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Metro-Allocation Planning

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step-wise increases in educational and occupational status which antedate any self-conscious desire for or even ideational assimilation to middle-class status. This does not, of course, mean that some working-class people may not self-consciously desire social mobility and prepare themselves for meaningful and integrated transition. In the normal course of events, these are the people who regularly do move out of working-class areas at the point in time when this can most consistently correspond with other status changes. In the situation of forced relocation, however, we observe the entire array of those individuals who

have not yet reached this point although their plans to move do provide evidence that some of this population were on the verge of making this transition.

²² Further analysis reveals yet another condition of variation. Among the group with higher education the fulfillment of pre-relocation residential aspirations leads to larger proportions of adjustment-adaptation. For the group with low education (0-11 years schooling), those with low aspirations are more likely to be adjusted-adapted if they move into a middle-class area.

Interpretation

METRO-ALLOCATION PLANNING

William L. C. Wheaton

Little of what is called comprehensive city planning today is effective. In older cities it ratifies what the market did before planning and land use controls were established. In suburban and newly developing areas it sanctions what the market will do anyway. One could compare Houston, which has had no planning, with any of a score of cities of comparable size and recency of development, which have had the most advanced planning and find no discernible important differences. In the growing literature of local development decision-making, the city planner and the plan rarely appear in the story. Where they do, it is often as a bystander or victim, rarely as the key actor or agent.¹

This failure stems in part from the paucity of planning powers, in part from the planners' inability to predict very well, or to describe alternative costs and benefits with any precision. Single purpose planning, such as highway planning, has on balance done much better in defining goals and methods, developing cost benefit measures, implementing plans, and developing the supporting clientele and institutions necessary to sustain a modern bureaucratic apparatus with power, resources, intelligence, and personnel.

But, while these may be very important reasons for the weaknesses of comprehensive city planning they are not the primary ones. The major failures of comprehensive planning stem from its definition of comprehensiveness in a world which lacks any comprehensive political power or institutions. With political institutions utterly lacking in power, much less a broad range of powers, it is scarcely credible that comprehensive plans (if they measured up to those terms in any dimension) could be

implemented. The paucity of power in local municipal government has been amply documented, from Lord Bryce to Robert Dahl and Wallace Sayre.

Again the case histories are illuminating. They describe major local controversies as a species of gladiatorial combat between contending parties, in which political leaders stand by watching the combat until all combatants save one are dead, are mortally wounded, or have withdrawn. Then the decision is announced: the winner has won. The political "leader" who enters a major contest does so at his peril. He too may become embroiled and lose his political life. Given a paucity of political capital, in Dahl's terminology, he husbands his resources with nice impartiality, leaving the arbitrament to others or to the political market. As a result public policies are formed by the contention between numerous special interests, rich and poor, capital and labor, Irish and Italian, Catholic and Protestant. Those not organized, not interested, or not strong enough are awarded crumbs. They too can have the fun of playing and being paid off in wooden nickels: token parks and playgrounds, token education, token public housing, rhetorical rehabilitation, symbolic slum clearance, real air pollution, real billboards and sprawl, and real unemployment.

The failure of our political processes of municipal government is surely not due to the poor quality of our political leaders. By and large they are a remarkably able group of people, deeply committed to the service of society, but they must first remain in office if they are to serve it at all. Nor can we blame some imaginary power structure, which by any sensible or accurate definition simply does not exist in most cities² (as Dahl, Sayre, and Adrian have demonstrated empirically, and Wolfinger theoretically). The failure partially stems from the indifference of the public. Partially it stems from

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the efficiency of the market, which supplies most of the people most of the time with a saturation of goods and services. Partially it stems from underrepresentation or indifference of the poor. But chiefly it stems from public acceptance of the idea of private affluence and public squalor, and from the public's adherence to historical ideologies, the inheritance of an agrarian past, which include the concepts of "the minimum possible government" and "home rule" in local affairs. We have simply been unwilling to confer any effective power on local officials to make decisions about the public welfare. Secondly, of course, planning failures have stemmed from its institutional isolation in the independent planning commission, a by-product of the upper class biases of the founders, and their distrust of local democracy at the time.

