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Lay Sensitivity to Sampling and Selection Errors in Scientific Studies

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Introduction

Individuals are regularly exposed to science media that makes causal claims about health and behavior yet they struggle to distinguish good from bad science and judge whether evidence is consistent with the claims (Shah et al., 2017; Sinatra & Hofer, 2016). In particular, people are overly influenced by prior beliefs and motivations (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2012) and accept unwarranted causal inferences based on correlational data (Seifert et al., 2022).

Here, we address the extent to which people are able to notice specific flaws to internal and external validity: Non-random assignment (Unequal attrition, Blocked Assignment, Self-Selection) and use of a Biased Sample

Methods

Experiment 1. 316 online participants completed a series of article comparisons (see Fig 1), in which they compared news-style reportings of scientific studies *with* and *without* flaws related to sampling and selection.

After comparing the two articles, they were asked (1) to judge which study better supported the author’s conclusions, and (2) what they would do to improve the worst of the two studies.

Individual difference data were collected on: Subjective Numeracy, Intuitive/Deliberative Thinking (Cognitive Reflection Test), Actively Open-Minded Thinking (AOT), Self-reported familiarity with research methods.

Experiment 2. 438 online participants rated only one article that varied according to the type of error and the framing: control (no error), implicit framing, or with the error explicitly called out to see if they recognize that the critical flaws are problematic for evaluating the study.

Acknowledgements

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Materials





Figure 1. Experiment 1 Methods

Results



In Experiment 2, participants were more sensitive to errors when they were made explicit in the article, reporting lower rated study quality ($p = .011$) and belief in evidence ($p = .004$).





Figure 2. Example Article

Blocked Assignment – Coffee and Exams				Blocked Assignment – Notes and Exams			
	Estimate	SE	Sig		Estimate	SE	Sig
Prior Beliefs	0.12	0.20	.53		-0.006	0.22	.98
Subjective Numeracy	-0.12	0.32	.70		0.15	0.34	.66
Methods Familiarity	0.84	0.43	.05		0.99	0.45	.03*
AOT	1.36	0.37	< .001**		1.53	0.38	< .001**
CRT	0.64	0.39	.10		0.34	0.38	.38
Unequal Attrition – Writing and Anxiety				Unequal Attrition – Yoga			
	Estimate	SE	Sig		Estimate	SE	Sig
Prior Beliefs	-0.27	0.22	.22		-0.23	0.23	.30
Subjective Numeracy	-0.04	0.31	.89		-0.15	0.30	.60
Methods Familiarity	0.53	0.36	0.18		0.34	0.36	.35
AOT	1.53	0.40	< .001**		1.30	0.36	< .001**
CRT	0.60	0.39	.12		0.38	0.36	.30
Biased Sample – Climate Change				Biased Sample – Iced vs Hot Coffee			
	Estimate	SE	Sig		Estimate	SE	Sig
Prior Beliefs	0.21	0.28	.44		-0.10	0.20	.63
Subjective Numeracy	0.27	0.30	.36		0.57	0.32	.07
Methods Familiarity	0.20	0.33	.54		0.001	0.34	.99
AOT	1.52	0.35	< .001**		2.13	0.47	< .001**
CRT	0.29	0.34	.39		-0.34	0.39	.38
Self-Selection – Fitness and Exams				Self-Selection – Meditation			
	Estimate	SE	Sig		Estimate	SE	Sig
Prior Beliefs	0.12	0.20	.55		-0.98	0.22	.72
Subjective Numeracy	-0.11	0.30	.71		0.14	0.31	.64
Methods Familiarity	0.64	0.37	.08		0.59	0.37	.10
AOT	1.46	0.34	< .001**		1.60	0.36	< .001**
CRT	0.39	0.35	.27		0.31	0.35	.38

Higher actively open-minded thinking was associated with better error identification across contexts ($p < .001$).

Conclusions & Discussion

- Laypeople struggle to detect sampling, selection, and assignment errors in scientific studies.
- Higher AOT predicts flaw detection, suggesting analytic disposition and effortful engagement — not just knowledge — are crucial for evidence evaluation.
- Explicit labeling enables recognition, suggesting detection failures reflect inattention rather than inability.
- How can we foster AOT in science education?