dutch became painfully clear during the Seven Years' War when the foundations were laid for both the Anglo-American and Anglo-Dutch crises. The Dutch Republic remained neutral when war broke out between France and Great Britain in 1754, to the disappointment of the British who had assumed that Anne's power as regent could be deployed to convince the Dutch to join the war.[171]

Though Dutch neutrality did not prevent the British from fueling their war effort with credit from the Republic's expansive financial sector, it created tensions within the Anglo-Dutch alliance on the issue of trade.[172] The Treaty of Westminster from 1674 - the treaty that ended the Third Anglo-Dutch War - stipulated that in the case of Dutch neutrality only war materiel to Britain's enemies would be considered "contraband" goods for Dutch merchants. The Republic's formal declaration of neutrality made Dutch merchants believe that they could continue to trade with all belligerents, including France and its colonies in the Caribbean.

During the war, the French used Dutch merchants to subvert British authority on the seas and gained access to what the British considered contraband goods. The French particularly used the commonly accepted exclusion of naval stores from contraband goods in the Westminster Treaty. The trade in naval stores enabled them to maintain and expand their navy. Meanwhile, Dutch merchants were eager to meet French demand during times of war when goods were scarcer and some goods, such as naval stores, were in high demand. According to the British government, Dutch merchants falsified documents, deliberately fooled British authorities, and

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[171] Anglo-Dutch commercial disputes also had historical precedent before the Seven Years' War, see: Victor Enthoven, "That Abominable Nest of Pirates: St. Eustatius and the North Americans, 1680-1780", *Early American Studies* 10 (2012), p. 239-301; Israel, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 537-716.
[172] Martin Buist, *At Spes Non Fracta - Hope & Co. 1770-1815* (The Hague: Bank Mees & Hope NV 1974).

shipped ‘contraband ’goods regardless of the Treaty of Westminster of 1674, undermining the British war effort.[173]

Tensions over Dutch supposed illicit trading had been simmering since the start of the war but exploded in 1758 when the British seized a large number of Dutch merchant ships from the Dutch colony of Suriname. The subsequent trial of the Suriname merchants in the British Admiralty Prize Court produced public outrage in the Dutch Republic, resulting in a pamphlet war against British privateering and various diplomatic delegations scrambling to find a peaceful solution. Resistance against British privateering expressed in the press primarily rested on the idea that “Freedom in Sea and Commerce affairs” was embedded in natural law and the laws of nations. This notion, originally coined by Grotius, was subsequently reiterated by natural law thinkers in the eighteenth century such as Cornelis van Bijnkershoek in 1703 and Emmerich de Vattel in 1758.[174] Although the tone of these pamphlets was adversarial and the British were essentially framed as pirates (*rovers”*) who aimed to obliterate Dutch commerce, the authors generally argued for reconciliation with Great Britain.[175]

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[173] Treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United Netherlands, concluded at Westminster February 9/19, 1673/4, in *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies, Volume 2 1650-1697,* ed. Frances G. Davenport (Clark, NJ: The Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2004), p. 229-246.

[174] Cornelis van Bijnkershoek, *Ad L. Axiosis IX. De lege Rhodia de jactu liber singularis. Et de dominio maris dissertatio* (1703) KB, 367 M 13:2; Emmerich de Vattel, *Le droit de la guerre, ou Principes de la loi naturelle* (1758), The Hague Peace Palace Library 165 H 32.

[175] SP 84/481, “De Geinteresseerden in Scheepen of Goederen”, Daniel Delara to James Wallace Esquire, NA; *Het waare oogmerk van Groot-Brittannien, ter verdelging van Nederlands-koophandel en zeevaart* (1758), UvA Pfl. P v 11 / 11a; *Nederlands verrekyker, ter beschouwing van Engelands daden sedert de opkomst der Republyk dienende tot antwoord op het Waare oogmerk van Groot Brittanien* (1758), UvA Pfl. P u 8; P*oliticque aanmerkingen over het geheime sistema van Groot-Brittannien, ten opzigte van het byëenhouden van een aanzienelyke krygsmagt in het binnenste van Engeland* (1758), UvA Pfl P v 1/1A; *Particuliere brief van een koopman te Londen, aan een koopman te Rotterdam, aangaande de wettigheid van het wegneemen en prysmaaken der Hollandsche scheepen* (1758), Obr 308, UvA Pfl P u 6 / 6a ; *Samenspraak tusschen een Haagsh heer, rentenier, koopman en boer, in de roef tusschen Rotterdam en Delft: in welke de ware toestand der zaken tusschen Engeland en Holland, de gegronde klachten van Neêrlands kooplieden op eene geestige wyze word beredeneert* (1758), UvA Pfl P u 9 . For more on the

British ambassador to the Dutch Republic, Sir Joseph Yorke, sought a more permanent solution to the problem, arguing for a renegotiation of the Treaty of Westminster and the "Necessity of a Regulation" to avoid similar problems in the future. The British government disagreed with Yorke's position, arguing instead for a case-by-case judgment on each grievance in the Admiralty Court. According to the British government, Dutch complaints about British privateers were "only stated in general Terms" and supported by "flimsy" evidence. If British privateers unlawfully plundered Dutch ships, the government argued, current laws sufficed. Dutch merchants could present evidence of piracy in the Admiralty Court and, if found guilty, British privateers would be prosecuted as pirates under British law.[176]

The British government's solution of delegating authority to the Admiralty Court prevailed, in large part because the Court ruled in favor of the Dutch merchants in several cases that were broadly publicized. The acquittal of the Suriname merchants appeased the Dutch public and merchant community who had been seeking reconciliation and an acquittal. Nevertheless, the British government's insistence on case-by-case judgments in Prize Court meant that the fundamental question, the extent to which Dutch merchants had the right to ship goods to Britain's enemies in case of Dutch neutrality during wartime, was not answered and had the potential to cause problems again in the future. Meanwhile, the seeds of discontent with the kind of political-economic system that Britain envisioned had been planted in the Dutch collective mind.

When the Seven Years' War ended in 1763, the British government immediately sought to consolidate control over its imperial territories and trading channels. The Dutch Republic

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Anglo-Dutch tensions during the Seven Years 'War, see: Alice Clare Carter, *The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years' War* (London: Macmillan 1971).

[176] SP 84/481, July 21, 1758, Earl of Holdernesse to Sir Joseph Yorke, NA.

logically became an important focal point for their initial inquiries, given their history in transatlantic smuggling and the trade disputes during the war.[177] Espionage documents from 1764 show the extent to which Britain sought to assess the volume and consistency of illicit trade between British ports and the Dutch Republic. In July of 1764, the Earl of Sandwich, the Secretary of State of the Northern Department, instructed British agent Richard Wolters to keep track of all illicit trade from the Netherlands "to the advantage of the fair Trade & the Increase of the publick Revenue … which particularly engage the constant care of His Majesty's Servants". While Wolters responded that "contraband trade is by its nature very Secret", he promised his "utmost zeal" in uncovering smuggling routes and merchants that undermined British government finances.[178]

During the first few years after the war, British concerns about Dutch smuggling were not limited to just its North American colonies. In 1764, Sandwich expressed concerns on illicit Dutch trading with the Isle of Man, which represented another famous smuggling route in the British Empire.[179] The Isle of Man, an island situated between England and Ireland, had become a hub of contraband trade since the late seventeenth century due to a series of feudal disputes that made agriculture unprofitable for land tenants, encouraging a significant section of the population to engage in illicit trade. Dutch merchants, among others, had regularly used the Isle of Man to buy and sell goods without regard for British customs or trading laws. Sandwich

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[177] Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2010), p. 40-103; Wim Klooster, *The Dutch Moment: War, Trade, and Settlement in the Seventeenth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2016); Klooster and Oostindie, *Realm Between Empires*.
[178] SP 84/506, Lord Sandwich to Richard Wolters, July 27, 1764, NA.
[179] SP 84/506, Lord Sandwich to Richard Wolters, August 21, 1764, NA.

instructed Wolters to gather information on the illicit trade to the island, as well as to instruct as many merchants as possible to cease any illicit trading activity.[180]

The British government employed all kinds of measures against these illegal trading routes. To solve the problem of the Isle of Man, the British government purchased the feudal rights of Dukes of Atholl to the Isle of Man in the Isle of Man Purchase Act of 1765. The purchase transferred the feudal rights to the monarch of Great Britain, giving the central government a substantial degree of power over this smuggling hub between Britain and Ireland.[181]

British attempts to get a better handle on Dutch smuggling practices in British ports in 1763 and 1764 coincided with an increasingly unstable and self-consumed Dutch domestic politics. The Duke of Brunswick, the *de facto* leader of the Republic in the 1760s, proved to be less politically astute than many had anticipated. As regent of the now teenage Stadtholder William V, Brunswick was confronted with a host of domestic issues that he proved incapable of handling. The centralization of power in the Stadtholderate and the lack of other Orangist political talent in the Republic in the early 1760s meant that no alternative politician could replace Brunswick to guide the Republic's complex internal politics. Orangist elites, such as the Anglo-Dutch nobleman Willem Bentinck, complained about the Stadtholder's lack of control over Amsterdam. According to Bentinck, this city overpowered the rest of the Dutch Republic through the States of Holland and the States General.[182]

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[180] SP 84/510, NA.
[181] R.C. Jarvis, "Illicit Trade with the Isle of Man, 1671-1765', *Trans. Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society* 58 (1945/1946), p. 245-267; L.M. Cullen, 'The Smuggling Trade in Ireland in the Eighteenth Century', *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy: Archaeology, Culture, History, Literature* 67 (1968/1969), p. 149-175.
[182] *Notes de Willem Bentinck. L'esprit de domination d'Amsterdam*, November 11, 1764, p. 518, AMON.

During a long dispute between the Dutch and British East India Companies in 1763 and 1764, Dutch political instability and Brunswick's inability to govern effectively proved problematic for the British. As in North America, Britain had expanded its power in East Asia in the Seven Years' War, largely at the expense of France. British commercial interest in Asia had been growing in the eighteenth century, particularly since the Carnatic Wars in the 1740s and 1750s. The Third Carnatic War, effectively the Indian campaign of the Seven Years' War, solidified Britain's hold in India and vastly expanded its commercial interests in Asia more broadly. The Dutch East India Company, however, had held substantial interests in India, and Asia more broadly, since the early seventeenth century. The Company saw increased British commercial and military presence as a threat to its interests.

In 1761, the Dutch East India Company boarded British merchant ships near the Company's factories in Asia, sternly informing the British merchants of the Dutch trading monopoly in the region. To make matters worse, the Dutch dispatched several armed vessels from Batavia as well as naval reinforcements from the Dutch Republic to enforce its monopoly in Asia. The British government feared that the Dutch East India Company intended to launch hostilities against rival British vessels in Asian waters.[183]

While the dispute between the two India Companies was resolved later in 1764, the conflict revealed the lack of political leadership in the Dutch Republic and the slow deterioration of the System that the British government was key to influencing allied European governments. Since the creation of the System in 1747, subsequent British administrations viewed the Stadtholderate as the cornerstone for the Anglo-Dutch alliance and the vehicle through which the Dutch government could be influenced. With the death of Anne in 1759, the lack of leadership

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[183] SP 84/504, NA.

on the part of the Duke of Brunswick, and the minority of the Stadtholder William V, however, the British were confronted for the first time with an exceptionally dysfunctional Stadtholderate through which it could not bend the Dutch government to its will. In 1764, Ambassador Yorke noted the lack of direction in Dutch domestic politics, when he wrote to his superiors at White Hall that "he present State of this Interior is quite confused. No Person, nor no College, can be said to have the Lead".

Despite these problems, Yorke and many others in the British government doubled down on their faith in the Stadtholderate. They argued that the path to stability lay with the majority of Stadtholder William V, who was only 13 years old in 1764. Since the East India Company, and the entirety of the Dutch government, "will fall under His Highness [the Stadtholder's] Direction and Protection" when he reached adulthood, the British government believed that disputes such as these would be avoided in the future. The British government sought to hold on to the System, based on the notion that "the true Interest of the Republick … consists in the most Intimate Connection with [the King of Great Britain]".[184] At the same time, the dispute reveals the souring of Anglo-Dutch relations and the cracking of the System in the 1760s. In the early years of the System, the British and the Dutch had cooperated on keeping out the Prussian Emden Company out of Asia. This 1764 dispute, which represented a mild threat of hostilities in Asia, was a far cry from the close cooperation that existed in the 1750s.

As the transatlantic smuggling events unfolded, debates ensued among intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic about what scholars have called economic Patriotism. These debates had roots going back to earlier in the century. But in the 1760s, they experienced a revival by way of France with the rise of the physiocracy movement in economics. Broadly speaking,

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[184] SP 84/504, Yorke to Sandwich, 14 February 1764, NA.

physiocrats such as François Quesnay, Anne Turgot, and the marquis de Mirabeau reasoned that only agricultural labor produced wealth in a society. Optimizing the balance of trade through protectionist trade measures, as mercantilists argued at the time, only harmed a country's wealth, according to the physiocrats. As a result, the physiocrats supported free trade and believed in the individual self-interest as the engine of prosperity. They were skeptical of the manufacturing and consumption of luxury goods.[185] Physiocratic critiques, especially on the consumption of foreign luxury goods, mixed well with classical republican and Enlightenment ideas on the merits of personal frugality and the vices of public corruption, ideas which formed an essential part of the Patriot canon.

During the 1760s and 1770s, American and Dutch political-economic ideas gradually aligned under the influence of physiocratic, classical republican, and Enlightenment thought.[186] As American colonial wealth grew during the eighteenth century, the consumption of British luxury goods increasingly signaled gentility in the colonies. These changes led many American colonists to criticize these societal and economic trends as detrimental to morality and the economy. Already in 1732, Benjamin Franklin chastised the consumption of British luxury goods, like tea. In a satirical story on a fictional character named Anthony Afterwit in his own *Pennsylvania Gazette,* Franklin equated frugality and domestic agricultural production with

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[185] Philippe Steiner, "Physiocracy and French Pre-classical Political Economy", in *A Companion to the History of Economic Thought,* eds. Warren J. Samuels, Jeff E. Biddie, and John B. Davis (New York: Blackwell Publishing 2006), p. 61-77; Auguste Bertholet, "The intellectual origins of Mirabeau", *History of European Ideas* 47 (2021), p. 91-96.

[186] Ida Nijenhuis, "For the Sake of the Republic: The Dutch Translation of Forbonnais's *Elémens du commerce*", *History of European Ideas* 40 (2014), p. 1202-1216; Koen Stapelbroek and Jani Marjanen, 'Political Economy, Patriotism, and the Rise of Societies', in *The Rise of Economic Societies in the Eighteenth Century: Patriotic Reform in Europe and North America,* eds. Koen Stapelbroek and Jani Marjanen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), p. 1-25.

masculinity and economic vitality.[187] When the imperial crisis unfolded in the 1760s, Franklin's sympathies for physiocratic, classical republican, and Enlightenment ideas increased. Especially after visiting Great Britain, Franklin concluded that not only British politics was corrupt to its core, but its economy was as well.[188] It was primarily these views that shaped Franklin's answers to the interrogation by Parliament in 1766. But Franklin was hardly alone in the colonies in his assessment of Great Britain and the American colonial economy. By the 1760s, American colonial legislatures argued that their boycotts of what were largely considered luxury goods would not only force Parliament to repeal its taxation acts. They would also promote the domestic economy of the American colonies.[189] Under pressure of British imperial policy, American Patriotism gained economic critiques, in addition to its political ones.

In the Netherlands during the 1760s and 1770, similar debates on economic Patriotism took place in intellectual circles, especially in the publications of the *Hollandse Maatschappye der Weetenschappen* (the Holland Society of Sciences) in the city of Haarlem. The Society called for submissions for a prize essay in 1771 on the foundation of Dutch trade, the causes of its decline, and how the economy could be restored. The competition generated a broad range of submissions. Hendrik Herman van den Heuvel - an economic thinker, gold medal winner of the competition, and ultimately president of the Society - reasoned in his essay that protecting

[187]" Anthony Afterwit, 10 July 1732", *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* Volume 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1959), p. 237-240.

[188] McCoy, "Benjamin Franklin's Vision", p. 605-628.

[189]" Examination before the Committee of the Whole House of Commons, 13 February 1766", *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* Volume 16 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1969), p. 124-162; Gordon S. Wood, 'Rhetoric and Reality in the American Revolution', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 23 (1966), p. 3-32; Charleston Non-Importation Agreement, July 22, 1769, at the Yale Avalon Project. Consulted last on December 4, 2019 at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/charleston_non_impotation_1769.asp; "Virginia Nonimportation Resolutions, 17 May 1769", *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, *vol. 1* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1950), p. 27-31. The influence of the physiocrats would continue after the Revolution as well. See: Manuela Albertone, "Physiocracy in the eighteenth-century America. Economic theory and political weapons" *History of European Ideas* 47 (2021), p. 97-118.

domestic manufacturers and promoting the consumption of domestic goods would revitalize the Dutch economy.[190] In this sense, van den Heuvel's arguments were similar to those that supported the home-spun movement and non-importation agreements in the American colonies.[191]

In another prize-winning essay, Cornelis Zillesen, a prominent historical and economic essayist, posited that luxury was the primary cause of Dutch economic decline, especially the consumption of British and other foreign luxury goods. Zillesen's ideas echoed physiocratic, classical republican, and Enlightenment thinkers like Montesquieu, who argued that the "less luxury there is in a republic" the more perfect it is.[192] Zillesen was likely aware of American colonial boycotts of British luxury goods, which were taking place around the time he wrote his article. And even though the prize-winning essays varied in their views, all authors nevertheless agreed that the essence of Dutch wealth was commerce and that the restoration of prosperous trade rested on Dutch neutrality, not aggressive imperial expansion.

Similar sentiments were expressed in Dutch intellectual circles outside of the prize-winning essays. In 1772, the notable eighteenth-century jurist Hendrik Constantijn Cras gave a speech to politicians and law students in which he argued, based on natural law, that war causes "a neglect of Agriculture, the Factories and Artisans will suffer, and Shipping and Trade will soon come to a halt".[193] As Lina Weber has shown, the Dutch reception of David Hume's *Of*

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[190] *Verhandelingen uitgegeeven door de Hollandse Maatschappye der Weetenschappen te Haarlem Volume 16* (1775), KB 3036 C 21:1.
[191] Carol Berkin, *Revolutionary Mothers: Women in the Struggle for America's Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Kopf 2005), p. 12-49; Breene, Marketplace of Revolution, p. 195-332.
[192] *Verhandelingen uitgegeeven door de Hollandse Maatschappye der Weetenschappen te Haarlem Volume 16* (1775), KB 3036 C 21:1; Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws Book VII, Chapter II and Book V, Chapter XIX.*
[193] Hendrik Constantijn Cras, *Het Omzigtig Beleid der Staatsbestierderen in het bevorderen van den Koophhandel* (1772), UvA Obr. FOL 90, p. 61. Similar arguments were also common earlier in the

Public Credit and *Political Discourses* also generated widespread uneasiness with the existing large-scale investments by Dutch creditors in British public debt, which was presented as a risky investment due to the supposed instability of the British government. In a similar vein, philosopher and wealthy merchant Isaac de Pinto contributed to the political-economic debates of the 1760s and 1770s. De Pinto argued against Hume in favor of public credit, the promotion of domestic manufacturers, and the use of taxes to control luxury consumption. The works of De Pinto, an ardent Orangist, also demonstrate how debates on economic Patriotism in the Dutch Republic did not fall neatly into partisan camps, at least not until after American independence.[194]

While intellectuals debated these issues, various disputes and British information collection campaigns increasingly revealed the extent to which the Dutch were tied up in smuggling to British ports. In 1766, a controversy emerged surrounding Irish merchants who sought to smuggle various goods from Dublin to Barbados. The customs officer in Barbados held the suspected ship in port, seized the ship's sails, and sent the case to the Admiralty Court for judgment. To avoid conviction in the Admiralty Court, the Irish captain and crew secretly stole sails, escaped the island with their ship, and sailed for the island of St. Eustatius under the control of the Dutch West India Company to hide from British justice. After the governor of Barbados discovered that the Irish had sailed for St. Eustatius, he asked the Dutch governor of

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eighteenth century, such as in G. Christianus, *Patriottische bedenkingen over de vermindering van den koophandel en het geld in de Vereenigde Nederlanden; voorgedragen by het doen van een leerrede over Seph. 1:11 in het Genootschap der raissonable biblianen* (1750), KB pflt 18255.

[194] Lina Weber, "Predicting the Bankcruptcy of England: David Hume's Political Discourses and the Dutch Debate on National Debt in the Eighteenth Century", *Early Modern Low Countries* 1 (2017), p. 135-155; Ida Nijenhuis, *Een joodse philosophe. Isaac de Pinto (1717-1787) en de ontwikkeling van de politieke economie in de Europese Verlichting* (Amsterdam: NEHA 1992); Richard H. Popkin, "Hume and Isaac de Pinto", *Texas Studies in Literature and Language* 12 (1970), p. 417-430; Isaac de Pinto, *Traité de la circulation et du crédit* (1771), KB 890 D 36.

St. Eustatius to help the British punish these violators of the "acts of trade". The governor of St. Eustatius responded, as expected according to British ambassador Sir Joseph Yorke, that the captain and crew were nowhere to be found and they had already sold their ship and cargo to various buyers. The governor of St. Eustatius thought it would prove impossible to bring the Irish smugglers to justice.[195]

Dutch entanglement in transatlantic smuggling to the American colonies became even more apparent to the British authorities after the passing of the Townshend Acts, given the increased enforcement measures embedded in those laws. In 1765, British spymaster Richard Wolters had already received instructions to report on smuggling practices from Rotterdam to any port in North America. In the summer of 1765, Wolters had acquired enough intelligence to give a full account of the general state of the trade of the Dutch Republic with British, Irish, and colonial ports and its varying trading duties. But in 1768, Wolters sent a letter to the British MP Grey Cooper in which he detailed the inquiries he had made into the illegal trade in America. From his inquiries, Wolters concludes that the last few years "this [illicit] Trade is encreased … most considerably" and that the primary objects of trade were "Teas and other Indian Goods, Spirits, Silesia Linens, Osnabrugs, Sail Cloth, Running Rigs &c" and that they are transported in various ways. In the letter, Wolters highlighted a scheme which the merchants used to subvert British authority on the high seas. Through intermediaries in the Bay of Honduras, goods are either sold to other merchants or loaded onto other trading vessels with the colonies of Philadelphia, Rhode Island, New York, and Carolina as their final destination.[196] St. Eustatius, Wolters highlighted, also remained a major place of illicit trading. As far as he knew, "2 ships

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[195] SP 84/511, Summer 1766, NA.
[196] SP 84/589, December 20, 1768, NA.

have sailed for St. Eustache", intending to unload their cargoes there "to be fetched by, or conveyed to their Friends in North America".[197]

The repeal of some of the Townshend Acts quelled some of the resistance in the American colonies, but the core dispute of the imperial crisis remained. Parliament still claimed the right to impose tax laws and core elements of the Townshend Acts, particularly the newly created enforcement institutions such as the American Board of Customs, remained in place. Moreover, the tax on tea remained, as well the regulations made in the Indemnity Act of 1767, which repealed the taxes on tea imported into England, enabling cheaper exportation of tea from England to the American colonies. In 1773, tea would become the focal point of the disputes between Britain and the American colonies, which further entangled the Dutch with the imperial crisis, both in the Netherlands and North America. Furthermore, the tea smuggling connections in 1773 and 1774 with the Dutch would foreground the smuggling of weapons and munitions to the American colonial militias, enabling the start of the American Revolutionary War.

Between 1770 and 1773, American colonial resistance to the remaining Townshend Acts seemed relatively limited, but subversion of trade laws by both the American colonists and the Dutch merchants remained strong. In March 1771, British ambassador to the Dutch Republic, Sir Joseph Yorke, reported that a ship called *The Little Peggy*, departed from Amsterdam "in the most secret manner" for New York loaded with barrels of spices.[198] Similarly in 1772, Rhode Island merchants resisted the seizure of a merchant ship by an Admiralty vessel named the *Gaspee*. The *Gaspee* was deployed on the coast of New England to chase down smugglers and, like all of the customs officers and others employed by the Admiralty, had broad powers to search vessels suspected of smuggling goods. Following the seizure of undeclared rum and the

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[197] SP 84/589, "List of Ships that Have Arrived", NA.
[198] SP 84/530, March 15, 1771, NA.

popular backlash against the incident, the *Gaspee*'s crew became increasingly aggressive in enforcing trade laws, causing even more resentment in Rhode Island. In the summer of 1772, the *Gaspee* ran aground in Narragansett Bay after chasing a merchant vessel. A group of Providence Patriots witnessed the event and saw the opportunity to put an end to the nuisance the *Gaspee* had caused. The Patriots, led by prominent Rhode Island merchant John Brown, boarded the *Gaspee* and set the ship on fire. The destruction of the *Gaspee* elicited a furious reaction from Britain, which charged the perpetrators with treason and sought to try them in England, rather than in the colonies. While the Royal Commission of Inquiry, charged with collecting evidence for the trial of the arsonists, was unable to find enough evidence for trial, Patriot elites in all thirteen of the North American colonies set up so-called committees of correspondence that enabled them to coordinate common colonial actions. These committees of correspondence would prove crucial in organizing colonial resistance as the imperial crisis developed in the following years.

Tea became a focal point of American colonial resistance to Great Britain for largely the same reason as the other problems during the imperial crisis, namely the reorganization of Britain's enlarged empire. After victory in the Seven Years' War, the British East India Company had taken up a significant task in governing the parts of India that were under its control. A combination of Company mismanagement and droughts in Bengal caused a massive famine among the Indian population under the Company's control in 1770. The famine rapidly increased the administration and security costs of the Company while significantly reducing its profits. The Bengal Famine of 1770 and the general downturn of the European economy in the

early 1770s brought the British East India Company to the brink of bankruptcy, which led to a plea to Parliament for reprieve.[199]

The result of East India Company lobbying was the Tea Act of 1773. The Tea Act allowed the East India Company to ship tea directly to the American colonies without first docking at a port in Great Britain. It also eliminated the duties paid on tea in Britain itself, reducing the final price that American colonial consumers would pay for the product. The North government reasoned that the Act would provide a way for the East India Company to get rid of its excess tea. At the same time, it would save the company from bankruptcy and lower the price of tea for American consumers. With these measures, the British government effectively monopolized the tea trade in the American colonies, a monopoly that it was determined to enforce.[200]

News of the Tea Act elicited outrage from the American colonists, a response rooted in the intellectual currents of the Patriot Atlantic. The Tea Act exemplified all of the evils that had befallen the American colonists during the imperial crisis in a single act of Parliament. The Act made clear that the Townshend duties on tea were not repealed, while it did repeal the tax on tea for consumers in Great Britain. The Act reinforced the notion that American colonists were not represented in Parliament and that Parliament, therefore, served only its constituents in Britain. At the same time, the Act explicitly favored the British East India Company over colonial merchants who had imported tea to the American colonies for decades. According to the American colonists, the Tea Act would grant the East India Company a monopoly on the tea trade in the American colonies, in addition to the Townshend taxes already unjustly

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[199] Huw Bowen, *Revenue and Reform: The Indian Problem in British Politics 1757-1773* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2002).
[200] Bowen, *Revenue and Reform*.

implemented, taking the colonial merchants out of business. Moreover, the Act focused on tea, a product that signaled a genteel lifestyle in British America. Much like the Townshend Acts, the Tea Act encouraged a movement against consumption of British tea and even of tea in general. In this fashion, the Tea Act was an affront to all ideological tenets of transatlantic Patriotism. The Act violated the balance of the social compact between the American colonists and Great Britain and it reaffirmed to the American colonists the ministerial corruption and tyrannical impulses of the British government. Meanwhile, the forced consumption of British tea clashed with Patriotic notions of personal virtue and aversion to the consumption of foreign luxury goods.

American colonial responses to the Tea Act show how they were a culmination of these Patriot influences. A pamphlet published in New York in 1773, written by an anonymous author who called himself "A Mechanic", described the "Bribery and Corruption" at the East India Company, the members of which were living in "Wealth and Opulence". The Mechanic also underlined the corruption of the British ministry, who were intent on destroying American "Liberty, and Property, by one fatal Stroke", repeating the arguments made in the 1760s against the Stamp and Townshend Acts. The Mechanic argued that "when any … Set of Men (prompted by Ambition, or an inordinate Thirst of Gain, or any other sinister Motive) … endeavour to overturn the Constitution of their Country, introduce Tyranny, and Oppression, and thereby deprive their Countrymen … of their just Rights and Liberties; they tacitly declare themselves Enemies of the Community". At the same time, the Mechanic called for virtuous Patriots that could use the self-discipline of their bodies to appeal for a repeal of the Act and create a society independent of foreign luxury goods. Tea, the Mechanic argued, was not only a "Superfluity", but it was also a "pernicious one". Basing his assertions on "eminent Physicians, in England, in

several learned Dissertations", tea has "as bad an Effect upon the Constitution and Health" as that of "that fatal Drug" opium. Therefore, the author strongly recommended "every American (who has the real Interest and Welfare of his Country at Heart) to enter immediately into the virtuous Resolution, never to make anymore Use of the deleterious Plant".[201]

Throughout 1773, various American colonial publications echoed the Mechanic's arguments. In the *Norwich Packet*, a Patriot newspaper published in New England, an author that styled himself a "Tradesman" argued that the latest measures of Parliament aimed to "sap the foundations of liberty". Those who advocated for the Tea Act were "a shame to decency and virtue". The Tradesman condemned the British notion that the American colonists who resist the British are rebels who sought to uproot the system. Rather, the Tradesman placed American colonial resistance in a long historical narrative of the restoration of liberty, such as the resistance to King John that created the Magna Carta in 1215 and the resistance to King James II that heralded the Glorious Revolution of 1688.[202]

In 1773, various local efforts sought to ban the consumption of British tea in the American colonies altogether, substantiating the intellectual resistance with physical action. *The New York Journal* chronicled an account of the "patriotic inhabitants of Lexington", Massachusetts, who had unanimously resolved against "the use of tea of all sorts". To "manifest the sincerity of their resolution, they brought together every ounce [of tea] contained in the town, and committed it to a common bonfire". Supposedly, Charlestown was "in motion to follow their [Lexington's] illustrious example". *The Journal* also reported on the famous destruction of tea in

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[201] *To the Worthy Inhabitants of New York. My dear Friends …,* Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 13042, Archive of Americana.

