

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Ciudad de la memoria y ciudad del olvido:
Changes in the Everyday Life of Tijuana's Working Class Under Neoliberalism
1964-2014

A Thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

in

Latin American Studies

by

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

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EPIGRAPH

*En estas desolaciones, padre, donde de tu risa
sólo quedaban restos arqueológicos.
- Roberto Bolaño*

*En todo caso, el futuro parecía que iba resultar mucho mejor. Por lo menos el
futuro tenía la ventaja de no ser el presente, siempre hay un mejor para lo que
es malo. Pero no había en ella miseria humana. Es que tenía en si misma cierta
frescura de flor.
- Clarice Lispector*

*Nací para deber
problemas sin resolver
duermo para soñar
mi ciudad en llamas.
- San Pedro El Cortez*

We decided not to look this over any longer. - Frantz Fanon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature page.....	iii
Epigraph.....	iv
Table of Contents.....	v
Acknowledgements.....	vii
Abstract of Thesis.....	ix
Introduction: The Importance of Tijuana and it's Becoming a Global City	1
Defining Neoliberalism	5
Neoliberalism and Space	7
Neoliberalism and the Working Class	9
Neoliberalism and Everyday Life.....	15
The Right to the City	19
Study Significance & Purpose of Study.....	21
Theoretical Framework	22
Review of Literature	23
Interviews.....	28
Analysis of Tijuana in Literature (and other texts)	29
Structure of Text	30
Chapter 1: Tijuana Chica.....	31
1.1 The Early Years Through the Roaring Twenties	31
1.2 The End of la Tijuana Chica: 1930-1975.....	37
1.3 Everyday Life in “la Tijuana Chica”: 1930-1975	48
1.3.1 Work.....	49
1.3.2 Union Work.....	53
1.3.3 Leisure.....	59
1.3.4 The Border	61
1.3.5 Tijuana’s Centro and Gender	63
1.3.6 Political Life and the Federal Government.....	69
Chapter 2: The Crisis in Tijuana, 1974 —1982.....	73
2.1 The Global Economy.....	74
2.2 Tijuana in the Crisis	82
2.3 Everyday Life in Tijuana During the Devaluations.....	87
2.3.1 Change of Currency	87
2.3.2 Migration.....	90
2.4 Conclusion	92
Chapter 3: Tijuana as Neoliberal Boomtown, 1982 – 2014	95
3.1 Social and Spatial History	97
3.2 Everyday Life Under Actually Existing Neoliberalism	116
3.2.1 Work.....	119
3.2.2 Leisure.....	144

3.3. Conclusion	146
Chapter 4: Tijuana’s Black Mirrors: Everyday Violence in Neoliberalism.....	147
4.1 Everyday Life for Migrant Deportees.....	148
4.2 Narco Criminal Organization as Neoliberal Counter-Power	158
4.3 Conclusion	172
Chapter 5: Conclusion	174
Appendix A	176
Appendix B	178
References	179

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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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This work seeks to examine changes in the everyday life of Tijuana's working class under neoliberalism. To do so, the text first examines the everyday life of the working class prior to neoliberalism, investigating everyday life through interviews and literature, and contextualizing these accounts in spatial, social,

and economic developments. Following such, the everyday life of the working class under neoliberalism is investigated by conducting interviews, analyzing literature, and participant observation, again contextualizing along similar fields. Tijuana's population boom and urban development are attributed to the wide-scale disenfranchisement that was the result of neoliberal restructuring. Caught in a global production network, the everyday life of working-class people in Tijuana is largely determined by such globality. Informality, social abandonment, and criminality are the result of actual existing neoliberalism.

Introduction: The Importance of Tijuana and it's Becoming a Global City

“The struggle of man [sic] against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting”. — Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter

In morose song, the late Mexican singer-songwriter José Alfredo Jimenez once wrote, most insightfully, that “las distancias apartan las ciudades, las ciudades destruyen las costumbres.” It should make sense that such lyrics became so popularized at the time in which he sang those words. Between 1940 and 1960, the country of México was undergoing drastic changes demographically and spatially due to huge economic transformations. Increasingly, under the pressures brought on by capitalist industrialization that followed the consolidation of the dictatorial Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI), people in México were on the move. Industrialization meant that people had to relocate from the countryside to the city. In that time period, now known eloquently as the Mexican Miracle in historical and economic texts, the push from the countryside to the city began as people moved in search of work and better living conditions, brought on by the broken ejido system. Cities like Mexico City, Monterrey, and Guadalajara, became magnets for those displaced workers. Under such economic changes, across México and Latin America, the framework was being set for an increasingly urbanized population, a process that changed the lives and customs of hundreds of millions as industrialization and the world market demanded labor to be freed and relocated

to industrial centers in the periphery. It is this change that will be the main interest of this work.

The city of Tijuana, however, had a much different history from the rest of the country. Far from the reach of the metropolitan and political center of the country, Tijuana was at the tip of the patria. Established in the late 1800s, the city commonly betrays most national narratives of city construction. It never really began as an agrarian-based society. It betrays typical lines of national historical development, beginning first with a service based economy and then becoming an industrialized one. The city was established primarily as a tourism site, meant to attract the American dollar. For years, both the federal government and the national economy had little to do with the city. So far removed from even other northern industrial centers, Tijuana had few roads leading to the city. It was not until the 1930s that the federal government would first intervene under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas, and again in the 1960s that Tijuana would increasingly fall into the economic domain of the nation (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Prior to this, Tijuana had more to do with the US North American economy than with the Mexican one. However, with federal initiatives geared towards industrializing the north, Tijuana was wrangled back into the Mexican framework.

However, by the 1970s and 1980s, more and more, Tijuana became the destination site for migrant workers looking to sell their labor. Tijuana's population booms were however always rooted in crisis (Zenteno Quintero 1995), and so with the world economic crisis of the 1970s and the early 1980s, Tijuana

became increasingly attractive, as industrialization began to take off (and with it, the promise of work) in view of the proximity to the United States, mythicized its availability of potential work. Since then, Tijuana has undergone a series of rapid transformations that have changed the city in a historical blink-of-the-eye. In the time-span of a single generation, the city of Tijuana was reinvented and changed forever. Tijuana became a neoliberal boomtown in the new global economic system that brought it into the complex fabric of neoliberal capitalism. But what did this mean for the lives of the workers arriving and already there?

Over recent decades, city living and the importance of cities themselves in the global fabric of the Late Capitalist world order have become increasingly important. Urban Studies and Urban Planning have been springing up in universities around the world as the movement of people into urbanized locations requires the production of specialized knowledge. Since neoliberalism has not only become hegemonic, but increasingly pervasive as it entrenches itself to consume every corner of the globe, cities have become sites for the concentration and accumulation more capital than ever. As Neil Brenner, Peter Marcuse, and Margit Mayer observe in their introductory essay to *Cities for People, Not for Profit*, “cities operate as strategic sites for commodification processes. . . for the production, circulation, and consumption of commodities” while “they are themselves intensively commodified insofar as their constitutive sociospatial forms[. . .] are sculpted and continually reorganized in order to enhance the profit-making capacities of capital” (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer

2012, p.3). As they further note, the city “is continually shaped and reshaped through a relentless clash of opposed social forces oriented, respectively, towards the exchange-value (profit-orientated) and use-value (everyday life) dimensions of urban sociospatial configurations” (Brenner et al 2012, p.3-4). Tijuana, under such a new neoliberal order became one such city. Tijuana is a Global City. Saskia Sassen, in her essay “The Global City: Introducing a Concept,” marks the difference between a world city (one such as London, Berlin, or New York, whose importance in the world economic system goes back to previous historical moments and continues through time) and a Global City is distinct in that the Global City is defined by neoliberalism as its developmental motor (Sassen, 2005). The German historian, Antje Dieterich, is thus right to claim that Tijuana is such a city (Dieterich, 2014). The question now becomes, what does this mean for those living there, those that live this globality?

Hence it is the purpose of this study to understand *how* everyday life and the right to the city changed as neoliberalism changed the city of Tijuana. What is attempted here is to cast light on the changes in working class formations in Tijuana and the lived experience of workers prior to and after neoliberalization, and how the process of neoliberalization, is lived in the everyday. By describing the actual lived experience of the city, through ethnographic research, it is hoped that we will be able to discover how access to the city has changed for the working class. By weaving a narrative of multiple intersecting voices, in an attempt to historicize them in a wider mark of process and change, this work

seeks to document these changes in reference to the everyday and the Right to the City.

Defining Neoliberalism

At this point, neoliberalism (often times interchangeable with the more mainstream signifier of “globalization”) has come under constant assault. Since the Great Recession that began in 2007, a series of texts have assaulted the basic premises of Late Capitalist economic thought centered in neoliberalism (see Harvey’s marxist account, *17 Contradictions and the End of Capitalism* (2014), and Picketty’s more mainstream *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (2014) for most recent attacks, though there exists a slew of others since neoliberalism’s inception). However, as the purpose of this text is to add context to changes in the everyday and the right to the city over time, it is necessary to briefly explain how neoliberalism came about, what it is, and how it operates on economic terms.

Following the economic collapse of the Great Depression, a new capitalist economic model became hegemonic throughout the Capitalist world, though it emerged in different forms in different places. That said, there is a basic underlying structure that connects “First World” Keynesian capitalism and “Third World developmentalist capitalism” in that they shared “two common features: state intervention in the economy and a redistributive logic” (Robinson, 2012, p.14). Hence, what these economic models attempted to balance was

fundamentally a class compromise between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Throughout Latin America (and in México), “the state was required to correct the failures of domestic markets” and at the same time “implement a broadly interventionist trade policy to transform the structure of exports and, by logical extension, domestic production” (Weeks, 1995, p.109). This structure was formally known as Import Substitution Industrialization, and in México began to be implemented under the Cárdenas sexenio. What resulted throughout Latin America (especially in industrializing countries like México), was an economic boom marked by “moderate to strong growth performances” in which “Latin American countries benefited from a relatively stable world trading system of fixed exchange rates [. . .] preferential trading agreements, and an increasing number of operative commodity agreements between producing and consuming countries” (Weeks, 1995, p.109-110). Here, Weeks points out the international division of labor and/or the world system. As Samir Amin recounts in his essay *Latin America Confronts the Challenge of Globalization, A Burdensome Inheritance*, México was one of the countries “doomed to remain subject to systematic grand-scale pillage, exclusively for purposes of capital accumulation in the dominant centers” and whose government served “the local reactionary coalitions [. . .] and the dominant foreign capital” (Amin, 2014, p. 29-30). A welfare economy in México existed, but it was far from perfect. Regardless, the time period between the Second World War and the 1980s in México was marked by great economic growth.

Neoliberalism would be installed through a series of restructuring processes world wide following the collapse of the Keynesian state due to internal and inherent contradictions. Neoliberalism has been defined as either “a *utopian* project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a *political* project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation to restore the power of economic elites” (Harvey, 2009, p.19). This economic/political project demands that “the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade”, it requires that “each individual is held responsible and accountable for his or her own actions and well-being” and it extends “into the realms of welfare, education, health care, and even pensions” (Harvey, 2009, p.64-65). Furthermore, “all agents acting in the market are generally presumed to have access to the same information” while it is also presumed there “to be no asymmetries of power or of information that interfere with the capacity of individuals to make rational economic decisions in their own interests” (Harvey, 2009, p.68). This neoliberal plan would have multiple consequences.

Neoliberalism and Space

It should be no surprise that if capitalism as an economic system is to function, it must continue to expand. As Harvey says, “Capital is always about growth and it necessarily grows at a compound rate” (Harvey, 2014, p.222).

Growth is thus inherent to the system. In spatial terms, neoliberalism allowed capitalism (and thus capital) to be unleashed beyond the national boundaries of states at a point when capitalism was in crisis. David Harvey notes that the French social theorist Henri Lefebvre noted that capitalism requires the production of *space* to continue growing, and indeed, remarks that this question was brought up before by both Vladimir Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg who “considered that imperialism — a certain form of production and utilization of the global space — was the answer to the riddle [of how space was produced]” (Harvey, 2005, p.87). Indeed, even in 1999, Hungarian marxist István Mészáros noted that despite neoliberalism’s claim of an equality of individuals and developmental democracy, space and imperialism must remain a primary concern for theorists (Mészáros, 2001). Space in neoliberalism should thus be a central issue in understanding the mechanics of exploitation and oppression, as such an understanding may point to new paths of resistance.

Though the city of Tijuana had obviously existed prior to neoliberal hegemony, it was neoliberalism that re-invented the city. This is specifically what this text aims to demonstrate by focusing on a contextualization of changes forced upon the city by far greater economic forces. Tijuana became important under neoliberalism for a very specific reason: the city’s geographic location. Tijuana’s development and growth is unparalleled by the cities around it. Mexicali, though it has grown dramatically and is the political capital of the state of Baja California, does not come close to the economic importance of Tijuana.

This is because Tijuana lies on the border along a trade path in California that makes production and distribution into the US easier, faster, and thus more profitable. Thus, Tijuana has become an integral component in a larger production circuit based on a global supply chain of the economic system.

Neoliberalism and the Working Class

At this point it is worth problematizing the signifier “working class” to understand the referent of this. The working class as a revolutionary subject has been the cornerstone of Left thought since Marx and Engels. On the eve of 1848 revolutions, Marx and Engels were already able to understand that capitalism was revolutionizing the economy, and with it, restructuring social formations. As they state in the Communist Manifesto, “society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat” (Marx & Engels, 2012, p.35). With the capitalist revolution, two new social categories were created: the owners of the means of production (i.e. the bourgeoisie) and the workers who were exploited for their labor-power (i.e. the working class). Marx was able to note in the Communist Manifesto that “all fixed, fast-frozen relations. . . are swept away”, as the “need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (Marx & Engels, 2012, p.38). Marx’s great discovery, that is, his Labor Theory of Value, indicating that profit is

directly derived from the exploitation of the worker (See *Capital Volume I* by Karl Marx). Thus, this very work speaks to the position of the contemporary working class. Though history has proven that the industrial worker is not always the revolutionary subject (see Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt's *Black Flame, the Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism*), in today's contemporary setting, it is my assessment as a libertarian communist that the one of the many potentially revolutionary subjects and agents may be the urban worker, regardless of formal or informal working position. Nonetheless, let us make clear that since 1848 great interventions have been made in understanding capitalism and the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

The focus of this work will examine the *economic* relationship of the working class to global capital and will also take into account the formal feminization of labor in Tijuana due to its significance and newness in the neoliberal economic paradigm (race will unfortunately be the subject of abstraction, something I will explain — and apologize for — momentarily). As stated previously, profit is the result of surplus value derived from the exploitation of the workers' labor. Thus, as Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) denotes in his text *Class Conflict in the World Economy*, it is the bourgeoisie “who receive surplus-value they do not themselves create and use it to accumulate capital” (p.120). It follows then that “the proletariat are those who yield part of the value they have created to others”, something fundamental in the capitalist mode of production (Wallerstein, 1991, p.120). Gerard Duménil and Dominique Lévy have done

much to further problematize class in neoliberal configurations. If we understand workers as merely those that sell their labor, then many other social actors (executive bankers and CEOs) would be included in this schema. This is why Duménil and Levy are crucial to understand the difference. Duménil and Levy (2011) note the consolidation, instead, of a tripolar class configuration observing that “modern capitalism coincided with the establishment of new class patterns more complex than the simple distinction between capitalists and production workers” (p.12). They note that,

a sharp polarization occurred within these groups, meaning a new hierarchy among wage earners, a division between leading and subordinated categories. The phrase ‘managerial and clerical personnel’ is meant to capture this dual pattern (‘Clerical’ must be taken here in a broad sense, including notably commercial tasks or maintenance). Managerial personnel define the leading category, and these clerical personnel, the subordinated category. . . . As a result of the gradual transformation of production and clerical labor during the latest decades of modern capitalism [neoliberalism], it became gradually more relevant to consider jointly clerical personnel and production workers. . . . the merger between production and clerical workers defines more a trend than a mature outcome and, in contemporary capitalism, the coexistence of heterogeneous categories is still a basic feature of these groups (Duménil and Levy, 2011, p.13).

Hence, beyond the mere categorization of industrial workers and capitalists, modes of production have produced new categories and configurations.

At the same time, it must be noted that Gayatri Spivak has also done much to problematize divisions within the working class. Spivak (2000) notes that “the descriptive definition of a class can be a differential one — its cutting off and difference from all other classes; ‘in so far as millions of families live under

economic conditions of existence that cut off their mode of life, their interest, and their formation from those of the other classes and place them in inimical confrontation [feindlich gegenüberstellen], they form a class” (p.258). Spivak (2000) notes that the “capitalist is defined as ‘the conscious bearer [Träger] of the limitless movement of capital’” while the working class itself is not “an undivided subject where desire and interest coincide”, thus offering “models of a divided and dislocated subject whose parts are not continuous or coherent with each other” (p.258). Thus, this text, by examining everyday life *in Tijuana*, hopes to address differences and show that everyday life is dependent on local conditions.

However, as stated previously, gender and the feminization of labor will also be taken up in this text. The question of women in the labor market has come into focus since feminist movements from the 1960s onwards. Angela Davis, in her now seminal text *Woman, Race, and Class* shows that the exploitation and disempowerment of women’s labor is not something that *only existed* in capitalism, but has persisted through changes in various economic modes of production (Davis, 1983). If Marx found that behind the commodity lies a system of relations, Davis (1983) found that behind the worker in advanced capitalist economies, lies women’s work that is “invisible, repetitive, exhaustive, uncreative” amounting to countless hours of labor-time itself (p.222). Despite this housewifization, Davis also notes that women have also been part of the formal economy at different moments of the historical past (and present) depending on the moment and location, as well as the race of the worker (Davis, 1983).

However, since neoliberalism, in the global south, a pattern of the feminization of labor in the international division of labor has emerged.

Neoliberalism is the dominant economic mode throughout the global south, and especially in México, Latin America, and Tijuana. Maria Mies (1998) reaffirms previous positions postulated in this text, noting that since neoliberalism, “labour-intensive — and hence labour-cost-intensive — production processes” have been “exported to the colonies, now called developing countries, the Third World, etc.” as industrial plants have been moved to these countries and employed colonial workers “because of their low wage levels” (p.113). This has meant that as factories closed in the global north, they would reopen in the global south (Mies, 1998). However, Mies (1998) notes two fundamental conditions to the new international division of labor: these enterprises must “find the cheapest, most docile and most manipulable workers” while “corporations must mobilize consumers” in the global north to buy these items — an economic project in which the “mobilization of women plays a central role” (p.114). The “cheapest, most docile, and most manipulable workers” often meant women (Mies, 1998, p.114). Hence, women have been integrated increasingly into the formal economy as industrial workers. However, this does not mean that women in the Third World gained independence through employment. Rather, as Mies (1998) points out, “that the strategy of integrating women’s work into development also mounts to export- or market - oriented production” as “poor Third World women produce not what they need, but what

others can *buy*” (p.118). They are not invisible in that this study focuses on what the everyday life of these workers also consists of as well, due to the marked *change*.

That said, race will be left out of this study, not for its lack of importance, but because of its *continuity*. It must be admitted, however, that although my own foray into critical race studies is elementary at best, it is absolutely clear that the role of race has not only been fundamental to the creation of capitalism but to its maintenance, and is instrumental in the formation of the working class, not only in the center, but in the periphery. The work of Cedric J. Robinson is fundamental in understanding this. In his watershed text, *Black Marxism: The Making of the Radical Black Tradition* (2000), Robinson makes clear that despite the revolutionary nature of capitalism, there are things that continue and are fundamental to its functioning. As Curtis Márez said in his class on Marxist Thought, “where Marx marks historical changes, Robinson marks historical continuities” (Márez, 2014). Thus, since we will only examine the working class as an economic relation and its feminization of labor, and since we are interested in changes, race will be the victim of abstraction (for those interested on race in Tijuana, see Antje Dieterich’s 2015 dissertation, *Indigenität in Tijuana: Globale Diskurse und lokale Adaptionen, 1989-2012*).

Neoliberalism and Everyday Life

This is precisely the question. What is everyday life under neoliberalism? As this text searches to understand how everyday life changed in Tijuana from 1964 to the present day, it is necessary to first identify (or at least problematize) what the everyday *actually is*. As Ben Highmore (2002) reflects upon the work of Henri Lefebvre, “for [him]. . . everyday life is ‘defined’ by ‘what is left over’ after all distinct, superior, specialized, structured activities have been singled out by analysis (Lefebvre 1991:97)” (p.3). As he (2002) continues summarizing Lefebvre’s thought, “the everyday is precisely what lies outside the disciplines of knowledge” but at the same time is “profoundly related to *all* activities, and encompasses them with all their differences and conflicts (Lefebvre 1991:97)” (p.3). Everyday life, then, is something that permeates all social fields. Everyday life, we can posit, is the result of a historical process (i.e. historical materialism) and at the same time, is the result of various social fields that spring alongside and through such development (kinship, economic, geographic, political, communitarian, linguistic, racial). It will always be embedded within a historic code that flavors each day with racism, classism, sexism, colonization, imperialism, and nationalism. The everyday, then, is the result of one’s own agency amongst a historical tide of different institutional (and counter-institutional) forces that collide, contradict, or synthesize in the momentary and the mundane. Furthermore, as de Certeau notes, the study of the everyday must not only include representations and behaviors, but the very creations that come

about through play with these different forces (de Certeau, 2011). Hence, the everyday is what the individual *makes* or *does* with his/her/their surroundings, and we must acknowledge that this is always the product of historical forces.

Understanding such, we can then say that the everyday is the consumption of social life (and the individual navigating within its currents) *as it has been produced*. Hence we live a life that is inherited through historical processes. We operate in a historical field that is not entirely of our making but that we are forced to navigate, in that the present is always the product of historical forces. The result of such forces (and whatever they entail, be it racism through colonization, proletarianization through industrialization, and so on, and so on) is what constitutes the everyday. Thus, as de Certeau posits regarding the everyday and the space that it unfolds upon, analysis must begin with those who did not create the space, but are forced to live it (de Certeau, 2011). But we must still understand the place of a particular space's history in everyday life theory.

Placing the everyday within its historical context thus requires that supreme attention be placed on *space*. It goes without saying, that everyday life *today* is in fact most distinct from everyday life two hundred years ago. Furthermore, however, everyday life *today* is not homogenous. It is dependent on geographic location. Everyday life *today* is different in Papua New Guinea from that which is lived in the depths of the Amazonia, and just as vastly different from that which is lived by those peoples in Manhattan, Paris, or Mumbai. As David Harvey (2001) points out, "Lived lives and the sense of what values attach

thereto are embedded in an environment actively molded and achieved through work, play, and a wide array of cultural practices” (p.174-175). Hence, if we are to understand the everyday, we must understand that the everyday is certainly local, yet at the same time dialectically created through extra-local forces that bear down and co-create *space* and *time*. For this reason Tijuana is important to examine at the time period selected, given that we see Tijuana enter an even greater economic web as the era of neoliberalism unfolds. Examining the everyday life of Tijuana from 1964 to the present day is to examine its entrance into the global stage. As Ben Highmore points out, “to live in the West is to be connected to patterns of exploitation, environmental catastrophe, and poverty taking place in both the West and the non-West, even if those connections are hidden in the practices of big business” (Highmore 2002, p.18). He continues, claiming that “Lefebvre imagines an approach to everyday life that would move from the daily activities at the level of specifically individual experience (shopping, for instance) to the level of the supra-individual, for instance, global financial markets” (Highmore, 2002, p.18). Hence, the everyday we are concerned with is in understanding the relation of everyday life in a specific location (Tijuana) to grander and larger historical changes (global installment of neoliberal economic formations).

If everyday life is a little bit of everything, which part of everything are we analyzing? The place is known, and it is Tijuana. The time period has been honed into a specific time period through which we will (hopefully) be able to see

how extra-local forces re-shaped the local space of Tijuana through historical processes that in turn developed everyday life (that is the time period around neoliberalization). But given that the everyday is influenced by so many social forces as mentioned above, this text cannot analyze all aspects of the everyday. Hence, as we are preoccupied specifically with how *economic* forces changed the *space* (i.e. Tijuana), then for the sake of this text, let us stay within the field of economic relations. That said, we will examine how historical economic processes changed both *work* and *leisure* in the city of Tijuana. As Henri Lefebvre (2014) says,

the relation between leisure and the everyday is not a simple one: the two words at one and the same time united and contradictory (therefore their relation is dialectical). . . Every day, at the same time, the worker leaves the factory, the office worker leaves the office. Every week Saturdays and Sundays are given over to leisure as regularly as day-to-day work. We must therefore imagine a 'work leisure' unity, for this unity exists, and everyone tries to programme the amount of time at his disposal according to what his work is — and what it is not. Sociology should therefore study the way the life of workers as such, their place in the division of labour and in the social system, is 'reflected' in leisure activities, or at least in what they demand of leisure. (p.51-52)

Work and leisure are intriguing for various reasons in this study. Work, as Lefebvre (2014) points out, "is the foundation of personal development within social practice" and "it links the individual with other works (on the shop floor, in the social class, in the social system) and also with knowledge" (p.60). At the same time, Lefebvre (2014) cites Marx in that "*The true realm of freedom, the development of human powers as an end to itself, begins beyond it, though it can*

only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis” (p.60). And yet, Lefebvre notes that leisure is not an end to itself as there “can be *alienation in leisure just as in work*” (Lefebvre, 2014). Hence, the concern of the present work is not only *how* work under neoliberalism changed in Tijuana but how the relation of workers among themselves, their city, and the wider globe changed. And at the same time, *how* did neoliberalism change their access to leisure, and what does leisure comprise of now in comparison with before. Hence, we will focus on what work/leisure was like prior to neoliberalization and what work/leisure became through it. However, the purpose here not to find activities or practices through which people rebel against the order of things, but rather how people are defined by the construction of history and neoliberalism.

The Right to the City

As stated previously, this text is greatly interested in the idea of the Right to the City. The concept of the Right to the City first came about in Left circles in the counter-cultural movement of 1968 within the global north that precipitated the crisis of the 1970s. As Peter Marcuse, son of Herbert Marcuse, reminds us, the crisis of 1968 was brought about by the “combined dissatisfaction of broad elements of the population with the frustrated potentials they saw society might frustrate” and thus centered between “the reality and the potential” of the city (Marcuse, 2012, p.28). At its core, the demand to the Right to the City was directed against “alienation in daily life, against the modernization of cities and

the destruction of their specific qualities, and against the exclusion from urban life” thus amounting to a struggle towards a “different city” (Schmid, 2012, p.43).

Marcuse (2012) reminds us that Lefebvre, the first to conceptualize the right, best defined the Right as such:

the right to the city is like a cry and a demand. This right slowly meanders through the surprising detours of nostalgia and tourism, the return to the heart of the traditional city, and the call of existent or recently developed centralities. . . [it is thus] the right to information, the right to use of multiple services, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time of their activities in urban areas; it would also cover the right to the use of the center (p.29)

Thus, the Right to the City is based on the potential of a rearrangement of power, based upon the creation of collective rights to the city as use-value, as opposed to one based on private rights, based on exchange-value.

Since that time period, we have seen throughout Latin America, and the world, the resurgence of such a concept. From San Francisco with the struggle against Google and Silicon Valley executives, to Brazil and Passe Livre Movement that mobilized millions throughout the country, to Turkey and the struggle for Ghezi Park — the city itself has become an important site of contestation. As David Harvey (2013) remarks, “the traditional city has been killed by rampant capitalist development, a victim of the never-ending need to dispose of overaccumulating capital driving toward endless and sprawling urban growth no matter the social, environmental, or political consequences” (p.xv-xvi). And it should make sense: throughout the world, and especially in Latin America,

entire populations are increasingly urban. Hence, the idea of the Right to the City has a potentially radical significance, if not revolutionary. Thus, this work intends to study how people and texts talk about the city, in order to create an imaginary cartography of the current status, in the hope that it may chart new paths.

Study Significance & Purpose of Study

Though books have been published regarding changes in the city of Tijuana, and narratives of people that lived those changes exist, as of yet, no study (to the extent of my knowledge) currently exists that attempts to document the changes in *everyday life* and how this is related to the Right to the City. Though this work may be limited (as it is only designed for a Masters thesis) it is my sincere hope that the work may provide fresh research into the field and inspire others to take up the same torch, so-to-speak. The point of this work is perhaps not so much to “give voice” to the voiceless, but to compile voices and contextual them in a larger narrative that was not of their choosing. The point is not to impose a history, but rather to uncover narratives and see how they intersect and form along historical lines. As Frederic Jameson says in *The Valences of the Dialectic*, it is the intersection of multiple accounts that provide insight into temporalities (Jameson, 2010). Hence, the question is not to understand resistance, but to understand changes in domination and exploitation at the micro-level, so as to better draw a map of its functioning, and pave roads of resistance.

