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Mimesis as Metamorphosis in Classical Greek Literature

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction

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by

Zachary Borst

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Mimesis as Metamorphosis in Classical Greek Literature

by

Zachary Borst

Doctor of Philosophy in Classics

University of California, Los Angeles, 2021

Professor Alex Purves, Chair

The aim of my dissertation is to trace an intellectual and theoretical trend in classical Greek literature and philosophy that ironizes and theorizes dramatic mimesis as transformative. The texts I will examine in my dissertation are *loci classici* for thinking about ancient literary criticism (e.g. Aristophanes' *Frogs*) as well as mimesis (Plato's *Republic*), and the originality of my project lies in bringing these texts together in order to think through a cluster of related concepts: mimesis, the body, and being and becoming. I will show show that the literary texts of Aristophanes and Euripides, in particular, shed light on dramatists' views of mimesis, and I argue that they offer an alternative to the view of mimesis in *Republic* Book 10 as an image impoverished of being and knowledge. In Aristophanes and Euripides putting on a costume can change one's bodily comportment and ultimately one's character and behavior.

By sketching a history of mimesis that precedes the work of Plato and Aristotle, my project brings out an alternative view of mimesis. I read the language surrounding mimesis in

Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato closely in order to show how mimesis is put into conversation with important thematic binaries such as being/becoming and seeming/being. Mimesis is often depicted not merely as a disguise or copy, but as a transformational force that affecting poets, actors, and audiences. By unpacking the depth and diversity of the discourses surrounding mimesis, we can see that it is connected to other topics in the intellectual revolution of the 5th c. BCE, such as *nomos* and *physis* and the development and profusion of rhetoric.

In the dissertation I use the term "mimetic metamorphosis" to convey this notion of mimesis as metamorphosis. "Mimetic metamorphosis" is a helpful term because it covers both the scenes that depict poets or characters becoming or representing different people (such as Dicaeopolis becoming Telephus in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*) and the theoretical discourse surrounding these scenes. In order for authors of literary works to theorize mimesis as transformational, the scenes in which these transformations are depicted are often highly metatheatrical. This allows for commentary on the nature of mimesis. Thus, "mimetic metamorphosis" applies both to the metamorphoses that are represented through the enactment of dramatic mimesis and to the metatheatrical, often ironic, commentary surrounding mimesis as a transformative force. Characters draw attention to the costumes, gestures, and language they put on to appear like another, and the language surrounding these scenes reveals a concerted interest in recurrent themes of being and becoming, often with reference to the words εἰμί ("be") and γίγνομαι ("become").

Ultimately, my aim with this project and the term mimetic metamorphosis is to revise the view of mimesis as a mere imitation or copy that is inherited from Book 10 of Plato's *Republic*. I trace these alternative views of mimesis in order to show that there is a rich conception of mimesis prior to Plato and that this discussion has an undercurrent in Plato's poetics. My project

offers new insights into the texts in question as well as ancient literary criticism and mimesis. By placing these texts in conversation with each other, I argue that Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato theorize that mimetic poetry is a medium affecting authors, performers, and audiences in a similar way. By imitating a character and taking on that character's defining traits, one differs from the person one was before. This kind of transformation and self-likening to another also allows for one to empathize with a fictional character. By reading for the literary representation and theorization of mimesis, or "mimetic metamorphosis," I argue that classical Greek literature views poetry as an affective, transformational force that challenges being and notions of the self.

The dissertation of Zachary Borst is approved.

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For Anneke.

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possible without the friendship and support of my wife, Anneke, who inspired me to learn ancient Greek.

VITA

Zachary Borst's research interests include archaic and classical Greek literature, aesthetics, and critical theory. He received his B.A. *cum laude* in English, with minors in History and Classical Languages, from Concordia University Irvine in 2012. He received an M.A. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Riverside in 2014. He received an M.A. in Classics from the University of California, Los Angeles in 2017. As a graduate student at UCLA he has received awards for his research and teaching. He has presented papers at the annual meetings of the Society for Classical Studies, the Pacific and Ancient Modern Language Association, and the California Classical Association. He expects to receive his Ph.D. in Classics from UCLA in 2021.

Introduction

I. Abstract

The aim of my dissertation is to trace an intellectual and theoretical trend in classical Greek literature and philosophy that ironizes and theorizes dramatic mimesis as transformative. The texts I will examine in my dissertation are *loci classici* for thinking about ancient literary criticism (e.g. Aristophanes' *Frogs*) as well as mimesis (Plato's *Republic*), and the originality of my project lies in bringing these texts together in order to think through a cluster of related concepts: mimesis, the body, and being and becoming. I will show show that the literary texts of Aristophanes and Euripides, in particular, shed light on dramatists' views of mimesis, and I argue that they offer an alternative to the view of mimesis in *Republic* Book 10 as an image impoverished of being and knowledge. In Aristophanes and Euripides putting on a costume can change one's bodily comportment and ultimately one's character and behavior.

By sketching a history of mimesis that precedes the work of Plato and Aristotle, my project brings out an alternative view of mimesis. I read the language surrounding mimesis in Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato closely in order to show how mimesis is put into conversation with important thematic binaries such as being/becoming and seeming/being. Mimesis is often depicted not merely as a disguise or copy, but as a transformational force that affecting poets, actors, and audiences. By unpacking the depth and diversity of the discourses surrounding mimesis, we can see that it is connected to other topics in the intellectual revolution of the 5th c. BCE, such as *nomos* and *physis* and the development and profusion of rhetoric.

In the dissertation I use the term "mimetic metamorphosis" to convey this notion of mimesis as metamorphosis. "Mimetic metamorphosis" is a helpful term because it covers both the scenes that depict poets or characters becoming or representing different people (such as

Dicaeopolis becoming Telephus in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*) and the theoretical discourse surrounding these scenes. In order for authors of literary works to theorize mimesis as transformational, the scenes in which these transformations are depicted are often highly metatheatrical. This allows for commentary on the nature of mimesis. Thus, "mimetic metamorphosis" applies both to the metamorphoses that are represented through the enactment of dramatic mimesis and to the metatheatrical, often ironic, commentary surrounding mimesis as a transformative force. Characters draw attention to the costumes, gestures, and language they put on to appear like another, and the language surrounding these scenes reveals a concerted interest in recurrent themes of being and becoming, often with reference to the words εἰμί ("be") and γίγνομαι ("become").

Ultimately, my aim with this project and the term mimetic metamorphosis is to revise the view of mimesis as a mere imitation or copy that is inherited from Book 10 of Plato's *Republic*. I trace these alternative views of mimesis in order to show that there is a rich conception of mimesis prior to Plato and that this discussion has an undercurrent in Plato's poetics. My project offers new insights into the texts in question as well as ancient literary criticism and mimesis. By placing these texts in conversation with each other, I argue that Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato theorize that mimetic poetry is a medium affecting authors, performers, and audiences in a similar way. By imitating a character and taking on that character's defining traits, one differs from the person one was before. This kind of transformation and self-likening to another also allows for one to empathize with a fictional character. By reading for the literary representation and theorization of mimesis, or "mimetic metamorphosis," I argue that classical Greek literature views poetry as an affective, transformational force that challenges being and notions of the self.

II. Mimesis as Metamorphosis

Much work has been done on mimesis in classics as well as in literary theory. As a result, there is some ambiguity about the term. In my dissertation I define mimesis as "representation," especially dramatic representation, which encompasses the embodiment entailed in impersonation much better than the translation of mimesis as "imitation," which suggests a copy of a model rather than enactment.[1] The prefix *re-* of "representation" suggests something that is presented again (re-presented). The repetition inherent in representation allows for differences to arise both in the performance and in the viewing of the representation. Something novel arises out of representation because of this repetition.[2] Many of the scenes of mimetic metamorphosis in my dissertation examine how mimesis transforms characters and hybridizes them. In Aristophanes' *Frogs* the slave Xanthias impersonates Heracles, thereby reproducing an image of Heracles while also drawing attention to the differences between them. After donning the Heracles costume, Xanthias becomes "Heracleoxanthias," changing into someone slightly different from who he was before.

I situate my project in conversation with works on mimesis and ancient literary criticism such as Stephen Halliwell's *Aesthetics of Mimesis* (2002), in which Halliwell claims that the pre-Platonic use of the word mimesis has a broad variety of connotations but is not fixed as a literary and philosophical term until Plato (2002: 15, 37). James Porter's focus on the materiality of aesthetic experience in *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece* (2010) and Anastasia-Erasmia Peponi's work on affect in *Frontiers of Pleasure* (2012) have also influenced my thinking on mimesis as bodily transformation. My dissertation differs from work on ancient literary criticism

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[1] On history of translating mimesis as "imitation" and "representation," see Halliwell (2002: 13f.). On choral mimesis as embodied reenactment, see Nagy (2013: 227-56).

[2] Cf. Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*: "Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it" (1994: 70).

that begins with Plato and discounts treating the work of literary figures such as Aristophanes or Euripides as "criticism."[3] Even if we do not take Aristophanes to be a critic, he reveals something essential about conceptions of mimesis (and, in particular, tragic mimesis) in this period: representation through embodiment, performance, and composition can enable someone to empathize and merge with another person. By attending to the language of mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes and Euripides, I show that we can observe several recurrent themes and concerns surrounding mimesis in these literary works.

My treatment of mimesis differs from Erich Auerbach's monumental *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* ([1946] 2013) in one key respect—my interest in representation is not primarily in its realism. The subtitle of Auerbach's work shows the link of literary realism to mimesis. Many of the scenes I examine are *un*realistic, such as Euripides' *Bacchae*, which depicts the activities of a god in human form. In the seminal chapter of *Mimesis*, "Odysseus' Scar," Auerbach compares Homer's *Odyssey* with the Hebrew Bible in order to investigate the "literary representation of reality in European culture" (23). Through this comparison he sets up two basic styles for the representation of reality: 1) a fully externalized description, with all events in the foreground and few elements of historical development; and 2) the balance of elements in focus as well as those that are made obscure, with a deep background and claims to a universal history. Auerbach categorizes mimesis in the *Odyssey* as that of the first

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[3] E.g. Halliwell criticizes readings of Aristophanes' *Frogs* that claim the play makes a point about politico-ethical judgment of poetic values (2011: 98). Porter claims that Aristophanes is "best seen as a symptom of the age," not as a critic (2010: 261). Hunter begins with Aristophanes' *Frogs* and mostly reads it in relation to Aeschylean criticism (2019: 10-52). Else's chapter on Gorgias, Aristophanes, and Euripides primarily focuses on Aristophanes' representation of Euripides in *Frogs*, not on the comic poet's treatment of literary topics such as mimesis (1984: 80-106). On the criticism of poetry as part of song culture, cf. Ford (2002: 1-22). Telò shows how Aristophanes uses different textures, textiles, and affects to differentiate his work from other Old Comedy poets (2016: 1-23).

style because there is "no secret second meaning" (13). The reality represented in the Homeric poems is available on a surface level. Dramatic representation must be immediate, and in that sense is completely available to the viewer. But I aim to show in the body of the dissertation that the metatheatrical commentary and irony of Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato complicate understanding mimesis as a literary style that operates purely on the surface. Eurycleia recognizes Odysseus for his childhood wound, but his body is much more plastic than the recognition of the scar would have us believe. Athena changes Odysseus' body as well as his garments, and his false narrative helps to sell his role to his household. It is not until he can reveal the secret of his marriage bed to Penelope that she believes his identity.[4]

A quick example will show the difference in focus between my project and that of Auerbach's. According to the natural historian Pliny the Elder (1st c. CE), Zeuxis famously entered into a painting contest with Polygnotus to determine who was the superior painter. Zeuxis' entry into the competition was a painting of a bunch of grapes so realistic that it deceived a flock of birds, who pecked at the painting believing the grapes depicted therein were real.[5] Socrates in the *Republic* criticizes painting precisely because of this kind of illusionist mimesis:

> Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἡ γραφικὴ πεποίηται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις; (Pl. *Resp*. 10.598b1-4)
>
> "Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of appearance or of truth?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

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[4] On Odysseus' concurrent selves, see Dougherty (2015).

[5] This story is recorded by Pliny the Elder (Plin. *NH* 35.35.64-66). Cf. Mansfeld: "The story of Zeuxis's grapes reinforces this lesson. Representation—no matter how closely it approximates reality—remains a falsehood. To mistake the image for true form results in disappointment for the bird and humiliation for Zeuxis" (2007: 27).

Plato's Socrates grants the effect of realism present in *trompe l'oeil* painting, but relegates realism to the imitation of appearance. The interlocutor Glaucon responds in the affirmative to Socrates' question whether painting "is an imitation of appearance or of truth" (φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις, 10.598b3-4). As I show in the dissertation, mimesis can imitate and indeed transform being (τὸ ὄν), a possibility that Socrates excludes here. He offers to Glaucon the two options that mimesis imitates "that which is as it is" or "that which appears as it appears." While the literary and philosophical works I examine make use of visual art for their arguments concerning mimesis, I focus on mimesis as representation that occurs in the body, rather than in art. My dissertation raises the possibility that mimesis represents a combination of appearance and being. How can one's appearance affect one's being? To amend Socrates' question to Glaucon, does mimesis represent that which appears not as it appears but as it is? Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato all grapple with this question in varying ways.

Instead of focusing on narrative realism, then, my project takes on the depiction of the act of mimesis itself within a literary work. We find examples of representation such as a character putting on a costume, a poet discussing his strategies at composition, or an audience empathizing with the actions of characters like them. Affect intersects representation in interesting ways because the trademark emotions of poetry, such as fear, requires a recognition that a character is like oneself in some way.[6] This situates mimesis in the body much more than when we consider mimesis as illusion. Thus, my interest is both in mimesis as an action or process and in how it is theorized within literature and philosophy of the classical period. I argue that we can see that mimesis is tied to questions of being and becoming from the start of these discussions in classical Greek literature.

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[6] Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 13.1453a2-7.

With this view in mind, mimesis is not so much an image of an image of the truth, as in the *Republic*, nor does it have much to bear on realism.[7] Instead, I claim that mimesis has a bearing on identity and referentiality. Mimesis interacts with being and becoming, where being is often depicted as the result of becoming. As I show, this view of mimesis is sketched out in metatheatrical contexts that allow for reflection and commentary on the dramatic and literary context. For example, Old Comedy's flexibility as a genre, namely that it can both dramatize present issues and directly address the audience, allows Aristophanes and his characters to discuss and criticize tragedy as a medium of poetic representation.[8] Gregory Dobrov claims that metatheater can be read in mutually-constructive ways that examines "deep structure" of the larger frame, e.g. City Dionysia (15).[9] Euripides and Plato write in dramatic forms (tragedy and dialogue) and comment on this power of poetry through metatheater as well.[10]

By surveying the works of Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato, I show the developing discussions of mimetic metamorphosis over the classical period (5th–4th c. BCE). It is useful to read these authors together not only because they write on similar themes but also because of their allusions to each other, showing how the idea of mimetic metamorphosis is adopted and adapted by each author. Much work has already been done on the special relationship between

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[7] E.g., Pl. *Resp.* 10.598a1-3.

[8] Cf. Rosen: "It was left to comic poets, therefore, to serve as public commentators on contemporary tragedy, not so much because any of them—even Aristophanes—necessarily had anything resembling a coherent critical agenda or aesthetic mission, but because it has always been the business of comedy to poke and prod at precisely those aspects of a society which appear to be most stable and authoritative" (2005: 265).

[9] Ultimately this creates a *mise en abyme*. More than exposing duplicity of drama, metafiction amplifies the theatricality of the scene by structuring it like a performance (Dobrov 2001: 23).

[10] For Euripides' awareness of literary precedents and metatheatrical commentary on them, in particular in the *Electra*, see Torrance (2011). For a reading of Plato's characters and dialogues as dramatic form, see Blondell (2002, esp. ch. 1).

Aristophanes and Euripides, for example.[11] Even in the classical period the references these two poets made to each other were commented upon by their contemporaries. Cratinus mocked Aristophanes' work for borrowing Euripidean phrasing and plot points and calls him a "Euripidaristophanizer." I claim that Plato, too, writes in response to Aristophanes' and Euripides' depictions of mimesis, in particular its capacity to arouse one's emotion and alter one's behavior.[12]

Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato locate mimetic metamorphosis in the body and mind, affecting not only poets and performers but audiences as well and transforming those who perform and experience it. My reading of mimesis as metamorphosis develops out of recent trends in classics, especially work on affect and New Materialism. James Porter's *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought in Ancient Greece* traces a history of the materialism of aesthetic experience in ancient Greek thought (2010). Part of this materialist bent includes classical scholars who situate their work on the emotions as part of the larger "affective turn" in the humanities and social sciences.[13] Porter himself aligns materialist aesthetics with feeling: "talk of sensation gives us a unique and privileged access to…'structures of feeling' in antiquity" (2010: 16). In his book on

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[11] E.g., Zuckerberg (2016) shows how Euripides self-consciously adopts the trope of the beggar in disguise in response to Aristophanes' *Acharnians*.

[12] E.g., the communist state Socrates sketches in *Republic* Book 5 may have been influenced to some extent by Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*. Views on this issue are mixed. Adam sketches the similarities between the two sources and thinks that Plato has Aristophanes and *Ecclesiazusae* in mind in *Rep*. Bk. 5 (1902: 345-55). According to Aristotle, Plato had no philosophical antecedents for this idea (*Pol*. 1266a, 1274b). Ussher finds it doubtful that Plato alludes to Aristophanes in (1973: xv-xx). Halliwell is more in favor of common source (1993: 224f.).

[13] E.g., Cairns has examined the Greeks' materialist conception of viewing and its relationship to emotion, in particular love and envy (2011).

textiles and affect in Aristophanes, Mario Telò adopts "affect as a material concept, a feeling transmissible from body to body" (2016: 15).[14]

Mimetic metamorphosis results not only in affective but material and physical changes. Characters experience change from the outside in when they put on a costume; they also are changed the from the inside out, resulting in new behaviors, gestures, and language. Much scholarly engagement on empathy and poetry turns to the *Republic* and debates whether performers and audiences empathize or sympathize (or neither) with characters represented in poetry.[15] Ismene Lada has argued that ancient Greek audiences were primed to respond to poetry with "empathetic transpositions of the 'self'" (1993: 112).[16] My dissertation does not seek to replicate Lada's claim that audiences respond empathetically. Instead, I trace the theorizations of mimetic metamorphosis, which includes a conception of losing oneself in another person's perspective and feeling another's pain (as opposed to simply "feeling for," or sympathy) in

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[14] In addition to books and articles that incorporate affect theory, there has been a number of recent publications on New Materialism in Classics. Telò and Mueller situate the affective turn within this broader scholarly trend (2018: 2). See the introduction to their edited volume on tragedy and materialism for a useful overview (1-15). In a similar vein, Porter engages with new materialism, speculative realism, and OOO and finds ancient counterparts to these theoretical discourses in a recent book chapter (2019: 189-209). For other classical work that incorporates affect and situates itself within New Materialism, see Chesi and Spiegel's edited volume *Classical Literature and Posthumanism* (2019); Canevaro on women as objects in Homer (2018); Gaifman and Platt on the embodied object (2018: 403-19); Bassi on materiality (2016); Mueller on objects and props in Greek drama (2016); and Purves on vibrant materialism and objects in Homer (2015: 75-94). For cognitivist approaches to classics, see the recent volume edited by Meineck, Short, and Devereaux (2019), especially the chapters on embodiment performance: Noel (2019: 297-309); Olsen (2019: 281-96); Varakis-Martin (2019: 310-27).

[15] Halliwell reads Book 3 of the *Republic* as positing an empathetic relationship for poets and performers, but in Book 10 claims that the audience sympathizes with characters, i.e. they do not empathize (2002: 80). On the other side of the spectrum, Lear claims that mimesis in the *Republic* is *only* concerned with appearances and thus requires no internal change of mind or beliefs (2011: 206).

[16] Lada claims there are typically two kinds of emotional response: 1) captivation, bewitchment, or transportation; and 2) empathy, identification, or sympathy (1993: 100).

comedy, tragedy, and philosophy.[17] I situate these questions in the *Republic* within the larger discussion of mimesis occurring in the classical period by examining earlier treatments of dramatic praxis in Aristophanes and Euripides.

III. Classical Greek Literature

The concerns of mimetic metamorphosis are in keeping with broader intellectual trends in the classical period, especially those of rhetoric. I claim that mimesis can transform characters in part because of the physical effect of putting on a costume or changing one's gestures. In this period there is already an interest in language because of its physical effects, such as the arousal of emotion. In Gorgias' rhetorical display piece *Encomium of Helen* (5th c. BCE), for example, he gives several reasons or causes to exculpate Helen for her affair with Paris and, ultimately, her role in the Trojan War.[18] The final cause Gorgias offers for her defense is language (λόγος):

> λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ, θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ· δύναται γὰρ καὶ φόβον παῦσαι καὶ λύπην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαρὰν ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ ἔλεον ἐπαυξῆσαι. (DK 82 B11.8)
>
> Language has a mighty capacity, despite its very small and invisible body, to accomplish supernatural effects, since it can put an end to fear, take away pain, introduce joy, and increase pity.[19]

Gorgias argues that if Paris resorted to persuasive language, then Helen must be found innocent because of language's powerful effects. Many of the "works" (lit. "very divine works," θειότατα ἔργα) that language accomplishes in this passage are related to affect: Gorgias claims that language can take away negative feelings of fear and pain, produce joy in an individual, and

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[17] Cf. Cairns on "feeling with" vs. "feeling for" (2015: 85).

[18] The causes are four in total: 1) the gods, 2) physical force, 3) love, and 4) speech/language (DK 82 B11.6). On the mixture of genres in this speech (encomium, defense speech, and "plaything"), see Porter (1993: 274). Porter argues that even the causes for Helen's departure become difficult to separate from one another (274f.).

[19] All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

increase one's sense of pity or empathy.[20] Gorgias treats language as a physical force with a "very small and invisible body" (σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ), much like an atom.[21] Gorgias utilizes his typically playful style by repeating with same variation the cognates ἔργα ("works") and the denominative verb ἐνεργάζεσθαι ("work in") to show that language is powerful because it produces physical effects in the world, such as Helen leaving Menelaus.[22]

Gorgias defines poetry as language in meter, and, as a subset of language, poetry can also arouse emotions in its listeners.[23]

> ἧς [sc. ποιήσεως] τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρυς καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθής, ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή. (DK 82 B11.9)
>
> Terrified shuddering, tearful pity, and melancholic yearning invades poetry's listeners. The soul, through language, experiences its own particular emotion at the good and bad luck of both the affairs and bodies of others.

Those who listen to poetry may experience various feelings of terror, pity, and longing, but Gorgias claims that poetry also affects the body. The audience may shiver (φρίκη) or weep (lit. "very tearful," πολύδακρυς).[24] George Walsh writes that for Gorgias "words are experienced immediately as things"; they have a "psychically real" effect on the listener (1984: 83, 84). Just as

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[20] On pity verging on empathy, cf. Lada (1993: 101).

[21] Atoms are sometimes referred to as σώματα in Democritus (e.g., DK 68 A47).

[22] Gorgias diverges from Democritus here by focusing on the divine effect on the audience instead of the divine inspiration of the performer, but Democritus, too, treats language as physical. Cf. Segal (1962: 126). On Gorgias' treatment of Helen's body as a parallel to sophistic language because of its fluidity and persuasiveness, cf. Worman (1997: 171-80).

[23] Aristotle objects to classifying poetry by meter, treating it instead as a medium mimetic artists use: "Homer and Empedocles having nothing in common except meter. Therefore, it is right to call the former a poet, and the latter a natural philosopher rather than a poet." οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν (Arist. *Poet.* 1.1447b).

[24] Cf. Segal on the psychological and physiological elements of this passage (1962: 106). On the power of language and poetry in Gorgias, see Franz (1991: 240-48); de Romilly (1973: 155-62).

sound enters the ear, emotive responses to poetry come from without and invade (εἰσῆλθεν) the audience. The *Encomium of Helen* reveals a nascent literary theory of affect and poetry in the 5th-c. BCE that classical authors will elaborate upon.[25]

In Plato's *Ion*, one can see the affective and physical qualities of poetry situated in the bodies of performer and the audience. Socrates' simile of the magnetic chain accounts for more than an epistemological hierarchy that precludes Ion from technical knowledge.

> ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁρῶ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ ἔρχομαι γε σοι ἀποφανούμενος, ὅ μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο εἶναι. ἔστι γὰρ τοῦτο τέχνη μὲν οὐκ ὂν παρὰ σοὶ περὶ Ὁμήρου εὖ λέγειν, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, θεία δὲ δύναμις, ἥ σε κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ, ἣν Εὐριπίδης μὲν Μαγνῆτιν ὠνόμασεν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ Ἡρακλείαν. καὶ γὰρ αὕτη ἡ λίθος οὐ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς δακτυλίους ἄγει τοὺς σιδηροῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις, ὥστ' αὖ δύνασθαι ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖν ὅπερ ἡ λίθος, ἄλλους ἄγειν δακτυλίους, ὥστ' ἐνίοτε ὁρμαθὸς μακρὸς πάνυ σιδηρίων καὶ δακτυλίων ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἤρτηται· πᾶσι δὲ τούτοις ἐξ ἐκείνης τῆς λίθου ἡ δύναμις ἀνήρτηται. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἐνθέων τούτων ἄλλων ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται. (Pl. *Ion* 533c9-e5)[26]
>
> Socrates: I do see, Ion, and I am going to reveal to you what I think is happening here. For you do not have a skill to speak about Homer, which I was just saying, but a divine power which moves you, as in the stone which Euripides called Magnesian, but everyone else calls Heraclean. For in fact, this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also implants its power into those rings so that they too can perform this same task as the stone, i.e. attract other rings, so that sometimes a very long chain of iron rings hang from one another. The power depends on that stone for all these rings. So, too, the Muse herself inspires poets, but on these inspired poets depends a chain of others in the throw of inspiration.[27]

In addition to explaining how it is that Ion is inspired by, rather than knowledgeable of, Homer, Socrates' magnet analogy confers upon poetry, and therefore Ion, a persuasive power. As Maria-Silke Weineck puts it, Ion is not a "hermenut of meaning" but a "mediator of affect" (1998: 39).

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[25] Cf. Segal: Gorgias' "approach to…the emotional reaction to art, suggested and stimulated a line of development which proves highly fruitful in the fourth century and culminates as a full-blown 'scientific' theory in the *Poetics* of Aristotle" (1962: 134).

[26] Greek text of Plato's *Ion* from Burnet's OCT (1903).

[27] For brevity and clarity I translate ἡ λίθος ("the Heraclean stone") as "magnet."

A magnet can move iron and be drawn to it because of the emanations that come from both objects, and Ion, too, is as liable to be moved by the audience as he is to move them. In the dialogue, the titular rhapsode agrees that he is inspired when he discusses and interprets Homer. Socrates forecloses the possibility that Ion has knowledge of his subject when Ion admits that he feels the effects of the poems he recites.

> ΣΩ. Ἔχε δή μοι τόδε εἰπέ, ὦ Ἴων, καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ, ὅτι ἄν σε ἔρωμαι· ὅταν εὖ εἴπῃς ἔπη καὶ ἐκπλήξῃς μάλιστα τοὺς θεωμένους, ἢ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα ὅταν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐδὸν ἐφαλλόμενον ᾖδῃς, ἐκφανῆ γιγνόμενον τοῖς μνηστῆρσι καὶ ἐκχέοντα τοὺς ὠϊστοὺς πρὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἢ Ἀχιλλέα ἐπὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα ὁρμῶντα, ἢ καὶ τῶν περὶ Ἀνδρομάχην ἐλεινῶν τι ἢ περὶ Ἑκάβην ἢ περὶ Πρίαμον, τότε πότερον ἔμφρων εἶ ἢ ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίγνῃ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἴεταί σου εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ οἷς λέγεις ἐνθουσιάζουσα, ἢ ἐν Ἰθάκῃ οὖσιν ἢ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἢ ὅπως ἂν τὰ ἔπη ἔχῃ;
> ΙΩΝ. Ὡς ἐναργές μοι τοῦτο, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τεκμήριον εἶπες· οὐ γάρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἐλεεινόν τι λέγω, δακρύων ἐμπίπλανταί μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαὶ αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ.
>
> Socrates: Come and tell me this, Ion, and don't conceal what I ask you! Whenever you recite verses well and especially when you stun the spectators—either when you sing Odysseus as he leaps upon the threshold, becomes conspicuous to the suitors, and sheds forth his arrows before their feet, or Achilles when he rushes at Hector, or even some one of the pitiable events that happen to Andromache, Hekabe, or Priam—are you in your mind then or outside of yourself? And does your soul, inspired as it is, think it's at the events where you recite them, or at the events taking place in Ithaca or Troy or wherever the verses are about?
> Ion: How clearly you have told me this proof, Socrates! I will answer without hiding anything from you. For whenever I say something pitiable, my eyes fill up with tears. And whenever I say something fearful or terrible, my hair stands on end out of fear and my heart races. (Pl. *Ion* 535b1-c8)

The magnetic force of poetry affects the performer not only with poetic knowledge, but with the same emotions that an epic character would feel in Troy or Ithaca. Just like a magnet, poetry attracts and empowers each successive iron chain in the line of poetic production and performance (poet, performer, audience). Ion himself weeps at the pitiable and fearful elements in the Homeric poems. Socrates asks whether Ion is outside of himself (ἔξω σαυτοῦ γίγνῃ, 535b7-c1) during his performance. The verb γίγνομαι ("become") shows that the action of

reciting epic poetry affects Ion in some way, changing him so that he takes on the view of Odysseus or Achilles, becoming something more than just Ion the rhapsode for the duration of the performance. This verb is an important linguistic marker of mimetic metamorphosis that recurs throughout the texts under discussion in the dissertation.

This language of being outside oneself in relation to the emotions and imagination inspired by literature is used to describe Euripides in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. Euripides' slave explains to Dicaeopolis that his master is in the house, but "his mind is outside" (ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω, Ar. *Ach*. 398) in the midst of composition. Socrates aims to discredit Ion as an interpreter, but the rhapsode's visceral response to the poem as an affective force also marks him as present.[28] Plato uses the verb ἀποκρύπτω ("hide"; med. "hide from sight," "conceal") for lying and obfuscation in the discussion between Socrates and Ion. Socrates asks Ion to avoid hiding from answering truly (καὶ μὴ ἀποκρύψῃ, 535b1), and Ion responds: "I will answer without hiding anything from you" (οὐ γάρ σε ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐρῶ, 535c5). The verb ἀποκρύπτω can also be used of literary representation. In the *Frogs*, Aeschylus explains to Euripides that "the poet must conceal wickedness and must not introduce or teach it" (ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητήν, / καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν, Ar. *Ran*. 1053f.). The language of seeming that appears throughout these works implies that poetry in some sense conceals the truth of being, hence Socrates' desire for a transparent Ion. The request that Ion represent himself honestly

[28] Murray writes that Ion's response is unlike that of the poet: "The rhapsode—and he is a rhapsode, not a poet—*is* transported into the scenes he evokes, but in the *Iliad* it is the Muses who see the events of the past, not the bard. Furthermore, the ecstatic state of the rhapsode has no parallel in Homer: we are simply told that the Muses were present and saw the events" (1981: 93).

without concealing anything also reminds the reader of *Ion* that the dialogue is itself a dramatic form that requires some concealment, especially of the author Plato.[29]

After Ion describes how he is affected by poetry, Socrates tells Ion that he affects his audience in the same way. Ion discusses his view of the audience when he performs which gives us a bird's eye view of how mimetic metamorphosis can be transmitted both to the reciter and audience of poetry.

> ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν ὅτι καὶ τῶν θεατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑμεῖς ἐργάζεσθε;
> ΙΩΝ. Καὶ μάλα καλῶς οἶδα· καθορῶ γὰρ ἑκάστοτε αὐτοὺς ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος κλαίοντάς τε καὶ δεινὸν ἐμβλέποντας καὶ συνθαμβοῦντας τοῖς λεγομένοις. δεῖ γὰρ με καὶ σφόδρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν· ὡς ἐὰν μὲν κλαίοντας αὐτοὺς καθίσω, αὐτὸς γελάσομαι ἀργύριον λαμβάνων, ἐὰν δὲ γελῶντας, αὐτὸς κλαύσομαι ἀργύριον ἀπολλύς.
>
> Socrates: You know, then, that you also produce these same effects in many of the audience members?
> Ion: Yes, I know that very well. For every time I look down on them from the platform above, they're weeping, looking terrible, and astounded at what is being said. For I have to pay very close attention to them. Since, if I make them weep, I will laugh and take their money, but if I make them laugh, I will cry because I've lost my money. (Pl. *Ion* 535d8-e6)

Socrates leads us to think of Ion's recitation of poetry as a mode of relation like a magnet: Ion affects his audience with emotions like pity and fear when he sings and he is affected not only by the emotions of the poem but also by the audience's reaction (the next link in the chain) to his performance.[30] Ion is outside of himself when he performs Homer, but he must also pay close attention (σφόδρα…τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, 535e4) to his audience as he does so.[31]

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[29] On dramatic form of Plato's dialogues and the inaccessibility of the author, see Blondell 2002 (esp. ch. 1).
[30] Following Lord and Parry on oral composition as process-in-performance, Murray claims that "inspiration in oral epic poetry is inextricably connected with performance" (1981: 95).
[31] Becker argues that even in the midst of performance, not just in his explication of the Homeric poems, Ion must pay attention, and therefore uses his *nous*. This ambiguity may not redeem the rhapsode, however, but poke fun at the alternative that he is truly inspired (1993).

The affective relationship between Ion and his audience parallels Ion's visual perception of the audience and their view of him. Ion looks down (καθορῶ, 535e1) from the stage in order to gauge how his performance is going, and when Ion looks from his position above the audience (ἄνωθεν, 535e2), the audience looks back from below. Ion can empathize with the characters in the poems he recites and also be present for his performance.[32] Indeed, Ion enables his audience to undergo the same experience (ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἐργάζεσθε, 535d8-9) he undergoes when he is transported by the Homeric poems.[33]

While Gorgias and Plato do not use the word μίμησις ("representation," "imitation," "mimesis") in the passages above, their treatment of the affective and physical qualities of language, in particular poetry, look forward to a theory of mimetic metamorphosis.[34] Mimetic metamorphosis is not only a process of identification or feeling, but a transformative experience that can change a person for a moment as well as over time, informing their character and habits. Gorgias shows how poetry can cause the listener's soul to experience its own emotion (ἴδιόν τι πάθημα) at the fortune or misfortune affecting the bodies of others (ἀλλοτρίων). In scenes of mimetic metamorphosis, a character is often transformed by costume or language to such an extent that the division between self ("one's own," ἴδιος) and another (ἀλλότριος) becomes difficult to parse. Similarly, Plato's *Ion* presents the perspective of the inspired performer as

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[32] Dorter argues that participating in an aesthetic experience requires this sort of possibility of distraction (1973: 73). Cf. Lada: "…Greek theatre appears to be constructing for itself an 'implied' spectator who is *both* 'engaged' in the fiction *and* capable of penetrating it, *both* bewitched and ready to understand the subtle interplays of representation-levels, i.e. the ways in which they interact not only with each other but with non-fictional reality as well" (1993: 122).
[33] *Pace* Cairns, who claims that it is uncertain whether Ion and his audience's response is an empathetic or sympathetic one (2015: 85).
[34] Ar. *Thesm*. 159. For the etymology and meaning of μίμησις, see Else (1958). He views this instance as s an example of *mimēsis*' meaning rooted in mime: "Thus it is noteworthy how often in Aristophanes, the comedian, *mimeisthai* and *mimêsis* (he never uses *mimêma*) seem to bring us a whiff from the world of mime" (1958: 81). Cf. Muecke 1982: 55.

analogous to that of the poet, both of whom become caught up in the lives and behaviors of characters: "Homer impersonates his characters no less than Ion does, so that in this sense at least *mimēsis* and *enthousiasmos*, so far from being incompatible, are actually one and the same thing" (Murray 1992: 41).

IV. Chapter Overview

In this dissertation I trace the themes and vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis across classical Greek literary genres from the 5th and 4th centuries BCE including Aristophanes' comedies (*Acharnians*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, *Frogs*, *Ecclesiazusae*), Euripidean tragedy (*Bacchae*), and Plato's dialogues (*Republic*). I will show that these authors treat mimesis as transformational, allowing poets, actors, and audiences to empathize with different characters, ultimately changing not only the appearance but also the behavior and characteristics of the person involved. I have arranged the dissertation chronologically, by author, and by genre (5th-4th c. BCE; Aristophanes, Euripides, Plato; Old Comedy, tragedy, philosophy) in order to trace the development of mimetic metamorphosis as a concept. My dissertation concludes with a discussion of Aristotle's *Poetics* in order to show how the language of mimetic metamorphosis and the theme of transformation are adapted for Aristotle's treatment of mimesis and poetry in that work.

The idea for this dissertation arose from reading Plato's *Ion*. Admittedly, Socrates treats the rhapsode and the art of literary interpretation as ridiculous in the dialogue, but I grew more and more interested in thinking about how the irony of the *Ion* could reveal a more serious concern in Plato about enactment and offer an alternative way to think about poetry in the classical period. While the chapter I initially planned for the *Ion* no longer fits into the dissertation in its current form, this approach led me to reading Aristophanes and Euripides in a similar fashion. Why do these dramatists return to these metatheatrical scenes of crossdressing? What

does it mean for Dicaeopolis or Dionysus to appear to be (φαίνομαι) and become (γίγνομαι) the characters they depict? My dissertation returns to these works of classical Greek literature and incorporates them into the tradition of ancient literary criticism because they shed light not only on questions of aesthetics and epistemology, as in *Ion* or *Republic* 10, but of ontology also. How much can one change before one is a new person entirely?

In addition to being the source of inspiration for this project, Plato's *Ion* is a helpful way to conceptualize the organization of the dissertation. Socrates' magnet analogy affords a view of literature that is dynamic and transformative when he claims that just as a magnet draws an iron ring to itself, implants its power in it, and enables it to attract other iron rings, so, too, the Muse inspires the poet, who inspires the performer, who then inspires the audience.[35] Scholars have taken interest in this metaphor because of Socrates' epistemological claim that Ion's ability to speak about Homer comes from divine possession that inspires him.[36] While Socrates does not use the word mimesis in the *Ion*, Ion's embodied experience as Odysseus on the threshold "bears a marked resemblance to the notion of *mimēsis* in Book 3 of the *Republic*" (Murray 1992: 41). I liken mimetic metamorphosis to this chain of inspiration and explore in the dissertation how each link in the literary chain of production (poet, performer, and audience) is transformed by mimesis. While Socrates treats both magnetism and literary inspiration as a top-down hierarchy, my conception of mimetic metamorphosis is not so neat. The transformations enacted by mimesis are depicted with a similar vocabulary and raise questions about being and becoming, but Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato introduce essentialist conceptions of identity alongside depictions of mimetic metamorphosis. These paradoxical treatments of mimesis show how

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[35] Pl. *Ion* 533c9-d5.

[36] See Tigerstedt 1970 & Murray 1981.

contested representation is and serve as an entry point for my reappraisal of mimesis in the classical period.

In the first chapter "Mimesis as Metamorphosis in Aristophanes," I investigate scenes in which Aristophanes depicts poets (Agathon, Euripides) as well as actors (Dicaeopolis) imitating tragic characters. These scenes complicate notions of being and identity. For Aristophanes, tragic poets and actors embody and represent other characters and, in doing so, empathize with them and take on their mindset. Dicaeopolis and Agathon imply that embodiment makes empathy for certain tragic characters possible, that tragic emotion is not entirely cognitive but rooted in the body. I read Aristophanes in order to think about the intersection of mimesis and embodiment. Aristophanes suggests two paradoxical ways for thinking about identity in 5th-c. BCE Athens: first, identity is natural and reflected in our garments; and second, identity is fluid and produced by the clothes we wear.[37] In *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis believes that Euripides' natural state is reflected in his characters, revealing how an essentialist belief of identity interacts with theories of mimetic representation. After seeing the poet, Dicaeopolis' response is "no wonder you write beggars!" (οὐκ ἐτὸς πτωχοὺς ποιεῖς, Ar. *Ach.* 413) and reasons that Euripides must represent lame beggars because the poet is lazy and slovenly dressed. The poet's physical appearance serves as an aetiology for his work.

We can consider Aristophanes' representation of Euripides a mockery of the tragic poet's fashion sense and his poetic praxis. If we read Euripides in this way, he is akin to Agathon in the Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*: both tragic poets play dress-up with their costumes at home. In the *Thesmophoriazusae* Euripides even admits to his Kinsman that he, like Agathon, dressed in costume when he was a younger poet: "For I, too, was like him at that age when I started writing"

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[37] Cf. Duncan (2006: 6, 47).

(καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος ἦν / ὢν τηλικοῦτος, ἡνίκ' ἠρχόμην ποιεῖν, *Thesm.* 173f.). We can read Euripides' representations of a particular type of character as dependent upon his physical comportment and dress. Whether Euripides is naturally slovenly or not may be uncertain, but he can connect with characters such as Telephus and Oeneus because of his physical similarity to them. I show throughout the dissertation that mimesis problematizes the referentiality of adjectives and pronouns. Euripides' claim to "be such" (τοιοῦτος) raises this problem: if Euripides was "such" a one as Agathon, how and why is he different now? Euripides suggests that mimesis performed with costumes and props offers the poet and performer the capaciousness to be "such." Although Dicaeopolis rebukes Euripides, he still asks the poet to outfit him as the tragic character Telephus. After putting on the costume, Dicaeopolis continues to ask Euripides for props to add to his character, but the rags he wears enable him to compose a pity-inducing speech, i.e. to be "such."

Aristophanes mocks tragic poets who effect this writing practice, but what happens when we take seriously the fact that mimesis is a means by which poets and actors become their characters? Because Dicaeopolis and Agathon have likened themselves in dress to their characters, they are able to compose and perform poetry and oratory that represent their characters. This "likeness" is not necessarily an inborn, natural one (e.g. Euripides), but one effected through mimesis. Aristophanes returns to these themes throughout his work, as I show by reading *Frogs* and *Ecclesiazusae*. In *Frogs*, the god Dionysus attempts to liken himself to Heracles but fails. In *Ecclesiazusae*, Praxagora and her fellow Assemblywomen transform into male assembly members in order to transform the workings of the state. By mocking the overly serious affectations of tragedians, Aristophanes precedes Plato's concern for the affective, transformative power mimetic poetry will have on the guardians of the Ideal State in the *Republic*.

In the second chapter "This is That: Mimetic Metamorphosis in Euripides' *Bacchae*," I argue that Euripides picks up on the language of mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes and draws attention to the metatheatrical context of the *Bacchae* as a religious festival in Athens. This constant interplay between the level of the drama and the metatheatrical commentary shows how seemingly simple elements of language such as demonstrative pronouns become ambiguous when mimetic metamorphosis is in play. In the prologue of the play, Dionysus makes use of deixis to create a metatheatrical commentary on the mimesis the theater and its environs undergo in the drama. He refers to the stage, set in Athens, as "this Thebes" (τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα, Eur. *Bacch*. 1).

The transformation enacted by mimesis suggests that "this is that" simultaneously. Many of the ironic misrecognitions that recur throughout the *Bacchae* are due to the transformation of one character into another through mimesis. Agave fails to recognize her son Pentheus partly because of the Dionysian ecstasy inspiring her, and partly because he is dressed as a woman. In Aristotle's *Poetics*, he defines mimesis as the recognition "that this is that" (ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος). Dionysus tells Pentheus that the latter looks like "those" (ἐκείναι), his mother and aunts: "When I look at you, I think I see them!" (αὐτὰς ἐκείνας εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ σ' ὁρῶν, 927). Dionysus' claim to Pentheus that "you" are or appear to be "them" raises the question of identity and recognition. At what point is misrecognition no longer a failure but a recognition of one's changed being? No one recognizes Dionysus as the Lydian stranger throughout the play, yet Dionysus claims in the prologue that he has taken on the nature of a human being (54). If Dionysus can change his very nature through mimesis, is this a misrecognition?

In addition to the similar vocabulary and themes that occur in Aristophanes and Euripides, Euripides also makes use of irony and metatheater to comment on dramatic praxis

and mimesis. In the famous crossdressing scene, Dionysus outfits Pentheus with a woman's costume, after which we see that Pentheus' behavior is markedly changed. This scene can be read as the depiction of Dionysian ritual, but the ritualistic aspects do not take away from the metamorphosis of the initiate.[38] After taking on the costume of a bacchant, Pentheus asks how to properly stand and arrange his clothes. As Agathon claims in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*, Pentheus "hunts out" the characteristics and body of a woman through mimesis.

In the third and final chapter "Mimesis on Seeming and Being in Plato's *Republic*," I turn to Plato's *Republic* where Socrates critiques poetry because it installs false beliefs in the audience and affects them with powerful emotions. In this chapter Plato moves from the first elements of the chain we see in Aristophanes and Euripides (poet, actor) to the final chain of the audience, the guardians of the ideal city. I focus on Socrates' critique of poetry as it pertains to affect in Books 2-3 and 10 of Plato's *Republic*. I view these sections of the *Republic* as a sequel to the *Ion* in some sense, as Socrates returns to poetry with an earnest concern for its affective power. Socrates claims that when we listen to poetry "we give ourselves" (ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, *Resp.* 10.605d3) over to the characters we listen to, just as Ion loses himself in Troy and Ithaca when he sings the Homeric poems. The participle Socrates uses for "surrender" (ἐνδόντες) derives from the verb ἐνδίδωμι which can mean variously "to give in," "give into's one's hands," or "give up." The audience "gives up" their identity momentarily when they empathize with the characters on stage, and the ἐν- prefix recalls the *Ion*'s language of *enthousiasmos*, especially where the magnet "implants" (ἐντίθημι) its own power into the piece of iron. In this way, perhaps we can think of the audience as giving themselves into, responding to, the characters on stage or in a poem.

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[38] Pentheus' crossdressing is a form of initiation, resulting in double vision and the view of Dionysus as a bull (Eur. *Bacch*. 918-22). On initiation into the rites of Dionysus as a cause for Pentheus' vision and behavior, see Seaford (1987: 77).

In the *Ion* the rhapsode loses any claim to technical knowledge but still leaves the discussion as an "inspired" performer who can also inspire his audience. In Book 10 of the *Republic*, Plato's Socrates returns to poetry because he finds mimesis' capacity to transform poets, actors, rhapsodes, and audiences troubling. Socrates suggests that the audience takes seriously and praises the poet who can affect them and make them surrender their own identities. It is precisely this transformative aspect of poetry that Socrates fears since the representations of male characters lamenting on stage, while tragic, befit women (ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, *Resp*. 10.605d9), not men.[39] Penelope Murray has argued that tragedy is excluded precisely because it is gendered feminine in the *Republic* (2011).

While the concern for much of Books 2-3 is the truth-value of poetic content and its use in education, the affective dimension of poetry underlies the first critique of poetry as well.[40] Socrates claims that when a moderate man (μέτριος) narrates the speech or action of a good man (ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ), "he will want to report the speech as if he were that man and will not be ashamed by such a mimesis" (ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι

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[39] Writing on the same passage, Murray argues that the exclusion of poetry is inextricably tied to Socrates' exclusion of the feminine from the state: "Homer, tragedy, lamentation and 'womanish' behaviour are all to be eliminated from the lives of the guardians, as from the city as a whole, and their interconnection is made abundantly clear in this passage" (2011: 183). Although Socrates concedes that both men and women can be guardians, this is only possible by desexing women and making them appear to be men. Cf. Murray: "In effect Book V attempts to put forward a view of human nature which dispenses with the notion of gender: men and women are to be treated in exactly the same way and to perform exactly the same functions" (2011: 176).

[40] Lear claims that the arguments against poetry in Books 2-3 and 10 are similar, not, as he claims, because they both are concerned with appearance-making (2011: 195f.), but rather because of their emphasis on empathy. While the issue of appearance arises in both critiques, Socrates also discusses mimetic empathy and transformation. In Book 10 Plato includes painting as an example of mimesis that does not require the performer's body. For this reason, Lear argues that scholarship claiming that the crux of Book 3 is the poet's empathy with another character is mistaken (2011: 196). Johnson and Clapp, on the other hand, argue that Plato's main critique of poetry in *Republic* 10 is against emotion (2005: 144f.). Plato's critique of poetry as an affective medium lies primarily in the fact that he wants reason to be in control for decision-making and behavior, but poetry arouses emotions in a powerful way, which Plato finds problematic (149).

ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, *Resp.* 3.396c6-8). Socrates' concern centers on the outcome of an affective education where guardians learn through mimesis how to feel both towards characters like and unlike them. Socrates imagines the performer identifying with his character, but we can imagine that the guardians in the audience, who share the same education as the performer, will also be able to empathize with representations of a good man and his actions. The adjective τοιοῦτος ("such," "such as this") in the phrase "such a mimesis" hints at this possibility. Much like Euripides was "such" a poet in his youth—if a guardian-performer recognizes himself in the representation of "such" a character and story (variously called "good," "serious," or "noble"), then the guardian-spectator or -reader will recognize himself as well. At the end of the first critique of poetry, Socrates and his interlocutors allow mimesis in the educational program of the *Republic* because it will enable the guardians to become "such."

In the conclusion, I turn briefly to Aristotle's *Poetics* to show how his treatment of tragedy, mimesis, and recognition are indebted to mimetic metamorphosis as it has been sketched in Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato. In this way, the organization of the dissertation parallels the overall argument. Instead of beginning the dissertation with *Poetics*, I end with that work in order to highlight how ancient literary criticism of mimesis arises from and is influenced by these dramatic works. By concluding the dissertation with Plato and Aristotle, I show that the popular depiction that their treatment of mimesis as an image or as a purely intellectual experience is only one way to read mimesis in the classical period. By following Aristophanes and Euripides, I model a way of reading of mimesis that re-presents the embodiment and transformation central to representation. Thus, when I turn to the philosophical works that discuss mimesis, I show that they respond to these earlier works and more importantly that they can be read for embodiment and transformation, which allows for a more nuanced reading of the *Poetics* and *Republic*.

Chapter 1

Mimesis as Metamorphosis in Aristophanes

I. Introduction

Aristophanes frequently parodies tragedy and incorporates metatheater in his works. In this chapter I argue that these passages reveal an Aristophanic conception of mimesis as metamorphic. In the *Acharnians*, *Thesmophoriazusae*, *Frogs*, and *Ecclesiazusae* characters transform into other characters on-stage, and while some insist on their costumes as disguises, mimesis has a transformative effect upon them, ultimately changing their character or behavior. I focus on Aristophanes' language and his depiction of transformation insofar as it contributes to a theory of mimetic metamorphosis. In Aristophanes' metamorphoses, the language of being and becoming are often used interchangeably to great effect. For example, Aristophanes often uses the verb "to be" (εἰμί) not only to indicate a character's essential being, hidden by a disguise, but also the end result of a transformation. By attending to Aristophanes' language, I argue that we can see how Aristophanes works through theories of mimesis, in particular how mimesis affects being.

Scholars often comment that Aristophanes is no literary critic despite his propensity for allusions to and parodies of tragedy.[41] Ralph Rosen suggests that because tragedy had strictly mythic content for plots, tragedians could not discuss their own literary merits in the same way Aristophanes does:

> It was left to comic poets, therefore, to serve as public commentators on contemporary tragedy, not so much because any of them—even Aristophanes—necessarily had anything resembling a coherent critical agenda or aesthetic mission, but because it has always been the business of comedy to poke and prod at precisely those aspects of a society which appear to be most stable and authoritative. (2005: 265)

[41] Porter, for example, claims that Aristophanes is "best seen as a symptom of the age" (2010: 261). Cf. Halliwell "Aristophanes' *Frogs* and the Failure of Criticism" (2011: 93-154).

Even if we do not take Aristophanes to be a critic, In this chapter I claim that he reveals something essential about conceptions of mimesis (and, in particular, tragic mimesis) in the classical period: mimesis as a form of embodiment, both in composition and performance, can make one more like another. This "likeness" is not necessarily inborn or natural one, which is why the Kinsman becomes distressed at Agathon's indeterminable gender.[42] The fact that throughout his career Aristophanes repeatedly dramatizes scenes that parody tragedy and depict characters changing into other characters shows a concerted interest in mimetic metamorphosis. By mocking the overly serious affectations of tragedians, Aristophanes precedes Plato's concern for the affective, transformative power poetry will have on the Guardians of the Ideal State in the *Republic*.

In the first section of the chapter, I turn to Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. I read Dicaeopolis' transformation into a beggar from Euripides' *Telephus* as a process that occurs over time. In this play Aristophanes introduces a vocabulary and themes surrounding metamorphosis that appear in his other works as well. Dicaeopolis stresses the importance of the acquisition and possession of props in order to be recognized as a particular character, but by wearing the rags of Telephus, his speech and behavior are changed. The transformation that occurs reveals that Dicaeopolis is in some ways naturally predisposed to a character like Telephus. It also shows how Dicaeopolis acquires not only Telephus' attendant costume and props but also that character's qualities, such as being importunate. Later in the play, when the braggart soldier Lamachus recognizes Dicaeopolis as a beggar, Dicaeopolis does not deny that he is a beggar, which problematizes reading his costume merely as a disguise or Lamachus addressing him as a beggar as a

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[42] Cf. Sissa: "To Inlaw's binary thinking, Agathon responds with a poetics of versatile, protean shape-shifting. Fluidity of language; fluidity of gender. Mimetic malleability of the visible body. Who cares about penetration?" (2012: 57).

misrecognition. In parodying Euripidean tragedy, the *Acharnians* lingers over concerns of identity and being and sketches a theory of mimesis as transformative upon a person.

In the second section of this chapter I turn to the famous scene in the *Thesmophoriazusae* when Euripides and his Kinsman visit Agathon. Kinsman is troubled by Agathon's apparent effeminacy because he does not know how to read Agathon's gender. Agathon possesses props (e.g. a comb and a lyre) that fail Kinsman as recognition tokens. *Thesmophoriazusae* shares some of the same concerns as *Acharnians* but also raises questions of referentiality. When Kinsman addresses Agathon, he wavers between using masculine and feminine gendered nouns and pronouns to refer to him. By the end of the play, *Thesmophoriazusae* suggests that it is not easy to turn back into your previous self. Kinsman asks to be stripped of his dress because of his sense of shame, but the Athenian Council demands he wear it because it marks him as a "wretch" (*panourgos*). The costume Kinsman first uses as a disguise becomes an extension of himself, subverting his own expectation that stripping his costume would reveal his true, inner self.

In the third section of this chapter, I turn to Aristophanes' *Frogs*. The *Frogs* is often viewed as an early example of ancient literary criticism, but, more significantly, in it Aristophanes shows a continued interest in mimesis and metamorphosis. Imitation is at stake from the beginning of the play when Dionysus visits Heracles while wearing a lion skin and holding a club. Yet Heracles' laughter at Dionysus suggests that mimesis does not produce a perfect simulacrum. Instead, mimesis hybridizes Dionysus. He wears a lion skin in imitation of Heracles but his saffron robes and boots show from underneath. Later in the play, Dionysus and his slave Xanthias switch roles, but when Xanthias puts on the Heracles costume, he calls himself

"Heracleoxanthias" and not "Heracles." This is the first instance where two characters transform into each other in Aristophanes.

In the final section of this chapter I turn to the *Ecclesiazusae*. In this play we have the first example of women transforming on stage. Praxagora and the Chorus of Athenian women impersonate Athenian citizens by stealing their husbands' clothes, recalling Aristophanes' conceptualization of mimesis as the acquisition and possession of qualities and costume earlier in his career in the *Acharnians*. Ultimately, after Praxagora's metamorphosis she does not become hybrid in the same way as an Agathon or Xanthias. Instead, she utilizes mimesis as a way to transform the state. By turning over Athens to Athenian women, public and political space becomes private, domestic space. Likewise, in taking her husband's clothes, Praxagora becomes "brave" or "manly" while her husband Blepyrus, left at home with only Praxagora's things to wear, is affected by the costume he puts on.

By putting these four plays in conversation with each other, I show that Aristophanes has a concerted interest in thinking through and theorizing mimesis, especially as it affects a person's being. Aristophanes plays with language to humorous effect but also develops a vocabulary for these themes of mimesis and metamorphosis. He shows how mimesis has metamorphic potential by using the verbs "to be" (εἰμί) and "to become" (γίγνομαι) interchangeably for on-stage transformations and by complicating the referentiality of names and pronouns. To whom do pronouns such as "he," "she," "this," or "that" refer when someone becomes another person? Many of these passages can be read as a commentary on tragedy. Aristotle prizes recognition in tragedy, but mimesis makes this difficult because of the change involved. Aristophanes' theory of mimetic metamorphosis can be situated in the intellectual discourses happening in classical Athens surrounding language and being.

I. *Acharnians* (425 BCE)

The *Acharnians*, Aristophanes' earliest extant play, is centered around a metatheatrical, paratragic scene in which the protagonist Dicaeopolis disguises himself as the titular character from Euripides' *Telephus* (438 BCE). Dicaeopolis desires to look like Telephus but to remain himself. This tension between appearance and identity occurs throughout the *Acharnians*, especially in recognition scenes. During the Assembly scene, near the beginning of the play, Dicaeopolis introduces this theme when he recognizes Cleisthenes despite the latter's attempts to disguise himself as a Persian eunuch accompanying Pseudartabas.

> ποίας ἀχάνας; σὺ μὲν ἀλαζὼν εἶ μέγας.
> ἀλλ' ἄπιθ' · ἐγὼ δὲ βασανιῶ τοῦτον μόνος. (110)
> ἄγε δὴ σύ, φράσον ἐμοὶ σαφῶς πρὸς τουτονί,
> ἵνα μή σε βάφω βάμμα Σαρδιανικόν ·
> βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας ἡμῖν ἀποπέμψει χρυσίον;
> ἄλλως ἄρ' ἐξαπατώμεθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πρέσβεων;
> Ἑλληνικόν γ' ἐπένευσαν ἄνδρες οὑτοιί, (115)
> κοὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐνθένδ' αὐτόθεν.
> καὶ τοῖν μὲν εὐνούχοιν τὸν ἕτερον τουτονὶ
> ἐγῷδ' ὅς ἐστι, Κλεισθένης ὁ Σιβυρτίου.
> ὦ θερμόβουλον πρωκτὸν ἐξυρημένε.
> τοιόνδε γ', ὦ πίθηκε, τὸν πώγων' ἔχων (120)
> εὐνοῦχος ἡμῖν ἦλθες ἐσκευασμένος;
> ὁδὶ δὲ τίς ποτ' ἐστίν; οὐ δήπου Στράτων; (Ar. *Ach.* 109-22)[43]
>
> Gobs of money indeed! You're so full of bullshit. Get out of here! I alone will test this guy. Come on, you, tell it clearly to my fist so I don't dye you a nice Sardinian crimson. Will the Great King send us gold? Or are we merely being deceived by the ambassadors? These guys nod the Greek way—there's no way that they aren't from this very place. Of the two eunuchs, I know who this one is, it's Cleisthenes, the "son" of Siburtius. Hey you, shaver of a hot and heavy asshole, you came to us dressed as a eunuch, you monkey, with a beard like that? Whoever is this guy? Surely not Strato?

Dicaeopolis begins his inquiry into Pseudartabas' intentions with a request for clarity (φράσον ἐμοὶ σαφῶς, 111). This implies that the ambassadors' story of Persian aid obfuscates the truth.

[43] Greek text of Aristophanes from Wilson 2007. Translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

He recognizes Cleisthenes and Strato, another famously beardless Athenian, because they "nod the Greek way" (Ἑλληνικόν γ' ἐπένευσαν ἄνδρες οὑτοί, 115), revealing a belief that gestures reveal the truth of their identity and, conversely, that costumes obfuscate the truth and disguise them.[44]

In this scene Dicaeopolis insists on the stability of being by emphasizing Cleisthenes' essential identity ("who he is," ὅς ἐστι): "Of the two eunuchs, I know who this one is, it's Cleisthenes the 'son' of Siburtius!" (καὶ τοῖν μὲν εὐνούχοιν τὸν ἕτερον τουτονὶ / ἐγῷδ' ὅς ἐστι, Κλεισθένης ὁ Σιβυρτίου., 116f.). Dicaeopolis' claim that Cleisthenes is "son of Siburtius," an owner of a wrestling gym, reveals a kind of slippage between one's identity and disguise. The patronymic serves as a joke that Cleisthenes is not manly enough to be a wrestler or that he is the passive partner of Siburtius.[45] For Dicaeopolis, Cleisthenes' pretense has no transformative effect on his being because the costume serves as a disguise, an outer layer that can be peeled back and reveal what lies beneath.[46] He even finds Cleisthenes' disguise ridiculous: "With a beard like that, you ape, you've come to us dressed up like a eunuch?" (τοιόνδε γ', ὦ πίθηκε, τὸν πώγων' ἔχων / εὐνοῦχος ἡμῖν ἦλθες ἐσκευασμένος; 120f.).[47] In the passive voice the verb σκευάζω means "to dress up."[48] This passage also introduces the notion that possession of a quality (τοιόνδε…τὸν

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[44] Ar. mocks Cleisthenes for beardlessness: *Eq.* 1373f.; *Th.* 235, 574-5, 582-3; cf. 119f.; *Nu.* 355; *Av.* 829-33. Strato is also mocked at Ar. *Eq.* 1373f. with Cleisthenes, & fr. 422. Later, a Chorus Member nods (ἀνένευσε, 611) to Dicaeopolis to signify that he has never served on a paid embassy, showing how this gesture reads as Greek when the two connect about Athenian military duty.

[45] Cf. Olson (2002: ad loc.) & Sommerstein (1980: ad loc.).

[46] Olson (2002: ad 117-22) suggests that the eunuchs wear false beards because eunuchs have no facial hair. Olson covers Dover's view that their faces are swathed in clothing.

[47] Sommerstein (1980: ad loc.) takes the joke to be Dic. being sarcastic that Cl. is too manly to pretend to be a eunuch.

