UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
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The Dog that Doesn't Bark?:

Religious Conflict and Peace Entrepreneurs in Nigeria

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Political Science

by

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

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Professor Mark Q. Sawyer, Chair

Conflict, civil war, and coup d'états have dominated Africa for nearly a century. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and leading petroleum producer, is no exception. In the Southwest, however, the Yorùbá, though internally divided among Christians and Muslims, appear immune to the ethno-religious conflict seen in the Northern and Middle Belt regions. Are the Yorùbá "exceptional" and atypical given their demography—a *Pax Yorùbá* over the region? The literature is far from conclusive on the issue—very few recent studies examine the intersection between the Yorùbá, conflict, and religion. Some explanations point solely to the region's colonial legacy and common ancestry. Relying on in-depth interviews and ethnographic field research, I find that the Yorùbá are the beneficiaries of what I call "Peace Entrepreneurs". These key local leaders identify potential conflict situations before they escalate and become deadly. The Yorùbá example may help to derive important solutions to alleviate entrenched violent episodes seen elsewhere in Nigeria and other conflict-prone contexts.

The dissertation of Florence Oluwabunmi Akinyemi is approved.

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2015

To those who valiantly came before

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Blessed *are* the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God *(*Matthew 5:9 KJV)

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Chapter 1

Introduction

From the Horn of Africa, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the outer reaches of the continent, conflict, civil war, and coup d'états dominate the narratives associated Sub-Saharan Africa. Ostensibly, undergirding the long litany of problems embattling the African continent today is the absence of effective leadership. Regimes like Mobutu Sese Seko, Charles Taylor, and Idi Amin demonstrate as good governance wanes, conditions become ideal for warlords to rise, and illicit markets emerge to occupy power vacuums vacated by failing institutions and embattled civil societies. If conditions persist, episodic violence stifles development, hindering the accumulation of capital (physical and human), and arrest economic growth (Reno 1999; Sachs and Warner 2001). Even within democracies, the current longest running African presidencies of Robert Mugabe, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, José Eduardo dos Santos, Paul Biya, and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni reveal elections alone do not guarantee a fully functioning *liberal* society where rule of law, respect for freedom of religion, speech, and oppositional voices are enshrined within the government (Zakaria 1997). Within these examples, executives enrich themselves to the detriment of those outside of their clientelistic networks and political parties (van de Walle 2003). Leaders' social contractual responsibilities to their populaces appear erratic, opportunistic, and uneven.

Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and leading petroleum producer is no exception to the deficient leadership seen elsewhere (Falola 2001; Suberu 2001). On Nigerian leadership, Achebe (1984) famously lamented, "The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of

leadership. There is nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership" (1). For Achebe, many of Nigeria's problems are a direct manifestation of the absence of good leadership. A cursory examination of Nigeria's brief, albeit turbulent history reveals added credibility to Achebe's observations. For example, military dictator Sani Abacha remains one of Nigeria's most repressive leaders to date who disposed of political rivals with frightening efficiency and embezzled millions of dollars from Nigeria's coffers. Fifteen years after his death, remnants of Abacha's corruption and kleptocracy continue to emerge as the United States government seized $458 million dollars connected with his regime (United States Department of Justice 2014).

Though Africa's problems, especially within Nigeria, are well documented, the question invariably emerges, are there any examples of leaders who appear to contradict Achebe's failure of leadership thesis? Are there any exceptions to the proverbial rule? My dissertation points to local Yorùbá leaders in the Southwest and their daily, yet significant, efforts to thwart religious violence. The Yorùbá appear inoculated from the endemic, protracted religious conflict seen in the Middle Belt and Northern regions (D. D Laitin 1986; John David Yeadon Peel 1983). This is even more puzzling given the religious demography of the region–roughly fifty percent Christian, fifty percent Muslim, and a sizable number of adherents to traditional, indigenous beliefs[1]. Even in the face of religious revivalism, namely Pentecostalism and Puritanical Islam, this apparent *Pax Yorùbá* remains intact (Paden 2005).

[1] The number of religious adherents is unknown. The Nigerian census has not included religion variables since 1963 because of the contentious nature of religion throughout the country.

Peel (2009), in his talk to honor Professor J. F. Ade Ajayi on his 80th birthday, also points to the peculiarities of the Yorùbá. Despite their religious composition, relations remain largely harmonious:

> The other, even more remarkable feature of the Yorùbá situation is that their coexistence has been, by and large, so harmonious. In Nigeria as a national system, where the two religions stand perhaps in a ratio of Muslims 55% to Christians 45%, there has been much, sometimes violent, conflict in recent decades. So too in many other places in the world where the two religions co-exist: the Balkans, Middle East, the Caucasus, South and S.E. Asia. But Yorùbáland exists within Nigeria as a harmonious sub-system within a conflictual national system. This harmony is the more remarkable in that both religions have many zealous adherents, and have been in vigorous competition for converts for over 150 years. *How this has come about remains to be fully understood [sic]* (2-3).

What can account for this apparent enduring "culture of peace" pervading Yorùbáland? Does a Pax Yorùbá truly exist? I argue that an all-encompassing "Pax Yorùba" does not exist. Conflicts still do occur. The Yorùbá, however, are the apparent beneficiaries of peace entrepreneurs, local leaders and elders who intervene to ameliorate potentially inflammatory situations and who seek resolutions between aggrieved parties. Conflicts do occur but peace entrepreneurs help to stave off the rapid escalation of conflict. Here, not only do leaders matter, but they are integral in maintaining religious peace.

Though the seminal work of Coleman (1960) and Sklar (1963) remain authoritative sources on Nigeria's transformative years from colonialism to fledging republic, each meticulously documenting the advent of nationalism and the rise of fractured political parties. This dissertation attempts to take a bottom up perspective—focusing less on political parties and their nationalistic machinery and more on local stakeholders and their engagement with their citizenry. Is the implication here then that political parties are no longer influential? No, parties do remain integral parts of Nigeria's modern society. Nevertheless, within the political science literature, less focus is casted on the grassroots efforts of Nigerian leaders, sans political parties,

to maintain peace in a geopolitical context rife with religious cleavages. Here, I stand firmly on the perspective that effective, local leaders, irrespective of national party politics, remain integral. The endurance of peace entrepreneurship within Yorùbáland continues despite the events in the capital city, Abuja and beyond.

Leaning on John Rawls' definitions of social cooperation and fairness, I argue at the heart of peace entrepreneurship is the maintenance and fortification of justice. Rawls (2001) argues, "The most fundamental idea in this conception of justice is the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next" (5). In other words, echoing the works of Rousseau, Plato, Locke, and Hobbes and others, peace entrepreneurs help to enforce an understood "fair system of social cooperation" and a communal "social contract". Communal members trust their leadership will pronounce equitable judgments to the entire community, and they in turn show restraint. Under the proper conditions, the enforcement of this social contract propagates justice; the fortification of justice begets peace. The absence of justice and trust creates an environment of unfairness and discontent and therefore causes unrest.

The credibility of peace entrepreneurs, however, is pivotal here. What is credibility? All parties again must believe: a) entrepreneurs will be fair and impartial in the execution of their decisions; and entrepreneurs' character remains unimpeachable to ensure justice for *all* parties. Reports of malfeasance or corruption undermine peace entrepreneurs' ability to keep the peace. Here, I argue religious leaders are more effective peace entrepreneurs than their traditional ruler counterparts, especially when traditional rulers are funded and appointed directly by the state. Violent upheavals against traditional rulers, e.g. burning down palaces and harsh rebukes of traditional leaders breaking protocol, are proxies for systemic discontent against traditional leadership and the Nigerian state. Religious leaders may be deemed more credible because their

accountability and livelihoods are directly tied to their performance, ability to be fair arbitrators, and the maintenance of their images as paragons of virtue.

Creditability→Fairness→Justice→Peace

Traditional rulers and monarchies continue to play pivotal roles within African society reflecting strong dichotomies between rural and urban areas (Herbst 2000; Mamdani 1996; Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1999). In South Africa, as apartheid ended, traditional chiefs, amidst shifting political loyalties and historical marginalization, prove resilient and "flexible" during the African National Congress (ANC) era (Kessel and Oomen 1997). Within the Nigerian context, Belasco (1980) observes that at the socio-historical core of the Yorùbá elders, writ large, exert tremendous power and influence over their flocks consequently, this position, I argue, makes them natural peace entrepreneurs:

> The value status of seniority in the structure of Yorùbá social relations is correlated with the concentration of political power among elders in the functioning of secret societies, age-grades, and title associations. Elders control the economic and religious life of their lineages, compound, town quarters, and the town itself. They are important repositories of tribal wisdom, adjudicators of quarrels, and mediators between the living and their ancestors; the gods are 'ancient grand parents' and equally, grandparents are prospective gods….Relationships between senior and junior members of lineages shape work organization and allocations of productive resources, affect distributions of farm produce and craft goods within the compound, and serve as the model for exploitative patron-client relationships outside of its walls (12-13).

Yorùbá traditional leaders, however, are struggling to maintain their legitimacy and credibility vis-à-vis their constituents and the state; a phenomenon not unique to Nigeria or the Yorùbá

alone. In a Afrobarometer[2] paper, Logan (2008) finds traditional rulers struggle as their loyalties are divided between the state and their citizenry, "the need of chiefs and elders to balance their dependence on local populations for "legitimacy," or at least "respect," with their desire for the recognition of higher authorities – and the different kind of legitimacy that this implies – may often have produced "Janus-faced" traditional authorities who were simultaneously respected and suspected by local populations" (4).




Figure 1 Peace Entrepreneurship Process

In classic Weberian terms, traditional forms of authority embody "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them" (Weber 1978, 215). Whereas, religious leaders represent charismatic leadership, "devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him

[2] Afrobarometer is an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa, spanning over 30 countries with several iterations across the continent.

(charismatic authority)" (215). Given the struggles of traditional forms of authority, charismatic leaders are more effective peace builders than traditional rulers. Traditional rulers are not completely ineffective, but when their legitimacy is questioned, their effectiveness diminishes.

Credible peace entrepreneurs serve not only as interlocutors for their communities, but their work is buttressed even further when common values or legend are shared. In the Yorùbá case, the myth of common ancestry coupled with cultural norms of deference to authority fuel peace. As I observed previously, deference to all authority is not absolute, but Yorùbá cultural norms do dictate leaders and elders *should be* respected. Conversely, there is an accepted basic understanding that leaders' judgements should be fair and impartial. These understood norms are promulgated everyday via proverbs and myths. Cultural examples like Obàtálá, a key figure in the Yorùbá pantheon, affirm peace is an established norm needing protection by credible leadership and is an attribute of virtue.

Why is the discussion of peace entrepreneurs important?

First, the presence of peace entrepreneurs helps counter the argument that "Big-manism" and "Godfatherism" are the only frames to examine Nigerian leadership. "Big-manism" and "Godfatherism" describes patron and client relationships whose primary preoccupation is distributing and extrapolating resources (Bayart, Ellis, and Hibou 2009; Reno 1999). In truth, the nature of leadership within Nigeria has experienced notable shifts and devolutions since the First Republic and colonial independence (Achebe 1984; Aremu and Omotola 2007; Balogun 1997; Larry Diamond 1988). Nevertheless, the current characterization of Nigerian leadership paradigms is radically different from the Yorùbá peace entrepreneur model. Peace entrepreneurs

are devoted to the betterment and advancement of their entire people by cultivating and maintaining religious peace.

Second, what are religious peace entrepreneurs' primary motivations? Are they purely altruistic? In many ways, Yorùbá leaders are at the center of a classic *prisoner's dilemma game*[3]. The maintenance of peace is a public good shared by everyone in the community. Violence is costly to both local leaders and their constituencies and undermines the authority of the local leader if he or she is unable to ensure peace. Disaffected parties, like unemployed youths, for example, may want to protest or cause instability in the area thinking they are better off by rioting and protesting to publicly address a grievance. In this scenario, leaders are the coordinating institution to keep the peace. Even in the face of eruptions, leaders work to ensure that outbreaks are contained. If leaders can maintain the public good of "peace", this endears them to their people, the state and federal authorities.

Third, within political science literature is largely silent on the issue of peace entrepreneurship among the Yorùbá. David Laitin's book, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yorùbá*, for example, discusses the lack of politicization of religion in Yorùbáland and ascribes this difference to stricter adherence to city state identity. However, Laitin's study excludes Orisha worshippers, practitioners of indigenous Yorùbá faiths. This exclusion is problematic. To fully understand Yorùbá culture, religion, and the dynamics

[3] "In the traditional version of the game, the police have arrested two suspects and are interrogating them in separate rooms. Each can either confess, thereby implicating the other, or keep silent. No matter what the other suspect does, each can improve his own position by confessing. If the other confesses, then one had better do the same to avoid the especially harsh sentence that awaits a recalcitrant holdout. If the other keeps silent, then one can obtain the favorable treatment accorded a state's witness by confessing. Thus, confession is the dominant strategy for each. But when both confess, the outcome is worse for both than when both keep silent. The concept of the prisoners' dilemma was developed by RAND Corporation scientists Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and was formalized by Albert W. Tucker, a Princeton mathematician" (Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff 2008).

inherent within this society, you must include practitioners of the Yorùbás' religious foundations, namely Orisha worshippers. As I will discuss, the attitudes and motives of peace entrepreneurs mirror embedded cultural norms and archetypes, once such example is the myth of Obàtálá, the formable orisha and paragon of virtue and peace. Moreover, documented instances of conflicts have occurred between Orisha worshippers and those who align with "new religions". Indigenous religions do matter. Clashes between old and new religions are habitually part of the Yorùbá religious kaleidoscope and the exclusion of Orisha worshippers leads one to the problematic conclusion of the complete absence of religious conflict in social and political spaces.

Moreover, much has changed in Nigeria since initial Laitin's study in 1980. The hegemonic institutions Laitin points to, obas and chiefs, Yorùbá kings, representing city states, have experienced rising discontent since the 1980s (Nolte 2002). Three different Yorùbá kings in the last decade were deposed from their thrones by enraged polities, perhaps, a reflection of the masses' disillusion with both the state and traditional seats of power. This statistic does not include cases where controversies existed regarding secession to the throne. Yet, despite attacks on Yorùbá kings, the Yorùbá continue to 'display' a *Pax Yorùbá* concerning religion. These recent developments help to undermine Laitin's conclusions about the moderating effects of city state identity.

Dissertation Outline

In this first chapter, I will begin by describing the context in which the Yorùbá exist, Nigeria. The country's strategic important is largely associated with its petroleum resources. Nevertheless, the petroviolence continues to mire Nigeria's geopolitical area. I then discuss

Nigeria's Christian and Islamic demography, religious revivalism, and the rise of extremist group, Boko Haram. I propose that the "Pax Yorùbá" is due in large part to the efforts of peace entrepreneurs and embedded cultural norms. In Chapter 2, I discuss briefly the peace and justice literature highlighting the dominant conflict resolution literature and other examples of peace entrepreneurs in other contexts. Peace entrepreneurs can be placed into two distinct categories: formal or informal. Formal peace entrepreneurs come into existence either after a conflict has occurred or they attempt to maintain peace as part of their position. Informal peace entrepreneurs, however, are leaders, citizens, or a person of prominent position whose expressed responsibilities do not necessarily entail peace keeping but, if and when a situation does arises, their quick intervention minimizes the onset of conflict. Here, for example, a social entrepreneur could become an informal peace entrepreneur. Both labels are not mutually exclusive.

I attempt to place Yorùbáland simultaneously within international and local cultural contexts by invoking the myth of Obàtálá and his similarities to modern peace entrepreneurs and the peace studies literature. In Chapter 3, I discuss the current project's research design and revisit my previous work done in Ile Ife, Nigeria in 2007 and conclude that despite the rise of "new religions", Yorùbáland apparent tolerance continues to hold. The initial results were inconclusive, so it was necessary to go back into the field.

In Chapter Four, I discuss the results and find that peace entrepreneurs are often at the center of religious conflict resolution though outbreaks of religious conflicts are rare phenomena. In Chapter Five, I discuss what possible implications the peace entrepreneur model may have on other parts of Nigeria. Is there a way to cultivate peace entrepreneurs in other areas of Nigeria? Is this purely a peculiarity of Yorùbáland? I argue that Yorùbáland has an advantage in terms of curbing religious violence because religious tolerance is considered a cultural norm. However, it

is possible to cultivate peace councils in the North. I also propose various economic development initiatives to give disaffected youths, often targets of extremism, and the possibility of upward mobility. These initiatives include the funding of Nollywood, the third largest movie industry in the world, increasing microfinance programs to spur entrepreneurship, fortifying Nigeria's struggling educational system, and expanding Nigeria's crumbling physical infrastructure. These initiatives will help to curb perceived injustices.

This dissertation project employs fifty open-ended interviews with clerics, pastors, head imams, Orisha practitioners, chiefs, and traditional Yorùbás kings in historically significant cities in Yorùbáland—Ibadan and Iseyin in Oyo State; Abeokuta, Osun State; Ile Ife, Ogun State and Lagos, Lagos State. Ile Ife is the historical cradle of Yorùbá civilization. Where Odùduwà the primogenitor of the Yorùbá people first settled, and reigned as the Ooni of Ife, or paramount ruler, of all of Yorùbáland. Abeokuta is not only the capital of Ogun State, but played a prominent role as a haven for the Egbe people during the Yorùbáland civil wars before British colonization. Former President Obasanjo and presumptive winner of the 1993 elections, Chief M.K.O. Abiola were natives of the city. Abeokuta was also one of the entrance points of Christianity within Yorùbáland and Lagos. Lagos State, former federal capital of Nigeria, remains one of the most important cities in Nigeria because of its population and commercial strength. Ibadan is home to the premier university in Nigeria, University of Ibadan, and rose to power after the end of the Yorùbá civil wars in the late nineteenth century. Conflict at the University of Ibadan in 2010 first brought my attention to Ibadan. Special attention is paid to Iseyin, a town one hundred kilometers north of Ibadan. Known for the production of aso-oke, a hand-woven cloth, the town has dealt with ethno-religious tensions in multiple dimensions: between Muslim fundamentalists, Orisha worshippers, and mainline Christian and Islamic

groups during the annual Oro festival, for example. Here both religious and traditional leaders continue to actively engage ethno-religious conflict head on and have created a peace council called MUCHAS, Muslim-Christian Association, in Iseyin. Respondents were interviewed for a half hour to an hour and a half. Interviewing a cross section of leaders provided an important litmus test for understanding the source of contemporary Yorùbá tolerance. Archival, newspaper, and library work is also used to augment the historical narratives of each city in the study. I was also embedded within Lagos State University and lived in one of the largest low cost housing in Lagos. As a student, I was able to informally interview students, faculty, and community members regarding their perspective on religion, the Yorùbá, and their futures. These interactions strongly helped to add the Vo*x Populi* to this project.

The Significance of Nigeria

Within Africa

Why is examining Yorùbá religious issues within Nigeria significant? The reasons are numerous. First, Nigeria, centrally located in Western Africa, is the seventh largest population in the world, making it the most populous state in on African continent. According to the World Bank (2011), Nigeria has the largest population in Sub-Saharan Africa with 154.7 million people or eighteen percent of the total population. Moreover, if South Africa and Nigeria's gross domestic products were combined, they would encompass fifty percent of Sub-Saharan Africa's gross domestic product.

Nigeria also serves as a hegemonic force within West Africa and beyond because of its geopolitical significance and population. Surrounded by countries like Niger, Togo, Benin, and

Cameroon, Nigeria has long served as an anchor to ECOMOG (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). Within Africa, at large, Nigeria continues to lend its military strength to peacekeeping missions in the West African region especially in the post-Cold War era (Olonisakin 1997). Nigeria played a key and decisive role in the Liberian Civil War by lending troops and later in Sierra Leone as tensions arose throughout the 1990s. Only recently has the African Union's African Standby Force started to transition the responsibilities of peacekeeping to Africa as a whole, but invariably Nigeria may continue to play a key role in preserving peace in the region (Dier 2010).

Nigeria and Petroleum

One of Nigeria's biggest contributions to the world economy is petroleum—the nation's biggest resource and backbone of the economy. According to the Energy International Administration, Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa with over 95 percent of export earnings and about 40 percent of government revenue emanating from petroleum production (Energy Information Administration 2011). In 2005, total Nigerian oil production, including lease condensates, natural gas liquids and refinery gain, averaged 2.6 million bbl/d (of which 2.4 million bbl/d was crude oil).[4] Five years later, "the total oil production in Nigeria was slightly over 2.46 million bbl/d, making it the largest oil producer in Africa. Crude oil production averaged close to 2.15 million bbl/d for the year. Recent offshore oil developments combined

[4] Bbl/d, barrels per day.

with the restart of some shut-in onshore production have boosted crude production to an average of 2.17 million bbl/d for the month of July 2011." (Energy Information Administration 2011).

OPEC.

In 1971, Nigeria formally joined oil cartel OPEC. The group began in 1960 by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela because they shared two common denominators, oil and the base of their economies relied heavily upon oil revenues. Since then, OPEC has expanded beyond its founding members, and today, OPEC, indisputably, is the most powerful and influential cartels in the world. By OPEC's own estimates, its twelve members, Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela control more than eighty one percent world's total proven crude oil reserves with Nigeria controlling 3.1 % holding proven reserves (OPEC 2012).

Oil Shocks: 1973-1974 and 1978-1979.

The successive oil shocks of the 1970s are an enduring reminder of the vital importance of oil security. Many scholars have written about the shocks, oil effects on the economy, and the difficulty in securing supplies (Dafter 1979-1980; Nordhaus 1980; Gately 1984; Yergin 1991; Mandle 2002). The 1973 and 1978 Arab oil embargoes set off a chain reaction that sent the world economy reeling. According to Yergin, "With oil so important in the economy, the two oil shocks inevitably had to have a dramatic impact upon the fortunes of an industrial world that had become dependent upon this fuel." (Yergin 1982, 3). In economic terms, the oil embargo was detrimental to the steady economic growth and development that occurred in the United

States and elsewhere in the World War II era. The shocks "…appear to have ended the era of high growth and full employment. What has been called the era of 'flamboyant growthmanship'. In its place, they have initiated a new and uncertain and uncomfortable era of "stagflation" a dual visitation of high inflation and low growth" (D. Yergin and Hillenbrand 1982, 3).

Oil Shock: 1973-1974.

The first oil shocks emanated from the growing discontentment amongst Arab oil producers concerning Western support, particularly the United States, of Israel. After the devastating defeat of Arab countries in the Yom Kippur War, many Arab countries were ready to retaliate against the superpower using the "oil weapon". According to Yergin (1991),"the Arab oil embargo had two dimensions, the broader one was composed of the rolling production restraints that affected the entire market—the initial cutbacks, then the additional 5 percent each month. The second element was the total ban on exported oil, which was initially imposed only two countries, the United States and the Netherlands, though subsequently extended to Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia" (613). The cutbacks incited pandemonium at gasoline stations across the United States. The U.S. consumer who once enjoyed an abundance of oil saw oil prices increase from about $2 dollars a barrel to about $10 dollars a barrel. As with any monumental event in history, there are differing opinions on why the shocks occurred. Gately (1984) suggests that there are two explanations for OPEC's role in the shock, "the one most widely accepted by economists is that OPEC effectively cartelized the world oil market, exploiting its power to raise prices above competitive levels by restricting production….The

other explanation argues that OPEC was largely irrelevant as an organization and that its member acted competitively" (1101).

Oil Shock: 1978-1979.

Four years later, the world once again would grapple with another oil shock. Instead of a concerted effort by OPEC and Arab leaders to cut oil supply, political instability within Iran initiated the oil shock of 1978—1979. The Revolution, spearheaded by the Islamic cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, capitalized on mounting frustration amongst the Iranian populace and ushered in a new era in Iranian politics. In the midst of the turmoil, Iran stopped exporting oil. This caused prices to surge from twelve to thirteen dollars to about forty dollars per barrel. Yergin asserts that the shortage from Iran overall was minimal---only four to five percent. Nevertheless, the fear and panic ultimately caused the shock to evolve into a greater crisis and caused supplies to jump by 150 percent (Yergin 1991).

Nigeria, Petroviolence and the Resource Curse

As world markets recoiled from successive oil shocks, Nigeria's membership within OPEC helped usher in an unprecedented decade of wealth and opulence. The infiltration of oil rents even permeated Nigeria's cultural sectors and Festec '77, Africa's second black arts festival, held in Nigeria, embodied the hope that Nigeria would exert greater pan-African influence, display Nigeria's pre-colonial culture, and highlight Nigeria's cultural production (A. Apter 2005). Ake characterizes 1973-1978 as Nigeria's 'quintessential boom period'. As world market oil prices adjusted, the 1980s were especially punishing as petroleum prices plummeted

worldwide, “by 1976 public expenditure had expanded so much that Nigeria began to have a budget deficit; wages continued to rise, and the Nigerian naira appreciated rapidly, as much as 100 percent between 1973 and 1978. Nigeria became more indebted. Despite a second oil boom between 1979 and 1982, the economy slide into crisis” (Ake 1996, 53). A reversal of fortunes emerged as Nigeria, once flourished with petro-dollars, was forced into a World Bank structural adjustment program and a time of austerity by the mid-1980s.

As the Nigerian example suggests, mineral wealth can quickly become a curse and provide economic incentives for protracted episodes of war, violence, and conflict (Paul Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Herbst 2000; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Ross 1999; Weinstein 2007). The extraction of Nigeria’s oil reserves contained largely in the Niger Delta has unleashed untold devastation and ecological degradation on the Ogoni people (Watts 2001). Several volumes have been written about the plight of the Ogoni and other minority groups adversely affected by ‘petro-violence’ (Frynas 2001; Naanen 1995; Osaghae 1995; Saro-Wiwa 1992; Watts 1987; Welch 1995). Though Niger Delta holds the vast majority of Nigeria’s resource wealth, the region fails to reap the monetary benefits. The developmental statistics for the region are staggering, “few Ogoni households have electricity, there is one doctor per 100,000 people, child mortality rates are the highest in the nation, unemployment is 85 percent, 80 per cent of the population is illiterate and close to half of Ogoni youth have left the region in search of work. Life expectancy is barely 50 years, substantially below the national average”(Watts 2004, 67). Militant organizations, like MEND, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, have arisen with the sole purpose of liberating the Niger Delta from the ills of petroleum extraction and the emergence of petroviolence and setting the ground for militant groups (United Nations Development Programme (Nigeria) 2006). In many ways, MEND was

birthed from the struggles of the peoples living within the Niger Delta, the 'South-South', the heart of Nigeria's gas and petroleum industry, a region decimated by the flaring of gas, petroleum extraction, and egregious violations of environmental standards.

In October 2010, as Nigeria celebrated fifty years of independence with a lavish ten billion naira affair in Abuja, the capital, festivities were quickly marred by violence as a series of explosions were detonated. In the aftermath, seventeen people were injured and twelve people were killed. MEND later expressed remorse for the loss of civilian life. The spokesman for MEND, Jomo Gbomo, placed full responsibility squarely on Nigerian security forces since warnings were issued five days prior to the attacks (Okulaja 2010). Its leader, Henry Okah, was arrested in South Africa shortly afterward and continues to reside in a South African prison awaiting formal charges[5] (Ifoh 2012).

Since 2006, MEND has continued to engage in attacks on several oil installations throughout the region. The late President Yar'adua gave systematic amnesty to Niger Delta militants in 2009 in exchange for the laying down of arms and for entering a 'rehabilitation program'. In exchange, Henry Okah, who was on trial for arms dealing, was given a presidential pardon (Adekoya and Komolafe 2010; E. Nwosu 2009). The fiftieth anniversary bombings, however, adversely affected the progress achieved via the amnesty program.

[5] Okah has since been sentenced to 24 years for his involvement.

Nigeria's Christian and Islamic Demography

Despite, Nigeria's regional and international significance, the intersection between religion and ethnicity continues to cause incessant problems within the nation. Nigeria is home to two hundred and fifty ethno-linguistic groups, two world religions, Islam and Christianity, and several indigenous religious groups. The Hausa Fulani, the Yorùbá, and the Igbo are the largest ethnic group populations within Nigeria. The Hausa-Fulani, in the North, is predominately Muslim with small Christian minorities; to the Southeast the Igbo are Christian, with substantial Catholic adherents; the Yorùbá, who reside in the Southwest, have large populations of Muslims, Christians, and Orisha worshippers, indigenous Yorùbá religions. Peel (1968) observes syncretism is commonly practiced among the Yorùbá, but Apter (2004) debunks the established paradigm of syncretism in the literature and characterizes the Yorùbás' faith as a historical by-product of "resistance and revision". Nevertheless, the Yorùbá possess a kaleidoscope of faiths and within this context the Yorùbá reside. In order to fully understand Yorùbáland, it is important in addition to the myth of Obàtálá to understand Christianity and Islam demographics as well.