Theoretical Framework

Aside from the above mentioned theories with which this text works (marxism, everyday life and the Right to the City), this work intends to pick up where Critical Urban Theory leaves off, in that it will be an attempt to create an ethnography probing the realities of urban processes through the texts created that document such changes. Critical Urban Theory has been a growing field in recent decades within the field of Geography and Urban Policy and Planning. The focus of the field has been to put Critical Theory into the field of spatial and geographic development. Theorists such as Henri Lefebvre, Manuel Castells, and David Harvey have been foundational, though a slew of others have come up within the field including Peter Marcuse, Neil Brenner, and Magit Meyer. As Marcuse, Brenner, and Meyer state in their text *Cities for People, Not for Profit* (2012), critical urban studies bases itself on the following criteria:

(a) to analyze the systemic, yet historically specific, intersections between capitalism and urbanization processes; (b) to examine the changing balance of social forces, power relations, sociospatial inequalities and political-institutional arrangements that shape, and are in turn shaped by, the evolution of capitalist urbanization; (c) to expose the marginalizations, exclusions, and injustices (whether of class, ethnicity, 'race' gender, sexuality, nationality, or otherwise) that are inscribed and naturalized within existing urban configurations; (d) to decipher the contradictions, crisis tendencies, and lines of potential or actual conflict within contemporary cities; and on this basis (d) to demarcate and politicize the strategically essential possibilities for more progressive, socially just, emancipatory, and sustainable formations of urban life (p. 5).

Review of Literature

Place is incredibly important in this text. In order to understand the political reality of the working class Tijuana, it is important to focus on Tijuana itself and its representations over time. It is not the purpose of this text to provide a history of Tijuana's representations but in order to note to understand the writing of this text this history must be considered. That said, I must briefly illustrate certain archetypical representations that the city has garnered, and for this I will briefly turn to the work of Humberto Félix Berumen, who has written extensively on the subject.

As Humberto Félix Berumen states in his landmark text, *Tijuana la horrible* (2003), Tijuana has garnered the reputation of being a city of sin. Tijuana is commonly written about or spoken of as a place that exists on the periphery of society, a parent-less city that breeds crime and vice. This is further reflected in Félix Berumen's text, "Snapshots from and about a City Named Tijuana" (2012), provides various illustrations of the city that have come into focus over the years. My sparse, if not absent, writing of sights, sounds, and smell is meant to combat such representations. He boils down representations to specific categories that have appeared over time: Tijuana as "Synthesis of the Nation", Tijuana as "Land of Promise", Tijuana as "City to Pass Through", Tijuana as "Symbol of Cultural Postmodernity", Tijuana as city "Engulfed in Violence", and Tijuana "Nation between Two Nations" (Félix Berumen, 2012). My aim is to dispel such claims as nonsense once contextualized and historicized.

Juan Manuel Benitez's work, *A Social History of the Mexico - United States Border: How Tourism, Demographic Shifts, and Economic Integration Shaped the Image and Identity of Tijuana, Baja California, Since World War II* (2001), attempts to provide a history of Tijuana's ever changing image by placing Tijuana in a deeper historical context. The work is largely focused on the *image* Tijuana has garnered throughout its history and is broken into three fundamental phases of its development: from 1945-1965, from 1965 - 1982, and from 1982 to present. Benitez places his emphasis on Tijuana's role as a site of tourism, marking the economic activity around as the core reason for its conception.

The work of María del Rosio Barajas Escamilla puts the growth of the maquiladora industry into social perspective. Her text, *Global Production Networks in an Electronic Industry: The Case of the Tijuana — San Diego Binational Region* (2000), aims to uncover social relationships that develop over such complex global networks. By examining primary and secondary economic exchange in San Diego and Tijuana, including statistical information and interviews, the author claims that Tijuana is a region that is semi-peripheral, along with the rest of the northern border region, due to its proximity to the United States and porous nature of the border.

The increasing importance of Tijuana as a manufacturing city was one of the central factors of the city's population boom since the 1980s. Both formal and informal housing markets have become the logical consequence as hundreds of thousands of people have migrated to the city in search of work. Alejandro

Rodríguez's *Informal Housing Markets and Urban Structures in Tijuana* (2009) brings key insight into the city's process of urbanization. The study of the city's informal housing structure is an important examination to the city's development. Rodríguez contests that the city's informal housing market has been created due simply to a lack of economic resources, instead positing that urban formality is obsolete, as it cannot keep up with the constant influx of rural migrants and urban land markets that malfunction, unable to maintain pace. His work provides key insight into informal urban structures and spatial production and provides much needed data.

However, in terms of spatial analysis, no one is better versed than Tito Alegría. His seminal book *Metrópolis transfronteriza, revisión de la hipótesis y evidencias de Tijuana, México, y San Diego, Estados Unidos* (2009), persuades the reader that contrary to many previous studies that have attempted to portray Tijuana and San Diego as a singular city, they are separate cities. Through a systematic analysis of comparing economic and demographic structures, of spatial distributions of economic activities and peoples, of comparing the urban form as well as the generating mechanisms of such forms, of analyzing residential ground use as well as commercial and service centers, (not to mention political organs and structure), Alegría justifies his argument that the two cities are in fact not the same. This text marks the perfect starting point for this study, as this work will not at all look at people living in San Diego, California.

Tito Alegría's article, *Estructura de las ciudades de la frontera norte* (2010), draws some of the key characteristics of urbanization along Mexico's northern border. Northern cities realize an explosion in population especially toward the final decades of the twentieth century as the United States and other countries exploit Mexican labor. By initiating NAFTA, you have extended the boundaries of labor production have effectively lowered the cost of labor. You no longer have to worry about the strict workers' rights found in the United States. By creating NAFTA have inversely expanded the labor pool in the United States, meaning that they've lowered the cost of labor, and exploited the low labor prices in Mexico, where, should they demand higher wages, will move their business elsewhere so as not to pay higher wages (Alegría 2010). Such should be considered an act of colonization without having to militaristically expand the nation state or bring extra people into the social security pool. Furthermore, towards the actual city structure of Tijuana, Alegría (2010) notes that those with higher income levels live closer to the old city center, which locates them closer to utilities, services, and the legal border crossing-point alike. Meanwhile, the poor are pushed to periphery subcenters, with less and less access to utilities and services.

Since the neoliberal order is based on the maximization of profit, border cities involved in neoliberal production are structured around the same concept. In an article by Lawrence A. Herzog entitled "Rethinking the Design of Mexican Border Cities: Seven Ecologies" (2007), the new spaces of Tijuana that have

been produced since the city's emergence on the global market are analyzed and scrutinized. The author quickly points out that globalization (or neoliberalism) has created first-world metropolises like New York, London, and Tokyo, that are home to headquarters of transnational corporations, and third-world cities like São Paulo, Shanghai, and Mexico City that are now megalopolis. However, since neoliberalism's onset, borders have become increasingly important, and the cities along certain borders have changed incredibly, like that of Tijuana. Due to Tijuana's proximity to the United States, Tijuana has been selected as a prime site for manufacturing. The city has created maquiladoras, which as the author notes, began in the mid 1960's as part of the Border Industrialization Program. Since then, a "Global Factory Zone" has been created. Unfortunately, the author paints their history as if it were linear. The author fails to note that the growth of maquiladoras blew up almost exponentially beginning around about 1982-1984, when the neoliberal structural changes were set into motion. Herzog does note that these spaces are dedicated to the development of goods, and the buildings around them are uniformed, set around a controlled landscape, that receives a great deal of security attention (Herzog 2007). What he fails to point out is that security is something that exists for the multinational corporations (or the spaces they inhabit) but not for the population that works there (or the spaces they inhabit). Another space he points to is the creation of the Transnational Consumer Space. Here, Herzog (2007) complains that increasingly space is being privatized and doing away with the city's past as new consumption centers,

like strip malls and shopping centers, are replacing traditional establishments.

The city of Tijuana has also created Global Tourism Districts, which according to the author, create colonized space in which those that have access to these portions of the city, those to whom these spaces are created for and utilized by, are foreigners (Herzog 2007). Another space that has sprung since globalization that the author notes are Post-NAFTA Neighborhoods, which are favela-like settlements that are self-constructed by the working poor, many of whom work in maquiladoras. The last important ecology that is worth mentioning is the Space of Conflict. According to Herzog (2007), the border itself has become increasingly militarized and spans an area much longer than the Berlin Wall, with dedication capabilities that are more advanced. Herzog (2007) claims that the wall “Berlinzes” San Diego and Tijuana. This claim is problematic: though it does create a separation quite similar to East and West Berlin, it is not an ideology that creates schisms between the two cities. This is a wall that separates the first-world and the third. Herzog does a fine job of painting the city as a city of extreme dualities, of spaces of rich and poor, of past and present, of first-world and third-world.

Interviews

To understand how changes in everyday life and the right to the city occurred, my study consists of two parts. The first is an ethnography made up of unstructured interviews of workers selected from specific economic sectors, and

includes as well my own participant observation. The first pool consists of people that were born in the city (or moved there at an early age), prior to 1960.

Understanding that the local economy prior to 1982 was largely made up of tourism and service sectors, workers had to work in such industries, and live in working-class neighborhoods such as Zona Norte, Zona Centro, Sánchez Tabuada, or La Libertad. The second pool of subjects that have been chosen either moved to the city of Tijuana after 1982 or were born there after the date. The same economic sectors of the first group apply but the maquiladora sector will now be added. I am interested in how the people themselves perceive and define their right to the city, the experience of work and leisure, to ultimately understand how they negotiate time and space. I do not want to impose a middle-class North American perception of what life and work should be. Hence, this is precisely why oral histories are so important because they give the subjects themselves the ability to define *their* everyday, in *their* own words.

Analysis of Tijuana in Literature (and other texts)

The study above will be supplemented above by a study that consists of textual analysis of literature, written or created over the time periods selected that represent the city. Examining novels and journalistic accounts will provide useful insight into the everyday experience of the working class. Literature and film is often capable of picking the subtleties of historical processes, social transformation, and the urban lifestyle that more technical sciences cannot

capture or produce. Due to the scant amount of literature regarding the city prior to 1982, *Calle Revolución* by Ruben Vizcaíno Valencia, written in the mid-1960s, has been selected, as well as small excerpts from *Tijuanenses* by Federico Campbell. For the period after 1982, I chose *Estrella de la calle sexta* and *Tijuana: crimen y olvido*, both by Luis Humberto Crosthwaite. I will also examine the nonfiction journalistic account by Omar Millan, *Al este de la ciudad* (2014).

Structure of Text

The work will be divided into four chapters. Each chapter will provide the socio-spatial history of each time period, and then examine the intersections of interviews, literatures, and journalism. These secondary sections will examine work and leisure, as well as other thematic developments. The first chapter will briefly examine Tijuana's foundation and then examine the time period from 1964 to 1974. Chapter two will examine the global economic crisis and its impact on Tijuana, between 1974 and 1982. Chapter three examines neoliberalism's arrival in the city between 1982 and 2014. Lastly, chapter four discusses neoliberalism's "black mirrors", that is, the completely negative outcomes that turn into social abandonment, as seen in migrant deportations, and neoliberalism as a mode of class violence that has logically created a narco system of counter-power.

Chapter 1: Tijuana Chica

“Nuestro trabajo no se perderá — nada se pierde en este mundo —: las gotas de agua, aun siendo invisibles, logran formar el océano.” — Mijail Bakunin

1.1 The Early Years Through the Roaring Twenties

It began in fits in starts. At the beginning of the 20th century, no one believed Tijuana would be the bustling and industrial border metropolis it is today. The city had little qualities to make it such. With no historical connection to any colonial administrative or economic center (like Mexico City, Guadalajara, Guanajuato, etc), Tijuana’s primordial point of creation was marked by the colonial westward expansion of the United States that defined Baja California’s northern borderline, and with it the extent of the country’s northwestern territory. Following the presidential decree by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada two decades later in 1874, a border checkpoint was established in what would be called by 1889, El Pueblo de Zaragoza del Rancho de Tijuana (Benitez, 2005). At a global scale, Tijuana’s importance in global production circuits was null at the turn of the century. Social necessity denied any relevance. At that time period, only the north Mexican cities of Saltillo, Monterrey, and Hermosillo were important to national economic production, as most of the heart of the economy was clustered in central Mexico (Herzog, 1990). Tijuana was thus greatly removed from the rest of the country. Though the area the city is now situated on lay upon indigenous lands (i.e. previously autonomous and largely outside the capitalist circuit of

exploitation and domination), a new trend of urbanization driven by external forces was beginning to establish itself.

This is further evidenced by the initial population booms (which are always tethered to economic activity) that were spurred by 1911. As the city's political demarcation line (the US - Mexico border) and its very creation was spurred by extra-local involvement, its population boom was pushed by outside forces as well. By the 1900s, Tijuana's economic value was eyed by speculators looking to extract profits from San Diego's booming population, seeing in the area that lay beyond the border the ability to extract profit from US American leisure-time. As it has been acknowledged, it was the production of services geared for American tourists that served as the initial economic spark for the city of Tijuana (Zenteno Quintero, 1995).

A dependency was thus being established at a nascent moment, especially given that the city lacked any practical connection to the federal government or most of the country (Verduzco Chávez, 1990). As horse races and bars were being made illegal in California in 1911, American capitalists turned a thirsty eye towards the blossoming city of Tijuana (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). In the midst of the Mexican Revolution, American capitalists H.A. Houser and H.J. Moore had obtained a permit to open a racetrack in Tijuana, in order to profit from business regulations in California, which shortly followed the establishment of Casino Montecarlo and Casino Sunset Inn (Hernández Vicencio, 2004).

This dependency was made clear, even during these formative years, when a short economic depression hit the city as the direct result of a closed border policy enacted by the United States due to Mexico's lack of involvement in the First World War (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). However, as the war ended in Europe and the United States officially opened the border, what came to define the city was again, foreign policy.

By 1920, changes were developing in Tijuana that made it more connected to both México and the United States. In 1919 governor Esteban Cantú, after making Tijuana its own municipality in 1917, connected the newly founded city with Tecate and Mexicali via the Camino Nacional freeway (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). However, despite attempts to connect Tijuana to Mexicali, the clear economic determinant was still the American consumer. The implementation of prohibition in the United States marked a new wave of capitalist formation in the city. It's proximity to the United States made it an ideal space for North American capitalists to escape strict product regulation and illegalization of alcoholic beverages. As Hernández Vicencio makes clear, prohibition in the border city meant an economic opportunity in the expansion of services related to the newly minted bootleg economy (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). The accumulation of capital that prohibition provided the city in turn allowed the economy to expand into basic commercial sectors (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). It was in this time period as well, that basic industry began to form. The Mexican dairy company, Jersey, was established in the 1920s by

Spaniard Cesáreo Jiménez who began to pasteurize milk for local consumption (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). Yet, despite the establishment of some industrial activity, Tijuana's economic base was firmly centered on tourism.

The enactment of prohibition in the 1920s, thus allowed a great deal of growth in economic activity. However, the bigger businesses that called Tijuana home were not only owned by North American capitalists, but many of the people that worked at businesses that revolved around tourism were foreign laborers as well. This in turn sparked early workerist social formations for the first time in the city, at least since the Magonista invasion of 1911. Tania Hernández Vicencio found that not only were the main investors primarily North American, but that a great portion of the workers in the 1920s in the tourist economy were actually North Americans and Chinese immigrants, while Mexican workers cleaned and did more invisible labor (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). This in turn led to an anarco-sindicalist backlash with the establishment of the Organización de Obreros Libertarios, itself integrated into the Confederación General de Trabajadores, that was both anti-American and radical in nature (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). Rather than focusing their efforts through political and electoral means, the CGT held a strategy based on direct action (Samaniego López, 1998). But the union took a hard hit in the early 1920s, when striking for more and better employment, the government responded through means of repression and imprisoned its primary leaders in neighboring Mexicali (Samaniego López, 1998). Despite the incarceration of early leaders however, anarco-sindicalism

continued to flourish among bartenders, waiters, dishwashers, and sweepers in Tijuana (Samaniego López, 1998). As Tijuana boomed in the 1920s, agitation among workers continued to escalate, especially in the months that the racetracks were closed (Samaniego López, 1998). Thus, under the governorship of Abelardo L. Rodríguez, due to increasing pressure from workers both in the CROM (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana) — which was favored by the government — and the CGT, it was announced in 1924 that any business owned by foreigners had to have a workforce made of at least 50% Mexican citizens (Samaniego López, 1998). Hence, due to racist working conditions and obvious exploitation, radical political sensibilities rooted in direct action found a nascent breeding ground.

Among such stark changes that began to form within Tijuana due to the economic boom that prohibition provided, distinct spatial markings in the city began to develop. Avenida Revolución became a primary sector of consumption, around which employment revolved. As Benítez explains, the street functioned as the main tourist attraction where prohibited commodities were sold all along the street (Benítez, 2005). In 1927, a group of Californian businessmen laid the foundations for the Compañía Mexicana de Agua Caliente that was a resort, casino, and racetrack all in one luxurious package (Benítez, 2005). This would become one of the primary tourist zones for the city, aside from avenida Revolución. However, in spatial terms, the Agua Caliente resort sprawled outwards from the south, further away from the bustle of Revolución, towards La

Mesa. Though removed from the central hub of Revolución, the Agua Caliente Resort also became a site of workerist contestation. On the day of inauguration, on December 28, 1929, more than a thousand anarco-sindicalist affiliated workers marched from downtown Tijuana to the Resort (Samaniego López, 1998). In the face of such agitation, the government ensured at least 80% of the workforce there and around the city would now have to be Mexican (Samaniego López, 1998). Though anarchism would eventually die out and be erased by union cooption into the CROM (Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana), it created a combative and autonomous sensibility that remained for some time (as will be apparent with later interviews).

The economic boom in the 1920s allowed for a number of developments. The booming profits that were yielded from companies that revolved around “vice” were increasingly taxed, allowing for the creation of public work projects that increased drainage services and allowed central avenues to be paved (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). And so, although Tijuana entered the 1920’s with a population of 1,228 people, by 1930 it had ballooned to 21,977 people (Herzog, 1990). This population boom was also aided by the Great Depression. In 1929, following the global economic crisis, a great many deported migrant workers arrived at Tijuana from the United States and formed the Colonia Libertad, due to the lack of resources to return to the country’s interior (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Hence, the decade made the city’s center revolve around Revolución while the periphery was being established eastward across the city. Thus, the 1920s mark

an important epoch in the history of Tijuana as its economic, labor, and spatial foundations were solidified.

1.2 The End of la Tijuana Chica: 1930-1975

With the end of Prohibition in 1933, the city of Tijuana found itself in a precarious position. By this year, Tijuana had registered approximately 200 businesses, though it must be noted that half of them were bars (Verduzco Chávez, 1990). Due to the end of prohibition in the United States, Tijuana suffered another economic depression (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). In the face of such economic crisis, the federal government addressed the city for the first time since establishing the outpost under Lerdo de Tejada (Ranfla González and Álvarez de la Torre, 1988). In order to counteract the depression that hit the city, Mexican president Abelardo L. Rodríguez established a tariff-free zone, known as a *perímetro libre*, in specific locations in Baja California (Verduzco Chávez, 1990). This was the beginning of a bigger plan to integrate the region with the rest of the country.

The presidency of Lázaro Cardenas marked serious changes for the city of Tijuana. In 1935, the president outlawed casinos in all of the country and this meant the closure of various work sites in the city, among them the famed Agua Caliente Casino (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). This furthered the necessity to reorient the local economy of Tijuana. In 1936, as part of a wider effort to bring Tijuana and northern Baja California into the fold of the nation, the “Plan para la

recuperación de los territorios” was put into action in order to lay down a stronger infrastructural foundation for economic and urban growth. The plan entailed a series of public works aimed around the development of urban infrastructure, as well as expropriating agricultural lands in the city’s periphery (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Following this, the temporary solution to create a tariff-free zone made by Rodríguez a few years prior became part of a larger plan. In 1937, the federal government initiated the Zona Libre para el Territorio Norte de Baja California, which legalized the tariff-free zone for a period of 10 years (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Due to the lack of locally produced goods and its isolated geographic position in relation to national production centers in the country’s interior, the move to make a tariff-free zone was born out of a lack of an alternative recourse or option (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). This allowed commerce to expand as industrial and commercial goods could be imported without taxation (Zenteno Quintero, 1995) creating a good deal of growth in the commercial field of the local economy, thus changing the face of employment in Tijuana. At 1940, 13.7% of those employed in the city worked in manufacturing, 22.7% in commerce, and 44.6% in the service sector (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Hence, the reliance on foreign production and consumption continued to be a lasting tradition in the city of Tijuana due to the lack of any viable alternative given Tijuana’s geographic position in relation to the rest of the country.

But with the North American entrance into the Second World War, San Diego’s economic and political position in global production dramatically shifted.

San Diego became the center of the North American naval command and became a primary site of naval and arms production. During the war, large amounts of male North American workers were shipped to faraway theaters of war, leaving economic production to female and foreign labor. As Zenteno Quintero adequately notes, if the US economy (and with it, its war machine) were to continue, it needed the help of foreign labor (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Thus, in 1942 the Bracero Program was established. This program was responsible for the relocation of 5 million Mexican workers to the United States, as well as many others that worked illegally in the US. Hence, the bracero program was greatly responsible for the population boom in Tijuana, and thus served as a principal push-factor for south-to-north migration in Mexico, especially among rural labor pools (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Hence, Tijuana's population once again exploded, as North American involvement in the Second World War brought thousands of people to the city and the rest of the northern region. In 1940, the city counted 21,977 people, and by 1950, it held within it some 65,364 people (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Furthermore, while male-workers went north to the United States, their families moved to and resided in northern Mexican cities, such as Tijuana (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). During the Second World War, the city also saw an increase of tourism from San Diego as well as commerce (Ranfla González and Álvarez de la Torre, 1988). The growth in tourism can be explained through the increased naval activity and the relocation of US armed forces personnel just on the other side of Tijuana, while commerce increased due

to lax regulation. Hence, with capital gains made from prohibition, the growth of tourism due to the creation of the San Diego Naval Base, the increased commerce due to the creation of the tariff-free zones, and the newly created reserve army of labor made through migration to the city, a process of diversification of Tijuana's economy was initiated.

To facilitate these changes, a number of bourgeois organizations had already formed through means of business associations and chambers of commerce. Organizations like the Cámara Nacional de Comercio, Servicios y Turismo (Canaco) de Tijuana (established in 1926, it continues to operate to this day representing interests of organizations like Oxxo, Dominos Pizza, and TelCel) became increasingly vocal and decisive in the city, and in 1947, the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Transformación (National Chamber for Processing Industry — Canacintra, in its Spanish acronym) was established, while in 1959 the Centro Empresarial (CE) de Tijuana was established (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). We should make clear however that by the 1950s the inherent contradiction of having tariff-free commerce while the rest of the country was under a regiment of import substitution industrialization meant that there was constant conflict between the local bourgeoisie, profiting from the free-trade, and the national one, that demanded an end to the tariff-free zone (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). Hence, the ability to have an open border through which goods could flow untaxed continued to be necessary to the development of the city, though the federal government would get involved (something that will

be discussed in a later section). Needless to say, what little farmland was created around the city was increasingly disappearing. Though the primary economic activity had always existed, it was increasingly being eclipsed by developments primarily in service and commerce, and secondarily by industrial processing. As Hernández Vicencio points out, by the 1950s, the primary sector was hardly considered an economic activity worth noting (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). In fact, between 1950 and 1970, more than half the working population worked in the service economy (Verduzco Chávez 1990). Hence, despite efforts to bring the economy into the national scope, Tijuana was still dependent on commerce with the United States (if not US policies), though the American dollar did allow changes to economic formations.

Regardless, the early 1960's found Tijuana on the eve of change. With only a few years before the expiration of the Bracero Program (which had been threatened before in the 1950s by the American government and resulted in a wave of deportations back to México) the Mexican federal government understood that something had to be done quickly before the waves of migrants flooded back by will or by force from the United States. The obvious place that migrant workers were bound to return to was the northern border, and with an already exploding population, not only did the city have to make economic changes, but infrastructural changes had to be made as well in order to facilitate the coming population boom. What these circumstances thus created was the push to industrialize the region, thus the invention of the maquiladora.. Though

the maquiladora program did not blossom as the Mexican government had hoped, it did set the stage for the coming phase of neoliberalization that would result from the economic crash of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

During the 1960s, a series of economic programs were put into place to absorb labor surplus and to stimulate industrialization in the city of Tijuana. These included the Programa Nacional Fronterizo (PNF), Programa Industrialización Fronteriza (PIF) and the Programa de Comercialización Fronteriza (PCF) (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). The goal of the federal government during this time period was to help modernize the region through industrialization and bring more concretely into the national orbit, particularly because the interior of the country had already been experiencing a strong surge of industrialization since the 1940s. Since the 1940s, the rest of the country had strongly adopted the economic regiment of Import Substitution Industrialization. As Williamson notes, under Miguel Alemán, the economic program called for capital to be accumulated by the state for “investment in infrastructure, technology, and education”, resulting in a program in which “the state provided the infrastructure and the basic utilities through its corporations, while the private sector followed the broad lines of development indicated by government planners in a business environment protected from external competition by high tariff barriers” (Williamson, 2009, p.400-401). During this time period, the country as a whole had been able to reduce the consumption of foreign goods from 22.2% in 1939 to 5.7% by 1958, while consumption of foreign intermediate and capital

goods reduced from 55.9% to 40.3% in the former and 90.3% to 68.4% in the latter (Garza, 2003). This rapid industrialization that overtook the country led, in turn, to a rapid urbanization, a necessary requirement for industrial growth and sustainment. The cities, thus, that grew at the fastest rates were those that specialized in manufacturing where products were made for substitution, such as México City and Monterrey (Garza, 2003). This process became known as the Mexican Miracle.

However, the industrial promises of the Mexican Miracle never really arrived at Tijuana. As we know, its local economy was largely dependent on foreign consumption, while the interior of the country tried to ween itself from foreign dependence. Hence, new programs were necessary if Tijuana were to be economically viable in the foreseeable future. In 1961, when the PNF was carried out for the duration of four years, the goal was to orient local industrial business to satisfy consumption needs of the local population, thus bringing it into the national fold (Hernández Vicencio, 2004). Given the geographic disparity of Tijuana in relation to other industrial centers, another, deeper plan was necessary, especially as deported workers were returning at the end of the Bracero Program.

With thousands of workers returning to the border region of Mexico, the government was in need of a new plan to integrate labor surplus into the economy. The need to industrialize became increasingly obvious especially as the agricultural crisis in Baja California was well underway (Quintero Ramírez,

1997). By 1960, only 1.1 percent of the total population was employed in agricultural sectors (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Hence, in 1965, the PIF was put into place, with the objective to grow employment opportunities, increase the standard of living, and develop new manufacturing processes (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). At the beginning, foreign capitalists were not allowed to surpass 49% of capital ownership at the plants (Bustamante, 1975). But by 1971, the law was modified so that 100% of capital ownership could be foreign and so that these foreign capitalists could have the right to dominion within the property on which the factories lay (previously restricted by Article 27 of the Constitution) for a duration of 30 years (Bustamante, 1975). The new face of the program allowed raw materials and equipment necessary for the means of industrial production to be imported without restriction, while at the same time allowing businesses made up entirely of foreign capital to operate in the city if the items manufactured or processed there were meant for exportation (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). This is why, as Lawrence Herzog notes, it was not until 1971 that the program was completely implemented (Herzog, 1990). However, the project had little success in early years. Between 1965 and 1973, the program had only created 9,276 jobs. Due to the inability to attract employment, this program formally evolved into the program for the Industria Maquiladora de Exportación (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). To make this even more attractive, the local Tijuana government provided capitalists with a series of tax and customs incentives, while providing currency transfers that were free, and increased labor control through the creation of the

Junta Local de Conciliación y Arbitraje (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). However, at the early stages of the maquiladora program, this formalization had hardly stirred any growth. By 1974, only 101 businesses had been established, while employing not more than 9,000 people (less than previous years), while the number of maquiladoras dropped to 99 in 1975, and 93 maquiladoras total the year after (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). At 1960, 21.5 percent of the population was employed through process manufacturing, despite efforts by the federal government to help this sector grow only 23.7% of the population in 1970 was employed here (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). Meanwhile, in 1970, the sectors of commerce and services combined were where more than half the city was employed (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). But why didn't this industry explode? The reason is simple. Back in 1970, C. Daniel Dillman (1970) had noted that US unions had exerted pressure on North American capitalists to not move industry overseas, given the Keynesian time period. Despite federal efforts to increase employment through industrialization, the scant number of jobs that the maquiladoras provided makes evident that the city still relied heavily on commerce and services.