[48] LSJ s.v. σκευάζω (A.II.2). Olson (2002: ad loc.): "'dressed up like a eunuch', i.e. in elaborate Persian robes."

πώγωνα ἔχων) is essential to identity—Cleisthenes "has" the kind of beard that both makes him who he is and also allows Dicaeopolis to identify him. For another example of the possession of a quality and its connection to identity, in the *Thesmophoriazusae* Euripides asks Agathon to intercede on his behalf because, he reckons, he will be recognized by his own beard: "I'll be recognized first thing since I'm gray-haired and have a beard" (πρῶτα μὲν γιγνώσκομαι· / ἔπειτα πολιός εἰμι καὶ πώγων' ἔχω, Ar. *Thesm.* 189f.). But this raises a question that conflicts with Dicaeopolis' essentialist conception of identity: can you acquire a new nature by acquiring different attributes?

Although the disparity between an Athenian citizen and a Persian eunuch may seem great, there is a certain symmetry between Cleisthenes' hairless face and the fact that he "shaved his rash asshole" (ὦ θερμόβουλον πρωκτὸν ἐξυρημένε, 119).[49] The distinction between costume and identity unravels further when we note that Dicaeopolis' beard joke puns on an Archilochus fragment: τοιήνδε δ' ὦ πίθηκε τὴν πυγὴν ἔχων ("With an ass like that, you ape," fr. 187).[50] Dicaeopolis addresses Cleisthenes as the man who shaves his πρωκτός ("asshole"), and the stage beard (πώγων) in Aristophanes' version of the line may already put in mind for the reader the word omitted from the Archilochus allusion, πυγή ("ass"), due to their similar sound (*p-g-*).[51]

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[49] Dover (1963) reads the Persian line of trimeter at l. 100 and suggests that the embassy is made up of Persians, not disguised Athenians. West argues (*contra* Dover) that the Persian of Pseudartabas is nonsense, made up of Persian-sounding syllables that Aristophanes might have recognized from hearing the Persian message of Great King in Greek assembly (1968: 6). Chiasson (1984), following Dover, analyzes Pseudartabas' trimeter line as Persian and argues that Pseudartabas and the eunuchs are all Persians, not Athenians in disguise. He suggests that the eunuchs actually wear beards, however, reading τοιόνδε τὸν πώγωνα as "so bushy" (1984: 135). Miller (2006/07) shows how Athenian depictions of Persians in Attic vases gradually became more effeminate and fantastic (to the point of winged, beardless Arimasps).

[50] Greek text of Archilochus from West 1971.

[51] Cf. Olson (2002: ad 120-21). On πώγων as stage beard, Olson writes (ad 117-22): "Eunuchs ought to have no facial hair and Pseud.'s attendants (on stage since 94) are accordingly not identified as such until just before Dik. rips a false beard off first one (118) and then the others (122)."

Cleisthenes' costume, body modifications, and his comportment ultimately make his disguise as a eunuch fitting, not jarring. Dicaeopolis insists upon a clean divide between who Cleisthenes is and who he pretends to be, but both Cleisthenes' beardless face and costume reveal his effeminacy, what Dicaeopolis considers is Cleisthenes' essential nature, that is who he *is* (ὅς ἐστι, 118). These also point to a further transformation Cleisthenes undergoes: from Athenian citizen into someone more and more exotic and effeminate, someone like a Persian eunuch. In mocking Cleisthenes, Dicaeopolis impresses upon us who the Athenian politician is becoming as well as who he is. And in doing so, the joke reveals an implicit fear that mimesis will change you. In the *Thesmophoriazusae*, Kinsman makes this anxiety surrounding mimesis and gender explicit when he mocks Agathon and fails (or refuses) to recognize him as a man.

Dicaeopolis may criticize Cleisthenes for his transgressive disguise, but he shows an awareness of costume's potential later in the play.[52] After he brokers a private treaty with Sparta, he asks the Chorus to allow him time to change: "Now, first, before I speak, let me dress myself up as wretchedly as possible" (νῦν οὖν με πρῶτον πρὶν λέγειν ἐάσατε / ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον, *Ach.* 383f.).[53] Aristophanes uses the verb ἐνσκευάζω, a compound of σκευάζω, the same verb that describes Cleisthenes' eunuch costume, for Dicaeopolis' costume change. Dicaeopolis realizes he is not sympathetic enough to move the Chorus of Acharnian elders, so he goes to Euripides in order to acquire pitiable attributes in the form of Telephus' costume.[54]

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[52] See Compton-Engle on Dicaeopolis' control over costume (2015: 90-94).
[53] Cf. Phryn. Com. fr. 39.1 δουλικῶς ἐνσκεύασαι ("dress slavishly").
[54] Aristophanes' parody of *Telephus* in *Acharnians* is not only mockery. Zuckerberg argues he imitates and appropriates the trope so that it works as a pitiable costume for the internal audience and for the external audience as humorous (2016: 208).

In Aristophanes' doorkeeper scenes, slaves often reflect their master's character. When Dicaeopolis meets Euripides' slave, the slave answers with a "typically Euripidean riddling paradox" (Olson 2002: ad loc.).

> ΘΕΡΑΠΩΝ τίς οὗτος; (395)
> Δι. ἔνδον ἔστ' Εὐριπίδης;
> Θε. οὐκ ἔνδον ἔνδον ἐστίν, εἰ γνώμην ἔχεις.
> Δι. πῶς ἔνδον, εἶτ' οὐκ ἔνδον;
> Θε. ὀρθῶς, ὦ γέρον.
> ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω ξυλλέγων ἐπύλλια
> κοὐκ ἔνδον, αὐτὸς δ' ἔνδον ἀναβαδὴν ποιεῖ
> τραγῳδίαν. (400)
> Δι. ὦ τρισμακάρι' Εὐριπίδη,
> ὅθ' ὁ δοῦλος οὑτωσὶ σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται.
> ἐκκάλεσον αὐτόν. (*Ach.* 395-402)
>
> The.: Who are you?
> Di.: Is Euripides inside?
> The.: He isn't at home, but he's inside, if you know what I mean.
> Di.: How can he be inside, and not at home?
> The.: Quite right, old man. While his mind collects versicles outside and isn't at home, he composes a tragedy inside with his feet up.
> Di.: Euripides, you're triply blessed since your slave acts so cleverly. Call him out.

The slave puns on the meaning of the adverb ἔνδον ("inside"), by applying it both to Euripides' location and his frame of mind: Euripides is inside the house, but not in his mind (οὐκ ἔνδον ἔνδον ἐστίν, 396). This passage contains the earliest attestation of the word tragedy (τραγῳδία) in ancient Greek, and here the genre is paired with the notion of behaving differently in order to compose poetry.[55] The slave's comment "if you understand [sc. what I mean]" (εἰ γνώμην ἔχεις, 396) reminds us of the importance of possessing a quality for identity and transformation in Aristophanes. In order to understand Euripides' thought process, his slave must "possess" (ἔχω) Euripides' "understanding" (γνώμη). The slave possesses this through habituation, having been

[55] For spatial metaphors for inspiration, cf. Pl. *Ion* for being outside of oneself (535b7-c1). See introduction (pp. 12-15). The fact that Euripides can be οὐκ ἔνδον ἔνδον ἐστί (*Ach.* 396) according to his slave shows that someone can be two things at once.

accustomed to Euripides and his mannerisms. This understanding can be acquired through bodily comportment and costume, as we will see with Agathon when he wears women's garments simultaneously with their γνώμη.

According to Dicaeopolis, Euripides' "slave acts so cleverly" (ὁ δοῦλος οὑτωσὶ σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται, *Ach.* 401) during the doorkeeper scene. The middle verb ὑποκρίνομαι can be translated as "answer" or "reply" and is later associated with acting on stage ("speak in a dialogue," "play a part").[56] The slave "acts" like Euripides, because clever, and can both speak as him and understand him.[57] There are two readings in the textual tradition of this passage: σαφῶς ἀπεκρίνατο (β) ("he answered clearly") and σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται (R) ("he acts cleverly").[58] This textual confusion leads us to waver between reading σοφῶς or σαφῶς. Does Euripides' slave "answer clearly" or "act cleverly"? The former has no bearing upon mimesis and metamorphosis. "He answered clearly" shows that the slave performed his role in answering Dicaeopolis' question. The latter reading, however, suggests that Euripides' slave possesses some sort of quality that allows him to act Euripides-like. The slave answers with riddling obfuscation, so he answers not "clearly" (σαφῶς), but in a typically Euripidean, or clever (σοφῶς), way.[59] Through this clever reply, the slave reflects his master Euripides so clearly that Dicaeopolis recognizes Euripides in him.

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[56] Cf. LSJ s.v. ὑποκρίνω B.II.

[57] Aristophanes uses same qualities to describe Eur. as a poet as in his parabases that set Ar. apart from other poets (cleverness *dexiotēs*, originality *kainotēs*, artistic skill *sophia*) (Zuckerberg 2016: 203f.)

[58] Olson reads σοφῶς ἀπεκρίνατο ("he answered cleverly") instead of ὑποκρίνεται (2002: ad loc.). Wilson keeps σοφῶς ὑποκρίνεται (as quoted above), as do Henderson (1998) & Sommerstein (1980).

[59] The distinction between "clear" and "clever" reappears in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. During the contest between Euripides and Aeschylus, Dionysus says: νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρα, δυσκρίτως γ' ἔχω· / ὁ μὲν σοφῶς γὰρ εἶπεν, ὁ δ' ἕτερος σαφῶς (Ar. *Ran.* 1431f.). Cf. 1444f.: πῶς; οὐ μανθάνω. / ἀμαθέστερόν πως εἰπὲ καὶ σαφέστερον.

Upon seeing Euripides at his home, Dicaeopolis says that Euripides depicts disabled and impoverished characters because of the poet's own physical appearance and behavior.

> Δι. ἀναβάδην ποιεῖς, (410)
> ἐξὸν καταβάδην; οὐκ ἐτὸς χωλοὺς ποιεῖς.
> ἀτὰρ τί τὰ ῥάκι' ἐκ τραγῳδίας ἔχεις
> ἐσθῆτ' ἐλεινήν; οὐκ ἐτὸς πτωχοὺς ποιεῖς.
> ἀλλ' ἀντιβολῶ πρὸς τῶν γονάτων σ', Εὐριπίδη,
> δός μοι ῥάκιόν τι τοῦ παλαιοῦ δράματος. (415)
> δεῖ γάρ με λέξαι τῷ χορῷ ῥῆσιν μακράν·
> αὕτη δὲ θάνατον, ἢν κακῶς λέξω, φέρει. (*Ach.* 410-17) [60]
>
> Di.: You write poetry with your feet up when you could do it with your feet on the ground? No wonder you write lame characters! Why do you wear the rags from a tragedy, such pitiable clothes? No wonder you write beggars! Still, I supplicate you at your knees, Euripides. Give me some ragged garment from an old play because I have to give the chorus a long speech, which will be the death of me if I deliver it badly.

Dicaeopolis criticizes Euripides for his dress and comportment because he believes it is more fitting for a tragic character than an Athenian citizen and tragic poet to compose with his feet up (ἀναβάδην ποιεῖς, 410) and to wear rags from one of his dramas (ἀτὰρ τί τὰ ῥάκι' ἐκ τραγῳδίας ἔχεις, 412). Dicaeopolis exclaims "no wonder you write beggars!" (οὐκ ἐτὸς πτωχοὺς ποιεῖς, 413), reasoning that Euripides represents lame beggars because the poet is lazy and slovenly dressed.[61] The poet's physical appearance serves as an aetiology for his work and reveals two implied theories of poetic composition: 1) Euripides composes lame beggars because he is naturally lazy and slovenly; and 2) Euripides composes lame beggars because he has habituated himself to sympathize with such characters through costume and behavior.

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[60] I follow the punctuation of Henderson (1998), Sommerstein (1980), & Olson (2002) rather than Wilson (2007) after καταβάδην and ῥάκια (411, 412).

[61] Cf. Sommerstein (1980: ad 410-13): "the idea is that expounded by Agathon in *Thesm.* 148-70, that a dramatist's characters will resemble their creator. Euripides wears rags and avoids exercise; therefore his characters too will wear rags, and be physically crippled. For the allegation that Euripides' plays were full of beggars and cripples cf. *Peace* 146-8, *Frogs* 842, 846, 1063-4." Olson (2002 ad loc.): LSJ s.v. ποιέω A.I.4.b ought to include a reference to this passage because there are no other uses of the verb ποιέω with acc. in this sense cited before Plato.

Aristophanes' representation of Euripides mocks the tragic poet's fashion sense and poetic praxis, but if Euripides wears the clothes from an actual tragedy (τὰ ῥάκί' ἐκ τραγῳδίας, 412), the essentialist conception of identity comes into question.[62] Karen Bassi argues that dressing in rags was considered "a sociopolitical transvestitism" in Athens because wealthy citizens dressed in this way to avoid paying for public expenses (1998: 117). This trend bolsters the claim that mimesis is transformative because Euripides dresses up as a beggar and not naturally like one of his "beggar-hero" types.[63] Euripides' representations of a particular type of character are dependent upon his physical comportment and dress. He can connect with characters such as Telephus and Oeneus because of his physical similarity to them, but that empathy does not rely on or (or at least no only on) an innate similarity or identity, but a similarity effected through gesture, bodily comportment, and dress. Euripides wears costumes when he composes tragedies in order to change from his natural state to a new mindset. In the *Thesmophoriazusae*, he admits to his Kinsman that he, like Agathon, dressed in costume when he was a younger poet: "For I, too, was like him at that age when I started writing" (καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος ἦν / ὢν τηλικοῦτος, ἡνίκ' ἠρχόμην ποιεῖν, *Thesm.* 173f.).[64] Aristophanes' parody of the pretensions of tragic poets and actors hints at the tragic feeling they attempted to convey. Tragic props and costumes affect the atmosphere of a tragedy, but these same props and costumes have a different effect in comedy.

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[62] Aristophanes parodies tragic language here, too. Euripides speaks in a tragic style and uses tragic vocabulary in this scene. Cf. Rau (1967: 30-36).

[63] See Zuckerberg (2016) for the "beggar-hero" character seen as typically Euripidean after Aristophanes' comic depiction of Telephus in the *Acharnians*.

[64] Austin & Olson read this line very differently (2004: ad loc.): "ἡνίκ' ἠρχόμην ποιεῖν refers in the first instance to Eur. himself, but the real function of the clause is to cast Agathon (to whom Eur. is comparing himself) as a rank—and quite pretentious—amateur at the art of tragedy, despite the fact that he had won at the Lenaia five years earlier…What Eur. means in 173-4 is 'I used to talk very similar nonsense'. But Inlaw takes him to be saying 'I used to dress and behave in the same way', and he accordingly reacts with contempt and disgust."

Mario Telò, considering the affective and material components of drama, asks: "Does tragedy *feel* different from comedy—and are there, in fact, tactile differences among tragedians, as there are among comedians?" (2016: 161, emphasis in original). By mocking Euripides for his rags and Agathon for his feminine apparel, Aristophanes claims that (whether or not it is explicitly theorized by tragedians) props in some sense make the tragic and that tragic costumes affect the poets and performers who wear them .

Although Dicaeopolis rebukes Euripides for his devolution from Athenian citizen to tragic character, he still asks the poet to outfit him as Telephus.[65] After putting on the costume, Dicaeopolis continues to ask Euripides for props to add to his character, but the rags are sufficient enough to affect his ability to compose a pity-inducing speech.

> Δι. ὦ Ζεῦ διόπτα καὶ κατόπτα πανταχῇ,
> ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον.
> Εὐριπίδη, 'πειδήπερ ἐχαρίσω ταδί,
> κἀκεῖνά μοι δὸς τἀκόλουθα τῶν ῥακῶν,
> τὸ πιλίδιον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τὸ Μύσιον.
> δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον,
> εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή ·
> τοὺς μὲν θεατὰς εἰδέναι μ' ὅς εἰμ' ἐγώ,
> τοὺς δ' αὖ χορευτὰς ἠλιθίους παρεστάναι,
> ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς ῥηματίοις σκιμαλίσω.
> Ευ. δώσω · πυκνῇ γὰρ λεπτὰ μηχανᾷ φρενί.
> Δι. εὐδαιμονοίης, Τηλέφῳ δ' ἁγὼ φρονῶ.
> εὖ γ' · οἷον ἤδη ῥηματίων ἐμπίμπλαμαι.
> ἀτὰρ δέομαί γε πτωχικοῦ βακτηρίου. (*Ach.* 435-48)
>
> Di.: Zeus, who peeps through and oversees everywhere, outfit me to be as wretched as possible. O Euripides, since you have granted me these rags as a favor, give me the those things that complement them, too. That Mysian cap, for

[65] Cf. Rosen: "If Aristophanes actually intended to criticize Euripides in *Acharnians*, one faces a potential paradox: Dicaeopolis—the play's central character who becomes closely identified with the author himself—goes to Euripides in order to *become* one of his characters, i.e., Telephus. In other words, Dicaeopolis actively seeks out a means of impersonating a *tragic* figure in order to be persuasive within a comedy. Why, if Aristophanes wanted to 'criticize' Euripides through parody, would he then have Dicaeopolis 'act Euripidean' in order to make what he claims to be a serious point?" (2005: 257)

> instance. For I have to seem to be a beggar today, and not to appear to be who I really am. The spectators must know who I am, and those chorus-members must be disposed like fools so that I will give them the finger with my pet phrases.
> Eu.: I'll give them to you since you're making refined plots with a clever mind.
> Di.: Bless you! "…and what I intend for Telephus." Well said! How I'm already filled with pet phrases! But I need a beggar's staff.

Dicaeopolis highlights the transparency of costume by jokingly addressing Zeus, who can see through (διόπτα, κατόπτα, 435) everywhere, especially through hole-y rags. As a character in disguise, Dicaeopolis is visible through his costume; likewise, the audience can see the comic actor through the Dicaeopolis costume. Tragic character depends upon props, too, as we see when Dicaeopolis asks Euripides for the "props that go with with the rags" (τἀκόλουθα τῶν ῥακῶν, 438) to fill out his Telephus character.[66] Once Dicaeopolis has put on the rags, he is inspired with in-character phrases to say (οἷον ἤδη ῥηματίων ἐμπίμπλαμαι, 447) and cites half of a line from Euripides' *Telephus* as a result.[67] This scene depicts transformation as a process.[68] Dicaeopolis has already become Telephus-like enough to speak and act in character, making the transition from being himself to becoming Telephus as transparent to the audience as his rags, but he does not think his transformation into Telephus is complete (he requires more props).

The quotation of *Telephus* is interesting not only because of its paratragic and comic aspects but because it raises concerns that arise in other scenes of mimetic metamorphosis, especially the question of identity as it relates to grammatical person. Dicaeopolis speaks in the first person when he mentions Telephus in the third person ("and what I intend for Telephus,"

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[66] Mueller argues that theatrical audiences at Athens were educated, sophisticated theatergoers who could recognize intertextuality of props and objects in addition to quotation of literary sources (2016: 2).
[67] This line and the following contrast an exclusively Aristophanic and pejorative word (ῥημάτια, 447) with the tragic citation of Euripides *Telephus* (448). Cf. Olson 2002 ad loc.
[68] *Pace* Olson (2002: ad loc.), who claims that Telephus' "clothing brings with it an automatic and immediate (ἤδη) gift of Euripidean verbal agility."

Τηλέφῳ δ’ ἁγὼ φρονῶ, *Ach*. 446), but Dicaeopolis appears to be and speaks as Telephus in this line. Telephus speaks of himself in the third person when he is in disguise as a beggar.[69] Thus, Dicaeopolis’ “I” can refer at once to himself, the beggar, and Telephus-as-beggar in the *Telephus*. Dicaeopolis attempts to disentangle this when he insists on the appearance of costume. He tells Euripides, “For I have to seem to be a beggar today” (δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον, *Ach.* 440). By Dicaeopolis’ reckoning, costume does not have a transformative effect on his character. Instead, he creates categories for being (his identity) and merely seeming to be (his costume). Aristophanes uses the same beginning half of the line at 440 as in 416: “For I have to speak” (δεῖ γάρ με λέξαι, 416). The beginning of these lines have the same metrical weight (– – ⏑ – / –), and the infinitives δόξαι (“to seem”) and λέξαι (“to speak”) appear in the same position in the line and are grammatically identical (aorist active infinitive). This parallel raises the question: what do seeming (δόξαι) and speaking (λέξαι) have in common? Are they as interchangeable as they are in this metrical formula? Costume enables Dicaeopolis to speak as Telephus—at what point does seeming become speaking? And at that point, is the imitation of Telephus through the beggar costume only an imitation of appearance?

This insistence on being belies a kind of paranoia that Dicaeopolis may somehow be transformed: “I must be who I am, but not appear so” (εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή, 441). For Dicaeopolis, appearance merely covers over or disguises being. Thus, he believes that costume is transparent: he can be recognized by the audience, yet not by the chorus. The act of recognition relies upon this essentialist notion that being is secure from becoming. Dicaeopolis

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[69] Cf. Olson (2002 ad loc.): “A parody of E. fr. 707 καλῶς ἔχοι μοι (*vel* σοι?; cf. Ath. 5.186c) · Τηλέφῳ δ’ ἁγὼ φρονῶ (‘May it go well for me—and for Telephos in accord with what I am thinking’; doubtless said by the disguised Tel. himself as a covert wish for good fortune; contrast below)….i.e. ‘and Tel. can go to hell!’, although Eur. is intended to hear something very different.”

wishes for the audience to recognize him (εἰδέναι, 442) for who he really is (ὅς εἰμ' ἐγώ), so long as the chorus is not in on the joke. The pronoun and identity of "I" become ambiguous though when the actor speaks out of character as the poet, "so that I will give them the finger with my pet phrases" (ὅπως ἂν αὐτοὺς ῥηματίοις σκιμαλίσω, 444).[70] For Aristotle's intellectual reading of tragedy in the *Poetics*, recognition, especially when paired with a change in fortune, is the most stirring and tragic plot.[71] Aristophanes parodies tragedy's dependence on spectacle and hints at another kind of recognition that is essential to theater-going: all the action happens within the space of the theater, and the audience recognizes that the characters they see are at the same time actors. This kind of recognition requires being to be stable, that the actor (in this instance, Dicaeopolis) will come out of the mimesis ultimately unchanged and that the audience will be able to recognize him for who he is, not for who he appears to be.

At the end of the passage above, Telephus' rags inspire Dicaeopolis to speak in character. Dicaeopolis may insist on the difference between seeming (δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι, 440; φαίνεσθαι, 441) and being (εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, 441), but he becomes clever at speaking as a result of his transformation into Telephus. Regardless of Dicaeopolis' identity, he is beginning to act like, or become, Telephus. He asks Euripides for Telephus' costume not only so that he can appear to be more pitiable and make his audience more amenable to his argument, but also for the character's capacity for making speeches. Euripides first suggests loaning Dicaeopolis the rags "that this lame

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[70] Cf. Olson (2002: ad loc.): "Once again…the actor speaks momentarily 'out of character', not *in propria persona* (since the real identity of the individual playing Dik. is of no particular interest), however, but as 'the poet' and probably quiet specifically as 'Ar.'"; Sommerstein (1980: ad loc.): "again he speaks as an actor." Although not technically a parabasis, Dicaeopolis addresses the audience also at 497-501. On this, see Rosen (2005: 257f.). Dobrov writes of the parabasis that it is the best known move from the world of the play to the extradramatic world in Aristophanes (2001: 22).

[71] On complex plot comprised of reversal of fortune and the recognition of actions, the object tragedy attempts to imitate, see Arist. *Poet.* 1452a36-b3.

Bellerophon wore" (ἆ Βελλεροφόντης εἶχε ὁ χωλὸς οὑτοσί; 427), but Dicaeopolis clarifies that he does not want to imitate just any Euripidean beggar, but someone who is also "clever at speaking" (δεινὸς λέγειν, 429): "No, not Bellerophon. But that one [whose costume I want] was also lame, importunate, chatty, and clever at speaking" (οὐ Βελλεροφόντης· ἀλλὰ κἀκεῖνος μὲν ἦν / χωλός, προσαιτῶν, στωμύλος, δεινὸς λέγειν, 428f.). When Dicaeopolis asks Euripides to outfit him so that the audience can tell who he is, he asks to be recognized (εἰδέναι) as himself, highlighting the transparency of costume. But in asking for the costume and props of Euripides' Telephus, he asks to be recognized as that tragic character by clear tokens of recognition.[72] Additionally, he asks to take on the characteristics and capacities of Telephus. Dicaeopolis reveals an actor's transition from everyday self to the otherness of a newly-assumed *persona*, but when the audience sees Dicaeopolis, whom will they see?[73]

Dicaeopolis thinks his costume is incomplete without props, but he is able to will himself to get in character in order to beg Euripides for more props (which he does successfully).

> ὦ θύμ', ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὡς ἀπωθοῦμαι δόμων, (450)
> πολλῶν δεόμενος σκευαρίων· νῦν δὴ γενοῦ
> γλίσχρος, προσαιτῶν λιπαρῶν τ'. Εὐριπίδη,
> δός μοι σπυρίδιον διακεκαυμένον λύχνῳ. (*Ach.* 450-53)
>
> My soul, do you see how I'm pushed away from these halls still in need of many props? Now become importunate, begging, and persistent. O Euripides, give me a basket burnt through by a lamp.

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[72] Olson claims that Euripides may give Dicaeopolis his own clothes here because he asks the slave to hand over Telephus' clothing but does not say anything else to the slave while he gives each article of clothing: "δώσω: Eur. orders the slave to hand over Tel.'s clothing at 432-4 but does not speak to him again until 479, and one obvious explanation of this is that the tragic poet himself gives Dik. the cap, the staff (448-9), the basket (453-7), the cup (458-60), and the greens (469-70), and that these are in fact all part of the 'tragic costume' he himself is wearing (412-13) and of which he is gradually stripped (esp. 464) as the scene proceeds" (2002: ad loc.).

[73] Lada argues that the two different reactions of the internal and external audience are two reactions of Athenian audience: they can feel pity for the tragic character (Telephus) *and* be keenly aware that the character is played by an actor (Dicaeopolis) (1993:120). Cf. Rosen (2005: 258); Zuckerberg (2016: 208).

When Dicaeopolis addresses his soul (ὦ θὐμ', 450) in a typically heroic way, he exhorts himself to become (νῦν δὴ γενοῦ, 451) the heroic character he is already costumed as in a manner befitting that character.[74] His language is inflected by the character of Telephus, revealing that he has already become Telephus-like during his costume change. The verb ἀπωθοῦμαι is a common verb in both Sophocles and Euripides, but it only appears twice in Aristophanes, lending Dicaeopolis more tragic gravitas before he completes his transformation.[75] The adverb νῦν ("now") and the simple aspect of the aorist imperative γενοῦ both suggest that a transformation takes place at the moment Dicaeopolis commits to pretending to be an importunate beggar. But Dicaeopolis does not turn completely into a tragic character here; the word σκευάριον ("garment," but also, as here, "prop") is exclusively comic. Dicaeopolis transforms into a tragic character but he retains features of Aristophanic comedy in his language, becoming a hybridized tragicomic character.[76]

Dicaeopolis not only takes the accoutrements and characteristics of Telephus, but, according to Euripides, the entirety of his tragedy. Aristophanes suggests that props and costumes comprise the majority of Euripides' tragedies. After Dicaeopolis asks for greens for his basket (Euripides' mother was a grocer), Euripides says, "You'll kill me! Here you go. My plays are gone!" (ἀπολεῖς μ'. ἰδού σοι. φροῦδά μοι τὰ δράματα, 470) and tells him to leave on the grounds that he is taking the entire tragedy: "You'll take my whole tragedy! Get out now you've taken it" (ὦνθρωπ', ἀφαιρήσει με τὴν τραγῳδίαν. / ἄπελθε ταυτηνὶ λαβών, 464f.).[77] As we have seen

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[74] In Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazousae*, Praxagora tells another woman to tie on her beard and become a man, using the same imperative: ἴθι δὴ σὺ περιδοῦ καὶ ταχέως ἀνὴρ γενοῦ (Ar. *Eccl.* 121).
[75] At *Pax* 776, a lyric passage. Also at adesp. com. fr. 208. Cf. Olson (2002: ad 450-52).
[76] Cf. Ar. *Ran.* 172; *Plu.* 809, 1139; Olson (2002: ad loc.).
[77] Olson interprets τραγῳδία as "the art of tragedy" (he cites *Ran.* 95, 798 for comparison) instead of "my tragedy" (2002: ad loc.).

with Dicaeopolis' costume change and the recognition of Cleisthenes through his disguise, the possession of a quality allows someone to be like another person and to be recognized for that quality. Likewise, the acquisition of that quality allows one to become like someone with that quality. The verb λαμβάνω in the aorist tense is an ingressive of ἔχω, the entry to or beginning of an action,[78] so when Euripides tells Dicaeopolis to take (λαβών) his tragedy, he asks him to possess (ἔχων) it, to be characterized by it. After Dicaeopolis asks for a cup with a chipped lip, Euripides equates Dicaeopolis' acquisition of this prop with his character: "Damn you, take it! But know you are being importunate in my home" (φθείρου λαβὼν τόδ' · ἴσθ' ὀχληρὸς ὢν δόμοις, 460). This line is composed of sentences with a parallel structure of imperative verb and nominative participle revealing a parallel structure in thought: the concepts of acquiring (λαβών) a prop and being (ὤν) in character are interrelated. Acquisition implies a transition that results in possession. Similarly, Dicaeopolis "being importunate" (ὀχληρὸς ὤν, 460) does not reveal his essential being but the result of his transformation, the result of becoming like Telephus. Previously Dicaeopolis urges himself to become importunate (νῦν δὴ γενοῦ / γλίσχρος, προσαιτῶν λιπαρῶν τ', 451f.), and while the adjective ὀχληρός does not appear in this list of adjectives, it is synonymous with them and has a paratragic cast, as it is not used in comedy prior to this instance.[79]

Euripides' recognition of Dicaeopolis as importunate shows that he has changed into the Telephus character. Just as the end result of acquisition is possession, the end result of becoming is being. Aristophanes marks Dicaeopolis' transformation with the participial ὤν but, in doing so, shows how becoming is constitutive of being, destabilizing the notion of a fixed, essential identity. Before leaving Euripides, Dicaeopolis recognizes that he is (εἰμί, 470) bothersome, which he

[78] Cf. LSJ s.v. λαμβάνω (A.I.12b). On aorist aspect as ingressive, see Smyth § 1924.
[79] Cf. Olson (2002: ad loc.).

wanted to become earlier: "No more, I'm off. For indeed I am very importunate" (ἀλλ' οὔκετ', ἀλλ' ἄπειμι. καὶ γάρ εἰμ' ἄγαν / ὀχληρός, 471f.). Mimesis is depicted as metamorphic here—Dicaeopolis says he "is" the thing he wanted to become not that he "appears to be" importunate.

Dicaeopolis, now in the guise of Telephus, speaks in the voice of the poet himself and addresses the Athenian audience.

> Δι. μή μοι φθονήσητ', ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι,
> εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν ἔπειτ' ἐν Ἀθηναίοις λέγειν
> μέλλω περὶ τῆς πόλεως, τρυγῳδίαν ποιῶν.
> τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία. (500)
> ἐγὼ δὲ λέξω δεινὰ μέν, δίκαια δέ. (*Ach.* 497-501)
>
> Di.: Don't begrudge me, gentleman in the audience, if as a beggar among Athenian citizens I intend to speak about the city, I who compose trugedies. For trugedy, too, knows what's right. I'll say things that are clever *and* just.

When Dicaeopolis addresses the audience, he does not ask them to forgive him for "appearing" as a beggar, but rather for "being" one (εἰ πτωχὸς ὤν, 499). As Ralph Rosen has argued, Aristophanes' self-reflexivity allows Dicaeopolis' address to work on two levels: 1) Dicaeopolis addresses the Acharnians, and 2) Aristophanes the Athenians (2005: 258). At a metathetical level, the audience (ἄνδρες οἱ θεώμενοι, 497) is reminded of the fact that the actor playing Dicaeopolis is not the character he represents.[80] To whom does the pronoun "me" (μοι) refer in this context? Likewise, the audience has seen Dicaeopolis costume change and knows that he is not actually a beggar, but the participial form of εἰμί suggests that Dicaeopolis *is* a beggar. He has become Telephus, at least momentarily.

The language in this passage reveals Dicaeopolis' tragicomic hybridity as well. Lines 497-98 parody a fragment of Euripides' *Telephus*, when Telephus delivers a speech to Argive

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[80] Whitmarsh describes this passage as a moment of metalepsis that draws attention to the dramatic frame of the comedy and likens it to the parabasis in Old Comedy: "The *parabasis*, then, is not simply of a piece with the play of representations elsewhere in the play; it marks a distinctive moment of frame-breaking" (2013: 13).

commanders while in disguise as a beggar: "Don't begrudge me, O highest of the Greeks, if a beggar dares to speak in the presence of noblemen" (μή μοι φθονήσητ', ἄνδρες Ἑλλήνων ἄκροι, / εἰ πτωχὸς τέτληκ' ἐν ἐσθλοῖσιν λέγειν, Eur. fr. 703, ed. Nauck). Aristophanes invokes the tragic Telephus while simultaneously creating a comic distance for parody. A similar effect occurs with the word τρυγῳδία ("trugedy," "comedy"). The phonological transformation of an alpha to an upsilon results in the genre *trugedy*, which recalls tragedy while referring to the present comedy

Dicaeopolis' preface to his speech echoes what he desired for in a beggarly character. He warns the audience that he will speak terrible yet just truths (ἐγὼ δὲ λέξω δεινὰ μέν, δίκαια δέ, 501), echoing the language he uses when he asks Euripides for the costume of a "lame, importunate, chatty, and clever at speaking" (χωλός, προσαιτῶν, στωμύλος, δεινὸς λέγειν, 429) beggar. Aristophanes puns on the potential meanings of the adjective δεινός, "terrible" and "clever," in these lines.[81] In the earlier passage, δεινός describes Dicaeopolis as the subject who is "clever at speaking" (δεινὸς λέγειν), but in the second passage, δεινά is the object. After his transformation, he has become a person who can and "will say terrible things" (λέξω δεινά). Yet, according to the Chorus, Dicaeopolis delivers a "terrible" speech even before he visits Euripides, that is, before his transformation: "This speech just now is terrible and heart-stopping, if you will dare to speak to us on behalf of the enemy" (τοῦτο τοὔπος δεινὸν ἤδη καὶ ταραξικάρδιον, / εἰ σὺ τολμήσεις ὑπὲρ τῶν πολεμίων ἡμῖν λέγειν, 315f.).

Dicaeopolis speaks terrible truths both before and after his transformation (τοὔπος δεινὸν, 315; λέξω δεινά, 501), revealing a natural predisposition or innate similarly to the character of Telephus before he puts on his costume. The use of the adjective δίκαια ("just") is ironic as well, as it calls attention to Dicaeopolis' identity even as he is now speaking cleverly as Telephus. The

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[81] Cf. LSJ s.v. δεινός (A, III).

Chorus' charge that Dicaeopolis is audacious (τολμήσεις, 316) for speaking on behalf of the enemy echoes the Euripides fragment (τέτλωκε, fr. 703) from Telephus' speech to the Argives. This even before Dicaeopolis' request to make himself appear wretched. The Euripides fragment and the Chorus' lines (315-16) have a similar structure and both emphasize the audacity of speaking transgressively: conditional εἰ; subject noun (πτωχός) or pronoun (σύ); verb of daring (τέτληκε, τολμήσεις); prepositional phrase highlighting the inappropriate context or subject of the speech (ἐν ἐσθλοῖσιν, ὑπὲρ τῶν πολεμίων); and the complementary infinitive λέγειν. The only unique syntactic element in Aristophanes is the indirect object ἡμῖν. Aristophanes' allusion to the Telephus speech shows that there is a preexisting similarity between Dicaeopolis and Telephus at the start of the play, not only in visual appearance but also in their character. Dicaeopolis desires to become a clever speaker (δεινὸς λέγειν), undergoing a transformation that results in the ability to speak persuasively to the Chorus, but he also becomes even more like Telephus than he was previously, despite his anxiety that he only seem to be a beggar but remain who he really is.

After his speech, Dicaeopolis encounters Lamachus, *miles gloriosus* and parody of the Achilles character in Euripides' *Telephus*. Lamachus feels slighted because the Chorus reveals Dicaeopolis has been speaking badly about the entire city.

> Λα. οὗτος, σὺ τολμᾷς πτωχὸς ὢν λέγειν τάδε;
> Δι. ὦ Λάμαχ' ἥρως, ἀλλὰ συγγνώμην ἔχε,
> εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν εἶπόν τι κἀστωμυλάμην. (*Ach.* 577a-79)
>
> La.: Hey you! You dare to say these things even though you're a beggar?
> Di.: Lamachus, my hero, pardon me if even though I'm a beggar I said something and chatted.

For Lamachus, it is impudent of Dicaeopolis to speak so audaciously because of his status as a beggar (πτωχὸς ὤν, 577). Curiously, Dicaeopolis does not offer the excuse "I only appear to be beggar." Instead, he asks Lamachus' pardon for speaking despite being a beggar (εἰ πτωχὸς ὢν

εἶπόν τι, 579). Dicaeopolis also apologizes for chattering (κἀστωμυλάμην, 579). The denominative verb στωμύλλομαι derives from the adjective στωμύλος ("chatty"), the same adjective Dicaeopolis uses to describe Telephus' character to Euripides during the costuming scene (429).[82] Dicaeopolis now performs the same actions that Telephus performs in Euripides' tragedy, and his current state of being (ὤν) is the end result of a metamorphosis. Does Lamachus misrecognize Dicaeopolis when he claims that he is a beggar?

Eventually Dicaeopolis reveals the fact that he is a citizen. While he does not reject outright being called a beggar, he shrugs the question off as if it is ridiculous: "Me, a beggar?" (ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι πτωχός; 594). He does not contradict the possibility that one can be both a beggar and a good citizen (πολίτης χρηστός, 595), or that a citizen may become a beggar, as was the case during the Peloponnesian War.

Λα. οἴμ' ὡς τεθνήξεις. (590)
Δι. μηδαμῶς, ὦ Λάμαχε·
οὐ γὰρ κατ' ἰσχύν ἐστιν· εἰ δ' ἰσχυρὸς εἶ,
τί μ' οὐκ ἀπεψώλησας; εὔοπλος γὰρ εἶ.
Λα. ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγὸν πτωχὸς ὤν;
Δι. ἐγὼ γάρ εἰμι πτωχός;
Λα. ἀλλὰ τίς γὰρ εἶ;
Δι. ὅστις; πολίτης χρηστός, οὐ σπουδαρχίδης, (595)
ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅτου περ ὁ πόλεμος, στρατωνίδης,
σὺ δ' ἐξ ὅτου περ ὁ πόλεμος, μισθαρχίδης. (*Ach.* 590-97)

La.: Oh my god, you're a goner!
Di.: No way, Lamachus. This isn't about strength. If you are strong, why haven't you docked my cock? You are well equipped.
La.: You, a beggar, say these things to a general?
Di.: Me, a beggar?
La.: What else are you?
Di.: What? A good citizen, not a politico. Ever since the war started, I've been a soldier, but you've been on the payroll.

[82] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. στωμύλος.

Aristophanes highlights the class difference between Lamachus' position as a general and Dicaeopolis' status as a beggar by contrasting "general" and "beggar" and placing them next to each other (ταυτὶ λέγεις σὺ τὸν στρατηγὸν πτωχὸς ὤν; 593).[83] But Aristophanes also gestures to the notion of being a multiplicity—Dicaeopolis is both a citizen and a soldier. As we have seen with Dicaeopolis' transformation into Telephus, metamorphosis is a process that takes time. Dicaeopolis says so himself: since the onset of the war, he has been a soldier (ἀλλ' ἐξ ὅτου περ ὁ πόλεμος, στρατωνίδης, 596).

II. *Thesmophoriazusae* (411 BCE)

At the beginning of the *Thesmophoriazusae*, Euripides reveals his plan to his Kinsman to send Agathon to the Thesmophoria. Just as the Megarian vendor in *Acharnians*, Euripides' "plot" (μηχανή, 87) involves disguising another person for his own personal gain.[84]

> Κη. νὴ τὸν Ποσειδῶ καὶ δίκαιά γ' ἂν πάθοις.
> ἀτὰρ τίν' εἰς ταύτας σὺ μηχανὴν ἔχεις;
> Ευ. Ἀγάθωνα πεῖσαι τὸν τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλον
> εἰς Θεσμοφόροιν ἐλθεῖν.
> Κη. τί δράσοντ'; εἰπέ μοι.
> Ευ. ἐκκλησιάσοντ' ἐν ταῖς γυναιξὶ χἂν δέῃ (90)
> λεξονθ' ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ.
> Κη. πότερα φανερὸν ἢ λάθρᾳ;
> Ευ. λάθρᾳ, στολὴν γυναικὸς ἠμφιεσμένον.
> Κη. τὸ πρᾶγμα κομψὸν καὶ σφόδρ' ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ τρόπου·
> τοῦ γὰρ τεχνάχειν ἡμέτερος ὁ πυραμοῦς. (Ar. *Thesm*. 86-94)
>
> Ki.: By Poseidon, you would suffer justly. So what's your plan against them?
> Eu.: To persuade Agathon the tragic poet to go to the Thesmophoria.
> Ki.: To do what? Tell me.
> Eu.: To assemble among the women and, if he has to, speak on my behalf.
> Ki.: Out in the open or in secret?

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[83] Dicaeopolis also brings attention to a perceived difference between himself and Lamachus with his joke at 591f. Where Lamachus claims he is superior to Dicaeopolis because he is a general, Dicaeopolis inverts this hierarchy by joking that Lamachus is "well-equipped" to sexually excite him, thus relegating Lamachus to a servile and passive role. See Smith (2017: 652f.).

[84] Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 738f.: ἀλλ' ἔστι γάρ μοι Μεγαρικά τις μαχανά, / χοίρους γὰρ ὑμὲ σκευάσας φασῶ φέρειν.

Eu.: In secret, wearing a woman's robe.
Ki.: This act is clever and very much like you. For we take the cake in crafting plots.

Euripides equates infiltrating the Thesmophoria "in secret" (λάθρᾳ) to going in disguise: "In secret, wearing a woman's robe" (λάθρᾳ, στολὴν γυναικὸς ἠμφιεσμένον, 92). The adverb λάθρᾳ derives from the verb λανθάνω ("to escape notice"), with Euripides elaborating upon its meaning by putting the rest of the line ("wearing a woman's robe") in apposition. Euripides plans for Agathon to be hidden in plain sight, to be (mis-)recognized as a woman through costume. As we saw in the *Acharnians* with Euripides' slave answering Dicaeopolis "cleverly" (σοφῶς, *Ach.* 401) in the *Acharnians*, cleverness and obfuscation are characteristic of Euripides and Kinsman applauds this plot by saying it is in character (σφόδρ' ἐκ τοῦ σοῦ τρόπου, 93).

Kinsman fails and subsequently refuses to recognize Agathon as a man when the latter is wheeled out on the *ekkyklēma*, revealing the difficulty of recognition.

Ευ. σίγα. (95)
Κη. τί ἐστίν;
Ευ. Ἀγάθων ἐξέρχεται.
Κη. καὶ ποῦ 'στιν;
Ευ. ὅπου 'στίν; οὗτος οὐκκυκλούμενος.
Κη. ἀλλ' ἦ τυφλὸς μέν εἰμ'; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ
ἄνδρ' οὐδέν' ἐνθάδ' ὄντα, Κυρήνην δ' ὁρῶ. (*Thesm.* 95-98)

Eu.: Shut up!
Ki.: What is it?
Eu.: Agathon's coming out.
Ki.: Where is he?
Eu.: Where is he?! He's right here being wheeled out.
Ki.: Am I blind? Because I don't see any man here, but a Cyrene.

Kinsman acts as if he is at a loss by asking where Agathon is (καὶ ποῦ 'στιν; 96), but Euripides insists that the man wheeled onto the stage is Agathon (and that he is a man) with the masculine demonstrative pronoun οὗτος.[85] Aristophanes uses the demonstrative pronoun in a marked way,

[85] On demonstrative pronoun οὗτος emphasizing a preceding subject or object, see Smyth §1252.

similar to the use of the verb εἰμί, signifying simultaneously the ease and difficulty of referentiality. One the one hand, Euripides' identification of Agathon as "this man" is uncomplicated, but, on the other, Kinsman's refusal to recognize Agathon as a man problematizes this. Kinsman questions the grammatical gender of the pronoun—should Euripides have used the pronoun αὕτη, to agree with Κυρήνη?—and also reveals how mimesis destabilizes being since "this man" is on some level not actually "Agathon" because played by an actor.

Just as when Dicaeopolis appears in the form of the beggar, Aristophanes uses a participial form of εἰμί in this passage to mark the end result of transformation: "Because I don't see any man here" (ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ / ἄνδρ' οὐδέν' ἐνθάδ' ὄντα, *Thesm.* 97f.). The use of the masculine accusative participle ὄντα is redundant, but perhaps we can read this use of the verb εἰμί as performative, as if Kinsman means to say "I don't see any man who *is being* a man here." Dicaeopolis is a beggar (πτωχὸς ὤν) because he wears Telephus' rags, and, similarly, Agathon is not a man (ἀνὴρ οὐδεὶς ὤν), at least in the eyes of Kinsman, because of his effeminate appearance and apparel. While Euripides claims Agathon is the man they're looking for, Agathon's dress and comportment affects his being to such an extent that he can both be and not be a man at the same time.

Kinsman's confusion concerning Agathon's gender compels him to attempt to read the props surrounding the tragedian, props that would determine whether the tragedian is male or female.

> Κη. ὡς ἡδὺ τὸ μέλος, ὦ πότνιαι Γενετυλλίδες, (130)
> καὶ θηλυδριῶδες καὶ κατεγλωττισμένον
> καὶ μανδαλωτόν, ὥστ' ἐμοῦ γ' ἀκροωμένου
> ὑπὸ τὴν ἕδραν αὐτὴν ὑπῆλθε γάργαλος.
> καί σ', ὦ νεανίσχ', ἥτις εἶ, κατ' Αἰσχύλον
> ἐκ τῆς Λυκουργείας ἐρέσθαι βούλομαι. (135)

ποδαπὸς ὁ γύννις; τίς πάτρα; τίς ἡ στολή;
τίς ἡ τάραξις τοῦ βίου; τί βάρβιτος
λαλεῖ κροκωτῷ; τί δὲ λυρὰ κεκρυφάλῳ;
τί λήκυθος καὶ στρόφιον; ὡς οὐ ξύμφορον.
τίς δαὶ κατρόπτου καὶ ξίφους κοινωνία; (140)
σύ τ' αὐτός, ὦ παῖ, πότερον ὡς ἀνὴρ τρέφει;
καὶ ποῦ πέος; ποῦ χλαῖνα; ποῦ Λακωνικαί;
ἀλλ' ὡς γυνὴ δῆτ'; εἶτα ποῦ τὰ τιτθία;
τί φῄς; τί σιγᾷς; ἀλλὰ δῆτ' ἐκ τοῦ μέλους
ζητῶ σ', ἐπειδή γ' αὐτὸς οὐ βούλει φράσαι; (*Thesm.* 130-45) (145)

Ki.: By the Holy Gentyllides, how sweet a song! Effeminate, too, and french-kissed, and snogged! As I listened to it, my whole ass tickled! Young man, as in Aeschylus' *Lycurgeia*, I want to ask you who you are. Where does this girlyness come from? What is its fatherland? its robe? What disturbance of life is this? What does the lyre say to saffron robes? Or a hairnet? What do an oil jug and a bra have to do with each other? They just don't go together! What do a mirror and sword have in common? And you yourself, boy, were you brought up as a man? So where's your dick? your cloak? your Spartan shoes? Or, as a woman then? Then where are your tits? What do you say? Nothing? Or must I search for you in your song since you yourself don't want to say?

Agathon performs his gender through clothing, but Kinsman requires further proof in the form of props in order to recognize him, just as Dicaeopolis asks Euripides for props in addition to a raggedy costume in order to become a more convincing Telephus. Kinsman calls Agathon's gender fluidity a "confusion of life" (ἡ τάραξις τοῦ βίου, 137). Agathon's transformation is one of hybridity: he has become an androgynous figure with masculine and feminine objects around him (e.g., a mirror and a sword), and his body is difficult to read as well, lacking both the comic phallus ("Where's your penis?", καὶ ποῦ πέος; 142) and breasts ("So where're your tits?", εἶτα ποῦ τὰ τιτθία; 143). As Anne Duncan has argued, Agathon is not merely a drag-queen but a "'disrupter of categories' (masculine/feminine, poet/actor, actor/character), and thus less easily dismissed" (2006: 35). This disruption (or confusion, τάραξις) influences Kinsman's language—he cannot make up his mind on how to read Agathon. Consequently, he addresses him both as "young man" (νεανίσκος) and asks him who "she" is with the feminine interrogative pronoun ἥτις

in immediate succession (ὦ νεανίσχ', ἥτις εἶ, 135). The chiastic structure of this address adds to this confusion: a long vowel sound (ὦ) is followed by a masculine noun (νεανίσκος), then feminine pronoun (ἥτις), and finally another long vowel sound with the diphthong εἶ. While Kinsman wants to contrast genders, Aristophanes utilizes near rhyme (*neanisk'*, *hētis*) to emphasize the sonic similarity of the words "young man" and the feminine pronoun "who," and by addressing Agathon as "child" (ὦ παῖ, 141), Kinsman introduces a kind of third term that can be perceived as either masculine or feminine.

Agathon explains to Kinsman that he crossdresses because it aids him in writing women's roles.

> Αγ. ὦ πρέσβυ πρέσβυ, τοῦ φθόνου μὲν τὸν ψόγον
> ἤκουσα, τὴν δ' ἄλγησιν οὐ παρεσχόμην·
> ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆθ' ἅμα τῇ γνώμῃ φορῶ.
> χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ δράματα
> ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν. (150)
> αὐτίκα γυναικεῖ' ἢν ποιῇ τις δράματα,
> μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν.
> Κη. οὐκοῦν κελητίζεις, ὅταν Φαίδραν ποιῇς;
> Αγ. ἀνδρεῖα δ' ἢν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι
> ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦθ'. ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα, (155)
> μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεύεται. (*Thesm.* 146-56)
>
> Ag.: Old man, old man! I heard your envious blame, but I didn't feel pain. I wear the clothes together with the mindset. For, to be a poet, a man must have the character in regard to what he has to do in his dramas. If someone writes dramas about women, his body must participate in their character.
> Ki.: So, when you write a *Phaedra*, you ride on top?
> Ag.: If someone writes plays about men, this subject is present in his body, but what we don't possess, mimesis already hunts those out.

Agathon uses a sartorial metaphor to compare the character's mindset to a costume: "I wear the clothes together with the mindset" (ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν ἐσθῆθ' ἅμα τῇ γνώμῃ φορῶ, 148).[86] Costume

[86] In Sophocles' *Antigone* Haimon uses the same verb φορέω when he asks his father Creon to reconsider his judgment: μή νυν ἓν ἦθος μοῦνον ἐν σαυτῷ φόρει, / ὡς φὴς σύ, κοὐδὲν ἄλλο, τοῦτ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν (Soph. *Ant.* 705f.).

enables Agathon to become somebody else, to inhabit their body and character, because it affects his own bodily comportment. Interestingly, the inverse seems to be the case when women take off their clothing. For example, when Candaules orders Gyges to look at his wife naked, Gyges says "a woman takes off her modesty at the same time as the *chiton* is taken off" (ἅμα δὲ κιθῶνι ἐκδυομένῳ συεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή, Hdt. 1.9.3). For Agathon, putting on another's clothes changes one's mindset, but for Gyges, when a woman takes off her own clothes (as opposed to a costume) she strips away her modesty or sense of shame. This Herodotean example highlights the transformative nature of putting on and taking off clothing. The act of stripping does not merely reveal a woman's body and her essential being, but transforms her into someone shameless, something she was not necessarily before.[87]

In order to compose parts for his tragedies Agathon claims that "it is necessary for a poet, being a man, to possess the characteristics in accordance with those dramas he writes" (χρὴ γὰρ ποιητὴν ἄνδρα πρὸς τὰ δράματα / ἃ δεῖ ποιεῖν, πρὸς ταῦτα τοὺς τρόπους ἔχειν, *Thesm.* 149f.). While the sense of these lines suggests something like "a poet must possess the characteristics for the dramas he writes," the parallel structure of Agathon's "overelaborate" style implies a correlation between the ideas that the poet must "perform" or "do" (ποιεῖν) something in character and also that he must "possess" (ἔχειν) the characteristics of those he represents.[88] What a poet must do and possess are not abstract personal qualities, but embodied: "The [sc. poet's] body must participate in their character" (μετουσίαν δεῖ τῶν τρόπων τὸ σῶμ' ἔχειν, 152). Agathon revises the concept that the possession of a quality informs one's being (as we have seen

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[87] Outside of the environment of Pl. *Symp*. of male self-love, Ag. in *Thesm*. attracts *phthonos* & *psogos* from the Kinsman (Sissa 2012: 28). in comedy, Agathon can only be met with scorn & envy (2012: 56).

[88] Following Austin and Olson's reading: "An awkward way of saying τρόπους ἔχειν πρὸς τὰ δράματα ἃ ποιεῖ, but the clumsiness (or overelaboration) is part of the implicit critique of Agathon's poetic style" (2004: ad loc.).

in the *Acharnians*) by focusing on the plasticity of the body. He claims that he can become another person and possess (ἔχω) a portion of her characteristics (οἱ τρόποι) by wearing different clothes. Kinsman does not take this answer very seriously, continuing to joke about Agathon's sexuality.[89] In response, Agathon explains that male characters are already present in his body: "If someone writes plays about men, this subject is present in his body" (ἀνδρεῖα δ' ἢν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι / ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦθ', 154f.). His response may seem to be a non-answer to Kinsman's joke, but it serves two functions: 1) as an apology for Agathon's effeminate dress; and 2) and as an answer to Kinsman's criticism of his ambiguous gender. Agathon can both dress like and represent women while also being a man, hence the emphatic use of the noun ἀνήρ in the predicate position.[90]

While Agathon's emphasis on his capacity to represent male characters because of his being male may seem essentialist, he continues to say that transformation is possible through mimesis: "What we don't possess, mimesis already hunts those out" (ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα, / μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεύεται, 155f.).[91] In Aristophanes, the possession of a quality is aligned with being, but Agathon suggests that even that which we do not possess (ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα) can be acquired. The συν- prefix of the verb συνθηρεύομαι "may mark the completion" of the action of a compound verb,[92] so we can infer that mimesis "completely hunts out" (i.e. it succeeds in its

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[89] While clearly a joke about Agathon's sexual preferences and femininity (οὐκοῦν κελητίζεις, ὅταν Φαίδραν ποιῇς; 153), it is interesting that Kinsman's idea of "character" is one dictated by behavior. On *praxis* as central to plot and character, cf. Arist. *Poet.*

[90] Cf. Austin and Olson (2004: ad loc.).

[91] Muecke argues that the use of the word *mimēsis* in *Thesm.* may not point to any artistic theory and claims that Aristophanes means something like "disguising oneself as a mime actor does" here (1982: 55). Else sees this as an example of *mimēsis*' meaning rooted in mime (1958: 81): "Thus it is noteworthy how often in Aristophanes, the comedian, *mimeisthai* and *mimêsis* (he never uses *mimêma*) seem to bring us a whiff from the world of mime."

[92] Smyth §1648.

hunt) the attributes Agathon needs to compose feminine dramatic parts. The συν- prefix reveals Agathon's view that mimesis is an additive process: Agathon will acquire the characteristics he does not currently possess while he represents a woman, but he will not lose anything in the process. This recalls his statement that he wears women's clothes "at the same time as" (or "with," ἅμα) their mindset. The present tense of the verb suggests that this process of becoming is continuous and never complete even if it is sufficient for Agathon's purposes.

Anne Duncan has argued that even if Agathon may seem to embody a postmodern theory of a constructed identity, he ultimately embodies the sex-gender system of classical Athens where one's "innermost nature [is] expressed naturally in one's body and appearance" (2006: 36).[93] Agathon even claims that poets produce tragedies that are characteristic of themselves:

> Αγ. καὶ Φρύνιχος—τοῦτον γὰρ οἶν ἀκήκοας—
> αὐτός τε καλὸς ἦν καὶ καλῶς ἠμπίσχετο·
> διὰ τοῦτ' ἄρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ κάλ' ἦν τὰ δράματα.
> ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.
> Κη. ταῦτ' ἄρ' ὁ Φιλοκλέης αἰσχρὸς ὢν αἰσχρῶς ποιεῖ,
> ὁ δὲ Ξενοκλέης ὢν κακὸς κακῶς ποιεῖ,
> ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὢν ψυχρῶς ποιεῖ.
> Αγ. ἅπασ' ἀνάγκη. ταῦτα γάρ τοι γνοὺς ἐγὼ
> ἐμαυτὸν ἐθεράπευσα. (Ar. *Thesm.* 164ff.)
>
> Ag.: And Phrynichus, of course you've heard of him, he both was beautiful and and beautifully dressed. Because of this, then, his plays were beautiful, too. For one must compose plays similar to one's nature.
> Ki.: So because Philocles is ugly, he composes ugly plays! And Xenocles, since he's base, composes basely, and, again, frigid Theognis composes frigidly!
> Ag.: Completely out of necessity. In fact, because I know these things, I treated myself.

Agathon claims that "one has to write things similar to one's nature" (ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει, 167), alluding in his theory of poetic composition to the 5th century debate between *nomos*

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[93] Duncan also argues that Agathon is more like an actor than poet because he is changeable in style and fluid in identity even if he, like Euripides and Aeschylus, is identified by the kinds of plays he wrote (2006: 26). Cf. Muecke: "Perhaps then Agathon's maxim is truer of himself than he will admit, and the fact that he is effeminate means that he writes effeminately" (1982: 54).

and *physis*. Yet while Agathon may be naturally effeminate and express that in his cross-dressing, he suggests that nature is malleable from the outside in, especially through clothing.[94] Agathon notes that Phrynichus is beautiful (καλὸς ἦν, 165) but also that he dresses beautifully (καλῶς ἠμπίσχετο). It is Kinsman who reduces poets' creative output entirely to their nature. He does not consider poets' dress; instead he thinks of poets as characterized by a singular quality, emphasizing this with a participial form of εἰμί: Philocles is ugly (ὁ Φιλοκλέης αἰσχρὸς ὤν, 168), ergo he writes in an ugly manner; Xenocles is base (ὁ δὲ Ξενοκλέης ὢν κακὸς, 169); and Theognis is frigid (ὁ δ' αὖ Θέογνις ψυχρὸς ὤν, 170).

In order to persuade Agathon to infiltrate the Thesmophoria, Euripides claims that he cannot play the role of a woman because he will be recognized.

> Αγ. τίς οὖν παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστιν ὠφέλειά σοι;
> Ευ. ἥ πᾶσ' · ἐὰν γὰρ ἐγκαθεζόμενος λάθρᾳ
> ἐν ταῖς γυναιξίν, ὡς δοκῶν εἶναι γυνή, (185)
> ὑπεραποκρίνῃ μου, σαφῶς σώσεις ἐμέ.
> μόνος γὰρ ἂν λέξειας ἀξίως ἐμοῦ.
> Αγ. ἔπειτα πῶς οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀπολογεῖ παρών;
> Ευ. ἐγὼ φράσω σοι. πρῶτα μὲν γιγνώσκομαι ·
> ἔπειτα πολιός εἰμι καὶ πώγων' ἔχω, (190)
> σὺ δ' εὐπρόσωπος, λευκός, ἐξυρημένος,
> γυναικόφωνος, ἁπαλός, εὐρπρεπὴς ἰδεῖν. (*Thesm.* 183-92)
>
> Ag.: Then how can I help you?
> Eu.: Completely—for if you sit among the women in secret, since you will seem to be a woman, and defend me, you will obviously save me. For you alone could speak worthily of me.
> Ag.: Then why don't you attend and speak on your own behalf?

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[94] Cf. Sissa: "This is a metamorphic theory of mimesis. The poet mimics whatever he is representing; the poet actually *becomes* each one of his characters. No ontology here: just the self-shaping of the poet, whose art consists in altering himself" (2012: 56). Muecke suggests that Agathon may be dressed in a longer *chiton*, which lyric poets such as Anacreon would have worn. The Kinsman is incapable of reading his ambiguous clothing, though, and therefore thinks he is dressed as a woman (1982: 43). Cf. Bassi's reading of gender and women's clothing in *Lysistrata* (1998: 108).

> Eu.: I'll tell you: I'll be recognized straight away since I'm gray-haired and have a beard, but you! You have a beautiful face and a womanly voice, you're pale, clean-shaven, tender, and fine to look upon.

Euripides says he will be recognized, "since I'm gray-haired and have a beard" (ἔπειτα πολιός εἰμι καὶ πώγων' ἔχω, 190), equating being (εἰμί) with the possession of a quality (πώγωνα ἔχω) by means of the conjunction καί, whereas Agathon can pass as a woman because he is clean-shaven (ἐξυρημένος, 191), the same adjective used to describe the effeminate Cleisthenes in the *Acharnians*.[95] Euripides does not make the same mistake as Kinsman, who misreads Agathon's ambiguous gender and vacillates between masculine and feminine gendered words. Instead, he consistently applies masculine gender participles and adjectives to Agathon, such as ἐγκαθεζόμενος, δοκῶν, μόνος (185-86). Euripides may favor the idea that Agathon merely "seems to be a woman" (δοκῶν εἶναι γυνή, 185) and has not undergone a more definitive change, but the list of Agathon's effeminate qualities points to the idea that Agathon is somehow different than the typical Athenian male. Apart from λευκός and ἁπαλός, Euripides uses compound adjectives to describe Agathon, reintroducing a kind of ambiguity to Agathon's gender despite the consistent grammatical gender because both masculine and feminine compound adjectives share the same ending (εὐπρόσωπος, ἐξυρημένος, γυναικόφωνος, εὐρπρεπὴς, 191f.).[96] These adjectives show how Agathon can pass both as a woman and as a man and how mimesis has affected Agathon's being, effectively making him hybrid. In addition to being a two-ending adjective with the same masculine and feminine forms, the adjective γυναικόφωνος is a possessive compound, with which "the idea of having (ἔχων) is to be supplied."[97] Thus, the predicative

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[95] Ar. *Ach.* 119.

