
UCLA Philippines/Schirmer Series


Title Intervention: U.S. Bases in the Philippines

Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2221q0zw

Author Schirmer, Daniel Boone

Publication Date 1988-02-01





On May 23, 1898 Senator Lodge visited the President and told him that the U.S. must colonize the Philippines because the home market was no longer sufficient to meet the productive capacities of U.S. industry. Foreign markets must be secured such as the Philippines would provide. Annex these islands and their ten million inhabitants would have to buy U.S. goods, and U.S. manufacturers would have so much additional trade.¹ In January 1899, as the U.S. Senate was discussing the treaty to annex the Philippines, Cushman Davis declared that "he with others, was looking forward to the prompt partition of the vast Chinese market among European nations, and he foresaw that if the United States did not secure a footing in the Orient such as they would now have through the terms of the treaty, they would be most effectively and forever shut off from this vast market."²

The expansionists faced two problems. Many of the people of the United States opposed this policy of expansion which they saw as imperialism; and the Filipinos did not want to become a U.S. colony, having only recently declared their independence from Spain as a result of an armed revolt. The expansionists resolved the first problem by defeating their domestic opponents in two important contests: the Senate battle torannex the Philippines in 1899, and the election of November 1900 when the Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan tried unsuccessfully to challenge imperial policies.

The Philippine problem was more difficult. Beginning in 1899, Filipinos fought bitterly against U.S. colonization, armed resistance to U.S. rule not ending until 1906. It took a total of 250,000 U.S. troops to conquer the Filipinos, and, according to one U.S. military figure over a half a million Filipinos died in the war or from war-related causes.

As a result of this initial U.S. military intervention in the Philippines, that country became a U.S. colony and was soon one of the best markets for U.S. manufactured goods in Asia. In 1900 Washington was able to send U.S. troops stationed in the Philippines to China where they joined other

> imperialist powers in suppressing the rebellion of the nationalist Boxers who wanted to close China to foreign economic penetration. The US had intervened in Philippine affaits in order to secure a strongpoint from which to intervene in China and other countries – and a pattern for the future had been established.

ω

Today it is important to remember that growing numbers of Filipinos regard these bases as a hangover of the U.S. military intervention at the turn of the century that destroyed their country's independence and turned it back to colonial status. They are seen as a relic of colonialism.

Ξ


It was after World War II that the U.S. military presence in the Philippines took its present form, in the bases agreement and other post war military arrangements.

In 1946 the United States declared the Philippines to be independent, but one of the conditions the U.S. placed upon this independence was the right to maintain U.S. military and naval bases on Philippine soil.

As in 1900 Washington saw a military presence in the Philippines – this time in the form of base installations – as a necessary buttress to U.S. economic expansion. The United States emerged from World War II as the foremost economic and military power, and Washington saw the opportunity for the growth of U.S. trade and investment abroad, especially in the Pacific region. In February 1946 the U.S. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations testified before Congress that 33 naval bases and airfields in 22 separate localities would be needed "to maintain strategic control of the Pacific Ocean area."³ This was why the U.S. insisted on the Philippine bases.

Other military arrangements reached specified that the Philippine armed forces would be guided and directed by a permanent advisory group of U.S. military officers called

Ν



haps even sharper definition in the U.S. support for the Marcos dictatorship from 1972 to 1986.

After the defeat of the Huks the poverty of the Filipinos, especially of those who lived in the countryside, grew worse. The result was that in the '60s and '70s the Philippines was the scene of peasant and labor organization and strikes that affected Philippine landlords and businessmen as well as U.S. multinational corporations. Nationalists in the Philippine Congress were discussing legislative restrictions against foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines. The streets were filled with demonstrations against the Vietnam War and the U.S. use of the Philippine bases to supply that war.

