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**MARITIME MANCHURIA:
EMPIRE, STATE, AND LABORERS, 1905-2016**

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Terms

Manchuria and Northeast China:

I use the term "Manchuria" to refer to the area of today's three Chinese provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang with the recognition that in post-1949 China, the term "Manchuria" is often associated with China's humiliating colonial past. Therefore, in the post-war primary sources of Chinese official and popular writings, "Manchuria" is replaced by the term "Northeast China" (*dongbei* 东北). To remain consistent across the wartime and postwar periods, this dissertation, nevertheless, in most cases still uses "Manchuria" throughout.

Dalian/Dairen/ Lüda and Guandong/Kwantung:

In wartime Japanese sources between 1905 and 1945, the city of "Dalian" was commonly referred as "Dairen." This was also the case for Guandong (southern Manchuria) and Kwantung in Chinese and Japanese respectively. Dalian was also named as "Lüda" in the socialist period until 1981. This dissertation uses the Chinese term Dalian and Guandong throughout.

Abstract

Maritime Manchuria: Empire, State, And Laborers, 1905-2016

Xiaofei Gao

This dissertation undertakes a historical examination of twentieth-century maritime Manchuria (Northeast China) to explore the role of seaborne interactions and coastal labor activities in shaping East Asian integration as well as social and environmental crises. "Maritime Manchuria" refers to the Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim, the area that runs along Manchuria, tracing the edge of east and north China and the Korean Peninsula, and extending into the corner of the Pacific. It is composed of port cities, less urbanized coastal villages, and the sea. The rim is not just a physical space, but also a space defined by social and economic relations. Questions animating this dissertation concern the kinds of human activities required to bring this rim into existence, the types of people who lived along the rim, and how they contributed to the development of the region.

The dissertation has two major goals: to highlight the transnational networks of commercial, cultural, and knowledge exchanges in the region, and to take full account of the everyday lives of local laborers, including male dock workers, women who grew seaweed and collected shellfish on shore, fishermen, students who were sent down to the coastal rural villages, and entrepreneurs. Its underlying argument is that region-making, nation-building, and environmental transformations require attention to those who made their living along the Manchurian coast. It shows the dialectic of transnationalism and modernity, which entailed the convergence of ideas,

the circulation of commodities, and confrontations centered on labor displacement and marine environmental crises.

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Introduction

On April 4, 2018, shortly after the U.S. announced plans to impose tariffs on Chinese goods of steel and aluminum to punish China for alleged infringement of intellectual property rights, the Chinese government responded by imposing tariffs of up to 25 percent on 106 American goods. It was the inclusion of soybeans in this long list of goods that most threatened economic and social damage to both countries. The U.S. is the world's major producer of soybeans, the majority of which are grown by farmers in the suburbs and rural areas of the Midwest. In 2017, 61 percent of American soybean exports, equaling more than 30 percent of U.S. overall soybean production, were purchased by China. In China, the world's largest importer of soybeans, farmers use soybeans to feed pigs and make cooking oil.¹ Farmers in both countries, especially Chinese pig raisers and American soybean growers, therefore, could suffer devastating losses if the U.S.-China trade war were to continue and further escalate. Dave Walton, a soybean and corn farmer in eastern Iowa, said “If this (trade war) turns into a longer-term thing, we’re going to see friends and neighbors go out of business. If this stretches into years, we ourselves won’t be able to sustain it.”²

¹ Eric Boehm, “Trump’s Trade War Will Crush American Farmers, Fuel Soy Boys,” *Reason.com*, April 5, 2018, <https://reason.com/blog/2018/04/05/soybeans-surpassed-corn-as-americas-top>.

² Caitlin Dewey, “They Voted for Donald Trump. Now Soybean Farmers Could Get Slammed by the Trade War He Started.” *Washington Post*, April 5, 2018, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/04/05/they-voted-for-president-trump-now-soybean-farmers-could-get-slammed-by-the-trade-war-he-started/>.

The production of soybeans in the U.S. and their importation by China is a relatively recent phenomenon, but China's history as a soybean producer is much longer. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, China was the world's leading producer of soybeans, most grown in the northeast. At its peak in the 1930s, Northeast China (also known as Manchuria), produced 42.5 percent of the world's soybeans.³ Thanks to the lucrative soybean trade, foreign investment, and a well-developed infrastructure, Manchuria was one of the most developed regions in China in the twentieth century. In addition to its record of economic development and socialist construction, Manchuria in the long twentieth century also presents us with the other side of history. It was a region filled with crises: colonialism, violence, resistance, and finally, demotion to China's rust belt in the reform period. Finally, the uneven development of China's post-socialist reform has generated inequalities between Manchuria and other regions in China, and *within* Manchuria between interior areas and coastal areas.

To examine the multifaceted history of Manchuria in the twentieth century, this dissertation explores "maritime Manchuria," focusing on the role of seaborne interactions and coastal labor activities in shaping East Asian integration as well as social and environmental crises. It has two major goals: first, to highlight the transnational networks of commercial, cultural, and knowledge exchanges in the region; and second, to provide an account of the everyday lives of local laborers, including dock workers, female aquaculture workers, farmers, fishermen, students

³ "History of World Soybean Production and Trade - Part 1," *Soyinfocenter.com*, http://www.soyinfocenter.com/HSS/production_and_trade1.php.

who were sent down to the coastal rural villages, and entrepreneurs. Its underlying argument is that region-making, nation-building, and environmental transformations require attention to those who made their living along the Manchurian coast.

The Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim and Dalian

"Maritime Manchuria" refers to the Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim, the area that stretches 3,100 miles, running along Manchuria, tracing the edge of east and north China and the Korean Peninsula, and extending into the corner of the Pacific. It is composed of port cities, less urbanized coastal villages, and the sea. Further, the rim is not just a physical space, but also a space defined by social and economic relations. Questions animating this dissertation concern the kinds of human activities required to bring this rim into existence, the types of people who lived along the rim, and how they contributed to the development of the region.

Dalian, a node in the web of the Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim, saw a succession of different political and military regimes throughout the twentieth century. Because of its strategic geographical location and economic significance, Dalian experienced colonialism earlier than most places in China. In addition to being a cradle of Japanese settler colonialism (1905-45), it was a frontline of the Chinese labor movement (1920s-1940s), a foothold of the post-war Soviet occupation (1946-55), an experimental ground for the CCP's ocean reform in coastal rural communities (1950s-1970s), and a showcase of the contemporary environmental movement (2000s-2010s). Each experience played an influential part in its subsequent

development and movement. In short, Dalian manifested the dialectic of transnationalism and modernity, which entailed the convergence of ideas, the circulation of commodities, and confrontations centered on labor displacement and marine environmental crises.

Manchuria at the Water's Edge

Fernand Braudel's study of the Mediterranean as a region has influenced subsequent studies of the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. Studies of the Pacific have been anchored either in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific islands, or framed by histories of labor, capital and commodity flows among South America, North America, and East Asia.⁴ Scholars who have looked at China's maritime history have focused on the eastern and southern coastline, which are seen as having greater strategic importance, better wealth-generating capacity, and more marine resources than China's northern coastline.⁵ To date, historians have shown little interest in considering the spatial category of seas and oceans from the vantage point of Manchuria.

Instead, most Anglophone and Chinese-language scholarship on Manchuria focuses solely on territory and the agrarian economy with little mention of maritime

⁴ Arif Dirlik, *What Is in a Rim?: Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (University of California Press, 1995); Matt K. Matsuda and Matt K. Matsuda, *Pacific Worlds: A History of Seas, Peoples, and Cultures* (Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁵ Dian H. Murray, *Pirates of the South China Coast, 1790-1810* (Stanford University Press, 1987); Hugh R. Clark, "Frontier Discourse and China's Maritime Frontier: China's Frontiers and the Encounter with the Sea through Early Imperial History," *Journal of World History* 20, no. 1 (May 3, 2009): 1-33; Micah S. Muscolino, *Fishing Wars and Environmental Change in Late Imperial and Modern China* (Harvard University Press, 2009).

peoples and their contributions to state-making projects.⁶ Scholars of the Japanese empire have considered Manchuria as a geographic lifeline for Japan's national strength and security. They have explored the organic sense of connection between Manchuria and Japan expressed by Japanese colonizers, the way that Manchuria took hold of the public imagination among ordinary Japanese, and the portrayal of Manchuria as an economic panacea and an agrarian paradise for Japanese settlers. This dissertation demonstrates that while Japanese rulers used maritime space to realize the integration of East Asia, constructing ports and other coastal infrastructures in Manchuria, Chinese state builders, intellectuals and dockworkers used the same maritime space to promote nationalist sentiments and form anti-imperialist movements.

In addition to departing from standard land-based studies of wartime Manchuria, this approach further seeks to expand studies of everyday life in China by including coastal regions in the study of the Chinese countryside in post-1949 China. Previous studies of rural China in the socialist period have put rural agriculture at the center of understanding China's path to communist revolution and socialism.⁷ The

⁶ Christian A. Hess, "From Colonial Jewel to Socialist Metropolis : Dalian 1895-1955," *Urban History* 38, no. 3 (December 2011): 373–90; Annika A. Culver, *Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo*(UBC Press, 2014); Robert John Perrins, "'Great Connections': The Creation of a City, Dalian, 1905-1931 : China and Japan on the Liaodong Peninsula," unpublished dissertation (York University 1997); Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria*(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern*(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (University of California Press, 2000).

⁷ Edward Friedman, Paul Pickowicz, and Mark Selden, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (Yale University Press, 1991); Felix Wemheuer and Kimberley Ens Manning, eds., *Eating Bitterness: New*

present project highlights the different forms of production in Chinese coastal villages--in the fishery and aquaculture industries in particular--and the unstable and fluid class labels of “workers” and “peasants” attached to coastal villagers in the Mao era. By doing so, it reveals the complexities and diversity of people living in China’s rural communities, showing that the divisions were blurred between farmers and fishermen, workers and peasants, as well as urban and rural classifications. It also suggests that women have both embodied and contested these socialist ideals through their own labor practices as aquacultural laborers.

Research for this project is based on collections at libraries and archives in both China and Japan. Records of the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) and the Kwantung Labor Association at the National Diet Library in Tokyo include colonial ordinances and company documents showing how Japanese officials, capitalists and immigrants produced maritime space that transcended the nation-state’s boundary. In China, I collected provincial, municipal, and county-level government reports, periodicals, and newspapers. These materials make it possible to track conflicts between farmers and fishermen that have been absent in previous historical studies.

Problems with the colonial statistical records and the Chinese government’s documents include the technical and ideological questions of their reliability. It has

Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine, Contemporary Chinese Studies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); Jeremy Brown and Matthew D. Johnson, eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015); Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016); Gail Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory: Rural Women and China’s Collective Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Jisheng Yang et al., *Tombstone: the Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962*, 2013.

been important to consider how and for what goals the records were collected or compiled. Further, the SMR researchers and the Chinese officials often neglected the attitudes, thoughts and values of Chinese peasants, and therefore created an incomplete portrait of them. Therefore, in addition to document-based research, I also conducted oral history interviews with dozens of local fishermen, women who had been aquacultural workers under rural collectivization, and former sent-down youth, who moved from cities to work in coastal villages during the Cultural Revolution. These accounts help make clear the disjunction between state initiatives and the daily lives of ordinary people, particularly in the socialist period.

Outline of Dissertation Chapters

The dissertation comprises five chapters. Chapter One, “Imperialism, Immigration and Everyday Life at the Water’s Edge,” provides a brief overview of the history of Tsarist Russia’s lease and construction of the ice-free seaport of Dalian (1898-1904). It then includes a discussion of Japanese port construction in southern Manchuria between 1905 and the end of World War II. Finally, it explores how imperialist and nationalist remaking of coastal space affected residents between 1905 and 1945. A large segment of the population in this area consisted of migrants moving from the southern tip of the “Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim” in North China. This chapter pays particular attention to dockworkers and fishermen in the burgeoning port cities and smaller fishing settlements.

Chapter Two, “Farmers versus Fishermen: The Sino-Soviet Conflict in Rural Dalian, 1946-1950,” addresses the challenges the newly arrived Communist Party faced at the outset of the civil war in Dalian, a war-free city but one that was politically and militarily managed by the Soviets and economically blockaded by the Nationalists. The Soviet upper hand in city affairs limited the local Communist Party’s capacity to mobilize urban dwellers, and caused the Party to move its organizing efforts to the countryside. The chapter reveals that the “semi-concealed” policy practiced by the Dalian Communist Party officials kept them from advocating radical class struggle in the countryside and led to discontent from village party members and peasants. Furthermore, despite its rich experience building rural bases and mobilizing peasants during the Sino-Japanese war, the CCP had no prior experience organizing rural areas populated not only by farmers, but also by fisher people. Whether or not fishermen fit the category “peasant” was a troubling issue for CCP leaders in this area. The chapter argues that the Communist Party failed to gain support from fishermen who lost access to their fishing zones after the Nationalist economic blockade, though it was able to mobilize women in fishing households to do land-related work.

Chapter Three, “Collision Course: The Industrial Transformation of Dalian’s Urban Fisheries,” turns attention from rural Dalian to urban factory life. It introduces Dalian’s integration into socialist networks of knowledge exchange, as its fishery factories adopted the Soviet management style and hosted North Koreans who came to study shipbuilding skills. It also reveals the contradictions that emerged as the state

simultaneously promoted urban industrialization and rural collectivization in the tense international political context of the Korean War in the 1950s. The dual development created competition for resources and laborers between the state-owned industrial companies and the rural collectives. This was manifested as the companies recruited workers and thus pulled fishermen away from the rural collectives. In addition, pursuing industrialization and collectivization at the same time created an imbalance between the inadequate investment the fishery factories received from the state and the demand for economic productivity. It resulted in shipwrecks, fish spoilage, and divisions between permanent and temporary workers.

Chapter Four, “Catch the Wave: The People’s Fisheries and Socialist Reform in the Coastal Villages,” shifts the focus back to the countryside and looks at a broad range of campaigns to transform the lives of coastal rural residents. The chapter begins with a discussion of land reform and rural collectivization in the 1950s, with attention to the tensions between farmers and fishermen. This chapter further describes rural women's labor experiences and the changing meanings of their labor. The Maoist rhetoric and practices blurred the distinction between men and women, but did not erase gender inequality. Finally, this chapter examines the shift toward the industrialization of the countryside in the 1970s, when both rural villagers and urban youth joined the rural fishery enterprises. Central to this chapter is an analysis of the flexibility and volatility of the Chinese state’s policies as it attempted to accommodate specific political considerations and constraints, and the diversity and variety of reactions from people at the grassroots. At a time of changing needs and

visions of the rural areas by the socialist state, the boundaries between agricultural and nonagricultural activities, labor performed by men and women, as well as urban and rural classifications kept shifting.

Chapter Five, “Contesting Reforms: Nostalgia, Gender and Conflict,” examines the post-Mao economic reforms of the last three decades. China’s reform era from the late 1970s onward has often been associated with the creation of an economic miracle. This chapter focuses on those who remained in rural communities and on the diverse and uneven impact of reform on them. It explores how the post-socialist market reforms provided more job opportunities for the younger generation of coastal villagers by encouraging the opening of township and village enterprises, meanwhile depriving older generations of the basic means of livelihood and social security. Finally, the chapter examines the 2010 oil spill incident in coastal Dalian. It explores how the government, the state-owned company, nonprofit organizations, the media, and individual villagers responded to the environmental challenges of the post-Mao reforms.

Chapter One

Imperialism, Immigration and Everyday Life at the Water's Edge, 1905-1945

The first class, Mantetsu's staff, sitting, eating and waiting to be dressed;

The second class, Fuchang's businessmen, making the rules;

The third class, Sanhesheng's employees, providing food;

The fourth class, coolie foremen, behaving like devils;

The fifth class, assistant foremen, bustling and bossing around;

The sixth class, stewards, on call constantly;

The seventh class, bookkeepers, writing and calculating;

The eighth class, head chef, washing rice and cooking meals;

The ninth class, assistant chef, carrying water and loads;

The tenth class, poor coolies, oppressed as if a dragon had appeared.¹

Created and chanted by Dalian's dockworkers laboring under Japanese rule in Manchuria, this song reflects the labor hierarchy and work grievances at the Fuchang Chinese Labor Company.² Fuchang Company, known as Fukushō in Japanese, was

¹ Gongcheng Liu and Yanjing Wang, *Ershi shiji dalian gongren yundong shi* (The History of Dalian Workers' Movement in the Twentieth Century) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 2001), 346.

² Evidence collected or written after the dismantling of the Japanese empire, such as the labor chant, is often shaped by the post-war East Asian state and popular narratives centering on larger subjects of

established in 1909 by Aioi Yoshitarō (1867-1930). It served as a Chinese laborer recruitment hub for other Japanese companies in Dalian, while also directly regulating Chinese coolies working on the Dalian docks. To house Chinese coolies, most of whom had migrated from north China, in 1911 Aioi built a vast dormitory complex in the southeast of the dock.³

For Aioi and the Japanese colonial authorities in Dalian, Manchuria provided food, work and stability to Chinese coolies, who fled into Manchuria to escape wars and poverty in north China. Equipped with clean rooms and recreational facilities, the workers' dorms were considered a showcase of Japan's modern labor management.⁴ Japanese intellectuals and artists, such as Fuchikami Hakuyō, the chief editor of *Manshū gurafu* (Manchuria Graph), praised Manchuria as a paradise for the Chinese working class, whom they regarded as liberated from the oppression they had suffered under Chinese warlords in north China.⁵ However, the labor chant by dockworkers provides a different picture of the everyday life of Chinese coolies. In contrast to the positive images of working conditions provided by Japanese authorities, this song exposes the brutal side of Japanese imperialism as experienced by Chinese laborers. Memoirs by Chinese dockworkers and the Communist Party

Japanese occupation, war responsibility, and collective memory. Thus, it is unclear how or by whom or whether editorializing was involved. In his article "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," *East Asian History* 2 (December 1991): 123, Gavan McCormack points out the problems of the historiography of Manchukuo in postwar China and Japan.

³ Tiezhuang Guo and Jie Guan, *Riben zhimin tongzhi dalian sishinian shi* (The 40-Year History of Japanese Colonial Rule in Dalian) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008), 392.

⁴ Yoshirō Shinozaki, *Manshū to Aioi yoshitarō* (Manchuria and Aioi Yoshitarō), (Dairen: Fukushō Kōshi Gokeikai, 1932).

⁵ Culver.

organizers also described the dorms built by Aioi as cramped, filthy, and a slum at best.⁶

The two opposing narratives capture the inherent contradiction of the Japanese imperial projects in Manchuria. On the one hand, Chinese laborers were the symbol and agents of the improved productivity of southern Manchuria under Japanese rule. On the other hand, politicization of Chinese workers and labor strikes against Japanese companies in the name of nationalism revealed the inequality and violence embedded in colonial economic development.

In his study of Manchukuo, Prasenjit Duara insightfully pointed out that Manchukuo represented a range of paradoxes, including imperialism vs. nationalism, modernity vs. tradition, frontier vs. heartland, and transcendence vs. boundedness.⁷ Manchukuo's colonial period (1905-45) demonstrates another tension as well: that between autonomy and integration. Dalian was Japan's territory, first leased from China and later part of Manchukuo. It was colonized, but never became an independent, full-fledged colony of Japan such as Taiwan and Korea. It experienced settler colonialism, but its sovereignty belonged to China and then Manchukuo. In fact, throughout the early half of the twentieth century, Dalian was situated in a complex triangular relationship between Japan, China, and Manchukuo.

⁶ Dalian gangwu guanli ju, *Bohai nutao: dalian gang matou gongren douzheng huiyilu* (The Bohai Waves: Memoir on the Struggle of the Dalian Dock Workers) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1973).

⁷ Duara, 2003.

This chapter examines the juxtapositions of imperialism and nationalism, modernity and tradition, and autonomy and integration by tracing changes in Japanese and Chinese immigration to southern Manchuria and in Japanese colonial labor policies. It describes the integration of Manchuria into the Japanese empire, and Japan's inability to create a "Japanese" Dalian separate from China, as a result of its reliance on Chinese laborers from China. Japan's competing ideologies, expressed by a variety of governmental and business agencies located in Japan, Manchuria, and North China, further caused a conflict of interests and inconsistent labor policies. Meanwhile, the Chinese central and regional governments, and Communist and labor union activists, attempted to consolidate or expand their presence in Manchuria, efforts that often ended in failure. Finally, the daily practices and conceptions of the Chinese laborers, Dalian's fishermen and dock workers in particular, exhibited the inherently paradoxical Japanese imperial and Chinese national projects along the coasts.

From the "Trinity Transportation System" to the "Yellow Sea Economic Zone":

The Role of Dalian in Empires

The transformation of Dalian from a fishing village to a modern port city began in the late 1890s following the Russian Empire's expansion to East Asia. In 1895, Japan and Qing China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), which gave Japan southern Manchuria (the Liaodong Peninsula). Immediately after the terms of the treaty became public, Russia,

Germany, and France intervened, and successfully forced Japan to return southern Manchuria to China in return for an additional indemnity. In the aftermath of this intervention, the Qing government granted Russia a twenty-five-year lease of the Liaodong Peninsula. From 1898 to 1903, in southern Manchuria Russians fortified the ice-free Port Arthur for its Pacific Fleet, and constructed a commercial port named Dalian (*Dal'nii* in Russian, meaning “faraway place”) in a fishing village called Qingniwa by Chinese residents.

The Japanese scholar Masafumi Asada has analyzed Russia’s political and economic motivations for building a free business port in its Far East. Asada argues that in order to expand trade to East Asia, the Russian Empire developed what he called the “trinity transportation system,” involving the coordination of railways, steamships, and ports.⁸ The purpose of the port of Dalian in this system was to become the eastern exit of Russia's Trans-Siberian Railway. In the early years of the twentieth century, the main goods exported to the Russian Empire through Dalian were Chinese tea and agricultural crops grown in Manchuria. In 1903, a total of 1,921,000 *poods* (one pood equals 36 pounds) of tea and 954,000 poods of agricultural crops were shipped in and out of Dalian, making Dalian the second busiest port in Manchuria after Yingkou Port.⁹

Russians were not the only ones who recognized the significance of opening a port in southern Manchuria. As early as the late 1890s, Japanese officials had seen the

⁸ Masafumi Asada, “Making a Vancouver in the Far East: ‘The Trinity Transportation System’ of the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1896-1917,” in Kimitaka Matsuzato ed. *Russia and Its Northeast Asian Neighbors: China, Japan, and Korea, 1858–1945* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 65–88.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 71,

potential of Dalian Port as well. Shimakawa Kisaburo, a member of Japan's Foreign Ministry at the time listed several advantages of Dalian, and argued that Dalian would soon surpass Yingkou as the center of trade in Manchuria. Kisaburo noted that while Yingkou Port was frozen from late November to mid-March, Dalian was ice-free throughout the winter. Further, the Dalian harbor had direct railroad access while Yingkou did not. Finally, Dalian was a free trade port, while foreign merchants had to pay duties and tariffs in Yingkou.¹⁰

By the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), Russians had constructed piers and dredged the harbor at the docks. Russia's trinity transportation system, nevertheless, collapsed when it lost the war to Japan. The Treaty of Portsmouth acknowledged the Qing government's sovereignty over southern Manchuria, but it also transferred the lease of Liaodong Peninsula from Russia to Japan. Japan set up the Kwantung Leased Territory in the peninsula, with the Kwantung Army stationed on the territory.¹¹

Dalian, renamed "Dairen" by the Japanese, maintained its international port status and flourished as the hub port of Manchuria until the end of World War II. When Japan reopened the port to commercial trade in 1907, Dalian ranked behind the port of Yingkou in export volume. Yingkou's output accounted for 75 percent of the

¹⁰ Su Chongmin ed., *Mantie dang'an ziliao huibian, Vol. 5: longduan dongbei tielu he haigang* (Compilation of Mantetsu Archives Documents: Monopoly of Northeast Railway and Seaports) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), hereafter cited as MTDA (V), 297.

¹¹ Jiang Yaohui, *Dalian Kaibu jianshi* (The City and Port Construction of Dalian) (The Dalian Press, 2013).

total output of South Manchuria, while Dalian's only accounted for 15 percent.

Andong Port ranked third.¹²

In the 1910s and the 1920s, however, Dalian's trade reached an unprecedented height, and in 1910, Dalian surpassed Yingkou as the largest port in Manchuria.

Dalian was also one of the five busiest ports in all of China at the turn of the twentieth century. Before 1916, Shanghai was the busiest port, followed by Hankou, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Dalian. In 1917, Dalian surpassed Guangzhou, and in the following year Dalian surpassed Tianjin and jumped to third place. In 1919, Dalian surpassed the port of Hankou and became the second busiest port, after Shanghai. If the contribution from offshore trade had been excluded and only foreign-related had been calculated, Dalian would have attained second place as early as 1916.¹³

Table 1. Trade Ratios of China's Five Busiest Ports (unit: percent)¹⁴

Year	Shanghai	Dalian	Hankou	Tianjin	Guangzhou
1916	4.6	0.7	1.6	1.1	0.9
1917	4.6	1.1	1.5	1.1	0.8
1918	4.7	1.3	1.4	1.1	0.8
1919	4.6	1.4	1.3	1.1	0.9
1920	4.9	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.9

The development of the Dalian port in the first two decades of the twentieth century was largely due to the soybean trade. Robert Perrins noted that soybean

¹² Minamimanshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Gaisha, *Mantetsufu zokuchi keiei enkaku zen shi. jōkan*. (The History of the Management of the Southern Manchuria Railway Affiliated Territory), vol. 1 (Tokyo: Ryūkeishosha, 1977), 1198.

¹³ Yoshirō Shinozki, *Dairen* (Dairen: Ōsakayagō Shoten, 1922), 789-792.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 791.

shipments from Manchuria to Europe began in 1908. Soybeans were purchased by British and German fertilizer and chemical companies. This business was so successful that it continued attracting Japanese companies to construct mills and warehouses in Dalian.¹⁵ By the late 1920s, Manchuria produced 59 percent of the world's soybeans.¹⁶

From the late 1920s, the Japanese authorities proposed the concept of “the Yellow Sea Economic Zone,” which covered the coasts of Manchuria, southern Korea, and western Japan.¹⁷ This idea represented Japanese recognition of the design in Russia's “Trinity Transportation System.” Dalian as the southern terminus of northeast Asia contributed as much to Tokyo as to St. Petersburg. Under both development schemes, railways transported agricultural products, mainly soybeans, and industrial raw materials such as coal and iron from central and northern Manchuria to Dalian. Then steamships run by Japanese companies carried these products to Japan, Korea and Europe.

Christian Hess has referred to Dalian, with its lucrative soybean trade, modern urban and port infrastructure, and a growing Japanese merchant community, as “the formal symbol of Japan's informal empire in Manchuria.”¹⁸ Japan historian Emer O'Dwyer characterized Dalian as “significant soil” to the Japanese empire, and “a city like no other” in shaping the formation of Japanese imperial identity.¹⁹ To understand

¹⁵ Perrins, 106-107.

¹⁶ Duara, 48.

¹⁷ Fangfang Song, “Himan shi burokku shita no tairin kō” (Dalian Port under the Japanese Yen Bloc), *The Journal of the Study of Modern Society and Culture*, no. 45 (July 2009): 105–20.

¹⁸ Hess, 377.

¹⁹ O'Dwyer, 23.

what this Japanese “informal” empire meant to its Japanese and Chinese subjects in Dalian, the following sections shift attention to some of the groups who lived in this area: fishermen and coolies, in particular.

Fishing for Empire: Japanese Fishermen in Southern Manchuria

Dalian’s development into a prominent port city in the first half of the twentieth century could not have been achieved without Japanese immigrants and Chinese coolie migrants. In fact, the key to understanding the issue of integration vs. autonomy of Dalian lies in the composition of its population. As “the most Japanese urban space beyond national boundaries,” the ratio in Dalian's population was approximately 100 Chinese for every 35 Japanese throughout the Japanese colonial period. 35 percent of Dalian’s population were Japanese, which meant that the city “surpassed the ratio of colonized to colonizer in every other city in Japan's overseas empire.”²⁰

Table 2. Chinese vs. Japanese in Dalian’s Population, 1906-30 ²¹

	1906	1910	1915	1920	1925	1930
Total population	32,836	68,225	111,511	213,310	244,964	365,432
Chinese	24,475 (75%)	41,534 (61%)	72,363 (65%)	150,448 (70%)	166,595 (68%)	249,914 (68%)
Japanese	8,338 (24%)	26,691 (39%)	39,148 (35%)	62,862 (29%)	77,953 (32%)	99,231 (22%)

²⁰ O’Dwyer, 50.

²¹ Ibid.

In her study of Manchuria, Louise Young noted that the jobs taken by Dalian's Japanese settlers were concentrated in the urban and commercial sectors. Twenty-five percent of Japanese immigrants worked in manufacturing, 23 percent in commerce, 22 percent in transportation, and 20 percent in public service as teachers, policemen and bureaucrats. The occupational distribution, therefore, helped generate among Japanese settlers "visions of colonial privilege and cosmopolitanism."²²

The Guandong Fishing Cooperatives

This description, however, does not provide a complete picture of Japanese immigrant groups. Geographically bounded by the Bohai Sea to the West, the Yellow Sea to the South, and the Korea Bay to the East, the region of southern Manchuria had one of the most abundant fish stocks in the world at the turn of the twentieth century. Despite the fact that less than 2 percent of Japanese people in Dalian were fishermen, Japanese fishing immigrants constituted an important component of the Japanese imperial agenda in southern Manchuria.

For Japanese intellectuals and officials, fishery development encouraged a vision of Japan as equal to the Western powers. As one author of *Manshū nichinichishinbun*, the region's main Japanese-language daily newspaper, observed:

Japan has recently become one of the five major powers of the world. However, compared to England and America, Japan falls

²² Young, 34.

behind in commerce, industry, agriculture, forestry, mining and animal husbandry. There is only one thing in which Japan is at the top of the world—that is the fishery industry.²³

Japanese fishermen first arrived on the Liaodong Peninsula during the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to supply fish to the Japanese army. During the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the number of Japanese boats in the Bohai/Yellow Sea reached more than 500 vessels.²⁴ These Japanese fishermen came mainly from the areas of Fukuoka, Saga, Oita, Kumamoto, Nagasaki, Yamaguchi, Kagoshima, Okayama, and Ehime.²⁵

To centralize the administration of fisheries and organize Japanese fishermen, in March 1906, the Guandong Civil Affairs Administration in Dalian promulgated the “Guandong Fishery Cooperatives Ordinance.” All fishermen were required to join the fishery cooperatives. The aim of these cooperatives included enabling the mediation and arbitration of disputes, issuing low-interest loans to fishermen, safekeeping tools and other supplies during a seasonal moratorium, taking care of sick fishermen, and providing pensions to the relatives of the dead.²⁶ In addition, fish products exported to domestic Japan from Dalian were to be exempted from taxation.²⁷

Immediately after the establishment of the fishing cooperatives, the local

²³ “Kantō-shū no suisangyō” (The Fishery Industry of Guandong), *Manshū nichinichishinbun* (Dalian), March 18, 1931.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Kantō-shū suisan kumiai, *Kantō-shū shutsugyo annai* (A Guide to Fishing in Guandong) (Kantō-shū suisan kumiai, 1907),9.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁷ Kantō-shū suisan-kai, *Kantō-shū suisan-kai jūnenshi* (A Decade History of Guandong Fisheries Association) (Kantō-shū suisan-kai, 1936), 44.

government put an announcement in the newspaper to recruit Japanese fishermen, stating:

Newly constructed apartment complexes in Laohutan Village include four buildings for fishermen, with a total of 64 apartments. Married couples who plan to live here for more than five years are allowed to move into the houses. However, no one has responded to our call as of yet, and therefore we are adding some additional information. For those who meet the above requirements, the houses are rent-free and they will also be provided with vegetable gardens. In addition, if the person has a fine character and can be considered as a model for other fishermen, we will give him free furniture, too.²⁸

As implied in this announcement, very few Japanese had joined the fishing cooperatives as of December 1907, eighteen months after their establishment.

Records show that in 1910 the population of Japanese fishermen was only 76. Ten years later, in 1920, the population of Dalian's Japanese fishermen had only doubled, reaching 154.²⁹

²⁸ “Rōtotan no sakkon” (Laohutan’s Past and Present), *Manshū nichinichishinbun* (Dalian), December 30, 1907.

²⁹ *Manshi no suisan jijō*, 517.



Map 1. The Guangdong Leased Territory and Fengtian Province³⁰

Before the arrival of Japanese fishermen, Chinese fishermen had a long history of living and working in the coastal areas of the Bohai Bay. The author of *Manshū no suisan jijō* noted that since the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907), Chinese fishermen had migrated from today's Dengzhou in Shandong province to the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria.³¹ In addition to traditional fishing households, fishing was also an important subsidiary business for many Chinese farmers in southern Manchuria. The majority of Chinese fisheries in this region operated in the fishing grounds close to shore, depending on traditional methods such as set nets, long lines and ground nets.³²

In the early half of the twentieth century, there were over thirteen thousand Chinese fishermen working in Dalian. As a result of the sheer size of the population gap

³⁰ Adapted from Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, *Manshū no suisan jijō* (Fisheries in Manchuria), Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, 1931.

³¹ Okamoto Shōichi, *Manshū no suisan jijō* (Fisheries in Manchuria), (Suisan tsūshin-sha, 1940), 510.

³² Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, *Manshū no suisan jijō* (Fisheries in Manchuria), (Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, 1931), 44.

between Chinese and Japanese fishermen, and the importance of fish and fish products to supply Japan's domestic market, the local government incorporated Chinese fishermen into the cooperatives, and hired Chinese staff such as Gao Jingxian to work for the ocean fishery groups.

The Guandong Fishery Experiment Station

Before the late 1910s, even though Japanese fishermen and their Chinese counterparts lived side by side in the fishing cooperatives, their preferences for fish, fishing methods, and fishing grounds differed. The top two favorite fish species for Japanese to catch off the coast of Dalian were sea bream and Spanish mackerel. Chinese residents, however, favored codfish, largehead hairtail, and yellow croaker.³³ The differences in sought-after fish species also led to Japanese and Chinese fishermen working in different fishing grounds, decreasing the chances for them to compete with each other.

Initially, in order to catch sea bream, Japanese fishermen used the method of long lines. With the advancement of technology attributed to the Guandong Fishery Experiment Station that had been established by the colonial government in 1907, from the late 1910s Japanese fishermen started using bottom trawling in fishing. Often referred to as “dragging,” this method entailed towing a net at the bottom of the ocean, indiscriminately catching all fish. The investigations of fishing resources conducted by the experimental station also led to the discovery of spawning grounds

³³ *Kantō-shū suisan jijō*, 47, 52-58. *Manshi no suisan jijō*, 523.

of sea bream.³⁴ The adoption of the bottom trawling technique, the expansion into spawning grounds, and the introduction of motorboats installed with inboard engines gradually led to the depletion of sea bream stocks.

The tension between Japanese and Chinese fishermen in Dalian escalated in the late 1920s. In a parallel development to events off the southeastern coast of China described by Micah Muscolino, Japanese vessels began catching yellow croaker, after their preferred fish species were depleted.³⁵ This shift put Japanese fishermen in direct competition with Chinese fishermen. Since the majority of Chinese fisheries in this region still depended on traditional methods such as set nets, long lines and ground nets, they were in the inferior position in this competition.³⁶

The Gaiping Incident

If the fishing disputes off the coast of Dalian in the 1920s among ordinary Japanese and Chinese fishermen occurred primarily because fish stocks were being depleted, the “Gaiping incident” in 1907 suggests another reason for fishery conflicts between China and Japan. On May 20, 1907, Hayashi Gonsuke, the Japanese ambassador to the Chinese Qing government, submitted a letter to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Gonsuke urged the Chinese minister to properly deal with the murder of Gao Jingxian and the detention of Honma Jōkichi, both of whom worked

³⁴ See Kantō totokufu suisan shikenjō, *Kantō totokufu suisan shikenjō yōran* (The Guidance of the Guangdong Fishery Experiment Station) (Kantō totokufu suisan shikenjō, 1913, 1940), and Kantō totokufu suisan shikenjō, *Suisan jikken hōkoku-sh* (A Report of Fisheries Experiments) (Kantō totokufu suisan shikenjō, 1915-1926, 1933-1941).

³⁵ “Kantō-shū no suisangyō” (The Fishery Industry of Guangdong); Muscolino.

³⁶ *Manshū no suisan jijō* (Fisheries in Manchuria), 44.

for the Guandong Ocean Fishery Group (*Kantō enyō gyogyō kumiai*), by Huang Jiajie, the general supervisor of the Fengtian Fishing Company.³⁷ Before the Japanese government acted, this so-called “Gaiping Incident” had already stirred up the Japanese domestic media. In reporting the incident, journalists of the leading Japanese newspapers *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* emphasized that the victims were residents of the Guandong Leased Territory in Dalian, an area where Japan had obtained extraterritorial rights in 1905.³⁸

Why was a Chinese person murdering another Chinese person and detaining a Japanese fishermen? What was at stake? How did fisheries become a realm of activity that pitted Japanese against Chinese, but also Chinese against Chinese, in an unpredictable way? *Yomiuri Shimbun* narrated the reasons that Gao and Honma had travelled from Dalian to meet Supervisor Huang Jiajie of the Fengtian Fishing Company in Gaiping. Soon after its establishment in 1906, the Fengtian Fishing Company, owned by the regional government of Qing China, sent people to Japanese-leased Guandong and plastered the area with posters recruiting Chinese fishermen to work for the company. This action, however, was considered by Japanese to be a threat and a violation of the interests of Japan’s fishing industry in Dalian, where according to the “Guandong Fishery Cooperatives Ordinance” promulgated in March 1906, both Japanese and Chinese fishermen in Dalian

³⁷ Tingyi Guo, Yushu Li, and Xunan Lan. *Qingji zhong ri han guanxi shiliao* (The Relations between Qing, Japan and Korea), (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindaishi yanjiu suo, 1972), 6395.

³⁸ “Nihon gyogyō hakugai mondai” (Japan’s Fishing Persecution Problem), *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), April 16, 1907; “Hōten gyogyō kōshi no muhō ni kyōkō shisei” (The Lawless and Hardline Stance of the Fengtian Fishing Company), *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), April 17, 1907.

belonged to the cooperatives. Thus, the Guandong Ocean Fishery Group and the Fengtian Fishing Company agreed to meet in Gaiping to solve this issue. During this meeting, Supervisor Huang was accused of killing Gao and detaining Honma.³⁹

In response to the accusation, Zhao Erxun, the governor-general of Shengjing, denied the charge of murder. He called the killing of Gao by Huang a case of self-defense. In his memorial to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Qing local governor said that it was Gao who had started the fight by shooting Huang.⁴⁰ The Chinese media also defended the official Chinese point of view. The journal *Dongfang zazhi* (The Eastern Magazine), for example, said that the extraterritorial privileges by no means applied to Chinese residents, and that the Qing government still exercised jurisdiction over the Chinese community in the Guandong territory. According to Qing law, no compensation would be paid to the families of those who had been killed as a result of committing atrocities.⁴¹

At the end of July of 1907, Qing China and Japan agreed on a settlement. First, Huang was removed from his position with the Fengtian Fishing Company and not allowed to work in Manchuria thereafter. Second, the Fengtian Fishing Company paid compensation to the relatives of Gao. Finally, Japanese fishing enterprises were given unimpeded access to waters outside the Guandong fishing territories. Collecting tax from Chinese residents living in Fengtian, however, was prohibited, and it was the

³⁹ “Kōkaketsu gaihei gyogyō kōshi sō ben shobun mondai kōshō jikkyō kiin higai jikkyō” (On Discussing the Cause of the Incident and the Punishment of Huang Jiajie), *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), April 30, 1907.

⁴⁰ *Qingji Zhong ri han guanxi shiliao*, 6396.

⁴¹ *Dongfang zazhi* (Shanghai), vol. 4, no. 8 (1907).

Chinese government's responsibility to ensure the safety of both Qing residents and Guangdong residents fishing in sea territories under Qing jurisdiction.⁴²

At first glance, the “Gaiping Incident” might appear merely as a conflict between Japan and Qing China over jurisdiction and the interpretation of “murder” and “self-defense.” However, the story was more complex. From both Japanese and Chinese perspectives, it was also a battle over fishery interests in the contested waters of the Bohai Bay. *Shengjing shibao* (Shengjing Times), the major Japanese-owned Chinese-language newspaper in Manchuria and one of the first media organizations to respond to the incident, emphasized that the incident heavily jeopardized the interests of the Japanese fishing industry, because the victim Gao was indispensable to the Guangdong Ocean Fishery Group.⁴³ On the other hand, Governor Zhao asserted that it was the Guangdong Ocean Fishery Group's own fault, because Japanese military vessels and the vessels that they were escorting intruded into China's yellow croaker fishing grounds, which belonged to the Fengtian Fishing Company headquartered in Gaiping.⁴⁴ The largest newspaper in China, *Shenbao*, also supported the official narrative by reporting that the population of Japanese fishermen in the Fengtian's coastal waters was more than 150 in May 1907. In addition, *Shenbao* observed that Chinese fishermen were excluded from participating in fishing activities, with the exception of those who paid tax to the Japanese groups.⁴⁵

⁴² Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Digital Archives of the Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy*, vol. 40, no. 2 (1907): 503.