[96] Both λευκός and ἁπαλός are frequently used to describe women, and ἁπαλός, while simple, looks and sounds like a compound adjective as well.

[97] Smyth §898. For adjectives of two endings, see Smyth §288.

structure of the phrase "you are woman-voiced" (σὺ δὲ γυναικόφωνος) can also be thought of as a possession of a quality: "You have the voice of a woman."

Although Agathon would play a convincing woman, he refuses to infiltrate the Thesmophoria.

> Ευ. τί δ' ἐστὶν ὅτι δέδοικας ἐλθεῖν αὐτόσε;
> Αγ. κάκιον ἀπολοίμην ἢ σύ.
> Ευ. πῶς;
> Αγ. ὅπως;
> δοκῶν γυναικῶν ἔργα νυκτερείσια
> κλέπτειν ὑφαρπάζειν τε θήλειαν Κύπριν. (205)
> Κη. ἰδού γε κλέπτειν· νὴ Δία, βινεῖσθαι μὲν οὖν.
> ἀτὰρ ἡ πρόφασις γε νὴ Δί' εἰκότως ἔχει. (*Thesm.* 202-7)
>
> Eu.: Why do you fear going there?
> Ag.: I would die a worse death than you!
> Eu.: How so?
> Ag.: How so?! I'd seem to steal women's nighttime works and to snatch away their feminine sexuality.
> Ki.: Stealing?! By Zeus, more like getting fucked, but his excuse is pretty likely.

The phrase "seeming to steal women's nighttime works" (δοκῶν γυναικῶν ἔργα νυκτερείσια / κλέπτειν, 204f.) echoes Euripides' claim that Agathon will "seem to be a woman" (δοκῶν εἶναι γυνή, 185). But the fact that Agathon worries only that he will seem to be stealing, in addition to Kinsman's response ("Stealing?!, ἰδού γε κλέπτειν· 206), implies that he already possesses a feminine sexuality, that he does not need to steal it.[98] Agathon will neither seem to be a woman nor seem to steal (κλέπτειν, ὑφαρπάζειν) anything pertaining to women if he can become a woman, as he has already, because he already possesses those qualities.

Kinsman volunteers to dress up as a woman in Agathon's stead. What follows is his onstage transformation into a female character. Euripides tells Kinsman that first he must strip

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[98] The adverb ἰδού, formed from the aorist imperative of ὁράω, can be used to mean "look!" or "behold!" but here it adds a quizzical tone to the verb κλέπτειν that follows it. Cf. LSJ s.v. ἰδού (A. 4).

off his cloak ("Take off your cloak," ἀπόδυθι τουτὶ θοἰμάτιον, 214) and then proceeds to shave him.

> Ευ. μή φροντίσῃς· ὡς εὐπρεπὴς φανεῖ πάνυ.
> βούλει θεᾶσθαι σαυτόν;
> Κη. εἰ δοκεῖ, φέρε.
> Ευ. ὁρᾷς σεαυτόν; (235)
> Κη. οὐ μὰ Δι', ἀλλὰ Κλεισθένη. (*Thesm.* 233-35)
>
> Eur.: Don't worry about it, you'll look very handsome. You want to see yourself?
> Ki.: Ok, if you think so.
> Eur.: Do you see yourself?
> Ki.: My god! No, I see Cleisthenes!

Kinsman no longer recognizes himself, seeing "Cleisthenes" in the mirror (οὐ μὰ Δι', ἀλλὰ Κλεισθένη, 255) instead because he is clean-shaven. This is another example of a running Cleisthenes gag in Aristophanes, but Kinsman also shows how possessing certain qualities affects character and identity. While Kinsman is not actually Cleisthenes, he sees a similarity in himself to the politician that was not present until he changed his appearance. At the beginning of the passage, Euripides assures Kinsman that the latter will become very beautiful (ὡς εὐπρεπὴς φανεῖ πάνυ, 233), using the same adjective, εὐπρεπής ("comely") he used to describe Agathon (192). By shaving his face, Kinsman becomes a Cleisthenes or an Agathon. That is, at this intermediate stage of his transformation into a woman, he has already changed into an effeminate man. Kinsman is not play-acting or imitating the politician or tragedian here.[99] He does not recognize himself because he did not consider himself like Cleisthenes or Agathon previously, but now that he has physically changed, he and Euripides recognize this in him.

Euripides asks Agathon to supply Kinsman with his own clothes, including a dress (ἱμάτιον, 250), bra (στρόφιον, 251), wrap (ἔγκυκλον, 261), and sandals (ὑποδημάτων, 262), as well

[99] The masculine Kinsman seems to be changed by cross-dressing as well as affected by Agathon's earlier performance, realizing Socrates' concern of men becoming unmanly through mimesis in the *Republic* (Duncan 2006: 46).

as a wig (κεφαλὴ περίθετος, 258).[100] Much like the scene where Dicaeopolis slowly accretes more and more props to become Telephus, Kinsman's transformation is depicted as a process where he adds more and more pieces to his costume. Before exiting, Agathon tells Kinsman, "You have what you need" (ἔχεις γὰρ ὧν δέει, 264), reiterating the need to possess certain props or clothes in order to become someone else.[101] Kinsman clearly makes a ridiculous figure, but he has the requisite costume and props to pretend to be a woman, and Euripides recognizes this.

> Ευ. ἀνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὑτοσὶ καὶ δὴ γυνὴ
> τό γ' εἶδος· ἢν λαλῇς δ', ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι
> γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς. (*Thesm.* 266-68)
>
> Eu.: Our man here is a woman, at least in appearance. If you speak, make sure to really play up the woman with your voice.

The enjambement between the first two lines results in a couple possibilities for reading Kinsman's transformation: 1) because of the predicative structure of this sentence, Kinsman, a man (ἀνήρ, 266), *is* a woman (γυνή, ibid.); yet 2) the following line undercuts the transformation as only occurring "in appearance" (τὸ γ' εἶδος, 267), i.e. superficially. Aristophanes suggests that costumes and props allow for a kind of double identity where an Agathon or a Kinsman remains a man but is also a woman.[102] This effect becomes greater over time as, for example, with Agathon, who becomes more and more habituated to being a woman to such an extent that he would be the most beautiful woman at the Thesmophoria. The audience is aware that Kinsman

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[100] Following Muecke, who argues that we can determine what Agathon wore by looking at the scene when Kinsman gets dressed because the order in which they are given to him seems to be the order in which Agathon would have to strip them off (i.e. outer wear, ἱμάτιον, στρόφιον, κροκώτος) (1982: 50).

[101] Similarly, Dicaeopolis says he "needs" props to fully transform into Telephus: ἀτὰρ δέομαί γε πτωχικοῦ βακτηρίου (*Ach.* 448); ὦ θύμ', ὁρᾷς γὰρ ὡς ἀπωθοῦμαι δόμων, / πολλῶν δεόμενος σκευαρίων (*Ach.* 450f.).

[102] Lada-Richards argues that the comic perspective of double identity is similar to Brechtian *Verfremdung* (1997).

is pretending to be a woman, that he is both at once, but in tragedy, this doubleness is purposefully not given attention because it disrupts suspension of disbelief.

The Chorus Leader opens the Thesmophoria by cursing women who make peace with Euripides or the Medes, equating the tragedian with Athens' longtime enemy. The women censure Euripides because of how he represents them, but the problem is not misrepresentation. Rather, Mica says, Euripides represents women as they are, so "We can no longer act as we did before" (δρᾶσαι δ' ἔθ' ἡμῖν οὐδὲν ὥσπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ / ἔξεστι, *Thesm*. 398f.). Before Euripides' fate can be decided, Cleisthenes enters the scene to warn the women of an imposter.

> Κρ. παύσασθε λοιδορούμεναι· καὶ γὰρ γυνή τις ἡμῖν
> ἐσπουδακυῖα προστρέχει. πρὶν οὖν ὁμοῦ γενέσθαι,
> σιγᾶθ', ἵν' αὐτῆς κοσμίως πυθώμεθ' ἅττα λέξει.
> Κλ. φίλαι γυναῖκες, ξυγγενεῖς τοὐμοῦ τρόπου·
> ὅτι μὲν φίλος εἴμ' ὑμῖν, ἐπίδηλον ταῖς γνάθοις. (575)
> γυναικομανῶ γὰρ προζενῶ θ' ὑμῶν ἀεί. (*Thesm.* 571-76)
>
> Cr.: Stop abusing each other, for some woman is running towards us in a hurry. So be quiet at once before she gets here so that we may hear from her what she has to say.
> Cl.: Dear women, kinswomen of my character. It's quite clear from my cheeks that I'm dear to you. I'm simply crazy about women and will be your ally forever.

As Cleisthenes approaches, Critylla recognizes him as a woman (γυνή τις, 571) and refers to him with a feminine participle (ἐσπουδακυῖα, 572) and pronoun (αὐτῆς, 573). Cleisthenes refers to himself with the masculine adjective φίλος ("dear," 575), a morphological correction of Critylla gendering him female, but he calls the assembled women "dear" (φίλαι γυναῖκες, 575) and asserts that he feels a kinship with women because of their shared character (ξυγγενεῖς τοὐμοῦ τρόπου, 575). The adjective συγγενής ("inborn," "akin") is used metaphorically here to suggest a kind of kinship beyond family lines.[103] Cleisthenes is a man but his position as a friend (φίλος) and

[103] Cf. LSJ s.v. συγγενής (II.2).

relative (συγγενής) to women puts him in an intermediary position. He says he will act as their *proxenos* or "public ally" forever (προξενῶ θ' ὑμῶν ἀεί, 576), further emphasizing his special relationship with women and his position adjacent to them.[104] Critylla's recognition of Cleisthenes as "some woman" can be read either either as a recognition or misrecognition since Cleisthenes is dear and cognate to women, highlighting his closeness and similarity to them, while also being an ally of a foreign power, a man. Cleisthenes points to own his clean-shaven cheeks as a sign (ἐπίδηλον ταῖς γνάθοις, 575) or token of recognition of this special relationship. After Cleisthenes mentions the risk of a spy's presence at the women's assembly, Critylla calls him by the third term "child": "What's the risk, child? For it's fitting to call you 'child' for as long as you have bare cheeks" (τί δ' ἐστίν, ὦ παῖ; παῖδα γάρ σ' εἰκὸς καλεῖν, / ἕως ἂν οὕτως τὰς γνάθους ψιλὰς ἔχῇς, Ar. *Thesm.* 582f.). The noun παῖς is a common noun and can be either masculine or feminine. By calling Cleisthenes a child, Critylla neuters him. This works as a joke at his expense, likening his effeminacy to prepubescence, but it also shows how Cleisthenes has become ambiguous or hybrid like Agathon since he is no longer easily categorized as male or female.

Cleisthenes' close kinship to women may explain his understanding of how a man could hide in plain sight among an assembly of women: "Euripides singed and plucked him and he furnished him like a woman with everything else" (ἄφευσεν αὐτὸν κἀπέτιλ' Εὐριπίδης / καὶ τἄλλ' ἅπανθ' ὥσπερ γυναῖκ' ἐσκεύασεν, *Thesm.* 590f.). Cleisthenes understands the plan because of his own liminal, ambiguous gender and propensity for transformation. Cleisthenes' second-hand description of the plot echoes the language from earlier in the comedy with the verb ἀφεύω ("singe off"). When Euripides costumes Kinsman, he shaves him and singes off his hair: "I'm going to shave all this and singe off everything downstairs" ([sc. μέλλω] ἀποξυρεῖν ταδί, / τὰ

[104] Later, during the same exchange, Critylla addresses Cleisthenes as a "public ally" as well (ὦ πρόξενε, *Thesm.* 602).

κάτω δ' ἀφεύειν, 215f.). Cleisthenes treats Kinsman's transformation as a costume change with the metatheatrical verb σκευάζω, which Dicaeopolis applies to Cleisthenes himself when he is disguised as a eunuch (τὸν πώγων' ἔχων / εὐνοῦχος ἡμῖν ἦλθες ἐσκευασμένος; *Ach.* 120f.).

The women at the Thesmophoria treat costume as a disguise, and not transformative.

> Κο. τὸ πρᾶγμα τουτὶ δεινὸν εἰσαγγέλλεται.
> ἀλλ', ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐκ ἐλινύειν ἐχρῆν,
> ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ ζητεῖν ὅπου
> λέληθεν ἡμᾶς κρυπτὸς ἐγκαθήμενος. (600)
> καὶ σὺ ξυνέξευρ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἂν τὴν χάριν
> ταύτην τε κἀκείνην ἔχῃς, ὦ πρόξενε. (*Thesm.* 597-602)
>
> Cho.: This matter you have announced is terrible. But we mustn't sit back and relax, women! But look out for the man and seek where he's sitting hidden and unnoticed. Help us look for him, ally, so you can earn our favor for this as well as your report.

The Chorus Leader genders the infiltrator as masculine, revealing the prevalent view of costume as disguise: Kinsman is only hidden (κρυπτός) and unnoticed (λέληθεν)—his essential identity is unchanged. When the Chorus Leader realizes she they does not recognize Kinsman, she tells Cleisthenes: "Wait a minute and look closely at her, for her alone, sir, we do not recognize" (ἀνάμενε δῆτα καὶ σκόπει γ' αὐτὴν σφόδρα· / μόνην γὰρ αὐτήν, ὦνερ, οὐ γιγνώσκομεν, 613f.). Yet, although Kinsman is suspected to be a man, the Chorus Leader still refers to him as "her" with the feminine pronoun αὐτή (613, 614) and the feminine adjective μόνη, just as when she misrecognizes Cleisthenes.

When Cleisthenes tests Kinsman, he is unable to give Cleisthenes any particulars, referring to her husband as "Mr. So-and-so" (ὁ δεῖνα, 620) and her roommate "Ms. So-and-so" (ἡ δεῖνα, 625). Kinsman's language has no clear referent, so Mica reasons that Kinsman has never been to the Thesmophoria before and therefore must not be a woman: "You aren't saying anything. Come here, here, Cleisthenes. This man is the one you mentioned" (οὐδὲν λέγεις. δεῦρ'

ἐλθέ, δεῦρ’, ὦ Κλείσθενες. / ὅδ’ ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ ὃν λέγεις, 634f.). Mica’s orders to strip Kinsman recall Kinsman’s interrogation of Agathon earlier in the play because they share an essentialist understanding of gender determined by *physis*.

> Μι. ὡς καὶ στιβαρά τις φαίνεται καὶ καρτερά ·
> καὶ νὴ Δία τιτθούς γ’ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχει. (640)
> Κη. στερίφη γάρ εἰμι κοὐκ ἐκύησα πώποτε.
> Μι. νυνδὴ δὲ μήτηρ ἦσθα παίδων ἐννέα.
> Κλ. ἀνίστασ’ ὀρθός. ποῖ τὸ πέος ὠθεῖς κάτω; (*Thesm*. 639-43)
>
> Mi.: How stout and strong she appears to be! And, by Zeus, she doesn’t have tits as we do.
> Ki.: Because I’m barren and I’ve never been pregnant.
> Mi.: You were just now the mother of nine children.
> Cl.: Stand up straight. Where are you pushing your dick down there?

Kinsman only “appears” (φαίνεται, 639) to be a woman, but that appearance is not convincing because of how “stout” (στιβαρά) and “strong” (καρτερά) she is. Mica ironizes Kinsman’s femininity by using feminine adjectives, implying that Kinsman’s strength and sturdy build undermine the artificiality of his costume and that his inner, essential nature is revealed under his feminine clothing. Kinsman cannot be a woman because “he doesn’t have tits like we do” (τιτθούς γ’ ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχει, 640). This lack determines how the women at the Thesmophoria read Kinsman’s gender. Cleisthenes assumes Kinsman’s maleness with the masculine adjective ὀρθός and then looks for Kinsman’s penis as a marker of who he really is (ἀνίστασ’ ὀρθός. ποῖ τὸ πέος ὠθεῖς κάτω; 643). Yet the past tense of the verb εἰμί echoes the language of transformation we have seen in Aristophanes. Until proven otherwise, Mica tells Kinsman, “You were just now the mother of nine children” (νυνδὴ δὲ μήτηρ ἦσθα παίδων ἐννέα, 642). Mica says this in order to show how Kinsman has contradicted himself, but it reveals that before he was discovered, Kinsman “was” a woman because of his costume and behavior.

After Kinsman's arrest, the Chorus exhort themselves to find any other men hidden on the Pnyx.

> Χο. ἡμᾶς τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτ' ἤδη τὰς λαμπάδας ἁψαμένας χρὴ (655)
> ζυζωσαμένας εὖ κἀνδρείως τῶν θ' ἱματίων ἀποδύσας
> ζητεῖν, εἴ που κἄλλος τις ἀνὴρ ἐπελήλυθε, καὶ περιθρέξαι
> τὴν πύκνα πᾶσαν καὶ τὰς σκηνὰς καὶ τὰς διόδους διαθρῆσαι. (*Thesm.* 655ff.)
>
> Cho.: So after this we now must light our lamps, gird up our loins well and bravely, strip our clothes and inquire whether somehow some other man has also invaded. We must also run around the whole Pnyx and examine both the tents and passages.

The Chorus Leader's imperative to search for men works on several levels: 1) at the basic level of the plot, it is a command to seek out more spies among the women at the Thesmophoria. 2) On a metatheatrical level, it's a joke that the women on the Pnyx should strip (ἀποδύσας, 656) and join the search "bravely" (κἀνδρείως, ibid.), with the adverb punning on the Greek word for man, ἀνήρ.[105] Of course, if the women stripped off their costumes, it would reveal that the actors are men. And 3) after the search, the Chorus insults the audience, another joke, but this time breaking the fourth wall, when they say: "But it seems to us that everything looks fine. For we at least don't see any other man sitting among us" (ἀλλ' ἔοιχ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντά πως διεσκέφθαι καλῶς. / οὐχ ὁρῶμεν γοῦν ἔτ' ἄλλον οὐδέν' ἐγκαθήμενον, 686f.).

In the *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis becomes a tragic character as he puts on a costume and acquires props, but in the *Thesmophoriazusae* Kinsman introduces us to the inverse idea, that stripping something will reveal its inner essence. Both plays parody the hostage scene from Euripides' *Telephus* but to different effect and with a different emphasis on how mimesis works: when Dicaeopolis abducts the Acharnians basket of coal, it adds to his characterization as

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[105] At the end of the *Thesmosphoriazusae*, Euripides tells Kinsman to run act "like a man" (ἀνδρικῶς, 1204) and run off to his wife and kids. Does he need a reminder because he's been in character?

Telephus; but when Kinsman takes Mica's baby hostage as leverage for his own escape, the focus is on the revelation that the baby is a wineskin.

> Κη. ὕφαπτε καὶ κάταιθε· σὺ δὲ τὸ Κρητικὸν (730)
> ἀπόδυθι ταχέως· τοῦ θανάτου δ', ὦ παιδίον,
> μόνην γυναικῶν αἰτιῶ τὴν μητέρα.
> τουτὶ τί ἐστιν; ἀσκὸς ἐγένεθ' ἡ κόρη
> οἴνου πλέως, καὶ ταῦτα Περσικὰς ἔχων.
> ὦ θερμόταται γυναῖκες, ὦ ποτίσταται (735)
> κἀκ παντὸς ὑμεῖς μηχανώμεναι πιεῖν,
> ὦ μέγα καπήλοις ἀγαθόν, ἡμῖν δ' αὖ κακόν,
> κακὸν δὲ καὶ τοῖς σκευαρίοις καὶ τῇ κρόκῃ. (*Thesm.* 730-38)
>
> Ki.: Kindle and light it! Quickly strip the Cretan garment. Child, blame your mother alone of all women for your death. What's this? The girl has become a sack full of wine and wearing Persian slippers too. You hot-headed women, dipsomaniacs continuously plotting to drink, you're a great boon to bartenders, but a terrible evil for us, evil both for our glassware and saffron.

When Kinsman strips (ἀπόδυθι, 731) Mica's child, he reveals its true identity: "The girl has become a sack full of wine" (ἀσκὸς ἐγένεθ' ἡ κόρη / οἴνου πλέως, 733f.). The predicate structure of this sentence and the aorist tense of the verb γίγνομαι ("become," "come into being") suggest the end result of a transformation or coming into being that happened sometime in the past, implying that the child transformed into and is now a wineskin. Yet this verb of becoming is used for a non-transformation: the wine-skin has always been a wine-skin, but covered in clothes. Aristophanes inverts the language of being and becoming. As we have seen, he uses εἰμί to mark transformations that affect a character, and here he characterizes costume or disguise as superficial, not transformative, by using the verb γίγνομαι to mark the child's identity. Stripping the child's clothes away reveals the true being of the wineskin, and it becomes a prop to characterize Mica. According to Kinsman, Mica and women generally are dipsomaniacs. Despite the fact that the wineskin is not a child, Kinsman metaphorically treats it as such, claiming that Mica is a "good mother by nature" because she will not allow him to cut the wineskin with his

knife: "You love your child by nature, but nevertheless she'll have her throat cut" (φιλότεκνός τις εἶ φύσει. / ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἥδ' ἀποσφαγήσεται, 752f.). While Dicaeopolis treats his hostage, the basket of charcoal, as a metaphorical child as well, the humor of the scene is in his insistence in treating the basket as a hostage while it clearly is a basket, whereas in the *Thesmophoriazusae* there is the added element of revealing an inner being by stripping the exterior facade of clothing. By calling Mica a naturally good mother (φιλότεκνος φύσει), Kinsman, albeit sarcastically, treats her wineskin as a child in fact and not in word, complicating the *physis/nomos* tension at stake in the disguise.

In order to extricate himself from the situation, Kinsman draws inspiration from Euripides' *Helen*, because more successful than *Palamedes*, in order to escape.

> τῷ δῆτ' ἂν αὐτὸν προσαγαγοίμην δράματι;
> ἐγῷδα · τὴν καινὴν Ἑλένην μιμήσομαι. (850)
> πάντως δ' ὑπάρχει μοι γυναικεία στολή. (Ar. *Thesm.* 849-51)
>
> With which play could I draw him to me? I know! I'll imitate his recent *Helen*, especially since I have a woman's dress.

Kinsman states that he can imitate Helen because he already wears a dress.[106] Kinsman's possession of the costume, which is indicated by the dative of possession (ὑπάρχει μοι γυναικεία στολή, 851), not his natural predisposition, enables him to imitate another (μιμήσομαι, 850).[107] Kinsman may believe that this is no transformation and only a disguise, but the dress he wears has had an effect on him. Agathon uses the verb ὑπάρχω ("be already in existence") to suggest that there is an underlying substrate or subjectivity present in his body that allows him to

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[106] Whitmarsh states that this paratragic scene in *Thesm.* "is already metaleptic, as it stages the author Euripides entering the world of his own play" (2013: 8). Euripides and Kinsman use deictics to say they are in Egypt, but Critylla "punctures the illusion" by referring to their Athenian context.

[107] Else argues that the notion of parody is important in this passage, so he reads the line as a moment of self-reassurance "that he is at least dressed for his mimic role: he can at least *look* like a woman" (1958: 80).

represent male characters: "If someone writes plays about men, this subject is present in his body" (ἀνδρεῖα δ' ἦν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι / ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦθ', 154f.). But here ὑπάρχω suggests that the dress has transformed Kinsman, enabling him to imitate other women, and although Kinsman uses the verb to express possession, we can think of it working predicatively as well—there is something feminine present in Kinsman already (ὑπάρχει γυναικεῖον) because of his previous transformation and the costume he has at hand. Critylla is not deceived by Kinsman's new disguise as Helen and responds critically: "You're turning into a woman again before paying the penalty for your first female role?" (αὖθις αὖ γίγνει γυνή, / πρὶν τῆς ἑτέρας δοῦναι γυναικίσεως δίκην; 862f.). Critylla uses the present tense of the verb γίνομαι in the phrase "becoming a woman" (γίγνει γυνή, 862). The transformation occurs in the present as a process. Kinsman's dress, as Agathon explained, allows him to take on the mindset of another person.

Kinsman's ploy successfully attracts Euripides' attention. The tragedian enters as a shipwrecked Menelaus, and Kinsman responds by welcoming him to Egypt: "This is the hall of Proteus" (Πρωτέως τάδ' ἐστὶ μέλαθρα, *Thesm*. 874). This phrase references Euripides' depiction of Helen, who remained in Egypt during the Trojan War, but the allusion to Proteus works on a metatheatrical level because Kinsman and Euripides change into various characters in this scene. Euripides and Kinsman stay in character, but Critylla insists on who she is: "By the two goddesses, I'm Critylla, daughter of Antitheus from Gargettus!" (μὰ τὼ θεώ, / εἰ μὴ Κρίτυλλά γ' Ἀντιθέου Γαργηττόθεν, 897f.). In doing so, she rebuts Kinsman, who pretends she is Proteus' daughter Theonoe, and insists on who Kinsman is: "You're a wretch!" (σὺ δ' εἶ πανοῦργος, 898).[108]

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[108] Dobrov argues that with the metatheater of *Thesm*., Ar. moves towards an explicit play within a play with the endpoint of *mise en abyme* (2001: 24).

Critylla reveals an essentialist position that emphasizes being over becoming, a belief that transformation is ineffective, but Euripides comically recognizes Kinsman as Helen, and Kinsman recognizes Euripides as well.

> Ευ. Ἑλένῃ σ' ὁμοίαν δὴ μάλιστ' εἶδον, γύναι.
> Κη. ἐγὼ δὲ Μενελέῳ σ' ὅσα γ' ἐκ τῶν ἀμφίων. (910)
> Ευ. ἔγνως ἄρ' ὀρθῶς ἄνδρα δυστυχέστατον. (*Thesm.* 909-11)
>
> Eu.: Dear woman, I have seen that you look especially like Helen.
> Ki.: And I see you look quite like my Menelaus from your clothes.
> Eu.: Then you've recognized rightly a most unlucky man.

Euripides and Kinsman recognize each other because they are visibly "like" (ὁμοίαν, 909) the character they represent. We are precisely aware of the fact that Menelaus is in fact a character played by Euripides and Helen by Kinsman, but their exchange suggests that likeness not only enables comparison to another but recognition of one's identity. Euripides and Kinsman model a doubled recognition that takes into account being and becoming—they each recognize the other, both as a player and as the character the other plays.

Kinsman asks the Magistrate to be stripped of his disguise of women's clothes before he's executed, but the Magistrate says his costume befits his character as a πανοῦργος.

> Κη. γυμνὸν ἀποδύσαντά με
> κέλευε πρὸς τῇ σανίδι δεῖν τὸν τοξότην, (940)
> ἵνα μὴ 'ν κροκωτοῖς καὶ μίτραις γέρων ἀνὴρ
> γέλωτα παρέχω τοῖς κόραξιν ἑστιῶν.
> Πρ. ἔχοντα ταῦτ' ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ σε δεῖν,
> ἵνα τοῖς παριοῦσι δῆλος ᾖς πανοῦργος ὤν. (Ar. *Thesm.* 939-44)
>
> Ki.: Tell the archer to tie me to the board after he's stripped naked so that as an old man I'm not a laughing stock wearing saffron robes and scarves to the crows as I feed them.
> Pr.: The Council decided you must wear these things so that it's clear you're a criminal to those present.

Kinsman wants the Scythian policeman strip him (γυμνὸν ἀποδύσαντά με, 939) before tying him so that he is no longer dressed as a woman when he dies, but the Magistrate argues that his dress

will make it clear that Kinsman is a criminal (δῆλος ἦς πανοῦργος ὤν, 944). Aristophanes uses the participial form of εἰμί to show that Kinsman has become and currently is a criminal, at least according to the Magistrate. Kinsman's desire to be stripped emphasizes his belief that the dress has not had an effect on his character, but the Magistrate argues differently that the dress has become a clear sign by which Kinsman can be recognized for what he is. The dress is no longer a costume serving as Kinsman's disguise but a marker of what he has done and who he has become.

Just as Kinsman gives up hope for his rescue, Euripides returns on stage as Perseus to save his "Andromeda."

> Κη. ταυτὶ τὰ βέλτιστ' ἀπολέλαυκ' Εὐριπίδου.
> ἔα · θεοί, Ζεῦ σῶτερ, εἴσ' ἔτ' ἐλπίδες.
> ἀνὴρ ἔοικεν οὐ προδώσειν, ἀλλά μοι (1010)
> σημεῖον ὑπεδήλωσε Περσεὺς ἐκδραμών,
> ὅτι δεῖ με γίγνεσθ' Ἀνδρομέδαν · πάντως δέ μοι
> τὰ δέσμ' ὑπάρχει. δῆλον οὖν τοῦτ' ἔσθ' ὅτι
> ἥξει με σώσων · οὐ γὰρ ἂν παρέπτετο. (Ar. *Thesm.* 1008-14)
>
> Ki.: These events are fun for Euripides. Wait! O gods and Zeus my savior, there still is hope! The man seems like he won't betray me. Instead, he's run out as Perseus, signaling that I must become Andromeda. Especially since I have the chains already. Clearly this will save me, for he wouldn't fly by.

Kinsman takes this as a sign (σημεῖον, 1011) "that I must become Andromeda" (ὅτι δεῖ με γίγνεσθ' Ἀνδρομέδαν, 1012). Kinsman uses the same phrase to explain why this change is reasonable as he did for, a dative of possession with the verb ὑπάρχω and adverb πάντως: "Especially since I have the chains already" (πάντως δέ μοι / τὰ δέσμ' ὑπάρχει, 1012f.).[109]

III. *Frogs* (405 BCE)

When Dionysus visits Heracles at the beginning of the *Frogs*, Heracles cannot help but laugh at his half-brother's get-up.

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[109] Cf. *Thesm.* 851 (above).

Ηρ. οὔτοι μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα δύναμαι μὴ γελᾶν·
καίτοι δάκνω γ' ἐμαυτόν· ἀλλ' ὅμως γελῶ.
Δι. ὦ δαιμόνιε, πρόσελθε· δέομαι γάρ τί σου.
Ηρ. ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷός τ' εἴμ' ἀποσοβῆσαι τὸν γέλων, (45)
ὁρῶν λεοντῆν ἐπὶ κροκωτῷ κειμένην.
τίς ὁ νοῦς; τί κόθορνους καὶ ῥόπαλον ξυνηλθέτην;
ποῖ γῆς ἀπεδήμεις;
Δι. ἐπεβάτευον Κλεισθένει. (Ar. *Ran.* 42-48)

He.: By Demeter, I can't help but laugh. Even though I bite my tongue, I still laugh.
Di.: Good sir, come here. I need something from you.
He.: But I can't stop laughing when I see a lion skin lying on a saffron robe. What do you have in mind? How do boots and a club go together? Where on earth have you come from?
Di.: I was just boarding (with) Cleisthenes.

Dionysus misreads Heracles' response to his costume as fear ("How greatly he feared me!" ὡς σφόδρα μ' ἔδεισε, *Ran.* 41), but Heracles finds Dionysus' appearance ridiculous because he wears a mixture of masculine and feminine attire. Dionysus has become hybrid, neither fully effeminate or masculine. Dionysus, unlike Dicaeopolis or Kinsman, has come in costume, needing neither clothes nor props, yet he needs something from Heracles to fully transform into him (δέομαι γάρ τί σου, 44).[110] Just as Kinsman asks Agathon in *Thesmophoriazusae*, Heracles asks how both masculine and feminine garments and props can coexist on a single body: "What do you have in mind? How do boots and a club go together?" (τίς ὁ νοῦς; τί κόθορνους καὶ ῥόπαλον ξυνηλθέτην; 47). Dionysus is difficult to read, and his intentions (ὁ νοῦς) are unclear, because of his change in appearance. The lion skin lies on top of, or covers, his saffron robe (λεοντῆν ἐπὶ κροκωτῷ κειμένην, 46), revealing a belief that essence underlies appearance or costume. Dionysus jokes, "I was just boarding (with) Cleisthenes," which has both a naval and sexual meaning. ἐπιβατεύω ("board," "be a passenger") suggests that Dionysus rode in a ship with Cleisthenes for a naval

[110] For extensive bibliography on views for and against Ar. *Ran*. as a landmark in literary criticism, cf. Halliwell (2011: 93f.).

battle, but since the verb takes Cleisthenes as its object, the joke is that he had sex with this comically effeminate man. Just as Dionysus' hybrid costume reveals his apparent doubleness, so too the verb ἐπιβατεύω works doubly, hinting at martial prowess while also reminding us of Cleisthenes' and Dionysus' effeminacy.[111]

Dionysus dresses up as a hero, just as a tragic actor would do, in order to journey to Hades, revealing a belief that his disguise will help him succeed if not change him into being the kind of person who could succeed in this task.

> Δι. ἀλλ' ὧνπερ ἕνεκα τήνδε τὴν σκευὴν ἔχων
> ἦλθον κατὰ σὴν μίμησιν, ἵνα μοι τοὺς ξένους
> τοὺς σοὺς φράσειας, εἰ δεοίμην, οἷσι σὺ (110)
> ἐχρῶ τόθ', ἡνίκ' ἦλθες ἐπὶ τὸν Κέρβερον,
> τούτους φράσον μοι, λιμένας, ἀρτοπώλια,
> πορνεῖ', ἀναπαύλας, ἐκτροπάς, κρήνας, ὁδούς,
> πόλεις, διαίτας, πανδοκευτρίας, ὅπου
> κόρεις ὀλίγιστοι. (*Ran.* 108-15) (115)
>
> Di.: But I've come wearing this apparel in imitation of you, so you would tell me about those guest-friends you stayed with that time when you came for Cerberus, if I needed them. Tell me about them, and also the harbors, bakeries, brothels, inns, side roads, springs, streets, cities, ways of life, innkeepers, where there are the fewest bedbugs.

Dionysus possesses (ἔχων, 108) something that characterizes him, but here it is not an innate quality but a garment. The noun σκευή ("garment," "apparel") can also mean the dress of an actor.[112] He possesses the clothes that will allow him to transform, showing that he has a changeable character. Dionysus does not require props or costumes from Heracles. Instead, he tells Heracles that he has need of (εἰ δεοίμην, 110) the relationships (τοὺς ξένους, 109) Heracles

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[111] Foley writes of this scene that Dionysus' "ludicrous fussing" over the Heracles costume in the *Frogs* is repeated with Pentheus in the *Bacchae*. "In contrast, the smiling god of the *Bacchae* expresses his divine authority by his control over role change and his ability to make those onstage believe whatever he intends.…Again, change of role/costume simultaneously effects comic exposure of self-ignorance and tragic entrapment" (Foley 1985: 226f.).

[112] See the use of the verb σκευάζω and compounds above, which are derived from the noun σκεῦος/σκευή. Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. σκεῦος.

gained from his twelfth Labor. The god of theater believes in mimesis' potential for producing change as he reveals with the phrase "in imitation of you" (κατὰ σὴν μίμησιν, 109).[113] For Dionysus, the Heracles costume enables him to travel to the Underworld and accomplish the same kinds of deeds as Heracles.

After making their way to Hades, Dionysus asks Xanthias, "What's this?" (τουτὶ τί ἐστι; *Ran.* 181), to which Xanthias responds, "This? It's a lake" (τοῦτο; λίμνη, 181). In the *Poetics*, Aristotle argues that this kind of "this is that" correspondence is at the heart of the educational aspect of mimesis. In the *Frogs*, Aristophanes uses deictics as a means of exposition: Dionysus and Xanthias tell the audience that "this is a lake" while pointing at the *orchēstra*, effectively telling them "the *orchēstra* is a lake." This encourages the audience to suspend their disbelief and also to recognize the *orchēstra*'s change. We can think of this in terms along the same lines as costume and identity, the referent of a deictic is made clear by gestures on stage, but the certainty that underlies referentiality is subverted.

Pronouns and names, i.e. being, become problematic in *Frogs* because of the metamorphosis effected by mimesis. Xanthias swears by Heracles when he sees the monster Empusa, but Dionysus rebukes him for invoking his name.

> Ξα. ἀπολούμεθ', ὦναξ Ἡράκλεις.
> Δι. οὐ μὴ καλεῖς μ',
> ὦνθρωφ', ἱκετεύω, μηδὲ κατερεῖς τοὔνομα.
> Ξα. Διόνυσε τοίνυν. (300)
> Δι. τοῦτ' ἔθ' ἧττον θἀτέρου. (*Ran.* 298-300)
>
> Xa.: We're goners, lord Heracles!
> Di.: Do not call on me, mortal, I beseech you, don't speak my name.
> Xa.: Dionysus, then.
> Di.: That's even worse than the other one!

[113] Else reads this as an example of mimesis meaning "mime" in 5th c. BCE (1958: 81).

Xanthias calls on "Heracles," but Dionysus reacts negatively, telling him "do not call on me" (οὐ μὴ καλεῖς μ', 298). Dionysus uses the first pronoun to refer to himself as Heracles. But when Xanthias corrects himself and addresses Dionysus by name, he is also forbidden from saying "Dionysus." In the space of a few lines, Xanthias has called upon two different gods by name, yet both names refer to Dionysus. By dressing up and acting as Heracles, Dionysus claims that the name "Heracles" refers to him while still identifying as "Dionysus." The disguised god of theater reveals a doubled identity—he is both Heracles and Dionysus simultaneously—fashioned by mimesis.

Dionysus hesitates before knocking on Aeacus' door, but Xanthias tells him to knock like Heracles.

> Δι. ἄγε δή, τίνα τρόπον τὴν θύραν κόψω; τίνα; (460)
> πῶς ἐνθάδ' ἄρα κόπτουσιν οὐπιχώριοι;
> Ξα. οὐ μὴ διατρίψεις, ἀλλὰ γεύσει τῆς θύρας,
> καθ' Ἡρακλέα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων.
> Δι. παῖ παῖ.
> Αια. τίς οὗτος;
> Δι. Ἡρακλῆς ὁ καρτερός. (*Ran.* 460-64)
>
> Di.: So then, how should I knock the door? How? How do the natives knock here?
> Xa.: Stop wasting time. Just take a taste of the door since you have the form and courage like Heracles.
> Di.: Boy! Boy!
> Aea.: Who is it?
> Di.: The mighty Heracles.

Dionysus wonders how (τίνα τρόπον, 460) he should knock the door, but the noun τρόπος (literally meaning a "way" or "turning") can refer to a person's habits or character. He is timid to continue his adventure into Hades and hesitates because he does not know how to act in character as Heracles. Xanthias responds by saying "just take a taste of the door" (ἀλλὰ γεύσει τῆς θύρας, 463), simultaneously advising Dionysus to get on with it as well as giving an answer to

the implied question about character: Dionysus should act the way Heracles is depicted in comedy, as a glutton. This didactic element of metamorphic mimesis is novel here. Xanthias guides Dionysus in acting like Heracles, showing how behavior and character can be transformed through mimesis and practice. According to Xanthias, Dionysus should act like Heracles because he possesses his attire and courage (καθ' Ἡρακλέα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων, 463). Aristophanes' use of rhyme and the connective conjunction καί shows that there is a relationship between *schēma* and *lēma*, between appearance and mindset. Xanthias implies that Dionysus' possession of both the Heraclean props and inner quality of courage are enough for Dionysus to become Heracles and act like him. Costume transforms his appearance and also affects his psychology. When Aeacus asks who is at the door (τίς οὗτος; 464), the pronoun οὗτος raises a further question for Dionysus. Who is "this"? Has he changed at all? By answering that he is Heracles (Ἡρακλῆς ὁ καρτερός), Dionysus shows how "this" can become "that" through mimesis.

Although Kinsman and Euripides take on multiple roles in *Thesmophoriazusae* we do not seem them become each other. Dionysus tells Xanthias to switch places with him dressing up as Heracles out of fear of Aeacus' reprisals, offering him to become the porter "for a turn" (ἐν τῷ μέρει, 497). Dionysus suggests that mimesis has only partial, temporary effects, that he can be a either a porter or a hero temporarily, but his flattery of Xanthias suggests otherwise.

> Δι. ἴθι νυν, ἐπειδὴ λῃματίας κἀνδρεῖος εἶ,
> σὺ μὲν γενοῦ 'γὼ τὸ ῥόπαλον τουτὶ λαβών (495)
> καὶ τὴν λεοντῆν, εἴπερ ἀφοβόσπλαχνος εἶ·
> ἐγὼ δ' ἔσομαί σοι σκευοφόρος ἐν τῷ μέρει.
> Ξα. φέρε δὴ ταχέως αὔτ'· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλὰ πειστέον.
> καὶ βλέφον εἰς τὸν Ἡρακλειοξανθίαν,
> εἰ δειλὸς ἔσομαι καὶ κατὰ σὲ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων. (500)
> Δι. μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς οὐκ Μελίτης μαστιγίας.
> φέρε νυν, ἐγὼ τὰ στρώματ' αἴρωμαι ταδί. (*Ran.* 494-502)

> Di.: Come on now, since you're courageous and brave, you become me and take this club and lion skin. That is, if you are fearless of heart. And I'll become your porter in turn.
> Xa.: Give me them quickly, for surely I must obey. Look at Heracleoxanthias and see whether I become cowardly and have a spirit like you.
> Di.: My god, no! Truly, you are the whipped Melitan. Come now, let me lift up these bags.

By praising Xanthias' bravery (ληματίας κἀνδρεῖος εἶ, 494), Dionysus reasons that Xanthias is predisposed to imitating Heracles because brave. Xanthias is already a"high-spirited man" (ληματίας), a noun related to λῆμα ("will," "courage").[114] Dionysus flatters Xanthias for being (εἶ) the very thing Xanthias exhorted him to use (τὸ λῆμα, 463) previously, when he advised Dionysus how to behave like Heracles. Xanthias possesses some of Heracles' traits already and therefore is already akin to him, but in order to imitate the hero, Dionysus tells Xanthias to take the Heracles costume and props (τὸ ῥόπαλον τουτὶ λαβών / καὶ τὴν λεοντῆν, 495f.). The participle λαβών echoes the *Acharnians* transformation scene when Euripides tells Dicaeopolis to take his tragedy (ὦνθρωπ', ἀφαιρήσει με τὴν τραγῳδίαν. / ἄπελθε ταυτηνὶ λαβών, *Ach.* 465). Dionysus uses the same participle here as his favorite tragedian, reminding us of the potential costume has for effecting change and of Aristophanes' continued interest in mimesis. The verb λαμβάνω means to "take," but the tense of the aorist participle λαβών suggests a one-time, simple action, "to take and to keep."[115] Thus, Dionysus tells Xanthias to acquire what he lacks (the lion skin and cudgel) in order to become Heracles, and by possessing those external markers and his inner bravery, he will effectively become Heracles.

Xanthias' predisposition and his acquisition of the Heracles costume and props serve as an aetiology for his ability to imitate Heracles, but, curiously, Dionysus tells Xanthias, "Become

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[114] Both nouns derive from the verb λῶ ("will"). Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. λῶ.

[115] See ch. 1 (pp. 43) above on aorist tense of λαμβάνω as an ingressive of ἔχω.

me" (σὺ μὲν γενοῦ 'γὼ, 495), not "Heracles." Dionysus uses the first person pronoun ἐγώ not to refer to himself but to the character he represents. The phrase is mirrored a couple lines later when Dionysus says "I will be your porter" (ἐγὼ δ' ἔσομαί σοι σκευοφόρος, 497). The correlative particles μέν and δέ suggest a contrast between these two phrases and also a logical connection. The word order is mirrored, with slight *variatio* in the second part: Dionysus commands Xanthias "You become me" (second person pronoun, verb, and nominative first person pronoun); and says of himself "I will be your porter" (first person pronoun, verb, second person pronoun, noun). The word order and particles lead us to expect "I will be you" (ἐγὼ δ' ἔσομαί συ), with the second person pronoun in the nominative case, instead of "I will be your porter." The correlation of these two phrases also draws attention to the similar use to which the verbs are employed. γίγνομαι and εἰμί are both put to work to describe an on-stage metamorphosis effected through costumes and props, i.e. mimesis. In the aorist tense, γίγνομαι can be translated as "come to pass," "happen," or, as here, "be."[116] While Dionysus effectively tells Xanthias, "Be me," and uses the verb "to be" in reference to himself a couple lines later, both verbs are deployed to describe becoming and not being.

But this becoming is not a transformation into a completely different person. Xanthias refers to himself by a new name compounded from his own name as well as Heracles', Heracleoxanthias (498). Xanthias acknowledges the process of becoming, and his new name encompasses his own transformation from Xanthias into Heracles. Dionysus may refer to himself as Heracles in the first person above, but Xanthias recognizes him as a kind of hybrid of metamorphosis as well. Xanthias asks Dionysus to consider whether he will be as cowardly (δειλός) as Dionysus was during his tenure as Heracles. Dionysus' portrayal of Heracles exhibited

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[116] Cf. *LSJ* s.v. γίγνομαι (A.I.3).

some of his own traits; he was a "Heracleodionysus," gluttonous like Heracles and cowardly like himself. Xanthias' question implies that by becoming Heracles he may become also like Dionysus. When he asks if he will have a spirit like Dionysus (κατὰ σὲ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων, 499), the second personal pronoun troubles who it is exactly Xanthias is becoming. The phrase κατά σε recalls Dionysus when he tells Heracles he came "in imitation of you" (κατὰ σὴν μίμησιν, 109) at the beginning of the play. Dionysus' affirms this view that mimesis somehow hybridizes Xanthias by saying, "My god, no! Truly, you are the whipped Melitan" (μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς οὐκ Μελίτης μαστιγίας, 500). The phrase ὁ ἐκ Μελίτης μαστίγιας points to Xanthias' hybridity as Heracleoxanthias: there was a sanctuary dedicated to Heracles in the Attic deme of Melite, but the noun μαστίγιας ("whipping post," "rogue") is often used for flogged slaves.[117] This noun pays attention to Xanthias' previous slave status but can also refer to Heracles' servitude to Omphale.

Dionysus insists on switching places with Xanthias at the prospect of food and entertainment provided by Persephone. When Xanthias orders Dionysus to pick up his baggage, Dionysus pretends he was not serious before.

> Ξα. ἴθι νυν, φράσον πρώτιστα ταῖς ὀρχηστρίσιν
> ταῖς ἔνδον οὔσαις αὐτὸς ὅτι εἰσέρχομαι. (520)
> ὁ παῖς, ἀκολούθει δεῦρο τὰ σκεύη φέρων.
> Δι. ἐπίσχες, οὗτος. οὔ τί που σπουδὴν ποιεῖ,
> ὁτιή σε παίζων Ἡρακλέα 'νεσκεύασα;
> οὐ μὴ φλυαρήσεις ἔχων, ὦ Ξανθία,
> ἀλλ' ἀράμενος οἴσεις πάλιν τὰ στρώματα. (525)
> Ξα. τί δ' ἐστίν; οὔ τί πού μ' ἀφελέσθαι διανοεῖ
> ἅδωκας αὐτός;
> Δι. οὐ τάχ', ἀλλ' ἤδη ποιῶ.
> κατάθου τὸ δέρμα.
> Ξα. ταῦτ' ἐγὼ μαρτύρομαι
> καὶ τοῖς θεοῖσιν ἐπιτρέπω.
> Δι. ποίοις θεοῖς;
> τὸ δὲ προσδοκῆσαι σ' οὐκ ἀνόητον καὶ κενὸν (530)
> ὡς δοῦλος ὢν καὶ θνητὸς Ἀλκμήνης ἔσει;

[117] Cf. Dover 1993: ad loc.

> Ξα. ἀμέλει. καλῶς· ἔχ' αὖτ'. ἴσως γάρ τοί ποτε
> ἐμοῦ δεηθείης ἄν, εἰ θεὸς θέλοι. (*Ran.* 519-33)
>
> Xa.: Go on now, tell the dancing girls inside straightaway that I myself am coming inside. Slave, follow me and carry the bags.
> Di.: Hold on, you! You aren't really serious, are you? Because I was playing when I equipped you as Heracles. Don't talk any more nonsense, Xanthias, but pick up the bags and carry them again.
> Xa.: What's this? You don't really intend to take away what you yourself gave me, do you?
> Di.: I'm not doing it soon but now. Take off that skin.
> Xa.: I bear witness to these events and entrust it to the gods.
> Di.: Gods?! Isn't it thoughtless and vain to expect that you, a slave and mortal, will be the son of Alcmene?
> Xa.: Never mind, fine. Take them. Perhaps you'll need me again, god willing.

Xanthias uses the reflexive pronoun αὐτός to emphasize that he is Heracles ("I myself am coming inside"; αὐτὸς ὅτι εἰσέρχομαι, 520), but when Dionysus attempts to take back the role, he uses the pronoun αὐτός to refer to Dionysus as Dionysus when he played Heracles, and not as Heracles: "You don't really intend to take away what you yourself gave me, do you?" (οὔ τί πού μ' ἀφελέσθαι διανοεῖ / ἅδωκας αὐτός; 526f.). Dionysus takes umbrage at being called "slave" (ὁ παῖς, 521) and being told to carry the bags (τὰ σκεύη φέρων) despite his promise to be Xanthias' porter (ἐγὼ δ' ἔσομαί σοι σκευοφόρος, 497). He claims that assigning Xanthias the role of Heracles was a playact (παίζων, 523) and suggests that Xanthias, perhaps naively, takes his role too seriously: "You aren't serious are you?" (οὔ τί που σπουδὴν ποιεῖ, 522). Dionysus couches costume (ἐνσκευάζω, 523) as a kind of play. In each appearance in Aristophanes, the verb (ἐν-)σκευάζω and the related noun σκευή suggest that costume provides a cover or disguise while the wearer's being remains unchanged underneath.[118] Dionysus implies that there is no

[118] E.g. τοιόνδε γ', ὦ πίθηκε, τὸν πώγων' ἔχων / εὐνοῦχος ἡμῖν ἦλθες ἐσκευασμένος; (*Ach.* 120f.); νῦν οὖν με πρῶτον πρὶν λέγειν ἐάσατε / ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ' οἷον ἀθλιώτατον (*Ach.* 383f.); ἀλλ' ὥνπερ ἕνεκα τήνδε τὴν σκευὴν ἔχων / ἦλθον κατὰ σὴν μίμησιν (*Ran.* 108f.).

transformation involved in Xanthias' becoming-Heracles, relegating acting and costume to the realm of disguise and pretense, mere play.

Dionysus wants Xanthias to return to his previous role as a slave and tells him, "Pick up the bags and carry them again" (ἀράμενος οἴσεις πάλιν τὰ στρώματα, 525). In order to make the point that Xanthias no longer is a fitting actor for the Heracles character, Dionysus utilizes the language of being we've seen in Aristophanes, emphasizing Xanthias' identity as a slave with the participial form of εἰμί: "Isn't it thoughtless and vain to expect that although you're a slave and mortal, you'll be the son of Alcmene?" (τὸ δὲ προσδοκῆσαι σ' οὐκ ἀνόητον καὶ κενὸν / ὡς δοῦλος ὢν καὶ θνητὸς Ἀλκμήνης ἔσει; 530f.). Dionysus emphasizes Xanthias' identity, undercutting his pretensions to becoming Heracles by ascribing the silliness of pretending to be Heracles with the particle ὡς and causal participle.[119] Similarly, Lamachus rebukes Dicaeopolis for speaking audaciously to him since he's a beggar (πτωχὸς ὤν, *Ach.* 577). Dionysus' claim that Xanthias cannot be a Heracles because enslaved and mortal is doubly ironic here: 1) Heracles himself was both enslaved and mortal; and 2) human beings must play Heracles in the *Frogs* as well as any other immortal character (even Dionysus). Dionysus' exclamation, "Gods?!" (ποίοις θεοῖς; 529), gets to this problem as well: Xanthias entrusts the matter to the gods, which Dionysus thinks is ridiculous because he is divine. But the exclamation can also be read ironically, as a metatheatrical nod to the mechanics of drama: "Gods? We're all humans here."

The Innkeeper recognizes Dionysus as Heracles. She and Plathane mark their certainty of Dionysus' identity with pronouns emphasizing his being.

Πα. Πλαθάνη, Πλαθάνη, δεῦρ' ἔλθ', ὁ πανοῦργος οὑτοσί,

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[119] On the particle ὡς with participle of cause or purpose, see Smyth (§ 2086): "This particle sets forth the ground of belief on which the agent acts, and denotes the thought, assertion, real or presumed intention, in the mind of the subject of the principal verb or of some other person mentioned prominently in the sentence, without implicating the speaker or writer."

ὃς εἰς τὸ πανδοκεῖον εἰσελθών ποτε (550)
ἑκκαίδεκ' ἄρτους κατέφαγ' ἡμῶν—
Πλ. νὴ Δία,
ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆτα.
Ξα. κακὸν ἥκει τινί.
Πα. καὶ κρέα γε πρὸς τούτοισιν ἀναβραστ' εἴκοσιν
ἀν' ἡμιβωελιαῖα—
Ξα. δώσει τις δίκην.
Πα. καὶ τὰ σκόροδα τὰ πολλά. (555)
Δι. ληρεῖς, ὦ γύναι,
κοὐκ οἶσθ' ὅ τι λέγεις.
Πα. οὐ μὲν οὖν με προσεδόκας,
ὁτιὴ κοθόρνους εἶχες, ἀναγνῶναι σ' ἔτι;
τί δαί; τὸ πολὺ τάριχος οὐκ εἴρηκά πω. (*Ran.* 549-58)

Pa.: Plathane! Plathane! Come here! This is the wretch who invaded the inn once and destroyed sixteen of our loaves—
Pl.: Oh my god, that's the very one!
Xa.: Someone's in trouble.
Pa.: —and in addition to those twenty cuts of boiled meat worth half an obol—
Xa.: Someone will be punished.
Pa.: —and many, many cloves of garlic!
Di.: You're mad, lady, you don't know what you're saying.
Pa.: You don't expect me to recognize you still because you're wearing boots? How? I haven't said anything yet about all the fish you ate.

The Innkeeper uses the demonstrative pronoun οὗτος strengthened with the -ί suffix to refer to Dionysus as Heracles ("*This* is the rogue," ὁ πανοῦργος οὑτοσί, 549). The Innkeeper uses the noun πανοῦργος ("rogue," "wretch") to refer to Heracles' previous misdeeds, but the attribution of this noun to a character's identity is problematized when we recall Kinsman from the *Thesmophoriazusae*. Both Critylla and the Marshal refer to Kinsman as a πανοῦργος, not because of his disguise as a woman, but because of his actions while in disguise.[120] The Marshal in fact says that Kinsman's dress identifies him as a rogue, not as a woman. The Innkeeper misrecognizes Dionysus as Heracles but in doing so brings to the audience's attention the comic knavery of Dionysus, who is willing to do anything (παν-οῦργος), including transforming into

[120] Cf. σὺ δ' εἶ πανοῦργος (*Thesm.* 898); Πρ. ἔχοντα ταῦτ' ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ σε δεῖν, / ἵνα τοῖς παριοῦσι δῆλος ᾖς πανοῦργος ὤν (*Thesm*. 943f.).

another person, in order to retrieve his favorite tragedian from Hades. Thus, the misrecognition of Dionysus as Heracles and the naive belief in the ease of referentiality are revealed to be correct on some level. Dionysus is not "this rogue," i.e. Heracles, but he is a rogue for the things he has done, including pretending to be Heracles. Plathane responds by using the demonstrative pronoun ἐκεῖνος and intensive pronoun αὐτός to identify Dionysus as Heracles: "Oh my god, that's the very one!" (νὴ Δία, / ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς δῆτα, 551f.). This passage raises the problem of referentiality in a mimetic situation; to whom does "this" or "that" refer? Is recognition ever an easy proposition?

The Innkeeper tells Dionysus that she can recognize him despite any change in his appearance: "You don't expect me to recognize you still because you're wearing boots?"(οὐ μὲν οὖν με προσεδόκας, / ὁτιὴ κοθόρνους εἶχες, ἀναγνῶναι σ' ἔτι; *Ran*. 556f.). At the beginning of *Frogs*, Heracles laughs at Dionysus' boots because they clash with the rest of his costume (τί κόθορνος καὶ ῥόπαλον ξυνηλθέτην; 47). Similarly, in *Thesmophoriazusae*, Kinsman laughs at Agathon's "confusion of life" (τίς ἡ τάραξις τοῦ βίου; *Thesm*. 137) because of the tragedian's androgynous appearance. Both Dionysus and Agathon are the objects of ridicule, both are depicted as hybrid because of mimesis, similar to Xanthias as Heracleoxanthias. The Innkeeper misreads Dionysus' boots as a disguise meant to hide his identity as Heracles, ignoring his hybridity in order to recognize (ἀναγνῶναι, 557) him, but the boots are not meant as a disguise. Rather, they trace the temporality of Dionysus' transformation from one form into another. They are the vestige of his initial form as Dionysus. The Innkeeper and Plathane insist on Dionysus' identity, his being, but Xanthias reveals a distrust in identity and recognition. His mumbled remarks are in keeping for a slave but they reveal an understanding of the ambiguities arising from mimesis and transformation. Twice during this exchange Xanthias expresses a similar idea

with τις: "Someone's in trouble" (κακὸν ἥκει τινί, 552); "Someone will be punished" (δώσει τις δίκην, 554). Xanthias makes no claims of recognition, calling his master neither Dionysus nor Heracles. Xanthias shows an awareness of the difficulty of recognition considering the transformations and reversals occurring in the play, and refers instead to τις, "somebody."[121]

The problem of referentiality continues when, after the Innkeeper and Plathane recount what Heracles ate and did, Xanthias says, "That *is* his work! This is absolutely in character" (τούτου πάνυ τοὔργον· οὗτος ὁ τρόπος πανταχοῦ, *Ran.* 563). In the first half of the line the demonstrative pronoun οὗτος ("this one") can refer to either the person who has done all the things Innkeeper and Plathane have listed, Heracles, or the physically closer person, Dionysus. The word- and sound-play of the line reinforces this ambiguity: the pronouns τούτου and οὗτος, while appearing closely, refer to the doer of the deeds in the first half of the line and to his character in the second half. Likewise, adverbs formed denominatively from πᾶς appear in both halves of the line,[122] and, like the doubleness of Heracles and "Heracles," πάνυ and πανταχοῦ resemble each other but are not identical. Finally, the sound *-ou* is repeated throughout the line, denoting a kind of sonic similarity, but, grammatically, these words do not agree (τ<u>ούτ</u><u>ου</u>, gen. sg. masc.; τ<u>οὔ</u>ργον, nom. sg. neut.; <u>οὗ</u>τος, nom. sg. masc.; πανταχ<u>οῦ</u>, adv.).[123]

Because the Innkeeper and Plathane recognize Dionysus as Hercules, Dionysus wants to trade places with Xanthias again in order to avoid punishment.

> Δι. κάκιστα ἀπολοίμην, Ξανθίαν εἰ μὴ φιλῶ.
> Ξα. οἶδ' οἶδα τὸν νοῦν· παῦε παῦε τοῦ λόγου. (580)
> οὐκ ἂν γενοίμην Ἡρακλῆς αὖ.
> Δι. μηδαμῶς,

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[121] Cf. Dionysus' nearly identical line when Aeacus bursts in to punish Xanthias as Heracles in a (ἥκει τῳ κακόν, *Ran.* 606).
[122] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. πᾶς.
[123] Cf. καὶ τοῦτο τούτου τοὔργον (*Ran*. 568).

ὦ Ξανθίδιον.
Ξα. καὶ πῶς ἂν Ἀλκμήνης ἐγὼ
υἱὸς γενοίμην δοῦλος ἅμα καὶ θνητὸς ὤν;
Δι. οἶδ' οἶδ' ὅτι θυμοῖ, καὶ δικαίως αὐτὸ δρᾷς·
κἂν εἴ με τύπτοις, οὐκ ἂν ἀντείποιμί σοι. (585)
ἀλλ' ἤν σε τοῦ λοιποῦ ποτ' ἀφέλωμαι χρόνου,
πρόρριζος αὐτός, ἡ γυνή, τὰ παιδία,
κάκιστ' ἀπολοίμην, κἀρχέδημος ὁ γλάμων.
Ξ. δέχομαι τὸν ὅρκον κἀπὶ τούτοις λαμβάνω. (*Ran.* 579-89)

Di.: May I die most terribly, if I don't love Xanthias!
Xa.: I know what you're thinking. I know! Stop speaking. Stop! I won't become Heracles again.
Di.: Nooooo, dear Xanthias.
Xa.: How could I become the son of Alcmene, anyway, when I'm a mortal and a slave?
Di.: I know, I know you're angry, and you're right to be. If you hit me, I wouldn't blame you. But if I take it away from you any time in the future, may I myself utterly, most terribly die, and my wife and children and that squint-eyed Archedemus.
Xa.: I accept this oath and on these terms take the costume back.

Xanthias uses Dionysus' words against him by asking whether it's possible for him to become Heracles while being a human and slave (καὶ πῶς ἂν Ἀλκμήνης ἐγὼ / υἱὸς γενοίμην δοῦλος ἅμα καὶ θνητὸς ὤν; 582f.). The adverbs αὖ ("again"), ἅμα ("simultaneously"), and ποτε ("ever") as well as the genitive construction τοῦ λοίπου χρόνου ("for the remaining time," "in the future") emphasize the temporality of being and becoming. Xanthias refuses to become Heracles "again" (αὖ), implying that one can change more than once, or change back into something. From this point of view, transformation is not final but a process. While Dionysus promises that he will not take the costume, which may lead Xanthias to believe his possession of the costume and identity of Heracles are not at risk, Dionysus' promise reveals that he could take the costume back. The adverbs αὖ and ποτε reveal the back and forth, present and future, of transformation,

but ἅμα ὤν reveals instead the continuity of being.[124] But this being is not stable and unchanging. The sarcasm inherent in Xanthias' question implies the answer, "Well, of course, I can be something (δοῦλος ἅμα καὶ θνητὸς ὤν) and at the same time become another thing (γενοίμην)." When Dionysus acknowledges Xanthias' anger as just (δικαίως), he admits that his previous argument is lacking: being does not stand in the way of becoming. Indeed Dionysus seems to already be on his way to becoming a Xanthias-like figure. Xanthias interrupts Dionysus with a repetition of the verb οἶδα (οἶδ' οἶδα τὸν νοῦν, 580), and shortly after Dionysus echoes this phrase (οἶδ' οἶδ' ὅτι θυμοῖ, 584). Before they exchange clothes for a second time, Dionysus' speech is already in character and Xanthias-like.