Given the population boom that began following the 1940s, Tijuana had to make a series of spatial changes. Between 1950 and 1960, the city grew at an astonishing rate. The previous population booms paled in comparison. At 1950 the city had a population of 65,364 people, but by 1960 the city had 165,690 people living within it (Zenteno Quintero, 1995). The economic and demographic

growth in turn meant a change in the geographic layout of the city. As Lawrence Herzog notes, prior to 1950 the city's "urbanized area remained within a zone concentrated around the traditional downtown, but the increased immigration to the city over the following decades created a dual-pattern of settlement and sprawl: working class people moved to less-desirable (and thus undeveloped) peripheral locations, while bourgeois and middle-class (or coordinating-class) people moved into already urbanized spaces (Herzog, 1990, p.106&108). By 1960, only 21% of the streets were paved in the city, while most of the commercial establishments were small and concentrated around the center of the city (Verduzco Chávez, 1990). Furthermore, between 1950 and 1970, more than 80 colonias were created as the city continued to sprawl (Verduzco Chávez, 1990). In the 1950s, we begin to see two new axis of spatial formation, one grew diagonally along the river, outwards from the downtown area, and other ran east-west towards the sea and the mountains.

By the late 1950s, new spatial formations were already being implemented particularly towards the east. Prior to the fifties, Tijuana was centered around the historic downtown, and was "a highly concentrated, pedestrian-scale city whose development was confined within a 3- to 4- kilometer (about 2-mile) radius (Herzog 1990, p.108). However, by 1950s, Zona Poniente was created along the coast, and in 1957, "the residential areas of 'Soler' and 'Costa Azul' were also built", while Playas was acquired by la Compañía Urbanizadora de Tijuana 1957, where the Plaza de Toros Monumental was created at the onset of the new

decade (Benitez, 2005, p.43). Despite the creation of tourist attractions in the eastern end of the city in the 1960s, it wasn't until the 1980s that upper-income areas developed in this area, and even then, only in pockets (Herzog 1990). Hence, these areas, due to their spatial segregation from more developed areas, remained working class. In 1962, the Comisión Mixta del Desarrollo Urbano Fronterizo was formed specifically to address new spatial concerns (Benitez, 2005). All of this was part of a wider spatial plan to bring more tourism (and thus capital) into Tijuana.

In 1961 the federal government had come up with a new plan. Through the National Border Program (PRONAF) the government "sought to beautify border cities as a way of increasing revenue from tourism" (Herzog, 1990, p.110). In spatial terms, this meant "the widening of Revolution Street, the redevelopment of downtown, and the development of the River Zone" (Herzog 1990, p.110). As C. Daniel Dillman noted back in 1970, the Mexican government's regional beautification program was meant to be "representative of 'Modern Mexico'" (Dillman, 1970, p.501). But for the most part, this was merely a spatial integration of preexisting economic formations around the tariff-free zones. However, one thing that PRONAF did lay the groundwork for was the creation of industrial zones. In order to facilitate industrial expansion proper communication systems and public services were necessary (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Hence, from the 1960s through the 1970s, Parques Industriales were established in Tijuana. Capitalists, through support of the local and federal

government, were able to lower the cost of manufacturing sites, and thus sites such as Centro Industrial Los Pinos, Centro Industrial Barranquitas were created in the late 1960s (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Both were located in the diagonal axis along La Mesa, southeast of the center of the city. Despite the fact that in the 70s, maquiladoras closed and thousands lost work due to the turmoil of the American market of the 1970s (Quintero Ramírez, 1997), the creation of such spaces laid the groundwork for the coming era of neoliberalization.

1.3 Everyday Life in “la Tijuana Chica”: 1930-1975

This following section will act as a sort of cross examination between interviews and literature. The novel selected was *Calle Revolución* first published in 1964 by Ruben Vizcaíno Valencia, who was born in Colima and arrived to Baja California in the 1950s. The interviewed subjects were selected on the basis of their having lived in Tijuana and experienced the city between 1940 and 1960, so as to better contrast their account with a variety of writers. Given the age group and difficult task of finding subjects who were adults in the city at the time period, Mr. R. Machado was selected. His experience is the only direct account selected for the period of the 1940s. Another account was selected for the same historical moment, that of Mr. Marcial García, who worked in Agua Caliente racetrack as a union employee in the late-1960s through the 1970s, and whose father was also a union employee in the period analyzed here, from the 1930s up until his death in the early 1960s. The father of Mr. Marcial García will be referred to as José

García. An additional subject, Mr. Gustavo Ramírez is also included in this section. Mr. Gustavo Ramírez worked at the racetrack as well, except not through the labor union, but directly under management as a parking lot attendant up until the 1980s. He was also born in the city in the 1950s. Accounts from these interviews will also be compared with selected sections from Federico Campbell's novel *Tijuanenses* and Jesús Blancornelas' nonfiction anthology *Conversaciones privadas*. It is the objective of this section to thus weave a narrative of everyday life through literature and lived experiences, and contextualize them through the previous historic understanding. Lastly, all subjects have been given false names in order to secure the identity of the participants.

1.3.1 Work

Mr. Machado was born in Naco, Sonora, in 1926, and in the following year he arrived at Tijuana. He lived for two years behind the Cine Zaragoza, on 5th Avenue, and then moved to 4th between G and H (before the city's street names were changed to national heroes). His father was born in Magdalena, Sonora, and his mother came from Copala, Sinaloa. Before moving to Tijuana, Mr. Machado's father worked as a customs' guard in Naco, Sonora. He remembered that his father "hablaba mejor inglés que español", something enabled him to secure a position as a guard in the Agua Caliente Casino when he arrived in Tijuana.

Meanwhile, when the Agua Caliente casino closed (though the Agua Caliente racetrack continued to stay open, where José García worked) in 1936, Machado was already working as a shoeshine boy. We see that Mr. Machado began working at an early age, something common for working class families in Mexico to this day. But in the way he spoke about it, the way he formulated his sentences, it appears as matter of fact. He explained that he would go to avenida Revolución to shine shoes, due to the high quantity of tourists. It should be noted that at the time that he was working, other gambling locations like Las Vegas did not exist, as Christopher Reynolds, journalist from the LA Times noted in an article about the old Tijuana (Reynolds 2007). Tijuana attracted a wide variety of tourists, and spaces like Agua Caliente Resort attracted bourgeois consumers. As Benitez (2005) notes, the Agua Caliente Resort had always been known for its splendor; in entertainment it attracted the likes of Rita Hayworth and in racing, even the famed Sea Biscuit galloped around its circuit. Marcial García remembers, that even in the 1950s, after the creation of other luxury tourist locations like Las Vegas, even then the city “era centro de atracción: estaba la Revolución, el salón de baile que estaba pegado ahí al lado del Jai Alai, el fuente [en frente] donde hubo muchas bodas, quinceañeras. . . Era un centro. Era muy elegante“. Hence, shining shoes meant the desire to shine shoes strapped to American feet, and that meant a good amount of money for a child to bring home. As Mr. Machado noted, “no se hablaba de peso — se hablaba de puros dolares. . . En dólar — todo dólar.” Hence, as shoe shine boy he explained that

he would go to avenida Revolución (then called avenida A) and Second Avenue. Even as a child, this dependence on North American money was quite clear, the need to get dollars, the need to transfer currency from the hand of an American to his own, was obvious. And it was a simple fact: they owned money.

During the Second World War, Mr. Machado stayed in Pasadena, California, where family (on his father's side) resided. He recalls, perfectly, arriving on Friday, December 5th, 1941, two days before the Pearl Harbor attack that ushered in WWII. An impressive memory for someone living in Tijuana, that the very day WWII started (more than a half century away) still remains perfectly clear, without needing a calendar or any note of reminder. He recalled the event that early in the morning, on Sunday, there was an attack on "aquellas islas de Pearl Harbor". During the entire duration of the war he worked in Pasadena as a dishwasher at a restaurant, a "pin-boy" at a bowling alley, and he picked apricots and grapes on farms. Meanwhile, the majority of his cousins that lived previously in Pasadena fought in the war effort, and "volvieron sanos y salvos todos".

Machado's father died in 1948. At that time, he had already found work at the Pepsi Cola Bottling Plant, where he labored for three years, from 1945-1948. When asked what he did at the plant, he replied "de todo". He sorted bottles: he explained that back then the bottles were made of glass and the boxes of wood. Pointing this out marks the difference between the material past and today. These objects that filled the everyday — the glass bottles, the wood boxes — are part of a menagerie of things that no longer exist, but filled the everyday in the

times of Mr. Machado's youth. This fascination in bygone items and objects, in things that no longer exist, is common among older generations, and is inherent to the economic transformations that occurred within the 20th century. Unlike any century that came before, the rate at which capitalist development changed the immediate surrounding is historically unprecedented. Quite like Marx observed in the Communist Manifesto, all that is solid dissolves into air. Similarly, the glass bottles and the wooden crates, and needless to say, the world around which Mr. Machado found himself changed at an astonishing rate, all within the single lifetime of a human being, that is, Mr. Machado's. The Tijuana that he knew — at a primary level, the very objects that he reached for to sustain himself, such as a glass bottle, and at a more abstract level (but just as visible), the space within which he was immersed himself — is all but gone. Quite like in a case of collective Alzheimers, all the things around him, all the material objects with which and through which he familiarized his world, were deleted, but not by his own mind, but by the very competitive mechanisms of capital that demanded (and continue to demand) a constant rate of change.

Work at the Pepsi Cola Bottling Plant was one of the early mechanized forms of work that existed in the city. Moving the bottles “boom boom”, he explained — washing them, and preparing them to be filled. He also worked on the labeling machine, detailing its specialized nature. He explained how boxes would arrive with bottles, and he made noises to simulate the sounds of machines, whistling and stomping. “Pa’ fuera. In-and-out. Y pa’ fuera”. His shifts

were eight hours long, arriving at work at 6am and leaving at 2pm, for six days a week, at 17 dollars pay. The Pepsi Cola Bottling Plant reveals one of the early processing plants that existed in Tijuana. Tijuana's capital circuit was closely tied to that of San Diego's and Southern California; money and machinery flowed in, and profit, through the extracted labor power of Mr. Machado flowed outwards. However, due to limitations in communication, transportation, and technology in general, an elaborate distribution circuit (like that which exists today) did not exist. Mr. Machado's labor-power, the way he worked the machines, was then directly tied to local patterns of consumption. The Pepsi Cola drink, "perfect for parties or for guests" as it was advertised in the post-war period, was thus bottled closer to the site of consumption. The grade of fetishization was thus not as greatly removed from the hands of Mr. Machado.

1.3.2 Union Work

Though the city was full of sites of exploitation, some sites served as an (imperfect) alternative of other forms of everyday life. One such space was the famed Agua Caliente racetrack. There the CROM confederated union, Alba Roja, managed the majority of racetrack employees.

Around the time that Mr. Machado was in early childhood, José García moved to Tijuana, that is, at the beginning of the 1930s. He was born in Chihuahua, Chihuahua in 1904, and had spent his youth working as a musician with his father, traveling through the United States and northern Mexico playing

drums for a big band. According to his son, Marcial, he visited Ciudad Juárez often, as the rest of his family lived there. This is where he met his wife, Eugenia Delgadillo. She worked at a bakery in Ciudad Juárez that belonged to her father, and her family owned a small ranch that had a few livestock, allowing a certain level of independence from the market. During prohibition, her father would cross liquor to the United States in exchange for flour to make bread. Marcial recalled his mother saying that every night her father went out, she would stay at home praying, “persinándose cada vez que escuchaba los balazos cuando cruzaban el río por caballo.” Marcial told a story in which his mother thought that José had worked as some sort of businessman, seeing how well dressed he always was, always wearing American made clothing each time he went into the bakery. But the fact was that he worked for Agua Caliente racetrack and was a unionized employee through Alba Roja union (that represented service workers within the racetrack and itself confederated within the CROM), a situation that allotted him remarkably good pay. Due to both his knowledge of English (which he had learned well from touring through the United States as a musician) and his understanding of mathematics (through his knowledge of music), he was an oddsmaker for sometime, before being promoted to Club Supervisor. All the money he was paid that was not spent, would be exchanged for gold and placed inside a steel lock box that José’s father had given him, a tradition born out of the Revolution that engulfed the country for more than a decade, as well as the resulting civil insurgencies in the aftermath. So, José García and Eugenia

Delgadillo were wed and she moved to Tijuana where she would work as a domestic laborer until old age.

Marcial García's account of his father's and mother's lives shows particularities that union employment garnered in Tijuana, more specifically within Alba Roja. Specifically, what should be of note is the quality of lifestyle that José García led. That he was able to afford American tailored clothing is telling. Though the tariff-free zone made it such that everyone bought clothing, that he was mistaken for a capitalist meant that as a worker, who did not own the means of production, but could be confused for such ownership is telling. By the time José García passed away in 1962, he was being paid 200 dollars a month as Clubhouse Supervisor, working four full-days at the race track and two half-days a week, according to Marcial García. As Marcial remembers, many of the unionized racetrack employees lived in la colonia Cacho. The colonia Cacho "era de dinero [pero] no era muy marcado [como son las casas hoy]". Hence, that workers could live in places where business owners and managerial workers lived is telling of the quality of lifestyle that a strong union could afford, though this is not to say that Alba Roja was combative against capital. Regardless, the fact that José García's money was converted into gold is also revealing. It reveals a primary level of suspicion with the economy and is directly linked to an underlying concept of instability not only with the economy, but at a more fundamental level with the PRI, for those that grew up during the revolution.

There were two pools of employment at the track: one was controlled directly by Alba Roja, overseeing the majority of operations, and the other was controlled directly by management, and it oversaw security, including parking attendance, and was not in any way controlled or influenced by the union, and employees here had no collective bargaining rights, and were, according to Marcial, “empleados de confianza”. Marcial García worked for the former as sweeper from 1967 to 1981 and Gustavo Ramírez for the latter as a parking attendant, for roughly the same period. Both were interviewed simultaneously in order to insure accuracy.

Both Marcial and Gustavo grew up in colonia Marrón, itself part of Zona Río, halfway between the racetrack and the downtown district. They described the neighborhood in which they lived as purely residential. Houses and small apartments filled the streets and the Pepsi Cola Bottling Plant where Mr. Machado worked was located in the same neighborhood. Recalling the neighborhood, they knew all the neighbors, including how many people lived there, their occupation, and so on. The neighborhood was of mixed economic background. Federico Campbell, who depicts the neighborhood in his 1989 novel *Tijuanenses*, describes 1950s childhood life in colonia Marrón as follows:

Yo nací y crecí en la Calle Río Bravo [one block away from where Marcial and Gustavo grew up], frente a la escuela El Pensador Mexicano. En el barrio jugábamos beisbol los de Arriba contra los de Abajo, denominación práctica que obedecía mas a la composición del terreno que a otro tip de rivalidad: por la Río Nazas descendía el nivel de la calle y empezaba la cuenca seca del río. Nuestras diferencias no se oponían como el blanco y el

negro. Ellos vivían en la más extrema pobreza y nosotros apenas al ras de cierta clase media baja, nunca en la más alta, en la que volaban los Pegasos del mundo feliz (Campbell, 1989, p.149-150).

Hence, the economic status within the neighborhood of colonia Marrón was mixed. In both Gustavo's and Marcial's accounts, they remember playing with children not only from around the neighborhood but from other parts of the city, with no clear division between class.

Both Marcial and Gustavo found work at the racetrack through familial connections. Marcial received work there a few years after his father died in 1962 because his father was one of the founding members, while Gustavo found work because his father was also employed there. This is obviously evidence of *compradazgo*, which is rampant in any milieu of Mexican social life. Marcial found work through the union as a sweeper. He continued: “[Trabajaba en el hipódromo] como barrendero, me pagaban 9 dolares y 10 centavos, por turno. Y si trabajabas dos turnos, te pagaban 18 dólares. Para trabajar los cinco días, tenías que saber ingles, tenías que saber matemáticas, y te pagan 23 dolares el turno”. He concluded that through union employment, “vivías como gringo”. While Gustavo did not specify the amount of money he was paid, he did reflected a similar sentiment, saying “me pagaban en dólar. . . y a mi papá le pagaban en dolares. Si tuvieras dólares eras chingón”. Marcial reflected that the union “era un grupito muy privado. Para trabajar en el Hipódromo tenías que ser miembro del sindicato. Para ser miembro del sindicato, alguien te tenía que recomendar. Trabajar ahí era un privilegio.” This privilege extended into the city. Credit lines

were immediately opened at stores throughout the city for union employees, as credit in those times functioned on a face-to-face basis. “Dependía en quien eras”, reflected Marcial, remembering that a clothing store opened a line of credit for him for 22 dollars “que era un chingo en aquel entonces.” But it should be noted that such high pay was due to two primary reasons: the fact that the union had a militant inception — as Marcial remembers that many of his father’s friends who established the union were dedicated communists — and because the racetrack grossed such a high amount of profit, from which the union was able to reclaim.

Alba Roja also had particular sensibilities that are no longer commonplace. Marcial spoke about how the union often provided social events for its workers, organized a basketball team and tournaments, created its own primary school, had its own newspaper, and its own ballroom for social events. This account displays that the union had created its own organs of what Schmidt and van der Walt calls counter-power and counter-culture, in which working class organizations form political and social organs that are independent of the market (Schmidt and van der Walt, 2012). Marcial spoke confidently of the union’s power. Management was not allowed to speak to union employees directly, but had to go through union delegates, or risk a fine placed by the union, creating an atmosphere of worker self-protection. And union life itself was vibrantly political, and generally weary of strong-armed cooption by the state through the CROM. According to Marcial, Alba Roja had been able to retain a certain level of

autonomy from the CROM and from the political will of the PRI. But this was ultimately short lived. In the early 1980s, under the restructuring of the CROM due to the onset of neoliberalization, as well as new ownership of the racetrack, a power struggle ensued within Alba Roja, and militant members were silenced, bought, or jailed. The man's account demonstrates that the union not only provided a mode of everyday life that was more political and autonomous, but through strong militancy, it was able to provide an everyday life that afforded access to more spaces than other workers had. They were able to enjoy more spaces of the city, while at the same time participating in an empowering mode of political life in which others could not.

1.3.3 Leisure

In terms of leisure, Mr. Machado proudly informed me that he was always a deportista. He explained that his favorite sport was basketball, and was proud to say that he was welcomed into Tijuana's Hall of Fame for his skill in the game. He participated in six national championships as a player on the Baja California State selection, and once as the coach. At the same time, he proudly explained that he played all the sports, except soccer and American Football: "lo demás — baseball, softball, volleyball — todo. Todo eso lo sabía porque todo eso lo pratiqué." Basketball was the most popular sport in Tijuana back then. This was surprising given the near-religion-like status of soccer in Tijuana today. But as he explained,

no había futbol en Tijuana. No había en esos años. Se oía decir que allá en Inglaterra estaba el futbol. Pero en Tijuana no había futbol. Había un tipo que se llama o se llamaba — no sé si ya murió — Oscar Mancilla. Oscar Mancilla se llamaba o se llama — si es que vive. El lo hizo de periodista aquí en Tijuana, deportivo, periodista deportivo. Pues cuando llegó a Tijuana, nosotros los basquetbolistas, lo vimos, que traía una pelota, *pateándola*, donde quiera que andaba. Como en Tijuana no había tráfico como ahorita y te movías por donde quiera, y pues podías tener la pelota botando o pateándola. Y así, lo vimos, y nosotros nos quedamos riéndonos, ‘Mira el loquito ese, pateándo la pelotita esa.’ No había y no sabíamos de futbol. Y ese fue el primero que llegó aquí a Tijuana con el diske ‘futbol’. . . Ese fue el primero. ‘No, pues es futbol’ [nos dijo]. ‘¿Futbol?’ [contestamos]. ‘Sí, futbol’ [contestó]. ‘¿Ese que juegan en Inglaterra?’ [preguntamos]. ‘Sí, ese’ [respondió]. ‘Ahhh, bueno’.

Mr. Macahdo’s account is revealing of leisure in Tijuana. Given the distant nature of the city in relation to the interior and the cultural activities of the rest of the nation in that time period, it is no wonder that soccer (which is commonly associated with Mexico) did not arrive until later. In the 1970s, basketball and other American sports were still commonplace, if not hegemonic. Regardless, it is worth noting that Mr. Machado depicted a vibrant life of leisure through sports in the 1940s and 1950s. A veterans basketball league was even created by 1960 for the older generation of deportistas. He claimed that the auditoriums where they played would be filled. The sports played in everyday life illustrates a public life more connected with the surroundings, less individualized as it is today. Without television and other alienating and individualized forms of entertainment or escape, after work people played sports and crashed against one another. Though it should rightly be noted that this was not all people, but rather males.

Though Mr. Machado did not bring up any account of women playing sports, it seemed safe to assume that the space was obviously gendered as all the names he mentioned were of other men, not to mention that to this day, sports remain a gendered field of cultural and everyday life. Regardless, this depicts an alternative vision of Tijuana's past, one different from the Black Legend that developed over the years since Tijuana's conception.

1.3.4 The Border

Before Mr. Machado's trip to Pasadena, he went to the immigration office to apply for a permit to go visit his aunt. When they asked him why he wanted a permit for two months, he replied simply that he was going up to see his aunt. In response, the immigration agent asked if he planned on grabbing a chair and seeing his aunt for two months straight. Infuriated, Mr. Machado left, grabbed his things from his home, went to San Diego, and took the following train to Los Angeles — all without the need of any permit. “No sacabas permiso, no sacabas nada.” It wasn't until the 1950s, according to Mr. Machado, that checkpoints were established in Oceanside. “Pero no como está ahorita. Ahorita esta tremendo, lamentablemente.” Crossing then was hardly what it is today. Though regulation of movement did exist, it was not the bureaucratized and militarized mechanism that is currently present. Today, such a response to authoritarian inquiry is impossible: such officials cannot be ignored if one wants access to the other side of the border (never mind how limited and dangerous that access is today). The

reason Mr. Machado turned around and went on his own without a permit was, in his own words, because he was proud. This thus implies a certain measure of insult. The insult to Mr. Machado was two-fold: not only did he find it unnecessary to be so probed, but to be probed in such a sarcastic and insulting tone. To turn around and bypass such belittling procedural possibilities was possible in those times, but today not, less risking the danger of crossing the border illegally. Hence, the borderland area then was continuous. One could cross as one pleased, as it was far more “transborder” than it currently is. Any argument made today regarding the current borderlands as transborder is thus absurd, given the historical past. What is transborder today is the flow of capital and goods, but certainly not people. And what restricts it today is thus the militarized border, with its steel, drones, barbered wire, legislation, minutemen, border patrol agents in cars, motorcycles, boats, and ATVs. The need for such restriction was not present in those times.

Though migration did occur, the kind of disenfranchisement that marks neoliberal migration was not yet in place. Hence, “en aquel tiempo, cuando eramos chamacos, no necesitábamos pasaportes. . . Te bajabas por la avenida. . . C y bajabas y cruzabas el río y [entrabas] a San Ysidro, que no había nada en San Ysidro en aquel tiempo. . . nada más la callecita” that today is Boulevard San Ysidro. Short trips over the border were commonplace, if not routine, and again, border control was hardly present. “Ni papeles, ni pasaporte, ni nada”. He says that he would cross the river into the United States to buy groceries there,

as they had a wider selection of fruit — the benefit of the tariff-free zoning laws. The account entailed a certain re-enactment, regarding how local the spaces were; he knew the proprietor and exchanged in small talk. The city was smaller, the border was hardly one, and Tijuana and San Diego were part of a continuous chain of spaces, with hardly any interruption. Though this does not mean that the past was idyllic in any way or form (as racism was certainly pronounced through the Southwest in the United States, and as the ability to cross a border did not entail equal rights of citizenship at all) but it does demonstrate that the border was far more fluid, far less dangerous. To cross the border illegally was not nearly as criminal as it has become since.

1.3.5 Tijuana's Centro and Gender

Ruben Vizcaíno Valencia's novel, *Calle Revolución*, is one of the earliest representations of the city. The narrative unfolds through the eyes of a foreigner, Mónica Méndez. Vizcaíno's work is a largely nationalist text, that laments the estrangement of the city from the rest of the country. Mónica, the protagonist of the novel, is forced to wander with her two children in search of her husband through the nightmarish cityscape of Tijuana, a place devoid of any moral constructs, lacking in similarity — whether spatial or cultural — with the rest of the "patria", a place that is completely alien to someone like her. Mónica is one of many rural women, according to Vizcaíno Valencia, that are made specifically to

endure life as if it were only for her to experience through suffering. Descriptions of her are highly patriotic, meant to typify the rural female home-keeper:

Es un instintivo impulso el que las sostiene, las lleva, las trae por los caminos y las penas. Vivir para ella, es vivir para sus hijos, para su marido, para sus padres, para la tierra, que es la patria misma. . . Ella era una mujer humilde; campesina pobre, del interior, que cuidaba vacas y ordeñaba todas las mañanas (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.39).

While wandering the streets, she stops to feed her infant daughter, when she is overtaken by a sudden wave of nationalist euphoria:

Formaba parte de un pueblo, de un pueblo viejo, creador de cosas que nadie sabía hacer mejor. Ser mexicana para ella, en ese momento de delectación y de euforia, era tan grande, tan inexplicable, tan placentero, que de un golpe su alma compendió en ese instante, por qué tantos y tantos seres venidos de otras tierras, tenían que asombrarse ante el espectáculo maravilloso de las cosas que salían de las manos de los hombres de los pueblos de su país (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.21)

Hence, Vizcaíno's female protagonist is an almost fascist reduction of a woman, whose only purpose is to serve her husband and her children, and in so doing, directly serves the Nation state. Throughout the entire novel, Vizcaíno's one-dimensional character is forced to navigate the streets of the city, which is only capable of producing vices for foreign and local consumption. Tijuana, according to a lament by the protagonist, is nothing but "un engaño para los campesinos. . . [un espacio] que no se parecía en nada a los pueblos del interior, que no parecía mexicana de ningún lado" (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.16). Such comparisons of the city to the rest of México abound throughout the text, but

given the contextualization of the previous sections, we know well why the city grew the way it did, given the geographic disparity in relation to the interior, the lack of technological advancements that could bring it in, and the strength of the local bourgeoisie.

Regardless, the text is worth analyzing given the documentation of the spaces through which the story unfolds, based on the lived experience of Vizcaíno who stayed in the city, and because the story takes place over the course of a single day, providing us an image of everyday life. The story takes place almost entirely within the downtown area of Tijuana, which in that time period, was the only hub and pole that was the primary economic sector (in spatial terms) for the entire city. She wanders down the primary street, Revolución, searching for her husband. The street is almost never ending for her, “pero seguían las tiendas y las tiendas, cabarets, expendios de licores y oficinas en donde se divorciaban a los matrimonios, cosa que ella no creía que pudiera existir. Burros en donde sacaban fotos, gente y gente por todos lados” (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.30). The street, with its attractions, continuously unfolds, almost without end. Here, Tijuana is bustling, the opposite of a rural town based upon the agricultural cycles. Tijuana is linear and fast, and full of people. Everywhere the city is selling products of many forms. Items of religious devotion commodified and sold: “Revisó la madre cuidadosamente el ámbito del aparador de aquella tienda. Había crucifijos de bulto, en los que al Señor solo le faltaba hablar. Vírgenes de los Remedios, Sagrados Corazones, de una ternura infinita”

(Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.27); alongside taxi drivers that entice the foreign youth into vice:

no sabía que los taxistas estaban tratando de convencer a los turistas adolescentes de ir a los burdeles que funcionaban en las afuera, y por otros muchos rumbos de la ciudad, gracias a la complacencia del gobierno; ignoraba también, que en esos antros, se vendía marihuana, se exhibían películas pornográficas y se hacían otras muchas cosas indignas de un ser humano (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.26).

And yet, while she wanders through the nearly endless stretch of store fronts, not a single space she encounters is public. Though we know that Tijuana did have public plazas and parks (as few as they were), they were few and far between. As she observes that “no había en las calles en dónde sentarse, por eso no le gustaba” she reminisces of her rural life: “era mejor el campo porque en cualquier parte o bajo cualquier árbol, uno se podía acostar” (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.46). Concluding that there is no public space for one to rest in, she asks : ¿Cómo iba a gastar el dinero a lo tonto, metiéndose a un restaurante de esos tan finos, en donde de seguro todo era muy caro y a lo mejor ni la dejaban entrar?” (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.46). Tijuana was thus a place whose built environment already reflected a nearly entirely commercial attitude, with little time spent in creating spaces that help promote a public life that is not based on consumption, but on civic engagement or profit-less leisure. This explains why sports, which cost only the initial investment in infrastructure (provided through the government) and equipment (provided individually though obviously shared)

were so commonplace for male workers, unable or unwilling to consume for leisure.

