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Destroying the Modes of Signifying:

Anti-Modism in Late Medieval Philosophy of Language

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Philosophy

by

Milo Jon-Christopher Crimi

2020

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2020

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Destroying the Modes of Signifying:

Anti-Modism in Late Medieval Philosophy of Language

by

Milo Jon-Christopher Crimi

Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

University of California, Los Angeles, 2020

Professor Brian P. Copenhaver, Co-chair

Professor Calvin G. Normore, Co-chair

This is a study of the anonymous *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying* (*DMS*). Produced in the mid- to late fourteenth century and occasionally attributed to the famous French cardinal Peter of Ailly (1351–1420), the *DMS* is one of very few surviving texts representative of late medieval anti-modist polemics. A fundamental tenet of modism is what I call 'the Modist Correspondence Thesis' ('MCT'), which asserts that the syntactic features of language are grounded in the ontological properties of the world. The *DMS* argues forcefully against MCT and offers an alternative theory that grounds syntax in mental language. Part 1 of the dissertation is an essay addressing the issue of authorship. Part 2 is an essay focusing on MCT and the negative project of repudiating modism. Part 3 provides a Latin edition and English translation of the text of the *DMS*.

The dissertation of Milo Jon-Christopher Crimi is approved.

Adam David Crager

Mary Sirridge

Mikko Yrjönsuuri

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University of California, Los Angeles

2020

In memory of my mother.

Paix et soleil.

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PREFACE

> Pale horse vows in the sacred signs,
> traded for an infinite aloneness to find
> wooden signs, helpful signs.
> How to fit your thoughts in mine?[1]

It's been a tough year for everyone. Completing a dissertation in the middle of a global health and economic crisis has been difficult. I haven't had unrestricted access to a library since March, nor have I left my apartment except for the essentials. In the past few weeks, my students and I have had to learn how to navigate a fully online curriculum. But these are barely hardships at all. As I write this, the *New York Times* reports over 26.6 million cases of COVID-19 and 875,610 deaths worldwide. A disproportionate number of these belong to the United States, where unemployment numbers are likewise staggering and cruel social inequalities are becoming even more deeply entrenched. I'm extremely lucky to have avoided the worst of this disaster. Social distancing is a time-tested writing technique, after all. And the dissertation has often been a welcome distraction. My sympathies go out to those whose pain, unlike mine, is too intense to be ignored.

I'm very grateful for the measures that the UCLA library system and the HathiTrust have taken to provide remote access to materials. I'm also very grateful to colleagues and friends for generously sharing their own resources. But lockdowns and slowdowns have nevertheless interfered at several points along the way. And so I ask forgiveness for the bibliographical deficiencies.

The content of my dissertation has also been shaped by circumstances, though ones of significantly less gravity. My original intention was to produce a study of fourteenth-century

[1] mewithoutYou 2015.

theories of material supposition (*suppositio materialis*). Over the course of several years, it became increasingly clear that completing that project would require three things I didn't have: more time, more texts, and a better understanding of the medieval grammatical tradition. Having no control over the first and little control over the second, I reached for the third. This is the result.

I owe thanks to more people than I could possibly list here. First of all, I thank the co-chairs of my committee, Brian Copenhaver and Calvin Normore – my advisors, mentors, and friends. Brian's generosity is paralleled only by Calvin's, and Calvin's wisdom only by Brian's. Calvin was my academic hero when he kindly agreed to give a talk at the undergraduate philosophy club at Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, where we first met. Brian joined that league when Calvin introduced us during my prospective visit to UCLA the following winter. Over the years, their support has been constant and their guidance has been expert.

Next, I thank my committee, Adam Crager, Mary Sirridge, and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, whose comments were just potent enough to generate significant improvements and restrained enough to avoid inducing panic. Through Adam's example, I've learned what energetic, rigorous, and profound scholarship in the history of philosophy looks like. Mary has been remarkably generous with her time, advice, and encouragement. It was through conversations with her at ESMLS 2018 in Düsseldorf that I became convinced that I needed to know a lot more about medieval grammatical theory. Mikko has been a perennial source of exceptionally valuable feedback during his frequent visits to UCLA.

I also owe thanks to my sixth and unofficial committee member Terry Parsons, who provided two especially key pieces of advice at a crucial stage. In paraphrase: "Start at the start and end at the end" and "Get to the point." I doubt that I've successfully implemented Terry's sage advice. But I continue to strive.

The UCLA philosophy department is a wonderful community, and there isn't a single member who hasn't in some way been a source of support to me. I'll only name a few friends, colleagues, and mentors who have been particularly helpful and kind. Among faculty: John Carriero, Barbara Herman, Andrew Hsu, David Kaplan, Gavin Lawrence, Seana Shiffrin, and Sean Walsh. Among graduate students, there are of course the six wonders: Ian Boon, Jenna Donohue, Kim Johnston, Amber Kavka-Warren, Vaheh Shirvanian, and Femi Taiwo. Ian and Kim have been especially good friends and gracious hosts. In addition: Christian De Leon, Antti Hiltunen, John Kardosh, Bill Kowalsky, Alexi Patsaouras, and Aaron West. Among staff: Ellen Evaristo, Julian Fischer, and Doug Myers.

For generous financial support at various stages throughout the PhD program, I thank the UCLA Graduate Division and the UCLA Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies.

Numerous other scholars from outside UCLA have also been gracious with their feedback, advice, or instruction. There are way too many to list. I'll just highlight a few with whom I've interacted especially closely or from whom I've learned especially much: Jacob Archambault, Josh Blander, Deb Brown, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Joseph Jedwab, Peter King, Gyula Klima, Henrik Lagerlund, Andre Martin, Chris Martin, Magali Roques, Boaz Schuman, Paul Spade, and Tom Ward. Special thanks to Christoph Kann for permission to use a passage from an unpublished edition of Thomas Maulfelt's *On Suppositions* in this dissertation.

Two colleagues deserve extra special thanks. First: my good friend Graziana Ciola, whose counsel, both scholarly and personal, made being a young medievalist at UCLA a little less lonely and a lot more fun. Second: my goatherd Allan Bäck, the most gifted and inspiring teacher I've ever known. Semper hircus.

I also thank Mark, Brian, Jeremy, and Yu Xiang for their friendship, The Melvins for rocking so damn hard, Nick Foles for the Philly Special, and Patrick "Lips" Cannolo and Kiki Artemis Reow for their pleasant, furry company. And I thank my family for their love, especially my mother. This dissertation is dedicated to her memory.

Above all I thank my best friend Allison, whose kindness makes it all possible, whose patience makes it all endurable, and whose humor makes it all worthwhile. She absolutely rules.

VITA

EDUCATION

CPhil Philosophy, UCLA, 2017.
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PUBLICATIONS

2018. "Formal and Material Consequences in Ockham and Buridan." *Vivarium* 56 (3–4): 241–271.
2017. "Ideally Sized Islands: Reply to Danielyan, Garrett, and Plantinga." *Analysis* 77 (2): 273–278.
2014. "Significative Supposition and Ockham's Rule." *Vivarium* 52 (1–2): 72–101.

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Honorable Mention: Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy Founders' Prize, 2019.
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Graduate Summer Research Mentorship, UCLA Graduate Division, Summer 2014.

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"*Hoc est corpus meum*: The Logic of the Words of Consecration in Pico's *Apology*." Umanesimo e Nuovo Umanesimo, L'Instituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento di Firenze and La Scuola Normale di Pisa, December 12–14, 2018.

"How Material Supposition is Possible." 22nd European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, "Language, Thought, and Reality: The Continental and British Traditions of Medieval Logic Revisited," University of Düsseldorf, June 25–29, 2018.

"Dialectical Invention and the Logic of Places (*Loci*) in Peter of Spain and Rudolph Agricola." 53rd International Congress on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 10–13, 2018.

"The 13th-Century Problem of Self-Sacrifice and Marguerite Porete's *Mirror of Simple Souls*." 5th Annual Symposium on Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Saint Louis University, June 19–20, 2017.

"The Problem of Self-Sacrifice in 13th-Century Philosophy." 52nd International Congress on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 11–14, 2017.

"Demonstratives and Signs of Materiality in Late Medieval Supposition Theory." 34th Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy with the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science, Fordham University, October 28–30, 2016.

"Ockham and Buridan on the Distinction between Formal and Material Consequences." 11th International Congress of HoPoS, The International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, June 22–25, 2016.

"'Argument' ('*Argumentum*') and 'Middle' ('*Medium*') in Peter of Spain's Logic of Places (*Loci*)." 4th Annual Symposium on Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Saint Louis University, June 20–22, 2016.

"The Third Mode of Equivocation in Ockham's Mental Language." 51st International Congress on Medieval Studies, Western Michigan University, May 12–15, 2016.

"Mental Language and Ockham's Bias in Favor of Personal Supposition." 90th American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco, CA, March 30–April 2, 2016.

"Impossible Intrinsic Middles in Ockham's Theory of Consequences." 113th American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, IL, March 2–5, 2016.

"Seeking a Cartesian Contextual Definition of 'Life'." Illinois Philosophical Association Conference, Eastern Illinois University, November 13–15, 2015.

"Material Supposition in the Fourteenth and Early Fifteenth Centuries." 33rd Annual Joint Meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy with the Society for the Study of Islamic Philosophy and Science, Fordham University, October 23–25, 2015.

"Some Aspects of Marsilius of Inghen's Supposition Theory." Annual Meeting of the British Society for the History of Philosophy, York University, April 9–11, 2015.

INTRODUCTION

Virtually all late medieval thinkers commented in some way on the relationship between language and reality. Broad concern with this subject transcends any 'English-Continental Split' there might – or might not – have been. Still, it's been hypothesized that the universities of Oxford and Paris pursued significantly different approaches to logic and grammar during the mid-thirteenth century.[2] As the story goes, Oxford embraced terminism while Paris, having abandoned terminism, was instead dominated by modism. Parisian modists (*modistae*) are supposed to have achieved the peak of their prominence among the arts faculty between about 1240 and 1270,[3] though just how prominent the modists were is a matter of debate.[4] But the theories on offer were certainly controversial and varied. Modist grammarians emphasized syntax, positing various modes of signifying (*modi significandi*) to explain syntactic structure.[5] Terminist logicians emphasized semantics, positing various properties of terms (*proprietates terminorum*), particularly supposition (*suppositio*), to account for semantic content.[6] The two approaches are, in certain respects, compatible. But modists and terminists did clash, especially in the fourteenth century, when

[2] de Libera 1982; Ebbesen 1983.

[3] Pinborg 1982, pp. 256–257; Rosier-Catach 2010, pp. 203–204.

[4] Bäck, unpublished.

[5] For background on speculative grammar and modism, see Bursill-Hall 1971; Pinborg 1967; Pinborg 1982; Marmo 1994; Rosier 1983; Rosier 1994; Rosier-Catach 2010, esp. pp. 203–215. For a bibliography up to 1976, see Ashworth 1978.

[6] For background on terminist logic and supposition theory, see Ashworth, 2010, esp. pp. 152–157; Cameron 2011; Dutilh Novaes 2007, pp. 7–77; Kann 2016; Parsons 2008; Spade 2007, esp. ch. 8–9, pp. 243–308; Swiniarski 1970, pp. 181–217.

terminism became more closely associated with nominalism and modism remained representative of realism.[7]

A particularly forceful statement of fourteenth-century anti-modism is found in Peter of Ailly's (1351 – 1420) *Concepts* (ca. 1372).[8] Peter denies modism three times, with increasing hostility, at the conclusion of his treatise:

> […] no 'modes of signifying' […] are to be maintained for significative utterances. For there are no such things added on to those utterances.[9]

> […] it is unneeded, unnecessary and in fact useless to posit, in the case of words, modes of signifying added on to utterances […].[10]

---

[7] The conflict appears to have continued, to some extent at least, into the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries: the French physician Symphorien Champier (1471–1539) saw it worthwhile to publish, maybe before 1501, a short introduction to logic providing what the editors and translators of that text call 'a nominalist critique of modist grammar' (Copenhaver & Ward 2015, p. 549).

[8] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980. Spade based his translation of the *Concepts* off of two incunables: Goff A-470 and A-472. There was no modern Latin edition of the *Concepts* when Spade was preparing his translation, and he wasn't able to locate any manuscripts. (The Turin and Cracow manuscripts Spade consulted only contain the *Insolubles*, not the *Concepts*.) See Spade 1980a, pp. 13–14. In the same year that Spade's translation was printed, Ludger Kaczmarek produced an edition of the *Concepts*, which I unfortunately haven't yet been able to access (Kaczmarek 1980). (See the Preface.)

[9] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980, ¶85, p. 33.

[10] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980, ¶87, p. 33.

> […] those people are completely wasting their time and working to no purpose – they throw away their effort – who try to posit modes of signifying added on to utterances so that those utterances signify in this way or that […].[11]

Despite all the venom, Peter doesn't provide a single substantive argument against modism in the *Concepts*.[12] Instead, he offers up the terminist theory as an alternative while making an oblique appeal to its relative ontological parsimony. This is consistent with the text's aim, which is constructive: to provide a theory of concepts (*conceptus*) and an account of the structure of mental language. The *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying* (*DMS*), as the title suggests, takes a different approach.[13] It first outlines some key modist doctrines and the arguments in favor of them,[14] it then puts forth a litany of anti-modist arguments,[15] all before presenting the 'truer way' ('*via verior*') – a very brief outline of the view on fuller display in the *Concepts*.[16] The remainder of the text applies the truer way to issues in grammar[17] and levels counterarguments against the modist arguments from the first part.[18] As a whole, it prescribes terminism as a cure for the ill of modism.

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[11] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980, ¶88, pp. 33–34.

[12] Spade points this out too, describing the *Concepts* as 'expository' rather than 'argumentative' (Spade 1980a, pp. 8–9).

[13] For a brief discussion of how modism is rebuked in the *DMS*, see Pinborg 1982, pp. 204–207.

[14] *DMS* §§2–31.

[15] *DMS* §§32–60.

[16] *DMS* §§61–66.5.

[17] *DMS* §§67–85.3.

[18] *DMS* §§86–110.

The authorship of the *DMS* is unknown. Ludger Kaczmarek, who produced an excellent edition of the *DMS* and has conducted the most thorough study to date of the text's authorship, considers both the long-standing attribution to Peter and the more recently uncovered possibility that the text was authored by Thomas Maulfelt.[19] But, impressive as Kaczmarek's investigation is, the results are inconclusive. In a favorable review of Kaczmarek's edition, E.J. Ashworth sums up the situation as follows:

> Kaczmarek's lengthy discussion of the problem of authorship reveals that there is no solid evidence for either attribution and some evidence against. Any final answer will depend on a much better knowledge of the interrelationships of fourteenth-century writers, schools of thought, and texts than we have at present.[20]

This dissertation is intended as a preliminary step in the direction Ashworth recommends. I hope that presenting the text of the *DMS* and studying its contents will not only prove philosophically valuable but will also eventually contribute to uncovering the text's relationships to other fourteenth-century grammatical and logical treatises, so that we might get a better sense of the place of the *DMS* in the history of philosophy, including who wrote it, and when, where, and why. Knowing these things would considerably aid our understanding of the timeline and shape of the

[19] Kaczmarek 1994, pp. xv–xli.

[20] Ashworth 1996, p. 726.

fourteenth-century anti-modist movement, which in turn would help inform our understanding of the late medieval realism-nominalism dispute. Continuing her review, Ashworth remarks:

> The edition itself is meticulously done, though […] [t]he numbering of clauses and arguments is not as perspicuous as it could be, and this points to one of the weaknesses of the volume. It has neither translation nor explanatory notes, and it also lacks a doctrinal introduction, so that only the initiated reader is going to grasp what the text is actually about.

I also hope that this dissertation can, by proxy, fulfill some of the wishes on this list.

Part 1 is an essay addressing the issue of authorship. My results, like Kaczmarek's, are mostly negative. To the extent that I do offer a positive result, it's to recommend more serious consideration of the author's relationship to John Buridan. While I think we can have reasonable faith in this very limited conclusion, on all else concerning authorship I recommend agnosticism. It's in that spirit that I avoid even 'Pseudo-Peter', endorsing instead the failsafe 'author of the *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*', which becomes less cumbersome when abbreviated to '*DMS* author'.[21]

[21] 'Pseudo-Peter' is used by Irène Rosier-Catach (Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 213). My trouble with it is the implication that we have conclusive evidence *against* the attribution to Peter, which I don't think is true at present.

Whoever the *DMS* author is, the text he produced was a fervent anti-modist polemic. But who exactly was the target? The *DMS* author often speaks contemptuously of 'those people' ('*isti*'), at one point referring to 'modern authors' ('*moderni auctores*').[22] These vague designations are all the more unhelpful to us because of the unclarity surrounding the *DMS* author's own identity. Remarkably, the word '*modistae*' doesn't occur once in the text, nor is there a single reference to a modist grammarian by name. Only the following individuals are cited: Alexander (probably Alexander of Villedieu, the 12th/13th-century Parisian master whose popular grammatical treatise *The Teaching of Children* (*Doctrinale puerorum*) was written in verse), Aristotle, Boethius (that is, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius, not the 13th-century modist Boethius of Dacia; the citations are to the commentary on *On Interpretation*), the Commentator (*Commentator*) (that is, Averroes; the citation is to the commentary on the *Physics*), the Commentator of Lincoln (*Commentator Lincolniensis*) (probably Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln from 1235 to 1253; the citation is to the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*), Donatus, Peter Helias, Priscian, and Thomas Aquinas.

None of these authors would be modern in the mind of the *DMS* author: the latest, Aquinas, died in 1274. And none would be an effective target for an anti-modist screed. While Peter Helias is an early speculative grammarian, he predates modism proper by about a century and is counted by the *DMS* author among Donatus, Priscian, and Alexander as one of the 'ancients' ('*antiqui*').[23] While Aquinas does frequently employ modist terminology and related ideas, he never himself

[22] *DMS* §79.8.

[23] *DMS* §79.8.

produced a work on grammar, and the ends to which he puts modes are significantly different from those sought by modist grammarians.[24] More to the point: both times the *DMS* author refers to Aquinas he casts him in a supportive role – and on the same narrow point – rather than as an adversary.[25]

A better representative of modism, and a better target for anti-modism, would be Thomas of Erfurt (late 13th c. – early 14th c.), whose *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar* (between 1300 and 1310) was one of the all-time most successful modist treatises.[26] Documentary evidence associates Thomas with two schools in Erfurt.[27] He wrote the *Speculative Grammar* two or three decades before the downfall of Parisian modism in 1330.[28] The text then thrived through the end of the fourteenth and into the fifteenth century.[29] The distribution of known manuscripts

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[24] On Aquinas's particular brand of modism, see Buersmeyer 1987; Schoot 1993, esp. ch. 2, pp. 41–73. While Buersmeyer's essay provides a helpful guide through the tangle of Aquinas's theories of analogy and predication, I think it misdiagnoses the central difference between Aquinas's approach to modes and that of the modists: Buersmeyer's focus is on the extent to which they accept a language-nature isomorphism, the view being that the modists are more steadfast, to their detriment, than Aquinas in enforcing such an isomorphism. To my mind, the more salient difference is rather that Aquinas appeals to modes in the context of *semantics*, which aims to identify *truth* conditions, while modist grammarians are oriented towards *syntax*, which aims to determine conditions of *agreement* (*congruitas*) or *well-formedness*. To my mind, Schoot's treatment of the subject better captures this.

[25] See *DMS* §§41, 91.3.

[26] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972. Bursill-Hall's Latin edition, which is the primary version of the text I consulted, is, by his own report, a near-verbatim copy of M. Ferdandez Garcia's edition, published in Florence in 1902 and based on Luke Wadding's edition from 1639. As of yet, I've been unable to consult Garcia's edition, though I've compared Bursill-Hall's to Wadding's. All English translations are my own, based on Bursill-Hall's edition. For some time the *Speculative Grammar* had been misattributed to John Duns Scotus (1265/66 – 1308), following Wadding's inclusion of it in his edition of Scotus's collected works. (As is frequently noted, Martin Heidegger wrote his Habilitation on the text, thinking it was by Scotus.) The attribution to Thomas is now uncontested, having been established by Martin Grabmann (Grabmann 1922). For general discussions of Thomas of Erfurt and his modism, see Bursill-Hall 1972; Zupko 2015.

[27] Zupko 2015, citing Lorenz 1989, pp. 312–325.

[28] Pinborg 1982, pp. 256–257; Rosier-Catach 2010, pp. 213-214; Zupko 2015, n. 16.

[29] Bursill-Hall 1972, pp. 26-28; Pinborg 1982, p. 256; Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 214.

suggests that its popularity was mainly confined to northern and eastern Europe: Jan Pinborg lists thirty-one, out of which thirteen are held in Prague, eight in Germany, five in Poland, three in England, and two in Italy.[30] According to Pinborg, it isn't clear whether the text was ever available in France, as none of the surviving texts seem to have originated from outside Germany and Eastern Europe.[31] But it has been suggested that Thomas himself may have spent some time at Paris, the main evidence being the similarity between his work and that of the Parisian masters Radulphus Brito (ca. 1270 – 1320) and Siger of Courtrai (ca. 1280 – 1341).[32] It's possible that the *DMS* takes specific aim at Brito or Siger, especially if it was composed at Paris. It's less likely that the target is Michael of Marbais (d. ca. 1300) – or, at least, Marbais *alone* – since his version of modism doesn't divide modes into active and passive, which is something that plays a significant role in the *DMS* author's presentation and criticism of modism.[33] But Thomas's *Speculative Grammar*, probably influenced by Brito, Siger, and Michael, represents the state of the art in modist grammar in the mid- to late fourteenth century. So it's also plausible to conjecture that Thomas's brand of modism – or something very close to it – is the sort scrutinized in the *DMS*.

In fact, there's some textual evidence – by no means conclusive – that the *DMS* author is especially familiar with, and focused on, Thomas: the five 'ways of positing' ('*modi ponendi*')

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[30] Pinborg 1967, p. 318.

[31] Pinborg 1967, p. 203.

[32] Zupko 2015, n. 2; Siger of Courtrai, *Summary of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Pinborg 1977; Radulphus Brito, *Questions on Priscian Minor*, eds. Enders & Pinborg 1980.

[33] Kelly 1995, p. xxiii.

modes entertained at the start of the *DMS* closely resemble the content of five of the modist theses stated in the opening chapters of the *Speculative Grammar*, the order of presentation being the same, though Thomas includes additional material between the theses. Siger's treatise is not as specifically organized around the theses as Thomas's own treatise is. And the same can be said, to an even greater extent, concerning Brito and Michael. The following chart catalogues these correspondences:[34]

Destructions of the Modes of Signifying	*On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*
First, they divide the mode of signifying into the active mode of signifying and the passive mode of signifying.[35]	Concerning the first item, it should be known that the mode of signifying conveys two things equivocally. Indeed, it is called an 'active' and a 'passive' mode of signifying.[36]
Second, those people who believe in such modes of signifying say that a twofold property or twofold account – namely, of a sign and of a consign – is attributed to a sign or utterance by the intellect.[37]	Next it should be known that when the intellect imposes an utterance to signify and to consignify, it grants a twofold account to it – namely, an account of signifying […] and an account of consignifying […].[38]
Third, those people say that the intellect gets a mode of signifying at the root from a property of a thing that it observes when it attributes that mode of signifying to	Concerning the second item, it should be known that […] every active mode of signifying is drawn at the root from some property of a thing.[40]

[34] Kaczmarek cites the corresponding passages from Thomas in the notes to the edition.

[35] *DMS* §3: 'Primo dividunt modum significandi in modum significandi activum et in modum significandi passivum.'

[36] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, §2, p. 134: 'Circa primum est sciendum, quod modus significandi duo importat aequivoce. Dicitur enim de modo significandi activo et passivo.'

[37] *DMS* §4: 'Secundo dicunt isti opinantes tales modos significandi, quod signo vel voci attribuitur per intellectum duplex proprietas vel duplex ratio, scilicet signi et consigni.'

[38] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, §3, p. 136: 'Iuxta quod notandum quod cum intellectus vocem ad significandum, et consignificandum imponit, duplicem ei rationem tribuit, scilicet, rationem significandi […] et rationem consignificandi […].'

[40] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, §4, pp. 136–138: 'Circa secundum notandum, quod […] omnem modum significandi activum ab aliqua rei proprietate radicaliter oriri.'

an utterance, and nonetheless it immediately gets it from a mode of understanding.[39]	Concerning the third item, it should be known that active modes of signifying are taken immediately from passive modes of understanding.[41]
Fourth, those people say that the mode of understanding is twofold – namely, active and passive.[42]	Next it should be known that just as the mode of signifying is twofold, namely active and passive, so the mode of understanding is twofold, namely active and passive.[43]
Fifth, those people say that the passive mode of signifying is materially in a signified thing, as in a subject, and formally in an utterance, as in a sign.[44]	Concerning the fifth item, it should be known that the passive mode of signifying materially is in a thing, as in a subject […]. But formally it is in the subject that the active mode of signifying is in […].[45]

These correspondences suggest the *DMS* author's strong familiarity with the kind of modism espoused by Thomas, if not direct acquaintance with his work. But even if the *DMS* author draws from the *Speculative Grammar*, it's almost certainly not his only source. One specific piece of evidence for this is that the notion of grammatical government (*regimen*), which plays a key role in the *DMS* author's critique, is entirely absent from Thomas's account.[46] More generally, the *DMS*

[39] *DMS* §5: 'Tertio dicunt isti, quod intellectus accipit modum significandi radicaliter a proprietate rei, ad quam aspicit, cum ipsum modum significandi voci attribuit, verumtamen immediate accipit ipsum a modo intelligendi.'

[41] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, §7, p. 140: 'Circa tertium notandum, quod modi significandi activi immediate a modis intelligendi passivis sumuntur.'

[42] *DMS* §6: 'Quarto dicunt isti, quod duplex est modus intelligendi, scilicet activus et passivus.'

[43] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, §7, pp. 140–141: 'Iuxta quod sciendum est, quod, sicut duplex est modus significandi, scilicet activus et passivus, ita duplex est modus intelligendi, scilicet activus et passivus.'

[44] *DMS* §7: 'Quinto dicunt isti, quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re significata tamquam in subiecto et formaliter in voce tamquam in signo.'

[45] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, §9, p. 146: 'Circa quintum est notandum, quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re, ut in subiecto […]. Formaliter autem est in eo subiecto, in quo est modus significandi activus […].'

[46] There are at least 73 occurrences of variants of '*regimen*' in the *DMS*, spread more or less evenly throughout the text. There are zero in the *Speculative Grammar*. As Bursill-Hall notes, the role played by the notion of grammatical government is subsumed by Thomas under the related notion of grammatical construal (*constructio*) (Bursill-Hall 1972, p. 62). On construal, see Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 45–52, ¶¶88-109, pp. 272–306.

author gives the impression of having an understanding of modism that's fairly broad, if not always particularly deep. So we shouldn't be surprised if the *DMS* author's sources turn out to be manifold. But I think it would be surprising if we didn't find Thomas among them.

The theses listed above provide a synopsis of the core content of fourteenth-century modist grammar. Not explicitly represented on this list, but equally essential, is a thesis that I'll call 'the Modist Correspondence Thesis' ('MCT'). In its most general formulation, MCT postulates a relationship between language and reality: the grammatical properties of language, by means of the epistemic properties of thought, are grounded in the metaphysical properties of nature. More specifically, MCT asserts that modes of signifying correspond to modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi*), which in turn correspond to modes of being (*modi essendi*). MCT is the fulcrum of the fourteenth-century debate between modists and anti-modists: Thomas derives a version of MCT at the start of his treatise; Peter, who repudiates modes as ontologically excessive, replaces MCT with the subordination (*subordinatio*) of spoken and written language to mental language; and the *DMS* author leverages MCT against the modist, attempting to derive absurdities from it.

Part 2 is an essay focusing on MCT and the negative project of repudiating modism. In particular, I'll consider three anti-modist arguments from the second chapter of the *DMS*, which I'll call the 'Regress,' 'No Property,' and 'Hylomorphism' arguments. All three arguments interact with MCT in some way, aiding an understanding of the modist thesis: the Regress Argument attempts to use MCT to generate an infinite regress of modes through the limitless imposition of

new utterances; the No Property argument attempts to use MCT to infer the absence of modes of signifying from the absence of modes of being in certain special cases; and the Hylomorphism Argument attempts to derive a contradiction from a different but closely related modist thesis – what I'll call 'the Modist Inherence Thesis' ('MIT') – which provides a hylomorphic interpretation of the correspondence relation postulated by MCT. But all three arguments are flawed in their treatment of modist doctrine: the Regress Argument relies on some questionable assumptions about modism and underestimates the strength of the modist's commitment to MCT; the No Property Argument attributes to the modist a stronger version of MCT than the modist is committed to accepting; and the Hylomorphism Argument misinterprets the hylomorphic structure of modes posited by MIT, thereby misunderstanding MCT. Recognizing these flaws helps us reconstruct an interpretation of MCT that's more plausible than the caricature repudiated by these arguments.

Part 3 provides a Latin edition and English translation of the text of the *DMS*. While the *DMS* has been edited before – twice, actually – by Ludger Kaczmarek,[47] the text below is, to my knowledge, the first ever translation into a modern language. I used Kaczmarek's expertly prepared edition from 1994 as my base text. Kaczmarek's edition (LK) is itself based on the two known manuscripts and two of the five known incunables:[48]

[47] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994. Kaczmarek intends this edition of the text to replace a preliminary one appearing in Kaczmarek 1980. Unfortunately, I haven't yet been able to consult Kaczmarek's earlier work. (See the Preface.)

[48] For more detailed descriptions of all of the texts, see Kaczmarek 1994, pp. ix–xiv.

Mü: Manuscript. Münich. Third quarter of the fourteenth century.

Me: Manuscript. Melk. 1441.

π: Incunable. Paris. ca. 1489. (Also listed as B in LK.)

λ: Incunable. Lyon. 1490–1495. (Also listed as E in LK.)

In addition to LK, I also consulted λ. I was unable to consult any other source texts directly.[49] Thankfully, Kaczmarek provides a meticulous editorial apparatus in LK.

My edition is in no way meant to supplant LK, which retains its authority due the talent of its editor and its basis in a greater number of original sources. My purpose in re-editing the *DMS* was simply to provide a facing Latin text for readers of my translation. While I did end up making numerous emendations to LK, the edition printed here isn't the result of a comprehensive reassessment of the available sources or even a systematic comparison between LK and λ. My approach was simple: translate the text as it appears in LK, and when difficulties emerge, whether due to puzzles with the language or with the content, consult LK's apparatus and λ to see if there's a plausible emendation that can be made to resolve that puzzle. These emendations are indicated in the notes to the Latin, the apparatus for which is explained in Appendix A.

LK includes several sections of text that are drawn from marginal notes in *Mü*. I left these out. I occasionally made adjustments to the punctuation in LK, but I didn't record these changes, nor did I implement them in any methodical way, other than to remove all quotation marks. I altered

[49] See the Preface.

the paragraphing in LK fairly drastically, with the intention of making the argumentative structure of the text more perspicuous. I also altered the section headers of LK, which are all editorial interpolations not present in the source texts. I left these out of the Latin entirely, while keeping them in the English. But in doing so, I didn't simply translate the headers from LK. Instead, I devised my own, though I carefully based them on language explicitly represented in the body of the Latin text. On example of this warrants special comment.

Kaczmarek organizes much of the first chapter into nineteen '*persuasiones*'.[50] The start of each '*persuasio*' is marked by '*item*' ('again'/'also'), present in the source texts. Each '*persuasio*' from the first chapter corresponds to a '*solutio*' from the third part of the third chapter.[51] This structural correspondence between the chapters is obvious from the text. Often a '*solutio*' repeats segments of its corresponding '*persuasio*'. But the labeling of these as '*persuasiones*' and '*solutiones*' is Kaczmarek's own editorial interpolation. Having removed these from the Latin, I felt no need to label the English with 'line of persuasion' or 'solution' – possible translations of '*persuasio*' and '*solutio*'. Instead, I used 'argument' and 'reply' respectively. These labels are warranted by the context, since it's clear that in the first chapter the *DMS* author is offering arguments on behalf of the modist and in the third part of the third chapter presenting his own anti-modist replies to those modist arguments.

[50] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, pp. 10–22; Cf. *DMS*, §§10.1–30.2.

[51] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, pp. 83–100; Cf. *DMS*, §§87.1–107.1.

But the choice of 'argument' is also grounded by the presence of '*argumentum*' in the text. The *DMS* author indicates at the start of each reply which argument he's replying to. In the case of the first reply, LK reads '*Ad quarum primam* [*persuasionem*]', where my version reads '*Ad primum argumentum* […]'.[52] I draw from λ for '*primum argumentum*', which, according to Kaczmarek's apparatus, also appears in π and *Me*. Presumably, '*argumentum*' is absent from *Mü*, and Kaczmarek reads an instance of the feminine '*primam*' there, rather than the neuter '*primum*' agreeing with '*argumentum*'. Reasoning that '*primam*' must agree with an implicit feminine noun, Kaczmarek chooses '*persuasionem*', the editorial addition of which is indicated by brackets. The choice makes some sense, recalling an instance of '*persuasionibus*' from the first chapter, which is used there to refer to the modist arguments that the replies of the third chapter are replying to.[53] But this is the only instance of a form of '*persuasio*' in the original text, occurring, in LK, seventy-three pages earlier.

By contrast, there are at least nine additional occurrences of some form of '*argumentum*' in the text,[54] and it's explicitly at the start of both the first and second reply in λ,[55] and, according to Kaczmarek's apparatus, in π and *Me* as well, agreeing with the neuter '*primum*' and '*secundum*'.[56] It also appears in the ninth reply – apparently in all four sources – though in a slightly different

[52] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, p. 83; *DMS* §87.1.

[53] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, p. 10, l. 2; Cf. *DMS* §9.

[54] *DMS* §§43.3, 46.6, 68.5, 81.3, 90, 97.1, 100.2–100.3.

[55] λ, a7vb.

[56] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, pp. 83, 86.

construction: '*quod argumentum procedit*'.[57] Following these texts, my version begins the second reply with '*Ad secundum argumentum*', where LK has '*Ad secundam* [*persuasionem*]', following the pattern adopted for the first reply. But, unlike the case of the first reply, the '*secundam*' here isn't drawn directly from *Mü*, which, according to the apparatus, reads '*conclusionem*' instead. By reading '*secundam*' for '*conclusionem*', Kaczmarek inserts a word with no witness in any of the texts.

From that point forward, none of the source texts explicitly presents '*argumentum*' in this construction, using instead a progression of the adjectival ordinals alone: '*Ad tertium/am*', '*Ad quartum/am*', and so on. Drawing from Kaczmarek's apparatus, it can be determined that none of the four source texts consistently has either the neuter or the feminine adjective: λ and π have the neuter all but once (the sixth reply, where they have the feminine); *Me* has the neuter all but twice (the third and fourteenth reply, where it has the feminine); and *Mü* has the feminine all but twice (the second reply, where it has '*conclusionem*', and the eleventh, where it has the neuter). Prioritizing the age of the witness, Kaczmarek follows *Mü* by including only the feminine ordinals. Prioritizing consistency across a larger number of witnesses, I follow *Me*, π, and λ by including only the neuter ordinals. Both of us chose to impose uniformity of one over the other, despite the fact that not one of the original sources is itself uniform in this respect. My goal was to produce an internally consistent text. Maybe Kaczmarek was guided by the same goal, albeit in a different direction.

[57] *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, p. 92; Cf. *DMS* §97.1.

That there are nineteen modist arguments in the first chapter is evidenced by there being nineteen replies in the third, and that there are nineteen replies in the third is made clear because the *DMS* author himself explicitly counts them off from 'the first' ('*primus*') to 'the nineteenth' ('*decimus nonus*'). But the nineteen arguments presented in the first chapter aren't all mutually independent. In fact, the argumentative structure of the first chapter is fairly complex. *DMS* §10.1 states a global argument for modes of signifying that the *DMS* author, when he later turns to refute modism, refers to as 'the first argument' ('*primum argumentum*') (*DMS* §87.1). Subsequent sections provide a series of reasons (*rationes*) or proofs (*probationes*) for the premise, or antecedent (*antecedens*), of the first argument. The first of these proofs occurs at *DMS* §§11.1–11.2. Next, at *DMS* §§12.1–12.2, the *DMS* author presents an argument that he later calls 'the second argument' ('*secundum argumentum*') (*DMS* §89.1), which is also the second proof of the antecedent of the first argument. The pattern continues: the third argument (*DMS* §§13.1–13.2) is also the third proof of the antecedent of the first argument, the fourth argument (*DMS* §§14.1–14.2) is also the fourth proof of the antecedent of the first argument, and so on, until we arrive at the eleventh argument (*DMS* §21.1–21.2), which disrupts the pattern by standing as an independent argument for modes of signifying. The twelfth (*DMS* §§22.1–22.4) and thirteenth arguments (*DMS* §§23.1–23.2) then resume the support of the antecedent of the first argument, making them the eleventh and twelfth proofs, respectively, of the antecedent of the first argument. There is then a proof of the thirteenth argument (§24), followed by the fourteenth (*DMS* §25) and fifteenth arguments (*DMS* §26), which are the second and third proofs, respectively, of the thirteenth argument. Finally, each of the sixteenth through nineteenth arguments (*DMS* §§27.1–30.2), like the eleventh, is an argument independent of the first. The whole nested argumentative structure can be represented as follows:

A. The First Argument (*DMS* §10.1)
   a. The First Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§11.1–11.2)
   b. The Second Argument, or the Second Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§12.1–12.2)
   c. The Third Argument, or the Third Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§13.1–13.2)
   d. The Fourth Argument, or the Fourth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§14.1–14.2)
   e. The Fifth Argument, or the Fifth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§15.1–15.2)
   f. The Sixth Argument, or the Sixth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§16.1–16.2)
   g. The Seventh Argument, or the Seventh Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §17)
   h. The Eighth Argument, or the Eighth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§18.1–18.2)
   i. The Ninth Argument, or the Ninth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §19)
   j. The Tenth Argument, or the Tenth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §20)
   k. The Twelfth Argument, or the Eleventh Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§22.1–22.4)
   l. The Thirteenth Argument, or the Twelfth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument (*DMS* §§23.1–23.2)
      α. The First Proof of the Thirteenth Argument (*DMS* §24)
      β. The Fourteenth Argument, or the Second Proof of the Thirteenth Argument (*DMS* §25)
      γ. The Fifteenth Argument, or the Third Proof of the Thirteenth Argument (*DMS* §26)
B. The Eleventh Argument (*DMS* §§21.1–21.2)
C. The Sixteenth Argument (*DMS* §§27.1–27.3)
D. The Seventeenth Argument (*DMS* §28)
E. The Eighteenth Argument (*DMS* §§29.1–29.2)
F. The Nineteenth Argument (*DMS* §§30.1–30.2)

I've labeled the sections accordingly in the translation.

As the outline above shows, the sequential placement of the eleventh argument doesn't match its placement in the argumentative structure: it disrupts the sequence of arguments for the antecedent of the first argument, which continues through the twelfth through fifteenth arguments.

I'm not sure if this can be attributed to a scribal error. It would require that the scribe accidentally copied the content of what should have been the fifteenth argument after the tenth and then, in an attempt to undo or conceal his mistake, reordered and relabeled the replies in the third chapter to match the mistaken order of the first chapter. The scribe would have to do all this while maintaining the normal degree of care and attention required of a copyist – already quite a lot, due to the fact that many manuscripts were copied out of order because of foliation and the time-demands of drying ink. An alternative hypothesis is that the *DMS* author intended this order, placing the independent eleventh argument where he did because it additionally serves as an introduction to the notion of grammatical agreement (*congruitas*), which plays a central role in the twelfth argument.

Parts of the second and third chapters exhibit even more complicated argumentative structures than the first, with numerous layers of nested sub-arguments, replies, and counter-replies. My labeling and grouping of those sections is intended to make those structures clearer. When things get especially complicated, I describe these more local argumentative structures in the notes to the translation.

The translation offered here is preliminary. I plan to improve it, and the edition, through further study. My primary translation goal was to produce idiomatic English that reliably reflects the original. Elegance and clarity were, admittedly, afterthoughts. But for the most part the *DMS* author's own writing is stiff, formulaic, and unclear (though not indistinct). It's also very plain. The only exception to this is the first section of the preamble, where the *DMS* author tries to get fancy. Whether he successfully produces stylish Latin in these opening lines is a question I'll leave for

those better equipped to judge. But my sense is: not really. Almost everywhere else, the prose is rigid and obscure. And so, where my English shares those features, it might not be so far off the mark. Specifically, I tried whenever possible to mimic the Latin syntax without shattering English conventions, and I also tried to translate individual words consistently throughout, though of course many require multiple translations to match the multitude of meanings in the Latin that just can't be captured by a single English word. My only hope is that in doing so I didn't introduce too much *more* rigidity, obscurity, and ambiguity in the English than is already there in the Latin.

The notes come in a variety of flavors. Many are designed for beginners without much or any background in medieval philosophy or logic, providing very basic explanations of some key terms that would otherwise appear to them as meaningless jargon. Other notes provide more detailed commentary on some specific aspect of the text that interested me. Most are internal cross references and guides to the argumentative structure. What I didn't do was provide citations to external texts, neither tracking down the *DMS* author's own references nor pointing readers to secondary literature that might be illuminating.[58] All that will have to wait for the next draft. This version – why not say it again? – is preliminary.

[58] See the Preface.

PART 1

SOME REMARKS ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE *DMS*

INTRODUCTION

The author of the *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying* (*DMS*) is unknown, though the scholarly consensus is that the most plausible candidates are either Peter of Ailly or Thomas Maulfelt. Here I wish to review some of the evidence for these two attributions and, drawing from observations I've made while studying the content of the *DMS*, add a few more confounding variables. My results, largely negative, are intended to undermine confidence in adopting either attribution at this stage. To the extent that I do offer a positive result, it's to recommend more serious consideration of the author's relationship to John Buridan. While I think we can have reasonable faith in this very limited conclusion, on all else concerning authorship I recommend agnosticism.

1 TWO CANDIDATES: PETER OF AILLY AND THOMAS MAULFELT

Our two candidates for authorship of the *DMS* – Peter of Ailly and Thomas Maulfelt – could hardly be more different in terms of their status in modern historical scholarship. Peter was a major player in significant world events and for that reason has been the subject of numerous biographies and histories, the scholarly interest in him extending well beyond his contributions to philosophy. Maulfelt is obscure among the obscure, studied almost exclusively by those of us in the small

corner of scholarship specifically focused on the history of logic and metaphysics. Accordingly, we know a great deal about Peter's life and next to nothing about Maulfelt's.

Some key pieces of Peter's biography include the following:[59] He was born around 1350 in Compiègne, in Northern France, and educated at the College of Navarre of the University of Paris, where he obtained his arts degree in 1367, entering the theology faculty the following year. He became a doctor of theology in 1381, and then went on to a career in university administration at Paris, becoming grand master of his former college in 1384 and serving as chancellor from 1389 to 1395. As chancellor, he championed a particularly zealous brand of nominalism – a counterpoint to the anti-Ockhamist movement that had begun, about ten years before Peter's birth, with the prohibition among the arts faculty of six 'Ockhamist Errors'.[60] From 1396 forward, Peter was heavily involved in ecclesiastical politics, particularly the Papal Schism that began in 1378, which saw multiple claims to the Papacy made along two distinct lineages, one based in Rome, the other in Avignon. Peter generally supported the conciliar movement aiming to end the Schism, though this didn't prevent him from accepting the Bishopric of Cambrai from the Avignon-based Benedict XIII in 1396. Peter nevertheless eventually denounced Benedict and supported Alexander V, elected by the Council of Pisa in 1409, against both Benedict and Gregory XII of Rome. John XXIII, who succeeded Alexander just a year later, raised Peter to the title of Cardinal in 1411 and appointed him Papal legate in Avignon in 1413. Peter returned the favor by denouncing John while sitting on the Council of Constance (1414–1418). One result of the council was the condemnation

[59] Biard 2011; Spade 1980a.
[60] van der Helm 2014, p. 39; Thijssen 1998, p. 170.

of the early reformers John Wyclif (ca. 1330–1384) and John Hus (1372–1415). The first was long dead, and the second would soon be: they charged Hus with heresy and burned him at the stake, setting the stage for the Hussite Wars (1419–1434). Another result was to depose John and Benedict and elect Martin V to replace Gregory at Rome, thereby ending the Schism. Peter died about two years later, in 1420, before he could witness the burning of Wyclif's books and exhumed corpse – the grim order for which was recommended by the council Peter sat on and carried out in 1428 by the Pope he helped elect.[61]

In stark contrast, Maulfelt's biography is an utter mystery.[62] Even the spelling of his name is exceedingly problematic: 'Malvelt', 'Manfelt', 'Manlefelt', 'Manlevel', 'Manlevelt', 'Manlovel', 'Mansfeld' – the list goes on.[63] Three manuscripts refer to him also as 'Thomas of England' ('*Thomae Anglici*'),[64] and there's a chance that he's the same Thomas of England documented to be an arts master at Paris in a charter from 1331.[65] On that assumption, it's been suggested that he began teaching in Louvain by 1340.[66] The label 'of England' does little to help identify his place of origin: he may be so-called because of his membership in the English Nation at the University of Paris, which included people from England as well as from all over northern and central Europe,

[61] Conti 2017.

[62] Fitzgerald 2015; Read 1999, p. 10; van der Helm 2014, pp. 15–28.

[63] Kaczmarek, pp. xxxvi–xli. I'll continue to use 'Maulfelt', following Kaczmarek, because that's how the name appears in the manuscript of the *DMS*.

[64] van der Helm 2014, p. 20.

[65] van der Helm 2014, pp. 63–64.

[66] van der Helm 2014, pp. 21, 35–38.

including the Low Countries and Germany.[67] Or he may have picked up the moniker due to his doctrinal alliance with English nominalism.[68] Alfred van der Helm, who has produced the most comprehensive examination of Maulfelt's identity, offers the hypothesis that Maulfelt is in fact from the Low Countries, specifically from the Duchy of Brabant, but nonetheless admits that this can't be advanced with much confidence.[69] But no matter where he's from, if Maulfelt was in fact an arts master in the 1330s, then he would have most likely been born around the 1310s, and so would probably have died by the 1370s or so.

Peter was a prolific writer, author of about 170 works, including works on philosophy, politics, the church, and, (in)famously, geography.[70] But his known writings on logic and language are relatively few: the *Concepts* and the *Insolubles*, both written around 1372,[71] and a treatise *On Exponibles*, which has been dated alternatively to the same time[72] or to between 1384 and 1388.[73] Maulfelt's bibliography, like his biography, is much scantier than Peter's. But his known works on logic are greater in number. He authored a popular set of *Little Logicals* (*Parva logicalia*) –

[67] As Lorenz, van der Helm, and Read point out (Lorenz 1996; van der Helm 2014, pp. 22, 63–66; Read 1999, p. 10). Van der Helm, citing Gilbert 1973, remarks that no one has yet located Maulfelt in a British biographical register (van der Helm 2014, p. 25).

[68] Lorenz 1996; van der Helm 2014, pp. 22, 63–66.

[69] van der Helm 2014, pp. 24, 34–35.

[70] Biard 2011, p. 954; Christopher Columbus apparently owned a copy of Peter's geography text *Image of the World* (*Imago mundi*), composed in 1410 (Spade 1980a, p. 1).

[71] Biard 2011, p. 954; Spade 1980a, p. 1. Spade notes that every known printed edition of the one includes the other but that there are two manuscripts of the *Insolubles* that don't include the *Concepts* (n. 2).

[72] Spade points out that Salembier dates it to around 1372, like the Concepts and Insolubles (Spade 1980a, p. 1, n. 8).

[73] Biard 2011, p. 954. Though Biard doesn't provide a citation.

including treatises *On Suppositions, On Confusions*, and *On Consequences* – which might very tentatively be dated to between 1324 and 1355, on the grounds that the work is influenced by William of Ockham's *Summary of Logic* (ca. 1323–1325) and exerts influence on Albert of Saxony's *Very Useful Logic* (1351–1355).[74] Two treatises on the Old Logic – *Questions on the Books of Porphyry* and *Questions on the Predicaments* – are attributed to Maulfelt by van der Helm, who edited the former and argues for its attribution.[75] The *Questions on Porphyry* (*QP*) can confidently be dated after the treatise *On Suppositions*, since the former includes a reference to the latter.[76] Van der Helm suggests the late 1330s or 1340s, after Maulfelt is thought to have traveled from Paris to Louvain.[77] Maulfelt also produced various other logical works, the dating of which is even less certain.[78] And there are three further philosophical works whose attribution to Maulfelt is tentative.[79] These two bibliographies, different as they are, share one very important thing in common: the *DMS* is listed on both, though qualifiedly.

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[74] van der Helm 2014, p. 27, citing Kann 1994, Read 1991, and Brands 1996. Brands says 1344 because that's the earliest known commentary on the treatise *On Consequences*. But the other treatises may have been written after this one. Van der Helm, citing Courtenay 1987, says ca. 1360 (van der Helm 2014, p. 21). But Fitzgerald argues that Albert might actually have been influenced on this issue not by Maulfelt but by Heytesbury (Fitzgerald 2015).

[75] van der Helm 2014, p. 16–17.

[76] van der Helm 2014, pp. 33, 38; *QP*, q. 25, ad. 3.

[77] van der Helm 2014, pp. 38–40.

[78] These include *On Ampliations*, *On Restrictions*, *On Appellations*, *On Alienations*, and *On Removals* (van der Helm 2014, p. 16).

[79] A treatise *On 'Begins' and 'Ends'* and commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* and *On the Soul* (van der Helm 2014, pp. 16–17). The *QP* cites the latter two, however. So, as van der Helm points out, if the *QP* is attributed to Maulfelt, so too should the later two (van der Helm 2014, pp. 33–34).

Wrapped up with the question of authorship is the question of dating the *DMS*. The obvious influence of Ockham's *Summary* establishes a solid *terminus post quem* of 1320 at the absolute earliest, and more probably 1330. Our earliest witness for the work is the Münich manuscript – *Mü* in Kaczmarek's sigla – dated to the third quarter of the fourteenth century.[80] So a reasonable *terminus ante quem* would be 1400. But from here things get very speculative. If Peter wrote the *DMS*, then it likely would have been between the 1370s, shortly after obtaining his arts degree, and 1389, when he became chancellor.[81] If Maulfelt wrote it, and if Maulfelt is the Parisian Thomas of England, then it almost certainly wasn't composed before 1330, when Ockham's *Summary* first arrives in Paris, or after the 1370s, the likely *terminus* of the man himself. Putting the two together situates the *DMS* somewhere between 1330 and 1389. But this is too broad to be informative: there was never any doubt about the *DMS* being the product of the mid- to late fourteenth century. More exactly dating the *DMS* will likely require getting clearer on its authorship, which will almost surely involve looking more closely at its contents.

2 On the Evidence for Peter

[80] Kaczmarek, p. xi.

[81] Biard says it was written by Peter before 1388 (Biard 2011, p. 954).

Many scholars – including Joël Biard,[82] Michael Covington,[83] Roberto Lambertini,[84] Jan Pinborg,[85] Paul Spade,[86] and numerous others[87] – have at some point endorsed or assumed the attribution to Peter, the early sources for which are Carl Prantl's *History of Logic in the Western World* from 1870 and the 1886 biography of Peter by Louis Salembier.[88] But Ludger Kaczmarek, who has conducted the most thorough study of the matter to date, raises significant doubts.[89] This has prompted some to buck the trend: Irène Rosier-Catach calls the author 'Pseudo-Peter of Ailly',[90] and Jack Zupko refers to 'an unknown Parisian author, once believed to have been Peter d'Ailly'.[91] Besides scholarly authority and sheer momentum, two main pieces of evidence are probably responsible for perpetuating the attribution – one textual, the other based on content.

The textual evidence for Peter's authorship is the Lyon incunable (Hain *833/Goff A-472) – λ in Kaczmarek's sigla – from between 1490 and 1495.[92] The *DMS* is included in λ along with the

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[82] Biard 2011, p. 954.

[83] Covington 2009, p. 124.

[84] Lambertini 1989, pp. 113–114.

[85] Pinborg 1967, pp. 203–210.

[86] Spade 1980a, p. 1, n. 8, p. 23, n. 171.

[87] Kaczmarek reports that all the following, in addition to those above, have at some point accepted the attribution to Peter: Monika Asztalos, Hubert Elie, Martin Grabmann, Eduard Hartmann, Wolfgang Hübener, C. H. Kneepkens, Gordon Leff, Alfonso Maierü, Bernhard Meller, Gabriel Nuchelmans, and Gerhard Ritter (Kaczmarek 1994, pp. xv–xvi).

[88] Kaczmarek 1994, p. xv.

[89] Kaczmarek 1994, pp. xv–xxviii.

[90] Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 213.

[91] Zupko 2015, n. 16.

[92] Kaczmarek, p. xii.

Concepts and *Insolubles*. Peter's name appears there three times. First, on the title page, which reads:

> *The Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, *Concepts*, and *Insolubles*, according to the way of the nominalists, of master Peter of Ailly.
>
> Destructiones modorum significandi. Conceptus. Et insolubulia secundum viam nominalium magistri Petri de allyaco[93]

Second, at the conclusion of the *Concepts*:

> And this is the end of the *Concepts*. The *Insolubles*, according to the way of the nominalists, described by master Peter of Ailly, follows.
>
> Et sic est finis conceptuum. Sequuntur insolubilia secundum viam nominalium a magistro petro de allyaco recitata.[94]

And third, at the conclusion of the *Insolubles*:

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[93] λ, a1r. Here and below I leave the punctuation and capitalization in the Latin just as they appear on the page.

[94] λ, a12va.

> And this is the end of the treatises of the *Insolubles* of master Peter of Ailly and of the *Concepts*.
>
> Et sic est tractatuum finis insolubilium magistri petri de allyaco et conceptuum.[95]

But the conclusion of the *DMS* itself doesn't mention Peter by name, reading only:

> And this is the end of the *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*. The *Concepts* and *Insolubles* follow.
>
> Et sic est finis destructionum modorum significandi. Sequuntur conceptus et insolubilia.[96]

This leaves room for doubt about Peter's authorship of the *DMS*.[97] As Kaczmarek points out, λ is the only witness among the two known manuscripts and five known incunables of the *DMS* that attaches Peter's name to the work, and of the eleven known incunables of the *Concepts-Insolubles* pairing, λ is the only one that also includes the *DMS*.[98] To this I'd add that the attribution in λ isn't

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[95] λ, a23rb.

[96] λ, a8vb.

[97] While the evidence that Peter wrote the *Concepts* and *Insolubles* is stronger than the evidence for the *DMS* (Kaczmarek, p. xix.), the only textual evidence for the *Concepts* comes from the numerous printed editions that include it along with the *Insolubles*. There are two known manuscripts containing the *Insolubles* but none containing the *Concepts* (Kaczmarek, p. xvii; Spade 1980a, pp. 13–14.).

[98] Kaczmarek, pp. xvii–xix.

even quite as reliable as it may at first seem, since only one of the three occurrences of Peter's name – the one on the title page – associates it with the *DMS*.[99] And, moreover, the attachment there is strictly speaking ambiguous between the following three readings, only the first of which clearly attributes the *DMS* to Peter: (i) *Peter of Ailly's Destructions of the Modes of Signifying, Concepts, and Insolubles*; (ii) *The Destructions of the Modes of Signifying and Peter of Ailly's Concepts and Insolubles*; (iii) *The Destructions of the Modes of Signifying, the Concepts, and Peter of Ailly's Insolubles*. We'll probably never know exactly what led John Trechsel, the Lyonnais printer, to include the *DMS* in this edition of the *Concepts* and *Insolubles*. But associating the *DMS* with the famous French cardinal's name would surely increase sales, and packaging it with one or two works already connected to Peter would be a sly way to conceal the marketing ploy, if that's what it was.

The content-based evidence is the apparent doctrinal agreement between the *DMS* and the *Concepts*. The pairing of these two works in a single edition, whether done for financial advantage or not, is very natural. They complement each other nicely, the former presenting an anti-modist polemic and the latter presenting the details of the theory that the former endorses as a replacement for modism. But this compatibility is insufficient to warrant the attribution to Peter. Hard evidence is lacking: I've noticed no verbatim reproductions of text between the two works. And Kaczmarek points out that some key terminology present in Peter's other works is either absent from the *DMS*

[99] It may be worth pointing out furthermore that the other two occurrences in λ attach Peter's name most directly to the *Insolubles*. Could it be that not even the *Concepts* is Peter's? I raise the question hesitantly, and I can't provide further considerations either way. I'll continue to assume that the attribution, accepted with little question by so many, is correct.

or is used differently.[100] In addition to this, I'd emphasize that not a single anti-modist argument, of which there are numerous in the *DMS*, appears in the *Concepts* – not even in paraphrase. The *Concepts*, which mentions modes of signifying a mere five times,[101] simply asserts the same anti-modist result of the *DMS*, which, unlike the *Concepts*, presents the reasoning that purports to achieve that result.[102] And the *DMS*, steeped as it is in nominalism, simply summarize*s* the theory, which is on much fuller display in the *Concepts*. So while it's true that both works advance a nominalist theory of language and take an anti-modist stance, this is an extremely broad degree of similarity that could be said of countless pairs of treatises written by numerically distinct authors who nonetheless share nominalist and anti-modist views. While the two complement each other, that alone isn't reason to assume shared authorship.

These considerations shouldn't be taken as evidence that Peter *didn't* write the *DMS*, though they do point out the weakness of the available evidence that he *did*. The text of λ and the supposed overlaps in content between the *Concepts* and *DMS* are consistent with both the affirmation and the denial of the hypothesis of Peter's authorship. So neither the textual nor the content-based evidence for the attribution to Peter is compelling.

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[100] Kaczmarek, pp. xxiii–xxvi. One difference that Kaczmarek cites concerns the notion of subordination (*subordinatio*). As Spade notes (n. 273), at one point in the *Concepts* Peter clearly claims that both written and spoken propositions can be directly subordinated to mental ones (Spade 1980a, p. 36, n. 273). Peter himself remarks that this is contrary to what people typically say, where the more standard view is that written ones are subordinated to spoken ones and spoken to mental (§93, p. 36). Kaczmarek seems to think that the *DMS* author has the more typical view. But what the *DMS* author says on the issue, while not an endorsement of Peter's more unusual view, seems to me to be compatible with it (Cf. *DMS* §§72.5, 79.3, 89.4).

[101] *Concepts*, trans. Spade, §§35, 39, 85, 87, 88.

[102] Spade points out as much, describing the *Concepts* as 'expository' rather than 'argumentative' (Spade 1980a, pp. 8–9).

3 On the Evidence for Maulfelt

As an alternative to Peter, we might follow Kaczmarek's consideration of Thomas Maulfelt.[103] This rests on somewhat firmer textual evidence: the 1441 Melk manuscript – *Me* in Kaczmarek's sigla – refers to the work as '*On the Modes of Signifying* of Master Thomas Anglicus, called Maulfelt' ('*de modis significandi magistri Thomae Anglici dicti Maulfelt*').[104] Here we have a very clear assertion of authorship, and from a source older than λ. On this basis, Lorenz contends that we should cast aside the attribution to Peter and embrace the attribution to Maulfelt, at least until an investigation into the content of the *DMS* suggests otherwise.[105] Van der Helm, without endorsing Lorenz' suggestion, raises no protest.[106]

But, as with Peter, we have just a single witness to connect Maulfelt to the *DMS*, making the textual evidence, again, very weak. Age shouldn't carry much weight: *Me* is only about fifty years older than λ; and besides, older manuscripts can be just as wrong as younger incunables. While there are some very obvious similarities in writing style between the *QP* and *DMS* – far more so than between the *DMS* and the *Concepts* or *Insolubles* – these aren't sufficiently strong to warrant the attribution. Both the *QP* and the *DMS* can be classified within the Question (*Quaestio*) genre

[103] Kaczmarek 1994, pp. xxix–xli.

[104] See Kaczmarek's apparatus at *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kaczmarek 1994, p. 100.

[105] van der Helm 2014, p. 16, citing Lorenz 1996, p. 155, n. 42.

[106] van der Helm 2014, p. 16, n. 9, p. 75,

of medieval philosophical writing. The *QP* is firmly rooted in the style, presenting a set of forty-five distinct questions, each of which displays the characteristic pattern. The *DMS* also exhibits this style, albeit somewhat more loosely at times, reading like one extended question on the theoretical utility of modism. But this similarity is of course way too broad to count as evidence of authorship, since the genre is ubiquitous. Somewhat more striking are the frequent similarities between certain heavily relied on turns of phrase and sentence structures. The texts do read very similarly. But this probably has more to do with their mutual adherence to the same formulaic genre and style than it has to do with their sharing the same author.

Content-based evidence doesn't fare much better. As with Peter, the *DMS* author and Maulfelt share a general commitment to nominalism. But, again, this is insufficient for an attribution of authorship. Furthermore, I'd like to highlight three discrepancies of content that cast some doubt on Maulfelt's authorship. These considerations, like those regarding Peter, don't establish that Maulfelt *didn't* write the *DMS*, but they do, to a moderate degree, undermine confidence in the claim that he *did*. I'll present them in order from weakest to strongest.

