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DISAGREEMENT, INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY AND REFLECTION

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ABSTRACT. It is often suggested that responding to a disagreement with one's epistemic peer with anything less than conciliation (i.e., a downgrading of one's conviction in the contested proposition) is incompatible with the demands of intellectual humility. I argue that this is mistaken, and that on the most plausible conception of intellectual humility it can be entirely reasonable to stick to one's original judgement. What is required by intellectual humility, I claim, is further reflection on one's epistemic position with regard to the target proposition. Crucially, however, such reflection is not to be understood as being incompatible with continued conviction in the target proposition.

1. DISAGREEMENT AND DOGMATISM

When faced with a disagreement with someone who one takes to be roughly as knowledgeable about the subject matter at hand, it does seem natural to suppose that one ought to downgrade one's assessment of the target proposition, if only temporarily. After all, if one really does regard this other person really as an epistemic peer, then it seems to follow that they ought to be as well-placed to form a judgement about the target proposition as you are.¹ But if that's right, and they disagree with you, then that seems to suggest that one ought to now be at least somewhat doubtful of one's own judgement. Indeed, wouldn't sticking to one's opinion even despite the presence of this epistemic peer disagreement be simply *dogmatism* on one's part?

It is reasoning of this general sort that supplies one of the main sources of motivation for *conciliatory* views as regards the epistemology of peer disagreement. There are a range of different proposals of this kind, but what they share is the idea that when faced with an epistemic peer disagreement one should lower one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition.² If it is

indeed true that not responding in this fashion to an epistemic peer disagreement, and hence retaining one's confidence in the target proposition, is by its nature dogmatic, then the conciliatory view looks to be on strong ground. Dogmatism, after all, is an intellectual vice.

Call this general line of reasoning the *dogmatic motivation* for conciliationism as regards epistemic peer disagreement. I think that the dogmatic motivation should be resisted. What is key to resisting this train of argument is to recognise an important distinction that this reasoning glosses over. What is certainly true is that encountering an epistemic peer disagreement requires one to reflect on the nature of one's epistemic standing with regard to the target proposition. Engaging in reflection in this way is how one avoids the intellectual vice of dogmatism. Crucially, however, engaging in such reflection does not demand that one should in the process downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition. This might be an *outcome* of this reflection, of course, but the crux of the matter is that merely being prompted to engage in this process of reflection does not demand such a downgrading by itself. Furthermore, as I will explain, the fact that reflection on one's epistemic standing with regard to the target proposition is compatible with maintaining one's conviction in that proposition in no way indicates that such reflection is fake or otherwise undertaken in bad faith. As we will see, appreciating this point requires us to better understand the nature of the intellectual virtue that we are aiming to manifest when avoiding dogmatism, which is *intellectual humility*. Properly understood, while intellectual humility demands reflection in response to epistemic peer disagreement, it doesn't demand a downgrading of one's confidence in the target proposition. As a result, one of the principal motivations for conciliatory views as regards epistemic peer disagreement is shown to be of dubious pedigree.

2. DOGMATISM, OPEN-MINDEDNESS AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

In order to properly understand the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism, we need to clarify what is meant by dogmatism and, relatedly, what it would take for an inquirer not to be dogmatic. The dogmatic motivation helps itself to the idea that merely maintaining one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in light of an epistemic peer disagreement is dogmatic, but this is far too quick. I take it as uncontroversial that someone who is open-minded is thereby not dogmatic. Indeed, one might plausibly argue that open-mindedness is the intellectual trait that is opposed to being dogmatic, though we don't quite need this strong a claim for our purposes. (As we will see below, there are reasons to be cautious here anyway once we bring in intellectual humility, an intellectual trait that might be distinct from open-mindedness, and which is also plausibly opposed to dogmatism). All that matters for us is that if one is open-minded, then one is

not dogmatic.

