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Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Bourbon Dynasty in Spanish America
and the Philippines During the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1715)

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in History

by

Aaron Alejandro Olivas

2013

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Loyalty and Disloyalty to the Bourbon Dynasty in Spanish America and the
Philippines During the War of the Spanish Succession (1700-1715)

by

Aaron Alejandro Olivas

Doctor of Philosophy in History

University of California, Los Angeles, 2013

Professor Kathryn Norberg, Chair

My project analyzes the transatlantic consequences of the War of the Spanish Succession, one of the first global wars. Focusing primarily on relations between Spanish America and France, it establishes a connection between colonial resistance to the Spanish crown, interactions between European empires, and global trade. Previous scholars have assumed that Spain's overseas empire accepted the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule without complaint, however my project reveals that the succession acted as a catalyst fomenting disloyalty throughout the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru. Representing a wide social and ethnic spectrum, wartime disloyalty cases illustrate the complexity of challenging Spanish imperial rule a century before the independence movements.

My project also demonstrates that trans-imperial forces actually shaped the contours of the Spanish empire. It provides concrete evidence as to how interactions between Spanish colonial subjects, foreign merchants, and the French, English, and Dutch governments steered personal loyalties regarding Spanish sovereignty during such political crises. Furthermore, it offers a new political perspective on the transatlantic slave trade. During the war, the directors of France's slave company formed alliances with Spanish colonial elites and facilitated the sale of political offices to officials who not only protected French trade in the Spanish colonies, but also actively prosecuted Habsburg sympathizers for treason. Thus, through a French-held slave monopoly, the Bourbon dynasty was able to negotiate local loyalty, undermine its enemies, and consolidate its control of Spanish America. The project incorporates a range of unpublished sources from Mexico, Spain, and France: pamphlets, legal transcripts from colonial *audiencias* and Spain's Council of the Indies, correspondence between Spanish colonial elites and Louis XIV's ministers at Versailles, and records of England's Colonial Office.

The dissertation of Aaron Alejandro Olivas is approved.

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University of California, Los Angeles

2013

I dedicate this work to my loyal partner Luis Muñoz...*mi rey, mi príncipe.*

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INTRODUCTION

THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION CRISIS

The objective of the present war is the commerce of the Indies and the riches it produces.

Louis XIV to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, French ambassador to Madrid, 1709¹

The War of the Spanish Succession has the distinction of being the first truly global war.² Nonetheless, scholars of European and Latin American history have failed to appreciate the importance of colonial elites in supporting the succession of Felipe V to the Spanish throne. With few exceptions, historians who have approached the topic assume that, unlike their European counterparts, Spanish American subjects accepted the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule either with indifference or without complaint. This dissertation seeks to correct this assumption by exploring how and why certain elites in the Caribbean Basin, colonial centers, and the Pacific Rim actually challenged the rule of a French-born prince over the Spanish empire through acts of conspiracy and sedition. Along with examining the issue of disloyalty, it also determines why the majority of elites chose to support the new dynasty. The project as a whole emphasizes the global dimensions of the Spanish succession crisis and the subsequent wars it produced.

¹ Letter from Louis XIV to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, 1709, cited in Yves Bottineau, *Les Bourbons d'Espagne: 1700-1808* (Paris: Fayard, 1994), p. 45.

² For an overview of the origins and military history of the war, see Appendix A.

New Perspectives on the War: Relevant Scholarship

This dissertation owes its inspiration, subject matter, and methodology to the growing body of scholarly works aimed at broadening perspectives of the War of the Spanish Succession. It follows the trend of current historians who seek to depart from traditional histories of the conflict, especially those written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These works tend to be either military histories focused on major battles in the Low Countries and Central Europe or diplomatic histories based on the memoirs of ambassadors and the nobility.³ Likewise, it departs from the trend among Spanish historians from the mid-twentieth century onward of focusing on administrative changes in Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia (site of the monarchy's most significant revolts) and Spanish Italy (where the crown lost the territories of Naples, Sicily, Milan, and Sardinia)—two themes that often serve specific nationalist agendas. Many contemporary scholars continue to frame the war within these national history perspectives, emphasizing the centralization of the Spanish state in Iberia and the socio-political consequences of eighteenth century reforms.⁴

³ In Spanish national history, the most important campaigns include the capture of Gibraltar (1704), Battle of Almansa (1707), and the siege of Barcelona (1714). William Coxe's four volume *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain* (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815) is the classic example within the genre of diplomatic history. Current historians working on the reigns of the first Spanish Bourbons continue to frequently cite Coxe.

⁴ For example, the War of the Spanish Succession has emerged as a central topic in modern Catalan nationalism. Felipe V punished Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia for their loyalty to the Habsburgs by revoking their foral privileges between 1707-1716. Catalan patriots tend to use this event to help justify their struggle for regional autonomy or, in extreme cases, independence from Spain. Catalan historians such as Pedro Voltès and Joaquim Albareda Salvadó have thus expressed much interest in the war. The loss of Spanish Italy also figures prominently in Spanish history since it consumed Spanish politics for half of the eighteenth century. Influenced by his wife Elisabetta Farnese and his ministers, Felipe V made several attempts to reacquire territory in Italy for his children. This led to the Sardinian and Sicilian campaigns (1717-1719), the occupation of Parma and Tuscany (1731-1735), the conquest of Naples and Sicily (1734), and the Pragmatic War (1746-1748). Critics of the Bourbons

New perspectives on the war stem largely from the tercentenary of Bourbon succession in the year 2000. The anniversaries of battles and peace treaties have reinvigorated interest among a new generation scholars from across the world, as evident in the series of recent international conferences commemorating such events.⁵ Over the past decade, historians have moved beyond Catalonia and Italy to analyze other contexts of the war, such as “regional histories” of the War of the Spanish Succession in traditionally neglected geographical areas such as Andalusia, Extremadura, and Murcia. The appearance of articles and conference papers on North Africa, Spanish America, and the Canary Islands demonstrates a growing interest in the war outside of Europe, if not innovation within the study of the early eighteenth-century Spanish empire.⁶ While these scholars refer to the War of the Spanish Succession as the first global war, they still tend to marginalize its non-European components or treat them only through the lenses of military and diplomatic history. Historians embracing the “global turn” continue to limit Spanish America’s role to the financial history of the Mexican and Peruvian silver fleets in funding the Bourbon army or the diplomatic history of the *asiento* in the negotiations at the Peace of Utrecht.

such as John Lynch draw upon Felipe V’s obsession with Italy as evidence of the dynasty’s foreignness and neglect of Spain.

⁵ Recent conferences and panels have occurred in the following cities: Seville (Cátedra General Castaños, 2000), Gran Canaria (Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 2000), Zaragoza (Institución Fernando el Católico, 2001), Jaén (Universidad de Jaén, 2001), Madrid (Ministerio de Defensa, 2007), Coventry (University of Warwick, 2011), London (German Historical Institute, 2012), Madrid (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2012), New Orleans (American Historical Association, 2013), and Utrecht (Universiteit Utrecht, 2013).

⁶ Historians who have recently examined the war in Spanish North Africa include Nabil Matar, Miguel Ángel de Bunes, Marion Reder Gadow, Teodosio Vargas-Machuca García, and José Antonio Ruiz Oliva. Historians such as Antonio de Béthencourt Massieu, Francisco Fajardo Spínola, Josette Chantel Tisseau des Escotais, and Didier Ozanam have produced articles on the war in the Canary Islands from an Atlantic World perspective.

Reactions to the conflict in Spanish America and the actual lived experiences of colonial subjects remain neglected topics. Only two monographs have substantially addressed the war from this perspective. Analola Borges's *La Casa de Austria en Venezuela durante la guerra de Sucesión Española* (1963) dealt with the 1702 outbreak of a pro-Habsburg conspiracy among officials in Venezuela, encouraged by what she considered to be Emperor Leopold I's preoccupation with Spanish America. She interpreted the incident as an isolated but important indicator of creole agency in times of imperial crisis. Twenty years later, her book inspired Luis Navarro García's *Conspiración en México durante el gobierno del virrey Alburquerque* (1982), which uncovered legal proceedings against supporters of Archduke Charles in Mexico City between 1706-1708. In contrast to Borges's findings, Navarro deduced that pro-Habsburg sentiments in Mexico involved *peninsulares* (Spanish-born subjects) rather than creoles, and merchants rather than royal officials. Christoph Rosenmüller recently critiqued the lack of critical analysis in Navarro's work in a chapter of his book *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues: The Court Society of Colonial Mexico, 1702-1710* (2008). Rosenmüller considered the Venezuelan and Mexican incidents unimportant and a manipulation of Spanish fears of rebellion. He argued that the viceroy of New Spain must have fabricated the conspiracies in order to punish the clients of his rivals, but he based this theory mostly on the assumption that European governments cared little about the political state of Spanish America and that Spanish American subjects would not have questioned Bourbon rule.

Dissertation Overview

This dissertation takes a different approach to uncovering and explaining Spanish American reactions to the transition from Habsburg to Bourbon rule. Foremost, it employs a global perspective that bridges the fields of Latin American, Spanish, and French History. In several ways, this approach repositions Spanish America into the larger scope of early modern geopolitics. It illustrates that commercial imperialism played a central role in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century European politics by considering Spanish, French, Dutch, and English preoccupations with loyalty to the Bourbons in Spanish America. Additionally, it focuses on the larger role of global trade—a common interest among Spanish American merchants, royal officials, and clergy—in producing reactions to imperial political crises. The financial interests and business choices of elites in Spanish America were frequently intertwined with their stances regarding Bourbon succession. Political developments in Spanish America need to be considered alongside the economic developments with which they overlapped. Finally, it proves that interactions between Spanish American elites and agents of other European empires had an impact on imperial subjects' relationship with the central authority of the crown.

As a whole, this dissertation offers a new perspective on Spanish America's connection with the larger world. Current scholars understand the relationship between Spanish American elites and the crown as one that functioned through clientelism and personal loyalties.⁷ However, they tend to overlook the fact that the

⁷ Harry Sieber, "The Magnificent Fountain: Literary Patronage in the Court of Philip III," *Cervantes: Bulletin of the Cervantes Society of America* 18.2 (1998): 85-116. For example, Sieber and

relationship between these elites and foreigners from other European empires had a profound effect on personal loyalties regarding Spanish sovereignty in periods of crisis. During the War of the Spanish Succession, agents from competing European empires gained considerable influence over the government and economy of Spanish America. Taking advantage of the war, the French, English, and Dutch used violence, propaganda, venality of office, and commercial benefits like contraband to influence elites into supporting Felipe V or Archduke Charles as king of Spain. As they expected, these actions motivated certain groups to either support or challenge Bourbon authority.

While foreign trade contributed to Spanish imperial decline and economic underdevelopment, this period proves that global commerce still enriched the Spanish colonial elites who maintained trade networks with Northern European cloth and slave merchants. The period of the War of the Spanish Succession serves as an excellent case study as to the means by which such elites negotiated alliances with Spain's imperial rivals—France, England, and the Netherlands. In the case of France and Spain, it shows how collaboration and co-existence in the first half of the eighteenth century aided both monarchies in the pursuit of empire. Above all, politics and trade served as the common mechanisms of cooperation.

This dissertation is based on a variety of documents that provide information on the crucial (and often ignored) trans-imperial encounters that swayed colonial loyalties. It uses legal records, inquisitional sources, and official correspondence found in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville and the Archivo General de la

Richard Kagan have argued that royal patronage adhered clients to the project of empire and bought their loyalty.

Nación Mexicana in Mexico City as the starting point for understanding the colonial tensions caused by the war. It is particularly original in its use of additional sources from France to address this topic. While not always apparent in Spanish and Latin American sources, correspondence in French archives exchanged between Louis XIV's ministers of state and Spanish American authorities more clearly illustrates the intermingling of the war with transatlantic patronage and global trade. These French sources, seldom used by Spanish and Latin American historians, provide the most candid look at the opinions of the period. Documents from the Archives Nationales de France, the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France reveal the means by which merchants, royal officials, and clergy used networks of trade with France and the French Antilles to exercise a considerable degree of autonomy under the new dynasty. Published documentation found in the Calendar of State Papers series show a similar relationship—albeit smaller and less successful—between other Spanish American elites and agents of the English government. French and English sources provide evidence that many acts of disloyalty occurred in Spanish America. The opinions that fomented conspiracies in Venezuela and sedition in Mexico, therefore, were not isolated. Placed into a larger context, they are clarified through comparison with additional incidents. These sources also support the notion that Felipe V's subjects on both sides of the Atlantic possessed a considerable degree of agency by expressing in words and deeds whether or not they approved of the new dynasty.

The chapters of this project use the lived experiences of a set of individuals—rather than the negotiations between states—as a vantage point to understand the

meanings of the succession crisis for Spanish American subjects. Colonial elites are placed at the center of this study, especially those who crossed the imperial boundaries of the Spanish monarchy and exploited the upheaval in Europe for their own purposes. The chapters reconstruct their lives to understand localized events in three geographical sub-regions of the empire. Individual chapters also consider the predominant trade networks in each sub-region, such as the transatlantic slave trade, the silver fleets, and the Manila galleon trade. These channels of trade connected the different parts of the Spanish empire to the wider world and, in turn, tied Spanish America to the global debate about Bourbon succession.

Chapter 1 provides the legal background for the project. It discusses how imperial subjects understood loyalty and disloyalty to the Bourbons during the War of the Spanish Succession. Authorities in Madrid and the viceroyalties considered conspiracy to commit rebellion the ultimate form of treason, yet they also regarded seditious speech and interaction with the English and Dutch allies of the Habsburgs with the same gravity. The Spanish crown and royal officials expected indigenous peoples and the lower strata of colonial society to perpetrate many of these crimes, however legal documents and correspondence prove that elites such as merchants, clergy, and secular authorities were far more prone to resist the new dynasty.

Chapter 2 discusses the shaping of personal loyalties in the Caribbean Basin, a region of intense interaction between European empires. It highlights the careers of Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte and his brother Bartolomé de Ponte, the governors of Caracas and Santa Marta, who became tangled in the wartime economic struggle between France, the Netherlands, and England for control over the *asiento* (the

Spanish slave monopoly). The Ponte brothers' alliances with Dutch and French slave companies shed new light on the conspiracy to declare Habsburg sovereignty over Venezuela. These commercial ties illustrate the importance of foreign trade in determining political stances regarding Bourbon sovereignty across the Atlantic.

Chapter 3 analyzes disloyalty in the colonial centers of Mexico and Peru. The chapter centers on tensions in Central and Northern Mexico between two factions: adherents of the viceroys (the Count of Moctezuma and the Duke of Albuquerque), who functioned as loyal clients of Felipe V and Louis XIV, and the disloyal commercial elites prosecuted for criticizing the Bourbons. In contrast to the Caribbean Basin, disloyalty in Mexico City manifested itself in the form of sedition rather than political conspiracy. Still, pro-Habsburg sentiments and Francophobia serve as important indicators of the merchant community's disapproval of the regime change. The Spanish and French crowns were greatly concerned about loyalties in Mexico, as they needed the cooperation of viceroys and merchants to finance the war through voluntary donations and the taxation of their revenues on the Mexican silver fleets. The Bourbons could count on the cooperation of viceregal authorities, however the discovery of sedition reveals that local commercial elites were far less supportive.

Chapter 4 examines cases of disloyalty that surfaced in the Pacific Rim. The chapter stretches the scope of the project to its broadest geographical limits through an analysis of wartime reactions in the Philippines. Similar to the merchants of Mexico, Recollect and Dominican missionaries on the island of Luzon committed crimes of sedition and *lèse-majesté*. Royal officials in Manila, allied with French merchants in the Manila galleon trade, attempted to punish the crimes of the disloyal

missionaries but found their efforts restricted by ecclesiastical privileges. These cases provide an example of how the succession of the Bourbons negatively affected certain religious elites, prompting them to resist the new restrictions placed upon them by the crown. Although these cases occurred in the remotest corner of the Spanish empire, sedition in the Philippines was directly connected to sentiments of Catalan and creole patriotism that prevailed in other imperial dominions.

Chapter 5 serves as the conclusion. It considers the changes and continuities resulting from Bourbon succession in the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru. Overall, manifestations of loyalty and disloyalty show that Bourbon succession as a paradox strengthened the monarchy's bond with colonial elites yet also acted as a catalyst for fomenting resistance. Two important points can be drawn from the cases and their revelations about trans-imperial relations. First, that Spain's relationship with France proved far more beneficial than harmful for the crown. Secondly, that the British empire clearly emerged out of the succession crisis as the greatest threat to the monarchy for the remainder of the colonial period.

Together, these chapters recast Spanish America's experience of the War of the Spanish Succession—long relegated to the negotiation table of European diplomats—to one of global interaction and reaction in a shared commercial space. As a whole, this study understands the alliance formed between Spanish American elites and French slave traders, cloth merchants, and ministers of state as one that helped the Bourbon dynasty consolidate its power and combat its enemies overseas for the duration of the war. While historians of colonial Latin America usually dismiss the early eighteenth century as uneventful, this project proves that during the

period Spanish America was an active and politically dynamic component of the empire. New Spain and Peru affected the global outcome of the succession crisis and were affected by it in turn. This project also challenges the traditional understanding of the colonial dimensions of early modern European wars to include periods chronologically predating the Seven Years War (1756-1763).

CHAPTER 1

DISLOYALTY TO THE CROWN UNDER FELIPE V

It is a mortal sin to abhor Felipe V or desire his death, the loss of his crown, or anything harmful to him or his army, which fights to preserve the monarchy...It is a mortal sin to speak with contempt and irreverence about his person or character, such as cursing him or speaking about him with indignation...It is a mortal sin to collaborate in any manner so that he loses the throne or any part of his dominions, taking up arms, providing intelligence, assistance, or aide to the enemy...

Excerpt from the pamphlet *Desengaño católico* (1710)¹

In 1712, the French military engineer Amédée-François Frézier arrived in Lima with instructions to improve Spanish fortifications along the coasts of Peru for Felipe V. In addition, Louis XIV's government secretly ordered him to investigate the status of French trade relations in the viceroyalty. Frézier reported that the inhabitants of the city—as well as those of the Andes—were clearly divided into pro-Bourbon and pro-Habsburg factions. Louis XIV's ministers were already aware of this fact to some extent.² Nonetheless, Frézier's account explained that at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession “the clergy and friars impudently prayed for [Felipe V's] competitor,” while the Basques (who tended to be merchants) and most of the *peninsular* Spaniards, “being informed of the valor and virtue of Felipe V, always

¹ Fray Juan de Ferreras y García, *Desengaño católico* (Madrid: 1710), pp. 7-8. The Jesuit intellectual Fray Juan de Ferreras y García (1652-1735) was the confessor of Cardinal Portocarrero, head of the Spanish Council of State. As a staunch supporter of the Bourbons, Felipe V rewarded him with appointments to the Real Academia Española in 1713 and the Biblioteca Real in 1715.

² The comte de Pontchartrain to the marquis de Blécourt, Versailles, 29 September 1710, ANF, Marine B⁷ 83, fs. 421-428. The French naval commander Alain Porée had already alerted the French ministry of the navy of the two Lima factions. He claimed the pro-Habsburg faction grew in number, and that he heard a Spanish officer say that Felipe V was a foreigner and should go back to France. In contrast to the strong sympathies for the Archduke in Lima, Porée found the inhabitants along the coast strongly supported the Bourbons.

expressed their fidelity to him.” The creole population appeared equally divided between those who embraced Felipe V as their “saint-king” and those who, disillusioned with French trade in the region, seemed less affectionate for their sovereign because he was a Frenchman. “Though there still remain obstinate spirits,” he added, “they will become more cautious, seeing [Felipe V’s] rule ensured by the unanimous consent of all nations.”³

Pro-Habsburg sympathies were not uncommon in Spanish America during the empire’s transition to Bourbon rule. Indeed, the issues of Bourbon succession and the Union of the Two Crowns between Spain and France polarized sectors of Spanish American society for the duration of the War of the Spanish Succession. Within its Spanish imperial context, it should be understood that the war led to a conflict of loyalties between elites who often chose to support Felipe V or his rival Archduke Charles based on whether or not they benefited from French influence over the political and commercial affairs of the empire.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss disloyalty to Felipe V as it is described in documents concerning the viceroalties of New Spain and Peru. Much to the fear of the Bourbons, dissent, sedition, and the threat of rebellion permeated life in Spanish America as in other parts of the Spanish empire. In many instances, those who questioned or resisted Bourbon rule in the early eighteenth century—such as those mentioned by Frézier—remained unprosecuted or even undiscovered by authorities. Evidence of dissent often emerged only at times when the state attempted

³ Amédée-François Frézier, *Relation du voyage de la mer du Sud aux côtes du Chili, du Pérou, et du Brésil, fait pendant les années 1712, 1713, et 1714*, volume II (Amsterdam: Pierre Humbert, 1717), pp. 437-438. Louis XIV rewarded Frézier with 1,000 *écus* for his mission. He published his account in Paris in 1714, which was followed by further editions and translations in England, the Netherlands, and Germany.

to repress it. Decrees issued on the local and imperial level illustrate attempts to deter the existing problem of seditious speech and interaction with the enemy with the threat of extreme punishments. Written denunciations sent by Spanish American subjects to the Bourbon monarchs and their ministers expose the awareness of individual cases of disloyalty and the discrete solutions taken to remedy them. Trial records provide the most vivid descriptions of conspiracy and opinions in favor of the Habsburg sovereignty. Together these documents outline the standard form by which disloyalty was detected and understood in its colonial context. They also show that the Spanish crown and royal officials expected dissent from the so-called “lower orders” of imperial hierarchy, such as the poor, African slaves, and indigenous communities. Yet in contrast to their initial assumptions, the Bourbon regime found itself faced with a broader array of disloyalty from members of the elite who possessed access to many more local tools of empire to challenge its authority.

Awareness of Disloyalty in Europe

Throughout the war, colonial subjects remained fully aware of the conflicting loyalties to the Bourbons within the European realms of the Spanish empire. Knowledge of popular uprisings and dissent among Iberian ruling elites quickly spread to New Spain and Peru. In May 1701, on the same day the royal proclamation of Felipe V's succession reached Mexico City, the inhabitants of the viceregal capital learned that an *oidor* in Madrid had been garroted for refusing to recognize a Frenchman as king of Spain. Similarly, Felipe V's public entry into Madrid became known in Mexico along with news of the perpetual banishment of another Castilian

oidor to the Philippines for similar inclinations.⁴ In 1702, at the time of the pro-Habsburg conspiracy in Venezuela, the royal officials of Caracas already knew about uprisings in Cremona and Naples occurring earlier that year.⁵ Subjects in New Spain and Peru gossiped about nobles like the Count of Oropesa, the Count of Corzana, and the Count of Monterrey who were known to be “little affectionate for the House of Bourbon and more inclined to that of Austria.”⁶ They were also aware of the anti-Bourbon manifesto published by the Admiral of Castile, as copies appeared in Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama. Fernando Dávila Bravo de Laguna, governor of Panama, was even accused of having contact with the infamous traitor through English intermediaries.⁷

Such information traveled across the Atlantic by word of mouth and in writings. Between 1707-1715, the Spanish crown and colonial clergy in effect publicized the rebellions in Naples, Catalonia, and the Balearic Islands in order to motivate wealthy secular and religious elites in Spanish America to contribute voluntary donations for the reconquest of these dominions.⁸ Felipe V himself kept royal officials informed about disloyalty among his ministers, particularly those of the Council of the Indies. During the Allied capture of Madrid in 1706 and 1710, roughly a third of the council abandoned the Bourbons and began serving Archduke Charles

⁴ Antonio de Robles, *Diario de Sucesos Notables (1665-1703)*, vol. III, ed. Antonio Castro Leal (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 1946), p. 145.

⁵ “Testimonio sobre la prisión y embargo de bienes de don Bartolomé de Capocelato...,” Caracas, 13 October 1702, AGI, Escribanía, 690A, 1^a pieza, fs. 24r-24v.

⁶ Robles, *Diario de Sucesos Notables*, vol. III, pp. 157-159.

⁷ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 22 June 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 232, fs. 52-53.

⁸ “Al arzobispo y cabildo de la iglesia de Lima...para el exterminio de los enemigos de la religión y corona que la infesta y que a su imitación se esfuercen cuanto sea posible,” Madrid, 26 July 1707, AGI, Indiferente General 431, Libro 45, fs. 353r-354v; Santiago de Larraín to Felipe V, Quito, 11 September 1716, AGI, Quito 128, No. 45.

at his court in Barcelona. The king sent lists of the members of “false Council of the Indies” to viceroys, governors, and town councils to prevent compliance with their decrees.⁹

Printed materials from Europe further raised awareness of disloyalty abroad.¹⁰ Pamphlets identified acts such as not praying for Felipe V, maintaining contact with the “heretical” English and Dutch, and criticizing the king’s appointed ministers as treasonous.¹¹ Pamphleteers from Madrid and Seville employed religious overtones to convince audiences that common offenses such as gossip mongering and irreverence towards the king were “mortal sins” without hope of absolution.¹² Satirical works mocked political dissidents as *servilleteros*, *fanáticos*, *archiduquistas*, and *sebastianistas*—labels that appear frequently in Spanish American court records.¹³

⁹ The Duke of Alburquerque to Felipe V, Mexico City, 10 June 1707, AGI, México 479; “A los virreyes del Perú, y Nueva España, audiencias, gobernadores, arzobispos de ambos reinos, participándoles los motivos que concurrieron para ausentarse los tribunales de la corte, su restitución a ella, y lo que debiera ejecutar,” Zaragoza, 9 February 1711, AGI, Indiferente General 432, Libro 46, fs. 221v-227r.

¹⁰ David González Cruz, *Propaganda e información en tiempos de guerra: España y América, 1700-1714* (Madrid: Sílex, 2009), pp. 16; 144-147. Though focusing primarily on Iberia, González provides an excellent overview of the diffusion of pro-Bourbon print culture from Castile into Spanish America during the War of the Spanish Succession.

¹¹ Anonymous, *Doctrina cristiana explicada en ocho cristiana máximas, muy útiles y necesarias a los vasallos para con su rey* (Madrid: Antonio Bizarrón, 1706), p. 13. In response to the adage *viva el rey y muera el mal gobierno* (“long live the king and death of bad government”), the author noted the following: “Do not tell me ‘I do not speak ill of the king, but of the government.’ This excuse is very common, but it ought to be understood as false, because it infers that the king does not govern, or that he blindly leaves the government in the hands of bad ministers. These words are injurious to the king...all rebellions begin with such discord.”

¹² Anonymous, *Doctrina cristiana explicada en ocho cristiana máximas, muy útiles y necesarias a los vasallos para con su rey* (Madrid: Antonio Bizarrón, 1706), p. 13. The author offered this warning about gossip and irreverence: “Do not speak ill of the king, not in public nor in secret...for the sake of your spiritual and temporal well-being, for your conscience, for your convenience, for the good of everyone and the common good of the monarchy. He who does not observe this rule will not have to search far to find someone to blow his cover. Do not blame the unfaithfulness of your friends. The sky is filled with little birds, and they will fly off and tell others. When God desires it, the secret will be divulged.”

¹³ The following works fell within the genre of satire: *Loa nueva, a más tinieblas más luces, al llanto más alegría* (Zaragoza: 1704), *Matachines para la zarzuela “De hacer cuenta sin la huespeda”* (Madrid: 1704), *Romance que una vieja de noventa años...le riñe y reprehende a un nieto suyo porque es servilletero* (Seville: c. 1710), and *Voces que dicta la verdad en desengaños* (Seville: 1711).

Dealing With Spanish American Disloyalty

Various members of the imperial bureaucracy dealt with disloyalty to Felipe V in Spanish America and the Philippines between the years 1702-1712. The early modern Spanish crown was naturally limited in its abilities to detect treason and sedition. Felipe V warned secular and religious authorities to be vigilant for such crimes, however cases were usually brought to their attention through formal denunciations from one or more associates of the perpetrator. Reactions to accusations made directly to Felipe V—or indirectly to him through his grandfather Louis XIV—were immediate and the cases were handled with the greatest discretion. These cases involved suspicious royal officials whom the crown usually recalled back to Spain under some pretext and replaced with a more trustworthy functionary. Such was the case of Juan Díaz Pimienta y Zaldívar, the governor of Cartagena de Indias suspected of being a partisan of the Archduke.¹⁴

Colonial governors and magistrates who received denunciations were forced to handle the situation on the local level. In these cases, informants sometimes waited a considerable amount of time before approaching authorities. The Mexican *alférez* Juan de Acosta denounced the hacienda administrator Salvador José Mañer nearly eight months after he made seditious comments in a public gaming house.¹⁵ Likewise, Recollect friars waited until the end of their year and a half journey to the Philippines

¹⁴ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 8 July 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 232, fs. 161-166; François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 14 August 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 232, fs. 320-323.

¹⁵ “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer, preso en la Real Cárcel de esta corte por infiel y desafecto a la Católica Majestad de Nuestro Rey y Señor don Felipe Quinto (que Dios guarde), haber proferido varias palabras indecorosas mal sonantes que constan de estos autos,” Mexico City, 22-27 November 1706, AGI, México 661, fs. 2r-7v.

before alerting royal officials about pro-Habsburg sentiment among their mission.¹⁶ After receiving denunciations, authorities would order soldiers to apprehend the traitor and confiscate his property under cover of darkness to avoid public scandal. From there, they proceeded with interrogations of the prisoner, the accusers, and additional witnesses. Cases were then assigned to the *audiencias* (royal high courts) of Mexico City, Santo Domingo, Panama City, Manila, or Santiago de Chile.¹⁷

Judges of the *audiencias* reviewed the cases and passed appropriate sentences. If the crimes or charges were particularly serious, the judges remitted the transcripts of the trials (and sometimes the offenders themselves) to Spain for final sentencing by the Council of the Indies in Madrid. The entire process was protracted and subject to numerous setbacks. The Portuguese slave trader Pedro Rodríguez Madeira and four others died in prison during trial delays.¹⁸ The series of trials from Caracas and Mexico City dragged on for two years and required an additional four years for judgment by the Council of the Indies.¹⁹ Culprits such as the Filipino Recollect

¹⁶ “Copia de los autos remitidos por el superior gobierno a Su Señoría Ilustrísima el Ilustrísimo Señor Arzobispo sobre puntos de deslealtad de algunos religiosos de los Agustinos descalzos de esta provincia de Filipinas,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza., fs. 1r-2v.

¹⁷ The case from Santiago de Chile (contained in AGI, Escribanía 933B) is unique in that the guilty party—the Marquis of Corpa—was not present to stand trial, having fled to the Archduke’s court in Barcelona. Still, the Council of the Indies ordered the *audiencia* judges to confiscate and auction his property and deposit the proceeds in the Cajas Reales. The Spanish crown expected the Marquis of Corpa to return to Chile with an English naval expedition.

¹⁸ Diego Fernández Santillán to the Council of the Indies, Vitoria, 9 January 1709, AGI, Escribanía 665^a, 2^a pieza, fs. 10r-10v; “Testimonio de la causa contra Manuel de Sousa,” Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 262C, fs. 263v-289v.

¹⁹ AGI, Escribanía 960; AGI, Escribanía 964. The trials from Mexico City and Caracas spanned the period 1706-1708, with the Venezuelan cases lingering another year in the Audiencia of Santo Domingo. Royal officials shipped the condemned back to Spain as prisoners between 1709-1710. The ministers of the Council of the Indies passed the final sentences between 1710-1712.

missionaries and the Caribbean smuggler Francisco Eusebio Soler escaped from prison in the middle of prosecution and had to be recaptured.²⁰

Judges and notaries used a variety of terms to describe subjects disloyal to the crown, such as *difidente*, *desleal*, *infidente*, *desafecto*, *traidor*, and *alevoso*. Despite subtle differences in definition, they used these terms interchangeably within the same records.²¹ As in other parts of the Spanish empire, denunciations of disloyalty were evaluated in accordance with statutes of Roman and medieval civil law found in the *Lex Julia Majestatis*, the *Siete Partidas*, and the *Nueva Recopilación de todas las leyes* (1567). These helped define the various crimes of disloyalty and their punishments during the period of the War of the Spanish Succession. All cases could be reduced into three broad categories: *iniuria*, *culpa*, and *infortunium*.

Disloyalty as Crimes of Iniuria

Iniuria was considered the most heinous form of disloyalty and warranted the most severe punishment. The *Nueva Recopilación* ordered royal judges to confiscate the property of anyone accused of crimes of this nature. In these cases, royal officials could auction the goods to benefit the royal treasury or to pay for the legal fees of the condemned. Often equated with sacrilege, *iniuria* consisted of a variety of offenses

²⁰ “Copia de los autos remitidos por el superior gobierno a Su Señoría Ilustrísima el Ilustrísimo Señor Arzobispo sobre puntos de deslealtad de algunos religiosos de los Agustinos descalzos de esta provincia de Filipinas,” Manila, 30 December 1711, AGI, Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 157v-158v; “De este pedimento cede traslado a la parte de don Francisco Eusebio Soler, y en cuanto al otro si por escribanía de cámara se recomienda al tribunal de la casa la seguridad de su persona,” Caracas, 14 June 1710, AGI, Escribanía 665A, 1^a pieza, fs. 2v-3r. Soler escaped from Caracas but was later captured in Havana.

²¹ According to the *Diccionario de autoridades* (Madrid: Francisco del Hierro, 1726-1739), *difidente* was defined as disloyal or malcontent, and implied a sense of mistrust. *Desleal* and *infidente* were both defined as lacking fidelity owed to another, and implied treachery and falsehood. *Desafecto* was defined as contrary or opposed to the king, and implied a lack of personal affection. *Traidor* was defined as the lack of loyalty or faith sworn to a sovereign, and implied disobedience. *Alevoso* was defined as treacherous and unfaithful, and implied a conspiring nature.

that shared a common sentiment of malice or hostility towards the monarch. At its worst, this meant desertion, taking up arms voluntarily in the name of the Archduke, or cooperating with the enemy in deed or “evil council” to instigate rebellions and “strip the monarch of his rightful kingdoms.” By law, these offenders committed *alta traición* (high treason) and deserved capital punishment.²² Several Spanish American subjects who collaborated with the English and Dutch escaped to enemy territory and avoided punishment altogether. Nevertheless, in an extreme case from 1707, Laureano de Ezcaray, governor of Maracaibo, executed smugglers in Riohacha for high treason on grounds that they interacted with the Dutch, “enemies of the holy church and of the crown of Castile.”²³

On the other extreme, *iniuria* included acts of lèse-majesté, which according to the *Siete Partidas* encouraged disobedience and injured the king’s ability to command authority. Thus it was argued that lèse-majesté—much like high treason—was analogous with regicide.²⁴ Such acts involved the manifestation of any viewpoints similar to those expressed by the Archduke’s faction: speaking with irreverence about Felipe V and his family, questioning the legitimacy of Bourbon sovereignty, maliciously spreading gossip or news prejudicial to the crown, and criticizing the king as unjust and burdensome. Individuals could also be implicated in

²² “Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad sobre las penas que debían imponerse y como había de procederse contra los que resultaran difidentes de resultas de la Guerra de Sucesión entre Felipe V y Carlos de Austria,” Madrid, 16 February 1711, BNF, Manuscrits Espagnols 423, fs. 164v; 166v.

²³ “Testimonio de autos seguidos por el señor don Laureano de Ezcaray contra Juan Francisco de Granadillo y otros reos sobre el descubrimiento de un poco de hierro y la ropa que se le cogió al sobredicho, y la sentencia de muerte que en él se ejecutó...” Maracaibo, 17 October 1707, AGI, Santo Domingo 667, fs. 110r-112v. The governor also banished seven accomplices to the presidio of Santa María de Galve in Pensacola.

²⁴ “Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad,” f. 170r. As stated in the *Siete Partidas*, “people who defame their king and speak ill of him commit known treason as if killing him, because others hear him being disliked and abhorred, and thus he loses his good standing and reputation.”

this crime by soliciting gossip. The crown considered it an act of disloyalty to listen with either “a calm face” or “dishonest spirit” to any slander directed against the monarch, if that person failed to denounce the speaker to the proper authorities. Both speakers and listeners of such *malquerencia* were supposed to possess the right to a fair trial in order to substantiate any accusations as well as evaluate whether or not their intentions were truly hostile towards the king. If malice was determined, civil law technically ordered the more “merciful” punishment of removing the offender’s tongue as opposed to execution.²⁵ This statute regarding the punishment of gossipmongers would explain the 1707 decree issued by the *alcalde mayor* of Puebla de los Ángeles that, in the same vein, threatened to cut off the ear of any person who spoke ill of Felipe V.²⁶ Lèse-majesté was common in Spanish America but there are no records indicating that any of its perpetrators were mutilated by royal officials as a consequence.

Disloyalty as Crimes of Culpa

Culpa was considered a more moderate form of disloyalty. Those guilty of this crime voluntarily attempted “to serve the Archduke and act as instruments of his usurped authority,” yet lacked the hatred or open hostility towards Felipe V that was characteristic of *iniuria*. Rather, offenders recognized “no other king in their heart but their own personal interest,” abandoning the Bourbon cause by desire for social mobility through titles, pensions, and posts offered by the Habsburgs and their allies. These were considered inexcusable acts of convenience and ambition that required a

²⁵ Ibid., fs. 164v; 166v; 169v-172r.

²⁶ Frances L. Ramos, “Succession and Death: Royal Ceremonies in Colonial Puebla,” *The Americas*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (October 2003): 187.

suitable punishment aimed at damaging the reputation of offenders and their families. Usually this meant suffering *infamia*—exclusion from receiving future political offices and honors from the crown, or exile at a distance based on the offender’s age and health so as not to be fatal. Offenders of lower social standing were supposed to be treated more mercifully, since their status was believed to render them susceptible to enemy influences and preoccupied with survival and self-interest. By contrast, elites of higher social standing such as nobles and royal officials were to be punished harshly, as they were deemed obligated to support Felipe V’s sovereignty by their blood, position, and debt to the crown for its patronage.²⁷ The Audiencia of Mexico City prosecuted Alberto de Rada y Oreña, the *alcalde mayor* of Tepeaca and Tecali, for such opportunism in 1706. Although viceregal judges exonerated him, the Spanish crown remained suspicious of Rada and secretly ensured his exclusion from future political office until after the war.²⁸

Disloyalty as Crimes of Infortunium

Infortunium was the least grievous form of disloyalty and consequently the most forgivable. The individuals implicated in this crime included the “fooled” masses whose support of the Archduke was motivated by *culpas del horror común*—fear resulting from news reports, anti-Bourbon political propaganda, and coercion of enemy arms. As with cases of *culpa*, guilty parties lacked any clear malice against Felipe V. Instead, they visibly recognized the Archduke as king, failed to resist

²⁷ “Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad...,” fs. 164v-168v; 173v.