Much planning thought consists of *mea culpas*. It seeks to blame our failures upon *technical* and *professional* deficiencies. I certainly share the belief that most planning methods of the past would not stand much rigorous scrutiny, or the test of application. On the other hand similar amateurish methods work in some respects quite well in parts of Europe, under political conditions about as pluralistic and certainly as democratic as our own. My theme is that we need *both* methodological improvements and political-institutional improvements.

In two areas we are seeing radical improvements in method: metropolitan transportation studies and community renewal programs. While the former have helped to provide a far better rationale for highway planning, and in some cases some ideological support for mass transit, in the main they have not altered transportation action as yet, and they have not affected land use controls at all. They have produced one important institutional development; the governing planning body which represents all levels as well as many areas of government—a new multilevel expression of the federal principle. (The Delaware Basin Compact is another major manifestation of this trend.) Equally sophisticated community renewal programs, on the other hand, may currently be in the process of repudiation by the local governments which sponsored them. Perhaps this is because they have revealed too clearly that our present renewal programs consist of crumbs and wooden nickels: that is, that they are not of the scale required to eliminate slums. Perhaps they have successfully revealed costs which no part of our political system is prepared to undertake as yet. Perhaps the CRP's tend to reveal that the extent of the problem is beyond the geographic, administrative, and political scope of local government.

One major institutional innovation that has emerged from the renewal program, however, is the Office of the Development Coordinator. Beginning in Philadelphia and Baltimore this office has spread in one form or another to most of our major cities, including Pittsburgh, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and lately San Francisco. This office has proved a powerful device for decision-making and execution. It has served the functions of coordinated planning and execution which the master plan and the capital budget were intended to perform but rarely achieved. In part the development coordinators could achieve sudden success because they had the heavy leverage of federal renewal grants: "I can get you two for one." Where development coordinators have secured adequate control over the capital budget

process they could in fact claim with some reason "I can get you two for nothing except what you're going to spend anyway." A second reason for the success of the development coordinator was his ability to intermix the functions of public and private investment decision-making. By presiding over knowledge of federal resources and procedures, local public resources and procedures, and private resources and investment criteria, the development coordinator can create, by direct negotiation, mutually profitable investments for all claimants. This happens to accord with and reflect newly developed conditions of the mixed economy which will surely grow in scope in the next half century. Finally, development coordinators have worked for mayors; their power has been in their ability to enhance the powers of mayors, the strongest element in a weak political system.

It is too early to discern a comparable evolutic social planning. No one knows yet what that is, nor i to do it. Ideas abound, but a systematic theory, strategy, or set of tactics is lacking. Almost random experiments are conducted on a massive scale, unhappily with only rare systematic observation of the results. Unhappily the Ford Foundation program created a new class of institutions to launch its experiments, perhaps the only modus operandi possible at the time, and modeled after the processes of development coordination. That new institution seems to be in deep trouble. One would guess that few will survive the decade. The issue has been beclouded by the accompanying clangor about the poverty program's ideological slogan "maximum participation by the poor." At the extreme this sets aside two hundred years of theory about representative government. In another interpretation it merely means that the poor get poor, that is, "indigenous," doctors, lawyers, architects, planners, and social workers, a dubiously efficient process.

Metropolitan Planning

If we turn from the municipal scene to metropolitan planning, political processes and institutions, the picture is indeed dismal. The distribution of power in metropolitan areas is almost totally diffused. A multiplicity of cities, towns, townships, counties, special districts, and state agencies, often wholly lacking in even regular communication systems, each weak in its own domain, each characterized by internal divisions, is wholly incapable of planning for action. As a result metropolitan planning agencies are largely powerless. They are undertakings for those planners who have the time sense of geologists and a studied indifference to prevalent local earthquakes.³

The planner's historic definition of metropolitan planning could hardly be more ill fitted to this scene. Comprehensive metropolitan plans have been merely city plans writ large. They show land use in seven to nine colors, major highways, large parks, and certain other community facilities as if most of these things were subject to some sort of metropolitan guidance or control. Since the same or similar features are not in fact planned where there is a local government institution in nominal charge, it seems incredible that we should have expected this exercise to be operative where government institutions are nonexistent. Only the rationale that planning is chiefly "educational" in purpose and method, a major justification of the independent commission, could have sustained the illusion of utility through the last thirty years of almost wholly unguided, and surely explosive,

metropolitan growth. Comprehensive metropolitan planning has been helpless, and largely useless except as a platform for exhortation. The one function that metropolitan agencies could have mounted—the provision of good, first class market data, demographic forecasts, and the like in forms useful to local government and business—they have generally failed to mount. Here simple information could be a powerful guide to public and private action.