3.1 Modes of Signifying

The first consideration directly concerns modes of signifying. Unlike the situation with Peter, there's almost no widely available evidence concerning Maulfelt's views on modes of signifying. The only modern edition of any of Maulfelt's logical works that's both complete and published is

van der Helm's edition of the *Questions on the Books of Porphyry*.[107] I was only able to locate a single mention of modes of signifying in that text. What we find there doesn't support the attribution.

The remark appears in the context of Question 22: 'Whether there are only ten genera and neither more nor fewer' ('*Utrum tantum sint decem genera et non plura, neque pauciora*'), where 'genera' ('*genera*') here refers to the 'most general genera' ('*genera generalissima*') – that is, the Aristotelian predicaments (aka categories): substance (*substantia*), quality (*qualitas*), quantity (*quantitas*), relation (*ad aliquid* / *relatio*), and so on. By assuming a strictly nominalist position, according to which every predicament is a term, as well as a strict tokenism, according to which every term is a token, it's argued that there are more than ten genera, since there are more than ten tokens of any one predicamental term; for example, there are more than ten instances of 'substance' written down in the works of Aristotle.[108] Maulfelt's reply to this argument relies on a distinction he makes between four different ways of calling things the 'same' ('*eadem*') or 'more' ('*plura*'): by number (*numero*), by species (*specie*), by genus (*genere*), and according to equivalence (*secundum equivalentiam*).[109] He illustrates one set of distinctions by saying that the spoken sign (*signum vocale*) and the written sign (*signum scriptum*) are the same in equivalence but different in genus.[110] What he means by this is brought out more clearly in his reply to the argument, where

[107] There are selections of the treatise *On Suppositions* in Read 1999, Fitzgerald 2015, and Maierù.

[108] *QP*, p. 263, ll. 7–9.

[109] *QP*, p. 266, ll. 7–9.

[110] *QP*, p. 266, ll. 7–10.

he concedes that there are more than ten predicaments of substance if 'more' is taken in the senses of number, species, or genus, but not if taken in the sense of equivalence, 'since the vocal, mental, and written predicaments of substance are equivalent in signifying and not in mode of signifying'.[111] The idea is pretty clearly that written, spoken, and mental instances of 'substance' are the same in equivalence because they're co-significative – they signify the same things – but are different in genus because the written ones are written, the spoken spoken, and the mental mental. Because the generic difference between such terms isn't accounted for by what they signify, it must be accounted for by something else. Maulfelt suggests a difference among their modes of signifying.

Maulfelt's endorsement of modes of signifying – however quiet – is a far cry from the anti-modist rhetoric of the *DMS*. And the use to which Maulfelt puts modes is structurally similar to a typical use by those who are more full-throated: to distinguish between terms that are the same in one respect but different in another, the more typical case being the distinguishing of morphosyntactically distinct instances of the same lexeme, such as instances of '*hircus*' in the nominative and '*hircum*' in the accusative. These are said to be the same in signifying but different in their modes of signifying because they signify the same things – goats – but have different syntactic features. But it's also important to acknowledge that Maulfelt doesn't put modes to exactly the same use here. Instead, he distinguishes between spoken, written, and mental instances of terms that are morphosyntactically the same – in this case, instances of '*substantia*'. The idea

[111] *QP*, p. 268, ll. 15–19: 'quia predicamentum substantie vocale, mentale et scriptum equivalent in significando, et non in modo significandi'.

might be an extension of the view that written and spoken terms, on the one hand, signify conventionally while mental terms, on the other, signify naturally. The relevant extension would be to further distinguish written terms from spoken, saying something like: written terms signify writtenly, spoken spokenly, and mental mentally. This use of the terminology is far from the traditional modist use and might even be consistent with an anti-modist position, so long as those modes of signifying aren't reified and grounded in extra-linguistic reality. But the point I want to make is that Maulfelt sees no problem with casually mentioning and relying on modes of signifying in his account here, which seems uncharacteristic of someone who wrote perhaps the most vehement anti-modist polemic we have on record.

The above observation relies heavily on the assumption that the passage in question accurately reproduces the author's original. The only surviving text of the *Questions on Porphyry* is the Erfurt manuscript *Bibl. Ampl.* 288, ff. 1ra–43va.[112] Van der Helm very tentatively dates the manuscript to around the 1360s or 1370s.[113] But there's no reason to think this is written by the author's own hand, and some reason to think not.[114] So it's certainly possible that the short string of words 'and not in mode of signifying' ('*et non in modo significandi*') is a scribal addition that Maulfelt himself wouldn't have endorsed. This is made all the more plausible by the fact that it appears to be the only mention of modes of signifying in the entire work.

[112] van der Helm provides a detailed description of the manuscript (van der Helm 2014, pp.135–141).

[113] van der Helm 2014, p. 140.

[114] Besides just the general fact that autographs are rare, van der Helm thinks that the hand is probably German, and so, as he points out, if Maulfelt isn't German, then he didn't write it himself (van der Helm 2014, pp. 140–141).

We may never know with much confidence whether Maulfelt himself is responsible for the remark. And we certainly won't be able to get a better sense of Maulfelt's views on modes of signifying until his other logical works are made more widely available, assuming they have anything to say on the topic. But for now, the available evidence concerning Maulfelt's views on modes of signifying doesn't support the attribution of the *DMS* to him and brings with it a certain degree of doubt.

Now on to a somewhat stronger consideration.

3.2 Predicaments

The second consideration concerns the predicaments more directly, specifically their ontological status. Ockham is famous for his nominalist reductionism, especially for his denial of the existence of real universals: the world consists entirely of particulars.[115] But he furthermore proposes a reduction of the number of predicaments from ten to two: substance and certain kinds of quality.[116] To maintain this minimalist ontological program, Ockham has to dissolve any apparent reference to anything other than particular substances and qualities. Ockham's approach is programmatic in the sense that he doesn't adopt a 'brute force' strategy of enumerating all possible cases and

[115] For a particularly emphatic expression of the view, see William of Ockham, *Exposition of Aristotle's On Interpretation*, eds. Gambatese & Brown 1978, I, §8, p. 363, ll. 14–19. Not all particulars are material, however. For a clear statement of Ockham's particularism, see Schierbaum 2014, pp. 1–2. On Ockham's ontological reductionism, see Adams 1987, ch. 5, pp. 143–167; Spade 1998; Spade 2006.

[116] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 40-62, pp. 111–192. This is a very well-studied subject, and giving a complete list of references would be too much for present purposes. For a start, see Adams 1987, ch. 5–9, pp. 143–313 and Klima 2006, and consult the references there.

reducing each in turn. Rather, he outlines a general method that he believes can be applied across the board.

The most important tool that Ockham wields for this purpose is his theory of connotative (*connotativa*) terms.[117] Connotative terms are contrasted with absolute (*absoluta*) terms, which are those terms that signify primarily only.[118] Connotative terms are those terms that signify something secondarily, though they may or may not signify something primarily.[119] For example, 'goat' ('*hircus*') – a concrete substance term – is an absolute term that primarily signifies substances (that is, goats) and doesn't secondarily signify anything. By contrast, 'pale' ('*album*') – a concrete quality term – is a connotative term that primarily signifies substances (that is, pale things) and secondarily signifies qualities (that is, palenesses), since its nominal definition (*quid nominis*) is 'something having paleness' ('*aliquid habens albedinem*').[120] Likewise, 'parent' – a relative term – primarily signifies substances (that is, parents) and secondarily signifies distinct substances (that is, children), since its nominal definition is 'something having a child'.[121] In short, a connotative term

[117] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 10, pp. 35–38. Ockham's theory of connotative terms has been extensively discussed, often in connection with his notion of mental language. Once again, a complete list of references would be too much. For a start, see Spade 1975; Panaccio 2004, ch. 4, pp. 63–83.

[118] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 10, p. 35, ll. 6–8.

[119] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 10, p. 36, ll. 38–39. Although Ockham here describes a connotative term as one that 'signifies something primarily and something secondarily' ('*significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario*'), by his own account not all connotative terms signify something primarily: figment (*figmenta*) terms – such as '*chimaera*' ('chimera'), '*tregelaphus*' ('goatstag'), and '*vacuum*' ('vacuum') – primarily signify nothing (*nihil*) but secondarily signify something (William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, II, ch. 14, p. 286, ll. 1–17). So connotative terms are better described as those that secondarily signify something, whether they also primarily signify something or not.

[120] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 10, p. 36, ll. 41–47.

[121] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 49, p. 155, ll. 29–35. See too William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, III-3, ch. 26, p. 690, ll. 21–23. Ockham's

is one that secondarily signifies those things primarily signified by a term appearing in an oblique case – for example, '*albedinem*' – in the connotative term's nominal definition.

This allows Ockham to reduce the predicaments. There's no need to countenance abstract relations, since relative terms are connotative terms signifying only particular substances, some primarily and others secondarily. The abstract relative term 'parenthood' is therefore synonymous[122] with its corresponding concrete relative term 'parent', which is a connotative term secondarily signifying those things that its correlative term 'child' primarily signifies. It's Ockham's contention that this same method can be applied to seven of the remaining eight accidental predicaments – that is, all of them except for certain cases of quality, since the nominal definition of a connotative quality term of this sort will include another quality term in its nominal definition, just like the nominal definition of '*album*' includes '*albedinem*'. So Ockham's ontology includes substances and qualities, but not relations.

Important for our purposes is the fact that, for similar reasons, Ockham's ontology likewise doesn't include quantities.[123] This was controversial at the time, in large part because Thomas Aquinas's account of the sacrament of the Eucharist requires that the qualities of the consecrated

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own typical example uses 'father' ('*pater*') and 'son' ('*filius*'), which is obviously flawed, since it implies that only fathers of sons are fathers.

[122] For Ockham's theory of synonymy, see William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 6, pp. 19–22; William of Ockham, *Seven Quodlibets*, ed. Wey 1980 V, q. 10; The secondary literature, once again, is very large. See Spade 1980b; Dutilh Novaes 2011; Chalmers 2006; Panaccio 2004, ch. 4, pp. 63–83; Brown 1996.

[123] *SL* I.10, I.44; *Quodlibeta septem* 4, q.25. See Klima 2006, p. 134. See Adams 1987, pp. 191–194.

bread inhere in the bread's quantity. This is because they have to inhere in some subject in order to be individuated, and they can't inhere in the bread substance, since that's no longer there, nor the Christ substance, since that would mean Christ would become chewy or salty or whatever, in opposition to dogma.[124]

Although the *DMS* author assumes Ockham's connotation theory, he appears to disagree about its application in the case of quantity. When replying to the second argument on the modist's behalf, the *DMS* author makes a distinction between two kinds of predicaments:

> […] species are manifold. For some are species of absolute predicaments, as are species of substance and also some species of quantity and of quality. Some are species of relatives and of connotatives, and all species in the genus of relation are especially such.[125]

In other words, the *DMS* author agrees with Ockham that substance and quality terms are absolute and that relative terms are connotative, but he also says, against Ockham, that some quantity terms are absolute not connotative. So if the *DMS* author follows Ockham's use of connotation theory in

[124] See Adams 1987, ch. 6, pp. 187–194.

[125] *DMS* §89.1: '[…] species sunt multiplices. Nam quaedam sunt species praedicamentorum absolutorum, cuiusmodi sunt species substantiae et etiam aliquae species quantitatis et qualitatis. Quaedam sunt species relativorum et connotativorum, et tales praecipue sunt omnes species in genere relationis.'

ontology – and there's no reason to think he wouldn't – his own ontology would include substances, qualities, *and quantities*.[126]

Maulfelt himself seems to follow Ockham's ontology, not the *DMS* author's.[127] The view comes up in Question 22 of *QP*, the same one addressed above, concerning the number of predicaments. But now Maulfelt considers an argument according to which there are *fewer* than ten:

> Again, that there are fewer most general genera is proved: everything that is is contained in either the predicament of substance or in the predicament of quality; therefore, most general genera other than the most general genera of substance and the most general genera of quality are superfluous.[128]

The argument here differs in an important respect from Ockham's own way of approaching the issue. It argues that there are fewer than ten predicaments in the domain of language on the grounds that there are fewer than ten predicaments in the domain of things; that is, this argument bases the

[126] As with the previous consideration, the current one depends heavily on the text being accurate. But this time the issue concerns the *DMS* rather than the *QP*. It's possible that the occurrence of '*quantitatis*' is a scribal error or addition. But Kaczmarek's apparatus suggests that all five source texts agree that the word is there.

[127] Maulfelt considers the possibility of eliminating substance from the ontology in his *Questions on the Predicaments*; but, as van der Helm points out, this shouldn't be read too strongly as an endorsement of a substanceless ontology (van der Helm 2014, pp. 8–11). Still, van der Helm sometimes makes it sound like Maulfelt is taking Ockhamism to its logical conclusion. I don't see it that way. If Maulfelt denies or even questions the existence of substance, then Maulfelt is going beyond Ockhamism, since the existence of substance is essential to Ockham's ontology and to his reductionist program: he needs substance in order to have something to reduce the other predicaments to using his method of connotation theory.

[128] *QP*, p. 264, ll. 5–8: 'Item, quod sint *pauciora* genera generalissima probatur: omne quod est, aut continetur in predicamento substantie vel in predicamento qualitatis; igitur superfluunt alia genera generalissima a genere gneralissimo *substantie* et a genere generalissimo *qualitatis*.'

reduction of logical predicaments on an antecedently established reduction of metaphysical predicaments. This is exactly the opposite of how Ockham argues, where he bases a metaphysical reduction on a logical one, arguing that there are fewer than ten predicaments in the domain of things on the grounds that there are fewer than ten predicaments in the domain of language.

Maulfelt – in the voice of his interlocutor – claims that the consequence (*consequentia*) is evident (*evidens*) and that 'the antecedent is clear according to the moderns, who posit that every thing is a substance or a quality'.[129] Presumably, these 'moderns' are the followers of Ockham. That Maulfelt himself is among them is suggested by the way he responds to the argument. Importantly, he denies the *consequence*, not the *antecedent*, claiming that it doesn't follow from the fact that there are only two metaphysical predicaments that there are only two logical ones, but not denying that there are only two metaphysical predicaments. This of course isn't the most impassioned endorsement of Ockham's ontology. But Maulfelt's silence here is somewhat telling. He easily could have denied the antecedent by asserting, as the *DMS* author does, that there are actually three, not two, predicaments.

But even if Maulfelt did deny the antecedent in this way, this wouldn't on its own be enough to refute the argument. He would still need to deny the consequence, since whether there are two or three predicaments there are fewer than ten. Maulfelt's aim might simply be brevity: since denying the consequence is sufficient for refuting the argument, and since denying the antecedent

[129] *QP*, p. 264, ll. 9–10: 'antecedens patet secundum modernos, qui ponunt omnem rem esse substantiam vel qualitatem'.

isn't, he provides the minimal answer. Going beyond this to point out that there are actually three, not two, predicaments would be irrelevant to the task at hand. On the other hand, this would be the perfect opportunity for Maulfelt to work in his view that there are actually three, not two, predicaments – an even better opportunity than the one taken up by the *DMS* author. And yet he doesn't, allowing his reader to assume, reasonably, that the lack of a denial of the antecedent is a tacit endorsement of it. This, I submit, casts some doubt on the attribution.

The next consideration is stronger than the previous two.

3.3 Material and Simple Supposition

The third consideration concerns the theory of supposition (*suppositio*), particularly the relationship between material (*materialis*) and simple (*simplex*) supposition.[130] Very roughly, material supposition is the late medieval version of quotation or, more accurately, the linguistic phenomenon of *mention* (as opposed to *use*).[131] A written or spoken term has material supposition when it supposits for (*supponit pro*) or stands for (*stat pro*) itself, in a particular way.[132] An

[130] On supposition theory in general, see the references above. For material and simple supposition in particular, see Normore 1997; Read 1999; Panaccio & Perini-Santos 2004; and Crimi 2014.

[131] For an excellent survey of modern theories of quotation and the use-mention distinction, see Cappelen & Lepore 2010.

[132] That is, it supposits for itself *and only* for itself. On this, see Crimi 2014. But note that 'itself' here has to be taken very broadly to include morphosyntactically distinct instances of the same lexeme: the nominative '*hircus*' can supposit materially for the accusative '*hircum*', for example. And in some cases a term might even supposit materially for a distinct lexical item: the abstract '*albedo*' might supposit materially for the concrete '*album*', for example. On this, see Normore 1997, p. 30; Read 1999; Panaccio & Perini-Santos 2004. I take up the variety of cases of material supposition in other work, currently in progress. But for our purposes, it isn't necessary to consider the details.

example would be the term '*hircus*' ('goat') in '*Hircus est nomen*' ('Goat is a noun'). Simple supposition is similar to material supposition, but the item for which the written or spoken term supposits is not that written or spoken term itself but rather the mental item to which that written or spoken term corresponds. An example would be the term '*hircus*' in '*Hircus est species*' ('Goat is a species'). Both of these cases are contrasted with personal (*personalis*) supposition, which occurs when a written or spoken term supposits for its significates (*significata*) – roughly, the items in its extension. An example would be the term '*hircus*' in '*Hircus est animal*' ('A goat is an animal').

The first two kinds of supposition were distinguished from the third on the grounds that they're both cases where the term in question supposits 'non-significatively' ('*non significative*'). But they were also distinguished from each other in most thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century logic treatises – including, notably, Ockham's *Summary*[133] – on the grounds that material supposition is supposition for a linguistic item and simple supposition is supposition for a mental item or form.[134] But as the theory of mental language began to take firmer hold, and the contents of the mind became identified with concepts (*conceptus*), and concepts with the terms of mental language, it was noticed that both material and simple supposition could be understood as cases in which one linguistic item supposits for another linguistic item: material supposition occurs when a written or

[133] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 64.

[134] William of Sherwood, *Introduction to Logic*, trans. Kretzmann, ch. 5, §2, pp. 107–109; Walter Burley, *On the Purity of the Art of Logic*, *Longer Treatise*, trans. Spade, part 1, ch. 1, pp. 81–92. The situation is a bit more complicated in Roger Bacon and Lambert of Auxerre, who both subsume what's later called 'material supposition' under 'simple supposition' but without using the former terminology at all (Roger Bacon, *The Art and Science of Logic*, trans. Maloney 2009, pp. 106–109; Lambert of Auxerre, *Logic*, trans. Maloney 2015, pp. 258–259). Peter of Spain neither uses 'material supposition' nor discusses such cases under the rubric of 'simple supposition' (Peter of Spain, *Summaries of Logic*, eds. and trans. Copenhaver, Normore, & Parsons, pp. 243–245).

spoken term supposits for a *written or spoken* term, while simple supposition occurs when a written or spoken term supposits for a *mental* term.[135] And so John Buridan (before 1300–after 1358) identifies simple supposition as a special case of material supposition.[136] He is the earliest known author to do this, and the uptake of the view was mixed: Marsilius of Inghen (ca. 1340 – 1396) follows suit,[137] but Albert of Saxony (ca. 1320–1390) doesn't.[138]

When considering the argument 'Sortes is a human; human is a species; therefore, Sortes is a species' ('*Sortes est homo; homo est species; ergo Sortes est species*'), the *DMS* author makes a passing remark that suggests his agreement with Buridan on this point. This is complicated to some extent by the state of the text. My version reads as follows, where the crucial part is underlined:

> […] iste terminus homo in prima propositione supponit personaliter et in secunda <u>supponit simpliciter vel consimiliter materialiter</u> […].[139]

> […] the term 'human' supposits personally in the first proposition and <u>supposits simply or, similarly, materially</u> in the second […].

[135] Dutilh Novaes 2008, pp. 449–452.

[136] John Buridan, *Summaries of Dialectic*, trans. Klima 2001, §4.3.2, pp. 252–258.

[137] Marsilius of Inghen, *On Suppositions*, ed. and trans. Bos 1983, p. 62.

[138] Albert of Saxony, *Very Useful Logic*, ed. Kann 1994, pp. 169–176; Thijssen 2004.

[139] *DMS*, §81.3.

Kaczmarek's version is the following:

> […] iste terminus 'homo' in prima propositione supponit personaliter et in secunda supponit simpliciter et materialiter […].[140]

> […] the term 'human' supposits personally in the first proposition and supposits simply and materially in the second.

The passage appears in λ as follows:

> […] iste terminus homo in prima supponit personaliter et in secunda supponit simpliciter consimiliter […].[141]

And the versions from *Me* and *Mü* can be reconstructed on the basis of Kaczmarek's editorial apparatus.[142] *Me* reads:

> […] ille terminus homo in prima propositione supponit personaliter et in secunda simpliciter vel materialiter consimiliter […].

[140] LK, p. 77.

[141] λ, f. a7rb.

[142] LK, p. 77.

And *Mü* reads:

> […] iste terminus homo in prima propositione supponit pro Sorte et in <u>simpliciter est materialiter</u> […].

Kaczmarek's apparatus also indicates that the 1489 Paris incunable (Pellechet 4205/Copinger 395/Reich 1720) – π in Kaczmarek's sigla – reads just like λ.[143]

As can be seen, my version follows λ, π, and *Me* in its inclusion of '*consimiliter*', *Me* and *Mü* in its inclusion of '*materialiter*', and *Me* in its inclusion of '*vel*'. Kaczmarek's follows *Mü* most closely, reading '*et*' for '*est*' and leaving off the '*consimiliter*' and '*vel*' from the other texts. But whether one prefers my version or Kaczmarek's, the passage asserts a similarity between material and simple supposition. Kaczmarek's version makes that similarity relation a form of identity: the term in question has both simple and material supposition. My version weakens that similarity relation, which I think more accurately reflects the doctrine: the term in question is said to have simple supposition or, similarly, material supposition, because the *DMS* author, like Buridan, takes simple supposition to be a species of material supposition. In either case, the source texts reasonably support the assertion of some sort of similarity relation. So we have reason to believe

[143] Kaczmarek's apparatus clearly indicates the omission of '*materialiter*' in λ and π, but it isn't totally obvious that '*materialiter*' appears in *both Me* and *Mü*. Still, Kaczmarek must be taking '*materialiter*' from either *Me* or *Mü*, and at present I'll just assume that because he doesn't indicate an omission in either that it's present in both. But I should flag the fact that failing to indicate an omission of a word shouldn't always be take as an assertion of its presence. It's also worth noting that it seems there may be an instance of '*secunda*' before '*simpliciter*' in *Mü*, though I can't quite parse Kaczmarek's editorial note here: secunda] *iter*. *et del*. (1) *Mü*. To definitively establish the readings in *Me* and *Mü*, it'll be necessary to inspect the manuscripts directly. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this, I am unable to do so. (See the Preface.)

that the *DMS* author subscribes to the position likewise taken by Buridan that simple supposition is a kind of material supposition – or at least, something very close to this view.

Peter, like Marsilius, very clearly endorses Buridan's position on this:

> […] when a spoken term in a spoken sentence is taken (*accipitur*) or supposits for a concept, or for a mental term properly so called, to which it is subordinated in signifying, then it is taken or supposits for a non-ultimate significate. Also, when it supposits or is taken for itself, or what is like itself, it is taken for a non-ultimate significate. In these cases, some people say it has 'material' supposition. But when it is taken for the thing it signifies ultimately by imposition, it is said to have 'personal' supposition, because then it supposits for its ultimate significate.[144]

The 'non-ultimate significate' ('*significatum non ultimatum*') of a written or spoken term is that term itself, or similar written or spoken terms, or the concept to which that written or spoken term is subordinated.[145] So Peter here makes a twofold division of supposition into personal and material, where the latter occurs when a written or spoken term supposits either for a written or spoken version of itself or for its corresponding mental term. At least, he says that 'some people' say this. But nothing Peter says here or elsewhere suggests that he isn't amenable to their way of

[144] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980, p. 29.

[145] Peter of Ailly, *Concepts*, trans. Spade 1980, ¶¶63–66, pp. 28–29. On the evolution of this terminology, see Read 1999.

speaking. In fact, he seems to take it a step farther by not mentioning simple supposition *at all*, rather than bringing up simple supposition only to assimilate it to material as others do.[146] While this makes the *DMS* text above consistent with the hypothesis of Peter's authorship, this doesn't qualify as evidence in favor of the attribution, since any number of other logicians from the fourteenth century might follow Buridan on this point.

But Maulfelt, unlike Buridan, Marsilius, Peter, and the *DMS* author, follows Ockham's more traditional division of supposition. Maulfelt hints at the view in the *QP*, at Question 15: 'Whether human is a species of animal' (*'Utrum homo sit species animalis*'). After raising five arguments for the negative, Maulfelt lays the groundwork for his replies by remarking: 'In that question the distinction of material, personal, and simple supposition is presupposed'.[147] The replies that follow each rely on distinguishing situations in which the terms supposit materially from those in which they supposit personally. The overall discussion here is very complicated, packed with nuanced use-mention distinctions and tricky argumentation. For our purposes, all that's crucial is that the cases of material supposition that Maulfelt considers are naturally read as involving written or spoken terms suppositing for written or spoken terms. At no point does Maulfelt suggest that any of the cases of material supposition involve written or spoken terms suppositing for concepts.

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[146] Buridan says that it's fine if people want to use the terminology of 'simple supposition' and to distinguish it from material in the typical way, but he prefers to speak of both as 'material' (John Buridan, *Summaries of Dialectic*, trans. Klima 2001, §4.3.2, p. 253). Marsilius advocates against using the terminology of 'simple supposition' at all, making his view more extreme than Buridan's but less extreme than Peter's (Marsilius of Inghen, *On Suppositions*, ed. and trans. Bos 1983, p. 62).

[147] *QP*, p. 233, ll. 1–2: 'In ista questione presupponitur distinctio de suppositione materiali et personali et simplici'. The are two other passing remarks that suggest the two kinds of supposition are distinct. See *QP*, pp. 391, 392. He mentions material supposition two other times, neither of which suggests that simple supposition is a kind of material supposition: *QP*, pp. 372–373.

This is especially remarkable because the discussion concerns the proposition 'Human is a species of animal' ('*Homo est species animalis*'), where the predicate term 'species of animal' ('*species animalis*') is what Ockham would call a 'name of second intention' ('*nomen secundae intentionis*') – that is, a written or spoken term that signifies a concept. Such a term is distinguished from a 'name of first intention' ('*nomen primae intentionis*') or 'name of first imposition' ('*nomen primae impositionis*'), which is a written or spoken term that signifies extra-linguistic and extra-mental things, such as 'human' ('*homo*'). These are all distinguished from a 'name of second imposition' ('*nomen secundae impositionis*'), which is a written or spoken term that signifies written or spoken terms, such as 'utterance' ('*vox*').[148]

According to Ockham's theory, a written or spoken term of first imposition/intention can have material supposition only if the predicate term of the proposition in question is a name of second *imposition*, barring cases of material supposition in which the predicate term is a name of second *intention*, as in Maulfelt's example, which, for Ockham, would have to be a case of simple supposition.[149] This is one of a set of rules Ockham proposes that appear to limit the kinds of supposition attributable to propositions of various sorts, thereby restricting textual interpretation.[150] Ockham's approach to this issue is a traditional one, stretching back to early

[148] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 11; Spade 1981.

[149] That is, so long as it's interpreted in a way that renders the proposition *true* – that is, as asserting that *human* is a species, not that a human is a species. On this see Dutilh Novaes 2007, pp. 7–77; Dutilh Novaes 2013; and Crimi 2014.

[150] William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 65; Spade 1974; Crimi 2014. It's my opinion that Ockham's rules are taken more strictly by modern scholars, and possibly also his contemporaries, than Ockham himself intended.

treatments of material supposition by thirteenth-century logicians such as William of Sherwood.[151] The doctrine came under scrutiny at Paris in the 1340s with the prohibition of the Ockhamist errors. By allowing cases of material supposition in which the predicate is a name of second intention rather than second imposition, Maulfelt is going against this very fundamental Ockhamist creed, all the while maintaining Ockham's more traditional three-fold division of supposition. And while Maulfelt doesn't appear to adopt Buridan's assimilation of simple supposition to material supposition, his approach operates in the more liberal Buridanist framework that releases these restrictions on the range of possible supposition-based interpretations.[152]

But the evidence from the *QP* isn't definitive. Maulfelt *names* the three kinds of supposition, but he doesn't *define* them, making it consistent with the text that all along he means for simple supposition to be understood as a special case of material supposition, in line with Buridan. But this reading is made implausible by his treatise *On Suppositions*. Not only does Maulfelt repeat the three-fold division of supposition there,[153] he also provides the following remarkably rigorous definition of material supposition:[154]

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[151] *Introduction to Logic*, trans. Kretzmann 1966, p. 113.

[152] This makes some of van der Helm's claims regarding Maulfelt's strict Ochamism and non-Buridanism seem somewhat overstated. See, for example, van der Helm 2014, pp. 55–56, 126.

[153] As reported by van der Helm, who provides the quote: 'Suppositio dividitur in suppositionem materialem, simplicem, et personalem' (van der Helm 2014, p. 33).

[154] But the definition captures less than it should, since the condition 'and which it wasn't imposed to signify' is too restrictive (Read 1999, pp. 11–12).

> Material supposition is a term standing [(i)] for itself or [(ii)] for another similar to it in utterance or in writing to which it is not imposed to signify ultimately, [(ii.i)] suppositing in the same way or [(ii.ii)] another, or [(iii)] for some other in utterance that is not inferior to it […].[155]

This definition rules out the possibility that a written or spoken term suppositing materially supposits for a concept.[156] Take some written or spoken term *t* such that *t* supposits materially for *t**. Then *t* must meet either condition (i), (ii), or (iii) of Maulfelt's definition. In each case it follows that *t** is a written or spoken term, not a concept. If (i), then *t** just is *t*, and since *t* is written or spoken, *t** is written or spoken too. If (ii), then *t** is a term similar to *t* 'in writing' ('*in scripto*') or 'in utterance' ('*in voce*'). In other words, *t** is either a written or spoken term. It's then irrelevant which of the two sub-conditions of condition (ii) *t** meets – whether (ii.i) suppositing in the same way or (ii.ii) another – since in either case *t** is written or spoken. If (iii), then *t** is, again, 'in utterance' and so, again, is a spoken term.

Maulfelt is well aware that his definition has this result. When explaining his reasoning for including the various conditions in the definition, he says:

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[155] Read 1999, p. 10: 'Suppositio materialis est terminus stans pro se vel pro alio sibi simili in voce vel in scripto eodem modo vel aliter supponente cui non imponitur ad significandum <mg. ultimate> vel pro aliqua alia voce que non est inferior ad ipsum […]'.

[156] Though it allows that a concept suppositing for itself in a mental proposition has material supposition (Read 1999, p. 11; Read 2015, p. 23). This is against Ockham but in line with Albert of Saxony. It's possible to interpret the *DMS* author's own remark in this way, as saying that if the proposition in question is written or spoken, then the term supposits simply, but if the proposition is mental, then the term supposits materially. This is ruled out by Kaczmarek's rendering of the Latin but is possible on mine. But I think this is a bit of a stretch, and it certainly isn't obvious.

> Also, the little part 'in utterance or in writing' is added because if a spoken or written term supposits for an item similar to it in the mind then it is not called 'material' supposition but 'simple', as will be made clear below.[157]

Here Maulfelt explicitly denies that a written or spoken term that supposits for a mental term supposits materially, remarking that condition (ii) of his definition is specifically designed to exclude such a case, which he labels 'simple supposition'. Maulfelt's definition is very intentionally constructed, as indicated by his explanation of condition (ii). So it would be surprising for him to have contradicted himself in the *DMS* concerning a matter about which he's so precise and careful in the treatise *On Suppositions*. One way to avoid that tension is to refuse to assent to the claim that he wrote the *DMS*, at least not without more solid evidence.

The three considerations above don't establish that Maulfelt didn't write the *DMS*, but they do, I suggest, undermine confidence that he did. To put the point another way, I think the three considerations I've raised warrant explanation from anyone who positively asserts the attribution. But I don't think they should outweigh all other considerations. We should be willing to undo our agnosticism in light of evidence to the contrary. And then if we can't explain away the

[157] I'm translating here from an unpublished selection of Latin text, generously distributed at the 2018 European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics: 'Additur etiam ista particula *in voce vel in scripto*, quia si terminus prolatuis vel scriptus supponit pro sibi simili in mente tunc non vocatur suppositio *materialis* sed *simplex* ut postea patebit.' The text is from a forthcoming critical edition of Maulfelt's *On Suppositions*, *On Consequences*, and *On Confusions*, based on five manuscripts, by Christoph Kann and Sönke Lorenz. I'm very grateful to Christoph for allowing me to use this text here.

inconsistencies, we should learn to live with them. Surely Maulfelt – like Whitman, Dylan, and the rest of us – contains multitudes.[158]

CONCLUSION: TWO FURTHER CANDIDATES

Ockham, Buridan, Maulfelt, Peter, and the *DMS* author all agree in their overall terminist, nominalist, and conceptualist framework. But there are two specific issues on which the *DMS* author appears to disagree with Ockham and Maulfelt: the reduction of the predicaments and the relationship between material and simple supposition. On the latter, the *DMS* author appears to agree with Peter and, more directly, Buridan.

The fact that the *DMS* author is compelled to assert the view, but does so in passing and sees no need to explain it, suggests that he might have expected his readership to have been comfortable with the idea, furthermore suggesting that it might have been kicking around for some time before the *DMS* author unceremoniously references it. Buridan is our earliest known source, but the uncertainty about the dating of the *DMS* makes it impossible at this stage to tell whether the *DMS* author is following Buridan here or vice versa. Or maybe the two had a common, as of yet unaccounted for source. But Buridan is well-deserving of his great reputation among today's scholars of medieval logic. And judging from this one work alone, I cautiously suggest that the *DMS* author is a much less innovative thinker. And so I submit that we should carefully consider the possibility that the *DMS* author post-dates Buridan and was influenced by his supposition

[158] Whitman 1881; Dylan 2020.

theory. If that turns out to be right, then the *terminus post quem* of the *DMS* should be pushed up to ca. 1340, to align with the best estimate for the dating of the treatise *On Suppositions* from Buridan's *Summaries of Dialectic*.[159]

That would be a when. But what about a who? Peter remains a possibility. Maulfelt too – though, if I was at all successful, maybe somewhat less-so than before. I think we should continue to seriously investigate these two. But I also think that maybe we should take another angle: look to figures we believe to have produced works on grammar in the anti-modist tradition of the late fourteenth century. With that approach in mind, I want to conclude this essay by endorsing two further candidates: John Aurifaber and Marsilius of Inghen.[160] As with the Maulfelt-Peter pair, we know next to nothing about the one and quite a bit about the other.

Aurifaber was an Averroist master working at Erfurt in the 1330s. We have a record of a public discussion there in 1332 or 1333 in which he presented an anti-modist polemic, now titled the *Determination of the Modes of Signifying*.[161] It's been claimed that before this he was a student of Maulfelt's at Paris, but the evidence for this is unclear.[162]

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[159] van der Lecq 1998, p. xvii.

[160] A third possibility, which I can't consider in more detail here, is Themon Judeus. See Thijssen 2004.

[161] John Aurifaber, *Determination of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Pinborg 1967. In addition, he's thought to have authored a commentary on Peter of Spain's *Summaries of Logic*, a treatise *On Dimensions*, and a treatise *On Demonstrations* (Kretzmann, Kenny, Pinborg, & Stump 1982, p. 865).

[162] van der Helm 2014, p. 18; Lorenz 1996, p. 164.

Marsilius was born in Nijmegen in 1340. He was an arts master, occasional rector, and theology student at Paris from 1362 until 1378, the start of the Papal Schism, when he became the university's delegate to Urban VI in Tivoli. It's unclear whether he ever returned to Paris, there being no record of him there after 1379. His subsequent whereabouts are unknown until 1382, when he pops up in Nijmegen for a banquet in his honor, and then again until 1386, when he becomes the founding rector of the University of Heidelberg. He resumed his theological studies at Heidelberg in 1390, becoming the university's first doctor of theology shortly before his death in 1396.[163] He was the author of a wide range of philosophical treatises, and his known works on logic and language include various *Questions* and *Summaries* of the Old and New Logic and a set of treatises on the properties of terms (*proprietates terminorum*), including a treatise *On Suppositions*,[164] and treatises *On Obligations*, *On Insolubles*, and *On Consequences*.[165]

It's obvious that Aurifaber and the *DMS* author are working in the same anti-modist tradition, and the *Determination* shares with the *DMS* some definite similarities in both content and structure.[166] One glaring similarity is their presentations of the five modist theses, which themselves seem to be taken from Thomas of Erfurt.[167] These are near verbatim copies of one another, presented in exactly the same order. Another is that the two texts share many of the same

[163] Hoenen 2017.

[164] Marsilius of Inghen, *On Suppositions*, ed. and trans. Bos 1983.

[165] An edition of the treatise *On Consequences* by Graziana Ciola is forthcoming. Selections from the text, along with exposition and commentary, are available in Ciola 2017 and Ciola 2018.

[166] Pinborg 1967, pp. 202–210.

[167] See the Introduction above.

anti-modist arguments.[168] But one glaring difference is the *DMS* author's reluctance to adopt the modist terminology of 'mode of being' ('*modi essendi*'), freely used by Aurifaber. Could Aurifaber have written both the *Determination* and the *DMS*, with the former being maybe a precursor to the latter? Maybe a more workable starting point would be to consider whether Aurifaber was a source for the *DMS* author.[169] Either way, a serious investigation will have to wait until another time.

Marsilius was an exceptionally talented extrapolator of Buridan's particular brand of nominalist terminism, though not unoriginal himself. As I briefly mentioned above, he adopts Buridan's assimilation of simple supposition to material supposition.[170] He influenced Peter of Ailly,[171] and his views are largely in agreement with the brand of conceptualism on display in both the *Concepts* and the *DMS*. Notably, Marsilius may also have written a post-modist grammar in the form of a Questions Commentary on Alexander of Villedieu's grammatical treatise *The Teaching of Children* (*Doctrinale puerorum*), which survives in a single manuscript with an internal attribution to a '*Magister Marcilius*'.[172] C.H. Kneepkens, having studied that manuscript,

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[168] Notably, among others, these include what I call the 'No Property' and 'Hylomorphism' arguments below. See John Aurifaber, *Determination of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Pinborg 1967, p. 224 for an instance of the former and p. 221 for the latter.

[169] Pinborg seems to think so, while still attributing the *DMS* to Peter. Kaczmarek points out that Lorenz' idea that Aurifaber was Maulfelt's student and that Maulfelt wrote the *DMS* reverses the order of influence here (Kaczmarek 1994, p. xxix).

[170] Though, as I remarked above, his view is a bit stronger than Buridan's, advocating against using the terminology of 'simple supposition' altogether. On the hypothesis that Marsilius is the author, it would seem that he wrote the *DMS* before the treatise *On Suppositions* – that is, after being influenced by Buridan to assimilate simple supposition to material but before he fully solidified his negative attitude toward the terminology.

[171] Read 1999.

[172] Kaczmarek, pp. xiii–xiv; Kneepkens 1990.

remarks on the 'resemblance to the theory of mental language that we find in the writings of Pierre d'Ailly, especially his early *Conceptus* […] and his *Destructiones modorum significandi*',[173] referring to the work as 'a conceptualist grammar, with a remarkable affinity to the works of Pierre d'Ailly'.[174] Could the *DMS* author be the same as the author of the *Questions on the Teaching*? And could the author of the latter be Marsilius? Kneepkens, adopting the so-called 'negative way', merely argues that there isn't an obvious reason to prevent attributing the *Questions on the Teaching* to Marsilius.[175] And now we have a connection between Marsilius and the *DMS* by way of the theory of supposition. So one possibility, which has to be explored in future work, is that the *DMS*, long paired with Peter's *Concepts*, has all the while been pining for its original, more fitting partner: Marsilius's *Questions on the Teaching*.

[173] Kneepkens 1990, p. 37.

[174] Kneepkens 1990, p. 42.

[175] Kneepkens 1990, p. 28.

PART 2

THE MODIST CORRESPONDENCE THESIS AND THREE ANTI-MODIST ARGUMENTS

INTRODUCTION

Essential to modism is a thesis that I'll call 'the Modist Correspondence Thesis' ('MCT'). In its most general formulation, MCT postulates a relationship between language and reality: the grammatical properties of language, by means of the epistemic properties of thought, are grounded in the metaphysical properties of nature. More specifically, MCT asserts that modes of signifying (*modi significandi*) correspond to modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi*), which in turn correspond to modes of being (*modi essendi*). MCT is the fulcrum of the fourteenth-century debate between modists and anti-modists: Thomas of Erfurt derives a version of MCT at the start of his treatise and the author of the *Destructions of the Modes of Signifying* (*DMS*) leverages MCT against the modist, attempting to derive absurdities from it.

Here I'll consider three anti-modist arguments from the second chapter of the *DMS*, which I'll call the 'Regress,' 'No Property,' and 'Hylomorphism' Arguments. All three arguments interact with MCT in some way, aiding an understanding of the modist thesis: the Regress Argument attempts to use MCT to generate an infinite regress of modes through the limitless imposition of new utterances; the No Property argument attempts to use MCT to infer the absence of modes of signifying from the absence of modes of being in certain special cases; and the Hylomorphism Argument attempts to derive a contradiction from a different but closely related modist thesis –

what I'll call the 'Modist Inherence Thesis' ('MIT') – which provides a hylomorphic interpretation of the correspondence relation postulated by MCT. But all three arguments are flawed in their treatment of modist doctrine: the Regress Argument relies on some questionable assumptions about modism and underestimates the strength of the modist's commitment to MCT; the No Property Argument attributes to the modist a stronger version of MCT than the modist is committed to accepting; and the Hylomorphism Argument misinterprets the hylomorphic structure of modes posited by MIT, thereby misunderstanding MCT. Recognizing these flaws helps us reconstruct an interpretation of MCT that's more plausible than the caricature repudiated by these arguments.

This raises questions about the strength of the *DMS* author's understanding of modism and about the purpose and intended audience of the *DMS*. But we should be careful about taking the *DMS* author's *statements* of the Regress, No Property, and Hylomorphism arguments as *endorsements* of them. The text as a whole roughly follows the pattern of the Question (*quaestio*) genre of philosophical writing: first a question is posed, then competing answers and arguments in their favor are presented, then the author's own view on the matter is explained, usually by presenting various distinctions or explanations, and then finally replies to the arguments presented in favor of the counter-position are given. The anti-modist arguments under consideration here come in the second part of this structure, where the *DMS* author is best read as simply presenting – rather than embracing – a set of considerations against modism. If we want to see the *DMS*

author's own positive response to modism, we should look to the final parts of the *DMS*, where he champions the 'truer way'.[176]

That said, I believe there's much to learn about the state of fourteenth-century anti-modism, and about the modist view it disparages, by carefully considering the anti-modist arguments from the second part of the *DMS*, paying special attention to where they go wrong. The sometimes blatant misrepresentation of modist doctrine in these arguments makes them better equipped to reinforce the anti-modist creed among its committed adherents than to convert the modist cohort. Many appear to be stock arguments, built and deployed to polemicize more than proselytize. The Regress, No Property, and Hylomorphism Arguments, three such examples, are my focus here.

1 Fundamentals of Thomas's Modism

Thomas's modism is a brand of speculative grammar (*grammatica speculativa*), and as such it aims to provide a scientific theory of grammar in general, rather than a descriptive account of the peculiarities of the grammars of specific languages.[177] As a specifically *modist* speculative grammar, Thomas's theory posits various modes of signifying (*modi significandi*) to explain the

[176] I intend to take up this topic more fully in future work.

[177] My emphasis will be on select aspects of the grammatical theory, particularly those occupying the first six chapters of Thomas' *Treatise on the Modes of Signifying* – that is, the part of Thomas' theory called the 'metalanguage' by Bursill-Hall (Bursill-Hall 1971, pp. 42–43, 48–55, 66–113). Both modism in general and Thomas' modism in particular have been extensively studied elsewhere. See the references above for some key sources.

morphological and syntactic features of language. The theory has two components: 'etymology' ('*etymologia*') and 'diasynthetics' ('*diasynthetica*').[178]

Etymology characterizes and taxonomizes the morphological features of utterances (*voces*) by describing their modes of signifying.[179] It divides modes of signifying into those that are essential (*essentiales*) and those that are accidental (*accidentales*).[180] An utterance's essential modes of signifying determine its basic morphological category, such as its being either a noun or a verb.[181] An utterance's accidental modes of signifying determine its morphological features specific to its

[178] The etymology occupies the first forty-four chapters of Thomas' *Speculative Grammar*, the diasynthetics the remaining ten chapters. Thomas remarks on the division of the text at the moment of its occurrence (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 45, ¶88, p. 273). See too Bursill-Hall 1972, p. 28, on the distinction.

[179] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1-44, ¶¶1-87, pp. 135–273; Bursill-Hall 1972, pp. 47–95.

According to modist doctrine, an utterance is a vocalization devoid of semantic content. An utterance then becomes an expression (*dictio*) when it gains signification or semantic content. An expression then becomes a part of speech (*pars orationis*) when it furthermore gains consignification or syntactic structure. In practice, there's a broad sense of 'utterance' that covers all three items: an expression is an utterance plus semantic content, and a part of speech is an utterance plus both semantic content and syntactic structure. Taken in this way, 'utterance' is a genus of 'expression' and 'part of speech', and so a common practice among modists, which I'll also adopt, will be to occasionally refer to something having semantic content or syntactic structure simply as an 'utterance', obviously not meaning by this the strict sense of 'utterance' as a vocalization devoid of semantic content and syntactic structure.

It's important to note furthermore that according to Thomas the grammarian doesn't consider the utterance inasmuch as (*inquantum*) it's an utterance, but rather inasmuch as it's a sign (*signum*); that is, the grammarian isn't concerned with the physics of the utterance – for example, its phonetic properties – but is rather concerned with its linguistic properties (THOMAS OF ERFURT, *ON THE MODES OF SIGNIFYING OR SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR*, ED. AND TRANS. BURSILL-HALL 1972, ch. 6, ¶12, p. 148).

[180] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 7, ¶13, p. 148.

[181] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 7, ¶13, p. 148, ch. 8, ¶15, pp. 152–154, ch. 25, ¶44, pp. 208–210.

morphological category: for nouns, this includes case, number, and gender; for verbs, person, number, tense, voice, and mood.[182]

For example, consider the utterance '*hircus*', a nominative singular masculine noun. The semantic content of '*hircus*' ('goat') is determined by what it signifies (*significat*): goats.[183] But its syntactic structure isn't determined by *what* it signifies, but by *how* it signifies what it signifies – that is, by the modes of signifying it exhibits. Put differently, its syntactic structure is determined not by what it *signifies*, but by what it *consignifies* (*consignificat*) – not goats, but certain properties (*proprietates*) of goats, to which its syntactic features correspond.[184] So modes of signifying are posited to account for, among other things, the different syntactic roles that various utterances exhibit, often – but not always – tracked by differences of inflection. '*Hircus*' is a noun because its essential modes include the mode of signifying nominally; it's nominative, singular, and masculine because its accidental modes include the modes of signifying nominatively, singularly, and masculinely. An oblique (*obliquus*) utterance, such as the accusative '*hircum*', signifies the same

[182] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 7, ¶13, p. 148, ch. 14, ¶¶24–25, pp. 174–176, ch. 27-28, ¶¶52–56, pp. 220–226.

[183] For Thomas, following the realist understanding of the Aristotelian semantic triangle, the thing signified by an utterance is *an essence*, not the individual instance(s) of that essence, and the sort of signification is *secondary*, the utterance *primarily* signifying the *intelligible species* of that essence. For the *DMS* author, following the nominalist semantic triangle, the things signified are the *individuals*, and the signification is *primary* (or left unqualified), the utterance being *subordinated* to the *concept* of the individuals. (For an overview and comparison of these two semantic frameworks, see Klima 2008; Klima 2010.) For the time being, these differences don't matter, and I'll adopt the nominalist way of speaking, using 'things signified' or 'significates' ('*significata*') for individuals, and not bothering to qualify this kind of signification as 'secondary', with the understanding that this way of speaking can be translated into the realist version of the doctrine by simply replacing talk of individuals with talk of their essences and talk of significates with talk of secondary significates. However, I'll reintroduce the distinction between primary and secondary signification below, where the terminology will be helpful for articulating the theory.

[184] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, ¶3, ch. 4, ¶8, pp. 136, 142.

things as its nominative counterpart '*hircus*', and likewise exhibits the same essential mode of signifying nominally, but it exhibits the accidental mode of signifying accusatively rather than nominatively.

Diasynthetics addresses the syntax of statements (*orationes*) by accounting for the principles of their grammatical construal (*constructio*), agreement (*congruitas*), and completion (*perfectio*).[185] Construal is a property of a complex utterance – considered as union (*unio*) of construables (*constructibilia*) – insofar as its parts exhibit grammatical dependencies, as an adjective depends on a determining noun, an adverb on a verb, or a transitive verb on a subject and an object.[186] Agreement is the property had when such a union is appropriate (*debita*), as when a noun agrees in case, number, and gender with its dependent adjective or a subject agrees in number with its dependent verb.[187] Completion is a property emerging from correct construal and

[185] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 45–54, ¶¶88–120, pp. 272–321; Bursill-Hall 1972, pp. 95–117.

[186] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 45–52, ¶¶88–109, pp. 272–306.

[187] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 53, ¶¶110-115, pp. 306–312. Thomas distinguishes agreement/disagreement (*congruitas*/ *incongruitas*) from propriety/impropriety (*proprietas*/*improprietas*), where the former concerns syntactic well-formedness and the latter concerns a sort of semantic well-formedness caused by the agreement or disagreement of the 'specific significates' ('*significatorum specialium*') of a complex utterance's constituents. His example is '*cappa categorica*' ('categorical cape'): since capes aren't the sorts of things that can be categorical, there's a sort of semantic ill-formedness in this complex. Thomas doesn't explain this notion of semantic ill-formedness in any detail, but the problem isn't merely that such a complex is false, or even that it's impossible, but rather that it's, in some sense, absurd or meaningless. (This is similar to Rudolph Carnap's account of 'Caesar is a prime number' (Carnap 1996, pp. 67–68)). Thomas insists, however, that the propriety of complexes, owing to their constituents' special significates, isn't the concern of the grammarian, but rather of the logician, reinforcing the grammarian's emphasis on syntax over the logician's emphasis on semantics. See Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 53, ¶111, p. 308.

agreement, whereby a complex utterance generates a complete sense (*perfectus sensus*) in the soul (*anima*) of the hearer (*auditor*).[188]

For example, consider the complex utterance '*Agricola magnus hircos parvos celeriter ducit*' ('The big farmer quickly leads the small goats'). This is a complete statement because it successfully communicates the complete sense that the big farmer quickly leads the small goats. Its completion is confirmed by noting that it exhibits correct agreement and construal. The agreement is correct because the adjective '*magnus*' and noun '*agricola*' are both nominative, singular, and masculine; the adjective '*parvos*' and noun '*hircos*' are both accusative, plural, and masculine; and the verb '*ducit*' and subject '*argicola*' are both singular. The construal is correct because the dependencies of the adjectives '*magnus*' and '*parvos*' are resolved by the determining nouns '*agricola*' and '*hircos*'; the dependency of the adverb '*celeriter*' is resolved by the determining verb '*ducit*'; and the dependency of the transitive verb '*ducit*' is resolved by the determining subject '*agricola*' and object '*hircos*'.[189]

Because the complete statement '*Agricola magnus hircos parvos celeriter ducit*' exhibits correct construal and agreement, it can be assembled by bringing together its sub-sentential utterances in stages. Begin with the list of constituents '*agricola*', '*magnus*', '*hircos*', '*parvos*', '*celeriter*'. Next identify the various dependencies of the simple utterances and combine them so

[188] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 54, ¶¶116–120, pp. 312–320.

[189] In the context of Latin instruction, as codified in nineteenth-century elementary textbooks, to perform this sort of analysis – somewhat akin to a 'parsing' – is to produce a 'construe' of the sentence or passage. The terminology traces back to '*constructio*', itself derived from '*construo*'.

as to bring about a range of possible complex utterances exhibiting correct construal: '*ducit*', a transitive verb, depends on a subject and an object; '*magnus*' and '*parvos*', both adjectives, depend on nouns; and '*celeriter*', an adverb, depends on a verb. Because there's just one verb in the list, the dependency of '*celeriter*' can only be resolved by '*ducit*', resulting in the complex '*celeriter ducit*'. Possibilities like '*magnus celeriter*' and '*celeriter agricola*' are ruled out as incorrectly construed, since they include no verb to resolve the dependency of the adverb '*celeriter*'.

While '*celeriter ducit*' resolves the dependency of '*celeriter*', it doesn't resolve that of '*ducit*' and so isn't a complete utterance. So we need to identify a subject and object for '*ducit*', and before that we need to resolve the dependencies of the adjectives '*magnus*' and '*parvos*'. This results in four possibilities: '*agricola magnus*', '*hircos magnus*', '*agricola parvos*', and '*hircos parvos*'. All of these exhibit correct *construal*, since their dependencies are resolved, but only two furthermore exhibit correct *agreement*: '*agricola magnus*' and '*hircos parvos*', since only they agree in gender, number, and case.

But these complex utterances are not yet complete statements, since they don't yet communicate a complete sense. For that, they require a verb.[190] So, returning to our verb-adverb complex '*celeriter ducit*', we now have the required subject and object – '*agricola magnus*' and

[190] Thomas speaks of the proximate and remote purposes of completion, where the proximate is brought about by the combining of, for example, nouns and adjectives, but only in service of reaching the remote purpose of pairing those noun-adjective complexes with a verb in order to produce a complete statement communicating a complete sense. See Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 54, ¶116, pp. 312–314.

'*hircos parvos*' – to resolve its dependencies. This results, finally, in the complete statement '*Agricola magnus hircos parvos celeriter ducit*'.

Etymology and diasynthetics are linked by modes of signifying, which are posited to explain those grammatical features necessary for determining construal, agreement, and completion. This is how the theory operates at the level of language. But there's also an underlying metaphysics, meant to explain where those modes of signifying themselves come from. Thomas endorses a correspondence between language, thought, and reality, represented by modes of signifying at the level of language, modes of understanding (*modi intelligendi*) at the level of thought, and modes of being (*modi essendi*) at the level of reality. In broad strokes, a mode of being is a way that a thing (*res*), existing in reality, has being; a mode of understanding is a way that a thought (*intellectus*), existing in the intellect, understands; and a mode of signifying is a way that an utterance (*vox*), existing in language, signifies. The grammatical features of language are explained by modes of signifying, which are explained by modes of understanding, which are explained by modes of being.[191] And so language, mediated by thought, is ultimately explained by reality.

For example, the essential mode of signifying exhibited by '*hircus*' – its nominal mode, in virtue of which the utterance is a noun – stems from the mode of being of stability and permanence (*habitus et permanentis*), while the essential mode of signifying exhibited by '*currit*' – its verbal mode, in virtue of which the utterance is a verb – stems from the mode of being of flux and

[191] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, pp. 136–138, ch. 3, ¶7, pp. 140–142.

succession (*fluxus et successionis*).[192] The accidental modes of these utterances likewise stem from modes of being. For example, the nominative mode of signifying of '*hircus*' stems from the mode of being of 'what is other' ('*quod est alterum*'), its singular mode from the mode of indivisibility (*indivisibilitatis*), and its masculine mode from the mode of agency (*agentis*).[193]

In finer detail, a mode is a property (*proprietas*) of a certain kind – either of a thing (*rei*), of a thought (*intellectus*), or of an utterance (*vocis*). A mode furthermore has an account (*ratio*) of a certain kind – one that involves capacities either of being (*essendi*), of understanding (*intelligendi*), or of signifying (*significandi*).[194] Modes are either active (*activus*) or passive (*passivus*), depending on whether their account involves its capacity actively or passively. The property of a mode is what that mode *is*, and the capacity of a mode, involved in its account, is what it *does* (if active) or what's *done to* it (if passive).

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[192] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 8, ¶15, pp. 153–153, ch. 25, ¶45, p. 210.

[193] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 16, ¶27, p. 178, ch. 17, ¶29, p. 182, ch. 19, ¶32, p. 186.

[194] Cf. Bursill-Hall 1972, pp. 32–33. The Latin '*ratio*' is notoriously difficult to translate. In this context, Bursill-Hall uses 'faculty', while I'll opt for 'account'. I agree with Bursill-Hall that Thomas' use of '*ratio*' associates it with the possession of certain capacities or powers – those of being, understanding, or signifying (Bursill-Hall 1971, pp. 53–54). (I prefer 'capacity' over 'faculty' here, since 'faculty' suggests that the thing exhibiting the power has to be animate, which isn't the case.) But I disagree that the *ratio* itself *is* the capacity/faculty. Instead, I suggest that the *ratio* of a mode is an account of that mode, which account involves – that is, makes mention of – one of those three capacities. As we'll see, passive modes of signifying, passive modes of understanding, and modes of being are distinguished from each other not in virtue of *proprietas* but in virtue of *ratio*. We might therefore say that they're the same in being, but different in account, as 'rational animal' and 'risible animal' are different accounts of the same being.

A mode of being (MB) is a property of a thing, and its account involves the capacity of being: it's a way a thing is being.[195] An active mode of understanding (MU_A) is a property of a thought, and its account involves the capacity of understanding as active: it's a way a thought is understanding.[196] A passive mode of understanding (MU_P) is a property of a thing, and its account involves the capacity of understanding as passive: it's a way a thing is understood.[197] An active mode of signifying (MS_A) is a property of an utterance, and its account involves the capacity of signifying as active: it's a way an utterance is signifying.[198] Finally, a passive mode of signifying (MS_P) is a property of a thing, and its account involves the capacity of signifying as passive: it's a way a thing is signified.[199] (See Figure 1.)

[195] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, pp. 136–138.

[196] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶7, p. 140.

[197] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶7, p. 140.

[198] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, ¶2, pp. 134–136.

[199] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, ¶2, pp. 134–136.

Figure 1: Modes, Properties, Capacities, and Accounts

Mode	Property	Capacity	Account
Mode of Being (MB)	Of a Thing	Of Being	A way a thing is being
Active Mode of Understanding (MU_A)	Of a Thought	Of Understanding (active)	A way a thought is understanding
Passive Mode of Understanding (MU_P)	Of a Thing	Of Understanding (passive)	A way a thing is understood
Active Mode of Signifying (MS_A)	Of an Utterance	Of Signifying (active)	A way an utterance is signifying
Passive Mode of Signifying (MS_P)	Of a Thing	Of Signifying (passive)	A way a thing is signified

It's clear that MB, MU_P, and MS_P are in some sense the same: MU_P is MB *as understood*; MS_P is MB *as signified*.[200] Thomas explains this by specifying relations of material and formal sameness and difference among modes. Two modes are materially (*materialiter*) the same just in case they're the same with respect to the kind of property they are. They're formally (*formaliter*) the same just in case they're the same with respect to the capacity involved in their accounts.

All modes are therefore both materially and formally the same as themselves, but not all modes are both materially and formally the same as one another. MB, MU_P, and MS_P are all properties of a thing, and so they're all materially the same. But MB's account involves a capacity of being, MU_P's a capacity of understanding, and MS_P's a capacity of signifying, and so they're all formally

[200] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 4, ¶8, p. 142. Technically, MS_P is MB as *con*signified, since MB isn't the *significate* of the utterance, but rather the *consignificate*. This technicality doesn't matter for present purposes.

different. Furthermore, MB, MU_A, and MS_A are properties of a thing, a thought, and an utterance respectively, and so they're all materially different. Their accounts likewise involve capacities of being, understanding, and signifying respectively, and so they're all formally different. Furthermore, MU_P and MU_A are properties of a thing and thought respectively, and so they're materially different. But both their accounts involve capacities of understanding, and so they're formally the same. Similarly, MS_P and MS_A are properties of a thing and an utterance respectively, and so they're materially different. But both their accounts involve capacities of signifying, and so they're formally the same.[201] (See Figure 2. The diagram should be understood as including implicit reflexive relations of material and of formal sameness holding between each mode and itself.)

Figure 2: Relations of Sameness and Difference among Modes



[201] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 4, ¶8, pp. 142–146.

The various modes are furthermore governed by a derivation relation that grounds modes of signifying, by means of modes of understanding, in modes of being. The structure of this derivation relation can be gleaned from the following passages:

> [1A] Therefore active modes of signifying are derived from modes of being by means of mediating passive modes of understanding. [1B] And so active modes of signifying are derived immediately from passive modes of understanding.[202]

> [2A] Concerning this it should be known that since capacities of this kind, or active modes of signifying, are not figments, [2B] every active mode of signifying must originate at the root from some property of a thing. [2C] Because it is clear that, since the intellect imposes the utterance to signify under some active mode of signifying, it observes the very property of a thing from which it originally draws the active mode of signifying, [2D] because the intellect, since it is a passive power, indeterminate by itself, does not proceed to a determinate act unless determined by another. [2E] Hence, since it imposes the utterance to signify under a determinate active mode of signifying, it is moved by necessity by a determinate property of a thing […].[203]

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[202] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶7, pp. 140–142: '[…] [1A] ergo modi significandi activi sumuntur a modis essendi, mediantibus modis intelligendi passivis; [1B] et ideo immediate modi significandi activi a modis intelligendi passivis sumuntur.'