Then, in September 1972, Ferdinand Marcos, having first consulted with President Nixon, declared martial law. Peasant and labor organizers, Congressional nationalists, demonstrators against U.S. base' were all thrown in jail. (Marcos dictatorship threw some 70,000 Filipinos in jail for political reasons and used torture and assassination against its political opponents.) With martial law, Marcos rule in office, so profitable to himself, was unconstitutionally prolonged. Following the declaration of martial law the U.S. government increased its military and economic aid to the Philippines and kept increasing such aid for 14 years, even as the popular opposition to the dictatorship grew and became more intense

Washington's support for the Marcos dictatorship was a glaring example of U.S. intervention in Philippine affairs. Why did the U.S. government give this support?

Testimony from U.S. officials in Manila at that time throws some light on this question. In 1973 the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent two staff members to investigate conditions in the Philippines. They came back to Washington to repart that "... U.S. officials appeared pre-

> pared to accept that . . . military bases and a familiar government are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best."⁷ A year later Charles F. Thompson, a reporter from the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, interviewed a U.S. diplomat in Manila who told him that when it came to negotiating a new bases agreement, "he preferred to deal with Marcos alone rather than to have the approval of the old nationalistic Congressmen, as would have been necessary before martial law."⁸ Later in 1974 Joseph Lelyveld wrote the *New York Times* from Manila that U.S. officials there cited the bases as the chief reason for U.S. support of martial law, for outweighing U.S. investment in their opinion.⁹

Providing background to these opinions was the fact that in the late '60s and early '70s the U.S. government was using Philippine bases as the chief source of supply for the war in Vietnam, while at the same time Philippine demonstrations against the war and the bases role in that war were growing. In these circumstances a compliant and repressive Philippine government suited the needs of the Pentagon, and Washington made no mistake in its reliance on Marcos.

Clark and Subic was up to 260.11 In 1980 after the fall of martial law, the authorized number of nuclear weapon at on Navy ships. In 1973, two years after the declaration of the Shah and the increase of instability in the Middle East, ment in the Philippines was 201, including 115 tactical bombs nuclear weapons there, without telling the Philippine people. armed ships and planes into the Philippines and to store nuclear reprisal. But Marcos allowed the U.S. to bring nuclear pines, claiming this tended to make their country a target for with the bases.¹⁰ To the contrary. For a decade nationalists that he would not use his martial law powers to interfere send a military aide to the U.S. Embassy with the message document the authorized ceiling on nuclear weapons deploy-In 1971 according to a top secret National Security Council had opposed the presence of nuclear weapons in the Philip-One of his first moves after declaring martial law was to

Marcos publicly gave the Pentagon the right to use the Philippine bases for military intervention in that part of the world.¹² In 1983 Marcos attitude was summed up when he guaranteed the U.S. "unhampered" use of the bases in the U.S.Philippine Bases Agreement of that year.

Under Marcos the bases prospered, but not the people of the Philippines. "By the mid-1970s seven out of every ten Filipinos were worse off economically as a result of martial law... Two out of every three Filipinos were living ... below the poverty line . . . a substantially greater, percentage of persons . . . than when Marcos had become president."¹³ As a result, opposition to the dictatorship increased, especially among the rural and urban poor. In the first years of matial law this opposition tended to be led by the left. After the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983, however, the center forces in the Philippine political life moved into active opposition to the dictator and he became virtually isolated. At the same time both the legal left and a Communist-led guerilla organization, the New People's Army, were growing, nationalist moods and anti-nuclear and anti-bases movements were on the increase.

Washington had supported the dictator Marcos for all these years because he had seemed capable of protecting the status quo in the Philippines. As it became evident, after the Aquino assassination, that this was no longer the case, important segments of the Reagan Administration began to make connections with the elite opposition in Philippine politics and the military, leaving the President and the White House to hang on to the Philippine dictator to the very last minute.

Ray Bonner's book, Waltzing with the Dictator, details U.S. secret funding of NAMFREL, the clean elections organization that helped Aquino win the 1986 election against Marcos, and for RAM, the organization of opposition military personnel that led to the military revolt.¹⁴ But it was

> the Philippine people, with their long tradition of resistance, that had the final say. It was their presence, by the millions. in the streets of Manila in February 1986 that foiled the military of the dictator and delivered the death blow to Marcos' rule.