Further, it seems to me that the only effective decision processes on the metropolitan level have arisen where we have created special purpose agencies, state highway departments, and special districts like port authorities with autonomous powers and special financial resources. The vesting of such powers for comprehensive planning, however, is a contradiction in terms. While we may see many new metropolitan governments formed in the next decade in the smaller metropolitan areas, especially those which lie in one county, metropolitan government in the larger metropolis, in any effective sense under present conditions, is virtually an impossibility. The officials of local government, the press, and the other media of mass communication will largely maintain the ruling myths of “the miniature republic,” “home rule,” minimum government, and the illusory right of the individual to choose his own environment in the market.

A Reconsideration of Metropolitan Planning

One useful approach to these problems would be to reconsider our conception of the metropolitan plan and the distribution of planning powers. What is of metropolitan concern, and why? Does the internal distribution of land use in the city of Berkeley make any difference to the metropolitan Bay Area? As long as Berkeley holds about 100,000 people does it matter to Oakland or San Francisco if they are all distributed at 10 families to the acre or over a range of from 5 to 100? Clearly the answer is no. If we were to canvass the content of most metropolitan area plans we would discover that they contain much material, most notably land use maps, which are of little relevance to the metro area at almost any scale of generality, yet which appear to intrude upon home rule and local autonomy.

My first proposition then is to exclude the purely local from metropolitan planning—especially the almost purely symbolic and irrelevant maps.

Next, I have made the claim that city planning, and the attendant powers of effectuation, are largely without influence upon the course of development. They purport to affect the kind of development, which is in fact unimportant to the metropolitan area as a whole. They may affect the quality of development in a cost raising sense, which is of little importance; they purport to but fail to control the density of development, which might be important, and they do not even purport to control the location and timing of development. If these claims should prove to be correct, might it not be wise counsel to define metropolitan planning and implementation to exclude almost all of what now goes under the name of local planning? If that were possible, we could vigorously defend the rights of local government to continue to exercise all present, and useless, powers, while we devise some new and useful powers.

My second proposition, then, is that metropolitan planning should not include the power to zone as now de-

fined, or to map local streets or plan or approve subdivisions or do other local things. The other side of that coin is new powers.

Next, I think we ought to devise a form of metropolitan planning which gives local officials a choice in development, and when they have made the choice, gives them good opportunity to carry it out. This means conferring additional power on local governments for the execution of a metropolitan plan which they have had a local share in developing—basically the right to spend more money. My third proposition, therefore, is more money for local government. Uncle Sam must and will provide.

My final concern is that we invent a new political institution to distribute the money (and the accompanying nonplan—planning choices). It must be representative, but operate within rules.

Metropolitan Target Plans

I would propose that a metropolitan plan consist of a set of tables which list for each local government area, for five year periods, and for 25 years, the following items:

1. The resident population.
2. The number and income classes of jobs.
3. The market value of retail sales and services.
4. The average annual expenditure per child on education.
5. The ratio of the resident members of the labor force to local employment opportunities, by low income groups and by job classes.
6. A statement of charges to be assessed for failure to comply within reasonable limits to the locationally non-specific items of the plan above. Such charges would be based on the cost of an individual community's action to the metropolitan area, and would take the form of a percentage of state and federal grants-in-aid to be withheld from those communities.
7. A set of prices per unit of capacity provided, to be paid or charged for locationally specific metropolitan facilities.

While this is a deliberate simplification, for purposes of illustration, I think that such a plan would cover most of the important planning concerns of metropolitan areas. None of the items in such a plan would involve things that local governments now control.

