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1 **Research priorities for global food security under extreme events**

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103

104 **Summary**

105 Extreme events, such as those caused by climate change, economic or geopolitical
106 shocks, and pest or disease epidemics, threaten global food security. The complexity of
107 causation, as well as the myriad ways that an event, or a sequence of events, creates
108 cascading and systemic impacts, poses significant challenges to food systems research
109 and policy alike. To identify priority food security risks and research opportunities, we
110 asked experts from a range of fields and geographies to describe key threats to global
111 food security over the next two decades, and to suggest key research questions and gaps
112 on this topic. Here we present a prioritization of the major threats to global food security
113 from extreme events, as well as emerging research questions that highlight the conceptual
114 and practical challenges which exist in designing, adopting, and governing resilient food
115 systems. We hope these findings help in directing research funding and resources towards
116 the food system transformations needed to help society tackle major food system risks
117 and food insecurity under extreme events.

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122 **Science for Society**

123 Extreme events threaten the food security of many citizens of the world, our friends,
124 families, and communities, with whom we are connected to at home and abroad. We
125 hear about these threats every day in the news, and in many cases such threats appear to
126 be on the rise. For example, we hear about rising heat waves, floods and droughts
127 ravaging agricultural landscapes, we hear about pest outbreaks and diseases threatening
128 production, about financial crises invoking trade barriers, and about conflicts and wars
129 threatening supply chains as well as food security of inhabitants of conflict zones. Our
130 ability to prepare for these events seems limited. This is exacerbated by their complexity:
131 the fact that multiple events can occur at the same time in different places in the world,
132 and that the impacts of events can cascade through our biophysical and social systems.
133 To date most research and policy on extreme events has developed in isolation, with
134 teams working on different solutions to different components of the challenge of
135 improving the resilience of our food systems. In this article we bring together a number
136 of food system experts to share their perspectives on what they think are the top threats
137 posed by extreme events to global food security over the next two decades, and what they
138 think are the top research questions that scientists should be focussing on to help society
139 prepare and respond to them. We find that underpinning many of key threats rest critical
140 and unsolved governance challenges in international relations, and that many of the
141 highest impact research questions require not only improving data and models but
142 directly addressing how society can design and adopt systems of governance for food
143 systems that are resilient to extreme events in the future.

144

145 **Introduction**

146 Extreme events caused by climate change, economic or geopolitical shocks, and pest or
147 disease epidemics can induce, spread, and prolong food insecurity^{1,2}. They do this by
148 reducing farming and fisheries productivity, threatening subsistence, and disrupting food
149 distribution and public service delivery. Extreme events can also drive increases in food
150 prices and volatility, human migration and political instability. These direct and indirect
151 effects lead to reductions in the availability of, and access to, healthy and nutritious
152 food¹⁻⁶. The magnitude, extent, and complexity of the threats posed by extreme events to
153 global food security can further create cascading and systemic impacts^{7,8}, that are
154 difficult to predict or plan and prepare for.

155 The complexity of causation, that is the range of hazards and events that may co-occur
156 and the multiple pathways by which hazards can create societal risks through exposures
157 and vulnerabilities, as well as the widespread scientific and political disagreement on the
158 relative efficacy of potential solutions, call for expert elicitation on this topic^{9,10}. Such
159 synthesis can help to balance viewpoints, find areas of consensus, identify problems and
160 solutions which current data or models may not be able to resolve with certainty, and

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161 ultimately help both researchers and funding agencies best direct their collective energy
162 and resources to help society tackle these major food system risks.

163 With ongoing crises affecting food systems -- from weather extremes, to COVID-19, to a
164 range of conflicts -- a horizon scan and priority-setting exercise is timely. Exercises like
165 the one we describe here have been applied to a range of complex issues, such as
166 economic risks¹¹ to linkages between climate change and conflict¹², climate resilience¹³,
167 near term climate impacts¹⁰, and conservation^{14, 15}, but not for extreme events and food
168 security.

169 Individual groups and organizations typically determine their own priorities and research
170 gaps, with the consequence that important interdisciplinary priorities may be overlooked.
171 The purpose of this work is to bring together a range of experts in an attempt to build
172 consensus on priorities for research and action to mitigate the effects of extreme events
173 on food insecurity. Through it, we hope to identify major threats and research gaps for
174 both knowledge generation, and implementation. Filling such implementation gaps will
175 necessarily require a fuller analysis of trade-offs in policy making, factors influencing
176 adoption of new management practices or technologies, and an assessment of the value of
177 different kinds of knowledge generation, given different capacities for access and
178 utilization across different contexts.

179 To identify priority food system risks and research opportunities, we surveyed, online and
180 in-person, a group of 69 food system experts (Supplementary Methods) spanning a range
181 of disciplines and subdisciplines, institutional backgrounds (academia, government
182 and/or international institutions, and NGOs), levels of seniority (e.g., students,
183 postdoctoral researchers, and various levels of faculty), and geographic focus (all
184 continents with permanent human habitation) (Supplementary Figs 1-3), on their
185 perceptions of key emerging threats and priority research questions for global food
186 security in the face of extreme events.

187 Here we present the summary results of this survey, together with a prioritization of these
188 threats and research questions for the wider research, policy, and funding communities.
189 We explore the nature of the threats identified, as well as the types of questions and
190 perceptions of uncertainty (i.e. in terms of resources required, time, existence of baseline
191 data and methods, requirements for collaboration across geographies, fields,
192 organizations). We hope these findings will broadly aid researchers and funders in
193 focusing on food system transformations needed to deal with the impact of extreme
194 events on global food security.