[203] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, pp. 136–138: '[2A] Circa secundum notandum, quod cum huiusmodi rationes, sive modi significandi activi non sint figmenta, [2B] oportet omnem modum significandi activum ab aliqua rei proprietate radicaliter oriri. [2C] Quod sic patet: quia cum intellectus vocem ad significandum sub aliquo modo significandi activo imponit, ad ipsam rei

Thomas maintains that MS_A is derived mediately from MB and immediately from MU_P (passage 1A above). This reveals the following incomplete picture of the derivation scheme among modes ('*X* < *Y*' means '*X* is derived from *Y*'):

$$MS_A < MU_P < MB$$

But how do MU_A and MS_P fit into this scheme? Thomas says that MS_A is derived immediately (*immediate*) from MU_P (1B). So neither MU_A nor MS_P should be placed between MS_A and MU_P. Thomas furthermore says that MS_A originates fundamentally (*radicaliter*) from MB (2B). So neither MU_A nor MS_P should be placed to the right of MB. Thomas's remark that the intellect (*intellectus*) imposes (*imponit*) utterances after it observes (*aspicit*) MB (2C), suggests that he's discussing an *active*, not *passive*, mode of understanding and so MU_A rather than MU_P. Thomas's further remark about a passive power (*virtus passiva*) (2D) might suggest that he's discussing MU_P rather than MU_A. But I think Thomas is concerned here with the active mode of understanding, the associated *power* of which – the intellect – is passive. Thomas here speaks of this passive power being 'determined' ('*determinetur*') by MB (2D) and being 'moved' ('*movetur*') by MB. The idea is that the passive power of understanding is affected by a property of a thing, thereby

proprietatem aspicit, a qua modum significandi activum originaliter trahit; [2D] quia intellectus cum sit virtus passiva, de se indeterminata, ad actum determinatum non vadit, nisi aliunde determinetur. [2E] Unde cum imponit vocem ad significandum sub determinato modo significandi activo, a determinata rei proprietate necessario movetur […].'

immediately producing an active – not passive – mode of understanding.[204] This suggests proximity of MU_A to MB, placing MU_A between MU_P and MB:

$$MS_A < MU_P < MU_A < MB$$

The placement of MU_A before MU_P in the derivation scheme is motivated by the thought that MU_P is logically posterior to MU_A. MU_P is just MB as understood when MU_A understands MB. So MU_P presupposes a mode that's engaged in the act of understanding MB – that is, MU_A. A similar account applies to MS_P and MS_A, resulting in the following:[205]

$$MS_P < MS_A < MU_P < MU_A < MB$$

[204] I'll say more about this below.

[205] But cf. the following from Rosier-Catach, who seems to think that the active modes are dependent on the passive, rather than the passive on the active as I maintain: 'The active mode of signifying has a double origin: a *fundamental* origin in the passive mode of signifying, an *immediate* origin in the passive mode of understanding' (Rosier 1982, p. 122: 'Le *modus significandi* activus a une double origine: une origine «radicale» dans le *modus significandi passivus*, une origine «immédiate» dans le *modus intelligendi passivus*'). If my argument above is correct, then the first part of this isn't strictly speaking right. Maybe the idea Rosier-Catach intends to express is that the active mode of signifying has a fundamental origin in the mode of being, which after all is materially the same as the passive mode of signifying. Still, strictly speaking, it's the mode of being, not the passive mode of signifying, that grounds the active mode of signifying. The reading could stem from the fact that in the passage Rosier-Catach cites Thomas speaks of the active mode of signifying originating fundamentally in the property of a thing (*proprietas rei*), not bothering to specify whether he means by this the mode of being or the passive mode of understanding (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, pp. 136–138). Probably the reason he doesn't specify this is that he hasn't yet introduced the distinction between active and passive modes of understanding, which comes in the next chapter (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶7, pp. 140–143). Another source of the reading could be Thomas' description of the mode of understanding as a 'passive power' ('*virtus passiva*'), which might suggest that he's talking about the passive mode of understanding. But he isn't, as I've explained. Bursill-Hall's understanding of the derivation structure of modes sometimes appears to agree with mine (Bursill-Hall 1971, pp. 73, 103) and at other times resembles Rosier-Catach's (Bursill-Hall 1971, p. 96). Covington's figure outlining Thomas' ontology of modes suggests agreement with my account (Covington 2009, p. 32.)

This derivation structure implies a correspondence between language and reality, mediated by correspondences between language and thought and between thought and reality: the grammatical properties of utterances, by means of the epistemic properties of thoughts, are grounded in the metaphysical properties of things. Furthermore, since active modes of signifying are derived from and grounded in modes of being, they 'are not figments' ('*non sint figmenta*') (2A). (Presumably, active modes of understanding likewise aren't figments, since they're the mechanism whereby active modes of signifying are derived from modes of being.) In short, active modes of signifying and active modes of understanding are grounded in reality by modes of being and therefore inherit positive ontological status of their own.

Thomas ties the derivation of modes to the imposition (*impositio*) of an utterance (2C and 2E). Imposition is the process whereby a linguistic item is introduced.[206] Before imposition, an utterance (*vox*) lacks both semantic content and syntactic structure: it's a mere vocalization, meaningless and linguistically inert. The utterance gains semantic content through an act of first imposition (*prima impositio*). The process is mediated by thought: first, the intellect observes a thing, from which it derives a thought of that thing; second, the utterance is imposed to signify that thing from which the thought was derived, thereby becoming an expression (*dictio*). At this point, the utterance is secured to some semantic content, but it as of yet lacks syntactic structure – it's neither nominative nor genitive, for example – and so it can't play a role in more complex linguistic

[206] Thomas himself doesn't have a very well worked out account of imposition. He provides a brief outline of the process at Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 6, ¶11, pp. 146–148, but he doesn't invoke the 'imposition' terminology there. Fuller accounts of imposition are present in other authors.

constructions, such as propositions (*propositiones*). The missing grammatical features are applied through an act of second imposition (*secunda impositio*), likewise mediated by thought: first, the intellect observes a mode of being of a thing, from which it derives a corresponding mode of understanding; second, the expression gains a corresponding mode of signifying, thereby becoming a part of speech (*pars orationis*) – a fully incorporated item of the language, with both semantic content and syntactic structure. The derivation scheme outlined above describes this act of second imposition.

As Thomas acknowledges, this all implies a correspondence between modes of signifying and modes of being:

> […] therefore to any active mode of signifying there corresponds some property of a thing, or mode of being of a thing.[207]

Here Thomas endorses a fundamental modist thesis, which I'll call 'the Modist Correspondence Thesis' ('MCT'), an initial formulation of which is the following:

> (MCT_1) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing.

[207] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, p. 138: '[…] ergo cuilibet modo significandi activo correspondet aliqua proprietas rei, seu modo essendi rei.' I've corrected Bursill-Hall's '*correspendet*' to '*correspondet*'.

As stated, MCT_1 asserts a correspondence between MS_A and MB, but it doesn't explain just what kind of correspondence relation is at work here. Note that the correspondence relation isn't just the same thing as the consignification (*consignificatio*) relation. Consignification holds between *an utterance* and a mode of being: '[…] a passive mode of signifying is the same property of a thing just as it is consignified by an utterance.'[208] But the correspondence relation in MCT_1 holds between *a mode of signifying* and a mode of being. Still, the notions of correspondence and consignification are interdefinable: a mode of signifying of an utterance corresponds to the modes of being that the utterance consignifies; and an utterance consignifies those modes of being to which its modes of signifying correspond. My own approach will be to take the correspondence relation to be more fundamental than consignification and to accordingly articulate my interpretation first and foremost in terms of correspondence, though I'll occasionally offer restatements in terms of consignification.

At present, we know little about the nature of this correspondence relation, whether with respect to its structure or its content. With respect to structure, we know that every active mode of signifying corresponds to *some mode of being or other* – specifically, that MS_A corresponds to MB, mediated by MU_A and MU_P – but we don't know anything about *which mode of being* a given active mode of signifying corresponds to. With respect to content, we know that the correspondence is based on some kind of derivation relation but we don't know much about the nature of that derivation and how it establishes the correspondence. Further details will emerge by

[208] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 4, ¶8, p. 142: '[…] modus significandi passivus est eiusdem rei proprietas, prout per vocem consignificatur.'

considering some additional modist doctrines and how a modist – Thomas in particular – might respond to some anti-modist arguments from the *Destructions*. Specifically, consideration of the No Property Argument will help clarify the structure of the correspondence posited by MCT, while consideration of the Hylomorphism Argument will help determine its content. Consideration of the Regress Argument, to which I'll now turn, will help clarify the strength of the modist's commitment to MCT.

2 THE REGRESS ARGUMENT

MCT appears to result in considerable ontological proliferation: for every grammatical feature of every utterance, there's some metaphysical property to which that grammatical feature corresponds. Still, Thomas insists that the proper aim of grammar is to study the active modes of signifying themselves, not their corresponding modes of being.[209] So, while theorizing about grammar, modism tries to keep the metaphysics in the background. But enemies of modism bring the metaphysical implications to the foreground when launching their attacks. One weapon in the anti-modist arsenal is the Regress Argument, which tries to show that MCT results in an infinite regress of modes of being.[210] The *DMS* author presents the Regress Argument as follows:

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[209] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, ¶3, p. 136.

[210] The Regress Argument appears to have had a fairly long-standing career, having been reproduced in Champier's introduction to logic. See Copenhaver & Ward 2015, pp. 575–577. The popularity of the Regress Argument is also suggested by the marginal notes in the λ incunable, where the text of the argument is highlighted by a line in the margin (λ f. a3va).

There are two differences between Champier's version of the Regress Argument and the *DMS* author's. The first is philosophically unimportant but may have historical implications: Champier changes the example used in the argument from 'Sortes' ('*Sortes*') to 'Peter' ('*Petrus*'), maybe intending by this to attribute authorship to Peter of Ailly. The second concerns the content of the argument and may be based on a transmission error or misunderstanding. Champier begins the argument by writing: 'According to you, in the noun 'Peter', signifying Peter, there is some

Again: I argue in the case of those natural things. And I take that property of a thing, which is a passive mode of signifying, so that if this noun 'Sortes' were to signify Sortes, then, according to them, there would be such a property in Sortes by which Sortes is signified. And they call that property a 'passive mode of signifying'. Therefore, let the property be called '*A*'. Then I ask whether the property *A* is signified by means of another property distinct from *A* or by means of its very self, so that no other property is required in order for the property to be signified. The first cannot be granted, since then there would be a procession into infinity. If the second is granted, then by the same account Sortes can be signified without such a

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property by which Peter is signified, and you say that the property is a passive mode of signifying.' (Copenhaver & Ward 2015, p. 575: 'Secundum te in isto nomine Petrus, significans Petrum, est quaedam proprietas qua significatur Petrus, et istam proprietatem dicis esse modum significandi passivum.' My English. Cf. Copenhaver & Ward 2015, p. 576.) This implies that the property of the utterance 'Peter' is a passive mode of signifying. (My thanks to Calvin Normore for pointing this out to me.) But that isn't the modist view. Instead, as we've seen, the property of the *utterance* is an *active* mode of signifying, while the property of the *thing* is a *passive* mode of signifying. The Champier text may be corrupt: the printing appears to have been done 'hastily or clumsily or both' and probably without Champier's approval (Copenhaver & Ward 2015, pp. 549–551). A simple emendation to the text would be to replace 'passive' ('*passivus*') with 'active' ('*activus*'). This would make Champier's version of the argument different from the *DMS* author's, in that the former would be directed at the active mode while the latter is directed at the passive mode. But this can't be right, since Champier frames the Regress Argument just like the *DMS* author does: as a confirmation of the major premise of the broader argument 'there's no passive mode of signifying; therefore, there's no active mode of signifying' (Copenhaver & Ward 2015, p. 575; *DMS* §34.3). Another possible emendation – for which there's no hard evidence, but which would capture the argument correctly – would be: 'Secundum te in isto **h**omine Petr**o**, significa**to per** Petr**us** […].' ('According to you, in this person Peter, signified by 'Peter' […].') (My thanks to Brian Copenhaver for the idea.) Finally, a third possibility is that Champier meant to refer to the modist thesis that the passive mode of signifying, which is *materially* in a thing, is *formally* in an utterance. (This is the Modist Inherence Thesis, which I mentioned above, and which I'll discuss in more detail below.) This would only require inserting '*formaliter*' before '*in*', or even just taking it to be implicit. But (i) this might be too subtle an aspect of modist theory for Champier to be aware of (he doesn't mention it elsewhere), (ii) this isn't how the argument is put by the *DMS* author himself, who recognizes but seems to misunderstand or misrepresent the notion of formal inherence, and (iii) it isn't clear why anyone who was aware of this modist view and who understood the argument correctly would put the argument this way rather than in terms of the material inherence in a thing, which is much more straightforward. So maybe the most likely explanation is that Champier, or someone copying him, misunderstood or misremembered the original argument.

> property, since, as one sees, there is no greater reason why that property [that is, *A*] can be signified without that property [that is, the property of *A* distinct from *A*].[211]

As presented, the Regress Argument is extremely compressed, the infinite regress it supposedly generates barely described at all. I'll attempt to reconstruct the argument implicit in the text. Before that, two points should be noted.

First, the *DMS* author opts to call the property of a thing the 'passive mode of signifying,' rather than the 'mode of being.' This is a general tendency.[212] Not much, if anything, turns on this in the context of the argument, since, as we've seen, the modist takes the passive mode of signifying and the mode of being to be materially the same, despite being formally different (Figure 2). So the infinite regress of passive modes of signifying can just as well be understood as an infinite regress of modes of being, which is how I'll frame my reconstruction. Second, it's merely incidental that the *DMS* author uses the singular utterance '*Sortes*' ('Sortes') rather than a general utterance, such as '*hircus*' ('goat'). But while the Regress Argument is meant to apply to a wide range of cases, it doesn't apply to all cases. Although the utterance in question doesn't have to have exactly one

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[211] *DMS* §34.10: 'Item: Arguo in istis rebus naturalibus. Et capio istam proprietatem rei, quae est modus significandi passivus, ut si hoc nomen Sortes significet Sortem. Tunc secundum eos in Sorte est talis proprietas, qua Sortes significatur. Et istam proprietatem vocant modum significandi passivum. Vocetur ergo illa proprietas *a*. Tunc quaero, utrum illa proprietas *a* significetur per aliam proprietatem ab *a* distinctam vel per se ipsam ita, quod nulla alia proprietas requiritur ad hoc, quod ipsa significetur. Non potest dari primum, quia sic esset processus in infinitum. Si detur secundum, ergo eadem ratione Sortes potest significari sine tali proprietate, quia non est maior ratio, ut videtur, quare ista proprietas possit significari sine ista proprietate.'

[212] There are no instances of the word '*essendi*' in the text. By contrast, the word '*passivus*' occurs 26 times. Opting for the language of 'passive modes of signifying' over 'modes of being' signals that the arguments are meant to undermine modism as a linguistic theory, not just as a metaphysical theory. While the *DMS* author would also deny that there are metaphysical modes, the goal is also to reject linguistic modes. And so the argument is framed in terms of the passive mode of signifying, which, as we've seen, is MB *as signified* – that is, MB *from the perspective of language*.

significate, it's a requirement of the argument that the utterance in question is non-empty, having at least one significate. This will also be a feature of my reconstruction.

The argument, I suggest, goes as follows. Start by considering the utterance 'Sortes', which signifies Sortes. 'Sortes' has grammatical properties and so exhibits modes of signifying. In particular, it's a noun phrase and so exhibits a nominal mode of signifying. According to MCT, every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing. So the nominal mode of signifying of 'Sortes' corresponds to a mode of being of Sortes, in particular the mode of permanence of Sortes.[213] Now consider the utterance 'the mode of permanence of Sortes', which signifies the mode of permanence of Sortes. The utterance 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' has grammatical properties and so exhibits modes of signifying. In particular, it's a noun phrase and so exhibits a nominal mode of signifying. According to MCT, every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing. Now consider the following question, which introduces a dilemma: What mode of being does the nominal mode of signifying of 'The mode of permanence of Sortes' correspond to? There are two options available to the modist: try to dig in, or try to dig out. Each option, according to the *DMS* author, leaves the modist buried.

If the modist tries to dig in, then the same account applies to 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' that applies to 'Sortes'; that is, the nominal mode of signifying of 'The mode of permanence of Sortes' corresponds to *a mode of being of* the mode of permanence of Sortes, in particular *the mode*

[213] Technically, the terminology should be 'mode of stability and permanence'. For perspicuity, I'm abbreviating this to just 'mode of permanence'.

of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes. Now consider the utterance 'the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes', which signifies the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes. What mode of being does the nominal mode of signifying of 'The mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes' correspond to? And so goes the regress: Sortes, the mode of permanence of Sortes, the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes, and so on.

If the modist tries to dig out, then a different account applies to 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' than applies to 'Sortes'; that is, the nominal mode of signifying of 'The mode of permanence of Sortes' corresponds to something other than a mode of being of the mode of permanence of Sortes, the most plausible candidate being the mode of permanence of Sortes *itself*. But if this works in the case of 'The mode of permanence of Sortes', then why doesn't it work just as well in the case of 'Sortes'? If it does, then the nominal mode of 'Sortes' corresponds to something other than a mode of being of Sortes, the most plausible candidate being Sortes *himself*. If this is the case, then modism, which asserts that an utterance's modes of signifying correspond to modes of being, is false. This is because Sortes – to which the modes of signifying of 'Sortes' would, on this view, correspond – is a *thing*, not a *mode of being*.

Stated more abstractly, without relying on the particular example of the utterance 'Sortes' and its nominal mode of signifying, the argument goes as follows. Begin by considering an utterance e such that e signifies thing t and exhibits an active mode of signifying $MS(e)$. According to MCT, every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing. So $MS(e)$ corresponds to a mode of being of t, $MB(t)$. Now introduce an utterance e^*

such that e^* signifies $MB(t)$ and exhibits an active mode of signifying $MS(e^*)$. According to MCT, every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing. Now ask: What mode of being does $MS(e^*)$ correspond to? There are only two plausible cases: either $MS(e^*)$ corresponds to *a mode of being of* $MB(t)$, or $MS(e^*)$ corresponds to $MB(t)$ *itself*. Case 1: Assume $MS(e^*)$ corresponds to a mode of being of $MB(t)$, $MB(MB(t))$. Now introduce an utterance e^{**} such that e^{**} signifies $MB(MB(t))$ and exhibits an active mode of signifying $MS(e^{**})$. And so goes the regress: t, $MB(t)$, $MB(MB(t))$, and so on. Case 2: Assume $MS(e^*)$ corresponds to $MB(t)$ itself. In that case, $MS(e^*)$ corresponds to its significate, $MB(t)$, not to a mode of being of its significate, $MB(MB(t))$. So, likewise, $MS(e)$ corresponds to its significate, t, not to a mode of being of its significate, $MB(t)$. So an active mode of signifying, corresponds to something other than a mode of being, and so modism is false.

The argument can be clarified further by introducing some terminology. Call an utterance *thing-signifying* if it signifies things and *mode-signifying* if it signifies modes of being; call a mode of being *first-order* if it's a mode of a thing and *higher-order* if it's a mode of being of a mode of being. According to modism, the active modes of signifying of both thing- and mode-signifying utterances correspond to modes of being. In particular, the active modes of signifying of thing-signifying utterances correspond to first-order modes of being. The question generating the dilemma is whether the modes of signifying of mode-signifying utterances correspond to first- or higher-order modes of being. If the answer is that they correspond to higher-order modes of being, then an infinite regress of such higher-order modes of being is generated. If the answer is that they correspond to first-order modes of being, then this calls into question whether the active modes of

signifying of thing-signifying utterances correspond to first-order modes of being after all – rather than directly to the things they signify – which calls into question the very foundation of modism.

This can also be articulated using the terminology of 'consignification'. According to modism, both thing- and mode-signifying utterances consignify modes of being. In particular, a thing-signifying utterance consignifies a first-order mode of being. The question generating the dilemma is whether mode-signifying utterances consignify first- or higher-order modes of being. If the answer is that they consignify higher-order modes of being, then an infinite regress of such higher-order modes of being is generated. If the answer is that they consignify first-order modes of being, then this calls into question whether thing-signifying utterances consignify first-order modes of being after all – rather than just consignifying the things they signify – which calls into question the very foundation of modism.

The Regress Argument fails for a number of reasons. But before considering how it fails, I'd like to consider a potential line of objection that I think doesn't succeed. One might be concerned with the step that introduces the mode-signifying utterance and the subsequent question asking about its modes of signifying. There's a certain artificiality about this move, made even more noticeable by the *DMS* author's use of the placeholder '*A*' for the mode-signifying utterance. One might think that such a placeholder wouldn't have well-defined grammatical properties, so that the question about where those properties come from would be vacuous and would fail to generate the infinite regress. I think this is misguided, for three reasons.

First, the argument in no way relies on the *DMS* author's use of the placeholder '*A*', as is made clear by my first reconstruction of the argument, which instead uses the perfectly acceptable English utterance 'the mode of permanence of Sortes', clearly a well-formed noun phrase having legitimate grammatical properties.

Second, there's reason to think that even such a placeholder has grammatical properties: it easily fills the role of a noun phrase in well-formed clauses, such as the *DMS* author's own '*A* is signified through another property distinct from *A*' (*'a significetur per aliam proprietatem ab a distinctam*'). Moreover, it seems to assume a fairly complete set of grammatical properties immediately upon its introduction. In the *DMS* author's clause, the first instance acts as a nominative subject and the second as an ablative, governed by the preposition 'from' ('*ab*'). It doesn't matter that in this case there's no inflectional difference, but there are some cases where inflectional differences would naturally occur. When I speak of *A*'s grammatical properties using the utterance '*A*'s grammatical properties', I inflect the artificial utterance '*A*' to '*A*'s', indicating the genitive case, and I do this without first having to introduce a new utterance over and above *A* itself. As soon as I use the utterance '*A*'s', it's understood that this is a genitive form of the same utterance introduced above.[214]

Third, and connected to the previous two points, it's unlikely that a medieval consumer of this argument would find any reason to be suspicious of the sudden introduction of a novel, artificial

[214] This example shows that the gap between the first and the second imposition of an utterance – the expression and part of speech – isn't as wide as the modist framework might suggest. I believe this sort of thought helps motivate some of the later developments in the terminist tradition.

utterance. What we have here is a live example of imposition: the *DMS* author imposes the novel utterance '*A*' in the process of unfolding the argument. The author, like all language users, is free to do this at any time. So let's set aside concerns stemming from the artificiality of the mode-signifying utterance introduced in the course of delivering the argument. What other criticisms does the argument face?

Let's start with the first horn of the dilemma. This horn alleges to derive an infinite regress from the assumption that a mode of signifying of a mode-signifying utterance corresponds to a higher-order mode of being – for example, that the nominal mode of signifying of 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' corresponds to the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes. Put differently, the first horn proceeds from the assumption that a mode-signifying utterance consignifies a higher-order mode of being. By reproducing the reasoning, we proceed from a thing, to a mode of being of a thing, to a mode of being of a mode of being of a thing, and so on. This is an infinite regress, but is it a *vicious* one? There are at least two ways that the infinite regress might be vicious: either *logically* or *ontologically*. I believe that it's ontological viciousness that concerns the *DMS* author. But let's take a moment to consider logical viciousness.

A logically vicious infinite regress presupposes the resolution of an infinite number of cases *prior* to the resolution of the base case. The regress figuring in Zeno's 'Dichotomy' paradox of motion is supposed to exhibit this sort of logical viciousness: in order to run one mile, one must *first* run a half mile; in order to run a half mile one must *first* run a quarter mile; and so on; so one must *first* traverse an infinite number of distances *before* traversing the base distance, showing that

it's impossible to traverse the base distance after all.[215] Bradley's regress is likewise supposed to be logically vicious: in order to relate A to B by R_1, one must *first* relate A to R_1 by R_2; in order to relate A to R_1 by R_2, one must *first* relate A to R_2 by R_3; and so on; so one must *first* relate an infinite number of relata *before* relating the base relata, showing that it's impossible to relate the base relata after all.[216]

Whether these arguments in fact establish what they purport to establish isn't the issue. What's important is the structure of the infinite regresses involved – a structure different from that of a logically non-vicious infinite regress, such as repeated applications of a successor function or a recursive definition. There's nothing logically suspect about the procession of natural numbers from 0, to 1, to 2, and so on, nor the procession of disjunctive propositions from 'p_1', to '$p_1 \vee p_2$', to '$p_1 \vee p_2 \vee p_3$', and so on. Logically non-vicious regresses can be canceled at any time by simply not applying the function or definition to bring about the next case. Or – another way to think of it – the infinity of items, including the base case, is always already there.

The regress in the first horn of the anti-modist Regress Argument is logically non-vicious. The new cases aren't *presupposed* by the base case, but are rather introduced *after* the base case has been established. The base case – that an active mode of signifying of a thing-signifying utterance corresponds to a first-order mode of being – is in fact an assumption of the argument. It's only after

[215] Huggett 2019.

[216] Perovic 2017. There are numerous medieval precursors to 'Bradley's' regress and the related problem of the unity of the proposition, notably in various discussions of relations and the function of the copula. See, for example, William of Ockham, *Summary of Logic*, eds. Boehner, Gál, & Brown 1974, I, ch. 51, pp. 169–170, ll. 204–212. On Buridan, see Normore 1985, p. 198. For citations of further medieval sources, see Gaskin 2008, p. 314, notes 110–116.

establishing this that the mode-signifying utterance is introduced, bringing with it an apparent commitment to a higher-order mode of being. One can cancel the regress at any time by simply not introducing the next mode-signifying utterance. I suspect that this would have been recognized by modists and anti-modists alike.

But even if the regress isn't logically vicious, it might be *ontologically* vicious, resulting in excessive ontological proliferation. There are two distinct senses in which the regress is ontologically proliferative. First, it proliferates the *kinds* of modes, since, in introducing mode-signifying utterances, it introduces higher-order modes of being. Second, it proliferates the *number* of modes, since there's a newly introduced higher-order mode of being for every newly imposed mode-signifying utterance. The viciousness of the regress turns on whether at least one of these kinds of proliferation is excessive. In fact, it seems the *DMS* author thinks both are excessive.

Let's start by considering the proliferation of the kinds of modes. To object to this form of ontological proliferation would be to immediately deny the very assumption at the base of the first horn – that a mode of signifying of a mode-signifying utterance corresponds to a higher-order mode of being – on the grounds that the very notion of a higher-order mode of being is incoherent, since modes can't themselves have modes. This is a concern for the *DMS* author, who elsewhere presents the following argument:

> Again: If such an active mode of signifying were subjectively in an utterance, it would follow that an accident would be a subject of an accident, which is against the Philosopher in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he says that an

> accident is not of an accident. About this text, it seems the Commentator of Lincoln holds that no accident is in an accident as in a subject. And Thomas Aquinas, expositing that text, distinctly says that no accident is in an accident as in a subject, but every accident is in a substance. Hence it is thus called 'substance', since it stands under accidents. Therefore, if some accident were the subject of an accident, by the same account such an accident could be called a 'substance', since it stands under an accident.[217]

The argument here aims to refute the active mode of signifying, rather than the passive mode of signifying or mode of being. It relies on maintaining the impossibility of higher-order properties or accidents (*accidentes*) – that is, properties of properties or accidents of accidents – arguing as follows: to be an accident is to be an accident of a substance, and since no substance is an accident, it follows that there can't be accidents of accidents. It then proceeds from the modist view that the active mode of signifying is a property or accident of an utterance. From this it's supposed to follow that an active mode of signifying is a higher-order accident. The crucial suppressed premise here is that utterances are themselves accidents – qualities of the air or relatives standing in a relation of sign-to-signified – which the *DMS* author elsewhere attributes to the modist.[218] But since there

[217] *DMS* §41: 'Item: Si talis modus significandi activus esset in voce subiective, sequitur, quod accidens esset subiectum accidentis, quod est contra Philosophum primo *Posteriorum,* ubi dicit, quod accidentis non est accidens, super quem textum videtur Commentator Lincolniensis velle, quod nullum accidens est in accidente tamquam in subiecto. Et Thomas de Aquino exponens illum textum expresse dicit, quod nullum accidens est in accidente tamquam in subiecto, sed omne accidens est in substantia. Unde ideo dicitur substantia, quia substat accidentibus. Ergo, si aliquod accidens esset subiectum accidentis, per eandem rationem tale accidens posset dici substantia, quia accidenti substat.' See too *DMS* §91.3.

[218] *DMS* §§17, 42.

can't be higher-order accidents, and since active modes of signifying are higher-order accidents, there can't be active modes of signifying.

This argument itself can't be straightforwardly applied to refute modes of being in general, since, unlike active modes of signifying, many first-order modes of being are properties or accidents of *substances*, not properties or accidents of *accidents*. But the premise that the argument relies on – namely, that there can't be higher-order accidents – bears on the first horn of the Regress Argument, maybe serving as one of the reasons the *DMS* author finds the regress excessively ontologically proliferative. The *DMS* author rests the denial of higher-order accidents on the authority of Aristotle, 'the Commentator of Lincoln' – probably Robert Grosseteste – and Thomas Aquinas, pointing to book I of *Posterior Analytics* and the commentaries on it.

It's well-known that Aquinas is independently committed to special cases of higher-order accidents by his account of the sacrament of the Eucharist, according to which the consecrated bread's quantity sustains its other accidents.[219] But whether Aquinas takes higher-order accidents to be *naturally* possible – as opposed to merely *supernaturally* – is less clear. There are several passages in the *Summary of Theology* where Aquinas takes up the issue, all of which have the same structure: Aquinas first raises an objection relying on the thesis 'an accident is not of an accident' ('*accidentis non est accidens*'), and he then provides a reply to the objection in which he clarifies

[219] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 3.77.2. For discussion, see Adams 2010, ch. 8, pp. 179–196; Brower 2014, pp. 245–250.

the meaning of this thesis.[220] At least three times he insists that an accident can't be an accident of an accident 'through itself' ('*per se*').[221] But this is just to say that there's some sense other than 'through itself' in which an accident *can* be an accident of an accident. As it turns out, there are two such senses:

> […] an accident is said to be an accident of an accident because they meet in a subject. But this obtains in two ways. In one way, insofar as two accidents are jointly coupled to one subject without some order, as pale and musical to Sortes. In another way, with some order, namely since the subject receives one accident by means of the other, as a body receives color by means of a surface.[222]

It's the second sense that's relevant for present purposes. One way of understanding this second sense of higher-order accidents is that the 'order' ('*ordo*') of accidents is a way of describing the logical priority of one accident's inhering in a substance over another accident's inhering in that same substance: a color can't inhere in a body unless that body first has a surface. This much at least is true. But if this is *all* Aquinas means, something seems to be lost – namely, the tightness

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[220] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1.77.7, obj. 2 and reply; 1–2.7.1, obj. 2 and 3 and replies; 1–2.50.2, obj. 2 and reply; 1–2.56.1, obj. 3 and reply.

[221] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1.77.7, reply to obj. 2; 1–2.50.2, reply to obj. 2; 1–2.56.1, reply to obj. 3.

[222] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1–2.7.1, reply to obj. 3: '[…] accidens dicitur accidenti accidere propter convenientiam in subiecto. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod duo accidentia comparantur ad unum subiectum absque aliquo ordine, sicut album et musicum ad Socratem. Alio modo, cum aliquo ordine, puta quia subiectum recipit unum accidens alio mediante, sicut corpus recipit colorem mediante superficie.' My translation.

of the connection between the two accidents. It isn't merely that the body's having a color presupposes that the body has a surface, the color is a color *of that surface*. So the color has to inhere in the surface inhering in the body, not merely inhere in the body that the surface inheres in. (The latter description seems to capture the *first* sense of higher-order accidents – where the accidents aren't ordered – better than the *second*.) This is why Aquinas continues his explanation of the second kind of higher-order accidents by writing: 'And so the one accident is also said to inhere in the other. Indeed, we say that the color is in the surface.'[223] So, I suggest, the ordering of accidents isn't merely a logical priority; rather, it's an ordering of real inherence relations.

But the *DMS* author attributes a denial of higher-order accidents to Aquinas. It's possible that this stems from the comingling of two distinct issues: whether there can be an accident of an accident (which, I contend, Aquinas grants in both natural and supernatural cases) and whether an accident can act as a fundamental substrate (which, I contend, Aquinas grants in supernatural but not natural cases).[224] This is suggested by what Aquinas himself says in the *Commentary on*

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[223] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1–2.7.1, reply to obj. 3: 'Et sic unum accidens dicitur etiam alteri inesse, dicimus enim colorem esse in superficie.' My translation.

[224] Cf. Brower 2014, p. 248: 'Up to this point in the *Summa Theologiae* [i.e., before introducing the account of the Eucharist], Aquinas has been at pains to emphasize the impossibility of second-order accidents – that is, accidents that have other accidents as substrata. Indeed, he repeatedly considers this possibility, including the specific case of quantities serving as the substrata for qualities, only to reject it. […]. It is only when we encounter this last passage [where Aquinas presents his account of the Eucharist] that it becomes clear that Aquinas's previous denials of second-order accidents have all had an implicit scope restriction. That is to say, accidents having other accidents as substrata is not something that is impossible as such, but only something that is *naturally* impossible (or impossible apart from miraculous divine intervention).' If we take 'higher-order accident', as Brower does, to mean an accident having an accident *as a substrate*, then my account agrees with the quoted material above. But Brower also writes: 'In fact, in each case he explicitly says that the only sense in which qualities can be said to be accidents of quantities is an extended one: substances cannot have certain qualities (such as color) unless they first have quantities (and hence surfaces)' (Brower 2014, p. 248). I'm suggesting a stronger interpretation of Aquinas according to which it isn't *merely* that certain qualities *presuppose* certain quantities. On my reading, certain qualities *inhere in* certain quantities. (And this holds also for other kinds of accidents.) So I'm suggesting that Aquinas allows for genuine natural cases of accidents inhering in accidents; it's just that there are no natural cases in which a chain of such inherence relations doesn't terminate in a first-order accident inhering in a substance.

Posterior Analytics passage that the *DMS* author cites, where we don't find a *denial* of higher-order accidents, but rather an *endorsement* and *explanation* of them:[225]

> Since indeed accidents are referred to substance by a certain order, it is not unsuitable for that which is an accident with respect to something to be also a subject with respect to another. Just as a surface is an accident of a corporeal substance, which surface is nonetheless the first subject of a color. But that which is a subject so that it is an accident of none is a substance.[226]

Here Aquinas describes the second kind of higher-order accident from the *Summary*, the example once again being a color that's an accident of a surface while that surface is an accident of a corporeal substance. But this passage also provides a further explanation of how such higher-order accidents are possible. Because accidents are accidents of subjects, a higher-order accident is an accident of a subject. But because the categories of substance and accident are disjoint, a higher-order accident is an accident of a non-substance. Aquinas's key move then is to accommodate higher-order accidents by differentiating a subject (*subiectum*) from a substance (*substantia*): the former is something in which something inheres, while the latter is something that doesn't inhere

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[225] Concerning the *DMS* author's other citations, he might have in mind Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* 82b37-83a31 and 83b17-24. (My thanks to Adam Crager for the pointer.) As for Grosseteste, having made a cursory inspection of the commentary on *Posterior Analytics*, there seems to be no relevant statement on the matter there (Robert Grosseteste, *Commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, Logic Museum 2015).

[226] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Posterior Analytics*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, Lectio 2, Caput 1: 'Cum enim accidentia quodam ordine ad substantiam referantur, non est inconveniens id quod est accidens in respectu ad aliquid, esse etiam subiectum in respectu alterius. Sicut superficies est accidens substantiae corporalis: quae tamen superficies est primum subiectum coloris. Id autem quod est ita subiectum, quod nullius est accidens, substantia est.'

in anything. A non-substance subject is something that inheres in something (making it a non-substance) and in which something inheres (making it a subject). Higher-order accidents are accidents of non-substance subjects.

This move seems to have been lost on the *DMS* author, who wrongly attributes to Aquinas the view that if there were higher-order accidents then an accident would be a substance.[227] So in order to uphold the excessiveness of the ontological proliferation of kinds of modes, the *DMS* author has to deny the possibility of higher-order accidents *against* – rather than, as he himself seems to think, *with* – the authority of Aquinas. Even more importantly, the modist isn't committed to denying the possibility of higher-order accidents, and so doesn't have to accept the ontological viciousness of the regress generated by the first horn of the Regress Argument, at least with respect to the proliferation of *kinds* of modes. In short, the modist might simply accept the possibility of higher-order modes, resting this acceptance on the distinction between subject and substance, as Aquinas himself does in the very same text the *DMS* author appeals to.

Let's turn now to the proliferation of the number of modes. To object to this form of ontological proliferation would be to accept the very idea of higher-order modes but deny that there can coherently be an infinite number of them. There are several ways one might object to this. The *DMS* author's own concern doesn't seem to be the *sheer number* of modes. Both the *DMS* author

[227] At least, it seems to have been lost on whomever the *DMS* author is presenting the Regress Argument on behalf of. It's of course possible that this is simply a mis-citation, or even refers to a different – or differently arranged – version of the *Commentary on Posterior Analytics*. Still, it's worth remarking on the fact that following the citation to *our* version of the text, we find that Aquinas says just the opposite of what the citation says he says.

and the modist recognize the unbounded potential for the imposition of new thing-signifying utterances. The modist, already committed to there being at least as many first-order modes of being as there are potential thing-signifying utterances, should therefore be perfectly willing to admit a *potential* infinity of first-order modes of being. If the *DMS* author took issue with this potential infinity of modes, then he could level his complaint at first-order modes, without bothering to bring in higher-order modes of being at all. But that's not how the Regress Argument proceeds, and so the *DMS* author is here concerned with a different problem stemming from the infinity of specifically higher-order modes.

There are two potential problems that the *DMS* author might plausibly have in mind. The first would involve there being a potentially infinite series of modes that at no point is grounded in any substance.[228] But this clearly doesn't apply in the present case, since the first horn of the Regress Argument proceeds from the assumption that there's some substance signified by a thing-signifying utterance, in which substance there inhere first-order modes to which the modes of signifying of the thing-signifying utterance correspond. So even if there's a potentially infinite series of modes proceeding from that substance, there remains a substance to ground that infinite

[228] This is something that Aquinas objects to, despite his acceptance of higher-order accidents: 'But in those sciences which are of some accidents, nothing prevents that which is accepted as a subject with respect to some passion to be also accepted as a passion with respect to an anterior subject. Nevertheless this does not proceed into infinity. Indeed, something first in that science should be arrived at, that is accepted as a subject so that in no way [is it accepted] as a passion, as is clear in the mathematical sciences, which are of continuous or discrete quantity. Indeed in these sciences those which are first in the genus of quantity are supposed, such as unity, and line, and surface, and others of the like.' (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Posterior Analytics*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, Lectio 2, Caput 1: 'In illis autem scientiis, quae sunt de aliquibus accidentibus, nihil prohibet id, quod accipitur ut subiectum respectu alicuius passionis, accipi etiam ut passionem respectu anterioris subiecti. Hoc tamen non in infinitum procedit. Est enim devenire ad aliquod primum in scientia illa, quod ita accipitur ut subiectum, quod nullo modo ut passio; sicut patet in mathematicis scientiis, quae sunt de quantitate continua vel discreta. Supponuntur enim in his scientiis ea quae sunt prima in genere quantitatis; sicut unitas, et linea, et superficies et alia huiusmodi.') (Note that a 'passion' ('*passio*') is a kind of 'accident' ('*accidens*').)

series. But a second problem stems from the very fact that a single substance grounds such an infinite series. This emerges at the conclusion of a variant of the Regress Argument that's structurally similar to the one above but which aims to refute the passive mode of understanding rather than the passive mode of signifying:[229]

> […] a procession into infinity quickly follows from this – namely, that every passive mode of conceiving is conceived by means of another passive mode of conceiving, which is clearly absurd, since then there would be infinite passive modes of conceiving in one thing in number.[230]

The concern raised is that the regress generates an infinity of passive modes of understanding, called here modes 'of conceiving' ('*concipiendi*').[231] Again, this can just as well be articulated as a concern about an infinity of modes of being, given the material sameness of passive modes and modes of being. The issue is that such an infinity appears to be entirely present 'in one thing in number' ('*in una re numero*'). That is, the *DMS* author seems to think that the regress results in an infinite number of modes of being – and therefore an infinite number of properties or accidents –

[229] *DMS* §55. I believe that essentially everything I say about the version aimed at passive modes of signifying applies, mutatis mutandis, to the version aimed at passive modes of understanding.

[230] *DMS* §55: '[…] ex hoc breviter sequitur processus in infinitum, scilicet quod omnis modus concipiendi passivus concipitur mediante alio modo concipiendi passivo, quod patet esse absurdum, quia sic essent infiniti modi concipiendi passivi in una re numero.'

[231] The *DMS* author seems to use these interchangeably, having a mild preference for 'conceiving' over 'understanding'. Thomas himself occasionally calls modes of understanding modes of conceiving.

inhering *in a single substance*. And that is problematic – at least on the face of it – as it appears to require admitting an *actual* infinity of modes, all simultaneously inhering in a finite being.

But the first horn of the Regress Argument doesn't have the consequence the *DMS* author thinks it does, at least not without a very strong assumption about the notion of inherence. Importantly, the regress doesn't generate an infinite number of *first-order* properties, but rather an infinite series of *higher-order* properties, with each n-order subject having inhering in it an n+1-order property: in a substance there inheres a property, in which property there inheres a property of a property, in which property of a property there inheres a property of a property of a property, and so on. But this is just to say that each subject has inhering in it *one* property, so that the underlying substance has inhering in it *just the first-order property*, not necessarily the whole infinite series of higher-order properties.

That the whole infinite series inheres in the underlying substance would only follow if inherence were transitive, so that if property P_1 were to inhere in property P_2 and P_2 were to inhere in substance S, then P_1 would inhere in S. But to maintain this would be to endorse a substantive view about the nature of inherence – one that might not hold up under scrutiny. While Aquinas says that the subject receives the higher-order accident, it does so only 'by means' ('*mediante*') of the first-order accident: the body receives the color only by means of the surface. One way to understand this is that the inherence of the higher-order accident in the substance is mediated by its inherence in the first-order accident inhering in the substance, so that the higher-order accident inheres in the substance only in an attenuated sense of 'inheres'. This leads to a failure of transitivity: the color genuinely inheres in the surface, and the surface in the body, but the color

doesn't genuinely inhere the body, but merely 'inheres' in the body in virtue of inhering in the surface inhering in the body.

To illustrate, consider how a certain color might inhere in a surface, and a certain intensity might inhere in that color, without the intensity inhering in the surface in which the color inheres.[232] For example, a brightness might inhere in a yellowness, and that yellowness in a book cover, without that brightness inhering in that book cover. (Technically, it's more accurate to speak of the yellowness inhering in the *surface* of the book cover, not the book cover *itself*, but the point is the same.) That is, to the extent that the brightness inheres in the book cover, it's only in virtue of the fact that the brightness inheres in the yellowness inhering in the book cover, not in virtue of the fact that the property of brightness inheres in the book cover itself. So the property of brightness only inheres in the book cover in an attenuated sense of 'inheres'.[233] As a result, the book cover would lose the property of brightness were the book cover to lose the property of yellowness in virtue of which the book cover is bright. The book cover might then regain the property of brightness by taking on another bright color, but that wouldn't be because the property of brightness remained in the book cover while its color changed.

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[232] This is Abelard's example. See Normore 2010, pp. 676–677. One might think that Aquinas only allows for specific cases of higher-order accidents – qualities of quantities – since this is his typical example and is the kind of case relevant to the Eucharist. This would rule out qualities of qualities such as the intensity of a color. But Aquinas specifically refers to a quality of a quality as an example of a higher-order accident – namely, virtue, which is a quality of a power of the soul, which power is itself a quality (Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1–2.56.1, obj. 3 and reply).

[233] Normore, discussing Abelard, writes: 'He also expressly maintains that a brightness may inform a whiteness (so that we may say the whiteness is bright), and that while a body may sustain that brightness (in virtue of sustaining the whiteness which it informs), the brightness does not inform the body (which is why we may not properly say that the body is bright). Thus Abaelard distinguishes a subject of predication, which is the subject of inherence, from what we might think of as a subject of constitution' (Normore 2010, pp. 676–677).

So the transitivity of inherence – a thesis that the *DMS* author doesn't argue for, and which the modist isn't committed to – seems to be excluded by Aquinas's account of higher-order accidents. This means that the whole infinite series of higher-order modes doesn't genuinely inhere in the underlying substance, and so there's no obvious reason to find the proliferation of higher-order modes to be excessive.

Because the first horn of the dilemma in the Regress Argument generates neither a logically nor ontologically vicious infinite regress, it's strictly speaking not necessary to consider the second horn of the dilemma in order to refute the Regress Argument. But I think some of the issues raised in the second horn are instructive for understanding the modist position.

So let's turn now to the second horn of the dilemma. This horn alleges to derive the theoretical uselessness of modes of being from the assumption that a mode of signifying of a mode-signifying utterance corresponds to a first-order mode of being – for example, that the nominal mode of signifying of 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' corresponds to the mode of permanence of Sortes. Put differently, the second horn proceeds from the assumption that a mode-signifying utterance consignifies a first-order mode of being. Then it supposes that if there's no reason to posit higher-order modes of being, then there's no reason to posit first-order modes of being either. In other words, on the assumption that 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' receives its nominal mode of signifying from what it signifies (the mode of permanence of Sortes) rather than from a mode of what it signifies (the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes), we can just as well say that 'Sortes' receives its nominal mode of signifying from what it signifies (Sortes) rather

than from a mode of what it signifies (the mode of permanence of Sortes). This is problematic because it appears to render even first-order modes of being theoretically useless.

But the parallelism between the cases doesn't hold up. In the one case, a given mode of signifying of a mode-signifying utterance corresponds to the mode of being that the mode-signifying utterance signifies. In the other case, a given mode of signifying of a thing-signifying utterance corresponds to the thing that the thing-signifying utterance signifies. The difference is that in the first case a mode of signifying corresponds to a *mode*, while in the second case a mode of signifying corresponds to a *thing*. The modist might accept the first and deny the second. The *DMS* author emphasizes that in both cases the mode of signifying corresponds to what it signifies, rather than to a mode of what it signifies. But that isn't particularly important to the modist, whose main concern will be with preserving MCT, which implies that *modes correspond to modes, not things*. The parallelism breaks down because the second case violates this while the first doesn't. So the modist might find the second case problematic but not the first, thereby rejecting the parallelism and the Regress Argument's slide from the first case to the second.

In fact, there seems to be no general modist prohibition against a mode of signifying of an utterance corresponding to what that utterance signifies, rather than to a mode of what it signifies, so long as what that utterance signifies is itself a mode. The issue is connected to another problem – controversial among modists – concerning the modes of signifying of indeclinable (*indeclinabiles*) utterances, including syncategorematic (*syncategoremata*) utterances, such as conjunctions and prepositions. Some, such as Martin of Dacia, assert that such utterances signify modes of signifying; others, such as Michael of Marbais, deny this, describing the controversy as

'an arduous difficulty and disagreement between our doctors of grammar.'[234] One way of understanding Martin's claim introduces a circularity that also contradicts MCT: if a syncategorematic utterance signifies its modes of signifying, and if its modes of signifying correspond to what it signifies, then its modes of signifying correspond to themselves.[235] But it's important to note that Martin is writing before the widespread use of terminology distinguishing the 'active' and 'passive' modes of signifying. So Martin could here be using 'mode of signifying', as he does elsewhere, not for a property of *an utterance*, but rather for a property of *a thing*, a difference later signaled by 'active' and 'passive'.[236] So Martin's view may be that a syncategorematic utterance signifies not its own *active* modes of signifying, but rather some *passive* modes of signifying or modes of being. Such a reading resolves the circularity.

As for Thomas of Erfurt, he clearly asserts that the modes of signifying of conjunctions correspond to real properties of things:

> The most general essential mode of signifying of the conjunction is a mode of signifying through a mode of conjoining two extremes. And that mode of signifying is taken from a property of conjoining and uniting in external reality. The

[234] See Marmo 1994, pp. 224–227; Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 209; Michael of Marbais, *Summary of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Kelly 1995, p. 124: '[…] ardua difficultas et dissensio inter nostros doctores grammaticae.'

[235] A similar sort of circularity emerges for Ockham's early theory of the origins of syncategorematic concepts.

[236] Lambertini 1989, p. 113. Note that Michael of Marbais doesn't use the 'active' and 'passive' terminology either, which might explain why he takes the difficulty to be so 'arduous' ('*ardua*').

> conjunction therefore is a part of speech signifying through the mode of conjoining two extremes.[237]

The idea here is that there are real properties or modes of conjoining and uniting in the world to which the modes of signifying of conjunctions correspond.[238] Thomas stops short of saying that a conjunction *signifies* a mode of conjoining, saying only that it signifies *through* (*per*) such a mode, perhaps meaning by this that a conjunction *signifies* nothing but *consignifies* a mode of conjoining. But, as we've seen, Martin can reasonably be interpreted as saying that syncategorematic utterances signify modes of being. The two views are compatible, and combining them results in the view that the modes of signifying of syncategorematic utterances correspond to the modes of being that such utterances signify, rather than to modes of being of those modes. Extending this account beyond syncategorematic utterances to mode-signifying utterances more generally, it would follow that the modes of signifying of mode-signifying utterances correspond to first-order modes of being rather than higher-order modes of being. (For example, the nominal mode of signifying of 'the mode of permanence of Sortes' corresponds to the mode of permanence of Sortes that the utterance signifies, rather than to the mode of permanence of the mode of permanence of Sortes.) This can be maintained all while denying that the modes of signifying of thing-signifying utterances correspond to things rather than first-order modes of being. (For example, the nominal

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[237] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 39, ¶76, p. 256: 'Modus significandi essentialis coniunctionis generalissimus est modus significandi per modum coniungentis duo extrema; et sumitur iste modus significandi a proprietate coniungentis et unientis in rebus extra. Coniunctio ergo est pars orationis, per modum coniungentis duo extrema significans.'

[238] A similar account applies to prepositions. See Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 41, ¶80, p. 262.

mode of signifying of 'Sortes' corresponds to Sortes, rather than to the mode of permanence of Sortes.) So the modist might deny that there are higher-order modes of being but simultaneously maintain that there are first-order modes of being to which the modes of signifying of both thing- and mode-signifying utterances correspond, thereby avoiding the anti-modist's slide from a lack of higher-order modes to a lack of first-order modes.

Because neither horn of the Regress Argument's dilemma is sharp, the modist might grasp either without incurring damage. So which would the modist choose? There are considerations pointing in both directions. On the one hand, given that there's nothing obviously incoherent about the very notion of higher-order modes of being, and given the modist's prior commitment to a potential infinity of first-order modes of being, there seems to be nothing prohibiting the modist from grasping the first horn and simply accepting the logically and ontologically non-vicious infinite regress of higher-order modes of being. This would make for a more proliferative metaphysical ontology but a less complicated grammatical doctrine, where the modes of signifying of mode-signifying utterances correspond to higher-order modes of being. On the other hand, as I've shown, the modist has no obvious commitment to higher-order modes of being, even if, for independent reasons, the modist accepts higher-order accidents more generally. This would make for a less proliferative metaphysical ontology but a more complicated grammatical doctrine, where the modes of signifying of mode-signifying utterances correspond to the first-order modes of being those mode-signifying utterances signify.

It's difficult to say which direction Thomas himself would take, as he seems to have both paths open to him and he doesn't, to my knowledge, anticipate and respond to the Regress Argument

himself. He clearly asserts that syncategorematic utterances consignify modes of being. But the interpretation depends furthermore on whether he takes syncategorematic utterances to signify nothing (in which case he might accept the first horn, with the more proliferative metaphysics but less complicated grammar) or to signify modes of being (in which case he might accept the second horn, with the less proliferative metaphysics but more complicated grammar). But Thomas's position on this issue is underdetermined by the text, as far as I can tell.

So the Regress Argument might compel the modist to take a side on the issue of the signification of syncategorematic utterances, but it shouldn't convince them to abandon modism. As I see it, the fatal flaw is an underestimation of the strength of the modist's commitment to MCT. The first horn of the dilemma is designed to scare the modist away from MCT by alleging that it implies an excessive proliferation of higher-order modes of being. But the modist, denying the logical and ontological viciousness of the infinite regress, might simply insist that the proliferation of modes of being, far from being excessive, is just *in keeping with* MCT. The second horn is designed to tempt the modist away from MCT by alleging that first-order modes of being can be done away with because higher-order modes can. But the modist, denying the parallelism between the two cases, might simply insist that the lack of higher-order modes reinforces, rather than undermines, the need for first-order modes, again, *in keeping with* MCT. So the modist, content to maintain MCT, will be undaunted by the Regress Argument either way.

3 THE NO PROPERTY ARGUMENT

While the Regress Argument tries to show that MCT results in *too many* modes in even the most typical of cases, such as non-empty singular and general utterances like '*Sortes*' ('Sortes') and '*hircus*' ('goat'), the No Property argument tries to show that MCT results in *too few* modes to accommodate certain special cases, such as privative, fictitious, and divine utterances, like '*caecitas*' ('blindness'), '*chimaera*' ('chimera'), and '*deitas*' ('deity').[239] MCT appears to dictate that an absence of modes of being implies an absence of active modes of signifying and therefore the ungrammaticality of any utterance for which there are no corresponding modes of being. But there are perfectly grammatical privative, fictitious, and divine utterances for which there appears to be no corresponding modes of being. The No Property argument, to which I'll now turn, attempts to exploit this observation to refute modism.

The *DMS* author presents the No Property Argument seven times, sprinkled throughout the text.[240] In one instance, the argument is presented as a refutation of the modist thesis that modes of signifying are divided into active and passive, where the active modes are properties of utterances and the passive modes properties of things.[241] The aim is to argue that active modes of signifying shouldn't be posited to explain the grammatical properties of utterances. The argument is framed as follows:

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[239] The no property argument stretches back to the early days of modism, being considered by Radulphus Brito in his commentary on Priscian (Radulphus Brito, *Questions on Priscian Minor*, eds. Enders & Pinborg 1980, p. 164).

[240] *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 46.3, 47, 49.1, 54, 74.5.

[241] *DMS* §§2, 33.

> And first I argue like so: Nothing without which there can be the most proper construal and most correct agreement should be posited for the sake of agreement or construal. But without such active and passive modes of signifying there can be the most proper construal and most correct agreement. Therefore, such active and passive modes of signifying should not be posited for the sake of construal or agreement.[242]

In other words, if there's an agreeing proposition the agreement of which isn't explained by the presence of modes of signifying, then modes of signifying in general shouldn't be posited and so modism is false.

The proposition '*Deus est Deus*' ('God is God') is supposed to provide such a counterexample. The proposition is obviously agreeing, being both grammatically well-formed and – assuming God exists – true. But its agreement can't be explained by modes of signifying, for the following reason:

> […] in the aforesaid statement nothing is signified other than that thing that is God. And there is not any property in God distinct from that very God, as all – philosophers just as much as theologians – think. Therefore, in the aforesaid

[242] *DMS* §34.1: 'Et arguo primo sic: Nulla, sine quibus propriissima constructio et verissima congruitas possunt esse propter congruitatem vel constructionem, sunt ponenda. Sed sine talibus modis significandi activis et passivis possunt propriissima constructio et verissima congruitas esse. Ergo tales modi significandi activi et passivi propter constructionem vel congruitatem non sunt ponendi.'

> statement there is not any property of a thing distinct from the signified thing. And by consequence there is not any passive mode of signifying there.[243]

The constituents of the proposition '*Deus est Deus*' are simply '*deus*' and '*est*'. So if the agreement of the statement stems ultimately from the modes of being of the significates of its constituent terms, then the source of agreement must be the modes of being of the significate of '*deus*', since '*est*' doesn't have any significates. But God – the significate of '*deus*' – doesn't exhibit any modes of being, since God doesn't have any properties that are really distinct from God. (Or, put differently, if God were to exhibit a 'mode of being,' it wouldn't be *a property* of God, but rather part of God's *essence*, and so it wouldn't be a mode of being in the sense postulated by modism: a property of a thing distinct from that thing.) So it appears the agreement of '*Deus est Deus*' stems from something other than the modes of being corresponding to the modes of signifying of its constituent utterances, and so modism is false. The same case can be generated using any utterance signifying God.[244]

But the '*Deus est Deus*' example merely points to a lack of modes of being in the thing, not immediately to a lack of active modes of signifying in the utterance. In order to argue that the agreement of the statement '*Deus est Deus*' can't be explained by active modes of signifying, as the *DMS* author intends, it's necessary to move from the absence of modes of being to the absence of

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[243] *DMS* §34.5: '[…] in praedicta oratione nihil significatur nisi illa res, quae est Deus. Et in Deo non est aliqua proprietas distincta ab ipso Deo, secundum quod omnes, tam philosophi quam theologi, sentiunt. Ergo in praedicta oratione non est aliqua proprietas rei distincta a re silgnificata. Et per consequens non est ibi aliquis modus significandi passivus.'

[244] Cf. *DMS* §37.

active modes of signifying. The following lines, inserted in the middle of the argument, enable this:

> But that there are no such modes of signifying here is proved like so: There is no passive mode of signifying here. Therefore, there is no active mode of signifying here.[245]

Here the *DMS* author once again speaks in terms of the 'passive mode of signifying' rather than the 'mode of being,' arguing from the absence of properties of a thing, to the absence of the passive mode of signifying, to the absence of the active mode of signifying. But essentially the same argument could have been articulated by arguing directly from the absence of the mode of being to the absence of active mode of signifying. This is because the passive mode of signifying and mode of being are materially the same. I suspect that this is what the *DMS* author – who, as we've seen, avoids the language of 'mode of being' through the entire text, opting instead to use 'passive mode of signifying' and 'property of a thing' – is attempting to do.

So the general argumentative strategy here is to identify cases in which there's no property of a thing, and so no mode of being, and to argue that there's likewise no active mode of signifying. The strategy therefore relies on the assumption that every active mode of signifying has a corresponding mode of being. Thus, the *DMS* author assumes MCT for the sake of argument and

[245] *DMS* §34.3: 'Quod autem hic non sunt tales modi significandi, probatur sic: Hic non est modus significandi passivus; igitur non est hic modus significandi activus.'

derives an absurdity from it – that an obviously agreeing proposition is not agreeing – thereby refuting modism on its own grounds.

As noted above, the *DMS* author applies this same strategy elsewhere in the text, appealing to a variety of cases. One example is the following:

> And it is argued like so: If the intellect were to get a mode of signifying from a property of a thing, then where there is no thing, or no property of a thing, there is no mode of signifying, since by a deficient root it is necessary that the whole tree withers. But it is clear that no thing, or property of a thing, corresponds to the noun 'chimera' or to the noun 'antichrist'. Therefore, there is no mode of signifying in those utterances.[246]

The utterances '*chimaera*' ('chimera') and '*antichristus*' ('antichrist') have well-defined morphological properties and are constituents of agreeing propositions, such as '*chimaera non est*' ('A chimera is not') and '*antichristus erit*' ('The antichrist will be'). The supposed truth of these propositions isn't necessary for their agreement, but the *DMS* author's choice of supposedly true examples was likely intended to avoid a quarrel over their agreement: any true proposition is by default agreeing, and so anyone who denies the agreement of these propositions likewise has to

[246] *DMS* §49.1: 'Et arguitur sic: Si intellectus accipiat modum significandi a proprietate rei, ergo, ubi nulla est res vel nulla proprietas rei, ibi nullus est modus significandi, quia deficiente radice necesse est totam arborem arescere. Sed clarum est, quod isti nomini chimaera vel isti nomini antichristus nulla res vel proprietas rei correspondet. Igitur in istis vocibus nullus est modus significandi.'

deny their truth. This would commit the objector to denying '*chimaera non est*' and '*antichristus erit*', which would be outlandish in the first case heretical in the second.

The utterances '*chimaera*' and '*antichristus*' are perfectly grammatical, but they're also empty, lacking significates: '*chimaera*' doesn't signify anything in reality because chimeras are figments (*figmenta*); '*antichristus*' currently lacks significates because the antichrist is supposed not to have come yet. There aren't significates for such utterances, and so, a fortiori, there aren't properties of the significates of such utterances. But if there are no properties, there are no modes of being, and, according to MCT, if there are no modes of being, there are no active modes of signifying. So modism, which asserts that there are active modes of signifying for these utterances, is false. The *DMS* author endorses similar arguments using utterances for privations (*privationes*), like '*caecitas*' ('blindness') and '*nihil*' ('nothing').[247] Once again, MCT is assumed in service of refuting modism.

