

UC Berkeley

Other Recent Work

Title

Using Survey Data to Explain Standard Propositions Regarding Exchange Rate Expectations

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2364b808>

Authors

Frankel, Jeffrey A.
Froot, Kenneth A.

Publication Date

1986-08-01

Peer reviewed

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Department of Economics

Berkeley, California 94720

Working Paper 8604

USING SURVEY DATA TO EXPLAIN STANDARD
PROPOSITIONS REGARDING EXCHANGE RATE
EXPECTATIONS

Jeffrey A. Frankel and Kenneth A. Froot

August 1, 1986

Key words: exchange rates, expectations, survey data, dollar

Abstract

Survey data provide a measure of exchange rate expectations superior to the forward rate in that no risk premium interferences. We test standard propositions using three new sources of survey data. We estimate extrapolative, adaptive and regressive models of expectations. Static or "random walk" expectations and bandwagon expectations are rejected: current appreciation generates the expectation of future depreciation because variables other than the contemporaneous spot rate receive weight. For example, when the dollar was strong, 1981-85, it was expected to depreciate strongly against five foreign currencies. In comparing expectations to the process governing the spot rate we find statistically significant bias.

JEL Classification: 431



Using Survey Data to Test Standard Propositions
Regarding Exchange Rate Expectations

Jeff Frankel

and

Ken Froot

Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California 94720

No variable is as ubiquitous in international financial theory and yet as elusive empirically as investors' expectations regarding exchange rates. In the past, expectations have been modelled in an ad hoc way, often by using the forward exchange rate. There is, however, a serious problem with using the forward discount as the measure of the expected change in the exchange rate, in that the two may not be equal. The gap that may separate the forward discount and expected depreciation is generally interpreted as a risk premium. Most of the large empirical literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward exchange rate, for example, has found it necessary either arbitrarily to assume away the existence of the risk premium, if the aim is to test whether investors have rational expectations, or else to assume that expectations are in fact rational, if the aim is to test propositions regarding the behavior of the risk premium.

We offer a new source of data to measure exchange rate expectations that

This is a revised version of NBER Working Paper no. 1672. We would like to thank Barbara Bruer, John Calverly, Louise Cordova, Kathryn Dominguez, Laura Knoy, and Stephen Marris for help in obtaining data, the National Science Foundation (under grant no. SES-8218300), the Institute for Business and Economic Research at U.C. Berkeley, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's doctoral dissertation program for research support.

avoids such problems: three independent surveys of the expectations held by exchange market participants. Since 1976, American Express Banking Corporation (Amex) has polled a sample of 250-300 central bankers, private bankers, corporate treasurers and economists regarding their expectations of major exchange rates six months and twelve months into the future, approximately once a year. Since 1981, the Economist Financial Report, a newsletter associated with the Economist, has conducted at regular six week intervals a survey of 14 leading international banks regarding their expectations at three, six and twelve-month horizons. And since 1983, Money Market Services, Inc. (MMS), has conducted a similar survey on a weekly or bi-weekly basis, at a variety of short-term horizons. The first two surveys record expectations of five currencies against the dollar (the pound, French franc, mark, Swiss franc and yen), and the MMS data has been collected for four currencies (the pound, mark, Swiss franc and yen). In each survey, it is the median response that is reported.

In this paper we are interested principally in two questions: how best to describe the survey expectations in terms of simple models of investors' expectations formation; and whether investors' expectations are unbiased forecasts of the actual spot exchange rate process. Our aim here is not to develop any special new hypotheses of our own. But a theme which runs throughout our investigation is the stability of expectations. Do the data confirm the suspicions of some critics of floating exchange rates that expectations are characterized by bandwagon effects? Or, in line with many macro models of exchange rate determination, does a current appreciation of the currency by itself generate expectations of future depreciation?

The paper is organized as follows. In section two we present some simple but enlightening summary statistics from the survey data. In section three we

attempt to describe the survey data by using several popular formulations for exchange rate expectations: extrapolative, adaptive, and regressive. Section four then investigates the behavior of the actual spot process and the rationality of the various expectations mechanisms considered in section three. In section five, we offer some thoughts on heterogeneity of exchange rate expectations. Finally, the last section gives our conclusions.

1. THE SURVEY DATA

Economists generally distrust survey data. It is a cornerstone of "positive economics" that we learn more by observing what people do in the marketplace than what they say. Nevertheless, alternative measures of expectations all have their own drawbacks. For this reason, closed-economy macro and finance economists have found survey data useful, in studies of expected inflation (where the Livingston survey has been the most popular), expected official announcements of the money stock and other macroeconomic variables (where MMS is the source), and firm inventory behavior and related topics (see Lovell (1986)). To our knowledge, there had been no studies prior to this one using survey data on exchange rate expectations.¹ This might be considered surprising in light of the great interest in the subject, evident in the large literature on the forward market. One could even argue that the case for using survey data on exchange rate expectations is on firmer ground than the case for using survey data on inflation expectations. The respondents to the surveys participate more directly in the spot and forward exchange markets than the respondents to the Livingston survey participate in the goods markets: they are economists in the foreign-exchange trading room or the traders themselves in major international banks who have up-to-the-minute information on the values

¹ For a recent study of exchange rate expectations using the MMS survey data, see Dominguez (1986).

of the currencies covered. At the very least, these exchange rate survey data contain some useful information that warrants study. It seems likely that economists have not used the data in the past only because they have been unaware of its existence.

One limitation to the survey data should be registered from the start, the relatively small number of times the surveys were conducted as of early 1986: 12 dates for the Amex data, 38 for the Economist data, 47 for the 1983-84 MMS survey. By pooling the cross-section of four or five currencies at each survey date, however, we achieve respectable sample sizes. The obvious contemporaneous correlation of error terms across currencies may be exploited, and we do so with two techniques. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions are used in cases where the error terms are serially uncorrelated, while Method of Moments estimators are employed when under the null hypothesis there is serial correlation.² In addition, there is considerable variety of forecast horizon in the data we employ. We estimate equations for the pooled data at three, six and twelve-month horizons for the Economist data, three-months for the MMS data, and six and twelve-months for the Amex data.³

2. PRELIMINARY RESULTS

Before we set out to test the hypotheses of interest, some descriptive statistics and preliminary tests are in order.

² A second limitation of the Amex survey is that it is conducted by mail, and therefore precise dating of expectations was impossible. In response to this problem we used several alternative methods of dating in all our tests. It turns out that the dating method had a negligible effect on the results. See the data appendix for more detail.

³ In the NBER working paper version of this paper, we also estimated bootstrap standard errors, which are robust in small samples, with respect to estimators that are nonlinear in the residuals and with respect to a variety of nonnormal distributions. This technique has been omitted here both because the resulting standard errors were not very different from those obtained using more conventional methods and because we now have several times as many observations for the Economist data and we have added the MMS sample to the analysis.

2.1. The Magnitude of Expected Depreciation

First, the survey data can be used to shed some light on questions concerning the size of expected depreciation relative to the forward discount. In general the forward discount can be decomposed into expected depreciation and the risk premium:

$$fd_t = \Delta s_{t+1}^e + \tau p_t .$$

Many models of exchange rate determination have made the simplifying (but extreme) assumption that expectations are static, for lack of a better alternative, i.e., that expected depreciation is zero:

$$\Delta s_{t+1}^e = 0 \tag{1}$$

For example, Branson, Halttunen and Masson (1977) did so, giving as a reason that "we have very little empirical evidence on alternative, more complicated expectations mechanisms" (p. 308). The immortal Mundell-Fleming model of exchange rates under conditions of perfect capital mobility can be interpreted as having assumed static expectations, so that international arbitrage equated domestic and foreign interest rates.

More recently, this point of view has been, in a sense, vindicated by the substantial work of Meese and Rogoff (1983). They have shown that the current spot exchange rate is a better predictor of the future rate than are standard monetary models, more elaborate time series models, or the current forward exchange rate; that is, that the exchange rate seems to follow a random walk. Similar empirical findings have turned up in other contexts. Many papers, such as Bilson (1981) and Huang (1984), have reported evidence that the rational expectation is closer to zero depreciation than to the forward discount. These authors did not explicitly conclude that the same is necessarily true of investors' expectations; they found support for the random walk model of the spot

rate, but were relatively agnostic on investors' expectations.

Nevertheless, this work seems to imply that investors' expected depreciation is not a very interesting variable -- that it does not differ very much from zero and is not very responsive to changes in the contemporaneous information set. Bilson (1985) seems to express this point of view, holding that "actual or market forecasts of exchange rates" are unrelated to the forward discount. The position in the Bilson paper is, in effect, that the random walk holds not only as a description of the actual spot rate process but also as a description of investors' expectations formation. It follows that the risk premium constitutes the entire forward discount.

A very different impression of the relative importance of expected depreciation as a component of the forward discount is given by all three of our surveys. Table 1a shows, for each of the surveys, expected depreciation of the dollar against all currencies for which data are available. Most striking is that the survey expected depreciation is not only consistently positive, but is larger (often several times larger) than the expected depreciation implied by the contemporaneous forward discounts reported in Table 1b. An important feature of Table 1a is the apparent agreement across different surveys and forecast horizons. The corroboration of such large expected depreciation numbers suggests that the results are not due to the particularities of each survey's respondents. Table 2 shows the averages of alternative measures of expected depreciation by survey and by country. The forward discount numbers seem to imply that, on average, the dollar was expected to depreciate against the mark, Swiss franc and yen, to remain approximately unchanged against the pound, and to appreciate against the franc. The survey expectations, on the other hand, suggest that the results in Table 1a do not mask a great deal of variation across countries. Table 2 shows that the surveys consistently predicted substantial

depreciation of the dollar against all five currencies surveyed. In every survey, expected depreciation is considerably smaller, however, for currencies that were selling forward at a smaller discount (or a larger premium).

These simple results provide some indication that market expectations are positively correlated, at least cross-sectionally, with the forward discount. Such systematic relationships between expected depreciation and other contemporaneous variables suggest that there is more to investor expectations than is revealed by the random walk model of expectations.⁴

2.2. Unconditional Bias

The simplest possible test of rational expectations is to see if expectations are unconditionally biased, if investors systematically overpredict or underpredict the future spot rate. Tests performed in the 1970s clearly failed to find any unconditional bias.⁵ But in the 1980s the dollar has consistently sold at a discount in the forward exchange market against most other major currencies, as is shown in Tables 1b and 2, and it was not until 1985 that the great, long-anticipated dollar depreciation began to materialize. Indeed, Evans (1985) uses a nonparametric sign test on the forward rate prediction errors over the 1981-84 period and finds significant unconditional bias against the pound. Could there be unconditional bias in the survey data for this period as well?