The Chorus fails to conceptualize transformation as a process—Xanthias must either be Heracles or Xanthias—but they advise Xanthias to get "back" into character, highlighting a kind of temporality to transformation.

> Χο. νῦν σὸν ἔργον ἔστ', ἐπειδὴ (590)
> τὴν στολὴν εἴληφας ἥνπερ
> εἶχες ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν,
> ἀνανεάζειν αὖ τὸ λῆμα
> καὶ βλέπειν αὖθις τὸ δεινόν,
> τοῦ θεοῦ μεμνημένον
> ᾧπερ εἰκάζεις σεαυτόν. (595)
> ἢν δὲ παραληρῶν ἁλῷς ἢ
> κἀκβάλῃς τι μαλθακόν,
> αὖθις αἴρεσθαί σ' ἀνάγκη
> 'σται πάλιν τὰ στρώματα. (*Ran.* 590-97)
>
> Now, since you have the clothes you previously had again, it's your job to refresh your courage again and look frightful again, in a way reminiscent of the god to whom you liken yourself. If you're caught being foolish or saying anything soft, you will have to pick up the bags again.

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[124] modifying the participle ὤν, emphasizing the temporality of being and becoming. adv. ἅμα used in connection with circumstantial participle = "at the same time." "…though strictly modifying the main verb, are often placed close to a temporal participle which they modify *in sense*" (Smyth § 2081, emphasis in original).

The adverb νῦν and present tense of the verb εἰμί (νῦν σὸν ἔργον ἐστί, 590) situate Xanthias' transformation as occurring in the present, but there is also a sense of repetition to this transformation. The Chorus says Xanthias has the costume "back from before" (ἐξ ἀρχῆς πάλιν, 591), implying that the costume, or στολή, enables Xanthias' transformation, and that Xanthias switches back and before between two identities, Heracles and Xanthias. They refer to Xanthias' transformation as a kind of return back to his previous state and as a repetition: "refresh your courage again" (ἀνανεάζειν αὖ τὸ λῆμα, 592); "look frightful again" (καὶ βλέπειν αὖθις τὸ δεινόν, 593). Heracles is Xanthias' past identity but that transformation has no lasting effect in the present. And if he acts out of character in any way, he'll go back to carrying bags again (αὖθις, πάλιν), back to being a slave. The depiction of changing back and forth from one character seems to be a dichotomous, essentialist notion of identity with no in-between state or aftereffects of transformation, but the verb ἀνανεάζειν ("to become young again") suggests an alternative to the Chorus' thinking. Xanthias must become young again in his "will" or "courage" (τὸ λῆμα, 592), which he already possesses (ληματίας, 494). He must go "back," ἀνα-, to his previous, younger self in order to fully transform into Heracles, bolstering the idea of a processual change in a person over time. We may consider Xanthias likening himself to Heracles (ὥπερ εἰκάζεις σεαυτόν, 595) as mere imitation, emphasizing Xanthias' being, (i.e. he is not actually Heracles only like Heracles), but this likening occurs after other processes of change take place in Xanthias' body. In addition to Xanthias' costume (ἡ στολή), he must look (βλέπειν) a certain way, be courageous (τὸ λῆμα), and remember (μέμνημαι) the person he imitates. The Chorus tells Xanthias to do his "work" (ἔργον, 590), casting his costume change as part of his role as a slave, so ultimately not transformative, but we can also think of the word ἔργον as a kind of Heraclean

labor.[125] His "work," like costume and language, works doubly, reminding us of Xanthias' being while also allowing for the possibility of becoming.

Xanthias suggests that Aeacus torture him and Dionysus in order to test whether Dionysus is truly a god.

> Δι. ἀθάνατος εἶναί φημι, Διόνυσος Διός,
> τοῦτον δὲ δοῦλον.
> Αια. ταῦτ' ἀκούεις;
> Ξα. φήμ' ἐγώ.
> καὶ πολύ γε μᾶλλόν ἐστι μαστιγωτέος·
> εἴπερ θεὸς γάρ ἐστιν, οὐκ αἰσθήσεται.
> Δι. τί δῆτ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ φῂς εἶναι θεός, (635)
> οὐ καὶ σὺ τύπτει τὰς ἴσας πληγὰς ἐμοί;
> Ξα. δίκαιος ὁ λόγος· χὠπότερόν γ' ἂν νῷν ἴδῃς
> κλαύσαντα πρότερον ἢ προτιμήσαντά τι
> τυπτόμενον, ἡγοῦ τοῦτον εἶναι μὴ θεόν.
> Αια. οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως οὐκ εἶ σὺ γεννάδας ἀνήρ· (640)
> χωρεῖς γὰρ εἰς τὸ δίκαιον. ἀποδύεσθε δή. (*Ran.* 631-41)
>
> Di.: I say I'm immortal, Dionysus son of Zeus, and this man's a slave.
> Aae.: You hear that?
> Xa.: I do. And he should be beaten all the more for it, for if he is a god, he won't feel it.
> Di.: Since you also claim you're a god, why don't you take a beating with the same strikes as me?
> Xa.: Good idea. Whomever you see of the two of us cry or notice the beating first, consider that one to be no god.
> Aae.: There's no way you aren't a nobly born man since you go towards what is right. Now strip!

Dionysus cannot persuade Aeacus that he is a god merely by claiming he is immortal (ἀθάνατος εἶναί φημι, Διόνυσος Διός, 631). Using the demonstrative pronoun to identify Xanthias as a slave (τοῦτον δὲ δοῦλον, 632) also fails, raising the problem of referentiality since the deictic does not work, Aeacus believes Xanthias is the god. In scenes of transformation, and especially in a metatheatrical situation such as *Frogs*, identity becomes unstable and difficult to determine. Both

[125] The noun ἔργον is used in reference to Heracles' deeds as early as Homer: φῶθ' Ἡρακλῆα, μεγάλων ἐπίστορα ἔργων (Hom. *Od.* 21.26).

Xanthias and Dionysus claim to be a god (ἀθάνατος εἶναί φημι, 631; σὺ φῂς εἶναι θεός, 635), so Aeacus decides to test them by their reaction to pain, their behavior. But this heuristic fails as well because Xanthias and Dionysus humorously cover their yelps of pain and also because Aeacus misrecognizes Xanthias as noble man (γεννάδας ἀνήρ, 640) for his interaction with him.[126]

Aeacus reasons that by ordering them to strip (ἀποδύεσθε δή, 641) he can investigate the truth, but the stripping of a costume does not reveal their essential character as we saw expressed in *Thesmophoriazusae*. In the *Frogs* stripping reveals how alike the two are. Xanthias may reveal his own experience as a slave and anxieties about torture when he asks Aeacus, "So how will you test us fairly?" (πῶς οὖν βασανιεῖς νὼ δικαίως; 642). The verb βασανίζω ("to test") can also be translated as "torture," a method used for making slaves testify to the truth in a legal procedure. But Aeacus' test does not reveal any difference between Xanthias and Dionysus. In fact, he cannot tell who is who.

> Αια. οὔτοι μὰ τὴν Δήμητρα δύναμαί πω μαθεῖν
> ὁπότερος ὑμῶν ἐστι θεός. ἀλλ' εἴσιτον·
> ὁ δεσπότης γὰρ αὐτὸς ὑμᾶς γνώσεται (670)
> χἠ Φερρέφατθ', ἅτ' ὄντε κἀκείνω θεώ. (*Ran.* 668-71)
>
> Aea.: By Demeter I still cannot tell which of you is a god. Come in though! For the master himself will recognize you and Persephone, too, since they're both gods.

Aeacus reveals his belief that being and similarity enable recognition—he thinks that "since they're both gods" (ἅτ' ὄντε κἀκείνω θεώ, 671), Hades and Persephone will recognize Dionysus and Xanthias for who they are. Aeacus' inability to recognize Xanthias and Dionysus shows how much they have changed over the course of the comedy. They have not only imitated Heracles and switched places imitating him, but their roles as Dionysus and Xanthias, as master and slave,

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[126] Pluto's slave uses the same language, calling Dionysus a "noble man": νὴ τὸν Δία τὸν σωτῆρα, γεννάδας ἀνὴρ / ὁ δεσπότης σου (*Ran.* 738f.).

are not as immediately recognizable as they were in the first scene. The joke that Xanthias is "well-born" and that Aeacus will "torture" the truth out of them plays on the audience's knowledge of their identities, but Aeacus recognizes that he cannot tell which of the two is a god and which is a slave. They both have equal claims to becoming Heracles through mimesis, so either of them could fit the bill for Aeacus. Alternatively, this scene may have a metatheatrical valence for Aristophanes: Aeacus fails to tell the difference between Xanthias and Dionysus because neither of them are gods, because played by actors.[127]

In addition to the on stage transformations in the play, both Aeschylus and Euripides believe that poetry transforms their audiences. Euripides claims that an audience marvels at a poet "for his cleverness and admonishments because we make people in the city better" (δεξιότητος καὶ νουθεσίας, ὅτι βελτίους τε ποιοῦμεν / τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 1009f.).[128] Aeschylus asks what punishment befits a poet who makes his audiences worse than when he received them.

> ταῦτ' οὖν εἰ μὴ πεποίηκας, (1010)
> ἀλλ' ἐκ χρηστῶν καὶ γενναίων μοχθηροτέρους ἀπέδειξας,
> τί παθεῖν φήσεις ἄξιος εἶναι; (*Ran.* 1010-12)
>
> So if you haven't done this, but made good, noble people more immoral, what will you you say is a fitting punishment?

In a rhetorical move like the Socratic *elenchus*, Aeschylus first asks Euripides a hypothetical about what the poet deserves for worsening his audience before claiming Euripides is guilty of that very mistake. Aeschylus tells Dionysus to "consider, then, what kind they were when he first took them

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[127] There is a similar ambiguity at the end of the *agōn* between Aeschylus and Euripides. Dionysus says he cannot choose because one is wise and the other enjoyable, but it is not clear which poet he is referring to in each case: ἄνδρες φίλοι, κἀγὼ μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ κρινῶ. / οὐ γὰρ δι' ἔχθρας οὐδετέρῳ γενήσομαι. / τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι σοφόν, τῷ δ' ἥδομαι (*Ran.* 1411-13). On the ambivalence of Aeschylus' win and Dionysus' choice, see Rosen (2005: 262-64).

[128] On "cleverness" as a Euripidean trait, see Zuckerberg.

from me" (σκέψαι τοίνυν οἵους αὐτούς παρ' ἐμοῦ παρεδέξατο πρῶτον, 1013), revealing a belief that transformation is a process that happens over time. According to Aeschylus, the Athenians were better previously (πρῶτον) when he was the leading tragedian of Athens, but "as they are now" (ὥσπερ νυν, 1015), they have departed from that standard. When Aeschylus asks if Euripides "made good, noble people more immoral" (ἐκ χρηστῶν καὶ γενναίων μοχθηροτέρους ἀπέδειξας, 1011), he suggests Athenian citizens have become worse (μοχθηρότεροι) over time from their previously good nature (ἐκ χρηστῶν καὶ γενναίων). Aeschylus claims Euripides makes Athenians worse, but Euripides' ἀπόδειξις (lit. "a showing forth") can be considered in its other sense of a publication or revelation—he has shown or revealed that human beings are worse through his dramas. Aeschylus' famous statement that poets are the teachers of Athens strengthens the idea that Euripides' plays display humans worse than Aeschylus' characters rather than making them worse. Aeschylus tells Euripides, "the poet must conceal wickedness and mustn't introduce it or teach it" (ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τόν γε ποιητήν, / καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν, 1053f.). Mimesis and change are often depicted as a form of concealment that covers being and identity in Aristophanes, and here concealment is an aesthetic imperative for the poet. While ostensibly arguing about the representation of immoral subjects, Aeschylus reveals a fear of the transformative effect poetry has on its audiences that plays with the language of concealment and being.[129]

[129] In the battle of the prologues, Eur. says saying "Oed. was at first blessed…and then became very wretched," but Aesch. denies the becoming. He says he never stopped being wretched. (1182ff.). Gill claims Aesch. in *Frogs* critiques Eur. on the grounds that he represents the wrong ethical norms, not on the fictionality of his works (Gill 1993: 73).

IV. *Ecclesiazusae* (392 BCE)

At the beginning of the *Ecclesiazusae*, Praxagora and the Chorus of Athenian women utilize costume in order to infiltrate the Pnyx. These are the first women to transform in Aristophanes.

> καίτοι πρὸς ὄρθρον γ' ἐστίν· ἡ δ' ἐκκλησία (20)
> αὐτίκα μάλ' ἔσται· καταλαβεῖν δ' ἡμᾶς ἕδρας
> δεῖ τὰς ἑταίρας κἀγκαθιζομένας λαθεῖν,
> ἃς Φυρόμαχός ποτ' εἶπεν, εἰ μέμνησθ' ἔτι.
> τί δῆτ' ἂν εἴη; πότερον οὐκ ἐρραμένους
> ἔχουσι τοὺς πώγωνας, οὓς εἴρητ' ἔχειν; (25)
> ἢ θαἰμάτια τἀνδρεῖα κλεφάσαις λαθεῖν
> ἦν χαλεπὸν αὐταῖς; (Ar. *Eccl.* 20-27)
>
> Yet it's nearly dawn. The assembly will start straightaway. We women must acquire seats and sit down unnoticed, as Phyromachus once said if you remember still. What then is holding them up? Don't they have the false beards we agreed to get? Or was it difficult for them to steal their husbands' clothes unnoticed?

Praxagora emphasizes that the women must acquire and possess masculine clothes and objects in order to pass as men in the Assembly. She worries that the women do not have stage beards (οὐκ…ἔχουσι τοὺς πώγωνας, 24f.) and that they struggled to steal (κλεφάσαις, 26) their husbands' clothes. Additionally, the acquisition of seats in the Assembly and costumes must be done in secret (κἀγκαθιζομένας λαθεῖν; κλεφάσαις λαθεῖν, 26). While Praxagora waits for the women, she hopes that they are not too late to "take" (καταλαβεῖν, 21) seats in the assembly. This vocabulary of taking, having, and stealing highlights the theme of acquisition and possession of a quality or of costumes and props that we have seen throughout metamorphic scenes in Aristophanes, but in this passage there is the additional sense of not only taking and wearing male dress and stage beards in order to pass for Athenian citizens, but also the possession of political power. By taking

on the aspects of men, these Athenian women can take the seats of the Assembly and transform the state, and thus effect political change.[130]

Praxagora makes sure that all the women are wearing fake beards before they go to the Assembly and exhorts them to practice speaking and acting like men. After one woman expresses a desire to card wool while waiting for the Assembly to fill up, Praxagora says that will give her away.

> ἰδού γέ σε ξαίνουσαν, ἣν τοῦ σώματος
> οὐδὲν παραφῆναι τοῖς καθημένοις ἔδει.
> οὐκοῦν καλά γ' ἂν πάθοιμεν, εἰ πλήρης τύχοι (95)
> ὁ δῆμος ὢν κἄπειθ' ὑπερβαίνουσά τις
> ἀναβαλλομένη δείξειε τὸν Φορμίσιον;
> ἢν δ' ἐγκαθιζώμεσθα πρότεραι, λήσομεν
> ζυστειλάμεναι θαἰμάτια · τὸν πώγωνά τε
> ὅταν καθῶμεν ὃν περιδησόμεσθ' ἐκεῖ, (100)
> τίς ουκ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἄνδρας ἡγήσαιθ' ὁρῶν; (*Eccl.* 93-101)
>
> Look at you, weaving! When you mustn't reveal any part of your body to the Assembly! Nice things indeed would happen to us if the citizens fill up their seats and then some woman steps over, hiking up her cloak, and gives them a glimpse of her Phormisius? But if we sit down first, we'll wrap our cloaks tightly around us unnoticed. When we let our beards down there, which we'll tie on presently, who won't think we're men when they see us?

Praxagora claims that the women's behavior, such as carding wool, will reveal a part of their body, which they should cover out of modesty. This inverts Agathon's claim that by crossdressing his body participates in the character he imitates. Instead, Praxagora betrays a belief that costume conceals the body and can ultimately be unveiled, reminding the women to neither "uncover" (παραφαίνω, 94) nor "show" (δείκνυμι, 97) their body: "You mustn't reveal any part of your body to the Assembly" (ἣν τοῦ σώματος / οὐδὲν παραφῆναι, 93f.). Weaving and carding wool are typically feminine work. Not only will this behavior reveal women's bodies but it will also reveal the character hidden by their disguise. The participle in Praxagora's example of a

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[130] *lanthanō*, cf. *lathra* in *Thesm.*; *imatia andreia*, cf. Ag. in *Thesm.*

woman "stepping over" (ὑπερβαίνουσα, 96) a seated citizen and revealing her sex works both as a joke and also as a marker of how transgressive the transformation from man to woman or from woman to man is (as we have also seen with Agathon), as ὑπερβαίνω can also mean in an extended sense to "overstep" or "transgress." In *Ecclesiazusae* transformation is politicized—women transgress the lines of gender through costume and behavior and become political actors.

While Praxagora considers costume as a means to an end, merely as disguise, her interlocutor gives an example of the Athenian politician Agyrrhius, who also uses costume in order to transform.

> Γυ. α. Ἀγύρριος γοῦν τὸν Προνόμου πώγων' ἔχων
> λέληθε · καίτοι πρότερον ἦν οὗτος γυνή ·
> νυνὶ δ'—ὁρᾷς;—πράττει τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τῇ πόλει. (*Eccl.* 102-4)
>
> Gu. A.: No one noticed Agyrrhius wearing Pronomus' beard. And he was a woman before. Now, you see, he's the biggest politician in the city.

The woman's formulation that Agyrrhius wears a beard as a disguise (lit. "unnoticed," λέληθε, 103) echoes Praxagora's description of costume as a means of disguise, not of transformation. Praxagora emphasizes the need for discretion with the verb λανθάνω ("to escape notice") above (at ll. 22, 26, and 98), highlighting costume as disguise. Likewise, the woman says that Agyrrhius needs to possess an object or quality (πώγωνα ἔχων, 102) to take on the characteristics of another person, and that this additional layer must be deceptive and unnoticed by any observer. For Praxagora, the Athenian women's transformation will deceive the minds of Athenian citizens but not have a lasting effect on the women themselves: "Who won't think we're men when they see us?" (τίς ουκ ἂν ἡμᾶς ἄνδρας ἡγήσαιθ' ὁρῶν; 101). The Athenians will only think (ἡγέομαι) that they are women, but there is no transformation beyond the deception of the men in the Assembly. Although Praxagora's co-conspirator Woman #1 uses a similar language of disguise, she suggests that mimesis entails a becoming that happens over time effected through costume

and mimesis. Woman #1 marks the process of transformation with the temporal adverbs πρότερον and νυνί: Agyrrhius may currently wear a beard, but he was a woman "before" (πρότερον, 103), and "now" (νυνί, 104) that he is not a woman, he is a politician. The tense of the verbs marks the change effected through mimesis. The imperfect tense of εἰμί marks Agyrrhius' previous state of being (he "was" a woman," ἦν, 103) before he puts on the beard prosthetic, and currently he practices politics, by the present tense of πράττω (πράττει, 104). Agyrrhius' transformation also troubles the easy use of the pronoun οὗτος ("he") since the grammatical gender of the masculine demonstrative pronoun and the subject complement, a feminine noun, do not agree. This language can easily be applied to Praxagora and the other women as well: should the Athenian women (γυναῖκες) refer to themselves as "these men" (οὗτοι) or "these women" (αὗται) now that they, like Agyrrhius, have put on beards?

Praxagora may consider costume a form of disguise, but she hopes that it will ultimately have a transformative effect.

> Πρ. τούτου γέ τοι, νὴ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν, (105)
> τόλμημα τολμῶμεν τοσοῦτον οὕνεκα,
> ἵν πως παραλαβεῖν τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα
> δυνώμεθ', ὥστ' ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν·
> νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὔτε θέομεν οὔτ' ἐλαύνομεν. (*Eccl.* 105-9)
>
> Pr.: It's because of him, by the coming day, we dare to do such a deed. In the hope that we can take over the city's affairs so as to do something good for the city. For right now we aren't going forward by sail or oar.

Praxagora turns the woman's example of Agyrrhius into an *aition* for their actions: it's "because of him" (τούτου οὕνεκα, 105f.) the women dress up as men and infiltrate the Assembly. Praxagora uses the same verb πράττω (πρᾶξαι, 108) to express what she hopes the women can achieve politically, echoing Woman #1 on Agyrrhius, and suggests that transformation can affect behavior. The women not only undergo the same physical transformation as Agyrrhius, but the

transformation also will enable them to become political actors like Agyrrhius, who "does the greatest things in the city" (πράττει τὰ μέγιστ' ἐν τῇ πόλει, 104). After these Athenian women transform and take over the Assembly, they can "do something good for the city" (ὥστε ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι τὴν πόλιν, 108). The natural result clause follows from the apodosis, "In the hope that we can take over the city's affairs" (ἵν πως παραλαβεῖν τῆς πόλεως τὰ πράγματα / δυνώμεθ', 106f.). Mimesis enables Praxagora's acquisition (παραλαβεῖν) of political power (τὰ πράγματα τῆς πόλεως) from men. Praxagora also uses a compound derived from λαμβάνω for taking the physical seats in the Assembly before it fills up (καταλαβεῖν, 21). We have seen the verb λαμβάνω elsewhere in Aristophanes to mark the acquisition of props (in *Frogs*) or even an entire tragedy (in *Acharnians*). Here, in addition to the theme of acquisition and possession of clothing and props in order to take on the character of another person, Praxagora reveals a desire for mimesis to enable women to transform the state and not only themselves.

But costume is not enough for the Athenian women to imitate men, so Praxagora suggests that they must also rehearse their roles. In doing so, Praxagora offers two views of the temporality of becoming: 1) she views transformation as occurring quickly with a costume change; but 2) she also reveals a belief that change requires habituation and that becoming is a process.

> Πρ. οὔκουν ἐπίτηδες ξυνελέγημεν ἐνθάδε,
> ὅπως προμελετήσωμεν ἀκεῖ δεῖ λέγειν;
> οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις τὸ γένειον ἄν περιδουμένη
> ἄλλαι θ' ὅσαι λαλεῖν μεμελετήκασί που.
> Γυ. Β. τίς δ, ὦ μέλ', ἡμῶν οὐ λαλεῖν ἐπίσταται; (120)
> Πρ. ἴθι δὴ σύ, περιδοῦ καὶ ταχέως ἀνὴρ γενοῦ.
> ἐγὼ δὲ θεῖσα τοὺς στεφάνους περιδήσομαι
> καὐτὴ μεθ' ὑμῶν, ἢν τί μοι δόξῃ λέγειν. (*Eccl.* 116-23)
>
> Pr.: Isn't that why we assembled here, so we can practice beforehand what to say there? You can't tie on your beard too quickly, and the others, too, who have practiced speaking.

> Gu. B.: Sweetie, who among us doesn't know how to chit-chat?
> Pr.: Come on, then, tie on your beard and quickly become a man. I'll put down my garlands and tie mine on with you in case I decide to say something.

Praxagora tells one of the women that they have gathered together "here" (ἐνθάδε, 116) in order to "practice beforehand what to say there" (προμελετήσωμεν ἀκεῖ δεῖ λέγειν, 117). The spatial adverbs ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ create two distinct spaces of rehearsal and performance. There is a temporal dimension to becoming marked by the prefix προ-, as the women have assembled to practice in advance (προ-μελετάω). The verbs φθάνω and μελετάω both add to this idea that transformation happens over time through habituation. The verb φθάνω when paired with a participle means to do something before another or to do it first, thus the woman Praxagora addresses "can't tie on the beard too quickly" (οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις τὸ γένειον ἄν περιδουμένη, 118). Additionally, the perfect tense of the verb μελετάω marks the timing of transformation. The other Athenian women "have practiced speaking" (λαλεῖν μεμελετήκασι, 119) before their performance on the Pnyx.

Praxagora reveals an alternate view of mimesis, the belief that transformation is quick, when she tells her interlocutor, "Come on, then, tie on your beard and quickly become a man" (ἴθι δὴ σύ, περιδοῦ καὶ ταχέως ἀνὴρ γενοῦ, *Eccl.* 121). The aorist tense of the imperative γενοῦ ("become," "be") along with the adverb ταχέως ("quickly") suggest that the woman must merely tie on her stage beard (περιδοῦ) and she will be a man. From this view transformation seems superficial, effected only through costume change, not affecting the woman's being in any way. However, in a joke suggesting that women talk too much, the woman says that assembled Athenian women already "know how to speak" (λαλεῖν ἐπίστανται, 120). That is, they already have a similar disposition or possess a quality typical of male citizens that enables their transformation. The imperative γενοῦ has appeared previously in on-stage transformations in the

Acharnians and *Frogs*, where the emphasis is on the physical becoming another person.[131] In all three of these transformations, the character already possesses the qualities they need to act in character, but they require additional costumes or props. The woman's interjection in this passage makes a case that women are already similar to political actors, so Praxagora tells her to put on her beard and become a man. This perhaps is reflected in the repetition of the verb περιδέω (118, 121, and 122). The beard is a supplement or a prosthetic that goes "about" or "around" (from the prefix περι-) the face, suggesting a superficial transformation that does not affect the character's being.

Ultimately, mimesis takes practice, lending credence to the view that becoming is a process. Praxagora tells another woman to put on a garland and also to modulate her voice and body in order to act like a man.

> ἴθι δὴ στεφανοῦ · καὶ γὰρ τὸ χρῆμ' ἐργαστέον.
> ἄγε νυν, ὅπως ἀνδριστὶ καὶ καλῶς ἐρεῖς,
> διερεισαμένη τὸ σχῆμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ. (*Eccl.* 148-50) (150)
>
> Come on, then, put on the garland, for the business must be done. Come on, now, see that you speak in a manly and beautiful way, and lean your body on the staff.

The garland and the staff (στεφάνομαι, 148; ἡ βακτηρία, 150) serve as part of the costume and as a prop for the woman to become a male Athenian citizen. But this transformation is not only a form of disguise—it occurs in the body. The performance is a kind of work or physical labor (ἐργαστέον, 148). The verb ἐργάζομαι is frequently used to describe the physical labor of farmers and slaves, and although the meaning is more metaphorical here—"the business must be done"—the verb connotes the contortion and movement of the physical body. In addition to this metaphor that locates mimesis in the body, Praxagora tells the woman to lean on the staff

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[131] Ar. *Ach.* 451, *Frogs* 495. See discussion above.

(διερεισαμένη τὸ σχῆμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ, 150), giving the woman concrete choreography. A bearded figure leaning on a staff, especially one involved in politics, suggests an aged Athenian man (perhaps a professional juror). The feminine participle διερεισαμένη reminds us that the Athenian woman is a woman, but Praxagora tells her how to perform like a man, and not only how to be disguised as one.

In addition to modulating her body, Praxagora tells the woman she must speak like a man (ἀνδριστί, 149) and beautifully (καλῶς, ibid.), invoking a performative view of mimesis akin to Agathon in *Thesmophoriazusae*, who uses tragedians' behavior as an aetiology for the quality of their tragedies.

> αὐτός τε καλὸς ἦν καὶ καλῶς ἠμπίσχετο · (165)
> διὰ τοῦτ' ἄρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ κάλ' ἦν τὰ δράματα.
> ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει. (*Thesm.* 165-67)
>
> He [sc. Phrynichus] both was beautiful and and beautifully dressed. Because of this, then, his plays were beautiful, too. For one must compose plays similar to one's nature.

Agathon offers an aetiological formula where the quality of a poet (adjective, καλός) and his behavior (adverb, καλῶς) explain the qualities of his plays (κάλα ἦν τὰ δράματα). Praxagora suggests this in a compressed fashion: by telling the woman, "See that you speak in a manly and beautiful way" (ὅπως ἀνδριστὶ καὶ καλῶς ἐρεῖς, *Eccl.* 149), Praxagora implies the end result of transformation. If the woman speaks like a man (adverb, ἀνδριστί) and beautifully (adverb, καλῶς), she will convincingly portray a beautiful male citizen (ἀνήρ, καλός) in her performance.[132]

We see language marking the end result of transformation when one of the Athenian woman makes a mistake. Despite Praxagora's coaching, the woman misspeaks by swearing by

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[132] When Praxagora gives her speech, she says a woman praises well (καλῶς) after her earlier mistake of invoking Aphrodite: ὡς ζυνετὸς ἀνήρ. νῦν καλῶς ἐπῄνεσας (*Eccl.* 204).

Demeter and Persephone: "By Zeus, as a man you swore by the two goddesses, although the rest you said was very clever" (μὰ Δί' ἀλλ' ἀνὴρ ὢν τὼ θεὼ κατώμοσας, / καίτοι τά γ' ἄλλ' εἰποῦσα δεξίωτατα, 158f.). Praxagora says that the woman playing a man was "being a man" (ἀνὴρ ὤν, 158). The participle of εἰμί suggests the end result of transformation: she has become and is currently a man. This is echoed by the masculine gender of the participle. Praxagora uses ὤν instead of οὖσα to describe the woman's transformation. Praxagora reveals her own paradoxical views of transformation when she contradicts herself in the next line, however, by using the feminine participle εἰποῦσα (159): she considers mimesis as a kind of transformation (the woman has become a man) and as a disguise (she truly is a woman underneath the costume) simultaneously. This paradox also shows how mimesis can hybridize characters by asking: how can a woman be a man (ὤν) and a woman (εἰποῦσα) at the same time?

Praxagora reveals in her speech how she is in the process of becoming. While rebuking the woman for swearing by the two goddesses (τὼ θεὼ κατώμοσας, 158), she herself swears by an appropriately masculine-gendered deity, Zeus (μὰ Δία, ibid.). Her oath does not show that she is essentially a man, but rather that she has accustomed herself to speaking in a manly way. When another woman swears by Aphrodite, Praxagora tells her, "Don't get accustomed to saying it now," (μηδ' ἐθίζου νῦν λέγειν, 192). The Athenian women must become accustomed not only to changing the way they speak but also they way they move and gesture with their bodies. One woman comments that while they are in character as men, they will have to remember to raise their hands to vote, "For we are accustomed to lift up our legs" (εἰθισμέναι γάρ ἐσμεν αἴρειν τὼ σκέλει, 265). The verb ἐθίζω, meaning "to be/become accustomed" in the passive, implies the repetition and process of habituation. The denominative verb derives from the noun ἔθος, which

can be used as a counterpart to φύσις ("nature").[133] Agathon says "one must compose plays similar to one's nature" (ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει, *Thesm.* 167), but he suggests that φύσις ("nature") is malleable through costume and habituation. While Praxagora and the Athenian woman suggest that one's character is also malleable, by focusing on habituation, they claim that transformation destabilizes φύσις even more so than in Agathon's conceptualization of mimesis. In the *Ecclesiazousae* a character's speech and bodily comportment do not reveal their nature but only how they are accustomed to speak and move. There is no φύσις, only ἔθος.

When Praxagora rehearses her speech for the Assembly, arguing that the citizens should hand over the reins of state to women, she speaks of women in the third person and men in the first: "I'll explain how they are better in character than us" (ὡς δ' εἰσὶν ἡμῶν τοὺς τρόπους βελτίονες / ἐγὼ διδάξω, 214f.). Praxagora has transformed into an Athenian citizen, referring to Athenian men as "us" (ἡμῶν, 214) and women as "them" (e.g. the third person plural verb εἰσίν; the nominative plural adjective βελτίονες). The Chorus Leader also refers to these Athenian women as men.

> ὥρα προβαίνειν, ὦνδρες, ἡμῖν ἐστι· τοῦτο γὰρ χρὴ (285)
> μεμνημένας ἀεὶ λέγειν, ὡς μήποτ' ἐξολίσθῃ
> ἡμᾶς. ὁ κίνδυνος γὰρ οὐχὶ μικρός, ἢν ἁλῶμεν
> ἐνδυόμεναι κατὰ σκότον τόλμημα τηλικοῦτον. (*Eccl.* 285-88)
>
> The hour has come for us to depart, gentlemen. For it's necessary that we always remember to say this, so that it never slips out from our memory. For the danger is by no means small if we are caught putting on such daring under cover of dark.

The Chorus Leader addresses the rest of the Chorus as "gentlemen" with the masculine vocative noun ἄνδρες (285), making it clear that she means the Athenian women by including herself in that number with the first person plural pronoun ἡμεῖς (ἡμῖν, 285). Mimesis allows women to

[133] Cf. LSJ & Chantraine (1968-77) s.v. εἴωθα.

transform into men, not only marking a change in gender, but also a change in perspective. They acquire the costume and objects of another and also their perspective. The first person and third person become inverted. When the Athenian women costume themselves and speak in-character during their on-stage transformation, the workings of mimesis as a form of metamorphosis become transparent. They take on the perspective and actions of the characters they would otherwise represent verbally in the third person.

The Chorus Leader speaks in character as an Athenian citizen by addressing the Chorus as men, but she also reminds them of their gender during the transformation. The feminine participle ἐνδυόμεναι, from ἐνδύω ("have on" or "put on"), marks the Athenian women's gender and suggests with a sartorial metaphor ("They have put on such daring," ἐνδυόμεναι…τόλμημα τηλικοῦτον, *Eccl.* 288) that their current form is only temporary and their essential being is intact. But the Chorus Leader's metaphor also suggests that dressing as a man can affect the Chorus more deeply than a disguise. Similar to Agathon's belief in the *Thesmophoriazusae* that he can wear a person's clothes simultaneously with their mindset, in the *Ecclesiazusae* the Athenian women must put on their husbands' clothes and courage to infiltrate the Pnyx.[134] The Chorus Leader also uses a feminine participle when she tells the Chorus they must "remember" (μεμνημένας, 286) to address each other as men. But the imperative to remember works in both directions, before and after the Chorus' costume change: the Chorus Leader reminds the Chorus to to speak and act like men, to be mindful of their present form, but in telling them to remember with a feminine participle, she reminds them at the same time of their previous form as women. The adverb ἀεί ("always") gets at both of these notions, the Chorus' hybridity as women and men and the temporality of transformation: the Chorus must continuously (ἀεί) remind themselves that

[134] For Agathon's use of φορέω for clothes and mindset, see discussion above on *Thesm.* 148-50.

they are men while they are on the Pnyx, but the grammatical gender of the participle suggests that they must also continuously (ἀεί) remind themselves that they are women so they do not forget themselves. Aristophanes plays on the Chorus' hybridity with the first person plural pronoun ἡμεῖς. The Chorus Leader, speaking first as a man, tells the Chorus "it's time for *us* [i.e. us men] to go" (ἡμῖν, 285), and then genders herself and the Chorus as feminine with feminine participles, reminding them to be mindful of their disguise "so that it never slips out from *our* [i.e. us women's] memory" (ὡς μήποτ' ἐξολίσθῃ / ἡμᾶς, 286f.). Aristophanes plays on the different cases of the same pronoun (ἡμῖν, 285; ἡμᾶς, 287), but his use of polyptoton also plays on the different referents and genders of the first person plural pronoun.[135] The Chorus Leader uses the pronoun in both instances to refer to herself and the Chorus, and their transformation proves how "we" can be and refer to multiple things simultaneously.

Praxagora's instructions to the Athenian women contextualizes transformation as something occurring in multiple places in the body.

> ἄγε νυν ἀναστέλλεσθ' ἄνω τὰ χιτώνια ·
> ὑποδεῖσθε δ' ὡς τάχιστα τὰς Λακωνικάς,
> ὥσπερ τὸν ἄνδρ' ἐθεᾶσθ', ὅτ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν (270)
> μέλλοι βαδίζειν ἢ θύραζ' ἑκάστοτε.
> ἔπειτ', ἐπειδὰν ταῦτα πάντ' ἔχῃ καλῶς,
> περιδεῖσθε τοὺς πώγωνας. ἡνίκ' ἂν δέ γε
> τούτους ἀκριβώσητε περιηρμοσμέναι,
> καὶ θαἰμάτια τἀνδρεῖ', ἅπερ γ' ἐκλέψατε, (275)
> ἐπαναβάλεσθε, κἆτα ταῖς βακτηρίαις
> ἐπερειδόμεναι βαδίζετ' ᾄδουσαι μέλος
> πρεσβυτικόν τι, τὸν τρόπον μιμούμεναι
> τὸν τῶν ἀγροίκων. (*Eccl.* 266-79)
>
> Come on now, hike up your robes and tie on those Laconian shoes as quickly as possible, just as when you watched your husband each time before he went to the Assembly or in public. Then, when all these things are on tight, tie on your

[135] In another instance of polyptoton with the pronoun ἡμεῖς, the Chorus urges each other not to be seen as they change out of their disguise: μὴ καί τις ὄψεθ' ἡμᾶς χἠμῶν ἴσως κατείπῃ (*Eccl.* 495).

> beards. When you arrange those precisely after you have fastened them on, throw on over the clothes you stole from your husband. Then walk leaning on your staffs and singing some old song, imitating the way of country folk.

The verbs in Praxagora's list of commands gives us a lexicon for metatheater and costuming, but what also interests me here is Aristophanes' use of prefixes to show how mimesis affects every part of the body. Praxagora tells the Chorus to "hike up" their robes (ἀνα-στέλλεσθε, ἄνω, 268), to "tie on (under)" their sandals (ὑπο-δεῖσθε, 269), to "tie round" their beards (περι-δεῖσθε, 273), to "throw up and over" their clothes (ἐπανα-βάλεσθε, 276), and to "lean on" their staffs (ἐπερειδόμεναι, 277). Praxagora choreographs how the Chorus is to interact with their costumes and props in order to successfully imitate old Athenian men. They must modulate their voices as well when they sing a rustic song, "imitating the way of country folk" (τὸν τρόπον μιμούμεναι / τὸν τῶν ἀγροίκων, 278f.).[136] Coming at the end of this list of imperatives and participles, the noun τρόπος ("turning," "way," but also "character") suggests that the Chorus must move their bodies and turn in a particular way to fully represent their characters, and if they do, the Chorus of Athenian women can become a Chorus of rustic (ἄγροικος) Athenian men.

In addition to situating mimesis in the body, Praxagora gives a narrative of mimetic transformation with temporal adverbs and particles. The Athenian women must infiltrate the Pnyx at a singular moment in time, but they also must inhabit the character of men accustomed to going to the Assembly routinely, in a ritual or circular temporality. Praxagora tells the women "come on, now" (ἄγε νυν, 268), to stir them into action, and to put on their shoes "as quickly as possible" (ὡς τάχιστα, 269). Both of these phrases suggest a moment of transformation that happens in the present, but they are not the end to the transformation. After these changes,

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[136] Else reads this instance of μιμέομαι as "imitation" deriving from the initial meaning of mimesis as "mime," because "aping of gesture…a kind of quasi-dramatic performance" (1958: 80).

Praxagora says that after these changes, they have to tie on their beards "then" (ἔπειτα, 272), "whenever" (ἐπειδάν, 272) their other garments are in order. They can only throw on their husband's clothes "when" (ἡνίκα, 273) they have scrutinized their appearance. And only "then" (εἶτα, 276) does Praxagora command the women to walk, lean on their staffs, sing, and represent old men. The adverbs add a continuity and tempo to the imperatives, suggesting a sequence of transformation as women gradually become old men. This temporality suggests a linear progression, but Praxagora also tells them to dress: "Just as when you watched your husband each time before he went to the Assembly or in public" (ὥσπερ τὸν ἄνδρ' ἐθεᾶσθ', ὅτ' εἰς ἐκκλησίαν / μέλλοι βαδίζειν ἢ θύραζ' ἑκάστοτε, 270f.). In addition to the many verbs for changing costume, the verb θεάομαι ("gaze out," "behold") gives the passage a metatheatrical tone, as it also denotes the watching an audience does in the theater. Thus, the women are getting dressed as they have seen their husbands do, but it also marks the audience's observation of the Chorus changing to go to the *skēnē*-cum-Assembly: "Just as when you saw the man each time he was about to go to the Assembly or in public." The correlatives ὅτε ("when") and ἑκάστοτε ("whenever") show that Athenian citizens go to the Assembly regularly, offering a repetitive notion of time. With the metatheatrical tone of the passage and these lines in particular, Praxagora orders the Chorus to dress up *qua* Chorus, i.e. as they do regularly for dramas as actors. This blends the narrative temporality of mimesis, happening in a progression of temporal adverbs ("first," "then," etc.), with a ritual or repetitive conceptualization of time. "Whenever" actors change clothes and are beheld by an audience, they do things they would not otherwise do (such as women going to the Assembly).

Praxagora's plan for women to take over the power of the state and transform it into a domestic space effects change before she and the Chorus return from the Pnyx. Her husband Blepyrus comes out on stage after the Chorus' song wearing his wife's slip and Persian slippers.

> τὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα; ποῖ ποθ' ἡ γυνὴ φρούδη 'στί μοι;
> ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἕω νὼν γ' ἔστιν, ἡ δ' οὐ φαίνεται.
> ἐγὼ δὲ κατάκειμαι πάλαι χεζητιῶν,
> τὰς ἐμβάδας ζητῶν λαβεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότῳ
> καὶ θοἰμάτιον· ὅτε δὴ ἐκεῖνο ψηλαφῶν (315)
> οὐκ ἐδυνάμην εὑρεῖν, ὁ δ' ἤδη τὴν θύραν
> ἐπεῖχε κρούων μοὐ Κοπρεῖος, λαμβάνω
> τουτὶ τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς ἡμιδιπλοίδιον
> καὶ τὰς ἐκείνης Περσικὰς ὑφέλκομαι. (*Eccl.* 311-19)
>
> What's going on? Where in the world has my wife gone? It's now almost dawn, and she isn't to be found. I'm lying down for a long time, needing to shit, so I try to grab my slippers and cloak in the dark. When I grasp for it blindly and I can't find it, Kopreius continues to knock on my door, so I take my wife's robe here and pull on her Persian slippers.

Blepyrus describes his situation negatively by noting the absence of his wife and his inability to find his clothes. By asking, "Where in the world has my wife gone?" (ποῖ ποθ' ἡ γυνὴ φρούδη 'στί μοι; 312), he unwittingly comments on Praxagora's transformation. He cannot find where his wife is (ἡ γυνή ἐστι) because she is not currently his wife, but a citizen at the Assembly. Additionally, by using the adjective φροῦδος ("gone"), he draws a connection to Dicaeopolis' transformation in the *Acharnians*, when Euripides tells him "My plays are gone!" (φροῦδά μοι τὰ δράματα, *Ach.* 470). Dicaeopolis transforms himself into Telephus, but by taking Euripides' costume and props, Euripides loses his plays. Similarly, Praxagora's transformation into a man comes at the expense of her being Blepyrus' wife; that person is gone (φρούδη). Blepyrus' comment that Praxagora is not visible anywhere (ἡ δ' οὐ φαίνεται, 312) can be read as an effect

of her costume: she does not appear to be (ἡ δ' οὐ φαίνεται εἶναι) who she was before her transformation because she currently is someone different.[137]

Blepyrus defines his own situation by lack, by the absence of Praxagora and also his own lack of clothing. He says he "[tries] to grab [his] slippers and cloak in the dark" (τὰς ἐμβάδας ζητῶν λαβεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότῳ / καὶ θοἰμάτιον, *Eccl.* 314f.). Blepyrus wants to possess (λαβεῖν) his clothes, a marker of his being a male citizen that his wife has stolen from him, but fails to do so. The participle ζητῶν (from ζητέω, "seek" or "try to do") highlights the lack driving Blepyrus' search, but it also plays on the participle χεζητιῶν ("wanting to shit," 313) from the previous line (*z̲ē̲-t̲ō̲n̲*, *khe-z̲ē̲-t̲i-ō̲n̲*). The desiderative form of the verb χεζητιάω expresses a desire or need, "to want to ease oneself."[138] Similarly Blepyrus' search (ζητέω) is one defined by the desire (another meaning of the verb) to reacquire his clothes and identity. Blepyrus' lack of clothes is further highlighted by his blind groping (ψηλαφῶν, 315) and inability to find (οὐκ ἐδυνάμην εὑρεῖν, 316) his clothes and shoes. Blepyrus takes (λαμβάνω, 317) Praxagora's robe and puts on (ὑφέλκομαι, 319) her slippers, but in doing so he admits a lack of mastery over his own clothes and identity as a man.[139] He gestures to the robe he currently wears as belonging to "his wife" (λαμβάνω / τουτὶ τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς ἡμιδιπλοίδιον, 317f.) but the deictic τουτί ("this here") and the actor's costume may cause the audience to revise their opinion as to who possesses the robe and therefore has the feminine quality associated with it. Thus, "I take this robe belonging to my wife" becomes "I take this robe belonging to a woman," suggesting that Blepyrus, who wears the woman's garment, has become a woman. There is a similar effect in the following line when Blepyrus puts on "that

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[137] Cf. Dicaeopolis, who does not want to appear (φαίνεσθαι) to be himself: δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον, / εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή (*Ach.* 440f.).
[138] LSJ s.v. χεζητιάω. On the formation of desiderative verbs, see Smyth § 868.
[139] On "mastery" over costume in Aristophanes, see Compton-Engle 2003.

woman's" shoes (καὶ τὰς ἐκείνης Περσικὰς ὑφέλκομαι, 319). We have seen that when characters transform in Aristophanes, names and pronouns no longer easily refer to characters they once referred to. If Blepyrus' wife is "gone" (φρούδη), and he now wears her clothes, to whom does the pronoun ἐκείνη refer?

Blepyrus' new costume not only transforms his visible appearance and sense of self, but it also affects his character at the level of his speech. He invokes Eileithyia, the goddess of childbirth, to help him take a shit.

> ὦ πότνι' Ἰλείθυα μή με περιίδῃς
> διαρραγέντα μηδὲ βεβαλανωμένον, (370)
> ἵνα μὴ γένωμαι σκωραμὶς κωμῳδική. (*Eccl.* 369-71)
>
> Lady Eileithyia, don't overlook me tearing at the seams and constipated, so I don't become a comic toilet!

Blepyrus reveals an awareness of being in a comedy (κωμῳδική, 371), or at the very least that he may warrant the jokes made at his expense that will appear later in a comedy. He shows how a scene in daily life can be adapted by a comic poet such as Aristophanes and notes that this kind of translation from life to the stage is a kind of becoming (γένωμαι, 371). While Blepyrus hopes that he will not become a running gag, his speech reveals that he has undergone a transformation that he is unaware of. He uses masculine participles in reference to himself (διαρραγέντα, βεβαλανωμένον, 370), but by addressing Eileithyia (ὦ πότνι' Ἰλείθυα, 369) to aid him in his "birth," he casts himself as a pregnant woman. The Athenian women are instructed to be ever-mindful to speak like men (τοῦτο γὰρ χρὴ / μεμνημένας ἀεὶ λέγειν, 285f.) because some misspeak by swearing on Demeter and Persephone (τὼ θεὼ κατώμοσας, 158), but, like his wife Praxagora, who swears by Zeus when she is dressed as a man (μὰ Δία, 158), Blepyrus does not need prompting to make the appropriate oath now that he is dressed as a woman. His costume has

affected not his appearance but also his speech, his character, resulting in a hybrid Blepyrus who speaks and dresses like a woman and also refers to himself with masculine gender participles.

After returning from the Assembly, the Chorus take off their disguises because they need to change back to who they were before.

> ὥστ' εἰκὸς ἡμᾶς μὴ βραδύνειν ἔστ' ἐπαναμενούσας
> πώγωνας ἐξηρτημένας,
> μὴ καί τις ὄψεθ' ἡμᾶς χἠμῶν ἴσως κατείπῃ. (495)
> ἀλλ' εἶα, δεῦρ' ἐπὶ σκιᾶς
> ἐλθοῦσα πρὸς τὸ τειχίον,
> παραβλέπουσα θατέρῳ,
> πάλιν μετασκεύαζε σαυτὴν αὖθις ἥπερ ἦσθα.
> καὶ μὴ βράδυν' · ὡς τήνδε καὶ δὴ τὴν στρατηγὸν ἡμῶν (500)
> χωροῦσαν ἐξ ἐκκλησίας ὁρῶμεν. ἀλλ' ἐπείγου
> ἅπασα καὶ μίσει σάκον πρὸς ταῖν γνάθοιν ἔχουσα ·
> καὐταὶ γὰρ ἀλγοῦσιν πάλαι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτ' ἔχουσαι. (*Eccl.* 493-503)
>
> So we cannot dawdle waiting around with our beards still hanging down, so no one will see us nor inform against us. But go on, come here in the dark to the wall, looking out with one eye open. Change yourself back again to how you were, and don't delay since we see our general coming from the Assembly. Hurry up, everyone, and get rid of the scruff on your cheeks. For they've been in pain for a long time keeping up this look.

By distinguishing their current selves from who they were before, the Chorus suggests that they are men in their current form (as opposed to merely appearing to be men): "Change yourself back again to how you were" (πάλιν μετασκεύαζε σαυτὴν αὖθις ἥπερ ἦσθα, 499). The adverbs and prefixes in this line (πάλιν, "back," "again"; μετα-, "after"; αὖθις, "back," "back again") highlight the temporality of transformation and demarcate the Athenian women's current form from their previous one. The feminine relative pronoun ἥπερ ("the very one who") signals that the women's identity as women is what is at stake in the transformation.[140] Aristophanes uses the verb εἰμί to mark transformations: the imperfect tense of the verb ἦσθα ("you were") suggests a continuity and also a pastness of being (i.e. the women were their previous selves over an

[140] On ὅσπερ denoting identity, see Smyth § 2495.

extended period of time, but now they are not) resulting in the new form they currently inhabit. The Chorus' desire to move quickly—they state twice in the antistrophe that they must not wait around and dawdle (μὴ βραδύνειν…ἐπαναμενούσας, 493; μὴ βράδυνε, 500)—as they change out of their costumes shows that transformation occurs in time even if they want transformation to happen instantaneously and have no lingering effect on their being. But the Chorus seem aware that transformation occurs over time with the temporal adverb πάλαι ("long") at the end of the passage: "For they've been in pain for a long time keeping up this look" (καὐταὶ γὰρ ἀλγοῦσιν πάλαι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτ' ἔχουσαι, 503). By describing their transformation as a change "back" into their previous forms, the Chorus implies with ἥπερ ἦσθα an alternative form of the phrase in the present tense and with a masculine gender pronoun, describing both their present state and the temporality of becoming: ὅσπερ ἐστέ ("who you are (now)").

When Praxagora returns from the Assembly, she tells the women to undress and get rid of their props. In doing so, she emphasizes the timing of transformation as well as the idea that transformation back is a kind of negation of the costumes and props they acquired previously.

> ταυτὶ μὲν ἡμῖν, ὦ γυναῖκες, εὐτυχῶς
> τὰ πράγματ' ἐκβέβηκεν ἀβουλεύσαμεν.
> ἀλλ' ὡς τάχιστα, πρίν τιν' ἀνθρώπων ἰδεῖν,
> ῥιπτεῖτε χλαίνας, ἐμβὰς ἐκποδὼν ἴτω,
> χάλα συναπτοὺς ἡνίας Λακωνικάς,
> βακτηρίας ἄφεσθε. καὶ μέντοι σὺ μὲν
> ταύτας κατευτρέπιζ', ἐγὼ δὲ βούλομαι,
> εἴσω παραερπύσασα πρὶν τὸν ἄνδρα με
> ἰδεῖν, καταθέσθαι θοἰμάτιον αὐτοῦ πάλιν
> ὅθενπερ ἔλαβον, τἄλλα θ' ἁξηνεγκάμην. (*Eccl.* 504-13)
>
> Our business has gone well for us, ladies, just as we planned. But quickly, before any of our husbands see, throw off your cloaks, step out of your slipper, loosen those fitted Laconian sandals, cast away your staffs. You, put these women in order, I want to slip inside before my husband sees me, drop of his cloak back from where I took it as well as the rest of the stuff I carried away.

Praxagora uses verbs denoting movement as well as prefixes and adverbs that highlight separation, suggesting that she believes the costumes are a mere disguise that can be taken off and have no effect on her being. She tells the Chorus to "throw away" (ῥίπτεῖτε, 507) their husbands' cloaks; to "step out of" their slippers (ἐκ-ποδὼν ἴτω, 507); to "loosen" (χάλα, 508) their sandals; and to "cast away" (ἄφ-εσθε, 509) their staffs. And she mentions that she wants to "sneak by" (παρα-ερπύσασα, 511) and "set down" (κατα-θέσθαι, 512) her husband's clothes. We have seen previously that the acquisition of objects and qualities aid characters in transformation, and Praxagora mentions that she took (ἔλαβον, ἐξηνεγκάμην, 513) her husband's clothes in order to disguise herself.

Praxagora tells the women to take their costumes off "as quickly as possible" (ὡς τάχιστα, 506) and "before a man sees" (πρίν τιν' ἀνθρώπων ἰδεῖν, 506; πρὶν τὸν ἄνδρα με / ἰδεῖν, 511f.), implying that mimesis does not affect being and that transformation happens at a single point in time and she and the Chorus can easily return to who they were before. But the very idea of a single point "before" (πρίν) transformation is impossible. When the members of the Chorus exhort themselves to transform back from who they are to "who they were" (ἥπερ ἦσθα, 499) before, they express how being and becoming occur over time, not in single moment. Additionally, while it may be possible in-plot for the women to change before their husbands see them, the metatheatrical nature of this scene makes this impossible. Praxagora and the Chorus change their costumes twice on stage while an audience of men (τις ἀνθρώπων, ἀνήρ) observe them. Praxagora tells the women to change "before" their husbands see them, but their change

occurs in the present, suggesting that there is no easy time of before and after when it comes to mimesis and transformation.[141]

Praxagora tells the Chorus of Athenian Women that she will use them as counselors because of their bravery in the Assembly: "For you, as far as I'm concerned, were very brave there among the tumult and terrors" (καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ μοι / ἐν τῷ θορύβῳ καὶ τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδρειόταται γεγένησθε, 518f.). Aristophanes plays on being and becoming here: the past tense of γίγνομαι can simply be predicative ("You were") or also hint at their transformation ("You became"). This secondary meaning is strengthened by the adjective ἀνδρεῖος, which can be translated as "brave" but also, since it derives from the noun ἀνήρ, as "manly."[142] Thus, we can read Praxagora's praise of the women doubly: 1) as praise for their being brave ("You were very brave"); and 2) as praise for their becoming manly. "You became very manly (ἀνδρειόταται)," i.e. "You became men (ἄνδρες)." While the play on the verb γίγνομαι shows how inextricable being and becoming are, how being is often only the result of becoming, the feminine gender adjective ἀνδρειόταται points to the Athenian women's hybridity. They were "very brave/manly women" while they performed their role on the Pnyx. Praxagora's goal for running the state is to transform Athens' public spaces into a kind of domestic space, but with the ultimate result of a kind of hybridity that she and the Chorus experience in their own transformations: "I will make all courts and stoas dining halls" (τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τὰς στοιὰς ἀνδρῶνας πάντα ποιήσω, 676). At the end of the *Ecclesiazusae* Praxagora claims that mimesis and becoming can transform politics. As Aristophanes shows in his language and dramaturgy, people, while attempting to affirm their identities, are continuously undergoing change, they are always in a state of

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[141] As an ekphrastic medium of art, drama describes what is happening in the present and also makes it present to a reader or audience member, so it also complicates this conceptualization of transformation as "before and after."

[142] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. ἀνήρ.

becoming, much like the theater itself. We will see in the following chapter that Dionysus in Euripides' *Bacchae* tracks the metamorphosis the theater of Dionysus and the city of Athens have undergone through mimesis and the enactment of the tragedy in much the same way that Aristophanes depicts characters changing through costume.

Chapter 2

This is That: Mimetic Metamorphosis in Euripides' *Bacchae*

I. Introduction

In this chapter, I turn to Euripides' *Bacchae* in order to continue reading for the themes and vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis found in Aristophanes in the previous chapter. As we saw in the *Acharnians*, Aristophanes and Euripides have a dialectical relationship, often parodying or referencing to the other's works. My aim in this chapter will not focus on this special "Euripidaristophanic" relationship per se, although this work can certainly be elaborated upon because of how Euripides seems to be taking up an interest in the same questions about ontology and mimesis that we have seen previously in Aristophanes.[143]

In *Frogs*, the easy referentiality of names and pronouns is made difficult by multiple transformations. Xanthias and Dionysus both refer to themselves as Heracles or as hybrids of Heracles. The demonstrative pronoun οὗτος is stretched to show the ambivalence between referring to the interlopers in the Underworld as Heracles and its use as a proximal pronoun (i.e., "this one near me"). Even the I-you relationship becomes unstable when Xanthias and Dionysus exchange costumes (σὺ μὲν γενοῦ 'γὼ, Ar. *Ran*. 495). The *Bacchae* serves as tragic test case for the argument I proposed in the first chapter. The play itself is highly metatheatrical, allowing for the space to reflect upon its own fictionality and the process of dramatic mimesis. In addition to serving as a proof of concept of my argument on Aristophanes' conception of mimetic metamorphosis, Euripides extends many of the questions mimetic metamorphosis produces to their logical conclusion. How can one recognize another person who impersonates someone else? Does one's identity change through mimesis?

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[143] Cratinus mocks Aristophanes' work of borrowing Euripidean phrasing and plot points and calls him a "Euripidaristophanizer" (εὐριπιδαριστοφανίζων, PCG F 342).

Even before *Bacchae* (405 BCE), Euripides shows an interest in being and becoming, often through metatheatrical scenes such as in the *Electra* (413 BCE). In the recognition scene, Electra famously rejects the recognition tokens the Old Man offers her, which, as Isabelle Torrance has argued, reveals her "semiological ineptitude" and also acts as a rejection of dramatic norms (2011: 180). Electra's arguments against recognizing the tokens seemingly fall short. Electra claims that Orestes' locket of hair is incomparable to her own because men and women's hair is so different:

> ἔπειτα χαίτης τῶς συνοίσεται πλόκος,
> ὁ μὲν παλαίστραις ἀνδρὸς εὐγενοῦς τραφείς,
> ὁ δὲ κτενισμοῖς θῆλυς; ἀλλ' ἀμήχανον. (Eur. *El.* 527-29)[144]
>
> And so how will a lock of flowing hair compare, when one is from a nobleman and nurtured in wrestling gyms and the other from a woman and treated with combs?

Electra recognizes how features can change, but fails to note that her hair may no longer differ from her brother's, as it is not as effeminate and combed as she claims.[145] Yet, this rejection of recognition tokens reveals the skepticism of someone aware of change. Why should Electra recognize the locket of hair as her brother's when her own hair has changed over time?

Likewise, the Old Man compares the footprint left by Orestes to Electra's foot, claiming it is "symmetrical" (σύμμετρος, 533) to hers. Electra's claim that men and women's feet cannot be similar (lit. "equal," ἴσος, 536) and that a man's foot must surely be larger ("the male [foot] rules," ἀλλ' ἄρσην κρατεῖ, 537) borders on the ridiculous, but growth and age do change people. Electra reasons they can no longer fit in children's clothes after the Old Man suggests recognizing Orestes by an old piece of weaving:

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[144] Greek text of Euripides' *Electra* from Diggle's OCT (1981).
[145] Cf. Torrance on this problem in Electra's reasoning, as she previously complains about her filthy hair (*El.* 184) (2011: 180).

πῶς ἂν τότ' ὢν παῖς ταὐτὰ νῦν ἔχοι φάρη,
εἰ μὴ ξυναύξοινθ' οἱ πέπλοι τῷ σώματι; (*El.* 543-44)

How could a man who was a child then have the same clothes now unless his robes grew with his body?

Electra's ignorant skepticism serves as a counterpoint to Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*, and although she is incorrect here, these tokens actually have been left by her brother Orestes, she shows an awareness of how bodies change over time, how hair and clothing can be altered much like costume. In the *Bacchae*, we see that the changes effected through mimesis can be great, such as Pentheus dressing as a woman, or rather subtle, as Tiresias says to Cadmus after dressing up as a bacchant: "For I, too, am young" (κἀγὼ γὰρ ἡβῶ, *Bacch.* 190).

The *Bacchae* traces how mimetic metamorphosis makes difficult the act of referring to another person or thing. The play begins with the seemingly simple identification that "this is that," a hallmark of mimesis according to Aristotle's *Poetics*. Dionysus enters the stage and sets the scene through this act of identification: "This is Thebes," "I am Dionysus," etc. This produces a bifurcated reality for the audience where the stage is *both* Thebes *and* Athens, Dionysus is *both* a god in the form of a mortal *and* a mortal actor pretending to be a god. This chapter develops the argument of the first chapter and will focus on how Euripides thematizes mimesis' transformative effect on identity especially through the use of deixis. The question of referentiality becomes an important one when someone is multiple or become another person. In many of the *Bacchae*'s most self-reflective and ironic moments, the recognition of identity and the articulation of that identity through language is firmly at stake. By the end of the play, it is clear that only Dionysus the god of theater can choreograph and costume the players, ultimately changing their identity and their conceptions of self. Dionysus' revelation to the audience that he is a god in the form of

a mortal emphasizes the capacity of costume to transform one's shape and identity, returning to the themes and vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis we see in Chapter 1.

II. Dionysian Deixis

The prologue of Euripides' *Bacchae* begins in a metatheatrical mode when Dionysus introduces the audience to the dramatic setting of Thebes.[146] In doing so, he calls attention to how stage elements such as the *skēnē* and *orkhēstra* have been transformed into something new and different through the use of deictics.

