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lack of a concluding chapter on the order of “Where do we go from here?” Certainly this is not neglected in the introduction, but it could be elaborated on to better purpose in the conclusion and would help tie the essays together.

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**Kit Carson and the Indians.** By Tom Dunlay. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000. 525 pages. \$45.00 cloth.

Tom Dunlay is a Kittite, an admirer of Kit Carson, who has set out to rescue Carson’s reputation from revisionism. In recent years, revisionist historians and critics, like Clifford E. Trafzer in *The Kit Carson Campaign: The Last Great Navajo War* (1982) and myself in the pages of this journal (“Kit Carson, John C. Frémont, the Indians, and Manifest Destiny; or, Oliver North Abets Lawrence of Arabia,” 1998), have questioned Carson’s reputation as a hero, especially in his relations with Indians in the conquest of California and Dinétah (Navajoland). Dunlay does not mention my article—though he alludes to a folksinger’s use of the analogy between Carson and North—and he does not really challenge Trafzer’s interpretation head-on, opining that others have already done the job in C. Gordon-McCutcheon’s *Kit Carson: Indian Fighter or Indian Killer?* (1996)

Dunlay makes as good a case for Carson as perhaps can be made. Carson came from a backwoods background, with its ethic of vigilante justice. As a trapper he fought with Indians just as they fought with each other, especially in retaliation for raids on life and property, usually stock. Throughout his memoirs Carson calls such retaliation “chastisement” (though both Dunlay and I have suggested that the word carried paternalistic connotations, the *Oxford English Dictionary* lists a separate military usage that strikes me now as closer to Carson’s usage). And he brought the ethic of chastisement along on Frémont’s expeditions. Dunlay uses it to justify Carson’s participation in a pre-emptive chastisement against Indians near Lassen’s ranch in northern California and again his participation in retaliatory chastisement against Klamaths who subsequently attacked a small party led by Carson and Frémont. Dunlay concedes that “Frémont’s decision to launch an attack on the Indians near Lassen’s ranch, to prevent an anticipated attack on white settlers, may have precipitated his later troubles” (p. 119). But he says that “Frémont must bear some, if not all, of the responsibility” (p. 119). He lays very little—or no—blame on Carson himself.

As he approaches Carson’s years as an Indian agent for the Muache Utes and Jicarilla Apaches, Dunlay tells of Carson’s experience with the decimation of California Indians before the onslaught of the Gold Rush. Here he would have done well to avail himself of more recent, important work by Trafzer, who has shown through the presentation of documents that this decimation comes very close to the official genocide Dunlay tries to avoid as an inappropriate concept (*Exterminate Them: Written Accounts of the Murder, Rape, and*

*Slavery of Native Americans During the California Gold Rush, 1848–1868*, edited by Trafzer and Joel R. Hyer, 1999). As agent, Carson becomes painfully aware of the threat of extermination facing the “Vanishing Indian.” Yet he was the *agent* of a government whose people were ineluctably expanding into and absorbing Indian territory. The “inevitable” clashes between these two peoples—European (including Hispanos) and Indian (a term that covers myriad tribes)—became the leitmotiv of the rest of Carson’s life as Dunlay tells it. Dunlay sees Carson as trying desperately to save the Indians from ruination, increasingly caused by the settlers; thus Carson subscribed to the ideology of the reservation system: to separate and protect the Indians from the settlers even as we teach them modes of self-sufficiency (especially farming as opposed to hunting and raiding) and inculcate our values and religion, “civilizing” them. Dunlay admits, “A deep, largely unquestioned ethnocentrism lay at the very root of the policy. The people most passionately committed to saving the Indians were the most determined to change them, for they saw the transformation as the only hope of their salvation” (p. 156).

Among these “people most passionately committed to saving the Indians,” Dunlay argues, *pace* Trafzer, were Carson and his commanding officer during the 1860s, General James Henry Carleton, the *bête noir* of Trafzer’s study of the Navajo campaign. Both Carson and Carleton, according to Dunlay, like General Canby before them, because of the failure of treaties to keep the peace (for various reasons, from the inability of headmen to speak for all the tribe to the rapacity of the settlers), became convinced of the “necessity” (*passim*) of rounding up the Navajos and removing them from their native lands to a reservation where they could be protected, become self-sufficient, and be Christianized. White men of their time, he argues, were simply incapable of understanding our modern concept of cultural imperialism. And Dunlay portrays Carson’s execution of the war against the Navajos as also inevitable: one that applied pressure until the Navajos surrendered. That pressure, unfortunately, was not that of conventional military campaigns but that of campaigns against guerrillas: destroy their subsistence and force them into unconditional surrender. Dunlay shows that in this campaign (as in an earlier one against the Mescalero Apaches) Carson either disobeyed or modified Draconian orders from Carleton to kill all the warriors. Moreover, Dunlay reminds us that Carson tried to resign his commission in the New Mexico Volunteers rather than prosecute the Navajo campaign. Carson did not preside over the Long Walk, nor did he preside over the failed Bosque Redondo Reservation except at the beginning when it seemed as if it were going to work.

