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Peripheral Dialectics:
History and Theory of Left Internationalism in Postcolonial Indonesia (1943-1966)

By

Thiti Jamkajornkeiat

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

South and Southeast Asian Studies

and the Designated Emphasis

in

Critical Theory

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in Charge:

Professor Peter Zinoman, Chair

Professor Sylvia Tiwon

Professor Colleen Lye

Summer 2022

Abstract

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Thiti Jamkajornkeiat

Doctor of Philosophy of South and Southeast Asian Studies

and the Designated Emphasis in Critical Theory

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Peter Zinoman, Chair

My dissertation is a global intellectual history of Indonesian Marxism in the period of postcolonial transition. It investigates four modes of internationalist praxes, namely, Soviet, Maoist, Left Third-Worldist, and Minor-Communist, emerging from the cooperation between the Indonesian left and actually-existing communism in the post-Comintern milieu. I combine insights from Marxist and postcolonial theories with critical ethnic studies to develop an experimental “peripheral Marxist” interpretive method to study Marxist movements outside of the capitalist centers and imperial metropolises. Both of my dissertation key analytics, peripherality and internationalism, allow for a treatment of Indonesia as already interconnected with other parts of the world. The former manifests a shared material condition between Indonesian and countries in the periphery of global capitalism. The latter connects Indonesian Marxism to other contemporaneous leftist struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and racism elsewhere. This dissertation proposes peripherality and internationalism be analyzed as an inextricable pair of the objective and subjective conditions for a global revolution against capitalist totality.

As a project of global intellectual history, I discovered that Indonesian left internationalists drew from a global variety of Marxist perspectives to analyze different peripheral facets of the capitalist-imperialist world system. My key finding is these Indonesian left analyses were situational and innovative. They concretely accounted for the peripheral conditions structuring the Indonesian society rather than entirely following the doctrinal imperative of Eurocentric Marxism or Soviet and Chinese interpretive authorities. In other words, they worked through the processual movements of material forces in the peripheries generating and mediated by capitalist contradictions that this dissertation collectively names peripheral dialectics. Instead of starting from abstract principles, left internationalist praxes studied in this dissertation began from a situated concrete reality of Indonesia. Indonesian thinkers whose discourses and practices this dissertation studies include Darmini, Ba Ren (Renshu Wang), Ibrahim Isa, and D.N. Aidit.

Chapter one looks at the interactions between Indonesian and Soviet feminist Marxists in their exposition of the relationship between patriarchal and imperialist oppressions of women in the periphery. Chapter two demonstrates the inter-racial proletarian solidarity between Chinese coolies and Indonesian peasants in their support of both Chinese communists (in the civil war) and Indonesian anticolonial nationalists (in the Indonesian Revolution). Chapter three shows the internationalist solidarity of the left Third-Worldists in supporting Indonesia in its struggles for Papuan liberation and against neocolonial Malaysia as a part of a larger systemic fight against the intertwined capitalist-imperialist system. Finally, chapter four examines the minor-communist critique of Soviet commandism made possible by the horizontal cooperation between the Indonesian Communist Party and peripheral radical nationalist and communist parties of North Kalimantan, Malaya, North Korea, and Albania.

Summarily, my project's four chapters investigate four different modes of internationalist praxes concerning different problematics of peripheral Marxism: feminism in the first, inter-racial solidarity in the second, anti-imperialism in the third, and communist decolonization in the fourth. These problematics provide intellectual resources for conceptualizing the intricate relationship between gender, race, and colonialism in peripheral Marxism. "Peripheral Dialectics," hence, opens up new methodological and historiographical terrains for researching intellectual production and political theory from the periphery.

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**Peripheral Dialectics:
History and Theory of Left Internationalism in Postcolonial Indonesia (1943-1966)**

Sekarang Ia Sudah Dewasa

Menjambut ulang tahun ke-35 PKI

35 tahun yang lalu
Ia lahir
dengan kesaktian
klas termaju
sebagai anak zaman
yang akan melahirkan zaman.
Ia tahan taufan
dan tak tidur karena sepoi
Ia menyusup dihati Rakyat
lebih dalam dari laut Banda.
Ia menghias hidup
lebih indah dari sunting cempaka.
Ia dihidupkan oleh hidup,
Tahun teror dan provokasi
Dulu, sekarang dan nanti.
Ia Antaeus, anak Poseidon
yang setia pada bumi.
Ia anak zaman yang akan melahirkan zaman

Sekarang ia sudah dewasa.¹

Now It is Already Mature

Celebrating the PKI's 35th Anniversary

35 years ago
It was born
with the power of
the most advanced class
as the child of the time
that will bring forth time.
It endures the storm
and does not sleep because of zephyr winds
It reaches the people's hearts
much deeper than the Banda sea.
It adorns life
more beautifully than the Cempaka garland.
It is brought to life by life,
Year of terror and provocation
in the past, present, and future.
It is Antaeus, son of Poseidon
loyal to the land.
It is the child of the time that will bring forth
time

Now it is already mature.

The Chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; PKI), D.N. Aidit (1923-1965), composed this poem to commemorate the party's 35th anniversary in 1955. He chose the Greek mythological character Antaeus to animate the party's earthly (*bumi*) qualities. Established in 1920, a year before the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921, the PKI was the first communist party in Asia. The PKI, like Antaeus, was borne out of land and would remain impregnable when firmly grounded on land. From a Marxist perspective, earthliness, groundedness, and land all have a direct affinity with materialism. Whereas idealism denotes ideas floating unhinged in the celestial realm, materialism insists that all social phenomena are materially grounded and interconnected.

Land or the earth in this poem also has another more concrete meaning: the laboring class. For the postcolonial world generally, the concept of laboring class ranges from the archetypal proletariat transposed from the European industrial milieu to the peasant majority in the global South, the subaltern or the Fanonian "*damnes*" of the colonial societies, the surplus population outside of the wage relations, and the precarious poor and hungry everywhere. In Indonesia, it is the ordinary or the little people called *rakyat kecil* (*rakjat ketjil* for the old spelling) in Indonesian or *wong cilik* in Javanese that stays closest to the land. Their artistic representations in the Indonesian tradition of social realism exclusively focus on their big and coarse "feet," denoting

¹ Aidit, D.N., 1955, "Sekarang Ia Sudah Dewasa: Menjambut Ulang Tahun ke-35 PKI," *Harian Rakjat* (22 May).

both intensive labor and affinity to land.² The laboring class in a Marxist paradigm does not merely denote a social status but its political-economic condition as a class undergoing multiple forms of structural oppression within global capitalism.

Analogizing the PKI to Antaeus served as a caution for the maturing communist party: beware of Hercules who will eventually uproot the PKI from the land and the people.³ Besides what is obvious in hindsight—that Suharto and the armed force were the PKI’s Hercules a decade after the composition of this poem—the Antaeus analogy reminds Marxists about the inseparability between Marxism, materialist analysis, and the oppressed class.

Yet, without specifying this materialist analysis within specific space-time coordinates, we may not have a sufficiently concrete framework for studying the communist movement outside of the capitalist core and the imperial metropolises. As Aidit suggests in the poem’s figural language, the geography and history of Indonesia both conditioned the PKI’s material life. Aidit referred to the Banda sea surrounding the Indonesian archipelago in order to emphasize the depth of the PKI’s reach into the ordinary people’s hearts and memories. Repeatedly, Aidit invoked the idea of “the child of the time” (*anak zaman*) to encapsulate the PKI’s timeliness as a revolutionary subject. In this sense, following Aidit and fellow Third-Worldist Marxists, this dissertation always qualifies its mode of analysis as *geo-historical* materialism.

In my geo-historical materialist interpretation, the Indonesian Communist Party is neither a mechanical reproduction of Western communism (hegemonic globalism) nor a communism with Indonesian characteristics (fundamentalist nativism). My approach refuses to separate the global from the local. Rather, Indonesian geography and history condition the PKI’s particularities that *co-produce* global communism with other equally global particulars. In other words, geo-historical materialist interpretations already place Indonesia and a variety of its productions in the capitalist world-system in relation to other meaningful forces constituting this totality.

Due to its status as a basic textbook for all communist parties since the 1940s, Stalin’s *Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, in which Stalin likened the Bolshevik party to Antaeus, was a likely source for Aidit’s imagery.⁴ What makes Aidit’s Antaeus metaphor, a circulating global form, particular to Indonesia, however, is the Indonesian interpretation of it as “the child of the time” whose life was extended by the sacrifices of other Indonesian communists going through the years of terror and provocation.

It is worth mentioning that, unlike their other leftist counterparts, the PKI generally chose *not* to vernacularize and indigenize Marxist concepts. These other vernacular terms—showing the attempts to give form to the specifically Indonesian revolutionary agent—include Soekarno’s *marhaen*, denoting a poor farmer, and Tan Malaka’s *moerba*, referring to the indigenous anticolonial proletariat. The PKI may have translated the terms by using existing words in Malay or Indonesian but rarely did it coin a new one. The proletariat, for the PKI, is transliterated as *proletar* or translated as *buruh* (literally ‘labor’). The PKI’s retention of the “original” terms, sometimes with only a slight change in spelling, denotes an investment in the concept’s transvaluation and the co-production of the concept’s meanings.

The methodological and historiographical precedent for this dissertation’s focus on the co-production of global Marxism comes from Ruth McVey’s classic study of the early PKI in 1965.

² Taring Padi: *Seni Membongkar Tirani*, 2011, Yogyakarta: Lumbung Press.

³ Taum, Yoseph Yapi, 2013, “D.N. Aidit, Sastra, dan Geliat Zamannya,” *Jurnal Ilmiah Kebudayaan SINTESIS* 7, 1 (Mar.): 9-10.

⁴ A Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), 1939, *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, New York: International Publishers, 362-3.

Her description of her book's method, deserving a full quotation, explains the many decisions concerning the relationship between the global and the local that a researcher of a peripheral area needs to make. She chose to analyze "both environments" of domestic and international settings, or the local and the global, which paved the way for me to think about the interconnection between them. In McVey's words:

Anyone attempting to deal with the history of a Communist movement outside the USSR must decide whether to consider the party primarily as a component of a world movement or to view it as a part of the domestic political scene. . . . My initial intention, having come to the PKI by way of an interest in the history of Communism, was to focus chiefly on the party's character as a component of the Comintern and to deal with the domestic scene only as a background for its relations with the Third International. I found, however, that the closeness of the party's ties to its local environment, when combined with the fact that these surroundings have not yet been adequately studied, forced me either to gloss over problems that were of cardinal importance for the party's attitude toward the world movement or to devote as much attention to its domestic as to its international setting. The result is a work that views the party in both environments and is directed at students of Indonesian as well as Communist history.⁵

Indeed, I have chosen to open with Aidit's "Now It is Already Mature" for methodological reasons laid down by McVey above. There is another reason that is more particular to its poetic form. "Sekarang Dia Sudah Dewasa" compressed the PKI's vicissitudinous life into 19 lines, demonstrating the party's progression through the vacillation of life-giving and death-dealing moments. Even as the poem, along with its title, concluded that the PKI had become mature, this was far from suggesting that it had come to an end. On the contrary, the last line enacted the principle of a qualitative leap when the quantitative composition changed in an extraordinary way. In this case, a child (*anak*) turned into a grown-up (*dewasa*). As a mature agent of political transformation, the PKI was prescribed with the autonomy to "melahirkan zaman"—literally 'giving birth' to time. It is these multiple movements related to creation—from being given life by past sacrifices to being a godly creature drawing energy from land in the present while bringing forth the future—that inspires this dissertation's conceptualization of "peripheral dialectics"—a processual movement of a communist becoming at the edges of the capitalist world-system.

An interpretive Southeast Asianist is trained to analyze what a text does not show as much as what it does show. This long hermeneutical tradition goes back to Oliver Wolters' search for the "something else" in the Southeast Asian cultural matrix, James Scott's provocation to interrogate the "hidden scripts" left by the peasants as means for countering state domination, or Ann Stoler's appeal for reading the colonial contradictions "along the archival grain." Particularly, in a politically-charged scenario, as Abidin Kusno and Melani Budianta have argued, critical-minded Indonesians may have to entertain the question of *arus bawah* or the "undercurrents" that operate at the subterranean level beyond the surface phenomenon.⁶

⁵ McVey, Ruth, 1965, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, xiv.

⁶ Presentations by Abidin Kusno and Melani Budianta in Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Society Conference, 2015, "Undercurrents: Unearthing Hidden Social and Discursive Practices," Universitas Airlangga, Surabaya, August 6-9. Some scholars also associate the idea of undercurrents to the *dalang* or the puppeteer who performs behind the cloth screen in the Indonesian shadow puppet *wayang kulit*.

From this hermeneutical perspective, this dissertation advances the claim that when Aidit alluded to the idea of “the most advanced class” and to Antaeus, the PKI already demonstrated a minimal level of communist internationalism that connected together the global struggles of oppressed people against capitalism and against imperialism. No doubt, some readers may wonder if mine are indisputable instances of internationalism. And this is precisely the point.

The PKI was founded 35 years previous to the poem through the internationalist efforts of Dutch socialists, Comintern communists, and Indies radicals. Even as the main emphasis of Aidit’s PKI was on rebuilding the people’s nation, the task would be impossible without the internationalist undertakings of many—whether with the assistance of the ex-Comintern members, through exchanges of theoretical knowledge with exiles in Australia and students in the Netherlands, and with the political solidarity from revolutionaries across the globe. Musso’s 1948 *Djalan Baru* (the ‘New Road’), a document that Aidit adopted as the PKI’s ideological and organizational guideline, already understood the Indonesian revolution as a part of the global proletarian revolution (*Revolusi Proletar dunia*). All these internationalist connections point to internationalism as a subterranean praxis that thoroughly constitutes Indonesian Marxism both in theory and practice.

This is also where the global intellectual historian intervenes. In this situation of Indonesian Marxism, I reconstruct this subterranean praxis of left internationalism that might not be fully articulated and conceptualized by the Indonesian historical actors themselves. I do not claim to “discover” this left internationalist strand of Indonesian Marxism. Rather, following Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis, I intend to renovate and make critical an already existing praxis.⁷ As the poem shows this absence so forcefully despite much evidence that suggests otherwise, internationalism is presupposed rather than enunciated. Besides recuperating this left internationalism’s history from Indonesia, my reconstructive endeavor concurrently examines its theoretical implications for global Marxism. This dissertation’s two objectives can be made possible only by treating Indonesia as a global site of knowledge production (rather than a case study) and Indonesian thinkers as knowledge co-producers (rather than native informants or data collectors).

So far, this introduction has already presented all the major methodological keywords in this dissertation through Aidit’s poem: geo-historical materialism, co-production, dialectics, communist becoming, and left internationalism. What is still missing is its main problematic and scholarly contribution, namely, peripherality. I will return to peripherality in greater detail later. For our current purposes, it suffices to state that uneven capitalist development works in tandem with imperialism to produce Indonesia as a peripheral political entity in the world. This peripherality, in turn, conditions Indonesia’s unequal relations with the “centers” of global domination (the capitalist world) and world liberation (the communist world).

A World Destroyed, A World Reborn

Indonesia, as a peripheral political entity, bears crucial geopolitical and ideological stakes for the centers of both worlds. The stakes were perniciously high in the face of the fierce superpower competition during the mid-1960s Cold War. For the communist world, Indonesia occupied a vanguardist position for the revolution against imperialism and capitalism in Asia and the rest of the colonized regions. Lenin exclusively referred to the anticolonial protests in the Indies

⁷ Gramsci, Antonio, 1971, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare and G. Nowell-Smith, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 330-31 (Q11, §12).

as indicative of the political awakening of Asia as a whole.⁸ Beijing mayor Peng Zhen conferred on Aidit the title “brilliant Marxist-Leninist theoretician” after Aidit’s speech at the CCP CC cadre school.⁹ Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi championed Indonesia for its firm commitment to the anti-imperialism and anticolonialism that characterized the socialism of the future.¹⁰

Ironically, the US likewise agreed with the communist world’s analysis of Indonesia one among several instrumental geopolitical sites, known as “the domino,” during the Cold War. Richard Nixon justified the bombing of North Vietnam to safeguard Indonesia’s “immense mineral potential,” but behind this justification was a mischievous strategy to isolate Indonesia from the communist reinforcements in Indochina.¹¹ In the weeks prior to the eruption of the anticommunist mass murder in late 1965, the US State Department was still convinced that a left-wing takeover of Indonesia was imminent. The takeover would have “immense pincer effects” on other non-communist countries in Southeast Asia.¹² Developing this hypothetical takeover thesis further, historian John Roosa suggested a PKI takeover would have rendered the US intervention in Vietnam futile.¹³ With hindsight, however, US Ambassador to Indonesia Marshall Green hysterically asserted in the interview that the “Indonesian cataclysm” was “a great turnabout” that “reversed the whole course of history, not only of that region but probably of the world.”¹⁴ The world-historical significance of Indonesia—a peripheral political entity—affected centers of global domination (Washington) and world liberation (Moscow and Beijing) both in their courses of action and respective visions of the world.

The 1965-66 Killings as a Turning Point: Genocide, Capitalist Expansion, Ideologicide

The bloody years 1965/1966 probably marked the greatest shift in postcolonial Indonesia from a nation endowed with the promise of a socialist future to an anticommunist utopia. “A Gleam of Light in Asia” was what the New York Times called the anticommunist pogrom and the embrace of American capitalism in Indonesia after the events of October 1965.¹⁵ As much as this mass killing was a genocide (*genosida* in Indonesian), it was equally a process of capitalist expansion and communist erasure. The genocide eliminated communist bodies as much as it extinguished anti-capitalist knowledge. It henceforth inaugurated a radically different pattern of capitalist accumulation freed from leftist opposition. I bring together insights from Marxist David McNally on the violent basis of capitalist accumulation and decolonial theorist Ramon Grosfoguel on the

⁸ Lenin, V.I., 1977 [1913], “The Awakening of Asia,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 19, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 86.

⁹ Aidit, D.N., 1964, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia: Report Delivered at the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 2, 1963*, Peking: Foreign Language Press.

¹⁰ “Chen Yi fuzongli tong Yinni fuzongli Subandeliyue huitan jilu” [Conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio], January 24, 1965, no.105-01910-05, CFMA., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 117.

¹¹ Quoted in Scott, Peter Dale, 1975, “Exporting Military-Economic Development: America and the Overthrow of Sukarno,” in *Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia*, ed. Malcolm Caldwell, Nottingham, UK: Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for Spokesman Books, 241.; Roosa, John, 2006, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement & Suharto’s Coup D’État in Indonesia*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 13-16.

¹² William Bundy, foreword to Marshall Green, in Southwood, Julie, and Flanagan, Patrick, 1983, *Indonesia: Law, Propaganda, and Terror*, London: Zed.

¹³ Roosa, *Pretext*, 15.

¹⁴ “Interview with Marshall Green: Concerning Indonesia 1965-69,” 1987, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress. (May 12). Available at: <https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004gre04/2004gre04.pdf>

¹⁵ Reston, James, 1966, “Washington: A Gleam of Light in Asia,” *The New York Times*, 12E (19 Jun.).

co-constitution of genocide and epistemicide to understand communist killings in 1965-66 as a combination of triple processes involving blood (genocide), money (capitalist expansion), and knowledge (ideologicide).¹⁶ By clarifying all the stakes of this brutal shift in Indonesian history, I aim to show the relevance and urgency of this research as succinctly as possible.

The International People's Tribunal for 1965, under Dutch feminist Saskia Wieringa's stewardship, tirelessly appealed to the Hague and the international civil society to recognize the Indonesian massacres as genocide. These massacres—acknowledged by the CIA as “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century”—qualified as a genocide because the rightwing military intentionally terrorized and destroyed a specific “Indonesian national group,” namely, the communists and their affiliates.¹⁷ Rather than spontaneous violence erupting exclusively at the local level, an explanation repeated *ad nauseam* by the perpetrators to exempt themselves from culpability, the genocide framework facilitates an understanding of the mass killings as a rational and systematic decision made through transnational co-operation.¹⁸ What is ironic is that the world-historical significance of the Indonesian genocide begins to gain attention by scholars and activists but not in the way Marshall Green proposed. It is not celebrated as the American triumphal victory over communism. It has become one of the rallying points for striking the American empire back. It exposes an ugly American atrocity.¹⁹

The genocide itself marked a significant shift in the pattern of capitalist accumulation in Indonesia. While the communists strongly advocated for economic self-reliance and more equitable distribution of property ownership, the military and much of the property-owning class championed market mechanisms and the liberal inflow of foreign capital. The economic rivalry between these two major political groupings representing different class interests affords an interpretation that the genocide was also a class war and, as Indonesianists Douglas Kammen and Katharine McGregor suggest, a counter-revolution.²⁰ Whether or not the genocide had an ulterior economic motive, it is undeniable that killing and capturing people with an anti-capitalist worldview abets the process of capitalist reproduction. Activist Hilmar Farid convincingly argues that the genocide separated “a large number of people from their means of production and subsistence.”²¹ In the process of annihilating the communists consisting substantially of plantation workers, trade unionists, and left feminists, the military regime expropriated land from the peasants, forced the political prisoners into unfree labor, and regulated the sphere of social reproduction. Most crucially, as Farid contends, the mass killings destroyed “the workers’ capacity

¹⁶ McNally, David, 2020, *Blood and Money: War, Slavery, Finance, and Empire*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 1-7.; Grosfoguel, Ramón, 2013, “The Structure of Knowledge in Westernized Universities: Epistemic Racism/Sexism and the Four Genocides/Epistemicides of the Long 16th Century,” *Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge* 11, 1 (Fall): 73-90.

¹⁷ “Indonesia: Documenting Violence in Indonesia,” Yale University: Genocide Studies Program. Available at: <https://gsp.yale.edu/case-studies/indonesia>.; Jarvis, Helen and Wieringa, Saskia E., 2019, “The Indonesian Massacres as Genocide,” in *The International People's Tribunal For 1965 and The Indonesian Genocide*, eds. Saskia E. Wieringa, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman, London and New York: Routledge, 222.

¹⁸ Robinson, Geoffrey, 2018, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 19-26.

¹⁹ Bevins, Vincent, 2020, *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade & The Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World*, New York: Public Affairs.

²⁰ Kammen, Douglas, and McGregor, Katharine, 2012, *The Contours of Mass Violence in Indonesia, 1965-1968*, Singapore: NUS Press for the Asian Studies Association of Australia, 11.

²¹ Farid, Hilmar, 2005, “Indonesia's Original Sin: Mass Killings and Capitalist Expansion, 1965-66,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, 1: 4.

for resistance,” which accommodated the smooth subsumption of Indonesia into transnational capitalism.²²

The workers’ capacity for resistance was inextricable from their knowledge of resistance. Australian political scientist Max Lane aptly characterizes this Indonesian genocide as an “ideologicide”—denoting the systematic extermination of leftist ideas (similar to Grosfoguel’s term epistemicide).²³ The ensuing military regime, called Orde Baru or the ‘New Order’ committed ideologicide first and foremost, physically, by killing the communists. It then outlawed Marxism-Leninism, banned leftwing organizations, restricted labor unions, blacklisted radical books, and rewrote history.²⁴ For Lane, the most important praxes erased by the ideologicide were a longer and more wide-ranging political tradition, to which the left studied in this dissertation belonged, of *pergerakan* (the [revolutionary] movement) and the notion of *aksi massa* (mass action). The military regime implemented the colonial governmental concept of “law and order” to depoliticize *pergerakan* and deradicalize *aksi massa*, ending “any form of open mobilizational politics.”²⁵ Most of the words that were made to become disgusting during Orde Baru related to revolutionary praxes: *aksi* (street protest), *mogok* (strike), *vergadering* (mass rally), *rapat massa* (mass meeting), *sarikat* (union), *berontak* (rebel), *semangat* (spirit), *pemuda* (youth), *massa* (the masses), *rakyat* (the people), *revolusi* (revolution), *sama rata sama rasa* (equality), *berdaulat* (sovereign), and *kepribadian nasional* (national character).²⁶ The exclusion of these words from public usage along with other practices of ideologicide plainly decapitated the Indonesian left.