²⁸ “Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña por lo que en ella se expresa,” Mexico City, 22 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 2v-18r; “Sobre la pretensión de don Alberto de Rada, representa lo que se le ofrece,” Madrid, 20 February 1711, AGS, Secretaría de Estado 468.

enemy forces, or provided Habsburg allies with refreshments and shelter in order to protect their lives and households from danger. This best describes the crimes of Jerónimo de Boza Solís, *corregidor* de Guayaquil, and Juan Antonio Pimentel, governor of Guam, who were both imprisoned for failing to resist the forces of the English privateer Woodes Rogers during his Pacific incursion of 1709-1710.²⁹ The crown assumed that most disloyal subjects fell into this category. It was believed that fear, deception, and the chaos of war impaired their good judgment and legally rendered their acts of collaboration involuntary. Judges were urged to be lenient in these cases, as those guilty of *infortunium* tended to be remorseful and easily corrected. As such, the crown considered them most deserving of general pardons to absolve their crimes and avoid future offenses.³⁰

Variations in Prosecuting and Defining Disloyalty

While civil law provided a framework for identifying crimes of disloyalty and their punishments, trials and sentences were far from standardized in any part of the Spanish empire. Judges were granted a considerable amount of freedom to consider each case “according to the person, time, age, sex, circumstances, and other innumerable factors in order to pass judgment in sound mind.”³¹ Natural law, reason

²⁹ AGI Filipinas, 129, No. 124; AGI Escribanía 913A-913C. The Audiencia of Quito prosecuted Jerónimo de Boza Solís for arranging the payment of a ransom to Woodes Rogers to spare Guayaquil from destruction. The Audiencia of Manila prosecuted Juan Antonio Pimentel for providing Woodes Rogers with water and food in order to thwart an attack on Guam and negotiate the release of the crew captured on the galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación*.

³⁰ “Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad...,” fs. 165r-167v; 168v-169r; 174r-174v.

³¹ “Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad...,” fs. 163v-164r. Judges were to “examine attentively the quality and circumstances of offenders, what they accomplished, what they have done or thought previously, their judgment and mental capacity, and other circumstances in a manner that would not appear to overly favor nor fear displeasing the monarch or others involved, since this would hinder justice.”

of state, historical precedent, the writings of jurists and theologians, and Spain's alliance with France also influenced decisions.³²

Punishments varied to a large extent. Throughout the war, the Spanish crown opposed cruel or excessive vengeance prescribed by civil law in punishing disloyalty, believing that clemency was more likely to prevent future disaffection and promote Felipe V as a benevolent (and therefore legitimate) monarch. The crown reasoned that many cases of disloyalty were the result of the general confusion caused by the vacillating progress of Bourbons on the battlefield as well as contact between the king's subjects and enemy forces. The crown would issue several general pardons at times when the Bourbons appeared to be winning the war, such as after the recapture of Madrid in 1706, the birth of the Prince of Asturias in 1707, and the victory at the battles of Brihuega and Villaviciosa in 1710. However, these did not extend to crimes of *iniuria* such as high treason or *lèse-majesté*.³³

The general pardons issued by Felipe V competed with those issued by his enemies. The government of Archduke Charles offered to absolve any individual who committed "treason" to the House of Habsburg as long as they were willing to recognize the dynasty's right to the throne. Habsburg amnesty decrees conveyed this message in the following terms:

Considering the astuteness rampant in Spain that allowed the intrusive duc d'Anjou [Felipe V] to enter the kingdom and be sworn as king, in disobedience to the legitimate king [Archduke Charles], we solemnly declare an act of amnesty and general pardon to all our vassals who committed the

³² Ibid., fs. 164r; 175r. The ministers of the Council of Castile and the French court referred to punishments imposed upon rebellious nobles over the course of Spanish history by Juan II (r. 1406-1454), Ferdinand and Isabella (r. 1474-1504), and Emperor Charles V (r. 1519-1556). Regarding imperial Rome, they cited the efforts of Emperor Theodosius I (r. 379-395) against the usurper Eugenius and Emperor Honorius (r. 393-423) against the Visigoth kings Alaric and Ataulf.

³³ "Consulta del Real Consejo a Su Majestad..." fs. 163r-163v; 164r; 175r.

crime of lèse-majesté and treason by receiving and swearing an oath of loyalty to the duc d'Anjou, on the condition that...they recognize and acclaim us as their legitimate king and natural lord...But if contrary to our hopes for loyalty, valor, and honor, any of our obstinate vassals should continue to blindly follow the faction of the usurper and attempt to resist our arms, we declare them enemies of the state and rebels to their king, and they will be punished to the extent of the laws established against perpetrators of high treason, and they will have to answer to God for the death and destruction caused by their rebelliousness.³⁴

The decree was widely circulated by the Habsburgs' allies in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic World. English naval commanders, the governors of Jamaica, and Dutch merchants assured its diffusion throughout the Caribbean Basin with the help of Spanish American intermediaries.³⁵

Expectations of Rebellion

The crown and royal officials anticipated that Spanish American subjects, in time of war, might commit the aforementioned crimes of disloyalty to Felipe V. However, they mistakenly believed that members of the *esfera baja* ("lower orders") would be most prone to commit them. There existed a general consensus among ruling elites that indigenous peoples, mixed-race *castas*, and African slaves were "easily swayed" or "people of commotion" whose rebellious nature could be "triggered by the slightest conspiracy" such as pro-Habsburg propaganda and unfavorable news about the Bourbon army.³⁶ Royal officials took what they considered to be necessary precautions. In the case of Mexico City, memories

³⁴ Archduke Charles's Decree of Amnesty, Lisbon, 1704, BNF, Manuscrits Portugais 28, fs. 7r-8r.

³⁵ "Al gobernador de Cartagena ordenándole dé cuenta de lo que ejecutare en fuerza de la requisitoria que le despachó el gobernador de Santa Marta para la aprehensión de un capitán vizcaíno que había pasado de Jamaica a divertir papeles a favor del Archiduque," Madrid, 13 October 1707, AGI, Indiferente General 431, Libro 45, fs. 365v-366v.

³⁶ Fray Pedro Mejorada to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Manila, 10 July 1712, AGI Filipinas 129, f. 5v; AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3.

lingered of the 1692 riots led by the urban Indians and the poor. Thus in 1701, the viceroy of New Spain dispatched sentinels to monitor these groups around Central Mexico in the expectation of similar post-succession turmoil.³⁷ Governors took the same precautions in other parts of Spanish America by forming militias or, in the case of Havana, declaring martial law.³⁸ Apprehensions were highest in frontier zones with a history of trans-imperial conflict. This was particularly true in places where the English and Dutch conducted contraband trade.³⁹ For example, the Spanish crown worried about the coast of Central America, where English merchants from Jamaica maintained relations with the Moskito Zambos.⁴⁰ Authorities in Venezuela and New Granada also feared the influence of Dutch agents over their own indigenous populations such as the Píritu. The Jesuit missionary Miguel Schabel, who spread pro-Habsburg propaganda via Curaçao, was considered particularly dangerous by the bishop of Caracas because he had “much practice and union with the Indians [of the region].”⁴¹

Deliberate attempts made to sway these “lower orders” for the Habsburg cause ended in failure. In 1709, the mulatto notaries Jorge Matías de León and Juan Eusebio Pacheco expected African and Carib laborers to willingly take up arms in support of Habsburg sovereignty in Trinidad. Instead, these same groups denounced

³⁷ The Count of Moctezuma to Felipe V, 5 May 1701, AGI México 472, No. 13, fs. 1r-4r. The viceroy also reported the general panic over a possible Anglo-Dutch invasion, which stirred up memories in Mexico of the pirate Laurens de Graaf’s capture of Veracruz in 1683.

³⁸ David Marley, *Wars of the Americas: a Chronology of Armed Conflict in the Western Hemisphere* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), p. 349.

³⁹ Francisco Ruiz de Aguirre to Felipe V, San José de Oruña, 4 July 1703, AGI Santo Domingo 582, f. 1r; the Marquis of Mijares to Felipe V, Caracas, 23 May 1702, AGI Santo Domingo 723, fs. 1r-1v; Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte to Felipe V, Caracas, 25 May 1702, AGI Santo Domingo 748, fs. 1r-5r.

⁴⁰ “Al la Audiencia de Panamá, mandando lo que ha de ejecutar para la reducción de los indios guayamines que habitan en el paraje que cita por descubrir desde aquella provincial a la de Nicaragua en la forma que se expresa,” Madrid, 20 May 1709, Panamá 232, L. 10, fs. 373r-375r.

⁴¹ Bishop Diego Baños y Sotomayor to Felipe V, Caracas, 24 August 1705, AGI Santo Domingo 794, fs. 1r-3v.

the conspirators to the governor.⁴² English officials also endeavored to incite a rebellion among the Caribes of Trinidad and other native peoples of Spanish America.⁴³ The governor of Jamaica, using Spanish intermediaries, even delivered rifles and gifts to the Kuna of Panama in hopes of stirring a revolt along the Peruvian silver route.⁴⁴ French officials from Saint-Domingue were far more successful in negotiating their own alliance with the Kuna and thus averting insurrection.⁴⁵

Two indigenous communities in Mesoamerica actually used loyalty to the Bourbons to their respective advantages. The Tlaxcalteca, whose ancestors aided Hernán Cortés, presented the Spanish crown with a published account of their elaborate ceremony celebrating the king's acclamation. By being among the first communities in Mexico to recognize Felipe V as king, they hoped the new dynasty would restore the privileges and tax exemptions bestowed on them at the time of the conquest.⁴⁶ Between 1700-1702, the Maya of Guatemala and Chiapas, hostile over labor abuses and the recent conquest of the Petén, reacted to the succession crisis by staging an uprising against the inspector general Francisco Gómez de Lamadriz.

⁴² The case against Jorge Matías de León and Juan Eusebio Pacheco is found in AGI Escribanía 665C.

⁴³ Moses Stringer to Queen Anne, London, 21 April 1704, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 22: 1704-1705*, pp. 41-62; Bevill Granville to Sir Charles Hedges, Barbados, 1 July 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 166-184.

⁴⁴ "El maestro de campo don Fernando Dávila da cuenta a Vuestra Majestad de las noticias que le participa el conde de Pontchartrain las que le dan del Darién y lo que ha ejecutado en estas disposiciones," Panama City, 13 April 1703, AGI Panamá 131, fs. 1r-8v; Thomas Handasyde to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jamaica, 18 June 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 142-166.

⁴⁵ Joseph d'Honon de Galiffet to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cap-Français, 24 September 1701, ANF, Colonies C^{9A} 5, fs. 393r-415v; Charles de la Motte Auger to the comte de Pontchartrain, aboard the *Aimable*, 24 September 1703, ANF, Colonies C^{9A} 6, f. 321r; Joseph d'Honon de Galiffet to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cap-Français, 20 April 1703, ANF, Colonies C^{9A} 6, fs. 400r-409v; Rowland Tyron to William Popple, 25 May 1709, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 24: 1708-1709*, pp. 300-322.

⁴⁶ Alejandro González Acosta, ed., *Crespones y campanas tlaxcaltecas en 1701* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2000), p. 9.

Professing their loyalty to Felipe V, the rebels claimed the objective of the insurrection was to remove an unjust administrator appointed by the former dynasty. In response, the king exonerated the insurgents and ordered the imprisonment of Lamadriz in Mexico City.⁴⁷

Realities and Dangers

It was not the impoverished but rather royal officials, clergy, and merchants who proved most inclined to dissidence. This seems logical, as elites had more to lose than others when it came to the economic effects of Bourbon succession. The fact that people of wealth and influence were implicated in crimes of disloyalty complicated matters. Few royal officials desired to publicize local cases of treason and sedition, even though the punishment of sensational crimes played a central part in the social life of colonial subjects. For example, the Duke of Alburquerque, viceroy of New Spain, rejected the suggestion of the *fiscal* (royal prosecutor) to turn sedition trials into a public spectacle.⁴⁸ The viceroy also ordered the captain-general of Cuba to pursue the case against Francisco Eusebio Soler with the utmost secrecy.⁴⁹ Likewise, the Marquis of Castllosrius, viceroy of Peru, disapproved of the decision of the governor of Cartagena de Indias to stage a public ceremony in which he read aloud

⁴⁷ María del Carmen León Cázares. *Un levantamiento en nombre del Rey Nuestro Señor: testimonios indígenas relacionados con el visitador Francisco Gómez de Lamadriz* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1988), p. 32. León argues “the alarming news from the metropolis about the succession of Carlos II, the threat of the empire being partitioned by the monarchs of Europe, and the rumor of enemy ships coming to the Indies” aggravated local tensions to the point to insurrection.

⁴⁸ “Testimonio de la causa contra Manuel de Sousa,” Mexico City, AGI, Escribanía 262C, fs. 266v-274v.

⁴⁹ “Autos hechos por el maestro de campo Don Laureano de Torres y Ayala...sobre la prisión de don Francisco Eusebio Soler,” Havana, 10 December 1709, AGI, Escribanía 665A, 3ª pieza, fs. 2v-3r.

and destroyed Habsburg amnesty decrees sent by the governor of Jamaica.⁵⁰

The secrecy surrounding the prosecution of disloyalty appears to have been motivated by fear. The governors of Caracas and Manila worried that “public tranquility” might be disrupted if knowledge spread that people of higher social standing committed acts of treason on the local level. They believed publicizing these cases would surely inspire others to resist the Bourbons.⁵¹ There were also concerns about the connections of the accused to persons of influence. Juan Bautista del Castillo y Leal was reluctant to expose the sedition of the royal prosecutor of the Audiencia of Quito directly to the Spanish court on account of the official’s ties to some of the ministers of the Council of the Indies. He sought the intercession of Louis XIV to ensure that his denunciation did not fall into the wrong hands.⁵²

Furthermore, there was the possibility that commercial elites might resort to violence to protect their business ties with the Habsburgs’ allies. In Mexico City, the judge José Joaquín Uribe and his wife expressed to the king their fear that the merchant community might retaliate against their family for presiding over the trial against seditious shop owners. As a consequence, Uribe took care whenever returning home after dark. The merchants captured in Mexico City did in fact appear to have important friends. As the viceroy later discovered, “gentlemen of importance” wearing wigs and carrying swords regularly visited them in the royal prison,

⁵⁰ Juan de Zúñiga y la Cerda to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cartagena de Indias, 15 February 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 786-801; Thomas Handasyde to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jamaica, 8 August 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 184-194.

⁵¹ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 137r-139v.

⁵² Juan Bautista del Castillo y Leal to Louis XIV, Quito, 2 August 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne 107, fs. 19r-22r.

presumably by bribing the jailer.⁵³ This danger may explain why the circle around Diego Ladrón de Guevara, the interim viceroy of Peru, chose not to denounce known sedition among groups of Peruvian merchants to the Audiencia of Lima.⁵⁴ The arrest of cloth smugglers for treason in Riohacha proved near fatal for the governor of Maracaibo. During the trials, a group of caped assailants—believed to be members of a local trade network with the Dutch—tried to assassinate him during an evening stroll.⁵⁵ Smugglers in Bayamo were successful in murdering Luis Sañudo y Anaya, governor of Santiago de Cuba, during his attempts to investigate local contraband ties with enemy English merchants.⁵⁶

Conclusion

Spanish American subjects both supported and questioned Felipe V's rule at the start of the eighteenth century. Agitated by the events of the War of the Spanish Succession, the Spanish crown and its colonial administrators interpreted a wide range of actions as proof of subjects' disloyalty to the king. Plotting a rebellion or interacting with the enemies of the Bourbons were grievous crimes. However, there were also serious concerns about the spread of unfavorable news or gossip that could cast doubts about the legitimacy of the dynastic change. The expectation of disloyalty among indigenous communities or marginalized groups proved unfounded over the

⁵³ AGI, Escribanía 262C, 2^a pieza, fs. 4v-8r; Luis Navarro García, *Conspiración en México durante el gobierno del virrey Alburquerque* (Valladolid: Casa-Museo de Colón, 1982), p. 38.

⁵⁴ Paul Fibras, "El *Diario* y la sátira en Lima: Joseph de Contreras y las décimas del Juicio fanático (1711)," in Ignacio Arellano and Antonio Lorente Medinas, eds., *Poesía satírica y burlesca en la Hispanoamérica colonial* (Madrid: Editorial Iberoamericana, 2009), pp. 125-168.

⁵⁵ "Testimonio de autos seguidos por el señor don Laureano de Ezcaray..." Maracaibo, 17 October 1707, AGI, Santo Domingo 667, f. 79.

⁵⁶ Pierre-Nicolas Partiet to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 12 December 1712, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 16, fs. 314r-317v.

course of the war. As the following chapters illustrate, members of the higher strata of colonial society tended to be caught committing crimes against the king as opposed to those from below. Spanish American elites loyal to Felipe V imprisoned the disloyal, collaborated with French corsairs and trade company agents, and promoted the Bourbons in sermons and public spectacles. Those elites disloyal to Felipe V spread pro-Habsburg propaganda, debated openly about the illegitimacy of Bourbon sovereignty, traded with enemy nations, and planned insurrections.

CHAPTER 2

THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

No warships of the king of Spain have arrived here in a long time. This not only makes it easy for the Dutch to conduct trade on the coasts, where they take in millions of pesos, it also gives them the means of making contacts and shaking the loyalties of so many subjects. The effects of these liaisons are most frightening during the present juncture of the war...

The Cabildo of Caracas to Louis XIV, 1706¹

In late November 1704, Captain Bartolomé de Ponte, *castellano* of the port of La Guaira in Venezuela, landed at Corunna on the armed French slave ship *Dragon* seeking a promotion to higher political office in Spanish America from the House of Bourbon. Arriving in the midst of the War of the Spanish Succession, Bartolomé de Ponte knew that he needed to prove his loyalty to Spain's new dynasty. This would be a challenge; it was well known at the Spanish and French courts that his brother, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte, the deposed governor of Venezuela, was implicated in a failed pro-Habsburg conspiracy in Caracas with Dutch slave traders.² In order to secure his candidacy, Bartolomé de Ponte sought the protection of the comte de Pontchartrain, Louis XIV's secretary of state of the navy, who would be an invaluable ally. Pontchartrain was chief minister of French colonial affairs and a director of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée, which came to control the *asiento* (Spain's slave monopoly) as a result of the Bourbon succession. The series of packets Bartolomé de

¹ The Cabildo to Caracas to Louis XIV, Caracas, 20 October 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 483-485.

² François-Ambroise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 10 December 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 233, fs. 396v-397r.

Ponte forwarded to Pontchartrain served not only as a testimony of his loyalty to the Bourbons and a defense of his family's honor, but also as a business proposition. He included letters of recommendation from the slave ship *Dragon's* captain and the French slave company's functionaries in Santo Domingo and Havana—all of which attested to his “zeal for the French” and usefulness as a liaison for the Compagnie Royale de Guinée.³ As Bartolomé de Ponte expected, Pontchartrain intervened on his behalf, and by 1706 Felipe V had granted him the office of governor of Santa Marta, the *futura* of captain-general of Guatemala, and an honorific key as gentleman of the Spanish king's bedchamber.⁴

Bartolomé de Ponte's political successes and his brother Nicolás Eugenio Ponte's failures highlight the larger role played by the transatlantic slave trade in the War of the Spanish Succession. Scholars of the war have traditionally analyzed the *asiento* primarily in the context of European diplomacy, missing the centrality of the slave trade to the war's execution and outcome in Spanish America: naval battles, the transportation of officials and correspondence, cases of disloyalty and sedition, political appointments, the financing of campaigns, and the provision of arms.⁵ While not always apparent in Spanish and Latin American sources, the intermingling of the

³ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Versailles, June 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 632-633.

⁴ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 20 December 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 14-15.

⁵ The broader political dimensions of the slave trade in early eighteenth-century Spanish America have been virtually ignored by historians since the publication of Georges Scelle's *Histoire politique de la traite négrière aux Indes de Castille* (1906). Over the past fifty years, the majority of scholars working on the slave trade in Spanish America have focused more on quantitative studies or the actual experiences of African slaves themselves and less on transnational politics. For example, Colin Palmer's *Human Cargo: The British Slave Trade to Spanish America, 1700-1739* (Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1981), which deals with all three topics, focuses least on politics. Herbert S. Klein, David Eltis, and David Wheat are currently shedding light on political alliances between African rulers and European slave traders, yet much work remains to be done on such alliances in Spanish America.

war and the slave trade is more clearly revealed in documentation found in French archives, especially letters—many of them confidential—exchanged between French ministers of state such as the comte de Pontchartrain and Spanish secular and religious authorities linked to the administration of the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru.⁶

As this correspondence demonstrates, many Spanish colonial elites, like Bartolomé de Ponte and his brother Nicolas Eugenio de Ponte, were quite aware that the European dynastic dispute over Bourbon and Habsburg rights to the Spanish throne centered in a more global context on a struggle between France, England, and the Netherlands for control of transatlantic commercial networks—principal among them the *asiento*.⁷ Elites on both sides of the Atlantic created alliances, promoted their private interests, and chose their loyalties accordingly. The Ponte brothers' journey within the commercial geographies of the Spanish empire reveals the importance of the slave trade in in the broader geopolitical struggle of the War of the Spanish Succession.

⁶ The Count of La Marquina to the comte de Pontchartrain, Seville, 25 January 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 269-276. For example, when the Count of La Marquina wrote Pontchartrain offering a bribe in return for an endorsement as viceroy of New Spain, he implored the French minister to keep the letter a secret from authorities in Madrid and, after reading, “to throw it into the fire without communicating its contents to anyone.” The count was named president of the Casa de la Contratación in 1709 instead of viceroy, and his descendants later became important colonial officials in Chile.

⁷ Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 109; 116-118. Stein and Stein are among recent economic historians that recognize the crucial connection between Spanish American trade and the origins, course, and aftermath of the War of the Spanish Succession, albeit focusing more on the silver fleet for their study.

The Slave Trade and Trans-Imperial Relations

The lives of Bartolomé and Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte provide examples of how the economic relationship between the Spanish empire and other foreign powers mattered politically on both sides of the Atlantic during the reigns of Carlos II (r. 1665-1700) and Felipe V (r. 1700-1746). The Pontes were descended from Genoese merchant bankers who financed the conquest of the Canary Islands in the late fifteenth century and became prominent nobles in Tenerife by the seventeenth century. Deeply entrenched in the Atlantic world, other members of the family included wealthy landowners in Venezuela as well as former royal officials in Havana, Cumaná, Panama City, and Sombrerete.⁸ Another relative, the Marquis of La Quinta Roja, served in Spain as the protector general of the *asiento* under the Portuguese from 1697-1701.⁹ The family's connection with Venezuela was strengthened in 1692 when Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte purchased the office of governor from Carlos II's government for a donation of 16,000 pesos. Prestige aside, his true intention was making a fortune off the cacao trade.¹⁰ Bartolomé de Ponte joined his brother's business venture when he followed him from Tenerife to Caracas in 1699, and shortly afterwards Nicolás Eugenio promoted Bartolomé from sergeant major to captain in command of the fort in La Guaira, despite Spanish laws prohibiting such nepotism. The appointment placed Bartolomé de Ponte in charge of Venezuela's principal port,

⁸ Andrés F. Ponte, *Bolívar y otros ensayos* (Caracas: Tipografía Cosmos, 1919), pp. 287-288. Bartolomé de Ponte y Hoyo (1655-1710) and his brother Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte y Hoyo (1667-1705) were also distant relatives of liberator Simón de Bolívar's father, Colonel Juan Vicente de Bolívar y Ponte.

⁹ "Papeles relativos al nombramiento de jueces conservadores del asiento de Negros que se hizo por don Manuel Ferreira Carvallo y compañía de Portugal," Madrid, 1698, AGI, Escribanía 1048B, fs. 3r-3v; 19r.

¹⁰ Eugenio Piñero, *The Town of San Felipe and Colonial Cacao Economies* (Philadelphia, PA: the American Philosophical Society, 1994), p. 73.

where local merchants exported cacao and Portuguese *asiento* agents imported the African slaves essential to sustain the region's hacienda-based economy. It did not take long before Bartolomé de Ponte began extracting bribes from ship captains for the right to enter the harbor, further blurring the line between his government occupation and personal business interests.¹¹

Through their participation in Venezuela's government and cacao trade, the Pontes became deeply involved with the politics of the transatlantic slave trade—a source of global tension coming to a head at the advent of Bourbon succession. The slave trade had already evolved into a powerful commercial force entangled in European politics and war. By the second half of the seventeenth century, Spain's imperial rivals had chartered state-funded companies designed to compete against one another for immense profits from the ever-growing need for African slave labor throughout the Americas.¹² These new English, Dutch, and French companies transformed the slave trade from an intermittent service for providing colonists with a labor force into a major business with investors of such striking political clout as noblemen, bankers, ministers of state, and the royal families of England and France.¹³ Such overlap between business and politics proved volatile, as evident in the slave trade's role as a catalyst for the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-

¹¹ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Versailles, April 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 632-633; Memorandum, 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 904-907; "Memorial ajustado de la residencia de la ciudad de Caracas...lo tocante a don Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte," Caracas, 27 July 1708, AGI, Escribanía 713A, fs. 4r; 85r-86r.

¹² Paul E. Lovejoy, "The Volume of the Atlantic Slave Trade: A Synthesis," *The Journal of African History* 23, No. 4 (1982): 478-481. On this growing demand, Lovejoy estimates that of the 1,868,000 African slaves imported to the Americas between 1601-1700 approximately 773,600 to 825,200 arrived between 1676-1700—about double the amount that arrived between 1651-1675.

¹³ On the history of these companies, see Kenneth Gordon Davies's *The Royal African Company* (New York: Atheneum, 1970), Johannes Menne Postma's *The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade (1600-1815)* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), and Abdoulaye Ly's *La Compagnie du Sénégal* (Paris: Présence Africaine, 1958). Of particular note, the English Royal African Company enjoyed a lobby in Parliament, royal patronage, and access to Charles II of England's Privy Council.

1667)¹⁴ and as an impetus behind campaigns in both the Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678) and the Nine Years War (1688-1697).¹⁵ The War of the Spanish Succession would serve as another example of a European war fought in part over the slave trade.

The struggle over the slave trade in the late seventeenth century reached into Spanish America, where elites such as the Ponte family often compromised the imperial interests of the Spanish crown in pursuit of personal wealth, frequently allying with the representatives of rival European companies. The Ponte brothers were expected to work with Portuguese slave traders in charge of the *asiento* factory in La Guaira, but they also maintained contact with functionaries of the WIC (the Dutch West-Indische Compagnie), who the Portuguese traders ironically depended on to meet *asiento* contract quotas.¹⁶ While Carlos II's government banned direct trade between the viceroyalties and Dutch, English, and French companies, the Portuguese slave traders could subcontract them as suppliers for the *asiento*. Regardless, whether selling slaves legally to the Portuguese traders or illicitly to buyers along the coasts of Spanish America, it was clear that these companies dominated the slave trade in the Americas by 1700. As early as the 1630s, the WIC had transformed Curaçao into an exclusive slave depot to serve the *hacendados* and mine barons in Venezuela.

¹⁴ Gijs Rommelse, *The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667): Raison d'état, Mercantilism, and Maritime Strife* (Hilversum: Uitgeverij Verloren, 2006), pp. 63; 88. The king of England's brother James Stuart, Duke of York and Lord High Admiral, instigated the Second Anglo-Dutch War while serving as governor of the English Royal African Company with the objective of conquering Dutch slave forts in West Africa.

¹⁵ Philip P. Boucher, *France and the American Tropics to 1700: Tropics of Discontent?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), pp. 217-218; 273. One of the French crown's objectives during the Franco-Dutch War was to completely remove the Dutch from the slave trade, which led to the capture of WIC forts at Gorée and Arguin. During the Nine Years War, English Royal African Company agents pillaged French slave ships off the coast of West Africa and destroyed the principal French slave fortresses, causing the bankruptcy of the Compagnie du Sénégal.

¹⁶ Felipe V to Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte, Madrid, 20 June 1702, AGI, Santo Domingo 685, fs. 1r-2r. For example, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte's first task as governor in 1699 was to settle a lawsuit involving the Portuguese slave traders in La Guaira.

Likewise, a considerable proportion of slaves shipped by the English Royal African Company to Jamaica and Barbados after 1660 were destined for clandestine sale in Central America, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Although relative latecomers, a series of French companies operating out of Martinique and Saint-Domingue aggressively trafficked slaves to ports in Panama and New Granada by the 1680s and 1690s with the encouragement of the French crown.¹⁷

Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte risked contact with the WIC to guarantee the financial success of his term as governor, hoping to cover the high cost of purchasing the office by participating in illegal trade with Curaçao.¹⁸ Dutch, English, and French slave traders made ideal customers since they came from countries with a high demand for the types of products specific to New Spain and Peru (cacao, cochineal, indigo, dyewoods, and hides) that Ponte could easily obtain. Spanish American elites made a far greater profit from selling these commodities to foreigners than they did from selling them within the imperial market. For example, Dutch slave traders from Curaçao were known to pay up to fifty percent more for Venezuelan cacao than buyers in legal markets such as Veracruz and Cadiz.¹⁹ The practice of interloping with foreigners also allowed local elites to evade heavy sales and export taxes such as the *alcabala de salida* and *almojarifazgo*. At the same time, interloping minimized the damage done by the unpopular trade restrictions imposed by the crown in 1676. New laws under Carlos II aimed at limiting and, in some cases, eliminating certain

¹⁷ Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), 117; Carolyn Hall and Héctor Pérez Brignoli, *Historical Atlas of Central America* (Oklahoma City, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003), pp. 132-133; AGI, Escribanía 473A; AGI, Escribanía 473B.

¹⁸ Memorandum, 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 904-907.

¹⁹ Piñero, *The Town of San Felipe*, pp. 45-63; 111. Piñero points out that Venezuelan cacao sold for a much higher price in Amsterdam than it did in Spanish ports.

networks of long-established intercolonial trade between the various regions of New Spain and Peru. As a consequence of these restrictions, contraband trade with foreigners increased in Spanish America during the latter years of the seventeenth century.²⁰

In allying with the WIC, the Ponte brothers capitalized on perhaps the greatest advantage of illicit trade with the slave companies: the exchange of Spanish American commodities for luxury textiles. Using the Portuguese slave trader Francisco de Acosta Pego as an intermediary, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte acquired fine cloth such as woolens, droguets, and camlets from the Dutch slave traders in Curaçao. Packed in cacao crates, the cloth was then smuggled undetected to Veracruz on Bartolomé de Ponte's cargo ship and resold for silver to Mexican cloth merchants.²¹ This particular sort of contraband activity went hand-in-hand with the slave trade. Company directors were often wholesale merchants with investments in European manufacturing as well as the importation of Chinese silks and Indian cottons. By the turn of the eighteenth century, Spanish America had become the most prestigious and profitable market for fine European and Asian textiles, where consumption was stimulated by the mining economies of the Andes and Northern Mexico. Slave companies could ensure the availability of this cloth at more affordable prices than Spanish merchants.²² The extraordinary demand for this cloth in urban centers reflected the preference of wealthy Creole and mixed-race elites for quality European

²⁰ Hall and Pérez, *Historical Atlas of Central America*, pp. 132-133.

²¹ Memorandum, 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 904-907.

²² Jean Tanguy, *Quand la toile va: l'industrie toilière bretonne du 16e au 18e siècle* (Rennes: Éditions Apogée, 1994), pp. 9; 106; P.C. Emmer, "The Dutch and the Making of the Second Atlantic System," in *Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System*, ed. Barbara L. Solow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 75-77.

linens, brocades, silks, lace, and serges over textiles produced in local *obrajes*.²³ The Pontes were clearly not the only Spanish American officials to profit from such a commercial alliance with slave companies during this period.²⁴

The Asiento and the Question of Spanish Succession

The Ponte brothers' business dealings with the WIC soon entangled them in the global political turmoil resulting from Bourbon succession. For Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte, the outcome would be quite tragic. With the death of Carlos II and the proclamation of Felipe V as king of Spain in November 1700, the French crown was poised to gain legal commercial rights in Spanish America that included the *asiento*. The comte de Pontchartrain, appointed French secretary of state of the navy in 1699, was one of several ministers in Louis XIV's council of state who believed Spanish American trade alone could financially support the Bourbons if England and the Netherlands—the dynasty's bitter enemies—declared war in favor of Archduke Charles, the Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne. Pontchartrain's interest in transatlantic commercial networks such as the *asiento* should be considered an attempt to implement the colonial policies of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the secretary of state of the navy and controller-general of finances from 1665-1683, who encouraged French merchants to participate in the slave and cloth trades with Spanish America as

²³ Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, "Prices and Agricultural Production: Potosí and Charcas in the Eighteenth Century," in *Essays on the Price History of Eighteenth-Century Latin America*, ed. Lyman L. Johnson and Enrique Tandeter (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1990), pp. 201-277.

²⁴ F.J. Osborne, "James Castillo—Asiento agent," *The Jamaican Historical Review* VIII (1971): 9-18; AGI, Escribanía 473A. To the same extent, the Catalan merchant Santiago del Castillo acted as an intermediary between the royal officials of Havana, the governor of Jamaica, and the English Royal African Company in the 1680s. Additionally, in 1699, the Marquis of Villarocho, governor of Panama, formed an alliance with Jean-Baptiste du Casse, director of the Compagnie du Sénégal and governor of Saint-Domingue, for smuggling fine lace into Peru in exchange for silver.

a means of obtaining revenue in silver to pay for Louis XIV's wars and absolutist ambitions.²⁵ For Pontchartrain, it represented a means of shoring up the finances for the French state in order to pay for the costly war to come. Hence during the first three years of the so-called "Union of the Two Crowns," the ministers of the navy, foreign affairs, war, and finance advanced a foreign policy with Spain that would give the French monarchy a dominant role in Spanish colonial trade and defense.²⁶

Notably, Felipe V's concession of the *asiento* to the Compagnie Royale de Guinée in August 1701 served as one of several issues that caused the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession. The prospect of a French-held *asiento* alarmed and angered the English and Dutch governments for several reasons. For over thirty years, the ministers of Carlos II had repeatedly rejected the demands of English and Dutch statesmen for rights to the *asiento* in exchange for naval protection of Spanish territories in their joint wars against Louis XIV.²⁷ In contrast, the president and the secretary of the Spanish council of state facilitated a contract between Felipe V and representatives of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée within months of the new king's arrival in Spain. This contract completely eliminated the possibility for the English and Dutch slave companies to continue as subcontractors by prohibiting "foreigners"

²⁵ Sara E. Chapman, *Private Ambition and Political Alliances: The Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain Family and Louis XIV's Government, 1650-1715* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2004), pp. 138-139; Charles Woolsey Cole, *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*, vol. II (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964), pp. 119-121.

²⁶ Pierre Goubert, *Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966), pp. 233-234; José Manuel de Bernardo Ares, "Tres años estelares de política colonial borbónica (1701-1703)," *Cuadernos de historia de España* LXXX (2006): 171-196.

²⁷ Frances Gardiner Davenport, ed., *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, vol. II (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1929), pp. 94-350. For example, the English government tried to get an *asiento* contract included in the Treaty of Madrid (1667), the Godolphin Treaty (1670), and the Treaty of Windsor (1680). In spite of rejecting their demands, the Spanish crown did concede to English and Dutch merchants the right to sell goods to Spanish Indies merchants in Seville and Cadiz, trade on a limited basis in Manila, cut logwood in the Yucatan Peninsula, and dock distressed ships in Spanish American ports.

and non-Catholics from direct or even indirect participation in the trade. Furthermore, the French company was given unprecedented privileges, including an exemption from ship inspections by Spanish royal officials and the right to establish slave factories and conduct business in virtually all the major Atlantic and Pacific ports of New Spain and Peru.²⁸ The English and Dutch governments forged a treaty of alliance with the Austrian Habsburgs in September 1701 and issued a formal declaration of war against the Bourbons in May 1702. In part, the English and Dutch feared that the new *asiento* contract would allow French economic hegemony in the Spanish empire or, even worse, French universal monarchy.²⁹

In Venezuela, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte appeared to resist the immediate consequences of Bourbon succession and the French-held *asiento*. The change of dynasty jeopardized his business arrangements from the start. The French crown was quick to publicize its newfound prominence in Spanish America's economy by sending a warship to La Guaira in January 1701 with a decree from Versailles—but written in the name of Felipe V—announcing Bourbon succession and the right of French vessels to enter Spanish American ports.³⁰ The announcement of the French *asiento* contract, which cut the Portuguese and the Dutch out of the slave trade, arrived promptly in the same fashion the following October.³¹ It was after the

²⁸ “Asiento con Juan Ducasse en nombre de la Compañía Real de Guinea del reino de Francia,” Madrid, 1701, AGI, Contaduría 261, fs. 1239-1305.

²⁹ Stein and Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War*, p. 121. Stein and Stein emphasize that the Anglo-Dutch alliance with the Habsburgs was formed a mere ten days after the signing of the *asiento* contract with the French.

³⁰ Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte to Felipe V, Caracas, 5 May 1701, AGI, Santo Domingo 695, fs. 1r-2v. Louis XIV's ministers devised this decree, dated 31 December 1700, while Felipe V was still in France. The copy sent to Venezuela arrived two months before the official decree from Madrid announcing Carlos II's death and Felipe V's succession.

³¹ Vicente de Verois and Andrés Manuel de Urbina to Felipe V, Caracas, 23 May 1702, AGI, Santo Domingo 719, fs. 1r-2v.

