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Under Color of (International) Law: Race and the Global Legal Order

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Bianca Freeman

Committee in charge:

Professor David A. Lake, Chair
Professor LaGina Gause
Professor Emilie Hafner-Burton
Professor Stephan Haggard
Professor Christina Schneider
Professor Jakana Thomas

2024

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University of California San Diego

2024

Dedication

To Mom, Dad, and Nicholas.

And, for the students sitting in an introduction to international relations classroom (including my younger self).

Epigraph

The function, the very serious function of racism is distraction. It keeps you from doing your work. It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being.

— Toni Morrison

To the extent that it prevails, Westphalian commonsense translates into the perception of a normative lack when it comes to postcolonial Africa. Instead of treating the African condition as evidence that undermines the empirical thesis of a uniform international morality, theorists often construe deviations from the Western state model as a sign of the inability of African states to live up to the requirements of sovereignty.

— Siba N. Grovogui

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have happened without the steadfast guidance and support of so many people along the way. First, I express my deepest gratitude for the sacrifices of my mom, dad, and twin brother. Their love and confidence in me have been my anchor, especially during the more challenging seasons of graduate school. This project is the fruit of their firm belief in my capacity to strive and embrace new opportunities at each stage. Every late-night pep talk was what I needed to hear. Every nugget of wisdom on the car ride to campus kept me clear. Their empathy was a gift through which I learned greater patience and self-compassion while growing throughout the dissertation process. I thank my family for heartening me to "finish my course and keep the faith." They nurtured this in me from an early age, and I rely on it today.

I am indebted to my dissertation committee for providing the strongest mentorship and intellectual home a student could ask for. I cannot overstate this point. Transparently, I had little understanding of what I signed up for by pursuing a doctoral program at UCSD Political Science. However, a passing conversation about race at an IR subfield lunch (go figure!) for prospective students would set the trajectory of my career and life. This conversation was with David Lake. In retrospect, he saw my potential to become a political scientist before I did. He gave me the building blocks to conduct empirical research, empowering me to develop theory-driven explanations for what we observe in world politics. Put simply, he teaches students "how to fish." David never assumed that I already had exposure to a certain skillset or topic. Instead, he made the curriculum—spoken and unspoken—accessible. He met me where I was. I lack the space in this acknowledgement to further articulate why this meant so much to me. David answered my questions, helped me work through ideas, encouraged me to take risks, and carved out a research agenda that aligned with my convictions and kept me curious about IR. His

dedication, foresight, and kindness as an advisor and dissertation chair were invaluable to this project and my ability to advance to the next stage in the profession. I think it will take me a career twice over to make good on all that David imparts. This dissertation is an imperfect, first step.

Christina Schneider and Emilie Hafner-Burton have been unwavering in their enthusiasm and sage advice for developing my research with an IR audience in mind. The community they create for graduate students, like IO Workshop and ILAR, were welcoming spaces for me to receive extensive feedback on my seminar paper. Christina and Emilie believed in the project's potential and stuck with me through multiple rounds of Revise & Resubmit. They were also generous with their support while I applied for fellowships and jobs. Christina and Emilie are unmatched, and I am forever grateful to them.

Throughout my time at UCSD, LaGina Gause has been a tremendous mentor and example. She willingly took a chance on advising an IR student! I am one of many that benefit from her expertise and commitment to graduate student success. She worked with me to refine my project and become more forthright and self-assured in my argumentation. She answered my questions about the profession and created opportunities for me to learn via REP Workshop and the research lab, APSA, and the Ralph Bunche Summer Institute. Her support across years and during the job market was essential. I'll always be grateful to LaGina for all that she invested in me. I'll be paying it forward for a long time.

I was incredibly fortunate to have Jakana Thomas on my committee. Her wisdom, encouragement, and candor were true guides for me in navigating a plan for an academic career. On several occasions, Jakana gave me very detailed and intentional feedback on my research and job market applications. She even taught me how to write a response to the reviewers (at the

time, I did not know we did that!). I often reflect on our conversations about the ebbs and flows of the career and greatly admire Jakana's scholarship and the example she sets. She did not have to agree to serve on my dissertation committee (while in my fifth year after she arrived to UCSD), but I am eternally glad that she did.

I also express my sincere thanks to Stephan Haggard. During the pandemic and remote learning, he said "yes" to a meeting with a student he did not know to discuss a dissertation prospectus. In that meeting, Steph listened to my ideas and reinforced my excitement about Status of Forces Agreements and the bigger picture of developing theory derived from world history rather than from a set of exclusively Eurocentric cases. This ambition immediately resonated with me. Steph's willingness to engage my work at different stages has been so appreciated.

A dissertation and five seasons of Insecure episodes later (my favorite show; shout out Issa Rae), I believe having a committee like this and belonging to a graduate program like this have made all the difference.

I am filled with gratitude for my UC Riverside mentors from my undergraduate and master's studies: Bronwyn A. Leebaw (my honors thesis advisor), John Christian Laursen, David Brady, and Francisco Pedraza. They gave me a foundation in the social sciences, believed in me, shaped my success at UCR, and supported my applications to doctoral programs. I also thank my friends, fellow students, and colleagues throughout the discipline whose feedback and encouragement gave me momentum and made me a better scholar. I will be fortunate to return even a fraction of what these colleagues have given me.

Generous support from several organizations made this research possible, including the UC Office of the President, UC San Diego Graduate Division, and the UC Institute on Global

Conflict and Cooperation (UCIGCC). The views in this dissertation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of colleagues, the UC Office of the President, UCSD, or UCIGCC.

Part I, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in the *Annual Review of Political Science*. Bianca Freeman; Kim, D.G.; and Lake, David A. Race in International Relations: Beyond the "Norm Against Noticing." *Annual Review of Political Science* 25 (2022): 175-196. Part II, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in the Race and Security Special Issue at *Security Studies*. Bianca Freeman. Racial Hierarchy and Jurisdiction in U.S. Status of Forces Agreements. *Security Studies* 32.4-5 (2023): 748-774. The dissertation author was the only investigator and author of this paper. Part IV is a co-authored project with William Nomikos.

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Abstract of Dissertation

Under Color of (International) Law: Race and the Global Legal Order

by

Bianca Freeman

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California San Diego, 2024

Professor David A. Lake, Chair

Global movements for racial justice and events like the murder of George Floyd are profound reminders that the law itself is often biased by racism. Many countries—advanced democracies included—have long hidden racism behind the principle of equality before the law in domestic politics. Despite conventional assumptions about formal equality between sovereign states, I suggest that international law cloaks race in similar fashion.

How does racism shape the application and enforcement of international law? Principally, I argue that international laws are exercised unevenly along the lines of constructed racial difference. Race positions actors in relation to each other, privileging a Western-centric, and thus, white-dominant order. It is within this racial regime that beliefs about capacity for self-governance are comprehensively formed and contested in a society—domestic and international. Countries below the 'color line' are essentialized as "deficient" and in need of assistance or corrective action by North American or European states. When state capacity is racialized, international rules and norms are exercised disparately by race even while espousing formal equality between states.

After taking stock of the literature in Part I, I examine three legal outcomes of racial hierarchy in world politics. In Part II, I code the jurisdiction clauses of 254 U.S. Status of Forces Agreements to estimate its determinants. I find that the United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly white host states, allowing these peer countries to try U.S. personnel, while withholding this same right from most non-white host partners, ceteris paribus. These results are complimented by qualitative evidence. In Part III, I use original data on mass atrocity events and a statistical matching strategy to examine the Responsibility to Protect cross-nationally. I find that the United Nations is more likely to associate a failure to protect with countries racialized as black, controlling for atrocity and state

capacity. A final project in Part IV merges existing geo-referenced, cross-national data on social identity of local populations and the country of origin and deployment patterns of UN peacekeepers to measure a relationship between peacekeeper race and local violence reduction.

PART I: Race in International Relations: Beyond the "Norm Against Noticing"

The murder in May 2020 of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police officer, who used his knee to press Floyd's throat into the street, was a catalyst for a global racial reckoning. Floyd's death spurred protests on every continent, even Antarctica. The now global movement for racial justice, embodied in the Black Lives Matter and Rhodes Must Fall movements, begun in 2013 and 2015, respectively, has sparked new attention by majority communities to the systemic racism long experienced and felt by minority groups around the world.

Black-led civic movements animate the links between domestic and international politics.[1] Ongoing struggles against state-sanctioned violence toward unarmed Black men and women in the United States resonate in countries facing similar crises.[2] From Nairobi to Tokyo to Buenos Aires, movements in solidarity for racial equality are themselves a feature of an interconnected world. Amplified by the concomitant rise of far-right political movements across the globe that seek to challenge antiracism,[3] the implications of racial justice are transnational.

At the height of the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), the world also witnessed a global surge in anti-Asian sentiment and hate crimes. In the United States, President

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[1] Tillery Jr, Alvin B. *Between Homeland and Motherland: Africa, US Foreign Policy, and Black Leadership in America*. Cornell University Press, 2011; Henderson, Errol A. *African Realism?: International Relations Theory and Africa's Wars in the Postcolonial Era*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2015; Getachew, Adom. *Worldmaking after empire: The rise and fall of self-determination*. Princeton University Press, 2019.

[2] Powell, Catherine. "“Viral Convergence”: Interconnected Pandemics as Portal to Racial Justice." *Viral Convergence Interconnected Pandemics as Portal to Racial Justice, chapter in Race and National Security* (2022): 41-55; Stephan, Maria. “How domestic civic movements could reshape US foreign policy.” *Just Security*, (2021).

[3] Sabaratnam, Meera. "Is IR theory white? Racialised subject-positioning in three canonical texts." *Millennium* 49, no. 1 (2020): 3-31.

Trump and top government officials insisted on referring to COVID-19 as the "Chinese virus," the "Wuhan virus," or even the "kung flu," accelerating the racialization of not only the health crisis but also the country's deteriorating relations with China. Anti-Asian sentiments and incidents were not confined to the United States. Though it later apologized, a French newspaper declared the virus the "Yellow Peril," prompting the social media hashtag #JeNeSuisPasUnVirus ("I am not a virus") in response. Human rights groups in Brazil, South Africa, and Russia reported COVID-19-related attacks on people of Asian descent. In May 2020, Malaysian authorities raided Rohingya refugee and migrant communities with the pretext of reducing COVID-19 spread.[4] The pandemic appears to have intensified trends toward greater nationalism and xenophobia across the globe.

Race and racism have long been ignored by scholars of international relations (IR). W.E.B. Du Bois famously wrote in 1906 that "the Negro problem in America is but a local phase of a world problem."[5] And as we discuss below, critical theorists have long decried the silence of IR scholars on race, and postcolonial scholars have forefronted the role of race in colonialism. Yet, until very recently, race and racism have received relatively little attention in the field's major journals. Vitalis,[6] citing Toni Morrison,[7] calls this pattern the "norm against noticing," the practice of overlooking and denying race and racism as factors in world politics. Despite this

[4] Peter, Zsombor. "Malaysia Rounds up Hundreds of Undocumented Migrants amid Coronavirus Fears." *Diakses dalam: https://www. voanews. com/east-asia-pacific/malaysia-roundshundreds-undocumented-migrants-amid-coronavirus-fears* (2020).

[5] Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt. *WEB Du Bois on Asia: Crossing the world color line*. Univ. Press of Mississippi, 2005 (1906).

[6] Vitalis, Robert. "The graceful and generous liberal gesture: Making racism invisible in American international relations." *Millennium* 29, no. 2 (2000): 331-356.

[7] Morrison, Toni. "Playing in the dark: Whiteness and the literary imagination." *Modern Philology* 92, no. 2 (1994): 267-271.

neglect, however, it is exceedingly unlikely that systemic racism, now propelled to broader public consciousness, ends at the water's edge a myth about domestic politics once believed to characterize international politics.

Our supposition in this review is that attention to race and racism not only by critical theorists but also by positivist scholars will reveal previously overlooked and important dimensions of world politics. We propose a framework that sketches out the intersecting relationships between hierarchical racial norms, international law, and foreign policy and practice, demonstrating that race can help explain patterns of behavior and interstate interactions that sustain an unequal global system. In doing so, we build on insights from new studies of hierarchy in international relations that open the door for better understandings of race in world politics. Based on the framework, we then review both classical and recent studies in the field that focus on race as a key theoretical element.

We posit two faces of racism in international relations: one that perceives majority non-White countries as deficient in essential domestic or international capabilities and a second that perceives these same countries as inherently aggressive and threatening. Examining the first face, in parallel with domestic law and its enforcement, we discuss several ways in which international law is both biased and unevenly enforced. We then suggest how this normative dissonance influences decisions to intervene in other states. Turning to the second face, we focus on how race and racism affect foreign threat perceptions and conceptions of national interest, two core concepts in IR. We show that race and racism can have far-reaching effects on the conduct of foreign policy on a wide range of issue domains from alliance politics to the rise of China.
We proceed in three major parts. First, we summarize the critique of IR scholarship as silent on race, discussing the prevailing norm against noticing and noteworthy, yet heretofore

marginalized, scholarly efforts to overcome this norm. Second, we outline our analytic framework and apply it to the two faces of racism. The final section discusses key methodological and empirical challenges that scholars need to address in further advancing empirical research on race in IR.

1.1 The Norm Against Noticing in International Relations

The field of IR is grappling with renewed calls to reform its longstanding elision of race, manifested most recently in Foreign Policy[8] and Foreign Affairs.[9] These interventions have since been complemented by various public speaker series, webinars, and discussion forums, each retrieving important contributions that criticize IR scholarship as silent on race. Those that expose and contest this silence aptly describe it as particularly tenacious in mainstream IR, especially research that appears in the discipline's top journals. While new efforts are being made to take race seriously, such as Búzás's piece[10] in the 75th anniversary special issue of International Organization and the special issue calls on race by Security Studies and Security Dialogue, IR scholars are still coming to terms with a discipline that is historically reluctant to address questions of race.

The notion that IR is colorblind has long been interrogated. Seminal critiques of this notion, of which the norm against noticing is a contemporary interpretation, lay bare the

[8] Bhambra, Gurminder K., Yolande Bouka, Randolph B. Persaud, Olivia U. Rutazibwa, Vineet Thakur, Duncan Bell, Karen Smith, Toni Hasstrup, and Seifudein Adem. "Why is Mainstream International Relations Blind to Racism?" *Foreign Policy* (2020); Shilliam, Robbie. "When did racism become solely a domestic issue." *Foreign Policy* 23 (2020); Zvobgo, Kelebogile, and Meredith Loken. "Why race matters in international relations." (2020).

[9] Blain, Keisha N. "CIVIL RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL The Fight Against Racism Has Always Been Global." In *The Long Year: A 2020 Reader*, pp. 157-170. Columbia University Press, 2022.

[10] Búzás, Zoltán I. "Racism and antiracism in the liberal international order." *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 440-463.

centrality of race and racism in the making of an intellectual and professional discipline. The mythology of a colorblind tradition in American IR was rendered explicit by early disciplinary work on the role of White supremacy in worldmaking. To the forebears of this critique, what was often taken to be race neutral was, in practice, silence and evasion about the African presence in world politics. As Krishna explains, race constitutes a crucial epistemic silence around which modern IR is continuously made and coheres.[11] For Krishna, contemporary IR discourse is predicated on a systematic politics of forgetting, an abstraction from the role of racialized violence in the construction of nation-states and the system they inhabit.

As the discipline developed, the timeless problems of anarchy and the security dilemma came to define the core questions of IR in line with Cold War imperatives, making race irrelevant for many scholars. Relations between states, where material power and national interest shape behavior, were assumed to occur above the supposedly domestic issue of race. Intellectual commitment to the assumption of anarchy in world politics, however, was coterminous with the discipline's willful amnesia about race. Indeed, while implicitly equating anarchy with the primitive, and equating the resulting state of nature with supposedly violent peoples outside Europe, scholars stripped anarchy of any notion of race and racism.[12] For some, the norm against noticing reflects a common difficulty in accepting the idea that the "international" in international relations was imagined along the color line.[13]

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[11] Krishna, Sankaran. "Race, amnesia, and the education of international relations." *Alternatives* 26, no. 4 (2001): 401-424.

[12] Sampson, Aaron Beers. "Tropical anarchy: Waltz, Wendt, and the way we imagine international politics." *Alternatives* 27, no. 4 (2002): 429-457.

[13] Vitalis, Robert. *White world order, black power politics: The birth of American international relations*. Cornell University Press, 2018.

For critical theorists, forgetting race cannot be reduced to discomfort, disinterest, or unawareness among scholars.[14] By implication, the invisibility of race in IR was not accidental but designed. Similar observations have been made about the makeup of the IR profession as mostly White and male, an institutionalized feature that produces and reproduces itself.[15] That which was made most visible in IR—its distinguishing intuitions and methodologies—is also that which conceals race, denying the possibility of its explanatory power.

1.1.1 A Critique on the Silence of a Discipline

The critique of IR's race blindness begins with the Howard School. The tradition of unveiling the modern world from its racialized origins was proffered by Howard University–based African American IR scholars beginning in the late nineteenth century.[16] Arguably path-breaking, the contributions associated with the Howard School highlight IR's systematic failure to appreciate race and its inscription into world order. Silence about racism in IR, imposed in part by the exclusion of work that advanced its critique,[17] obscured race as an orienting worldview in the emergent field. Despite various adaptations of publications like Foreign Affairs—which had been titled the Journal of Race Development from 1910 to 1919—its

[14] Sabaratnam, Meera (2020).

[15] Doty, Roxanne Lynn. "The bounds of'race'in international relations." *Millennium* 22, no. 3 (1993): 443-461; Henderson, Errol A. "Navigating the Muddy Waters of the Mainstream." *African American Perspectives on Political Science* (2007): 325; Henderson, Errol A. "Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory." In *Race and Racism in International Relations*, pp. 19-43. Routledge, 2014; Lake, David A. "White man's IR: An intellectual confession." *Perspectives on Politics* 14, no. 4 (2016): 1112-1122; Rutazibwa, Olivia U. "Hidden in plain sight: Coloniality, capitalism and race/ism as far as the eye can see." *Millennium*48, no. 2 (2020): 221-241.

[16] Henderson, Errol (2013); Henderson, Errol A. "The revolution will not be theorised: Du Bois, Locke, and the Howard School's challenge to white supremacist IR theory." *Millennium* 45, no. 3 (2017): 492-510; Vitalis, Robert (2015).

[17] Vitalis, Robert (2000).

genealogy implies what early scholars deemed the subject of IR to be. This veneer of substantive change in the discipline was counterpoised by W.E.B. Du Bois's seminal thesis on the color line, first offered in The Souls of Black Folk[18] and later extended in "The Color Line Belts the World."[19] Du Bois noted, "The problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the Color Line."[20] For Du Bois, White supremacy and anti-Blackness were organizing principles of US expansionism. Similarly, other scholars of the Howard School made plain that theorizing the international required careful scrutiny of its imperial, colonial, and neocolonial.[21] Notwithstanding, mid-century debates in the field over stability, dependency, and territorial sovereignty were underpinned with racial ontologies, willful or otherwise, that privileged Whiteness in their assumptions about the social world.[22]

This early critique of IR's race blindness was elaborated in opposition to the incipient field's essentialist notions of race. For Alain Locke and Ralph Bunche, race was what today we recognize as a social construct based on phenotypic characteristics that are themselves socially constructed. By advancing this argument, Locke and Bunche removed race from its biological and anthropological moorings, effectively rejecting the "hierarchy of races" assumption that

[18] Du Bois, William Edward Burghardt, and Manning Marable. *Souls of black folk*. Routledge, 2015 (1903).

[19] Du Bois, WEB 2005 (1906).

[20] Du Bois, WEB 2005 (1906), 33.

[21] Locke, Alain. *Race contacts and interracial relations: Lectures on the theory and practice of race*. Howard University Press, 1992; Bunche, R. J. "A World View of Race Washington, DC: Assoc." *Negro Folk Educ* (1936); Tate, Merze. "The war aims of World War I and World War II and their relation to the darker peoples of the world." *The Journal of Negro Education* 12, no. 3 (1943): 521-532.

[22] Vucetic, Srdjan. "What is this thing called IR? A view from Howard U." *Disorder of Things*, (2016).

anchored the developing field of IR.[23] Locke's sociological thesis[24] of race as a product of culture informed Bunche's subsequent analysis in A World View of Race.[25] For Bunche, race was arbitrary. Devoid of any scientific meaning, race was a device of national policy that shaped bargaining in class conflict. The Howard School also anticipated much of the postwar scholarship on race and racism in IR. To be sure, it developed some of the earliest theory of modern war as an outcome of imperialist and other racial projects,[26] a point delivered in Henderson's critique[27] of Vitalis's apparent disassociation of these scholars from the formulation of IR theory.[28] Though met with scant regard, the insights developed by the Howard School unveil an IR that not only noticed race but also highlighted it as a prominent axis of inquiry and theory building.

The norm against noticing has since been engaged by scholars, and this confrontation actively informs the present debate. Across interlocking approaches to the study of race, new scholarship coheres around the assertion that race and racism are unavoidable when grappling with the is- sues and methodologies of IR.[29] The norm against noticing has been challenged by excavating disciplinary genealogies and unveiling forms of racialization as power in IR.

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[23] Henderson, Errol (2013).

[24] Locke, Alain 1992 (1916).

[25] Bunche, RJ (1936).

[26] Du Bois, WEB 2015 (1903); Tate, Merze (1943); Bunche, RJ (1936).

[27] Henderson, Errol (2017)

[28] Vitalis, Robert (2015).

[29] Persaud, Randolph B., and Rob BJ Walker. "Apertura: Race in international relations." *Alternatives* 26, no. 4 (2001): 373-376; Shilliam, Robbie. "Race and research agendas." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 152-158; Shilliam, Robbie. "Race and racism in international relations: Retrieving a scholarly inheritance." *International Politics Reviews* 8, no. 2 (2020): 152-195.

Burgeoning literature on Eurocentrism[30] and new advances in non-Western IR theory, embodied by the "Global IR" project,[31] similarly examine the imperial conditions that coconstitute relations between the European "core" and the non-White "peripheries." Recent contributions in the field also illuminate the racial and gendered patterns of IR canon formation. In a recent essay, for instance, Hutchings & Owens expose opportunities to theorize race in IR through a fundamental reorientation toward the international thought of women (of color).[32]

1.1.2 A New Opening: Hierarchy in International Relations

Scholars of IR have in many ways hidden behind the assumptions that states are sovereign and that the international system is anarchic or composed of formally equal states.[33] If all states have equal standing, in this view, race can play no role. If a predominantly Black African nation has the same vote in the United Nations General Assembly as a White European or North American country, where is racism? Indeed, critics might ask, since predominantly White countries have higher incomes per capita, greater power at the international level, larger militaries, and so on, yet formal status is supposedly equal, where is the discrimination in the UN rule of one-country, one-vote? But in assuming that anarchy accurately describes the international system as well as relations between states, scholars of IR have neglected the possible role of racial inequality in shaping contemporary world politics. Even if they

[30] Hobson, John M. *The Eurocentric conception of world politics: Western international theory, 1760–2010*. Cambridge University Press, 2012; Haggard, Stephan, and David C. Kang, eds. *East Asia in the world: Twelve events that shaped the modern international order*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.

[31] *Non-Western international relations theory*. Edited by Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan. Taylor & Francis, 2009.

[32] Hutchings, Kimberly, and Patricia Owens. "Women thinkers and the canon of international thought: Recovery, rejection, and reconstitution." *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 2 (2021): 347-359.

[33] Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*. 1979. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

acknowledge the role of race in the age of empires, it is assumed that decolonization and universal sovereignty have dissolved the international color line. Moving beyond the anarchy assumption basic to so many theories of IR, new theorizing identifies hierarchy as a key organizing principle in relations between states and opens the door to incorporating race and racism at the center of the field. Various accounts of hierarchy, broad and narrow, can be leveraged to illustrate the ways states racialize and are racialized pursuant to their interests and positions in world politics.

In its broadest conception, hierarchy in international politics is any ordered ranking of states "organized into vertical relations of super- and subordination."[34] Unlike narrow or contractual forms, these orders are not bargained, nor are they typically open for renegotiation, though they are frequently contested. Broad hierarchies manifest and reinforce themselves as deep patterns of inequality. Importantly, hierarchies create the conditions of possibility in which actors exist and interact in world politics.[35] By positioning actors in relation to each other, broad hierarchy demarcates who and what belongs, ascribing to all a superior or inferior status. This broad conception underlies our notion of racial hierarchy below.

Other scholars employ a narrower conception of international hierarchy, defined as the exercise of authority by one state over another, albeit in varying degrees and forms. When understood narrowly, international hierarchies are theorized as functional, intentional solutions to

[34] Zarakol, Ayşe. "Theorising Hierarchies: An Introduction." *Hierarchies in World Politics edited by Zarakol Ayşe* (2017): 1-14, 1.