So the No Property Argument purports to show that certain cases of utterances – divine, figment, and privative utterances – provide counterexamples to modism. For lack of a better name, I'll group these three kinds of utterances under the heading of 'empty utterances'. I admit that the label is unfortunate, since fictitious and privative utterances are empty in a way that divine utterances, according to our medieval thinkers, certainly aren't: in fact, the latter might, in a sense, be the *fullest* utterances there are. But by 'empty' I don't mean lacking a *signficate* – although that's incidentally true of fictitious and privative utterances – but rather I mean lacking a *significate*

[247] *DMS* §46.4.

having a property or mode of being. Fictitious and privative utterances lack a significate having a property because they lack significates; divine utterances lack a significate having a property because their significate has no properties. The No Property Argument attempts to refute modism by arguing that it doesn't apply to empty utterances, so understood. The assumption behind the strategy is that if modism fails in even a single case, it fails in all cases, since the modist purports to offer a genuinely scientific – and therefore general – theory of grammar, not an ad hoc analysis of specific cases.

But the No Property Argument relies on a particularly strong version of MCT to reach its conclusion:

> ($MCT_{2.1}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing signified by that utterance.

Attributing $MCT_{2.1}$ to the modist, the *DMS* author assumes that the modes of signifying of '*deus*' must correspond to modes of being of God and the modes of signifying of '*chimaera*' to the modes of being of chimeras, arguing from the lack of such modes of being to the lack of such modes of signifying. But the modist might deny $MCT_{2.1}$ while maintaining MCT_1, thereby undercutting the No Property Argument. In fact, Thomas does just this, taking the issue up immediately after his initial statement of MCT, suggesting that he sees the No Property Argument as a fairly obvious objection – to be dealt with swiftly – to the merely provisional formulation MCT_1. Thomas is far

from original in his denial of $MCT_{2.1}$: numerous modists before him have done so as well.[248] His way of approaching the issue likely draws heavily from those sources.

Thomas's version of the No Property Argument concerns grammatical gender, which he takes to be grounded in properties of acting (*agentis*) (= masculine gender), being acted on (*patientis*) (= feminine), or indeterminacy (*indeterminata*) (= neuter) present in things.[249] The specific example he uses is the feminine utterance '*deitas*' ('deity'):

> But against this it is objected, since this significative utterance – namely, '*deitas*' – has feminine gender, which is a mode of signifying; nonetheless, the property does not correspond to itself in the signified thing, since it is a property of being acted on from which feminine gender is taken.[250]

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[248] For example, Radulphus Brito, *Questions on Priscian Minor*, eds. Enders & Pinborg 1980, pp. 164–166.

[249] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 16, ¶27, pp. 178–180.

[250] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶5, p. 138: 'Sed contra hoc obiicitur: quia haec vox significative, scilicet *deitas*, habet foemininum genus, quod est modus significandi; tamen in re significata sibi proprietas non correspondet, quia est proprietas patientis, a quo sumitur foemininum genus.' Bursill-Hall's edition has '*passivus*' following '*significandi*'. I've omitted the word because it's false that Thomas takes feminine gender to be a *passive* mode of signifying; rather, it's an *active* mode of signifying that corresponds to a passive mode of signifying. The inclusion of '*passivus*' in the text stems from Wadding's edition, where '*significandi*' is asterisked, linked to a marginal comment reading '*passivus*.' Possibly, Wadding confused '*passivus*' and '*patientis*', thinking that Thomas was saying here that the feminine gender of '*deitas*' is a property of being acted on. But even this would be strictly speaking false: the active mode of signifying responsible for feminine gender isn't *itself* a property of being acted on; rather, it *corresponds to* a property of being acted on.

Note also that when Thomas says that the grammatical property of the utterance doesn't 'correspond to itself in the signified thing' ('*in re significata sibi […] non correspondet*'), he means that the significate of the utterance doesn't exhibit the metaphysical property of being acted on corresponding to the grammatical property of feminine gender, not merely that the grammatical property itself doesn't appear in the signified thing, which is also true but not what's at issue.

The idea behind Thomas's example is that '*deitas*' signifies God, but God isn't the sort of thing that can be acted upon and so doesn't exhibit the property of being acted on. So the feminine mode of signifying of '*deitas*' isn't derived from a mode of being exhibited by the thing it signifies. The case of grammatical gender was likely chosen by Thomas because it's particularly clear that God, being pure act, never exhibits the property of being acted on. But the issue extends beyond the particular grammatical property of gender. No grammatical property of a noun signifying God can be grounded in a property of God really distinct from God, since there are no such really distinct properties, as the *DMS* author asserts in his own presentation of the objection. Thomas also considers privative utterances and fictitious utterances, raising the same observation as the *DMS* author but drawing a different conclusion:

> Again, privations and figments fall under no properties, since they are not beings; and nonetheless, significative utterances of privations and of figments have active modes of signifying, like 'blindness', 'chimera', and the like.[251]

But rather than taking empty utterances as counterexamples to modism, as the *DMS* author does, Thomas insists that the theory can accommodate them. But how?

It'll be helpful at this point to reintroduce some terminology that I've been suppressing ever since briefly mentioning it above. According to the realist interpretation of the Aristotelian

[251] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶5, p. 138: 'Item, privationes et figmenta sub nullis proprietatibus cadunt, cum non sint entia; et tamen voces significativae privationum et figmentorum modos significandi activos habent, ut caecitas, chimaera, et similia.'

semantic triangle, which Thomas likely maintains, an utterance *primarily* signifies a thought and *secondarily* signifies the thing(s) from which that thought is derived through sensation and abstraction. I'll use variants of 'signify$_1$' to indicate this primary sense of signification and 'signify$_2$' for this secondary sense. So 'goat' signifies$_1$ a thought of goats and signifies$_2$ the goats themselves, and the significate$_1$ of 'goat' is the thought of goats, and the significates$_2$ of 'goat' are the goats themselves.[252]

Applying this terminology, empty utterances can be described as those that don't signify$_2$ anything (as in the case of privative and fictitious utterances) or that signify$_2$ something that doesn't have any really distinct properties (as in the case of divine utterances). According to the modist, such empty utterances have active modes of signifying, but those active modes of signifying can't correspond to modes of being of their significates$_2$, since either there are no such significates$_2$ or those significates$_2$ don't have really distinct properties. In light of this, MCT$_{2.1}$ – the particularly strong version of MCT that this argument assumes – can be reformulated as well:

> (MCT$_{2.2}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing signified$_2$ by that utterance.

Thomas denies MCT$_{2.2}$. One might think the obvious way to reply is to first point out that empty utterances, though they lack significates$_2$ (or properties of their significates$_2$), all have significates$_1$

[252] More accurately, according to this picture, 'goat' secondarily signifies the real essence of goats. This difference is irrelevant for present purposes, and so I'll continue to speak of the thing(s) themselves as the secondary significate(s) of utterances, rather than an essence.

(or properties of their significates$_1$): 'blindness' signifies$_1$ a thought of blindness, 'chimera' a thought of chimeras, and 'God' a thought of God, and all of these thoughts do have properties really distinct from them, according to the modist. The reply would then be to insist that the active modes of signifying of utterances needn't correspond to modes of what an utterance signifies$_2$, but need only correspond to modes of what it signifies$_1$.

This is in fact one way of understanding Thomas's reply. But, as I'll explain shortly, it isn't the correct way, since it would uncharitably interpret Thomas as resting his reply on a mere rhetorical trick meant to placate an objector. Thomas's reply, in my view, isn't mere rhetoric. I think he offers a much more substantive response, though extracting it requires some effort.

To set the stage for that, consider why the reply above would be insufficient. Note that because the significate$_1$ of an utterance is a thought, the mode of being of the significate$_1$ must be a mode of a thought – that is, a mode of *understanding*, not a mode of *being*. The proposed solution would then amount to altering (MCT$_{2.2}$) to the following:

> (MCT$_{2.3}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds to a mode of understanding exhibited by the thought signified$_1$ by that utterance.

But to assert (MCT$_{2.3}$) and deny (MCT$_{2.2}$) would amount to a serious qualification of Thomas's modism. In fact, it would undermine the very point of MCT – that language is fundamentally grounded in reality – as it would leave some items of language grounded solely in thought, without

a further tether to reality. Put another way, while adherents of modism do accept ($MCT_{2.3}$), they can't simply replace ($MCT_{2.2}$) with ($MCT_{2.3}$) and retain what's distinctive about modism. That is, modism is characterized by its acceptance of something closer to the *conjunction* of ($MCT_{2.2}$) and ($MCT_{2.3}$):

> ($MCT_{2.4}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance (i) non-ultimately corresponds to a mode of understanding exhibited by the thought signified$_1$ by that utterance and (ii) ultimately corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing signified$_2$ by that utterance.

And now the No Property Argument can be reapplied: the trouble is that empty utterances fail to meet condition (ii) of ($MCT_{2.4}$), not that they fail to meet condition (i). And the modist can't simply accept this fact about these special cases without sacrificing the alleged generality of the theory. Moreover, once an exception is made by saying that in certain cases only condition (i) of ($MCT_{2.4}$) has to be met, there seems to be no reason not to say the same for all cases, so that modes of being would become superfluous. So, far from such a move constituting a solution, it would amount to falling into the exact trap that the anti-modist sets by raising the No Property Argument in the first place. Thomas is wilier than that. His solution is rather to amend condition (ii) of ($MCT_{2.4}$) while retaining a commitment to modist ideals.

Thomas develops his solution in two stages. The initial stage is to say that, in certain cases, an utterance's modes of signifying correspond not to the modes of being of the things signified$_2$ by *that* utterance, but instead to the modes of being of the things signified$_2$ by *other* utterances:

> It should be said that it is not correct that an active mode of signifying is always drawn from a property of the thing of that expression of which it is a mode of signifying. But it can be received from the property of the thing of another expression and granted to the thing of that expression, and it is sufficient for this that [the property of the first thing] is not repugnant [to the second thing] […].[253]

Once a mode of being grounds a mode of signifying of one utterance, that same mode of being can ground a mode of signifying of a distinct utterance, regardless of whether the significates$_2$ of the second utterance ever exhibit the mode of being in question. So the modes of signifying of empty utterances are somehow derived from the modes of signifying of certain non-empty utterances, whose modes of signifying correspond to the modes of being of the things *they* signify$_2$, since in the case of these non-empty utterances there are significates$_2$ with really distinct properties. But what are these mode-giving utterances? Thomas quickly kicks away the ladder: there's no need to articulate the account in terms of the transferal of modes of signifying from one utterance to another. Instead, the account can be described in terms of a correspondence between empty utterances and the modes of being of things that those empty utterance nevertheless don't signify. But now what things?

[253] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶5, p. 138: 'Dicendum, quod non oportet, quod semper modus significandi activus dictionis trahatur a proprietate rei illius dictionis, cuius est modus significandi; sed potest accipi a proprietate rei alterius dictionis, et rei illius dictionis tribui, et sufficit quod ipsi non repugnet […].'

Note that above Thomas explains that the modes of signifying of one utterance are transferred to another utterance when the properties *of the thing* signified$_2$ by the first utterance are transferred *to the thing* signified$_2$ by the second utterance. Thomas can't really mean this, since in some cases – like privative and fictitious utterances – there's no thing for any properties to be transferred to at all. Instead, despite Thomas's wording, the transferal doesn't occur in the domain of things. Instead, it occurs in the domain of thought.

Note furthermore that Thomas insists that a transferal of modes is possible so long as the property transferred isn't repugnant (*repugnat*) to – that is, incompatible with – the thing it's transferred to. If this account is to be at all successful, the notion of compatibility at work here has to be more permissive than metaphysical compatibility, since the theory must allow for the property of being acted on to be somehow compatible with God, despite the fact that such a property is metaphysically incompatible with God. And so, as Thomas makes clear, the transferal of modes occurs in thought – specifically, the faculty of imagination – and the sort of compatibility involved is imaginative compatibility: if an image of the thing as having the property in question can be produced, then the utterance can receive a mode of signifying corresponding to that property, even if the property doesn't – in fact, even if it metaphysically *can't* – belong to the thing in question.

Thomas illustrates the solution for divine utterances as follows:

> […] and since we do not understand separated substances unless through the sensible items, thus we impose those names [for separated substances] under the

> properties of the sensible items and we attribute active modes of signifying to their [that is, the separated substances'] names. Hence, although in God, according to the truth, there is not a passive property, nevertheless we imagine that very God as if a patient to our prayers.[254]

In the Aristotelian tradition, understanding of material substances is had through the reception of sensible species and then the abstraction of intelligible species from them. But God is a separated substance (*substantia separata*) – as are separated souls and angels – having no matter and therefore being unperceivable through the senses. So, to the extent that humans do understand God, that understanding isn't through sensory experience of God, but rather through sensory experience of the effects of God, through which an imperfect understanding of God – an incomplete intelligible species – is had.[255] Likewise, the modes of signifying of '*deitas*' and other divine terms can't come from sensory experience of God. (More generally, the modes of signifying of any term signifying a separated substance can't come from sensory experience of a significate$_2$ of that term.) So in order to ascribe modes of signifying to such terms, modes of understanding are

[254] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶5, p. 138: '[…] et quia substantias separatas non intelligimus, nisi ex istis sensibilibus, ideo sub proprietatibus sensibilium eis nomina imponimus, et nominibus eorum modos significandi activos attribuimus. Unde licet in Deo, secundum veritatem, non sit proprietas passiva, tamen imaginamur ipsum tamquam patientem a nostris precibus.' Bursill-Hall's edition (maybe following Garcia's) italicizes '*in Deo*' here. The Wadding edition has no italics here, though it does have italics elsewhere. I left out the italics in my reproduction of the text above and translated the passage accordingly. The italics are misleading, making it appear as if Thomas were *mentioning* the utterance, changing the example from the intended '*deitas*' to a new one, '*in Deo*'. But it's clear that Thomas is *using* the utterance '*in Deo*', saying that God – the thing, not the utterance – doesn't have the property in question.

Again the text speaks of a 'passive' property where strictly speaking it should be a 'patient' property. Unlike the other instance, this one isn't an interpolation by Wadding, but seems to have been present in whatever edition(s) Wadding himself consulted.

[255] Thomas Aquinas, *Summary of Theology*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, 1.12.11–12.

derived from the modes of being of some sensible substances and then applied, in the faculty of imagination, to the intelligible species of God that's also been drawn from sensible substances. In the case of the feminine '*deitas*', a property of being acted on is derived from some sensible patient thing and then attributed to God by imagining God as being affected in some way – by prayer, for example. Although God is not a patient, God can be imagined as a patient. And this act of imagination allows for a feminine mode of signifying to be applied to the utterance '*deitas*'.

Thomas illustrates the solution for privative and fictitious utterances as follows:

> Similarly, we understand privations from their fixtures, thus we impose names under these properties of fixtures, and we attribute their [that is, the names'] active modes of signify to [other] names. Similarly, in names of figments the active modes of signifying are taken from the properties of the parts from which we imagine a chimera to be composed, as we imagine [a chimera to be composed] from the head of a lion, the tail of a serpent, and so on for others.[256]

The modes of being of privative utterances are derived from what Thomas calls the 'fixture' ('*habitus*') of the privation, meaning by this the privation's positive correlate.[257] For example, the

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[256] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶5, p. 138: 'Similiter privationes intelligimus ex suis habitibus, ideo sub proprietatibus habituum eis nomina imponimus, et nominibus eorum modos significandi activos attribuimus. Similiter in nominibus figmentorum sumuntur modi significandi activi ex proprietatibus partium, ex quibus imaginamur chimaeram componi, quam imaginamur ex capite Leonis, cauda Draconis; et sic de aliis.'

[257] This use of '*habitus*' is somewhat different from its uses in Thomas' technical terminology '*proprietas habitus et permanentis*' ('property of stability and permanence'), which is the mode of being to which the nominal mode of signifying corresponds (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-

modes of signifying of '*caecitas*' aren't derived from modes of being of an instance of blindness – which has no positive ontological status – but rather from modes of being of an instance of vision – the fixture of the privation – which does have positive ontological status. This is because the instance of vision is the source of the privative thought of blindness that '*caecitas*' signifies$_1$, which privative thought is produced in the faculty of imagination by applying a mental operation of negation to the thought of vision. In the case of the fictitious utterance '*chimaera*', the modes of signifying are supposed to be derived from the modes of being of the lion and serpent whose parts compose the chimera. This is because the lion and serpent are jointly the source of the fictitious though of a chimera that '*chimaera*' signifies$_1$, which fictitious thought is produced in the faculty of imagination by applying a mental operation of combination to the thought of the lion and the thought of the serpent.

(Maybe more exactly, there are two operations in the faculty of imagination involved here – combination as well as separation – since the construction of the chimera seems like it must involve separation of the thought of the lion's head from the thought of the lion, separation of the thought of the serpent's tail from the thought of the serpent, and then combination of the two, along with all the other thoughts of parts, which themselves have been separated from their wholes.)

Hall 1972, ch. 8, ¶15, pp. 152–153). But the two, I take it, aren't entirely unrelated, both being drawn from a more general sense of '*habitus*' as a stable disposition: the *habitus* of a privation is the stable and real grounding of the unreal privation, lending stability to the privation; the mode of being in question is the mode exhibited when something has such stability. 'Fixture' is the best English I could come up with that blends the following three features of this use of '*habitus*': (i) it designates something stable; (ii) it designates something acting as the basis for something else; (iii) it designates something positive or posited.

So condition (ii) of ($MCT_{2.4}$) has to be modified to account for the fact that the modes of signifying of empty utterances don't ultimately correspond to modes of being of the things they $signify_2$ but to modes of being of the things causally involved in the production, in the faculty of imagination, of the thought that the utterance $signifies_1$. One way to do this is to add disjunctive sub-conditions to condition (ii), dividing the condition into the non-empty and empty cases, as follows:

> ($MCT_{2.5}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance (i) non-ultimately corresponds to a mode of understanding exhibited by the thought $signified_1$ by that utterance and (ii) ultimately corresponds to either (ii.i) a mode of being exhibited by a thing $signified_2$ by that utterance or (ii.ii) a mode of being exhibited by a thing causally involved in the production of the thought $signified_1$ by that utterance.

Condition (ii.i) covers the non-empty cases; condition (ii.ii) covers the empty ones. As stated, there are two criticisms that can be raised against ($MCT_{2.5}$).

The first criticism is that the disjunctive character of condition (ii) is a threat to the theory's generality. Why do empty utterances have to be treated differently than non-empty ones? Wouldn't a more successful theory handle them both with a single, overarching account? But this can be dealt with swiftly by noting that condition (ii.i) is contained within condition (ii.ii), making the former redundant. In the case of a non-empty utterance, the mode of being from condition (ii.i) just is the mode of being from condition (ii.ii), since the thing causally involved in the production

of the thought signified$_1$ by a non-empty utterance just is the thing it signifies$_2$: goats are involved in the production of the thought of goats that 'goat' signifies$_1$, and 'goat' signifies$_2$ goats. So condition (ii.ii) covers both empty and non-empty cases, and condition (ii.i) can be deleted:

> (MCT$_{2.6}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance (i) non-ultimately corresponds to a mode of understanding exhibited by the thought signified$_1$ by that utterance and (ii) ultimately corresponds to a mode of being exhibited by a thing causally involved in the production of the thought signified$_1$ by that utterance.

The second criticism cuts deeper. Thomas, assuming the persona of his objector, puts it as follows:

> And if it were insisted: if active modes of signifying, in [the case of] names of privations, are taken from the modes of being of [their] fixtures, then the names [of privations] designate the modes of being of a fixture and not [the modes of being] of privations. And with this put, the names of privations, through their active modes of signifying, will be consignificatively false.[258]

[258] 'Et si instetur: si modi significandi activi, in nominibus privationum, sumuntur a modis essendi habituum, tunc nomina <modos> essendi habitus, et non privationis designabunt; et hoc posito, nomina privationum per suos modos significandi activos erunt consignificative falsa.' The instance of '*modos*' in angle brackets is my own interpolation, and I've translated the passage assuming its presence. The word appears in neither Bursill-Hall's nor Wadding's edition. Bursill-Hall's translation shows that he reads '*nomina*' as an accusative, the object of '*designabunt*': 'And if it is insisted, that if the active modes of signifying in relation to the names of negations are taken from the modes of being of their features, then they designate the names of the actual existing feature and not of the negations.' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶6, p. 141.) This leaves it unclear what the subject of '*designabunt*' is supposed to be. The English suggests to me that Bursill-Hall takes the

Thomas's view is that a privative utterance derives its modes of signifying from the modes of being of its positive correlate or fixture. Expressing this by using the terminology of consignification, one might be tempted to say that privative utterances consignify properties of their fixtures: '*caecitas*' consignifies properties of instances of vision.[259] Thomas raises the possible objection that this renders privative utterances 'consignificatively false' ('*consignificative falsa*').[260]

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subject to be '*modi significandi activi*', the resulting interpretation being that *modes designate names*. But that seems wrong. Adding the accusative '*modos*' introduces a new object for '*designabunt*', allowing '*nomina*' to be read as a nominative and therefore as the subject of the verb, the resulting interpretation being that *names designate modes*. I suspect this was Thomas' intention. The addition is justified by the fact that in the immediately following paragraph there's an instance of '*modos*' that's able to assume this role, allowing the words '*nomina*' and '*modos*' to be used as subject and object, respectively, of '*designant*', the order of the words further evidencing this reading: '[…] immo nomina privationum per suos modos significandi activos designant circa privationes modos intelligendi privationum.' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 3, ¶6, p. 140.) This supports my reading of '*designare*' as a near or total synonym of '*consignificare*'. The only other occurrence of a form of '*designare*' in the text seems to be consistent with this use (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 16, ¶27, p. 180).

[259] I briefly introduced this terminology above. In his statement of the objection, as in his reply to the objection, he uses forms of '*designare*' where we might expect forms of '*consignificare*'. Thomas uses '*consignificare*', in various forms, about 35 times, making it a key piece of his vocabulary; by contrast, there are only three occurrences of forms of '*designare*' in the entire text. (Bursill-Hall translates forms of both '*signare*' and '*designare*' with appropriate forms of 'designate', resulting in an English translation that makes it seem as though '*designare*' were more common in the Latin than it in fact is. But '*signare*', which is far more common, plays a different role in the theory than '*designare*'. Bursill-Hall usually translates '*consignificare*' as 'consignify', but occasionally as 'connote'. For example, see Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 19, ¶32, p. 187; ch. 20, ¶34, ed. and trans. G.L. Bursill-Hall, p. 195.) The first two occurrences of '*designare*' are in the passage immediately above, where Thomas presents the objection to his account of privative utterances and in the immediately following paragraph, where Thomas provides his reply (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶6, p. 140). The third occurrence is during Thomas' discussion of epicene grammatical gender (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 16, ¶27, p. 180). In all three occurrences, '*designare*' is used to indicate a relation that, similar to consignification, holds between an utterance and the modes of being corresponding to its active modes of signifying, suggesting that these are near, if not total, synonyms for Thomas.

[260] There are only two instances of 'consignificatively false' in the text. The other occurs in the immediately following paragraph, quoted below (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶6, p. 140). In both places, the Wadding edition has a marginal note offering that '*consigna*' be inserted into the text. This change would imply that what the objector takes to be false are such consigns ('*consigna*'). Thomas only uses the terminology of 'consign' once, when he speaks of the 'active mode of signifying, through which a significative utterance becomes a consign or [becomes] consignifying […]' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 1, ¶3, p. 136: '*modus significandi activus, per quam vox significans fit consignum, vel consignificans* […].') This suggests to me that a consign is just an utterance that's become consignifying through the addition of modes of signifying, so that 'consign'

Thomas doesn't explain this notion of consignificative falsehood, but the idea seems to be captured by the following:

> CONSIGNIFICATIVE FALSEHOOD: An utterance is consignificatively false just in case it consignifies a mode of something it doesn't signify$_2$.

The feigned objector's concern about consignificative falsehood assumes that the second imposition of an utterance, which establishes its consignification and syntactic structure, is at least partially restricted by its first imposition, which establishes its signification and semantic content. Any utterance in violation of this is deemed 'consignificatively false'. This was an issue of some controversy in earlier brands of modism from around the 1270s: Matthew of Bologna maintains a certain voluntariness and independence of the acts of first and second imposition so that an utterance could belong to any part of speech, regardless of what it signifies; by contrast, Boethius of Dacia rejects this degree of voluntariness and independence, maintaining that imposition isn't dependent entirely on the will because the second imposition is 'regulated' by the first.[261] Thomas's objection comes from the latter perspective, assuming the position of Boethius. A good modist theory should includes no consignificative falsehoods.

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and 'part of speech' are roughly, if not entirely, synonymous. (This reading relies on translating '*fit*' as 'becomes', rather than Bursill-Hall's own 'creates'.) This means that Wadding's recommendation is superfluous, and so I've followed Bursill-Hall's text in leaving out '*consigna*'.

[261] Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 208.

The more general idea here is that semantic content constrains syntactic structure, which might be called the 'Constraint Principle'. Violations of the Constraint Principle could yield strange results – maybe even contradictory ones. Imagine if '*hircus*' were to signify goats but derive some of its modes of signifying from the modes of being belonging to the significate of a verb. Then the utterance '*hircus*' would signify substances but would exhibit some of the grammatical features associated with verbs, such as tense. What would it mean to speak of the tense of a substance-signifying utterance? And would the utterance itself be a noun or a verb? Could '*hircus*' derive a nominal essential mode of signifying from goats but then receive a verbal accidental mode of signifying, such as signifying in the present tense, from something else? Would '*hircus*' then be a present tensed noun? I think these are the sorts of difficulties the Constraint Principle is meant to avoid. (This isn't to say that these hurdles are insurmountable without the Constraint Principle, but just that the Constraint Principle is designed to remove the hurdles so that they don't have to be surmounted.) The force of the objection is that Thomas's treatment of privative utterances renders them consignificatively false and therefore in violation of the Constraint Principle. '*Caecitas*' consignifies modes of instances of vision but doesn't signify$_2$ instances of vision, since it doesn't signify$_2$ anything. So '*caecitas*' is consignificatively false, and so, it appears, the syntactic structure of '*caecitas*' isn't constrained by its semantic content.

Thomas's reply amounts to showing that privative utterances don't violate the Constraint Principle after all, leading to a rethinking of the notion of consignificative falsehood.[262] His reply reads:

[262] But cf. the following from Rosier-Catach, who seems to see a tension in modist attitudes towards the correspondence of language and reality: 'In addition to the requirement that a scientific grammar be grounded in

[3A] It should be said that [the above] is not true. On the contrary, the names of privations, through their active modes of signifying, designate, concerning privations, the modes of understanding of privations, [3B] which are their [the privations'] modes of being. Next it should be known that even though privations are not positive entities outside the soul, they are nevertheless positive entities in the soul, as is clear from IV *Met. Text* 9, and are entities according to the soul; and since their being understood is their being, so their modes of understanding are their modes of being. [3C] Hence the names of privations, through their active modes of signifying, are not consignificatively false, because, since the modes of understanding of privations are reduced to the modes of understanding of [their] fixtures (for a privation is not understood except through [its] fixture), thus the modes of being of privations after all are reduced to the modes of being of [their] fixtures.[263]

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reality, there was another requirement, going in the opposite direction: to prove the independence of the sphere of grammar and language from reality' (Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 208). On this reading, the modists' consideration of empty utterances had the result that '[t]he partial or total independence of the significate from the grammatical features of a word effectively proved the independence of syntax and semantics' (Rosier-Catach 2010, p. 209). This isn't how I see Thomas engaging with the issue. Instead, I think Thomas tries to *maintain* the dependence of syntax on semantics – what I call the 'Constraint Principle' – by claiming that the putative counterexamples of privative utterances *don't* undermine this dependence. (Whether he's successful is another issue, but this seems to me to be his aim.) This agrees, I think, with Zupko's reading: 'For the *Modistae*, then, the words 'chimera' and 'horse' differ, but only in terms of the complexity of their underlying modes. […]. The fact that nothing answers to the name 'chimera' simply does not matter. Modism was a theory about meaning (*significatio*) […]. Besides, if grammatical truths are universal and necessary – i.e., if there really is a science of grammar – then they cannot be altered by the fact that there are no chimeras. It is the assumption that some palpable phenomenon must underlie every grammatical truth, causing it to be the way it is, which guides Thomas's discussion in the remainder of the treatise […]' (Zupko 2015). Cf. Lambertini 1989, pp. 118–119; Marmo 1994, pp. 140ff.

[263] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶6, p. 140: '[3A] Dicendum, quod non est verum; immo nomina privationum per suos modos significandi activos designant circa privationes modos intelligendi privationum, [3B] qui sunt eorum modi essendi. Iuxta quod sciendum, quod licet privationes non sint entia positiva extra animam, sunt tamen entia positiva in anima, ut patet IV *Met. Text 9*, et sunt

Thomas's reply comes in three parts, which I've labeled 3A, 3B, and 3C in the passage above. Part 3A includes a significant restatement of the modist framework. Parts 3B and 3C elaborate and explain the claim in Part 3A.

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entia secundum animam; et quia eorum intelligi est eorum esse, ideo eorum modi intelligendi erunt eorum modi essendi. [3C] Unde nomina privationum, per suos modos significandi activos, non erunt consignificative falsa, quia cum modi intelligendi privationum reducantur ad modos intelligendi habitus (nam privatio non cognoscitur nisi per habitum), ideo modi essendi privationum tandem ad modos essendi habitus reducuntur.' Bursill-Hall's edition, following Wadding's, has '*consignificativa*', which I've replaced with the adverb '*consignificative*', following the immediately preceding paragraph of the text, quoted above.

Thomas repeats the same objection and reply five chapters later, in the context of a discussion of the most general (*generalissimus*) essential mode of signifying of the noun: 'And if someone were to say: there are many names that signify privations, such as '*nihil*', '*caecitas*', and the like. Therefore, since all privations and negations are not entities, it seems that they are not able to stand under a property, and thus the active mode of signify in such [cases] is not able to originate, through a mode of being, from a property of a signified thing. It should be said, and it was said before, that although privations and negations are not positive entities posited outside the soul, they are nevertheless positive entities according to the soul, as is clear from the intention of The Philosopher [in] IV *Met. Text 9*, where he says that opinions of contradictories are contraries; that is, two contradictories outside the mind are two contraries according to the mind; and since privations and negations and figments are entities according to the mind, thus they fall under a property of a being, which is the property of stability and of permanence, from which property the most general mode of signifying of the noun is drawn.' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 8, ¶16, p. 154: 'Et si dicat aliquis: multa sunt nomina, quae privationes significant, ut *nihil*, *caecitas*, et huiusmodi; cum ergo omnes privationes et negationes non sint entia, videtur quod sub proprietate stare non possint, et ideo modus significandi activus per modum entis in talibus a proprietate rei significatae oriri non potest. Dicendum, et dictum est prius, quod licet privationes et negationes non sint entia positiva extra animam posita; sunt tamen entia positiva secundum animam, ut patet ex intentione Philosophi IV *Met. Text 9*, ubi dicit quod opiniones contradictorum sunt contrariae, hoc est, duo contradictoria extra animam sunt duo contraria secundum animam; et quia privationes et negationes et figmenta sunt entia secundum animam, ideo cadunt sub proprietate entis, quae est proprietas habitus et permanentis; a qua proprietate trahitur modus significandi generalissimus nominis.') Note that '*habitus*' in this passage isn't being used in the sense of the positive correlate of the privation, but rather in the sense of the mode of being to which the nominal mode of signifying corresponds. What Thomas is saying is that a privative thought, considered as a being in its own right, exhibits a mode of stability and permanence, and so the privative utterance exhibits a nominal mode of signifying.

The textual reference 'IV *Met. Text 9*' in Bursill-Hall's edition, present in both passages, is copied verbatim from Wadding's (except that Wadding uses an Arabic '4', rather than the Roman 'IV'). One might think this means either Book IV (Γ), Chapter 9 or Book IX (Θ), Chapter 4 of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. ('The Philosopher' refers to Aristotle.) But neither citation can be right: the *Metaphysics* doesn't include a Chapter 9 to Book IV, and the discussion at Book IX, Chapter 4 doesn't seem relevant. Maybe he's referring to a commentary on the *Metaphysics* rather than Aristotle's own text. It's likely that the relevant passage in Aristotle is *Metaphysics* IV, Chapter 2, 1003b5-10. (My thanks to Adam Crager for the pointer.) Commenting on this passage, Aquinas remarks that negations and privations have being 'in reason' ('*in ratione*') (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Fundación Tomás de Aquino 2019, Lecture 1). But there's no obvious reason to call Aquinas' commentary on this passage 'Text 9'. So the citation may refer to a different commentary that makes a similar point.

In part 3A, Thomas responds to the objector's claim that privative utterances consignify modes of being of their fixtures rather than modes of being of privations. Against this, Thomas insists that privative utterances consignify the *modes of understanding* of privations. This at first may be surprising, since it might be assumed that in all cases consignification is an utterance-to-reality relation. This is in fact how it goes in the standard cases: typically, an utterance consignifies modes of being, not modes of understanding. Parts 3B and 3C provide some sugar for the pill, attempting to help the reader come to terms with the surprising claim that this actually isn't always the case.

There are two possible readings of Part 3B. On one reading, the passage simply presents a semi-sophistical terminology shift. On this reading, Thomas tries to save the letter of the thesis 'utterances consignify modes of being' by introducing an ambiguity. He says that the modes of understanding consignified by a privative utterance *are* the privation's modes of being, basing this in a claim about the ontological status of privations: although they're not positive entities in reality, they *are* positive entities in the soul – 'entities of reason' ('*entia rationis*'), to use traditional Aristotelian terminology that Thomas himself doesn't invoke here. In the case of privations, *to be* is *to be understood*, and so *to exhibit modes of being* is *to exhibit modes of understanding*. But it's important not to take this claim too seriously, as I think Thomas himself doesn't. If he did, then he'd have a ready response to the No Property Argument of the sort we considered, and rejected, above. That reply claims that the modes of signifying of empty utterances correspond to their modes of understanding, and that's that. After asserting this, Thomas could save the letter of ($MCT_{2.1}$) by relying on the equivocity of the unqualified 'signify' and by making the claim that the modes of understanding of empty utterances *just are* their modes of being. Presto chango! But, behind the curtain, privations have no real being (*esse*), and so, strictly speaking, they have no real

modes of being. Furthermore, modes of understanding are properties of *thoughts*, and modes of being are properties of *things*; so, strictly speaking, a mode of understanding can't *be* a mode of being.

(While it's true that there's a broad sense of 'thing' ('*res*') according to which mental and linguistic beings are things, the standard usage is narrower, picking out non-mental and non-linguistic beings. Importantly, it's this narrower sense that's operative the account of modes of being as properties of things, so that shifting the meaning here would do nothing to avoid the problem either.)

It would be uncharitable to read Thomas as if he didn't know this, pinning the whole of his reply on the shift in vocabulary. I don't think Thomas simply conjures some terminological magic to transfigure the claim about consignification into something more palatable. Instead, I think he offers a somewhat informal explanation of it. And, with a bit of squinting, I think a substantive lesson can be drawn from the text of part B: when it comes to privative utterances, the thought *plays the role* that would be played by the thing, were there such a thing, and, in the same way, the mode of understanding *plays the role*, that would be played by the mode of being, were there such a mode. In the first case, the role is to provide the privative utterance's semantic content; in the second, the role is to provide its syntactic structure.

This helps to illuminate the claim from Part 3A. Thomas's idea, in true modist fashion, seems to be that the second imposition of privative utterances, by which they gain syntactic structure, directly mirrors their first imposition, by which they gain semantic content. The semantic content

of privative utterances can't be provided by privative things, but must be provided by privative thoughts, since there are no such privative things. Likewise, their syntactic structure must be provided by privative thoughts, not privative things. And so privative utterances don't violate the Constraint Principle after all: their syntactic structure is constrained by their semantic content, it's just that their semantic content isn't given by what they signify$_2$, which is nothing, but by what they signify$_1$, and so likewise for their syntactic structure.

But this isn't to say that privative utterances and their modes of signifying have no tether to reality, for just as a privative utterance's semantic content comes *non-ultimately* from the mind but *ultimately* from reality, so too its syntactic content comes *non-ultimately* from the mind but *ultimately* from reality. To introduce some terminology that Thomas himself doesn't use, call the semantic content that's derived from the mind an utterance's *non-ultimate* semantic content and that which derives from reality its *ultimate* semantic content. For example, the non-ultimate semantic content of 'blindness' is thoughts of blindness, while its ultimate semantic content is instances of vision. This can likewise be extended to other empty utterances: the non-ultimate semantic content of 'chimera' are thoughts of chimeras, while its ultimate semantic content is real lions and serpents and so on; similarly, the non-ultimate semantic content of 'deity' are thoughts of God, while its ultimate semantic content is the real effects of God. Then another way to state the Constraint Principle is that *non-ultimate* semantic content constrains syntactic structure.

Thomas draws out this last point in Part 3C, leading to a reassessment of the notion of consignificative falsehood. Note that Part 3A taken alone and out of context wouldn't be sufficient to quiet the objector. Thomas says that privative utterances consignify their modes of

understanding, therefore drawing their modes of signifying from the thoughts that they signify$_1$. But this is just to say that privative utterances consignify modes of something they don't signify$_2$, which is to say that they're consignificatively false. But, to Thomas, this isn't a reason to think that privative utterances are counterexamples to modism, but rather that the proposed notion of consignificative falsehood is flawed.

The key idea in Part 3C is the reduction of the modes of understanding of privative thoughts to the modes of being of their corresponding fixtures. Privative thoughts are 'reduced' – that is, '*reducantur*' or 'are led back' – to positive thoughts, which themselves are reduced to positive beings. In the same way, the modes of understanding of privative thoughts are reduced to the modes of understanding of positive thoughts, which themselves are reduced to the modes of being of positive beings. This reduction traces the causal chain leading from the abstraction of an intelligible species to the creation of a thought by means of the productive capabilities of the imagination – a path that Thomas has already described and which led us to condition (ii) of (MCT$_{2.5}$) and (MCT$_{2.6}$).

This requires a reassessment of consignificative falsehood. An utterance isn't consignificatively false because it consignifies modes of something it doesn't signify$_2$; rather, it's consignificatively false because it consignifies modes that are *semantically irrelevant* because they can't be traced back to the utterance's ultimate semantic content. Put differently:

> CONSIGNIFICATIVE FALSEHOOD*: An utterance is consignificatively false just in case it consignifies a mode irreducible to a mode of its ultimate semantic content.

And so now it can be confirmed, as Thomas insists, that privative utterances – and all other empty utterances for that matter – aren't consignificatively false. All such utterances consignify modes that are reducible to their ultimate semantic content.

Furthermore, this notion of ultimate semantic content can serve as a way to abbreviate ($MCT_{2.6}$) while more accurately representing the modist thesis than the original ($MCT_{2.1}$):

> ($MCT_{2.7}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds as to a mode of being exhibited by the ultimate semantic content of the utterance.

This dulls the edge of the No Property Argument. The modes of signifying of empty utterances, just like those of non-empty utterances, correspond to modes of being – namely the modes of being of the things serving as their ultimate semantic content. It's just that in the case of non-empty utterances the ultimate content bears a direct similarity to the non-ultimate content or thought, while in the case of empty utterances the ultimate content bears an indirect similarity to the non-ultimate content, since it passes through, and is manipulated by, the imagination along the way.

4 The Hylomorphism Argument

So far we've uncovered some important features of the correspondence relation posited by MCT. It holds between the active modes of signifying of an utterance and the modes of being of what I'm calling the utterance's 'ultimate semantic content' – that is, the things to which the thoughts that

serve as the utterance's significates$_1$ are reduced, which things are in some but not all cases the utterance's significates$_2$. The active modes of signifying of an utterance correspond to the modes of being of its ultimate semantic content in virtue of the fact that the modes of signifying correspond to active modes of understanding of the thoughts reducible to the ultimate semantic content, which modes of understanding themselves corresponds to those modes of being. It's therefore absolutely essential to the modist theory that the correspondence between modes of signifying and modes of being is mediated by correspondences between modes of signifying and modes of understanding and between modes of understanding and modes of being.

All this helps clarify the *structure* of the correspondence relation, but it leaves much unclear about its *content*: What's the nature of this correspondence? We can begin to get a handle on this by considering the relationship between an utterance's ultimate semantic content and the thought reducible to that content. This reduction traces backwards along a causal path from a thought to the extramental things from which that thought was derived, the process being one of abstraction and subsequent manipulation in the imagination. In the Aristotelian tradition, causal processes of this sort are characterized as forms of change, and change is characterized in terms of underlying hylomorphic – or 'matter-form' – structures. Hylomorphic terminology is ubiquitous in the texts of modist grammarians. We've already seen it represented in the specification of the various relations of material and formal sameness and difference among modes (Figure 2). It's therefore a plausible hypothesis that the derivation scheme we identified above, and the correspondence relation posited by MCT, will be based on some sort of hylomorphic relation holding between the various modes. Such a reading would produce a formulation of MCT more specific than MCT$_1$ and the various forms of MCT$_2$:

> ($MCT_{3.1}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance corresponds, as matter (potency) to form (act), to a mode of being exhibited by the ultimate semantic content of the utterance.

In this section, I'll argue that the correspondence relation in MCT is such a hylomorphic relation and that MCT should be understood as a specific version of $MCT_{3.1}$. In service of this aim, I'll introduce the anti-modist Hylomorphism Argument as presented by the *DMS* author and consider how Thomas might be prepared to reply to it. This will lead to the identification of Thomas's notions of material and formal inherence, which ground the hylomorphic correspondence relation.

The anti-modist Hylomorphism Argument is meant to undermine modism by exploiting the hylomorphic terminology present in modist doctrines. In the *DMS* author's presentation, it comes as an argument against the fifth 'way of putting' modism, which I'll call 'the Modist Inherence Thesis' ('MIT'):

> Against the fifth saying above – namely, that a passive mode of signifying is materially in a thing as in a subject and is formally in an utterance as in a sign […].[264]

[264] *DMS* §58: 'Contra quintum superius dictum, scilicet quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re ut in subiecto et formaliter est in voce tamquam in signo […].' The *DMS* author's initial statement of the thesis, almost identical to this, is the following: 'Fifth, those people say that the passive mode of signifying is materially in a signified thing, as in a subject, and formally in an utterance, as in a sign.' (*DMS* §7: 'Quinto dicunt isti, quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re significata tamquam in subiecto et formaliter in voce tamquam in signo.')

Kaczmarek's version of the latter text adds '*in intellectu et*' ('in a thought and') after '*formaliter*' ('formally') (LK, p. 9). I believe there are textual reasons for omitting the words, as I indicate in the apparatus to my edition. But I also

In a word, MIT says that MS_P materially inheres in a thing and formally inheres in an utterance. It'll take some effort to determine just what this means. That effort is aided by considering the Hylomorphism Argument, by which the *DMS* author attempts to reduce MIT to absurdity:

> Again: [4A] Since this passive mode of signifying is composed from matter and form, [4B] it follows that one and the same thing in number is a passive mode of signifying taken materially and a passive mode of signifying taken formally. [4C] And so there will be one and the same thing in number subjectively in a signified thing and in an utterance, [4D] which is posited by no one, since then one and the same accident in number would be subjectively in different things, in a distinct and not mutually continuous site and place. [4E] But if it is posited that one is a material passive mode of signifying and another formal, [4F] by the same account they have to posit that one is a material active mode of signifying and another formal. [4G] And so an even greater multiplication and abuse of fictitious things is made, which in no way can be posited or sustained, as is made sufficiently clear by the aforesaid.[265]

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think there are theoretical reasons for omitting them. The account I offer below of formal inherence will maintain that, according to Thomas, MS_P *doesn't* formally inhere in a thought (though MU_P does). At no point, to my knowledge, does Thomas assert that MS_P formally inheres in a thought. If the *DMS* author meant the words to be there, then this would be a mischaracterization of the modist thesis (at worst) or a misleading abbreviation of the claim that MU_P formally inheres in a thought (at best).

[265] *DMS* §58: 'Item: [4A] Cum iste modus significandi passivus sit compositus ex materia et forma, [4B] sequitur, quod una et eadem res numero sit modus passivus significandi sumptus materialiter et modus significandi passivus sumptus formaliter. [4C] Et sic erit una et eadem res numero subiective in re significata et in voce, [4D] quod a nullo ponitur, quia sic unum et idem accidens numero esset in diversis rebus subiective situ et loco distinctis et ad invicem non continuatis. [4E] Si autem ponatur, quod unus sit modus significandi passivus materialis et alius formalis, [4F] eadem ratione habent ponere, quod unus est modus significandi activus materialis et alius formalis. [4G] Et sic adhuc

The argument begins with the claim that MS_P is composed of matter and form (passage 4A above), which is meant as a restatement of MIT. From here, the argument branches into two cases: in Case 1, the passive mode of signifying taken materially ('*passivus significandi sumptus materialiter*') (MS_P-M) and the passive mode of signifying taken formally ('*modus significandi passivus sumptus formaliter*') (MS_P-F) are assumed to be numerically identical (4B); in Case 2, MS_P-M and MS_P-F are assumed to be numerically distinct (4E).[266] The two cases jointly exhaust the possibilities, and both are supposed to result in absurdity, and so modism is supposed to be shown to be false.

Put somewhat more formally, the general structure of the hylomorphism argument is the following (where '=' means numerical identity):

maior multiplicatio fit abusiva rerum fictarum, quae nullo modo potest poni nec sustineri, sicut patet sufficienter per praedicta.'

[266] Admittedly the proof by cases structure of the argument isn't readily apparent from the wording of the text. That the argument is supposed to have such a structure is evidenced by John Aurifaber's own statement of the argument, which makes the structure more explicit: '[…] it is said of a passive mode of signifying that it materially is in a thing as in a subject and formally taken is in an utterance. Against this: a passive mode of signifying taken materially and formally is either the same thing or another. If it is the same thing, it follows that each is the active mode of signifying, since the passive [mode of signifying] will be in the same thing [as the active mode of signifying is in] when [the passive mode of signifying is] taken formally. If it is one and another thing, then we would have a twofold passive mode of signifying, namely one of a thing and one of an utterance, and again a twofold active [mode of signifying].' (John Aurifaber, *Determination of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Pinborg 1967, p. 221: '[…] dicitur de modo significandi passivo, quod materialiter est in re ut in subiecto et formaliter sumptus est in voce. Contra: modus significandi passivus sumptus materialiter et formaliter aut est eadem res aut alia. Si est eadem res, ergo uterque est modus significandi activus, <quia> passivus in eodem erit quando sumitur formaliter. Si est alia et alia res, tunc habemus duplicem modum significandi passivum, scilicet unum rei et unum vocis, et iterum duplicem activum.')

(HA) General structure of the Hylomorphism Argument

1.	MS_P-M inheres in a thing *t*.	[Premise 1]
2.	MS_P-F inheres in an utterance *u*.	[Premise 2]
3.	MS_P-M = MS_P-F.	[Assumption: Case 1]
…		
n.	<absurdity>.	[From ???]
n+1.	MS_P-M ≠ MS_P-F.	[Assumption: Case 2]
…		
n+1+m.	<absurdity>.	[From ???]

The absurdity supposedly drawn in Case 1 is that one and the same property inheres in multiple subjects (4D), which follows from the intermediate step asserting that each of MS_P-M and MS_P-F inheres in both a thing and an utterance (4C). The absurdity supposedly drawn in Case 2 is that there will be a multiplication of fictitious things (*res ficta*) (4G), the result of applying to MS_A the same account (*eadem ratione*) that's applied to MS_P (4F).

Case 1 is far more important for our purposes than Case 2. And, as we'll see, one way of declawing Case 1 obviates the need to engage with Case 2. But let's take a moment to consider Case 2 on its own before proceeding. The argument here echoes some of the weaknesses of the Regress Argument: if MS_P-M and MS_P-F are numerically distinct components of MS_P, then there must also be numerically distinct components of MS_A: the active mode of signifying taken materially (MS_A-M) and the active mode of signifying taken formally (MS_A-F); this results in excessive ontological proliferation, and so is absurd. At worst, this is just question-begging, arguing that there can't be numerically distinct material and formal components of *some* mode because that would imply that there are numerically distinct material and formal components of *all* modes, which is absurd because there can't be numerically distinct material and formal

components of *any* modes. A bit better would be to argue that although there can be such components of some modes, there can't be such components of all modes, not because there can't be such components of any, but because there's something specifically absurd about there being such components for all. Even better would be to pin the absurdity specifically on there being such components of MS_A. The *DMS* author, however, doesn't specify what he has in mind, and it's difficult to charitably reconstruct his line of reasoning.

An alternative interpretation would be that the *DMS* author thinks the absurdity in Case 2 is an infinite regress, generated through the analysis of modes into material and formal components and the subsequent analysis of those components into their own material and formal components. But neither the *DMS* version of the argument nor that of Aurifaber's *Determination* has this flavor. If this is what they have in mind, there would be no need to move the discussion from MS_P to MS_A, since they could have effected the regress by simply introducing material and formal components for MS_P-M or MS_P-F. And even if an infinite regress is what they have in mind, it seems that regress, like that of the first horn of the Regress Argument, would be neither logically nor ontologically vicious.

So let's turn to a closer look at Case 1, which can be reconstructed as follows:

(HA-1) General structure of the Hylomorphism Argument: Case 1

1.	MS_P-M inheres in a thing *t*.	[Premise 1]
2.	MS_P-F inheres in an utterance *u*.	[Premise 2]
3.	MS_P-M = MS_P-F.	[Assumption: Case 1]
4.	MS_P-F inheres in *t*.	[From 1 and 3]
5.	MS_P-M inheres in *u*.	[From 2 and 3]

…

Lines 4 and 5 of HA-1 each result from the applications of an inference – which I'll call the 'Colocation Inference' – which relies on the plausible idea that numerically identical modes inhere in all the same subjects:

COLOCATION INFERENCE: *M* inheres in *s*; $M = M^*$ ∴ M^* inheres in *s*.

HA-1 furthermore makes the background assumption that no one numerically identical property inheres in two numerically distinct subjects. Call this the 'No Multilocated Properties' assumption. (A further assumption, totally innocuous, is that the posited thing *t* and utterance *u* are numerically distinct subjects.) The conjoining of lines 2 and 4 contradicts the No Multilocated Properties assumption, thereby generating an absurdity: MS_P-F inheres in two distinct subjects – namely, the utterance *u* and the thing *t*. A similar absurdity is drawn for MS_P-M by conjoining lines 1 and 5, making line 5 superfluous. (Note: The contradiction isn't generated by two distinct properties inhering in one subject, but rather by one property inhering in two distinct subjects; that is, the conjoining of lines 1 and 4 (or 2 and 5) doesn't generate the absurdity. Rather, the conjoining of lines 2 and 4 (or 1 and 5) generates the absurdity. So none of the premises are superfluous, despite the fact that line 5 is.)

Both the validity of the Colocation Inference and the truth of the No Multilocated Properties assumption are plausible, and there's no obvious reason to think a modist would take issue with them. (At least in natural, as opposed to supernatural, cases. God might have the power to imbue two distinct subjects with numerically the same accident, but this wouldn't ever occur by wholly natural processes.) They both follow from a broadly Aristotelian understanding of individual properties or accidents: the brownness inhering in one goat is numerically distinct from the brownness inhering in a numerically distinct goat, and if this brownness inhering in a goat is numerically the same as that brownness, then the latter brownness (which just is the former) likewise inheres in the goat. So, unlike Case 2 of the Hylomorphism Argument, Case 1 reasons validly from a set of premises to a conclusion that would be considered genuinely absurd by both parties to the debate. But in order for the *DMS* author to successfully refute modism, the premises of HA-1 must also present an accurate representation of modist doctrine – MIT in particular. This, I suggest, a modist would dispute.

Note that the *DMS* author's presentation of HA-1 appeals to a twofold notion of MS_P (MS_P materially and formally taken, represented by 'MS_P-M' and 'MS_P-F' respectively) and a single notion of inherence, rather than a twofold notion of inherence (material and formal inherence) and a single notion of MS_P. This terminological choice is significant, and duplicitous. The trick is performed when the *DMS* author moves from the statement of MIT, which asserts a twofold notion of inherence, to the argument against it, which exploits the novel terminology of a twofold MS_P. The sleight of hand involves the sly interpolation of the participle 'taken' ('*sumptus*'), which then

assumes the adverbial modification of 'materially' ('*materialiter*') and 'formally' ('*formaliter*') originally applied to 'is in' ('*est in*').[267] (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3: Inherence Terminology Changed

DMS Author's Statement of MIT	*DMS* Author's Argument against MIT
[…] a passive mode of signifying **materially is in** a thing […] and **formally is in** an utterance […].	[…] a passive mode of signifying **taken materially** and a passive mode of signifying **taken formally**. […] **in** a signified thing and **in** a signifying utterance […].
[…] modus significandi passivus **materialiter est in** re […] et **formaliter est in** voce […].[268]	[…] modus passivus significandi **sumptus materialiter** et modus significandi passivus **sumptus formaliter**. […] **in** re significata et **in** voce significante […].[269]

When Thomas himself endorses MIT, he states the thesis so that inherence is twofold rather than MS_P:

[267] The amendment is also apparent in Aurifaber's statement of MIT, where it's tenuously introduced, and in his subsequent argument against MIT, where it's on full display: '[…] a passive mode of signifying […] **materially is in** a thing […] and **formally taken is in** an utterance. […] a passive mode of signifying **taken materially and formally** is either the same thing or another.' (John Aurifaber, *Determination of the Modes of Signifying*, ed. Pinborg 1967, p. 221: '[…] modo significandi passivo […] **materialiter est in** re […] et **formaliter sumptus est in** voce. […] modus significandi passivus **sumptus materialiter et formaliter** aut est eadem res aut alia.')

[268] *DMS* §58. See too *DMS* §7.

[269] *DMS* §59.

[…] a passive mode of signifying **materially is in** a thing […]. But [a passive mode of signifying] **formally is in** that subject in which is the active mode of signifying […].[270]

So Thomas might respond to the *DMS* author by insisting that MS_P *itself* isn't to be modified as materially or formally taken, but rather that *the inherence of* MS_P should be so modified, so that the general structure of the Hylomorphism argument should be represented not as in (HA) above but as follows:

(HA*) General structure of the Hylomorphism Argument (Modist Revision)

1. MS_P materially inheres in a thing *t*. [Premise 1]
2. MS_P formally inheres in an utterance *u*. [Premise 2]
3. $MS_P = MS_P$. [Premise 3]

…

n. <absurdity>. [From ???]

This renders the proof by cases structure of the argument unnecessary: Premise 3 of (HA*) is a tautology and so alone exhausts the possibilities. The modist revision also undermines the colocation inference, which relies on the notion of inherence being the same in both premises. So nothing further can be inferred from the premises. And the three premises don't themselves constitute an absurdity, since the modist can also insist on an amendment to the No Multilocated Properties assumption: no one property *materially* inheres in two distinct subjects. This doesn't prohibit the same property from inhering materially in one subject and formally in another, as

[270] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, ¶9, p. 146: '[…] modus significandi passivus **materialiter est in** re […]. **Formaliter** autem **est in** eo subiecto, in quo est modus significandi activus […].'

Premises 1 and 2 of (HA*) express. So the hylomorphism argument fails when the premises are amended to faithfully represent MIT.

The *DMS* author's presentation of the Hylomorphism Argument is inspired by a certain reading of MIT that identifies the thesis as saying something about the hylomorphic structure of MS_P: 'Since this passive mode of signifying is composed from matter and form […]' ('*Cum iste modus significandi passivus sit compositus ex materia et forma* […]'). While the *DMS* author is correct to understand MIT as positing a hylomorphic structure, the nature of that structure is mischaracterized. The *DMS* author seems to interpret this hylomorphic structure as *internal* to MS_P, where MS_P is composed of a material component (MS_P-M) and a formal component (MS_P-F). But this doesn't appear to be how the modist – Thomas in particular – understands MIT. Instead, as I'll argue, the hylomorphic structure at work in MIT is *external* to MS_P, where MS_P itself stands to something else as matter (potency) to form (act).

To illustrate the difference, consider the doctrine of Aristotelian psychology that the body is related to the soul as matter (potency) to form (act), the two jointly composing an animated substance.[271] The *DMS* author seems to interpret the hylomorphic structure posited by MIT in such

[271] It might not be quite right to talk about the body as being related to the soul as matter to form, since one might take the body *to be* that compound – namely, a compound of *prime* matter and form. (See Brower 2014, pp. 271–272.) A 'body' without a form is a body in name alone, in the way that the 'eye' of a corpse isn't really an eye. So maybe 'corpse' would be better than 'body' here. The trouble is that the English 'corpse' suggests something that previously was and now is no longer alive, which is more restrictive than what we're after. Another possibility would just be 'matter', but that makes the claim sound somewhat trivial: matter is related to soul as matter to form. Probably most accurate would be to talk, as Brower does, in terms of an individual's matter (Socrates's matter) and soul (Socrates's soul) together making up that individual's body (Socrates's body), which is identical with the complex, material substance that is Socrates (Brower 2014, p. 272). But I think these details can be bracketed for present purposes, and so I'll just stick with 'body' as a label for the individual's matter.

a way that MS_P fills a role analogous to *the animated substance*, with MS_P-M being analogous to the body and MS_P-F to the soul. But Thomas himself seems to take MS_P to be more directly analogous to *the body*, not the animated substance of which its a component. Furthermore, as I'll also argue, the hylomorphic structure isn't so much *compositional* as it is *dynamic*: MIT doesn't posit that MS_P itself is composed of matter and form, nor that MS_P is a material component of some further thing, but rather that MS_P is a terminus of some change or action explainable in hylomorphic terms. And so a better analogy – likewise drawn from Aristotelian psychology – is the hylomorphic structure in which the sensitive soul is related to the sense object as matter (potency) to form (act). On this analogy, MS_P is analogous not to *the overall process* of sensation, but to *the sensitive soul* involved in that process: a matter (potency) actualized by some form (act). So maybe another way to characterize the difference is to say that the hylomorphism in question is *epistemic* rather than *ontological*.

Just what is the form (act) that actualizes MS_P? I claim it's the mode from which MS_P is derived in the derivation scheme outlined above: MS_A. Furthermore, an additional hylomorphic relation of this sort – an external, dynamic, and epistemic one, rather than internal, compositional, and ontological one – underwrites the derivation scheme as a whole and is therefore the correspondence relation appealed to in MCT, according to which MS_A corresponds to MB.[272]

[272] At times Bursill-Hall's presentation makes it seem as though he takes the modes themselves to have a compositional hylomorphic structure, where the matter of a mode is its *property* and the form its *faculty* (his translation of '*ratio*'). (For example, see the chart and surrounding discussion at Bursill-Hall 1972, pp. 32–33.) This isn't totally implausible: as we've seen, Thomas accounts for material sameness as sameness of property and formal sameness as sameness of *ratio*. But there's then some tension – not necessarily irresolvable – with Bursill-Hall's claim that a mode's *ratio* is a *faculty* or *power* associated with that mode, since it's also supposed to be that mode's *form*. But this tension doesn't emerge if we interpret '*ratio*' as 'account', as I recommend, since *the faculty involved in the account* might be a power and *the account itself* might be a form. (As I noted before, my preference would be for 'capacity' here rather than Bursill-Hall's 'faculty'.) Nevertheless, Thomas doesn't, to my knowledge, ever clearly express that modes themselves

The following text from Thomas lends initial support to this interpretation:

> […] the intellect, since it is a passive power, indeterminate by itself, does not proceed to a determinate act unless determined by another.[273]

Above I argued on the basis of this text that MU_A is derived from MB, suggesting the following reading: the intellect is a passive power that when affected by a thing produces an active mode of understanding the object of which is a mode of being of that thing. Put another way, because the intellect stands to the thing as potency to act or – to fully emphasize the hylomorphic terminology – as matter to form, so too MU_A stands to MB as matter (potency) to form (act). This suggests – but doesn't conclusively establish – that the derivation relation holding between all modes should be given a hylomorphic interpretation: mode *M* is derived from mode *M** just in case *M* stands to *M** as matter (potency) to form (act). Further support for this comes from close consideration of Thomas's notions of material and formal inherence.

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have such a compositional hylomorphic structure. Even more importantly for present purposes, the Hylomorphism Argument wouldn't be able to exploit such a structure to refute modism: if MS_P-M were just MS_P as *property*, and MS_P-F were just MS_P as *faculty/account*, there would still be an equivocation in the notion of inherence to say that MS_P-M inheres in a thing and MS_P-F inheres in an utterance. Even if it makes sense to talk about the inherence of a faculty/account (and it isn't clear that it does), it's plausible to think that the way a faculty/account inheres in a subject would be different from the way a property does. So the Colocation Inference, on which the Hylomorphism Argument relies, would still be undermined.

[273] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 2, ¶4, p. 138: '[…] intellectus cum sit virtus passiva, de se indeterminata, ad actum determinatum non vadit, nisi aliunde determinetur.'

As we've seen, MIT posits a distinction between two kinds of inherence: MS_P inheres materially in a thing and formally in an utterance. Thomas provides a brief account of the two notions of inherence, basing that account on the relations of material and formal sameness and difference holding among modes:

> Concerning the fifth item, it should be known that a passive mode of signifying materially is in a thing as in a subject, since [a passive mode of signifying] materially is a property of a thing; but a property of a thing is in that of which it is as in a subject. But [a passive mode of signifying] formally is in that subject in which is the active mode of signifying, since [a passive mode of signifying] formally does not differ from an active mode of signifying.[274]

This account can be represented by the following contextual definitions:

> MATERIAL INHERENCE: Mode *M materially inheres in* subject *s* just in case *M* is a property of *s*.