Table 3 reports formal tests of unconditional bias. The MMS three-month data, available for the period January 1983 to October 1984, show statistically significant bias for all four currencies, even more than the three-month forward discount data during the same period. The Economist data is available through 1985, the first year of dollar decline. The bias is not quite statistically

⁴ Froot and Frankel (1986) decompose the variance of the forward discount into expected depreciation and the risk premium. In the present paper we are concerned only with the first moments.

⁵ See Cornell (1977), Stockman (1978) and Frankel (1980).

significant at the three-month and six-month horizons, but it is significant at the one-year horizon.⁶ The general rule seems to be that when the forward discount is biased, the survey data are also biased, with the implication that the finding cannot be attributed to a risk premium. The presence of biasedness in the 1980s clearly arises from the episode of dollar appreciation that ended in February 1985. Respondents consistently overpredicted the future value of foreign currencies against the dollar in this period.

One explanation that could be suggested for such findings of biasedness is that the surveys measure investors' expectations with error. But it should be noted that if one is willing to assume that the measurement error is random, then the conclusions are unaffected. Under the null hypothesis, positive and negative measurement errors should average out, just like positive and negative prediction errors by investors.

Short of concluding that investors' expectations are not equal to the rationally expected value, one major possible explanation for findings of biasedness remains. It is that the standard errors in our tests are invalidated by the "peso problem" of non-normality in the distribution of the test-statistic. The peso problem arises when there is a small probability of a large change in the exchange rate each period -- such as results from a devaluation, a bursting of a speculative bubble, or a big change in fundamentals -- and when the sample size is not large enough to invoke the central limit theorem with confidence.^{7,8}

⁶ For all data sets but the Amex 6-Month, prediction errors are overlapping because the surveys are conducted more frequently than the forecast interval. The standard errors reported for each currency in Table 3 reflect the number of nonoverlapping intervals in each data set, and are thus upper bounds. Higher significance levels could be obtained by combining the results for different currencies. But the apparent low standard errors when all observations are simply pooled are misleading, as there is a definite correlation of errors across currencies at any point in time. The proper technique (SUR) for this problem is applied in the following section.

⁷ Calculations in Frankel (1985) undermine the hypothesis that the forward discount rationally reflected the 1981-85 path of dollar appreciation, even allowing for the possibility of a sudden large collapse in the dollar.

⁸ It should be noted that a fourth explanation sometimes given for findings of biasedness in the forward rate, after the existence of a risk premium, a failure of rational expectations and the peso problem, is the convexity term due to Jensen's Inequality (see Engel (1984)).

The sensitivity of the direction and magnitude of the bias in prediction error is evident in the Amex survey, the only one available in 1976-79. These data show unconditional bias in the opposite direction in the earlier period, as do the forward rate data: respondents consistently underpredicted the value of foreign currencies against the dollar. When the entire Amex data set from 1976 to 1985 is used, prediction errors show no unconditional bias for either the survey data or the forward rate.

3. TESTS OF EXPECTATIONS FORMATION

The question of what mechanisms investors use to form expectations is of interest independent of the question of whether these mechanisms are rational, that is, whether they coincide with the mathematical expectation of the actual spot process. In this section we investigate alternative specifications of expectations, and in section four we test for their rationality.

A number of simple formulations have traditionally been used. A general framework for expressing them comes from writing the investors' expected future (log) spot rate as a weighted average of the current (log) spot rate with weight $1-\beta$ and some other element, x_t , with weight β :

$$s_{t+1}^e = \beta x_t + (1-\beta)s_t \quad (2)$$

In examining different versions of equation (2), our null hypothesis will be that expectations are in fact static, i.e., that $\beta = 0$ (investors believe in the random walk). We choose interesting candidates for the "other element", x_t , as

Note, however, that if exchange rates are log-normally distributed this convexity term is bounded above by the unconditional variance of the spot rate and is therefore small. For a log-normally distributed random variable, X , $E[X] = \int e^x f(x) dx = \exp\{\mu + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\}$ and $E[1/X] = \int e^{-x} f(x) dx = \exp\{\mu - \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\}$, where $f(x) = \frac{1}{\sigma\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}\}$.

Thus, $\log(E[X]) - \log(E[1/X]) = \sigma^2$, which is weakly greater than the conditional variance, provided that expectations are formed rationally. During the 1980s, $\sigma^2 \approx 0.02$ for the spot rate, so that Jensen's inequality is too small to explain the magnitude of the forward rate prediction errors, let alone the very large shift of about 18 percent between the late 1970s and early 1980s in Table 3.

alternative hypotheses. The models we will consider are extrapolative expectations, adaptive expectations, and regressive expectations. They feature as the "other element" x_t : the lagged spot rate, s_{t-1} , the lagged expectation, s_t^e , and some notion of a long-run equilibrium level of the spot rate, \bar{s}_t , respectively.

One characterization of expectations formation often claimed by market participants themselves is that the most recent trend is extrapolated: if the currency has been depreciating, then investors expect that it will continue to depreciate.⁹ Such "bandwagon" expectations are represented:

$$\Delta s_{t+1}^e = -g \Delta s_t \quad (3)$$

where Δs_t is the most recent observed change in the log of the exchange rate and g is hypothesized to be less than zero. (Again, static expectations would be the special case where $g = 0$.) It has long been a concern of critics of floating exchange rates that bandwagon expectations would render the system unstable. For example, Nurkse (1944, p. 118):

[Speculative] anticipations are apt to bring about their own realization. Anticipatory purchases of foreign exchange tend to produce or at any rate to hasten the anticipated fall in the exchange value of the national currency, and the actual fall may set up or strengthen expectations of a further fall... Exchange rates under such circumstances are bound to become highly unstable, and the influence of psychological factors may at times be overwhelming.

Nurkse's view was challenged by Friedman (1953), who argued that speculation would be stabilizing. "Speculation" can be defined as buying and selling of currency in response to expectations of exchange rate changes, as compared to the counterfactual case of static expectations. A property of bandwagon expectations is that the expected future spot rate as a function of the observed current spot rate has an elasticity that exceeds unity, as contrasted to static expectations, which has an elasticity equal to unity. Because investors sell a

⁹ See, for example, the discussion in Dooley and Shafer (1983, pp. 47-8).

currency that they expect to depreciate, it follows that under bandwagon expectations speculation is destabilizing.

The remaining three models we discuss go the opposite direction. They can all be subsumed under the label **inelastic, or stabilizing, expectations**: a change in the current spot rate induces a revision in the expected future level of the spot rate that, though it may be positive, is less than proportionate. An observed appreciation of the currency generates an anticipation of a future depreciation of the currency back, at least partway, toward its previously expected level. If speculators act on the basis of the expected future depreciation, they will put downward pressure on the price of the currency today; in other words, speculation will be stabilizing. One case of inelastic expectations is equation (3) with g greater than zero. An equivalent representation would be

$$s_{t+1}^e = (1 - g)s_t + gs_{t-1} \quad (4)$$

where s_t is the logarithm of the current spot rate and g is hypothesized to be positive. The hypothesis is a simple form of **distributed lag expectations**. Obviously we could have longer lags as well.

Table 4 reports the results of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions¹⁰ of the survey expected depreciation on the recent change in the spot rate, equation (3), which we call under the general title of extrapolative expectations, where $g > 0$ represents the case of distributed lag and $g < 0$ represents the case of bandwagon expectations. Most of the slope parameters in the column labelled "g" in Table 4 are positive and significant at the one percent level. The evidence suggests that expectations are less than unit elastic with respect to the lagged spot rate, that is, expectations are stabilizing. For example, the point estimate of 0.04 in the three-month Economist data set implies that if the currency

¹⁰ Due to the small number of observations in the Amex data sets, OLS rather than SUR was used to conserve degrees of freedom in this case.

appreciates 10 percent today, it is expected to depreciate 0.4 percent over the next three months, a rate of 1.6 percent per year.

The Durbin-Watson tests for serial correlation reported in Table 4 (except those for the Amex data sets) are the averages of the equation by equation OLS regressions used in the first step of the SUR procedure. For this reason, and since the Amex data are irregularly spaced and thus are not true time series, values of the DW test must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the null hypothesis of no "serial" correlation is still appropriate, and the low reported values of the statistic suggest that the standard errors are suspect. To correct for serial correlation in the residuals, we used a generalized three stage least squares estimator that allows for contemporaneous as well as first order serial correlation of each country's residual.¹¹ These results for the Economist and MMS data sets are reported beneath the uncorrected SUR estimates in Table 4.¹² While we find some evidence of serial correlation in the data, the corrected coefficients are similar in size, and the standard errors are even more unfavorable to the bandwagon hypothesis than in the uncorrected SUR regressions. The lone case of a negative point estimate for g , in the three-month MMS sample, loses its statistical significance under the correction for serial correlation.

Despite the rejection of bandwagon expectations in favor of the stabilizing distributed lag, it may still be true that psychological factors are important in foreign exchange markets. The absence of bandwagon effects in the data does not rule out the possibility of speculative bubbles. Rational bubbles which are constantly forming and popping would not yield systematic bandwagon effects in the spot rate.

¹¹ See Parks (1967).

¹² Because of irregular spacing, we could not correct the estimates for serial correlation in the Amex data sets.

Adaptive expectations are an old standby in the economist's arsenal of expectations models. The expected future spot rate is formed adaptively, as a weighted average of the current observed spot rate and the lagged expected rate:

$$s_{t+1}^e = (1-\gamma_1)s_t + \gamma_1 s_t^e \quad (5)$$

where γ_1 is hypothesized between 0 and 1 for expectations to be inelastic.¹³

We report the results of regressing expected depreciation on the lagged survey prediction error in Table 5:

$$\Delta s_{t+1}^e = \gamma_1 (s_t^e - s_t). \quad (5')$$

Three of the six coefficients in the column labelled γ_1 are statistically significant. All three are positive, implying that expectations place positive weight on the previous prediction. The results in Table 5 provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that expectations are stabilizing. The DW statistics are again very low, particularly in the twelve-month data. When we use the three stage least squares correction for serial correlation, the coefficient is significant in three out of four data sets.