Metropolitan Prices and Local Choice

To implement such a plan we would first have to know more than we now know about these matters. Then we could establish a dialogue between the new metropolitan planning agency and local governments. The planning agency would prepare a set of forecasts for each local area which would be internally consistent for the metropolitan area and aggregated to metropolitan totals. These forecasts would reveal some share imbalances. Some communities would have more jobs than employees, some less. Some would have too many rich residents and too few homes for their low income wage earners. These imbalances occasion costs to the rest of the metropolitan area—spillover costs resulting from externalities imposed by some municipalities. The cost of overcoming these imbalances can be approximately estimated. For example, suppose community X desires 10,000 jobs at \$5,000 per year, but desires to house only 2,000 workers in this

income class. This would inflict extra costs on the surrounding communities for municipal services not fully reimbursed by taxes from these low income residents. The cost for housing the remaining 8,000 workers from, say, 6,000 families in the nearest accessible and receptive community might be \$400 per year per family. Part of that cost would be attributable to the extra cost of accommodating, building, or servicing houses for these employees; part would be payable to them for extra transportation expenses incurred by their distant location; and part would be payable as a form of local tax bonus to the receiving community to secure its cooperation.

Each local government is now in a position to consider its set of forecast targets, and estimated prices. If community A desires exclusiveness and low density it cannot also have numerous tax paying industries and shopping centers. In striking a required metropolitan balance the planning agency is forced to strike approximate local balances, reflecting in some degree local natural economic advantage, historical fact, and feasible rates of change, but balancing to a metropolitan total with a minimum aggregate spillover charge to other localities.

Since elementary and secondary education appear to be an area in which adverse spillover effects may be maximized, any community which failed to provide some minimum expenditure (initially the metropolitan average) would have to be subsidized to achieve the minimum. In many states equalization formulae purport to achieve this already. They would continue to operate.

The system of charges (prices) for noncompliance should operate only with respect to future increases in state and federal grants-in-aid. These will assuredly be very large. Already new federal aids in education, health, housing, renewal, air and water pollution, transit, open space and parks, to name a few, amount to several billions per year. They will grow, and if peace should break out they will grow gigantically. Thus, there would be strong incentives for local cooperation if charges are imposed by withholding a proportion of grants-in-aid which would otherwise be available to a local government. Let us guess that half of all potential increases in grants-in-aid will be thus held back for compliance failures and for equalization payments in recognition of spillover costs. These funds go into a pool for the metropolitan area from which to pay the subsidies necessary to other governments which then assume the costs which are, in effect, a burden to the metropolitan area. For an amount like \$10 billion a year one would guess that much local cooperation could be purchased.

With targets and prices of the exchange of functions between communities set forth in a preliminary way, local governments would have an opportunity to respond, proposing their own, locally determined targets. The planning agency would then aggregate local targets, recompute spillover costs, and post a revised set of prices. Some adjustments would be cost free; they could readily be made by accommodation between communities by exchange of services. Others would sharply increase prices, especially to communities which seek to pursue highly independent policies. Bargaining would be conducted in terms of spillover costs until a mutually satisfactory set of targets and prices is achieved.

At this point I think we may distinguish between locationally nonspecific targets, like population, employment, retail sales and school expenditures, and locationally spe-

cific community facilities, such as major parks, sewer outfalls, and freeways. In the former category the service can be accommodated anywhere in the locality at its option, without cost to others. It is conceivable that an employment center with 20,000 employees on a single shift may become such a major traffic generator that it makes a difference where it is located. In general, however, our models rarely treat location with a specificity of plus or minus one mile, and the charges for a few excessive concentrations in very small areas will be small. Some locationally specific facilities, however, can be moved from their "naturally advantageous" location only at considerable cost. For this reason a capacity charge may be set and levied on all participants. The receipts may be used to subsidize the receiving community for the inconvenience to it of accommodating metropolitan needs. Some state park systems already recognize kind of cost payments in lieu of taxes to counties which have large ratios of publicly owned land.

The implementation of such a metropolitan plan naturally presents a few problems, but the kinds of incentives which could be applied would be a powerful force. If local governments have accepted targets for development, they will receive substantial grants to enable them to build the community facilities, and to offer the services necessary to attract growth. These public capital and service aids are in themselves powerful generators of market action. Market data, widely publicized, will also help to channel private investment into profitable areas. Housing subsidies could provide incentives for residential location in accordance with local targets. The luxury housing market would seek out the higher cost, higher service level areas as it now does, but taxes in such areas might be a little higher because they will not share proportionally in grants-in-aid.