Hence, through the eyes of Mónica, the mother of the nation, Tijuana's space is meant primarily for the consumption of goods, and those meant to consume the goods and thus circulate capital are the North Americans. Throughout the text, North Americans appear constantly and English is the primary language that is spoken on and around avenida Revolución, according to Vizcaíno. Local tijuanaenses however speak both languages, or at least speak English at a commercial level. English (and all the interviewed subjects in this section knew how to speak it well) was not only commonplace in spatial terms, but helped facilitate transactions. Furthermore, given the fluidity of the border, it should come as no surprise that the region was bilingual as the spaces were more easily and commonly shared in the past. But fundamentally, at an economic level, then, English provided an access to money. And the only money that worked in those times was the dollar. As Mónica discovers when she tries to pay for tamales in pesos: "Ese dinero aquí no sirve, págamelo en oro. . . en moneda gringa, en dólares" (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.36). Such an analysis coincides with Machado's account as well and speaks volumes to just how separate the city was from the rest of the Mexican republic.

Aside from providing insight into the old city's economic platform, Vizcaíno represents the downtown district as a highly gendered space. Throughout María's entire exploration through the downtown district that ran along avenida

Revolución, there are only a few encounters that occur with other women. Given that all accounts of these early days from interviewed participants did not include women in public spaces, except for romantic dates, we can conclude that female participation within the city was far less than that of male counterparts. Women, in the novel of Vizcaíno, work in three places: in small shops selling souvenirs, in the outskirts selling tamales, and in brothels. Mónica herself is economically dedicated to the reproduction of the family. This concurs with sparse accounts of Marcial García whose mother, Eugenia, is remembered practically always at home reproducing the family and the workforce. In accounts of Eugenia's leisure activity, she is either surrounded by the family, or she is visited by other mothers.

In another of Marcial's accounts, his father had stayed out drinking with friends. Eugenia, wanting the return of her husband, took the young Marcial (who in that time period still went to primary school) to search for José. Outside of a gentleman's club, Eugenia sent the young Marcial in to inquire about his father while she stayed in the vehicle. Inside, Marcial found his father on a drum-set, beating out the sound of the dancer's striptease, to the applause of men. José, noticing his young son, motioned to the barkeeps, who then called Marcial to the bar and gave him a soda pop. Distracted momentarily, Marcial turned around and his father had disappeared, to the roaring laughter of the men inside the bar. This memory further demonstrates the gendered space of the city. Eugenia, a religious and conservative mother, would rather send her son into the space than enter herself. Inside, for the young Marcial, his presence and his father's escape

was all a good joke. Similarly, in Vizcaíno's text, Mónica accidentally happens upon such a club, where she found men that, "veían a una muchacha morena, mexicana seguramente, que se retorció como víbora. . . la piruja aquella se contorsionaba como enseñando las chichis y apenas unos pedacitos de hilacho cubrían las partes por donde nacen los hijos" (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.32-33). Disgusted and embarrassed, "salió angustiada, pensando. . . que aquello era el infierno" (Vizcaíno Valencia, 1964, p.33). Hence, such spaces are strictly meant for male consumption of the female body. Due to cultural practices in that time, women could not enter, lest they too be seen as commodifying their bodies.

1.3.6 Political Life and the Federal Government

Political life in the everyday was largely nonexistent. Mr. Machado recalled the massacre of 1968 as a moment that brought national attention to the political regime of Mexico. But even then, Mr. Machado still expressed a certain unease regarding the situation. Regarding the massacre at Tlaltelolco he reflected: "Sí hicieron una cosa muy mal hecha. ¿Cómo se ponen a matar a muchachos y jóvenes?" but only added that "en aquel entonces no decías nada. . . Tenías que guardarte tu opinión." He did not want to continue on the subject while being recorded. Both Gustavo and Marcial reflected that political life for most people in Tijuana was nonexistent under the fascistic structures of the PRI. Marcial recalled that he was jailed once following his vote. He remembered that military personelle would stand behind voters during elections, and after his turn, the

military officer asked for whom he had cast his vote, as Alba Roja was seen as a potentially communist hotbed due to its name. In response, Marcial replied, “a las ratas” which landed him a brief stay in jail. Jesús Blancornelas, who worked as a reporter for La Voz de la Frontera in Tijuana in 1968, recalled the presidential visit of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz:

Pocas veces en 40 años he visto a tantas personas hasta el punto de muchedumbre para recibir a un presidente. La gran mayoría estaba allí a fuerza. Obligados por el gobierno y el Partido Revolucionario Institucional. Fueron transportados en autobuses o camiones de carga. . . a cada uno su torta, soda, y banderita con la foto del presidente y el logotipo del partido. . . Los asistentes ni caso hacían a los oradores y les importaba poco la razón para estar allí (Blancornelas, 2002, p. 189).

Hence, political life was largely a spectacle and alienating. It was reserved for special events and was hardly a lived experience. Furthermore, that Mr. Machado, to this very day, was fearful about expressing any political opinion on tape, is telling. Government repression was real and people feared being thrown in jail or disappeared. The federal government was something that was (historically) far away, and involvement in such things marked a level of danger that the vast majority of the population did not want to risk.

However, the visit of the president in that time period is also instructive. Besides the fact that he visited in the same year as the massacre in Mexico City, his visit also came during a time period in which PRONAF was installed, which entailed the “beautification” of the city. However, much of this beautification became part of a process of primitive accumulation. The canalization project is

remembered in all the accounts of the interviewed subjects. For “Tijuana chica”, it marked the arrival of the federal government. In order for the canalization project to be carried out, a slum-settlement known as cartolandia had to be evicted by force. Cartolandia was essentially a shantytown, constructed by those that arrived at the city with little or nothing, the result of massive migration waves with nowhere to go. As Mr. Machado remembers, “Pues todo el mundo, no tenían a dónde. Y allí se metieron, y allí se metieron, y allí se metieron, y levantaron unas casitas de cartón. . . la cuestión es que tenían algo para casa, y eran puras casas de cartón y entonces lo pusieron cartolandia”. As Gustavo remembers, “cuando ibas desde los Estados Unidos a Revolución, por mano derecha ibas viendo todo lo que era cartolandia”. Marcial recalled, “yo te puedo decir que el gobierno federal se empieza a meter en Tijuana en el 66, 65 pa’delante” and the first instance in which he recalled the federal government’s force was regarding cartolandia’s eviction. However, due to complications and setbacks, it wasn’t until 1973 that the squatting residents had to be removed by (Saavedra Lara). Residents tried to resist the eviction through legal channels, but as their land rested atop of federal land, the courts saw that they had no right to it (Saavedra Lara). And so, as Marcial remembers,

[e] que no se quiso cambiar, lo quemaron la casa. Llego el gobierno federal a quemar casas. Era gente que trabajaba en lo que fuera. Estaban en la zona federal, era del gobierno. Y como no hubo gobierno federal que estaba ahí, luego modernizan el cuartel, llegan mas soldados, sacan a la gente que estaba ahí, queman a sus casas. Sacaron a la gente a las tres de la mañana. . . Toda esa gente la quitan y lo muevan a Sánchez Tabuada.

This moment marked the beginning of a new age for Tijuana. The federal government was becoming increasingly present in the city. Around the historical corner lay the coming peso devaluation of 1976, the economic crisis of 1982, and the resulting neoliberalization that killed the Tijuana chica that residents once knew. Everyday life was more limited then. The border was far more open and fluid, working class jobs existed that provided a middle-class lifestyle, the peso bought more, a public life existed (for men) that revolved around work, though at the same time inequality was still largely present; the city's historical center was overrun by North Americans, the local economy dependent on foreign consumption of goods, while other basic things were purchased from the United States. Spaces were more gendered then than now, and employment for women was scarce, and reproductive labor was common. Women spent free time with family and other female counterparts and were more closely bonded to their own property than the actual city. Vice existed then, but other accounts deny the Black Legend of Tijuana. This Tijuana, however, was reaching its expiration point.

Chapter 2: The Crisis in Tijuana, 1974 —1982

“The passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!” — Mijail Bakunin

This chapter will exclusively examine the period that runs from 1974 to 1982. The reason is that the time period that spanned between these years brought about enormous changes that would ultimately usher in an arrangement that would create a rupture with the past. As Hannah Arendt states, “Events, by definition, are occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine procedures” (Ardent 1970, p.7). The very routines that were commonplace in Tijuana were uprooted, not by internal changes, but by external ones, that made a small town that had until recently experienced any kind of population boom, become first a magnet for transnational capital, and, second, an even greater magnet for people in search of work.

Hence, in order to understand the emerging period of neoliberalization, we must first understand the crisis that made neoliberalism a feasible economic program that would engulf the entire world, and with it, Tijuana. In this chapter we will examine the global economic meltdown and the resulting neoliberal revolution that brought Tijuana into the global sphere of Late Capitalism. Many accounts of Tijuana fail to capture the global nature of Tijuana’s sudden growth. Especially for those living in the city, the changes came on suddenly and without explanation. But, by delving into the crisis of the Keynesian compromise, we can

understand the mechanisms that brought change to the city, and realize that Tijuana's conversion into a global city was brought about from without, and implemented in other parts of the Global South. This restructuring of the hegemonic system was necessary for the very survival of capitalism as a feasible economic program.

2.1 The Global Economy

The 1970s marked a turning point in the history of world capitalism. Throughout the Capitalist world, a crisis was unfolding. A perfect storm of events was bringing about the destruction of Keynesian capitalism. The capitalist economic order of the post-war depended on the robust economy of the United States. In the stalemate of the Cold War, the US had to float much of the capitalist world and supply endless funds to divert communist conquest (and prevent decolonization in the Global South), which was, without doubt, a costly enterprise. As Paul Bowman demonstrates, interventions to prevent the spread of communism such as that of Vietnam were central to the fall of the capitalist compromise with labor as "the spiraling costs of the Vietnam War increased the flow of US dollars outside of US jurisdiction from a river to a flood" so that by "1971, this brought the maintenance of dollar convertibility at \$35 per ounce of gold, the Bretton Woods founding price, to impossible levels" (Bowman, 2014, p.35). Hence, Bowman (2014) follows:

as the global reserve currency, the dollar, was trying to do two jobs at the same time. The first was to serve the domestic needs of US

economic growth and global trade competitiveness. The second was to serve the needs of the global community of capitalist nations that needed dollars for their own reserves and international settlement needs. The dilemma was that the two roles were in contradiction with each other. . . for the US to supply external countries with enough dollars to support their own growth [by means of creating buffer states like West Germany and supporting them economically throughout the Cold War] — thus keeping them from the clutches of the Cold War enemy — required running a massive current account deficit. As well as driving up inflation at home, the popularity of the dollar as reserve currency meant high demand and high value for the dollar, thus making US exports more uncompetitive relative to those of other countries. The compensatory factor of external demand for US treasuries making the rest of the world subsidize cheap deficit credit for the US. . . actually only aggravates the net secular effect of exporting productive capacity to the rest of the world. . . [Hence] in 1971, Nixon's administration was forced to end the direct convertibility of the dollar to gold [in which] a revaluation of currencies follow later that year and, by 1973, countries abandoned any form of exchange rate control over the dollar and other currencies (p.35-36).

This led to a perfect storm of events. As Harvey (2006) recounts:

By 1973, even before the Arab-Israeli War and the OPEC oil embargo, the Bretton Woods system that had regulated international economic relations had dissolved. Signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere apparent, ushering in a global phase of stagflation, fiscal crises of various states (Britain had to be bailed out by the International Monetary Fund in 1975-6 and New York City went technically bankrupt in the same year, while retrenchment in state expenditures was almost everywhere in evidence). The Keynesian compromise had evidently collapsed as a viable way to manage capital accumulation consistent with social democratic politics (p.14).

The crisis of the 1970s that began to beset the capitalist world was thus rooted in structural problems in the capitalist economic formation. As Robinson notes, the crisis was structural, rooted in Kondratieff cycles “in which a period of expansion is followed by a period of contraction” resulting in “more generalized crises

involving social and political upheavals” (Robinson, 2012, p.14). Although capitalism attempted to solve some of its internal contradictions by drafting a Keynesian compromise, due to the inherently contradictory nature of capitalism, the crash of the solution was inevitable.

Latin American economies (México included) were shaken by the US decision to suspend the fixed-price convertibility of the dollar for gold, as México and the rest of Latin America were particularly exposed to fluctuations in the world market (Weeks, 1995). However, the oil embargo meant the price of México’s petroleum skyrocketed while other Latin American economies who had no such resource, continued to suffer greatly. This came at the same moment that México discovered oil reserves that could potentially generate 70 billion barrels, as well as potential reserves for nearly 200 billion barrels (Williamson, 2009). The Mexican government continued to increase foreign loans as the economy “resumed ‘miraculous’ annual growth rates of 7 per cent”, all the while this led to “wasteful or misconceived development projects” (Williamson, 2009, p.405). But this boom would not last forever. By the 1980s, everything would fall apart.

The 1980s began a process of creative destruction in México. In 1981, the price of oil dropped (as oil accounted for 67 per cent of total exports of México) and at the same time US interest rates rose (Williamson, 2009). Faraway in New York, banks were colluding with Washington to maintain US hegemony in unstable economic times. Harvey recounts, “since the loans were designated in

US dollars, any modest let alone precipitous rise in US interest rates could easily push vulnerable countries into default” (Harvey, 2006, p.23). Hence, when the interest rates rose, México’s economy was put into a dangerous position. Suddenly, ”the price of México’s prime export (oil) had nosedived, interest rates had spiraled upwards, and rich Mexicans had transferred billions of dollars out of the country” (Skidmore, Smith, and Green, 2014, p. 69). The triumvirate between the Reagan administration, the International Monetary Fund, and the US Treasury allowed México to rollover its debt in exchange for structural reforms (Harvey, 2006). Thus Mexico was forced into accepting structural reforms pushed by the IMF which represented new monetarist policies. As Robinson notes, “these programs sought to achieve within each country the macro economic equilibrium and liberalization required by transnationally mobile capital and to integrate each nation and region into globalized circuits of accumulation” (Robinson, 2012, p.18). These restructuring programs became the primary mechanism through which local economies would be transformed for the benefit of the global capitalist economy (Robinson, 2012). (At this point it should be briefly noted that the discourse revolving around this by most writers is problematic — though “México” was forced into this position, let us make clear that this was something that clearly benefitted local elites, as the cost was laid atop the backs of the working-class). México was to be one of the initial experiments (after Chile’s, of course) in neoliberal restructuring. And so, the

policy of Import Substitution Industrialization was being scrapped for new policies.

Hence by the 1980s, something new was needed to solve the problem of capital accumulation, as the Soviet Union continued to stand ever looming. Robinson notes that “in the Third World, developmentalist projects became exhausted as manifested above all in economic contradiction and the debt crisis of the 1980s” and thus “signaled the transition to a new transnational stage in the system” (Robinson, 2012). The lack of a coordinated, articulate, and effective Left response allowed capitalism to transfigure itself in a potentially revolutionary moment. And the moment was revolutionary indeed, and turned in capital’s favor. Neoliberalism surged as “a potential antidote to threats to the capitalist social order and as a solution to capitalism’s ills that had long been lurking in the wings of public policy” (Harvey, 2006). Neoliberalism was “perfectly functional for transnational capital at the particular historic moment in which the major combines of capital worldwide were transnationalizing and seeking to impose new social relations to production” (Robinson, 2012). As Robinson (2012) continues,

[n]eoliberalism is a concrete program and an ideology, a culture, a philosophical worldview that takes classical liberalism and individualism to an extreme. It glorifies the detached, isolated individual — a fictitious state of human existence — and her creative potential, which is allegedly unleashed when she becomes unencumbered by state regulation and other collective constraints on freedom. . . . Neoliberalism as an ideology legitimates individual survival, everyone for herself, and the law of the jungle. The means of survival are to be allocated strictly on a market basis; in its

ideological construct, neoliberalism sees these markets not as created and structured through state and societal relations of power and domination but as products of nature. Followed to its logical conclusion, neoliberalism as a prescription for society would mean the end of social reciprocity, of collective redistribution of the social product, an end to the family, and eventually to the species itself (p.17).

In short, the goal of neoliberalism was to “remove all barriers that insulate domestic decision-making by the private sector and the state from the influence of world markets” thus in turn promoting the denationalization of the economy (Weeks 1995, p.130), by globalizing the economies and making them available to the transnational bourgeoisie. As Margaret Thatcher, famed for being a primary agent of neoliberal ideologies, once stated, “Economics are the method. . . but the object is to change the soul” (Harvey, 2006, p.17) and “there is no society, only the individual” (Robinson 2012, p.17). Slogans like TINA (There Is No Alternative) became the new mantra of a new order. This “meant nothing short of a revolution in fiscal and social policies and immediately signaled a fierce determination” to end the welfare state (Harvey 2006, p.16). Neoliberalism was seen as an excellent solution by ruling elites to the problem of capital accumulation (Robinson, 2012). And for the first time in human history, technology made such a program possible: “new technologies — particularly in the communications and information revolution, but also revolutions in transportation, marketing, management, automation, robotization, and so on” allowed neoliberalism as a global(izing) project to take place (Robinson 2012, p.15). This spurred the creation of a new phase in space-time compression in

which decision-making in both private and public spheres have shrunk due to advances in technology in both transportation and communication, as well as their diminishing cost, has allotted capital to spread ever further and faster (Harvey, 1992). The technological moment was fundamental for the creation of such a system. Like no other time in history before, humanity was connected to a degree that allowed the supply-chains that would later be created come to fruition through technological and transportive revolutions. Furthermore, deregulation was seen as one of the primary devices to make possible “the use of this technology to develop new transnational circuits of accumulation” (Robinson, 2012, p.15). The class compromise that marked the previous phase of capitalism was being “replaced by monetarist policies, deregulation, and a supply side approach that included regressive taxation and new incentives for capital” as a “new capital-labor relation based on deunionization, flexible workers, and deregulated work conditions” (Robinson, 2012, p.19) began to spread across the globe through agents like the United States, the IMF, banking institutions, and later the European Union. And so, neoliberalism became the new deal following the crisis of Keynesian capitalism, and created the conditions to allow new spaces to be brought into the changing market.

Neoliberalism should be seen, as Gerard Duménil and Dominique Levy have claimed, as a project of restoration of class power (Harvey, 2006) in the hands of the bourgeoisie. If the previous phase of capitalism was marked by class compromise, then this phase is marked by class violence, wielded by the

bourgeoisie against the working class. As William I. Robinson notes, “at the core of the global structure was a new capital-labor relation” resulting in the “casualization or informalization of labor associated with [. . .] flexible accumulation” that in turn involves “new systems of labor control [. . .] making it [labor] ‘flexible’ and readily available for transnational capital in worldwide labor pools” (Robinson, 2008, p.22). This results in making workers “appendages” of global production circuits resulting “in even more extensive forms of alienation than in previous capitalist labor relations” (Robinson, 2008, p.22). Flexible accumulation, as David Harvey calls it, thus “allowed employers [in the global north] to exert stronger pressures of labour control on a workforce in any case weakened by[. . .] inflation, that saw unemployment rise to unprecedented postwar levels” as “organized labor was undercut by the reconstruction of foci of flexible accumulation in regions lacking previous industrial traditions” (Harvey, 1992, p.147) such as Tijuana. Thus, neoliberalism was not only meant to disenfranchise workers in the north, but to dispossess and create new methods and forms of exploitation in the South, which in turn further hurts the working class in the north. Neoliberalism found a fertile home in Tijuana because of the peso devaluation and the coming shifts in labor management.

Space has become increasingly important, since neoliberalism (as all other phases of capitalism) requires a spatial fix “to the crisis-prone inner contradictions of capital accumulation” (Harvey, 2005, p. 87). By this, Harvey (2005) means that value is fixed into the land but at the same time,

the production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resource complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formations by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements. . . provide important ways to absorb capital and labour surpluses (Harvey, 2005, p.116).

As Bowman explains, this was a cunning move by capitalists, in that “globalizing production chains allowed capitalists to outflank worker’s revolt against productivity in the West by relocating production” to previously unindustrialized regions like South East Asia and Latin America (Bowman, 2014, p.37). This in turn created in the Industrial North an “income gap opened by the drop in real wages caused by deindustrialization and replacement service-sector ‘McJobs’” that were bridged by “the importation of disinflation, in the shape of ever-cheaper wage goods from the East” (Bowman, 2014, p.37). Hence, space became hugely important to the neoliberal project, and particular spaces became increasingly important in commodity production.

2.2 Tijuana in the Crisis

Moving from the national and global scope, Tijuana as a locality was chosen as a site of transnational production for very specific reasons. Among them was the transnationalization of capital that allowed foreign capital in unprecedented quantities to move to Tijuana, the creation of global production and service chains, and the creation of Export Processing Zones. A final component that made Tijuana ideal was the very crisis itself that had an

outstanding effect on wages and purchasing power, brought upon by devaluation, that thus provided a capstone incentive to capitalist offshore labor here.

Though the maquiladora was created in 1964 as part of the Mexican government's Border Industrialization Program, it makes sense that the maquiladora system did not boom until the 1980s, and with it, the population of Tijuana. This is rooted in the changes brought about by neoliberalism. As mentioned previously, capital was freed from the national home. David Harvey posits that financialization of the global economy is an integral component to neoliberalism, as "deregulation allowed the financial system to become one of the main centers of redistributive activity through speculation, predation, fraud and thievery" (Harvey, 2006, p.45). Robinson thus notes that "since the 1970s, the emergence of globally mobile transnational capital increasingly divorced from specific countries has facilitated the globalization of production" (Robinson 2008, p.25). Previously, national economies were distinct and "linked externally to one another", this turn to financialization brought on by deregulation, allowed a turn to the reorganization of economies as "component elements of this new global production and financial system" (Robinson, 2008, p.25). Hence, "global production and service chains" were created in such a manner that "each stage [of the production] adds some value or plays some role in the production and distribution of goods and services worldwide" (Robinson, 2008, p.27). Tijuana was hence chosen as one of these links in a global production chain.

As stated previously, Tijuana was a prime target to center production due to its geographic location and proximity to a consumption center (i.e. the United States). This, in turn, is due to the coercive laws of spatial competition. As capitalists must constantly compete against one another “to gain advantage and higher profits”, Harvey notes that capitalists must thus occupy “superior locations” that also create “a locational dynamism within production that parallels technological and organizational dynamism” (Harvey, 2006, p.97-98). And what better place than next to the United States itself, where labor costs are too high compared to México. Thus, Tijuana became an Export Processing Zones (EPZ). Here, “products are stored, processed, and manufactured free from the payment of import duties on equipment, machinery, and raw materials”, “with the intention of exporting most or all of the output” thus taking advantage of “the supply of abundant, cheap labor from the host country” (Robinson, 2008, p.104). As Robinson continues to note, Tijuana and other spaces along the border thus became “major nodal point[s] of the global economy on the historical basis of the North American political economy” (Robinson, 2008, p.107). All of this was of course exacerbated with the North American Free Trade Agreement that was implemented in 1994 that further forced rural workers to migrate to industrial centers like Tijuana due to the economic integration that destabilized the rural economy of México (Gutiérrez, 2014). All of this changed Tijuana forever as the city became an appendage of a global economic network built on the competitive exploitation of the working class.

Though the population boom had begun in the 1950s for Tijuana (as rural-urban migration had been catalyzed by industrialization) and was accentuated by the 1960s due to the end of the bracero Program, by the late 1970s, the boom in population only continued. As Lawrence Herzog notes, between 1970 and 1980, Tijuana's population growth actually grew from 340,583 to 709,340 people — though government official estimates placed the population only at 461,257 (Herzog, 1990). During the same time period, the United States experienced a huge population boom in regard to Mexican-born migrants — from 760,000 in 1970 to 2.2 million in 1980 (Passel, Cohn, and González-Barrera, 2012). This is in direct correlation to the turbulent shock produced in 1976 from the sudden peso devaluation. Lothar Witte notes that Tijuana became an attractive space for internal migrants for a number of reasons, among them that up until 1982, Tijuana offered a standard of living that was much better relative to other cities throughout Mexico (Witte, 1998). Although the cost of living in Tijuana until 1982 was superior to many other spaces in the interior of the nation, salaries were still higher (in relation) and Tijuana also offered the ability to work clandestinely in the United States (Witte, 1998). Witte noted that by 1980, 70 percent of Tijuana's employable work force was composed of waged labor (Witte, 1998). Hence, Tijuana continued to be seen by many rural workers as a primary destination point as it "promised" access to sites where they could sell their labor at a higher price.

As we now know from the previous chapter, Tijuana was already an ideal site for neoliberal exploitation given the new structure of production chains. Its location not only next to the international border, but next to California, one of the biggest economies in the world, made Tijuana a primary site for working class exploitation. Furthermore, it was already familiar with free-trade through its tariff-free zoning, and, the city had already installed the maquiladoras that were meant for exporting goods. For this reason, the city attracted labor power from around the country, making it fertile ground wherein the cost of labor could be reduced by the surge in population. However, it was the devaluation of the peso that provided the final incentive to attract business to offshore production to Tijuana.

The devaluation of the peso first hit Tijuana and the rest of México in 1976, and though the recovery allowed the peso to sputter upwards, by the 1980s the peso would drop for good. In 1976, the “peso was devalued 45 percent in terms of the dollar”, resulting in a cut in real wages, which in turn meant that consumption in the United States (something that was common practice) was no longer feasible for individuals paid in pesos (Harrell and Fischer, 1985, p.28). Meanwhile, 39 maquiladoras that existed in Tijuana at the time had to close shop for good while “others had to cut their employment by up to 50 percent”, resulting in nearly 40,000 people losing work in less than a year, while investment dropped nearly 40 percent (Benitez, 2005, p.192). Between 1974 and 1979, only 1,600 new jobs were created in the maquiladora sector, the decline being directly related to the crash of the US economy (Zenteno Quintero, 1994). The Mexican

government bolstered the peso-dollar exchange rate for a few years allowing the peso to increase in value, something that we know was doable due to increased oil sales from the OPEC embargo, but in February of 1982, the peso suddenly dropped again by 30 percent, while six months later, the peso dropped again another 75 percent (Harrell and Fischer, 1985). Under such pretext, the geographic location was ripe for primitive accumulation.

2.3 Everyday Life in Tijuana During the Devaluations

The devaluations affected everyday life primarily in that for the first time, the interviewed subjects knew that something different was happening. The devaluations signaled to the population already living there, that things had begun to change — and perhaps for the worst. Marcial García and Gustavo Machado are the only subjects examined in this section, and their account will focus primarily on what they noticed from the devaluation. Both Gustavo and Marcial, at the time that the crisis occurred, were living their final years at the racetrack, and perhaps more importantly, in Tijuana, though neither one of them would ever truly leave the city. Following the crisis, both of them would end up in San Diego, while spending a great deal of time in Tijuana, regardless of their relocation.

2.3.1 Change of Currency

As we know from the last chapter, the existence of the dollar in Tijuana was central to the very existence of the city. The dollar was a symbol of Tijuana's

attachment to a North American economic configuration. Tijuana had always been more closely attached to the North American market than the Mexican one, and this is due to its extreme geographic isolation from the development of the interior and the central north of Mexico (i.e. Nuevo León). The dollar was thus central to the everyday life of everyone around. Mr. Machado shined shoes for it in the streets of el Centro in the 1930s, and Marcial and Gustavo continued to grow up around it. However, in 1982, in a sudden transformation that happened virtually over night, the dollar was replaced with the peso.

In the midst of the new crisis that México had found itself, the Mexican government struggled to find alternatives. Throughout the late 1970's, México had exceeded an economic growth rate of 8 percent, but this was all on the back of amassing external debt that had risen from \$18.2 billion in 1975 to \$86.1 billion in 1982 (Copelovitch, 2010). Following the initial devaluation of 1982, the "Mexican government recognized the need for official international assistance in meeting its external debts" as "the peso depreciated rapidly against the dollar" resulting in an "inflation in excess of 60 percent annually" (Copelovitch, 2010, p.152). On August 11, Mexico's banks announced that they were not going to pay the principal payments that were due in less than a week, resulting in Jesús Silva Herzog, México's finance minister, rushing into an agreement with the US Treasury and Paul Volcker, that resulted in the United States providing billions of dollars of assistance, as well as the banks of the other western European countries (Copelovitch, 2010). This allowed Mexico to avoid default. Following

this breath, Silva Herzog entered talks with the IMF, but was suddenly blindsided by the decision of then-president López Portillo's to nationalize the banks (Copelovitch, 2010). As Mark S. Copelovitch notes, "López Portillo imposed exchange controls, nationalized the Mexican banking system, and dismissed Miguel Mancera, the governor of the Banco de México and a close ally of Silva Herzog" (Copelovitch, 2010, p.155-156). Hence, "exchange controls were imposed" and "dollar accounts in Mexican banks, amounting to about \$14 billion, could only be withdrawn in pesos at a devalued rate of 69.5 pesos to the dollar. Customers buying pesos with dollars were also charged this rate, while limited amounts of dollars for specific government-sanctioned purposes could be purchased at 49.5 pesos" (Harrell and Fischer, 1985, p.29). Meanwhile, faraway in Tijuana, both Marcial and Gustavo remembered, "antes de eso [la devaluación del 82], no se conocía el peso. En todo que se vendía, era dolar. Todo estaba marcado en dólar". But this reality had come to an end.