The **regressive expectations** model was made popular by Dornbusch (1976b). It is a more elegant specification, consistent with dynamic models in which variables such as goods prices converge toward their long-run equilibrium values over time in accordance with differential equations, or, in discrete time, in accordance with difference equations:

$$s_{t+1}^e = (1 - \vartheta)s_t + \vartheta \bar{s}_t \quad (6)$$

Here \bar{s}_t is the long-run equilibrium exchange rate, and ϑ (a number between 0

¹³ Adaptive expectations have been considered by Kouri (1976), as a third alternative after static and rational expectations, as well as by Dornbusch (1976a) and many other authors.

and 1 in this discrete-time version) is the speed at which s_t is expected to regress toward \bar{s}_t , as can perhaps be seen more clearly in the equivalent representation,

$$\Delta s_{t+1}^e = -\vartheta(s_t - \bar{s}_t) \quad (7)$$

The long-run equilibrium, \bar{s}_t , can itself change. It is normally assumed to obey Purchasing Power Parity, increasing proportionately in response to a change in the domestic money supply and price level.

In the econometric tests below, we try out two alternative formulations for \bar{s}_t . The simplest possible description of the long-run equilibrium is that it is constant over our sample. Thus we regress expected depreciation on the spot rate and constant terms for each country. The results are presented in Table 6. A second specification for the long-run value of the exchange rate is that given by purchasing power parity. In this case, \bar{s}_t moves with relative inflation differentials instead of remaining constant:

$$\bar{s}_t = s_0 + \log \left(\frac{P_t / P_0}{P^*_t / P^*_0} \right) \quad (8)$$

where s_0 is the log of the average nominal value of the foreign currency in terms of dollars, 1973-79, P_t and P^*_t are the current monthly levels of the US and Foreign CPIs, respectively, and P_0 and P^*_0 are the average levels of the US and foreign CPIs, 1973-79.

The general conclusions that come out of Tables 6 and 7 are identical. Four of the six data sets give significant weight to the long-run equilibrium, in each case positive. Investors expect the spot rate to regress toward its long-run equilibrium. Note that this is a stronger property than the fact, which we discovered in Tables 1a and 2, that investors have been forecasting large depreciation on average throughout the 1980s. Regressivity requires not only that

investors expect a currency that is above its long-run level to depreciate, but also that they expect it to depreciate by more the farther it is above its equilibrium value. In Table 7, the Economist regressions at three-month, six-month and twelve-month horizons show that deviations from PPP are expected to decay at annual rates of $(1-0.9881^4) \approx 5$ percent, $(1-0.9218^2) \approx 15$ percent and 24 percent, respectively. This last figure implies that the expected half-life of PPP deviations is 2.5 years.

Clearly, if a high R^2 were our goal, more complicated models could have been reported. We estimated the most general specification for expectations, expanding the information set to include simultaneously the current and lagged spot rates, the long-run equilibrium rate and the lagged expected spot rate. We then tested the entire set of nested hypotheses, beginning with this general specification all the way to static expectations. In particular, we considered as alternatives to the simple models discussed above hybrid specifications such as "adaptive-bandwagon":

$$\Delta s_{t+1}^e = \gamma(s_t^e - s_t) - g \Delta s_{t+1}$$

The R^2 s of these more complex permutations were higher than those reported in Tables 4 through 7. However the best fits were for models which are unfamiliar compared with the popular formulations above. Furthermore, the strongest statistical rejections were those reported here, of static expectations against the simpler extrapolative, adaptive and regressive models; when estimating the hybrid models, by contrast, we were able statistically to accept the constraints implied by the simple models. For these reasons we do not report the results.

The central point of our analysis is to investigate the robustness of a rejection of static expectations, not to settle on any single model of expectations. The goodness-of-fit statistics in Tables 4 through 7, however, give us an opportunity to compare the fits of these simple alternative specifications. From this

set of alternatives, the best model appears to be the distributed lag.

4. ARE EXPECTATIONS FORMED RATIONALLY?

Now that we have an idea of the parameters describing the formation of investor expectations, we will see how well they correspond to the parameters describing the true process governing the spot rate. We could estimate first the mathematical expectation of the actual spot process and only then test for equality with the process governing investors' expectations estimated in section 3. Here we report directly regressions of the difference between the investor expectations and the realized spot rate -- $\Delta s_{t+1}^e - \Delta s_{t+1}$, or equivalently, $s_{t+1}^e - s_{t+1}$ -- against the same variables as in the preceding section. Under the null hypothesis the coefficient should be zero, and the error term should be uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables, i.e., the spot rate prediction error should be purely random, as should be the case for any right-hand-side variables observed at time t . Furthermore, under the null hypothesis, the error term should be serially uncorrelated, which makes the econometrics easier. The logic is the same as in the existing literature of rational expectations tests, where expectations are measured by the forward rate rather than survey data, except that we are free of the problems presented by the risk premium.¹⁴

In testing whether expectations are rational there are added advantages in having first tested models of what variables matter for expectations. For those cases in which we fail to reject the null hypothesis, it helps to have an idea whether the right-hand-side variable is relevant to determining Δs_{t+1}^e and Δs_{t+1} ; if not, the test of rational expectations is not very powerful. For those cases when we do reject the null hypothesis, we will have a ready-made description of

¹⁴ In the NBER working paper version, we reported for purposes of comparison in all our tests results both using expectations measured by the forward discount and using expectations measured by the survey data.

the nature of investors' bias; an explicit alternative hypothesis is lacking in most standard tests.

4.1. Econometric Issues

The tests of rational expectations below were performed by OLS with standard errors calculated using a method of moments procedure. The usual OLS standard errors are inappropriate because of the contemporaneous correlation across countries, and a sampling interval many times smaller than the forecast horizon. In the previous section, where expected depreciation is the regressee, a long forecast horizon and short sampling interval do not themselves imply that the error term is serially correlated, since expectations are formed using only contemporaneous and past information. When the prediction error is on the left-hand-side, however, we have the usual problem induced by overlapping observations: under the null hypothesis the error term, consisting of new information that becomes available during the forecast interval, is a moving average process of an order equal to the number of sampling intervals contained in the forecast horizon minus one.¹⁵ The OLS point estimates remain consistent in spite of the serially correlated residuals. The method of moments estimate of the sample covariance matrix of the OLS estimate, $\hat{\theta}$ is:

$$\hat{\theta} = (X_{NT}' X_{NT})^{-1} X_{NT}' \hat{\Omega} X_{NT} (X_{NT}' X_{NT})^{-1} \quad (9)$$

where X_{NT} is the matrix of regressors of size N (countries) times T (time). The $(i, j)^{th}$ element of the unrestricted covariance matrix, $\hat{\Omega}$ is:

$$\hat{\omega}(i, j) = \frac{1}{NT-k} \sum_{l=0}^{N-1} \sum_{t=k+1}^T \hat{u}_{t+lT} \hat{u}_{t-k+lT} \text{ for } mT-n \leq k \leq mT+n ; m = 0, \dots, N-1$$

$$= 0 \quad \text{otherwise .} \quad (10)$$

¹⁵ For the original application of method of moments estimation to exchange rate data with overlapping observations, see Hansen and Hodrick (1980).

where n is the order of the MA process, \hat{u}_{t+lT} is the OLS residual, and $k = |i-j|$. Such an unrestricted estimate of Ω uses many degrees of freedom; in the case of the Economist twelve-month data, $N = 5$ and $n = 8$, so that the covariance matrix has $N(N+1)n/2$ or 120 independent parameters. We instead estimated a restricted covariance matrix, $\tilde{\Omega}$ with typical element:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\omega}(t+lT, t-k+pT) &= \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{t=0}^N \hat{\omega}(t+lT, t-k+pT) \text{ if } l = p \text{ and } -n \leq k \leq n \\ &= \frac{2}{N(N-1)} \sum_{p=0}^{N-1} \sum_{t=0}^{N-1-p} \hat{\omega}(t+lt, t-k+pT) \text{ if } l \neq p \text{ and } -n \leq k \leq n \\ &= 0 \quad \text{otherwise.} \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

These restrictions have the effect of averaging the own-currency and cross-currency autocorrelation functions of the OLS residuals, respectively, bringing the number of independent parameters down to $2n$.

A problem with our estimate of $\tilde{\Omega}$ is that it need not be positive definite in small samples. Newey and West (1985) offer a consistent estimate of Ω that discounts the j th order autocovariance by $1 - (j/(m+1))$, and is positive definite in finite sample. For any given sample size, however, there is still a question of how large m must be to guarantee positive definiteness. In the subsequent regressions we tried $m = n$ (which Newey and West themselves suggest) and $m = 2n$; we report standard errors using the latter value of m because they were consistently larger than those using the former.

4.2. The Results

We now turn to the results of our tests of rationality within the three models examined in section 3.

In Table 4 we found that if investors' expected future spot rate is viewed as a distributed lag of the actual spot rate, then the weight on the current spot rate is less than one and the weight on the lagged spot rate greater than zero. Is this degree of inelasticity of expectations rational? Or is the future spot rate more likely to lie in the direction of the current spot rate, as would be the case if the actual spot rate followed a random walk?

Table 8 shows highly significant rejections of rational expectations for three of the six data sets. As in the case of unconditional bias, the results are immune to measurement error in the survey data, provided the error is random, because it simply goes into the regression error. The Economist twelve-month data significantly overestimate the tendency for the spot rate to keep moving in the same direction as it had been, while the Amex data underestimate the tendency to keep moving in the same direction. The diversity of results is not primarily attributable to a difference between the two surveys. Table 4 showed similar parameters of expectations formation in the two surveys. Rather the difference is primarily attributable to the behavior of the actual spot process during the two different sample periods for which data are available. If one includes in the sample the years 1976-78, during which the Amex data is available, then more extrapolative expectations would have been correct, because the dollar had a long run of declines followed by a long run of appreciation. But if one considers the period 1981-85 alone, less extrapolative expectations would have been correct, because first differences of the actual spot rate (though usually negative) were not positively serially correlated.¹⁶ The conclusion is that the actual spot process is significantly different from investors' expectations, but it is also more complicated than a simple distributed lag with constant weights, whether correctly perceived by investors or

¹⁶ In the NBER working papers version, we report in each table separate regressions for the actual spot process.

not.