[35] Mattern, Janice Bially, and Ayşe Zarakol. "Hierarchies in world politics." *International Organization* 70, no. 3 (2016): 623-654; Zarakol, Ayşe (2017).

collective problems of global governance.[36] These bargained orders are assumed to structure subsequent interactions between actors that contest at the margins the rights and duties in their relationship. This conception generalizes European colonialism—which clearly rested on racialized beliefs[37]—as but one form of international hierarchy that was con- tingent on a peculiar historical time and place.[38] For our purposes here, narrow forms of racial hierarchy manifest themselves most clearly in international law.

Whether held as discrete or mutually constitutive, narrow and broad conceptions allow race to be theorized as a hierarchy in and of itself. Orders constructed along shared norms of racial difference may thus influence policy and practice, thereby justifying or normalizing an unequal assignment of rights and responsibilities between states. While hierarchy opens the door to studying race and its effect on international politics, however, few have walked through that doorway. One of the most prominent collaborative volumes on hierarchy in IR includes chapters on empire, gender, paternalism, and military bases, yet none on race.[39] In the next sections, we discuss race in international relations and lay out an analytic framework that incorporates racial hierarchy, and then we turn to its application in different literatures and domains of IR.

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[36] Lake, David A. "Hierarchy in international relations." In *Hierarchy in International Relations*. Cornell University Press, 2011; Lake, David A. "Laws and norms in the making of international hierarchies." *Hierarchies in world politics* 144 (2017): 17. See Zarakol 2017, 17–42.

[37] Barder, Alexander D. "Scientific racism, race war and the global racial imaginary." In *Violence and the Third World in International Relations*, pp. 9-25. Routledge, 2020; Barder, Alexander D. *Global race war: International politics and racial hierarchy*. Oxford University Press, 2021.

[38] Acharya, Amitav and Buzan, Barry eds. (2009).

[39] Zarakol, Ayşe, ed. *Hierarchies in world politics*. Vol. 144. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

1.2 Race in International Politics: An Analytic Framework

As the Howard School knew, race is a social construct that categorizes or classifies humans according to contrived differences. Its categories—races—are always and everywhere contested, a product of social struggle. As such, race is nearly always vertically stratified, entitling members of the ranked categories different rights and privileges within society. Omi & Winant center this idea of racial hierarchy in their theory of racial formation.[40] They explain that hierarchy is established and sustained as a racial project such that "everybody learns. . .the rules of racial classification and of her racial identity. . .inserted in a comprehensively racialized social structure. Race becomes 'common sense'—a way of comprehending, explaining, and acting in the world." As Bonilla Silva suggests, racialization—the process by which groups are attributed racial meaning—conditions how actors relate to the social structures and institutional systems they in-habit.[41] As an organizing principle of super- and subordination, it orders race hierarchically and engenders behaviors and interests to fit the position of the groups in the racial regime.

Fanon perceived racial hierarchy and the process of racialization in the language of colonial domination.[42] To internalize the norms of the colonizer was to participate in one's own oppression, to reflect the very hierarchical structures of alienation. Once racial stratification is established and its "racial logics" are absorbed,[43] race becomes an in- dependent criterion for

[40] Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. *Racial formation in the United States*. Routledge, 2014.

[41] Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. "Rethinking racism: Toward a structural interpretation." *American sociological review* (1997): 465-480.

[42] Fanon, Frantz. "(1967). Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press." (1952).

[43] Hobson, John M., and Jason C. Sharman. "The enduring place of hierarchy in world politics: Tracing the social logics of hierarchy and political change." *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2005): 63-98.

vertical hierarchy in a society, both domestic and international. And to be sure, race as a hierarchy is international. Wynter argues that a globally expanding West used race to define and order the human.[44] The color line encoded deserving and undeserving status within Western imperial orders.

Racial hierarchy becomes important in IR in at least two fundamental ways, explored in more detail below. Though the coin may eventually be revealed as multisided, we see perceived deficiency and hostility as the two faces of racism in world politics. In the first face, countries below the color line are perceived to be deficient in some essential attribute. Through the mid-twentieth century, this face of racism was manifested in the "standard of civilization" criteria for establishing sovereignty and acceptance into the family of nations. As the norm of juridical sovereignty took hold after the formation of the United Nations, conferring sovereignty on any recognized member of the international community regardless of their capacity to govern their territory effectively,[45] the same projection of deficiency onto countries with majorities of people of color continued in the practice and interpretation of international law. In the second face, non-White-majority countries are perceived by White-majority countries to be inherently aggressive or threatening. Within a racialized global order, dominant actors perceive racially "inferior" foreign countries as potentially destabilizing to the status quo. This is precisely how Du Bois construed the problem of the color line: the prospect of war and peace hinges upon how White-

[44] Wynter, Sylvia. "Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation—An argument." *CR: The new centennial review* 3, no. 3 (2003): 257-337.

[45] Jackson, Robert H. *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World*. Vol. 12. Cambridge university press, 1990.




Figure 1.1: The relationship between racial hierarchy, international order and law, and foreign policy: an analytic framework.

The norm of racial hierarchy conditions the design and enforcement of an international legal order (i) which in turn further promotes the embedded social norm (ii). International law, once codified, guides the practice of foreign policy making (iii) which in turn reproduces a global order underwritten by the international legal system (iv). The norm of racial hierarchy shapes and legitimates foreign policy discourses and practice (v) which in turn further reify and reinforce the global racial hierarchy (vi).

majority countries cope with perceived challenges from the "awakening of the brown and black races."[46]

The integrated analytic framework in Figure 1 illustrates the intersections of racial hierarchy, international law, and foreign policy. First, norms, including the norm of racial hierarchy, are so deeply woven into the fabric of social life that they appear natural, effectively conditioning the design and enforcement of an international legal order (i). Once the embedded social norm (in this case, the norm of racial hierarchy) is codified, international law further authorizes and promotes it (ii), which is often the intended goal of norms entrepreneurs in

[46] Du Bois, WEB 2005 (1906), 34.

international politics.[47] In other words, international law, racialized in its content and enforcement, helps consolidate what Reus-Smit calls the "authorized forms of difference" along the color line.[48] As discussed in more detail below, uneven application of law by race plagues international politics.

Providing rules that order relations between states with different status, rights, and responsibilities, international law thus guides the practice of foreign policy making (Figure 1, iii), which in turn reproduces an unequal global order that is underwritten by the international legal system as well as the racial hierarchy embedded within it (iv). Racial hierarchy also implicates foreign policy and practice more directly. The racial norm shapes foreign policies by conditioning how actors perceive their interests, interpret the position and interests of racial others, and act accordingly. As emphasized by Jackson, racial hierarchy affects foreign policy making through the process of legitimation, defined as "the process of drawing and (re)establishing boundaries, ruling some courses of action acceptable and others unacceptable."[49] By supplying the language of legitimation that shapes predominant foreign policy discourses, racial hierarchy thus renders certain foreign policies as acceptable and therefore possible (Figure 1, v). Similar to how international law facilitates the authorization of racial hierarchy (ii), foreign policy and practice in turn further reinforce the norm of racial hierarchy, reifying the contrived racial categories and differences (vi). Altogether, the interactions of racial hierarchy,

[47] Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. "International norm dynamics and political change." *International organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

[48] Reus-Smit, Christian. "Cultural diversity and international order." *International Organization* 71, no. 4 (2017): 851-885.

[49] Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. *Civilizing the enemy: German reconstruction and the invention of the West*. University of Michigan Press, 2006.

international law, and foreign policy reaffirm one another and produce a racialized world that is taken for granted.

1.3 The First Face of Racism: International Law

Many countries and even the developed democracies have long hidden racism in domestic politics behind the principle of equality before the law. Racial justice movements and events like the murder of George Floyd are profound reminders that the law itself is often biased by racism. Rates of incarceration in the United States are five times higher for black citizens than for white citizens.[50] The law is unevenly enforced by race when technical violations are more often used by police as justification to search the automobiles of black and Latino drivers. While any individual defendant before the same judge might be treated similarly—in accord with the principle of equality—it is increasingly hard to ignore the systematic racial bias in the practice of law and its enforcement. This is, in turn, only the tip of a larger iceberg. The principle of equality before the law is frequently subverted in the United States and elsewhere by housing segregation and redlining, differential funding for schools, environmental racism, and other forms of racial discrimination.

While individual members of majority groups are beginning to acknowledge bias in the law and its enforcement, they less readily recognize that widespread racial prejudice permits and, in fact, demands this bias. While the implicit bias of individuals is easily documented, few admit their racism. Yet, bias in practice cannot exist without broadly held prejudice. More telling, it is prejudice against black citizens and other minorities that either ignores or justifies their higher

[50] Alexander, Michelle. "The color of justice." *The new Jim crow: Mass incarceration in the age of colorblindness* (2010): 59-62.

rates of incarceration, as well as other forms of racial injustice. Many individuals, even those of good will, are now struggling with this realization.

In a parallel fashion, as suggested above, race is hidden behind international law and the principle of sovereign equality. Rooted in conceptions of natural law, international law is necessarily universal and based on principles of equality. Yet, race was implicated in the development of international law almost from its very origins.[51] The vision of equality at its core was immediately challenged by Europe's encounter with the rest of the world during the age of discovery. If international law applied universally to peoples, their territory, and their existing governance structures, then Europeans would have to recognize these unfamiliar polities as equal to their own, which in turn would have prevented them from expropriating the land and enslaving those who lived on it. To justify expropriation, international law thus required the creation or application of racialized hierarchies that considered non-European societies as less than human.

The interpretation of race as a stable, self-evident difference became the marker from which more elaborate notions of difference, like "civilization," were constructed.[52] In one such justification, John Locke declared the territory occupied by Indigenous peoples in the Americas as forfeit for their failure to enclose and cultivate the land.[53] In short, international law required Europeans to assign a lesser status to others in order to reconcile the conception of equality under

[51] Pitts, Jennifer. *Boundaries of the international: law and empire*. Harvard University Press, 2018.

[52] Anghie, Antony. "Decolonizing the concept of good governance." *Decolonizing international relations* (2006): 109-30.

[53] Arneil, Barbara. *John Locke and America: the defence of English colonialism*. Oxford University Press, 1996.

the law that governed their own relations with the desire to exploit the "new worlds" they "discovered." Thus, race was tethered to the rationale for conquest undertaken by European powers.

Race continued to animate international law and relations between Europe and the rest of the world well into the twentieth century. In negotiations over the League of Nations in 1919, for instance, Japan's proposed language on racial equality was rejected. Although it received broad support, US President Woodrow Wilson, who himself had resegregated the US civil service, was in the Chair and summarily declared that such an important change required unanimity, which effectively killed the proposal. Following World War II, renewed calls for formal racial equality at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 and later the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1969 led to the prohibition of racism, but subtly embedded it in the precept of sovereignty and the corresponding doctrine of domestic jurisdiction that allowed member countries to prohibit international oversight of their domestic racial regimes.[54] As a shield against foreign interference, sovereignty became a way of preserving racial inequality at home.

Its universal standard also gave rise to an international legal order that obscured racism from view. By the mid-twentieth century, non-European societies acquired the status of sovereign statehood previously denied by international law. On its face, decolonization overcame the notion that racial others were somehow not ready for full sovereignty.[55] In practice, however, writing race out of law was necessary to conceal, and therefore maintain, the uneven application

[54] Búzás, Zoltán I. "Racism and antiracism in the liberal international order." *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 440-463.

[55] Grovogui, Siba N'Zatioula. *Sovereigns, quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and self-determination in international law*. Vol. 3. U of Minnesota Press, 1996.

of international norms and rules along constructed racial difference. By implication, formal manifestations of race are no longer permissible. But at the same time, the projection of racial deficiency by white-majority countries onto especially black-majority states is found in the practice and interpretation of contemporary international law.

Although engagement varies across the movement of critical race theories and Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), much of the work within these reconstructive traditions has sought to uncover the ongoing dynamics of racialized power that constitute international law and relations. Today, the racialization of international law can be seen in several contemporary legal and political trends that are at least implicitly premised on a conception of non-white-majority countries as being deficient and in need of assistance or corrective action by North American or European states.

1.3.1 Good governance

The program of good governance and its strategic promotion in the non- European world illustrates this point. A term that gained considerable prominence in the field during the 1990s, good governance became a way of organizing, interpreting, and deploying legal doctrines in international politics. While norms entrepreneurs in various international and non- governmental organizations herald the concept as an advance in international law, critics note that it bears an old lineage of racialized dispossession. Influential development institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as well as human rights groups, promote standards of governance that are seen as already perfected in the European world. On the other hand, non-White-majority societies are imagined in perpetual lack of the good governance needed for stability and progress. Countries that lack good governance, thus, are understood as lacking some quality implicitly assigned to White countries. According to Anghie, good governance was

invoked to create non-European governments that would facilitate European commercial expansion.[56] Grovogui similarly explicates international law as "outside administration" by a West that seeks to maintain its imperial holdings long after its withdrawal.[57]

1.3.2 Status of Forces Agreements

Extraterritoriality in US Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) betrays similar assumptions about state capacity and governance. SOFAs establish when and how the domestic laws of host governments are applied to US military personnel stationed in those countries.[58] While these agreements stop short of immunizing US troops against criminal sanctions, SOFAs effectively constrain the legal authority host countries exercise over US forces. At their core, SOFAs attempt to reconcile US interest in safeguarding soldiers' rights with deeply held beliefs about the inferiority of non-European institutions and courts.[59] Foreign basing contracts like SOFAs—a bargained concept of hierarchy—are not beyond prevailing symbols of subordination that reinforce pathologies of colonial legal regimes.[60] The notion that non-Europeans lack "government suited to the white man" has long been embraced as "just cause" for extraterritorial

[56] Anghie, Antony (2006).

[57] Grovogui, SNZ (1996).

[58] Yeo, Andrew I. "Security, Sovereignty, and Justice in US Overseas Military Presence." *International Journal of Peace Studies* 19, no. 2 (2014); Efrat, Asif. "Facing US extraterritorial pressure: American troops in foreign courts during the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics* 84, no. 1 (2022): 242-257.

[59] Freeman, Bianca. "Racial Hierarchy and Jurisdiction in US Status of Forces Agreements." *Security Studies* 32, no. 4-5 (2023): 748-774.

[60] Cooley, Alexander. "Command and control? Hierarchy and the international politics of foreign military bases." *Hierarchies in World Politics* (2017): 154-74. See Zarakol 2017, 154–74; Allen, Michael A., Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers. "Outside the wire: US military deployments and public opinion in host states." *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (2020): 326-341.

jurisdiction, and in some cases, capitulation.[61] A hallmark of Western foreign policy, extraterritoriality declares a kind of state of emergency where normal rules do not apply.[62] Variation in US SOFA jurisdiction conveys a similar story. The United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly European host states, allowing these peer countries to try US personnel while withholding this same right from most non-European host partners, ceteris paribus. Since immunity relies on the premise of inherent difference between peoples and societies,[63] it affirms prevailing beliefs about racial difference. Thus, hierarchical conceptions of race are reified through extraterritorial jurisdiction and its codification into the SOFA.

1.3.3 Responsibility to Protect

Unanimously endorsed at the UN World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) represents a collective commitment to atrocity prevention. Viewing authorized intervention as responsibility constitutes a departure from the norm of nonintervention established in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 and incorporated into the UN Charter. R2P engenders and reproduces international hierarchy through its normative diminution of sovereignty.[64] Integral to this process is the recasting of sovereignty as responsibility, a concept that invents the conditions for intervention in ways that are racially biased. Notwithstanding the African origins of R2P, often cited to thwart charges of neo-imperialism, the doctrine of

[61] Grovogui, SNZ (1996), 51.

[62] Ruskola, Teemu. "Colonialism without colonies: on the extra territorial jurisprudence of the US court for China." *Law & Contemp. Probs.* 71 (2008): 217.

[63] Cassel, Pär Kristoffer. *Grounds of judgment: extraterritoriality and imperial power in nineteenth-century China and Japan*. Oxford University Press, 2011.

[64] Getachew, Adom. "The limits of sovereignty as responsibility." *Constellations* 26, no. 2 (2019): 225-240.

responsibility appeals to the paternal protection common in colonial philosophy. To be sure, the shadow of racial hierarchy in international law is long. From the Berlin Treaty, which "enshrined the responsibility of Europe in watching over and improving the conditions of native populations,"[65] to the League of Nations settlement, which excluded those lowest in the race hierarchy from its international supervisory mechanism (the mandate system), racism and the rhetoric of responsibility are constitutive of the principle and need for intervention.[66] R2P is no exception. The principle renders sovereignty conditional upon the evaluations of international institutions (like the UN Security Council) that are empowered to decide when a state has failed to fulfill its responsibility. At its core, R2P reflects the same projection of deficiency onto non-White countries, promoting the idea that countries lack either the will or the capacity to treat their domestic populations equitably and fairly. The fruit of this alleged failure of responsibility is the near-exclusive application of R2P toward African states.

1.3.4 International Criminal Law

The projection of deficiency onto racial others is also implicated in the brokering of international criminal law. Since the establishment of the Rome Statute in 1998, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been routinely criticized for its punitive focus on Africans. To date, the ICC has issued indictments against 42 individuals, all of whom are Black and/or Arab-African. Although the court's narrow fixation has evolved to investigate cases in Afghanistan, Georgia, and Palestinian territories, the ICC's reluctance to bring Western countries under scrutiny remains. Equally important, crimes that fall under ICC jurisdiction constitute an important site of

[65] Gathii, James Thuo. "International law and eurocentricity." *Eur. J. Int'l L.* 9 (1998): 184.

[66] Gathii, James Thuo (1998); Grovogui, SNZ (1996).

racial hierarchy.[67] Over time, the tribunal has consecrated a more restricted international legal order,[68] one that effectively interprets grave atrocity events as the province of the non-Western world. The constructed distinction between types of human rights violations—those elevated as international crimes and those deemed national or transnational concerns—overlap with racial categories.[69] Article 5 of the Roman Statute routinely associates most serious crimes with forms of violence akin to those perpetuated in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.[70] In contrast, other types of violations such as apartheid, colonial domination, torture, and environment degradation are implicitly designated as less grave and therefore peripheral to the scope of the ICC (each initially considered but abandoned amid negotiations of the Statute's core crimes). The selection of which atrocities count not only institutionalizes the uneven application of ICC jurisdiction but it also projects racist tropes onto Black and Brown societies.

Presumed deficiency is exemplified in the exercise of complementarity. Referenced in Article 17, this legal principle advances the idea that states will have priority over the ICC in overseeing cases within their jurisdiction. However, complementarity is predicated on a formal assessment of whether states are unwilling or unable to conduct an investigation. This operationalization not only enhances the court's power by denying states' prerogative to manage

[67] Clarke, Kamari Maxine. "Negotiating racial injustice: How international criminal law helps entrench structural inequality." *Just Security* 24 (2020).

[68] Ba, Oumar. *States of justice: The politics of the International Criminal Court*. Cambridge University Press, 2020; Ba, Oumar. "A truly international criminal court." *Foreign Affairs* 18 (2021).

[69] DeFalco, Randle C., and Frédéric Mégret. "The invisibility of race at the ICC: lessons from the US criminal justice system." *London Review of International Law* 7, no. 1 (2019): 55-87.

[70] Clarke, Kamari Maxine. "Negotiating racial injustice: How international criminal law helps entrench structural inequality." *Just Security* 24 (2020).

violence on their own terms but also requires the admission of state incapacity and dependence.[71] The language of state failure that animates ICC evaluations thus upholds racialized beliefs about the inability of African countries to govern themselves. It also renders Western legal precepts most legitimate for confronting violence.

1.4 The Second Face of Racism: Foreign Policy

The recent worldwide surge in anti-Asian hate at the height of the pandemic calls for renewed attention on how race and racism connect to international politics. Fueled by inflammatory elite rhetoric, deep-seated racial animus has far-reaching implications for not only domestic racial relations but also interstate, and most importantly, great power relations.[72] As we shall see, race and racism can affect the way foreign threats are perceived, competing visions of national interest are deliberated, and foreign policy responses are selected. Having elucidated international law as a projection of racial deficiency, we now turn to the second face of racism, namely the perception of racial others as potential threats. Notions of deficiency and hostility, though seemingly contradictory, straddle a key feature of racial hierarchy. Subordinate racial groups are considered not only inferior but potentially threatening to the status quo. Dominant actors within a racialized international order, in other words, perceive racial others as a latent threat to their own interests, and by extension, their identity. Racial hierarchy thus directly conditions how state actors interpret the behavior of racial others, assess their own interests, and

[71] Clarke, Kamari Maxine (2020).

[72] Dionne, Kim Yi, and Fulya Felicity Turkmen. "The politics of pandemic othering: Putting COVID-19 in global and historical context." *International Organization* 74, no. S1 (2020): E213-E230; Kim, D. G. "The Politicization of COVID-19 and Anti-Asian Racism in the United States: An Experimental Approach." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 11, no. 1 (2024): 1-11; Kim, D. G. "Anti-Asian Racism and the Rise of Hawkish Mass Opinion in China." *Political Science Quarterly* 139, no. 2 (2024): 177-199; Reny, Tyler T., and Matt A. Barreto. "Xenophobia in the time of pandemic: Othering, anti-Asian attitudes, and COVID-19." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 10, no. 2 (2022): 209-232.

cope with felt challenges to their status. Understanding this element of racial hierarchy can help us reexamine the overlooked role of race and racism in shaping a wide range of foreign policy preferences and decision making.

In the language of Reus-Smit, though he avoids explicit reference to race, an international order is a configuration of political authority in which the need for legitimacy requires complex heterogeneity to be converted into authorized forms of cultural—including racial— difference.[73] Racial hierarchy, by extension, provides a key source of legitimacy for an unequal global order, engendering "intersubjective understandings about. . .the appropriateness of its constituent role identities."[74] Under such prevailing "diversity regimes," subordinate groups are perceived as a latent existential threat with potentially revisionist intent and incompatible interests. Sociological and psychological understandings of racial hierarchy also suggest that it is through the effect of racial prejudice that dominant groups evaluate threats from racial others and formulate their behavioral responses. Building on Blumer's group position theory of prejudice,[75] Bobo posits that racial prejudice involves more than negative feelings or stereotypes and instead derives more fundamentally from a felt challenge to the sense of relative group position.[76] The long tradition of social dominance theory also attributes the source of racial prejudice and violence to the human predisposition to maintain group-based social hierarchies.[77] Conceived in this way,

[73] Reus-Smit, Christian (2017), 879.

[74] ibid.

[75] Blumer, Herbert. "Race prejudice as a sense of group position." *Pacific sociological review* 1, no. 1 (1958): 3-7.

[76] Bobo, Lawrence D. "Prejudice as group position: Microfoundations of a sociological approach to racism and race relations." *Journal of social issues* 55, no. 3 (1999): 445-472.

[77] Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto. *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge University Press, 2001.

racism is related to but goes beyond social identity theory, which posits an innate human tendency toward in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination.[78] By socializing state actors into constituent identities and interests, racial hierarchy turns attention away from simple out-group tensions to threats to group status and, thus, shows how racism can play a deeper role in shaping perceived foreign threats, national interest, and ultimately foreign policy behaviors (see Hanania and Trager 2020).

1.4.1 Foreign security policy

First, racial hierarchy, through "colored" perceptions of foreign threats and national interest, has direct implications for how countries conduct foreign policy on a wide range of security and military issues, including alliance politics, regional order building, and territorial expansion. A few exceptional works on race in IR have emphasized that racial identity can be an important factor in the formation, stability, and durability of alliances in international politics. Focusing on the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–1923), Búzás proposes that racial prejudice inflates perceptions of threat and aggressive intentions from racially dissimilar countries.[79] He finds through extensive archival research that racial difference came to inflate British threat perceptions of Japan, predisposing the two allies toward discord and eventually the termination of the alliance at the 1921 Washington Conference. At the same time, Anglo–American racial similarity saved the United States and Britain from such racialized fears, despite frequent military tensions including the Venezuela crisis of 1895–1896. The dominant racial

[78] Tajfel, Henri, John C. Turner, William G. Austin, and Stephen Worchel. "An integrative theory of intergroup conflict." *Organizational identity: A reader* 56, no. 65 (1979): 9780203505984-16.