So what does being open-minded demand of an agent? Well, it certainly involves being willing to listen to the views of another person, within reason, and being willing to explain one's own standpoint, again within reason. I say 'within reason', since I take it that no-one will dispute that one is failing to be open-minded by refusing to listen to the presentation of the very same view repeatedly, or by refusing to keep repeating why one holds one's position. How far one can stretch the 'within reason' *caveat* is an interesting issue, but we can set it aside for our purposes here. This is because we are concerned with epistemic peer disagreement, and hence we can reasonably take it that one's disagreement is with someone who is not going to be making these excessive (and pointless) intellectual demands on one.

Note that being willing to listen to the reasons others can provide for their conflicting viewpoints, and being willing to explain one's own reasons for thinking as one does, is entirely compatible with maintaining one's stance as regards the subject matter in question. Accordingly, one does not get a basis for the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism from simply appealing to the absence of this feature of open-mindedness. Still, one might argue that open-mindedness demands more than merely the willingness to intellectually engage with others in this way, in that it also demands a willingness to reflect on one's epistemic position as a result of this exchange, and to change one's opinion if necessary as a result. This further demand seems particularly relevant when it comes to epistemic peer disagreements, given that we are taking it as given that your opponent is at least as epistemically well-situated with regard to the subject matter as you are. Doesn't this further element of open-mindedness provide the necessary basis for the dogmatic motivation?

Not quite. To begin with, notice that merely being willing to reflect on the epistemic standing of one's commitment to the target proposition is entirely compatible with retaining that commitment to the same degree as before. Even regarding commitments about which we have previously reflected upon, and so already have a reasonable handle on their epistemic basis, it seems good epistemic practice to be willing to revisit that basis in light of an epistemic peer disagreement. Reflection of this sort thus does seem to be required of the open-minded individual (it is even more required if one hasn't previously reflected on why one has this commitment, or has done so half-heartedly). But one can quite properly manifest reflection of this kind without actually changing one's opinions at all. Perhaps one reflects on the epistemic standing of one's commitment and finds everything entirely in order? Surely then one should stick to one's previous assessment. Moreover, one can undertake this process without as a result downgrading one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition, or otherwise suspending judgement about it. Reflecting on the nature of one's epistemic commitments need not entail either strategy. (Our

opponent will no doubt protest at such point that unless such reflection leads to a downgrading of one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition, then it is somehow fake or otherwise in bad faith. We will return to this further issue below).

Of course, this process of reflection might well lead one to change one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition, including downgrading that assessment (perhaps even to the point of abandoning it). But note that it might also lead to one *upgrading* one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition. Perhaps in reflecting on the epistemic basis for one's commitment to this proposition one comes to realise that it is far better grounded than one thought, and hence that one ought to have had more confidence in its truth than previously, even despite the presence of the epistemic peer disagreement. This point is important, since it reminds us that while reflection can lead to a change in one's epistemic assessments, this change need not necessarily be a negative one.

Moreover, the key word here is 'can'. For the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism to work, it is important that there is a stronger claim in play—*viz.*, that not merely *might* one be led to downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition, but that one *must*. But we don't get this stronger claim from simply reflecting on open-mindedness as an absence of dogmatism. One's open-mindedness will lead one to reflect on one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition as a result of the epistemic peer disagreement. And in doing so, one might be led to change that assessment, including negatively. But there is no straightforward way of getting from open-mindedness to the claim that one must downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in the light of an epistemic peer disagreement.

I now want to motivate a (potentially at least) slightly stronger claim in this regard. This is that there is nothing essentially contrary to the demands of good intellectual character that one maintains one's commitment to the target proposition in the light of epistemic peer disagreement. Whether this claim is potentially stronger depends on how one conceives of open-mindedness in relation to good intellectual character. In particular, is open-mindedness an intellectual virtue? Some have claimed that it is, in which case being open-minded is part of the requirements of good intellectual character, and hence we are not making a stronger claim here at all, at least insofar as the manifestation of good intellectual character that is relevant to avoiding dogmatism is that of displaying one's open-mindedness. In particular, in maintaining that open-mindedness doesn't require one to downgrade one's epistemic assessments in the light of epistemic peer disagreements, we are also thereby claiming that good intellectual character doesn't require this either.