⁴³ “Gaiping ming'an zhi jiaoshe” (The Negotiation of the Gaiping Incident), *Shengjing shibao* (Fengtian), April 16, 1907.

⁴⁴ *Qingji Zhong ri han guanxi shiliao*, 6397.

⁴⁵ *Shenbao* (Shanghai), May 25-26, 1907.

At the national and the international levels, the incident showed the effects of the early years of Japanese expansion into Manchuria, which clashed with Qing China's intention to transform Manchuria from the ancestral homeland of China's Manchu rulers into an indispensable part of China's national territories. Under the pressure of foreign invasion and domestic troubles, the Qing government initiated a series of changes to consolidate their governance in the Northeastern border territories in the last decade of the dynasty. One of the changes was the establishment of the Fengtian Fishing Company, almost at the same time when Japan established its Guandong Ocean Fishery Group in Dalian.

The lack of clearly defined maritime boundaries gave rise to the disputes in the waters off the Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim between the newly emerging Japanese and Chinese enterprises in Manchuria. Japanese boats ventured into waters off the coasts of central Manchuria during the fishing seasons. The Chinese company, in turn, recruited Chinese fishermen in Japanese-leased Dalian. The joint imperial project by Japanese businessmen and the complicated interaction between Japanese and Chinese fishing groups, therefore, demonstrates that Japan's empire building was by no means just a state project.

Laboring along the Sea: Chinese Coolies and the Japanese Labor Control Policy

As noted above, very few Japanese immigrants in Dalian were involved in manual or unskilled occupations. Yet the development of Manchuria required unskilled laborers. In the Japanese sources, the term coolie (*kūrī* in Japanese) was

often interchangeable with the term laborer (*rōdōsha* in Japanese). However, “coolie” often had a more specific connotation of people who did heavy outdoor physical jobs, and had more difficult lives than ordinary laborers.⁴⁶ In the Fuchang company’s records, for example, writers almost exclusively used the term coolies to refer to Chinese dock workers. The distinction between Japanese laborers and Chinese coolies was clear for the company’s managers. According to a 1914 report by the director of the Office of the Dalian Dock, the selection criteria for dock workers included a docile temperament, strong physical condition, adaptation to water jobs, endurance, willingness to accept low wages, and convenient sources of recruitment.⁴⁷ Chinese coolies were more advantageous than Japanese workers in almost all these dimensions. Further, the majority of Chinese coolies were single, while Japanese laborers “were more anxious to start a family, and once married, their cost of living would increase by about fifty percent.”⁴⁸

Finally, the company managers were aware that Japanese immigrants, who arrived in Dalian with as sense of superiority to the Chinese workers, would not be willing to work side by side with their Chinese counterparts. At the same time, Chinese coolies, greater in number, would not want to be paid less than Japanese

⁴⁶ David Tucker, “Labor Policy and the Construction Industry in Manchukuo: Systems of Recruitment, Management, and Control,” in *Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories* (M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 33.

⁴⁷ Chongmin Su, ed., *Mantie dangan ziliao huibian, Vol 6: shulu jiaotong he yunshu gongren* (Compilation of Mantetsu Archives Documents, Vol 6: Land and Sea Transportations and Workers) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), hereafter cited as MTDA (VI), 217-218.,

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 218-219.

laborers. In the end, the company came to the conclusion that hiring Chinese coolies would be a better fit for the company's goals.⁴⁹

“Moving Beyond the Great Wall”

The migration of Chinese coolie laborers from North China to southern Manchuria can be traced back to the second half of the nineteenth century. Before that, the Qing emperors sought to preserve their homeland of Manchuria as a separate territory from the rest of China to enhance the Manchu identity.⁵⁰ The policy of isolation was terminated in the late 1800s in response to the growing threat of Russian and Japanese expansion into Manchuria. For the Qing authorities, a relaxation of the ban on Han Chinese immigration would help exercise control over Manchuria. As a result, between the 1890s and the 1940s roughly 25 million Chinese migrated to Manchuria from the provinces of Shandong and Hebei in North China.

This massive migration was often called by Chinese “Breaking through the Pass” (*Chuang guandong* in Chinese). Thomas Gottschang and Diana Lary called it “one of the greatest population movements in modern history.”⁵¹ Gottschang and Lary also collected annual migration numbers, which increased from an average of less than 40,000 a year between 1891 and 1895 to over a million each year in the late 1920s. The number dropped in the 1930s, but surged again in the 1940s.⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid., 221.

⁵⁰ Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York: Macmillan, 1935).

⁵¹ Thomas R. Gottschang and Diana Lary, *Swallows and Settlers: The Great Migration from North China to Manchuria* (The University of Michigan, 2000), 2.

⁵² Ibid., 38.




Chart 1. Migration Between North China and Manchuria, 1891-1942⁵³

The migrants entered and left Manchuria either by train or by steamship.

Between the two options, the sea route accounted for 75 percent, and the land route accounted for 25 percent. For example, migrants who left from Shandong could depart from the ports of Qingdao, Longkou and Yantai, cross the Bohai Bay, and land in southern Manchuria. Migrants from Hebei could take either the Beijing-Fengtian Railway to central Manchuria, or a steamship from the ports of Qingdao and Tianjin to Manchuria.⁵⁴ In cases both of departure and arrival by steamship, Dalian Port was the transportation hub, because of its privileged position between the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Sea. Passengers from the ports in Shandong only needed to spend ten to fifteen hours on the steamers to arrive at Dalian. The steamer fares cost 1.59 yuan,

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ MTDA (VI), 301-302.

1.78 yuan, and 2 yuan one way respectively from the ports of Yantai, Longkou and Qingdao to Dalian.⁵⁵ A laborer's daily income as a dockworker in Dalian on average was 0.4 yuan and 0.52 yuan as a miner in Fushun, Manchuria.⁵⁶ Therefore, taking steamers was relatively affordable for migrants.

Labor Recruitment and the Batou System

Like many other places in China during the Republican period, migrant workers relied on native-place organizations to establish and maintain social connections. In 1930, out of 2,571 groups of 11,284 coolies arriving in Dalian and Yingkou, 884 groups were recruited by "people who had gone back to escort them to Manchuria."⁵⁷ This arrangement of labor procurement was called the *batou* system. In his study of construction workers in Manchukuo, David Tucker noticed that Chinese intermediaries, the *batou*, recruited and delivered workers to employers. He argued that Japanese colonial control of Manchuria "did not bring direct control of workers," and that "Japanese enterprises continued to depend on indirect labor management through the *batou* system."⁵⁸

In her study of the contract labor system in Shanghai, Emily Honig noted that recruiters went to villages and brought girls back to Shanghai's textile factories, which might be owned by foreigners but whose labor recruitment was under the

⁵⁵ Gottschang and Lary, 123.

⁵⁶ *MTDA (VI)*,

⁵⁷ Gottschang and Lary, 62.

⁵⁸ Tucker, 30.

control of Chinese agents.⁵⁹ The Japanese Fuchang company in Dalian also hired Chinese batou to regulate coolies from North China, who deducted a little over 10 percent of workers' wages for themselves.⁶⁰ However, the company was not entirely dependent on these batou for labor recruitment. In fact, as a result of the popularity of sea routes and Dalian's unique advantage in the routes, Fuchang could easily hire coolies from among those who had recently arrived at Dalian Port without extra help from batou.⁶¹

To further consolidate its direct control over Chinese coolies, the company built dormitories. Initially, they were established in response to the plague prevalent in Manchuria in 1910-1911. Aioi Yoshitorō, the president of the company, built the dormitories for its company's coolies and staff in order to separate them from ordinary residents. By 1923, the construction area of dormitories reached 29,000 *ping* (one *ping* equals 3.3 square meters), which could house 12,000 laborers. Aioi believed that accommodating workers in dormitories with clothing, food, and entertainment facilities would not only encourage coolies to stay at Fuchang, but would also free them from Chinese batou control.⁶²

As a result of the weak batou system and the abundance of labor, the retention rate of coolies in the Fuchang company was very low. In 1926, there were almost 10,000 coolies working on the docks daily. However, the turnover rate of laborers

⁵⁹ Emily Honig, *Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1919-1949* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1986).

⁶⁰ Asobu Yanagisawa, *Nihonjin no shokuminchi keiken: Dairen Nihonjin shōkōgyōsha no rekishi* (Japanese Colonial Experience: the history of the Dalian Japanese Businessmen) (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999).

⁶¹ MTDA (VI), 283.

⁶² Shinozaki.

was 100.4 percent.⁶³ The number was striking, because it meant that all coolies left the company in a year (although it does not exclude the possibility that they returned later after working somewhere else). In comparison to other companies in Manchuria at the same time, the turnover rate at the Fushun Mining Company was about 38 percent, and it was about 20 percent at the Anshan Steel Company.⁶⁴

Lives as “Swallows”

Before the 1930s, the majority of Dalian’s coolie laborers were men. Among them, 42.2 percent were married, and 57.8 percent were single.⁶⁵ Married men normally left their wives and children behind in North China, since it was difficult to support the whole family in Dalian on their meager earnings. However, the fast and convenient transportation between North China and Manchuria resulted in frequent movements of migrants. Among the 25 million migrants who came to Manchuria from Shandong and Hebei in the first half of the twentieth century, two thirds eventually returned to their home villages.⁶⁶ Often referred to as “swallows,” seasonal migrants made considerable contributions to the stability and prosperity of North China. As Philip Huang noted, they helped relieve the population pressure in North China, and brought earnings home from Manchuria to be invested in land.⁶⁷

⁶³ MTDA (VI), 291.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 295.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 311.

⁶⁶ Gottschang and Lary.

⁶⁷ Philip C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983).

After these migrant coolies arrived and settled, native-place organizations and labor guilds provided services and relief in times of crisis. Funeral expenses, travel funds and emergency loans were available to members of the native-place organizations.⁶⁸ For example, in the late 1920s, there was a surge in Chinese refugees, on average a million per year, moving from Shandong to Manchuria after a series of natural disasters. The Shandong native-place organizations opened a relief center in downtown Dalian to provide services for Shandong migrants.⁶⁹

Japanese scholar Asobu Yanagisawa's study of the Chinese coolies at Fuchang shows that until the early 1930s, Fuchang treated their coolies fairly benevolently by meeting their basic needs. For instance, in the dorms, coolies were provided with food and winter clothes to survive the cold weather. When they were injured in accidents, the company provided compensation and additional relief funds. The medical treatment for sick and injured coolies was also free. Each day, a bag of flour for cooking was provided for every 20 Chinese laborers. In 1931 a bag of flour was sold to coolies at the price of 2.85 *yuan*, which was lower than the market price. The company subsidized the losses caused by price fluctuations over the years, which cost them about 15.2 million *yen* a year.⁷⁰

Fuchang management sought to provide benevolent policies to its workers because they were worried about the development of a labor movement. Labor unrest and work stoppages increased rapidly in the 1920s following the establishment of the

⁶⁸ Perrins, 105.

⁶⁹ O'Dwyer, 173.

⁷⁰ Yanagisawa.

⁷⁰ MTDA (VI), 283.

Chinese Communist Party and Chinese coolie workers' increased dissatisfaction with the high cost of living. This theme is further discussed below. In short, the Japanese colonial authorities were afraid of the politicization of unskilled Chinese laborers, which could "sow the seeds of revolution throughout the leasehold."⁷¹

To respond, the company developed several measures to eliminate discontent among workers, undermine their solidarity, and suppress the worker movements.⁷² These included improving workers' wages, educating workers to understand the wage policy, not using insulting language against workers, and listening to workers' demands. The company was also wary of activists, planning to hire more docile Chinese workers in the future and strengthen its relationship with the local police. The ultimate goal was "to prevent the movement of Chinese workers and make them willing to settle through improved wages and social welfare."⁷³

Colonial Labor Control

Before the Manchurian Incident in 1931 and the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, the Japanese colonial government rarely intervened directly in the labor policies of each enterprise. In the 1930s, however, the Japanese colonial regime in Dalian and Manchukuo strengthened their control of immigration, which was often in conflict with the interests of enterprises. While the authorities sought to restrict Chinese immigration from North China, companies faced increased labor demands

⁷¹ O'Dwyer, 134.

⁷² MTDA (VI), 226-228.

⁷³ Ibid.,226.

following the expansion of military and industrial projects in Manchuria.

In 1932, shortly after Japan occupied Manchuria and established its puppet state of Manchukuo, the Manchukuo government promulgated “The Meaning and Necessity of Labor Regulation.” The labor regulation included three aspects. The first was "the rule of working conditions," that is, the establishment of a minimum wage system and the maintenance of adjustment of working hours. The second aspect was "the control of labor protection," that is, the enactment of laws and regulations for welfare and relief. The last one was “the regulation of labor supply and demand” in order to control the flow of laborers.⁷⁴

The final stipulation is particularly important. The document states, "The entire labor force necessary for the Manchurian industry should be provided by native Manchurians, Japanese, and Koreans." Only by doing so would it " fulfill political, economic and social needs."⁷⁵ Specifically, it would help restrain the increase of Han Chinese in Manchuria, leave room for Japanese to move into Manchuria, maintain social order in Manchukuo, and prevent the outflow of capital and laborers out of Manchuria.⁷⁶

To implement its labor policy, the Guandong and Manchukuo governments entrusted the Dadong Company, which had its headquarters in Tianjin and branches in Dalian, Qingdao and Longkou, with the transportation of coolies to Manchuria. The company arranged physical examinations after coolies disembarked, and issued

⁷⁴ Guo and Guan, 890-891.

⁷⁵ Ibid.,891.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

work certificates to those who were healthy and qualified to work in Dalian.⁷⁷ The result of the labor control policy was remarkable. In the late 1920s, the annual entry of coolie workers from Shandong and Hebei reached nearly a million each year. In the year of 1934-1935, the number of licensed laborers dropped to 440,000. In 1936 it was 360,000, and 380,000 in the following year.⁷⁸ The restriction law was successful in limiting the entry of laborers.

After the outbreak of the total war between Japan and China in 1937, the colonial government in Dalian further strengthened labor controls. It set up a Guandong Labor Association as the new labor regulation agency. The main task of the Association was to issue labor permits to workers employed in Dalian. According to the 1938 "Worker Registration Rules," all Chinese workers, both men and women, had to register with the Guandong Labor Association. Workers were required to carry their labor permits with them for inspection at any time.⁷⁹ The permits included a photograph and fingerprints of the worker. Chinese historians have pointed out that collecting fingerprints through labor permits would help the colonial government identify criminals or activists. For example, in June 1940, the Guandong Police Department in Dalian was able to arrest participants in the anti-Japanese movement through fingerprints provided by the Guandong Labor Association.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Zhifen Ju and Jianping Zhuang, eds., *Riben lueduo huabei qiangzhi laogong dangan Shiliao Ji* (*Archival Document Collection of Japan's Forced Labor in North China*) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003).14-15.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁷⁹ Guo and Guan, 905.

⁸⁰ Mingyi Gu, *Dalian Jinbainian Shi* (*A Nearly a Hundred Year History of Dalian*) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1999), 720.

By 1941, the Association had 2288 employer members, including 613 Japanese members, 1668 Chinese members, and 7 members from other countries. The Association stipulated that all members should not employ undocumented workers or employ those who worked for other members. By doing so, it was said to restrict the flow of undocumented laborers into the Dalian area, and avoid any unhealthy competition between companies.⁸¹

A Shortage of Labor

At the same time that Japan's Guandong leased territories and the Manchukuo regime sought to limit immigration from North China, companies in Dalian insisted on access to more, not fewer, workers from North China. From the 1930s, the primary economy of Dalian shifted from trade and export to industrialization, after Japan sought to "turn Manchuria into a testing ground for industrial management and planning techniques."⁸² The prioritization of industrial management encouraged Japanese businessmen to invest in new factories and hire more industrial laborers. In 1932, the number of factories in Dalian was 487. It rose to more than 1,000 by 1937.

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Despite the fact that Dalian needed more laborers, it lost its advantage in attracting capital and migrants from North China. Before the establishment of Manchukuo as the headquarters of the Guandong government and the Southern

⁸¹ Guo and Guan, 907.

⁸² Young, 52.

⁸³ Hess, 378-379.

Manchurian Railway, Dalian was the political and commercial center of Japanese investment. Of the 1,180 Japanese corporations in Manchuria at the end of 1930, 728 were in Dalian. Dalian also held 87.6 percent of capital invested in Manchukuo by Japanese.⁸⁴ After 1932, however, a considerable number of newly arrived Japanese industrial enterprises operated in central and north Manchuria.

The new enterprises set up in places outside Dalian also competed for Chinese coolies with companies in the Guandong Leased territory. For example, the number of Chinese workers who entered Manchuria through Dalian was 111,880 in 1937, and increased more than threefold to 347,798 in 1939. However, the proportion of Chinese laborers staying in Dalian gradually was reduced, from 68 percent of total laborers entering in Manchuria in 1937 to 60 percent in 1938, and 48 percent in 1939.⁸⁵ Dockworkers, in particular, became targets for poaching by companies outside Dalian. In 1938, the managers of Fuchang complained, “Almost all the Chinese laborers whom we paid a great deal of money to recruit were poached by competitors.”⁸⁶

Although Dalian's monopoly on Japanese capital in Manchuria ended in the 1930s, the centrality of the port and the trinity transportation system still functioned. In fact, Japanese investment in port and other infrastructure construction increased considerably in the 1930s. In his study of the 1930s world depression and its impacts on the Manchurian economy, Tim Wright noted that the Depression resulted in the

⁸⁴ Young, 251.

⁸⁵ Yanagisawa, 197.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

decline of the soybean trade and severe decline in peasant livelihood in central and northern Manchuria. However, southern Manchuria not only remained stable in output and incomes, but in addition investment in the construction and infrastructure sectors increased as a result of the transfer of capital into this area from other parts of Manchuria during the Depression. Construction work in ports and railways increased fourfold in value in 1933, and increased a further 50 percent in 1934.⁸⁷

Factories in Dalian continued to complain that they could not find enough workers, both skilled and unskilled. The labor policy that sought to restrict the movement of laborers in and out of Manchuria led to labor shortages. In response, with the implementation of a strict labor policy, the Guandong government restricted movement of workers out of Dalian, in addition to controlling their movement into Dalian. It established offices in the harbors and railway stations. Every Chinese worker who tried to leave Dalian was required to show a labor permit, a short-term travel certificate and other paperwork before being allowed to purchase tickets.⁸⁸ To retain Chinese migrant workers, especially the skilled workers, in 1942, Japanese officials issued a new registration law that divided the Chinese population into two categories. Those who were either originally from Dalian or working in prioritized industries as skilled workers were granted “registered” status. Everyone else was considered a “temporary” resident. Being a registered resident allowed one’s children to attend better schools, chiefly the Japanese-run schools, training institutes, and

⁸⁷ Tim Wright, “The Manchurian Economy and the 1930s World Depression,” *Modern Asian Studies* 41, no. 5 (2007): 1073–1112.

⁸⁸ Guo and Guan, 912.

colleges.⁸⁹

Labor Mobilization: From Free Labor to Forced Labor

The colonial labor policy was shaped by the government's desire to shift Manchuria away from China, but the demographic reality and the increased labor supply needs of non-governmental agencies eventually led to the removal of immigration control in the 1940s. However, it was too late to attract people from North China to move into Manchuria. The Sino-Japanese war that began in North China in 1937 created inflation. As a result, the living expenses in North China were more than twice as high as before the war. Meantime, by 1941 there was little difference between factory workers' wages in Manchuria and North China.⁹⁰ In agriculture, in fact, farmers in North China began to earn more. In summer 1940, the wages of the agricultural labor force rose from 2.5 yuan to 3 yuan per month, which was three times the salary of the factory positions in Dalian. Factory workers faced the temptation to leave, since 70 percent of the existing migrant laborers originally were farmers.⁹¹

The Japanese authorities' initial imaginary of Manchuria as an empty space that Japanese immigrants could soon fill up turned out to be unrealistic as well. As mentioned earlier, local Japanese-owned companies were unwilling to cooperate in the scheme. The wage disparity between Japanese workers and Chinese coolies was

⁸⁹ Hess, 382.

⁹⁰ Tucker, 46.

⁹¹ MTDA (VI), 242-43, 246.

simply too high. It became worse after 1942, when many Japanese workers had to leave their jobs, after they were conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army.

Factories thus had to use Chinese workers to make up for the technical posts left by Japanese workers.⁹² This left the issue of who would take the positions left by those Chinese workers.

The companies tried to look for alternative labor supplies. For example, the Fuchang Company sent recruiters to Shanghai to hire laborers. From March to April 1941, 1,264 Chinese coolies from Shanghai arrived at Dalian and joined Fuchang. Although the wages of Shanghai workers were lower compared with those of North China, the proportion of unskilled workers was also higher, decreasing labor efficiency. In addition, Shanghai workers were unwilling to come to Manchuria, given the inferior working conditions. Fuchang hoped to recruit 4,000 workers from Shanghai, ending up with a little more than 1,000.⁹³ The company also encouraged laborers to bring their families. In 1942, the wives of coolies accounted for 53 percent of the full workforce working at the docks, an increase of 15 percent from the previous year.⁹⁴

Failing to fulfill the increased labor demand nevertheless, the authorities turned to a final alternative supply, that is, forced labor. On January 16, 1943, the Japanese Guandong government announced the establishment of "The Labor Service Organization." With the aim of increasing labor supplies to the maximum, both the

⁹² MTDA (VI), 390-391.

⁹³ Yanagisawa, 197.

⁹³ MTDA (VI), 283.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

general public and students were incorporated into the coercive labor recruitment process. For the general public, the policy stipulated that all adults living in Dalian, including men between the ages of 14 and 40, and unemployed, unmarried women under the age of 25, were required to join the "labor service organization." Their assignments included working in the Dalian Port, the railway, the machinery factory and other war industries.⁹⁵

High school students took part in the same kinds of jobs. In a 2016 interview, Li Chengjun, a graduate of the Japanese-owned Lüshun Public High School in the years of 1942-44, shared the story of Japanese labor mobilization of the youth. He remembered that he spent most of his time in his senior year digging trenches and repairing the airport. His Japanese classmates at school were also doing the same work, although they could eat rice while the Chinese students were only provided sorghum.⁹⁶

The Guandong colonial government also reached an agreement with the Japanese army stationed in North China. It connected the recruitment of workers in North China with social stability. The colonial government in Hebei, for example, transported a large number of young and middle-aged Chinese suspects and criminals to Manchuria.⁹⁷ Within Manchukuo, police arrested the homeless people, and forced them to engage in labor after the publication of "The Emergent Evacuation of the Urban Floating Population" on April 18, 1943. On the second day, the police at

⁹⁵ Gu, 734.

⁹⁶ Interview with Chengjun Li, Jan 25, 2016.

⁹⁷ Guo and Guan, 917.

Changchun, the capital of Manchukuo, arrested 3,160 vagrant people, and 1,287 of them were sent to forced labor camps. In the city of Fengtian, on April 27, the policed arrested 3,567 vagrant people. All those who were able to work were forced to do so for wartime military projects.⁹⁸

From Strikes to Arson: Dalian Workers' Movements

In her comparison of workers' movements in Dalian and Shanghai in the 1920s, O'Dwyer argues that Dalian did not have widespread workers' demonstrations against Japanese imperialism such as those that occurred in Shanghai in the mid-1920s. Strikes and labor activism in Dalian met with "little success but much repression."⁹⁹ The local police, along with the Guandong Army stationed in Dalian, were effective in maintaining order and disrupting workers' movements with the aid of advanced equipment. For example, in 1920, the Guandong Government-General had acquired an ultraviolet ray machine, a microscope, a spectroscope, and new capabilities in basic forensic science to assist in criminal investigations.¹⁰⁰

Even though the Japanese colonial authorities kept a close watch on workers, it was not rare for the local Communist Party and labor unions to organize workers' movements and strikes. Perrins recorded the number of strikes happening in Dalian

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ O'Dwyer, 361

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 134.

from 1916 to 1927, and noted that it was not until the mass arrests of the union and CCP leaders in the summer of 1927 that the workers' movements fell apart.¹⁰¹

Table 3. Strikes in Dalian, 1916-27 ¹⁰²

Year	Number of strikes	Total number of days	Total number workers
1916	3	7	730
1917	7	15	1,479
1918	22	99	4,977
1923	28	98	4,055
1924	29	128	5,490
1925	65	266	8,899
1926	67	311	13,795
1927	34	138	9,865

Strikes in the 1920s

The first large strike wave in Dalian took place in the summer of 1925, as an act of solidarity with the Shanghai workers, after British police in Shanghai's International Concession fired on demonstrators on May 30, 1925. On June 15, the Dalian Chinese Workers' Study Society, the leading labor union for industrial workers of Dalian, convened a meeting with a few organizations to discuss how to

¹⁰¹ Perrins, 154.

¹⁰² Ibid., 155.

support their Shanghai comrades. At this meeting, they decided to 1) issue a public telegram expressing their concerns for and support of the Shanghai workers; 2) collect donations to provide relief for the Shanghai strikers; 3) organize a memorial meeting honoring those killed by the British police; 4) distribute flyers throughout Dalian denouncing Japanese colonial rule in the Guandong leasehold; and 5) hold a public parade protesting Japanese imperialism in China.¹⁰³

In the following days, strikes were held throughout Dalian. The largest strikes occurred at the Fengtian chemical plant, the Lüshun salt works, the Fukushima cotton mill, and the Shahekou factory.¹⁰⁴ Even though these actions began as a solidarity strike, soon local grievances became the central issues. Workers demanded equal payment between Chinese and Japanese workers, compensation for abuses by factory batou and managers, and improvement of working and living conditions.¹⁰⁵

Without violence and punishment, the companies accepted worker demands almost immediately. It turned out that the local government and Japanese enterprises were preparing for an industrial exhibition, with the aim of showing “a glorious display of “Sino-Japanese solidarity.” The exhibition was held on August 10, 1925 and ran for six weeks.¹⁰⁶

The next year, the largest labor strike in Dalian’s history happened in the Fukushima cotton mill. Founded in 1925, the mill had 20,000 spindles and 1,200 workers. Among them, female workers accounted for 56 percent of its workforce, and

¹⁰³ Ibid., 168.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 169.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 161.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 167.

child laborers accounted for 38 percent. The Chinese employees worked more than 12 hours and earned 0.25 yuan a day, which was merely 25 percent of the wages of the Japanese workers in the same industry. The wage of female cotton workers was 20 percent lower than that of male workers. This strike was triggered by the Japanese managers paying the workers in Fengtian yuan, while at the same time charging workers' meal fees in inflated Japanese yen (1 yen equaled 1.2 Fengtian yuan).¹⁰⁷

After receiving a report of the situation from the factory's representative, Fu Jingyang, the head of the Dalian Chinese Workers' Study Society, decided to support the workers in the Fukushima cotton mill to strike. Fu drafted six demands for workers to negotiate with their Japanese managers, including 1) managers were not to physically or verbally abuse workers; 2) they were to permit mothers to breast feed their children at the factory floor; 3) the factory should increase workers' wages by one-third without increasing the meal fees; 4) they should grant workers a day off every two weeks, and should pay double salary for holiday work; 5) the work day should be no longer than 10 hours ; 6) the dormitory fees should be reduced.¹⁰⁸

The mill managers initially rejected the demands and hired policemen to disrupt the strike. They also sent batou to recruit new workers. However, the first scene new workers encountered was hundreds of protesters in front of the factory, proclaiming "support the Third International!" and "down with imperialism!" The strike also won widespread support from the city residents. The major local newspapers reported this

¹⁰⁷ Dangshi bangongshi, "Guanyu Dalian Fufangchang Sierqi Dabagong de Zonghe Baogao (The Report of the Fukushima Strike on April 27, 1926)," in *Dalian dixiadang zhuanti ziliao* (The Collection of Records of the Underground CCP in Dalian) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1987),168.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid,171.

strike sympathetically. Labor unions from other cities also sent in statements of support. After learning that the local activists had been arrested by the police, the North China Regional Committee of the CCP sent experienced strike leaders to Dalian to help with the protest. After more than a three-month strike, the workers' movement achieved a great victory. The Japanese mill owner agreed to all the demands on August 6.¹⁰⁹

In the 1925 strike wave and the 1926 Fukushima strike, the Dalian Chinese Workers' Study Society and the local branch of the CCP were indeed active. Chinese historians, especially local historians studying the CCP, often have attributed the success of workers' movements to effective leadership by the CCP. However, the union leaders, such as those from the Dalian Chinese Workers' Study Society, first and foremost were factory activists. Nevertheless, as in the cases of workers' movements in Shanghai and Tianjin in the Republican period, one should be careful not to overemphasize the existence of working-class consciousness.¹¹⁰ After all, the grievances workers brought up in many cases were rooted in local and individual issues, rather than class-based.

Dock Workers' Resistance in the 1930s

Between 1928 and 1931, labor movements were in a retreat caused by internal

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 172-180.

¹¹⁰ Gail Hershatter, *Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949* (Stanford: Stanford Univ Press, 1986); Honig.

factionalism and ideological dissent within their leadership.¹¹¹ However, from the early 1930s, the Northeast Bureau of the CCP designated the railways and harbor as the new center of the workers' movements in Manchuria. The dockworkers' resistance against Japanese imperialism was particularly prominent. At the beginning of 1932, a dockworker named Zhang Baiyuan organized a study group under the guidance of the local Party secretary Liu Jingxin. In the group meetings, they read revolutionary books together, such as *Yingxiong lei* (Hero's Tears) and *Guoshi bei* (Sad National Affairs), and sang the song "Workers Young Pioneers." Some workers joined the CCP, and soon they established a branch of the Communist Party.¹¹²

In December 1932, to support the Shanghai residents' movement to boycott Japanese goods, Dalian dockworkers set up a "soccer team" with the name of "qunyou", meaning "group friends." They organized football fans in the factories to carry out the boycott of Japanese goods. As a result of these activities, it did not take long before the slogan "Chinese workers should not buy Japanese goods" spread throughout the docks. The study group also set up a mutual aid fund with a donation from workers, to support the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army.¹¹³

In the early 1930s, Chinese dock workers also waged several strikes against oppression. After the Manchurian incident in September 1931, the Fuchang managers forced Chinese dockworkers to take off their clothes for inspection when entering factories. This led to strong dissatisfaction and resistance from the workers. They

¹¹¹ Chong-Sik Lee, *Revolutionary Struggle in Manchuria: Chinese Communism and Soviet Interest, 1922-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

¹¹² Guo and Guan, 393.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 394.

returned to their dormitory to implement a strike. The consecutive strikes affected the shipment of goods in Dalian, forcing Fuchang to compromise and finally give up the inspection rules.¹¹⁴

The Anti-Japanese Arson Group

From the mid-1930s on, many coolie laborers or forced workers suffered and died as a result of the heavy workload and deteriorating living conditions. Port workers and the CCP began to set fires in the warehouses on the docks. In 1933, a group of young communists were selected by the Northeast Bureau of the Communist Party to undergo training in the Soviet Union. By the end of the year, some members including Qiu Shixian, Huang Zhenlin, and Zhao Wenguo returned to China. In 1934, they set up "The Chinese Unit of International Intelligence" (CUII), and directed the operation of the intelligence unit in Manchuria. Because of Dalian's strategic location in Japan's invasion of China, the CUII made the city the focus of its work.¹¹⁵

In the summer of 1934, the Dalian International Intelligence Group, also known as the Anti-Japanese Arson Group, was established. Zhao Guowen and Li Shoushan were in charge. In March 1936, CUII member Qiu Shixian arrived in Dalian, disguised as a worker, and lived in the worker's dorms. He actively developed the Anti-Japanese Arson Group, and implemented arson activities.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ MTDA (VI), 795.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

Within the six years of its establishment between 1934 and 1940, this group set 57 fires, burning the Japanese army supplies of more than 20 million yuan, enough to sustain six to seven thousand Japanese soldiers all year round. Among all the workers, the dockworker Yu Shouan set the most fires: seventeen.¹¹⁷ Although the arson sabotage was effective, it also marked the disappearance of the collective workers' movements on which people had relied in the mid-1920s. From the mid-1930s through the end of World War II, it was individual activists from the arson group, who attacked the Japanese colonial structure. Ultimately, the radical arson activities in the 1930s proved costly, as the Japanese administrators and police eventually wiped out the CCP's fledgling organization in Dalian in the early 1940s.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the role Dalian played in the Japanese empire's expansion into Manchuria in the twentieth century. Dalian became increasingly integrated into the empire through its role in the "Trinity Transportation System" and the "Yellow Sea Economic Zone" system. The reliance of abundant and cheap supplies of labor from North China, however, made the creation of a "Japanese" Dalian impossible. The colonial labor control system, with an aim to weaken the ties of Manchuria to North China, contradicted the needs of the Japanese companies. Finally, as difficulties of labor supply mounted in the 1940s, the Japanese colonial regimes turned to forced laborers.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 792.

Encountering colonial governance, the Chinese governments, the CCP and labor activists, and individual fishermen and workers reacted accordingly. Their reactions were shaped by colonial policies to shift Manchuria away from China, but also by motivations rooted in demographic reality and local, individual needs. As the next chapter shows, when World War Two ended in 1945 and the CCP members followed the Soviet Army to re-enter the city of Dalian, they faced the challenges of how to (re)established its presence in both the city and the vast countryside. Dalian's history under Japanese rule and its status as a city situated in the complex relationship between multiple nation states laid the foundation on which the CCP later conducted mass mobilization under Soviet supervision built.

Chapter Two

Farmers vs. Fishermen: Rural Dalian in the Civil War and Land Reform,

1946-1950

On April 1950, the newly founded Dalian Fishery Department received two complaints from the "people" (*renmin yijian*), forwarded by the consultative committee of the People's Representative Conference of Dalian. In the first letter, fishermen grumbled about the complicated and wasteful bureaucratic procedures which required all individuals to register every fishery activity in which they engaged. A second letter compared the government's attitudes toward farmers and fishermen, complaining that "after the recovery (*guangfu*) of Dalian [from the Japanese], the government only paid attention to farmers. It did not treat fishermen's issues as seriously. We hope from now on that fishermen will be valued equally." In its response, the Fishery Department admitted its inadequate work organizing fishermen, who were living either in the remote coastal areas or in other rural communities where they were economically and socially intermingled with farmers. The response also boasted about loans the government had issued to fishermen, while acknowledging the department's failure to establish a more effective fishery administration.¹

¹ "Guanyu chuli renmin yijian de daifu," (On the response of people's advice), December 20, 1950, the Dalian Municipal Archives (hereafter cited as DLA), 50-1-3.

The challenges faced by the CCP government in dealing with a population of fishermen must be understood in a longer historical context. The CCP did not even have a presence in rural Dalian until the post-1945 civil war between the CCP and the GMD. Prior to the civil war, the Soviet Union had assumed control of Dalian from the Japanese. The Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed in August 1945 between the GMD and the Soviet Union leased the formerly Japanese-controlled Port Arthur and Port Dalian to the USSR as a marine base and a commercial port respectively. Although Chinese were in charge of the civil administration of Dalian, the treaty specified that leadership of the civil administration needed to take into Soviet interests account.² In reality, as Han Gang, the party secretary in Dalian from 1945 to 1948 recalled, Dalian in the civil war “was subject to the military supervision and control of the Soviet authorities.”³ Once the civil war began in 1946, the Party was now confronted with a new situation: a war-free city politically and militarily managed by the Soviets and economically blockaded by the Nationalists.

The Soviet upper hand in city affairs limited the CCP’s capacity to mobilize urban dwellers, and caused the CCP to switch its organizing efforts to the countryside.⁴ The civil war period (1946-49) was the first time that the Chinese Communist party established a presence in the countryside of southern Northeast

² Dalian shi shizhi bangongshi (ed.), *Sulian hongjun zai Lüda* (The Soviet Red Army in Dalian) (Dalian: Dongbei caijing daxue yinshuangchang, 1995), hereafter cited as SLHJZLD, 265.

³ Han Guang, *Han Guang Dangshi gongzuo wenji* (The Work Documents of Han Guang) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), 34.

⁴ Conflicts between the CCP leaders and the Soviets took place frequently over the issues of city management, wages of Chinese workers and removal or sales of factory equipment. Hess, 2011. In addition, Liu Shunyuán, vice party secretary of Dalian, also recalled that top officers who openly criticized the Soviet policies in the city were purged and removed from their posts. Ding Qun, *Liushunyuán zhuan* (Biography of Liu Shunyuán) (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1999), 34.

China. Despite its rich experience building rural bases and mobilizing peasants during the Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945), the CCP had no prior experience organizing rural areas populated not only by farmers, but also by fisher people.

This chapter addresses the conundrum the Communist Party faced at the outset of the civil war in Dalian: how to conduct mass mobilization and gain support from farmers and fisher people during a time when the local CCP operated under Soviet supervision. It begins with a brief account of rural development under Japanese colonial rule (1905-1945). Then it explores the policies that the CCP adopted to gain support from peasants in coastal villages beginning in 1946, as well as the effects of those policies on the rural communities. The Party was not internally unified about how to proceed. CCP leaders from the Party Central Committee, its Northeast Bureau, and municipal and county Party committees had conflicting views on how to mobilize peasants in rural Dalian. Their efforts to mobilize peasants, both farmers and fisher people, can be seen in an examination of Jin County, a rural area that was formally part of Dalian.

The chapter, while building upon previous research about the reasons for ultimate CCP success in the Northeast,⁵ shows that the victory of the CCP in the civil

⁵ In his groundbreaking study of the civil war in Northeast China, Steven Levine noted that the CCP lacked mass support from the rural population in Manchuria prior to the civil war, the very population on which the Communists had relied to initiate the revolution in north and central China. Levine argued that communist policies in the Northeast countryside, including land reform and other peasant mobilization strategies, provided the political and military basis for the Communist success. Military studies of the Communist victory in Northeast China have endorsed Levine's statements. They also noticed a lack of an existing network of Party activists and popularity among peasants before the civil war, and argued that it led the CCP to switch from its rural-based guerrilla warfare tactics to a combination of guerrilla and mobile warfare. See Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948* (Columbia University Press, 1987). Harold Tanner, "Guerrilla,

war hinged on how well it could adapt to new conditions as the civil war proceeded, and adjust its policies to local circumstances. It shows that the “semi-concealed” policy practiced by the Dalian CCP, in which the party committee did not operate openly instead assigned members to serve as officers or managers in public posts, created divisions among CCP leaders of different levels. In particular, it contributed to discontent on the part of county and village party members. Because during the civil war the CCP in Dalian was subordinate to Soviet control (and the USSR had signed the treaty with the GMD, not the CCP), it could not advocate fierce class struggle. This meant that it discouraged poor farmers from demanding rent deductions against landlords. At the same time, because of Soviet and GMD blockades of the coastal areas, the CCP could not solve the plight of fishermen, with the exception of women in fishing households.

Rural Development under Japanese Colonial Rule

When the CCP entered the countryside of Dalian for the first time, it had to devise means to cope with the legacy of Japanese rule in rural areas. The rural population in the district of Dalian included Manchus who had settled in rural

Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947." *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 4 (2003): 1177-1222; Victor Cheng, "Imagining China's Madrid in Manchuria: The Communist Military Strategy at the Onset of the Chinese Civil War, 1945-1946." *Modern China* 31, no. 1 (2005): 72-114. Recent studies of Northeast China in the civil war period have turned to the urban history and actual practices within the city of Dalian, arguing that the Soviet occupying army and Sino-Soviet relations shaped the successes and failures of the Communist strategy by confining urban grassroots campaigns and cultural productions. Hess 2011; Zheng Cheng, *Kokkyō naisenki no chūkyō, soren kankei: ryojun, dairen chiku o chūshin ni* (The Relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union during the Chinese Civil War, with a Focus on Dalian and Lüshun), (Tōkyō :Ochanomizu Shobō, 2012), 30.

southern Manchuria beginning in the early eighteenth century. They were joined by a large influx of migrant farmers from China proper after the Qing court's removal of immigration barriers in the nineteenth century. These farmers, who had mostly moved from Shandong and Hebei, constituted a primary and continual source of labor supply and introduced agricultural cultivation to the area.⁶

Decades before the Japanese government established a puppet regime in 1931 Japanese villagers had begun to move to Japanese Guandong Leased Territory, which included Port Arthur, and the urban center and rural areas of Dalian. In 1915, 19 Japanese households were recruited by a former Japanese policeman to join the pioneer village of Japanese settlers in rural Manchuria, named the Aichuan (*Aikawa*) Village and located in Jinzhou (renamed Jin County during the civil war).⁷ Compared to the situation in central and northern Manchuria, Japanese who resided in the vast countryside of the Guandong Leased Territory were rather rare. The majority of Japanese immigrants, most of whom were employees of the South Manchurian Railway, entrepreneurs, and their wives and children, lived in the cities.