[79] Búzás, Zoltán I. "The color of threat: Race, threat perception, and the demise of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902–1923)." *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (2013): 573-606.

discourse of the trans- Atlantic Anglo-Saxon brotherhood drew the two countries toward foreign policy cooperation to a greater extent "than any other comparable pairs of states."[80] Bell further notes that this prevailing White supremacist vision undergirded the fin de siècle discussion of racial utopianism—the claim that an Anglo-Saxon security community would eliminate all forms of interstate conflict (see also Vucetic 2020).[81]

Racialized beliefs can also have far-reaching effects on other types of foreign security and military policies such as regional institution-building and territorial expansion. Hemmer & Katzenstein argue that perceived racial identity, among other components of collective identity, played an important yet underappreciated role in shaping starkly different American approaches to regional orders in postwar Europe and Asia.[82] Despite a huge disparity in material capabilities between the United States and its regional allies in both regions, American policy makers established multilateral security institutions in Europe while opting for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia. Postwar foreign policy elites viewed their potential Asian partners as part of an inferior race who were less trustworthy and thus ineligible for membership in a NATO-like multilateral security community. Maass shows that the perception of the native population as racially inferior, dangerous, and thus inherently unsuited for republican governance also explains the limited American territorial expansion in Mexico.[83]

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[80] Vucetic, Srdjan. "A racialized peace? How Britain and the US made their relationship special." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 4 (2011): 403-421.

[81] Bell, Duncan. "Before the democratic peace: Racial utopianism, empire and the abolition of war." *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (2014): 647-670.

[82] Hemmer, Christopher, and Peter J. Katzenstein. "Why is there no NATO in Asia? Collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism." *International organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 575-607.

[83] Maass, Richard W. *The Picky Eagle: How Democracy and Xenophobia Limited US Territorial Expansion*. Cornell University Press, 2020.

1.4.2 Foreign economic policy

The effects of race and racism can also be found in foreign economic policy. Critical race scholarship in IR has long pointed out the enduring legacies of colonialism as manifested, for instance, in the global labor regime. Immigrant laborers continue to be subject to the racialized practices of labor exploitation.[84] Racialized global inequality also permeates other domains such as North–South trade relations and aid regimes. Rosenberg provides systematic evidence of how racism affects global migration flows, showing that migrants from majority-Black states migrate significantly less than they would under a racially blind hypothetical scenario.[85] Focusing on the role of more subtle forms of modern-day racism, Singh shows that the global North continues to offer unfavorable trade terms to the global South.[86] Scholars have also placed racism at the center of the global aid regimes, finding that paternalism[87] and racial resentment[88] play a large role in garnering public support for foreign aid.

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[84] Persaud, Randolph B. "Racial assumptions in global labor recruitment and supply." *Alternatives* 26, no. 4 (2001): 377-399.

[85] Rosenberg, Andrew S. "Measuring racial bias in international migration flows." *International Studies Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2019): 837-845.

[86] Singh, Jatinder Pal. *Sweet Talk: Paternalism and collective action in North-South trade relations*. Stanford University Press, 2017.

[87] Baker, Andy. "Race, paternalism, and foreign aid: Evidence from US public opinion." *American Political Science Review*109, no. 1 (2015): 93-109; Baker, Andy, Lauren Prather. “Racial paternalism and support for foreign aid in the U.S. and Norway: evidence from the Mauritius experiment.” Working Paper, 2021. University of Colorado, Boulder, CO.

[88] Simon, Christopher A., and Michael C. Moltz. "Immigrant Citizens and Racial Resentment in International Policy Perspective: The Role of Nativity and Racial Resentment in Shaping Support for US Foreign Assistance Expenditure, 2002–2016." *Development* 62 (2019): 186-195.

One particularly promising area of research centers on the increasing racialization of international trade, engaging conventional theories of trade policy preference in international political economy. Utilizing survey experiments and multi-year public opinion surveys, a group of scholars finds that the racial identity of a potential trading partner has become increasingly important for American public support for overseas trade, often at the cost of the respondent's material self-interest. These recent studies find that such racial considerations are most prominent among White Americans who have become far more protectionist than other racial groups in the country.[89] Supported by evidence from multiple surveys, Mutz, Mansfield and Kim point to higher levels of racial prejudice among Whites as one potential source of the growing race gap in trade attitudes.[90] As the United States comes closer to becoming a "majority-minority" nation, future research might further investigate the sources and political consequences of the race gap in trade and other foreign policy issues.

1.4.3 Power Shifts

As Reus-Smit notes, challenges to prevailing regimes of cultural stratification become most pronounced in the face of shifting material balances of power. Racial prejudice, after all, is activated by perceived competition with subordinate racial others in order to maintain the status quo hierarchy.[91] Racialized threat perceptions, in other words, can have the most palpable effects on world politics under the condition of major power shifts. In conjunction with their newfound material capabilities, rising but racially subordinate states can trigger racialized fears and foreign

[89] Guisinger, Alexandra. *American opinion on trade: Preferences without politics*. Oxford University Press, 2017.

[90] Mutz, Diana, Edward D. Mansfield, and Eunji Kim. "The racialization of international trade." *Political Psychology* 42, no. 4 (2021): 555-573.

[91] Bobo, Lawrence (1999).

policy aggression from declining but racially dominant states. As Adler-Nissen & Zarakol point out, the current challenge to the liberal international order partly comes from rising non-Western powers such as China who seek to redress their grievances against what they perceive to be a Western-centric, and thus White-dominant, global order.[92] Historically, Japan's revisionist foreign policy in the early 1930s has also been explained as motivated in large part by the rising power's frustration with the then more explicitly racialized Western-dominated international order.[93] Dominant powers simultaneously tend to perceive such challenges with a racial lens, giving rise to racialized foreign policy narratives, most famously exemplified by the still popular "Yellow Peril" discourse.[94] Perceived racial affinity, on the contrary, appears to substantially ameliorate fears and uncertainty under power shifts, again as suggested by the fin de siècle Anglo–American rapprochement.[95] Future research should investigate whether racial fears inflate threats from a rising China, produce public support for hawkish policies, and potentially aggravate military tensions. More studies are needed, for example, on the extent to which contemporary public opinion on China is racialized, how top-down anti-China rhetoric can activate racial fears, and the potential mechanisms by which racial prejudice affects actual policy making and crisis management.[96] In parallel, researchers can pay more attention to how a rising

[92] Adler-Nissen, Rebecca, and Ayşe Zarakol. "Struggles for recognition: The liberal international order and the merger of its discontents." *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 611-634.

[93] Ward, Steven. "Race, status, and Japanese revisionism in the early 1930s." *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (2013): 607-639.

[94] Búzás, Zoltán (2013); Ward; Steven (2013).

[95] Vucetic, Srdjan (2011); Vucetic, Srdjan (2020); Edelstein, David M. *Over the horizon: Time, uncertainty, and the rise of great powers*. Cornell University Press, 2017.

[96] Miller, Charles, and Helen Taylor. "Can economic interests trump ethnic hostility? Trading ties versus outgroup hostility in Australian perceptions of China as a security threat." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 17, no. 1 (2017): 67-99; Dionne, Kim Yi, and Fulya Felicity Turkmen (2020); Han, Enze, and Daniel Marwecki. "Racialised international order? Traces of 'yellow peril'trope in Germany's public discourse toward China." *Cambridge Review*

China produces and manages its own racialized narratives as it promulgates the discourse of the century of humiliation by the West (see Cheng 2011, Zhang 2020).[97]

1.5 Methodological and Empirical Challenges

Studying race is enormously problematic. For many of the critical theorists who have brought race to the fore in IR, race implies a particular epistemology and, in turn, methodology. In this view, race is constitutive of social relations and cannot be separated from the larger social con- text of which it is part. As a description of the world, this is undoubtedly true, as it is for gender, ethnicity, religion, and culture more broadly. But just as feminist scholarship in IR moved from critical examinations of the role of gender[98] to include positivist studies that, where possible, derive theoretical propositions and identify empirical patterns of the effect of gender identity on individual and collective behavior,[99] we expect—and, indeed, hope to provoke through this article—a similar expansion of approaches to the study of race in world politics. Not every question can be addressed through if-then hypotheses, but when features of the social

of International Affairs 36, no. 3 (2023): 391-409; Kim, D. G (2024 a,b); Ebner, David, and Vladimir E. Medenica. "Race and empire: racial resentment and support for US military policy." *Work. Pap., Univ. Delaware, Newark, DE* (2021).

[97] Cheng, Yinghong. "From campus racism to cyber racism: Discourse of race and Chinese nationalism." *The China Quarterly* 207 (2011): 561-579; Zhang, Chenchen. "Right-wing populism with Chinese characteristics? Identity, otherness and global imaginaries in debating world politics online." *European journal of international relations* 26, no. 1 (2020): 88-115.

[98] Enloe, Cynthia. *Bananas, beaches and bases: Making feminist sense of international politics*. Univ of California Press, 2014; Tickner, J. Ann. *Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security*. Columbia University Press, 1992.

[99] Reiter, Dan. "The positivist study of gender and international relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 1301-1326; Karim, Sabrina, and Kyle Beardsley. *Equal opportunity peacekeeping: women, peace, and security in post-conflict states*. Oxford University Press, 2017; Thomas, Jakana L. "Wolves in sheep's clothing: assessing the effect of gender norms on the lethality of female suicide terrorism." *International organization* 75, no. 3 (2021): 769-802.

context can be reasonably assumed to be constant during the period of the study, positivists can make contributions to our understanding of even highly social concepts like race.

At the same time, race is not simply another factor to be included in an observational study— another right-hand side variable, if you will. As a constitutive principle of social relations, it is difficult if not impossible to entirely separate race from its social causes and consequences. Indeed, in almost any observational study, it would be trivially easy to make race "go away" by including one or more of its social correlates in a regression. This is why in Figure 1 we emphasize the two-way or interactive effects of racial hierarchy, international law, and policy outcomes. Positivists thus have to theorize the role and effects of race before beginning any empirical investigation. As race is a constitutive principle, and a particularly deep one that is embedded in many social relations, there are likely to be few valid instrumental variables or exogenous shocks that permit clear causal identification in observational studies. Rather, positivists must think clearly about the causes and effects of race and racism on world politics and what can and cannot be held constant when varying race in any given study. For this reason, we suggest below that priming and framing experiments may be particularly appropriate ways to identify the impact of race on choice and behavior. In this section, we turn to the issues of measurement, aggregation, and causation, explaining the key questions and potential research design solutions for each of these issues.

1.5.1 Measurement

The first challenge faced by scholars interested in empirical research on race in IR concerns the operationalization of the constructs of race and racism. As Rosenberg notes, race

poses dual measurement problems to scholars in the field.[100] Operationalizing race can be difficult because the concept is socially constructed by "self-perceptions, other perceptions, and phenotypical differences that are themselves socially constructed." As Rosenberg points out, studying race in a cross-national context presents additional problems, as the meaning of race and racial categories often do not travel across borders. Notwithstanding these issues, to identify the effect of race on outcomes in IR requires a reliable measure of the construct. This is especially important insofar as race correlates with many other observable attributes of individuals and countries. While these correlates may themselves be the products of long-standing racism and inequalities, they nonetheless make it difficult to separate the effect of race from some of its socioeconomic consequences.

In recent scholarship on race in IR, scholars have developed several strategies to address, or at least circumvent, this measurement challenge. For observational studies, scholars have either (a) developed their own measures of cross-national racial distance and classification or (b) borrowed existing measures from outside political science. For example, Singh develops a new scale called the paternalism strength index (PSI) that measures racial and cultural distances between countries in the North and former European colonies, demonstrating that PSI scores significantly correlate with lower levels of reciprocal tariff and nontariff concessions in North–South trade relations.[101] In his study of the effect of race on global migration flows, Rosenberg adopts two validated scales of cross-national racial classifications from research in economics

[100] Rosenberg, Andrew (2019), 841.

[101] Singh, Jatinder Pal. *Sweet Talk: Paternalism and collective action in North-South trade relations*. Stanford University Press, 2017.

and public health.[102] While acknowledging the limitations of each measure, he emphasizes that the adopted scales are designed to measure racial perceptions relevant to producing migration policies—his main outcome of interest.

Another strand of emerging research on race in IR utilizes experimental methods to directly manipulate perceptions of race. Following the research design of what Sen & Wasow call "exposure studies," this new line of research randomly assigns different racial cues to survey respondents to estimate the direct behavioral effects of racial identity on individual-level foreign policy preferences.[103] Baker's study of racial paternalism and public support for foreign aid uses Photoshopped images to manipulate the perceived racial identities—Black or White—of foreign aid recipients.[104] Similarly, Bayram & Holmes manipulate stereotypical racialized images of foreign aid recipients to probe the influence of negative imagery and emotions in garnering public support for foreign development aid.[105] Other recent studies have also adopted this visual racial cue approach to estimate the effects of race on public support for humanitarian intervention[106] and perceived institutional legitimacy of international organizations.[107]

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[102] Rosenberg, Andrew (2019).

[103] Sen, Maya, and Omar Wasow. "Race as a bundle of sticks: Designs that estimate effects of seemingly immutable characteristics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, no. 1 (2016): 499-522.

[104] Baker, Andy. "Race, paternalism, and foreign aid: Evidence from US public opinion." *American Political Science Review*109, no. 1 (2015): 93-109.

[105] Bayram, A. Burcu, and Marcus Holmes. "The logic of negative appeals: Graphic imagery, affective empathy, and foreign development aid." *Global Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (2021): ksab032.

[106] Chu, Jonathan A., and Carrie A. Lee. "Race, religion, and American support for humanitarian intervention." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (2023): 00220027231214716.

[107] Chow, Wilfred M., and Enze Han. "Descriptive legitimacy and international organizations: evidence from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees." *The Journal of Politics* 85, no. 2 (2023): 357-371.

For scholars who might be interested in studying the role of racial attitudes (e.g., antiminority racism) in the context of international politics, distinct measurement issues exist. One important issue with importing existing measures of symbolic racism, especially those formulated to capture anti-Black racial resentment,[108] involves the question of how domestic racial attitudes translate to views toward foreign countries and populations. Baker, for example, finds that anti-Black racism manifests in a paternalistic rather than a typically resentful way in shaping public opinion toward foreign aid, suggesting that different dimensions of racial prejudice may apply to foreign policy preference formation depending on the type of policy issues and target countries.[109] More research can be done to explore the applicability of existing racial attitude measures to the study of foreign policy public opinion (see Kinder and Kam 2010, Sides and Gross 2013, Green 2021).[110] Additionally, conventional measures of racism have fallen short of capturing the specific contents and dimensions of racial sentiments against non-Black racial minorities.[111] IR scholarship could benefit further from incorporating recent group-specific measures of ethnoracial resentment that go beyond the "black-white binary"[112] and investigating

[108] Kinder, Donald R., and Lynn M. Sanders. *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals*. University of Chicago Press, 1996.

[109] Baker, Andy (2015).

[110] Kinder, Donald R., and Cindy D. Kam. *Us against them: Ethnocentric foundations of American opinion*. University of Chicago Press, 2010; Sides, John, and Kimberly Gross. "Stereotypes of Muslims and Support for the War on Terror." *The Journal of Politics* 75, no. 3 (2013): 583-598; Green, Jon. "Does race stop at the water's edge? Elites, the public, and support for foreign intervention among white US citizens over time." *Political Science Quarterly* 136, no. 2 (2021): 339-361.

[111] Lajevardi, Nazita, and Marisa Abrajano. "How negative sentiment toward Muslim Americans predicts support for Trump in the 2016 presidential election." *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (2019): 296-302.

[112] Stephens-Dougan, LaFleur. "The persistence of racial cues and appeals in American elections." *Annual review of political science* 24, no. 1 (2021): 301-320.

the role of anti-Asian,[113] anti-Latino,[114] and anti-Muslim[115] sentiments in shaping related foreign policy attitudes. Researchers need to keep in mind that dimensions of racism that manifest in a domestic context may present themselves differently when applied to foreign countries, even those with clear perceived racial differences.

1.5.2 Aggregation and Causation

The other two important, interrelated issues inherent to the study of race and racism in IR are the well-documented problems of aggregation and causation. The aggregation problem concerns how individual attitudes translate into collective foreign policy decisions.[116] This problem applies to all efforts to build up from individual attitudes to foreign policy outcomes, but it may be even more difficult than usual on questions of race due to the disjuncture explained above between the principle of equality embedded in international law and bias in practice and application. Given considerable heterogeneity across individuals and groups in racial attitudes, scholars first need to establish that racial beliefs matter in a systematic fashion for shaping relevant foreign policy attitudes. Then questions arise as to how we move from such racially motivated behavioral foreign policy preferences to institutional and group-based decision making that pertains to interstate interactions. Are foreign policy elites equally susceptible to racial biases? Do individual biases aggregate up to policy in a coherent way, or do collective decision-

[113] Kim, D. G. (2024 a,b); Reny, Tyler T., and Matt A. Barreto (2020).

[114] Garcia-Rios, Sergio and Angela Ocampo. "A Novel Approach and New Measure of Latino Ethno-racial Resentment." In *annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in San Juan, Puerto Rico*. 2020.

[115] Terman, Rochelle. "Islamophobia and media portrayals of Muslim women: A computational text analysis of US news coverage." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 3 (2017): 489-502; Lajevardi, Nazita, and Marisa Abrajano (2019).

[116] Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Stephan Haggard, David A. Lake, and David G. Victor. "The behavioral revolution and international relations." *International Organization* 71, no. S1 (2017): S1-S31.

making processes magnify their effects or cancel each other out through bureaucratic rationality or the wisdom of crowds?[117]

The related issue of causation concerns the potential epiphenomenality of race and racial motivations on the process of foreign policy decision making and elite opinion formation. For foreign policy elites, race might serve as "window dressing or rationalizations"[118] for policy opinions and outcomes that are actually determined by strategic considerations or hidden parochial interests. Búzás, as discussed above, highlights the autonomous role of racial identity in shaping threat perceptions by comparing how British policy makers differentially responded to a racially similar America versus a racially dissimilar Japan.[119] While this research design helps control for some of the confounding factors, it still raises important questions about the direction of causality: To what extent were the discourses of the "Blood Brothers" and the "Yellow Peril" shaped by strategic or unknown elite interests? Is it possible that British elites instrumentally used racialized language to justify their otherwise hard-to-sell foreign policy objectives?

Similarly, even at the level of the mass public, researchers face the question of whether racial attitudes are formed prior to the expression of policy opinion or are merely the product of outstanding security concerns (see Jervis 2013, pp. 166–68). These questions are especially important in light of our suggestion that the relationship between racial hierarchy and foreign policy can be bidirectional (Figure 1), with the former shaping a menu of acceptable foreign

[117] LeVeck, Brad L., D. Alex Hughes, James H. Fowler, Emilie Hafner-Burton, and David G. Victor. "The role of self-interest in elite bargaining." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, no. 52 (2014): 18536-18541; Kertzer, Joshua D., Marcus Holmes, Brad L. LeVeck, and Carly Wayne. "Hawkish biases and group decision making." *International Organization* 76, no. 3 (2022): 513-548.

[118] Jervis, Robert. "Do leaders matter and how would we know?." *Security Studies* 22, no. 2 (2013): 153-179, 166.

[119] Búzás, Zoltán (2013).

policy options and the latter in turn further reinforcing the racial beliefs. While race and foreign policy are indeed coconstitutive in this feedback loop, it should still be possible to examine the autonomous influence of one fac- tor on the other, at least in the short term when feedback effects can be assumed to be relatively modest.

Carefully designed research, often through multimethod approaches, can help ameliorate the aforementioned issues of aggregation and causation in the empirical study of race in IR. To begin, researchers can pay more attention to probing how the effect of race and racism directly manifests at the highest level of foreign policy decision making and outcomes. Meier, for example, conducted a series of semistructured elite interviews with national security professionals and bureaucrats in Germany to investigate the role of institutionalized racism in governmental responses to White supremacist terrorism.[120] Similarly, Carson, Min, and Van Nuys explore the pervasive influence of racial thinking in American bureaucratic assessments of foreign leaders, using a computational text analysis of declassified intelligence materials.[121]

More research can also be conducted on the linkage between the public and foreign policy elites, focusing on how racially motivated mass opinion aggregates into foreign policy outcomes through strategic elite–public interactions. An early work by Hill finds that members of Congress based their votes on South African sanctions on domestic racial considerations, specifically the perception of aggregate constituent preferences and racial attitudes.[122] One can

[120] Meier, Anna A. "The idea of terror: Institutional reproduction in government responses to political violence." *International Studies Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (2020): 499-509.

[121] Carson, Austin, Eric Min, and Maya Van Nuys. “Racial tropes in foreign policy: a computational text analysis.” Working Paper, 2021. University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.

[122] Hill, Kevin A. "The domestic sources of foreign policymaking: congressional voting and American mass attitudes toward South Africa." *International Studies Quarterly* 37, no. 2 (1993): 195-214.

also examine how electorally motivated politicians take advantage of public sentiment to advance racially charged foreign policy rhetoric. To further obtain external validity, scholars can combine evidence on the effect of race at the public level with parallel findings from foreign policy elites through elite interviews, experiments, and qualitative case studies.[123]

Multimethod research can also help ascertain the autonomous influence of race by combining more externally valid elite-level studies with survey or lab experiments that lay out the micro- foundational evidence concerning the effect of race on foreign policy outcomes of interest. Researchers can follow the example of Yarhi-Milo, who, though focused on leader psychology unrelated to race, provides both qualitative and experimental evidence to advance a behavioral explanation of variations in willingness to use military force for reputation.[124] Various experimental techniques can prove useful, especially since race often correlates with many other individual and country-level attributes such as regime type and other cultural traits. One can think of a conjoint experimental design, for example, to test the causal claim by Han & Marwecki that "as a non-Western and non-White nation, even if China were a liberal democracy, it would face significant obstacles to being accepted as the leader by many Western states."[125] In addition, when studying the direct behavioral effect of racial attitudes, scholars can design priming studies that temporarily activate the subject's racial sentiment or manipulate the perceived racial identity of a target country. Finally, besides experimental methods, IR scholars

[123] Dietrich, Simone, Heidi Hardt, and Haley J. Swedlund. "How to make elite experiments work in international relations." *European Journal of International Relations* 27, no. 2 (2021): 596-621; Kertzer, Joshua D., and Jonathan Renshon. "Experiments and surveys on political elites." *Annual Review of Political Science*25, no. 1 (2022): 529-550.

[124] Yarhi-Milo, Keren. *Who fights for reputation: The psychology of leaders in international conflict*. Vol. 156. Princeton University Press, 2018.

[125] Han, Enze, and Daniel Marwecki. "Racialised international order? Traces of 'yellow peril'trope in Germany's public discourse toward China." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 36, no. 3 (2023): 391-409, 15.

could benefit from looking for within-country variation in racial beliefs among elite policy makers, isolating the influence of race and racism while holding constant important features of the shared international environment. Huff and Schub's latest work also demonstrates that researchers can combine micro-level quantitative data with archival research to tease out the effect of race on crucial outcomes of interstate conflict such as combat fatalities.[126]

1.6 Conclusion: In Search of Race in International Relations

It is well past time to mainstream the study of race in IR, to abandon the norm against noticing. In this review, we have highlighted substantive areas where we, and other scholars engaged in this enterprise, suspect race exerts important if sometimes subtle effects on world politics. A focus on race reveals inequalities in international law and practice, embedded in the very concepts, for instance, of good governance and responsibility. Such a focus also suggests how racism may exacerbate international competition and conflict.

In closing, we highlight a promising area for future research that, in our view, has not yet received the attention it deserves, namely, the strategies and patterns of resistance to racial hierarchy. Drawing on emerging themes in IR, we have suggested how international law is racialized in practice and how race can be mobilized against non-White rivals. But racialized groups have agency and can be expected to challenge racial norms. W.E.B. Du Bois did not simply identify the color line in world politics. He believed it to be a region of struggle and, indeed, called upon peoples of color to actively contest and resist domination. Today's racial norms are being contested. Transnational racial justice movements are growing. Scholars can contribute to these efforts by taking resistance to racial hierarchy seriously. A first step, of

[126] Huff, Connor, and Robert Schub. "Segregation, integration, and death: evidence from the Korean war." *International Organization* 75, no. 3 (2021): 858-879.

course, is to notice race. A second is to understand how, where, and why racial hierarchy exerts its most pernicious effects. The third step, now the research frontier, is to examine when and how hierarchy can be challenged successfully and changed. Drawing on work on transnational advocacy networks[127] and nonviolent resistance movements[128]—which, like most of IR, has been silent on race—it may be possible to identify how racial hierarchy is the same as or different from other social norms, and how racial justice can be best achieved.

Finally, as IR engages race more seriously, scholars must take a global perspective. We are cognizant of our own limitations on this score. Analysts are always influenced by their own experiences. As US or US-trained IR scholars, we most easily see race through US lenses. Although IR is still unfortunately an American social science,[129] the experience of race in the United States is not the experience of race everywhere. We need to engage with the work of scholars with other, more varied experiences that are also contributing to a fuller understanding of how race shapes world politics. We are aware that this work—both critical and positivist—already exists and that scholars are already "there." Important as questions of race are, we hope all can join in a common enterprise to understand how race and racism shape our world. Integrating race into our theories and empirical studies offers the promise of a deeper, more realistic, and powerful understanding of world politics—if only the discipline of IR would stop averting its eyes.