Christianity Snapshot

According to the Pew Forum, in 1953, 45.3% of the Nigerian population was Muslim, 21.4% was Christian and 33.3% belonged to other religion in Nigeria. By 1963, the percentage of the population that belonged to other religions declined by 15 percentage points, nearly matching the 13.1 point increase for Christians; during this same time period, the percentage of Muslims increased by less than 2 percentage points. The number of Christians increased by

another 13.1 percentage points from 1963 to 1990 (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2006). Not only has the number of Christians increased, but the term "Christian" has evolved over time. "Christian" now extends beyond mainline churches, like Anglicans or Catholics, to Pentecostals as well. Today, fourteen percent, or 7 million of all Christians are Pentecostals and Charismatics (M. Ojo 2004).

Pentecostals, Christian Fundamentals, and New Religions

Many classical Pentecostal churches came to fruition as a result of Western missionary activities in Nigeria around the 1930s and 1940s (Ukah 2007, 3). These churches include the Foursquare Gospel Church, the Apostolic Mission, The Apostolic Church, and the Assemblies of God Church. Indigenous Pentecostal churches among the Yorùbá are called Aladura churches. Christ Apostolic Church (CAC, included in the study), Celestial Church of Christ Cherubim and Seraphim Society, and Church of the Lord are all under this heading. The term Aladura comes from the Yorùbá word for "prayful people". This name is evident within Aladura church services where prayer is always a key component of services. These churches differ from their Western-based counterparts because their headquarters, leadership, and beliefs are typically steeped in indigenous practices and culture. The third classification is the newest variant of Pentecostalism in Nigeria called "Wealth and Health". Many of these churches emerged after revivals on Nigerian university campuses in the 1970s (Ukah 2007, 3). These newer churches were able to spread rapidly because recent graduates enlisting in Nigeria's Youth Service Corps bought their faith to their new assignments all over Nigeria (Ilesami, personal interview). Doctrinally, these churches tended to focus on the economic and physical wellbeing of their congregants–generally, espousing the ideology of "wealth and health". Church leaders often

argue members are children of God, and the Almighty wants them to be prosperous. The Winners' Chapel is one example of this newer type of Pentecostalism.

The recent rise of Pentecostalism is a significant development in recent Nigerian and Yorùbá history. Not only is Pentecostalism noteworthy because it is a new addition to the Yorùbá religious landscape, but its doctrine is fundamentally different than many mainline churches. In the midst of economic decay, the Pentecostal church serves as an apparent respite and source of hope for its adherents. Its emphasis on healings, miracles, and fervent prayer continues to draw large crowds to energetic worship services. When a person becomes a Pentecostal their entire life is said to have transformed. They become, as many Pentecostals term, "born again". This transformation impacts all aspects of the new convert, even their cultural affinities and ethnic affiliations. Droogers (2001, 45) writes:

> Conversion often means that a person takes leave of customs in his or her culture that are considered sinful and demonic. This may lead to the church being seen as an alternative cultural community, that substitutes the dominant culture in important respects and that may even demand the rupture of kinship ties with non-convert. In contexts where ethnic identity is salient, the brothers and sisters of the church may form a new 'tribe", as it were. The original culture will not fully disappear from the lives of such converts, but it will undergo profound changes and only those aspects that are considered harmless remain.

Marshall's (2009) argument parallels Droogers. According to Marshall, "born-again converts managed to project this new image beyond their communities and into the public sphere. Capitalizing on the moral uncertainty engendered by the boom and bust, converts presented themselves as a new sort of social capital. Interpersonal relations beyond the community were thus also mediated by the new expectations for social practice that conversion implied: employers of all confessions recounted how they actively sought out Born-Again recruits, and

lecturers complained that Born-Again female students could not be pressured into exchanging sexual favors for passing grades" (112). It appears Pentecostals adherents take seriously the scripture written in 2 Corinthians 5:17 "Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, the new creation has come: The old has gone, the new is here!" (*The NIV Study Bible: New International Version: With Study Notes and References, Concordance and Maps* 1987). This is reflected in their projection of 'social capital'. Pentecostals may not be active politically, but they are aggressive in their conversation efforts. As Pentecostals increase in influence, so do their Muslim counterparts.

Rise of Islamic Revivalism

Pentecostalism is not the only religion witnessing a resurgence in Nigeria. Islam, which predates both Christianity and colonialism within Nigeria, is no stranger to revivalism. The exact date of Islamic penetration into Nigeria is highly disputed among Islamic scholars, but it is generally agreed that Islam and Sharia, Islamic law, were firmly established by the fifteenth century (Nwanaju 2008). In 1789, the religious, political arena would change once again with the rise of Uthman dan Fodio, a prominent Nigerian scholar and teacher, who waged a jihad during the early nineteenth century. This jihad brought an Islamic revival to Northern Nigeria and provided fuel for subsequent Islamic crusades to the rest of Nigeria. Fodio declared the jihad for a multitude of reasons, namely because the decadences of the northern Hausa ruling emirates. Moreover, "the aim of the Jihad was to cleanse Islam of its impurities, and which the Hausa kings were incompetent or unwilling to effect." (81). Falola (1998) proposes other reasons as well, "the highly educated Fulani felt excluded from power while others of their ethnic group complained of marginalization. As it turned out, in the execution of the jihad and the distribution of power that followed, the Fulani benefited a great deal" (36). By the colonial period, however,

Christian missionary activity was largely outlawed in the North and confined to southern borders. This policy helped curtain the outbreak of violence between missionaries and emirs, but did little to ferment a united Nigerian identity (Nafziger 1983). Conversely, "The advent of British rule interrupted a Hausa-Fulani invasion southward" (Horowitz 1985, 30).

These historic episodes resulted in high death tolls and structural damage. In post-colonial Nigeria, the implementation of Sharia, Islamic law, across all 12 Northern states in 2000 further fueled antagonisms between Christian and Muslim populations (Laremont 2010). Many non-Muslims vehemently opposed Sharia, fearing they would be subjected to severe punishments. Though Muslim authorities claimed non-Muslims would be exempted, clashes still occurred. Like the Fulani before them, current northern elites benefited greatly from the implementation of Sharia. Take for example, Ahmed Sani Yarima. Despite alleged malfeasant activities before reaching office, the governor of Zamfara (1999-2007), and the first governor to implement Sharia rule, received much acclaim from his people and the Muslim world. Further politicalizing the role of religion within the North:

> Sani quickly appreciated the public appeal that Sharia enjoyed, and he moved to embrace it. That move was timely, as his reputation prior to the declaration rested upon his tenure in several posts in Nigeria's Central Bank during the military administration, when billions of dollars mysteriously disappeared. Widely publicized prosecution under sharia gave Sani positive public prominence and exposed his political foes to the charge of ignoring popular interests and associating with a corrupt establishment. His status as a defender of sharia also gave him entrée to officials in Pakistan, Egypt, Qatar, the Sudan, and Saudi Arabia (Reno 2004, 230-231).

Clashes

Northern ethno-religious episodes also gained international attention in recent years. The Miss World Riots in 2002 is one such example. The events began in 2001 when Agbani Darego won the Miss World beauty pageant, a first for a black African. The next year, organizers subsequently decided to hold ceremonies in Nigeria's capital, Abuja. Many conservative Muslims fervently protested. The controversy became explosive when fashion reporter, Isioma Daniel, from *ThisDay* newspaper openly chastised Nigerian Muslims for their opposition to the Miss World pageant. She further suggested that the Prophet Mohammed would have taken one of the contestants as a wife. Her comments ignited killings in major Northern cities resulting in retaliations and reprises by both Christians and Muslims. Official estimates vary but the final dead toll stood at nearly 200 people. In 2006, a Danish political cartoon unflattering portrayal of the Prophet Mohammed touched off days of protest and violence worldwide including Nigeria. Nigeria was the hardest hit from the caricature controversy with over 100 people killed throughout the North (Polgreen 2006).

As a new decade dawned, religious violence in the North went digital when inflammatory text messages sparked violent riots in Jos Plateau State--a region already battered with protracted episodes of ethnic-religious hostilities in 2001, 2004, and 2008. Jos, a city with a large Muslim majority but sizeable Christian minority communities, was the scene of the latest round of rioting beginning on January 17, 2010. Riots continued for four days with reported causalities totaling 326 people according Plateau State Police Command (*Daily Independent* January 28, 2010). Allegedly, the circulating text messages foreshadowed impeding violence. A sample text message read, "War, war, war. Stand up... and defend yourselves. Kill before they kill you. Slaughter before they slaughter you. Dump them in a pit before they dump you." (*BBC News*

January 27, 2010). Widespread rumors warned Christians not to eat food sold by Muslims because it was "poisoned". Conversely, allegations among Muslims spread stating that the water supply would be cut by the state governor. The resulting violence caused thousands to be displaced and added yet another chapter to the incessant violence gripping the North and neighboring Middle Belt regions.

Boko Haram Rising: History

As Islamic revivalism surges, Islamic antiestablishment groups emerge as well. According to Paden (2007) "five board categories help to cluster contemporary Muslim identities and organizations within the broader historical and cultural context: Sufi brotherhoods and Izala; student and youth organizations; women's organizations; national umbrella organizations; and antiestablishment networks, including the so-called Shiites and Taliban organizations" (27). The fifth category–"antiestablishment networks"–are of the upmost concern. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic, there has been a steady rise of radical and Puritanical Islam in Nigeria. Boko Haram is a recent domestic, Islamic terrorism group currently confronting the Nigerian State. Often branded as the Nigerian "Taliban", Boko Haram has engaged in several attacks throughout the North and has successfully instigated several religious riots and crises throughout the Northern region. The group's official name in Arabic is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad though the Northern Hausa shortened the name to Boko Haram meaning, "Western Education is Sin" or "Western Education is forbidden". As its name suggests, the fundamental ideological underpinnings of Boko Haram is a staunch rejection of Western influences, ideology, and education. Moreover, the ultimate goal is "to overthrow the Nigerian state, impose an

extreme interpretation of Islamic law and abolish what they term "Western-style education" (Boyle 2009). Founded in 1995, the group reached greater prominence when Mallam Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf assumed the reigns of the group in 2002 (Cline 2011). Yusuf was reportedly highly educated, proficient in English, and wealthy, a paradox, given his fierce criticism of western education and educational background. ("Nigeria: Boko Haram Attacks" 2009). Yusuf died in extrajudicial killings in 2009 during the Maiduguri crisis, which led to over one thousand causalities (Balal 2011).

Doctrine of Boko Haram and Echoes of the Past

Adesoji (2011) argues that Boko Haram in many ways mirrors the Maitatsine uprisings in the early 1980s. Like Boko Haram, the Maitatsine riots centered in Kano and thrived in an environment where the Nigerian state and its institutions struggled to counter the economic challenges besieging Nigeria (Adesoji 2011). Isichei (1987) details several Maitatsine riots that eerily mirror many of the riots perpetrated by Boko Haram today. The Maitatsine then, and Boko Haram now, is composed of poor, young men with little to no prospect of gainful employment. Within the context of Nigeria where petroleum dominates the economy and produces little jobs, "there is no doubt that the movement appealed to the disinherited; Maitatsine recruited them deliberately, and they were attracted by his attacks on affluence and western materialism." (Isichei 1987, 201).

Boko Haram Attacks

Boko Haram's first, initial attack took place in Kannama, Yobe State, northeastern Nigeria during in 2004. According to published reports, the causalities include one police officer,

several government buildings, about thirty local, community members abducted and coerced to carrying loot for the sect ("Tracking down Nigeria's 'Taleban' Sect" 2004). Then labeled as the "Taliban", government officials claimed then that the sect has been completely dismantled, but five years later, Nigeria would see the first outbreak of intrastate conflict since 1966 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010). Since 2004, Boko Haram continues to wage several attacks on government properties with the sole aim of establishing an Islamic republic. Summer 2011 proved especially deadly as Boko Haram engaged in daily attacks in the North. The bombings at the United Nations building in Abuja gained international attention and eighteen people died in the blasts with several injured (Udo 2011). Boko Haram continued to target civilians with twin bombings at churches in the Northern cities of Jos and Abuja on Christmas Day, 2011 killing an estimated forty people (N. Nwosu et al. 2011). In January 2012, the group engaged in a new series of attacks in Kano leaving one hundred and eighty dead (Lobel 2012). On April 29, 2012, Boko Haram once again targeted worshipping, Christian parishioners at Bayero University in Kano (Agih 2012). Two days prior, the terrorist organization detonated explosions at three, different Nigerian media outlets for reporting unfavorable accounts of the group ("ThisDay, Sun, the Moment Bombed" 2012). More troubling are the new reports that Al-Qaeda may have penetrated Nigeria, and is collaborating with organizations like Boko Haram–scenarios long dismissed by scholars and policy experts (Ogunlesi 2011). This new revelation is troubling given the destructive patterns of Al-Qaeda and their syndicates throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East.

Responses to Boko Haram

In 2011, party officials within one of Nigeria's major political parties, Action Congress of Nigeria, ACN, set up new security measures to counteract potential attacks from Boko Haram moving southward (Adeseri 2011). Leaders of ACN were reacting to "recent reports about the sect's threat to strike in some southern states particularly Lagos where it was rumored that they may target the Third Mainland Bridge" (Adeseri 2011). Further reports have surfaced that Boko Haram is planning to attack commercial buses in Lagos—Nigeria's southwest commercial capital (Stearns 2011). Boko Haram attacks also directly affect the National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), an organization created as a means of dealing with reconstruction after Nigerian Civil War ("National Youth Service Corps" n.d.). NYSC helps Nigeria deal with the lack of distribution of highly skilled laborers throughout Nigeria, "in 1973, the Nigerian Federal Government established a National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) as a multi-purpose one-year compulsory national service scheme for university graduates. The scheme was later extended to graduates from other institutions of higher learning such as the polytechnics and colleges of technology." (F. Ojo 1980, 52). With the electoral violence that seized most of Northern Nigeria in 2010, members were displaced from Borno State amidst fears Boko Haram would stage more attacks against the young people ("Boko Haram: 1,114 Corps Members Relocate from Borno" 2011).

Given the rise of Christian and Islamic revivalism throughout Nigeria, what potential impact does it spell for religious violence within Yorùbáland? Will extremist groups also seize religious cleavages to further their ends? Undeniably, Christianity and Islam are active, salient forces in Yorùbá society and exert tremendous influence. Toyin Falola observes:

> "…both religions [Christianity and Islam] have been able to draw members from the same family, group, and town, without either religion being able to attain dominance. Second, religious competition is equally as intense among the Yorùbá as other groups, only that it has yet to produce violence on a major scale. Religious groups are aggressive in conversion efforts. They employ verbal aggression, and take sides in violence elsewhere" (Falola 1998, 273)

Though all the ingredients for entrenched ethno-religious conflict exist within Yorùbáland, deeply divided populations along religious lines, the Yorùbá fail to mirror the endemic ethno-religious violence in the North. Buttressed by peace entrepreneurs committed to tranquility, ethno-religious violence is largely contained.

Pax Yorùbá?

> What will surely remain true is that, as in the 19th Century, the competition between Islam and Christianity, or indeed between groups within them, will be required to be played under Yorùbá rules of the game. This is the surest guarantee that the tradition of religious toleration and harmony which has been such a notable accomplishment of Yorùbá people in the past will remain a heritage for the future (J.D.Y. Peel 2009, 19)

Given the problem of religious conflict seen elsewhere in Nigeria, why do the Yorùbá seem immune? Does a Pax Yorùbá exist in the first place? What are the Yorùbá 'rules of the game' referred to Peel above? The Yorùbá rules of the game call for moderation and decorum within the religious arena if not; the consequences will entail the intervention of elder, leaders, and peace entrepreneurs. The term *Pax Yorùbá,* though useful, is problematic if used chiefly to connote the *complete* absence of tensions. On the surface, the inhabitants of Yorùbáland appear exceptional from their Northern counterparts, a region where contemporary disagreements along ethno-religious lines rarely materialize at all. Upon closer inspection, however,

misunderstandings and small-scale conflicts do occur regarding religion in the Southwest. The key difference is conflict usually does not intensify and become protracted, episodic, full-blown crises as seen in Northern Nigeria. Disagreements, as they pertain to religion, are quickly quelled before additional eruptions become entrenched and violent.

Distinctive features of the Yorùbá

Who are the Yorùbá? Geographically, the Yorùbá are largely concentrated in the Southwest Nigerian states of Oyo, Ogun, Lagos, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, and Kwara and constitute roughly twenty one percent of Nigeria's total population[6]. The Yorùbá are composed of several sub-ethnic groups including the Egba, Ijebu, and the Oyo, each group has its own festivals, dialects, and distinct political and monarchical structures. According to Peel, the Yorùbá name initially evolved from the Oyo sub group and witnessed a marked transformation over time:

> Originally the word referred to only one Yorùbá grouping, the Oyo. Yorùbá ethnic identity began to be adopted by other groups (e.g. Ijesha, Egba, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ondo) from the 1920s, as migration, cash-cropping, education, and conversion to the world religions drew more people into a Nigeria-wide sphere of social relations. From the late 1930s, when nationalism really began to underway, the Yorùbá began to shape themselves politically against other 'tribes', especially the Igbo in the political crucible of Lagos. Between 1945 and 1951, the nationalist movement in southern Nigeria fragmented, and national politics assumed the form of a competition (2000, 966)

Other scholars point to the Hausa, another major Nigerian ethnic-linguistic group in Northern Nigeria, and Arabic origins as the precursor of the collective Yorùbá name and identification as group (Johnson 1921; R. Law 1997). Ojo (2009) brilliantly argues that to fully understand Pan-Yorùbá identity as it exists today, you must trace the Pan-Yorùbá identity to the eve before the

[6] The real numbers are unknown. Elements like religion and ethnicity were eliminated since the 1963 census because post-colonial censuses agitate regional tensions and court corruption (Suberu 2001).

collapse of Old Oyo Empire, the transatlantic slave trade and efforts of repatriated Nigerian slaves to consolidate Yorùbá founding myths and fortify Yorùbá power vis-a-vie other regions[7].

As we discuss the social and cultural framework of the Yorùbá, what is the religious and economic context? How are the Yorùbá economically aligned? More importantly, is class and religious intrinsically tied? Anecdotally, we can say that a multi-religious middle class exists within Yorùbáland and there is no evidence to validate the belief that Yorùbá Muslims are better off than their Christian counterparts. An official consensus including religion has not been conducted since 1963. Ostien (2012) ties the 1952 and 1963 survey data results to current Nigerian states today in the table below. In terms of religion, there are no separate Muslim and Christian regions within the Yorùbá area, though according the 1963 consensus there is a heavy Christian presence in Ondo and Ekiti, a historical by-product of major missionary activity and pre-colonial trade route concentration in these regions.

Percentages by religion of the 1952 and 1963 populations of Nigeria's present states (Yorùbáland)

Yorùbáland States	1952			1963		
	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other	% Muslim	% Christian	% Other
Oyo	50.4	26.7	22.9	58.3	30.5	11.2
Lagos	48.3	44.3	7.4	56	40.7	3.3
Ogun	47.5	35.2	17.4	53	37.9	9.1
Osun	48.3	38.2	13.5	52.7	42.2	5.1
Ondo	12.7	66.7	20.6	14.2	78.2	7.6
Ekiti	8.2	69.3	22.5	10.6	58.2	10.4
Average	**35.9**	**46.7**	**17.3**	**40.8**	**47.95**	**7.78**

Table 1. Source: Ostien (2012)

[7] See Apter (2013) for a fuller discussion of the creation of the Pan-Yorùbá identity particular as it relates to Yorùbá towns and homes.

Today, many Yorùbás still trace their ancestry to one man, Oduduwa, yet two major countervailing traditions exist regarding his origins. In one tradition, Oduduwa is said to have descended from the heavens via a chain and created dry land (Law 1973). These duties, however, were originally given to Obàtálá, an orisa, a deity, by God. Obàtálá, meaning "King of white cloth" is often depicted in white and his devotees wear white as well; he is often represented as the orisha of peace. In some myths, he is the eldest son of God, the head of all orishas, and the owners of all heads, *ori.* Obàtálá failed to complete his task successfully when he became inebriated, so Olodumare, or God, sent Oduduwa instead. This would spur a fierce rivalry between Oduduwa and the Orisa indefinitely. The second stream insists that Oduduwa was a migrant from either the Nile River Valley, Mecca, or Nupe, to the northeast of Yorùbáland (Law 1973). Oduduwa then became the Ooni of Ife, the king of the city, elevating him to the father of the Yorùbá, and Ile Ife would become the collective ancestral home of the Yorùbá people. Later, his sons dispersed throughout the region and expanded Yorùbá influence by creating city states. These city-states would become independent, powerful territories, with the most powerful being the Oyo Empire until its demise in 1888 (Smith 1988).

Despite the Nigerian civil war, which saw the collapse of the aforementioned Oyo Empire in the eighteenth century, the Yorùbá collectively had several proverbial ties that bind including monarchical institutions. Johnson (1921) details the governmental infrastructure of the feudal Oyo Empire. He reminds the reader that the "remoter" portions of Yorùbáland also had a semblance of independence and "the entire Yorùbá country has never been thoroughly organized into one complete government in a modern sense." (40). Johnson continues by conveying the ever important role of the King, *Alafin*, or *Oba*. In Oyo, the monarch's power was absolute and successions passed via familial lines, "the King is more dreaded than even the gods. The office is

hereditary in the same family, but not necessarily from father to son. The King is usually elected by a body of noblemen know as Oyo Mesi, the seven principal councilors of state" (41).

In Abeokuta, in southwest Yorùbáland, the kingship roles were strikingly different before the penetration of the British and Anglican missionary Henry Townsend. The town initially began as a refugee encampment during the height of the Yorùbá civil wars ---thus beginning the formation of the Egba people. The most distinguishing feature of the area is the rocks surrounding city. It is from these rocks that Abeokuta derives its name. The city initially was divided by four kings, the Alake of Egbaland, Olowu of Owu, Agura of Gbagura and Oshile of Oke OnaNolte. According to Nolte (2002) these four Egba kings were competitive toward each other and exerted marginal power until the British elevated the Alake above the other Egba kings. Even today, the Alake remains the high king of Abeokuta above the three others:

> In Abeokuta, kingship and European interests were closely related from the installation in the first *Alake* in 1854. From Townsend's day, Western powers hope that having central authority in the town would make dealings with the town and, later, its administration, easier. However, several factors combined to prevent the emergence of such an authority until after the incorporation of Abeokuta into the Protectorate of Nigeria in 1914. First, the majority7 of Abeokuta's townships represented Egba towns, and the relations among these towns were characterized by competition. Second, even the pre-colonial Egba towns, the kings had not held much power and day-to-day decisions were normally made by the representative town association, the Ogboni. The third, in both Egba and Owu society, the social status of kingship had declined with the rise of a warrior elite in the early nineteenth century, which continued to control affairs in Abeokuta. The traditional institution of kingship---as envisaged by Townsend and other Europeans---had very little to sustain it in terms of unified appeal, traditional support structures and control of resources (2002, 383).


Comparing Oyo and Abeokuta briefly reveals that Yorùbá leadership cannot be spoken of in monolithic terms. Local histories, external forces, and myth figure prominently within the creation of specific Yorùbáland subgroups like the Oyo and Egba. If monarchical structures differed across Yorùbáland, how did the modern Yorùbá identity emerge? Though narratives

regarding the perceived unity among Yorùbá subgroups existed a priori the height of the Atlantic slave trade in Yorùbáland[8], the rise of Christian Yorùbá elites in Lagos helped firmly establish the Pan-Yorùbá identity. Ojo stipulates that "from the Christian churches… came the first generation of teachers and school pupils who were trained to be national heroes—writers and student of "national histories," and a national (Yorùbá) language….In effect, what emerged in Lagos was a pan-Yorùbá identity stronger than anything that existed either in the diaspora or in the hinterland…By the 1920s, not many educated or non-educated members of the elite would dispute the "fa(mo)(bro)therhood" of Ile-Ife in relation to other Yorùbá districts (71-72).

Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs now exist within a cultural subtext forged during the colonial and post-colonial era—this identity and accompanying norms are deeply embedded within the mores of Yorùbá society. These cultural norms are neither fixed nor absolute, but these distinctive Yorùbá features such as proverbs, hierarchy, cross cutting ties and every day and associational forms of engagement bolster entrepreneurs' peacemaking efforts. These features provide fertile ground for entrepreneurs to do their work. These factors explain peace entrepreneurs' ability to thwart the escalation of religious conflict as it occurs.

[8] (1973) suggests that references of a Pan-Yorùbá identity do not exist before the nineteenth century and the emergence of pan-Yorùbá narrative were by-products of propaganda by the Oyo Empire to validity to their empire.

Map1: Yorùbáland



Why Peace Entrepreneurs?

If the Yorùbá are historically tolerant and elders hold tremendous power within their respective communities, why do the Yorùbá need peace entrepreneurs? From my observations in the field, religious conflict arises when there is a perceived violation or disrespect to another practitioner's religious ceremonies or beliefs. One commonly held Yorùbá proverb says, "Owo kii fun owo lorun", Lit: "When you are doing your own, you cannot inconvenience others." This proverb is particularly salient within Orisha worship, the hegemonic religious schema present before the penetration of Christianity and Islam into Yorùbáland. Orisha, or deities, devotees can be initiated into different Orisha cults and sects. Nevertheless, the Yorùbás are not monolithic in their perspectives of history, myth, and particularly, the Yorùbá orisha pantheon. The exact number of orishas is unknown. Apter (1992, 156) argues the Orisha pantheon exhibits great fluidity and is context dependent. The attributes and lineage of one Orisha may differ greatly depending on the historical and power dynamics within a particular, town, *ilu*:

> Properly conceived, the Yorùbá pantheon exists as a practical calculus of differential, substitutable, and integral relations which can be variously interpreted according to changing contexts and situations. Every kingdom adheres to the same schematism but applies it differently, positioning its own *orisa* in relations to its dominant cults and corresponding bases of political power. Not only do different Yorùbá kingdoms provide alternative pantheons based on the corresponding configurations of their dominant cults; more importantly, pantheons vary *within* kingdoms as well.

Moreover, within Orisha worship, there are clear lines of demarcation between Orisha practitioners and understood rules of decorum.

Imagine an exchange between Egungun and Obàtálá cultists as their paths crossed while the Egungun are performing their rituals. The egungun are masked individuals closely associated

with ancestor worship and vary greatly in their types and manifestation (Drewal 1978). Their costumes are often beautifully ornate with cowry shells and colorful beads and male dominated. One Egungun might say, *"Egungun la n se, Orisa ko, Alaso funfun kuro laarin wa"*[9]. Lit: We are observing masquerade, you are doing your own orisha, devotees of Obàtálá (those who wear white clothes) remove yourself from us. The implications in this proverb are insightful and significant. The proverb admonishes hearers, particularly the Obàtálá cultists to practice moderation and respect while the Egungun, and other cults, perform their religious rites and ceremonies. The cardinal sin of 'inconvenience to others' has tremendous repercussions within Orisha worship and even outside orisha cults. When a violation of this axiom occurs, peace entrepreneurs push for and maintain ethno-religious peace—an established, understood cultural norm. Norms, however, are not sufficient to prevent all conflict, and inevitable disputes do arise. Peace entrepreneurs play a key role in diffusing disputes before they escalate into major conflicts. In many ways, the myth of Obàtálá as a paragon of peace and moderation exists within the consciousness, whether knowingly or unknowingly, of all Yorùbá entrepreneurs as they spring to action and defuse conflicts, as we will explore in chapter three and the 'Imprisonment of Obàtálá'.