The predominant change in the rural economy during colonial rule in Dalian was the commercialization of agriculture. Grain production in rural Dalian was only able to provide two-thirds of the daily needs of local urban and rural residents, and the Japanese colonial government relied on imported grain from northern Manchuria

⁶Christopher Isett, *State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, 1644-1862*, (Stanford University Press, 2007).

⁷The project unfortunately proved to be a failure, since it only lasted for a brief time and the majority of immigrants later returned to Japan. Kantōshūchō naimubu dobokuka (ed.), *Kantōshū Ai-kawamura: Hojin Manshū imin no sakigake* (The village of Aikawa in the Kantō territory: The forefront of Japanese settlers in Manchuria) (Dalian: Manshū nichinichi shinbunsha, 1935), 8.

to supply the rest.⁸ Transportation improvements and urban expansion intensified the commercialization of agriculture and domestic and international trade.⁹ Under Japanese control, Dalian produced a diversity of foods such as corn, sorghum, millet, yellow beans, peanuts, vegetables, livestock, and fish products. The most lucrative crop was soybeans. These products not only supplied the city of Dalian, but were also shipped to other parts of China, Japan, Europe, and the United States.¹⁰ Rapid agricultural development ceased in the 1930s, when the global depression caused a decline in the trade in soybeans, the single most important export commodity in Manchuria. The initial years of the Manchukuo regime restricted the migration of Chinese from North China, which reduced the supply of farming labor.¹¹

As Chapter 1 shows, fisheries in rural Dalian also became more commercialized under Japanese rule. In order to expand fishing production, Japanese authorities organized cooperatives. The majority of Chinese fishermen had lived far away from the city and operated in fishing grounds close to shore. They depended on traditional methods such as set nets, long lines and ground nets.¹² In 1906, the Japanese colonial government established the Guandong Fishing Cooperatives in coastal fishing villages to organize fishermen. All fishermen were obliged to join the

⁸Ibid., 128.

⁹Ramon Myers and Thomas R. Ulie, "Foreign Influence and Agricultural Development in Northeast China: A Case Study of the Liaotung Peninsula, 1906-42." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 02 (1972): 329-350.

¹⁰Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui, ed. *Lüda Gaishu* (A brief account of Lüda) (Lüda: Lüda gaishu bianji weiyuan hui yinxing, 1949), 129-132.

¹¹Nai-Ruenn Chen, "Agricultural Productivity in a Newly Settled Region: The Case of Manchuria." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 21, no. 1 (1972): 87-95; Wright, 1073-1112.

¹²Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, *Manshū no suisan jijō* (Fisheries in Manchuria), (Minamimanshū tetsudō kaisha, 1931), 44.

fishery cooperatives. The function of these cooperatives was to enable the mediation and arbitration of disputes, issue low-interest loans to fishermen, store tools and other supplies during a seasonal moratorium, take care of sick fishermen, and provide pensions to the relatives of the dead.¹³

The contribution of women to the household economy in the commercialized agricultural and fishing villages was substantial. In the agriculture-dominated villages, women were more likely to work on the farm, while men left villages to work elsewhere.¹⁴ The Japanese colonial fishing company in Dalian had hired women divers from South Korea to harvest seafood by hand from the sea floor. During the colonial period, it was also a custom for rural Chinese women who lived along the coast to pick up *jimaocai*, a kind of seaweed, and transport it to markets for sale. The total amount of *jimaocai* picked by women was estimated at between five and six thousand *jin* each year.¹⁵ In addition, when men took long fishing trips to a good fishing site, women were left behind with agricultural tasks.¹⁶

In sum, under Japanese colonial rule, villages in Dalian's rural counties had highly commercialized agriculture and fisheries. Peasants produced a diversity of products, and obtained income from farm and nonfarm income, taking advantage of the convenient transportation system and the area's proximity to the city of Dalian

¹³Ibid., 15.

¹⁴Benjamin, Dwayne, and Loren Brandt. "Markets, discrimination, and the economic contribution of women in China: historical evidence." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 44, no. 1 (1995): 63-104.

¹⁵*Lüda Gaishu*, 152.

¹⁶Yang Baozhong, *Dongfang Yufu* (Eastern Fishermen) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 2008), 5.

and the markets in Japan. Finally, women made a considerable contribution to the household economy in both farming and fishing villages.

Entering Coastal Jin County and Building the Party Apparatus

The defeat of Japan in 1945 pushed Northeast China into a civil war between Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government and Mao's Communist Party. As a marine base controlled by the USSR, Dalian's good fortune of not becoming a military battlefield did not prevent it from turning into a geopolitical limbo. As the USSR entered the city of Dalian and quickly secured control over harbor and shipbuilding facilities, chemical industries and the locomotive plant left by the Japanese, both the Nationalists and the Communists also positioned themselves to gain a foothold in the city. The Nationalist Party wanted to land troops at Dalian in late 1945 and then proceed inland to central and northern Manchuria. However, the Soviets repeatedly denied Nationalist military forces access to the commercial port of Dalian.¹⁷ In response, the Nationalists adopted a naval blockade in 1947 to halt Soviet ships operating between Manchuria and Chinese ports under Nationalist control. The USSR soon strengthened the naval gunnery and increased patrols of the surrounding waters around the ports of Dalian and Arthur.¹⁸

¹⁷Chang Kia-ngau, *Last chance in Manchuria: the diary of Chang Kia-ngau* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 79-80, 86-87.

¹⁸Bruce A Elleman, and S. C. M. P, "Soviet Sea Denial and the GMD-CCP Civil War in Manchuria, 1945-1949," In *Naval coalition warfare: from the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (London: Routledge 2008), 122.



Map 2. The Area Where the Soviet Army was Stationed¹⁹

Despite its initial shock at the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty in which the Soviets recognized Chiang's Nationalist government as the only legitimate government of China, the Communist Party was able to take advantage of the Soviet presence in Manchuria. The Soviets gave the CCP considerable assistance, including the use of the port and railways to transport troops and cadres from outside the Northeast, to help the Communists establish their presence in Northeast China.²⁰ In the fall of 1945, the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee headed by Peng Zhen was established. In accordance with the decision of the Central Committee, the Northeast Bureau assisted the migration of cadres from the Communist base area headquarters in Yan'an and North China to the Northeast.²¹

¹⁹ Leng and Jiang, 30.

²⁰ Ibid., 123.

²¹ Levine, 106.

As mentioned above, the focus of the CCP during the civil war in Dalian was the countryside. However, the CCP had only a weak presence in rural areas of Dalian in late 1945. The challenges faced by the CCP organizing rural residents can be seen in Jin County. Located about 30 kilometers northeast of the urban section of Dalian, Jin County used to be the site of the central government office of the Liaodong Peninsula, before Czarist Russia established Dalian as a commercial port in 1898.²² It was both the largest and the most populated county belonging to Dalian, and “the only county of China that bordered two seas.”²³ Jin County faced the Bohai Sea to the west and the Yellow Sea to the east. It covered a land area of 1,340 square kilometers with a coastline of 269 kilometers.²⁴ After the Japanese defeat in 1945, there were 13 sub-counties, and 12 of them were coastal.²⁵ Most rural residents of the county conducted both farming and offshore fishing.

Records showed that Li Penghua and Yu Zhihua were the only CCP members in Jin County before the Sino-Japanese war ended. Disguised as a coolie, Li was sent by the Liaodong Party Committee to the salt flats in Jin County. He conducted anti-Japanese propaganda and recruited workers to join the Party. In 1946 Li organized more than 90 workers from the salt industry to fight the Nationalist Army in central Manchuria. The other underground Party member during the war, Yu Zhihe, worked in the fruit orchards of a county named Zheng Mingsi from 1942. His main work was

²²Qiao Dexiu, *Nanjin Xiangtu zhi* (Gazetteer of Jin) (Dalian: Xinya Yinwu gongsi, 1931).

²³Dalianshi jinzhouqu difangzhi bianzuanweiyuanhui, *Jinxian zhi* (Gazetteer of Jin County) (Dalian, Dalian chubanshe, 1989), 1.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Jinxian diming bangongshi, *Jinxian Dimingzhi* (Place Names of Jin County) (Dalian: Dalian haiyunxueyuan chubanshe 1988), 4.

to propagate the CCP's policy of resistance to Japanese control.²⁶ When the Soviet army took control of the countryside of Dalian in late 1945, it kept the previous leadership of the Japanese-established *Jin hui*, a rural administrative unit introduced by Japanese, to stabilize the rural communities.²⁷ At the same time, the CCP began sending cadres from former base areas in north China to Dalian to gain a foothold in the countryside.²⁸ The influx of cadres was paralleled by the emergence of local, dispersed underground CCP members in both the city and the countryside after Japan's surrender.²⁹

Building a government structure in the county during the civil war, however, often resulted in differences between the CCP's national, regional, and local political strategies. At the center, Mao directed that in the newly liberated areas, the fundamental party line in the countryside was to rely on the poor peasants and the farm laborers, who made up about 70 percent of the rural population. At the same time, the Party should unite with the middle peasants, who accounted for about 20 percent of the rural population. The targets of land reform should only include counter-revolutionaries who sided politically with the Nationalists and stubbornly opposed the Party and its army. In addition, Mao said that absolute egalitarianism was

²⁶“The Process of Party Building and the Current Organizational Status,” April 1947, the Jinzhou District Archives (hereafter cited as JZA), 001-1-004.

²⁷To regulate Chinese rural households, Japanese established the local administrative unit of *hui*. One Japanese was the head of each *hui*, and in general another Japanese would be assigned as the head police officer. The actual management in the countryside seems to have remained unchanged. Kinship ties were still important for social relations and the integration of new laboring and tenant families into villages. Newcomers relied on kinship ties to obtain land and other resources.

²⁸Jinzhou quwei dangshi bangongshi, *Teshu jiefangqu de Jinzhou (1945-49)* (The special liberated area of Jinzhou (1945-49) (Dalian: Jinzhou chengnei yinshuachang, 1990),1.

²⁹Levine, 105.

wrong, and that the government should allow peasants to get rich as long as they did not engage in exploitation.³⁰ In short, the CCP central committee apparently believed that their newly liberated areas should continue implementing the moderate practices that they had developed in their base areas during the Sino-Japanese War. The Northeast Bureau of the CCP also encouraged a relatively relaxed attitude toward landlords. They allowed the landlords who had fled the Northeast to return home and receive land allocations.³¹ They decreed that landlord should also receive the same allotment of land and property as did a peasant. From the perspective of wartime needs, officers in the Northeast Bureau were convinced that a stable rural economy would “provide more military and daily supplies to the army and the newly occupied cities.”³²

For the municipal party committee of Dalian, however, whether or not Dalian belonged to the CCP’s “newly liberated area” was a complicated issue. In an official document issued in October 1947, the municipal Party leadership denied that Dalian was one of those “newly liberated areas.” Rather, it considered Dalian a naval base of the USSR. The mission of the municipal committee was to serve the needs of the

³⁰Mao Zedong “Guanyu xinqu gongzuo zhengce wenti,” (On the Issue of work in the newly liberated areas), May 24, 1948, in Zhonggongzhongyang zhengceyanjiushi, *Zhengce huibian* (A compilation of Policies) hereafter cited as ZCHB, (Haerbin: zhonggongzhongyang dongbeiju, 1949), 39. Mao Zedong “Zai jinsuiganbuhuiyi shang de jianghua” (Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi-Suiyuan Liberated Area), April 1, 1948, in ZCHB, 24.

³¹Zhonggong dongbei zhongyangju “Guanyu taowang dizhu chuliwenti de zhishi” (The Direction on dealing with landlords who had fled the Northeast), ZCHB.

³²Zhonggong dongbei zhongyangju “Guanyu baohu xinshoufuchengshi de zhishi” (On the Protection of the newly liberated areas), June 10, 1948, in ZCHB,101.

Soviets, and to “put the Soviets first” (*yi su wei zhu*).³³ The CCP committee of Dalian also advocated a “semi-concealed” approach to Party work. Before April 1949 the party committee did not announce itself. Party members worked as officers or managers of different levels of government, mass organization and business corporations. The CCP municipal leaders believed that this policy, different from both that in the new liberated areas and in the areas controlled by the GMD before liberation, would be effective in organizing struggle against the GMD without offending the Soviets.³⁴

In the countryside this party line required the village cadres to follow the preferences of the Soviets, who had opposed open struggle or violent sessions directed at landlords or rich peasants. Even though in actual practice this policy had much in common with the policies put forward by the central and regional CCP committees, including an emphasis on the unity between farmers and landlords and the protection of rights of both farm laborers and their employers,³⁵ they were rooted in different concerns. The CCP line was aimed at gaining widespread support from the rural community, while the aim of the municipal Party committee was to avoid irritating the Soviet authorities.

³³“Guandong muqianxingshi yu dangde renwu” (The Current Situation and the Mission of the Party), October 1947, in Lüda shiwei bangongshi, *Weijin huibian* (The Compilation of Documents), hereafter cited as WJHB, (Dalian: Lüda shiwei bangongshi 1953), 7-18.

³⁴Han, 35-36.

³⁵“Guandong diqu nongcun laoziguanxi tiaozheng zanxingbanfa” (The temporary methods to adjust the relationship between labour relations in Guandong), “Guandong diqu nongcuntudi zudianguanxi tiaozhengzanxingbanfa” (The temporary methods to adjust the tenancy relationship in rural Guandong), February 1948, in Lüda xingzhengongshu mishuchu, *Lüda sannian lai faling huibian 1947-49* (The compilation of laws in the past three years, 1947-49) (Lüda xingzhengongshu mishuchu 1949), 79-88.

County and village cadres expressed serious dissatisfaction with this policy. The grassroots cadres complained about obedience to the Soviets. In a meeting in Jin County, a local cadre said, "the small noses (Japanese) are gone, but the big noses (Russians) came. Aren't they the same? The newspaper said that the United States harmed Chinese sovereignty, but how come building a naval base here does not do the same?" Some cadres had problems with the Soviet discipline and their attitudes toward Chinese. They criticized Soviet soldiers for robbing people's property, killing men, and raping women.³⁶ These village cadres hoped to eliminate interference from the Soviets, and carry out radical land reform and mobilize peasants to struggle against landlords.

Farmers and Fishermen in a World of Fractured Policy

The conflicting views among the CCP leadership affected its attempts to mobilize both farmers and fishermen. After completing some preliminary organization building in the countryside, from September 1946 to 1947, the municipal CCP held a rent reduction movement in the villages of Jin County. The county party committee sent work teams to the villages. The work team first convened a general meeting to explain their goals to the villagers. Members then were assigned to different sub-villages (*tun*) to learn the property and tenancy relationships, and start educating peasants. They later established small teams with tenant peasants (*diannong*), and found and trained activists among them to improve their class

³⁶“Guanyu ganbu dui Lüdasujun genjudi yu sujun renshi zongjie” (A summary of how our cadres understood the Soviet naval base and the Soviet army), December 1947, JZA 001-1-002.

consciousness and increase their determination to struggle against the landlords. Afterwards, these activists were organized into a rent reduction committee to lead the movement. During this process, the personal prestige of these activists was expected to be improved, and the CCP planned to establish the peasant associations based on the rent reduction committees later.³⁷

The inconsistency between different levels of leadership and conflicts between the CCP and the Soviets put strain on the CCP's mobilization of peasants in the rent reduction movement. This movement met with interference from the Soviets, who prevented the local activists and the CCP members from holding mass rallies to denounce landlords, dismissing the meetings and arresting the local cadres.³⁸ The former municipal Party secretary Han Gang remembered that the Soviet authorities sent soldiers to surround the meetings and fired on the crowd. The Soviets were concerned, according to Han, that agents of the Nationalists and the American reporters could hide themselves and take photos at the rallies, and accuse them of defying the terms of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty which required them to remain neutral in the conflict between the GMD and the CCP.³⁹

³⁷“Dengshahequ jianzujianliang gongzuozongjie” (A summary of the rent deduction work in Dengshahe), January 10, 1946, JZA, 001-1-005.

³⁸Wang Zhenha, *Chen shaojing zai jinxian* (Chen Shaojing in Jin County) (Jinzhouqu dangshi bangongshi, 1993),20.

³⁹*Sulian hongjun zai Lüda*, 18-19.



Image 1. The Soviet Soldiers in rural Dalian⁴⁰

Confronted with Soviet disapproval, the municipal Party committee stayed supportive of the party line of “putting the Soviets first.”⁴¹ In contrast, cadres in the villages openly denounced the Soviet officers. As one said at the time, “I think the Soviets were following the landlord line and I hated them...They ordered us to return confiscated land to landlords, but I disagreed. If we do that, the landlords will rise again...They humiliated us in front of the villagers. I lost face and it is difficult to continue to do my job.”⁴² In practice, the village cadres carried out the rent reduction movement secretly. They “pretended not to know until the Soviets found out” or concluded that “it did not matter whether the Soviets would find out.”⁴³

⁴⁰ Yibin Leng and Yaohui Jiang, eds., *Yongheng de Jiayi: Sulian Hongjun Zai Lvda* (The Eternal Memory, the Red Army of the Soviet Union in Lvda) (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 2015), 54.

⁴¹Han. 362.

⁴²“Guanyu ganbu dui Lüdasujun genjudi yu sujun renshi zongjie,” December 1947, JZA 001-1-002.

⁴³“Sannianlai dangquangongzuo jibenzongjie bei’an” (A summary of the Party work on the mass in the past three years), December 30, 1948, JZA 001-1-008.

The ambivalent attitude toward landlords on the part of varying levels of the CCP leadership also confused peasants. During the rent-reduction campaign, peasants became reluctant to demand a decrease in their rents. They were afraid that the government would remove some of their land, or that the landlords would not rent their land to them anymore. They also feared that the Nationalists would later return and reverse the policy. Some villagers were worried that the campaign would harm their relationships with landlords, who were, in some cases, their relatives or friends. The responses from landlords further complicated the progress of the movement. Some landlords requested to take back some of the land they had rented out and farm on their own. Some did not come to meetings, or spread rumors that the Nationalist army was coming. A few landlords took more flexible “struggling” strategies. For example, they signed two agreements with peasants, one under the supervision of the work team, and the other one behind the work team’s back. Some of them lied about the actual size of their landholdings in order to make up for their losses from rent reduction.⁴⁴

In addition to farmers, the weak position of the CCP in the diplomatic and military affairs of Dalian also affected fishermen. During the civil war, the Soviet navy patrolled the waters surrounding Dalian. Its strategy prevented not only the Nationalist force but also the local fishermen from having access to these waters. In the late 1930s, the annual fish production had been more than 5000 *dun*. In 1946, it

⁴⁴“Dengshahequ jianzujianliang gongzuozongjie” (A summary of the rent deduction work in Dengshahe), January 10, 1946, JZA 001-1-005; “Wei shuli women de zhengcesixiang yu gaizaogongzuo zuofeng er feidou” (Working for building our political thoughts and changing our working styles), JZA 001-1-008.

decreased dramatically to only 300 *dun*.⁴⁵ Fishermen became one of the poorest groups in coastal Dalian. In contrast to the agriculture-dominated villages, where even during the most turbulent years of the civil war landlords and rich peasants lived well, and farmers could rent land from the rich to make it through the bad years, the livelihoods of fishermen became precarious.

The county and sub-county government reports listed a few reasons for the misery of fishermen. First, the fishing season (April-September) was as short as it had always been. Fishermen had no other ways to make a living for nearly half the year. Second, the threats from the Nationalists during the civil war limited the water zones where they could go fishing. The Soviet soldiers required fishermen to renew the permits they had been issued by the previous colonial government, put signs on the boats, and be prepared to be inspected. Third, in the past colonial period the Japanese had limited the sale of fish and processed seafood by individual fishers; their catch could only be sold through the Japanese-controlled fishery groups. This may have contributed to the lack of development of a stratum of rich commercial fishermen, corresponding to the landlords or rich peasants in the farming communities.⁴⁶ The shortage of grain made their lives even more perilous. A memoir by Yang Baozhong,

⁴⁵ *Jinxian zhi* (Gazetteer of Jin County), 213.

⁴⁶ “Shuishanqu gongzuo zongjie” (A summary of fishery work of Gushan District), JZA 011-1-024; “Dengshanhe qu shuichan gongzuo zongjie” (A summary of fishery work of Dengshahe District), JZA 011-1-024; “Shihe qu zhengfu yuye gongzuo baogao” (A report of the fishery work by the government of Shihe), JZA 011-1-024; “Nanshan qu shuichan gongzuo zongjie” (A summary of fishery work of Nanshan District), JZA 011-1-024; “Yuye daikuan banfa” (The methods of issuing loans to fishermen), JZA 011-1-012; “Jinxian yuye xianchang daikuan tiaoli (The terms of on-site issuing loans to fishermen), JZA 011-1-016; “Shiuchangu shangbannian gongzuo zongjie” (The summary of fisheries in the first half of the year by the fishery bureau), JAZ 011-1-048; “Weifafang yuchuan biaoqi qi you” (The reason to issue flags to fishing boat), JZA 011-1-003.

who was born in 1940 and grew up in a Dalian fishing family, explains that “in normal years, fishermen could exchange half a boatload of fish for a whole boat of grain from farmers. In the winter of 1947, however, a full boat of fish only got fishermen a tiny bit of grain back.”⁴⁷

Some CCP local cadres also held a prejudice toward fishermen, and explained their sufferings as rooted in their cultural practices and daily habits. They described these fishermen as “uncivilized in nature” (*benxing yeman*), spending all their earnings on food and drink. Other local cadres said that fishermen could not be helpful, loving or cooperative with each other. Rather, they were jealous and hated other fishermen. As a result, the cadres argued that the government should not “help or distribute loans to people who did not farm.”⁴⁸ In one case, when the county issued 5,000 *jīn* of grain to fishermen, the local cadres, who preferred farmers over fishers, reallocated 650 *jīn* to farmers.⁴⁹ A few officials sympathized with fishermen. They noted that fishing was an extremely risky activity and fishermen simply could not predict when they would die, and therefore they did not attempt to accumulate savings.⁵⁰

Conduct Land Reform and Transform the Old Local Structure

⁴⁷ Yang, 6-7.

⁴⁸“Dengshanhe qu shuichan gongzuo zongjie” (A summary of fishery work of Dengshahe District), JZA 011-1-024.

⁴⁹“Shihe qu zhengfu yuye gongzuo baogao” (A report of the fishery work by the government of Shihe), JZA 011-1-024.

⁵⁰Ibid. “Shiuchangu shangbannian gongzuo zongjie” (The summary of fisheries in the first half of the year by the fishery bureau), JAZ 011-1-048.

Campaigns the CCP conducted during the civil war prioritized the Soviet needs ,and the need for food to solve the Nationalist blockage, over class struggle within villages or a settlement of the most popular demand of peasants. After the rent-reduction movement, the county Party leadership acknowledged it had committed several mistakes. For example, they admitted that the fundamental goal of the movement was not clear. While they realized some short-term goals, including punishing counter-revolutionary traitors and decreasing rent for some peasants, the long-term goal of uniting and gaining support from peasants had failed. Instead of distributing the land and properties of the counter-revolutionaries to peasants, the government used them to build hasty cooperatives. Further, the origins of work team members were complicated. Peasants only comprised a small portion of that group, and “eighty percent of the team members were not proletarians.”⁵¹ Most were former officers and staff of the villages in Japanese colonial rules, or sons and daughters of landlords and rich peasants, who were “not firm believers in our policies.”⁵² As Party reports pointed out, when some rumors about the CCP losing the civil war spread, they easily lost confidence and quit the work teams. This indicates that the Communists had sought the cooperation of the old rural elite while the Party struggled to gain a foothold in the countryside.

After the Communists gradually won Northeast China from mid-1948, the Party began to strengthen the recruitment of peasant activists. In the beginning their recruitment criteria, however, concentrated on the willingness of these potential

⁵¹“Dengshahequ jianzujianliang gongzuozongjie,” 2

⁵²Ibid.

activists to speak up in mass rallies, rather than on their class backgrounds. In this process, “rogues and rascals took advantage and became activists.” The Party reports admitted that the leadership had been short-sighted and ignored the importance of mobilizing the masses and building a local presence in the countryside.⁵³

After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the Dalian CCP leadership decided to appeal better to the needs of peasants, among which the land question was paramount. On December 1, 1949, the municipal government issued “The Decision on Rural Land Redistribution.” As the Decision noted, by 1949 landlords and rich peasants constituted 7.6% of the total population of rural Dalian, though they owned 30% of the total land. The poor and hired peasants, in contrast, owned 20.5% of the total land despite constituting nearly 45% of the total population. Instead of dividing the land equally among all peasants, the Decision called for a “land adjustment” (*tudi tiaoji*), in which whether the land should be adjusted among villagers depended on how much land was left to distribute in the specific villages (“*youdi zhe tiaoji, wudi zhe budong, youduoshao jiu tiaoji duoshao*”).⁵⁴ The CCP’s Northeast Bureau, in its response to the Dalian government on December 14, endorsed this policy of only redistributing extra land from landlords and rich peasants to the poorest.⁵⁵

This land reform was designed to concentrate on the two extremes of the economic strata of the rural communities, by moving lands from the wealthiest to the

⁵³Ibid., 4.

⁵⁴ Zhonggong daliangshiwei dangshi bangongshi, *Shehuizhuyi gaizaoshiqi de Dalian* (Dalian in the socialist reform period) (Dalian:Dalian chubanshe, 1992),49.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

poorest. It still left a solid group of “middle peasants” untouched. At the same time, it maintained social stability by not using violence against landlords and rich peasants, and leaving them some portions of land. At some points the reform was successful during the short time in which it was operated. By March 1950 when the land reform ended, more than 510,000 *mu* land previously owned by landlords and rich peasants were confiscated and redistributed to more than 140,000 poor peasants.⁵⁶

Initially peasants and village cadres responded enthusiastically to the land reform. The county government reported that many poor peasants made statements such as “a thousand-year-old withered tree suddenly blossoms, and the long-expected land returns home,” “in the past we only partly *fanshened*, but now we completely *fanshen*,” and “we jumped out of the frying pan into the a blessed hole, and we will never forget the favor showed to us by the Communist Party.”⁵⁷

But ultimately a mild land reform in Dalian did not indicate a decisive movement in favor of a complete overthrow of the economic and social relationships in the countryside. In addition to demanding the land they cultivated, some peasants were also eager to excise a fuller citizenship and abolish all the privileges enjoyed by landlords. Some peasants were especially frustrated by the official orders in which “the landlords can still live in their original big houses and own their personal properties,” and “no beatings and killings.” These peasants complained “if so, then the rich stay rich, and the poor stay poor,” “the landlords and rich peasants are like boats. When the boat was broken, it still has sides, and when the sides were broken, it

⁵⁶ Ibid., 45.

⁵⁷ “Tudi tiaoji buzou” (The steps of the land adjustment), 1950, JZA 001-1-016.

still has the base, and even when the base was also broken, the boat still has nails,” and “in southern Liaoning people practiced a land reform, why did we only conduct land adjustments? It did not solve the problems.”⁵⁸

The responses from landlords and rich peasants were also interesting. Immediately after hearing news of land reform, many landlords and rich peasants panicked, fearful of ending up like those in southern Liaoning (where radical land reform was conducted). Once they realized that their personal property would not be confiscated and there would not be random beatings and killings, they launched a counterattack against the poor peasants by damaging their farming tools, and complained about the cadres and the government. The policy was not always successful in keeping some poor peasants from using violence against landlords and rich peasants, after the poor realized that the reform failed to fulfil all their aspirations.

The government eventually arrested and punished both groups who did not follow the official policy. Forty-six landlords and rich peasants were arrested after counterattacking peasants and cadres.⁵⁹ At the same time, the final stage of the land reform decreased the percentage of landlords and rich peasants from 8% to 7%, which can be seen as an indication of its limited aims.

To conclude, at the beginning of the PRC, the land reform helped poor peasants become private land owners, and opened up a channel through which peasants could articulate their grievances and take actions on them. It was a departure from the rent-reduction movement in 1946, when farmers were reluctant to make radical demands

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

but willing to make accommodations with landlords. However, many farmers also felt baffled and discouraged during the land reform, when they saw the incomplete transfer of land and property from the rich to the poor. In addition, a large portion of farmers, especially “middle peasants,” remained indifferent when they were not economically or politically empowered by the reform to become more active in the rural communities.

Building the Fishermen Association and Mobilizing Women in the Fishing Households

The livelihoods of fishermen also increasingly concerned the CCP. In early 1947, as the civil war between the Nationalist and Chinese forces was intensifying, the Nationalists cut off Dalian’s outside sources of food, fuel and industrial raw materials to isolate it. The CCP committee announced practical, low-cost instructions on how the region could feed itself in the midst of political upheaval. It called for a comprehensive great production movement. The slogan of the movement was “no matter how large or small the reward, those living on mountains should live off the mountains, those living near seas should live off the seas, those living on land should live off the land.”⁶⁰

This movement called upon everyone in the countryside to mobilize, regardless of occupation, class and gender. For the cadres in Jin, it was essential to mobilize peasants, both farmers and fishers, in all fields to increase production and unite the

⁶⁰“Decision on Carrying out the Great Production Movement” in Lüda Xingzheng gongshu, *Lüda sannianlai faling, 1947-49* (Laws of the Last Three Years in Lüda, 1947-49), DLA.

rural communities. The dominant CCP policy for fishermen was to issue loans to the poorest fishermen. The loans were in kind and included grain, fishing lines and hooks, and oil (*qingyou*). The policy stipulated that fishermen should pay back their loans twice a year, at a rate of seventy-five percent of the existing prices on the market.⁶¹ Unfortunately, the effort did not always succeed. The government found it difficult to get back their loans or investments, since the poor fishers in most cases were not able to pay back the loans.⁶² In addition, by deciding to distribute goods without any prior organizational work, the Party was not well aware of or prepared for the troubles faced by fishermen in the production process and their daily lives.

The 1947 great production movement resulted in a high yield of grain. Compared to 1945, grain production grew by 73.3% in 1948, solving the food needs for eighty percent of local residents.⁶³ However, it did not help win substantial support for the CCP from fishermen. To improve their work on fishermen, from late 1948 the officials started to build the Fishermen Association (*yumin hui*), in order to organize fishermen and thus to enable them to channel their grievances and aspirations within the new state system. The formation of the Fishermen Association resulted from an initiative by the local authorities to extend the peasant associations formed in the countryside.⁶⁴ By 1950, all major counties of Dalian were expected to

⁶¹“Yuye daikuan banfa” (The methods of issuing loans to fishermen), JZA 011-1-012; “Jinxian yuye xianchang daikuan tiaoli (The terms of on-site issuing loans to fishermen), JZA 011-1-016.

⁶²“Shihe qu zhengfu yuye gongzuo baogao” (A report of the fishery work by the government of Shihe), JZA 011-1-024; “Shiuchangu shangbannian gongzuo zongjie” (The summary of fisheries in the first half of the year by the fishery bureau), JAZ 011-1-048.

⁶³*Lüda Gaishu*, 129-132.

⁶⁴ “1950 nian Lüdashi yuye gongzuo baogao” (The report on the fishery work in 1950), 1950, DLA 50-1-4.

have established branches of fishermen associations. In practice, the lack of a central fishery administration, however, created inefficiencies and inconsistencies in each county. Lushun, for example, did not have an independent fishermen association, but arranged a fisherman group within the peasant association. In Changshan County, fishermen associations and the trade unions co-existed without a clear division of responsibilities. Other places also gave no clear guidelines about leadership and work content.⁶⁵

Initially, the distribution of the leadership favored the local elites. However, after realizing "those local tyrants in charge of the Fishery Association were enjoying their own extravagant lives without serving poor fishermen,"⁶⁶ the government started to incorporate more middle and poor fishermen into the leadership.⁶⁷ The central responsibilities of the associations included the organization and education of fishermen, the distribution of loans, and the mobilization of fishermen into mutual assistance cooperatives.⁶⁸ Perhaps the last task was the most important. In Jin county, for instance, not only did the fishermen association set up mutual aid groups, but they also created an eight-point agreement. The terms included assigning special persons to purchase fishing tackle and bait, exchanging experience among the group members,

⁶⁵ibid.

⁶⁶"Chengjiao qu jianshe gu shuichan gongzuo zongjie" (A report of the fishery work by the government of Chengjiao), 1948, JZA 011-1-024.

⁶⁷"Guanyu zhaokai Lüda shi yuye huiyi de baogao ji guanyu jinhou gongzuo de yijian" (A report of the meeting of the Lüda fishery and the suggestions on the future," DLA 50-1-5.

⁶⁸ibid.

protecting fishing tools from damage, working together as much as possible, taking care of each other, and urging each other to work hard.⁶⁹

In some ways, government organization of fishermen resembled the general spirit of peasant organization. To ensure survival in the turbulent years of the civil war, the overall strategy of both peasant and fishermen communities was to minimize risk and improve production. This was especially true for fishermen. By 1949, the fisheries were producing at only about 30% of the level they had achieved before the civil war. As a government report wrote, “supplies exceeded demand, which reduced the fish prices and further limited the purchasing powers of fishermen for fishing nets and bait.”⁷⁰ The greatest concentration of actions by the fishermen’s association, as shown in the above eight-term agreement, was therefore in the area of “mutual responsibility.” Those who owned boats and nets were asked to share their tools with those who did not, and the households that had more manpower were asked to assist other households.⁷¹ In this way, it was expected that fishing production could rise.

On other matters, however, the government treated fishermen in a way that differed from farmers. The land reform ensured that each farming household, wealthy and poor, had a share of land, and cleared the way for farmers to become land owners and participate in political life without handicap. The land reform also affected fishing households by ordering the transfer of privately owned land by fishlords

⁶⁹ “Lüda da diqu 1950 nian shangbannian yuye shengchanqingkuang zongjie baogao,” (The report on the fishery production in the first half of 1950), 1950, DLA 50-1-4.

⁷⁰ “shuichan ju yewu gongzuoshang jige youguan zhengce wenti de yijian,” (some suggestions on the policies from the fishery bureau), 1950, DLA 50-1-5.

⁷¹ “1949 nian shuichan gongzuo zongjie,” (The summary of the fishery work in 1949), JZA 011-1-039.

(*yuzhu*) and rich fishermen (*fuyu*) to poor peasants, including poor fishermen (*pinyu*) and hired fishermen (*guyu*).⁷² However, the government refused any thought of a redistribution of sea resources or fishing tools among fishermen households on any egalitarian basis. The overall principal was “mutual benefit for laborers and capitalists” (*laozi liangli*). As the report issued by the Dalian municipal government said, “in the past we equalized the relationship in the fisheries with that in the agriculture. The outcome was that the capitalists were afraid of struggles and redistribution, and the laborers were waiting for struggles and redistribution. It was a mistake. The correct principle was to bring benefit to both laborers and capitalists. Those who owned capital should get 5.5 [out of 10] and the laborer should get 4.5 [out of 10] of the fruits.”⁷³

In addition to the establishment of fishermen associations, the CCP also strengthened the mobilization of women from fishing households. During the civil war, after fishermen’s traditional fishing zones were blocked by the Nationalists, men who owned boats fled to Shandong, from where their ancestors had migrated in great hardship hundreds of years earlier, in hopes of bringing back some food. Those left behind, including women and children, suffered from hunger, but also managed to survive.⁷⁴

⁷²“Lüda tudi gaige juti zhengce,”(The specific policy on the land reform of Lüda), 1950, JZA001-1-12; “Lüda diqu tudi gaige zhixing xize,” (The terms of the the land reform of Lüda), 1950, JZA 001-1-12

⁷³ “Lüda diqu 1950 nian shangbannian yuye shengchanqingkuang zongjie baogao,” (The report on the fishery production in the first half of 1950), 1950, DLA 50-1-4.

⁷⁴“Shiuchangu shangbannian gongzuo zongjie.”

The government encouraged these left-behind women and children, as well as women in other fishing households, to gather seafood on the beach. For example, in a village called Dalianwan, “at low tide women and children, carrying baskets in their hands and on their shoulders, dug clams and caught crabs on the beach. They worked hard, full of enthusiasm. Within a very short time (between low and high tides), one person could dig more than two hundred *jin* of clams, and on average the village can get four and five thousand *jin* in total.”⁷⁵

As mentioned above, women living in the coastal communities had also collected seafood in the Japanese colonial period. However, picking up excessive amounts of seafood, especially seaweed, was seen by the Japanese officials as a threat to the business of aquatic farming. The civil war, therefore, was the first time that the official ideology supported and encouraged this act. When the great production movement put forward the slogan “those living near the seas should live off the seas,” it could be translated as “women living near the seas should live off the seas,” since fishermen at that moment had either fled back to Shandong or were prevented from going fishing in the contested waters during the war.

Although the CCP was able to mobilize fisher women to work in and outside the fishery activities, in general, as the opening letters showed, the CCP lacked an effective policy toward fisher people. For the government, the land issue overwhelmed all others in the rural communities. They held that “everything was born from the soil, and the soil produces gold and all treasures.” That is, they believe

⁷⁵“Nanshan qu shuichan gongzuo zongjie” (A summary of fishery work of Nanshan District), JZA 011-1-024.

that as long as peasants were given land, all problems would be solved. It was not necessary to redistribute other goods, including houses and production tools for fishery or other sidelines industries.⁷⁶ The problem of this policy was a failure to show clearly where different groups of peasants sentiment lay. In places where a harsh climate and infertile soil dominated, or where peasant obtained income mainly from other sources, a land reform was far from enough to settle the demands and grievances of peasants.

Conclusion

The “semi-concealed” approach of the Dalian CCP committee, adopted to deal with a city controlled by a foreign power, ultimately produced divisions within the CCP leadership. In particular, it contributed to discontent on the part of county and village party members. The municipal CCP’s “semi-concealed” policy also limited its success in mobilizing peasants. First, in fear of the Soviet objections and interventions, the Party’s ambiguous and lenient attitudes toward landlords during the rent-reduction movement discouraged poor farmers from demanding rent reductions. Second, its inability to remove the full-scale economic blockade in Dalian by the Nationalists during the civil war can be seen as a result of its secondary position in controlling the diplomatic and military affairs of the city. Although the rent reduction movement and the great production movement, which the CCP initiated as a remedial action, fed agriculture-based farmers, it failed to solve the problems of fishermen who

⁷⁶Ibid.

lost their fishing zones, as the Nationalist economic blockade included the sea territories too.

While the second iteration of land reform in 1950 gave the poorest peasants the right to become land owners, it frustrated peasants who wanted a radical change of the rural society. Further, throughout the civil war and the land reform, the CCP was mostly helpless toward male fishers, though they were able to mobilize women in fishing households, who traditionally had done a range of sea-related, land jobs.

From 1946 to 1950, the requirements of the Soviets and the views of local CCP leadership were sometimes in conflict with the needs of peasants. Unlike other newly liberated areas, the special historical background of Dalian at this time made it impossible to address peasant grievances or their tension with landlords within the revolutionary framework of class struggle. Without solid organizational foundations and popular support in rural areas, the CCP had difficulty distinguishing the most common demands in the coastal communities between fisher people and farmers, and between men and women. This problem intensified in the coming decades when the government engaged in extensive mobilization of peasants and brought fishermen into much closer contact with farmers. But before continuing with the story of people in rural Dalian, the next chapter shifts the focus to the urban, industrial fishery.

Chapter Three

Collision Course: The Industrial Transformation of Dalian's Urban Fisheries, 1949-57

In 1953, the Ministry of Agriculture sent a work team to the Lüda Fisheries Company to investigate its operations. According to the work team report, the Luda company was one of the few fisheries in China that reached their production quota and made a profit that year. The work team attributed its success to a close cooperation between the Party and the management committee, as well as a collaborative relationship with workers and sailors. It also initiated the piece-rate wage system and production competitions to promote enthusiasm from workers for production. Finally, advanced fishing techniques, introduced effectively improved production.