Compagnie Royale de Guinée established a slave factory in La Guaira that Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte began to show hostility towards the French and adherence to the old regime. François-Roger Robert, the French intendant in Martinique, complained to Pontchartrain that Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte did nothing but make life difficult for the French slave traders and at the same time allowed the Portuguese slave traders to remain in La Guaira, where they continued to sell slaves and maintain contact with the company's Dutch rivals. When the Compagnie Royale de Guinée functionaries sought legal action in May 1702, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte ruled in favor of the Portuguese, granting them the right to sell three hundred and fifty *piezas* that they claimed were purchased from the WIC before the end of their contract and were still awaiting transport from Curaçao to La Guaira. The French accused the governor of favoring the business interests of the Bourbon's enemies at the expense of the Spanish crown's allies.³²

Relations between Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte and the French grew problematic from a political standpoint as well. The potential for an Anglo-Dutch invasion of Spain's Caribbean ports prompted Felipe V to instruct Spanish American royal officials to cooperate with Louis XIV's military and political authorities for the security of the empire.³³ The deployment of an English squadron under Admiral John Benbow to Jamaica in November 1701 made such a precaution even more pressing. As a response, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte sent the Portuguese slave trader Francisco

³² Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte to Felipe V, Caracas, 25 May 1702, AGI, Santo Domingo 748, fs. 1r-2v.

³³ "Al virrey del Perú, previniéndole lo que ha de ejecutar para resguardo del intento que ingleses y holandeses tienen de invadir las Indias," 11 January 1701, AGI, Indiferente General 431, Libro 45, fs. 122r-123v; "Al virrey del Perú, participándole lo que se recela de ingleses y holandeses en orden a perturbar los dominios de la América aclamando por rey al Archiduque," 31 January 1701, AGI, Indiferente General 431, Libro 45, f. 129v.

de Acosta Pego, his intermediary with the WIC, on several missions to Martinique to request munitions and flour for the garrison in La Guaira. It did not take long before the governor's excessive demands and refusal to pay for the supplies irritated the intendant Robert and the commandant of Fort-Royal. Pego's haughtiness and clear resentment towards the French further offended the officials, who claimed the governor's envoy was nothing but a rogue.³⁴ As Robert told Pontchartrain, rather than following orders from Versailles to provide rifles, canons, and gunpowder to neighboring Spanish governors, he should be sending a warship to the coast of Venezuela to breakup Dutch trade.³⁵

French slave traders and officials were not the only ones who mistrusted the intentions of Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte. At the same time, Venezuelan nobles, clergy, and *alcaldes ordinaries* (municipal magistrates) started questioning the governor's loyalty to Felipe V based on his apparent complicity with Bartolomé de Capocelato, the Count of Antería, who instigated a brief pro-Habsburg conspiracy in Caracas in September 1702. Claiming to be an ambassador from the Habsburg court of Vienna, Capocelato attempted to persuade the Venezuelan elites to recognize Archduke Charles as their sovereign and align with his Dutch allies. WIC agents had transported the count from Rotterdam to Curaçao, then finally to the valley of Ocumare (to the west of Caracas). From then onwards, accounts differ on Capocelato's stay in Caracas and his relationship with Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte. In one version, Francisco de

³⁴ François-Roger Robert to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 3 April 1702, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 14, fs. 99r-108r; François-Roger Robert to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 21 April 1702, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 14, fs. 94r-97v. Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte insisted that the bill for the French supplies should be sent to Madrid, not Caracas.

³⁵ François-Roger Robert to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 10 February 1703, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 15, fs. 74r-87r.

Acosta Pego escorted Capocelato from the Ocumare coast to Caracas, assuring him of the sympathy of the wealthy cacao growers; Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte and the military personnel from La Guaira welcomed him as an emissary. After receiving the count's credentials and a decree written in the name of the Archduke, the governor, a group of soldiers, and some Canarian and Portuguese merchants marched the Habsburg banner through the plaza and proclaimed their loyalty to the old dynasty to the sound of drums. The disloyal subjects were eventually dispersed by a larger mob of Bourbon supporters comprised of the bishop and creole merchants and nobles, who carried a pendant with Felipe V's arms. The resistance of the mob supposedly persuaded the governor to take Capocelato prisoner.³⁶ In the other version of events, a captain in Ocumare arrested Capocelato for his seditious behavior and transferred him in chains to the royal jail in Caracas. Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte then removed the count (and his chains) and placed him in governor's palace so he could receive regular visits from Pego regarding WIC affairs in Curaçao. Most witnesses claimed Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte and the conspirator were unusually friendly with one another, even dining together with the governor's secretary Pedro de Castro Garay and attending mass in the governor's private oratory. It was alleged that Capocelato devised a plan with Castro and several officers from La Guaira to surrender the fort and its French munitions to a Dutch squadron in return for 150,000 pesos and future political posts from the Archduke.³⁷

³⁶ "Testimonio sobre la prisión y embargo de bienes de don Bartolomé de Capocelato, conde de Antería," Caracas, 12 October 1702, AGI, Escribanía 690A, 1^a pieza, fs. 18v-24v.

³⁷ "Testimonio de los autos hechos por el gobernador y jueces oficiales reales de la Nueva Ciudad de la Veracruz sobre haberse desembarcado en el puerto de Ocumare de la provincia de Caracas un alemán nombrado don Bartolomé Capocelato," Veracruz, 4 June 1704, AGI, Santo Domingo 747, f. 1r-9v; AGI, Escribanía, 690A, 6^a pieza, f. 1r. The royal officials in Venezuela knew that the declaration of war had been pronounced in Curaçao in May 1702.

Bartolomé de Capocelato eventually escaped from the governor's palace in May 1703 and fled to Curaçao with Francisco de Acosta Pego and Pedro de Castro Garay. The count's activities did not end there, as he attempted to further arouse Spanish American sympathies for Archduke Charles from the safety of the Dutch enclave. His efforts were joined in Willemstad by a larger group of agents that included the Portuguese slave traders Felipe Enríquez, Gaspar de Andrade, and Antonio Montero Bello, the Bohemian Jesuit Fray Miguel Schabel, and the creole Augustinian Fray Agustín de Caicedo y Velasco.³⁸ For the remainder of the war, these men used Pego and other WIC smugglers to send correspondence and printed pro-Habsburg pamphlets to Caribbean merchants, clergy, cacao growers, and royal officials. The lieutenant Bernardo de Matos y Machado and his accomplices Matía Viña and Antonio Franco helped distribute the materials until an investigation by the *alcaldes ordinarios* of Caracas forced them to flee to Curaçao in 1706.³⁹ Pego's activities came to an end at the same time in Guatemala, where the Mulatto merchant Marcos de la Cruz denounced him and the commander of fort of San Felipe de Lara for trafficking Dutch cloth up the Dulce River. The captain-general imprisoned the commander while Pego received asylum in a local monastery, where he died shortly afterwards.⁴⁰

³⁸ "Remito al Consejo de Indias el papel incluso en que se expresan los nombres de tres sujetos que pasaron de la América con designios de conciliar los ánimos a favor del Archiduque..." Madrid, 23 January 1706, AGI, Santo Domingo 679, fs. 1r-2v; "Informe de la provincia de Caracas de la deslealtad de fray Agustín de Caicedo, del orden del señor San Agustín," Caracas, 14 June 1713, AGI, Santo Domingo 801, fs. 1r-3v.

³⁹ Fernando de Rojas y Mendoza to Felipe V, Caracas, 25 November 1706, AGI, México 478, fs. 1v-2r.

⁴⁰ Murdo J. MacLeod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520-1720* (Austin: the University of Texas Press, 2008), p. 371-372. Details of the arrest are contained in AGI Guatemala 291-292. MacLeod was unaware of Pego's activities as a pro-Habsburg conspirator.

As for Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte, the escape of Capocelto and his accomplices to Curaçao ultimately led to his downfall. The members of the “pro-Bourbon faction” in Caracas reproached the governor for allowing apparent Habsburg sympathizers to interact in his own home, plot against Felipe V’s sovereignty, and then flee to enemy territory unpunished. When the governor fell mysteriously ill a few months later, the *alcaldes ordinarios* took advantage of the situation to declare him insane and incapable of ruling. The governor was confined to his quarters at the palace while the *alcaldes ordinarios* seized control of the political and military affairs of Venezuela in the name of Felipe V.⁴¹ Powerless after the overthrow, Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte languished for two more years before dying in 1705. Several of the magistrates then dispatched detailed reports of the conspiracy to the royal officials of Veracruz, the Audiencia of Santo Domingo, the viceroy of New Spain, Felipe V, and Louis XIV. Captain Diego Ramírez de la Peciña y Arellano, a Venezuelan military official, even traveled to Spain and denounced the Capocelato conspiracy to Felipe V with another case of sedition involving Fray Francisco Álvarez de Cardona, guardian of the convent of San Francisco in San Juan de Puerto Rico, who was guilty of sending printed manifestos written by the Archduke to various Franciscan monasteries in New Spain.⁴² José de Melo, the *juez de contrabando* of La Guaira, gave the news to the court of Versailles, though the French government was aware of the Venezuelan and Puerto Rican affairs through their personnel in Madrid as well.⁴³

⁴¹ “Cabildo,” Caracas, 19 November 1703, AGI, Escribanía 665A, fs. 1r-18v.

⁴² “Extract from two declarations by Diego Ramírez de la Peciña y Arellano,” n.d., ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 218-220. The French ambassador in Madrid forwarded to Pontchartrain a memorandum regarding the captain’s two reports.

⁴³ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 30 January 1705, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 234, fs. 197r-199v; the Cabildo of Caracas to Louis XIV, Caracas, 20 October 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 483-488; “Extrait d’un mémoire espagnol de don José de Melo,

The ruling “pro-Bourbon” faction in Caracas continued to prosecute individuals in Venezuela suspected of disloyalty and sedition against Felipe V up until the year 1712. These included trials against José Rois Carvalho, Pedro Rodrigues Madeira, and Vita Tejeira—three Portuguese slave traders with ties to the Dutch. Also, the *alcaldes ordinarios* prosecuted Lucas Pereira, a customs official from La Guaira who tried to convince them to punish the Compagnie Royale de Guinée functionaries for smuggling French linen and brandy into the port. Instead, they ordered an investigation against Pereira and found him guilty of introducing pro-Habsburg manifestos and gazettes into Caracas through contact with WIC smugglers.⁴⁴ Not surprisingly, during this period the merchants and *alcaldes ordinarios* of Caracas collaborated with the interests of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée and protected its contraband textile operation. As Pontchartrain boasted to the French ambassador in Madrid, the French trade had supplanted that of the enemy Dutch in Caracas through these measures.⁴⁵

The Capocelato conspiracy was certainly not the last recorded instance of Anglo-Dutch attempts to sway the loyalties of Spanish American elites for the Habsburgs. Anglo-Dutch colonial governors and traders were encouraged by their governments in Europe to arouse pro-Habsburg rebellions in the hopes of gaining the same commercial privileges given by Felipe V to the French in Spanish America. Archduke Charles and his father Emperor Leopold I supported this endeavor by

capitaine de guerre et juge de la contrebande sur la côte de la province de Caracas,” Paris, n.d., AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 174, fs. 234r-239r.

⁴⁴ “Testimonio de los autos que se fulminaron contra don Lucas Pereira y otros reos sobre introducción de diferentes papelones perjudiciales a la Real Corona,” 1706, AGI, Escribanía 665B, 11^a pieza.

⁴⁵ The comte de Pontchartrain to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, Marly-le-Roi, 4 November 1705, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 154, fs. 93r-95r.

promising their allies the right to trade freely in Spanish America and retain sovereignty over any territories they should conquer during the war in return for their support of Habsburg sovereignty in Spain.⁴⁶ This incentive was formalized in the Treaty of Barcelona (1707), in which Archduke Charles secretly pledged to grant English slave traders the *asiento* in compensation for Queen Anne's continued military and financial assistance to the Habsburgs.⁴⁷

One of the primary Anglo-Dutch approaches to the war in the Americas was to disrupt the slave trade and cut France off economically from Spanish America. This initially involved privateering and commerce raiding, though gradually the English and Dutch employed less violent tactics to persuade Spanish American elites to recognize Archduke Charles as their king. For example, the official instructions from the English government were as follows:

Whereas we, in conjunction with our allies the States General [the government of the Netherlands], are willing to encourage our and their intercourse [i.e. trade] with such of the Spanish nation in the West Indies as shall be inclined to acknowledge the title and sovereignty of Charles III, king of Spain, with whom we are in friendship and alliance. We therefore direct that from and after June 1, 1704, no injury, violence, spoil or molestation whatsoever shall be done by any of our ships of war, privateers, letters of marque, or by any of our governors, or under their permission or authority, or any other officers of, in, or belonging to any of our isles, colonies, or plantations in America, upon or within the main land of the continent, or of the isles, or plantations belonging to the Spaniards in America...provided that no goods belonging to the inhabitants of France or its vassals or any others inhabiting within the dominions and territories of that crown, nor any contraband goods or provisions of war be permitted to be carried to any Spanish plantations in any ship whatsoever...⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Davenport, *Treaties*, vol. III, pp. 75-87.

⁴⁷ "Copia del tratado de comercio hecho en Barcelona en 10 de julio 1707," AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 173, fs. 96r-121r.

⁴⁸ Sir Charles Hedges to Thomas Handasyde, Saint James's, 4 May 1704, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 22: 1704-1705*, pp. 111-123.

The strategy was practical in the sense that the Habsburgs' allies expected to dominate Spanish American trade after the war and therefore endeavored not to further alienate their future customers.

Instead, English and Dutch traders turned to distributing Spanish-language pamphlets and engravings of the Archduke along with their contraband slaves and textiles on the Spanish American coast. Sir Charles Hedges and the Earl of Sunderland, the English secretaries of state for the Southern Department, were most keen on sending propaganda to Jamaican governors Thomas Handasyde and Lord Archibald Hamilton for distribution. Standing to profit from such a venture, these governors were equally keen on carrying out this mission.⁴⁹ The pamphlets ranged from portraits and manifestos written in the name of the Archduke, to amnesty decrees offering Anglo-Dutch naval support and arms should local elites rebel, to gazettes highlighting Felipe V's military failures in Europe.⁵⁰ Handasyde and Hamilton thought rigorous contraband trade (slaves and English woolen goods) and

⁴⁹ Thomas Handasyde to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jamaica, 1 April 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 95-108. For example, this letter refers to the "small trunk of King Charles's declarations, etc., which are to be distributed among the Spaniards in these parts." In this particular case, Handasyde proposed sending some of the pamphlets to Cartagena de Indias through a Spanish captain in Jamaica who was serving as an intermediary for English smugglers. He offered the captain a bribe and a letter of recommendation to the Archduke for his services, then planned to sneak him into Cartagena de Indias under the ruse of a prisoner exchange. The admiral in charge of the exchange was to write a letter to the Spanish governor to "acquaint him that the queen of Great Britain sent him there not to molest or do any injury to those who were her ancient allies, but to protect all those who were willing to throw off the French yoke, and declare for their right and lawful king Charles III, whose clemency and protection they might be assured."

⁵⁰ The sieur de M. to the comte de Pontchartrain, London, 13 February 1711, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 8, fs. 189r-190v; Sir Charles Hedges to Thomas Handasyde, Whitehall, 1 August 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 184-194. Regarding the use of news as propaganda, after Madrid briefly fell to the Archduke's army in 1706, Hedges ordered Handasyde to "take all opportunities that offer of letting the Spaniards in America have the good news of the happy progress of the allies, particularly of their lawful sovereign, that it may encourage them to shake off the yoke of a foreign government, and to declare for His Catholic Majesty [Archduke Charles]."

undercutting French prices for slave would induce Spanish American elites to look more favorably upon the Habsburg cause.⁵¹

Eager to protect its commercial interests, the French crown stayed abreast of these tactics with the aide of informants in London, Amsterdam, and Spanish American ports. In fact, Louis XIV's ministers were well aware that the English government intended to send various friars from London to the Spanish Caribbean with orders to incite insurrections. The French crown notified Felipe V, who warned royal officials in Spanish America to take necessary precautions.⁵² French corsairs from Saint-Malo caught at least one of these friars—a Neapolitan named Pietro Marino Sormani—on a ship bound for Jamaica in 1708. Similar to the case of the WIC and Bartolomé de Capocelato, the Earl of Sunderland had given Sormani the mission of traveling to New Granada “to excite the people to rise up in favor of the Archduke,” although he ended up imprisoned at Mont Saint-Michel in France for the rest of the war.⁵³ Interestingly, by then the accusations against Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte's disloyalty were so notorious at the French and Spanish courts that the friar was initially rumored to be one of the governor's brothers.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Frank Cundall, *The Governors of Jamaica in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (London: the West India Committee, 1937), pp. xxi; 26-65.

⁵² The marquis de Torcy to the marquis de Blécourt, Paris, 8 September 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 107, f. 189r; “Al virrey del Perú, ordenándole ponga muy particular cuidado en que no se introduzcan en aquellos dominios religiosos extranjeros o españoles seglares que no llevaron las licencias y requisitos arriba expresados,” 5 March 1703, AGI, Indiferente General 431, Libro 45, fs. 225r-228r.

⁵³ Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, 13 August 1708, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 181, fs. 203r-208r; François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 1 January 1709, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 76, fs. 55-57; the Earl of Sunderland to Thomas Handasyde, Windsor, 19 July 1708, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 24: 1708-1709*, p. 37. Sunderland's letter of recommendation states that Sormani was going to Spanish America “to do service there to his lawful king, Charles III.”

⁵⁴ Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, 13 August 1708, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 181, fs. 203r-208r.

The Compagnie Royale de Guinée and the Consolidation of Bourbon Power

Bartolomé de Ponte's role in the Capocelato conspiracy remains unknown, as he appears to have never been formally denounced to the Spanish or French crowns by anyone in Venezuela for disloyalty to the Bourbons. Instead, he took great measures after the incident to prove his loyalty to the new dynasty and protect his career. Above all, Bartolomé de Ponte sought an alliance with the Compagnie Royale de Guinée. An opportunity arose to prove himself to the company in June 1704 with the arrival of the slave ship *Dragon* to Venezuela. Its captain, the sieur de Louet de la Bouvière, had captured the vessel from English slave traders attempting to sell four hundred contraband slaves off the coast of Central America. Louet took the cargo as a prize and delivered it to the slave factory in La Guaira, where the company sold the slaves for silver and 2,024 *fanegas* of cacao.⁵⁵ The captain was well received by the *alcaldes ordinarios* and promised to deliver a packet of their letters to Felipe V when he transported the cacao to Spain.⁵⁶ By striking up a friendship with Louet, Bartolomé de Ponte secured passage on the *Dragon* to the port of Corunna in Galicia, where he immediately attempted to contact the comte de Pontchartrain to plead his case for protection. While he also submitted a petition to the Council of the Indies in Madrid, Bartolomé de Ponte had more faith in getting a new post in Spanish America with the aide of Pontchartrain and the Compagnie Royale de Guinée. In a sense, Bartolomé de Ponte's willingness to serve the Bourbons and the company must have come as a

⁵⁵ The Cabildo of Caracas to Felipe V, 20 June 1704, AGI, Santo Domingo 719, f. 1r; Voyages Database. 2009. *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*. <http://www.slavevoyages.org> (accessed August 2, 2010).

⁵⁶ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 6 December 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 233, fs. 389r-390v; Felipe V to the royal officials of the Hacienda of Caracas, Madrid, 6 February 1705, AGI, Santo Domingo 685, fs. 1r-1v. The company director Huberto Hubrecht and Bartolomé de Flon were in charge of selling the cacao once it arrived in Spain.

relief to Pontchartrain, as he sought a post in the urgent months after the Bourbon loss of Gibraltar, the appearance of an English privateer expedition off the Pacific coast of New Spain, and simultaneous denunciations against disloyal royal officials in Panama City, Cadiz, and Granada.⁵⁷

Pontchartrain and the other directors of the *Compagnie Royale de Guinée* maintained a strong interest in courting Spanish royal officials such as Bartolomé de Ponte and possessed enough power to promote them. Comprised of an intimate circle of nobles and businessmen, the directors had ties with the French, Spanish, and viceregal courts that could ensure the political advancement of most of their clients. Pontchartrain was the company's most important political figure after Louis XIV and Felipe V, who together were investors in half of the company. Jean-Baptiste du Casse, admiral of the joint Franco-Spanish fleet in the Caribbean and former governor of Saint-Domingue, was another important director whose presence abroad protected Spanish American ports (and the company's business) from Anglo-Dutch incursions.⁵⁸ Several other directors were notable bankers from Paris and Madrid who in effect were financing the War of the Spanish Succession: Samuel Bernard, a financier of the French navy and Louis XIV's chief banker; Antoine and Pierre Crozat, two of the wealthiest lenders to the French crown; and Huberto Hubrecht, the

⁵⁷ Francisco Gurpegui de Velasco to Felipe V, Campo de Nisa, 28 June 1704, AMAEF, *Correspondance Politique, Espagne*, No. 143, fs. 328r-331r; the comte de Pontchartrain to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, Versailles, 13 June 1705, AMAEF, *Correspondance Politique, Espagne*, No. 152, fs. 429r-431r; Felipe V to Louis XIV, Madrid, 24 June 1705, AMAEF, *Correspondance Politique, Espagne*, No. 152, fs. 507r-519r.

⁵⁸ The chevalier du Bourk to the marquis de Torcy, Madrid, 19 October 1706, AMAEF, *Correspondance Politique, Espagne*, No. 161, fs. 190r-192v. Admiral du Casse was considered a "great help" to the royal officials of Spanish America in regards to trade and defense.

private banker of Felipe V, who along with his business partner Bartolomé de Flon served as the company's representatives in Spain.⁵⁹

The correspondence between the various directors of the *Compagnie Royale de Guinée* and Spanish American officials like Bartolomé de Ponte offers a glimpse of how the company was able to build a wide network of clients in important political posts throughout Spanish America who would both promote the company's business and loyalty to the House of Bourbon. The company's Spanish director, Huberto Hubrecht, and his partner, Bartolomé de Flon, were essential in orchestrating the placement of pro-company, pro-Bourbon officials in the most valuable posts. Flon could procure many of these appointments since he served as one of the principal mediators of venal offices and honors at the Spanish court. Felipe V awarded Flon this task as a means of recovering debt due to him for his generous loans to the crown. Between 1704 and 1712, Flon earned a reputation for arranging mostly the sale of offices in Spanish America, with himself and Hubrecht loaning sums to purchasers to cover the high cost of the appointments.⁶⁰ Company clients agreed to repay the loans once they reaped the economic benefits of their posts in Spanish America—that is, with money earned from collaboration with the French slave and textile trades. At the time Bartolomé de Ponte was soliciting a post, Hubrecht and Flon expected

⁵⁹ “Asiento con Juan Ducasse en nombre de la Compañía Real de Guinea del reino de Francia,” Madrid, 1701, AGI, Contaduría 261, fs. 1239-1305.

⁶⁰ Francisco Andújar Castillo, *Necesidad y venalidad: España e Indias, 1704-1711* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008), pp. 102-108. Andújar notes that “Bartolomé de Flon aprovechó su capacidad financiero y su papel de agente en la negociación de ventas de cargos para prestar dinero a quienes pretendían comprar puestos en la administración borbónica, fundamentalmente en Indias, en donde se vendían en mayor número y, algunos de ellos, a precios muy elevados... Cualquier cosa se podía comprar si la agencia de Flon tenía interés en conseguir el objetivo...”

repayment and cooperation from officials in ports such as Campeche, Havana, Cartagena de Indias, Panama City, and Buenos Aires.⁶¹

To a large extent, the success of the Bourbon dynasty in the war depended on the support of the directors of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée and their clients. The directors' financial backing of Bourbon succession in Spain started with the original *asiento* contract in 1701, in which they agreed to pay up-front a badly needed loan of 200,000 pesos to the Spanish crown. Their support of both the Spanish and French crowns continued for the rest of the war. When Felipe V was forced to abandon Madrid to the Archduke's army during the invasion of 1706, the king's only recourse to pay his troops was to pawn the royal jewels and request funds from the Compagnie Royale de Guinée.⁶² Company money also went to paying the salaries of the French ambassadors in Madrid and to transporting the Marquis of Castellidosrius, viceroy of Peru and former Spanish ambassador to Versailles, to his post in Spanish America. Castellidosrius remained heavily indebted to the Compagnie Royale de Guinée for the rest of his term as viceroy, which to some extent explains the influence that the French slave traders had over affairs in Lima.⁶³ En route to his post, Castellidosrius

⁶¹ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 30 September, 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 233, fs. 154v-155r; Memorandum from Huberto Hubrecht and Bartolomé de Flon, Madrid, 27 June 1705, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 466, fs. 38r-39r. Hubrecht used the Compagnie Royale de Guinée functionaries in these ports to collect the money and send it back to Spain.

⁶² Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to Louis XIV, Campo de Sopetrán, 30 June 1706, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 159, fs. 262r-266v.

⁶³ The Marquis of Castellidosrius to the marquis de Torcy, Paris, 28 March 1704, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 143, fs. 148r-156r; Alfred Moreno Cebrián and Núria Sala i Vila, *El 'premio' de ser virrey: los intereses públicos y privados del gobierno virreinal en el Perú de Felipe V* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2004), pp. 17-53. The viceroy's letter to the French secretary of state of foreign affairs reveals that he was already in debt 150,000 francs to the Compagnie Royale de Guinée before he left Europe. Sala notes that French slave traders and corsairs dominated Peruvian trade during Castellidosrius's entire administration.

promised Pontchartrain that he would never miss an opportunity to favor the interests of the company.⁶⁴

Bartolomé de Ponte's petition for office was complicated by his brother's connection to the Capocelato conspiracy. As a result, he needed to convince Pontchartrain of his loyalty to the Bourbons in order to get an official endorsement. Hubrecht and Flon's promotion of candidates was always done with the approval of Pontchartrain and other French ministers such as the marquis de Torcy, secretary of state of foreign affairs, and the resident group of ambassadors at the court of Madrid such as Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay. Since he knew that his loyalty was being questioned, Bartolomé de Ponte went to great lengths to get Pontchartrain's protection, even traveling personally to Versailles in the spring of 1706. He addressed allegations that his brother was not affectionate towards the French by claiming that no one rejoiced more than Nicolás Eugenio de Ponte over the news of Felipe V's succession. As for contraband trade with the WIC, as far as he knew the crates he transported to Veracruz only contained cacao. Ponte stressed his role in improving relations between the French slave traders and Spanish colonial elites in La Guaira and Veracruz.⁶⁵ He supported these claims with letters from the slave ship captain Louet, the French officers in Caracas, and the Compagnie Royale de Guinée functionaries from Havana and Santo Domingo. He argued "the natives of the country [i.e. the creoles] support the French because of my relationship with them, their gratitude to His Most Christian Majesty [Louis XIV], and the generosity of his

⁶⁴ The Marquis of Casteldosrius to the comte de Pontchartrain, Panama City, 7 January 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 697-699.

⁶⁵ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Versailles, April 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 632-633.

ministers towards the Spanish people.” The captain and the crew of the slave ship *La Paix*, whom he met en route to Corunna, could attest that Bartolomé de Ponte even got into a fistfight with two Spaniards in Veracruz defending the French nation. In regards to his loyalty to Felipe V, he vowed that he was willing to sacrifice his own life.⁶⁶

In the end, Bartolomé de Ponte’s pleas and elaborate self-promotion paid off, as the company’s directors were able to attain for him the governorship of Santa Marta along with other honors. Flon brokered the final sale of the office in 1706 for the sum of 180,000 reales and would have expected Bartolomé de Ponte’s collaboration with the company once the governor reached Spanish America.⁶⁷ Bartolomé de Ponte offered his sincerest thanks for securing the post and asked Pontchartrain “to honor him with his orders and to employ him however he felt fit during his term.” Bartolomé de Ponte returned Pontchartrain the favor by acting as a liaison with other potential clients while he was in Europe. For example, he forwarded a letter from Pedro Carrasco de Aguilar, *contador juez* of the Reales Cajas in Veracruz, who also requested Pontchartrain’s protection. Carrasco wanted the French minister to know that he supported the interests of Felipe V to fill posts with people affectionate to the Bourbons, and that he always did whatever he could to favor the French in Veracruz.⁶⁸ Likewise, before embarking across the Atlantic from Saint-Malo, Bartolomé de Ponte revisited Versailles in the company of the newly

⁶⁶ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Versailles, 5 June 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 911-914.

⁶⁷ Andújar, *Necesidad y venalidad*, pp. 264-265. Andújar provides a chart showing some of the principal political and military posts and their prices as sold by Flon and his associates. I have found that these same posts were filled by individuals who sought Pontchartrain’s protection.

⁶⁸ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Paris, 18 July 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, f. 139; Pedro Carrasco de Aguilar to the comte de Pontchartrain, Veracruz, 9 May 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 140-141.

appointed governors of Buenos Aires (Manuel de Velasco y Tejada), Havana (Laureano de Torres y Ayala), and Popayán (Baltasar Carlos de Viveros)—all of whom had already sought Pontchartrain’s protection in exchange for favoring French commerce overseas. These other officials wanted to “pay reverence” to Pontchartrain, which to Bartolomé de Ponte meant that they too were “very attached to Felipe V and very well intentioned for the French nation.”⁶⁹

Pontchartrain seemed to have developed the utmost confidence in these visitors, and he counted on them to act as informants and protect the French slave traders in return for whatever services he could provide back in Europe.⁷⁰ The Compagnie Royale de Guinée made sure to transport the governors to Spanish America, where they performed more or less as expected. Manuel de Velasco y Tejada did in fact improve the situation for the Compagnie Royale de Guinée in Buenos Aires. His predecessor Alonso Juan de Valdés e Inclán had tried to oppose the company’s contraband activities throughout his term in office. The crown eventually removed Valdés in 1706 when, upon learning of the Allied capture of Madrid, he closed the port to the slave traders and corsairs “because the Archduke was now on the Spanish throne and the French, with whom he was at war, were enemies of the state.”⁷¹ His company-endorsed replacement Velasco was far

⁶⁹ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 20 December 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 469, fs. 14-15; Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Paris, 18 July 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 139-141.

⁷⁰ The comte de Pontchartrain to Manuel de Velasco y Tejada, Versailles, 23 January 1709, ANF, Marine, B² 214, fs. 263-264.

⁷¹ François-Ambroise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 23 May 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 231 F^o 425r-429v; “Décret de Sa Majesté Catholique qui ordonne au gouverneur de Buenos Aires de rendre le navire le *Falmouth* aux directeurs de la Compagnie de Chine et de donner toute sorte de secours à l’équipage de ce navire,” Madrid, 17 October 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470 F^o 730-737; John Selwyn Bromley, *French Traders in the South Sea: The Journal of Lieutenant Pitouays, 1706-1709* (Coimbra, PT: Universidade de Coimbra, 1979), p. 155. The sieur Pitouays accused Alonso

friendlier towards the French, although his cooperation came at a price. As governor, he expected the company agents to pay him per shipment up to 50,000 pesos in bribes and another 6,000 pesos to the other royal officers for the right to sell contraband French textiles undisturbed in Buenos Aires.⁷² Laureano de Torres y Ayala never demanded bribes as an incentive and was equally helpful to the company. The strategic location of Cuba made the French government particularly apprehensive about Habsburg sympathy there, which might explain why French officials and traders fostered such an intimate relationship with Torres.⁷³ Once in Havana, the governor wrote to Pontchartrain that his “principal attention” was to favor the French nation. Torres proved this by accommodating Admiral du Casse’s fleet, sending news reports to Pontchartrain whenever possible, and outfitting slave ships with commodities on their return voyages to Europe.⁷⁴ He also made several notable arrests based on Bourbon political and commercial interests. First, with the assistance of the slave company functionaries, Torres deported French and Spanish sailors in Havana who had deserted during the course of the war.⁷⁵ Later, the governor imprisoned the first instance judge José Fernández de Córdoba Ponce de León on

Juan de Valdés e Inclán of being a creature of Marquis of Leganés, then imprisoned in Bordeaux for leading the grandee conspiracy against Felipe V in 1705.

⁷² Fernando Jumar, “Le commerce français au Río de la Plata pendant la Guerre de Succession d’Espagne,” in *La Mer, La France et l’Amérique latine*, eds. Christian Buchet and Michel Vergé-Franceschi (Paris: Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2006), p. 325. The bargain came with an incentive: Velasco would prosecute anyone else infringing on the Compagnie Royale de Guinée’s contraband textile business.

⁷³ Memorandum, 1706, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 467, fs. 904-907. The French ministers considered Havana “the key and boulevard of the Americas,” and had determined “it is thus to be judged that we must confer the government there only to a subject of whose fidelity we can be entirely assured.”

⁷⁴ Laureano de Torres y Ayala to the comte de Pontchartrain, Havana, 18 February 1708, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 471, f. 385; the comte de Pontchartrain to Laureano de Torres y Ayala, Versailles, 27 October 1708, ANF, Marine, B² 209, f. 371.

⁷⁵ The comte de Pontchartrain to Laureano de Torres y Ayala, Versailles, 18 April 1708, ANF, Marine, B² 207, fs. 298-299; the comte de Pontchartrain to the sieur Mosnardeau de Buelton, Marly-le-Roi, 15 May 1709, ANF, Marine, B² 215, fs. 605-607.

charges of misconduct after he tried to prosecute merchants in Havana who did business with the French.⁷⁶ Finally, Torres captured Francisco Eusebio Soler, a Valencian merchant guilty of spreading pro-Habsburg pamphlets from Curaçao around the Caribbean. Soler had smuggled Dutch cambric into Campeche, Veracruz, Havana, and La Guaira since the 1690s. His sedition against the Bourbons was grounded on his resentment of French dominance of Spanish American trade. Torres shipped Soler back to Spain as a prisoner.⁷⁷

As for Bartolomé de Ponte, he demonstrated his own loyalty to the Bourbons and the Compagnie Royale de Guinée as soon as he returned to Spanish America. His first service was to hand-deliver a packet of correspondence from Pontchartrain to the Duke of Albuquerque, viceroy of New Spain, in Mexico City.⁷⁸ Pontchartrain included a letter of recommendation in the packet that urged the viceroy to accommodate Bartolomé de Ponte's needs, as the governor of Santa Marta was "so well intentioned for the service of the king, his master, and so loyally attached to his interests."⁷⁹ Bartolomé de Ponte not only delivered Pontchartrain's letters to the Duke of Albuquerque, he also did another service to the French crown by reporting to the viceroy the abuses he witnessed against the French slave ship *Alcyon* by the commandant of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz. Albuquerque proved to

⁷⁶ The comte de Pontchartrain to François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois, Versailles, 6 February 1709, ANF, Marine, B² 214, fs. 410-417; François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 29 April 1709, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 1, f. 107v.

⁷⁷ "Autos hechos por el maestro de campo don Laureano de Torres y Ayala, caballero del orden de Santiago, gobernador y capitán general de la ciudad de La Habana, isla de Cuba, sobre la prisión de don Francisco Eusebio Soler," 1709, AGI, Escribanía 665A, 3^a pieza; "Don Francisco Eusebio Soler, valenciano de nación, preso en la cárcel de la Contratación de Sevilla, adonde fue remitido en la próxima flota por don Laureano de Torres, gobernador de La Habana, con el motivo de desafecto a Su Majestad," 1709, AGI, Escribanía 665B, 12^a pieza.

⁷⁸ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Saint-Malo, 3 September 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, f. 482.

⁷⁹ The comte de Pontchartrain to the Duke of Albuquerque, Versailles, 3 August 1707, ANF, Marine, B² 198, fs. 671.

be just as zealous for the French and took the letter of recommendation and the report very seriously.⁸⁰ To Bartolomé de Ponte's satisfaction, Albuquerque protected the Compagnie Royale de Guinée and issued a severe reprimand against the fort's commandant.⁸¹

Bartolomé de Ponte's relationship with the French continued to develop en route to his post. The French slave ship *Nymphe* transported him from Veracruz to Santa Marta but not before anchoring at Fort-Royal for a reception with the governor of Martinique, Gabriel Jean Nicholas de Gabaret, and the new intendant, Nicolas François Arnoul de Vaucresson. Both officials organized a seven canon salute and a greeting party of "major and illustrious persons" to welcome Bartolomé de Ponte to the island—a performance of their duty "to flatter all officers in command of the Spanish American coasts" for the good of France.⁸² Before continuing the voyage, Vaucresson provided a much-needed cargo of arms, munitions, and flour, which Bartolomé de Ponte assured would be repaid by the Spanish crown.⁸³ The merchants of Martinique hoped to make a profit from trade with Santa Marta, and so they provided Bartolomé de Ponte with textiles and advanced him sums of money. As the

⁸⁰ The Duke of Albuquerque to the comte de Pontchartrain, Mexico City, 16 May 1708, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 472, f. 166. The Duke of Albuquerque thanked Pontchartrain for sending news of the birth of the don Luis, the prince of Asturias. He attached a report with news about New Spain for Louis XIV, then said he was completely devoted to Pontchartrain and hoped to please him with ardor in all occasions.

⁸¹ Bartolomé de Ponte to the comte de Pontchartrain, Mexico City, 23 May 1709, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 3, fs. 143v-145r. Ponte reported that the commandant of the fort made unlawful visits to the French slave ships in order to thwart the importation of contraband cloth. In the case of the *Alcyon*, when he failed to discover any cloth, the commandant ordered the ship to leave the port under threat of artillery fire. The Duke of Albuquerque wrote to the company directors Antoine and Pierre Crozat so they could make a formal complaint to the Council of the Indies. He then ordered an escort so the slave ship could reenter the harbor and launched an investigation against the commandant.

⁸² Gabriel Jean Nicholas de Gabaret to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 3 October 1709, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 17, fs. 47r-48r.