195

196 **Threat perception**

197 We asked each member of our expert panel to describe a single emerging threat on the
198 horizon — one which they thought would increase global food insecurity in the face of
199 extreme events over the next two decades (the kind of event and threat, e.g., social,

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200 biological, political, was left to the discretion of each expert). From 69 submissions, we
201 identified 32 distinct threats, which covered a range of intersecting social, economic,
202 environmental, and geopolitical dimensions. We then asked the experts to rank each
203 threat along two key dimensions—*Impact* (the impact on global food security) and
204 *Probability* (the probability of occurrence)—following the methods of risk perception
205 commonly used in economic forecasting⁷. We conditioned average scores on individuals,
206 to account for some respondents consistently giving higher or lower scores, a common
207 feature in expert surveys⁹.
208

209 We found several cross-cutting themes emerged from the synthesis of the expert
210 elicitation. The first theme, *Compound events and cascading risks*, encompasses both
211 correlated risk of disasters across space and time, sectors and regions¹⁶, as well as specific
212 pathways by which a single hazard can cause a cascade of impacts across food systems⁷,
213 respectively. The second theme, *Vulnerability and adaptive capacity*, involves factors
214 that predispose communities to losses, or diminishes their ability to cope with a loss
215 when it occurs¹⁷. Finally, *Cooperation/conflict*—itself a key component of vulnerability
216 and adaptive capacity—was identified as a third theme, presenting in both acute or
217 chronic conditions, which can undermine communities’ and nations’ abilities to resist and
218 respond to extreme events when they occur^{18,19}. We explain top ranking threats below, but
219 also include the full list in Supplementary Table 1.

220

221 Food system exposure to events of a compound nature has received increasing research
222 attention in recent years¹⁶ (albeit with a climate focus), so it is perhaps little surprise that
223 our panel identified multiple risks which fell into this category. These included key
224 compound events in specific world regions, such as co-occurring heat waves and
225 droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa²⁰, or combined monsoon and meltwater disruptions in
226 Asia^{21,22}. They also included other globally relevant threats, such as sequential exposure
227 to hazards throughout cropping seasons²³ or across major breadbaskets^{24,25}, and co-
228 occurring heat-waves at land and sea affecting food supplies^{26,27}. Physical drivers of these
229 correlated hazards include simple location shifts in temperature distributions across
230 multiple geographies²⁸, disruptions to atmospheric circulation patterns such as El Niño
231 Southern Oscillation (ENSO) or the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO)²⁹, and amplified
232 Rossby Waves³⁰ as well as the crossing of large-scale tipping points in climate leading to
233 unprecedented weather regimes on a long-term basis³¹. Exposure of food systems to
234 cascading risks was also of increasing concern and included risk of disruption to critical
235 infrastructure, transport, and public utility systems³², and disruption of choke points in
236 food supply chains impacting multiple processes and actors in food systems
237 simultaneously or in sequence³³.

238 Like concerns over the changing nature of compound hazards, issues related to
239 vulnerability and adaptive capacity of particular human populations also received
240 attention. Perennial issues, such as increased water demand from population growth—
241 impacting access to clean water, groundwater depletion, and lack of ability to irrigate

242 sustainably—were perceived as top threats that increase vulnerability and reduce adaptive
243 capacity to extreme events^{34–36}. Similarly, income reversals for the poor (already
244 happening pre-COVID)^{37,38} coupled with price transmissions, especially in import-
245 dependent low and middle-income countries^{39,40}, were ranked as top threats. Of additional
246 notable concern was an agricultural development trajectory of increasing industrialization
247 leading to a loss of managed diversity on farms (crops and livestock), and concentration
248 of food flows in supply chains and actors^{41,42}; as well as biodiversity loss and loss of
249 ecosystem services supporting food and feed for animal and fish populations⁴³.

250 Finally, human conflict was identified as a key threat to global food security which could
251 increase over the next two decades. More than 50% of the world’s hungry live in conflict
252 regions, and increasing food insecurity within failed states or in regions with political
253 instability, terrorism, civil unrest and/or armed conflict was seen as a key threat to global
254 food security by our panel^{2,44}. Of similar concern were migration and displacement, with
255 associated impacts not only on refugee and migrant food security and nutrition⁴⁵ but also
256 on international cooperation, with important implications for progress on responding to
257 world hunger¹⁹—a concern supported by recent independent assessments of climate
258 impacts¹⁰. Governance failures and geopolitical resource conflict⁴⁶, resource grabbing on
259 land and sea by wealthier nations that have depleted their own resource bases⁴⁷,
260 increasing polarization of politics within and between countries, and trade barriers
261 affecting trade and disaster aid³ were all also raised as key threats of concern.

262 Other top threats included pest and disease outbreaks and marine heatwaves (one of many
263 emerging threats marine systems face)—both poorly understood issues with the potential
264 to affect large cropland or fisheries areas simultaneously and severely. While fall
265 armyworm and locust outbreaks in Sub-Saharan Africa in recent years have received
266 media attention⁴⁸, data on pest damage and losses at the field level are poorly documented
267 across the world, with assessments themselves relying on expert elicitation⁴⁹ or models
268 built on sparse or coarse resolution data and or simplified assumptions that do not
269 account for the huge diversity of damage functions and interactions between different
270 pests and diseases^{50,51}. For marine heatwaves, only a few experts on our team felt
271 qualified to rank its risk level, but those that did ranked this threat highly, with the
272 importance of this issue being supported by a growing literature on this topic^{52–54}.