Gustavo remembered that "todas las cuentas bancarias que tenías en dolares se transformaron en peso". And obviously this was to greatly affect the people of Tijuana. Marcial continued:

Afecta porque todo de repente se cambió al peso. [Antes] si entregabas dólar, te regresaron dólar. . . [Pero ahora] si tenías dólares, sí te chingó [la devaluación]. No te dio el tipo de cambio que como estaba en el mercado, te dio el tipo de cambio que el gobierno dio. Dictaba [el gobierno]. De ahí adelante, todos los que tenían dólares abrieron cuentas en los Estados Unidos[si podían cruzar]. Por eso tengo mi dinero en los Estados Unidos. . . Todo el mundo empieza a esconder dinero.

As Gustavo remembered, most accurately and observably, “Un *chingo* de gente tronó”. It was observable within their immediate surrounding at the racetrack. As Marcial remembered, “el hipódromo ya no estaba pagando en dolar [debido a la devaluación], muchas de esas personas perdieron sus casas en la Chapultepec”. Those members of the working-class that, through unionization, were able to afford moving to middle-class neighborhoods, like la Cacho and Chapultepec, which had been created in the 1960s for upper-class employers, were thus kicked out of these neighborhoods. The money that they had in the bank was not only converted but lost its value *incredibly*, all decided unilaterally from faraway locations that ranged from Mexico City to New York to Washington D.C. The decision that affected millions of people across México was decided by a handful of technocrats in México and other parts of the world. The internal debt that the Mexican government had amassed had doubled between 1979 and 1982, and all of this occurred without the consent of the people that lived the debt crisis. The decision making was alienated from the people of México and Tijuana, but the results were acutely intimate. This trend will continue in the following chapter, as the crisis laid the foundation for the following neoliberal restructuring to take place through the 80s and 90s.

2.3.2 Migration

Though migration to the city had become increasingly pronounced since the 1950s, it was not felt by either subjects until after the first devaluation of

1976. Marcial recalled as a young boy visiting family in Chihuahua, that when strangers discovered his father lived in Tijuana, they asked if the streets were paved in gold. Marcial obviously found this quite amusing, if not ridiculous, knowing that most of the streets were in fact not paved at all. It was not until years later that Marcial experienced the draw Tijuana had for migrants. One day at work, he explained, he was sent to the primary bus terminal in Tijuana and saw for the first time the number of people that were arriving by the busload. As Marcial remembers,

[p]uta madre como llegaron gente. Llegaron en autobus[. . .] porque la venta de un boleto [para el avión] era para clase media alta. Nunca en mi perra vida había visto tanta gente. Nunca había visto ese desmadre de gente. . . La central camionera no era muy grande, no era muy grande, porque no había tanta gente llegando [antes]. . . Un chingo de gente con sombreros, que los estás viendo tú, como gente de campo, con botas, con cintos de piel. . . Gente de rancho estás viendo.

For both parties interviewed, noticing such a great arrival of migrants so late in their life speaks to three things. Primarily, that access to the city was highly centralized, and the new periphery settlements that were beginning to take shape in the outskirts were obviously the beginning of a stronger divide. Those that grew up in the old center stayed in the center. It also shows that social circuits were thus divided. Friends made in the old center stayed friends with people from there. Furthermore, there was a certain shock in the dress of the migrant workers. Many recent border theorists like to highlight the mixture of Mexicanness and Americanness creating (or not creating) a hybrid culture in

Tijuana, something that this text is not interested in discussing. Suffice is to say, that with the migration, cultural norms within the city were becoming pluralistic, and divorced from North American fashion norms that had pervaded everyday life in Tijuana.

Meanwhile, Gustavo noted that as the number of immigrants to the city grew, so too did the presence of the federal government. He recounted that the size of the military fortress had begun to expand by the late 1970s. And in 1976, the military enacted a stronger recruitment drive. Gustavo was lured by the recruitment drive because, according to him, the army paid \$50 dollars (in dollars) every five days, something that was obviously alluring to working class males, but only to those who could play basketball. As the federal government was trying to increasingly insert itself into the space, it tried to insert its dominance by recruiting the best players in the city to play for the Army's basketball team, as a measure of promotion. Gustavo thus played basketball for the army for the duration of a single year before leaving. The arrival of the federal government thus took a two fold approach: primarily, the canalization process, and secondarily, in the increasing amount of federal troops in the city as well as federal police.

2.4 Conclusion

Hence, by freeing up labor (through losing thousands of jobs in Tijuana and making rural life outside of Tijuana significantly harder) a reserve army was

essentially created, while the devaluation of the peso added incentive to foreign capitalists (primarily from the United States) looking to invest newly freed capital. We know that out of the vacuum of the peso devaluation, the Mexican economy was forced to open its markets and allow foreign investment. The end of the capitalist compromise of the postwar period led to neoliberalism as “the only alternative” out of the crisis. The crisis itself was brought on by structural deficits inherent to capitalism and the fight against communism bankrupting the welfare state of the global north. The new phase of capitalism — neoliberalism, or Late Capitalism — reshaped production by offshoring it to “competitive locations” (determined by how poorly workers were treated vis-a-vis the diminished cost of the workers’ labor), thus creating supply chains, while at the same time undermining workers of the global north by diminishing their wages, creating massive unemployment, and providing poorly paid work in place of well-paid industrial jobs. Hence, by October of 1983, one year after the devaluation, “an average compensation of 90 cents per hour was paid to workers in *maquiladora* firms. This average includes benefits required by Mexico’s Federal Labor Law such as social security contributions, education taxes, maternity leave, employee housing, day care assistance, and state payroll taxes” (Harrell and Fischer 1985). With such institutional changes made at the national and global level, Tijuana was set to live under actually existing neoliberalism.

Meanwhile, for those living there, the shocks produced by the devaluations were great. Workers not only lost their jobs, but thus the security of

having a steady paycheck and a home. Workers, like those at the race track, lost homes and were pushed out of entire neighborhoods. Entire economic and political formations were changing suddenly and quickly, but the only way it manifested in the everyday was in the sudden shocks in the market. New institutions were being created, and to the people that lived in the city, it was something entirely divorced from their participation. These changes, that would ultimately determine the fundamental structure of the city, were implemented from without and from above.

Chapter 3: Tijuana as Neoliberal Boomtown, 1982 – 2014

“The colonized’s sector, or at least the ‘native’ quarters, the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation, is a disreputable place inhabited by disreputable people. You are born anywhere, anyhow. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. The colonized’s sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light.” — Frantz Fanón, Wretched of the Earth

Since the 1980s, Tijuana’s space, and in turn, working-class rights and relationship to the city have changed dramatically. The city has become an integral part of a global space-component of supply-chains and production circuits, resulting in radically distinct social relationships compared to Tijuana’s previous eras. The city has since become increasingly integrated to the United States economically, but drastically divorced from it spatially, with the militarization of the border. Capital is allowed to freely and instantaneously move out of the city, while people are not. Meanwhile, due to neoliberalization across the country (and across Latin America), Tijuana has come to function as a magnetic hub for excess labor, stressing resources, driving down wages, and exponentially expanding the spatial limits of the city. This in turn has created entire segments of the working-class to fall into a state of precariousness that benefits capital in multiple ways and in multiple spaces. Excess labor power drains into the United States and serves the interests of capital in the United States (by essentially creating a rightless and disposable worker, similar to the hay-days of laissez faire capitalism, but entirely different due to the control that

the state wields over them) only to then be deported back to México to serve the interests of the security apparatus there. This security apparatus in turn, is driven by the War on Drugs. The criminalization of drugs and the expansion of the drug economy is vital to the functioning of neoliberalism in México (and in the United States) as we will see. Ultimately, neoliberalism depends on creating the socially abandoned.

All of this is manifested in the realities of the everyday. It is in this time period that the realities of the working-class through the everyday become even more polarized and pluralized. While some are able to hold on to steady work, the feeling of precarity is always present, as the individual worker is always on the precipice of disaster. And though their personal life may not be in any immediate danger or state of insecurity, the social conditions in which their life is surrounded is in fact defined by it, seen most pertinently in the state of public security (or lack thereof).

Hence, this section will first examine the social and spatial history of actually existing neoliberalism in Tijuana. It will focus on the IMF structural adjustment programs, growth of the maquiladora sector, and its spatial impact. Following this, the implementation of NAFTA alongside the militarization of the border will be brought into focus. Henceforth, the tourism sector be examined in relation to the United States' War on Terror and its effect on cross-border consumption. It will delve into the everyday through interviews and literature.

Through all this, the everyday life of the working class will be brought into light and demystified.

3.1 Social and Spatial History

Neoliberalism in Tijuana was implemented through a series of changes in the form of adjustment programs that impacted the entire nation, while culminating in the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Its effects were significant in the composition and position of labor, which allowed the maquiladora sector to experience almost exponential growth before hitting a competitive ceiling, while at the same time expanding the informal sector of the economy. Meanwhile, the changes wrought by neoliberal restructuring and trade agreements created an exceptional population boom in the border city, something that had to be addressed spatially, explained best through informal spatial development, new orbs and the militarization of the border.

As we know neoliberalism found its entrance to México through the form of crisis. Following the debt crisis of 1982, México was forced into a series of structural adjustment programs by the IMF. Alongside South Korea, México has become the largest borrower from the IMF in the neoliberal era — “from 1983 to 1997, the Fund provided México with SDR 20.6 billion in financing through four lending arrangements (1983, 1986, 1989, 1995)” — resulting in the “composition of their private external debt shift[ing] significantly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s” (Copelovitch 2010, p.143). Despite the bailout that occurred in 1982,

brokered by Paul Volcker and the US Treasury, “by the end of 1983, Mexico was the second largest developing country borrower in the world[. . .] with total outstanding external debt of \$93 billion, two-thirds of which (\$62.4 billion) was owed to private international creditors” (Copelovitch, 2010, p.151). What’s more, most of the debt (\$24.9 billion) was held specifically by US firms — Citibank, Chase Manhattan and others (Copelovitch, 2010). Mexico, alongside Brazil, owed so much to just Citibank and Bank of America, that had they decided to default on their loans, neither bank would have been able to meet long-term financial obligations, resulting in financial disaster. What resulted then was a series of strong-armed deals brokered by the IMF that completely restructured the Mexican economy in order to save Mexico from defaulting, and in turn save banks from crashing.

The IMF considered the restructuring programs to be great successes. As Copelovitch notes, “Christopher Taylor (alternate executive director [of the IMF] — United Kingdom) saw the success of concerted lending in the Mexican case as a model to be followed in future lending cases” despite the fact that “the IMF could not ‘meet all of Mexico’s financial needs’” though it “could ‘give confidence to donors and creditors, particularly commercial banks, and encourage them to continue lending to a country that was having extreme difficulty’” (Copelovitch, 2010, p.165). Meanwhile, Tero Hiraro, another executive director, declared, following México’s “salvation” that “the Fund’s primary role should be to restore public confidence in the economy of a debtor country by formulating a suitable

adjustment program, thereby facilitating the country's access to private credit" (Copelovitch, 2010, p.166). However, these declarations were made early on, following only the *initial* loan. There was still another *three* loans after these early calls of victory. In any case, the objective through the era remained clear: "restoring public confidence" and "facilitating the country's access to private credit". But what does that look like socially?

Aside from opening the Mexican market to foreign investment, México had to undergo a series of structural changes that ultimately should be seen as a restoration of class power in the hands of the transnational bourgeoisie and the institutionalization of class violence against the working-class. As Edwin Williamson assesses, "the burden of the [IMF prescribed] austerity program, needless to say, fell upon the shoulders of the poor and the working classes. Average wages rose by 40 per cent in 1983, when inflation was running at 100 per cent; reductions in subsidies of staples and transport drove up the cost of living for the broad mass of people" (Williamson 2009, p.406). Carlos Salinas de Gortari would come to be the face of neoliberalization in México after his presidential victory in 1988. Under his rule, he took down "corrupt" unions (most of which had been corrupted in their nascent days by being incorporated into the PRI structure), "cutting public spending", privatizing steel companies owned by the state, privatizing the banks, telecommunications, and further opening the economy up to foreign trade (Williamson 2009). However, the ultimate opening of

the Mexican market came with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.

The North American Free Trade Agreement was lauded by both governments as a new dawn of economic growth. The agreement formalized free-trade between Canada, the United States, and Mexico creating an entirely new economic block that allowed capital to move freely between the three nation-states and more extensively relocate labor to competitive climates (Gutiérrez 2014). But since its very conception, critiques abounded. Ross Parot, a presidential candidate at the time, lamented that NAFTA “would result in a ‘giant sucking sound’ as American jobs would move to Mexico” (Gutiérrez, 2014). Faraway in Chiapas, the Zapatistas rose up in rebellion as they saw NAFTA meant nothing more than a death sentence to the indigenous communities (Gutiérrez 2014). The criticism moved beyond political speculation (or certainty). As Ruiz Durán notes, there certainly were those that knew “that economic dislocation [through implementation of NAFTA] in Mexican agriculture could easily lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in undocumented immigration to the United States” (Ruiz Durán, 2003, p. 51). Despite, the reservations held by some, NAFTA was implemented.

The result was terrifying and nothing less than a formal assault on the working class. As Ruiz Durán noted, in such a competitive climate, “Canada and Mexico maintained a policy of competitiveness via low wage growth” which was ultimately “a self-defeating strategy, as it weakens one’s domestic market and

does not allow capacities for taking advantage of economies of scale, which was one of the main issues in the NAFTA debates. . . (Ruiz Durán, 2003, p.60). This competitiveness was the result of the Toyota production model, which replaced the Fordist model, in which “it allows companies to avoid investing in infrastructure and reduce operating costs and to benefit from a less expensive labor force” thus increasing “productivity by overexploiting labor in dependent countries” (Castillo Fernández and Sotelo Valencia, 2013, p17). Mexico became a primary destination point for offshore labor. As Castillo Fernández and Sotelo Valencia note, A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index “which rates the 50 principal offshoring locations for production and services” stated in 2011 that “Mexico is superior to many other countries because of its high productivity and its developed industry and because its workforce has a wide range of skills and specialties through the country” through outsourcing labor, resulting in a reduction of production costs “by 5-15 percent” (Castillo Fernández and Sotelo Valencia, 2013, p.20). Hence, neoliberalization had turned México into a primary location for offshore production. But this was the result, in large part, of the restructuring of labor in México.

In order for México to become so competitive, its labor model had to undergo extensive restructuring — a basic facet of neoliberalization. In the last chapter, it was discussed how the devaluation of the peso was essential to neoliberalization. But the question of organized labor still remained. This meant that an all out assault on organized labor was essential. As part of the neoliberal

deal that was brokered through the IMF, new labor policies were put into place that promoted labor flexibility and deregulation (Escobar Toledo, 2010). Between 1982 and 1988, when the IMF was heralding a continuous victory in México, real wages dropped 48.3% and unemployment rose “vertically” though it was hard to pinpoint due to migration to the US and informality (Escobar Toledo, 2010). Miguel de la Madrid, who assumed power in December of 1982, broke with corporatist structure that the PRI had founded at its inception, by dramatically changing the relations between the State and the official unions that it recognized (Escobar Toledo, 2010). Previously the State had a pact with organized labor that allowed unions to control the workplace through a number of measures mediated by collective bargaining, but under the new pressures formed by the IMF and other transnational capitalist interests, the government assaulted unions by having the unions attack one another, by supporting white unionism, essentially dissolving union activity in the Congreso del Trabajo, and taking away collective bargaining from public sector employees (Escobar Toledo 2010). Hence, at the national level union subordination was a primary concern to attract capital.

At the same time, this meant that unions in Tijuana also had to be reigned in. Cirilia Quintero Ramírez noted that this resulted in a change from traditional syndicalism to a kind of subordinated syndicalism (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Traditional syndicalism, according to Quintero Ramírez, is that which is integrated to the state through confederations linked to the PRI, in which the

primary goal is to mediate between capital and labor (Quintero Ramírez, 1989). Hence, the State held the unique position of controlling labor. The CTM (Confederación de Trabajadores de México), the CROC (Confederación Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos), and the COR (Confederación Obrera Regional) historically represented the primary currents of such unionism in the city, since the PRI came to power across México (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Subordinated syndicalism, however, is defined by the submissive role of unions (to either becoming flexible or being kicked out), while the State favors unions that can be “functional” to industrial production and assures that no conflict will arise to the dismay of transnational corporations (Quintero Ramírez, 1989). It is subordinated syndicalism that has become the primary mode of labor organization in Tijuana and is best reflected by the practices of the CROM, which sees its primary relationship to capital as one of collaboration (as opposed to opposition) — thus silencing and obliterating the participation of the worker, by means of simply circumventing and controlling conflicts, primarily in the maquiladora sector (Quintero Ramírez, 1989). Hence, as Tijuana was targeted as a manufacturing site as an EPZ (export processing zone), the question of labor was primary.

The struggle in Tijuana to expel militant unions was essential for the construction of the space as an EPZ. Various unions had attempted to infiltrate the maquiladoras throughout the 1970s, resulting in a series of strikes that had occurred in the mid-70s (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). However, by 1982, business

associations and local government took advantage of factionalism within the unions to destroy the nascent militant movement within the maquiladoras (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). The Junta Local de Conciliación y Arbitraje functioned in marginalizing militancy by not recognizing cases brought forth by grassroots union, opting instead to recognize unions that are willing to play the new game (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Despite the fact that the government focused its efforts on the maquiladora sector, such measures happened across the economic fields. Regardless, under the new economic paradigm, the unions were brought under control of the State and forced into a position of subordination according to the needs of capital.

Under such conditions the maquiladora industry grew incredibly in Tijuana — despite the turbulence of the 1980s. Prior to the economic collapse of 1982, the number of maquiladoras was unimpressive — 101 in 1974, dropping to 92 in 1977, before reaching 124 in 1982 (Zenteno Quintero, 1994). However, with the devaluation of the peso and the subordination of labor, the number of maquiladoras began to grow almost exponentially on a yearly basis — 131 in 1983, 147 in 1984, 192 in 1985, 238 in 1986, 317 in 1987, 388 in 1988, 478 in 1989, and 512 by 1990 (Zenteno Quintero, 1994). In 1982, 14,482 people worked in the maquiladoras and by 1990, 65,852 people worked in the burgeoning industrial sector (Zenteno Quintero, 1994). At a nationwide level, between 1980 and 1995, employment in the maquiladora industry grew at an annual average of 11.8 percent, counting 2,104 maquiladoras nationwide with

639,974 people employed in the sector (Aguilar Nery, 1999). NAFTA had a huge effect on maquiladora employment: just two years prior to its implementation, 68,697 people were employed in the sector, but a year after NAFTA was implemented in 1994, 88,120 people were employed in the maquiladora sector of Tijuana, increasing the national added value from 13.3% in 1992 to 15.7% in 1993 (Aguilar Nery, 1999). This pattern of growth only continued through the millennium, as Tijuana counted nearly 600 maquiladoras and 193,000 workers in the sector (more than 160,000 working for a foreign company) by 2009 (Rodríguez, 2009). Manufacturing became Tijuana's economic base as 97% of foreign direct investment went purely to manufacturing (Rodríguez, 2009). Neoliberalization thus created a fertile ground to sow the seeds of industrialization in Tijuana.

Despite the impressive results of NAFTA and other neoliberal measures to industrialize the city, the gains have been less than exemplary. At a national level, “[d]espite the fact that the GDP per capita of Mexico rose from 4,048 dollars [in 1994] to 10,501 dollars [in 2014], poverty in Mexico only dropped 1.1%” (Gutiérrez, 2014). This is not to mention that the Economic Policy Institute “found that some 700,000 American jobs were lost due to the treaty and the offshoring that resulted” (Gutiérrez, 2014). Meanwhile, the effect of neoliberalism on the livelihood of workers has been horrendous. In order to maintain the competitive atmosphere, wages had to be repressed. In 2014, “the vice president of the National College of Economists recently acknowledged that a wage of at

least three times the minimum wage is necessary to purchase enough basic foodstuffs for a typical family in the state of Baja California, and that increases in the minimum wage have not covered living costs for at least thirty years” (Gutiérrez, 2014).

The reference is to the 30 years since neoliberalization fell upon Baja California. This goes directly in the face of the national government which had declared that between 2000 and 2006, poverty had been relieved by 40%, nationwide (Damián, 2010). These numbers are essentially cooked as the government uses a calculation method known as the method of the poverty line (MLP) which defines poverty as the following: income that is less than the cost of a normal food basket, the cost of education (not including higher-education), the cost of health, and the cost of clothing, footwear, transportation and housing (Damián 2010). However, as Araceli Damián takes note, this method fails to take into account the basic costs of human needs as it does not qualify a number of other rubrics such as the cost of goods needed to prepare and consume food (utensils and so on), nor the costs of personal hygiene, household cleaners, furniture, etc (Damián, 2010). Put simply, official numbers fail to capture the economic reality in México. Hence, as Araceli Damián reveals in her work, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, poverty rose dramatically, despite minor drops from time to time, and by using the Method of Integrated Mediation of Poverty (or MMIP, which takes into the account the measurements of the MLP, as well as the Method of Basic Necessities Not Satisfied, or MNBI, and the Poverty of Tim,

which takes into account domestic work, education, and recreation), Damián is able to calculate that between 2000 and 2006, poverty only dropped from 75.9 percent to 70.9 percent (Damián, 2010). This is despite the fact that NAFTA has produced \$3 billion a day, \$1 trillion a year, according to US Commerce Secretary, Penny Pritzker in 2014 (Gutiérrez, 2014). Thus, neoliberalism has had a great effect in accumulating ever-greater quantities of capital, but at the cost of poverty for the working-class. And yet, one of the greatest consequences of neoliberalism inflicted upon the Tijuana has been the massive waves of migration to the city, due to the nationwide level of poverty.

Tijuana's population has been contested various times, but for the sake of simplicity, we consult the official record (itself astonishing enough). In 1990, following the federal census, "Tijuana's population was about 700,000, 370,000 of which were born" outside of Tijuana (Gutiérrez, 2014). Following nearly two decades of neoliberalization, Tijuana's population had reached 1,210,820, with more than half of the people living there having been born elsewhere — 581,235 to be precise (Gutiérrez 2014). The single greatest migrant population group came from Sinaloa, as the city registered 99,286 people born in the state, followed by Jalisco (79,559), Distrito Federal (54,603), and Michoacán (50,543) (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, or INEGI). Both Sinaloa and Michoacán are states that are largely agrarian, and thus reflect the effect neoliberalism has had on the countryside, reflecting the Zapatista analysis that NAFTA was a death sentence to rural and indigenous communities (Gutiérrez

2014). This is also witnessed in the growth of people in Tijuana from Chiapas and Oaxaca, which in 2000 numbered a combined total of 29,020 (INEGI). Furthermore, we witness here that NAFTA had huge effects on the population of the city. Even if the federal count is questionable, the federal numbers alone are impressive and speak to the disenfranchisement that neoliberalism wrought. By the new millennium, Tijuana held nearly half of all the people living in Baja California (INEGI). By 2010, the growth spurt leveled off a bit, but still remains substantial as the federal census counted 1,559,683, but with still counting 744,150 people being born outside the state (Gutiérrez, 2014). By 2010, the amount of people coming from Chiapas grew to 41,521, from Distrito Federal to 59,442, from Guerrero 31,064, from Jalisco to 85,619, from Michoacán 60,163, from Nayarit 45,440, from Oaxaca 21,634, from Puebla 24,007, and from Sinaloa 131,834 (INEGI). Hence, we see that Tijuana continues to attract more people from periphery centers that are not known for industrial production. And, what goes beyond saying, is that the stress from an exponentially increased population is nothing short than astonishing.

However, the explosion of population in Tijuana and across the northern border, due in great part to the effect of neoliberalism, has had great repercussions on the border itself. Since neoliberalism, the border that divides Tijuana and San Diego has undergone a serious militarized restructuring. First signs of border militarization coincided with the inaugural years of neoliberalism. As we know, mass migration is normally attributed to crisis (something that

capitalism inherently cannot get enough of) and “as the U.S. economy went into a severe recession during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and INS apprehensions in the U.S. — Mexico border region continued to increase in number, the notion of ‘regaining control of our borders’ became more salient and politically expedient” (Dunn, 1996, p.36). It was under the Reagan administration that border enforcement (through militarization) began to increasingly take a primary stage in American politics, riding the reactionary backlash. Under this administration, in fact, the border and undocumented immigration became a “national security issue — e.g., invoking images of ‘tidal waves’ of refugees and of terrorist infiltration across the U.S. — Mexico border” (Dunn, 1996, p.42). However, over the years and through presidential administrations, the US-Mexico border increasingly became a concern for the United States, as it was clear that the effect of neoliberalism required a particular spatial fix to the coming waves of migrants.

The most drastic changes have occurred since NAFTA. Just months following the inauguration of the free-trade agreement, Operation Gatekeeper “was put into San Diego to prevent” mass migration, as if policy-makers knew full well the program would act as a formal death sentence to rural workers (Gutiérrez, 2014). The program was intended to enforce “the illegal entry of human beings. . . as well as curbing drug imports” (which will be discussed later) (Gutiérrez, 2014). And yet, even greater changes occurred following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. Again seizing the reactionary tidal wave, the

government quickly mobilized on public sentiment and expanded the power of the border patrol. But this militarization came at the very safety of those looking to cross the border in search of work:

From 2002 to 2012, the number of Border Patrol agents doubled to the threat of terrorism. However, the rapid expansion has also lead [sic] to very questionable findings. Recently, the Center for Investigative Reporting found that the Border Patrol has hired thousands of agents without a polygraph exam that was only recently made mandatory for applicants. This is something that should cause a deal of apprehension (to say the least) as hundreds of new applicants under the new polygraph requirement have admitted to kidnap and ransom, child molestation, and rape. The absurdity is that these same applicants who admitted to such nefarious charges *passed* all the previous stages. That leaves literally thousands of Border Patrol agents that were hired without the polygraph unaccounted for (Gutiérrez, 2014).

This led to a series of human violations across the border:

The potential of shady personalities further reveals itself in recent events of border killings. The brutal murder of Anastasio Hernandez Rojas by multiple Customs and Border Protection agents is only one sad account. There have been multiple accounts of Border Patrol agents violating international law by shooting into Mexico, including cases where people picnicking in Mexico have been shot. Despite more 'protection' what has resulted from the massive growth of border forces was not a reduction of any amount of 'illegal' human beings (as there are roughly 11.7 million [in the United States] today) or drugs (as the cost of a single gram of cocaine is 74% cheaper now than it was 30 years ago). In fact, for all the fear of foreigners, four out of five people arrested by narcotics at the border are actually US citizens. Not to mention that despite all the spending in the southwest border, there has yet to be any news of 'terrorists' being apprehended. The only tangible result has been a much more violent, much more militarized border (Gutiérrez, 2010).

Hence, the border in Tijuana has functioned as a way to control population growth in the United States, a necessary step for the North American

government to control an already flammable economy, as evident in the recent financial crisis. As Ruiz Durán notes, between 1989-2001, 3.7 million persons migrated from México to the United States (Ruiz Durán, 2003). Hence, border militarization used multiple fears to increase the capacity of the government to restrict the movement of human beings, as capital moved freely from México to the United States. The result then was the booming population in Tijuana which had a serious impact on the built environment.

The border was only the most obvious spatial change in the city — though not the only one. Though the method of primitive accumulation is thought of as something particular to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, David Harvey notes “that all the features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully present within capitalism's historical geography up until now” as neoliberalism has caused “displacement of peasant populations and the formation of a landless proletariat in countries such as México and India in the last three decades” (Harvey 2005). Public lands were quickly given up to make way for industrialization. All that is Mesa de Otay was redeveloped for industrial purposes. As Cicilia Quintero Ramírez notes, throughout the 1980s, a group of capitalists were commissioned to promote maquiladoras throughout the border region, resulting in one of the most important spatial developments to facilitate industrialization via maquiladoras, which was the creation of the “industrial park” in Tijuana (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). As Quintero Ramírez notes, this was part of a process of capital diversification, and was spearheaded by businesses such as

Grupo Bustamante Realty Group (which is owned by the same family to which Carlos Bustamante, mayor from 2010 to 2013, belongs), while other real estate groups, such as the grupos Limón and Salmán dedicated themselves to promoting these new industrial zones, renting lands associated to such development, industrial buildings, and providing services to the industrial parks (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). These new companies speculated the territories around La Mesa which lies to the southeast of the old city center and to the east in Mesa de Otay, taking advantage of the new created economic climate, a product of the debt crisis. Mesa de Otay, which had previously been ejido (i.e. public land) was thus repurposed for private ends. The government helped in facilitating these new spatial formations, Ciudad Industrial Nueva Tijuana located in Mesa de Otay being the government's most important contribution, where the majority of the new maquiladoras ended up being built (Quintero Ramírez, 1997). Hence, Mesa de Otay became envisioned as a new production and product transport zone.