Peace entrepreneurs are also important because they act as the proverbial checks in the system. For example, at the University of Ibadan in 2010, the school nearly erupted when a Christian student wearing a hijab, a traditional Islamic head covering, walked into the on-campus mosque and started to proselytize loudly during Friday morning prayers. If not for the quick intervention of the University's Chancellor, an informal peace entrepreneur, in this instance, the university would have continued to erupt into several days of protests at the height of Ramadan

[9] Thank you for Profs. Adesanya and Adeleke, University of Ibadan, for your insights (October 2010).

(Jegede 2010). In Ibadan's city center, nearly two weeks later, two Islamic sects, Izalat and Tijaniyah, clashed regarding the sermons of a visiting imam from Northern Nigeria. Once again, local leaders, in addition to local enforcement, moved quickly to arrest actors involved in disturbing the peace and sort avenues of diplomacy.

Chapter 2

Peace and Justice

Justice

What is justice? The interplay between leaders, the state, citizenry and the implications on peace and justice have long preoccupied political philosophers. In *Das Kapital*, Marx and Engels (1867) contend the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie, systematically perpetuate injustice against the proletariat. Under capitalism, the labor force is divorced from the fruits of their labor, and capitalists reap the profitable benefits of the system. For Marx, this system of oppressive class relationships is an injustice. Plato's *Republic* conversely depicts a rigid, utopian society where the producers and agrarian class (Hoi Polloi); the military (Hoi Epikouroi); and the Guardians or philosopher kings (Hoi Phylakes) exist. Owens (1996) observes the three classes interact on the basis of labor and the division of the soul: appetite, passion, and reason:

> The two bases for the political tripartite division of society are (a) the principle of separate and specific function, based on the division of labour, and (b) an analogous tripartite division of the human psyche (a division which may have its origins in Pythagorism) into the elements of appetite, passion and reason which mirror the three classes of the ideal society. The underlying problem with this political structure is that it requires that the ideal city be constituted primarily of classes, of separate socio-political groupings, and not of individual human beings.

The Philosopher kings, the best in society, are firmly affixed upon the apex of an established political order. Consequently, they receive an elite education and are breed to retain the mental acuity necessary to lead. Within this society, freedoms are curtained, because "….the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state" (Plato

1961, 564a). For Plato, justice is an ordered society where aristocracy, the best, governs the rest, logic and knowledge supersedes emotions, and the impulses of the masses, or demos, are curtailed. Justice is invariably tied to order and logic.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle's conceptualizations of justice diverge slightly from Plato. For Aristotle, the just "good life" is the ultimate aim of the city, the polis. Here, rulers are admonished to rule virtuously, judiciously, and show self-restraint. In turn, his virtuous constituents will react favorably to him, "For if the ruler is not temperate and just, how will he rule well? And if the ruled, how will he obey well? If intemperate and cowardly he will not perform any of the duties of his position. It is evident therefore that both must possess virtue, but that there are differences in their virtue." (Aristoteles 1944, 1259b). Appealing to virtue within the leadership, leaders are held to a higher, "golden" standard. Miller (2004, 13–14) contends ultimately justice is a communal virtue (*koinōnikē aretē)* enjoyed by the entire community and leaders are essential in achieving the end of the good, virtuous life:

> The proper aim of the polis is the happiness of its citizens, and the proper task of the science of politics is to perfect them by providing them with a just political order embodied in a constitution and laws. In order to establish and preserve such an order, the lawgivers and politicians must have a true understanding of the nature of the human beings who are to share in the polis. Proceeding from this understanding, they can form a correct conception of justice which will guide the process of legislation so that the citizens of the polis will possess rights or claims of justice which are in accordance with nature.

Later, Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan* (1651), John Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* (1689), and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Du contrat social ou Principes du droit politique* (1762) would continue the discussion regarding the interconnection between citizens and the state via the social contract. Broadly speaking, a social contract is an actual or hypothetical agreement among the members of an organized society or between a community and its ruler that defines

and limits the rights and duties of each citizen. Citizens bequeath their will individually for the collective benefit of the entire society. On one side of the spectrum, Locke proposes limited government. Hobbes, however, views the state on the other spectrum. Humans, citizens, in the state of nature are filled with disorder, confusion, and most importantly a diminished existence. Consequently, citizens enter into a contract, or covenant, to form a great "Leviathan". Within this system, there is safety, but citizens are subject to authoritarian rule:

> This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the Commonwealth, he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him that, by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all, to peace at home, and mutual aid against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the essence of the Commonwealth; which, to define it, is: one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence (1998, chap. 17).

Unlike Hobbes, Rousseau does not believe a draconian, authoritarian relationship between the sovereign and the ruled must exist. Instead, Dunn (2002, 8) remarks, "The ideal society he [Rousseau] proposes in *The Social Contract* is, more than anything else, a communitarian society in which the responsibilities and duties of citizenship outweigh individual rights and freedoms." Like Aristotle, he believes the ideal citizen-sovereign relationship is symbiotic and idyllic. Moreover, Dunn proposes, as the citizenry bond together, they able to experience the Aristotelian "good life", "selflessly, citizens bind and commit themselves to the common good of all, willing to make sacrifices for their political community. Their virtue is

richly rewarded. Though their devotion to the community, their self-discipline, and patriotism, they thrive as human beings, thus realizing their full rational and moral potential" (8).

Rawls (2001) evokes the same social contract tradition, and contends justice is predicated on fairness. In other words, justice is fermented vis-à-vis equality and equity. Justice is not equality in outcome, but equality in opportunity. Justice ultimately is a society working, via social cooperation, together toward a greater good. The good is determined by the social norms of the society:

> (a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequately schedule of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and
>
> (b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to offices and positions opens to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle) (42).

Peace

International perspective

What is peace? What are the conditions necessary for enduring, sustainable amity within a given community? Is it possible to cultivate a "culture of peace'? On October 7, 1999, The United Nations passed the "Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace" attempting to answer the questions above, what is peace? (see Appendix 1). The resolution, which can trace its genesis back to the late 1980s, provides a working framework for the cultivation and implementation of the "Culture of Peace" (CP) model (Adams 2000). The UN Resolution outlines nine key points necessary to create conditions suitable for generating a culture of peace—namely, "values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behavior". These necessary

prerequisites include everything from upholding rule of law, respecting the sanctity of life, gender equality, human rights, and curtailing violence conflict:

> (*a*) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;
>
> (*b*) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;
>
> (*c*) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;
>
> (*d*) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;
>
> (*e*) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;
>
> (*f*) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;
>
> (*g*) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;
>
> (*h*) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;
>
> (*i*) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.

Though the ambitious resolution took nearly ten years to create, aspects of the initial draft were fraught with disagreement. According to David Adams, the Director for Unit for the International Year for the Culture of Peace UNESCO[10], the European Union countries found fault with the declaration's wording because the resolution's initial expressed aim was to outline a program that would supplant an endemic "culture of conflict and war" with

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10 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

a “culture of peace”. According to Adams (2000), this verbiage was especially problematic for European Union members:

> The states of the European Union took the position that there is no culture of war and violence in the world, and they succeeded in imposing their way so that all references to this had to be taken out of the final document. Ironically, this was during the war in Kosovo where the actions of NATO were guided especially by these same states. Why is there such objection by the most powerful states to the idea that there is a culture of war in the world today? My personal belief is that the opposition to the concept of a culture of war reflects a refusal to admit that powerful states today—just as they have been from the beginning of recorded history—depend on the culture of war to retain their power (260).

Though controversial language was left out the final resolution, other important features remained, namely, the acknowledgement that the suitability of peace rests on the inclusion of a myriad of actors, including those in the international community, government, and members in civil society. Article 8 explicitly states:

> A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers, social workers, managers at various levels as well as to non-governmental organizations.

With civil society occupying the proverbial space between the public and private sectors, and non-governmental actors, we know civil society has endless connections to the development and fermentation of democratic institutions (Boussard 2003; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Calhoun 1993; Hirst and Bader 2001; Hudock 1999; Kaldor et al. 2003; Karatnycky, Motyl, and Graybow 1999; Oxhorn 1995; Patrick 1996; Scholte 2002). We also know that civil society is an integral part of the creation of social capital which generates closeness and networks in a given society (Putnam 2001). There is increasing evidence that civil society is also an important factor in sustaining peace. Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney (2012) found in Northern Ireland that civil society, namely churches, were significant in the Northern Ireland peace process, though

historically their importance is largely undervalued. Churches' involvement ranged from "small-scale, less-known peace builders" to those leaders and peace brokers firmly enmeshed in the peace process.

The History of Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies

What does the literature say about peace studies? The evolution of conflict resolution occurred in four successive generations with each period marking a pivotal turning point in the evolution of the field. The first two generations spanning from 1918-1965 laid the foundation for what would become the conflict resolution studies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011). During the first generation, the field of International Relations was conceived as a reaction to the failure to prevent the onset of World War I and World War II. Here, intellectuals and practitioners recognized the need for a scientific approach to developing theories for enduring peace, yet the actual creation of a conflict resolution field did not materialize until much later. There was an apparent disconnect between the study of conflict, with its emphasis on theories, and the generation of solutions for the cessation of conflict.

The second generation of conflict resolution emerged in the aftermath of World War II. Kenneth Boulding, an economist, established the Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1957, the first of its kind. Within the seminal issues of the publication, Kenneth Boulding (1959) argues about the precarious nature of peace, "We have no secure place to stand where we are, and we live in a time when intellectual investment in developing more adequate international images and theories of international systems may bear an enormous rate of return in human welfare." (131). Other pioneers of peace research arose during this time as well. Johan Galtung, for example, introduced

models for the study of conflict, violence and peace and the typology of violence. For Galtung, peace hinged on three key principles: 1. 'The term 'peace' shall be used for social goals at least verbally agreed to by many, if not necessarily by most; 2. These social goals may be complex and difficult, but not impossible, to attain.; 3. The statement peace is absence of violence shall be retained as valid"(Galtung 1969).

One of Galtung's most significant contributions to the conflict resolution field was his introduction of the 'Conflict Triangle', or triangles, which depict the genesis, duration, and cessation of conflict (see Figure 2.1). Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2011) expound upon Galtung's three triangles. In the first triangle, contradiction (C), attitude (A) and behaviour (B) are positioned on three points respectively, "here the contradiction refers to the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived 'incompatibility of goals' between the conflict parties generated by what Mitchell calls a 'mis-match between social values and social structure (1981: 18)." (10). In other words, contradictions emerge when actors cannot agree and are unable to find common ground. The second point, attitudes are "emotive (feeling), cognitive (belief) and conative (will) elements…attitude includes the parties' perceptions and misperceptions of each other and of themselves. These can be positive or negative, but in violent conflicts parties tend to develop demeaning stereotypes of the other, and attitudes are often influenced by emotions such as fear, anger, bitterness and hatred" (10).


The importance of attitudes within conflict cannot be underestimated. Before actions are ever taken, the formation of attitudes is the necessary precursor. Once attitudes are acted upon, this leads to the third point of the triangle, behavior. The behavior of actors "can include cooperation or coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility. Violent conflict behaviour

is characterized by threats, coercion and destructive attacks" (11). For Galtung, all three elements of Triangle A are necessary conditions for the emergence of full conflict. Without contradictions and attitudes, the emergence of behaviors in conflict is not possible. Galtung also acknowledges power dynamics in conflict with some conflicts being asymmetric and others symmetric. For example, conflicts between a superior and subordinate, asymmetric, are different than arguments between peers, symmetric: "in a symmetric conflict, the contradiction is defined by the parties, their interests and the clash of interests between them. In an asymmetric conflict, it is defined by the parties, their relationship and the conflict of interests inherent in the relationship" (10).

The second triangle depicts three different forms of violence. Direct violence corresponds directly to behavior and what we commonly refer to as physical and verbal violence. The second vertex, on Triangle B, structural violence refers to institutionalized oppression and repression which does not allow actors to reach their full potential. Racism, sexism, and poverty, are commonly cited examples (Lieban 2012). Cultural violence, like structural violence, is typically invisible. According to Galtung, "The visible effects of direct violence are known: the killed, the wounded, the displaced, the material damage, all increasingly hitting the civilians. But the invisible effects may be even more vicious: direct violence reinforces structural and cultural violence" (Galtung 2004). Cultural violence is crouched in cultural norms, like religion or ideology and used as justifications for direct violence (Galtung 1990). Structural and cultural violence relate to contradictions and attitudes on Triangle A, respectively. Galtung goes on to say, "cultural and structural violence cause direct violence, using violent actors who revolt against the structures and using the culture to legitimize their use of violence as instruments"(Galtung 2004).

The third and final triangle is necessary to create peace. For example, structural violence can only be remediated by changing the structural dynamics of society and perhaps, changing the power dynamics. When direct conflict emerges, there is a need for peacekeeping. For example, the deployment of UN troops to bring calm and order. Lastly, cultural violence can only end, when 'peace-making' exists, when cultural biases and negative attitudes are overcome, and equity is achieved between actors.

Figure 2 Galtung's Model of Conflict, Violence and Peace



Source: Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall 2011

Actors and peace.

How then should we label actors within civil society responsible for creating a "culture of peace" and ensuring justice? Present in the literature are terms like "peace workers", "peace

builders", and even "peace keepers", but these terms fail to encapsulate the importance these leaders serve in advancing justice. Those who cultivate reconciliation are not simply keepers or builders, but they are entrepreneurs. The word entrepreneur comes from the French word *entreprendre* which means to 'undertake'. The essence of an entrepreneur is one who is proactive, builds, identifies potential problem areas, and works to build reconciliation in the event problems arise. They are also adept in the rhetoric they use to persuade parties to resolutions. Unlike like business entrepreneurs, whose benefits are largely monetary, peace entrepreneurs create social capital for their entire community including ensuring justice.

Emergence of peace entrepreneurs

Within the social psychology and social movement literature, there are discussions of 'social entrepreneurs', those preoccupied with making lasting and creative social changes within their given communities (Bornstein 2007; Dees, Emerson, and Economy 2001; Elkington and Hartigan 2008; Emerson and Twerksy 1996; Nicholls 2006; Praszkier, Nowak, and Coleman 2010; Sharir and Lerner 2006; Waddock and Post 1991; Zahra et al. 2009). Though the term is useful, the expressed goals of social entrepreneurs are varied and extensive, not necessarily tied with a peace agenda. Peace entrepreneurs, however, in deeds and in rhetoric, 'undertake' the task of upholding peace in arenas where peace may be tenuous, firmly embedded, or completely non-existent. Peace entrepreneurs are typically close to their constituencies and understand how their societies think and function. Local peace entrepreneurs' close proximity to their societies help to give further credence to their goals of sustaining peace and producing social capital. Their people trust them because they know who they are and understand their motives. Though the leaders highlighted in

Article 8 are far from an exhaustive list, members within the list are usually the most influential leaders of a given society because of their proximity.

As we take a cursory look into history, key figures like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Mohandas Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela are contemporary examples of leaders enmeshed in social movements, but who had strong non-violence messages. They, too, can be categorized as formal peace entrepreneurs. The definitive marking of a peace entrepreneur is the instance on non-violence and reconciliation. For King, his rhetoric was based on the foundation of fostering a "culture of peace". His most iconic speech, "I Have A Dream", was laden with peace formation imagery, "I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of "interposition" and "nullification"–one day right there in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers" (Luther King, Jr. 1992). King was envisioning a culture of peace and a just society in the deepest parts of the South.

Mohandas Gandhi, another example of a peace entrepreneur, propagated a message of non-violence during his struggle for Indian independence from Britain. Gandhi, like King, was a passionate advocate for peace. He famously remarked, at a talk in Geneva, that he was a 'soldier of peace' (Gandhi and Merton 1965). Nelson Mandela, former South African president and anti-apartheid activist, did not start his career as a peace entrepreneur or cultivating justice. In fact, he created Umkhonto we Sizwein in 1961, the military wing of the ANC, the African National Congress. In the era after he was released from prison, Mandela transformed into a peace entrepreneur. His presidency would help cultivate a 'culture of justice' with the implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission who heard cases for amnesty for injustices committed during the apartheid era and attempted to bring closure for victims.

Peace entrepreneurs, in practice, need not be heads of social movements, like Mandela, Gandhi, or King. Peace entrepreneurs can be centered in small towns, city centers, and villages. For the Yorùbá, peace entrepreneurism and the creation of a 'culture of peace' appear to be a hallmark of the Southwest.

Obàtálá: The first Yorùbá peace entrepreneur

As we transition from the international context to the local Yorùbá level, are there any Yorùbá cultural archetypes or supports for the peace entrepreneur model? As we reexamine the importance of the inclusion of Orisha worshippers in discussions regarding peace within the Yorùbá context, the myth of Obàtálá, the orisha, emerges as a natural frame to study conceptualizations of peace at least in regards to religion. As you may recall in Chapter One, Obàtálá, is described as a deity embodying both virtue and peace. Belasco (1980) refers to several origin myths where Obàtálá is depicted as the progenitor of all humans beings. Not only is he described as peaceful, but his ritual sacrifices exude his 'serene' nature, "Obàtálá (Lisa) who shapes the human embryo in the womb. Appropriately called the "serene sculptor," he is said to mold Yorùbá culture. His main sacrifices are snails, bloodless offering, symbolic gentleness, and that is unstained, peace" (51). Apter (1992) reminds us continually that rituals and mock dramas are steeped in cultural and historical realities. Founding myths are context dependent and vary tremendously from city to city. Even Obàtálá's name assumes numerous recapitulations. Apter challenges Beier (1959) conceptualizations of the Obàtálá festival in Ede, and elsewhere, depicted briefly below. Apter insists the rituals and plays are not just myths or allegories for "conquest of an aboriginal population in the remote past", but reflective of political realities and subjection.:

> Ajagemo is taken prisoner by Olunwi and carried off from the palace. The Oba [king], however, intervenes for his release. He pays ransom to Olunwi, and Ajagemo is liberated and allowed to return to the palace. The return gradually attains the qualities of a triumphal procession. The dancing of this simple story, as told at Ede, takes only a few minutes. But it is intensely moving largely because of the qualities put into his part by Ajagemo. This is no question of mere acting. The ability to suffer and not to retaliate is one of the virtues every Obàtálá worshipper must strive to possess (Beier 1959, 14).

For our purposes, Obàtálá, or Ajagemo, reactions to injustice and false imprisonment are noteworthy. During his imprisonment, Obàtálá had the opportunity to use his power and strength but in humility decided to choose peace. Obàtálá shows unquestionable restraint in the midst of injustice. Despite the variations to the Obàtálá myth from Ile Ife to Oyo, Apter reminds readers that "Obàtálá, a paradigmatic white deity, or *orisa funfun*, is the orisa of political displacement: his ritual power, cool and controlled, dignified surrender political authority and discourages rebellion" (30). Again, Obàtálá is the embodiment of a peace entrepreneur, cool, calm, collected, and has an unwavering commitment to peace. Lawuyi (1992) remarks closely mirrors Apter's observations of Obàtálá, "What is intriguing about Obàtálá's saga is that he is one of the few Yorùbá gods and goddesses who is represented as being non-violent. In this way he symbolizes a rare quality--something the Yorùbá want but rarely ever have. He is one of the few Yorùbá deities who stand for something non- concrete and non-material."(369). Conflict and violence are indisputable realities within the Yorùbá context, nevertheless, peace entrepreneurs are the proverbial pressure valves pushing for moderation and placating potentially inflammatory situations. Within the consciousness of every Yorùbá peace entrepreneur is the myth of Obàtálá, subconsciously or consciously. In many ways, peace entrepreneurs are modern day Obàtálás.

Proverbs

Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs are effective because religious tolerance is not foreign among the Yorùbá. Messages of tolerance and conflict resolution are laden within Yorùbá religion, culture, and proverbs. These proverbs, *òwe*, are often evoked during times of conflict and are firmly embedded within the cultural lexicon of the Yorùbá. Agbaye (2002) observes, "Yorùbá elders constitute the repository of the traditional intelligence, logic and verbal or oral wit. Skills in public mediation are also expected of elders. An upright elder is accorded with the dual qualities of wisdom and eloquence. Proverbs are often skillfully introduced into the speech of elders/mediators at crucial moments and are influential in the actual resolution reached. In Yorùbá society, an elder/mediator who comprehends proverbs will be able to set matters right promptly" (238-239). Olaoye (2010) points to several adages as integral parts of the peace building process. Rhetoric and speech are key tools at the disposal of a skillful peace entrepreneur. The utterance of these proverbs wields tremendous power and influence particularly in episodes fraught with emotion and conflict. For example:

- *Ija o dola, oruko ni so eni.* Lit: Conflict does not bring wealth. Instead, it stigmatizes.
- *Ma roro, agba tio roro, ki ko eniyan jo.* Lit: Do not be wicked, an elder that is wicked will have no followers
- *Alajobi ko si mo, alajogbe l'oku.* Lit: Good neighbourliness is as desirable as family membership.
- *Awon ati enj nja, won si npari ija.* Lit: Both the tongue and the mouth do quarrel and they eventually settle the quarrel.
- *A ja ma tan ko si.* Lit: Nobody fights till eternity.
- *Otito ni ngbe orile ede leke.* Lit: Righteous exalts a nation.

Implicit within these 'peace' proverbs is the understanding that conflicts do occur, but the perpetual state of conflict is neither ideal nor advantageous to the entire community. Though "both the tongue and the mouth do quarrel and they eventually settle the quarrel" and leaders

stand as arbiters of this peace. Entrepreneurs also help to settle quarrels before they intensify. Coming together to defuse communal conflicts via proverbs and dialogue is another Yorùbá cultural norm which adds legitimacy to peace entrepreneurs and is witnessed in day to day interactions.

Honor, Decorum, and Status

Greetings and language.

Dennett (1909) provides an early twentieth century external snapshot of Yorùbá greetings and language. Laden within the Yorùbá language is a constant deference to authority. Members of society are aware of their position and are called on continually to 'act out' their reverence to their elders.

> The superior usually salutes first, and when the disparity of position is great, the inferior prostrates. The young always prostrate to the aged. Women kneel but never prostrate themselves. Sons, without reference to age or rank, prostrate to their mothers. They never suffer anything to inter-fere with the observance of these courtesies. (Dennett 1909, 187)

The 'performance of honor' occurs even today. Adetunji (2006) suggests there are three categories of respect demonstrated by the Yorùbá: salutational respect, referential respect and name avoidance, and lastly, deferential respect. Each category is closely tied to age and a physical or verbal demonstration of the older person's age and status.

- **Salutational Respect:** One important way that the Yorùbá manifest age-respect is through greetings. There are established norms on how the young should greet their elders. It is expected that younger person will show obvious signs of respect in greeting an older person: boys/males bow down with hands toward the floor or actually prostate (lay flat on the floor in front of the older person, and girls/women genuflect or kneel down to greet their elders).

- **Referential respect and Name Avoidance:** Another way that younger people show respect to older people can be observed in the type of words they use in

referring to older people. In general, younger people use plural pronouns for older people: they use "e" or "eyin" (you in plural), instead of "o" below one'

- **Deferential Respect:** There is the deferential respect for age as well, which means that younger persons defer to those older than them in making decisions and choices. Those who are older get to choose before the younger ones. If a young person is sitting on a seat and an older person is standing without a vacant seat, it is expected of the younger person to offer his/her seat to the older person (184-186).

Leaders matter within conflict resolution and it is understood that given their status they deserve both respect and honor given their positions. Again, Olaoye points to common maxims like: *Ai fi agba fun enikan ko jeki aye ogun*: Lit: Lack of respect (even among adults) for the elderly, head or a leader does not allow for a stable and peaceful society; or *Olorun ni ya olori/alasa*. Lit: It is God that appoints leaders/rulers. Olaoye suggests, "put together, the two wise sayings have a great import for peace building and conflict resolution. In the first instance, there is the admonition for us to recognize leaders and accord them the honour they deserve. In the second instance, the view that it is God who appoints leaders compels us to accept the will of God and submit to constituted authorities" (314). This is not to suggest deference to authority is absolute or total, but the respect conveyed within these proverbs can be invoked by peace entrepreneurs anytime. These maxims serve to not only admonish youths from the dangers of conflicts, but stand as a stern reminder to all echelons of society to pursue peace and settle conflicts quickly and promptly.

Peace Entrepreneurs: Formal and Informal (ad hoc)

Who are peace entrepreneurs? Peace entrepreneurs can be placed into two distinct categories: formal or informal (ad hoc). Formal peace entrepreneurs come into existence after a

conflict or series of conflicts have occurred or they try to maintain peace as part of their office or position. Informal peace entrepreneurs, however, are leaders, elders, citizens, or persons of prominent position whose expressed responsibilities do not necessarily entail peacekeeping but, if and when a conflict situation arises, their quick intervention attempts to minimize conflicts. These informal peace entrepreneurs willingly try to intervene to arrest conflict before escalation.

Overall peace entrepreneurs in Yorùbáland devise creative ways to maintain peace and justice while minimizing the outbreak of religious conflict. One such example is MUCHAS, the Muslim-Christian Association of Iseyin, an advisory peace council in Iseyin in Oyo State, Nigeria. This formal peace entrepreneur organization came into existence *after* the Iseyin king's palace was burned down by disenchanted Iseyin youths in 2003. The council, consisting of Iseyin Christian and Muslim leaders, recognizes potential areas of conflict and moves quickly to resolve them. Leaders, projecting their authority and legitimacy, evoke credible threats like: involving police authorities, public shaming, i.e. telling other members in the community of their disruptive activities, and other social sanctions to coerce disaffected parties into cooperating even if they have a strong desire not to keep the peace. These leaders are closely tied to their communities, so they are able to signal other council members before eruptions occur. MUCHAS's efforts are so successful they have been asked to intervene in matters beyond religion, including communal issues such as negotiating to keep the Nigerian Youth Service Corp camp in Iseyin. Again, MUCHAS would be designated as a formal peace entrepreneur because they were created with the expressed purpose of peacebuilding and were created in reaction to conflicts within the community.

Chapter 3

Methods

An illustrative literature on contention, identity, and politics has emerged in recent years (Brewer, Higgins, and Teeney 2012; Gurr 1971; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). A subset of this literature focuses specifically on ethnicity and its role in conflict situations. There is some disagreement, however, on how to define ethnicity in the first place (K. Chandra 2006). Is ethnicity a product of history, time, self-interested elites, or other mechanisms? Different schools of thought have arisen to answer these questions, namely primordialism and constructivism, each ascribing to different conceptualizations of ethnicity. The primordialist school of thought claims that ethnicity is often biological or "in the blood"; when conflict emerges along ethnic cleavages, they are often manifestations of long standing hatreds (Gil-White 1999; Horowitz 1985; Shils 1957). Constructivists, however, take another perspective. Identities are malleable, flexible, and context dependent social constructs (Kanchan Chandra 2007; Posner 2005; Young 1979). We also learn that elites are often instrumental in manipulating ethnic imagery for political and monetary gain which can lead to destructive ends (Deng 1995; Dickson and Scheve 2006; Prunier 1995).

Fearon and Laitin (2003) also fierce proponents of constructivism, combat the theoretical underpinnings of primordialism. Relying on a cross section of case studies from Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, Sudan, and India, the authors argue that identity formation and conflict is often linked to two key actors: self-interested elites "from above" and

the general masses "from below". Ethnic conflict emanating "from above" relates to elites and their need to ferment power and acquire resources through the use of violence. The construction and manipulation of ethnic identities is simply a means to a resource end. Laitin and Fearon also observe, across all their cases, elites often systematically identify an "out-group" as a target for violence particularly if infighting emerges:

> An interesting feature of several of these case studies is that internal conflicts between extremists and moderates belonging to a single ethnic group spur leaders or dissidents to provoke violence with members of an out-group. Violence has the effect, intended by the elites, of constructing group identities in more antagonistic and rigid ways. These newly constructed (or reconstructed) ethnic identities serve to increase support for the elites who provoked the violence while favoring the continuation or escalation of violence. (846).

Fearon and Laitin also find that "a necessary condition" for the sustainability of ethnic conflict usually revolved around the availability of youths to engage in conflict "from below":

> Several of these accounts convey the sense that on the ground, what is described as ethnic violence looks very much like gang violence with no necessary ethnic dimension. Indeed, based on these studies, one might conjecture that a necessary condition for sustained ''ethnic violence'' is the availability of thugs (in most cases young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) who can be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated, would shy away from killing their neighbors with machetes (869).

Here, Nigeria appears to satisfy this above precondition with seventy percent of the Nigerian population under age thirty and largely unemployed. Yet, all the evidence on the ground suggests that Yorùbáland, though susceptible, continues to be free of ethno-religious[11] violence. The motiving question of this study is, how is this so?