273 **Research priorities**

274 In addition to asking experts their perceptions on key threats to global food security from
275 extreme events, we also asked participants to identify top-priority research questions on
276 the topic of extreme events and food security. We prioritized the initial 179 responses
277 into 50 by asking the panel to rank the submitted questions along dimensions of research
278 impact and difficulty—how impactful they thought answering the question would be (i.e.
279 in terms of helping to ensure food security in the face of extreme events), and how
280 difficult it would be to answer it (i.e., resources required, time, existence of baseline data
281 and methods, requirements for collaboration across geographies, fields, organizations).
282 Using this prioritization, we differentiated research questions into those that were *lower*

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283 *effort*, i.e. were high impact research questions but easier to answer from those that were
284 *higher effort*, i.e. high impact but more difficult to tackle. We then grouped the final
285 prioritized questions into three main emergent themes: *Better maps and predictions*,
286 *farm-level interventions*, and *food system transformation*, as we explain below.

287

288 ***Better maps and predictions***

289 The standard basis for identifying risk, forecasting, and responding to the impact of
290 extreme events on food security is high-quality data. Creating better maps and predictions
291 that can inform proactive prevention and timely response before, during and after
292 extreme events is crucial. However, the quality, frequency, and spatial extent of validated
293 on-the-ground data on food security have kept pace with advances in geospatial
294 predictive analytics tools⁵⁵. Currently, the world’s foremost standard for classifying acute
295 food insecurity, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), relies heavily
296 on expert judgement⁵⁶. Systemic issues relate to limited funding for ‘boots on the ground’
297 and institutionalized survey programs, poor infrastructure and low maturity of data
298 governance systems within key nations⁵⁷, as well as limited programs for grassroots
299 participation in data generation and decision-making on acute and chronic food security.
300 This data availability, access, and utilization problem is exacerbated by logistical
301 challenges that *de facto* accompany extreme events, as seen in conflict zones and with the
302 movement restrictions of COVID-19^{2,58}. With these critical challenges in mind, which are
303 related to both data generation and the use of data products and services, the lists of
304 questions posed by participants in this category are given below. These questions clearly
305 highlight frontiers for advanced mapping and analytics and modeling of food systems,
306 while at the same time stressing the need to explicitly monitor, update and validate the
307 success of these new technologies and insights for improving food security on the
308 ground. While a few are purely methodological, most are thematic.

309

310 *Lower effort*

- 311 1. What are the likely impacts of specific critical infrastructure failures on food
312 security?
- 313 2. What is the evidence for cascading impacts from extreme events in developing
314 countries?
- 315 3. What types of extreme events affect which types of farmers? [Who is most at risk
316 and what types of adaptive capacity do they need to bolster?]
- 317 4. How many individuals are exposed to extreme weather events through hazards
318 which occur in domestic versus export partner countries’ production areas?
- 319 5. Which import-dependent countries are most vulnerable to climate shocks in major
320 grain exporting countries?

- 321 6. To what extent can early warning systems identify and inform people most
 322 exposed, vulnerable, and unable to adapt to food insecurity challenges in the face
 323 of extreme events?
- 324 7. How can big data, artificial intelligence and machine learning best be used to
 325 improve early warning systems?
- 326 8. How can remote sensing technologies best contribute to reducing food insecurity
 327 and better understand increasing extreme events in data-scarce areas?
- 328 9. How will flooding affect food production and food systems in developing
 329 countries in the future?
- 330 10. Where are the hotspots of food production vulnerability to different kinds of
 331 extreme events within key producing regions?
- 332 11. How do impacts of different kinds of extreme events on agriculture in the sub-
 333 Saharan African region vary?
- 334 12. Are there tipping points in the intensity of extreme events that will cause global
 335 food insufficiency?
- 336 13. Is the international food trade system dynamic enough to accommodate
 337 compound and cascading events?
- 338 14. Which features of early warning systems are essential for them to be effective?
- 339 15. What factors drive synchronous or asynchronous crop production, and how are
 340 these factors changing in the past and the future?

341 *Higher effort*

- 342 1. How resilient are different food system sectors to a range of key perturbations?
 343 [Can they be stress tested?]
- 344 2. To what extent does early warning for high risk pest outbreaks for Africa improve
 345 food security on the ground?
- 346 3. How will geographies of pests change in the face of climate change?
- 347 4. Can we develop globally dynamic predictions of the stocks and flows of food?
- 348 5. What methods best predict cascading impacts from extreme events across food
 349 systems?
- 350 6. How accurate are seasonal-to-annual food security forecasts, and do these
 351 forecasts become more accurate by incorporating climate and weather forecasts?
- 352 7. Can we build accurate sub-seasonal models of precipitation in Sub-Saharan
 353 Africa, and what can and cannot be said with the current network of observational
 354 weather station data?
- 355 8. What earth system features (e.g. atmosphere, ocean, land surface, and cryosphere)
 356 are best at predicting seasonal-scale extremes for key agricultural and populous
 357 regions around the globe?
- 358 9. How does the frequency and intensity of extreme events and their subsequent
 359 impact on global food security (from both land and sea) change under different
 360 climate change scenarios and Shared Socio-economic Pathways?
- 361 10. Can artificial intelligence be used to predict extreme event probability and risk
 362 profiles and the range of possibilities of future extreme event occurrence?