[127] Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink (1998).

[128] Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. *Why civil resistance works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*. Columbia University Press, 2011.

[129] Hoffmann, Stanley. "An American social science: international relations (1977)." In *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, pp. 212-241. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1995.

1.7 Acknowledgement

This chapter, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in the Annual Review of Political Science. Bianca Freeman; Kim, D.G.; and Lake, David A. Race in International Relations: Beyond the “Norm Against Noticing.” Annual Review of Political Science 25 (2022): 175-196.

PART II: Racial Hierarchy and Jurisdiction in U.S. Status of Forces Agreements

In January 2015, the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) drafted a special report on Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) to the Department of State.[130] The independent committee gave high priority to the protection of American soldiers from foreign prosecution. When jurisdiction is held exclusively by the United States, the risks associated with host country adjudication are effectively minimized. However, the ISAB qualified this recommendation. It proposed that U.S. interests are better served by tailoring each agreement to individual host country conditions. The quality of legal system among other strategic considerations should influence assessment of host eligibility for jurisdiction over American personnel. Where local jurisprudence is sound, the ISAB advised the Department of State to implement a concurrent, or shared, jurisdiction regime. Requests for far-reaching immunities are thus constrained by mutually accepted rules of behavior and accountability between the host government and Washington.

The extraterritorial reach of American law is conditioned by host capacity for impartial judgement. Yet, despite civil or common legal practices, the United States withholds jurisdiction from most majority non-white host countries. Since the 1990s, judge advocates (JAGs) and

[130] "Report on Status of Forces Agreements," International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), Washington, DC, (January 16, 2015): 1-60.




Figure 2.1: World map of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction.

civilian lawyers have criticized U.S. SOFA provisions as unequal in the non-European world.[131] According to Major Manuel E. F. Supervielle, Chief of the International Law Branch in the Office of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), East Asian and non-NATO allies may see U.S. SOFA jurisdiction as a bias in favor of Western European "civilized" people and governments and a bias against mostly "third world", "non-white", Asian, African, or Latin people and governments.[132] Military legal scholars rightly speculate about this pattern in American status agreements, illustrated above in Figure 2.1. However, the forms and roles of race in U.S. SOFA negotiation remain unclear. If considered against known conditions like host country law, then such a bias may implicate how eligibility for shared jurisdiction is understood and accounted for in U.S. status of forces policy.

[131] Youngjin Jung, and Jun-Shik Hwang, "Where Does Inequality Come From-An Analysis of the Korea- United States Status of Forces Agreement." *Am. U. Int'l L. Rev.* 18 (2002):1103.

[132] Manuel EF Supervielle, "The legal status of foreign military personnel in the United States." *Army Law.* (1994): 3.

Why does the United States share jurisdiction under some SOFAs and not others? Why is jurisdiction withheld from some civil and common law host countries? I argue that U.S. SOFAs project a racialized conception of host state capacity for governance over American soldiers. My supposition is developed by examining variation in jurisdiction as an outcome influenced by American racial order. The United States negotiates a SOFA to shield its personnel from unfair indictment or systems that depart fundamentally from basic procedural fairness. Yet, eligibility for jurisdiction is racialized when disproportionately denied to non-white majority host countries. I argue that concerns for capacity dually permit patterns of exclusion, inadvertently or otherwise, toward most non-European receiving states. Perceived race—a hierarchy in and of itself—is considered among context specific indicators of capacity, such as legal system type, or even material capability or affinity.

Race is especially visible in early postwar negotiations over status protections. To be sure, Washington's view of foreign courts as unfair or inadequate included European systems.[133] While other strategic concerns ultimately outweighed anxieties over European jurisdiction, most non-white hosts are denied similar concession despite their importance to "forward zones," their adoption of civil and common law practices, or other indicators of capacity for governance. Non-white host courts were unofficially equated with the "primitive," the "strange," and the "emotional" among U.S. officials in charge of SOFA policy formation.[134] The few non-white

[133] Senate, U. S. "Agreement regarding status of forces of parties of the North atlantic treaty: Supplementary hearing before the committee on foreign relations on, 83rd cong." (1953).

[134] "263. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)," Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Korea, General, 3/62-7/62. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v22/d263; "639. The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young)," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d639; "351. Memorandum of Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 27, 1958," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960,

host partners granted legal authority over American troops had a higher bar to clear, a point debated between the Departments of State and Defense on the question of racial discrimination and SOFA jurisdiction.[135]

I demonstrate my argument by estimating the determinants of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. Specifically, I examine the relationship between host country racial majority and the United States' decision to share legal authority over U.S. military personnel. It is important to note that other factors constitute a model of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction, and thus, require elaboration. Even when plausible alternatives like host country legal system, physical integrity rights, UN voting similarity, deployment characteristics, and military power (among others) are considered, I find that the extraterritorial application of American law is biased in favor of majority-white host partners. The United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with predominantly white host states, allowing these peer countries to try U.S. personnel, while withholding this same right from most non-white host partners.

My empirical approach does not seek to advance claims that are causal. Rather, I attempt to demonstrate that racial hierarchy helps to explain American SOFA patterns. Other key sources of variation notwithstanding, race matters. I also acknowledge that racism can directly condition perceptions of the host. Non-white receiving states may be essentialized as somehow "different" from white receiving states. Such beliefs, more or less conscious, are likely inexplicit under

Arab-Israeli Dispute, United Arab Republic, North Africa, Volume XIII. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v13/d351

[135] "480 Memorandum by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v14p2/d480

strong social norms and laws against discrimination.[136] However, this chapter considers an indirect path racism often takes. That is, it hides behind, and thus constitutes, the very assumptions about state capacity for governance.[137] My theory of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction clarifies this embedded, institutional dynamic. Though conceptually distinct, it is difficult to disentangle the racialization of capacity from the racialization of the host country. Racism toward a host will likely coincide with similar notions about its capacity. In addition, I do not deny an overlapping story of American exceptionalism. The idea that foreign justice is inferior may explain jurisdiction in some SOFAs. Even so, the delegation of legal authority does not reflect this pattern systematically. Rather, the "othering" of foreign jurisdiction, I argue, is racial.

The challenges of measuring race in a cross-national study like this also deserve attention. Insofar as racial hierarchy is a feature of the international system, its examination is not as straightforward as my statistical model implies, especially since we cannot legitimately treat variables as independent of each other. Indeed, it is difficult to separate race from the larger, highly social (global) environment of which it is part.[138] A deeply embedded and constitutive construct, race is inherently problematic to operationalize. On some level, a reliable measure of race has to reconcile differing perceptions of race, all of which are socially constructed. The United States' perception of host race doubtlessly differs from host country perceptions and *self-perceptions* of race. The experience of race in the United States is not the experience of race

[136] Zoltán I Búzás, "Racism and antiracism in the liberal international order." *International Organization* 75, no. 2 (2021): 440-463.

[137] Bianca Freeman, D. G. Kim, and David A. Lake, "Race in International Relations: Beyond the "Norm Against Noticing"." *Annual Review of Political Science* 25 (2022): 175-196.

[138] Freeman, Kim, Lake, "Beyond the Norm."

everywhere. Relatedly, it is challenging to examine race empirically since it correlates with many observable country characteristics. While the correlates of race may themselves be products of long-standing racism and inequities in world politics, the effects of race are difficult to separate from its institutional and socio-economic consequences.[139] In addition, this chapter leaves open the question of aggregation. The qualitative evidence I present suggests that jurisdiction was shaped by the racial presumptions of those deciding its terms. Yet, exactly how individually held biases translate into collective SOFA policy formation is unclear. Moving forward, research beyond this study will have to provide further evidence of a causal link between race and SOFA jurisdiction.

The chapter proceeds by first describing variation in U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. Next, I theorize the racialization of host capacity in American SOFAs. Specifically, I lay out extraterritorial law as a principle by which U.S. racial hierarchy shapes the terms of host country jurisdiction. The subsequent sections provide empirical support. I devote the remainder of the chapter to alternative explanations for jurisdiction, detailing why such accounts are incomplete without a theory of race. Finally, I offer some implications of my argument and its evidence for understanding international law and security from its racial underpinnings.

2.1 What are SOFAs?

Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) designate the legal status of U.S. servicemembers in a foreign country. In particular, SOFAs regulate when and how the domestic laws of host governments are applied to American soldiers.[140] While status agreements stop short of

[139] ibid.

[140] Chuck R. Mason, "Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What is it, and how has it been utilized?" Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, (2012): 1-20.

immunizing U.S. personnel from criminal sanctions, SOFAs effectively constrain the legal authority that hosts may exercise over U.S. forces within their own territories. Central to these agreements is an attempt to reconcile the extraterritorial application of American law in foreign countries. Although policymakers and legal scholars heed the balance of rights and obligations between sending and receiving states—SOFAs as a shared sovereign prerogative—the division of legal authority remains the most important and frequently contested issue.[141] Since the onset of the Cold War, this question of jurisdiction has proved crucial to the forward-deployment of U.S. troops and other strategic interests around the world.[142]

SOFAs are often a strategic response to asymmetric jurisdiction between sending and receiving states. Prior to a SOFA, the host country as a receiver of foreign military personnel retains the exclusive right to adjudicate violations of host country law. Thus, without a SOFA in place, American soldiers are subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state.[143] In order to minimize this prospect, the United States as sending partner proffers a SOFA to limit legal exposure of its forces to host country courts. Specifically, SOFAs grant the United States either exclusive right or shared right over U.S. troops stationed overseas. In doing so, the agreement transfers legal authority from the host country to the United States, legitimating its enforcement options against the host country when an American soldier breaks the law. Under the SOFA, U.S. interests in intervening through status protections are vindicated. These agreements remain

[141] Andrew I. Yeo, "Security, Sovereignty, and Justice in US Overseas Military Presence," International Journal of Peace Studies 19, no. 2 (2014): 43-67; Mark E. Eichelman, "International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States Military." *Army Law.* (2000): 23; William J. Norton, "United States Obligations under Status of Forces Agreements: A New Method of Extradition." *Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L.* 5 (1975): 1.

[142] Erik Rosenfeld, "Application of US Status of Forces Agreements to Article 98 of the Rome Statute." (2003): 273.

[143] In principle, see Jung, and Hwang, "Where Does Inequality," 1119.

an integral feature of U.S. force projection beyond their initial use in containment policy following World War II.

The United States has been party to more than 350 SOFAs with over 46 percent of states in the international system.[144] While the majority of existing status agreements involve the United States as sending state, several other states authorize and maintain similar arrangements with various partners. South Korea, Mozambique, France, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, the United Kingdom, and Germany, among others, have negotiated comparable basing contracts.

When an American soldier is accused of breaking host country law, the SOFA in place determines whether the host government or the U.S. government exercises jurisdiction over that soldier. The particular division of legal authority between signatories mainly falls under one of two categories: exclusive or concurrent.

2.1.1 Exclusive Jurisdiction

SOFA jurisdiction is exclusive if the United States has sole legal authority over its personnel in a host country. Under an exclusive arrangement, the host government agrees to surrender its jurisdiction over U.S. forces within its territory for the duration of the SOFA. When an American soldier breaks host country law, the United States gets to decide what, if any, disciplinary action to take. Some senators and military officers express the view that civilian or U.S. courts-martial impose greater penalty on troops than host jurisdiction.[145] Alternatively, legal

[144] Jennifer Kavanagh, "US security-related agreements in force since 1955: Introducing a new database," RAND Project Air Force, Santa Monica CA, (2014) : 1-61.

[145] Asif Efrat, "Troop crime in peacetime: Criminality and accountability of US Troops worldwide during the Cold war." *Armed Forces & Society* 48, no. 3 (2022): 657-678; Asif Efrat, "Facing US extraterritorial pressure: American troops in foreign courts during the Cold War." *The Journal of Politics* 84, no. 1 (2022): 242-257; Asif Efrat, "How to Handle Offending Troops Overseas: The US Military's Legal Strategy during the Cold War." *Armed Forces & Society* 49, no. 2 (2023): 489-506.

scholars note that exclusive jurisdiction allows for the minimizing or dismissing of violations in question. The right to exert legal control can provide U.S. servicemembers complete immunity from the laws of receiving state.

Exclusive jurisdiction is generally bestowed in two ways. First, SOFAs may include a provision that accords U.S. personnel a status equivalent to that of the administrative and technical staff at the U.S. Embassy in the host country. This privilege comes from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, an international treaty that grants diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.[146] Second, SOFAs may also include a provision that authorizes exclusive control by the United States over its personnel within the host territory. This clause may be provided in addition to or in place of the Vienna provision within the status agreement.

2.1.2 Concurrent Jurisdiction

When jurisdiction is shared between sending and receiving states, the status agreement is concurrent. Under this type of arrangement, the SOFA divides jurisdiction according to which nation's laws have been violated: U.S. law, host country law, or both. Violations of only U.S. law fall under U.S. jurisdiction. Violations of only host country law are subject to host country jurisdiction. However, when the crime in question is in violation of both laws, a formula exists to allocate jurisdiction between states. The host country has primary jurisdiction unless two exceptions are met: 1) when the violation is committed inter se (by Americans against Americans), and 2) when the offense is carried out by Americans during performance of official

[146] "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961," United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 500, p. 95, Vienna, 1961. https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf

duties (defined by the United States). In these situations, the United States assumes primary jurisdiction. This type of SOFA is intended to ensure a legal framework of checks and balances that guards against excessive claims while also preserving good relations between sending and receiving states.

Under concurrent jurisdiction, U.S. personnel are typically protected by fair trial guarantees that are comparable to those provided by civilian courts in the United States.[147] However, in cases that violate both countries' laws, the right to prosecute can be ambiguous and often conditional on the details of the alleged crime committed. For these cases, the United States often seeks its own jurisdiction pursuant to its request of the host country, which is typically granted by waiver. Concurrent SOFAs can become problematic when the United States chooses to assert its legal authority in cases that are dubious or that clearly fall under host jurisdiction.

2.2 Race and U.S. SOFA Policy

Multiple factors constitute a model of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. Foremost are those relating to the character of host country law. The type of legal system within a host country matters to Washington when negotiating the terms of status. According to the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), the United States asserts jurisdiction to prevent exposure of its personnel to systems that diverge from fundamental concepts of Western jurisprudence.[148] Thus, variation in legal authority should reflect the level of principles like the rule of law, due process, and equal protection under host country law. Insofar as the receiving state upholds individual

[147] "Report on Status of Forces Agreements," ISAB, 50.

[148] "Report on Status of Forces Agreements," ISAB.

rights and liberties, it is reasonable to expect the United States to share jurisdiction. Despite the presence of civil and legal protections, however, the United States still withholds jurisdiction from some host countries. Disparate application of American law is particularly stark in non-white host states, including those that maintain the rule of law or practice the same type of law.[149] While the content and exercise of law within a host country usually shapes the terms of status, it does not explain some cases of jurisdiction. It also does not address the systematic promotion of exclusive jurisdiction in the non-European world.

Military and civilian legal scholars have raised the issue of race in discussions of inequality in U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. They have warned against the lack of reciprocity toward non-white host countries across common status provisions, noting the risks that perceived prejudice poses to cooperation. One such policy examined in the literature is unilateral concessions on immunity when foreign troops from non-NATO countries are hosted in the United States. Different arguments exist for nonreciprocal SOFAs, including the assumption that American courts will treat all parties equitably regardless of nationality.[150] Yet, legal systems in non-European countries are often met with the inverse assumption. The United States requires status provisions to guarantee minimum due process for American personnel overseas, while foreign troops in the United States go without the protection of a SOFA.

Concerns that Washington is not "playing fair," are not just a matter of principle or symbolism. For some host partners, nonreciprocity reflects a pattern of bias against non-

[149] for example, see U.S.-Botswana SOFA.

[150] Additional explanations for nonreciprocity include unequal bargaining power and limited presence of foreign personnel on American soil, see Adam B. Norman, "The rape controversy: Is a revision of the status of forces agreement with Japan necessary." *Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.* 6 (1995): 717.

European peoples and governments.[151] Critics contend that the "rhetoric of alliance and friendship" in status agreements obscures the "racing" of status protections, which are typically reserved for Western European NATO countries.[152] A construct of race and its potential influence on U.S. SOFA jurisdiction remain unclear, however. Explanations that omit racial formulations of jurisdiction may suffer an incomplete understanding of U.S. SOFAs and American extraterritorial law more generally.

2.2.1 Racial Hierarchy

Narrow and broad hierarchy are important concepts for understanding the process by which American extraterritorial law becomes racialized.[153] As a legal contract, status agreements are both the product and site of political struggle between sending and receiving states.[154] That is, each actor contests at the margins the rights and duties in their relationship over U.S. military deployment. In this narrow conception of hierarchy, SOFAs aid in overcoming the problems associated with unspecified jurisdiction or authority held exclusively by the host partner. Narrow orders like U.S. SOFAs, however, are not without the influence of coinciding orders. American racial hierarchy conditions status agreements during the bargaining process.

Building on what International Relations (IR) has come to define as a broad order, racial hierarchy is the ranking of actors into vertical relations of super- and subordination along

[151] Supervielle, "The legal status."

[152] Norman, "The Rape Controversy."

[153] Freeman, Kim, Lake, "Beyond the Norm."

[154] David A. Lake, "Laws and norms in the making of international hierarchies." *Hierarchies in world politics* 144 (2017): 17; David A. Lake, *Hierarchy in international relations*. Cornell University Press, 2011.

contrived racial difference.[155] It entitles members of each ranked category disparate rights and privileges within the racial regime. Unlike narrow or contractual forms, racial orders are not bargained nor can they be renegotiated, though they are always and everywhere contested. Race, a hierarchy in and of itself, produces the actors and their repertories for action, reconstructing the conditions of possibility from which they interact and pursue their interests.

Racial hierarchy takes on different forms in U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. One such pathway—and the focus of this study—is host state capacity for governance. Scholarship on race and international law examines the rhetoric of capacity in European extraterritoriality over non-European populations.[156] Racial hierarchy can manifest as notions of deficiency that undercut, often violently, the agency of perceived racial out-groups overseas. IR literature on aid makes a similar assertion, establishing both the empirical and policy implications of such a trope.[157] Like patterns of assistance that exhibit a "strings attached" logic whereby the intervenor assumes the "burden" of paternalistic control over non-white populations, I consider how U.S. SOFAs also restrict the behavioral choice set of most non-white receiving states on the basis of incapacity. Below, I lay out a theory of mutually constituted hierarchies to help elucidate this dynamic in American extraterritorial law.

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[155] Broad hierarchies manifest and reinforce themselves as deep patterns of inequality. By locating actors in relation to each other, broad hierarchy demarcates who and what belongs, ascribing to all a superior or inferior status, see Ayşe, Zarakol, eds. *Hierarchies in world politics*. Vol. 144. Cambridge University Press, 2017.

[156] Siba N'Zatioula Grovogui, *Sovereigns, quasi sovereigns, and Africans: Race and self-determination in international law*. Vol. 3. U of Minnesota Press, 1996; Antony Anghie, "Decolonizing the Concept of." Good Governance"', in Gruffydd Jones, B.(ed.), *Decolonizing International Relations*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, MD (2006): 109-30.

[157] Andy Baker, "Race, paternalism, and foreign aid: Evidence from US public opinion." *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 1 (2015): 93-109.




Figure 2.2: Interactions between racial hierarchy, extraterritoriality, and SOFA jurisdiction.

2.2.2 A Theory of U.S. SOFA Jurisdiction

Race in the United States functions as an independent criterion for vertical hierarchy (Figure 2.2, 1a). It positions actors in relation to each other, privileging a Western-centric, and thus, white dominant order. It is within this racial regime that assumptions about capacity for self-governance are comprehensively formed and contested in a society, both domestic and international.[158] When it comes to status protections, non-white countries are perceived as deficient, lacking the essential capabilities required for jurisdiction over American personnel on host soil. Since legal authority is conferred onto the United States as sending partner, its exclusionary terms, though decried by some host governments, are nonetheless codified into the SOFA.

I note that "racist actors" are not necessary for U.S. SOFAs to vary empirically along the global color line. Individual bias, when and where it occurs, is often concealed beneath strong social norms against such beliefs or behaviors. While my argument advances a broad conception of racial hierarchy in U.S. SOFA jurisdiction, it does not deny the importance of individuals that broker the agreement. However, a "smoking gun" of overtly racialized speech in negotiations is

[158] Freeman, Kim, Lake, "Beyond the Norm."

not necessary for examining legal status as a pattern of bias, similar to that in American criminal law. Structural racism—an established set of expectations within an institution— can underpin the routine politics of status over U.S. interests in host countries.

SOFA policy is not always shaped by racial hierarchy directly.[159] What is more likely, the agreement itself becomes racialized through the extraterritorial application of American law. When applied to individuals, extraterritoriality describes a foreigner's state of exemption from local jurisdiction, typically as a result of diplomatic negotiation. Status agreements apply this same principle whereby U.S. jurisdiction is exercised legitimately within countries that receive its forces **(1b)**. Though common practice between states, extraterritoriality has received little attention in the IR literature.

At its core, the principle of extraterritoriality reflects beliefs that derive from civilizational constructs of 19th and early 20th century international law. The notion that non-Europeans lack government for white foreigners was espoused by imperialists as "just cause" for extraterritorial jurisdiction. Imperialists were emphatic in denying non-Europeans the capacity to govern. According to Siba Grovogui, extraterritoriality—to the point of native capitulation—is reconciled by the belief that Indigenous peoples possess inferior social habits, moral sentiments, and political structures.[160] When host populations are imagined to be in want of civil institutions and rights, their conquest is deemed justifiable. As Teemu Ruskola explains, the practice of

[159] The legalization of racial equality in the UN Charter constituted an apparent disassociation of international law from its colonial legacy. In reality however, domestic racism persists under the cover of law, in this case, U.S. extraterritoriality and its application in foreign policy. See Búzás, "Racism and Antiracism."

[160] Grovogui, *Sovereigns*; Siba N. Grovogui, "Regimes of sovereignty: International morality and the African condition." *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (2002): 315-338.

American extraterritoriality emerged as a key technology of non-territorial imperialism, a "colonialism without colonies" for its commercial holdings long after withdrawal.[161] Thus, majority-white countries imposed one set of rules to govern among themselves and another set to regulate association with those racialized as "other".

U.S. SOFAs betray similar ideas about host state capacity and extraterritoriality. As a norm, racial hierarchy conditions the rules of behavior—principles—that are readily translated into law.[162] Where racial stratification is established and its "racial logics" absorbed,[163] principles that contain overlapping constructs or conceptual elements can become racialized. Moreover, such principles "stick" when they appear to advance a widely-held standard or expectation of group behavior. Extraterritoriality embraces the assumption that (certain) people are immune from (certain) host country governance upon entry. Since extraterritorial law relies on the notion of inherent difference between peoples and societies, it "fits" or affirms prevailing beliefs about race **(2a)**. When this interaction occurs, the United States applies jurisdiction unevenly by race **(2b)**, regulating host country behavior over U.S. forces **(1c)**. As a narrow or contractual hierarchy, the agreement reinforces its interior principle of extraterritoriality—framed by racialized assumptions about capacity—making the cyclical nature of these interactions complete

[161] For scholars of comparative law, the U.S. Court in China helps illustrate this point. The "unequal treaties" imposed on Qing dynasty China up until the 20th century institutionalized differential legal treatment of Western merchants and local Chinese populations based on ethnic identity. During its congressionally sanctioned tenure, the court held that China, as far as the status of Americans is concerned, is similar to that of an unorganized territory belonging to the United States. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, Washington's extraterritorial jurisdiction was frequently conflated with the legal status of colonies. In the case of the court, American judges were commonly assigned from U.S. territorial colonies. See Teemu Ruskola, "Colonialism without colonies: on the extraterritorial jurisprudence of the US Court for China," *Law and Contemporary Problems* 71, no. 3 (2008): 217-242.

[162] Lake, "Laws and Norms."

[163] John M. Hobson, and Jason C. Sharman, "The enduring place of hierarchy in world politics: Tracing the social logics of hierarchy and political change." *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2005): 63-98.

(2c). The United States ultimately reserves jurisdiction for its (white) coequals. Unilateral concessions on jurisdiction are tailored toward host partners outside of the European "core."