As he saw it, Carson’s last years were spent in the continuing service of his country: as part of an expeditionary force against Comanches and Kiowas, as part of a peace commission trying to effect a treaty that would guarantee reservation lands to Arapahos and Cheyennes, and as Indian agent for Colorado, trying to keep peace with the Tabeguache Utes. Aside from Carson’s vitriolic denunciation of Chivington’s massacre of Cheyennes at Sand Creek—a denunciation of which Trafzer himself approves—perhaps most telling during these years are Carson’s sentiments as expressed to the Congressional Doolittle Commission on Indian Tribes. They express elegiac

lament over the diminution of the Indians, and they implore the government to let the army run a reservation system free from the corruption of the political appointees of the BIA and responsive to and protective of the Indians and their needs, particularly for adequate food and supplies. Carson supplemented his testimony with a report that concludes in a position that appears a significant modification of his earlier ethic of chastisement: specific depredations (we would today call these acts of terrorism) must be viewed as criminal acts and must not be avenged by warfare against whole nations. If no *civilized* nation could be expected to eliminate crime entirely, Carson argued ethnocentrically, how can we expect uncivilized Indians to do so? But as Dunlay points out, Carson's hope that the army would be able to police such criminal acts on both sides was unrealistic, for each would protect its own.

In short, Dunlay exculpates Carson as much as possible. Nevertheless, I would recommend that his book be read alongside Trafzer's account of the Navajo campaign, for one. If Dunlay presents the Anglo side well, Trafzer presents the Indian side well, and it is important to know how Carson is viewed from the Indian side, even if one concludes that he is a figure on whom is cathected more than he merits as an individual (as in the application to him of the name of Red Clothes, according to Dunlay's ingenious interpretation).

I would also suggest that the term *genocide* can be used in appropriate ways: as Dunlay admits, there were many who, in fact, recommended extermination of the Indians, and even if one cannot make the case, at least anent the Indians of the Southwest, that *de jure* genocide was an ultimate goal, one can make the case for *de facto* genocide. The biggest example would be the constant, horrendous shortchanging of the Indians in terms of material needs to survive once they had entrusted themselves to the Great Father.

Finally, Carson, as Dunlay occasionally and reluctantly admits, was indeed an agent of Manifest Destiny. One perspective Dunlay omits: when Nuevo Mexico became part of the United States, the Mexicans living there, as fellow Europeans, automatically became "citizens" (Dunlay, *passim*). The Indians did not. They remained aliens—on lands that once were theirs but which now Americans wanted, especially for their mineral resources. (A major reason Carleton did not want the Navajo Reservation to be on their traditional lands, Dunlay admits, was that it was rumored to be filled with gold.) By the Lockean principle that land belongs only to those who turn it to account, the Indians did not own it. So Carson was the agent of an imperialism and its ideology that made the destiny of these lands manifest: they would be ours. When asked by the Utes why the US government seemed incapable of keeping its word, Carson himself had to justify his equivocations: "It is impossible to answer these complaints, for I know too well their justness; but as a true agent of the government I cannot admit the wrong" (quoted in Dunlay, p. 226).

Dunlay's opening chapter asks, "Will the Real Kit Carson Please Stand Up?" Of course, there is no one, real Kit Carson. When young, he was rash and delighted in the "sport" (Carson's word in his memoirs) of killing Indians and burning their villages, whether as a preemptive strike or revenge. He never stood up against the widespread, systematic enslavement of Indian captives but even purchased such slaves of his own. All Dunlay can do in the face of such

inescapable aspects of Carson's life is to speculate that the word *sport* was really that of Carson's amanuensis or to excuse Indian slavery by saying everyone, even the Indians, did it. Dunlay is at a loss to temporize Carson's execution of California prisoners, except to suggest again that he was motivated by the ethic of retaliation; he honorably refuses to avail himself of the excuse that Carson was just following orders.

Dunlay makes a good case, however, that the older Carson seems wise in his understanding of the Indian problem. But in his attempt to prepare for his rationalization of Carson's actions in California, Dunlay lets slip the word "invasion" when describing Blackfeet resistance to white incursions in their traditional hunting grounds (p. 74). A few lines later Dunlay insists on the mountain men's "right" to trap in Blackfeet territory "if they were strong enough to assert it." Despite his disclaimer at the end of this chapter that the mountain men "were not conquerors trying to impose their values or their political and social dominion" (p. 84), Dunlay, by use of the word "invasion," tacitly admits that the mountain men were invaders—an advance guard for those who would come later and take because they had the power to do so. In that sense, throughout his life, Kit Carson was the—perhaps unwitting—agent of imperial conquest.

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**Medicine That Walks: Disease, Medicine, and Canadian Plains Native People, 1880–1940.** By Maureen K. Lux. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. 300 pages. \$50.00 cloth; \$22.95 paper.

This book, a ringing indictment of Canada's health policy in regard to American Indians during the period under study, concentrates on a time when Indians and their cultures were held in low esteem by the dominant majority; in fact, it could well have been at its lowest point since the arrival of Europeans in North America. It was a time when Indians were considered to be a vanishing race; long gone were the partnerships that had been so important to exploration and the early fur trade. Instead, the "Indian problem"—including health—was seen as the consequence of an inferior people struggling to make the "rough transition from 'savagery to civilization'" (p. 110). Human diversity attracted endless attention and racial theories flourished, ranging from the "scientific" to the popular (the ranking of races from inferior to superior was seen as scientifically valid). One result of such an attitude was that health programs for Indians during this period were more concerned with serving bureaucratic goals than the needs of the people.

Lux begins her survey with the starvation the Plains Indians suffered following the decimation of the buffalo herds, the basis of their subsistence, during the last decades of the nineteenth century. In her view that crisis not only affected the people's health, it also reinforced the official perception that Aboriginal peoples were inferior, even racially flawed, a position that justified the political goal of assimilation. Wretched living conditions resulting from