> Δι. Ἥκω Διὸς παῖς τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα (1)
> Διόνυσος, ὃν τίκτει ποθ' ἡ Κάδμου κόρη
> Σεμέλη λοχευθεῖσ' ἀστραπηφόρωι πυρί·
> μορφὴν δ' ἀμείψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν
> πάρειμι Δίρκης νάμαθ' Ἰσμηνοῦ θ' ὕδωρ. (5)
> ὁρῶ δὲ μητρὸς μνῆμα τῆς κεραυνίας
> τόδε ἐγγὺς οἴκων καὶ δόμων ἐρείπια
> τυφόμενα Δίου πυρὸς ἔτι ζῶσαν φλόγα,
> ἀθάνατον Ἥρας μητέρ' εἰς ἐμὴν ὕβριν.
> αἰνῶ δὲ Κάδμον, ἄβατον ὃς πέδον τόδε (10)
> τίθησι, θυγατρὸς σηκόν· ἀμπέλου δέ νιν
> πέριξ ἐγὼ 'κάλυψα βοτρυώδει χλόῃ. (Eur. *Bacch.* 1-12)[147]
>
> Di.: I, Dionysus the son of Zeus, whom Cadmus' daughter Semele bore and delivered by a flashing fire, have come to this land of Thebes. I have arrived at the waters of Dirce and Ismene after exchanging my divine form for a mortal one. I see my thunderstruck mother's tomb near the house and the halls' remains, smoldering with the still-living flame from Zeus' fire, [a mark of] Hera's immortal outrage against my mother. I praise Cadmus, who set this ground apart as holy, his daughter's burial ground. I have covered it all round with shoots of grape-filled vines.

Dionysus reveals his identity in the first person (ἥκω…Διόνυσος, 1-2) in the first lines of the play, but this simple declaration of identity is complicated by the fact that, currently, he pretends and

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[146] There has been much work on metatheater and Eur. *Bacch.* E.g., see Mueller (2016b); Segal ([1982] 1997); Zeitlin (1996: 341-74); & Foley (1995, ch. 5).

[147] Greek text of *Bacchae* from Diggle's OCT (1994).

appears to be a Lydian mortal and is therefore unrecognizable.[148] At a metatheatrical level, Dionysus' declaration acts as a claim that the actor "is" Dionysus in the current theatrical situation.

Dionysus likens his transformation into the Lydian stranger to putting on new clothes (μορφὴν δ' ἀμείψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν, 4).[149] The verb ἀμείβω ("change," "exchange") appears in a variety of contexts including the exchange of gifts, movement (i.e. "changing" one place for another, or one knee for another as one steps forward), or the exchange of words (meaning "reply"), and it appears as early as the *Iliad* to depict characters exchanging armor.[150] When Dionysus states that he merely "takes in exchange" (ἀμείβω) a mortal "form" or "outward appearance" (μορφή) for his divine form (ἐκ θεοῦ), ἀμείβω recalls this earlier, sartorial usage, marking it as a metatheatrical comment about costume.[151] Glaucus' uneven exchange with Diomedes in *Iliad* 6 parallels Dionysus' situation as he takes on the form of a human being in exchange for his divine form, an exchange of gold for bronze.

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[148] On Dionysus' "smiling mask," which would allow the audience to recognize him no matter the costume, see Foley (1985: 246-54). Billings argues convincingly against the smiling mask and traces its origins to Dodds or Winnington-Ingram (2017: 19).

[149] Cf. *Hom. Hymn Dem*. 275f.: ὣς εἰποῦσα θεὰ μέγεθος καὶ εἶδος ἄμειψε / γῆρας ἀπωσαμένη, περί τ' ἀμφί τε κάλλος ἄητο.

[150] This occurs most famously in the scene where Diomedes and Glaucus exchange their armor as tokens of their inherited guest-host relationship. Zeus interferes by confusing Glaucus, "who exchanged his golden armor with Diomedes, Tydeus' son, for bronze, the value of a hundred oxen for nine" (ὃς πρὸς Τυδεΐδην Διομήδεα τεύχε' ἄμειβε / χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι' ἐννεαβοίων" (Hom. *Il.* 6.235f.). Cf. LSJ s.v. ἄμειβω; Cunliffe s.v. ἄμειβω. See also: οἰχόμενοι δ' ἐπὶ πάντας ἀρήϊα τεύχε' ἄμειβον (*Il.* 14.381); στὰς δ' ἀπάνευθε μάχης πολυδακρύου ἔντε' ἄμειβεν (17.192).

[151] ἀμείβω meaning "to change clothing" appears elsewhere in Euripides: αὔτη, τί πέπλους μέλανας ἐξήψω χροὸς / λευκῶν ἀμείψασ'… (*Hel.* 1185f.); πέπλους δ' ἀμείψασ' ἀντὶ ναυφθόρου στολῆς / ἐγώ νιν ἐξήσκησα καὶ λουτροῖς χρόα / ἔδωκα, χρόνια νίπτρα ποταμίας δρόσου (1382-84).

In the following line, the verb πάρειμι (5), which can be translated "to be present" but also "to have arrived at/from," conveys a sense of movement from somewhere else, especially when paired with the preposition ἐκ.[152] When Dionysus says that he has come to Thebes, the implication is that he has come from (ἐκ) Asia, but we can also read this as pertaining to Dionysus' metamorphosis if we take the prepositional phrase ἐκ θεοῦ ("from a god," 5) as the state of being from which Dionysus arrives. We can compare this to another Euripidean instance of πάρειμι where the object of the preposition ἐκ is a divine source: "Some mortal diseases are self-inflicted, others come from the gods" (νόσοι δὲ θνητῶν αἳ μέν εἰσ' αὐθαίρετοι, / αἳ δ' ἐκ θεῶν πάρεισιν, fr. 292.4-5 Nauck).[153] While we are meant to take the prepositional phrase ἐκ θεοῦ with the verb ἀμείβω in the previous line, this use collocation to mean "exchange" is a unique instance both in Euripides and in classical Greek drama. The verb πάρειμι, however, leads us to expect ἐκ or a similar preposition, encouraging us to read this prepositional phrase as a zeugma applying to both verbs simultaneously: "I have taken on a mortal form for my divine one (ἀμείψας ἐκ θεοῦ)" and "I have come from being a god (πάρειμι ἐκ θεοῦ) to the waters of Dirce and Ismenus." Dionysus' exchange for a mortal form may serve a simple function, as it allows him to interact with the mortal characters on stage instead of on top of the *skēnē*, but Euripides emphasizes the theme of transformation throughout the prologue. Dionysus uses the demonstrative pronoun ἥδε to refer to the *orkhēstra* as "this land of Thebes" (τήνδε Θηβαίαν

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[152] Cf. LSJ s.v. πάρειμι (A.I.6). The collocation (πάρειμι + ἐκ) appears elsewhere in Eur.: κείνου δ' ἀκούσας πρῶτα τοὺς λόγους μάθε, / ὃς ἐξ ὄρους πάρεστιν ἀγγελῶν τί σοι (*Bacch.* 657f.); Σι. πόθεν Σικελίαν τήνδε ναυστολῶν πάρει; / Οδ. ἐξ Ἰλίου γε κἀπὸ Τρωϊκῶν πόνων (*Cyc.* 106f.); εἰ δ' ἦσαν ἀνθρώποισιν ὠνητοὶ λόγοι, / οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτὸν εὖ λέγειν ἐβούλετο · / νῦν δ', ἐκ βαθείας γὰρ πάρεστιν αἰθέρος / λαβεῖν ἀμοχθί, πᾶς τις ἥδεται λέγων / τά τ' ὄντα καὶ μή · ζημίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει (fr. 978 Nauck).

[153] This collocation also appears in Aeschylus and Sophocles: ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρῆν (Aesch. *Eum.* 797); τοιαῦθ' ἑλέσθαι σοι πάρεστιν ἐξ ἐμοῦ, / εὖ δρῶσαν, εὖ πάσχουσαν, εὖ τιμωμένην / χώρας μετασχεῖν τῆσδε θεοφιλεστάτης (*Eum.* 866-68); χῶρον δ', ἐπείγει γάρ με τοὐκ θεοῦ παρόν, / στείχωμεν ἤδη, μηδ' ἔτ' ἐντρεπώμεθα (Soph. *OC* 1540f.).

χθόνα, 1), informing the audience what the elements of the stage "are" (or, have become). Deictics also transform the theater's altar dedicated to Dionysus into the tomb of Semele (ὅρῳ δὲ μητρὸς μνῆμα τῆς κεραυνίας / τόδε, 5f.).

Referring to "this" as "that" does not erase the previous form of the stage or an actor, but adds another layer to it. Writing on what he calls "dramatic metalepsis," the transgression of boundaries between the imagined world of drama and its place of performance, Tim Whitmarsh notes that dramatic prologues often make use of the ambiguity produced by deixis:

> What they behold is neither contemporary Athens nor ancient myth but the simultaneity of both, telescoped into a single, liminal environment.…to say '*this* is Thebes' metaleptically glues together the real, Athenian set-building and the imaginary world of the drama. (Whitmarsh 2013: 7f.)

The simultaneity of perspectives afforded to the audience through the figure of dramatic metalepsis parallels Dicaeopolis' view of disguise (i.e. that he can appear to be a beggar while remaining himself). The transgressive nature of metalepsis also parallels the parabasis of Old Comedy, which allows the poet to speak through the Chorus or, in Dicaeopolis' case, a character. Yet the deixis in the prologue, much like the present tense of the verbs ἥκω and πάρειμι, points to a continuous transformation occurring over time. By referring to the stage as Thebes, this transformation occurs both at once with the deictic pronoun and also over time as the result of any stage-dressing or scene painting of that may have taken place prior to the performance. For example, Dionysus "covered" (ἐκάλύψα, 12) the sacred ground with grapevines, which serve as an ornamentation around (πέριξ, 12) the scene like a garland. The stage-dressing does not hide what lies beneath but serves as an additional mark of holiness. This subtle transformation of the burial ground into a burial ground covered with grape vines is a metonymic change occurring in time and dictated by contiguity. While Dionysus suggests that his transformation into a mortal is a disguise that he can put on (much like Dicaeopolis in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*), his language

suggests that his metamorphosis into a Lydian stranger also takes place in time—he *becomes* a Lydian man, not only pretends to be one).

In addition to changing his own form, Dionysus transforms the women of Thebes into bacchants. He effects this, in part, through costume:

> πρώτας δὲ Θήβας τάσδε γῆς Ἑλληνίδος
> ἀνωλόλυξα, νεβρίδ' ἐξάψας χροὸς
> θύρσον τε δοὺς ἐς χεῖρα, κίσσινον βέλος· (25)
> …
> τοιγάρ νιν αὐτὰς ἐκ δόμων ᾤστρησ' ἐγὼ
> μανίαις, ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι παράκοποι φρενῶν,
> σκευήν τ' ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ' ὀργίων ἐμῶν.
> καὶ πᾶν τὸ θῆλυ σπέρμα Καδμείων, ὅσαι (35)
> γυναῖκες ἦσαν, ἐξέμηνα δωμάτων·
> ὁμοῦ δὲ Κάδμου παισὶν ἀναμεμειγμέναι
> χλωραῖς ὑπ' ἐλάταις ἀνορόφους ἧνται πέτρας. (*Bacch.* 23-25, 32-38)
>
> I have excited Thebes first of all Greece with Bacchic cries, fitted them with fawn skin, and put into their hand a thyrsus, an ivy weapon.…So I have driven them mad from their halls—they dwell on the mountain out of their minds—and I have forced them to wear the apparel of my rites. I have driven the entire female sex of Thebes, however many women there were, out of their minds and halls. Mixed together with Cadmus' daughters, they sit in the open air on cliffs under green pines.

Dionysus excites Theban women and drives them out of their minds and homes, but equally important for the women becoming bacchants is their costuming. While ἀνολολύζω ("excite with Bacchic cries") is the main verb of the first sentence in this passage, the circumstantial participles ἐξάψας (from ἐξάπτω, "fasten," 24) and δούς (from δίδωμι, "give," 25) show that the god's and his attendants' voices alone do not stir the women of Thebes into action. The adjective πρῶτος ("first") agrees grammatically with the noun Thebes (πρώτας Θήβας, 23), but its emphatic placement at the beginning of l. 23 prepares us to read this becoming-bacchant as a process occurring in time through the acquisition of costumes and props: first, Dionysus excites Theban women with Bacchic cries; then, he dresses them in fawn skin, and then he gives them a thyrsus.

Dionysus fits the Theban women with fawn skins (νεβρίς, 24) and thyrsi (θύρσος, 25) and compels them to wear the "apparel" or "costume" (σκεύη, 34) of his rites. The noun σκευή can be read doubly here, referring both to the equipment or apparel necessary for the women to perform Dionysian rites and to the costumes actors wear in their performance as bacchants. Dionysus recognizes that costumes and props possess agency in transforming characters and forces the Theban women "to have" or "possess" (ἔχειν) his costume. The Theban women's acquisition of this bacchant costume, in addition to their madness, transforms them into bacchants not only in appearance but also in behavior. While Dionysus tells the audience he has driven mad "however many women there were" (ὅσαι / γυναῖκες ἦσαν, 35f.) in Thebes, his use of the verb εἰμί introduces a kind of slippage between being and becoming, serving as a metatheatrical commentary on dramatic mimesis. At the level of the plot, the Theban women "were" women before becoming bacchants, highlighting the effect mimesis can have on one's behavior and identity. At a metatheatrical level, the women of the play "were" male actors before they got into their roles. The actors' being-woman is the end result of mimetic metamorphosis, just as the Theban women's being-bacchant is within the action of the play.

Euripides' use of deixis in the prologue shows how mimesis produces a doubled effect: the deictic ἥδε ("this city"; πόλιν τήνδε, 39) refers simultaneously to the city of Athens in which the play is performed and also the city of Thebes where the action of the play is set:

> δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκμαθεῖν, κεἰ μὴ θέλει,
> ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν τῶν ἐμῶν βακχευμάτων, (40)
> Σεμέλης τε μητρὸς ἀπολογήσασθαί μ' ὕπερ
> φανέντα θνητοῖς δαίμον' ὃν τίκτει Διί. (*Bacch.* 39-42)
>
> For, since this city is uninitiated in my Bacchic rites, it must learn them, even if it doesn't wish to. And I must speak in defense of my mother, Semele, so I have appeared to mortals as a god, whom she bore to Zeus.

The demonstrative pronoun ἥδε refers to the theater as Thebes (τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα, 1; πρώτας δὲ Θήβας τάσδε, 23; πόλιν τήνδε, 39) and Dionysus' statement that the city "is uninitiated" (ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν, 40) asks the Athenian audience to suspend their disbelief. In addition to marking the end result of mimetic metamorphosis, deixis adds an ironic layer to the *Bacchae*, which depicts the establishment of Dionysian cult while being performed at the City Dionysia in the Theater of Dionysus.[154] The city is initiated at the same time as it is depicted as uninitiated.

In this passage the participle οὖσα shows how the entirety of the Athenian theater, the audience as well as the actors and stage, has been transformed into Thebes. As in Aristophanes, the verb εἰμί calls attention not only to being but also to becoming, in this case the transformation of the Theatre of Dionysus (and synecdochically Athens) into the city of Thebes. The conjunction of the participle οὖσα with the deictic pronoun ἥδε represents Athens as Thebes. Since Athens is not actually uninitiated at the time of the performance, we can think of this participial phrase as performative: "the city *is being* uninitiated." This is complicated by the fact that, at the level of the plot, Dionysus will make certain that Thebes recognizes his divinity by the end of the play. This use of εἰμί highlights the transformation that will inevitably come with Dionysus' intervention: the city may be currently uninitiated in his rites, but it will be initiated by the end of the tragedy.

The infinitive verb ἐκμαθεῖν (*Bacch.* 39) looks forward to Aristotle's claim that mimesis is educative. In the *Poetics* he argues that viewers enjoy mimetic art (even paintings that portray grotesque objects such as corpses) because learning is pleasurable:

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[154] Zeitlin claims that because of the myths of incest and fratricide surrounding Thebes, it acts as a screen for Athens, "the negative model to Athens' manifest image of itself" (1990: 131). Rehm argues that the conflict between Dionysus and Pentheus reflects the conflict between a man of action (Pentheus) and quietist (Dionysus) in the midst of wartime Athens (2002: 213).

> αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβάινει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος · (Arist. *Poet.* 4.1448b12-17)[155]
>
> The reason for this is that learning is not only very pleasurable to philosophers alone but also to all others likewise, but they seldom take part in it. For this reason viewers enjoy images, because at the same time as they behold it they learn and reckon what each individual part is, for example that this is that.

I will discuss Aristotle's theory of mimesis at greater length in the conclusion, but of interest to our discussion of the *Bacchae* is the recognition at the root of mimesis "that this is that" (ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος). The demonstrative pronouns οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος echo the prevalent use of deictic pronouns in the prologue of Euripides' *Bacchae*. The implied copulative verb εἰμί works as a shorthand for the metamorphosis effected through mimesis (i.e. "this has become that"), a feature shared with the Aristophanic and Euripidean vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis. For spectators of a mimetic work of art, learning and understanding what something represents happen simultaneously with their viewing (συμβάινει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι). The repetition of the verb μανθάνω in this short passage shows the significance of learning to Aristotle's theory of mimesis. The intensifying prefix ἐκ- ("utterly") in the *Bacchae* passage foreshadows how thoroughly disruptive the city's recognition of Dionysus' divinity will be.

Dionysus casts his appearance in Thebes as an epiphany (φανέντα θνητοῖς δαίμονα, *Bacch.* 42). The first word of the play (ἥκω, "I have come") has an epiphanic resonance as well.[156] This epiphany occurs not only at the end of the play with the *deus ex machina*, but in the present as well: Dionysus has come (ἥκω), is present (πάρειμι), and appears as a god (φανείς δαίμων) to mortals in order to defend his mother Semele. Dionysus brings attention to the fact that his appearance in the form of a mortal is an act of mimesis, that, much like the deictics he uses to

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[155] Greek text of Aristotle *Poetics* from Kassel (1965).
[156] Cf. Dodds: "a favourite word with supernatural visitants" (1960: ad loc.).

refer to the city, "this is that." His divinity is hidden by the Lydian stranger disguise. The audience can track Dionysus in his mortal form, so he is still present in some way, but the epiphany at the beginning of the prologue is not the physical manifestation of a god to mortals so much as the appearance of a mortal claiming to be a god, which dramatizes the epiphany of an actor playing a god in the theater. On a metatheatrical level, Dionysus has come to the people of Athens in mortal form because represented by a mortal actor, who, like the god himself, claims to be Dionysus. These epiphanies work through mimetic metamorphosis. Dionysus can be present in the form of the Lydian stranger because he has taken on the form of a mortal. Likewise, an actor can be present as Dionysus through gesture, costume, and speech, i.e. saying that he is Dionysus (ἥκω…Διόνυσος, 1-2).

Dionysus marks his arrival to Thebes with epiphanic language even as he appears in the form of a mortal to the audience and remains in disguise as the Lydian stranger for most of the play.

> ὧν οὕνεκ' αὐτῷ θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξομαι
> πᾶσίν τε Θηβαίοισιν. ἐς δ' ἄλλην χθόνα,
> τἀνθένδε θέμενος εὖ, μεσταστήσω πόδα,
> δεικνὺς ἐμαυτόν· ἢν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλις (50)
> ὀργῇ σὺν ὅπλοις ἐξ ὄρους βάκχας ἄγειν
> ζητῇ, ξυνάψω μαινάσι στρατηλατῶν.
> ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω
> μορφήν τ' ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. (*Bacch.* 47-54)
>
> For this reason, I'll show him, and all the Thebans, I am a god. I shall remove to another country after administering the affairs here well and showing myself. If the city of Thebes endeavors out of anger to bring the bacchants from the mountain with weapons, I will join the battle in command of the maenads. For this reason, I have a mortal form and have changed my shape into the nature of a man.

Dionysus states that he will show (ἐνδείξομαι, 47; δεικνύς, 50) himself to Thebes since he is currently unrecognizable. His emphasis on a future revelation after removing his costume implies

a belief similar to Dicaeopolis' that costume serves merely to disguise. Dionysus plans to reveal that he "is" or "was born a god" (θεὸς γεγώς, 47), but the perfect participle of γίγνομαι suggests that he may reveal he "has become" a god—that he must transform again, change back into his earlier, divine form after taking on the role of the Lydian stranger.

The anaphoric phrase "because of this" in lines 47 and 53 (ὧν οὕνεκα) explains Dionysus' arrival in Thebes while drawing a parallel between his future revelation that he is a god (θεὸς γεγώς) and his current disguise (i.e. he possesses a mortal form, εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω, 53). The nouns εἶδος ("form") and μορφή ("form" or "shape," 54) refer both to one's visual appearance and, in conjunction with verbs of exchange (ἀμείβω, ἀλλάσσω), suggest an impermanent change, that Dionysus can and will change back. Yet just as the participle of γίγνομαι can be read to imply a more radical change, the noun φύσις suggests something deeper, as it can mean "outward appearance" or "form" but more basically means "origin," "growth," or "nature."[157] By having Dionysus transform into a man "in nature" as well as "in form," Euripides grounds the ontological stakes of mimesis as it pertains to being and becoming to his contemporary intellectual context by alluding to debates surrounding *nomos* and *physis* in the 5th-century BCE.

Dionysus' promise to fight against Thebes if the city threatens violence ("I'll join [sc. the battle]," ξυνάψω, 52) recalls verb ἐξάπτω, when he explains he fitted the Theban women with Dionysian apparel ("I have fitted them with fawn skin," νεβρίδ' ἐξάψας χροὸς, 24). συνάπτω and ἐξάπτω are both compounds of the same verb, imbuing Dionysus' action as a leader in battle

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[157] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. φύομαι. See Ch. 3 for mimesis' effect on *physis*. For the landmark treatment of the *nomos/physis* dichotomy in classical Greek literature, see Heinimann 1945.

with the costuming language from earlier in the prologue.[158] The metatheacricality of the prologue brings attention to the fact that the mortal φύσις Dionysus takes on can be read not only as belonging to the character of the Lydian stranger but also to the human actor who plays the god. The effect is not entirely ironic given the epiphanic language of this passage—the actor comes to "this Thebes" (the stage) in a mortal form (his current costume/role as the Lydian stranger) and he will, by the end of the play, reveal he "has become a god," by changing into the costume of the god Dionysus and interacting with the characters from above the *skēnē*.

III. Being and Becoming

In the first scene after the prologue and choral eisodos, Tiresias comes to call on Cadmus wearing a bacchant costume and carrying a thyrsus. Tiresias' appearance confuses the doorkeeper, who fails to recognize him. The doorkeeper's misrecognition spurs on Tiresias to contrast his identity as an old man with his bacchant-like appearance.

> τίς ἐν πύλαισι; Κάδμον ἐκκάλει δόμων, (170)
> Ἀγήνορος παῖδ', ὃς πόλιν Σιδωνίαν
> λιπὼν ἐπύργωσ' ἄστυ Θηβαίων τόδε.
> ἴτω τις, εἰσάγγελλε Τειρεσίας ὅτι
> ζητεῖ νιν· οἶδε δ' αὐτὸς ὧν ἥκω πέρι
> ἅ τε ξυνεθέμην πρέσβυς ὢν γεραιτέρῳ, (175)
> θύρσους ἀνάπτειν καὶ νεβρῶν δορὰς ἔχειν
> στεφανοῦν τε κρᾶτα κισσίνοις βλαστήμασιν. (*Bacch.* 174-77)
>
> Who's at the doors? Call Cadmus the son of Agenor, who left the Phoenician city and founded this city of Thebes, out from his halls. Let someone go, tell him that Tiresias asks for him. He himself knows why I have come, what I agreed to, one old man to another: to fasten thyrsi, wear fawn skins, and to wreathe my head with with ivy shoots.

Tiresias has to identify himself as an old man (πρέσβυς ὤν, 175) after announcing his name to the doorkeeper at line 173, stressing the fact that he "is an old man" even if he dresses and acts

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[158] This word also appears in the aetiology of satyrs taking the tympanum and "joining" it (συνάπτω) to their dances: ἐς δὲ χορεύματα / συνῆψαν τριετηρίδων (*Bacch.* 132f.).

like a youthful follower of Dionysus. The participial form of εἰμί recalls its appearance in the prologue to mark the Theater of Dionysus-cum-Thebes as "being" (οὖσα) uninitiated in Dionysus' rites even as the city Athens celebrates the god. In the previous chapter, I claimed that Aristophanes marks the end result of mimetic metamorphosis with the verb εἰμί in order to highlight the process of becoming even in simple statements of being.

As previous commentators have noticed, Tiresias' new clothes seem to rejuvenate him. While this certainly has an ironic effect, Tiresias' costume hybridizes him into both a masculine and effeminate figure, both tragic and comic figure (similar to Dionysus and Xanthias in the *Frogs*).[159] When he bids the doorkeeper to "call Cadmus out from his halls" Cadmus (Κάδμον ἐκκάλει δόμων, 170), his language echoes Aristophanic doorkeeper scenes, such as when Dicaeopolis asks Euripides' slave to to call out the poet (ἐκκάλεσον αὐτόν, *Ach.* 402).[160] Craig Jendza claims in his recent book *Paracomedy* that this scene from the *Bacchae* incorporates comic elements in order to introduce lightheartedness into the tragedy (2020: 23). Tiresias' appearance is not only significant because it is "paracomic," however. He announces his presence to the doorkeeper using the same verb as Dionysus at the beginning of the play (ἥκω, 174), marking his own arrival as parallel to that of Dionysus. Both characters cannot be recognized as themselves in their current dress because they wear the costumes of the followers of Dionysus, and both mark their appearance as epiphanic. These parallels are strengthened by the fact that Tiresias and Dionysus never appear on stage together and therefore were most likely played by the same

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[159] On the irony of this scene, cf. Dodds (1960: 90).

[160] In his discussion of this scene Jendza does not mention the verb ἐκκαλέω as a marker of paracomic or Aristophanic language (2020). This verb appears in similar contexts elsewhere in Aristophanes. Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 217-21, 266-72; *Lys.* 850f., 875; *Thesm.* 64f.; *Eccl.* 32-35 (on which, cf. Ussher (1973: ad loc.) "the usual Aristophanic meaning"); and *Plut.* 1100-1106. Also appears in classical Greek drama and Menander: Soph. *Phil.* 1263f.; Eup. fr. 148 (K-A); Men. *Aspis* 162f. (ed. Sandbach); *DE* 11; *Mis.* 191; and *Pk.* 1006-9.

actor.[161] Tiresias insists on his identity in much the same way that Dionysus' explains his divinity and mortal disguise to the audience in the prologue. Tiresias implies that his current get-up may make it difficult for others to recognize him both by naming himself and emphasizes his identity with the participle ὤν. This also works on a metatheatrical level—the actor affirms his role as an old man in contrast to his previous role as Dionysus while bringing to our attention simultaneously to the fact that these characters are quite similar in their language, epiphanic appearance, and relationship with the divine. This affirmation of identity can also be seen as performative similar to "the city being uninitiated" in the prologue; the actor is currently "being" an old man but is not necessarily one, nor was he at the beginning of the play. Tiresias shows us how flexible εἰμί can be in the metatheatrical and mimetic context of Euripides: the verb can reflect both identity, as if fixed, and transformation.

Cadmus also arrives on stage dressed up and ready to play the bacchant. His entrance echoes those of Tiresias and Dionysus with the use of the verb ἥκω (180) and the demonstrative pronoun ἥδε. This deixis has a doubling effect similar to Dionysus' reference to the stage and audience as the city of Thebes during the prologue.

> Κα. ὦ φίλταθ', ὡς σὴν γῆρυν ᾐσθόμην κλυὼν
> σοφὴν σοφοῦ παρ' ἀνδρός, ἐν δόμοισιν ὤν.
> ἥκω δ' ἕτοιμος τήνδ' ἔχων σκευὴν θεοῦ ·
> δεῖ γάρ νιν ὄντα παῖδα θυγατρὸς ἐξ ἐμῆς
> [Διόνυσον ὃς πέφηνεν ἀνθρώποις θεὸς]
> ὅσον καθ' ἡμᾶς δυνατὸν αὔξεσθαι μέγαν.
> ποῖ δεῖ χορεύειν, ποῖ καθιστάναι πόδα
> καὶ κρᾶτα σείσαι πολιόν; ἐξηγοῦ σύ μοι
> γέρων γέροντι, Τειρεσία · σὺ γὰρ σοφός.
> ὡς οὐ κάμοιμ' ἂν οὔτε νύκτ' οὔθ' ἡμέραν
> θύρσῳ κροτῶν γῆν · ἐπιλελήσμεθ' ἡδέως
> γέροντες ὄντες.
> Τε. ταὔτ' ἐμοὶ πάσχεις ἄρα ·
> κἀγὼ γὰρ ἡβῶ κἀπιχειρήσω χοροῖς. (*Bacch.* 178-90)

[161] Cf. Pickard-Cambridge [1953] 1991: 147.

> Ca. Dear friend, I heard your voice, a wise voice from a wise man, while I was in my halls. I have come ready, wearing this costume of the god. Since Dionysus, who has revealed he is a god to mankind, is the child of my daughter, insofar as it is in our power, he must grow in greatness. Where should I dance? Where should I place my foot and shake my gray head? Show me the way, Tiresais, old man to old man, for you are wise. I will not tire by night or day striking the ground with my thyrsus. We forget with pleasure that we are old men.
> Ti. So you are experiencing the same as me! For I, too, am young and will try my hand at dancing.

When Cadmus refers to his costume as "this costume of the god" (ἥκω δ' ἕτοιμος τήνδ' ἔχων σκευὴν θεοῦ, 180), the deictic pronoun ἥδε both refers to his bacchant costume while also drawing attention to the costume *as* costume. The noun σκευή has both a religious and metatheatrical register in its first appearance in the prologue when Dionysus describes his costuming of the Theban women and their transformation into bacchants (σκευήν τ' ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ' ὀργίων ἐμῶν, 34).[162] Cadmus dresses up as a follower of Dionysus, but the deixis in the phrase "this costume" (ἥδε σκευή) suggests that Cadmus' costume is in service of the god Dionysus both as the ritual dress of a bacchant and as a dramatic costume at a festival dedicated to him, the City Dionysia.[163]

E. R. Dodds notes in his commentary that Cadmus displays a "timid worldliness" in this passage, as his support for Dionysus' divinity depends on familial relation (νιν ὄντα παῖδα θυγατρὸς ἐξ ἐμῆς, 181), not on faith (1960: 90). Other commentators have seen Euripides' presentation of Cadmus as a great joke.[164] Even if Cadmus and his interpreters do not take Dionysus seriously, this passage is imbued with the vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis. The conditional participle of εἰμί at line 181 explains Cadmus' action in this scene: since Dionysus is

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[162] Dionysus refers to his Heracles' costume as a σκευή. Cf. Ar. *Ran*. 108.
[163] On liminality of Dionysus and cross-dressing as important element of Dionysian ritual, see Csapo (1997: 253-95).
[164] See Dodds on Pater and Grube (1960: 90f.).

his daughter's son (νιν ὄντα παῖδα θυγατρὸς ἐξ ἐμῆς), Cadmus dresses and acts as a bacchant. This clause describes and identifies Dionysus, but as we know from the action within the play, Dionysus is not only the son of Semele, he is also a god and the Lydian stranger. Any claim on being or identity becomes more complicated.

Cadmus tells Tiresias he heard "a wise voice from a wise man" (γῆρυν… / σοφὴν σοφοῦ παρ' ἀνδρός, *Bacch.* 178f.). The rhetorical figure of polyptoton plays on the grammatical case and gender of the adjective σοφός ("wise"). The same adjective appears in the nominative case at the end of line 186 (σὺ γὰρ σοφός), forming a ring structure that closes Tiresias' greeting. At first, the claim seems tautologous (Tiresias is wise *because* his voice is wise) and essentialist (Tiresias' voice is wise because he *is* wise), but by repeating the same word this Gorgianic figure emphasizes difference in sound and grammatical function. Where there is similarity, there is also difference.[165] Cadmus and Tiresias are Cadmus and Tiresias even as they play bacchants, but if we play close enough attention, we will realize they have become different from themselves, much like a noun or adjective in an oblique case differs from its lexical form. When Cadmus tells Tiresias to show him the way, one old man to another (γέρων γέροντι, 186), he makes use of the figure again, suggesting that while they both may wear masks typical of the characters of old men and they both wear bacchant costumes, they are not identical to one another. As exemplified in the figure of polyptoton (nominative case γέρων, dative case γέροντι), Cadmus and Tiresias differ both from each other (and from themselves as they put on their bacchant costumes.

In Hesiod's *Theogony*, Hesiod depicts poetry as a medium that both memorializes deeds performed by famous heroes and encourages the audience to forget their cares outside of the poem (*Theog.* 98-103). Cadmus invokes a similar notion of mimetic art when he says to Tiresias

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[165] On difference producing similarity, cf. Deleuze (1994: 70).

that "we forget with pleasure that we are old men" (ἐπιλελήσμεθ' ἡδέως / γέροντες ὄντες, *Bacch.* 188f.). Unlike Hesiod's example of the grieving listener, however, Cadmus forgets himself by participating in the act of mimesis, but he also takes on the identity, language, and behavior of the character he represents, the bacchant. Poetry's capacity to induce forgetfulness implies that mimetic art affects only the epistemological, that it is only illusory and has no transformative effect. The Muses' declaration at the base of Mt. Helicon that they can tell lies like the truth (ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, *Theog.* 27), making truth and fiction indistinguishable, gets to this view of mimesis. Cadmus' statement that he and Tiresias forget "being old men" (γέροντες ὄντες) gestures to how ontology is at stake in mimesis. The actors who play Cadmus and Tiresias may not be old men, yet for the moment they are, highlighting the fluidity of being and becoming in classical Greek literary thought.

At the end of the passage, Tiresias responds to Cadmus, "For I, too, am young" (κἀγὼ γὰρ ἡβῶ, 190).[166] This can be read ironically, as a "miracle rejuvenation" (Dodds 1960: ad loc.), but it also reveals a transformation subtler than the donning of a disguise of or pretending to be a bacchant—Tiresias, by virtue of wearing the apparel of a bacchant, becomes a younger man capable of dancing and hiking Mt. Cithaeron without an attendant. He does not become a bacchant but a younger version of himself. Tiresias marks this transformation in the present tense, "I am young" (ἡβῶ), but much like the verb εἰμί and Cadmus' phrase "being old men" (γέροντες ὄντες), the verb ἡβάω implies that this present state is the result of change and is in some way performative (i.e., "I have become young" or "I am being young"). Dressing up in bacchant costume produces similar experiences for Tiresias and Cadmus ("So you are experiencing the same as me!" ταὔτ' ἐμοὶ πάσχεις ἄρα, 189), yet while similarity is stressed here,

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[166] Cf. 193: Κα. γέρων γέροντα παιδαγωγήσω σ' ἐγώ.

subtle differences in their experience of transformation are revealed. Cadmus forgets himself momentarily, suggesting that his essential identity remains unchanged, yet Tiresias becomes a younger version of himself, the same but not the same, as slight of a difference as that between a nominative noun and its oblique case.

Tiresias assuages Cadmus' feelings of embarrassment and shame for dressing up as a bacchant and preparing to dance by claiming that Dionysus does not distinguish between young or old followers.

> Κα. ἐρεῖ τις ὡς τὸ γῆρας οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι,
> μέλλων χορεύειν κρᾶτα κισσώσας ἐμόν;
> Τε. οὐ γὰρ διῄρηχ' ὁ θεὸς οὔτε τὸν νέον
> εἰ χρὴ χορεύειν οὔτε τὸν γεραίτερον,
> ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιμὰς ἔχειν
> κοινάς, διαριθμῶν δ' οὐδέν' αὔξεσθαι θέλει. (*Bacch*. 204-9)
>
> Ca. Will someone say that I am ashamed of my old age since I am about to dance with my head garlanded in ivy?
> Ti. Of course not! The god doesn't decide whether a young or old man should dance, but he does want to have common honors from all and, counting no one out, wishes to increase in greatness.

On the surface, Tiresias' claims that Dionysus appeals universally to a diverse group of worshipers preempts Pentheus' (and perhaps any audience members') ridicule for the old men in their costumes. It presents a religious and rational argument for their behavior. However, this appeal to universality simultaneously elides difference. Dionysus makes no distinction between young and old (οὐ γὰρ διῄρηχ' ὁ θεὸς οὔτε τὸν νέον / …οὔτε τὸν γεραίτερον, 206f.), he excludes no one from his worship (διαριθμῶν δ' οὐδένα, 209), and he wishes for "common" or "universal" (κοινός) honors from all people (ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιμὰς ἔχειν / κοινάς, 208f.). Tiresias presents a view of Dionysian worship here that is similar to his previous claim that he and Cadmus experience the same things when in costume (τὰ αὔτα, 189). Dionysus' worshipers become more and more similar to a bacchant and to each other, hence

indistinguishable, the more they wear bacchant costumes, perform dances, and give honors to the god. Mimesis makes the recognition of identity difficult because of the transformation one undergoes, such as Tiresias in the doorkeeper scene. In this passage, mimesis transforms a diverse group of people into an assimilated collective, yet Tiresias and Cadmus are individuated from the Chorus both as individual characters in the drama and as the older, male worshipers in the collective.

IV. Recognition as Misrecognition

When Pentheus discovers Cadmus and Tiresias outside of the house, he mocks them for their apparel, thereby echoing Cadmus' fears. Pentheus recognizes the costumed elderly pair despite their claims of rejuvenation, but his ignorance of the Lydian stranger's identity shows how mimesis confuses identity and recognition.

> ἐκεῖνος εἶναί φησι Διόνυσον θεόν,
> ἐκεῖνος ἐν μηρῷ ποτ' ἐρράφθαι Διός·
> ὃς ἐπυροῦται λαμπάσιν κεραυνίαις
> σὺν μητρί, Διοὺς ὅτι γάμους ἐψεύσατο. (245)
> ταῦτ' οὐχὶ δεινὰ κἀγχόνης ἔστ' ἄξια,
> ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, ὅστις ἐστιν ὁ ξένος;
> ἀτὰρ τόδ' ἄλλο θαῦμα· τὸν τερασκόπον
> ἐν ποικίλαισι νεβρίσι Τειρεσίαν ὁρῶ
> πατέρα τε μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς, πολὺν γέλων, (250)
> νάθρθηκι βακχεύοντ'· ἀναίνομαι, πάτερ,
> τὸ γῆρας ὑμῶν εἰσορῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον.
> οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις κισσόν; οὐκ ἐλευθέραν
> θύρσου μεθήσεις χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάτερ; (*Bacch.* 242-54)

> That man claims that Dionysus is a god, that he was once sewn up in Zeus' thigh. Dionysus! who was burnt up by lightning bolts with his mother because she lied about her marriage to Zeus. Aren't these terrible things, committing outrage, deserving of a hanging, whoever this stranger is? But here is another strange thing —I see the fortuneteller Tiresias in dappled fawn skins and my mother's father, too, a great laughingstock, playing the bacchant with a fennel stalk. I am ashamed, sir, to see your old age having no sense. Won't you shake off your ivy? Won't you set your hand free of the thyrsus, O father of my mother?

Pentheus criticizes the Lydian stranger for committing outrages and telling lies about Dionysus' parentage, but his complaint can also be read ironically as a recognition of Dionysus. Pentheus first says that "That man claims that Dionysus is a god" (ἐκεῖνος εἶναί φησι Διόνυσον θεόν, 242). The first three words of the line leads the audience to expect that the Lydian stranger (i.e. Dionysus) claims to be Dionysus: "That man claims he is…" (ἐκεῖνος εἶναί φησι). The subject of the infinitive would be nominative in that case, but the initial ambiguity allows for the line to be read both ways. This produces a moment of dramatic irony of the situation where Pentheus, who disbelieves in Dionysus' divinity, accidentally lands on the truth. He fails to recognize "that man" (ἐκεῖνος) who makes claims about Dionysus is Dionysus while nearly saying so. This line reveals the completeness of Dionysus' mimetic metamorphosis into the Lydian stranger and the limits of referentiality with pronouns and claims to identity.

In the following line, Pentheus emphasizes that it is the Lydian stranger or "that man" who makes these claims by repeating the pronoun ἐκεῖνος: "That man claims that Dionysus was once sewn up in Zeus' thigh" (ἐκεῖνος ἐν μηρῷ ποτ' ἐρράφθαι Διός, 243). The main verb φημί and the subject of the infinitive (we are meant to understand and supply Διόνυσον from the previous line) are dropped in this line. However, when the subject of a verb of speaking is the same as the subject in indirect speech, the subject can also be omitted.[167] This leads to an ambiguity about the subject of the infinitive in this line even though the grammar in this clause operates the same as before. Because the subject is omitted, we can also read, "That man claims that *he* was once sewn up in Zeus' thigh." In conjunction with the playful word order of the previous line this reading provides another moment of dramatic irony for the audience, who know Dionysus' identity, and also allows for Pentheus to plod through the themes of identity,

[167] Cf. Smyth §1973.

recognition, transformation, and mimesis while simultaneously misrecognizing Dionysus' identity and mocking the possibility of mimetic metamorphosis in the case of Tiresias and his grandfather Cadmus.

In the *Acharnians* Dicaeopolis uses the relative phrase ὅς ἐστι ("who he is") when he recognizes Cleisthenes in his Persian eunuch costume: "Of the two eunuchs, I know who this one is, it's Cleisthenes, the 'son' of Siburtius" (καὶ τοῖν μὲν εὐνούχοιν τὸν ἕτερον τουτονὶ / ἐγῷδ' ὅς ἐστι, Κλεισθένης ὁ Σιβυρτίου, *Ach.* 117f.). As I argued in Chapter 1, Dicaeopolis' recognition of and emphasis on Cleisthenes' being underlies an essentialist notion of identity. Pentheus' use of the relative phrase ὅστις ἐστιν in the *Bacchae* passage above, "whoever this stranger is" (ὅστις ἐστιν ὁ ξένος, *Bacch.* 247) however, generalizes identity. Despite the moment of irony where Pentheus seems to land on Dionysus' identity, he fails to recognize him. Pentheus claims earlier that the god Dionysus, "whoever that is" (ὅστις ἔστι, 220), is a mere excuse (πρόφασις, 224) covering over women's worship of Aphrodite. Where Dicaeopolis disregards the potential of mimetic metamorphosis, Pentheus fails in identifying both the Lydian stranger and Dionysus, marking how completely Dionysus has transformed.

Cadmus tries to reason with Pentheus by making a pragmatic argument: the family will profit from the belief that Semele's son is divine even if Dionysus is not a god. Cadmus' argument is interesting because he defends lying (καταψεύδου καλῶς, 334) for familial gain and reveals his own ambivalence towards Dionysus' divinity and identity.[168]

> Κα. ὦ παῖ, καλῶς σοι Τειρεσίας παρῄνεσεν. (330)
> οἴκει μεθ' ἡμῶν, μὴ θύραζε τῶν νόμων·
> νῦν γὰρ πέτῃ τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς.
> κεἰ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φῄς,
> παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω· καὶ καταψεύδου καλῶς

[168] Dodds (1960) writes ad loc. that "a καλὸν ψεῦδος is not a 'noble lie,' but one which makes a good impression."

ὡς ἔστι Σεμέλης, ἵνα δοκῇ θεὸν τεκεῖν (335)
ἡμῖν τε τιμὴ παντὶ τῷ γένει προσῇ. (*Bacch.* 330-36)

> Ca. Child, Tiresias has advised you well. Stay home with us, don't go outside the bounds of custom. For right now you are up in the air and in your thoughts you think nonsense. For even if he is not a god, as you say, say it anyway. Lie the lovely lie that Dionysus is the son of Semele, so people think she gave birth to a god and honor will be given to us, your whole family.

Cadmus affects disinterest in the truth of Dionysus' identity, telling Pentheus to allow the worship of Dionysus to continue "even if he is not a god" (κεἰ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, 333). The demonstrative pronoun οὗτος refers to Dionysus but does not fix his identity since Cadmus does not state conclusively that "this one" is a god or man. The ambiguity of the pronoun serves Cadmus' argument since he does not want to make a strong claim about Dionysus. The conditional clause paired with the negative particle μή shows how uncertain being and identity are.

Aristotle does not cite the *Bacchae* in his definition of mimesis, but it is compelling in connection with that passage that Pentheus and Cadmus refer to the Lydian stranger and Dionysus with the demonstrative pronouns οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος. Similar to Pentheus accidentally landing on Dionysus' identity when discussing the Lydian stranger, Cadmus refers to the god Dionysus while suggesting he may not be a god. Cadmus argues that it is advantageous to worship Dionysus because Semele is his daughter, but he does not recognize that Dionysus is not a god because in the form of a human being. Pentheus and Cadmus both hint at the identity of the Lydian stranger and Dionysus, referring to the same person with different pronouns, hinting at how mimesis can change identity and make referentiality difficult because "this is that."

This scene is of also interest because of its strong resemblance to the doorkeeper scene in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*. The *Bacchae* alludes to and inverts the *Acharnians* scene through the scene's context of waiting outside a home, the metaphorical language of inside/outside for sanity,

and the discussion of costume and dress. In the *Acharnians*, Euripides' slave responds with riddles to Dicaeopolis' request to see Euripides: "He isn't at home, but he's inside, if you know what I mean" (οὐκ ἔνδον ἔνδον ἐστίν, εἰ γνώμην ἔχεις, Ar. *Ach.* 396). The slave expands on the riddle by depicting Euripides as flighty and eccentric with a spatial metaphor—"his mind is outside" (ὁ νοῦς μὲν ἔξω, 398) of his body. Dicaeopolis takes umbrage at Euripides' seeming laziness when the poet is wheeled out onto the stage on the *ekkyklēma* with his feet propped up (ἀναβαδήν, 399) while composing tragedies. In the *Bacchae*, however, Euripides privileges the eccentricities of his parodied self, invoking the "outside" metaphor for insanity against Pentheus for his resistance to Dionysus and costume. Cadmus urges Pentheus, "Stay home with us, don't go outside the bounds of custom" (οἴκει μεθ' ἡμῶν, μὴ θύραζε τῶν νόμων, *Bacch.* 331). The use of the adverb οἴκει ("at home") is purely metaphorical, as Tiresias and Cadmus are about to climb Mt. Cithaeron. Likewise, while the adverb θύραζε ("outdoors," "out") derives from the noun θύρα ("door") and the two elderly men wait outside the Theban palace, here it signifies Pentheus' divergent mindset, much like how Euripides "is not inside" (οὐκ ἔνδον) while he literally is "inside" (ἔνδον) his home.[169]

Cadmus continues: "right now you are up in the air and in your thoughts you think nonsense" (νῦν γὰρ πέτῃ τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, *Bacch.* 332). Pentheus is unmoored from the firm reality of the ground, flying out of control (πέτομαι).[170] Paired with this metaphorical unmooring is Cadmus' claim that Pentheus does not think straight (καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς). During the *sparagmos* scene, Dionysus aids Pentheus in finding a lofty spot in a fir tree to better observe the bacchants' behavior, but he is brought back down to the ground by their violence. Only then does he recognize and respect the divine power of Dionysus. While Aristophanes and

[169] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) s.v. θύρα.
[170] On metaphorical use of πέτομαι ("of fickle natures"), cf. LSJ s.v. πέτομαι A.II.

Euripides do not use the same vocabulary in these scenes, they draw on the same spatial metaphor (ἔνδον : οὐκ ἔνδον/ἔξω :: οἴκει : θύραζε). In conjunction with the importance of costumes in both scenes, it seems Cadmus' response to Pentheus also answers Dicaeopolis' mockery of the mimesis and transformation of Euripides in *Acharnians*. Aristophanes attributes Euripides' eccentricity partially to costume since he is dressed similar to his "beggar-hero" characters, whereas in Euripides' *Bacchae* Cadmus notes that Pentheus' firm unbelief in Dionysus and unwillingness to dress up as a bacchant is beyond or "outside of" the norm.

Pentheus rejects Cadmus' offer to garland him (341f.), and all that the garland entails, rather violently because views the worship of Dionysus as a pollution, "as if it were a physical infection transmissible by contact" (Dodds 1960: 114).

> Πε. οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ἰών,
> μηδ' ἐξομόρξῃ μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί;
> τῆς σῆς ⟨δ'⟩ ἀνοίας τονδε τὸν διδάσκαλον (345)
> δίκην μέτειμι. (*Bacch.* 343-46)
>
> Pe. Don't you lay your hands on me! Go and play the bacchant, but don't wipe off your foolishness on me! I'll pursue that teacher and punish him for your folly.

Pentheus emphatically tells Cadmus neither to touch him (οὐ μὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, 343) nor to wipe his foolishness off on him (μηδ' ἐξομόρξῃ μωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐμοί, 344) so as not to pollute him.[171] Dodds views Pentheus' "violent horror of such contact" as an insight into the character's psychology: "something in him knows already the fascination and the mortal peril which the new rites hold for him" (114). The pollution metaphor may hint at Pentheus' unconscious foreknowledge of his own death on Mt. Cithaeron, but I am primarily interested in Pentheus' idea that Cadmus' dress (e.g. the fawn skin, garland, thyrsus) and behavior (seen in his Dionysus worship and desire to dance) go hand-in-hand. After Pentheus commands Cadmus not to touch

[171] Cf. Smyth (§1919, 2756) on the second person future indicative as a strong prohibition.

him, he tells him to go off (presumably to a safe distance from Pentheus' person) and perform bacchic rites (βακχεύσεις δ' ἰών, 343). This is Pentheus' alternative to receiving a garland from Cadmus and joining the elder men in Dionysian dance and worship. For Pentheus, at least, the Theban women's (along with the elder men's) ecstatic worship of Dionysus is not the only pollution to be wary of. Costume can also effectively transform a person's behavior—what Pentheus refers to as Cadmus' "foolishness" (μωρία, 344) and "thoughtlessness" (ἀνοία, 345).

The earliest appearance of the verb ἐξομόργνυμι ("wipe off (from)") occurs in Euripides. The verb appears several times throughout his corpus, often in conjunction with bodily fluids and disease.[172] In the *Heracles* (416 BCE), Theseus, unlike Pentheus, disregards any risk of pollution and offers Heracles his hand anyway:

> Θη. παῦσαι · δίδου δὲ χεῖρ' ὑπηρέτῃ φίλῳ.
> Ηρ. ἀλλ' αἷμα μὴ σοῖς ἐξομόρζωμαι πέπλοις.
> Θη. ἔκμασσε, φείδου μηδέν · οὐκ ἀναίνομαι. (Eur. *Her.* 1398-1400)
>
> The. Stop! Give your hand to a helping friend.
> Her. But don't let me wipe blood off on your robes.
> The. Wipe away, don't spare anything. I am not ashamed.

This passage highlights an interesting contrast with the *Bacchae* where Pentheus views costume as *the source of* the contagion. In this passage, Heracles wipes the polluting blood of his family off *on* clothes. Theseus even suggests this course of action to Heracles: "Wipe away, don't spare anything" (ἔκμασσε, φείδου μηδέν, 1400). Similarly, the Old Man in *Electra* (420 BCE) wipes his

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[172] E.g. in the fragmentary *Phaethon* (420 BCE), Clymene tells her maidservants to wipe off Phaethon's blood from the ground after his corpse has been presented to her: οὐ θᾶσσον; οὐ σταλαγμὸν ἐξομόρζετε, / εἴ πού τις ἐστιν αἵματος χαμαὶ πεσών; (*Phaethon* 219f., ed. Diggle 1970). Cf. Aristophanes, who parodies this word and the notion of pollution in the *Acharnians*, when the Chorus praises Dicaeopolis' wealth and success with his separate peace: οὐδ' ἐξομόρζεται Πρέπις τὴν εὐρυπρωκτίαν σοι (Ar. *Ach.* 843). Plato extends the meaning of ἐξομόργνυμι from "wipe off" pollution and infect someone else to "imprint" or "stamp" a metaphorical disease or scar on one's soul in the *Gorgias* (524d7-525a3) and the *Laws* (775d4-e2).

tears off with his ragged clothes.[173] Pentheus' attitude towards costume as a source of pollution is clear from his first appearance when he asks Cadmus to take off his costume and rid himself of his props: "Won't you shake off your ivy? Won't you set your hand free of the thyrsus, O father of my mother?" (οὐκ ἀποτινάξεις κισσόν; οὐκ ἐλευθέραν / θύρσου μεθήσεις χεῖρ', ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάτερ; *Bacch.* 253f.). Pentheus implies that Cadmus' senseless old age (τὸ γῆρας νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, 252) and foolishness (μωρία, 344) can be healed by depriving him of the bacchant costume and props that enslave him (οὐκ ἐλευθέρα χείρ) and influence his behavior. In a play where costume figures so prominently, Pentheus highlights the metamorphic power mimesis effects on those who dress up in character.[174]

V. What is Not

Pentheus describes the Lydian stranger by negation, by what he is not. This process of negation focuses on identity and on being, not on the capacity for change in appearance or behavior. Pentheus' belief in the stability of being produces a moment of dramatic irony for the audience since Pentheus is ignorant of who the Lydian stranger previously was and who he will reveal himself to be at the end of the play.

> Πε. μέθεσθε χειρῶν τοῦδ' · ἐν ἄρκυσιν γὰρ ὢν
> οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὠκὺς ὥστε μ' ἐκφυγεῖν.
> ἀτὰρ τὸ μὲν σῶμ' οὐκ ἄμορφος εἶ, ξένε,
> ὡς ἐς γυναῖκας, ἐφ' ὅπερ ἐς Θήβας πάρει ·
> πλόκαμός τε γάρ σου ταναὸς οὐ πάλης ὕπο, (455)
> γένυν παρ' αὐτὴν κεχυμένος, πόθου πλέως ·
> λευκὴν δὲ χροιὰν ἐκ παρασκευῆς ἔχεις,

[173] ἐγὼ δὲ τρύχει τῷδε ἐμῶν πέπλων κόρας / δακρύοισι τέγξας ἐξομόρξασθαι θέλω (Eur. *El.* 501f.).

[174] Euripides also uses the verb metaphorically in the *Hippolytus* (428 BCE), where the titular character "will wipe away" the Nurse's words in her message from Phaedra: ἁγὼ ῥυτοῖς νασμοῖσιν ἐξομόρξομαι / ἐς ὦτα κλύζων. πῶς ἂν οὖν εἴην κακός, / ὃς οὐδ' ἀκούσας τοιάδ' ἁγνεύειν δοκῶ; (Eur. *Hipp.* 653-55). Pentheus sees the god Dionysus and act of dressing up and worshiping him as something that would ultimately debilitate him, just as Hippolytus finds sex and the Nurse's overture unappealing.

οὐχ ἡλίου βολαῖσιν ἀλλ' ὑπὸ σκιᾶς
τὴν Ἀφροδίτην καλλονῇ θηρώμενος.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον ὅστις εἶ γένος. (*Bacch.* 451-60) (460)

> Pe. Let go of him. Since he is in our nets, he is not so swift as to escape me. You aren't ugly, though, stranger, to women at least, which is why you've come to Thebes. You have long locks, not for wrestling, reaching to your very cheek. Full of desire. You keep your skin fair on purpose, not in the sun's rays but in the shade you seek out sex with your beauty. So, first, tell me who you are by birth.

Pentheus defines Dionysus negatively when he tells his servant to let go of him "since he is in our nets he is not so swift as to escape me" (ἐν ἄρκυσιν γὰρ ὢν / οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὠκὺς ὥστε μ' ἐκφυγεῖν, 451f.). In an interesting case of enjambement, Pentheus claims to know who or in what situation Dionysus *is* currently (ὤν, i.e. trapped in nets) while negating what Dionysus is capable of (οὐκ ἔστιν) in the following line, i.e. he *is not* swift enough to escape. Dionysus proves himself to be capable of freeing himself from his bonds, which adds to the layers of irony at play in this scene. Pentheus of course does not recognize who the Lydian stranger is, but in attempting to define him statically through being, he makes further mistakes.

Pentheus also describes Dionyus' beauty negatively rather than positively through the figure of litotes, "You aren't ugly, though, stranger" (ἀτὰρ τὸ μὲν σῶμ' οὐκ ἄμορφος εἶ, ξένε, 453), defining who Dionysus is—a beautiful, effeminate foreigner—with the particle οὐκ and alpha-privative adjective ἄμορφος ("unsightly," "misshapen"). In addition to negating different qualities of the Lydian stranger, Pentheus limits the beauty he ascribes to Dionysus with the restrictive adverb ὡς, claiming that he is beautiful only to women (ὡς ἐς γυναῖκας, 454).[175] Pentheus' strategy to define the Lydian stranger by his physical traits fails him, as he admits his ignorance when he commands Dionysus, "First, tell me who you are by birth" (πρῶτον μὲν οὖν μοι λέξον ὅστις εἶ γένος, 460). The indirect question ὅστις εἶ echoes the relative clause in

[175] Cf. Dodds (1960) ad loc.: "to a woman's taste, at least"; Smyth §2993.

Pentheus' offhand comment earlier in the play ("whoever this stranger is"; ὅστις ἐστιν ὁ ξένος, *Bacch*. 247). In the *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis asserts that he knows the identity of Cleisthenes in disguise (ὅς ἐστι, *Ach.* 118). Similarly, he tells Euripides he must remain who he is (ὅσπερ εἰμί, 441) while appearing to be Telephus. Pentheus, like Dicaeopolis, defines other characters by their identity and assumes being is static. Unlike Dicaeopolis, however, Pentheus uses indefinite and interrogative pronouns, fails to recognize people through their costume, and is not in control of the costume he will put on later in the play.

The question of identity reappears in this exchange when Dionysus tells Pentheus, "You don not know how you are living, what you are doing, nor who you are" (οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῇς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾷς οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ, *Bacch*. 506), echoing Pentheus' language with the indirect interrogative pronoun ὅστις and the verb εἰμί. In Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* (ca. 429 BCE) there is a similar moment where Tiresias tells Oedipus that he is ignorant of his parentage and identity as well:

> λέγω δ', ἐπειδὴ καὶ τυφλόν μ' ὠνείδισας·
> σὺ καὶ δέδορκας κοὐ βλέπεις ἵν' εἶ κακοῦ,
> οὐδ' ἔνθα ναίεις, οὐδ' ὅτων οἰκεῖς μέτα.
> ἆρ' οἶσθ' ἀφ' ὧν εἶ; (Soph. *OT* 412-15) (415)
>
> I speak since you have even reproached me for being blind: you have sight and you do not see what a calamity you are in, nor where you live, nor with whom you dwell. Do you know who your parents are?[176]

The blind seer Tiresias contrasts sight with understanding in this passage, stressing Oedipus' ignorance of his present circumstances and his birth. The repetition of οὐδέ and the use of different synonyms for "dwell" (ναίω, οἰκέω) in each half of line 414 expand on Oedipus' ignorance while highlighting that Oedipus' various blindspots ultimately come back to his own

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[176] Text of Soph. *OT* from Lloyd-Jones and Wilson's OCT. I follow Finglass' punctuation after μέτα (2018), following Holford-Strevens' note in Lloyd-Jones and Wilson *Sophoclea*: "ἆρ' οἶσθ' ἀφ' ὧν εἶ; is a climax, not an interruption, especially since καὶ looks forwards and not backwards" (1990: ad 414f.).

person. Oedipus knows neither "where" (ἔνθα) nor "with whom" (ὅτων μέτα) he lives because he assumes Thebes is his adopted, not natal, home. The pronoun ὅστις ("who") echoes Pentheus' command to Dionysus above to tell him "who you are by birth" (ὅστις εἶ γένος, *Bacch.* 460) as well as Dionysus' rebuke "you do not know who you are" (οὐκ οἶσθ'…οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ, 506).[177] Finally, Tiresias asks Oedipus about his knowledge of his birth: "Do you know who your parents are?" (lit. "Do you know from whom you are?" ἆρ' οἶσθ' ἀφ' ὧν εἶ; 415). By questioning Oedipus' knowledge Tiresias also destabilizes his sense of identity or being (εἰμί). This passage parallels the *Bacchae* scenes in interesting ways: like Pentheus, Oedipus fundamentally does not know who he is; and yet, like Dionysus, Oedipus is mistaken for a stranger in his native land, resulting in disastrous consequences.

Pentheus equates appearance and being not only when he takes the Lydian stranger's identity for granted, but also when he asks Dionysus, "Since you claim to see clearly, what did the god look like?" (ὁ θεός, ὁρᾶν γὰρ φῄς σαφῶς, ποῖός τις ἦν; *Bacch.* 477). Instead of getting closer to a description of Dionysus' being (ἦν), Dionysus teases Pentheus by responding thus: "Whatever he wanted. I didn't arrange it" (ὁποῖος ἤθελ' · οὐκ ἐγὼ 'τασσον τόδε, 478). Dionysus returns to the deixis of "this is that" from the prologue when he employs the demonstrative pronoun τόδε as the object of τάσσω. We can read τόδε both as a pronoun in response to Pentheus' question about Dionysus' appearance ("I didn't arrange it," i.e. the god's appearance) and as a deictic referring to the *hic et nunc* of dramatic performance ("I didn't arrange this (here)," i.e. the drama).

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[177] Dodds claims that Dionysus rebukes Pentheus at l. 506 because "the man mistakes himself for the god's master" (1960: 140). This reading also works at the metatheatrical level where Pentheus remains blind to the truth of Dionysus' disguise and to his own presence within the god's domain of the theater. Pentheus mistakes his own sovereignty as king of Thebes as well as his own agency in Dionysus' unfolding revenge drama.

The irony serves as a tongue-in-cheek denial of Dionysus' responsibility for his current appearance as the Lydian stranger as well as for the drama itself at the City Dionysia.

When the god of theater is involved, it is useless to ask what Dionysus looks like, since he can change his appearance at will to be "whatever he wanted" (ὁποῖος ἤθελε, 478). The Lydian stranger says that Dionysus' shape depends on the god's will, not his own, with the negating particle οὐκ and personal pronoun ἐγώ. In ancient Greek the nominative pronoun is usually omitted unless emphatic: "*I* didn't arrange it."[178] The irony of this line works on several levels since Dionysus, who appears as the Lydian stranger, certainly did arrange his disguise. The distinction between the third person (ὁ θεός, τις, ἦν, ἤθελε) and first person (ἐγώ, ἔτασσον) suggests a demarcation between the identities of the god Dionysus and the Lydian stranger. Dionysus' answer also reflects the result of mimetic metamorphosis. While Dionysus and the Lydian stranger are played by the same person, there is a distinction between the third person (the god Dionysus) and the first person (Lydian stranger) made through the transformation effected through mimesis. Pentheus does not understand this, so when the Lydian stranger says he is not responsible for the god's appearance, he tells the truth in a way, as it is the god Dionysus who chose that appearance.