H1: *The United States is less likely to share jurisdiction with non-white majority host countries*

As mentioned at the outset, U.S. SOFA jurisdiction is likely determined by several factors. I introduce two alternative explanations in addition to race that are theoretically important for understanding its variation. First, recall that the quality of law within a host country should matter when negotiating legal status. Interagency assessments of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction confirm the significance of this variable. Exclusive arrangements are reserved for receiving states that would expose American personnel to unfair judicial and legal customs.[164] Otherwise, it is reasonable for the United States to pursue a concurrent arrangement that will, in practice, secure U.S. jurisdiction where doing so protects U.S. interests (which tends to be the case under shared regimes).[165]

The logic of an association between jurisdiction and the quality of host law is loosely akin to venue transfers in the legal profession. Similar to a petition for change in trial venue, SOFAs are employed in response to factors that render impartial judgement improbable in the original host country setting. It is worth noting that there may be multiple dimensions of host law that are more or less salient to U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. Since bias in the application and enforcement of host law is an expressed concern among members of the U.S. government, I

[164] "Report on Status of Forces Agreements," ISAB, 9,

[165] "Report on Status of Forces Agreements," ISAB, 17-18.

select the rule of law—the extent to which a country's law are equally enforced and independently adjudicated—as one alternative explanation for this study.

H2: *The United States is more likely to share jurisdiction with host countries that have high rule of law.*

Second, U.S. SOFA jurisdiction may reflect shifts in the distribution of power. The initial postwar period ushered an influx of SOFAs, mostly concurrent, as an institutionalized compromise among NATO members. Shared jurisdiction between the United States and its host partners also characterized a majority of agreements throughout the Cold War. On the other hand, SOFA terms that vest jurisdiction exclusively in the United States did not take off until the 1990s, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, again, after the September 11 attacks in 2001. This upward trend of exclusive SOFAs coincides with a shift in U.S. deployments to and operations within host countries throughout the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia.

Post-Cold War growth in exclusive agreements could reflect changes in the security environment. Indeed, the United States may be better positioned to "get what it wants" without compromise. The fact that Washington manages to negotiate exclusive jurisdiction and favorable basing rights suggests that power and security imperatives matter. Shifts in the distribution of power may indicate that exclusive rights were easier for the United States to obtain from host partners following the Cold War.

H3: *The United States is less likely to share jurisdiction after the Cold War.*




Figure 2.3: U.S. SOFAs by jurisdiction, 1951-2021

2.3 Data and Design

I model the determinants of jurisdiction statistically in search of important patterns in U.S. SOFA agreements. I utilize the Department of State online SOFA archive and the RAND Dataset of U.S. Security Treaties and Agreements to code jurisdiction.[166] I conduct analysis on available agreements (1951-2020) at the country-year unit since it is common for host countries to maintain multiple SOFAs with the United States.[167]

[166] Status of Forces Agreement, Department of State, https://www.state.gov/subjects/status-of-forces-agreement/; Database of U.S. Security Treaties and Agreements (TL-133-AF), RAND, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR736.html

[167] Some hosts maintain multiple U.S. SOFAs for various operational and political reasons that cover a range of issues relating to U.S. military installations overseas. Based on the availability of agreements, I collected and coded 254 agreements that specify jurisdiction between 1951-2020. That said, SOFA jurisdiction between host governments and the United States typically remains constant over time (with the exception of South Korea). Even when SOFAs are renegotiated or overridden by new status agreements, they often inherit the division of legal authority initially set between sending and receiving state. According to the ISAB, it is not clear when a SOFA goes

2.3.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, *Jurisdiction*, measures the division of legal authority over American soldiers stationed in host countries. I code the jurisdiction clause as a dichotomous indicator. Concurrent jurisdiction is recorded "1" if legal authority is shared between the host country and the United States and "0" if legal authority is held exclusively by the United States. The data for *Jurisdiction* are measured at the level of national jurisdiction since SOFA terms, including the delegation of legal authority, are bargained and specified at the country level.

2.3.2 Independent Variables

Non-White Majority: I use the Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) dataset and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to create a dichotomous indicator which records Non-white Majority, coded "1" if the largest racial group within a host country is of non-European dissent, and "0" for the converse. The EPR-ED identifies the socially constructed racial marker of origin. Specifically, it defines race as ethnic groups' origins from particular world regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Americas, East Asia, South Asia, Europe, Oceania, and Middle East and Northern Africa.[168] I select the EPR-ED data as the construct of race for this study because it captures regional origins that became relevant as social categories in the context of European colonization globally and related processes of white-dominant racial classification.[169] The

out of force. Moreover, the U.S. government operates its SOFA efforts without a comprehensive or accessible archival database of all existing agreements, 39.

[168] The EPR-ED variable for race identifies multiple markers of origin on the individual level, a choice that reflects the data's constructivist understanding of race as a social category. Where the data identify more than one racial segment, the EPR-ED advised to treat these segments as one combined racial dimension; Nils-Christian Bormann, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Manuel Vogt, "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(4), (2017): 744–71.

[169] Moreover, both likely differ from how race is measured in this article. For example, the "white" coding for several host countries in Central and South America reflects the European-origin majority of the population. This

dichotomous coding also reflects this. The data cover 1946-2017, and I code the period 1951-2017.

Rule of Law: I include indicators that proxy for the quality of host country law. The United States' decision to share legal authority over its soldiers is likely influenced by the level of the rule of law within the receiving state. *Rule of Law Index* (v2x_rule) from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset records the extent to which a country's laws are transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and the extent to which the actions of government actors comply with the law.[170] V-Dem's measure is an interval that ranges of 0 to 1, where "0" corresponds to low rule of law and "1" relays the converse. Data coverage extends from 1798 to 2020, and I include observations from the 1951-2019 time period. For a more sensitive measure, I use *Judicial Independence* from the Latent Judicial Independence dataset in a separate specification.[171] This indicator directly captures the quality of judicial system which is a primary concern for the United States. While physical integrity rights are also considered, these data are excluded from the main model because of high correlation with the rule of law.

Cold War: Jurisdiction may reflect shifts in the distribution of power following the end of the Cold War. I use a dummy variable, coded "0" to indicate SOFAs signed into force 1991 and prior and "1" for agreements signed into force after 1991.

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decision was made based on the literature and data available, though at the expense of a more nuanced measure of race in Latin America. While I focus on the United States' projection of race onto host countries, coding racial categories would ideally account for the politics self-determination, colonialism, and U.S. intervention among other dynamics.

[170] Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C.H., Lindberg, S.I., Teorell, J., Alizada, N., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Cornell, A., Fish, M.S. and Gastaldi, L., 2021. V-Dem dataset v11. 1.

[171] Jeffrey Staton, Drew Linzer, Christopher Reenock, Jordan Holsinger, "Update, A Global Measure of Judicial Independence, 1900-2015", (2019), https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NFXWUO, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:WO2IMcRMrcGvGhtJZCYs1A== [fileUNF]

2.3.3 Controls

Sharia: It is plausible that the type of legal system (or code of ethical conduct) matters for selecting the level of potential exposure American personnel with have to foreign courts. As a majority common law country, the United States may be less inclined to surrender jurisdiction to host countries that diverge in legal dimension. While variation exists between the world's five legal systems (civil, common, customary, religious, and mixed), this study considers the distinction between religious and non-religious legal traditions. It is reasonable to expect the United States to retain exclusive legal authority from host partners that practice Sharia. Thus, I use a dichotomous indicator for legal system type. *Sharia* is coded "1" for host countries that exhibit Islamic canonical legal traditions, whether exclusively or in a "mixed" system, and "0" for law that emanates from a common, civil, and/or customary legal system.

National Capability: SOFA jurisdiction may depend on the capabilities of host countries. In particular, the degree of legal control a host country cedes to the United States may reflect the bargaining power of that host country, as indicated by their level of international power. I use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) from the Correlates of War (COW) project,[172] which contains six dimensions of international power: military spending and personnel, total and urban population, iron/steel production, and energy consumption. These data have been used widely and cover 1816-2000. I use the CINC score for each state's capabilities for the 1951-2000 time period.

[172] Greig, M., and A. J. Enerline. "Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities (NMC) Data Documentation (Version 5.0) period covered: 1815-2012." *Department of Political Science, University of North Texas* (2017).

Troops Size: SOFA jurisdiction may reflect the size of U.S. troop deployment to host countries.[173] I include a control from R package {troopdata} for the 1951-2020 time period.

NATO Member: It is reasonable to expect defense alliances to affect the United States' decision to share legal authority over its servicemembers in host countries. As a particularly strong pact and institutional feature between the United States and countries that host its personnel, I use NATO membership, coded "0" for no membership and "1" for membership, as a control.

UN Voting Similarity: Delegation of jurisdiction could depend on how aligned the host country is with the United States. I use the voting similarity index (agree2un) in the United Nations General Assembly Voting dataset, which records the total number of votes where both states agree on an issue divided by the total number of joint votes. U.N. Voting Similarity Index covers 1946-2011 and ranges from "0" to "1", where "1" represents total affinity between the United States and the host country.[174]

Veto: The United States may be more likely to share jurisdiction with a host country that has power to veto substantive resolutions on the UN Security Council.

While jurisdiction is coded for 105 host countries and 254 SOFAs, the analysis includes 183 observations due to missing values in some of the control variables. I implement a logistic model that accommodates rare events and cluster standard errors on the host country to account

[173] Michael A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, and Carla Martinez Machain. "US global military deployments, 1950–2020." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 39, no. 3 (2022): 351-370.

[174] Michael A. Bailey, Anton Strezhnev, and Erik Voeten. "Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 2 (2017): 430-456.

for correlation in the error term.[175] I use this estimation method to reduce small-sample bias given the possibility of a small number of cases on the rarer outcome (exclusive = 40; concurrent = 143).[176] I also run a generalized linear model and include the full table of controls, correlations, and other supporting information in the Appendix.

2.4 Results

Each column in Table 2.1 reports the regression coefficients and standard errors for U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. Columns 1 through 3 display the association between the main independent variables—*Non-White Majority*, *Rule of Law*, and *Cold War*—and jurisdiction respectively. Columns 4 and 5 include control variables. As the results suggest, non-white majority host states are associated with exclusive jurisdiction even when accounting for the rule of law, shifts in the distribution of power, and other explanations. This finding is consistent with H1 and is robust to the general logistic model specification, though statistically weaker (Column 5). This finding also holds with judicial independence as a more sensitive measure than the rule of law (Appendix, Columns 6 and 7). In Column 4, *Non-White Majority* is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. To better interpret the substantive effect of the coefficient, I calculate an odds ratio. Exponentiating *Non-White Majority* provides the expected increase or decrease in the odds of concurrent jurisdiction for a unit increase in *Non-White Majority*. Thus, the odds of the United States sharing jurisdiction with a host country shrink by a factor of 0.14 when that country is not

[175] The model allows a fully general structure w.r.t. heteroskedasticity and serial (cross--sectional) correlation, see Manuel Arellano, "Computing robust standard errors for within-groups estimators." *Oxford bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 49, no. 4 (1987): 431-434.

[176] Paul Allison, "Logistic regression for rare events." *Statistical Horizons* 13 (2012); Gelman, A., Jakulin, A., Pittau, M. G., & Su, Y. S. "A Weakly Informative Default Prior Distribution for Logistic and Other Regression Models," Annals of Applied Statistics 2, no. 4 (2008): 1360–83; and Erik Gartzke, and Jon R. Lindsay, "The influence of sea power on politics: domain-and platform-specific attributes of material capabilities." *Security Studies* 29, no. 4 (2020): 601-636.

Table 2.1: Non-White Majority Host on U.S. SOFA Jurisdiction

	Jurisdiction				
	relogit (1)	relogit (2)	relogit (3)	relogit (4)	logit (5)
Non-White Majority	-3.303***			-1.947***	-2.514*
	(0.449)			(0.558)	(1.026)
Rule of Law		5.110***		0.438	-0.441
		(0.770)		(1.075)	(2.008)
Cold War			-1.865***	-3.582***	-10.674***
			(0.459)	(0.945)	(2.349)
Controls	N	N	N	Y	Y
States	85	85	85	85	85
Observations	183	183	183	183	183
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

white. Substantively, a non-white host is associated with an 86% decrease in the odds of a concurrent SOFA. I provide odds ratios in the Appendix.

The inclusion of control variables alters the relationship between jurisdiction and the rule of law. While positive, the effect of *Rule of Law* is indistinguishable from zero (Columns 4 and 5). *Judicial Independence* performs similarly. One reason for this null result may be that both indicators lack sensitivity to the particular features of host law and enforcement that put U.S. soldiers at greater risk of confinement overseas. Beyond these inputs identified by the U.S. interagency, bias may be more important in other, related areas. For example, foreign prison conditions or the quality of relationship between the U.S. military and local authorities are both reasonable controls. Though globally limited, host public opinion on American basing is another

indicator worth testing.[177] Despite the lack of support for H2, additional legal explanations for U.S. SOFA jurisdiction should be examined.

I also control for *Sharia*. Its coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.01 level in each regression, suggesting that the United States is less likely to relinquish authority to host partners that practice Sharia, even in mixed legal regimes (Sharia and civil law for example). The odds of a shared SOFA are near zero in these cases. One interpretation is that Washington is less inclined to surrender jurisdiction to a country that diverges from civil, common, and/or customary law standards.

The results indicate support for H3. Under Column 4, *Cold War* is negative, significant at the 0.01 level, and robust to other model specifications (Column 5, Appendix Column 6-7). The odds of a concurrent arrangement decrease by a factor of 0.03, or approximately 97%, after the Cold War. This finding suggests that a decline in the odds of a shared SOFA could be associated with a shift in the U.S. security position. Put differently, the United States may be better positioned to establish extraterritorial privileges in the host country without compromise since the end of the Cold War. *U.S. Troops Size*, *NATO Membership*, and *UN Voting Similarity* perform as expected. Each association is statistically significant and positive, suggesting that the United States is more likely to share jurisdiction with receiving partners that host more American troops, are NATO members, and have high voting similarity with the United States on issues in the UN General Assembly. I also control for veto power and find that its coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level in the logit specification. In this case, the United States may be more likely to share jurisdiction with a host partner that can veto substantive resolutions on the

[177] Michael A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers. *Beyond the Wire: US Military Deployments and Host Country Public Opinion*. Oxford University Press, 2023.

UN Security Council. Lastly, the association between *National Capability* and SOFA jurisdiction is positive though statistically weak, indicating that a host country's bargaining power is not a strong predictor of the United States' decision to delegate legal authority.

I have presented some evidence suggesting the importance of race to U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. I also proposed several alternative explanations. Yet, my empirical approach provokes certain questions and criticisms that deserve attention. While the regression attempts to account for a post-Cold War change in the security environment, this shift in U.S position remains one such concern that I grapple with analytically in what follows.

2.4.1 Racial Hierarchy or Shifts in the Distribution of Power?

Recall the surge of exclusive SOFAs at the end of the Cold War. One fair interpretation of this pattern is that the United States was better positioned to negotiate exclusive rights over its troops on host soil. Thus, the consequences of racist presuppositions and shifts in the U.S. security position require disentanglement. Yeo's 2014 study on security, sovereignty, and the U.S. military presence overseas confronts the very question of exclusive jurisdiction.[178] Although Yeo focuses on shared rights over American personnel—attributing the trend to greater demands for sovereignty—Yeo also addresses the post-Cold War influx of exclusive SOFAs. The fact that Washington manages to attain exclusive jurisdiction suggests that power and security imperatives make a difference. However, shifts in the distribution of power do not necessarily indicate that exclusive rights were any easier for the United States to acquire from host partners following the Cold War.

[178] Yeo, "Security, Sovereignty."

The literature considers several explanations that unsettle the notion, including decreased threat, increased host bargaining power, democratization, the media, and changes in the type of U.S. basing. Without a Soviet threat, U.S. and host government elites supporting the American military presence could no longer invoke the war as cause to suppress anti-base protests and intensifying calls for host jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers. As Yeo states, "with decreased threat perceptions, some elements of society saw U.S. bases as more of a liability than an asset."[179] Even in cases where host countries exercise some jurisdiction, such as South Korea, Panama, and the Philippines, they have still contested sovereignty rights at the margins through SOFA revision processes over time. Authoritarian regimes have also made sovereignty demands to exact higher "rent" from the United States for basing privileges, including jurisdiction.[180] Thus, while the post-Cold War security environment changed to favor the U.S. position, it also provided permissive conditions for host partners to assert their preference for equal SOFA terms.

Relatedly, exclusive SOFAs were not necessarily easier to achieve after the Cold War since host nations exercised greater bargaining power. By hosting specific assets, host countries increased their leverage to extract important concessions from the United States, "whittling down" U.S. use rights to the minimum required for U.S. operations in a post-Soviet era.[181] According to Yeo, "the bargaining power of a host nation rises as the sunk costs of U.S. bases generate increasing strategic returns for the United States."[182] In other words, U.S. interest in

[179] Yeo, "Security, Sovereignty," 57.

[180] Alexander Cooley, *Base politics: democratic change and the US military overseas*. Cornell University Press, 2012.

[181] Alexander Cooley, and Hendrik Spruyt, "Contracting states." In *Contracting States*. Princeton University Press, 2009.

[182] Yeo, "Security, Sovereignty," 49.

maintaining global basing access after the Cold War empowered host governments to obtain jurisdiction and other material quid pro quos.[183]

In addition, the onset of democratization emboldened anti-base mobilization over time but particularly after the Cold War. Prior to the 1990s, national security laws in some host countries banned protest against the U.S. military. Yet, with a shift in U.S.-Soviet global rivalry, these laws were not enforced to the same extent since their political feasibility waned.[184] Thus, campaigns for greater legal accountability —if not for the withdrawal of U.S. troops altogether— erupted across receiving countries including South Korea, Ecuador, Japan, and the Philippines. Such movements were not limited to host communities or local groups with stakes in base politics. Broader civil society supported demands for equal jurisdiction. Increased media coverage, rapid diffusion of information, and better reporting of crimes committed by American soldiers also made exclusive rights more difficult for the United States to attain without compromise.

Some scholars argue that host countries became more amenable to basing, especially once U.S. deployments became smaller and shorter compared to previous eras. This is not to suggest that host communities grew more tolerant of crime, pollution, or other negative externalities from the American military footprint. Nor does it suggest that U.S. basing was less extractive. Instead, it may be the case that a reduction in the size and duration of the U.S. presence made exclusive jurisdiction more tolerable to host publics and governments.[185]

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[183] ibid.

[184] ibid.

[185] Allen, Flynn, Martinez, and Stravers, *Beyond the Wire.*

These explanations help dispel the notion that exclusive jurisdiction became easier for the United States to obtain because of its improved position after the Cold War. Still, exclusive SOFAs likely indicate that power matters. However, each of these alternative stories fall short of explaining why shared jurisdiction was no longer satisfactory to the United States. By 1990, the model for jurisdiction over American soldiers in host countries had been concurrent for more than forty years. Yet, the United States ultimately deviated from this pattern once its basing operations extended beyond the northern hemisphere and its traditional host partners. If the change in jurisdiction were a matter of power, then we might also expect an upward trend of European waivers after the Cold War. Specifically, an unrivaled United States could presumably pressure its European partners to relinquish primary right over American servicemembers in cases that fall under host jurisdiction. Despite the importance of the U.S. position, SOFA waiver activity does not reflect this shift in U.S. power. Annual waiver rates published by the Judge Advocate General of the Army show that host countries denied U.S. petitions for jurisdiction more after the end of the Cold War. While the waiver rate fluctuated throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there was a marked decrease in waivers granted to the United States in 1993 and 1994. In fact, jurisdiction waivers did not reach or surpass Cold War levels until 2000 as reflected in the *Annual Reports on Military Justice*.[186] Based on these patterns, it is unlikely that a shift in the distribution of power is the sole driver of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction.

Also, recall that American skepticism over foreign courts—European venues or otherwise— does not explain the decision to share or retain authority over American troops. Rather, the advent of exclusive agreements corresponds with the United States' decision to enter

[186] "Annual Reports," United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Washington, DC, https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/ann_reports.htm

into SOFAs with non-white countries. Along with a change in basing strategy, the United States established a different set of rules for most non-white host partners such that American jurisdiction would be exercised absolutely over violations of host law. To be sure, race and power are difficult to tease apart analytically. It is often the case that systems of power—racial hierarchy included—interact and operate interdependently. Thus, while the United States revised its standard model of jurisdiction from a position of greater power following the Cold War, this shift toward exclusive authority was nonetheless applied selectively to non-white host partners. SOFA jurisdiction as an outcome of perceptions about legal capacity varies by host race. Despite general mistrust over the impartiality of host courts, equal right over American troops is denied to most non-white partners because they are viewed as intrinsically different. Such a racialized view, I argue, is analytically prior to other considerations.

2.5 The U.S.-Japan Status Agreement

U.S. diplomatic records reveal how race was foregrounded in the question of Japanese jurisdiction. I select this case for a few reasons. First, we learn that race actually mattered to those negotiating the terms of status. According to some U.S. diplomats, racism shaped notions about host capacity for equal right over American troops.[187] The potential for racial bias to derail other U.S. security interests was enough to belabor the question of status protections among Washington elites. Second, we also learn that concurrent SOFAs are no less racialized. This is the case when jurisdiction is shared with white and non-white hosts partners alike. The United States ultimately yielded to Japan's demands for legal authority by 1960 in attempt to keep defense contracts afloat. Notwithstanding this flip in jurisdiction, an agreement that concedes a

[187] "480 Memorandum."

measure of authority to non-white host partners can still betray racist beliefs over which the SOFA takes form. As IR scholars have demonstrated, there are identity-based mechanisms that can influence the very reasons for cooperation between states (along racially hierarchic terms).[188]

I intend the U.S.-Japan case as a qualitative complement to the regression analysis above. However, it has several limits worth noting upfront. The case lacks clear evidence of causality from race to SOFA jurisdiction. Also, the U.S.-Japan agreement shifts from exclusive to concurrent status provisions. Indeed, the decision to renegotiate in favor of shared jurisdiction inverted the typical model of unilateral authority, especially applied to non-white host countries. While the case of Japanese jurisdiction makes my argument about race feel somewhat "awkward," this example still offers important insight for the central argument.

2.5.1 The Race Problem

The belief that non-Europeans possess inferior courts animated early postwar ideas about host "eligibility" for equal right over American troops. This is not to suggest that European partners were met without concern. Lack of due process, harsh penalties, and anti-American bias in European courts were heavily debated by U.S. officials over the NATO SOFA in the early 1950s. Strong opposition in the Senate and the public was eventually subdued and the NATO SOFA ratified once it became clear that shared jurisdiction was a necessary concession for U.S. security interests.[189] Thus, legal authority to try American personnel was granted.

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[188] Amoz JY Hor, "NATO was founded to protect 'civilized' people. That means white," *The Washington Post*, April 22, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/11/nato-ukraine-refugees-whiteness/; Zoltán I. Búzás, "The color of threat: Race, threat perception, and the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923)." *Security Studies* 22, no. 4 (2013): 573-606.

[189] Senate, U. S. "Agreement regarding status of forces of parties of the North atlantic treaty: Supplementary hearing before the committee on foreign relations on, 83rd cong." (1953).

In stark contrast, the question of jurisdiction between the United States and non-European host partners was an explicitly racial one. Racism toward non-European hosts became a salient issue among U.S. officials writing SOFA policy. In particular, disagreement between the Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) over how to handle the "problem of racial discrimination" animated diplomatic activity on security cooperation with Japan and other hosts countries.[190] Concerns about legal inferiority by some U.S. officials were decoded as assumptions about racial inferiority by other authorities involved in negotiating jurisdiction for the United States.

In 1952, the Secretaries of State and Defense wrote a memorandum to the President requesting his decision on criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in Japan.[191] The request was made upon sustained disagreement between the departments over which type of arrangement to pursue: a SOFA that follows the "NATO formula" allowing shared jurisdiction or one that gives complete immunity to American personnel from Japanese courts. At the center of this debate was the issue of racial discrimination. DOS, in favor of shared jurisdiction, cited American racism as a "decisive" roadblock to keeping other agreements with Japan intact. Political success of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Pact was at stake if unequal treatment by the West continued. DOS officials believed that discrimination toward Japan on the matter of jurisdiction would inflame national and racial feelings against close association with the United States. Without an arrangement similar to that afforded European host partners, DOS analysts

[190] "480 Memorandum."

[191] "480 Memorandum."

expected Japan to interpret exclusive jurisdiction as infringement on the sovereignty of a "defeated" "racially inferior" "enemy."[192]

It is clear that the question of jurisdiction was understood and discussed among U.S. officials with race in mind. According to the Secretary of State, "the entire non-white world [would] be watching closely the nature of [U.S.] relations with Japan to determine whether [the United States] [is] willing to work with a non-white country on the basis of equality and partnership."[193] To be sure, a general aversion to foreign courts may explain some instances of U.S. SOFA jurisdiction. However, hierarchical views of race were acknowledged as playing a central role in the decision of legal authority with Japan and the rest of Asia. Importantly, accusations about discrimination toward non-white host countries were not made by Japan alone. DOS shared concern over American racism on the matter of SOFA jurisdiction. As explained by the Secretary of State, "[U.S.] discriminations at home are a great burden upon [its] relations with Asia: an attempt to practice similar discriminations officially in [U.S.] relations with the Governments of Asia would be considered by them to be intolerable."[194] American racial order can project racialized conceptions of host state capacity for governance over American soldiers.