This seemingly successful story of the Maoist state establishing control over Dalian's fisheries industry in the 1950s, was far more complex than it may have appeared. This chapter uses government reports, company records and worker letters to reveal the internal dynamics of factory life, the relationship between the state management and workers, and, ultimately, the serious problems that accompanied the reported achievements. This chapter demonstrates that two contradictions emerged as the state simultaneously promoted urban industrialization and rural collectivization in the context of the First Five-Year Plan. First the dual development created competition between the state-owned industrial companies (SOE) and the rural

collectives for resources and laborers. This was manifested as the state-owned vessels frequently collided with collectively owned boats, and as the SOE recruited workers and thus pulled fishermen away from the rural collectives. Secondly, pursuing industrialization and collectivization at the same time under a tense domestic and international political environment in the 1950s, created the imbalance between the investment the SOEs received from the state and the demand for economic productivity. The rising tensions with neighboring nations during the Korean War and the underdeveloped infrastructure system to bridge the countryside and the city, led to the failure of the state to expand investment effectively and meet a growing demand on the ground from the mid-1950s on.

The chapter further discusses ramifications caused by the two contradictions. Inside the industrial workplace, they led to shipwrecks, fish spoilage and divisions between permanent workers and temporary workers, and between men and women, over the issues of wages, welfare and benefits. Meantime, it also created problems outside the workplace, revealing the rural-urban divide and the reasons why rural fishermen had a hard time identifying themselves with the state. Finally, this chapter describes ways in which people subtly challenged the authority of the state. While fishermen asserted their autonomy by denying the state fleets entry to their fishing grounds or demanding compensation for their damaged boats, workers in the SOEs defended their rights by using the official rhetoric of the 1950s. By criticizing the state for not meeting the expectations the state itself introduced to them, workers were able to both embody and contest the state ideologies.

Overview

In the early 1950s, the Chinese government's central policy of fisheries was "development of fisheries, assistance to fishermen," signaling a concurrent trend of the establishment of state enterprises and the organization of fishermen.¹ As we saw in the last chapter, in Dalian the CCP organized land reform in the fishing villages, issued class labels to fishermen, and mobilized them into collectives. In the city, meanwhile, the goal of industrialization propelled the state to establish six companies in Dalian supervised by the Lüda Fisheries Bureau. In 1956, the six state-owned enterprises had more than 6,000 workers, and undertook assorted tasks, including fishing, marketing, processing, net-making, fishing vessels building and repairing, to aquaculture.²

Following the productivity flow of fish to introduce this ensemble of companies and their history, it begins with the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company. Established in 1952 to supply boats for fishing, it had 7 production workshops and 1,403 workers. The quantity and quality of production equipment was inadequate, and therefore workers worked in three shifts in the workshops with the best metal cutting machine tools, while others had more leisure time. Compared to other SOEs of the fisheries industry, the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company was smaller, and more remotely located from the urban center. It also lacked skilled workers,

¹ "A Summary of Fishery production in 1950," DLA 50-1-4.

² A Brief Report of the Lüda State-owned fisheries Industry," 1956-6-25, DLA 50-2-92.

especially carpenters, and was in bad need of temporary workers during busy seasons.³

To supply fishing nets and ropes, the Lüda Net-making Company had the longest history among the six SOEs. Built in 1946 during the economic blockage of the civil war, it was intended to solve the war-time unemployment crisis. It hired more than 40,000 workers during the civil war, who were responsible for processing the cotton transported from the Soviet Union into fishing nets and ropes. After 1949, most workers of the Lüda Net-making Company were transferred to other factories in order to “transport experts with the political thoughts” (*shusong you zhengzhi sixiang jichu de rencai*). The business of net-making continued.⁴

Then, it was the turn of the Lüda Fisheries Company. As the leading company among the six to carry on the policy of developing fisheries by catching fish, it was established in 1951 after the Chinese-owned Guangdong Fishing Company merging with Sino-Soviet Fishery Company, it had 2,293 employees and 101 fishing vessels by the end of 1956. Aside from the 148 managers and 62 technicians, all of the rest were fishing workers.⁵ One of the biggest challenges acknowledged by the company was the sole dependence on customary experience instead of modern scientific knowledge for captains on most vessels. Many of the captains had no idea of how to

³ Ibid.

⁴ “A Brief Introduction of the Lüda Net-making Company,” 1956-8-1, DLA 50-1-58.

⁵ “Briefings of Recent Years Development of the Lüda Fisheries Company,” 1956-8-1, DLA 50-1-58.

use charts or compasses. It was no better for the regular crew, among whom 78 percent were illiterate.⁶

To transport fresh fish back to land, it needed ice and refrigeration equipment provided by the Lüda Ice-making Company. The company was reconstructed and reformed on the basis of the ice-making workshop in the Japanese South Manchuria Fisheries Company. It had hundreds of workers, and during the FFYP the biggest challenge for both companies was the lack of skilled workers and advanced technologies.⁷

At the end of the productivity flow of fish, it was the Lüda Fishery Supply and Marketing Company. It was founded in March 1956, to centralize the marketing process and expand sources of fish products for urban residents. It had the shortest history among the six SOEs, with a total of 642 employees. It owned a fish-processing plant, several wholesalers and retail stores in urban Dalian, and acquisition stations in the coastal villages.⁸

One last state enterprise in the fishing industry was the Lüda Aquaculture Company. Like the Lüda Ice-making Company, it was rebuilt on the basis of the aquaculture workshop of the Japanese South Manchuria Fisheries Company.⁹ In the early 1950s, its task was preliminary to the aquaculture development during the Great Leap Forward.

⁶ “A Brief Report of the Lüda State-owned fisheries Industry,” 1956-6-25, DLA 50-2-92.

⁷ “A Brief Introduction of the Lüda Ice-making Company,” DLA 50-1-53.

⁸ “Materials for Polish Experts by the Lüda Fishery Supply and Marketing Company,” 1956-8-1, DLA 50-1-58.

⁹ “A Brief Report of the Lüda State-owned Fisheries Industry,” 1956-6-25, DLA 50-2-92.

Operating as separate companies but all under the supervision of the Lüda Fisheries Bureau, these six state enterprises worked together to contribute to the total output of the fishing industry of Dalian in the 1950s. They were well coordinated by the state, although some, including the Lüda Net-making Company and the Lüda Ice-making Company, had been around much longer than others, dating back to the Japanese colonial period. For those newly built enterprises, the Lüda Fisheries Company and the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company for instance, they were more likely to run into the start-up problems of a shortage of skilled, experienced workers and advanced technologies.

Learning from and Teaching the Socialist Brothers: Management, Organization and Training

The first few years of the Soviet occupation laid the foundation for the development of the fisheries in the 1950s, as the Soviets had taken over Japan's South Manchuria Fisheries Company immediately after the WWII and established the Sino-Soviet Fisheries Company to resume local fisheries production. Before being transferred to the Chinese local government in March 1951, the Sino-Soviet Fisheries Company produced 7,220 tons of fish, an impressive increase from 3,400 tons in 1946. Chinese officials also expressed admiration for the company's success in "repairing broken vessels, training Chinese cadres and workers, and teaching Chinese the Soviet management experience."¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid.



Image 2. The Establishment of the Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding Company¹¹

The Chinese SOEs enthusiastically adopted the Soviet approach to industrial management and organization. Between 1948 and 1952, the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company replaced the hour-rate wage system with the Soviet piece-rate wage system, imitating the one set up first in the Sino-Soviet Joint Fisheries Company in 1946. The company's records praised the new system as increasing worker enthusiasm and responsibility in production. The reports also noted that workers became dissatisfied with a large production team under the new system, where they suffered the consequences of their fellow workers' idleness.¹² In addition to the piece-rate wage system, the Lüda Fisheries Company also adopted the Soviet collective contract system in 1950. The collective contract offered workers economic incentives, while managing to reduce costs as it encouraged workers to save uses of

¹¹ Leng and Jiang, 72.

¹² "Experience in implementing piecework wage in state-owned Dalian shipbuilding company," DLA 50-2-71.

materials and tools. It also encouraged mutual learning and supervision among workers. Like the piece-rate wage system, the essence of the contract was that the more people worked, the more they earned. The company reports showed that workers even requested to go out to sea to fish before the season began or during bad weather.¹³

The Lüda Fisheries Company also adapted worker training practices from the Soviet Union. Before 1949, new workers served as apprentices to masters. The Soviet “proxy training system” (*daixun zhi*) was adopted by the Lüda Fisheries Company in 1954 after the company’s study of suggestions made by a Soviet expert named Kurchatov to the Changchun Automobile Factory. The workshop directors signed a training contract with the experienced workers of the company (*lao shifu*), and authorized them to teach the apprentices based on a strictly approved syllabus and textbooks. This system, the company hoped, would effectively prevent the apprentices from belonging to the senior masters, and make sure that the apprentices would come under the full management of the factory directors later (*zhezong zhidu fangzhi hetong qianding hou, tugong jiu shi laoshifu de le, dang yihou you shiqing, chejian zhuren bugan rang tugong ganhuo*). It is puzzling to note that the same record also confirmed the co-existence of the traditional apprenticeship with the new “proxy training system” in the 1950s, saying the Chinese apprenticeship contract was a voluntary arrangement with a socialist nature of serving the masses.¹⁴ It is possible that what this report regard as Chinese traditional apprenticeship was actually quite

¹³ “A Summary of Fishery production in 1950,” DLA 50-1-4.

¹⁴ Kurchatov’s suggestion of the training system in the first automobile factory,” DLA 50-2-40.

different from the one common in pre-1949 factories, as the state in the 1950s itself took over the task of hiring and training new workers with the aid of the experienced, senior workers.



Image 3. “Chinese and Soviet Experts to Conquer Technical Difficulties Together”¹⁵

The Soviet Union was not the only socialist country that served as a model for the fishery enterprises. For instance, Dalian forwarded East Germany (the GDR) its materials regarding the organization of the company, including the management system, production equipment types, and staff specification, as well as technical data about fishing and refrigeration.¹⁶ Germans visited Dalian as well, and advised on the improvement of fish product quality and fishing vessel arrangements.¹⁷ Dalian also invited experts from Poland, who provided suggestions on fisheries work.¹⁸ In 1956, China joined an International Fisheries Agreement led by the USSR, together with

¹⁵ Leng and Jiang, 75.

¹⁶ “Fishery technical data supplied to Germany.”

¹⁷ “On the Germany experts' suggestions and improvement measures,” DLA 50-1-58.

¹⁸ “On the reception of the Polish fishery experts,” DLA 50-1-58.

North Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia. The tasks included a joint study of fishery resources of the western Pacific to protect and increase fishery production.¹⁹

Dalian's integration into complex international networks of knowledge exchange made it the host company of interns from North Korea for studying fishing techniques. In May 1955, thirty North Korean interns were transferred from Shanghai to Dalian to learn carpentry shipbuilding skills in the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repair Shipyard. The program was set up for six months, from June 1 to December 1, 1955, with 1250 training hours and a target of getting the interns to become third and fourth level skilled workers.²⁰ The company assigned each intern to work with one experienced worker, and assessed their skills monthly.²¹

On the surface, the program for North Korean interns was idyllic. Teachers and interns normally went to work and had lunch together, and from time to time interns had dinner at the teacher's home. The company also provided rice for the interns, offering monthly stipends, meal tickets, bedding and clothes, celebrating the Korean festivals with them. The Korean interns also had their own dormitory, with a small club room. When bidding farewell at the train station, teachers and interns exchanged gifts, such as Chairman Mao's and Chairman Kim's portraits and notebooks.²²

Nevertheless, the internship situation was not perfect. The interns complained about the curriculum, when they were merely asked to do some random jobs in the first two months, including carrying heavy wood instead of performing skilled tasks.

¹⁹ "Thanks to the Soviet Union for the help to our fisheries industry," *China Fisheries*, 1958-13.

²⁰ "Internship program for North Korean interns," DLA 50-1-45.

²¹ "North Korean interns practice at Lüda Shipping building and repairing shipyard," DLA 50-1-45.

²² "Summary of training interns from North Korea," DLA 50-1-45.

They also expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of opportunity to perform tasks on their own, since they were always required to work with teachers. Other grievances included the insufficiency of translators and the problems of the assessment system.²³ Meanwhile, employees of the Chinese enterprise inspected the materials and notes the interns intended to bring back to North Korea, in order to prevent them from taking away technical data, which might expose national secrets.²⁴

The CCP's Inventions: Political Indoctrination, Competed Heroism and Welfare Benefits

Despite the knowledge transmitted by Soviet advisers, the CCP also played a major role in developing the fisheries during the early years of the PRC. Although a number of scholars have described Dalian as “the cutting edge of ‘the Soviet model,’” many aspects of the fishing industry did not conform to the Soviet model. Scholars have observed that the Soviet model of one-man management, based on Stalin’s idea that industry had to be run by professional managers without interference from the party, had a stronger influence in the Northeast in the 1950s than in the regions of East and South China.²⁵ Christian Hess has called Dalian, largely supervised by the Soviet Union between 1946 and 1955, “the cutting edge of ‘the Soviet model’ – the

²³ Report of the problems in the inspection and training of the interns from North Korea,” DLA 50-1-45.

²⁴ “Several jobs at the end of the internship for North Korean interns,” DLA 50-1-45.

²⁵ Mark W Frazier, *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution, and Labor Management*. Cambridge Modern China Series (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). You Ji, *China’s Enterprise Reform: Changing State/Society Relations After Mao* (Psychology Press, 1998)

embrace of Soviet guidance, expertise and culture.”²⁶ However, the company’s records stressed features of the local environment that did not conform to the Soviet model, pointing out the coexistence of political education and administrative matters, and the collaboration between party cadres and professional managers. Both production and political consciousness, in Dalian throughout the 1950s, were recognized as equally important.²⁷ Ship repair, for instance, was one of the fundamental tasks of the Shipbuilding and Repair Company. In the colonial period, however, factionalism between workers over the issues of fishing grounds from different vessels had been widespread. To remove factionalism, the party committee and the management worked together, as the latter exposed the problems and put forward a solution, and the former educated the disrupted workers without replacing the roles played by the executives.²⁸

Even though the models of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries facilitated production by providing a guide, to organization and management, the CCP’s political indoctrination of labor also played an important role in promoting productivity. The routine political education took the form of the circulation of reading materials and political discussions on fishing boats.²⁹ It also employed less formal methods. In 1955, for example, the Lüda Fisheries Bureau held a Maritime Sports Competition. Sports, according to the organizers, would allow workers to learn from one another, strengthen collective thinking, improve worker health and

²⁶ Hess, 388.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ “A Summary of Fishery production in 1950,” DLA 50-1-4.

happiness, and promote enthusiasm about completing production tasks. After the athletes returned to their respective work units, they were supposed to play a leading role in promoting political awareness among their co-workers.³⁰ As a result, workers were allegedly able to overcome the fear of going out fishing and being caught by the enemy aircraft shooting during the Korean War, when the United States patrolled the territorial waters along the northern Yellow Sea and harassed Chinese ships.³¹

The state enterprise also attributed its achievement to production competitions and labor model campaigns. It held three red-flag labor competitions each year. The first competition, following the Soviet model, was to have the different branches of the whole company compete for two red flags. The second was a contest between fishing vessels, while the third was a contest between different enterprises within the Fisheries Bureau.³² The identification of models was also used by the company to stimulate production. Each year, the Fisheries Company would select 5% of the workforce as models, and 50% as heroes.³³ Criteria for models and heroes usually included a serious attitude and responsibility for work; studying innovative techniques; obeying the leadership and the regulations of the factory; actively participating in the study of politics; maintaining solidarity and mutual assistance with other workers, and doing well in cleaning common areas.³⁴

³⁰ “the Lüda Fisheries Bureau’s Maritime Sports Competition,” DLA 50-1-43.

³¹ “A Summary report of the leadership of the General Fisheries branch.”

³² “A Summary of Fishery production in 1950,” DLA 50-1-4.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ “Personal exemplary deeds of the 1953,” DLA 50-2-54.

A model leader was also supposed to pay attention to both worker safety and production. For example, 55-year-old Liu Yiguang, a poor peasant from the countryside who joined the factory in 1946, was a captain of the advanced production team of Ship No. 55 and Ship No. 56. After the introduction of the red flag competition system in 1950 with an aim of increasing the enthusiasm of the staff, his crew had complained, "our boat is small, and their boats are big, how can we compete? We must replace our vessels." Captain Liu replied, "hey, it's OK, don't be afraid, take your time, look at us." (*hei, meiyou guanxi ,buyaopa, manmanlai, kanzande*). In the third quarter, his vessels finally won the red flags, and thus his words become well-known in the factory and encouraged everyone.³⁵ Nevertheless, his model title was by no means just because of his completion of production tasks on schedule. Other reasons, according to the report, including his outstanding experience in parking the vessels during stormy and foggy weather to ensure safe returns, as well as his special contributions during the Korean War. Captain Liu's vessel transported PLA soldiers to land on the battlefield island, and on the way return to Dalian it confronted three enemy ships, an encounter that resulted in the death of one crew member and serious injury to another. Captain Liu encouraged his crew by saying, "Comrades, don't panic, and just fight, I promise that I won't leave the vessel." Eventually, he brought the crew and the vessels successfully away from the battlefield.³⁶

³⁵ The advanced worker model and the highest-level hero Liu Yiguang of the Lüda Fisheries Company," DLA 50-2-13.

³⁶ Ibid.

Another key factor identified by the enterprise was regular training of workers and improved conditions of wages and welfare. As early as 1950, the Lüda Fisheries Company implemented a number of incentive benefits systems for its regular employees. They provided workers food, including rice, oil, meat and fish, and household supplies, including rescue kits, disinfectant, and bedding and bath goods. Workers could read books, watch movies, and play table tennis in the company club.³⁷ According to the collective contract the Lüda Fisheries Company signed with workers in 1954, the length of the workday was 8 hours, and each week workers could take one day off. Workers also enjoyed statutory holidays and paid vacation. Maternity leave for pregnant women was 45 to 70 days, including 15-35 days before childbirth and 30-42 days after childbirth. If the mother encountered abnormal childbirth or had twins, she was given another 15 days' maternity leave.³⁸ For childcare, the company provided subsidies to the parents. For example, if the child was not sent to the factory nursery or taken care of by grandparents, the company would pay 6 *yuan* each month for each child to subsidize the expenses their parents spent on hiring a babysitter. If the child was sent to the nursery, then the monthly subsidy for each child was 3 *yuan*. The company also covered the expenses of bedding for the children. If a child was sick and had to be cared for by the mother, the company would pay 80% of her wages for the period of her absence.³⁹ The factory had a medical center, and both workers and their immediate family members could be

³⁷ "1950 Fishery Production Summary," DLA 50-1-4.

³⁸ "the Collective Contract," DLA 50-2-53.

³⁹ "Tentative provisions on problems in welfare of fishery enterprises," DLA 50-1-91.

reimbursed for their medical expenses at designated hospitals.⁴⁰ If a worker died, one month of salary was provided as funeral allowance, and half a month's salary for the death of a family member.⁴¹ The factory covered bus fares for workers, as much as 1.4 *yuan* per month for those taking a bus to work. Employees who biked to work were also eligible for transportation subsidies.⁴² The company also took consideration of people's various religious customs. For example, Muslim workers got extra subsidies for food, as much as 3.4 *yuan* per month.⁴³

These policies reflected the expansion of benefits and social welfare for workers during the FFYP. As some workers said, "in the past (during the Japanese occupation), they forced me to go home every month, but now I not only eat in the dining hall, but also receive stipends, watch plays, and learn literacy. Who could imagine that people like us, children of the Sea Wolf (*hailangzi*), would have these benefits? They are brought by the Communist Party and Chairman Mao."⁴⁴

Overall, the Chinese factories' party officials and managers gained nearly complete control over production and labor relations during the FFYP, through a combination of the adoption of regulations and advice from other socialist nations and the creation of political indoctrination and incentive policies. These policies were effective in expanding production, shown in a comparison between the Dalian industrial fisheries development and the Shanghai state fisheries industry. In March

⁴⁰ "Provisions on reimbursement of medical expenses of employees' families, DLA 50-2-91.

⁴¹ "the Collective Contract," DLA 50-2-53.

⁴² "Tentative provisions on problems in welfare of fishery enterprises," DLA 50-1-91.

⁴³ "Corrections to the standard of catering allowance for Muslim workers," DLA 50-2-91.

⁴⁴ "1950 Fishery Production Summary," DLA 50-1-4.

1953, the Lüda Fisheries Company, under the authorization of the Ministry of Agriculture, sent a work team to the Shanghai Fisheries Company to look into its failure to complete the production goals in the first quarter of 1953. Other than not fulfilling the production quota, the Shanghai company's vessels did not get repaired in time either, causing 30% of their vessels to fail to be functional. Moreover, the days in which sailors engaged in production were also dramatically reduced from usual levels.⁴⁵ The work team held respective meetings with the management board, workers and technical staff as well as sailors, identifying a few problems about the operations of the Shanghai Fisheries Company. First of all, according to the report, the political education in the Shanghai enterprise was weak, which caused distrust, mutual contempt between managers and workers, and a lack of cooperation between technicians and workers. The second problem identified was the leadership style of the enterprise. Leaders of the company refused to have workers discuss the production plan, suppressed criticism, and even retaliated against those who disagreed with them. As a result, workers were not well aware of the production goals. Managers also purchased machines without consulting with workers or technicians, resulting in a waste of money. Workers commented, sarcastically, that the company was buying machines for an exhibition. In addition, the incentive system of the company was seen as impractical and even destructive. Since the one-time reward for overproduction was tremendously larger than worker monthly wages, normally four and five times the monthly figure, it led to malign

⁴⁵ "Inspection report of the Shanghai Fisheries Company," DLA 50-1-22.

competition and a brake to future growth. A final problem of the Shanghai enterprise was the weakness of worker welfare. An excessive dependence on bonuses caused a reduction in the regular wages. The largest cut of wages was 70%, making it difficult for workers to maintain the minimum livelihood. The company also showed little concern about the sick and injured workers. For example, when Zhang Wencai was injured in 1951, the company told him to leave the company, if he did not plan to return to work the next day. Some sailors called the managers capitalists.⁴⁶

It is, therefore, probably no coincidence that the three critical factors which the Lüda Fisheries Company identified to explain the failure of its Shanghai counterpart--the lack of political education, the limited worker mobilization and the inadequate social welfare, were also the determining advantages of its own company. As the fishing industry was growing, the SOEs needed more resources and laborers, which led to their competition with the coastal cooperatives along the water frontier. Meantime, the SOEs required more investment from the state to sustain its continued expansion, and yet at this point the state was unable to provide them. By looking more closely at each of these two contradictions, we will understand the problems they produced as well.

Contradiction I: Domestic Battles and Alliances on Water Frontier

The FFYP promoted production and expanded social welfare for workers, but also created new problems during the high tide of socialism. The simultaneous

⁴⁶ Ibid.

development of both industrial and collective fisheries in the 1950s generated a growing rivalry between the state and the collective over fishing grounds and laborers. The fishing SOE not only frequently vied for control of resources with collective crafts and individual fishermen, they also crossed Yellow/Bohai Sea rim to recruit laborers from coastal villages, which ended up creating more tensions between the two interest groups.

On April 6, 1951, for instance, the Lüda Fisheries Company's No.45 and No. 46 fishing fleets crashed into a small boat along the shoreline of Jinin city, Shandong. On May 4, the No. 42 and No. 44 also hit a local fishermen's craft, and their nets got tangled up with those of fishermen from Laizhou, Shandong. Even after the state vessels immediately cut their nets, it still impacted the production of the fishermen they hit. Three days later, when they slightly scraped against a boat's fishing nets in order to dodge another boat, more than ten fishermen jumped into their vessels with six knives and two axes. They hit the captain and the crew of the state boat, saying, "we have veteran soldiers on the boat, who fought Japanese during the war. Even vessels from the Yantai fishing companies were afraid of us, how dare you (from Dalian) come to our territory?!" The captain of the SOE vessels offered the fishermen an apology in the end.⁴⁷ In 1956, another state-own fishing vessel went to Dalu Island in Andong, Liaoning, to fish, and also caused damage to the equipment of the local fishermen. In the company's report, it admitted its mistake for not well educating the fishing workers and defying the national interests as well as the interests of the

⁴⁷ "Dispute between Luda Aquatic Company and Shandong fishermen", 1951-6-16, DLA 50-2-3.

ordinary fishermen.⁴⁸ The above are only two of many similar accidents taking place in the Yellow/Bohai waters.⁴⁹

In addition to the competition over fishing resources, state-owned enterprises also competed with the collectives for laborers. In 1956, the delegates to the Dalian's First People's Congress noticed how urban units recruiting fishermen disrupted the fishery production in the countryside by pulling the main workforce away from the rural collectives.⁵⁰ SOEs from other cities also came to rural Dalian to hire fishermen, resulting in dissatisfaction on the part of the Lüda Fisheries Company. For example, the Lüda Fisheries Company complained that Yantai sent people to Changhai county to hire local fishermen as their captains and first mates, even after those fishermen had already signed draft leases with the Lüda Fisheries Company. Shenyang's Northeast Aquatic Products United Company also came to Dalian to recruit workers. They not only offered them better wages, but also wooed the workers by bringing them to restaurants, inviting them to watch plays, and loaning them money.⁵¹

These incidents reveal the cleavages that existed within the Maoist planned economy in the FFYP, chiefly between state-owned and newly collectively owned units. State authorities had apparently hoped that organizing fishermen into cooperatives and pooling laborers and resources into collectively owned fishing

⁴⁸ " Investigation report of Yantai, Qingdao, Luda company ships invade the fishing area and hit the fishermen's production tools" DLA 50-1-59.

⁴⁹ For example, see Yantai's and Qingdao's state enterprises also came to coastal Dalian to fish, and triggers disputes with local fishermen. " Yantai's and Qingdao's state enterprises came to Changhai to fish,"DLA 50-2-46.

⁵⁰ " The group discussion record of the fourth discussion session of the First People's Congress Meeting," 1956-8, DLA 50-2-95.

⁵¹ "Outside units do not follow rules but lure workers to leave our factory."

vessels would boost fishery production, and supplement the output of fish from the state enterprises. However, the overlap of fishing grounds and the labor shortage gave rise to competition between state and collective interests. The fishermen were not shy about defending their rights when it came to conflicts. In many cases, they firmly asserted their autonomy by keeping the state fleets from entering into their fishing grounds or demanding compensation for their damaged tools and boats. The state enterprises, on the other hand, made a series of concessions to the fishery collectives in order to mitigate the tensions between them. The lack of progress in fishing industry during the final two years of the FFYP (reasons to be introduced in the next chapter about the Great Leap Forward), in contrast with the obvious advances of the rural collectivization at the same time, partly explains the opposing attitudes of the SOEs and the collectives after those conflicting incidents.

Moreover, both fishermen and fishing companies seldom took borders on land as the primary focus delineating their fishing grounds. Instead, they placed marine space at the center of their practices, and frequently crossed marine borders to look for resources and laborers.

Contradiction II: Investment Shortage and the International Context

The simultaneous pursuit of industrialization and collectivization also meant that the state could not adequately invest in either. . An imbalance grew between the investment the SOEs received from the state and the demand for economic productivity, in particular, toward the end of the FFYP. As a result, the period of high

socialism witnessed a growth of shipwrecks, fish spoilage and divisions between workers, as well as tension between urban consumption and rural sales of fish products.

The international political environment in the 1950s partly accounts for the inadequacy of the state's investment in urban fisheries industry. The "fishing wars" of between China and Japan in the East China Sea that occurred during the first half of the 20th century continued after the establishment of the PRC in 1949.⁵² In March 1952, the Lüda Fisheries Company found more than 10 Japanese fishing vessels operating along the Chinese coastal waters in the Yellow Sea. The Chinese crew noticed that the vessels had a radio system on board, and reported to the government that it was possible the ships were doing military scouting.⁵³ Similar incidents frequently took place in the early 1950s, resulting in the seizure of 158 Japanese vessels by China, involving 1,910 Japanese fishermen and staff by 1954.⁵⁴ Unlike seizures before 1949, which were mostly done by the Nationalist Chinese officials, post-1949 detentions were normally initiated by local Chinese fishing vessels and fishermen.

In the absence of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic and Japan, the settlement of fishing disputes between the two countries were dependent on non-government initiatives. In December 1953, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened a meeting, announcing that fishing companies and individual fishermen

⁵² Muscolino.

⁵³ "The Japanese fishing vessels invaded China's territory," DLA 50-1-51.

⁵⁴ "Strictly implement the decision of not capturing the invaded Japanese vessels in the future," 1954-4-16. DLA 50-2-46.

were forbidden from capturing Japanese vessels. Only the Navy or the Ministry of Public Security had the right to do so.⁵⁵ In 1954, the Japanese fishing industry formed the Japan-China Fishery Association of Japan, representing those with marine fishing interests in waters bordering China.⁵⁶ Chinese formed the Fishery Association of China supervised by the Chinese government. In 1955, the two associations signed a nongovernmental fisheries agreement featuring “peaceful coexistence.” It stipulated that the fishing between China and Japan in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea should be conducted on the basis of “equality and mutual benefit,” aiming to enhance the friendship between the Japanese and the Chinese peoples. The Chinese government agreed to educate fishermen and local companies to avoid conflicts with Japan.⁵⁷ This agreement was extended in following years, and expired in 1958. With its enforcement, “the number of Japanese fishing vessels seized by China dropped virtually to nil; only three were seized between the middle of 1955 and early 1958.”⁵⁸

Peaceful coexistence and friendship, however, still were subordinated to the primary concern of China’s maritime security. In the agreement, the Chinese side set up three military zones and a conservation zone, including one military zone in the northern part of the Yellow Sea, which Japanese fishing vessels were not allowed to enter. Furthermore, it ordered the Chinese fishermen to raise vigilance and strengthen

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Choon-Ho Park, “Fishing under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Fisheries Controversy?” *Ocean Development & International Law* 2, no. 2 (January 1974): 110.

⁵⁷ “Notification of the implementation of the Sino-Japanese fisheries Agreement,” DLA 50-2-86;

“Records of maintaining the Sino-Japanese fisheries Agreement,” DLA 50-2-100.

⁵⁸ Park, 116.

inspections. If they found any foreign vessel violating the agreement and entering the military zones, they needed to report to the Chinese state immediately.⁵⁹

This requirement was no doubt a way to cope with tension arising from Chinese involvement in the Korean War in the early 1950s. The government documents show that most international fishing conflicts in the 1950s in the Yellow Sea took place between China and South Korea.⁶⁰ In 1955 and 1956, it was reported that South Korean vessels appeared frequently in coastal areas of Dalian, sending spies and seizing Chinese fishermen to find out the structure of China's coastal defense fortifications.⁶¹ This damaged fishermen's enthusiasm for developing deep-sea fishing grounds and continuing fishery operations. In order to alleviate the fishermen's anxiety and ensure production safety, both the state's Marine Patrol department and the aquatic companies took measures to strengthen the protection of fishermen, including the daily patrolling.⁶² In addition, fishermen were also asked by the state to form groups to go out to sea, and report to the Marine Patrol department the location of their work, the boat number and the time of returns. If they operated farther than 12 nautical miles north of the Yellow Sea, it was necessary to leave the fishing grounds before 9PM in the evening and to return to the harbor or a safe zone for the night. They also needed to assign a particular person to watch the situation at

⁵⁹ "Notification of the implementation of the Sino-Japanese fisheries Agreement," DLA 50-2-86.

⁶⁰ "Report of Changhai County fishing boats found enemy ships on the sea, which captured our eight fishermen," 50-2-66; "Luda Aquatic company captures a Korean motored vessel," DLA 50-2-76.

⁶¹ "Enhancing vigilance and strengthening protection measures", DLA 50-1-59.

⁶² Ibid.

night if necessary and possible, and notify the coastal defense forces as soon as they found enemy ships.⁶³

Overall, the state discouraged mass actions such as capturing Japanese vessels by Chinese fishing companies and individual fishermen. The settlement of fishing disputes between the two countries was dependent on non-governmental initiatives. Peaceful coexistence and friendship between Japan and China, however, still was subordinated to the primary concern of China's maritime security. The state ordered the Chinese fishermen to raise vigilance and strengthen inspections. International fishing conflicts in the 1950s in the Yellow Sea did not drop, but mostly took place between China and South Korea. This both damaged fishermen's enthusiasm for developing deep-sea fishing grounds and continuing fishery operation, also push the state to spend more on security than on capital, material and workforce investments in production.

To conclude, these two contradictions, the rivalry between the SOEs and the rural collectives and the imbalance between the state's investment and its expectations, led to a number of problems which threatened to undermine the success of the fishing industry of Dalian. These problems involved various accidents and challenges inside the industrial workplace, including shipwrecks, fish spoilage and the increasingly tense labor relations. The second issue of fish spoilage also created problems outside the workplace, revealing the rural-urban divide intensified by rural sales and urban consumption of fish products.

⁶³ "Regarding the maintenance of fishermen's maritime production safety," DLA 50-2-66.

Work Safety: Shipwreck and Fish Spoilage

Limited investment and the growing demands on productivity under the context of industrialization and collectivization in the 1950s led to work accidents. Ship accidents and shipwrecks affected sailors, while fish spoilage marred the daily operations of fishery processing workers. The latter further shaped the rural-urban relationship during the course of purchase and sales of fish products.

One of the major concerns in the fishing industry was work safety. In 1955 alone, there were 97 safety accidents, 42.7% more than the number in 1954. They included one shipwreck and three accidental deaths.⁶⁴ In 1956, the accidents continued to increase. For example, on Oct. 18th, 1956, due to the improper operations of rope on a fishing boat, First Mate Zhang Shixin lost three of the fingers of his right hand.⁶⁵ During the same year, the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company reported, the lack of knowledge of safety protocols resulted in two carpenters of the shipbuilding factory suffering injuries to their ribs and spine.⁶⁶

Company officials were normally held accountable for explaining the causes of accidents. The Dalian Bureau of Fishery criticized the neglect of safety education by the managers. Their reports called the security system merely a formality, and characterized factory leaders as reckless with the state's property and people's lives

⁶⁴ "The marine sports conference of the Bureau of Fishery," DLA 50-1-43.

⁶⁵ "The Accident Report of the No. 260 First Mate Zhang Shixin injury," DLA 50-1-60.

⁶⁶ "The investigation report of the Luda serious injury Accident ", DLA 50-1-60.

and safety.⁶⁷ State officials concluded that “it is obvious that this problem is due to subjective reasons, when the capitalist management ignored the security or a serious study of the implementation of national labor protection policy.”⁶⁸

Even though the company’s management was held accountable, other factors also contributed to the growth of accidents. Since 1955, the Fisheries Company had built new vessels every year, without hiring experienced captains or technicians. As a result, labor mobility was frequent among the crew, one-third of the crew constantly moving from one boat to another. It led to a "stranger mentality."⁶⁹ The crew rarely could maintain emotional stability after frequent transfers, nor were they always aware of the production quota and safety procedures of each vessel. Overall, reports by the state’s fishery bureau suggested, toward the high tide of socialism before the end of the FFYP, the state enterprise paid one-sided attention to the number of fishing vessels and the production quotas, ignoring the training of technical personnel.

Additionally, the lack of adequate freezer systems on the boats and underdeveloped infrastructure bridging the countryside and the city led to fish spoilage accidents. For example, the Fisheries Company’s reports confessed that it was not well prepared for a harvest season, resulting in insufficient manpower and trucks to move the fish over to the market on time. By only focusing on quantity, without paying attention to quality and protection, factory management created a situation in which fish deteriorated when it was still on the boats. Salted fish was not

⁶⁷ “The marine sports conference of the Bureau of Fishery,” DLA 50-1-43.

⁶⁸ “A Preliminary summary of 1955 work,” DLA 50-1-43

⁶⁹ “The labor organization of the DFC,” DLA 50-2-97.

maintained well either, because sanitation was not good, and both equipment and the staff's personal hygiene were problematic.⁷⁰ Even worse, the improper processing of pufferfish, which has tetrodo toxin in the skins and organs, caused several accidental deaths when the crew mixed pufferfish with other fish without removing the poisonous parts and sold it to consumers.⁷¹

Before the socialist transformation in the FFYP, the city of Dalian had a total of 273 fish dealers, including 88 vendors, who had market stalls, and 175 mobile peddlers. By 1956, however, one dealer was incorporated into the state-owned shops, 66 joined state-private joint ventures, and most of the rest collaborated and took the form of cooperative shops. Only three still operated their business as individual mobile peddlers in 1956.⁷² As a result, the buying, selling and processing of fish was mainly controlled by the state enterprise of the Lüda Fisheries Company, and after 1956 by the specialized purchasing-selling state enterprise of Lüda Fisheries Supply and Marketing company.

The Fishery Supply and Marketing Company set up 63 permanent and 10 temporary acquisition stations in the coastal villages. It adopted the policy of "contract acquisition, mobile acquisition, whenever possible" (*hetong shougou, liudong shougou, suidao suishou*).⁷³ As a 1956 government report put it, this strategy would help promote sales, ease fishermen's anxiety over abundant output in the productive season, and increase their enthusiasm for production. The purchase price

⁷⁰ "A Preliminary summary of 1956 work of the Linda Fisheries Bureau", DLA 50-1-51.

⁷¹ "A discussion on the issue of the poisoning of pufferfish," DLA 50-1-51.

⁷² "A Preliminary summary of 1956 work by the Luda Fisheries Bureau", DLA 50-1-51.

⁷³ Ibid.

of fish products in 1956 was "reasonable,"⁷⁴ when the average price of fish was 8.06% higher than in 1955, and slightly lower than in 1954, but significantly lower compared with 1953.

With respect to sales, the government implemented the policy of "prioritizing exports over domestic sales."⁷⁵ Domestic sales accounted for only 64.7% of the total market, among which a large part proportion of fish products was transported to other Northeast cities, such as Shenyang. As a result, how to coordinate intercity transactions became a core issue for the state. In 1954, the Northeast government decided that the state-owned food companies should be put in charge of unified purchase and unified wholesale. It limited direct trades between producers and consumers, leading some local Northeast food companies to abandon the previous designated producing areas and purchase products outside the region. For example, the Northeast Food Company had previously contracted with Jin county in Dalian to buy their fish products, but in 1956 it went to Yantai in Shandong to purchase fish instead. This led to an overstock of local fish products in Jin. In addition, since the food companies now could select the species of fish products they wanted to buy, they ended up only buying fish with the best quality or richest nutrients while ignoring cheap varieties that were favored by working-class city residents.⁷⁶

The limitation of fish species in the markets and a rise in prices due to the increasing costs in the cross-regional transportation kept city residents from choosing

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ "Report on the problem of marketing and transportation of Aquatic," DLA 50-2-58.

a diversity of fish products and being able to afford those that were available. Nevertheless, the 1950s witnessed a considerable increase in the volume of fish products consumed in cities. Jan Solecki notes that the shortage of other food products, better transportation, and improved techniques of freezing and canning fish contributed to a widespread increase in fish consumption.⁷⁷ In Dalian, for example, fish became one of the most popular products during the Chinese New Year, when the market often could not meet the demands of city dwellers, causing most suppliers to be out of stock.⁷⁸ In the discussions during the Dalian's First People's Congress in 195x., delegates also pointed out the problem. In an open discussion they were reported as saying, "the supply of fish products to local residents in a production area like Dalian, however, was inadequate. There was always a long waiting line in the fish shops, and customers often found that nothing was left when it was finally their turn. Had we changed it to ration supplies for each household, then everyone would have fish."⁷⁹

Dalian's fishing industry not only provided direct food products, but also fish oil, a particularly potent source of vitamins. In 1952, all fish oil produced by Dalian was purchased by the Central Military Commission's logistics department. From the beginning of 1953, the Shenyang Medical Purchasing and Supply Station carried out Dalian's fish oil sales, mainly to the Northeast region. The main source of fish oil was

⁷⁷ Jan.J. Solecki, *Economic Aspects of the Fishing Industry in Mainland China* (Institute of Fisheries, University of British Columbia, 1966), 132.

⁷⁸ "Report on the seafood supply during the New Year, " DLA 50-2-46.