[274] Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, ¶9, p. 146: 'Circa quintum est notandum, quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re, ut in subiecto; quia materialiter est proprietas rei; rei autem proprietas est in eo, cuius est, ut in subiecto. Formaliter autem est in eo subiecto, in quo est modus significandi activus, quia formaliter a modo significandi activo non discrepat.'

FORMAL INHERENCE: Mode *M formally inheres in* subject *s* just in case (i) there's some mode *M** such that *M* is formally the same as *M** and (ii) *M** materially inheres in *s*.[275]

Applying these definitions yields the correct results with respect to MS_P: MS_P materially inheres in a thing because MS_P is a property of a thing; MS_P formally inheres in an utterance because (i) MS_P is formally the same as MS_A and (ii) MS_A materially inheres in (that is, is a property of) an utterance.

As the definitions stand, MS_P also formally inheres in a thing, since (i) MS_P is formally the same as MS_P itself and (ii) MS_P materially inheres in (that is, is a property of) a thing. But we can easily define a notion of *strict* formal inherence that doesn't have this consequence:

STRICT FORMAL INHERENCE: Mode *M strictly formally inheres in* subject *s* just in case (i) *M* formally inheres in *s* and (ii) *M* doesn't materially inhere in *s*.

Applying this definition, MS_P strictly formally inheres in an utterance because (i) MS_P formally inheres in an utterance and (ii) MS_P doesn't materially inhere in an utterance. Although MS_P formally inheres in a thing, it follows from the definition of strict formal inherence that MS_P doesn't

[275] When Thomas writes 'But [a passive mode of signifying] formally is in that subject in which is the active mode of signifying' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, ¶9, p. 146: 'Formaliter autem est in eo subiecto, in quo est modus significandi activus'), I take it that we're to understand the second 'in' ('*in*') as 'materially in' ('*materialiter in*'), hence condition (ii) for formal inherence.

strictly formally inhere in a thing, since MS_P materially inheres in a thing, thereby failing condition (ii).

Although Thomas himself doesn't do so, a version of MIT can be applied to each of the kinds of modes belonging to the modist ontology by appealing to the definitions above.[276] (See Figure 4.)

[276] Thomas does say that MS_A materially inheres in an utterance: 'But an active mode of signifying, since it is a property of a significative utterance, materially is in a significative utterance, as in a subject […].' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, ¶10, p. 146: 'Modus autem significandi activus, cum sit proprietas vocis significativae, materialiter est in voce significativa, ut in subiecto […].') He then goes on to describe a variety of other ways MS_A inheres: '[…] but [an active mode of signifying is] in a property of a thing just as a caused [is] in the original and remote efficient cause; and [an active mode of signifying is] in an understanding just as a caused [is] in a proximate efficient cause; and [an active mode of signifying is] in a construal as an efficient cause [is] in its proper effect.' (Thomas of Erfurt, *On the Modes of Signifying or Speculative Grammar*, ed. and trans. Bursill-Hall 1972, ch. 5, ¶10, p. 146: '[…] in proprietate autem rei sicut causatum in causa efficienti radicali et remota; et in intellectu sicut causatum in causa efficienti proxima; et in constructione ut causa efficiens in suo effectu proprio.') Thomas could here be saying that MS_A *materially* inheres in each of these: (a property of) a thing, an understanding, and a construal. (It's surprising to me that he says that the mode inheres in *a property of a thing* and not just *a thing*. I'm not sure what to make of this, since his typical use of 'inheres' is such that a mode inheres in *an utterance*, *a thought*, or *a thing*, not *a property of* an utterance, thought, or thing. Possibly this is just a transmission error.) Bursill-Hall seems to understand Thomas as making three additional claims about *material* inherence here, since he adds three additional occurrences of 'materially' to his translation, despite the fact that there are no corresponding instances of '*materialiter*' in the Latin. This would be in tension with my interpretation of material inherence, since on my account MS_A materially inheres in an utterance only. But I think what Thomas says here can be accommodated by my account. There are two interpretative options. First, Thomas might just be describing three notions of inherence different from material inherence, in which case my account stands as is. Second, Thomas might mean that MS_A does materially inhere in (a property of) a thing, an understanding, and a construal, but in *ways* different from that in which it materially inheres in an utterance: MS_A materially inheres in an utterance *as in a subject*; it materially inheres in (a property of) a thing *as an effect of a remote cause*; it materially inheres in an understanding *as an effect of a proximate cause*, and it materially inheres in a construal *as an efficient cause*. Then my account stands, so long as it's taken as describing just the first sort of material inherence but not the others.

Figure 4: Material and Formal Inherence of Modes

Mode	Materially inheres in …	Formally inheres in …	Strictly formally inheres in …
MS_P	A thing	A thing An utterance	An utterance
MS_A	An utterance	An utterance A thing	A thing
MU_P	A thing	A thing A thought	A thought
MU_A	A thought	A thought A thing	A thing
MB	A thing	A thing	

Thing	Thought	Utterance
$\underline{MS_P}$ $\underline{MU_P}$ $\underline{MB}$ $\underline{\underline{MS_A}}$ $\underline{\underline{MU_A}}$	$\underline{MU_A}$ $\underline{\underline{MU_P}}$	$\underline{MS_A}$ $\underline{\underline{MS_P}}$

('$\underline{X}$' means '*X* inheres materially'; $\underline{\underline{X}}$' means '*X* inheres strictly formally'.)

The results in Figure 4 can be confirmed by considering the information in Figures 1 and 2 above. To illustrate for a single case: MU_A materially inheres in a thought because MU_A is a property of a thought (Figure 1); MU_A formally inheres in a thought because (i) MU_A is formally the same as MU_A itself (Figure 2) and (ii) MU_A materially inheres in a thought; MU_A formally inheres in a thing because (i) MU_A is formally the same as MU_P (Figure 2) and (ii) MU_P materially inheres in a thing (that is, it's a property of a thing) (Figure 1); and finally, MU_A strictly formally inheres in a thing because (i) MU_A formally inheres in a thing and (ii) MU_A doesn't materially inhere in a thing (that is, it isn't a property of a thing) (Figure 1). It's also worth noting that MB doesn't strictly

formally inhere in anything, since MB doesn't formally inhere in anything that it doesn't also materially inhere in, since MB formally inheres in a thing only.

A hylomorphic correspondence relation – which I'll call 'H_1-Correspondence' – can be built on the foundation of these notions of material and formal inherence. This involves a particular interpretation of strictly formal inherence. For a mode to strictly formally inhere in a subject is for that mode to be a potency with respect to a different mode materially inhering in that subject. In other words, if mode *M* materially inheres in (that is, is a property of) a subject *s*, and if *M* strictly formally inheres in another subject *s**, then *M* is a potency with respect to some mode *M** that materially inheres in *s**; that is, *M* materially inheres in *s* in virtue of being brought to act by *M**. *M* and *M** thereby stand in a hylomorphic relation traversing the subjects *s* (in which *M* materially but not strictly formally inheres) and *s** (in which *M** materially but not strictly formally inheres) such that *M* is matter (potency) with respect to *M** and *M** is form (act) with respect to *M*. (See Figure 5.)

Figure 5: H_1-Correspondence

s	*s**
	
M materially inheres in *s*. *M** materially inheres in *s**. *M* strictly formally inheres in *s**. *M* H_1-corresponds to *M** (as matter (potency) to form (act)).	

H_1-Correspondence is further characterized by the following conditions:

(DHC1) Mode *M* strictly formally inheres in subject *s* just in case there's some mode *M** such that *M** materially inheres in *s* and *M* H_1-corresponds to *M**.

(DHC2) If *M* H_1-corresponds to *M**, then *M** doesn't H_1-correspond to *M*.

(DHC3) If *M* H_1-corresponds to *M**, and if *M*** H_1-corresponds to *M**, then *M* = *M***.

(DHC4) If *M* H_1-corresponds to *M**, and if *M* H_1-corresponds to *M***, then *M** = *M***.

Condition (DHC1) basically says that H_1-Correspondence is built on the notion of strictly formal inherence. (We'll see shortly what this amounts to in practice.) Condition (DHC2) says that H_1-Correspondence is antisymmetric: no mode H_1-corresponds to a mode that H_1-corresponds to it. Condition (DHC3) says that no two distinct modes H_1-correspond to the same mode. Condition (DHC4) says that no one mode H_1-corresponds to two distinct modes. (See Figure 6.)

Figure 6: Cases Ruled Out by Conditions on H_1-Correspondence



My suggestion is we understand Thomas's claim that MU_A is derived from MB as saying that MU_A H_1-corresponds to MB. (See Figure 7.)

Figure 7: MU_A H_1-Corresponds to MB



On this supposition, we can derive further H_1-Correspondence relations among the other modes.

The following argument establishes that MU_P H_1-corresponds to MU_A: By DCH1, MU_P strictly formally inheres in a thought just in case there's some mode *M** such that *M** materially inheres in a thought and MU_P H_1-corresponds to *M**. We know that MU_P strictly formally inheres in a thought (Figure 4), so there's some mode *M** such that *M** materially inheres in a thought and MU_P H_1-corresponds to *M**. We know that only MU_A materially inheres in a thought (Figure 4). So *M** has to be MU_A, and so MU_P H_1-corresponds to MU_A. (See Figure 8.)

Figure 8: MU_P H_1-Corresponds to MU_A



By a structurally identical argument, MS_P H_1-corresponds to MS_A. (See Figure 9.)

Figure 9: MS_P H_1-Corresponds to MS_A



It remains to be shown is that MS_A H_1-corresponds to MU_P. This can be done on the basis of the following argument: By DCH1, MS_A strictly formally inheres in a thing just in case there's some mode *M** such that *M** materially inheres in a thing and MS_A H_1-corresponds to *M**. We know that only MS_P, MU_P, and MB materially inhere in a thing (Figure 4). So *M** is either MS_P, MU_P, or MB. Suppose that *M** is MS_P. Then MS_A H_1-corresponds to MS_P. But we already know that MS_P H_1-corresponds to MS_A (Figure 9). So MS_A H_1-corresponds to MS_P and MS_P H_1-corresponds to MS_A. (See Figure 10.)

Figure 10: MS_A H_1-corresponds to MS_P and MS_P H_1-corresponds to MS_A?



But this violates DCH2 (Figure 6). So *M** isn't MS_P. Assume instead that *M** is MB. Then MS_A H_1-corresponds to MB. But we already know that MU_A H_1-corresponds to MB (Figure 7). So MS_A H_1-corresponds to MB and MU_A H_1-corresponds to MB. (See Figure 11).

Figure 11: MS_A H_1-corresponds to MB and MU_A H_1-corresponds to MB?



But this violates DCH3 (Figure 6). So *M** isn't MB. So *M** has to be MU_P, and so MS_A H_1-corresponds to MU_P. (See Figure 12.)

Figure 12: MS_A H_1-corresponds to MU_P



That there are no additional H_1-Correspondence relations holding between the various modes can be established as follows: By DCH1, MB strictly formally inheres in subject *s* just in case there's some mode *M** such that *M** materially inheres in *s* and MB H_1-corresponds to *M**. We know that MB doesn't strictly formally inhere in any subject (Figure 4). So there's no mode *M** such that MB H_1-corresponds to *M**. And given that every other mode H_1-corresponds to some mode, DCH4 rules out that any mode also H_1-corresponds to another mode (Figure 6).

The resulting scheme of H_1-Correspondence relations is structurally similar to the derivation scheme identified above. But note that this alone is insufficient to establish a hylomorphic relation holding between MS_A and MB, and so H_1-correspondence itself isn't the hylomorphic correspondence relation appearing in MCT. H_1-correspondence is intransitive: just because MS_A H_1-corresponds to MU_P, and MU_P to MU_A, and MU_A to MB doesn't mean that MS_A H_1-corresponds to MB. To arrive at the sought after hylomorphic correspondence relation between MS_A and MB, we have to consider the *transitive closure* of H_1-correspondence – that is, the

relation obtained by taking the union of the compositions of each of the H_1-correspondences – which I'll call H_2-correspondence. (See Figure 13.)

Figure 13: H_2-Correspondence



So, I suggest, the correspondence relation that holds between MS_A and MB is H_2-Correspondence, which, like H_1-Correspondence, should be understood as a hylomorphic relation.

Two things should be noted about H_2-Correspondence. First, as I remarked above, I think it shouldn't be understood as a compositional hylomorphic relation, where the two relata jointly compose some third thing, but rather as dynamic, where the two relata are termini of an action or change. But what is the action or change in question? As we've seen, Thomas ties the account of the derivation of modes to the imposition of an utterance. H_2-Correspondence, I suggest, explains this act of second imposition. Prior to the second imposition, MB is an actual property of a thing, but the remaining modes are mere potential properties of those subjects in which they potentially

materially inhere: MU_A is a potential property of a thought, MS_A of an utterance, and MU_P and MS_P of that thing of which MB is an actualized property. Then MU_A, which is in potency to MB, is brought to act by MB, so that the thought takes on MU_A as an actual, materially inhering property. Next MU_P, which is in potency to MU_A, is brought to act by the newly actualized MU_A, so that the thing takes on MU_P as an actual, materially inhering property – one that's materially the same as MB but formally different, since the newly actualized property MU_P is MB *as understood*. The process continues, generating the grammatical features of the utterance once MS_A and MS_P are actualized, thereby completing the act of second imposition.

The second thing to note about H_2-Correspondence is that it's a derivative hylomorphic relation, built on the foundation of H_1-Correspondence. Note that MS_P H_1-corresponds to MS_A, which H_1-corresponds to MU_P, so that MS_P stands to MS_A as matter to form and MS_A stands to MU_P as matter to form. Relying on traditional Aristotelian terminology, we can say that MS_P stands to MS_A as matter (potency) to *first* form (act), while MS_P stands to MU_P as matter (potency) to *second* form (act) (similar to the way the capability to acquire literacy is a potency to the first act of being literate and to the second act of exercising that literacy by reading or writing). This is roughly the sort of hylomorphic relation H_2-Correspondence is meant to capture.

This lends support to the following reformulation of MCT, adapted from $MCT_{3.1}$:

> ($MCT_{3.2}$) Every active mode of signifying exhibited by an utterance H_2-corresponds, as matter (potency) to form (act), to a mode of being exhibited by the ultimate semantic content of the utterance.

I suggest that $MCT_{3.2}$ more accurately represents Thomas's understanding of MCT than the caricatures of MCT appealed to in the anti-modist Regress, No Property, and Hylomorphism arguments and that $MCT_{3.2}$ isn't vulnerable to those arguments.

CONCLUSION: THE TRUER WAY

I've presented three arguments from the second chapter of the *DMS*, all of which in some way leverage MCT in order to argue against modism, and all of which in some way misunderstand or misrepresent the modism they attack. I occupied myself much of the time with defending modism against what appear to be unfair criticisms. And so the story as I've told it runs the risk of painting the *DMS* author in a bad light – as some sort of bonehead or bad faith arguer. I don't think that's the case. As I mentioned above, all three of the arguments I've considered come in the second chapter of the *DMS*, where the goal is simply to *present* the well-rehearsed arguments and viewpoints in opposition to modism, without necessarily *endorsing* them. As I also remarked, they appear to be anti-modist stock arguments, designed for easy reproduction by the anti-modist-on-the-go who needs to quickly cut down an interlocutor in a debate, perhaps a public one. They don't represent the *DMS* author's settled views nor his strongest arguments.

Probably the strongest anti-modist argument of all is the pro-terminist one – the so-called 'truer way' ('*via verior*') – which the *DMS* author makes the case for in the third chapter of his book, about twice the length of the previous two chapters combined. In very broad outline, the view

asserts that the items of nature don't have to exhibit some sort of correlate of syntactic structure in order for our written and spoken languages to have a grammar. Instead, that grammar is derived from the naturally occurring grammar of the mind. The view is supported by parsimony and explanatory power: it purports to posit fewer unnecessary entities and yet to be able to explain all the same phenomena.

I can't at present give the *DMS* author's truer way the attention it deserves, though I can say that it's an impressive and ambitious feat, building off of the groundwork laid by Ockham and others. But this isn't to call it flawless. Readers can judge for themselves, by studying the text and translation of the *DMS* that I offer below.

PART 3

TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE *DMS*

THE DESTRUCTIONS OF THE MODES OF SIGNIFYING

PREAMBLE

§1.1

Restrained by nature's bond, feeling no little compassion for those overwhelmed by knowledge, and hoping that I – crushed by the mass of the modes of signifying – might do for others what I would want many of these same people to do for me, I extend a helping hand, so that, once unburdened of their unbearable load, they might freely and more lightly advance into a region of knowledge remote to them.

↓[277] ↑[278] Naturae vinculo astrictus, non modicum in scientiis obrutis compatiens, ut aliis faciam, quod mihi vellem fieri ab eisdem multis mole modorum significandi oppressus, manum porrigam sublevantem, qua importabili onere exonerati in regionem scientiae talibus longinquam libere levius proficiscantur.

§1.2

To be clearer, I will maintain the following order of discussion: First, I will briefly describe the root notions of those who posit such distinct modes of signifying, along with their reasons.[i] Second, I will clarify the contrary view, along with its reasons and proofs.[ii] And third, by undoing the reasons for the contrary view, I will extract what appears to me to be the truer way.[iii]

Quod ut planius fiat, ordinem talem tenebo tractandi: Primo recitabo breviter radicalia ponentium tales modos significandi distinctos et eorum rationes. Secundo opinionem contrariam cum suis rationibus et probationibus declarabo. Et tertio eligam viam apparentem mihi veriorem solvendo opinionis contrariae rationes.

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[277] LK, p. 6.
[278] λ, f. a2ra.

THE FIRST CHAPTER

THE ROOT NOTIONS OF THOSE WHO POSIT MODES OF SIGNIFYING

§2

Concerning the first item, it should be known that there are many who want to be teachers, considering themselves to be knowledgeable and almost perfect in grammar, who posit such modes of signifying, totally distinct from a signified thing, and from a signifying utterance, and also from a signifying inscription,[iv] which are posited in the following way:

↓[279] Circa primum est sciendum, quod multi sunt, qui volunt esse magistri reputantes se esse scientes et quasi perfectos in grammatica, qui ponunt tales modos significandi distinctos totaliter a re significata et a voce significante et etiam a scripto significante, quorum modus ponendi est talis:

The First Way of Positing Modes

§3

First, they divide the mode of signifying into the active mode of signifying and the passive mode of signifying. But an active mode of signifying is a property of an utterance, attributed to it by the intellect, by which mediating property the utterance signifies a thing and consignifies a property of a thing. But a passive mode is the property such that it is consignified by the utterance. But the first mode is called active from 'to signify', which is to act, and the second mode is called passive from 'to be consignified', which is to be acted upon.[v]

Primo dividunt modum significandi in modum significandi activum et in modum significandi passivum. Modus autem significandi activus est proprietas vocis attributa sibi per intellectum, mediante qua proprietate vox rem significat et proprietatem rei consignificat. Modus autem passivus est ↓[280] proprietas, secundum quod per vocem consignificatur. Primus autem modus vocatur activus a significare, quod est agere, et secundus modus vocatur passivus a consignificari, quod est pati.

The Second Way of Positing Modes

§4

Second, those people[vi] who believe in such modes of signifying say that a

Secundo dicunt isti opinantes tales modos significandi, quod signo vel voci

[279] LK, p. 7.
[280] LK, p. 8.

twofold property or twofold account – namely, of a sign and of a consign – is attributed to a sign or utterance by the intellect. By the first, an utterance is made to be formally signifying and signing and an expression. By the second, it is made to be consigning, or consignifying, and a part of speech. And the second property is that by which one part of speech is related formally to another in a statement,[vii] as by an intrinsic efficient principle.[viii]

attribuitur per intellectum duplex proprietas vel duplex ratio, scilicet signi et consigni. Per primum efficitur vox formaliter significans et signans et dictio. Per secundum efficitur consignans vel consignificans et pars orationis. Et ista secunda proprietas est illud, per quod una pars orationis formaliter refertur ad aliam in oratione tamquam per principium efficiens intrinsecum.

The Third Way of Positing Modes

§5

Third, those people say that the intellect gets a mode of signifying at the root from a property of a thing that it observes when it attributes that mode of signifying to an utterance, and nonetheless it immediately gets it from a mode of understanding.[ix]

Tertio dicunt isti, quod intellectus accipit modum significandi radicaliter a proprietate rei, ad quam aspicit, cum ipsum modum significandi voci attribuit, verumtamen immediate accipit ipsum a modo intelligendi.

The Fourth Way of Positing Modes

§6

Fourth, those people say that the mode of understanding is twofold – namely, active and passive. The active is the mode of conceiving by which the intellect conceives a property of a thing. But the passive is the property of a thing exactly as apprehended or understood by the intellect.[x]

↓[281] Quarto dicunt isti, quod duplex est modus intelligendi, scilicet activus et passivus. Activus est modus concipiendi, quo intellectus concipit proprietatem rei. Passivus autem est proprietas rei, prout ab intellectu est apprehensa vel intellecta.

The Fifth Way of Positing Modes

§7

Fifth, those people say that the passive mode of signifying is materially in a

Quinto dicunt isti, quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re

[281] LK, p. 9.

signified thing, as in a subject, and formally in an utterance, as in a sign.[xi]

significata tamquam in subiecto et formaliter in voce tamquam in signo.[282]

§8

For the most part, those are the greatest strengths of that view, and when you have sufficiently disproved[xii] them, the error made by those who hold the view, and by many other fakers, will be made quite obviously clear.

Ista sunt ↑[283] pro maiori parte, quae sunt maioris virtutis istius opinionis, quibus sufficienter reprobatis satis manifeste patebit error istorum et multorum aliorum a sic opinantibus fictorum.

§9

Nonetheless, they strive to prove those modes of signifying, as distinct items, by many lines of persuasion.[xiii]

↓[284] Verumtamen istos modos significandi sic distinctos nituntur probare multis persuasionibus.

The First Argument

§10.1

First, like so:[xiv] Something is added to an utterance by its being a sign or part of speech.[xv] And they call that addition a 'mode of signifying'. Therefore, modes of signifying should be posited.

Primo sic: Voci per hoc, quod ipsa est signum vel pars orationis, aliquid additur. Et illud additum vocant modus significandi. Ergo modi significandi sunt ponendi.

§10.2

The consequence[xvi] seems to be known and clear, the antecedent[xvii] proved by many reasons.

Consequentia videtur esse nota et plana, antecedens probatur multis rationibus.

The First Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§11.1

First, like so: If nothing were added to an utterance when the utterance is made to be a sign or part of speech, and when

Primo sic: Si voci nihil adderetur, quando vox fit signum vel pars orationis et quando ipsae voces imponuntur ad

282 formaliter] in intellectu et *add.* LK, λ. (Cf. LK: et formaliter … signo] *om*. *Mü*, *Me*; *DMS* §58.)
283 λ, f. a2rb.
284 LK, p. 10.

those utterances are imposed to signify, it would follow that utterances could produce construal[xviii] before imposition[xix] just as they do after imposition.

significandum, sequeretur, quod voces ante impositionem possent facere constructionem sicut post impositionem.

§11.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is proved, since the same, as the same, is naturally apt always to produce the same, according to Aristotle in the second book of *On Generation and Corruption*. But an utterance is the same before imposition and after. Therefore, if it can produce construal after imposition, with no mode coming to it, it follows that it can produce construal before imposition. The falsity of the consequent is evident, since it is clear that a non-significative utterance,[xx] which certainly was never imposed to signify, cannot produce construal.

Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Consequentia probatur, quia idem inquantum idem est aptum natum semper facere idem, secundum Aristotelem secundo *De generatione.* Sed vox est eadem ante impositionem et post. Ergo si post impositionem nullo modo sibi adveniente potest facere ↓[285] constructionem, sequitur, quod ante impositionem potest facere constructionem. Falsitas consequentis apparet, quia clarum est, quod vox non significativa, vel quae numquam fuit imposita ad significandum, non potest facere constructionem.

The Second Argument, or the Second Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§12.1

Again: Everything narrowed to a delimited species, to which it was not narrowed before, is narrowed by something else being added to it. But after imposition an utterance is narrowed to the delimited species of a part of speech, to which it was not narrowed before imposition. Therefore, an utterance is narrowed by something being added to it.

Item: Omne contractum ad determinatam speciem, ad quam prius non fuit contractum, est per aliquid aliud sibi additum contractum. Sed vox post impositionem est contracta ad determinatam speciem partis orationis, ad quam ante impositionem non fuit contracta. Ergo vox per aliquid sibi additum est contracta.

§12.2

The major[xxi] is clear on its own,[xxii] since, if nothing were added to it after the imposition of an utterance to signify,

Maior patet de se, quia, si nihil esset additum sibi post impositionem vocis ad significandum, non esset maior ratio,

[285] LK, p. 11.

there would be no greater reason[xxiii] why such an utterance would be put in some new species after, rather than before, the imposition of the utterance to signify. The minor is explained, for an utterance, after imposition, is made to be under the species of noun[xxiv] or verb or some other part of speech, under which species it was not contained before imposition, since before imposition it was neither a noun nor a verb, as is clear on its own and confirmed by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*,[xxv] where he says and holds[xxvi] that nouns as much as verbs are utterances significative by convention.

quare post impositionem vocis ad significandum talis vox poneretur in aliqua specie nova quam ante. Minor declaratur, nam vox post impositionem efficitur sub specie nominis vel verbi vel alicuius alterius partis orationis, sub qua specie ante impositionem non continebatur, quia ante impositionem nec fuit nomen nec verbum, sicut de se patet, et confirmatur per Aristotelem primo *Perihermenias,* ubi dicit et ↓[286] vult, quod tam nomen quam verbum sint voces significativae ad placitum.

The Third Argument, or the Third Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§13.1

Again: Something is newly added to everything to which some accident is newly accrued. But some accident is newly accrued to an utterance through imposition. Therefore, something is newly added to an utterance through imposition.[xxvii]

Item: Omni tali de novo aliquid additur, cui aliquod accidens de novo acquiritur. Sed voci per impositionem aliquod accidens de novo acquiritur. Ergo voci de novo per impositionem aliquid additur.

§13.2

The major is known on its own. The minor is proved, since accidents are accrued to an utterance through imposition – namely, that it is of some case, some gender, some person, some conjugation, and so on. For it is clear that before imposition an utterance was not of some gender nor of some case, and so on for others.

Maior est nota de se, minor probatur, quia voci per impositionem acquiruntur accidentia, scilicet quod sit alicuius casus, alicuius generis, alicuius personae, alicuius coniugationis et cetera. Nam clarum est, quod vox ante impositionem non fuit alicuius generis nec alicuius casus, et sic de aliis.

286 LK, p. 12.

The Fourth Argument, or the Fourth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§14.1

Again: Everything that now passes something on to the intellect or now produces some complete sense[xxviii] for the intellect – already well and in the same way disposed[xxix] – that it did not produce before, now has something added to it that it did not have before. But through imposition an utterance passes something on to the intellect or produces some sense for the intellect – in the same way disposed – that it did not produce before imposition. Therefore, an utterance has something added through imposition that it did not have before imposition.

Item: Omne illud, quod nunc derelinquit aliquid intellectui vel aliquem perfectum sensum nunc facit iam intellectui ↑[287] bene et eodem modo disposito, quem prius non fecit, habet aliquid additum sibi nunc, quod prius non habuit. Sed vox per impositionem derelinquit aliquid intellectui vel ↓[288] aliquem sensum facit intellectui eodem modo disposito, quem ante impositionem non fecit. Ergo vox per impositionem habet aliquid additum, quod ante impositionem non habuit.[289]

§14.2

The major seems to be known on its own. The minor is explained, since it is clear that after imposition this construal 'A human is an animal' sufficiently imparts some complete sense to the intellect, and before imposition it did not impart this, since then it signified nothing.

Maior videtur esse nota de se. Minor declaratur, quia clarum est, quod haec constructio homo est animal post impositionem intellectui sufficienter derelinquit aliquem sensum perfectum et ante impositionem non derelinquebat, quia tunc nihil significabat.

The Fifth Argument, or the Fifth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§15.1

Again: Something is newly added or accrued[xxx] to everything that now falls under the consideration of some science under which it did not fall before. But after imposition an utterance falls under the consideration of some science under which it did not fall before imposition.

Item: Omni tali de novo est aliquid additum vel acquisitum, quod nunc cadit sub consideratione scientiae alicuius, sub qua prius non cadebat. Sed vox post impositionem cadit sub consideratione alicuius scientiae, sub qua ante impositionem non cadebat. Ergo voci per

287 λ, f. a2va.
288 LK, p. 13.
289 iam] tam LK; *om*. λ.
fecit$_1$] hoc *add*. LK; faciebat λ.

Therefore, something is newly added or accrued to an utterance through imposition.

impositionem est aliquid de novo additum vel acquisitum.

§15.2

The major seems known on its own, since, if nothing were newly added to it, there would be no greater reason why it would now fall under the consideration of such a science any more than before. The minor is explained, for after imposition an utterance is a significative utterance, which grammar and also logic considers, although in different ways. But before the imposition of the utterance, it was a non-significative utterance, which neither grammar nor also logic considers. Therefore, and so on.

Maior videtur de se nota, quia, si nihil sibi adderetur de novo, non esset maior ratio, quare nunc caderet sub consideratione talis scientiae magis quam prius. Minor declaratur, nam vox post impositionem est vox significativa, de qua considerat grammatica et etiam logica, quamvis diversimode. Sed ante impositionem vocis vox non fuit significativa, ↓[290] de qua nec grammatica considerat nec etiam logica. Ergo et cetera.

The Sixth Argument, or the Sixth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§16.1

Again: Something is newly accrued to everything that now can cause something that it could not cause before. After imposition an utterance now can cause something that it could not cause before imposition. Therefore, something is newly accrued to an utterance through imposition.

Item: Omni tali de novo aliquid acquiritur, quod potest nunc aliquid causare, quod prius non potuit causare. Vox post impositionem potest nunc aliquid causare, quod ante impositionem non potuit causare. Ergo voci per impositionem aliquid de novo acquiritur.

§16.2

The major is known on its own. The minor is explained, since through imposition, and after, an utterance causes – and before imposition did not cause – an act of knowing. Therefore, and so on.

Maior est nota de se. Minor declaratur, quia vox per impositionem et post causat actum sciendi et ante impositionem non causabat. Ergo et cetera.

[290] LK, p. 14.

The Seventh Argument, or the Seventh Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§17

Again: Everything that of its own nature is naturally in one predicament,[xxxi] cannot be put in another predicament unless by something being added to it. But before imposition an utterance of its own nature is in its predicament of quality, as is made clear by what is said in the *Categories*, and after imposition the utterance is in the predicament of relation, for through imposition the utterance is made to be a sign, and every sign of something is a sign of some signified thing. Therefore, and so on.

Item: Omne illud, quod de natura sua est in uno praedicamento naturaliter, illud non potest poni in alio praedicamento nisi per aliquid sibi additum. Sed vox ante impositionem de sua natura est in suo praedicamento qualitatis, sicut patet per dicta in *Praedicamentis,* et post impositionem vox ↓[291] est in praedicamento relationis, nam vox per impositionem efficitur signum, et omne signum alicuius rei significatae est signum. Igitur et cetera.

The Eighth Argument, or the Eighth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§18.1

Again: Everything that now is confined and bound that before was free and unfixed has something added to it. But after imposition an utterance is confined, and before imposition it was free and unfixed. Therefore, after imposition an utterance has something added to it.

Item: Omne illud, quod nunc est coartatum et strictum, quod prius fuit liberum et vagum, habet aliquid sibi additum. Sed vox post impositionem est coartata, et ante impositionem fuit libera et vaga. Ergo vox post impositionem habet aliquid sibi additum.

§18.2

The major, just as the minor, is made clear by all grammarians – so those people say.

Tam maior quam minor patet per omnes grammaticos, ut isti dicunt.[292]

The Ninth Argument, or the Ninth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§19

Again: After imposition an utterance is a sign. Therefore, after imposition an

Item: Vox post impositionem est signum. Igitur vox post impositionem est

[291] LK, p. 15.
[292] patet] patent LK, λ.

utterance is a relative. Therefore, I take the relation and I ask: What is it in subjectively?[xxxii] It cannot be said that it is in a signified thing or in a consignified property, since those are the terms of the relation. Nor is the relation in the intellect, since the intellect is not related to an external thing. Therefore, it necessarily remains that it is in a signifying utterance. From which, it obviously follows that through the imposition of an utterance there should be something that is accrued – namely, the relation. And the relation is a mode of signifying. Therefore, a mode of signifying is accrued through the imposition of an utterance.

relativum. Capio igitur istam relationem et quaero, in quo sit subiective. Non potest dici, quod est in re significata vel in proprietate consignificata, quia illi sunt termini illius relationis. ↓[293] Nec et ista relatio est in intellectu, quia intellectus non ↑[294] referatur ad rem extra. Relinquitur ergo necessario, quod est in voce significante. Ex quo sequitur manifeste, quod per impositionem vocis debet aliquid esse, quod acquiritur, scilicet ista relatio. Et ista relatio est modus significandi, ergo modus significandi acquiritur per impositionem vocis.

The Tenth Argument, or the Tenth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§20

Again: It is impossible that something stands successively under each term of a contradiction without the new accrual or loss of some thing. But before imposition an utterance was under one term of a contradiction and after imposition under another term of a contradiction, since before imposition an utterance was not significative and after imposition it was significative. But to signify and not to signify are two terms of a contradiction. And after imposition an utterance has not newly lost some thing. Therefore, it has newly accrued some thing, and that thing is no thing other than a mode of signifying.

Item: Impossibile est aliquid successive stare sub utroque termino contradictionis sine acquisitione vel deperditione alicuius rei de novo. Sed vox ante impositionem fuit sub uno termino contradictionis et post impositionem sub alio termino contradictionis, quia ante impositionem vox non fuit significativa et post impositionem fuit significativa. Sed significare et non significare sunt duo termini contradictionis, et vox post impositionem non deperdebat aliquam rem de novo. Igitur ipsa acquisivit aliquam rem de novo, et ista res non est alia res quam modus significandi.

[293] LK, p. 16.
[294] λ, f. a2vb.

The Eleventh Argument

§21.1

Again:[xxxiii] That due to the variance of which the agreement[xxxiv] of a statement is varied should necessarily be posited. A mode of signifying is of this kind, and therefore is that due to the variance of which the agreement of a statement is varied. And therefore a mode of signifying should necessarily be posited.

↓[295] Item: Illud necessario est ponendum, ad cuius varietatem variatur congruitas orationis. Modus significandi est huiusmodi, ergo illud, ad cuius varietatem variatur congruitas orationis. Et ergo modus significandi necessario est ponendus.

§21.2

The major seems known on its own. The minor is explained, since by saying '*Homo currit*' there is thus an entirely agreeing construal, and by saying '*Hominem currit*' the agreement is thus varied, and so it is made to be disagreeing there.[xxxv] But this is not exactly by reason of an utterance, since an utterance by its own nature produces neither agreement nor disagreement, as is obvious on its own. Nor also is the variation because of the signified thing, since the same thing is signified by the expression '*hominem*' and by the expression '*homo*'.[xxxvi] Therefore, it remains that the variation is made because of a mode of signifying.

Maior videtur nota de se. Minor declaratur, quia sic dicendo homo currit est omnino congrua constructio et sic dicendo hominem currit variatur congruitas, et sic fit ibi incongruitas. Sed sic non est praecise ratione vocis, quia vox de sua natura nec facit congruitatem nec incongruitatem, sicut manifestum est de se, nec etiam ista variatio est propter rem significatam, quia eadem res significatur per istam dictionem hominem et per istam dictionem homo. Relinquitur igitur, quod ista variatio fit propter modum significandi.[296]

The Twelfth Argument, or the Eleventh Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§22.1

Again:[xxxvii] If nothing were added to an utterance through imposition, there would be nothing by which the agreement of a statement would be caused.

↓[297] Item: Si voci per impositionem nihil adderetur, non posset dari aliquid, a quo causaretur congruitas orationis.

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295 LK, p. 17.
296 videtur λ] *om*. LK.
297 LK, p. 18.

§22.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is the antecedent. The falsity of the consequent is clear, since agreement is a genuine[xxxviii] thing, at some time beginning to be and at some time ceasing to be. And by consequence it necessarily must be that it would have some cause.

Consequens est falsum, igitur et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia congruitas est vera res aliquando incipiens esse et aliquando desinens esse. Et per consequens oportet necessario, quod habeat aliquam causam.

§22.3

But the cause cannot be an utterance, since an utterance, as was said before,[xxxix] does not produce agreement by its own nature. For if an utterance were to produce agreement by its own nature, then the statement 'A human is an animal' would have been agreeing before the imposition of the parts of the statement, just as now, which clearly is false, since, before imposition, there was neither a noun nor a verb, and by consequence no agreement.

Sed ista causa non potest esse vox, quia vox, sicut prius dictum est, non facit congruitatem de sua natura. Nam si vox de sua natura faceret congruitatem, tunc ista oratio homo est animal ante impositionem istarum partium istius orationis fuisset congrua, sicut est nunc, quod patet esse falsum, quia ante impositionem nec fuit nomen nec verbum et per consequens nulla congruitas.

§22.4

Neither can we say that agreement is caused by signified things, since, if this were so, it would follow that when there is neither proportion nor accord[xl] between signified things, then there would not be agreement in a statement about such signified things, or in the parts of such a statement. But this is false, and therefore so is that from which it follows. The falsity of the consequent is evident, since all of these statements are agreeing: 'The sacred Devil is a substance', 'The most vile God is the Devil', 'A human is a rational donkey'. And yet in the signified things there is disproportion and

Nec possumus dicere, quod congruitas causatur a rebus significatis, quia, si sic, sequitur, quod, quando non esset proportio nec convenientia inter res significatas, tunc in oratione rerum talium significatarum sive in partibus talis orationis non esset congruitas. Sed hoc est falsum, ergo illud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis ↓[298] apparet, quia omnes istae orationes sunt congruae: sanctus diabolus est substantia, vilissimus Deus est diabolus, homo est asinus rationalis. Et tamen in rebus significatis

[298] LK, p. 19.

not accord.

est ↑[299] disproportio et non convenientia.[300]

The Thirteenth Argument, or the Twelfth Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§23.1

Again: If there were not a mode of signifying accrued to an utterance through imposition, nothing could be given by which a noun would be a noun and by which a noun would differ from a verb.

Item: Si non esset modus significandi acquisitus voci per impositionem, non posset dari aliquid, per quod nomen esset nomen et per quod nomen differret a verbo.

§23.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is that from which it follows. The consequence is proved, since:

Consequens est falsum, ergo illud ex quo sequitur. Consequentia probatur, quia:

The First Proof of the Thirteenth Argument

§24

An utterance from its nature is neither a noun nor a pronoun, nor is it a verb, since, if an utterance from its nature were a noun or a pronoun or a verb, it would have been a noun, pronoun, or verb before imposition. Nor also is an utterance a noun or pronoun by a signified thing, since that thing would have been even before imposition.

Vox ex sua natura nec est nomen nec pronomen, nec est verbum, quia, si vox ex sua natura esset nomen vel pronomen vel verbum, ante impositionem fuisset nomen, pronomen vel verbum. Nec etiam vox est nomen vel pronomen per rem significatam, quia ista res fuit etiam ante impositionem.

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299 λ, f. a3ra.

300 non$_2$] *om*. LK, λ.
illud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis λ] illud, ex quo sequitur falsitas consequentis LK. (Cf. *DMS* §§23.2, 36.3.)
ergo] igitur λ.
apparet] Apparet LK; declarat λ.

The Fourteenth Argument, or the Second Proof of the Thirteenth Argument

§25

Again:[xli] Exactly the same thing is signified by this noun 'Sortes' and by this pronoun 'that', indicating Sortes. Therefore, the signified thing does not bring about the difference between a noun and pronoun. Therefore, it remains that only a mode of signifying brings about the difference between a noun or a pronoun.

Item: Eadem res praecise significatur per hoc nomen Sortes et per hoc pronomen ille demonstrando Sortem, ergo res significata non facit differentiam nominis et ↓[301] pronominis. Relinquitur ergo, quod solus modus significandi facit differentiam nominis vel pronominis.

The Fifteenth Argument, or the Third Proof of the Thirteenth Argument

§26

Again: There are many nouns that signify absolutely no thing. Therefore, if such nouns should differ, it must be that it is brought about by their modes of signifying. And nouns of this kind are 'nothing', 'chimera', and so on. Therefore, if such nouns should be of different parts of speech, it must be that it is by their modes of signifying.

Item: Multa sunt nomina, quae simpliciter nullam rem significant. Si igitur talia nomina debeant differre, oportet, quod fiat per eorum modos significandi. Et huiusmodi nomina sunt nihil, chimaera et cetera. Si igitur talia nomina debeant esse diversae partes orationis, oportet, quod sit per eorum modos significandi.

The Sixteenth Argument

§27.1

Again:[xlii] There is a mode of understanding. Therefore, there is a mode of signifying.

Item: Est dare modum intelligendi, ergo est dare modum significandi.

§27.2

The consequence is known on its own, since a mode of signifying is gotten from a mode of understanding. The antecedent is clear, since each and every thing, in

Consequentia est nota de se, quia a modo intelligendi accipitur modus significandi. Antecedens patet, quia ↓[302] unaquaeque res in agendo vel patiendo habet suum

[301] LK, p. 20.
[302] LK, p. 21.

acting or being acted upon, has its mode. But to understand is to act or to be acted upon. Therefore, there will be some mode of that understanding.

modum. Sed intelligere est agere vel pati. Ergo illius intelligere erit aliquis modus.

§27.3

Also: the effect is posited by the posited cause.

Etiam posita causa ponitur effectus.

The Seventeenth Argument

§28

Again: To signify, which is the act of the utterance, is to act. And since, as was already said,[xliii] in every acting there is a mode of acting, by which mode one acting is distinguished from another, it therefore necessarily follows that in a signifiying utterance there will be some mode of signifying by which one signifying is distinguished from another.[xliv]

Item: Significare, quod est actus ipsius vocis, est agere. Et cum in omni agere sit modus agendi, sicut iam dictum est, per quem modum unum agere distinguitur ab alio, ergo sequitur necessario, quod in voce significante erit aliquis modus significandi, per quem unum significare distinguitur ab alio.

The Eighteenth Argument

§29.1

Again: If there were not a mode of signifying, then the logician would consider the parts of speech just as the grammarian does.

Item: Si non est dare modum significandi, tunc eodem modo consideraret logicus partes orationis, sicut grammaticus.

§29.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is the antecedent. The falsity of the consequent is clear on its own, since logic and grammar are distinct sciences. The consequence is clear, since it seems those two sciences, since they both consider the significative utterance, differ by nothing other than that grammar considers the significative utterance under its

Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet de se, quia sunt distinctae scientiae logica et grammatica. Consequentia patet, quia per nihil aliud videntur illae duae scientiae differre, cum utraque consideret vocem significativam, nisi quod grammatica

disposition to the mode of signifying, but logic only to truth and falsity.

considerat ↓[303] vocem significativam sub habitudine ad modum significandi, sed logica non nisi ad veritatem et falsitatem.

The Nineteenth Argument

§30.1

Again: If there were not modes of signifying, it would follow that grammar would be a science of reality, since it would consider those signified things and their consignified properties by producing government[xlv] and construal by means of those things and properties.

Item: Si non essent modi significandi, sequeretur, quod grammatica esset scientia realis, quia consideraret ipsas res significatas et proprietates suas consignificatas faciendo per istas res et proprietates regimen et constructionem.

§30.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is the antecedent. The falsity of the consequent is clear, since, according to everyone, grammar is a science of language. The consequence is proved, since there cannot be anything by means of which construal or agreement could be produced other than a signified thing or consignified property or mode of signifying. Therefore, if there were no mode of signifying, it necessarily remains that such construals would be produced by means of signified things and their consignified properties.

Consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet, quia secundum omnes grammatica est scientia sermocinalis. Consequentia probatur, quia non potest dari aliquid, per quod fit constructio vel congruitas, nisi res significata vel proprietas consignificata vel modus significandi. Ergo si modus significandi non sit, relinquitur, quod tales constructiones necessario fiant per res significatas et earum proprietates consignificatas.

§31

But those are the reasons, by which, and because of which, many people of little wisdom, because they are just as totally ignorant in logic as in philosophy, uselessly, needlessly, and to the excessive impediment of many, multiply infinite things, which they call 'modes of

Istae autem sunt rationes, per quas et propter quas multi minus sapientes et tam logicam quam philosophiam ex toto ↑[304] ignorantes infinitas res, quas modos significandi appellant, sine aliqua necessitate ad nimium impedimentum multorum inutiliter multiplicant, aliter

[303] LK, p. 22.
[304] λ, f. a3rb.

signifying', not knowing how otherwise to undo so many childish reasons.

nescientes solvere rationes quamplurimas pueriles.

THE SECOND CHAPTER

THE CONTRARY VIEW

§32

Now remains the second main item promised at the beginning of the treatise – namely, to disprove, in order, the fundamentals of the views described above.[xlvi]

↓[305] Restat nunc secundum principale in principio tractatus promissum, scilicet fundamenta istarum opinionum superius recitata per ordinem reprobare.

Against the First Way of Positing Modes

§33

And first is the division that they posit as a root notion in the beginning,[xlvii] concerning the active and passive mode of signifying. And I prove that those active and passive modes of signifying should not be posited.[xlviii]

Et primo istam divisionem, quam ipsi in principio pro radice ponunt de modo significandi activo et passivo. Et probo, quod isti modi significandi activi et passivi non sunt ponendi.

The First Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The First Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§34.1

And first I argue like so: Nothing without which there can be the most proper construal and most correct agreement should be posited for the sake of agreement or construal. But without such active and passive modes of signifying there can be the most proper construal and most correct agreement. Therefore, such active and passive modes of signifying should not be posited for the

Et arguo primo sic: Nulla, sine quibus propriissima constructio et verissima congruitas possunt esse propter ↓[306] congruitatem vel constructionem, sunt ponenda. Sed sine talibus modis significandi activis et passivis possunt propriissima constructio et verissima congruitas esse. Ergo tales modi significandi activi et passivi propter

305 LK, p. 23.
306 LK, p. 24.

sake of construal or agreement.

constructionem vel congruitatem non sunt ponendi.

§34.2

The major is known, and the minor is explained.[xlix] And I take this statement 'God is God'. It is clear, according to all grammarians, that there is the most proper construal and most correct agreement in that statement. And there are no active and passive modes of signifying in it. Therefore, the aforementioned minor is true.

Maior est nota, et minor declaratur. Et capio hanc orationem Deus est Deus. Clarum est secundum omnes grammaticos, quod in ista oratione est propriissima constructio et verissima congruitas. Et in ista non sunt modi significandi activi et passivi. Ergo minor praeaccepta est vera.

§34.3

But that there are no such modes of signifying here is proved like so: There is no passive mode of signifying here. Therefore, there is no active mode of signifying here.

Quod autem hic non sunt tales modi significandi, probatur sic: Hic non est modus significandi passivus; igitur non est hic modus significandi activus.[307]

§34.4

The consequence is clear for two reasons. One is that when a genuine thing is denoted or signified, there is no greater reason why a passive mode of signifying, rather than an active mode of signifying, could be absent from the most correct construal, and this is especially so when a genuine thing is signified. The other is that when a remote and root cause, by which an effect is necessarily gotten, is removed, that effect is also removed. But, according to them, an active mode of signifying is thus gotten from a property of the thing, which property is a passive mode of signifying.

Consequentia est plana duplici de causa. Tum, quia, quando res vera denotatur vel significatur, non est maior ratio, quare a verissima constructione modus significandi passivus potest abesse, quam modus significandi activus, et hoc praecipue, quando vera res significatur. Tum, quia remota causa et radice, a qua necessario effectus accipitur, removetur et iste effectus. Sed modo ita est, quod modus significandi activus accipitur a proprietate ipsius rei secundum eos, quae proprietas est modus significandi passivus.

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307 est$_2$] vel erit *add*. LK, *om*. λ.
hic$_2$] *om*. λ.

§34.5

The antecedent is explained, since in the aforesaid statement nothing is signified other than that thing that is God. And there is not any property in God distinct from that very God, as all – philosophers just as much as theologians – think. Therefore, in the aforesaid statement there is not any property of a thing distinct from the signified thing. And by consequence there is not any passive mode of signifying there.

Antecedens declaratur, quia in praedicta oratione nihil significatur nisi illa res, quae est Deus. Et in Deo non est aliqua proprietas distincta ab ipso Deo, secundum quod ↓[308] omnes, tam philosophi quam theologi, sentiunt. Ergo in praedicta oratione non est aliqua proprietas rei distincta a re silgnificata. Et per consequens non est ibi aliquis modus significandi passivus.

§34.6

And if it replied to this that those who posit such modes of signifying understand them to be in natural things and not in supernatural things or in God, that reply is exceedingly childish.

Et si dicatur ad istud, quod ponentes tales modos significandi intelligunt eos esse in rebus naturalibus et non in rebus supernaturalibus vel in Deo, istud est nimis puerile responsum.[309]

§34.7

First, since there is no greater reason why such modes of signifying should be posited in natural things, rather than in supernatural things, for producing correct construal and agreement.

Primo, quia non est maior ratio, quare ponendi sunt tales modi significandi in rebus naturalibus ad veram constructionem et ad congruitatem faciendam, quam in rebus supernaturalibus.

§34.8

Again: I do not speak of supernatural things unless very much incidentally and secondarily, since principally I speak of this construal or statement 'God is God', which is a natural thing in which is posited a genuine noun, and a genuine verb, and a genuine supposit, and a genuine apposit, and a genuine part of

Item: Non loquor de rebus supernaturalibus nisi valde per accidens et secundario, quia principaliter loquar de ista constructione vel oratione Deus est Deus, quae est res naturalis, in qua ponitur verum nomen et verum verbum et verum suppositum et verum appositum et vera pars orationis. ↑[310] Si igitur hic non sunt

[308] LK, p. 25.
[309] puerile] pueriliter LK, λ. (Cf. LK: puerliter] puerile *Me.*)
[310] λ, f. a3va.

speech. Therefore, if those modes of signifying are not here, at least I hold this conclusion to be obviously proved: that there can be the most correct construal and most correct agreement without such modes of signifying.

illi modi significandi, ad minus habeo istam conclusionem probatam manifeste, quod verissima constructio et verissima congruitas possunt esse sine talibus modis significandi.

§34.9

And if it is replied that the signified thing itself is a passive mode of signifying, by the same account the signifying utterance itself will be an active mode of signifying. And by consequence such things or modes of signifying distinct from a signifying sign and from a signified thing should not be posited.

Et si dicatur, quod ipsa res significata est modus significandi passivus, eadem ratione ipsa vox significans erit modus significandi activus. Et per consequens tales res vel ↓[311] modi significandi distincti a signo significante et a re significata non sunt ponendi.

§34.10

Again:[l] I argue in the case of those natural things. And I take that property of a thing, which is a passive mode of signifying, so that if this noun 'Sortes' were to signify Sortes, then, according to them, there would be such a property in Sortes by which Sortes is signified. And they call that property a 'passive mode of signifying'. Therefore, let the property be called '*A*'. Then I ask whether the property *A* is signified by means of[li] another property distinct from *A* or by means of its very self, so that no other property is required in order for the property to be signified. The first cannot be granted, since then there would be a procession into infinity. If the second is granted, then by the same account Sortes can be signified without such a property, since, as one sees, there is no greater reason why that property can be signified without that property.[lii] From which:

Item: Arguo in istis rebus naturalibus. Et capio istam proprietatem rei, quae est modus significandi passivus, ut si hoc nomen Sortes significet Sortem. Tunc secundum eos in Sorte est talis proprietas, qua Sortes significatur. Et istam proprietatem vocant modum significandi passivum. Vocetur ergo illa proprietas *a*. Tunc quaero, utrum illa proprietas *a* significetur per aliam proprietatem ab *a* distinctam vel per se ipsam ita, quod nulla alia proprietas requiritur ad hoc, quod ipsa significetur. Non potest dari primum, quia sic esset processus in infinitum. Si detur secundum, ergo eadem ratione Sortes potest significari sine tali proprietate, quia non est maior ratio, ut videtur, quare ista proprietas possit significari sine ista proprietate. Ex quo Sortes non magis dependet aliquo modo dependentiae ab ista proprietate, quam ista proprietas dependet ab alia.[312]

311 LK, p. 26.
312 per$_1$] *a* vel per *add*. LK, *om*. λ.

Sortes no more depends, in some way of depending, on that property than that property depends on another.[liii]

§34.11

Therefore, as one sees, it is not necessary to posit the having of such a passive mode of signifying for the genuine signification of a thing.

Ergo, ut videtur, non est necesse ponere ad veram significationem rei habendam talem modum significandi passivum.

The Second Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Second Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§35.1

Again:[liv] I take again that property by which Sortes is passively signified and I ask whether it is a substance or an accident. Not a substance, since it is neither matter nor form nor a composite, as is clear on its own. Nor can it be said that it is an accident, since then it would be a divisible or an indivisible accident.

↓[313] Item: Capio adhuc istam proprietatem, qua Sortes significatur passive, et quaero, utrum sit substantia vel accidens. Non substantia, quia nec materia nec forma nec compositum, sicut de se patet. Nec potest dici, quod sit accidens, quia tunc esset accidens divisibile vel indivisibile.

§35.2

Not indivisible, since then it would not have any first subject. From which: there is not anything in Sortes that can be its first subject, since there is nothing indivisible there.

Non indivisibile, quia sic non haberet aliquod subiectum primum. Ex quo in Sorte non est aliquid, quod potest esse suum subiectum primum, quia ibi nullum est indivisibile.

§35.3

And if it is replied that in Sortes himself there is an indivisible intellective soul, in which there can be such an indivisible accident, then take a tree or stone and argue concerning it just as it was already argued concerning Sortes.

Et si dicatur, quod in ipso Sorte sit anima intellectiva indivisibilis, in qua tale accidens indivisibile potest esse, tunc capiatur lignum vel lapis et arguatur de isto, sicut iam argutum est de Sorte.

[313] LK, p. 27.

§35.4

And if it is replied that it is not unsuitable that an indivisible accident would be in a divisible subject or not have some first subject, this is contrary to Aristotle in the fourth book of the *Physics* and to the Commentator,[lv] where they reduce accidents to their first subjects, just as paleness is in a human because it is in a body, and in a body because it is in the surface as in a first subject. In that same place they also say that knowledge is in a human, since it is in the soul as in its first subject. Therefore, the view of Aristotle and the Commentator is distinctly that some first subject corresponds to every accident.[lvi]

Et si dicatur, quod non est inconveniens accidens indivisibile esse in subiecto divisibili vel non habere aliquod subiectum primum, hoc est contra Aristotelem quarto *Physicorum* et Commentatorem, ubi ipsi reducunt accidentia ad eorum subiecta prima, sicut albedo est in homine, quia est in corpore, et in corpore, quia est in superficie tamquam in subiecto primo. Ibidem etiam dicunt scientiam esse in homine eo, quod est in anima tamquam in subiecto suo primo. ↓[314] Ergo opinio Aristotelis et Commentatoris est expresse, quod omni accidenti correspondet aliquod subiectum primum.

§35.5

Again: If such an accident were indivisible, there would be no greater reason why it would be in one part of a single subject any more than in another. Therefore, it is in any part of a subject or in none.

Item: Si tale accidens esset indivisibile, non esset maior ratio, quare esset in una parte unius subiecti magis quam in alia. Igitur est in qualibet parte subiecti vel in nulla.

§35.6

But if it is a divisible accident, then either it is composed from parts of the same type or from parts of different types.[lvii]

Si autem sit accidens divisibile, vel igitur componitur ex partibus eiusdem rationis vel ex partibus diversarum rationum.

§35.7

Not from parts of different types, since by no greater reason would one of those parts be matter or form rather than the other. Similarly, no accident is composed from matter and form, according to the Philosopher[lviii] in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*.

Non ex partibus diversarum rationum, quia una istarum partium non maiori ratione est materia vel forma quam alia. Similiter nullum accidens componitur ex materia et forma, secundum Philosophum septimo *Metaphysicae.*

[314] LK, p. 28.

§35.8

But if it were composed from parts of the same type, then any part is of the same species as the whole. And by consequence the name of the whole would be univocally predicated of any part. And if this were so, it would follow that any part of such a passive mode of signifying would be a passive mode of signifying. And since such an accident is not composed from divisible, nor even finite, parts – since there is no greater reason for it to be composed from three or four parts rather than from five or six or seven, and so on into infinity – therefore it obviously follows that there will be infinite passive modes of signifying in the domain of things.[lix]

Si autem ↑[315] componatur ex partibus eiusdem rationis, igitur quaelibet pars est eiusdem speciei cum suo toto. Et per consequens nomen totius univoce praedicatur de qualibet parte. Et si sic, sequitur, quod quaelibet pars talis modi significandi passivi sit modus significandi passivus. ↓[316] Et cum tale accidens non componatur ex divisibilibus et saltem ex finitis partibus, quia non maiori ratione ex tribus vel quattuor partibus quam ex quinque vel sex vel septem, et sic in infinitum, ergo manifeste sequitur, quod ex parte rei erunt infiniti modi significandi passivi.

§35.9

Again: From this it follows, as one sees, that any part of a human is a human. For in any thing there is such a passive mode of signifying that is consignified by the expression 'human'. Such a thing is human, since it is genuinely signified by the expression 'human'. But in any part of a human, as held above, there is such a passive mode of signifying. Therefore, any part of a human is a human.[lx]

Item: Ex hoc sequitur, ut videtur, quod quaelibet pars hominis est homo. Nam in quacumque re est talis modus significandi passivus, qui consignificatur per istam dictionem homo. Talis res est homo, quia vere significatur per istam dictionem homo. Sed in qualibet parte hominis, sicut superius est habitum, est talis modus significandi passivus, ergo quaelibet pars hominis est homo.

§35.10

The major of that reasoning, as one sees, is known on its own, since the expression 'human' is imposed to signify each thing having such a property. For, according to them, the whole reason why the expression 'human' signifies a newly born

Maior istius rationis videtur nota de se, quia omni rei habenti talem proprietatem imponitur illa dictio homo ad significandum, nam ista est tota illa dictio homo significat puerum de novo natum sine nova impositione, secundum eos,

315 λ, f. a3vb.
316 LK, p. 29.

child without a new imposition, is because the passive property by which the term 'human' is imposed to signify is in such a child, since, according to them, if it were not in such a child, there would not seem to be a greater reason why, without a new imposition, the term 'human' would signify such a newly born child rather than a newly born calf.

quia ista proprietas passiva, a qua imponitur iste terminus homo ad significandum, est in tali puero, quia, si non esset in tali puero, secundum eos non videtur maior ratio, quare iste terminus homo significaret sine nova impositione talem puerum de novo natum quam unum vitulum de novo natum.[317]

The Third Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Third Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§36.1

Again: if such a property of a thing were necessarily in every signification of an expression signifying some thing,[lxi] then I ask whether in any thing such properties are finite or infinite.

↓[318] Item: Si talis proprietas rei sit necessario in omni significatione dictionis significantis aliquam rem, tunc quaero, utrum in qualibet re sint tales proprietates finitae vel infinitae.[319]

§36.2

Not infinite, as is made clear by Aristotle in the third book of the *Physics*, where he holds that in no thing are there infinite, entirely distinct things, of which none is a part of another or no two are parts of some third.

Non infinitae, sicut patet per Aristotelem tertio *Physicorum,* ubi vult, quod in nulla re sint infinitae res omnino distinctae, quarum nulla est pars alterius, vel ambae partes alicuius tertii.[320]

§36.3

But if such properties were finite, then there would be as many expressions imposed to signify the thing as there are properties. Then there could not be a further expression to be imposed to newly signify the thing, since there would not be some remaining property by means of

Si autem sint finitae tales proprietates, ergo imponantur tot dictiones ad significandum illam rem, quot sunt proprietates. Tunc non posset ulterius dictio imponi ad significandum illam rem de novo, quia non esset aliqua proprietas relicta, mediante qua talis res posset

317 nova$_1$ λ] omni LK.
318 LK, p. 30.
319 finitae vel infinitae] infinitae vel non infinitae LK; infinitae vel non λ. (Cf. LK: infinitae vel non infinitae] finitae vel infinitae *Mü*.)
320 vel λ] nec LK. (Cf. LK: nec] vel *Me*, λ, π.)

which such a thing would be able to be newly signified. But this consequent is false, and therefore so is that from which it follows. The falsity of the consequent is made clear by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he holds that the noun and the verb are utterances significative by convention.[lxii]

significari de novo. Sed hoc consequens est falsum, igitur illud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis patet per Aristotelem primo *Perihermenias,* ubi vult, quod nomen et verbum sint voces significativae ad placitum.[321]

§36.4

Again:[lxiii] We experience in ourselves that we can impose as much terminology as we please to signify one and the same thing, as is clear on its own.