363 11. How much would a global network of smart farms providing dynamic data (on
364 farm level soil, water, air, crop changes in response to shocks), help to inform risk
365 reduction for different production systems?

366 *Farm-level interventions*

367 A key focal point for research on food security in the face of extreme events is at the farm
368 level. This is because despite being food producers, many of the world's farmers, herders,
369 hunters, and fishers, are themselves food insecure. This brings a double benefit to
370 research focused on enhancing resilience to extreme events at the farm level, and in
371 production systems more generally, not only for global food security through stabilizing
372 supply, but also for improved livelihoods. However, food producers operate in socio-
373 ecological systems that may enable or restrict their ability to be resilient or adapt to
374 extreme events. Even when armed with knowledge of resilience enhancing practices,
375 socioeconomic constraints or incentives can shape vulnerability to extreme events. For
376 example, the presence of well-functioning insurance markets can encourage farmers to
377 plant drought-sensitive crops because of moral hazard (where an actor is incentivized to
378 increase exposure because they do not bear the full costs of that risk)⁵⁹ while the absence
379 of financial markets in combination with liquidity constraints can also prevent farmers
380 from investing in resilient agricultural practices⁶⁰. One example of the latter mechanism
381 include slow adoption rates of drought or flood tolerant seed varieties or irrigation
382 systems in many developing countries.

383 A range of priority research questions are listed below. In addition, similar but adapted
384 questions should be explored for populations involved in non-sedentary agriculture,
385 capture and farming fisheries, or hunting and foraging activities. A key overall theme is
386 on farm-level diversification, which is critical given that the dominant agricultural
387 development trajectory has been away from diversified farming systems and toward
388 reduced biodiversity in farming landscapes.

389 *Lower effort*

- 390 1. Which on-farm practices increase resilience to drought, are cost-effective and
391 easily adopted?
- 392 2. What are the effects of crop diversification on pest, drought, and disease
393 resistance?
- 394 3. How much can increasing crop diversity improve smallholders' adaptive
395 capacity?
- 396 4. How do intercropping systems based on productive perennial crops & legumes
397 assist in drought tolerant production systems?
- 398 5. How does farmer livelihood diversification mediate food insecurity during
399 extreme weather events?
- 400 6. How can we best assist food producers in their response to short-term (acute)
401 extreme events (extreme rainfall, high-intensity storms, extreme temperature,
402 storm surge, etc.)?

403 *Higher effort*

- 404 1. How context dependent are on-farm resilience practices across the world, and are
 405 there common themes, interventions and technologies that work across multiple
 406 locations?
 407 2. How does the loss of biodiversity make cropping systems more susceptible to
 408 extreme events?

409 ***Food system transformation***

410 It is widely recognized that system-level interventions are required to address existing
 411 structural constraints in food systems⁶¹, without which the benefits of better maps and
 412 predictions and improved evidence synthesis of farm-level interventions for addressing
 413 food security in the face of extreme events will not be realized. Many groups have
 414 discussed the issue of transforming food systems for improved resilience, including the
 415 Committee on World Food Security at the UN, IPES-Food, International Assessment of
 416 Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development, and the UN Food
 417 Systems Summit (UNFSS)⁶²⁻⁶⁵. However, the community currently remains divided on
 418 how food system resilience can be increased through the application of specific solutions,
 419 with ongoing concerns about the inequitable distribution of power and resources in food
 420 systems. The majority of research questions pertaining to this theme were, not
 421 surprisingly, deemed more difficult to answer. However, they address many critical
 422 issues which, building on the above categories, sit squarely at the intersection of
 423 information generation and availability versus utilization of that information for
 424 improving food security. As such, understanding ways to close the implementation gap,
 425 with a particular focus on governance, roles of different actors, and the key actions
 426 required, underscores a key research priority for improving food security under extreme
 427 events.

428

429 *Lower effort*

- 430 1. How does crop diversification at the household, community, and regional scales
 431 mediate food insecurity during extreme climate events?
 432 2. How can food production and supply chains be made robust to disruptions from
 433 extreme events affecting multiple regions, or the same region sequentially?
 434 3. What mitigating steps (e.g. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs),
 435 climate-smart agriculture) will also help provide resilience against extreme
 436 events?
 437 4. What is the effect of agroecological management of food systems on farmer
 438 vulnerability to extreme events?
 439 5. In what ways does insurance enhance or undermine food security in the face of
 440 extreme events?

441

442 *Higher effort*

- 443 1. What does governance for resilient food systems look like?
- 444 2. What are the major obstacles in developing resilience to extreme events in small-
445 scale farming systems?
- 446 3. What are the most effective approaches for enhancing adaptive capacities at local
447 and regional levels?
- 448 4. What are the practical tools and policies for the world's poor within the scope of
449 limited resources, institutions, infrastructure, capacity, to adapt to the extreme
450 events and food insecurity in the near to medium term?
- 451 5. What are some feasible policy (top down) or community (bottom up) pathways
452 for different sectors to enhance the resilience of food security to extreme events?
- 453 6. What are policies that make farming systems less vulnerable to extreme events,
454 without negatively affecting other sustainable development goals?
- 455 7. How does land access affect rural vulnerability to extreme events, and what has
456 been the effect, globally, of land reform efforts on food security and poverty in
457 the face of extreme events?
- 458 8. How can international food prices and distribution systems enable widespread
459 food security without lowering food prices so much that they harm local and
460 regional producers?
- 461 9. What are the key societal adaptations required to deal with synchronous crop
462 failures?
- 463 10. What are the major barriers undermining the effective uptake of adaptation
464 strategies and how can the limitations associated with these barriers be addressed?
- 465 11. What are the most cost-effective strategies to reduce the impacts of production
466 shocks on food access for the world's poor?