That said, I'm inclined to think that there is some clear blue water between open-mindedness and the demands of intellectual character. In particular, I'm not convinced that open-

mindedness is an intellectual virtue. At least, I think there is an intellectual virtue in the vicinity of the traits characteristic of the open-minded, and it isn't clear to me that being open-minded should be identified with this intellectual virtue. The intellectual virtue that I have in mind is *intellectual humility*.³ Intellectual humility is a trait that is also naturally described as being opposed to dogmatism, at least to the extent that the intellectually humble will not be dogmatic.⁴ Relatedly, the intellectually humble are also naturally described as being open-minded. So there is a natural fit between intellectual humility and open-mindedness. Perhaps they are the same general intellectual virtue, but there are some grounds for doubt on this score.

One overarching reason for not identifying the two traits as being a single intellectual virtue is that open-mindedness doesn't seem to essentially involve the kinds of motivational states that are characteristic of intellectual virtues. Like virtues more generally, intellectual virtues are not merely dispositions to behave in certain ways, but more specifically dispositions that are rooted in appropriate motivational states. When it comes to the intellectual virtues, I take this to include a love of the truth. So, for example, two people might display the same dispositions related to being intellectually humble, but one of them behaves in this way because of their love for the truth while the other behaves in this way for merely strategic reasons—perhaps, for example, she has worked out that such behaviour is useful in furthering one's academic career. Crucially, only the agent who has the relevant motivational states is exhibiting a genuine intellectual virtue.

This point is important for our purposes because it seems that one can manifest the dispositions that are characteristic of being open-minded—such as listening to the views of others, offering one's own reasons for believing as one does, being willing to reflect on one's reasons, and so on—even while lacking the motivational states associated with intellectual virtues. In particular, couldn't one be open-minded for purely strategic reasons? For example, imagine a scientist who is open-minded not because they have any great concern for the truth, but rather because they recognise that getting to the truth—and in particular getting to the truth in a way that others will describe as open-minded—can bring with it all kinds of practical benefits, such as prestige, greater earnings, and so on. Their concern for the truth, we might say, is purely instrumental, as opposed to the non-instrumental, or final, valuing of the truth that is distinctive of the intellectually virtuous. There seems no essential tension in regarding such a person as genuinely open-minded, even while granting that they lack intellectual virtue.

We will consider a second reason for doubting that open-mindedness is the same as intellectual humility in a moment, once we have clarified what the latter involves. What is important about the present objection to taking the two as being identical is that it doesn't trade on any particular account of what intellectual humility is, but only on what an intellectual virtue more generally demands. Put more carefully, my point is that so long as open-mindedness can be

understood (as I think it can be) as a trait that doesn't essentially involve the motivational states associated with intellectual virtue, then it cannot be identified with the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility. That formulation leaves it open that one might wish to define open-mindedness in such a way that motivational states are also required, in which case there would be no objection on this score at least for treating the intellectual trait now being described as an intellectual virtue. (Though even then I think it is important to keep the general idea of open-mindedness, construed in such a way that it can be employed purely strategically, apart from the more specific idea of open-mindedness that brings with it the characteristic motivational states of an intellectual virtue).