Global Intellectual History after the Genocide

Writing a global intellectual history of the Indonesian left is an ethico-political act in the aftermath of genocide, counter-revolution, and erasure of communist knowledge. I treat global intellectual history as a method of historicizing theoretical frameworks at their situated point of geo-historical production in connection with other meaningful global forces. In this dissertation specifically, it performs the double purpose of recuperating the erased history and rebuilding the repertoire of praxis. The Indonesian left carried the memory and knowledge of struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and racism. Global intellectual history reopens this revolutionary horizon.

This dissertation is the first global intellectual history of Indonesian Marxism in the postwar period. The exemplary scholarship of Ruth McVey—whose studies of the postwar PKI range from explorations of the party’s understanding of the Chinese question to examinations of the different social constituents of the PKI members, the PKI’s interpretation of traditional puppet theater *wayang*, and the PKI as an educational institution—serves as a precedent for my intellectual historical work.²⁷ While McVey works primarily on the social and cultural aspects of the postwar

²² *Ibid.*, 12.

²³ Lane, Maxwell Ronald, 2009, “Mass Mobilisation in Indonesian Politics, 1960-2001: Towards a Class Analysis,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of History and Politics, University of Wollongong, 113.

²⁴ Abdul Wahid particularly discusses the cooperation between the universities and the military in “cleansing” the left from campus. Novianto, Arif, 2017, “Genosida Intelektual (Intellectualcide): Pemberangusan Ideologi dan Kaum Kiri di Kampus Indonesia Pasca September 1965,” *MAP Corner Klub MKP UGM* (24 Feb.). Available at: <https://mapcorner.wg.ugm.ac.id/2017/02/genosida-intelektual-intellectualcide-pemberangusan-ideologi-dan-kaum-kiri-di-kampus-indonesia-pasca-september-1965/>

²⁵ Lane, “Mass Mobilization,” 107-8.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 106.

²⁷ McVey, Ruth, 1969, “Indonesian Communism and China,” in *China in Crisis*, Vol. 2, eds. Ping-Ti Ho and Tang Tsou, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 357-94.; McVey, Ruth, 1970, *The Social Roots of Indonesian Communism*, Brussels: Centre d’étude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l’Extrême Orient.; McVey, Ruth, 1986, “The Wayang Controversy in Indonesian Communism,” in *Context, Meaning, and Power in Southeast Asia*, eds. Mark

PKI, her analyses usually include intellectual historical explanations of these socio-cultural phenomena. Jacques Leclerc's comprehensive dissertation (in French) on late Aidit's PKI, Bob Hering's articles on the PKI's understanding of communism during Aidit's leadership, Justus van der Kroef's comparative studies of Southeast Asian communist parties, Robert Cribb's article on the Indonesian Marxist tradition, and Samardji's reconstructed history of the postwar PKI provide good starting points to investigate on the topic further.²⁸ The edited volume on postwar Indonesian political thoughts by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles and another on Chinese-Indonesian political thinking by Leo Suryadinata offer a helpful survey of Indonesian intellectual history in this period.²⁹ The work of five scholars plus two edited volumes show deeper engagement with the intellectual history of the Indonesian left than Rex Mortimer and Donald Hindley's institutional historical studies of the postwar PKI.

Mortimer and Hindley focus exclusively on the political and organizational history of Aidit's PKI. Both of them identify the united national front as the PKI's critical ideological orientation and then describe multiple iterations and executions of this "party line" in history.³⁰ I view this approach as a rudimentary and limited form of intellectual history because it presents only a chronology of the development of some PKI ideas. Mortimer's and Hindley's rudimentary intellectual history does not situate Indonesian Marxism in the global Marxist intellectual milieu, connect it to bigger theoretical problems, or critically assess some of its conceptual premises. To be fair, intellectual history is not a primary concern for Mortimer and Hindley. My critical evaluation of their scholarship makes two points. First, intellectual history of the postwar PKI exists but is of marginal concern to any classical historical studies of the subject. Second, and relatedly, this lack of concern in the existing scholarship means there are many new research possibilities to explore.

Among the existing scholarship, Olle Törnquist's exhaustive treatment of the theoretical "failure" of Aidit's PKI in his Swedish dissertation-turn-book might be the closest to the intellectual history that I am undertaking. Törnquist points out the insufficiencies of both communist theories (Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao) and the PKI's theories ("the party line") in analyzing the new form of capitalism in Indonesia that he calls postcolonial capitalism.³¹ There is, however, a major difference between Törnquist's and my intellectual historical approaches. Whereas Törnquist looks at "what went wrong" in theories of both international communism and

Hobart and Robert Taylor, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Studies Program, 21-51.; McVey, Ruth, 1990, "Teaching Modernity: The PKI as an Educational Institution," *Indonesia* 50 (Oct.): 5-27.

²⁸ Leclerc, Jacques, 1969, "La pensée des communistes indonésiens: l'indonesianisation du marxisme-leninisme à travers les textes d'Aidit (1962-1965): essai d'approche et d'interprétation," Ph.D. Dissertation.; Hering, Bob, "Marxism a la Aidit," *Kabar Sebarang* 119-39.; Van der Kroef, Justus M., 1962, "Lenin, Mao, and Aidit," in *Polycentrism: The New Factor in International Communism*, eds. Ealter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, New York: Praeger, 197-218.; Cribb, Robert, 1985, "The Indonesian Marxist Tradition," in *Marxism and Asia*, eds. Colin Mackerras and Nick Knight, London: Croom Helm, 251-72.

²⁹ Feith, Herbert, and Castles, Lance (eds.), 2007 [1970], *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia).; Suryadinata, Leo, 1999 [1979], *Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 1900-1995: A Sourcebook*, Singapore: Singapore University Press.

³⁰ Mortimer, Rex, 1974, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.; Hindley, Donald, 1966, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

³¹ Törnquist, Olle, 1982, *Marxistisk Barlast: varför misslyckades världens tredje största kommunistparti? De indonesiska kommunisternas strategiska problem 1952-1965 och konsekvenser för gängse teser om kampen i tredje världen*, Stockholm: Symposion.; Törnquist, Olle, 1984, *Dilemmas of Third World Communism: The Destruction of the PKI in Indonesia*, London: Zed Books.

the PKI, I focus on the historical process of knowledge production. I look more at the PKI's theoretical innovations and the Indonesian co-production of global Marxism.

My differences with Törnquist do not end with the historical approach. It also lies in our different assumptions about thinkers from the Global South. Unlike Törnquist, who makes a statement like “the PKI failed to appreciate x or y,” my research assumes that every Indonesian leftist whose thoughts are examined in this dissertation is a critical thinker working within the limits and possibilities of their own historical milieu. Törnquist's patronizing attitude may be seen as symptomatic of leftists from the center in general, but it is by no means unique to the left. It points to the larger systemic problem of epistemic imperialism whereby Western-educated thinkers present themselves as more knowledgeable than their subjects of analysis, mostly from the colonized world. A great exception here is Dutch Marxist sociologist Wim Wertheim whose scholarly endeavors long question this epistemic imperialism of the Eurocentric left, expose Dutch racism, and treat Indonesian thinkers as equals.³² It is worth mentioning that Wim Wertheim was the mentor of the Malay sociologist Syed Hussein Alatas whose *The Myth of the Lazy Natives* has become a classic text for Southeast Asian decolonization.

To begin to decolonize from epistemic imperialism, my account of intellectual history instead treats peripheral thinkers as co-producers of global knowledge. When it comes to critique, I attempt to make critical of what is already there (some might call this gesture an immanent critique) rather than judge that knowledge to be “a failure.” Again, to be fair, Törnquist is a social scientist with the good intention to find better alternatives for Indonesian progressive politics, not an intellectual historian who is concerned with the process of knowledge production. My critical assessment of Törnquist means only to suggest that it is important to be self-reflexive about one's subject position and the relationality one establishes with the subject of inquiry.

If McVey, Mortimer, Hindley, Leclerc, Hering, Van der Kroef, Feith, Castles, Suryadinata, and later Törnquist and Cribb constitute the first generation of scholars working on the postwar PKI dating from the 1960s to 1990s, a second generation emerged around the 1990s-2000s. The work of the second generation is characterized by an increasingly intersectional and transnational approach to the Indonesian left and a critical interrogation of official anticommunist historiography. Intellectual history might not be their primary concern, but their robust scholarship makes it possible for me and scholars of my generation to engage directly with critical histories of the PKI rather than having to start with critiquing the official historiography. Katharine E. McGregor and Rommel A. Curaming's exemplary scholarship inaugurated this fairly recent historiographical tradition.³³ Saskia Wirienga, Jafar Suryomenggolo, and Taomo Zhou published studies on gender, class, and racial aspects of the postwar Indonesian left, respectively.³⁴ Lastly, Larisa M. Efimova, Jennifer Lindsay, Maya H.T. Liem, Vannessa Hearman, Mark Ethan, Ramon

³² Wertheim, Willem Frederik, 1974, *Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation*, Baltimore: Penguin.; Wertheim, W.F., 1990, “Netherlands-Indian Colonial Racism and Dutch Home Racism,” in *Imperial Monkey Business: Racial Supremacy in Social Darwinist Theory and Colonial Practice*, ed. Jan Bremen, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 71-88.; Wertheim, W.F., 1995, “Pramoedya as Historian,” in *Kabar Seberang Special Edition: Pramoedya Ananta Toer 70 Tahun: Essays to Honour Pramoedya Ananta Toer's 70th Year*, ed. Bob Hering 24/25.

³³ McGregor, Katharine E., 2007, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past*, Singapore: NUS Press.; Curaming, Rommel A., 2003, “When Clio Meets the Titans: Rethinking State-Historian Relations in Indonesia and the Philippines,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University.

³⁴ Wirienga, Saskia E., 2002, *Sexual Politics in Indonesia*, The Hague: The Institute of Social Studies.; Suryomenggolo, Jafar, 2013, *Organising under the Revolution: Unions and the State in Java, 1945-1948*, Singapore, Kyoto: NUS and Kyoto University Press.; Zhou, Taomo, 2019, *Migration in the Time of Revolution*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Guillermo, Su Lin Lewis, and Anna Bellogurova continue to set a standard for the transnational history of the Indonesian left in the coming decades.³⁵

The study of the PKI in the past, particularly during the Aidit period, has always been quite scattered and individualized because of the fraught nature of the subject. With perhaps the exception of McGregor and Lewis, I do not see a formal research community created by other scholars to study the Indonesian left. The third generation, of which I am part, will be different. The third generation comprises scholars who recently completed or are currently writing Ph.D. dissertations on the PKI histories from 2016 onwards: Rianne Subijanto, Klaas Stutje, Kankan Xie, Oliver Crawford, Grace Leksana, Hongxuan Lin, Matthew Woolgar, myself, and Wildan Sena Utama. Four of the nine researchers (Lin, Woolgar, Utama, and myself) are working on the postwar period. But we are working on different topics: Lin on Islam and Marxism, Woolgar on the local-global interactions in the West Javanese PKI, Utama on the Afro-Asian student movement.³⁶ Other scholars also have different emphases: Subijanto on leftist print culture in the 1920s, Stutje on anticolonial solidarity in the interwar years, Xie on the PKI's international networks after the colonial crackdown in 1926/27, and Leksana on the contemporary memorization of the anticommunist violence in East Java.³⁷ I see my global intellectual historical approach as closest to Crawford's analysis of Indonesian internationalist Tan Malaka's political thought.³⁸ Compared to my eight colleagues, I am more explicit about my emphasis on global intellectual history and my theoretical inclinations which include Marxism and theories of decolonization.

It is a pity that the PKI and the left generally are still taboo research topics in Indonesia. Of course, censorship is never absolute. What I mean here is there might be scattered individual interests, but there is no sustained collective research effort that constitutes an "Indonesian tradition of study," at least at the university level. There are some outstanding master theses and dissertations on the Indonesian left supervised by professional non-leftist historians at the top two national universities, Universitas Indonesia and Universitas Gadjah Mada. Among the recent remarkable ones include Andi Achdian's study of the cosmopolitan origin of the PKI, Rhoma Dwi

³⁵ This set of scholars published on the transnational history of the Indonesian left in the earlier period but here are their more recent representative works: Efimova, Larisa, 2011, "Stalin and the New Program for the Communist Party of Indonesia," *Indonesia* 91 (Apr.): 131-63.; Lindsay, Jennifer and Liem, Maya H.T. (eds.), *Heirs to World Culture: Being Indonesian 1950-1965*, Leiden: KITLV Press.; Hearman, Vanessa, 2020, "From Indonesia with Love: Friendships between Political Prisoners and their Pen Pals and the Creation of Human Rights Activist Networks," *Social History* 53, 108 (Oct.): 417-36.; Mark, Ethan, 2018, *Japan's Occupation of Java in the Second World War: A Transnational History*, London: Bloomsbury.; Guillermo, Ramon, 2018, "Blood-Brothers: The Communist Party of the Philippines and the Partai Komunis Indonesia," *Southeast Asian Studies* 7,1: 13-38.; Lewis, Su Lin, 2019, "Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom, 1952-1956," *Journal of World History* 30, 1-2 (Jun.): 55-88.; Belogurova, Anna, 2019, *The Nanyang Revolution: The Comintern and Chinese Networks in Southeast Asia, 1890-1957*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁶ Lin, Hongxuan, 2020, "Ummah Yet Proletariat: Islam and Marxism in the Netherlands East Indies and Indonesia, 1915-1959," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Washington.; Matthew, Woolgar, 2021, "Communism in Context: The Indonesian Communist Party in West Java, 1949-66," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oxford.

³⁷ Subijanto, Rianne, 2016, "Media of Resistance: A Communication History of the Communist Movement in the Dutch East Indies, 1920-1926," Ph.D. Dissertation, the University of Colorado at Boulder.; Stutje, Klaas, "Behind the Banner of Unity: Nationalism and Anticolonialism among Indonesian Students in Europe, 1917-1931," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Amsterdam.; Xie, Kankan, 2018, "Estranged Comrades: Global Networks of Indonesian Communism, 1926-1932," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Berkeley.; Leksana, Grace, 2020, "Embedded Remembering: Memory Culture of the 1965 Violence in Rural East Java," Ph.D. Dissertation, Universiteit Leiden.

³⁸ Crawford, Oliver, 2019, "The Political Thought of Tan Malaka," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge.

Yuliantri's work on the PKI's Vice-Chairman Njoto, and Satriono Priyo Utomo's examination of Aidit's political thought. History "researchers" whose works expose and contest official anticommunist historiography like Asvi Warman Adam, Hermawan Sulisty, and Baskara T. Wardaya operate at research institutes and centers with relative autonomy from the universities. There are also a handful of leftist historians who work cautiously within the university bounds like Yerry Wirawan. Institutions that might be closest to fostering an "Indonesian tradition of study," I claim, are rather publishing houses and personal archives.

Leftist publishing houses and online media like Ultimus in Bandung (chief editor: Bilven Sandalista), Marjin Kiri in South Jakarta (Ronny Agustinus), Historia in West Jakarta (Bonnie Triyana), Gerak Budaya in greater Kuala Lumpur (Chong Ton Sin), and online platform Indoprogress (Coen Husain Pintoh and Rianne Subijanto) play a crucial role in creating an epistemic community interested in investigating histories of the Indonesian left. In addition, the intellectual network created by student activists in the late Suharto period (the 1990s) that culminated as the Indonesian Institute for Social History (IISH; director: Ayu Ratih) was crucial to the recuperation of leftist histories, particularly its comprehensive oral history project coordinated by Ayu Ratih, John Roosa, and Hilmar Farid.

Equally important are the informal research communities formed around certain personal archives in creating interests on the topic. The Indonesian Institute for Social History itself mainly collects the materials of leftist Indonesian-Chinese translator Oey Hay Djoen. Another Indonesian-Chinese left-nationalist Oey Hiem Hwie collects original manuscripts of the renowned writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer at his personal library Medayu Agung in Surabaya. At Warung Arsip in Jogjakarta, Muhidin M. Dahlan inventories all the leftist documents from the Aidit period (the 1950s-1960s), following Pramoedya's footsteps when he gathered colonial manuscripts as sources for his historical fiction. Lastly, Hersri Setiawan—a political prisoner, a prolific writer, and a committed archivist-historian—stores his personal collections and his interviews with the Indonesian exiles both at KUNCI institute in Jogjakarta and the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. Ita F. Nadia, a prominent feminist and Hersri's partner, contributes significantly to the feminist Marxist component of Hersri's collection, particularly the archival materials of left third-worldist Francisca Faggidaej.

Some Indonesian activists mentioned in the two paragraphs above hold a pessimistic view about the Indonesian left's theoretical insights or radical imaginations due to its ongoing subjugation. They at times cited the phrase "*kemiskinan imaginasi*" or 'the impoverishment of the imagination' to describe the current status of the left. I can see why they think so, but I beg to differ.

The concern about theoretical insights came from an observation about the "scientific" nature of the Marxist-Leninist or party Marxist tradition. This tradition's analytical style was largely mechanical and objective. It left little room for auto-criticism, subjectivity, and, ironically, contradictions. The differences, for example, between Mao Zedong's 1939 *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, Aidit's 1957 *Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution*, and Jose Maria Sison's 1970 *Philippine Society and Revolution* lie in some minor nation-specific details, though many of the "objective" analyses are shared.³⁹ The PKI already painfully struggled to rebuild the theoretical repertoire of the Marxist-Leninist tradition as it was regenerating the severely damaged party after multiple postwar anticommunist assaults. Thus, it understandably missed other more or less contemporaneous thinkers who similarly tarried with

³⁹ Closer comparison between Aidit and Sison's works, read: Guillermo, Ramon, 2018, "Blood-Brothers: The Communist of the Philippines and the Partai Komunis Indonesia," *Southeast Asian Studies* 7, 1: 22-36.

this tradition but also questioned it from within, for example, Rosa Luxemburg, José Carlos Mariátegui, Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, Antonio Gramsci, Harry Haywood, György Lukács, or Amílcar Cabral.

As far as radical imaginations go, in the official writings, the PKI quite creatively recomposed Marxist-Leninist teachings to capture the Indonesian material situation in a process called the “Indonesianization of Marxism-Leninism.” It is not difficult to identify this strong Indonesianizing tendency running through the PKI’s anticolonial nationalist thought as its major theoretical contribution. After all, just as Lane notes, the whole revolutionary tradition of *pergerakan* was deracinated by the New Order. The inclination of the PKI’s present day interpreters to primarily pick up on anticolonial nationalism is to be expected since the stakes of recovering this popular lost tradition are high.

Yet, as much as the nation was an enabler for the PKI’s theoretical contribution, it was also a limit. During the postwar period, “the left” registered a “progressive bloc” of communists, radical bourgeois nationalists, anticolonial Muslims, and the workers and peasants, united by Indonesian President Soekarno. While the PKI arguably had the most developed theoretical account of anticolonial nationalism within the “progressive bloc” (it was an open secret that Soekarno entrusted PKI’s Vice Chairman Njoto to be his speechwriter during his last years), the specificity of Marxist analysis was hard to distinguish. Another Australian political scientist Rex Mortimer argues that the PKI’s Marxist specificity manifested through the party’s “practical ideology”—“a capacity for and interest in promoting organization and self-activity among the workers and peasants.”⁴⁰

As an intellectual historian schooled in Marxist and postcolonial theories, I am primed to think that there is something more to the lack of theoretical insights and radical imagination. We need to ask new questions, make unlikely connections, and come up with different interpretations. Why was the Indonesian left, particularly the PKI, so invested in producing theory that shares analytics with those of other communist parties? Why were there so many instances of internationalist praxes undergirding the Indonesian left’s anticolonial nationalism that seemed to be undertheorized? How do we study leftist innovations within the constraint of restricted Marxist-Leninist idioms?

I arrive at two conclusions. Both of them are about making connections. First, the shared analytics in theoretical production indicate a common condition of uneven development among countries on the periphery of global capitalism. Second, internationalism connects Indonesian Marxism to the leftist struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and racism elsewhere in the decolonizing “third world.”

These two conclusions led me to develop a “peripheral Marxist” interpretive method for studying the global intellectual history of Indonesian left internationalism in the early postwar period that I call the “postcolonial transition.” Such is a one-sentence description of what this dissertation, “Peripheral Dialectics,” is about.

The Postcolonial Transition

Let me first clarify about the periodization I am using before I move on to discuss peripherality and internationalism. This dissertation follows the itineraries of Indonesian left internationalists and the timeline of the communist world. These do not perfectly align with the mainstream periodization of Indonesian history. This standard periodization of the time span

⁴⁰ Mortimer, Rex, 2006 [1974], *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Jakarta and Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia), 27.

covered in this research is organized through administrative successions: from the Dutch colonial administration ending in 1942 to the Japanese occupation (1942-45), the Independence War against Dutch re-colonization (1945-49), Soekarno's presidency covering both periods of Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy (1950-66), and Suharto's presidency or the New Order (1967-98). The task is to find an operational timeframe that is based on Indonesian history but also accommodates the study of both the Indonesian left and the communist world more generally.

I choose the term "postcolonial transition" to methodologically connect the periods from mid-WWII to the end of Soekarno's presidency. The term "postcolonial transition" signifies the uneven development of Indonesia (or, rather, the East Indies) as it transformed into a postcolony. The notion of transition, in particular, captures the ephemerality of unrealized revolutionary possibilities accumulated throughout the period before the military regime eliminated them.

The years 1950 to 1966 enjoy scrupulous attention from scholars of the Indonesian left. Not only were they the relatively stable moment of postcolonial reconstruction under Soekarno's presidency after a series of wars with imperial powers, but they also coincided with the PKI's long period of uncontested leadership under D.N. Aidit. This relatively stable moment without major foreign invasions, however, witnessed multiple challenges from within the country. These variegated contradictions within the process of postcolonial reconstruction itself earned the label the "decades of dialectics" for the 1950s and early 1960s.

Scholars do not often treat the tumultuous years from the Japanese occupation to the end of the Independence War together with the years 1950-1966 because those years had too many contingencies and numerous political shifts. Yet, it was during these years that we could identify turning points shaping the events in subsequent decades. For the communist world at large, the dissolution of the Third International or the Comintern in 1943 caused the communist parties in the colonies to reconsider their praxis of internationalism and relations to the global revolution. Aidit and a member of Aidit's politburo, Sudisman, both joined the PKI in 1943 with an anti-fascist/Japanese orientation.⁴¹ Mortimer convincingly argues that the experiences of members of the PKI's leading stratum during the Japanese occupation and the Independence War—including the sense of national unity, an intense anti-imperialist feeling, and a conviction to the spirit of the revolution—defined the PKI's ideological orientations during the Soekarno's period, and had the greatest affinity to Soekarno's policies during Guided Democracy (1959-1966).⁴² Therefore, by naming this period postcolonial transition, my dissertation highlights the longer process of struggle against colonialism and capitalism beginning in the middle of WWII to the end of Soekarno's presidency.

If this dissertation were to have exclusively worked within the "decades of dialectics" of the 1950s-60s, it would have aligned more perfectly with the existing periodizing paradigm of the "Long Sixties." Fredric Jameson and Christopher Connery coin this framework to encapsulate a particular phase of world-historical contradiction between capitalist expansion and systemic revolt, or, in a more historicized terms, US neo-imperialism and Tricontinental decolonization. I regard this framework as the scholarly endeavor closest to my own attempt to connect the multiple dissident forces that might have found solidarity but were kept separate by the capitalist and imperialist oppressors. Another way to characterize Jameson's and Connery's framework is as an endeavor to conceptualize non-centralized and non-official "co-present" popular and subaltern

⁴¹ Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism*, 35.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 26.

forms of internationalism after the Third International's disbandment—not definitively from below but also absolutely not from above.⁴³

Besides operating with a more extended historical timeframe that begins in the 1940s, my research differs from the Long Sixties paradigm in two respects. First, while the Long Sixties framework suggests global Maoism as the alternative Marxist praxis to Soviet Marxism, my research also examines other theoretical sources besides Maoism that the Indonesian internationalists deployed to contest Soviet revisionism, including left Third-Worldism and postcolonial Leninism. Second, being more situated in the Marxist tradition than the Long Sixties proponents, this research exclusively studies the “Indonesian left” rather than other oppositional popular movements suggested by Connery. The simple criterion this research uses to select who is a part of the Indonesian left, referring primarily to the PKI and its sympathizers, in the period of postcolonial transition is that the figure in question was identified by the military regime as one. The ethical consideration here is these leftists and their families suffered from multiple forms of state oppression—death, torture, rape, exile, incarceration, and dehumanization overall. This is to rule out other strands of Indonesian leftism, such as the Indonesian Socialist Party (like Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo) or the Moerba Party (like Adam Malik), that actually benefitted from the rise of the military regime and hence were irredeemably complicit in the anticommunist killings.