7

In the post-Marcos era, the attitude of the United States government to U.S. bases in the Philippines remains the same. In his testimony before a Congressional hearing in April 1986, Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, made this very plain: "...no one should underestimate our resolve ... to preserve our access to the facilities at Clark and Subic through 1991 and beyond - with the continued cooperation and support of the Filipino people"¹⁵

Whatever the attitude of the Filipino people, it appears that the United States will get the cooperation of President Aquino. In 1984, as nationalist sentiment in the Philippines grew in the last years of the Marcos dictatorship, Corazon Marcos opposition, signed what was known as the Convenors' Statement calling for the removal of U.S. bases from the Philippines. In the election campaign of 1986 she retreated from this stand, however, saying that the bases could remain until 1991 (the date of their expiration according to the agreement now in force), and that after that she would "keep her options open." Although this is still her position, Peter Bacho, a U.S. scholar and writer on Philippine affairs, says that "it is now almost assured that some form of accommodation will be reached."¹⁶

There are today, however, certain new features that bring to the fore and give added weight to the question of U.S. bases and intervention in the Philippines.

In the first place, the Reagan Administration, in pursuit of a policy of military intervention in the Middle East that

9

began with Carter and the fall of the Shah, has brought the United States to the verge of war with Iran. Since Clark and Subic are an important source of supply for the U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, this situation can only bring added intensity to Washington's preoccupation with the bases.¹⁷

ASEAN region (which includes the Philippines).19 and new legislators, he spoke out against a nuclear-free indirect manner, when, after meeting with President Aquino Robert J. Dole, spoke sharply against them, saying they endangered U.S. bases in the Philippines.¹⁸ In June of this announced in September 1986, Senate Republican leader, state, obviating such discussion. When these provisions were year Secretary of State Shultz expressed opposition in an reached by executive agreement between the two heads of public discussion. Previous basing agreements have been pine Senate and the U.S. Senate, thus opening the door to treaty requiring passage by a two-thirds vote in the Philipdates that any new bases agreement must be achieved by a "consistent with the national interest." The other man-One declares the Philippines to be nuclear weapons-free, sentiment that grew as the Marcos regime came to an end constitution that can be seen as concessions to the nationalis Second, there are two provisions of the new Philippine

Finally, last March, President Reagan signed a "funding" appropriating a multi-million dollar grant for increased CIA activity in the Philippines and adding a dozen agents to the Manila CIA staff of 115. Washington intelligence sources interpreted this to mean "helping the Philippine military with its intelligence gathering, providing them with computers, computer training, detailed maps ... overflights ... the implementation of political dirty tricks." Richard Kessler, an Asian expert with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace stressed the serious nature of this step as the "first symbol of direct U.S. involvement in the counter-insurgency campaign."²⁰

> It is against this background that a vigorous public discussion of U.S. intervention, especially of the covert variety, in Philippine affairs has occurred, in which this intervention has been linked to the question of the U.S. bases. Government officials, the press, leaders of public opinion (including those in the movement against U.S. bases and nuclear weapons) have all expressed concern about this matter. As a result the Philippine House of Representatives has established a committee to investigate such intervention, and the Senate appears likely to do the same.²¹

Ξ

Although it was Colonel Gregorio Honasan's attempted coup of August 28 that triggered proposals for Congressional investigation, it was around the figure of retired General John Singlaub that the public discussion first centered. Singlaub was the confederate of Colonel Oliver North in sending aid to the Nicaraguan contras and is a leader of the World Anti-Communist League (the Philippine chapter of which was filled with cronies of Ferdinand Marcos.)²²

Singlaub has been in the Philippines several times. (A well-placed Philippine military source says, "Singlaub comes in and out of the country. He can even land at Clark without our knowing it.")²³ But interest in Singlaub picked up in November 1986 when his presence in the Philippines became widely known. From November on, Singlaub is reported to have been in the Philippines for four months. He declared himself to be in the Philippines to hunt for buried Japanese treasure, a claim discounted by many Philippine observers as a cover. Be that as it may, U.S. Ambassador Bosworth interceded with the Philippine government in behalf of Singlaub and his treasure-hunting venture.²⁴