Insofar as intellectual humility and open-mindedness are both opposed to dogmatism, and yet can come apart as intellectual traits, we really need to determine what the former demands, particularly since this is now the leading contender of the two to represent the demands of intellectual character (on account of being a genuine intellectual virtue). This point is especially pressing because there are certain ways of thinking about intellectual humility such that it would immediately entail a downgrading of one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement. If that were so, then the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism would obviously be immediately back in business. Fortunately for our purposes, however, this way of thinking about intellectual humility is not at all plausible on closer inspection, though in order to understand this point we need to work out how best to understand this intellectual virtue.⁵

3. INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY

One can see the surface attraction of the idea that intellectual humility demands that one should downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in light of an epistemic peer disagreement. After all, one might well imagine that what humility in general requires is having a downgraded assessment of oneself, in terms of one's abilities, achievements and so on.⁶ Accordingly, wouldn't it follow that intellectual humility should likewise demand that one should adopt a generally downgraded assessment of one's intellectual self, in terms of one's intellectual abilities, one's intellectual achievements and so on, and hence accordingly be willing to downgrade one's epistemic assessment of one's beliefs also?

Even if one grants the plausibility of this conception of intellectual humility, note that it doesn't really help defenders of the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism. After all, the idea behind the dogmatic motivation was that there was something about the nature of epistemic peer

disagreements which meant that, if one was to avoid dogmatism anyway, then one should downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition. But this account of intellectual humility is demanding the downgrading one's epistemic assessments across the board, and hence we lose the idea that this downgrading is meant to be the specific result of responding appropriately to an epistemic peer disagreement. At most, the support lent to the dogmatic motivation by this conception of intellectual humility is that one should be *especially* inclined to downgrade one's epistemic assessments in light of an epistemic peer disagreement. But insofar as one already has a downgraded epistemic assessment of the target proposition, then that is compatible with one *not* in fact further downgrading that assessment in light of an epistemic peer disagreement, contrary to what conciliationism demands.

In any case, this way of thinking about (intellectual) humility is far from being credible. For notice that it in effect demands *inaccuracy* in the subject's judgements. After all, this downgrading is meant to occur regardless of whether one's original judgements were correct or not. The humble person may well have achieved great things in her life, but on this view the facts of the matter hardly count, in that she should nonetheless have a downgraded assessment of these achievements.⁷ I find the idea that virtue in general could demand inaccuracy very implausible. But it is even more implausible that intellectual virtue could demand inaccuracy, given that the intellectual virtues are characterised, in significant part, by a love for the truth.⁸ Indeed, notice that if an intellectual virtue can demand inaccurate beliefs on the part of the subject, then it would follow that having accurate beliefs can be the manifestation of an intellectual vice.

Putting this proposal to one side, let us consider accounts of intellectual humility that don't demand inaccuracy in our beliefs. There are two main accounts in this regard, neither of which, as we will see, enable us to formulate a case for the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism. Consider first the most popular of these views, which is the idea that one should 'own' one's fallibility. According to this proposal, intellectual humility involves having a correct assessment of one's intellectual achievements and cognitive abilities, and thereby recognising one's inherent intellectual limitations.⁹

Crucially, however, one can satisfy this conception of intellectual humility while nonetheless retaining one's commitment to the target proposition in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement. For suppose that one reflects on one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in response to this disagreement and finds that it is entirely sound. Couldn't one simultaneously recognise one's intellectual frailty and yet nonetheless not downgrade one's epistemic assessment of this proposition as a result? For sure, one might well be more inclined to downgrade one's assessment as a result of the epistemic peer disagreement if one is acutely aware of one's intellectual failings. But the point remains that one can manifest intellectual humility on

this proposal while nonetheless retaining one's commitment in the target proposition in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement. And that is contrary to what conciliationism demands.