[202] *The Norwich Packet and the Connecticut, Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, and Rhode-Island Weekly Advertiser* (Norwich, Connecticut), From Thursday, November 25, to Thursday, December 2, 1773, America's Historical Newspapers Database.

Boston, what would later be called the Boston Tea Party. *The Journal* stressed the harsh public punishment of a man who was "filling his pockets" with tea while others were dumping the cargo, underlining the Patriotic notion that the destruction of the tea was a virtuous act of defiance.[203]

Beyond the intellectual and socio-political effects of the Tea Act in the American colonies, it also showed the growing extent to which the Dutch were involved in American colonial tea smuggling. The British government had been aware of Dutch smuggling for several decades. But the Tea Act put Dutch smuggling practices at the heart of the imperial crisis and made it part of public discourse as well. In New York, a pro-British satirical pamphlet pretended to be a notice from agents of the Dutch States General in New York to the agents of the States General at St. Eustatius. The agents at St. Eustatius, the "Beloved Partners in iniquity" of the agents in New York, were warned that "the Parliament of Great Britain have passed that damnable law, which allows the East-India Company to send Tea to this country, without paying any duty in America". The Tea Act allowed American colonists to buy tea "for half the price we [the Dutch] expected to extort from them for the trash lodged in your hands from Holland … The consumers of Tea in this city", the author warned, "will no longer be blinded to their own interest; therefore, dispatch our Dutch Tea immediately, that we may get it sold before the English [tea] arrives". A fictitious man called Isaac van Pompkin , an English attempt to ridicule a Dutch name, signed the pamphlet at the nonexistent "Perjury Hall" in New York to underline the satirical point of the tract. [204]

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[203] *The New-York Journal; or, The General Advertiser (New York, New York*), December 23, 1773, America's Historical Newspapers Database.
[204] *To the agents of their High Mightinesses the Dutch East-India Company …,* October 28, 1773, Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 13037, Archive of Americana.

After the destruction of the tea in Boston in late 1773, the controversies surrounding Dutch smuggling to the American colonies shifted from tea to gunpowder, munitions, and firearms. Diplomatic and espionage reports from 1774 indicate that the British authorities sought to reveal the illicit trading of war materiel to the American colonies. In August 1774, British ambassador the Dutch Republic, Sir Joseph Yorke, reported that "it appears that the Quantity of Gun Powder shipp'd for New York on board the Vessel formerly mentioned, amounts … to three Hundred Thousand Pounds". Yorke warned the British government that "the Dutch export … a pretty large Quantity for their Island of St. Eustatia, which is the Center of all Contraband in that part of the World". Moreover, Yorke informed White Hall that a "considerable Quantity of Artillery for sale is also sent off to that Island."[205]

The controversy surrounding the shipment of ammunition and firearms from the Dutch Republic to the American colonies intersected with the formation of militia units in the American colonies, organizations that would prove foundational to the Patriot Atlantic of the next decade and a half. The British government viewed the dumping of tea in Boston Harbor in late 1773 in horror. In response and in 1774, Parliament passed the Coercive Acts. Called the Intolerable Acts in the American colonies, the Coercive Acts mainly sought to suppress the Patriot movement in the colony of Massachusetts. It was also an attempt to punish the Bostonians for destroying East India Company property. The Coercive Acts included the Boston Port Act, which closed down the Boston harbor, the Massachusetts Government Act, which suspended local powers of the government of Massachusetts and placed it under the direct control of Great Britain, and the Administration of Justice Act, which gave the governor of Massachusetts the power to have royal officials tried in other parts of the Empire. In addition, Parliament passed the Quartering

[205] SP 84/543, Joseph Yorke to White Hall, August 26, 1774, NA.

Act, which applied to all of the colonies and allowed the British government to house troops in unoccupied buildings in the colonies.[206]

In response to the Coercive Acts, American Patriots formed new committees of correspondence in their respective colonies and subsequently sought to respond collectively in the First Continental Congress. The Congress convened in September of 1774 and was initially primarily split on the issue of the formation of militias. John Adams, the by-then famous Bostonian lawyer who had defended the British soldiers involved in the Boston Massacre in 1770, argued for a resolution that ordered each colony to form their own militias in response to the increased presence and activity of British troops. Some in the Congress found Adams' suggestions akin to a declaration of war on Britain. But the Congress eventually endorsed the Suffolk Resolves, a resolution passed by the revolutionary Committees of Correspondence from several Massachusetts counties. The Suffolk Resolves urged, but not instructed, each colony to raise a militia for self-defense against British incursions, while also purging existing militias from those who were not "inflexible friends to the rights of the people". New officers of the militias would have to be elected, particularly those who did not support the American cause.[207] The Suffolk Resolves managed to sway many moderates in the Congress to support more radical measures, such as the adoption of the Continental Association, a colonial wide boycott of British goods similar to the ones passed on a local level during the 1760s.

But even before Congress' endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves, many revolutionary committees, particularly in New England, were already raising their own militias. In Connecticut in September 1774, the counties of New London and Windham had convened to "consult for

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[206] Middlekauf, *Glorious Cause,* p. 227-255.
[207] *The Suffolk Resolves in a Supplement to the Massachusetts Gazette*, September 15, 1774, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections Online.

their common Safety" and recommended that the militias of these counties would "immediately comply with … the Laws of this Colony" by supplying their "Town Stock with a full Complement of Ammunition and military Stores". The Committee also recommended that those "who by Law are required to provide and keep Arms and Ammunition … to arm and equip themselves" as well as "improve in, and learn the Use and design of their Arms".[208]

Similarly in October, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, a shadow government set up in response to the suspension of the local legislature, passed a resolution to organize "several Companies of Militia" through the election of officers, if they had not already done so. As in Connecticut, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress urged the provincial militias to "immediately provide themselves" with "Arms and Ammunition", as well as "perfect themselves in Military Skill". At the same time, the Congress emphasized they had "not the most distant Design of attacking, annoying or molesting His Majesty".[209]

After about a month of debate, the Continental Congress unanimously voted for a Declaration and Resolves, which indicated the American colonists were still seeking reconciliation with Great Britain. Like the Suffolk Resolves and other Patriot documents during the imperial crisis, the Declaration and Resolves underlined the colonists 'dedication to the Crown and "English liberties" as well as the notion that their actions and their demands for a restoration of their "rights and liberties" were founded in ancient historical precedent.[210]

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[208] *At a meeting of delegates of the towns in the counties of New-London and Windham*, September 8, 1774, Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 42660, Archive of Americana.

[209] *In Provincial Congress, Cambridge, Massachusetts*, October 26, 1774, Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 13416, Archive of Americana.

[210] *Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,* October 14, 1774, The Avalon Project of Yale University. Consulted last on May 20, 2019 at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp.

Meanwhile, in response to the formation of militias and shadow governments, the British government sought to track specific merchants trading firearms with the American colonies in Dutch ports in Europe and the Caribbean. In late 1774, the British government became obsessed with finding a merchant vessel from Rhode Island called the *Smack* that had "put on board about forty Pieces" of swivel guns and possibly muskets and gunpowder in Amsterdam. The captain of the *Smack,* Benjamin Page, was a staunch Patriot from Rhode Island, a merchant, and a militiaman. In 1772, he had also participated in the burning of the *Gaspee*. In response to the rumors about the *Smack*, the British government dispatched a ship of war to the Dutch Republic to ensure it would not leave the port of Amsterdam. At the same time, the British leveraged their influence in the Dutch government to seize and search the ship for illicit goods. Since the *Smack* was docked in Amsterdam, however, it fell under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of Amsterdam. As a result, neither the British nor the pro-British Stadtholderate could force the Admiralty to inspect the ship. The Admiralty of Amsterdam, dominated by anti-British and anti-Stadtholder merchants who were involved in the trade to the American colonies and the West Indies, declined their requests.[211] In December 1774, after months of attempting to search the *Smack*, Ambassador Yorke came to suspect that Captain Page had possibly unloaded its illicit cargo in other ships during the night, avoiding his capture.[212]

Despite British attempts in 1774 and 1775, American purchasing of firearms in Dutch ports continued at a steady pace. In the early months of 1775, the British government's frustrations with Dutch illicit trading practices reached a peak moment during which tensions escalated rapidly. In late 1774, the British government had sent a warship to the Dutch Republic to patrol waterways that led to and from the Amsterdam harbor in hopes of capturing merchant

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[211] SP 84/543, Joseph Yorke to White Hall, several letters in late 1774, NA.
[212] SP 84/543, Joseph Yorke to White Hall, December 16, 1774, NA.

ships smuggling to America. In early 1775, Ambassador Yorke pushed for even greater involvement of the Dutch. Yorke pressured the Stadtholder and his allies to ban the sale of ammunition and other war materiel to the American colonies. Yorke also succeeded in creating a naval checkpoint on Texel, a Dutch island in the North Sea, where merchant vessels could be stopped and searched for illicit contents. Meanwhile, the Duke of Rochford, the Secretary of State of the Southern Department in 1775, ordered the Lord Commissioners of the British Admiralty to direct the "Commanders of the Ships & Vessels … in their respective Stations to intercept & seize any British or foreign Ships which may be found carrying on an illicit Trade" between the American colonies and Dutch ports.[213]

The early formation of militias and their attempts to acquire munitions through smuggling networks with the Dutch would prove explosive on the American continent. Following the endorsed Suffolk Resolves, the Patriots in Massachusetts had set up militias as well as stocked and stored military supplies. As in the Dutch Republic and on the Atlantic Ocean, the British sought to prevent American access to firearms, particularly in Massachusetts which the British government had declared a colony in rebellion in February of 1775. In April, General Gage, the Commander of British forces in the American colonies and the royally appointed military governor of Massachusetts after the Coercive Acts, received instructions to disarm the colonists, arrest their leaders, and restore order to Massachusetts. Meanwhile, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress had given orders in late March to resist with force any attempts by the British authorities to enforce the Coercive Acts. Gage ordered his troops to march on Concord, where colonial militias had stored large amounts of weapons and military supplies. The march to Concord passed through Lexington. A complex system called "alarm and

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[213] SP 84/546, Early 1775, NA.

muster" alerted the militia in Concord and surrounding areas that Gage's troops were marching from Boston. As the assembled colonial militias and British troops met in Lexington, fire was exchanged and a minor skirmish with great consequences ensued.[214] The American revolutionary war had begun.

The imperial crisis transformed the history of the Patriot Atlantic. As Great Britain sought to reform the Empire after the Seven Years' War, Patriot notions of sovereignty, virtue, and social compacts became omnipresent in the American colonies. British reform exposed the fact that American colonial thought had been infused with Patriot ideas on sovereignty and virtue, the same ideas that had inspired the Orangist Patriots in 1747. Fundamental ideas on balanced social compacts and local rights, the necessity of a disinterested Patriot King, and the centrality of personal virtue to a free and virtuous government formed the heart of both political movements. Indeed, the notion that a balanced government of liberty needed to be restored and that the long history of tyranny and liberty proved this notion, drove both the Orangists Patriots in the Netherlands and the colonial Patriots in America.

At the same time, Dutch smuggling, particularly of tea and firearms, to the American colonies exacerbated the imperial crisis and laid the foundation for revolutionary entanglements in the following decade. Dutch merchants, ports, and jurisdictions were widely used in the evasion of British trade laws on the Atlantic. These transatlantic smuggling networks slowly started to tear apart the "union" between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain that had been created in 1688 and revitalized in 1747. Meanwhile, stocking weapons for the newly created militias in 1774 and 1775 not only created more friction between the American colonies and

[214] David Hackett-Fisch, *Paul Revere's Ride* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994).

Great Britain. It would also greatly contribute to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War.

The start of the revolutionary war at Lexington and Concord signified a new moment in the history of the Patriot Atlantic. With the imperial crisis turning into war, it became even more urgent for the British to suppress Dutch smuggling to the American rebels.. At the same time, the revolutionary war eventually led to American independence, prompting a reimagination of Patriotism in America that would soon spill over to the Dutch Republic.

Chapter Five - War and Independence

Before 1775, the idea of a Patriot King was a core ideological tenet of Patriotism on both sides of the Atlantic. In the Dutch Republic, many were dissatisfied with the functioning of the government, but few questioned the authority of the Stadtholder, who embodied the idea of a Patriot King there. Up until the 1760s, Dutch Patriotism had even been largely married to the Stadtholderate, which was revitalized during the Orangist Revolution of 1747 after a lapse of nearly five decades. Similarly, in the American colonies, the Patriots were largely in favor of the monarchy and the Empire. As evidenced by the Albany Plan and colonial protests between the end of the Seven Years War in 1763 and 1775, American Patriots viewed the disinterested monarch as the indispensable link that bound the Empire together.

The outbreak of the American revolutionary war in 1775 fundamentally altered the Patriot Atlantic and the ideology of Patriotism in America, leading Patriots to disavow the idea of the Patriot King in its original form. Some American Patriots remained staunch proponents of the monarchy in the early months of the war. Yet King George III's dismissal of the petitions of the Second Continental Congress made clear that George - like Stadtholder William IV before him - was not a disinterested Patriot King. Instead, he demonstrated his wholehearted support for the measures that his ministers and Parliament had implemented during the imperial crisis. Unlike in the Dutch Republic in 1748 where the relationship between the prince and the form of government was more complex, the King's rejection of colonial petitions transformed American Patriotism into a decisively republican ideology, paving the road to independence.

A decisively republican Patriot ideology spread through all institutions in the former American colonies. The republicanization of American Patriotism became especially evident in the Patriot militias, an institution that would prove key on both sides of the Patriot Atlantic.

Militias had already been formed to defend American “rights and liberties” before the war had started, but this remained largely confined to New England. The expansion of the war, however, led to the creation of militias in all of the colonies, birthing attempts to make the colonial militias into living institutions of American Patriotism.

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Despite the outbreak of hostilities in April 1775, many American Patriots still considered reconciliation with Great Britain and a restoration of their English “rights and liberties” the ultimate goal of their resistance. Yet reconciliation became increasingly illusory after the Battles of Lexington and Concord. A minority of Patriot thinkers - such as Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress John Adams - viewed independence from Great Britain as the way to restoring Americans’ “natural rights and liberties”. But before American independence could become a reality, Patriotism itself had to become independent from a central tenet of its political gospel that few had dared to question in the preceding decade on either side of the Atlantic: the idea of a Patriot King.

After the First Congress, the Continental Congress had agreed to meet again in the spring of 1775 to discuss the disputes with Great Britain. In April of 1775 and after the Battles of Lexington and Concord, this planned meeting became all the more urgent. These battles occured only weeks before the Second Continental Congress was supposed to meet in May. Although universally dismayed with the outbreak of hostilities, members of the Congress remained split on the next step to take, much like the First Continental Congress six months earlier. Under the leadership of John Dickinson, the majority of the Congress eventually agreed to appeal to King George, their Patriot King, whose intervention could initiate a process of reconciliation with Britain and prevent further escalation. After the occupation of Boston and the start of the war,

John Adams viewed yet another attempt of reconciliation as futile. Popular support for an independent America would, according to Adams, only grow as Britain showed its brutality in the war. The Congress should therefore focus on strengthening the war effort rather than seeking reconciliation.[215] Despite Adams' wishes and in the spring and summer of 1775, military action remained uncoordinated with New England militias fighting on their own accord, most famously in the Battle of Bunker Hill in June.[216]

The Congress remained divided, but its delegates eventually agreed to issue a list of causes that had forced them to armed resistance while at the same time extending an Olive Branch Petition to King George III. The desirability of reconciliation with Great Britain remained the consensus in Congress. *The Declaration of the Causes and the Necessities of Taking Up Arms* - coauthored by John Dickinson and the young Virginian planter and delegate Thomas Jefferson - reasoned that the American colonies did not voluntarily take up arms against Great Britain but were compelled to do so. Invoking Patriot discourse on unjust and imbalanced governments, the *Declaration of Causes* recalled the "inordinate passion for a [unjustifiable and unconstitutional] power" on part of British Parliament during the imperial crisis. Similarly, *the Declaration* underlined the long history of American settlement and colonization as a time of cooperation and balanced government between the British government and the American colonies up until the end of the Seven Years' War. From that moment on, according to *the Declaration*, the British government repeatedly ignored American peaceful petitions and protests, culminating in the military occupation of Boston and "an unprovoked assault" on

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[215] John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11, 1775, Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, In Congress, May 1775, Diary of John Adams Volume 3.
[216] Richard M. Ketchum, *Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill* (New York: Henry Holt & Company 1999); Nathaniel Philbrick, *Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution* (New York: Viking Books 2013).

Massachusetts at Lexington. Nevertheless, the Congress wanted to assure “our friends and fellow-subjects in any part of the empire” that “we mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily existed between us, and which we sincerely wish to see restored.”[217]

Congress's attempt to restore that happy “union” with Great Britain took shape in the Olive Branch Petition, a direct petition to King George III to intervene in the disputes between Parliament and the American colonies. Like *the Declaration of Causes*, the language of the Olive Branch Petition was steeped in Patriot discourse as it had developed in the last few decades. It was above all a monarchist document that supported the idea of a Patriot King. The Petition praised the old, balanced social compact between the American colonies and the Crown. It also underlined the loyalty that the American colonists had historically shown to the monarch. At the same time, the document blamed all of the discord between Great Britain and the American colonies on “Your Majesty’s Ministers”, who had engaged in “delusive pretences, fruitless terrours, and unavailing severities” that had complicated the relationship. Suggesting that the King was a true disinterested Patriot that would be sympathetic to the American cause, the Petition called upon the King to intervene and restore “the former harmony between [Great Britain] and these Colonies” as well as seek to create “a concord … between [the American colonies and Great Britain] upon so firm a basis as to perpetuate its blessings, uninterrupted by any future dissenssions”.[218] The devotion to the monarch and his disinterestedness shown in the Petition was starkly similar to the faith of the Orangist Patriots in the power and patriotic spirit of the Stadtholder in 1747.

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[217] Thomas Jefferson and John Dickinson, *A Declaration by the Representatives of the United Colonies of North-America, Now Met in Congress at Philadelphia, Setting Forth the Causes and Necessity of Their Taking Up Arms*, July 6, 1775, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States, Government Printing Office (1927), Document No. 398.

[218] Petition to the King, July 8, 1775, *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1779,* Volume II, p. 158-172.

The Petition's intended to restore the harmoniously balanced compact between the American colonies and Great Britain, but the British government, including the King, considered the outbreak of the war too damaging to repair with mere words and "concords". Even before the Petition had reached the King, the news of the Battle of Bunker Hill - in which colonial militias sought to prevent British control over Boston harbor - arrived in London. In August of 1775 and in response to news about Bunker Hill, the British government declared the Patriots in all of the North American colonies in rebellion. The King, on behalf of his government, proclaimed that "all of Our Officers … are obliged to exert their utmost Endeavours to suppress such Rebellion, and to bring the Traitors to Justice" and that all of the colonists were "bound by law to be aiding and assisting in the Suppression of such Rebellion".[219] The King received the Olive Branch Petition shortly after the Proclamation but ignored it since the proclamation had rendered the Petition meaningless.

Though the proclamation was not a direct response to the Olive Branch Petition, it was perceived as such in the American colonies. The Congress was flabbergasted at the King's disregard and responded with indignation to the Proclamation in December. Their response largely contained rhetorical questions that ridiculed the Proclamation and neither explicitly praised nor reprimanded the King. Their ambiguity suggests confusion among the delegates on how to proceed vis-a-vis the monarch and his government.[220] The crumbling of the idea of the Patriot King was hard to take for the delegates of the Continental Congress.

Despite their wish to reconcile and their confusion towards the monarch, Congress had nevertheless already begun to lay the groundwork for independence in the second half of 1775,

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[219] *By the King, A Proclamation, For Suppressing Rebellion and Sedition*, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections Online.
[220] *We, the Delegates of the thirteen United Colonies in North America*, December 6, 1775, *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1779*, Volume II, p. 409-412.

particularly with regards to the American armed forces. Following reports of uncoordinated military actions, the Congress passed a resolution in June of 1775 to create a Continental Army that answered to the Congress and would serve to defend all of the colonies. The Congress appointed George Washington - who enjoyed a good reputation in all of the colonies - as commander of the new Continental Army. While the Army in 1775 remained a ragtag band of militiamen from New England and New York, the Congress had taken steps to coordinate military action and appoint a central commander, making the rebelling American colonies look more and more like a separate state.[221]

In July, the Congress created a more centralized military command by issuing a set of recommendations for the formation of militias in each of the colonies for their common defense. The Congress recommended the creation of a militia force in each colony, if they had not already done so, and sought to incorporate into them the organizational style of New England militias. The Congress called upon "all able-bodied men, between sixteen and fifty five years of age, in each colony, immediately [to] form themselves into regular companies of militia" and that the "officers of each company shall be chosen by the respective companies", mimicking regulations of New England militias set up in 1774 and 1775.[222]

The Congress also copied the New England model when they recommended that "one fourth part of the militia in every Colony be selected for minute men, of such persons as are willing to enter into this necessary service … their officers chosen and commissioned as aforesaid, to be ready to on the shortest notice to march to any place where their assistance may be required for the defence of their own or a neighbouring Colony". The minutemen would form

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[221] *The consideration of the articles of war being resumed, Congress agreed to the same*, June 30, 1775, *Journal of the Continental Congress* Volume II, p. 111-123.
[222] *Resolved, That it be recommended to the inhabitants of all the united English Colonies in North America*, July 18, 1775, *Journal of the Continental Congress* Volume II, p. 187-188.

a portion of the colonial militias and function like a quick reaction force of citizens that could be deployed as the first line of defense. The Congress, therefore, recommended that "a more particular and diligent attention be paid to their instructions in military discipline".[223]

The calling forth of colonial militias for the war not only laid the groundwork for American independence but also created popular institutions in the American colonies based explicitly on Patriot ideas. Generally, the intellectuals of the Patriot canon had written derisively about standing armies, ideas which had circulated for decades in the American colonies. Militias composed of the citizens were considered superior to standing armies, largely because standing armies were considered only loyal to the King, not to local or factional political interests. Militias were therefore explicitly bound to the idea of limited loyalty to the state and adherence to a balanced social contract. The argument against standing armies became critical to English and Scottish Protestant thought in the seventeenth century, particularly after the Glorious Revolution. The English Bill of Rights of 1689 complained that James II had raised and kept a "standing army within this kingdom in time of peace" and had disarmed Protestants "at the same time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law".[224] It was in this historical context that Andrew Fletcher and John Trenchard crafted their ideas on standing armies and the many supposed benefits of citizen's militias.

While militias had been commonplace in the colonies since their founding, the American Patriots celebrated them, reorganized them, and tried to shape them in their own ideological image. In 1775, Timothy Pickering built on Trenchard and Fletcher's ideas in his *An Easy Plan*

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[223] *Resolved, That it be recommended to the inhabitants*, p. 188-189.

[224] English Bill of Rights 1689, "An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown", The Yale Avalon Project. Consulted last on April 20, 2018 at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp.

for the Discipline of a Militia, which would become the Continental Army's handbook for drilling in the early years of the war. The handbook revealed the extent to which Patriot notions of virtue and abjuration of luxury were used as motivations for creating militias and maintaining military discipline at large during the early phases of the American revolutionary war.

Pickering's essay - originally written in 1769 for the *Essex Gazette* in Massachusetts but widely republished in 1775 - detailed new instructions for drilling the militia, a process which he considered too ostentatious. Based on his experiences in the Essex County militia, Pickering argued that certain military exercises and dress were redundant because they were purely for display and not for practical means of warfare. "Except the *priming, loading, and firing*, which are necessary in an engagement [with the enemy], all the rest of the exercise is *good for nothing*", because it corrupts the militiamen's minds. When these militiamen engage in activities "merely because to them they appear to be graceful … their ideas seldom extend beyond the lines of the parade … they excite the gaze of the admiring croud, by whose applause their zeal is limited, and their ambition bounded". Luxury, such as parading for display, was just another "lust for pleasures, wealth, *power*, fame". Echoing Fletcher's classical republican argument of Spartan military training and the decay of European civilization due to the wealth of the Renaissance, these parades of luxury were only a waste of money and time. These precious resources, according to Pickering, could be better spent on training the militiamen to become effective, virtuous warriors. "Away then with the trappings (as well as tricks) of the parade: *Americans* need them not: *their* eyes are not to be dazzled, nor their hearts awed into servility, by the splendour of equipage and dress: *their* minds are much too enlightened to be duped by a glittering outside".[225]

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[225] Timothy Pickering, *An Easy Plan for the Discipline of a Militia,* Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14404, Archive of Americana. p. 10-12.

Throughout 1775, militia units all over the American colonies began to put these Patriot ideas into practice in defense of American liberty. The Provincial Congress of the colony of New Jersey argued in its resolution that "the inhabitants of this province be forthwith properly armed, and disciplined for defending the cause of American Freedom". Trust in the power of the militia could be "confided in by the people" because they were "truly zealous in support of our just rights and privileges".[226] In South Carolina, the Provincial Congress called upon "all the Gentlemen Volunteers" to sign up for the militia "to serve the cause of *America*". In these militia resolves, the South Carolina revolutionary government hoped that their encouragement would be "an Inducement to the Sober and Industrious to enter into that Service". At the same time, the resolve showed that voluntary dedication to the cause - rather than financial rewards or blind obedience to the King - formed the heart of the South Carolina militia units. The officers would "esteem it their Duty (through principles of Humanity and Interest) to treat the Soldiers well, since it is their most ardent Wish to have Men obey them through Love and Esteem, rather than their Compliance with Orders should be the effects of Fear". Like Pickering's enlightened militiamen and Fletcher's devoted soldiers, South Carolina's militiamen would not be "so selfish and narrow-minded" to fight only for a narrow cause such as fear, their own province, or their purse. Instead, they would fight for "the cause of all *North-America* [sic]; a Cause which ought to warm the Heart of every Native and Inhabitant of this … Continent, and diffuse an animated Spirit of Self-Defence thro' each Individual."[227]

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[226] *In Provincial Congress, at Trenton, New Jersey*, June 3, 1775, Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14283, Archive of Americana.
[227] *South Carolina (Colony) Laws, Statutes, etc., Resolves Respecting the Militia of the Colony*, Nov. 20 1775, printed in Charleston, South Carolina, Early American Imprints, Series 1, no. 14467, Archive of Americana.

The colonial militias themselves started to employ other concepts of Patriotism as well, such as ideas on popular sovereignty. These proved very similar to the implementation of popular sovereignty by the Dutch Orangists in 1747. Militias from all over the colonies copied the Continental Congress's recommendations regarding the election of officers. The Congress had, in turn, copied these instructions from Patriot militia units in New England in 1774 and 1775. The colony of New York attempted to form its own militia units with its regulations, because "the well ordering and regulating the militia is become an object of the greatest importance to the preservation of the lives and liberties" of New York's inhabitants. A critical component of these regulations were the elections of officers, which took place whenever there was a vacancy. Soldiers cast their votes equally and if a tie in votes occurred they would repeat the process until the officers were elected.[228] Like the Spartan dress and exercises that Pickering supported, the elections were intended to inspire soldiers' devotion to the officers and vice versa, enabling bravery and devotion to the cause on the battlefield. At the same time, officers were expected to act as virtuous leaders who could inspire the troops. The elections of militia officers were in essence Patriot notions of popular sovereignty and virtue made practical for war.

The significance of these officer elections should not be underestimated, particularly when one considers the extent to which elections had heretofore been rituals of a political process reserved for elites. Voting for colonial legislatures and extralegal governing bodies such as the Continental Congress had been reserved for free white men with property. In contrast, militia members were recruited from the free white, male population at large and local Congresses made every attempt to enable all classes to participate. Though they were encouraged to purchase one themselves, plenty of soldiers did not own a weapon and they would

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[228] *New York (Congress) Provincial Congress, 1775, Rules and Orders for Regulating the Militia …* August 22, 1775, Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14309, Archive of Americana.

theoretically be provided with one. Owners would - again, in theory - even be financially compensated in case they lost their weapons on the battlefield. In addition, most militia instructions stipulated that all men between the ages of sixteen and fifty were eligible to serve in the militia, thus making them eligible to vote for officers.

The creation of the minutemen by Congress's orders were similarly embodiments of American notions of Patriotism. The minutemen served as a temporary quick reaction force. Unlike their counterparts in the Continental Army or the regular militia, they would remain permanent inhabitants of their respective towns, but could be deployed when necessary, for the defense of their own or a neighboring colony. The minutemen were even more an embodiment of Patriot military service than even the regular militia, because they fulfilled the Patriot ideal of a volunteer citizen's army that could be deployed temporarily for the defense of the polis. The provincial Congresses provided separate instructions for the minutemen, who were expected to "meet once in every week" under the supervision of their officers "to employ half a day, or at least four hours each time, in perfecting themselves in military discipline". Similarly, the whole companies of the militiamen were to meet "once every fortnight, to spend the same time for the same purpose".[229] Some provincial Congresses took the minutemen and their readiness very seriously. In July 1775, the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts recommended that minutemen "carry their Arms and Ammunition with them to Meeting, on the Sabbath and other days, when they meet for public Worship" to march at "a Minute's Warning".[230] Like in Fletchers' ideal, these minutemen would be trained to be citizen-soldiers in locally organized exercises, ready to

[229] *In Provincial Congress, at Trenton, New Jersey, June 3, 1775,* Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14283, Archive of Americana.
[230] *In Provincial Congress, Watertown, June 17, 1775, Whereas the Hostile Incursions …*, Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14234, Archive of Americana.

march at a moment's notice, even during church services, for the virtuous defense of their liberties.