In addition, DOS addressed racialized assumptions about the law in Japan, stating that, "there are no strange 'oriental' crimes in the Japanese penal system" to worry about, especially since it "modernized" under Occupation.[195] Japan's adoption of civil law under U.S. imperialism was an outcome of hierarchical relations—narrow and broad—that were doubtless racialized.

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[192] ibid.

[193] ibid.

[194] ibid.

[195] ibid.

However, worth noting is the critique DOS made about racial conceptions of legal capacity for governance over American personnel. The Defense Secretary held different views. DOD believed that exclusive jurisdiction in Japan was a matter of military necessity. The right to subject American troops to trial by Japanese courts for offenses against Japanese law was considered a "fundamental danger to [the United States'] security mission" and troop morale.[196] In the memorandum, DOD cited harassment from unfriendly local officials, resentment against the presence of U.S. forces, and a "loss of face" from the assumption of Japanese jurisdiction as grounds for exclusive legal authority.

The Secretary of Defense also raised concerns about the law itself. American personnel would be subject to, "strange laws and strange procedures administered by a people who have different standards and a different outlook…who were not so long ago bitter enemies."[197] NATO host partners were indeed met with similar concerns. DOD officials expressed what they felt were "equally strong" views over U.S. forces in Germany. Denying Japan jurisdiction was also about maintaining its ability to do the same to other host governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Matthew Ridgeway believed that, "the initial negotiating position of the United States vis-à-vis Japan should be one which is consistent with, rather than one which would undercut [the United States'] negotiating position vis-à-vis the Federal Republic of Germany."[198] Unlike Japan, Germany had not yet gained full sovereignty and was willing to surrender legal authority. Thus, DOS argued that Germany was no precedent for the question of jurisdiction in Japan. This was especially the case in light of the NATO SOFA, a shared arrangement over

[196] ibid.

[197] ibid.

[198] ibid.

which the United States voiced similar concerns about host law. The State Secretary concluded his recommendation to the President on this point, stating that there was no problem of racial discrimination in the German context. It was not a useful standard for negotiating a SOFA with Japan.

The 1952 memorandum demonstrates that race and racism were issues in debate over SOFA jurisdiction within the U.S. government. Specifically, the discussion hints at potential relationships between American racial hierarchy and ideas about host country capacity for jurisdiction. The formation of rules over status, like other bargains that involve U.S security interests, were informed, at least in part, by the beliefs of those negotiating the terms. Assumptions about Japan's capacity for legal authority over U.S. personnel not only reflected American racial hierarchy but also engendered the pattern of subsequent contests over jurisdiction.[199]

Importantly, the United States would later delegate jurisdiction to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960. This is not to suggest that race did not matter for the SOFA.[200] Though other factors ultimately led U.S. officials to concede exclusive right over American soldiers on Japanese soil, the bar for jurisdiction was higher than that for European

[199] According to Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, the initial 1951 agreement "subjugated" Japan to a lesser position than its American counterpart. Efforts for revision, led by Shigemitsu, challenged the United States' unilateral determination over the employment of its forces, as detailed in a 1957 white House memorandum of a conversation between Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and President Eisenhower. When John Foster Dulles finally came to the table, he explained to Shigemitsu that revision was "premature" because Japan lacked "the unity, cohesion, and capacity to operate under a new treaty arrangement." See "183. Memorandum of a Conversation, white House, Washington, June 19, 1957, 11:30 a.m.," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Japan, Volume XXIII, Part 1 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d183; Nick Kapur, *Japan at the crossroads: Conflict and compromise after Anpo*. Harvard University Press, 2018.

[200] The U.S.-South Korea SOFA is a similar case.

hosts, all else equal.[201] Today, Japan continues to decry Washington's ongoing "stretching" of extraterritorial privileges, a strategy some view as "semi-colonial" and unique to non-Western host states.[202]

2.6 Race and International Security

Racial hierarchy in international relations could be hiding in plain sight. The outcome of SOFA jurisdiction is but one contemporary legal trend in world politics that is at least implicitly premised on a conception of non-white peoples as lacking capacity for governance. Until recently, most international relations (IR) scholarship has offered explanations for interstate interaction without any theory of race.[203] Interests, norms, international power, alliances, and other variables are generally treated as 'race-neutral.'[204] Security studies and foreign policy analysis feature a similar silence on the question of racism. Given the centrality of race to the formation and contestation of hierarchy in domestic politics, it remains exceedingly unlikely that racism stops "at water's edge." In this chapter, I have examined U.S. SOFA jurisdiction as an illustrative indicator of racial hierarchy in world politics. Variation in jurisdiction can be theorized as a decision conditioned by racialized perceptions of host capacity for governance. All else equal, the United States imposes concurrent jurisdiction to govern its interactions with

[201] Hor, "NATO was founded."

[202] John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II*. WW Norton & Company, 2000.

[203] Critical and theoretical work on race in IR has existed for a long time, though grossly ignored, see Robbie Shilliam, "Race and racism in international relations: Retrieving a scholarly inheritance." *International Politics Reviews* 8, no. 2 (2020): 152-195; Errol A. Henderson, "Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 26, no. 1 (2013): 71-92; Meera Sabaratnam, "Is IR theory white? Racialised subject-positioning in three canonical texts." *Millennium* 49, no. 1 (2020): 3-31.

[204] Phillip Y. Lipscy, and Jiajia Zhou. "Institutional Racism in International Relations." *Available at SSRN* (2022): 1-44.

predominantly white host states, allowing these peer countries to try U.S. personnel, while withholding this same right from most non-white partners, even those that indicate high rule of law.

This project advances the literature in a couple of ways. First, it enhances what we know about status agreements in security studies. Innovative work on U.S. foreign basing dynamics already exists.[205] The latest studies establish patterns of American crime and local accountability within the host state.[206] Few have examined SOFA jurisdiction, however, despite its ubiquity across defense partnerships.[207] By developing a systematic evaluation of jurisdiction, I extend this research to elucidate SOFAs as an interaction that underpins the forward-deployment of U.S. troops and other strategic interests around the world.

Second, this chapter amplifies scholarly attention on race in foreign policy. At their core, SOFAs reconcile the United States 'concern for safeguarding soldiers 'rights with deeply harbored beliefs about the inferiority of non-Western institutions and courts. Today, anti-base resistance is increasingly transnational in response to SOFA terms that further enmesh

[205] Cooley, *Base politics*; Sebastian, Schmidt, *Armed guests: Territorial sovereignty and foreign military basing.* Oxford University Press, USA, 2020; Michael A. Allen, Michael E. Flynn, Carla Martinez Machain, and Andrew Stravers. "Outside the wire: US military deployments and public opinion in host states." *American Political Science Review* 114, no. 2 (2020): 326-341; Alex Braithwaite, and Jeffrey Kucik. "Does the presence of foreign troops affect stability in the host country?." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 14, no. 4 (2018): 536-560; Charmaine Willis, "The right frame of mind? An analysis of global anti-US-military protests." *An Analysis of Global Anti-US-Military Protests (September 1, 2019)* (2019); Sue-Je L., Gage, "We're Never Off Duty": Empire and the Economies of Race and Gender in the US Military Camptowns of Korea." *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 1, no. 6 (2013).

[206] Efrat, "Troop crime in peacetime"; Efrat, "Facing US Extraterritorial Pressure"; Efrat, "How to Handle."

[207] Yeo, "Security, Sovereignty"; Kelly Elizabeth O'Connor, "Couching intervention: norms, interests, and trends in jurisdictional allocation in Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)." PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018; Aubree Herrin, "Understanding status of forces agreements: what shapes jurisdictional control?" PhD diss., The University of Iowa, 2020.

Washington in the domestic politics of numerous host states.[208] Central to this contestation is the promotion of American extraterritoriality across the Global South. Thus, I foreground a theory of racial hierarchy in U.S. status agreements. In general, my analysis aims to render visible the ordering effects of race in IR. Finally, by understanding such biases, SOFA policy can be revised to more accurately reflect individual host conditions and relations. Reducing inequities may better serve U.S. deployments and their flow of consequences within host communities.

Status agreements provide a novel empirical setting for theorizing the effects of racism on international security outcomes. Prioritizing questions at the juncture of race and world politics opens our eyes to a more realistic understanding of what drives interactions between states. Beyond an awareness of the field's longstanding "blindspot," such a task moves us toward a collective research program on race in an unequal global order.

2.7 Acknowledgement

Chapter 2, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in the Race and Security Special Issue at *Security Studies*. Bianca Freeman. Racial Hierarchy and Jurisdiction in U.S. Status of Forces Agreements. *Security Studies* 32.4-5 (2023): 748-774. The dissertation author was the only investigator and author of this paper.

This article reflects the generous feedback received on earlier versions of the paper from David Lake, Christina Schneider, Emilie Hafner-Burton, LaGina Gause, Marisa Abrajano, Jakana Thomas, Stephan Haggard, Adam Saxton, Zoltán Búzás, Richard Maass, participants of the UCSD International Organizations Group, the UCSD Race and Ethnic Politics Lab, the UCSD IR Workshop, and the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS). I also thank

[208] Alexander Cooley, and Daniel H. Nexon, ""The empire will compensate you": the structural dynamics of the US overseas basing network." *Perspectives on Politics* 11.4 (2013): 1034-1050.

participants at the 2021 and 2022 APSA Annual Meeting, the Race and Security Workshop at the University of Chicago, the 2021 National Conference of Black Political Scientists Conference, the University of Arizona School of Government & Public Policy Speaker Series, and the IDC Herzliya Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy & Strategy Democratic and Rule-of-Law Implications of Military Deployments Abroad Workshop. Lastly, I express my gratitude to Ronald Krebs, Jennifer Erickson, and each reviewer. This research was supported by the UC Office of the President and the UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (UCIGCC). The views in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of these colleagues, the UC Office of the President, or UCIGCC.

Data Availability Statement: The data and materials that support the findings of this study are available in the Harvard Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZW46YI

PART III: Race and the Responsibility to Protect

> *Airports, blacks, mercenaries — repeated over and over again, just as the very first calls for a no-fly zone were made.*
>
> *— Maximilian Forte*

> *Different treatment under international law should be permitted only when it can be justified by the criterion of justice'; one may replace justice with reasonableness…even a doctrine of reasonableness required by pragmatism should not be allowed to do away with the questions of democracy and the morality implied in different treatment of similarly situated events and persons.*
>
> — Judge Kotaro Tanaka, ICJ *(V. Van Dyke, 1973; S. N. Grovogui, 2011, p.572).*

The 2011 military intervention in Libya clarified a longstanding racial dissonance belying domains of international law. The scapegoating of black Africans in Libya revealed the extent to which racism was a unifying logic that bridged local revolt with the decision to intervene.[209] This dynamic was observed across stages of crisis escalation. The production of "useful myths" about "Afro-merc" black migrant workers in nationalist discourse and viral online folklore, calls on the ground for preferential Western "humanitarian involvement," the transmission of racialized fear over Muammar al-Qaddafi and "his Africans" by the Libyan opposition and Western media, and, ultimately, the invocation of R2P by the UN Security Council coalesced to justify imperial intervention.

[209] Forte, Maximilian. "The War in Libya: Race, 'Humanitarianism', and the Media." *MR Online* (2011).

Importantly, the placement of black Africans beyond the scope of "human rights" was perhaps the most clear racial double standard at play.[210] Whereas a potential massacre in Benghazi inspired global outcry, the plight of African migrant workers targeted and killed by the Libyan opposition went largely uncontested.[211] The projection of black Africans as "savage intruders" that pose a threat to international stability in the context of Libya empowered the democratic ideal of R2P in practice. According to some scholars, the racialization of R2P is perhaps the greatest ideological victim of the Libyan war.[212]

Foreign intervention in Libya also reinforced the racist notion of Africa and Africans as deficient. This particular trope took center stage in deliberations leading up to R2P invocation. Despite Qaddafi's longstanding fixture in African politics, Western leaders seemed to ignore what Libya's immediate neighbors—who had known Qaddafi for decades—might have to offer.[213] African opposition to military intervention in favor of inclusive peace talks and a constitutional transition was effectively sidelined and tokenized by France and other allies that had positioned themselves as the essential core of international community charged with a responsibility to protect. While summits on Libya took place in Istanbul, Moscow, and Berlin, African Union mediators and diplomats were nearly excluded from attendance or from

[210] ibid

[211] Lockwood, Katie. "Is the International System Racist?." (2019). https://www.e-ir.info/2019/03/03/is-the-international-system-racist/

[212] Forte, Maximilian (2011).

[213] Grovogui, Siba N'Zatioula, (2020). By Ignoring African Leaders, the West Paved the Way for Chaos in Libya." *Foreign Policy*. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/20/by-ignoring-african-leaders-the-west-paved-the-way-for-chaos-in-libya/

participating meaningfully in debates that would decide the fate of Africa. Yet, media reframed this "faux pas" with the racial subtext of "Africa's loss of influence."[214]

The marginalization of African leaders was also explained away by concerns over their ability to remain impartial towards Qaddafi due to his alleged gifts and influence over Africans. This kind of accusation is not new. From the Congo Crisis in the 1960s to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa to a near-unanimous condemnation of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, African opposition to intervention in favor of self-determination and reconciliation is "routinely faulted for moral weakness, corruption, or lack of appreciation of the stakes in global politics."[215] To be sure, the African Union was unequivocal in both its denunciation of the actions taken by the Libyan government and in its preference for a peaceful solution. These two points are apparent in UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorized various mandates in response to the crisis in Libya—from immediate ceasefire and dialogue to the enforcement of a no-fly zone and military intervention.[216]

Taken together, the Western effort to stabilize Libya began with admirable pretenses that resulted in otherwise unimpeachable mandates in Resolution 1973.[217] However, selective application of these mandates and the reduction of the African role in delivering peace in the region mirrored an old belief: Africa as devoid of the ethics and legal complexity needed for arbitrating its own disputes let alone those that capture the world's imagination. From the

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[214] Chothia, F. (2020). How Africa has been frozen out of Libya peace efforts. *p. BBC News*. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51293355; Grovogui, S.N. (2020).

[215] Grovogui, S.N. (2020); Grovogui, S. N. (2011). Looking Beyond Spring for the Season: An African perspective on the world order after the Arab Revolt. *Globalizations*, *8*(5), 567-572.

[216] United Nations Resolution 1973 (2011). https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/1973-%282011%29

[217] Grovogui, S.N. (2011).




Figure 3.1: World map of R2P counts by country

perspective of the Western alliance, according to Grovogui, "the sin of African states was one of gullibility…Africans, in other words, were stupid enough to not understand that the task at hand was the removal of Gaddafi and that resolutions merely make references to mediation in some instances to appease equally gullible domestic constituencies."[218] The decision to invoke R2P—and to exhaust the principle through to its most extreme conclusion—coincided with the projection of black Africans as a violent problem that they themselves could not solve.

Although R2P was designed to protect populations around the world from mass atrocity events, this global principle is selectively invoked over African societies (Figure 4). Little is known about how race shapes international intervention, however. I argue that invocation of R2P betrays an anti-black bias whereby race—in addition to atrocity and state capacity—explains the

[218] ibid.

decision to intervene. The stereotype of black populations as "deficient" and in need of correction is so embedded within the doctrine of intervention that mere mention of atrocity and capacity as conditions of R2P activates this underlying trope. When a country is African and cast as black within the international community, the UN is more likely to associate that country with a failure to protect and therefore authorize a subsequent, collective "responsibility" to intervene. Conversely, the UN is more likely to withhold corrective action over a non-African country, particularly one racialized as white, even when the commission of atrocity and symptoms of incapacity are just as severe. I predict that R2P is more likely invoked over an African country.

In this chapter, my argument will be tested quantitatively. To address empirical differences between cases, I examine R2P cross-nationally by matching countries on characteristics that likely drive intervention. Using UN resolutions and original data on mass atrocity events, I measure the relationship between race and the decision to intervene. The results suggest that R2P is disproportionately invoked over societies racialized as black, all else equal. This study aims to deepen our understanding of international law and intervention through its focus on racism. By establishing systematic evidence of disparity in R2P, we can inform a more humane, equitable approach to atrocity prevention. Within the field of political science, this research advances a theory of world politics that accounts for intervention as one of its most destructive outcomes.

3.1 Hypotheses

When a country is predominantly African and racialized as black within the international community, the United Nations is more likely to associate the country in question with a failure to protect, and therefore, invoke its subsequent, collective responsibility to intervene.

H1: The United Nations is more likely to invoke R2P over an African country.

A predominantly European country will not inspire the same decision to intervene, even when similar types and levels of atrocity and incapacity to non-European states are present.

H2: The United Nations is less likely to invoke R2P over a European country.

3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy

An attempt to draw appropriate causal inference is impeded by the fact that race—if accepted as "immutable"—cannot be manipulated.[219] We can plausibly imagine how a non-white person lived under Anglo-European imperial rule or how African migrants are treated in transit along the Western Mediterranean route or how aid recipients in the Arab world are perceived.[220] However, it is difficult to conceptualize an experimental analogy such that a person's race (and only the person's race), let alone a country's racial majority, is a manipulable treatment. If race is understood and measured through an essentialist lens, then appropriate counterfactuals are not available since each country is not potentially exposable to any race—a seemingly fixed characteristic—as the cause. Thus, when we cannot define all potential outcomes, randomization of a country's racial majority is beyond our reach.

[219] Sen, M. and Wasow, O., 2016. Race as a bundle of sticks: Designs that estimate effects of seemingly immutable characteristics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *19*, pp.499-522.

[220] Rosenberg, A.S., 2022. Undesirable immigrants: Why racism persists in international migration. Princeton University Press.

3.2.1 Propensity score matching

One way this study attempts to sidestep the issue of race immutability is through propensity score matching.[221] R2P is likely invoked over countries based on their characteristics. Since the estimation of the effects of race is inherently a comparison of potential outcomes—whether from a randomized or a non-experimental study—we care to make the comparison between country *i*'s outcome if country *i* is assigned into the treatment, $Y_i(1)$, and country i's outcome if country *i* is assigned the control, $Y_i(0)$. For example, what is the decision on intervention in Sudan if it is assigned "black" and if it is assigned "white?" Of course, only one of these potential outcomes can be "observed" regardless of the race category. If follows that we cannot guarantee that countries within "treated" and "control" groups are only randomly different from one another on all background covariates theoretically related to international intervention. Estimation of the effects of race can thus be considered a missing data problem wherein predicting the unobserved potential outcomes is of immediate interest. Ideally, countries in both treated and control groups, or "races," should be as similar as possible, especially in non-experimental settings such as this. Therefore, I match countries on characteristics that likely drive R2P. Specifically, I create propensity scores (the probability of treatment) from covariates that should be related to the decision to intervene. Broadly, this method aims to equate or balance the distribution of covariates in both treated and control groups.

I include mass atrocity events as key covariates in a model of international intervention. The most grave human rights violations such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and

[221] Stuart, E.A., 2010. Matching methods for causal inference: A review and a look forward. *Statistical science: a review journal of the Institute of Mathematical Statistics*, *25*(1), p.1.; Harris, Heather and Horst, S. Jeanne (2016) "A Brief Guide to Decisions at Each Step of the Propensity Score Matching Process," Pr actical Assessment, Research, and E valuation: Vol. 21 , Article 4;

crimes against humanity are effective covariates since they are both theoretically and empirically related to R2P as the outcome of interest. The selection of these variables is based on the explicit guidelines provided for R2P invocation. The 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome Document, a General Assembly resolution, affirms each state's responsibility to protect their own populations from the four mass atrocities (138). When national authorities manifestly fail to uphold this responsibility, the international community has a responsibility to take collective, timely action, through the Security Council, for the protection of populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (139). Heads of State and Government unanimously adopted this responsibility to protect.

In addition to these four atrocities, the R2P resolution also identifies a lack of state capacity as a motivating factor for appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other forms of intervention in countries under duress. Hence, I include measures of state capacity to absorb, if imperfectly, the level of risk a state may exhibit for mass atrocity events to occur. There are other important theoretical reasons for matching on state capacity when constructing a model of international intervention. Recall, this study argues that state capacity becomes racialized when R2P is disproportionately invoked over non-white states, all else equal. The stereotype of Black populations as "deficient" and in need of correction is so embedded within the doctrine of intervention that mere mention of capacity as a condition of R2P activates this underlying trope. Thus, without accounting for capacity in the model, it is difficult to disentangle the impact of racism from the effects of a state's capacity on the decision to invoke R2P. I also match on conflict-related fatality. One uniform requirement for propensity score matching is that each unit must have a nonzero probability of participation—international intervention in this case. As the "strongly ignorable treatment" assumption would suggest, it makes sense that the only countries

likely to inspire the invocation of R2P by the international community are those that exhibit a high level of conflict-related violence. Therefore, this covariate is included for propensity score computation. Lastly, time-related factors may also play a role in the outcome. R2P is probably activated in response to violations that are widespread, ongoing, and escalating over time. Accordingly, I implement a one-year lag on all covariates that vary from year to year. I note that mass atrocity events and state capacity appear to be the sole explanations for R2P provided in the UN resolution, subsequent resolutions on the matter, and supporting documentation.

Another challenge befalls a concept of race that assumes immutability or "assignment" at conception.[222] International intervention may be explained by a set of covariates that occur downstream of race. Those relevant to R2P specifically, such as mass atrocity events, the number of civilian deaths, and state capacity, are determined after a country's race is "assigned." Thus, matching on or controlling for such explanations in a regression model can introduce post-treatment bias, particularly in observational studies like this. Take the famous example of racism in American policing.[223] If Black people are stopped by police for lesser (or nonexistent) crimes, failing to account for this post-treatment to race will distort (at best) and virtually erase (at worst) the extent of racism that drives outcomes such as the use of force.[224] Similar issues abound in international intervention. It could be problematic to control for covariates like state capacity: while theoretically predictive of R2P, state capacity may also be a direct consequence of white supremacist causes like racial slavery and colonialism. If we control for state capacity, the effect

[222] Sen and Wasow, 2016.

[223] Schonfeld, B. and S. Winter-Levy (2020). How to Study Racial Disparities. Scientific American; Knox, D., Lowe, W. and Mummolo, J., 2020. Administrative records mask racially biased policing. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(3), pp.619-637.

[224] ibid.

of country race would likely be biased downward since we have already controlled for an important consequence of race.

Even (especially?) in an international context, the issue of race and post-treatment bias applies. The greatest racial projects in history have a transnational arc and residual impact on dimensions of interstate interaction today.[225] Thus, race conceivably affects several institutional, economic, and conflict variables that we include in a standard regression analysis of outcomes in world politics. In many cases of applied research, dropping attributes that could be a consequence of race is not satisfactory. By including only race on the right-hand side of a regression (capturing the *total* effect of race),[226] we potentially leave a more nuanced understanding of international intervention on the table. For this study, I do not exclude such factors generally since "country race" can be conceptualized and operationalized as a disaggregable, composite variable itself. This strategy, detailed below, alleviates some of the issues with manipulability and post-treatment bias concerning race. The common support problem and multicollinearity are also issues that arise when controlling for race-related covariates. If country attributes vary according to race or vary closely with race, then the lack of variance in background variables may result in small changes having a large impact on the coefficient estimates, making standard errors large and the effect of race more difficult to detect.

A third issue is the instability of race.[227] We should caution against flattening something as complicated as race into a simple binary or categorical variable. When conceptualizing race at

[225] Freeman, B., (2023). Race in IR: toward empirical study. *International Politics*, pp.1-8.

[226] Sen and Wasow, 2016.

[227] Sen and Wasow, 2016; Henderson, E.A., 2023. Racism and global war in world politics: As obvious as it is ignored. *International Politics*, pp.1-30.

the country level, this caution magnifies. Building upon the most recent empirical work on race and IR,[228] a constructivist approach rightly interprets race as unstable and variable across treatments, observations, and time. For example, a category "white" may include Latin American countries that feature predominantly European demographics. This variation is further confounded by racial identity. Irrespective of ethnic origin, "white" identification is common in some Latin American countries—including within mixed and indigenous groups—and does not necessarily capture European ethnicity. Rather, the social construction of whiteness varies from one place to another (and from one time to another) and subordinates different "non-white" groups within the racial hierarchy to varying degree. A country's self-identification can also differ from the racial projections imposed upon it by the international community. In addition to these qualitative aspects, the dynamic nature of race can produce different outcomes since no two measures of race will capture the same information.[229] For example, South Africa and Sudan may prompt different decisions on R2P though both are distinctively African countries with majority non-white populations (and controlling for all else). The instability of race in world politics will continue to matter not just for research designs focused on causal inference but also for those pursuing non-causal inquiries.[230]

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[228] Baker, Andy, (2015). "Race, paternalism, and foreign aid: Evidence from US public opinion." *American Political Science Review* 109, no. 1: 93-109; Barder, Alexander D., (2021), *Global race war: International politics and racial hierarchy*. Oxford University Press*;* Búzás, Zoltán I, (2013), "The color of threat: Race, threat perception, and the demise of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902–1923)." Security Studies 22, no. 4: 573-606; Goddard, Stacie E. and Paul K. MacDonald, (2023), "From 'butcher and bolt' to 'blugsplat': Race, counterinsurgency, and international politics." *Security Studies*: 1-34; Kim, Daegyeong, (2022), Anti-Asian Racism and the Racial Politics of US-China Great Power Rivalry. University of California, San Diego.