Similarly, one cannot use the other main account of intellectual humility in the literature to ground the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism. According to this proposal, intellectual humility is not to be primarily understood in terms of how one judges oneself (whether accurately or otherwise), but rather in terms of how one intellectually treats others. In particular, on this view intellectual humility will involve lacking the characteristic dispositions involved in excessive intellectual self-regard, such as conceit, intellectual arrogance, and so on. Conversely, it will involve manifesting such dispositions as an openness to other people's viewpoints, a willingness to listen to counterevidence, and the inclination to change one's mind if the facts require it, where such dispositions are rooted in appropriate motivational states (i.e., a genuine intellectual respect for others, and a love of the intellectual good of truth more generally).¹⁰

This 'non-egotist' account of intellectual humility does not provide support for the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism. One can display the characteristic other-regarding dispositions on this view, rooted in the associated motivational states, while nonetheless maintaining one's commitment to the target proposition in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement. It does follow from this proposal that one is required to intellectually engage with one's epistemic peers when there are such disagreements, and this will also involve a willingness to reflect on one's own epistemic position in this regard. Relatedly, one should be willing to change one's opinions if the facts demand it. But none of this entails that one must downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition.

For what it is worth, although the non-egotist view is not as popular as the owning one's limitations view in the contemporary literature, I find that it is the more plausible of the two (not that this matters much for our purposes, given that neither can be used to motivate the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism).¹¹ The reason for this is that it seems to me that one can fully embrace one's fallibility and yet fail to be intellectually humble. In particular, if one is genuinely intellectually superior to those around one, and one recognises this fact, then what would preclude one from owning one's intellectual limitations while nonetheless behaving in intellectually superior ways to those around one (e.g., belittling their opinions, and so on)?¹² And yet such conduct does not seem compatible with intellectual humility at all. In contrast, notice that this behaviour would not count as intellectually humble according to the non-egotist account as even the (knowingly) intellectually superior person will be required to intellectually respect others, and that will mean not acting in intellectually arrogant ways to those around them.

This point also highlights another way in which intellectual humility can come apart from open-mindedness, at least on the non-egotist conception of the former anyway. We noted earlier

that open-mindedness doesn't demand that one should be willing to repeatedly defend one's position in response to the very same objections, or be willing to repeatedly listen to the arguments for the very same view. In fact, it isn't at all clear that being open-minded obliges one to listen to the presentation of a position even a second time, let alone 'repeatedly'. Being open-minded means being willing to listen to different views, and being willing to defend one's own view in response to those different views, but once that process is completed, there doesn't seem to be any obligation to repeat it. In particular, if it is clear that what is being presented as an opposing view is a position that one has previously examined, then there seems nothing at all close-minded about declining to engage with it, and hence sticking to one's opinions regardless.

Such cases aren't relevant to epistemic peer disagreements because we can reasonably take these disagreements to concern opposing views that are being raised for the first time, not least because if there is a history of taking opposing positions as regards the subject matter in hand, then that would lessen the temptation to regard each other as epistemic peers. But these cases are important for distinguishing between open-mindedness and intellectual humility, for it seems the intellectually humble person would be willing to intellectually engage with an opponent even if this is ground that has previously been covered. There will no doubt be limits to this, of course—at some point there will clearly be nothing gained by carrying on an intellectual engagement of this kind. But the point is that there does seem to be an obligation for the intellectually humble to at least rerun an intellectual engagement of this sort, whereas there seems no such obligation imposed by open-mindedness. Again, then, we find that intellectual humility is a more demanding feature of intellectual character, which shouldn't be surprising given our earlier point that it is an intellectual virtue. Open-mindedness seems to be more of a necessary condition for intellectual humility rather than being an intellectual virtue in its own right.

In any case, notice that the non-egotist account of intellectual humility is ideally placed to account for this feature of what intellectual humility demands (but which isn't demanded by open-mindedness). On this view one manifests one's intellectual respect for others by being willing to reengage with opponents in just this fashion. The matter is clearly important to them, which is why they are raising it again, and hence one manifests one's intellectual humility by being willing to open up the discussion as to why they believe what they do, and why one does not agree with these judgements. In contrast, how is the owning one's intellectual limitations account of intellectual humility to explain this phenomenon? After all, isn't it enough to manifest one's owning of one's intellectual limitations that one fully engages with one's opponent's views? But why then should there be any obligation to *re*-engage with those views thereafter? That we do think that intellectual humility demands such reengagement is thus a further reason to prefer the non-egotist account of this intellectual virtue over the owning one's intellectual limitations

account.