Peripherality and Internationalism

My starting point for theorizing peripherality arises from an understanding of the capitalist system as a globally interrelated totality involving the production and reproduction of the “total social capital.”⁴⁴ Driven by imperatives to accumulate profits, generate surplus value, and transcend limits, world capitalism necessitates a political and economic subordination of peripheries as a whole to their center through the phenomenon we now call imperialism.⁴⁵ Therefore, in this integrated account, imperialism is irreducibly constitutive of capitalism. I contend that only by conceiving imperialism together with capitalism could we begin to study total social capital. This understanding of the capitalist system is consistent with my geo-historical materialist approach to Indonesian Marxism as co-producing global Marxism with other equally global particulars. Marx's analysis of British imperialism, for example, treats British industry, Ireland, Southern states of the US, India, and opium trade with China as interrelated parts of a single economic system.⁴⁶

Studying the production and reproduction of the total social capital from the periphery means accepting the periphery's unequal and compulsive relationship with the capitalist center. The capitalist center is often one and the same as the imperialist metropole. The unequal relationship entails the periphery's multiply oppressed conditions imposed by capitalist and imperialist oppressors to continually extract resources, exploit labor-power, and further valorize surplus value. As thinkers like Claudia Jones, Maria Mies, and Himani Bannerji argue, inextricable conditions of capitalist exploitation, imperialist subjugation, and racialized-sexualized domination—what the Combahee River Collective calls “interlocking oppressions”—structure the

⁴³ Connery, Christopher Leigh, 2007, “The World Sixties,” in *The Worlding Project: Doing Cultural Studies in the Era of Globalization*, eds. Rob Wilson and Christopher Leigh Connery, New Pacific Press: Santa Cruz and North Atlantic Books: Berkeley, 78.

⁴⁴ Marx uses this term more extensively in Volume 2 of *Capital*.

⁴⁵ Here I combine insights I learn primarily from reading Chapter 26 on primitive accumulation in Marx's *Capital*, Lenin's insights on imperialism, and Samir Amin's world-systems analysis.

⁴⁶ Pradella, Lucia, 2013, “Imperialism and Capitalist Development in Marx's *Capital*,” *Historical Materialism* 21, 2: 121-2.

peripheral societies. Peripherality names a global condition connecting the multiply oppressed that has been otherwise kept separate by the capitalist and imperialist oppressors.⁴⁷ My description of peripherality as a condition includes all historical and ongoing forms of colonialism: settler, internal, and overseas.

When traditional Marxism epitomizes “free labor” as the meta-revolutionary subject, it conceals three basic assumptions. First, the “freedom” of this free labor is made possible by the liberal constitutional politics in the imperialist metropole. Second, the empire’s liberal politics is premised on extracted resources, exploited labor, and expropriated population (“interlocking oppressions”) elsewhere in the colonies. Third, when making all unmarked adjectives visible, this exemplary free labor presupposes an identity of a white, male, and waged laborer. Summarily, similar to arguments by W.E.B. DuBois, Eric Williams, and Noel Ignatiev, the so-called metropolitan free labor enjoys his privileged “freedom” by benefitting from imperialism and its attendant system of labor immigration.⁴⁸

I understand internationalism as a risky but empowering praxis of cooperation that crosses the primarily national and racial divisions produced by capitalist empire. The emancipation of oppressed people in the peripheries is fundamental to oppositional politics in the center as both are deeply interconnected in the capitalist system. To transform and abolish the transnational capitalist-imperialist nexus, it is imperative for the multiply oppressed of the world to transgress the divisions enforced by the capitalist and imperialist oppressors. Transgressing divisions necessitates cooperation among the multiply oppressed in the peripheries and the “free labor” in the center. For European free labor to help the exploited masses in the colonies, to use Fanon’s language, they “must first of all decide to wake up, put on their thinking caps, and stop playing the irresponsible game of Sleeping Beauty.”⁴⁹ In other words, as much as the multiply oppressed in the periphery struggles against interlocking oppressions, the metropolitan working class is also required to labor on decolonizing itself. Internationalism is everyone’s work.

The exemplary internationalist instance for Marx during his time was the Irish question. During the height of the Fenian movement in the late 1860s, Marx understood that the Irish surplus generated for British capitalist accumulation forced down the wages of the English working class. He further observed that the empire-mediated relations between Irish immigrant workers and English proletarians caused institutional racism in which the Irish denounced the English as the colonial instruments and the English hated the Irish as an inferior competitor.⁵⁰ Marx posited that the national emancipation of Ireland was a precondition for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Britain.⁵¹ The internationalist praxis between Irish anticolonial revolutionaries and the British

⁴⁷ Jones, Claudia, 1949, “An End to the Neglect of the Problems of Negro Women!” Political Affairs by National Women’s Commission, C.P.U.S.A. (Jun): 51-67.; Mies, Maria, 2014 [1986], *Patriarchy and Accumulation on A World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour*, London: Zed Books.; Bannerji, Himani, 2005, “Building from Marx: Reflections on Class and Race,” *Social Justice* 32, 4: 144-60.; Taylor, Keeanga-Yamahatta, 2017 [1977], “The Combahee River Collective Statement,” in *How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective*, Chicago: Haymarket.

⁴⁸ DuBois, W.E.B., 2007 [1935], *Black Reconstruction in America*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Williams, Eric, 2021 [1944], *Capitalism & Slavery*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.; Ignatin, Noel, 1974, “Black Workers, White Workers,” *Radical America* 8: 41-60.

⁴⁹ Fanon, Frantz, 2004 [1961], *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox, New York: Grove Press, 62.

⁵⁰ Marx, Karl, and Engels, Frederick, 1988 [1870], “Letter to Sigfrid Meyer and August Vogt,” *Marx and Engels Collected Works*, Vol. 43: Marx and Engels: 1868-70, Letters, New York: International Publishers, 473 (9 Apr.).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 473-5.

working class served as the basis for overthrowing the capitalism-imperialism nexus as a unitary and interconnected revolutionary movement on a global scale.

Whereas peripherality connects the multiply oppressed of the world, internationalism provides those multiply oppressed praxes for transforming the capitalist-imperialist system. Both peripherality and internationalism, therefore, need to be analyzed together as objective and subjective conditions for the global revolution against the capitalist totality.

Understood in such terms, peripherality can be a corrective for the politically nebulous “global South” as an analytical category since it presupposes a normative, and hence more substantial, understanding of the societies outside of capitalist cores and imperial metropolises: a condition of multiple oppressions induced by capitalism and imperialism. While current scholarship only begins to understand the conceptual utility of peripherality because of a severe lack in the geo-historical materialist and political-economic study of the postcolony, internationalism has become more relevant as both a topic of study and praxis of resistance in the last decade.⁵² There is a proliferation of a conceptualizations of internationalism in multiple forms from a renewed proletarian internationalism⁵³ to Maoist internationalism,⁵⁴ Chicana/o internationalism,⁵⁵ black internationalism,⁵⁶ indigenous internationalism,⁵⁷ third-worldist

⁵² While it is difficult to find a geo-historical materialist and political-economic study of the postcolony in the fields most equipped to examine the non-West like history, anthropology, area studies—or even political economy itself, which is extremely Eurocentric—I find scholarships in postcolonial geography (Gillian Hart, Sharad Chari, Kanishka Goonewardena), comparative historical sociology (Kamran Matin, Anaheed Al-Hardan, Julian Go), critical international relations (Gilbert Achcar, Lisa Tilley, Robbie Shilliam), and Southern political theory (Adom Getachew, Jane Gordon, Amy Allen) more aligned with what I am undertaking in this dissertation.

⁵³ Amin, Samir, 2018 [2006], “Toward a Fifth International?” in *The Movements of Movements: Rethinking Our Dance*, ed. J. Sen, New Delhi: OpenWord and PM Press, 465-83.

⁵⁴ Wilcox, Emily, 2017, “Performing Bandung: China’s Dance Diplomacy with India, Indonesia, and Burma, 1953-1962,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 18, 4: 518-39.; Cook, Alexander, 2014, *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Evans, James Gethyn, 2021, “Maoism, Anti-Imperialism, and the Third World: The Case of China and the Black Panthers,” *Made in China* (1 May). Available at: <https://search.informit.org/doi/abs/10.3316/informit.288376828599479>.

⁵⁵ Gómez, Alan Eladio, 2016, *The Revolutionary Imaginations of Greater Mexico: Chicana/o Radicalism, Solidarity Politics, and Latin American Social Movements*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

⁵⁶ Robinson, Cedric J., 2019, *Cedric J. Robinson: On Racial Capitalism, Black Internationalism, and Cultures of Resistance*, ed. H.L.T. Quan, London: Pluto Press.; Swan, Quito J., 2020, *Puulu’s Diaspora: Black Internationalism and Environmental Justice*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida.; Burden-Stelly, Charisse, and Horne, Gerald, 2020, “From Pan-Africanism to Black Internationalism,” in *Routledge Handbook of Pan-Africanism*, ed. Reiland Rabaka, London and New York: Routledge, 69-86.; Malloy, Sean L., 2017, *Out of Oakland: Black Panther Party Internationalism during the Cold War*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.; Higashida, Cheryl, 2011, *Black Internationalist Feminism: Women Writers of the Black Left, 1945-1995*, Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press.

⁵⁷ Estes, Nick, 2019, *Our History Is the Future: Standing Rock versus the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Long Tradition of Indigenous Resistance*, London and New York: Verso, Chapter 6.; Crossen, Jonathan, 2017, “Another Wave of Anti-Colonialism: The Origins of Indigenous Internationalism,” *Canadian Journal of History* 52, 3 (Winter): 533-59.; Salaita, Steven, 2016, *Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine*, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press.; Desai, Chandni, 2021, “Disrupting Settler-Colonial Capitalism: Indigenous Intifadas and Resurgent Solidarity from Turtle Island to Palestine,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 50, 2: 43-66.

internationalism,⁵⁸ anti-US imperialist internationalism,⁵⁹ and inter-racial coalition.⁶⁰ Logically, the struggles against capitalism and imperialism from the periphery must assume some forms of internationalism to be effective at all. This is because of the opponent's transnational nature—which could be called the trans-imperial or inter-capitalist alliance. Meanwhile, the periphery's condition of multiple oppressions greatly hamper its ability to build solidarity and oppose the oppressors. Leftist internationalism always provides the insurgent resources for the multiply oppressed of the world.

I contend that the peripherality and internationalism dyad is ever more relevant for contemporary left analysis. While the former rescues left analysis from identifying with the oppressors, the latter prevents the analysis from reaching an anti-dialectical and authoritarian solution—a position which is now widely called “tankie.” One living example of a collective deploying left analysis that shares similar concerns with my accounts of peripherality and internationalism is Critical China Scholars (CCS). Rather than advancing the orthodox tankie analysis that mindlessly championed the Chinese Communist Party's communism against American imperialist capitalism, the CCS's position, as represented by sociologist Eli Friedman, is to support the socially oppressed people *both* in China and the United States against *both* Chinese authoritarianism and American imperialism.⁶¹ The left, in other words, needs to overcome ethno-nationalism and organize towards internationalism to contest capitalism and imperialism.

Towards Peripheral Marxism

My accounts of peripherality and internationalism in the earlier section essentially constitute a larger analytical framework that I call “peripheral Marxism.” What remains to be articulated are the framework's governing principles.

To place Marxism in the service of the multiply oppressed in the periphery and to make Marxism adequate to an analysis of the periphery's geohistorical conjuncture requires a rethinking of Marxism *not* as an accomplished theory, an eternal law, or a general historico-philosophical theory.⁶² Rather, Marxism ought to be rethought as a research program without final

⁵⁸ Chen, Kuan-Hsing, Lu, Miao, and Qiu, Jack Linchuan, 2022, “Back to Bandung for the Future: The Never-Ending Project of De-Imperialization,” *Communication Theory* 32, 2 (May): 281-88.; Popescu, Monica, 2021, “Afro-Asian Internationalism: Leftist Solidarities during the Cold War,” *PMLA* 136, 5: 800-8.; Aung, Geoffrey, 2018, “Reworking Bandung Internationalism: Decolonization and Postcolonial Futurism in Burma/Myanmar,” *Critical Asian Studies* 51, 2: 198-209.; Majumder, Auritro, 2017, “Gayatri Spivak, Planetarity, and the Labor of Imagining Internationalism,” *Mediations* 30, 2 (Summer): 15-28.; Amrith, Sunil S., 2006, “Asian Internationalism: Bandung's Echo in a Colonial Metropolis,” *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 6, 4: 557-69.

⁵⁹ Onishi, Yuichiro, 2013, *Transpacific Antiracism: Afro-Asian Solidarity in Twentieth-Century Black America, Japan, and Okinawa*, New York and London: New York University Press.; Liu, Zifeng, 2019, “Decolonization Is Not a Dinner Party: Claudia Jones, China's Nuclear Weapons, and Anti-Imperialist Solidarity,” *Journal of Intersectionality* 3, 1: 21-45.; Liu, Wen, 2020, “Internationalism Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity,” *Journal of Transnational American Studies* 11, 2: 13-6.; Juan Jr., E. San, 2010, “African American Internationalism and Solidarity with the Philippine Revolution,” *Socialism and Democracy* 24, 2: 32-65.

⁶⁰ Gao, Yunxiang, 2021, *Arise Africa, Road China: Black and Chinese Citizens of the World in the Twentieth Century*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.; Wu, Judy Tzu-Chun, 2013, *Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism during the Vietnam Era*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁶¹ Critical China Scholars, 2021, “China and the U.S. Left: A Dialogue between Critical China Scholars and *Spectre*,” *Spectre* (17 Jul.). Available at: <https://spectrejournal.com/china-and-the-u-s-left/>.

⁶² Aimé Césaire's letter to Maurice Thorez explaining his reasons for quitting the French Communist Party inspired the first half of this sentence. Césaire, Aimé, 2010 [1956], “Letter to Maurice Thorez,” trans. Chike Jeffers, *Social Text* 28, 2 (Summer): 145-52.

determinations.⁶³ It must always analyze anew multiple geo-historical material forces operating in different scales, rhythms, and frequencies—what Antonio Gramsci and Stuart Hall call “conjunctural forces”—that matter to leftist transformational politics in a concrete situation. Drawing his lesson from Gramsci, Hall writes that “when a conjuncture unrolls, ... you have to attend, “violently,” to the “discipline of the conjuncture.”⁶⁴ I thus generalize from Hall’s Gramscian lesson that peripheral Marxist analysis starts from a situated conjuncture and problematic in relation to Marxist presuppositions instead of ready-made and metaphysical Marxist schemas.⁶⁵ Peripheral Marxists, in other words, cannot be intellectually lazy to analyze actual revolutionary situations and must start over each time a new set of material realities arise.⁶⁶ As Kevin Anderson meticulously shows, Marx himself dynamically modified his analyses of the peripheral societies from developing in a unilinear evolution to instantiating multilinear revolutionary possibilities the more he researched capitalist relations in different regions of the world.⁶⁷

Fanon famously states, “In the colonies the economic substructure is also a superstructure. The cause is the consequence. ... This is why Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial problem.”⁶⁸ I read the gist of Fanonian “stretch” as capturing peripheral Marxism’s imperatives to be situational and innovative when analyzing peripheral societies. In this way, peripheral Marxism is epistemologically open, incomplete, and non-deterministic. While this epistemology rejects a totalistic determinism where only one absolute answer is possible, its dialectical openness does not automatically endorse radical contingency where anything is possible.⁶⁹ Peripheral Marxism is open insofar as it grapples with varying interrelations of material forces in the capitalist totality. Such a ceaseless and processual movement of material forces in the peripheries generating and mediated by capitalist contradictions is what this dissertation sees as peripheral dialectics.

As peripheral Marxists, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and other Indonesian left internationalists studied in this dissertation could not be more violently attentive to the discipline of the conjuncture. Aidit always stressed the importance of analyzing the Indonesian concrete situation and the balance of forces (“the conjunctures”) rather than dogmatically applying the Marxist tenets to the Indonesian society. The PKI executed a research program on the characteristics of the Indonesian society since the Party’s Fifth Congress in 1954. Its main method was to combine general Marxist propositions with the concrete material reality of Indonesia. PKI’s Vice Chairman Njoto exclaimed that these research initiatives inaugurated the moment when

⁶³ I adapted this from Alan Shandro’s formulation. Shandro, Alan, 2014, *Lenin and The Logic of Hegemony: Political Practice and Theory in the Class Struggle*, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 161.

⁶⁴ Hall, Stuart, 2021 [1987], “Gramsci and Us,” in *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*, London and New York: Verso, 162.

⁶⁵ Among many internal Marxist critiques of dogmatism, Trotsky is the most forceful. Hence it is also most helpful for my understanding of the situational analysis. Trotsky, Leon, 1938, “Learn to Think: A Friendly Suggestion to Certain Ultra-Leftists,” *The New Internationalist* 4, 7 (Jul.): 206-7. Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1938/05/think.htm>

⁶⁶ The following article by Peter Hudis particularly sharpens my analysis. Hudis, Peter, 2020, “Beyond Unilinear Evolutionism: Rethinking Marx’s Relevance for the Non-Western World,” in *Theory and Praxis: Reflections on the Colonization of Knowledge*, eds. Murzban Jal and Jyoti Bawane, London: Routledge India, 31-52.

⁶⁷ Anderson, Kevin B., 2016, *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

⁶⁸ Fanon, *The Wretched*, 30.

⁶⁹ I adopt this formulation from Gillian Hart. Hart, Gillian, 2018, “Relational Comparison Revisited: Marxist Postcolonial Geographies in Practice,” *Progress in Human Geography* 42, 3: 371-94.

“Indonesian Marxists have understood Indonesia!”⁷⁰ The PKI’s research mantra from the late 1950s onwards was “tahu Marxisme, kenal keadaan,” translated as ‘know Marxism, understand the situation.’ Knowing Marxism, as evident from the research slogan, was not an end in itself. “A mistake in the investigation of actual facts,” Aidit contended in the 1954 Party Congress, “will lead to wishful thinking and adventurism.” The research group on West Javanese peasantry that Aidit himself led in 1963, for example, came up with a more fine-grained analysis of the peasantry’s social stratification, its class enemies (thus named “the rural devils” or ‘setan desa’), and the prospect of the agrarian movement after implementing the land reform act.⁷¹

Indonesian Left Internationalism

This dissertation investigates four modes of internationalist praxes emerging from the cooperation between the Indonesian left and actually-existing communism in the post-Comintern milieu: Soviet, Maoist, Left Third-Worldist, and Minor-Communist. I present the large picture by situating these four lines of Marxism (we can call them “Sixties Marxism”) in the intellectual-historical context first before moving to discuss Indonesian left internationalism proper. I use the term Sixties Marxism here as a Marxist subset of Jameson and Connery’s Long Sixties.

At the most macro level, I argue that these four lines of Sixties Marxism grappled with Stalinist legacies of dehumanization, instrumentalization, totalization, and centralization. Soviet Marxism during Khrushchev’s premiership corrected the problem of dehumanization through a return to early Marx’s humanism via a 1956 Russian translation of *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript* and philosopher Evald Ilyenkov’s idea of creative Marxism. By conceiving capitalism as decaying and at the same time downplaying class struggle, Soviet Marxism did not posit American capitalism-imperialism as its primary contradiction, earning it the PRC’s accusation of being a revisionist and leading to the Sino-Soviet split.

During the split, Chinese Marxism dealt with both Stalin’s instrumentalization and Khrushchev’s humanism through dialectical thinking, which was made possible by a chain of reading from Mao Zedong’s *On Contradiction* to Lenin’s *Philosophical Notebooks*, and Hegel’s *Science of Logic*. Chinese Marxism dialecticized Stalinism from instrumentalized into revolutionary Stalinism. It likewise insisted on the relevance of Marxism-Leninism (which can be called “neo-Marxism-Leninism” to differentiate it from the pre-split form) in understanding the ongoing contradictions between American capitalism-imperialism with the rest of the decolonizing world.

Left Third-Worldism rectified Stalinism’s flattening totalization of the communist world by deploying geo-historical materialism to analyze the material unevenness of interconnected capitalist-imperialist development in the third world. Left Third-Worldists like Fanon, Cabral, and Barka emphasized the continuing internal contradiction between the anticolonial bourgeois regime and the anticapitalist people in the postcolony. Lastly, Minor-Communism—the anti-revisionist communist circuit peripheral to the Soviet Union and China—re-engaged with Lenin not to just redeem the revolutionary aspects of actually-existing communism but to decolonize Soviet commandism. In sum, the four lines of Sixties Marxism transcended Stalinism through humanism, dialectics, geo-historical materialism, and decolonization.

Indonesian leftists played an increasingly central role in my account of the coproduction with Soviet internationalism, then Maoist internationalism, Left Third-Worldist internationalism,

⁷⁰ Njoto, 1965 [1964], *Strive for the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution with the Weapon of Dialectical and Historical Materialism*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 6.

⁷¹ Aidit, D.N., 1964, *Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan2 Desa*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan.

and finally Minor-Communist internationalism. Assessed from the Indonesian peripheral vantage point, Soviet internationalism was the most abstract as it emanated from the center of the communist world and was geographically most distant from Indonesia. Other forms of left internationalism were more concrete as we approached the periphery, namely, Indonesia. Paradoxically, only at its most peripheral does internationalism become most concrete and actual, acquiring a status of a particular universal.⁷² This paradox captures the kernel of “peripheral dialectics.” To reiterate, then, peripherality and internationalism mutually reinforce one another as objective and subjective conditions of the global revolution.

Because the center has a tendency to neglect the periphery, the official accounts of both Soviet and Maoist internationalism do not pay specific attention to Indonesia. The locus of internationalist cooperation between the Indonesian left and both communist centers lay elsewhere—at the “peripheries” of these centers. In Eastern Europe, the periphery of the Soviet Union, Indonesian women, children, labor, and peace activists attended the international conferences organized by Soviet organizations. On the other hand, the internationalist coalition between Chinese and Indonesians occurred when both realized the marginal status of the overseas Chinese in both countries. While Indonesia was among many core participants of Left Third-Worldist internationalism, it became the central organizer for Minor-Communist internationalism. Indonesian leftists pushed the agenda of triple decolonization in the former: Dutch colonization in West Papua, British neocolonialism in Malaya, and American militarism in Southeast Asia overall. For the latter, Indonesian internationalists formed an anti-revisionist circuit with other minor communists to decolonize from Soviet Union’s commandism.

Chapter One on post-Comintern Soviet internationalism looks at the interactions between the Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani) and Soviet Marxist feminists in the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF). It shows that Indonesian left feminists like Darmini, Sulami, and Umi Sardjono combined anticolonial critique with insights from what we would now call social-reproduction feminism to argue for the multiple oppressions of women in the periphery. They later turned this critique against Soviet Marxism itself for having emptied out anti-imperialism in its thin account of peace. Materials from the first chapter came largely from Katharine McGregor’s collection of Indonesian left feminists in the online archive Alexander Street that ranged from Gerwani’s periodical *Api Kartini*, the WIDF periodical *Women of the Whole World*, and the WIDF’s *Information Bulletin*.

Chapter Two on Maoist internationalism follows the activism of Ba Ren or Wang Renshu, the undercover Chinese Communist Party member assigned to Southeast Asia to coordinate with the politicized Chinese diaspora in the region. It demonstrates the inter-racial proletarian solidarity from below between ethnic Chinese coolies and Indonesian peasants in their support of both Chinese communists in the civil war and Indonesian anticolonial nationalists in the Indonesian Revolution. This chapter primarily consulted available translated resources in Chinese by Taomo Zhou in her book *Migration in the Time of Revolution* and Glan Peterson’s *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*.