⁷⁹ " The group discussion record of the fourth discussion session of the First People's Congress Meeting," 50-2-95, DLA 1956-8.

mackerel liver, followed by shark liver and cod liver. The Lüda Fisheries Company supplied mackerel, while coastal fishermen supplied the other two kinds. Even so, the source was far from sufficient to satisfy domestic demand, and the fish oil products were often in short supply.⁸⁰

Ironically, even as cities had difficulties meeting people's growing demands for fish, coastal villagers also had trouble selling small aquatic products, such as shrimp, crab and oysters. One example of this dual impact is shown in the Shenyang-Jin transaction as mentioned above. Jin County in Dalian was originally a seafood supplier for Dadong District, Shenyang. Jin's annual production of oysters was more than 400,000 kg, and each retail unit in Dadong could sell more than 1,000 kg per day. After the food companies gained the right to control unified purchase, however, the sale of oysters in the whole city of Shenyang was 500-600 kg per day, a dramatic decline from the past. The food company not only reduced the purchase from Jin, but also set up a higher price for consumers. The food company spent 1,800 yuan per *jin* getting the oysters from rural fishermen, and set up a 3,000 yuan wholesale price. Then when it arrived in the retail sector in Shenyang, the price was more than 5,000 yuan, which was too high for the urban residents to afford. At the same time, following the unjustifiable policy of "no acquisition of low quality, low-quantity, and cheap products" (*zhiliang ci de bushou, shuliang shao de bushou, jiage di de bushou*),

⁸⁰ "Production of liver oil in aquaculture farms", 50-2-46.

a large amount of oysters collected by rural fishermen in Jin failed to be transported to market.⁸¹

The Dalian local government gradually realized that the policy dissatisfied both city residents and rural fishermen. In 1956 it proposed to adopt “first purchasing products within the (Northeast) area, and then outside the area.”⁸² This policy would not only solve the problem of unsold fish products in the region, but would also reduce transport difficulties and costs, thereby lowering the burdens on consumers. The Dalian local government also mentioned that if the food company refused to accept this method of organizing sales, it should allow direct trades between the producers and the retail units.⁸³ As Solecki notes, nationally, from the fall of 1956 the state relaxed government control of marketing, and allowed aquatic products markets to reopen. As a result, the government withdrew its marketing agencies from coastal villages, and the private fish dealers reappeared.⁸⁴

Overall, during the FFYP, the state instituted the system of “unified purchase and marketing” of grain, cotton and aquatic products, as well as other goods. Just as it did with agricultural products, the state extracted fish products (food and industrial materials) from the countryside to feed the urban population and fund industrialization. However, unlike grain, aquatic products are valued for (?)freshness.⁸⁵ They must be sold immediately before they go rotten. The market was

⁸¹ "Report on the problem of marketing and transportation of Aquatic," DLA 50-2-58.

⁸² "A Preliminary summary of 1956 work by the Luda Fisheries Bureau", DLA 50-1-51.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Solecki, 128.

⁸⁵ As Solecki notes, “In the northern part of the country, 70 to 75% percent of the catch is sold in live, fresh or frozen form. In subtropical regions, 70% of the catch is deep-salted and dried.” 129.

supposed to play a large role in the purchase and sales of aquatic products. The Maoist planned economy in the early phase of the FFYP, however, meant the end of the private market in fish products and its dealers. The primary characteristic of a planned economy was to pay more attention to increasing production than how to acquire products and deliver them to consumers. In addition, due to the inefficient transportation system, the state enterprises--both the Fishery Supply and Marketing Company and the state-owned food companies—ended up only spending too many costs and providing poor services, such as transferring, loading and unloading of aquatic products. The result, as shown above, was that people in cities did not have enough and varied fish products to consume, while less lucrative species of fish products or those produced in remote coastal villages failed to be transported and sold in urban markets. In short, the marketing methods during the FFYP unfavorably affected both fishermen and urban dwellers.

Labor relations

Temporary Workers, Apprentices and the PLA Veterans

The socialist transformation of Chinese industry during the First Five Year Plan, and a more rapid growth in industrial output envisaged by the state planners on the eve of the Great Leap Forward, created tensions within the workforce over working conditions, safety and the distribution of welfare benefits. Workers in the Lüda Fisheries Company were categorized as full-time, apprentices, and temporary

employees. As in other cities, disparities in income, welfare, housing subsidies, bonuses and job security favored full-time employees over the latter two groups.⁸⁶

At the beginning of the FFYP, the Lüda Fisheries Company imposed strict restrictions on the native origins and the length of employment of temporary workers. In 1954 the policy stipulated that the length of employment of temporary workers normally should be no more than 3 months, and after which they should be hired as full-time workers. The enterprises were also required to sign official contracts with the temporary workers and obtain the consent of the work unions of the *danwei*. In addition, without authorization, factories were not allowed to recruit workers from the countryside, or hire recently arrived migrants.⁸⁷ In reality, the factory did not always strictly follow the policy. They signed labor contracts with temporary and seasonal workers occasionally, and dismissed them randomly.⁸⁸

Although disparities within the workforce over benefits, working and living conditions, and safety did not completely vanish in the early 1950s, the division between permanent and temporary workers became salient only after 1955, when the state loosened the restriction on the employment of temporary workers and encouraged peasants to move to the cities to propel urban industrialization. For example, in order to meet the national production plan, in March 1956 the Lüda Shipbuilding and Repairing Company hired 82 temporary carpenters from the city of

⁸⁶ Elizabeth Perry, "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957," *The China Quarterly* 137 (March 1994).

⁸⁷ "Provisional Regulations on the employment of temporary workers in public and private enterprises," DLA 50-2-49.

⁸⁸ "Notice of the continuation of signing labor contracts with temporary workers," DLA 50-2-53.

Andong in Liaoning province,⁸⁹ and the Lüda Fisheries Company hired 300 temporary workers in April 1956.⁹⁰ The government also assisted companies to recruit workers from the countryside. One delegate to the Dalian's First People's Congress criticized the Labor Bureau for transferring 13 young fishermen from Shuangdao Village to the city as temporary workers, and later making them long-term workers, which meant that all the remaining fishermen in the village were over 45 years old.⁹¹

Many temporary workers soon had good reasons to feel ill-served by their urban units. In June 2, 1956, among the 400 newly hired temporary workers, a group wrote a letter to the Lüda Fisheries Company's leader, complaining about the delay in paying them and their poor working conditions. They said that they had not been paid for over two months, and that the attitude of the management was bad. The company also did not provide facilities for them to wash their hands after processing fish. There was no light in the toilet either, causing troubles for those working on the night shifts. Eating was also a big problem for these temporary workers. The dining hall refused to sell food to them, even when they had food tickets (*liangpiao*). When they brought home-made food to work, they could only eat in the yard outside the dining hall. After they finally were allowed to eat inside, because the company thought that it was unsightly to have them eating outside, they had to trade this "opportunity" for a

⁸⁹ "On hiring workers from Andong," DLA 50-1-62.

⁹⁰ "Opinions on the employment disorder of the payroll department and insufficient care for temporary workers." DLA 50-1-62.

⁹¹ "The group discussion record of the fourth discussion session of the First People's Congress Meeting," 50-2-95, 1956-8.

promise to clean the dining hall after everybody left. The medical clinic also refused to treat these temporary workers, telling the patients to seek cures on their own.⁹²

Problems also existed among the 82 temporary carpenters who had moved from the city of Andong. Their dormitory was unclean, cleaning tools were lacking, and the roof leaked.⁹³

In addition to temporary workers, apprentices and some former PLA soldiers also filed complaints with the officials. Apprentices complained about the extended length of their training period, and being failed to be promoted and paid as regular workers after the original apprenticeship period expired.⁹⁴ As the PLA downsized dramatically in the 1950s, many demobilized officers were assigned to work in state enterprises.⁹⁵ However, the flawed labor system made it difficult to ensure that benefits and necessary training reached these veterans. Liang Yutang had served in the Army as a correspondent and a car driver. Upon his discharge, he was assigned a job at the Dalian Fishing Nets factory. His first assignment was sorting fabric materials, but after he complained that his sweat leg, feverish stomach and nearsighted eyes were worsened by the assignment, he was transferred to the factory's transportation department. Soon he realized that this new job further aggravated his physical conditions. In his letter to the mayor of Dalian, he complained about the the factory management ignoring his of his knee and back pain,

⁹² "Opinions on the employment disorder of the payroll department and insufficient care for temporary workers." DLA 50-1-62.

⁹³ "On hiring workers from Andong," DLA 50-1-62.

⁹⁴ With regard to the status processing after the apprenticeship period," 09/08/1956, DLA 50-1-62.

⁹⁵ Neil J. Diamant, *Embattled Glory: Veterans, Military Families, and the Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949-2007* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

and asked help from the mayor for a new job.⁹⁶ Another veteran, Zhao Meihong, also complained about the unfair assignment of jobs and lack of medical care. Zhao had been assigned a job at the Shipbuilding and Repairing company as an apprentice. However, his skills did not improve after working for seven months, he said, due to the lack of patience from his teacher. When he spoke to the factory staff and hoped to change to a light-load job to accommodate his heart disease, the factory turned him down. Interestingly, Zhao used military rhetoric in his petition, and addressed the head of the factory as *shouzhang* [leading comrade] instead of *changzhang* [factory head] in the letter.⁹⁷

Permanent Workers: Wages and Welfare

Although permanent workers were the beneficiaries of the factory employment system compared to temporary workers, apprentices and the PLA veterans, they too had serious complaints about inequality. The most common complaints from the permanent workers concerned the wage system. Chinese state enterprises went through two national wage reforms in the 1950s, first in 1952, and then in 1955-56. The wage rate was based on a national wage scale, usually involving eight grades, with each rate associated with a set of skills. The objective of the wage system was to reward "each according to his work," but as Mark Frazier argues, it also "kept the

⁹⁶ "The job of Liang Yutang," 12/31/1956, 50-1-62.

⁹⁷ The job of Veteran soldier Zhao Meihong in the ship building factory," Dec. 12, 50-1-62.

growth of wages well below the growth of labor productivity, and helped spur China's 18 percent annual growth rate in industrial output during the FFYP.”⁹⁸

In 1956 and 1957, collective petitions and individual letters to the factory management, the local newspapers and the city government became commonplace in the Lüda Fisheries Company. One of the most serious problems identified by workers and technicians was the unrealistic assumption that fisheries and agriculture were both suitable for the piece-rate salary system. As a worker named Huang Xifang mentioned in a petition letter, “admittedly, in most cases the piece-rate is a more advanced wage system than the hour-rate system, but whether it can stimulate productivity in fisheries is a problem.”⁹⁹ Huang listed three reasons that the piece-rate system might be problematic. First, fisheries largely depended on the quality of the ships and tools. Vessels provided by the company had differences in size and engine power, making it difficult for workers to compete fairly. Second, fishery production was dependent on access to natural resources. The piece-rate system, would naturally lead boats to concentrate on the most favorable fishing grounds. It would undermine the overall arrangement of resources by the company, and the excessive concentration on high-producing areas for short-term gain would also damage the fishery resources, resulting in a reduction of output in the long run. Third, fishery production had a high rate of energy and materials consumption. Simply encouraging more

⁹⁸ Frazier, 145.

⁹⁹ “Reflection of the problems of salary and management,” DLA 50-1-62.

production by the piece-rate system could well end up causing a big waste of resources and harming the accumulation of wealth.¹⁰⁰

Another contentious issue driven by the wage reform was income inequality. Workers complained that they or some of their experienced and skilled colleagues had been assigned relatively low wage grades. In one letter sent to the Dalian Wage Assessment Board, a worker who had worked for eight years in the shipbuilding company said that his salary and his classification as a second-grade workers had not been changed for sixth years even though he often took assignments that required a fifth-grade or even sixth-grade level of skill. During the 1956 wage reform, after his colleagues all supported him for a promotion during their team meeting , he was ignored by the factory management.¹⁰¹ In another letter, the worker Sun Chengyu also complained that he was given a third-grade classification, while he in reality worked at a grade five or grade six level. One of his capable colleagues, who had been a labor model, also failed to get a promotion and a raise.¹⁰²

Worker dissatisfaction with their grade settings and their wages was perhaps not unusual, but it is worth noticing that such complaints increased during 1956 and early 1957. When state planners attempted to create faster growth in production by building more boats and recruiting more workers, the Lüda Fishery Company experienced a shortage of safe machinery and labor funds. For example, although the state enterprises expanded housing and health care benefits over the course of the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ “A letter from the shipping building company.” DLA 50-1-62.

¹⁰² “Shipyard workers Sun reflect the unreasonable wage assessment,” DLA 50-1-62.

FFYP, from the middle of the 1950s, the Shipbuilding and Repairing Company workers expressed dissatisfaction with limited housing and poor living conditions. Workers complained that “the shipbuilding factory had seven places for workers to live, some of which were in remote locations. In some dormitories, there was not even a mattress, not to mention the poor sanitation.”¹⁰³ The Fishery Purchasing and Supply Company was no better. Workers complained about the crowded dormitory, which had nine workers living in one room, many of the rooms with three or four broken windows. When it was raining, their personal possessions were a “calamity.”¹⁰⁴ In addition, more and more workers brought their families from the countryside to the cities, creating a living situation in which single workers shared space with families. “It was always a long night when their children kept crying,”¹⁰⁵ said one single worker. The company responded that there were more than 200 families of workers and staff members for whom housing had to be provided. If those three-generation families living in one single room were also counted, more than 500 families needed to change their housing situation, and the company simply could not resolve all these problems at once.¹⁰⁶ As a result, the health and productivity of the workers were affected. For example, some of the company's engaged or married employees found themselves confronting demands to break off an engagement, or divorce, because they were unable to provide housing.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the increase in

¹⁰³ “On the poor condition of dinning hall and dormitories.” DLA 50-1-62.

¹⁰⁴ “On the dormitory of the Fishery Purchasing and Supply company.” DLA 50-1-62.

¹⁰⁵ “Opinions on the neglect of shipyard housing,” DLA 50-1-62.

¹⁰⁶ “Opinions on the neglect of shipyard housing,” DLA 50-1-62.

¹⁰⁷ “A survey of several issues concerning the welfare of workers and staff members,” DLA 50-2-91.

the number of workers created the problem of how to feed them. The dining hall, with an area of 180 square meters, could only accommodate 200 people, but the company had 600 people routinely trying to eat lunch there. In the summer people could eat in the yard, but in the winter, this became a big problem.¹⁰⁸

Gender and Childcare

The lack of space also affected gendered issues, for instance, the need for childcare. Women workers, for instance, accounted for more than seventy percent of the total workforce in the Net-making Factory. However, the nursery did not have enough space to take in all the children of the workers. The nursery was also far away from the factory, causing mothers to spend almost half an hour on the way to the nursery for in order to nurse their children during the noon break. Some women had to nurse their child while they were at lunch, which was adding to the women's fatigue and affecting their physical health.¹⁰⁹

In their efforts to meet rising production quotas, some factories also became reluctant to hire or train women. For example, Xu Yuzhen, a woman working in the net-making factory, said that the technical class did not allow her to take classes and learn new techniques when she was pregnant. When she came back from maternity leave, the personnel department transferred her from the position of worker to cashier, because the aquatic department reportedly did not need a mother with children. Xu said, "The training class did not accept mothers, and the aquatic department did not

¹⁰⁸ "A survey of several issues concerning the welfare of workers and staff members," DLA 50-2-91.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

want mothers, either. As mothers, we don't have a future. I feel distressed every day. Is my career over? If so, we'd better not have children or marry, or not live at all."¹¹⁰

In the Fishery Purchasing and Supply Company, women workers in the fish-processing department also complained about male workers who asked the women to wash clothes their clothes for them.¹¹¹

Worker Responses

Interestingly, grievances, expectations and demands of workers, both permanent and temporary, did not push workers in Dalian's fisheries industry into collective and confrontational activism. Instead, Dalian's state enterprise workers joined in petitioning and critiquing the bureaucracy as intellectuals criticized the bureaucracy during the Hundred Flowers Campaign. Workers filed individual petitions to the factory managers, newspapers and the city government, without engaging in labor activism.

Worker protest used state rhetoric and built on the state concerns in the 1950s, both embodying and contesting the state ideology. For example, when the worker Tian Bingyan wanted to switch to another job because of health concerns, he said, "I used to work for the Japanese, who oppressed and beat us. But now as a socialist citizen and a socialist worker, I want to contribute and help our country build socialism. I don't feel eased by getting paid without fulfilling my job requirement"

¹¹⁰ The work of Xu Yuzhen, DLA 50-1-62.

¹¹¹ "The group discussion record of the fourth discussion session of the First People's Congress Meeting," 1956-8, DLA 50-2-95.

(implying that he could not contribute much at the current post).¹¹² Similarly, when a cook on a fishing vessel complained about the long working hours and the demand that he both make meals and engage in fishing, he said, “I heard that this arrangement was initiated by the Japanese. I felt sad about it. We Chinese should learn advanced experience from foreigners, but not including the experience of exploitation.”¹¹³

Workers also appealed to the state’s policies to protect their benefits. Workers complained about the long working hours, and said, “if we are overworked, it will hinder production and result in significant losses in the state economy.”¹¹⁴ Workers blamed the bureaucracy and management corruption for the mistreatment of workers. They blamed corrupt officials for their difficulties in obtaining benefits, getting promotions and raises. Workers also pointed out that the factory’s director rarely respected the results of workshop and production team meetings in determining the wage grades, and there was always one authority in charge.¹¹⁵ They also took serious accidents as evidence the authorities’ neglect of safety education.¹¹⁶

Andrew Walder found that workers in the state enterprises were highly dependent on their enterprises for basic necessities, and therefore did not belong to the most militant and rebellious activist groups.¹¹⁷ This theory seems to substantiate why the Shanghai’s 1957 strike wave, in which workers experienced serious and

¹¹² “Change jobs for Tian Bingyan,” DLA 50-1-62.

¹¹³ A letter of from cooks reflecting long working hours.” DLA 50-1-62.

¹¹⁴ “working overtime to damage their health,” DLA 50-1-62.

¹¹⁵ “A reflection on the corruption in the wage reform,” DLA 50-1-62. “A reflection on the Net-making company not caring about workers.” DLA 50-1-62.

¹¹⁶ “The Accident Report of the No. 260 First Mate Zhang Shixin injury,” DLA 50-1-60; “The investigation report of the Luda serious injury Accident”, DLA 50-1-60.

¹¹⁷ Andrew Walder, “The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class, 1949-1981,” *Modern China* 10, no. 1 (1984).

aggressive labor movements, involving factory walkouts, organized slowdowns of production, happened at small joint-ownership firms instead of state-owned enterprises.¹¹⁸ Another explanation is suggested by Christian Hess's study of Soviet-occupied Dalian. Hess links the worker status under the "Soviet model" to the situation of workers during the Japanese colonial period. He notes that both Japanese officials and the Soviet military officials in Dalian placed great emphasis on heavy industry, and thus granted skilled workers a more privileged status. They both "enforced restrictions on people's movement, consumption patterns and work life, which deepened people's dependency on their work units and the state."¹¹⁹

Both Walder and Hess highlight the role played by the authorities in regulating labor movements by granting relatively privileged status to workers in large-scale state enterprises. A study of workers in the fisheries industry in Dalian in the 1950s, however, shows that various groups of workers in the state enterprise were not satisfied with their wages, benefits, working conditions and safety. They proposed their opinions and requests boldly yet ingeniously by criticizing the state for not meeting the expectations the state itself introduced to them. At the moment when the Party encouraged intellectuals to criticize the bureaucracy, which was seen by Mao as standing in the way of the transition to socialism, the state maintained openness to worker petitions as well. However, it was short-lived as in the Hundred Flowers Campaign for intellectuals. The extensive paper trail that had worker letters only have files from late 1955 to early 1957.

¹¹⁸ Perry.

¹¹⁹ Hess, 384.

Conclusion

The peculiarity of Dalian in the 1950s as an industrial city partly lies in its colonial past under the Japanese and the Soviet occupations. Colonial legacy was reflected in the hierarchy of the workplace and the emphasis on heavy industry as the leading sector of economic development. The role of the Soviet Union during the early 1950's was also critical. However, the CCP also played a major role in Dalian's economic development. . Through its programs of educating, training, and awarding workers, Maoist policies in the early 1950s successfully expanded production, increased wages, improved welfare, and enhanced literacy and skills of workers, even though not in a completely egalitarian manner.

A major shift took place in the mid-1950s, when both production output and the number of laborers in fisheries shrank. This decline was partly a result of unfavorable weather, but was also due to the state's decision to intensify socialist industrialization and collectivization at the same time. For this young socialist state, it was already difficult enough to regulate and supervise six state enterprises, which specialized in different roles inside the fishing industry. Coordinating the needs from these SOEs with the rapidly growing demands from the rural collectives further complicated this situation. The Korean war and the tense international relation contributed to the intensification of the problem. When the state realized that it had no good means to resolve the contradictions coming along with the industrial development, and that the state-owned urban enterprises encountered more and more problems meeting the

ever-growing demand for productivity toward the end of the FFYP, it turned its attention to developing what the next chapter calls the “People’s Fisheries program,” on the eve of the Great Leap Forward.

Chapter Four

Catch the Wave: The People's Fisheries and Socialist Reform in the Coastal

Villages, 1950-1976

One day in 1961, Baijie, a 20-year-old teacher at the First Agricultural Middle School of Jin county, was called into her supervisor's office. Her home brigade, Zhaojia, had just sent a letter to the school, notifying them that her father's class status had been changed from an "upper middle peasant" (*shangzhongnong*) to a "rich peasant" (*funong*). In the context of early 1960s China, when a lower class status meant greater political reliability and better access to opportunities, this was troubling. Months later, Baijie received more bad news. The county had disbanded the First Agricultural Middle School to encourage more students of the school to farm. This was a result of the new policy of "adjustment, consolidation, supplementation, and improvement" issued by the state in the wake of the disastrous Great Leap Forward and famine. While most of Baijie's colleagues were transferred and continued to teach at other middle or primary schools, Baijie was sent back to her home village to farm, an assignment directly traceable to the recent change in her father's class label.¹

Baijie's story confirms what Jeremy Brown suggests was the "dynamism, instability, extreme variation, and sheer confusion" of the class status system in

¹ Interview with Baijie, August 3, 2016.

socialist China.² From 1950 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, the Chinese state imposed a broad range of campaigns to transform the lives of coastal rural residents. Some efforts, like the 1961 “Transforming the Backward Areas” campaign just mentioned, emphasized class struggle by making changes to the class statuses of peasants. Some efforts, including the lenient policies in the state's implementation of land adjustment and collectivization, paid less attention to political struggle and aimed instead at an economic objective: the expansion of fishery production in the coastal villages. Other efforts, including what I will call in this chapter the People’s Fishery Program, shifted gendered divisions of labor and space.

This chapter aims to show the flexibility and volatility of the Chinese state’s policies, as officials attempted to accommodate specific political considerations and constraints on the one hand, and the diversity and variety in reactions from people at the grassroots on the other. Focusing on the connections and frictions between class, gender, and labor, it tracks three questions: In this region, when were class labels important and what were their meanings to different groups of peasants? When was the distinction between farmers and fishermen important and when was it blurred? When were boundaries of gendered space and labor crossed and when was gender equality constrained? At a time when the socialist state's needs and visions for rural areas were changing, the boundaries between agricultural and nonagricultural activities, men and women, as well as urban and rural classifications kept shifting.

² Jeremy Brown, “Moving Targets: Changing Class Labels in Rural Hebei and Henan, 1960–1979,” in Jeremy Brown and Matthew D. Johnson, eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism* (Harvard University Press, 2015), 53.

The chapter begins with a discussion of land adjustment and rural collectivization in the 1950s. It investigates the process and consequences of the increasing specialization of work activities in the countryside, with attention to the tensions between farmers and fishermen in coastal rural communities. This chapter further describes rural women's labor experiences and the changing meanings of their labor. Maoist rhetoric and practices blurred the distinction between the labor performed by men and women, but did not erase gender inequality. Finally, this chapter examines the shift toward the industrialization of the countryside in the 1970s, when both rural villagers and urban youth joined the rural fishery enterprises. This period also witnessed the advent of interactions between people and the surrounding environment that would soon become problematic.

Land Adjustment and Political Campaigns

During the civil war period of 1946-1949, the control of the port of Dalian by the Soviet Union severely constrained the CCP's mobilization of peasants in rural Dalian, as the Soviet leadership opposed mass rallies and radical struggle against landlords or rich peasants. As a result, in contrast with the CCP's relatively thorough land reform in its new territories in southern China, the "semi-concealed" CCP in Dalian only carried out a Rent Reduction Movement in 1946-47. As we saw in Chapter 3, this movement gained only limited support from rural cadres and peasants during the Civil War.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, the Dalian CCP leadership decided to better address peasant needs, among which the land question was paramount. On December 1, 1949, the Dalian municipal government issued "The Decision on Rural Land Redistribution." The most interesting part in this Decision was a call for "land adjustment" (*tudi tiaoji*), instead of the more familiar term "land reform" (*tudi gaige*). While a normal land reform would divide the land equally among all peasants, land adjustment meant that the necessity and scope of land redistribution had to depend on "how much land is left to distribute in the specific villages, and do it only when the village has extra land" (*Youdi ze tiaoji, wudi ze budong, youduoshao jiu tiaoji duoshao*).³ The CCP's Northeast Bureau, in its response to the Dalian government on December 14, endorsed this policy of only redistributing extra land from landlords and rich peasants to the poorest.⁴ In other words, land readjustment maintained the stability of rural society to the greatest extent. Without radical struggles, extra land owned by the wealthiest was smoothly transferred to the poorest.

Many peasants responded enthusiastically to land adjustment. They commented, "we jumped out of the frying pan into a blessed bowl, and we will never forget the favor shown us by the Communist Party."⁵ However, others felt baffled and discouraged during land adjustment when they saw the incomplete transfer of land and property from the rich to the poor. They complained, "In southern Liaoning

³ Zhonggong dalianshiwei dangshi bangongshi, *Shehuizhuyi gaizaoshiqi de Dalian* (Dalian in the socialist reform period), (Dalian:Dalian chubanshe, 1992),49.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "The steps of the land adjustment," 1950, JZA 001-1-016.

people practiced land reform; why did we only conduct land adjustments? It did not solve the problems.” Or “The landlords and rich peasants are like boats. When the boat is broken, it still has sides, and when the sides are broken, it still has the base, and even when the base is also broken, the boat still has nails.”⁶ Nevertheless, land adjustment was successful. By March 1950 when land adjustment ended, more than 510,000 *mu* of land previously owned by landlords and rich peasants had been transferred to more than 140,000 poor peasants.⁷ However, the ramifications of this peaceful, mild land readjustment emerged later in 1961.

Classification of Coastal Villagers during Land Adjustment

As Jacob Eyferth’s study of paper-making craftsmen in Sichuan reveals, although the traditional five class labels of “landlords,” “rich peasants,” “middle peasants,” “poor peasants” and “hired laborers,” covered the majority of the rural population, there were other groups in the countryside who could not be defined simply in terms of their relationships to land.⁸ In Dalian, the most prominent groups that did not fit standard classification were residents of fishing villages. Government records of land reform did contain categories of “fishlords” (*yuzhu*) and “rich fishermen.” (*fuyu*) However, it was more common for villagers to be classified on the basis of their land ownership.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid., 45.

⁸ Jacob Eyferth, *Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots: The Social History of a Community of Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000* (Harvard East Asian Monographs 314. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009), 124.

Dagushan Township and Wanli Village are two examples. Located in southern Jin County, Dagushan was surrounded by water on three sides and had a coastline of 37 kilometers. Fisheries were its main mode of production, supplemented by cultivating limited arable land.⁹ Among its 278 households in 1950, three were classified as “fishlords” and five were classified as “rich fishermen” during land reform. These two groups rented out their boats and tools, and depended on hired laborers or fish-tenants for their income. There were twelve households classified as “middle fishermen” and four as “poor fishermen.” The remaining 254 households were divided into the main five categories of farmers, just like inhabitants of other farming villages.¹⁰

Located next to Dagushan, Wanli Village had even less arable land. One woman from Wanli remembered that people rarely worked in the fields. Instead, most fished either for themselves or for others to make a living.¹¹ However, a 1950 survey of class distribution of Wanli in 1950 shows that among the entire 219 households, none was issued a class label during land reform that reflected a fishing occupation. Even though in the descriptions of work team investigations, many households owned at least one boat and used fishing as their primary means of making a living, the household members were still labeled poor or middle peasants.¹²

⁹ *Jinxian Diming Zhi*, 69.

¹⁰ “Report on Current Fisheries Production and Views of the Fisheries Policies,” 1953, the Dalian Municipal Archives (hereafter cited as DLA) 50-2-20.

¹¹ Interview with Yulan, August 8, 2016.

¹² “A Survey of the Classification of Various Classes in Rural Areas of Wanli in Jin County,” 1950, JZA 70-1-61. The fact that fishermen were rarely considered as a separate class, despite the fact that fishing was not merely the sideline but their main sources for making a living, was in contrast with some regions in South China. Sara Friedman notes that in southeastern China, officials assigned class

Moreover, even for the few fishlords and rich fishermen, unlike their farmer counterparts of landlords and rich peasants, punishments levied on them did not include the confiscation and redistribution of their fishing equipment. While their surplus land, houses, and livestock were redistributed, they were allowed to keep their equipment and continued to hire fishing laborers. Former fishlords, rich fisherman, and ordinary peasants were all encouraged to make a living by fishing on their own or renting their fishing equipment to those who did not have their own means of production.¹³

In sum, during the 1950 land readjustment, the CCP did not intentionally label fishermen according to their main occupation in the coastal villages. The land issue overwhelmed all others in the rural communities. The government held that “everything was born from the soil, and the soil produces gold and all treasures.”¹⁴ That is, they believed that as long as peasants were given land, all problems would be solved. Furthermore, in the eyes of the new state during the beginning years of the PRC, fishing was not seen as different from sideline productions such as handicrafts or fruit growing in the countryside. Therefore, land readjustment did not have much of an impact on peasants’ fishing activities.

The First Reclassification

labels according to boat ownership instead of land ownership. Sara Friedman, *Intimate Politics: Marriage, the Market, and State Power in Southeastern China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006), 41.

¹³ “Report on Current Fisheries Production and Views of the Fisheries Policies,” 1953, DLA 50-2-20.

¹⁴ “A summary of fishery work of Nanshan District,” JZA 011-1-024.

The first reclassification of coastal villagers happened in 1953, the first year of the First Five Year Plan (FFYP). The newly established fishery management agencies in Jin, Lüshun, and other coastal counties of Dalian abandoned the previous classifications. Instead, the government divided all villagers from fishing villages into four categories of “fishlord and landlord,” (*yuzhu jian dizhu*), “fishing capitalists” (*yuye zibenjia*), “laboring fishermen” (*laodong yumin*), and “hired fishermen” (*yugong*).¹⁵ In 1953, the government reported that Dagushan township now had one “fishlord and landlord” whose fishing property was protected but whose land was confiscated. Dagushan also had seven fishing capitalists, equaling 2.5 percent of the overall households. They owned seven big boats and six junks, and hired 53 laborers. Dagushan had 255 households of laboring fishermen, comprising more than 90 percent of the population. They either owned boats or junks, and hired laborers, or fished on their own. Finally, hired fishermen, who lacked any means of production but worked for others, made up 16 households.¹⁶

This 1953 classification system was in contrast to the system used in 1950. During the 1950 land reform, only 24 out of 278 households of Dagushan were classified in terms of their relation to boat ownership, while in 1953 the entire village population was reissued labels on the basis of their actual occupation as fishermen. Why did the government relabel the villagers in 1953? Were the new categories equivalent to those for farmers? Further, in the case of “fishlord and landlord,” why was their land confiscated but not their fishing equipment?

¹⁵ Asking for Instruction to Solve the Problems Existing in Fisheries,” DLA 50-1-19.

¹⁶ Ibid.

The government's attitudes towards fishermen in both the 1950 land adjustment and the 1953 reclassification reflects the principle of the transitional period of "New Democracy" proclaimed by Mao in the early 1950s. New Democracy highlighted cooperation and compromise among various classes in Chinese society except for the landlords in the rural areas and the "bureaucratic capitalists" in the cities.¹⁷ For fishing, it proposed "mutual responsibility" between those households who owned boats and nets and those households that had more manpower.¹⁸ The government even stressed that the overall principle in fishery was "mutual benefit for laborers and capitalists" (*laozi liangli*). As a 1950 report issued by the Dalian municipal government said:

"In the past, some people equated the fisheries with agriculture. The outcome was that the capitalists were afraid of struggles and redistribution, and the laborers were waiting for struggles and redistribution. It was a mistake. The correct principle was to bring benefit to both laborers and capitalists. Those who owned capitals should get 5.5 [out of 10] and the laborer should get 4.5 [out of 10] of the fruits."¹⁹

The supportive attitude toward capitalists in fisheries also explains why in 1953, the government invented and assigned the class label "fishing capitalists" to some previous "fishlords" and "rich peasants."

¹⁷ John Wong, *Chinese Land Reform in Retrospect*, Centre of Asian Studies Occasional Papers and Monographs (Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 1973), 5.

¹⁸ "The summary of the fishery work in 1949," JZA 011-1-039.

¹⁹ "The report on the fishery production in the first half of 1950," 1950, DLA 50-1-4.

Cooperation under Collectivization

Following the “mutual responsibility” principle, coastal villages began the collectivization process. In the first stage of collectivization, villagers pooled their labor and tools in mutual aid teams. These teams mainly consisted of relatives and neighbors who exchanged labor seasonally as they had in the past. This arrangement was well-accepted by fishermen in fishing-dominated villages. As a result of the pooling of a variety of fishing tools and fishing grounds both offshore and on the open sea, the creation of mutual aid teams extended the operating season, and expanded the kinds of products fishermen produced. For instance, the work season of mutual aid teams was two or three months longer than that of fishermen who did not join a team. Becoming team members also kept fishermen safer because more people sailed out together.²⁰

There were both temporary and permanent mutual aid teams. The temporary teams joined together in peak fish harvesting seasons and were disbanded afterwards. Since each household now owned an independent plot of land after land adjustment, they farmed their land after the fishing season ended. In permanent mutual aid teams, fishermen joined on a permanent basis throughout the year. The teams coordinated fishing with agriculture and other subsidiary businesses, such as livestock rearing and handicrafts.²¹ The first stage of collectivization aimed at forging an alliance between

²⁰ “The Basic Situation and Measures to Improve Fishery Production and Mutual Cooperation,” 1954, DLA 50-2-44.

²¹ “The Basic Situation of Collectivization in the Past Two Years,” 1952, DLA 50-1-20.

households with different types of fishing tools as well as tools for farming and subsidiary businesses.

If mutual aid teams forged alliances between neighbors and relatives, the lower-producer cooperatives inaugurated in 1953 extended the scope of these alliances by building cooperation between fishing capitalists, laboring fishermen, and hired fishermen. Although private ownership did not change, the cooperatives were now in control of the use of equipment and the distribution of income. The cooperatives distributed income on the basis of labor as well as investment of ships and tools. The income of fishing capitalists from their shares of vessels and tools investments, for example, accounted for more than 45-60% of the total.²² By 1955, 40.5% of the fishing households in Dalian had joined the lower-producer cooperatives.²³

These first two stages of collectivization were promulgated amidst the spirit of a “United Front” between different classes in the countryside. The state treated fishlords and fish capitalists as leniently as they treated rich peasants who farmed full-time. Not all villagers, however, were as enthusiastic about this form as the state expected. Fishing capitalists and laboring fishermen, who did not get along well with the hired laborers, were not happy to see their relationship transformed from “employer and employees” to “equal collaborators.” Some fishing capitalists or laboring fishermen heard rumors of impending collectivization and began to stop

²² “Report on Current Fisheries Production and Views of the Fisheries Policies,” 1953, DLA 50-2-20.

²³ To Mobilize Farmers and Fishermen and Carry Out the Socialist Agricultural and Fishery Stimulation Campaign,” 1955, DLA 50-2-66.

purchasing new tools. Some even sought to sell their boats and tools quietly through local brokers.²⁴

Even so, state leaders thought highly of the lower-producer cooperatives. Du Runsheng, the Secretary of the Central Committee's Rural Work Department, said in a 1955 speech that lower-producer cooperatives suited the fishery communities best. According to Du, cooperatives were in the interests of both rich fishermen who lacked laborers and poor fishermen who lacked capital.²⁵ From the perspective of the state, the priority in the early 1950s was to accumulate wealth from as many sources as possible to support the fragile rural economy. The state's support of a united front between the rich and the poor, as shown in the case of lower-producer cooperatives, was also a result of fear that attacking rich peasants would trigger opposition to the state from the fishlords and fish capitalists from rural communities.

Specialization under Collectivization

While some state officials, such as Deng Zihui, head of the Central Committee's Rural Work Department, were heartened by the achievements of mutual aid teams and lower-producer cooperatives, and cautioned against establishing larger cooperatives, Mao insisted that collectivization was developing too slowly.²⁶ During the high tide of socialist construction in the countryside in 1955-56, the lower

²⁴ "The Basic Situation and Measures to Improve Fishery Production and Mutual Cooperation," 1954, DLA 50-2-44.

²⁵ "The Summary at the Fisheries Symposium of the Central Committee's Rural Work Department," 1955, DLA 50-2-77.

²⁶ Friedman, Pickowicz, and Selden, 185.

cooperatives were replaced by the advanced-producer cooperatives. By the end of 1956, in Dalian 6,755 households joined the advanced-producer cooperatives, more than 98% of the overall households.²⁷

Unlike the mutual aid teams and the lower-producer cooperatives, which stressed cooperation across class and place of residence, the advanced cooperatives emphasized specialization. The coastal villages in Dalian were geographically divided into 20 fishery cooperatives and 62 fishery-agricultural cooperatives.²⁸ Even inside the fishery-agricultural cooperatives, there was a functional separation between fishery and agriculture.

This raised a number of questions: in the fishery cooperatives, who would work in the fields if all fishermen went out fishing? In the fishery-agricultural cooperatives, how should work be distributed? Three solutions were implemented in the producer cooperatives. First was the so-called “complete union of agriculture and fishery.” Laborers were assigned to either job entirely based on their skills. The second solution was the “household division of labor,” where women from these cooperatives worked in agriculture, while men joined fisheries. The last one was to contract the land of fishing households out to farming households. Each cooperative would decide on its own which method to choose.²⁹

This specialization resulted in an expansion of production. Fishermen could now spend more time fishing. According to the official reports, the average number

²⁷ “A Preliminary Summary of Work of Luda Fisheries Bureau in 1956,” 1956, DLA 50-1-51.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ “The Suggestions on the Fisheries Collectivization,” 1955, DLA 50-1-44.

of working days for each male fisherman in 1956 was 276, compared to 214 in the previous year. The average number of working days for each fisherwoman was 68, versus 56 in the previous year. The overall yield in 1956 was 2.7% higher than that in 1955.³⁰ Furthermore, fishermen had time to travel farther in search of new fishing grounds. For example, fishermen from Dagushan sailed along the Bohai/Yellow sea rim and fished in coastal Shandong province.³¹ Former fisherwoman, Yulan, remembered that in 1956-57, her fellow villagers fished far away from their collectives, and thus needed a cook on boats. She was thrilled to be picked as the cook, and was able to sail with the fishermen.³²

The specialization also resulted in some unexpected consequences for the rural community. Fishing had never been a safe business. Extending fishing seasons and expanding fishing grounds to the open sea also meant increased risks. The number of deaths of fishermen and their wives who picked up seafood along the shore in 1956 was almost twice the number in the previous four years in total. The causes identified by the local government included failed weather forecasting, careless operations, and poorly equipped vessels.³³ One person named Manxing remembered that his father, an experienced fishermen, died in 1957 during a storm when he had already been at sea a few weeks, longer than previous years.³⁴

³⁰ The Luda Statistics Bureau, "Income Distribution and Problems of Fishery Cooperatives in 1956, May 13, 1957, DLA 50-2-109.

³¹ "Summary of Mass Fisheries in 1957 by the Luda Fisheries Bureau," 1957, DLA 50-1-66.

³² Interview with Yulan, August 21, 2016.

³³ "A Preliminary Summary of Work of Luda Fisheries Bureau in 1956," 1956, DLA 50-1-51.

³⁴ Interview with Manxing, August 16, 2016.