As the American colonial militias were becoming small-scale experiments in Patriot thought independent from the idea of a Patriot King, the continuation of the war made it impossible to ignore the fundamental question in American colonial politics on the meaning of the King's rejection of the Olive Branch Petition. The pressing nature of this question became particularly clear in the first few months of 1776 when Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* was published. Paine was a native Englishman, whose fortunes in England had gone awry. In the early 1770s, he had divorced his wife and was dismissed from his job as an excise officer in Sussex. In the summer and fall of 1774, however, Paine's fortunes improved when he moved to London and met Benjamin Franklin, who urged him to emigrate to the American colonies. In late 1774, Paine - presumably already sympathetic to American Patriot ideas - moved to Philadelphia, where he became the editor of the *Pennsylvania Magazine,* a pro-Patriot publication.[231]

Paine wrote the essay *Common Sense* in late 1775 while working in the heart of the American revolutionary printing community. The pamphlet not only confronted the American Patriots with the problem of a failed Patriot King but offered a solution to it as well. *Common Sense* was published anonymously in the first months of 1776 and presented a radically different notion of Patriotism from the publications that preceded it on both sides of the Atlantic. *Common Sense* repeated many of the same Patriot ideas that the American colonists had proclaimed in some form or another in the past decade. Yet it unequivocally rejected any possibility of reconciliation between the American colonies and Great Britain. Up until 1775, the American

[231] Eric Foner, *Thomas Paine*, American National Biography.

Patriots had argued and even fought for the reestablishment of the old, glorious connection between the colonies and Great Britain. In contrast, Paine ridiculed reconciliation with Great Britain. Like John Adams, he argued that after Lexington and Concord reconciliation was no longer an option. Those who still sought reconciliation were weak, prejudiced, or "think better of the European world than it deserves", according to Paine.[232]

Common Sense also departed intellectually from previous Patriot writings in its unapologetic praise of a republican form of government and its explicit disdain for monarchy as an institution. Paine disavowed the British monarchy and constitutional system as a whole, rejecting the long-standing idea of a Patriot King. In the introduction, Paine wrote that "the King of England [who] hath undertaken in his *own right*, to support Parliament in what he calls *Theirs*". The people of the colonies, Paine argued, "have an undoubted privilege … to reject the Usurpation" of both King and Parliament. Based on the natural law theory that had been so central to early liberal arguments, Paine reasoned that the natural state of man was to organize government voluntarily and with consent; first by themselves, then later through representatives, but never through a monarch, even if that monarchy was found in a limited constitution like Britain's.[233]

The problem with the monarch, according to Paine, was hereditary succession, which he considered an evil with "in it the nature of oppression. Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, soon grow insolent. Selected from the rest of mankind, their minds are early poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to

[232] Thomas Paine, "Common Sense" in *The Writings of Thomas Paine vol. 1,* ed. Moncure Daniel Conway (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons 1894), p. 90.
[233] Paine, *Common Sense,* p. 67-68.

the government are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the dominions."[234] Paine was equally dismissive of the House of Lords in the British system of government, an institution that also suffered from hereditary succession. Paine saw the House of Lords as merely an extension of the King's power. "The prejudice of Englishmen, in favour of their own government, by King, Lords and Commons", Paine argued, "arises as much or more from national pride than reason."[235]

An aggressive advertising campaign accompanied *Common Sense,* greatly expanding its reach. Newspapers all over the colonies prominently placed advertisements of the anti-monarchical pamphlet.[236] The target audience for *Common Sense* was broad as well. Immediately after the second edition came out in February, the first edition's price was reduced by half "in order to accommodate it to the abilities of all ranks of men". At the same time, Paine and his printer friends were targeting non-Anglo Saxons too. In New York, a Dutch edition was reported to be in the press. In Philadelphia, there were - albeit English - advertisements in *Der Wöchentliche Pennsylvanische Staatsbote,* a German-language newspaper there.[237]

Common Sense also fundamentally changed American Patriot perceptions of monarchical government. This shift becomes evident from other Patriot writings that appeared in early 1776, such as John Adams' *Thoughts on Government,* which was likewise published anonymously. In *Thoughts on Government*, Adams reiterated classical republican ideas that had now become Patriot orthodoxy, namely that the "happiness of man, as well as his dignity, consists in virtue".

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[234] Paine, *Common Sense,* p. 81-82.
[235] Paine, *Common Sense,* p. 74.
[236] *Pennsylvania Packet, published as Dunlap's Pennsylvania Packet or, the General Advertiser* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), January 15, 1776, p. 3, America's Historical Newspapers Database.
[237] *The New-York Journal; or, The General Advertiser (New York, New York)* February 1, 1776, p. 1; *Der Wöchentliche Pennsylvanische Staatsbote (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)* January 26, 1776, p. 2, America's Historical Newspapers Database.

The goal of his pamphlet was to outline a form of government "whose principle and foundation is virtue", promoting the general happiness more than any other form of government. Similarly, Adams' repeated the necessity of a "militia law", which he called a "wise institution, and, in the present circumstances of our country, indispensable". At the same time, Adams underlined the economic Patriot notions of austerity and frugality. "Frugality is a great revenue", Adams agreed with many of the intellectuals from the Patriot canon. Frugality allowed the American colonies to "carry on this war forever" and cure "us of vanities, levities, and fopperies, which are real antidotes to all great, manly, and warlike virtues".[238] Adams also vehemently agreed with Paine that a new constitutional framework of the American colonies could only be a republican one. Adams too had repudiated the idea of the Patriot King, an idea popularized by his favorite intellectual Bolingbroke. Echoing Paine, Adams nevertheless argued that "there is no good government but what is republican." Adams also agreed with Paine that "the only valuable part of the British constitution" is its republican element, namely the representative House of Commons.[239]

Yet Adams rejected Paine's radical ideas of republicanism, such as a unicameral legislature. Instead, Adams argued in favor of a balanced republican government, one that the British constitution and previous Patriot notions inspired. Arguably, Adams' *Thoughts on Government* was the first Patriot writing that reconciled older Patriot notions of a balanced constitution with the newer anti-monarchical and republican ideas that Paine had stirred up with his pamphlet. In *Thoughts on Government* Adams argued for a government with a representative assembly that "should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large". At the same time,

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[238] John Adams, *Thoughts on Government, Applicable to the Present State of the American Colonies*, published in Philadelphia, 1776, Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 14639, Archive of Americana.
[239] Adams, *Thoughts on Government*.

Adams considered a unicameral legislature problematic, employing Patriot notions of virtue to argue against it. A unicameral legislature, Adams argued, would be "subject to fits of humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice, and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments."[240]

Adams employed the example of the Dutch Republic and the Long Parliament of seventeenth-century England to argue that a "single assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual". Instead of a unicameral legislature, Adams proposed a balanced government with an executive - which Adams called a "governor" - and a second legislative chamber - which he called the "council" - to balance out the passions of the people's representatives. In Adams' model, the governor would hold veto power over all legislation and the "council" would temper the passions of the representative assembly. Meanwhile, governors would be stripped of "the badges of domination, called [royal] prerogatives" and would have the power to nominate judges, who would be approved or disproved by the legislature. Demonstrating how far the Patriot King had fallen, Adams took the Patriots' venerated model of the British constitution and stripped the executive power of nearly all of its prerogatives, reducing it to a relatively weak position that was largely beholden to voters and the legislative assembly.[241]

In the early months of 1776, anti-monarchical and republican ideas of government became an essential part of American discourse at large. In February, shortly after the publication of *Common Sense*, the *Connecticut Courant* published anonymous pieces that were virulently anti-monarchical. One article called King George "the Royal Brute of Great Britain" and equated the attempt at reconciliation with giving a prostitute back her "innocence". To

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[240] Adams, *Thoughts on Government.*
[241] Adams, *Thoughts on Government,* also in: John Adams to John Trumbull, 13 February 1776.

underline that the Patriot King had turned into the Royal Brute, the author ominously called "mankind" to "oppose not only the tyranny, but the tyrant" as well.[242] In another pamphlet from February, a fictional dialogue between the ghost of Continental Army General Richard Montgomery - who had died in battle during his assault on Quebec in December of 1775 - and a delegate at the Congress also showed the degree to which American Patriotism was quickly becoming a republican and anti-monarchical movement. Acting as a ghost that was sent to "a wood near Philadelphia" on an "important errand", the Montgomery character argued that reconciliation is no longer possible because "the King has proclaimed you rebels" and had tried to make the American colonies into slaves. Montgomery's responses similarly exemplified the fall of the Patriot King that the rejection of the Olive Branch Petition and the publication of *Common Sense* had caused. When the delegate told Montgomery that he "should distinguish between the King and his ministers" in assessing Britain's tyrannical policies - as the Petition had done - Montgomery answered that he lives in the afterlife "where all political superstition is done away. The King", Montgomery knew from beyond the grave, "is the author of all the measures carried on against America". In the pamphlet, Montgomery even likened the King and his ministers to a murderer and the bad company he keeps. "You shun the streams and yet you are willing to sit down at the very fountain of corruption and venalty" that is the King of Great Britain, so said the ghost of the General.[243]

The novel republican ideas of the American colonists animated Loyalists as well. Charles Inglis - an Anglican priest from New York - offered vocal resistance to American ideas of independence and their newly found adherence to republicanism. In his pamphlet, *The Deceiver*

[242] *Connecticut Courant, published as the Connecticut Courant and Hartford Intelligencer*, February 26, 1776, America's Historical Newspapers Database.
[243] *For the Pennsylvania Packet*, *A Dialogue Between the Ghost of General Montgomery and a Delegate*, February 19, 1776, America's Historical Newspapers Database.

Unmasked, Inglis used the Congress's own words against them. Inglis quoted the Congress and the old Patriot argument on the title page that the American colonists are not "desirous of independency" but seek a restoration of the "former harmony" between Great Britain and the American colonies. *The Deceiver Unmasked* was a strong anti-republican tract. It vociferously attacked Paine's *Common Sense*, arguing that Paine "united the violence of a republican with all the folly of a fanatic".[244]

Loyalists also employed other Patriot arguments to argue against the newfound republicanism of the American colonists. In the *Pennsylvania Ledger,* a loyalist paper sold in several North American colonies, old accounts from British ambassadors to the Dutch Republic were published on the front page, with anti-republican and pro-monarchy commentary primarily in the margins. The comments directly engaged the new Patriot idea that a republic will provide the answer for America's problems with Britain. The commentary stated that the "necessary principle of a Republic, *Virtue*, subsists no longer" in the Netherlands. Wealth had corrupted the Dutch people, according to the commentator, and destroyed virtue in the Dutch Republic. Though republics are "unquestionably, upon paper, the most rationable and equitable form of the government", only poverty could keep the country virtuous and thereby prolong the existence of a republic. In a country where luxury has developed, such as England or the Dutch Republic, a limited monarchy is the best option, according to the commentator. If the Stadtholder is wise, "he will desire no more [than a limited monarchy]; if the people are wise, they will give it to him."[245]

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[244] Charles Inglis, *The Deceiver Unmasked, or Loyalty and interest united*, printed in New York and London, 1776, Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 43050, Archive of Americana.
[245] *Pennsylvania Ledger, published as The Pennsylvania Ledger: or the Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, & New-Jersey Weekly Advertiser (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)* February 10, 1776, America's Historical Newspapers Database.

This larger context of a tectonically shifting Patriot ideology, heated American colonial discourse on the question of republicanism, and the continuing war with Great Britain gave birth to and ideologically shaped the American independence movement. Various members of the Continental Congress - most vocally John Adams - began to pressure the Congress to consider independence from Great Britain as these debates on republicanism and monarchy unfolded. Though many skeptics of independence remained in the Congress, the news that the British government was hiring German mercenaries to fight in America made the issue even more pressing.[246] In addition, news of the Prohibitory Act also reached the colonies. The Act was essentially a British naval blockade of the American colonies, an attempt to subdue and cut off the rebellion from vital supplies. In response, the Continental Congress took another step towards acting as a *de facto* independent state, issuing letters of marque against enemy ships.[247]

Meanwhile, various individual colonies were already effectively declaring independence from the British imperial structure by creating new constitutions that provided temporary governance and precluded any influence from Britain. In March, South Carolina created a constitution "for regulating the internal polity of this colony" as long as the conflict between Great Britain and the American colonies persisted. Though the South Carolinians still hoped that "an accommodation of the unhappy differences between Great Britain and America can be obtained", they nevertheless installed a government that had no approval from or formal connection to Great Britain.[248] Similarly, North Carolina sought to follow in the footsteps of its

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[246] *The humble address and petition of the Freeholders of the county of Berks*, *Pennsylvania Evening Post, published as The Pennsylvania Evening Post (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania),* April 6, 1776, America's Historical Newspapers Database.
[247] "Instructions to the commanders of private ships or vessels of war … ", April 3, 1776, *Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1779,* Volume II, p. 251-255.
[248] *In a Congress, begun and holden at Charles-Town, on Wednesday the first of November …* (1776), Early American Imprints Series 1, no. 15092, Archive of Americana.

neighboring colony and asked John Adams for advice, which was the motivation behind Adams' publication of his *Thoughts on Government*.

Though Patriot discourse and continuing grievances built increasing momentum for independence within the Patriot movement, the Continental Congress still lacked the political legitimacy and authority to declare independence on behalf of all of the colonies represented there. Delegates to the Congress were sent with explicit instructions and none of them contained provisions that they could declare independence. In April, a first step toward creating this legitimacy was made when North Carolina passed the so-called Halifax Resolves. The North Carolinians explicitly empowered their delegates to "concur with the other delegates of the other Colonies in declaring Independency, and forming foreign Alliances".[249] In early May, the Patriot legislature of Virginia likewise instructed its delegates, Thomas Jefferson among others, to declare independence. Meanwhile, jurisdictions at the local level also disavowed their allegiance to the British Crown, even in the form of jury instructions or colonial wide forms of declaring independence, such as Rhode Island.[250]

As the American Patriots built the political authority and legitimacy for declaring independence in the spring of 1776, they drafted the text of the Declaration of Independence as well. In June 1776, Congress was out of session so that its delegates could ask their colonial legislatures to receive instructions for declaring independence. In the meantime, Congress agreed to form a committee to draft a declaration of independence, should the Congress decide to sever its ties with Great Britain. Much has been said about the origins and influences on the document that Thomas Jefferson - who was part of the committee and tasked to write the document -

[249] Halifax Resolves in *North Carolina Manual, 1991-1992*, ed. Julie W. Snee (Raleigh, NC: North Carolina Historical Commission 1992), p. 549-550.
[250] Pauline Maier, *American Scripture: Making the Declaration of Independence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1997), Chapters 1 and 2.

drafted and Congress eventually passed. Scholars have credited John Locke, Emmerich de Vattel, Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, the 1689 English Bill of Rights, and even the Dutch Act of Abjuration of 1581 as the crucial source for the Declaration of Independence.[251]

Yet when the text of the Declaration is placed within the larger context of the intellectual history of Patriotism up until 1776 and its rapid ideological shift from a limited monarchy to republicanism in the months leading up to the draft, it becomes clear that the Declaration was the sum of these intellectuals, their works, and their ideas, much like the ideology of Patriotism itself. As Thomas Jefferson himself said in 1825, the Declaration was neither original in its principles or sentiments. Rather, it aimed to provide "an expression of the American mind, and to give to that expression the proper tone and spirit called for by the occasion."[252] It was, in other words, a document drafted at the height of anti-monarchical sentiment in American thought based on the Patriot canon.

The draft that Jefferson wrote for the Committee of Five deviated in several key ways from the eventual document that the Congress passed, but the core of both the draft and the final document was a repudiation of the idea of the Patriot King. The Declaration was the definitive legal, political, and ideological shift from a monarchical to a republican form of Patriotism in the American colonies. George III featured prominently in the Declaration, a document that mostly consisted of a list of grievances against the King himself. Unlike Patriot writings that preceded

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[251] Maier, *American Scripture*, p. 53-57; David Armitage, *The Declaration of Independence: A Global History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2007), particularly p. 38-40 and 113-126; Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence: A Study in the History of Political Ideas* (San Diego: Harcourt 1922); Gary Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1978); Stephen E. Lucas, "The 'Plakkaat van Verlatinge': A Neglected Model for the American Declaration of Independence", in *Connecting Cultures: The Netherlands in Five Centuries of Transatlantic Exchange,* eds. Rosemarijn Hofte and Johanna C. Kardux (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1994), 189–207.

[252] Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825, *The Works of Thomas Jefferson vol. 12 (Correspondence and Papers 1816-1826* (New York: The Knickerbocker Press 1905).

January 1776, Jefferson primarily blamed the King for oppressing the colonies. The Declaration blamed Parliament - which heretofore had played a central role in American grievances - only in one of the final paragraphs when it briefly mentions its "unwarrantable jurisdiction over us". Parliament, however, was largely reduced to a role of subservience to the true evil machinations of King George.

At the same time, the Declaration substantiated its claims by invoking key Patriot concepts, particularly those on natural law and their relation to just governance. Much like the Orangist Patriots of 1747 and the American Patriots during the imperial crisis, the Declaration of Independence underlined the importance of local rights and privileges. The document argued that the King had taken away "our Charters" and abolished "our most valuable Laws and altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments". These passages not only demonstrate the importance of Vattel's influence on the claim of sovereignty in the Declaration, as David Armitage has argued.[253] They also reflect how Vattel's conceptions of constitutional and consensual government had shaped American revolutionary thought. Jefferson invoked Vattel's notion that secession is legitimate when the "greater part of a free people, after the example of the Jews in the time of Samuel, are weary of liberty, and resolved to submit to the authority of a monarch".[254] Much like Vattel, who reasoned that a liberty-loving minority can secede and can "unite again under another form of government", the Declaration stated that "when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their [mankind's] right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security."[255]

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[253] Armitage, *The Declaration of Independenc*e, particularly p. 38-40 and 113-126.
[254] Emmerich de Vattel, *The Law of Nations,* p. 94
[255] The Declaration of Independence. Consulted last on April 30, 2021 at the Library of Congress website: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/bdsdcc:@field(DOCID+@lit(bdsdcc02101)).

In addition to overthrowing Bolingbroke's Patriot King and invoking Vattel's ideas on legitimate government, the Declaration also echoed Trenchard and Fletcher's ideas on standing armies and citizen's militias. The Declaration positioned itself firmly within the Patriot tradition of arguing against standing armies. It proclaimed that King George had "kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our legislatures", breaking two Patriot holy grails at once. Like Fletcher, and in response to the news that German soldiers would fight against the Americans, Jefferson abhorred the use of mercenaries who came to "compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny".[256]

The Declaration of Independence was a transformative document both for Patriotism and the American colonies. It definitively transformed American Patriotism into a republican rather than a monarchical movement and ideology. The outbreak of the war, King George's rejection of the Olive Branch Petition, and Thomas Paine's *Common Sense* were the rocks that started a republican avalanche, burying the idea of a Patriot King with it, at least in America in the form it had taken over the last several decades. Republican Patriotism had now become so much American revolutionary orthodoxy that the Patriots even held "these truths to be self-evident" and that their rights were "unalienable" and "endowed by their Creator".

Now that the American colonies had declared themselves independent states, they needed allies and transatlantic support to win the war with Great Britain and make the country's claim to independence legitimate. Where better to seek this support than in a country that had smuggled goods to the American colonies for decades, where Patriotism had flourished, and where republican brotherhood could be found?

[256] The Declaration of Independence.

Chapter Six: Scots, Agents, and the Dutch Opposition

"To [the] Dutch … the Cause of America was represented as similar to that of the [Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth century]; and thus the People were by degrees habituated to think ill [of Great Britain] … In addition to this way of reasoning founded upon the ill-applied Vanity of their own History, the hopes of sharing in the Spoils of England, & increasing their Trade, came in for a great deal" so wrote Sir Joseph Yorke, British ambassador to the Dutch Republic in 1778.[257] Yorke's account of the attitudes of the Dutch towards the Anglo-American disputes was undoubtedly biased in favor of the British government. Yet he correctly assessed that the American revolutionary war had transformed the Anglo-Dutch relationship and the political and ideological dispositions of the Dutch public.

Traditionally, scholars have understood that the linkages between the Dutch and the American Patriots originated after the outbreak of the American revolutionary war, largely because it provided the impetus for the diplomatic connections that Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt examined in such detail.[258] Yet surveying correspondence, pamphlets, and espionage documents between 1775 and 1780 reveals that the American revolutionary war - and American independence from 1776 onwards - created much deeper connections between American Patriots and the Dutch opposition to the Stadtholder than mere diplomatic connections. These connections deeply shaped Dutch political and cultural discourse by revitalizing dormant oppositional Patriotism. They thereby proved foundational for the Dutch Patriot Revolution of the 1780s.

[257] SP 84/561, Sir Joseph Yorke to the Earl of Suffolk, August 25, 1778, NA.
[258] Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1982).

The transatlantic connections between the Dutch and the American Patriots gradually tore apart the already cracking System of alliance that had placed the Dutch in the sphere of British influence over the last four decades. As in the Seven Years' War, the British government called upon Dutch assistance to fight a war in America. But the British found their long-time ally even more reluctant to comply with their demands than during the Seven Years' War as a result of changing political-economic ideas and practices as well as the increasing profitability of the Atlantic trade. American Patriot resistance struck a chord with the growing but disorganized Dutch opposition to the Stadtholder. The American Patriots also found support among Dutch merchants who regarded the Atlantic trade as one of the few avenues for economic opportunity in an otherwise stagnant economy.

Instead of assisting the British, Dutch formal neutrality undermined British efforts to crush the American rebellion. Smuggling to the American colonies and the newly formed United States continued apace and even expanded between 1775 and 1780. Moreover, increasing sympathies in the Dutch Republic for the American revolutionary cause - stirred up by pro-American forces in the Netherlands and their American friends - revitalized the Dutch Patriot movement. In the late 1770s, Dutch Patriot notions of sovereignty underwent dramatic change. Since the Orangist Revolution of 1747, they latched onto the steadily growing pro-American and anti-Stadtholderian movement. American revolutionary ideas on natural law, liberty, and representation rapidly transformed Dutch political, economic, and cultural discourse. The Americans provided a meaningful structure and target for Dutch Patriotism, dormant in the Dutch Republic for decades. The American Revolution effectively galvanized Dutch opposition to the frail regime of the Stadtholder.

Subsequently, the Dutch political opposition started to align itself with the American revolutionaries and created transatlantic support networks. They corresponded with them, acted as agents for the Congress, and blanketed the public sphere with articles in support of the American Revolution. This transatlantic entanglement between the American revolutionaries and the pro-American opposition in the Netherlands not only helped the American revolutionary cause. It also deeply affected the political and cultural discourse of the Dutch Republic, laying the groundwork for the Patriot Revolution in the 1780s.

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In early 1775, the States General issued a ban on the sale of war materiel to the American colonies. But the Dutch government found it increasingly difficult to uphold the ban. In August 1775, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) pressed William V, the Stadtholder of the Dutch Republic and Supreme Commander of the Company, to ask for exceptions to the ban on trade with the American colonies. The WIC argued that the ban on trade would not only hurt their mercantile interests. It could also cause a "large famine" in the North American colonies. Their trade, the WIC posited, would help relieve the American colonists of a humanitarian disaster. The Society of Suriname, a mercantile company closely related to the WIC, put forth a similar argument to William.[259] The Stadtholder wrote to the Grand Pensionary of Holland Pieter van Bleijswijk that only a person without "healthy brains" could conceive such an exception to British policy.[260] William found it difficult to pursue a decisively pro-British agenda, however. In addition

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[259] *Missive de la Compagnie des Indes Occidentales. Le commerce Americain*, July 21, 1775, AMON.
[260] *Le prince d'Orange au conseilier-pensionair. Même sujet. Le régiment Fourgeod.*, August 9, 1775, AMON.

to the WIC and the Society of Suriname, he encountered much resistance from the Amsterdam city government and other merchant cities who considered Britain's *mare clausum* ("closed seas" as opposed to Grotius' *mare liberum* or "free seas") policy bad for business.

In addition to the controversial trade in firearms, the American revolutionary war also added troop augmentation to the tensions between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, further exacerbating the Anglo-Dutch trading conflict. Britain's war with the American colonists required a substantial increase of troop presence there. Without significant colonial forces to call upon, Britain started to recruit troops on the European continent, something which it had also done during the Seven Years' War, especially in the German states. The British government leveraged King George's position as Elector of Hanover to hire mercenary forces there for the war in America. The British even used the Dutch Republic as a passageway through which it transported these German troops.[261]

In a similar vein, the British government sought to employ the so-called Scots Brigade for the war in America. These army companies had defended the Dutch Republic and been paid by the Dutch government since the Dutch Revolt against Spain in the 1580s. Nevertheless, the Scots Brigade still swore their oath of loyalty to the King of Great Britain and were technically under his command. As a result, the British government considered them on loan to the United Provinces. Their formal subordination to the King

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[261] Franz A.J. Sabo, *The Seven Years War in Europe: 1756-1763* (New York: Routledge 2007); Stuart Reid, *Frederick the Great's Allies 1756-63* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing 2013); *Le Duc de Brunswick au prince d'Orange, Le passages des troupes Anglaises*, January 4, 1776, AMON.

of Great Britain allowed the British to call upon the service of the Scots Brigade for the war in America.[262]

The British government, however, encountered much resistance from the Dutch to their plans to employ the Scots Brigade, particularly because they would be used against the American colonists. In early October of 1775, ambassador Yorke was engaged in several high-level meetings with officials of the Stadtholderian government who - to the astonishment of the British government - categorically refused to lend the Scots Brigade, particularly if these troops would be sent to fight in America. Through ambassador Yorke, the British tried to assuage the Dutch government's most skeptical members, particularly the Duke of Brunswick. The British offered financial compensation for the raising of new troops and troops from the Electorate of Hanover to replace them. But the Duke considered the political cost of lending out the Scots Brigade too high. The Dutch government would either have to raise new troops or accept replacement forces that had no loyalty to the Dutch Republic. Brunswick particularly objected to the idea that soldiers from King George's Electorate of Hanover would replace the Scots Brigade, presumably not impressed with the quality of the Electorate's troops or concerned about the political message it would send to the Dutch public.[263]

In addition to these problems, the augmentation of land and naval forces had long caused partisan divides in the Dutch Republic. Traditionally, pro-Stadtholder and pro-British factions in the countryside in the Netherlands favored a strong land army against France. Meanwhile, pro-republican and pro-French factions in the west favored a strong navy that could protect their mercantile interests at sea.[264] Moreover, the rising commercial interest of merchants in the

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[262] James Ferguson, ed., *Papers Illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the Service of the United Netherlands 1572-1782*, Volume I, II, and III (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1899).
[263] SP 84/547, NA.
[264] Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 739-795.

provinces of Holland and Zeeland in the trade with the rebellious American colonies was far too lucrative for them to accept that "Dutch" forces would fight against their American customers. Nevertheless, the British government managed to persuade the Stadtholder of their plans with the Scots Brigade, who started the political process of having the units transferred to Great Britain.

Brunswick had correctly assumed that the use of the Scots Brigade in the American conflict would produce outrage among the increasing number of critics of William's regime. In late 1775, the question of the Scots Brigade began to animate Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, a nobleman from the eastern Dutch province of Overijssel who had bought himself into provincial politics through the purchase of an estate. Over the course of the 1760s and 1770s, van der Capellen had become aware of the American protests against Great Britain and became sympathetic to their cause based on his familiarity with the intellectual currents of Patriotism.[265] In the States of Overijssel – the provincial governing body - van der Capellen gave an oration on his resistance to Britain's plans with the Scots Brigade. He most likely had the text of his speech leaked for publication across the Dutch Republic to increase public resistance to Britain's plans.

Van der Capellen's pamphlet leaned heavily on Patriot thought - especially natural law theory - and particularly resisted the idea that the Scots Brigade could be used against "what some call a Rebellion of American colonists". Van der Capellen argued the American Patriots were a virtuous people simply defending their rights, which were "not given by the Legislature of England, but received from God … The fire that burns in America", van der Capellen warned ominously, "may set the whole of Europe, that is full of combustibles, ablaze".

Aside from vocally supporting the American cause, van der Capellen railed against the British government for violating the law of the free seas, likewise a God-given natural law. The

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[265] E.A. van Dijk, *De wekker van de Nederlandse natie: Joan Derk van der Capellen (1741-1784)* (Zwolle, NL: Waanders 1984).

British "deny us our rights of free ship, free goods, they search and confiscate our ships as they please … they declare goods as Contraband which are not, and they treat Us as if we are not a free *People* [sic]." At the same time, van der Capellen viewed Britain's "demand" for the Scots Brigade as part of a long history of British demands for Dutch support in their frivolous wars without providing just compensation to the Dutch. At the end of the War of the Austrian Succession, the British gained land in America as well as Gibraltar and Minorca, "the key to the Mediterranean. And what about us? — Nothing … nothing more than an irreversible, empty treasury".[266]

Both in the public and private spheres, van der Capellen's pamphlet elicited emotional reactions. Ambassador Yorke reported that the pamphlet had "much offended the Prince of Orange [the Stadtholder]" and had the entire pamphlet translated into English for the British government.[267] Meanwhile, several supporters of the Stadtholder and the British cause took up their pens and started a small pamphlet war with van der Capellen and his supporters, which became more divisive in tone as the controversy progressed.[268] In response to the vociferous reactions to its plans with the Scots Brigade, the British government canceled their request for

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[266] *Advis door Jonkheer Johan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol over het verzoek van zyne Majesteit den Koning van Groot Brittannië, Raakende het lenen der Schotsche Brigade, op den 16. December 1775, ter Staatsvergadering van Overyssel uitgebragt, en in de Notulen dier Provincie geïnsereerd*, Pfl. Q p 4a/b, UvA.

[267] SP 84/552, *English translation of essay van der Capellen,* NA.