Chapter Three on Left Third-Worldist internationalism tracks the anticolonial praxis of Ibrahim Isa, the Indonesian representative at the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization in Cairo. It shows that Isa thought of struggles for Papuan liberation and against neocolonial Malaysia as part of a larger anti-systemic fight against the intertwined capitalist-imperialist system. I argue

⁷² This follows Marx’s Hegelian method in investigating the movement of value in *Capital*. See: Banaji, Jairus, 1979, “From the Commodity to Capital: Hegel’s Dialectic in Marx’s *Capital*,” in *Value: The Representation of Labour in Capitalism*, ed. Diane Elson, London: CSE Books, 22.

that this understanding of the world as an intertwined capitalist and imperialist system is uniquely left Third-Worldist. The chapter mainly utilized materials from the uncatalogued Francisca Fanggidaej papers in the International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam) and rare book collections at the KITLV library (Leiden). Samples of materials include personal correspondences, telegram messages, meeting resolutions, unpublished speeches, and memoirs.

Chapter Four on Minor-Communist internationalism examines the horizontal solidarity between the Indonesian Communist Party and peripheral radical nationalist and communist parties of North Kalimantan, Malaya, North Korea, and Albania. It demonstrates the minor-communist critique of both Stalinist dogmatism and Khrushchevian revisionism as two sides of the same Soviet big-country chauvinism. Minor-Communist internationalism returned to Lenin for an anti-imperialist, proletarian, and dialectical Marxism. This chapter focuses on PKI's documents as retrieved from the Indonesian National Archive (Jakarta), the International Institute for Social History (Amsterdam), and multiple personal collections.

While the history of the Indonesian left in general is a history of defeat, melancholia, and bourgeois capture, this dissertation invites the readers, as Gramsci and Hall did, to attend violently to the discipline of the conjuncture. This conjuncture entails nothing less than ceaseless and processual movements of material forces in the peripheries generating and mediated by capitalist contradictions—to be analyzed using “peripheral dialectics.” By attending to the conjuncture and working through the peripheral dialectics, new revolutionary possibilities emerge, and operating contradictions begin to transform. Whereas the official praxes of Soviet and Maoist internationalism did not figure the Indonesian left very prominently, internationalist cooperation arose from within a Soviet front like the Women's International Democratic Federation or from a convergence on the marginal status of the overseas Chinese. The mighty solidarity between the Indonesian internationalists, the Left Third-Worldists, and the Minor-Communists presented actual material changes in the capitalist-imperialist world and hence left indelible precedents in the history of left struggle and organizing. After the communist genocide, the exiled Indonesian leftists continued to oppose the military regime from abroad. Among the greatest internationalist comradeship for the Indonesian exiles came from another peripheral—and rather unlikely—location, namely, Albania. And probably, most unlikely of all, is the interest of this dissertation's author in writing about such a topic.

The intellectual history recounted in “Peripheral Dialectics” offers a leftist archive of hope—a trace of futures past that activists might reanimate in the present.⁷³ It enables an understanding of the past as opening up revolutionary horizons in the contemporary moment. Therefore, a recuperation of Indonesian internationalism that has long been “left of the left” contributes to the long process and multiple cycles of struggle against capitalism and imperialism.⁷⁴ I am convinced that one task of a scholar-activist, particularly an intellectual historian of the periphery, is to be a mediator connecting disparate resistances that have been kept separate by capitalist and imperialist oppressors. As President Soekarno reminded the Indonesian public in his 1966 Independence Day speech, never abandon history (“djangan sekali-kali meninggalkan sedjarah”). The struggle continues.

⁷³ I adapt this formulation from Vijay Prashad's Tricontinental Institute blogpost.

⁷⁴ I draw the idea of multiple cycles of struggle from Samir Amin and a long process of struggle from Mao Zedong. Amin, Samir, 2008, “Reviewed Work: Perilous Passage: Mankind and the Global Ascendancy of Capital by Amiya Kumar Bagchi,” *Social Scientist* 36, 5/6 (May-Jun.): 84-8.; Mao, Tse-tung, 1965, “On Protracted War,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2: The Period of the War of Resistance against Japan, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, and Frankfurt: Pergamon Press, 113-94 (May 1938).

Chapter 1

Post-Comintern Soviet Internationalism: The Social Questions, Anti-Imperialist Peace, and Undialectical Communism

Post-Comintern Soviet internationalism studied in this chapter spanned from the eras of late Stalin (1943-1953), Khrushchev (1954-1964), to early Brezhnev (1964-1968). During the Second World War, the Soviet Union already began to acknowledge the significance of national material particularities on the questions of struggles against imperialism-capitalism, socialist transition, and communist construction. Such acknowledgment led eventually to the dissolution of the Comintern during the time of Stalin. This chapter identifies three modalities of post-Comintern internationalist praxes generated by different historical conjunctures. The first modality took the form of the semiautonomous Soviet “fronts” (mostly founded in the late 1940s), which were politicized by the early Cold War sharp bipolarism. Intellectually, these Soviet “fronts” focused on the social questions or social agents within the communist framework, ie. the questions of women, trade unionists, youths, or students. Among them, the World Peace Council (WPC) bore the closest resemblance to the unofficial post-Comintern Soviet internationalist platform as there were high political affinities between the WPC and the USSR policies. This chapter particularly analyzes the intellectual interaction between the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF; Soviet front) and the Indonesian Women’s Movement (*Gerwani*; Indonesian leftist feminist movement), which, it argues, generated a mode of analysis connecting anticolonial internationalism to social reproduction feminism. The second modality was the print infrastructure, which was centered in an internationalist journal based in Prague called *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (PPS) or the *World Marxist Review* (1958-1990). The journal was a collective effort of the non-Western European communist parties in shifting the focus of the Soviet Union from Western Europe, as expressed through the Cominform, to the rest of the world. The title of the journal articulated Khrushchev’s anti-imperialist proposition of peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age. The third modality manifested as the third worldist Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia (RUDN) or Lumumba University (1960-present), established after Khrushchev determined the third world as the potential site of socialist and anti-imperialist struggles. The RUDN and general political atmosphere in the Soviet Union formed a particular socialist cosmopolitical subjectivity for Indonesians who either studied or exiled there, compelling them to become internationalists. The general dominant characteristics of post-Comintern Soviet internationalism in the 1940s-1960s could be best identified with Khrushchev’s paradoxical proposition of peaceful coexistence which attempted to reconcile Soviet Union’s anti-imperialist orientation for the third world and its co-operation with imperialist America to prevent the annihilation of the world. Along with Khrushchev’s undialectical analytics of class antagonism in the Soviet society as being already dissolved and global imperialism-capitalism in accelerating decay, post-Comintern Soviet internationalism could be called into question by certain critics as revisionist.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ Timeline of significant occurrences analyzed in this section.

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|------|--|
| 1935 | The seventh Comintern Congress, announcing the antifascist popular front policy |
| 1943 | The disbandment of the Comintern |
| 1947 | The declaration of the Zhdanov doctrine; the formation of the Cominform |
| 1952 | The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Stalin) |
| 1956 | The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev); Khrushchev’s Secret Speech; the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Poland |
| 1957 | The International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties |
| 1958 | The launching of <i>Problems of Peace and Socialism</i> or the <i>World Marxist Review</i> |

From Interwar Stalin's Capitalist Crisis Thesis to Post-war Zhdanov's Two-Camp Theory

Until the disbandment of the Third International or the Comintern in June 1943, its ideological and tactical basis remained one of antifascist popular front---at the cost of support for anticolonial and working class struggles---as a consequence of the seventh Comintern congress in July to August 1935.⁷⁶ This applied both to the Nazi order in Europe and the Japanese expansion under the sign of co-prosperity sphere. Despite such original intention, the international antifascist credentials of the Comintern and the Soviet Union were gravely damaged by the Molotov-Robbentrop Pact between Stalin and Hitler in August 1939. The pact licensed a retroactive cynical reading of the anti-Fascism of the Third International as ultimately a Soviet ideological apparatus that executed Stalin's arbitrary decisions at a global scale. This reading's lineage can be traced to Trotsky's critique of the post-Lenin Third International's reduction of Communist Parties to instruments of Soviet foreign policy. "The task of the parties in the Comintern assumes," Trotsky wrote, "an auxiliary character; their mission is to protect the USSR from intervention and not to fight for the conquest of power. ... If our internal difficulties, obstacles, and contradictions, which are fundamentally a reflection of world contradictions, can be settled merely by "the inner forces of our revolution" without entering "the arena of the world-wide proletarian revolution" then the International is partly a subsidiary and partly a decorative institution, the Congress of which can be convoked once every four years, once every ten years, or perhaps not at all."⁷⁷ This pact, a betrayal of sorts, could also be read as a split between Soviet state interests and world revolution.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, the Nazi attack on June 1941 prompted the Comintern to resuscitate its antifascist intent with a stronger emphasis on the national unity as an instrumental mobilizing and legitimizing means to combat Nazism.⁷⁹ With this line of the Comintern, the tactics of popular fronts gradually morphed into national fronts. Georgi Dimitrov, the General Secretary of the Comintern and a Bulgarian communist, noted that there are two related reasons for dissolving the Comintern. First, it is impractical to lead the working class movement from one center. And second, the disbandment strengthened the local communists by showing that communist parties were not agents of a foreign state.⁸⁰ Undergirding this line of argument is the deep recognition of the national basis of each communist party along with its relative autonomy from the Soviet center.

1959 The Extraordinary Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev)

1960 The International Meeting of 81 Communist and Workers Parties; the founding of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia

1961 The Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Khrushchev); the ratification of the Third Program of the CPSU

1966 The Twenty-Third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Breznev)

⁷⁶ Haslam, Jonathan, 1979, "The Comintern and the Origins of the Popular Front 1934-1935," *The Historical Journal* 22, 3 (Sep): 673-91.

⁷⁷ Trotsky, Leon, 1936 [1928], *The Third International after Lenin: The Draft Program of the Communist International – A Criticism of Fundamentals*, trans. John G. Wright, New York: Pioneer Publishers, 61-2.

⁷⁸ Pons, Silvio, 2015, "The Soviet Union and the International Left," in *The Cambridge History of the Second World War Volume 2: Politics and Ideology*, eds. Richard Bosworth and Joseph Maiolo, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 89.

⁷⁹ Lebedeva and Narinskii (eds.), *Komintern I Vtoraia Mirovaia Voina*, vol. II, doc. 101. quoted in Pons, "The Soviet Union," 75.

⁸⁰ Banac, Ivo (ed.), 2003, *Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 275-6 (21 May 1943).

The Soviet analytical explanation of the world during the post-1943 antifascist popular front period is best captured by Stalin's capitalist crisis thesis expressed during an informal meeting with Yugoslav and Bulgarian communist leaders in January 1945: "The crisis of capitalism has manifested itself in the division of the capitalists into two factions---one fascist, the other democratic. The alliance between ourselves and the democratic faction of capitalists came about because the latter had a stake in preventing Hitler's domination, for that brutal state would have driven the working class to extremes and to the overthrow of capitalism itself. We are currently allied with one faction against the other, but in the future we will be against the first [sic] faction of capitalist, too."⁸¹ The statement underlines the strategic aspect of the united front in the alliance between the communists and the antifascist capitalists while also gesturing towards its future breakup when the capitalists themselves are undivided.

In the post-war world where fascism was extinguished and capitalism re-unified, Stalin did discern a new political form from within the communist regime that could both compete with the capitalist liberal democracy and enable other forms of socialist transitions differing from the dominant Soviet model. That form was "popular democracy" endowed with social content.⁸² Even though there was no evidence that the Soviet Union intentionally turned this idea of popular democracy into a grand design, the discourse lingered and saturated Soviet's official post-war analytics offered by the Soviet cultural ideologist Andrei Zhdanov. In contrast to Stalin's capitalist crisis thesis, Zhdanov's two-camp theory returned the emphasis to the primary contradiction between capitalism and communism prior to the rise of Fascism.

In September 1947, Zhdanov declared that "the political forces operating in the world arena" had been divided "into two basic camps," the imperialist and anti-democratic camp on one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other.⁸³ The general opposition between capitalism and communism was counterintuitively framed in the Zhdanovian formula as one of imperialist aggression represented by the United States and democratic peace represented by the Soviet Union. This formula exposes the operation of imperialist expansionism behind the American justificatory rhetoric of liberal democracy, presciently anticipating the self-reflexive characterization of the US as a military industrial complex by President Eisenhower on January 1961.⁸⁴ On the other hand, it reappropriates and claims the discourse of anti-imperialist democracy for the Soviet Union, elevating it to be the harbinger of peace as opposed to the American imperialist aggression and moral degeneracy culminated in its use of nuclear and atomic bombs. This stark juxtaposition between the bad United States and the good Soviet Union in the postwar period paralleled the earlier interwar discursive construction that contrasted Jim Crow America to Stalin's multiethnic empire.

It was widely surmised that the direct consequence of Zhdanov's two-camp theory was the Soviet Union's advice for militancy or armed struggle to several Southeast Asian communist participants in the 1948 Conference of Youth and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 357 (28 Jan. 1945).

⁸² Pons, "The Soviet Union," 87.; Banac, *Diary*, 372 (7 Jun. 1945).

⁸³ Procacci, Giuliano (ed.), 1994, *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947 / 1948 / 1949*, Milan: Feltrinelli, 226 (25 Sep. 1947).

⁸⁴ Eisenhower, Dwight D., 1961, "Farewell Radio and Television Address to the American People," in *Dwight D. Eisenhower 1960-61: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the President, January 1, 1960, to January 20, 1961*, Washington: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, and General Services Administration, 1035-40 (17 Jan. 1961).

and Independence or generally known as Calcutta Youth Conference (February 19-23).⁸⁵ The conference was sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Student (IUS), which are to be properly introduced in the next section. Larissa Efimova, a Russian scholar of Indonesian communism, has proven this hypothesis of Soviet's pre-planned grand strategy in Southeast Asia wrong due to the lack of evidence on this question even from the secret report of the Soviet participant and *Pravda* correspondent in Indonesia Olga Chechetkina herself.⁸⁶

Post-Comintern Soviet's Dual Internationalist Platforms: *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and the Soviet Fronts on the Social Questions

From September 1947 to April 1956, the Soviet Union did establish a coordinating platform for nine Eurocommunist parties mainly to repel the American anticommunist schemes of the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and, later, NATO. The platform was called the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).⁸⁷ Zhdanov's two-camp theory was announced and adopted in the inaugural Cominform meeting at Szklarska Poręba, Poland. The Cominform had its own journal called *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* which ended along with the bureau's dissolution in 1956. The dissolution was a consequence of the deliberation in the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union where Tito, Mao, and Togliatti loudly opted for its abortion.⁸⁸ Then during the 1957 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, a meeting aimed to express the true internationalism of the global communist parties absent CPSU domination, the idea of launching a joint ideological monthly publication for inter-party relations and world Communism was raised. Such new internationalist platform of the Communists was one of intellectual than bodily exchange, similar to the Cominform. The new international (rather than strictly European) Communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (PPS) or *World Marxist Review* was established and first printed in September 1958 under the editorship of Aleksey Rumyantsev from the USSR. The journal ceased publication in June 1990.

⁸⁵ There were six Indonesian youth delegates from the Indonesian Youth Congress (BKPRI), a youth organization which was sympathetic to the left. Twenty-five were supposed to attend but the majority were prevented from doing so by the Dutch blockade. The complete delegation list remains unknown. IUS, 1948, "Hands Off South East Asia: Conference of the Youth and Students of South East Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence," *Special Bulletin of the Colonial Bureau of the IUS* (Apr.): 1-3, quoted in McVey, Ruth T., 1958, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings*, Ithaca, NY.: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 7-8, fn. 20.

Rather we have the information about the leaders of the Indonesian delegation in the preparatory meeting on March 1947. They were the young communists Maroeto Daroesman and Soeripno.

⁸⁶ Efimova, Larissa, 2009, "Did the Soviet Union Instruct Southeast Asian Communists to Revolt? New Russian Evidence on the Calcutta Youth Conference of February 1948," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 40, 3 (Oct): 449-69. Similar argument was made by C.M. Turnbull in Turnbull, C.M., 1992, "The Beginning of the Cold War, 1948-1954," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 600.

⁸⁷ Di Biagio, Anna, 2002, "The Cominform as the Soviet Response to the Marshall Plan," in *The Failure of Peace in Europe 1943-48*, eds. Antonio Varsori and Elena Calandri, Houndmills and New York: Palgrave, 299-302.

⁸⁸ Rieber, Alfred, 2016, "Afterword: Promises and Paradoxes of Socialist Internationalism (Personal and Historical Reflections)," in *Socialist Internationalism in the Cold War: Exploring the Second World*, eds. Patryk Babiracki and Austin Jersild, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 332. For the full account of the deliberation in Russian read: Stykalin, A.S., 2013, "Rukovodstvo KPSS v poiskakh novykh mekhanizmov vliianiia na mirovoe kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie. Ot Kominformbiuro k pervomu bol'shomu moskovskomu soveshchaniu kompartii (vesna 1956-osen' 1957)," in *Nasledniki Kominterna. Mezhdunarodnyi soveshchaniia predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii v Moskve (Noiabr' 1957 g.) Dokumenty*, ed. N.G. Tomilina et al., Moscow: Rosspen, 5-51.

The Czech Press Distribution Agency in Prague was the publisher and distributor. The first issue of this journal stated its fundamental task to be “the propagation and further elaboration of Marxist-Leninist theory” which was “the concern of the Communist and workers’ parties of all countries.”⁸⁹ Those major concerns, resulting from the debates between Khrushchev’s policies and his critics, included peace tactics, the campaign against revisionism, the superiority of Communism, Bloc solidarity, and the strategy of national liberation. D.N. Aidit, the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party, was a frequent contributor of this journal. The Indonesian coordinator for PPS was Suhardjo or Hardjo, reported to be an editor on the staff of PPS in Prague in February 1963.⁹⁰ The 1957 International Meeting had a follow up that resulted in the 1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. The Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, which all attending communist parties adopted as their working principles, was declared in this meeting.

However, because the Cominform only exclusively dealt with the European communist movements, concurrently there were other more “internationalist” oriented apparatuses of the Soviet Union. Despite their irreducible semi-autonomous status from and loose relationship with the Soviet Union, these were oftentimes understood as the Soviet “fronts” that attended to the leftist activities on a world scale.⁹¹ Most of these “fronts” were not initially formed by the Soviet Union but became aligned with it once there was an internal splintering away of the anticommunists in these organizations as a result of the Cold War mode of politicization. Members of these collectives were mostly not state diplomatic players but rather locally based organic intellectuals, artists, doctors, lawyers, workers, and activists---sets of characters which Rachel Leow calls subaltern internationalists.⁹² Among the more salient organizations that Indonesian progressives actively participated were the World Peace Council (WPC; founded in 1950; based first in Paris but forced to relocate several times until permanently settled in Helsinki in 1968), the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF; founded in 1945; based in East Berlin), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY; founded in 1945; based in Budapest), the World

⁸⁹ *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, 1958.

⁹⁰ Central Intelligence Agency, 1967, *Problems of Peace and Socialism (PPS) (The Monthly Journal of the International Communist Movement): An Investigative Aid*, CIA-RDP78-02646R000500340001-5, Box 004, Folder 035, Web, Accessed 15 Jul. 2019.

Little is found out on this figure of Suhardjo. Presumably he was a member of the Indonesian Communist Party. He was a journalist who attended the World Peace Conference in Helsinki in July 1965 and was one of the seven Indonesian delegates to attend the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January 1966. The other six delegates were Ibrahim Isa (the head delegate), Willy Hariandja, Francisca Fanggidaej, Umar Said, Margono, and Sugiri. *Pokok2 Laporan Delegasi Indonesia ke Konferensi Tiga Kontinen di Havana*, January 1966, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, International Institute of Social History (IISH), Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

⁹¹ On this question, Fransisca de Haan was among the most vocal in making a revisionist argument that the WIDF, one of the organizations listed under the Soviet fronts below, was not a Soviet front as mischaracterized by the US. When the WIDF was reduced and denounced by the US as a Soviet front, then this feminist organization became only a Soviet propaganda apparatus that was not truly representative of a broad range of women. Nevertheless, not until more archival research is done to corroborate the status of semi-autonomous relationship between these “fronts” and the Soviet Union, this characterization is still open for further reformulation. de Haan, Fransisca, 2010, “Continuing Cold War Paradigms in Western Historiography of Transnational Women’s Organization: The Case of the Women’s International Democratic Federation,” *Women’s History Review* 19, 4 (Sep): 547-73.

⁹² Leow, Rachel, 2019, “A Missing Peace: The Asia-Pacific Peace Conference in Beijing, 1952, and the Emotional Making of Third World Internationalism,” *Journal of World History* 30, 1-2 (Jun.): 30.

Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU; founded in 1945; based in Prague), and the International Union of Students (IUS; founded in 1946; based in Prague).⁹³

The more systematic and institutional accounts of Indonesians participating in the WPC, WFDY, and IUS remain to be researched. Yet we have plenty evidences of exchanges and sporadic engagements between progressive Indonesians and these so-called front organizations, for example: a peace festival in Jakarta in June 1957 headed by Utami Suryadharma and Sirajuddin Abbas; a conference opposing the presence of foreign bases in Jakarta and Bali in October 1965; and the participation of Indonesian delegates in the Asia and Pacific Rim peace conference in Beijing (October 1952), a congress of the people for peace in Vienna (1952), world peace conference in Helsinki (June of both 1955 and 1965), a conference against A- and H-Bomb in Hiroshima (1964), and a peace conference in Tokyo (August 1965). Prijono, a minister of education in several Soekarno's cabinets, received the Stalin Peace Prize for his activities as a member of Indonesian Committee of World Peace Movement in 1954 along with Bertolt Brecht and the Burmese poet Takhin Kodaw Hmaing among others. Soekarno, the first President of Indonesia, received the same award in 1960 after it was renamed to the Lenin Peace Prize due to de-Stalinization. There are telegraphic accounts of Indonesian youth participants in the youth festivals organized by WFDY and IUS in Prague (1947), Budapest (1949), East Berlin (1951), Bucharest (1953), Warsaw (1955), Moscow (1957), Vienna (1959), and Helsinki (1962). Around twenty thousand youths from other countries joined the Indonesian youth delegates in these festivals. The last youth festival that the youth members of the Indonesian Communist Party could have attended was planned to be held in Algiers in the summer of 1965 (along with the "second Bandung" conference). However, due to the military toppling of Ben Bella's third worldist government, this youth festival had to be postponed to Sofia in 1968. Suar Suroso, a representative of the Indonesian leftwing youth organization *Pemuda Rakjat*, was a vice president of the WFDY in the mid 1950s. Wiwoho Busono, a professor of psychology at Gadjah Mada University, once served as a secretary-general of the International Union of Students in 1955 when he just graduated from Charles University in Prague.

We will focus more on thinkers who were involved with the WIDF in the section as it corresponded to one largest semi-autonomous "sub-organization" of the Indonesian Communist Party, namely, the Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerwani; *Gerakan Wanita Indonesia*).

WIDF and Gerwani: Anticolonial Internationalism and Social Reproduction Feminism

Despite its various permutations, the "progressive" women movement in postwar Indonesia was a member of the WIDF starting in 1946, only a year after the WIDF was founded in November 1945 in Paris at the first World Congress of Women. It was Kowani (*Kongres Wanita Indonesia*; 'Indonesian Women's Congress') in 1946, Gerwis (*Gerakan Wanita Sadar*; 'The Movement of Politically Conscious Women') in 1949, and finally Gerwani in 1954.⁹⁴ Gerwis took

⁹³ The other "fronts" include the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ; founded in 1946; based in Prague), the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL; founded in 1946; based in Brussels), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW; founded in 1946; based in London), the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFRF; founded in 1951; based in Vienna), the International Radio and Television Organization (IRTO), the International Institute for Peace (IIP; founded in 1958; based in Prague), and the Christian Peace Conference (CPC; founded in 1958; based in Prague).

Staar, Richard F., 1987, *USSR Foreign Policies after Détente*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.