↓[322] Item: Experimur in nobismet ipsis, quod possumus imponere tot vocabula, quot nobis placet ad significandum unam et eandem rem, sicut de se patet.

§36.5

Again:[lxiv] There are not so many synonymous names that even more could not be imposed to signify one and the same thing, as is clear on its own.

Item: Non sunt tot nomina synonyma, quin adhuc plura possunt imponi ad significandum unam et eandem rem, sicut patet de se.

The Fourth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Fourth Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§37

Again:[lxv] God is signified by various names, such as 'God', 'deity', 'creator', 'omnipotent', 'light', 'protector', 'fashioner', 'word-begotten', and so on for many others. And yet God does not have any property in the domain of things distinct from God by means of which God might be signified.

Item: Deus significatur per diversa nomina, sicut sunt Deus, deitas, creator, omnipotens, lumen, protector, plasmator, verbigena, et sic de multis aliis. Et tamen non habet aliquam proprietatem ex parte rei distinctam a se mediante qua significetur.[323]

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321 illud ex quo sequitur. Falsitas consequentis λ] illud, ex quo sequitur falsitas consequentis LK. (Cf. *DMS* §23.2, §22.4.)
consequentis] ut *add*. λ.
patet] Patet LK.

322 LK, p. 31.

323 habet] habent LK, λ. (Cf. LK: habent] habet *Mü*.)
se] sive ab eo *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: sive ab eo] *add.* λ, π.)

The Fifth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Fifth Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§38

Again: Obviously we see and experience that our shared fathers and mothers[lxvi] impose various names to signify merely by convention and not by some property of a thing.

Item: Videmus et experimur manifeste, quod isti conpatres et illae conmatres mere ad placitum et non aliqua proprietate rei imponunt diversa nomina ad significandum.

§39

With those things being maintained concerning the passive mode of signifying, it remains now to discuss or examine the active mode of signifying, which is posited by them to be subjectively in a signifying utterance as an accident in a subject. Against which it is argued like so:

Istis habitis de modo significandi passivo restat nunc dicere vel videre de modo significandi activo, qui ab istis ponitur esse subiective in voce significante sicut accidens in subiecto. Contra quod arguitur sic:

The Sixth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The First Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§40.1

If the active mode of signifying is in a signifying utterance as in a subject and was not always in an utterance as in a subject, then at some time it began to be in an utterance as in a subject. Then I ask: What caused such a mode of signifying to be in the utterance, whether this was the signified thing or the utterance or the intellect? For, as one sees, nothing else can be imagined to cause that mode of signifying to be in an utterance, as is clear on its own.

↓[324] Si iste modus significandi activus sit in voce ↑[325] significante tamquam in subiecto et non semper fuit in voce tamquam in subiecto, ergo aliquando incepit in voce esse tamquam in subiecto. Tunc ego quaero, quid causavit talem modum significandi in voce, utrum hoc fuit res significata vel ipsa vox vel ipse intellectus. Nam nihil aliud videtur posse imaginari causare istum modum significandi in voce, sicut de se patet.

[324] LK, p. 32.
[325] λ, f. a4ra.

§40.2

But it is clear that the signified thing does not cause the mode of signifying to be in an utterance, since a signified stone does not make it so that this utterance 'stone' signifies that stone nominally or verbally or in any other mode.

Sed clarum est, quod ipsa res significata non causat istum modum significandi in voce, quia lapis significatus non facit, quod haec vox lapis ipsum lapidem significet nominaliter vel verbaliter vel qualicumque alio modo.

§40.3

Neither also does the utterance cause the mode of signifying in its very self, since the utterance its very self does not make its very self signify, since, if this were so, then it would signify naturally and not by convention.

Nec etiam ipsa vox causat istum modum significandi in se ipsa, quia ipsamet vox non facit se ipsam significare, quia, si sic, tunc significaret naturaliter et non ad placitum.

§40.4

Again: From this it follows that the same thing would be an agent and a patient with respect to the same thing, which is quite distinctly contrary to Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Physics*. Therefore, it remains that such a mode of signifying is caused by the intellect, which they concede.

Item: Ex hoc sequitur, quod idem esset agens et patiens respectu eiusdem, quod satis expresse est contra Aristotelem septimo *Physicorum.* Relinquitur ergo, quod talis modus significandi causatur ab intellectu, quod ipsi concedunt.

§40.5

But this cannot be, according to Aristotle in the third book of *On the Soul*, where he says that an operation of the intellect is an immanent operation and in no way crosses over to cause something in an external thing.[lxvii]

↓[326] Sed hoc non potest esse, secundum Aristotelem tertio *De anima,* ubi dicit, quod operatio intellectus est operatio immanens et nullo modo transiens ad causandum aliquid in re extra.

§40.6

Again: If such a mode of signifying were caused by the intellect, this would be by an imposition to signify, so that, namely,

Item: Si talis modus significandi causaretur per intellectum, hoc esset per impositionem ad significandum, ita

[326] LK, p. 33.

if the intellect, when it imposes an utterance to signify an external thing, were then to cause such a mode of signifying to be in an utterance, then, and by consequence, when the intellect does not impose an utterance to signify, it would not then cause such a mode of signifying to be in the utterance. But the intellect never imposed the utterance numerically the same as 'human' to signify, as is clear on its own, although it did impose some utterance similar to it to signify.[lxviii]

scilicet, quod, si intellectus tunc talem modum significandi causaret in voce, quando imponeret vocem ad significandum rem extra, et per consequens, quando intellectus non imponeret vocem ad significandum, tunc non causaret talem modum significandi in voce. Sed istam eandem vocem in numero homo numquam imposuit intellectus ad significandum, sicut de se patet, quamvis imposuit aliquam vocem sibi similem ad significandum.[327]

§40.7

Nor can it be said that by virtue of the first imposition such a mode of signifying is in such an utterance, since any thing newly existing is newly caused. And every thing that exists now in nature[lxix] for the first time is caused now for the first time. But this utterance 'human' exists now in nature for the first time, and therefore this utterance 'human' is caused now for the first time.[lxx] And by consequence any accident existing subjectively in that utterance is caused now for the first time. And it is clear that such a mode of signifying is not caused now by the intellect, since the intellect, as I submit, now imposes nothing to signify.

Nec potest dici, quod virtute primae impositionis talis modus significandi est in tali voce, quia quaelibet res noviter existens est noviter causata. Et omnis res, quae nunc primo existit in rerum natura, nunc primo est causata. Sed haec vox homo nunc primo existit in rerum natura, ergo haec vox homo nunc primo est causata. Et per consequens quodlibet accidens existens in ista voce subiective, nunc primo est causatum. Et clarum est, quod talis modus ↓[328] significandi nunc non causatur ab intellectu, quia nunc intellectus, ut suppono, nihil imponit ad significandum.

The Seventh Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Second Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§41

Again: If such an active mode of signifying were subjectively in an utterance, it would follow that an accident would be a subject of an accident, which

Item: Si talis modus significandi activus esset in voce subiective, sequitur, quod accidens esset subiectum accidentis, quod est contra Philosophum primo

327 quamvis] quia non LK, λ. (Cf. LK: quia non] quamvis *Mü*, *Me*.)
328 LK, p. 34.

is against the Philosopher[lxxi] in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he says that an accident is not of an accident. About this text, it seems the Commentator of Lincoln[lxxii] holds that no accident is in an accident as in a subject. And Thomas Aquinas, expositing that text, distinctly says that no accident is in an accident as in a subject, but every accident is in a substance. Hence it is thus called 'substance', since it stands under accidents.[lxxiii] Therefore, if some accident were the subject of an accident, by the same account such an accident could be called a 'substance', since it stands under an accident.[lxxiv]

Posteriorum, ubi dicit, quod accidentis non est accidens, super quem textum videtur Commentator Lincolniensis velle, quod nullum accidens est in accidente tamquam in subiecto. Et Thomas de Aquino exponens illum textum expresse dicit, quod nullum accidens est in accidente tamquam in subiecto, sed omne accidens est in substantia. Unde ideo dicitur substantia, quia substat accidentibus. Ergo, si aliquod accidens esset subiectum accidentis, per eandem rationem tale accidens posset dici substantia, quia accidenti substat.

The Eighth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Third Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§42

Again: If the active mode of signifying were in an utterance as an accident in a subject, then it would be in – mediately or immediately – that in which the utterance is in as in a subject. And since the utterance is subjectively in the air, it follows that the active mode of signifying, at least mediately, will be subjectively in the air, and so at some time it will be blown with the wind and vanish.

↓[329] Item: Si ille modus significandi activus sit in voce tamquam accidens in subiecto, igitur mediate vel immediate est in illo, in quo illa vox est tamquam in subiecto. Et cum illa vox sit in aere subiective, sequitur, quod modus significandi activus saltem mediate erit subiective in aere, et sic aliquando cum vento aflabitur et evanescet.

The Ninth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Fourth Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§43.1

Again:[lxxv] Because such an active mode of signifying is an accident, it must be that it is either a divisible or an indivisible accident.

Item: Talis modus significandi activus, cum sit accidens, oportet, quod sit vel accidens divisibile vel indivisibile.

[329] LK, p. 35.

§43.2

Not an indivisible accident, since then it would have no first subject, since in an utterance or in the air there is nothing indivisible that could correspond to such an accident as a first subject.

Non accidens ↑[330] indivisibile, quia sic nullum haberet subiectum primum, cum in voce vel in aere nihil sit indivisibile, quod posset correspondere tali accidenti tamquam subiectum primum.

§43.3

Neither also is it a divisible accident, as one sees, since, if this were so, the whole such mode of signifying would have to be in the whole utterance, and part of the mode of signifying in part of the utterance. And thus some part of the mode of signifying would be subjectively in a syllable. And since the mode of signifying is not composed from parts of different types – as can be proved by the argument[lxxvi] made above concerning the passive mode of signifying[lxxvii] – it follows that the part of the mode of signifying that is subjectively in the syllable will be of the same type as the whole of which it is a part. And by consequence a proper passion[lxxviii] of the whole applies to such a part, just as being wet applies to any part of water. And since making an utterance signify nominally or verbally, and so on for the other parts of speech, would be a proper passion, or a proper accident, of the whole, it necessarily follows that the part of the mode of signifying that is subjectively in a syllable would make the syllable signify nominally or verbally, or signify in such a mode as the whole utterance of which the syllable is a part. From which it follows that the syllable 'Sor' is thus a noun and thus signifies

Nec etiam est accidens divisibile, ut videtur, quia, si sic, oporteret, quod totus talis modus significandi esset in tota voce et pars illius modi significandi in parte illius vocis. Et sic aliqua pars illius modi significandi esset subiective in syllaba. Et cum iste modus significandi non componatur ex partibus diversarum rationum, sicut potest probari per argumentum superius factum de modo significandi passivo, sequitur, quod illa pars illius modi significandi, quae est in syllaba subiective, erit eiusdem rationis cum suo toto, cuius est pars. Et per consequens tali parti competit propria passio totius, sicut cuilibet parti aquae competit humidum esse. Et cum propria passio totius sive proprium accidens sit facere ↓[331] vocem significare nominaliter vel verbaliter, et sic de aliis partibus orationis, sequitur necessario, quod illa pars modi significandi, quae est in syllaba subiective, faciet syllabam significare nominaliter vel verbaliter vel tali modo, quali significat tota vox illa, cuius illa syllaba est pars. Ex quo sequitur, quod ista syllaba Sor ita est nomen et ita significat nominaliter, sicut haec vox Sortes, cuius illa syllaba Sor est pars, quod videtur esse falsum.

330 λ, f. a4rb.
331 LK, p. 36.

nominally just as this utterance 'Sortes' of which the syllable 'Sor' is a part, which, as one sees, is false.

The Tenth Argument against the First Way of Positing Modes, and The Fifth Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§44.1

Again: If such an active mode of signifying were in an utterance as an accident in a subject after imposition, and not before, it follows that something would be changed without a change.

Item: Si talis modus significandi activus esset in voce tamquam accidens in subiecto post impositionem et non ante, sequitur, quod aliquid mutaretur sine mutatione.

§44.2

The consequent is impossible, since it includes a contradiction, and therefore the antecedent is also impossible. The consequence is explained, for if such an accident were in an utterance after the imposition of that utterance, and not before, then after imposition the utterance would be related otherwise than it was related before imposition, and then furthermore the utterance would be changed. The consequence is clear from the signification of the terminology, since to be changed is nothing other than for something to now be related otherwise than it was before.

Consequens est impossibile, quia includit contradictionem; ergo et antecedens est impossibile. Consequentia declaratur, nam si tale accidens sit in voce post impositionem ipsius vocis et non ante, ergo vox post impositionem aliter se habet, quam se habuit ante impositionem; et ultra ergo vox mutatur. Consequentia patet ex significatione vocabuli, quia nihil aliud est aliquam rem mutari quam ipsam aliter se habere nunc quam prius.

§44.3

Therefore, if the utterance is changed, I ask: By what species of change or motion is it changed?

Si igitur vox mutatur, quaero, qua specie mutationis vel motus mutatur.

§44.4

Neither generation nor corruption, since I submit that such an utterance is neither

↓[332] Non generatione nec corruptione, quia suppono, quod talis vox non

[332] LK, p. 37.

generated nor corrupted, but would, by a potency of a first cause, remain through some time, at the middle instant of which, I presume, the imposition of the utterance would be made.

generatur nec corrumpitur, sed per potentiam primae causae maneat per aliquod tempus, in cuius medio instanti volo, quod impositio vocis fiat.

§44.5

Nor also is it locally moved, as I submit, since it is clear that it is not necessary that it be moved locally in order to signify some signified.

Nec etiam movetur localiter, ut suppono, quia clarum est, quod non est necesse, quod ipsa moveatur localiter ad aliquod significatum significandum.

§44.6

Nor also is it augmented or diminished, as is clear on its own.

Nec etiam augmentatur nec diminuitur, sicut de se patet.

§44.7

Nor also is it altered, since every alteration, according to Aristotle in the fifth book of the *Physics* and the first book of *On Generaton and Corruption*, is between contrary forms, as a human is altered from cold to hot. But an utterance had no form before imposition that it loses through imposition. Nor also does the active mode of signifying have some form contrary to it, unless it is said that the passive mode of signifying is contrary to it. And it is clear that through imposition an utterance is not changed from a passive mode of signifying into an active mode of signifying.

Nec etiam alteratur, quia omnis alteratio secundum Aristotelem quinto *Physicorum* et primo *De generatione* est inter formas contrarias, sicut homo alteratur a frigiditate in caliditatem. Sed vox ante impositionem nullam formam habuit, quam per impositionem amittit. Nec etiam iste modus significandi activus habet aliquam formam sibi contrariam, nisi dicatur, quod modus significandi passivus sibi contrarietur. Et clarum est, quod vox per impositionem non mutatur de modo significandi passivo in modum activum.

§44.8

Again: There is nothing that could alter the utterance other than the intellect. But the intellect does not alter an external thing, as is made clear by what was said

Item: Non potest dari aliquid, quod alteret ipsam vocem, nisi esset intellectus. Sed intellectus non alterat rem extra, sicut patet per superius ↑[333] dicta.[334]

[333] λ, f. a4va.
[334] aliquod$_1$] aliquale LK. (Cf. LK: aliquale] aliquod *Mü*.)

above.[lxxix]

§44.9

And, according to Aristotle in the fifth book of the *Physics*, there are no more species of motion or of change than the aforesaid. From which it clearly follows that if an utterance is changed through imposition, it will be changed without any change.

Et secundum ↓[335] Aristotelem quinto *Physicorum* non sunt plures species motus vel mutationis quam praedictae. Ex quo plane sequitur, quod, si vox per impositionem mutetur, sine aliqua mutatione mutabitur.[336]

Against the Second Way of Positing Modes

§45.1

Their second saying described above[lxxx] is this: that a twofold property – namely, an account of a sign and an account of a consign – is attributed to an utterance by the intellect. By the first, an utterance is made to be formally signifying and an expression. By the second, an utterance is made to be formally a consign, or consignifying, and a part of speech, for by the account of consigning, or consignifying, one part of speech is related to another as by an intrinsic efficient principle.

Secundum dictum superius recitatum ab eis est illud, quod voci per intellectum attribuitur duplex proprietas, scilicet ratio signi et ratio consigni. Per primum efficitur vox formaliter significans et dictio. Per secundum efficitur vox formaliter consignans vel consignificans et pars orationis, nam per rationem consigni vel consignificandi una pars orationis refertur ad aliam tamquam per principium intrinsecum efficiens.

§45.2

Against that, all accounts made before against the active mode of signifying can also be brought.

Contra illud possunt adduci omnes rationes prius factae contra modum significandi activum.

The First Argument against the Second Way of Positing Modes

§46.1

Again: If an account of a sign or consign were to formally constitute the utterance,

Item: Si ratio signi vel consigni constituerent vocem, dictionem vel

335 LK, p. 38.
336 Physicorum] dicentem quod *add.* LK, λ. (Cf. LK: Physicorum] dicentem quod *add*. λ, π.)

expression, or part of speech, then, without those accounts, an utterance could not be an expression or part of speech.

partem orationis formaliter, tunc sine istis rationibus non potest vox esse dictio vel pars orationis.

§46.2

The consequent is false, and therefore so is the antecedent. The consequence is clear on its own, since nothing can be of some kind without that which makes it be formally such, as a human cannot be pale without paleness, since a human is formally pale by paleness. Nor also can a human be a human without an intellective soul, since a human is formally a human by an intellective soul.

↓[337] Consequens est falsum, igitur et antecedens. Consequentia patet de se, quia nihil potest esse aliquale sine illo, quod facit ipsum formaliter esse tale, sicut homo non potest esse albus sine albedine eo, quod homo formaliter est albus per albedinem. Nec etiam homo potest esse homo sine anima intellectiva eo, quod homo formaliter est homo per animam intellectivam.

§46.3

The falsity of the consequent is explained.[lxxxi] And I take the utterance 'antichrist'. That utterance signifies or consignifies absolutely nothing, since it signifies or consignifies no being, as can be proved inductively. Therefore, it is not a sign or a consign, since a sign or a consign, according to them, is so called from an act of signifying or consignifying. Therefore, if nothing were signified and consignified, there would be no sign or consign. Yet this does not prevent the utterance 'antichrist' from being a genuine expression and genuine part of speech, as is clear from the agreeing statements 'The antichrist will be' and 'The antichrist will not be'.

Falsitas consequentis declaratur, et capio istam vocem antichristus. Ista vox simpliciter nihil significat vel consignificat, quia nullum ens significat vel consignificat, sicut potest probari inductive. Ergo non est signum vel consignum, quia signum vel consignum secundum eos dicitur ab actu significandi vel consignificandi. Si ergo nihil significaret et consignificaret, nullum esset signum vel consignum. Hoc tamen non obstante ista vox antichristus est vera dictio et vera pars orationis, sicut patet in istis orationibus congruis antichristus erit, antichristus non erit.

§46.4

Again: It can be argued concerning the utterances 'chimera', 'nothing', 'blindness', and the like, which signify

Item potest argui de istis vocibus chimaera, nihil, caecitas et similia, quae simpliciter nihil significant et tamen sunt

[337] LK, p. 39.

absolutely nothing and yet are proper expressions and parts of agreeing statements, as is clear from the agreeing statements 'A chimera is not', 'Blindness is not a being', and so on for others.

propriae dictiones et partes orationum congruarum, sicut patet in istis orationibus congruis chimaera non est, caecitas non est ens, et sic de ↓[338] aliis.[339]

§46.5

And if it is replied that those utterances signify a being of reason,[lxxxii] I take that being of reason and I ask whether it is a substance or an accident. Not a substance, as they concede, nor also an accident, since then I ask: What is it in subjectively? It cannot be said that it is subjectively in anything other than in the intellect. And if this were so, then it is a nobler accident or a nobler being[lxxxiii] than a paleness or a darkness, since the nobility of an accident is gotten from the nobility of the subject and cause of the accident, since a nobler cause causes a nobler effect. Therefore, since the intellect – which causes the being of reason and which the being of reason is subjectively in – is nobler than any body in which there is a paleness or a darkness, it necessarily follows that the being of reason is a nobler being than a paleness or a darkness. And by consequence the significate of a chimera is a more perfect being and a nobler being than a paleness and a darkness. And so it follows that just as this is agreeing and true, 'Paleness is', this will moreover be true, 'A chimera is', which is denied by all.[lxxxiv]

Et si dicatur, quod istae voces significant ens rationis, capio illud ens rationis et quaero, utrum sit substantia vel accidens. Non substantia, sicut ipsi concedunt, nec etiam accidens, quia tunc quaero, in quo sit subiective. Non potest dici, quod sit in aliquo subiective, nisi in ipso intellectu. Et si sic, igitur est nobilius accidens vel nobilius ens quam albedo vel nigredo, quia nobilitas accidentis est accipienda a nobilitate subiecti et causae illius accidentis, quia nobilior causa causat nobiliorem effectum. Cum ergo intellectus, qui causat illud ens rationis et in quo illud ens rationis est subiective, sit nobilior quam quodcumque corpus, in quo est albedo vel nigredo, sequitur necessario, quod illud ens rationis sit nobilius ens quam albedo vel nigredo. Et per consequens significatum chimaerae est perfectius ens et nobilius ens quam albedo et nigredo. Et sic sequitur, quod, sicut haec est congrua et vera albedo est, a multo fortiori haec erit vera chimaera est, quod ab omnibus negatur.

§46.6

But if it is replied that the being of reason, which is a certain fiction of the intellect,

Si autem dicatur, quod illud ens rationis, quod est quoddam fictum ab ↑[340]

338 LK, p. 40.
339 et$_3$] orationis congruae vel *add*. LK, *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: orationis congruae vel] *add*. *Mü*.)
340 λ, f. a4vb.

is neither a substance nor an accident nor does it exist in something as in a subject, that is just a refuge for scoundrels, since I am merely changing terminology, and the arguments stand unresolved then just as before. I ask whether such a fiction exists by itself[lxxxv] or exists not by itself. If it exists by itself, I call such a thing a 'substance'. If it exists not by itself, and it is in nature, I call such a thing an 'accident', and then it is argued against as before.[lxxxvi] If it is replied that such a fiction is not in nature, then what was proposed is held – that is, that 'chimera' signifies or consignifies absolutely nothing.[lxxxvii]

intellectu, nec est substantia nec accidens nec in aliquo tamquam in subiecto existit, illud non est nisi fuga miserorum, quia tantummodo muto vocabula et stabunt argumenta insoluta tunc, sicut prius. ↓[341] Quaero, utrum tale fictum sit per se existens vel non per se existens. Si sit per se existens, talem rem voco substantiam. Si non sit per se existens et sit in rerum natura, talem rem voco accidens, et arguitur tunc contra, sicut prius. Si dicatur, quod tale fictum non sit in rerum natura, tunc habetur propositum, videlicet quod chimaera simpliciter nihil significat vel consignificat.

§46.7

Again: From this follows the opposite of their saying – namely, that such modes of signifying are not caused by the intellect, and that such modes of signifying are not attributed to an the utterance by the intellect – because that which is nothing is neither caused by, nor attributed to, anything.

Item: Ex hoc sequitur oppositum dicti eorum, scilicet quod tales modi significandi non causantur ab intellectu et quod tales modi significandi non attribuuntur ipsi voci per intellectum, quia illud, quod nihil est, a nullo causatur nec alicui attribuitur.

§46.8

And if it is replied that such modes of signifying do not have to be subjects in nature but only have to be objects, and so are subjectively in nothing, again on sees that the reply is just an evasion by scoundrels. Because, first, it is necessary for them to concede that either such things subsist by themselves, and so are substances, or they do not subsist by themselves, but inhere in others, and so are accidents. And since for an accident to be is for it to be in,[lxxxviii] according to

Et si dicatur, quod tales modi significandi non habent esse subiectivum in rerum natura, sed tantum esse obiectivum, et ideo in nullo sunt subiective, adhuc videtur, quod ista responsio non sit nisi miserabilis evasio. Primo, quia necessarium est eis concedere, quod tales res per se subsistunt, et sic sunt substantiae, vel non per se subsistunt, sed aliis inhaerent, et sic sunt accidentia. Et cum ↓[342] accidentis esse sit inesse, secundum Aristotelem quinto et septimo

[341] LK, p. 41.
[342] LK, p. 42.

Aristotle in the fifth and seventh books of the *Metaphysics*, again it follows that those things must be subjectively in something. And because, second, since such things would be caused by that noble cause, as by the intellect naturally, it is necessary that there are things nobler than those that are caused by a more ignoble cause, as are corporeal qualities.[lxxxix]

Metaphysicae, adhuc sequitur, quod oportet illas res esse in aliquo subiective. Secundo, quia, cum tales res causentur ab ista nobili causa, sicut ab intellectu naturaliter, necessarium est, quod sint res nobiliores quam istae, quae causantur ab ignobiliori causa, cuiusmodi sunt qualitates corporales.

The Second Argument against the Second Way of Positing Modes

§47

Again:[xc] Wherever there is nothing that is consignified, there is nothing that consignifies. But in the statement 'God is God' there is nothing in the domain of things that is consignified, and therefore there is nothing that consignifies there. And yet it is clear that the aforesaid statement is agreeing and just as maximally proper for the grammarian as for the logician, since it is most true, since – according to Boethius in the fifth commentary on the first chapter of *On Interpretation* – no statement is truer than that in which the same thing is predicated of its very self. Therefore, without a mode of signifying or some other property attributed, in accordance with the intellect, to the utterance itself, an expression can formally be a part of speech. But, as is clear on its own, in the aforesaid statement there is nothing in the domain of things that might be consignified, since, according to them, such a consignificate is a property of a signified thing distinct from that signified thing of which it is a property. And there is no property in God distinct from that very God, as all intelligent people –

Item: Ubicumque nihil est, quod significatur, ibi nihil est, quod significat. Sed in ista oratione Deus est Deus ex parte rei nihil est, quod significatur, ergo ibi nihil est, quod significat. Et tamen clarum est, quod praedicta oratio est congrua et maxime propria tam grammaticae quam logicae, quia est verissima eo, quod nulla oratio est verior illa, in qua praedicatur idem de se ipso, secundum Boethium quinto commento super primo *Perihermenias.* ↓[343] Igitur sine modo significandi vel aliqua alia proprietate attributa ipsi voci secundum intellectum potest dictio formaliter esse pars orationis. Quod autem in praedicta oratione ex parte rei nihil sit, quod consignificetur, patet de se, quia secundum eos tale consignificatum est proprietas rei significatae distincta ab ipsa re significata, cuius est proprietas. Et in Deo nulla est proprietas distincta ab ipso Deo, sicut omnes intelligentes tenent, tam theologi quam philosophi.

[343] LK, p. 43.

theologians as much as philosophers – hold.

Against the Third Way of Positing Modes

§48.1

The third saying described above[xci] is that the intellect takes a mode of signifying at the root from a property of a thing that it observes when it attributes that mode of signifying to an utterance.

Tertium dictum superius recitatum est, quod intellectus sumit modum significandi radicitus a proprietate rei, ad quam aspicit, cum ipsum modum significandi voci attribuit.[344]

§48.2

Against this, along with the reasons made before, one thing is argued.

Contra hoc arguitur una cum rationibus prius factis.

The Argument against the Third Way of Positing Modes

§49.1

And it is argued like so:[xcii] If the understanding were to get a mode of signifying from a property of a thing, then where there is no thing, or no property of a thing, there is no mode of signifying, since by a deficient root it is necessary that the whole tree withers. But it is clear that no thing, or property of a thing, corresponds to the noun 'chimera' or to the noun 'antichrist'. Therefore, there is no mode of signifying in those utterances.

Et arguitur sic: Si intellectus accipiat modum significandi a proprietate rei, ergo, ubi nulla est res vel nulla proprietas rei, ibi nullus est modus significandi, quia deficiente radice necesse est totam arborem arescere. Sed clarum est, quod isti nomini chimaera vel isti nomini antichristus nulla res vel proprietas rei correspondet. Igitur in istis vocibus nullus est modus significandi.

§49.2

The minor is clear on its own and was also explained above.[xciii] And yet the aforesaid utterances are most genuine names, most genuine expressions, and most genuine parts of speech. Therefore, such a mode of signifying is not

↓[345] Minor patet de se et etiam fuit superius declarata. Et tamen praedictae voces sunt verissima nomina, verissimae dictiones et verissimae partes orationis. Ergo talis modus significandi ad hoc,

344 dictum] *om*. LK, λ. (Cf. *DMS* §§45.1, 50.)
345 LK, p. 44.

necessary in order for something to be a noun or a part of speech or an expression. And by consequence such a mode of signifying is not taken at the root from the property of a thing.

quod aliquid sit nomen vel pars ↑[346] orationis vel dictio, non est necessarius. Et per consequens talis modus significandi non sumitur radicitus a proprietate rei.

Against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes

§50

Against the fourth saying described above[xciv] – namely, that the mode of understanding is twofold, namely active and passive; the active is the mode of conceiving by which the intellect conceives a property of a thing; the passive mode of understanding is the property of the thing exactly as apprehended by the intellect. And it is argued like so:

Contra quartum dictum superius recitatum, scilicet quod duplex est modus intelligendi, scilicet activus et passivus. Activus est modus concipiendi, quo intellectus concipit proprietatem rei. Modus intelligendi passivus est proprietas rei, prout ab intellectu est apprehensa. Et arguitur sic:

The First Argument against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes, and The First Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§51.1

The active mode of understanding or conceiving is either the intellect, or the power or act of the intellect, or a disposition, or an intelligible species. But it is not any of those. Therefore, there is no such mode of understanding in the domain of the intellect.[xcv]

Iste modus intelligendi vel concipiendi activus vel est ipse intellectus vel ipsa potentia vel actus ipsius intellectus vel habitus vel species intelligibilis. Sed non est aliquod istorum. Ergo talis modus intelligendi non est ex parte intellectus.

§51.2

The major is made clear by a sufficient division, since many things are not posited by anyone to be in the domain of the intellect, as is quickly made clear.[xcvi] The minor is just as clear for any particular.[xcvii]

↓[347] Maior patet per sufficientem divisionem, quia plures res non ponuntur ab aliquo esse ex parte intellectus, ut breviter patet. Minor patet quantum ad quamlibet particulam.

346 λ, f. a5ra.
347 LK, p. 45.

§51.3

First: Indeed it is not the intellective power, since then it would be the soul itself, which they do not intend.

Primo: Non enim est ipsa potentia intellectiva, quia sic esset ipsa anima, quod ipsi non intendunt.

§51.4

Neither also is it an act of the intellect itself, or the intellection itself, since such an intellection is a passion rather than an action, since, according to Aristotle in the third book of *On the Soul*, to understand is for a certain thing to be acted upon.

Nec etiam est actus ipsius intellectus vel ipsa intellectio, quia talis intellectio potius est passio quam actio, cum secundum Aristotelem tertio *De anima* intelligere est quoddam pati.

§51.5

Nor does anyone posit that it is a disposition, since it is neither understanding nor knowledge nor wisdom nor any other disposition, as is clear on its own.

Nec ponitur ab aliquo, quod sit habitus, quia nec est intellectus nec scientia nec sapientia nec aliquis aliorum habituum, sicut patet de se.

§51.6

Nor also is it an intelligible species, since, as one sees, that precedes the intellection and a mode of the intellection.

Nec etiam est species intelligibilis, quia ista videtur praecedere istam intellectionem et modum intellectionis istius.

The Second Argument against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes, and The Second Such Argument against the Active Mode of Signifying

§52

Again: A reason, distinct from the aforesaid, that, so it seems to me, pushes more toward not positing such a mode of conceiving or understanding is this: namely, that a plurality of things is not to be posited without a compelling reason.[xcviii] But it does not seem that there

Item: Ratio, quae plus movet ad non ponendum talem modum concipiendi vel intelligendi distinctum a rebus ↓[348] praedictis, sicut mihi videtur, est haec, scilicet quod pluralitas rerum non est ponenda sine ratione cogente. Sed non videtur, quod sit aliqua ratio cogens, sicut

[348] LK, p. 46.

is any compelling reason, as will be made clear by the replies to the reasons in opposition. Therefore, no such mode should be posited.

patebit per responsiones ad rationes in oppositum. Igitur nullus talis modus est ponendus.

§53

Against this, which is said concerning the passive mode of conceiving – namely, that such a mode of conceiving is a property of a thing – it is argued like so:

Contra hoc, quod dicitur de modo concipiendi passivo, scilicet quod talis modus concipiendi est ipsa proprietas rei, arguitur sic:

The Third Argument against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes, and The First Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§54

There are many things, as one sees, that do not have such properties, as is clear concerning a first cause – and concerning many other separate subjects[xcix] – and especially concerning the first cause, in which there is no property distinct from itself.[c] Therefore, there are many things in which there is no passive mode of conceiving, yet which are truly conceived and truly signified. Therefore, such a mode of conceiving is not necessary in order for a thing to be conceived.[ci]

Multae sunt res, ut videtur, quae non habent tales proprietates, sicut patet de prima causa et de multis aliis subiectis separatis et praecipue de prima causa, in qua nulla est proprietas ab ipsa distincta. Igitur multae res sunt, in quibus non est modus concipiendi passivus, quae tamen vere concipiuntur et vere significantur. Igitur talis modus concipiendi non est necessarius ad hoc, quod res concipiatur.

The Fourth Argument against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes, and The Second Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§55

Again:[cii] Such a passive mode of conceiving might be taken, in the aforesaid way, described above, which those who are of this view thus posit for their foundation, and let it be '*A*'. And I ask whether or not *A* is conceived without some other passive mode of conceiving. If yes, then by the same account the thing,

Item: Capiatur talis modus concipiendi passivus modo praedicto superius recitato, quem pro fundamento ipsorum tales opinantes sic ponunt, et sit *a.* Et quaero, utrum *a* concipiatur sine aliquo alio modo concipiendi passivo vel ↓[349] non. Si sic, igitur eadem ratione ipsa res, quaecumque fuerit, concipietur sine *a,*

[349] LK, p. 47.

whatever it might be, is conceived without *A*, since, as one sees, there is no greater reason why one thing could be conceived without a passive mode of conceiving rather than another. If no, then a procession into infinity quickly follows from this – namely, that every passive mode of conceiving is conceived by means[ciii] of another passive mode of conceiving, which is clearly absurd, since then there would be infinite passive modes of conceiving in one thing in number.[civ]

quia non videtur maior ratio, quare una res potest concipi sine modo concipiendi passivo plus quam alia. Si non, ex hoc breviter sequitur processus in infinitum, scilicet quod omnis modus concipiendi passivus concipitur mediante alio modo concipiendi passivo, quod patet esse absurdum, quia sic essent infiniti modi concipiendi passivi in una re numero.

The Fifth Argument against the Fourth Way of Positing Modes, and The Third Such Argument against the Passive Mode of Signifying

§56

Again: That appears to be a totally willful saying, since we neither conceive by reason nor perceive by experience such a mode of conceiving to be in the domain of things.

Item: Illud apparet esse totaliter dictum voluntarie, quia nec ratione nec ↑[350] experimento concipimus vel percipimus talem modum concipiendi esse ex parte rei.

§57

Yet I do not care much about those sayings concerning the active and passive mode of conceiving, since they bring no rewards for their many great harms.

De istis tamen dictis de modo concipiendi activo et passivo non multum curo eo, quod non inferant gratis multa gravia damna.

Against the Fifth Way of Positing Modes

§58

Against the fifth saying above[cv] – namely, that a passive mode of signifying is materially in a thing as in a subject and is formally in an utterance as in a sign – I count what was said above to be argument enough.[cvi]

Contra quintum superius dictum, scilicet quod modus significandi passivus materialiter est in re ut in subiecto et formaliter est in voce tamquam in signo, sufficienter per superius dicta reputo esse argutum.

[350] λ, f. a5rb.

Another Argument against the Fifth Way of Positing Modes

§59

Again:[cvii] Since this passive mode of signifying is composed from matter and form, it follows that one and the same thing in number is a passive mode of signifying taken materially and a passive mode of signifying taken formally. And so there will be one and the same thing in number subjectively in a signified thing and in an utterance, which is posited by no one, since then one and the same accident in number would be subjectively in different things, in a distinct and not mutually continuous site and place. But if it is posited that one is a material passive mode of signifying and another formal, by the same account they have to posit that one is a material active mode of signifying and another formal. And so an even greater multiplication and abuse of fictitious things is made, which in no way can be posited or sustained, as is made sufficiently clear by the aforesaid.

↓[351] Item: Cum iste modus significandi passivus sit compositus ex materia et forma, sequitur, quod una et eadem res numero sit modus passivus significandi sumptus materialiter et modus significandi passivus sumptus formaliter. Et sic erit una et eadem res numero subiective in re significata et in voce, quod a nullo ponitur, quia sic unum et idem accidens numero esset in diversis rebus subiective situ et loco distinctis et ad invicem non continuatis. Si autem ponatur, quod unus sit modus significandi passivus materialis et alius formalis, eadem ratione habent ponere, quod unus est modus significandi activus materialis et alius formalis. Et sic adhuc maior multiplicatio fit abusiva rerum fictarum, quae nullo modo potest poni nec sustineri, sicut patet sufficienter per praedicta.[352]

§60

And although many reasons can be multiplied, almost into infinity, for the destruction of those so foolishly aforesaid fake modes of signifying, nevertheless, in order to avoid prolixity, let those reasons suffice for now.

Et quamvis plures rationes ad destructionem modorum significandi praedictorum fatue fictorum quasi in infinitum possent multiplicari, istae tamen causa prolixitatis vitandae ad praesens sufficiant.

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351 LK, p. 48.

352 voce] significante et intellectu concipiente *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: significante … concipiente] *add*. λ, π; *DMS* §7, §58.)

THE THIRD CHAPTER

THE TRUER WAY

§61

Therefore, the third part of this treatise now remains, in which I extract what appears to me to be the truer way, while, along with this, positing some conclusions and, with this, undoing the reasons in opposition.

↓[353] Igitur restat nunc tertia pars huius tractatus, in qua eligam mihi viam apparentem veriorem, simul cum hoc ponendo aliquas conclusiones et similiter solvendo cum hoc rationes in oppositum.[354]

§62

Therefore, I say in the beginning that in no government, nor in any statement, is there any thing except a sign and a signified thing, and – if the sign and signified thing can be divided – a part of a sign and a part of a signified thing. But whether a signified thing is necessarily required for correct government and correct construal will be made thoroughly clear by some conclusions put below.

Dico igitur in principio, quod in nullo regimine vel aliqua oratione est aliqua res praeter signum et rem significatam et partem signi et partem rei significatae, si signum et res significata possunt dividi. ↓[355] Utrum autem res significata necessario requiratur ad verum regimen et veram constructionem, per aliquas conclusiones infra ponendas plane patebit.[356]

THE FIRST PART OF THE THIRD CHAPTER

TWO DISTINCTIONS AND ONE EXPLANATION

§63

To explain those conclusions, I offer two distinctions and one explanation.

Ad declarationem istius praemitto duas distinctiones et unam declarationem.

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353 LK, p. 49.

354 Restat igitur ulterius ad veritatem materiae declarandum aliqua declarare. Primo] *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: Restat … Primo] *add*. λ, π.)

355 LK, p. 50.

356 est] aliud vel *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: aliud vel] *add.* λ, π.)

The First Distinction

§64.1

The first of which is this: that among signs one is mental, another spoken, and another written.

Quarum prima est haec, quod signorum aliud est mentale, aliud vocale et aliud scriptum.

§64.2

That distinction is drawn from the remarks of Boethius in the beginning of his commentary on the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he holds that some statement is mental, another spoken, and another written. Therefore, since every statement is composed from signs and expressions, it necessarily follows that some sign or some expression is mental, another spoken, and another written.

Ista distinctio elicitur ex verbis Boethii in principio sui commenti super primum librum *Perihermenias,* ubi vult, quod quaedam oratio sit mentalis, quaedam vocalis et quaedam scripta. Cum igitur omnis oratio componatur ex signis et dictionibus, sequitur necessario, quod aliquod signum vel aliqua dictio sit mentalis, aliqua vocalis et aliqua scripta.

The Second Distinction

§65.1

The second distinction is this: that among signs some signify naturally and some by convention.

↓[357] Secunda distinctio est haec, quod signorum quaedam significant naturaliter, quaedam ad placitum.

§65.2

And although that distinction is common, and known by almost all children, it is nonetheless necessary that it be proposed to many. And it is drawn from the remarks of Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he holds that mental signs – namely, concepts and passions of the soul – are the same among all; that is, they naturally signify the same among all, since, if they were imposed to signify by convention, then they would

Et ista distinctio, quamvis sit communis et quasi ab omnibus pueris scita, tamen ad propositum est multum necessaria. Et elicitur ex verbis Aristotelis primo *Perihermenias,* ubi vult, quod ↑[358] signa mentalia, scilicet conceptus et passiones animae, sunt eadem apud omnes, id est naturaliter apud omnes idem significant, quia, si ad placitum imponerentur ad significandum, ita diversificarentur et essent dissimiles apud diversos, sicut

[357] LK, p. 51.
[358] λ, f. a5va.

be differentiated and would be dissimilar among different people, just like utterances, which signify by convention, especially since the conventions of people are not in such agreement that all uniformly mean the same. And so it is also held in the same place that some signs are instituted by convention, as is made clear by the passage: 'A noun is an utterance significative by convention', and so on.[cviii]

voces, quae ad placitum significant, praecipue cum placita hominum non ita concordent, quod omnes uniformiter velint idem. Et sic habetur etiam ibidem, quod aliqua signa sunt ad placitum instituta, sicut patet per illum textum nomen est vox significativa ad placitum et cetera.

The Explanation

§66.1

The explanation to be posited is this: why, and for what, were any utterances imposed to signify.

↓[359] Declaratio ponenda est haec: Quare et ad quid aliquae voces fuerunt impositae ad significandum.

§66.2

Concerning which, it should be known that – according to all those who speak on these matters, the authoritative ones just as much as the not authoritative – the exact reason why signifying utterances were invented is for the external expression to another of what in no way can be shown by means of a concept, since, according to Aristotle in the third book of *On the Soul*, an operation of the intellect is an immanent operation and in no way can cross over to an external thing.[cix]

Circa quod est sciendum, quod secundum omnes de ista materia loquentes, tam authenticos quam non authenticos, praecisa causa, quare voces significantes fuerunt inventae, est: ad exprimendum exterius alteri illud, quod per conceptum nullo modo potest ostendi, quia secundum Aristotelem tertio *De anima* operatio intellectus est operatio immanens, et nullo modo potest esse transiens ad res extra.

§66.3

Again: By an operation of the intellect, and by a concept under its proper form, what was sensed from external things could in no way be expressed.[cx] And since that expressing was entirely

Item: Per operationem intellectus et per conceptum sub sua propria forma nullo modo potuit quis exprimere, quid de rebus extra sentiebat. Et quia illa expressio fuit homini omnino necessaria

[359] LK, p. 52.

necessary for a human – since a human is a political and civil animal – utterances were thus invented as alternates held external to mental signs, so that they might express externally what is conceived internally by the intellect, and especially so they might signify by convention and externally to another what mental signs, which are a person's natural concepts, signify internally to that person.

eo, quod homo sit animal politicum ↓[360] et civile, ideo inventae sunt voces, ut extra tenerent vices signorum mentalium et exterius exprimerent, quod interius per intellectum concipitur, et praecipue illud ad placitum illud significarent alteri exterius, quod signa mentalia, quae sunt naturales conceptus hominis, interius sibi significant.

§66.4

Again: For a similar reason, they posit written signs as substitutes for utterances, since no human utterance is sufficient for showing a concept of the mind to those absent and very distant, nor also for explaining an external thing to someone. Thus, written signs were imposed to signify and are held as alternates to utterances and for remotely showing the wishes of people to those who are distant.

Item: Consimili ratione ponuntur signa scripta vocibus substituta eo, quod absentibus et multum distantibus nulla vox humana sufficit ad mentis conceptum manifestandum vel etiam ad aliquid de rebus extra declarandum. Ideo fuerunt signa scripta imposita ad significandum et vices vocum tenendum et remote distantibus manifestandum hominum voluntates.[361]

§66.5

And the whole explanation is drawn quite distinctly from the sayings of Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he holds that 'utterances are signs of those that are in the soul – marks of the passions'.[cxi]

Et tota illa declaratio satis expresse elicitur ex dictis Aristotelis primo *Perihermenias,* ubi vult, quod voces sunt signa earum quae sunt in anima, passionum notae.

[360] LK, p. 53.
[361] substituta] subinstituta LK, λ. (Cf. LK: subinstituta] substituta *Mü*, *Me*.)

THE SECOND PART OF THE THIRD CHAPTER

SOME CONCLUSIONS

§67

With those matters maintained, some conclusions should be posited.

↓[362] Istis habitis ponendae sunt aliquae conclusiones.

The First Conclusion

§68.1

The first of which is this: that there is agreement and disagreement in mental statements. The conclusion is proved like so:

Quarum prima est haec, quod in orationibus mentalibus est congruitas et incongruitas.

§68.2

Everything true or false is agreeing. Every non-interrogative mental proposition in the indicative mood is true or false. Therefore, every non-interrogative mental proposition in the indicative mood is agreeing. And furthermore it follows that there is agreement in mental statements and propositions.

Ista conclusio probatur sic: Omne verum vel falsum est congruum. Omnis propositio mentalis indicativi modi, non interrogativa est vera vel falsa. Ergo omnis propositio mentalis indicativi modi, non interrogativa est congrua. Et ultra sequitur, quod in orationibus et propositionibus mentalibus est congruitas.

§68.3

The major is made clear by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he quite distinctly indicates that true and false presuppose agreeing. The minor is also made clear by Aristotle in the same place and in the first book of the *Prior Analytics*.

↓[363] Maior patet per Aristotelem primo *Perihermenias,* ubi satis expresse innuit, quod verum et falsum praesupponunt congruum. Minor etiam patet per Aristotelem ibidem et primo *Priorum.*

[362] LK, p. 54.
[363] LK, p. 55.

§68.4

Then like so: Disagreement can be found in any statements in which agreement can be found. But agreement can be found in mental statements, as was already explained.[cxii] Therefore, disagreement can be found in them.

Tunc sic: In quibuscumque orationibus potest inveniri congruitas, in eisdem potest inveniri incongruitas. Sed in orationibus mentalibus potest inveniri congruitas, sicut iam declaratum est. Ergo in eisdem potest inveniri incongruitas.

§68.5

The major is known, since opposites have to be made concerning the same item. Therefore, if agreement can be found in mental signs or in mental statements, it follows that disagreement can be found there. The minor is made clear by the preceding argument.[cxiii]

Maior nota, quia opposita habent fieri circa idem. Ergo, si in signis mentalibus vel in orationibus mentalibus potest inveniri congruitas, sequitur, quod ibi potest inveniri incongruitas. Minor patet per argumentum praecedens.

The Second Conclusion

§69.1

The second conclusion is this: that there is correct and proper construal in mental statements, which is proved like so:

Secunda conclusio est haec, quod in orationibus mentalibus est vera et propria constructio, quae probatur sic:[364]

§69.2

Wherever there is correct and proper agreement, there is correct and proper construal. But there is correct and proper agreement in mental statements. Therefore, there is correct and proper construal in mental statements.

Ubicumque est vera et propria congruitas, ibi est vera et propria constructio. Sed in orationibus mentalibus est vera et propria congruitas. Igitur in orationibus mentalibus est vera et propria constructio.[365]

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364 quae] quod LK. (Cf. LK: quod] quae *Mü*; *DMS* §71.1.)
est haec, quod in orationibus mentalibus est vera et propria constructio, quae probatur sic] *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: est haec, quod] *om*. λ, π. quod … constructio] *om*. λ, π.)

365 Ubicumque est vera et propria congruitas, ibi est vera et propria constructio. Sed] *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: quod … constructio] *om*. λ, π.)
in orationibus mentalibus est vera et propria constructio] *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: quod … constructio] *om*. λ, π.)
Igitur] et cetera *add*. λ. (Cf. LK: quod … constructio] *om*. λ, π.)

§69.3

The major is clear on its own and is conceded by all, for nothing else is called 'proper agreement' or 'proper construal' than an appropriate union of construables. The minor is made clear by the preceding conclusion.[cxiv]

↓[366] Maior patet de se et conceditur ab omnibus, nam propria congruitas vel propria constructio non vocatur aliud quam debita constructibilium unio. Minor patet per praecedentem conclusionem.

The Third Conclusion

§70.1

The third conclusion is this: that there is proper government in mental statements.

↑[367] Tertia conclusio est haec, quod proprium regimen est in orationibus mentalibus.

§70.2

That conclusion follows quite obviously from the two preceding conclusions,[cxv] for wherever there is proper construal, there is proper government. But there is proper construal in mental statements. Therefore, there is proper government there.

Ista conclusio sequitur satis manifeste ex duabus conclusionibus praecedentibus, nam ubicumque est propria constructio, ibi est proprium regimen. Sed in orationibus mentalibus est propria constructio. Igitur ibi est proprium regimen.

The Fourth Conclusion

§71.1

The fourth conclusion is this: that these three – namely, agreement, government, and construal – are in mental propositions naturally, which is proved like so:

Quarta conclusio est haec, quod haec tria, scilicet congruitas, regimen et constructio, sunt naturaliter in propositionibus mentalibus. ↓[368] Quae probatur sic:

§71.2

Those three aforesaid things are in mental propositions, as is made clear by the

Ista tria praedicta sunt in propositionibus mentalibus, sicut patet per conclusiones

366 LK, p. 56.
367 λ, f. a5vb.
368 LK, p. 57.

preceding conclusions. Therefore, either those three aforesaid things are in mental propositions naturally or by convention and artificially. But they are not there by convention and artificially, as is made clear by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*. Therefore, they are there naturally.

praecedentes. Igitur vel illa tria praedicta sunt in propositionibus mentalibus naturaliter vel ad placitum et artificialiter. Sed non sunt ibi ad placitum et artificialiter, sicut patet per Aristotelem primo *Perihermenias.* Ergo sunt ibi naturaliter.

The Fifth Conclusion

§72.1

The fifth conclusion is this: that agreement, government, and construal apply by themselves, in the second way,[cxvi] to a mental statement. That conclusion is proved like so:[cxvii]

Quinta conclusio est haec, quod congruitas, regimen et constructio competunt orationi mentali per se secundo modo. Illa conclusio probatur sic:

§72.2

Everything that is rightly proper to another applies by itself, in the second way. But the aforesaid three are rightly proper to a mental statement. Therefore, the aforesaid three apply by themselves to a mental statement.

Omne proprie proprium alicui competit per se secundo modo. Sed praedicta tria sunt proprie propria orationi mentali. Igitur praedicta tria competunt orationi mentali per se.

§72.3

The major is made known by Aristotle in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. The minor is explained, for everything that applies to something and does not apply to another unless through that very thing applies by itself to it and is rightly proper to it. But the aforesaid three apply to a mental statement and do not apply to some other unless because they apply to a mental statement. Therefore, the aforesaid three apply by themselves to a mental statement and are rightly proper to it.[cxviii]

Maior est nota per Aristotelem primo *Posteriorum.* Minor declaratur, nam omne illud, quod competit alicui et non competit alteri nisi per ipsum, illud competit sibi per se et ↓[369] est proprie proprium sibi. Sed praedicta tria competunt orationi mentali et non competunt alicui alteri, nisi quia competunt orationi mentali. Ergo praedicta tria competunt orationi mentali per se et sunt sibi proprie propria.

[369] LK, p. 58.

§72.4

The major is made clear by Aristotle in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he explains that this passion – to have three angles – applies first and by itself to triangle, since it applies to no other unless because it applies to triangle.[cxix] The minor is explained, for agreement, government, and construal apply to nothing other than a mental statement and a spoken statement and a written statement. But they do not apply to a spoken statement and a written statement unless because they apply to a mental statement. Therefore, the aforesaid three apply first and by themselves, in the second way, to a mental statement.[cxx]

Maior patet per Aristotelem primo *Posteriorum,* ubi declarat, quod haec passio habere tres angulos competit per se et primo triangulo eo, quod nulli alteri competit, nisi quia competit triangulo. Minor declaratur, nam congruitas, regimen et constructio nulli competunt nisi orationi mentali et orationi vocali et orationi scriptae. Sed orationi vocali et orationi scriptae non competunt, nisi quia competunt orationi mentali. Ergo praedicta tria competunt orationi mentali primo et per se secundo modo.

§72.5

The major is known on its own. The minor is conceded by all, since if a spoken or written statement were never subordinated to a mental statement, it would be neither agreeing nor disagreeing, and in it there would be neither government nor construal, as is clear on its own.

Maior est de se nota. Minor conceditur ab omnibus, quia, si oratio vocalis vel scripta numquam esset subordinata orationi mentali, nec esset congrua nec incongrua, nec in ea esset regimen nec constructio, sicut de se patet.

The Sixth Conclusion

§73.1

The sixth conclusion is this: that those three – agreement, construal, and government – are more intrinsically suited to a mental statement than to some other statement. The proof of which is this:

↓[370] Sexta conclusio est haec, quod ista tria, congruitas, constructio et regimen, magis intrinsece conveniunt orationi mentali quam alicui alteri orationi. Cuius probatio est haec:

[370] LK, p. 59.

§73.2

Whatever naturally applies to something more intrinsically applies to it than to that to which it artificially, or by convention, applies. But the aforesaid three intrinsically apply naturally to a mental statement, whereas they apply only artificially, or by convention, to a spoken, a written, and to any other statement. Therefore, the aforesaid three more intrinsically apply to a mental statement than to some other statement.

Quaecumque competunt alicui naturaliter, magis intrinsece competunt sibi quam illi, cui competunt artificialiter vel ad placitum. Sed praedicta tria intrinsece competunt orationi mentali naturaliter, vocali vero et scriptae et omni alteri orationi competunt solum artificialiter vel ad placitum. Ergo praedicta tria magis intrinsece competunt orationi mentali quam alicui alteri orationi.

§73.3

The major is known on its own. The minor is also clear, since before the imposition of utterances to signify it is posited that – were those same utterances that are now to have been before imposition – there would have been no agreement or construal or government in the utterances, as is conceded by all. Therefore, the aforesaid three are not in utterances naturally but through imposition by convention.

Maior est nota de se. Minor etiam patet, quia ante impositionem vocum ad significandum posito, quod illae eaedem voces, quae nunc sunt, ante impositionem fuissent, nulla congruitas vel constructio vel regimen in vocibus fuisset, sicut ab omnibus conceditur. Igitur praedicta tria non insunt vocibus naturaliter, sed per impositionem ad placitum.

The Seventh Conclusion

§74.1

The seventh conclusion, which follows from the aforesaid,[cxxi] is this: that proper agreement and proper construal and proper government are in some mental statement without such an active or passive mode of signifying, as they are described above.

↓[371] Septima conclusio est haec, quae ex praedictis sequitur, quod propria congruitas et propria constructio et proprium regimen sunt in aliqua oratione mentali sine tali modo significandi activo vel passivo, quales superius sunt recitati.

[371] LK, p. 60.

§74.2

That conclusion is immediately made clear by what was said above,[cxxii] for the aforesaid three are in a mental proposition, and in a mental proposition there is no active mode of signifying, since the mode of signifying, according to all of them, is a property attributed to an utterance by the intellect and existing subjectively in an utterance. And it is clear that that mode is not in a mental proposition. Therefore, and so on.

Illa conclusio statim patet per superius dicta, nam in propositione mentali sunt praedicta tria, et in propositione mentali non ↑[372] est modus significandi activus, quia iste modus significandi secundum omnes eos est proprietas voci attributa per intellectum et in voce subiective existens. Et clarum est, quod iste modus non est in propositione mentali; igitur et cetera.

§74.3

But it is possible that those people mean to say that just as there are active modes of signifying, caused by the intellect, in a spoken proposition, so in a mental proposition there are natural modes of signifying. But against this it can briefly be argued, as was argued above,[cxxiii] that such a plurality of things should not be posited without necessity.[cxxiv]

Sed possibile est, quod isti volunt dicere, quod, sicut in propositione vocali sunt modi significandi activi causati per intellectum, ita in propositione mentali sunt modi significandi naturales. Sed contra hoc breviter potest argui, sicut superius argutum est, quod talis pluralitas rerum non est ponenda sine necessitate.

§74.4

Again: In some mental statement there are no such modes of signifying distinct from the mental signs themselves. Therefore, in no mental statement are there such modes of signifying distinct from those signs themselves.

Item: In aliqua oratione mentali non sunt tales modi ↓[373] significandi distincti ab ipsis signis mentalibus. Ergo in nulla propositione mentali sunt tales modi significandi distincti ab ipsis signis.

§74.5

The consequence is clear, since there is no greater reason for them to be in one mental statement rather than in another. The antecedent is clear concerning the mental statement 'The Antichrist will be',

Consequentia est plana, quia non est maior ratio de una oratione mentali quam in alia. Antecedens patet de ista oratione mentali antichristus erit, quia clarum est, quod ibi non est modus significandi

372 λ, f. a6ra.
373 LK, p. 61.

since it is clear that there is no passive mode of signifying there, since there is no property of a thing there, since there is no thing there.[cxxv]

passivus, quia ibi nulla est proprietas rei eo, quod ibi nulla sit res.

The Eighth Conclusion

§75.1

The eighth conclusion is this: that everything that governs or is governed in a mental statement governs or is governed naturally. That conclusion is proved like so:

Octava conclusio est haec, quod omne, quod regit vel regitur in oratione mentali, naturaliter regit vel regitur. Ista conclusio probatur sic:

§75.2

In every government that is natural and by itself, whatever governs or is governed governs or is governed naturally. But every mental government is a natural government. Therefore, in every mental government whatever governs or is governed governs or is governed naturally.

In omni regimine naturali et per se, quidquid regit vel regitur, naturaliter regit vel regitur. Sed omne regimen mentale est regimen naturale, ergo in omni regimine mentali, quidquid regit vel regitur, naturaliter regit vel regitur.

§75.3

The major is known on its own, since the whole reason why there is such natural mental government is because in all such government something governs or is governed naturally. The minor is made clear by what was said above.[cxxvi]

Maior est nota de se, quia tota causa, quare tale regimen mentale naturale est, est, quia in omni isto regimine aliquid regit vel regitur naturaliter. Minor patet per superius dicta.

§75.4

Again: Everything that governs or is governed governs or is governed either from its nature and by itself or by another and by accident. But in mental government nothing governs or is governed by another and by accident,

↓[374] Item: Omne illud, quod regit vel regitur, ex sua natura et per se regit vel regitur vel per aliud et per accidens. Sed in regimine mentali nihil regit vel regitur per aliud et per accidens, quia, si sic, sequeretur, quod esset processus in

[374] LK, p. 62.

since, if this were so, it would follow that there would be a procession into infinity. Therefore, it remains that in every mental government what governs or is governed governs or is governed naturally and by itself.

infinitum. Relinquitur ergo, quod in regimine mentali omne, quod regit vel regitur, naturaliter et per se regit vel regitur.

The Ninth Conclusion

§76.1

The ninth conclusion is this: that just as the nominative case is governed naturally in a natural government, likewise the genitive, dative, accusative, and ablative – and generally every case – can be governed by something in such a government. It is proved:

Nona conclusio est haec, quod in regimine naturali, sicut nominativus casus regitur naturaliter, ita genitivus, dativus, accusativus et ablativus, et generaliter omnis casus in tali regimine ab aliquo regi potest. Probatur:

§76.2

For just as in the mental statement 'A human is' the mental verb 'is' naturally requires the nominative case in order for it to make, from it and another concept, a complete statement naturally complexly signifying that a human is, likewise in this mental statement – namely, 'Sortes sees Plato' – this mental verb 'sees' requires from its nature the accusative case after it in order for it to make, from it and another concept, a complete statement naturally complexly signifying that Sortes sees Plato. And just as in the first mental statement the nominative case is governed by such a verb from no other force than from a natural force or naturally, likewise in the second mental statement the accusative is naturally governed by this verb 'sees' from the natural force of the governing concept.

Nam sicut in ista oratione mentali homo est istud verbum mentale est ad hoc, quod ex eo et alio conceptu fiat oratio perfecta significans complexe naturaliter hominem esse, requirit naturaliter nominativum casum, ita in oratione mentali ista, scilicet Sortes videt Platonem, hoc verbum mentale videt ad hoc, quod ex eo et alio conceptu fiat oratio perfecta naturaliter significans complexe Sortem videre Platonem, requirit ex sua natura accusativum ↓[375] casum post se. Et sicut in prima oratione mentali nominativus casus regitur a tali verbo non ex alia vi nisi vi naturae vel naturaliter, ita in secunda oratione mentali accusativus regitur ab hoc verbo videt naturaliter ex vi naturae conceptus regentis.

[375] LK, p. 63.