The construction, development, and planning around Mesa de Otay (where the Ciudad Industrial Nueva Tijuana was located) revolved primarily around the question of production and product transportation, while the needs of residents that would inhabit the sector was a secondary concern. It was also hoped that the new urban sector would replace dependency on the historic downtown center, and meant to better distribute services (Herzog, 1990). This was further facilitated by the construction of Otay Mesa border crossing in 1985

(Herzog, 1990). This new sector thus added an entirely new zone dedicated to maquiladora industrial processes.

With an entirely new urban sector being created, Tijuana entered a new phase of spatial configuration. As Alejandro Rodríguez (2009) notes in his text, *Informal Housing Markets and Structures*, the result has been such that an approximate 65,000 people move to Tijuana annually. But again, this is only to the extent of official registration, as even Rodríguez (2009) speculates that despite the fact that the federal government counted approximately 1.2 million people in 2000, it was more likely estimated at around 2 million. Hence, as Rodríguez (2009) states, “Tijuana is the result of an accelerated process of urbanization caused by external economic factors in an environment lacking suitable conditions to accommodate human life” (p.28). Spatially, this has translated into an intense pattern of uneven development. The constructions of the neoliberal era focused almost exclusively on extracting profit. The primary concern of Mesa de Otay was to open untapped land resources for the interests of capital (Herzog, 1990). Meanwhile, the result of the canalization process (that involved the forced removal of cartolandia) that was mentioned at the end of the first chapter, was to erect “modern shopping malls, hotels, government offices, private-sector office buildings, the Cultural Center, and residential areas on the former flood plain” — all of it developed in the 1980s (Rodríguez, 2009, p.34). Hence, Zona Río became an administrative, governmental, cultural, and consumer center primarily for the use of the middle and upper classes, while the

historic downtown continued to serve as a tourist center, and Mesa de Otay was converted into an industrial center. But as we know, the stress on the old city center was already great by the 1980s when Mesa de Otay was being developed. What resulted, then, with the mass migration of the disenfranchised that came to Tijuana from around the country, is a geographic pattern wherein “most of the areas of underclass are located in a U shape along the edges of the city”, in “mostly new areas of development, especially those on the east side of Mesa [de Otay] and behind Cerro Colorado”, as well as those in Zona Norte located along the “international border close to downtown” (Rodríguez, 2009, p.99). As Rodríguez (2009) notes, this follows “a classic differentiation between the inner city and the suburbs, like the Latin American cities of Caracas, Río de Janeiro and Lima” as “the city center harbors a concentration of wealth, industry and commercial sectors” wherein “the upper classes are close to the city center” while “the underclass is located in the suburbs, along the border between urban and rural” (p.99-100). However, this new configuration depended on urban informality.

As neoliberalism moved people from the countryside to the city, as the border restricted movement out of the city, as the maquiladora industry grew into new stretches, urban informality became increasingly common in Tijuana. Urban informality is thus a fundamental facet of neoliberalism, that reflects the class character of the economic program. As Rodríguez (2009) notes, urban “Illegality is mainly present in two forms: One is the lack of ownership of the land parcel on

which a house has been built” wherein “the land may have been acquired from a legal owner, but as in the case of an illegal subdivision, this transaction does not indicate legal tenure of the land”; meanwhile, the other form “of informality by legal standards is the lack of proper building permits. A household could have legal tenure over the land, and even build a unit according to city ordinances, but if the household does not have the required construction documentation, then this situation is informal” (p.55-56). Already by “1984, 38% of the city’s population was living in informal settlements” while “by 1995, the number of people living in informal settlements had increased to 64%” (Rodríguez, 2009, p.56-57).

Informality developed first along the historic downtown center, but as neoliberalism heightened the spatial stress, it moved towards the peripheries (Rodríguez, 2009). However, aside from the legal rights to land, Rodríguez also discovered that informality through access to services is also rampant throughout the city: as he notes, “only 71 out of 488 *colonias* [neighborhoods] have access” to water, sewage, electricity, street lights, telephone, and gas, located in particular pockets of wealth (2009, p.63). Meanwhile, the study reveals that in 13 *colonias* there is neither water nor electricity; 100 *colonias* (out of 500 studied) lack any particular basic service; 45 *colonias* lack any access to water whatsoever (clustered mainly in the peripheral east end of the city as well as southwest Lomas region) (Rodríguez, 2009). Meanwhile, in terms of actual constructive materials used, 266 of 387 lack proper materials for roofs (Rodríguez, 2009). In the end, though not exhaustive of the 764 *colonias* counted

in Rodríguez's 2009 study, it is revealed that such development reflects the neoliberal preference of profit over people.

Hence neoliberalism spurred forth a great series of changes upon the city of Tijuana. These changes were spurred by agreements that were brokered from above without participation of the working-class, and in turn, its burden has been transferred to the shoulders of this class. Neoliberalism has resulted in a city that is defined by inequality, defined by insecurity, and defined by a particular relationship of class violence, wherein the transnational bourgeoisie transfers social risk to the working-class. Though Tijuana was never an idyllic space, the results of neoliberalism have been catastrophic for the working class in ways that are multidimensional. Ways that have intensified over the years and become increasingly manifest in the everyday.

3.2 Everyday Life Under Actually Existing Neoliberalism

In this section we will attempt to reveal the effects of neoliberalism in the everyday life of the working class. It should be noted that prior to neoliberalism, several basic facets were uncovered: that is, that the border was not militarized and though deportations occurred in various moments, one could cross easily and without documentation if necessary (this is not to say that other institutions of oppression and exploitation did not exist upon crossing); unionization provided a means of economic security, at least in the case of those unionized through Alba Roja at the Agua Caliente racetrack; life was generally simpler, economically and

spatially; though people were able to traverse the border, everyday life largely revolved around the center of the city (though economically segregated, nonetheless), while Tijuana's economic product was part of a more local chain; women's labor was largely domestic or informal, and largely invisible; politics was hardly part of everyday life, though syndicalism did afford the creation of a certain political sensibility; we also know that leisure time was plentiful, that people participated in sports outside of work, whether unionized or not; and we know that the downtown was a center filled with North American tourists, if not a zone explicitly built for their enjoyment. As Mr. Machado eloquently expressed, it was the era of "la Tijuana chica". However since the 1980s, Tijuana has changed drastically.

Through the history and contextual information that proceeded this section, it should be enough to dissuade even the casual reader and the concerned citizen alike as to the fallacy of the neoliberal argument. Numbers alone show the catastrophic weight that rests upon the geographic space, let alone the political and the social space. But how does this translate in terms of lifestyle and livelihood? What of Tijuana's workers who produce its wealth, wealth that leaves faster than its products? Numbers too easily can be cooked. As we know, statistics are easily manipulated. The point of this work then is to help open a space that will allow other narratives to surface. As Geraldine Pratt says, "stories of individual experiences are typically discounted by government experts as merely anecdotal", whereas "numbers 'turn a qualitative world into information

and render it amenable to control” resulting in the fact that numbers “by their very nature, [. . .] simplify” (Pratt, 2012, p.26&27). As such, it is necessary to delve into the personal and the more easily read as human.

This section then cross-examines multiple accounts from different workers. Nearly all the workers here were not born in the city of Tijuana, except for three subjects. Most of the subjects interviewed are also women. The workers were selected to gain a glimpse within particular economic fields: four women were chosen to investigate the maquiladoras, one woman was chosen to investigate the informal transborder domestic worker market, one male was chosen to investigate the service and tourism industry around avenida Revolución, and one woman was chosen to investigate the San Ysidro border market. Their testimonies will in turn be compared to scenes from Luis Humberto Croswaite’s *Estrella de la Calle Sexta*. In all of these cases, the everyday will be revealed in terms of work, leisure, gender, the experience of the border and the city. After such, a final investigation in the darkest contradictions of neoliberalism: we will examine migrant deportations and the social abandonment that neoliberalism produces through a series of interviews conducted with state officials, police officers, and a number of migrants (all male). Then, we will conclude the chapter by examining perhaps the most blatant and darkest contradiction that neoliberalism has created: that drug cartel and the violence of everyday life in the city of Tijuana.

It should also be noted that as in previous chapters, all people are referred to with false names in order to protect their identity.

3.2.1 Work

Perhaps the greatest change that neoliberalism brought to the field of work in Tijuana was the proliferation of the maquiladora. Since its inception in the 1960s, though it was intended to provide work for male workers repatriated from the United States, it has largely attracted female labor (Zenteno Quintero 1994). Guadalupe Taylor (2010), in her text, *The Abject Bodies of the Maquiladora Female Workers on a Globalized Border*, notes that “most maquiladora workers are rural young women who form part of the Mexican diaspora who have migrated to the border in order to escape poverty and authoritarian patriarchy, which could be fathers, brothers, husbands, priests, or the State” (p.351). She notes that this is because “according to foreign managers of the maquiladora industry, Mexican female workers are docile, submissive, disciplined and detail orientated” an attractive stereotype for transnational corporations further facilitated by the fact that “they are not only paid inferior wages compared to men, but they get unskilled jobs and are watched more closely”, thus producing a discourse that in turn produces, “a female object with a diminishing value that can be replaced easily (Taylor, 2010, p.352). This is specifically why female subjects have been chosen to analyze the maquiladora sector.

Four subjects were chosen: Rosa, Leticia, Alicia, and Erica. Both Rosa and Leticia were born in the state of Puebla; both acknowledged that they were born in rural communities “[donde] no llegaba ni dios ni el gobierno” in the 1980s. For Rosa in particular, her childhood was marked by rural life:

Mis papas vivían en el cerro, la última casa. . . no teníamos agua, luz, drenaje — ningún servicio. Para tener agua teníamos que ir con cubetas hasta el pueblo. . . donde había una llave comunitaria y pues llevábamos el agua en cubetas. . . La iglesia estaba muchísimo más lejos. . . caminábamos una hora para llegar a la iglesia y a la escuela al centro. . . [Era muy parecido a Tijuana]. . . el centro, lo que nosotros concemos como el centro realmente no está en el centro sino en una orilla. Entonces nosotros vivíamos en otro extremo.

Her life in this small rural town was marked by a strict patriarchy. Both her mother and father worked through subsistence farming, selling extra food in the local market. But she recounted that her father kept the money and often spent time in the city getting drunk, returning with no money. Due to her class background and rural lifestyle, schooling was hardly a priority, and she said that she did not grow up understanding the very concept of time. Time was not fixed, nor schedule, but personal and seasonal. She explained that she often arrived to school late, not understanding the concept of tardiness.

She did however go through school and upon completion moved to Puebla where she worked as a domestic worker for a middle-class family, living with them in a separate room. She hated the working conditions; she explained that her employers did not trust her and thus constantly followed her around the home and continuously accused her of theft. Furthermore, they often neglected

to pay her. Leaving one patriarchal home, she only found another. Hence, when her cousin told her to move to Tijuana, she found in the offer a golden opportunity: “La ventaja que yo vi para poder venir a Tijuana era que posiblemente podía conocer gente, tener otro tipo de trabajo, la posibilidad de estudiar, de conocer gente distinta, y yo soñaba también con tener una casa que a la mejor allá sí podría tener una casa. Y dije, sale, me voy.”

Her life in Puebla was thus marked by alienation and solitude. The city represented to her a new life:

En la televisión hay muchas historias, ¿no? se oye de Tijuana, como, hay mucho dinero, este, mucho trabajo, la gente vive diferente, una ciudad muy moderna y además yo ya había escuchado la historia que en Tijuana se barre dinero y dije “órale, yo quiero barrar dinero”. Me parecía como una oportunidad muy, muy grande. . .

Hence, Tijuana represented many things: liberation from patriarchal households, the ability to explore the city and its social fabric, the chance to be an individual and not merely a person who sells their labor, and the opportunity of social mobility. As she said, “tenía una maleta grande, grande, grande de sueños que para mí eso era lo más importante”.

When she arrived her cousin that lived with her aunt came and picked her up from the airport. When they arrived home, Rosa barely had enough time to let her luggage go when her cousin asked, “Where do you want to work?”, to which Rosa asked what kind of work is available:

Me dijo, “Mira — aquí hay muchas fábricas. Puedes trabajar en la que tú quieras. Entonces, sin comer ni nada, nos fuimos directito a

la fábrica. Me hicieron la prueba del espejo, así como ‘¿Respiras? ¿eres humano? Puedes trabajar.’ No me pidieron absolutamente nada. . . Y de ese momento me quedé a trabajar allí, en el turno de la tarde.

Maquiladora work is thus something that was readily available for unemployed women. All the women interviewed here worked throughout the 2000s, hence, one must keep in mind that the working conditions examined here are likely better than through earlier decades. Regardless, their testimony is telling. The most recently employed in the interviews conducted were Alicia and Erica, two sisters who sought work in the maquiladoras in the late 2000s. What makes Alicia and Erica different is that they were born in Tijuana, in the eastern neighborhood of El Florido. However, both their parents were migrants to the city — their father came from Sinaloa and their mother from Jalisco, both meeting in the city of Tijuana soon after their respective arrivals. Growing up in the eastern end of the city in 90s and the first decade of the 2000s, they recounted that their parents were “original pobladores” of their neighborhood, and that “no había agua, luz, ninguna cosa” and that the streets were not paved until well into the 90s.

Upon completing high school, both of them searched for work in the maquiladoras “porque hubo muchos gastos”. They found work in a major Japanese electronics maquiladora located in Ciudad Industrial Nueva Tijuana. In order to get the job, they recounted that they only had to show their birth certificate and their high school diploma, a seemingly stricter requirement than

those presented to Rosa and Leticia (who also confirmed similar hiring practices to those experienced by Rosa). However, both Alicia and Erica stated that other workers they knew there had been hired having only shown an elementary school diploma, while still others provided false documents, something that also resulted in the hiring of a 14 year old child. They claimed that though hiring practices appeared strict, once inside they discovered that they were in fact rather lax.

In order to understand the everyday, I asked Alicia and Erica to walk me through a typical day working at the maquiladora. Both laughed and said that it begins with waking up early. They said that first, one has to consider the neighborhood. They explained that they lived in el Florido and that most of the other workers also lived in eastern neighborhoods, such as Mesa de Otay, Buenos Aires, Via del Sol, Fontana, and so forth. Due to their class background, they had to rely on public transportation. As they had day shifts, work began at eight in the morning, so that translated into getting up at 5 a.m. “Hay un camión que pasaba por nuestra casa. En aquel tiempo era ocho pesos. Una hora para llegar. Entonces te levantas a las cinco, para prepararte, para llegar a tiempo.” Furthermore their mother would accompany them in the morning and walk them to the bus stop, located a kilometer away, until it arrived to pick them up. They explained that she did this as it was always dark in the mornings and her mother did not want anything happening to them, revealing an underlying fear of sexual or physical assault that accompanies the everyday experience of female

maquiladora workers. Although the bus only took one hour to arrive, they explained that the bus was often too full to stop, and so they had to set aside extra time (time being a continuous factor as we shall see) to assure on-time arrival at the plant.

The bus itself was filled to the brim with other maquiladora employees, signaled by the fact that all of them already wore the maquiladora coats. “Mejor que te la pones así si hay un accidente el empleador sabe. . . [porque] si vas de tu casa al trabajo y hay un accidente, la empresa es responsable”, they explained. This sense of insecurity is marked in other ways; if the bus is full they explained that they often were forced in sitting in makeshift seats that in case of accidents, death would likely result (they said this laughing); they also explained that it is advised you wear “lo menos que puedas. Ni aretes o anillos” because theft is common.

Upon arriving at the maquiladora, they explained that you are provided a locker where you leave all your things, especially electronics. This is likely related to security concerns in way of trade secrets and the physical safety of the workers — as they have workers wear special bracelets that are supposed to help with static. Five minutes before 8 a.m., a bell would sound announcing to the workers that the workday was about to begin. At 8 a.m. precisely the work-bell would sound. They explained:

Sabes que a las ocho debes de estar. Tenemos que hacer televisiones en la area de asemblo. Ahí, nos decían cuantas televisiones necesitaban salir, y cuantas hicimos el día anterior, y

cuantas teníamos pendientes. La línea es responsable de todo. Son puros procesos. El primero que te sube la tele. El segundo que ensambla los pies, o las patas — por ejemplo tú atornillabas, yo, me pusieron a revisar la televisión antes de empacar. . . la pantalla, todo eso.

However, if someone noticed an error in the production, it would be returned to the person responsible for the error so that they could fix the error. This obviously affects the speed of production and is thus punishable, and the punishment comes in the form of yelling at *all* the workers in the group. “[Como] éramos varios que teníamos que hacer un equipo, si uno se equivocaba pues la otra se retrasaba. Si la otra no iba [al trabajo] pues tenían que poner a otra. [Pero de todos modos] la regañada va a ser para todos,” they told me. By putting workers in a group, this adds a certain group pressure dynamic in that the worker not only receives the scorn of the supervisor, but the scorn of the entire group. When they scold the individual and the group, “es una llamada de atención, la primera. . . Son tres llamadas de atención. Ya que haces eso te ponen un reporte por... falta de trabajo, o algo así. . . que no le hechas ganas.

“Irresponsabilidad, o algo así”, said Erica.

“Es un reporte,” explained Alicia. After the third report, you are suspended. After three suspensions, you’re fired.

”Bye”, Erica laughed.

They explained that the idea of producing perfect televisions is absurd. “Nunca vas a hacer el trabajo perfecto. Siempre vas a tener errores. La gente no es robot y no puede ser todo perfecto.” Other reasons for firing are missing work,

excessive suspensions, or for simply talking too much. This reveals that work in the plants is thus isolating and alienating, and it reveals that the group dynamic is hardly oriented towards positive socialization practices, but rather towards total control. As they explained, bathroom breaks are allowed twice a day. “Y no tampoco de media hora. Es de cinco minutos.” But what needs to be made clear is that under “Just-in-time” production practices, this has to be so. The supervisor is inherently restrictive, inherently aggressive because an entire supply chain depends on such time values. Hence, breaks in the bathroom slow down production which has an effect on sellers and piles up merchandise in non-existent warehouses, as the entire idea of “Just-in-time” production is based on making things just-in-time so as to reduce the cost of storage by not having it. Hence, under the current economic structure, this has to be so.

This is further enforced by having strict production quotas. At the plant where Alicia and Erica worked, there was no reward for making more televisions. Simply a “felicidades”. They had to assemble and check some 2,000 televisions daily. If they do not make the 2,000 televisions, and miss the mark by 500, then those 500 have to be done the following day, plus the additional 2,000.

“A mi linea nunca superó la meta,” said Erica.

“A mi tampoco,” responded Alicia.

However, for the case of both Rosa and Leticia, other enforcement mechanisms were in place. In both of their experiences, maquiladora owners offered bonuses for those that not only surpassed the production quota, but

assembled an additional fixed amount of products. So that, if they had to stitch together some 1,000 shirts, for example, and were able to stitch up an additional 500, they would receive extra money, given in cash that same day. However, if they were only able to achieve producing some 1,450 shirts for example, and fell short of the bonus quota by fifty, then by 50 shirts, then they received no extra compensation. This was common, according to both Rosa and Leticia. Hence, a common strategy, they explained, to accomplish this was to simply refuse going to the bathroom, which in turn meant not eating and not drinking water. A painful experience indeed, and one that reveals that the very production cycles on which the global north depends on the ability of female workers controlling their very bodies, their very organs by denying them releases, thus making production an ultimately visceral experience, that is necessitated by the inherent requirements of such a global system. The very requirements of the socially necessary labor time thus bear on the workers *insides*.

Physical pain however is a common element in all cases. As Erica and Alica explained, you spend hours working. “Y paradas. El dolor de pies que te da, que no soporta la espalda, no, no, es horrible.” Furthermore, the psychological effects are great as well.

“Es aburridísimo obrar,” said one.

“El sueño que te da es inmenso,” said the other.

“Es tedioso es aburrido pero porque es fácil.”

“Es lo mismo durante 8 o 9 horas”

“No sé como lo hacen la gente que duran 20 o 30 años. Tanto tiempo haciendo lo mismo, lo mismo, y lo mismo”.

Hence work is not only physically excruciating, but psychologically daunting as well. Boredom results in errors which in turn result in complaints, and so on and so on. Though one is able to keep the job, it depends entirely on one's own endurance and ability to maintain the schedule. Some fleeting sense of job security is therefore provided only for the most disciplined of workers. Hence, working at a maquiladora, at the level of the everyday, takes an incredible amount of mental perseverance.

Breaks are thus inherently few, given the structure of the production and its complicated entanglement in a global circuit. Sometimes however there are times when the material to make the televisions is lacking, and you get a break. “De una o dos horas”, they said. But still the worker has to stand and is not allowed to sit while more materials arrive. For breaks, both Erica and Alicia explained that the bathroom breaks, though only five minutes, offer some sort of relief, as rumors are written on bathroom walls in pen.

“En una fábrica es puro chisme. Que tú andas con este, o con este, o que ya te vieron con el otro. A unas si son ciertas y otras no. . . Y todo estás leyendo y [así] te entretienes.”

“Con la linea 2, con la linea [de producción] 4, con la p de p de plasma. Y luego es como una historia. Escribe una, y la otra la contesta,” said Alicia, providing an example. “Y luego voy el día siguiente al baño para ver que pasó”,

she added and laughed. Hence, the bathrooms at the maquiladora can provide some sort of entertainment (momentary as it is), though entirely fleeting.

Breaks and lunch are highly regulated and mechanized experiences as well. So let us provide the basic outline of their day. It is 10 hours a day of work. From 8 to 6. 10:30 is the first break, for ten minutes. However, these breaks are rotative, due to the quantity of workers at the plant (which in the particular plant that Alicia and Erica worked at, they estimated to be 5,000). So some have breaks at 10, others at 11, and still others at 12.. “Para que te vayas agarrando aire”. Some take their break just to sit down, because the entire day you are standing. Lunch break is similarly provided at 1, 2, and 3, for a half hour. 3, 4, 5, another ten minute break.

Lunch break itself demonstrates the near total control of the production and efficiency at the plant. It is necessary to point out that workers can pay 50 pesos a week to be provided lunch at the maquiladora, which is either pizza or hamburgers. As with other operation cycles, it sounds with a bell: “La primera vez que vi que todas corren pues yo también corrí. Todos te empujan y todo eso. Cuando van a sonar los timbres se ponen asi como ‘listos’. En serio. Así se ponen. Y luego necesitas correr otra vez para llegar a tu lugar a la una y media. Porque no te puedes pasar ni un minuto. [Si no] te regañan.”

The image of cattle running to the feed is immediately conjured. And the reason is hardly that the workers simply *wish* to run to their food. It is again the conditions created by the production method. Given the massive amount of

workers and the half-hour time limit, workers have to rush to their food so they actually have the time to eat it, as the 30 minutes begin not when their plate is filled and they have (finally) been able to sit down. Rather, it commences the moment the bell sounds, thus producing a rush to be served and seated. But as Erica said, “Perate que eso no es todo. Agarras tu comida y como fuiste la última, a ver si agarras asiento.” However, they also said that if one’s workstation is at the opposite end of the plant, there is no longer a need to run. “Ya para que corres [aunque] tienes que hacer fila porque es lo que te cobran de los 50 pesos.” If you are the last one, they said, then you get the leftovers and you only have five minutes to eat. Both Alicia and Erica say that using the bathroom during the break is not advantageous, as many of the other workers want to use the restroom during that time, so they can use the break. Hence, one does not want to waste the little time that they have during their break in a bathroom line.

Furthermore, it must be noted how the line-formation is constantly reproducing itself in the workplace. A Line to the bus, a line to enter. A line to put on clothes. A line to enter the assembly floor. A line of production groups. A line to the bathroom. A line for food. A line to return to the plant floor. The line is everywhere. The everyday experience reproduces the assembly line all throughout the workday. Hence, not only is the worker’s labor-power mechanized and regulated, but the very body is mechanized and regulated, as if it itself is in the production line.

What's more, hierarchies are rampant throughout the workplace. Hierarchies not only exist in actual gendered employment positions, but amongst the line workers themselves. If you're friends with the cafeteria workers, then they allow you to move to the front of the line to be served first. "Llegaba uno y 'Hey ¿qué onda? y saludaba y ya la dan la última hamburguesa' They say that "ya lo tenían apartado". This practice of reservation also applies to seating. This practice is reserved by maquiladora workers with the most time there, and those are few that can stand the same repetitive fabric of everyday life in the maquiladoras. However, what must be noted is that in the cases of all four interviewed subjects, they referred to co-workers in the feminine form, speaking louder to the gendered nature of the maquiladora. There is workplace mobility in that workers can raise ranks, they said, as both of them were offered (secretarial) positions if they had a high school degree or if they knew computers. But we must keep in mind that that still factors out a quantity of workers. However, at the same time, most of the supervisors there, they admitted, were males, most promoted out of the assembly line.

This gendered position of power also translates into sexual harassment. However, there were a series of contradictions in their testimony regarding the matter. As they said, "si no te llevas no van a decir nada. O sea, si tú eres seria. . . no te van a decir nada." But at the same time, she remarked "y si te llegan a decir algo que vas hacer? Te vas a salir [del espacio]" Meanwhile, they acknowledged, that "pasas y te empiezan a decir cosas pero no tan al faltarte el

respeto. . . O a veces ya sabes donde se ponen y no quieres pasar por allí . . . [entonces] prefiero dar la vuelta. Y como son muchos — y sí puedes reportarlo pero evitas problemas [si solamente los evitas] porque sabes que van a seguir allí. No más los van a sancionar pero no los van a correr. . . Me tocó varios de esos medio pesaditos. También los señores — no crees que se detienen. . . los ingenieros... todos! Casi todos son casados y todos quieren andar con las muchachillas.”

This indicates that sexual harassment is part of the everyday experience for female maquiladora workers, and worse yet, is a sense of ‘rape-blame’ in which, at least in the case of these two workers, those that received the crudest, most inhumane treatment were at fault for entertaining their male superiors. Yet at the same time, they say that filing a formal complaint results in nothing. Hence, the best practice according to them is to merely map the workplace of sexual aggressors and to do your best avoiding them, and if sexually harassed, then to merely ignore it.

And, according to Alicia and Erica, all of this everyday experience is sold at the cost of 700 pesos weekly. This is the everyday work-life of more than 100,000 people in the city of Tijuana. In 2013, 552 maquiladoras were registered in Tijuana, employing more than 160,000 (García, 2013). However, due to the daunting workload, many find work elsewhere. Aside from the tourism and service sector, those that do not want to work in either (or cannot find work in either) can find work in the informal sector. Such was the case for Graciela.

Like Rosa, Graciela left her hometown to escape patriarchal structures. She was pregnant when she left Guadalajara for Tijuana, though intending only to visit. She explained, “Se me hizo más facil ya quedarme y así fue como llegué a Tijuana. . . Tenía 23 [años] más o menos”. Now 50 years old, she works as a domestic worker, cleaning houses in the United States.

“Empecé, por medio de mi hermana, me consiguió trabajo aquí en los Estados Unidos,” she explained. “Entonces, así fue como empecé a limpiar casa. Es un poquito cansado. . . [Pero] vale la pena porque lo que gana uno en realidad en una maquiladora, lo que uno allá a la semana es lo que uno, se puede decir, gana uno aquí en un día.”

Hence, the incentive to do reproductive labor in the United States for wages much higher than in Tijuana is great. Though it should be made clear that here the worker is completely unprotected. By importing such labor into the United States, a phenomenon has been created in that labor-power is extracted from the work but with nearly no external cost in the form of social security or political agency. She is essentially a rightless worker. Through neoliberal state-crafting, the rightless worker has yet again been created in the United State. Furthermore, though she expends her labor in the United States and operates throughout its space, she has no genuine right to the city of San Diego. The increased security apparatus at the border is what best marks her daily routine and the fact that she has no protection. As she describes:

“Lo único difícil es la pasada. . . Cruzar. . . Ya tengo ahorita como seis años cruzando, limpiando. . . Hace como dos años cruzaba diario. Era para mi, ir y venir, ir y venir. Pero después en una ocasión uno de los inmigrantes me...me dijo a qué venía yo constantemente... Pues, me preguntó, ‘¿a qué vienes hoy?’ “De compras”, she stated.