[229] Sen and Wasow, 2016.

[230] Sen and Wasow, 2016.

3.2.2 Measuring race

We know that race is rarely if ever a single, uniform entity. Instead, race is an aggregate of many components. Sen and Wasow describe this as a "bundle of sticks." In contrast to a more essentialist perspective embodied by the race binary, I treat race as a composite measure that, in some cases, can be disaggregated into constitutive elements. As other social sciences have established, elements of race that are strongly identified with or highly collinear with the particular racial or ethnic category can be thought of as what make the composite of race meaningful in the world. To address the above issues of immutability, post-treatment bias, and instability, I also use the level of white ancestry in a country as a measure of race for the independent variable. It attempts to avoid the race binary construction, it is not necessarily "assigned" before the covariates of interest, and it skirts the stability assumption about race. Importantly, white ancestry still captures, or rather, proxies for the level of assumed "whiteness" of a country. In other words, a high level of white ancestry in a population at any given time is not easily confounded with non-Europeanness or non-whiteness. While this study measures white ancestry across countries, another analysis could leverage a "within-group" design such that one or more constitutive elements of race exhibit within-group variation and are identified as a manipulable treatment. By identifying relevant within-group differences, scholars can possibly narrow the causal mechanisms that explain disparate across-race outcomes.[231] For the purposes of this study, I use the level of white ancestry to construct continuous and binary treatments, as well as a measure to capture countries historically coded as black in the international community.

[231] ibid.

3.2.3 Data

I model the determinants of R2P invocation with the goal of identifying important patterns in international intervention. I conduct analysis at the country-year unit since it is common for the United Nations to invoke R2P more than once over a country across years.[232]

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable, *R2P Invocation*, measures the collective decision to invoke the responsibility to protect via UN resolution over a country. I use data provided by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect on R2P invocations drafted within UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.[233] I code the UN resolution as a dichotomous indicator. R2P is coded "0" if the UN does not invoke the responsibility to protect *in a UN resolution* in a given year and "1" if R2P is invoked.

Independent Variables

I use the Ethnic Dimensions (EPR-ED) dataset and the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset[234] to create a dichotomous indicator which records *Black*, coded "1" if the largest racial group within a country is of African dissent, and "0" for the converse (not African). The EPR-ED attempts to measure race as a social construction that varies across countries, ethnic groups, and time. I select the EPR-ED data as the measure of race because it approximates, if

[232] While the regression analysis focuses on R2P invocations by year, this study can also consider R2P counts per year.

[233] Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/; United Nations Security Council Resolutions, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0

[234] Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. 2010. "Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and Analysis." *World Politics* 62(1): 87–119.; Bormann, Nils-Christian, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Manuel Vogt. 2017. "Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(4): 744–71.

imperfectly, a more constructivist approach to a construct of race. It captures regional origins that became relevant as social categories in the context of European colonization globally and related processes of white-dominant racial classification. I aggregate this data (ethnic groups by racial categories relevant within the country) to the country level. The data cover 1946-2017, and I code the period 2004 - 2022.

I also use EPR-ED and the EPR datasets to construct a binary indicator for *White*, coded "1" if the racial majority of a country is of European dissent, and "0" if a country's racial majority is non-European.

I include a continuous measure of race, *White Ancestry*, that measures the level of European ancestry in a country. I construct this measure from EPR-ED and the EPR datasets by including ethnic groups that exhibit at least 50 percent European dissent. That is, an ethnic group whose ancestry is at least 50 percent white is counted in the level of white ancestry. This coding is also a conservative measure of white ancestry since I only count ethnic groups in the country-level measure that have mostly European ancestry. To be clear, this is not a measure for "white" like the binary indicator above. Instead, this approach is attempting to proxy for the level of whiteness in a country by measuring the level of European ancestry. As stated prior, a high level of white ancestry in a population at any given time is not easily confused with non-Europeanness or non-whiteness. This variable is an interval that ranges from 0 to 1, where "0" corresponds to no white ancestry and "1" relays the converse.

Controls

It is likely that the presence of mass atrocities matter for the decision to invoke R2P. Recall that the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document unambiguously identifies four atrocities over which the country in question becomes eligible for R2P. These include genocide,

ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Thus, I create binary measures for each mass atrocity event. To accomplish this, I use a team of 11 undergraduate research assistants (RAs) to read annual atrocity reports published by Amnesty International, code each atrocity, and provide a description of the atrocities that occurred. The criteria used to determine if an event constitutes one or multiple mass atrocities is based on the definitions advanced by the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Specifically, the UN provides the histories of conceptualization of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, the elements of each violation, its association with international law, and its corresponding resolutions over time. I provide these definitions in the Appendix. I code each atrocity as a dichotomous indicator. *Genocide* is coded "1" when Amnesty International reports the violation has occurred and "0" for the alleged absence of the atrocity. I code *Ethnic Cleansing*, *War Crimes*, and *Crimes Against Humanity* in the same fashion as binary variables. The data cover 2004 - 2022. In the next iteration of the study, I triangulate data sources (Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, respectively) and RAs (each assistant codes different countries and years between the two sources and conducts quality control measures).

I control for other reasonable explanations for international intervention. I include a variable for conflict-related fatalities. On its face, R2P is likely invoked over countries that have higher levels of deaths related to conflict. The use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians is a condition for mass atrocity events to precipitate. Also, mentioned prior, R2P should be invoked by the international community only in cases that feature a high level of conflict-related violence. Thus, I use the Fatality Estimates

indicator (data name: Best_estimate) from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program[235] as a measure for the number of civilian deaths. This continuous variable is called *Conflict Fatality*. I use observations from the period 2004 - 2022. I also include a continuous measure of state capacity, *Infant Mortality*—from the Varieties of Democracy dataset[236] that is less directly related to atrocity and race—for the reasons I detail above. Lastly, I include the *Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization* index variable from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF).[237] A robust literature on intranational and international conflict suggests that patterns of ethnic diversity shape outcomes of violence. My purpose for including *Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization* in the model is to parse out the effect of ethnic diversity from the effect of race, especially if they correlate, though not perfectly so.

I use two strategies to model R2P invocation. The first type estimates propensity scores in order to match covariates for the binary treatment of race. The second type generates balancing weights for the continuous treatment of race. I calculate propensity scores using logistic regression in order to create a multivariate composite of the covariates that likely influence R2P invocation. This strategy seeks to balance black and non-black (or white and non-white in another model) countries' propensity for either treatment. I employ nearest neighbor (NN) matching with caliper adjustment to increase the quality of matches between groups. I asses the matches by comparing the balance visually in the Appendix. Balance measures for the

[235] Eck, Kristine & Lisa Hultman (2007). One-sided violence against civilians in war: insights from new fatality data. Journal of Peace Research 44(2): 233-246; Davies, Shawn, Therese Pettersson & Magnus Öberg (2022). Organized violence 1989-2021 and drone warfare. Journal of Peace Research 59(4).

[236] Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C.H., Lindberg, S.I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Bernhard, M., Borella, C., Cornell, A. and Fish, M.S., (2024). V-Dem Codebook v14.

[237] Drazanova, Lenka, (2019), "Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF)", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/4JQRCL, Harvard Dataverse, V2, UNF:6:z4J/b/PKbUpNdIoeEFPvaw== [fileUNF]; Fearon, J.D., 2003. Ethnic and cultural diversity by country. *Journal of economic growth*, *8*, pp.195-222.

covariates produced by the weights are also provided in the Appendix. Having matched key covariates and evaluated the quality of balance between treatment and control groups, I estimate the effects of race on R2P. I implement logistic regressions and cluster standard errors on the country to account for correlation in the error term. A 1-year lag on the atrocity and conflict covariates is also included in a separate model to account for a time-related trend.

3.3 Results

Each column in Table 4.1 reports the regression coefficients and standard errors for R2P invocation. Columns 1 through 6 display the association between the main independent variables— *Black, White, and White Ancestry*— and the decision to invoke the responsibility to protect respectively and with controls. Columns entitled "matched" denote models that feature propensity score matching and binary treatments of race (either *Black* or *White*), and "weighted" columns feature models that weight the covariates and have a continuous treatment (*White Ancestry*). As the results suggest, country race matters for the decision to invoke R2P, even when accounting for mass atrocities, state and non-state violence towards civilians, state capacity, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization. In Column 1, *Black* is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating a relationship with R2P invocation. When a country is predominantly African and cast as Black within the international community, the United Nations is more likely to associate the country in question with a failure to protect, and therefore, invoke its subsequent, collective responsibility to intervene. This finding is consistent with H1 and when control variables are lagged to account for invocations that occur in response to ongoing and escalating violations (Column 4).

Table 3.1: Country Race and R2P

	Dependent variable					
	matched	matched	weighted	matched	matched	weighted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black	0.132***			0.090***		
	(0.029)			(0.024)		
White		−0.039*			−0.024	
		(0.016)			(0.014)	
White Ancestry			−0.083*			−0.090*
			(0.042)			(0.036)
Conflict Fatality	0.00003*	0.00002*	0.00001**			
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)	(0.00000)			
Infant Mortality	0.0001	0.001	0.001			
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.001)			
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization	0.015	−0.089*	−0.024	0.011	−0.040	−0.010
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.062)
Crime Against Humanity	0.062*	0.017	0.062*			
	(0.028)	(0.013)	(0.027)			
War Crime	0.073**	0.041	0.092**			
	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.034)			
Ethnic Cleansing	−0.011	−0.019	−0.044			
	(0.058)	(0.018)	(0.025)			
Genocide	−0.105	−0.014	−0.086*			
	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.038)			
Conflict Fatality Lag1				0.00001***	0.00000	0.00001**
				(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Infant Mortality Lag1				0.0002	−0.0001	0.001
				(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.001)
Crime Against Humanity Lag1				0.014	0.014	0.035
				(0.028)	(0.008)	(0.027)
War Crime Lag1				0.066*	0.011	0.075*
				(0.026)	(0.014)	(0.031)
Ethnic Cleansing Lag1				−0.043	−0.016	−0.037
				(0.048)	(0.010)	(0.032)
Genocide Lag1				−0.087	−0.004	−0.073*
				(0.055)	(0.015)	(0.035)
Observations	266	208	644	322	254	601
AIC:	-23.69709	-263.429	159.3911	-46.26739	-398.1925	158.7357

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The effects of *White* and *White Ancestry* also align with the expectations of this study. White (Column 2) and *White Ancestry* (Column 3) are negative and significant at the 0.1 level. While statistically weak, R2P invocation is less likely when a country is racialized "white," all else equal. An increase in the level of European ancestry within a country is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of R2P invocation. Though a country that is predominantly European may feature similar types and levels of atrocity, civilian fatality, state capacity, and ethnic diversity to non-European states, the United Nations will still withhold the decision to invoke corrective action over the country. These results indicate support for H2. In the lagged models, the effect of *White* is also negative, though indistinguishable from zero (Column 5). One reason for this null result may be that the covariates in general matter less to the outcome of R2P invocation when they are lagged. It may be the case that the UN Security Council in particular convenes quickly and within the same year atrocities are committed within a state. This is could be the case even for the effects of *Black* (Column 4) and *White Ancestry* (Column 6) in the lagged models, both of which are statistically significant.

The role that mass atrocity events play in the decision to intervene are is also worth noting. *Crimes Against Humanity* and *War Crimes* are positive and statistically significant in Columns 1 and 3, providing some evidence that these atrocities matter for R2P invocation. Though significant in two out of the three models, these two mass atrocity events constitute a majority of the types of violations identified in the annual reports, and thus, likely feature enough data to power the inference. Further, this result could reflect the fact that crimes and against humanity and war crimes make up a majority of the mass atrocities witnessed around the world. Conversely, *Ethnic Cleansing* and *Genocide* are negative in predominantly insignificant. These results are likely extremely biased since ethnic cleansing and genocide are only identified

(explicitly or implicitly according to UN definitions) a handful of times between 2004 and 2022. Lastly, conflict fatality performs as expected across the models: an increase in conflict fatalities is associated with an increase in the likelihood of R2P invocation.

Without overstating the regression results, I have presented some evidence suggesting the importance of race in the decision to intervene through the responsibility to protect principle. I also examine alternative explanations that likely drive R2P invocation. Yet, my empirical approach begs greater nuance and analytical development on a few scores, including qualitative cases and accounts of racially disparate treatment at different points of the bargain over R2P invocation. Future work will attempt to flesh out qualitative evidence.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have examined international intervention as an outcome of racial bias. Variation in the invocation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be theorized as a decision conditioned by racialized perceptions of state capacity and atrocity. All else equal, the UN is more likely to associate an African country with a failure to protect and therefore justify invocation of the R2P principle. On the other hand, the UN is less likely to invoke R2P over a country racialized as white, despite the presence of atrocities and the level of state capacity. This project seeks to advance the literature by increasing what we know about the determinants of R2P specifically, and international law and intervention generally. While studies on the Libyan intervention contribute an important and complex case, a cross-country approach to the outcome of R2P reveals patterns that allow for theorizing and testing explanations systematically. Since R2P has been invoked in over one hundred UN resolutions from the principle's adoption in 2005, and in some cases implemented with military action, its quantitative examination can be relevant for scholarship and policy. This study also seeks to

deepen our understanding of international law and intervention through its focus on racism. By establishing systematic evidence of racial disparity of R2P in practice, equity in atrocity prevention becomes relevant and possible.

3.6 Acknowledgement

This chapter is an early draft and reflects the generous feedback received from David Lake, Marisa Abrajano, Jakana Thomas, and participants of the UCSD Race and Ethnic Politics Lab. I also thank Kelebogile Zvobgo, William Nomikos, Zoltán Búzás, Amoz J. Hor, Rikio Inouye, and participants of the Race in IR Workshop for extensive, thoughtful comments.

PART IV: Blue Line, Blue Helmet: Race and the Limits of Representation in Peacekeeping

The vast majority of international interventions in fragile and conflict settings are conducted by Global North countries in the Global South.[238] Despite this pattern, we know remarkably little about how race shapes the outcomes of those interventions. Recent work suggesting that local perceptions are central to the legitimacy and efficacy of intervention makes this omission particularly problematic. We fill this gap by centering race and racism in an analysis of international intervention effectiveness.

We propose two mechanisms that develop race as a theoretically distinct explanation for peacekeeping efficacy. First, peacekeeping operations (PKOs) reflect a process of "intersubjective racialization" wherein the perceived racial identities of both 'peacekeeper' and 'peace-kept' matter for violence reduction. Both actors are racialized—attributed racial meaning as they interact—by perception of the other. It is PKO race that helps to explain when local populations perceive intervention as fair, an important determinant of buy-in for predominantly foreign-led peacekeeping efforts. We expect the presence of non-white PKOs to correlate with a decrease in communal violence. We expect to observe the converse with majority-white peacekeeping operations.

A second mechanism, however, assumes no difference in peacekeeping efficacy by PKO race, particularly when violence is perpetrated by the state. With this "blue helmet" effect, the uniform is perceived to matter more than peacekeeper race. Yet, we assert that such a dynamic is

[238] Malone, D. M., & Thakur, R. (2001). UN peacekeeping: lessons learned?. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, *7*(1), 11-17.

not race-neutral. PKOs and the post-colonial state interact under a shadow of colonial-era hierarchies and other forms of state regulation that systematically targeted and destabilized non-white societies. When violence is perpetrated by the state—a co-colonial actor—peacekeepers regardless of race will likely have no effect on civilian victimization.

In order to test our arguments, we examine the case of UN peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa. With a force of 100,000 personnel and an annual budget exceeding $6 billion, UN peacekeeping operations are the largest international intervention in world politics. Moreover, the multinational nature of troop composition allows us to test the implications of our theory. Merging existing geo-referenced, cross-national data on social identity of local populations and the deployment patterns of UN peacekeepers, we measure a relationship between the likely perceived subjective race of each peacekeeper and local violence reduction. First, we find that majority-black communities are more likely to experience a reduction in violence when the peacekeeping unit is non-white compared to those perceived as white. Second, the results suggest no association between PKO race and state violence.

Our study demonstrates the theoretical importance of prioritizing local perceptions of race in international intervention. Race, in addition to related concepts like linguistic distance, ethnicity, or culture, can help explain the conditions under which peacekeepers reduce violence.

4.1 Diversity in Peacekeeping: A Puzzling Omission

We know that peacekeeping operations are associated with lower levels of violence against citizens in fragile and conflict settings. Dozens of empirical studies show that peacekeeping operations (PKOs) can reduce civilian and military deaths, prevent the spread of

violence, help belligerents achieve peace, and help countries maintain post-conflict peace.[239] Of the studies that focus on communal violence reduction, some look more closely at the composition of UN missions and whether features of PKO makeup help or hurt civilians in precarious political environments. Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) is one way composition is conceptualized. Dworschak and Cil argue that greater diversity of TCCs undermines peacekeeping efficacy by increasing coordination problems among peacekeepers.[240] Alternatively, Bove and Ruggeri find that PKOs recruited from an ethnically and linguistically diverse range of countries are more successful at reducing violence against civilians.[241]

Cultural distance is another approach to the study of diversity in PKOs and its effects on local violence reduction. Peacekeepers that are culturally closer to the populations they intervene in are more effective at reducing violence against civilians.[242] By contrast, distance may actually be beneficial at the local level since it sustains perceptions that PKOs are unbiased.[243] While multiple studies consider or even center variation in peacekeeper composition as an explanation for peacekeeping outcomes, the literature lacks consensus over the costs and benefits of TCC diversity and cultural distance.

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[239] Walter, B. F., Howard, L. M., & Fortna, V. P. (2021). The extraordinary relationship between peacekeeping and peace. *British Journal of Political Science*, *51*(4), 1705-1722.

[240] Dworschak, C., & Cil, D. (2022). Force structure and local peacekeeping effectiveness: micro-level evidence on UN troop composition. *International Studies Quarterly*, *66*(4), sqac072.

[241] Bove, V., & Ruggeri, A. (2016). Kinds of blue: Diversity in UN peacekeeping missions and civilian protection. *British Journal of Political Science*, *46*(3), 681-700; Bove, V., & Ruggeri, A. (2019). Peacekeeping effectiveness and blue helmets' distance from locals. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *63*(7), 1630-1655.

[242] ibid.

[243] Nomikos, W. G. (2022). Peacekeeping and the enforcement of intergroup cooperation: Evidence from Mali. *The Journal of Politics*, *84*(1), 194-208.

What is more or less implicit in research on PKO composition is the role of local perceptions in violence reduction. Studies on peacekeeper composition suggest that PKO nationality conditions civilian perceptions of foreign-led intervention, influencing how communities interact with PKO practices. To be sure, peacekeeper nationality captures several important socially-constructed attributes that likely shape local perceptions, such as language, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, cultural understanding, and religion among others. However, race is virtually missing from the peacekeeping literature despite its historical salience and contemporary patterns within the UN peacekeeping regime. Below, we explore a set of mechanisms that develop PKO racial composition as a theoretically distinct explanation for peacekeeping efficacy.

4.2 The Limits of Racial Representation in Peacekeeping

4.2.1 A Symbolic Representation Mechanism

Race as a form of representation within peacekeeping could matter for local violence reduction. It is possible for multiracial PKOs to reflect the communities they interact with.[244] More often than not, however, even diverse missions lack racial representation of the populations for which they intervene.[245] By contrast, majority black peacekeeping units are more likely to

[244] We acknowledge a possible racial diversity mechanism, though we do not empirically test it. Racial diversity may cue more favorable community-level orientations to peacekeeping efforts. When PKO membership varies by race, civilians may be more likely to view the intervention as less biased than same-race PKOs. If so, then foreign-led peacekeeping units should stand a better chance of obtaining local buy-in as a legitimate partner in local violence reduction. Indeed, multiracial missions often lack descriptive representation of the particular communities they interact with. Yet, it is racially diverse PKOs that are apt to be perceived *prima facie* as fair compared to homogeneous units. This does not suggest that civilians are any less critical of multiracial missions in general or their peacekeeping conduct specifically. However, diversity may boost public trust and confidence in PKOs.

[245] United Nations Peacekeeping. “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Country and Personnel Type: Experts on Mission, Formed Police Units, Individual Police, Staff Officer, and Troops."

have perceived racial identity in common with the civilians they encounter since most UN missions are deployed to African settings. This type of descriptive representation can be important for reasons similar to a racial diversity mechanism.[246] Yet, beyond descriptive representation, the presence of black PKOs can also serve a symbolic function that increases community willingness to pursue collective peace.

Black representation could influence perceptions of how black individuals are included and excluded within the peacekeeping regime as a site of global governance and diplomatic power. According to the literature, symbolic representation shapes how particular social groups are recognized as members of a political community.[247] Consequently, such notions of belonging underlie subtle power dynamics that endow legitimacy and affect other dimensions of representation (i.e. descriptive and substantive). When it comes to UN operations, the question of representation has been fundamentally racial. As a symbol itself, the United Nations sets the context of norms and principles that constrain perceptions of peacekeeping— who

[246] Studies on race and group-level perceptions of policing can help inform a racial diversity mechanism. In the United States and other multiracial societies, civilians tend to prefer multiracial police departments over single-race units. Since the intensity of policing is itself coproduced by race, public attitudes towards officers are generally lukewarm or negative among the most policed communities— those coded Black and Brown. Notwithstanding, minority groups typically favor racial diversity in law enforcement. This preference is consistent with the belief that multiracial departments are important for symbolic reasons that may have some effect on public confidence, even when individual interactions with police are unwanted or evaded. Given long patterns of unlawful and excessive use of force against the racialized poor by overwhelmingly white police departments, diversifying has been found—in certain cases—to improve community relationships with the police. To be sure, the constructs and salience of race in policing differ within and across African societies and from the United States and elsewhere. Still, understanding the roles and limits of racial diversity in policing elucidates a similar dynamic in peacekeeping efforts. As an institution criticized for its overrepresentation of white member-states in decisions made about Black and Brown people, peacekeeping is likely influenced by the racial composition of personnel deployed to protect and serve. See Isaac, J. C. (2015). The American politics of policing and incarceration. *Perspectives on Politics*, *13*(3), 609-616; Weitzer, R., & Brunson, R. K. (2015). Policing different racial groups in the United States. *Cahiers Politiestudies*, *6*(35), 129-145; Weitzer, R., & Tuch, S. A. (2004). Race and perceptions of police misconduct. *Social problems*, *51*(3), 305-325; Schafer, J. A., Huebner, B. M., & Bynum, T. S. (2003). Citizen perceptions of police services: Race, neighborhood context, and community policing. *Police quarterly*, *6*(4), 440-468.

[247] Lombardo, E., & Meier, P. (2018). Good symbolic representation: The relevance of inclusion. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, *51*(2), 327-330.

constitutes ‘peacekeeper’ and ‘peace-kept’— without being directly palpable. Tudor situates the role of racial hierarchy in the selection and employment of peacekeepers at various levels of operation within UN bureaucracy, an empirical case that fits larger patterns of interventionism and liberal imperialism over time.[248]

Today, peacekeeping perpetuates the same North-South disconnect in post-colonial conflict environments: UN mission design and financing remain firmly in the hands of wealthy and majority-white member states while those directly affected by the intervention are seldom deferred to for similar decision-making.[249] For societies constructed on the frontlines of postcolonial statehood, racial identity of PKOs may shape local views of international peacekeeping generally. By reinforcing the types of actors that get to steward peace, this symbolic role imbued with racial meaning can also impact how communities interact with UN missions empowered to exercise the use of force and wield influence over local governance. We expect the presence of black and non-white PKOs to increase individuals’ willingness to buy into cooperative solutions compared to that of majority-white PKOs.

H1a: The presence of white peacekeepers increases communal violence.

H1b: The presence of non-white peacekeepers decreases communal violence.

[248] Tudor, M. (2023). *Blue Helmet Bureaucrats: United Nations Peacekeeping and the Reinvention of Colonialism, 1945–1971*. Cambridge University Press; Tudor, M. (2021). “Rethinking the history of UN peacekeeping.” BISA. https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/rethinking-history-un-peacekeeping

[249] Klobucista, C., & Renwick, D. (2021). The role of peacekeeping in Africa. *New York: Council on Foreign Relations*, *5*.