[11] Within the Nigerian context, religion and ethnicity map on to each other, therefore I refer to conflict here as 'ethno-religious'. Returning to the Laitin and Fearon (2003) study, the countries mentioned: Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, the Balkans, Sudan, and India, can also be labeled at 'ethno-religious' because of the interplay between religion and ethnicity within each country. This is not true of all ethnic conflicts. McCauley (2010) highlights instances where ethnic and religious considerations diverge and elites may invoke linguistics over religious identities. Ultimately, I decided to use the label, ethno-religious conflict, because of the strong interplay between ethnicity and religion in Nigeria.

David Laitin's (1986) book, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yorùbá,* sought to understand the interesting, yet puzzling discovery about the Yorùbá. Amid two hundred and fifty disparate ethnic groups, the Yorùbás comprise one-fifth of Nigeria's total population or thirty million people. Unlike the Hausa-Fulani to the north, and the Igbo to the southeast, the Yorùbá divided chiefly between Christianity and Islam.[12] Though both faiths are firmly entrenched throughout Yorùbáland, Laitin discovered, Christians and Muslims exhibited an unexpected religious tolerance toward each other. Unexpected because, given their cultural resources, Yorùbás had ample opportunity to align themselves along their religious identities in the political arena. Moreover, given the importance of religion among the Yorùbá, the nonpoliticalization of religion seemed unusual vis-a-vie their Northern counterparts. Scholars like Geertz (1973), Weber (1958), and (1976) argue both religion and religious imagery are powerful tools for mobilization and cohesion. Laitin's exploration into the Yorùbá, however, revealed religion never factored into the Yorùbá leaders' "political calculus", the tools used to navigate the Yorùbá political arena. The nonpoliticization of religion became increasingly clear during Nigeria's constitutional debates on Sharia, Islamic law, during the late 1970s. Yorùbá leaders' were able to debate the issue without recourse to their own personal religious affiliations.

Why would rational actors not fully maximize cultural resources at their disposal? The British, Laitin found, used the strategy of "indirect rule" to defuse any potential religious fanaticism within Nigeria. The memory of the Sudanese Mahdi revolution was still fresh within the British memory and they wanted to preempt similar upraises within the Yorùbá context

[12] Orisha Worship, an indigenous Yorùbá religion, is still practiced in Nigeria, though adherents have progressively diminished over time. The real numbers are difficult to ascertain.

(154). Hegemonic institutions, like local chieftaincies or kingships, were reinforced during the British colonial era. Laitin, relying on the work of Antonio Gramsci, defines hegemony as "the political forging –whether through coercion or elite bargaining—and institutionalization of a pattern of group activity in a state and the concurrent idealization of that schema into a dominant symbolic framework that reigns as common sense" (Laitin 1986, 19). Though the Yorùbá historically identified with their ancestral cities, or their fathers' hometowns, called *ilu*s, this identification started to decline after successive internal civil wars. Under British colonialism, or hegemony, traditional kings were restored and ancestral cities were thereby given a new lease on life (150). Essentially, "the core idea was to preserve local authority structures while the colonial authorities could 'overrule'—that is, guide and manipulate local authority" (150).

The British were successful because ties to ancestral cities were real and legitimate. Moreover, the British gave tangible benefits not only to kings and chiefs, but to other groups that made claims in terms of their ancestral city identities (153). Peel also found similar results in his study on Yorùbá peoples in Ijesha (John David Yeadon Peel 1983). Ijeshan Yorùbás, according to Peel, were more likely to identify first with their towns, lineage, and occupational groups then their faith.

If city-state identities were revitalized and reinforced under the British, how and why did the nonpoliticalization of religion endure after independence? We do know there was a steady decline of British influence in Africa as a whole even before Laitin conducted his study.

Crawford Young (1997) observes:

> Particularly intriguing has been the relative effacement over time of Great Britain on the African scene. Great Britain has long seen itself as a great power, although the resources to support such a claim silently ebbed away because imperial overreach…" In the 1950s,

> as the era of decolonization opened for Africa, conventional wisdom held that Great Britain was the most likely of the colonizers to maintain a permanent role in its vast colonial estates because of the flexible framework for evolution supplied by the British Commonwealth. This illusion proved to be based upon false inferences deduced from the older constellation of self-governing dominions, which had remained closely bound in imperial security relationship with London (29).

Young also points out that within Nigeria, Britain's influence declined precipitously as well. Though the British exerted some influence after decolonization, it paled in comparison to the colonial era:

> In Nigeria, Great Britain initially had a defense agreement; however, this was annulled in 1962 due to Nigerian nationalist pressure. In a number of cases, national armies remained under British command for a few years after independence; in 1964, the British commander of the Nigerian army refused the solicitation of some Nigerian leaders to intervene after scandal-ridden national elections brought the country to the brink of disintegration. Security assistance and economic aid in modest quantities continue, and in a few cases—most notably Kenya—influence remains significant (30).

If British influence and resources steadily declined over time, should we then expect a rise in religious considerations in the Yorùbá political arena today? Laitin argues Nigeria's founding fathers did play a pivotal role in preserving local hegemonic cleavages as decolonization ended. The Nigerian founding fathers, like the British, wanted to curtail religious hostilities from seeping into the Nigerian political arena. According to Laitin, "Awolowo [acclaimed Yorùbá nationalist] wrote that he was shocked by the massive killings associated with the [Indian] partition, and believed that religious warfare should be avoided in Nigeria at all costs" (148). We also learn Awolowo heavily subsidized pilgrimages to Mecca for Yorùbá Muslims with the intention of preempting Muslim revitalization and forming key coalitions.

Can the persistence of the non-politicization of religion and the containment of ethno-religious conflict be attributable to charismatic, strategic Yorùbá politicians alone? By Laitin's own admission, the answer is no. Instead, Laitin points to the creation of a common sense among the Yorùbá (159). According to Laitin, for the Yorùbá "ancestral city represents 'blood' while religion represent 'choice' is so deeply embedded into commonsense thinking that experience and empirical data demonstrating otherwise fail to disabuse Yorùbá people of this 'truth'" (158). Moreover, Laitin contends, "In the case of Yorùbáland, the model of hegemonic control gives a plausible explanation of the way primordial identities become forged politically, and how, once forged, these identities become commonsensically real" (159-160). For Laitin, if the Yorùbás did not derive material benefits from their city-state identities, this pervasive "common sense" best explains why the non-politicization of religion endures.

Hegemony and Culture Today

Laitin's work warrants further study today because nearly thirty years have passed since his initial field work. During this time, Nigeria's political, social, and religious landscape has changed significantly. In the last twenty-five years Nigeria has witnessed a succession of ineffective, patron-client, "Big Men" leadership (Achebe 1984; L. J. Diamond and Plattner 1994; Reno 1999). When Laitin studied in Nigeria, the country was transiting from a prolonged period of military rule to democracy. Optimism ran high as Shehu Shagari assumed the presidency in 1979. This initial optimism quickly faded as the Shagari administration, besieged with corruption allegations, was finally deposed in a military coup d' etat in 1983.

Malfeasance, political instability, and economic decline, all symptoms of ineffective leadership, continue to plague successive military and civilian regimes. In 1980, when Laitin

conducted his field work, the value of the Nigerian Naira, Nigeria's national currency, was 0.55 naira to one American dollar. Nearly thirty years later, the Naira only garners 157 naira for one dollar—only a fraction of its former strength. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) now ranks Nigeria amongst the lowest on its human development indicators, only slightly ahead of Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, Nigeria continues to lag behind South Africa and other lower income countries.

These statistics are surprising considering Nigeria's position as a major oil producer. Though Nigeria is resource rich, ninety percent of Nigeria's gross domestic product is linked with the petroleum industry, the overall economy continues to stagnate (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako 2007). This heavy reliance on petroleum revenue hinders overall economic development (Auty 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004; Ross 1999; Sachs and Warner 1997, 1999). Even worse, much of the petroleum revenue does not reach the government's coffers. Corruption scandals continue to besiege local and federal governments. Most recently, *ThisDay*, reported that corruption had reached all new highs. The Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, claims that corruption and mismanagement swallow about 40 percent of Nigeria's $20 billion annual oil income.

The changing nature of Yorùbá city-state identity

Laitin's hegemonic theory is not without its critics. Apter (1983) challenges Laitin's characterization of ancestral city identity as the quintessential frame to examine Yorùbáland politics. Though voters in Ibadan and Ife aligned largely along city state during the 1983 elections, voters in Ondo State, and the subsequent explosion of electoral violence that followed,

did not. Galvanized by blatant vote rigging, supporters of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) began rioting and took up arms against members of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the party of incumbent president Shargari. Apter recounts as he watched UPN supporters take to the streets and destroyed property in response to a brazen mischarge of democratic ideals. Perpetrators of violence did come from one subgroup as Laitin may have predicted. On the contrary, the NPN party base, Apter observes, cut across socio-economic strata, religion and class. Apter explains, "it was precisely the cleavage of partisan politics which transcended all others, turning friends, neighbours, and kinsmen against each other." (502). At least in Ondo state, Laitin's theory did not hold.

Perhaps, the biggest challenge to the Laitin's theory is the recent onslaught against Yorùbá kings, physical representatives of city states themselves in Yorùbáland. The institutional hegemony that Laitin points to as being the underpinning of the unusual, Yorùbá tolerance is eroding. In last ten years, at least six different Yorùbá traditional kings in Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, and Osun states came under assault from their constituencies and were removed from their thrones (D. Ojo 2009; Olajide 2003). In nearly each instance, the monarch's palace was burned down; and the chief perpetrators of these attacks were youths in their communities who were indignant about perceived injustices from their Obas (kings). Indeed, city-state identity remains strong, but the stewards of the identity are only vestiges of what they once were. They experienced a notable decline since the mid-1980s (Nolte 2002). This is not to say that kings no longer demand respect, but the ability of hegemonic institutions and city state identities alone to arrest ethno-religious conflict and politicization of religion is questionable. There must be another mechanism upholding the peace. Here, I point to the existence of peace entrepreneurs, key strategic leaders and elders from various backgrounds, and even kings, who work to maintain a "culture of peace"

and justice in Yorùbáland. Peace entrepreneurs utilize not only their power and position but access myth, legend, and history to add to their legitimacy and cultivate peace. The model of Obàtálá, the chief Orisha, for some, stands as an enduring example of peace entrepreneurship in the midst of trying circumstances. Orishas are absent from his analysis, as we shall see, a serious deficiency.

Pilot Study

Do Yorùbás still identify first with their ancestral cities before their respective faiths within the Nigerian political arena? Has the tide reversed? Are the institutions which moderated religious extremism beginning to dissipate? These were some of the guiding questions motiving my first pilot study in Ile Ife, Nigeria in August 2007. Then, I sought to explore the non-politicization of religious difference in Yorùbáland—revisiting the work of David Laitin in *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Religious Change among the Yorùbá.* The major impetus of the project was to retest Laitin's findings and see if they still held nearly thirty years after his first research findings.

As I previously discussed in Chapter one, Laitin was preoccupied with why religion, by his estimations, was never politicalized, among the Yorùbá. He concluded that the British were instrumental in fortifying indigenous, Yorùbá institutions namely kingships and chieftaincies. These institutions were largely on the decline because of the Yorùbá civil wars in the 1800s. For the British, imbuing local, non-religious leaders with power and resources would prevent the politicization of religion and circumvent massive, religious upheavals as witnessed in the Sudan. Though religion was pervasive within Yorùbá society, the British wanted the Yorùbá to seek material benefits and power, not from their houses of worship, but from kings and chiefs in their

city-states. The British would then supply these material benefits to their proxies, Yorùbá kings and chiefs. According to Laitin, ultimately, identification with city-state identity, or one's hometown or ancestral city trumped religious identity in the political arena, eliminating an incentive for Yorùbá elites to use political language and rhetoric.

My first study survey results revealed two notable findings: a) many respondents now considered religion when casting their ballots and b) Pentecostal congregants are just as likely to consider religion when voting as compared to their mainstream counterparts. The second finding was notable because I thought Pentecostal respondents would diverge from their mainline Christian and Muslim counterparts given that Pentecostalism was a recent addition to the Yorùbá religious landscape. The findings, though interesting, were far from conclusive. Nearly forty percent of the Yorùbás surveyed considered religious affiliations when casting their vote. It was difficult, however, to gauge if Laitin's work was truly eroding. Most respondents were surveyed in their houses of worship and not in their homes. We now know that a person can possess multiple identities at one time. For example, a person can be a student, mother, sister, teacher, African, women, etc. Depending on the context, one identity may be more salient than the others. When a person is teaching, for example, their occupation may be more significant in that moment than their gender, class or any other identity. Respondents may have been primed unintentionally to answer in religious terms. There is no way of knowing for sure.

After my fieldwork in 2007, I understood that I needed to go back to Nigeria and explore not only the non-politicization of religion, Laitin's main thesis, but explore the nature of religious cleavages in Yorùbáland in the first place. The second section of this chapter Going beyond Laitin discusses my subsequent field research to Nigeria. If a 'Pax Yorùbá' did exist, as Laitin claims, how was it maintained and by what actors? Were chiefs and kings centrally

involved and instrumental in keeping the peace? How about religious actors? As I will discuss in the next chapter, I found:

- Peace entrepreneurs, influential leaders in society, were instrumental in keeping the peace.
- These leaders surprisingly were not historical products of colonial hegemonic interference and manipulation as Laitin suggests.
- Religious leaders are also paramount in keeping the peace and consequently, restraining the politicization of religion.

Religion, as we will see in the next chapter, does become contentious periodically, but it rarely becomes violent. Particularly in comparison to the high death tolls in the Middle Belt and Northern Regions, where the rise of Boko Haram and other terrorist organizations continues to pervade the northern regions. The endurance of the unusual tolerance displayed among the Yorùbá has less to do with British hegemonic influence, and more to do with elites actively committed to minimizing the outbreak of religious hostilities–cultural norms already pervasive throughout Yorùbáland. Peace entrepreneurs are the proverbial gatekeepers, making sure religious conflict is largely contained and dealt with immediately before tensions and conflict billow over and become entrenched.

Laitin Revisited

Methodology: Establishing contacts and building trust

When David Laitin began his research in 1980, he employed two different research approaches[13]. First, Laitin embedded himself in two different congregations in Ile Ife, Nigeria: one mosque, the Central Mosque of Ile Ife, and one Christian church, St. Paul's Anglican Church[14]. While attending for several weeks, he wrote thick descriptions of his experiences and detailed accounts of how congregants dressed, their initial reactions to him, and exchanges between him and elites. These accounts are vividly discussed throughout the book. He used this time to cultivate trust amongst congregants and religious leaders. Overtime, these daily interactions bloomed into relationships which allowed Laitin key insights into Yorùbá culture and beliefs.

Laitin later "cultivated" two senior members in both congregations and asked them to escort him to homes when conducting interviews. These men did not receive compensation for their assistance; he opted to give small gifts instead. Laitin ultimately delegated the responsibility of choosing respondents to escorts and they were instrumental in explaining the purpose of the study to all respondents. They were then charged to find well-respected senior males in their respective congregations and escort Laitin into these respondents' home. Ultimately, Laitin conducted interviews with thirty-five Anglicans and thirty-five Muslims in total.

[13] Though the book was published in 1986, his field took place in 1980.
[14] According to Laitin, he chose to embed himself within an Anglican church because "it is most closely identified with the British colonial experience. More than any other Christian denomination, the Anglicans defined Christianity in Yorùbáland" (193).

When I arrived in Ife in 2007, I established and built trust among elites and members quickly before interviewing potential respondents. I hoped to hire a research assistant at Obafemi Awolowo University, the major federal university in Ife, but my father, both a Nigerian and a Yorùbá, decided to accompany me instead. Before we made contacts with church and mosque officials, I educated him on the research aims of the project and trained him on how to conduct interviews. As we entered the Anglican Church and the Central Mosque, my father would introduce us and explain the purpose of our visit. He would say, "An American professor came to Ife about twenty five years ago to conduct research and my daughter is here to follow up his findings." I thought my father was helpful because: 1) he had a full mastery of the Yorùbá language and cultural norms. For example, at the central mosque, my father gave the assistant iman's mother 1,000 naira (around 10 dollars) because she was in her late seventies and a widow. This action did much to deepen our relationships with the iman and other elders in the mosque where the elderly are well respected, 2) his presence also established me as an insider–a Yorùbá who happened to be educated and born aboard.

My father and I were well received at each research site we entered. Leaders were eager to assistance us in any way possible. Though I did not have the luxury of spending one year in Ife, I was able to establish great relationships with all elites at the respective sites. After leaders were identified, relationships formed and survey pretesting conducted, we left thirty-six surveys at each research site with strict instructions that all surveys be given to well-respected Yorùbá congregation members. Since we wanted to canvas five sites with thirty six respondents each, we thought, at the time, leaving surveys for elites to distribute was the most efficient method. Officials were glad to cultivate respected members on our behalf and administer the survey as well. Ultimately, one hundred and thirty-three respondents answered questionnaires.

Survey and Question rationale

Once the research sites were established, survey questions were drafted and respondents were asked about their ancestral city and religious attachments. Below is a sampling of those questions:

- ***Question 1: Each person has several ways of identifying him/herself: nationality, religion, ethnic group, gender, personality, point of view. For you, what identity is most important?***
- ***Question 2: Which identity would you place second?***
- ***Question 3: Who would you prefer to vote: a person from your ancestral city; a person from your religion; doesn't matter; and none given?***

Questions one and two hoped to gauge the relative importance of religion amongst respondents. I expected respondents to identify in largely religious and ethnic terms. Question three, explicitly and directly, asked respondents about their voter preferences. Essentially, this question pits Laitin's hegemony hypothesis against my own. If my hypothesis, the politicization of religion amongst the Yorùbá is correct, then we would expect to see respondents relying on religious considerations when casting their votes. If Laitin's hypothesis still holds, we would expect "a person of your ancestral city" and "doesn't matter" to be the most popular answers chosen.[15]

Though Laitin's original surveys were consulted, many of the questions were dated and removed from the final survey. For example, Laitin included a question referring to a disagreement between former president Shagari and Governor Jakande in the early 1980s. The question said, "There has recently been a conflict between Governor Jakande of Lagos and President Shagari concerning free education. Shagari told Jakande that if Lagos state has free

[15] In hindsight, the question should make distinctions between electoral level, e.g. local, state-level, or national. Parsing out the levels could be fruitful and potentially yield interesting findings.

education, then all children living in Lagos must get free education. Jakande answered that only children from states which have free education should be able to get free education in Lagos. Suppose the argument went to the courts and you were the lawyer for Jakande, what is the main point you would make to the judge". No similar comparison could be drawn today, so the question was removed completely.

Ultimately, Laitin's inferences about the relative salience of ancestral city and religious identities were based on his impressions and interviews, not on any systematic effort at collecting survey data. The question above is representative of the questions he asked respondents. These types of questions do little to clearly ask respondents about their thoughts on the intersections of politics, religion, and city-state identity. My questions explicitly asked respondents about their identities and political preferences, while Laitin's questions inferred the respondents' preferences from his extensive ethnographic work.

Results

The survey results appeared initially to overturn Laitin's findings about the non-politicization of religion within Yorùbáland. When respondents in St. Paul's Anglican Church were asked "Who would you prefer to vote for?: a person from your ancestral city; a person from your religion; doesn't matter, and none given?", forty-one percent of respondents indicated "a person from your religion". Twenty-eight percent said "doesn't matter" (see table 1). Only nineteen percent chose "a person from your ancestral city". A similar result appeared in the Central Mosque. Nearly half, or forty eight percent, of congregants indicated religion as their primary preference. The choices of "doesn't matter" and "a person from your ancestral city"

only garnered thirty-nine percent of respondents. These results are surprising in light of Laitin's original research findings. One would expect "a person from your ancestral city" or "doesn't matter" to be the most popular answers given Laitin's assertion that religion rarely factored into the political calculus of Yorùbás. Nearly half of respondents from both sites answered religion does matter. These results demonstrate a marked shift from Laitin's nonpoliticalization of religion finding.

For questions one and two, respondents were asked to rank their primary identities. Religion overwhelmingly was the number one and number two answers given. This result is not surprising given the importance of religion in Yorùbá society (Olupona 1991; Benjamin 1993). In light of these results, is the non-politicization of religion only occurring within mainstream churches like those originally studied by Laitin? Are Pentecostals just as likely to invoke religious considerations when casting their ballots?

Pentecostalism and City State Identity

Table 1: Research Sites

<table>
<tr><th>MUSLIM</th><th colspan="4">CHRISTIAN</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Central Mosque</td><td>Traditional</td><td colspan="3">Pentecostal</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">St. Paul's Anglican</td><td>Indigenous Pentecostalism
Aladura</td><td>New Pentecostalism
"Wealth and Health"</td><td>Western/Classic Pentecostalism</td></tr>
<tr><td>Christ Apostolic Church (CAC)</td><td>Winners' Chapel</td><td>Foursquare</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Laitin's original survey</td><td colspan="3">Additions to the survey</td></tr>
</table>

As discussed previously, the rise of Pentecostalism represents one fundamental change within Nigeria since Laitin's field work. Though tempting to discuss Pentecostalism as one cohesive unit, Pentecostalism in Nigeria is far from a monolith; great diversity exists throughout these charismatic movements. After surveying the religious landscape of Ile Ife and speaking with many scholars in the field, I decided to expand the study to three additional sites: Winners' Chapel, Christ Apostolic church, and the Foursquare church (see table 1). Each of these churches can be placed in three distinct categories as you may recall from Chapter one. Though there are marked differences among the Pentecostal churches, the differences between Laitin's research sites and the Pentecostal churches are more pronounced. The original research sites are traditional and mainstream in their beliefs (first two left columns in table 2), while the Pentecostal churches rose from newer religious movements.

Methodology and Results

The research methodologies employed at the first two sites, St. Paul's Anglican Church and Ile Ife Central Mosque, were identical to the methodology employed at the three additional, Pentecostal research sites. Across all five sites, contacts and relationships were cultivated immediately with elites upon arrival in Ile Ife, Nigeria. We left surveys with the strict instructions to distribute surveys among well respected, Yorùbá members of the congregation. Overall, Pentecostal respondents considered religion, albeit slightly, less than their non-Pentecostal counterparts when voting (table 3). When asked, "Who would you prefer to vote for: a person from your ancestral city; a person you're your religion; and doesn't matter.", Pentecostals were largely split along choices: "doesn't matter" (42 percent) and "a person from

your religion" (37 percent). This is in contrast with non-Pentecostal sites, where "a person from your religion" was chosen by 44 percent of respondents. Only 27 percent of the sample chose "doesn't matter". This is one of the most interesting findings of the study, because one would expect that Pentecostals overwhelming would support Christian politicians because religious values are comparable to their own.

When respondents were asked to order their primary and secondary identities forty-five percent chose religion across all sites (see Appendix: Tables 3, 4, and 5),. These results are not surprising. As previously mentioned, the Yorùbás are an intensely religious ethnic group; therefore, strong religious primary and secondary identifications are expected. Moreover, since respondents were surveyed as members of their houses of worship, this may explain why they identified in largely religious terms. Across all sites (See Appendix: Table 2) religion is a serious consideration for Yorùbás today as compared to twenty-five years ago. Forty percent of respondents across all sites would consider religion when casting their votes. When the Christian and Muslim sites are compared, the likelihood that respondents would vote for a person of their ancestral city is roughly fifteen and thirteen percent—respectively. Christians and Muslims diverge in their preferences to vote for someone from their religion by ten percentage points. Nearly half of all Muslim respondents prefer to vote for someone of their own faith, while thirty eight percent of Christians would do the same.

Going Beyond Laitin

Overcoming Shortcomings in the Pilot

This pilot study was the first step in trying to understand the changing dynamics of the Yorùbá political and social arena. In reviewing this study, I realized certain methodological shortcomings should be reexamined and addressed. For example, when site elites distributed surveys, they may have introduced bias within the study. It is plausible elites distributed surveys solely within their own social networks—congregants like themselves who identified strongly with religion. This inadvertently may have excluded possible respondents with strong attachments with their ancestral cities. Elite survey distribution, though unintentional, may have swamped the results in favor of my finding. Moreover, since the surveys were distributed within houses of worship, respondents may have been primed to respond in "religious" terms, though their ancestral city attachments may be equally as strong. If respondents feared verbal reprisals from church and mosque elites for not identifying strongly with religion, this may have undermined the survey results as well. Ultimately, there was no way of knowing for sure until retesting was done. In 2010, I returned to Nigeria.

Second Study

While conducting field research in 2010, I was motivated by three new guiding questions: does a *Pax Yorùbá*, an unusual ethno-religious peace exist within Yorùbáland? If a Pax Yorùbá does not exist, what constrains prolonged, episodic instances of conflict from erupting

continually as compared to the Northern and Middle Belt regions? If and when these incidents do occur, why do they remain localized? Are Yorùbá hegemonic institutions moderating conflict as Laitin suggests? From my research, interviews, and ethnographic observations, I found there is no "Pax Yorùbá" per say, but there is a consistent intervention of peace entrepreneurs at all levels—both formal and informal. Peace entrepreneurs, namely local leaders, intervene to ameliorate potentially inflammatory situations and seek resolutions between aggrieved parties. These peace entrepreneurs can be placed into two distinct categories: formal or informal. Formal peace entrepreneurs come into existence either after a conflict has occurred or they try to maintain peace as part of their position. Informal peace entrepreneurs, however, are leaders, citizens, or a person of prominent position whose expressed responsibilities do not necessarily entail peace keeping but, if and when a situation arises, their quick interventions minimize conflict. These informal peace entrepreneurs willingly try to intervene to arrest conflict before escalation. When insistences of small scale conflict do arise, for example, disagreements about whether ceremonies of one group should take place or apparent inflammatory rhetoric is said by one group against the other, peace entrepreneurs are keepers of the peace. In truth, most Yorùbá conflicts that I discovered were generally resolved without becoming protracted conflicts. Conflicts were often dealt with swiftly before escalating.

Most of my respondents insisted that religious conflict among the Yorùbá was rare. Nearly all my respondents mentioned the high rate of intermarriage among religions in Yorubland as a key reason constraining ethno-religious conflict. Though no official statistics are available regarding religion in Nigeria; intermarriage is generally quite high. From what I observed while in the field, there are still large numbers of Christian-Muslim-Orisha worshipper households within a given Yorùbá family. Familial structures and ties are still strong and serve

as an anchor to arrest ethno-religious conflict. Colonial educational legacies in the South were another reason given by several respondents. Southern Muslims raised in the southwest were direct byproducts of a strong missionary influence especially in education. Western education not only allowed Muslim students to intermix with their Christian counterparts, but they were also able learn how to read and write.

Demographics of Sample Respondents

Total Respondents

Interviewed, N=50

Age	**%**
18-30	16%
31-40	11%
41-50	26%
51-60	21%
61+	26%

Gender	**%**
Male	100%

Religion	**%**
Christian	14%
Muslim	62%
Orisha Worshippers	19%
Other	5%

Methods

Like Laitin, I found it extremely beneficial to speak with and interview elites—i.e. political, religious, economic, and traditional leaders. If there were any religious reversals in Yorùbáland, leaders would have intimate knowledge of these realities within their own towns

and congregations. How did I come to this conclusion? First, while in the field, I observed that within Yorùbáland, hierarchy, leadership, and position are paramount features of the society. Though I knew this going into the field, titles like "Chief", "King", "Dr.", "Councilor", "Big Women", and "Big Man" held a great deal of power and salience everywhere I went. A "Big Man" or "Big Woman" was a person of tremendous political, financial, and social capital. When I was at Lagos State University, students and classmates would say to me, "we like you Bunmi [my Yorùbá name], you're a big woman, but you don't act like it".

I was unaware that I was a 'big woman' and engaged my Nigerian professors and counterparts as equals. I was at Lagos State University as both a Yorùbá language student and researcher with support of the Boren Fellowship for International Study to conduct research and reach fluency in the Yorùbá language. Though my Yorùbá comprehension was excellent, my thick American accent, in English and Yorùbá, was evident to all. I recall several spirited discussions in the office of the HOD (the Head of the Department) of African Languages and Literatures while at Lagos State. His door was always open and he was constantly receiving guests and students. He even conducted some classes in his office, which was a delight to both his students because his office had air conditioning when the erratic power grid was working. The topics of discussion varied, but they typically revolved around Nigerian politics, development and conflict. Perhaps, in the eyes of the other, Nigerian Yorùbá language students, I was an American "big" woman, a person of influence, affluence, and political access, but in truth, I simply wanted to do my best to fit in within my Yorùbá courses I was taking and learn more about 'Pax Yorùbá'. Acting like a 'big woman" would defeat that purpose. Nevertheless, I learned being a person of influence, in a leadership role was important in Yorùbáland and this is why I chose to interview elites.