§76.3

From which follows the question: Why does this mental verb 'is' govern the nominative case from the part before and this verb 'sees' govern the accusative case from the part after? And the question, which amounts to the same: Why does a human generate a human and a lion a lion? Since, as is clear on its own, nothing is a cause of another unless because they are of such a nature. And with this any further inquiry concerning the unity or correctness of natural government ends.[cxxvii]

Ex quo sequitur quaerere, quare hoc verbum mentale est regit nominativum casum a parte ante et hoc verbum videt regit accusativum casum a parte post. Et quaerere, quod idem est: Quare homo generat hominem et leo leonem: Quia, sicut de se patet, nulla est alia causa nisi, quod sint talis naturae. Et in hoc ↑[376] cessat omnis ulterior quaestio de unitate vel veritate regiminis naturalis.[377]

The Tenth Conclusion

§77.1

The tenth conclusion is this: that the exact cause of some utterance's being a noun is this: that it is a mark of some nominal concept or that it is a mark of some mental noun, which amounts to the same. That is proved like so:[cxxviii]

Decima conclusio est haec, quod praecisa causa, quare aliqua vox est nomen, est haec: quia est nota alicuius conceptus nominalis vel quia est nota alicuius nominis mentalis, quod idem est. Ista probatur sic:[378]

§77.2

The exact cause of some effect is that which wherever posited, with all else removed, such an effect is posited and which wherever removed, with all else posited, such an effect is removed.[cxxix] But so it is in the proposed case, for wherever it is posited that some utterance is a mark of some mental noun, with all else removed, such an utterance is a noun,[cxxx] and by that removed – namely,

Illa est praecisa causa alicuius effectus, qua posita quocumque alio remoto ponitur talis effectus et qua remota quocumque alio posito removetur talis effectus. ↓[379] Sed sic est in proposito, nam posito, quod aliqua vox sit nota alicuius nominis mentalis quocumque alio remoto, talis vox est nomen, et remoto illo, ita scilicet quod talis vox non sit nota alicuius nominis mentalis, nullo

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376 λ, f. a6rb.

377 quaerere$_1$] quod idem est *add*. LK, λ.
Et quaerere λ] Item LK. (Cf. LK: Item] *om*. *Mü* et quaerere *add*. *Mü*, λ, π.)
quod idem est] *om*. LK, λ.

378 Ista probatur sic] Istud probatur sic LK; patet λ. (Cf. LK: Istud probatur sic] patet λ, π. Ista] ista conclusio *Me*.)

379 LK, p. 64.

so that such an utterance is not a mark of some mental noun – such an utterance is in no way a noun.[cxxxi] Therefore, the exact cause of some utterance's being a noun is that it is a mark of some mental noun.

modo est talis vox nomen. Igitur praecisa causa, quare aliqua vox est nomen, est, quia est nota alicuius nominis mentalis.[380]

§77.3

The major is clear on its own. The minor is proved, since before the utterance was made to be a mark of some mental noun through imposition, no utterance was a noun, as is clear on its own and is also conceded by all.

Maior patet de se. Minor probatur, quia, antequam vox per impositionem fieret nota alicuius nominis mentalis, nulla vox fuit nomen, sicut de se patet et etiam ab omnibus conceditur.[381]

§77.4

Again:[cxxxii] If some utterance ceases to be a mark of some mental noun – or at least ceases to be so related such that it would be a mark of some mental noun without a new imposition, were there such a mental noun in nature – then it would immediately cease to be a noun, since then such an utterance would be related without any mode of signifying just as it was related before imposition, or before it was made to be a mark of some mental noun. But it was not a noun before, and therefore neither will it be a noun after it ceases to be a mark of some mental noun.

Item: Si aliqua vox desinat esse nota alicuius nominis mentalis vel saltem desinat sic se habere, quod esset nota alicuius nominis mentalis sine nova impositione, si tale nomen mentale sit in rerum natura, statim desinit esse nomen, quia tunc talis vox se habet per omnem modum significandi, sicut se habuit ante impositionem vel antequam fieret nota alicuius nominis mentalis. Sed ante non fuit, igitur nec postquam desinit esse nota alicuius nominis mentalis, erit nomen.

§77.5

Against that conclusion,[cxxxiii] it is argued that the conclusion seems to be against this common reply, approved by almost everyone, and used in almost every place – namely, the reply as to why some utterance is a noun. For if it is asked why 'human' is a noun, then it is replied: since

Contra istam conclusionem arguitur, quia ista conclusio videtur esse contra istam communem responsionem quasi ab omnibus approbatam et quasi in omni loco usitatam, qua scilicet respondetur, quare aliqua vox est nomen. Nam si ↓[382] quaeratur, quare homo est nomen, tunc

380 ita] *om*. LK, λ. (Cf. *DMS* §§34.10, 40.6, 81.3, 100.3.)
381 patet λ] nota LK. (Cf. LK: nota] patet λ, π.)
382 LK, p. 65.

it signifies a substance with a proper or common quality.

respondetur: quia significat substantiam cum qualitate propria vel communi.

§77.6

Again:[cxxxiv] From this it would follow, as it seems, that those who posit modes of signifying would hold the following: namely, that something would be attributed to an utterance by the intellect. For from this – that an utterance is a noun by reason of a nominal concept to which it corresponds, and before it corresponded to such a concept it was not a noun – it follows, as one sees, that something came to the utterance by means of the concept by which it was made to be a noun.

Item: Ex hoc sequeretur, ut videtur, quod ponentes modos significandi haberent propositum, scilicet quod aliquid sit voci attributum per intellectum. Nam ex eo, quod vox ratione conceptus nominalis, cui correspondet, est nomen, et antequam tali conceptui correspondebat, non fuit nomen, videtur sequi, quod aliquid advenit voci mediante conceptu, per quod fit nomen.

§77.7

The consequence is explained, since it is impossible for contradictories to be predicated successively of something without it changing. But these – 'noun' and 'not a noun' – are contradictories. Therefore, those cannot be verified successively of something without a change of species. But before an utterance was a mark of some nominal concept it was not a noun, and after it was a mark of some mental concept it was a noun. Therefore, that utterance is changed in some way. And it does not seem that it is changed by means of some other species of motion or of change than by means of alteration, since it must not be that it is a local motion or that it is an augmentation or diminution or generation or corruption. Therefore, it remains that it is an alteration. But an alteration, according to Aristotle in the fifth book of the *Physics* and the first book of *On*

Consequentia declaratur, quia impossibile est contradictoria de aliquo successive praedicari sine sui mutatione. Sed ista nomen et non nomen sunt contradictoria. Ergo illa non possunt verificari successive de aliquo sine mutatione speciei. Sed antequam vox fuit nota alicuius conceptus nominalis, non fuit nomen, et postquam fuit nota alicuius conceptus mentalis, fuit nomen. Igitur ista vox in aliquo est mutata. Et non videtur, quod sit mutata per aliquam aliam speciem motus vel mutationis quam per alterationem, quia non oportet, quod sit mota localiter vel quod sit augmentata vel ↓[383] diminuta vel generata vel corrupta. Relinquitur ergo, quod sit alterata. Sed alteratio, secundum Aristotelem quinto *Physicorum* et primo *De generatione,* est motus in qualitatem. Ergo talis vox, postquam est facta nota alicuius nominis mentalis vel conceptus

[383] LK, p. 66.

Generation and Corruption, is a motion into a quality. Therefore, such an utterance, after it was made to be a mark of some mental noun or nominal concept, has some quality that it did not have before, and those who posit such modes call such a quality an 'active mode of signifying'.

nominalis, habet ↑[384] aliquam qualitatem, quam prius non habuit, et talem qualitatem vocant sic ponentes modum significandi activum.

§77.8

To the first of these,[cxxxv] it is simply replied by conceding that the reply – by which it is said that something is a noun because it signifies a substance with a proper or common quality – is useless and vain. For, as is clear, the utterance 'chimera' is most truly a noun, and yet it does not signify some substance. This same thing is clear concerning the utterance 'nothing' and the utterance 'antichrist' and the utterance 'blindness', and so on for many others, which cannot supposit[cxxxvi] by an active verb of the present tense.[cxxxvii] But that the aforesaid nouns do not signify some substance must necessarily be conceded by all, since they signify no substance, and therefore they do not signify some substance. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is clear inductively.

Ad primum istorum dicitur simpliciter concedendo, quod illa responsio, qua dicitur, quod aliquid est nomen, quia significat substantiam cum qualitate propria vel communi, est inutilis et vana. Nam sicut patet, illa vox chimaera est verissime nomen, et tamen non significat substantiam aliquam. Hoc idem patet de illa voce nihil et de illa voce antichristus et de illa voce caecitas, et sic de pluribus aliis, quae non possunt supponere verbo activo praesentis temporis. Quod autem praedicta nomina non significant aliquam substantiam, oportet necessario concedi ab omnibus, quia nullam substantiam significant, igitur non significant substantiam aliquam. ↓[385] Consequentia est plana, et antecedens patet inductive.

§77.9

And if it is replied[cxxxviii] that those who posit the reply – or the proposition 'A noun signifies a substance with a quality' and so on – do not mean by that reply that it signifies some substance or external thing but rather mean by it that it is not necessary that every noun signifies some external thing or some substance, but

Et si dicatur, quod ponentes dictam responsionem volunt intelligere per istam responsionem sive propositionem nomen significat substantiam cum qualitate et cetera, quod non necesse sit, quod omne nomen significet aliquam rem extra vel aliquam substantiam, sed significet absolute per modum per se stantis, et non

384 λ, f. a6va.
385 LK, p. 67.

instead a noun might signify absolutely by means of a mode of standing by itself:[cxxxix] That would not be adequate, since from this it follows that a connotative[cxl] or relative noun, such as the nouns 'father', 'son', 'pale', 'similar', and similar nouns, would not be nouns, since none of them signifies absolutely, but only relatively. And neither do they signify by a mode of standing by itself, since any of them signifies its significate by connoting something other than it in nature.

volunt intelligere, quod significet aliquam substantiam vel rem extra: Illud non valet, quia ex hoc sequitur, quod nomina connotativa vel relativa, sicut talia nomina pater, filius, album, simile et similia nomina, non essent nomina, quia nullum istorum significat absolute, sed relative. Nec etiam significant per modum per se stantis, quia quodlibet istorum significat suum significatum connotando aliquid aliud a se in rerum natura.

§77.10

Therefore, I say that the reply,[cxli] in whatever way or by whatever cause it was invented, is for the instruction of children – that is, so that children who understand that some nouns signify a substance might, by this, come more easily to recognize what a noun is and to discern a noun from a verb and from other parts of speech, either because many nouns, or nearly all, signify a substance – taking substance broadly for the essence of any thing whatsoever – or because such a thing is properly called a substance, or else an accident. Yet it is childish and, when reconsidered, not generally true but simply false.

Dico igitur, quod illa responsio, qualicumque modo sive qualicumque causa fuerit inventa, sit propter informationem puerorum, ut videlicet pueri intelligentes, quod aliqua nomina significant substantiam, facilius per hoc devenerunt ad cognoscendum, quid esset nomen, et ad discernendum nomen a verbo et ab aliis partibus orationis, sive quia multa ↓[386] nomina vel fere omnia significant substantiam accipiendo substantiam large pro essentia cuiuscumque rei, sive talis sit substantia proprie dicta vel accidens. Est tamen puerilis et non generaliter vera respective sed simpliciter falsa.[387]

§77.11

But the exact cause of an utterance's being a noun is this: that the utterance is a mark of some mental noun, since, if an utterance is a noun, then it is a noun either by itself or by accident. Not by itself,

Sed praecisa causa, quare aliqua vox est nomen, est illa: quia illa vox est nota alicuius nominis mentalis, quia, si vox est nomen, vel ergo est nomen per se vel per accidens. Non per se, quia eadem vox,

386 LK, p. 68.

387 respective λ] *om*. LK. (Cf. LK: vera] respective *add*. λ, π.)
sed λ] verumtamen LK. (Cf. LK: verumtamen] sed λ, π.)
simpliciter] est *add*. LK, *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: est] *om*. λ, π.)

since the same utterance, before it was a mark of some concept, was not a noun. But everything that is of some kind by itself was such whenever it was, as can be drawn from the sayings of Aristotle in the first book of *Posterior Analytics*. Therefore, if an utterance were a noun by itself, such an utterance would have been a noun whenever it would have been, and so it would have been a noun before imposition just as after, which is false. Therefore, it remains that an utterance is a noun by accident. But everything that is by accident is reduced to something by itself, according to Aristotle and the Commentator[cxlii] in the fifth book of the *Physics*, in the chapter on place. But that by accident item cannot be reduced to something by itself unless to a concept to which the utterance corresponds, which concept is naturally and by itself a noun.

antequam fuit nota alicuius conceptus, non fuit nomen. Sed omne illud, quod est per se aliquale, quandocumque fuit, fuit tale, sicut potest elici ex dictis Aristotelis primo *Posteriorum.* Igitur, si vox esset per se nomen, quandocumque talis vox fuisset, fuisset nomen, et sic ita bene fuisset nomen ante impositionem sicut post, quod est falsum. Relinquitur ergo, quod vox sit nomen per accidens. Sed omne per accidens reducitur ad aliquid per se, secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem quinto *Physicorum* capitulo ↓[388] de loco. Sed istud per accidens non potest reduci per se ad aliquid nisi ad conceptum, cui talis vox correspondet, qui conceptus est naturaliter nomen et per se.

§77.12

To the second,[cxliii] it is said that nothing is attributed by the intellect to an utterance as some accident really inhering in it, since it is impossible for something to be attributed to an utterance itself by the intellect, since every operation of the intellect is an immanent operation.

Ad secundum dicitur, quod voci per intellectum nihil est attributum tamquam aliquod accidens sibi realiter inhaerens, quia impossibile est voci per intellectum aliquid sibi attribui eo, quod omnis operatio intellectus sit operatio immanens.

§77.13

And it is further replied[cxliv] by denying the proposition 'Contradictories cannot be verified of something successively without it changing'. Nonetheless, contradictories should be distinguished, since some are relative contradictories, and others are not relative contradictories.

Et ulterius dicitur negando istam propositionem contradictoria non possunt ↑[389] verificari de aliquo successive sine sui mutatione. Verumtamen distinguendum est de contradictoriis, quia quaedam sunt contradictoria relativa, quaedam contradictoria non relativa.

388 LK, p. 69.
389 λ, f. a6vb.

§77.14

But relative contradictories can be verified successively of something without it changing, as is made clear by Aristotle in the fifth book of the *Physics*, where he holds that a relative can come to something without that to which it comes changing, so that if only Sortes were pale, then he would not be similar to something with respect to paleness. Then it is posited that later Plato is made to be pale and Sortes does not change at all, then, without Sortes changing, Sortes is made to be similar to Plato, and the two contradictories 'similar' and 'not similar' are verified successively of Sortes without Sortes changing.[cxlv]

Contradictoria autem relativa possunt verificari successive de aliquo sine sui mutatione, sicut patet per Aristotelem quinto *Physicorum,* ubi vult, quod relatio potest advenire alicui sine mutatione illius, cui advenit, sicut si solus Sortes esset albus, tunc non esset similis alicui secundum albedinem. Posito ergo, quod Plato postea fit albus et Sortes in nullo mutatur, tunc sine mutatione Sortis Sortes fit similis Platoni, et illa duo contradictoria simile et non simile verificantur successive de Sorte sine mutatione Sortis.

§77.15

But it is quite true that it is impossible for two contradictories to be verified of something successively, whether or not they are relative contradictories, without either that of which it is verified, or something else, changing.[cxlvi] And so it is in the proposed case, for the utterance is neither changed nor altered by its being a noun and a mark of some concept, but the one imposing the utterance is changed, since now the one imposing imposes and before did not impose.

↓[390] Sed bene verum est, quod impossibile est duo contradictoria verificari de aliquo successive, sive sint contradictoria relativa sive non, sine mutatione illius, de quo velificatur, vel alterius. Et sic est in proposito, nam ipsa vox non mutatur nec alteratur per hoc, quod sit nomen et nota alicuius conceptus, sed imponens ipsam vocem mutatur eo, quod nunc imponit et prius non imposuit.

§77.16

Therefore, it is clear from what was said that the exact cause of some utterance's being a noun is that it is a mark of some mental noun. And, by the same account, the cause of some utterance's being a verb is that it is a mark of some mental verb.

Patet igitur ex dictis, quod praecisa causa, quare aliqua vox est nomen, est, quia est nota alicuius nominis mentalis. Et eadem ratione causa, quare aliqua vox est verbum, est, quia nota alicuius verbi mentalis. Et sic similiter dicendum est de

[390] LK, p. 70.

And so it should similarly be said of any other spoken parts of speech.

quibuscumque aliis partibus orationis vocalis.

§77.17

And so just as it was said concerning utterances with respect to concepts of the soul, it should similarly be said concerning inscriptions with respect to utterances. For just as utterances hold themselves to concepts and passions of the soul, so inscriptions hold themselves to utterances, as is made clear by Aristotle in the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, where he says: 'Therefore those that are in utterance are marks of those passions that are in the soul, and those that are written of those that are in utterance'.[cxlvii] From this, it clearly follows that the exact cause of some inscription's being a noun or some part of speech is that such an inscription is a mark of some spoken noun or of some spoken verb or of some other spoken part of speech.

Et sicut ideo dictum est de vocibus respectu conceptuum animae, consimiliter dicendum est de scriptis respectu vocum. Nam sicut se habent voces ad conceptus et passiones animae, sic se habent scripta ad voces, sicut patet per Aristotelem primo *Perihermenias,* ubi dicit: Sunt ergo ea, quae sunt in voce, earum, quae sunt in anima, passionum notae et ea, quae scribuntur, eorum, quae sunt in voce. Ex quo sequitur plane, quod praecisa causa, quare aliquod scriptum est nomen vel aliqua pars orationis, est, quia tale scriptum est nota alicuius nominis vocalis vel alicuius verbi vocalis vel alterius partis orationis vocalis.

The Eleventh Conclusion

§78.1

The eleventh conclusion is this: that every government is either mental, spoken, or written.

↓[391] Undecima conclusio est haec, quod omne regimen vel est mentale, vocale vel scriptum.[392]

§78.2

That is clear, since every statement is either mental or spoken or written. But every government is a statement, or at least in a statement. Therefore, every government is in either a mental, or

Ista patet, quia omnis oratio vel est mentalis vel vocalis vel scripta. Sed omne regimen est oratio vel saltem in oratione. Ergo omne regimen vel est in oratione mentali vel vocali vel scripta. Et regimen,

391 LK, p. 71.

392 conclusio] vel regula *add*. LK; constructio λ. (Cf. LK: vel regula] *om*. λ, π.)
regimen] communiter usitatum *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: communiter usitatum] *add*. λ, π.)

spoken, or written statement. And the government that is in a spoken statement is called or named 'spoken government'. But that which is in a mental statement is called 'mental government'. And that which is in a written statement is called 'written government'.

quod est in oratione vocali, vocatur sive nominatur regimen vocale. Sed quod est in oratione mentali, vocatur regimen mentale, et quod est in oratione scripta, vocatur regimen scriptum.[393]

§78.3

The major is made clear by Boethius in the commentary on the first chapter of *On Interpretation*, and the minor is known on its own.

Maior patet per Boethium in commento super primum *Perihermenias,* et minor nota est de se.[394]

The Twelfth Conclusion

§79.1

The twelfth conclusion is this: The ultimate force of any government is the concept to which it is reduced. That conclusion is explained by running through each government in turn.

↓[395] Duodecima conclusio est haec: Cuiuslibet regiminis ultimata vis, ad quam reducitur, est conceptus. Ista conclusio declaratur per singula regimina discurrendo.[396]

§79.2

For mental government, which is government by itself and naturally, is made naturally from the force of the nature of the concepts from which such a government is composed, as is clear from the above.[cxlviii]

Nam regimen mentale, quod est regimen per se et naturale, fit naturaliter ex vi naturae conceptuum, ex quibus tale regimen componitur, sicut ex praedictis patet.

§79.3

But spoken government, which is artificial government, and by convention and by accident, is made from the force

Regimen autem vocale, quod est regimen artificiale et ad placitum et per accidens, fit ex vi conceptuum, quibus correspondet

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393 oratio$_1$] communiter usitata *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: communiter usitata] *add*. λ, π.)
regimen$_1$] communiter usitatum *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: communiter usitatum] *add*. λ, π.)

394 Maior] praedictae rationis *add* LK, *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: praedictae rationis] *om*. λ, π.)

395 LK, p. 72.

396 conclusio$_1$] sive regula *add*. LK; constructio λ (Cf. LK: sive regula] *om*. λ, π.)

of the concepts to which such a spoken government corresponds. For, as was held before and extensively explained,[cxlix] the whole reason why some utterance is a noun of third person, and why some utterance is a verb of third person and of a conjugation and so on, and why such a verb requires such a noun, is because such utterances are subordinated to such concepts, of which one is a noun of third person and another is a verb of third person. For if some utterance were to correspond to no such concepts, there would be no such spoken government, as was explained, since then such utterances would not be nouns or verbs.

tale regimen vocale. Nam tota causa, sicut primo habitum est et declaratum difuse, quare aliqua vox est nomen ↑[397] tertiae personae et quare aliqua vox est verbum tertiae personae et coniugationis et cetera et quare tale verbum requirit tale nomen, est, quia tales voces subordinantur talibus conceptibus, quorum unus est nomen tertiae personae et alius est verbum tertiae personae. Nam si nullis talibus conceptibus aliqua vox corresponderet, nullum esset regimen tale vocale, sicut declaratum est, quia tunc tales voces non essent nomina vel verba.

§79.4

But the force of written government is such a spoken government, as was explained, since such would be neither nouns nor verbs unless those inscriptions were to correspond to utterances. And in them there would be no government. From which it clearly follows that every written government is made from the force of the utterances to which such inscriptions correspond, and every spoken government is made from the force of the concepts to which such utterances correspond. Therefore, the ultimate force of any government is the concept to which it is reduced.

Vis autem regiminis scripti est regimen tale vocale, sicut declaratum est, quia talia nec essent nomina nec verba, nisi vocibus corresponderent ipsa scripta. Et in illis nullum esset regimen. Ex quo plane sequitur, quod omne regimen scriptum fit ex vi vocum, quibus talia scripta correspondent, ↓[398] et omne regimen vocale fit ex vi conceptuum, quibus tales voces correspondent. Ergo cuiuslibet regiminis ultimata vis, ad quam reducitur, est conceptus.

§79.5

But against that conclusion it is argued like so:

Sed contra istam conclusionem arguitur sic:

397 λ, f. a7ra.
398 LK, p. 73.

§79.6

There can be written government in nature even if there is no utterance in nature, and there can be spoken government even if there is no concept. Therefore, the concept is not the force of spoken government, and the utterance is not the force of written government.

Regimen scriptum potest esse in rerum natura, quamvis nulla vox sit in rerum natura, et regimen vocale potest esse, quamvis nullus conceptus sit. Ergo nec conceptus est vis regiminis vocalis, nec vox est vis regiminis scripti.

§79.7

The consequence seems to be clear, and the antecedent is clear on its own, since it is clear that some inscription can be and remain even if no human is speaking. Similarly, there can be a spoken statement even if there is no concept.

Consequentia videtur esse plana, et antecedens patet de se, quia planum est, quod aliquod scriptum potest esse et permanere, quamvis nullus homo loquatur. Similiter oratio vocalis potest esse, quamvis conceptus non sit.

§79.8

Again: If all government were from the force of a concept or from the force of an utterance, then it would follow that all modern authors, and also all ancients, such as Donatus, Priscian, Alexander, Peter Helias, and very many others, would have been much too excessive, since they multiplied so many governments, and so many cases of governments, and also forces – that is, that the nominative case is sometimes governed from the force of person and sometimes from the nature of a verb, sometimes from the force of apposition, sometimes from the force of conjoining, sometimes from the force of calling-out, sometimes from the force of prolepsis, and so on for others.[cl] And the excessive multiplication of other cases of governments can be similarly exemplified. And that such great authors

Item: Si omne regimen esset ex vi conceptus vel ex vi vocis, tunc sequitur, quod omnes moderni auctores et etiam antiqui, sicut Donatus, Priscianus, Alexander, Petrus Heliae et quamplurimi alii, essent nimis superflui, quia ↓[399] multiplicaverunt tot regimina et tot casus regiminum et etiam vires, videlicet quod nominativus casus aliquando regitur ex vi personae et aliquando ex vi verbi, aliquando ex vi appositionis, aliquando ex vi conceptionis, aliquando ex vi evocationis, aliquando ex vi prolepsis, et sic de aliis. Et similiter potest exemplificari de nimia multiplicatione regiminum aliorum casuum. Et quod tales et tanti auctores — ita reverendi experti — essent ita inutiliter et ita fatue et multum superflui, non videtur verum.[400]

399 LK, p. 74.
400 vi4 λ] [vi] LK; naturae *add*. LK; nature *add*. λ.

– who should be revered as experts – would have been so foolish and so very uselessly excessive does not seem true.

§79.9

To the first of these,[cli] it is replied that grammarians do not speak so strictly nor so ingeniously, speaking instead as if utterances, and similarly concepts, always remain. And this is said for the sake of those who are speaking.[clii] Hence, in the spoken statement 'Sortes disputes', all grammarians say that the nominative 'Sortes' is governed by the verb 'disputes'. And yet this utterance 'Sortes' is not in nature when this utterance 'disputes' is in nature.[cliii] But grammarians speak as if both utterances are there simultaneously, and as if they are continual, simultaneous, and fixed, and as if they stably remain in nature.

Ad primum istorum dicitur, quod grammatici non loquuntur ita stricte nec ita artificiose, sed loquuntur, ac si voces semper manerent et conceptus similiter. Dicitur et hoc propter favorem loquentium. Unde in ista oratione vocali Sortes disputat dicunt omnes grammatici, quod iste nominativus Sortes regitur ab hoc verbo disputat. Et tamen, quando haec vox disputat ↓[401] est in rerum natura, tunc haec vox Sortes non est in rerum natura. Sed grammatici loquuntur, ac si ambae voces simul essent et ac si continue simul fixe et stabiliter manerent in rerum natura.[402]

§79.10

Nonetheless, if someone wanted to speak entirely strictly, then it could be said that an utterance is governed from the force of a concept without a new imposition. That is, an utterance is related so that it is governed from the force of a concept as if there were such a concept in nature, either because such an utterance had corresponded to such a concept, or because it is so ruled, or will be so ruled, when there will have been such a concept.[cliv] And it should be similarly said concerning inscriptions with respect to utterances. And this is sufficient for the agreement of spoken and written statements, since, if such utterances did not correspond to such concepts when

Verumtamen, si aliquis omnino vellet ita stricte loqui, tunc posset dici, quod vox regitur ex vi conceptus sine nova impositione, id est, vox sic se habet, quod regitur ex vi conceptus, si talis conceptus esset in rerum natura, vel quia talis vox correspondebat tali conceptui, vel quia taliter regitur vel regetur cum talis conceptus fuerit. Et consimiliter dicendum est de scripto respectu vocis. Et hoc sufficit ad congruitatem orationis vocalis vel scriptae, quia, si tales voces non corresponderent talibus conceptibus, cum tales conceptus essent, tunc non esset

401 LK, p. 75.
402 loquentium λ] loquendi LK. (Cf. LK: loquendi] loquentium λ, π; *DMS* §79.12.)

there were such concepts, then there would not be such government, as is made clear by what was explained above.[clv]

tale regimen, sicut patet per ↑[403] superius declarata.[404]

§79.11

And if someone wants to entirely insist that such utterances are not simultaneous, then logically speaking it must certainly be conceded that there would be no government in an utterance if not for the intellect in the way explained.

Et si aliquis vellet omnino instare, quod tales voces non simul sunt, tunc certe logice loquendo oportet concedere, quod nullum regimen esset in voce nisi ad intellectum modo declaratum.

§79.12

To the second,[clvi] it is replied that ancient authors were speaking according to the customary usage for their times, not noticing or explaining what truth there might have been in their way of speaking. But now, in our times, because of the excessive errors that rise up daily and are multiplied almost into infinity from speaking in such a way, which certainly is not fully understood, we are compelled to cut down the root and render an explanation of some kind – at least close to true – for the ancient way of speaking. Accordingly, it should be said that ancient authors, although they were able to express various governments more briefly, nonetheless so replied for the sake of their attentive listeners. And they brought out various governments and expressed them with various names, yet

Ad secundum dicitur, quod antiqui auctores loquebantur secundum usum temporibus eorum habitum, non sentiendo vel declarando, quid veritatis esset in tali modo ↓[405] loquendi. Sed iam istis temporibus propter nimios errores, qui ex tali modo loquendi, qui non sane intelligitur totaliter, cottidie insurgunt et quasi in infinitum multiplicantur. Coacti sumus radicem discutere et causam aliqualem saltem verisimilem antiquae locutionis reddere. Quapropter dicendum est, quod antiqui auctores, quamvis brevius potuissent diversa regimina expressisse, tamen responderunt ita propter favorem respondentium audientium, regimina tractaverunt diversa et diversis nominibus expresserunt, semper tamen ad bonum intellectum.

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403 λ, f. a7rb.

404 vel$_2$ λ] *om*. LK.
quia$_1$] sine nova impositione *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: sine nova impositione] *add*. *Mü*.)
correspondebat λ] corresponderet LK. (Cf. LK: corresponderet] correspondebit *Me*; correspondebat λ, π.)
quia$_2$ λ] qui LK. (Cf. LK: qui] vel quia λ, π.)
regitur$_3$ λ] regit LK.
regetur λ] regitur LK.
cum talis conceptus fuerit λ] *om*. LK. (Cf. LK: regitur] regetur cum talis conceptus fuerit λ, π.)

405 LK, p. 76.

always inclined toward a good understanding.

§80

So that this might be understood better, let us give a few examples.

Quod ut melius intelligatur, pauca ponamus exempla.

The First Example: Government from the Force of Person

§81.1

And first an example of the government that is from the force of person, which government is so named because the nominative, which is said to be governed from the force of person, frequently signifies a third person, about whom there was discussion between another two people. For, furthermore, when some people are talking together – namely, when they talk about themselves – they use the terminology 'you' and 'I', and when they speak of some other, they use nouns and pronouns of the third person – namely, 'that' and 'itself', 'Sortes' and 'Plato', 'John' and 'Bernard', and so on for others.

Et primo de regimine, quod sit ex vi personae, quod regimen ita nominatur, quia frequenter iste nominativus, qui dicitur regi ex vi personae, significat tertiam personam, de qua fiebat sermo inter aliquos duos. Nam quando aliqui adhuc simul loquuntur, scilicet de ipsis loquuntur, utuntur istis ↓[406] vocabulis tu et ego, et quando de aliquo alio loquuntur, utuntur nominibus et pronominibus tertiae personae, scilicet ille et ipse, Sortes et Plato, Johannes et Bernardus, et sic de aliis.

§81.2

And since such expressions, in grammar as much as in logic, are sometimes posited significatively, for an external thing that they were imposed to signify, and are sometimes posited simply,[clvii] namely, for an intention or concept of the mind, as is clear in propositions such as 'Animal is a genus', 'Human is a species', and so on for others, similarly the term 'person' sometimes stands for[clviii] an external thing that it signifies. And frequently it is a third thing or third

Et quia tales dictiones tam in grammatica quam in logica aliquando ponuntur significative pro re extra, pro qua fuerunt impositae ad significandum, et aliquando ponuntur simpliciter, scilicet pro intentione vel conceptu animae, sicut patet in talibus propositionibus animal est genus, homo est species, et sic de aliis. Consimiliter iste terminus persona aliquando stat pro re extra, quam significat. Et frequenter est tertia res vel tertia persona ab illis, qui simul de ea

[406] LK, p. 77.

person, separate from those who are talking together about that thing or person, and sometimes it stands simply for the concept of such a person.

loquuntur, et aliquando stat simpliciter pro conceptu talis personae.

§81.3

And so, just as in arguments such as 'Sortes is a human; human is a species; therefore, Sortes is a species' there is a fallacy of equivocation from the variation of supposition, from this – that the term 'human' supposits personally in the first proposition and supposits simply or, similarly, materially in the second[clix] – a similar defect is made in arguments such as 'This government is made from the force of the third person; and the third person is Sortes; therefore, this government is made from the force of Sortes'. For in the first proposition this expression 'third person' supposits simply for an intention of the soul, and in the second it supposits significatively for an external thing. And so sometimes, and almost always in grammar, when mention is made of 'person', this expression 'third person' signifies a concept, so that the truth of the matter is that all such government is reduced to a concept.

Et ideo, sicut in talibus argumentis: Sortes est homo; homo est species; ergo Sortes est species, est fallacia aequivocationis ex variatione suppositionis ex eo, quod iste terminus homo in prima propositione supponit personaliter et in secunda supponit simpliciter vel consimiliter materialiter, consimilis defectus fit in talibus argumentis: Hoc regimen fit ex vi tertiae personae; et tertia persona est Sortes; ergo hoc ↓[407] regimen fit ex vi Sortis. Nam in prima propositione haec dictio tertia persona supponit simpliciter pro intentione animae, et in secunda supponit significative pro re extra. Et ita aliquando et quasi semper in grammatica, quando fit mentio de persona, haec dictio tertia persona significat conceptum ita, quod omne tale regimen in rei veritate reducitur ad conceptum.[408]

The Second Example: Government from the Verb's Nature

§82

And it is similarly understood when it is said that the nominative case put after the substantive verb is governed from the force of the verb's nature. The term 'verb's nature' does not stand, nor supposit, for

Et consimiliter intelligitur, quando dicitur, quod nominativus casus positus post verbum substantivum regitur ex vi naturae verbi. Iste terminus natura verbi non stat nec supponit pro aliqua re extra

407 LK, p. 78.

408 vel] et LK. (Cf. LK: et] vel *Me*.)
consimiliter λ] *om*. LK. (Cf. LK: materialiter] consimiliter *add*. *Me*.)
materialiter] *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: materialiter] *om*. λ, π.)

some thing external to the soul, but for the mental substantive or calling verb,[clx] from the force of which such a government is made in the utterance, since such a mental verb naturally requires a case after it just like it had before it. Or at least it requires that if some noun is added in the part after, the noun would be put in the same case in the part before.

animam, sed pro verbo mentali substantivo vel vocativo, ex cuius vi fit tale regimen in voce, quia tale verbum mentale naturaliter requirit consimilem casum post se, qualem habuit ante se, vel saltem requirit, quod, si aliquod nomen addatur a parte post, in simili casu ponatur, in quo nomen ponitur a parte ante positum.[409]

The Third Example: Government from the Force of Apposition, Calling-Out, Conjoining, and Others

§83

And it should also be similarly said of apposition, of calling-out, of conjoining, and so on for others, which supposit simply for a concept or concepts in such propositions, when it is said 'Such a case is governed from the force of apposition, from the force of calling-out, from the force of conjoining' – that is, from the force of such concepts that are so named. And why they are so named can, by a clever person, be taken easily from the sayings of Priscian and of other ancients.

↓[410] Sic etiam dicendum est de appositione, de evocatione, de conceptione, et sic de aliis, quae supponunt simpliciter pro conceptu vel conceptibus in talibus propositionibus, quando dicitur: Talis casus regitur ex vi appositionis, ex vi evocationis, ex vi conceptionis, id est ex vi talium conceptuum, qui ↑[411] taliter nominantur. Et quare sic nominantur, faciliter potest ingeniosus ex dictis Prisciani et aliorum antiquorum elicere.

The Fourth Example: Government from the Force of Possession

§84.1

It should also be similarly said of the government of the genitive, when it is said that such a genitive is governed from the force of possession – that is, from the force of a concept, which concept commonly, indeed frequently, signifies a possessed thing or a possession, even

Consimiliter etiam dicendum est de regimine genitivi, quando dicitur, quod talis genitivus regitur ex vi possessionis, id est ex vi conceptus, qui quidem conceptus, ut communiter, hoc est frequenter, significat rem possessam vel ↓[412] possessionem quamvis aliquando

409 intelligitur] intelligendum est suo modo LK. (Cf. LK: intelligendum est suo modo] intelligitur *Mü*, *Me*.)
410 LK, p. 79.
411 λ, f. a7va.
412 LK, p. 80.

though it sometimes signifies entirely nothing, as is clear in the statement 'The son of a chimera runs', or in the statement 'The substance of blindness is an accident', and so on for others.

omnino nihil significet, sicut patet in ista oratione filius chimaerae currit vel in ista oratione substantia caecitatis est accidens, et sic de aliis.

§84.2

And it should be similarly understood that when it is said that in the statement 'The cask is full of wine', the genitive 'of wine' is governed from the force of fullness or emptiness – governed, that is, from the force of a concept, which concept commonly signifies a full or an empty thing, although sometimes in such a statement, or in a similar construal, the corresponding concept signifies nothing, as is clear in the statement 'A vacuum is filled with a chimera'.

Et consimiliter intelligendum est, quando dicitur, quod in ista oratione dolium est plenum vini, quod iste genitivus vini regitur ex vi plenitudinis vel vacuitatis, id est regitur ex vi conceptus, qui conceptus, ut communiter, significat rem plenam vel vacuam, quamvis aliquando in tali oratione sive consimili constructione conceptus correspondens nihil significet, sicut patet in ista oratione vacuum est plenum chimaerae.

§84.3

And it can also be similarly said that when it is said that in the statement 'Sortes is a lover of wine', the genitive 'of wine' is governed from the force of an act converted into a disposition – that is, from the force of a concept, which concept connotes a disposition caused by many acts, since no one is called a 'lover of wine' because of one drinking of wine, but because of many such acts, which, so multiplied, generate a disposition.

Et consimiliter etiam potest dici, quando dicitur, quod in ista oratione Sortes est amator vini iste genitivus vini regitur ex vi actus conversi in habitum, id est ex vi conceptus, qui conceptus connotat habitum causatum ex multis actibus, quia nemo dicitur amator vini propter unam potationem vini, sed propter multos tales actus, qui sic multiplicati generant habitum.

§85.1

From this, what should be held concerning all governments can be known easily, with this always being held fundamental: that every government is ultimately produced from the force of a concept or concepts.

Ex his faciliter potest haberi, quid de aliis regiminibus sit dicendum, hoc semper pro fundamento tenendo, quod omne regimen fit ex vi conceptus finaliter vel conceptuum.

§85.2

Again: If it is sometimes asked by some people: What is that concept that is called a 'mental noun' or 'mental verb'? I say that a mental noun can be described like so: A mental noun is a concept or passion of the soul primarily required in the composition of a complete mental statement. And a mental verb is a passion of the soul secondarily required for the composition or construal of a complete mental statement. And those are descriptions and are not, properly speaking, called 'definitions', since, according to Aristotle in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*, no accidents are properly speaking defined. But they are statements that make known what is conveyed or signified by that name, and this is sufficient.

↓[413] Item: Si aliquando ab aliquibus quaeratur, quis est ille conceptus, qui dicitur nomen mentale vel verbum mentale, dico, quod nomen mentale potest sic describi: Nomen mentale est conceptus vel passio animae primo requisitus in compositione orationis mentalis perfectae. Et verbum mentale est passio animae secundario requisita ad compositionem vel constructionem orationis mentalis perfectae. Et sunt istae descriptiones et non definitiones proprie dictae, quia, secundum Aristotelem septimo *Metaphysicae,* nullum accidens proprie definitur. Sed sunt orationes notificantes, quid per ipsum nomen importetur vel significetur, et hoc sufficit.

§85.3

And if it is further asked: What is that concept that primarily is required and that secondarily is required in the composition of such a statement? I say that this is had by means of experience, since a person, careful in considering themselves and how they compose mental statements, experiences in themselves what concept is more suitable to precede and what more suitable to follow and what is required and what not required. And so there should be nothing said to further such inquiries beyond considering how, in one's own mind or in oneself, it is experienced what concept precedes and what follows and what concept presupposes another and what does not, as if it were asked: What is fire?

↓[414] Et si quaeratur ulterius, quis est ille conceptus, qui primo requiritur et qui secundario requiritur in compositione talis orationis, dico, quod hoc habetur per experimentum, quia homo subtilis subtiliter in se considerans, qualiter componat orationes mentales, experitur in se, quis conceptus convenientius praecedit et quis convenientius sequitur et quis requiritur et quis non requiritur. Et ideo ulterius ad tales quaestiones non est dicendum, nisi ut cogitet, quamvis in mente sua sive in se ipso, et experiatur, quis conceptus praecedit et quis sequitur et quis conceptus alium praesupponit et quis non, sicut si quaeratur, quid esset ignis, convenienter respondetur, quod est elementum calidum et siccum. Et si

[413] LK, p. 81.
[414] LK, p. 82.

It would be suitably replied that it is a hot and dry element. And if it is further asked: What is that hot and dry element? It very well can be replied to such a questioner: one can poke a finger in all elements and experience what element is hot and what dry and what is not. Nor can anything else more suitable be replied.

quaeratur ulterius, quid esset illud elementum calidum et siccum, bene posset responderi tali quaerenti, quod talis poneret digitum in omnibus elementis et experiretur, quod elementum esset calidum et quod siccum et quod non. Nec convenientius posset aliter responderi.[415]

THE THIRD PART OF THE THIRD CHAPTER

UNDOING THE REASONS IN OPPOSITION

§86

With those matters so finished, there now remains the third part of this chapter – namely, to reply to the reasons in opposition.

↓[416] Istis taliter finitis iam restat nunc tertia pars huius capituli, scilicet ad rationes in oppositum respondere.

Reply to the First Argument

§87.1

To the first argument,[clxi] it is replied that this proposition 'Something is added or accrued[clxii] to an utterance by that utterance's being a sign or part of speech' should be distinguished, since something's being added or accrued can be understood in two ways.

Ad primum argumentum dicitur distinguendo hanc propositionem voci per hoc, quod ipsa est signum vel pars orationis, aliquid additur vel aliquid acquiritur, eo, quod aliquid addi vel acquiri potest intelligi dupliciter.[417]

§87.2

Namely, really, as paleness is added to a wall or hotness is added to its subject. In that way, the aforesaid proposition is false, since absolutely nothing is added in that way to an utterance by that

Scilicet realiter, sicut albedo additur parieti vel caliditas additur suo subiecto. Et isto modo praedicta propositio est falsa, quia nihil simpliciter ↑[418] additur tali modo voci per hoc, quod ipsa vox sit

415 requiritur$_2$] convenienter *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: convenienter] *add*. λ, π.)
416 LK, p. 83.
417 primum λ] quarum primam LK.
argumentum λ] [persuasionem] LK. (Cf. LK: quarum … distinguendo] quarum primum argumentum ditinguo *Me*; primum argumentum igitur dicendum est distinguo λ, π.)
418 λ, f. a7vb.

utterance's being significative, or by its being a noun or a verb or some other part of speech, since this is distinctly against Aristotle in the fifth book of the *Physics*, where he holds that in no way is a motion made toward a relation, understanding by this that a relative term can be verified of something and afterward falsified without something changing or without the arrival of something to it, of which such a term is verified and afterward falsified. And this is made clear by what was said before concerning the relative term 'similar'.[clxiii] For it is posited that there is merely one colored item in nature. Then, without it changing, an item so colored would be similar to no other. If God were to make another body having similar qualities to those of the first body, then the first body would be similar to the other, and yet nothing at all would be really added to it.

significativa, vel nomen vel verbum vel aliqua ↓[419] alia pars orationis, quia hoc esset expresse contra Aristotelem quinto *Physicorum,* ubi vult, quod ad relationem nullo modo fit motus, per hoc intelligens, quod terminus relativus potest de aliquo velificari et postea falsificari sine aliqua mutatione vel sine adventu alicuius ad id, de quo talis terminus verificatur et postea falsificatur. Et hoc patet per prius dicta de isto termino relativo simile. Nam posito, quod unum coloratum tantummodo esset in rerum natura, tunc taliter coloratus nulli alteri esset similis sine eius mutatione. Si Deus faceret aliud corpus habens consimilem qualitatem cum primo corpore, tunc esset illud corpus primum alteri simile, et tamen nihil penitus esset sibi realiter additum.

§87.3

In another way, something can be added to another by predication, although nothing is added or changed in the domain of things, especially concerning that to which such an addition is made by predication. And in that way something is added to an utterance by that utterance's being significative, or by its being a noun or some other part of speech, since immediately after the imposition is made the predicate 'noun', or the predicate 'part of speech', which did not apply to the utterance before, applies to it. And it is like this concerning many other grammatical accidents or grammatical predicates, such as the predicates 'of masculine gender', 'of singular number', 'of finite figure', and

Alio modo potest aliquid addi alicui per praedicationem, quamvis nulla sit facta ex parte rei additio vel mutatio, praecipue circa ipsum, cui talis additio per praedicationem fit. Et isto modo voci aliquid additur per hoc, quod ipsa fit significativa, vel nomen vel aliqua alia pars orationis, quia statim post impositionem factam competit voci illud praedicatum ↓[420] nomen vel illud praedicatum pars orationis, quod prius sibi non competebat. Et sic de multis aliis accidentibus grammaticalibus vel praedicatis grammaticalibus, sicut sunt ista praedicata masculini generis, singularis numeri, figurae finitis et multa alia. Nam ante impositionem nullum

419 LK, p. 84.
420 LK, p. 85.

many others. For before imposition none of these applied to an utterance. And this I say properly speaking.

istorum voci competebat. Et hoc dico proprie loquendo.

Reply to the First Proof of the Antecedent of the First Argument

§88.1

And to the proof of those first propositions[clxiv] – when it is said that if nothing is added to an utterance when an utterance is made to be a sign or a part of speech or when it is imposed to signify, then utterances before imposition could produce construal just as after – I reply that, if this is understood as a real addition, then I deny the consequence, since utterances become nouns and parts of speech through imposition, just as a boy is called 'John' through imposition and was not called 'John' before imposition. And yet it is clear that nothing at all in the domain of things is added to the boy by his being called by such a noun.

Et ad probationem istius primae propositionis — quando dicitur, quod, si voci nihil adderetur, quando vox fit signum vel pars orationis vel quando imponitur ad significandum, tunc voces ante impositionem possent facere constructionem sicut post — dico, quod, si intelligatur de additione reali, tunc nego consequentiam, quia per impositionem voces fiunt nomina et partes orationis, sicut per impositionem puer vocatur Johannes et ante impositionem non vocabatur Johannes. Et tamen clarum est, quod puero ex parte rei nihil penitus additur per hoc, quod tali nomine vocatur.[421]

§88.2

And further, when it is said as a proof of the consequence[clxv] that the same, as the same, is naturally apt always to produce the same, I say that that proposition should be conceded concerning a natural process or operation, since the same, as the same, is naturally apt always to produce the same naturally, but not accidentally or artificially, since sometimes, by some device,[clxvi] it produces at one time what it does not produce at another time. And thus an utterance by the device of grammatical imposition makes something to be a

Et ulterius, quando dicitur probando consequentiam, quod idem inquantum idem semper est aptum natum facere idem, dico illam propositionem debere concedi quantum ad factionem vel operationem naturalem, quia idem inquantum idem aptum natum est facere idem naturaliter, sed non ↓[422] accidentaliter vel artificialiter, quia aliquando idem per aliquam artem facit in uno tempore, quod non facit in alio tempore. Et ita vox per artem imponentis grammaticalis fit construtibile grammaticale, quae ante impositionem

421 post] prius LK, λ. (Cf. *DMS* §11.1.)
422 LK, p. 86.

grammatical construable that before imposition was not a grammatical construable or some part of speech properly speaking.

non fuit constructibile grammaticale, vel aliqua pars orationis proprie loquendo.

Reply to the Second Argument

§89.1

To the second argument,[clxvii] it is replied that this proposition 'Everything narrowed to a delimited species, to which it was not narrowed before', and so on, should be distinguished. That proposition should be distinguished, since species are manifold. For some are species of absolute predicaments, as are species of substance and also some species of quantity and of quality.[clxviii] Some are species of relatives and of connotatives, and all species in the genus of relation are especially such.

Ad secundum argumentum dicitur distinguendo hanc propositionem omne contractum ad determinatam speciem, ad quam prius non fuit contractum et cetera. Illa est distinguenda eo, quod species sunt multiplices. Nam quaedam sunt species praedicamentorum absolutorum, cuiusmodi sunt species substantiae et etiam aliquae species quantitatis et qualitatis. Quaedam sunt species relativorum et connotativorum, et tales praecipue sunt omnes species in genere relationis.[423]

§89.2

Taking species in the first way, I concede that nothing can be narrowed to a delimited species unless by something added to it.

Primo modo accipiendo speciem sic concedo, quod nihil potest contrahi ad determinatam speciem nisi per aliquod sibi additum.

§89.3

But taking species in the second way, I deny the aforesaid proposition, since then something can be contained under some species of relation under which nothing was contained before, even though nothing at all is added to it, as is made distinctly clear by the Philosopher[clxix] in

↓[424] Sed accipiendo speciem secundo modo nego praedictam propositionem, quia tunc aliquid potest contineri sub aliqua specie relationis, sub qua prius non continebatur, quamvis penitus nihil sibi addatur, sicut expresse patet per Philosophum ↑[425] in *Praedicamentis*

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423 secundum λ] secundam LK.
argumentum] [persuasionem] LK; *om*. λ. (Cf. LK: secundam] conclusionem *Mü*; secundum argumentum *Me*; secundum λ, π.)

424 LK, p. 87.

425 λ, f. a8ra.

the chapter on substance in the *Categories*, where he holds that the same statement is sometimes narrowed to the species of truth and sometimes to the species of falsity without something being added to it.

capitulo de substantia, ubi vult, quod eadem oratio in modo aliquando contrahatur ad speciem veritatis et aliquando ad speciem falsitatis sine hoc, quod aliquid sibi addatur.

§89.4

Yet it very well must be conceded that something is newly added to whatever such thing is narrowed to some species, or to something else, since, although nothing is really added to a statement, nonetheless something is added to the thing for which the statement is verified or falsified. And similarly, I say that an utterance is narrowed to the species of noun not by something added to or impressed on the utterance, but by a change made in the will of the one imposing, who decided to establish and subordinate an utterance to a concept and an inscription to the utterance.

Verumtamen, bene oportet concedi, quod cuicumque tali contracto ad aliquam speciem de novo aliquid addatur vel alicui alteri, quia, quamvis orationi nihil addatur realiter, tamen rei, pro qua oratio verificatur vel falsificatur, aliquid additur. Et consimiliter dico, quod vox contrahitur ad speciem nominis non per aliquod voci additum vel impressum, sed per mutationem factam in voluntate imponentis, cui placuit statuere et subordinare vocem conceptui et scriptum voci.

§90

And, generally, all the following arguments are replied to by making that reply.

Et per istam responsionem fere ad omnia argumenta sequentia respondetur.

Reply to the Third Argument

§91.1

To the third[clxx] – when it is said 'Something is newly added to everything to which some accident is newly accrued' – I say that that proposition should be distinguished, since accident is taken in two ways, since something is called an 'accident' of something else because it really inheres in it and is really in it as in

↓[426] Ad tertium: quando dicitur omni tali de novo aliquid additur, cui aliquod accidens de novo acquiritur, dico ad istam propositionem distinguendo eo, quod accidens dupliciter accipitur, quia aliquid dicitur accidens alicuius eo, quod sibi realiter inhaeret et est in eo realiter tamquam in subiecto. Alio modo dicitur

[426] LK, p. 88.

a subject. In another way, something is called an 'accident' of something because it is accidentally predicated of it.

aliquid accidens alicuius, quia de eo accidentaliter praedicatur.[427]

§91.2

In the first way, paleness is an accident of a pale subject. In the second way, the term 'blind' is an accident of the term 'human', since it is accidentally predicated of the term 'human'. And similarly the term 'sitting' or 'running' is an accident of the term 'human', since it is accidentally predicated of the term 'human'. And similarly, all these proposition are true by accident: 'A human is blind', 'A human is sitting', 'A human is running', and so on for similars. And in that way, the terms 'of the nominative case', 'of masculine gender', 'of singular number', and similar terms are accidents of the term 'noun'.

Primo modo albedo est accidens subiecti albi, secundo modo iste terminus caecus est accidens istius termini homo, quia accidentaliter praedicatur de isto termino homo. Et similiter ille terminus sedens vel currens est accidens illius termini homo, quia accidentaliter praedicatur de illo termino homo. Et similiter omnes istae propositiones sunt per accidens verae: homo est caecus, homo est sedens, homo est currens, et sic de similibus. Et isto modo isti termini nominativi casus, ↓[428] masculini generis, singularis numeri et consimiles termini sunt accidentia istius termini nomen.

§91.3

Therefore, taking accident in the first way, the aforesaid proposition is true. But like this no accident is accrued to an utterance, since no accident is in an utterance as in a subject, as Aristotle holds in the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he says that an accident is not of an accident – and especially according to the Commentator of Lincoln,[clxxi] and also according to Thomas,[clxxii] expositing that text. But taking accident in the second way, the aforementioned proposition is thus false, since such an accident can newly come to something even if nothing is really accrued to it, as is made clear by the aforesaid.[clxxiii]

Primo modo igitur capiendo accidens praedicta propositio est vera. Sed sic nullum accidens acquiritur voci, quia in voce nullum est accidens tamquam in subiecto, sicut vult Aristoteles primo *Posteriorum,* ubi dicit, quod accidentis non est accidens, et praecipue secundum Commentatorem Lincolniensem et etiam secundum Thomam illius textus expositorem. Sed secundo modo accipiendo accidens sic praeaccepta propositio est falsa, quia tale accidens potest advenire alicui de novo, quamvis nihil acquiratur sibi realiter, sicut patet per praedicta.

427 tertium λ] tertiam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: tertiam] tertium λ, π.)
428 LK, p. 89.

Reply to the Fourth Argument

§92

To the fourth,[clxxiv] it is replied by denying the proposition – namely, 'Everything that now imparts something to the intellect or produces some sense in the intellect' and so on. For it is clear that a Latin proposition, one and the same in number, that produces no sense in the intellect of the lay person, afterwards, without changing, produces a sense in that same intellect – namely, because that lay person has been taught. Nonetheless, as was said above, it must be that some change is made either in an utterance or in some other, by reason of which such an utterance produces a sense, which it did not produce before, in the intellect.

Ad quartum dicitur negando istam propositionem, scilicet omne, quod nunc derelinquit aliquid intellectui vel aliquem sensum facit intellectui et cetera. Nam ↓[429] clarum est, quod una et eadem propositio numero latina nullum sensum faciens intellectui laici, postea in nullo mutata facit sensum intellectui eiusdem, cum scilicet ille laicus fuerit instructus. Verumtamen, sicut supra dictum est, oportet, quod aliqua mutatio sit facta vel in voce vel in aliquo alio, ratione cuius talis vox facit intellectui sensum, quem prius non fecit.[430]

Reply to the Fifth Argument

§93

To the fifth,[clxxv] it is replied by denying the major, for after imposition this utterance 'human' is a consideration of the grammarian, and before imposition it was not a consideration of the grammarian, since after imposition it is properly speaking a noun, and before imposition it was not a noun. Yet there is not anything really added to the utterance, but it is merely by its being decided by the one imposing, since this utterance 'human', which before was not a mark of some concept, is a mark of some concept, as is made clear by the aforesaid.

Ad quintum dicitur negando maiorem, nam haec vox homo post impositionem est de consideratione grammatici et ante impositionem non fuit de consideratione grammatici, quia post impositionem est nomen proprie loquendo et ante impositionem non fuit nomen. Non tamen illi voci aliquid realiter additur, sed tantummodo per hoc, quod placuit impositori, quia haec vox homo esset nota alicuius conceptus, quae prius non fuit nota alicuius conceptus, sicut per praedicta patuit.[431]

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429 LK, p. 90.

430 quartum λ] quartam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: quartam] quartum *Me*, λ, π.)

431 quintum λ] quintam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: quintam] quintum *Me*, λ, π.)

Reply to the Sixth Argument

§94

To the sixth,[clxxvi] it is replied by denying the major, for it is clear that fire to which a heatable item does not approach does not heat. And when approached in the appropriate way by a heatable item, that fire, the same in number and without changing, heats that heatable item. And that is not because of a change made in the fire but in the heatable item. Like so, a spoken statement can cause an act of studying, believing, or knowing, after its imposition is made and not before its imposition is made. But this is not because of a change made in the statement, but in some other – namely, in the one imposing.

↓[432] Ad sextum dicitur negando maiorem, nam clarum est, quod ignis, cui non approximatur aliquod calefactibile, non calefacit. Et ille idem ignis numero in nullo mutatus, calefactibili debito modo approximato, illud calefactibile calefacit. Et illud non est propter mutationem factam in igne, sed in calefactibili. Sic oratio vocalis potest causare actum studendi, ↑[433] opinandi vel sciendi post eius impositionem factam et non ante impositionem factam. Sed hoc non est propter mutationem factam in oratione, sed in aliquo alio, scilicet in imponente.[434]

Reply to the Seventh Argument

§95

To the seventh,[clxxvii] it is replied by denying the major, since something that now is not in the predicament of relation can be in the predicament of relation without it changing, as is made sufficiently clear by the aforesaid.[clxxviii]

Ad septimum dicitur negando maiorem, quia aliquid, quod nunc non est in praedicamento relationis, potest sine sui mutatione esse in praedicamento relationis, sicut per praedicta satis patet.[435]

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432 LK, p. 91.

433 λ, f. a8rb.

434 sextum] sextam LK λ; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: sextam] sextum *Me*.)
non$_1$] appropinquatur vel *add.* LK. (Cf. LK: appropinquatur vel approximatur] approximatur *Me*.)

435 septimum λ] septimam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: septimam] septimum *Me*, λ, π.)
relationis] et hoc totum intelligendo respectu alicuius tertii correlativi *add*. LK, λ. (Cf. LK: et hoc totum intelligendo respectu alicuius tertii correlativi] *add*. λ, π.)

Reply to the Eighth Argument

§96

To the eighth,[clxxix] it is replied by denying the major, or it is replied that, by taking a restriction, just as an utterance is restricted by its being imposed to signify, like so the major is false, since such a restriction is nothing more than to signify a certain thing now that it did not signify before, or to correspond to some concept now to which it did not correspond before. And in that way a restriction is sufficiently broadly taken. And then something can be restricted without this: that it is changed in some manner.[clxxx]

↓[436] Ad octavum dicitur negando maiorem, vel dicitur, quod accipiendo artationem, sicut vox artatur per hoc, quod imponitur ad significandum, sic maior est falsa, quia talis artatio non est aliud nisi certam rem significare nunc, quam prius non significabat, vel alicui conceptui nunc correspondere, cui prius non correspondebat. Et isto modo satis large accipitur artatio. Et tunc aliquid potest artari sine hoc, quod in aliquo mutetur.[437]

Reply to the Ninth Argument

§97.1

To the ninth,[clxxxi] it is replied that the argument proceeds according to a fabrication of those who posit a relation to be a thing distinct from any sign and from each term of a relation and also its foundation, which fabrication I count to be false. For I hold that a relation is not any thing distinct from a signifying relative sign or from a thing related or relatable to another.

Ad nonum dicitur, quod argumentum procedit secundum imaginationem istorum, qui ponunt relationem esse rem distinctam ab omni signo et ab utroque termino relationis et etiam ab fundamento, quam imaginationem reputo esse falsam. Nam ego teneo, quod relatio non sit aliqua res distincta a signo significante relative vel a re ad aliam relatam vel referibilem.[438]

§97.2

And so I say that a relation that arises by the imposition of an utterance is not any thing distinct from a sign signifying relatively. And so where that relative sign is, there the relation is, so that if the

Et ideo dico, quod relatio, quae resultat per impositionem vocis, non est aliqua res distincta a signo significante relative. Et ideo, ubi est illud signum relativum, ibi est ipsa ↓[439] relatio, ut si illud signum

436 LK, p. 92.
437 octavum] octavam LK; viii λ; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: octavam] octavum *Me*, λ, π.)
438 nonum] nonam LK; ix λ; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: nonam] nonum *Me*, λ, π.)
439 LK, p. 93.

relative sign is subjectively in the air,[clxxxii] then the relation is subjectively in the air, and if the relative sign is in the intellect, then the relation is in the intellect.

relativum est in aere subiective, tunc illa relatio est in aere subiective, et si illud signum relativum est in intellectu, tunc illa relatio est in intellectu.

§97.3

And furthermore I say that the proposition that is assumed – namely, that the intellect is not related to some external thing – although it does not have much to do with what was proposed, is most false according to their principles. For the intellect is related to the one who is understanding, since it follows: an intellect; therefore, an intellect of someone understanding. And again it follows: an understanding; therefore, an understanding by some intellect. And it is clear that what is understanding is an external thing – namely, God, an angel, a human, and the like.

Et ultra dico, quod ista propositio, quae assumitur, quamvis non multum sit ad propositum, scilicet quod intellectus non refertur ad rem extra, secundum principia eorum est falsissima. Nam intellectus refertur ad intelligentem, quia sequitur intellectus, ergo alicuius intelligentis intellectus. Et iterum sequitur intelligens, igitur aliquo intellectu intelligens. Et clarum est, quod intelligens est res extra, sicut Deus, angelus, homo et similia.

Reply to the Tenth Argument

§98

To the tenth,[clxxxiii] it is replied by denying the major, since, as held before,[clxxxiv] the same thing in number can stand successively under each term of a contradiction relatively without it changing or without an accrual or loss of some other thing in it.