⁸³ The comte de Pontchartrain to the marquis de Blécourt, Versailles, 25 November 1709, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 78, f. 954.

intendant noted, Bartolomé de Ponte “particularly loves the French” and would surely protect their commerce along the coast of New Granada.⁸⁴

Conclusion

As the lives of the Ponte brothers illustrate, the French were masterful at exploiting the slave trade between 1701-1713 to form politically important trade alliances with Spanish American elites. French merchants such as those associated with the Compagnie Royale de Guinée could trade quite openly with these colonial elites thanks to the convenience of the *asiento* privileges. The company agents of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée furnished subjects in the Caribbean with a labor force and luxury cloth while also buying their local products, and Spanish law under Felipe V seemed to protect the practice. Additionally, the French supplied arms to Spanish American garrisons and offered naval support at the expense of the Spanish crown rather than the local community. All clients of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée stood to profit financially from their relationship with the *asiento* under the French, whether it was from receiving a salary from the company or collaborating with the

⁸⁴ Nicolas-François Arnoul de Vaucresson to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 1 April 1710, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 17, fs. 312r-312v; Nicolas-François Arnoul de Vaucresson to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 31 March 1711, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 18, fs. 70r-112r; Nicolas-François Arnoul de Vaucresson to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 5 November 1710, ANF, Colonies, C^{8A} 17, f. 373r. As an epilogue, Bartolomé de Ponte died in Santa Marta in 1710, which “completely upset the measures that we [the French officials and merchants] had taken to establish trade with that place...” The bill for the arms went unpaid and his nephew Diego Tomás de Ponte stole the money and cloth from the French merchants instead of carrying out his uncle’s projects. English privateers later took this nephew as a prisoner of war to Plymouth, where he requested Pontchartrain’s assistance in delivering his ransom.

company's contraband textile operations.⁸⁵ In this sense, it would seem that much support of the Bourbons was “bought” in Spanish America through these means.

⁸⁵ José de Santiago Concha y Salvatierra to Huberto Hubrecht and Bartolomé de Flon, Lima, 30 September 1708, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 471, fs. 772-775. As one of their monopoly privileges, the directors had the right to designate authorities as *juez conservadores* for legal cases involving the Compagnie Royale de Guinée in the viceregal capitals of Mexico City and Lima as well as in ports with slave factories, such as Veracruz, Havana, Portobelo, Panama City, Cartagena de Indias, Santa Marta, Cumaná, Maracaibo, La Guaira, Callao, and Buenos Aires. These jobs were given to local governors or *oidores* in return for a salary and other perks from the company for their services. For example, José de Santiago Concha y Salvatierra, oidor in the Audiencia of Lima and juez conservador of the *asiento*, expected the Compagnie Royale de Guinée to pay him a bonus in 1708 for protecting its interests by blocking the sale of slaves captured from enemy ships by corsairs competing with the company.

CHAPTER 3

COLONIAL CENTERS

Up through the present, I have taken the most just measures possible to root out the seeds of rebellion apparent in New Spain. I boldly assure Your Majesty that these vast provinces now enjoy perfect tranquility.

The Duke of Albuquerque to Louis XIV, 1707¹

Over the course of 1706-1707, the governments of Felipe V and Louis XIV took measures to inform the Duke of Albuquerque, viceroy of New Spain, about the dramatic turn of events regarding the War of the Spanish Succession in Europe. For the Bourbons, this period proved to be especially problematic. Apart from disastrous military defeats in the Low Countries, Italy, and Catalonia, the Habsburg allies invaded Castile and occupied Madrid for three months. In the process, over a dozen Castilian nobles and ministers defected to Archduke Charles's court in Barcelona. The English and Dutch governments assumed that should Castile and its capital fall to the Habsburgs, Spanish America would follow as a consequence.² With this prospect in mind, the two Bourbon courts rushed to reassure viceregal subjects of impending Franco-Spanish military successes and, at the same time, reemphasize patron-client relationships between ruling elites in Versailles, Madrid, and Mexico City. These propagandistic measures were aimed at justifying the continued defense of Mexico's coasts against Anglo-Dutch incursions. They were also aimed at ensuring the prompt

¹ The Duke of Albuquerque to Louis XIV, Mexico City, July 22, 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 644-645.

² The duc de Gramont to the marquis de Torey, Versailles, 2 January 1706, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 162, fs. 183r-183v.

departure of the silver fleet from Veracruz to fund the reconquest of Iberia in the name of Felipe V.³

It would require effort on the part of the Duke of Albuquerque to fulfill the orders given to him by Louis XIV “to maintain the viceroyalty of New Spain under the obedience of His Catholic Majesty [Felipe V].”⁴ As the Bourbons feared, the military failures of their armies triggered hostilities in the colonial centers of Mexico and Peru, where political and commercial elites administered the silver fleets. Authorities such as viceroys and judges remained loyal to the dynasty, as Bourbon patronage and trade benefits had bought their cooperation. Instead, disloyalty in the viceregal capitals took the form of seditious speech and writings spread among merchants and intellectuals critical of the Union of the Two Crowns and the controversial French naval presence in Veracruz and Callao. The clearest accounts of the sedition come from Mexico, which is the focus of this chapter. Records of the denunciation and prosecution of disloyalty from Mexico City preserve otherwise unheard voices of resistance to Bourbon succession found an important center of colonial power. These cases illustrate that forms of sedition deemed rather insignificant today mattered greatly to authorities of the early modern Spanish empire, especially in periods of extreme political instability.

³ Louis XIV to the Duke of Albuquerque, Versailles, 26 July 1706, ANOM, Colonies, B28, f. 250; the Duke of Albuquerque to the comte de Pontchartrain, Veracruz, 28 March 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 95-96. Albuquerque anticipated the financial needs of the Spanish monarchy and had already forwarded funds to Spain on the *armada de Barlovento*.

⁴ The Duke of Albuquerque to Louis XIV, Veracruz, 28 March 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 93-95.

Concerns Over Loyalty Among Mexican Officials

Finding loyal colonial representatives was of key importance to the Spanish crown. Regardless of the dynastic shift, the replacement of royal officials such as viceroys would have been expected at the start of any new monarch's reign. Still, the Bourbons had their own urgent reasons to select suitable replacements for Mexico and Peru. Cooperation from Spanish American viceroys was necessary for the survival of the empire. Along with the merchants of Mexico City and Lima, viceroys orchestrated the departure of the silver fleets, which provided the crown with its chief means of repaying the interest on its debt to the royal bankers. Through the privilege known as the *quinta real*, the kings of Spain were entitled to a 20% tax on all silver transported by merchants on the fleets. In the fight to keep Felipe V on the throne, the Spanish and French crowns expected to sustain their armies through tax revenues from the silver fleets as well as *donativos* ("voluntary donations") from wealthy Mexican and Peruvian elites.⁵ The issue of Mexican silver was vital to the Bourbons. A mere thirteen days after Louis XIV accepted Carlos II's will, the French ministers of the navy, war, and finance began to devise measures to increase the efficiency of the fleet system.⁶ Fearing Anglo-Dutch hostilities towards Bourbon succession, the ministers of Louis XIV and the Spanish Council of State agreed upon French naval escorts to protect the silver fleets on their voyages from Veracruz to Europe. The measure was considered highly controversial. As early as 1702, the comte de Pontchartrain's envoy to Madrid reported that the prospect of French participation in

⁵ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 26 October 1703, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 229, fs. 221r-226r.

⁶ The comte de Pontchartrain to the marquis de Harcourt, Versailles, 29 November 1700, ANOM, Colonies, B 21, f. 703v.

the fleets agitated Spanish subjects both sides of the Atlantic, including the members of the Council of the Indies. Later in 1708, the French commercial envoy noted that the escorts “alienated the hearts of the Castilians and weakened their affection for the king of Spain,” as French naval activities caused “the Spanish people [to] view us as the usurers of their money from the Indies.”⁷

Despite the apparent outrage, the Bourbons insisted on the policy and instead focused on appointing suitable viceroys who could be trusted not only to collect funds for the monarchy, but also work in conjunction with the French navy and oppose any colonial resistance to the escorts. The need for such effective and trustworthy administrators became apparent in the early months of the transition to Bourbon rule. The Spanish and French crowns already questioned the loyalties of the Count of Moctezuma, the last Habsburg-appointed viceroy of New Spain. Rumors circulated that after the Carlos II’s death Moctezuma would assert the dynastic rights of his wife—a descendant of the Mexica emperor Moctezuma II—and assume control over the viceroyalty as an independent kingdom.⁸ There were also more serious claims that the viceroy favored a Habsburg succession or at least sided with the Archduke’s

⁷ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 9 December 1702, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 226, fs. 409r-415v; Nicolas Mesnager to the marquis de Torcy, Paris, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 179, fs. 224r-225r.

⁸ Alexander Stanhope to James Vernon, Madrid, 3 April 1697, in *Spain Under Charles the Second, or Extracts from the Correspondance of the Honorable Alexander Stanhope, British Minister to Madrid, 1690-1699*, ed. Philip Henry Stanhope (London: John Murray, 1844), p. 109; James Vernon to the Duke of Shrewsbury, 8 June 1699, in *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III, from 1696 to 1708, addressed to the Duke of Shrewsbury by James Vernon, Esq., Secretary of State*, volume II, ed. G.P.R. James (London: Henry Colburn, 1841), pp. 302-305; Pierre de Catalan to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 8 December 1698, ANF, Affaires étrangères, B¹ 213, fs. 288r-291v. James Vernon, secretary of state for the Southern Department, had intelligence from Mexico City that “...the Indians there are very earnest with the Countess of Moctezuma, who is descended of their race, that she would take upon her the title of queen, which she seems willing to accept, but the *conde*, her husband, refuses it as yet, though it is thought if the king of Spain dies, he will set up for himself [an independent monarchy].” The French consul in Cadiz also reported a rumor that the count had died, causing a rebellion in Mexico City led by his daughter.

Anglo-Dutch allies even after publically recognizing Felipe V as king in March 1701. The French crown received warnings about Moctezuma's informal commercial agreement with the merchants of Jamaica and Curaçao, who were allowed to sell woolens through intermediaries in Veracruz for a 15% commission on their imports.⁹ Officials in Versailles and London possessed intelligence that the viceroy distrusted the French navy, delaying the departure of the 1701 silver fleet for a year to keep the wealth of New Spain from falling into Bourbon hands as long as possible.¹⁰ The delay proved disastrous since it provided the English and Dutch navies with an opportunity to blockade and sack Cadiz and Puerto de Santa María. They would eventually attack the silver fleet at the Battle of Vigo Bay in October 1702, after most of its cargo reached the shore.¹¹

The Count of Moctezuma addressed these accusations once he returned to Spain for his *juicio de residencia*, the standard judicial inquiry terminating a royal official's term in office. Fearing a harsh sentence, he worked diligently to seek the

⁹ The Marquis of Barinas to Louis XIV, Algeria, 1701, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 90, fs. 153r-156v; Philippe Hrodej, *L'amiral Du Casse, l'élévation d'un gascon sous Louis XIV*, volume II (Paris: Librairie de l'Inde, 1999), p. 578. Hrodej cites Michel Bégon, the former intendant of Saint-Domingue and Martinique, as stating that the Count of Moctezuma paid 160,000 pesos for the office of viceroy and made quadruple that amount while in Mexico—presumably through the commercial ventures with the English and Dutch mentioned by the Marquis of Barinas.

¹⁰ Hrodej, *L'amiral Du Casse*, volume I, 291; John Benbow to James Vernon, London, 24 December 1701, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of William III, Volume 11: 1700-1702*, p. 473; James Vernon to George Stepney, Whitehall, 13 February 1702, in *Letters Illustrative of the Reign of William III*, volume III, pp. 176-179. Spanish smugglers in Jamaica reported this news to Admiral Benbow, who then informed James Vernon, secretary of state of the Southern Department. Vernon then passed the intelligence to George Stepney, English ambassador to Vienna, as follows: "We hear lately of an extraordinary piece of news from the West Indies, and wish it may prove true. It is said that Moctezuma, viceroy of Mexico, would not suffer their plate [i.e. the merchants' silver] to come into the hands of the French, and that orders from Spain would not be obeyed while they were looked upon to be under the influence of France." The vicomte de Coëtlogon, who was sent from France with the comte de Château-Renault to escort the silver fleet, also claimed he encountered resistance in Veracruz.

¹¹ Henry Kamen, "The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702," *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* (November 1966), p. 168-172. The Battle of Vigo Bay was the first major naval battle of the War of the Spanish Succession in Europe.

intervention of Louis XIV, the comte de Pontchartrain, and the marquis de Torcy, (French minister of foreign affairs). He believed the French court could incline Felipe V's "royal benevolence" and ensure a good review.¹² As an incentive, he offered to act as a secret informant for the French crown and clarify issues related to the defense and finances of New Spain. The resident French naval commissioner in Madrid, who had long conversations with Moctezuma, attested to Pontchartrain that the former viceroy's "greatest passion is to merit your good graces."¹³ He also made an effort to defend the comte de Château-Renault's conduct during the escort the silver fleet before the queen.¹⁴ These actions in effect saved Moctezuma's reputation, as Pontchartrain and Torcy were eventually able to arrange his promotion to president of the Council of the Indies by 1705.¹⁵

The former viceroy's efforts to dispel rumors about his administration indirectly revealed early indications of disloyalty in Mexico. As head of the Moctezuma dynasty, he assured the French crown that no descendants of the Mexica emperor would challenge Bourbon authority over their "ancient dominions." Most provocative of all, he suggested that part of the population in Mexico questioned Bourbon sovereignty from the beginning. Moctezuma contrasted his own "inflexible"

¹² Louis XIV to the Count of Moctezuma, Versailles, November 27, 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 110, f. 287r.

¹³ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to Comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 9 December 1702, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 226, fs. 409r-415v. Moctezuma arranged to meet François-Ambroise Daubenton de Villebois, Pontchartrain's envoy to Madrid, through Miguel Antonio de Errasquín, a secretary in the Council of Indies who also acted as a spy for the French crown.

¹⁴ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to Comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 9 December 1702, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 226, fs. 409r-415v.

¹⁵ The comte de Pontchartrain to Père Guillaume Daubenton, Versailles, 21 September 1705, ANOM, Colonies, B 26, f. 164v; the comte de Pontchartrain to the Count of Moctezuma, Versailles, 26 September 1705, ANOM, Colonies, B 26, f. 166; the comte de Pontchartrain to Père Guillaume Daubenton, Versailles, 4 April 1708, ANOM, Colonies, B 31, f. 49. Felipe V was lenient on Moctezuma and, after he donated 100,000 escudos to the war effort, gave him the title of Duke of Atrisco. From 1705-1708, he served as president of the Council of the Indies and favored French commercial interests.

loyalty to Felipe V with the “vacillating spirits of such a number of local inhabitants and Spaniards” who attended the king’s acclamation ceremony in Mexico City. He claimed that he had counteracted these attitudes by his example in celebrating the change in dynasty through public spectacle. Unlike others in the viceregal capital, his loyalty did not falter.¹⁶

If Moctezuma accepted Bourbon succession and its demands without resistance, who in Mexico would have opposed it? French ministers in Versailles and Madrid suspected factions among the merchant elite. Intelligence sent by the vicomte de Coëtlogon and the chevalier de Sugères in Havana concluded that the Mexican merchants purposely delayed loading their silver on the awaiting ships in protest to Felipe V’s requirement of a French escort.¹⁷ In an effort to avoid future problems, Louis XIV decided to station hundreds of armed French troops in Veracruz. The official reason for the deployment was to protect the silver fleet and the port from potential Anglo-Dutch attacks, though their presence also proved useful in intimidating the merchants to comply with Bourbon policy.¹⁸ In addition, the French crown provided Felipe V with the services of the sieur Berquin and the sieur Bouchard, two military engineers ordered to improve the defenses of the fortress of

¹⁶ The Count of Moctezuma to the marquis de Torcy, Madrid, April 19, 1703, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 115, fs. 308r-309v; Iván Escamilla González, “Razones de la lealtad, cláusulas de la fineza: poderes, conflictos y consensus en la oratoria sagrada novohispana ante la sucesión de Felipe V,” in Alicia Mayer and Ernesto de la Torre Villar, eds., *Religión, poder y autoridad en la Nueva España* (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2004), pp. 179-204. At least one contemporary in New Spain drew a parallel between the *translatio imperii* of Mexican sovereignty from Moctezuma II to Emperor Charles V and the Count of Moctezuma to Felipe V.

¹⁷ “Délibérations du conseil de guerre assemblé le 27 décembre 1701 sur le vaisseau du roi l’Éclatant dans le port de La Havane,” Havana, 27 December 1701, ANOM, Colonies, C^{8A} 13, fs. 333r-336v.

¹⁸ The marquis de Blecourt to the marquis de Torcy, Madrid, November 11, 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 110, fs. 166r-168r; Monsieur Ozon to the marquis de Torcy, Madrid, November 11, 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 110, fs. 188r-192r.

San Juan de Ulúa. They sent detailed plans of Veracruz and other intelligence back to Versailles, further providing the Bourbons with a means of preparing for local conflict.¹⁹

The appointment of new viceroys for New Spain and Peru was another crucial precaution to promote the political and economic interests of the Bourbons. In New Spain, the task fell upon the Duke of Albuquerque, the former captain-general of the coasts of Andalusia from 1695 until 1701. As captain-general, Albuquerque was in charge of defense and ship inspections in the Bay of Cadiz, the Iberian terminus of the Indies trade. Through his post, he interacted with the international merchant community of the region. This included the Spanish-born *cargadores a Indias* in Cadiz and Puerto de Santa María who participated in the legal trade with Spanish America; it also included the French, English, and Dutch traders who illegally supplied them with the vast majority of the cloth and manufactured goods that entered New Spain and Peru. Barred from a direct role in Spanish American trade by the Council of the Indies, foreign traders took advantage of diplomatic treaties such as the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659) and the Godolphin Treaty (1670) to enter the Spanish market, whereby they gained a presence in Andalusian ports. They relied on the *cargadores* of Cadiz to act as intermediaries to smuggle their goods aboard the Indies fleets, sell them in Veracruz and Callao, and collect the profits from the returning

¹⁹ Louis XIV to the vicomte de Coëtlogon, Versailles, 23 March 1701, ANF, Marine, B² 152, fs. 72r-79v; François-Roger Robert to the comte de Pontchartrain, Martinique, 11 July 1701, C^{8A} 13, fs. 138r-142v. The French troops sent to Veracruz were accompanied by two artillery officers, four bombardiers, a lieutenant colonel, a major, four captains, and eight subaltern officers. Louis XIV ordered similar deployments to the other ports along the route of the Mexican and Peruvian silver fleets, such as Havana, Lima, Panama City, Portobelo, and Cartagena de Indias.

silver fleets.²⁰ Placed in charge of confiscating illicit merchandise aboard the convoys, local judges and captain-generals were prone to work with (rather than against) the foreign traders. They often chose to ignore cargo contents and export tonnage quotas during their inspections in exchange for bribes or commissions.²¹

Albuquerque's potential loyalty to the Bourbons seemed assured by his reputation with the French navy and merchant community in Puerto de Santa María. By the turn of the eighteenth century, the French traders in the Bay of Cadiz were among the wealthiest and most successful merchants in Andalusia. Albuquerque's affinity for them seems natural, as he was already associated with the pro-French faction at the Spanish court that promoted a Bourbon succession in the latter years of Carlos II's reign.²² His alignment with the faction—apart from his own financial interests—could explain his refusal to collect the heavy taxes directed at French merchants by Carlos II's government and designed to coerce them out of Andalusia in the 1690s.²³ The French consul Pierre Catalan, who supplemented his salary through

²⁰ Carlos Daniel Malamud Rickles, *Cádiz y Saint-Malo en el comercio colonial peruano (1698-1725)* (Jerez de la Frontera: Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1986), pp. 29-32; 97-98. The Spanish crown prohibited direct foreign participation in the Indies trade in order to keep the bulk of Spanish American silver within the kingdom. Nonetheless, foreign smuggling on the Indies convoys ensured that much of the returns on the silver fleets ended up abroad. For example, of the 22,808,977 pesos that arrived in Cadiz on the silver fleet of 1682, 2,500,000 pesos was exported to France, 2,500,000 pesos to England, 3,500,000 pesos to the Netherlands, and 4,500,000 pesos to Genoa—over half the returns.

²¹ Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *Silver, Trade, and War: Spain and America in the Making of Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), pp. 64; 77-86.

²² François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 23 May 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 231, fs. 425r-429v; A. Morel-Fatio and H. Léonardon, *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution française, XII: Espagne (1701-1722)*, volume II (Paris: Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et Compagnie, 1898), p. 42. Antonio de Ubilla y Medina, one of the leaders of the pro-Bourbon faction, was an intimate ally of the Duke of Albuquerque. Described by French diplomats as a "servant" of Albuquerque's household, Ubilla first entered Spanish politics as secretary to the duke's uncle during his term as viceroy of Sicily (1667-1670). By 1698, Ubilla served simultaneously as a secretary in the Council of the Indies, the Council of State, and the Despacho Universal del Rey—the council that persuaded Carlos II to recognize the future Felipe V as his heir.

²³ *La Gazette*, no. 4, 28 January 1696, p. 41. The report mentions that the French merchants were willing to pay 20,000 escudos but the Duke of Albuquerque would not accept their money. It also

the Indies trade, noted that Albuquerque treated him better than the other foreign consuls in the region. Catalan's relationship with Albuquerque was so intimate that he would receive the captain-general in his private chambers as opposed to the patio of the consulate as was customary with other officials.²⁴ The consul's correspondence to the French crown also conveyed Albuquerque's affability and deep respect for Louis XIV—attitudes Catalan exploited to avoid customs duties and inspections.²⁵ Once Felipe V ascended the throne, Albuquerque continued to protect the French merchants while carrying out measures to remove their English and Dutch competitors from Cadiz.²⁶

Louis XIV and his ministers recognized the Duke of Albuquerque's services as captain-general and used their influence in Madrid to further promote his career.²⁷ In September 1701, Albuquerque requested a recommendation from the French court for a post of viceroy in either New Spain or Peru. As he wrote to Louis XIV, "my own zeal encourages me to solicit occasions to serve the king my lord [Felipe V] even more so having merited in all my endeavors your royal approval and that of your

mentions that similar taxes already caused many other merchants to close their businesses in Cadiz.

²⁴ "Mémoire des fonctions du consul de France dans Cadix depuis l'année 1669," Cadiz, 2 July 1699, ANF, Affaires étrangères, B¹ 213, fs. 332r-336r.

²⁵ Pierre de Catalan to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 20 May 1698, ANF, Affaires étrangères, B¹ 213, fs. 239r-240v; Pierre de Catalan to the comte de Pontchartrain, Cadiz, 21 July 1698, ANF, Affaires étrangères, B¹ 213, fs. 251r-252v. Catalan credited his own negotiations with the Spanish royal officials as assuring better treatment for the French merchants. Albuquerque and his wife often met with the consul in the company of French naval officials such as vice-admiral Coëtlogon and the comte d'Estrées.

²⁶ The Duke of Albuquerque to the Council of State, Puerto de Santa María, 17 March 1701, AHN, Estado, 195; the Duke of Albuquerque to the Council of State, Puerto de Santa María, 6 April 1701, AHN, Estado, 681; the marquis de Torcy to Antonio de Ubilla, Versailles, 18 September 1701, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 93, fs. 94r-94v.

²⁷ Louis XIV to the Duke of Albuquerque, Versailles, 18 July 1701, AHN, Diversos-Colecciones, 19, N. 1752, fs. 1r-3v.

court and ministers.”²⁸ Louis XIV already planned to recommend the Marquis of Castellodorsius, the Spanish ambassador to France, for the post of the viceroy of Peru. Therefore, French envoys in Madrid were instructed to persuade Felipe V to give the position in New Spain to Alburquerque. The king of Spain confirmed the appointment by 1702.²⁹ Before departing for New Spain, Alburquerque wrote to Louis XIV to thank him for his patronage and profess his devotion to the Bourbon dynasty.³⁰

The Duke of Alburquerque relied on the French navy to transport him to New Spain to assume his post. The voyage had potential for danger. The Earl of Pembroke, Lord High Admiral of England, sent nine warships under Rear Admiral Sir John Munden to the coast of Galicia to stop the new viceroy from reaching Mexico. Munden’s fleet eventually retreated back to England thanks to the superiority of the French forces.³¹ Admiral Jean-Baptiste du Casse, by then a principal investor in the *asiento*, commanded the squadron of eight French ships of the line and fourteen transport vessels across the Atlantic to Puerto Rico. The fleet also carried 2,000 loyal Galician soldiers for the garrisons of Veracruz and Cartagena de Indias.³² Added to

²⁸ The Duke of Alburquerque to Louis XIV, Madrid, September 2, 1701, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 93, fs. 66r-67r; the Duke of Alburquerque to Louis XIV, Madrid, December 15, 1701, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 94, fs. 275r-275v.

²⁹ Morel-Fatio, *Recueil des instructions*, 75-76. Cardinal d’Estrées and the comte de Marsin spoke personally about the nominations with Felipe V, who had no objections to either of the French-approved candidates.

³⁰ The Duke of Alburquerque to Louis XIV, Corunna, June 18, 1702, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 105, fs. 261r-262r.

³¹ The Earl of Pembroke to Sir John Munden, 5 May 1702, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of Anne, Volume 1: 1702-1703*, p. 49; “Resolution of a council of war held on board the *Russell* four leagues northwest from Cape Prior,” 28 May 1702, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of Anne, Volume 1: 1702-1703*, 181. Sir John Munden was tried by court martial in July 1702 for failing to stop Admiral du Casse’s squadron. Although acquitted, the incident damaged his reputation with the English court and he was dismissed from Queen Anne’s service.

³² Philippe Hrodej, “L’amiral Du Casse: de la marchandise à la Toison d’or,” *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l’Ouest* 104 (4) (1997): 23-39; Admiral John Benbow to the Earl of Nottingham, Port

the list of passengers was the viceroy's entourage of 160 retainers that included his secretary Juan de Estacasolo y Otalora, a majordomo, an equerry, three chaplains, eighteen *criados mayores*, sixteen pages, and numerous other servants, cooks, and bakers.³³ The vicereine and her daughter brought a separate entourage of 110 retainers such as maids of honor, *dueñas*, nuns, and friars. In accordance with Louis XIV's orders, Admiral du Casse made a great effort to lodge and entertain Alburquerque and his party with splendor, "sparing nothing from the first day of the voyage to the last." Although he complained about the nuisance of this task, the admiral assured Pontchartrain that his hospitality on the month and a half journey successfully gained him the viceroy's favor.³⁴ He would need Alburquerque's cooperation to defend French participation in the silver convoys and the Compagnie Royale de Guinée's slaving interests in New Spain. Reciprocally, Alburquerque could rely on Admiral du Casse as an important naval ally. Du Casse's August 1702 victory over Admiral John Benbow off the coast of Santa Marta certainly assured Alburquerque of France's commitment to protecting Spanish America.³⁵

Royal, 24 September 1702, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 21: 1702-1703*, pp. 82-90. Du Casse left Alburquerque at San Juan de Puerto Rico and continued on with six ships of the line and three transport ships to deliver five hundred of the soldiers to Cartagena de Indias. From there he cruised the coast of New Granada to combat Anglo-Dutch contraband and "settle the *asiento*."

³³ Christoph Rosenmüller, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues: the Court Society of Colonial Mexico, 1702-1710* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2008), pp. 58-59.

³⁴ Jean-Baptiste Du Cass to the comte de Pontchartrain, San Juan de Puerto Rico, 17 August 1702, ANF, Colonies, C^{9A} 6, fs. 5r-8r; Robert Du Casse, *L'amiral Du Casse, chevalier de la Toison d'or (1646-1715): étude sur la France maritime et coloniale (règne de Louis XIV)* (Paris: Berger-Levrault et Compagnie, 1876), pp. 251-257. Du Casse complained "...for discretion, he [Alburquerque] does not want to take with him more than seventy companions aboard the *Heureux*, and yesterday he requested seven separate tables. I will treat him as the king desires, although I would rather encounter two English warships than these inconveniences." As for the vicereine's entourage, he complained about the arrogance of the *dueñas* and the friars' demand for separate cabins. He was also annoyed at the behavior of the French crew, who took advantage of the situation to "live like lords."

³⁵ The Duke of Alburquerque to Louis XIV, Mexico City, 6 January 1703, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 230, fs. 165r-170r; the Duke of Alburquerque to Louis XIV, Mexico City, 28 March 1703, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 230, fs. 171r-174v; Du Casse, *L'amiral Du Casse*, p. 356. Alburquerque wrote that the defeat of

Albuquerque, his family, over half of their entourage, and a thousand of the soldiers continued on the journey from Puerto Rico to Mexico aboard two French frigates and four transport vessels. Du Casse entrusted the chevalier de Benneville to complete the journey to Veracruz and use Albuquerque's influence to collect the 350,000 escudos collected by the archbishop of Mexico City that awaited remission to Felipe V at the port.³⁶ The expedition stopped in Cap-Français for refreshments before arriving in Veracruz on October 6, 1702. A series of celebrations in Jalapa, Tlaxcala, and Puebla de los Ángeles delayed the party's ceremonial entry into Mexico City until November 27. The ensuing processions, bullfights, theatrical performances, and masses lasted through the feast of the Immaculate Conception on December 8.³⁷ A month later, on the feast of the Epiphany, the soldiers of the royal guard paraded through the streets of Mexico City for the first time in French uniforms with tricorne hats. The change of dress left little doubt about the viceroy's adherence to the Union of the Two Crowns.³⁸

Once in office, Albuquerque worked in conjunction with a number of other royal officials to defend the joint interests of Felipe V and Louis XIV. As viceroy, he had the power to appoint nearly half of all military and political posts in New Spain.³⁹ Albuquerque installed *alcalde mayores*, *corregidores*, and interim governors who he

Benbow "resounded with the glory of [Louis XIV] and applause for General du Casse in all of the Americas." He added, "I have celebrated it as one of the greatest triumphs of the always victorious arms of Your Most Christian Majesty."

³⁶ Jean-Baptiste du Casse to the chevalier de Benneville, San Juan de Puerto Rico, 17 August 1702, ANF, Colonies, C^{9A} 6, fs. 9r-10r.

³⁷ Rosenmuller, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues*, pp. 47-48.

³⁸ Antonio de Robles, *Diario de Sucesos Notables (1665-1703)*, volumen III, ed. Antonio Castro Leal (Mexico City: Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 1946), 252. The Oratorian diarist Antonio de Robles described the soldiers, captain, alférez, and corporals as dressed "in the French fashion" with tri-cornered hats, blue coats, and crimson sleeves and stockings.

³⁹ Rosenmuller, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues*, pp. 58-78.

trusted to uphold the Franco-Spanish alliance. Their cooperation was crucial to French operations in the Gulf of Mexico. For example, the French forces in Veracruz and the inhabitants of the fledgling colony of Louisiana would not have survived the war without the provisions provided by the Mexican officials.⁴⁰ Direct clients of the French crown also filled the most important political and military posts in Mexico during Albuquerque's administration. At least two judges in the Audiencia of Mexico City received commissions from the French ministry of the navy, as did the royal prosecutor José Antonio de Espinosa Ocampo y Cornejo—Albuquerque's legal advisor.⁴¹ Francisco Manso de Zúñiga, the new commander of the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa, and the principal judges and fiscal officers in Veracruz all received their promotions through the intercession of French ministers as well.⁴²

The Discovery of Open Sedition

Although Felipe V could count on the loyalty of the Duke of Albuquerque and the royal officials, other subjects in New Spain proved to be less trustworthy. The governors of Jamaica, who closely monitored the situation through informants, already knew that certain Mexican elites maintained pro-Habsburg sentiments. In 1702, Spanish and English smugglers reported that the merchants of Veracruz

⁴⁰ José Antonio de Espinosa Ocampo y Cornejo to Louis XIV, Mexico City, 21 March 1707, ANF, B⁷ 470, fs. 98-99; the comte de Pontchartrain to José Antonio de Espinosa Ocampo y Cornejo, Marly-le-Roi, 27 July 1707, ANF, B² 198, fs. 512v-513r; Antoine Crozat to the comte de Pontchartrain, Paris, 27 March 1712, ANF, B⁷ 13, fs. 157r-157v. Espinosa's letter to Crozat was dated 6 October 1711.

⁴¹ Agustín de Robles y Lorenzana to the comte de Pontchartrain, San Cristóbal de La Laguna, 24 January 1708, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 471, f. 324; the comte de Pontchartrain to Agustín de Robles y Lorenzana, Versailles, 11 June 1708, ANF, Marine, B² 207, f. 196. For example, the comte de Pontchartrain helped Agustín de Robles y Lorenzana, nephew of the governor of the Canary Islands, receive the post of *alcalde del crimen* in the Audiencia of Mexico City in 1708. Lorenzana offered his services in the tribunal, asking the French minister to honor him with his orders.

⁴² Pedro Irlas y Pineda to the comte de Pontchartrain, Veracruz, 3 May 1707, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 470, fs. 97-98; Pedro Carrasco de Aguilar to Bartolomé de Ponte y Hoyo, Veracruz, 9 May 1707, ANF, B⁷ 470, fs. 140-141.

distrusted the intentions of the French and purposely delayed the departure of the fleets carrying the king's revenues by not relinquishing their silver.⁴³ By 1706, English officials and merchants were assured that news of revolts in Iberia would sway loyalties and stimulate similar movements across the Atlantic—or at least revive trade between Jamaica and Mexico.⁴⁴ Try as they may, however, foreign enemies failed to agitate conspiracy in Mexico as they did in the Caribbean. Written offers of arms and naval assistance sent by English commanders to Veracruz and Campeche were ignored as long as French warships remained anchored off shore.⁴⁵ Jamaican commercial activities in the Yucatan and Laguna de Términos were themselves curtailed by militias from Tabasco and Campeche, who forcefully removed the foreign smugglers and dyewood cutters from the region between 1702-1713.⁴⁶ During these attacks, at least one Spanish intermediary was captured among the English carrying copies of the Archduke's manifesto. The governor of Tabasco condemned him as a traitor and promptly sent him back to Spain as a prisoner.⁴⁷

Mexican subjects did not require foreign intrigue to inspire disloyalty to Felipe V. In Central and Northern Mexico, dissent spread in particular among elites such as cloth merchants—the most influential sector of the viceroyalty's trade community. The Union of the Two Crowns posed a serious dilemma for their business. By the end of the seventeenth century, Louis XIV had privatized the navy

⁴³ Peter Beckford to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Jamaica, 26 May 1702, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 20: 1702*, pp. 345-346.

⁴⁴ Edmund Dummer to William Popple, London, 10 January 1706, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies, Volume 23: 1706-1708*, pp. 1-13.

⁴⁵ James Vernon to Admiral John Benbow, London, 22 February 1702, *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series of the Reign of William III, Volume 11: 1700-1702*, pp. 520-522.

⁴⁶ J. Ignacio Rubio Mañé, *El Virreinato, Vol. III: Expansión y defensa* (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de México, 1983), pp. 265-321.

⁴⁷ François-Ambroise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 23 May 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 231 F^o 425r-429v; *La Gazette*, no. 23, 7 June 1704, p. 271.

and relied on corsairs to conduct the French crown's naval expeditions for profit.⁴⁸ After Bourbon succession, wealthy cloth merchants from Brittany quickly seized the opportunity to arm and man the French warships sent to Veracruz by order of the new king of Spain. Direct access to the port allowed the corsairs to flood the Mexican market with highly sought-after linen, lace, brocades, and taffeta at prices well below Spanish competitors. The situation resulted in tremendous financial losses for any merchant not aligned with the French, such as those who dealt in legally acquired textiles from the *cargadores* of Cadiz or local indigenous artisans. To make matters worse, the viceroy and other local political clients of the Bourbons collaborated with the entire operation. In fact, Albuquerque and his entourage were among the corsairs' chief clients.⁴⁹ By 1704, a number of merchants addressed written complaints to Felipe V and the Council of the Indies about the political corruption in Mexico City and the "harsh treatment" they suffered at the hands of the viceroy. Yet the king appeared to do little in response.⁵⁰

The commercial activities of the French corsairs and the Duke of Albuquerque seemed to intensify pro-Habsburg sentiments in Mexico, or at least cause certain individuals to brazenly express their disapproval of the dynastic change in public and private conversations. In the wake of the Bourbon military disasters of 1706, roughly two-dozen elites in Mexico were accused of acts of sedition against

⁴⁸ This shift in French naval policy is masterfully analyzed in Geoffrey Symcox's *The Crisis of French Sea Power, 1688-1697: From Guerre d'Escadre to the Guerre de Course* (The Hague, NL: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

⁴⁹ Rosenmuller, *Patrons, Partisans, and Palace Intrigues*, pp. 146-147.

⁵⁰ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 23 May 1704, ANF, Marine, B⁷ 231, fs. 425r-429v.

Felipe V.⁵¹ The first denunciation occurred in late October 1706. Captain Alonso de Asinas Duque de Estrada, a wholesale merchant, denounced to the viceroy a fellow merchant and former royal official named Benito de Cartagena. The act of sedition was committed at a dinner party at the home of the royal notary Tomás Fernández de Guevara.⁵² During the dinner party, Cartagena waved a napkin made of *alemanisca* (huckaback cloth) and, in an apparent play on word, claimed he would not be content until such a banner waved over New Spain.⁵³ The literal waving of the *servilleta* or napkin itself implied that Cartagena was a *servilletero*, a term applied to Habsburg sympathizers in Spain. Similarly, *alemanisca*—the cloth of the napkin in question—was another wartime term for those who refuted Carlos II’s will.⁵⁴ The fact that *alemanisca* was a common textile supplied by English smugglers in Spanish America

⁵¹ AGI México 658, Pieza 4^a, fs. 330r-335r; AGI México 660, 5^a pieza, fs. 1317r-1347r. This is not counting two cases dismissed by the Audiencia of Mexico City in 1709 as false accusations. The first was against Manuel Fernández de Acuña, a Portuguese cavalry officer, and seven accomplices for disloyalty in Guadalcázar (near San Luis de Potosí). Fernández was exonerated and proved his loyalty with a portrait of Felipe V that he displayed in his home. He also offered to give a large *donativo* for the urgencies of the war and offered to serve the crown on the northern frontier. The second case was against Pedro Pablo de Cuéllar, the *alcalde mayor* of Tochimilco (near Puebla). In both cases, the Sala del Crimen determined the witnesses to be personal enemies of the accused and arrested them for perjury.