⁹⁴ In this section, most of the information and quotations are drawn from a delicate archival research and publications of Katharine E. McGregor. McGregor, Katharine E., 2012, "Indonesian Women, The Women's

over the WIDF membership from Kowani who withdrew and became to be only a contact organization because of the objections from its Muslim women organizations to the WIDF's socialist orientation.⁹⁵ Subsequently in 1954, Gerwis changed its name to Gerwani. The WIDF immediately recognized this organizational change by sending its vice president Monica Felton from Britain to observe Gerwani's first congress.⁹⁶ A few of the Gerwis/Gerwani executives became a member of WIDF secretariat in Berlin including: Darmini (1954) as a representative of Gerwis before the organizational renaming, Suwarti Bintang Suradi (1956-57), Massje Siwi (1960) who was elected in the 1960 WIDF council meeting in Warsaw, and Sulami (1958-60, 1963-64) a Vice Secretary-General of Gerwani from 1957-1965. Katharine McGregor notes that at least six Indonesian women served on the WIDF secretariat in East Berlin for periods of one to two years. Many of these women contributed articles to the monthly WIDF publication, *Women of the Whole World* (1946-1991).⁹⁷

Gerwis/Gerwani was an active participant of WIDF functions. Suwarti Bintang Suwardi, the first chair of Gerwis, attended a WIDF congress in Vienna entitled On the Defence of Children (1952). Later in December the same year, Umi Sardjono, vice chair of Gerwis, along with Tam and Warsini, Gerwis members, attended the WIDF council meeting after a conference on peace in the Asia Pacific at Beijing as trade union delegates and a People's Congress on Peace in Vienna, indicating both the fluid organizational affiliation of the Indonesian political actor (in this case, women's organization and trade union) and the close resemblance of the Soviet front organizations (in this case, WPC and WIDF). In the meantime, Aisjah, the General Secretary of Gerwis, took part in a WIDF working meeting in Berlin to plan for the 1953 World Congress of Women in Copenhagen. That 1953 World Congress was attended by S.K. Trimurti, vice chair of Gerwis, Kartinah, Sumampouw-Lapian, Setiati Surasto, Darmini, Massje Siwi, and Sulami. In 1955, Gerwani sent nine representatives to the WIDF Mother's Congress in Lausanne, Switzerland. Mudigdo, Gerwani's second vice chair, attended a Conference on the Creation of Conditions that will Enable a Woman to Fulfill Her Role in Society as Mother, Worker, and Citizen as part of the WIDF congress (1958). Then Gerwani hosted a WIDF council meeting in Jakarta (1960). Hurustiati Subandrio, the left-leaning wife of Foreign Minister Subandrio and later leader of Kowani from 1961-1966, was invited to lead the proceedings on 21 April in honour of Kartini Day at the Copenhagen meeting to commemorate 50 years of International Women's Day (1960). Sunardi Surachman and S. Hanafi attended the World Gathering of Women for Disarmament in Vienna (1962). Lastly, Umi Sardjono led the Gerwani entourage to take part in the fourth WIDF congress in Moscow in June 1963 where she abstained from voting on the issue of peace in solidarity with Soekarno's policy of confrontation or *konfrontasi*.

The issues of intersection between the WIDF and the Indonesian women's movement were anti-imperialism and conditions of women and children in the postcolonial society. I suggest that it was a constellation of a particular type of anticolonial internationalism and postcolonial feminism interested in the questions of social reconstruction, reproduction, and distribution. Beginning with anti-imperialism, Kowani first joined the WIDF in 1946 precisely because of its

International Democratic Federation and The Struggle for 'Women's Rights,' 1946-1965," *Indonesia and the Malay World* 40, 117: 193-208.; McGregor, Katharine E., 2013, "The Cold War, Indonesian Women, and the Global Anti-Imperialist Movement, 1946-65," in *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change*, eds. Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney and Fabio Lanza, London and New York: Routledge, 31-51.

⁹⁵ McGregor, "The Cold War," 33.

⁹⁶ Felton, Monica, 1954, "Dawn Over the Equator," *Women of the Whole World* 7-8 (Jul-Aug): 10-11, quoted in McGregor, "The Cold War," 38.

⁹⁷ McGregor, "Indonesian Women," 196.

promise and program to end colonialism.⁹⁸ Darmini, then the first representative of Gerwis to WIDF, is suspected to be the writer of a WIDF report in 1950 that discussed the issues of American exploitation in Indonesia, the imperial transition from the Dutch and Japanese to the Americans, excessive foreign investment, the repressive militarized techniques of US-trained Indonesian policemen, and the presence of foreign base in Indonesia. We see in this report a critique of what later came to be called Americanism in the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist modes. The report claims that “The Rockefeller Corporation owns hundreds of oil wells here. More than a million acres of rubber plantations belong to American monopolists.”⁹⁹ On the social reproduction side, in the World Congress of Women in 1953, Sumampouw-Lapian, a Minahasa Gerwis representative, reported on the lack of protection for mothers and high infant mortality in Indonesia along with the ignorance of marriage rights and the unequal wages between genders. Sumampouw-Lapian identified the colonial Dutch agreement made as a condition of Indonesian independence in 1949 to be the cause of wage inequality and other social ills in Indonesia.¹⁰⁰ In her contribution to the 1954 WIDF executive meeting, Darmini expressed the need for marriage reforms especially in the regional areas, including protection from workplace dismissal due to pregnancy and need for maternity leave.¹⁰¹ S.K. Trimurti, Gerwis vicechair and the first minister of labor of the Indonesian republic in 1947-1948, proposed the amendment of the labor law on the maternity leave clause in 1951 and it successfully became the Labour Act but was not fully implemented across the newfound nation.¹⁰² A saddening WIDF report on the burden and real discrimination of the working Indonesian women was delivered by Suwarti Bintang Suradi, the second representative of Gerwani to WIDF, in 1957. She disclosed that “It is very difficult for Indonesian working mothers-one can even say impossible-to undertake jobs or accept transfers to jobs in other places other than the family residence without running the risk of a split in the family.” According to Suwarti, many men were unwilling to work under women and in foreign companies married women were allowed to work for only half a day without an entitlement to health insurance and other benefits.¹⁰³ Such questions of women labor, marriage reform, equal wage, social reproduction, and later children rights have been a sustained agenda of the politically conscious women’s movement in Indonesia.

From the start, Gerwis/Gerwani saw the intimate connection between (neo)imperialist warfare and women’s rights, colonial possession and superexploited labor, militaristic overspending and divestment from children as the former is executed at the expense of the latter. Very poignant was the 1953 political-economic critique of war (during a period of the intermission between Korean and Vietnam wars) as the cause of poverty, unemployment, and the maldistribution of national budget to the military, which took away the necessary expense for children’s healthcare, food, and education. The Gerwis’s WIDF report also promoted the solidarity with Vietnam and disfavored the remilitarization of Japan. Gerwis’s critique of American imperialism was carried on by Darmini in 1954 when she opposed the military treaties with the

⁹⁸ WIDF, 1947, *Information Bulletin* 12: n.p. quoted in McGregor, “The Cold War,” 33.

⁹⁹ WIDF, 1950, *Information Bulletin* 10: 19 quoted *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁰ Sumampouw-Lapian, 1953, *World Congress of Women (Copenhagen June 5-10, 1953): Reports, Speeches, Documents*, Berlin: Women’s International Democratic Federation, 223-4 quoted in *Ibid.*, 35-6.

¹⁰¹ Darmini, 1954, “XIVth Executive Session Executive Committee WIDF, Geneva 16-19th January 1954,” Berlin: WIDF, 34 quoted in McGregor, “Indonesian Women,” 199.

¹⁰² Blackburn, S., 2004, *Women and the State in Modern Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 176.

¹⁰³ WIDF, 1957, *Information Bulletin* 14: 27 quoted in McGregor, “Indonesian Women,” 199.

US and advocated lifting the US-endorsed embargo on rubber trade with China.¹⁰⁴ Suharti, a Gerwani vice president, linked the issues of children's rights to education especially at the kindergarten level, their lack of opportunity due to poverty, and their high mortality rate with the inadequate wages of the parents in the 1955 fifth council meeting of the WIDF in Geneva. She attributed parents' low wages to the weakness of labor laws, the continuing foreign ownership of plantations, and the ongoing Dutch colonialism in New Guinea, the processes fundamental to what we might call super-exploitation today. Suharti made clear that her critique was in a direct anticolonial lineage of the Bandung conference.¹⁰⁵ Sulami, Gerwani vice secretary-general, a member of WIDF secretariat, and the most prolific contributor to *Women of the Whole World*, wrote a short story called "Seven Girls" in 1963 that made explicit the link between the internal and external causes of women suffering in Indonesia. Different from other female thinkers who assigned the suffering of women and children to militarism and its excessive cost, Sulami reflects in the short story: "that [it] is the combination of feudalism and colonialism which gave women no rights, no freedom, no right to property, and happiness."¹⁰⁶ Sulami did not elaborate further on feudalism but it was an opening for a different line of feminist critique that examines internal oppression in addition to the external ones. If Claudia Jones, the U.S. Black feminist Communist, identified classism, racism, and sexism ("the worker, the Negro, and the woman") as the structural constituents of the "triple oppression" in the US,¹⁰⁷ Gerwani thinkers diagnosed lingering feudalism and impinging military imperialism under capitalist imperatives as the loci of women's multiple oppression in Indonesia in a manner close to the world systems analysis.

The Gerwani critique of the WIDF's rather undifferentiated conception of women began to take shape as early as 1958 at the fourth WIDF Congress in Vienna when Mudigdo, Gerwani vice president and mother in law of D.N. Aidit, questioned the WIDF for not emphasizing enough the obstacles faced by peasant women to property ownership.¹⁰⁸ This question of unpropertied women was taken up further in the 1960 report along with other related issues of unequal wages on the plantation, illiteracy, and the possibility of practical assistance programs for women workers like credit co-operatives and childcare. The critique of the WIDF was sharper in 1963 when Umi Sardjono, Gerwani chairwoman, called out the WIDF's pacifism and its Soviet-inflected abstract notion of peace that hollowed out anti-imperialist principle. Hence, the critique of the WIDF was also a critique of Khrushchev's Soviet itself. Umi demanded a more robust reflection from the WIDF on the rise and development of the national struggles of revolutionary women in Asia and Africa. She saw that the WIDF "offers 1001 excuses not to talk about the anti-imperialist struggle and only emphasize the struggle of women for peace as an abstract principle 'peace for peace.' It is not possible, however, to achieve peace as long as there is still imperialism, when it still results In the death of patriots of independence and when it is a source of the danger of war."¹⁰⁹ She also

¹⁰⁴ Darmini, 1954, "XIVth Executive Session Executive Committee WIDF, Geneva 16-19th January 1954," Berlin: WIDF, 34 quoted in McGregor, "The Cold War," 37.

¹⁰⁵ Suharti, 1955, "Working for Peace in Asia," *Women of the Whole World* 6: 18-19 quoted in *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁰⁶ Sulami, 1963, "Seven Girls," *Women of the Whole World* 4: 30-2 quoted in McGregor, "Indonesian Women," 204.

¹⁰⁷ Jones, Claudia, 1949, "An End to the Neglect of the Problems of Negro Women!" Political Affairs by National Women's Commission, C.P.U.S.A. (Jun): 51-67.

¹⁰⁸ Mudigdo, 1958, *Report Presented to the Conference on "The Creation of Conditions which will Enable a Woman to Fulfill Her Role in Society as a Mother, Worker, and Citizen," 4th Women's Congress, Vienna, 1-5 June 1958*, Berlin: WIDF Secretariat, 66 quoted in McGregor, "Indonesian Women," 200.

¹⁰⁹ Sardjono, Umi, 1964, *Madju Terus untuk Integrasi Total Gerwani dengan Wanita Buruhtanimiskin (Laporan Umum Ketua DPP Gerwani Nj Umi Sardjono Kepada Sidang Pleno Ke-III DPP Gerwani, Djakarta: DPP Gerwani*, 18 quoted in McGregor, "The Cold War," 44.

added that the resolution concerning women and peace “did not fulfill the aspirations of women who wanted to be free from the shackles of imperialism and feudalism.”¹¹⁰ This critique of the WIDF’s general peaceful political stance partly compelled Gerwani to begin to frame Southeast Asia as the center of struggle in its own right. In Gerwani plenary meeting in Bandung in 1964, Umi made the statement “Southeast Asia is at the center of contradictions in the world with the people there fighting to oppose several forms of imperialist, colonial, and neocolonial power and terror. As a women’s movement located in Southeast Asia, Gerwani has a duty to escalate their activities in winning the people’s revolution in Southeast Asia. All Gerwani members should make a rapid effort to understand these forward development.”¹¹¹

Anti-Imperialist Peace and Third World’s Techno-Political Education

The Cominform and the Soviet “fronts” discussed above largely expressed post-Comintern Stalinist directives. These Stalinist directives extended past Stalin’s demise (1953) into the early years of Nikita Khrushchev’s leadership until the formal repudiation of Stalin by Khrushchev in his disconcerting “secret speech” made on the last day of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (14-25 February 1956). The essence of the speech was a denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult and dictatorship as well as a theoretical evaluation of Stalin’s communism as a distortion of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev’s proffered corrective to Stalin’s arbitrary rule was the return to Leninist principles of democracy, self-criticism, and collective leadership; but his actual remedy for the latter was much more complicated. The immediate response of Khrushchev was to reject state terror and arbitrary rule as the means of the state in sharpening internal contradictions.¹¹² The speech officially inaugurated a new Khrushchevian direction for the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1964, a period characterized by de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence, unofficially known as Khrushchev Thaw or *otтеpel* in Russian. Even after Khrushchev’s era, this remained main “communist” strategy of the Soviet Union to 1986, as it was sanctioned by the 1961 Third Program of the CPSU, which was the only time between 1917 and 1986 that the Soviet Communist Party changed its strategic document.

Attesting to the nuclear catastrophe of the Second World War, similar to Zhdanov, Khrushchev made it clear in his 1959 analysis of the post-war milieu published in the American journal *Foreign Affairs* that “in our day there are only two ways: peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third choice.”¹¹³ Khrushchev asserted further that “the new

¹¹⁰ Sardjono, *Madju Terus*, 17 quoted in *Ibid.*, 43.

¹¹¹ Sardjono, *Madju Terus*, 15 quoted in *Ibid.*, 44.

¹¹² “The secret speech” generated a new liberal culture of discussion and debate in the Soviet public sphere unhampered by violent forms of state censorship. At the same time, it also spawned a generation of intellectuals who regarded themselves as “the children of the Twentieth Congress.” This is to say how significant the notion of the “Twentieth Party Congress” was in the imagination of intellectuals of a certain generation including the reformer from within the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Smith, Kathleen E., 2017, *Moscow 1956: The Silenced Spring*, Cambridge, MA. and London: Harvard University Press, 3-5.

The different critical and oppositional take on the secret speech in the form of dissent in defense of Stalin has been comprehensively studied in chapter 1 and 2 of Hornsby, Robert, 2013, *Protest, Reform, and Repression in Khrushchev’s Soviet Union*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹³ Khrushchev, Nikita S., “On Peaceful Coexistence,” *Foreign Affairs: An American Quarterly Review* 1, 38 (Oct.): 7.

Eleonory Gilburd notes that in order to prove the very possibility of peace as a consequence of the ratification of the peaceful coexistence directive, Soviet journalists, international law experts, and philosophers drew on legal treatises on international organizations and international law and thinkers unconventional in the Marxist-Leninist

alignment of international forces which has developed since the Second World War offers ground for the assertion that a new world war is no longer a fatal inevitability, that it can be averted.”¹¹⁴ In the Third Program, “imperialism” was identified as “the only source of the war danger. The imperialist camp is making preparations for the most terrible crime against mankind—a world thermonuclear war that can bring unprecedented destruction to entire countries and wipe out entire nations.”¹¹⁵ Khrushchev’s rejection of war was premised on the real possibility of the class-blind annihilation of entire mankind, the speculative third world war, which was a possibility up to that point monopolized by the imperialists. Peace, hence, must be glorified as a concentrated goal of the continuing class and ideological struggle of communism against militaristic capitalism and criminal imperialism to abolish war. Though Khrushchev’s propositions sounded almost identical to the anti-totalitarian, reformist, and “third way” arguments of the post-war anticommunist social democrats,¹¹⁶ he did not frame peaceful coexistence as the third choice between totalitarian communism and exploitative capitalism. Rather, theorizing from the “center” of world communism, Khrushchev redefined and constructed the latest form of communism as peaceful coexistence, rendering critiques of Stalinist totalitarian communism anachronistic since that was no longer supposed to be the form that Soviet communism embodied.

It is also important to note that peace as a critique of warmongering imperialism and nuclearization had already been a rallying point for various “Soviet front organizations” such as the World Peace Council (WPC) long before Khrushchev elevated it to an official policy of the Soviet Union. The WPC even gave more emphasis than Khrushchev on people of color, women, and newly decolonized states in Asia and Africa as corporeal targets of the nuclear bomb. Yet, the Soviet oppressions of the anti-Soviet, but not anticommunist, Poznań protests in Poland and the pro-capitalism, anticommunist Hungarian uprising in October and November of 1956, merely a few months after the Twentieth Congress, already belied the Khrushchevian rhetoric of peaceful coexistence since the policy did not extend to the states under the control of the particularistic Soviet dirigist government. As Andreas Hilger puts it, “strengthening the socialist camp and affirming Moscow’s socialist hegemony seemed to be quasi-identical goals.”¹¹⁷ One could interpret such a situation as the continuation of the Stalinist state-making whose major characteristic was the use of terrorizing force to suppress dissenting acts, while rhetorically disavowing Stalin and his murderous legacy. One can even go further to argue that the hierarchical relationship between Russia and its frontier along with the attitude of great-power chauvinism can be traced back to the Tsarist imperial era. Soviet action in Poland and Hungary in 1956 caused an

canon, ie. Russian translations of Thomas More and Tommaso Campanella, Erasmus and Hugo Grotius, abbé de Saint-Pierre and Fichte, William Penn and Wilhelm Weitling, and Kant’s *Perpetual Peace* essay.

Gilburd, Eleonory, 2018, *To See Paris and Die: The Soviet Lives of Western Culture*, Cambridge, MA. and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 33-4.

¹¹⁴ Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Coexistence,” 7.

¹¹⁵ “Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” in *The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (October 17-31, 1961)*, 1961, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 503-4.

¹¹⁶ Imlay, Talbot C., 2017, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914-1960*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹¹⁷ Hilgers, Andreas, 2017, “Communism, Decolonization, and the Third World,” in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2: The Socialist Camp and World power 1941-1960s, eds. Norman Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 321.

unbridgeable rift between the WPC and other anti-Soviet European peace groups, fracturing the unity of the world peace movement that once consolidated around the WPC.¹¹⁸

Anti-imperialism, at least of a militant, anti-Soviet, or even anti-American kind, was not a salient term in the discourse of peaceful coexistence, as compared to the earlier Zhdanovian dichotomy of anti-imperialism and democracy. Yet, historical evidence suggests that Khrushchev and particularly Soviet's foreign policy apparatus were indeed concerned, albeit often haphazardly, about the concrete struggles against imperialism and third world revolutionary movements. As early as November and December 1955, Khrushchev and fellow Presidium member Nikolai Bulganin undertook a tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan. The tour was most likely influenced by Tito whom by that time had visited both India and Burma to trailblaze for the socialist and non-aligned camp.¹¹⁹ In the 1956 CPSU's Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev formally affirmed his anti-imperialist commitment by characterizing decolonization as a "post-war development of history-making significance" and "the new period in world history ... [when] the peoples of the East are playing an active part in deciding the destinies of the whole world and are becoming a new mighty factor in international relations."¹²⁰

Khrushchev's attention to the third world nations was far greater than to the Soviet Union's communist allies in the third world itself, meaning, in particular, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam.¹²¹ It included progressive non-Marxist movements for national liberation. In September 29, 1964 conversation with Indonesian President Soekarno, for example, Khrushchev sought to emphasize that the Soviet Union was in solidarity with different races on anti-imperialist principle, attempting to counteract a then-circulating accusation that USSR's policies were racist and white supremacist. W.E.B. Du Bois was among those supporters of the Soviet Union's "refusal to 'be white.'"¹²² The conversation between Khrushchev and Soekarno went as follows:

We are people of the white race, but we have come to the aid of the yellow race, because we are not guided by the racist policy, not by the policy of the racists, but we are guided by the reasonable progressive national policy of Lenin. ... What else is needed? We do more than those who blabber about the struggle with imperialism. We blabber less, but

¹¹⁸ Wittner, Lawrence, 1993, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953*, vol. 1, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 94-7.

¹¹⁹ "Memoranda of Conversations between Government Delegations of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the USSR" (May 27-28, 1955), in *Sovetsko-Yugoslavskie otnosheniia, 1945-1956 gg.*, 2010, eds. V.G. Titov and B. Stefanovich, Novosibirsk: Alfa-porte, 641, quoted in Radchenko, Sergey, 2012, "The Soviet Union and Asia, 1940s-1960s," in *Empire and After: Essays in Comparative Imperial and Decolonization Studies*, ed. Uyama Tomohiko, Sapporo: Sapporo Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, 108.

Leaders in Beijing praised Khrushchev's new diplomacy in the Third World. Yang Shangkun, a member of the CCP Politburo, wrote in his diary on January 3, 1956: "The flexible policy adopted by the Soviet Union has isolated the United States in many areas. The visit to India and Burma by Bulganin and Khrushchev represented the first contact between the Soviet Union and these Eastern countries over the last several decades and improved the Soviet position in Asia."

Yang Shangkun, 2001, *Yang Shangkun riji* [Yang Shangkun's Diaries], vol. 1, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 219., quoted in Zhai, Qiang, "Road to Bandung: China's Evolving Approach to De-Colonization," in *Comparing Modern Empires: Imperial Rule and Decolonization in the Changing World Order*, ed. Uyama Tomokiho, Hokkaido: Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, 194.

¹²⁰ Khrushchev, Nikita S., 1956, *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 26.

¹²¹ Radchenko, "The Soviet Union," 109.

¹²² Baldwin, Kate A., 2002, *Beyond the Color Line and the Iron Curtain: Reading Encounters between Black and Red, 1922-1963*, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 149-201.

do more. .. Think about the other policy, which you are being sold and which is being praised highly. Is it as parallel to your interests as ours is? Perhaps not. I am only saying this because none of this will be published. I did not tell you anything, and you did not hear anything.¹²³

While providing fluctuating levels of financial aids, arms supplies, and technological assistances to the third world, Khrushchev's Soviet was emphatically invested in knowledge production about the third world—specifically its revolutions—and in providing education for third world citizens at the institutional level. The USSR Academy of Sciences founded the Institute of African Studies in 1959 and Institute of Latin American Studies in 1961 in addition to the already existing Institute of Oriental Studies which exclusively focused on Asia and North Africa. From May 1956, this Institute of Oriental Studies had Bobojon Ghafurov, the ex-leader of the Tajik communist party, as a director until his death in 1977, demonstrating Soviet commitment to “the East.” Along with instituting Bobojon, the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (*Sovetskii komitet solidarnosti stran Azii I Afriki*; SKSSAA) was also founded around the same time. It was built upon earlier institutions like the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (*Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitse*; VOKS) but with a much larger budget. The SKSSAA's board included the Tajik poet Mirzo Turson-zade, foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, and a number of specialists and party advisors.¹²⁴

Along with the All-Union Central Soviet of Trade Unions and the Committee of Youth Organizations, SKSSAA and VOKS were the founding organizations of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (*Rossiiskii Universitet Druzhyby Narodov*; RUDN University), a university meant for the students from Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It was established in February 1960 and then later renamed Patrice Lumumba University in February 1961 after the Congolese revolutionary leader Patrice Lumumba who was killed in a CIA-backed coup that January.¹²⁵

¹²³ Khrushchev, Nikita S., 2007, “Conversation between Nikita Khrushchev and Sukarno (September 29, 1964),” in *Stenogrammy Plenuma TsK KPSS i drugie dokumenty*, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond Demokratiia, 151-3., quoted in Radchenko, “The Soviet Union,” 114.

¹²⁴ Kalinovsky, Artemy M., 2017, “Soviet Union and the Global Cold War,” in *The Cambridge History of Communism Vol.3: Endgames? Late Communism in Global Perspective, 1968 to the Present*, eds. Juliane Fürst, Silvio Pons, and Mark Selden, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 75.