Despite Pentheus' disapproval of Cadmus and Tiresias' costumes, he shows an awareness of the power of how mimesis affects identity when he states that he will punish Dionysus by changing his appearance, taking away his props, and curtailing his freedom of movement. When Pentheus defines Dionysus by what he is not, he presumes that his being, his identity is stable and unchanging, and he still presumes so here even if he threatens to change Dionysus' dress. Pentheus does not expect Dionysus to change, so he overlooks the metamorphic potential of

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[178] See Smyth §1190.

mimesis, but he does hope to embarrass and insult him by stripping him of the tokens that he finds essential to the Lydian stranger's identity. He threatens to cut Dionysus' hair (πρῶτον μὲν ἁβρὸν βόστρυχον τεμῶ σέθεν, *Bacch.* 493), take his thyrsus (ἔπειτα θύρσον τόνδε παράδος ἐκ χεροῖν, 495), and imprison him (εἱρκταῖσί τ' ἔνδον σῶμα σὸν φυλάζομεν, 497).[179] This punishment is ultimately ineffectual not only because Dionysus will free himself from his bonds but also because Dionysus can change his appearance at will and trick his captors with illusions (e.g., by making them believe a bull is the imprisoned Lydian stranger).

Dionysus plays on Pentheus' inability to see through appearances and understand, equating vision and understanding, much like Tiresias and Oedipus in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.

> Δι. καὶ νῦν ἃ πάσχω πλησίον παρὼν ὁρᾷ. (500)
> Πε. καὶ ποῦ 'στιν; οὐ γὰρ φανερὸς ὄμμασίν γ' ἐμοῖς.
> Δι. παρ' ἐμοί· σὺ δ' ἀσεβὴς αὐτὸς ὢν οὐκ εἰσορᾷς. (*Bacch.* 500-502)
>
> Di. Even now he is present nearby and sees what I'm suffering.
> Pe. And where is he? Because he isn't clear to my eyes at least.
> Di. He's where I am, but since you are so impious you cannot see him.

Dionysus, as the Lydian stranger, contrasts the god's vision (ὁρᾷ, 500) with Pentheus' blindness (οὐκ εἰσορᾷς, 502), casting the god as a spectator to the events of the drama. This effect is compounded by Dionysus' use of the first and third person. Dionysus' presence is both near (πλησίον) and far since he is actually the Lydian stranger, yet the god is also distant because narrated in third person and not revealed until the end of the drama. If we follow Dodds, who takes πλησίον as a preposition with an implied object σου ("near you") instead of as an adverb ("nearby") (1960: ad 502), Dionysus elaborates an interesting relationship between Pentheus and himself, adding further to the ambiguity and irony of his words to Pentheus. Dionysus triangulates Pentheus in relation to himself as the Lydian stranger (I-you) as well as to himself as

[179] Dodds reads these lines as a threat oriented toward the future, not as actions presently carried out on stage (1960: ad 493-97).

a god ("he is near you," πλησίον σου). Dionysus' identity is bifurcated in this discussion, similar to but somehow different from the hybridity effected by costumes in *Frogs* when Xanthias becomes Heracleoxanthias. On a metatheatrical level, Dionysus is nearby (even if the actor playing him is only a mortal) viewing the events of the drama because the City Dionysia is dedicated to him.

When Dionysus says that the god "is present" (παρών, *Bacch.* 500) and "by my side" (παρ' ἐμοί, 502), Pentheus may understand that Dionysus accompanies the Lydian stranger but is not identical to him.[180] This misunderstanding reflects how Dionysus represents his transformation into the Lydian stranger to Pentheus with the triangulation of first, second, and third persons (Lydian stranger, Pentheus, and Dionysus, respectively). Yet the prepositional phrase παρ' ἐμοί can also be read as a form of wordplay that sounds like the lexical form of the verb πάρειμι ("I am present"), with the short vowel epsilon and the diphthong -ει transposed (*pa-re-moi*, *pa-rei-mi*).[181] Dionysus' answer to Pentheus' question ("where is he [sc. the god]?") can be read simultaneously as "he is next to me" (παρ' ἐμοί) and the epiphanic "I am here" (πάρειμι). The first reading distinguishes between the first and third person, the Lydian stranger and Dionysus, while the latter equates the first and third person. This passage shows how mimesis can confuse identity with first and third person, with being and becoming, as it confuses what delimits and defines the singular entity "I" with another ("he").

Dionysus uses the first and third person to trace the connection between these two identities when he warns Pentheus: "For when you wrong me, you lead him into chains" (ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν κεῖνον ἐς δεσμοὺς ἄγεις, *Bacch.* 518). As Dionysus, in the form of the Lydian stranger, is about to be led away in chains, he warns Pentheus that he in fact does this to the god,

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[180] Dodds, following Murray's suggestion "where I am," reasons that "the irony vanishes if we translate 'Beside me'" (1960: ad loc.).

[181] For this kind of productive reading of sound and sense, see Shoptaw 2000.

suggesting an equivalence between the third and first person and translating his own first person experience (*"you lead me (ἡμᾶς) into chains") into the third person ("you lead him (ἐκεῖνον) into chains"). The meter and syntax of the line both suggest a parallelism between the third and first person: the caesura breaks the first clause from the second: ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν | κεῖνον ἐς δεσμοὺς ἄγεις (– – ⏑ ⏑ ⏑ / – | – ⏑ – / – – ⏑ – | |); and each clause follows a similar pattern of accusative object in first place (ἡμᾶς, κεῖνον) and the governing participle or verb in third place (ἀδικῶν, ἄγεις).

Dionysus' punning soundplay above shows the complex relationship to being and becoming instantiated in his own person, and he also uses it to contrast his divine knowledge with Pentheus' disbelief and ignorance. Dionysus states that "even now" (καὶ νῦν, 500) the god watches him nearby, which rhymes with Pentheus' disbelieving question (καὶ ποῦ 'στιν; "and where is he?", 501) in the following line. Dionysus introduces the ideas of the god's presence, being, vision, and understanding (παρὼν ὁρᾷ, 500) and then presents the antithesis to those ideas with verbs with the same root: Pentheus "is not pious" (ἀ-σεβὴς…ὤν, 502) and "does not see" (οὐκ εἰσορᾷς, 502). Dionysus returns to the definition through negation that Pentheus resorted to previously (452-54). Pentheus misreads Dionysus' identity when he attempts to define him negatively (e.g. he is not swift enough to flee, he is attractive only to women), but Dionysus correctly identifies what Pentheus is not, foreshadowing how he might transform in his final moments. Here, then, the participle ὤν does not mark Pentheus' identity at the end of a transformation, but rather his state before being captured and mauled by the bacchants and Theban women on Mt. Cithaeron. He "is" currently impious and blind, but he will later undergo a violent transformation in order to finally understand and recognize Dionysus' ascendancy.

VI. Costume Change, Behavior Change

At the beginning of the *Bacchae*, Euripidean deixis highlights the metatheacricality of the play and serves as a comment on how mimesis affects referentiality. The Messenger speech serves a similar function. The Messenger speech is a formalized part of the structure of Greek tragedy, so when the Messenger refers to the fantastic activities of Theban women with the demonstrative pronoun τάδε ("this," "these things"), much of which involves the Theban women rearranging their costumes and props, his speech functions both as way to progress the plot and also as a reminder to the inherent metatheatricality of the genre: "If you were there and saw this, you'd approach the god, whom you censure now, with prayers" (ὥστ', εἰ παρῆσθα, τὸν θεὸν τὸν νῦν ψέγεις / εὐχαῖσιν ἂν μετῆλθες εἰσιδὼν τάδε, *Bacch.* 712f.). The Messenger casts himself as a spectator of the dramatized events off-stage: "I saw wild bacchants" (βάκχας ποτνιάδας εἰσιδών, 664). When the Messenger returns to Thebes to recount the actions of the women on Mt. Cithaeron he returns to the theme of Pentheus' lack of vision and understanding from Pentheus' earlier exchange with Dionysus. The highly descriptive account shows that Pentheus' inability to see is not (only) metaphorical—he misses the opportunity to see the activities of the women on Mt. Cithaeron. The conditional clause "if you were there" (εἰ παρῆσθα) and the aorist participle εἰσιδών in the apodosis clearly mark Pentheus' absence from the scene on Mt. Cithaeron and his inability to see what occurred there while echoing Dionysus' previous rebuke to Pentheus: "you do not see" (οὐκ εἰσορᾷς, 502).

In the prologue Dionysus says he compelled the women of Thebes to wear his apparel, and in the Messenger speech we see the effect of that costume change on their behavior. The women rearrange their costumes, not to deny their becoming bacchants, but as an expression of the transformation that has already occurred: "they let their hair drop to their

shoulders" (καθεῖσαν εἰς ὤμους κόμας, *Bacch*. 695); "they tied up fast their spotted skins with snakes licking at their cheeks" (καταστίκτους δορὰς / ὄφεσι κατεζώσαντο λιχμῶσιν γένυν, 697f.); and "put on ivy garlands" (ἐπὶ δ' ἔθεντο κισσίνους / στεφάνους, 700). For those who took off or loosened their garments in a moment of respite, they do not return to being sober critics of Dionysus. Rather, the stripping of clothing is seen as characteristic of their bacchic revelry, and they do not hesitate to "put their fawn skins back on" (νεβρίδας τ' ἀνεστείλανθ', 696).

After describing the costuming of the bacchants, the Messenger describes their actions. This evinces a theory of mimetic metamorphosis in the *Bacchae* where costumes change the appearance of characters and their behavior. Pentheus' paranoia about women's religious rites and freedom of movement reveals, in addition to his latent curiosity, an unconscious awareness that costume can affect behavior.

> αἱ δ' ἀγκάλαισι δορκάδ' ἢ σκύμνους λύκων
> ἀγρίους ἔχουσαι λευκὸν ἐδίδοσαν γάλα, (700)
> ὅσαις νεοτόκοις μαστὸς ἦν σπαργῶν ἔτι
> βρέφη λιποῦσαις· ἐπὶ δ' ἔθεντο κισσίνους
> στεφάνους δρυός τε μίλακός τ' ἀνθεσφόρου.
> θύρσον δέ τις λαβοῦσ' ἔπαισεν ἐς πέτραν,
> ὅθεν δροσώδης ἅδατος ἐκπηδᾷ νοτίς· (705)
> ἄλλη δὲ νάρθηκ' ἐς πέδον καθῆκε γῆς
> καὶ τῇδε κρήνην ἐξανῆκ' οἴνου θεός·
> ὅσαις δὲ λευκοῦ πώματος πόθος παρῆν,
> ἄκροισι δακτύλοισι διαμῶσαι χθόνα
> γάλακτος ἑσμοὺς εἶχον· ἐκ δὲ κισσίνων (710)
> θύρσων γλυκεῖαι μέλιτος ἔσταζον ῥοαί. (*Bacch*. 699-711)

> However many new mothers whose breasts were still bursting with milk after leaving their children, they held in their arms a fawn or wild wolf cub and nursed them. They put on garlands of ivy, oak, and flowering bindweed. One bacchant took up a thyrsus and struck it against a rock, and out of it leapt a dewy stream. Another put down her fennel wand into the ground and the god released a spring of wine there. By digging with the tips of their fingers they had streams of milk for as many bacchants who wanted a white drink. And from their ivy thyrsi sweet flows of honey dripped.

The Messenger gives the impression of a cohesive collective as he recounts the acts the bacchants perform. He even describes the groups of bacchants led by Pentheus' mother and aunts as *thiasoi* (religious "bands") and choruses: "I saw three bands of female choruses" (ὁρῶ δὲ θιάσους τρεῖς γυναικείων χορῶν, 680). In the passage above, the demonstrative use of the feminine plural article (αἱ δὲ, "and they," 699) defines one group of bacchants' activities, but the relative pronoun ὅσαι, while limiting who those women are, leaves their number ambiguous: "However many new mothers had breasts still bursting with milk after leaving their children" (ὅσαις νεοτόκοις μαστὸς ἦν σπαργῶν ἔτι / βρέφη λιπούσαις 701f.). The Messenger adumbrates the particular actions of individual bacchants with the indefinite pronoun τις ("anyone," "someone," 704), third singular verbs (ἔπαισεν, καθῆκε; 704, 706), and the pronoun ἄλλη ("another woman," 705). Except for Autonoe, Ino, and Agave, these women are not individuated, as seen at the end of the passage when the Messenger returns to plural subjects: "by digging with the tips of their fingers they had streams of milk" (ἄκροισι δακτύλοισι διαμῶσαι χθόνα / γάλακτος ἑσμοὺς εἶχον, 709f.); "and from their ivy thyrsi sweet flows of honey dripped" (ἐκ δὲ κισσίνων / θύρσων γλυκεῖαι μέλιτος ἔσταζον ῥοαί, 710f). The Theban women's actions reveal that they not only dress and act like bacchants—they have become a cohesive collective of bacchants, each doing her part. The interchangeability of "one" (τις) bacchant with another shows that they have become a multiplicity. The performance of these women is the end result of their transformation into bacchants, a revelation of how completely they have transformed from the prologue.

Despite the many references to the Theban women and their bacchic rites, their transformation into bacchants occurs entirely off-stage. The clearest example of mimetic metamorphosis in the *Bacchae* occurs when Pentheus crossdresses in order to spy on the women on Mt. Cithaeron. Dionysus plays on Pentheus' suspicions of the women's activities and

persuades him to dress up as a woman by emphasizing the themes of desire and vision. He asks, "Do you wish to see them sitting together in the mountains?" (βούλῃ σφ' ἐν ὄρεσι συγκαθημένας ἰδεῖν; *Bacch*. 811), to which Pentheus responds with the superlative (μάλιστα, 812). Dionysus translates Pentheus' wish to an erotic desire (ἔρως): "What? Have you succumbed to such a great desire for this?" (τί δ' εἰς ἔρωτα τοῦδε πέπτωκας μέγαν; 813). The demonstrative pronoun τόδε ("this") gestures both to Pentheus' aforementioned wish to see the women on Mt. Cithaeron and to the drama unfolding on the stage, of which Pentheus is ironically ignorant. Pentheus desires to be the observer of Dionysian rites while being the spectacle of a tragedy at the City Dionysia.

Pentheus claims that it would cause him pain to observe the drunk and sex-crazed bacchants, "It should pain me to see them drunk" (λυπηρῶς νιν εἰσίδοιμ' ἂν ἐξῳνωμένας, 814), but Dionysus notes that Pentheus' is a masochistic desire to see something that will pain him: "Still, you'd like to see what is bitter to you?" (ὅμως δ' ἴδοις ἂν ἡδέως ἅ σοι πικρά; 815). Indeed, these ideas of vision and desire (ἴδειν, ἔρως), pleasure and pain (ἡδέως, λυπηρῶς), and the sweet and the bitter (ἡδέως, πικρά) cast Pentheus' voyeuristic desire as distinctly erotic.[182] Pentheus' desire is for the feminine Other, which is also cast as a desire to become the Other.[183] In order to get close enough to observe the Theban women, he must become a woman. Pentheus initially resists Dionysus' plan, but is quickly persuaded:

> Δι. ἀλλ' ἐξιχνεύσουσίν σε, κἂν ἔλθῃς λάθρᾳ.
> Πε. ἀλλ' ἐμφανῶς · καλῶς γὰρ ἐξεῖπας τάδε.
> Δι. ἄγωμεν οὖν σε κἀπιχειρήσεις ὁδῷ;
> Πε. ἄγ' ὡς τάχιστα · τοῦ χρόνου δέ σοι φθονῶ. (820)
> Δι. στεῖλαί νυν ἀμφὶ χρωτὶ βυσσίνους πέπλους.
> Πε. τί δῆτα τόδ'; ἐς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς τελῶ;
> Δι. μή σε κτάνωσιν, ἢν ἀνὴρ ὀφθῇς ἐκεῖ.
> Πε. εὖ γ' εἶπας αὖ τόδ' · ὥς τις εἶ πάλαι σοφός. (*Bacch.* 817-24)

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[182] This last recalls Sappho's depiction of Eros as a "sweetbitter" (γλυκύπικρον) creature (fr. 130).
[183] Cf. Lacan on desire as lack and for the Other ([1973] 1981: 104).

Di. But they'll track you, even if you go in secret.
Pe. In the open, then. You have said this well.
Di. So shall I lead you? And will you attempt the journey?
Pe. Take me as quickly as possible. I resent you for the delay.
Di. Drape a linen dress around your frame.
Pe. What? Why? So I become a woman instead of a man?
Di. So they won't kill you if you, a man, are seen there.
Pe. Well said. How clever you've been all along!

This passage echoes the language of Dicaeopolis' visit to Euripides in the *Acharnians* in which he declares he wants to be viewed as a beggar and not be one. Here, Dionysus points out that Pentheus cannot sneak upon the Theban woman "in secret" (λάθρᾳ, 817) as he is, in his current form. Pentheus suggests that he will approach them "in the open" (ἐμφανῶς, 818) instead. The hidden/open dichotomy is reversed here, where Pentheus will not successfully be able to approach the Theban women "hidden," which of course foreshadows his eventual discovery and *sparagmos*, and instead opts to approach the mountain "in the open."[184] This appearance of truth, however, is covered by the dress of a female follower of Dionysus. How can it be that Pentheus approaches the women "openly" and be in disguise at the same time? In that situation is his appearance not "hidden"?

I would suggest that Pentheus' disguise, as in the other theories of costume we have seen in Aristophanes, serves to reveal something about Pentheus. He can approach the women openly as a woman because of his desire for the Other, which is really a desire to become the Other. Dionysus' warning to Pentheus, "But they'll track you, even if you go in secret" (ἀλλ' ἐξιχνεύσουσίν σε, κἂν ἔλθῃς λάθρᾳ, 817), echoes Pentheus' command to find the Lydian stranger earlier in the play: "March throughout the city and track the effeminate stranger" (οἱ δ' ἀνὰ πόλιν

[184] This reference to "the open" as well as Pentheus' view of the sun recalls the performance context in an open-air theater in ancient Athens. Cf. Rehm: "Greek tragedies often refer to sunlight or the dawn near their outset, a dramatically effective means of bringing the myth into the present world of its performance" (2002: 37).

στείχοντες ἐξιχνεύσατε / τὸν θηλύμορφον ξένον, 352f.).[185] The second and final appearance of the verb ἐξιχνέυω draws an implicit comparison between the two cousins, both of whom use this verb and are the object of the verb, and recalls Pentheus' previous curiosity about Dionysus' effeminate appearance. Indeed, Pentheus, who is typically portrayed as a beardless youth in ancient art, looks similar to the effeminate (θηλύμορφος) Dionysus. Dionysus makes this explicit by saying he will lead Pentheus "in the form of a woman" (γυναικόμορφος, 855) in an aside to the Chorus after Pentheus leaves the stage for his costume change. Pentheus' curiosity about Dionysus' effeminacy and the women's secret rites and his youthful appearance show an inclination to become a woman before he has even taken up the dress of a female follower of Dionysus.

When Pentheus asks Dionysus why he should dress up at all, "What? Why? So I become a woman instead of a man?" (τί δὴ τόδ'; ἐς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς τελῶ; 822), he does not question the appearance he will put on because ridiculous or duplicitous. The verb τελέω in this context means "to be counted among" and therefore "belong to" a certain class, especially for tax purposes.[186] Dionysus' response, "So they won't kill you if you, a man, are seen there" (μή σε κτάνωσιν, ἢν ἀνὴρ ὀφθῇς ἐκεῖ, 823), suggests that Pentheus' transformation is only in appearance, yet Pentheus reveals a paranoia similar to Dicaeopolis about the contagious, transformational effect of mimesis. As we shall see, the costume not only reflects some inner characteristic but also changes Pentheus' behavior.

Dionysus tells Pentheus, who is "wearing the costume of a woman, madwoman, and bacchant" (σκευὴν γυναικὸς μαινάδος βάκχης ἔχων, 915), "You look like one of Cadmus'

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[185] The noun ἴχνος appears in the Messenger's speech describing one of the Theban women who carries Pentheus' severed foot (*Bacch.* 1134).
[186] LSJ s.v. τελέω II.3.

daughters in form" (πρέπεις δὲ Κάδμου θυγατέρων μορφὴν μιᾷ, 917). Pentheus now looks exactly like the women he wants to spy on, his mother and aunts. And when he undergoes what seems to be a Dionysiac initiation rite and dresses up as a woman, he becomes fixated on how best to act like a bacchant.

> Πε. τί φαίνομαι δῆτ'; οὐχὶ τὴν Ἰνοῦς στάσιν (925)
> ἢ τὴν Ἀγαυῆς ἑστάναι, μητρός γ' ἐμῆς;
> Δι. αὐτὰς ἐκείνας εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ σ' ὁρῶν.
> ἀλλ ἐξ ἕδρας σοι πλόκαμος ἐξέστηχ' ὅδε,
> οὐχ ὡς ἐγώ νιν ὑπὸ μίτρᾳ καθήρμοσα.
> Πε. ἔνδον προσείων αὐτὸν ἀνασείων τ' ἐγὼ (930)
> καὶ βακχιάζων ἐκ ἕδρας μεθώρμισα. (*Bacch*. 925-31)
>
> Pe. What do I look like then? Don't I have the bearing of Ino or Agave, my mother?
> Di. When I look at you, I think I see them! This lock of hair stands askew from its place, not as I fit it under your mitra.
> Pe. I must have moved my hair from its place when I was inside waving it back and forth, up and down, in a frenzy.

Pentheus' question (τί φαίνομαι δῆτα; 925) reveals costume's capaciousness produce more than mere visual likeness. Pentheus, who is told immediately prior to this that he looks exactly like his mother, is more concerned with his posture, gestures, and behavior. Indeed, this echoes the dichotomy of going to Mt. Cithaeron "in secret" (λάθρᾳ) or "openly" (ἐμφανῶς, 817f.). The adverb ἐμφανῶς shares a root with φαίνομαι. Pentheus' transformation returns to a similar question of person and pronouns. Dionysus says, "When I look at you, I think I see them!" (αὐτὰς ἐκείνας εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ σ' ὁρῶν, 927), equating the second person Pentheus ("you," σύ) with the Theban royal women, Agave, Autone, and Ino ("them," ἐκεῖναι). Yet this transformation does not only problematize referentiality and language, it affects Pentheus' behavior as well, as he admits that, unprompted, he shook his head back and forth (προσείων, ἀνασείων, 930) and acted like a bacchant (βακχιάζων, 931).

Pentheus mocks Cadmus' and Tiresias' ridiculous garb, but once he has transformed, he now has opinions on how best to wear and accessorize his bacchic garments. Much like Dicaeopolis' inspiration to quote Euripides' *Telephus* after putting on the costume, Pentheus' behavior changes after donning his costume.

> Δι. ζῶναί τέ σοι χαλῶσι κοὐχ ἑξῆς πέπλων (935)
> στολίδες ὑπὸ σφυροῖσι τείνουσιν σέθεν.
> Πε. κἀμοὶ δοκοῦσι παρά γε δεξιὸν πόδα·
> τἀνθένδε δ' ὀρθῶς παρὰ τένοντ' ἔχει πέπλος….
> Πε. πότερα δὲ θύρσον δεξιᾷ λαβὼν χερὶ (941)
> ἢ τῇδε βάκχῃ μᾶλλον εἰκασθήσομαι;
> Δι. ἐν δεξιᾷ χρὴ χἅμα δεξιῷ ποδὶ
> αἴρειν νιν· αἰνῶ δ' ὅτι μεθέστηκας φρενῶν. (935-38, 941-44)
>
> Di. Your girdle hangs loose and the folds of your robe stretch out in disarray below your ankle.
> Pe. I think so too on the right foot, but on this side the robe hangs well on the tendon.…
> Pe. How should I hold the thyrsus, with my right hand? Which will make me look more like a bacchant?
> Di. You must hold it in your right hand and raise it simultaneously with your right foot. I approve that you have changed your mind.

Dionysus costumes and choreographs Pentheus in this passage, but Pentheus shows an earnestness in playing the role of bacchant well. For example, he asks Dionysus how to hold the thyrsus properly (941f.). Pentheus' use of the passive verb εἰκάζομαι ("to be like," "resemble") after this question reveals he does not only want to appear to be a bacchant. He wishes to pass as a bacchant by assimilating himself to the character and taking on her mannerisms. After the costume change, Pentheus' behavior changes as well. He arranges his costume by certifying the folds of the robe hang correctly on his body (935ff.). He no longer mocks the dress Cadmus and Tiresias wore; instead, he praises how the costume fits him: "but on this side the robe hangs well on the tendon" (938).

VII. This and That

The second Messenger recounts the killing and ritual dismemberment of Pentheus at the hands of his female family members. Much like the Kinsman at the end of *Thesmophoriazusae*, the changes that have occurred in Pentheus cannot be easily undone.[187] The Kinsman remains dressed as a woman as a form of punishment. Similarly, Pentheus dies dressed as a bacchant. In a desperate attempt to plead for his life, Pentheus takes off his costume in order to be recognized as Pentheus, Agave's son and king of Thebes, but fails.

> Αγ. πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ ἦρξεν ἱερέα φόνου
> καὶ προσπίτνει νιν · ὁ δὲ μίτραν κόμης ἄπο (1115)
> ἔρριψεν, ὥς νιν γνωρίσασα μὴ κτάνοι
> τλήμων Ἀγαυή, καὶ λέγει παρηίδος
> ψαύων · Ἐγώ τοι, μῆτερ, εἰμί, παῖς σέθεν
> Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δόμοις Ἐχίονος ·
> οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ μῆτέρ με μηδὲ ταῖς ἐμαῖς (1120)
> ἁμαρτίαισι παῖδα σὸν κατακτάνῃς.
> ἡ δ' ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα καὶ διαστρόφους
> κόρας ἑλίσσουσ', οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν,
> ἐκ Βακχίου κατείχετ', οὐδ' ἔπειθέ νιν. (*Bacch.* 1114-24)
>
> Ang. First his mother, the priestess, began the murder and attacked him. He threw the mitra away from his hair, so that upon recognizing him, wretched Agave would not kill him. And touching her cheek, he said: "It's me, mother, your son Pentheus, whom you bore in Echion's halls. Pity me, mother! Don't kill your son for my failures!" But she, foaming at the mouth and crossing her eyes, did not understand what she needed to. She was possessed by Bacchius, and he did not persuade her.

Pentheus throws away his mitra in order to allow his mother to recognize him, but this comes too late (1115-17). Curiously, despite Pentheus' attempt to undress, the verb γυμνόω ("strip naked") is only used when he has been killed and his body is torn apart by his mother and aunts: "His ribs were stripped by their rending" (γυμνοῦντο δὲ / πλευραὶ σπαραγμοῖς, 1134f.). Pentheus' costume is only stripped naked after the ritual *sparagmos*—it is too deeply ingrained in his behavior and character to make much difference when he takes it off.

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[187] Cf. Pentheus' late cousin, Actaeon, Eur. *Bacch.* 337-40.

Pentheus beseeches his mother, claiming his identity as her son (ἐγώ τοι, μῆτερ, εἰμί, παῖς σέθεν / Πενθεύς, *Bacch.* 1119f.). He emphasizes this with the first person pronoun ἐγώ, which stands in the emphatic first position in his address to her. He elaborates by giving his kinship affiliation to her (παῖς) and finally his name. Pentheus' strategy to identify his being (εἰμί) instead of how he has changed fails him. Pentheus attempts to create a close relationship between him and his mother by using first and second person pronouns and possessive adjectives (ἐγώ τοι, παῖς σέθεν, 1118; παῖδα σόν, 1121), but this attempt at intimacy does not work. Euripides cleverly uses alliteration when Pentheus appeals to Agave, highlighting the similarity of sounds in "mother" and "me": οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ μῆτέρ με μηδὲ ταῖς ἐμαῖς (1120). In addition to calling upon his mother with the vocative case, the echoing syllable *-me* serves to remind Agave who she is in relation to him, his ma-ma. Agave ignores Pentheus' plea for pity and his claim to any intimate first-second person relationship between a mother and child. Pentheus seems to admit that there is a distinction between himself in his current form and Agave's son when he tells his mother: "Pity me, mother! Don't kill your son for my failures!" (οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ μῆτέρ με μηδὲ ταῖς ἐμαῖς / ἁμαρτίαισι παῖδα σὸν κατακτάνῃς, 1120f.). The accusative pronoun με ("me") should be supplied in apposition to the object "your son" (i.e. "Don't kill me, your son"), but in referring to his mistakes with the possessive adjective ἐμός ("my") and to Agave's son as "your" (σός), it is as if Pentheus distinguishes between the person he was and the person he has become, as if "your son" is in the third person.

When Agave returns to the city, she uses the deictic pronoun ὅδε ("this") to refer to the mountain lion in her hands.

> Αγ. ἔμαρψα τόνδ' ἄνευ βρόχων
> ⟨λέοντος ἀγροτέρου⟩ νέον ἶνιν,[188]

[188] Kovacs (2002) supplies this emendation. Diggle does not emend the lacuna (1994).

ὡς ὁρᾶν πάρα. (*Bacch.* 1173-75) (1175)

Ag. I caught this young son of a wild lion without a net, as you can see.

Agave presents the head of Pentheus to Thebes and says it is a lion, "as you can see" (ὡς ὁρᾶν πάρα, 1175). The prefix παρά, which has undergone anastrophe, is an abbreviated, poetic form of πάρεστι. The head of the lion "is present" (πάρεστι) for the Chorus and the audience to see. These lines echo Dionysus' prologue both because of the deictics and the epiphanic visuality of the scene. Agave refers to the head with the deictic pronoun ὅδε, a strategy that Dionysus uses to refer to the stage and the theater as Thebes. Dionysus' presence in the prologue is epiphanic (πάρειμι, "I am present"), despite being in the form of a human being, the Lydian stranger, and on a metatheatrical level, an actor. Agave's attempts to say "this is that" fall flat, though, when Cadmus asks Agave to look closely at the lion's head again. Dionysus reveals his power over and recognition of mimetic metamorphosis throughout the play. He is able to say "this is that," to costume and thereby transform characters, which is a study in contrast with Agave and Pentheus.

Agave's continued use of deictics in her address to the audience, whom she calls "dwellers of Thebes," becomes an ironic revelation of the truth despite her failure to control mimesis. Bonnie Honig argues that the significance of the "lion cub" of line 1174 works doubly as both a filicide (lion *cub*) and regicide (*lion* cub) (2015). If read in this way, even in her misrecognition, Agave's reference to "this young son" (τόνδε…νέον ἶνιν, 1173f.) of a lion rings true to the audience in a perverse way, similar to Pentheus' misunderstanding the Lydian stranger's riddling replies to his interrogation. She calls the Athenians-cum-Thebans to "come and see this wild prey that we, the daughters of Cadmus, caught" (ἔλθεθ' ὡς ἴδητε τήνδ' ἄγραν /Κάδμου θυγατέρες θηρὸς ἣν ἠγρεύσαμεν, 1203f.) and refers to her son's head as "this reward" (τάδε…τἀριστεῖα, 1238f.) when she sees her father Cadmus. Her use of deixis (ὅδε νέος ἶνις, ἥδε ἄγρα, τάδε

ἀριστεία) and emphasis on visuality echo Dionysus' prologue, which lays out how mimesis can alter the way we see and refer to the things around us.

These themes of sight and understanding also occur in the recognition scene when Cadmus asks Agave "whose head" (τίνος πρόσωπον, 1277) she carries. The interrogative pronoun τίνος and the conversation that follows leads Agave to recognize her son and his identity at last.

> Κα. τίνος πρόσωπον δῆτ' ἐν ἀγκάλαις ἔχεις;
> Αγ. λέοντος, ὥς γ' ἔφασκον αἱ θηρώμεναι.
> Κα. σκέψαι νυν ὀρθῶς· βραχὺς ὁ μόχθος εἰσιδεῖν.
> Αγ. ἔα, τί λεύσσω; τί φέρομαι τόδ' ἐν χεροῖν; (1280)
> Κα. ἄθρησον αὐτὸ καὶ σαφέστερον μάθε.
> Αγ. ὁρῶ μέγιστον ἄλγος ἡ τάλαιν' ἐγώ.
> Κα. μῶν σοι λέοντι φαίνεται προσεικέναι;
> Αγ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ Πενθέως ἡ τάλαιν' ἔχω κάρα.
> Κα. ᾠμωγμένον γε πρόσθεν ἢ σὲ γνωρίσαι. (1285)
> Αγ. τίς ἔκτανέν νιν; πῶς ἐμὰς ἦλθ' ἐς χέρας;
> Κα. δύστην' ἀλήθει', ὡς ἐν οὐ καιρῷ πάρει.
> Αγ. λέγ', ὡς τὸ μέλλον καρδία πήδημ' ἔχει.
> Κα. σύ νιν κατέκτας καὶ κασίγνηται σέθεν. (*Bacch.* 1277-89)

> Ca. Whose head do you hold in your hands, then?
> Ag. A lion's, so the huntresses claimed.
> Ca. Look at it now aright. It is a small hardship to look.
> Ag. Hold on, what do I see? Why am I holding this in my hands?
> Ca. Gaze at it and learn more clearly.
> Ag. Wretched me! I see a very great pain.
> Ca. Does it seem to look like a lion to you?
> Ag. No. I, wretch that I am, hold the head of Pentheus.
> Ca. He was mourned before you recognized him.
> Ag. Who killed him? How did he come into my hands?
> Ca. Terrible truth, you have come here at the wrong moment.
> Ag. Tell me. My heart leaps in anticipation.
> Ca. You killed him. You and your sisters.

Curiously, Agave claims that her fellow hunters told her (ἔφασκον, 1278) that the head belonged to a lion. Before Cadmus enters the stage, Agave tells the audience that they can see the lion's head for themselves, and presumably she can as well, but at this point in the drama her

knowledge is relegated to hearsay, disembodied speech that is not present in the same epiphanic way as Dionysus is in the prologue.

Cadmus exhorts Agave to look at the lion's head (σκέψαι, εἰσιδεῖν, 1279; ἄθρησον, 1281), but when Agave looks again, she does not understand what she is seeing: "Hold on, what do I see? Why am I holding this in my hands?" (ἔα, τί λεύσσω; τί φέρομαι τόδ' ἐν χεροῖν; 1280). The second half of line 1280 features the deictic pronoun to refer to the mask Agave carries and can be read as agreeing with he interrogative pronoun τί ("what?" "why?"): "What is this thing I am holding in my hands?" The interrogative pronoun τί recalls Cadmus' question τίνος πρόσωπον, and the neuter gender of the pronouns τί and τόδε can be read as referring back to πρόσωπον, so despite Agave's misrecognition and her confusion, the reference to the thing in her hands as an object rings true because "this" is a mask. It has been and still is difficult for Agave to identify the face of Pentheus, but the deictic pronoun gestures to the fact that the mask can also stand in as something or for someone else (i.e. Pentheus). Agave is still unsure of what this (τόδε) is, and her use of the verb φέρομαι signals her continued confusion. In the middle voice φέρομαι can mean to "carry off as a prize" or "win."[189]

Agave reclaims her own identity by stating the first person pronoun ἐγώ in the emphatic position at the end of line 1282. Simultaneously as she reaffirms her own identity, she recognizes her son, "I see a very great pain" (ὁρῶ μέγιστον ἄλγος, 1282), punning on her son's name Pentheus, as ἄλγος ("pain") can also mean "grief," like πένθος. At Agave's next line, when she finally names Pentheus, the phrase ἡ τάλαιν' ἔχω (1284) near line end echoes ἡ τἀλαιν' ἐγώ (1282), shows an equivalence between this great pain and her son. The parallelism of these lines functions similar to a deictic referring to this as that.

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[189] LSJ s.v. φέρω A.VI.2-3.

VIII. Conclusion

The *Bacchae* famously ends with a transformation. Dionysus announces to Cadmus that he and his wife will change into serpents as punishment:

> Δι. δράκων γενήσῃ μεταβαλών, δάμαρ τε σὴ (1330)
> ἐκθηριωθεῖσ' ὄφεος ἀλλάξει τύπον,
> ἣν Ἄρεος ἔσχες Ἁρμονίαν θνητὸς γεγώς. (*Bacch.* 1330-32)
>
> Di. You will change and be a serpent, and your wife, Harmonia the daughter of Ares, whom you married despite being mortal, will become a wild animal and take on the shape of a snake.

This final transformation from human to animal echoes Dionysus' transformation from god to human in the prologue:

> ὧν οὕνεκ' αὐτῷ θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξομαι
> πᾶσίν τε Θηβαίοισιν.…
> ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω
> μορφήν τ' ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. (*Bacch.* 47f., 53f.)
>
> For this reason, I'll show him, and all the Thebans, I am a god.…For this reason, I have a mortal form and have changed my shape into the nature of a man.

At the end of the play Dionysus makes good on his promise to reveal that he is a god (θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξομαι, 47), both to the Theban characters within the drama and the Thebans-cum-Athenians in the audience. As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the participial phrase θεὸς γεγώς can work both as an expression of Dionysus' essential identity (i.e. he *is* a god) and as a promise that the Lydian stranger (and the actor who plays him) will transform into the god through costume and staging. Dionysus states here that Cadmus married Harmonia "despite being mortal" (θνητὸς γεγώς, 1332), which can work in a similarly ambivalent way. On this reading, the participial phrase can highlight Cadmus' unchanging being or essential identity (Cadmus *is* a mortal). Alternatively, this can be read as a point in time relative to Cadmus' transformation (Cadmus is/was a mortal man, but he will soon be a serpent). The latter reading

is in keeping with my claim that Euripides' *Bacchae* reflects upon the ontological stakes of mimetic metamorphosis throughout the play. It also fits nicely into Dionysus' claim that Cadmus and Harmonia will eventually return to their human shape, which parallels Dionysus' experience in the play.

It is not surprising that Euripides uses a vocabulary of metamorphosis at the end of the play that is similar to the prologue, as we see with the verbs γίγνομαι (47, 1330, 1332), μεταβάλλω (54, 1330), and ἀλλάσσω (53, 1331). Nor is it surprising that the same character, Dionysus, voices these lines. Dionysus shows an understanding of mimesis that the humans he interacts with simply do not possess. What I find interesting is that these transformations are treated as of the same kind. That is, Dionysus' transformation into a human being is not on the side of mere appearance but of a kind with the transfiguration of Cadmus and Harmonia into a different animal. Earlier in the play, Dionysus claims that in addition to changing his shape or form he takes on a human nature, φύσις (54). Unlike Dionysus and Pentheus, Cadmus and Harmonia do not transform through costume or purposefully change their behavior, but the similarity between these scenes shows how transformative mimetic metamorphosis can be. In the final chapter, I will argue that Plato's Socrates recognizes that mimesis can transform citizens in Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic*, noting the ontological stakes of mimesis present in Aristophanes and Euripides, only to abandon becoming for being. Part of Socrates' strategy lies in treating mimesis as epistemologically impoverished in Book 10.

Chapter 3

Mimesis on Seeming and Being in Plato's *Republic*

I. Introduction

Ontology is at stake from the very beginning of Plato's *Republic*. The fact that seeming and being do not always align is a problem at the heart of Socrates' critique of poetry. In this chapter I will show how themes of seeming and being and being, and being and becoming, are central to the discussion of mimesis in the dialogue. I argue that Plato picks up on the language of mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes and Euripides. The *Republic* continues the themes we have observed in Chapters 1 and 2: a strong desire for being to be stable; an awareness that being is not stable; and the depiction of mimesis and becoming as constitutive of being. More importantly, Plato's Socrates offers a view of mimetic metamorphosis that is quite serious—not treated comically or ironically as in *Acharnians* or *Bacchae*. Many of Socrates' concerns about mimesis lie with the end result of mimetic metamorphosis, how mimetic representation will affect performers and audiences over time. Because of the transformative effect of mimesis, Socrates must grapple with its political dimension: does becoming endanger or enable the ideal state? Thus, Plato's *Republic* focuses on a different chain in Ion's link of poetic inspiration that we saw in the introduction. Where Aristophanes and Euripides use paratragedy and metatheater to comment on the mimetic metamorphosis, Socrates theorizes about its ultimate effects.

The aim of the chapter is ultimately to revise view of mimesis we receive from Book 10, which is often read as the final word on mimesis in the *Republic* and in Plato. In this chapter I turn to Books 2 and 3 in order to flesh out the language of seeming that surrounds mimesis and show how seeming (and mimesis) has more substance than we might believe after reading Book 10. Indeed Socrates depicts mimesis as something that can affect the guardians emotionally and

ultimately change their being. In the first section of this chapter, I trace the language of seeming as it pertains to justice and injustice. I then turn to the first critique of mimesis in Books 2 and 3, where I claim the language of seeming and being go back to the vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes and Euripides. In section three I show how seeming is treated as a costume that can be stripped, but I complicate this with a reading of seeming and the unjust man. In section four, I look at Socrates' categorization of different poetic styles, and how the use of one style or another (e.g., mimeis and diegesis) constitutes a kind of transformation. I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion of the second critique of mimesis in Book 10, where I show how the seeming and being dichotomy raise doubt about the final exile of poetry from the state.

While much of the discussion about mimesis in Books 2 and 3 is about mimetic poetry more generally, Plato shows that he is most interested in dramatic mimesis. This encourages us to think about the *Republic* as dialogue. Ruby Blondell claims that the formal fact that Plato's dialogues are dramatic means that "none of the character's voices can be identified in any direct sense with that of the author" (2002: 18). At a metatheatrical level, Plato struggles with the same questions about representation that Socrates raises in his discussions of mimesis. Socrates claims in the section on style (*lexis*) in Book 3, that Homer should not speak as if he is Chryses, but we are confronted with the same problem with Plato's dialogues. While the dialogue was not staged as such, there are references to the body as it pertains to mimesis even if it is slightly disembodied. For example, Socrates lists the kinds of tragic women the guardians cannot imitate. This can be read as a list of tragedies and tragic women (e.g. a *Niobe* or *Hecabe*), but Socrates also makes a point to exclude the actions of tragedy.[190] For Socrates the body is not the prime site of experimentation of mimesis anymore. Instead, mimesis raises questions about seeming and

[190] On the definition of tragedy as an imitation of an action, cf. Arist. *Poet.* 6.1449b24-28.

being, being and becoming, that are essential to the dialogue: what is and what seems to be? Do the products and subjects of mimesis exist or do they only seem to be?

In a dialogue aiming to define justice, to some extent justice depends on the identity of the people with whom one interacts. Thus, when Socrates' interlocutor Polemarchus defines justice as helping friends and hurting enemies, Socrates asks for clarification about who friends and enemies are.

> Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, ἀλλ' οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον. τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθρούς.
> Φίλους δὲ λέγεις εἶναι πότερον τοὺς δοκοῦντας ἑκάστῳ χρηστοὺς εἶναι, ἢ τοὺς ὄντας, κἂν μὴ δοκῶσι, καὶ ἐχθροὺς ὡσαύτως;
> Εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη, οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν.
> Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον;
> Ἁμαρτάνουσιν. (*Resp.* 1.334b7-c9)[191]
>
> "No, by Zeus," he said, "I don't know any more what I meant, but I think that justice is to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies."
> "By 'friends' do you mean those who seem to be good and useful to someone or those who actually are good and useful, even if they don't seem so and similarly with enemies?"
> "Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad and harmful."
> "But surely people often make mistakes about this, believing many people to be good and useful when they aren't, and making the opposite mistake about enemies?"
> "They do make mistakes." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The impersonal phrase δοκεῖ μοι ("it seems to me," "I think") is a common, unmarked phrase, but in this passage, with its questions of seeming and being, it takes on an added significance, especially with the emphatic form of the first person pronoun (ἔμοιγε). The grammar of Polemarchus' definition is in itself not irregular, but in conjunction with his uncertainty ("I don't know any more what I meant," οὐκέτι οἶδα ἔγωγε ὅτι ἔλεγον, 1.334b7), it shows how closely

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[191] Greek text of Plato *Republic* from Slings' OCT (2003). All translations are my own unless noted otherwise. I use Grube's revised 1997 translation of the *Republic* throughout.

intertwined seeming and being are, and how difficult it is to extricate them. Lack of knowledge is treated as parallel to or synonymous with seeming. In response to Polemarchus' claim, Socrates sorts friends and enemies into categories based on seeming and being, thereby contrasting the two. Socrates' question, whether friends are those who appear to be good (οἱ δοκοῦντες χρηστοὶ εἶναι) or are good (οἱ ὄντες χρηστοί), raises uncertainty about Polemarchus' definition. Is justice helping friends and harming enemies, or does it only seem to be so at first glance?

Polemarchus relies on visual language to elaborate on what he means by "friend." The participle εἰκός ("probably," "it is likely") derives from the verb ἔοικα ("to be like," "look like," or "seem") and has a visual register.[192] The noun εἰκών ("likeness," "image"), which appears in the first critique of poetry in Book 3, is a nominal formation of the verb ἔοικα as well.[193] The rather unmarked phrase "it is likely" (cf. "it seems to me," above) contains within it a reliance on the idea of seeming. Polemarchus' definition does not do much to sway Socrates, as it depends on the subjective belief of an individual: "Probably, one loves those one considers good and useful and hates those one considers bad and harmful" (εἰκὸς μέν, ἔφη, οὓς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστοὺς φιλεῖν, οὓς δ' ἂν πονηροὺς μισεῖν, 1.334c4-5). Arguments that depend on likelihood and seeming dictating one's emotions (φιλεῖν, μισεῖν) and beliefs (ἡγέομαι) about being leads to uncertainty.

Socrates rejects Polemarchus' initial definition of justice, claiming that when the distinction between being and seeming is elided, one can err in ascertaining the identity of a friend. The question of error (ἁμαρτάνω), especially in the recognition of someone's identity, looks forward to Aristotle's *Poetics*, which enshrines ἁμαρτία ("error," "mistake") and ἀναγνώρισις

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[192] For more on *eikos*, see Wohl (2014: 1-14): "At once a logical operation, a rhetorical trope, and a literary device, *eikos* is a way of thinking about the probable and the improbable, the factual and the counterfactual, the hypothetical and the real" (1).
[193] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. ἔοικα.

("recognition") as important elements of the tragic plot.[194] The distinction between seeming to be (δοκεῖν εἶναι) and being (or in this case not being, μὴ ὄντες) are implicated in the discussion about justice from the very beginning of the *Republic*. This binary surfaces in Socrates' critique of poetry as well. As I will show, Socrates recognizes, while also attempting to dismiss and censure, the capacity for mimetic poetry to transform one's being, thus adding a third term to the seeming/being dichotomy—becoming. Transformation endangers the project of a stable soul and state, and by tracing the language surrounding this at first intractable opposition, we see, as with Polemarchus' definition of justice, that being and seeming are often interchangeable, undercutting the notion of an essential identity. This reading is strengthened when we take into account that the dialogue's language and themes utilize the vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis I have traced through the works of Aristophanes and Euripides.

Socrates casts becoming as a theatrical experience when he and his interlocutors begin to lay the foundations for the ideal state.

> Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; (*Resp.* 2.369a6-8)
>
> "So," I said, "if we could watch a city coming to be in language, wouldn't we also see its justice coming to be, and its injustice as well?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The theorization of this city coming into being employs visual language typical of the theater. The words for spectator (θεατής) and theater (θέατρον) both derive form the verb θεάομαι ("gaze at," "behold," "view as a spectator").[195] The verb εἶδον ("see") of the apodosis depicts the viewer

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[194] On ἀναγνώρισις as significant component of tragic plot, see Arist. *Poet.* 6.1450a33-35. On ἁμαρτία as central to the simple and therefore superior plot entailing περιπέτεια, see *Poet.* 13.1453a7-17.

[195] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) and Frisk (1960-72) s.v. θεάομαι. Athenian spectators at domestic political gatherings and religious festivals were called θεαταί ("spectators"). Cf. Nightingale on the distinction between a θεατής and θεωρός (2004: 49-52).

of injustice as a spectator but it also suggests that justice and injustice are not only abstract concepts but actions that take place between persons, much like the actions depicted on a stage. The becoming of a city and of justice and injustice then is a coming to be apparent to a spectator.

Socrates depicts transformation in a negative light in the *Republic* as well. He argues by analogy of horses and dogs that harming enemies cannot constitute justice because it makes people worse:

> Ἀνθρώπους δέ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μὴ οὕτω φῶμεν, βλαπτομένους εἰς τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀρετὴν χείρους γίγνεσθαι;
> Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
> Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή;
> Καὶ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη.
> Καὶ τοὺς βλαπτομένους ἄρα, ὦ φίλε, τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνάγκη ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι.
> Ἔοικεν. (*Resp.* 1.335c1-8)

> "Then won't we say the same about human beings, too, my friend? That when they are harmed they become worse in human virtue?"
> "Indeed."
> "But isn't justice human virtue?"
> "Yes, certainly."
> "Then people who are harmed must become more unjust?"
> "So it seems." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The context of this passage concerns the harming of fellow humans, so it is inherently negative. It is interesting that the predicate of the verb of becoming has a negative connotation and is closely connected with inferiority and injustice (χείρους γίγνεσθαι, 1.335c2; ἀδικωτέρους γίγνεσθαι, 1.335c7). Socrates depicts transformation as a kind of devolution that departs from virtue and justice.

Later in Book 1, Socrates claims that when injustice comes into being (ἐγγίγνομαι) it causes hatred and factions. In addition to the image of becoming worse over time, coming into being is likened to an invasive growth.

> Ἀλλ' εὖ γε σὺ ποιῶν, ὦ ἄριστε. τόδε δέ μοι λέγε· ἆρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιεῖν ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις ἐγγιγνομένη μισεῖν ποιήσει ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιάζειν καὶ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ μετ' ἀλλήλων πράττειν; (*Resp.* 1.351d7-e2)
>
> "You're still doing well on that front. So tell me this: if the work of injustice is to produce hatred wherever it occurs, then, whenever it arises, whether it comes into being among free men or slaves, won't it cause them to hate one another, engage in civil war, and prevent them from achieving any common purpose?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

In this passage injustice comes into being universally ("wherever it is"; ὅπου ἂν ἐνῇ, 1.351d8; "in both free men and slaves"; ἐν ἐλευθέροις τε καὶ δούλοις, 1.351d8-9). Injustice highlights difference by engendering hatred (μῖσος, μισεῖν), factiousness (στασιάζειν), and lack of cooperation (ἀδυνάτους εἶναι κοινῇ, 1.351e1). Injustice is likened to a kind of decay, and when it comes into being, people become worse, making the running of the state that much more difficult. The creation of *stasis* in a state produces people who are unable (ἀδυνάτους εἶναι) to work together. Much like in Aristophanes and Euripides, the end result of becoming is being (ἐγγίγνομαι, ἔνειμι).

Injustice has a property similar to poetry in that it makes (ἐμποιεῖν, ποιεῖν) people feel and do things, such as feeling hatred and forming factions.[196] Socrates elaborates that injustice comes into being (ἐγγίγνομαι), it makes a city or army factious within itself and be an enemy to itself (ἐχθρὸν εἶναι ἑαυτῷ, *Resp.* 1.352a3). Injustice is viewed here as something that comes into being (ἐγγίγνομαι) with an effect that is ultimately deleterious to being (εἰμί).

> Καὶ ἐν ἑνὶ δή, οἶμαι, ἐνοῦσα ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιήσει ἅπερ πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν ποιήσει στασιάζοντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, ἔπειτα ἐχθρὸν καὶ ἑαυτῷ καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις. ἦ γάρ; (*Resp.* 1.352a6-9)

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[196] Thrasymachus claims that the most perfect injustice makes the one who does the injustice happy and makes those who suffer it unhappy. Those who are successful at performing injustice and enslaving their fellow citizens and remain unpunished "are called happy and blessed instead of these terrible names" (ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνομάτων εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται, 1.344b7-c1).

> "And even when it is in a single individual, I suppose, it is disposed by its nature to produce the very same effect. First, it makes him incapable of achieving anything, because he is in a state of civil war and not of one mind. Second, it makes him his own enemy, as well as the enemy of just people. Doesn't it have that effect?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

When injustice comes into being in a person, it does what it naturally does (πέφυκεν ἐργάζεσθαι, 1.352a7). This appeal to nature elides how these changes take place gradually—is the factiousness that is concomitant with injustice "natural" to the body it inhabits when it previously was absent? These transformations occur within the body, much like the changes that actors undergo when they take on a costume. After Socrates' discussion of injustice coming into being in a city and in individual, he refers to injustice "when it is in a single individual" (ἐν ἑνὶ… ἐνοῦσα. 1.352a6). He uses language similar to that we have seen in Aristophanes and Euripides in previous chapters concerning being and identity where being is the end result of transformation (i.e., ἐγγίγνομαι > ἐνειμί). The Greek word Socrates uses for "enemy" (ἐχθρός) suggests an internal enemy or personal rival, not an external or foreign enemy of war (πολέμιος).[197] The end result of a particular behavior (such as the individual's incapacity for action) or attitude (factiousness and discord) follows from the model we have seen in Aristophanes and Euripides where mimetic metamorphosis results in changed behavior or perception. While there is no costume change, and thus no clear, external marker of the beginning stages of mimetic metamorphosis, the transformation at the individual and state level consists of a similar process.

When Glaucon enters the argument at the beginning of Book 2, takes over for Thrasymachus, and asks Socrates to continue the discussion, he makes an important distinction

[197] Cf. Konstan (1997: 12): then noun ἐχθρός ("enemy") is often paired with and contrasted with φίλος ("friend"), whereas a ξένος ("guest-friend," "stranger") is external, akin to πολέμιος ("enemy").

between seeming to persuade and actually persuading, echoing the language of seeming and being present in the discussion of justice:

> Ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἢ ἄδικον; (*Resp*. 2.357a4-b2)
>
> "Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us that it is better in every way to be just than unjust, or do you want to truly to convince us of this?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

This will also become an important distinction for Socrates when he discusses mimetic poetry. The *Republic* is situated around defining a subject, in this case justice, as in many of Plato's early dialogues. Seeming and being continue to crop up in the conversation as the interlocutors attempt to define what justice actually is. The previous definition—that justice helps friends and harms enemies—is seemingly straightforward on the surface, but it, too, is quagmired in issues of seeming and being. Who *is* a friend? How can we know that for certain? Not only does Glaucon's question reiterate the themes of seeming/being already present in the *Republic*, but it also reveals a metatheatrical awareness of the goal of the dialogue itself—can Socrates actually persuade his interlocutors (and Plato his readers), or will he only seem to do that work?[198]

II. Stripping and Separating

Glaucon suggests that in order to get at the root of the problem of appearance and the truth, the reputation of a just man must be stripped away (ἀφαιρετέον) from him. In contrast, the perfectly unjust man will be allowed a great reputation. That way Socrates and his interlocutors

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[198] Blondell claims that "repeating philosophical dialogues may make us more philosophical. The dialogues themselves would then *become* philosophy, in a way that drama rarely, if ever, *becomes* what it represents (e.g. a suicide or an internecine quarrel). A reader or actor speaking lines composed by another is in a certain sense *doing philosophy*, if she rehearses original philosophical views, in so far as she either internalizes of engages with those views." (2002: 27, emphasis in original)

can ascertain whether or not justice is good in itself and makes the just man happier than the perfectly unjust man.

> Δοτέον οὖν τῷ τελέως ἀδίκῳ τὴν τελεωτάτην ἀδικίαν, καὶ οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον ἀλλ' ἐατέον τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικοῦντα τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὐτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα σφάλληταί τι, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δυνατῷ εἶναι, λέγειν τε καὶ βιάσασθαι ὅσα ἂν βίας δέηται, διά τε ἀνδρείαν καὶ ῥώμην καὶ διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας. τοῦτον δὲ τοιοῦτον θέντες τὸν δίκαιον αὖ παρ' αὐτὸν ἱστῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ, ἄνδρα ἁπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον, κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα. Ἀφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν· εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται αὐτῷ τιμαὶ καὶ δωρεαὶ δοκοῦντι τοιούτῳ εἶναι. ἄδηλον οὖν εἴτε τοῦ δικαίου εἴτε τῶν δωρεῶν τε καὶ τιμῶν ἕνεκα τοιοῦτος εἴη. (*Resp*. 2.361a6-c4)[199]
>
> "So our completely unjust person must be given complete injustice. Nothing must be taken away from it. We must allow that, while doing the greatest injustice, the unjust man has nonetheless provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice. If he happens to make a slip, he must be able to put it right. If any of his unjust activities should be discovered, he must be able to speak persuasively and to use as much force is needed, because of his courage and strength and because of the wealth and friends he has provided for himself. Having hypothesized such a person, let's now in our argument put beside him a just man, who is simple and noble and who, as Aeschylus says, doesn't want to be believed to be good but to be so. Seeming must be taken away, for a reputation for justice would bring him honor and rewards, so that it wouldn't be clear whether he is just for the sake of justice itself or for the sake of those honors and rewards." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The notion of stripping suggests a costume or superficial layer that can be taken off to reveal the essential being that lies underneath. Yet, in some instances, as in the case of the unjust man, seeming goes hand-in-hand with being, much like Kinsman's costume, which becomes a marker of him being a "wretch" (πανοῦργος, Ar. *Thesm*. 944). The unjust man's "reputation" (δόξα), a noun derived from the verb δοκεῖν ("to seem"), allows him to commit injustices while avoiding punishment so long as he seems just.[200] Glaucon shows how seeming abets injustice and this

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[199] Glaucon cites Aeschylus *Sept*. 592 here. The reference is to Amphiaraus and his simple shield, in contrast with the rest of the seven, whose shields have varying signs on them.
[200] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) s.v. δοκέω & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. δοκεύω.

passage returns to the parallels of seeming/being and injustice/justice (i.e., seeming : being :: injustice: justice) that Socrates sketches in Book 1.

In addition to hiding his true motivations behind δόξα, the unjust man is also supported with props, such as friends and wealth.[201] The verb παρασκευάζω ("prepare") and noun παρασκευή ("providing," "procurement") are compounds that ultimately derive from the noun σκεῦος ("vessel," "implement") and the denominative verb σκευάζω ("furnish"). At the beginning of Aristophanes' *Frogs* the slave Xanthias uses the noun σκεύη ("baggage") to refer to other comic poets whose baggage-carrying scenes serve as scatological jokes, and we have seen σκευάζω used metatheatrically for costuming in Aristophanes (e.g. Cleisthenes as a eunuch).[202] Glaucon's example allows that the unjust man "has provided himself with the greatest reputation for justice" (τὴν μεγίστην δόξαν αὑτῷ παρεσκευακέναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην, 2.361a7-b1), drawing a parallel not only between injustice and seeming but also to the language of costuming. The noun παρασκευή in the phrase "because of the wealth and friends he has provided for himself" (διὰ παρασκευὴν φίλων καὶ οὐσίας, 2.361b5) recalls the props that characters in Aristophanes and Euripides use in order to behave in character and suggests that the unjust man uses people (φίλοι) as well as and as if they are objects.

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[201] The reason souls are stripped for judgment in the *Gorgias* myth is precisely because of this issue: οἱ κρινόμενοι κρίνονται· ζῶντες γὰρ κρίνονται. πολλοὶ οὖν…ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντας ἠμφιεσμένοι εἰσὶ σώματά τε καλὰ καὶ γένη καὶ πλούτους, καί, ἐπειδὰν ἡ κρίσις ᾖ, ἔρχονται αὐτοῖς πολλοὶ μάρτυρες, μαρτυρήσοντες ὡς δικαίως βεβιώκασιν· οἱ οὖν δικασταὶ ὑπό τε τούτων ἐκπλήττονται, καὶ ἅμα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀμπεχόμενοι δικάζουσι, πρὸ τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς αὑτῶν ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ ὦτα καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα προκεκαλύμμένοι. (Pl. *Gorg.* 523c3-d4, ed. Dodds 1959). Kahn claims that when Socrates moves from dialectic to the myth in *Gorgias* and in *Republic*, "Plato goes beyond the strictly dramatic form of conversation between dialogue partners and uses his privileged persona to speak directly to the audience, as in an Aristophanic parabasis" (1983: 104).

[202] καὶ Λύκις κἀμειψίας / σκεύη φέρουσ' ἑκάστοτ' ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ (Ar. *Ran.* 14f.). "Lycis and Ameipsias carry baggage every time in their comedies, too!" For σκευάζω used in reference to costuming Cleisthenes (Ar. *Ach.* 121), see Ch. 1 (p. 30).

This passage echoes the vocabulary and themes of being and seeming we have seen in Aristophanes and Euripides. The unjust man's reputation (δόξα) as a just man, his seeming just, constitutes his being and acting unjust. Glaucon refers to these hypothetical just and unjust figures with demonstrative pronouns οὗτος ("this") and τοιοῦτος ("such as this," "such a one"), recalling the use of deictics to trace changes wrought by mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes and Euripides. Glaucon sets out to define the perfectly just man in language (τῷ λόγῳ), echoing Socrates' creation of the ideal city "in language" (λόγῳ).[203] This method of definition raises more questions: to whom does "this" (οὗτος) refer when this person is imagined and constructed verbally? Does this person exist? What does it mean to be "this" or "such a" person when you can change your appearance, behavior, and language so as to be another person?