While in the Philippines, several Philippine sources say, Singlaub met with various right-wing and business groups, giving them the impression that he represented the U.S. government. In November he met with Aquino's Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, shortly before Enrile was dis-

missed from the cabinet for alleged participation in planning a military coup against Aquino. Indeed the right-wing U.S. magazine *Insight* reported that Singlaub was "joining forces" with Enrile. He was reported to have been encouraging the formation of "anti-Communist" death squads, as a leader of such squads in Enrile's home province testified. During the Vietnam war Singlaub was one of the on-site commanders of Operation Phoenix, the U.S.-directed assasination and counter-terror program. He is said to have brought veterans of this program to the Philippines to train Filipinos in such work.²⁵

Singlaub's role in the Philippines is said to have aroused discussion in the Congress of the United States, where there has been interest in what part, if any, Singlaub played in the August 28 coup.²⁶

or the practices of the transnational corporation."27 promoted by Singlaub "has been to label as 'red' any form Mission that the effect of terrorist squads such as those of dissent such as questioning the presence of the U.S. bases the base were fearful that they would be targetted with dire consequences as a result of their opposition to the bases." Philippine activists in Cebu also told the Clark organizers whom we interviewed in Angeles near the site of purpose of which is to combat public demonstrations against the bases in the coming period. It further reports "Those adjacent to Subic Base and Clark Air Field, the avowed businessmen's associations at Olongapo and Angeles cities report of this mission credits Singlaub with having initiated Clark led a "Fact Finding Mission" to the Philippines. The their removal. In May 1987 former Attorney General Ramsey Philippines and to organize opposition to those who want activities has been to promote support for U.S. bases in the There is evidence that a central purpose of Singlaub's

A top Philippine security official gave this explanation of Singlaub's role in the Philippines, "I think the American


> covert activities here are aimed at a future national campaign to keep the U.S. military bases."²⁸ If this opinion has any truth, it throws a certain light on the boost President Reagan gave to the CIA activity in the Philippines last spring.

The role of Singlaub suggests that U.S. covert activities have been connected with an effort to preserve U.S. bases in the Philippines. Leaders of the Philippine anti-nuclear weapons and anti-bases movement believe the same purpose inspired the Honasan coup attempt. That is why they have been especially vocal in charging the U.S. covert complicity in that coup attempt.

Events in the Philippines that preceded the August 28 coup tend to lend some credibility to their belief. On August 10 a nationalist bloc of seven members of the House of Representatives started working on a bill calling for the dismantling of U.S. bases in their country to end what they called "the continued subservience of the Philippines to U.S. interests." They also announced that they would push for a national referendum on the bases as provided for by the new constitution.²⁹

Emphasis was given to the Congressional discussion a few days later when the USS Missouri visited Subic Base on its way to the Persian Gulf to protect Kuwaiti tankers bearing the U.S. flag. The ship's visit brought forward the concerns of the Philippine anti-bases movement. Frank Arcellana and Reverend Elmo Manapat, leaders of the No-Nukes Movement and the Nuclear Free Philippines Coalicion, respectively, claimed that the Missouri was equipped with nuclear cruise missiles and so should be banned from Philippine ports under the anti-nuclear provision of the new constitution. Noting that the Missouri was on its way to the Persian Gulf. Manapat protested, "By allowing the USS Missouri to dock in the Philippines we are allowing ourselves to be dragged into a conflict we have no business to be part of."³⁰

13



in the Honasan coup, as reflected in a report from Manila Philippines as to the possibility of US covert intervention published in the Philadelpia Inquirer: Malacañang as a bed of communist-coddlers who ought to be exterminated."³⁶ rebel military officers, "the home-grown Rambos who saw should acknowledge their "ideological paternity" of the specific complicity in the coup were valid, US right-wingers the Philippines (promoted especially as political justification for the bases). Manglapus said that, even if US denials of obsessive anti-Communism that is a feature of US policy in suggesting as a motive force in the Honasan rebellion the ment." Senate, made an unusual contribution to the discussion, Secretary Raul Manglapus, when still a member of the military ambition and desire for outright rule, etc. Foreign of the President for "neglect of the armed forces" - and her obviously unhappy over the anti-nuclear arms provision of the Constitution and are worried over the fate of the U.S. military facilities in the Philippines under the Aquino governconcessions to labor in a recent transport workers' strike, 35 mutually exclusive) of the coup's motivations: punishment command" of the CIA, maneuvering outside the ficial described his own suspicion that a "lost officials, a high-level Philippine government of In a meeting Friday with several US embassy But there was evidently widespread agreement in the There were other interpretations (not necessarily