Choosing Sites

While in the field, I spoke with fifty elites and informants, including pastors, emirs, university professors, traditional priests/babalowos, traditional rulers, and activists in four Yorùbá cities: Abeokuta, Ibadan, Lagos, and Iseyin. I chose each of the sites because of their historical significance. First, Ile Ife is considered the historical cradle of Yorùbá civilization. Where Odùduwà, the primogenitor of the Yorùbá people first settled, and reigned as the Ooni of Ife, or paramount ruler, of all of Yorùbáland. Abeokuta is not only the capital of Ogun State, but played a prominent role as a haven for the Egbe people during the Yorùbáland civil wars before British colonization. Former President Obasanjo and presumptive winner of the 1993 elections, Chief M.K.O. Abiola were natives of the city. Abeokuta was also one of the entrance points of Christianity within Yorùbáland and Lagos. Lagos State, former federal capital of Nigeria, remains one of the most important cities in Nigeria because of its population and commercial strength. Ibadan is home to the premier university in Nigeria, the University of Ibadan, and rose to power after the end of the Yorùbá civil wars in the late nineteenth century. Special attention is paid to Iseyin, a town one hundred kilometers north of Ibadan. Known for the production of aso-oke, a hand-woven cloth, the town has dealt with ethno-religious tensions in multiple dimensions: between Muslim fundamentalists, Orisha worshippers, and mainline Christian and Islamic groups during the annual Oro festival, for example. Here both religious and traditional leaders continue to actively engage ethno-religious conflict head on and have created a peace council called MUCHAS, Muslim-Christian Association, in Iseyin.

Vox Populi

Since I was embedded within Lagos State University (LASU), I also had the opportunity to speak to students informally about their daily frustrations, the University's lecturers who went on strike while I was there, their thoughts on religion, and even observed the interactions between Christians, Muslims, and traditionalists. Lagos State University is located in Lagos State in a city called Ojo. The city is also famous for the Alaba market—the largest electronics market in Africa. Though I spoke with elites for eight months, I also had the opportunity to observe and interact with these Yorùbá language students. The majority of these students were ethnically Yorùbá, but studied the cultural and linguistic underpinnings of the Yorùbá language, comparable to an English major in the United States.

Once the holy month of Ramadan began, everyday religious interactions and the norm of religious tolerance became more apparent. It was interesting to observe how the Islamic holy month of Ramadan was perceived by Muslim and Christian students. During this month, from sunrise to sunset, Muslims observing the fast are not allowed to drink any water or eat any food during the fast. Though the weather remained cool in August and September, I could see that the fast took a toll on those observing the fast. Before the fast, I was largely unaware of the religious backgrounds of my classmates, but during the fast, my Muslim, female classmates would cover their heads. I rarely saw women wearing the hijab—Islamic head coverings. I knew Ramadan had begun because the gateman at the house in which I was staying was observing the fast as well. For me, the thought that struck me the most was how religion was a non-issue though a mosque and church were on campus. I remember a student trying to raise money for an on-campus Christian group, and Christians and Muslims alike were approached. There was, as my

respondents would repeatedly say, a "love" between the Yorùbá students–a love perhaps, but certainly a deeply ingrained religious tolerance that showed no signs of abating or reversing. It appeared, at least, among these Lagos State students, religion was not contentious and the possibility of conflict was minimal.

Interview Format

The interview format while interviewing elites was a detailed, in-depth interviews lasting from 30 minutes to an hour and a half. These interviews were conducted in both Yorùbá and English. Though my Yorùbá spoken proficiency is at an intermediate-mid level, there were instances were my Yorùbá tutor and research assistant, Wale, would conduct interviews on my behalf with my interview schedule and questionnaire in hand. For many of the interviews, I was sitting beside him interjecting in English when necessary for greater clarification because I could follow the conversation and interview in Yorùbá. He was chosen for a myriad of reasons. First, my faculty sponsor at Lagos State suggested Wale because of his superior Yorùbá language skills and his academic achievements. He was an undergraduate student at the Lagos State University and on scholarship there to study Yorùbá. During my duration in the field, he served as my Yorùbá tutor, translator, and research assistant. Wale was invaluable for several reasons. First, he was familiar with cultural norms within Yorùbáland. He would advise me on the type of gifts to give to respondents. For example, it was customary to give Schnapps and kola nuts to kings and chiefs as gifts and newly printed bills to older respondents. Gifts were a non-negotiable part of the interview process because it was tied to expressing respect. I even had one older respondent sing about wanting a 'gift' before one of my interviews. It was humorous at the

time, but I had his 1,000 naira of nearly minted bills in hand. These were societal norms I had to abide by. Wale also helped me navigate the potential societal pitfalls that would have befallen an unsuspecting American conducting research in Yorùbáland. The presence of Wale during the interview process gave more gravitas to my findings and made respondents more comfortable discussing ethno-religious issues with me.

Finding respondents and setting up interviews

I used my social networks in Nigeria to secure interviews with prominent Yorùbá religious and political elites. My first Yorùbá teacher at the University of California, Los Angeles worked at the progressive, Nigerian newspaper*, Next,* in Lagos. She introduced me, in passing, to one of her friends who was a reporter. He then connected me to another reporter who worked at *The Economist.* She was stationed in Lagos at the time, and was well connected to many prominent Lagos elites. These acquaintances were instrumental in securing one of my respondents—a prominent Pentecostal preacher who was vocal about his criticism of the current Nigerian presidency. This preacher would later go on to run for the Nigerian vice presidency in 2011, but I was able to speak with him before his candidacy. Though based in Lagos, he was a native of Abeokuta, one of the cities I was interested in focusing upon. I probably would not have received that connection if not for my reporter friends.

This Pentecostal preacher also had a second-in-command that made it his personal mission to help me connect with any other prominent Yorùbá elites I needed. I first went to his office in Lagos and the preacher immediately teased me about my American accent. I was frequently teased about being 'American' while in Nigeria; the teasing was benign, warm and

rarely ever hostile. This preacher said at the beginning of our interview, even before speaking about the project, "you think like an American, you eat like an American, and you talk like an American, but you look like us". An astute observation since I neither discussed food nor my own personal, intellectual ideologies. That day, coincidently, I was wearing a traditional, Yorùbá shirt and blouse in adire cloth, a distinct cloth from Abeokuta, the hometown of the preacher. I usually wore traditional dress nearly every day, so I could blend in and I was fairly successful at that endeavor until I spoke. I wore traditional dress even more so than my fellow Yorùbá students at LASU, who only wore traditional dress on Fridays and on days when they were making presentations in class. My motivation every day was to assimilate into Nigerian society as best as I could, so that respondents would feel comfortable speaking with me, despite my American upbringing.

The preacher lived in the United States for several years, and made frequent speaking trips to the Nigerian-American diaspora communities in the States. The preacher and his second-in-command later applauded me for coming back to Nigeria and doing research there. They also said they were committed in helping me in any way they could. How I received favor in their eyes, I am still unsure, but this second-in-command invited me to the fifth anniversary celebration at the Alake's palace, the paramount Yorùbá king and ruler of Abeokuta a few weeks later. Here titles were given to new kings and chiefs and because of the assistant preacher's prominent position, Wale and I sat inches away from the king. The anniversary was lavish with newly crowned chiefs also hosting speculator after parties. Everywhere on the palace's grounds were beautifully decorated tents and tables. There were also singers and drummers singing praise songs to guests as they arrived in expensive European SUVs, wanting a sizable tip for their celebratory songs. The second-in-command personally knew a chief who was being initiated—a

medical doctor who resided in the States who came home specifically for the ceremony. The ceremony, without doubt, was a visible, modern display of the importance of celebration and kingship among the Yorùbá.

In truth, I was not there for the celebration, but to make an appointment to interview the king. I wrote him a letter explaining the purpose of my research and my reasons for wanting to interview him. I frequently found that a letter or official endorsement was always needed to speak with officials or elites. I tried to have a letter ready, if and when the occasion arose. The second-in-command included a few thousand naira, about thirty five US dollars, in the envelope as well and handed it to the personal assistant to the king. One hundred naira could buy a large loaf of bread. So a couple of thousands of naira was a lot of money. The second-in-command was a 'Big Man', and very wealthy, but I still appreciated the gesture. Whether the money would reach the king, I was not sure, but it would certainly expedite my request, as I found money always did.

Unfortunately, though we made an appointment to come visit the king, his travel schedule took him elsewhere. Though slightly disappointed, I was able to interview another prominent king in Abeokuta that day–the second in line to the Abeokuta throne. I learned while living in Nigeria, flexibility is not a virtue, but a necessity. This king was a learned man, a lawyer, and well-versed in Abeokuta history. When he found out my mother was an Abeokuta native, he made sure that I was able to sing the Egba[16] anthem.

[16] The Egba are a Yorùbá sub-ethnic group native to Abeokuta

In Iseyin, my connections and interviews were established with the combination of help from Wale and my UCLA Yorùbá professor. I mentioned to my professor the possibility of doing work in Iseyin, and she said she just returned from there and connected me to a good friend of hers. As a native of the town, my teacher's friend was invaluable for a myriad of reasons. First, he was connected to the town since birth and he had strong connections to the Iseyin palace. I was able to interview the king of Iseyin because of this connection. He also knew every major religious, political, and traditional leader in Iseyin because he was a teacher and reporter there. His presence and endorsement helped open doors that would have remained closed to me otherwise. Wale was also from Iseyin, so his knowledge of the town was instrumental. He knew every portion of the township, and introduced himself as a native son, which was also helpful with interviews.

In Ibadan, Wale and I split up. I interviewed key actors in the Ramadan incident, when a Christian student burst into the on-campus University of Ibadan mosque during the height of prayers, and Wale went into town and interviewed the key actors regarding the conflict between Izalat and Quadriyyah, when a visiting Northern cleric incited conflict between the two groups. Wale is a Muslim and later he would tell me that respondents were comfortable speaking with him because he was able to pray and sported a beard. For the members of Izalat, this beard signified his true Islamic devotion–another happy coincidence and fortunate for my work. At the University of Ibadan, I spoke to professors in different departments, getting both their academic and personal input on the incident. Some gave me suggested book titles and even lent me their books, so I could make copies of chapters. I tried to contact the publishers, but securing copies for my own library proved difficult. Several volumes were out of print and no longer accessible

to the general public. I also spoke to the imam and professor who lead prayers during the Ramadan student disruption. His quick thinking helped avert a full blown crisis on campus.

Chapter 4

Results and Findings

Conflicts in Yorùbáland and peace entrepreneurs

Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs are crucial in keeping ethno-religious peace and justice in Nigeria. These elites play a key role in quelling potential problems and episodes of conflict. As we discover in the snapshots of Yorùbá conflict below, peace entrepreneurs are constantly working to find peaceful settlements when religious conflict emerges. I also examine the efforts of MUCHAS, a formal peace entrepreneur group and their attempts to fortify peace in Iseyin, Nigeria. The stories below are illustrative of conflict resolution within Iseyin and Ibadan—two of the Yorùbá cities highlighted in the study. Contemporary Nigerian, ethno-religious conflicts are usually presented along the Christian/Muslim binary, rarely are other pairings explored extensively. Yorùbá Christians, Muslims, Orisha worshippers, Oloro, indigenous Yorùbá religion practitioners, were not without conflict in the last year, far from a *Pax Yorùbá*. Even Islamic Sufi brotherhoods, Quadriyya and the Tijaniyya, were at odds with the anti-Sufi group, Izalat. Below I explore the dynamics of these fissures and the role peace entrepreneurs played in arresting the escalation of conflict, and the tools they use to maintain a "culture of peace" and equitable justice.

The Oro Festival and Iseyin: Islam, Christianity and Oro Worshippers

Iseyin is a small township located about one hundred thirty six miles north of Lagos, and around fifty miles north of Ibadan in Yorùbáland, and the site of conflicts between the Islamic, Christian and Oro worshipper communities. This bucolic town is famous for the production of aso-oke, a hand-woven cloth, created on large looms located throughout the town. Iseyin is also well-known for its observance of the Oro festival, the cause of episodic religious tensions in the town for the last sixty years. Though not unique to Iseyin alone, the Oro festival is celebrated in other Yorùbá cities annually venerating one of the many Orisha, or deities, within the Yorùbá religion–Oro. In brief, Oro is the God of Vengeance within the Yorùbá religious pantheon. Said to prowl sacred-area groves at night, women are not allowed to behold Oro and his devotees, but men are allowed to do so. Batty (1890) describes the Oro festival and Oro's appearances in vivid detail:

> Oro generally puts in an appearance somewhere or another almost every night, and it is so uncertain when and where he may show himself that it is wise for every female who values her life, to keep at home between the hours of 7 p.m. and 5 a.m., as any woman getting a sight of, or finding out the secret of, Oro, must certainly be given over to him. If a man were to reveal the secret to any woman, and it became known to the authorities, both the man and woman would be given up and put to death without mercy; no bribe could alter the sentence (160).

Referred to by the British as a bullroarer, a wooden instrument on a long string, the 'voice of Oro' signals the start of the Oro festival. This instrument when swung around creates a high pitched sound heard for miles.

Today, the festival–with its exclusion of women–is increasingly becoming contentious in communities where Orisha worship is no longer the dominant religious system. When the Oro

festival coincides with worship days, this division becomes even more pronounced. In Ikorodu, Lagos State, residents have recently decried the existence of the festival. Locals fiercely oppose the festival with some saying, "It is so sad that in spite of the level of civilization globally, we, in Nigeria, still condone some archaic and barbaric tradition that ought to be extinct" ("Stop Oro Festival, Ikorodu Residents Cry" 2011). Others question the constitutionality of the Oro festival in Nigeria's religiously pluralist society. Some feel the festival infringes on their personal rights and indelible freedoms, "The constitution should supersede every tradition or religious activity of any town." The continuation of the Oro festival does present interesting questions for a society where some still embrace their deeply seeded historical, religious heritage, while others adopt new forms of religious ideologies and worship. Even in the environment of religious evolution, where multiple belief systems are held at the same time, where is the line of demarcation between traditional religious freedom and infringement on others? How does an Oro festival fit within Nigeria's fledgling democracy? How should other practitioners react? How do you resolve these problems when they presented themselves? Leaders in Iseyin grapple with all these questions as well.

Similar tensions exist between Yorùbá traditionalists and their Muslim and Christian counterparts in Iseyin because of the restrictions placed on the community during Oro festival or 'Oro days'. For example, the Iseyin Oro festival mandates women are not allowed to leave their homes during the festival–Christians confronted Oro devotees historically, but these issues reached their zenith during the 1950s and 1960s. Recently, an outcry against the festival emerged from the Muslim community and the matter was sent to the king, the Aseyin and the state courts. Consequently, the Oro festival route and days were curtailed to accommodate the entire town.

The new settlement stipulated that on the seventh and seventeenth festival day, women are not allowed to leave their homes at all, a requirement of the festival.

Conflicts arose again when the Oro festival began earlier than agreed, and Muslims felt that traditional practitioners were not adhering to the rules of the original settlement. While I was in Iseyin, I was able to speak with several respondents familiar with and intimately involved in the Oro conflict. Most striking is respondents' candor and ability to articulate the core issues of the conflict. When I asked Respondent A5[17], a prominent Muslim cleric, about the religious crisis he discussed the genesis of the clashes. Beginning first with the objections posed by the Christians, and then moving to 1995 when the town's Muslim students, the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN), began to raise objections. Respondent A5 does acknowledge the primacy of Oro to Iseyin, but also highlights what he perceives as the injustices of the "Oro days":

> I witnessed a religious crisis at Iseyin in Oyo State some years back, the difference occurred between Oro worshippers and Christians. According to the history of Iseyin, Oro cult was the only religion that existed. This Oro festival was celebrated for 8 days in every year and all the females in the town stayed at home from 6pm to 12pm but on the seventh and seventeenth day women are not allowed to come outside for the whole two days which are "Ije ati Itadougn".
>
> In 1995, Christians disagreed with them for this inhuman attitude because it was highly inimical to the society. The Christians went to the Itan area, the household of the Oro cult on the seventeenth day of the festival celebration to stop those [Oro worshippers] from denying women liberation every year. The Nigerian constitution states that every citizen has his own right. Later, when the Christians stepped down the Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria (MSSN) gathered together and asked for the human right because no religion can deny another religion's right. MSSN leader announced for their wives to come out in anytime in the day. The Oro worshippers disagreed with the MSSN act toward the announcement. In 1997 to 1998, the situation worsened than previous years because state securities, Muslim society and Oro worshippers were involved in that religious conflict. It

[17] Here, I refer to my respondents by letters and numbers to protect their privacy

> was in that particular year we went to the court and the court injunction favored us [Muslims] that the Oro cult festival should start at 6pm to 5am.

This respondent refers to the treatment of women within the Oro festival as 'inhuman' and the Muslim students sought to find women 'liberation', in many ways echoing his Ikorodu counterparts. For this particular respondent, the constitutionality of the existence of Oro festival was of chief concern. These statements highlight the proverbial clash between modernity, upholding the supremacy of the Nigerian constitution above all else, and antiquity, the Oro worshippers' need to perform their rituals and up hold the traditions of the cult.

Though there was a prescription found in the court system, as Respondent A5, describes, the tensions flared again regarding the Oro festival in 1998:

> In October 1st 1998, it was a Thursday morning when Oro worshippers and Ifa worshippers started riots in the town. They came to my house and destroyed many things because I was the leader of the Muslims, including MSSN and all the Muslim Youths in the town. But later, it had been resolved by the court of law and asked them to continue doing the Oro cult festival from 6pm to 5am the following day; otherwise the court would sanction them, though the court ordered that females should stay home throughout the seventh and seventeenth days of the festival. The conflict happened during the reign of the late Oba Ganuyu Alobalowo II and since then every religion has their own lawyer, the then, Aseyin called us together at his palace and both sides explained their opinions, and it was there we agreed to solve the occurring problems.

Here, we witness the Aseyin, the Iseyin king, acting as a peace entrepreneur. After the successive court injunctions failed, the king tried to intervene between the aggrieved parties. Most interesting is the members' recourse to the legal system to find remediation of the problem, via court injunctions. As Olaoba (2008) observes, the historical recourse to the legal system and community elders is deeply embedded within Yorùbá society. There is precedence for going to higher authorities to express grievances, and receive judicious judgments from them:

> The Yorùbá elders wherever they have facilitated the dynamics of legal engineering are forthright and forward-looking to the end of justice. They provide veritable and vibrant green light to the legal procedure and principles behind adjudication. The Yorùbá elder ensure and enhance the *modus operandi* of social justice and morality. It behooves on them to educate the youth, both male and female in the dramaturgy of legal culture. (69)

Respondent A5 contends that was not the end of the battle between the Muslims and the Oro practitioners. He goes on to state, the conflict begin again with the Oro cult masquerade "Oniko" and the refusal of the Oro worshippers to abide by the court injunction and rules established by the courts:

> Though the conflict was totally bad, the Oro worshippers put fuel in the fire. The Oro cult has a masquerade "Oniko" by the name. When the Muslim community gathered for a lecture in front of the central mosque at Market place by 12 noon. On that day, the masquerade came to scattered us there, and it was that place they started another crisis. The Oro cult festival is an every year festival at Iseyin Township but they did not agree on the Court injunction. Because if you look at the masquerade issues, he came by at 12 noon and court said they should start by 6pm in the evening. We had a change because there was no problem until this year's festival when the Oro Cult masquerade wanted to start another crisis but it settled amicably by elders of the town.

Respondent A5 did not mask his disdain for Oro worshippers actions and the tools, mechanisms, and actors they employed; in his estimations, the Oro worshippers incited conflict in the town, "The Oro Worshippers always employ hooligans by giving them food and drinks. Once they're satisfied, they can do whatever paganists asked them to do, like carrying cutlasses, charms and so on to terrorize people the town particularly Muslims". This emotionally charged comment reflects the underlining tension between the two communities over the Oro festival.

Oro worshipper leaders have their own strong opinions on why differences emerged periodically regarding the festival. Respondent C1, a prominent Oro worshipper and town chief, describes how town elders traditionally dealt with conflicts, as peace entrepreneurs, and how conflicts were traditionally resolved with the presentation of evidence and prudent

pronouncements. Again, C1 refers to the historical precedence of Yorùbá kings and chiefs intervening in conflicts, and diffusing situations before they became unmanageable, "our forefathers were very simple. If they suspected that a matter might arise, they would gather themselves to prevent riots because if we fold our hands, it may destabilize community peace. Elders would tell who is at fault." Here, elders move quickly to ensure justice, and adjudicate between multiple claims. Therefore ensuring peace remains.

For Respondent C1, religion became increasingly contentious when the Cherubim and Seraphim church, an Aladura church, one of the indigenous Pentecostal churches in Yorùbáland, began to question the annual Oro festival. Respondent C1, here, explains how he served as a peace entrepreneur during these conflicts between the Oro worshippers and the Muslim communities. His involvement began initially with the Aseyin, the town king, sending him word that a religious crisis was beginning to materialize again, and he needed to intervene immediately:

> I heard about religious crises between 1967 to 1969 at Iseyin it was the C & S Church [*Cherubim and Seraphim]* members fought with Oro worshippers and made a women at the market to be mad before she died, then later they came to this house wishing pastors and Oro worshippers to agree that the Oro cult festival will start at 5pm on Sunday. But recently Muslim started their own problems, though I'm also a Muslim and paganist. When the problems occurred every year, it was me that called the Aseyin and Chief Basorun to sift the Oro cult festival after Ramadan this year because it would clash. They accepted my request and everybody lives peacefully.
>
> Even of recent I was at a party, when Aseyin sent a message to me that a religious crisis around at Ilado and I rushed there immediately and settled it, though the Oro worshippers were at fault. Then I boldly told them to seek for an apology from the Muslims and asked them to pay the hospital bill of the injured person. When Youth Muslims arraigned my daddy at court in Ibadan, the chief judge said we should go on settle it at home and asked us to start the Oro Cult festival at 7pm but my daddy refused the time. But we agree to start the festival at 5pm to 6am of the following day but the Oro Cult masquerade came out at 12 noon and scattered the Muslim gathering in front of the Central Mosque at the market. This brought another crisis to the town.

Within this example, C1 served as formal peace entrepreneur, a person or persons, charged to keep the peace and whose authority was an extension of the Aseyin. Of note is the dynamic nature of peace resolution displayed here. Respondent C1 employed several tactics to secure peace: 1) he sought reconciliation by asking for an apology from the Oro worshippers, because they were at fault; 2) secured restitution and justice for injured parties; 3) changed the time of the Oro festival to accommodate both the Muslims and Christians. Respondent C1's actions are hallmarks of Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs. Guaranteeing equability and his intervention helped ensure that this particular episode did not escalate.

Respondent D6, another Oro worshipper and town leader, also gave his thoughts on the conflict between the Oloro, Muslims and Christians. He, too, refers to the historical dominance of Oro in Iseyin and how the town initially was united, but over time divisions emerged as both the Christian and Muslims attempted to make ideological demarcations between themselves and the Oro members. Again, highlighting the tensions between modernity and antiquity:

> From the onset, the Oro cult is the father of all religions because when we wake up in the morning, we need to perform some certain things like washing off our face, brushing our teeth but all these were Oro in the Yorùbá view. The particular point that caused the problems here was hatred, because all the religions were praying in the same way, nobody can wake up in the morning and start cursing himself but the Muslims insists that they're better than traditional religion but they should remember that out of traditional religion, Islam and Christianity were alien not indigenous religion. Nobody can boldly say that he brought Islam from the heaven like our wise, traditional faith which was established by our forefathers since the creation of the world. Though it is only God that can settle the conflict because God times everything.
>
> In the olden days, Oloro [practitioners of Oro] and Muslims were together but now everything has changed because of their bone of contention of which one is the better religion. But the cog of the wheel of this matter is arrogance of the youth Muslims. If Muslims comes to the Oro worshippers and make a solid agreement to change the time of Oro cult festival instead of this, they brought some weapons to fight Oro worshippers at Itan here. Though, we don't hate Muslims but it is Muslims that hate Oro worshippers.

The Oloro perspective is an interesting one. Before the Muslims' assertions that they were better than the Oro, the community remained at peace, according the respondent. This is an example of what Galtung (1969) would refer to as cultural and direct conflict. The assertion of the supremacy of the Muslims over the Oloro resulted in cultural conflict while threats of violence caused tensions that linger today resulting in direct conflict.

I then had the opportunity to interview Respondent J7, a local reporter and teacher in Iseyin, in November 2010. As a longtime resident of the town, he is well connected with community leaders and even the Iseyin king. Respondent J7, a devout Muslim, shared his perspective on a variety of issues including the problems surrounding the yearly Oro Festival[18]. He spoke in detail about the conflict and highlighted the fact that the issue was not only between Oro worshippers and the town, but the Egungun worshippers as well–another orisha within the Yorùbá religious pantheon, known for their vibrant and colorful rituals and masquerades. Those involved with the Egungun masquerades wear beautifully ornate costumes and 'embody the spirit of their ancestors'. This procession of masquerade dancers caused problems within Iseyin according to Respondent J7. He places blame on youths within new Islamic sects for being agitators in the latest round of conflicts associated with the Oro festival. He also pointed out that the extent of the conflict was minimal and largely managed by the court system, when necessary:

> The fracas was not only with the Oro festival or the Oro priests or the Oro followers alone. There was this time when the Egungun masquerades used to fight between the masquerades and the Muslims. Before we were born, there were masquerades that would go pay homage to some people who lived beside the mosque or in a highly dominated area, or highly Islamic area. But you know, these youths, these Muslim sects coming out now a days, they would come out and say would say they did not want the masquerades

[18] I spent several days with this respondent and we stopped numerous times, so he could pray at local mosques.

> to pass by that side anymore. The masquerades would say it was their right to pass and their right to go visit that person. The next thing would be fracas. Maybe at the end of the day you would see some bloody heads. You would see people brandishing cutlass. But hardly would you hear of someone dying. They may get hold of the masquerade, burn the costume, and beat the person under it. At the end of the day, the people would come and arrest them. And the most volatile would go to court. Maybe the government would come in and arrest some people and take them to court just to serve as deterrents.

I then asked what the Christian community's reaction to the Oro festival and the Egungun was. I wondered if they were actively part of the dissenting voices emerging alongside the Muslims. Were they interjecting about the continued practice of the Oro festival as well? Respondent J7 said the Christians, particularly newer, evangelical groups, were previously involved in similar fisticuffs with Oro worshippers, but those episodes diminished with time:

> No, no. There was a time when the Christians did this same thing that the Muslims are doing. When the Deeper Life[19] sect started then, they were the ones who use to come out during the Oro festival. In fact, I witnessed an occasion when the Oro people stripped the women naked, beat them, they even beat them with charms. That kind of a thing. I think there is a bit of understanding among the Christians. Even the Deeper Life are no more as they use to be then. And you know, they were all over the place preaching their doctrines. But now, I think maturity has come in, they are no more as they use to be. Now the thing is now among the Muslim sects now. Maybe with time that zeal will fizzle out. The zeal will go with time.

Though the humiliation of being stripped naked and beaten is jarring and offensive, we must also remember to place this incident within the greater context of Nigeria at large. In comparison to the massive loss of life happening on a continual basis outside the bounds of Yorùbáland, in the North, the incident above, though serious, seems trivial in comparison. In truth, the incident above displays the real and tangible issues which emerged between those in the Deep Life Christian denomination, "new religion", and the Oro worshippers early in its history. It does appear to diminish the "Pax Yorùbá" claim, but it does help to place Yorùbáland in context.

[19] As you may recall, Deeper Life is characterized as one of the newer, Pentecostal movements emerging in Nigeria

Conflicts do occur, but they appear muted in comparison to the continued episodic ethno-religious conflict in the North and Middle Belt regions. Here, context, the Nigerian context, is important to remember.