I see no reason why we should not move directly to public control over the location and timing of development. The metropolitan plan, based upon an "equitable" distribution of jobs, population, and spillover charges, would provide a reasonable and socially justifiable basis for the allocation of new homes, factories, and stores to local government jurisdictions. No major problems of property rights appear to be involved in such a quota allocation. At the local level varying policies might obtain. Some communities would doubtless choose to allow development to occur within existing zoning and other accepted regulations. Others might desire to economize by requiring contiguous growth, or by adopting a local version of the metropolitan plan, that is, one which features self-contained development and minimum spillover costs. In a "nearly fully developed" community the squeeze on sites might create land pricing problems, but the courts now seem quite willing to countenance the use of eminent domain or renewal procedures if and when such problems arise. In any event the proposed type of metropolitan plan would present both the state legislatures and the courts with a fully acceptable rationale for intervention and control.

A New Metropolitan Institution

Finally, we must invent new institutions. I would propose a representative special district for each metropolitan area, which we might call the Metropolitan Services Improvement District, to avoid any impression that this is metropolitan government in any shape or form. It is

merely another special district, which happens to be designed to improve local services by distributing money. Whether it should consist of representatives of local governments, or of popularly elected officials, I leave to others in political science who have examined those issues, though I incline toward popular election. Presumably such a district might acquire other special district functions. There is now precedent for state and federal participation in such agencies, particularly in transportation planning, but also in pollution control and water resource development. Since state and federal subsidies are involved each might well be represented by an appointee of the Governor, the President, or the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Federal interest in milder forms of this proposal is growing. The Muskie Bill, providing for mandatory metropolitan planning and review as a condition of many federal grants-in-aid, is an example. This bill has been developed over many years by Senator Muskie, and has been fostered and perfected by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. While the Muskie Bill was not passed in the last session, some related provisions are incorporated in the Model Cities Act. The President's Model Cities and Metropolitan Areas programs also move a long step in the direction of block grants. They will in effect be block grants, for enumerated programs pursuant to a local plan. If and when these programs are adopted, the principle will have been established. Finally the principle of differential grants-in-aid for conformity with a metropolitan plan was established in the Housing Act of 1962 in the Open Space Program. Similar but less explicit differentials exist in many other grant-in-aid programs, not frequently in state formulae for grant-in-aid for education. In short, all of the elements required for a federal grant-in-aid system exist. Only a coordinating rationale and process are required. I have tried to provide a first approximation of that. A federal grant program tied to a requirement for a state authorized representative Metropolitan Services Improvement District would evoke action by the 50 states within a year.

In summary I sense the need for a set of inventions which will preserve what is good in our present systems of local government, bypass what is useless or illusory in our present processes, use to the extent possible our ideologies and myths, build upon the hunger of our best political leadership for effective power to guide the course of metropolitan development, preserve much local freedom of choice, encourage variety where it does not im-

pinge upon the rights or entitlements of others, and adapt to the present and foreseeable distribution of power.

Whoever tries to invent in our complicated society exposes himself to errors of ignorance, mistakes of judgment, and bad logic, and I hope that this brief discussion may occasion criticism and comment. While these proposals have been presented as one package, the separate components—the target plan, a system of prices, a means of securing choice, and the metropolitan institution—should each be considered on their own merits.

NOTES

¹ I refer to the case studies of: Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955); Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961); Morris Janowitz (ed.), *Community Political Systems* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961); Robert J. Morwitz and Deil S. Wright, *Profile of a Metropolis* (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1961); Alan Altschuler, *The City Planning Process* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1965); and C. R. Martin et al., *Decisions in Syracuse* (Bloomington, Indiana: University Press, 1961).

² Empirical statements: Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1963); and Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960). Theoretical Systems: Raymond E. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power,'" *American Sociological Review*, XXV (October, 1960); and Nelson W. Polsby, "Three Problems in the Analysis of Community Power," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV (December, 1959).