⁵² AGI Pasajeros a Indias, Libro 14, f. 502; AGI Contratación 5454, No. 3, f. 120r. Cartagena was a former *alcalde mayor* of Marabatio y Jacona and a clerk in the Secretaría del Virreinato in the administrations of two former viceroys—Marquis of La Laguna (1680-1686) and the Count of Galve (1688-1696). The sons of both former viceroys passed over to the Habsburg court in Barcelona during the course of the war: the Count of Galve in 1706 and the Marquis of La Laguna in 1710. The latter, who was born in Mexico City, served as a minister to the Archduke in the false Council of the Indies.

⁵³ “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 31 October 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, f. 1r.

⁵⁴ *Luces del desengaño y destierro de tinieblas* (Seville: Casa de los Herederos de Tomás López de Haro, c. 1710), p. 8; *Matachines para la zarzuela de “Hacer cuenta sin la huéspedea”* (Zaragoza: 1704), pp. 10-11. The author of the first pamphlet lists the epitaph *servilletero* among other terms for opponents to the Bourbons: “...los difidentes (que ahora llaman fanáticos, sebastianista, cerveceros, servilleteros, etc.) es una especie de gente que, con el deseo y esperanza de que reine otro, viven atormentados y, con la posesión de esa esperanza, viven después arrepentidos y nunca hallan rey a medida de su deseo y gusto.”

suggested yet another meaning: a preference for trade with the Allies as opposed to the French.⁵⁵

The case presented a significant revelation. The viceroy panicked at the idea of Mexican elites openly discussing their grievances with the crown during the chaotic succession crisis. Albuquerque considered the napkin incident highly subversive and ordered royal guards to arrest Cartagena. He pushed for immediate prosecution of the affair to prevent “the prejudicial consequences that similar liberties could cause to public tranquility.”⁵⁶ Nonetheless, as Cartagena’s testimony suggested, there had been plenty of time for others to learn about the incident and deal with it, as it had occurred at least before August 1706. Asinas had previously taken the opportunity to confront Cartagena and his wife in private about the incident. Cartagena admitted to discussing the turmoil of Iberia at the home of Tomás Fernández de Guevara but claimed the adverse news caused him to sympathize with “the poor king” who had “nothing but tribulations since he arrived in Spain.” Alonso de Lejarza and Lucas de Careaga, two of Cartagena’s friends, came to his defense and attested that they had prayed together for Felipe V at the shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe after the news about Habsburg victories in Catalonia and Aragon arrived from Veracruz. Careaga added that Cartagena expressed joy at Felipe V’s retreat to Pamplona during the Catalan campaign, since the people of Navarre were known to

⁵⁵ Florence M. Montgomery, *Textiles in America, 1650-1870* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.), p. 261. Huckaback or *alemanisca* was a type of linen textile originally produced in Germany (hence the Spanish name). By the turn of the eighteenth century, it was manufactured in Northern England (Warrington near Liverpool and Darlington) and distributed by English merchants in Jamaica and Cadiz throughout the rest of the Americas.

⁵⁶ “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 1 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 4v-7r.

be very loyal to the Bourbons. Cartagena insisted he was innocent and accused Asinas of targeting him as a rival for the rents of the colonial playing card monopoly.⁵⁷

Cartagena's words were considered most grievous in light of the fragile political situation in Castile and recent tensions in Veracruz over the fleets. The viceroy therefore passed matter for the Sala del Crimen, the superior chamber of the Audiencia of Mexico City that prosecuted crimes against the state.⁵⁸ The chamber was headed by Baltasar de Tovar, who also received a commission from the Compagnie Royale de Guinée as *juez conservador* of the *asiento* in Mexico City.⁵⁹ Thus Albuquerque orchestrated a trial under the care of judges already sympathetic to the economic interests of the Union of the Two Crowns.

The *alcaldes del crimen* (high court judges) requested formal testimonies from the other guests at the dinner party. When reexamined about the incident, Captain Asinas seemed unsure whether Cartagena made the comment on his own accord or repeated seditious speech he had heard elsewhere. Fernández remembered Cartagena uttering “something about a napkin” in his home, to which he immediately told him to be silent. Most surprising to Tovar, a clergyman named Luis de Aguilar present at the dinner party refused to give testimony about Benito de Cartagena without the authorization of the archbishop.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 3 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 31r-42r.

⁵⁸ The resulting inquiry by the viceroy and the Audiencia of Mexico City is contained in AGI Escribanía 262A.

⁵⁹ “Real Cédula, subdelega la comisión de protector general de la introducción de esclavos negros en la América y se sirve nombrar por juez conservador del asiento...,” AGN-M Indios 91, Expediente 2.

⁶⁰ “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 1 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 4v-7r.

The judges could do little to punish Cartagena without any further evidence besides “public notoriety.” The royal prosecutor Gaspar de Cepeda Castro requested the court torture Cartagena to reveal the source of the original napkin comment. He argued that Cartagena consorted with *fanáticos* (Habsburgs supporters who sympathized with the English) and “by extending a napkin, manifested the desire that the flag flying over the viceroyalty should be the one from where the napkin had been manufactured.” Cepeda labeled Fernández an accessory to Cartagena’s crime for discussing the delicate matters of the war in his home and for not informing authorities immediately after the napkin incident.⁶¹ By March 1707, however, Tovar and the judges decided not to pursue prosecution.⁶²

Disloyalty Among Royal Officials

The intermingling of politics, trade, and anti-Bourbon opinions played out further in the cases following the Cartagena denunciation. Within a month of Cartagena’s arrest, Alberto de Rada y Oreña, the *alcalde mayor* of Tepeaca and Tecali, was accused of conducting seditious conversations in the *portal de mercaderes*—the luxury goods market across from the viceregal palace on the Plaza Mayor. The initial denunciation was made by Luis Pérez de Tamara, a *corredor* who Rada relied on to purchase goods such as cacao and lace to sell in his jurisdiction. Pérez contacted the *audiencia* about the sedition after Rada failed to fulfill his

⁶¹ “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 1 January 1707, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 89r-100r.

⁶² “Testimonio de los autos y causa criminal...contra don Benito de Cartagena,” Mexico City, 1 January 1707, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 103v-104v.

promise of granting Pérez a military post in Tepeaca. The accusations were supported by Pedro de la Águila, the *corregidor* of Querétaro.⁶³

Rada had legitimate reason to be disgruntled with the Bourbons. The change of dynasty cost him the *corregimiento* of Aymaraes, a wealthy supply center for the mines of Peru, which he had previously purchased from Carlos II's government in 1698. Felipe V suppressed the sale of offices in 1701 and cancelled any unfulfilled appointments made by Carlos II's government. Two years later, when the Spanish crown began selling offices once again, the king compensated Rada with a far less lucrative post in Central Mexico only after he made a donation of 3,500 pesos to the royal treasury for the urgencies of the war.⁶⁴ Once in Mexico City, Rada eagerly discredited news of Felipe V's military triumphs as fictitious. On several occasions, he stated aloud in the public market that "the imperial [i.e. Habsburg] eagles always prevail" and "our king will be the one with the most force on the battlefield." Upon learning of the failed Bourbon siege of Barcelona, Rada remarked that he owned a reversible coat when it came to the fate of monarchy.⁶⁵

Pérez and Águila claimed Rada made the comments to Juan de Bustamante y Velasco (*alcalde mayor* of Sonora), Juan Francisco Marmolejo y Miranda (*alcalde mayor* of Pátzcuaro), and Pedro de Esmaille y Lobato (a former Cadiz merchant and newly appointed governor of Maracaibo). The three officials had arrived in Mexico with Rada after also buying their posts through donations to the Spanish crown for the

⁶³ "Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña por lo que en ella se expresa," Mexico City, 22 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 18v; 77r-78r.

⁶⁴ "Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña," Mexico City, 5 July 1707, AGI Escribanía 190A, f. 73v.

⁶⁵ "Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña por lo que en ella se expresa," Mexico City, 22 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 2v-18r.

war. Bustamante and Marmolejo admitted to chastising Rada for making the “unwise” statements and suggested at the time that he should watch what he said about the crown. Esmaille completely denied the allegation, though perhaps to hide his own negative feelings about the Bourbons. His later actions as governor of Maracaibo revealed a personal aversion for the French—his commercial rivals in the Caribbean. In 1709, at the insistence of the French crown, Felipe V removed Esmaille from office for abuses that included the imprisonment of the *Compagnie Royale de Guinée* factor in Maracaibo and the confiscation company’s supply of cloth.⁶⁶

Alberto de Rada and his lawyer cleverly handled the accusations of disloyalty. Under interrogation, Rada admitted to uttering the comments about a reversible coat and his willingness to recognize whichever king proved strongest on the battlefield. However, he stressed that the witnesses and the judges misinterpreted his words. Rather than an expression of disloyalty, he argued the coat comment inferred that he was a faithful servant of the Spanish crown. To him, it meant he was willing to serve the Habsburg dynasty under Carlos II and now the Bourbon dynasty under Felipe V. As for the comment about the battlefield, he claimed it as a compliment to Louis XIV, who “in the period he waged war with all of Europe, always came out victorious, so now our king and lord Felipe V would end up the same, united with His Most Christian Majesty.”⁶⁷ He then issued his own allegations against Pedro de la Águila and Luis Pérez de Tamara, his original accusers, as a means of discrediting their testimonies. He brought up the fact that Águila had been found guilty by the

⁶⁶ The comte de Pontchartrain to Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, Versailles, 21 July 1709, ANF Marine B⁷ 78, fs. 103-105; the comte de Pontchartrain to François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois, Versailles, 21 July 1709, ANF Marine B⁷ 78, fs. 105-107; AGI Escribanía 794B.

⁶⁷ “Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña,” Mexico City, 29 December 1706, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 38r-42r.

audiencia for smuggling gunpowder and had left for Spain to avoid punishment. Most damning of all, Rada and several character witnesses from the merchant community asserted that Pérez was himself a *fanático* who had fled to Mexico from Andalusia as a traitor to the crown. As it turned out, Pérez had sold provisions to the forces of Sir George Rooke during the sack of Cadiz and Puerto de Santa María in 1702. This new denunciation caused Pérez to flee to Central America.⁶⁸

Despite Rada's defense, the judges still considered the statements to be malicious in intent, as the witnesses emphasized that he said them in anger. The comments about military force were especially inflammatory at a time when the Archduke's troops seemed to be winning the war. Lacking more tangible evidence, however, the Sala del Crimen voted for absolution of the crime of *lèse-majesté* by February 1708. Rada was also absolved from the punishment of *infamia* that would bar him and his descendants from ever holding political office. For Rada, his release was hardly celebratory. During the course of prosecution, the viceroy filled his office with a loyal client and refused to reinstate him. Dissatisfied with losing yet another post, Rada returned to Spain on the silver fleet of 1710 to demand restitution before the crown.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ "Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña por lo que en ella se expresa," Mexico City, 22 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 120r; 150r. Luis Pérez de Tamara sought sanctuary in the hospital of San Antonio Abad in Mexico City. The abbot disapproved of his crime and gave him forty-eight hours to leave. Rada's character witnesses assumed he escaped to Panama or Guatemala.

⁶⁹ "Testimonio de la causa...contra don Alberto de Rada y Oreña," Mexico City, 17 February 1708, AGI Escribanía 190A, fs. 154v-177v.

Disloyalty Among the Flota Merchants

The allegations against Benito de Cartagena and Alberto de Rada troubled the viceroy and the *alcaldes del crimen*. They grew nervous most of all at the fact that disloyal conversations were being conducted in public places like the *portal de mercaderes* in front of the general populace. Two weeks after the denunciation against Rada, the judges Baltasar de Tovar and José Joaquín de Uribe decided to launch a secret investigation into the public opinions circulating in the marketplace. To avoid scandal, Uribe proceeded to interrogate informants at Tovar's home rather than the courtroom. Their testimonies singled out a circle of eight men of *peninsular* origin that frequently held seditious conversations around the city.⁷⁰

The investigation centered on Gregorio Gasco Suárez, a merchant from Galicia who owned a cloth shop in the *portal de mercaderes*. Gasco worked as a merchant in Cadiz before coming to Mexico City in 1699 as an *almacenero* distributing merchandise shipped to Veracruz consignment from diverse associates in Spain.⁷¹ Gasco was accused of initiating seditious conversations at his home and in front of his shop. Gasco shared anti-Bourbon sentiments with a number of merchants and artisans, including Antonio del Villar Bahamonde and Antonio Bernardo Caballero (two Mexico City shop owners), Pedro Collazos de Soto (a shop owner in Guadalajara), Joaquín Puyol (a Catalan shop owner in Chihuahua), José Pardo (a Cadiz trade agent), the priest Lorenzo Sánchez de Figueroa (Gasco's confessor), and

⁷⁰ "Testimonio de la causa criminal hecha de oficio de la Real Justicia contra Juan López Camaño Herrador, vecino de esta ciudad, por decir ser desafecto a la Católica Majestad de Nuestro Rey y Señor don Felipe V," Mexico City, 17 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 2r-6r.

⁷¹ "Testimonio de la causa criminal hecha de oficio de la Real Justicia..." Mexico City, 12 July 1707, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 47r-48v. Gasco's associates in Cadiz appeared to have English, Dutch, and Genoese connections.

Juan López Camaño (Gasco's blacksmith). The principal merchants involved in the case conducted business in Veracruz and were in direct competition with the French corsairs. Witnesses described the group as "restless individuals and chatterers who appear to scandalously expose themselves as manifesting disloyalty in their conversations."⁷² Their lack of affection for the Bourbons was expressed publically and scandalously "without paying attention to anyone present" at the marketplace. Gasco and the priest Sánchez were the most ardent critics of Felipe V's government, having expressed seditious opinions well before the unfavorable news about the 1706 campaign reached New Spain.⁷³

Uribe's informants included the shop owner Antonio Freire and his clients Juan Díaz and Bernardo Gómez Lobato. They frequently argued with Gasco and his companions in public about their loyalties to rival claimants to the throne. In these debates, Sánchez tried to intimidate Freire with claims that 6,000 Indians were preparing to revolt against Bourbon authority. He also mentioned commonly hearing parishioners question their loyalty to Felipe V during the sacrament of confession.⁷⁴ The *archiquistas* labeled Freire a "French son" and "dumb savage" for supporting the Bourbons at a time when the Habsburg Allies appeared to be winning the war. They called Díaz a *filipense* for responding to their conversations with absolutist rhetoric about Felipe V's anointment by God as the only true king of Spain. They referred to

⁷² "Testimonio a la letra de la causa criminal hecha a Antonio del Villar, vecino de esta ciudad y dueño de cajón de mercaderías, por decir ser desafecto a la Majestad Católica de Nuestro Rey y Señor don Felipe V," México City, 17 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B.

⁷³ "Testimonio de la causa criminal hecha de oficio de la Real Justicia..." Mexico City, 17 November 1707, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 7v-8r. One witness claimed Gasco "never spoke the way he should have" about the king and rejected his rule ever since he ascended the throne. Sánchez spoke of prognostics favoring the Habsburgs. He occasionally discussed the issue of Salic law and the rights of the kings of Portugal to the Spanish crown.

⁷⁴ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, f. 92r. The 1706 fire at the royal mint was supposed to be evidence of the impending revolt.

Gómez as a madman and used the epitaph “the judge” since they believed “he would hang many traitors and people disloyal to the king [in Mexico City] if he were judge or a man of power.” They even taunted him to purchase the office of magistrate for 20,000 pesos so he could persecute the traitors that offended him.⁷⁵ In retaliation, the pro-Bourbon merchants referred to Sánchez as the “bishop of London” and “the Englishman.”⁷⁶

Such arguments about Spanish politics had potential for violence. Antonio del Villar Bahamonde and Pedro Collazos de Soto grew belligerent with Freire and Gómez on several occasions. At one point, Collazos even drew his sword and threatened to readily defend the Archduke’s cause with force of arms. Reciprocally, Gómez expressed desire to kill Gasco for his remarks against the king or at least motivate royal officials to banish him to the northern frontier “so he could not incite an uprising or do damage through his connections in Veracruz.”⁷⁷

Uribe presented a report on the situation to the Duke of Albuquerque on November 17, 1706 and the arrests of the suspects soon followed.⁷⁸ Royal guards also took into custody José Pardo’s nephew Juan Antonio Pardo (owner of a cloth shop) for irreverence. When questioned if he knew why the *audiencia* sought his uncle’s arrest, Juan Antonio struck the alférez on the forehead and, pointing to an engraving

⁷⁵ “Testimonio a la letra de la causa criminal...,” México City, 19 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 20r-21v.

⁷⁶ “Testimonio de la causa criminal...,” Mexico City, 29 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 19r-19v.

⁷⁷ “Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo,” Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, fs. 4r-9r.

⁷⁸ “Testimonio de la causa criminal hecha de oficio de la Real Justicia contra Juan López Camaño Herrador, vecino de esta ciudad, por decir ser desafecto a la Católica Majestad de Nuestro Rey y Señor don Felipe V,” Mexico City, 17 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 2r-6r.

of Felipe V, said it was the king's fault.⁷⁹ Two of the suspects had already fled Mexico City. Pedro Collazos de Soto went north to Guadalajara and was eventually captured in January 1707 in nearby Atotonilco el Alto.⁸⁰ Likewise, Joaquín Puyol went north but was caught by the captain of the presidio of Conchos near Chihuahua.⁸¹ Both were transported back to Mexico City for trial. The captain of the presidio also submitted incriminating papers carried by Puyol that implicated the deceased Captain Martín de Ugalde of the presidio of Cerro Gordo (near Durango) in sedition as well.⁸²

Throughout the trial, the judges interrogated witnesses such as market patrons, the servants of the offenders, and others. Pascual de Amorín, a merchandise agent, knew of Gasco's sedition first-hand and claimed to have grown weary of his attitude over the course of the war. The master tailor Juan Rey, who bought cloth from Gasco, implied that Gasco criticized Felipe V for years because his business had been negatively affected by Bourbon succession. Gasco's servant Juan Bautista Bel added that his master's sedition was inspired by the lull in trade caused by the French corsairs who glutted the Mexican market with cheap, "inferior quality of the cloth" from Brittany. The economic situation directly influenced the political opinions of Gasco and his colleagues, who abhorred any favorable news from Europe about Felipe V. It is therefore no surprise that the deponent saw Gasco rejoice over the

⁷⁹ "Testimonio de la causa criminal..." Mexico City, 17 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 12r-12v.

⁸⁰ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, f. 114r. When the Audiencia of Mexico City began making arrests, Collazo fled to Guadalajara and then, after learning that the Audiencia of Guadalajara was searching for him, hid in the convent of Santo Domingo in La Barca.

⁸¹ "Testimonio de la causa criminal contra don Joaquín Puyol," AGI Escribanía 263A, fs. 55r-58r.

⁸² "Diligencias fechas en virtud de real provision de la Real Audiencia de la Nueva Galicia," Presidio de San Miguel del Cerro Gordo, 18 February 1707, AGN-M Civil 880, Expediente 3, fs. 1r-6v.

rumor that the Archduke had already conquered all of Spain. Gasco reasoned that the Habsburgs were best suited to rule over the Spanish empire, stating "...if someone had served a master for a long time, would it not be best that he served his son and not some stranger? He said so for the House of Austria, which was 'our house.'"⁸³

Others noted that Gasco exhibited Francophobia, lamenting to the blacksmith Juan López Camaño that French trade made business difficult for the Spaniards. He also believed the French naval forces to be deceitful. Gasco did not blame Felipe V for the war but rather Louis XIV, whom he called a "*gabacho* dog" and two-headed monster determined to rule both France and Spain. Like others, Gasco believed the news received in New Spain came from France, not Spain. Gasco's opinions also appeared to be those of a *fanático*. He spoke favorably about the English as the best nation and praised the strength of the English navy, which during the course of the war had not been used against the meager fleet of New Spain. After the confiscation of Gasco's goods, Tovar did in fact judge that the merchant traded predominately English and Dutch merchandise as opposed to French and Flemish. The judges became interested in the nature of Gasco's contact with English and Dutch in the Caribbean.⁸⁴

The investigation of Joaquín Puyol was even more revealing. Puyol, owner of a cloth shop in the Chihuahua mining community of Parral, assumed the arrest stemmed primarily from his Catalan origin. However, he also told the court he assumed they desired to punish him for speaking ill of the viceroy or for suspicion of Habsburg sympathies. He first voiced his anti-Bourbon sentiments in 1705 by

⁸³ "Testimonio de la causa contra Gregorio Gasco," Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 263A, fs. 47v-52r.

⁸⁴ "Testimonio de la causa contra Gregorio Gasco," Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 263A, fs. 47v-52r.

speaking favorably about the Archduke and conjecturing that Felipe V was losing the war because Spaniards never get along with Frenchmen.⁸⁵ Confiscation of his belongings brought to light incriminating correspondence with Gasco. In one letter from 1705, Puyol thanked the Mexico City merchant for sharing favorable news about the Habsburg army. Puyol shared this information with a local family and a Portuguese merchant, all of whom were happy to hear the “truth” about the war. He had just returned from Cerro Gordo, where he visited the Francophobic captain Martín de Ugalde.⁸⁶ He planned to inform the captains of the neighboring presidios of the news during an upcoming dinner party—where presumably they would be eager to hear about developments in Central Mexico and Europe. Puyol sent him a recent gazette from Veracruz regarding the arrival of frigates from Rochefort, the disastrous Portugal and Gibraltar campaigns, the delay of the silver fleet, and a revolt in Andalusia. Gasco lamented the news of the French ship and was delighted to learn about the Archduke’s progress.⁸⁷

Along with Gasco and Puyol, Pedro Collazos de Soto, a prominent Galician merchant in Guadalajara, was considered among the guiltiest parties in the proceedings. Collazos was a close associate to Gasco and frequented his home and business when traveling back and forth to Veracruz. Collazo spoke publically about Felipe V’s misfortune (especially his problems with the *grandees*) in front of the shop

⁸⁵ Testimonio de la causa criminal contra don Joaquín Puyol,” AGI Escribanía 263A, fs. 91r-103r

⁸⁶ “Diligencias fechas en virtud de real provision...,” Presidio de San Miguel del Cerro Gordo, 18 February 1707, AGN-M Civil 880, Expediente 3, fs. 1r-6v; “Título del capitán del presidio de San Miguel del Cerro Gordo y otros títulos e instrumentos pertenecientes a los servicios y dependencias del capitán don Martín de Ugalde...,” Mexico City, 6 September 1708, AGN-M Civil 880, Expediente 4, fs. 7r-58r. Ugalde served in the northern frontier from 1687-1706, dying eight months before the first denunciations appeared in Mexico City.

⁸⁷ “Testimonio de la causa contra Gregorio Gasco,” Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 262A, fs. 165r-167v.

of Antonio del Villar Bahamonde. Collazos toasted to the Archduke's health and doubted favorable news about the progresses of the Bourbon army. The *corredor* Amorín had reacted to this by calling Collazos "a schismatic dog of the doctrine of Gasco."⁸⁸ When Callazos repeated rumors in 1704 that Madrid had fallen to the Archduke, Amorín motioned to draw his sword. Villar intervened to calm the *corredor* and urged him to leave peacefully by implying with irony that the topic was not worth a quarrel since the empire would never lack a king to tell people what to do or a pope to excommunicate them.⁸⁹ Collazo seemed to know that his words could lead to his imprisonment, exile to the Philippines, or retaliation from the viceroy, yet he joked that he did not fear retribution.⁹⁰ Villar himself was quick to accuse Collazos of being a *sebastianista* and even an *atarantado*—a reference to either his bellicose nature or his approval of Habsburg victories in Naples.⁹¹

The Gasco case dragged on until October 1708. The written evidence against Gasco and Puyol was enough to ensure a guilty sentence. The Sala del Crimen deemed Gasco's words a crime against both Felipe V and Louis XIV, and the considered torturing him to reveal his ties with the English.⁹² In the end, they ordered Gasco and Puyol shipped back to Spain at their own expense for final judgment by

⁸⁸ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, fs. 22v-31v.

⁸⁹ "Testimonio a la letra de la causa criminal..." México City, 21 November 1706, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 26v-27r.

⁹⁰ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, fs. 22v-31v. According to Cotera, Collazo claimed, "in Mexico City people go around making conversations in all the *cacahuaterías* and small gatherings of friends...they have said to me that [Felipe V] recaptured Barcelona, I don't believe it. That he won over Portugal, I don't believe it, because I have motive to say so...I don't fear prison, but rather violence from the viceroy."

⁹¹ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, f. 114r.

⁹² "Testimonio de la causa contra Gregorio Gasco," Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 263A, fs. 284r-302r.

the Council of the Indies.⁹³ Collazos remained under suspicion and, although released, was ordered to return to Spain as the case awaited review by the Council of the Indies. The suspicious priest Lorenzo Sánchez de Figueroa avoided punishment through ecclesiastical privilege. The viceroy personally intervened to protect him and defer the matter to the archbishop, who banished Sánchez from Mexico City and stripped him of the right to hear confession. The court treated Antonio del Villar, Luis López Camaño, and the Pardos as lesser offenders whose time in prison served as their punishment for associating with Gasco. They were also exempted from the stigma of *infamia*.⁹⁴

Disloyalty Among Intellectuals

By the end of November, the Sala del Crimen became aware that the inhabitants of Mexico City not only criticized the Bourbons in their conversations and private correspondence, but also in writings that circulated among the populace. This fact came to their attention with the arrest of the hacienda administrator Salvador José Mañer for crimes of sedition. Like the previous denunciations made to the *audiencia*, the case against Mañer was initially based on inflammatory comments made in a place of public gathering. Juan de Acosta, an *alférez* in the palace guard, and other witnesses such as the merchant Andrés de Villa testified that on two occasions during Lent of 1706 Mañer entered a gaming house and wagered 200 pesos that the Archduke would rule over all of Spain by the end of the war. Furthermore, Mañer spread gossip that Castile was in a state of rebellion due to Felipe V's favoritism of

⁹³ "Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo," Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, fs. 271r-277r.

⁹⁴ "Testimonio a la letra de la causa criminal...", México City, AGI Escribanía 262B, fs. 100v-114r.

the French nobles at Spanish court, which aggravated the grandees and drew them to the Archduke's faction. In his conversations, Mañer claimed that "those called traitors now will be considered the most loyal later" once the Archduke attained the final victory. Several of the witnesses assumed Mañer was a rebellious Catalan or a Neapolitan. Acosta confronted him at the time. After calling him a rogue, he warned that many others had been hanged in Spain for lesser offenses to the king.⁹⁵ Sensing opposition from everyone in the room, Mañer attempted to excuse his comments as a jest and left the building.⁹⁶

The life of Salvador José Mañer reveals the subversive intellectual side of resistance of Bourbon sovereignty in Spanish America. Born in Cadiz, the precocious Mañer came to Mexico via Caracas, where he had lived since 1690. His parents originally sent him to Venezuela as an adolescent to seek his fortune in his uncle's cacao trade, yet Mañer proved less inclined towards the world of commerce and more towards poetry, politics, and astrology.⁹⁷ He soon became the protégé of several Spanish American clergymen who shared his intellectual interests and encouraged him to pursue them. For example, Fray Nicolás de Sotomayor, a Dominican in Venezuela who maintained contact with the Dutch in Curaçao, chose Mañer to accompany him on a WIC voyage to the Netherlands between 1699-1700. There the two men discussed world affairs with the Baron Belmonte, the Sephardic patrician

⁹⁵ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer, preso en la Real Cárcel de esta corte por infiel y desafecto a la Católica Majestad de Nuestro Rey y Señor don Felipe Quinto (que Dios guarde), haber proferido varias palabras indecorosas mal sonantes..." Mexico City, 22-27 November 1706, AGI, México 661, fs. 2r-7v.

⁹⁶ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 8 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 10r-16v.

⁹⁷ "Noticia de la vida y obras del M.I. y R.P. D. Fr. Benito Gerónimo Feijoo..." in Fray Benito Jerónimo Feijoo, *Teatro crítico universal, o discursos varios en todo género de materias para desengaño de errores comunes*, vol (Madrid: Imprenta Real de la Gaceta, 1765), p. xxvii.

and literary patron, who gave Mañer a treatise on Caribbean trade.⁹⁸ Later in 1704, when Mañer relocated to Mexico as his uncle's commercial agent, he was taken under the care of the priest Juan Mieguel Pardo de Mayorga, owner of a Mexico City butcher shop and the hacienda San José Comalco in nearby Toluca. Mañer met Pardo through his friend Fernando del Monte García, another resident of Venezuela who worked as a butcher for Prado in Mexico City. Pardo employed Mañer as administrator of the livestock at his hacienda and paid him a third of the estate's earnings.⁹⁹

In spite of these responsibilities (and to his uncle's chagrin), Salvador José Mañer devoted much of his time in Mexico to gambling and intellectual discussions about politics and religion. Mañer's employer Juan Miguel Pardo de Mayorga and his associate José de Toledo y Mendoza, a priest in San Juan Jiquipilco with ties to the Mexican Inquisition, collected printed propaganda on Bourbon succession and the Chinese rites controversy. They encouraged Mañer to debate and write critiques on these topics, and in turn the two priests promoted Mañer's compositions among other erudite clerics such as the Oratorian Antonio de Robles, the poet Pedro Muñoz de Castro, and faculty at the University of Mexico.¹⁰⁰ This "impertinent" profession,

⁹⁸ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Cordoba, 13-15 November 1713, AGI, México 661, fs. 224r-225r. Mañer learned of the death of Carlos II in November 1700 while in Amsterdam.

⁹⁹ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 18 September 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 96r-100r.

¹⁰⁰ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 14 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 32r-35v; 43r. Pardo owned pamphlets on the Admiral of Castile, another about the clergy of Portugal's opposition to the war, the comedy *Al freír de los huevos*, the zarzuela *Hacer la cuenta sin la huésped*, and the treatise *Teología irrefragable contra los apasionados por el Archiduque*. Juan de Somoza, a customer of Pardo, shared the bishop of Cartagena's *Carta pastoral* and a 1706 almanac. José de Toledo y Mendoza had materials on the Chinese rites controversy. Mañer penned a response to them, which Toledo shared with the Jesuit Gaspar de los Reyes. Mañer also gave Toledo a book of poetry he had written in 1700, entitled *Obras varias de poesía*, that included a poem about the death of Carlos II.

Mañer told his uncle, earned him patronage and the esteem of the city's learned elite.¹⁰¹

Mañer's writing career also brought him into contact with Manuel de Sousa y Prado, a Portuguese leather craftsman who also produced satirical poems and debated the issue of Bourbon succession in public.¹⁰² Sousa was another associate of the butcher Fernando del Monte García, who shared with Sousa news from Venezuela contained in letters from his wife. The other tanners in Mexico City already despised Sousa as an *archiducista* on account of his partiality for the Habsburgs. Sousa first expressed seditious sentiments when, upon hearing Carlos II's will being read aloud, he called Bourbon succession foolish and a violation of Salic law. Throughout the war, he ignored all good news about the Bourbons and rejoiced over Habsburg victories. A few days before his arrest, he was said to discuss the illegitimacy and tyranny of Felipe V's government and the squadron of thirty English warships dispatched after the fall of Madrid to obtain the oath of fealty in Spanish America for the Archduke. The next silver fleet, he claimed, was destined for the Archduke's use and he even conjectured that no galleons had arrived yet from Manila because the Dutch fleet had already conquered the Philippines. Similar to Mañer, Sousa was brazen enough on two occasions to wager in public 50 pesos that the Archduke held both Barcelona and Badajoz and that almost all of Spain was now under Habsburg

¹⁰¹ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 18 September 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 91v-100r. Mañer's uncle tried to dissuade his nephew from writing. Mañer argued that his writing allowed him to supplement his income through the dedication of select non-controversial works to members of the local aristocracy such as the Count of Miravalle. He awaited the arrival of the Marquis of Villapiente de la Peña as a potential new patron.

¹⁰² "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 25 June 1708, AGI, México 661, fs. 138r. These sentiments seem largely inspired by his regionalist attitudes, as Sousa was known to be proudly Portuguese. When someone gave him news that Portugal had fallen in two days, he answered back that the king of Portugal could put 60,000 men in battle without losing his kingdom, and that one Portuguese soldier was worth many Spanish ones.

domination.¹⁰³ The Sala del Crimen suspected that Sousa received intelligence from enemy agents in the Caribbean such as the former Portuguese agents of the *asiento* who were known to undermine Bourbon authority. He underwent torture before the judges ordered his transport back to Spain.¹⁰⁴

The subversive opinions of Salvador José Mañer and Manuel de Sousa y Prado found a ready audience among the literate public of the viceregal capital. A number of seditious writings circulated in Mexico City at the time of the disloyalty trials. Decrees of the Mexican Inquisition warned about the appearance of two 1706 Spanish pamphlets that appeared in Mexico: *El anónimo, que escribe para todos, en mal moral...* and *La verdad sin doblez*.¹⁰⁵ Published in Valencia and Barcelona (two cities under the Archduke's control), both pamphlets accused the French of manipulating gazettes and religious sermons to fool Spanish subjects into supporting Felipe V. They added that the war had been initiated by “the ambitious fury of Mars [Louis XIV] and his misplaced ideas of universal monarchy” to allow the French to usurp the silver fleets and Indies trade.¹⁰⁶ Mexican writers also wrote their own poems satirizing the negative consequences of Bourbon rule, such as the 1707 work *Llegó el día sino me engaño* (which ends with the line “the Archduke will reign over

¹⁰³ “Testimonio de la causa contra Manuel de Sousa,” Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 262C.

¹⁰⁴ “Testimonio de la causa contra Manuel de Sousa,” Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 262C, fs. 263v-289v. Under torture, Sousa screamed profanities and slapped Pedro de Urtazun for speaking ill of the king of Portugal and the Archduke.

¹⁰⁵ “Por cuanto conviene al servicio de Dios nuestro señor, recoger y prohibir *in totum* los libros y papeles siguientes...” Mexico City, 17 March 1708, AGN-M, Edictos de Inquisición 4-5, f. 14r.

¹⁰⁶ Anonymous, *El anónimo, que escribe para todos, en mal moral, y peor castellano, derribando antiguas gacetas, soñados juramentos, y la fingida guerra de religión, que predicaron los gallos* (Valencia: 1706); Anonymous, *La verdad sin doblez, copia de una carta escrita por un profesor de sagrada teología, a un amigo suyo, en respuesta de la que con titulo de Carta Pastoral, ha salido en nombre del...Señor D. Luis Belluga, obispo de Cartagena* (Barcelona: 1706). Interestingly, the author of the first pamphlet legitimized Archduke Charles's invasion of Spain by comparing it to a creole grandson from the Indies traveling to Spain to claim his grandfather's estate. Both pamphlets consist of legal arguments about the illegitimacy of Carlos II's will.

us”) and the sonnet *Qué importa que lo mande el mismo rey*.¹⁰⁷ These were followed in 1708 by the sonnets *Duque, virrey Christiano, aunque lo mienta* and *Chato barato dirán* that compared the Duke of Albuquerque’s commercial activities with the French to Judas selling out Christ to the Romans. The Inquisition considered these latter works’ attacks against the viceroy and the French as attacks against Felipe V. As the inquisitors warned, “given the present circumstances, what [the poems] expresses about France can be considered seditious against the public peace and the union between His Catholic Majesty and His Most Christian Majesty.” They added “said verses are motivated to deal with merchandise, prices, and many other things related to the France, [which are] subjects at this time too risky [to be discussed]...”¹⁰⁸ The Inquisition continued to denounce other writings in the same vein through the end of Albuquerque’s term and even up through the Peace of Utrecht.¹⁰⁹

During his trial, Salvador José Mañer insisted on his innocence but at the same time suggested that sentiments critical of the Bourbons were not uncommon

¹⁰⁷ “Viendo las acordadas disposiciones en este Santo Tribunal por diferentes edictos procurado las necesarias para refrenar la audacia...” Mexico City, 12 August 1707, AGN-M, Edictos de la Inquisición 4-5, f. 13r. The satirical poem against the archbishop of Mexico City, entitled *Juan Arzobispo de México... cuando caigan del pináculo*, also circulated at the same time entitled.

¹⁰⁸ “Autos sobre una denuncia hecha en razón de ciertos versos que se han denunciado contra el duque de Albuquerque, virrey de Nueva España,” Mexico City, 22 October 1708, AGN-M, Inquisición 732, Expediente 18, fs. 514r-517r.

¹⁰⁹ “Autos sobre un papel denunciado que tiene por título *Confesión se hace en los últimos días de su gobierno el excelentísimo señor duque de Albuquerque*,” Mexico City, 1710, AGN-M, Inquisición 740, Expediente 3, fs. 54r-68r; Edict of the Tribunal of the Holy Office, Mexico City, 17 June 1714, AGN-M, Inquisición 551, Expediente 55, fs. 343r-344v; Edict of the Tribunal of the Holy Office, Mexico City, 19 June 1714, AGN-M, Inquisición 551, Expediente 55, f. 1r. For example, the Inquisition denounced the 1710 poem *Confesión que se hace en los últimos días de su gobierno el excelentísimo señor duque de Albuquerque* that, in the form of a mock confession of Albuquerque’s “sins,” implicates him in the smuggling of Chinese and French luxury goods. The inquisitors considered this affront to Albuquerque as an offense against Felipe V as well. In June 1714, the poem *Viva Philipo Quinto, rey de España declarado* was banned for criticizing the sanctions of the Peace of Utrecht. A more general edict against satirical songs and poetry was issued that same month.

around Mexico City and Toluca. On one of his visits to the gaming house, for example, he claimed that several men were discussing the book by the Jesuit Fray Juan Álvaro Cienfuegos in defense of the Admiral of Castile's adherence to the Archduke.¹¹⁰ He had heard his acquaintance Bartolomé Montero complain that the merchants of the *portal de mercaderes* constantly spread negative news about the king and the war; Montero threatened to return to the market and attack the first such rumormonger he encountered.¹¹¹ At the hospital of San Hipólito, Fray Antonio de Ortega, newly arrived from Spain, gossiped with Mañer and a group of priests in a mocking tone about the scandals of Felipe V's court, including the resistance of the grandees to the king's authority—news witnesses claimed Mañer repeated in public. Lastly, in Toluca, Mañer heard a group of bystanders outside of a shop refer to Felipe V with irreverence.¹¹²

Mañer could do little to defend himself once the Audiencia discovered incriminating papers at the hacienda of San José Comalco. One piece of evidence—Baron Belmonte's treatise on Spanish American contraband—confused the judges, as they mistook the author for the Count of Antería, the infamous figure behind the 1702 Habsburg conspiracy in Venezuela. Nonetheless, two sets of correspondence in Mañer's possession more concretely linked him to seditious acts: business papers

¹¹⁰ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 14 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 32r-32v.