[268] *Brief van een vyand der Kwaadspreekenheid aan zyn vriend te Rotterdam; aangaande het onlangs uitgegeeven Advis, door Jonkheer Johan van der Capellen tot den Pol, over het verzoek van zyne Majesteit den Koning van Groot Brittannië, Raakende het lenen der Schotsche Brigade, op den 16. December 1775, ter Staatsvergadering van Overyssel uitgebragt, en in de Notulen dier Provincie geïnsereerd,* Pfl. Q p 4c, UvA; *Onpartydige en vrymoedige aanmerkingen over het bekend Advis van Jr. J.D. van der Capellen tot den Pol. Den 16 December 1775. Op den Overysselsen Landdag ingegeven, en in de Notulen dier Vergadering geïnsereerd*, Knuttel No. 19127 UB Utrecht; *Hollandsche Vrymoedige Bedenkingen, over het alom bekende gedrukte Advis van Jonkheer J.D. van der Capellen tot den Pol*, Royaards 8:14, UB Utrecht; *Vrye gedachten van een jong welmeenend patriot, over het berugte Advis van Jonkheer Johan van der Capellen tot den Pol, beneffens eenige aanmerkingen over den Brief van een Vyand van Kwaadspreekendheid*, Pfl. Q q 4, UvA.

the Brigade. Instead, they refocused their efforts on stopping Dutch illicit trade with the American colonies, which the government considered a far greater problem.

In addition to thwarting Britain's efforts to use the Scots Brigade in the war against the American rebels, van der Capellen's pamphlet also revitalized the political opposition to the Stadtholder in the Netherlands. The American Revolution proved an effective common cause for rallying the opposition. Intellectuals like van der Capellen recognized that American revolutionary ideas shared a common origin with Dutch political theories and were applicable to Dutch politics. Meanwhile, Britain's longstanding attempts to stop Dutch trade in the Atlantic had become more than just a nuisance for the struggling mercantile economy of the Dutch Republic. After van der Capellen's successful and very public attempt to undermine the British use of the Scots Brigade, the defiance that the Dutch merchants had shown to the British authorities for over a decade acquired a political and ideological layer that it did not have in previous decades. As such, resistance to the British, and the Stadtholder who seemingly supported them, gained a profoundly pro-American, anti-British, and anti-Stadtholder character. Van der Capellen's pamphlet prompted a broader revitalization of Dutch Patriotism due to the increasing importance of the American Revolution in public discourse. In 1775 and 1776, Dutch politics became increasingly entangled with the war in the American colonies and their quest for independence.

Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas was in many ways the personification of these American-Dutch entanglements and the revitalization of the opposition. Dumas was a significant supporter of the American cause, like van der Capellen. Yet, unlike van der Capellen, Dumas was also infatuated with America as a place. Dumas was originally born

in Germany, but in the 1750s he moved to Switzerland and then to the Netherlands to settle there. During the 1760s, Dumas met Benjamin Franklin on the latter's travels through Europe; they began a correspondence that mostly pertained to their shared love of science, the arts, and literature of various kinds. Dumas became enchanted with stories of East Florida to which he considered moving, but which Franklin assured him was a desolate place where "Sickness and Mortality" killed many new settlers, certainly those of Dumas' advanced age. Instead, Franklin suggested that Dumas should move to Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or New York, because there are "Numbers of Germans, Hollanders, and French among the Inhabitants" who can speak the same language as Dumas. Franklin offered his help in securing land for Dumas, in case he decided to move to America.[269] Dumas' obsession with America continued into the late 1760s when he translated William Smith's narrative of the Pontiac War (*An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians, in the Year 1764, Under the Command of Henry Bouquet)* into French.

Though correspondence between Franklin and Dumas was initially focused on intellectual and personal matters, it became more political in 1775 as the American revolutionary war began. The letters from Dumas from the spring and summer of 1775 revealed the extent to which Dumas too had been immersed in Patriot thought and had become a supporter of the American cause. Dumas recounted how two French travelers - Vaillant and Pochard who would deliver Dumas' letter to Franklin - had fled from the "tyranny and despotism" of France. Dumas explicitly endorsed the Continental Congress - calling them "Virtuous Men!" - and stated that the "most ardent of my wishes is that the

[269] Benjamin Franklin to Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas, July 25, 1768, *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, American Philosophical Society Library, henceforth referred to as APSL.

hateful storm that rages upon … [the American colonies] dissipates, and that their liberties come out of it more radiant and firmer than ever".[270]

In a following letter, Dumas also sent Franklin various copies of Vattel's *Law of Nations,* the new edition of which he was the editor and had written a foreword that spoke favorably of the American colonies. Dumas included his own ideas on government in the foreword, which he believed were "impracticable, and therefore useless and dangerous to discuss in Europe", but perhaps in America "it could take root, sprout, and come to fruition one day."[271]

Franklin and the Congress were grateful for Dumas' dedication to Patriotism, his love for America, and the works of Vattel he sent over. In December 1775, Franklin wrote that the copies of Vattel "came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations". Franklin sent one of Dumas' Vattel copies to the public library of Philadelphia and the other to Harvard College in Massachusetts, while his own copy had "been continually in the hands of the members of our congress, now sitting, who are much pleased with your notes and preface, and have entertained a high and just esteem for their author."[272] Though it cannot be verified, it is highly likely that Jefferson had Dumas' volume of Vattel in mind, if not on his desk, when he wrote the draft of the Declaration of Independence a few months later.

Meanwhile, Franklin employed Dumas to become an agent for the Congress in the Dutch Republic. Franklin asked Dumas to act as the Congress' representative in The Hague and inquire with various diplomats of European nations whether they would

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[270] Dumas to Franklin, May 17, 1775, APSL.
[271] Dumas to Franklin, June 30, 1775, APSL.
[272] Franklin to Dumas, December 9, 1775, APSL.

consider an alliance with the American colonies. Acting in secrecy, Dumas needed to convince foreign diplomats of the economic potential of the American colonies as well as the fact that its military was capable of defeating the British on the battlefield. Aware of the many Dutch merchants already engaged in the illicit trade in firearms with the American colonies, Franklin asked Dumas to entice more merchants to "make great profit [in the American colonies]; such is the demand in every colony, and such generous prices are and will be given". More strikingly, Franklin explained to Dumas that the American colonies "are in great want of good engineers" and asked if Dumas could "engage and send us two able ones, in time for the next campaign, one acquainted with field service, sieges, &c. and the other with fortifying of sea-ports." Franklin also made clear that "if you have not a direct safe opportunity, we recommend sending [your return letters to the Congress] by way of St. Eustatia, to the care of Messrs. Robert and Cornelius Stevenson, merchants there, who will forward your dispatches to me." St. Eustatius was not only a port for illicit trade but also for secret and illicit information. Finally, Dumas was paid a lump sum of hundred pounds sterling for his services, putting him officially on the payroll of the Continental Congress.[273]

America's Declaration of Independence in July 1776 further divided Dutch politics along pro and anti-American lines. By August, Stadtholder William V had already read the Declaration of Independence. He called the document "a parody" compared to what "our ancestors made against Philip II [of Spain in 1581]".[274] Likewise, Hendrik Fagel the Elder - the *griffier* (Secretary General or clerk) of the States General - noted that any "reasonable

[273] Franklin to Dumas, December 9, 1775, APSL.
[274] *Le prince d'Orange au greffier Fagel. L'abjuration du roi d'Angleterre en Amérique*, August 20 1776, AMON, p. 449.

person" would think it "too strong" to suggest that George III was a tyrant like Philip II of the sixteenth century. At the same time, Fagel argued that even if the American colonists would succeed, he could not "understand how the twelve colonies [sic] would be able to form a republic like ours, since they are so different in sentiments, religion or otherwise, that they won't be able to agree on a form of government". Fagel also saw the discussion of the Declaration as an opportunity to demonstrate his loyalty to the Stadtholder. He noted that "had we not had prince William the First [during the Dutch Revolt in the sixteenth century] our Republic would not have come into existence, just like I am convinced now, that without prince William V the seven sovereign states will soon be torn apart".[275]

Meanwhile, Dutch supporters of the American cause doubled down on their campaign to mobilize the Dutch population in favor of the American cause and against what they perceived to be a pro-British Stadtholder. They recognized the relevance of Patriotism to political movements on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1776, van der Capellen continued his support for the American cause by translating Richard Price's famous pamphlet *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America.* Capellen took the opportunity to write a mini pamphlet as an introduction to the translation. The intent behind the translation of Price's *Observations*, Capellen argued, was to show the problematic imbalance of power between the unarmed people on the one hand and the all-powerful standing army of the Stadtholder on the other. Price's pamphlet was also an important addition to the Patriot canon, van der Capellen insisted. Those "who think that the rights of Mankind in general,

[275] *Le greffier au prince d'Orange. Réponse.* August 21 1776, AMON, p. 449-450.

and the true origins of a citizen's society [*burgermaatschappij*] … have been completely uncovered by Grotius and Pufendorf, [and] that it is not possible that authors such as [John] Locke, [Francis] Hutcheson … [Joseph] Priestley, or Price can shed a clearer light on these matters will probably consider Doctor [Price's] arguments as new, possibly as dangerous".

Though originally intended for American audiences, van der Capellen believed the translation of Price's work should serve as a larger reflection on the principles of the Dutch government. Price should remind the Dutch people of the Patriot principle that liberty and power are habitually unbalanced and needed timely correction. The Stadtholderate had destroyed the old Dutch principles over time in a series of revolutions, much like what the British were doing to the American colonists. "But what acts of tyranny had the governments, which have been overthrown in 1672 [the rise of Stadtholder William III] and 1747 [the Orangist Revolution], done?", van der Capellen asked. "Abuses, which needed correction and from which no government ever was without, had certainly slowly manifested themselves; but what had they done that deserved complete annihilation?"[276]

While van der Capellen publicly supported the American cause in 1776, Dumas tried to ensure that coordination between the Americans and their Dutch supporters remained a secret. Just before American independence, Dumas wrote to the Congress that he would "die happy if what remains of my life can be useful to a cause so beautiful and just". Moreover, Dumas considered it "nobler and more glorious … by serving [the

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[276] Richard Price, *Aanmerkingen over den aart der burgerlyke vryheid, over de gronden der regeering, en over de rechtveerdigheid van den oorlog met Amerika*, translated by Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol in 1776, UVA Pfl. Q q 1b.

American cause] in secret and silence". To achieve this secrecy, Dumas devised a book cipher based on a work from the Patriot canon, specifically the edition of Vattel's *Laws of Nations* that he had edited and sent to the American Congress. To cloak the letter in even more secrecy, Dumas wrote that Franklin should understand "why I do not sign with my name".[277]

Dumas managed to keep his book cipher a secret, but his "noble and glorious" service to the American Congress was anything but a secret to the British government. By late 1776, the British government was already fully aware of his dedication to the American cause and his service to the Congress, employing informants of their own who created a character profile of Dumas. British informants even became aware of Dumas' letters to Franklin from the 1760s in which he had expressed his desire to move to America as well as of his service since then. The Earl of Suffolk, the Secretary of State for the Northern Department in 1776, assured Ambassador Yorke "that Dumas is an actual Agent of the Congress." Even though the British were aware that Dumas was an agent of the Congress, they incorrectly assumed that he was "the only Man that is really so in Holland".[278]

In the early years of his service, Dumas largely sought to influence the Dutch public sphere. During the mid to late 1770s, he translated and sent pro-American publications to Dutch and even German publishers. The Continental Congress was particularly interested in highlighting the contrast between the humanity of the Americans and the inhumanity of the British and relayed pieces to Dumas to publish in Dutch and German newspapers. According to Dumas, Jean Luzac, the editor of the most famous

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[277] Charles-Guillaume-Frédéric Dumas to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, May 9, 1776, APSL.
[278] SP 84/554, Several documents from the fall of 1776 pertaining to Dumas' service, NA.

European newspaper called the *Gazette de Leyde*, suggested that it would be helpful to contrast American treatment of prisoners of war with that of the English who had been supposedly exceptionally cruel against American prisoners.[279]

Van der Capellen similarly took up the task of spreading American propaganda in the Netherlands. He was also particularly animated by spreading stories regarding the American revolutionaries' humanity in contrast to their British counterparts. The American Congress had become aware of van der Capellen's pamphlet against the Scots Brigade. In 1777, a Dutch merchant called Gosuinus Erkelens wrote to van der Capellen from Philadelphia and expressed thanks on behalf of the Congress "and thousands [of others] in a radius of 1500 miles" for van der Capellen's help in the "suppression of unlawful tyrants". At the same time, Erkelens - a self-proclaimed inhabitant of New England and associate of Governor Jonathan Trumbull of Connecticut - asked on behalf of the Congress and Trumbull to translate and publish various documents that would "further influence the opening of a connection and relationship" between the Dutch and the United States. Erkelens' mail packet included letters of Jonathan Trumbull and William Livingston, the governor of New Jersey, from before independence that explained and defended the American revolutionary cause.[280]

Erkelens also attached an extraordinary document of his own making to the letter that he had titled "the British Humanity Unmasked" and asked van der Capellen to simultaneously publish the piece "in four of our most prominent cities in Holland" at his expense. Erkelens' claimed his first-hand account of the American War of Independence

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[279] Dumas to Franklin, May 23, 1777, APSL.

[280] "Brief van G. Erkelens aan v.d. Capellen", in W.H. de Beaufort ed., *Brieven van, en aan Joan Derck van der Capellen tot den Poll* (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon 1879), p. 5-8.

was a neutral one. Yet it primarily contained gruesome details of British savagery against American forces contrasted with the humane American treatment of British prisoners.[281] In 1777, van der Capellen published the Trumbull letters and also started a correspondence with Trumbull himself, whose address Erkelens' had given in his letter, expanding the transatlantic network that connected the Dutch opposition movement with the American revolutionary cause.[282]

During the late 1770s, the increasing entanglement of the Dutch opposition with the American Revolution gradually transformed not just the political and cultural discourse of the opposition, but that of the Dutch Republic as a whole. In the late 1770s, a Dutch nobleman called Lodewijk Theodorus, Count of Nassau La Lek wrote a pamphlet series titled *Letters on the North-American Rebellion*. As a count of the Nassau family, Nassau was a distant relative of the Stadtholders, though he had some sympathies for Patriot arguments. In this sense, Nassau was more of a Patriot in the mold of the Orangists of 1747 than the newer Dutch Patriotism as it developed during the late 1770s. He was considerably more deferential to Stadtholderian authority. Yet his patriotic sympathies led to a deep fascination with the American Revolution. He attempted to approach the event neutrally, somewhat uncharacteristic for a time in which 'neutrality' was largely a rhetorical device to obscure bias towards one party or another.

Published in Utrecht between 1777 and 1779, Nassau's *Letters on the North-American Rebellion* were eighteen long pamphlets, six volumes of three pamphlets per volume. In the *Letters,* Nassau went to great lengths to underline that he was a neutral

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[281] "De Britsche menschlievendheid ontmaskert", in W.H. de Beaufort ed., *Brieven van, en aan Joan Derck van der Capellen tot den Poll* (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon 1879), p. 31-40.
[282] Among others: "Brief van Trumbull aan v.d. Capellen", December 12, 1778, in W.H. de Beaufort ed., *Brieven van, en aan Joan Derck van der Capellen tot den Poll* (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon 1879), p. 73-77.

observer of the conflict, which in many ways was emblematic for the argument he sought to make with his *Letters*. Nassau argued that the Dutch Republic should remain neutral in the dispute between the Americans and the British. According to Nassau, there was no gain for the Dutch to choose either the American or the British side. After all, "if England remains superior, we would not have unfriended or angered him; and if it [England] loses the Colonies … we would not have angered the Americans either". Staying neutral was beneficial for Dutch trade, Nassau argued, just as it had been during the Seven Years' War when the Dutch profited from both sides of the conflict.[283] In this way, Nassau borrowed heavily from the arguments surrounding economic Patriotism that had become so widespread in the Netherlands during the eighteenth century.

Though Nassau made an argument for Dutch neutrality in the American conflict, many of the sources and some of the arguments he used revealed his sympathy towards the ideas of Patriotism. Nassau argued that the American revolutionaries had a significant military advantage over the British, in part because they used militia that fought on their home soil for a cause they believed in, which was essentially a Fletcherian argument.[284] Perhaps not surprisingly given his family line, Nassau was also a fervent believer in the idea of a Patriot King. In the eleventh letter, Nassau figured that even if the Americans would win the war, it would prove extremely difficult to keep the country together because of the differences between the individual states. Unlike the Dutch Republic in the sixteenth

[283] Jonkheer Lodewijk Theodorus Graaf van Nassau La Leck, *Brieven over de Noord-Americaansche onlusten, den waarschijnlijken uitslag dier oorlog, en den invloed die deeze gebbeurtenisse zoude kunnen hebben, zo op de belangens van Europa in 't algemeen, als van deezen staatin 't bijzonder, Derde Drietal,* 27-28

[284] Jonkheer Lodewijk Theodorus Graaf van Nassau La Leck, *Brieven over de Noord-Americaansche onlusten, den waarschijnlijken uitslag dier oorlog, en den invloed die deeze gebbeurtenisse zoude kunnen hebben, zo op de belangens van Europa in 't algemeen, als van deezen staatin 't bijzonder, Tweede Drietal*, p. 7-23, Leiden UB 395 E 1.

century, the Americans did not have a Stadtholder to unite them, to act as the disinterested Patriot King, and would therefore most likely disintegrate in time, perhaps even reunite with the British Empire. At the same time, Nassau fervently believed in the idea of representatives. Though he was skeptical that political representation could be implemented in America where distances were too great to create an effective state, he revealed his liberal sympathies towards representative government. Moreover, Nassau showed that he primarily read contemporary Patriot publications, such as van der Capellen's pamphlet on the Scots Brigade, American Patriot newspapers, and even *Common Sense,* the last of which he mistakenly attributed to John Adams.[285]

A kind of xenophobia that was unique among his contemporaries supported Nassau's dedication to Patriotism, his reluctance to support the American cause, and his argument for neutrality. Scattered throughout his letters are various xenophobic remarks, particularly towards the Germans who Nassau believed made up the bulk of the common people in America. The elites, according to Nassau, were Englishmen and could therefore be relied upon to be in favor of freedom. But liberty was not embedded in the culture of German immigrants and their offspring. They could therefore potentially undermine the newly created United States. Likewise, in his assessment of whether the American Revolution could spread to other empires' colonies, he argued that this was true in the case of all empires, except the Dutch where all inhabitants supposedly enjoyed Dutch rights and privileges, giving them no reason to revolt.[286]

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[285] Jonkheer Lodewijk Theodorus Graaf van Nassau La Leck, *Brieven over de Noord-Americaansche onlusten, den waarschijnlijken uitslag dier oorlog, en den invloed die deeze gebbeurtenisse zoude kunnen hebben, zo op de belangens van Europa in 't algemeen, als van deezen staatin 't bijzonder, Vierde drietal*, p. 67-80, Leiden UB 395 E 1.
[286] Nassau La Leck, *Brieven over de Noord-Americaansche onlusten, Tweede drietal*, p. 24-34.

In an extraordinary comedic play that he had published in 1778, entitled *The North American in Holland, or the betrayed hubris in five acts,* Nassau's xenophobia was even more explicit. The play demonstrates his adherence to the old Orangist idea of Patriotism that was more prevalent in 1747/48. Its comedic content predominantly leaned on ethnic humor and stereotypes of various people, particularly of Germans. The main character of the play is an American, named Gammon or Schinken (translated as "ham") by his German name, who is described as originally a German immigrant to America. After migrating to America, Gammon returned to Europe to secure a loan for the United States in the Dutch Republic. Though Gammon's Dutch is somehow fluent, his German brother - another prominent character in the play - speaks Dutch with a comically heavy German accent. The brother is - to the bemusement of some of the other characters - illiterate as well. The play essentially chronicles American hubris concerning money and independence. While in the Netherlands, Gammon purchased expensive clothes and wigs on credit that he could not afford. When Gammon is placed in debtor's prison at the end of the play, an 'Englishman' steps in to pay for his loans on the condition that he and his "stupid" brother will sell Gammon's land in America to the Englishman and work for him as a servant for ten years in the American colonies, symbolizing England's victory over the arrogant American.[287] When it is decided that Gammon and his brother will leave for America, a Dutch character notes that "thank God we got rid of another foreigner [*vrempie*]. I wish more Englishmen like this would come. We could get rid of a whole lot of them [foreigners]".[288]

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[287] Jonkheer Lodewijk Theodorus Graaf van Nassau La Leck, *De Noord Amerikaan in Holland, of De Bedrogen Hoogmoed* (1778), KB 3035 C 14:3, p. 52-56.
[288] Nassau La Leck, *Bedrogen Hoogmoed*., p. 55.

Similar to Nassau, pro-Stadtholder and nonpartisan publications saw merits in the American revolutionary cause, but ultimately believed that reconciliation between the Americans and the British was still possible, viewed in the light of Dutch history. Writing in 1778, the anonymous author of a pamphlet titled *A Dialogue in the Realm of the Dead between Prince William I [of Orange], and the General Montgomery* argued that both the American colonists and the British were to blame for the war. At the same time, the author still believed that reconciliation was possible. Much like the Dutch in the sixteenth century, the author argued that the Americans were not necessarily arguing against the King, but against Parliament. A restoration of their former rights and privilege would be enough to satisfy them. "In England [and the American colonies] liberty is the great word", the author argued. "In conversations, held between two people, both armed against the Entity that have suppressed them, one does not always have to take seriously what is put in their mouths by the Faction they adhere to".[289]

In the actual conversation, the author reflected on American and Dutch history through the eyes of William of Orange - the first Stadtholder and founder of the Dutch Republic - and General Montgomery, the fallen American general who had been the subject of postmortem conversations in the American colonies as well. History proved that Britain had treated the American colonies unfairly like the Spanish had done to the Dutch in the sixteenth century, but that a restoration of the Americans' former rights could restore the old transatlantic bonds.[290]

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[289] *Samenspraak (in 't ryk der dooden) tusschen Prins Willem den I, en den generaal Montgommery, over de eertyds voorgevallene omwenteling in de Nederlanden, en de tegenwoordige gesteldheid der zaaken in Amerika* (1778), KB GW A113895.
[290] *Samenspraak (in 't ryk der dooden) tusschen Prins Willem den I, en den generaal Montgommery, over de eertyds voorgevallene omwenteling in de Nederlanden, en de tegenwoordige gesteldheid der zaaken in Amerika* (1778), KB GW A113895.

The American Revolution also began to infect longstanding domestic disputes as well. Though these conflicts were seemingly unrelated to the American Revolution, they were very much shaped by the transatlantic Patriot discourse and the revitalization of Dutch oppositional politics arising the American Revolution. During the late 1770s, a particularly prominent domestic problem was the so-called *drostendiensten* or drost services. "Drosten" had originally been stewards of medieval lords in the Low Countries, tasked with administrative duties, such as justice and tax collection. In exchange for these services, peasants would labor for a certain amount of time for the drost, which was called *drostendiensten.* Aristocrats forcibly dispossessed peasants of the fruits of their labor, similar to serfdom in Eastern Europe. The Dutch Republic initially kept this feudal institution intact after its founding, but it was abolished in all of the provinces in 1651. In 1776, however, the lords in Overijssel - the province in which van der Capellen was a nobleman - reinstated the *drostendiensten.* The law required peasants to work two days per year for the benefit of the *drosten*. If they refused, they could be confronted with fines or other punishments.

Van der Capellen, fully immersed in the intellectual thought of the Patriot Atlantic and inspired by American revolutionary rhetoric, wrote a pamphlet against the *drostendiensten*. Because he had defended the injustices perpetrated against the American colonies, van der Capellen said that he will once again stand up against the fact that "sadly! owning people … in this free country has once again been established and made legal." In his "Argument on the Drostendiensten", van der Capellen compared the *drostendiensten* to colonial slavery. He emphasized that he had defended the natural rights of the slaves in the Dutch colonies. It would therefore be outrageous not to defend his

fellow Dutchmen living in the countryside suffering from the same threat to their liberties. According to van der Capellen, it did not matter "how long or when" a person was a slave. "Some are slaves for life; others for a certain time, and our Peasants are slaves during two days of the year, during which they, like the Negroe slaves in the Colonies, do all kinds of work, the most horrible of which not excluded, for the Lords Drosten, forced with punishment or fines."[291]

Van der Capellen based his resistance to the *drostendiensten* on the equality of man at birth and the laws of nature, ideas rooted in transatlantic Patriotism. "Created by the same mighty hand; born from the same blood … subjected to the same future judgment of the Great Creator of Heaven and Earth … is all mankind equal among themselves." Even if one person is stronger or richer than the other, it does not give him the right to "own and use his poorer, less able, and less strong fellow man of nature [*natuurgenoot*]. Nature … does not know masters or slaves." Based on natural law, van der Capellen pointed out that mankind formed society to protect each other's 'privileges' [*voorrechten*] given by God. "Society", van der Capellen argued, "is the proper measure taken through which mankind seeks to protect their natural freedom and possessions; the rights they are born with and have received, against all infringements." If the laws of nature and society itself will not allow or even tolerate the submission of one man to another, van der Capellen concluded, on what grounds did the province seek to reinstitute the *drostendiensten*?[292]

[291] Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, *Vertoog over de ontwettigheid der drostendiensten in Overyssel* (1778), UvA UB Obr. FOL 542.
[292] Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol, *Vertoog over de ontwettigheid der drostendiensten in Overyssel* (1778), UvA UB Obr. FOL 542.

Like his appeal against lending the Scots Brigade to the British, van der Capellen's had his speech published to stir up public resistance against the *drostendiensten,* much to the resentment of the States of the provinces of Overijssel. After his passionate speech against the *drostendiensten* in 1778, the States effectively banned van der Capellen from attending their meetings, even though he was officially a delegate.

Van der Capellen nevertheless stepped up his propaganda effort against the *drostendiensten.* He teamed up with François Adriaan van der Kemp, a reverend from Leiden who had become equally sympathetic to the Patriot cause during the 1770s. Van der Kemp published a host of other pamphlets, some anonymous, that supported van der Capellen's earlier argument against the *drostendiensten* in the late 1770s. Van der Kemp published a pamphlet under the pseudonym 'Frank de Vrije' or "Frank the Free" that sought to broaden public support for van der Capellen's argument against the *drostendiensten*. Van der Kemp positioned his 'Frank' character as a concerned citizen who was so well informed that he could tell his wife on the spot "how many deserters the King of Prussia had lost already … how many loafs of Bread Admiral Howe still had in his pantry, and whether General Clinton will soon visit General Whassington [sic]." Despite Frank's supposed boundless knowledge of worldly affairs, van der Kemp's piece was not a defense of van der Capellen's argument on its own, but mostly of his character. Presumably, van der Capellen's admonishment from the States of Overijssel was considered a stain upon his character and van der Kemp attempted to defend him in response to it. Van der Kemp argued that van der Capellen had a true "love for liberty".

His speech against the *drostendiensten* only sought to achieve freedom for the - albeit somewhat "uncivilized" - peasants of the east.[293]

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Compounding the transformation of discourse in the Netherlands linked to the American Revolution were a series of diplomatic controversies between the Dutch Republic and Great Britain concerning the issue of Dutch smuggling to America. These diplomatic controversies not only made Dutch neutrality increasingly untenable. They also gradually shifted Dutch public attitudes in favor of the American revolutionaries and invigorated new debates on the Dutch political economy and political system, helping to mobilize the Patriot movement in the Dutch Republic.

The first major Anglo-Dutch dispute after the Scots Brigade controversy focused on the "First Salute", an event connected to the growing Dutch-American smuggling networks. In the 1760s and early 1770s, merchants had predominantly smuggled consumer goods. But the occupation of Boston and the American Patriot militias had created a lively smuggling trade in firearms, gun powder, and other war materiel, which in many ways contributed to the outbreak of the war. The war itself greatly increased American demand for war materiel and Dutch merchants and manufacturers were a trusted source for these products. Between the outbreak of the war in April 1775 and before independence in July 1776, the British sought to stop the transatlantic smuggling of firearms to the American colonies. The American and Dutch merchants, however, were becoming more sophisticated in hiding their cargoes and avoiding British capture. In August 1775, the use

[293] Frank de Vrije [pseudonym of François Adriaan van der Kemp], *Bedenkingen van Frank de Vrije, omtrent het vertoog van jonker J. D. van der Capellen. Over de onwettigheid der drostendiensten in Overysel*, UvA UB Pfl. Q s 16.

of the Dutch flag on American merchant ships forced the British to start patrols in Europe as they had done in America.[294] The trade was also expanding beyond the usual firearms and gunpowder. In early 1776, Dutch merchants even supplied the American revolutionaries with a "large order for Soldiers Cloth & Cloaths" for the war effort, aside from the large quantities of munitions and firearms that were being sold.[295]

Despite Dutch formal bans of the trade in firearms, the transatlantic trade continued apace, which added significant tensions to the Anglo-Dutch relationship. Tensions exploded after an event that was referred to in America as "the First Salute", which involved an American ship called the *Andrew Doria* and the Dutch smuggler's paradise of St. Eustatius. The *Andrew Doria* had been active since the start of the war. It patrolled the Atlantic coast for the American revolutionaries and in early 1776 participated in the successful American raid of Nassau in the Bahamas to acquire the much-needed gunpowder stored there.[296] In October 1776, the *Andrew Doria* left Philadelphia for St. Eustatius to acquire gunpowder for the American war effort. Flying the Continental colors, the *Andrew Doria* reached St. Eustatius later in the year and fired a 13-gun salute to Fort Oranje on St. Eustatius. To the surprise of those on board, the *Andrew Doria* received a full salute in return, the first time a foreign entity gave full formal honors to the Continental colors and American independence.[297]

The First Salute was widely publicized in the American press, eventually reaching Europe and the British government. In a letter from the Earl of Suffolk in early 1777, the

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[294] SP 84/547, August 1 and 8, 1775, NA.
[295] SP 84/552, March 20, 1776, NA.
[296] John McCusker, *Essays in the economic history of the Atlantic world* (London: Routledge 1997), p. 181-187.
[297] Barbara Tuchman, *The First Salute* (New York: Random House 1989).