³ Compare Scott Greer, *Governing the Metropolis* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962); Luther H. Gulick, *The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962); Norton E. Long, "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games," in Edward C. Banfield (ed.), *Urban Government* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961); U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *Government Structure, Organization, and Planning in Metropolitan Areas* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961); The M.I.T.—Harvard Joint Center for Urban Studies, *The Effectiveness of Metropolitan Planning*, prepared for the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964); and U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency, *1964 National Survey of Metropolitan Planning*, prepared for the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, U.S. Senate Committee on Government Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965).

Author's Note:

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The author acknowledges his indebtedness to Harvey Perloff, for numerous ideas and articles on the scope of planning; to Henry Fagin, who anticipated some of these ideas in his Metropolitan Policies Plan; to Robert Mitchell, who first differentiated levels of planning concerns; and to his colleagues Melvin Webber and John Dyckman.

CONTENT ANALYSIS OF A STATE PLANNING CONFERENCE

Jack C. Fisher and Henry P. Henderson

As indicated by its title, "Existing Status and Future Trends," the 1966 Cornell University conference on state planning had as its intended focus the concepts of change and direction. The participants included field practitioners at the state government level, administrators of federal programs closely related to state activities, and research scholars from governmental advisory groups. Given the new federal inducements to state planning, this assemblage of representatives from both the state and the federal levels attempted to produce a meaningful evaluation of ways for improving the state planning process.

A sober assessment of the conference content shows genuine insights into the nature of state planning, but the desired evaluation did not progress sufficiently to generate acceptable proposals and recommendations. The insights deserve attention, not because they are new, but because they tend to confirm existing hopes and fears concerning state planning. These hopes and fears are discussed in terms of the issues explicitly raised at the conference which attracted special attention. The utility of the conference, however, was not limited to issues discussed, but also included issues and developments avoided or unrecognized. In what follows, points of agreement, disagreement, and omission will be analyzed by reference to the conference content and to the appraisals of two state governors.

Conference Content

The first panel, which concentrated on federal-state relations and their effect on state planning activities, dealt mainly with "considerations on the use of money as the great coordinator." Appropriately, the discussion focused on the development of the same policy areas but at different levels of governmental decision-making. The effectiveness of such coordinated sets of policies in eliminating duplicated effort and preventing directional divergence requires special mechanisms. Although emphasis presently seems to be concentrated upon the vertical coordination, owing to the peculiarities of our federal system, interdisciplinary problems and horizontal coordination may be of greater significance to the potential contributions of the new state planning programs.

The awareness of the need to seek harmony between program developers and administrators—the need to

build a partnership—is in large part a result of the urban transformation of the past two decades. With federal programs responsive to the immediate problem and inducing activity in a different direction from that of the states, a gap developed between the levels of governmental planning activities that strained relations in an all too evident manner. Partial solutions, uncoordinated approaches, and opposed activities became prominent, provoking charges of blame as well as recognition that something must be done. One slow mediating force was the increasing pressure for attention to the enormous and growing urban problems. With some common grounds of concern present in the vertical governmental levels and the horizontally diversified agencies, the intergovernmental relations panel concentrated on the new quest for faster, more expedient means to secure the harmony necessary to do the job at hand. Although the older approach to revising intergovernmental relations—the blaming of other departments for being illegitimately involved or improperly concerned—is clearly not gone from the scene, newer methods seem to be gaining in both variety and acceptance. Recognition of the scope of common urban problems by various governments and disciplines has also led to realistic assessments of the essential resources. The resources required, however, are enormous, and the federal government holds the power to secure and distribute the necessary revenue. Thus coordination and mediating devices of an administrative nature, depending primarily upon control of money, now constitute a significant approach to intergovernmental relations for state planning.

Accompanying the "shopping basket" approach to federal grant programs have been such devices as the use of planning requirements as prerequisites to federal aids, the use of formal or informal interagency agreements with respect to aggregating aid programs in the same area, the use of priority rules as a criteria for allocating aid, and the proposed use of federal coordinators. The states which daily administer the grant programs have generated the devices of an office of local affairs, the federal-state liaison officer, executive budgeting reform in a few instances, and the state planning agencies themselves. As a conference panelist noted, all such devices are merely attempts to solve both horizontal and vertical coordination problems that were clearly perceived in

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