As I have shown in Chapter 2, Dionysus employs deictic pronouns as a way to comment on the metaleptic frame of the drama (referring to the theater as "this Thebes," for example).[204] The problem with definition is akin to that of recognition in the dramas where mimetic metamorphosis takes place. Seeming impedes one's ability to recognize a person—if someone appears to be just, it will be unclear why he is such (τοιοῦτος εἴη, *Resp.* 2.361c4). The precision of the future most vivid construction is contrasted with the subject under discussion (seeming) and the capaciousness of the pronoun τοιοῦτος: "for if he seems to be just, he *will* have honors and

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[203] Ἆρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ γιγνομένην πόλιν θεασαίμεθα λόγῳ, καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτῆς ἴδοιμεν ἂν γιγνομένην καὶ τὴν ἀδικίαν; (Pl. *Resp.* 2.369a6-8) "So," I said, "if we beheld a city coming into being in language, would we also see its justice and injustice come into being?" (trans. Grube, 1997, adapted)

[204] See Ch. 2 (pp. 118f.).

bounties" (εἰ γὰρ δόξει δίκαιος εἶναι, ἔσονται…, 2.361c1-2).[205] What does it mean to be "such a one" when only reputation and appearance are at stake?

Glaucon declares that "seeming must be taken away" ('Αφαιρετέον δὴ τὸ δοκεῖν, 2.361c1) from the just man so that Socrates and the interlocutors can ascertain the goodness of justice divorced from a good reputation. The verbal adjective ἀφαιρετέον appears at the beginning of this passage when Glaucon discusses the perfectly unjust man as well. In that context the unjust man will not be stripped of (οὐκ ἀφαιρετέον, 2.361a7) but allowed to have a reputation (δόξα) that enables him to commit further injustices. The unjust man's behavior and character depends on seeming just, whereas the just man's justice must be tested without seeming. The verb ἀφαιρέω appears over one hundred times in the Platonic corpus but only seven times as a verbal adjective: four times in the *Republic*, three times in the *Statesman*.[206] In addition to the two examples in the above passage, the other two instances of the verbal adjective in the *Republic* appear in the discussion about musical education in Book 3. I am curious about the thematic parallels produced by the repetition of this relatively infrequent verbal adjective in the first critique of mimesis. What similarities of theme and language arise when we view stripping away the reputation of the truly just man and the stripping of music and its various components side by side?

The next use of ἀφαιρετέον occurs when Socrates suggests that the poetic representations of characters, such as Achilles displaying fear of Hades, must be eliminated from the guardians' education.

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[205] Smyth §2328 notes that this kind of protasis (εἰ with fut. ind.) in a future more vivid condition "expresses strong feeling," and the apodosis "conveys a threat, a warning, or an earnest appeal to the feelings."

[206] Pl. *Resp.* 2.361a7, 2.361c1, 3.387c8, & 3.398e3; *Plt.* 291c6, 292d5, & 303c1.

> Οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα ὀνόματα πάντα τὰ δεινά τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποβλητέα, Κωκυτούς τε καὶ Στύγας καὶ ἐνέρους καὶ ἀλίβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτου τοῦ τύπου ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν δὴ ποιεῖ †ὡς οἴεται† πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας; καὶ ἴσως εὖ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι· ἡμεῖς δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβούμεθα, μὴ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν.
> Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, φοβούμεθα.
> Ἀφαιρετέα ἄρα;
> Ναί. (*Resp*. 3.387b8-c8)

> "And the frightening and dreadful names for the underworld must be struck out, for example, 'Cocytus' and 'Styx,' and also the names for the dead, for example, 'those below' and 'the sapless ones,' and all those names of things in the underworld that make everyone who hears them shudder. They may be all well and good for other purposes, but we are afraid that our guardians will be made softer and more malleable by such shudders."
> "And our fear is justified."
> "Then such passages must be struck out?"
> "Yes." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates recognizes that poetry has educational value, but because of that, it must be stripped of problematic content. This follows the general outline of the first critique of poetry, which begins with the misrepresentations of the gods' improprieties and transformations. At this moment in the argument what must be taken away are elements of poems that make men fear.[207] Socrates suggests that names associated with Hades that cause fear should be removed, such as the rivers Cocytus (lit. "wailing") and Styx ("hateful"). This instance of stripping appearance occurs at a very fundamental level of mimesis, referentiality, or saying that "this is that."[208]

The final use of the verbal adjective ἀφαιρετέον in the *Republic* appears in the discussion of the threnodic or mournful musical modes.

> Τίνες οὖν θρηνώδεις ἁρμονίαι; λέγε μοι· σὺ γὰρ μουσικός.
> Μειξολυδιστί, ἔφη, καὶ συντονολυδιστί, καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες.
> Οὐκοῦν αὗται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀφαιρετέαι; ἄχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιζὶν ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσι.
> Πάνυ γε. (*Resp*. 3.398e1-5)

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[207] E.g Achilles proclaiming he would rather be a slave on earth than rule in the Underworld (Hom. *Od*. 11.489-91); the gods' hatred of the Underworld (*Il*. 20.64f.).
[208] Cf. Arist. *Poet*. 4.1448b4-17.

> "What are the lamenting modes, then? You tell me, since you're musical."
> "The mixed Lydian," he said, "the intense Lydian, and some others of that sort."
> "Mustn't these be excluded, then? They're useless even to women who must be good, let alone to men."
> "Certainly." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates contrasts seeming with being when he claims that these musical modes are "useless" (ἄχρηστοι) for women who "must be good" (δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, 3.398e4). The adjective ἄχρηστος is related to the verb χράομαι ("to need," "use"), which suggests a materiality of the thing used, as we can see in the substantive χρῆμα ("thing," "matter").[209] For Socrates, seeming is immaterial ("useless") when contrasted with being. The seeming of a man's reputation must be stripped (ἀφαιρετέον) because it can be superficial and misleading. The content of poetry and even musical modes must be stripped away because they arouse emotions such as fear and sadness. While dismissing reputation, poetry, and musical modes, however, Socrates implies that seeming can be transformative and therefore affect being. Socrates excludes threnodic modes precisely because they inspire lamentations, which is neither helpful for women who "must be good" (δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι) nor men, presumably because they "must be" men. Much like the costume Dicaeopolis wishes to take on and not be affected by, Socrates reveals a paranoid view of poetry's transformative potential while censuring it for its triviality, such as its representation of unserious characters.

In Plato's *Statesman*, the only other dialogue to contain the verbal adjective ἀφαιρετέον, Socrates, Theodorus, and Socrates the Younger attempt to define what a statesman is with the

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[209] χρῆμα and χρηστός may derive from χράομαι (Frisk notes on this etymology: "Entscheidung nicht immer möglich"), but they all ultimately derive from the noun χρή. Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. χρή.

Eleatic Stranger. The Stranger states that the act of stripping away extraneous and deceitful figures such as sophists leads to clearer insight.

> ΞΕ. Τὸν πάντων τῶν σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόητα καὶ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειρότατον· ὃν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καίπερ παγχάλεπον ὄντα ἀφαιρεῖν ἀφαιρετέον, εἰ μέλλομεν ἱδεῖν ἐναργῶς τὸ ζητούμενον. (*Plt.* 291c3-6)[210]
>
> Stranger: "[sc. I saw] the greatest wizard of all the sophists, and the most experienced in this craft. Although it is very difficult to remove him from those who really are in possession of the art of statesmanship and kingship, he must be removed if we are going to see clearly what we are looking for." (trans. Rowe 1997, adapted)

The *Statesman* was most likely composed after the *Republic*, but it is interesting it picks up on several vocabulary items that appear in the earlier dialogue, especially in its discussion of poetry. The Stranger calls the sophist who busies himself with a city's affairs a "wizard" (γόης), which is the same word used by Socrates in the *Republic* to describe a god who is misrepresented as a "wizard" (γόης, 2.380d1) who changes his shape at will and deceives mortals. In Book 10, Socrates states that people who believe the outlandish claims of craftsmen who claim to produce anything "have encountered and been deceived by some wizard or mimetic artist" (ἐντυχὼν γόητί τινι καὶ μιμητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, 10.598d3-4).

The Stranger states that the sophist "must be removed" (ἀφαιρετέον) from men with better characteristics for ruling the state. On the political level as well as the musical, bewitchment, deception, and seeming must be removed. The Stranger emphasizes being with the figure of polyptoton, repeating two different endings of the same verb, with the adverb ὄντως ("really") and participial form of εἰμί (ὄντων) (ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν, *Plt.* 291c4-5). This figure is also used with the verb ἀφαιρέω: "although it is very difficult to remove him, he must be removed" (καίπερ παγχάλεπον ὄντα ἀφαιρεῖν ἀφαιρετέον, 291c5-6).

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[210] Text from Duke et al.'s OCT *Platonis Opera* (1995).

Slightly later in *Statesman*, the Stranger suggests that men who pretend to be statesmanlike must be removed (ἀφαιρετέον) from their inquiry in order to discover the science of government.

> ΞΕ. Ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὴ νῦν τοῦτο οὕτω σκεπτέον, ἐν τίνι ποτὲ τούτων ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι περὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς, σχεδὸν τῆς χαλεπωτάτης καὶ μεγίστης κτήσασθαι. δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν αὐτήν, ἵνα θεασώμεθα τίνας ἀφαιρετέον ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου βασιλέως, οἳ προσποιοῦνται μὲν εἶναι πολιτικοὶ καὶ πείθουσι πολλούς, εἰσὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς. (*Plt.* 292d1-7)
>
> Stranger: "Out of necessity, then, we must now consider in which of these types of rule the expert knowledge about ruling people happens to come into being. It being practically the most difficult and the most important knowledge to acquire. For we must catch sight of it in order to see who must be removed from the wise king—those who pretend to be statesmanlike and persuade many people, but in fact are not statesmanlike at all." (trans. Rowe 1997, adapted)

In these passages, separating (ἀφαιρετέον) men who pretend to be statesmanlike from the genuine article allows the Stranger and his interlocutors to see or understand their subject more clearly. Visual language forms the metaphor where vision equates to knowledge and understanding of political science (σκέπτειν, ἰδεῖν, θεᾶσθαι). The verb θεάομαι ("behold," "view as a spectator") has a theatrical as well as ritual register, referring to the spectator's gaze in the theater.[211]

The men whose seeming to be statesmanlike must be stripped away become the object of the Stranger's and his interlocutors' gaze: "in order to see who must be removed from the wise king" (ἵνα θεασώμεθα τίνας ἀφαιρετέον ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονίμου βασιλέως, *Plt.* 292d5-6). These men pretend (προσποιέω) to be statesmanlike, but this is only an appearance, as "they are not statesmanlike at all" (εἰσὶ δὲ οὐδαμῶς, 292d7).[212] This pretense, or seeming, is contrasted with being—it must be stripped away, like a costume, in order to get at the truth. In *Statesman* the men

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[211] The Athenian spectator of festival rituals such as the Dionysia was called θεατής, which is to be distinguished from a spectator who made a pilgrimage to view the spectacle (θεωρός) (Nightingale 2004: 49-52).

[212] The verb προσποιέω ("pretend") is also used to compare would-be politicians to sophists in Plato's *Gorgias*. Socrates says that politicians and sophists act similarly: κινδυνεύει γὰρ ταὐτὸν εἶναι, ὅσοι τε πολιτικοὶ προσποιοῦνται εἶναι καὶ ὅσοι σοφισταί (Pl. *Gorg.* 519c2-3).

who seem to be statesmen succeed in persuading many (πείθουσι πολλούς, 292d7), but they are not actually statesmen. After the discussion with Thrasymachus, Glaucon claims that Socrates seems to persuade, but does not actually (πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι, *Resp*. 2.357a5-b1).

The verbal adjective ἀφαιρετέον, used as a formula for excluding a particular topic from discussion or a kind of person from philosophical inquiry into politics, may at first seem mundane, but it has a close relationship to the themes of seeming/being and to mimesis in Plato's *Republic*. Even with the discussion of musical modes, the removal of the mixed and intense Lydian modes is a way to remove seeming, in this sense a song seeming to be mournful, from *mousikē*. Stripping music of meters and modes and separating men who are not what they claim to be serves as a kind of sartorial metaphor for appearance. Without the operation of stripping, it is unclear how one can distinguish between seeming being. In each of these instances of ἀφαιρετέον, one can gain intellectual clarity by taking away seeming.

III. Seeming and Being

After Glaucon suggests that a good reputation must be stripped away from the just man, he quickly defends himself for making this argument and distances himself from it. He does not speak for himself, he says, but rather for those who praise injustice.

> λεκτέον οὖν · καὶ δὴ κἂν ἀγροικοτέρως λέγηται, μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας πρὸ δικαιοσύνης ἀδικίαν. (*Resp*. 2.361e1-3)
>
> "So it [i.e. an account of the just and unjust man's life] must be said. And if it is said boorishly, Socrates, don't think that I am speaking, but those who praise injustice at the expense of justice." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

In this passage the verb for speaking, λέγω, appears three times in quick succession. The first two instances are passive, distancing Glaucon from what he has just said: the argument "must be said" (λεκτέον) even if "it is said" (λέγηται) in a boorish way. Only the third instance of the verb

λέγω is in the active voice, but Glaucon's speech is still at one remove, as it appears in indirect statement: "don't think that I am speaking" (μὴ ἐμὲ οἴου λέγειν, 2.361e1-2).

Glaucon has been speaking throughout this section of the dialogue, but he goes to great lengths to distance himself from the speech act and its content. In the first two instances, there is no agent, as both verbs are in the passive voice. By claiming that he did not speak previously, Glaucon implies that he was not himself, but those who praise injustice (τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας… ἀδικίαν, 2.361e2-3). In this moment of mimesis, Glaucon does not speak on behalf of those who praise injustice but *as* one of them. He has taken on a dramatic role. This serves as a metatheatrical moment in the dialogue: Glaucon discusses the difficulty in parsing seeming and being at the level of the plot, and then explains to Socrates that he only seems to praise injustice. When Glaucon asks Socrates "don't think that I am speaking," he reminds the reader that Plato, the author of the dialogue, has taken on a kind of mask through his characters. The dramatic form of Plato's dialogues means that "none of the character's voices can be identified in any direct sense with that of the author" (Blondell 2002: 18).[213]

Glaucon returns to the Aeschylus passage he quoted earlier in order to revise it for the argument.[214] According to Glaucon, the proverb is truer of the unjust man than Aeschylus' just man.

> τὸ δὲ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου πολὺ ἦν ἄρα ὀρθότερον λέγειν κατὰ τοῦ ἀδίκου. τῷ ὄντι γὰρ φήσουσι τὸν ἄδικον, ἅτε ἐπιτηδεύοντα πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον καὶ οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν… (*Resp*. 2.362a2-6)

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[213] For the dramatic form of Plato's dialogues and how that affects the representation of particular characters, cf. Blondell 2002 (especially ch. 1). Murray argues that the prefatory words to the mimesis discussion (ὥσπερ ἐν μύθῳ μυθολογοῦντες, 2.376d) "draw attention to its own status as a kind of *mūthos*, warning us, perhaps that what follows should not be taken entirely literally in all its details" (1992: 39).

[214] κατ' Αἰσχύλον οὐ δοκεῖν ἀλλ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἐθέλοντα (Pl. *Resp*. 2.361b7-9).

> "Indeed, Aeschylus' words are far more correctly applied to unjust people than to just ones, for in reality they will say that an unjust person, having a way of life based on the truth about things and not living in accordance with opinion, doesn't wish to seem unjust but to be so." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

In order to be successful at committing injustice, the unjust man "doesn't wish to seem unjust but to be so" (οὐ δοκεῖν ἄδικον ἀλλ' εἶναι ἐθέλειν, 2.362a2). What does it mean that the unjust man does not concern himself with reputation (οὐ πρὸς δόξαν ζῶντα, 2.362a5) if he does not wish to seem unjust?

In order to be unjust, the truly unjust man must wish to (and also actually) commit injustices. The unjust man's desire to seem different from himself is paradoxically a marker of his being unjust. His pursuit is "based on the truth about things" (πρᾶγμα ἀληθείας ἐχόμενον, 2.362a5) because it is unjust and therefore true to his character. The very being and behavior of an unjust man depends on seeming other than he is—just. He must escape notice (λανθάνειν) as an unjust man in order to be truly (ἀ-ληθής) unjust. Glaucon shows that what will later appear to be the aesthetic and educational problem of mimesis are firmly rooted in the dialogue's question of justice. The just man wishes to be (εἶναι) just and does not give any consideration to seeming or reputation. While the unjust man wishes to be (εἶναι) unjust, he also wishes not to seem (οὐ δοκεῖν) unjust. Although the unjust man does not strive for a reputation (δόξα) of injustice, his being still depends on seeming just because he must seem to be just in order to succeed at committing injustices.

When Adeimantus intervenes in the argument, he asks Socrates to show what justice and injustice do to those who practice them. Curiously, justice is opposed not only to injustice but to seeming.

> μὴ οὖν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐνδείξῃ τῷ λόγῳ ὅτι δικαιοσύνη ἀδικίας κρεῖττον, ἀλλὰ τί ποιοῦσα ἑκατέρα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴ δι' αὑτὴν ἡ μὲν κακόν, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν · τὰς δὲ δόξας ἀφαίρει, ὥσπερ Γλαύκων διεκελεύσατο. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις

> ἑκατέρωθεν τὰς ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι φέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, συμφέρον τοῦ κρείττονος, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον αὑτῷ μὲν συμφέρον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι ἀσύμφορον. (*Resp*. 2.367b3-c5)
>
> "So don't merely give us a theoretical argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but tell us what each itself does, because of its own powers, to someone who possesses it, that makes injustice bad and justice good. Follow Glaucon's advice, and don't take reputations into account, for if you don't deprive justice and injustice of their true reputations and attach false ones to them, we'll say that you are not praising them but their reputations and that you're encouraging him to be unjust in secret. In that case, we'll say that you agree with Thrasymachus that justice is the good of another, the advantage of the stronger, while injustice is one's own advantage and profit, though not the advantage of the weaker." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

For Adeimantus justice is opposed to seeming, not injustice. He states that if Socrates continues to appraise justice with men's reputations intact, Socrates will praise seeming (τὸ δοκεῖν) instead of justice (τὸ δίκαιον). These may be opposed, but there is present wordplay that evinces the very slipperiness of seeming under discussion—the pun on the similarity of the sound of seeming (τὸ δοκεῖν) and justice (τὸ δίκαιον).[215] The pun gets at the heart of the problem of seeming, as the two words sound alike, glossing their possible differences with their seeming similarity. Both neuter substantives are formed with the article and composed of the same consonants and similar vowel sounds. These nouns are the same gender, case, and number (neuter accusative singular) and occupy a similar position in the sentence as the object of ἐπαινεῖν and the syntax of the sentence draws the parallel between the two even while contrasting them: "You will praise this, not that."

If Socrates fails to censure injustice and continues to criticize seeming unjust, Adeimantus claims that Socrates will exhort the unjust man not to be just but to escape notice (παρακελεύεσθαι ἄδικον ὄντα λανθάνειν, 2.367c2). Seeming does not only take on the role of

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[215] Cf. Ar. *Ach*. τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον οἶδε καὶ τρυγῳδία (*Ach*. 500).

mere appearance and disguise in the *Republic*, it is also associated with being. We see here a confluence of ideas, namely that seeming opposes knowledge of the truth (especially about justice) and that seeming is also a form of being (ὄν) that escapes notice. In Book 10 Socrates claims that mimetic art is furthest removed from knowledge and being after the creations of a god and a craftsman: "'Well, then,' I said. 'Are you calling the one who is the third generation from nature 'imitator'?'" (Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ · τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; *Resp*. 10.597e3-4). The move in Book 10 to deny being to mimesis contrasts the fact that seeming has substance to it here. Socrates struggles with the tension between the fact that mimesis both is and is not simultaneously. Despite that conflict, seeming is also on the side of falsehood—the verb λανθάνειν ("to escape notice") makes up the root of the word ἀλήθεια, which can be translated as "truth" or "that which escapes notice" (ἀ-λήθεια).

In addition to the conflict between seeming and being, Socrates' critique of mimesis rests on his argument that the ideal city must divide individuals and their work into specialties. This claim looks forward to arguments both for the planned economy (e.g., in Book 5) as well as against mimesis because it suggests that there can be no becoming or transformation.

> Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὰ Δία ἄτοπον. ἐννοῶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτός, εἰπόντος σοῦ, ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἡμῶν φύεται ἕκαστος οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλὰ διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλος ἐπ' ἄλλου ἔργου πρᾶξειν. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; (*Resp*. 2.370a7-b3)
>
> "That certainly wouldn't be surprising, for, even as you were speaking it occurred to me that, in the first place, we aren't all born alike, but each of us differs somewhat in nature from the others, one being suited to one task, another to another. Or don't you think so?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates bases this argument on the idea that no individual is like (οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, 2.370b1-2) another because they differ in nature (διαφέρων τὴν φύσιν, 2.370b2). This is interesting considering his later critique of mimesis—is it impossible to be (or become) like anyone at all? Socrates proposes a theory of difference here, inscribed at the individual level,

where one naturally differs from others. By relying on "nature" to support this claim (φύεται, φύσις), he borrows from the vocabulary of intellectuals of the fifth century debating the distinction between *nomos* and *physis*.

Socrates lays out the basics of a young man's education in the ideal state, which consists of *mousikē* (musical) and *gymnastikē* (gymnastic). In response to Adeimantus' question about theological models, Socrates provides the correct model for how poets ought to describe gods.

> Ὀρθῶς, ἔφη · ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας τίνες ἂν εἶεν;
> Τοιοίδε πού τινες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ · οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, ἀεὶ δήπου ἀποδοτέον, ἐάντε τις αὐτὸν ἐν ἔπεσιν ποιῇ ἐάντε ἐν μέλεσιν ἐάντε ἐν τραγῳδίᾳ.
> Δεῖ γάρ.
> Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω; (*Resp.* 2.379a5-b1)
>
> "All right. But what precisely are the patterns for theology or stories about the gods?"
> "Something like this: whether in epic, lyric, or tragedy, a god must always be represented as he is."
> "Indeed, he must."
> "Now, a god is really good, isn't he, and must be described as such?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Divine being is emphasized here with the participial ὤν as well as the stock phrase τῷ ὄντι ("really").[216] In this first prescribed model for musical education, Socrates modifies poetic content in regard to how mimetic poetry represents being. He allows only that poetry which depicts "as he is" (οἷος τυγχάνει ὁ θεὸς ὤν, 2.379a7), as "really good" (ἀγθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι, 2.379b1). By this standard, Socrates argues that Homer must be rejected because he makes mistakes (ἁμαρτάνω, αὕτη ἡ ἁμαρτία) in representing the gods.[217]

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[216] The verb τυγχάνω with the supplemental participle ὤν, as above, simply means "to be" (εἰμί). Cf. LSJ s.v. τυγχάνω A.II.1.

[217] E.g., when Achilles claims Zeus mixes jars of good and evil fates in the *Iliad* (*Resp.* 2.379c2-d4).

As for the second model, after the poets have described how the gods really are, poets must not represent gods changing shape. Much like the citizens of Kallipolis, each of whom is similar to no one (οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, 2.370b1-2), the gods must be unchanging and unique.

> Τί δὲ δὴ ὁ δεύτερος ὅδε; ἆρα γόητα τὸν θεὸν οἴει εἶναι καὶ οἷον ἐξ ἐπιβουλῆς φαντάζεσθαι ἄλλοτε ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸν γιγνόμενον, [καὶ] ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὑτοῦ εἶδος εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, ἢ ἁπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν; (*Resp*. 2.380d1-6)
>
> "What about this second model? Do you think that a god is a sorcerer, able to appear in different forms at different times, sometimes changing himself from his own form into many shapes, sometimes deceiving us by making us think that he has done it? Or do you think he's simple and least of all likely to step out of his own form?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates' critique of the representation of gods transforming into other things echoes the themes and language of the prologue in Euripides' *Bacchae*. The collocation of ἀλλάσσω and τὸ εἶδος does not appear elsewhere before the *Republic* except for that passage, which is concerned with divine transformation into mortal forms, just as Socrates is here.[218]

> ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω
> μορφήν τ' ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. (Eur. *Bacch*. 53f.)
>
> For this reason, I have a mortal form and have changed my shape into the nature of a man.

In the passage above, Socrates contrasts "being simple" (ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, 2.380d5) with appearance (φαντάζεσθαι). Seeming is on the side of deceit (ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὑτοῦ τοιαῦτα δοκεῖν, 2.380d4-5), not the truth. So shapes and forms (εἶδος, μορφαί, ἰδέαι) must not alter if they are to be on the side of being and not becoming (change, instability, deceit, etc.). Socrates criticizes poetry that depicts gods changing shape because they are already perfect. Any

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[218] Socrates also uses the noun εἶδος to categorize different forms of stories (λόγων δὲ διττὸν εἶδος, 2.376e10); cf. Gill on true and false stories in Plato (1993).

derivation from their being would require that gods become worse. In response to Euripides, Socrates might ask, "Why would Dionysus take on the form of a man at all?"

The essential identity of a stable being must be singular (ἁπλοῦν εἶναι, 2.380d5), so becoming is problematic for being because it is plural. Socrates criticizes poetry not only because it depicts gods changing shape but also because they change into many different shapes ("in other forms"; ἐν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις, 2.380d2; "into many shapes"; εἰς πολλὰς μορφάς, 2.380d3-4).[219] To be more than one thing, to become different from oneself, to seem to be different than what one is—these ideas are apparently at odds with the founding principles of a just city where individuals are unique. One way human beings differ from gods is that they can change. The guardians, for example, are meant to change over time through the educational program that Socrates proposes in the *Republic*. Even when Socrates suggests that the singular is preferable to the plural, that being is preferable to seeming and becoming, the dialogue form "by definition involves more than one character, *forces* human plurality and differences on our attention" (Blondell 2002: 49, emphasis in original).

In the *Bacchae*, Euripides invokes the dichotomy of *nomos* and *physis*. How is it that Dionysus can change into the *physis* of a human being? This noun is notably absent in Plato's allusion to Euripides' prologue. Socrates does not claim that gods change their nature or that they transform into different natures, because being and nature must be stable. Socrates translates the language of motion Dionysus uses to discuss both his epiphany in Thebes and his transformation into one of stillness. Gods should not "depart" (or "step out," ἐκβαίνειν) from their form; they

[219] A little later, Socrates takes issue not only with the fact that myths represent gods as changing shape but also that gods take on a plurality of forms ("resembling many different strangers"; πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, 2.381e4).

must remain the same forever. This contrasts with Dionysus, who comes (ἥκω, Eur. *Bacch.* 1) to Thebes in his present, mortal form, and leaves his divine form behind (ἐκ θεοῦ…πάρειμι, 4-5).

Socrates opposes the transformation of gods on educational grounds because myths that represent gods changing shape have a deleterious effect on young children. He claims that mothers must not tell these kinds of stories because it makes children more cowardly.

> μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες τὰ παιδία ἐκδειματούντων, λέγουσαι τοὺς μύθους κακῶς, ὡς ἄρα θεοί τινες περιέρχονται νύκτωρ πολλοῖς ξένοις καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἰνδαλλόμενοι, ἵνα μὴ ἅμα μὲν εἰς θεοὺς βλασφημῶσιν, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς παῖδας ἀπεργάζωνται δειλοτέρους. (*Resp.* 2.381e1-6)
>
> "Do not let mothers be persuaded by these poets nor terrify their children by telling bad stories about the gods wandering at night in the shapes of strangers from foreign lands. Such stories blaspheme the gods and, at the same time, make children more cowardly." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

We can see at work here the pride of place poetry takes in classical Greece. The difficulty for Socrates in the *Republic* is that he seeks to remove poetry from its traditional place in education and replace it with philosophy in its place.[220] Socrates and the founders of the city must change mothers' views of poetry: "do not let mothers be persuaded by these poets" (μηδ' αὖ ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναπειθόμεναι αἱ μητέρες, 2.381e1-2). The verb ἀναπείθω recalls Glaucon asking Socrates if he wishes to actually persuade his interlocutors at the beginning of Book 2 (πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι ἢ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι, 2.357a5-b1). The fact that Plato's *Republic* is dramatic in form, and therefore mimetic, raises uncertainty about whether a reader will be truly persuaded, or if the dialogue only stages Socrates persuading the other characters of the drama.

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[220] Cf. Blondell on competition between Plato and poetry: "…by adopting 'dramatic' form, Plato is setting himself up as a direct rival to Homer and the dramatists in the provision of ethically influential characters as models for emulation" (2002: 84). For the view that the "ancient quarrel" between philosophy and poetry is Plato's invention, see Most 2011: 1-20; Nightingale 1995: 60-67; Havelock 1963: 3-19.

Socrates makes use of a metaphor from visual art to describe the effects stories have on children. The verb ἀπεργάζομαι ("finish off," "complete," "make") is used for finishing work and also completing or filling out a painting. Socrates recognizes that mimesis possesses a transformative power, albeit a negative one, when he claims that these stories can change Kallipolis' youth for the worse. In this passage Socrates critiques poetry not only for its content in representing becoming but also for its effect on the audience. In Book 10 Socrates uses the same verb to make a different point about mimesis.

> ἀλλ' οἴει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἅτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μιμεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἑταίρους ἐποιήσατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἠγαπᾶτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν… (*Resp.* 10.600c3-7)
>
> "But, Glaucon, if Homer had really been able to educate people and make them better, if he'd known about these things and not merely about how to imitate them, wouldn't he have had many companions and been loved and honored by them?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Here Socrates challenges inherited wisdom that poetry can make (ἀπεργάζεσθαι) anyone better, denying the possibility of mimetic metamorphosis, or at least metamorphosis with a positive effect. We have seen this belief that poets are educators in virtue and can better their audiences in Aristophanes' *Frogs* when Euripides and Aeschylus argue about who had the better effect on the Athenian audience.[221]

While Socrates deems mimetic poetry as it is currently practiced a bad influence that does not portray the truth, he is ambivalent about lying itself as a pedagogical practice. He claims that it is possible and useful to liken a lie to the truth about matters beyond one's knowledge.

> καὶ ἐν αἷς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ταῖς μυθολογίαις, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι ὅπῃ τἀληθὲς ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιοῦμεν; (*Resp.* 2.382d1-4)

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[221] Ar. *Ran.* 1009-12. See Ch. 1 (pp. 89f.).

> "It is also useful in the case of those stories we were just talking about, the ones we tell because we don't know the truth about those ancient events. By making a falsehood as much like the truth as is possible, don't we also make it useful?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

It is a curious idea to liken a lie about something that is unknowable to the truth.[222] Much like Pandora, created "like a shamefaced maiden" (παρθένῳ αἰδοίῃ ἴκελον, Hes. *Theog*. 572, *Op*. 71) while simultaneously being the first mortal woman, Socrates suggests an interesting impossibility of mimetic representation that differs from the models Socrates has laid out for *mythoi*.[223] Previously, Socrates claims that individuals in Kallipolis are different from one another (lit. "not like," οὐ πάνυ ὅμοιος ἑκάστῳ, 2.370b1-2). In this passage, Socrates takes it upon himself and the founders of the ideal city "to liken a lie to the truth," yet how does one liken anything to something without a model? When is the act of making like appropriate? With no knowledge of the past, the historical truth becomes difficult to grasp and articulate. Socrates and his interlocutors aim towards a moral truth when they liken a falsehood to the truth, and the project of the dialogue itself mirrors this difficulty. Just as Plato stages the characters and the discussion of the *Republic*, Socrates establishes the exempla of the ideal city and the guardians. Both are like the truth in that they are useful as a mode of philosophical education, but they are both likenesses, mimetic representations, of that which they purport to be true.[224]

In Book 10 we have a different view of likening and its relationship to the truth. Socrates asks Adeimantus whether mimetic art imitates the works of the craftsman or the pure being of the Form.

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[222] Cf. Gill: in the *Republic* Plato innovates in his use of notions of falsehood and deceptiveness in regards to poetry. Gills claims that this is not in an attempt to define fiction, however (1993: 42).
[223] Cf. Loraux's reading of Pandora in Hesiod (1993: 82); Vernant (2011: 412).
[224] On mimetic pedagogy and character in Platonic dialogues, see Blondell (2002: 84).

> εἰπὲ δέ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα;
> Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη.…
> Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἡ γραφικὴ πεποίηται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις;
> Φαντάσματος, ἔφη. (10.598a1-b5)
>
> "Now, tell me this about a painter. Do you think he tries in each case to imitate the thing itself in nature or the works of craftsmen?"
> "The works of craftsmen."…
> "Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of an appearance or of truth?"
> "Of appearances." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

This passage establishes that mimetic art, specifically painting, imitates the work of the craftsmen rather than "the thing itself in nature" (ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει, 10.598a2). When Socrates suggests replacing traditional *mythoi* "by making a falsehood as much like the truth as possible" (ἀφομοιοῦντες τῷ ἀληθεῖ τὸ ψεῦδος ὅτι μάλιστα, 2.382d3), he puts the lie in a position similar to the craftsman's work, at one remove from the Form.[225] Yet, any likeness, especially one told in a narrative form as a *mythos*, must be mimetic in some form.

This passage returns to the theme of seeming and being at the heart of the *Republic*. Socrates phrases his question to Adeimantus about mimesis with the phrase δοκεῖ σοι ("does it seem to you," 10.598a3), which we have seen previously in the dialogue. That mimesis cannot reproduce or imitate *physis* is significant, too. As in Plato's allusion to Euripides' *Bacchae*, *physis* is seen as something that is inimitable. Socrates then asks how mimesis relates to being (πρὸς τὸ ὄν, 10.598b2) and seeming more directly (πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, 10.598b3), going so far as to repeat, in parentheses and with slight variation, the terms of the dichotomy ("as it is"' ὡς ἔχει, 10.598b2; "as it appears"; ὡς φαίνεται, 10.598b3). Curiously, in the same sentence in which a negative

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[225] On distinction between lies and the truth in Plato, see Gill (1993).

answer is expected to the question "does painting imitate being?" the participle οὖσα ("being") agrees with the noun μίμησις. To ask whether painting "is (being) an imitation of an appearance or of truth" (φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὖσα μίμησις; 10.598b3-4) is to grant some substance to mimesis that the dialogue would otherwise refuse.

One prescription for poetry that Socrates suggests in the first critique of mimesis in Books 2 and 3 is the end goal that the guardians will be unafraid of death. Socrates tells Adeimantus, "We surely say that a decent man doesn't think that death is a terrible thing for someone decent to suffer—even for someone who happens to be his friend" (φαμὲν δὲ δὴ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, οὗπερ καὶ ἑταῖρός ἐστιν, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται, 3.387d4-6, trans. Grube 1997). For Socrates, poetry is helpful for instilling belief (ἡγέομαι) in an individual because it can fashion a lie that convinces its audience.

> ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα παραιτησόμεθα Ὅμηρόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς μὴ χαλεπαίνειν ἂν διαγράφωμεν, οὐχ ὡς οὐ ποιητικὰ καὶ ἡδέα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκούειν, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ποιητικώτερα, τοσούτῳ ἧττον ἀκουστέον παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, δουλείαν θανάτου μᾶλλον πεφοβημένους. (*Resp.* 3.387b1-6)
>
> "We'll ask Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we delete these passages and all similar ones. It isn't that they aren't poetic and pleasing to the majority of hearers but that, the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men who are supposed to be free and to fear slavery more than death." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

By stating that the guardians must be free (οὓς δεῖ ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, 3.387b5), Socrates implies that they are vulnerable to poetry and can become slaves through listening to poetry. The use of the impersonal verb δεῖ ("must") and the infinitive εἶναι ("to be") in discussion of mimesis is similar to Dicaeopolis' insistence about his identity in the *Acharnians*: "For I have to seem to be a beggar today, and not to appear to be who I really am" (δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον, εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή · Ar. *Ach.* 440f.). In addition to the similar vocabulary and

themes, both of these passages express a belief (and also desire) that being is stable. For Dicaeopolis, he must remain himself no matter what he appears to be; for Socrates, the guardians must be free and therefore cannot listen to poetry. Yet both of these statements reveal a kind of paranoia that being is unstable. Dicaeopolis seems aware, or at least afraid of the possibility, that he can become more Telephus-like after pretending to be him. Socrates, too, recognizes that the guardians may become more servile, more fearful of death by listening to poetry depicting Hades in a frightening way. In his prescription of poetic content, Socrates reveals an awareness of mimetic metamorphosis.

In addition to passages that go against instilling a lack of fear of death, poets must also excise names of Hades (e.g. Cocytus, lit. "River of Wailing"; Styx, lit. "River of Hatred") because they evoke shivers. Socrates claims that the physical effect of shivering will ultimately change the guardians' character.[226] In Socrates' view, not only can the poetic representations of characters, settings, and events transform the audience, but the names of those things can affect the audience as well. Because of the affective qualities of language (δεινά, φοβερά), the names of things (ὀνόματα, ὀνομαζόμενα) can produce physical effects such as shivering (φρίττειν, φρίκη) in audience.[227] Socrates fears that the emotional and physical effects of poetry will ultimately affect the guardians' character and change them, that they will become warmer and softer than the founders of Kallipolis require (θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένωνται ἡμῖν, 3.387c5-6).[228]

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[226] See discussion of *Resp*. 3.387b8-c6 above (pp. 175f.).

[227] Grethlein reads *Resp*. 2-3 through a cognitivist lens, and argues against notions of realism and tragedy, claiming instead that language and affect are experienced physically (2020: 157-69). For the classical view that language has affective qualities and can arouse emotions, see Gorg. *Hel.* (DK 82 B11.8-9). Cf. Segal 1962.

[228] Warmth and softness are often signs of (or environmental factors in) foreignness and effeminacy in ethnographic accounts, e.g. Hippoc. *Aer*. 12.

In addition to the passages and names that present the risk terrifying the guardians, the messengers of these ideas are important. Socrates casts speech appropriate to each character, for example lamentations to unserious women (and men). The guardians' education will transform them into citizens who will be unable to stand such behavior, now uncharacteristic of themselves, because mimesis affects their behavior and beliefs.

> Ὀρθῶς ἄρ' ἂν ἐξαιροῖμεν τοὺς θρήνους τῶν ὀνομαστῶν ἀνδρῶν, γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις, καὶ ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἵνα ἡμῖν δυσχεραίνωσιν ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν οὓς δή φαμεν ἐπὶ φυλακῇ τῆς χώρας τρέφειν. (*Resp*. 3.387e10-388a3)
>
> "We'd be right, then, to delete the lamentations of famous men, leaving them to women (and not even to good women, either) and to cowardly men, so that those we say we are training to guard our city will disdain to act like that." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates employs deictics and other pronouns to discuss dramatic roles and mimetic metamorphosis much like Dionysus in Euripides' *Bacchae*. The discussion of casting cowardly men into roles that do not fit the guardians uses the ὅσος construction in the phrase ὅσοι κακοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν (3.388a1), which recalls Dionysus' "however many women there were" (ὅσαι / γυναῖκες ἦσαν, *Bacch*. 35f.).[229] As in that passage, Socrates' comment discusses the mechanics of theater beyond the frame of the dialogue: Dionysus speaks at the level of the plot and at a metatheatrical level about costuming the women of Thebes as bacchants (and the men of Athens as women); Socrates casts and excludes dramatic characters based on the (negative) transformative effect they have on the guardians both as audience and actors. Socrates hopes that the negative exemplum will affect the guardians' behavior in a positive way, that they disdain

[229] See Ch. 2 (pp. 120f.).

"doing things like these men" (ὅμοια τούτοις ποιεῖν, 3.388a2).[230] The guardians feel disgust because of the representations, the likenesses (ὅμοια), of actions that are committed by wicked men.[231] Socrates prescribes that poetry should not represent men (nor serious women) lamenting, unless they are wicked. He is not only concerned with the content of mimesis, however. Instead, Socrates' concern centers on the outcome of an affective education where guardians learn through mimesis how to feel towards characters both like and unlike them. This discussion moves from the characteristics of a particular dramatic role to the behavior effected by mimetic metamorphosis. Socrates hopes to achieve inculcating in the guardians a sense of disdain for the actions of "these" (οὗτοι) inferior and unserious characters.[232]

Socrates claims that serious women (σπουδαίαι) should not be represented lamenting or singing dirges, and we can infer that neither should serious or "reputable" (ὀνομαστοί) men. This passage leaves open the possibility that serious, noble characters can be represented in the ideal state. While the concern for much of Books 2-3 is the truth-value of poetic content and its use in education, the affective dimension of poetry underlies this passage as well. Socrates' concern centers on the outcome of an affective education where guardians learn through mimesis how to

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[230] Socrates' concern for poetry as a medium that conveys falsehoods is momentarily forgotten in favor of the more pressing matter of transformation. Lear notes that mimesis has a dual nature for Plato in the *Republic*: "What exactly is it about poetry that Plato considers to be so dangerous, the fact that it can involve impersonation or its status as an appearance?" (2011: 195). Cf. Murray, who notes that *Republic* reveals an ambivalence about mimesis' usefulness, namely "the view that mimesis is beneficial provided that its object is suitable, and the feeling that there is something potentially harmful about mimesis in itself" (1996: 5).

[231] Goldhill writes on rivalrous emotions such as envy, spite, and jealousy as part of a "politics of feeling" (2003: 166). Tragedy often uses envy and jealousy "within the rhetoric of explanation," but these emotions rarely appear in tragedy and seldom motivate the plot (169). While Goldhill does not discuss disgust, it seems to me to be another negatively-charged, rivalrous emotion.

[232] In particular, as here, women. Murray argues that Plato's attack on poetry is related to his exclusion of the feminine (2011: 175). Plato is suspicious of dramatic impersonation partly because men play women.

feel towards characters who are both like and unlike them. It is important to nurture the guardians' disdain for wicked behavior because if the young do not laugh at these characters' speeches as unworthy, they will think the behavior is acceptable for them to perform (3.388d).[233] Socrates' prescription aims at the end result of mimetic metamorphosis—behavioral and identity change. Although female and servile characters should be laughable, to encourage an emotional distance from these characters, Socrates discourages an excess of laughter, reasoning that "the youth must not be lovers of laughter" (Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ φιλογέλωτάς γε δεῖ εἶναι, *Resp.* 3.388e4) because when one laughs, one seeks a change (μεταβολή). Change threatens the stability Socrates and the city's founders require in the guardians.

IV. Speaking as If

Socrates finishes his examination of poetry's content and moves to style (λέξις), which is defined as what must be said (ἃ λεκτέον) and how it must be said (ὡς λεκτέον) (3.392c).[234] Socrates categorizes poetry into three poetic styles—narrative (διήγησις), mimesis (μίμησις), and mixed—and revises the the quarrel of Chryses and Agamemnon at beginning of the *Iliad* into a pure narrative style with no impersonation.

> λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐδὲ ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄλλοσε τρέπειν ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πειρᾶται ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα ποιῆσαι μὴ Ὅμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερέα, πρεσβύτην ὄντα. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὴ πᾶσαν σχεδόν τι οὕτω πεποίηται διήγησιν περί τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ καὶ ὅλῃ Ὀδυσσείᾳ παθημάτων. (*Resp.* 3.393a6-b4)

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[233] Goldhill writes on rivalrous emotions such as envy, spite, and jealousy as part of a "politics of feeling" (2003: 166). Tragedy often uses envy and jealousy "within the rhetoric of explanation," but these emotions rarely appear in tragedy and seldom motivate the plot (169). While Goldhill does not discuss disgust, it seems to me to be another negatively-charged, rivalrous emotion.

[234] Aristotle uses similar language in the *Poetics* to state that different forms of mimesis, such as dithyramb and epic, differ from each other in their subjects, media, and modes: διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν, ἢ γὰρ τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (Arist. *Poet.* 1.1447a16-18). "They differ from one other in three respects: by producing mimesis in different media, of different objects, or in different modes" (trans. Halliwell 1995, adapted).

> "The poet himself speaks and doesn't attempt to get us to think that the speaker is someone other than himself. After this, however, he speaks as if he himself were Chryses and tries as far as possible to make us think that the speaker isn't Homer but the priest himself—an old man. And he composes pretty well all the rest of his narrative about events in Troy, Ithaca, and the whole *Odyssey* in this way." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The vocabulary of mimetic metamorphosis in this passage echoes that of Aristophanes and Euripides. Socrates repeats the intensive pronoun αὐτός in order to distinguish and emphasize the different speakers inherent to the narrative and mimetic styles. Socrates prefers it when a poet speaks in third person (lit. "the poet himself speaks"; λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής, 3.393a6) because he does not persuade the audience "that the speaker is someone other than himself" (ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός, 3.393a7).[235] The distinction between third and first person here is an important one. If the poet speaks in the voice of a character, i.e. in first person, it may turn one's thought (διάνοια) because speech is one way a character's thought is conveyed.[236] Mimesis represents speech as belonging to another, and it is this sense of alterity that is problematic for Socrates because one can adopt another's thoughts as one's own.[237]

Socrates prefers a diegetic style because otherwise Homer "speaks as if himself were Chryses" (ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει, 3.393a8). This threatens Homer's being as well as the belief in the stability of being because the poet momentarily becomes another person and is

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[235] Socrates narrates the discussion in the *Republic* in such a mixed style, comprised of the first and third person. He notes that "I went down" (κατέβην) to the Piraeus, for example. He will give speaker tags, but often uses direct, and not indirect, speech. Cf. Blondell: "Plato's choice of "dramatic" form self-consciously raises the question of whether one person can ever speak for another" (2002: 20).

[236] For διάνοια as an important characteristic in tragedy, cf. Arist. *Poet.* 6.1449b36-50a9.

[237] While Lear does not think impersonation is implied in mimesis here, he also notes that mimesis produces otherness: "The audience does not experience *him* as present at all. In fact, so far as the success of the mimesis is concerned, it is neither here nor there whether the poet is present. What is essential to mimesis is that the poet creates an appearance *other* than an appearance of himself." (2011: 201)

not himself. In this passage, Socrates makes use of the participle ὤν, which we have seen is a key feature of mimetic metamorphosis. When Socrates notes that Chryses "is an old man," he uses the same participle (πρεσβύτην ὄντα, 3.393b2). Socrates is concerned about the false belief mimesis instills in the audience—Homer "makes it seem" (ποιῆσαι…δοκεῖν, 3.393b1) as though he is not Homer but Chryses—yet the use of εἰμί shows that there is a performative aspect to being, that it is not as stable as Socrates would like.[238] Homer is in some sense "being" Chryses, "being" an old man, even if Socrates wants to frame this as deceptive. Homer being and speaking "as if" (ὥσπερ) he is another person allows a fluidity of being that goes beyond mere pretense. "Speaking as if" is an important component of Plato's Socratic dialogues, for example, when characters speak ironically or as if they are not themselves (e.g. Glaucon on behalf of those who praise injustice, 2.361e). [239]

When Socrates categorizes poetic styles, he responds to a point of Adeimantus' with the unmarked aside "as you say" (ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, 3.394c1), which reminds us at a metatheatrical level that this dialogue is composed in a dramatic form, that Plato speaks *as if* he were Socrates, Adeimantus, and the other interlocutors.

> ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι' ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. (*Resp.* 3.394c1-2)
>
> "One kind of poetry and story-telling employs only imitation—tragedy and comedy, as you say. Another kind employs only narration by the poet himself" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

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[238] Cf. Dicaeopolis' comment to Lamachus at the end of the *Acharnians* (εἰ πτωχὸς ὤν, Ar. *Ach.* 579). See Ch. 1 (pp. 46f.).

[239] See Billings on deceit (ἀπατή) in Gorgias: "Though we must at some level retain a consciousness that the stage-world is not our own world, we react-at least at some level-as if it were. Gorgias' paradox elides this 'as if' quality of drama, the gap between *mimêsis* and reality, and Sophocles does much the same, spotlighting the consequences of deception for the deceived, and curiously enough, the 'justice' of the deceiver" (2018: 50).

Socrates contrasts poetry produced by pure narrative (ἀπαγγελία), his explicit preference, with poetry composed completely through imitation (ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, 3.394c1). Tragedy and comedy, the genres par excellence of the purely mimetic style, are apposed to this definition. Socrates calls back to an earlier statement made by Adeimantus with this little phrase "as you say," but the context adds a layer irony to the discussion given the dramatic frame of the dialogue. Socrates' discussion with his interlocutors, what they say and how they say it, is effected entirely through mimesis, just as tragedy and comedy are.

Mimesis, by Socrates' definition, is set against the ethics of the ideal city. In Book 1 Socrates claims that the individuals of the city are not like one another, but Homer (and all mimetic poetry) likens language to each character. When a poet speaks in person as a character, he likens (ὁμοιόω) his speech to that speaker. Not only is there a disguise or level of deception in his speech, but the poet changes his speech in some way to make it different. This takes place, as in Socrates' example of the Chryses episode from Book 1 of the *Iliad*, during the change from the diegetic third person to the mimetic first person.

> Ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ ῥῆσιν ὥς τις ἄλλος ὤν, ἆρ' οὐ τότε ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ λέξιν ἑκάστῳ ὃν ἂν προείπῃ ὡς ἐροῦντα;
> Φήσομεν · τί γάρ;
> Οὐκοῦν τό γε ὁμοιοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἄλλῳ ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον ᾧ ἄν τις ὁμοιοῖ;
> Τί μήν;
> Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὗτός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνται. (*Resp.* 3.393b9-c8)
>
> "But when he makes a speech as if he were someone else, won't we say that he makes his own style as much like that of the indicated speaker as possible?"
> "We certainly will."
> "So, isn't likening himself to another either in voice or body imitating that person, whomever it is he likens himself to?"
> "Certainly."
> "In these passages, then, it seems that he and the other poets effect their narrative through imitation." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Whenever Homer composes a speech that is the voice of another character, he likens his style (λέξις) to that character. Socrates plays on the double meanings of λέξις, which can be translated both as "style" (as in the passage above) and also as "speech." Not only does Homer change his own speech from the third person voice of the narrator to the first person voice of the speaker, he also changes his "style" from the diegetic to the mimetic. By taking on the speech of another, a poet takes on the mimetic style. The language here implies mimesis is inherently dramatic even in the readerly genre of dialogue, as likening one's speech occurs in the voice (φωνή) as well as in the body (σχῆμα).[240]

Socrates juxtaposes pronouns such as ἄλλος ("another), αὐτός ("he"), ἕκαστος ("each"), ἐκεῖνος ("that"), and ἑαυτοῦ ("of himself," "his own") to demarcate Homer from his characters. The confusion of persons and pronouns is an essential part of mimetic metamorphosis as we have seen, for example, in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. When Homer "speaks as if himself were Chryses" (ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει, 3.393a8), thus convincing his audience "that the speaker is someone other than himself" (ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτός, 3.393a7), "he" (αὐτός) is likening "his own" (ἑαυτοῦ) speech to each person (ἕκαστος) in his poem. Socrates presents a parallel to the transformation from first to third person—the pronominal transformation from the reflexive and intensive pronoun to the indefinite (i.e. I : he :: he himself/his own : another). Socrates' sentence attempts to track mimetic metamorphosis, but in doing so he disorients—who *is* Homer? When he composes his poetry, is he himself or another?[241] .

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[240] On Plato's reader "doing philosophy," the very thing the dialogues represent, cf. Blondell: "A reader or actor speaking lines composed by another is in a certain sense *doing philosophy*, if she rehearses original philosophical views, in so far as she either internalizes of engages with those views." (2002: 27, emphasis in original)

[241] This question and reaction are of course most notably present in Kinsman and Agathon's discussion at Ar. *Thesm.* 130ff. Cf. Ch. 1 (49f.).

Socrates continues to disorient with a chiastic sentence, in which the jumble of pronouns and questions about identity becomes even more entangled: "So, isn't likening (τό ὁμοιοῦν) himself (ἑαυτὸν) to another (ἄλλῳ) either in voice or body imitating that person (ἐκεῖνον), whomever (ᾧ ἄν) it is he likens (τις ὁμοιοῖ) himself to?" (*Resp*. 3.393c4-5). The verb ὁμοιόω ("liken") appears near the beginning and end, at the emphatic positions, of the sentence, which further highlights this repetition. The repetition of an accusative pronoun followed by a dative pronoun forms the chiastic structure ABB'A': A (ὁμοιόω); B (acc. pron., dat. pron.); B' (acc. pron., dat. pron.); A' (ὁμοιόω). The rhetorical figure chiasmus emphasizes repeated phrases and ideas and draws attention to the interaction of these ideas. The notion of likening (ὁμοιόω) is triangulated with two other points—oneself (ἑαυτόν) and another (ἄλλος, ἐκεῖνος). The action of likening is complicated by the multiple pronouns used for the other person to whom one likens oneself and the different forms of the verb. The neuter participle τὸ ὁμοιοῦν is disembodied and abstract whereas the verb in the relative clause (ὁμοιοῖ) is finite. The chiastic sentence structure draws one's attention to the interconnectedness of these ideas, but also shows how likeness produces difference at a grammatical as well as ontological level.

This chiastic effect is strengthened by the repetition of the conjunction ἤ ("or") and the prepositional phrase with κατά ("either in voice or body"; ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα, 3.393c4-5). The sentence hinges upon the predicate (μιμεῖσθαί ἐστιν, 3.393c5), which appears in the middle of the chiasmus. This complicated sentence structure serves as a definition of mimesis ("isn't likening…mimesis?") that, through its use of pronouns and emphasis on likeness and difference, shows how Plato has adopted the language and themes of mimetic metamorphosis

from his dramatic predecessors.[242] Socrates reveals that he has dramatic enactment in mind in his definition of mimetic poetry even as he uses Homer as his prime example, as he allows for mimesis that is performed "either in voice or body."[243]

Socrates then raises the question whether guardians should be involved in mimesis. He answers with the tenet of specialization, each person should have only one occupation, returning to the beginning of the dialogue.[244]

> Τόδε τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, ἄθρει, πότερον μιμητικοὺς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὔ· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔπεται, ὅτι εἷς ἕκαστος ἓν μὲν ἂν ἐπιτήδευμα καλῶς ἐπιτηδεύοι, πολλὰ δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο ἐπιχειροῖ, πολλῶν ἐφαπτόμενος πάντων ἀποτυγχάνοι ἄν, ὥστ' εἶναί που ἐλλόγιμος; (*Resp.* 3.394e1-6)
>
> "Then, consider, Adeimantus, whether our guardians should be imitators or not. Or does this also follow from our earlier statement that each individual would do a fine job of one occupation, not of many, and that if he tried the latter and dabbled in many things, he'd surely fail to achieve distinction in any of them?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

There are two threads to disentangle in this passage: first, Socrates implies that mimesis is harmful to being. He asks Adeimantus to consider "whether our guardians should be imitators or not" (πότερον μιμητικοὺς ἡμῖν δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας ἢ οὔ, 3.394e1-2). To be mimetic (μιμητικοὶ δεῖ εἶναι) is at issue because it affects one's being and changes who one is. Second, mimesis is pitted against the work of the guardians because its aims are multiple, not singular. Socrates

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[242] Socrates defines poetry in which the poet does not hide himself at all as non-mimetic: Εἰ δέ γε μηδαμοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτοιτο ὁ ποιητής, πᾶσα ἂν αὐτῷ ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποίησίς τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονυῖα εἴη. (*Resp.* 3.393c10-d1) "If the poet never hid himself, the whole of his poem would be narrative without imitation" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

[243] Socrates treats Homer as a tragic poet, noting that epic poetry is composed of the mixed style, which comprises narrative and mimesis, but does not explicitly refer to the embodiment of rhapsodes as they recite poetry. In Plato's *Ion*, the rhapsode Ion is affected by the Homeric poems to such an extent that he weeps and his hair stands on end (Pl. *Ion* 535b1-c8).

[244] Aristotle avoids this issue in the *Poetics* by claiming that poets do not need to know everything they represent because poetry does not have same standards of correctness as politics or other arts (*Poet.* 25.1460b6-22).

emphasizes the individuality of the guardian (εἷς ἕκαστος) and their work (ἕν ἐπιτήδευμα) and contrasts this with the impossibility of doing many things well (πολλὰ δ' οὔ). According to this logic, performing multiple jobs or imitating multiple people is as undesirable as being multiple. Socrates defines mimesis through the deictics of "this is that" and equates attempting "this" (τοῦτο, i.e. mimesis) with failing "those" (lit. "many," πολλά; "all," πάντα). According to Socrates, the declension of mimesis is in the plural.

The specialization of each citizen in Kallipolis results in the exclusion of the guardians from mimetic art.

> Σχολῇ ἄρα ἐπιτηδεύσει γέ τι ἅμα τῶν ἀξίων λόγου ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ πολλὰ μιμήσεται καὶ ἔσται μιμητικός, ἐπεί που οὐδὲ [τὰ] δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι δύο μιμήματα δύνανται οἱ αὐτοὶ ἅμα εὖ μιμεῖσθαι, οἷον κωμῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ποιοῦντες. ἢ οὐ μιμήματα ἄρτι τούτω ἐκάλεις; (*Resp*. 3.395a1-5)
>
> "Then, he'll hardly be able to pursue any worthwhile way of life while at the same time imitating many things and being an imitator. Even in the case of two kinds of imitation that are thought to be closely akin, such as tragedy and comedy, the same people aren't able to do both of them well. Did you not just say that these were both imitations?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates distinguishes mimesis from worthwhile pursuits (τὰ ἄξια λόγου ἐπιτηδεύματα, 3.395a1-2), which looks forward to the distinction between the works of craftsmen and mimesis in Book 10. Curiously, Socrates also divides the activity of mimesis (πολλὰ μιμήσεται) from being imitative (ἔσται μιμητικός, 3.395a2). One issue here is the temporality inherent to being something more than once, which takes place "simultaneously" (ἅμα) and does not progress over time as the education of the guardians does. Socrates states that no one can be a rhapsode and actor simultaneously (Οὐδὲ μὴν ῥαψῳδοί γε καὶ ὑποκριταὶ ἅμα, 3.395a7).[245] Socrates pushes the

[245] This is partly at issue in Plato's *Ion*. Socrates is determined to discredit Ion of his ability to interpret Homer in addition to perform as a rhapsode. E.g., cf. Pl. *Ion* 530d2-3**:** "No one else who has ever existed is able to speak so many fine thoughts about Homer as I can" (…οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς τῶν πώποτε γενομένων ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν οὕτω πολλὰς καὶ καλὰς διανοίας περὶ Ὁμήρου ὅσας ἐγώ).

concept of specialization to its limits by claiming that imitators cannot produce different kinds of imitations, even those that seem to be similar to one another (τὰ δοκοῦντα ἐγγὺς ἀλλήλων εἶναι, 3.395a3), such as comedy and tragedy.[246]

Socrates uses the noun μίμημα for objects of imitation and the media in which they are represented.[247] This distances the activity of likening or imitating something to a passive object, which looks forward to the definition of mimesis as a mere copy of physical objects, far-removed from the truth.

> Καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, φαίνεταί μοι εἰς σμικρότερα κατακεκερματίσθαι ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι, ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν ὧν δὴ καὶ τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα. (*Resp.* 3.395b4-7)
>
> "And human nature, Adeimantus, seems to me to be minted in even smaller coins than these, so that it can neither imitate many things well nor do the actions themselves, of which those imitations are likenesses." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates couches his position about human nature (ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, 3.395b5) within the idea of mere appearance ("it seems to me"; φαίνεταί μοι, 3.395b4). Considering he is making a strong claim about mimesis, it is interesting that his statement is weakened and made ambiguous by this. Socrates not only contrasts *physis* with mimesis but claims that mimesis is actually harmful to it. The earlier claim that individuals are unique and their occupations should be specialized is now applied more generally to human nature. The attempt to perform multiple occupations or be multiple things will harm one's *physis*. This results in a person whose *physis* is incapable of imitating many things well (ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι πολλὰ καλῶς μιμεῖσθαι, 3.395b6) or doing many things (ἢ αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα πράττειν, 3.395b6-7). Imitation (μιμεῖσθαι) and performance (πράττειν) are contrasted here, but so is their object—the singular opposed to the plural.

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[246] This, contrary to Socrates' belief that the same person can compose tragedy and comedy in the *Symposium* (223c6-d6)!

[247] For history of μίμημα and original meaning of "copy of nature," cf. Else (1958: 77f.).

Socrates treats imitations as passive objects and defines them as copies (τὰ μιμήματά ἐστιν ἀφομοιώματα, 3.395b7). This looks forward to the treatment of mimesis as passive in Book 10. Socrates relies on essentialism of identity (e.g. nature is singular), yet he uses the verb εἶναι to mark the end of transformations. *Physis* is torn apart and cut up into smaller pieces when it is disorganized and attempts to imitate many things, resulting in it "being incapable" (ὥστε ἀδύνατος εἶναι). If we read this with Gorgias in mind, even the copy has being (ἐστιν).[248] Even in this passage, where mimesis is treated as passive, we see the deictics of "this is that," where the successful imitation of many objects (πολλά) is treated as just as impossible for the individual specialist as performing those very things (αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα).

Socrates makes an exception here, however, for guardians who imitate good or fitting models from childhood on.

> ἐὰν δὲ μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὁσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοὺς εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι αἱ μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; (*Resp*. 3.395c3-d3)
>
> "If they do imitate, they must imitate from childhood what is appropriate for them, namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and free, and their actions. They mustn't be clever at doing or imitating slavish or shameful actions, so they do not they come to enjoy the reality from enjoying the imitation. Or haven't you noticed that imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle into habits of body, voice, and thought?" (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates claims that the characters and events guardians must imitate are those that are fitting to them (τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα, 3.395c4). The objects of imitation must be appropriate for, yet distinct from, the guardians. Socrates moves between the neuter and masculine plural and expands upon the characters the guardians may emulate ("courageous, self-controlled, pious, and

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[248] Cf. Gorg. *On not Being* (DK 82 B 3).

free") with the pronoun τοιοῦτος (τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, 3.395c5-6). He makes use of the preposition ἐκ several times in this passage to mark the temporality of these imitations ("straightaway from childhood"; εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων, 3.395c4-5; "from youth"; ἐκ νέων, 3.395d1), noting the gradual changes that occur over time as the guardians become habituated to the characters they imitate.