In Table 5 we found that investors' expectations can be viewed as adaptive. When investors make a prediction error, they revise their previous expectations most, though not all, of the way to the new observed spot rate. Would they do better to revise their expectation even farther, or less far? Assume that the true best predictor of the future spot rate is a weighted average of the current spot rate and the lagged expectation:

$$s_{t+1} = (1-\gamma_2)s_t + \gamma_2 s_t^e + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (12)$$

Then investors' expectations would be rational if and only if γ_1 from equation (5) were equal to γ_2 from equation (12). Taking the difference of the two equations,

$$s_{t+1}^e - s_{t+1} = (\gamma_1 - \gamma_2)(s_t^e - s_t) + \varepsilon_{t+1} \quad (13)$$

In Table 9 we regress the expectational error against the lagged expectational error as in equation (13). Such tests of serial correlation are a common way of testing for efficiency in the forward market.¹⁷ In the context of adaptive expectations, we can see clearly what the alternative hypothesis is. Positive serial correlation would mean that expectations are insufficiently adaptive; investors could avoid making the same error repeatedly if they revised their expectations all the way to the new spot rate. Negative serial correlation would mean that expectations are overly adaptive. Table 9 shows that expectations are insufficiently adaptive in each data set. The lagged expectation essentially contains no information useful for predicting the next change in the spot rate. In two cases the tendency for investors to put too little weight on the current spot rate is highly significant statistically.¹⁸

¹⁷ See, for example, Dooley and Shafer (1983) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980).

¹⁸ Marris (1985, pp. 120-122) argues that expectations are overly adaptive, or more generally that they put too much weight on the most recent spot rate, the opposite of the result found here. His argument, however, is that a forecasting strategy of putting less weight on the contemporaneous spot rate would ultimately be vindicated *in the long run*.

In Tables 6 and 7 we found that investors expected the spot rate to regress over the subsequent year toward a long-run equilibrium, at a rate of up to 24 per cent of the existing gap. In Tables 10 and 11 we test whether this regressive expectation is borne out by reality. An earlier version of this paper that included data only up to March 1985 showed that the Economist data were overly regressive. But now in both the Economist and MMS data the actual spot rate on average regressed toward equilibrium to an even greater extent than investors expected. In the case of the Economist twelve-month data, this underestimation of regressivity constitutes a highly significant rejection of rational expectations. But the results are dominated by the peaking of the dollar in 1985. When the years 1976-78 are included (the Amex sample) there is on average no tendency for the spot rate to regress toward equilibrium. Again, the rejection of rational expectations is robust, but the sign is sensitive to the precise sample period.

5. THOUGHTS ON "THE" EXPECTED EXCHANGE RATE

The foregoing results suggest that, if we are to reject the hypothesis of rational expectations, the alternative must be something more complex than the simple models considered above. In Table 3, we found that investors systematically overpredicted the depreciation of the dollar in the 1980s, and systematically underpredicted its depreciation in the late 1970s. Similarly, there was a consistent tendency for investors to overestimate the speed of regression before 1985 and to underestimate it thereafter. Such findings suggest the possibility that the nature of the forecasting bias changes over time. Investors could even be rational, and yet make repeated mistakes of the kind detected here, if the true model of the spot process is evolving over time.

Another puzzle is that the gap between the forward discount and the expected rate of depreciation in the survey data is so large, an average of 7

percent for the Economist six-month data. To explain the gap as a risk premium would require (a) that assets denominated in other currencies were perceived in the early 1980s as riskier than assets denominated in dollars, and (b) that investors are highly risk-averse. An alternative is the possibility that investors do not base their actions on a single homogeneous expectation such as regressive expectations. If expectations are heterogeneous, then the forward discount that is determined in market equilibrium could be a convex combination of regressive expectations and other forecasts that are closer to static expectations.

A third clue is that in our results, the three-month survey data exhibit a lower speed of regression toward the long-run equilibrium, even when annualized, than do the six-month data, and the six-month survey data exhibit a lower speed of regression than do the twelve-month data. This pattern in the term structure suggests the possibility that those investors who think longer-term tend to be the ones who subscribe to regressive expectations, and those who think shorter-term tend to be the ones who subscribe to forecasts that are closer to static expectations.

In the present paper we have treated exchange rate expectations as homogeneous, for the simple reason that almost all the literature, both theoretical and empirical, does so. Our goal here was only to test standard propositions about "the" expected rate of depreciation, whether it is non-zero, whether it is inelastic, whether it is rational, etc. But in fact, each forecaster has his or her own expectation. The Economist six-month survey, for example, reports a high-low range around the median response; it averages 15.2 percent for the five exchange rates.¹⁹ Different models may be in use at one time. We believe

¹⁹ Such heterogeneity across investors can still be compatible with a well-defined market expectation. Rubinstein (1974) gives conditions under which agents with different beliefs may be aggregated to form a composite investor with preferences exhibiting rational expectations.

that heterogeneous expectations and their role in determining market dynamics are important areas for future research.

6. CONCLUSIONS

To summarize our findings:

(1) Exchange rate expectations are not static. The observed nonzero forward discount numbers, far from being attributable to a positive risk premium on the dollar, have understated the degree of expected dollar depreciation during the recent period, which was consistently large and positive.

(2) Exchange rate expectations do not exhibit bandwagon effects. We find that the elasticity of the expected future spot rate with respect to the current spot rate is in general significantly less than unity; expectations put positive weight on the "other factor", regardless whether it is the lagged spot rate (distributed lag expectations), lagged expected rate (adaptive expectations), or the long-run equilibrium rate (regressive expectations). The general finding of inelastic expectations is important because it implies that a current increase in the spot exchange rate itself generates anticipations of a future decrease, as in the overshooting model, which should work to moderate the extent of the original increase. Speculation is stabilizing.

(3) While expected depreciation is large in magnitude, the actual spot exchange rate process may be close to a random walk, giving rise to unconditional bias in the survey forecast errors during the 1980s. In view of point (2), a spot process with a large random walk component would suggest that expectations are less elastic than is rational. Indeed, we find statistically significant bias conditional on, for example, lagged expectational errors. This is the same finding common in tests of efficiency in the forward exchange market, but it now cannot be attributed to a risk premium.

(4) The nature of the rejection of rational expectations strongly depends on

the sample period. During the 1981-85 period, the actual spot process did not behave according to investors' expectations that the currency would return toward its previous equilibrium, but after February 1985, the dollar depreciated at a rate in excess of what was expected. It seems likely that the actual spot rate process is more complicated than any of the models tested here.

(5) While the present paper adopted the standard theoretical and empirical framework that assumes homogeneous expectations, a number of clues suggest that investigating heterogeneous investor expectations would be a useful avenue for future research.

7. DATA APPENDIX

In this appendix we briefly describe the construction of the Economist, Amex and MMS data sets more specifically.

The Economist Financial Review conducted 38 surveys beginning in June, 1981 through December, 1985. Surveys took place on a specific day on which the foreign exchange markets were open. Respondents were asked for their expectations of the value of five currencies (the pound, French franc, mark, Swiss franc, and yen) against the dollar in three months, six-months and twelve-months time. We carefully matched a given day's survey results with that day's actual rates, and with actual rates as close to 90 and 180 days later as possible. Survey dates and the dates we used are reported in Table A1.

The Amex Bank Review has conducted 12 surveys beginning in January, 1976, through July 1985. Respondents were asked for their expectations of the value of the same five currencies in six-months and twelve-months time. The first three surveys, however, included only the pound and the mark. Future foreign exchange market realizations were matched in a manner similar to that used for the Economist data. Amex Bank surveys were conducted by mail, and hence it was impossible to pick specific days which were used by all respondents as reference points with any degree of certainty. Since exchange rates vary so much within a month, two methods of choosing the contemporaneous spot rate (and the corresponding future rates respondents were predicting) were employed. First, single days within the survey period were selected. Second, 30 day averages of daily rates were constructed to encompass the entire survey period. The days and averages used are reported in Table A2, the results from the first Amex data set are not reported here; they are available in the NBER working paper version of this paper. Since both methods gave very similar quantitative results in the body of the paper, the results from the Amex

DAY data set are reported only in the NBER working paper version.

Between January, 1983 and October, 1984, MMS conducted 47 surveys (one each two weeks) of the value of the dollar against the pound, mark, Swiss franc and yen in three-months time. Matching of actual spot rates and forward rates was done in a similar manner. Survey dates are reported in Table A3.

Actual market spot and forward rates were taken from DRI. They represent the average of the morning bid and ask rates from New York. Lagged exchange rates (used for extrapolative expectations) are market rates approximately 90 days before survey dates. These dates are reported in the last columns of Tables A1, A2 and A3.

8. REFERENCES

- Bilson, John, "The Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis," *Journal of Business*, July 1981, 54, 435-51.
- _____, "Macroeconomic Stability and Flexible Exchange Rates", *American Economic Review*, Papers and Proceedings, May 1985, 75, 62-67.
- Branson, William, Hannu Halttunen and Paul Masson, "Exchange Rates in the Short Run: The Dollar-Deutschemark Rate," *European Economic Review*, 1977, 10, 303-324.
- Cornell, Bradford, "Spot Rates, Forward Rates, and Exchange Market Efficiency," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 1977, 5, 55-65.
- Dominguez, Kathryn, "Expectations Formation in the Foreign Exchange Market: New Evidence from Survey Data," Yale University, January 1986.
- Dooley, Michael and Jeffrey Shafer, "Analysis of Short-Run Exchange Rate Behavior: March 1973 to November 1981," in D. Bigman and T. Taya, eds. *Exchange Rate and Trade Instability: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies*, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1983.
- Dornbusch, Rudiger, "The Theory of Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Policy," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, May 1976, 78, 255-79.
- _____, "Expectations and Exchange Rate Dynamics," *Journal of Political Economy*, December 1976, 84, 1161-76.
- Engel, Charles M., "Testing for the Absence of Expected Real Profits from Forward Market Speculation," *Journal of International Economics*, 1984, 17, 299-308.
- Evans, George W., "Speculative Bubbles and the Sterling-Dollar Exchange Rate: A New Test," Stanford University, September 1985.
- Frankel, Jeffrey, "Tests of Rational Expectations in the Forward Exchange Market," *Southern Economic Journal*, April 1980, 46, 1083-1101.
- _____, "The Dazzling Dollar," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 1985, 1, 199-217.
- Frankel, Jeffrey A. and Kenneth A. Froot, "Using Survey Data to Test Some Standard Propositions Regarding Exchange Rate Expectations," NBER Working Paper, No. 1672, July 1985.