Ad decimum dicitur negando maiorem, quia, sicut prius habitum est, eadem res numero potest successive stare sub utroque termino contradictionis relative sine sui mutatione vel sine acquisitione vel ne alicuius alterius rei in se.[440]

Reply to Eleventh Argument

§99.1

To the eleventh,[clxxxv] it is replied by denying the major just as much as the minor, speaking of the mode of signifying

↓[441] Ad undecimum dicitur negando tam maiorem quam minorem, loquendo de

[440] decimum λ] decimam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK decimam] decimum *Me*, λ, π.)
[441] LK, p. 94.

as they speak.

modis significandi, sicut ipsi loquuntur.[442]

§99.2

Yet if they want to call the mental parts of speech, which are concepts of the mind, 'modes of signifying', like so the minor would be true. For this spoken statement '*Hominem currit*' is disagreeing by accident because the mental statement, to which it corresponds, is disagreeing from its nature and by itself. And thus it is because of a variation of a concept that agreement is varied. Yet it does not follow from this that there is any mode of signifying, as they posit, in an utterance.

Si tamen vellent vocare modus significandi partes orationis mentales, quae sunt conceptus mentis, sic esset minor vera. Nam haec oratio vocalis hominem currit est incongrua per accidens, quia oratio mentalis, cui illa correspondet, est incongrua ex sui natura et per se. Et ideo propter variationem conceptus variatur congruitas. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod sit aliquis modus significandi in voce, sicut ipsi ponunt.

Reply to the Twelfth Argument

§100.1

To the twelfth,[clxxxvi] it is replied by denying the consequence. And to the proof, I reply by conceding that agreement is not always caused by those signified things nor also is it efficiently or formally caused by utterances. Nonetheless, it is materially caused by utterances and inscriptions and formally by concepts, and it is efficiently caused by bringing forth or producing a statement. For the agreement of a statement is not anything other than the agreeing statement itself, and therefore whatever causes an agreeing statement causes the agreement.

Ad duodecimum dicitur negando consequentiam. Et ad probationem dico concedendo, quod congruitas non semper causatur ab ipsis rebus significatis nec etiam causatur a vocibus efficienter vel formaliter. Verumtamen causatur a vocibus et scriptis materialiter et a conceptibus formaliter, et a proferente vel efficiente orationem causatur efficienter. Nam congruitas orationis non est aliud ↓[443] quam ipsa ↑[444] oratio congrua, et ergo, quidquid causat orationem congruam, causat congruitatem.[445]

442 undecimum λ] undecimam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: undecimam] undecimum *Mü*, *Me*, λ, π.)
443 LK, p. 95.
444 λ, f. a8va.
445 duodecimum λ] duodecimam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: duodecimam] duodecimum *Me*, λ, π.)

§100.2

And if it is replied that it follows from this that this spoken statement 'A human is an animal' before imposition had been agreeing, since before imposition there was the utterance 'A human is an animal', I say that the consequence should be denied, since there is there the fallacy of the figure of an expression[clxxxvii] – although the ignorant believe that all such arguments, which nonetheless are most obviously paralogisms, are demonstrations.[clxxxviii]

Et si dicatur, quod ex hoc sequitur, quod haec oratio vocalis homo est animal ante impositionem fuisset congrua, quia ante impositionem fuit ista vox homo est animal, dico negando consequentiam, quia ibi est fallacia figurae dictionis, quamvis ignorantes credant omnia talia argumenta esse demonstrationes, quae tamen manifestissime sunt paralogismi.

§100.3

Hence, it is clear that this argument is not valid: 'Sortes and *A* are the same thing; and yesterday Sortes was Sortes; therefore, yesterday Sortes was *A*'. For it is posited that *A* signifies Sortes exactly through that present day and not before or after, so that it did not signify Sortes yesterday – then the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Hence, this consequence is not valid: 'Yesterday Sortes was what now is *A*; therefore, yesterday Sortes was *A*', just as it does not follow 'Yesterday Sortes was what now is a father; therefore, yesterday Sortes was a father', since it is posited that the son of Sortes is born this hour – then the antecedent is true and the consequent false.[clxxxix]

Unde clarum est, quod istud argumentum non valet, Sortes et *a* sunt idem res; et Sortes heri fuit Sortes; igitur Sortes heri fuit *a*. Nam posito, quod *a* significet praecise Sortem per istam diem praesentem et non ante vel post ita, quod non significavit Sortem heri, tunc antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Unde ista consequentia non valet Sortes heri fuit illud, quod nunc est *a*; igitur Sortes heri fuit *a*, sicut non sequitur Sortes heri fuit illud, quod nunc est pater; igitur Sortes heri fuit pater, quia posito, quod filius nascatur Sorti ista hora, tunc antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.[446]

§100.4

And all that is clear to anyone knowing anything about logic.

↓[447] Et totum illud est clarum cuilibet scienti aliquid de logica.

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446 istud argumentum] ista argumenta LK; ista argumentatio λ. (Cf. LK: argumenta] argumentatio λ, π; *DMS* §§43.3, 68.5, 87.1, 89.1, 97.1.)
valet λ] valent LK. (Cf. LK: valent] valet λ, π.)

447 LK, p. 96.

Reply to the Thirteenth Argument

§101

To the thirteenth,[cxc] it is replied by denying the consequence, for a noun is a noun materially by its very self and formally by a concept and efficiently by an imposition, or by what causes and affects that noun. And yet from this it does not follow that there is some mode of signifying – according to what they posit – subjectively in the utterance.

Ad decimum tertium dicitur negando consequentiam, nam nomen est nomen se ipso materialiter et conceptu formaliter et impositione efficienter vel causante et efficiente illud nomen. Et tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod sit aliquis modus significandi — secundum quod ipsi ponunt — subiective in ipsa voce.[448]

Reply to the Fourteenth Argument

§102

To the fourteenth,[cxci] it is replied by conceding that this noun 'Sortes' and this pronoun 'that', which designates Sortes, signify exactly the same item. And similarly it is conceded that a signified thing does not make a noun to be a noun nor bring about the difference between a noun and a pronoun. And further the consequence that infers 'Therefore only a mode of signifying brings about the difference' is denied – taking 'mode of signifying' in this for something existing subjectively in an utterance. For all expressions, and similarly all things, differing among themselves are different in themselves.

Ad decimum quartum dicitur concedendo, quod hoc nomen Sortes et hoc pronomen ille, quod denominat Sortem, praecise idem significant. Et consimiliter conceditur, quod res significata non facit nomen esse nomen nec facit differentiam inter nomen et pronomen. ↓[449] Et ulterius negatur consequentia, qua infertur ergo solus modus significandi facit differentiam, in hoc accipiendo modum significandi pro aliquo existente subiective in voce. Nam omnes dictiones et similiter omnes res differentes semet ipsis differunt.[450]

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448 decimum tertium] decimam tertiam LK; secundum λ; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK decimam tertiam] decimum tertium λ, π, *et inv*. *Me*.)

449 LK, p. 97.

450 decimum quartum λ] decimam quartam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam quartam] decimum quartum λ, π.)

Reply to the Fifteenth Argument

§103

To the fifteenth,[cxcii] it is replied that I concede that there are many nouns that signify exactly no thing. And further the consequence that infers 'Therefore those nouns differ by a mode of signifying' is denied – and this, of course, always with the understanding that the mode of signifying is taken as they take it.

Ad decimum quintum dicitur concedendo, quod multa sunt nomina, quae praecise nullam rem significant. Et ulterius negatur consequentia, qua infertur igitur ista nomina differunt per modum significandi, et hoc semper sane intelligendo, quod accipitur modus significandi, sicut ipsi accipiunt.[451]

Reply to the Sixteenth Argument

§104

To the sixteenth,[cxciii] it is replied that I concede that there are various modes of understanding, and similarly that there are various modes of signifying, yet not as they posit, since the modes of signifying that I concede to be, I do not concede to be distinct from signifying signs and concepts, which signify naturally.

Ad decimum sextum dicitur concedendo, quod diversi sunt modi intelligendi, et similiter, quod diversi sunt modi significandi, non tamen, sicut ipsi ponunt, sed quia isti modi significandi, quos concedo esse, concedo non esse distinctos a signis significantibus et conceptibus, qui naturaliter significant.[452]

Reply to the Seventeenth Argument

§105.1

To the seventeenth,[cxciv] it is replied by denying the proposition 'To signify is to act', since to signify is no action at all.

↓[453] Ad decimum septimum dicitur negando istam propositionem significare est agere, quia significare nulla penitus est actio.

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451 decimum quintum λ] decimam quintam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam quintam] decimum quintum λ, π, *et inv. Me*.)

452 decimum sextum λ] decimam sextam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam sextam] decimum sextum λ, π; sextum decimum *inv*. *Me*.)

453 LK, p. 98.

§105.2

And it might be replied: 'to signify' is an active verb; therefore, it signifies an action.

Et si dicatur significare est verbum activum; igitur significat actionem.

§105.3

Again: Every verb signifies to act or to be acted upon; therefore, and so on.

Item: omne verbum significat agere aut pati; ergo et cetera.[454]

§105.4

To the first of those,[cxcv] it is replied by denying the consequence, since not all active verbs are thus called 'active' because they signify an action. But some are called 'active' because they have an ending just like verbs that signify an action, and similarly they can take an *-r*, just like active verbs that signify an action.[cxcvi] And this is clear concerning the verb 'to understand', which is an active verb according to grammarians, and which nonetheless – according to the Philosopher[cxcvii] in the third book of *On the Soul*, where he says that to understand is for something to be acted upon – signifies a passion.[cxcviii] And the reply is confirmed by Donatus, who does not say that active verbs are those that signify an action. But he says that those are active that end in *-o* and are able to take an *-r* and be made passive.[cxcix]

Ad primum istorum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia non omnia verba activa ideo dicuntur activa, quia actionem significant. Sed aliqua dicuntur ↑[455] activa, quia habent consimilem terminationem cum verbis, quae significant actionem, et consimiliter possunt recipere *-r*, sicut verba activa, quae significant actionem. Et hoc patet de isto verbo intelligere, quod est verbum activum secundum grammaticos, quod tamen secundum Philosophum tertio *De anima* significat passionem, ubi dicit, quod intelligere est quoddam pati. Et illa responsio confirmatur per Donatum, qui non dicit, quod verba activa sunt illa, quae significant actionem. Sed dicit, quod sunt illa, quae desinunt in *-o* et possunt accipere ↓[456] *-r* et fieri passiva.

§105.5

And it can be replied otherwise that although an utterance might act by signifying, that action nonetheless is not

Et potest aliter dici, quod, quamvis vox agat significando, ista tamen actio non distinguitur realiter a voce significante.

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454 decimum septimum λ] decimam septimam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam septimam] decimum septimum *Me*, λ, π.)

455 λ, f. a8vb.

456 LK, p. 99.

really distinguished from the signifying utterance.

§105.6

To the second of those,[cc] it is replied by denying the proposition 'Every verb signifies to act or to be acted upon', since this substantive verb 'I am' does not signify to act or to be acted upon. And yet it can be said, on behalf of the authorities, that the ancient authors mean by such propositions that a great many verbs signify to act or to be acted upon, and that they are speaking so broadly for the initiation of children.

Ad secundum istorum dicitur negando istam propositionem omne verbum significat agere vel pati, quia hoc verbum substantivum sum non significat agere vel pati. Et pro auctoritatibus tamen potest dici, quod antiqui auctores per tales propositiones volunt intendere, quod maior multitudo verborum significat agere vel pati et quod ita large loquuntur propter parvulorum introductionem.

Reply to the Eighteenth Argument

§106

To the eighteenth,[cci] it is replied by denying the consequence, since the grammarian considers utterances by ordering those utterances according to agreement, or under an account of maintaining agreement and avoiding disagreement, and with respect to grammatical passions. But the logician considers utterances under an account of recognizing truth and falsity, and with respect to logical passions.

Ad decimum octavum dicitur negando consequentiam, quia grammaticus considerat voces ordinando ipsas voces ad congruitatem et sub ratione congruitatis tenendae et incongruitatis vitandae et respectu passionum grammaticalium. Logicus autem considerat voces sub ratione veritatis et falsitatis cognoscendae et respectu passionum logicalium.[457]

Reply to the Nineteenth Argument

§107.1

To the nineteenth,[ccii] it is replied by denying the consequence. Since the grammarian considers utterances, which are signs, under an account by which they

↓[458] Ad decimum nonum dicitur negando consequentiam. Quia grammaticus considerat voces, quae sunt signa sub ratione, qua signa sunt. Et non considerat

[457] decimum octavum λ] decimam octavam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam octavam] decimum octavum *Me*, λ, π.)

[458] LK, p. 100.

are signs. And the grammarian does not consider those that are not signs unless incidentally, by coming upon something produced for an example. And thus it is a science of language and not of reality.

ista, quae non sunt signa nisi per accidens, adveniendo pro exemplo aliquo faciendo. Et ideo est scientia sermocinalis et non realis.[459]

§108

And what has been said concerning the destruction of the modes of signifying is sufficient for now.

Et sic de destructione modorum significandi ad praesens dicta sufficiant.

§109

Thanks be to God.

Deo gratias.

§110

This ends the treatise concerning the disproof of the modes of signifying.

Explicit tractatus de improbatione modorum sinificandi.

[459] decimum nonum λ] decimam nonam LK; [persuasionem] *add*. LK. (Cf. LK: decimam nonam] decimum nonum *Me*, λ, π.)

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

[i] Those who posit modes of signifying are modists (*modistae*). The modes they posit are distinct (*distincti*) in that they are distinguished from, and not reducible to, the utterances (*voces*) of which they're modes. The *DMS* author's goal in the first chapter is to present the root notions (*radicalia*), or fundamental theses, of modism and to likewise present some arguments that modists might give in support of their view.

[ii] The contrary view (*opinio contraria*) here is anti-modism, in opposition to the view of the modists. The *DMS* author's goal in the second chapter is to *present*, not necessarily *endorse*, a series of anti-modist reasons (*rationes*) and proofs (*probationes*), aiming to undermine confidence in modism, not definitively refute it. The notion of proof here is weaker than that of a rigorous mathematical or scientific demonstration. The Latin '*probare*' might also be translate as 'to aprrove, the noun '*probatio*' as 'line of approval'. Later, the *DMS* author begins to call these 'arguments' ('*argumenta*') (*DMS* §44.3).

[iii] The contrary view here is the view *contrary to* the view described as the 'contrary view' in the immediately preceding sentence; that is, the contrary view here is modism, or the view contrary to anti-modism. The *DMS* author's goal in the third chapter is to undo (*solvere*), or undermine, the arguments presented in the first chapter in support of modism. In doing so, the *DMS* author presents and explains the anti-modist view that he himself endorses.

[iv] 'Inscription' translates '*scriptus*' – literally, 'something written'. An inscription in this sense is an item of written language, understood by the *DMS* author as what we might call its 'physical' manifestation, such as the ink marks on a piece of vellum or the carving in some hunk of wax, wood, or stone. The English 'inscription' tends to suggest the latter more than the former, but here it's intended to cover the former as well.

[v] 'Signification' ('*significatio*') and 'consignification' ('*consignificatio*') are central terms in modist theory. The first refers to a relation holding between an utterance and a thing (*res*), thereby accounting for the utterance's semantic content. The second refers to a relation holding between an utterance and a property (*proprietas*) of a thing, thereby accounting for the utterance's syntactic structure. The active mode of signifying (*modus significandi activus*) is the property of the utterance whereby that utterance consignifies a property of a thing. The passive mode of signifying (*modus significandi passivus*) is the property that's consignified by the utterance. Modists typically introduce the further term 'mode of being' ('*modus essendi*'), maintaining that the passive mode of signifying is materially (*materialiter*) the same as the mode of being. But the *DMS* author never uses this term in the treatise.

[vi] 'Those people' ('*isti*') carries a pejorative connotation. The *DMS* author frequently uses the expression to refer to his opponents, the modists.

[vii] A statement (*oratio*) is, most often, a sentence or proposition. But there's another use of the terminology such that a statement can be either incomplete, like 'Happy goat' ('*Hircus felix*') or complete, like 'The happy goat runs' ('*Hircus felix currit*').

[viii] This passage introduces the following crucial modist terminology: 'utterance' ('*vox*'), 'expression' ('*dictio*'), and 'part of speech' ('*pars orationis*'). According to modist doctrine, an utterance is a vocalization devoid of semantic content. An utterance then becomes an expression when it gains signification or semantic content. An expression then becomes a part of speech when it furthermore gains consignification or syntactic structure. In practice, there's a broad sense of 'utterance' that covers all three items: an expression is an utterance plus semantic content, and a part of speech is an utterance plus both semantic content and syntactic structure. Taken in this way, 'utterance' is a genus of 'expression' and 'part of speech', and so the *DMS* author, following a practice typical among modists themselves, will occasionally refer to something having semantic content or syntactic structure simply as an 'utterance', obviously not meaning by this the strict sense of 'utterance' as a vocalization devoid of semantic content and syntactic structure.

[ix] The mode of understanding (*modus intelligendi*) is the property of the intellect mediating the correspondence betweeen the active and passive modes of signifying.

[x] The *DMS* author appears to use 'mode of understanding' ('*modus intelligendi*') and 'mode of conceiving' ('*modus concipiendi*') synonymously. The division of active (*activus*) and passive (*passivus*) modes of understanding mirrors that of the active and passive modes of signifying. The active mode of understanding is the property of the intellect whereby that intellect understands a property of a thing. The passive mode of understanding is the property that's understood by the intellect.

[xi] This modist thesis posits a twofold notion of inherence, material and formal, and asserts that the passive mode of signifying materially inheres in a thing and formally inheres in an utterance. This thesis, which can be extended to the other kinds of modes, is misrepresented by the *DMS* author in his argument against it (*DMS* §59).

[xii] As noted above, the notion of proof here is significantly weaker than that of mathematical or scientific demonstration. The Latin '*probare*' and '*reprobare*' might also be translated as 'to approve' and 'to disapprove' (or 'to reproach') respectively.

[xiii] 'Lines of persuasion' ('*persuasiones*') is another expression for the proofs (*probationes*), reasons (*rationes*), and arguments (*argumenta*) mentioned above.

[xiv] This begins a series of sections with a somewhat complex argumentative structure, which I've tried to make apparent in my choice of labels for the sections. *DMS* §10.1 states a global argument for modes of signifying that the *DMS* author, when he later turns to refute modism, refers to as 'the first argument' ('*primum argumentum*') (*DMS* §87.1). Subsequent sections provide a series of reasons (*rationes*) or proofs (*probationes*) for the premise, or antecedent (*antecedens*), of the first argument. The first of these proofs occurs at *DMS* §§11.1–11.2. Next, at *DMS* §§12.1–12.2, the *DMS* author presents an argument that he later calls 'the second argument' ('*secundum argumentum*') (*DMS* §89.1), which is also the second proof of the antecedent of the first argument. The pattern continues: the third argument (*DMS* §§13.1–13.2) is also the third proof of the antecedent of the first argument, the fourth argument (*DMS* §§14.1–14.2) is also the fourth proof of the antecedent of the first argument, and so on, until we arrive at the eleventh argument (*DMS* §21.1–21.2), which disrupts the pattern by standing as an independent argument for modes of signifying. The twelfth (*DMS* §§22.1–22.4) and thirteenth arguments (*DMS* §§23.1–23.2) then resume the support of the antecedent of the first argument, making them the eleventh and twelfth proofs, respectively, of the antecedent of the first argument. There is then a proof of the thirteenth argument (§24), followed by the fourteenth (*DMS* §25) and fifteenth arguments (*DMS* §26), which are the second and third proofs, respectively, of the thirteenth argument. Finally, each of the sixteenth through nineteenth arguments (*DMS* §27.1–30.2), like the eleventh, is an argument independent of the first.

[xv] The idea is that if an utterance has syntactic structure and is therefore a part of speech, then there was something added to that utterance, when it was a mere vocalization, in virtue of which that utterance gained that syntactic structure and became a part of speech.

[xvi] A consequence (*consequentia*) is an argument that can be represented in the form of '*A*; therefore, *C*' or 'If *A*, then *C*', where *A* is the antecedent (*antecedens*) and *C* is the consequent (*consequens*) of the consequence. The antecedent might consist of several premises, while the consequent is always a single conclusion. This is the genus under which more specific forms of argument, such a syllogisms, fall.

[xvii] That is, the premise of the first argument: 'Something is added to an utterance by its being a sign or part of speech' ('*Voci per hoc, quod ipsa est signum vel pars orationis, aliquid additur*') (*DMS* §10.1).

[xviii] Construal (*constructio*) is a property of a complex utterance whose parts exhibit grammatical dependencies, as an adjective depends on a determining noun. For an utterance to 'produce construal' ('*facere constructionem*') is for it exhibit such a dependency, and so an utterance has the ability to produce construal only if it has syntactic structure. Most often, 'construal' designates the abstract property had by a complex utterance whose parts have such grammatical dependencies, but sometimes it designates the complex utterance itself. See *DMS* §§14.2, 21.2, 34.8, 84.2.

[xix] Imposition (*impositio*) is the process whereby a linguistic item is introduced. It's the conventional act in virtue of which a mere utterance gains its signification (semantic content) and consignification (syntactic structure). The act is

effected by the one imposing or the impositor (*imponens*), who establishes the linguistic conventions determining the utterance's semantics and syntax.

[xx] A non-significative (*non significativa*) utterance, in this context, is an utterance in the strict sense, understood as a mere vocalization devoid of both semantic content and syntactic structure. It isn't a meaningful utterance that nonetheless lacks significates, such as 'nothing' ('*nihil*') or 'chimera' ('*chimaera*'). See too *DMS* §15.2.

[xxi] 'Major' ('*maior*') and 'minor' ('*minor*'), used in this way, designate the major and minor premises of a syllogism.

[xxii] 'On its own' translates '*de se*'. This can be contrasted with 'by itself', which I reserve for '*per se*'. The *DMS* author doesn't appear to use the notion of something's being 'clear' ('*patet*') or 'known' ('*nota*') on its own is a technical or rigorous way. It doesn't, for instance, mean that something invites or requires no argumentation, as the *DMS* author often says that something is known on its own and then proceeds to argue for it.

[xxiii] The claim that 'there is no greater reason' ('*non est maior ratio*') for one thing over another is one of the *DMS* author's favorite argumentative tools. The notion isn't totally univocal, but the basic idea is that if there's no greater reason for *X* than for *Y*, then *Y* should be posited whenever *X* is. Put differently, one shouldn't accept *X* and deny *Y* if there's no reason for *X* that isn't also a reason for *Y* or no reason against *Y* that isn't also a reason against *X*. See *DMS* §§15.2, 34.4, 34.7, 34.10, 35.5, 35.7–35.8, 55, 74.5.

[xxiv] The English 'noun' and the Latin '*nomen*' have somewhat different meanings. The category of *nomen* includes substantive adjectives, in addition to common and proper names, but not pronouns (*pronomina*), which are those linguistic items that take the place of – or go for (*pro*) – a *nomen*.

[xxv] Aristotle's *On Interpretation*, which the *DMS* author would have known through Boethius's Latin translation and commentaries, is his most cited source. See too *DMS* §§36.3, 47, 64.2, 65.2, 66.5, 68.3, 71.2, 77.17, 78.3.

[xxvi] 'He says' ('*dicit*') and 'he holds' ('*vult*') are the *DMS* author's preferred ways of introducing the views of authorities. The former suggests that one is drawing from the authority's explicit words, while the latter – which might also be translated as 'he intends', 'means', 'thinks', or 'supposes' – suggests that some interpretative work needs to be done to reveal the authority's intended meaning. But it isn't clear that the *DMS* author makes such a distinction, even less so in any systematic way.

[xxvii] The *DMS* author seems to use 'added to' ('*additur*') and 'accrued to' ('*acquiritur*') synonymously. See especially *DMS* §§15.1, 87.1.

[xxviii] A complex utterance is said to produce a complete sense (*perfectus sensus*) for the intellect when it exhibits correct construal and agreement (*congruitas*). The basic idea is that such a complex is a grammatically well-formed statement, complete because it has a subject and a verb and all of its grammatical dependencies are resolved.

[xxix] That is, the intellect is assumed to be sufficiently primed for the detection of the complete sense, whatever exactly that might entail.

[xxx] As noted above, the *DMS* author seems to use 'added to' ('*additur*') and 'accrued to' ('*acquiritur*') synonymously. See too *DMS* §87.1.

[xxxi] A predicament (*praedicamentum*) is one of the ten Aristotelian categories: substance (*substantia*), quantity (*quantitas*), quality (*qualitas*), and so on.

[xxxii] 'Subjectively' ('*subiective*') is a technical term that should not be taken in the modern English psychological/epistemological sense. The idea is that *X* is subjectively in *Y* just in case *X* is in *Y* as an accident (*accidens*) in a subject (*subiectum*). The *DMS* author often expresses the notion, synonymously, as *X* is in *Y* 'as in a subject' ('*tamquam in subiecto*').

[xxxiii] The eleventh argument, unlike all those that precede it, isn't an argument in support of the antecedent of the first argument, but is rather an independent argument against modes of signifying. The pause is short lived: the *DMS* author immediately returns to the task of supporting the antecendent of the first argument in the twelfth and thirteenth arguments. Why insert this independent argument here? On hypothesis is that the *DMS* author intended this order, placing the independent eleventh argument where he did because it additionally serves as an introduction to the notion of grammatical agreement (*congruitas*), which plays a central role in the twelfth (*DMS* §§22.1–22.4) argument.

[xxxiv] Agreement (*congruitas*) is the property had by a complex utterance when its parts are related in correct grammatical fashion, as when a noun agrees in case, number, and gender with its dependent adjective or a subject agrees in number with its dependent verb. It's related to the modern notion of grammatical 'well-formedness', when that's understood as occurring at both the sentential and the sub-sentential levels.

[xxxv] '*Homo currit*' ('A human runs') is an agreeing construal/statement because the subject '*homo*' is a singular noun in the nominative case, as the verb '*currit*' requires. '*Homimem currit*', is disagreeing (*incongruitas*) because '*hominem*' is in the accusative. The closest thing to a translation of the latter sentence would be something like the ungrammatical 'To a human runs'. Thus, by changing '*homo*' to '*hominem*', the agreement of the construal/statement is varied.

[xxxvi] It's typical among both modists and anti-modists to accept the thesis that syntactically distinct instances of the same lexical item, in this case '*homo*' and '*hominem*', signify exactly the same things. But modists, unlike anti-modists, attribute the syntactic difference to a difference in their modes of signifying.

[xxxvii] With the twelfth argument, the *DMS* author returns to the task of supporting the antecedent of the first argument (*DMS* §10.1).

[xxxviii] 'Genuine' here translates '*vera*', a word with a wide range of applications and meanings. When applied to propositional or sentential things, it can mean 'true'. When applied to arguments, it can mean 'valid' or 'good' or 'convincing'. When applied to non-propositional or non-sentential things, it most often means something like 'real' or 'legitimate' or 'genuine', as opposed to 'illusory', 'imaginary', or 'fake'.

[xxxix] See *DMS* §21.2.

[xl] 'Proportion' ('*proportio*') and 'accord' ('*convenientia*') don't appear to be technical terms. The first appears in this passage alone. The second appears in only one other passage, as the comparative adjective 'convenientius', which in that context I've translated as 'more suitable' (*DMS* §85.3). The *DMS* author's examples help illustrate the idea.

[xli] With the fourteenth argument, the *DMS* author turns to providing additional support for the thirteenth argument (*DMS* §§23.1–23.2), itself providing support for the antecedent of the first argument (*DMS* §10.1).

[xlii] With the sixteenth argument, the *DMS* author turns to providing a series of arguments for modes of signifying each of which, like the eleventh argument (*DMS* §§21.1–21.2), is independent of the first argument (*DMS* §10.1).

[xliii] See *DMS* §27.2.

[xliv] There's a distinction here in the Latin, not easily captured in idiomatic English, between the infinitives '*agere*' ('to act') and '*significare*' ('to signify') on the one hand and the participles '*agendus*' ('acting'), '*significandus*' ('signifying'), and '*significans*' ('signifying') on the other. The following more literal translation wears the argumentative pattern on its sleeve: '*To signify*, which is the act of the utterance, is *to act*. And since, as was already said, in every *to act* there is a mode of *acting*, by which mode one *to act* is distinguished from another, it therefore necessarily follows that in a *signifying* utterance there will be some mode of *signifying* by which one *to signify* is distinguished from another.'

[xlv] Government (*regimens*) is what accounts for a the correctness or incorrectness of construal. In some modist texts, government is entirely subsumed under construal.

[xlvi] In the second chapter, the *DMS* author provides arguments against each of the five ways of positing modes of signifying, described in the first chapter (*DMS* §§3–7). The first way receives the most criticism by far, but the *DMS* author also claims that all the arguments against the first way can be applied to the second (*DMS* §45.2), those against the first and second ways can be applied to the third (*DMS* §48.2), and those against the first through fourth ways can be applied to the fifth (*DMS* §58). But he doesn't explain exactly how this reapplication of the arguments is supposed to work.

[xlvii] See *DMS* §3.

[xlviii] The first way of positing modes of signifying divides them into active and passive (*DMS* §3). The *DMS* author's strategy is to level arguments first against the passive mode of signifying (*DMS* §§34.1–38) before arguing directly against the active mode of signifying (*DMS* §§40.1–44.9). Nevertheless, the *DMS* author indicates how arguments against the passive mode of signifying can also be used in service of arguing against the active mode of signifying (*DMS* §34.3).

[xlix] What follows is the first of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument' in the attached essay. See too *DMS* §§37, 46.3, 47, 49.1, 54, 74.5.

[l] What follows is the first of two instances of what I call the 'Regress Argument' in the attached essay. See too *DMS* §55.

[li] 'By means of' here translates '*per*'. 'By' doesn't work, since the dilemma the *DMS* author raises isn't whether (i) a property distinct from *A* signifies *A* or (ii) *A* signifies itself. *A* is a property, and *properties* don't signify, *utterances* do. Rather, the dilemma is whether (i) '*A*' signifies *A* by means of a property distinct from *A* or (ii) '*A*' signifies *A* by means of *A* itself – put differently, whether (i) '*A*' consignifies a property distinct from *A* or (ii) '*A*' consignifies *A* itself. Cf. the *DMS* author's use of 'by means' ('*mediante*') at §§3, 55.

[lii] The first instance of 'that property' ('*ista proprietas*') refers to *A*, the second instance refers to a property of *A*. The idea is that if *A* can be signified without a property of *A*, then Sortes can be signified without a property of Sortes.

[liii] Both instances of 'that property' ('*ista proprietas*') refer to *A*, which is a property of Sortes. The idea is that Sortes no more depends on a property of Sortes in order to be signified by 'Sortes' than *A* depends on a property of *A* in order to be signified by '*A*'.

[liv] Cf. *DMS* §§43.1–43.3.

[lv] That is, Ibn Rushd (Averroes) (1126–1198). See too *DMS* §77.11.

[lvi] But cf. *DMS* §§41, 91.3.

[lvii] 'Type' here translates '*ratio*', which has an enormous range of possible meanings. In other contexts, I've translated it as 'reason' or 'account'. (See, for example, *DMS* §§1.2, 4.) The latter comes close to capturing the meaning in this section: the parts composing the divisible accident are of either the same or different types because they have either the same account or different accounts. The types/accounts are then characterized using hylomorphic (matter-form) terminology (*DMS* §35.7). The idea is that if a mode of signifying is a divisible accident, then either all its parts are matter, all are form, or some are matter and others are form.

[lviii] That is, Aristotle. See too *DMS* §§41, 89.3, 105.4.

[lix] 'In the domain of things' translates '*ex parte rei*', which more literally means 'from the part of a thing'. The idea is that reality as a whole is divided into three parts or domains: the extra-mental and extra-linguistic items of nature, the linguistic items of language, and the mental items of the intellect that mediate the other two. '*Ex parte rei*' designates the first of those three domains. The *DMS* author twice uses the phrase '*ex parte intellectus*' ('in the domain of the intellect') to designate the third of those three domains (*DMS* §§51.1–51.2). The phrase '*ex parte rei*' is related to, but

not obviously synonymous with, '*rerum natura*', which I render simply as 'nature' but more literally means 'the nature of things'.

[lx] This argument is complicated, difficult to interpret, and might even be deeply flawed. It operates under the assumption that a passive mode of signifying is a divisible accident composed from parts of the same type and aims to infer the supposedly absurd claim that every part of a human is a human. But the premises and reasoning are suspect. First, the argument assumes that every part of a human contains a passive mode of signifying, saying that this 'is held above' ('*superius est habitum*'). This doesn't seem to correctly represent *DMS* §35.8, where what he says implies that every part of the passive mode of signifying in a human is itself a passive mode of signifying, but not that there's a passive mode of signifying in every part of a human. The reference could be to a sentence in the very same passage: 'For in any thing there is such a passive mode of signifying that is consignified by the expression 'human'' ('*Nam in quacumque re est talis modus significandi passivus, qui consignificatur per istam dictionem homo*'). This would require reading 'thing' ('*re*') here as meaning 'part of a human'. But even then the premise would be left unjustified. It isn't warranted by *DMS* §35.8 – at least, not without assuming that if every part of a part *P* of a whole *W* is of the same type, then every part of *W* is of the same type, which seems false: every part of a red part of a red and blue thing is red, but not every part of a red and blue thing is red. Second, the argument seems to be relying on an equivocation in the Latin. Even if we assume that every part of a human contains a passive mode of signifying, it doesn't follow that every such passive mode of signifying is *a human*, even if it does follow that every such passive mode of signifying is *human*, in the same way that Sortes' hand is *human* without being *a human*. There are no articles in Latin, so the equivocation is possible there in a way it isn't in the English. I left off the article in the sentence where '*homo*' is taken in that quasi-adjectival way.

[lxi] The *DMS* author doesn't mean that the property of the thing is literally *in* the act of signification of the thing, but rather that every act of signification of a thing involves there being a property of that signified thing.

[lxii] 'By convention' translates '*ad placitum*', which more literally is something like 'to what is pleasing'. For an utterance to be significative by convention is for it to be imposed to signify, thereby establishing a convention within a linguistic community determining that utterance's semantic content and syntactic structure.

[lxiii] This is intended as further support for the falsity of the consequent in *DMS* §36.3.

[lxiv] This is intended as further support for the falsity of the consequent in *DMS* §36.3.

[lxv] What follows is the second of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 46.3, 47, 49.1, 54, 74.5.

[lxvi] 'Our shared fathers and mothers' ('*isti conpatres et illae conmatres*') designates Adam, Eve, and so on. This connects the model of imposition to the naming of the animals in the garden, as described in *Genesis*.

[lxvii] See too *DMS* §66.2.

[lxviii] By 'the utterance numerically the same as 'human'' ('*istam eandem vocem in numero homo*'), the *DMS* author means the very token of 'human' ('*homo*') that he is tokening at that moment. The point is that this token was not the one that was imposed in the initial act of imposition. So if a mode of signifying comes from the intellect during the act of imposition, then this very token wouldn't have a mode of signifying.

[lxix] 'Nature' translates '*rerum natura*', which more literally means 'nature of things'. The phrase is a common idiom designating the domain of real items. It's related to, but not obviously synonymous with, the phrase '*ex parte rei*' ('in the domain of things'). Note that the *DMS* author here speaks of an utterance as existing *in rerum natura*. This means that whether something is *in rerum natura* or not isn't simply determined by its ontological type – that is, whether it's an item of nature, language, or the mind. Rather, the notion has more to do with an item's ontological status as real or not.

[lxx] Here 'this utterance 'human'' ('*haec vox homo*') means the very token now being tokened.

[lxxi] That is, Aristotle. See too *DMS* §§35.7, 89.3, 105.4.

[lxxii] That is, Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1168 – 1253), Bishop of Lincoln from 1235 to 1253. See too *DMS* §91.3.

[lxxiii] A substance (*substantia*) is something that stands (*stat*) under (*sub*) something else. In making this point, the *DMS* author uses the compound '*substat*', rather than breaking it into a distinct preposition and verb. Rendered more literally, the line would be 'Hence it is thus called 'substance', since it substands to accidents'.

[lxxiv] See too *DMS* §91.3. But cf. *DMS* §35.4.

[lxxv] Cf. *DMS* §§35.1–35.10.

[lxxvi] This is the first point at which the *DMS* author uses '*argumentum*', rather than '*ratio*', '*persuasio*', or '*probatio*' as a label for an argument. He repeats the label at *DMS* §§68.5, 87.1, 89.1, 97.1, 100.3. While the Latin '*argumentum*' has a much wider range of meanings than the English 'argument' – meaning anything from a single term, to a premise, to a syllogism or consequence to a lengthy argumentative discourse – in this context it primarily means something like a syllogism or consequence.

[lxxvii] See *DMS* §35.7.

[lxxviii] A proper passion (*propria passio*) is a property of something that holds of all instances and is properly characteristic of it.

[lxxix] See *DMS* §40.5. See too *DMS* §66.2.

[lxxx] See *DMS* §4.

[lxxxi] What follows is the third of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 47, 49.1, 54, 74.5.

[lxxxii] A being of reason (*ens rationis*) is something lacking real being or existence and therefore not belonging to nature (*rerum natura*).

[lxxxiii] 'Nobler' ('nobilior') doesn't mean anything so loaded as something's being of higher virtue, celebrity, authority, or dignity. Instead, nobility tracks a being's rank in an ontological hierarchy such that soul, intellect, and form are more highly ranked than body and matter. The *DMS* author also expresses this in terms of one thing's being 'more perfect' or 'more complete' ('*perfectius*') than another, meaning that the nobler thing exists more truly or really than the less noble.

[lxxxiv] In other words: The intellect is nobler than the body, and so what is in the intellect is nobler than what is in the body. But a quality such as paleness is in the body. And so, if a being of reason such as a chimera is in the intellect, it follows that a chimera is nobler than a paleness, and so a chimera exists at least as truly or really as a paleness, which is supposed to be absurd. See too *DMS* §46.8.

[lxxxv] 'By itself' translates '*per se*'. This contrasts with 'by accident' ('*per accidens*'), introduced by the *DMS* author at *DMS* §75.4. Something is *X* by itself when it is *X* in virtue of itself – that is, in virtue of its essence or what it is. Something is *X* by accident when it is *X* in virtue of something other than itself – typically, in virtue of some accidental property of it. In the particular usage in this passage, something exists by itself when its existence doesn't depend on the existence of another. This is the sort of existence had by substances, which is contrasted with the sort of existence had by accidents, which is not by itself because an accident requires a substance in order to exist.

[lxxxvi] See *DMS* §46.5.

[lxxxvii] See *DMS* §46.3.

[lxxxviii] That is, for an accident to exist is for it to be an accident of a subject and therefore to exist *in* something.

[lxxxix] In other words: If the intellect is a more noble cause than the cause of corporeal qualities, and if such qualities exist, then anything that's caused by the intellect has to also exist. And so, if beings of reason are caused by the intellect, they have to exist to at least the same extent as those qualities. But those qualities exist in such a way that they are subjectively in things, and so beings of reason must so exist as well, which is supposed to be absurd. See too *DMS* §46.5.

[xc] What follows is the fourth of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 46.3, 49.1, 54, 74.5.

[xci] See *DMS* §5.

[xcii] What follows is the fifth of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 46.3, 47, 54, 74.5.

[xciii] See *DMS* §§26, 46.3–46.4, 46.6, 49.1. See too *DMS* §§74.5, 77.8, 84.1–84.2.

[xciv] See *DMS* §6.

[xcv] 'In the domain of the intellect' translates '*ex parte intellectus*'.

[xcvi] That is, those three – a power or act of the intellect, a disposition, and an intelligible species – are all the kinds of items posited to be in the intellect, and so they exhaust the possibilities.

[xcvii] That is, for any among these three: a power or act of the intellect, a disposition, and an intelligible species.

[xcviii] Here the *DMS* author cites what is now sometimes called 'Ockham's Razor'. The principle is by no means unique or original to Ockham, nor is it nearly as extreme as its modern popular (mis-)interpretation 'the simplest explanation is to be preferred'. Nevertheless, it serves a crucial role in the *DMS* author's overall anti-modist argument. See too §74.3 below.

[xcix] That is, a subject separate from matter, such as God, angels, or the intellectual soul.

[c] That is, God. See *DMS* §§34.2, 34.5, 37, 47.

[ci] This is the sixth of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 46.3, 47, 49.1, 74.5.

[cii] What follows is the second of two instances of what I call the 'Regress Argument'. See too *DMS* §34.10.

[ciii] 'By means' here translates '*mediante*', rather than '*per*'.

[civ] The addendum 'in one thing in number' ('*in una re numero*') is important.

[cv] See *DMS* §7.

[cvi] It isn't clear which of the arguments above the *DMS* author takes to apply also to the fifth way of positing modes or exactly how they're supposed to be reapplied.

[cvii] This is the first and only instance of what I call the 'Hylomorphism Argument'.

[cviii] This is a more or less a verbatim quote from Boethius's Latin translation of Aristotle's *On Interpretation*.

[cix] See too *DMS* §40.5.

[cx] That is, one cannot directly communicate what one perceives about external things through concepts alone.

[cxi] Cf. Boethius' Latin translation of Aristotle's *On Interpretation*: 'Therefore those that are in utterance are marks of those passions that are in the soul, and those that are written of those that are in utterance' ('*Sunt ergo ea quae sunt in voce earum quae sunt in anima passionum notae et ea quae scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce*'). The *DMS* author's addition of 'sign' ('*signa*') throws off the sentence. He more successfully quotes Boethius' translation at *DMS* §77.17.

[cxii] See *DMS* §§68.2–68.3.

[cxiii] See *DMS* §§68.2–68.3.

[cxiv] See *DMS* §§68.1–68.5.

[cxv] See *DMS* §§68.1–69.3.

[cxvi] That is, in the second way of 'perseity', which is contrasted with the first way of perseity. In the Aristotelian logical and metaphysical tradition, *X* is per se in the first way (per se_1) with respect to *Y* just in case *X* is part of the essence of *Y* – that is, just in case '*X*' appears in the account or definition of *Y*. For example, animal is per se_1 with respect to human, since animal is part of the essence of human – that is, 'animal' appears in the account of human: mortal rational animal. *X* is per se in the second way (per se_2) with respect to *Y* just in case *X* belongs to *Y* and *Y* is part of the essence of *X* – that is, just in case '*Y*' appears in the account or definition of *X*. For example, scalene is per se_2 with respect to triangle, since triangle is part of the essence of scalene – that is, 'triangle' appears in the account of scalene: a triangle having three unequal sides. The *DMS* author is saying here that the three grammatical features of agreement, government, and construal each belong to mental statements per se_2, and so mental statement must be part of the essence of each and 'mental statement' must appear in each of their accounts.

[cxvii] The argumentative structure of the section on the fifth conclusion is somewhat complex: *DMS* §72.2 presents an argument the conclusion of which is the fifth conclusion; then *DMS* §72.3 presents an argument for the minor premise of the argument from *DMS* §72.2; then *DMS* §72.4 presents an argument for the minor premise of the argument from *DMS* §72.3; and, finally, *DMS* §72.5 presents an argument for the minor premise of the argument from *DMS* §72.4.

[cxviii] Strictly speaking, the conclusion of this argument is merely that agreement, government, and construal are *rightly proper* to mental statements. Then, by referring back to the argument the minor premise of which this one is justifying (*DMS* §72.2), it can further be inferred that those three *apply by themselves* (in the second way) to mental statements.

[cxix] For example, having three angles applies to scalene in virtue of the fact that the scalene is a triangle, not in virtue of the fact that the scalene is scalene. So having three angles applies first and by itself to triangle.

[cxx] Strictly speaking, the conclusion of this argument is merely that agreement, government, and construal *apply to other kinds of statements only because they apply to mental statements*. Then, by referring back to the argument the minor premise of which this one is justifying (*DMS* §72.3), it can further be inferred that those three are *rightly proper* to mental statements. Then, by referring back to the argument the minor premise of which *that* argument is justifying (*DMS* §72.2), it can be further inferred that those three *apply by themselves* (in the second way) to mental statements.

[cxxi] The *DMS* author seems to be referring collectively to all six of the preceding conclusions (*DMS* §§68.1–73.3). But his argument presupposes only the first, second, and third (*DMS* §§68.1–70.2) conclusions, which are weaker than the fourth, fifth, and sixth (*DMS* §§71.1–73.3).

[cxxii] See *DMS* §§68.1–70.2.

[cxxiii] See *DMS* §52.

[cxxiv] Here the *DMS* author again cites 'Ockham's Razor'. See too *DMS* §52.

[cxxv] This is the seventh of seven instances of what I call the 'No Property Argument'. See too *DMS* §§34.2, 37, 46.3, 47, 49.1, 54.

[cxxvi] See *DMS* §§71.1–71.2.

[cxxvii] This last remark isn't merely a throwaway conclusion to the section. Rather, the *DMS* author is making the substantive point that once it's recognized that mental government is natural, there's nothing more to inquire about regarding why a given mental government is the way it is, in the same way that the final explanation of why humans generate only humans and lions only lions is just that the generators are of the same nature as what they generate. Cf. the similar point made at *DMS* §85.3.

[cxxviii] The argumentative structure of the section on the tenth conclusion is highly complex: *DMS* §77.2 presents an argument the conclusion of which is the tenth conclusion; then *DMS* §77.3 and *DMS* §77.4 each present an argument for the major premise of the argument from *DMS* §77.2; next, *DMS* §77.5 and *DMS* §77.6 each consider an objection to the tenth conclusion, and *DMS* §77.7 provides support for the argument in *DMS* §77.6; then *DMS* §77.8 responds to the objection from *DMS* §77.5; next, *DMS* §77.9 provides a counter reply to *DMS* §77.8, and *DMS* §§77.10–77.11 constitute the *DMS* author's final response to the objection from *DMS* §77.5; then *DMS* §§77.12 replies to the objection from *DMS* §77.6; then *DMS* §§77.13–77.15 further the reply of *DMS* §77.12 by responding directly to the support for *DMS* §77.6 that's provided by *DMS* §77.7; finally, *DMS* §§77.16–77.17 reiterate and modestly expand upon the fifth conclusion.

[cxxix] This is somewhat tricky. The core idea can be identified by ignoring, for the moment, the parts that read 'with all else removed' ('*alio remoto*') and 'with all else posited' ('*alio posito*'). Then a preliminary interpretation is this: *X* is the exact cause of *Y* just in case (i) *Y* is posited when *X* is posited and (ii) *Y* is removed when *X* is removed – in other words, *Y* is posited when and only when *X* is posited. But this only establishes that *X* and *Y* are *always co-occurring*, not that *X* is the *exact cause* of *Y*. If *X* is also always co-occurring with *Z*, then *Z* would likewise be always co-occurring with *Y*, and it would be underdetermined whether it's *X* or *Z* that's the exact cause of *Y*. This is why the additions 'with all else removed' and 'with all else posited' are necessary. To determine that *X* is the exact cause of *Y*, we need to consider the case in which *X* is posited *and all else is removed* (or, better, *bracketed*) and the case in which *X* is removed *and all else is posited* (or, better, *unbracketed*). So the more accurate rendering of the thesis is this: *X* is the exact cause of *Y* just in case (i) *Y* is posited when *X and only X* is posited and (ii) *Y* is removed when *X and only X* is removed. (The Latin '*posito*' and '*remoto*', translated here as 'posited' and 'removed' respectively, are abstract notions derived from the more concrete 'put' and 'taken away'. They're participles formed from the verbs '*ponere*' and '*removere*', also appearing in the passage.)

[cxxx] This is meant to meet the first condition for one thing's being the exact cause of the other: an utterance's being a noun (*Y*) is posited when that utterance's being a mark of a mental noun (*X*) and only that utterance's being a mark of a mental noun (*X*) is posited. In other words, when an utterance is a mark of a mental noun, bracketing all else, it follows that the utterance is a noun.

[cxxxi] This is meant to meet the second condition for one thing's being the exact cause of the other: an utterance's being a noun (*Y*) is removed when that utterance's being a mark of a mental noun (*X*) and only that utterance's being a mark of a mental noun (*X*) is removed. In other words, when an utterance isn't a mark of a mental noun, leaving all else unbracketed, it follows that the utterance isn't a noun.

[cxxxii] This is another argument for the major premise of the argument from *DMS* §77.2.

[cxxxiii] See *DMS* §77.1.

[cxxxiv] See *DMS* §77.1.

[cxxxv] See *DMS* §77.5.

[cxxxvi] 'Supposit' translates '*supponit*', which expresses the semantic property of supposition (*suppositio*) – roughly, a linguistic item's reference. Supposition theory was central to late medieval semantics and was especially emphasized by the terminist logicians who clashed with modist grammarians.

[cxxxvii] To say that an expression *S* can't supposit with an active, present tense verb is to say that all statements of the form '*S* is *P*' are false, though some statements of the form '*S* was *P*' or '*S* will be *P*' or '*S* can be *P*' might be true. Various empty expressions are like this.

[cxxxviii] See *DMS* §77.8

[cxxxix] That is, by the mode that makes the signified thing exist by itself (*per se*) and so be self-subsistent and a substance, rather than an accident.

[cxl] A connotative (*connotativa*) noun is one that is a co- (*con*) mark (*nota*) of two items. Relative nouns are a central case. For example, 'parent' co-marks parents and children because a parent is someone *having a child*; likewise, 'child' co-marks children and parents because a child is someone *having a parent*. The notion of connotation was crucial to fourteenth-century nominalism, following Ockham, who's connotation theory is one of the central tools in his ontological reductionism. Ockham's way of putting the point is to say that connotative nouns have both primary and secondary signification: 'parent' primarily signifies parents and secondarily signifies children; 'child' primarily signifies children and secondarily signifies parents.

[cxli] See *DMS* §77.5.

[cxlii] That is, Averroes. See *DMS* §35.4.

[cxliii] See *DMS* §77.6.

[cxliv] See *DMS* §77.7.

[cxlv] That is, when Sortes and only Sortes is pale, 'not similar' (to Plato with respect to pallor) is verified (that is, truly predicated) of Sortes. Then, when Plato becomes pale and Sortes stays just as he is, 'similar' (to Plato with respect to pallor) is verified of Sortes. So the relative contradictories 'not similar' and 'similar' are verified successively of Sortes without Sortes changing.

[cxlvi] That is, when two contradictories, relative or not, are verified successively of any *X*, *either X* changes *or* something other than *X* changes.

[cxlvii] Here the *DMS* author quotes verbatim from Boethius' translation of Aristotle's *On Interpretation* – a more accurate quote than the attempt at *DMS* §66.5.

[cxlviii] It seems that the *DMS* author is drawing generally from the third through tenth conclusions here (*DMS* §§70.1–76.3)

[cxlix] See especially *DMS* §§77.1–77.4, 77.11, 77.16.

[cl] Apposition (appositio), conjoining (*conceptio*) (also known as 'syllepsis' ('*syllepsis*')), calling out (*evocatio*), and prolepsis (*prolepsis*) are four of the figures of construction (*figurae constructionis*) in grammar and rhetoric. Details can be found at the *Silva Rhetoricae* (http://rhetoric.byu.edu).

[cli] See *DMS* §§79.6–79.7.

[clii] That is, the charge of speaking loosely that the *DMS* author just applied to those grammarians is intended to vindicate rather than condemn them.

[cliii] The uttering of the statement 'Sortes disputes' ('Sortes disputat') has temporal duration, and by the time the uttering of the verb begins, that of the noun has already ceased. More generally, none of the parts of any vocal statement are simultaneous, and so they can only exist in nature one at a time (if even that!).

[cliv] The passage is difficult, and the Latin disagrees significantly among the source texts. But the basic idea seems to be that the convention established in the act of imposition is such that the utterance will always be ruled as if there were an existing concept ruling it, so that even when the concept by which the utterance was imposed goes out of existence, the convention established by imposition remains and so the utterance is still so-ruled.

[clv] See especially *DMS* §79.3.

[clvi] See *DMS* §79.8.

[clvii] 'Significatively' ('*significative*') and 'simply' ('*simpliciter*') are contrasting technical terms related to supposition (*suppositio*) theory. For a linguistic item to be posited (*ponitur*) significatively is for it to have significative or personal (*personalis*) supposition, which is for it to supposit for what it signifies; for it to be posited simply is for it to have simple (*simplex*) supposition, which is for it to supposit for its corresponding concept.

[clviii] 'Stand for' ('*stat pro*') and 'supposit for' ('*supponit pro*') are used interchangeably within supposition theory.

[clix] Material supposition (*suppositio materialis*) is the kind of supposition a linguistic item has when it supposits for (*supponit pro*) itself – that is, for that very linguistic item or for morphologically related ones. Here the *DMS* author asserts a similarity, perhaps an identity, between simple (*simplex*) and material supposition. This is a substantive claim, and it's of some importance for determining the work's authorship.

[clx] The substantive verb (*verbum substantivum*) is '*esse*' ('to be'), a calling verb (*verbum vocativum*) is one such as '*vocare*' ('to call'), '*appellare*' ('to address'), and '*nominare*' ('to name'). Both kinds of verbs are such that the subject and the predicate/complement are both in the nominative case, as is in '*Hircus est felix*' ('The goat is happy') and '*Is vocatur Sortes*' ('He is called Sortes').

[clxi] See *DMS* §§10.1–10.2.

[clxii] As noted above, the *DMS* author seems to use 'added to' ('*additur*') and 'accrued to' ('*acquiritur*') synonymously. See too *DMS* §15.1.

[clxiii] See *DMS* §77.14.

[clxiv] See *DMS* §11.1.

[clxv] See *DMS* §11.2.

[clxvi] 'Device' translates '*ars*', also meaning 'art' or 'skill', connecting directly to the adverb 'artificially' ('*artificialiter*') appearing just before.

[clxvii] See *DMS* §§12.1–12.2.

[clxviii] It's only linguistic items in the categories of substance, quality, and quantity that are 'absolute' ('*absoluta*') or non-connotative. It's significant that the *DMS* author cites these three as absolute, having some bearing on the question of authorship.

[clxix] That is, Aristotle. See too *DMS* §§35.7, 41, 105.4.

[clxx] See *DMS* §§13.1–13.2.

[clxxi] That is, Grosseteste. See *DMS* §41.

[clxxii] That is, Aquinas. See *DMS* §41.

[clxxiii] See too *DMS* §41. But cf. *DMS* §35.4.

[clxxiv] See *DMS* §§14.1–14.2.

[clxxv] See *DMS* §§15.1–15.2.

[clxxvi] See *DMS* §§16.1–16.2.

[clxxvii] See *DMS* §17.

[clxxviii] See *DMS* §§77.14, 87.2. See also *DMS* §98.

[clxxix] See *DMS* §§18.1–18.2.

[clxxx] This passage is obscure. The subject matter is the major premise of the eighth argument, which, paraphrased, says that everything that gets restricted has something added to it that so-restricts it (*DMS* §§18.1). Attempt to deny the premise seems to involve pointing to some specific instance of restriction – that of an utterance to signify some specific thing – and noting that, in a broad way of understanding restriction, nothing needs to be added for that restriction to occur. The *DMS* author doesn't explain what this broad sense of restriction is, and so the reply comes off as somewhat question-begging.

[clxxxi] See *DMS* §19.

[clxxxii] The Latin '*aere*' could mean either bronze or air. Not much would turn on this for the purposes of the passage. But it seems to be air that's meant, as the *DMS* author says elsewhere that an utterance is an accident of the air, '*aere*' being unambiguous in this instance because he speaks of the utterance being blown in the wind (*ventus*) (*DMS* §42).

[clxxxiii] See *DMS* §20.

[clxxxiv] See *DMS* §§77.14, 87.2, 95.

[clxxxv] See *DMS* §§21.1–21.2.

[clxxxvi] See *DMS* §§22.1–22.4.

[clxxxvii] The fallacy of the figure of an expression (*fallacia figurae dictionis*) is a form of fallacious reasoning that relies upon the apparent similarity between the figures (*figurae*) – maybe, shapes – of the premise(s) and conclusion, or terms within the premise(s) and conclusion. Sometimes this is due to morphology and inflection, diagnosed by some in terms of modes of signifying. The *DMS* author seems to be referring to the argument from the premise 'Before imposition there was the utterance 'A human is an animal'' ('*Ante impositionem fuit ista vox homo est animal*') to the conclusion 'This spoken statement 'A human is an animal' before imposition had been agreeing' ('*Haec oratio vocalis homo est animal ante impositionem fuisset congrua*'). Just how this argument is fallacious is clarified by the examples that follow (*DMS* §100.3).

[clxxxviii] A paralogism (*paralogismos*) is a faulty argument, failing to be a (correct) syllogism (*syllogismos*). A demonstration (*demonstratio*) is a special kind of (correct) syllogism granting the highest epistemic status to its conclusion.

[clxxxix] The *DMS* author's second and third examples have the following structure: 'In the past, *X* was what now is *Y*; therefore, in the past, *X* was *Y*'. The fallaciousness can be brought out further by expanding the single premise into two, thereby matching the structure of the *DMS* author's first example: 'In the past, *X* was *X*; *X* is now *Y*; therefore, in the past, *X* was *Y*'. The argument that the *DMS* author criticizes in the previous section (*DMS* §100.2), with a bit of massaging, can fit this mold: 'Before imposition, the utterance 'A human is an animal' was what now is an agreeing statement; therefore, before imposition, the utterance 'A human is an animal' was an agreeing statement'. Or, expanded: 'Before imposition, the utterance 'A human is an animal' was the utterance 'A human is an animal'; the utterance 'A human is an animal' is now an agreeing statement; therefore, in the past, the utterance 'A human is an animal' was an agreeing statement'.

[cxc] See *DMS* §§23.1–23.2, 24.

[cxci] See *DMS* §25.

[cxcii] See *DMS* §26.

[cxciii] See *DMS* §§27.1–27.3.

[cxciv] See *DMS* §28.

[cxcv] See *DMS* §105.2.

[cxcvi] The first personal ending for the passive voice is *-r*.

[cxcvii] That is, Aristotle. See too *DMS* §§35.7, 41, 89.3.

[cxcviii] 'To understand' ('*intellegere*') signifies something passive, or a 'passion' ('*passio*'), because the intellect is a passive power acted upon by something else – namely, external reality. The *DMS* author's point is that '*intellegere*', grammatically speaking, is classified as an active verb even though what it signifies is a passive power.

[cxcix] For example, the active '*intellego*' can be changed into the passive '*intellegor*'.

[cc] See *DMS* §105.3.

[cci] See *DMS* §§29.1–29.2.

[ccii] See *DMS* §§30.1–30.2.

APPENDIX A

EMENDATIONS KEY

◦ The basic structure of an emendation note is the following:

X] Y

◦ X indicates the word(s) in the text, Y contains the notes to the emendation.

◦ If X is subscripted like 'X_n', then that means the nth occurrence of X.

◦ Y will indicate either an addition (*add*.), an omission (*om*.), or replacement word(s).

◦ λ indicates the Lyon incunable. LK indicates Kaczmarek's edition.

◦ Some toy examples:

hircus] felix *add*. λ.	('felix' is added after 'hircus' in λ.)
hircus] *om*. LK.	('hircus' is omitted in LK.)
hircus] caper LK.	('hircus' is replaced by 'caper' in LK.)

◦ When an emendation is drawn from my consultation of λ, I indicate that inside the bracket. For example:

hircus λ] *om*. LK.	('hircus', which appears in λ, is omitted in LK.)
hircus λ] caper LK.	('hircus', which appears in λ, is replaced by 'caper' in LK.)

◦ Notes in Y can be stacked on a single line, separated by either a semi-colon or a comma. The semicolon separates the notes in Y into distinct units, while the comma refers back to the note that came before. The differences can be subtle. Examples should help:

hircus] felix *add*. λ, LK.	('felix' is added after 'hircus' in both λ and LK.)
hircus] felix *add*. λ; parvus *add*. LK.	('felix' is added after 'hircus' in λ; 'parvus' is added after '*hircus*' in LK.)

hircus] felix *add*. λ, *om*. LK.	('felix' is added after 'hircus' in λ and is omitted in LK.)
hircus] felix *add*. λ; *om*. LK.	('felix' is added after 'hircus' in λ; 'hircus' is omitted in LK.)

◦ Often after an emendation note there will be a parenthetical remark to compare (Cf.) either the apparatus in LK or another section in the current edition. These comparisons are sometimes contrastive, but are most often meant to provide support for my emendation. Since Kaczmarek consulted more texts, I sometimes lean on his apparatus for my choice.

◦ These parenthetical cross references use Kaczmarek's sigla: π is the Paris incunable; *Me* is the Melk manuscript; and *Mü* is the Munich manuscript.

◦ *DMS* indicates my edition and translation.

Examples:

hircus] caper LK. (Cf. LK: caper] hircus *Mü*, *Me*.)	('hircus' is replaced by 'caper' in LK; Kaczmarek's apparatus indicates that 'caper' is replaced by 'hircus' in *Mü* and *Me*.)
hircus] caper LK. (Cf. *DMS* §40.1.)	('hircus' is replaced by 'caper' in LK; there's something relevant to this emendation at *DMS* §40.1.)

◦ Arrow marks in the Latin indicate page breaks in LK and λ.

◦ ↓ is always LK; ↑ is always λ. These are keyed to footnotes that indicate the page (p.) or folio (f.).

◦ The folios of λ are cited by folio number (a*n*), recto (r) or verso (v), left column (a) or right column (b). For example:

f. a2rb. (folio a2, recto, right column)

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