“Pero ¿a qué viniste ayer?” he asked in turn.

‘De compras.’

‘Y, ¿ant’yer?’

Y así, me decía

‘Pues mira, tu veniste tal día, tal día, este día no veniste, luego volviste a venir tal día, tal día, tal día, tal día’

Me dijo un mes hacía ‘tras. Entonces me dijo, ‘No. Tú tienes un patron como que tú trabajas aquí en los Estados Unidos y el día que no vienes es porque lo descansas’

Y igual yo, le dije que ‘No, yo vendo en Tijuana.’ Me buscó en la computadora pero no encontró nada. Y me dejó pasar. Entonces, de ahí con unas de las personas que yo trabajo me dijo, ‘quédate en la casa.’ Entonces, a partir de ese, de allí, yo ya me empecé a quedar. Y ahorita se puede decir que yo cruzo tres veces a la semana. Por decir, lo que es jueves, sábado, y domingo. Y ya no cruzo toda la semana.

What is even more interesting however is that she herself notes the contradiction. She said it is their job to make sure people don’t come to the United States to find work illegally, but in the end, “pues uno, la necesidad le hace, pues sí, venir.” It is a necessity to work in the United States, given the recent crisis. In recent years, informality has become much more commonplace in Tijuana. And this is likely due to the fact that the city was struck by high

unemployment rates — even at an official level. The Financial Crisis that hit world wide throughout the latter half of the last decade also hit Tijuana, especially as tourism decreased. In 2007, the official unemployment rate was at 2%, but soared up to 5.3% unemployment in 2011 (El Economista, 2013). As of 2014, of the 552,000 youth that lived in Tijuana, 6.7% were unemployed (Hernández, 2014). This is not to mention that as of August of 2014, the unemployment was at 7% (García Ramos, 2014). Hence, jobs like Graciela's, illegal as they are, are necessary for survival.

However, the work takes up most of her week, as just getting to work takes so much time. This cannot qualify as leisure, though she is not at work. This is simply dead time — that is, time that is neither productive or enjoyed. As she explains:

Me levanto a las cinco de la mañana. Para salir a las cinco y media de la casa. Por decir, de donde yo vivo a donde yo tomo la calafia, son dos cuadras. Esa calafia pues me trae a Brisas, ahí me bajo y hay un transporte; son taxis particulares que vienen directamente a la linea que duran unos quince minutos a la linea. La linea depende en como esté hay veces que puede uno cruzar en una hora, a veces puede cruzar uno hasta tres horas y media, así me pasó. . .

Hence, entire hours are added to her work day. And what's more, since Graciela has to stay in the United States most days of the week in order to keep her visa that permits her to keep her job, she is forced to live at her workplace, staying at the house of one of her employers in Chula Vista. Everyday work then becomes cycles of days.

However, as is seen in the historical record, tourism has historically been a safe job in Tijuana, employing a great portion of the population. Such is the case for Juan. Juan was born in Tijuana in the neighborhood of Alemán, not far from the city center. He began working as waiter upon completion of high school. “Empecé a trabajar en una tienda de curiosidades [en la avenida Revolución]; después al año, empecé a trabajar en la gastronomía. En un restauran-bar en la avenida Revolución,” in the 1980s. Despite the financial crisis, he remembers the time period positively. As he recounts, “O sí, la revolución en esos tiempos — estamos hablando del 85 — era muy concurrida por mucho turismo — australianos, japoneses — de todas las partes del mundo llegaban ahí. Llegaban tours con mucha gente, pues. Mucho turismo. [Llegando] en camiones. Era de fiesta todo el tiempo. Era todo el tiempo el ambiente sano, de fiesta, ante la bienvenida del turismo. No había tanta delincuencia.”

This party atmosphere is further revealed in the story *Todos los barcos*, which forms part of Luis Humberto Crosthwaite’s book, *Estrella de la calle sexta*. Published in 2000, the story takes place in a Tijuana that had yet to be affected by problems of public security and the militarization of the border, which would begin to hit hard after 9-11. The story is formed by one long and continuous paragraph that takes the reader through the bustling street of avenida Revolución, experienced through the eyes of North American tourists who come down to celebrate the 18th birthday of a lovesick boy named Ken. Ken is dragged

through the street to the brothels in Zona Norte, just blocks away, by his older brother Steve, in an attempt to keep his mind off his love interest.

Here, the city is experienced through the eyes of the foreigner and is completely mystified, to the intention of the author. There is no care about the space or the people that fill it. It is merely something to be consumed, like Juan's labor. As Crosthwaite writes: "Pues sí: ocho y media, rumbo a la avenida Revolución. Peregrinaje. Alrededor las ofertas, el comercio: artesanías, cigarros, taxi-taxi, señoras pidiendo limosna con bebés amarrados a sus espaldas. El camino está sucio. ¿Nunca lo limpian?. . . Enormes filas por las banquetas, husmeando: cantinas, restaurantes, farmacias" (Crosthwaite, 2009, p.69) To them, the city just is. It has no history, no beginning, no struggle. It is merely a product, an object in-and-of-itself, something that is to be consumed in a drunken fever. Inside a gentlemen's club, "Las muchachas se sientan cerca de ellos. En medio de las mesas, y toda la gente y del tas-tas-tas-tas. Gente brincando, haciendo escándalo. Uno de los amigos de Steve aúlla. Las muchachas, carcajadas" (Crosthwaite, 2009, p.69). Outside people are lured in: "Hey, hey, amigos, amigos, we have the best pussy for you. Risas-risas" (Crosthwaite, 2009, p.71), While inside: "Afortunadamente: mesa junto a la pista. El lugar está imposible. . . No se oye, no se oye. Tas-tas-tas-tas. . . Sobre la pista baila una mujer alta, hermosa, senos y caderas enormes. . . Uno de los amigos (¿Mark?) se acerca a la mujer y le ofece un dólar. . . El amigo toca los enormes senos, los

besa. Luego grita, aúlla” (Crosthwaite, 2009, p.71-72). Then another female comes out,

igualmente despampanante: senos, caderas, piernas. banderita gringa en el bikini. Marcha. Saludo militar. Cuatro de julio. Multitud grita, aplaude. Un soldado quiere subir a la pista. No trae uniforme; cualquiera sabe que es un soldado. Alcanza a jalar el brazo de la mujer. Tres hombres se acercan, lo detienen. Le sonr en. Lo calman. Tranquilo-tranquilo (Crosthwaite, 2009, p.72).

The tourist center exists primarily for the consumption of the foreigner. Space and persons are forced into a relationship of transaction. For the sex workers, despite the empowerment they may have, the relationship to foreign money, to foreign consumption, and to transnational capital crushes the individual power dynamic that they may hold for the moment. Its relationship is still premised on capital. Their sexual liberation, as it is thus premised on the transaction and the necessity to live, is thus still sexual subordination, as they are objectified as any other commodity. Their very life is mystified, eroticized to the foreign consumer. It is, thus, a relationship based on dependence. Furthermore, with the increased tourism from around the world, as Juan recounted, globalization has an effect on their bodies. As Sheila Jeffreys (2009) says in her text *The Industrial Vagina: The Political Economy of the Global Sex Trade*,

the globalization of the sex industry means that markets in women’s bodies are no longer confined within national boundaries [or in this case, the borderlands region]. Trafficking, sex tourism and the mail order bride business have ensured that women’s severe inequality can be transferred beyond national boundaries as the women of poor countries can be sexually bought by men from rich countries (Belleau, 2003) (p.6).

Hence, there is an underlying dependency that can be related to equality (it should be made clear that a woman giving her body to whomsoever she pleases is fine — what's at issue is the economic relationship). But this dependence runs across the board for all workers in the tourism industry (though obviously it's not as visceral).

Juan noted that even then in those good times life was lived through tips;

[s]iempre hemos vivido de la propina. Entonces esta es la situación. Lo que pasa es que aquí en lo que es... más bien es el país son los sueldos que, que... el sueldo bajo, pues. El sueldo bajo a nivel nacional es lo que nos. . . pasa a perjudicar a todos los mexicanos pues porque pues no avanza el país porque siempre estamos en el sueldo mínimo. . . y hay gente que gana mucho menos entonces aquí. . . en el ramo gastronómico a los meseros lo que nos ayuda. . . es que ganas la propina porque tu sueldo es. . . treinta dólares a la semana. Son 440 pesos a la semana. Siempre nos han pagado el sueldo mínimo.

This relation to the tip of the foreigner is problematic at best. It is at its core susceptible to pleasing the foreigner, worse yet, is susceptible to peso devaluations, and still worse yet, it is susceptible to the very border. In the same way that border security has negative impacts for those domestic workers that clean houses in the United States, it has tremendous effects on the tourism industry. As Juan explains the development of border security:

Fue causa a lo que pasó con las torres. [Nos afectó] mucho. Muchísimo, mucho, mucho, mucho. La gente no venía. La gente no venía a Tijuana. Fue cuando soltó toda la delincuencia pues. . . Ya la gente no venía, ya el turismo no venía Fue una baja muy, muy, muy, muy fea por parte de lo que es en el ramo gastronómico. Nosotros, la gastronomía se debe mucho al turismo local y extranjero. Entonces. . . la avenida Revolución cambió totalmente. Porque todas las tiendas de curiosidades y los bares y las cantinas

y todo esos lugares y los restaurantes precisamente donde yo trabajaba, todos esos que estaban a alrededor, pues ya no venía la gente. Era pura gente local que patrocinaba todos esos restaurantes y empezó allí la decadencia, decadencia, decadencia. . . hasta que muchos a la fecha han cerrado. [Ahora] es raro el turismo que cae [a la avenida Revolución]. Yo te puedo decir. . . uno o dos [Norte Americanos vienen para el fin de semana]. Nada más. Todos, el americano se va a lo que es, ahorita, ahorita en la actualidad a lo que es la zona Roja, a los congaes. Todo esto de lo que es la Calle Sexta, es pura gente local.

And with the dependency on local consumers (most of them pertaining to the lower-middle class), the tips themselves would also reduce dramatically. Hence, a raise in the minimum wage (in order to spur local spending) is absolutely critical. But even the union, through which Juan is represented under the CTM, does nothing to raise wages. He explained that the union (which represents a scant 850 hotel and restaurant workers) mainly does its work through trying to find people jobs and making sure people are paid. However, the primary job of the union, as all of the above lays evident, should be to raise wages, especially as the lack of tourism highlights this necessity. Hence, neoliberalism and the subsequent rise of border security have attacked workers in tourism.

The lack of tourism has also had profound effects on workers along the border. As Yolanda, a shopkeep that works at the San Ysidro border crossing recounts, the increased militarization of the border produced an incredible stress on the border workers: “Era muy molesto, muy frustrante. . . mucha gente dejó de ir en esos tiempo, porque era un trauma muy grande que pues que te veas

sospechoso, les valía madre que fueras con la familia y todo hicieron un pinche desmadre. . . Era algo muy, muy duro.”

Yolanda had arrived to Tijuana from Guadalajara in 1995 to visit her uncle who was looking to retire, and as none of his children wanted the restaurant he owned on the border, he gave it to her. As she said, “[p]ues el trabajaba todo los días allí en la pura línea. Todos los días nos veías allí, parados, platicando, ayudándole y él ya estaba grande y no quería dejar su negocio a otra gente que no fuera su familia y sus hijos no lo querían y allí nos convenció y nos quedamos con el restaurán.”

Her memory of the border, even then, was completely different to the border that has come to exist since the new millennium. “Había mejor trato y todo. No estaban tan militarizados. Había más facilidad de llegar a ellos. . . Incluso a los mismos migras yo les llevaba de comer. Pidieron mucho lo del coctel de camarón . . . Ahora ya pues están poniendo muchas trabas. Se me hace inhumano pero, allá ellos.” Her words recognize not only the drastic change — even utilizing the key signifier of militarization, something no one else has dared to use in the other interviews — but also the lack of agency in the matter. It was *they* who did this. The control was out of her and anyone else’s hands.

As she explains, “Qué no hemos visto en la línea. Tantas y tantas cosas. . . Ya he visto millones y millones de carros, de gente, gente, gente, gente, gente, mucha gente. . .” Everyday life, with the militarization of the border, since she arrived and through the developments of the 2000s, then, entailed the

passing of constant steel and carbon. The anonymity of the faces. Their market depended again on the foreign consumer. Furthermore, aside from the increased hostility by the border patrol agents, the wait time to cross was worsened with the reconstruction of the San Ysidro border due to security purposes — something that caused the lines to cross to San Ysidro to lengthen even more. The San Ysidro border crossing was begun in its first phase in 2011 (Ibarra 2013) but was not completed until 2014. This affected border crossing even more, as Yolanda remembers:

Nos afectó muy feo. Nos bajaron muchísimo las ventas. . . ya mucha gente no quiere pasar, lo mismo porque son filas de tres, cuatro horas. . . Los llamamos líneas piojosas porque son líneas locales, es pura gente de aquí. Que va para el otro lado a comprar o estudiar. . . bajó muchísimo la venta. Toda ya ha ido cambiado

Again, the reliance on the local consumption proved fatal to many small businesses. However, what had a further effect on everyday life was the explosion of the drug war in 2006 (discussed more closely later). As Yolanda recounts, “Y luego viene la seguridad aquí que se puso bien feo. Hace como seis años. Igual. Pues todo el mundo tenía miedo que porque dicen que en Tijuana salías y ya pisabas los muertos.”

Complaints for the government to do *anything* — whether it was to end the war on drugs, to restore public security, to improve the lines — fell on deaf ears. As Yolanda says, “Aquí, pues, México está en crisis. Se va para abajo, se va para abajo, se va de pique, y como todo, ¿no? El gobierno no ayuda. . . el gobierno, ¿qué ayuda? Se ayuda, esa es una *mínima*.” Despite the bureaucratic

monster that is the political apparatus of Mexico, there is no one that responds. It is, as Hannah Arendt (1970) says, government by no one:

Today we ought to add the latest and perhaps most formidable form of such domination: bureaucracy or the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no men [sic], neither one nor the best, neither the few nor the many, can be held responsible, and which could be properly called rule by Nobody. (If in accord with traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could be asked to answer for what is being done. It is this state of affairs, making it impossible to localize responsibility and to identify the enemy, that is among the most potent cause of the current worldwide rebellious unrest, its chaotic nature, and its dangerous tendency to get out of control and to run amuck) (p.38-39).

Hence, Tijuana found itself in a double-bind. Everyday life was greatly affected by the international processes, that revealed that the low-wages needed to facilitate the EPZ proved (though never enough to improve the quality of life), detrimental when tourism stopped, due to heightened security from “international terrorism” (when in reality it was meant to block migrant crossings) and the drug wars. If the minimum wage were to be raised, it would end up displacing factories as they look for a more “suitable” climate. But the drug wars and the need to suppress immigrant crossings had much more profound effects that brought to light the full contradictions of the neoliberalism (and will be analyzed more closely in the following chapter).

3.2.2 Leisure

For nearly all parties involved leisure is rare. The one that had perhaps the most amount of leisure time have been Juan and Yolanda. Given the proximity to the center and their steady employment over the years, they have been able to secure ample time to experience the city. Yolanda to this day goes to calle Sexta and Revolución, and has her older children watch the shop at the border, taking shifts. Juan however has felt the changes most drastically.

[Antes] jugaba beisbol después del trabajo. . . salíamos a divertirnos a la avenida Revolución. Todavía en esos tiempos estaba muy bien. [Íbamos] al cine. . . a la playa, a las albercas, o sea, la situación económica era buena. . . No había crisis económica. Para mí, los noventas — entre los ochentas y noventas fueron los mejores años de mi vida aquí en Tijuana. . . porque la situación económica fue muy buena.

But now, given the economic crisis he hardly goes out.

For maquiladora workers there is hardly time for leisure. As Alicia and Erica said, they get off work at six and the morning is restrictive since they had to be at work on time so they had to arrive at the bus stop early in case the bus was full. As it takes two hours to get home after work, “ya no alcanzas para hacer nada. Y luego el camión te lleva en ciertos lugares [que obviamente no es enfrente de tu casa]. Me iba oscura y regresaba oscura. No había ni luz tampoco.”

Hence, leisure is reserved for weekends, as Alicia and Erica say:

Los fines de semana [hay] fiestas en casa. Nunca lo de antro, lo de parque. Sábado fiesta en casa de alguien. Luego aparte ganabas 700 pesos — tenías que dar algo a tu casa. Aparte el camión. Si te

quedaban 200 no lo ibas a gastar a ver el cine. Pues no. Tengo que guardar. Entonces que era lo mas facil? La gente iba a casas, ponía música, y cada quien lleva lo que quieran y ya. Y pues los invitados eran los de la fábrica porque eran los conocidos. Porque es ahí donde más te relacionabas.

Rosa and Leticia said very similar things. In fact, it had taken them years to even go to the center of the city, explaining that many of their co-workers had never ever gone. For them, the city and the neighborhood they lived in were the city limits.

Graciela in turn said that she never used to have free time — that is before working as a domestic worker. Everyday life was confined to the household. Graciela remembers: Me la pasaba en la casa con mis hijos. Pues, también por falta de dinero. Tambien no, no me podía dar el lujo de decir, ‘ah, hoy voy a ir al cine’. O sea, no. El trabajo absorbía mucho tiempo, y no se da uno la oportunidad de ir a la escuela, o pensar en progresar.” When asked if she ever had the opportunity to explore the city — whether it be to go to city center or west to the beaches she simply said:

No. Pues apesar de que tenemos playas tan cercas... pero no. No tiene uno el tiempo. Bueno, en mi casa, yo no tengo el tiempo para decir ‘yo voy a ir a la playa con mis hijos’. Pues, volvemos a lo mismo, por falta de dinero. Pues, sí, esa es la razón por la cual uno no puede ir al parque.

However, now that she works as a domestic worker and has more money, she can spend more time, but still does not have the ability to fully explore the city. As Graciela says,

[l]a mayoría del tiempo me la paso trabajando. El día que me toca descanso, por decir, que son dos domingos que tengo al mes libres, allí sí aprovecho y ahora sí me doy la oportunidad de ir al cine con mis hijos. Se siente muy bonito. Es algo pues diferente porque anda uno con su familia, incluso he ido hasta el parque Morelos con ellos. Porque tengo dos niños, unos chicos. Entonces tengo entrada de dinero. Y eso pues me facilita más cosas para poder andar con ellos en el cine, ahora sí voy al parque Morelos.

3.3. Conclusion

It goes without saying, then, that neoliberalism has been detrimental to the working -class of Tijuana. For the workers of the maquiladoras, their time is completely absorbed by their work, which is necessarily so given that their labor is caught in a complex and transnational supply-chain production. Those in the tourism industry lived a bright moment with the increase of tourism in the 80s and 90s, but suffered greatly due to the War on Terror and the War on Drugs, resulting in the dependence on local consumption, which is much weaker given the low wages necessary to keep the business climate favorable for transnational corporations. The growth in the informal economy in Tijuana, that has developed steadily alongside neoliberal restructuring but exploded with the financial collapse has grown. This has created domestic workers that cross the border to clean houses, but at the cost of living at employer's home, separating themselves from family and their city, and having incredibly precarious working conditions. However, only through such work is free-time afforded, and the ability to experience the city. For everyone else, due to low-wages, they are confined to their neighborhood, experiencing the city at a micro-scale, resulting in a

segregation of space along class lines. In nearly all cases, the right to the city is basically non-existent.

Chapter 4: Tijuana's Black Mirrors: Everyday Violence in Neoliberalism

“ . . . pero de la violencia, de la verdadera violencia, no se puede escapar, al menos no nosotros, los nacidos en Latinoamérica. . . ” — Roberto Bolaño, El Ojo Silva

“Si eres pobre te humilla la gente. Si eres rico te trata muy bien. Un amigo se metió a la mafia. Porque pobre ya no quiso ser.” — Los Tucanes de Tijuana, “El Centenario”

As stated at the beginning of this project, Tijuana is often portrayed as a city of sin, as the years have spun black legends around the city. This is only so in particular aspects, but it is not something self-made, or something that developed through lack of morality or ethics. Rather, it was the abandonment of the social project, and the elevation of the individual that has made this legend manifest, particularly in two distinct, yet related, social phenomena that serve as black mirrors of neoliberalism, revealing its own terrifying face; that is the case of the migration deportations and the case of the narco violence that hit Tijuana from 2007 to 2010, before slowly submerging into the memorial ether, and forgotten. In both these cases, the structures of neoliberalism created what João Biehl (2001) calls social abandonment, in the way that human beings become animalized and how, through a combination of State-craft and market forces, become socially invisible and disposable as citizenship becomes “conceived as universal for the minority rich, regulated according to market inception” but “denied to the majority of poor and marginal population” (p.136). But what becomes even more elemental to understand either case, but more importantly neoliberalism as a whole, is to examine violence as a relationship,

and neoliberalism, as a restoration of class power, is the practice then of class violence.

If it is such that neoliberalism is the restoration of bourgeoisie class power, and if it follows that class power unfolds as class warfare, then we know that warfare is fought through violence, and if it is of a class nature, then it must be that neoliberalism is defined by class violence. Hence, Tijuana is the result of this class violence, and it is best epitomized by the migrant deportees (who become non-persons through their lack of property) and by the wave of violence that hit Tijuana in 2007 through 2010. By understanding both phenomena through the prism of the everyday, we will see precisely how violence is the defining character of neoliberalism.

4.1 Everyday Life for Migrant Deportees

This section will provide a brief ethnography regarding the everyday life of deported migrants. Again, all names have been changed in order to keep interviewees safe. The section accounts for two informal interviews that took place at a migrant shelter (David and Luis), an informal interview with a retired police officer (Emiliano), an informal interview with an official from the Instituto Nacional de Migración, and recordings from a migrant protest that took place on August 7, 2014 in Tijuana, in which a number of migrants were interviewed. No details about their crimes (or lack thereof) in the United States will be addressed here, only their experience in Tijuana upon deportation and their everyday life.

We must understand primarily that the border exists to prevent immigration from México into the United States. As Ackerman and Furman (2013) state in their article, “The criminalization of immigration and the privatization of the immigration detention center: implications for justice: While the forces of globalization lead to a natural loosening of the nation state borders and the transnational flow of labor back and forth between nations, the criminalization of immigration attempts to act as a counterforce to these powerful movements, with the aim of closing the American border to the free flow of labor” (p.252).

As I stated in an article last year, regardless of increased efforts by the United States government to scare people from crossing the border, the number of deaths along the border only increases, as migrants are forced into more dangerous scenarios to make it across. Without addressing the economic roots of migration (i.e. disenfranchisement through free-market fundamentalism), the need to cross to the United States will always be greater than the fear of starving to death.

Luis, who first crossed to the United States in the early 2000s, said “I came to the United States for the American Dream... There wasn’t any more reason than that. In the United States there’s work, at home there isn’t. So you have to choose.”

Gerardo expressed a similar story, except his is directly linked to the debt crisis of 1982. In that year, he left his native Michoacán to end up in the Bay

Area, until he was deported in 2014. “I left [México] for a simple reason — to find work. In México there wasn’t any work at the time. And I needed to feed my mother. It was that simple.”

Both Luis’s and Gerardo’s flight from México and into the United States were hardly choices. Back home, given the lack of work or the poor conditions and wages that *may* be available for some (but certainly not all), crossing the border was a matter of accessing social mobility and hopefully a better life. Thus, human beings are economically coerced into leaving. Understanding that access to work thus entails access to life (i.e. the ability to buy food, the ability to have shelter, and so on), just as Monisha Das Gupta states, migration can be directly attributed to structural adjustment policies (Das Gupta, 2006). Furthermore, due to the increased vulnerability created by the border patrol, migrants have to rely on criminalized networks of smugglers (thus the militarization of the border has created the necessity of such criminal organizations and not vice versa). Furthermore, due to the massive vulnerability of working class people south of the border produced by NAFTA and neoliberal restructuring, migrants are increasingly becoming victims of growing trends of kidnapping and human trafficking (Gutiérrez, 2014). If the border were as free for the people as it was for the money that crosses it, such horrors would be avoided. But rather, the logic perpetuates itself, as the Border Patrol, ICE, and other border-concerned US institutions demand more money to combat new criminal trends they themselves helped create. By criminalizing the free movement of people across the border,

they have opened new markets for smugglers. In creating this market, they have also created markets for human traffickers and kidnappers to prey on the vulnerable who fall into their hands thinking they are simply guides or smugglers.

Under the Obama administration, upwards of two million people have been deported (a number that, to be fair, is inflated due to a more expansive definition of what constitutes a deportee). To justify the removals and the breaking up of families, the US government maintains that people are being expelled for criminal behavior. However, a New York Times report found that “two-thirds of the nearly two million deportation cases involve people who had committed minor infractions, including traffic violations, or had no criminal record at all” (Thompson and Cohen, 2014). This is important because this “title” crosses the border with them. Police in Tijuana claimed in 2013, that due to the high deportation rates, some 600 people are deported daily to the city and but 50 are sent back to their home city (Ruvalcaba, 2013). According to the official interviewed from the Instituto Nacional de Migración, he claims that most people do not return to their home city because they “they don’t want to return home empty-handed as when they left” but this is more likely because they don’t want to return to a place with no jobs. Regardless, the police claims that the vast majority of these migrants are criminals, and that they are responsible for violent assaults because they don’t want to get jobs (Ruvalcaba, 2013). However, given the economic data, already it seems that this is highly unlikely. Rather than

finding legal residence in Mexico, what is found for migrants in Tijuana is that they in fact *do not* exist legally.

As Emiliano, a former police officer, explained, Tijuana's city code has a particular law called Bando de Policia y Buen Gobierno (Right of the Police and Good Government). Under this law, the police are allowed to ask an individual for identification. He explicitly said that they had to prove that they "maintain an honest lifestyle". Formally, this means that they have to present identification, which proves residence. Informally, this means if you look like a migrant — i.e. homeless — then you are criminalized. Furthermore, this demonstrates that citizenship in México is thus a privilege based upon property. It should come as no surprise that as neoliberalism is based on classical liberalism, that this is rooted in the Lockean idea of property, and hence to be able to own property, is to be able to have personhood (Cacho, 2012). If you cannot demonstrate that you have property aside from that which you carry with you, then you are subject to constant arrest.

One migrant explained the frustration of being searched by the police routinely and indiscriminately. At the August 7 protest, he grabbed me by the arm and told me to write down the following:

"The worst thing about it is when the police search me. They open my bag, and they just dump my things onto the dirty ground. Things that I've tried so *hard* to collect. Hygienic products, my toothbrush." He paused and looked away down the street, and bit his lip. He turned his head back around and continued:

“How can I get a job if I’m not even *presentable*? To the police, we and our things are just garbage.”

David said similar things. David had spent the vast majority of his life in the United States and grew up in a working-class Mexican-American neighborhood. He now works at a migrant shelter. He said, for those that are former gang members, employment is difficult. David explained, “Look, you can’t go out there and try to get a job all vato-like. You gotta grow your hair out. Cover those tattoos, you know. Pull up your pants. Shave your goatee, even. Gotta look respectable.” Employment is thus based on presentation and assimilation. “So I did that,” he said. “It was hard, but you got to make a choice.”

Finding work is the primary concern of any migrant. There are others that arrive at the shelter. “[Here at the shelter] you get *everything*. Here, you even get abuelitos [grandfathers],” he said. He explained that there are also old men that get deported. “Between 18 and 50 [years of age] — you got a chance. But if they send you out after 50, man... That’s different,” he said, raising his gaze, looking out into the street behind me, past the steel fence that separated us from the world outside. “Then there’s no going back. You see them just give up on life.” He said an old man had recently died after only three months of deportation. He said there needs to be a social program. “This isn’t enough. Pretty soon — they die.”

The only social institution that has been put into place in Tijuana to receive them has been that which is provided by the Instituto Nacional de Migración. The

official there explained that all migrants upon arriving to Tijuana, “are given identification, permitted two phone calls, are given maps, and the institute pays for the flight to their home city.” But, as stated previously, who wants to return to the place they left *because* of the lack of jobs. Regardless, what is most important from that packet is the identification they are given. This is provided so that in the case of police inspection, the idea is that the migrants can show their current propertyless condition. However, both Emiliano and the official from the Instituto Nacional de Migración corroborated that city police often rip up these papers so as to fulfill quota requirements.

“Look,” Emiliano said, “I’m going to be real honest. Officially [arrest quotas] do not exist. But we have to prove that we did something. So you have to grab some people here or there.”

“And migrants are easy,” I said.

“They’re the easiest,” he replied. He explained that you have to tell yourself that you’re helping them somehow, that at least they’re getting food and a shower.

“Look,” he said, “it’s terrible. I knew I was joining a terrible thing, but I believed I can make changes from the inside.”