4. VIRTUOUS REFLECTION

So far our critique of the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism has turned on whether, after reflecting on one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition in light of an epistemic peer disagreement, one is obliged to downgrade this epistemic assessment. The proponent of the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism will no doubt protest that to put the matter this way is to gloss over what is really important to this debate. For isn't the real issue whether one should downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition *before* the process of reflection kicks-in rather than after? That is, shouldn't one downgrade one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition, or otherwise suspend judgement in it, while this reflection is taking place?

We noted above that we can at least make sense of the idea of genuinely reflecting on one's epistemic assessment of a proposition without thereby downgrading that assessment. But we also noted that there is a potential challenge here that ultimately this position is unsustainable, on the grounds that unless the reflection goes hand-in-hand with a downgrading, even if temporarily, of one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition (if not a suspension of judgement in this regard), then the reflection in play is somehow fake and hence not genuine at all. Now is the time to revisit this claim, for if it were true then it would undermine our critique of the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism. After all, it would be enough for this line of argument if it results in even a temporary downgrading of one's epistemic assessment of the target proposition as the period of reflection is undertaken.

We can give a specific spin to this line of objection by setting it within the non-egotist account of intellectual humility. For one might argue that if intellectually engaging with others in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement in the manner demanded by the non-egotist account doesn't lead to even a temporary downgrading (or even suspending) of one's judgement in the target proposition, then this isn't a genuine intellectual engagement at all, but rather just someone going through the motions. As one might put it, one is merely patronising one's adversary rather than intellectually engaging with them in good faith, and that can hardly be the manifestation of good intellectual character. Real intellectual engagement of the kind demanded by intellectual humility, and the reflection that is associated with it, must thus be accompanied with a corresponding downgrading or suspension of judgement.

Rather than exacerbating the problem, however, bringing in the non-egotist account of intellectual humility in fact highlights how one should respond to this problem. This is because the

description just offered of how the intellectually humble person engages with others leaves out a crucial element. This is the motivational component. Recall that intellectual humility, like virtues more generally, demands not just certain characteristic dispositions but moreover that these dispositions are rooted in appropriate motivational states. We noted above that when it comes to the intellectual virtues, the relevant motivational state is a love of the truth, where this treats the truth as a final, non-instrumental good, rather than being merely a means to a further end. Since intellectual humility is an intellectual virtue, then it will also involve this motivational state. But like many other virtues that are the intellectual aspect of a more general virtue (e.g., intellectual courage, as opposed to courage more generally), intellectual humility doesn't just involve the intellectual motivation of the love of the truth, but also the relevant motivational states associated with the general virtue in question, in this case humility. When it comes to the non-egotist account of intellectual humility, these other motivations will be a concern for others of a kind that one would expect to find in the humble person more generally. We thus get a blend of motivational states at issue with regard to intellectual humility, involving both concern for others and a love of the truth, where both are valued non-instrumentally. The result is an intellectual concern for others, for their reasons, and in turn a willingness to expose and explain one's own contrary reasoning.¹³

If this is the right way to think about the process of virtuous reflection in play when the intellectually humble person rationally engages with others in the context of an epistemic peer disagreement, then there is clearly nothing fake about our protagonist's behaviour. In particular, the presence of the relevant motivational states, and specifically a love of both the truth and a concern for others, would exclude such fakery by definition.