The other use of ἐκ in this passage is causal—not only does mimesis occur over time but it can result in altered being: "so they do not they come to enjoy the reality from enjoying the imitation" (ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν, 3.395c7-8). The verb ἀπολαύω can be translated as "to take advantage of," "derive benefit from," and also "enjoy," and its object is being (τὸ εἶναι). The pleasure of mimesis, both the playacting in performance and the enjoyment of an audience, is problematic for Socrates. Mimesis is the root cause for the guardians taking pleasure in (and therefore abusing) playacting and actually "being" characters inimical to their assigned roles in the ideal city. This shows that being is at stake in the question of mimesis: one can take on the being of another just as easily as one takes up the role of a character in a drama.

If being can change, if mimetic metamorphosis is a possibility, being is a of form of becoming. Indeed, Socrates claims that imitations performed over time "become part of nature and settle into habits of body, voice, and thought" (εἰς ἔθη τε καὶ φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, 3.395d1-3). This opens up a view of mimesis that differs from that of mere appearance because it can change one's character and *physis*. Socrates awareness of mimesis' relationship to being and becoming dictate the musical education of the youths in the state. It is precisely because of the behavioral change that mimesis can effect that it must be controlled (and later exiled). Socrates again seems to have drama in mind here when he states that these habits and natures that are established occur "in body, voice, and thought" (κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, 3.395d2-3).

Socrates' outline for musical education is geared towards the end result of transformation. The youths who make up the guardians must become good men, so they cannot imitate women or other characters lacking in virtue.

> Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὧν φαμεν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναῖκα μιμεῖσθαι ἄνδρας ὄντας, ἢ νέαν ἢ πρεσβυτέραν, ἢ ἀνδρὶ λοιδορουμένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσάν τε καὶ μεγαλαυχουμένην, οἰομένην εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, ἢ ἐν συμφοραῖς τε καὶ πένθεσιν καὶ θρήνοις ἐχομένην· κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἐρῶσαν ἢ ὠδίνουσαν, πολλοῦ καὶ δεήσομεν. (*Resp*. 3.395d5-e2)
>
> "Then we won't allow those for whom we profess to care, and who must grow into good men, to imitate either a young woman or an older one, or one abusing her husband, quarreling with the gods, or bragging because she thinks herself happy, or one suffering misfortune and possessed by sorrows and lamentations, and even less one who is ill, in love, or in labor." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates stresses to his interlocutors that the guardians must become good men (δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, 3.395d5-6), thus recognizing that poetry has a transformative effect, but he also emphasizes an essentialist notion of identity: the guardians should not imitate women "because they are men" (ἄνδρας ὄντας, 3.395d6-7).

The use of the participle ὤν recalls its use in Aristophanes both to mark the end result of transformation and the performative aspect of "being" someone or something. In particular, it recalls Kinsman's reaction to Agathon.

> Κη. ἀλλ' ἦ τυφλὸς μέν εἰμ'; ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ
> ἄνδρ' οὐδέν' ἐνθάδ' ὄντα, Κυρήνην δ' ὁρῶ. (Ar. *Thesm*. 95-98)
>
> Ki.: Am I blind? Because I don't see any man here, but a Cyrene.[249]

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[249] For more in-depth discussion of this passage, see Ch. 1 (pp. 49f.). Murray argues that mimesis in Plato is inherently feminine and refers to this scene: "Furthermore, the notion of *mimêsis* in the sense that it is used in Book III (i.e. impersonation) seems to be bound up from the start with questions of gender. The first time it occurs is in Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae* where Euripides and his relative, Mnesilochus, call on the tragic poet Agathon, and find him dressed in drag, and in the very act of creation" (2011: 187).

Beyond the comical reaction inherent in Kinsman's exclamation, there is an implicit claim about being and identity: since Agathon imitates women and crossdresses as part of his mimetic method of composition, he is not a man. Mimetic metamorphosis affects Agathon's being (ὤν), but we can also read this as performative: Agathon is not currently "being" a man, but a woman. Socrates forbids men from imitating women, but his language draws on Aristophanes' depiction of the tragic mimesis of women.

Agathon responds to Euripides' Kinsman with a theory of mimetic metamorphosis. He can become and therefore represent a woman by altering his body:

> ἀνδρεῖα δ' ἢν ποιῇ τις, ἐν τῷ σώματι
> ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦθ'. ἃ δ' οὐ κεκτήμεθα,
> μίμησις ἤδη ταῦτα συνθηρεύεται. (*Thesm*. 154-56)
>
> If someone composes dramas featuring men, this subject matter is present in his body. But mimesis already hunts out what we do not possess.

Agathon acknowledges that being informs his poetry: "This," that is, the experience of being a man, "is present in his body" (ἐν τῷ σώματι / ἔνεσθ' ὑπάρχον τοῦτ, 155). But being is a slippery thing that turns the poet in this example into an indefinite "someone" (τις, 154) who can hunt out (συνθηρεύεται, 156) whatever characteristics do not belong to him naturally. Socrates wants to censor the content and form of poetry because imitators such as Agathon can take on new characteristics that he did not already possess and becoming something new.

The *Republic* passage works in a similar vein. For Socrates, the end goal of the guardians' education is that they become men. Yet, he also reveals a belief similar to that of Kinsman that mimesis can negatively affect being. He emphasizes the essential identity of the guardians as men (ἄνδρες ὄντες, 3.395d6-7) and the need for them to "be men" in the performative sense. Thus, the founders of the city will not allow the guardians to imitate a woman out of concern that they become women. The elaborated list of the kinds of women the guardians should not imitate

reads as a list of tragic women roles.[250] Not only does Plato seem to acknowledge Aristophanes' conception of mimetic metamorphosis here, but we can see in Socrates' statement a sort of cryptogram that alludes to that *Thesmophoriazusae* scene and revises the way Agathon performs his gender.[251] The guardians "must themselves become good men" (δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, 3.395d5-6), or we can revise this to "the men must become good." Agathon's name derives from this same adjective "good" (ἀγαθός). In Socrates' prescription for appropriate mimesis we can now see a rejoinder to those who imitate women with no concern for how it affects their being: "Agathon must become a man" (δεῖ ἄνδρα τὸν Ἀγάθωνα γένεσθαι).[252]

Near the end of the discussion of poetry in Book 3 of the *Republic*, Socrates puns on the congruity between the guardians and the dramatic poetry they perform and observe. The adjective μέτριος ("modest," "moderate") derives from the noun μέτρον, which can be translated as "measure" or also "meter."[253]

> ὁ μέν μοι δοκεῖ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἀνήρ, ἐπειδὰν ἀφίκηται ἐν τῇ διηγήσει ἐπὶ λέξιν τινὰ ἢ πρᾶξιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ, ἐθελήσειν ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος ἀπαγγέλλειν καὶ οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει…ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατά τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα κατὰ βραχύ, ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, ἀλλ' αἰσχυνεῖσθαι, ἅμα μὲν ἀγύμναστος ὢν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς τοιούτους, ἅμα δὲ καὶ δυσχεραίνων αὐτὸν ἐκμάττειν τε καὶ ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακιόνων τύπους, ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν. (*Resp.* 3.396c6-e1)
>
> "Well, I think that when a moderate man comes upon the words or actions of a good man in his narrative, he'll be willing to report them as if he were that man himself, and he won't be ashamed of such an imitation.…When he comes upon a character unworthy of himself, however, he'll be unwilling to make himself seriously resemble that inferior character—except perhaps for a short time when he's doing something good. Rather he'll be ashamed to do something like that,

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[250] E.g. "striving with the gods and boasting," Niobe; "in the midst of misfortune, grief, and lamentations," Hecabe.
[251] See Shoptaw 2002 for this idea of "lyric cryptography."
[252] Halliwell argues that Plato signals that all mimetic art has a transformative, psychological power at the conclusion of the first critique on poetry (2002: 73).
[253] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. μέτρον.

> both because he's unpracticed in the imitation of such people and because he can't stand to shape and mold himself according to a worse pattern. He despises this in his mind, unless it's done in play." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

The guardian who fits into Socrates' educational poetic program may safely perform a role like himself and not become immoderate, unmeasured, or unmetrical. Indeed, unlike Homer who speaks in the role of Chryses, it is permissible for the guardian to play the good man and speak "as if he were that man himself" (ὡς αὐτὸς ὢν ἐκεῖνος, 3.396c8).

Socrates imagines the performer identifying with his character, and we can imagine that the guardians in the audience, who share the same education as the performer, will also be able to empathize with representations of a good man and his actions. The adjective τοιοῦτος ("such," "such as this") in the phrase "of such an imitation" (ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ μιμήσει, 3.396c9) hints at this possibility—if the guardian *qua* performer recognizes himself in the representation of "such" a character and story (variously called "good," "serious," or "noble"), then the guardian *qua* spectator or reader will as well. Socrates limits the time ("for a short time"; κατὰ βραχύ, 3.396d5) guardians may be allowed to imitate an inferior character and also the context, "when he's doing something good" (ὅταν τι χρηστὸν ποιῇ, 3.396d5-6). This limitation on the kinds of characters that are acceptable to imitate reveals a recognition of the transformative power of mimesis. The guardians may play characters like themselves since it will reinforce their education, but they can be changed if they play characters unlike themselves, and that change can in turn affect the audience.

V. Conclusion

At the end of Book 3, Socrates allows a limited form of mimetic poetry into the state. He claims that a moderate man will willingly narrate the speech or action of a good man in the voice of that man. In the final section of this chapter, I turn to Book 10, where all mimetic poetry is

exiled from the state. In Book 10 Socrates acknowledges the affective quality of poetry and depicts poetry as metamorphic. I show how Socrates returns to the language of seeming and being that marks his discussion of poetry in the first critique of mimesis and claim that this leaves doubt as to whether mimesis should be exiled or not. The guardians are permitted to imitate characters that model appropriate behavior in Book 3, but when Socrates returns to the topic of poetry in Book 10, he revises his stance. Now that he and his interlocutors have distinguished the different parts of the soul, they discover they correctly formed their ideal state "by allowing no poetry which is mimetic in any way" (Τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση μιμητική, 10.595a5).[254]

Socrates returns to poetry because he finds mimesis' capacity to affect poets, actors, and audiences problematic.

> Ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν μιμουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ.
> Οἶδα · πῶς δ' οὔ;
> Ὅταν δὲ οἰκεῖόν τινι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς αὖ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπῃνοῦμεν. (*Resp.* 10.605c9-e1)
>
> "Listen, then, and consider whether it can or not. When even the best of us hear Homer or some other tragedian imitating one of the heroes grieving and making a long lamenting speech or singing and beating his breast, you know that we enjoy it, give ourselves up to following it, sympathize with the hero, take his sufferings seriously, and praise as a good poet the one who affects us most in this way."
> "Of course we do."
> "But when one of us suffers a private loss, you realize that the opposite happens. We pride ourselves if we are able to keep quiet and be steadfast, for we think that

[254] Murray argues that Plato's claims in Book 3 against mimesis and the assimilation of performers to their characters are then applied to all poetry in Book 10. In Book 3 not all poetry is mimetic, but it is dangerous, but in Book 10 all poetry is treated as mimetic and condemned as worthless (1992: 41f.).

> this is the manly thing to do and that behavior, which we praised before, is womanish." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates fears this transformative aspect of poetry because the representations of characters lamenting on stage, while tragic, befit women and not men. Earlier in the *Republic*, however, Socrates claims that lamentation and other tragic behaviors do not befit all women, but those who are not serious (οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις, 3.387e11-388a1). From this one can infer that there are some serious roles that serious men and women (σπουδαῖοι) can play.

Seeming and being are contrasted here as well even as Socrates considers the affective aspect of poetry. Socrates uses the verb μιμέομαι ("imitate") for Homer and other poets who represent characters in poetry and the participle ὤν to describe the imitated hero in mourning (lit. "one of the heroes being in grief"; τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα, 10.605c10-d1). The participial form of the verb εἰμί reappears when Socrates categorizes certain behaviors as being (ὄν) masculine (keeping a stiff upper lip) and feminine (lamentation, singing, striking one's breast) τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, *Resp.* 10.605d9). That the poetically represented character can be in mourning is problematic for the essentialist conception of identity and gender roles Socrates wants to define here. Seeming and being intersect and complicate affect in this passage. Socrates does not want his guardians to change through lamentation or think that behavior is appropriate to them, but as we have seen in Aristophanes and Euripides, being is often represented as the end result of transformation. A man in mourning can become a mournful man.

Socrates turns seeming and being inside out. He defines masculine and feminine behavior by noting to Glaucon that men "take pride in" keeping quiet about their misfortune. The denominative verb καλλωπίζομαι ("pride oneself in," *Resp.* 10.605d8) derives from the words for

beauty (κάλλος) and face (ὤψ).[255] The verb in the active voice can be translated as "beautify the face," "give a fair appearance," or "embellish," and in the middle voice (as above) as "adorn oneself" or "make a display." The behavior Socrates urges men to perform is itself a kind of appearance-making by hiding one's emotions ("keep quiet," ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν; "be steadfast," καρτερεῖν, 10.605d8-9). Socrates also makes use of the mimetic formula "this is that" in order to arbitrarily assign gender roles: "this is the manly thing to do, and that womanish" (ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, 10.605d9). The coordinating particles μέν…δέ… set up the contrast between τοῦτο and ἐκεῖνο, but the use of the "this is that" formula and the verb εἰμί reveal an ambiguity between the inside and outside of mimetic representation and reality (and, in this case, gender).

After Socrates claims that the audience empathizes (συμπάσχοντες, 10.605d) with grieving characters, he argues that being subjected to the emotions of others ultimately destabilizes and changes the subject.

> λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα · θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν. (*Resp.* 10.606b5-8)
>
> "I suppose that only a few are able to figure out that enjoyment of other people's sufferings is necessarily transferred to our own and that the pitying part, if it is nourished and strengthened on the sufferings of others, won't be easily held in check when we ourselves suffer." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates forbids the enjoyment (ἀπολαύειν) of others' suffering in poetry, just as he forbids guardians from enjoying being another person when they imitate another (ἵνα μὴ ἐκ τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν, 3.395c7-8). When we take pleasure in the emotions depicted in poetry, we transfer another's experiences into our own (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα,

[255] On formation and meaning of καλλωπίζω, cf. Chantraine (1968-77) s.v. καλός.

10.606b6-7). Empathizing with characters, even with characters that are treated as suitable for the state in Book 3, endangers the stability of citizens' sense of selfhood.[256]

If guardians take on the opinions, habits, and suffering of another, they may no longer be fit to serve as guardians. Likewise, the regulation of artisans to a particular field of expertise becomes unstable if they begin to adopt another person's experiences and beliefs. The pronouns ἐκεῖνος ("that person") and ἑαυτοῦ ("of himself") as well as the possessive adjectives ἀλλότριος ("of/belonging to another") and οἰκεῖος ("one's own") highlight this problem. By nourishing pity in those situations (ἐν ἐκείνοις) that belong to others, the theatergoer has difficulty restraining the same emotion in his own suffering (ἐν τοῖς αὑτοῦ πάθεσι, 10.606b7-8). The adoption of someone else's emotions (τὰ ἀλλότρια) invades one's own (εἰς τὰ οἰκεῖα, 10.606b6-7). In this passage Socrates sees emotion as something one nourishes or tends (θρέφαντα, 10.606b7). The verb τρέφω in this passage is glossed as "contain within oneself," but it can also serve as a metaphor for child-rearing ("bring up," "rear").[257] By nourishing emotions such as pity, we allow them to grow within us. Growth, while natural, allows for change, which problematizes Socrates' view of an essential nature and for the goal of nourishing a particular kind of character in the guardians of the ideal city.

Mimetic poetry can produce many different kinds of passions in us that one should not feel. Socrates revises his stance from Book 3 to 10 because poetry is dangerous, transformative, and corruptive to the performers and audiences who empathize with it.

> Καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δή φαμεν πάσῃ πράζει ἡμῖν ἕπεσθαι, ὅτι

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[256] Cf. Halliwell, who states that the "intense imaginative sympathy" of Book 10 "constitutes, on Plato's premises, a compromise to the integrity of the individual, thereby threatening, in some degree, to turn 'one person' into 'many'" (2002: 93). Cf. Lada on sympathy, empathy, and identification (1993: 101).

[257] Cf. LSJ s.v. τρέφω II.6.

> τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται· τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῖν καθίστησιν, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτὰ ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα. (*Resp.* 10.606d1-7)
>
> "And in the case of sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains that we say accompany all our actions, poetic imitation has the very same effect on us. It nurtures and waters them and establishes them as rulers in us when they ought to dry up and be ruled, for that way we'll become better and happier rather than worse and more wretched." (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates returns to the metaphor of rearing and nourishment, but here it is mimetic poetry itself (ἡ ποιητικὴ μίμησις, 10.606d3-4), not the individual, that nourishes (τρέφει) emotions. Poetry "waters" (ἄρδουσα) these emotions in us, letting them grow rampant, when instead they "should dry up" or "be parched" (δέον αὐχμεῖν, 10.606d3-4). Socrates links the metaphor of nourishment and growth with the transformations he would prefer audiences to undergo, from worse to better (ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων γιγνώμεθα, 10.606d6-7). He casts affective qualities of mimetic poetry in a negative light and acknowledges the transformative power of poetry.

While some critics read the exile of poetry in the *Republic* as Socrates' (and Plato's) final word on the matter, Socrates makes room for poetry in his ideal state and admits that he remains enchanted by Homer.[258]

> ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἅσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι' Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; (*Resp.* 10.607c4-d2)

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[258] Blondell writes that the "permissible poetry of *Republic* shows the virtuous being rewarded and the wicked punished," which "is just what happens in the myths of both *Republic* and *Gorgias*, where such punishment is explicitly designed as an example to others" (2002: 92). Nussbaum claims that Plato's dialogues are "anti-tragic theater": "If the dialogues are a kind of theater, owing a debt to tragic models, they are also a theater constructed to supplant tragedy as the paradigm of ethical teaching" (2001: 129).

> Nonetheless, if c the poetry that aims at pleasure and imitation has any argument to bring forward that proves it ought to have a place in a well-governed city, we at least would be glad to admit it, for we are well aware of the charm it exercises. But it is wrong to betray what one believes to be the truth. What about you, Glaucon, don't you feel the charm of the pleasure-giving Muse, especially when you study her through the eyes of Homer? (trans. Grube 1997, adapted)

Socrates ends his discussion on poetry by allowing for an exception to the rule and states that he and his interlocutors would gladly receive poetry back into the state after its exile. The verb καταδέχομαι can be translated as "receive," but it is also used in the political sense to "receive back" or "take home again" from exile.[259] Are we meant to believe that poetry's exile was never meant to be permanent? Is poetry's ostracism a preemptive measure to prevent its tyranny over our senses and feelings? Even ostracized, would-be tyrants return to Athens after 10 years.

In addition to offering lovers of poetry (φιλοποιηταί, 10.607d8) an opportunity to argue for poetry's return, Socrates opens the possibility of leaving the discussion in aporia. As we have seen in this chapter, the verb δοκέω can be translated as "to think," "believe," or "seem best." Socrates and his interlocutors have come to an agreement on what they believe (δοκέω) to be the truth about poetry during the course of the argument. "But it is wrong," he says, "to betray what one believes to be the truth" (ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι, 10.607c7-8). But δοκέω can also mean "to seem." Socrates consistently makes a point to differentiate between seeming and being, and the claims he has made about poetry in this dialogue show how ineluctable this relationship is between seeming and being, being and becoming, poetry, and philosophy. Thus, the arguments Socrates advocates against poetry in the *Republic* may only be "the seeming truth," the truth for now, an appearance, but not the final word on poetry.[260] It is

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[259] Cf. LSJ s.v. καταδέχομαι A.2.

[260] Cf. Halliwell: "…the text pointedly signals a lingering hope that the banishment might be reversed and that it might prove possible, after all, to remain a philosophical lover of poetry" (2011: 30).

Aristotle, that lover of poetry, who will turn to poetry in order to vindicate it as an affective and transformative medium in the *Poetics*.

Conclusion

I. Being and Becoming

At the beginning of the *Poetics*, Aristotle lists the areas of investigation he will examine in the work, one of which is the capacity (δύναμις) of poetry.

> Περὶ ποιητικῆς αὐτῆς τε καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς, ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει… λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων. (Arist. *Poet.* 1.1447a8-13)[261]
>
> We are to discuss both poetry in general and the capacity of each of its genres… beginning, as is natural, from first principles. (trans. Halliwell 1995, adapted)

The first sentence of the *Poetics* echoes Gorgias' depiction of language in the *Encomium of Helen*. For Gorgias, "language has a mighty capacity" (λόγος δυνάστης μέγας ἐστίν, DK 82 B11.8) and is capable (δύναμαι) of altering one's emotions. The nouns δύναμις ("power") and δυνάστης (lit. "lord," "ruler") derive from the verb δύναμαι, and here Aristotle assigns that power to poetry (ἡ ποιητική τέχνη).[262] In Plato's *Ion* Socrates attributes a divine power (θεία δύναμις, Pl. *Ion* 533d3) to poetry as well.[263] This dynamism that Aristotle claims is characteristic of poetry connects the *Poetics* to the depictions of mimetic metamorphosis I have examined in this dissertation. Mimesis alters being and transforms poets, performers, and audiences even while they insist on their identity. This passage does not include the word "mimesis," but Aristotle often equates poetry and mimesis in the *Poetics*. He recognizes the power of poetry, in particular its power to change, and defines it as essential to each genre of poetry and, ultimately, to mimesis.

To conclude the work of this dissertation I will show how the themes and language of mimetic metamorphosis inform the critical vocabulary of Aristotle's *Poetics*. While I have not

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[261] Greek text of Aristotle's *Poetics* from Kassel (1965).
[262] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. δύναμαι.
[263] For discussion of these passages from Gorg. and Pl. *Ion*, see the introduction (pp. 10-17).

addressed Aristotle in a focused chapter, the work of Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato anticipate and inform his theory of mimesis in the *Poetics*, in particular his discussion of tragedy. Because of this relationship, Aristotle has recurred throughout the dissertation as a heuristic for examining and unearthing moments of mimetic metamorphosis in his literary precursors (e.g. in the discussion of the recognition that "this is that").[264] The work of this dissertation has been to propose a literary conception of mimesis beginning in the 5th c. BCE that revises a common view of mimesis stemming from Book 10 of Plato's *Republic*. This conclusion will show how Aristotle inherits the the theoretical language and interest of mimetic metamorphosis from Aristophanes on. I will revisit some of the findings of the previous chapters and read them in conjunction with the *Poetics*. The points of contact with the previous chapters show that there is a serious engagement with the question of mimesis and being and becoming.[265]

In the first two chapters I discussed how Aristophanes and Euripides ironize mimetic metamorphosis and in doing so reveal how mimesis intersects questions of being and becoming. These depictions show a belief that tragic poets and actors become the characters they represent. In the last chapter I turned to Plato's *Republic* as a text that grapples with mimetic metamorphosis because of its transformative effects on that last chain of poetic inspiration, the audience. Socrates excludes poetry on educational and political grounds because of the transformative effects poetry may have on the citizens of his hypothetical Kallipolis. Aristotle brings a resolution of sorts to this "ancient quarrel" by defining poetic (and especially tragic) mimesis as an

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[264] See, e.g., Ch. 2 on "this is that" and the educative aspect of mimesis (pp. 121-23).
[265] It is important to note here that some scholars have argued that Aristotle is not responding to Plato's view of poetry in his *Poetics*. E.g., Woodruff claims that mimesis in Plato contains (imitative) qualities of the original (1992: 78), whereas, he argues, Aristotle takes mimesis only as imitation of an action (82). I take Aristotle's view to be influenced by Plato's, although it may not be explicit within the *Poetics* because of both philosophers' work on the educational aspects of mimesis and the important role poetry has in education.

intellectual and educational activity allowing citizens to experience painful emotions safely in the theater.

Aristotle's work attempts to define mimesis and offer a way to read tragedy. He shows an awareness of the many parts of tragedy and even its capacity to change the audience by accomplishing a catharsis of their emotions. Aristotle's definition identifies tragedy's being, which is not that of an image (unlike Plato's *Republic*) but something dynamic and capable of change.

> ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. (*Poet.* 6.1449b24-28)
>
> Therefore, tragedy is a mimesis of a serious and completed action that has grandeur, effected by language sweetened separately by each of its forms in its parts, of actors and not through narration, that effects, through pity and fear, a catharsis of such emotions.

The verb "to be" (εἰμί) is placed at the beginning of this sentence in the emphatic position. This reminds the reader that this is the defining statement of what tragedy *is*—mimesis. For Aristotle, tragedy is composed of many moving parts, but it is ultimately meant to accomplish a catharsis of emotions through pity and fear. These tragic emotions and the purgation of them are essential to tragedy as an art form and constitute its capacity. The verb περαίνω ("to accomplish") derives from the noun πεῖραρ (Attic πέρας), which denotes an "end" or "limit."[266] Tragedy is not only

[266] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. πεῖραρ.

capable of producing an effect such as catharsis, but in the teleological language of Aristotle, the ultimate end or aim of tragedy is to experience pity and fear and purge such emotions.[267]

Tragic mimesis then is defined as a change in emotions accomplished through performers, not narration (δρώντων καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, 1449b26). In this passage Aristotle shows a strong preference for mimesis (such as impersonation) rather than descriptive narrative. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates is aware that the guardians may change through mimesis, especially through impersonation and performance, and he treats the affective qualities of poetry as dangerous. Within the narrative of the *Republic*, Socrates explicitly critiques poetry precisely for the emotions it can arouse in performers and audience alike, but when we consider the *Republic* as a drama representing Socrates and other characters going through an argument, it seems likely that Plato's readers will likely experience catharsis after they have their own encounter with *aporia*.[268]

The significant parts of a tragedy are all defined by becoming. When Aristotle discusses the optimal plot length and organization for a tragedy, he states that the plot that allows for a change (μεταβάλλειν) in fortune is the correct size for a plot.

> ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶν τοῦ μεγέθους. (*Poet.* 7.1451a11-15)

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[267] We may not know exactly what *katharsis* is, but Murnaghan claims that Aristotle thinks *katharsis*' effect is "beneficial, transformative, and discontinuous with what causes it" (1995: 761). On *eleos* connoting an action, not feeling, see Belfiore (1992: 186). On aesthetic and moral psychology of catharsis, see Halliwell (2011: 208-65). On the "tragic emotions," Konstan (1999). On pity on stage vs. pity in the audience, see Cairns (2015: 89). On pity in *Resp.*, cf. Destrée (2011). On mimesis and psychology in *Resp.*, Lear (2011). On pity as educational emotion, cf. Johnson & Clapp (2005). Munteanu claims Arist. is first "theorist" of aesthetic emotions (2012, ch. 4). On other tragic emotions, such as envy, cf. Goldhill (2003).

[268] Cf. Blank who argues that interlocutors and readers of the dialogues experience catharsis after they experience aporia in relation to their false beliefs (1993: 436f.)

> To state the definition plainly: the size which permits a transformation to occur, in a probable or necessary sequence of events, from adversity to prosperity and vice versa, is a sufficient limit of magnitude. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

Aristotle uses the participial form of the verb "to become" (γίγνομαι) to refer to events depicted in a tragedy (lit. "things that come into being," γιγνόμενα). The successful plot represents a change (μεταβάλλειν) in fortune that arises out of these events.

In addition to the overall aim of tragedy to effect catharsis (an emotional change) and tragedy's depiction of change from one state to another, Aristotle defines many of the constituent parts of tragedy by change.[269] Tragic plots can be simple or complex because the actions they represent can be simple or complex, but even a simple action entails change (μετάβασις) (lit. "a change occurs"; ἡ μετάβασις γίνεται, 10.1452a11-21). Reversal of fortune (περιπέτεια) is a change (μεταβολή) in the plot to the opposite direction of events (11.1452a22-29). Recognition (ἀναγνώρισις) is defined by change from ignorance to knowledge.

> ἀναγνώρισις δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, τῶν πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν ὡρισμένων· (*Poet.* 11.1452a29-32)
>
> Recognition, as the very name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, leading to friendship or to enmity, and involving matters which bear on prosperity or adversity. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

Recognition is a change from ignorance to knowledge (ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, 1452a30f.) that arises from repetition—itself a source of difference or change, such as in the repetition inherent in mimesis (or re-presentation). The prefix ἀνα- in the noun ἀναγνώρισις ("recognition") suggests repetition.[270] For Aristotle, recognition results from a change in circumstances or appearances that allows one to understand what one sees. Aristotle plays on

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[269] Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 11.1452b8-13 on three components of plot: 1) reversal, 2) recognition, and 3) pathos ("suffering").

[270] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) s.v. ἀνά ("de nouveau"). See introduction for discussion of repetition inherent in representation (p. 3).

these kinds of slight changes within his definition, which is composed of related nouns all deriving from the verb γιγνώσκω ("come to know," "know"): ἀνα-γνώρισις, ἀ-γνοία, γνῶσις.[271] Recognition is often depicted as a moment when a character can put a name to another character, but as we have seen previously it is difficult to refer to and recognize another by means of names and other signifiers when mimetic metamorphosis occurs.[272]

II. "This is That"

In Chapter 1, we saw how Aristophanes stages mimetic metamorphosis and raises problems surrounding identity and referentiality. To whom do pronouns and names refer when one becomes another person? Aristotle prizes recognition in tragedy, but mimesis complicates the recognition of identity because of the transformations involved. Dicaeopolis, for example, is (mis-)recognized as a beggar by Lamachus as well as the chorus in the *Acharnians*. At what point is his disguise a form of misrecognition? This kind of recognition requires being to be stable, that the actor (in this instance, Dicaeopolis) will come out of the mimesis ultimately unchanged and that the audience will be able to recognize him for who he is, and not as who he appears to be.

In Chapter 2, Pentheus fails to recognize the Lydian stranger as Dionysus, his cousin, because of the god's transformation. As Aristotle writes, recognition is a change from ignorance to knowledge leading "either to friendship or enmity" (ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, *Poet.* 1452a31). It is only after Pentheus' transformation into a bacchant that he becomes aware of the the

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[271] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. γιγνώσκω.

[272] For the traditional view of recognition as a change of awareness, see Else (1957). Halliwell argues that Aristotle is "interested in recognition as a device of a structure of events, rather than as a means of dramatising a sense of tragic awareness on the part of the agents" (1987: 143). (On problem of tragic awareness or psychological awareness, see Belfiore (1992). Cave claims that *anagnōrisis* involves obscured identities (1988: 35). Sissa argues recognition is a genealogical awareness of identity and that deeds are a significant feature (2006: 40f.).

Stranger's divinity.[273] Agave wrongfully believes she holds the head of a lion cub when she returns to Thebes and fails to recognize her son because of the madness Dionysus has inspired in her (*Bacch.* 1173-75). This madness is signaled (and partially caused) by her costuming as a bacchant. Only after she has come back to her senses can she recognize her son. What once was a hunting trophy, is recognized as a beloved family member, leading, too late, to φιλία.

In Chapter 3, Socrates rebuts Polemarchus and claims that justice cannot depend on the recognition of the identity of a friend or enemy. When the distinction between being and seeming is elided, one is liable to make a mistake (ἁμαρτάνω) in ascertaining the identity of a friend.

> Ἆρ' οὖν οὐχ ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι περὶ τοῦτο, ὥστε δοκεῖν αὐτοῖς πολλοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς εἶναι μὴ ὄντας, πολλοὺς δὲ τοὐναντίον; (*Resp.* 1.334c6-8)
>
> But surely people make mistakes about this, believing many people to be good and useful when they aren't, and making the opposite mistake about enemies? (trans. Grube, adapted)

The question of error, especially in the recognition of someone's identity, looks forward to the theory of ἁμαρτία ("error," "mistake") and ἀναγνώρισις in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Error is an important element of the tragic plot because it allows for tragic events that would otherwise be despicable to occur while also allowing for the audience to sympathize with the characters represented on stage.

For Aristotle, recognition and the feelings of pity and fear are aroused in spectators by characters who do not differ (διαφέρων) from them too much spectator. The error (ἁμαρτία) that causes a character to fall into misfortune allows for poets to depict tragic situations that are not always the fault of these characters, such as Oedipus' incest and patricide.

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[273] His crossdressing is a form of initiation, resulting in double vision and the view of Dionysus as a bull (Eur. *Bacch.* 918-22). On initiation into the rites of Dionysus as a cause for Pentheus' vision and behavior, see Seaford (1987: 77).

> ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα τούτων λοιπός. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτος ὁ μήτε ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ μήτε διὰ κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν μεταβάλλων εἰς τὴν δυστυχίαν ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν τινά, τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων καὶ εὐτυχίᾳ, οἷον Οἰδίπους καὶ Θυέστης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν ἐπιφανεῖς ἄνδρες. (*Poet.* 13.1453a7-12)
>
> This leaves, then, the person in between these cases. Such a person is someone who does not differ from us in virtue and justice, one who falls into adversity not through evil and depravity, but through some kind of error, and one belonging to the class of those who are of great renown and prosperity, such as Oedipus, Thyestes, and eminent men from such lineages. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

Giulia Sissa has shown shown how the *Poetics* depends on Aristotle's ethics and notions of voluntary and involuntary actions. *Hamartia* marks the failure in identifying another (Sissa 2006: 38). The actions depicted in a tragedy are pitiable precisely because they happen to loved ones, and they are dramatically preferable when done involuntarily, as a result of error. In this passage, Aristotle's definition of the fitting character for tragedy utilizes the capaciousness of the pronoun τοιοῦτος ("such"). We have seen in previous chapters that "being such" is a flexible form of identity—mimetic metamorphosis can alter one to "be such." Aristotle's preference for this kind of character and characters "from such families" (οἱ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν, 13.1453a11) shows how the pronoun develops from addressing or describing another character within a drama to particular kinds of characters at the level of commentary and literary criticism.

The use of εἰμί for the definition of this kind of character is again in the first, emphatic position of the sentence. Aristotle bestows a kind of being upon tragedy and the characters that tragedy represents. In the *Republic*, Socrates raises the issue of distinguishing friends who seem to be friends (δοκεῖν εἶναι, *Resp.* 1.334c7), but in fact are not (μὴ ὄντες), from true friends. The best kinds of character for a tragic plot are "those who are of great renown" (τῶν ἐν μεγάλῃ δόξῃ ὄντων, 13.1453a10). As I have discussed in Chapter 3, the reputation (δόξα) of the unjust man entails a kind of seeming (δοκεῖν) that allows him to act unjustly. For Aristotle, when depicting

tragic heroes, the identity or being of those characters depends upon their reputation, upon seeming.

To be or become "such" complicates being and allows for mistakes in recognition. We have seen this play out through the use of deictics in Aristophanes and Euripides to call attention both to characters who have undergone transformation as well as to the doubled meaning of the dramatic setting.[274] In the *Frogs*, after Dionysus Xanthias arrive in Hades, the god asks, "What's this?" (τουτὶ τί ἐστι; *Ran.* 181), to which Xanthias responds, "This? It's a lake" (τοῦτο; λίμνη, 181). Aristophanes uses deictics as a means of exposition: Dionysus and Xanthias tell the audience that "this is a lake" while pointing at the *orchēstra*, effectively telling them "the *orchēstra* is a lake." This encourages the audience to suspend their disbelief and also to recognize the change that the *orchēstra* has undergone. The referent of a deictic is made clear by gestures on stage, but this referentiality is complicated by claiming "this is that." Being (εἰμί) becomes difficult to pin down: to say "the *orchēstra* is a lake" acknowledges becoming ("the *orchēstra* has become a lake") as well as the performativity inherent to being ("the *orchēstra* is (being) a lake").

Euripides' *Bacchae* also traces how mimetic metamorphosis complicates the act of referring to another person or thing. When Dionysus enters the stage, he identifies his surroundings with the deictic pronoun "this" (e.g. "this Thebes"; τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα, *Bacch.* 1). As I argued in Chapter 2, Dionysian deixis adds a metatheatrical layer to the action of the play that comments on being and becoming effected through mimesis. In the *Poetics* Aristotle claims that the recognition "that this is that" is central to mimesis.

> ἐοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινὲς καὶ αὗται φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ

[274] Cf. Whitmarsh on metalepsis (2013: 4-16).

> συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὁρῶντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, οἷον ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος· ἐπεὶ ἐὰν μὴ τύχῃ προεωρακώς, οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν. (*Poet.* 4.1448b4-19)
>
> It can be seen that poetry was broadly engendered by a pair of causes, both natural. For mimesis is inborn in human beings from childhood on. Indeed, this distinguishes them from other animals: man is the most mimetic of all, and it is through mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding. And equally natural is the fact that everyone enjoys mimetic objects. A common occurrence indicates this: we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us, such as the forms of the vilest animals and of corpses. The explanation of this too is that understanding gives great pleasure not only to philosophers but likewise to others too, though the latter have a smaller share in it. This is why people enjoy looking at images, because through contemplating them it comes about that they understand and infer what each element means, for instance that "this is that." For, if one happens not to have seen the subject before, the image will not give pleasure *qua* mimesis but because of its execution or colour, or for some other such reason. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

The recognition"that this is that" (ὅτι οὗτος ἐκεῖνος, 4.1448b17) serves as the basis for Aristotle's theory of mimesis. The demonstrative pronouns οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος echo the prevalent use of pronouns to comment on mimetic metamorphosis in the prologue of Euripides' *Bacchae*. Aristotle inverts the *nomos/physis* dichotomy surrounding mimesis here, too: for Socrates in the *Republic*, mimetic poetry molds citizens from childhood on (ἐκ παίδων, 3.395c4; ἐκ νέων, 3.395d1) and they can become the worse for it. In this passage, however, both the practice of mimesis (τὸ μιμεῖσθαι) and its enjoyment (τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι) are completely natural or "innate" (σύμφυτον) to human beings (4.1448b5-9).[275] Aristotle uses biological language to discuss the production of poetry here, claiming that the causes for poetry are "natural" (φυσικαί)

[275] For Socrates the enjoyment one derives from poetry and drama is a strong reason to expel it from the state. Cf. Pl. *Resp.*: οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἑπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες, καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῇ (10.605d2-5).

and that human beings "beget" (γεννῆσαι) poetry. By emphasizing the educative aspect of mimesis and claiming it is natural, Aristotle suggests that poetry is not only a kind of appearance-making but a method of recognizing being.

Mimesis is not deceptive in this formulation, but rather informs the audience through their recognition of the represented subject. Aristotle employs soundplay to forward this argument, rhyming μάθησις ("learning," "lesson") with μίμησις: "…and it is through mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding" (καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, *Poet.* 4.1448b7-8). Learning happens at the same time that one contemplates representation (συμβαίνει θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἕκαστον, 4.1448b16). In contrast with the *Republic* where poetic imitation can be misleading and untruthful, further from the truth than the works of craftsmen, the pleasure of mimesis comes from learning. Curiously, Aristotle writes off the enjoyment of art for its execution or color. In Aristotle's theory of poetry, mimesis is not only natural and educative, but it is more essential to a piece of art than mere workmanship. In contrast, when Socrates divides mimesis from pure narrative in the *Republic* in his discussion of different styles, he claims to prefer the latter even while he remains bewitched by the former. In the *Poetics*, recognition serves as the antidote to ignorance in tragedy, and the recognition of a work of mimesis combats ignorance as well.[276] This view recuperates mimesis from its seeming epistemological impoverishment in Book 10 of the *Republic*.

Aristotle does not cite the *Bacchae* in the *Poetics*, but it is compelling that Tiresias and Cadmus refer to Dionysus with the demonstrative pronouns οὗτος and ἐκεῖνος in order to convince Pentheus of the god's identity and the importance of worshiping him. Tiresias compares Dionysus and Pentheus as rulers: "That one, too, I think, delights in being

[276] Cf. Sissa: "And in Aristotle's language, this is the polarity of tragedy—*agnoia* versus *anagnôrisis*." (2006: 46).

honored" (κἀκεῖνος, οἶμαι, τέρπεται τιμώμενος, *Bacch*. 321). Cadmus draws attention to Pentheus' familial relationship to Semele: "For even if he is not a god, as you say, say it anyway" (κεἰ μὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φῄς, / παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω, 333f.). While dressed as bacchants and discussing the god of theater, Tiresias and Cadmus refer to the same person with different pronouns ("this," οὗτος; and "that," ἐκεῖνος), hinting at how mimesis can change identity and make referentiality difficult because "this is that." Dionysus plays on the ambiguity produced by mimesis when he appears before Pentheus as the Lydian stranger by using the first and third person to trace the connection between his two identities when he warns Pentheus: "For when you wrong me, you lead him into chains" (ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν κεῖνον ἐς δεσμοὺς ἄγεις, 518). For the audience, mimetic metamorphosis produces a moment of dramatic irony where they know that the Lydian stranger ("I," ἡμεῖς) is the same person as Dionysus ("he," ἐκεῖνος).[277] We have seen that costume and props can affect characters' gestures and behavior, ultimately changing them. When Aristotle defines mimesis as the recognition that "this is that," he recognizes the importance of speech in enacting mimesis.

III. Nature

In Plato's *Republic* in Chapter 3 we saw the language of seriousness (σπουδαῖος) and triviality (φαῦλος), a key signifier in terms of the dangers of mimesis. The subject matter of poetry is not only trivial—it can trivialize all the way to the watcher. Aristotle picks up this same language, but he does not share the same anxiety about mimesis. Instead, he shows how different genres and poets move towards the *telos* of being more serious or trivial than they were before. Aristotle's use of the serious/trivial binary differs from Plato because it is used to depict the evolution of genres of poetry over time as they become more like themselves. In Plato the serious

[277] Segal reads the *Bacchae*'s finale as a recognition of Dionysus as destroyer, a reversal of fortune from the ecstasy of the initiate (1999-2000: 289.)

and trivial are useful identifiers for the characters and actions that are appropriate or inappropriate for the guardians to imitate. In this section of the conclusion I trace the language of the serious and the trivial as it is applied to tragedy and mimesis at various appoints in the *Poetics* in order to show how poetry itself changes over time and affects the other links in the chain of poetry.

Aristotle defines tragedy as the mimesis of a serious action (ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας, *Poet.* 1449b24). In the first critique of mimesis, Plato employs similar language about seriousness when Socrates claims that "when he [sc. the moderate man] comes upon a character unworthy of himself, he will not seriously wish to make himself resemble that inferior character" (ὅταν δὲ γίγνηται κατά τινα ἑαυτοῦ ἀνάξιον, οὐκ ἐθελήσειν σπουδῇ ἀπεικάζειν ἑαυτὸν τῷ χείρονι, *Resp.* 3.396d3-5).[278] Socrates uses the adverb σπουδῇ ("earnestly"), which is related to the adjective σπουδαῖος ("earnest," "serious"), anticipating Aristotle's distinction between serious (σπουδαῖος) and trivial (φαῦλος) genres, poets, and characters in the *Poetics.*[279] Socrates polarizes mimesis as something that can be done either earnestly (σπουδῇ) or playfully (παιδιᾶς χάριν)—the former only when the character we imitate will educate us and the latter only to remind us that we must keep ourselves distant from an inferior character. The guardians will only play a worse or more trivial character than them in specific conditions, such as performing a good action, and even then they distance themselves from that character by "dishonoring that person in his mind, unless it's done in play" (ἀτιμάζων τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὅτι μὴ παιδιᾶς χάριν, 3.396e1).

We have seen in the *Acharnians* and *Thesmophoriazusae* that the genre and content of poetry depends on the character of the poet (e.g., Euripides' beggar heroes, and Agathon's effeminate

[278] Translation adapted from Grube (1997).
[279] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. σπεύδω.

lyricism). According to Aristotle, the differences in poets' characters are essential in the formation and development of particular poetic genres.

> διεσπάσθη δὲ κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη ἡ ποίησις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, οἱ δὲ εὐτελέστεροι τὰς τῶν φαύλων, πρῶτον ψόγους ποιοῦντες, ὥσπερ ἕτεροι ὕμνους καὶ ἐγώμια. (*Poet.* 4.1448b24-27)
>
> Poetry branched into two, according to its creators' characters: the more serious produced mimesis of noble actions and the actions of such people, while the more vulgar depicted the actions of the base, in the first place by composing invectives, just as others produced hymns and encomia. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

The evolution of poetry into two types depends on the characters of the poets themselves. This kind of essentialism is already familiar to us from Aristophanes' depiction of Agathon, Euripides, and Aeschylus. In Aristotle's teleological vision, this essentialism allows for poetry to change into its current forms of tragedy and comedy. Poetry is drawn to "its creators' characters" (lit. "to their own characters," τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη, 4.1448b24). The adjective οἰκεῖος ("one's own"), which derives from the noun οἶκος ("house," "family"), suggests a kinship between the authors and their poetic genres.[280]

This kinship recalls Gorgias' use of the synonymous adjective ἴδιος ("one's own," "private") in his discussion of poetry in the *Encomium of Helen*.[281] Through the power of language, one's soul experiences other's misfortunes as its own (ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίαις καὶ δυσπραγίαις ἴδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή, DK 82 B11.9).[282] There is a fundamental difference, however, between the way that Gorgias and Aristotle understand this essentialism of what is "one's own." For Gorgias, one adopts another's experience into the self from outside as one's own (ἴδιόν τι πάθημα). Aristotle understands

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[280] Cf. Chantraine (1968-77) & Frisk (1960-72) s.v. οἶκος.
[281] For ἴδιος as synonym of οἰκεῖος, cf. LSJ s.v. οἰκεῖος A.III.2.
[282] For discussion of Gorgias and adjective ἴδιος in this fragment, see introduction, pp. (16f.).

character as a refining of what is already in oneself and natural to oneself (τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη). Character is actually fundamental to the nature of genre itself and it develops over time.

The use of the pronoun τοιοῦτος ("such") in this passage shows the similarity not only of authors and genres but of the fine deeds and the agents who perform them: "the more serious [poets] produced mimesis of noble actions and the actions of such people" (οἱ μὲν γὰρ σεμνότεροι τὰς καλὰς ἐμιμοῦντο πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων, *Poet.* 4.1448b25-26). Poets compose poetry and represent characters that serve as extensions of themselves, all of which (the serious poet, the serious genre, etc.) become more and more like themselves. Initially, more trivial poets represented actions of trivial characters and therefore wrote blame poetry in iambics, and more serious poets wrote epics: "Of the poets of old, some became composers of epics, others of iambics" (καὶ ἐγένοντο τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἡρωικῶν οἱ δὲ ἰάμβων ποιηταί, 4.1448b32-34). The essential identity (or being) of particular genres and poets as either σπουδαῖος or φαῦλος (or, as here, their synonyms σεμνός, "solemn," and εὐτελής, "worthless") is depicted as a kind of evolutionary becoming (ἐγένοντο) where poets from an older period in literary history become differentiated over time to such an extent that they write in different genres. Thus, the serious and trivial poets first attracted to iambics and epics become tragic and comic poets.

In addition to poets and their genres, Aristotle describes the kinds of people mimetic artists represent as either serious (σπουδαῖος) or trivial (φαῦλος).

> ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις, κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες, ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς · (*Poet.* 2.1448a1-5)
>
> Since mimetic artists represent people in action, and the latter should be either elevated or base (for characters almost always align with just these types, as it is through vice and virtue that the characters of all men vary), they can represent people better than our normal level, worse than it, or much the same. As too with painters. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

In defining the likenesses of characters to the kinds of people they are meant to represent, Aristotle discusses how people differ from each other. He relies on a sense of universality when he writes about this difference: "characters almost always" (τὰ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεί) fall into two types (serious and trivial); "the characters of all men vary through vice and virtue" (κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες, 2.1448a3-5). Mimesis depends on the recognition of similarity, not only on the similarity of "this is that" but also on the recognition of the fact that characters are in some way like us (τοιοῦτοι). Aristotle defines this likeness by difference: for these characters to be "such" so that we recognize them, they must differ from one another in seriousness or triviality, just as tragic and comic poets do.[283]

In Euripides' *Bacchae* Dionysus exchanges his form for the nature or φύσις of a human being: "I have changed my shape into the nature of a man" (μορφήν τ' ἐμὴν μετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν, *Bacch.* 54). Euripides plays on the dichotomy of *nomos* and *physis* in these lines—what is the relationship of form (μορφή) to nature (φύσις)? How does one change (μεταβάλλω) one's nature? Aristotle's history of tragedy and comedy accounts for transformation, but it is a transformation leading to a *telos*, the perfection of one's nature.

> παραφανείσης δὲ τῆς τραγῳδίας καὶ κωμῳδίας οἱ ἐφ' ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν ὁρμῶντες κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν οἱ μὲν ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο, οἱ δὲ ἀντὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τραγῳδοδιδάσκαλοι, διὰ τὸ μείζω καὶ ἐντιμότερα τὰ σχήματα εἶναι ταῦτα ἐκείνων. (*Poet.* 4.1449a2-6)
>
> And when tragedy and comedy had shown themselves, those whose own natures gave them an impetus towards either type of poetry abandoned iambic lampoons and became comic poets or they abandoned epic and became tragedians because these newer forms were grander and more esteemed than those. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

According to Aristotle, poetry comes naturally to human beings and progresses over time depending on the nature of the poet. Iambic and epic poets became (ἐγένοντο) poets of another

[283] Cf. Deleuze (1994: 70).

genre because they were driven "by their own nature" (κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν, *Poet.* 4.1449a2) to a genre fitting that nature and also exceeding the previous genre (comedy and tragedy, respectively). The relation of "these forms" (τὰ σχήματα ταῦτα) of poetry and "those" (ἐκεῖνα) is one of comparison and progress. Aristotle draws our attention to the similarity of these poetic genres by claiming that "these" poetic forms are greater and more esteemed than "those" and invoking the formula of mimetic metamorphosis that "this is that" (or, "these are those," ταῦτα ἐικεῖνα). Both tragedy and comedy retain likeness to their previous forms (epic, iambic) but they are more perfectly themselves, more serious and trivial, in these new forms. The word for "form" (σχῆμα) also refers to a body or form of a person, notably those that change through mimesis, as in Aristophanes and Plato.[284]

The relationship of identity to nature is one of becoming or self-discovery. When Aristotle discusses tragic meter, he claims that "its very nature discovered the fitting meter" (αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον εὗρε, *Poet.* 4.1449a24). Similar to the temporality of becoming that occurs when an actor takes on the costume and accoutrements of the character he represents, tragedy and comedy gradually (κατὰ μικρόν, 4.1449a13) advanced over time. Over time tragedy stopped changing because it had achieved its nature: "After it had undergone many changes, tragedy stopped changing since it had acquired its own nature" (καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν, 4.1449a14-15). The genre of tragedy changes over time (πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα), much like the characters it represents whose fortunes change in the progress of each tragedy. Tragedy does not have an

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[284] E.g., Dionysus possesses the form of Heracles when he imitates him: καθ' Ἡρακλέα τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ λῆμ' ἔχων (Ar. *Ran.* 463); Praxagora tells one of her compatriots to lean her body on a staff so she appears more like an old man (διερεισαμένη τὸ σχῆμα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ, *Eccl.* 150); the women kept their look or appearance throughout the assembly (καὐταὶ γὰρ ἀλγοῦσιν πάλαι τὸ σχῆμα τοῦτ' ἔχουσαι, *Eccl.* 503); likening oneself to another, or mimesis, occurs in the voice or "body" (κατὰ σχῆμα, Pl. *Resp.* 3.393c4-5).

unchanging *physis* from start, however.[285] Much as with Dionysus, this raises a puzzle: what is one's nature if that nature must be discovered, acquired, or perfected over time? For Socrates in the *Republic*, the guardians must only imitate serious characters, but this depends on a kind of prescription based on an essentialist notion of *physis*. In the *Poetics*, poets are attracted to a particular genre with particular characters (serious or trivial), but their natures develop over time.[286]

IV. Affect

The likeness of one's nature to another's helps to explain how genres and poets are paired with the serious and trivial actions and characters they represent. Likeness is also significant for the ultimate work of tragedy, which is to arouse pity and fear. Tragedy must not represent good men (ἐπιεικής) whose fortunes change from good to bad because that would be neither pitiable nor fearful, but(μιαρόν) (13.1452b34-35).[287] Likewise, tragedy should not represent wicked men whose fortune changes for the worse because…

> τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον (ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον), ὥστε οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερὸν ἔσται τὸ συμβαῖνον. (*Poet.* 13.1453a1-7)
>
> Such a pattern might arouse fellow feeling, but not pity or fear, since the one [pity] is felt for the undeserving victim of adversity, the other [fear] for one like ourselves (pity for the undeserving, fear for one like ourselves), so the outcome will be neither pitiable nor fearful. (trans. Halliwell 1995, adapted)

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[285] E. Segal argues that comedy does not reach its *physis* until around the time Aristotle writes the *Poetics* with Menander (1973: 131).

[286] Not only is comedy a mimesis of trivial things (ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, Arist. *Poet.* 5.1449a32-33), its history has been forgotten because it is not serious: αἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις καὶ δι' ὧν ἐγένοντο οὐ λελήθασιν, ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία διὰ τὸ μὴ σπουδάζεσθαι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλαθεν (5.1449a37-49b1).

[287] Plato uses the same adjective ἐπιεικής ("good," "decent") to describe good women who should not imitate inappropriate characters (Pl. *Resp.* 3.398e1-4).

According to Aristotle, then, fear is a tragic emotion aroused for someone who is like oneself (περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον).[288] Pity, on the other hand, is a tragic emotion aroused by the suffering of someone who does not deserve to suffer (περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον). Through this pairing of pity and fear, Aristotle draws attention back to similarity and likeness between one character and another. While he defines fear specifically as a fear someone like us (ὅμοιος), pity also requires likeness or at least proximity.

Aristotle defines pity in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* in a similar fashion as a feeling for someone who does not deserve their suffering. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle explains that the unworthy person is much closer to the viewer than might be apparent in the *Poetics* passage. Aristotle emphasizes this closeness with the intensive pronoun αὐτός ("himself").

> ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὃ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοῦτο, ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον οἷον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἷον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον· (*Rh.* 2.8.1385b13-19)[289]
>
> So let pity be a certain pain upon the appearance of evil, either destructive or painful, befalling someone who does not deserve it, which someone might expect himself to suffer or some one of his friends whenever it seems near. For, clearly, it is necessary that the person who will feel pity be such a one as to think he himself or one of his friends would suffer some evil such as has been stated in the definition, either like it or about the same.

When one perceives an apparent evil (φαινόμενον κακόν, 1385b13), one feels pity either for oneself or for someone from one's circle of acquaintances (ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινα, 1385b15). Pity requires a perceived likeness, a shared relationship, or even proximity. Aristotle notes that one feels pity "whenever it seems near" (ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται, 1385b15-16), thus translating the

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[288] One of the four aims concerning character is likeness (τὸ ὅμοιον). Character is revealed in a moral choice (προαίρεσις) through action or speech. The four aims of character are: 1) they should be good (χρηστά); 2) characters should be fitting (ἁρμόττοντα); 3) they should share a likeness (τὸ ὅμοιον); and 4) they should have consistency (to ὁμαλόν) (Arist. *Poet.* 15.1454a16-26).
[289] Greek text of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* from Ross' OCT (1959).

future-oriented timing of pity and the expectation of suffering into spatial terms of closeness. The person who feels pity must "be such" (ὑπάρχειν τοιοῦτον, 1385b16-17) so as to recognize himself or someone he knows in the undeserving victim of suffering. Thus, as we see in the *Poetics*, not only is there a shared likeness between poet, genre, actions, and character, there is a likeness, a capaciousness to "be such," between those categories and the one who watches or reads them. This is what allows pity and fear to occur and change the viewer.

Despite Aristotle's definition of the dramatic mode as that of enactment, he treats tragedy as though it is disembodied. Aristotle allows that the fearful and pitiable can arise from spectacle, but he excludes it from the art of tragedy, claiming its power lies outside of performance (ἀγών) and actors (ὑποκριταί) (6.1450b18-20).[290] Instead, the tragedian organizes plots so that they evoke pity and fear and compel even a reader to shiver at the events portrayed.

> δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον ὥστε τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων· ἅπερ ἂν πάθοι τις ἀκούων τὸν τοῦ Οἰδίπου μῦθον. τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατῶδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδίᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶσαν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἡδονὴν ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας ἀλλὰ τὴν οἰκείαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον. (*Poet.* 14.1453b3-14)
>
> For the plot should be so structured that, even without seeing it performed, the person who hears the events that occur shivers and feels pity at what comes about (as one would feel when hearing the plot of the *Oedipus*). To create this effect through spectacle has little to do with the poet's art, and requires material resources. Those who use spectacle to create an effect not of the fearful but only of the sensational have nothing at all in common with tragedy, as it is not every pleasure one should seek from tragedy, but the appropriate kind. And since the poet should create the pleasure which comes from pity and fear through mimesis, it is clear that this should be built into the events. (trans. Halliwell, adapted)

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[290] A counter to this claim can be found in Eur. *Bacch*. Foley argues that in the *Bacchae* "the plot or arrangement of events, the action or *praxis*, and the spectacle become for large parts of this play one and the same thing." (1985: 219).

Aristotle says that spectacle can produce pity and fear, but in this passage the preference for arousing these emotions are narrative. Poets should not rely on spectacle or sensationalism, but instead seek the appropriate pleasure (ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή). Even in this example, when tragedy is divorced from dramatic impersonation, the audience experiences a physical effect ("shivering," φρίττειν) when listening to mimetic representations in narrative.

Aristotle may not prefer spectacle over narrative for furnishing feelings of pity and fear, but he uses the same theatrical verb for costuming and equipping props (παρασκευάζειν) for the emotions of pity and fear that spectacle and poetry produce in an audience.The repetition of the verb, a metaphor from theater, in this context draws attention to the materiality of both spectacle and mimetic poetry and the efficacy of that materiality in transforming their intended audiences.[291] Spectacle furnishes the tragic emotions (τὸ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν) but it requires material resources (δεόμενόν ἐστιν, *Poet.* 14.1453b7-8). Aristotle claims that the tragic poet should instead induce pity and fear through the plot: "since the poet should create the pleasure which comes from pity and fear through mimesis, it is clear that this should be built into the events" (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως δεῖ ἡδονὴν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν, φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον, *Poet.* 14.1453b3-14).

The verb παρασκευάζω ("prepare") and noun παρασκευή ("providing," "procurement") are compounds that ultimately derive from the noun σκεῦος ("vessel," "implement") and the denominative verb σκευάζω ("furnish"). Cognates and compounds of the verb σκευάζω ("furnish") have appeared throughout the passages I have discussed in this dissertation, usually in relation to mimetic metamorphosis. In dramatic and metatheatrical contexts σκευάζω can also

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[291] The verb παρασκευάζω is used in regard to thought, which is furnished by speech (ἔστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι, Arist. *Poet.* 19.1456a36-37), and in regard to creating emotion in a tragedy (τὸ πάθη παρασκευάζειν, 19.1456a38).

mean to "dress up." In Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis recognizes Cleisthenes dressed up as a eunuch. In Aristophanes' *Frogs* and Euripides' *Bacchae* the god Dionysus uses the noun σκευή ("equipment") to refer to his own Heracles costume and Pentheus' bacchant apparel.[292] Plato uses the verb παρασκευάζω in the *Republic* when Glaucon gives the example of the unjust man who furnishes himself with a great reputation, thus drawing a parallel between seeming and costuming.[293]

The preponderance of the vocabulary of furnishing oneself or another with costume and seeming evinces a development in the theorization of mimetic metamorphosis in the classical period that parallels the organization of the argument of the dissertation. In Aristophanes and Euripides we see those first two chains in the magnetic link, the poet and the actor, costume themselves and change in the process. Glaucon's unjust man shows the caution with which Socrates treats mimesis and seeming in the *Republic*. In Aristotle, he treats the catharsis of pity and fear as the ultimate goal of mimesis. This is what a poet must furnish his audience, that last link in the chain, through the representation of tragic events.

In the passage above, Aristotle uses the adjective οἰκεῖος in reference to the "fitting pleasure of tragedy" (ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή). This same adjective is used to describe the characters and genres that are fitting for each poet. I end with Aristotle's conception of tragedy and its "fitting pleasure" in order to reflect on the language of mimetic metamorphosis I have traced throughout the dissertation. My project has grappled with this very question of what is "one's own" (οἰκεῖος) and what is another's, especially when one pretends to be another and takes on new characteristics. At what point does one become another person? As we saw with Gorgias, poetry

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[292] Ar. *Ach.* 121-22; *Ran.* 108f.; Eur. *Bacch*. 915. For metatheatrical uses of σκευάζω and compounds of the same verb, see Ar. *Ach.* 383f., 738f.; *Thesm.* 590f.; *Ran.* 522-23.
[293] *Resp*. 2.361a6-b1.

has the power to make us experience the fortunes and misfortunes as well as the emotions of another as "one's own" (ἴδιος). In Plato's *Ion*, the rhapsode sees himself standing on the threshold, just like Odysseus, and weeps and shivers at pitiable and fearful events. In the magnet analogy, Socrates states that magnet implants (ἐντίθημι) its power into iron rings, enabling them to attract other rings (δύναμιν ἐντίθησι τοῖς δακτυλίοις, Pl. *Ion* 533d6).

While Aristotle does not discuss inspiration as such, he recognizes that the poet must include fearful and pitiable events in the plot: "it is clear that this should be built into the events" (φανερὸν ὡς τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμποιητέον, *Poet.* 14.1453b3-14). Aristotle inherits the language of being and becoming that surrounds mimesis and incorporates the idea of change into his definition of poetry and tragedy at multiple points, most especially his declarations that a plot includes a change in fortune, and that recognition is the change from ignorance to knowledge. In the *Poetics* mimetic metamorphosis becomes enshrined as a literary ideal that should also be "put into" the plot (ἐμποιητέον). Aristotle values mimesis because the representation of events affect the audience and cause them to experience another's experiences and emotions as their own. According to Aristotle, everyone enjoys recognizing that "this is that," or "this has become that." By reading Aristotle through the lens of (and as an inheritor of) his literary precursors, we can see that just as the Muse's inspiration travels from herself to the poet, actor, and audience, the theorization of mimetic metamorphosis in Aristophanes, Euripides, and Plato moves along a similar path through the classical period.

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