-
- _____, "The Dollar as a Speculative Bubble: A Tale of Chartists and Fundamentalists," NBER Working Paper, No. 1854, March 1986.
- Friedman, Milton, "The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates," in M. Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 157-203.
- Froot, Kenneth A. and Jeffrey A. Frankel, "Interpreting Tests of Forward Discount Unbiasedness: Using Survey Data on Exchange Rate Expectations," University of California, Berkeley, May 1986.
- Kouri, Pentti J.K., "The Exchange Rate and the Balance of Payments in the Short Run and the Long Run: A Monetary Approach," *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 1976, 10, 280-304.
- Hansen, Lars and Robert Hodrick, "Forward Rates as Optimal Predictors of Future Spot Rates: An Econometric Analysis," *Journal of Political Economy*, October 1980, 88, 829-53.
- Huang, Roger, "Some Alternative Tests of Forward Exchange Rates as Predictors of Future Spot Rates," *Journal of International Money and Finance*, August 1984, 3, 157-67.
- Lovell, Michael C., "Tests of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis," *American Economic Review*, March 1986, 76, 110-124.
- Marris, Stephen, *Deficits and the Dollar: The World Economy at Risk*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, December 1985.
- Meese, Richard and Kenneth Rogoff, "Empirical Exchange Rate Models of the Seventies: Do They Fit Out of Sample?", *Journal of International Economics*, February 1983, 14, 3-24.
- Newey, Whitney and Kenneth West, "A Simple, Positive Definite, Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix," Woodrow Wilson School Discussion Paper, No. 92, May 1985.
- Nurkse, Ragnar, *International Currency Experience*, Geneva: League of Nations, 1944.
- Parks, R.W., "Efficient Estimation of a System of Regression Equations when Disturbances are Both Serially and Contemporaneously Correlated," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 1967, LXII, 500-509.
- Rubinstein, Mark, "An Aggregation Theorem for Securities Markets," *Journal of Financial Economics*, 1974, 1, 225-244.
- Stockman, Alan C., "Risk, Information and Forward Exchange Rates," in J.A. Frenkel and H.G. Johnson, eds. *The Economics of Exchange Rates*, Reading Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1978.

Table 1a
SURVEY EXPECTED DEPRECIATION
OF THE DOLLAR
AGAINST FIVE CURRENCIES†

Data Set	1975-79	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
MMS 3 Month				8.17	7.26	
Economist 3 Month		9.95	13.44	10.17	10.68	1.56
Economist 6 Month		8.90	10.31	10.42	11.66	3.93
AMEX 6 Month	1.20	7.50	10.37	4.19	7.93	1.16
Economist 12 Month		7.17	8.33	7.65	10.02	4.24
AMEX 12 Month	-0.20	5.67	6.86	5.18	8.47	3.60

Notes: † MMS data is the average of four currencies (the Pound, Mark, Swiss Franc, and Yen) and does not include the French Franc. 1986 includes data through March.

Table 1b
FORWARD DISCOUNT
OF THE DOLLAR
AGAINST FIVE CURRENCIES†

Time Sample	1975-79	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
MMS 3 Month				3.05	4.60	
Economist 3 Month		3.94	2.95	1.17	3.20	1.22
Economist 6 Month		3.74	3.01	1.10	3.21	0.83
AMEX 6 Month	1.06	4.49	5.21	1.48	4.37	0.02
Economist 12 Month		3.40	3.02	1.25	3.29	0.89
AMEX 12 Month	0.93	3.70	4.65	1.28	4.45	0.31

Notes: † Forward discounts were recorded at the time each survey was conducted. MMS data is the average of four currencies (the Pound, Mark, Swiss Franc, and Yen) and does not include the French Franc. 1986 includes data through March.

04/19/86

Table 2
 VARIOUS MEASURES OF EXPECTED DEPRECIATION
 OVER THE FOLLOWING MONTHS
 (% percent per annum)

FORECAST HORIZON	SURVEY SOURCE	DATES	N	$E[s(t+1)] - s(t)$	FORWARD DISCOUNT $f(t) - s(t)$	N	$s(t+1) - s(t)$	ACTUAL CHANGE
3 MONTHS								
TOTAL	MNS	1/83-10/84	187	7.76	3.75	187	-10.77	
UK			47	4.46	0.37	47	-13.92	
WG			47	8.33	4.68	47	-13.68	
SW			46	9.62	6.13	47	-12.61	
JA			47	8.68	3.85	47	-2.90	
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	190	9.13	2.20	195	-0.84	
UK			38	3.66	-0.06	38	-6.43	
FR			38	5.17	-3.94	38	-4.43	
WG			38	11.84	4.36	38	0.81	
SW			38	12.30	5.99	38	1.47	
JA			38	12.66	4.67	38	4.37	
6 MONTHS								
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	190	9.30	2.22	180	-2.18	
UK			38	4.19	0.14	36	-6.79	
FR			38	4.69	-4.03	36	-6.29	
WG			38	12.39	4.35	36	-0.96	
SW			38	12.27	5.89	36	-0.36	
JA			38	12.94	4.74	36	3.52	
TOTAL	AMEX	1/76-8/85	51	3.87	2.07	51	5.98	
Early Period		1/76-12/78	26	1.20	1.06	26	8.98	
Later Period		6/81-8/85	25	6.66	3.12	25	2.86	
12 MONTHS								
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	195	7.77	2.31	155	-6.42	
UK			38	3.38	0.36	31	-9.47	
FR			38	3.72	-3.63	31	-11.20	
WG			38	10.67	4.24	31	-5.60	
SW			38	10.41	5.91	31	-5.75	
JA			38	10.67	4.66	31	-0.08	
TOTAL	AMEX	1/76-8/85	51	2.81	1.88	46	2.02	
Early Period		1/76-12/78	26	-0.20	0.93	26	8.85	
Later Period		6/81-8/85	25	5.95	2.88	20	-6.66	

Table 3
UNCONDITIONAL BIAS IN PREDICTIONS
OF FUTURE EXCHANGE RATES
(% percent per annum)

FORECAST HORIZON	SURVEY SOURCE	DATES	N	SURVEY ERROR			FORWARD DISCOUNT ERROR		
				Mean	SD of Mean	t stat	Mean	SD of Mean	t stat
3 MONTHS									
TOTAL	HMS	1/83-10/84	187	18.53	2.88	6.44	14.51	2.66	5.08
UK			47	18.38	5.91	3.11	14.29	5.90	2.42
WG			47	22.01	5.89	3.73	18.36	5.99	3.07
SW			46	22.23	5.20	4.28	18.74	4.85	3.86
JA			47	11.58	5.14	2.25	6.75	4.97	1.36
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	190	9.97	2.92	3.42	3.04	2.73	1.12
UK			38	10.09	6.66	1.51	6.37	5.88	1.08
FR			38	9.61	6.47	1.48	0.49	5.98	0.08
WG			38	11.02	6.45	1.71	3.55	5.90	0.60
SW			38	10.83	7.03	1.54	4.52	6.73	0.67
JA			38	8.29	5.95	1.39	0.30	5.84	0.05
6 MONTHS									
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	180	11.70	3.20	3.66	4.48	3.03	1.48
UK			36	11.32	6.71	1.69	7.10	6.24	1.14
FR			36	11.08	7.13	1.55	2.15	6.71	0.32
WG			36	13.56	7.16	1.89	5.36	6.63	0.81
SW			36	12.77	7.80	1.64	6.37	7.37	0.86
JA			36	9.76	6.84	1.43	1.41	6.65	0.21
TOTAL	AMEX	1/76-8/85	51	-2.11	2.82	-0.75	-3.92	2.61	-1.50
Early Period		6/76-12/78	26	-7.78	2.94	-2.65	-7.93	2.80	-2.83
Later Period		6/81-8/85	25	3.79	4.59	0.83	0.26	4.30	0.06
12 MONTHS									
TOTAL	ECONOMIST	6/81-12/85	155	14.83	2.23	6.64	9.00	2.39	3.77
UK			31	13.73	4.96	2.77	10.39	5.46	1.90
FR			31	15.10	4.75	3.18	7.20	5.09	1.41
WG			31	17.02	4.72	3.60	10.02	4.82	2.08
SW			31	16.73	5.06	3.31	12.13	5.41	2.24
JA			31	7.46	5.02	1.49	5.15	5.27	0.98
TOTAL	AMEX	1/76-8/85	46	0.71	2.52	0.28	0.04	2.30	0.02
Early Period		6/76-12/78	26	-9.05	3.20	-2.83	-7.92	3.36	-2.36
Later Period		6/81-8/85	20	13.40	1.07	12.52	10.38	1.10	9.42

Note: Degrees of Freedom used to estimate SD of mean is the number of nonoverlapping observations for each data set. The t statistics are thus minimum bounds.

TABLE 4
 EXTRAPOLATIVE EXPECTATIONS
 Independent variable: $s(t-1) - s(t)$

SUR Regressions(1) of Survey Expected Depreciation: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t) = a + g(s(t-1) - s(t))$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient		DW(2)	DF	t:b1=0	R ²
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)	g					
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0082 (0.0032)	0.0119 (0.0024)	0.0292 (0.0023)	0.0306 (0.0024)	0.0317 (0.0033)	0.0416 (0.0210)	1.81	184	1.98 *	0.30	
with AR(1) Correction		0.0076 (0.0045)	0.0116 (0.0025)	0.0288 (0.0045)	0.0304 (0.0029)	0.0316 (0.0040)	0.0463 (0.0195)		179	2.37 **	0.38	
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0127 (0.0015)		0.0218 (0.0015)	0.0249 (0.0026)	0.0212 (0.0013)	-0.0391 (0.0168)	1.49	179	-2.32 **	0.37	
with AR(1) Correction		0.0126 (0.0016)		0.0210 (0.0031)	0.0249 (0.0027)	0.0211 (0.0019)	-0.0298 (0.0203)		194	-1.46	0.19	
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0193 (0.0034)	0.0216 (0.0031)	0.0612 (0.0029)	0.0611 (0.0032)	0.0647 (0.0032)	0.0730 (0.0225)	1.36	184	3.25 ***	0.54	
with AR(1) Correction		0.0185 (0.0053)	0.0213 (0.0049)	0.0609 (0.0048)	0.0609 (0.0036)	0.0650 (0.0053)	0.0832 (0.0236)		179	3.53 ***	0.58	
Amex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0058 (0.0084)	0.0031 (0.0091)	0.0222 (0.0085)	0.0188 (0.0090)	0.0313 (0.0064)	0.2994 (0.0487)	1.89	45	6.15 ***	0.81	
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0292 (0.0049)	0.0322 (0.0037)	0.1046 (0.0035)	0.1033 (0.0034)	0.1070 (0.0043)	0.2018 (0.0296)	1.47	184	6.82 ***	0.84	
with AR(1) Correction		0.0252 (0.0082)	0.0298 (0.0079)	0.1033 (0.0039)	0.1026 (0.0030)	0.1068 (0.0059)	0.2638 (0.0251)		179	10.51 ***	0.92	
Amex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0020 (0.0138)	-0.0104 (0.0150)	0.0429 (0.0139)	0.0318 (0.0148)	0.0538 (0.0104)	0.3796 (0.0798)	0.94	45	4.76 ***	0.72	

(1) Amex 6 and 12 Month regressions use OLS due to the small number of degrees of freedom.