events surrounding the August 28 military revolt normal channel of operations, played a role in

request. They wanted to know, he said, "About the US Embassy representatives at their own perceptions of US involvement in the events of the In an interview later, the official said he met with last two weeks."

> was a general feeling that the US was involved The palace official said he responded that there

He said the US officials did not answer that questhe Aquino government. "made this very strong statement" in support of tion directly but instead responded that Reagan

"These CIA guys who are in town, we perceive them as part of the lost command."³⁷ "They never tell you what they are up to," he said.

report is alleged to have called Malacaffang at the height of junta, "the only solution." The U.S. government in another the presidential palace. 39 the crisis and offered President Aquino "safe conduct" from Cardinal Sin to urge President Aquino to join a military one he knew at the U.S. Embassy and asked to persuade the Philadelphia Inquirer reported an interview with an aide Clark Air Field.38 Two involved the U.S. Embassy in Manila: military man, a Marcos loyalist named Reynaldo Cabauatan, Clark Air Field; and that following the coup another rebel coup conferring with the U.S. military; that Honasan had that Honasan had been seen at Clark in the days before the to Cardinal Sin who claimed to have been phoned by somehad held a press conference at a location inside the base at been rescued when the coup failed by a helicopter from The press carried many reports suggesting U.S. compli-city in the coup. Three such reports involved Clark Air Field:

case, several accounts quoted a confidential report by General Major Dennis Lawler at Villamor Air Base. In the Raphael Raphael at Honasan's headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo, and been with the rebels at the time of uprising: Lt. Col. Victor military attaches at the Embassy who were reported to have Honasan attempt the press carried the names of two U.S. The discussion has intensified. Two months after the

17

Fidel Ramos, Aquino's chief of staff, alleging that at one point during the August coup attempt Raphael urged Aquino's loyalist forces not to attack the coup leaders, with whom Raphael had spent much of his time during the past 20 months. Ambassador Nicholas Platt acknowledged that Raphael had been at Honasan's headquarters, "to keep track of fast moving developments." The next day, October 28, the U.S. Embassy announced the recall to the United States of Lt. Col. Raphael. Ambassador Platt stressed that the charges against him were unwarranted. Raphael's recall "underscored growing anti-American sentiment within the Aquino government," according to Mark Fineman, Manila correspondent of the Los Angeles Times.⁴⁰

ments on Philippine sovereignty. Warning of a "new Viet-nam," Philippine Senator Neptali Gonzales in the Malaya as diverse as Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus and Senator of American military involvement here," he cautioned "It will only take one encounter between members of the countries has served as justification for U.S. intervention. of November 5, 1987, said that the "idelible lesson of history" were taken to provide more security for the bases. Figures outside the bases in a five mile radius around their circumin recent weeks, might be responsible.41 The U.S. response New People's Army and U.S. soldiers to justify an escalation was that protection of U.S. lives and property in other Juan Ponce Enrile protested the off-base patrols as infringeference. The U.S. authorities announced these measures to the killings was immediate, however, 500 Marines were flown in to Clark Air Field, and U.S. servicemen in full wing forces, who had sought to destabilize the Government guerillas. Local residents also expressed suspicion that right the Mayor of Angeles City said they suspected Communist two U.S. airmen, in uniform, a retired Air Force sergeant battle-gear and with live ammunition were sent to patrol but a Philippine security commander at Clark Air Field and pino businessman were shot and killed near Clark Air Field. who may or may not have been a U.S. citizen, and a Fili-U.S. officials said they did not know who was responsible Hours after the Embassy announced Raphael's recall

> Although Raphael has been recalled, in general the U.S. Embassy has denied all reports of U.S. complicity in the August coup, declared full support for President Aquino, and warned that all U.S. military and economic aid to the Philippines would be cut off should Aquino be overthrown. Washington has done the same.