Secretary of State of the Northern Department, the British government strongly criticized the salute, calling it "unfriendly & offensive Conduct". The British government especially viewed the salute of a "Dutch fort to a Rebel Brigantine carrying the flag of the Rebel Congress" as a "flagrant insult to His Majesty's Colours". The British government demanded no less than the "Dismission & Recall" of Johannes de Graaff, the Dutch governor of St. Eustatius.[298]

Few in the Dutch Republic understood Britain's outrage regarding the First Salute. Even the Stadtholderian elites who were generally sympathetic to the British considered their reaction to the event an insult. Particularly the Duke of Brunswick called the demand for the dismissal of Governor de Graaff "insulting to the [Dutch] state" and impossible to execute if the Dutch Republic wished to maintain its "sovereignty and independence".[299]

The Stadtholder agreed with Brunswick and his political opponents that Britain's reaction to the Salute was overblown, but William nevertheless sought to steer a neutral course in an attempt to satisfy both the pro-American merchant class as well as his British allies. The Stadtholder and the Grand Pensionary of Holland cooperated to appease both the British and the merchant contingent. In seeking to please the Amsterdam merchants through one of the city's burgomasters, Grand Pensionary Pieter van Bleiswijk admitted to the Stadtholder that he had written a letter to Amsterdam Burgomaster Temminck while keeping in mind that he and the other burgomasters were "more American … than a certain prominent minister of state" in The Hague.[300] The letters to the various merchant

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[298] SP 84/555, February 14, 1777, NA.

[299] *Le duc de Brunswic au prince d'Orange. Le mémoire de l'ambassadeur Yorke sur l'ile de St. Eustache*, 22 February 1777, AMON.

[300] *Le conseiller-pensionnaire au prince d'Orange. Envoi d'une missive au bourgmaître Temminck. Même sujet.* 22 February 1777, AMON.

communities around the Dutch Republic likewise underline how the Stadtholder sought to please all sides. To the pro-American factions in Amsterdam, the letters emphasized that the British had understood the affair with more "anger than reason". In contrast, correspondence with pro-British factions in Rotterdam underlined that "American success in the war would become our ruin" and that the regents in Rotterdam would do anything in their power to "appease the mother country [Great Britain] and obstruct its obstinate children".[301]

Stadtholder William's government quickly concluded that recalling - though not dismissing - Governor de Graaff for questioning to the Netherlands would resolve the issue. The Dutch Stadtholderian government evidently misunderstood the totemic nature of Britain's complaint. The immediate problem may have been that the governor of a Dutch Caribbean island had given full honors to a rebel brig. But the underlying issue was that St. Eustatius had operated without obstruction as a smuggling hub for years, undermining British attempts to suppress a rebellion in their colonies. St. Eustatius had supported American resistance for more than a decade and the Dutch government tacitly allowed this contraband trade to continue in the name of neutrality. In the eyes of the British government, Fort Oranje's 11-gun salute to the *Andrew Doria* symbolized how the Dutch merchants had disregarded Britain's complaints all these years. As the Earl of Suffolk put it just days before the news of the 'First Salute' reached Europe, "it is impossible after all that [Great Britain] has suffered during the last three years, from the sordid & unfriendly Conduct of the Dutch Merchants, to feel much Anxiety about their Clamours against any little disappointment they may meet with."[302] The problem was not

[301] *Copie d'un missive du fiscal Denick au conseiller-pensionnaire*, 24 February 1777, AMON.
[302] SP 84/555, 4 February 1777, NA.

merely the conduct of Governor de Graaff, but that Dutch merchants and the island of St. Eustatius increasingly presented themselves and acted as the "Protector of all Americans" on both sides of the Atlantic.[303]

De Graaff's recall pleased the British government somewhat, but Dutch merchants nevertheless continued to sell war materiel to "His Majesty's Rebellious Colonies".[304] When the 'First Salute' controversy was still ongoing, a Dutch ship called *Eendracht* was detained "with a Cargo of 1500 Barrels of Gun Powder. The Quantity being so large" that it bred the suspicion that it was bound for America.[305] Meanwhile, court cases in which Dutch merchants were tried often took painfully long due to continuous merchant appeals.[306]

Adding to the frustration was that the British sometimes mistakenly seized goods of merchants who were not trading with the American rebels, which did not help their reputation among merchants and other powerful people in the Dutch Republic. In the case of the *Eendracht,* Ambassador Yorke found out that the ship was actually transporting gunpowder to Spain rather than St. Eustatius or North America. According to Yorke, the insurers of the freight, one of whom was the brother of the Dutch consul in Lisbon, were "very angry" that the British had unnecessarily detained the ship since they had "always declared themselves Anti-American".[307]

The vast pro-American financial and bureaucratic support system of the Dutch merchants complicated Britain's attempts to prosecute them for illicit trading practices. In

[303] SP 84/556, 14 December 1776, A Letter from Vice Admiral James Young, NA.
[304] SP 84/555, Suffolk to Lords of the Admiralty, 29 March 1777, NA.
[305] SP 84/555, Suffolk to Lords of the Admiralty, March 26, 1777, NA.
[306] SP 84/555, Yorke to Suffolk, March 25, 1777, NA.
[307] SP 84/556, Yorke to Suffolk, April 4, 1777, NA.

early 1777, the pro-British Admiralty of the Meuse (in Rotterdam) interrogated the captain and crew of the *Jan Gerard* on suspicion of smuggling. During the interrogation, the captain, called Arie Kunst, walked back on several earlier statements. He also conveniently had trouble "remembering" key details about his case. The interrogators asked if Kunst's papers backed up his stories to which he repeatedly responded that it would and that his bookkeeper, a certain Adrianus Dubbeldemuts, had these papers.[308] A letter between the reverend-spy Benjamin Sowden and Benjamin Franklin from 1778 reveals that Dubbeldemuts was not just "a capital ship Broker" in Rotterdam. He also served as a messenger between the pro-American Sowden and Franklin, sending Sowden's letters to an acquaintance of Franklin to avoid British interception.[309] Later in 1780, Dubbeldemuts would play host to the American commissioner John Adams and his son, further exposing his pro-American sympathies. The fact that accused smugglers used Dubbeldemuts as a purveyor of reliable evidence suggests that he most likely tampered with smugglers' ship manifests and passports.

It is hard to verify whether document falsification happened in the case of Arie Kunst and the *Jan Gerard*, but other smuggling cases make clear that smugglers frequently employed the services of people like Dubbeldemuts. In 1777, prosecutors presented a case to the British Admiralty Prize Court of a ship called the *Hendrik & Alida*, a Dutch ship built in New England. The captain stood accused of shipping gunpowder and guns to the American colonies. According to the Prize Court case, the shipmaster's name was "written on an Erasure and the Date has also been altered." Meanwhile, the captain's written

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[308] SP 84/558, Interrogation of Ary Kunst of the *Jan Gerard,* NA.
[309] Benjamin Sowden to Benjamin Franklin, June 1, 1778, APSL.

statements contradicted the ones he had made under oath, somewhat similar to the *Jan Gerard* case.[310]

As the war progressed, the Dutch also became increasingly tied up in other American naval activities that the British considered illegal. The island of St. Eustatius, aside from a smuggling port and informational link in transatlantic correspondence, also became a safe haven for American privateers who used it as a base for their activities in the Caribbean and the Atlantic. In 1777, the British governor of the Leeward Islands, William Mathew Burt, asked governor de Graaff of St. Eustatius to arrest and hand over an American privateer called Vanbibber, a resident of St. Eustatius but "a Native of America" and "a natural born subject of the King, my Master".[311] In his reply, De Graaff claimed that he had already arrested and imprisoned Vanbibber, but that, supposedly, "through the Negligence or Treachery of the Centinels upon Duty … he [Vanbibber] hath since made his Escape [and] … got off the Island".[312]

The British suspected Dutch merchants were not just smuggling to the American rebels but that they were also helping build the United States Navy. In a letter from late 1777 labeled "Secret and Private", the Earl of Suffolk confided in Ambassador Yorke that he had received intelligence on a shipyard in Amsterdam that was constructing two ships for "the use of the Rebel Agents".[313] By February 1778, Yorke had found out more information about the case, now disclosing that the two ships were supposedly built for France and Spain, though they were "strongly suspected to be ultimately destined for the

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[310] SP 84/559, Admiralty Prize; the Hendrik & Alida, Hendrik Klok, Master, NA.
[311] SP 84/558, Copy of a Letter from Governor Burt to Governor de Graaff of St. Eustatia, dated St. Christopher's 10th of June 1777, NA.
[312] SP 84/558, Copy of a Letter from Governor DeGraaff to Governor Burt dated St. Eustatia 12th July 1777, NA.
[313] SP 84/559, Earl of Suffolk to Yorke, November 14, 1777, NA.

Service of the Rebels in America". Yorke had even got his hands on a "coloured Drawing" of one of the ships, which, he ominously warned, was "ready for Sea".[314]

As a result of these economic and diplomatic disputes, the Atlantic was becoming an increasingly perilous ocean to cross. Dutch merchants and ship's masters had to dodge warships and privateers on both sides of the conflict.[315] Particularly after the French declaration of war against Great Britain and its military alliance with the United States in 1778, the British were concerned that Dutch merchants would reinitiate their shipping of "contraband" goods that maintained the French Navy, adding concerns to the ones related to the smuggling with the American rebels. As a result, the British started to pursue Dutch shipping even more aggressively than before France joined the war.[316] Sea travel became so perilous that even British packet boats - carrying diplomatic correspondence and intelligence - had difficulty just reaching the British Isles because they feared French privateers.[317]

In response to the increased hostility on the Atlantic, Dutch merchants started petitioning the States General for naval protection. The calls for naval protection were controversial in the Dutch Republic because they once again put the divisive issue of troop augmentation at the center of political debate. Already in February 1778, when war between Britain and France was brewing, merchants put pressure on the Stadtholder to agree to an expansion of the Dutch navy. As supreme commander of the Dutch Republic's

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[314] SP 84/561, Yorke to the Earl of Suffolk, February 10, 1778, NA.
[315] An American privateer had seized one of the ships of the pro-American Dutch merchant brothers Franco and Adrianus Dubbeldemuts. Through their contacts with Benjamin Franklin, they appealed to the Continental Congress for restitution, see: *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, correspondence with Franco and Adrianus Dubbeldemuts, APSL.
[316] Scott, "Sir Joseph Yorke", *The Historical Journal* (1988), p. 571-589.
[317] SP 84/565, Yorke to Lord Viscount Weymouth, 29 May 1779, NA.

land and naval forces, the Stadtholder would be a powerful ally in helping persuade the States General to expand the navy. Stadtholder William argued, however, that an expansion of the navy had to be accompanied by an expansion of the land forces to protect the country's land borders. The Stadtholder made a traditional argument of the Orangist faction that feared the land armies of France instead of Britain's navy.[318] Britain's war with France, the Stadtholder argued, could "spread over all of Europe". France would invade the Austrian Netherlands - where the Dutch Republic had manned barrier fortresses - and the "[French] Crown would prevent us from arming ourselves and therefore the independence of this State would be nothing more than a naked honorary title".[319] William's augmentation of the land forces would be complemented with a policy of strict neutrality, which William supported with the argument that people would otherwise blame him for the debilitated state of the country's defenses. Moreover, William claimed he had no stake in going to war because his position was hereditary anyway.[320]

Compounding the problem of troop augmentation were American diplomatic overtures to the Dutch Republic, sowing even more division within the Netherlands and between the Dutch and British governments in 1778. After French recognition of the United States as an independent power in the spring of 1778, the United States Commissioners in Paris - Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and John Adams - sent a letter to the Grand Pensionary of Holland Pieter van Bleiswijk that essentially sought to open diplomatic negotiations on a possible treaty of amity and commerce with the Dutch Republic. The American commissioners knew there was substantial support in the Dutch

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[318] *Nouvelle admonition de songer à la défense de l'état tant par terre que par mer*, 30 February [sic] 1778, AMON.
[319] *Le prince d'Orange au conseiller-pensionnaire. Même sujet.* 18 March 1778, AMON.
[320] *Le prince d'Orange au conseiller-pensionnaire. La situation politique de la République,* AMON.

Republic for their cause and their treaty with Louis XVI emboldened them to make explicit overtures. In the spring of 1778, Ambassador Yorke confronted Bleiswijk about the letter, and Bleiswijk - according to Yorke - "was rather embarrassed with my [Yorke's] manner of opening the Business" but confirmed that this was true.[321] Bleiswijk himself recalled the conversation differently. He stated that Yorke was rather confrontational and mistakenly thought that the letter discussed Dutch recognition of American independence. The Grand Pensionary was also shocked that Yorke believed that the Grand Pensionary had to report to him about a letter that was an internal Dutch affair. Nevertheless, he provided Yorke with a copy of the letter to satisfy the ambassador.[322]

The cooling of diplomatic relations between even the Dutch Republic's most pro-British politicians and the British government continued into 1779 after the arrival of the American naval commander John Paul Jones to the Netherlands. Jones had been a naval commander for the Continental Navy since late 1775 and had engaged various British merchant and Royal Navy ships over the years. In the summer of 1779, Jones commanded the brig *Bonhomme Richard* which came into contact with the HMS *Serapis* in the North Sea off the coast of Scotland. The British sunk Jones's *Bonhomme Richard* in battle, but Jones managed to board and take control of the heavily damaged *Serapis*. Commanding the *Serapis*, Jones sailed for the Dutch Republic for victual and ship repairs.[323]

Jones's arrival in the Netherlands in the fall of 1779 turned into a public spectacle and a major diplomatic issue. If the Dutch allowed Jones to repair his ships and be

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[321] SP 84/561, Yorke to Suffolk, 29 May 1778, NA.
[322] *Le conseiller-pensionnaire au prince d'Orange. Une plainte de l'ambassadeur Anglais à propos d'une lettre des envoyés du congrés Américain*, 28 May 1778, AMON.
[323] Joseph Callo, *John Paul Jones: America's First Sea Warrior* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press 2006); Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 70-73.

resupplied, the British reasoned that the Dutch gave aid and comfort to the American rebels. Due to British complaints, the Stadtholder viewed Jones's presence as an unnecessary nuisance that undermined his neutrality stance. William wanted Jones to leave the Dutch Republic sooner rather than later. Dutch neutrality, however, prevented the Stadtholder - as well as the States of Holland and the States General – from forcing the issue. As a neutral power, it was not up to the Dutch government to decide who was a rebel or not. Therefore, the government found itself in an impossible position to stay true to its course of neutrality while pleasing the British at the same time.[324]

Compounding the issue was that during the fall of 1779, Jones's arrival was widely publicized and even celebrated in the Netherlands. As Jan Willem Schulte Nordholt has documented, songs were written to celebrate Jones's arrival. Crowds gathered in Amsterdam to gawk at the mysterious American naval hero who had triumphed over the seemingly invincible Royal Navy, a clear sign that pro-American sentiment had penetrated the population at large by the late 1770s. Jones also could - like his smuggler and privateer predecessors before him - count on the support infrastructure of various pro-American figures in the Dutch Republic. The merchant Jean de Neufville - who had smuggled to and from the American colonies at least since the 1760s - offered his services to the Americans to help Jones with the repairs for his ship. De Neufville also provided Jones with the necessary supplies for his next stop in France. Similarly, Dumas - who had been crucial in arranging Jones's stay in the Dutch Republic - invited Jones to his home. Dumas' thirteen-year-old daughter even developed an infatuation for the American naval hero. Judging by

[324] Callo, *John Paul Jones*; Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 70-73.

the poem Jones wrote for her and his issues later in life with courting young girls, he seemed to reciprocate her infatuation.[325]

After Jones left the Netherlands, the Congress and the American negotiators in France saw more opportunities to draw the Dutch Republic into the war as well. Particularly John Adams thought that the United States had to expand its diplomatic, political, and commercial connections to avoid being completely reliant on France. The lukewarm reactions from the Netherlands to the earlier letter from the American commissioners required a more in-person approach, Adams believed. Not waiting for Congress to initiate relations, in early 1780, Adams traveled to the Netherlands on his own accord to see whether the Dutch could be persuaded to support the United States. On his way to The Hague with his two sons, Charles and future United States president John Quincy, Adams stayed and dined with none other than the merchant Adrianus Dubbeldemuts.[326] However, much like other diplomats, including Yorke, Adams found Dutch government officials refusing talking to him, still afraid to offend the British and threaten their delicate neutrality.

Dutch merchants nevertheless continued to pressure the Stadtholder and the States to outfit naval convoys, which would prevent privateers from boarding their ships to verify the legality of their trade. In 1779, the French government sought to disrupt Britain's attempts to block Dutch shipping to France. The French sanctioned various cities in the Dutch Republic that supported the Stadtholder's refusal to protect merchant shipping with naval convoys. In late 1779 and under immense pressure from the Dutch Republic's

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[325] Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic,* p. 71-75.
[326] Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 106-112.

merchants who suffered from the French boycotts, the States General ordered the Stadtholder to outfit limited naval convoys for Dutch merchant vessels.

The convoys were intended to prevent British privateers from seizing Dutch merchant ships, but the convoys only created more conflict between the British and the Dutch. In December 1779, one of the first convoys set sail under the command of Rear Admiral Lodewijk van Bijlandt, who escorted 17 Dutch merchant ships to the Mediterranean. Bijlandt received specific instructions to uphold Dutch neutrality and not to protect ships from countries that the Dutch Republic had not recognized, meaning the United States. Passing through the English Channel, Bijlandt's convoy quickly encountered a British squadron. Its commander, Commodore Fielding, demanded that the British be allowed to search the Dutch merchant vessels for contraband goods. Bijlandt refused, though he did present Fielding with the inventories of the ships which listed hemp and iron. Used commonly in shipbuilding, the British considered these products contraband and once again demanded a search of the merchant ships. When Bijlandt refused again, the Dutch and British ships briefly exchanged fire, after which the entire Dutch convoy struck their colors, hopelessly outgunned against the far superior squadron of the Royal Navy.[327]

Bijlandt's quick surrender and the arrest of several merchants in the convoy sent shockwaves through the Dutch Republic. The Dutch press framed Bijlandt - who was supposed to protect the merchants - as a coward for striking his colors without truly engaging the British. Moreover, the surrender revealed the sorry state of the Dutch Navy, incapable of standing up to the much better equipped British Royal Navy. Pressure on the

[327] Edler, *The Dutch Republic and the American Revolution,* p. 96-117.

States General and the Stadtholder mounted. Many in the public demanded unlimited convoys, instead of the limited convoys that the States General had reluctantly allowed. Many also urged for a massive expansion of the Navy, which they believed would fend off British aggression.

Compounding the issue was that Dutch merchants were not the only ones suffering from British privateering. British privateers had seized Danish and Swedish ships and threatened to upset the mercantile trade of various other neutral nations, including Russia, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire. In early 1780 and to protect the shipping rights of neutrals, Empress Catherine II of Russia declared Russian armed neutrality. The Russian government sought to build a larger alliance of neutral nations that could stand up to the Royal Navy, in case the British violated their neutral rights, and would scare off British privateers. In 1780, the Kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden - which together controlled Scandinavia and were powerful players on the Baltic Sea - joined Catherine's League of Armed Neutrality. Given the Field-Bijlandt Affair, the League also became an attractive option for the Dutch Republic. As a member, the Dutch Republic would be able to bolster its weak convoys and have powerful international backing against British privateering. The threat that the Dutch Republic might join the League made Britain fearful that it would lose, what it still considered, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, an ally. Moreover, as a member of the League, the Dutch would have considerably more protection for their smuggling activities. Throughout 1780, war slowly started to loom in the minds of both the British and the Dutch. The British doubled down on their belief that the Stadtholder might intervene on their behalf. But the Stadtholder was becoming

increasingly unpopular among the general public which viewed him as too weak to enforce neutrality or too Anglophile to recognize the United States.

In 1780, war between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic finally broke out for a relatively minor cause, but one that symbolized the compounded issues between Great Britain and the Dutch Republic of the last decade and a half. In late 1779, the Continental Congress decided that Henry Laurens, a prominent Southern planter, would be the best minister to the Netherlands to conduct negotiations on a commercial treaty and recognition. After concluding various personal affairs and only in August 1780, Laurens sailed from Philadelphia for Amsterdam onboard the *Mercury.* While on the Atlantic, however, the British vessel *Vestal* intercepted the *Mercury* and captured Laurens, who carried with him a draft treaty between the Dutch Republic and the United States. The treaty had been drawn up in private in 1778 by William Lee, an agent of the Congress who sought to obtain support and recognition from Prussia and Austria, and Jean de Neufville, a pro-American merchant from Amsterdam. Laurens sought to dispose of the papers in the sea before he was captured, at least according to his own account. But the British managed to get the papers and shockingly discovered the Lee-Neufville draft treaty. Even though Neufville had acted on his own accord, the British government viewed the treaty as evidence in support of long-standing suspicions that the American revolutionaries and the Dutch government were in secret negotiations on a commercial treaty and Dutch recognition of American independence.

The discovery of the draft treaty combined with Dutch attempts to enter the League of Armed Neutrality pushed the British government over the edge after more than a decade of Dutch injuries to their cause. In December 1780, the British government recalled

Ambassador Yorke - who had served in the Dutch Republic for more than three decades - and declared war on the Dutch Republic. The “System” - the Anglo-Dutch alliance that had shaped both Great Britain and the Dutch Republic for a century - had come to a violent end.

Chapter Seven - A Constitutional Revolution

"Just like *the Aristocracy* ends up in insufferable *Despotism*; *Anarchy* is the miserable companion of complete *Democracy … an Aristo-Democracy*, see there, is what we are searching for" so wrote Quint Ondaatje - Utrecht's most prominent Patriot leader - at the height of the Dutch Patriot Revolution in 1785.[328] Ondaatje's creative description of his ideal government reflects in many ways the diverging historiographical interpretations of the framing of both the United States Constitution and the Dutch Patriot Revolution of the tumultuous 1780s.

With a few notable exceptions, scholars of the Dutch Patriot Revolution have largely viewed the 1780s as the decade that birthed modern democracy.[329] These scholars have understood the Dutch Patriot Revolution itself as undergoing a gradual transformation from an "aristocratic" to a "democratic" movement as the decade progressed. Through this lens, these scholars especially interpreted Patriot ideas on representative politics as the foreshadowing, if not the clarion call, for modern democratic government. Subsequently, they have argued that the Patriot Revolution of the 1780s was an early phase of the Batavian Revolution of 1795 and a precursor to the democratic Dutch Constitution of 1848.[330]

In contrast, scholars of the framing of the United States Constitution have understood American political discourse of the 1780s in more varied ways. On the one hand, Progressive historians have decried the Constitution as an aristocratic power grab, an attempt to empower the

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[328] *De correspondent, in drie verzamelingen,* Volume 1*,* UvA Pfl. S f 10, p. 11.
[329] The exception to this interpretation is: Velema, 'Jonathan Israel and Dutch Patriotism', *Achttiende Eeuw* (2009), p. 152-160.
[330] Palmer, *The Age of the Democratic Revolution;* Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*; Joost Rosendaal, *De Nederlandse Revolutie: Vrijheid, Volk en Vaderland, 1783-1799* (Nijmwegen: Vantilt 2005); Edwina Hagen, *President van Nederland: Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck, 1761-1825* (Amsterdam: Balans 2012); Joris Oddens, *Pioniers in schaduwbeeld: Het eerste parlement van Nederland, 1796-1798* (Nijmwegen: Vantilt 2012); Israel, *The Expanding Blaze*; Van Sas, *De metamorfose van Nederland;* de Dijn, *Freedom: An Unruly History*.

preexisting economic and social status of the Patriot elites.[331] On the other hand, Whig historians have viewed the Constitution as a product of the Anglo-American eighteenth-century intellectual tradition that also engendered the American Revolution. Similar to Dutch scholars, Neo-Whigs have argued that the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists represented the aristocratic and democratic wings of the Revolution. They have pointed out that the more democratic Anti-Federalists "stood for the liberal, pluralistic, interest-ridden future of American politics".[332] Still others have posited - like scholars of the Dutch Republic - that the framing of the Constitution can be primarily understood as the birth of American democracy.[333]

In light of these historiographical debates on the aristocratic and democratic nature of the 1780s, what do we make of the statements by Ondaatje and his ideological kin in the Patriot Atlantic? What did aristocracy and democracy mean to the Dutch and American Patriots during the 1780s, at the height of Patriotism in the Atlantic World? To what extent were the 1780s the foundational decade of the American and Dutch democracies? And what were Patriot ideas for a social and political order and how did the Dutch Patriot Revolution and the United States Constitution practically implement them?

Surveying correspondence, revolutionary printed material, and various government documents reveals that the Atlantic Patriots sought a restoration of a mythologized social and political order based on longstanding Patriot ideals rather than the complete repudiation of an aristocratic and creation of a new democratic one. Though many of their political reforms were

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[331] Charles A. Beard, *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: MacMillan Press 1913).
[332] Gordon S. Wood, 'Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution' in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (eds.), *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1987), p. 69-112.
[333] Michael J. Klarman, *The Framers' Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016).

procedurally unprecedented - such as representative politics through more inclusive elections, written constitutions, and citizen's armies - the Dutch and American Patriots themselves largely viewed these procedural novelties as practical methods to correct the problems of the existing social and political order. The goal of Patriot reforms was not to necessarily establish a new government that translated the will of the people into law or a cynical ploy to reinforce a new aristocratic order. Rather their goal was to preserve the ancient rights and liberties they believed were threatened by foreign and domestic forces. In this sense, the sources demonstrate that the procedural reforms the Patriots implemented may have foreshadowed some essential political practices of modern Western democracies and that they strengthened the power of a ruling class in important ways. Nevertheless, the Patriot Republic - the political and social order the Patriots envisioned on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1780s - was fundamentally different from the "aristocracy" they wanted to undo or the modern democracies that would succeed them in subsequent decades.

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The Dutch and the American attempt to create and preserve a Patriot Republic was largely the product of their respective wars with Great Britain and, especially in the Dutch case, a result of their transatlantic entanglements. The outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in late 1780 proved consequential for both the Dutch Republic and the United States. Like the War of American Independence, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War was an Atlantic war. In addition to British naval engagements on the North Sea and immediately after he learned of the declaration of war in early 1781, Admiral Rodney launched a succesful invasion of St. Eustatius.[334] Consequently, the Dutch Republic lost significant portions of its colonial empire while the American

[334] SP 84/556, A Letter from Vice Admiral James Young, 14 December 1776, NA.

revolutionaries lost a link in their longstanding smuggling and intelligence chain in the Caribbean. Rodney looted St. Eustatius - for the British government, but also his personal gain - and committed ethnic violence against the island's Jewish population. Rodney's pillaging turned out to be a boon to the Americans, because it delayed his reinforcement of British forces in North America, contributing to Britain's military defeats during the Southern Campaign in 1781.[335]

Beyond its immediate consequences, the war's more significant repercussion was the transformation of Dutch politics. It heralded a new era for the Dutch Patriot movement that was firmly grounded in the intellectual current of the Patriot Atlantic, revitalized by their entanglements with the American revolutionaries. In 1781, the Dutch Patriot movement started to take shape as political discourse guided by the Patriot canon and American revolutionary ideas transformed the political structure and composition of the Dutch Republic. Debates ensued about the causes of the war, the disastrous state of the Dutch Republic that the war exposed, as well as the ideas that could save the Republic from downfall. Starting in 1782, these debates intensified and Patriots gained political power in localities throughout the Dutch Republic. During the 1780s, the gradual increase of political power provided Patriots with the means to implement Patriotism in government. These developments led to procedural reforms on representative government through local elections as well as the creation of Patriot militias. These reforms aimed to protect the ancient rights and liberties of the Dutch people. Ultimately, the form of government that the Dutch Patriots envisioned and sought to implement across the Republic was neither an attempt to secure an aristocracy nor the dawn of modern democratic rule. Instead, the Dutch Patriot sought to restore an imagined society of the past with balanced political powers,

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[335] Simms, *Three Victories and a Defeat*, p. 615-661; Schama, *Patriots and Liberator,* p. 58-64; Peter Trew, *Rodney and the Breaking of the Line* (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Maritime 2005), p. 103-106.

virtuous public servants, a representative government, and a citizen's militia that could protect the people's natural rights from the ever-present danger of tyranny.

The weekly magazine *De Post van den Neder-rhijn* (The Post of the Lower-Rhine) was one of the earliest Patriot voices to arise from the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and to shape the Dutch Patriot movement. *De Post* first came out in January of 1781 - immediately after the start of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in December 1780 - and was an innovative publication. Rather than a pamphlet or a newspaper, *De Post* was a periodical that provided short weekly commentary on global events, mostly about the Dutch Republic. In this way, *De Post* combined the politically charged commentarial character of the pamphlet with the branding and publication speed of newspapers. The editor of *De Post* was Pieter t' Hoen, a poet-turned-politician who had contributed to a number of pro-American comedic plays in the late 1770s. t' Hoen had also become an important figure in the political opposition to the Stadtholder in the increasingly Patriot-leaning city of Utrecht.[336]

The first publication reveals the origins of *De Post* as a publication that would vent the Dutch public's deep resentment of Great Britain as well as its strong support for the American Patriots. *De Post*'s first issue was a response to the British declaration of war and a broad call for the rearmament of the Dutch navy and army, which *De Post* argued had been neglected for decades. Like Patriots before the 1780s, *De Post* promoted a unifying message, which the editors based on the motto of the Dutch Republic *Eendracht maakt macht* (Unity makes power). The periodical also railed against the British, in a way reminiscent of Joan Derk van der Capellen tot

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[336] *Het Engelsche en Amerikaansche kaartspel,* UvA O 62-5203; *De misrekening, zijnde een tweede vervolg op het Engelsche en Amerikaansche kaart-spel*, VU Library XN.00774:3; *De verdrukte wildeman, zijnde een vervolg op Het Engelsche en Amerikaansche kaart-spel*, VU Library XN.00774:2; P.J.H.M. Theeuwen, *Pieter 't Hoen en de Post van den Neder-Rhijn (1781-1787): een bijdrage tot de kennis van de Nederlandse geschiedenis in het laatste kwart van de achttiende eeuw* (Hilversum, NL: Uitgeverij Verloren 2002), p. 77-128.

den Pol's essay on the Scots Brigade in 1775. The British, *De Post* argued, may have been friends of the Dutch Republic in the past. But they had been largely ungrateful for Dutch contributions to securing their liberty, such as getting rid of James II's "tyranny and slavery" in 1688, echoing American colonial arguments from the 1760s and 1770s that pointed out American contributions to British victory in the Seven Years' War. *De Post* positioned itself as a thoroughly pro-American publication.[337] In its sixth issue, the periodical framed the British as selfish exploiters of the Americans who wanted to enslave the American people and "rob them of their Privileges and Liberty".[338]

In addition to offering a medium to vent anti-British and pro-American sentiments, *De Post* was also a critical publication for framing the discourse of the Dutch Patriots, shaping the movement throughout the 1780s. *De Post* provided a regular platform for reader contributions and fostered a nationwide conversation on Patriotism which closely resembled the American debates during the 1760s and 1770s. Much like the Americans who praised the British constitution and sought to "restore liberty", the Dutch Patriots were seeking a similar restoration of the original Dutch constitution, the Union of Utrecht of 1579.