Chris Connery notes that “The sectors of the Soviet foreign affairs occupied with third world matters represented some of the most important and politically innovative intellectual production in the USSR during the period. The work of Karen Brutents, Viktor Tiagunenko, Lev Klochkovsky, Oleg Dreyer, and others in the Foreign Ministry or associated institutes remains some of the most astute analyses of third world revolutionary development and prospects”

Connery, Chris, 2009, “The End of the Sixties,” *boundary 2* 36, 1: 203.

¹²⁵ Contrary to the existing tradition of political schools training the non-Soviet revolutionaries like the Communist University of the National Minorities of the West (1921-1936), the Communist University of the Toilers of the East (1921-1937), the Sun Yat-Sen Communist University of the Toilers of China (1925-1930), and the International Lenin School (1926-1938), the RUDN University was not a political school for cadres and revolutionaries but an academic institution to train physicians, engineers, economists, administrators, and the managerial class for running the state. Students did still have opportunities to take the social science courses, namely, history of the Communist Party, political economy, Marxism-Leninism, and fundamentals of scientific communism as electives. The students can be categorized into two groups: 1) students from non-aligned Asian countries ie. India, Indonesia, Laos, and Sri Lanka or countries allied to Moscow ie. Cuba or Mali and 2) members of Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern communist parties; of African nationalist and left-leaning movements; of youth organizations and trade unions; or of pro-Soviet cultural societies; or were candidates recruited on the recommendation of the students' unions of RUDN.

Khrushchev announced the inauguration of the People's Friendship University during his 10-day visit to Indonesia in February 1960. According to one Russian source, Khrushchev addressed 3,000 students at Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta by affirming that the Soviet government "wished to help the [developing] countries to train their national workforce, engineers, agronomists, doctors, teachers, economists" and at the same time give a chance to "many talented young people coming from poor families" who otherwise were "deprived of the possibility of realizing their wish to study in the Soviet Union."¹²⁶ The curriculum of the RUDN was designed to serve the unique needs of foreign students, which included intensive Russian language training,¹²⁷ a curriculum geared toward the problems of the Third World (i.e. tropical agronomy, animal husbandry in subtropical climates, and tropical disease), practicum with advanced technological equipment, and extra support in adapting to a difficult social climate.¹²⁸ Such specialized curriculum aimed to produce students who are "ready to apply their knowledge in the specific geographical and socio-economic conditions of the countries in which they will work."¹²⁹ The Central Asian republics, in particular, served to showcase the communist modernity that had been made possible by Soviet science and industrial technology for the benefit of third world visitors who could learn about the relative success of the Soviet development model in a "non-European" setting.¹³⁰ The educational philosophy of training foreign students to make a positive impact on their home countries was sharply contrasted to an imperialist "Western education" model which "siphon[ed] off the best and brightest students from the third world and enticed them to stay and work in the West."¹³¹ Vladimir Stanis, the rector of the RUDN from 1970 to 1993 and an economics professor, described the ethical subject formed by the university as "true patriot" whose sympathy to humanity was both grounded in the nation and boundless at the same time—an ethos that could arguably be defined, following Pheng Cheah, as "cosmopolitical."¹³² In Stanis's words, "a true patriot is a person for whom it is natural to sympathize with events happening to other peoples, to feel himself and his

Katsakioris, Constantin, 2019, "The Lumumba University in Moscow: Higher Education for a Soviet-Third World Alliance, 1960-91," *Journal of Global History* 14, 2: 285-7.

¹²⁶ Krasovitskaia, Tamara, et al., 2013, *'Vozvratit' domoi druž'iami SSSR': obuchenie inostrantsev v Sovetskoi Soiuzie* ('Return Home as Friends of the USSR': The Training of Foreigners in the Soviet Union), Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond Demokraciia, 605., quoted in Katsakioris, Constantin, 2019, "The Lumumba University in Moscow: Higher Education for a Soviet-Third World Alliance, 1960-91," *Journal of Global History* 14, 2: 282.

¹²⁷ It was noted that the university was equipped with modern technology to "help instructors cope" with the challenges of teaching foreign students who did not speak Russian, including "simultaneous translation devices and motion picture installation" in lecture halls. Additionally, the residential buildings boasted "radio, a local automatic telephone switchboard and television facilities."

Samokhvalova, T., 1960, "University of Friendship is Getting Ready!," Current Digest of the Russian Press 12: 24-5., quoted in Kret, Abigail Judge, 2013, "'We Unite with Knowledge': The Peoples' Friendship University and Soviet Education for the Third World," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 33, 2: 250.

¹²⁸ Kret, "'We Unite with Knowledge,'" 249-50.

¹²⁹ Stanis, Vladimir Frantsevich, 1975, *The Role of the Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University in the Training of Specialists for Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America: The Report of Professor V.F. Stanis, Doctor of Science in Economics, Rector of the University, at the VIth General Conference of the International Association of Universities (August 19-25)*, Moscow: The Patrice Lumumba Peoples' Friendship University, 19., quoted in Kret, "'We Unite with Knowledge,'" 250.

¹³⁰ Kret, "'We Unite with Knowledge,'" 253.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 251.

¹³² Cheah, Pheng, 1997, "Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism," *boundary 2* 24, 2 (Summer): 157-97.

country a part of the human community with all its joys, sufferings and struggle and to understand the interrelationship between the fortunes of the mostly widely differing countries and regions.”¹³³

Cosmopolitical Patriots: Indonesian Exiles in the Soviet Union and the PKI's Afterlives

Even Stanis's articulation of patriotism was made in the seventies, it could be retroactively stretched to cover the disposition of Indonesian students attending the RUDN starting in the early 60s—those who accepted Khrushchev's invitation at Jogjakarta.¹³⁴ These students were targeted by the anticommunist pogrom in Indonesia in 1965 precisely because they were cosmopolitical patriots. They either had to become exiles without Indonesian passports in the foreign lands or political prisoners, if not being murdered outright, if they risked to return home. The Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev's leadership (1964-1982) did issue numerous statements condemning the devastating treatment of the communist party members, signaling its remaining internationalist commitments. On 29 March 1966, at the CPSU's Twenty-Third Party Congress, Brezhnev declared “The whole of our Party and our nation condemn the anticommunist terror in Indonesia” and demanded “that the criminal butchery of Communists ... be stopped at once.”¹³⁵ The Soviet government also pled for clemency for Njono and Sudisman, the members of the PKI's central committee, from being executed in October 1968 but was callously rejected by the Indonesian government. The CPSU made these solidarity statements in the thick of the Sino-Soviet split when it saw the downfall of the PKI only as a cautionary tale against following the CCP's line of excessive “adventurism,” as opposed to its reformist parliamentarism and strategic co-operation with the fractionalizing capitalists.¹³⁶ There was also an instrumental side to the USSR's protestations, as noted by David Hill and other historians. Though the USSR was opposed to Suharto regime's anticommunism and its genocidal practice against a fraternal communist party, Brezhnev's government also needed to ensure the repayment of Indonesia's debt to the USSR that

¹³³ Stanis, *The Role*, 43., quoted in Kret, ““We Unite with Knowledge,”” 253.

¹³⁴ Besides the RUDN, Indonesian students around the 1960s were also attending Lomonosov University, the Moscow Power/Energy Institute, Moscow Stalin Steel Institute, and the Cinematography Institute, as well as military academics and special communist party training schools. Interestingly, some of those who studied in the All-Russian State University of Cinematography named after S.A. Gerasimov (or in short VGIK) returned to Indonesia and worked relatively safely under the anticommunist regime ie. Sjumandjaya and Ami Prijono. Their, as well as some of their patrons', enigmatic life trajectories from the Soviet Union to the New Order are another fertile ground for intellectual exploration. Sjumandjaya and Ami's life trajectories were drastically different than that of another filmmaker Awal Uzhar, a dear friend of another leftist writer Utuy Tatang Sontani who chose to exile in the USSR after 1965. Awal, also an alumni of VGIK, chose to stay in the Soviet Union and found a position at Moscow University as a lecturer of Indonesian language and literature.

Hill, David T., 2014, “Indonesian Political Exiles in the USSR,” *Critical Asian Studies* 46, 4: 624.

The special phenomena of a massive number of Indonesian students going to the Soviet Union to study has been fictionalized in the novelette *Kisah Pak Kapten* (‘The Story of Mr. Captain’) by Sobron Aidit, the younger brother of PKI's leader D.N. Aidit.

Sobron, Aidit, 1962, *Derap Revolusi: Kumpulan Novelette & Tjerpen*, Djakarta: Bagian Penerbitan Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat.

¹³⁵ CPSU, 1966, *23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 23.; CPSU, 1967, “From the PCSU Central Committee Report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU,” in *In Defence of Fighters Against Reaction and Imperialism: On the Events in Indonesia*, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 12-3.

¹³⁶ Secret report of News Department MFA on Soviet actions since Indonesian coup, October 22, 1965, Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive (CFMA) doc. 109-03641-02, 33, and Brezhnev speech to Communist Party plenum, March 26, 1966, RGANI f.2 0.1 d.820, 12., quoted in Friedman, Jeremy, 2015, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 144.

had been incurred by Soekarno.¹³⁷ Because of this, it was heavy-handed in subduing those Indonesians residing in the Soviet Union who were critical of the USSR's willingness to maintain diplomatic relations with Suharto's Indonesia. For example, in early 1967 the Soviet government declared the communist youth leader Suar Suroso, who came to study physics at the Lomonosov University in 1961, *persona non grata* because of his protests against such continuing USSR-Indonesia collaboration.¹³⁸ As a result, Suar left Moscow for China with his wife and two children in February the same year. Brezhnev's opportunistic foreign policy was a definitive tipping point for those who were still fluctuating between the two sides of the Sino-Soviet split in that they now realized the Soviet Union was not consistent in its Marxist-Leninist praxis and China could be a more reliable ally of third world communism. Right before 1965, the CPSU hypocritically developed ties with the Murba Party, a "Trotskyist" rival of the PKI, to balance out the political influence of the PKI which it perceived as a close CCP's ally. The differences in anti-imperialist philosophy and strategy of the Soviet Union and China will be discussed more fully in the later sections.

Indonesian students in the Soviet Union were affiliated with broad left-wing organizations such as the People's Youth (*Pemuda Rakjat*; PR), Indonesian Youth Student League (*Ikatan Pemoeda Peladjar Indonesia*; IPPI), and the Unified Movement of Indonesian Students (*Consentrasi Gerakan Mahasiswa Indonesia*; CGMI) or they were cadres of the communist party itself.¹³⁹ Indonesian students in Europe were connected through an organizational network of the Indonesian Students' Association (*Perhimpunan Peladjar Indonesia*; PPI) located in each major European nations or cities, all under a larger umbrella Indonesian Students' Association of Europe (*PPI se-Eropah*), which at that time was quite dominated by leftist students loyal to Soekarno.

Among the most prominent of the RUDN students were the brothers of significant Indonesian political actors, namely, Koesalah Soebagyo Toer and Soesilo Toer, brothers of the masterful writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer, and Murad and Asahan Alham Aidit, brothers of the leader of the Indonesian Communist Party D.N. Aidit. Koesalah and Asahan studied in the historical-philological faculty, while Soesilo and Murad undertook political economy. Soesilo, in particular, focused on economic planning and philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. After graduation from the RUDN, Soesilo was the only one who furthered his doctoral study at the Plekhanov Moscow Institute of the National Economy. Koesalah, Soesilo, and Murad returned to Indonesia after they graduated in the mid 1960s and were incarcerated. Asahan fled to Vietnam via China and later obtained a doctoral degree in Vietnamese language and literature from the University of Hanoi in the 1970s.¹⁴⁰ Other leftist RUDN students, an estimated 150, were equally politically active. After the passports of this first wave of these leftist students were cancelled when they did not recognize the legitimacy of the anticommunist regime in 1966, they established a Revolutionary Students' Movement (*Gerakan Mahasiswa Revolusioner*; *Gemarev*) and a Movement of the Defenders of Soekarno's Teachings (*Gerakan Pembela Adjaran Soekarno*; GPAS). Together they published wall posters, periodicals, pamphlets, and bulletins in Russian, English, and Indonesian critical of the pro-military students' association, the military attaché, and the anticommunist regime.¹⁴¹ Aside from the RUDN students, there were also some other high profile students studying in the Soviet Union at that time, for instance, Soetanti Aidit, the wife of

¹³⁷ Hill, "Indonesian," 635-6.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 636.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 625.

¹⁴⁰ He later fled to the Netherlands in 1984 from Vietnam.

¹⁴¹ Hill, "Indonesian," 632.

D.N. Aidit who undertook advanced medical study at Lomonosov University but returned to Jakarta prior to the 1965 putsch.

In the contexts outside of Indonesia, it was not just the communists that rejected the dictatorial regime of Suharto but also the left nationalists who identified themselves with the vernacularized Marxist teachings of Soekarno¹⁴² and other more neutral or non-party politically conscious Indonesians. The Bugis Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, Manai Sophiaan (1964-1967), and an International Law doctorate from Lomonosov University, Ahmadi, were examples of that left nationalist class.¹⁴³ Some exiles were also merely those who refused to truncate their studies and return immediately to Indonesia, thereby indicating disloyalty in the eyes of the Indonesian state as they had received scholarship support from the Soekarno's government. Many students in the USSR eventually left Moscow for Beijing because of either their own political commitment or invitation of the PKI Delegation in Beijing.¹⁴⁴ The intellectual-historical aspect of Indonesians who were forced to become internationalists after 1965 is out of this dissertation's scope. Yet it is important to grasp the basic parameter of their mobilities and activisms to better understand the afterlives of Indonesian communism outside of Indonesia when it was almost impossible within the country.

Simultaneous with the outflow of Indonesian students in the Soviet Union to China, there were also Indonesian communists who became disillusioned with China and moved to the USSR in the early 1970s. Among the notable were the Sundanese playwright Utuy Tatang Sontani, dramatist Kuslan Budiman, Rusdi Hermain (son of the former Indonesian ambassador to Cuba, A.M. Hanafi), *Harian Rakjat* (People's Daily) correspondent in China Soerjono, third worldist North Sumatran poet Agam Wispi, some of who arrived in Moscow in 1971 after seven days on the trans-Siberian railway. With the exception of Agam Wispi, who continued on to Leipzig, East Germany to study literature, the others settled in Moscow, where Utuy and Kuslan found work teaching Indonesian.¹⁴⁵ Besides these students and relocated exiles, there were also members of the Indonesian Communist Party working at the Indonesian Embassy in the Soviet Union prior to the anticommunist takeover. Among the top in the list to be purged by the Suharto regime were Akbar Moedigdo, Anwar Dharma, and Thomas Sinuraya. Akbar, whose fate had been relatively unknown after being sacked by the embassy, was a brother-in-law of D.N. Aidit. Anwar was the Moscow correspondent for *Harian Rakjat* and the head of the PKI's Moscow Committee. He was expelled from the USSR because of his involvement in "anti-Soviet activities" in September 1966. His expulsion prompted the Beijing faction of the PKI to programmatically critique the opportunism of Soviet revisionism and USSR's hypocritical collaboration with the anticommunist regime.¹⁴⁶

Thomas was a Karo Batak and former general chairperson of the North Sumatran branch of the Indonesian Youth Student League (IPPI). He had been studying in the Soviet Union since 1961. After 1965, he initiated and spontaneously became the leader of the pro-Moscow Marxist-

¹⁴² The teachings were at times referred to as Marhaenism and those who followed them were called Marhaenist or Soekarnoist.

¹⁴³ Sipayung, Bambang Alfred, 2011, "Exiled Memories: The Collective Memory of Indonesian 1965 Exiles," M.A. Thesis, International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands, 23.

¹⁴⁴ Hill, "Indonesian," 637.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 637-8.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 633. Dharma, Anwar, 1966, "Soviet Revisionists' Shameless Collaboration with Indonesia's Fascist Military Regime Condemned," *Peking Review* 42 (Oct 14): 30-2.; PKI, 1967, "On the Expulsion by the Soviet Government of Comrade Anwar Dharma," *Harian Rakjat* correspondent, from Moscow: Statement of the Political Bureau of the CC-PKI," *Indonesian Tribune (Tirana)* 1, 3 (Jan): 30.

Leninist faction of the PKI formed together with several dozen like-minded Indonesians in exile called the Overseas Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Comite Luar Negeri PKI*; CL-PKI). It operated for several years from at least 1967 without a formal name, then formalized as *Comite Luar Negeri* on 23 May 1969, the Indonesian Communist Party's 49th anniversary.¹⁴⁷ Some major, yet shifting, CL-PKI members included the former Indonesian ambassador to Sri Lanka M. Ali Chanafiah (but later fell out), the representative of CL-PKI to the journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* in Prague Rahardjo Sudiman (alias Setiajaya Sudiman), Pardede Salengkat, and Darwin Hutajulu (who later also fell out).¹⁴⁸ The group had links with PKI exiles in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, East Germany, Vietnam, and North Korea. The Soviet Communist Party Committee explicitly supported the Overseas Committee especially the leadership of Thomas by endorsing him as the spokesperson for the PKI in pro-Soviet international events. Some of the members also worked as a translator for the CPSU publishing house called Progress. From 1966 until 1991, the Overseas Committee published a periodical called *Tekad Rakyat* (The People's Will). It also shared the pro-Soviet connection with the Communist Party of India (CPI) in Delhi which assisted the publication of *Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia* in February 1969 to express the perspectives of the pro-Soviet PKI.¹⁴⁹ The Overseas Committee was disbanded in December 1991 before Thomas and his family migrated to the Netherlands, just a year and a half before the USSR was disestablished.¹⁵⁰

Revisionism?: Undialectical Communist Construction in the Contradictory (Neo)Colonial-Capitalist Order

The Soviet Union's new understanding of communism during Khrushchev's leadership was most articulate in the 1959 extraordinary Twenty-First Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. During the Congress, it was declared that the world had arrived at a new stage of world socialist system where the socialist material foundations had been successfully laid by the Soviet Union, updating Stalin's analysis made in 1936 about the Soviet Union achieving only the first or lower phase of communism.¹⁵¹ Class antagonism in the Soviet society, the theory went

¹⁴⁷ Hill, "Indonesian," 638.

¹⁴⁸ It is worth noting that not all the surviving PKI members residing in the Soviet Union agreed to join the CL-PKI, for example, Sudibjo, the younger brother of PKI Politburo executive Sudisman, chose to be neutral in the splitting Sino-Soviet factions.

Hill, "Indonesian," 639.

¹⁴⁹ Communist Party Publication, 1969, *Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia*, New Delhi: New Age Printing Press, Published by D.P. Sinha for Communist Party of India.

The pro-Soviet Indian Communist journal *Mainstream* also published a statement of the pro-Soviet "Marxist-Leninist Group of the Communist Party of Indonesia," likely to be an informal name of CL-PKI, on March 11 and 18, 1967. The statement reiterated the Soviet anti-Chinese line of critique. It urged concentration on the proletariat rather than the peasantry and called on the Indonesian communists to forge a united left-wing front to combat imperialist and anti-democratic forces.

McVey, Ruth T., 1968, "Indonesian Communism and China," in *China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, ed. Tang Tsou, vol. 2, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 389-90, fn. 42.; McVey, Ruth T., 1971, "PKI Fortunes at Low Tide," *Problems of Communism* Special Issue: Focus on Asia 20 (Jan.-Apr.): 36, fn. 24.; Sani, A.M., 1968, "Remo Sovjet dan Kaum Renegat PKI Serta Kegiatannja," *API* [Tirana] 2, 2 (16 Jan.): 8-17.

¹⁵⁰ Hill, "Indonesian," 644.

¹⁵¹ Stalin, Joseph V., 1947, "On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.: Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R.," in *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 548 (25 Nov. 1936).

on, was already dissolved by the becoming majority of the proletariats even as hierarchies of political and social consciousness within the working class still existed. Here, dialectics disappeared completely from the analysis and, unlike Mao, who followed Lenin, the Congress did not conceptualize the internal contradiction within the working class as non-antagonistic contradiction. The novel duty of the USSR thus was to carry on “the full-scale construction of a communist society,” as opposed to Stalin’s communist stasis argument that no progress could be made in the development of communism in the USSR.¹⁵² The 1961 CPSU Third Program went as far as proclaiming the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while announcing “a state of the entire people” as the new contemporary phase of the Soviet state.¹⁵³ The world capitalist system, on the other hand, back to this particular 1959 analytics, was going through “an intense process of disintegration and decay.”¹⁵⁴ Internal contradictions had accelerated the development of monopoly capitalism into state-monopoly capitalism, which had been militaristically exploiting the working class and plundering the population in the extreme. This led to the great sharpening of both class and national antagonisms, and the internal and external contradictions of capitalist society.

In concert with the principle of peaceful coexistence, however, the working class and communist struggles against capitalist exploitation and monopolization ought to take the form of democratic reforms, which would subsequently lead to peaceful socialist revolution. The 1959 Congress argued that this method of struggle (democratic reforms) of the Marxist-Leninist Parties was not reformist; it “consider[ed] reforms within the framework of the capitalist system as the ultimate goal and deni[ed] the necessity of socialist revolution.”¹⁵⁵ Because the working class and popular front in various capitalist countries were united entities, argued the Congress, there was an opportunity for such a united majority to “win state power without civil war and ensure the transfer of the basic means of production to the hands of the people. ... [They can] secure a firm majority in a parliament, transform parliament from an instrument serving the class interests of the bourgeoisie into an instrument serving the working people, launch an extra-parliamentary mass struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the socialist revolution.”¹⁵⁶ The dictatorship of the proletariat would be an extension of democracy, transitioning from formal bourgeois democracy to genuine socialist democracy for working people. The Congress also briefly contemplated the possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism, alluding to Lenin, in the event of the exploiting classes resorting to violence against people.

“Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving socialism; it has created a socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower phase of communism.”

¹⁵² CPSU, 1959, *Control Figures for the Economic Development of the U.S.S.R. for 1959-1965; Report Delivered at the 21st Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, January 27, 1959*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,

¹⁵³ “Programme,” 547.

Mikhail Epstein argues that the immediate intellectual precedence for an uncontradictory, unitarian, and, “post-class” concept of “a state of the entire people” can be traced to Stalin’s last publication *Marxism and the Questions of Linguistics* (1950). In this short pamphlet, Stalin supplanted class for nation as a basic category of “Marxist” analysis. This supplantation enables a reading of “a state of the entire people” as a reconciliation between official Soviet Marxism and Russian nationalism.

Epstein, Mikhail, 1994, *The Vicissitudes of Soviet Marxism: 1950-1994*, Washington D.C.: The National Council for Soviet and East European Research, Emory University, 5-6.

¹⁵⁴ CPSU, *Control Figures*,

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*,

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*,

This Congress much accentuated the “creative application” of Marxism-Leninism in relation to specific national historical conditions, jettisoning a “mechanical copying” of other national communist parties’ policies and tactics.¹⁵⁷ It was vocally against the transactional “import-export” model of the socialist revolution and rather insisted that the socialist revolution was “a result of the internal development of the country concerned, of the utmost sharpening of social contradictions in it.”¹⁵⁸ In this respect, it plainly acknowledged the “national peculiarities and departure from the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism regarding the socialist revolution and construction.”¹⁵⁹ It is important to emphasize that, in the Soviet Union’s view, this recognition of the dialectics between situated material conditions and socialist construction along with the communist parties’ internal autonomy was not a sanctioning of “ideological polycentrism” as the telos was still to reenact the “common laws” of socialist construction, not to construct totally different laws.