¹¹¹ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 20 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 35v; 51r

¹¹² "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 20 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 32r-53v. Fray Antonio de Ortega "made a mockery" out of the argument between Felipe V and the grandees over allowing the Prince of T'Serclaes to sit beside him in the royal chapel on the bench traditionally reserved for the princes of Asturias. The incident caused a group of nobles led by the Duke of Sessa and the Count of Lemos to leave the chapel in the middle of a *Te Deum* service for recent Bourbon victories.

dealing with Caribbean trade, and letters to and from the priests Pardo and Toledo about his writings.

The business papers proved that Mañer maintained direct contact with three individuals guilty of spreading pro-Habsburg propaganda obtained in Curaçao and Jamaica. Two of these men—Pedro Rodrigues Madeira and José Ruiz Carvallo—were Venezuelan cacao traders and former associates of the Portuguese *asiento* company. The other individual was Francisco Eusebio Soler, a Francophobic smuggler from Valencia who sold Dutch cloth in La Guaira, Campeche, and Havana. Royal officials in Caracas and Havana arrested these men during the course of the war for their disloyal activities.¹¹³ Soler's letters to Mañer contained explicit passages attacking the French as drunks who ruined trade in Veracruz by importing too much brandy and linen from Rouen and Brittany. He accused these same Frenchmen of spreading false news in Spanish American ports to their advantage, giving the impression that the Bourbons were winning the war. The “real news” from Spanish sources, he argued, was that Felipe V had lost control over Castile. He said the king feared participating in the upcoming campaign because his troops were close to surrendering. Furthermore, he told Mañer that a friar led an open revolt in Andalusia and that Felipe V beheaded many *grandees* at court and imprisoned the Marquis of Leganés for Habsburg sympathies.¹¹⁴ The correspondence arrived clandestinely in

¹¹³ These cases are contained in AGI Escribanía 665A and 665B. Mañer relied on Francisco Eusebio Soler, Pedro Rodríguez Madeira, and José Ruiz Carvallo to carry correspondence to his uncle in Venezuela. They were arrested and taken to the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa for transport to Spain.

¹¹⁴ “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer,” Mexico City, 18 September 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 90v-91v. The royal guards also discovered duplicates of letters sent by Mañer to his uncle. He conveyed news about French contraband activities in Veracruz—above all, how seventeen French ships “stripped” the city of all its silver. He also repeated the rumor of a peace agreement between the Dutch and the Bourbons. As for news about the war, Mañer told him that much news circulated in Mexico but little of it was true. He did believe reports about the siege of Turin and

Mexico City sealed inside other letters addressed to Nicolás González de la Cueva, an assayer of Cajas Reales, who hosted *tertulias* (salons) at his home attended by Mañer and other intellectuals. Mañer had asked González the favor of receiving his mail from the Caribbean in return for some books and a set of globes. The assayer knew nothing about the content of the papers and would give them to the poet Pedro Muñoz de Castro to deliver to Pardo.¹¹⁵

The other set of papers—correspondence with Juan Miguel Pardo de Mayorga and José de Toledo y Mendoza—exposed Mañer’s subversive intellectual activities. In one letter, Pardo mentioned sending Mañer a copy of a prognostic that predicted the triumph of the Archduke. Pardo was inclined to agree with its predictions given the unfavorable reports about the Bourbon army in the gazettes. The delay of the silver fleet and the arrival of an English squadron in Jamaica also seemed ominous. To be certain, he asked Mañer as a “renowned *servilletero*” to validate the mathematic calculations of the “astrologers of the north.” In two additional letters, Pardo and Toledo instructed Mañer to watch his words and behavior in public in light of the arrest of Benito de Cartagena and others for “speaking about the king.” The priests also informed him about the arrest near Toluca of Gabriel Macazaga y Arizcón, *alcalde mayor* of Metepec, and two of his associates for Habsburg sympathies. As they warned Mañer, the situation in Mexico had become “delicate.”¹¹⁶

the arrest of two preachers in Cadiz for sedition. Overall, Mañer’s association with Soler, his interest in the Dutch peace agreements, and his concern about French trade suggests that his uncle was involved in cloth smuggling.

¹¹⁵ “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer,” Mexico City, 25 November 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 118v-121r.

¹¹⁶ “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer,” Mexico City, 18 September 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 113v-116v. The arrest and secret investigation against Gabriel Macazaga y Arizcón is contained in AGN-M, Criminal 220, Expediente 1, fs. 1-378.

The series of arrests for crimes of disloyalty prompted Mañer's ecclesiastical friends to take precautions. Pardo and Toledo appear to have disposed of the seditious materials mentioned in their letters. When royal guards confiscated their papers, they only found Mañer's poetry and works on the Chinese rites controversy. The seditious prognostic and pamphlets were nowhere to be found.¹¹⁷ A few months later, Pedro Muñoz de Castro, the priest and poet who handled Mañer's mail, turned himself in to the Mexican Inquisition to confess writing and circulating subversive poems on viceregal politics. He voluntarily relinquished to the inquisitors nine sonnets that he had shown to his friends. Each of the poems lampooned the commercial activities of the viceroy and archbishop. To distance himself from other acts of sedition, he then accused the priest and royal notary José de Valdés of penning the poem *Qué importa que lo mande el mismo rey* that directly criticized Felipe V. The grand inquisitor of Mexico, who frequented the same *tertulias* as Muñoz, granted him forgiveness.¹¹⁸

While the suspicious clergymen benefited from ecclesiastical privilege and their ties with the Inquisition to avoid punishment, Mañer could not avoid imprisonment and a harsh sentence. The *alcaldes del crimen* determined that the written evidence verified the oral testimonies about Mañer's seditious sentiments. Given his connection to Soler and the Portuguese slave traders, they believed Mañer hated the king's French allies and therefore supported the Archduke.¹¹⁹ The judges

¹¹⁷ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 26-29 January 1707, AGI, México 661, fs. 67r-70r.

¹¹⁸ "El bachiller Pedro Muñoz de Castro, presbítero de este arzobispado, en los autos fechos en virtud de declaración que hizo en obediencia de cierto edicto de este Santo Tribunal en que se mandaron recoger unos versos y lo demás..." Mexico City, 11 October 1707, AGN-M, Inquisición 718, Expediente 18, fs. 235r-248v.

¹¹⁹ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Mexico City, 2 February 1708, AGI, México 661, fs 123v-125r.

therefore found him guilty of disloyalty to the king and prejudicial to the peace and tranquility of New Spain. In the end, they ordered him transported back to Spain.¹²⁰

Resolutions to the Cases

By the end of 1708, the Sala del Crimen ordered a total of five men to be transported in chains to the jail of the Casa de la Contratación in Seville to await final judgment by the Council of the Indies. Three of the condemned died during the two year wait: Manuel de Sousa y Prado and Gregorio Gasco in the royal jail in Mexico City and Joaquín Puyol at the fortress of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz.¹²¹ Andrés de Pez transported Salvador José Mañer and Pedro Collazos (the only survivors) along with the treasonous smuggler Francisco Eusebio Soler on the silver fleet of 1710 under escort by the French navy. Pedro Collazos, Alberto de Rada and Juan Bautista Bel also traveled with them. Mañer was turned over to the Casa de la Contratación in June 1710 while Collazos remained on probation at the disposal of the Council of the Indies.¹²² Once in Spain, Rada sought compensation for losing the *alcaldía mayor* of Tepeaca. Despite absolution from *infamia*, Rada ended up without any post. After receiving news of the trial, Felipe V offered to reimburse him the 3,500 pesos originally paid for the office. When the crown still failed to repay him a year later, Rada demanded his money or a comparable post to compensate his loss and restore his honor. Felipe V then appeared to acquiesce to the *alcaldía* of Verapaz in the

¹²⁰ “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer,” Mexico City, 23 June 1708, AGI, México 661, fs. 140r.

¹²¹ “Testimonio de la causa contra Manuel de Sousa,” Mexico City, AGI Escribanía 262C, fs. 263v-289v; “Testimonio de la causa contra Pedro Collazo,” Mexico City, Escribanía 262C, fs. 271r-277r.

¹²² “Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer,” Seville, 1 July 1710, AGI, México 661, f. 145r.

highlands of Chiapas, but then secretly wrote to the Duke of Linares, the new viceroy of New Spain, for information about Rada's guilt. The Council of the Indies suggested that Rada deserved the post given the verdict of the trial, but in the end the king returned his money and excluded him from royal service for the time being. Long after the war, Rada finally acquired the post of *alcalde mayor* of Amilpas in 1732.¹²³

Rada, Collazos, and Mañer continued to exhibit anti-Bourbon sentiments while in Spain. The three men had become friends during their thirteen-month incarceration in Mexico City. Once in Cadiz, Mañer and Collazos moved into the home of Bel's brother-in-law. Collazos visited Mañer daily at the prison of the Casa de la Contratación. It was there that Collazos presented Mañer with seditious propaganda and worked with him developing new treatises about Habsburg rights to the Spanish throne.¹²⁴ After three months in Seville, the Council of the Indies sentenced Mañer to a year of hard labor in the presidio of Ceuta and perpetual banishment from Spanish America. The royal prosecutor noted the situation in Mexico could have been worse if not for the loyalty of the vassals there and the diligence of the viceroy. Before the sentence could be served, Mañer escaped from the Casa de la Contratación only to be caught and jailed in Cordoba. In Andalusia, authorities discovered evidence of Mañer's activities with Collazos. The Council of

¹²³ "Título de alcalde mayor de Guacitla, por otro nombre las Amilpas, en el reino de Nueva España, para don Alberto de Rada y Oreña, residente en estos reinos," Cadiz, 10 July 1732, AGI, Contratación 5480, No. 1, R. 23.

¹²⁴ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Cordoba, 13-15 November 1713, AGI, México 661, f. 219r-224r. Pedro Collazo gave Mañer a variety of pamphlets that included the following: *Mojiganga de mojangas*, *De Lucifer en Audiencia*, a work on the siege of Turin, *Ley de que se escribió en Ginebra pen--- que corría entre católicos*, *Católico español* by a Valencian priest, *Voces que el señor Carlos Segundo daba a los españoles desde el panteón del Escorial*, and *Prontuario para saber en breve los claros y justísimos derechos que a la corona de España tiene Nuestro Católico Monarca el Señor Don Felipe Quinto, que Dios guarde*.

the Indies issued a warrant for Collazo's arrest, however he had already escaped to the Canary Islands with his papers. His brother-in-law testified Collazos favored the Archduke and should have been hanged.¹²⁵

In December 1712, Mañer escaped from Cordoba, this time with another prisoner, but was caught and brought back to jail again in January 1713. The royal prosecutor of the Council of the Indies now asked for an even harsher punishment out of fear that Mañer might return to the Americas or cause problems in Spain. As the *corregidor* of Cordoba put it, "the spirit of [Mañer] is capable of disrupting the peace of the entire universe." The case lingered until May 1714, when the council found him guilty of writing seditious pamphlets, having contact with Capocelato, and attempting to flee to enemy Portugal.¹²⁶ He would eventually be sent to the presidio of the Peñón de la Gomera for six years. Despite his hardships, Mañer survived the ordeal and actually developed a career as writer in Spain after the war.¹²⁷

Conclusion

Elites in the colonial centers of power conveyed mixed reactions to Bourbon succession and the subsequent French influence over the political and economic

¹²⁵ AGI México 405; AGI México 337. Collazos also told the brother-in-law that he bought the post of secretary of the Inquisition in Mexico City, which would earn him 3,000 pesos yearly. The Council of the Indies could not verify the claim.

¹²⁶ "Testimonio de los autos hechos contra don Salvador José Mañer," Seville, 15 May 1714, AGI, México 661, fs. 237r-237v.

¹²⁷ Nicolás María de Cambiaso y Verdes, *Diccionario de personas célebres de Cádiz*, volume I (Madrid: D. León Amarita, 1829), pp. 193-198. After imprisonment in North Africa, Salvador José Mañer (1676-1751) returned to Spain and continued to write under his own name and the pseudonym "Monsieur Le Margne." In 1729, he published *Anti-teatro critico sobre el primero y segundo tomo del Teatro critico universal*, a critique of the famous Spanish philosopher Fray Benito Jerónimo Feijóo. He also acquired the patronage of the Spanish minister of state José Patiño, to whom he dedicated his work *Sistem politico de Europe*. He founded the gazette *Mercurio histórico y político* in Madrid in 1738. He eventually took up residence at the monastery of San Pablo de la Breña in Montellano (Seville), where he died in 1751.

administration of the viceroyalties. Ministers of state at the courts of Madrid and Versailles worried most about the loyalties of viceroys and royal judges, who they relied on to orchestrate the departure of the silver fleets that essentially repaid the crown's war debts. The political protection and financial gains of the Union of the Two Crowns ensured royal officials such as the Duke of Albuquerque would champion the interests of the new dynasty even in times of crisis. However, Mexican merchants and intellectuals proved the first to waver in terms of their loyalties to the Bourbons. In contrast to the Caribbean Basin, disloyalty in Mexico City manifested itself in the form of sedition rather than conspiracy with Anglo-Dutch forces. Seditious speech and writings in Mexico warranted harsh responses from royal officials who remained on edge throughout the succession crisis. Recorded cases of anti-Bourbon sedition and Francophobia serve as important indicators of the merchant community's criticism of the new regime and the attempts of the Spanish state to police the sentiments of its elites.

CHAPTER 4

THE PACIFIC RIM

...the crime of lèse-majesté [is] so worthy of punishment, by the fastest means possible, on account of the inevitable dangers that could result, particularly from any delay, in these remotest parts of the empire.

Fray Francisco de la Cuesta to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi,
governor of the Philippines, 1712¹

In August 1712, Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, archbishop of Manila, issued what appeared to be a zealous response to a recent royal decree regarding his duty to combat crimes of treason against the Bourbon dynasty. Written in the wake of intensified military and propaganda campaigns by the Habsburgs' allies, the 1711 decree warned Archbishop Cuesta to be vigilant against the spread of unfavorable books, gazettes, and news meant to shift or disturb the loyalty of Felipe V's subjects in the Philippines—as had occurred in other parts of the Spanish empire.² The decree emphasized the caution he should apply in monitoring his archdiocese and the expectation that he should efficiently punish “all ecclesiastics who in any manner waver in their obligations of fidelity and respect that they owe to [the king's] sovereign authority and rule.”³ While the archbishop assured Felipe V that no subject under his obedience would be capable of committing a crime of sedition or disloyalty,

¹ Fray Francisco de la Cuesta to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Manila, 28 April 1712, AGI, Filipinas 168, No., fs. 107r-107v.

² Joaquim Albareda Salvadó, *La Guerra de Sucesión de España (1700-1714)* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 2010), 360-362.

³ “Copia de Real Cédula de Su Majestad...en que se encarga el vigilante cuidado que debe tener el señor arzobispo de Manila en atajar en sus súbditos la desafección y difidencia que han intentado los enemigos introducir contra la Real Persona de Nuestro Rey y Señor (que Dios guarde),” Corella, 20 July 1711, AGI Filipinas 290, No. 49, pieza 3a, fs. 1r-3r.

he vowed nonetheless out of his own love, faith, and loyalty to fully execute the crown's orders in case such a situation should arise.⁴

Archbishop Cuesta's response was rather ironic, given that over the course of the preceding year he had taken repeated measures to interfere in the prosecution of six Augustinian Recollects in Manila accused of *lèse-majesté* and disseminating unfavorable news about the Bourbon government. Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, governor of the Philippines, and the *oidores* (royal judges) of the Audiencia of Manila ardently pursued the case against these Recollects. Throughout the process, the governor and the archbishop disagreed sharply over how to prosecute and sentence these crimes in order to remedy the resulting public scandal. Yet in the end, the archbishop prevailed in protecting the denounced clergy, and their crimes of sedition went relatively unpunished.

The case of the seditious Recollects reveals several critical points about the War of the Spanish Succession. The fact that the political turmoil surrounding Bourbon succession spread to the Philippines—the remotest corner of the Spanish empire—significantly broadens our understanding of the war as global in scope. Hence, these cases in part bring to light the war's widest geographical scale that extended not only across the Atlantic, but also across the Pacific Rim. What these cases reveal most are the problems posed by such a distance, namely the potential inability of the crown and its legal representatives to properly defend the interests of the new dynasty and administer justice against its detractors in extreme peripheries of

⁴ Fray Francisco de la Cuesta to Felipe V, Manila, 3 July 1713, AGI Filipinas 290, No. 49, pieza 1a, f. 1r; Felipe V to Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, Aranjuez, 20 June 1715, AGI Filipinas 333, Libro 12, f. 151r. The king received Archbishop Cuesta's response three years later in June 1715—in the midst the final recovery of Mallorca and Ibiza from pro-Habsburg rebels.

empire. The story of the mission also provides examples of the some of the challenges faced by ecclesiastics in the Spanish empire as a result of the War of the Spanish Succession.

The Wartime Difficulties of the Recollect Mission

A number of hardships plagued the Recollect mission of 1710, contributing to the hostilities of some its members towards the Bourbon dynasty and other more internal tensions. Fray José de Santa Gertrudis, the head of the seditious “Aragonese” faction, served as the mission’s *comisario* and, as such, dealt with most of its political and economic problems. The son of a Catalan cloth merchant, Santa Gertrudis joined the Recollect province of the Philippines as part of the mission of 1683 and held a number of administrative positions in Cebu, Manila, and Mexico City.⁵ Between 1690-1708, he controlled most of the province’s finances and was instrumental in the acquisition of three shops in Manila for the Recollects. In 1695, the order transferred him to Mexico City as president of the hospice of San Nicolás de Tolentino, a residence for Recollect missionaries in transit to the Philippines.⁶ As part of running the hospice, Santa Gertrudis managed two of the Recollects’ most important investments: the hacienda of San José de Burras and in the Rayas silver mine in

⁵ Fray José de Santa Gertrudis (d. 1715) was born José Atzet in Vilafranca de Penedès in Catalonia (kingdom of Aragon). He was professed into the Recollect Order in 1677 at the convent of Santa Mónica in Barcelona. His posts for the Filipino province included procurator general and president of the Hospice of San Nicolás de Tolentino in Mexico City. He also preached sermons—three of which were published—before such prominent figures such as the archbishop Juan Ortega y Montañés and the Duchess of Albuquerque, vicereine of New Spain.

⁶ Alfonso Martínez, “Hospicios de Nueva España para misioneros del Oriente,” *Estudios filosofía historia y letras* 6 (Fall 1986): 35-49. The hospice was later confiscated by the Mexican government and bequeathed to the insurgent Vicente Guerrero in reward for his services in securing independence.

Guanajuato. Santa Gertrudis's regional loyalties are first apparent in this period, as he offered shares in the mine to the superiors of his home province in Aragon.⁷

Santa Gertrudis witnessed firsthand the ways in which Bourbon succession placed the Filipino province's financial and ministerial survival at risk. As one of several measures aimed at curbing the flow of silver across the Pacific, Felipe V issued a royal decree in 1705 that forced the Recollects to relinquish their shares in the Rayas mine—by then the province's principal source of revenue.⁸ Likewise, the crown ordered Santa Gertrudis to close the chapel of the Recollect hospice to the public and refrain from collecting alms in New Spain for the *doctrinas* in the Philippines. The economic blow to the province could not have occurred at a more critical time for the Recollects. After almost two decades without additional friars, the Filipino province desperately needed to fund a new mission. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, death and old age reduced the community to thirty-two clerics who struggled to administer congregations throughout the islands of Luzon, Romblon, Masbate, Panay, Cebu, and Mindanao.⁹ A year before the decree, the order had already begun organizing what would become the mission of 1710 to meet the urgent needs of the province; Fray José de San Nicolás, the provincial superior in Manila, appointed Santa Gertrudis as its comisario. Referred to as the *misión grande*, the Recollects planned for a group double the size (and cost) of a standard mission.¹⁰

⁷ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 223v-224r.

⁸ "A los virreyes del Perú y Nueva España y a los arzobispos y obispos de ambos reinos, encargándoles la puntual observancia y cumplimiento de la ley 4, libro 1^o, título 11, que prohíbe que los religiosos y clérigos pueden beneficiar minas," Madrid, 7 March 1705, AGI Indiferente General 538, Libro 45, f. 287.

⁹ P. 65-66. Over those two decades, seventy friars had died.

¹⁰ Fray José de Santa Gertrudis to the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 26 April 1709, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 57, pieza 2a. The Recollects had planned a new mission in 1699, however for unknown reasons it was disbanded by its comisario before it could leave Spain.

The task of recruiting missionaries, outfitting them with liturgical items, clothing, and books, and transporting them across two oceans was both complicated and expensive. The War of the Spanish Succession ultimately made the process even more difficult for Santa Gertrudis. As part of the *patronato real*, the Spanish crown needed to approve the mission before its members could depart for the Philippines. However, the political turmoil of the war kept Felipe V from granting permission to the Recollects' three initial requests between 1704-1706. Nearly a third of friars on the provisional list of recruits were natives of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia in the crown of Aragon—a dominion in open revolt against the Bourbons and occupied by enemy troops. For this reason, the ministers of the Council of the Indies questioned the loyalty of the friars and advised the king against the mission.¹¹ The recent failure of Bourbon military campaigns in Catalonia and Aragon added the fear that the Recollect missionaries might spread unfavorable news and incite an uprising in the Philippines at a time when the dynasty appeared to be losing the war.¹²

The crown's uncertainty about the loyalty of the Recollects missionaries can be related to another contemporaneous incident: the arrest of Fray Juan Bautista Sicardo, the Augustinian bishop-elect of Buenos Aires. Sicardo remained in Madrid during the Allied occupation of 1706 and preached at a mass for the Archduke on the feast of Saint James. He also participated in a public gathering on the steps of the convent of San Felipe el Real, a popular *mentidero* or meeting place for newsmongers

¹¹ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 288r-288v. These first petitions were sent to Madrid between 1704-1706 and provide an account of the province's destitution. They also included approbations from Domingo Zabálburu de Echevarri, the governor of the Philippines at the time.

¹² The fiscal of the Council of the Indies to Felipe V, Madrid, 12 August 1709, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 57, pieza 3a, fs. 1r-2v.

in the Puerta del Sol. During the event, witnesses observed priests deliver sermons comparing the Archduke to Christ the Redeemer and interpret religious miracles as divine support of Habsburg succession. After prosecution by the Council of the Indies, Felipe V stripped Sicardo of his bishopric and imprisoned him in the convent of San Pablo de los Montes near Toledo.¹³ The Sicardo affair forced the Council of the Indies to consider the real danger that could result from disloyal clerics assuming positions of prominence in Spanish America. The prospect even raised concerns among Louis XIV's ministers, who monitored the affair closely. The process of nominating a new bishop of Buenos Aires raised concerns that the crown needed to carefully assess the loyalty of clergy before allowing them to serve to the viceroalties of New Spain and Peru.¹⁴

The rebuff of the petitions eventually motivated Fray José de Santa Gertrudis to leave Mexico City for Madrid to appeal to the crown in person for the sake of the mission.¹⁵ Santa Gertrudis carried with him the finest jewels from the hospice of San Nicolás, which he pawned along the way in order to pay for the costly trip. He departed Veracruz on May 1708 on the Mexican silver fleet, which was detoured by Admiral Jean-Baptiste du Casse to the port of Pasajes (near San Sebastian) to avoid

¹³ Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to the marquis de Torcy, Campo de Cienpozuelos, 31 August 1706, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, No. 160, fs. 291r-293v. Fray Juan Bautista Sicardo (1637-1717) was the prior of the Augustinian convents of Salamanca, Segovia, and Burgos. He traveled to Mexico City in 1667 and, upon his return to Spain, taught theology at various universities. Felipe V appointed him bishop of Buenos Aires in April 1704. Sicardo eventually escaped imprisonment during the second Allied capture of Madrid in 1710, fleeing to Catalonia before he settled in Habsburg-controlled Naples. His two brothers were also supporters of the Archduke. Antonio Sicardo, *alguacil* of Madrid, who dressed his horse with a ruby-studded bridle for the Archduke's proclamation as king, was imprisoned for disloyalty in 1706. Fray José Sicardo, Archbishop of Sassari, took up residence at the Archduke's court in Barcelona after the Habsburg capture of Sardinia.

¹⁴ Fray Pablo Pastells, *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Perú, Bolivia y Brasil) según los documentos originales del Archivo General de Indias*, vol. 5 (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1933), 153; 161-162.

¹⁵ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 288r-288v.

the Anglo-Dutch fleet off Cadiz.¹⁶ Coincidentally, Santa Gertrudis embarked in the company of three prisoners from Venezuela—José Ruiz Carvallo, Pedro Rodríguez Madeira, and Vital Teixeira—previously detained in the fort of San Juan de Ulúa in Veracruz for circulating the Archduke’s decrees and spying for the Dutch West-Indische Compagnie.¹⁷

From August 1708 until October 1709, Santa Gertrudis worked at reorganizing the mission in Castile and readdressing the crown through petitions and memorials. By then, the Bourbon victory at Almansa and the recapture of Valencia and part of Aragon momentarily shifted the political climate in Madrid and counterbalanced anxieties about rebellious friars and the spread of bad news. During this time, Santa Gertrudis made extensive visits to the Recollect colleges in Salamanca, Alcalá de Henares, and Madrid in search of new friars, yet the revised list of fifty-eight recruits still included eight members of reported Aragonese origin. Santa Gertrudis took the risk knowing that Felipe V had recently approved a Jesuit mission destined for the reductions of Paraguay and Tucumán with a *comisario* and four friars from Aragon.¹⁸ The inclusion of the eight Aragonese friars in the Recollect mission must have been important to Santa Gertrudis, as he was willing to spend 222 pesos on gifts to help “alleviate the difficulties” with the ministers of the Council of the Indies. Felipe V and the Council of the Indies finally agreed to reconsider Santa

¹⁶ The Mexican silver fleet left Veracruz on May 10, 1708 and stopped in Havana until July 5 before arriving in Pasajes near San Sebastián at the end of August. The Peruvian silver fleet was less fortunate, as English naval vessels sank it off Cartagena de Indias a few weeks earlier.

¹⁷ The cases against them are found in AGI Escribanía 665A and AGI México 478. They possessed the king of Portugal’s declaration of war and the decree issued by the Archduke offering amnesty to anyone who took up arms in the name of the Habsburgs. They corresponded with other spies and former Portuguese Asiento functionaries in Curaçao.

¹⁸ “Expediente de información y licencia de pasajero a Indias de Francisco Burgués, jesuita, sacerdote, superior de la misión, natural de Zaragoza, a Paraguay y Tucumán,” 14 February 1710, AGI, Contratación 5466, No. 1, R. 105.

Gertrudis's appeals but insisted that each of the recruits undergo a precautionary investigation to assure their "fidelity, zeal, and love for the service of the king."¹⁹ The inquiries, which cost the province 457 pesos in legal fees, focused primarily on the eight Aragonese friars and produced no evidence linking any of the missionaries to previous crimes of disloyalty.²⁰

The friars began the long and expensive journey from Madrid to Manila after Felipe V granted his official approval and patronage of the mission in January 1710. The king's donation of 26,000 pesos covered less than half their expenses and could only be collected from the Real Hacienda after their arrival in Veracruz. Santa Gertrudis had to collect alms and transport European merchandise to sell in the Philippines in order to offset the remaining expenses.²¹ Beginning in February, the friars traveled in small groups to the convent of Nuestra Señora del Pópulo in Seville for their licenses from the Casa de la Contratación. Apart from the processing fee, Santa Gertrudis spent 135 pesos to bribe the judge. In April, they proceeded by barge down the Guadalquivir River to Cadiz and lodged at the home of José Domingo Colarte y Lila, a prominent Indies merchant, while they awaited transport across the Atlantic on the fleet of General Manuel López Pintado. The fleet, which also transported a precious cargo of mercury for the mines of New Spain, anchored in San Juan de Puerto Rico for thirteen days before reaching Veracruz, where Santa

¹⁹ Fray José de Santa Gertrudis to the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 26 April 1709, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 57, pieza 2a; Memorandum of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 12 August 1709, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 57, pieza 3a, fs. 1r-2v.

²⁰ Memorandum of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 24 October 1709, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 57, pieza 5a, f. 1r. These included Fray Pedro de la Purificación, Fray Francisco de la Asunción, Fray Jerónimo de San Miguel, Fray Miguel de Santa Teresa, Fray José de San Antonio, Fray Ignacio de San Bernardo, Fray Gabriel de San Antonio, and Fray José de Nuestra Señora del Niño Perdido.

²¹ Pedro Fabo del Corazón de María, *Historia General de la Orden de Agustinos Recoletos*, vol. VI (second part) (Barcelona: Editorial Librería Religiosa, 1927), pp. 305-307.

Gertrudis received the king's donation from the Real Hacienda after paying the *oficial mayor* a bribe of 180 pesos. By July, the friars continued by mule train to Mexico City for a seven-month stay at the hospice of San Nicolás de Tolentino. In March 1711, they descended to Acapulco and boarded the Manila galleon *Nuestra Señora del Rosario* carrying arms and Mexican silver to the Philippines. Arriving in Manila in June, the large group was divided between the convents of San Sebastián and San Nicolás de Tolentino as Santa Gertrudis determined their assignments to the outlying congregations.²²

Allegations of Sedition Among the Recollects

Once in the Philippines, the much-anticipated mission of 1710 only continued to cause problems for the Recollect province. Accusations of disloyalty among the Aragonese faction occurred within two months of the mission's arrival in Manila. Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, governor of the Philippines, received an initial written denunciation against Fray José de Santa Gertrudis on the afternoon of August 4, 1711. In the denunciation, Fray Francisco de Jesús María, Fray Francisco de la Natividad, Fray Felipe de Santa Ana, and the chorister Fray Diego de San Nicolás of the convent of San Nicolás de Tolentino wrote that Santa Gertrudis had the mission "very roused up and full of rebellion and discord" due to his impassioned lack of respect and fidelity towards Felipe V. They alleged Santa Gertrudis expressed opinions of doubt regarding the legality of Bourbon sovereignty "with other words spewed out to dishearten the loyal and arouse their affection for the Archduke." They further

²² Fray José de Santa Gertrudis to Fray José de San Nicolás, aboard the *Nuestra Señora del Rosario*, 13 June 1711, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 319r-326v.

criticized Santa Gertrudis for allowing others in the mission to express similar pro-Habsburg sentiments, such as the Aragonese friar Fray Pedro de la Purificación, who had the audacity to profess his affection for the Archduke publically in front of the other missionaries. The authors of the denunciation noted the danger that such sentiments could affect the opinions of others.²³

Given the gravity of the accusations, Urzúa immediately convened the *audiencia* judges in the governor's palace that afternoon, and together they approved orders to secure both Fray José de Santa Gertrudis and Fray Pedro de la Purificación with all secrecy.²⁴ By the evening, the governor sent the most senior judge and a group of soldiers to inform Archbishop Fray Francisco de la Cuesta of the affair and arrange for the arrests. By the early hours of August 5, Santa Gertrudis and Purificación were taken into custody and sequestered in the convent of San Pablo. They were denied communication with one another and prohibited from administering sacraments.²⁵

Over the following days, Urzúa and the officials of the *audiencia* received oral testimonies from the authors of the denunciation and seven additional members of the mission who observed the scandalous behavior of Fray José de Santa Gertrudis and Fray Pedro de la Purificación. The witnesses' first sign of suspicion against Santa Gertrudis was the fact that he had concealed his Catalan origins from the Council of the Indies and Casa de la Contratación by claiming to be a native of Borja—one of

²³ "Copia de los autos remitidos por el superior gobierno a Su Señoría Ilustrísima el Ilustrísimo Señor Arzobispo sobre puntos de deslealtad de algunos religiosos de los Agustinos descalzos de esta provincia de Filipinas," Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 1r-2v.

²⁴ At the time, the Real Acuerdo consisted of the governor Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi and the four Audiencia judges: José de Torralba, Gregorio de Villa, Bartolomé Patricio Delgado, and Agustín Miguel de Barrientos y Ribera. By the end of the trial, only Torralba and Villa remained in the Audiencia (Delgado died and Barrientos's position was suspended in light of criminal suit against him).

²⁵ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 3r-7r; 37r-38r.

the few cities in Aragon to remain loyal to the Bourbons—in order to pass the crown’s precautionary investigation.²⁶ The official register of licenses from the Casa de la Contratación does in fact support this claim, stating that Santa Gertrudis was born in Borja, when he was actually from Vilafranca del Penedès in Catalonia.²⁷ Apart from hearing their seditious statements firsthand, a few of the witnesses also claimed to have been told by three people outside of the mission—one in Spain and two in Mexico—that Santa Gertrudis and Purificación were known *archiquistas* (partisans of the Archduke).²⁸

The most common allegation against Santa Gertrudis regarded him speaking unfavorably about Bourbon succession throughout the journey from Spain to the Philippines. One missionary said from the time they met in Salamanca, Santa Gertrudis always spoke with “melancholic voice” whenever discussing Felipe V’s government.²⁹ When Fray Blas de la Madre de Dios met Santa Gertrudis in Alcalá de

²⁶ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 20v; 28v; Pascual Madoz Ibáñez, *Diccionario geográfico-estadístico-histórico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar*, vol. IV (Madrid: Establecimiento literario-tipográfico de P. Madoz y L. Sagasti, 1846), 410. The citizens of Borja gained renown for their loyalty to the Bourbons after they resisted the Archduke’s army during the campaigns of 1706. In 1708, Felipe V granted the city special privileges and the motto “Saqueado por ser siempre fidelísima” (“Sacked for being always ever faithful”) in recognition of such heroism. Apart from Santa Gertrudis, two other members of the mission claimed to be natives of Borja.

²⁷ “Misión de los 58 religiosos del Orden Descalzo de San Agustín que pasa a Filipinas a expensas de la Real Hacienda,” Seville, 4 February 1710, AGI Contratación 5465, No. 2, registro 42, f. 2v; Fabo, *Historia General de la Orden de Agustinos Recoletos*, pp. 429-432. Fabo noted this discrepancy in his history of the Augustinian Recollects covering the years 1706-1714. After consulting parish records from Borja and Vilafranca del Penedès, he confirmed that Santa Gertrudis was born in Catalonia, not Aragon. Unaware of the trials, Fabo attributed this “error” in the register to the carelessness of the royal officials in Seville.

²⁸ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 18v-19r; 21v; 23v-24r; 33v. The theologian Fray Juan de Santiago, who encountered Santa Gertrudis “from the mission to Asia” during the celebrations for the *jura* of the Prince of Asturias, told two witnesses in Alcalá de Henares that the comisario was the greatest “Archiquista” he had ever met. Juan de Rojas, who lived near the hospice of San Nicolás de Tolentino in Mexico City, told another witness that Santa Gertrudis was abhorred throughout the neighborhood as an “Archiquista.” Purificación upset Francisco Paredes, *oficial mayor* in the Mexico City cabildo, by criticizing Felipe V’s government and the sale of venal offices in his home.

²⁹ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 27v.

Henares, he heard the *comisario* tell the recently expelled papal nuncio that if the inhabitants of the Spanish Indies knew about the Bourbon dynasty's breach with Rome, they would no longer recognize Felipe V as king.³⁰ While Santa Gertrudis solicited approval for the mission in Madrid, he professed to the Recollect procurator general and Fray Pedro de Santo Tomás, preacher to the king, that the members of the House of Austria were the only true claimants to the throne.³¹ At the convent of Nuestra Señora del Pópulo in Seville, Santa Gertrudis toasted to the Archduke's health in his cell and complained about the rampant sale of ecclesiastical and secular offices under the Bourbons.³² In San Juan de Puerto Rico, after learning about the bankruptcy of a Havana merchant at the hands of a French corsair, Santa Gertrudis grew into a rage and argued in front of the greater part of the mission that the Archduke deserved the Spanish crown based on "different reasons of marriage" and the defection of so many of Felipe V's ministers from the royal bureaucracy.³³ In Mexico City, when the pharmacist of the Recollect hospice asked Santa Gertrudis for news from Spain, he responded dishearteningly that "all was lost" on account of the intrusiveness of the French crown in Spanish political affairs.³⁴ On another occasion in Mexico, he spoke with contempt about Felipe V's meager donation to the mission and again bemoaned the rampant sale of offices under the Bourbons, saying "...the

³⁰ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 33r; David Martín Marcos, *El papado y la Guerra de Sucesión española* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2011), 193-199. Between February and April 1709, Felipe V formally severed relations with Pope Clement XI in response to the papacy's recognition of the Archduke as king of Spain. As a result, the crown closed the tribunal of the nunciature and expelled the papal nuncio Antonfelice Zondadari from the Spanish court. The king also prohibited all communication between Spanish clergy and the Vatican.

³¹ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 30r. Fray Pedro de Santo Tomás was so horrified by Santa Gertrudis's fervor that he asked to be left alone. The witness found the conversation with the Recollect procurer general to Rome particularly troubling since "...even though there were other friars present, [Santa Gertrudis] paid no attention to them."

³² "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 18v; 30r.

³³ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 10v.