4.2.2 "Blue Line, Blue Helmet": A Structural Racism Mechanism

Another approach to a theory of racial composition in peacekeeping is one that assumes no difference in local perceptions of PKOs by race. On first pass, such a position appears to advance a 'race-neutral' explanation for peacekeeping efficacy. Like attitudes that take the "blue cops" posture in local or domestic politics, there may be a "blue helmet" effect wherein civilians believe the uniform (and the legitimacy it bestows) matters more than peacekeeper race. In American society, such 'non-racial' views of policing are held by a majority of white and Latin civilians and a third of black civilians when asked about differences in the way white and black officers treat civilians.[250] Some studies have found no evidence of police with different racial or ethnic backgrounds performing differently due to factors such as institutional culture.[251] If taken as a loose, imperfect analogy, then we might expect there to be no relationship between the deployment of white or nonwhite PKOs and violence against civilians.

However, we assert that such a mechanism is not race-blind. Rather, the blue helmet dynamic reflects the interests of an institution that is systematically oppressive toward black communities. When peacekeepers are sent to stop or prevent violence, they can do so successfully when intervening between civilians. Thus, in the case of communal violence, PKO race matters for the reasons identified above (i.e. local perceptions of impartiality and representation). Yet, when violence is perpetrated by the state—a co-colonial actor—,

[250] Weaver, V. M., & Lerman, A. E. (2010). Political consequences of the carceral state. *American Political Science Review*, *104*(4), 817-833; Soss, J., & Weaver, V. (2017). Police are our government: Politics, political science, and the policing of race–class subjugated communities. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *20*, 565-591.

[251] Fifield, J. (2016). Does diversifying police forces reduce tensions. *Pew Trusts*.

peacekeepers regardless of race will advance the system of which both they and the state are a part.[252] We predict:

H2a: The presence of white peacekeepers will have no effect on state violence.

H2b: The presence of nonwhite peacekeepers will have no effect on state violence.

4.3 Cross-National Evidence

4.3.1 Data

Independent Variables

In line with previous work,[253] we divide each country into 0.5 × 0.5 decimal degree grids with month as the temporal unit of analysis; 0.5 decimal degrees are about 50km at the equator, meaning that each grid is roughly 2,500km^2 in size. We then aggregate peacekeeping deployments within each grid cell for each month. Spatial grid cells present a unit of analysis that is not endogenous to conflict processes, reduces the degree of measurement error present in the dependent variable, and recognizes the conflict's spatial and temporal dynamics. In addition, communal disputes are not defined by the boundaries of a particular administrative district. It is more accurate to use a geographic measure to bound a unit of observation. The grid version of the dataset has the added advantage of being readily mergeable with all data available from Peace Research Institute Oslo's Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which we use to collect the georeferenced covariates discussed below.

[252] Must account for state consent in relationship with peacekeeping both theoretically and empirically.

[253] Ruggeri, Andrea, Han Dorussen and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, (2017). "Winning the peace locally: UN peacekeeping and local conflict." International organization 71(1):163–185; Fjelde, Hanne, Lisa Hultman and Desirée Nilsson. 2019. "Protection through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians." International Organization 73(1).

We use the Robust African Deployment of Peacekeeping Operations (RADPKO) dataset to measure peacekeeping deployments. The dataset contains the location and number of UN peacekeeping troops, UN police, and UN military observers deployed to every new UN PKO authorized under a Chapter VII mandate from 1999 through 2019.[254]

Figure 4.1 visualizes the entire dataset by grid cell; the unit of analysis is the grid-month. The map shows the spatial variation of UN peacekeeping deployments, both across and within countries. The shaded grids in Figure 4.1 indicate the areas in which peacekeepers have established bases. However, this operationalization underestimates peacekeepers' effectiveness in two ways. First, it assumes that all peacekeeping units are equally effective. Since this is not the case, we add the count of peacekeepers from the RADPKO dataset.[255] For each grid-month, we record the number of peacekeepers deployed and scale this number by 1,000 for ease of interpretation: one unit for each independent variable corresponds to 1,000 UN personnel. Second, this approach assumes that peacekeeping effectiveness is contained within these grid areas, yet some peacekeepers patrol far from the capital or their base. To account for this possibility, we estimate the minimum linear distance between the center of a grid cell and the nearest UN PKO base. Since we seek to estimate the effect of deploying peacekeepers on the likelihood that violence will break out in the future, we introduce a lag for the peacekeeping

[254] This dataset is published as Hunnicutt and Nomikos (2020) For access to the data, see the online interface for the RADPKO data on the website of the Data-driven Analysis of Peace Project website https://dapp-lab.org.

[255] ibid.




Figure 4.1: Sample of UN peacekeeping deployments.

Note: All shaded grids include peacekeeping bases. Darker shades indicate a higher average number of peacekeepers (0–6,000).

Table 4.1: Average number of peacekeepers deployed, by mission.

Mission	Grids	All	All Nonwhite	African	Regional	White
MINURCAT	493	2677	1684	1017	0	993
MINUSCA	257	12266	10722	7689	2508	1544
MINUSMA	503	12080	10532	7956	6504	1548
MONUC	850	11818	10014	3502	0	1804
MONUSCO	850	18842	16230	5057	0	2612
ONUB	18	4514	4426	2480	0	88
UNAMID	217	16852	14671	11237	722	2181
UNAMSIL	40	11019	10146	5006	3441	872
UNISFA	11	4164	4147	4127	0	18
UNMIL	51	9963	9101	3761	2615	862
UNMIS	936	9644	8018	1672	617	1626
UNMISS	255	12434	12067	4684	475	366
UNOCI	136	8994	7443	3507	2395	1551

variables so that in month *t*, we are observing the relationship between peacekeepers deployed at time $t-1$ and the onset of violence at *t*.

Next, we rely on data on peacekeeper country of origin to measure perceptions of racial difference. While peacekeepers' country of origin does not exactly capture perceptions of race, it is the best possible proxy at such a coarse level of analysis. Readers should be aware of these limitations of this data and interpret it *in conjunction with* the analysis.

Our argument is related to what Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri[256] call indices of distance, which they measure in terms of geography, language, religion, political institutions, and economy. They find that cultural distance is associated with negative peacekeeping outcomes, and they attribute this finding to the inability of peacekeepers from culturally distant countries to

[256] Bove, V., Ruffa, C., & Ruggeri, A. (2020). *Composing peace: Mission composition in UN peacekeeping*. Oxford University Press.

understand and interact with local populations, which aligns with the findings of qualitative researchers as well.[257] By contrast, we argue that these differences are related to racial differences between peacekeepers and local populations.

We also expect that domestic populations are more likely to perceive peacekeepers from countries with relatively similar identity cleavages as biased. Locals may have *more* information about the biases of UN personnel from countries that they know more about, including neighboring countries. In this case, biases could work against those peacekeepers. To operationalize similar identity cleavages, we take the count of peacekeepers deployed from contributing countries in the same region as the country of deployment. For each setting, these countries are likely to be the most socio-culturally proximate to social groups in Mali. Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri measure cultural distance as geographic contiguity. we broaden their approach to capture countries from the entire region because residents of a country may have similar identity cleavages with those from a country that does not necessarily share a border. We do not use any of their other distance measures because they are operationalized as a score ranging from 0 (personnel are culturally identical to the local population) to 1 (personnel are as culturally distant from the local population as possible). This construction prevents us from calculating and imputing peacekeepers' cultural distance in grid-months in the sample in which no personnel are deployed.

[257] Pouligny, Béatrice. (2006). Peace operations seen from below. UN missions and local people. Hurst; Autesserre, Severine. (2010). The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Dependent Variable

We rely on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED)[258] to operationalize outbreaks of communal violence. ACLED includes reported information on violent events coded by the perpetrator, type of event, date, and geographic location, which allows us to pinpoint communal violence events. We aggregate this data at the grid-month level and code a binary dummy variable that indicates whether communal violence broke out in that grid in a given month. We code for the onset of violence from what ACLED calls "identity militias."

The event-based data on violence used in this chapter likely undercounts the onset of violence. There are other possible datasets that we could use to complement or replace ACLED, such as the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset non-state actor dataset or the Social Conflict Analysis Database.[259] However, they contain even fewer observations of communal violence than ACLED. Thus, although we acknowledge Eck's evaluation that UCDP's "geocoding and precision information is far superior to ACLED's",[260] we trade that precision to gain exponentially more observations.

Another methodological concern associated with using the ACLED data is that it might generate measurement error. It is difficult to capture all escalations resulting from every potential communal dispute. However, any such potential measurement error is likely to be non-systematic, meaning that measurement error of the dependent variable simply produces statistical

[258] Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. (2010). "Introducing ACLED: an armed conflict location and event dataset: special data feature." Journal of peace research 47(5):651–660.

[259] Salehyan, Idean, Cullen S Hendrix, Jesse Hamner, Christina Case, Christopher Linebarger, Emily Stull and Jennifer Williams. (2012). "Social conflict in Africa: A new database." International Interactions 38(4):503–511.

[260] Eck, K. (2012). In data we trust? A comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED conflict events datasets. *Cooperation and Conflict*, *47*(1), 124-141, p. 137.

noise that is not correlated with the independent variables. For this reason, any measurement error will not bias the results of the statistical analysis. As these methodological shortcomings make clear, a deeper analysis of a single mission, which we offer in the following section, is needed to thoroughly evaluate the hypotheses derived from the theory.

The nature of variation in the dependent variable illustrates why a sub-national time-series approach is needed. First, there is *geographic* variation in the data. Consider the difference between and within cases visualized in Figure 4.2. Chad has had very few instances of communal violence, while Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Mali have had quite a few. Moreover, some countries, like South Sudan and the Central African Republic, have had a fairly equal distribution of violence across grids. In other cases, like Sudan and Mali, communal violence is extremely localized: certain areas are hubs of communal violence while others have experienced no violence at all. Analyses using data aggregated at the country level might adequately explain variation in UN effectiveness in cases like Chad or even South Sudan and the Central African Republic. However, strictly country-level data will miss the spatial spread of violence in cases like the DRC and Mali.

The data also exhibits *temporal* variation. Figure 4.2 graphs the number of communal violent events during the UN PKO in the three countries with the most communal violence—Sudan, Mali, and DRC. As the figure shows, a lot of variation occurs over time even within countries; collapsing the data into a single cross-section would miss that variation. Sometimes the pattern seems fairly obvious, such as the rise in communal violence in Mali beginning in 2016. In other cases, the pattern is more subtle, as in the DRC where violence has steadily




Figure 4.2: Total communal violence events

Note: 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid across 10 countries in the sample. All shaded grids include at least one instance of communal violence. Darker shades indicate more violence from 0 to 14.



Figure 4.3: Variation Over Time in Communal Violence during UN Peacekeeping Deployments in Sudan, Mali, and the DRC

increased since 2007 after decreasing between 2000 and 2007. In yet other cases, the pattern is not at all obvious, as in Sudan, where violence has repeatedly fluctuated over time. And, of course, there is variation over time sub-nationally as well. For all of these reasons, we use a cross-national dataset that varies within countries and over time.

5.3.2 Research Design

Selection bias is a key methodological concern associated with observational studies. Selection effects are problematic because an endogenous selection process can produce biased coefficient estimates. Changes in the local deployment of peacekeepers may be correlated with observable and unobservable factors that independently explain the onset of communal violence. One major threat to inference is that shifts in the broader conflict environment may explain both

where peacekeepers are deployed and why communal violence breaks out. If UN peacekeeping missions are more likely to deploy peacekeepers to particularly unstable areas, then any correlation we observe between peacekeepers and the onset of violence may be spurious. Ex ante, we expect selection effects of this kind to bias our results downward toward zero. Prior research has shown that peacekeepers generally deploy to the frontlines of a conflict.[261]

To account for this type of potential bias, we explicitly model the temporal and spatial process peacekeepers use to select which areas to patrol. Following convention, we use coarsened exact matching[262] to pre-process the sample along a set of factors that research and practice have shown determine where (and how) UN peacekeepers are deployed. We match grids that have peacekeepers deployed to those that do not but are similar in every other way. This procedure approximates an experimental setup in which peacekeepers are assigned as-if randomly to certain locations.

Specifically, we measure travel time to major cities, distance to an international border, the grid's average mountainous elevation, population, pre-deployment levels of violence, nighttime luminosity, distance to the country's capital from the center of the grid, child mortality rate, pre-deployment levels of violence, and immunization rates.[263] These factors affect where peacekeeping bases are initially sited because they predict both the need for peacekeeping to

[261] Fortna, Virginia Page. 2008. Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents Choices after Civil War. Princeton University Press.

[262] Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2012). Causal inference without balance checking: Coarsened exact matching. *Political analysis*, *20*(1), 1-24.

[263] Measures of accessibility are taken from AidData's GeoQuery tool. We use nighttime luminosity from the Defense Meteorological Program Operational Line-Scan System dataset of nighttime light emission.




Figure 4.4: Standardized Mean Differences of Key Covariates between Grids with vs. without Peacekeepers (Full and Matched Samples)

provide security and the logistical challenges the UN will face when establishing a base.[264] We also limit matches to within the same mission to ensure as close of a match as possible.

Figure 4.4 illustrates how much the matching procedure improves the sample by pruning it of observations in the data that would substantially bias it. The circles plot the standardized

[264] Blair, Robert A. 2019. "International Intervention and the Rule of Law after Civil War: Evidence from Liberia." International Organization 73(2):365–398.

mean difference between grids that have peacekeepers and those that do not for the key covariates. Peacekeeping grids are different to a statistically significant extent (indicated by the shaded gray area) from non-peacekeeping grids on all measures except immunization rates. Thus, any comparison of grids in an unmatched sample would be akin to comparing apples and oranges. In the matched sample, there is no statistically significant difference between grids with vs. without peacekeepers. Although we cannot be certain that we have eliminated all potential sources of bias, this figure confirms that we have improved along several important observable dimensions.

In addition to pre-processing the data, we adjust the estimation for a set of time-variant and time-invariant factors that could be endogenous to the relationship between the local deployment of particular peacekeeping personnel and communal violence. Communal violence could also systematically follow temporal patterns. For example, it may become more frequent as conflicts progress because fragile states become progressively less able to resolve local disputes as state capacity disintegrates. For this reason, we include a cubic polynomial (t,t^2, and t^3) to explicitly model the temporal dependence of the units in the data.[265]

We control for five variables that previous studies have associated with peacekeeping outcomes. First, we proxy for how violent a given administrative district is using a binary indicator of whether it had any civilian fatalities in the previous month. Second, since armed group involvement can quickly escalate a dispute, we proxy for the presence of armed groups using the number of battle-related fatalities in the grid in the previous month. Third, we include a dummy that indicates whether violence in a given district-month stems from an ongoing rebel

[265] Carter, David B and Curtis S Signorino. 2010. "Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data." Political Analysis 18(3):271–292.

conflict with the government. This helps us distinguish between violence generated by the onset of communal disputes—our dependent variable of interest—and spillover violence from elite-level conflicts. Fourth, we control for the duration of a conflict since longer conflicts likely create new grievances between populations, making peacekeeping more challenging. Finally, we include a control for population since a larger population will have more opportunities for communal disputes.

4.4 Results

Table 4.2 reports the relationship between the variables measuring the presence of peacekeepers from different sets of contributing countries and the onset of communal violence using the ACLED data. Each column has coefficients from a separate OLS regression with mission and year fixed effects as well as controls for time trends, past levels of violence against civilians, night lights, distance to the border, population, distance to the capital, immunization rate, child mortality rate, travel time to the nearest city, and average elevation of territory. The independent variables are the number of white UN peacekeepers (columns 1-3), nonwhite peacekeepers (column 1), nonwhite peacekeepers from African countries (column 2), nonwhite peacekeepers from Asian countries (columns 2-3), peacekeepers from the same African region (column 3), peacekeepers from a different African region (column 3). All variables are scaled by 1,000 for ease of interpretation.

Our theory predicts that the presence of nonwhite UN peacekeepers should increase individuals' willingness to pursue cooperative solutions to disputes, stabilize communities, and prevent the onset of communal violence while the presence of white UN peacekeepers does not.

Table 4.2: Association between Racial Composition of Peacekeepers and Communal Violence.

	Onset of Communal Violence (ACLED)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
White	−0.009	−0.008	−0.010
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
All Nonwhite	−0.010***		
	(0.002)		
All African		−0.008*	
		(0.003)	
Regional African			0.006
			(0.006)
Non-Regional African			−0.015***
			(0.004)
Asian		−0.011***	−0.010***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Time trend adjusted	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Mission Fixed Effects	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Controls	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Observations	29548	29548	29548

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

The results in Table 4.2 are consistent with these predictions. The correlation between the presence of nonwhite peacekeepers in a grid-month and the onset of communal violence in the following month in the same grid is negative and statistically significant. In other words, the more peacekeepers from nonwhite countries that the UN sends to a grid in a given month, the less likely it is that communal violence will break out. Also, in line with our theory, there is no relationship between peacekeepers likely to be perceived as white and communal violence.

Table 4.3: Association between Racial Composition of Peacekeepers and One-Side Violence by the State.

	Onset of One-Sided Violence (UCDP)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
White	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
All Nonwhite	−0.0001		
	(0.001)		
All African		−0.004	
		(0.002)	
Regional African			−0.002
			(0.004)
Non-Regional African			−0.004
			(0.003)
Asian		0.003	0.003
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Time trend adjusted	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Mission Fixed Effects	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Controls	*Y*	*Y*	*Y*
Observations	29548	29548	29548

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001

Table 4.3 reports the relationship between the variables measuring the presence of peacekeepers from different sets of contributing countries and the onset of violence against civilian using the ACLED data. Each column has coefficients from a separate OLS regression with the same model specification as before.

Our theory predicts that there will be no relationship between the deployment of white or nonwhite peacekeepers and violence against civilians. The results in Table 4.3 are consistent with these predictions. The correlation between the presence of white or nonwhite peacekeepers in a grid-month and the onset of violence against civilians in the following month in the same

grid is statistically indistinguishable from 0. In other words, there is no relationship between peacekeepers and civilian victimization, regardless of race.

4.5 Conclusion

Despite stark patterns of peacekeeping by Western countries in the non-Western world, the potential roles of race over the outcomes of those interventions is largely missing in the empirical literature. We aimed to fill this gap by developing theoretical mechanisms for race and racism in an analysis of international intervention effectiveness. Specifically, this chapter demonstrates the importance of prioritizing local perceptions of race in international intervention. Race, in addition to related concepts like linguistic distance, ethnicity, or culture, can help explain the conditions under which peacekeepers reduce violence.

4.6 Acknowledgement

This chapter is an early draft of a co-authored study with William Nomikos. We thank Austin Carson, Zoltán Búzás, and participants of the Race in IR Workshop for extensive, thoughtful comments.

Appendix

Table A.2.1: U.S. SOFA Jurisdiction by Racial Majority of Host Country

	Exclusive			Shared			
White	Dominican Republic Belize Honduras El Salvador Nicaragua Colombia Ecuador Peru Bolivia			Canada Panama United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Belgium Luxemburg France Switzerland Spain Portugal Germany Poland	Austria Hungary Czech Republic Slovakia Italy Albania Montenegro Macedonia Croatia Yugoslavia Bosnia & Herzegovina Kosovo	Slovenia Greece Cyprus Bulgaria Moldova Romania Russia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine Armenia Georgia	Azerbaijan Finland Sweden Norway Denmark Iceland Australia
Non-White	Haiti Trinidad and Tobago Grenada St. Lucia Antigua & Barbuda St. Kitts and Nevis Guatemala Guyana Suriname Cape Verde Mali	Senegal Benin Niger Guinea Burkina Faso Liberia Ghana Cameroon Gabon Chad Democratic Republic of the Congo	Burundi Rwanda Djibouti Ethiopia Mozambique Botswana Swaziland Comoros Seychelles Iran Egypt Bahrain Bangladesh Maldives Cambodia East Timor	Turkey Iraq Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Kazakhstan South Korea Japan Philippines Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands	Tonga Marshall Islands Federated States of Micronesia		

Table A.2.2: U.S. SOFA Jurisdiction Types

Jurisdiction Type:	**Definition:**	**SOFA Clause Example:**
Exclusive	United States has exclusive jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in host country	1. Host government agrees that U.S. personnel be accorded the privileges, exemptions, and immunities equivalent to those accorded to administrative and technical staff of a diplomatic mission under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 2. Host government recognizes the particular importance of disciplinary control by United States armed forces authorities over U.S. personnel, and therefore, authorizes the U.S. government to exercise jurisdiction over U.S. personnel while in the host country.
Concurrent	United States and host country share jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in host country	• If U.S. personnel violate only U.S. law, the U.S. has primary right. • If U.S. personnel violate only host country law, the host country has primary right. • When U.S. personnel violate both host country law and U.S. law, then U.S. has primary right over U.S. personnel in host country when: 1. the violation is committed "inter se" (by Americans against Americans, and 2. the offense is carried out by Americans during performance of official duties.

Table A.2.3: Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Jurisdiction	1.00	-0.64	-0.32	-0.37	0.54	0.20	0.57	0.54	0.40	0.65	0.21
Non-White Majority	-0.64	1.00	0.19	0.38	-0.45	-0.22	-0.53	-0.53	-0.27	-0.53	-0.02
Cold War	-0.32	0.19	1.00	-0.06	-0.56	-0.20	-0.37	-0.18	-0.24	-0.69	-0.23
Sharia	-0.37	0.38	-0.06	1.00	-0.23	-0.08	-0.34	-0.32	-0.08	-0.25	0.04
NATO Mmember	0.54	-0.45	-0.56	-0.23	1.00	0.33	0.65	0.53	0.43	0.74	0.20
Veto	0.20	-0.22	-0.20	-0.08	0.33	1.00	0.26	0.11	0.48	0.26	0.42
Rule of Law	0.57	-0.53	-0.37	-0.34	0.65	0.26	1.00	0.86	0.31	0.66	0.22
Judicial Independence	0.54	-0.53	-0.18	-0.32	0.53	0.11	0.86	1.00	0.22	0.51	0.13
National Capability	0.40	-0.27	-0.24	-0.08	0.43	0.48	0.31	0.22	1.00	0.39	0.45
UN Voting Similarity	0.65	-0.53	-0.69	-0.25	0.74	0.26	0.66	0.51	0.39	1.00	0.24
U.S. Troops Size	0.21	-0.02	-0.23	0.04	0.20	0.42	0.22	0.13	0.45	0.24	1.00

Table A.2.4: Non-White Majority Host on U.S. SOFA Jurisdiction


	Dependent Variable						
	relogit	relogit	relogit	relogit	logit	relogit	logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Non-White Majority	−3.303***			−1.947***	−2.514*	−1.738**	−2.401*
	(0.449)			(0.558)	(1.026)	(0.565)	(1.151)
Rule of Law		5.110***		0.438	−0.441		
		(0.770)		(1.075)	(2.008)		
Cold War			−1.865***	−3.582***	−10.674***	−2.951**	−10.529***
			(0.459)	(0.945)	(2.349)	(0.915)	(2.690)
Judicial Independence						1.571	0.213
						(1.154)	(2.211)
Sharia				−6.951***	−19.304***	−6.016***	−19.233***
				(1.123)	(3.893)	(1.099)	(4.157)
National Capability				0.659	1.058	0.678*	1.114
				(0.372)	(0.774)	(0.332)	(0.708)
U.S. Troops Size				0.0001***	0.0004***	0.0001***	0.0004***
				(0.00002)	(0.0001)	(0.00002)	(0.0001)
NATO Membership				1.669**	17.269***	1.382**	17.011***
				(0.512)	(1.661)	(0.468)	(1.475)
UN Voting Similarity				8.002***	11.929***	7.788***	11.659**
				(1.510)	(3.565)	(1.520)	(3.679)
Veto				0.961	17.891***	0.957	17.878***
				(0.632)	(1.639)	(0.616)	(1.635)
Constant	2.704***	−1.942***	2.587***	3.821*	11.426**	2.808	11.212**
	(0.536)	(0.345)	(0.417)	(1.662)	(3.555)	(1.658)	(4.119)
States	85	85	85	85	85	85	85
Observations	183	183	183	183	183	183	183

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2.5: Odds Ratios

	relogit	logit	relogit	logit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rule of Law	1.549	0.643		
Non-White Majority	0.1427	0.081	0.176	0.0906
Judicial Independence			4.810	1.237
Sharia	0.001	0.000	0.002	0.000
National Capability	1.932	2.879	1.970	3.047
U.S. Troops Size	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
NATO Membership	5.309	31614180	3.982	24422570
UN Voting Similarity	2986.91	151569	2410.467	115783.5
Veto Power	2.613	58893970	2.603	58121360
Cold War	0.0278	0.000	0.052	0.000
Constant	45.659	91636	16.575	74045
States	85	85	85	85
Observations	183	183	183	183

Figure A.3: Balanced and Imbalanced Data Visualization



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