One might naturally respond to this line, however, by wondering why we should characterise what the intellectually humble person is doing in these encounters with her disagreeing epistemic peer as *reflection*, specifically. Indeed, this point is particularly pressing on the non-egotist view, since the very other-directed nature of intellectual humility on this conception means that what the subject is doing seems to lack the interior focus characteristic of reflection. This worry trades on a faulty way of understanding the non-egotist account of intellectual humility, however. For while this intellectual virtue is indeed (on this view) primarily other-focussed rather than ego-centric in its manifestation, this does not preclude one reflecting on the epistemic standing of one's commitments. Indeed, the very point is that in intellectually respecting others, and the truth more generally, one will be inclined to rehearse, and thereby further reflect on, one's reasons for holding the claims that one makes. (Remember too that while this account of intellectual humility demands a concern for others, it also demands, as with all intellectual virtues, a love of the truth). What's important to the view is that what motivates this reflection is an outer-

directed concern, but the outer-directed nature of the concern does not prevent this from being a genuine process of reflection.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have argued that one can resist the dogmatic motivation for conciliationism in the epistemology of disagreement. In particular, there need be nothing essentially dogmatic about sticking to one's intellectual guns in response to an epistemic peer disagreement. Indeed, I've claimed that on the most plausible, non-egotist, account of intellectual humility available, such a response can be in keeping with the demands of good intellectual character. What is demanded is virtuous reflection, as part of a wider rational engagement with the other party. But one can accept this point without thereby being committed to conciliationism.¹⁴

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NOTES

¹ For more on the notion of epistemic peerhood, see Kelly (2005) and Matheson (2015).

² For some prominent defences of (versions of) conciliationism, see Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), and Feldman (2007).

³ I take it as reasonably uncontroversial that intellectual humility is a genuine intellectual virtue, but for some pushback on this claim, see Bloomfield (2017*a*; cf. Bloomfield 2017*b*).

⁴ The more natural way to express the ‘opposing’ trait to intellectual humility, at least to the extent that we are talking about an intellectual vice of deficit (rather than the corresponding intellectual vice of excess), would be *intellectual arrogance*. Still, the intellectually arrogant are surely also inclined to be dogmatic, so the point still holds.

⁵ For two recent discussions of open-mindedness, see Riggs (2010) and Baehr (2011). See also Battaly (2018), who takes the interesting line that closed-mindedness can in certain conditions be an intellectual virtue.

⁶ Driver (1989) seems to suggest such a view, at least as regards the supposed virtue of modesty.

⁷ See Driver (1989) for a defence of the virtue of modesty as involving inaccuracy, though note she also distinguishes between modesty and humility in this regard, and suggests that the latter might not involve inaccuracy. See also Brennan (2007) for a related proposal (though here it is not inaccuracy as such but rather holding oneself to higher standards than one would ever hold others too).

⁸ One might plausibly argue that the awkwardness of conceiving of any virtues, intellectual or otherwise, as demanding inaccuracy is parasitic on the point that the intellectual virtues involve a love for the truth. After all, if one holds that the virtues are broadly integrated traits, to the extent that, for example, one cannot develop the intellectual virtues without thereby developing the moral or practical virtues, then it will be hard to make sense of even non-intellectual virtues in ways that demand inaccuracy.

⁹ For two important developments of this type of account of intellectual humility in the recent literature, see the *doxastic* proposal offered by Church (2016) and the *limitations-owning* proposal offered by Whitcomb *et al* (2016). Note, however, that there are important differences between these two proposals, though they are not relevant for our current purposes. For a useful discussion of these differences, see Barrett & Church (2016).

¹⁰ See Roberts & Wood (2003; 2007) for two important defences of this approach. See also Priest (2016), Tanesini (2016), Kallestrup & Pritchard (2017), and Pritchard (*forthcominga*, *forthcomingb*).

¹¹ Indeed, I have explicitly defended the view—see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2017) and Pritchard (*forthcominga*, *forthcomingb*).

¹² For a development of this objection to the owning one’s limitations view, see Pritchard (*forthcomingb*).

¹³ Note that alternative views of intellectual humility will naturally go hand-in-hand with corresponding accounts of humility in general. So one would expect an owning one’s intellectual limitations account of intellectual humility to go together with an owning one’s limitations account of humility. I explore the more general question of the nature of humility and how it relates to accounts of intellectual humility in Kallestrup & Pritchard (2017).

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