³⁴ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 11r-11v.

government of Spain was lost because everything was being given away for money.”³⁵

Santa Gertrudis’s alleged comments resounded not only Francophobia and political critiques of the monarchy, but also rumor and gossip. Once during dinner in Cadiz, Santa Gertrudis referred to Felipe V irreverently as a simpleton (*un simple bobo*) dominated by Queen María Luisa, who ridiculed him in public by slapping his gaping mouth with her fan.³⁶ On other occasions, Santa Gertrudis remarked that the Prince of Asturias was being raised improperly since the royal family barred his contact with anyone Spanish at the palace, only allowing him to speak French and consort with Louis XIV’s envoys and courtiers.³⁷ Purificación spread rumors as well that Felipe V mispronounced the oath to protect Aragon’s foral privileges while the Archduke pronounced it properly.³⁸ Conversely, Santa Gertrudis derided popular stories favorable to the king. He spoke with disapproval about tales of Felipe V’s participation in the military campaigns of the war and laughed heartily that the “insane” masses would believe the king ate atop a drum on the battlefield. He also mocked the story circulating in a celebrated pamphlet about the statue of the Virgin of Sopetrán miraculously predicting Bourbon victory in the war.³⁹

³⁵ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 28v; 32r.

³⁶ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 18v; 25v-26r.

³⁷ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 16v; 18v; 32r.

³⁸ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 23r-23v. The rumor was that Felipe V, with his French accent, mispronounced the phrase “sí, juro” (“I swear”) as “sí, churro,” thereby rendering the oath illegitimate.

³⁹ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 27v-28r; *Oración que el Rey nuestro Señor Don Felipe Quinto, que Dios guarde, hizo...a la gran reina de ángeles y hombres María Santísima Nuestra Señora de Sopetrán* (Madrid: 1706). Felipe V sought refuge in the shrine of the Virgin of Sopetrán in June 1706 during the Allied capture of Madrid. According to legend, while kneeling in prayer, he placed his crown at the statue’s feet and asked for her intercession in defeating the Archduke’s army. When the prayer was over, the virgin stretched out her hand and dropped a prognostic at the king’s knees that assured the monarchy to the Bourbons.

Santa Gertrudis further manifested disloyal behavior during public ceremonies and festivals in Mexico City. The missionaries testified that Santa Gertrudis caused much scandal by apparently refusing to pray for the king's health as expected during their Saturday masses for Our Lady of Consolation at the Recollect hospice. The first time this occurred, Fray Blas de la Madre de Dios stood up and exclaimed, "why do you not mention His Majesty's name?," before storming out of the choir. When Santa Gertrudis failed to name the king again, Fray Blas de la Madre de Dios stood up once more and interrupted the *comisario* by defiantly chanting in Latin "el regem nostrus Philipum." It took the objections of the Castilian fathers to oblige Santa Gertrudis to mention Felipe V in the future.⁴⁰ Later, during the evening celebrations for the *jura* of the Prince of Asturias, Santa Gertrudis "made a sour face" and refused to spend any of the mission's money on purchasing firecrackers. He also attempted to hinder the tolling of the bells in the hospice by locking the door to the bell tower. The Castilian friars defied both of these actions by breaking down the door to ring the bells and by collecting a few *reales* to buy a rocket.⁴¹

The witnesses implicated others in Santa Gertrudis's offenses, accusing him of harboring Habsburg sympathizers and even war fugitives within the mission.⁴² They singled out four as being the most dangerous: Fray Francisco de Santa Engracia,

⁴⁰ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 10v-11r; 17r; 19r; 24v-25r; 28r-28v; 30v; 36r.

⁴¹ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 24v

⁴² "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 24r; 34v. Among those named was the Valencian friar Fray José de Santo Tomás, said to be "pursued by the king's soldiers," who abandoned the mission in Cadiz on account of illness. The Aragonese Fray Miguel de Santa Teresa, another alleged criminal, died in Mexico City in the winter of 1710. Two other rumored fugitives from Aragon, Fray Ignacio de San Bernardo and Fray Francisco de la Asunción, arrived in the Philippines and testified in the disloyalty trials but were never incarcerated nor prosecuted.

Fray José de la Concepción, Fray Félix de Santiago, and Fray José de San Agustín.⁴³ These four clerics from the Aragonese faction fail to appear in notarized archival records listing Santa Gertrudis, Purificación, and the rest of the friars approved by the crown, which corroborates one witness's claim that several Aragonese missionaries traveled to the Philippines without official licenses.⁴⁴ Two of the witnesses heard Fray Francisco de Santa Engracia and Fray José de la Concepción sing *coplillas* praising the Archduke and satirizing Felipe V on several occasions, such as on the voyage from Seville to Cadiz.⁴⁵ Concepción also read aloud the phrase "Long live Carlos III, king of the whole world" and the verses to the anti-Bourbon *coplillas* in front of three witnesses in Mexico City. These passages were part of the introduction to a religious treatise, which he removed after the witnesses threatened to report him if he did not tear the incriminating pages from the manuscript.⁴⁶ Fray Félix de Santiago revealed to others during their stop in Puerto Rico that he had served as chaplain in one of the Archduke's regiments, recounting for his own amusement an anecdote about a Valencian colonel whose horse would trample violently at the mention of Felipe V's name. As Santa Gertrudis's *vice-comisario*, he also refused to pray for the king's health at the Recollect hospice.⁴⁷

The tensions between the Castilian friars (the accusers) and the Aragonese friars (the accused) were largely piqued by a common pastime among the

⁴³ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 11v; 17v.

⁴⁴ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 32v.

⁴⁵ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 22r; 113r. The *coplillas* apparently shocked the muleteers from Seville who guided the party.

⁴⁶ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 35r; 106v-113r. The witnesses, who shared a cell with Concepción, claimed he personally read these sections aloud and pointed them out "with particular care." Having "no proper opportunity to do anything about it," the scandalized friars reprimanded him "with brotherly love." They believed Concepción had shown them him these pages because he "wanted to have more confidence" in them.

⁴⁷ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 11v; 20r; 35r-36v.

missionaries: discussions about the war and the Spanish monarchy.⁴⁸ Santa Gertrudis participated in at least one of these discussions on the voyage of the mercury fleet, however Fray Félix de Santiago and Fray Pedro de la Purificación proved to be the most active defenders of the Habsburg cause. The most heated discussion occurred in April 1710 at the home of the Indies merchant Colarte in Cadiz. As the debate over the legitimacy of Felipe V's rule intensified, Fray Blas de la Madre de Dios intervened and warned the participants not to talk about such things, pointing out that Felipe V deserved veneration as patron of the mission. Purificación, the most contentious of the group, responded angrily that only the Archduke would reign as king in his heart and threatened to defend the Archduke's honor with his fists. When the Castilians still continued to argue in favor of Felipe V, Purificación assaulted Madre de Dios and two others before being held back by his Aragonese compatriots. The witnesses to the incident criticized Santa Gertrudis for not punishing Purificación's violent actions "as was his obligation," and they suggested the *comisario*'s inaction was yet another sign that the two men were of the same political opinions.⁴⁹ After the incident, Purificación persisted in arguing with the Castilians about Bourbon succession, mentioning later on the mercury fleet that Infanta María Teresa—Felipe V's grandmother—had renounced the claims of her descendants to

⁴⁸ "Copia de los autos...", Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 23v. At least one Aragonese father refused to participate in these debates: Fray Ignacio de San Bernardo. For this reason, his *paisanos* referred to him as a "botifler"—a Catalan pejorative term for Bourbon loyalists.

⁴⁹ "Copia de los autos...", Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 19v-20r; 23r; 31v-32r; 103r-105r. One witness stated that Purificación grew into a great rage "...saying the Archduke would reign in his heart—calling him 'Carlos III'—even though Felipe V reigned in the hearts of the Castilians friars, and that he would defend himself with his fists against anyone who spoke ill of the Archduke." Purificación was also quoted as saying "...I have had until now the patience to hear you speaking ill of the Archduke, but from now on I will have to defend him with my fists." The discussion was so raucous that it awoke another witness from his siesta. The owner of the lodgings, all of his servants, and nearly all of the mission witnessed the incident.

the Spanish throne. The debates continued to be a major problem after their arrival in Manila, at which point Santa Gertrudis issued a verbal order of obedience requiring the friars to refrain from discussing the affairs of Spain.⁵⁰

The eleven witnesses dealt with the situation in various ways before finally denouncing the sedition. Most of them claimed that they merely tried to distance themselves from Santa Gertrudis and the Aragonese friars whenever possible to avoid having to hear scandalous or seditious conversation.⁵¹ However, they and the other Castilian friars actually seem to have been quite aggressive about initiating confrontation with the Habsburg sympathizers through their debates. At one point, a Bourbon loyalist in the mission even admonished them for continuously agitating the *comisario* and the Aragonese fathers with talk of politics.⁵² A few wanted to abandon the mission in Cadiz and Mexico City but stated in the end they could not renege on their obligations to the crown and the Recollect order. Two of them wanted to seek the aide of the Duke of Alburquerque while in Mexico City but were afraid of jeopardizing the entire mission and the ministries of their companions.⁵³ Several feared punishment by Fray José de San Nicolás, the Recollect provincial in Manila, who was a close ally of Santa Gertrudis and threatened anyone who spoke ill of him. All of the witnesses maintained they were moved by service to God and the king—and no other cause—to provide their testimonies in the trial.⁵⁴ Yet it does seem in part

⁵⁰ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 16r-16v; 19v-20r. The witness suspected that Santa Gertrudis implemented the order to avoid problems with authorities in the Philippines.

⁵¹ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 11r; 26r; 30v; 32r.

⁵² “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 35v. They were rebuked by Fray Nicolás de Santa Bárbara, who made sure to add to his testimony that he would always defend Felipe V on account of his oath and the many benefices his family received from the Bourbons.

⁵³ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 17r; 226r-226v; 231v.

⁵⁴ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 25r; 27r; 29r; 31r; 32v.

that the four initial denouncers sought the invention of the governor after growing disillusioned with Santa Gertrudis's favoritism towards the Aragonese faction. Certainly, they were upset upon learning in Manila that Santa Gertrudis would not appoint them to prime leadership positions in the Filipino congregations despite their prestigious degrees from the universities of Salamanca and Alcalá de Henares. At the time of the denunciation, Santa Gertrudis was preparing four ships to disperse them to the outer lying missions while the Aragonese friars awaited preferential assignments in Luzon.⁵⁵

The accusations against the four additional friars prompted the governor to order their arrest and the confiscation of their belongings. Royal guards captured Fray Félix de Santiago and Fray José de San Agustín under the cover of nightfall at the convent of San Nicolás and transported them in the governor's coach to solitary confinement at the Franciscan convent of San Francisco.⁵⁶ In the process, they discovered that two of the friars—Fray José de la Concepción and Fray Francisco de Santa Engracia—had escaped four days earlier to Cavite with their papers.⁵⁷ They were later caught (without their papers) by the *castellano* of the port, who ensured that they did not leave the island.⁵⁸

The papers confiscated by the royal guards consisted of mostly business records such as licenses, duplicates of decrees from the crown, and ledgers.⁵⁹ Nonetheless, there were a few personal documents of note. Among those of Fray José de Santa Gertrudis was a letter to Fray José de San Nicolás complaining about the

⁵⁵ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 8v-12r; 51r-53v.

⁵⁶ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 86v-94r.

⁵⁷ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 82r-83v.

⁵⁸ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 83v-87r.

⁵⁹ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, f. 92v.

unrest within the mission caused by the friars' regular discussion about "the news of Spain."⁶⁰ In another letter, he wrote about assigning some of Castilian fathers—among them, his detractors before the *audiencia*—to distant posts and preventing their correspondence with the outside world. There were also letters from Fray Juan de San Andrés, his Aragonese secretary, regarding Santa Gertrudis's relationship with merchants in Mexico City and his role in offering a stake in the Rayas mine to the Aragonese province.⁶¹ Oddly enough, Fray José de la Concepción, who had destroyed the seditious passages from his theological treatise, left in his desk a thanksgiving sermon from 1668 commemorating Portuguese independence from Spain and the rebellions of Catalonia and Flanders.⁶²

The Concerns of the Governor and Audiencia of Manila

Urzúa and *audiencia* judges issued a sentence on October 17, 1711 against the Aragonese friars for "the lack of fidelity, disloyalty, and disaffection that they appear to show towards our Catholic Monarch, king, and natural lord Felipe V...blaspheming against His Majesty, resulting in disunion, unrest, and prejudicial scandalous disturbances." They exonerated Fray José de San Agustín due to lack of evidence. The other five friars received banishment to Spain on the next departing galleon to Acapulco. From there, the prisoners and copies of the proceedings were to be handed over to the Duke of Alburquerque in Mexico City and transported to Veracruz "with all security, assistance, and care." Once in Spain, the case was supposed to be deferred to the Council of the Indies for final judgment. The judges

⁶⁰ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 243r-245r.

⁶¹ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 223v-224r; 256r-270r.

⁶² "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 326v-393r.

expected the Recollect province to pay the expense of the trial and the voyage. They also expected Archbishop Cueva to execute the order.⁶³

In the sentence, the members of the *audiencia* expressed several larger concerns raised by the friars' disloyalty. Above all, they considered the crimes of sedition a threat to the public good and the preservation of the Spanish empire. To their dismay, the case had already caused public outrage in the Philippines. The Franciscan and Augustinian communities of Manila, who felt their convents had been disgraced by housing the Recollect prisoners, were among those most appalled by the affair. The governor feared that the scandal had the potential to inspire a revolt among Manila's diverse, non-Spanish population. This implied the *indios* or native Filipinos, who Urzúa considered ignorant and easily manipulated by the clergy, and the *sanglayes* or ethnic Chinese, who traditionally served as middlemen for English and Dutch merchants and had a history of rebellion.⁶⁴ Worst of all, it was thought that any support for the Habsburgs could aid an enemy invasion from English, Dutch, and Portuguese settlements in Asia.⁶⁵

The apprehensions of the Audiencia were not completely unfounded. The Eighty Years War (1568-1648) offered a precedent in terms of potential danger. Between 1610-1648, the governors of the Dutch Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) attempted several incursions on the Philippines from Batavia, which consequently incited revolts among the *sanglayes* of Manila and the Muslims

⁶³ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 137r-139v.

⁶⁴ AGI Filipinas 129. The governors of the Philippines viewed the *sanglayes* with added distrust during the War of the Spanish Succession and imposed harsher economic sanctions upon them.

⁶⁵ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 8a, fs. 137r-139v.

of Mindinao.⁶⁶ French spies in Amsterdam uncovered the VOC's similar plans to capture Manila and Lima in the name of the Archduke during the War of the Spanish Succession.⁶⁷ Royal officials in the Philippines remained on guard after receiving warnings from the Council of the Indies and a Dominican friar from the Tonkin mission, who gathered intelligence in Batavia en route to Manila.⁶⁸ They also knew from missionaries in China and Luzon that English East India Company officials in India devised a similar invasion, sending the factor Allen Cathpoole to fortify a garrison on the island of Poulo Condor within 150 leagues of Manila.⁶⁹ The outbreak of the First War of Javanese Succession, counterattacks by French corsairs, and the Malay massacre at Poulo Condor kept both plans from reaching fruition but did not dispel fears of an attack.⁷⁰

The presence of Anglo-Dutch privateers further raised paranoia about the security of Spain's Pacific dominions. They preyed mainly on the annual voyages of

⁶⁶ M.P.H. Roessingh, "Nederlandse betrekkingen met de Philippijnen," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 124 (3) (1968): 482–504; Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, eds., *The Philippine Islands, 1493–1898*, Vol. 35 (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark Company, 1906). The VOC failed in all of its attempts to conquer the Philippines. Admiral François de Wittet commanded the company's earliest assault on Manila at the First Battle of Playa Honda in 1610, followed after his death by subsequent battles in 1617 and 1624. Between 1646–1648, Admiral Maarten Gerritsz Vries and a fleet of eighteen VOC warships led another series of invasions on Luzon and Mindanao. Locally the victory over the Dutch was attributed to the statue of Our Lady of the Rosary (popularly known as "La Naval de Manila"), whose intercession in the Eighty Years War is still celebrated in the Philippines.

⁶⁷ Domingo López de Calo Mondragón to Manuel de Aperregui, Madrid, 6 May 1701, AGI Filipinas 193, No. 31, f. 1r.

⁶⁸ Domingo de Zabálburu y Echévarri to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 10 June 1706, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 5, 1a pieza, fs. 1r-2r; Domingo de Zabálburu y Echévarri to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 24 May 1708, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 39, fs. 1r-2v. The Dominican missionary Fray Francisco López learned in Batavia that the States General supported the plan but could not provide the VOC with the necessary auxiliaries. López also provided details about Dutch fortifications.

⁶⁹ Domingo de Zabálburu y Echévarri to Felipe V, Manila, 20 June 1706, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 5, piezas 1^a-2^a; Domingo de Zabálburu y Echévarri to Felipe V, Manila, 15 June 1707, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 10, fs. 1r-2v.

⁷⁰ Domingo de Zabálburu y Echévarri to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 24 May 1708, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 21, fs. 1r-2v. For example, a squadron of French corsair vessels captured VOC reinforcements along the Coromandel coast, taking 60 cannons and 4,000,000 pesos in silver as a prize. The corsairs imprisoned the Dutch general at Pondichéry and confiscated the States General's orders about the Javanese revolt.

the Manila galleons transporting Asian cloth and luxury goods to Acapulco and Mexican silver back to the Philippines. Two months prior to the denunciation of Recollects, the Audiencia of Manila sentenced Juan Antonio Pimentel, the Peruvian-born governor of Guam, to imprisonment for his failure to resist the English privateer Woodes Rogers.⁷¹ Rogers and his party sailed under the Habsburg flag and terrorized the coast of Chile and Peru before commandeering the galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación* off Cabo San Lucas in 1710.⁷² To the alarm of the Audiencia of Manila, Rogers's frigates escorted the galleon across the Pacific and landed in Guam on their way back to England via Batavia and the Bay of Bengal. Lacking troops and munitions, Pimentel welcomed the privateers and provided them with refreshments; in turn, this allowed him to avoid an attack and negotiate the release of the Filipino crew and the statue of the Virgin Mary and the relics from galleon. Woodes Rogers vowed to return to Guam within two years with an even greater force. He bribed the governor with gifts—twenty yards of scarlet serge, six pieces of cambric, and two African pageboys—in hopes that English merchants could use the island for their Pacific trade.⁷³ The Woodes Rogers expedition had been preceded by two other expeditions against the Manila galleons. William Dampier's expedition of 1703-1704 failed to capture *the Nuestra Señora de Rosario* but managed to harass the coasts of

⁷¹ Felipe V to the Audiencia of Manila, El Pardo, 6 July 1714, AGI Filipinas 333, Libro 12, fs. 120v-121r.

⁷² Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 17 July 1710, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 124, pieza 1a. The Woodes Rogers expedition caused much panic throughout the Spanish Pacific. Along with the capture of the galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación*, Rogers's frigates the *Duke* and the *Duchess* pillaged twenty-three Spanish ships, captured a French corsair vessel, and sacked the wealthy port of Guayaquil in the viceroyalty of Peru. They amassed roughly 7,000,000 pesos in booty.

⁷³ Juan Antonio Pimentel to the Audiencia of Manila, San Ignacio de Agaña, 13 April 1710, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 124, pieza 3a; Woodes Rogers, *A Cruising Voyage Round the World* (London: A. Bell, 1712), 360-365.

Chile and Peru.⁷⁴ In 1705, Dutch privateers in the service of the VOC made an attempt on the galleons as well off Luzon but retreated to Nagasaki when confronted by the recently constructed Filipino coast guard armed by the governor at great expense to the crown.⁷⁵

The advantages of French trade under the Bourbons suggest another reason behind the zeal of the *audiencia* to defend Felipe V and punish the Habsburg sympathies of the Recollects. Spanish laws—even after Bourbon succession—prohibited Northern European merchants from trading with the Philippines. Nonetheless, for the duration of the war, the governors and royal officials in the Philippines, who held interest in the Manila galleon trade, formed a mutually beneficial alliance with the factors of the *Compagnie de Chine* in Canton, who wished to expand French commercial interest in Southeast Asia. The factors considered Manila “the city best suited for trade in the East Indies because of the great amount of silver there [i.e. the returns from the Manila galleon trade].” French merchants needed Spanish American specie for trade with China, Siam, and Cochinchina, as silver allowed them to broker more favorable commercial agreements than their English and Dutch rivals in the region. Therefore, they were very eager to network with Spanish colonial elites in Asia. Less than three months into Felipe V’s reign, agents of the *Compagnie de Chine* began trafficking surplus French luxury goods (mirrors, linen,

⁷⁴ William Funnell’s *A voyage round the world* (London: W. Botham, 1707) provides a first-hand account of the Dampier expedition.

⁷⁵ Domingo de Zabáburu y Echévarri to Felipe V, Manila, 20 June 1706, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 5, piezas 1^a-2^a; Domingo de Zabáburu y Echévarri to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 24 May 1708, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 37, fs. 1r-2v; Domingo de Zabáburu y Echévarri to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 24 May 1708, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 40, fs. 1r-2v. Regarding expenditures, the governor informed Felipe V that the cost of expanding and maintaining the coast guard in 1705 amounted to over 52,775 pesos. While the squadron successfully protected the galleons that year, it failed to keep seven English vessels from sacking Spanish vessels off Leyte a few months later.

gold and silver braid, and beaver hats) from their factory in Canton to Cavite, Manila's principal port. These goods were originally intended for the Chinese market but were in higher demand among elites in the Philippines.⁷⁶ Perceiving the Union of the Two Crowns as an opportunity to obtain these goods, the royal officials of Manila allowed the Compagnie de Chine to conduct business with them in Cavite as well as use the harbor as a terminus for trans-Pacific trade missions to the coasts of New Spain and Peru.⁷⁷ The French merchants also recruited intermediaries from the Philippines—including a Dominican friar—to accompany them on these voyages and facilitate interactions with the inhabitants of Spanish America.⁷⁸

Local ties with the French grew stronger under governor Urzúa, who assumed his post in 1709. The governor had a longstanding relationship with the French. Admiral Jean-Baptiste du Casse provided him with munitions during his term as governor of the Yucatan, which he used to expel English logwood cutters from the Laguna de Términos. The comte de Pontchartrain later promised him political protection soon after purchasing the office of governor of the Philippines and title of

⁷⁶ Horacio de la Costa, "Early French Contacts with the Philippines," *Philippine Studies*, Vol. 11 (3) (1963), 401-418; "Summary of the letters from the sieur Sallot to the directors of the Compagnie de Chine," Canton, 1699-1701, ANOM, Colonies, C¹ 17, fs. 165-180.

⁷⁷ Jean Pechberty to the directors of the Compagnie de Chine, Canton, 24 November 1705, ANOM, Colonies, C¹ 18, fs. 204-211; The sieur France to the comte de Pontchartrain, Canton, 16 December 1705, ANOM, Colonies, C¹ 19, fs. 148-152; Pierre Perrée du Coudray to the comte de Pontchartrain, Lima, 10 March 1706, ANOM, Colonies, C¹ 19, fs. 47-49.

⁷⁸ The Duke of Albuquerque to Felipe V, Mexico City, 24 September 1709, AGI México 482B, fs. 1r-4v; Minutes of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 20 June 1710, AGI México 482B, fs. 1r-3r. One of the Compagnie de Chine's voyages landed near the town of Compostela off the coast of the Bay of Banderas in 1709. The 60-cannon French vessel carried four Spaniards and a Dominican friar from the Philippines with news from China for Diego Camacho y Ávila, bishop of Guadalajara and former archbishop of Manila. As local officials reported, the five intermediaries, who claimed to be traveling to France, pretended to sell Chinese silk and French canvas belonging to the company as a means of paying for their passage to Europe. The fiscal of the Council of the Indies denounced Toribio Rodríguez de Solís, the president of the Audiencia of Guadalajara and client of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée, for not doing enough to stop them. It was believed that the ship intended to pass to one of the ports of the viceroyalty of Peru "to get the best appraisal and prices given to goods and merchandise from China in that kingdom."

Count of Lizárraga.⁷⁹ As governor of the Philippines, Urzúa endeavored to make a fortune off the Manila galleon trade and relied on the Compagnie de Chine to supply him with French mirrors and Chinese textiles needed for the Spanish America market. He justified these business arrangements by claiming his actions were “in obedience of the royal decrees calling for good correspondence with the French.” His bonds with the French were so close that he entrusted Jean Pechberty, a Compagnie de Chine factor, to captain the galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación* on its voyage to Acapulco in 1709—a fact uncovered by the Council of the Indies only after Woodes Rogers captured the ship.⁸⁰

Accusations of Disloyalty Among the Dominicans

The Recollects were apparently not the only clerics to raise concerns of disloyalty in the Philippines. On December 2, 1711, Urzúa received similar accusations against Fray Diego Gorospe e Irala, the Dominican bishop of Cagayán in Northern Luzon.⁸¹ Fray Bernardino Bembrive, vicar of the convent of Lingayen, first denounced Gorospe to the Dominican provincial in Manila, Fray Pedro Mejorada, who then deferred it to the governor—“the living representation of our great monarch Felipe V”—as a matter for the crown. Bembrive had learned from sergeant Deza of

⁷⁹ François-Amboise Daubenton de Villebois to the comte de Pontchartrain, Madrid, 8 November 1703, ANF, B⁷ 229, fs. 254r-257v; The comte de Pontchartrain to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Marly-le-Roi, 28 November 1703, ANF, Marine, B² 170, f. 509v-510r; José Ignacio Rubio Mañé, *El virreinato*, Vol. III (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas de UNAM, 2005), 269-276.

⁸⁰ Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 17 July 1710, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 124, 1^a pieza.

⁸¹ Diego de Gorospe e Irala (1649-1715) was born into a prominent Creole family in Puebla de los Ángeles; the family owned a hacienda in Tepeaca. He served as a prior of the convents of San Pablo and Santo Domingo in Puebla, catedrático of the Dominican order (and published several sermons), and an envoy to Spain and Rome. The famous Capilla del Rosario was completed in 1690 under his direction and patronage. He was appointed bishop of New Segovia in June 1699. He served the post until May 1715. Blair and Robertson note his efforts to establish visitations to the Dominican and Augustinian missions.

Cagayán that Gorospe displayed an engraving of the Archduke being crowned by an angel in his chambers in the bishop’s palace. The image—lost in a fire—was possibly Johann Jakob Kleinschmidt’s *Sieg iiber die Galli-Spanier bey Saragossa* (1710), which Dutch forces circulated in Italy and Iberia. After noting the absence of any image of Felipe V, Deza questioned Gorospe about the significance of the angel holding the crown, to which the bishop replied that it meant the Archduke was the only one worthy of the Spanish throne and that heaven would grant it to him. Captain Lucas Manzano de Ochoa, the former *alcalde* of Ilocos, also saw the engraving on a visit to the bishop’s palace and added that Gorospe had reacted negatively to the pamphlet about the miracle of the Virgin of Sopetrán supporting the Bourbons. When Manzano read the pamphlet aloud during his audience, Gorospe responded sharply, “That is just a chimera, tell us what real news comes from Manila. Is there any other news? Because I have already read about that [miracle], and it is just one of those lies going around.” Sensing the anger in the bishop’s voice, Manzano excused himself and returned home.⁸²

Bembrive was convinced of the veracity of Deza and Manzano’s accounts based on a previous conversation with Fray José Muñoz, the creole Dominican prior of Veracruz, whom he met in New Spain on his journey to the Philippines. They met around 1699 when the inhabitants of Mexico anticipated the death of Carlos II. At the time, Muñoz warned Bembrive that Gorospe often spoke seditiously about the monarchy and even hoped for a rebellion upon the king’s death. If this occurred with the succession crisis, Gorospe envisioned himself as taking on the same role as Fray

⁸² Fray Pedro Meajorada to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Manila, 2 December 1711, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 149, pieza 2a, fs. 2v-5r.

António Vieira, the Jesuit orator who acted as a diplomat for the viceroyalty of Brazil and preached sermons in support of the Portuguese empire's independence from the Spanish monarchy in 1640. As Muñoz stated to Bembrive:

I am a creole, but Bishop Gorospe is excessively creole and against the Gachupines [*peninsular* Spaniards], that even us Creoles are scandalized to hear the things he says about them, as he never holds his tongue in front of anyone. Even when speaking about the king, he speaks with such grave immodesty. On one occasion...the bishop said, 'If I ever live to see the day when New Spain rose up against the king and the Council of the Indies, I would act as Vieira with childlike affection and preach a grand sermon of thanksgiving for the rebels, providing them with propaganda in order to preserve the kingdom against Spain, as Vieira did in Portugal.'

Muñoz added that Gorospe was unworthy the patronage of the crown and could potentially misuse his high social position and gift of rhetoric to “damage” others with his seditious spirit.⁸³

Mejorada referred to the task of punishing Gorospe as “full of thorns” and one to be dealt with without involving “other spheres,” suggesting the archbishop. Mejorada finished by stating the affair was “truly a subject and business of such importance,” as it was “frightening that a man placed in such a high position, of such spirit and opinion and temperament, in a city so cut off and in such remote parts, could infect or corrupt many easily persuadable people [i.e. the native Filipinos and the lower spheres] with the energy of his voice.” Mejorada felt it was his obligation to his religious order, lineage, and oaths “to defend the law, reason, truth, and preserve loyalty towards his natural lord and king.” Claiming to be motivated by the heavy weight of the crimes on his conscience, he knew that some might consider the allegations “impetuous” or inspired by vengeance for all of the letters written by

⁸³ Fray Pedro Mejorada to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Manila, 2 December 1711, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 149, 2^a pieza, f. 2r.

Gorospe against the other Dominicans of the Philippines, as he was in charge of making *visitas* or inspections in the local *doctrinas*. Still, Mejorada argued that the governor should take the accusations seriously and “even give blood from his own veins before faltering in the least bit on such a sensitive subject as the royal crown, as silence would be the same as treason and lack to legal fidelity that we should have for our monarch Felipe V.”⁸⁴

Unlike the case of the Recollects, the *audiencia* opted not involve Archbishop Cuesta in the Gorospe affair, but instead employed spies to observe the suspicious bishop with great care and secrecy for the service of the king. The *audiencia* wanted “to procure and observe the operations of the bishop with the greatest caution and possible skill to discover the truth, and to approve a convenient remedy when it is necessary...” Urzúa used Pedro de Babaze, his correspondence secretary, to handle the affair; the gravity and secrecy of the affair meant that he did not want the involvement of any public notaries. Gorospe was never arrested but continued under the surveillance of the governor until his death in 1715.⁸⁵

Ecclesiastical Privilege and Resistance to the Audiencia

The caution and secrecy taken in the Gorospe case contrasts sharply with the *audiencia*'s actions against the seditious Recollects four months earlier. This shift in approach was likely due to the resistance posed by Fray José de San Nicolás, the provincial superior of the Recollects, and Archbishop Cuesta to the arrest and

⁸⁴ Fray Pedro Mejorada to Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi, Manila, 2 December 1711, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 149, 2^a pieza, fs. 5r-5v.

⁸⁵ Martín de Urzúa y Arizmendi to the Council of the Indies, Manila, 7 July 1712, AGI Filipinas 129, No. 149, pieza 1a.

sentencing of the crimes. San Nicolás, a known ally and compatriot of Santa Gertrudis, attempted to delay the trial by first denying licenses to the witnesses to leave their convents. He then attempted to convene a chapter meeting of the Recollects and insisted that the governor allow Santa Gertrudis to participate. Above all, San Nicolás viewed the trial and the sentence as an abuse of the secular powers of the governor and complained that the handling of the case by Urzúa undermined the provincial's authority over the ecclesiastics of the province—many of whom now refused to obey him. Furthermore, he implied that the governor was more interested in conducting business in the port of Cavite—presumably with the French—than resolving the situation.⁸⁶

While the provincial attempted to overturn the sentence, three friars brought allegations to against him before the governor for crimes of machination and conspiracy against Felipe V “with words and signs of aversion and detestation of his government and kingdom.” The witnesses complained of San Nicolás's favoritism towards Habsburg sympathizers as well as his use of the term *gabachos* (a pejorative term for Frenchmen) to refer to supporters of the Bourbons. One witness claimed he was even told by a superior that “if your reverence is an *archiduquista*, you will obtain whatever you want from our father provincial.” They also denounced San Nicolás's doubts about any news favorable to the Bourbons. In one particular conversation with a traveler named Don Blas, who brought news that the Archduke was ill and that Felipe V was gaining ground in his campaigns, San Nicolás grabbed his forehead, sighed, and angrily lamented that the news from Europe was melancholic. Upon hearing that the Bourbon army had marched through his homeland,

⁸⁶ “Copia de los autos...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 140v-146v.

he expressed with pride that the women of Aragon fought against Felipe V by throwing hot water and oil on his soldiers. Other charges against him involved public displays of support for the Habsburgs, such as covering the convent's altar with Burgundy-dyed cloth—a color emblematic of the Archduke's heraldry. Also, as officials in Manila prepared to celebrate the Bourbon victory at the battle of Almansa, San Nicolás told a group of priests that he would toll the convent's bells for the soldiers who died defending the Archduke, not for Felipe V. On the occasion of Urzúa's reception for the newly arrived mission, the provincial was said to have gestured to the portrait of Carlos II in the governor's palace, telling the missionaries that it lacked a portrait of "Carlos III" (i.e. the Archduke) to be placed beside it.⁸⁷

The friars told Urzúa that San Nicolás ceased his expressions in favor of the Archduke after they threatened to denounce him. At that point, he imposed a verbal order of obedience that the residents of the convent could neither speak in favor nor against Felipe V. After Santa Gertrudis and his faction were arrested, he replaced this order with a written one allowing the friars to speak in favor of Felipe V. A witness heard San Nicolás remark to the Recollect *definidor* in the privacy of his cell that he did this to protect himself from the vexations of those loyal to the Bourbons.⁸⁸

In light of the provincial superior's complaint, the *audiencia* reviewed the case again but upheld the same sentence on December 8, 1711.⁸⁹ By the end of December, five of the seditious Recollects attempted to take matters into their own hands by escaping captivity to seek the assistance of the archbishop. Fray Pedro de la Purificación escaped first from the convent of San Pablo, forcing his way past the

⁸⁷ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 147r-150v.

⁸⁸ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, f. 151v.

⁸⁹ "Copia de los autos..." Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 152r-155r.

father provincial and prior after mass on the feast of the Holy Innocents.⁹⁰ Two days later, Fray Félix de Santiago, Fray José de la Concepción, Fray Francisco de Santa Engracia, and Fray José de San Agustín made a similar escape from the convent of San Francisco while the Franciscans gathered in the choir to recite the divine office. The four prisoners ran out of the doors of the entry hall and into the streets of Manila as the *portero* distributed food to the poor.⁹¹ The fugitives hid for the evening in the convent of San Nicolás, their original residence, with the apparent aide of Fray José de San Nicolás. The prior must have advised them of his plans to meet with the archbishop the next day and inspect the construction of the shrine of Nuestra Señora de Guía. When the two men entered the chapel atrium, they encountered the Aragonese Recollects “casually” awaiting them. Though repulsed by their presence, Archbishop Cuesta sided with them and immediately ordered their confinement in the convent of San Nicolás rather than ordering their return to their original prisons. The archbishop appeared sympathetic the pleas of the five friars and the prior San Nicolás that their escape was not illegal, as they had been denied their right to defend themselves before the governor and review the charges against them after four and a half months of imprisonment. The friars and provincial superior asserted ecclesiastical privilege, arguing that the charges against them were a matter for the Recollect order and not the crown. They were only returned to the convents of San Francisco and San Pablo under strict vigilance a month later.⁹²

⁹⁰ “Copia de los autos...” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, f. 156r.

⁹¹ “Copia de los autos...” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 157v-158v.

⁹² “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...sobre puntos de deslealtad y desafecto al Rey Nuestro Señor Felipe Quinto (que Dios guarde) de algunos religiosos Agustinos Recoletos de la nueva misión que se condujo a estas islas el año inmediato de 1711,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 47r-53v; 61v-62v; “Copia de los autos...” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 8^a pieza, fs. 165r-167r.

Archbishop Cuesta took equal pains to disrupt the trial. By April 20, 1712, he began to compile his legal argument for overruling the sentence and deferring the problem to the Recollect order. To confirm his powers to do so, he convened a special junta of “the most learned persons of the archbishopric” in the his palace on the afternoon April 25. As he argued, the sentence appeared to be determined only by the *audiencia*’s claim to the right of secular princes to preserve the tranquility of their dominions. The governor was barred from participating in the case “since it was against members of the religious orders totally exempt from his jurisdiction.” The group included the provincials of the Dominican and Jesuit orders, two of the Dominican theologians from the University of Santo Tomás, the priors of the Augustinian and Dominican convents, the rector of the seminary of San Clemente, two archiepiscopal synod judges, and several Inquisition judges.⁹³

The archbishop wanted input on two questions: if there was insufficient evidence, did the Audiencia have the right to impede his intervention in the case, and if there was sufficient evidence, could he supersede the governor in the role of judge? The members of the junta agreed that there was not sufficient evidence in the case and determined that, on the issue the jurisdiction, the archbishop should not be impeded from intervening in the case as inferred by the *audiencia*. They also upheld the point that clergy were exempt from secular jurisdiction “except in cases expressed in the Council of Trent, which are not those in the present case.” Therefore, the governor was not deemed legitimately competent to judge the missionaries “as it is common knowledge among jurists that secular authority is not capable of spiritual jurisdiction.” They determined that the archbishop could prohibit the governor from

⁹³ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 92r-93v.

proceeding in the case because it was always more suitable for ecclesiastical jurisdiction to supersede secular jurisdiction—never the other way around. They believed that the archbishop was not obligated to carry out the sentence since only prelates of superior standing within the Recollect order should judge the case. This would mean the case fell upon the provincial rector of the Recollects. The junta unanimously declared the archbishop exempt from executing the original sentence.⁹⁴

The doctors, theologians, and priests of the *junta religiosa* presented lengthy discourses on the illegality of the trial, citing figures such as Erasmus and popes Clement IV and Sixtus IV.⁹⁵ Dr. Gabriel de Ysturís, rector of the royal seminary of San Clemente, made a most provocative reference by citing theologian Antonino Diana’s observations on the conspiracy headed by the Dominican Tommaso Campanella.⁹⁶ Shortly after the death of Philip II in 1598, Campanella became involved in a plot known as the “Catanzaro conspiracy” to incite a revolt in Calabria with the help of the Turks; he gave sermons to provoke the local population to take up arms. Based on Diana, Ysturís argued that the problem in the case of Recollects was jurisdictional, between secular and ecclesiastical law. As Ysturís claimed:

...in order to argue more correctly in the present case, as it appears that those who are now called prisoners were indicted on crimes of lack of fidelity to the king our lord, I bring to your attention the case referred to by the sage Doctor Diana...from the year 1600, in which a priest in the kingdom of Naples committed the atrocious crime of rebellion and had planned to place certain lands of said kingdom in the hands of the Turks; after the royal prosecutor alleged that for similar crimes a certain Neapolitan priest in the past had been decapitated, Clement VIII declared in this case ‘fuit male iudicatum’...