467

468 **Outlook**

469 Identifying key priorities for researchers and funders can be greatly aided through
470 crowdsourcing approaches, which collect the knowledge and wisdom of many, and
471 reduce bias associated with any particular researcher or group⁶⁶. While similar exercises
472 have been undertaken across a range of fields and topics, this work presents, as far as we
473 know, the first attempt to build consensus on the major threats and priorities for research
474 on food security in the face of extreme events from experts working with diverse
475 backgrounds and expertise and geographic foci. New panel compositions and teams may
476 provide different perspectives, particularly with higher representation of fisheries,
477 livestock, hunting and foraging expertise. At the same time we recognize that many of the
478 issues we identified are important across these diverse domains. With these points in
479 mind, our results provide some clear insights into some of the major issues threatening
480 global food security from extreme events over the next two decades, as well as examples
481 of some of the top research questions on this topic.

482 Our analysis found experts perceived threats on correlated risks across geographies and
483 sequential years to be high. While this topic has previously received attention from a
484 climate perspective¹⁶, our analysis extends this further to a broader range of hazards.
485 There was significant concern that compound events will continue to lead to reductions in
486 redundancy, and degrade communities', regions', and nations' abilities to respond to
487 events when they occur. Furthermore, major socio-political, geophysical, and
488 climatological changes in Africa and Asia present key connected and compounding
489 threats to many of the world's most food insecure.

490 Our prioritization also indicated that both scientists and practitioners have a need for
491 more granular data and better maps, and improved predictive capacity. New methods of
492 analysis and technologies have allowed for improved advisories, surveillance,
493 monitoring, and humanitarian response^{67,68}, but At the same time a scarcity of ground data
494 and lack of systems for grassroots data governance, as well as the underutilized role of
495 forecasting in decision-making (such as timely disbursement of resources that limit the
496 scale of disasters) limits the potential of these technologies. There is a need to ensure the
497 design of new tools and data and information products is inclusive and coupled with
498 capacity building, improved access and utilization, respect for data sovereignty, and
499 evaluation in terms of ultimate on the ground impact.

500 Our findings support the notion that the pathway to peace globally remains essential for
501 ensuring global food security in the face of extreme events. Conflict and lack of
502 cooperation--in a variety of manifestations, and at different political scales--continues to
503 present a major impediment to global food security and is a key factor that predisposes
504 communities and nations to disasters following shocks^{3,18}. Supporting this consensus,
505 since the inception of this project several serious new conflicts have arisen, from the
506 current Ethiopian civil war to the Ukraine-Russia war, all seriously threatening regional
507 and global food security.

508 Markets play an important role in moderating the impacts of local shocks⁶⁷, through
509 mediating access to resources, incentivizing resilient production practices and spreading
510 risk across geographies. At the same time, markets enhance certain risks which include
511 exposure to risk cascades through interrupted trade and supply chains, price transmission
512 effects for low-income countries, and loss of food sovereignty and redundancy through
513 short-term gains inefficiency in food supplies (including 'just-in-time' contracting).
514 Markets that fail to price the cost of the loss of food system resilience lead to increased
515 systemic risks. Thus, understanding how to better utilize the power of markets while
516 mitigating the risks they bring to food security is critical to minimize the knock-on effects
517 of extreme events when they do occur.

518 We found that major threat groupings of conflict, compound/cascading events, and
519 vulnerability and adaptive capacity (e.g., water security and poverty eradication³⁸,
520 biodiversity loss, and the vulnerability these impart to food systems, both on land and
521 sea⁴³) emerged from our analysis, which raises two interrelated questions: Why did these
522 themes emerge? And what underpins them? All carry major uncertainty in terms of

523 effective and timely resolution, all also represent cross-border issues and their resolution
524 requires tackling many outstanding problems of international relations. As we have
525 discussed above, this remains a major challenge for conflict, poverty reduction, and for
526 responding to both cascading events and compound events. For example, the reductions
527 in the likelihood of compound extreme weather events depend on the speed at which
528 governments can collectively realize climate targets which itself is uncertain. This
529 uncertainty in action on climate change is in turn exacerbated by war and policy
530 responses, including, concerns around short-term energy security. A key connecting
531 thread is that underpinning all these emergent categories of risks are failures to engender
532 trust and commit to shared values in international relations and governance.

533 An important question that arose during our discussions as a group concerned the relative
534 value of prioritizing new research questions, when existing information is not being
535 effectively used for ensuring food security. Part of the gap between knowledge
536 generation and use results directly from access and utilization gaps, which themselves
537 represent both hard and soft infrastructure issues, which differentially influence
538 communities' abilities and capacity to access and use information generated by scientists.
539 At the same time, implementation gaps can also exist because of institutional or
540 governance silos, jurisdictional constraints, resource availability constraints, scientific
541 literacy, or political capture by particular actors, which can limit the utilization of
542 information even if it is available and accessible.