Respondent J7's observation about the "fizzling out" of tensions between the Oro festival participants and dissenters over time is an interesting one as well. Perhaps the conflict was less to do with the existence of the Oro festival, but, the greater manifestation of conflicts between those who subscribe to perpetrating Yorùbá religious, cultural norms from antiquity and those who are pushing for the dominance and emergence of 'new' religions. Respondent J7 points out that the Oro festival traditionally has been deeply embedded within the societal fabric of Iseyin and thus any changes result in adverse reactions from Oro worshippers. Especially since dissenters are aggressively trying to end the Oro festival by force:

> The Oro episode has so ballooned because Iseyin is known traditionally as Oro worshippers. All over the country when you mention Iseyin. They instantly associated it with the Oro. That Oro has been there for long and the panegyric rendition of Iseyin is not complete without mentioning Oro. These [new] religious sects thought they had to put an end to Oro. I would not like to subscribe to that as well. You cannot force something to halt or stop just like that using force.
>
> When you mention Oro, it is more profound here. It's like Oro started here, but I don't want to subscribe to that. Here, they take that Oro to symbolize origination of this place. Because the founders were well known with the deity of Oro. It's not like they are not doing Oro at some other place. At Ijebu [another Yorùbá city] during their festival. It is very mandatory that no one should come out not even males that are not in the Oro cult would not be allowed to come out. Like Ikorodu. They have industries there. They have rural development there. But people are using the sentiment that Iseyin is not developed because of Oro. Because during that festival, it's a seven day festival and the belief is, females should not go out for those seven days. But now a days, they have made it a bit simple. As in, all you have to do is stay indoors from the hours of 6pm to 6 in the morning. Like, I'm a male and I move around so much. My work, my vocation demands that I move around. During this period when they asked people to stay indoors. It has been legalized that you can be anywhere you want during the day, but all they want is during the night stay indoors. It is not that they are doing anything much. It is because

> these people are trying to force the halt. Trying to force these people to stop the practice of their religion makes them to say ok, "You want us to stop, we will not stop."

Once again, it appears the issues are between modernity and antiquity, the past and future. I then asked how widespread was this thought—the push for the cessation of the Oro festival. Was it only among the youth or among the elders as well? J7 thought it was mostly the youth who wanted to see the end of the Oro festivals, he remarked, "The older Muslims, I don't think subscribe to the stoppage of the festival. I don't think so. Except for those who are in the new sects. The new sects are mainly youths."

This statement about the dominance of youths is not surprising. As I discussed briefly in Chapter 1, the Nigeria's youth problem remains problematic for numerous reasons. First, with the lack of employment opportunities, this makes youth susceptible to extremism and violence. As you may recall, from the Maitatsine in 1980s and Boko Haram today, these movements are dominated with disenchanted youth. "Area Boys", gangs of young men often associated with criminal activity, remain a big problem, especially in Nigeria. I recall one frightening encounter with 'Area Boys' on July 4th, 2010, coming back from Ibadan to Lagos. There was heavy traffic on the Lagos-Ibadan expressway because of an overturned tanker trailer. Several area boys started to move through traffic, demanding, though nicely, for 'something'. I quickly reached into my pocket for 50 naira, about 31 US cents and gave it to the driver. I asked the driver, "What would have happened if we did not give the youth some kind of 'tip'?" He said plainly, "him and his friends would have destroyed our car". This encounter with Area Boys is not unique. Such occurrences are common place within Nigeria urban areas. The all important question to ask is why? Why are youths involved in instances of criminality? Momoh (2000) contends the lawlessness and destruction often associated with these youths is more complex then often reported. He conducted research with Area Boys across three major areas in Lagos

Island. He finds the Area Boys are routinely casted as 'scapegoats' and the issues often associated with youths manifest because of the state's failure to properly address the tissue of youths and their plights. Despite youth initiates in the past, the lack of a comprehensive youth policy presents the state's inability to properly address the plight of youths. More importantly, as we examine Area Boys, must be under the guise of contradiction:

> the *Area Boys* [sic] phenomenon is a product of urban contradictions and uneven development. Second, it is rooted in class contradictions, because most of the *Area Boys* are the urban poor and victims of a class society. Third, the *Area Boys* issue is a reflection of generational contradictions between a preponderantly adult and well-to-do Omo[20] area and the youth, *Area Boys*. The generational contradictions mediate with the other contradictions to give full expression and meaning to the understanding of the Area Boys phenomenon. Fourth, the Area Boys question is ideological, because it is rooted in a theory of social atomism and urban anonymity. It dehumanizes people and criminalises them, without establishing the causative agent. In this regard, the youth are seen as deviant or delinquent and the state as benevolent and charitable to them. This is thoroughly misleading because the state is a class agent and the producer of urban contradictions. It is the marketer of the ideology of criminalizing the *Area Boys*. And the state's goal in doing this is to caricature or trivialize the urban youth crisis in order to dismiss it most simplistically.

Similar issues have emerged with the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja (FTC), the nation's centrally located capital. Considered the most beautiful and planned cities in Nigeria, the capital is not immune to turmoil associated with disaffected indigene youths. The political ramifications leading to the moving of the Abuja from Lagos were tremendous (Moore 1984). The societal ramifications are still being felt today, particularly among Abuja's indigene population. Abdulrahman and Adejoh (2001) observe:

> Amongst the indigenous population of Abuja, the generation of youth born between 1976 and 1986 are the worst hit by the crisis of development in the Territory. They are the ones

[20] According to Momoh, Omo, located on Lagos Island, is affluent and cost of living remains high. Moreover, "the revenue generated from Lagos Island alone is more than the total revenue generated by any selected three states of Nigeria put together.

> who have come of age with neither land to farm or to build a home on. Unemployment and illiteracy rates are high. Politically, the educated ones do not have a house of assembly or the office of a Mayor/Governor to aspire to. The federal legislature makes laws for the Territory while the president appoints the executive minister of the area. Out of the three representatives of the FCT to the national assembly, only one is an indigene and the executive minister also is not an indigene. The yoke of heavily on the indigenous youth population.

The plight of many young Nigerians is akin their African American counterparts in economically depressed areas throughout the United States. Youths in South Central Los Angeles have experienced similar economic subjection and economic upheaval during the 1980s had disastrous effects on youths especially. According to Kelley (1996):

> The economic decline of black communities in Los Angeles, "the generation that came of age in the 1980s was the product of devastating structural changes in the urban economy that date back to least to the late 1960s. While the city as a whole experienced unprecedented growth, the communities of Watts and Compton faced increased economic displacement, factory closures, and unprecedented deepening of poverty…South Central neighborhoods experienced a 50 percent rise in unemployment wile purchasing power dropped by one-third. The media income for South Central L.A.'s residents was a paltry $5,900-2,500 below the median income for the black population a few years earlier. Youths were the hardest hit. For all of Los Angeles County, the unemployment rate of black youth remained at about 45 percent, but in areas with concentrated poverty the rate was even higher. (99)

From Iseyin, Lagos, Abuja, and South Central Los Angeles, the actors and cultural contexts may differ but the expressed nihilism; hopeless and economic decline remains the same. The 1980s were times of tremendous upheaval for Nigerian and Los Angelino youths where economic pressures were particularly punishing. The contexts of Iseyin, Lagos, and Abuja are drastically different and yet the conclusions are eerily similar. Here, like other places around the world, the dangerous combination of youth and hopelessness are palatable.

As this peace entrepreneur explains, the centrality of youths within conflicts is neither coincidental nor surprising. The greater issue remains the emergence of youths disenchanted with the 'old ways' and finding alternative outlets to channel their discontents. As Momoh reminds us, the auspices of religion or criminality are simply an avenue to express the frustration within life as a young, Nigerians today.

J7 also highlights an interesting fact about the demography of the Oro worshippers. The majority of the worshippers are in fact, Muslim, even if in name only. The conflict appears to be between brothers, those who practice syncretism, a mix of Islam and Oro worship and those who are fundamentally opposed to the mixing of the two faiths and advocate the continued existence of Oro worship:

> The unfortunate fact is this, if you see the Oro worshippers, twenty of them, trying to dig, you discover that about seventeen of them of are Muslims. They will still go to mosque. The fact is they don't belong to that sect, one. Second fact is that they only call themselves Muslims. They don't' really follow the real guidelines. The real doctrines of the religion. You can attribute that thing to poverty at times. The Oro people are magnanimous with their property. If they go to the farm in the season of famine they put so much money into farming. During the festival, all they get there is what they bring home. They sell some to have cash. The rest they use to prepare food. You see them killing goats, preparing pounded yam and providing drinks— as in alcoholic drinks. And the people who will go there to enjoy these things are the Muslims.

Yunus vs. the town of Iseyin

Our conversation then began to focus on the conflict between the fundamental Islamic sect group, al-Yunus, after its founder's name, and the greater Iseyin Muslim community in 2010. With a large camp along the Ibadan-Iseyin road (Kilometer five), al-Yunus was thought to be a fundamentalist group because of their preaching and ascetic lifestyle. Respondent J7 had just interviewed Yunus before my interview with him. He remarked that the dominant thought

among Iseyin community members was that the al-Yunus group was stealing their daughters and sons away into the radical Islamic sect. There were also accusations of child abuse and severe malnourishment among the children. These thoughts however were reversed after meeting with him:

> We use to be told that the place is like a slave labor camp. That they kidnap, they take people children without the parent's support. And if you're a girl, they take you there forcefully. I would not believe that particular one. I still don't believe it. My thought is the majority of girls, now a days are getting wiser and if a girl does not have high expectations. As in, not much focus for her future. There is this thought that instead of her going around trying to find someone to get married to. The whole thing, in short, steams out of laziness. Because these people will not allow their wives to work. Even the wives will not be allowed to go fetch water. It will be your husband that will do everything. Work, bring food, fetch water, take care of the children, and the children, we are taught that the children are suffering. And their own believe is we shouldn't allow our children to be pampered too much. Children should not be given food three times a day.

Who was Yunus I asked? What was his background, and what was his impetus for sharing this Islamic sect? According to Respondent J7, he wanted members to go back to the fundamental tenets of Islam. For al-Yunus, he thought the current Islamic leadership was preoccupied with accruing resources, a deviation from the model of the Prophet Mohammed:

> He started his education with Arabic. His father didn't want him to have western education. But people started to ask the father, will this boy not go to school? This guy was so brilliant that he only went to primary six, [the last year of elementary school]. After primary six, he wrote his common entrance. He went to the best school in Iseyin. He was in the sciences and after that he said he wanted to read at the University of Ibadan. Maybe to do computer science but he was not given admission. So he had to result to doing accountancy at one polytechnic. Eventually, after doing that course, he used the knowledge that he got from formal schooling to better his life. Not that he wanted to gain government appointment. What he is trying to preach, according the discussion I had with him this morning, that every individual should be self-sufficient. Self-employable. The idea when they call you alfa, [Islamic cleric], you should not be going around eating crumbs. Going to people's house praying for them so that they will give you. Mohammed didn't go begging to eat. Mohammed and his disciples had to work. Why would I call myself an alfa and be going to be people's houses early in the morning, praying, so they can they give me? Even if they do not give, I'll ask, "I was at your place yesterday and you did not drop that usual thing" [monetary donation]. These

> people are well read. Even with what that man said [Yunus] to create that camp. He said he had it in mind that people should be self-sufficient. And they should know the doctrine of Islam not the other way that some other people are teaching. The way that Mohammed really did it.

Yunus, according to this reporter, was not a deranged, fanatical leader but was militant about his critiques about the established Islamic clerics in Iseyin, and his group's push to return to Mohammed's model of "self-sufficiency". I then asked how the Yunus conflict was ultimately handled and which actors were involved with quenching the episode. The conflict was two-fold: between Yunus and Oro worshippers and Yunus and the greater Muslim community. Yunus opposition to the Oro festival was mostly symbolic and non-violent with the Oro worshippers ultimately 'winning' the battle according to respondent.

> What I found out about them is that they have never, since they started, gone out and attacked anybody. But they might say, ok, if the Oro worshippers say they are starting their Oro tomorrow through the palace. There will be announcements all over the place that all females should stay indoors within this particular hour to this particular hour. These people with their own belief, there shouldn't be anything like Oro. Though they will not attack the Oro worshippers, they will ask their wives to go out. You will see some men following them later, maybe at some distance. These men don't have any weapons. If the crisis is between the Oro worshippers and the Muslim sects, it's always the Oro worshippers that will have an upper hand. They will be the ones who will be beating the Muslim's heads.

The Al-Yunus episode was ultimately resolved when key leaders of the Muslim community met formally with al-Yunus and his leaders. Both sides were able to air their grievances and Al-Yunus agreed to release some members because of allegations of child abuse at his compound. The police officials present said they would continue to do inspections to ensure that children were not mistreated. The settlement was recorded and placed on video cd, as a means to disseminate into the community. I acquired the video and watched intently, interested to witness Yorùbá conflict resolution in action. Throughout, both sides understood the importance of

discourse and dialogue, an established norm in Yorùbá society. The al-Yunus episode came to a peaceful resolution.


University of Ibadan

The University of Ibadan (UI), located in the major Yorùbá town of Ibadan, is considered one of the premier universities in Nigeria. The university formally began in 1948 as an offshoot of Yaba Higher College in Lagos, an institution in existence since 1932 (Nkulu 2005). Though it was connected to the University of London, the University of Ibadan became independent in 1962. The University remains one of the most active research institutions in the country, attracting researchers from all over the world interested in Nigeria, Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. Despite its rich, illustrious history, the University of Ibadan is no stranger to religious contention among its students and faculty. Perhaps, one of the most famous examples is what is commonly known as the "Cross Crisis" in 1985-1986. Like many public Nigerian universities, houses of worship are prominently displayed on campus, interwoven into the fabric of the daily lives of students and faculty. The University of Ibadan is no different. What's important to note is how the crisis was solved and the key players involved in the resolution. Peace entrepreneurs, from outside the University, quickly convened to prevent the issue from escalating. Twenty five years later, peace entrepreneurs would help to quell a similar disruption poised to ignite tensions between Christians and Muslims for weeks.

The Cross Crisis

How did the 'Cross Crisis" begin? The position of a large cross near the Chapel of the Resurrection began to stir controversy. The central mosque was adjacent to the University

chapel, and the cross was in full view of Muslim congregants during prayers. According to Imohisen and Ashaye (2008), the Muslims argued "it was forbidden in their religion, they went on, to see an idol during prayers, and since to them the Cross was an idol, it should be removed from its position" (82). Members of the Chapel of the Resurrection discounted the Muslims claims saying that the concrete cross was erected nearly thirty years before, and their arguments were without merit. The issue quickly gained national attention with the entire nation asking whether the cross should remain, if it should be moved or if was it a fixed part of campus. University outsiders were called in to adjudicate the situation including the Federal Minister of Education, the National Universities Commission (NUC) and the Commissioner of Police of Oyo State (Imohisen and Ashaye 2008).



Picture 1: University of Ibadan, Central Mosque and Cross for the Chapel of the Resurrection

Ultimately, the crisis ended amicably and with key provisions implemented to pacify both Christian and Muslim parties. Instead of tearing down the cross, a symbolic, concrete barrier was erected between the mosque and the cross, essentially blocking the view of cross from the mosque (see picture above). According to Imohisen and Ashaye (2008):

> At the end of the deliberations on all the issues raised, it was decided, first, that a concrete screen should be constructed between the mosque and the cross in such a way that the latter would not be seen from the former. Second, in deference to Moslem [sic] demands, it was agreed that a Moslem symbol should be erected in the vicinity of the Cross. Third, as proposed by the Commissioner of Policy of Oyo State, a dwarf wall, about 900 mm high, should be built to demarcate Protestant and Moslem zones (83).

Nearly thirty years later, the barrier remains as a lasting example of peace entrepreneurship with actors using creativity, consensus and dialogue to resolve the key issue, the position of the cross. One question does remain, even though the 'crisis' ended without further escalations, why the sudden outcry against the position of the cross if the cross stood for nearly thirty years? According to Falola (1998), Christians thought visiting Muslim politicians were the chief instigators of the disagreements. Like the visiting Izalat, northern imam whose inflammatory speeches stirred controversy within Ibadan in 2010, visiting Muslim politicians, too, were at the center of the cross controversy. According to Falola (1998), "This incident came at a time when interreligious hostility had reached its peak and when a number of Yorùbá Muslims were calling for the imposition of al-Shari'a [Islamic law]. Chief Abiola, now determined to play the religion card, became involved in what was becoming known as the Ibadan Cross Crisis." (175). Ironic, given Chief M.K.O. Abiola, a Southerner and Yorùbá, would later go on to run for the presidency in 1993 with some of the broadest based support throughout the country, especially among Yorùbás. M.K.O still remains an indelible part of Nigerian history.

The 1993 Election Crisis

When President Babangida captured power in 1985, by means of a military coup, he promised institutional reform via the National Electoral Commission, Constituent Assembly and local elections (Diamond et. al. 2007). By 1993, he could no longer delay in holding national presidential elections. An election was finally called, after four different postponements. M.K.O. Abiola, a Muslim, millionaire, Yorùbá politician and apparent victor won votes not only in the south, but in the north as well—a clear and decisive popular mandate. Babangida moved quickly to void the electoral results, and instituted a "caretaker government" when national and international outrage forced him to finally step down. Hopes for a democratic transition were dashed when Sani Abacha captured power via a military coup d'état on November 17, 1993. He would usher in one of the most brutal, corrupt, and repressive governments in Nigeria's history until his death in 1998. The 1993 Election Crisis sparked massive protests, and would also rally Yorùbás around M.K.O.:

> …the annulment of June 12, 1993, presidential election and the apparent haunting of prominent Yorùbás by Sani Abacha's regime between 1993 and 1998 reawakened a renaissance of ethnicity as a basis of interpersonal relationship among a people who, hitherto, has begun to be ethnically blind–at least in official dealings (Ajayi 2006, 261)

Moreover, it would appear that Abiola's personal faith played no role in the universal outrage felt by Yorùbás when the presidency was usurped by Northern politicians, especially when Abiola died while incarcerated. As Ajayi suggests, the electoral crisis was a key, important event in Yorùbáland history. Irrespective of class or religion, it was widely believed that Abiola was denied the presidency because of his ethnicity and wealth. This one event collectively brought Yorùbás together.

In 1985, however, Abiola allegedly was at the center of the controversy. Perhaps, given Abiola's entanglements with the 'Cross Crisis', he realized that religion based appeals, particularly among the Yorùbá, were destructive. It is difficult to know for sure. By 1993, it appears, he gave up using the potentially destructive "religion card" for political ends. Even within interviews with respondents, nearly all spoke positively about Abiola. This incident demonstrates that religious differences do occur in Yorùbáland; however, they are usually dealt with swiftly and usually peacefully with the assistance of peace entrepreneurs. Even instigators, too, can change their political appeals.

University of Ibadan, August 2010

In August 2010, the school nearly erupted when a Christian student wearing a hijab, a traditional Islamic head covering, walked into the on-campus mosque and started to proselytize loudly during Friday morning prayers. If not for the quick intervention of the University's Chancellor, the university would have continued to erupt into several days of protests at the height of Ramadan instead of just one day after the incident occurred. I had the opportunity to interview the imam who was leading prayers when the disturbance took place. He said he instantly understood the severity of the situation and it was he who called for the Vice-Chancellor to come and assure outraged students that the female student would be disciplined and her egregious offenses punished and brought to justice.

There remain several theories about why she did it. The lead pastor at the Chapel of the Resurrection said she was mentally unstable, some believe it was a lover's quarrel, she was a Christian and her boyfriend was a Muslim and she did so to shame him. Some students, in

informal conversations, felt she was paid to do it—by radical Christians to stir up trouble. Though each theory appears to be equally plausible, no one really understands her motivation for the sudden outburst. The quick intervention of the imam and Vice Chancellor, acting as informal peace entrepreneurs, leaders who are not explicitly keepers are of the peace, but who arise to the position as the situation necessitates, helped contain the situation and ensured the maintenance of an atmosphere of religious peace.

Qadriyya, Tijaniyah, and Izalat

Some of the antagonisms that existed between Izalat and Tijaniyah in Ibadan in August 2010 can be traced back to historical theological divides. Between Qadriyya, or *Quadriyya*, and Tijaniyah, Islamic Sufi-brotherhoods, or sects, and theological debates have raged for nearly a century in West Africa. Sufism, a branch of Islam, often referred to as Islamic mystics, remains one of the most popular strains of Islam in Western Africa. Even before the genesis of Izalat, the two Sufi Islamic groups, Qadriyya and Tijaniyah, were constantly at odds in Northern Nigeria. Both Islamic sects were birthed in the Middle East, with the Qadiriyya linking their beginnings to Bagdad. Tijaniyah was founded by Ahmad al-Tijani Abd al Qadir in the Fez, Morocco, reaching Nigeria in the 1820. Three core tenets underpin the Tijaniyah beliefs, and these same tenets caused frictions between the two sects:

> First among these elements is the veneration of Muhammad not so much as the finite 'seal of the prophets' (Qur'an 33: 40), but something akin to the pre-existent Word in John's Gospel, al-haqiqat al-muhammadiyyah (the essence of Muhammad), the fountainhead from whom all created things derive. The second element centers on this veneration of Muhammad as specified for the whole of the Tijaniyyah by the saintly influence of Ahmad al-Tijan who claimed for himself the title of qutb al-aqtab (the supreme role of

> sainthood) or khatm al-awlya' (the seal of the saints), the overflowing source of all human closeness both to God and to Muhammad not only for his own generation but for all generations before and after. The third element often (but not always) involves attachment to and reverence for a mystical propagandist (muqaddam) in the Tijaniyyah who channels the spiritual benefits to be derived from Ahmad al-Tijani, the Prophet Muhammad and God to the individual member (Ryan 2000, 2–3).

According to Alao (n.d.), though the group theologically were similar, there were enough differences between the two which caused tension:

> First, the latter [Qadiriyya] opposed the ritual and doctrine of the Tijaniyya like the traditional crossing of arms while prayer was being said. This indeed made the Sadaunna (the Head of Nigeria's Muslim Community) decree that all prayer leaders should pray with their arms at their side. Second, the Quadriyyas found what they saw as the Tijaniyya tendency to venerate Ahmad-al-Tijani, known to them (Tijanniyyas) as the "Seal of the Saints" over and above Prophet Mohammed objectionable. To the former, Mohammed was the last of the Prophets. There were also disagreements over the treatment of women, with the Tijaniyyas being more relaxed in the ways women were treated and was somewhat opposed to the hijab (wife seclusion).

The Rise of Izalat

The genesis of *Jama'at Izalat al-Bid'a wa-Iqamat as-Sunna* (Movement for the Suppressing Innovations and Restoring the Sunna), or Izalat, emerges in Jos, Northern Nigeria, in 1978. The Izalat are diametrically opposed to their Qadriyya and Tijaniyah cousins, "preaching an authentic Islam and forbid the surviving beliefs and customs of traditional religions" (Gregoire 1993, 111). This opposition would cause conflict from the late 1970s and throughout the 1990s. This is not surprising even Galtung's conflict triangles and the preconditions for conflict being the presence of different behaviors, contradictions, and attitudes. Generally, Izalat major battles would be more with the Tijaniyah and less with the Qadriyya, Loimeier (1997) observes:

> First, the Qadiriyya in almost all of Northern Nigeria was smaller in numbers than the Tijaniyya and thus automatically less of an object of attacks by the 'Yan Izala. Second, the Qadiriyya, under the undisputed leaders of Nasiru Kabara, was a relatively homogenous and united movement, whereas the Tijaniyya was split up into many different networks which even fight each other for influence…Finally, the Qadiriyya in contrast to the Tijaniyya did not possess significant number of controversial dogmatic positions so that attacks on the 'Yan Izala on the Qadiriyya were not very effective (277).

Ibadan (Town), August 2010

In August 2010, violent conflict broke out between Izalat and Tijaniyah members over a divisive speech delivered from a visiting Northern, Izalat sheik to the Sabo area of Ibadan, the predominately Hausa migrant enclave in Yorùbá towns. Citing Tijaniyah's practice of prostrating to religious leaders in respect, the cleric said that such actions are expressly forbidden by the Quran, and Muslims should only prostrate to Allah alone. The intensity of the speech escalated even further with the use of loud speakers and the impact of the sermon became more widespread because it was distributed via cassette tape. According to interview respondent C8, the imam was attacked by Tijaniyah youths in retribution for his remarks. C8 recalls the incident by saying:

> The Sheik had recorded a cassette which criticized the Tijaniyah Muslim sect throughout, as a Yorùbá proverb says "Bi eti o gbo yinkin, inu kii baje". When a person insults you but you can't hear it there will be no problem, but if you're informed of it then you will get upset." On the next day, the Izalat sheik finished the lecture at Sabo and on his way to Bodija market for another lecture; some boys selling cell phones at Sabo junction attacked him. They were members of the Tijaniyah Muslim sect challenging him for what he said during this lecture at Sabo.

By the end the 2010 episode, twenty five members from both Tijaniyah and Izalat were arrested on several criminal charges ranging from disturbing the peace to "unlawful damage of properties including a Land Rover Freelander Jeep, motorcycle, roofing sheets, ceiling fans, and

a generating set; as well as willful and unlawful assault occasioned by bodily harm" (Jegede 2010). On the surface, the Ibadan Ramadan disturbance appears to be an isolated incident connected to the sheik's sermon, but the root cause may be connected to the continued construction of an Izalat mosque in the Sabo neighborhood—a perceived injustice. Respondent B14, a Muslim and key leader in Tijaniyah, along with several other respondents, suggest the mosque being at the center of the continued controversies as well:

> There are two things that are always causing the problem, firstly, the new Izalat under construction Jumat Mosque [Friday service] and the sheik at their Ramadan lecture. Though about the mosque, the Sheik and the council of elders advised the Izalat to mount their mosque in the far place and the court injunction sanction the Izalat not to observe Jumat service at their new mosque at Sabo to prevent problems between them but they declined the court order. It was pronounced that Islamic lectures should stop during the Ramadan though, we [Tijaniyah] agreed with them but Izalat still brought their sheik for Islamic lectures every year. But there are no problems between Muslims and Christians living here."

Respondent A8, a key leader and advisor in the Seriki's place, the Sabo king, suggests that the underlying issue may be political, "I haven't witness or heard any difference between Muslims and Christians in this Sabo area before, even many churches are built here, until last Ramadan when the two Islamic sects Tijaniyat and Izalat, Muslim missionaries, disagreed with each other but for my own view I couldn't believe it as a religious crisis because some politicians are behind the crisis." A8's observation may be salient, but not in connection with Yorùbáland. The use of religious ideology for political ends is not uncommon in Nigeria. Some would suggest that the impetus for the implementation of Sharia rule, Islamic law, in the northern states was solely political. According to this view, Sharia in Northern Nigeria has less to do with a Northern, Islamic religious resurgence and more to do with political leaders doing their best to retain power and using religion, employing divisive rhetoric, encouraging religious conflict, and using religious appeals to obtain political aims. There is little evidence, however, that there is a

systematic politicalization of religion in Yorùbáland and the other respondents failed to connect the Tijaniyat and Izalat crisis to political actors.

If the mosque was such an inflammatory issue, did leaders, peace entrepreneurs, intervene to negotiate between both parties as we witnessed in Iseyin? As Respondent B14 earlier observes, leaders were instrumental in trying to cultivate peace. Respondent C8 recounts how he heard about the latest round of conflict connected with the visiting sheik and how he, the council of elders, composed of various ethnic groups, Ibos, Yorùbás, and Hausa-Fulani, and the king of Sabo were called to intervene to stop the conflict, "We're on a meeting at Seriki's place, the Sabo King, before we're informed about the conflicts. Everything was scattered and Seriki asked us to go and stop them. We tried our best. After that I drove the Area Commander's office at Iya Ganku with the King and the Council of Elders." Respondent C8 goes on to say, even despite the on-going controversies, the two groups still interact with each other and are cordial despite the circumstances, "We still engage in business together up till now but it is the Izalat Sheik who always comes every year to cause problems every Ramadan; and the case is yet in court. We're together even til now. The two groups are non-differentiable."