A bigger challenge resulting from the development of advanced-producer cooperatives and excessive specialization was the tension between fishermen and farmers. As the above discussion has shown, at the stage of advanced-producer cooperatives, most of the fishery production in Dalian took place in the rural agro-fishery collectives, which included both farmers and fishermen. At the beginning, the local government assumed that fisheries would develop alongside agriculture. According to the government's 1957 report, fishery production was unstable and fluctuated because of weather conditions. Agricultural production was stable yet lower than that of fisheries in normal years. The government believed that when fishery production experienced downturns, agricultural production could balance the overall incomes, and fisheries could fund and support agricultural development in good years.³⁵

However, neither fishermen nor farmers were happy about occupational separation under the combined agro-fishery collectives. The first layer of tensions came from the nature of the types of jobs. Working in fisheries and sea farming often involved long work hours, heavy physical demands, and dangers. In addition, work days for fishermen were calculated by task, while those for farmers were calculated by hours. The fishermen complained that they had to work hard and catch at least 35 kg of fish per day to be compensated for a full work day, when farmers only needed to “go out to work” (*chugong*) to achieve the same result, regardless of the actual

³⁵ JZA 24-2-1, 1957-11-22.

work they did.³⁶ Some fishermen condemned farmers for “taking advantage of them” (*kayou*).³⁷ Farmers in the agro-fishery collectives and those contracting land from the fishery collectives were not happy either. They countered the fishermen's complaints, saying that farmers were the ones who grew crops and fed fishermen.³⁸

A deeper gulf between the two groups arose from the unequal payments they received. One of the most puzzling aspects of the government report of labor remuneration in the Hongqi Collective in Jin County, is the terminology used in the responses from fishermen and farmers at the same collective. It is said that fishermen were “suffering losses” (*chikui*), while farmers were “gaining benefits” (*dedao haochu*). Specifically, the report further noted, in 1956 fishermen on average should have been paid 789 *yuan* instead of 448 *yuan* based on their actual contribution, while farmers should have been paid 160 *yuan* rather than 279 *yuan*.³⁹ In 1957, both groups continued to be paid in proportions that did not reflect the actual material profits they created. Each fishermen “suffered losses” of 175 *yuan*, and each farmer “gained benefits” of 96 *yuan*.⁴⁰

In other words, in the fishermen’s view, they did not get fair pay under the current system. In fact, the report implied, fishermen were subsidizing farmers. This miscalculation of the value of people’s labor was rooted in the “uniform per capita income per day” system, a feature of the advanced-producer cooperatives stage. The

³⁶ November 22, 1957, JZA 24-2-1.

³⁷ “For Instruction to Solve the Payment for Farmers and Fishermen in Hongqi Collective of Wanli Township,” January 22, 1958. JZA 1-3-125.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

average per capita income per day for both groups was set at the same rate, amounting to 1.37 *yuan* per day in 1956 and 1.16 *yuan* in 1957. Fishermen earned more than farmers because of their longer work days. However, fishermen believed that their contribution to the total income of the collective was much greater than that from agriculture, because the acquisition price from the state for fish products was higher than for grain.⁴¹ They believed that they should receive a greater share because they were performing the high-margin, demanding fishing work. Some fishermen requested to work in the agricultural sector, and some young adults moved to the city and switched to factory jobs, partly as result of frustration and disappointment.⁴² Farmers, of course, were not happy either. Even with the supposed “extra benefits,” they still earned considerably less than fishermen on a daily or yearly basis. In response to fishermen’s complaints, in 1959 the Liaoning provincial government issued an order that fishery and agriculture work would be paid through different systems. The profits earned through fishing activities would be accounted for separately.⁴³

Second Reclassification

In the 1950s, a mild land redistribution, gradual collectivization, and an imperative to expand production dominated development in Dalian’s coastal villages. Social tensions did exist in the rural, coastal community. But they were most often

⁴¹ November 22, 1957, JZA 24-2-1.

⁴²“The Summary of the Mass Fisheries in 1957 by the Fishery Bureau,” January 17, 1958, DLA 50-1-66.

⁴³ February 2, 1959, JZA 1-3-251.

caused by income inequality between farmers and fishermen and the state's failure to address the different needs of the two groups who resided within the same collectives or communes. Although each village had a class label, class struggle was downplayed in the 1950s.

However, things started to change in the early 1960s. Following the failure of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), as a part of the process of the rectification of work-style and communes, in 1961 the Liaoning provincial Party committee launched the "Transforming the Backward Areas" campaign (*gaizao luohou diqu yundong*).⁴⁴ The provincial officials believed that Dalian's colonial history and the peaceful land redistribution had left the socialist revolution in Dalian incomplete.⁴⁵ The aim of this co-called "*Luogai*" movement was to regain the leadership from the hands of enemies and establish the absolute authority of poor peasants in the backward areas. Dalian, considered to have "high mountains and deep water" (*shangao shuishen*) with "hidden dragons and crouching tigers" (*canglong wohu*), became one of the focal regions of this campaign.

Baijie's home of Dengshahe Commune in Jin County of Dalian, for instance, became one of the major targets of the campaign. This place historically had been a prosperous rural area, well-known for having ample cooking oil and grain. Not only did people from the local county come to buy land, those from other regions of

⁴⁴ Mao first brought up this national campaign in 1954. It come up again in 1961, but not appeared as a national campaign at that time, but only focused on Dalian.

⁴⁵ *The Beginning of Comprehensive Construction of the Socialist Period of Dalian* (Dalian: The Dalian Press, 1998), 98-99; *Jinzhou in the Period of Socialist Construction* (Dalian Jinzhou District Annals Office, 1997), 50.

Dalian also purchased land here. Further, Dengshahe was close to the town, and many villagers preferred to rent out their land and live in the town. Finally, it was near both railways and the coastline. It was therefore easy for enemy spies to infiltrate, according to official records.⁴⁶

In Baijie's case, when the 1950 land redistribution came to Baijia, a village in Dengshahe, Baijie's household was classified as "upper middle peasants" in the campaign. The amount of land Baijie's father owned was a little more than average, but since he had a large family and only hired one year-round laborer, the label of "middle peasant" seemed to suit him best in accordance with the Land Reform Law. The details of this campaign are now blurry in Baijie's mind. The government records kept in the archives showed that Baijia had ten landlords and six rich peasants, which was less than seven percent of the overall households of Baijia.⁴⁷ As a result of the luogai campaign, in 1961, however, the number of households labeled as landlords grew to nearly 10%, double the number that was so designated in the land reform in 1950.⁴⁸ Baijie's father's class status, as we have seen, was changed from a "upper middle peasant" to a "rich peasant."

The luogai campaign also hit the fishing villages hard. Between October 1959 and the end of 1961, Dalian sent a work team with 305 members to Changhai Island. The government reports said that that it had been a mistake to exempt Changhai from radical land reform because of its lack of arable land. During the 1950 land reform,

⁴⁶ 1961, JZA 89-1-036; 1961, JZA 89-1-038.

⁴⁷ 1965, JZA 070-1-985; 1950, JZA 071-1-114.

⁴⁸ 1961, JZA 89-1-036; 1961, 89-1-038.

there were 4 fishlords, 46 landlords and 186 rich peasants, but by the end of the luogai in 1961 the numbers of these three categories rose to 36, 111 and 257 respectively.⁴⁹ Moreover, to respond to the state's requirement of "purifying the interior, consolidating the fortress, and defending the coastal borders," 273 Changhai households with a total of 1,541 residents were relocated to Jianping County in Liaoning. The majority of the relocated households were the "five bad elements" (*wulei fenzi*) of landlords, rich farmers, counter-revolutionaries, bad-influencers, and rightists identified during the luogai campaign.⁵⁰

Yang Deyu was one of these "bad elements." After the Luogai movement began, he was first put into a training camp (*jixun dui*), and was responsible for digging and transporting stones for construction under the watch of soldiers from March to October 1960. As he recalled, "*it was the time of hard years (the great famine that began in 1958). In the beginning, it was bad but we could still eat until we were half full and complete the heavy tasks. Soon however, we were only provided food substitutes such as corn or straw. At first they allowed our families to bring food to us because of the physically demanding work and limited food, but this was soon prohibited also. My wife knew my suffering, and sent my children a few times to deliver food. But the guards scolded them and kept them away. After eating food substitutes for two months, I kept sweating abnormally during work. In another two*

⁴⁹ *The beginning of Comprehensive Construction of the socialist period of Dalian* (Dalian: The Dalian Press, 1998), 108-111.

⁵⁰ "A summary of the luogai movement of Changhai County," in *Changhai Literature and History I*, 144.

months, we all could barely walk and started to suffer edema.”⁵¹ Later Yang and his family were relocated to Jianping in western Liaoning province. Throughout the 1960s, Yang and his family remained targets in the successive political campaigns.

The Four Cleanups Movement

The political campaign aiming to transform “backward” rural Dalian did not end with the luogai movement. From December 1964 to August 1965, the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee and the Liaoning Provincial Party Committee launched a sweeping socialist education movement, known as the Four Cleanups movement (*siqing*). It was considered in official records to be the largest and most ferocious political campaign in rural Jin county.⁵² The Four Cleanups team, referred to in the records as “a group of ten thousand cadres” (*wanren gongzuo tuan*), was led by Song Renqiong, the head of the Northeast Bureau of the Central Committee, and included twelve thousand cadres from different levels. The content of the Four Cleanups at the beginning was restricted to the economic areas of rectifying—that is, making necessary adjustments to-- work points, property, accounts, and warehouses in the villages. It was later extended to “cleaning” thoughts and politics as well. The basic motivation behind the Four Cleanups was not much different from that of the luogai movement, as the state retained its suspicion of Dalian's past colonial history. Unlike the luogai movement, however, the Four Cleanups movement targeted low-level rural cadres, including brigade heads, team

⁵¹ Yang Deyu, “My experience in the Relocation of luogai,” in *Changhai Literature and History I*, 53.

⁵² *Jinzhou in the Period of Socialist Construction* (Dalian Jinzhou District Annals Office, 1997), 79-94.

leaders, and accountants. The work team dismantled the village authority, organized village meetings, and identified and mobilized young activists to educate cadres.⁵³

One illustration of the process and outcome of the Four Cleanups movement is the story of the 43-year-old Yi Chunzhi, who was the head of the Women's Department of Liujia Brigade and a mother of six. She was removed from her post during the Four Cleanups movement. In her own testimony collected by the government, the villagers and work team questioned the work points she had earned through *"building houses, holding meetings and watching crops."* Moreover, in the village meeting with more than 200 participants, accusations against her also involved the sources of food she lent to her fellow villagers. Yi herself said *"I was working hard day and night and even putting my family aside (for the village), and had pinched and saved on food to lend it to others, but it turned out to become my fault."* Perhaps what hurt Yi most was the painstaking "struggle meeting" conducted by her three daughters at home. One daughter scolded her at home, saying *"you idiot, why on earth did you want to become a cadre? If not because of your unclear work points, how could it be possible that I wasn't chosen as an activist! It's all your fault."* Another daughter, who *"used to bully fellow villagers, and was selfish,"* said *"I have never been considered good (by others), and now under your influence I will be thought of as even worse."* Yet Yi's story seemed to have a good ending. After she

⁵³ Ibid.

studied the “23rd Article” and other Party documents, she was re-elected as a cadre after the siqing movement.⁵⁴

In sum, rural Dalian in the 1960s experienced tense political changes. The luogai movement targeted ordinary rural villagers by identifying more “exploitative” peasants, while the Four Cleanups Movement turned its attention to low-level “corrupt” rural cadres. Class status became more important in the 1960s. Those whose labels were reassigned in the early 1960s had to live with the consequences until the end of the Cultural Revolution. The state fought to reassert its control over many rural communities to keep poor farmers disaffected by the GLF from decollectivizing. But what was interesting in DL was the rhetoric the state adopted. Whenever the state came to introduce something into Dalian, even though it was a national campaign, it brought up with its particular colonial past. The common narrative was never to forget that Dalian were a Japanese colony, and make sure all traitors were gone.

New Political Consciousness

It would be misleading to suggest that peasants were simply passive participants in the political movements in the 1960s. The campaigns created new political consciousness for some peasants, such as Yulan, and provided discourses for others, like Baijie, to defend themselves. In the 1960s, Yulan was elected as an

⁵⁴ Yi Chunzhi, “Take Mao Zedong Thought as the guidance, correctly treat the revolutionary mass movement,” 1965, JZA 5-1-20.

activist and a member of the Communist Youth League of the Wanli brigade during the Four Cleanups movement. She remembered the basic criteria for an activist as including *"being young, progressive, and daring to speak up. The league members were normally unmarried. Married women were not willing to participate."* The league members' main job was to *"report to the siqing work team, and help the 'upstairs' cadres 'go downstairs' (xialou)."* Yulan did not like some of the content of the movement, as she said, *"We had to accept the work team (their instructions to critique local cadres) no matter whether we were happy or not. What problems could the production team possibly have at that time? The accountant? Team leaders? The women's head? We did not have unclear work points or accounts...In order to look more active, people criticized non-existent things."*

In Baijie's case, she used the opportunity provided by the Four Cleanups movement to challenge the decisions made by the party leaders and the disruption from the local cadres. In my interviews with Baijie, the most interesting episode of Baijie's story happened during the Four Cleanups movement. Both Baijie and her father Zifu had refused the tag of "fish having escaped the net" (*louwang zhi yu*). In the Four Cleanups movement, Baijie found a cadre of the work team, and tried to persuade him to remove the "hat," or "label," of her father. She said *"I brought a land reform pamphlet and found a cadre from Dandong. I told him that we had twelve members in the household and only hired one laborer. It was not exploitative."* Her request for rehabilitation was declined. The work team cadre replied *"The overall and*

per capita crop yields of your family was higher than that of the average middle peasants.”

Baijie had a hot temper. She never really got along with poor and lower middle peasants, and was often shunned during collective activities. After the failure to change her family's class status, she quarreled with people in her production team when they mocked her. She even gave a lecture to the production team leader, who enjoyed taking advantage of her family. The production team leaders attempted to get free haircuts when Baijie bought tools to do haircuts for her three younger brothers at home. She told the freeloaders to stay away from their house since they were from two different classes and were supposed to keep class struggle in mind.

Because of the distinctive geographical setting of the region, the socialist transformation in the coastal villages of Dalian both paralleled and differed from the process in inland agricultural communities. In the fishing or agro-fishing villages, after a mild land redistribution in 1950, socialist transformation passed through three stages of collectivization, from the mutual aid teams to the lower-producer cooperatives to the advanced-producer cooperatives. The treatment of fishing boats and tools in the beginning years of the PRC was identical to approaches to commercial property, which were exempt from confiscation and redistribution.

Under collectivization, however, fisheries were expected to become increasingly specialized to fulfill growing domestic and international needs. This specialization led to the first reclassification in coastal villages in 1953. In contrast to the state's attitudes toward sideline production and their practitioners, which were

tightened and discredited as collectivization moved forward, fishermen were protected and encouraged to thrive. Specialization under collectivization also meant that although they lived side by side, fishermen were separated from farmers in labor and grain distribution. This ended up creating tensions between peasants and cadres, and between farmers and fishermen. The second reclassification of villages in 1960-61, which stemmed from the increased social tension and the failure of the Great Leap Forward, was larger in scale and more profound in influence. The Four Cleanups Movement in the mid-1960s also provided both new identity and meanings for rural villagers.

Maximization of Production and Gender Politics

Yulan was 16 years old when the Great Leap Forward began in 1958. Earlier that year, her brother, who worked in the city at the time, brought her to Dalian from her fishing village. However, her stay in the city only lasted three months. She remembered, “*My job was processing vegetables for factory dining halls. I reluctantly worked eight hours every day (tiantian kao bagedian). I had already been spoiled by the freedom in the countryside (zai nongcun ziyou guanle), and found life in the city unbearable. Then I came back home.*”

At first glance, the refusal of Yulan, a woman from a fishing household in Jin County, to stay in the city at the age of 16 might seem surprising. For most peasants, the opportunity of an urban job would have been too precious to decline. Yulan’s story, however, suggests a key element of the state’s development strategy beginning

in the late 1950s. In the absence of capital inputs in the Maoist era, rural fishery products gradually replaced urban, industrial products as the basis for expanding fishery production. This expansion required increased labor input. Mobilizing and liberating women's productivity, therefore, were important initiatives in the rural fishing industry. These efforts redefined the boundaries of the gendered division of space and labor. The ability of rural women to transgress boundaries, however, met constraints imposed by the state, which maintained an ambivalent attitude toward women's domestic duties and health protection.

The People's Fisheries Program

Even before the late 1950s, fish and other aquatic foods were widely recognized as important sources of nutrition. Some aquatic products also had medicinal value. Seaweed, for instance, served as a source of iodine to cure goiter, a glandular disease widespread in the inland and mountainous areas of China. However, it was only after the mid-1950s that newly established acquisition stations in the coastal villages, improved canning and freezing techniques, and better transportation made it easier for fish products to reach urban residents.⁵⁵ Jan Solecki also notes that widespread education and migration further led residents of cities or inland areas, where fish had previously not been eaten often on customary or religious grounds, to overcome their

⁵⁵ "To Strengthen the Production and Supply of Supplement Food," *China Daily*, 1958-12-28; "The Urgent Instruction to Collect and Produce Large-scale Supplement Food," *China Daily*, 1960-11-14; "To Obtain Delicious Food from Seas," *China Daily*, 1961-12-28;

prejudices against eating it.⁵⁶ In addition to the rising domestic value of fishery products, the export of these products helped pay for industrial imports from the Soviet Union. In 1959, one ton of frozen fish was worth two tons of steel, and one ton of shrimp was worth six tons of steel. Small dry shrimp called *xiami* were worth even more: one ton could buy 9.5 tons of steel.⁵⁷



Image 4. Marine Aquaculture in Dalian⁵⁸

The ultimate push for mobilizing more peasants to work in the fishery industry emerged following the Great Leap Forward. After Mao famously announced in November 1957 that within 15 years China's steel production would surpass that of Britain, the Ministry of Fisheries eagerly proposed an equivalent agenda, promising

⁵⁶ Jan Solecki, *Economic Aspects of the Fishing Industry in Mainland China* (Institute of Fisheries, University of British Columbia 1966), 132.

⁵⁷ "To Implement the Policy of a Combination of Catching and Growing," September 1959, DLA 50-1-80. Jan Solecki's research, drawing on Russian records, provides figures on exports of fish from China to the USSR between 1957 and 1963.

⁵⁸ *Shuichan zhi*, 188.

that “by 1962 the fishery and aquatic products will catch up with and surpass that of Japan, and become first in the world.”⁵⁹ To achieve this goal, the state depended on labor power from the masses, rather than mechanized ships, to increase fish production. As we saw in the last chapter, the output of fishery products from the state-controlled companies began to shrink at the end of the First Five-Year Plan.⁶⁰ Xu Deyan, the head of the Ministry of Fisheries, pointed out that coastal villages accounted for 90% of fishery production, and acknowledged that the past preoccupation with deep-sea fishing by the government-controlled companies resulted in an overall slowdown in fishery output. In the late 1950s, as Xu noted, China lacked the necessary technology and advanced equipment to engage in deep-sea fishing, and therefore, he called on the local agencies to give leadership to the masses for coastal fishing and aquaculture.⁶¹

As a result, unlike rural handicrafts such as textile production, which were redefined as part of urban industry and phased out of the countryside by the late 1950s, rural fishery was considered more important than its urban counterpart.⁶² This new trend shaped many aspects of rural society in coastal areas, in particular women’s lives, as women were encouraged to step into the agricultural labor left behind by men, and join both of the main targets of the “People’s Fisheries” program - offshore fishing and marine aquaculture.

⁵⁹ “Why hasn’t the 1957-year plan been completed? How to ensure the completion of the 1958-Year Plan?” January 1958, DLA 50-2-126.

⁶⁰ “Analysis of fishing boats and labor force in Luda fishery,” December 1957, DLA 50-2-109.

⁶¹ “Speech by Minister Xu at the end of the Aquatic Symposium,” September 1957, DLA 50-1-80.

⁶² Jacob Eyferth, “Liberation from the Loom? Rural Women, Textile Work, and Revolution in North China,” in Jeremy Brown and Matthew D. Johnson, eds., *Maoism at the Grassroots: Everyday Life in China’s Era of High Socialism* (Harvard University Press, 2015), 131–53.

Women in Agriculture

As mentioned above, the transition to APCs created conditions for adult fishermen to make extended expeditions from the villages to fishing grounds off the coast of Dalian. The absence of men prompted women's participation in agricultural work, much like the "feminization of agriculture" described by Gail Hershatter in her analysis of rural Shaanxi in the 1950's.⁶³ As in rural Shaanxi, women in rural Dalian became the essential labor force for field work, subsidiary work and construction work. In the spring, women were busy with ploughing, sowing, and collecting manure. In the summer, women hoed weeds and plucked the paddy grass. In the fall, women harvested peanuts, the second main crop of the region after corn, and grew sweet potatoes.⁶⁴

Farming women often played an important role in the tensions between farmers and fishermen. In collectives that adopted the "household division of labor," women from fishing households joined agricultural teams (or joined in agricultural work) and belonged to the same payment system as male farmers. In this case, a household often had a husband who fished and a wife who worked in agriculture, and the couple was paid in separate systems. When the farmers saw that fishermen earned more per year (despite the fact that in the fishermen's eyes the actual income was still lower than

⁶³ Hershatter, 2011.

⁶⁴ "Survey on women's participation in collective, sideline production and household work in Hua Jia commune," August 1, 1962, JZA 50-2-9.

what they thought they should be paid), they complained about the issue of household income.

In a 1965 report, farmers said that male fishermen earned only for themselves, and left their wives and children to be fed by farmers. They said, “Why not transfer their wives to fishing activities as well, so they do not eat our grain anymore?” Some farmers requested to reunify the payment system, and count fisheries as a sideline of agriculture. As a response, the village cadres made a breakdown of fishermen’s income, and concluded that male fishermen did not in fact earn as much as the male farmers claimed. While fishermen earned more cash, their grain rations were less than those of farmers. The village cadres also noted that the women from the fishing households who had been working in the agricultural fields contributed more than 30% of the total income for the collective, commenting that “women were not only eating without working’ (*bushi zhi chifan bu ganhuo*).”⁶⁵ This example shows that members of the community, if not cadres, tended to both overlook women’s labor contributions and assess women largely through the kinds of jobs their husbands did and how much income their husbands made.

Women also engaged in the subsidiary work of raising hogs and chickens and collecting mushroom and herbs. At the fourth team of the Taishan Brigade of Dalijia, for instance, each woman was able to collect an average of 6-7 jin of mushrooms each year and earned 8-10 *yuan* from selling them.⁶⁶ The most important sideline production in the early 1960s was raising hogs, which previously had been considered

⁶⁵ July 2, 1965, JZA 81-1-144.

⁶⁶ “Survey on women in sideline production,” August 18, 1962, JZA.

a filthy and tiring business. In order to encourage women to take part in hog raising, the Women's Federation stimulated women's enthusiasm through model examples. In one propaganda story, an old woman said to a young woman who was raising hogs, *"You are only eighteen years old. What is wrong with your doing this dirty work?"* *"It's not dirty, if my mind is clean,"* said Jiang, the young woman, *"I know whatever the party calls for will be a good thing. I want to keep the commune healthy and prosperous. I don't care (about others' thoughts)."* Another young woman pig-keeper said, *"I'm going to breed (hogs) until my hair turns from black to grey."* (*cong heitoufa yangdao baitoufa*).⁶⁷ In fact, the work of raising hogs was often assigned to children, as their mothers were busy with all sorts of other field work and domestic assignments. Yueyue, Yulan's daughter, recalled that her sisters and she spent time after school collecting herbs on the mountain to feed their pigs.⁶⁸ Women also performed construction work. In the Nianyuwan Brigade, for example, fifty-five women took part in the maintenance of the national defense highway. The original plan was to complete the mission in twenty days, but in reality, an official work report noted, it only took five days thanks to the industrious women. In the Dagushan brigade, hundreds of women also helped build infrastructure to prevent hillside collapse.⁶⁹

Women in Fishery and Aquaculture

⁶⁷ How the Liangjiadian Commune's Women's Federation Encourage Woman to join the pig industry," July 29, 1960, JZA 50-1-14.

⁶⁸ Interview with Yueyue, September 3, 2016.

⁶⁹ "A report on war preparations in rural women," December 21, 1965, JZA 5-2-12.

However, not all women remained on land. Women also went out fishing, a new phenomenon that departed from the traditional customs in coastal villages. Fisheries, both deep-sea and offshore, were traditionally dominated by adult men. It was a violation of cultural and social taboos for women to go to sea. During the GLF, women were encouraged to go out on fishing boats with their male counterparts, although sometimes women sailed independently. To better stimulate women to undertake these new adventures, labor models were found or created.

For instance, the nationally renowned journal *China Fishery* published a story about Wen Shuzhen in its 1960 issue. Born in 1939 in a fishing village on Zhangzi Island of Dalian, Wen was locally and nationally recognized as “Mulan on the ocean.” In 1958, according to the journal, she decided to fish with three other girls from her village in order to “support national development construction and overcome the labor shortage of the communes.” Her fellow male villagers pointed out with suspicion, “I couldn’t do it as a man, how dare you girls try? Just give up the idea.” In the beginning Wen and other girls suffered severe seasickness during storms at sea, but she remembered the encouragement from the Party: “As brave and ambitious women, you are doing what no other women have done before. You must overcome the difficulties and open up a broad road for women on the island to participate in the socialist construction.” Wen learned fishing and sailing techniques in the next two years, and led other women to join her in fishing.⁷⁰ Local newspapers recorded more details of her story. In 1960 the Zhangzi Commune arranged for two

⁷⁰ *China Fisheries*, 1960(8):20-21.

vessels to be led by Wen. The boats only had women on board and were named “No. 3-8,” referring to March 8th, International Women’s Day. Women on these boats sailed as far as Shandong and Zhoushan in Zhejiang. “No. 3-8” became a national model team, and Wen herself was celebrated as a national model laborer. “Mulan on the sea” was so widely known that even Premier Zhou Enlai called her this when meeting her.⁷¹

Tina Chen suggests that state representations of “*nüjie diyi*” (the first female model) such as female tractor drivers in the 1950s, helped produce female subjectivities.⁷² It was indisputable that, like other “*diyi*” icons, Wen also occupied a symbolic place in the state’s narrative of women’s liberation, in this instance at the water’s edge. It is also possible that Wen inspired other poor peasant women to follow her lead. However, it is not possible to know what it meant to Wen herself to be a model, and how that position affected her domestic duties as a mother and a wife. In the official version, her story apparently did not depart from similar cases of women labor models in the Maoist period. They were not afraid of harsh natural conditions or male suspicion or gossip. They were able to overcome the physical limitations of women and join the previously male-dominated domain. As a national labor model, as well as a fisher and a sailor who frequently travelled beyond regional boundaries, Wen also became what Hershtatter has called a link between “individual,

⁷¹ *Dalian Evening News*, October 3, 2009.

⁷² Tina Mai Chen, “Female Icons, Feminist Iconography? Socialist Rhetoric and Women’s Agency in 1950s China”, *Gender & History*, vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2003), pp. 268-295.

regional, national and even international spaces.”⁷³ However, the intentional or unintentional omission of daily responsibilities at home in her model stories may suggest the answer.

Model woman fishers never represented the totality of work arrangements for women in the coastal villages. Many women joined aquaculture by focusing on the cultivation of seaweed, which was prized for its high industrial values, medicinal effects, and compatibility with Dalian’s climate.⁷⁴ Seaweed grows in cool waters and is suitable for cultivation along China’s northern coastline.⁷⁵ The earliest Chinese efforts to cultivate it was begun in 1952 by the state-owned Dalian Aquaculture Factory. The annual yield of seaweed until 1956 was only 56 tons.⁷⁶ The great leap in its production began during the GLF, when “everyone talked about seaweed, and every collective grew it.”⁷⁷

⁷³ Hershatter, (2011), 210.

⁷⁴ Seaweed required a temperature of 5-10 degrees Celsius, and Dalian was estimated to have more than 200 thousand mu of coastal space that was suitable to grow seaweed in late 1950s. The cultivation area only declined beginning in the late 1970s, when sea farmers preferred cultivating shellfish.

⁷⁵ During the GLF, nevertheless, the state successfully transplanted seaweed cultivation to southern provinces as a result of the so-called “Great Socialist Cooperation” (*shehuizhuyi da xiezuo*). Dalian provided the seedlings for Fujian and other southern coastal provinces, Shandong provided technicians and skilled workers, and those southern provinces supplied bamboo, hemp ropes, and other materials which were scarce in North China. (“Preliminary report on the growth experiment of seaweed in Zhejiang Offshore,” *China Fisheries*, November 1958; “To reap the south-shifted seaweed,” *China Daily*, May 4, 1958.

⁷⁶ “The 1959 Aquatic Product Summary and the 1960 plan,” September 10, 1959, DLA 50-1-86.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*



Image 5. Women Harvesting Seaweed⁷⁸

Some people believed that women had advantages in seaweed aquaculture. When I interviewed rural women, those who had worked in sea farming told me that women had more deft hands than men, and almost every boat sailing out to farm seaweed had one man and one woman on board.⁷⁹ Men were responsible for rowing back and forth and harvesting by cutting full grown, massive seaweed off ropes and dragging it to the boats. Women were responsible for attaching seeds to ropes, adding fertilizer, and some land processing work.

Thanks to the contribution from women, the annual seaweed yield grew to 3,918 tons in 1958 from a little over 2,000 tons in 1957. In 1959, its yield rocketed to 15,000 tons, more than triple the yield of 1958, and seven times that of 1957.⁸⁰ Model production teams were also promoted by the state. A team from the Malan River

⁷⁸ *Shuichan zhi*, 197

⁷⁹ Interviews in July and August 2016.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Aquaculture Farm created a national record by harvesting 229,068 tons of seaweed, producing 17,622 per *mu*.⁸¹ We certainly cannot take the number at face value, given the prevalence of the “exaggeration wind” in other rural cases during the same period.⁸² It would not be surprising if the local cadres who took charge of aquaculture also felt compelled to over-report.

Often, the same group of women joined in all of the above tasks of fishing, aquaculture, and agricultural work. For instance, upon Yulan’s return from the city, she first began to work in the aquaculture industry with other villagers. She once went out to sea to fertilize seaweed, but suffered severe seasickness. Afterwards, she started sailing with other villagers as a cook, traveling as far as Shandong, as mentioned above. She also worked on land, processing and salting seaweed. Yulan, together with other women villagers, picked up shells, small crabs, and oysters by the seaside after work. They brought some back home as subsistence, and sold the rest on the market.

Overall, the examples of Yulan and other women suggest that under the People’s Fisheries Program, previous boundaries of gendered space and labor were crossed. Women’s farming in the fields, planting seaweed on the open ocean, or sailing across the Yellow Sea Rim all transgressed the traditional, ideal space designated for women, namely inside homes. The transgression of spatial boundaries

⁸¹ Assembly information collection of 1958 Advanced Unit and model Workers (Luda General Labor Union, 1959).

⁸² Felix Wemheuer and Kimberley Ens Manning, eds., *Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine*, Contemporary Chinese Studies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011).

was clearly associated with the dismantling of labor boundaries. None of the labor practices mentioned above belonged to women under the traditionally well-known system of “men till, women weave.” The fluidity of gendered boundaries during this period may explain why Yulan preferred her rural life over what she experienced briefly in the city, as the village valued her labor while at the same time giving her control over the rhythm of her time and sparing her the rigid discipline of the factory floor.

“Diligence and Thrift” and “Walking on Two Legs”

Although spatial and labor boundaries between men and women shifted in the coastal villages, this phenomenon did not necessarily lead to women’s liberation and equality between the two sexes. In fact, when it came to gender politics and women’s roles, the socialist state faced two dilemmas. The first was whether to see women as either indispensable laborers in production or the diligent housekeepers of their households. In this sense, even though some of the ways in which women’s labor and life changed were specific to coastal communities, including women’s working on fishing or harvesting seaweed. However, other changes reflected national priorities. For instance, despite party officials’ efforts to mobilize rural women to step out of seclusion and into new labor roles, in the early 1960s the state adopted a national policy to promote the women’s virtues of “diligence and thrift in maintaining households.” (*qinjian chijia*) It encouraged women to carry out sideline production to

expand household incomes, and educated women to spend money wisely and save more for the family.⁸³

This was not the first time the state promoted “diligence” in women’s performance of their domestic duties. As Wang Zheng notes, as early as 1957 at the Third National Women’s Congress, the All-China Democratic Women’s Federation (ACWF) adopted the agenda known as “the two diligences” (diligently, frugally build the country, and diligently, frugally manage the family).⁸⁴ Wang suggests that the “apparently regressive line” in comparison to ACWF’s previous efforts to address gender inequality can be explained as arising from the pragmatic concerns of the ACWF—to protect the organization from attacks by male party leaders during the anti-rightist movement. It is understandable that the ACWF shifted its priorities given the difficult political atmosphere the organization faced at that moment, but this strategic maneuver predictably ended up becoming a turning point for many rural women, especially women labor models or activists.

Yulan joined the Party in June 1965 thanks to her outstanding performance as a Youth League activist and an industrious laborer. One year later, she married into Zhongjia, a mountainous village, 50 miles away from Wanli. Lacking the excitement that suffused her account of her life before marriage, her account of life after marrying Zhongjia, however, was associated with bitterness. She retreated from activist work, and started to learn how to do agricultural work in the fields and to

⁸³ The Plan of educating women in the county for diligence and thrift,” November 23, 1961. JZA, 5-1-15.

⁸⁴ Zheng Wang, *Finding Women in the State: A Socialist Feminist Revolution in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1964* (Oakland, California: University of California Press, 2017), 55.

manage her household well. Another woman named Chunni experienced a similar transformation after getting married. Like Yulan, Chunni was from a fishing village. She was born in 1945 in Manjiatan Village, and worked for the aquaculture team in the early 1960s. She worked hard, and earned ten points each day as the male villagers did. She was selected as the women's head in her team in the early 1960s for three years, and joined the party in 1965. After getting married in the late 1960s, however, what she remembered most was the difficulties she had in managing the household and raising the children. Being an activist was no longer realistic for her.⁸⁵

The examples of Yulan and Chunni reflect the adverse effects of the policy emphasizing "diligence and thrift" in women's domestic duties in the 1960s. This policy did not mention equality between men and women in either political participation or economic production, but only women's contributions in household affairs. To further complicate the situation, the "diligence and thrift" policy did not last long. During the Socialist Education Movement in the mid-1960s, the state found two main problems involving rural women. First, most women no longer actively participated in collective work. For example, in Zhaojia, the village into which Yulan had married, out of 258 women, only 139 still engaged in collective production. Furthermore, the state found an upsurge in private economic activity. Many women were said to be preoccupied with market activities in order to increase the household

⁸⁵ Interviews with Chunni and her husband in January 2015, and summer 2016.

incomes, such as traveling to Shenyang, Shandong, Inner Mongolia, and other places to sell fish, pork, cotton, and other commodities.⁸⁶

As a result, from the mid-1960s onwards, during the Cultural Revolution, the “diligence and thrift” policy was replaced by the “walking on two legs” policy. Women were once again portrayed as an important labor force in production. The Iron Girls became female icons and the sign of women’s liberation during the Cultural Revolution.⁸⁷ But “walking on two legs” meant that women were also responsible for housework. Yulan remembers that she began to learn how to do agricultural work in the collective fields, and also watered the apple trees in the plantation, when she injured her legs and rested for months. In their own yard, Yulan and her husband Sanbin raised hogs and chicken, and turned hogs and eggs over to the state every year. The couple remembered throughout the 1970s how anxious they became when they simply did not have enough food and nutrients to enable chickens to lay enough eggs and fulfill their quota. Sometimes their starved chickens went out to the collective field but only ended up being poisoned by the production team, who put pesticide around the field to prevent farmers’ chickens from eating crops. The couple and their three children often ran out of grain before the harvest, and needed to borrow some from the production team (*changzhi*). They rarely had extra eggs to feed themselves either, even though they raised quite a few chickens. The same difficulties

⁸⁶ “A summary report of women’s work in Zhaojia Brigade in the socialist education movement,” March 29, 1964, JZA 5-1-19.

⁸⁷ Emily Honig, “Iron Girls Revisited: Gender and the Politics of Work in the Cultural Revolution, 1966–76,” in Barbara Gutwiler and Gail Henderson, eds., *Re-Drawing the Boundaries of Work, Households, and Gender* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

arose in Chunni's case. After getting married, her attention turned to household matters. Living next to the coast, she said "*Those sea products were worthless, and we didn't get much other products from the fields. We can't only eat fish or seaweed, because we don't get enough oil (to digest them).*" With regard to child rearing, she said "*We did not have kindergartens, and only the elders looked out for the kids.*" She later summarized her situation by saying, "*We got more rights, but our daily lives did not get better.*"

Health Protection

Under the circumstances of "walking with two legs," Yulan and Chunni, among many other rural women, suffered from sleep deprivation, fatigue, and illnesses. In these situations, what kinds of health protection did the state give? The responses from the state reflect the second dilemma it faced. Similarly to the first dilemma of seeing women primarily as productive laborers or domestic housekeepers, the state now faced seeing women's physiological bodies as something that can be overcome or that required special protection.

Most of the reproduction policies that the local Women's Federation implemented happened elsewhere in China. For instance, the local Women's Federation in Jin County stressed the importance of women's health protection. Its 1961 reports mentioned that women not only had more burdens than men, they also had different natural physiological characteristics. The Women's Federation therefore suggested that the cooperative leadership should protect women during the four

periods when their bodies were the most vulnerable. Specifically, the suggestions included reducing women's workload during menstruation; avoiding physical exertion, such as pushing, pulling or lifting, during pregnancy; providing a 45-day maternal leave and extra 15 jin of grain after giving birth; as well as allocating women light and nearby work to accommodate breastfeeding.⁸⁸

Women's Federation's instructions for rural leaders, however, were not always well implemented. While women I interviewed described some slightly special care they were given during pregnancy and the month following the delivery of a child, they rarely mentioned the other protections. Jacob Eyferth's study of rural Shaanxi and Kimberley Manning's study of rural Henan also confirm that at the grassroots women's health protection policies were implemented unevenly at best.⁸⁹ Child care was at times even worse. Chunni mentioned that it was not uncommon for children to be injured and even die during the busiest periods because of the lack of adequate supervision.

Manning suggests that the answer to the disjuncture between policies and reality in protecting women's health lies in the coexistence of two contradictory discourses during the socialist period, namely "Marxist maternalism" and "revolutionary Maoism." The former stressed women's physiological differences from men and their ultimate role as mothers, while the latter advocated that both women's gendered bodies and gendered roles could, and should, be overcome.

⁸⁸ "A Survey of Women's Labor Protection and Future Opinions," September 9, 1961, JAZ 5-1-15.

⁸⁹ Kimberley Manning, "The Gendered Politics of Woman-Work: Rethinking Radicalism in the Great Leap Forward," *Modern China* 32, no. 3 (July 1, 2006): 349–84.

Manning found cases when women cadres were, surprisingly, among the most adamant group to embrace revolutionary Maoist discourses and reject extra care for women. The Jin County local Women's Federation's reports from the 1960s I collected also mentioned these thoughts from regular rural women. Some senior women were said to not take their bodily concerns or limitations seriously in order to earn more work points. Young women, on the other hand, were often too shy to even ask for light work or rest during menstruation because of "feudal thoughts."⁹⁰

It is difficult to fully explain why women did not get adequate health protection under the Maoist period. However, it is clear that marriages were a turning point in many women's lives. Before marriage, rural women seemed to own more political rights to become activists and leaders. They were also able to transcend occupational boundaries and engaged in different kinds of labor activities. However, after they were married, many soon faced disillusionment. Married women's attention turned to household matters, because of the state's calls for women to be diligent and frugal, and later to walk on two legs. Their situation was further aggravated by a lack of health protection at the most vulnerable periods for their bodies. Women's liberation during the Maoist period perhaps can best be understood as a limited challenge to gender norms because it encouraged women to do whatever men can, but left housework, child care, and women's health almost untouched.

Aquaculture and Rural Industrialization

⁹⁰ "A Survey of Women's Labor Protection and Future Opinions, "September 9, 1961, JAZ 5-1-15.

In December 1971, Taishan, a 16-year-old boy from the Jin county seat, together with three other recent graduates from the Jin Textile Middle School, joined the local government-owned Jin Aquaculture Farm located in Dadi Brigade of rural Jin county as part of the Sent-down Youth Program. Upon his arrival, Taishan soon found out that they were not the only urban students who had been sent down to work at this farm. Four students from the Jin No.16 Middle School, as well as twenty-six students from the Dengshahe No.3 Middle School, had arrived months earlier.

At first Taishan was excited about this new life. It did not take long, however, before he became somewhat indignant at the job assignments. The students from the No. 16 Middle School were categorized as permanent workers (*guding gong*) and treated as “intellectuals and cadres.” They were assigned office jobs such as accounting or managing storehouses. Taishan and the rest of the urban youth were categorized as “both workers and peasants” (*yigong yinong*), and carried out onerous work at sea with other rural workers from the nearby brigades.⁹¹

The Chinese rural enterprises epitomized by the Jin Aquaculture Farm can be traced back to the Great Leap Forward movement. In 1958, responding to Mao’s call to develop rural industry in the countryside, communes throughout the nation participated in the widespread establishment of rural industrial enterprises.⁹² The failure of the GLF, however, caused rapid dysfunction and often led to the dissolution of many rural enterprises in the early to the mid-1960s, including the Jin Aquaculture

⁹¹ Interview with Taishan, March 13, 2016 and September 6, 2016.

⁹² The 6th Plenary Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, *Guanyu Renmin Gongshe Ruogan Wenti de Jueyi* (Resolution on a Number of Issues of People’s Commune) (The Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 1958).