In the early 1780s, *De Post* also pushed Bolingbroke's idea of a Patriot King on the Stadtholder, reminiscent of American Patriot discourse before independence and Orangist Patriotism of the 1740s. Even though the Dutch Patriots of the 1780s experienced decades of political problems under Stadtholder William V, *De Post* placed the blame for the disastrous progression of the war - and the bad state of the country in general - on the Duke of Brunswick. The Duke was framed as the evil foreign teacher who had led the Stadtholder astray in his youth.

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[337] *De Post van den Neder-rhijn*, Volume 1, Issue 1, UvA O 76-184. Other anti-British tracts in the early phase of the war include, but are not limited to, issues 13, 17, 19, 40, and 41.
[338] *De Post van den Neder-rhijn*, Volume 1, Issue 6, UvA O 76-184.

Already in one of the early publications of *De Post,* the editors published a set of allegorical tales that were intended to demonstrate the corrupting influence of Brunswick on the Stadtholderate.[339] In both stories, the author represented the William V character as a mostly hapless victim of a foreign scheme seeking to undermine the state.

Yet even more important than *De Post* for the creation of the Patriot revolutionary movement in the early 1780s was Joan Derk van der Capellen tot den Pol's seminal pamphlet *Aan het Volk van Nederland* (To the People of the Netherlands). Van der Capellen had already become a prominent - if not the most prominent - member of the opposition against the Stadtholder's government. For years, he had also supported the American Revolution, both publicly and privately.

Aan het Volk van Nederland was undoubtedly the crown jewel on van der Capellen's long career as a staunch Patriot, albeit a secret one. In many ways, *Aan het Volk van Nederland* was comparable to Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, both in its widespread distribution and how it shaped Patriot discourse in the Netherlands. Like *Common Sense*, *Aan het Volk van Nederland* was printed in high volumes and distributed widely, ensuring that the entirety of the Dutch Republic would learn of its message. The distribution of the pamphlet was equally impressive. During just one night in late September 1781, carriages spread the pamphlet all over the Dutch Republic. Similar to *Common Sense*, *Aan het Volk van Nederland* was published anonymously with many subsequently guessing the identity of the author. Despite - or perhaps because of - the fact that he cited himself numerous times in the pamphlet, van der Capellen succeeded in keeping his authorship a secret. 'The secret of Appeltern' - as the secret surrounding the authorship would later be called after van der Capellen's place of residence - was so well hidden

[339] *De Post van den Neder-rhijn*, Volume 1, Issue 10 and 13, UvA O 76-184.

that scholars discovered only in 1891 that van der Capellen wrote the seminal pamphlet. Just as with Paine's *Common Sense*, *Aan het Volk van Nederland* would be spread outside of its country of origin, with translations appearing in Great Britain, Germany, and France soon after its original publication in Dutch in 1781.[340]

Beyond its remarkable production and distribution achievements, the content of *Aan het Volk van Nederland* was as polemical and as discursively influential to the Dutch Patriots as *Common Sense* had been in America. Like Paine, van der Capellen railed against his prince, calling him a drunk and a philanderer. Though van der Capellen's tone was arguably even sharper than Paine's, he did not disavow the Stadtholderate as an institution, as Paine had done with the monarchy. The first Stadtholder William of Orange was still much admired in the Dutch Republic as the 'father of the fatherland' and had unquestionably been instrumental in cementing the Union of Utrecht of 1579, the constitution that the Patriots revered. Even though van der Capellen may have presented William the First as a 'foreigner' - meaning German - who came to the rescue to protect his substantial financial interests in the Netherlands, he also praised him as a defender of religious toleration and as a smart and good-natured leader.[341]

Despite his tacit support for the institution of the Stadtholderate, van der Capellen nevertheless recalled a 'long train of abuses and usurpations' of the Stadtholders who had conscientiously chipped away at Dutch liberty over the last two centuries. Van der Capellen discussed several instances in Dutch history in which the Stadtholders had usurped power over

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[340] A.H. Wertheim-Gijse Weenink and W.F. Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland: Het democratische manifest* (Weesp, NL: Uitgeverij Heureka 1981), p. 7-37; *An Address To the People of the Netherlands, On The Present Alarming and most Dangerous Situation Of The Republick of Holland : Showing The True Motives Of The Most Unpardonable Delays Of The Executive Power In Putting The Republick Into A Proper State Of Defence, And The Advantages Of An Alliance With Holland, France And America ... : Translated From The Dutch Original,* British Library MFR/1700 *625* DSC.

[341] Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland,* p. 68-72.

local legislatures. Like the Orangist Patriots of 1747, van der Capellen argued that the perverse appointment system of public offices corrupted the governance of the Dutch Republic. This system, van der Capellen posited, did not produce patriotic public servants. Instead, "those who seek fortune" as public servants only need the "favor of the Stadtholder … And we all know and see that he [the Stadtholder] cannot be charmed by virtuous behavior … by being a righteous patriot. Far from it. The Stadtholders need pliable, pushovers [as public servants]."

Instead of loyalty to the Stadtholder or the oligarchic *regenten* from the past, van der Capellen proposed procedural reforms to secure the Patriot Republic, primarily what he conceived of as a rejuvenation of representative government. Van der Capellen based his idea of representative government on the examples of "various republics in Switzerland, but also …. the thirteen United States of North America" which had proven that their governments fostered what van der Capellen believed to be patriotic, virtuous rule. In Switzerland and the United States, according to van der Capellen, "everyone who seeks fortune or a job [as a public servant] is forced to act proper and virtuous, and be courteous, friendly, and serviceable towards his fellow citizens, and most above all prove himself to be a proponent of liberty … In other words … he must be a righteous *patriot*."[342]

To implement a representative government and safeguard the Patriot Republic, van der Capellen argued for a fully armed citizenry and the creation of citizen militias. Mainly based on the ideas of Andrew Fletcher - whose work van der Capellen translated in the 1770s - and his understanding of the Swiss and American republics, van der Capellen argued that the long history of the Stadtholderate proved that the Stadtholder's permanent command over a standing army had allowed him to gain too much power and thereby to diminish Dutch liberty. Van der

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[342] Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland,* p. 100.

Capellen posited that the Stadtholders wanted to wage war permanently so that they could continue to control a large land army with which to oppress the Dutch people. Van der Capellen especially protested against garrison cities and employed the historical examples of cities like Nijmegen to prove that the Stadtholder used the city's defensive forces as an occupying army. In so doing, the Stadtholder manipulated the composition of the city's *vroedschappen* (local government) to his will and thereby undermined the city's ancient rights and privileges.[343]

According to van der Capellen, the Stadtholders' thirst for power and use of land armies had precedent in European history, revealing the ideological origins of his objections against standing armies in the larger Patriot Atlantic. Van der Capellen employed the example of the English Civil War in the mid-seventeenth century to demonstrate how, after the English had thrown off the yoke of absolute rule under Charles I and "were about to reap the spoils from the battle for freedom[,] … they were subjugated and made slaves by Cromwell, who commanded the army of the nation." Almost literally quoting Fletcher and echoing other Patriot thinkers at the time, van der Capellen argued that there "has been no freedom in Europe anymore since monarchs started to have standing armies".[344]

As a consequence of the Stadtholder's use of standing armies to suppress Dutch liberties, van der Capellen argued for the creation of citizen's militias to ensure that the people remain "the strongest force in the land". The militias could counterbalance the Stadtholder's army and his usurping powers. According to van der Capellen, the creation of these citizen's militias was not a radical or even a new idea. It represented the true implementation of the Union of Utrecht, the original constitution of the Dutch Republic. The Union's eighth article - which circumscribed a draft of inhabitants for "the protection and security of these United Provinces" - had never been

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[343] Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland*, p. 107-137.
[344] Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland*, p. 80-81.

truly implemented, van der Capellen argued. The creation of these militias acted in the spirit of the original constitution.[345] Traditional city militias (*schutterijen*) had been important institutions in Dutch cities since the Middle Ages, but they effectively functioned like a medieval guild by barring entry to common burghers. Moreover, these old-style *schutterijen* were either abolished or had fallen into disuse. The militias barely exercised at all by the eighteenth century. The Patriot militias van der Capellen envisioned would revitalize this neglected institution to counter the Stadtholder's power and support representative government. As in the case of representative government, Switzerland and the United States offered the example for how these militias would broadly operate. The "burghers and farmers" of the Dutch Republic, van der Capellen posited, "must each get a musket with a bayonet and a sword, and learn how to use them. They have to organize themselves in regiments and companies and choose the officers to command them. And they have to - particularly on Sunday after the church service - practice every now and then. The Swiss do it like this and the Americans do it like this."[346]

Van der Capellen believed these militias had virtually unlimited benefits. The militias would have prevented all of the Stadtholder's attacks on liberty in the past, had they been implemented earlier, and would restore those liberties in the present. How soon, van der Capellen, asked, "would we discover the traitors, would we know the honest *regenten*, and save our sinking fatherland! How soon would we have a *fleet* at sea and an alliance with France and America, and take revenge on our enemies! How soon would we revive our decrepit trade and return the jobs to all those thousands of inhabitants [of the Dutch Republic]."[347]

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345 R. Fruin en H. T. Colenbrander, *Geschiedenis der Staatsinstellingen in Nederland tot den val van den Republiek* (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff 1922), p. 363-401.
346 Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland*, p. 82.
347 Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland*, p. 82-83.

The creation of the militias would also enable the creation of the representative government and defend the Patriot Republic that van der Capellen espoused. A fully armed population, van der Capellen argued, was the guarantor of Dutch liberty and the people's rights and privileges, which were closely linked to the sovereignty of the people.

> "O country men! Again, arm yourselves, altogether, and take care of the affairs of the entire country, that is of your *own* affairs. The country belongs to you all together, and not to the Prince and his cronies alone, who regard and treat you and us all, the entire Dutch people … as their cows and sheep, which they can shave and slaughter as they please … The people that live in this country … are the true *owners,* the lords and masters of the land … The *regenten*, the governments and magistrates, the Prince … are only the directors, the commanders, the stewards of that … society and in *this* position lesser than the members of that society, that is the entire nation or the entire people."[348]

Aan het Volk van Nederland, then, was a call for the restoration of a mythological Dutch Patriot Republic, the implementation of what van der Capellen - and other Dutch Patriots - believed to be the Dutch Republic's true constitution from the sixteenth century, sufficiently balanced and representative that it would guarantee virtuous Patriot rule. Though the pamphlet was highly critical of the Stadtholderate - and with its *ad hominem* attacks on William V's supposed infidelity and alcoholism downright inflammatory - the pamphlet argued for strong limits on the Stadtholder's power rather than overthrowing the institution altogether. Van der Capellen even considered a standing army under the command of the Stadtholder necessary.

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[348] Weenink and Wertheim, *Aan het volk van Nederland*, p. 83-84.

Hostile countries that surrounded the Netherlands had standing armies and it would be unreasonable to deploy regular citizens abroad during wartime. Moreover, the Dutch Republic was already formally a republic, rather than the colonies of a world empire. The preexisting republican nature of the Netherlands cemented the belief that the remedy was a restoration of liberty without necessarily changing the executive and structure of government, as Paine advocated for in America in 1776.

Aan het Volk van Nederland struck like lighting in the Dutch Republic. William V - insulted by the pamphlet's unflattering description of his character - unsuccessfully sought to prevent further publications and to discover who the author was.[349] Orangist publications attempted to paint the pamphlet in a negative light, while those who read the pamphlet passed it around to those who had not read it.[350] There is also evidence that suggests that van der Capellen's famous pamphlet was discussed in organized domestic get-togethers of neighbors who found copies "on the street".[351]

At the same time, *Aan het Volk van Nederland* proved transformative for Patriot discourse and practice. The pamphlet was a clarion call for the creation of citizen militias and burgher representation, the procedural reforms and institutions that would form the heart of the Dutch Patriot Revolution. In 1782, *De Post* reprinted one of the earliest proposals for the creation of a Patriot militia in the district of Oostergo of the northern province of Friesland, the

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[349] *Missive van het Hof ten aansien van een naamloos boekje, Aan het volk van Nederland, en met een concept placaat om daar tegen te voorsien: commissoriaal. 11 october 1781,* KB 402 B 95:35; *Copy van een briev van een heer uit Rotterdam, aan zijn vriend te Amsterdam: wegens het voorgevallene met de boekverkopers Bronkhorst en de Leeuw, over het nadrukken van den verboden Vrymoedigen Briev genaamt, Aan het Volk van Nederland,* UvA O 59-340.
[350] *Vrymoedige aanmerkingen op het berucht werkje [by Baron J. D. van der Capellen, Heer tot den Poll], betyteld: Aan het volk van Nederland. In eenen brief van een' heer te Utrecht aan zynen vriend in s'Gravenhage,* UvA O 77-740.
[351] *Nacht-praatje tusschen Louw en Krelis over een op Kattenburg, op straat gevonden gedrukt boekje, genaamt: Aan het volk van Nederland,* UvA Pfl. R i 40da.

same district where John Adams found much support for recognition of American independence around this time.[352] Inspired by van der Capellen's pamphlet, the district representatives recalled the disastrous state of the Dutch Republic, its contracting economy and trade, the declining "liberty of the inhabitants", and the Stadtholder's impulse to enlarge the Dutch Republic's land forces, which the representatives considered not necessary. The foreign mercenaries in the Stadtholder's standing army were too expensive, the representatives argued, and would have no true interest in fighting for the Republic as foreigners.

Like van der Capellen, the delegates based their argument on the "never implemented" eighth article of the Union of Utrecht. The eighth article inspired them to create "an armed people, whose Officers are chosen among them, whose Commerce flourishes, [who] will fear no slavery or domination; they will find the means to fend off these monstrosities, in their own free and happy burgher heart." Meanwhile, "domestic and foreign histories" proved the efficacy of militias, such as the examples of "freedom-loving Switzerland" and "marvelous North America". The rules for the proposed militia were far-reaching, including drafting one-third of the Oostergo male population between the ages of 18 and 60 - excluding various government and church officials, disabled people, and Mennonites - who were required to train once a month, except during the winter. These draftees would elect their own officers, though the officers were required to be "natural born Frisians, or Frisians naturalized by marriage", a requirement that did not apply to foot soldiers.[353] The Oostergo militia would ultimately not materialize under this

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[352] Historisch Centrum Leeuwarden (henceforth referred to as HCL). Toegang 1552 Sociëteit Door Vrijheid en IJver te Leeuwarden, 1772-1787, Kleinere Sociëteiten VI - 1, Notulen 1772-1775; HCL. Toegang 1552 Sociëteit Door Vrijheid en IJver te Leeuwarden, 1772-1787, Kleinere Sociëteiten VI - 7. 1782-1784; HCL. Toegang 1552 Sociëteit Door Vrijheid en IJver te Leeuwarden, 1772-1787, Kleinere Sociëteiten VI - 8, 1782-1787; HCL. Toegang 1552 Sociëteit Door Vrijheid en IJver te Leeuwarden, 1772-1787, Kleinere Sociëteiten VI - 9, 1782.

[353] *De Post van den Neder-rhijn*, Volume 2, Issue 102 *Propositie van het Quartier van Oostergo nopens de Burger-Land Militie*, VU Library XT.00078.

specific proposal. But it nevertheless represented the first of many attempts to form Patriot militias in various towns and cities across the Dutch Republic in 1783 and 1784.

Yet creating these new Patriot institutions was by no means an easy task. A pamphlet from Schoonhoven - a small town of only a few thousand inhabitants in the province of Holland - provides insight into the many complications that arose when forming a Patriot militia in localities of the Dutch Republic during the early 1780s. The problems that confronted the Schoonhoven Patriots was a microcosm of the problems Patriots faced across the Republic when creating their institutions as well as the increasing threat that the Patriot militias posed to local, provincial, and, ultimately, national authorities during their revolution.

According to the Schoonhoven pamphlet from 1783, criticism on the Patriot militia came predominantly from the city's War Council (*Krijgsraad*), a council that was part of the city's government in charge of the city's defenses and public order. Since the militias effectively supplanted the traditional *schutterij* under the command of the Council, they viewed the creation of the Patriot militia as an implicit criticism of their capacity to maintain public order. Colonel Dirk Hoola van Nooten - evidently the most prominent member of Schoonhoven's War Council - had no faith in the effectiveness of the Patriot militia if faced with unrest. It would be more effective, he said according to the Patriot pamphlet, "when the Burghers [of the militia] would flip their muskets and start hitting the unruly mob with the butts of their weapons, than if they would drive away the riffraff with Bayonets and Balls."[354] In addition, van Nooten and his supporters argued that arming the entire population of Schoonhoven would be too expensive and burghers would be reluctant to be drafted into the Patriot militia. Though the author of the pamphlet disputed these arguments, the Patriots proposed a compromise in which militia service

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[354] *Nader, echt, omstandig en zeer interessant bericht van het voorgevallene te Schoonhoven omtrent de oprichting van het Exercitie-Genootschap*, Leiden UB 1153 D 15, p. 3.

would not be required of all burghers, but would just accept volunteers.[355] Moreover, to help finance the arming of the militia - the author argued that they needed “brand new muskets” - prominent burghers set up a fund for voluntary donations. In this way, the Patriots in Schoonhoven argued, taxes - “already very high” - would not need to be raised to pay for the militia.[356]

The militia also ran into issues of political authority, particularly with the War Council. Van Nooten believed that the militia would constitute a redundant force of arms that he could not control. Under van Nooten’s command stood the traditional *schutterij* (militia) charged with the city’s defenses. The Patriots did not object to being formally subordinated to the city’s War Council, but their insistence on electing their own officers threatened van Nooten’s grip on the city’s defenses and presumably his ability to dole out important positions to his associates. Van Nooten’s decline in political power became painfully clear when the Patriot members voted against his nominees for the commander of the newly formed volunteer militia. In addition, the much-repeated Patriot idea of holding corrupt government accountable to the people by force of arms presumably did not inspire much enthusiasm from incumbent politicians such as van Nooten.

In addition to creating the new militias, Patriots who gained power in various localities also sought to enact other political reforms to restore the mythologized Patriot Republic. They framed their reforms as an assault on what they called the “Aristocracy”, meaning the incumbent and nepotistic officials that had dominated the Dutch Republic’s governments for decades. In 1784 in the province of Utrecht - where the Patriot party had successfully gained influence in the

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[355] *Nader, echt, omstandig en zeer interessant bericht van het voorgevallene te Schoonhoven omtrent de oprichting van het Exercitie-Genootschap*, Leiden UB 1153 D 15, p. 4.
[356] *Nader, echt, omstandig*, p. 7-9.

city of Utrecht and surrounding towns - Patriots proposed a new provincial constitution that promised to restore the government following the Union of Utrecht of 1579 and the "ye olde free government of the province [of Utrecht]". The proposed constitution sought to undo the *Regeerings Regelement van 1674* (Regulations of Government of 1674) that William III had implemented. These regulations had essentially placed the power of appointment of Utrecht's public offices in the hands of the Stadtholder.[357]

The "restoration" of the rights and privileges of the city and province of Utrecht that the Patriots proposed primarily entailed placing the appointment of public offices in the hands of the burghers of the city. This reform was an effort to destroy the "Aristocracy" that the Patriots argued had caused the demise of the Republic. Simon Schama has framed these reforms as 'democratic', even leading to the rise of modern democracy itself.[358] Yet the sources demonstrate that the Patriots themselves imagined them largely to be a restoration of the Patriot Republic and its medieval practices, rights, and protection of liberty. The reforms were a countermeasure against the rampant nepotism, an attempt to undo the Dutch Republic's "Aristocracy" and keep it at bay. The most 'democratic' reform the constitution proposed was a "council of representatives [*Gecommitteerden*] from the citizenry [*burgerij*], just like in the year 1491, which will take place under the name *Meentemannen*". This council referred to a short-lived medieval practice in which a group of 'common men' could temporarily fill vacancies in Utrecht's government. Yet the council of *Meentemannen* would not have any legislative authority. Rather, it would function more like an oversight committee, particularly on the finances of the city, a crucial power intended to check the "aristocratic" practice of privately profiting from public funds.[359]

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[357] *Concept-reglement op de regeeringsbestelling van de provintie Utrecht* (1784), UvA O 06-5590.
[358] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, p. 88-99.
[359] *Concept-reglement op de regeeringsbestelling van de provintie Utrecht* (1784), UvA O 06-5590, p. 26-33.

More importantly, while suffrage was formally granted to the "citizenry" [*burgerij*] at large, Patriot militias ran the elections and suffrage was limited to those who joined the militia. Militia members would vote in their respective companies - assigned to a certain district of the city - and the officers would collect the votes for representatives, who then voted for a public official such as a burgomaster through a complex series of lotteries and indirect elections. Rather than creating a new society based on democratic ideals, the goals of these reforms were to crush the "Aristocracy" and restore the mythological Patriot Republic. The limited democratic nature of the reforms also becomes clear in the elaborate rules on family relations and public offices in the concept constitution. For instance, "not two Brothers, nor Father and Son, or Grandfather and Grandson nor more than one Uncle, and also four Cousins in blood or marriage, and two Brother-in-laws, can sit or be elected" to the council.[360]

Giving only militia members suffrage was the implementation of *eendracht*, the Patriots' utopian concept of unity that would materialize in their Patriot Republic. The Dutch Patriots often discussed their 'rights and privileges' in the context of the *tweedracht* - polarization - that the aristocracy, the Stadtholder, and their foreign allies had created. In a 1783 pamphlet on Utrecht's *Pro Patria* militia, a fictional conversation between two militia members and their officer turned to those in the city who did not seek to fight in the militias and who disagreed politically with the Patriots. According to the Patriot officer, if someone was part of the political opposition to the Patriots they were "not *free*, not a *true* Batavian! not a Utrecht Burgher! … Those People may have the official name of Burgher, they are actually without the Burgher right of our Liberty - a disgrace they are, and they deserve to be in the Netherlands, as much as they

[360] *Concept-reglement op de regeeringsbestelling van de provintie Utrecht* (1784), UvA O 06-5590. For anti-nepotism clause, see, for instance, p. 14.

deserve our attention".[361] Voting was intentionally elaborate and limited to loyal Patriots to undo the "Aristocracy" and restore what the Patriots believed to be their ancient "rights and privileges", which included the right to limited representation in government and participation in citizen's militias.

The Patriot militias were not just an institution of political power, but they also became an important element of the cultural and social life of the Dutch Republic in the early to mid-1780s. As such, they offer a glimpse of how the Patriots envisioned the day-to-day workins of their restored Republic. The exercises of the militias were public spectacles and their private meetings presented social gathering places for people of all walks of life, including religious minorities.[362] At the same time, militia meetings had the potential of becoming frivolous affairs. Nearly all of them had fines on the books for arriving drunk or becoming drunk during an exercise, a common occurrence in fraternities such as these. In addition, militias were also cultural societies. Of particular importance was music for marching - which was usually achieved with drums - but some militias also spent quite a bit of money on acquiring flutes and tambourins.

At the intersection of the militia's social and cultural life were Patriot women. The historical evidence on Patriot women is relatively scarce. But the militia in the city of Dordrecht provides insight into women's roles in what was a male-oriented organization. In the "Legalized Society of the Weapon Exercise, called *De Vrijheid* [The Freedom or Liberty], in Dordrecht" women could acquire a form of honorary membership by donating a yearly sum of money to the society. In this way, women fell in a similar category as honorary members or "extraordinary"

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[361] *De Burger-vriend. Of gemeenzaame gesprekken, tusschen een'Utrechtsch burger-officier, met zijne twe rotsgezellen, Gozewijn, een'gegoeden burger, en Jan, een'werkman,* UvA Pfl. R z 27a, p. 20-21.
[362] *Het Genootschap van Wapenhandel onder de zinspreuk: Pro patriot et libertate, Aan de Manhafte Schuttery, deezer Stad, Utrecht,* Amsterdam Rijksmuseum Research Library, KOGS D21.2-426.

male members, who had to be older than fifty years, either those physically incapable of exercising themselves or those who were simply not citizens of the city. These members received a membership pass and could, provided they placed an identifying feather in their hats, witness the Patriot exercises from up close.[363] Illustrations from various Patriot exercises throughout the Dutch Republic indicate that women were often present at the exercises and participated in the social aspect of the militia societies.

In a similar vein, women were also featured in various cultural expressions that the militias created. These sources suggested a strong connection between private life and participatory citizenship in the Patriot Republic. The records of *De Vrijheid* hold a number of songs and poems dedicated to the militia and its members, apparently read and sung during a "solemn meal". One of the poems is dedicated to the "*Vaderlandsche Meisjes*" (Fatherland or Patriot Maidens), which offers a striking insight into how the Patriots considered women to have an important supportive role for the exercising men. The women would "strengthen us [the militia members] in duties of freedom" and help put on the "sword and harnass … Praise the dedication of the Batavians! Glorify Liberty! the Militia! … Does not your heart jump with joy", the poem asked the women, "now that you see us armed?"[364]

The Patriot militias were predominantly local phenomena in 1783 and 1784, but they started to have provincial and national political ambitions as they gained more power in various localities across the Republic in 1785. The Patriots had founded a sufficient number of militias across the Republic by December 1784 that they were able to organize provincial and national meetings in which representatives from each militia would vote on proclamations and policies that promoted a common Patriot cause. These meetings hardly represented a parallel government

[363] Regionaal Archief Dordrecht (henceforth referred to as RAD), 325/11.
[364] *Aan de Vaderlandsche Meisjes,* RAD 325/11.

like the American Continental Congress of the 1770s. But they demonstrate that the Patriot militias sought to associate themselves and coordinate with each other. In this way, they became a more formidable political threat to the Stadtholder and his allies in the Dutch Republic's many layers of government.

At a national militia meeting in Utrecht in July 1785, the militias agreed to the *Akte van Verbintenis der Republikainsche constitutie* (Act of Association of the Republican constitution). In the Act, the Patriots underlined their commitment never "to implement any other form of Government than the true Republican, based on the laws of our land, namely a government of the People by representation" that included a "hereditary Stadtholder, from the Serene House of Orange" subject to the republican government. Some scholars, such as Simon Schama, have interpreted the act as yet another "advanced statement of democratic principles". But the *Akte* was rather vague on specific policies and actually explicitly denounced "Complete Democracy" as well as "Autocracy [and] an independent, hateful, and liberty oppressing Aristocratic Family Government". Moreover, the statement explicitly committed itself to "the laws of our land", suggesting Patriot fealty to the existing Dutch Republic rather than a novel democratic government.[365]

A similar meeting to the one in Utrecht was the considerably more consequential provincial meeting of militias in Leiden in the fall of 1785. This meeting in the province of Holland was called in response to Leiden's local government attempts to ban the militia from exercising. The delegates to the provincial meeting subsequently produced a document that was probably the best developed and most clearly articulated Patriot political program after van der Capellen's *Aan het Volk van Nederland* four years earlier. As with many other Patriot documents

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[365] "*Akte van Verbintenis" van de burgercorpsen van de Republiek ter verdediging van de republikeinse constitutie, 1785,* Het Utrechts Archief (henceforth referred to as UA), 752, 1.7.1.3.1, 487.

that came before it, scholars have interpreted *Het Leids Ontwerp* or the Leiden Draft as one of the founding documents of modern democracy and definitive proof of "the emancipation of the democratic Patriots from the tutelage of the [aristocratic] regents".[366] Yet the document itself is predominantly a repetition and, in some ways, a clarification of the political arguments that Patriots had been making publicly in America since the 1760s and in the Netherlands, at various moments, since 1747.

That scholars have treated *Het Leids Ontwerp* as a novel democratic program is especially striking considering that the text itself explicitly made the case for the restoration of the original Patriot Republic. The first chapter of *Het Ontwerp* discussed the "Necessity of preserving the original good Constitution, by remedying the crept-in abuses". *Het Ontwerp* underlined that some procedural improvements of the constitution were necessary due to "internal shocks" that the Republic suffered in the last two centuries as well as the continuing rise of "formidable neighbors". But it simultaneously acknowledged that "these deficiencies are not in the nature of the Constitution itself". The Dutch Republic's many overlapping sovereignties and political structure may appear to produce "very different interests" that hamper governmental action. But, according to *Het Ontwerp*, these varying factions are "only a coincidence, and not grounded in our Constitution!" Instead, considering that the Dutch Republic is located near the sea and that the soil cannot be tilled, all the provinces and cities have the same goals, namely "the protection and advancement of Navigation, Commerce and Manufactures; the maintenance of the Union, and the preservation of their respective forms of government of their Republican Constitution."

[366] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, p. 96; Jeremy D. Popkin, "Dutch Patriots, French Journalists and Declaration of Rights: the leidse ontwerp of 1785 and its Diffusion in France", *The Historical Journal* 38 (1995), p. 553-565; Jeremy D. Popkin, "Antoine-Marie Cerisier; le Leidse Ontwerp et le Grondwettige Herstelling un debat encore ouvert", *De Achttiende Eeuw* 29 (1997), p. 17-34.