543 Several key research priorities, particularly those from the transformation theme, speak
544 to these issues. We identified questions on enablers of social change, mechanisms for
545 building trust between actors at multiple levels and across contexts, levers for balancing
546 power and equity in food systems, as well as on developing governance frameworks for
547 ensuring resilience to extreme events. How to translate information and knowledge into
548 action is clearly itself a key research priority and represents a large knowledge gap. These
549 research questions are highly complex, demand strong multidisciplinary expertise and
550 approaches, and require new funding efforts and coordination, to assess which kinds of
551 information hold the most value for leveraging change. They also require researchers to
552 step beyond their own silos and place their efforts where they are most needed to enable
553 such transformations.

554 Extreme events impact global food security through a multitude of pathways. Some of the threats
555 highlighted here are recognized by the panel to be 'already happening' or 'age-old issues', but
556 are of magnified importance in the next two decades. In contrast, some of the complex linkages
557 between social and natural systems identified here in the context of extreme events are only just
558 beginning to be made by others⁶⁹. There is little doubt that COVID-19 and ongoing and emerging
559 conflicts and wars have shed new light on these kinds of problems. We are all mindful that
560 research and resources in the public and private sectors are not infinite; at the same time, tackling
561 some of the highest impact research questions will require significant investments of time and
562 money. However, these investments are needed, as extreme events will continue to threaten
563 global food security over the near to medium term. As such, we see it as our responsibility, as

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564 practitioners and researchers with expertise in this area, to join forces and help address these
565 challenges head-on.
566

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766 **Supplementary Information**

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768 Supplementary Methods

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770 We used a modified version of the Delphi technique⁷⁰ to identify threats for extreme
771 events and food security globally. This horizon scanning method has been applied
772 successfully in a similar manner to identify emerging issues for global conservation and
773 biological diversity¹⁴. We also used expert elicitation and a priority-setting exercise to
774 identify priority research questions for extreme events and food security. This method, or
775 variations of it, have been applied to identify top research questions in a range of research
776 fields and contexts¹⁵.

777 We surveyed experts on top threats and priority research questions by i) circulating a
778 request to participate within our professional networks with an initial online survey and,
779 following this ii) an in person workshop session on “Extreme Events and Food Security”
780 at the “Extreme Events - Building Climate Resilient Societies” conference, which was
781 funded by the VW Foundation and held 9-11 Nov. 2019 in Hannover, Germany. We
782 asked for open-format text answers to the following question:

783 “Describe an emerging threat on the horizon, which could increase food insecurity in the
784 face of extreme events over the next two decades.”

785 Participants were given 100 words to describe one threat and asked to add references and
786 supporting sources. As part of these same initial submission rounds, we also asked
787 participants to identify up to three responses to the question:

788 “Identify a top priority research question on the topic of extreme events and food
789 security”

790 In the first round of expert elicitation via the online survey and workshop, we received 69
791 replies (69 threats, 179 questions) from participants covering a wide range of expertise,
792 institutional background (academia, government or supranational institutions, and
793 NGOs), seniority (Ph.D. students, PostDocs, and various levels of Professors and
794 Lecturers), and geographic focus (all continents were covered, with a particular emphasis
795 on Africa and Asia). This experience can be seen in SI Figs 1-3, which show the details
796 of participants’ area of expertise, years of experience, and geographic research focus as
797 collected on the initial online survey.

798 During the in-person workshop, we collected all the online and in person submissions and
799 undertook a pilot ranking exercise of the responses. Here we separated the threats and
800 questions into preliminary themes and asked 2-3 experts that self-identified with each
801 theme to review the list, undertake a pilot ranking exercise to test the prioritization
802 methodology, to identify any extensively broad or duplicate questions that should be
803 eliminated and to make any other suggestions.

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804 After the workshop, a moderator removed threats and questions flagged as obvious
805 duplicates or being too broad, and reworded others for clarity, resulting in 32 threats and
806 147 questions that were sent out to the full group of contributors in a second online
807 survey. We did not remove ‘low-quality research questions’⁷¹. While we recognize this
808 may have resulted in some questions being of perceived higher research quality than
809 others (e.g. having both theoretical and empirical components, sufficient granularity, not
810 being double barreled), we wished to maintain, as much as possible, the diversity of
811 different ideas and sources submitted for full consultation.

812 We compiled these revised lists into a second set of online surveys for prioritization. We
813 invited the full list of experts (N = 69), to rank the list of refined threats and research
814 questions, each presented in their own survey, in which items were presented in
815 randomized order per participant, and participants were asked to rank each item (whether
816 a threat or research question) on simple likert scales (high to low; 1 to 5, with non-
817 anchored intervals). For threats, these scales included *Impact* (What is the impact of this
818 threat on global food security?) and *Probability* (What is the probability of this threat
819 occurring?). For research questions, these scales included *Impact* (How much impact do
820 you think the research question will have if answered?), *Difficulty* (What difficulty level
821 does this research question have?), and *Expertise* (What is your level of expertise in the
822 topic area of this question?). In total, we received N=30, and N=29 responses for threat
823 and research question prioritization surveys, respectively. We piloted each survey prior to
824 sending it out to confirm the estimated time for the survey, and to ensure it was navigable
825 and that the FAQ was clear.