Farm. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), rural industrialization and the farm were ushered into a new stage of development, thanks to scientific experiments and mechanization, the “both workers and peasants” labor policy, and the reconciliation between environmental protection and economic development.

The Birth of the Jin Aquaculture Farm, 1958-64

Located in the Dadi village of Dagushan Township, the Jin Aquaculture Farm was founded on August 6, 1958 after the state adopted the policy of “prioritizing aquaculture, and developing fishing simultaneously” (*yi yang weizhu, yang bu bing ju*) in the fishery industry during the GLF.⁹³ From the beginning, aquaculture seaweed was the major product of the farm. The environmental conditions of the eastern Bohai Sea that ran along the edge of Dadi village were said to be the most ideal for seaweed cultivation, with appropriate water flow, temperature, nutrients, and light. The farm also produced small amounts of farmed fish, sea cucumbers, and oysters.⁹⁴

In the initial years of its establishment, the farm was jointly owned by the state and the collectives (*guoshe heyings*). The state invested 9.24 million *yuan*, and the collective invested 1.89 million *yuan* in addition to material supplies. The collective was also responsible for paying wages to its employees.⁹⁵ The 682 employees were divided into four categories: 30 cadres and technicians, 21 permanent workers (*guding gong*), 28 temporary workers (*linshi gong*), and 603 commune members

⁹³ “The Construction and Future Production Plan of the Jin County State-run Aquaculture Farm,” August 25, 1958, JZA 113-1-001.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

(*sheyuan*) from Dagushan Commune. The salaries of the first three groups were paid in full on a monthly basis. Only 40% of commune members' wages, however, were paid in cash monthly, while the other 60% were paid once a year in grain and cash with the rest of the commune members of Dagushan at the end of July. As for the necessary expenses for food and other daily needs, these commune member workers could "borrow money beforehand" (*yuzhi*).⁹⁶ Commune member workers were not entitled to workers' welfare, including medical expenses, funeral expenses, women's maternity leave, and clothing subsidies.⁹⁷

The unequal treatment stirred discontent among the commune member workers. They said, "In winter, we faced biting, cold wind, stood on frozen water, and operated beneath the ice. In other seasons, our boats were frequently washed over by powerful waves. The job was dangerous and exhausting."⁹⁸ They looked for all kinds of excuses to leave and go home. By 1960, 57 commune members had left the farm. Daily attendance and performance of the remaining members also remained low.⁹⁹ In March 1961, the state decided to change the ownership of the Jin Aquaculture Farm from joint ownership between the state and the collectives to local government ownership (*difang guoying*). The State investment remained unchanged, but all commune members were converted to the status of permanent workers. They were paid each month at a fixed rate, instead of relying primarily on the dividends of the

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ "Petition for Salary Assessment, Subsidy and Work Uniform," October 11, 1958, JZA 113-1-001.

⁹⁹ "Petition for Changing the Nature of Jin Aquaculture Farm from the Joint Venture to Local State-owned, and Its Members to Permanent Workers with Full Wages," March 24, 1960, JZA 113-1-004.

entire commune's income at the end of each year. The rural commune members also enjoyed the same social welfare and labor protections as the rest of the workers.¹⁰⁰

From the state's perspective, the change in ownership resulted from reasons beyond a concern for workers' benefits. By setting up a high-yielding sea farm in the center of a rural zone, the state soon found that nearby production teams repeatedly entered the aquaculture areas and took away the farmed products, for instance, sea cucumber and oysters. The state was concerned about the loss of these valuable products, as well as "the relationship and the solidarity between the workers and peasants."¹⁰¹ In June 1960, the state decided to incorporate the Dadi Brigade, a total of 199 households and 674 laborers, into the farm in order to "solve the relationship between the farm and the production brigade, realize the all-round development of agriculture, fishery, and aquaculture, and integrate manpower, material, and financial resources."¹⁰² The implication was that by holding the entire rural community accountable for the production and protection of the sea farming products, this new ownership plan would settle the competition between the state-owned rural enterprise and the commune.

The initial years of its establishment witnessed a leap in the amount of seaweed the Jin Aquaculture Farm planted. To cultivate seaweed in the ocean, workers first needed to fix a significant number of paired wooden rafts to the bottom of the ocean. Then they tied cultivation ropes made of hard fiber, approximately 10-20 meters long,

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ "Request of Merging the Dagushan Commune Dadi Brigade into the Aquaculture Farm," June 17, 1960, JZA 113-1-004.

¹⁰² Ibid.

to both ends of the paired rafts with glass buoys attached. These first two steps were completed in the winter. In the spring, workers started to attach cans with seaweed seeds to the cultivation ropes, and later they added fertilizer to the seeds. The seaweed was then left alone to grow until it was ready to harvest in summer.¹⁰³ Each cultivation rope was called “fa” in Chinese. In the year of 1958 when the farm was built, there were 780 *fa*, and the next year it increased into 3,341 *fa*. In 1960, there was 5,800 *fa*.¹⁰⁴ As mentioned earlier in this chapter, coastal brigades and communes also had their own aquaculture farms as part of their income sources. The total amount of *fa* cultivated by the local government-owned Jin Aquaculture Farm and numerous collective-based farms reached 13,300 *fa* at the end of 1960.¹⁰⁵

Problems started to emerge during the peak of aquaculture expansion. In the early spring of 1960, the workers reported, the distances between ropes and between rafts was too close, which kept some seaweed from getting sunlight. As the water temperature was low at the same time, some of the seaweed was infected with diseases and failed to grow.¹⁰⁶ It did not seem to bother the farm administrators, though. According to the 1960 official report, the Farm planned to add another 10,000 to 15,000 *fa* in 1961 and build a seaweed processing factory at the same time.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Interviews with Taishan, September 6, 2016.

¹⁰⁴ “Request of Merging the Dagushan Commune Dadi Brigade into the Aquaculture Farm,” June 17, 1960, JZA 113-1-004.

¹⁰⁵ “Report on Production and Future Work of Aquaculture,” August 25, 1960, JZA 24-1-004.

¹⁰⁶ “Report on the Disease of Seaweed in the Farm,” March 29, 1960, JZA 24-1-004.

¹⁰⁷ “Request of Merging the Dagushan Commune Dadi Brigade into the Aquaculture Farm,” June 17, 1960, JZA 113-1-004.

Soon, however, reality diverged from this ambitious plan. In fact, in 1962, the number of *fa* quickly dropped to 2,000, even lower than 1959. At the end of 1963, it was only 900. The workforce also suffered a severe decrease. In 1963, the number of workers was reduced from 520 to 184. Just one year earlier, the had farm received 170 urban unemployed workers and recent graduates assigned by the state. By 1963, however, these recent arrived urban workers and students were the most negatively impacted. The government report said, “since these urban people came to the farm late (last year), except for the few who are adaptable, the rest will be moved to other units.” In the end, out of 170 new urban migrant workers, only 47, including 40 men and 7 women, were able to stay.¹⁰⁸ In 1964, things continued to deteriorate as production was completely discontinued. On February 21, 1964, the farm was placed in the custody of the Lüda Aquaculture Farm.¹⁰⁹

What caused these drastic changes? While the three years of the Great Famine (1959-61) have been commonly considered to be the worst famine in modern Chinese history, which resulted in massive destruction of agriculture and peasants’ livelihood, what has been left out of most scholarly treatments is the Great Leap Forward's impacts on rural enterprises.¹¹⁰ In the case of the rural aquaculture industry, the crop shortages during the famine increased the need for aquaculture products as an important substitute for daily food. The farm was said to “produce a large amount of seafood, increase the market supply, and meet the needs of both urban and rural

¹⁰⁸ “Report on Handling Personnel of the Aquaculture Farm,” December 24, 1963, JZA 113-2-12.

¹⁰⁹ “History of the County Aquaculture Farm,” April 15, 1964, JZA 113-1-011.

¹¹⁰ Frank Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962*, 1st U.S. ed (New York: Walker & Co, 2010); Yang, 2012.

people.”¹¹¹ In other words, the three-year famine was also the fastest growth period for the rural aquaculture industry. It was not until the end of the famine, when the domestic economic situation improved, that the price of aqua-products fell by 33.3% and the need shrank as well.¹¹² At the end of 1963, the Farm suffered a total loss of more than 872,000 *yuan*. As the state shifted its attention from rural industry back to growing crops in the countryside, it required unprofitable government-owned rural industrial enterprises like the [name of this farm] to shut down.¹¹³

The Recovery, 1966-76

As with the Great Famine, the most common narrative of the Chinese Cultural Revolution has focused on its disruption to China’s economic, cultural and social order. Nevertheless, a growing number of scholars have noticed the complexity of the period. People studying the relationship between the Cultural Revolution and rural economic development, in particular, have found that the Maoist state not only did not obstruct economic development, it actually advanced the rural economy through scientific experiments, mechanization and educated urban youth who bridged knowledge and resource gaps between urban and rural China.¹¹⁴ In the case of rural aquaculture exemplified by the Jin Aquaculture Farm, the Cultural Revolution offers

¹¹¹ “The Summary of the Aquaculture Farm Handover,” July 15, 1964, JZA 113-2-15.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ “History of the County Aquaculture Farm,” April 15, 1964, JZA 113-1-011.

¹¹⁴ Dongping Han, *The Unknown Cultural Revolution: Life and Change in a Chinese Village* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2008); Emily Honig and Xiaojian Zhao, “Sent-down Youth and Rural Economic Development in Maoist China,” *The China Quarterly* 222 (June 2015): 499–521; Sigrid Schmalzer, *Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2016).

a contrast between an overall retrogression of the national economy and the prosperity of the rural collective enterprise.

On June 27, 1966, the Jin Aquaculture Farm was returned to Jin County from the Lüda Aquaculture Farm.¹¹⁵ During the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, it slowly resumed its production. The farm was encouraged by the state to follow the models of Dazhai for agriculture and Zhangzi Island for fishery.¹¹⁶ That is, instead of relying on outside investment and help, transformation would occur through self-reliance and hard work from its laborers. For instance, in 1970 when the farm started to grow mussels, male workers made more than 1,000 rafts in ten days. Female workers walked to an island twenty miles away to collect more than 80 pounds of seeds. As a result, the farm did not waste any time in its effort to cultivate and harvest the mussels.¹¹⁷

Technology and Mechanization

Technology and mechanization were considered to be the foundations for rapid development of the rural aquaculture industry. Taishan remembered, when he first arrived at the Jin Aquaculture Farm as a sent-down youth in 1971, that the boats that workers used to go out sea to grow and harvest seaweed were small dinghies. It took nearly two hours to arrive at the farthest *fa*. In 1972, according to Taishan, the farm

¹¹⁵ “Transfer Agreement,” December 5, 1965, JZA 113-1-007.

¹¹⁶ “A Comprehensive Briefing on the National Experience of Mariculture,” 1975, JZA 24-2-20; “Report on Aquaculture Work in 1974 and the 1975 Aquaculture Arrangement,” January 23, 1975, JZA 24-2-22. Liaoning sheng changhai xian geming weiyuanhui, *Haishang Dazhai: Zhangzi dao* (Maritime Dazhai: Zhangzi Island), (Agriculture Publisher, 1975).

¹¹⁷ “A Comprehensive Briefing on the National Experience of Mariculture,” 1975, JZA 24-2-20.

started to install a new type of pump in the dinghies. Unlike today's boats, whose external propellers are usually in the water below or behind the boats, at the farm the pumps were set inside the boats and generated thrust to move the boats by spraying water into the sky. In addition to equipping the current boats, the farm also purchased some diesel-engined ships with 20 or 40 horsepower.¹¹⁸

Sigrid Schmalzer notes that the state applauded peasants for their experiences and traditional knowledge, and incorporated them into rural scientific experiments with lab scientists and cadres.¹¹⁹ The Aquaculture Farm also highlighted the “three-in-one” system in which workers, technicians, and cadres teamed up to conduct in scientific experiments. Under this new system, mass scientific experiments would “serve the proletariat and peasants, resolve the problems of seedlings, diseases, and processing, and build new machinery and research.”¹²⁰ As a result, the farm produced a variety of machines in the 1970s, including packing machines, denitrification machines, spillover boats, and air ropeways.¹²¹

The farm also built processing plants for its products. For instance, in 1973 Taishan and some other sent-down youth were transferred to the Farm's newly built iodine processing workshop. He and other workers processed seaweed into iodine, mannitol, and a type of industrial gum.¹²² In 1974, the farm established the first seedling rearing room for marine treasures (*haizhenpin yumiaoshi*) of the country.

¹¹⁸ Interviews with Taishan, September 6, 2016.

¹¹⁹ Schmalzer, 42.

¹²⁰ “A Comprehensive Briefing on the National Experience of Mariculture,” 1975, JZA 24-2-20.

¹²¹ “Several Problems in the Process of Jin County Fishery Mechanization,” April 1974, JZA 24-1-17.

¹²² Interview with Taishan, September 6, 2016. “Jin Aquaculture Farm's Request to Increase the Investment on the Production of Iodine and Labor Force,” January 19, 1971, JZA 009-1-074.

The official report said, “the needs for sea treasures increased as Chairman Mao's diplomatic policy prevailed and as more and more foreign leaders visit China. Therefore, China's traditional marine treasures such as sea cucumber, scallops, abalone are in high demand.”¹²³ The last example that reflected the growing attention to technology and science at the farm was the establishment of a processing workshop to turn fresh fish and mussels into cooked food, including fish balls, grilled fish, mussel soup, and even mussel soy sauces.¹²⁴



Image 6. The Seedling Rearing Room.¹²⁵

“Both Workers and Peasants” Labor System

In addition to improving the level of technology and mechanization, another key issue for rural industrial development was to increase the labor force. As

¹²³ “Summary of the Symposium on Treasure Sea Products,” November 5, 1974, JZA 24-2-14.

¹²⁴ “Plan of of Collective Aquatic Product Processing Plant,” May 18, 1975, JZA 24-1-28.

¹²⁵ *Shuichan zhi*, 205.

mentioned earlier, workers in the farm were mainly divided into two groups: workers with urban household registration and rural workers hired from nearby villages. In the 1970s, the farm found it hard to attract workers from the first group. The fundamental challenge stemmed from the location of the farm. The farm was located in the remote, poor rural area, thereby alienating young urban workers from the familiar living surroundings and conditions where they grew up. Even after some gradually became accustomed to the new environment and even found partners from the farm to marry, they soon found that no couple or family dormitories would be provided to them.¹²⁶ Years later, as the children of the earliest workers to arrive at the farm graduated from schools and faced being sent down to the countryside, their parents hoped to have their children settled in the nearby villages of the farm. However, their requests were turned down. The farm replied to the parents (aka the farm's senior workers), "It is rather difficult to send your children to nearby villages, because these brigades are coastal, fishery-dominated villages. They have abundant labor force but less cultivated land (to accommodate extra laborers), so it is hard to arrange in this way."¹²⁷

Compared to these urban-oriented workers, rural workers had certain advantages. They were more familiar and comfortable with the environment. They were from the nearby villages and could still live at home. Their incomes and benefits as workers were better than their fellow rural commune members. Therefore, when

¹²⁶ "Request of Building a New 800 Square Meters Staff and Family Quarters," July 3, 1973. JZA 113-1-16.

¹²⁷ "Report on the Settlement of the Children of Workers after Graduating from Secondary School," September 11, 1974, JZA 113-1-12.

the farm had a worker shortage in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, most new hires came from the rural communes rather than people from the county or the city.¹²⁸

However, the official title of most rural workers was that of “both worker and peasant” (*yigong yinong*) as opposed to “permanent workers” (*guding gong*). Scholars studying rural China in the socialist period have noticed the hierarchy existing between permanent workers and temporary workers in rural industrial enterprises,¹²⁹ However, they have rarely paid attention to this middle-ground group of “both workers and peasants.” The term first appeared in Liu Shaoqi’s talk on August 1, 1964. He said,

“Regarding the labor system, I put forward another system in order to use rural surplus laborers, that is, the implementation of the “both workers and peasants” category (*yigong yinong*). In rural production factories, rural technology stations, and so on, we should implement this system. We need to train farmers to use machines, and have machinery enterprises absorb farmers. When it is the busy season (for their agricultural work), we let them leave. When they are free, we call them back, teach them, and let them work (in the enterprises) for six months. This system has many benefits. By doing so, they do not need to go to the city, and farmers get to learn technology. In the long run, it narrows urban and rural differences, as

¹²⁸ “On the Production Plan of Seaweed Production in 1970 and Some Related Questions,” August 20, 1969, JZA 113-1-007.

¹²⁹ Walder, : 3–48.

well as the difference between workers and peasants. It is good for individuals, the collectives, and the country.”¹³⁰

Mao seemed to support this system in the early years of the Cultural Revolution. In the famous letter he wrote to Lin Biao on May 7, 1966 (commonly known as the “May 7th Instruction), he instructed Lin to turn the People’s Liberation Army into a big school, in which politics, defense, and agriculture were all taught. In the same letter, Mao also said, “farmers should mainly do farming (including forestry, animal husbandry, and fishing); however, they should also learn military skills, politics, and culture. When conditions allow, the countryside should also organize small factories.”¹³¹ Following this May 7th Instruction, there was an immediate nationwide upsurge of building great schools of Mao Zedong Thought (*Mao Zedong sixiang de daxuexiao*) in all places of China.¹³² In the countryside, peasants were encouraged to join the rural industrial enterprises as “both workers and peasants.” Peasants, therefore, “can work once they pick up hammers, farm once they pick up hoes, defend the nation once they pick up guns, and finally, write once they pick up pens.”¹³³

¹³⁰ Shaoqi Liu, “Bangong Bandu, Yigong Yinong” (Half working, half studying, both workers and peasants), in *Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi (II)*, (Renmin Publisher, 1985), 465–69.

¹³¹ “Wuqi Zhishi” (May 7th Instruction), *Baidu Baike*, accessed December 1, 2017, <https://baike.baidu.com/item/五·七指示/5331499?fr=aladdin&fromid=7699334&fromtitle=五七指示>.

¹³² “Both Workers and Peasants’ System is Great, and the Whole Country should Become a Great School of Mao Zedong Thought,” *People’s Daily*, August 3, 1966; “The Whole Country vividly Responded to the Great Call of Chairman Mao for the Revolutionary Big School,” *People’s Daily*, August 5, 1966; “The Whole Country Should Become a Big School of Mao Zedong Thought--Commemorating the 39th Anniversary of the PLA,” *People’s Daily*, August 1, 1966.

¹³³ “The Whole Country Should Become a Big School of Mao Zedong Thought--Commemorating the 39th Anniversary of the PLA,” *People’s Daily*, August 1, 1966.

The Jin Aquaculture Farm also followed the call to combine agriculture and industry, by gradually replacing temporary workers with “both workers and peasants.” In 1969, there were 185 workers who operated on the sea, and among which 74 were “both workers and peasants.”¹³⁴ In 1971, all newly recruited sea workers belonged to “both workers and peasants.” Women workers accounted for 50% of this group.¹³⁵ Women’s equal position in participating in sea work during this time period was also affirmed by my interviews. Both Taishan and Chunni said that aside from the winter season, in other seasons, on each boat there was one man and one woman. While men were in charge of rolling back and forth, women were in charge of attaching seeds to the ropes and adding fertilizer with their “deft hands.”¹³⁶

Many urban sent-down youth, were also assigned to this category. The farm report notices that many new workers had serious seasickness, or did not know how to roll the boats.¹³⁷ Taishan was one of them. He remembered that he suffered severe seasickness. “It was the worst. All I remember during the first few weeks was the queasy feeling.” Taishan still seemed satisfied with the job. After all, it was lighter compared to the land work. Taishan was assigned to a boat with two other adult laborers, a man and a woman. Taishan said, “I was only 16 years old then, and never did sea work before. I could not roll the boat, because I did not have enough strength. What I mainly did was remove water from the boat when we shipped the heavy

¹³⁴ “On the Production Plan of Seaweed Production in 1970 and Some Related Questions,” August 20, 1969, JZA 113-1-007.

¹³⁵ “For Instructions on the Purchase of Machines,” March 30, 1971, JZA 113-1-007.

¹³⁶ Interview with Taishan, September 6, 2016.

¹³⁷ “For Instructions on the Purchase of Machines,” March 30, 1971, JZA 113-1-007.

seaweed back to land.”¹³⁸ In the second year, the farm transferred all of the urban youth from sea work to the newly built iodine workshop. Taishan became an electrician from then until 1978.

The subsidiary land work to dry and store seaweed, according to Taishan, was mainly completed by the old and the weak, who could not stand working all day long at sea. Another important but slightly unexpected source of land laborers was middle school students. While the Maoist rhetoric for peasants was to become “both workers and peasants,” in the “big schools of Mao Zedong Thought,” students should be “half-time studying, half-time working” (*bangong bandu*).¹³⁹ According to the farm records, summer was the busiest season when they needed “200 hundred students for support from late May to mid-June.”¹⁴⁰ Students did not get paid, but in the rare cases when they were injured from work during “the half-time working,” the enterprises provided compensation.¹⁴¹

Liqing was a junior middle school student in the Jin No. 16 Middle School, when she went for the first time to the Jin Aquaculture Farm to help collect and dry seaweed in the mid-1970s. Liqing remembered, “I was very excited, not only because it was my first time seeing the sea so closely, but we also stayed overnight at the farm. It was a fresh experience for us, and we even brought our own meal boxes.”

¹³⁸ Interview with Taishan, September 6, 2016.

¹³⁹ ““Both Workers and Peasants’ System is Great, and the Whole Country should Become a Great School of Mao Zedong Thought,” *People’s Daily*, August 3, 1966.

¹⁴⁰ “Request to Increase the Labor Force in 1977 for Seaweed Harvest,” March 12, 1977, JZA 113-1-16. “Request to Increase the Labor Force in 1976 for Seaweed Harvest,” March 10, 1976, JZA 113-1-14.

¹⁴¹ Interview with Liqing, September 6, 2016.

Liqing worked with her fellow students for three days at the farm, drying the seaweed under the sun and later rolling it inside the storehouse.¹⁴²

Without the documents that detailed the salaries and benefits of groups of permanent workers and “both workers and peasants,” it is hard to tell whether they were treated equally in all aspects. Taishan remembered that he was paid the same as the other send-down youth who were permanent workers at 39 *yuan* per month. The sense of unfairness came from the nature of the work itself, when the permanent workers were assigned to lighter jobs such as accountants or storehouse keepers. In the case of social welfare, documents did show that at least women who were “both workers and peasants” enjoyed certain benefits. For instance, from the sixth-month of pregnancy to the end of lactation (a total of 24 months), women did not need to go to sea, but were paid as usual.¹⁴³

In sum, the implementation of the “both workers and peasants” system in rural enterprises reflects the state’s efforts to create an all-purpose rural society in the socialist period. The goal was to narrow the gap between urban and rural differences by developing rural industrialization and empowering peasants to become workers. It was ironic that despite the fact that this idea was first brought up by Liu Shaoqi in 1964, its full implementation was later deployed against Liu to attack his revisionism. The “both workers and peasants” system was said to break Liu’s “three freedoms labor route” (*laodong sanzizhou luxian*), which advocates using temporary workers rather than permanent workers. Under the temporary labor system, the local

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ “Report of the Application of Two Sets of Salary system,” September 14, 1974, JZA 113-1-012.

government argued, “workers would only care about their incomes. And it also created unequal pay and tensions between different levels of workers.”¹⁴⁴ If this is the case, then this understudied system of “both workers and peasants” in rural industrialization during the Cultural Revolution could be seen as an experiment for social equality.

Environmental Protection and People’s Potential

As shown in the example of the “both workers and peasants” labor system, which was employed to attack Liu Shaoqi’s “revisionist” thoughts of labor, rural economic development can never be separated from political movements in the Maoist period. Between 1973 and 1976, Jiang Qing and her allies, with the approval from Mao, initiated the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” campaign (*Pilin pikong*). The issue at stake in this campaign was that the legalists, identified with Mao and Emperor Qin Shihuang, were seen as progressive, as opposed to the “modern Confucius” Zhou Enlai, who was considered to be reactionary. This conflict between Legalism and Confucianism produced a debate in the rural fishing industry that focused on the protection of marine resources.

Despite the fact that “Regulations for the Protection of Fish and Shrimp Resources in the Bohai Sea Region” had been promulgated for many years, the Jin fishery official report says, “we did not pay enough attention to the protection of resources.” It points out, some boats did not comply with the regulations , fishing in

¹⁴⁴ “Opinions on Selecting New Workers from Collective Neighborhood Workers,” May 13, 1975, JZA 24-1-28.

the banned fishing areas or within the banned fishing periods. It also notes that many fishing methods and gear were unsustainable, causing tremendous destruction of fish and other species.¹⁴⁵ The ignorance of environmental protections was often associated with the overemphasis on economic production, a narrative commonly heard in today's neoliberal China. For instance, the official reports mention that some fishing farms or brigades only cared about economic productivity and pursued profits at the expense of the state's regulations and the environment.¹⁴⁶

Capitalist liberalization was also blamed for the destruction of the environment. The Jin Aquaculture Farm noticed that many workers skipped political studies and leisure activities, instead going to the banks of the Western Sea in the evening to collect the naturally grown clams and mussels. Rather than face exhaustion during the next day of work, some workers took sick leaves and became full-time pickers. They still earned salaries from the farm, but meanwhile sold the sea products they collected in the markets. The farm said this kind of behavior was attributed to “the spread of capitalist liberalization” (*Zibenzhuyi ziyou fanlan*).¹⁴⁷

Ironically, at the same time, local officials rejected the notion of resource depletion (*ziyuan kujie*). Instead, they believed that fishery still had tremendous potential, and that people should not be discouraged from tapping the resources. The government found it troubling when some production teams gave up

¹⁴⁵ “Notice of Forwarding ‘The Summary of the Symposium on the Protection of Aquatic Resources in Bohai Sea area,’” May 16, 1975, JZA 24-2-20.

¹⁴⁶ “The Report of Jin Aquatic Management Station Revolutionary Committee to Deal with the Violation of the Banned Seasons for Shrimp in 1975,” May 10, 1976, JZA 24-2-26.

¹⁴⁷ “Jin Aquatic Management Station Revolutionary Committee's Opinions on Strengthening Western Sea Management,” August 25, 1974, JZA 24-2-17.

fishery production following changes in marine resources. To solve this problem, the government launched a “people’s war” (*Renmin zhanzheng*) to mobilize fishermen to continue fishing in order to ensure the completion of the export plan. The Dalian Fishing Field, for example, sailed earlier than usual and caught 40 tons of products within half a month. The vast majority of fishermen also worked every day from dawn until late evening at 9PM.¹⁴⁸ The efforts, according to the government, invalidated Liu Shaoqi’s and Lin Biao’s “idealist apriorism,” meaning that social practices could alter the predetermined natural conditions.¹⁴⁹

Therefore, on one hand the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” campaign employed the environmental law to check some illegal activities. On the other hand, it embraced Marxist materialist theory to celebrate humanity's indomitable willpower. Perhaps one of the best options to reconcile the two was aquaculture. As mentioned earlier, in 1974 the Jin Aquaculture Farm established the seeding rearing room for marine treasures. It would overcome “exploitation, destruction, and capitalist liberalization of resources, while ensuring the supply of Chinese traditional valuable sea products to foreign visitors.”¹⁵⁰ Today’s China has the world's largest aquaculture industry. Although some have associated this phenomenon with the growing Asian market and the depletion of natural stock, the advancement of aquaculture, however, is deeply rooted in the struggles during Chinese socialist past to balance between environmental protection and economic development.

¹⁴⁸ “The Summary of Acquisition of export red shellfish in the First Half of 1974,” August 3, 1974, JZA 24-2-14.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ “Summary of the Symposium on Treasure Sea Products,” November 5, 1974, JZA 24-2-14.

Chapter Five

Contesting Reforms: Nostalgia, Gender and the Environment, 1980-2016

When I visited Chun and Xing in 2015, the couple lived in a two-bedroom apartment at Jinshitan, a rural, coastal town located 35 miles north of the urban center of Dalian. Like many rural Chinese women in their early seventies, Chun shouldered most of the domestic duties, including preparing daily meals, looking after grandchildren, and taking care of her husband Xing, who had been half-paralyzed for decades by a stroke. Despite how eager she was to talk about her life, Chun was not interested in responding to most of my questions about work and life in the Mao years. Rather, Chun spent most of the time expressing her frustration with the contemporary local government because of the meager compensation she had received when the state expropriated farm land and sea from peasants of her village beginning in the 1990s.

Her husband Xing, a retired rural cadre and a policy implementer for the expropriation of rural land in the mid-1990s, in contrast, was more willing to help me shift the subject back to the older period and evade his wife's litany of complaints about the present. Even so, a similar sense of nostalgia in both Xing's narration of the past and that of his wife. The couple applauded farmers in the Mao era as "being honest, having a high level of moral and political consciousness, and following the

government policies without doubts and resistance," while denouncing contemporary farmers and Chinese people in general as the opposite.¹

China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world from the late 1970s onward. The major developments in rural reform during this period included the introduction of market mechanisms, the acceleration of commodification and industrialization, and a massive migration from rural areas to urban regions. This transformation propelled rural development and broadened rural occupational choices. Many unmarried young rural women and men seized this opportunity by leaving their home communities and becoming migrant workers in cities. Rural entrepreneurs also took advantage of the opportunity opened by the dismantling of collective economy and started private businesses.

China's reform was a multifaceted process, engendering social and environmental consequences. While most studies of contemporary Northeast China focus on the formation of the rust belt in the interior areas, this chapter addresses *three* arenas of conflict and resistance by focusing on people who remained in rural communities of the coasts. It argues that social gaps across generation, gender, and environment lines, grew apace with rapid economic development. Viewed from the perspectives of grassroots groups, despite far-reaching changes in the countryside, dissatisfaction and resistance remained.

The first group this chapter considers is rural men and women, such as Xing and Chun, born before 1949. In the 1990s and 2000s, land requisition from

¹ Interview with Xing and Chun, January 5, 2015, August 16, 2015, September 15, 2015.

collectives in the name of economic development without proper compensation distressed villagers of this older generation, as we saw in the case of Chun. Her husband Xing, a former rural cadre, however, felt disappointed by the agitated reactions of peasants to the farm land acquisition by the state. Their varied responses reflected the heterogeneity of both generational and gender responses to the post-Mao state's project of modernity. This old cohort viewed the economic reform with a sense of nostalgia, as their assets and labor were marginalized.²

Chun's cohort is not the only group of women whose lives have been put into limbo in the reform era. The second group this chapter concerns is middle-aged rural women who worked in rural, private fishery enterprises. Neither settling in cities like young female migrant workers, nor being completely deprived of the means of work like the older generation, this group of women formed what Xiaoxian Gao calls "the middle ground" between the two other groups. These are women who "were 'rural workers,' having left the soil but not the countryside."³ Many of them might earlier have migrated to cities. However, they eventually returned to the countryside before or after getting married, and retained their rural household registration. Unlike the group of "worker-peasants" we have seen in the socialist period, in the rural private fishery enterprises, this group of women were concentrated in labor-intensive and low-paid positions. Their wages were also lower than those of men.

² Lisa Rofel, *Other Modernities: Gendered Yearnings in China after Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999).

³ Xiaoxian Gao, "China's Modernization and Changes in the Social Status of Rural Women," in Christina Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, Lisa Rofel, Tyrene White, eds., *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 80–97.

The final group of peasants discussed in this chapter is less marked by age or gender than by the actions they took against the state-owned enterprises when their interests were threatened or ignored. Following the Northeast China Revitalization Program the state introduced in 2003, Dalian strengthened its traditional heavy industry sectors, becoming a petrochemical base of Northeast China. Petroleum pollution, however, contaminated the marine environment and threatened the livelihood of fishermen and sea farmers. In this last section, I examine the 2010 oil spill incident in coastal Dalian, the country's worst ever oil leak, caused by the oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The efforts of the local fishermen and fish farmers to seek protection from central authorities and compensation for their losses caused by ocean pollution largely failed, as both the local government and the central government were reluctant to take responsibility. Meanwhile, actors including nonprofit organizations and the media also entered the political process.

“Northern Hong Kong,” “Great Dalian,” and “Maritime Jinzhou”


During the reform era, Dalian earned several nicknames. These include “Soccer Capital,” as it once had one of the most successful soccer teams in the nation; “Garden City,” thanks to its numerous green squares and forest parks; and “Fashion Cosmos,” as Dalian held the country's second largest International Fashion Festival in the 1990s, second only to Guangzhou, drawing hundreds of thousands of designers, clothing merchants and celebrities to the city each year. However, perhaps the most

well-known nickname for the city in the 1990s was “Northern Hong Kong” (*beifang xianggang*). As a port city, beginning in the reform era, Dalian was not only a city of industry, but also a city for trade, tourism and entertainment, providing an atmosphere comparable to that of Hong Kong. Bo Xilai, the mayor of Dalian from 1993 to 2000, said in a 1994 interview that in the current map of China’s opening-up and reform, Shenzhen represented southern China, Shanghai central China, and Dalian was the flagship of the north.⁴

Because of its emphasis on the development of tourism and entertainment, in the 1990s the Dalian government began to reduce the areas devoted to farmland and rural residences, transforming them into non-agricultural use. The hometown of Chun and Xing exemplifies this process. The township of Manjiatan is located along the coast of the Yellow Sea. It has a coastline of 18 miles, a sea area of 36 square miles, and land area of 39 square miles. It includes the seven administrative villages of Miaoshang (village of Chun and Xing), Manjiatan, Shizijie, Longshan, Chenjia, Hezui and Putaogou. In the early 1990s, the state decided to change the township’s name from Manjiatan (“Full Houses Beach”) to Jinshitan (“Golden Pebble Beach”), and made it the first in northeast China to build a national tourist and vacation zone.⁵

⁴ “Dalian, Weilai de beifang ‘xianggang’ (Dalian, The Future Northern “Hongkong”), August 30, 1994, <http://www.infobank.cn/IrisBin/Select.dll?Special?db=HK>. In one of the biggest political scandals in the post-Mao era, in 2013 Bo Xilai was expelled from the position of Communist Party chief in Chongqing and jailed for life for corruption and abuse of power.

⁵ “Guowuyuan guanyu jianli dalian jinshitan guoji lvyou dujiaqu de pifu” (The State Council’s Reply on the Establishment of Jinshitan National Tourist Resort and Vacationing Zones),” *The Bulletin of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China*, No.26, October 4, 1992; *China Encyclopedia Yearbook 1993* (Zhongguo baike nianjian 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo dabaikē quanshu chubanshe, 1994), 263.



Map 3. Jinshitan⁶

Foreign investment assisted the development of Jinshitan and its administrative unit, the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone. To finance various projects in the new tourist zone, the Dalian government provided the foreign investors from Hong Kong, Japan and the United States with preferential policies, including tax incentives, real estate benefits, and import and export assistance.⁷ In return, adopting the form of joint ventures, foreign investors contributed machines, technology and designing ideas. For example, in 1997 five California developers from a company called Worldports arrived in Dalian. They partnered with Dalian Mingxing Real Estate Development and Management Corporation and helped turn Dalian’s fishing villages into “an internationally recognized residential community.” Using their

⁶ Jun Yang et al., “‘Dalian Jinshitan Lvyou Dujia Qu Juzhu Yongdi de Kongjian Fenyi,’ (Spatio-Temporal Differentiation of Residential Land for Coastal Town: A Case Study of Dalian Jinshitan),” *Dili Yanjiu (Geographical Science)* 26, no. 4 (August 1, 2016): 566–76.

⁷ Dalian Municipal Government, “Dalian jinshitan guojia lvyou dujiaqu tudi shiyong guanli banfa” (Measures of land use management in Dalian Jinshitan National Tourist Resort), May 6, 1993.

experience in implementing the vision for Marina del Rey in Los Angeles, they “facilitated the local government approval process, assisted with construction of manufacturing and distribution facilities, and provided a Western-style quality of life.”⁸ After decades of construction by Chinese and foreign firms, Jinshitan Tourist Resort was now a national highest-level tourist scenic spot, including a marine amusement park, an international yacht club, a forest hunting zone, a geological landscape tour, a golf course, and many other attractions.

From the early 2000s, the development mode of “Northern Hong Kong” has been gradually replaced by the program of “Great Dalian.” The new emphasis follows the shift of China’s regional development focus from the coasts to the interior. To narrow the socio-economic gaps between coastal and inland regions, the central government first introduced the “China Western Development Program” in 2000 and then “the Northeast China Revitalization Program” in 2003. One major strategy in this revitalization program was to upgrade the old industrial base of the Northeast. Under this program, in spite of being a coastal city and a beneficiary of Deng’s opening-up policy, Dalian was able to strengthen and upgrade its traditional heavy industry sectors. The Dalian government proposed the “one center, four bases” strategy, making the city the transportation hub of Northeast China while developing both heavy and light industry sectors.⁹ The first base under the “one center, four bases” strategy is the petrochemical industry. From the mid-2000s onward, Dalian

⁸ “Dalian City Stretches out for Touch of Southern California,” *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, March 13, 1997.

⁹ Mark Wang, *Old Industrial Cities Seeking New Road of Industrialization: Models of Revitalizing Northeast China* (World Scientific, 2014), 101.

positioned itself as “a new world-class center for the petrochemical industry.”¹⁰ It hosted a few of China’s major oil processing companies, including CNPC, the one responsible for the 2010 oil spill incident.¹¹

Compared to the slogans “Northern Hong Kong” and “New Dalian,” a less visible local government agenda was developing the marine economy and building “Maritime Dalian” (*haishang Dalian*) beginning in 1986. Under this slogan, Dalian’s subordinate districts and counties soon devised their own agendas, among which Jinzhou District was the most prominent. In 1988, Jinzhou (known as Jin County in the Maoist period) designated aquaculture as the top priority of the five rural industries. The following year, the total aquaculture production of Jinzhou reached 230,000 tons, including fish, seaweed, and mussels. It was the highest output in China, accounting for one-eighth of the national total production of 1.6 million tons of aquaculture products. From the 1980s to the mid-1990s, Jinzhou led the nation in the aquaculture industry. In 1992, the district officially put forward the slogan “Building Maritime Jinzhou.”¹²

To implement this program, the district government offered several incentives, including a one-time subsidy of 100,000 yuan to collectives or individuals who purchased fishing vessels with more than 200 horsepower for ocean fishing. It also provided as much as 30 percent of the seeding purchase fees for those engaging in

¹⁰ “Urban Security in China – A Case Study of Dalian,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, September 6, 2011, <https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/urban-security-in-china-a-case-study-of-dalian/>.

¹¹ Wang.

¹² “Wang Yebin’s Speech of the Speeding Up the Construction at the ‘Maritime Jinzhou’ conference,” JZA Contemporary Papers, February 28, 1997.

aquaculture. For other fishing or aquaculture-related industrial enterprises, such as seafood processing or marine medicine factories, it provided tax credits. Finally, in order to attract skilled technicians and experienced workers to move from outside regions, the local government provided urban household registrations.¹³ These measures led to the development of the marine economy, the rise of village and township enterprises, and the expansion of rural occupational choices. Non-farming, maritime sectors have been the major source of rural coastal household income in Jinzhou from the 1990s onward. As we will see below, peasants, many of whom were middle-aged women, joined the township fishing and aquaculture enterprises.

At first glance, both “Northern Hong Kong” and “Maritime Dalian” involved the state’s management of natural resources. However, there was a stark difference between the ownership and the authorization of land and sea uses. According to the Land Law of 1986, ownership of rural farmland belongs to the rural collectives. When the Household Responsibility System was adopted in the 1980s, most farmland was contracted out to peasant households, with the administrative villages designated as the authority for farmland management. As Yongshun Cai argues, village cadres usually had the deciding vote for land management and conversion. They could “even grant land to peasants directly without reporting their applications to the higher-level government.”¹⁴ Collective ownership thus meant that when it came to land disputes, peasants would most often blame the village or township cadres for neglecting their

¹³ “Relevant Provisions on Encouraging the Acceleration of the Construction of Maritime Jinzhou, JZA Contemporary Papers, April 21, 1997.

¹⁴ Yongshun Cai, “Collective Ownership or Cadres’ Ownership? The Non-Agricultural Use of Farmland in China,” *China Quarterly*, no. 175 (September 2003): 665.

interests, a dynamic explored later in this chapter.