Het Ontwerp echoed Patriot thought from the last four decades and argued that "our Republican Constitution … has a certain degree of virtue, perfection, and yes, even of simplicity". The Republic's government in its original form is "the translator of the will of the people" because the confederal structure promised representation on every layer of government. From this constitutional construct, *Het Ontwerp* proclaimed, one can naturally conclude that because all the layers of government represent the will of the people, they have the "same interest, which is the interest of all … Thus the true Constitution of our Republic … can bring about a salutary unanimity in the entire State."[367]

Het Ontwerp echoed many other ideas from the Patriot Atlantic as well. The Dutch Patriots retained great faith in a disinterested executive - a Patriot Stadtholderate - who could "maintain the unity between the different" parts of the Republic and enhance the status of the Republic abroad. *Het Ontwerp* was so supportive of the Stadtholderate that it did not even challenge the controversial hereditary nature of the office, implemented only after the Orangist Revolution of 1747 and one of the primary reasons figures like Thomas Paine objected to monarchy. Despite their support for the Stadtholderate as an institution, the Dutch Patriots had grown considerably more suspicious of executive power since 1747, especially in regard to the disinterested nature of the Stadtholderate. As a result, *Het Ontwerp* was much less celebratory of the Stadtholder than the 1747 Patriots had been. It proposed strict limitations on the Stadtholder's powers, especially in appointing local officials, reflecting William V's growing unpopularity. The Stadtholder - in the eyes of the Patriots - should be akin to a constitutional

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[367] *Ontwerp om de republiek door eene heilzaame vereeniging der belangen van regent en burger, van binnen gelukkig, en van buiten gedugt te maaken*, UvA Pfl. S h 21, p. 8-11.

monarch or a president, a disinterested executive who serves at the pleasure of the Dutch people, the true sovereign of the Republic.[368]

In a similar vein, *Het Ontwerp* reiterated various core principles of transatlantic Patriot thought regarding the correlation between representative government and the historical struggle between power and liberty. Like van der Capellen's *Aan het Volk van Nederland* and similar to American revolutionary writings, *Het Ontwerp* retold Dutch history as a continuous struggle between the people protecting their rights and the tyrannical governments that sought to suppress them. *Het Ontwerp*'s proposal for a *Grondwettige Herstelling* (Constitutional Restoration) represented another necessary restoration of liberty because the "Aristocracy" had instituted a government of "*more than a thousand little tyrants*". The *regenten* - the "little tyrants" - had abandoned the spirit of the Dutch Republic's original republican constitution by failing to act as the people's representatives. They had created *tweedracht* - polarization - in the process. *Het Ontwerp* argued that a government of elected representatives would bridge the *tweedracht* in Dutch society. Instead, it would create a unified government - or *eendracht* - that would only act in the interests of the people, namely, to protect their rights and spend their taxes wisely.[369]

Het Ontwerp proposed a representative government that simultaneously tempered the people's passions. To the authors of *Het Ontwerp,* history had demonstrated that the Dutch people were not afraid to stand up to tyrants. At the same time, however, history showed that these reactions to tyrants were in many ways too democratic, passionate, and violent. A representative government would prevent "a state of confusion and unpredictability" that would inevitably follow the two extremes of an "Aristocratic Family" government or when the Dutch

[368] *Ontwerp,* p. 12-15.
[369] *Ontwerp,* p. 28-32.

people were left to "govern themselves" in the state of nature or a democracy. In this way, *Het Ontwerp* declared, "the Constitutional Restoration [they proposed] will thus unite the interests of the *regenten* and the people".[370]

Though *Het Ontwerp*'s procedural ideas regarding representative government hint towards a modern democracy - and has been interpreted in that light - the power of the people to influence the government remained limited and largely provided political power to the Patriots themselves. Much like in the early American Republic, *Het Ontwerp* intentionally reserved both passive and active voting rights for males who owned a certain amount of property. In addition, these men had to live in cities. According to the medieval model of *burgerschap* (citizenship) as the Patriots understood it, only those who lived in the cities could become *burghers.*

But *Het Ontwerp* went even further in limiting suffrage. The militias would play an exceptionally large role in elections of government positions, according to the document. As the constitutional reforms in Utrecht and other places have demonstrated, Patriot militias constituted key institutions for the appointment of public officials. They provided the only legal polling places and the exclusive source of recruitment for representatives. *Het Ontwerp* copied this model and argued that all those who elect people to "Government positions must come forth from the bosom of the … Militias, except in those places, where the Guilds possess this right … In the current system of Europe [which was hostile to the Netherlands]", *Het Ontwerp* reasoned, "one cannot instill the spirit of arms too much". In a similar vein, *Het Ontwerp* limited passive suffrage - the right to be elected to a government position - to those who "have participated in Military Exercises for a certain amount of time" to "encourage the most prominent Burghers to participate in the Burgher Militias". This design would also "provide the opportunity [for the

[370] *Ontwerp*, p. 43-50.

government officials] to get to know more of their fellow Burghers from up close", highlighting the sociopolitical functions of these militias.[371]

Het Ontwerp demonstrates that the Dutch Patriots in the 1780s had become convinced that the "Aristocracy" had slowly destroyed Dutch liberties and had caused all misfortunes that had befallen the Republic in the last century, if not longer. To the Patriot mind, the Aristocracy created an artificial division and imbalance in the Republic that was at the root of Dutch decline. If the Aristocracy was removed through their procedural reforms, the Patriots argued, the balance in the Republic's government would be restored. All burghers would rally around their shared interest of liberty and rights and would happily join the militia, while the economy would once again be as glorious as it was in the seventeenth century.

Implementing elections, run by and in favor of the Patriots through the militias, was the procedural reform that the Patriots believed was necessary to restore the mythological Patriot Republic. The elections the Patriots envisioned were essentially an anti-corruption measure that aimed to root out the Aristocracy, in the same way that the 1747 Patriots had championed the Stadtholderate as the ultimate antidote against the nepotism of the *regenten*. That the Patriots favored a balanced government that did not infringe on their rights, rather than a modern democracy that actively translated the will of the people in a representative legislature, also becomes explicit when the authors of *Het Ontwerp* argued that the people's representatives should "keep a watchful eye on the Finances [of the government] and the maintenance of their rights [of the people]; but as for the rest that pertains to government, let the hands of the *regenten* not be bound!"[372] The Patriot representatives thus functioned more like watchmen rather than actual legislators. Similar to what the American revolutionaries argued, elections by a limited

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[371] *Ontwerp*, p. 62-68.
[372] *Ontwerp*, p. 41.

number of virtuous men would create a virtuous government and would balance the power of the government against the liberties of the people. Moreover, the passions of the people, too often the cause of civil disruption and instability, would be tempered through the mechanism of representation and limited government powers.

As the Patriots increased their control over local *vroedschappen* and their militias flourished in the mid-1780s, they became a growing threat to the Stadtholder's position of power, particularly regarding the armed forces. The Dutch Republic's standing army formally fell under the command of the Stadtholder, but the provinces largely paid for them. The system of payment - called the *repartitie* or repartition - meant that provincial states paid for the deployment of specific regiments, even though they operated under the central command of the Stadtholder and the States General.[373] After increasing tensions between the Patriots and the Stadtholder in 1785, the Patriot-dominated States of Holland took control of 'their' garrison in The Hague in an attempt to weaken the Stadtholder's grasp on the Republic's military forces. Meanwhile, a split in the States of Utrecht caused the Orangist faction to leave the city of Utrecht. Instead, they convened in the city of Amersfoort, where they requested the Stadtholder to station troops in that city and the town of Zeist to counter the Patriot threat. The Stadtholder subsequently moved from his residence near The Hague east to Nijmegen in the province of Gelderland after the States of Holland took control of 'their' garrison in The Hague. Frustrated by the Patriots' increasing encroachment on his powers and in September 1785, the Stadtholder deployed the troops requested by the Orangist faction of the States of Utrecht.[374]

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[373] H.T. Colenbrander, *De Patriottentijd, hoofdzakelijk naar buitenlandse bescheiden Deel 1* (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff 1897), p. 350-370 and *Deel 2*, p. 8-75.
[374] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, p. 100-110; Joost Rosendaal, *De Nederlandse Revolutie,* p. 17-56.

The creation of the Patriot militias and the Stadtholder's decision to deploy troops close to Utrecht set the stage for a violent confrontation, even the possibility of a protracted civil war. As in 1747 and the early 1780s, tensions escalated in late 1785 and early 1786 regarding the appointment of political offices, this time in the small towns of Elburg and Hattem in the eastern province of Gelderland. Several political offices in those towns became vacant and the Stadtholder took advantage of the opportunity to appoint Orangist officials. According to the Patriots, this act constituted a violation of the rights and privileges of the burghers of Hattem and Elburg. Under the leadership of Herman Willem Daendels - an officer in the Hattem Patriot militia and the son of one of the officials that was being replaced - the Patriots fortified Hattem and appointed their own government officials in defiance of the Stadtholder's authority. Though it seemed as if the standoff could lead to a violent confrontation, the Stadtholder marched his troops to the two towns. Meanwhile, the Patriots retreated to Zwolle, the larger neighboring city in another province, without much bloodshed.[375]

The events at Hattem and Elburg did not immediately lead to an outbreak of hostilities, but they did set the stage for more confrontation between the Patriots and the Stadtholder in the coming years. To signal their disapproval of the Stadtholder's actions in Hattem and Elburg, the Patriot-leaning States of Holland demanded his resignation as commander of the armed forces. In the meantime, the States of Holland assumed full command over their own share of the States Army and appointed a French nobleman with connections to the Dutch Republic, the Rhinegrave of Salm, as the commander of their forces. The States of Holland, Utrecht, and various cities in Overijssel also agreed to a common defense pact against the Stadtholder, should he attack with

[375] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators*, p. 100-110; Joost Rosendaal, *De Nederlandse Revolutie,* p. 17-56.

his remaining forces. The city of Utrecht - a Patriot hotbed - transformed into a garrison of Patriot troops.[376]

In the spring of 1787, the political and military stalemate turned bloody. The Stadtholder's troops sought to seize a sluice near Vreeswijk, a town in the province of Utrecht, near the city of the same name. The attempt to secure the sluice was tactical. The Patriots could use it to inundate the countryside, an effective method of military defense in the Dutch Republic, and disrupt troop movements of the Stadtholder's forces. The Patriot garrison in Utrecht learned of the Stadtholder's move and dispatched troops to prevent the Stadtholder's forces from capturing the sluice. The opposing forces met near the town of Jutphaas and exchanged fire. Though this so-called Battle of Jutphaas was a minor skirmish with few casualties, it was a victory for the Patriots, militarily as well as in the press. The fallen troops were turned into martyrs for the Patriot cause. Cornelis Govert Visscher, one of the commanders who had perished in the Battle of Jutphaas, was lionized as a hero of the burghers fighting for Utrecht's city rights who had given his life willingly "to the Fatherland".[377]

Other events in the spring of 1787 also pushed the Republic to the brink of civil war. In Amsterdam, the Orangist ship carpenters (called the *Bijltjes* or little axes) had grown increasingly disaffected with the Patriots in control of the city. In the spring, tensions between the Orangists and the Patriots ran high, particularly when Patriots attacked Orangist clubs. In response, the fervently Orangist *Bijltjes* started a riot, having managed to get their hands on muskets and small canon from the Amsterdam Admiralty. The *Bijltjes* fortified themselves on Kattenburg Island - a small island in Amsterdam on which they built ships - and the Amsterdam

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[376] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators,* p. 111-132; Rosendaal, *De Nederlandse Revolutie,* p. 17-56.
[377] *Portret van Cornelis Govert Visscher,* by Pieter Hendrik Jonxis (1787), to be found at the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam.

government responded by sending in the Patriot militia to put them down.[378] The bloody suppression of the *Bijltjes* would live on beyond the Patriot Revolution, both in the Dutch language and culture. Even today the term *Bijltjesdag* (Little Axe Day) signifies a day of reckoning after a period of oppression.

The Patriots were initially on the winning end in this escalating contest, but the summer of 1787 ultimately tipped the scales in favor of the Orangists. A pivotal moment came in late June when Wilhelmina - the Stadtholder's wife and sister of the Prussian King - sought to defuse the tensions between the Patriots and Orangists. The first step was to try to convince the States of Holland to allow the Stadtholder to return to The Hague. Rumors that Wilhelmina would seek to travel to The Hague reached the Patriot militia of the city of Gouda, who set up a blockade on her expected route. Members of the Gouda militia arrested Wilhelmina at a small town called Goejanverwellesluis and placed her under guard on a farm. Wilhelmina later claimed to have been dishonored by being exposed to a drawn sword and was reportedly not even allowed to relieve herself in private. She was ultimately allowed to return to Nijmegen - where her husband temporarily resided - but the arrest infuriated Wilhelmina. Frustrated with the Patriots, Wilhelmina wrote a letter to her brother and the King of Prussia, Fredrick William II, informing him of the circumstances of her arrest.[379]

Wilhelmina's arrest at Goejanverwellesluis deeply insulted the Prussian King and proved politically convenient as well. The arrest provided a cause to the Prussians and the Stadtholder to defeat the Patriots by force, restore the Stadtholder's power, and undo the Patriot Revolution.

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[378] *Echte beschryving van het tumult, binnen Amsterdam, en byzonder op het eiland Kattenburg, voorgevallen op den 29 may 1787,* UvA Pfl. S v 10b.

[379] Arie Wiltschut, *Goejanverwellesluis. De strijd tussen patriotten en prinsgezinden, 1780-1787* (Hilversum, NL: Uitgeverij Verloren 2005); W.A. Knoops and F. Ch. Meijer, *Goejanverwellesluis. De aanhouding van de prinses van Oranje op 28 juni 1787 door het vrijkorps van Gouda* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij De Bataafsche Leeuw 1987).

During the summer of 1787, Prussia assembled an army of about 20,000 men at the Dutch border. The Prussian government demanded an apology to Wilhelmina and prosecution of the perpetrators by the States of Holland. Under pressure from the Patriot militias in Holland, the States refused to apologize. A Prussian invasion of the Dutch Republic soon followed. Patriots held out for a time in various places, most notably in Amsterdam and Friesland, but ultimately very few shots were fired. By October 1787, all Patriot forces had surrendered or retreated without putting up a fight.[380]

The defeat of the Patriots and the suppression of their revolution was in essence a restoration of the Stadtholder's rule before the 1780s, but the Orangists framed it as a great victory, even as a revolution in and of itself. Orangists widely celebrated the Prussian victory. The *Bijltjes* presented the Prussian invasion as revenge for the suppression of their uprising by derisively calling the Patriots "the so-called sons of liberty".[381] Meanwhile, Orangist soldiers took revenge on the country's most famous Patriot. They used gunpowder to blow up the grave of van der Capellen, who had died unexpectedly in 1784. The Orangist restoration was compared to 1747 and even the Glorious Revolution of 1688, a moment in which the "independence" and "religion" of the Dutch Republic were restored. The Prussians, meanwhile, marked the victory over the Patriots by building the Brandenburger Tor (Brandenburg Gate), a distinctive monument in Berlin, supposedly as a symbol of peace.[382]

The Orangist restoration was devastating to the Patriots, destroying the movement and the institutions it had built in the preceding decade. Local Patriot governments were overhauled

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[380] Schama, *Patriots and Liberators,* p. 124-135.
[381] *Triumph zang, der zoo lang verdrukte eilanders, van Kattenburg, Wittenburg en Oostenburg, verlost door den heere van de onderdrukking, en het geweld der zoogenaamde vryheids-zoonen,* Amsterdam Rijksmuseum Research Library, Depot RPK.
[382] Zitha Pöthe, *Perikles in Preußen. Die Politik Friedrich Wilhelms II. im Spiegel des Brandenburger Tores* (Berlin: epubli GmbH 2014).

in favor of Orangist *regenten* and the militias were undone through massive firearm collection campaigns in late 1787. Without its weapons and its leaders, the Patriot militias - and with that, the Patriot movement - disappeared from the Dutch Republic.

Chapter Eight: A Revolutionary Constitution

The outbreak of the Anglo-Dutch War in late 1780 allowed the Americans to start diplomatic negotiations on Dutch recognition of the United States as well as to procure loans for the cash-strapped American government. As the Patriot Revolution and the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War unfolded, however, the Americans increasingly retreated from the Dutch Republic and from Europe generally. With Dutch recognition and a Dutch loan secured in late 1782, the Congress and the American commissioners in Paris were soon preparing to end the American Revolutionary War. John Adams formally remained the United States of America's minister to the Netherlands after his departure to Paris for peace treaty negotiations. But the role of US minister effectively passed on to Charles Dumas, who in the mid-1780s was predominantly occupied with seeking financial compensation for his years of unpaid work for the American government. The official end of the war in 1783 normalized America's role in diplomacy, as it was recognized "among the powers of the Earth". Subsequently, American independence was no longer an important issue in European geopolitics.[383]

But much like in the Dutch Republic, the end of the American Revolutionary War in 1783 nevertheless heralded a transformative period for the United States. The constitutions of the various states as well as the Articles of Confederation that bound the states together during the war presented an opportunity to maintain the kind of Patriot government the Americans had revered in the previous decades. Yet American interpretations of what Patriotism meant in practice were considerably more divisive than their common agreement on the principles that fomented their revolution. The Articles of Confederation provided adequate cohesion among the states to win the war. But the Congress became increasingly divided after peace was concluded,

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[383] Eliga Gould, *Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2014).

particularly regarding the economy and government debt. Meanwhile, civil unrest confronted the state governments. Simultaneously, animosities grew between the individual states on matters of politics and economics.

In response to these issues, various American leaders sought to empower the central government to save the Patriot Republic from what they believed to be the road to dissolution of the United States. Other Patriots disagreed that American Patriotism needed saving through the centralization of political power. Instead, they wanted to conserve Patriotism under the Articles of Confederation, based on the same principles that supporters of a federal constitution used. This political battle over the meaning of the American Patriot Republic and the procedural and constitutional implications of the ideology of Patriotism initiated what Pauline Maier has called a "dialogue between power and liberty" in the Early American Republic. This dialogue profoundly shaped the United States Constitution of 1789 as well as the Bill of Rights of 1791 and ultimately cemented Patriotism in the United States government.[384]

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During the War of Independence, the American revolutionaries had established new forms of government in their respective states. Once peace was concluded, these governments were confronted with a host of challenges. During the war, the governments under the Articles of Confederation of 1777 - the original constitution of the United States that enumerated the powers of the confederal government - were relatively unified when Congress' priority was securing independence from Great Britain. It would take years before each state would ratify it, but the Articles were mostly uncontroversial. They essentially enumerated the tasks the Continental Congress had been responsible for since at least 1775, such as foreign policy, postal services, and

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[384] Pauline Maier, *Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2010), p. 468.

regulating the armed forces. Under the Articles, each state received one vote in the Congress - regardless of how many delegates it sent or the size of its population and territory - while resolutions required a nine-state majority, and alterations to the Articles needed unanimity. Taxation powers, however, were not granted to the Continental Congress. The lack of taxation powers had complicated financing the war as it was fought. After the war, the absence of taxation powers made governing increasingly difficult when collective debts were owed.[385] The Congress found it difficult to provide back pay to Continental Army soldiers. The enlisted men had received irregular salaries during the Revolutionary War. They demanded payment when the fighting had ended, money which Congress proved unable to raise. These financial difficulties prompted the Pennsylvania Mutiny of 1783. The unrest that followed the war forced Congress to relocate throughout the 1780s, first from Philadelphia to Trenton and later to Annapolis and New York City.[386]

Problems related to economy and trade confronted state governments too. A general downturn in the economy combined with the burden of revolutionary war debt in the mid-1780s put the states under pressure, but no obligation, to pay back debts. Meanwhile, the individual states created their own transatlantic and interstate commerce problems. Their sovereignty allowed them to enact tariffs and other trade regulations, even against each other. Financial issues within states also led to insurrection, most notably Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1787. Shays' Rebellion broke out as a result of collection of longstanding debts that rural farmers owed merchants in Boston. The merchants, in turn, had to pay back debts to European creditors

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[385] George William van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government: The Articles of Confederation and the Road to the Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2017); Gordon S. Wood, *The Making of the Constitution* (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press 1987).
[386] John A. Nagy, *Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution* (Yardley: Westholme 2008).

who only accepted hard currency, unimpressed with America's volatile paper currency. A privately financed army eventually suppressed the rebellion. Shays' Rebellion exposed the problems states had with handling their finances, as well the Confederation's inability to raise an army quickly, both against domestic insurrections and possible future foreign invasions.[387]

Several American political leaders increasingly viewed a stronger national government as the solution to the problems that they believed threatened the experiment of Patriotism in America. A series of successes in solving interstate commerce disputes encouraged national leaders - the venerated George Washington, among others - to push for amendments to the Articles of Confederation. The Mount Vernon conference of 1785 was the first example of interstate cooperation and dispute settlement because it solved issues regarding the rights of navigation on the waterways between Virginia and Maryland. The conference also laid the groundwork for the Annapolis Convention of 1786. The Annapolis Convention lacked the power and sufficient representation from all the states to enforce a set of resolutions. But the Convention was largely in agreement that interstate commerce issues needed to be solved further. The Convention called all states to send delegates to convene in Philadelphia the following year to amend the existing Articles of Confederation.[388] As James Madison would put it decades later, the Philadelphia Convention had to decide whether "the American experiment was to be a blessing to the world, or to blast for ever the hopes which the republican cause had inspired".[389]

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[387] Robert A. Gross, "A Yankee Rebellion? The Regulators, New England, and the New Nation", *New England Quarterly* 82 (2009), p. 112-135; Leonard L. Richards, *Shays's Rebellion: The American Revolution's Final Battle* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 2002); Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government*.
[388] Van Cleve, *We Have Not a Government;* Wood, *The Making of the Constitution*.
[389] James Madison to John G. Jackson, December 28, 1821, *The Papers of James Madison*, *Retirement Series,* vol. 2, J. C. A. Stagg ed. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press 2010) p. 441–444.

Madison's grand expectations of the convention motivated him to come prepared with a proposal to preserve American Patriotism, known as the Virginia Plan. When the delegates met in Philadelphia in May of 1787, a significant number of them quickly agreed that the convention should work to create a new federal constitution rather than merely amend the existing Articles. The delegates were partially motivated by fears arising from unrest such as the recent Shays' Rebellion as well as by the more general political problems in the central government. Since Madison was the only delegate with a mode for a new central government, the debates at the convention quickly shifted to his plan.

Safeguarding the Patriot Republic from imbalance and popular convulsions was at the forefront of Madison's mind when he devised the procedural technicalities of the Virginia Plan. Much like *het Leids Ontwerp* and other Dutch Patriot proposals for constitutional reform, Madison designed the new federal government to be representative of the people but also insulated from the people's passions. In the Virginia Plan, the people would directly elect the first branch of the legislature, whereas the second branch would be elected by the first. The combined legislature would elect the chief executive of the federal government as well the judicial branches. These measures insulated the appointment of various government offices from any direct influence of the popular will.

The convention's discussions on Madison's Virginia Plan largely centered on the practical, procedural implications of implementing Patriot ideas in the new national government. All delegates agreed in principle on a balanced republican form of government, demonstrating their shared adherence to Patriotism as a guiding ideology. But the debates quickly demonstrated that various delegates disagreed on how to implement it. One of the first discussions of the convention centered on the role of the people in the election of the new federal government.

Elbridge Gerry - a delegate from Massachusetts and an important proponent of American independence in the previous decade - considered many of the current state constitutions too democratic. Gerry believed these democratic forms of government should not be replicated nationally. He argued that "the people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots." Shays' Rebellion demonstrated to Gerry "the danger of the levilling spirit". In contrast, George Mason - another future Anti-Federalist for entirely different reasons than Gerry's - and Madison argued that the people should have a significant say in the new federal government. Their power would primarily run through the legislature which would be the "grand depository of the democratic principle", as Mason put it. Madison, in particular, also considered the people's voice in the national government essential to providing a firmer foundation of the national government. At the same time, Madison argued that there should be limits on the power of the people, with only the first branch of the legislature directly elected.[390]

Creating a balanced federal government that simultaneously preserved Patriotism in the United States government also dominated the convention's discussions on the role of the executive. During these discussions, the fall of the idea of the Patriot King in 1776 loomed in the back of the delegates' minds. Many delegates feared that the executive's powers would continuously expand to become a monarchy and proposed several methods to limit the executive's natural inclination to expand its powers. Some delegates, George Mason in particular, reasoned that the best way to avoid a tyrant and a monarchy in the United States was to have an executive branch of three people rather than one. Each of the three executives would represent a region of the United States, specifically the North, Middle, and South. Others - most notably Elbridge Gerry and Pierce Butler from South Carolina - argued that a split executive

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[390] James Madison Notes, May 31, 1787, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Volume 1,* ed. Max Farrand (New Haven: Yale University Press 1911), p. 47-55.

would only encourage factionalism inside the branch itself. Each executive would look after their regional interests and unnecessarily hamstring the government.[391] In his response to the argument that a split executive would be ineffective, Mason agreed that a three-person executive might govern more ineffectively in theory, particularly when marshaling armies in times of war. But in a true Patriot fashion Mason argued that a Patriot Republic would compensate for this with a citizen's army. "Every husbandman", Mason argued, "will be quickly converted into a soldier when he knows and feels that he is to fight not in defence of the rights of a particular family, or a prince, but for his own." Mason even invoked the principle of *pro aris et focis* (for house and hearth), not coincidentally the name of several burgher societies and militia groups during the Patriot Revolution in the Dutch Republic. According to Mason, citizen's armies would fight harder if they fought for their own rights and country.[392] Patriotism, Mason argued, would triumph over any kind of theoretical benefit that a single executive would possess.

In a similar vein, the skepticism of executive power baked into transatlantic Patriotism after American independence dominated the Convention's discussion on other issues regarding the executive, such as the manner of appointment, his veto powers over the legislature, and even his salary. Benjamin Franklin argued that an executive invariably seeks to become a monarch. Franklin posited that there are "two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men … ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money". Therefore, Franklin reasoned that the executive should have no salary or veto powers. Instead, the executive should be a "post of *honor*" rather than a "place of profit", a kind of argument that Dutch Patriots would have heartily supported as a dismantling of their much-hated "Aristocracy". Similarly, Franklin posited that the people have "a natural inclination … to Kingly Government [because it] gives

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[391] Madison's Notes, *Records, vol. 1*. June 1, 1787, p. 63-70.
[392] K. M. Rowland, *Life of George Mason, Volume 2* (New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons 1892), p. 112-115.

more of the appearance of equality among Citizens". Therefore, the people are easily seduced into giving the executive what he wants, such as land, money, and power.[393] Franklin also feared that the executive could sell his veto powers to the highest bidder, as he argued the governor of the colony of Pennsylvania had in the past.[394]

Madison's Virginia Plan originally had the legislature choose the executive, largely because the representatives were deemed wiser and more informed than the average citizen. In some ways, these ideas reflected the staged elections that the Dutch Patriots proposed. The discussions at the Convention, however, quickly turned to the deleterious effects of this system. The executive would be dependent on the legislature for his ascent to power and so the executive and the legislature could conspire to control the government. After much discussion, the Convention settled on a staged election through an electoral system in which the people would choose electors who were then deputized to vote for the executive. The electoral system would ensure that the people's passions and predisposition towards chaos would not spill over into the executive, while simultaneously preventing the imbalance of a conspiracy between the executive and the legislature.

In addition to debating the balance within the federal government, delegates also held discussions on the balance of power between the state and federal governments. There was a broad agreement among the delegates that the Articles of Confederation had created a dysfunctional relationship between the state governments and the Congress. But the delegates nevertheless debated which powers the states would retain - if any - under the new constitution. In the Convention's discussions, Madison proved to be most skeptical of state power and the most supportive of the increased power of the new national government. He particularly argued

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[393] Madison's Notes, June 2, 1787, *Records, vol. 1*, p. 79-89.
[394] Madison's Notes, June 4, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 98-101.

against the delegates who reasoned that the Virginia Plan would create a system in which states with a greater population - "larger states" - would overpower states with a smaller population, or "smaller states".[395]

An alternative to the Virginia Plan substantiated the complaints of the smaller states. This plan, commonly referred to as the New Jersey Plan, would essentially retain the Articles of Confederation and leave much of the political powers at the state level, except that the new federal government would gain taxation powers and would be chartered to manage interstate commerce. Madison reasoned that the New Jersey Plan would solve none of the problems the Articles had created. Indecisiveness, paralysis, and chaos plagued the United States under the Articles. According to Madison, the New Jersey Plan would perpetuate these problems because it retained the one vote per state procedure. Moreover, Madison argued, larger states would be more likely to bully smaller states in a confederation. Madison used the Dutch Republic as an example to argue that larger provinces - such as the province of Holland - dominated the smaller provinces, even in a confederation in which the provinces were nominally equal.[396] In any case, Madison posited, the real political divisions in the United States were not smaller versus larger states, but northern versus southern states. Franklin likewise objected to the New Jersey Plan. He argued that it could create a government in which the minority of the people could rule over the majority. In the new federal system - as the proponents of the Virginia Plan envisioned it - the complaints of the smaller states were unjustified.[397]

Despite the arguments put forth by Madison and Franklin, delegates from the smaller states were not convinced their rights would be safeguarded under the Virginia Plan,

[395] Madison's Notes, June 15, 1787, *Records, vol. 1*, p. 242-245.
[396] Robert Yates' Notes, June 19, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 294-301.
[397] Yates' Notes, June 29, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 470-476.

necessitating a compromise to mitigate their concerns. The solution to the disagreement came from Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman - delegates from Connecticut and longstanding Patriots - who argued for a mixed government that was part federal, part national. Sherman and Ellsworth proposed that the first branch of the legislature - chosen directly by the people - would remain proportionally represented as in the Virginia Plan. At the same time, the second branch of the legislature - proposed to be elected by state legislatures - would be apportioned per state, like in the Articles of Confederation and in line with the New Jersey Plan.[398]

Delegates regularly deployed the example of the Dutch Republic to demonstrate how the American Patriot Republic could be safeguarded under the new constitution. When the delegates debated the merits of a single or three-person executive, Franklin argued that the Dutch Republic's Stadtholder had likewise historically proven to be an aspiring monarch. Franklin was a little hazy on some of the details of Dutch history. He believed Stadtholder-King William III was the son of William the Silent, even though he was in reality the Silent's great-grandson. Franklin was nevertheless aware of the Stadtholder's elevation to a hereditary office in 1747 as well as the developments surrounding the Patriot Revolution. Franklin mentioned that "the present Stadthder. is ready to wade thro' a bloody civil war to the establishment of a monarchy".[399] Likewise, the well-known corruption and ungovernability of the Dutch Republic stood out as an example not to follow for the United States under the new constitution. Madison argued that a government should be able to amend "defects" of the system of government, the inability of which plagued the current states - such as his native Virginia - as well as the Dutch who "have made four several attempts to amend their system without success".[400] Much like

[398] Yates' Notes, June 29, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 470-476.
[399] Madison's Notes, June 4, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 98-104.
[400] Yates' Notes, June 29, 1787, *Records, vol. 1,* p. 476.

during the imperial crisis, the Dutch Republic primarily served as a reminder to the Americans of how to avoid the downfall of a quintessentially Patriot Republic.