With Khrushchev’s theses of avertible war, peaceful struggles, disintegrating imperialism-capitalism, and creative Marxism-Leninism combined, we get a double, rather formal, revisionist argument, not just a revision of Stalin’s terror, which was also directly related to Mao’s idea of militant insurrectional acts, but also of Lenin’s positions on imperialism. Khrushchev’s address to the third congress of the Workers Party of Rumania in 1960 openly suggested that imperialist violence was empirically avoidable because the contemporary concrete historical conditions enabled a peaceful path forward through a disintegrating imperialism (and capitalism). In Khrushchev’s words:

The Thesis on imperialism put forward by Lenin remains valid and, as heretofore, serve and will continue to serve as our guiding star in theory and practice. But it must not be forgotten that Lenin’s positions on imperialism were put forward and elaborated by him tens of years ago, when many phenomena, which have now become decisive in the development of the historical process and for the entire international setting were absent. ... We must not mechanically repeat now on this question what was said by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin many decades ago on imperialism and affirm that imperialism wars are unavoidable until socialism has won the world over ... Therefore, what the great Lenin said under

¹⁵⁷ The notion of “creative” Marxism as opposed to the strictly dogmatic and “scientific” Marxism of Stalin’s Soviet Union became a common discourse in Soviet philosophy after the denunciation of Stalinism. Mikhail Epstein identified the publication of Marx’s *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript* in Russian translation in precisely 1956 as the major cause of the (re)turn to the more philosophical question of the human and humanism in Soviet and Eastern European Marxism. The most prominent version of this (re)turn to “humanized” Marxism was Alexander Dubček’s “socialism with a human face” politically pronounced during the Prague Spring of 1968. In the Soviet Union, “creative” Marxism was associated most with the philosopher Evald Ilyenkov. The conscious deployment of the term “creative” by the Congress suggested the term’s currency within the CPSU’s politburo even as there was no conclusive evidence to prove the politburo’s deeper theoretical knowledge about the term. This interest in the human question resulted in a certain analytical shift from class to humankind, similar to Stalin’s supplantation of class with nation. The analytical shift to humankind greatly corroborated Khrushchev’s emphasis on peace for all mankind while not (yet) totally abandoning class analysis. According to Epstein, the sincere attempt to reconcile universal values with their class character was the hallmark of Soviet Marxism in the 1950s-1960s.

Epstein, “The Vicissitudes,” 8-12.

¹⁵⁸ CPSU, *Control Figures*,

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*,

completely different historical conditions cannot be repeated without reckoning with the concrete circumstances and the change in the balance of forces in the world.¹⁶⁰

Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence was itself a paradoxical proposition as it attempted to reconcile two incommensurable aims. At the geopolitical level, it appeased the aggressive United States and normalized relations with other imperialist powers to avoid the class-blind destruction of humanity. At the ideological level, it supported various national third world liberation movements and helped postcolonial states achieve full independence. The most illustrative and perhaps aporetic instances were the advice to withdraw missiles from Cuba to terminate the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 and the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August 1963. Political scientist Constantine Pleshakov explains that Khrushchev's paradoxical foreign policy was in the classical Stalinist tradition of thinking geopolitics together with ideology, one of the last cases of it in the history of the Soviet Union. Pleshakov adds: "[Khrushchev's] exotic cocktail of nuclear age realism and revolutionary idealism, calculating brinkmanship, and a utopian view of the future of humankind can be explained only by the ideological luggage that he was left by his predecessors."¹⁶¹ While Khrushchev's analytics of the world from "the center" and his peaceful coexistence idea were premised upon the presuppositions that antagonisms were dissolved in the Soviet Union, imperialism disintegrating, and capitalism decaying in an accelerating speed, some other Marxist-Leninist analytics of global capitalism especially from the third world either fundamentally disagreed with such presuppositions (decaying capitalism/imperialism) or the chosen solution (peaceful coexistence). The major dissensus pivoted around the continuing existence of class antagonisms, the even greater (neo)colonial, anti-popular, and reactionary effort to resort to violence, the structural concession to capitalist restoration, general nature of imperialism, and the Soviet Union's "social imperialism" given its center position in the communist world system.

These critiques were the primary ideological bases for the internal critique of the Soviet Union (best exemplified by the 1968 Prague Spring), the Sino-Soviet split, and the rift between certain third worldist regimes and the USSR. The proponents of these critiques often label Khrushchev's USSR revisionist in a more political-theoretical sense, denoting not merely the deviation from or the retooling of the Soviet predecessors (which I call formal revisionism) but also the failure to analytically grasp the material dynamics of global (neo)imperialism-capitalism nexus. In the political-theoretical sense of the term, revisionism is not an all-purpose charge from the monopolistic position of theoretical purity or political legitimacy against those who deviate from it. Rather it follows the first usage of the term by Lenin and Luxemburg to critique Edouard Bernstein's analytics in *Evolutionary Socialism* which took the surface empirical reality of capitalist society (ie. growth of the middle class, growth in worker wages, and the decrease in monopolistic concentration of capital) as the indicator of the non-necessity of socialist and class struggles. In other words, political-theoretical revisionism registers the disjuncture between communist theory and the material reality of the capitalist social totality.

¹⁶⁰ Khrushchev, Nikita S., 1960, "Address to the Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Rumania in Bucharest, June 22, 1960," quoted in N.H. Mager and Jacques Katel, 1961, *Conquest Without War: An Analytical Anthology of the Speeches, Interviews, and Remarks of Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev with Commentary by Lenin, Stalin, and Others*, New York: A Trident Press Books, 67.

¹⁶¹ Pleshakov, Constantine, "Nikata Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations," in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 227.

Chapter 2

Maoist Internationalism: Neo-Marxism-Leninism, Peripheral Anti-Imperialism, and The Overseas Chinese Question

Scholarship on Maoism often offers a hyper-politicized account of Maoism as dogmatic, un-Marxist, and subjectively arbitrary, emphasizing its violence, fanaticism, and failure. With exceptions of Nick Knight, Roland Boer, Pang Laikwan, and a few others, scholars of Mao do not sufficiently examine Mao's engagement with different elements of Marxism; thereby, missing the Marxist theoretical foundation of Mao's thoughts. In that framework, Mao's internationalism is understood superficially only as a pragmatic Cold War tactic and political opportunism. Scholars have also speculated and suspected the Indonesian Communist Party's connection to Maoism without real historical evidence. This points to the problem of both Maoism's capaciousness and vacuity, which necessitates its more robust account.

Similar to other chapters in this section, this chapter investigates Maoist praxis of internationalism to think about the practical, institutional, and intellectual connections between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and other non-party leftist intermediaries of the two nations from the 1940s to the 1960s. This chapter situates Maoist internationalism in the history of inter-communist relations with a specific emphasis on Marxist internal intellectual debates. It restores dialectics and political economy to Maoist internationalist praxis by engaging with both over- and under-analyzed Mao's texts. Some of the latter include *Reading Notes on the Soviet Text Political Economy*, *the Lenin Polemics*, and *the Nine Chinese Polemics* of the Sino-Soviet Split. It suggests that Maoist internationalism always corresponds to the CCP's concrete analysis of the capitalism-imperialism nexus. The chapter thus shows that Mao's engagement with the "sciences" of dialectics and political economy—or, Mao's Marxism—allows him to undogmatically renew "revolutionary Stalinism," discern contradictions in the transforming material situation, identify anti-imperialism as the post-War form of communist praxis, and critique the Soviet Union's capitalist restoration. The chapter argues that in its most complex form in the early 1960s, Maoist internationalism is characterized by anti-revisionist third worldist anti-imperialism. This dissertation coins the term neo-Marxism-Leninism to affirmatively explain Mao's anti-revisionist efforts in re-engaging with this existing Marxist-Leninist lineage of praxis, as opposed to Khrushchev's "modern" revisionism, which is a renewal of an existing tradition of revisionism. It proposes the notion of peripheral anti-imperialism to capture the third worldist and inter-racial stance of Maoist internationalism, as opposed to Soviet anti-imperialism of the communist metropole. The former combatted both American neocolonialism and Soviet modern revisionism, while the latter is uncritical of both.

Indonesian communists are featured only tangentially as one of the Asian fraternal parties in Mao's broader anti-imperialist internationalist scheme. Maoist internationalism strategically focuses on communist parties in political struggles like those of North Korea, North Vietnam, Zanzibar, and Angola. This study suggests that a more tenacious link between Maoist internationalism and Indonesia pivots around the Overseas Chinese question. Even so, the Indonesian Communists hardly engaged with both Maoist internationalism and the Overseas Chinese question until after 1965, when some PKI members lived in exile in China, and some genocide survivors explicitly deployed Maoism to critique the pre-1965 PKI's leadership. Before the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, CCP's internationalism conceived of progressive and working class overseas Chinese as revolutionary agents. The most productive attempt to solve the tension between the Chinese communist revolution and local emancipation

generated an internationalist theory of inter-racial working class struggle. After 1949, the CCP saw the overseas Chinese as a bourgeoisie, which could paradoxically participate in both processes of socialist accumulation and socialist subjectivation. This chapter ends by suggesting that Maoist peripheral internationalism offers an infrastructure for third world Marxism and internationalism, of which Indonesian communism is a part, to emerge and strengthen despite its limits in comprehending third world's geo-historical materialist specificities.

Sino-Soviet Alliance: Unequal Division of Communist Labor and the Chinese Leadership of Asian Communist Revolution

China did not emerge as the potential center of Communist internationalism until October 1st, 1949, when Mao Zedong declared the creation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since 1921, when the CCP was founded, the party, along with a great number of Chinese peasants, had been waging protracted and asymmetric warfare with the nationalists, Japanese imperialists, and other rightists in China until it gained victory in 1949.¹⁶² With the success of the Chinese Revolution, Mao and the CCP Central Committee (CCP CC) was convinced that China had an obligation to assist the Communist parties and oppressed peoples of Asia and other colonial countries to fight for liberation. In this sense, the Chinese Revolution, argues Lu Dingyi, was of world-historical significance in two respects. It both represented a continuation of the Russian revolution and offered an example to colonial countries in the non-Western world. Like the Russian revolution, it was committed to abolishing the capitalist system and establishing the proletariat's dictatorship. Unlike the Russian revolution, which arose out of a former territorial empire, however, the Chinese revolution took place in an agrarian society that experienced both Western and Japanese colonial rules, both white supremacy and anti-Sinitic racism.¹⁶³ These commitments compelled the CCP CC to internationalize and mobilize its own revolutionary experience to other political struggles, primarily in Asia and beyond.

In early 1949, Stalin offered a deal with Mao in an unequal division of labor in leading the global communist parties. The Soviet Union looked after Europe and the rest of the world. At the same time, China developed ties with Asian communist parties, specifically the Koreans, Japanese, and Southeast Asians, along with other anticolonial forces in the East.¹⁶⁴ Mao's unrealized idea of the "Asian Cominform," modeled after the dissolved Soviet Cominform, took an incipient shape after Stalin approved of China as the leader of the Asian communist world. During the secret visit of Liu Shaoqi, Vice Chairman of the CCP, to Stalin at the Soviet Union on July 27th, 1949, Stalin offered an assessment that it would be inappropriate for the CCP to join the Cominform since the situation in China was completely different from that in Europe. He instead suggested China to consider establishing a "League of Communist Parties in East Asia." Still, Stalin had some reservations that it might be too premature to do so even as he added that the Soviet Union was

¹⁶² Mao, Tse-tung, 1965, "On Protracted War," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 2: The Period of the War of Resistance against Japan, Oxford, New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, and Frankfurt: Pergamon Press, 113-94 (May 1938).

¹⁶³ Lu, Dingyi, 1992, "The World Significance of the Chinese Revolution," in *Lu Dingyi wenji* [Collected Works of Lu Dingyi], Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992, 432-9 (30 Jun. 1951), quoted in Zhai, "Road to Bandung," 184-5.

¹⁶⁴ Shen, Zhihua and Xia, Yafeng, 2014, "Leadership Transfer in the Asian Revolution: Mao Zedong and the Asian Cominform," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 14, 2 (May): 195-213.

both a European and Asian country so that it might join an East Asian Cominform in the future, should the idea itself ever be realized.¹⁶⁵

As soon as February 14th, 1950, Soviet foreign minister Andrei Vyshinskii and Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai signed a thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Aid, as Stalin and Mao looked on.¹⁶⁶ Sergey Radchenko, a historian of Sino-Soviet relations, notes that the Soviet Union imposed “quasi-imperialist conditions” on China, including joint-stock enterprises, joint ownership of the Chinese Eastern railway, and a secret deal to keep Manchuria and Xinjiang closed to foreigners other than the Soviets.¹⁶⁷ Again, it expressed the inequality of power between the Soviet Union and China in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Mao allegorized the supportive, yet secondary, role of China in the Sino-Soviet alliance as the synergized subjugation of imperialism anthropomorphized as a lion. In May 1949, through a cable from Ivan Kovalev, Stalin’s personal liaison to Mao, Mao said that even as the Soviets were holding down the lion’s head, “we, the Chinese communists, pinched the lion’s tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion.”¹⁶⁸

The CCP during this period of the Sino-Soviet alliance demonstrated its leadership role for the Asian communist revolution on three levels: practical, organizational, and ideological. We will discuss the first two levels in this section. The examination of the organizational has to necessarily address its offshoot in the later period because of its material persistence. The ideological level will have a section of its own later due to its complexity and higher relevance to this research project.

At the level of practice, the CCP mainly supported other Asian communist parties’ revolutionary activities through military means and based on the proletarian internationalist principles. In different periods from 1948-1953, it assisted the Worker’s Party of Korea (WPK) of Kim Il-sung with the manpower necessary to establish the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and secure the DPRK’s territory during the Korean War.¹⁶⁹ The CCP’s support of the DPRK signaled for new left Chinese historian Wang Hui a construction “not only of a new China but also of a new world,” undominated by the current oppressive imperialist and capitalist powers.¹⁷⁰ Except for China’s aid to North Korea during the Korean War, historians Shen and Xia claim that China offered the most guidance and support to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) among all the communist parties in Asia. In the first half of 1950, the CCP sent a large number of elite military commanders and advisors to Vietnam’s liberated areas to analyze the war situation,

¹⁶⁵ Telegram, Liu Shaoqi to the General Office of the CCP CC, 27 July 1949, in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi and Zhongyang dang’anguan (eds.), 2005, *Jianguo yilai Liu Shaoqi wengao* [Liu Shaoqi’s Manuscript since the Founding of the PRC, hereafter cited as *JYLSW*], vol. 1, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 40-1., quoted in Shen and Xia, “Leadership,” 201.

¹⁶⁶ Bo, Yibo, 1992, “The Making of the “Leaning to One Side” Decision,” trans. Zhai Qiang, *Chinese Historians* 5, 1: 57-62.

¹⁶⁷ Radchenko, Sergey, 2017, “The Rise and the Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1949-1989,” in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2, 248.

¹⁶⁸ “Cable from Ivan Kovalev to Joseph Stalin,” 2005, in *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, eds. A.M. Ledovskii, R.A. Mirovitskaia, and V.S. Miasnikov, vol. 5, book 2: 1946-February 1950, Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 130 (17 May 1949), quoted in Radchenko, “The Rise and the Fall,” 251.

¹⁶⁹ Shen, Zhihua, 2012, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s*, trans. Neil Silver, London and New York: Routledge.

¹⁷⁰ Wang, Hui, 2013, “The Korean War in the 20th Century Chinese Historical Perspective,” *Beijing Cultural Review* 6.

provide material assistance, set up logistical infrastructure, establish a standard communist party, and strengthen party building for defeating the French imperialists.¹⁷¹

At the organizational level, the CCP Central Committee's headquarters were relocated from Xibaipo village in Hebei (1947-1949) to Zhongnanhai, a former imperial garden in the Imperial City of Beijing, in March 1949. The relocation made it easier for the CCP to conquer Beijing before October the same year. Even before the complete control of Beijing, the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP CC already envisioned a one-year study group for Asian communist parties' leaders in Zhongnanhai beginning at the end of July. Lian Guan, then secretary-general of the UFWD, headed the study group. It was comprised of seven small country teams, including high-ranking communist party members from the following seven countries: Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaya, the Philippines, Indonesia, and India.¹⁷² As the main objective of this study group was to learn from the CCP's revolutionary experience, the contents of the lectures were drawn heavily from Mao Zedong's collected works and the party leaders' real experiences. They included armed struggle, the united front work, party building, mass movements, theoretical issues, and the experience of the Chinese revolution. The instructors were leaders of the CCP CC and heads of related departments: Zhu De, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Li Wei-han, Zhang Wentian, Chen Boda, and Liu Ningyi, among others.¹⁷³ To further enhance and control the Chinese process of ideological training, Stalin dispatched the philosopher Pavel Fyodorovich Yudin, whose politics firmly aligned with Stalin himself, to China to edit the *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* under Mao's request in the late 1950s. During a talk with Yudin on December 30th, 1950, Mao stated that "all the Communist parties in the Asian countries are now looking for advice and help from the CCP ... Beijing has gathered delegates from all the Asian communist parties, excluding the Communist Party of India." Mao also exhibited the CCP's interest in researching specific material conditions of each Asian communist party for the CCP to provide relevant advice and assistance. The divisions within the Asian communist parties, such as those of Burma, Indonesia, Japan, and India, particularly interested the CCP.¹⁷⁴

By the beginning of 1952, higher demands for cadre training prompted the CCP CC to set up the first branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to offer a three-year course for general, not just high-ranking or senior, communist cadres from all over Asia. The first branch of the Institute was divided into seven classes, including communist cadres from Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. The Japanese cadres were a major contingent and had a more concentrated branch of their own in Tianjin.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ *JYLSW*, vol. 1, 356-7, 589-90; vol.2, 256-7; vol.3, 762-9., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 210.

¹⁷² The connection between the CCP and mainland Southeast Asian communist parties around this period was likely to be mediated through the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi. In instruction to Chen Geng, Chairman of the Yunnan People's Government, on March 3, 1950, Liu Shaoqi asked him to provide "a warm welcome and assistance" if the communist parties in Southeast Asia, especially from Vietnam and Burma, dispatched envoys to Yunnan.

Liu Shaoqi to Chen Geng, 3 March 1950, in *JYLSW*, vol. 1, 572-3., quoted in Zhai, "Road to Bandung," 186.

¹⁷³ A. Cheng (Shan, Ruhong), 2007, *Wo jianfu de shiming: Magong zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuan A Cheng huiyilu* [My Mission: Memoirs of the Malayan Communist Party CC Politburo Member A Cheng], vol. 4, Kuala Lumpur: 21st Shiji Chubanshe, 11-37., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 202.

¹⁷⁴ Report, Yudin to Stalin, 20 January 1951, APAH (Archive of Russian Academy of Sciences), f.1636, op.1, d.194, l.9014, quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 205.

¹⁷⁵ A. Cheng, *Wo jianfu*, 43-9, 213-4., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 206.

According to a report by B. Stepanov, vice head of the AUCP (All-Union Communist Party) CC's Department of Liaison with the Communist and Workers' Parties in the Socialist Countries, in August 1952, the CCP decided to establish a special school for the Japanese communists based on one of the branches of the Institute of

Besides the study group and cadre school, the CCP CC created a research committee on Asian countries under the United Front Work Department in February 1950. Li Wei-han, the head of the United Front Work Department, himself served as secretary.¹⁷⁶ In August 1950, he proposed the CCP CC to set up an International Liaison Department (ILD; *zhonglianbu*) under the Central Committee for managing the CCP's increasing interactions with all fraternal parties in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe as well as contacting with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.¹⁷⁷ The ILD was also charged with coordinating actions and policies with the international departments of other mass organizations such as the trade union, the women's and youth organizations, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chinese ambassador to the Soviet Union Wang Jiaxiang was appointed as the director of the ILD in January 1951.¹⁷⁸ According to the available archival materials as the ILD archives are still not declassified, we only know that the ILD's activities after establishment were its communication with the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) from 1953-1955 and the setup of long-range radio transmitters in Yunnan Province for broadcast into Southeast Asia around the 1960s.¹⁷⁹

The public face of the United Front Work Department (UFW) took the form of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Exchanges with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC). Coordinated by the CCP's International Department, the CPAFFC was founded in 1954 as the PRC's soft power apparatus. It showcased the success of the PRC's communist revolution, promoted as an "exportable" revolutionary model, through carefully planned tours and exceptional "techniques of hospitality" for the "foreign guests" (*waibin*).¹⁸⁰ Members of the first CPAFFC were academic and cultural celebrities including the Chu Tunan (Chairman; calligrapher), Ding Xilin (Vice-Chairman; dramatist), Guo Moruo (writer and historian), Mei Lanfang (opera artist), Jiao Juyin (director), Zhou Yang (literary theorist), the novelists Mao Dun and Lao She, the playwrights Cao Yu, Xia Yan, Tian Han, and Yang Hansheng, the composers He Luting and Ma Sicong, and the journalists Fan Changjian and Hu Yuzhi. Without a comprehensive study of the organization, we also learn that the Chinese Peace Committee, a Chinese chapter of the "semi-

Marxism-Leninism (which might be the Tianjin branch institute discussed by A. Cheng). The former member of the JCP CC Takakura Hui was appointed principal of the special school by the CCP CC. There were about 1,500 students in total and most of them were selected from among the Japanese who had stayed in China after the end of World War II. The AUCP CC sent four instructors to the school, teaching the history of the AUCP, political economy, and Russian language.

Telegram, Stepanov to Khrushchev, 6 August 1953, RGANI (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), f.5, op.28, d.3, 1.94-95., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 206.

¹⁷⁶ *JYLSW*, vol. 3, 27., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 204.

¹⁷⁷ Xu, Zehao (ed.), 2001, *Wang Jiaxiang nianpu, 1906-1974* [Chronology of Wang Jiaxiang, 1906-1974], Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 400., quoted in Shen and Xia, "Leadership," 206.; Wang, Fuchun, 2003, *Waishi guanli xue gaiduan* [Survey of Foreign Affairs Work], Beijing: Beijing University Press, 212., quoted in Shambaugh, David L., 2007, "China's 'Quiet Diplomacy': The International Department of the Chinese Communist Party," *China: An International Journal* 5, 1 (Mar.): 35.

¹⁷⁸ Xia, Yafeng, 2009, "Wang Jiaxiang: New China's First Ambassador and the CCP's First Director of International Liaison Department," *American Journal of Chinese Studies* 16 (Fall): 143-5.

Liu Shaoqi clarified to Wang Jiaxiang in a correspondence dated January 16th, 1951 that Wang's "most important task" would be to establish contact with and provide assistance to fraternal parties in the East. "At the moment, the parties of Japan, Indonesia, Bruma, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malay all have representative in Beijing."

Liu Shaoqi to Wang Jiaxiang, 16 January 1951, *JYLSW*, vol. 3, 25.

¹⁷⁹ Shambaugh, "China's 'Quiet Diplomacy,'" 38.

¹⁸⁰ Lovell, Julia, 2015, "The Uses of Foreigners in Mao-Era China: 'Techniques of Hospitality' and International Image-Building in the People's Republic, 1949-1976," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 25: 135-58.

autonomous” World Peace Council (WPC), had been connecting the CCP to the broader internationalist community of the anti-imperialist peace strand. Guo Moruo, or known in the WPC’s documents as Kou Mo-jo, and the Xinjiang Muslim political leader Burhan Shahidi headed this committee as a chair and vice-chair since its establishment in 1950 at the latest.¹⁸¹ This whole Chinese constellation of internationalist bodies could be understood as an equivalent of the Soviet’s International Department, academic institutes (i.e. Institute of Oriental Studies), and semi-governmental organizations (i.e. the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee or SKSSAA, and the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries or VOKS).

We now turn to the ideological relations between the CCP and CPSU on two fronts: Stalinism and the communist revolution. Both present different cases of Chinese continuation of and rupture from Soviet ideology.

Stalinism as the Theoretical Basis and Object of Critique for Mao’s Marxism

It is no controversial claim that the theoretical basis of Mao Zedong’s Marxism was Stalinism.¹⁸² The highly doctrinal *Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)*, published in September 1938 under Stalin’s absolute supervision and translated into Chinese in 1939, was compulsory reading for Chinese cadres.¹⁸³ The book was the clearest textual codification of Stalin’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, which we could identify as Stalinism. Mao regarded the book as an encyclopedia of Marxism-Leninism.¹⁸⁴ More generally, during the time of socialist construction, Mao treated the Soviet Union as China’s best teacher and instructed the cadres to learn from or even emulate it indiscriminately. “The Soviet Union of today is our tomorrow” became a popular slogan during this time.¹⁸⁵ The exemplary role of the Soviet Union appeared very pointedly in Mao’s speech in commemoration of the CCP in 1949:

At first some of the Soviet Communists also were not very good at handling economic matters and the imperialists awaited their failure too. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emerged victorious and, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, it learned not only how to make the revolution but also how to carry on construction. It has

¹⁸¹ Forster, Elisabeth, 2020, “Bellicose Peace: China’s Peace Signature Campaign and Discourses about “Peace” in the Early 1950s,” *Modern China* 46, 3: 250-80.