States government in events and what appeared to be its conservative policy that connects U.S. support for Aquino ever wins in the end." Malaya indicated the substratum of of the fence in the hope of being in the good graces of whoone more instance of the U.S. trying to straddle both sides dominant preference for Aquino. with support for her right-wing military opponents, but Malacañang, wrote that this "could only be interpreted as cribed them as if they were completely dichotomous and in origins of the different tendencies in U.S. policy, it deswith different answers. The Inquirer (a paper of centrist seemed to underplay the active intervention of the United the Embassy to give President Aquino safe conduct from ber 2 on the other hand, taking note to the alleged offer of no way complementary. The left of center Malay of Septemlunatics." While this analysis may be true in suggesting the hold on to the bases even if it means encouraging right-wing the "apostles of geo-politics at the Pentagon who want to ween the "liberals" in the State Department who support policy) of October 5 saw a split in the U.S. government betopponents in the right wing military - and they came up to be the contradictory aspects of U.S. policy in the Philipremained. Two Manila papers wrestled with what seemed them the appearance of ambivalence in Washington's policy have not settled matters for many in the Philippines. For "the rennaissance of democracy" in the Philippines, and pines - support for President Aquino and support for her The denials of the Embassy and Washington evidently

19

Ellen Tordesillas, writing under her byline in the Malaya of October 12 offered what was a more subtle and comprehensive explanation of the contradictions of U.S. policy. Writing about the new U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt, she said, "Platt is here to carry out the U.S. strategy of sustaining the enemies of the Aquino government, not necessarily to topple her, but just enough to unsettle her and make her abandon whatever influence her nationalist advisers have on her."

It is plausible to suggest that the policy ascribed to the U.S. by Tordesillas has been that of the U.S. government towards the Aquino government ever since its inception. Tordesillas' explanation is one that makes sense out of the series of 5 military "revolts" that have, from the beginning, pre-occupied Aquino, pushing her farther and farther to the right, as, over this period, she has broken off negotiations and declared war on the NPA, purged her cabinet of "leftists," ditched any effort at effective social reform, endorsed vigilantes, and cracked down on labor. The ultimate effect of such a U.S. policy, it seems, would be to turn the Aquino government into a militant defender of a conservative status quo in the Philippines, at the center of which, of course; would stand the U.S. bases. All indications are that this is the role Washington has wished the Aquino government to assume, ever since that of Ferdinand Marcos proved incapable of fulfilling it any more.

The views of Rodney Tasker, Manila correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review, show a similarity to those of Tordesillas in suggesting that there is no hard and fast line between Washington's support for Aquino and its support for her right wing opponents. He approaches the matter from the standpoint of a successful military coup against Aquino and says, "After initial protests, Washington might also have to accept a fait accompli, as long as any new leadership in Manila was not hostile, and posed no immediate threat to the future of U.S. military bases."⁴²

> However they differed otherwise, both the Inquirer and Malaya were unanimous in their assertion (with Rodney Tasker) of the main point: it is the bases that are the touchstone and primary source of U.S. interevention in the Philippines. Malaya says, "The U.S. will throw anybody to the wolves as long as that is necessary to protect its interests. And such interests in the Philippines are primarily the military bases that many in the Aquino government would rather see dismantled."⁴³ The Inquirer: "The bottom line is evidently the bases. For as long as they are here, there will dently the bases. For as long as they are here, there will always be factions within the U.S. government which, for always be factions within the P.S. government which interone reason or another, will feel obliged to resort to interventionism in the Philippines."⁴⁴

What of the future? Respresenta..ve Gregorio Andalana of the left-wing Partido ng Bayan of North Cotabato has this to say, "First it will be the executive (that will be controlled by the military), then this Congress and the people along the way."*5 There is historical precedent for such an outlook. "Today the Philippine bases are essential to U.S. military Intervention in the Mideast, and there is a growing opposition to the bases in the Philippine Congress and in the public at large. It was just such a conjunction of circumstances – U.S. military intervention in Vietnam supplied by Philippine bases and a growing Philippine opposition to the bases – that was an element in the U.S. support for martial law in 1972. Will this be the case today, with or without Aquino?

