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Author

O'Donnell, James H., III

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leave a dimension out of their work, but they also leave the cause of Indian claims without the historical ammunition it needs and deserves.

Mr. Carrico, has a unique opportunity here to dig for the truth—a truth that could make a difference for thousands of people. He does not need to be enticed into the righteous world of passive objectivity: That is the world of the pedestrian local scholars. Congratulations on the Award of Merit from the San Diego Historical Society, Mr. Carrico, but please recognize what it is and what it is not. No more travel logs. There is something more to be said here, and I believe Mr. Carrico can say it.

Van Hastings Garner
University of La Verne

The Iroquois Struggle for Survival: World War II to Red Power.
By Laurence M. Hauptman. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986. 328 pp. \$37.50 Cloth, \$15.95 Paper.

Those who wish to fathom the struggle for native American rights since World War II must read this volume by Laurence Hauptman. By detailing the internal and external difficulties of the Iroquois peoples from 1942 to 1974, the author exposes the basic nature of the resistance waged by America's native peoples in the twentieth century as similar to their ancestors' struggles in the seventeenth century. Cultural integrity and tribal continuity were the goals, whether fought against land-hungry settlers or modern creators of public works empires.

Building on the foundation laid in his study of the Iroquois and the New Deal, Hauptman argues that one cannot understand present day Iroquois dilemmas without first realizing the fundamental assumption that tribal status, land claims, and sovereignty rest on specific treaties made at the end of the American Revolution: Fort Stanwix in 1784; Jay in 1794; and Canandaigua in 1794.

It was then as autonomous people that the Senecas sought resolution of a long standing dispute with a number of non-Indian leaseholders in Salamanca, New York. In this instance, as usual, the Indian plaintiffs fought more than one adversary,

contending not only with the delinquent renters but also with the county and state governments. On this occasion, happily, a victory was won in 1942 when the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision favoring the Senecas.

The skirmish may have been won, but not the war. As Professor Hauptman explains, there was a backlash in the form of vengeful attitudes assumed by both local and state authorities in New York. Viewing the Supreme Court decision as a threat to their sovereignty, the county board of supervisors proposed in 1942 that none of the monies annually allotted for Indian social assistance be approved, since the Iroquois, by virtue of the implications in the court decision, were no longer under state jurisdiction. At the state level, moreover, authorities sought ways to reassert their control of the Iroquois. Indeed New York officials were delighted with the post war, post-New Deal Bureau of Indian Affairs which was advocating a plan under which tribes would be "freed" from federal control. Put less euphemistically, the new BIA policy was termination of special status for the tribes.

The congressional heavy in the post-war years was Senator Hugh Butler of Nebraska, pioneer descendant and chair of the Senate Committee on the Public Lands, who wished to end the special status of the Indians. Butler sought to accomplish this end by introducing (July 21, 1947) three bills which would place New York reservation Indians under both the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state courts, and perhaps most ominously for Iroquois sovereignty "provide for the settlement of certain obligations of the United States to the Indians of New York." The latter would approve a lump-sum payment instead of the annuity provided under the Treaty of Canandaigua. Approval of such action threatened both the Iroquois peoples and all other native groups, concludes Hauptman, since Public Law 280 was modeled after the Iroquois legislation of 1948 and 1950.

While the New York Iroquois struggled against this legislation, which one Seneca woman described as "spite bills" in retribution for the Salamanca decision, the Wisconsin Oneida and the Seneca-Cayuga likewise resisted governmental pressure urging them to give up their tribal status. Resolution of any problem concerning the Oneidas and the Seneca-Cayuga, moreover, was complicated by the relatively low land base of the two groups as

well as by bitter disagreements within the tribes. Like the Senecas, however, both groups opposed commutation of the 1794 treaty.

Whatever happened to the Iroquois during the late 1940s, the events of the next decade proved even more disruptive. Perhaps prophetic of coming events was the appointment in 1950 of a new commissioner of Indian Affairs, Dillon S. Meyer, who was recommended because of his experience in dealing with the relocation of a minority people (the Japanese-Americans during World War II).

Equally threatening to the Iroquois in the 1950's was the Indian policy of the executive branch, which was hidden from public view, unlike congressional policy. The most blatant example of presidential decision-making was the approval given for the construction of the Kinzua Dam by President Dwight Eisenhower. Despite fifteen million dollars in compensation, Seneca elders still have difficulty speaking of this event twenty years after the fact. As Hauptman relates:

The Seneca Nation's unsuccessful fight to save their ancestral lands was the most tragic event of their contemporary history. The . . . 125 million dollar Kinzua Dam broke a federal-Iroquois treaty . . . flooded . . . 9000 acres . . . ; destroyed the old Cold Spring Longhouse . . . ; caused the removal of 130 Indian families . . . ; and resulted in relocation of these same families . . . to . . . suburban-styled housing . . .