“If they had jobs at home, they would have never left,” he stated, bluntly. He complained that the Mexican government washes its hands of helping the migrants, by getting very little of them back home. Programs do exist to return individuals back home after deportation “but for every ten they get back home,

there are still hundreds more” that are stuck, left wandering. He said that there should be some kind of program that puts them in social housing and at least gets them work, “at least something temporary.”

The only thing that is provided for deportees are the dozens of migrant shelters that riddle the northernmost neighborhoods of Tijuana. David provided a tour of one of the shelters located not far from the San Ysidro border crossing. “You come in, you line up. Write your name, state where you’re from, age, how many years you’ve been in the United States. It’s 15 [pesos] to sleep and 5 [pesos] to eat” said David. “Sorry, but it doesn’t say ‘government’ [above the door]”.

Living conditions within the shelter are spartan. There are nearly 70 bunks within the shelter. Taking a tour through the facility, the rooms were silent. The bunks were perfectly kept and lined up along the room and color coded according to time spent in the shelter. “Gotta keep orderly,” David told me.

There are two dormitories: one down stairs and one upstairs. He said if its your first week here, you get a red cot and you’re allowed to keep your things in a plastic box. He pointed to the corner were there were stacks of black boxes. He said if its your first day, you usually have nothing and so most of the boxes are empty. For those that have good behavior they are allowed to stay more than two weeks and you can get a white cot and lock your things in a locker. In between each cot was a black plastic locker. If you leave for more than one day, you can no longer get a cot. The room upstairs was identical but here there were wooden

cabinets between the cots. The rooms were stark, clean. “Everyone gets up at seven to pick up, eat, and pray and you have to be off the facility by 10:00am,” he explained. Here, there is nothing but roof, shelter, and God — all at a price. “From there, you try to get a job,” he said.

This is precisely what everyday life is for deported migrants: a constant search for a person to whom to sell their labor. Their very lives depend on it, they see it all around them. The brutal reality of living at the bottom of the social pyramid while knowing full well that not only can they work, not only are they physically capable of enduring whatever it is they can get, but that they are competing for jobs with thousands of other deportees, thousands of other people that unemployed as well, given the poor economic climate. This is most evident in job fairs for migrant deportees that hardly employ the quantity (or quality) necessary (Gutiérrez 2014). The INM likes to say they’ve also helped by creating “módulos” where migrants have access to computers, but this hardly a social program. What results then is complete social abandonment that depends on their ability to somehow find work.

Hence, deported migrants are forced to wander the city. Many languish alongside el Bordo, the name that has been given to the canal — the very same canal upon which the deported and the down-and-out were evicted from cartolandia some fifty years back. Most stay around the downtown area searching for work, but as has been laid bare, that work is hardly existent. Even the downtown area lacks any sort of public bathroom. Hence, many defecate or

urinate in the canal. As one migrant at August 7th protest said, it's simply humiliating. Furthermore, as the majority of the migrant shelters exist along the San Ysidro border area, and taking public transportation results in mobility or food (and no guarantee of coming back in time), leaving the area poses a huge risk for the migrants. What this thus leads to is a very spatialized zone of abandonment.

What results is that they become prey for both the state and for elements of organized crime. As many of the banners read on the August 7th protest: "¡No somos criminales! ¡Somos trabajadores!" But the migrants function better for the State as criminals. Following the wave of violence that hit Tijuana in 2007 and continued to batter the city through 2010, the State used the migrants as signifiers of natural criminals and blamed whatever violence arose as a US American created phenomenon. On the other hand, the migrants, abandoned as they are, may fall into the routine of drug-use or end up selling drugs in the hope of lifting themselves up from poverty (thus becoming the State's self-fulfilling prophecy). Organized criminal elements may then use them to conduct low-level drug distribution. But more importantly, organized criminal elements have begun to kidnap and ransom the migrants (due to the ease of so doing and due to their social vulnerability). This brings profits in for criminal organizations, but also serves the State; in cases where they save the migrants, it perpetuates its own need, but by making the problem to begin with.

Hence, the very structures of neoliberalism have created an entirely new underclass of disposable workers. Due to the very mechanisms of neoliberalism — economically coerced migration, rightlessness in the United States, citizenship based on property — these migrant deportees are a socially created sector of Tijuana's population that form a sort of black mirror. Their everyday life is consumed by desperateness and bleakness, as their position is the product of the economic structure. Their everyday life is a fleeting hope that one day they may be able to sell their labor. Until then, they bounce from shelter to shelter, until they find that work or are consumed by the very streets they wander.

4.2 Narco Criminal Organization as Neoliberal Counter-Power

It was the complete intention of the author to ignore drug cartels when this project began, as it appeared as a separate phenomena. Or rather, one that is too outside the social structure. But, over the course of research, it became quite clear and evident that the surge of narco-power is directly related to the decline of the social state in México. Though not openly apparent, the war on drugs functions as an undercurrent in the everyday of Tijuana. It is everywhere. In newspapers. On television. In film. In literature. One cannot escape the shadow of the narco. But when the wave of violence hit Tijuana in 2008, spurred by Felipe Calderón's war on drugs, it took everyone by surprise that so many dead bodies would be produced. This revealed not only the power of narco organizations, but their embeddedness, particularly in working class

neighborhoods. Furthermore, the persistence of their existence in the face of the State, shows that narco organizations function as a secondary state and as a neoliberal safety net for the unemployed. Hence, this final section will examine narco organizations as systems of counter-power that challenges the state because it is what the State cannot be: a purely neoliberal enterprise. By this, the violence that occurred in Tijuana from 2008-2011 — the crime wave that pronounced the death keel for tourism in the city — was not something created during these three years; rather, the violence was only a manifestation of a system of violence, as neoliberalism *is* a system of class violence, wielded against the working class. In order to probe this we will examine violence in neoliberalism and examine the narco as an everyday element in Tijuana through the texts *Tijuana: Crimen y Olvido* by Luis Humberto Crosthwaite and *Viajes al este de la ciudad: una crónica de la guerra contra el narco en Tijuana* by Omar Millán.

To understand that violence is not merely an act but a relationship, we must probe what violence is. Walter Benjamin, in his essay *Critique of Violence* states that within the capitalist mode of production that engendered its own legal system of protection, “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-preserving” (Benjamin, 1978, p.287). Hannah Arendt, in her text *On Violence*, reminds us of the Weberian definition of the state as “the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is allegedly legitimate, violence” (Arendt, 1970, p.35). If violence then is something that is inherent to governing, through

which it coerces people toward the desired outcome so that the machine may continue, unhindered (as is the case with the deported migrants and everyone else for that matter) in its production and reproduction, then *allowing* social organisms outside of the formal neoliberal State to exercise violence (through legal means, such as a state sanctioned strike) is ultimately a gesture to allow laws to be made or preserved, either way, keeping the social fabric of capitalism knit. Benjamin reminds us that “organized labor is [or rather was], apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence”, reminding us that the Capitalist state of yesteryear allowed the right to strike not as a means to exercise violence “but, rather, to escape from a violence” (Benjamin, 1978, p.282). We must remember that this kind of violence to which Benjamin alludes to is the violence of the proletariat, a dictatorship that will end the exploitation of bourgeois social relations. This is particularly true in the corporatist union structure in México — that is, that unions were allowed to employ sporadic incidents of working-class violence, only in order to maintain the class compromise of the Keynesian era. As André Gorz concurs, “Historically, unions developed out of the workers’ need for self-defense and self-organization. . . the turning point came when they were recognized as and considered themselves to be the sole lawful representatives of the working class within the capitalist system” (Gorz, 1973, p.31). More concretely, unions that are allowed to be preserved are those that function as “permanent institutions holding legal rights and responsibilities” that “develop into permanently structured - and

therefore hierarchical and bureaucratic — organizations to administrate the ‘interests’ of the working class through juridically defined forms” (Gorz, 1973, p.31). Unions were part of the law-making and law-preserving process in order to stave off the ultimate “messianic” violence of the Revolution, as Benjamin would likely say. Hence, the capitalist state must hold a monopoly on violence and incorporates workerist organization.

In the case of Tijuana and the rest of México, we see that expressions of violence become increasingly commonplace as neoliberalism scorches forward. People increasingly die, murder happens more frequently and grotesquely, and the body is increasingly objectified and the Self increasingly alienated from a society denied, all of this making the very *act* of violence more commonplace. But why now? Whereas in prior stages of capitalist production, the right to strike (the right to commit class violence) was permitted so long as it was not revolutionary (this is most evident in that the Mexican state successfully killed subversive elements of society during its Dirty War) and brought forward laws that preserved the status quo and the system of relations it entails, the state similarly allowed the growth of the narco organizations. By crushing unions, steam had to be allowed to escape from the neoliberal pressure cooker. Hence, once more, narco organizations developed out of the vacuum, out of a social necessity for self-organization and self-defense, to use Gorz’s words. Narco organizations developed at a time when avenues of legitimate, legal life (i.e. non criminal life) was largely not feasible, especially after NAFTA. In fact, narco

organizations could only have developed at this particular time, technologically.

As Dawn Paley (2014) makes clear,

[w]hat is clear, however, is that free trade agreements and neoliberal restructuring have defined the shape of the drug market today. A study of over 2,200 rural municipalities in Mexico from 1990 to 2010 found that lower prices for maize, which fell following the implementation of NAFTA, increased the cultivation of opium and cannabis. ‘This increase was accompanied by differentially lower rural wages. . . (p.48).

As Paley (2014) continues, “Mexico scholars Watt and Zepeda argue that” NAFTA “provided both the infrastructure and the labor pool to facilitate smuggling” as “highways built to bring agricultural exports to US markets also serve drug traffickers, and increasing inequality makes more people willing to risk working in the illicit economy” (p.49). Hence, narco organizations developed out of a combination of social necessity and technological moment, just as labor unions.

However, labor unions directly attacked the State and the capitalist status quo — something that narco organizations did not do when they first developed. By As loan Grillo (2012) makes clear, when drug trafficking organizations first began to develop, “no one in the Mexican government seemed worried. ‘There is violence, but it is narcos killing narcos,’ politicians sighed. In any case, traffickers were not attacking the system, but rather competing with each other to see who could get the best of those to be bribed. The government could sit back and get paid, whoever won” (p.79-80). Hence, unlike revolutionary organizations that grew in the post-68 years, the State showed little concern. Their reaction was

ultimately a bourgeoisie scoff, unable to believe that these criminal organizations could ever threaten the State.

Thus, narco organizations, like labor unions, allow steam to escape from an *inherently* violent system of exploitation, so that a greater violence (i.e. the revolution) does not take place. They do this by employing the unemployed; they grease the cogs of capital, and they do away with the excess of the reserve armies of labor through murder and through literally *disappearing* entire persons, leaving behind only the memory. Far from hindering the machine of Late Capitalism, they are vital to it. Hence, the state *benefited* from their existence.

However, this was only the case until the Calderón administration attacked drug trafficking organizations in 2007. When Felipe Calderón assumed power on the 1st of December, 2006, he said that the primary goal of his administration would be to restore public security (Hernández, 2014). However, this did not mean to end existence of narco organizations. Growing exponentially in resources and power since the 1980s, this was merely an effort to reign in their power. As journalist and exile Anabel Hernández makes clear in her text, *Narcolandia: the Mexican Drug Lords and Their Godfathers*, the Mexican government's war on drugs is hardly a genuine effort to eradicate drugs from the market (Hernández, 2014). Rather, the intervention should be seen as one based on the protection of the Sinaloa Cartel (Hernández, 2014). Over the decades, the Mexican state developed an increasingly formal (though hidden) relationship with the cartels, culminating in a agreement in 2001 wherein an organization known

as “The Federation” would come into being — essentially an umbrella organization of previously independent narco organizations (Hernández, 2014).

This organization was established to establish the following:

strict hierarchy and discipline. . . [Members] would share the routes that different leaders had secured over the years, as well as their respective armed groups, and even their money-laundering men. Thus were unified the operations in sixteen Mexican states, representing more than half the country. . . At the top of the pyramid sat Joaquín Guzmán as the coordinator, with a vertical chain of command below him (Hernández, 2014, p. 179).

Hence, the war in 2008 came as a means to maintain strict control of illicit markets that could not be stopped. As Hernández says, “there is firm documentary evidence that Calderón’s war was overwhelmingly aimed against those drug traffickers who are El Chapo’s enemies or represent a threat to his leadership” resulting “not [in] a ‘war against drug traffickers,’ but a war between drug traffickers, with the government taking sides for the Sinaloa Cartel” (Hernández, 2014, p.241). Hence, the war against the narco organizations was against very specific organizations. One of them being the Arellano-Felix Cartel (CAF or Tijuana Cartel), which had dominated the city of Tijuana since the 1980s.

The CAF operated alongside local State forces since the 1980s. As journalist Jesús Blancornelas wrote, despite the increased presence of local State forces alongside the narcos, “Fue la combinación ideal: corruptores y corruptos dándose la gran vida; y los narcostraficantes en su recreo de crímenes con el sello de la casa y sin ser investigados” (Blancornelas, 2009, p.39). Local

Tijuana police forces had been penetrated by the local cartel. After The Federation was consolidated in 2001 — headed by the Sinaloa Cartel leader, El Chapo Guzmán — the CAF was attacked in 2002 as it contested the compromise (Hernández, 2014). Despite the string of violence that occurred since then, a single most important episode occurred in Tijuana between 2008-2011. However, around that time period, the media reported on the narco-related violence as *if* it were something surprising. As *if* it had been invisible all along, or at most, as if it were merely a pestering bug that must be squashed. However, this violence had always existed. It had always been there.

Luis Humberto Crosthwaite's text makes visible how this came about. Crosthwaite's text is a metafictional account in which the author attempts to probe the fictional disappearances of two journalists: Magda Gilbert, a crime reporter for a Tijuana newspaper, and Juan Antonio Mendivil, a crime reporter for the San Diego Union-Tribune's latino-section newspaper. Through imaginary reconstructions, documental investigations, and collections from Magda's diary, he reconstructs the 2007-2010 crime wave that hit Tijuana. However, he does not write about the crime wave directly, but rather about the crime that existed *before* the crime wave. Published in 2010, the novel examines fictional accounts that occurred in 2005, just before Calderón announced the war in 2006, and it arrived in full force in 2008. By doing so, the novel makes clear that such violence did not occur only from 2008-2011, but rather it was part of a reality that was largely ignored.

This violence however, continues to be ignored. Since 2011, people speak of the violence in the past tense, as if it no longer exists. But la Violencia, as people there in Tijuana commonly refer to the time period, continues to exist, though not manifest. It exists beneath the surface, and murders that make the news, appear only as physical and visceral manifestations, but the violence rides underneath the surface like an enormous current. For years, despite the fact that narco organizations, like the Tijuana cartel, had been a primary news subject, people ignored it, including the presence of the Arellano Felix Cartel which ruled Tijuana for years as an everyday thing. As Jesús Blancornelas wrote in 2002, “[I]ver o escuchar tantas veces de o sobre los Arellano Félix se ha vuelto familiar en nuestro país, hasta lo común; como si se hablara de un equipo musical o de algún equipo futbolero con un recuento de sus respectivas temporadas” (Blancornelas, 2009, p.33). But as Crosthwaite accounts, this presence was largely ignored, externalized if you will, yet made alien. He writes, “Convivimos con el miedo, lo ignoramos. Creamos fronteras psicológicas, nos albergamos en el falso sentimiento de seguridad que nos brinda la idea de que la peor violencia se desata en los rincones más alejados de la ciudad, en la otra Tijuana, la desposeída, la tierra de nadie” (Crosthwaite, 2010, p.95).

Omar Millan’s text, *Viajes al este de la ciudad*, a nonfictional and journalistic account of the war on drugs in Tijuana expresses a similar spatial attitude, as “the east side of the city has been the most affected by the so-called drug war. . . where there was more marginalization” (Millan, 2014,

p.304&299).Hence, “the community’s first reaction when facing a series of unprecedented violent events. . . was disbelief” (Millán, 2014, p.298). Disbelief became “the way that residents of this border protected themselves from the cruelty and pain that still felt foreign” (Millán, 2014, p.298). However, this would change when people no longer left their houses, when “between 2008 and 2011, during the war against drug trafficking, the main cause of death in Tijuana was murder” (Millán, 2014, p.297).

The previous action of ignoring and then hiding is best expressed in a scene in Crosthwaite’s novel in which Magda, who had been threatened anonymously through menacing communications over the police scanner that she kept vigil over at night, was suddenly approached by a dark vehicle. As Crosthwaite (2010) writes in sparse and broken prose,

[e]llos. Tres hombres bajaban de una camioneta Suburban. Corrían hacía mi. No supe qué hacer, no pude huir. Me tiré al piso, me cubrí la cabeza. No pude llorar, gritar. Venían por mi. Estaba perdida. Ellos. Los que matan. Corrían hacia mí. . . Sin embargo, no sentí sus garras. . . Pasaron de largo, se alejaron de mí. . . Levanté la cabeza y miré a mi alrededor: la conmoción de la gente... la incomprensión... el asombro en sus miradas. . . el temor de sentirse desprotegidos... el temor a que ellos se acerquen, de que corran hacia ti... el temor de que algo así puede suceder cualquier día, a cualquier persona... el horror de saberse indefenso. . . Transcurrieron unos segundos y la gente siguió su marcha, continuó con sus compras. El hecho fue lanzado al olvido (p.97-99).

This scene captures the entire 2008-2011 crime wave perfectly. The entire episode in the novel functions as a single entry from Magda’s diary entitled “ellos”. Despite the knowledge of the existence of such an ominous entity, people

in their the day-to-day activities ignored it. It was always someone else's problem. That is, until it grazes you. Then it absorbs you in the momentary flash and, there is nothing to do but wait and hope that it passes and gets someone else. The lack of a functional state only added to these passive tensions. As one subject interviewed in Millán's text that lives in an eastern neighborhood explains, "they [the narcos] threw many parties [in a neighboring home]. Sometimes screams could be heard, like people apologizing and begging. Fancy cars and police cars parked in front, as they were also coming to the party. Once even a headless man was dumped outside. The police came but didn't do anything. Nobody said anything because they were afraid" (Millán, 2014, p.295).

During the entire time period, there were great demonstrations, but many of them failed to grasp the root of the problem or any solution. Going to a religious service for the deaths that unfolded in 2008, Millán (2014) recounts:

In addition to the service organizers, there were other middle-class organizations with abstract or average names, such as Women, Students, Artists, professionals, Mothers... That Tijuana middle class, with its generalized resentments and its secret slaving love of work, of food, of technology, and shopping, now, in one of those life ironies, had taken to the streets and other forums to demonstrate for months like never before. . .distress was evident (p.314).

Thus the most violent time period unfolded upon Tijuana. Between 2008 and 2011, "there were more than 2,800 murders, hundreds of kidnappings and muggings, dozens of dead bodies decapitated and hung from bridges, and a number of shoot-outs in restaurants, dance clubs, hospitals, residential areas,

and busy streets” (Millán, 2014, p.293). But by 2012, “the local government, entrepreneurs, politicians, and some business people had changed the alarmist discourse. . . some even denied that the *narcos* continued to seed violence in the communities” while others justified ongoing murders as “‘focused’ only on those that were related to organized crime” (Millán, 2014, p.294). The problem of organized crime still continued, but it was relegated to the past tense, or worse, alienated once more. Though it gripped everyone for a moment, like the Crosthwaite scene, everyone got up and continued as normal, the reason being, that to solve the narco problem, is to solve the neoliberal problem.

This is best evidenced in the narco recruitment practices. In order for narco organizations to exist at the scale and capacity that they do, the primary ingredient is social abandonment — something that has been revealed to be plentiful in Tijuana. The reason that the worst violence hit the eastern end of the city is precisely because of the living conditions that are so prevalent there. The economic crisis in the city has made fertile recruitment grounds out of working-class neighborhoods, especially for youth. Arrests of youth increased tenfold between 2009 and 2011. Millán (2014) quotes Victor Clark Alfaro, director of the Binational Center for Human Rights, in an interview:

Now the organized crime is reorganizing itself. Young people are increasingly being used as *mules* or distributors, whether to cross drugs into the U.S. or to sell in the city. Minors are cheap labor and disposable for organized crime, in an environment where there is little employment or recreation opportunities for them, and where the business of drug distribution and consumption has grown rapidly (p.306).

This is further discussed by José Luis Ávalos López (president of Cirad, a civil organization dedicated to addiction treatment) who was also interviewed by Millán (2014): “These are the social conditions of the city today: disintegrating families, immigration, lack of job opportunities, and corruption. It’s a breeding ground for teenagers entering the world of drugs and organized crime” (p.307).

Abandoned by the state and by society then, it is the working-class that takes the hit the hardest from the narcos. Hence, as neoliberalism assaults the legitimate living conditions of the working-class and disposes and abandons these neighborhoods, the immediate result is the explosion of criminality. It should be no surprise then that Arellano Felix Cartel first made itself present in Tijuana in 1982 (Blancornelas, 2009). But, as is known, the State did little to remedy this, until it was being faced by a growing power of the narcos.

In order to understand the narcos, it is useful to identify narco organizations as ones that have effectively demonstrated counterpower while achieving dual power, in the face of neoliberalism. Due to the impossibility to find work under the neoliberal structure or advance economically, working for a narco organization offers the possibility to get rich. The sale of illegal narcotics is such a lucrative enterprise, that it attracts working-class people who can be employed in this criminalized economic sector. Given the scale of the production and distribution process (which, like neoliberalism is only possible now given the technological moment), the amount of profits reaped are enormous. As I and

Antje Dieterich stated in an article written last year, “In this social environment, narco organizations have grown enormously powerful, forming organizational structures and institutions that run parallel to the Mexican state” effectively forming a sort of counter-power (Dieterich and Gutiérrez, 2014). Counterpower, as defined by Michael Schmidt and Lucien van der Walt (2009), is institutional: “organs. . . able to supplant the organs of ruling class power” (p.65). Though Schmidt and van der Walt are specifically talking about anarchist revolutionary doctrine, when applied to narcos, the concept is terrifying. As their power swells in their ability to coerce and deploy violence against the State, and in view of their incredible amount of money, they compete with the state for legitimacy. In fact, they have achieved dual power through their bribery and corruption, they wield autonomous power outside the state, and *inside* the state. But under the neoliberal doctrine, they can be even more neoliberal than the state as they do not abide by any bourgeoisie law. To them, as Mao tse-Dong said, power stems from the barrel of a gun. At the same time, the narco organization does not need the State per se (perhaps in the form of creating a sort of “false” state for appearances sake), but the State needs the narco as it perpetuates its own (supposed) utility in combatting it.

Although the narco problem receded following 2011, the problem was not solved; it was merely pushed into the periphery. A policy of containment followed, as tourism attempted to be revitalized. But narco question still remains and it is only a matter of time before this contradiction will return. Hence, it is not that the

criminalized narcotic in and of itself is violent, or even the producer of the narcotic is violent, or even the vender, but ultimately, the entire system in which it circulates in and that it perpetuates (e.g. the neoliberal market) is inherently evil. Given the global nature then of production, distribution, and consumption, answering the “Cartel Problem” is more genuinely truthful if one answers instead the “Neoliberal Problem”. Neoliberalism has thus created a land of free ranging individualism, especially given that “public” security is lost. Until the contradiction of violence returns to this particular space (as it has been moved elsewhere — and return it will as Tijuana is a market that must be dominated), it will continue to remain under the surface of the everyday.

4.3 Conclusion

Hence what is made visible is that neoliberalism has inherently created social abandonment that is manifested through both the migrant deportee and the narco violence. Citizenship in Tijuana in the neoliberal era is defined by property. The everyday life of the migrant deportee is one of total abandon, one of social limbo that results only in social death. However, the deportee’s existence remains useful to the State, as the State blames them for violence and legitimizes its own necessity. Meanwhile, the socially abandoned can find work through narco organizations. These narco organizations capitalize on the historical-technological moment, and their power grows to such a degree that they compete with the State. This competition is made manifest in a war between

the two formal and informal governmental organizations. This in turn, highlights that neoliberalism results in a dramatic reproduction of violence that falls — transmitted by either the transnational corporation, the State, or the narco organization — on the backs of the working-class.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Raoul Vaneigem (2012) said, originally in 1967, that “[t]he history of our time calls to mind those cartoon characters who rush madly over the edge of a cliff without seeing it: the power of their imagination keeps them suspended in midair, but as soon as they look down and see where they are, they fall” (p. 6). The case of Tijuana and its history shows all too well that this ignorance of that awful precipice can last decades, if not generations.

Today, it is common to walk throughout the bars of San Diego and hear that there is a revival afoot in Tijuana; that Revolución is back and better than ever. That there is a renaissance in Tijuana. Reporters for American alternative magazines crawl her streets looking for the next bar that “feels like home” where “the drink de rigueur is a big-ass cup of Modelo” (Deal 2014). Focus has been brought back at what feels good. But all the while, there is a return of old ghosts, hastily stuffed back into the closet, as “zonas calientes” and narcomantas announce a new wave of violence (Sinaloa se enfrenta al CAF, 2015). What is made clear is that despite all the previous violence, something new is needed if Tijuana is ever to be something more than it is, if its citizens (and this term is used loosely) will ever get to enjoy it, live it, have direct and democratic control over it.

But this would mean approaching any transformative change radically, fundamentally, and its roots. Tijuana does not need tourism. Neoliberalism is

clearly an assault on the city and the lives that inhabit it. What is known through the course of this text is that Tijuana is the result of an incredible economic transformation that began in the 1960s, when industrialization via maquiladoras first developed. However, it was not until the 1980s, when neoliberalism came to be installed from above that the city's most rapid transformation began to take place. These rapid transformations radically transformed the lived experience of the city's working class. The city became increasingly segregated, dispersed, and chaotic. Many of the social problems that Tijuana faces are deeply structural, and as this structure is embedded in a global fabric, the solution to the contradictions that ail the city's working-class are such that would take global effort to repair.

However, this would mean ditching the sinking ship known as neoliberalism. Until then, those that live on this side of the border, and those that live on that side, must work together to probe new alternatives, as we are caught in the same complex fabric.

Appendix A

People Interviewed in Chapters 1-3

Machado - Born in Naco, Sonora in 1927. Moved to Tijuana in 1928. Lived in Tijuana until the 1990s, before moving to San Diego.

Marcial García - Born in Tijuana in the early 1950s. Parents were from Chihuahua and moved there in the 1930s. After his father died in the early 1960s, he got work at the Agua Caliente racetrack through Alba Roja union.

Gustavo Machado - Born in Tijuana in the early 1950s. Worked at the Agua Caliente Racetrack parking lot. Then worked as a basketball player for the military. Now lives in San Diego, working as a day laborer.

Rosa - Born in rural Puebla in the late 1970s and moved to Tijuana in the early 2000s. She worked at textile maquiladoras up until the end of the decade. Lived in Mesa de Otay.

Leticia - Born in rural Puebla in the early 1980s and moved to Tijuana in the late 1990s. She worked at textile maquiladoras up until the end of the decade. Lived in Sanchez Taboada.

Alicia - Born in Tijuana in the late 1980s. Her parents were from Sinaloa and Jalisco. She worked at an electronics maquiladora upon completing high school. Sister of Erica. Lives in El Florido.

Erica - Born in Tijuana in the early 1990s. Her parents were from Sinaloa and Jalisco. Got work at the maquiladora upon completing high school. Began

working at an electronics maquiladora when she completed high school. Sister of Alicia. Lives in El Florido.

Graciela - Born in Jalisco in the 1960s and moved to Tijuana in the 1990s.

Began working at a maquiladora until she got work in the informal market. Lives in La Mesa.

Juan - Born in Tijuana in the late 1960s, worked at souvenir shops as a child and then was employed as a waiter. He now works for the Confederación Mexicana de Trabajadores.

Yolanda - Born in Jalisco in the 1960s and moved to Tijuana in the 1990s.

Worked at the San Ysidro border crossing ever since she arrived.

Emiliano - Born in Tijuana in the late 1950s. Began working as a police officer in the late 1970s.

David - Born in Mexicali in the 1980s. As a child his family moved to Stockton, California, where he grew up. Deported in the 2000s. Works at a migrant shelter.

Gerardo - Born in Michoacán in the late 1950s. Moved to the US in the early 1980s. Deported in 2014. Lives at a migrant shelter.

Luis - Born in Sinaloa. Crossed illegally to the United States in the early 2000s. Deported in 2014. Lives at a migrant shelter.

Appendix B

Outline of Informal Interviews

When were you born?

When did you arrive to Tijuana?

What was home like?

When did you start working?

Where was your first job?

Why did you start working?

How much were you paid?

How long was your working-day?

How long did it take you to get to work?

Walk me through a typical day.

Where did you go to have fun?

Why did you leave?

What did you expect of Tijuana?

Why did you come to Tijuana?

Where did you live when you moved here?

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