17.	16.	- 15.	14.	13.	12.	.11.	10.					-							F	22
7. Evelyn Colbert, "The United States and the Philippine Bases," FPI Policy Briefs, Foreign Policy Institution, School of Advanced International Studies, The John Hopkins University, Washington, DC, August 1987.	6. Peter Bacho, "U.S. Policy Options towards the Philippines," Asía Survey, April, 1987.	 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "U.S. Securi- ty Interests in the Philippines," Current Policy, no. 815, Washing- ton, DC, April 1986. 	4. Ibid., p. 404.			1. Ibid., p. 133.	0. Raymond Bonner, op. cit., p. 123.	9. New York Times, June 26, 1974.			6. Raymond Bonner, <i>Waltzing with the Dictator</i> , Times Books, New York, 1987, pp. 98-99.	р. 146.	5. Quoted in The Philippines Reader, edited by Daniel B. Schirmer	 Luck Latter, worn of the reope, international rubitanens, New York, p. 265. 		3. Mark Selden, editor, <i>Remaking Asia</i> , Pantheon Books, New York, 1074 n. 281. Stenhen Boeskomm Shalom The Inited States and	2. Boston Evening Transcript, January 26, 1899.	1. Boston Evening Transcript, May 24, 1898.	Footnotes	2
	, ta	-	(2)	(3)	(4)	۵	N	N	2	2		2	2	2	2	2	2	19.	18.	·····*
	35. New York Times, S	34. Malaya, September 7, 1987; Manila Chronicle, September 20, 1987; Malaya, September 20, 1987.	33. New York Times, August 23, 1987.	32. Boston Globe, August 21, 1987.	31. New York Times, August 23, 1987.	30, Malaya, August 19, 1987, The Daily Inquirer, August 20, 1987.	29. Malaya, August 11, 1987.	28. Village Voice, February 24, 1987.	27. Report of Clark Fact Finding Mission, pp. 29, 21-22.	26. Robert Healy, "Did Singlaub's group play a role in the Philippine uprising?", Op-Ed piece, Boston Globe, September 2, 1987.	Reports: Anderson and Anderson, op. cit., p. 151; Washington Post, February 15, 1987.	25. New York Times, February 18, 1987; Insight, January 19, 1987; Michael Redford "Military Rule in the Philippines." Third World	24. New York Times, February 18, 1987.	23. New York Times, February 18, 1987.	22. Scott Anderson, Jon Lee Anderson, Inside the League, Dodd, Mead & Company, New York, 1987, p. 59.	21. Washington Post, October 27, 1987.	20. Philippine News, March 25-31, 1987.	9. Philippine American News, June 16-30, 1987.	8. Washington Post, September 20, 1987.	23

		45	4 .	43.	42.	41.	40.	39.	38.	37.	36.	35.	24
Campaign Against U.S. Military Bases in the Philippines (CAB) 135 Haddon Place Montelair, NJ 07043	Published February 1988	Malaya, September 16, 1987.	The Daily Inquirer, editorial, "Cabauatan's hidden sponsors," October 5, 1987.	Malaya, editorial "The U.S. 'helping hand,'" September 2, 1987.	Far Eastern Economic Review, October 22, 1987.	Boston Globe, October 29, 1987.	Washington Post, October 27, 1987; Boston Globe, October 29, 1987.	Philadelphia Inquirer, September 16, 1987; Malaya, September 2, 1987.	<i>New York Times</i> , September 5, 1987; <i>The Daily Inquirer</i> , October 5, 1987.	Philadelphia Inquirer, September 16, 1987.	Malaya, editorial "The U.S. 'helping hand' ", September 2, 1987.	New York Times, August 29, 1987.	
· · ·		- -	-					H	ч		7.		
	x												