(2) The DW statistic is the average of the equation by equation OLS Durbin-Watson statistics for each data set. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE 5
ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS
Independent variable: $E(t-1)[s(t)] - s(t)$

SUR Regressions(1) of Survey Expected Depreciation: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t) = a + \gamma_t (E(t-1)[s(t)] - s(t))$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient	DW(2)	DF	t:b1=0	R ²
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)	γ_t				
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0077 (0.0029)	0.0114 (0.0024)	0.0279 (0.0024)	0.0291 (0.0024)	0.0291 (0.0034)	0.0798 (0.0203)	2.01	169	3.93 ***	0.63
with AR(1) Correction		0.0079 (0.0040)	0.0118 (0.0023)	0.0285 (0.0037)	0.0296 (0.0024)	0.0297 (0.0038)	0.0716 (0.0180)		164	3.97 ***	0.64
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0128 (0.0016)		0.0219 (0.0018)	0.0245 (0.0031)	0.0216 (0.0015)	-0.0272 (0.0215)	1.29	159	-1.26	0.15
with AR(1) Correction		0.0126 (0.0020)		0.0185 (0.0061)	0.0242 (0.0032)	0.0210 (0.0024)	-0.0234 (0.0234)		154	-1.00	0.10
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0199 (0.0038)	0.0215 (0.0036)	0.0592 (0.0032)	0.0598 (0.0031)	0.0601 (0.0034)	0.0516 (0.0161)	1.12	159	3.20 ***	0.53
with AR(1) Correction		0.0173 (0.0067)	0.0198 (0.0064)	0.0575 (0.0063)	0.0583 (0.0054)	0.0590 (0.0054)	0.0783 (0.0223)		154	3.52 ***	0.58
Amex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0040 (0.0175)	0.0138 (0.0173)	0.0082 (0.0145)	-0.0035 (0.0162)	0.0237 (0.0155)	-0.0702 (0.1200)	2.10	15	-0.58	0.04
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0442 (0.0066)	0.0431 (0.0060)	0.1097 (0.0063)	0.1113 (0.0062)	0.1009 (0.0057)	-0.0093 (0.0244)	1.10	139	-0.38	0.02
with AR(1) Correction		0.0130 (0.0094)	0.0071 (0.0118)	0.0713 (0.0093)	0.0758 (0.0083)	0.0737 (0.0071)	0.1890 (0.0301)		134	6.28 ***	0.81
Amex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0042 (0.0163)	0.0020 (0.0178)	0.0543 (0.0161)	0.0466 (0.0178)	0.0669 (0.0126)	0.0946 (0.0212)	0.55	31	4.47 ***	0.69

(1) Amex 6 and 12 Month regressions use OLS due to the small number of degrees of freedom.

(2) The DW statistic is the average of the equation by equation OLS Durbin-Watson statistics for each data set. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE 6
REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS I
Independent variable: $s(t)$
Long Run Equilibrium Constant

SUR Regressions(1) of Survey Expected Depreciation: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t) = a - \Theta s(t)$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient	DW(2)	DF	t:bl=0	R ²
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)	Θ				
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0241 (0.0055)	-0.0575 (0.0206)	-0.0050 (0.0101)	0.0028 (0.0083)	-0.1647 (0.0555)	0.0359 (0.0101)	1.56	184	3.55 ***	0.58
with AR(1) Correction		0.0183 (0.0069)	-0.0326 (0.0222)	0.0077 (0.0112)	0.0132 (0.0089)	-0.0918 (0.0599)	0.0226 (0.0109)		179	2.07 **	0.32
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0077 (0.0060)		0.0306 (0.0156)	0.0319 (0.0127)	0.0761 (0.0867)	0.0100 (0.0159)	1.46	179	0.63	0.04
with AR(1) Correction		0.0138 -0.0074		0.0143 (0.0193)	0.0194 (0.0155)	-0.0122 (0.1065)	0.0061 (0.0195)		174	0.31	0.01
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0529 (0.0066)	-0.1308 (0.0259)	-0.0117 (0.0127)	0.0019 (0.0105)	-0.3534 (0.0698)	0.0764 (0.0127)	1.14	184	6.00 ***	0.80
with AR(1) Correction		0.0552 (0.0101)	-0.1389 (0.0346)	-0.0154 (0.0174)	-0.0010 (0.0139)	-0.3759 (0.0934)	0.0807 (0.0170)		179	4.73 ***	0.71
Anex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0072 (0.1414)	0.0125 (0.0868)	-0.0245 (0.1081)	0.0219 (0.1112)	0.0313 (0.1286)	0.0000 (0.0235)	1.19	45	0.00	0.00
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.1058 (0.0087)	-0.3110 (0.0328)	-0.0596 (0.0162)	-0.0302 (0.0133)	-0.8370 (0.0884)	0.1724 (0.0161)	1.03	184	10.70 ***	0.93
with AR(1) Correction		0.1116 (0.0125)	-0.3428 (0.0372)	-0.0775 (0.0192)	-0.0449 (0.0153)	-0.9357 (0.0998)	0.1905 (0.0182)		179	10.48 ***	0.92
Anex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0463 (0.2080)	-0.1413 (0.1276)	-0.0229 (0.1590)	-0.0242 (0.1635)	-0.3781 (0.1892)	0.0791 (0.0346)	0.48	45	2.29 **	0.37

(1) Anex 6 and 12 Month regressions use OLS due to the small number of degrees of freedom.

(2) The DW statistic is the average of the equation by equation OLS Durbin-Watson statistics for each data set. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE 7
 REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS II
 Independent variable: $\bar{s}(t) - s(t)$
 Long Run Equilibrium PPP

SUR Regressions(1) of Survey Expected Depreciation: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t) = a + \theta (\bar{s}(t) - s(t))$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient	DW(2)	DF	t:b1=0	R ²
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)	θ				
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0068 (0.0035)	-0.0169 (0.0170)	0.0210 (0.0054)	0.0256 (0.0039)	0.0291 (0.0034)	0.0223 (0.0126)	1.66	184	1.78 *	0.26
with AR(1) Correction		0.0075 (0.0052)	-0.0031 (0.0180)	0.0248 (0.0062)	0.0280 (0.0040)	0.0302 (0.0045)	0.0119 (0.0133)		179	0.89	0.08
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0141 (0.0024)		0.0291 (0.0060)	0.0293 (0.0045)	0.0237 (0.0020)	-0.0207 (0.0146)	1.55	179	-1.41	0.18
with AR(1) Correction		0.0127 (0.0030)		0.0237 (0.0082)	0.0263 (0.0056)	0.0222 (0.0028)	0.0083 (0.0194)		174	0.43	0.02
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0146 (0.0037)	-0.0568 (0.0215)	0.0387 (0.0069)	0.0476 (0.0050)	0.0577 (0.0032)	0.0600 (0.0159)	1.32	184	3.77 ***	0.61
with AR(1) Correction		0.0134 (0.0069)	-0.0806 (0.0298)	0.0324 (0.0101)	0.0441 (0.0066)	0.0569 (0.0069)	0.0782 (0.0221)		179	3.54 ***	0.58
Amex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0051 (0.0108)	-0.0248 (0.0266)	0.0203 (0.0113)	0.0185 (0.0117)	0.0315 (0.0081)	0.0315 (0.0202)	1.22	45	1.56	0.21
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0154 (0.0053)	-0.1971 (0.0292)	0.0389 (0.0092)	0.0640 (0.0065)	0.0866 (0.0047)	0.1750 (0.0216)	1.25	184	8.10 ***	0.88
with AR(1) Correction		0.0076 (0.0095)	-0.2897 (0.0370)	0.0124 (0.0136)	0.0481 (0.0088)	0.0806 (0.0093)	0.2449 (0.0274)		179	8.93 ***	0.90
Amex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0047 (0.0148)	-0.1453 (0.0364)	0.0261 (0.0155)	0.0225 (0.0160)	0.0545 (0.0111)	0.1236 (0.0276)	0.60	45	4.48 ***	0.69

(1) Amex 6 and 12 Month regressions use OLS due to the small number of degrees of freedom.

(2) The DW statistic is the average of the equation by equation OLS Durbin-Watson statistics for each data set. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE 8
RATIONALITY OF EXTRAPOLATIVE EXPECTATIONS
Independent variable: $s(t-1) - s(t)$

OLS Regressions of Survey Prediction Errors: $E [s(t+1)] - s(t+1) = a + g1 (s(t-1) - s(t))$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient g1	DF	t:b=0	F test	
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)				R ²	a=0, b=0
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0196 (0.0153)	0.0178 (0.0154)	0.0249 (0.0149)	0.0261 (0.0148)	0.0210 (0.0147)	0.2501 (0.1695)	184	1.48	0.19	1.06
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0534 (0.0129)		0.0600 (0.0123)	0.0605 (0.0123)	0.0272 (0.0119)	-0.2084 (0.1506)	182	-1.38	0.18	6.67 ***
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0505 (0.0339)	0.0480 (0.0343)	0.0641 (0.0334)	0.0619 (0.0332)	0.0474 (0.0331)	0.2449 (0.2904)	174	0.84	0.07	0.97
Amax 6 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0155 (0.0240)	-0.0361 (0.0298)	-0.0264 (0.0243)	-0.0606 (0.0278)	-0.0193 (0.0276)	1.0987 (0.3776)	45	2.91 ***	0.48	3.32 ***
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.1651 (0.0329)	0.1782 (0.0328)	0.1861 (0.0313)	0.1782 (0.0309)	0.1221 (0.0305)	-0.6516 (0.2564)	149	-2.54 **	0.42	8.09 ***
Amax 12 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0165 (0.0329)	-0.0607 (0.0400)	-0.0382 (0.0331)	-0.0635 (0.0378)	0.0275 (0.0373)	2.0001 (0.3667)	40	5.45 ***	0.77	5.28 ***