The movement for the Kinzua Dam had not begun during the Eisenhower Administration, but it was Ike's command decision in favor of the project which gave it final impetus. With the background of the Cold War pressuring him to match Russian public works accomplishments, one could expect Ike to approve Kinzua. Useful in implementing this project was the head of the White House Office of Public Works Planning, General John S. Bragdon, who was a West Point classmate of the president, a native of Pittsburgh, and former deputy chief of the Army Corps of Engineers. Accordingly, Bragdon was receptive to the Pittsburgh interests backing Kinzua, such as the Corps of Jones and Laughlin Steel, Carnegie Steel, Gulf Oil, and the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce.

Despite the powerful "iron triangle" of interests aimed at their

hearts, the Senecas rallied support wherever they could find it. For a time they had the backing of the governor of New York, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Friends Service, the Indian Rights Association, the Central Missionary Guild of the Presbyterian Church of America and well known writers such as Brooks Atkinson and Edmund Wilson. As the leader of their resistance the Senecas secured the services of Arthur E. Morgan, educator, environmentalist, and legendary foe of the Corps of Engineers. In the end, however, no coalition was strong enough to oppose the combined power of the presidency and the Pittsburgh special interest groups.

Like the frontier farmer of early America who demanded abundant acreage, public-works supporters of the 1950's required the same commodity in the name of improvement. Just as the Senecas lost land to those backing Kinzua, so the Iroquois peoples near the St. Lawrence would suffer at the hands of the seaway promoters.

A collusion of bi-national interests even more powerful than those behind the Kinzua project proposed development of the St. Lawrence Seaway, a massive reconstruction which would dramatically change the St. Lawrence and Niagara frontiers, ruin Indian fishing and cattle industries, and dislocate numbers of tribespeople. It is Professor Hauptman's contention that this conflict led to Red Power militancy among the Mohawks, permanently altering the world view of both the St. Regis (Akwesasne) and Caughnawaga communities. Out of the attempts to block construction came not only cooperation to gain some residual rights, but also the creation of the influential and widely read *Akwesasne Notes*. From his analysis of this project, the author concludes that at Caughnawaga the lands were purposely undervalued and that the relocation was carried out without the least sensitivity to Indian culture, ideas of sovereignty, or sense of place.

As if the Iroquois had not suffered enough at the hands of the power brokers during the Kinzua and St. Lawrence affairs, the state of New York decided it had to expand its Niagara power facilities at the expense of the Tuscarora. Like their kinspeople elsewhere, the Tuscarora rallied to oppose this take-over in every way possible, with much of the resistance organized by the Tuscarora clan mothers, like their forebears of old, rallying the people in defense of their lands. Again, however, the federal govern-

ment's power of eminent domain prevailed, at least according to the 1960 Supreme Court decision which went against the Tuscarora, 4 to 3.

Hardened by the experiences of 1942-1970, many Iroquois groups entered the 1970's in sympathy with activism. Against New York they directed pressure concerning the state's possession of sacred wampum, the control of Indian education, and the compensation demanded for land losses in connection with widening I-81. Across the nation they participated in the occupation of Alcatraz and the Trail of Broken Treaties Caravan. Indeed, the Onondagas not only aided the peoples at Wounded Knee with time, money, and moral support, but also sheltered American Indian Movement leader Dennis Banks for more than a year. Although outsiders might judge all their activities as militant, the Iroquois saw them as strategies to preserve their conservative lifestyle.

Laurence Hauptman is to be congratulated for the way in which he has illuminated numerous Iroquois undertakings and experiences since World War II, deftly providing background where needed and details when necessary. We are grateful for his even-handed skill at political and biographical analysis, introducing us not only to Richard Oakes and Minnie Kellogg but also to the machinations of Dwight Eisenhower and Robert Moses. Professor Hauptman's volume should be read by anyone interested in contemporary native American struggles in particular or minority rights in general.

James H. O'Donnell III
Marietta College

The Wind Eagle And Other Abenaki Stories. By Joseph Bruchac. Greenfield Center, NY: Bowman Books. 1985. 39 pages. \$5.00 Paper.

It has long been thought that the Abenaki peoples, traditionally living in the New England Areas of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, had dwindled in numbers to almost total disappearance since the ending of the French and Indian Wars of the 1750's. Or it has been convenient to propose and further such thought! John Moody, of Sharon, Vermont, in his informative