It appears the Sabo Council of Elders and the state courts were tireless trying to ameliorate the situation, however, the visiting cleric reignited the debate again. Respondent B15, another key Tijaniyah leader, seems to support C8's argument emphasizing the pervasive tolerance and cohesion among both groups aside from the 'mosque issue':

> The issue was in the court for very long time but we're still doing things together even as I said earlier that Izalat Jumat Mosque was banned by court order and some Izalat members aren't buying the idea of the new mosque. The Tijaniyah Mulism sects also composed of Yorùbá, Hausa, and other Muslim tribes and it existed many years back but

> Izalat was established in 1979 and contain only Muslim youths. They caused trouble because they're young.

Respondent B15 commentary on the youth of Izalat is telling. Is the youthful composition of Izalat a chief contributor to the on-going conflict? Leaders in charge of defusing the Yunus issue in Iseyin seem to agree. They too pointed to the age of the Yunus group as a contributing factor in the conflict, but thought that the conflict would ultimately subside as the group matured.

Would the violence that occurred in 2010 ever begin without the inflammatory words of the Sheik? It is difficult to say. His speech was the spark inflaming underlying issues surrounding the ideological differences between the two Islamic groups and the positioning of the mosque in Sabo. Respondent A8 seems to suggest that conflict was an isolated incident, and Sabo leaders, peace entrepreneurs, would not allow conflicts to penetrate the understood norms already on ground, ethnic and religious tolerance. In his words, "love". This love would invariably provide the buffer for future conflicts and issues, "Okay, look at Sabo here, the leader of the Igbos is a Christian, the Yorùbá leader is a Muslim and while the Seriki, the Sabo King, is also a Muslim. We are sharing love together and we won't allow religious cultism to put a barrier between us. That is why we are always saying that love makes peace".

MUCHAS of Iseyin

In last ten years, at least six different Yorùbá traditional kings in Ondo, Ogun, Oyo, and Osun states came under assault from their constituencies and were removed from their thrones (D. Ojo 2009; Olajide 2003). In nearly every instance, the monarch's palace was burned down; and the chief perpetrators of these attacks were youths in their communities who were indignant about perceived injustices from their Obas (kings). In Iseyin, the Aseyin Oba Ablud Ganiyu Afolarin Adebayo Alobalowow II sought refuge in the local police station after some community youths burned down his palace and forced the king into temporary exile. Tensions had been mounting for some time in the community over high crime rates and injustice (Babasola 2003). Thousands of youths descended on the Aseyin's place demanding a reprieve. Oba Folarin subsequently ordered mobile police to the palace to manage the crowd and the situation quickly escalated resulting in five youth injuries and one alleged death. The youths retaliated against the king by burning down the palace.

Observers of Yorùbáland might find the aforementioned scenario unfathomable because of the central role of the oba. Historically, the position of oba meant political, spiritual, and economic power and control. Today, however, obas are no longer the paramount rulers in Yorubland. Now, he must share his symbolic power with governors, chancellors, and other competing interests. Perhaps, as the prominence of obas has waned, the reverence toward the institution waned as well. Olajide (2003) observes:

> A remarkable trend in the current onslaught on Yorùbá obas is that the youths have been in the forefront of the attack on the royal fathers. This trend, analysts say, may not be unconnected with the high unemployment rate and other economic woes plaguing the nation in general. It is believed in some quarters that the youths may just have been taking out their frustrations on the royal fathers, not necessarily out of disdain for the

obaship institution but because of the closeness of the obas to their various communities and the unrestrained access to their palaces.

Could the burning of the Aseyin's palace have been prevented? What mechanisms could have been put into place to stop the disturbances? In Iseyin, the solution was the creation of Muslim-Christian Association of Iseyin (MUCHAS). The organization comprises of twenty-four prominent Muslim and Christian leaders, two legal councils, and the Aseyin of Iseyin, the King of the community. Meeting once a week, they serve in a consultative capacity. The organization's mission is conflict alleviation of all kinds. MUCHAS sprang from the recognition that better, more effective institutions are necessary to defuse misunderstandings and tensions before they turn violent or destructive. Though the name of organization is Muslim-Christian Association of Iseyin, the initials of the organizations also spells out their specific goals, MUCHAS: M, "Maintain peace and orderliness"; U, "Use all that you have to promote your community"; C, "Commit the affairs of your community into the hand of the Most High God; H, "Highlight the implications and consequences of chaos"; A, "Avoid religious disturbances"; and S, "Serve God with humility and tolerate other religions".

What guarantees the success of organizations like MUCHAS? First and foremost, MUCHAS is built upon indigenous institutions already on ground and they are closely connected to the people of Iseyin. MUCHAS serves in an advising capacity to both the king of Iseyin and the traditional council of chiefs, thus giving the organization legitimacy. Religious leaders on the council are chosen from a cross-section of Christian and Muslim leaders. Judgments pronounced by the organization are deemed fair and impartial because of the diverse composition of the membership board. MUCHAS is also successful because each member moves quickly to combat potential conflicts among their own constituencies, and members reprimand instigators immediately. During weekly meetings, leaders exchange information and

warn the entire MUCHAS council of any brewing tensions that may escalate into full blown crises. One issue typically combated by MUCHAS is the timing of religious services between two neighboring houses of worship, usually a mosque and church. If Muslims are celebrating an important holy holiday and a church nearby also plans services around the same time, they will invariably clash. If both parties wish to use loud speakers and amplified sound, the possibility of conflict increases. Religious leaders recognizing the impending danger may alert MUCHAS of the problem and urge the forum to mediate. The group often moves quickly to intervene and pronounce judgment on the situation. A typical decision may dictate that the mosque may start their prayers from 8am to 10am, while the Christian church cannot begin their program until 11am. Both bodies of worship are able to implement their programs peacefully and a sufficient buffer is created for both services to occur. MUCHAS's chief goal is to adjudicate fairly at all times, as most peace entrepreneurs seek to do.

Second, MUCHAS is effective because all actors know when someone fails to comply with a MUCHAS decision; the forum will hand agitators over to the police and the Nigerian criminal justice legal system. The two legal councils on MUCHAS help to provide legal assistance when pronouncing their judgments. Compliance with decisions from MUCHAS, communal leaders, supersedes entanglements with the Nigerian legal system, so aggrieved parties find it beneficial to deal with MUCHAS first and foremost instead of the police.

Within the conflict resolution literature, MUCHAS's interventions are examples of Track Four and Track Seven diplomacy. Diamond and McDonald (1996), expanding on the previous work by Davidson and Monteville (1981), proposes a multi-faceted approach to conflict resolution and diplomacy. With official, formal talks between governments residing within Track 1; informal, professional, analytic, non-governmental organizations involvement, Track 2;

businessman-to-businessman, private sector, free-enterprise, multinational corporation interactions, Track 3; citizen-to-citizen exchange programs of all kinds, such as scientific, cultural, academic, educational, student, film, music, art, sports, and youth exchanges, Track 4; research, training, and education, Track 5; activism, or peacemaking through advocacy, Track 6; religion, or peacemaking through faith in action Track 7; funding, or peacemaking through providing resources, Track 8; communications and the media, or peacemaking through information, Track 9. Given MUCHAS's membership composition and goals, the group can be labeled as by-products of Track Seven diplomacy, "faith in action". Nevertheless, the group is also Track Four diplomacy because the group stimulates "citizen-to-citizen" exchange by holding educational programs about other religious groups and giving citizens the opportunity to air their grievances.

Not Everyone is Invited

Despite conflict abating activities of MUCHAS, there are no Orisha practitioners, babalowos, priests, or priestesses, on the council. When I asked respondents about the lack of clear representation of Orisha babalowos or priestesses in MUCHAS, the Aseyin quickly said they were going to be added next week. Other leaders, however, suggested no signs of the inclusion of babalowos or priestesses in the near future. One MUCHAS Christian leader said the Aseyin, the king, is the traditional representative of Oloro and others, so the further inclusion of Orisha worshippers is unnecessary. Another MUCHAS Muslim leader said they were excluded because the fundamental theological differences between Orisha practitioners and the Abrahamic faiths, Christianity and Islam. Another MUCHAS leader said Christians and Muslims are the

same, and that Orisha are so different. Perhaps, the palace was undergoing plans to include Orisha worshippers but the response of prominent leaders within MUCHAS would seem to suggest otherwise. Traditionalists from the council said they were never called, but if they were called they would immediately come and be part of the dialogue.

Whether the Aseyin alone is a sufficient representative for Orisha worshippers at large is still subject to debate. Perhaps, if another crisis arises regarding the Oro festival within Iseyin, this will expedite the inclusion of the Oloro within the dialogue. Irrespective of MUCHAS's membership composition, their efforts for conflict resolution should be applauded. The exclusion of the Orisha worshippers is representative of the tensions seen throughout these cases: the clash between old and new religions in Yorùbáland and the tension between modernity and antiquity. How the young and old will continue to evolve together is yet to be seen in Yorùbáland, but peace entrepreneurs will invariably be there to keep the peace if tensions arise.

Chapter 5

Conclusions

Varshney (2003) *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India* points to the importance of civic engagement in preventing conflict in ethno-religiously divided regions. For Varshney, established literatures on ethnic conflict fail to capture variation below the national level (38). He also notes that the "four existing traditions" including primordialism and constructivism do not distinguish between conflict and violence. For Varshney, conflict is not necessarily violent. He contends pre-existing local networks of civic engagement between two communities stand as the most proximate cause for communal peace. In areas, where every day and associational forms of engagement are minimal, there is a greater likelihood of conflict and strife. What are some examples of everyday and associational forms of engagement? Everyday forms of engagement include children playing together, visiting each other regularly, eating together, going to school, and engagement in the marketplace where associational forms of engagement include credit, business, and trade unions.

Varshney also highlights the importance of place, drawing a dividing line between urban and rural—where urban areas are more apt to experience greater instances of violence. He argues when people move from village to towns or from towns to villages, there are more links necessary to connect people (50). He notes that "cities tend to be less interconnected". Elites' ability to form coalitions or introduce polarizing legislation is dependent on the entrenchment of these networks. The more associational forms of engagement exist, the less polarizing elites tactics are.

I found the existence of everyday and associational forms of engagement abound within Yorùbáland from houses of worship to families and universities. With the foundation of everyday and associational forms of engagement, peace entrepreneur groups like MUCHAS in Iseyin have arisen to go above and beyond every day and associational forms of engagement to maintaining and enforcing peace.

The Yorùbá, like other pluralistic societies, report instances of religious conflict, the emergence of differing opinions and divergent goals among actors. These episodes, as we have seen, rarely escalate into violent confrontations. Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs, embedded community leaders, quickly intervene before conflict becomes violent. Why does conflict arise? As several respondents remarked repeatedly, "because we are human and only God is capable of perfection". In essence, the Yorùbá people are not the embodiment of perfection as the term *Pax Yorùbá* may suggest; the complete eradication of conflict within a given society is both improbable and unrealistic. Nevertheless, key institutions and actors have emerged to stave off violence before escalation, and work to maintain what the United Nations labels a "culture of [religious] peace" and justice. The culture of peace is steeped in Yorùbá myths and understood expectations of elders within Yorùbá society.

In truth, the Yorùbá appear to have notable advantages over their Northern counterparts. Yorùbá peace entrepreneurs are able to utilize common proverbs and myths, like Obàtálá, to restrain their flocks. Religious cleavages among the Yorùbá are cross-cutting in-nature, in other words, religious identity intersects both ethnic and regional considerations. Knowing a person's ethnicity and city state identity, or hometown, does not automatically translate into religious identity. A Mohammed or an Ayub may be a Muslim, but such assumptions may be wrong among the Yorùbá. The scenario in the Middle Belt and Northern Nigerian regions is quite

different, where religion and ethnicity are closely tied and these tensions continue to raise the tide of vigilantism (Higazi 2008). The cross-cutting nature of ethnicity and religion in Yorùbáland is an advantage for the Yorùbá.

When I asked respondents about the nature of conflict in Nigeria, they often expressed the potentially devastating effects religious upheavals and confrontations have on the familial unit. Several respondents observed, "Why would I harm or kill my brother over faith? Why does it matter what religion I am in relation to my brother? If I kill my brother, it is like killing a part of me. In one family, you may find a Muslim; another member is a Christian and the grandmother maybe an Orisha worshipper." The same sentiment was echoed repeatedly across the fifty interviews conducted. I also observed the same sentiments in practice while studying with Yorùbá language students at Lagos State University in Ojo, Lagos.

With such a pervasive religious tolerance ethos among the Yorùbá, it is little wonder why peace entrepreneurs are successful in arresting the escalation of ethno-religious conflict. Nevertheless, these conduits of peace are still necessary. From what I observed, conflicts typically occur when a perceived violation, an injustice, takes place, when one group, usually composed of young people or "new religions", infringe upon the understood rights of others, by criticizing the doctrines of another groups' faith. Or, in the case of Ibadan, an outside force, or voice, helps to stir dissention within the town. Peace entrepreneurs act as the proverbial pressure valves within the Yorùbá society, intervening if and when there is a necessity to "let out steam".

Where does this religious tolerance among the Yorùbá emanate from? Traditional Yorùbá religion provides some insight. Here the worship of a pantheon of Orishas, deities, within Yorùbá religion invites accommodation, diversity, and tolerance among practitioners. Though the actual number of Orisha worshippers in Yorùbá is lower than their Islamic and Christian

counterparts, it is estimated that ten percent of Yorùbá are still Orisha worshippers. The Yorùbá religion is still respected, often feared, and still resonates throughout Yorùbá society and even the world (Ellis and Haar 2004; Olupona and Rey 2008). In many ways, peace entrepreneurs are modern day Obàtálás, the orisha often depicted as peaceful and serene (Belasco 1980). Laitin (1986) remarked, regarding his choosing of Ile Ife and choosing just "one church and one mosque", "As I walked through the town for the first time and saw the central mosque and an imposing Anglican church on two sides of the king's palace, I was satisfied that the two world religions would be productively compared in Ile-Ife" (193). Yes, the two houses of worship still exist side by side, but missing from Laitin's calculus is the inclusion of Orisha worshippers. The exclusion of Orishas is a severe deficient. The Yorùbá norms of peace have their genesis not in Christianity or Islam, but in Orisha myth and tradition. As we adjudicate between ways of interpreting the city state and Pax Yorùbá theses, we must remember that religious conflicts are entrenched realities. The reason why the non-politicization of religion exists in Ife and the Pax Yorùbá thesis appears true is because the ethos of Obàtálá looms in the background. Laitin fails to acknowledge the weight, scope, and potential impact upon the Yorùbá of this myth and others. As a Nigerian scholar once told me, there are lines of demarcation within the Yorùbá religious demography, but there are spaces for all practitioners to exist, one God, but several avenues, or orishas, to reach this God. This mindset, consciously or unconsciously, is firmly embedded within Yorùbá members especially peace entrepreneurs. This reality cannot be overlooked or underestimated.

Going beyond: Solutions, Policy, and Nigerian Nationalism

Is explicit ethno-religious tolerance necessary for achieving ethno-religious peace as the Yorùbá seem to demonstrate on average? The proverbial creation of an extended familial unit

embedded within state? Is it more difficult, nigh impossible, to kill or maim those you consider part of your family? As I reflect back on the statements of respondents within this study, the Yorùbá peace entrepreneur model has ramifications elsewhere in Nigeria and beyond. If the call for the formation of 'brothers' is too idealistic and even naïve, mutual respect at the bare minimum is required. For the faithful, Nigerian Christian, devoted Muslim, and sage Orisha worshipper, each faith provides theological support for pursing tolerance and peace. Within the Quran, the "people of the Book", the *Ahl al-Kitāb,* those of Judeo-Christian faith, are encouraged to be treated with respect. In Christianity, the constant and unending admonition is to "love your neighbors as yourself". For the Orisha worshipper, the king, the leader, is usually deemed the "father of all religions" even Orisha worshippers.

As policy makers try to conceive solutions for endemic conflict, whether ethno-religious, secessionist, or factional, any proposed policy changes, including development, peace entrepreneurships, and growth, will not occur until there is a gradual systematic shift in how Nigerians from all six geopolitical zones: North-Central, North-Eastern, North-Western, South-Eastern (Igboland), South-South (Niger Delta), South-Western (Yorùbáland), perceive each other. This mentality was clearly demonstrated in 2010 when leaders within the People Democratic Party (PDP) were jockeying for power and influence. Opposition rose within the party saying that Goodluck Jonathan was not entitled to run again because his region, or zone, the South, was already presented in the presidency when President Umaru Yar'Adua died in office. Though a specific power sharing agreement about Northern and Southern seats is not explicitly written within the Nigerian constitution, or the PDP constitution, discussion about power rotation and zoning gripped the nation for months. President Goodluck Jonathan dismissed critics and decided to run for office. The zoning issue is emblematic of the divided

nature of Nigerian society. For many Nigerian elites their zone comes first, and the nation second and these agenda infiltrate their constituencies.

Coleman (1971) describes how colonial nationalism swept Africa and in particular Nigeria. There is a need to return to these nationalistic sentiments and cohesion. While studying in the south and discussing my work, I recall several Yorùbás saying, "the Hausa-Fulani, the ethnic group dominate within the North, are so wicked". It is likely that similar claims are made against Southerners in the North. This sort of generalization has problematic consequences for the peaceful coexistence of disparate groups. These thoughts are indeed a by-product of Nigeria's colonial experience. Ihonvbere (1994) describes the devastating impact that colonialism had on Nigeria. The mutual distrust fostered by indirect rule, using native authorities to govern as proxies for the British, kept the North and South separate, essentially forming an "us" versus "them" mentality pervasive in both the North and South today. The rise of the terrorist organization Boko Haram feeds off these divides and their campaign of terror is unrelenting and destructive. Nigerians cannot go back and reverse the irreparable harm of colonization, civil war, and even mutual mistrust. Nigerians can, however, begin to walk toward institutional and societal change today.

As the Rwandan genocide demonstrates, rhetoric and semantics are powerful vehicles when the "other" is labeled as "cockroaches", like in Rwanda, violence can permeate one's family. Here, I'm not advocating nationalism for nationalism's sake. It is easy to be proudly Nigerian during a World Cup game. To cheer on Nigeria's football (soccer) team as I saw many Nigerians do in 2010. It is another thing all together, to view all Nigerians, collectively, irrespective of their backgrounds, as fellow citizens and even brothers.

Once Nigerians are able to gradually change their mindsets about each other, what is the subsequent step in achieving peaceful relationships, especially within the religious arena and even beyond? First, is the recognition of the problems and injustices. The reaction to comments made by John Campbell U.S. ambassador were telling. John Campbell (2010), former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria wrote a book called *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. The volume contains a sobering discussion of Nigeria's political, economic, and religious issues. As the title suggests, John Campbell paints a Nigeria literally on the brink of demise. The electoral violence in 2011 seems to give further credence to Campbell's argument when several Northern cities erupted when President Goodluck Jonathan was declared over former President Muhammadu Buhari. In 2010, when the book was released in Nigeria, it was not well received. Nigerian scholars, reporters, and citizens dismissed his arguments as 'doomsday' and unnecessarily alarmist. Whether Nigeria is "Dancing on the Brink" as Campbell's book title suggests or it is 'getting better' as Campbell's distractors would argue, both parties should agree that Nigeria needs to implement effective policy programs to push Nigeria forward. Tackling Nigeria's endemic religious violence is a necessary precursor to the country's continued development.

Within Nigeria, however, it is difficult to disentangle violence, development, ethnicity, religion, politics, and other contentious cleavages. Though the scope of the volume has dealt primarily with religious violence in Yorùbáland, in this chapter we turn to feasible solutions to Nigeria's religious conflict while drawing on the Yorùbáland example. To ameliorate problems, perceived injustice, in one sector, religious violence, it is necessary to create protracted, innovative, progressive policy solutions in other sectors. Nigeria needs innovative (indigenous) programs, like the Yorùbá peace entrepreneur model where leaders are embedded within their communities as peace agents. Nigeria must also work on its institutions. As (2000) finds, in

ethnically diverse societies, poor institutions increase the likelihood of civil war. If Nigeria is going to arrest the religious conflict which is endemic in Nigeria today, the starting point is the creation and maintenance of good institutions and curbing injustice. What kind of institutions? Suberu (2001) suggests a 'true federalist system'. Suberu contends one of the central problems bedeviling Nigeria today is its lack of fair distribution of petroleum revenue, and over-centralization, to the determent of local government and state government areas (LGAs). Third, Nigeria is in dire need of economic development and massive reforms in its educational system. At the root of conflict, especially in Nigeria, is a general sense of hopelessness. I learned this while speaking with Lagos State University students for eight months. Though scholars differ on the causes of conflict and civil war[21], if you give young people, those who have no prospects for gainful employment, hope, the need to turn to destructive, terrorist activities subsides.

Going beyond religion: the MEND example

As previously discussed in Chapter 1, Why is the MEND, a militant group in the Niger Delta, important to our present discussion given that this volume has focused primarily on ethno-religious conflict? Ethno-religious conflict and militarism, though diametrically different, have similar roots within the Nigerian context: economic deprivation, colonialism, and the implementation of faulty peace policies. Indeed, there have been previous attempts to systematically formulate a policy of peace. Most recently, the National Peace Policy (NPP) was created by the Nigerian Federal government in conjunction with the Peace and Conflict

[21] "Collier and Hoeffler (2004) or Azar (1990) differ on their perspectives on civil war, the former pointing to greed as a contributing factor for war and the latter pointing to grievances within a given society.

Resolution (IPCR) in collaboration with the United Nations Development Program. The policy "emphasizes social, political and economic integration of Nigeria's diverse ethnic, religious, cultural cleavage and other identity groups"(Jimoh 2009). The federal government has also exponentially increased the amount of spending toward security with *Africa Confidential* reporting "On 13 December, President Goodluck Jonathan announced that the government would spend a staggering 921 billion naira (US$5.5 bn.) of the N4,749 billion budget for 2012 on the armed forces and security services" ("The Business of Terror" 2011).

These solutions won't work if Nigerians do not tackle the underlining issues causing conflict in Nigeria in the first place: the economic structure of Nigeria, the lack of micro peace initiatives, i.e. peace entrepreneurs, and the availability of jobs. Nigeria is in desperate need of creative, "out of the box" solutions. The international community, given Nigeria's political and strategic importance, should think of creative solutions as well. Not the mere distribution of aid, but the strategic development of microfinance programs, targeted not at the upper echelons of Nigerian government, but at the local and state levels.

Policy Solutions

Reversing course and going micro: Raising peace entrepreneurs

As we witnessed in Iseyin, Nigeria, the peace entrepreneur group, MUCHAS, did not come about because of religious conflict. Several hundreds of Iseyin youths attempted to burn the royal palace, the seat of power, and the elders in the town recognized there needed to be a mechanism where leaders could effectively communicate to other leaders about impending problems and perceived injustice within the town. There was also recognition that there needed

to be mechanisms where students could voice their frustrations, and leaders who could tackle potentially inflammatory situations. The examination of organizations like MUCHAS in Iseyin helps expand our understanding of conflict management and successful innovative tools to ensure that similar conflicts do not occur elsewhere. Many misunderstandings in Northern Nigeria could be defused if an effective MUCHAS-type organization were in place. Rumors and insinuations typically precede many ethno-religious eruptions. "MUCHAS" type organizations at the grassroots level should be replicated and populated by individuals and leaders committed to peace and justice, and have substantial credible influence in their community. All decisions must be reinforced by Nigerian rule of law. Without the implementation of these policies, i.e. National Peace Policy, at grassroots levels, any successes or gains will be ephemeral. MUCHAS is successful because community members are sanctioned by communities who know and trust the leaders in the organization. You must have elites who 'buy into the system'. MUCHAS, peace entrepreneur-type organizations might be helpful in the 'South-South' but the most important key is arresting environmental degradation caused by petroleum extraction, and creating jobs for those who traditionally relied on agriculture and are now unable to do so.

Create jobs and put youths to work

Within the Nigerian context, we can say that the middle class is increasing. The African Development Bank estimates, fifteen million people exist within the middle class-- those making between $4 dollars and $20 dollars a day. This number jumps dramatically when those who make between $2-4 dollars a day are included bringing the middle class estimate to 34.5 million Nigerians. Nigeria has a bourgeoning youth population, nevertheless, with 70 percent of all

Nigerians are under 30 years old[22]; rampant unemployment in an economy based primarily on petroleum[23;] large economic disparities between the most affluent members of society; and corruption and malfeasance has infiltrated every aspect of government. Advanced-fee fraud, or "419", named after Nigerian Criminal Code concerning "Obtaining Property by False Pretenses; Cheating", is so endemic, popular movies and videos have immortalized "Yahoo Boys" and their dubious gains. According to (2005)"the "419" continued to grow as a majority industry in Nigeria, second only to oil (or in some accounts, third, after narcotics) as the nation's major export earner of foreign currency in the 1990s" (226). The popularity of these industries demonstrates that there are few options for jobs.

[22] Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, managing director of the World Bank, spoke recently in Lagos about the problems affecting Nigeria's youth population and development. Citing a recent Harvard Study, she estimated that 24 million jobs needed to be created in the next 10 years to half Nigeria' current unemployment problem (*Punch*, April 10, 2010).

[23] Most recent figures places Nigeria's unemployment rates as high as 19.7 percent on average, but almost half of 15-25 year olds living in urban areas are jobless according to Finance Minister Olusegun Aganga (Next, June 4, 2010)



Picture 2: Koranic School in Iseyin



Picture 3: Speaking to Iseyin students about the importance of education

Since Nigeria's petroleum industry is resource dependent and not human capital intensive, students and young people are left with few options. Religious extremism and militarism will not be eradicated with the influx of jobs, but it will help students invest in their own futures and invariably Nigeria's future. This will help institute fairness.

Support burgeoning industries like "Nollywood": Nigeria's Hollywood

As we consider creative ways for job creation within Nigeria, beyond petroleum, the support of Nigeria's "Nollywood", the world's third largest movie industry behind the United States' Hollywood and India's Bollywood, would help generate new jobs and greater opportunities for young people. Currently, Nollywood generates 500 million dollars a year, and is one of Nigeria's biggest private industries (Haynes 2007; Rice 2012). The National Council for Arts and Culture currently collaborates with Nollywood practitioners in the following ways by:

- Engaging practitioners in refresher courses by way of improving performance and delivery,
- Undertaking periodic training workshops to upgrade technical competence, Equipping relevant personnel with appropriate cultural impetus in characterization, context and role interpretations; and
- Improving on overall package of Nollywood productions among others (NCAC n.d.)

There should be more investment in the Nollywood industry. With government resources helping artists and entrepreneurs who would like to expand Nollywood's reach. The problem will be to increase development, yet curtail malfeasant behavior that is already rampant throughout Nigeria's government.



Picture 4: Sampling of Nollywood Films

Introduce a “Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways” type initiatives within Nigeria

Having lived in Lagos, for close to a year, and traveling extensively throughout the Southwest, the most notable problematic feature of Nigerian society is the condition of roads and




Picture 5: Lagos roads

infrastructure. Poor infrastructure, including roads, water, and electricity are detrimental to economic growth (C. A. Calderon and Servén 2004; C. Calderon and Servén 2008; Kessides 1993; Queiroz and Gautam 1992). These key features are necessary for development in Nigeria. These industries can put young people to work. The Nigerian system should model its efforts after the Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways which brought tremendous connectivity between rural and urban America.



Picture 6-7: Roads after Rain. Average Commute times from Iyana-Ipaja to Lagos, Ikoyi



extreme poverty[24] (World Bank 2012). The World Bank Development Program describes extreme poverty as living on less than US$1.25 a day. Yet this is the reality for two-thirds of Nigerians. Extreme poverty conjures up a myriad of visceral images: babies crying out for relief from hunger pains, men and women gaunt because nutritious foods are scarce and costly, to the spread of disease like dysentery, polio, malaria–ills long eradicated in the developed world. Within the context of conflict situations, extreme poverty and lack of upward mobility are the fertile breeding ground for extremist groups. As we may recall from Chapter 1, the radical, Islamic groups Maitatsine in 1980s, and Boko Haram now, is composed of poor, young men with little to no prospect of gainful employment. Within the context of Nigeria where petroleum dominates the economy and produces few domestic jobs, "there is no doubt that the Islamic movement appealed to the disinherited; Maitatsine recruited them deliberately, and they were attracted by his attacks on affluence and western materialism" (Isichei 1987, 201).