Method of Moments standard errors are in parentheses. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE 9
 RATIONALITY OF ADAPTIVE EXPECTATIONS
 Independent variable: $E(t-1)[s(t)] - s(t)$

OLS Regressions of Survey Prediction Errors: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t+1) = a + (\gamma_1 - \gamma_2)E(t-1)[s(t)] - s(t)$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient $\gamma_1 - \gamma_2$	DF	t:b=0	F test	
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)				R ²	a=0, b=0
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0281 (0.0154)	0.0272 (0.0152)	0.0330 (0.0150)	0.0339 (0.0150)	0.0198 (0.0154)	0.0133 (0.0140)	173	0.95	0.09	1.33
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0528 (0.0120)		0.0541 (0.0114)	0.0563 (0.0114)	0.0281 (0.0121)	0.0014 (0.0075)	172	0.18	0.00	8.44 ***
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0662 (0.0333)	0.0589 (0.0318)	0.0737 (0.0312)	0.0697 (0.0313)	0.0496 (0.0328)	0.0079 (0.0170)	161	0.46	0.02	1.20
Aax 6 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0379 (0.0331)	-0.0020 (0.0455)	-0.0238 (0.0408)	0.0067 (0.0730)	0.0600 (0.0582)	0.5571 (0.5227)	15	1.07	0.11	1.04
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.1348 (0.0358)	0.1330 (0.0312)	0.1762 (0.0303)	0.1659 (0.0303)	0.0823 (0.0338)	0.0287 (0.0127)	137	2.27 **	0.36	12.23 ***
Aax 12 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0321 (0.0336)	0.0306 (0.0462)	0.0234 (0.0344)	0.0561 (0.0467)	0.1150 (0.0466)	0.2273 (0.0836)	26	2.72 **	0.45	2.34 *

Method of Moments standard errors are in parentheses. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

05/05/86

file: tables4.wkt

TABLE 10
RATIONALITY OF REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS I
Independent variable: $s(t)$
Long Run Equilibrium Constant

OLS Regressions of Survey Prediction Errors: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t+1) = a - \theta_2 s(t)$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient θ_2	DF	t:b=0	F test	
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)				R ²	a=0, b=0
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	-0.0452 (0.0417)	0.3645 (0.1894)	0.1902 (0.0914)	0.1584 (0.0744)	0.9435 (0.5116)	-0.1686 (0.0934)	184	-1.80 *	0.27	1.20
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0353 (0.0542)		0.0831 (0.1403)	0.0782 (0.1130)	0.1865 (0.7823)	-0.0288 (0.1431)	182	-0.20	0.00	6.02 **
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	-0.0942 (0.0867)	0.7778 (0.3925)	0.4134 (0.1902)	0.3432 (0.1551)	2.0120 (1.0624)	-0.3582 (0.1936)	174	-1.65 *	0.28	1.40
Amex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0022 (0.0936)	0.0757 (0.2989)	0.0243 (0.1493)	-0.0165 (0.1294)	0.2140 (0.8996)	-0.0427 (0.1647)	45	-0.26	0.01	2.07 *
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	-0.0496 (0.0898)	0.9775 (0.3784)	0.5627 (0.1827)	0.4824 (0.1483)	2.3980 (1.0393)	-0.4167 (0.1895)	149	-2.20 ***	0.35	6.54 ***
Amex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	0.1173 (0.1641)	-0.3116 (0.5336)	-0.1695 (0.2708)	-0.1661 (0.2405)	-1.0034 (1.6103)	0.1904 (0.2919)	40	0.65	0.05	0.36

Method of Moments standard errors are in parentheses. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

TABLE II
 RATIONALITY OF REGRESSIVE EXPECTATIONS II
 Independent variable: $\bar{s}(t) - s(t)$
 Long Run Equilibrium PPP

OLS Regressions of Survey Prediction Errors: $E[s(t+1)] - s(t+1) = a + \theta_1(\bar{s}(t) - s(t))$

Data Set	Dates	dummies					coefficient θ_1	DF	t:b=0	F test	
		a(uk)	a(fr)	a(wg)	a(sw)	a(ja)				R ²	a=0, b=0
Economist 3 Month	6/81-12/85	0.0467 (0.0188)	0.2974 (0.1482)	0.1067 (0.0452)	0.0739 (0.0293)	0.0441 (0.0195)	-0.2041 (0.1100)	184	-1.86 *	0.28	1.24
MMS 3 Month	1/83-10/84	0.0503 (0.0217)		0.0684 (0.0565)	0.0642 (0.0375)	0.0330 (0.0196)	-0.0335 (0.1387)	182	-0.24	0.01	6.01 ***
Economist 6 Month	6/81-12/85	0.1017 (0.0394)	0.6373 (0.3041)	0.2355 (0.0932)	0.1635 (0.0610)	0.1010 (0.0417)	-0.4344 (0.2252)	174	-1.93 *	0.29	1.49
Amex 6 Month	1/76-8/85	0.0184 (0.0325)	9.0421 (0.1976)	-0.0194 (0.0415)	-0.0526 (0.0391)	-0.0189 (0.0352)	0.0343 (0.1643)	45	0.21	0.00	1.78
Economist 12 Month	6/81-12/85	0.1789 (0.0381)	0.8215 (0.2965)	0.3533 (0.0878)	0.2712 (0.0572)	0.1721 (0.0416)	-0.5090 (0.2227)	149	-2.29 **	0.37	6.48 ***
Amex 12 Month	1/76-8/85	-0.0135 (0.0571)	-0.4707 (0.2989)	-0.0631 (0.0687)	-0.0569 (0.0651)	0.0470 (0.0568)	0.4278 (0.2412)	40	1.77 *	0.26	0.85

Method of Moments standard errors are in parentheses. * Represents significance at the 10 percent level. ** Represents significance at the 5 percent level. *** Represents significance at the 1 percent level. R² corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.

Table A1
 DATES USED TO CONSTRUCT ECONOMIST DATA SETS

ISS #	RUB NO	SURVEY DATE	SPOT DATE	3-month Lead Date	6-month Lead Date	12-month Lead Date	3-month Lag Date
1	129	23-Jun-81	23-Jun-81	21-Sep-81	18-Dec-81	23-Jun-82	25-Mar-81
2	132	07-Aug-81	07-Aug-81	30-Oct-81	29-Jan-82	03-Aug-82	05-May-81
3	135	15-Sep-81	15-Sep-81	14-Dec-81	12-Mar-82	15-Sep-82	17-Jun-81
4	138	27-Oct-81	27-Oct-81	25-Jan-82	23-Apr-82	27-Oct-82	29-Jul-81
5	141	09-Dec-81	09-Dec-81	08-Mar-82	04-Jun-82	09-Dec-82	09-Sep-81
6	144	24-Jan-82	24-Jan-82	24-Apr-82	24-Jul-82	24-Jan-83	29-Oct-81
7	147	09-Mar-82	09-Mar-82	07-Jun-82	04-Sep-82	09-Mar-83	09-Dec-81
8	150	19-Apr-82	19-Apr-82	19-Jul-82	15-Oct-82	19-Apr-83	19-Jan-82
9	153	01-Jun-82	01-Jun-82	31-Aug-82	29-Nov-82	01-Jun-83	03-Mar-82
10	156	12-Jul-82	12-Jul-82	10-Oct-82	09-Jan-83	12-Jul-83	13-Apr-82
11	159	23-Aug-82	23-Aug-82	23-Nov-82	20-Feb-83	23-Aug-83	25-May-82
12	162	04-Oct-82	04-Oct-82	02-Jan-83	03-Apr-83	04-Oct-83	06-Jul-82
13	165	16-Nov-82	16-Nov-82	14-Feb-83	13-May-83	16-Nov-83	18-Aug-82
14	168	03-Jan-83	03-Jan-83	01-Apr-83	01-Jul-83	03-Jan-84	05-Oct-82
15	171	14-Feb-83	14-Feb-83	13-May-83	12-Aug-83	14-Feb-84	16-Nov-82
16	174	28-Mar-83	28-Mar-83	24-Jun-83	23-Sep-83	27-Mar-84	28-Dec-82
17	177	09-May-83	09-May-83	05-Aug-83	04-Nov-83	08-May-84	08-Feb-83
18	180	21-Jun-83	21-Jun-83	19-Sep-83	16-Dec-83	20-Jun-84	23-Mar-83
19	183	01-Aug-83	01-Aug-83	28-Oct-83	27-Jan-84	31-Jul-84	03-May-83
20	186	12-Sep-83	12-Sep-83	11-Dec-83	11-Mar-84	11-Sep-84	14-Jun-83
21	189	24-Oct-83	24-Oct-83	20-Jan-84	20-Apr-84	23-Oct-84	26-Jul-83
22	192	06-Dec-83	06-Dec-83	05-Mar-84	01-Jun-84	05-Dec-84	07-Sep-83
23	195	24-Jan-84	24-Jan-84	23-Apr-84	20-Jul-84	23-Jan-85	21-Oct-83
24	198	05-Mar-84	05-Mar-84	01-Jun-84	31-Aug-84	05-Mar-85	04-Dec-83
25	201	16-Apr-84	16-Apr-84	15-Jul-84	14-Oct-84	16-Apr-85	17-Jan-84
26	204	29-May-84	29-May-84	27-Aug-84	23-Nov-84	29-May-85	29-Feb-84
27	207	10-Jul-84	10-Jul-84	08-Oct-84	07-Jan-85	10-Jul-85	11-Apr-84
28	210	21-Aug-84	21-Aug-84	19-Nov-84	18-Feb-85	21-Aug-85	23-May-84
29	213	02-Oct-84	02-Oct-84	31-Dec-84	01-Apr-85	02-Oct-85	04-Jul-84
30	216	13-Nov-84	13-Nov-84	11-Feb-85	13-May-85	13-Nov-85	15-Aug-84
31	219	NA	14-Dec-84	13-Mar-85	12-Jun-85	15-Dec-85	15-Sep-84
32	222	05-Feb-85	05-Feb-85	04-May-85	04-Aug-85	05-Feb-86	07-Nov-84
33	225	19-Mar-85	19-Mar-85	17-Jun-85	13-Sep-85	NA	17-Dec-84
34	228	30-Apr-85	30-Apr-85	29-Jul-85	28-Oct-85	NA	30-Jan-85
35	231	11-Jun-85	11-Jun-85	09-Sep-85	09-Dec-85	NA	13-Mar-85
36	234	23-Jul-85	23-Jul-85	21-Oct-85	20-Jan-86	NA	24-Apr-85
37	237	03-Sep-85	03-Sep-85	02-Dec-85	03-Mar-86	NA	05-Jun-85
38	240	15-Oct-85	15-Oct-85	13-Jan-86	NA	NA	17-Jul-85
39	243	24-Nov-85	24-Nov-85	24-Feb-86	NA	NA	22-Aug-85