⁹⁴ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 93v-104r.

⁹⁵ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 112r-143v.

⁹⁶ Antonino Diana, *Resolutionum moralium* (Lyon: Laurent Annison, 1646), 22.

The tract ended with the conclusion that the case was outside the jurisdiction of the archbishop and, again, fell upon the provincial.⁹⁷

In the end, Cueva did admit that the case was urgent and grave, and that as “vicar and ever loyal vassal to His Majesty” he was obligated to look into the matter. However, after having reviewed the testimonies with his own eyes, the archbishop concluded that the case lacked sufficient evidence of complicity on the part of Santa Gertrudis. He promptly informed the governor that he was not convinced of the case and refused to execute the determined sentence. To the horror of the *audiencia*, he proceeded to defer the case to Fray José de San Nicolás, the seditious father provincial of the order.⁹⁸

The proceedings of the junta left the governor and *audiencia* judges feeling demonized “as monsters or wolves in the place of sheep” by the ecclesiastical authorities of Manila, whom they believed were either complicit to the Recollects’ sedition or failed to realize the gravity of their crimes. They already suspected Fray José de San Nicolás of Habsburg sympathies, but argued that he lost the right to preside over the case because he failed to distribute justice and avoid public scandal after the “loyal and affectionate” friars first complained to him about blasphemies against the king.⁹⁹ Since the archbishop and junta opposed the sentence on a juridical basis, the *audiencia* now referred to the divine right of kings and their representative magistrates to protect their realms against detractors. As the royal prosecutor of the

⁹⁷ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 136r-143r. For a brief but detailed account of Tommaso Campanella’s involvement in the Calabrian conspiracy, see Pietro Giannone’s *Dell’Istoria civile del regno di Napoli*, vol. IV (Naples: Niccolò Naso, 1723), 302-307. Anthony Pagden analyzes Campanella’s later writings in Chapter II of *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

⁹⁸ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 104r-110v.

⁹⁹ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 185r-194r.

audiencia argued, the jurisdiction of the monarch transcended the sphere of secular law, as “[kings] are placed on earth by the hand of God...they reign over the temporal and the spiritual in all aspects pertaining to politics based on natural law.” Since members of the clergy acted as “conservators of the king’s vassals,” the *audiencia* considered them an appendage of the body politic when it came to the issue of the preservation of the realms and inhabitants of the monarchy—both of which were threatened by the sedition and public scandal caused by the Recollects.¹⁰⁰

The *audiencia* pleaded three more times with Archbishop Cuesta over the course of two months in hopes that he would execute the court’s resolution by the July departure of the galleons. They referred a new variety of sources: the *Siete Partidas* (the Medieval civil code that granted sovereigns the authority to punish disloyalty), the *Patronato Real* (the papal privilege that conceded to the king power over Spanish clergy), and even the rule of the Recollect order.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, the archbishop continued to excuse himself from lending assistance. The governor finally relented in his struggle with archbishop and sent the transcripts of the trial to the Council of the Indies on the galleons without the six prisoners.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 151r-169r. The fiscal argued, “it is without doubt that all men should be subjugated by their kings because they are placed on earth by the hand of God, and as such they possess power to govern over people and make their vassals to live rationally. For this reason, they are called kings because they reign over the temporal and the spiritual in aspects pertaining to politics based on natural law. Clerics and religious orders are conservators of the king’s vassals, and they are part of the temporal body politic in all pertaining to the preservation of the public good. As popes are the vicars of God in the spiritual realm, kings are these over the temporal realm, not incidentally over the spiritual, but what is temporal and pertains to the conversation of their realms and inhabitants. Princes and their magistrates are placed to maintain justice and law in the land not only legal right by also divine right...”

¹⁰¹ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 204v-224r. The fiscal argued that by the Council of Trent and the rule of the Recollect Order, the archbishop was obligated to intervene and comply with the Audiencia to correct the excesses of any of the religious orders and impose their penalties upon them.

¹⁰² “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 226r-229v; 232v-236r.

The protection granted to the seditious friars led to protests by the “loyal” Recollects, who by then made up the majority of the convent of San Sebastián. On February 6, 1712, the prior of San Sebastián allowed two of the denouncers, Fray Nicolás de Santa Bárbara and Fray Blas de la Madre de Dios, to escape without licenses to Cavite and, with the help of secular clergy, board a French ship in order to return to Spain and obtain the assistance of Felipe V. They never reached Europe, having drowned in a shipwreck on their way.¹⁰³ In a bold move, the twenty-seven remaining Recollects from the convent of San Sebastián paid a visit to the *audiencia* judges on February 9 to address in person “the notable scandal in all of the city.” Passing through the *audiencia* chambers into the salon of the governor’s palace, they pleaded with Urzúa to place the seditious friars in a more secure location such as the convent in Bataan or one in the port of Cavite until they could be sent back to Castile for the peace and tranquility of the islands. They pleaded as well in a written statement to the archbishop for compliance with the sentence.¹⁰⁴

By March 1712, the pro-Bourbon faction of Recollects split from the rest of the order out of fear of punishment by Fray José de San Nicolás for having participated in the *audiencia*’s trial. Under the protection of the governor, they sought refuge in the convent of San Sebastián outside the city walls. The thirty-six residents of the convent then created their own chapter, calling themselves “the True Order of Saint Nicholas, Reformers of the Their Province, Only Loyal Vassals of His Majesty.” They demonstrated their loyalty by raising a banner with the Bourbon coat of arms atop the tower of the convent. They also continued to inform Felipe V about

¹⁰³ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 71r-72v.

¹⁰⁴ “Autos, consultas, y diligencias...,” Manila, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 7^a pieza, fs. 80v-90r.

Santa Gertrudis and his faction, who San Nicolás allowed to pass in and out of the walls of Manila in total liberty “with notable scandal of the loyal hearts of the people.” Several pleaded to be given licenses “to leave from whence the sovereign name of your majesty is little venerated and cared for,” as their mission could never be fully accomplished.¹⁰⁵

The province was so divided that in May 1713 the order celebrated two simultaneous chapters—one in San Sebastián and the other at the principal convent of San Nicolás in Manila.¹⁰⁶ The archbishop could not reconcile the division within the province, and chose to only attend the meeting in the principal chapterhouse of the order in the convent of San Nicolás. The convents of loyalists elected Fray Andrés de San Fulgencio as their prior and appealed to the *audiencia* and archbishop to nullify the election made by the pro-Habsburg faction and validate theirs instead.¹⁰⁷

The proceedings of the trial were not received in Madrid until December 1714, with the ministers of the Council of the Indies finally reviewing the case on February 6, 1715. The council was completely astonished that the disloyalty of Santa Gertrudis and the others had become “common news” and “caused great scandal and outrage in islands.” They also felt that the governor and judges wasted valuable time by sending repeated requests to the archbishop to ship the seditious fathers back to Spain. The council believed that if royal officials would have merely removed them from Luzon, they could have “avoided the inconveniences and scandal and bad example to the vassals of those islands.” The Council of the Indies considered this case particularly

¹⁰⁵ The Recollects of Manila to Felipe V, Manila, 22 July 1713, AGI Filipinas 296, No. 105.

¹⁰⁶ The Audiencia of Manila to Felipe V, Manila, 27 July 1714, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 34, fs. 1r-3r ; [??] AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 1a.

¹⁰⁷ AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, pieza 1a.

urgent or severe, given the great distance of the Philippines to Spain, in “such immediacy to territory occupied by other nations, especially the Dutch in Batavia,” and the simplicity of the Indigenous Filipinos. However, the friars would go unpunished, as by then Felipe V had secured the throne and the war had drawn to a close.¹⁰⁸

Conclusion

The constant circulation of people and ideas across the Spanish empire ensured that subjects in the Pacific Rim experienced the turmoil of the War of the Spanish Succession. Catalan and creole patriotism prevailed in the Philippines and linked the island to problems occurring elsewhere in the empire. French commercial intrusion and the threat of Anglo-Dutch naval forces served as other common links to the global experience of the war. Cases of disloyalty pursued by the Audiencia of Manila illustrate that certain members of the clergy joined factions of colonial merchants and royal officials in resisting a new dynasty that negatively impacted their rights and economic standing. As in the Caribbean Basin and colonial centers, the appearance of anti-Bourbon sedition in the Philippines greatly troubled local elites who in fact benefited financially from the Union of the Two Crowns and feared the outbreak of rebellion. By contrast, however, geographical distance as well as ecclesiastical privilege limited the ability of the Spanish crown and its officials to punish crimes of disloyalty in the remotest peripheries of the empire.

¹⁰⁸ Minutes of the Council of the Indies, Madrid, 22 February 1715, AGI Filipinas 168, No. 3, 1^a pieza.

CHAPTER 5

CHANGES AND CONTINUITIES UNDER FELIPE V

Watch over your Indies and silver fleets. Promote trade. Reign in close accord with France, as nothing is so beneficial to our two powers as this union that no one can interfere with...Never forget that you are French.

Louis XIV to Felipe V, December 1700¹

In the summer of 1680, vice-admiral Jean d'Estrées departed on an expedition to intimidate the inhabitants of New Granada with displays of French naval prowess. However, in spite of the French crown's orders, d'Estrées adopted a far more diplomatic approach to his mission once he made contact with Spanish colonial authorities in Cartagena de Indias and Santa Marta. Instead of encountering resistance, he found the royal officials and clergy eager to treat the members of the expedition "with all possible civility"—even offering to billet the French officers in their homes. Over the course of their visit, the vice-admiral and his son presented gifts to the governors of both ports, with whom they dined, discussed European affairs, and toured the local fortifications and convents.² Additionally, d'Estrées and père Guy Tachard, the expedition's chaplain, explained to the creole friars Louis XIV's fight against "heretical" Calvinism during the recent Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678). Although their monarch Carlos II of Spain had supported the Dutch in the same war, the friars seemed more impressed with what they considered to be the Sun King's

¹ M. Michaud, Ed., *Nouvelle Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'Histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu'à la fin du XVIIIe siècle*. (Paris: Didier, 1854), pp. 71-72. These words were among the written instructions given to Felipe V by Louis XIV upon his departure from the French court.

² The comte d'Estrées was received by Rafael Capsir y Sanz, governor of Cartagena de Indias, and Ignacio de Espinosa, governor of Santa Marta. His son Victor-Marie d'Estrées, who accompanied him on the 1680 mission, later received an appointment as lieutenant general of the Spanish navy from Felipe V in 1701.

defense of the Catholic faith. In response, the Jesuit superiors invited the French visitors to attend the fiesta of their patron Saint Ignatius as their guests of honor.³

The opinions d'Estrées encountered on his mission offer a provocative glimpse at trans-imperial relations in Spanish America at the turn of the eighteenth century. More importantly, they foreshadow developments that later transpired during the reign of Felipe V. The vice-admiral observed in Cartagena de Indias and Santa Marta that local elites appeared friendly towards the French naval officers and hostile towards *peninsular* (Spanish-born) merchants. Likewise, they spoke with great veneration for Louis XIV and great animosity for the ministers of state of Habsburg Spain—especially those of the Council of the Indies. The governor of Santa Marta complained in particular to d'Estrées about “the harshness of the Spanish government, which orders the removal of all silver from the Indies and makes the inhabitants purchase merchandise at excessive prices, while never bothering to protect them from the pirates or Indians that make war on them.” The vice-admiral capitalized on these sentiments “to impress upon these people the power of the king [Louis XIV] and his heroic virtues, and to inspire them to want to purchase merchandise from the French first-hand at a better price.” They went on to discuss French manufactures such as beaver hats—a highly sought-after commodity among the creole elites—that cost 13 or 14 *écus* in Paris but sold for up to 180 *écus* in Santa Marta. These discussions of religion, creole patriotism, defense, and trade ultimately convinced d'Estrées that if a

³ “Mémoire du 24^e août 1680, à la rade du Petit-Goâve,” Philippe Levieux Valois, marquis de Villette-Mursay, *Mémoires du marquis de Villette* (Paris: Société de l'Histoire de France, 1844), 204-205. The comte d'Estrées's expedition encountered a wide-spread belief in Spanish America that the French were heretics and barred from openly practicing Catholicism. The vice-admiral blamed the Spanish crown for deliberately spreading the rumor as a strategy to evoke fear and thus dissuade contact between Spanish colonial subjects and those of the French Antilles.

“revolution” or change of political affairs occurred within the Spanish monarchy, the subjects of Spanish America would chose an alliance with Louis XIV over any other European prince.⁴

To a large extent, the ascension of a Bourbon to the Spanish throne in 1700 produced the result predicted by d’Estrées twenty years earlier. Felipe V’s succession generated a positive response among most Spanish American elites, whose personal interests benefitted from the Union of the Two Crowns. The efforts of both Bourbon monarchs to align their imperial policies seemed advantageous on a local level, as it solved colonial grievances over trade, defense, and access to power that marked the reign of Carlos II. For the majority of elites in New Spain and Peru who profited from the monarchy’s relationship with France, Felipe V would have been the most obvious choice as their king when faced with the Habsburg alternative.

Still, Bourbon succession did not go unchallenged across the Atlantic. On a broader imperial level, the Union of the Two Crowns was problematic, serving as the main contributing factor to the escalation of the War of the Spanish Succession. In Spanish America, the change in dynasty threatened the economic interests of a select group of merchants, officials, and clergy. Spain’s alliance with France influenced the preference among these elites for Archduke Charles and motivated them to spread sedition and ally with the enemies of the Bourbons.

Cases of disloyalty against Felipe V in the Caribbean Basin, colonial centers, and Pacific Rim provide a human perspective to the relationship between the War of

⁴ “Mémoire du 24^e août 1680, à la rade du Petit-Goâve,” Philippe Levieux Valois, marquis de Villette-Mursay, *Mémoires du marquis de Villette* (Paris: Société de l’Histoire de France, 1844), 191-200; 217-218. The governor of Santa Marta also paid d’Estrées in silver for a hundred pounds of fuses for the garrison, which the vice-admiral collected off the French warships.

the Spanish Succession and Spain's overseas empire. These lived experiences reveal the broader repercussions of disloyalty and personal struggles for wealth in the Spanish empire during periods of political and military upheaval. European negotiations over colonial trade affected lives on both sides of the Atlantic and had potential for mutually beneficial relations for many involved. Spanish legal documents, interpreted in conjunction with French political correspondence, reveal the depth of the economic relationship between colonial elites, foreign traders, and their governments. Together they help reorient the study of these commercial aspects of Spanish America towards a more global perspective.

The successes and failures of elites drawn into the wartime conflict of loyalties demonstrate how Bourbon succession represented continuity as much as a change in the orders of things under the last Habsburgs. Spanish American elites continued to foster commercial alliances with French, Dutch, and English traders, who made their business ventures more profitable and provided them with the slaves and textiles they demanded. Political crises over Habsburg versus Bourbon loyalty shook the confidence of Spanish American elites seeking wealth at the far reaches of empire, but heightened rather than compromised existing arrangements of illicit foreign trade through arrangements such as a French-held *asiento* and cloth smuggling.

Nonetheless, Spain's dynastic shift ushered in marked changes from a colonial perspective. The most dramatic departure from the Habsburg era involved the Bourbon dynasty's new potential for providing patronage, which was a direct consequence of the political and economic alliance between the empires of Spain and

France. The active intervention of the French crown and the directors of the Compagnie Royale de Guinée in the appointment of colonial officials between 1701-1713 allowed for greater possibilities of political advancement compared with the old Spanish Habsburg administrative structure. Although the political crisis of the war tested loyalties, the Habsburgs and their allies had difficulty competing with the benefits of clientelism offered by Louis XIV's court—an element that made French commercial alliances not only official policy but also the most attractive. This aspect to Felipe V's early reign only helped ensure loyalty to the Bourbons across the Atlantic as well as allowed the monarchy to protect its authority from the attacks of its rivals. These benefits should be seen as partly responsible for first legitimizing Bourbon sovereignty in Spanish America.

The struggle for control over colonial trade networks during the War of the Spanish Succession indicates the evolution of imperial conflicts in Spanish America from wars of territorial conquest to commercial wars. Won through European diplomacy rather than a successful alliance with Spanish American elites, the granting of the *asiento* to the English South Sea Company in the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) was by no means a definitive means of bringing peace to the Spanish empire. On the contrary, the transatlantic slave trade continued to embroil Felipe V in international conflicts and compromises with the English crown for the next thirty years. Later Spanish imperial wars caused in part by the English *asiento* contract—the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720), the Anglo-Spanish War (1727-1729), and the War of Jenkins's Ear (1739-1748)—show that Spanish American trade remained a major point of political contention for the remainder of Felipe V's reign. The War of the

Spanish Succession emphasized the fact that England was Spain's chief imperial rival, and the empire's subsequent wars attest to the Spanish Bourbons' long lasting endeavors to break foreign economic and political hegemony over the Spanish empire for the rest of the eighteenth century.

APPENDIX A

ORIGINS AND COURSE OF THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

A review of the origins and course of the War of the Spanish Succession is necessary to fully understand the conflict's global dimensions. The events leading up to the conflict are complex, as well as the political, economic, and religious concerns of its various participants. The war initially began as a dispute between the French Bourbons and Austrian Habsburgs over the will of Carlos II, the last Habsburg king of Spain, who died in November 1700. As a consequence of incessant familial inbreeding, Carlos died childless and decrepit after thirty-five years on the Spanish throne. The death of Carlos's favored heir Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria in 1699 left the Spanish throne with two potential candidates: Louis XIV's grandson Philippe d'Anjou and Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I's son Archduke Charles. Both of these princes were young and presumably weak, yet they held equally solid claims to the crown through their lineage.¹

The fate of the Spanish monarchy raised international concerns well before Carlos II's death.² The promotion of either candidate to the throne posed potential benefits and risks to the various states of Western Europe. The governments of France,

¹ J. H. Elliot, *Imperial Spain (1469-1716)* (London: Penguin Books, 2002), pp. 373-374. Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria was the grandson of Carlos II's sister Infanta Margarita. Philip of Anjou and Archduke Charles were both descended from the sisters of Philip IV of Spain: Infanta Anne of Austria (Queen of France) and Infanta María (Holy Roman Empress). Philip of Anjou had an additional claim to the throne since his grandmother Infanta María Teresa (wife of Louis XIV) was Carlos II's elder half-sister.

² Frances Gardiner Davenport, ed., *European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependencies*, vol. II (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1929), pp. 143-156. The governments of Louis XIV and Emperor Leopold I first endeavored to solve the issue of Spanish Succession in 1668 through a partition of the empire. Neither government expected the infant king Carlos II to live long enough to marry and produce children. The Austrian Habsburgs agreed to concede Naples, Sicily, Franche-Comté, the Philippines, and North African presidios to the French Bourbons in order to ensure that a son of the emperor received Spain and Spanish America.

England, and the Netherlands desired to profit from the crisis and conspired to divide the dominions of the Spanish empire in a series of secret negotiations known as the First Partition Treaty (1698) and Second Partition Treaty (1700). In the latter, they agreed to recognize Archduke Charles as heir to Spain, Spanish America, Flanders, and the North African presidios of Ceuta, Melilla, and Oran in exchange for French possession of Naples and Sicily.³ The two treaties outraged the ministers of the Spanish Council of State, who refused to recognize the right of foreign governments to determine the succession to the Spanish throne. After cautious consideration, they ultimately advised Carlos II to recognize a French successor in the belief that an alliance with Louis XIV would be the best means of preserving the territories and trade of the Spanish empire from partition and foreign dominance.⁴

In the end, Carlos II left Spain and its empire to Philippe d'Anjou in the third (and final) version of his will drafted a month before his death on November 1, 1700. Much to the chagrin of the Austrian Habsburgs, the Spanish government officially proclaimed the French heir as Felipe V, with the new king making his public entry into Madrid by February 1701. The French and Spanish monarchs declared their

³ Davenport, *Treaties*, vol. III, pp. 1-28. By appeasing the French crown with Spanish Italy and supporting a Habsburg as heir to Spain and Spanish America, the English and Dutch governments hoped to gain greater access to the Spanish Indies trade. It was even speculated that either nation might acquire the *asiento* (Spanish slave monopoly). The diplomats sent to negotiate the treaty attempted partition part of Spanish America—Cuba, La Española, Panama, and Chile—but could not reach an agreement to the matter.

⁴ Minutes of the Council of State, Madrid, 8 June 1700, AHN, Estado 2761, Caja 1, fs. 8v-34v; Minutes of the Council of State, Madrid, 6 June 1700, AHN, Estado 2761, Caja 2, fs. 5r-29r. Outrage over the partition treaties coupled with hostilities in the Americas such as piracy and Scottish occupation of Darien in Panama led the council to distrust England and the Netherlands, Spain's allies throughout the reign of Carlos II. The Spanish ambassadors to England and the Netherlands further incited hatred of England and the Netherlands in letters detailing their plots to seize more territories from Spain in Spanish America and Asia, and convert the colonial population to Protestantism. The Spanish Council of State felt betrayed by its allies, and with these factors in mind its members made the king write a new will leaving the Spanish empire to Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV, in October 1700.

national interests to be mutual in what became known as the “Union of the Two Crowns.” Leopold I immediately contested the succession of a Bourbon over what he considered to be his family’s rightful realms. By April 1701, the emperor dispatched troops to Spanish Milan in order to defend his son’s rights to the Spanish monarchy; there the initial shots of the war were fired between French and Austrian soldiers in July 1701.⁵

Over the next two years, the Spanish succession crisis quickly transformed from a dynastic quarrel into a major military struggle over the European balance of power and the control of global trade networks. These two issues had been played key roles in the Nine Years War (1688-1697), a previous conflict waged against French hegemony in Europe, and once again they proved to be a source of political tensions at the start of the eighteenth century. These issues pulled the governments of England and the Netherlands into the conflict in 1701, and they (along with France) quickly became the war’s principal belligerents in Europe and abroad. By 1703, the war pitted Spain, France, and Bavaria against Austria, England, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the Duchy of Savoy.⁶

Within the European realms of the Spanish empire, the Bourbons faced a series of internal rebellions. Disillusioned with French influence over the affairs of the Spanish state, various grandees, nobles, and merchants in Naples, Flanders, Catalonia, Valencia, Aragon, and parts of Castile challenged Felipe V’s rule by recognizing Archduke Charles as their monarch. The Admiral of Castile was the first

⁵ Sir George Clark, “From the Nine Years War to the War of the Spanish Succession,” in J.S. Bromley, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History: The Rise of Great Britain and Russia 1688–1715/25*, vol. 6. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 403-404.

⁶ Kamen, *The War of Succession*, pp. 3-4. Kamen stresses the importance of the “maritime powers” in both entering the war and determining its outcome through their shifting alliances.

and most notorious traitor, fleeing to Lisbon in 1702 and even publicizing his grievances with the new dynasty in a printed manifesto. The issue of conflicted loyalties escalated further when the Austrian claimant entered Portugal in 1704 and invaded Spain in 1705 with an allied army of English, Dutch, and Portuguese troops. The invasion led to the conspiracy of the Marquis of Leganés and, following the capture of Madrid for the Habsburgs in 1706 and 1710, the defection of dozens more nobles and ministers of Felipe V. Archduke Charles protected his supporters in Barcelona, where he and his consort maintained a rival court with the Allies' support until 1713.⁷ In the meantime, Iberia plunged into a civil war that continued in Catalonia and the Balearic islands for two years after the signing of the Peace of Utrecht (1713) and Rastatt (1714).⁸

The Role of Imperialism in the European Conflict

It should not be overlooked that issues of European imperialism played an important role in the decisions made by its participants regarding French universal monarchy and the European balance of power. Louis XIV received intelligence shortly after accepting Carlos II's will that the English and Dutch governments feared the Union of the Two Crowns would financially ruin their nations by cutting off their merchants' access to the lucrative Spanish American market. As early as December 1700, the French crown suspected that the two maritime powers would declare war in

⁷ Henry Kamen, *The War of Succession in Spain, 1700-15* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. 83-117.

⁸ Josep M. Torras i Ribé, "Cataluña, 1713: asediados por Felipe V, abandonados por el archiduque," in Eliseo Serrano, ed., *Felipe V y su tiempo: congreso internacional* (Zaragoza: Cometa, S.A., 2004), pp. 211-234; Tomeu Caimari Calafat, "El conflicto sucesorio en el reino de Mallorca: del reconocimiento de Felipe V al dominio austracista (1700-1715)," in Rafael de Valenzuela Teresa, ed., *La Guerra de Sucesión en España y América* (Madrid: Editorial DEIMOS, 2000), pp. 249-262.

order to place a Habsburg on the throne and thereby influence Spanish American policy for the continued success of their nations' trade.⁹ The Treaty of the Hague (1701)—the basis for the Grand Alliance between Austria, England, and the Netherlands—only reaffirmed the suspicions of Louis XIV's government. The treaty, while asserting Emperor Leopold's grievances over the loss of Habsburg territories in Italy and the Low Countries, also sought to prevent the possibility that "English and Dutch shipping [shall] never again enjoy the freedom of the high seas and the trade they enjoyed hitherto both in the Indies, in the Mediterranean and elsewhere" as a consequence of the Franco-Spanish alliance. Such apprehensions were partly related to the fact that the French crown "already dispatched many men-of-war to guard the Spanish colonies in the Indies; all this to such effect that it is now the case that the fates of the kingdoms of France and Spain are so intimately bound up in each other that it will not be realistic henceforth to think of them save as one and the same, a single, unified realm."¹⁰ The treaty was provocative in that it suggested the balance of power in Europe entailed access to Spanish American resources. Bourbon succession in Spain justified the Allies' involvement in the war based on grounds that to some extent included colonial concerns along with more pressing European issues of defense and trade.

European imperialism directed the course of the war to an even greater extent during its latter stages. Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay, French ambassador to Madrid, was particularly convinced of the importance of Spanish America in the

⁹ Louis XIV to the duc d'Harcourt, Versailles, 27 December 1700, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne 86, fs. 259r-270r.

¹⁰ W.N. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, *Spain Under the Bourbons, 1700-1833: A Collection of Documents*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 17-18.

conflict. As he told Louis XIV in 1707, the reason the English and the Dutch continued to fight the war was “to place a king of their liking on the throne of Castile” in order to exert economic hegemony over the Spanish Indies.¹¹ Later in 1710, Louis XIV and Felipe V were persuaded that the desire for access to the wealth of Peru motivated the Allied military resurgence in Iberia, which resulted in the second capture of Madrid for Archduke Charles.¹² Queen Anne herself validated the assertions of the Bourbons five years later, when in a speech to the House of Commons she pointed out that “the apprehension that Spain and the West Indies might be united to France was the chief inducement to begin this war.” Since trade in the Americas “so deeply concerned” the English nation, “the effectual preventing of such a union” was a principle aim of her government in the final peace negotiations.¹³

The Spanish and French crowns considered the mineral and commercial wealth of New Spain and Peru a major advantage to their respective nations while England and the Netherlands considered it a potential threat. Spain, France, and their enemies would go to considerable lengths throughout the period to obtain the riches of the Spanish Indies through diplomatic measures and by force. For example, at the Battle of Vigo Bay in October 1702, a combined English and Dutch naval squadron attempted to capture the Mexican silver fleet and its accompanying French escort as it

¹¹ Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, 3 June 1707, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne 168, fs. 188r-189v; Michel-Jean Amelot de Gournay to Louis XIV, Madrid, 7 May 1708, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne 180, fs. 2r-8v. Similarly, he added, the Anglo-Dutch alliance with Portugal was aimed at gaining economic and territorial influence over Brazil as well as revenues from the Portuguese gold fleets.

¹² The comte de Castelblanco to Louis XIV, 19 November 1711, AMAEF, Correspondance Politique, Espagne 203, fs. 436r-437v.

¹³ Queen Anne’s speech to the House of Commons, London, 6 June 1712, in *Journal of the House of Commons, from December the 7th 1711, in the Tenth Year of the Reign of Queen Anne, to August the 1st 1714, in the First Year of the Reign of King George the First*, volume 17 (London: By Order of the House of Commons, 1803), p. 258.

unloaded its cargo in Galicia. Port officials hastily unloaded most of the silver before the arrival of enemy forces resulted in the loss of specie and other valuable cargo such as cochineal.¹⁴ Despite the humiliating destruction of the fleet, over thirteen million pesos in silver was saved—“the largest sum in history ever obtained in any one year from America by any Spanish king.”¹⁵ The Spanish crown used the silver to finance the developing war and distributed two million pesos to Louis XIV for his military support. Although the actual financial impact of Mexican and Peruvian silver on the war is debatable, the speculated wealth of Spanish America remained a central matter in European politics. The English and Dutch governments withdrew from the war once a European balance of power could be reached, and part of this agreement meant that the Spanish and French crowns would have to alter their colonial policies. Hence the Peace of Utrecht granted the English control over *asiento* (the Spanish American slave monopoly), prohibited Spanish transatlantic commerce with foreign nations and the use of foreign fleets in the Spanish America, redistributed territories in North America, and regulated the seizure of prizes taken at sea by privateers.¹⁶

The Effects of the War Outside of Europe

As imperialism influenced the war in Europe, European events and decisions had colonial consequences. Late seventeenth-century tensions between rival empires erupted in violence at the arrival of Bourbon succession. The inhabitants of virtually every Spanish, French, English, Dutch, and Portuguese overseas territory suffered the

¹⁴ Geoffrey Symcox, ed., *War, Diplomacy, and Imperialism, 1618-1763*. (New York: Walker and Company, 1974), pp. 226-232. Sir John Rooke provided a lively account of the battle.

¹⁵ Henry Kamen, “The Destruction of the Spanish Silver Fleet at Vigo in 1702,” *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* (November 1966), p. 168-172.

¹⁶ Hargreaves-Mawdsley, *Spain Under the Bourbons*, pp. 50-57.

effects of the conflict in their own ways. Campaigns of territorial conquest and commerce raiding in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans attest to the fact that colonial subjects were by no means isolated from European political developments at the turn of the eighteenth century.¹⁷

Outside of Europe, Bourbon succession resulted in a global commercial war waged throughout the Americas, Africa, and Asia. This conflict aimed at reconfiguring the control of trade networks as well as factories and centers of contraband trade. Primarily fought in the Caribbean basin and the Canadian borderlands, the commercial war conducted by European trade companies, merchants, and privateers in the Americas also spread to Africa and Asia. Concerns over Mediterranean trade led to the English alliance with the forces of Mustapha Ben Youssef, the bey of Algeria, to blockade and attack Spanish presidios of Ceuta and Oran in North Africa—the latter of which fell into Ottoman hands by 1708. In West Africa, French, English, and Dutch slave companies harassed their rivals' forts, impressed enemy slave ships, and sought to shake their rivals' alliances with local lords. Asian aspects of the war included French, English, and Dutch naval assaults along trade routes in India, China, and Southeast Asia over the spice and cloth trades. English privateers and agents of the Dutch East India Company in Batavia also attempted to gain access to influx of Mexican silver into Philippines through attempted invasions and attacks on the Manila galleons.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blussé, eds., *Rivalry and Conflict; European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th centuries* (Leiden, NL: CNWS Publications, 2005), p. 3. In the same vein, van Veen and Blussé follow the tradition of Charles Boxer in arguing that conflict in European overseas colonies “were naturally connected to some extent with political developments in Europe itself.”

¹⁸ AGI Filipinas 129; AGI Filipinas 193; AGI Filipinas 204.

The War of the Spanish Succession as a global commercial war left Spanish America and the Philippines particularly vulnerable, above all in regions neighboring other European colonies. Tensions in the borderlands between English North American colonies, Spanish Florida, and the French colonies of Quebec and Louisiana resulted in a series of battles between 1702-1711 referred to as Queen Anne's War.¹⁹ This phase of the war spread to into Spanish territory when James Moore, the governor of Carolina, sent an expedition to invade Florida and attack the fortress of Saint Augustine in 1702. English traders from Charleston and their Creek allies also massacred Spanish mission communities such as Santa Fe de Toloco in the southern Appalachians in 1703-1704. In 1707 and 1711, they invaded yet again, attacking the presidio of Santa María de Galve in Pensacola and Fort Louis in Mobile. Joint Spanish and French forces launched their own counterattacks out of Havana against Charleston in 1702 and 1706.²⁰

Similar hostilities erupted in South American borderlands. Expeditions of *bandeirantes* from Brazil raided Spanish Jesuit missions in the Andes in search of Indigenous slaves, while an expedition of Spanish and French forces conquered the notorious Portuguese trading settlement of Colônia do Sacramento along the Rio de la Plata in 1704. The burden of paying for the defense of Brazil and Portugal triggered tax revolts in Salvador and Recife in 1710. Most astonishing of all, French forces

¹⁹ W.J. Eccles's *The Canadian Frontier 1534-1760* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969) explains the course of Queen Anne's War. French and English colonists fought over territorial and economic dominance in the northern frontier, which resulted in France's loss of Acadia, Newfoundland, and trading posts along Hudson's Bay by 1713.

²⁰ Charles Arnade, *The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959), p. 4; W. Stitt Robinson, *The Southern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1979), pp. 98-122. English colonists called for the "the taking of Saint Augustine before it be strengthened with French forces." The two expeditions against Charleston ended in Spanish and French defeat by a Dutch convoy and local militias.

under the corsair René Duguay-Trouin captured and ransomed Rio de Janeiro for 610,000 *cruzados* in September 1711. The resulting panic was one of the factors that compelled the government of João V to sue for peace with the Bourbons.²¹

Most of the violence in the Spanish American theater of war centered on the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean basin, where the allies of Felipe V and Archduke Charles actively competed against one another for access to Spanish American silver and commodities. Slave traders, cloth and cacao smugglers, and privateers from the French, English, and Dutch Antilles engaged in aggressive commerce raiding off the coasts of traditional centers of contraband trade such as Venezuela, Central America, and Cuba.²² In 1703, English forces briefly invaded Panama—an event that arose fears throughout the viceroyalty of Peru. The French commanders Claude Le Chesnaye and Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville successfully destroyed English privateering settlements in the Bahamas in 1703 and Nevis in 1706 with the assistance of the governors and militias of Cuba. Likewise, between 1712-1713, the corsair Jacques Cassard attacked Dutch bases in Surinam and Curaçao.²³

The English navy also played its own role in the Caribbean. Admiral John Benbow commanded the first expedition of the English navy to the region in 1701 with orders to capture the silver fleet and blockade French *asiento* ships. He was soon

²¹ Eduardo Brazão, *As expedições de Duclerc e de Duguay-Trouin ao Rio de Janeiro, 1710-1711*. (Lisboa: Divisão de Publicações e Biblioteca, Agência Geral das Colónias, 1940). The creole corsair Jean-François Duclerc tried but failed to capture Rio de Janeiro in 1710.

²² David Marley, *Wars of the Americas: a Chronology of Armed Conflict in the Western Hemisphere* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008), pp. 340-343. For example, in August 1702, the privateers Brown and Christian plundered the port of Tolú near Cartagena de Indias. Furthermore, in November 1702, the Jamaican privateer Charles Gant disembarked three hundred men on Cuba and ransacked the towns of Casilda and Trinidad. The expedition left the island with a prize of a hundred African slaves.

²³ Marley, *Wars of the Americas*, pp. 344; 349-350. As for French colonies, the English targeted Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Saint-Domingue in 1703 and 1706.

defeated by Admiral Jean-Baptiste du Casse and died of his injuries at the Battle of Santa Marta in 1702, which was hailed throughout Spanish America as one of France's greatest victories. Other important commanders such as William Whetstone, William Kerr, John Jennings, Charles Wager, and James Littleton attempted to use the English navy to intimidate the inhabitants of Spanish American ports into recognizing Archduke Charles as their sovereign. In the process, Admiral Wager and Commodore Littleton successfully assaulted the Peruvian silver fleets at the Battle of Barú (1708) and the Battle of Cartagena de Indias (1711).²⁴

Additional fighting occurred in the colonial centers of Mexico and Peru. Militias from Tabasco and Campeche made numerous efforts between 1702-1713 to expel English smugglers, logwood cutters, and their slaves from settlements in the Yucatan and the Laguna de Términos. English privateers retaliated with strikes against the regional cities of Tancochapa, Chiltepec, Lerma, and Jalpa.²⁵ The William Dampier expedition of 1704-1705 and the Woodes Rogers expedition of 1709-1710 extended the war to the Pacific coasts of Mexico and Peru. French corsairs protected Callao and Concepción from attacks, however Rogers and his crew managed to capture the rich cacao port of Guayaquil in 1709. They looted the city and spared it from complete destruction for a ransom of over 30,000 pesos. The English privateers

²⁴ Carla Rahn Phillips, *The Treasure of the San José: Death at Sea in the War of Spanish Succession*. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 129-171. The 1708 sinking of the *San José* and two other galleons by Wager's squadron resulted in a loss of over ten million pesos in silver accumulated by the viceroy of Peru for the war effort. Littleton's 1711 squadron ended up with a lucrative prize: the treasure of the galleon *San Joaquín*.

²⁵ J. Ignacio Rubio Mañé, *El Virreinato, Vol. III: Expansión y defensa* (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de México, 1983), pp. 265-321.

continued north to Cabo San Lucas, where they captured the Manila galleon *Nuestra Señora de la Encarnación* on its descent to Acapulco in January 1710.²⁶

²⁶ AGI México 482B; AGI Filipinas 333, Libro 12; Marley, *Wars of the Americas*, p. 353.

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- AGS Archivo General de Simancas (Simancas, Spain)
- AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid, Spain)
- AMAEF Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de France (La Courneuve, France)
- ANF Archives Nationales de France (Paris, France)
- ANOM Archives Nationales d'Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence, France)
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