826 We then used hierarchical cumulative link models⁷² to estimate the modes of the likert
827 scales, and probabilities of those modes, for each threat and research question, and for
828 each response (e.g. Impact, Probability for threats, and Impact, Difficulty and Expertise
829 for research questions) conditioning on individuals (which were treated as random
830 intercepts). For research questions we also conditioned mode probability estimates on
831 expertise level (treated as fixed intercepts) to account for higher likelihood of individuals
832 giving higher priority for questions related to their own fields. We then ranked each
833 outcome on the concatenation of the mode and probability (e.g. lets say for *Impact* a
834 selection of threats had modes of 5, 5, 4, and probabilities of those modes 0.8, 0.6, 0.9,
835 their concatenation would be 5.08, 5.06, 4.09; and we would rank them in order 1,2,3
836 from most to least impactful). For identifying top threats (most impactful and highest
837 probability of occurrence) we simply computed the mean rank of *Impact* and *Probability*
838 ranks, and ranked those mean ranks (these ranks are shown in Supplementary Table 1).
839 For identifying top research questions, we identified the top ranking 50 questions in terms
840 of *Impact* and then split them into higher and lower hanging questions based on a simple
841 percentile split in ranks of *Difficulty*.

842 We then collated the final threats and research questions into emergent themes post
843 prioritization and added examples into a first manuscript draft. We shared this manuscript

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844 draft with the full list of contributing experts (N=69) for review and allowed experts to
845 submit suggestions and thoughts, as well as textual edits to the final lists.

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
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873 Supplementary Figures



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875 Fig S1 Geographic expertise of experts contributing to the study. Note, experts were
876 allowed to declare more than one focal geography. These data were collected in the initial
877 online survey (see Supplementary Methods).

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
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
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Fig S2 Field of expertise from experts contributing to the study. Note, these were self declared, and some experts declared more than one area of expertise. “Other” includes a range of additional experts foci not shown, in philosophy, ethics, rural sociology, conflict science, humanitarian response, plant genomics, livestock systems, crop modeling, coastal hazards, environmental monitoring, drought management, urban food systems, gender analysis, landscape ecology, phytosanitation, human nutrition, socio-ecological systems, enterprise management, research performance evaluation, and impact assessment. These data were collected in the initial online survey (see Supplementary Methods).

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Fig S3 Years of expertise in the declared field from experts contributing to the study. These data were collected in the initial online survey (see Supplementary Methods).

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Supplementary Tables

SI Table 1. List of threats ranked and prioritized in this study. See main text for additional context and discussion.

Title	Class	Text	Rank (Impact)	Rank (Probability)	Mean Rank
Increased water demand	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Combination of rising water demand as well as low innovation in ways of growing food with limited amounts of water, will lead to further water insecurity in the face of climate extremes, particularly in irrigation dependent production systems, which will be amplified by population growth, urbanization, and the over-reliance on non-renewable resources, especially groundwater.	1	2	1.5
Drought & heat waves in SSA	Compound events	Losses to crop production by droughts and heat waves in Sub-Saharan Africa resulting in significant increases in food insecurity in the region.	2	1	1.5
Collapse of ecosystem services	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	The co-occurrence of extreme events, biodiversity loss, and ecosystem service collapse with negative effects on food production, food prices, and ultimately food security, through loss of essential services such as water regulation, pollination and pest control, and supporting food and feed for fish and animal populations.	4	6	5
Marine heat waves	Other	Heat waves and other extreme events negatively impacting marine resources through changes in their abundance and distribution, especially impacting coastal systems, and dependent communities in small and low income countries.	3	8	5.5
Income inequality	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Production losses and associated price spikes not accompanied by rapid income growth for the poor putting the most vulnerable communities at even greater risk to food insecurity through increased poverty limited access.	12	3	7.5
Political instability and migration	Co-operation/ conflict	Extremes events amplifying food insecurity from, as well as increasing, conflict, terrorism, and migration/displacement within and between nations.	11	4	7.5
Pest and disease outbreaks	Other	More frequent and severe weather, combined with long term climate change impacts on novel pest distributions, will lead to increasing pest pressure, more severe outbreaks, and a breakdown in genetic resistance, which will result in significant	10	7	8.5

Title	Class	Text	Rank (Impact)	Rank (Probability)	Mean Rank
		crop losses and health threats for humans and animals.			
Monsoon & meltwater disruption in Asia	Compound events	Major disruptions of monsoon patterns and alterations of meltwater flow patterns in major river basins negatively affecting agricultural production due to missing irrigation water in Asia, and impeding food security for billions dependent on these water resources.	8	10	9
Price shocks and volatility	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Extreme events inducing global food price shocks, which will affect middle and low income countries the most. The strong global market integration of these countries make them vulnerable for price fluctuations transmitted to their local markets and oftentimes these countries lack the capacity to protect their local markets (e.g. because of trade agreements, lack of storage facilities).	14	5	9.5
Low agricultural diversity	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	An increasing simplification of global agricultural systems through monoculture cropping and livestock genetics, will make these systems highly dependent on agrochemical inputs and more vulnerable to a range of climatic risks, evolution of pesticide resistance, fuel price volatility, and epidemics.	16	9	12.5
Climate tipping points	Compound events	The crossing of large-scale tipping points in climate will lead to fundamentally different climate regimes and unprecedented weather regimes on a long-term basis. Exceeding those tipping points will have also negative feedback effects by accelerating and intensifying climate change and extreme weather events.	5	20	12.5
Adaptive tipping points	Compound events	An increase in extreme events frequency and severity leading to continued and time compounded losses to agricultural productivity across sequential cropping cycles, exacerbating and accelerating impacts of individual events, and reducing farm level resiliency and adaptive capacity.	13	17	15
Unpredictable weather changes	Other	Major shifts in weather patterns such as storms and rainfall and temperature extremes disproportionately affecting rural communities. Aggravated by changes in	17	14	15.5