Sea ownership, in contrast, belongs to the state. In the socialist period, sea rights were collectively owned. In the reform era, however, the law stipulates central state ownership of the sea. In October 2001, the 24th session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress published the "Law on the Management of Sea Use" formalizing state ownership. Any entity or individual who intended to use the sea was required to apply in advance, and could obtain the right to sea use only after the approval of the central government.¹⁵ City or township levels did not have the authority to approve sea-use applications. It was thus difficult for local governments to provide an effective management system for sea-use activities or solutions for sea-use conflicts. For example, one year after the publication of the law, the Dalian Marine Fisheries Administration promulgated "The Method of Mediation for the Dispute over the Right to Use the Sea Areas."¹⁶ It seems that the local administration scarcely played a deciding role, other than as a mediator, when sea use-related disputes broke out, as we will see later in the 2010 oil spill incident.

The reform era government's policies, in particular those concerning the ownership and uses of farmland and sea, led to major changes in the lives of peasants. In many ways, the lives of coastal rural residents since the late 1970s have been as dynamic and tumultuous as they were in the Mao years. The following sections will use three examples to show the impacts of China's contemporary rural reform

¹⁵ "Law on the Management of Sea Use." October 2001.

http://www.soa.gov.cn/zwgk/fwjgwywj/shfl/201508/t20150826_39738.html

¹⁶ "Notice on Forwarding 'Methods for the Mediation of Disputes over the Right to Use the Sea Areas,'" JZA Contemporary Papers, December 13, 2002.

projects on Chinese peasants.

Xing and Chun

Xing was born in 1944 in the coastal rural village of Miaoshang, Manjiatan. Xing's father once worked on a Japanese-owned fishing vessel as a fisher in the early 1940s, but shortly before Japanese lost the war and its territory in Dalian, he sneaked out and fled back home. In 1950 during the land redistribution movement, the family was labeled middle peasants. They owned 6 *tian* and 5 *mu* of land, and rented nearly the same amount of land from others. During the collectivization years, Xing's father actively organized fishery mutual-aid groups, and was granted awards by the local government several times for his outstanding performance. His father died in 1960 during a fishing trip to Shandong.¹⁷

After his father's death, Xing and his family were put into a dire situation. According to local records, at the time of his father's death, Xing's two eldest brothers were in mechanic training schools, and he had just been admitted to middle school. His younger brother and sister were too young to offer any substantial assistance to the family. His mother had been sick for years. From 1960 to the mid-1960s, the family depended on local government aid for educational and daily subsistence costs. Testimonies included in the family file verified Xing and his family's hardship, and others, mostly from Xing's school, noted that Xing had always been a hardworking, considerate student, and showed extraordinary leadership skills.

¹⁷ "Miaoshang Brigade Class Statuses Papers," JZA 070-2-284, April 2, 1965.

In 1962, at the age of 18, Xing joined the Communist Youth League, while also serving as the chairman of the Student Union in his middle school.¹⁸

As a result of Xing's family's misfortune and his personal accomplishments, in 1965 the class label of Xing's family was downgraded from middle peasant to lower-middle peasant during the Four Cleanups Movement. This was a more favorable political classification. As we saw in the last chapter, it was not uncommon for the Maoist state to make changes to the class status of peasants. What is not also so clear, however, are the reasons that underpinned such changes. Sometimes, it was Dalian's colonial past and the fear of decollectivization after the failure of the GLF that upset state authorities, as we saw in Baijie's case in chapter five. At other times, the causes of a change in class status seemed more personal. Xing's file does mention the amount of land and property his family owned, but it never seemed to be the focus or the determining factor in his reclassification. In other words, even during the high socialism stage, a person's class was not always predestined. One's parents' or one's own achievements or misfortunes could affect the assignment of class labels.

In 1963, after graduation Xing began to work as a cashier in the production team at Ge sub-village (*tun*). The change in the class label in 1965 won Xing political credibility and probably laid the foundation for his future career success. Later in 1965 he was promoted to work in the Miaoshang brigade, and soon joined the Communist Party. For the following few years, he held a number of positions, including Youth League secretary, militia commander, and security officer. At the

¹⁸ Ibid.

age of 28, he became the brigade's Party Secretary. Four years later, he joined the Manjiatan commune's leadership. In the 1990s, before retiring, Xing was the head of Manjiatan township.

Xing married Chun in 1969. Chun was born in 1945, one year after Xing. They came from the same coastal village of Miaoshang. The reason for their marriage, according to Chun's humorous account, was "I pitied him, so I married him." Although she was partly joking, it might well have described the circumstances. At the time when they married, Chun's natal family had more able-bodied laborers, including her father and several adult siblings. They helped with Xing's family's field work. Chun was as capable as her husband. She served as the women's team leader in their brigade's aquaculture farm for three years before the marriage. She joined the Party on the same day as Xing in 1968, an acclaimed and widely spread story in their village.

The story of Xing and Chun could be presented as that of a heroic couple who had achieved recognition and success. However, the tone and content of their narration was often negative, filled with grievances dating mainly from the 1990s. In 1993, Xing, then the party secretary of the Manjiatan township, turned 50. In the same year, the town changed its name to Jinshitan and became a tourist and vacation resort. Xing's home village, Miaoshang, stood on a proposed site for a golf course at the resort. It therefore became one of the first targets of the local government's requisition of rural land. The government paid each villager a one-time compensation

of 4,000 yuan, and provided an apartment of the same size as their old homes, located in the urban area of the town.

As a result, along with the other villagers of Miaoshang, Xing and Chun moved out of their rural residence to multi-storied buildings in the town, a process known colloquially as “Going Upstairs” (*shanglou*). However, soon villagers began to make complaints to Xing, their township Party secretary. Xing and Chun remembered that villagers came to their apartment every evening, expressing their discontent and sometimes anger over being relocated to the town. The villagers said, “We do not want to leave the sea, the land, our own yards, even the chickens and pigs.” Intense work during daytime and the reception of unstoppable angry visits in the evenings may have contributed to Xing’s declining health. In 19xx he had a stroke, which left him half-paralyzed. Given his circumstances, it is not hard to understand why Xing denigrated the contemporary villagers’ morals, while being nostalgic for the “honest, highly politically conscious” farmers in the Mao era.

Xing’s story shows the interactions between the state, rural cadres, and peasants when it came to land disputes. In order to convert some Jinshitan farm land into public resort areas, the government needed to change the ownership rights from collectives to the state. In this process, the state paid the collectives compensation to cover the loss of land, the loss of produce, and the loss of any other attachments to land. Problems and discontent from peasants arose when the compensation seemed too low. When I asked Xing and Chun what a one-time compensation of 4,000 yuan meant, Chun replied that it was more or less equal to the annual income of a rural

household in the mid-1990s. Since each member of the household got 4,000 yuan, it could mean up to several years of income.¹⁹ It seemed that many peasants were not happy with the amount.

When the peasants from Jinshitan were upset about the amount of compensation, they turned to Xing and other rural cadres. Since the ownership of the expropriated land belonged to the collectives before being nationalized, rural cadres became the targets for complaint and blame. It is not possible to determine whether Xing and other cadres abused their power in this conversion of land ownership, or whether they were willing to defend the interests of villagers by negotiating with the state. This is a subject about which Xing was not willing to say more. He did say that he had spent a tremendous amount of effort and time to ensure that his town was chosen as the location of the first National Tourist Resort in all of Northeast China. He travelled to different provinces of China, Japan, and the United States to secure investments to fund the various projects as mentioned above.

It becomes even more complicated to assume that local cadres like Xing were either predators or sympathizers with peasants' rights when taking into account the experience of Xing's wife Chun. Chinese people often cite an old saying "Things always come in threes" (*shi buguo san*). Chun's experience verified that this saying, at least, applied to her situation. First, neither Xing nor Chun received monetary compensation from the state. Xing was a government official, and thus was not qualified to receive the compensation for regular peasants. Chun was no longer a

¹⁹ I cannot determine the accuracy of Chun's estimate.

peasant. In the 1980s, she had become a “member of an official’s household” (*gong shu hu*) with urban household registration, after she “bought a ticket” (*mai piao le*). She still lived in the countryside and worked in the fields, but owned an urban household registration. However, as a result of this change, she did not enjoy the same compensation as her fellow villagers.

Second, the state gave each unemployed or retired “upstairs-goer” a minimum government subsidy of 20,000 yuan per year until death. But once again, the couple did not receive the minimum living guarantee for the same reason. Although Xing had a substantial pension as a retired cadre, Chun had a much smaller pension. Because she only became an urbanite on paper, and was never employed by a real urban company or had an employer who paid into social security for her, she had contributed most of her pension out of her own pocket. In other words, Chun had very limited net earnings after she turned 50 years old, the starting point of pensionable age.

Finally, the village of Miaoshang has the longest coastline in Jinshitan. In 2004, as we have seen after the publication of the “Law on the Management of Sea Use,” the previous collective ownership of sea use began to be relocated to the state. Each villager in Miaoshang received a compensation of several thousand yuan. Once again, Xing and Chun did not receive this income as a result of their move from the village to the town ten years earlier, before the golf course was built.

Thus, rapid economic development and excessive public works construction destabilized rural communities. It was disturbing in particular to the older generation

of villagers. Unlike the younger generation, who could migrate to cities or find jobs in nearby township enterprises, the older generation of peasants lost their means of livelihood, including working in the field, tending their backyard plots, and raising livestock. For peasants living by the sea, they also lost an extra source of income from fishing or collecting sea products on the shore. The living situation for the elderly deteriorated in cases where they did not have adequate retirement pensions, like Chun. When villagers found out that land, previously owned by collectives and managed by individual households, was being expropriated and, in some cases, privatized for commercial use, they turned to local cadres like Xing.

Middle-aged Women in Rural Enterprises

The Tiansheng Fishery Company, a seaweed-growing and processing plant in Dalijia Township, was a bustling enterprise in July 2016. A crane on the shore offloaded seaweed from a harvesting vessel. The crane then unloaded the raw seaweed into a large reservoir filled with hot water and salt. Several minutes later, the seaweed arrived at another tunnel reservoir with cold water for rinsing, changing color from brown to dark green. The final stop of this automated operation was a steam-heated drum drier. From there, the seaweed was sent to another room, a workshop with more than twenty middle-aged female workers. Working in pairs, these women chopped the seaweed in a cutter, coated it with salt, and packed them into bundles for storage.



Image 7. Women Fishery Workers at the Tiansheng Fishery Company²⁰

“Except for cutting and packing, we have achieved full automation,” the owner of this company, Tian, a 48-year-old man, said to me proudly.²¹ Indeed, compared to the Maoist period when harvesting and processing seaweed relied almost exclusively on manual labor, his company looked highly mechanized. Tian’s Tiansheng Fishery Company was established in the late 1990s, several years after the closing of the collective-owned Dagushan Aquaculture Farm in 1996. The farm’s *fa* that once were used to grow seaweed, however, were not abandoned. As mentioned above, from the 1990s onward, Dalian and its subordinate districts and townships developed the project “Maritime Dalian.” This resulted in an increase in both collectively owned and private fishery enterprises. Tian’s company was one of the twenty to thirty rural

²⁰ Interview with Tian, July 9, 2016.

²¹ Ibid.

enterprises in the Jinzhou District that took part in the seaweed growing and harvesting business in the reform era.

Tian, as well as other fishery workers from the farm, contracted out the sea areas and privatized the fa. In 2016, Tian's company owned 1,500 fa, including the original 37 he contracted directly from the collective, nearly 260 that he bought from other villagers, as well as a little more than 1,200 new ones that his company built over the preceding decade. The products included seaweed and laver. According to Tian, his buyers for the former were mostly from Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, where seaweed was widely used in hot pot and breakfast pickled dishes. Laver, despite tasting better with richer nutrients, is less in demand by domestic consumers than by the Japanese market. In general, Tian's business had gone well. "I don't need to reach out for retailers or customers. They just come to me," Tian said.

The rise of the rural fishery industry also led to changes in occupational choices for villagers. The Maoist period witnessed a mixture of urban and rural laborers and a blurring of the rural-urban divide through the examples of the Jin Aquaculture Farm and the labor category of "worker-peasant." In contrast, the rural work force in the aquaculture industry in the reform era was dominated by middle-aged rural women. Most urban migrants, especially the former sent-down youth, had gradually left the countryside by the early years of the reform era. For example, in 1980 Taishan returned to the city and succeeded to his mother's position in an urban factory. The change in status from "worker-peasant" to "urban worker" meant that he obtained the

same life-time guarantee, the iron rice bowl, as those from the Jin No.16 Middle School that he used to feel jealous about.

In addition to former urbanites, another group that began moving out of the countryside in the reform period was the young, unmarried rural population. As the once strict household registration system became looser, the movement of rural laborers into cities reached an unprecedented level. Many young rural migrants moved to cities and performed jobs that city residents were unwilling to do. They contributed to the nation's transformation into an industrial powerhouse and the world's factory. Some may have worked in the rural or township enterprises temporarily, but once opportunities arrived, cities became a more attractive destination.

In these circumstances, married women came to fill in the labor force of the township enterprises. Much of the scholarship on contemporary Chinese rural society mentions that women after marriage were more likely to work near home rather than pursue jobs further away. Because of the shortage of child care and elder care facilities in the countryside, middle-aged and elderly women stayed in (or returned to) the rural areas.²² The existence of rural non-agricultural enterprises allowed these women to become rural workers who left the soil but not the countryside.²³

The experience of Tian's Tiansheng Fishery Company affirms this process. Initially, Tian explained, "before 2003, we had lots of young female workers from rural Jilin province or other places in Liaoning province. At the time, the whole

²² Jacka, 2012.

²³ Gao, 1994.

company only had one phone located in my office, and when parents wanted to speak to their daughters, they called my office. Sometimes I was at the office, and could hear what the parents said on the other side. In the beginning, the parents said to their daughters ‘work hard, don’t be lazy and get sent home’ (*haohao ganhuo, bie toulan, bie nianhuijia le*). However, a few years later, things started to change. Instead of urging their daughters to work hard, parents now said ‘does the factory pay you well? Do you work happily? If not, come home.’” (*changzi de daiyu haouhao? gande haobuhao? Buhao zanmen lai*).

Tian used this anecdote to explain why the biggest challenge his company now faced was to recruit workers: “The north (of Dalian) used to be poor, but now those areas also have their own local enterprises, so people from there do not want to come anymore. After all, it is a very physically demanding job for women to do the sea work. These are cold-water jobs, and bad for women, especially in winter. Unlike clothing factories which have a clean and dry environment, young women don’t like to work in the fishery industry.” As a result, beginning in the mid-2000s, the major on-land work of Tian’s family business was done by middle-aged women from nearby villages.

In addition to women, the company also hired men. As in the Maoist period, there was a gendered division of labor. Male laborers seldom worked on land unless they were managers. They were the workers who did “sea work,” including building *fa* and operating fishing vessels and cranes. Unlike the situation in the Maoist period, in the reform era there was a striking difference in the salaries paid to male and

female fishery workers. Women earned much less than men in Tian's company. For men, in 2016 the minimum annual income was 80,000 yuan per year, plus a year-end bonus. For women, it was a fixed rate of 130 yuan per day, and 4,000 yuan per month.

Tian also explained why he did not hire men to do land work. "Men are paid more. It would be 40-50 yuan more per day to hire a man to do the land job," said Tian. This pay discrepancy apparently was not the result of differences in skill levels between the two sexes. Tian said that his company once adopted the piece-rate salary system. "Workers then earned more, 200-300 per day, and men could not compete with women (for land work). Women earned 5,000-6,000 yuan per month." Tian did not say why he replaced the piece-rate salary system with an hourly-rate system, and whether it was about reducing the cost of production, or had something to do with the gendered distribution of payments.

The development of Tian's company was an integrated part of the transformation of Chinese rural industry in the reform era. The first wave of rural industrialization in this era took place from the 1980s to the early 1990s. During this period, the former commune and brigade enterprises, such as the Jin Aquaculture Company discussed in the last chapter, became township or village enterprise (TVEs). These enterprises absorbed rural surplus laborers released from farming, increased rural household incomes, and contributed to rural economic growth. However, TVEs stagnated from the mid-1990s, when the local government faced less pressure for self-financing and the market played a bigger role. During the second

stage of rural industrialization since the mid-1990s, many TVEs were privatized. Tian's company, together with other private enterprises, started to thrive in the countryside.

These private enterprises replaced the collective-owned TVEs to absorb rural laborers, especially middle-aged women, as we have seen in the case of Tian's company. And yet, this new employment opportunity created new and recurring challenges for women. Problems included uneven pay in the enterprises, lack of mobility of women after marriage, and unequal gendered expectations for the care of children and the elderly. Scholars who studied the early years of the reform period have noticed the effects on rural women of the rise of TVEs. For example, the Chinese feminist scholar Li Xiaojiang has suggested that by the early 1990s China witnessed a "reverse tide" of women's liberation.²⁴ Others, while clearly identifying the problems rural Chinese women face, remain optimistic. Middle-aged rural women employed by TVEs represent, in Gao Xiaoxian's words, the "middle ground" in rural society between farmers and urban workers. Compared to traditional agricultural laborers, these women were more likely to accept new things, and realize financial independence. Over time, Gao believes, businesswomen and female entrepreneurs will emerge as well.²⁵

To some extent, the situation of women in rural private enterprises was comparable to that under the TVEs. What women were doing in private enterprises

²⁴ Xiaojiang Li, "Economic Reform and the Awakening of Chinese Women's Collective Consciousness," in Christina Gilmartin, Gail Hershatter, Lisa Rofel, Tyrene White, eds., *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 360–84.

²⁵ Gao, 1994.

was not so different from what they did in the TVEs, as their work was just as labor-intensive and low-paid. In the absence of a thorough marriage reform and changes in gender roles, rural women still faced double burdens. Located in the countryside, both TVEs and private enterprises retained many patriarchal values and customs, which further limited the advancement of women's rights. In private enterprises like Tian's, there were no pension or insurance plans available for these women. Without proper labor protection and equal payment systems between men and women, the fortunes of these middle-aged rural women were not promising by 2016. Meanwhile, Tian and other rural fishery entrepreneurs also faced their own difficulties caused by industrial pollution as shown in the next section.

Resistance and Responses: A New Arena of Conflict

On July 16, 2010, two oil pipelines owned by the state-owned enterprise CNPC, China's biggest oil and gas producer and supplier, blew up in Dalian's Xingang Harbor. According to the state's official news agency Xinhua, improper desulfurizer injections into the oil pipeline caused the explosion. It resulted in a release of 1,500 tons of oil, about 400,000 gallons, into the Yellow Sea, stretching over at least 183

square kilometers of ocean, with 50 square kilometers severely polluted.²⁶ The worst ever oil spill incident in the country left one worker missing, one firefighter dead, a property loss of 233 million yuan, and a clean-up and rescue cost of about 1.2 billion yuan.²⁷

Living in Dalian at the time, only 10 miles away from the explosion site, I can still recall the clouds of black smoke covering the sky and the pungent smell of burning oil which lasted several days. However, this uncomfortable feeling could not compare to that suffered by fishermen and aquaculture farmers. The oil spill posed a severe threat to marine life, and thus hurt people who relied on these resources for a living. In the affected areas of Jinshitan township and Dalijia township, the hometowns of Chun, Xing, and Tian, for example, inhabitants faced heavy losses.

According to a report in *Southern Weekly*, Shao Deshan, the head of Hezuizi village in Jinshitan, said that there were more than 100 households in the villages earning their incomes from aquaculture and fishing. They faced a loss of 30 million yuan in 2010 after the pollution of the sea, as most of the scallops and oysters were killed, the fish were contaminated, and Japanese and domestic customers canceled

²⁶ "Improper desulfurizer injection causes Dalian oil pipeline explosion: investigation," *People's Daily*, July 23, 2010, <http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/7078890.html> "Over 500 fishing boats join Dalian oil spill cleanup operations after pipeline explosion," *People's Daily*, July 19, 2010, <http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/90882/7072210.html> According to Greenpeace, the size of the oil spill was significantly larger than 1,500 tons, and reached as more as 60,000 to 90,000 tons. See "Workers Question China's Account of Oil Spill," *The New York Times*, August 4, 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/world/asia/05dalian.html>, and an investigation by Greenpeace <http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/press/releases/climate-energy/2010/dalian-oil-recommendations-steiner/>

²⁷ "13 sentenced in Dalian oil spill," *China Daily*, August 30, 2013. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/30/content_16933720.htm

orders for seaweed.²⁸ My informant Tian from Dalijia also experienced losses due to a reduction in seaweed sales. Nevertheless, he said, “It was better than other folks who contracted for sea-bottom cultivation. The oil sank to the bottom of the sea, and was eaten by sea creatures like crabs or scallops. Seaweed floating on the surface of the sea was not as heavily damaged.” It is difficult to affirm the validity of Tian’s judgment, as environmental scientists believed that some of the oil would break down and disperse in the water, and its invisible influence would continue for many more years.²⁹

Unfortunately, after the incident neither CNPC nor the local government provided adequate measures to deal with the spill. According to Dr. Richard Steiner and other activists from Greenpeace, an international non-governmental organization, fishermen and fishery workers had been sent by the local government to manually collect oil from the sea surface into barrels. They were paid about 300 yuan per barrel. And yet, none of the clean-up fishermen and workers observed by Greenpeace wore protective gear such as masks, boots and gloves. “Some workers have gone to local hospitals with symptoms such as nausea and skin and respiratory ailments--all signs of acute chemical exposure,” Dr. Steiner noted in his report.³⁰

In addition to failing to provide safety measures for the clean-up fishermen and fishery workers, CNPC and the local government did not respond to requests from

²⁸ *Southern Weekly*, September 17, 2010, <http://www.infzm.com/content/50086>

²⁹ “China tackles oil slick after pipeline blast,” *The Guardian*, July 19, 2010. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/jul/19/china-oil-spill-dalian>

³⁰ Greenpeace East Asia, “Dalian Oil Spill: Preliminary Findings and Recommendations,” August 2, 2010. <http://www.greenpeace.org/eastasia/press/releases/climate-energy/2010/dalian-oil-recommendations-steiner/>

victims for compensation in a timely manner. On September 2, after nearly two months without receiving any compensation from CNPC or the local government, Shao Deshan together with more than twenty aquaculture farmers traveled to Beijing to petition for help from the central government. Shao collected and brought with him signatures from most of the 100 fishing and aquaculture households in his village. Before heading to Beijing, Shao had spoken with the Jinzhou district government and the Dalian municipal government. Both times, the requests for compensation were rejected. "We were so disappointed by the governments' attitude," Shao said in his interview with *China Daily* and *Southern Weekly*.³¹

To explain why it did not take any action, the local government said, "It is the central authorities' job, including the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the State Administration of Work Safety, to assess the economic and environmental damage from the accident."³²As mentioned above, sea use authorization in China is different from land use authorization. While the ownership of land belongs to the local collectives, the sea belongs to the state. Thus, the Dalian local officials seemed to have less say than the central government about the sea-related disputes. Further, as an oil giant, CNPC was a major contributor to the local GDP. Wen Bo, an environmental activist and a journalist, noted in his blog that after the incident, "on August 3, the Dalian government welcomed PetroChina's Chairman Jiang Jiemin and

³¹ "Villagers ask for compensation over oil leak," *China Daily*, September 14, 2010 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/14/content_11297807.htm And *Southern Weekly*, September 17, 2010, <http://www.infzm.com/content/50086>

³² Ibid.

his delegation at the Dalian Shangri-La Hotel and expressed gratitude towards the oil giant's contribution to Dalian's economy."³³

It was not uncommon for Chinese peasants to bypass the local officials and appeal to the central state in defending their interests. O'Brien and Li have proposed the theory of "rightful resistance" to explain a common strategy that rural Chinese people used in collective actions. Under this theory, peasants use the rhetoric and commitments of the central state to fight misconduct by local officials.³⁴ Shao and other fishermen travelling to Beijing to submit petitions to the central government, therefore, can be described as engaging in "rightful resistance."

However, Shao and his fellow villagers soon felt disappointed with the response they received in Beijing, where the officers told them to go back home and wait. CNPC was a state-owned enterprise, with deep connections to the central government. Its management team included high-ranking officials, which made it almost impossible for the central government to punish it and hold it accountable. Many people thought that the Dalian oil spill could be compared to the 2010 BP incident in the Gulf of Mexico. And yet, the China National Petroleum Corporation had a more powerful governmental backer than BP. In this case, the central government failed to act as a "protection umbrella" in the "rightful resistance" paradigm.

³³ Wen Bo, "Separate Oil and State," August 9, 2010. <https://www.pacificenvironment.org/separate-oil-and-state/>

³⁴ Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

In 2011, CNPC and the Dalian municipal government reached a settlement. The local government was responsible for paying the compensation. In return, CNPC agreed to build a refinery plant in Dalian with an annual refining capacity of 20 million tons, and an ethylene production project with an annual capacity of 1 million tons. The yearly output from the two projects, plus the old local plants previously built by CNPC, was said to contribute to one-third of the GDP of Dalian.³⁵ It is difficult to ascertain the accurate amount of compensation the local government paid to fishermen and aquaculture farmers. Some articles said it was “no more than 876 million yuan,” still much lower than the total losses of the victims.³⁶

The compensation scheme showed the political bargaining between the state-owned company, the local government and individual victims. Environmental laws and their enforcement did not play an important role. In fact, the local government officials had persuaded fishermen and aquaculture farmers not to prosecute but rather to accept administrative mediation. When the private enterprise Dalian Tianyi Aquaculture Enterprise filed a lawsuit against CNPC in the Dalian Maritime Court, the local government urged the company to withdraw the case. The Dalian Maritime Court later also refused to place this case on file for investigation and prosecution.³⁷

The turning point came in 2015, five years after the oil spill. On June 5, 2015, the Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteer Association, a local NGO founded in

³⁵ *Southern Weekly*, January 4, 2011, <http://www.infzm.com/content/54205>

³⁶ *Southern Weekly*, July 22, 2011, <http://news.sina.com.cn/green/news/roll/2011-07-22/164922859776.shtml>

³⁷ Gao Shengke, “Behind PetroChina Paying for Dalian Oil Spill: 200 Million Yuan is Far From Enough,” July 7, 2015, <http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20150707/130822612441.shtml>

2003, sued CNPC.³⁸ It demanded that CNPC pay 645 million yuan for damages that resulted from the oil spill. Earlier that year, the nonprofit organization consulted environmental scientists from the Dalian University of Technology, hired legal experts, and arranged volunteers to conduct survey from local residents. It also sent volunteers to collect pollution data caused by the oil spill from the Dalian Environmental Protection Bureau and the Dalian Fishery Bureau. Yet, the former bureau only provided air pollution data, while the marine pollution data the Dalian Fishery Bureau provided were limited to the previous year of 2014.

On June 5, 2015, World Environment Day the Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteer Association officially lodged a lawsuit against CNPC in the Dalian Maritime Court. Thirteen days later, the court rejected the case, stating that “the Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteer Association does not qualify to initiate public interest litigation of marine pollution.” The news article on the filing of this lawsuit published in the local newspaper *Bandao Morning* was also deleted.³⁹

However, activists in this association refused to submit and planned to appeal to a superior court. They cited the new environmental protection law taking effect on Jan 1, 2015 which allowed “any environmental organization registered with a civil affairs bureau at city level or above and that has been operating for at least five years

³⁸ Following the 2010 spill, this organization also immediately organized volunteers to help clean up oil slicks and the beach, according to Chen Jiangning, the secretary-general of the association. See “Dalian tourism in recovery despite oil spill,” August 2, 2010, *China Daily*, http://www.china.org.cn/environment/NE_China_Oil_Spill/2010-08/02/content_20622325.htm

³⁹ The official website of the Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteer Association provides a detailed chronology of this lawsuit. See <http://www.depv.org/index.php/article/detail/item/1223.html>

to bring public interest litigation.”⁴⁰ This new law granted NGOs rights to use legal weapons in protecting the public interest. Before the association filed an appeal to the superior court, the local government intervened again by mediating between the two parties. On June 24, CNPC agreed to set up a 200-million-yuan environmental sustainability and protection fund. Although the offer did not meet the initial demand of 645 million, the association considered it acceptable and dropped its appeal. Yang Baixin, the chairman of the association, said, "the primary aim of the lawsuit was to raise the public awareness in safeguarding their rights of a good environment."⁴¹

This litigation case was considered the nation’s largest public interest lawsuit.⁴² However, there were many questions unanswered, especially concerning how the fund would be managed and used. Some Chinese media suspected that this non-profit organization had strong backing from the local government. The reason why it initiated the lawsuit was the failure of the CNPC to keep its promise of investment, causing the local government to pay the compensation without getting any returns from CNPC.⁴³

There are even more perplexing aspects of this incident. According to Tian, the Party secretaries of a few villages in Dalijia and Jinshitan, as well as many

⁴⁰ “Oil giants sued over Bohai spill,” July 27, 2015, *China Daily*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-07/27/content_21414896.htm

⁴¹ “PetroChina, NGO reach pretrial settlement over sea pollution,” *Xinhua*, July 9, 2010, http://china.org.cn/environment/2015-07/09/content_36022883.htm

⁴² “CNPC settles China oil spill lawsuit,” *Financial Times*, June 26, 2015, <https://www.ft.com/content/035cdc42-1bca-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480>; “Oil giants sued over Bohai spill,” *China Daily*, July 27, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-07/27/c_134449223.htm

⁴³ *Chinese Business Newspaper*, July 18, 2015, <http://oil.in-en.com/html/oil-2365611.shtml>

aquaculture farmers, were arrested for embezzling the state's money (*zhapian guojia peichangkuan*) after the government issued compensation. In order to issue compensation to aquaculture farmers, the government needed the villages or individuals to report their losses. First, it turned out that many of the aquaculture enterprises did not have valid documents from the state for contracting sea usage rights. They somehow obtained the rights from the village cadres, who did not have legal power to issue authorization.

Second, even for those who had valid permission to conduct aquaculture businesses, some put more *fa* in the sea than allowed. Some *fa*, according to Tian, were “just a rope, completely useless.” However, they would gain the growers more compensation in incidents like the oil spill, or sea requisition by the state for various reasons. In those cases, the government issued compensation based on how many *fa* people had, just as they would base compensation on the size of houses and landholdings in a land requisition situation.⁴⁴

Reactions to the Dalian oil spill incident from various players not only enrich our understanding of environmental politics in the reform period, but also shed light on state-society relations and the process of policy making. Kevin O'Brien and Lianjiang Li have proposed the concept “rightful resistance” and Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang used the phrase “socialism from afar” to describe the interplay between the

⁴⁴ I was unable to find relevant government records on the arrest of those cadres and individuals.

state and rural society.⁴⁵ They argue that much of the rural resistance in China was directed at local officials at the village and township levels, and that peasants appealed for support and the central government based on the law. While unpacking the Chinese state as a double-layered structure of the center and the local, this scholarship, however, omits one important player: the state-owned enterprises which have been deeply entrenched in rural communities in recent years.

In the Dalian 2010 oil spill incident, public participation incorporated involvement from local fishermen and sea farmers, nongovernmental organizations and the news media. They blamed both the local government and CNPC for a lack of transparent and accurate disclosure regarding the spill and for disregarding requests for adequate compensation from victims. The grassroots participation seemed effective when CNPC finally issued the 200-million-yuan environmental protection fund for damages that the spill caused.

However, the pitfall of this type of resistance was a lack of broad participation from the public, and therefore leading to an exclusion of the grassroots from the decision-making process. Unlike urban environmental protests against economic development projects in recent years, such as the anti- paraxylene (PX) campaigns, which revolved around public concerns about air pollution, fisherman and sea farmers in the oil spill resistance mostly emphasized their immediate and exclusive benefits. One year after the spill, on August 14, 2011, more than 10,000 urbanites in Dalian

⁴⁵ O'Brien and Li; Li Zhang and Aihwa Ong, eds., *Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

held a peaceful demonstration against the building of a PX chemical factory in Dalian and marched through Dalian's city center.⁴⁶ The protestors won widespread sympathy from local citizens, as the demonstration was conducted in the name of the protection of health of all of the city's residents. In contrast, in the countryside the claimants of compensation for polluted waters in the case of the 2010 oil spill, or for requisitioned farmland in the case of Chun and Xing, were restricted to a limited group of members.

As heartened as people might feel about the involvement of the environmental NGOs, the very idea that the Dalian Environmental Protection Volunteer Association lodged a lawsuit against CNPC following the new environmental protection law confined its ability to advocate for a larger public awareness and get involved into the process of policy making. Instead of organizing street demonstrations or trying to change the policy of the introduction of polluted companies like CNPC, the local NGO turned to laws and followed the existing rules. By only pursuing compensation, the NGO in fact assisted the government to channel complaints and elected not to highlight the more serious issue of prioritizing GDP over the public welfare.

Conclusion

In the last few decades, China has gained acclaim as the world's fastest-growing economy and a global and regional power. It has also been increasingly faced with formidable social rifts: generational gaps, gender inequality, urban-rural

⁴⁶ Sharon LaFraniere and Michael Wines, "Plant Protest Shows China's Officials Under Pressure," *The New York Times*, August 15, 2011, sec., <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/world/asia/16dalian.html>.

divisions, ethnic clashes, and environmental damage. Some of the problems are directly attributable to the new era, yet others, such as gender and urban-rural inequality, are rooted in history. The authorities seek to strengthen their rule, promote China's international position, and accelerate economic growth, as their predecessors desired. This process invariably creates winners and losers. Some groups in today's society, in particular those with access to capital and power, gained opportunities and enriched themselves. Others, however, were gradually disadvantaged and disillusioned with the reform.

Thus, viewed from different angles, China's economic reform has brought both positive and destructive consequences to Chinese citizens. The case studies described in this chapter, include a variety of actors such as the elderly, middle-aged women, aquaculture farmers, local cadres, entrepreneurs, the central government, state-owned companies, the NGOs, and the media. Altogether, it consists of an extremely dynamic picture of today's rural China.

Conclusion

In mid-March, 2018, the world watched President Xi Jinping cement his status as China's most powerful leader in decades after the National People's Congress voted to abolish presidential term limits. Now included in China's constitution, Xi's ideology, entitled "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," represents a departure from the policies of his predecessors. Instead of "reform and opening up" as Deng Xiaoping advocated, Xi's "New Era" takes a more aggressive direction by "going out" to the world. Today, the Chinese economy is dependent on exports more than ever, even though it risks engagement in a trade war with the United States.

In spite of Xi's declaration that China is now on the path back to glory after a century of humiliation, one major obstacle to "realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation" is the unevenness of regional development.¹ The Northeast was particularly hard-hit by China's transition from a planned economy to a market economy, and became China's rust belt.² In 2016, Liaoning was the only province in China with a negative GDP growth. In 2017, Liaoning's GDP growth rate was 4.2 percent, lagging behind the national average rate of 6.9 percent. The situations of the

¹ Xi Jinping, "Juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui, duoqu xin shidai zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli" (Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era), delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017.

² A good investigation and analysis of the formation of the rust belt and its implications on the working population, see Ching Kwan Lee, *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007).

Northeast's other two provinces, Jilin and Heilongjiang, were slightly better, but they still had the lowest growth rates in the country.³

In this context, a negative portrayal of the Northeast as a region dominates social media. Popular Chinese websites, such as Weibo, Douban or Zhihu, urge readers "not to invest beyond the Great Wall" (*touzi buguo shanhaiguan*). The posts about the Northeast offer hundreds of responses about individual negative experiences of investing or simply traveling in Northeast China, caused by corruption, governmental red tape, or a lack of business infrastructure. Not only is there a lack of people interested in moving to the Northeast, but people from the Northeast are rushing to leave, a typical feature of the rust belt. A large outflow of laborers and a lower fertility rate than elsewhere in China makes it even more difficult for this region to realize economic revitalization.⁴ In desperation, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission in March 2018 announced a plan to revive Northeast China by pairing up the three northeastern provinces with developed southern and eastern regions. Under this scheme, Jiangsu will provide financial support and share experiences with Liaoning, Zhejiang will provide support to Jilin, and Guangdong will help Heilongjiang.⁵

One way to understand the uneven development between Northeast and other parts of China is to situate the region in the context of its colonial and socialist past.

³ "China Enlists Richer Provinces in Tie-Ups to Revive Rustbelt Northeast," *Reuters*, March 30, 2018, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-china-economy-northeast/china-enlists-richer-provinces-in-tie-ups-to-revive-rustbelt-northeast-idUKKBN1H607P>

⁴ "Low Fertility Rate, Labor Outflow Hampers NE China's Development," *Chinadaily.Com*, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-07/17/content_21313472.htm.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Throughout the twentieth century, Northeast China was governed by a multitude of regimes. These include the Qing dynasty, followed by the Chinese republican government, the Japanese occupation of southern Manchuria and subsequent establishment of Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo, and after World War II, a decade of Soviet occupation. After 1949, Northeast China was part of the Maoist effort to create a socialist economy.

In both the colonial and socialist periods, the development of Manchuria or Northeast China largely relied on outside, top-down investment in heavy industry, first by Japanese and later by the Chinese state. Even at the height of its development, this region was unable to realize self-sustained commerce. Therefore, after the state withdrew most of its investment after the mid-1990s, the region has struggled to keep up with the rapidly growing cities on the eastern and southeastern coasts. The lack of necessary infrastructure and business culture, and the region's peculiar geographical position in a cold, remote borderland, further kept outside people from entering and doing business there. In the end, the Chinese state has had to step in again as a matchmaker to tie the northeast provinces with the eastern and southern provinces.

In addition to a story of uneven development between Northeast China and other regions, the reform period also tells another story of discrepant development, as interior Manchuria and coastal Manchuria are moving in different directions. When the state pulled out investment and outsiders showed no interest in coming into interior Northeast China, as Chapter 5 showed, the state-owned oil giants set up factories and outside businessmen built golf courses and yacht clubs in the coastal

areas. Thanks to its privileged location, the maritime part of the Northeast, most notably the city of Dalian, has benefited from both Deng's "opening up" policy in the 1980s and the 1990s, and President Hu's "rejuvenation of the traditional industrial bases in northeastern China" project in the early 2000s.

Some local residents of Dalian see the city as an exception to the overall decline of the region. In the second decade of the twentieth century, the popular Chinese websites have been full of debate about whether Dalian belongs, or does not belong, to Northeast China. For example, one online commentator said, "Shenyang (the capital of Liaoning) belongs to Liaoning, but Dalian belongs to China" (*Liaoning shenyang, zhongguo dalian*). Or, "I never said to others that I am a Dongbei-er. I only told people that I am from Dalian."⁶

The history and the present of the coastal Northeast have spurred the formation of this superiority complex. For example, Dalian was in a complex triangular relationship first between Japan, China, and Manchukuo, and later between the Soviet Union, the Communists, and the Nationalists in the first half of the twentieth century. The issue of being autonomous (albeit part of the Japanese empire and then the Soviet sphere of influence) or fully incorporated into the Chinese nation was constantly contentious.

The tension of autonomy vs. incorporation also plays a role in accounting for the differences within Chinese groups inside Northeast China. As the first chapter shows, Manchuria was an ideal destination for migrants in North China, who aimed

⁶ Baidu.com, Tieba.com.

to “Breaking through the Pass” (*Chuang guandong*). As a result, the majority of residents in southern Manchuria were composed of migrants from the provinces of Shandong and Hebei in North China, who maintained close ties to China proper rather than other places in Manchuria.

Finally, this superior sense of identity is certainly not unique to people in Dalian. We find it in other post-colonial societies such as Hong Kong or post-industrial places such as Chicago. This kind of identity permeates communities when they ignore their colonial past or traditional role in the region. Instead, they focus on ambitions to be global, cosmopolitan centers.

No matter how complex the sources of unequal development, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that Dalian, is first and foremost, a port city. No matter how developed its maritime connections with outside regions, goods loaded into the vessels and transported through the maritime routes were produced inside Northeast China. In April 2018, based on the store distribution of 160 brands and its own commercial database, China’s Yicai Media Group evaluated the business attractiveness of 338 Chinese cities. In its list, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou are the first-tier cities. Dalian, which used to be listed as a “new first-tier city,” drops out of the list and ranks 21st.⁷ Therefore, we do not see a clear trend that Dalian has thrived in recent years while other places in the region are struggling. As an ancient Chinese proverb goes, “when drinking water, one should never forget those who dug the well” (*Chishui buwang dajingren*). Dalian may well need to re-

⁷ Xinhua, “Shanghai Tops Beijing in Most Commercially Attractive City,” accessed May 27, 2018, http://www.china.org.cn/business/2018-04/28/content_50990966.htm.

embrace its role as the transportation hub of Northeast China, and re-tie itself to its hinterland.

The question then becomes how Dalian positions itself in the region while not losing its global connection. This dissertation has explored the history of Dalian's present, looking at the maritime world and networks in coastal Manchuria, and examining how they came into existence in the first place, and who developed them. The maritime region along the Bohai/Yellow Sea Rim shows the dynamics and tensions produced by global competition, transnational, and national forces. Today, in Xi's "New Era," history will tell what shape the complicated entanglement of Dalian with Northeast China as a whole, the rest of China, and the other nations of Northeast Asia will take.

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