When compromise was reached on the myriad of procedures with which the new federal constitution could safeguard the American Patriotism, the delegates in favor of the constitution were immediately tasked with convincing the states - and by extension the electorate - of ratifying the document. This effort started just before the convention ended in September 1787, when the various delegates were allowed to give their opinion on the final document. Particularly revealing was Franklin's closing speech, in which he defended the constitution's compromises based on Patriot principles. Franklin admitted that the document was not perfect, although he stipulated that he had come to learn at old age that he was not "in possession of all truth". Franklin nevertheless supported "this Constitution with all its faults". He supported it not only because he believed a national government was necessary, but also because the administration of good government depends as much on the virtue of its people as it does on the exact form it takes. Patriot government, Franklin argued, "can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of any other." Always aware of the value of good press, Franklin urged the other delegates to avoid publicly explaining the problems of the constitution to their constituents. Instead, he urged them to argue in favor of its ratification.[401]

Despite Franklin's calls to project unanimity on the proposed constitution to domestic and foreign audiences, the ratification process proved considerably more polarized than he had wished. Again, Patriotism proved to be more contentious in practice than it did in theory. In some states, such as Delaware, ratification was unanimous or at least passed relatively smoothly.

[401] Madison's Notes, September 17, 1787, *Records, vol. 2,* p. 641-644.

In other states, however, resistance was stronger, not in the least because several delegates of the convention ultimately opposed ratification of the document. Particularly in New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia, resistance arose against the powers vested in the new government, which some considered too great. The proponents of the constitution started a publicity offensive to counter the opposition to ratification. The most well-known of these public campaigns for ratification was the one created by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison in New York. The three proponents of the new federal constitution authored a long series of essays under the pseudonym 'Publius' to sway public opinion towards ratification. The Federalist Papers, as they would later be called, provided the most thorough and holistic arguments in favor of ratification. Their pamphlets were not just printed in New York but across the United States.

The Federalist essays intended to represent the framers of the new constitution as a united front to argue that the Constitution was the only way to preserve America's Patriot Republic. Even though Hamilton, Madison, and Jay had their disagreements during the convention, 'Publius' spoke with one voice in favor of the compromises that created the proposed constitution. In their attempts to assuage the skeptics of the new constitution, the Federalists generally argued that the constitution was necessary because the alternative of continuing under the Articles would eventually produce chaos that would tear the United States apart. Building on the traditional Patriot discourse of societies in a continuous struggle between power and liberty, the Federalist essays sought to demonstrate that the Constitution would create a "more perfect Union" balancing the various interests in society to preserve American liberty that had been achieved with independence from Great Britain.

The Federalist authors leaned heavily on Patriot discourse in their defense of the new Constitution. They defended its procedural reforms as a better safeguard of Patriotism in

America than the supposed idealism of the Constitution's opponents and the Articles of Confederation they supported. In Federalist no. 6, Hamilton argued that the states would invariably go to war if the United States remained a confederacy. To demonstrate how a civil war could just as easily happen in the United States as in Europe, Hamilton used the Patriot argument that a lack of virtue and the proclivity to passions in individuals could lead republics astray.

> Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?

The Dutch Republic was such an example of a fallen republic. It had been continuously at war since its founding, Hamilton argued. The Dutch were true Patriots, having "had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the opponents of Louis XIV." The Constitution, according to Hamilton, stripped the American Republic of its supposed infallibility. It would create a government with realistic procedures that prevented the destruction of Patriotism, like what unfolded in the Dutch Republics.

> Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful

> dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue?[402]

The Federalists' argument on the practicality of the Constitution versus the idealism of its detractors even substantiated some of the document's more controversial elements, in particular those that were related to the militia and the armed forces of the United States. In the late 1780s, Americans still broadly accepted the idea that standing armies were a danger to liberty. But the Federalists defended the Constitution's provisions that nationalized the state militias and placed relatively few limits on raising and maintaining a standing army in times of peace.

In the Federalists no. 24 through 28, Hamilton provocatively argued that there was nothing particularly harmful about the federal government keeping a standing army in times of peace. The safeguards built into the Constitution prevented it from becoming an instrument of tyranny. Using Patriot ideas on balance in government, Hamilton argued that the Constitution split the war powers - including the raising and commanding of the armed forces - between the legislature and the executive. Moreover, the proposed Constitution provided that the legislature would have the power to raise funds raised for a federal army. The legislature would also reevaluate these expenditures every two years, which allowed the people's representatives to eliminate funding for the army should it no longer be necessary. Likewise, the president's position would be limited to commanding the forces and not raising them. Moreover, Hamilton reasoned, conspiracies that "subvert the liberties of a great community *require time* to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those liberties, could only be

[402] Federalist No. 6, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds George W. Cary and James McClellan. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 23-26.

formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a combination would exist at all?"[403] Similar to what van der Capellen argued in his *Aan het Volk van Nederland* in 1781, Hamilton also argued that a standing army and a navy were necessary in some form or another. Foreign and Indian powers surrounded the United States. Future conflict, particularly as the United States was expected to expand westward, should therefore be expected.

Madison later contributed to this debate in the Federalist Papers with a more classic Patriot defense of a standing army under the new Constitution. Echoing Patriot thought on balance in government and society at large, Madison underlined that a standing army would never be able to withstand the power of the combined arms of the citizens of the United States if the government truly oppressed the liberties of the people. Like in the American Revolution, the state governments, with the people on their side, could create a force of about half a million militiamen. This army of citizens would easily overpower any force that the federal government could muster. In addition to an armed population, the American attachment to local governments that had the power to appoint officers in state militias "forms a barrier against the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a simple government of any form can admit of."[404]

These Patriot arguments similarly supported the Federalist position on the nationalization of the militias. Hamilton argued that the nationalization of the militias arranged in the Constitution was not an affront to liberty because the states retained control over the

[403] Federalist No. 26, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 130-131.
[404] Federalist No. 46, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 247-248.

appointment of officers and the federal government was composed of the people's representatives. Moreover, Hamilton posited, it would prove impossible to deploy the militias in the oppression of civil liberties. After all, the militias were composed of the people themselves and would therefore never participate in such an endeavor. "Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens?", Hamilton asked rhetorically.[405]

Finally, as was common in other Patriot writings, historical examples featured prominently in the Federalists' arguments. They sought to demonstrate how the Constitution would prevent the fall of confederated governments and therefore safeguard the Patriot Republic, as had happened in the past. Hamilton, Jay, and Madison leaned on various examples throughout their publicity campaign. But they also dedicated specific essays to these historical examples. Federalist No. 18 discussed the Amphictyonic League of ancient Greece and how discord among its members led to weak decision-making, an imbalance of power among the members, and foreign corruption.[406] In a similar vein, Federalist No. 20 was wholly devoted to the Dutch Republic. Hamilton and Madison characterized the Dutch Republic as a country with "imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war." The Dutch Republic lacked, in other words, a virtuous citizenry and a Patriot government. Like the Dutch Patriots themselves, Hamilton and Madison blamed this situation partially on the "calamities produced by the stadtholdership". They also considered the "United Netherlands [as] … a confederacy of … aristocracies". Unlike the Dutch Patriots, however, the Federalists understood the original

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[405] Federalist No. 29, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 143.

[406] Federalist No. 18, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 84-89.

constitution of the Dutch Republic to be fundamentally flawed, probably in part to substantiate their support for their own proposed Constitution that empowered a centralized government. Even without the Stadtholder, “the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would long ago have dissolved it”. According to Hamilton and Madison, even “the true patriots” of the Dutch Republic believed that the country’s system of government needed to be nationalized to function effectively and not be torn apart by regional factions. Hamilton and Madison expressed hope in the Patriot Revolution, even though they were evidently unaware that the Prussian invasion had already suppressed the Dutch Patriots by the time their essay was published in December 1787.[407]

Federalist arguments in favor of the Constitution were met with opposition from various influential individuals during the ratification process, whose arguments were likewise deeply grounded in Patriot political thought. Some scholars have described the Anti-Federalists, the faction opposing the Constitution, as the more ‘democratic’ wing of American politics during the 1780s. Yet the Anti-Federalists were hardly a unified force and contained both moderate as well as more radical voices. Like the Federalists, the Anti-Federalists shared a strong adherence to Patriot principles. They deployed Patriot ideas to resist ratification and wrote essays in newspapers across the United States to demonstrate how the proposed Constitution would destroy American Patriotism rather than safeguard it. The Anti-Federalists had no real equivalent of the coordinated campaign that Hamilton, Jay, and Madison had accomplished in New York. But Anti-Federalist arguments proved nevertheless effective at forming a meaningful political coalition against the Federalist factions in various states. By participating in this debate,

[407] Federalist No. 20, in *The Federalist Papers*, eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 95-98.

they ultimately managed to extract a monumental concession from proponents of the Constitution in the form of the Bill of Rights.

Arguably the most prominent Anti-Federalist was Patrick Henry, a staunch Patriot who delivered the famous "Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death" speech during the Revolution. In the summer of 1788, Henry became a delegate to Virginia's Ratifying Convention. In his speeches on the convention floor, Henry railed against the Constitution's provisions. Henry framed the Constitution as an anti-Patriot governmental compact that would enable tyranny in America. The Constitution, Henry argued, would bring America's "privileges and rights … in danger", such as the ability to resist a tyrannical government with a militia composed of the people. The Constitution would give the states the authority to appoint the officers, but "if they [the Congress] neglect or refuse to discipline or arm our militia, they will be useless: the States can do neither, this power being exclusively given to Congress."[408] In addition, Henry was worried about the tyrannical impulses of the president in the new Constitution. Unlike many of his Federalist opponents, Henry no longer believed in the usefulness of a Patriot King, even if he was an elected public servant. The executive position, Henry argued, was given so much power that it "squints towards monarchy: And does not this raise indignation in the breast of every American? Your President may easily become King". According to Henry, the powerful executive as well as the "imperfectly constructed" Senate imbalanced the government, which led him to argue that there were no checks in this Constitution. It gave power to politicians to "perpetrate the worst of mischiefs".[409]

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[408] Patrick Henry's Speech at Virginia Ratification Convention, June 5, 1788 in *The Essential Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers,* ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 2003), p. 30-33.
[409] Patrick Henry's Speech at Virginia Ratification Convention, June 7, 1788 in *Debates and Other Proceedings of the Convention of Virginia, convened at Richmond, on Monday the Second Day of June, 1788, for the purpose of deliberating on the Constitution recommended by the Grand Federal Convention* (Richmond: Enquirer Press 1805), p. 52.

Henry was likewise not convinced of the Federalists' much-repeated claim that failure to ratify the Constitution would destroy the American Patriot Republic. "Is there a disposition in the people of this country to revolt against the dominion of laws? Has there been a single tumult in Virginia? … Is there any revolution in Virginia?"[410] Henry argued that the proposed Constitution would turn the United States into the Dutch Republic rather than prevent them from going down the same path. "We are … frightened by dangers from Holland", Henry warned. "We must … escape the wrath of that republic. Holland groans under a government like this new one. A stadtholder, sir, a Dutch president, has brought on that country miseries which will not permit them to collect debts with fleets or armies".[411] Henry also considered the current Confederation more than capable of effective government. Henry argued that the government under the Articles of Confederation "carried us through a long and dangerous war: It rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation: It has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses."[412] Why change the government and invite tyranny, if the current one already constitutes a grand Patriot Republic?

Anti-Federalists, in various publications that were printed across the United States, deployed Patriot arguments, only they did so to defend America from what they believed to be a dangerous Constitution. In Massachusetts, an Anti-Federalist author wrote a series of essays against the Constitution under the pseudonym "John DeWitt". His pseudonym was a deliberate reference to the seventeenth-century Grand Pensionary of Holland Johan de Witt, revered by Patriots - both in the Netherlands and abroad - as a defender of liberty. In classic Patriot fashion,

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[410] Patrick Henry's Speech, p. 52

[411] Jonathan Elliot, ed., *The Debates, Resolutions, and Other Proceedings in Convention, of the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia, on the 17th of September 1787: With the Yeas and Nays on the Decision of the Main Question*, Volume II, (Washington, 1828), p. 135.

[412] Patrick Henry's Speech at Virginia Ratification Convention, June 5, 1788.

DeWitt regarded the federal Constitution as incapable of stemming people's passions, particularly of the politicians in power. If the United States would "establish this Government which is unanimously confessed imperfect, yet incapable of alteration … [they would be] subject to the same unbounded passions and infirmities as yourselves, possessed with an insatiable thirst for power, and many of them, carrying in them vices, tho' tinsel'd and concealed, yet, in themselves, not less dangerous than those more naked and exposed."[413] DeWitt even sought to validate his essay with the argument that the debates on ratification "required a cool, dispassionate examination, and a thorough investigation, previous to its adoption", of which his work was supposedly an example.[414]

Similarly, DeWitt devoted one of his essays entirely to the Constitution's novel provisions on the militia. DeWitt viewed these provisions in a somewhat conspiratorial light, which, as Bernard Bailyn has noted, was a hallmark of Patriot political thought in this period.[415] DeWitt referred to the Patriot canon and argued that the framers of the Constitution deliberately placed control over the militias in the hands of the national government, which allowed that government to raise a standing army in times of peace to purposefully infringe on the people's liberties. "It is asserted by the most respectable writers upon Government", DeWitt wrote, "that a well regulated militia, composed of the yeomanry of the country have ever been considered as the bulwark of a free people." Yet the framers of the Constitution placed little authority over the militia in the hands of the states, except for the power to appoint the officers which DeWitt

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[413] DeWitt No. 3 in Essays by John DeWitt (*Boston American Herald,* October-December 1787), Herbert J. Storing ed. *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981), Volume 4, p. 15-40.
[414] DeWitt No. 2 in Essays by John DeWitt (*Boston American Herald,* October-December 1787), Herbert J. Storing ed. *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981), Volume 4, p. 15-40.
[415] Bailyn, "A Note on Conspiracy", *Ideological Origins*, p. 144-160.

considered “an insult, rather than a priveledge”. DeWitt warned that under these circumstances, a standing army would replace the militias. He asked the supporters of the Constitution to name an example “in any country, in the Old or New World, where they [standing armies] have not finally done away the liberties of the people”.[416]

More radical voices than Henry and DeWitt appeared among the Anti-Federalists as well. An essayist who called himself “Montezuma” wrote a sharp tract in the *Independent Gazetteer* that derided the Constitution in quintessential Patriot terms. Montezuma’s satirical version of the Constitution started his preamble with “We the Aristocratic party of the United States … submit to our Friends in the first class for their inspection, the following defense of our monarchical, aristocratical democracy”. Using satire, Montezuma accused the framers of combining the worst kinds of governments into one. Montezuma largely viewed the Constitution as a document that allowed elites to wrestle power from the common people and abolish the Patriot Republic. The elites would accomplish the oppression of liberty either through the creation of a monarchical executive - “we thought proper to adopt [the title president] in conformity to the prejudices of a silly people who are so foolishly fond of a Republican government, that we were obliged to accommodate in names and forms to them … but we all know that Cromwell was a King, with the title of Protector” - or through the abolition of state sovereignty. Like Henry and DeWitt, Montezuma also considered the nationalization of the militia as well as the government’s power to raise a standing army in peacetime as threats to liberty. “When we and we alone have the power to wage war and make peace … organize the militia and crush insurrections assisted by a noble body of veterans subject to our nod, which we have the power of raising and keeping even

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[416] DeWitt No. 5 in Essays by John DeWitt (*Boston American Herald,* October-December 1787), Herbert J. Storing ed. *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981), Volume 4, p. 15-40.

in the time of peace. What have we to fear from state legislatures or even from states, when we are armed with such powers?"[417]

Most of the Federalists understood the Anti-Federalist criticisms, in part because they had expressed some of these themselves in secret at the convention. The Federalists eventually sought to compromise with the more moderate Anti-Federalists to ratify the Constitution in the states where opposition was strongest. In addition to the complaints on the aristocratic and monarchical nature of the Constitution, a lack of a bill of rights that would explicitly enumerate the rights of the citizens and the limits of federal power disturbed the Anti-Federalists. Its absence was proof that the Constitution could be used as an instrument of tyranny. At first, this criticism rang hollow with the Federalists. They argued that the Articles of Confederation, as well as various state constitutions, did not include a bill of rights either and thus such a bill was not an essential feature of a Patriot Republic.[418] This argument proved insufficient to convince the Anti-Federalists, however. The debates at the ratifying conventions in states like Massachusetts and New York became increasingly vicious. In Massachusetts, Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry and Federalist delegate Francis Dana got into a fistfight on the floor of the convention, after Gerry was not allowed to speak. Anti-Federalists - and prominent Patriots - Samuel Adams and John Hancock eventually agreed to ratification if a bill of rights was included that would enumerate the inalienable rights that the Patriots valued most and the federal government could not infringe upon, despite its empowerment through the Constitution. Though there was more resistance in New York, their convention eventually voted for ratification too on the condition that a bill of rights would be passed.

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[417] Essay by Montezuma (Philadelphia *Independent Gazetteer* 17 October 1787), Herbert J. Storing ed. *The Complete Anti-Federalist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1981), Volume 3, p. 53-57.
[418] Federalist No. 38 and 84, in *The Federalist Papers,* eds. George W. Cary and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2001), p. 186-192 and 442-451.

After the First United States Congress met in 1791, Madison - elected to the House of Representatives for Virginia's fifth district - immediately started to work on a set of constitutional amendments that would form the Bill of Rights. He based the amendments on existing state constitutions as well as broadly supported Patriot ideas on the limits of government power. Madison originally proposed twenty amendments to the Constitution, including changes to the preamble. But the various House and Senate amendments to the Bill of Rights eventually submitted twelve amendments for ratification, only ten of which would ultimately be ratified in the 1790s. To counter the argument that the new federal government would constitute a tyranny, Madison's first proposals included various provisions that sought to limit the federal government's ability to infringe on the people's natural "rights and liberties". Madison not only reaffirmed the right "to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press". He also wrote a separate clause, hearkening back to the American Revolution, that the "people shall not be restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good; nor from applying to the legislature by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances." In a similar vein, Madison countered the Anti-Federalist argument that the new Constitution effectively disarmed the people. He added an amendment that limited the federal government's power over the people's right to "keep and bear arms" and organizing themselves in a "well armed and well regulated militia" as these were "the best security of a free country".[419] Almost all of Madison's clauses would eventually be scrapped, combined, or amended. But the spirit of Patriotism would continue to inform all drafts of the Bill of Rights, including the final one.

[419] Charles F. Hobson and Robert A. Rutland, eds., *The Papers of James Madison*, *Congressional Series*, vol. 12, March 2, 1789 – January 20, 1790 and supplement October 24, 1775 – January 24, 1789 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press 1979), p. 196-210.

The creation of the United States federal Constitution and the events of the Dutch Patriot Revolution - not to mention the outbreak of the French Revolution - have led scholars of European and American history to understand the 1780s as the decade that birthed modern democracy. The sources demonstrate that the 1780s was unquestionably a transformative decade. But neither the Dutch nor the American Patriots sought to overthrow the existing political order. They also did not seek to establish a form of government with the primary purpose of directly translating the popular will into government action. Likewise, the sources do not reveal an intent to establish a new aristocracy either, especially when one considers how much both the American and particularly the Dutch Patriots despised the aristocracy as they understood it. Instead, during the 1780s, both the American and Dutch Patriots aimed to restore and protect a mythologized social and political order based on virtue, balance, and liberty. They sought to create a Patriot Republic, a form of government they had actively promoted over the last four decades. The American and Dutch Patriots sought to make practical what had been largely criticisms of the existing political order based on the convergent political theories from the Patriot canon.

In the United States, the Patriots debated and created the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to preserve those "natural rights and privileges" they believed they had painstakingly clawed back from Great Britain during the Revolution. According to many American Patriots, the convulsions of the 1780s and historical precedent demonstrated that the Articles would eventually lead to civil war, discord among the States, and the end of Patriotism in the United States. The Constitution's proponents argued that the document's reforms would protect the

gains of the Revolution against the imbalance and turbulence that the Articles of Confederation generated. The Constitution, in other words, would safeguard the Patriot Republic - its balanced government, its virtuous public servants, and its armed citizenry - from the imbalance, vices, and decline that tormented nations like the Dutch Republic. The Constitution was intended as a practical attempt to conserve Patriotism, a revolutionary constitution created to "form a more perfect Union … and secure the Blessings of Liberty" for the Patriots themselves and their posterity.

In the Dutch Republic, restoring and preserving rights, liberties, and privileges likewise characterized the Patriot movement of the 1780s. According to the Patriots, the Dutch Constitution was originally a virtuous compact that the "Aristocrats" and their nepotistic practices had slowly degenerated. Only restoring the rights of the *burgerij* to representation, to participate in a militia, and to a virtuous government overseen by a disinterested Patriot Stadtholder would prevent the Dutch Republic from its imminent downfall. Despite Patriot victories and successes at reform throughout the 1780s, a Prussian army would ultimately shatter Dutch hopes of restoring the Patriot Republic of their imagination.

The start of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War in late 1780, then, launched the Dutch and American Patriots on separate yet still intimately connected trajectories. Due to their entangled histories on the periphery of the British Empire, their common ideological origins, and their shared historical consciousness during the previous four decades, the 1780s represented a climactic era for transatlantic Patriotism. And yet, when the French Revolution broke out in 1789, some Patriots believed that the revolutionary wave that had engulfed the Netherlands and North America had not ended. To Patriots across the Atlantic, the French revolutionary rhetoric of liberty, equality, and fraternity seemed to encapsulate their political program and promised the

establishment of yet another Patriot government. As the French Revolution radicalized and spread with its armies throughout Europe during the 1790s, however, the hopes of many Patriots would soon be shattered. They saw the French Republic descend into the chaos and tyranny they had so desperately sought to prevent in the previous four decades.

Conclusion

In January 1795, French revolutionary forces overran the Dutch Republic, prompting Stadtholder William V to flee to England. The Stadtholder's departure from the Netherlands signified the end of the Dutch Republic. It also heralded the dissolution of the Dutch Empire. William effectively handed the Dutch colonies over to the British government in his so-called Kew Letters, which he wrote to Dutch colonial officials during his exile in the United Kingdom.

Like the Netherlands, the United States was also affected by the French Revolution. The policy questions it raised - from providing political and military support to the naturalization of immigrants - deeply polarized George Washington's cabinet and American society at large. But in 1795, the Senate's ratification of the Jay Treaty definitively signaled that the United States government chose neutrality and trade with Great Britain over the revolutionary politics of France.

By the middle of the 1790s then, seemingly little was left of the unified Patriot Atlantic. The invasion of the French Revolutionary Army and the subsequent dissolution of the Dutch Republic meant that the Netherlands would continue to be embroiled in the instability of revolutionary politics. But in contrast to the 1780s, French revolutionary discourse dominated the Netherlands. The Batavians shared few substantial connections with the Americans, who had withdrawn themselves from the European continent. The U.S. Constitution, and the Patriot ideals it was based on, had created an American establishment that preferred neutral commerce and westward expansion over immersion in European affairs.

Even though the United States and the Dutch Republic had diverged dramatically from the period of entanglement and comity that had characterized earlier decades, their deep entanglements in the Patriot Atlantic would nevertheless echo into the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries. Starting in 1747, the Dutch Orangists unknowingly started the Patriot Atlantic phase of the Age of Revolution when they restored the power of the Stadtholderate and simultaneously demanded more popular say in government to counteract the nepotism of the ruling elites. The political discourse and objectives of the Orangist Patriot movement were rooted in the Patriot canon, the great hinterland of liberal, classical republican, and Enlightenment writings that seemingly explained the logic behind the state of liberty that the Dutch cherished. The Orangist Patriots had relatively moderate aims and succeeded only partially in their political objectives, namely the restoration of the Stadtholderate. But their Orangist Revolution foreshadowed the Patriot movements of subsequent decades and the revolutionary potential of Patriotism.

Before 1763, the Patriots in both the Netherlands and the American colonies had been primarily pro-British. But in the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, it increasingly gained an anti-British character. During the imperial crisis, the American colonists sought to reconcile their political convictions with their desire to be included in the expanding British Empire, the government of which did not care very much for American colonial arguments about taxation and representation grounded in Patriotism. The slow march of the American colonies towards independence ended the pro-British character of the Patriot Atlantic as well in the partial undoing of the idea of a Patriot King, a tenet that had hitherto been essential to Patriotism on both sides of the Atlantic.

Even without adhering to the idea of a Patriot King, Patriotism nevertheless continued to gain momentum in the United States under the banner of republicanism and across the Atlantic, largely as a result of transatlantic mercantile and political networks. Independence propelled the American revolutionaries to enlist European powers in their quest to be recognized "among the powers of the Earth". They not only sought alliances with traditionally anti-British forces like

France but also with the Dutch Republic, with whom they believed they shared ancient connections, economic opportunities, and political convictions. Since 1688, the Dutch government had generally allied itself with Great Britain. But during the 1750s and 1760s, the Dutch public became increasingly disaffected with the Stadtholder's government and its deference towards Britain which increasingly sought to exclude Dutch merchants from the lucrative Atlantic trade. American revolutionary ideas awakened nascent notions of Patriotism among the Dutch opposition and generated support, especially among the urban middle classes suffering under economic decline and a sclerotic government. The American promise of a revitalized political system and a burgeoning economy free from the shackles of British privateering became increasingly appealing to the Dutch opposition. Starting in 1775, Dutch sympathizers actively spread American propaganda in the Dutch Republic to build support for their own opposition movement.

In the 1780s, Patriotism was at its height in the revolutionary Atlantic World. The Dutch Patriots looked to America for novel procedural reforms to restore what they perceived to be the original constitution of their ancient Republic, including militias and the establishment of a limited form of popular sovereignty. Meanwhile, the American revolutionaries managed to defeat the British on the battlefield and secured their independence. American victory in 1783 heralded a moment of reflection on the workability of the kind of federation of states the Americans had established at home. Like the Dutch Patriots, the Americans looked across the Atlantic and into history to determine how best to build a government that maximized virtue, balanced power, adhered to the original governmental pacts as they understood them, and secured their decisively early-modern conceptions of liberty.

The Dutch Patriot Revolution ultimately failed in 1787 and the American adherence to Patriot ideals gradually faded and changed over time. But generations of Americans and Europeans would nevertheless continue to feel the impact of the Patriot Atlantic, especially during the 1790s. The French revolutionaries had a fundamentally different understanding of 'revolution' than the Patriots had espoused in previous decades, especially after the establishment of the First Republic in 1792. They did not regard themselves as restorers of an original constitution but rather the harbingers of a new world of reason, creating new institutions on the rubble of the old. Subsequently, during the debates over the constitution of the new Batavian Republic, a split emerged between the Federalists, who preferred a federal government based on the old Dutch Republic and the United States, and the Unitarians, who argued for a centralization of power based on the French model. American politics became similarly split between the Federalists and the Democrat-Republicans, who likewise tussled over the French Revolution and the proper allocation of political power. In this way, the radicalizing French Revolution held up an uncomfortable mirror to the Patriots in the Netherlands and the United States. The French Revolution forced them to question the validity of their relatively moderate revolutions. Had the Dutch Patriot Revolution of the 1780s been ambitious enough to ultimately get rid of the nepotism and corruption that haunted the old Dutch Republic? Should the United States be more ambitious with its revolutionary aims after securing its independence, participating in the transnational struggle against tyranny? Could the French revolutionary model displace that of the Patriot Atlantic? The Atlantic Patriots ultimately split on these questions, shaping both the Netherlands and the United States in the process.

Though most acutely experienced during the 1790s, the legacy of the Patriot Atlantic would also be felt beyond the French revolutionary era. The core tenets of Patriotism proved

especially enduring in the United States, where the federal and state constitutions enshrined Patriotism into America's common law system and broader political discourse. A glance at just the historical controversies surrounding the first and second amendments to the United States Constitution demonstrates the immense degree to which Patriot ideas continue to shape American lives.

Patriotism did not leave the same kind of legal and political footprint in the Netherlands as it did in the United States. Yet the legacy of the Patriot Atlantic in the Netherlands is more pronounced than it at first seems. In 1747, the Orangist Patriots elevated the Frisian line of the Stadtholders to hereditary rulers over all of the provinces in the Dutch Republic. The Orangist Patriots gave the Orange-Nassau family powers and legitimacy it previously did not possess and, to a certain extent, have since never truly abandoned. The descendants of Stadtholders William IV and V have remained kings and queens of the Netherlands to this day, albeit eventually constrained in their political power by constitutional limits. Moreover, the Dutch Patriots of the 1780s permanently placed concepts such as liberty, popular sovereignty, and representative government at the heart of Dutch - and eventually European - politics. Finally, the Dutch Patriots proved instrumental in undoing the Dutch Republic, a major European power for more than two centuries. The Dutch Patriots were therefore foundational to the modern Kingdom of the Netherlands and unintentionally helped set in motion a fundamental transformation of Europe.

Between 1747 and 1787, the Dutch and American Patriots sought to recapture an imagined past of virtue, balanced and representative government, prosperity in free commerce, and disinterested public leadership. The Dutch and American Patriots consumed the same canon of works, drew inspiration from each other, and created a vast web of transatlantic networks that would constitute the Patriot Atlantic. In their attempts to recreate this idealized society of liberty,

the Patriots not only shaped the four decades of the Patriot Atlantic in the eighteenth century. They also laid the foundations for the Age of Revolution and the world it created during the next two centuries.

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