Title	Class	Text	Rank (Impact)	Rank (Probability)	Mean Rank
		climate teleconnection patterns, rendering existing agricultural knowledge of seasonality less useful.			
Compound heat waves on land	Compound events	Compound heat waves in space and/or time will aggravate individual heat-related impacts on food production. Simultaneous production shocks from multiple heat waves across agricultural regions have the potential to increase global food prices and food insecurity.	9	24	16.5
Breadbasket failure	Compound events	Multiple breadbasket failures, resulting from co-occurring climate extreme events, pests, and diseases as well as the lack of buffering capacity of global markets, will lead to long-term stability of food and nutrient provisioning.	7	26	16.5
Breeding failures	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Difficulties to breed tolerance to heat stress because of physiological constraints and because the interaction of genetics and environmental factors on plant responses under extremely high temperatures is largely unknown.	23	12	17.5
Compound heat waves on land and sea	Compound events	Co-occurring heat waves on land and sea as the result of shifting mean climates and higher probability of extreme land and sea temperatures leading to both loss of crop yields and available fish catch, leading to a double whammy of food supply shortages.	6	29	17.5
Resource conflict	Co-operation/ conflict	Resource grabbing on land and sea by powerful countries that have exploited their own resource base, and governance failures to control this activity, amplifying the impact of extreme events for the most vulnerable by reducing their capacity to grow, hunt, or access food.	25	11	18
Trade barriers	Co-operation/ conflict	The increasing number and strength of trade barriers by many industrialized and BRIC countries affecting both open trade and disaster aid needed for resilience to shocks to major breadbaskets failures due to extreme events.	21	15	18
Increase in civil unrest	Co-operation/ conflict	Production losses and reduced resource bases and rising food prices as the result of extreme events increasing riots, civil unrest and armed conflict, especially in failed/unstable states.	18	19	18.5
Loss of subsistence capacity	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	The interplay between the scale transition to less farmers operating larger farms and reduction in subsistence farming, with increased market dependency for food, will lead to high exposure and food insecurity in the face of extreme events, especially for	26	13	19.5

Title	Class	Text	Rank (Impact)	Rank (Probability)	Mean Rank
		underprivileged and poorer communities.			
Loss of food sovereignty	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	The continued rise in corporate control of the food system and the inability to institutionalize and enforce The Right to Food will severely affect the livelihoods of low-income communities and hinder their access to healthy food in the face of extreme events.	24	16	20
Critical infrastructure disruption	Compound events	Damage to critical infrastructure and public utility systems, leaving millions of households affected by minor inconveniences (such as power outages of short duration) to more severe disruptions (such as extended loss of utilities and public services for days and weeks, and the long-term shut-down of bridges, roads, and other transportation networks), with significant disruptive impacts on food insecurity.	19	23	21
Multiple supply chain failures	Compound events	The correlated risk of extreme events throughout supply chains leading to simultaneous stressors on the production, stocking, transport, storage, and retail components of agricultural systems. This is particularly problematic if 'choke points' are affected.	15	30	22.5
Climate skepticism	Co-operation/ conflict	An increase in climate skepticism hindering timely and effective implementation of adaptation and mitigation strategies.	20	25	22.5
Workforce heat stress	Other	Extreme heat and other climatic factors having adverse health impacts on farmers and crop workers, and negatively impacting food security both through productivity losses, and for the workers themselves through income loss or health detriments (e.g. from heat exposure or nocturnal working hours) .	32	18	25
Loss of human co-operation	Co-operation/ conflict	Further polarization of politics across a range of scales will lead to increasingly competitive rather than collaborative forms of governance between communities and countries, undermining co-operation at different levels in society.	22	28	25
Ageing farming populations	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	A growing age of farmers in agriculture and the lack of successors from younger generations creating severe difficulties for adaptation to extreme events.	29	22	25.5
Agricultural intensification	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Global trends of intensifying agricultural systems by conventional means (i.e. optimized for increased yields and calories) further increasing their susceptibility to climate extreme events.	31	21	26

Title	Class	Text	Rank (Impact)	Rank (Probability)	Mean Rank
Increased gender inequality	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Extreme events leading to exacerbation of existing gender inequality, which will entail substantial negative impacts for food security given womens key roles in agricultural production, and food provision within households.	28	27	27.5
Destabilization of pollution sources	Compound events	Threats from nuclear or other major industrial/pollution sources that are susceptible to extreme events severely damaging terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic resources simultaneously.	27	32	29.5
Increasing uncertainty and business risks associated with extreme events will lead to a lack of investment in agriculture, with negative consequences for the creation of globally sustainable and resilient food systems	Vulnerability/ adaptive capacity	Diminished agricultural investments resulting in negative consequences for the creation of globally sustainable and resilient food systems.	30	31	30.5