The international community can help with aid. Not the traditional avenues of aid such as large block grants and loans that are top-down, but rather bottom up approaches, namely, microfinance initiatives. The Millennium Development Goals established in 2000 is an international effort to help the world's developing economies to reach eight specific goals by 2015. These goals are to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality rates, improve

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24 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population): Population below $1.25 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day at 2005 international prices.

maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development. The international community made tremendous strides in Asia in countries like Bangladesh, but, regions like Africa, however, lag behind (United Nations 2010). Though the Millennium Corporation placed conditions on aid to ensure better practices—extreme poverty remains.

International aid is effective in some contexts and ineffective in others. Resources often given to the upper echelons of society and government, and are expected to trickle down to those most in need. Unfortunately, malfeasance and corruption usurp much needed resources away from those in extreme poverty (Easterly 2000; Hancock 1992; Svensson 2000). Some international development advocates propose aid by relieving the crushing debt load carried by many developing countries with the logic that if the developing countries had more resources at their disposal, not servicing debt, they could in turn invest those resources into their people. This approach alone is not enough, suggests Joseph Stigliz, former head of the World Bank. There are issues associated with giving large amounts of aid, namely the Dutch disease, "The IMF [the International Monetary Fund] warns about "Dutch disease" problems, when an influx of foreign exchange drives up the local currency's exchange rate, making it difficult to create jobs in the export sector or to protect jobs against cheaper foreign imports. Countries need to rely on themselves and mobilize domestic resources (although the IMF's frequent insistence on tight monetary and fiscal policies often makes this more difficult" (Stiglitz 2005). Funding micro-solutions to local economic entrepreneurs with either low or zero interest loans helps circumvent the issue of the "Dutch disease" and helps spur job growth. Unlike aid, these loans must be paid back.

Microfinance continues to be one of the most sustainable models available for development–where idealists and pragmatists interested in curtailing poverty and stimulating entrepreneurship can work together to achieve these aims. In Bangladesh, the World Bank extended $260 million dollars over ten years to six million of the country's poor (World Bank 2007). The results were substantial with borrowers reporting:

- 99% increase in income, often by more than 15%
- 96% improved quality of life
- 99% eat better and more food
- 99% are clothed better
- 86% live in better housing
- 88% are now able to send children to school
- 83% have better access to sanitation

Microfinance puts capital in the hands of those who need it the most, the poor. Investing in local businesses ensures not only personal advancements, as the Bangladesh example demonstrates, but encourages communal prosperity as well. Scholars do caution that microfinance schemes are not be a cure-all for alleviating poverty and may produce mixed results in the short term. (2009) randomly selected half of the one hundred and four slums in Hyderabad, India and placed a microfinance branch there. The study found that in the areas where a microfinance branch was placed, "average monthly expenditure per capita did not increase but expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas and the number of new businesses increased by one third". The study looks at effects fifteen to eighteen months after the introduction of the banks, a limited time horizon. In order to see effects, like in Bangladesh, it may take more time. Nigeria is currently perfecting its microfinance framework, but must deal with credible issues like timely repayment and harmonization in lending practices institutions and international donors (Anyanwu 2004; Olomola 2002).

Conclusion

The nature of conflict is complex and has multiple dimensions. As we have seen within the Yorùbá example, conflict and tensions do emerge; *Pax Yorùbá* does not exist completely, but peace entrepreneurs, key leaders, help to arrest conflict before escalation by affirming justice and fairness in Rawlsian terms. As Nigeria continues to deal with the issues associated with the extremist group, Boko Haram, the solutions ultimately will not be more guns or security forces. The key, in the long run, will be securing the economic future of the entire country outside of the petroleum industry. To uproot the roots of violence, a multi-track approach is necessary. First, leaders, at all levels, must exhibit the political will to intervene before conflict escalates and be true peace entrepreneurs. The MUCHAS example in Iseyin provides a great framework: community leaders, from multiple faiths, meeting regularly, identifying issues before they escalate, and constant engagement with young people. Second, economic initiatives like the ones mentioned above are important for job creation. Economic disparity is the breeding ground of extremism. Though correcting economic disparity will not solve all of Nigeria's conflict situations, religious, or otherwise, it is a beginning toward greater stability.

APPENDIX 1

53/243. Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace

A

DECLARATION ON A CULTURE OF PEACE

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Charter of the United Nations, including the purposes and principles embodied therein,

Recalling also the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which states that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed",

Recalling further the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[1] and other relevant international instruments of the United Nations system,

Recognizing that peace not only is the absence of conflict, but also requires a positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation,

Recognizing also that the end of the cold war has widened possibilities for strengthening a culture of peace,

Expressing deep concern about the persistence and proliferation of violence and conflict in various parts of the world,

Recognizing the need to eliminate all forms of discrimination and intolerance, including those based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status,

Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the "International Year for the Culture of Peace", and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 2001-2010 as the "International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World",

Recognizing the important role that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continues to play in the promotion of a culture of peace,

Solemnly proclaims the present Declaration on a Culture of Peace to the end that Governments, international organizations and civil society may be guided in their activity by its provisions to promote and strengthen a culture of peace in the new millennium:

Article 1

A culture of peace is a set of values, attitudes, traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life based on:

(*a*) Respect for life, ending of violence and promotion and practice of non-violence through education, dialogue and cooperation;

(*b*) Full respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

(*c*) Full respect for and promotion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(*d*) Commitment to peaceful settlement of conflicts;

(*e*) Efforts to meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations;

(*f*) Respect for and promotion of the right to development;

(*g*) Respect for and promotion of equal rights and opportunities for women and men;

(*h*) Respect for and promotion of the right of everyone to freedom of expression, opinion and information;

(*i*) Adherence to the principles of freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, solidarity, cooperation, pluralism, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations; and fostered by an enabling national and international environment conducive to peace.

Article 2

Progress in the fuller development of a culture of peace comes about through values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life conducive to the promotion of peace among individuals, groups and nations.

Article 3

The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally linked to:

(*a*) Promoting peaceful settlement of conflicts, mutual respect and understanding and international cooperation;

(*b*) Complying with international obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

(*c*) Promoting democracy, development and universal respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms;

(*d*) Enabling people at all levels to develop skills of dialogue, negotiation, consensus-building and peaceful resolution of differences;

(*e*) Strengthening democratic institutions and ensuring full participation in the development process;

(*f*) Eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing inequalities within and among nations;

(*g*) Promoting sustainable economic and social development;

(*h*) Eliminating all forms of discrimination against women through their empowerment and equal representation at all levels of decision-making;

(*i*) Ensuring respect for and promotion and protection of the rights of children;

(*j*) Ensuring free flow of information at all levels and enhancing access thereto;

(*k*) Increasing transparency and accountability in governance;

(*l*) Eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance;

(*m*) Advancing understanding, tolerance and solidarity among all civilizations, peoples and cultures, including towards ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities;

(*n*) Realizing fully the right of all peoples, including those living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, to self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and embodied in the International Covenants on Human Rights,[2] as well as in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

Article 4

Education at all levels is one of the principal means to build a culture of peace. In this context, human rights education is of particular importance.

Article 5

Governments have an essential role in promoting and strengthening a culture of peace.

Article 6

Civil society needs to be fully engaged in fuller development of a culture of peace.

Article 7

The educative and informative role of the media contributes to the promotion of a culture of peace.

Article 8

A key role in the promotion of a culture of peace belongs to parents, teachers, politicians, journalists, religious bodies and groups, intellectuals, those engaged in scientific, philosophical and creative and artistic activities, health and humanitarian workers, social workers, managers at various levels as well as to non-governmental organizations.

Article 9

The United Nations should continue to play a critical role in the promotion and strengthening of a culture of peace worldwide.

B

PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON A CULTURE OF PEACE

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on a Culture of Peace adopted on 13 September 1999,

Recalling its resolution 52/15 of 20 November 1997, by which it proclaimed the year 2000 as the "International Year for the Culture of Peace", and its resolution 53/25 of 10 November 1998, by which it proclaimed the period 2001-2010 as the "International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World";

Adopts the following Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace:

A. *Aims, strategies and main actors*

1. The Programme of Action should serve as the basis for the International Year for the Culture of Peace and the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the Children of the World.

2. Member States are encouraged to take actions for promoting a culture of peace at the national level as well as at the regional and international levels.

3. Civil society should be involved at the local, regional and national levels to widen the scope of activities on a culture of peace.

4. The United Nations system should strengthen its ongoing efforts to promote a culture of peace.

5. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization should continue to play its important role in and make major contributions to the promotion of a culture of peace.

6. Partnerships between and among the various actors as set out in the Declaration should be encouraged and strengthened for a global movement for a culture of peace.

7. A culture of peace could be promoted through sharing of information among actors on their initiatives in this regard.

8. Effective implementation of the Programme of Action requires mobilization of resources, including financial resources, by interested Governments, organizations and individuals.

B. *Strengthening actions at the national, regional and international levels by all relevant actors*

9. Actions to foster a culture of peace through education:

(*a*) Reinvigorate national efforts and international cooperation to promote the goals of education for all with a view to achieving human, social and economic development and for promoting a culture of peace;

(*b*) Ensure that children, from an early age, benefit from education on the values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life to enable them to resolve any dispute peacefully and in a spirit of respect for human dignity and of tolerance and non-discrimination;

(*c*) Involve children in activities designed to instill in them the values and goals of a culture of peace;

(*d*) Ensure equality of access to education for women, especially girls;

(*e*) Encourage revision of educational curricula, including textbooks, bearing in mind the 1995 Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy[3] for which technical cooperation should be provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization upon request;

(*f*) Encourage and strengthen efforts by actors as identified in the Declaration, in particular the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, aimed at developing values and skills conducive to a culture of peace, including education and training in promoting dialogue and consensus-building;

(*g*) Strengthen the ongoing efforts of the relevant entities of the United Nations system aimed at training and education, where appropriate, in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management, peaceful settlement of disputes, as well as in post-conflict peace-building;

(*h*) Expand initiatives to promote a culture of peace undertaken by institutions of higher education in various parts of the world, including the United Nations University, the University for Peace and the project for twinning universities and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Chairs Programme.

10. Actions to promote sustainable economic and social development:

(*a*) Undertake comprehensive actions on the basis of appropriate strategies and agreed targets to eradicate poverty through national and international efforts, including through international cooperation;

(*b*) Strengthen the national capacity for implementation of policies and programmes designed to reduce economic and social inequalities within nations through, *inter alia*, international cooperation;

(*c*) Promote effective and equitable development-oriented and durable solutions to the external debt and debt-servicing problems of developing countries through, *inter alia*, debt relief;

(*d*) Reinforce actions at all levels to implement national strategies for sustainable food security, including the development of actions to mobilize and optimize the allocation and utilization of resources from all sources, including through international cooperation, such as resources coming from debt relief;

(*e*) Undertake further efforts to ensure that the development process is participatory and that development projects involve the full participation of all;

(*f*) Include a gender perspective and empowerment of women and girls as an integral part of the development process;

(*g*) Include in development strategies special measures focusing on needs of women and children as well as groups with special needs;

(*h*) Strengthen, through development assistance in post-conflict situations, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconciliation processes involving all engaged in conflicts;

(*i*) Incorporate capacity-building in development strategies and projects to ensure environmental sustainability, including preservation and regeneration of the natural resource base;

(*j*) Remove obstacles to the realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, in particular of peoples living under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, which adversely affect their social and economic development.

11. Actions to promote respect for all human rights:

(*a*) Full implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;[4]

(*b*) Encouragement of development of national plans of action for the promotion and protection of all human rights;

(*c*) Strengthening of national institutions and capacities in the field of human rights, including through national human rights institutions;

(*d*) Realization and implementation of the right to development, as established in the Declaration on the Right to Development[5] and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action;

(*e*) Achievement of the goals of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004);[6]

(*f*) Dissemination and promotion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at all levels;

(*g*) Further support to the activities of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in the fulfilment of her or his mandate as established in General Assembly resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, as well as the responsibilities set by subsequent resolutions and decisions.

12. Actions to ensure equality between women and men:

(*a*) Integration of a gender perspective into the implementation of all relevant international instruments;

(*b*) Further implementation of international instruments that promote equality between women and men;

(*c*) Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women,[7] with adequate resources and political will, and through, *inter alia*, the elaboration, implementation and follow-up of the national plans of action;

(*d*) Promotion of equality between women and men in economic, social and political decision-making;

(*e*) Further strengthening of efforts by the relevant entities of the United Nations system for the elimination of all forms of discrimination and violence against women;

(*f*) Provision of support and assistance to women who have become victims of any forms of violence, including in the home, workplace and during armed conflicts.

13. Actions to foster democratic participation:

(*a*) Reinforcement of the full range of actions to promote democratic principles and practices;

(*b*) Special emphasis on democratic principles and practices at all levels of formal, informal and non-formal education;

(*c*) Establishment and strengthening of national institutions and processes that promote and sustain democracy through, *inter alia*, training and capacity-building of public officials;

(*d*) Strengthening of democratic participation through, inter alia, the provision of electoral assistance upon the request of States concerned and based on relevant United Nations guidelines;

(*e*) Combating of terrorism, organized crime, corruption as well as production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs and money laundering, as they undermine democracies and impede the fuller development of a culture of peace.

14. Actions to advance understanding, tolerance and solidarity:

(*a*) Implement the Declaration of Principles on Tolerance and the Follow-up Plan of Action for the United Nations Year for Tolerance[8] (1995);

(*b*) Support activities in the context of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations in the year 2001;

(*c*) Study further the local or indigenous practices and traditions of dispute settlement and promotion of tolerance with the objective of learning from them;

(*d*) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance and solidarity throughout society, in particular with vulnerable groups;

(*e*) Further support the attainment of the goals of the International Decade of the World's Indigenous People;

(*f*) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with refugees and displaced persons, bearing in mind the objective of facilitating their voluntary return and social integration;

(*g*) Support actions that foster tolerance and solidarity with migrants;

(*h*) Promote increased understanding, tolerance and cooperation among all peoples through, inter alia, appropriate use of new technologies and dissemination of information;

(*i*) Support actions that foster understanding, tolerance, solidarity and cooperation among peoples and within and among nations.

15. Actions to support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge:

(*a*) Support the important role of the media in the promotion of a culture of peace;

(*b*) Ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information and communication;

(*c*) Make effective use of the media for advocacy and dissemination of information on a culture of peace involving, as appropriate, the United Nations and relevant regional, national and local mechanisms;

(*d*) Promote mass communication that enables communities to express their needs and participate in decision-making;

(*e*) Take measures to address the issue of violence in the media, including new communication technologies, *inter alia*, the Internet;

(*f*) Increase efforts to promote the sharing of information on new information technologies, including the Internet.

16. Actions to promote international peace and security:

(*a*) Promote general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, taking into account the priorities established by the United Nations in the field of disarmament;

(*b*) Draw, where appropriate, on lessons conducive to a culture of peace learned from "military conversion" efforts as evidenced in some countries of the world;

(*c*) Emphasize the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in all parts of the world;

(*d*) Encourage confidence-building measures and efforts for negotiating peaceful settlements;

(*e*) Take measures to eliminate illicit production and traffic of small arms and light weapons;

(*f*) Support initiatives, at the national, regional and international levels, to address concrete problems arising from post-conflict situations, such as demobilization, reintegration of former combatants into society, as well as refugees and displaced persons, weapon collection programmes, exchange of information and confidence-building;

(*g*) Discourage the adoption of and refrain from any unilateral measure, not in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, that impedes the full achievement of economic and social development by the population of the affected countries, in particular women and children, that hinders their well-being, that creates obstacles to the full enjoyment of their human rights, including the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for their

health and well-being and their right to food, medical care and the necessary social services, while reaffirming that food and medicine must not be used as a tool for political pressure;

(*h*) Refrain from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion, not in accordance with international law and the Charter, aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of any State;

(*i*) Recommend proper consideration for the issue of the humanitarian impact of sanctions, in particular on women and children, with a view to minimizing the humanitarian effects of sanctions;

(*j*) Promote greater involvement of women in prevention and resolution of conflicts and, in particular, in activities promoting a culture of peace in post-conflict situations;

(*k*) Promote initiatives in conflict situations such as days of tranquillity to carry out immunization and medicine distribution campaigns, corridors of peace to ensure delivery of humanitarian supplies and sanctuaries of peace to respect the central role of health and medical institutions such as hospitals and clinics;

(*l*) Encourage training in techniques for the understanding, prevention and resolution of conflict for the concerned staff of the United Nations, relevant regional organizations and Member States, upon request, where appropriate.

APPENDIX 2

Questionnaire Results (Pilot Study)

Table 1

Laitin's Original Research Sites (Anglican Church and Central Mosque)

Question 1: Each person has several ways of identifying him/herself: nationality, religion, ethnic group, gender, personality, and point of view. For you, what identity is most important?

Anglican Church (N=32)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	25
Religion	47
Ethnic group	6
Gender	3
None given	19

Central Mosque (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	9
Religion	57
Ethnic group	9
Other given	17
Multiple identities given	9

Question 2: Which identity would you place second?

Anglican Church (N=32)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	22
Religion	19
Ethnic group	22
Personality	13
None given	19

Central Mosque (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	26
Religion	35
Ethnic group	26
Personality	4
Other given	9

Question 3: Who would you prefer to vote for: a person from your ancestral city; a person from your religion; doesn't matter, and none given.

Anglican Church (N=32)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person of your ancestral city	19
A person from your religion	41
Don't matter	28
Alternative answer given	3
None given	9

Central Mosque (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	13
A person from your religion	48
Doesn't matter	26
Multiple identities given	4
None given	9

Table 2

Question 3: Who would you prefer to vote for: a person from your ancestral city; a person from your religion; doesn't matter; and none given?

All sites (N=133)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	14
A person from your religion	40
Doesn't Matter	36
Multiple Choice Given	2
None given	8

Christian sites vs. Muslim site

Christian sites (N=110)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	15
A person from your religion	38
Doesn't Matter	38
Multiple Choices Given	2
None given	7

Muslim site (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	13
A person from your religion	48
Doesn't Matter	26
Multiple Choice Given	4
None given	9

Pentecostal vs. non-Pentecostal sites

Pentecostal sites (N=78)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	13
A person from your religion	37
Doesn't Matter	42
Multiple Choice Given	1
None given	6

Non-Pentecostal sites (N=55)	
Identities	***Percentage***
A person from your ancestral city	16
A person from your religion	44
Doesn't Matter	27
Multiple Choice Given	4
None given	9

Table 3

Question 1: Each person has several ways of identifying him/herself: nationality, religion, ethnic group, gender, personality, point of view. For you, what identity is most important?

All sites

All sites (N=133)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	22
Religion	45
Ethnic group	5
Gender	4
Personality	10
Point of view	1
Other given	6
Multiple identities given	5
None given	6

Christian sites vs. Muslim site

Christian sites (N=110)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	25
Religion	43
Ethnic group	5
Gender	4
Personality	9
Point of view	1
Other given	4
Multiple identities given	4
None given	0

Muslim site (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	9
Religion	57
Ethnic group	9
Gender	0
Personality	0
Point of view	0
Other given	17
Multiple identities given	9
None given	0

Pentecostal vs. non-Pentecostal sites

Pentecostal sites (N=78)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	24
Religion	41
Ethnic group	4
Gender	3
Personality	13
Point of view	1
Other given	5
Multiple identities given	5
None given	3

Non-Pentecostal sites (N=55)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	18
Religion	51
Ethnic group	7
Gender	2
Personality	0
Point of view	0
Other given	7
Multiple identities given	4
None given	11

Table 4

Question 2: Which identity would you place second?

All sites (N=133)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	14
Religion	27
Ethnic group	23
Gender	6
Personality	10
Point of view	4
Other given	7
Multiple identities given	1
None given	9

Christian sites vs. Muslim site

Christian sites (N=110)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	12
Religion	25
Ethnic group	22
Gender	7
Personality	11
Point of view	5
Other given	6
Multiple identities given	1
None given	11

Muslim site (N=23)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	26
Religion	35
Ethnic group	26
Gender	0
Personality	4
Point of view	0
Other given	9
Multiple identities given	0
None given	0

Pentecostal vs. non-Pentecostal sites

Pentecostal sites (N=78)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	8
Religion	28
Ethnic group	22
Gender	10
Personality	10
Point of view	5
Other given	9
Multiple identities given	1
None given	6

Non-Pentecostal sites (N=55)	
Identities	***Percentage***
Nationality	24
Religion	25
Ethnic group	24
Gender	0
Personality	9
Point of view	2
Other given	4
Multiple identities given	0
None given	13

APPENDIX 3

Survey (Pilot Study)

Location: _____

Name: _____

Site:_____

Observation Number_____

Date_____

Time_____

Survey administer: _____

1. Gender: Male _____ Female _____

2. Please indicate your age group: _____18-30 _____ 31-40 ____ 41-50 _____ 51-60 _____ 61+

3. What religion are you?: ___Christian ____ Muslim _____Traditional Worshipper ____ Other _____Atheist/Agnostic

3a. If you indicated a religion above, which religious sect are you part of specifically?:

1. _____Muslim: specify sect:_____
2. _____Mainline Christian (Anglican, Catholic, Jehovah Witness, etc)
3. _____Western Pentecostalism (Four Square, Assembly of God)
4. _____New Pentecostalism (Redeemed, Winner's Chapel)
5. _____African Churches (CAC, Celestial)
6. _____Traditional Religion Worshipper
7. _____Other: _____

4. Are you married?:

1) Yes
2) No

4a. If married, what is your first spouse's religion: ___Christian; ____ Muslim ; _____Traditional Worshipper ; ___ Other (specify)_____; _____Atheist/Agnostic

5. Do you have more then one spouse? If so, do they all have the same faith as you?

1) Yes
2) No

6. Are you working currently?

1) Yes
2) No
3) Retired
4) Disabled
5) Unemployed
6) Underemployed

7. What is your Ethnic group? :
   1. _____ Igbo
   2. _____ Hausa-Fulani
   3. _____ Yorùbá
   4. _____ Other (please list) _____

8. What is your ancestral city?: _____

9. Where do you live currently?_____ .

   a. How long have you lived there?_____

10. There are numerous ways that someone can identify themselves, what is the primary way in which you identify yourself?:
    1. _____Nationality
    2. _____Religion
    3. _____Ethnic group
    4. _____Ancestral City
    5. _____Gender
    6. _____Other (specify) _____

11. There are numerous ways that someone can identify themselves, what is the secondary way in which you identify yourself?:
    1. _____Nationality
    2. _____Religion
    3. _____Ethnic group
    4. _____Ancestral City
    5. _____Gender
    6. _____Other (specify) _____

12. Did you vote in the last presidential election?
    1. _____Yes
    2. _____No
    3. _____Refuse to Answer/No answer

13. Did you vote in the last election for governor?
    1. _____Yes
    2. _____No
    3. _____Refuse to Answer/ No answer

14. Did you vote in the last election for State House of Assembly?
    1. _____Yes
    2. _____No
    3. _____Refuse to Answer

15. Who would you prefer to vote for:
    1. _____A person from your ancestral city/ethnicity
    2. _____ A person from your religion
    3. _____ Doesn't matter
    4. _____No answer given

16. Explain your answer: _____

_____

_____

17. To whom do you feel closer:
    1. _____A person from your ancestral city/ethnicity
    2. _____ A person from your religion
    3. _____ Doesn't matter
    4. _____No answer given

18. Explain your answer: _____

_____

_____

19. Sharia, Islamic law, was recently implemented in several northern Nigerian states. Should *Civil Sharia* law (Marriage, Inheritance, and Burial) be implemented in Yorùbáland?

_____Strongly agree
_____Agree
_____Disagree
_____Strongly disagree
_____Don't know
_____No answer given

20. Explain your answer: _____

21. Sharia, Islamic law, was recently implemented in several northern Nigerian states. Should *Criminal Sharia* law be implemented in Yorùbáland?

_____Strongly agree
_____Agree
_____Disagree

_____Strongly disagree
_____Don't know
_____No answer given

22. Explain your answer: _____

23. Which person would be most helpful if you were facing a serious problem? Chose one:

_____Your religious leader
_____Your boss at work
_____Your neighborhood or ward councilor
_____The leader of your social group or club
_____The leader/chairperson of your town union
_____Personal friend
_____Alternative answer given (specify_____)
_____No answer given

24. Explain your answer: _____

25. Please rank the following contemporary national issues in order of importance:

1. Corruption _____
2. Education _____
3. Security of life and property _____
4. Electricity _____
5. Employment _____
6. Problems in the Niger Delta _____
7. Disagreement and violence between political parties _____
8. Problems in the Middle Belt/North _____
9. No answer given _____

26. Explain your answer: _____

27. Have you attended school?

1. _____Yes
2. _____No
3. _____No answer given

28. If yes, highest level of education you have completed:

1. _____Primary school
2. _____Secondary school
3. _____Some college or university
4. _____University, College or Technology Graduate
5. _____Post-graduate
6. _____No formal schooling
7. _____No answer given

29. Do you read a national newspaper?

1. _____Almost always
2. _____Most of the time
3. _____Some of the time
4. _____Almost never
5. _____No answer given

30. How often do you watch or read the local news?

1. _____Almost always
2. _____Most of the time
3. _____Some of the time
4. _____Almost never
5. _____No answer given

31. Could you or your children marry a person of a different religion?

1. _____Yes
2. _____No
3. _____Don't know

32. Explain your answer: _____

33. How often do you pray?:

1. _____Daily
2. _____Up to 2 times a week
3. _____Up to 3 times a week
4. _____Occasionally
5. _____Never
6. _____None given

34. Do you attend weekly services?

1. _____Almost always
2. _____Most of the time
3. _____Some of the time
4. _____Almost never
5. _____None given

35. Have you discussed politics during the past year?

1. _____Never
2. _____No, but would do so if had the chance
3. _____Yes, once or twice
4. _____Yes, several times
5. _____Yes, often?

6. _____None Given

36. Explain your answer: _____

37. What is your primary mode of transportation?
_____Okadas (motorcycles)
_____Public Transport
_____I own my car
_____Other (Specify: _____)
_____No Answer Given

38. How many cars do you own in your nuclear family?
_____List Number given
_____No cars are owned by nuclear family
_____No Answer Given

39. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 'A' or Statement 'B'.
'A': In order to make decisions in our community, we should talk until everyone agree.
'B': Since we will never agree on everything, we must learn to accept differences of opinion within our community."
None Given

40. Explain your answer: _____

41. Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 'A' or Statement 'B'.
'A': Political parties create division and confusion; it is therefore unnecessary to have many political parties in Nigeria.
'B': Many political parties are needed to make sure that Nigerians have real choices in who governs them
None Given

42. Explain your answer: _____

43. "Please tell me whether you disapprove or approve of the following: Every religion and church in this country should be allowed to promote its beliefs and values.
_____Strongly Disapprove.
_____Disapprove.
_____Neither Disapprove nor Approve.
_____Approve.
_____Strongly Approve.
_____None Given

44. Explain your answer: _____

APPENDIX 4

Interview Schedule (In-depth Interview)—Second Study

1. Can you tell me a little about yourself? What is your role in this community?

2. Some people say that the Yorùbá are tolerant people. In your opinion, is that true?

3. Have you witnessed or heard of any religious riots in Yorùbáland? If so, when did it occur? What were the issues at hand? Who was involved? How was it resolved? Who was instrumental in helping to resolve the riot, issues, or misunderstandings?

4. Have these conflicts always been around? Are they new? How about before? Why do you think things have changed?

5. Do you know of any inter-religious organization in your town or in others that help to resolve conflict or misunderstandings if and when they occur?

6. In your opinion, are Muslim-Christian relations in the North, the same as Muslim--Christian relations in the south and/or Yorubland? Explain.

7. If and when, religious violence breaks out in your town or elsewhere, do your religious leaders ever comment upon it? If so, what do they say or do?

8. If and when religious violence breaks out, here or elsewhere, are you or your friends personally affected? If yes, how so?

9. In your opinion, what is the cause of religious violence in general? What about in the North; in the Middle Belt; and here?

10. Who is Chief Obafemi Awolowo? What did he do? What comes to mind when you hear his name? What is his legacy in your opinion?

11. Who was M.K.O. Abiola? What did he do? What comes to mind when you hear his name? What is his legacy in your opinion?

12. What happened on June 12th, 1993? Describe the events that occurred on this day. Did the events of that day have any personal impact upon you and your family? What of the nation as a whole? Explain.

13. Who is Oduduwa? What did he do? Why is he important? What comes to mind when you hear his name?

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