Table A2
 DATES USED TO CONSTRUCT AMEX DATA SETS

Approximate Survey Date †	6-Month Forward Date	3-Month Lag Date
AMEX DAY DATES †		
30-Jan-76 **	30-Jul-76	31-Oct-75
30-Jul-76 **	31-Jan-77	30-Apr-76
31-Jan-77 **	29-Jul-77	01-Nov-76
30-Jun-77	01-Dec-77	01-Apr-77
01-Dec-77	01-Jun-78	02-Sep-77
30-Jun-78	29-Dec-78	31-Mar-78
01-Dec-78	01-Jun-79	01-Sep-78
30-Jun-81	31-Dec-81	01-Apr-81
30-Jun-82	31-Dec-82	01-Apr-82
30-Jun-83	30-Dec-83	01-Apr-83
29-Jun-84	31-Dec-84	30-Mar-84
28-Jun-85	31-Dec-85	29-Mar-85

Approximate Survey Date †	6-Month Forward Date	3-Month Lag Date			
AMEX MONTH DATES †					
From	To	From	To	From	To
01-Jan-76	31-Jan-76 **	01-Jul-76	31-Jul-76	01-Nov-75	30-Nov-75
01-Jul-76	31-Jul-76 **	01-Jan-77	31-Jan-77	30-Apr-76	30-May-76
01-Jan-77	31-Jan-77 **	01-Jul-77	31-Jul-77	31-Oct-76	29-Nov-76
16-Jun-77	15-Jul-77	16-Dec-77	15-Jan-78	15-Mar-77	16-Apr-77
16-Nov-77	15-Dec-77	16-May-78	15-Jun-78	17-Aug-77	16-Sep-77
01-Jun-78	30-Jun-78	01-Dec-78	31-Dec-78	01-Apr-78	01-May-78
16-Nov-78	15-Dec-78	16-May-79	15-Jun-79	17-Aug-78	16-Sep-78
16-Jun-81	15-Jul-81	16-Dec-81	15-Jan-82	15-Mar-81	16-Apr-81
16-Jun-82	15-Jul-82	16-Dec-82	15-Jan-83	15-Mar-82	16-Apr-82
16-Jun-83	15-Jul-83	16-Dec-83	15-Jan-84	15-Mar-83	16-Apr-83
16-Jun-84	15-Jul-84	16-Dec-84	15-Jan-85	15-Mar-84	16-Apr-84
16-Jun-85	15-Jul-85	16-Dec-85	15-Jan-86	15-Mar-85	16-Apr-85

† Because each AMEX survey took place over 2 to 4 weeks, two different sets of market reference dates were used. The first is a single day approximating the survey date, and the second uses averages over corresponding 30 day periods.

** Surveys included only the pound and the mark.

Table A3
 DATES USED TO CONSTRUCT MMS 2 WEEK AND 3 MONTH SURVEYS

OBS #	SURVEY DATE	SPOT DATE	14-day Lead Date	3-month Lead Date	14-day Lag Date	3-month Lag Date
1	05-Jan-83	05-Jan-83	19-Jan-83	04-Apr-83	22-Dec-82	04-Oct-82
2	18-Jan-83	18-Jan-83	01-Feb-83	19-Apr-83	04-Jan-83	19-Oct-82
3	01-Feb-83	01-Feb-83	15-Feb-83	03-May-83	18-Jan-83	02-Nov-82
4	14-Feb-83	14-Feb-83	29-Feb-83	16-May-83	31-Jan-83	15-Nov-82
5	28-Feb-83	28-Feb-83	14-Mar-83	31-May-83	14-Feb-83	29-Nov-82
6	14-Mar-83	14-Mar-83	29-Mar-83	13-Jun-83	29-Feb-83	13-Dec-82
7	28-Mar-83	28-Mar-83	11-Apr-83	27-Jun-83	14-Mar-83	27-Dec-82
8	11-Apr-83	11-Apr-83	25-Apr-83	11-Jul-83	28-Mar-83	10-Jan-83
9	25-Apr-83	25-Apr-83	09-May-83	25-Jul-83	11-Apr-83	24-Jan-83
10	09-May-83	09-May-83	23-May-83	08-Aug-83	25-Apr-83	07-Feb-83
11	23-May-83	23-May-83	04-Jun-83	22-Aug-83	09-May-83	22-Feb-83
12	06-Jun-83	06-Jun-83	20-Jun-83	06-Sep-83	23-May-83	07-Mar-83
13	20-Jun-83	20-Jun-83	05-Jul-83	19-Sep-83	04-Jun-83	21-Mar-83
14	05-Jul-83	05-Jul-83	19-Jul-83	04-Oct-83	21-Jun-83	05-Apr-83
15	18-Jul-83	18-Jul-83	01-Aug-83	17-Oct-83	05-Jul-83	18-Apr-83
16	01-Aug-83	01-Aug-83	15-Aug-83	31-Oct-83	18-Jul-83	02-May-83
17	15-Aug-83	15-Aug-83	29-Aug-83	14-Nov-83	01-Aug-83	16-May-83
18	29-Aug-83	29-Aug-83	12-Sep-83	28-Nov-83	15-Aug-83	31-May-83
19	12-Sep-83	12-Sep-83	24-Sep-83	12-Dec-83	29-Aug-83	13-Jun-83
20	26-Sep-83	26-Sep-83	10-Oct-83	27-Dec-83	12-Sep-83	27-Jun-83
21	11-Oct-83	11-Oct-83	25-Oct-83	10-Jan-84	27-Sep-83	12-Jul-83
22	24-Oct-83	24-Oct-83	07-Nov-83	23-Jan-84	10-Oct-83	25-Jul-83
23	07-Nov-83	07-Nov-83	21-Nov-83	06-Feb-84	24-Oct-83	08-Aug-83
24	21-Nov-83	21-Nov-83	05-Dec-83	21-Feb-84	07-Nov-83	22-Aug-83
25	05-Dec-83	05-Dec-83	19-Dec-83	05-Mar-84	21-Nov-83	06-Sep-83
26	19-Dec-83	19-Dec-83	03-Jan-84	19-Mar-84	05-Dec-83	19-Sep-83
27	03-Jan-84	03-Jan-84	17-Jan-84	03-Apr-84	20-Dec-83	04-Oct-83
28	16-Jan-84	16-Jan-84	30-Jan-84	16-Apr-84	03-Jan-84	17-Oct-83
29	30-Jan-84	30-Jan-84	13-Feb-84	30-Apr-84	16-Jan-84	31-Oct-83
30	14-Feb-84	14-Feb-84	01-Mar-84	17-May-84	02-Feb-84	17-Nov-83
31	01-Mar-84	01-Mar-84	15-Mar-84	31-May-84	14-Feb-84	01-Dec-83
32	15-Mar-84	15-Mar-84	29-Mar-84	14-Jun-84	01-Mar-84	15-Dec-83
33	29-Mar-84	29-Mar-84	12-Apr-84	28-Jun-84	15-Mar-84	29-Dec-83
34	11-Apr-84	11-Apr-84	25-Apr-84	11-Jul-84	28-Mar-84	11-Jan-84
35	25-Apr-84	25-Apr-84	09-May-84	25-Jul-84	11-Apr-84	25-Jan-84
36	09-May-84	09-May-84	23-May-84	08-Aug-84	25-Apr-84	08-Feb-84
37	23-May-84	23-May-84	06-Jun-84	22-Aug-84	09-May-84	22-Feb-84
38	06-Jun-84	06-Jun-84	20-Jun-84	05-Sep-84	23-May-84	07-Mar-84
39	20-Jun-84	20-Jun-84	05-Jul-84	19-Sep-84	06-Jun-84	21-Mar-84
40	05-Jul-84	05-Jul-84	19-Jul-84	04-Oct-84	21-Jun-84	05-Apr-84
41	19-Jul-84	19-Jul-84	08-Aug-84	18-Oct-84	05-Jul-84	19-Apr-84
42	01-Aug-84	01-Aug-84	15-Aug-84	31-Oct-84	18-Jul-84	02-May-84
43	15-Aug-84	15-Aug-84	29-Aug-84	14-Nov-84	01-Aug-84	16-May-84
44	29-Aug-84	29-Aug-84	12-Sep-84	28-Nov-84	15-Aug-84	30-May-84
45	12-Sep-84	12-Sep-84	24-Sep-84	12-Dec-84	29-Aug-84	13-Jun-84
46	26-Sep-84	26-Sep-84	10-Oct-84	24-Dec-84	12-Sep-84	27-Jun-84
47	10-Oct-84	10-Oct-84	24-Oct-84	09-Jan-85	24-Sep-84	11-Jul-84

Aug-86

RECENT ISSUES OF THE WORKING PAPER SERIES
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

Copies may be obtained from from the Institute of Business and Economic Research.
See the inside front cover for further details.

8601 Jeffrey A. Frankel

THE DESIRABILITY OF A CURRENCY DEPRECIATION,
GIVEN A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY AND CONCAVE SUPPLY RELATIONSHIPS
Feb-86.

8602 Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps

REPUTATION AND MULTIPLE OPPONENTS I: IDENTICAL ENTRANTS
May-86.

8603 Jeffrey A. Frankel and Kenneth A. Froot

EXPLAINING THE DEMAND FOR DOLLARS: INTERNATIONAL RATES OF RETURN
AND THE EXPECTATIONS OF CHARTISTS AND FUNDAMENTALISTS
Jun-86.

8604 Jeffrey A. Frankel and Kenneth A. Froot

USING SURVEY DATA TO EXPLAIN STANDARD PROPOSITIONS REGARDING EXCHANGE RATE
EXPECTATIONS
Aug-86.

8605 Jerry A. Hausman and Paul A. Ruud

SPECIFYING AND TESTING ECONOMETRIC MODELS FOR RANK-ORDERED DATA WITH
AN APPLICATION TO THE DEMAND FOR MOBILE AND PORTABLE TELEPHONES
Aug-86.

8606 Roger Craine

RISKY BUSINESS: THE ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL
Aug-86.