¹⁸² Among other Stalinized terrains that have been examined in the scholarship is the one-party constitutional structure. Read: Li, Hua-yu, 2001, “The Political Stalinization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, 2 (Spring): 28-47.

¹⁸³ The history of the book’s production, circulation, and reception is comprehensively studied in Brandenberger, David, and Zelenov, Mikhail, 2019, *Stalin’s Master Narrative: A Critical Edition of the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) - Short Course*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Before the Short Course, the standard textbook for educating communists worldwide, including China, was Bukharin’s *The ABC of Communism*. Mao Zemin, Mao’s younger brother, was in charge of publishing and distributing CCP publications as well as Bukharin’s *The ABC of Communism* in late 1925. In early 1926, this book was an essential text for educating CCP members who attended a newly established “higher party school.”

Smith, Stephen A., 2000, *A Road is Made: Communism in Shanghai, 1920-1927*, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 127.

¹⁸⁴ Li, Hua-yu, 2010, “Instilling Stalinism in Chinese Party Members: Absorbing Stalin’s *Short Course* in the 1950s,” in *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, eds. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hya-yu Li, Lanham: Lexington Books, 111, 119, 123.

¹⁸⁵ Bernstein, Thomas P., 2010, “Introduction: The Complexities of Learning from the Soviet Union,” in *China Learns*, 6.

built a great and splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it.¹⁸⁶

The CCP used the *Short Course* as a blueprint for communist construction most extensively in the 1950s, even as the book only covered the history of the AUCP/VKP(b) from 1883 to 1937.¹⁸⁷ During the CCP's study campaign of 1953-1954, the whole party was assigned to study chapters 9 to 12 of the *Short Course* on processes happening during the socialist transition, i.e. industrialization, collectivization, and class struggle, to gain insights for building a centrally planned industrial economy.¹⁸⁸ Like other indoctrinating texts, many historical facts and theoretical claims in the *Short Course* were manipulated to serve Stalin's purposes and idolize his autocratic ruling style. It aimed at intellectual conformity and political submission rather than autocritique or meaningful philosophical discussion.

There were some key aspects of Stalinism from the *Short Course*, which were either unclear in or contradictory to Marx and Lenin, that the CCP both followed and departed from. The first concerned a sharp intraparty contradiction between the correct and incorrect line or between revolutionary friend and bourgeois enemy, exemplified by the real figures of Lenin-Stalin versus Bukharin-Trotsky. This "line struggle" defined Stalinist understanding of the class struggle that intensified in the socialist system rather than abated along the transition to socialism. For Stalin, the continuation of class struggle as line struggle required a long period of harsh repression and purges of individuals in the party leadership who argued for a slower transition to socialism and tolerated market mechanisms and certain kinds of private enterprise.¹⁸⁹ The second bore upon the notion of "primitive socialist accumulation" for industrialization. Primitive socialist accumulation referred to a practice of collective farming as the socialist state's means of expropriating agricultural surplus and cheaply extracting grain from the rural communes for rapid industrialization in the city. Thomas Bernstein suggests that Stalin's idea of primitive socialist accumulation stemmed from his idiosyncratic interpretation of Lenin's article *On Co-operation*.¹⁹⁰ The third involved the idea that socialism fundamentally equaled revolution from above, state ownership, forced collectivization, and centralized bureaucracy. This conception of socialism totally abandoned the masses and collective ownership, which were paradoxically its constitutive elements. The fourth pertained to Stalin's instrumentalist understanding of dialectical materialism (abbreviated as "diamat" for most Marxist-Leninist practitioners), which Nick Knight argues to be a foundation of "orthodoxy" or dogmatism.¹⁹¹ The second section of chapter 4 on dialectical and

¹⁸⁶ Mao, Tse-tung, 1961, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 4: The Third Revolutionary Civil War Period, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 423 (30 Jun. 1949).

¹⁸⁷ AUCP / VKP(b), standing for All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) / *Vtoroe Krepostnoe Pravo (Bol'shevistskoe)*, was the official name of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) from 1925-1952 until it changed to the latter in 1952.

¹⁸⁸ Li, "Instilling Stalinism," 122.

¹⁸⁹ Walder, Andrew G., 2017, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution," in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2, 221.

¹⁹⁰ Bernstein, Thomas P., 2017, "The Socialist Modernization of China: Between Soviet Model and National Specificity 1949-1960s," in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2, 200.; Stalin, Joseph V., 1954, "Industrialization and the Grain Problem," in *Collected Works*, vol. 11: 1928 – March 1929, Moscow: Foreign Publishing House, 167 (9 Jul. 1928).

¹⁹¹ Knight, Nick, 1997, "The Laws of Dialectical Materialism in Mao Zedong's Thought: The Question of 'Orthodoxy,'" in *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*, eds. Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, New York: Humanity Books, 84-116.

historical materialism was, in fact, the only part of the *Short Course* that Stalin solely authored.¹⁹² Here, we witness the split between Stalin and Mao in terms of historical materialist and political-economic analyses, not in ideology. These differences in the historical materialist and political-economic analysis of the concrete situation, which also determined a differing method of socialist construction in Soviet and China, this dissertation claims, laid the material foundation for the impending Sino-Soviet split.

It has to be made clear at the outset that this dissertation concerns more with the intellectual historical aspect underlying this whole revolutionary war machine that resulted in an economic disaster, a deadly famine, a new form of inequality, massive displacement, and a cold-blooded sovereign exercise of letting people die as human sacrifices. Several critical studies of actually existing state Marxism's—to avoid the pitfalls of the non-analytical terms like failures and mistakes—assumptions, limitations, logic, non-pragmatism, illiberalism, and violence have been undertaken, and this dissertation would leave that important task to those who could do it better.¹⁹³ Rather than evaluating actually existing state Marxism from a pre-determined normative standpoint (looking at how are peripheral Marxisms deviated from the Eurocentric and fundamentalist Marxism), this dissertation is interested in investigating the challenges, difficulties, and struggles of generating normativity in the periphery of global capitalist accumulation. In other words, this project looks at how peripheral Marxisms are generated from a specific geo-historical materialist formation under peripheral limits.

Even as Mao regarded Stalinism as his theoretical basis of Marxism, he interpreted Stalinism based on his own theoretical dispositions, and the specific Chinese material condition and social formation. In his 1961-62 *Reading Notes on the Soviet Text Political Economy*, Mao derived a proposition “starting from fundamental principles and rules is not the Marxist method” from reading Soviet's *Political Economic* textbook published by the Institute of Economics of the USSR's Academy of Sciences. He explicitly criticized Soviet Marxist orthodoxy for “proceed[ing] from rules, principles, laws, definitions, a methodology Marxism-Leninism has always opposed.” In contrast to the textbook's “deductive method,” Mao advocated for a dialectical, analytical, and concrete approach to capitalist economy in *Das Kapital*, which “commences with appearances, searches out essences, and only then uses the essence to explain the appearance, making through this method effective summaries and outlines.”¹⁹⁴ Only through protracted and painful processes of struggle and study could one gradually advance knowledge and eventually, a set of temporary laws. Under another proposition of “the dialectical process of knowledge” in the same reading notes, Mao wrote:

If you want to know the objective laws of the development of things and events you must go through the process of practice, adopt a Marxist-Leninist attitude, compare successes and failures, continually practicing and studying, going through multiple successes and failures; moreover, meticulous research must be performed. There is no other way to make

¹⁹² Tucker, Robert C., 1992, *Stalin in Power: Revolution from Above*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 531.

¹⁹³ For example, Teiwes, Frederick C. and Sun, Warren, 1999, *China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959*, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

¹⁹⁴ Mao, Tsetung, 1977, “Reading Notes on the Soviet Text *Political Economy* (1961-1962),” in *A Critique of Soviet Economics*, trans. Moss Roberts, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 73-4.

one's own knowledge gradually conform to the laws. For those who see only victory but not defeat it will not be possible to know these laws.¹⁹⁵

On the first point of sharp intraparty contradiction, Mao followed Stalin in typologizing the “incorrect line” within the party, which included the right-opportunist line of Chen Duxiu, the left-deviationist line of Qu Quibai, the left-adventurist line of Li Lisan, and the left-opportunist line of Wang Ming. The CCP adopted this typology in the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of April 1945 during the discussion of the CCP's party history. Yet, Mao argued most forcefully in his 1957 *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*—a text written partly as a response to the 1956 anticommunist Hungarian uprising—that the continuation of line struggle did not necessarily lead to violent repression and purges when the contradictions between the line happened within the same social or ideological class.¹⁹⁶ In this sense, the intra-party contradiction, Mao contended, was a non-antagonistic and corrigible one. It would be resolved through a dialectic between individual and collective ideological education within a schema of unity-criticism-unity than Stalin's absolute opposition between life and death. Mao explained that this method of solving non-antagonistic contradictions “start[ed] from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on a new basis.”¹⁹⁷ Mao situated the importance of unity within the larger imperative to construct and consolidate the socialist system in China, an arduous task Mao conceived as “the battle against nature.”¹⁹⁸

On this second point about primitive socialist accumulation, already in his 1955 *On the Co-Operative Transformation of Agriculture*, Mao gave three related reasons to offset Soviet's practice of primitive socialist accumulation while keeping the logic of state's resource extractivism in place. First, socialist industrialization cannot be carried out in isolation from the co-operative transformation of agriculture. It followed that, second, the heavy industry produced technologies and machineries for large-scale co-operative farming uses. Lastly, the agriculture and light industry, downplayed in the Stalinist model, would produce funds large enough to accomplish both national industrialization and the technical transformation of agriculture. Reiterating the dialectical relation between industry and agriculture, Mao wrote: “Therefore we must on no account regard industry and agriculture, socialist industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture as disconnected or isolated things, and on no account must we emphasize the one and play down the other.”¹⁹⁹ Mao further challenged the notion of primitive socialist accumulation in his 1956 *On the Ten Major Relationships* by emphatically suggesting an investment in both heavy industry and agriculture, rather than sacrificing the latter as the means to achieve the former. Both workers and peasants were after all dual foundational forces for Chinese socialist construction. In fact, Lenin made a similar point about possible co-operation between the proletariat and exploited peasantry

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.

¹⁹⁶ Knight, Nick, 2007, *Rethinking Mao: Explorations in Mao Zedong's Thought*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 224.

¹⁹⁷ Mao, Tse-tung, 1978, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 5: The Period of the Socialist Revolution and Socialist Reconstruction (1), Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 390 (27 Feb. 1957).

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 396.

¹⁹⁹ Mao, Tse-tung, 1978, “On the Co-Operative Transformation of Agriculture,” in *Selected Works*, vol. 5, 197 (31 Jul. 1955).

for the Soviet industrial-communist construction in his 1923 *On Co-operation*.²⁰⁰ Mao expressed his frustration with the Soviet's treatment of the peasants in the following way: "The Soviet Union has adopted measures which squeeze the peasants very hard. It takes away too much from the peasants at too low a price through its system of so-called obligatory sales and other measures. This method of capital accumulation has seriously dampened the peasants' enthusiasm for production. You want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you don't feed it; you want the horse to run fast and yet you don't let it graze. What kind of logic is that!"²⁰¹ Without feeding the hen and letting the horse graze, Mao warned, the peasants may rise up and turn their wrath on the Communist Party itself.²⁰² Unlike Stalin who subscribed to the stadial and progressivist logic on the matter of transition from agriculture to industry, Mao already witnessed firsthand the peasantry's revolutionary force in combatting foreign oppressors, capitalists, and landlords during the final months of the communist party's alliance with the nationalists, the testimony which then materialized in his 1927 *Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan*.

For the third point on the revolution from above, Mao did use Stalin's economic development plan as a blueprint for Chinese socialist construction. Besides chapters 9-12 of the *Short Course*, the CCP even ordered provincial and regional party committees to study Stalin's 1952 pamphlet *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* in November 1958 during the early period of the Great Leap Forward.²⁰³ In his 1959 speech at the Lushan Conference, Mao contended that only through the study of the Soviet political economy would the cadres better comprehend the specific situation in China during the Great Leap Forward: "They had not properly studied political economy. They had not clearly understood the laws of value, exchange of equal values, and remuneration according to work done. ... If they have not understood the textbooks, let them study some more. If the top cadres in the communes do not understand a little political economy, this won't do."²⁰⁴ Consistent with his general theoretical assessment of Stalinism in the 1950s, nonetheless, Mao stipulated the CCP cadres to study the Soviet political-economic treatises dialectically. Specifically, Mao cautioned the CCP against the ultraleft adventurist and orthodox interpretation of the Soviet political economy, a symptom Lenin a few decades earlier called an infantile disorder of left-wing communism.

Mao identified the undialectical and reductive implementation of productive forces theory as the root cause of the pathological revolution from above. In this reductive understanding of social production, socialism was merely a programmatic, scientific, and rational organization of the productive forces, a theory of economic development planning. This science-fundamentalist position was held by L.D. Yaroshenko, a specialist in the State Planning Commission, in the CPSU and the CCP's politburo except for Mao. Stalin himself already critiqued Yaroshenko in his 1952 *Economic Problems* by emphasizing the dialectical interconnection between productive forces and production relations, referring to Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital*. In Stalin's words:

²⁰⁰ Lenin, Vladimir I., 1965 [1923], "On Co-operation," in *Lenin's Collected Works*, vol. 2, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 467-75 (4 & 6 Jan. 1923).

²⁰¹ Mao, Tse-tung, 1978, "On the Ten Major Relationships," in *Selected Works*, vol. 5, 291 (25 Apr. 1956).

²⁰² Peck, James, 1977, "Introduction," in *A Critique of Soviet Economics*, 24.

²⁰³ Mao, Tse-tung, 1977, "Concerning Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR," in *A Critique of Soviet Economics*, 129.

For a contextualized study of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, read chapter 7 of Pollock, Ethan, 2006, *Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 168-211.

²⁰⁴ Mao, Tse-tung, 1974, "Speech at the Lushan Conference," in *Chairman Mao Talks to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971*, ed. Stuart Scharm, trans. John Chinnery and Tieyun, New York: Pantheon Books, 135-6 (23 Jul. 1959).

Social production consists of two sides, which, although they are inseparably connected, reflect two different categories of relations: the relations of men to nature (productive forces), and the relations of men to one another in the process of production (production relations). Only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation. ... Comrade Yaroshenko ... considers that this postulate of Marx is not applicable to the socialist system. Precisely for this reason he reduces the problem of the Political Economy of Socialism to the rational organization of the productive forces, discarding the production, the economic, relations and severing the productive forces from them.²⁰⁵

Stalin acknowledged the continuing contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production under socialism. However, Stalin contended that with the right policy, “these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms.” The directing bodies needed to discern and resolve the incipient contradictions, gradually converting collective farms’ property into public property and commodity exchange into product exchange.²⁰⁶ This argument led to more centralized state planning, controlled direction, and bureaucracy. The state became an absolutist apparatus where all contradictions were resolved.

At the Eighth National Congress of the CCP in September 1956, Liu Shaoqi delivered the CC CCP’s report, stating: “Now, ... new relations of production have been set up, and the aim of our struggle is changed into one of safeguarding the successful development of the productive forces of society, a corresponding change in methods of struggle will consequently have to follow, and a complete legal system becomes an absolute necessity.”²⁰⁷ Similarly, this argument led to the centralized collectivization of agriculture, the public ownership of the means of production, and the commanding promotion of the productive forces. Mao did not have an issue with the promotion of the productive forces *per se*. He was concerned with the ultraleft tendency among the party members to fixate on generating and controlling economic growth as experts (quantitative productive forces) while abandoning mass struggles and their revolutionary subjectivity (qualitative production relations). James Peck suggested that Mao’s attack on the theory of productive forces hinged on the lessons he had learned about revolutionary transformation during the Yan’an years of guerilla warfare (late 1935- early 1947). The main features of the Yan’an model included self-reliance, decentralization, antagonism to bureaucratism and elitism, collective aims and discipline, nonmaterial incentives, and the participation of the masses in all aspects of social and economic activity. Development was comprehensive, designed to bring up all sectors, not just a chosen part.²⁰⁸

Contra Stalin and the CCP’s ultraleft tendency, Mao argued in *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* that despite the ending of “large-scale turbulent class struggle” in pre-socialist China, “there are still remnants of the overthrown landlord and comprador classes, there is still a bourgeoisie, and the remolding of the party bourgeoisie has only just started. Class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle ... will still be protracted and tortuous and at times

²⁰⁵ Stalin, Joseph, 1952, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 71.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 75-6.

²⁰⁷ Liu, Shao-chi, 1956, “The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” in *Eight National Congress of the Communist Party of China: Documents*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 82.

²⁰⁸ Peck, “Introduction,” 14.

even very sharp. ... As soon as something erroneous is rejected and a particular truth accepted by mankind, new truths begin to struggle with new errors. Such struggles will never end. This is the law of development of truth and naturally, of Marxism.”²⁰⁹ In other words, in a socialist society, the basic contradictions “are still those between the relations of production and the productive forces and between the superstructure and the economic base.”²¹⁰ Socialist relations of production, Mao continued, “have been established and are in correspondence with the growth of the productive forces, but these relations are still far from perfect, and this imperfection stands in contradiction to the growth of the productive forces.”²¹¹ On this matter, Mao explicitly called out Stalin for his “mistakes” in not implementing one law of dialectics, the negation of the negation: “The October Revolution negated capitalism but he refused to admit that socialism maybe negated too.”²¹² In contrast to Stalin, who relied on the centralized and unitary bureaucratic state to resolve contradictions, Mao located contradictions within the state itself:

Apart from correspondence as well as contradiction between the relations of production and the growth: of the productive forces, there is correspondence as well as contradiction between the superstructure and the economic base. The superstructure, comprising the state system and laws of the people’s democratic dictatorship and the socialist ideology guided by Marxism-Leninism, plays a positive role in facilitating the victory of socialist transformation and the socialist way of organizing labor; it is in correspondence with the socialist economic base, that is, with socialist relations of production. But the existence of bourgeois ideology, a certain bureaucratic style of work in our state organs and defects in some of the links in our state institutions are in contradiction with the socialist economic base. We must continue to resolve all such contradictions in the light of our specific conditions.²¹³

As Mao conceived the world through the dialectics of unity and disunity, balances and imbalances, his conception of state planning was also consistently dialectical. Hence for Mao, the purpose of state planning was not just to overcome contradictions and prevent them from emerging (Stalin). It entailed a constant readjustment process to deal with the contradiction between production and society’s needs. An economic plan may reach a temporary point of equilibrium, a provisional unity of opposites, but the equilibrium would soon be upset by the struggle of opposites:

Of course, new problems will emerge as these contradictions are resolved. And further efforts will be required to resolve the new contradictions. For instance, a constant process of readjustment through state planning is needed to deal with the contradiction between production and the needs of society, which will long remain an objective reality. Every year our country draws up an economic plan in order to establish a proper ratio between accumulation and consumption and achieve an equilibrium between production and needs. Equilibrium is nothing but a temporary, relative, unity of opposites. By the end of each

²⁰⁹ Mao, “On the Correct Handling,” 409.

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 393.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 394.

²¹² Mao, Tse-Tung, 1974, *Miscellany of Mao Tse-Tung Thought (1949-1968)*, Arlington, Va.: Joint Publications Research Service, 50.

²¹³ Mao, “On the Correct Handling,” 394-5.

year, this equilibrium, taken as a whole, is upset by the struggle of opposites; the unity undergoes a change, equilibrium becomes disequilibrium, unity becomes disunity, and once again it is necessary to work out an equilibrium and unity for the next year. Herein lies the superiority of our planned economy. As a matter of fact, this equilibrium, this unity, is partially upset every month or every quarter, and partial readjustments are called for. Sometimes, contradictions arise and the equilibrium is upset because our subjective arrangements do not conform to objective reality; this is what we call making a mistake. The ceaseless emergence and ceaseless resolution of contradictions constitute the dialectical law of the development of things.²¹⁴

In *Reading Notes on the Soviet Text*, Mao reiterated his dialectical conception of balance and imbalance, which was totally missing from the Soviet political economy. He stressed that “contradictions and struggle are absolutes; unity, unanimity, and solidarity are transitional, hence relative.”²¹⁵ Mao’s solution to the problematic of revolution from above, which included the dogmatic productive forces theory, centralized planning, bureaucratic domination, state ownership, and forced collectivization, then, was the continuing movement of mass and class struggles.

In the first CCP’s official response to Khrushchev’s de-Stalinizing secret speech in *Renmin Ribao* editorial of April 1956, it identified the party-state’s alienation from the masses as the fundamental problem of Stalinism without altogether denouncing it. The CCP resolutely affirmed the mass line and mass struggles to rectify this problem.²¹⁶ “The thorough implementation of the mass line and collective leadership,” the editorial asserted, was “to avoid elevation of oneself and individualist heroism, both of which mean divorce from the masses, and to reduce to a minimum subjectivism and one-sidedness in our work which represent a departure from objective reality. We must also learn from the struggle of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union against the cult of the individual and continue our fight against doctrinairism.”²¹⁷ This was a different direction than Khrushchev’s CPSU, which also rejected Stalinism and returned to the masses but by way of peaceful socialist working class-driven democratic reform, not radicalizing mass struggle. In the talk of March 10th, 1958 at the Chengdu Conference, Mao reflected on Stalin that “when Stalin was criticized in 1956, we were on the one hand happy, but on the other hand apprehensive. It was

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 395.

²¹⁵ Mao, “Reading Notes,” 82.

²¹⁶ The mass line is the foundational method of revolutionary leadership of the masses. The CCP, as the most conscious and best organized proletarian party, strived to achieve this leadership method. Mao explained the mass line as “from the masses, to the masses.” The whole process is reiterative and dialectical, spiraling towards a socialist revolution and a more substantiated socialist society. Mao’s classic formulation is as follows: “In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily “from the masses, to the masses.” This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.”

Mao, Tsetung, 1965, “Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 3: The Period of the War of Resistance Against Japan (II), Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 119 (1 Jun. 1943).

²¹⁷ Chinese Communist Party, 1959, “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,” in *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, Peking: Foreign Language Press, 13-4. The original article in Chinese appeared in *Renmin Ribao*, April 5, 1956.

completely necessary to remove the lid, to break down blind faith, to release the pressure, and to emancipate thought. But we did not agree with demolishing him at one blow.”²¹⁸ Khrushchev’s project was de-Stalinization while retaining state bureaucracy.

In contradistinction, Mao’s was re-dialecticizing Stalinism—salvaging, while renewing, to borrow Lorenz Lüthi’s terms, revolutionary Stalinism from bureaucratic Stalinism through a re-engagement with Marxism-Leninism.²¹⁹ This dissertation names this stance of Mao that re-engages with Marxism-Leninism, a stance which has been identified in the scholarship negatively rather than affirmatively as anti-revisionist, neo-Marxism-Leninism. However, Mao’s reaction against Khrushchev’s critique of Stalin was not a purely intellectual defense but also instrumentally driven by his self-identification with Stalin. Mao partially internalized Khrushchev’s critique of Stalin’s cult of personality and felt vulnerable to the same critique in China, where Mao limited the wider discussion of Khrushchev’s Secret Speech.²²⁰

Despite upholding a vanguard role, the communist party must be subject to the mass line and stand within, not outside, the dialectical process of uninterrupted revolution. Mao disproved the idea that “once in the Communist Party, people all become saints with no differences or misunderstanding, and that the Party is not subject to analysis, that is to say, it is monolithic and uniform... .”²²¹ Only when the party cadres immersed themselves among the masses, subjected to their criticisms, and collaboratively experimented with different praxes would new potentially revolutionary forms and methods emerge. Mao had long put into practice this notion of co-operation between party cadres and the masses, particularly in the period of accelerating collectivization in 1955-1957 immediately before the Great Leap Forward. In a report *On the Co-Operative Transformation of Agriculture*, Mao advised the cadres thus: “Both cadres and peasants will remold themselves in the course of the struggles they themselves experience. Let them go into action and let them learn and become more competent as they go along. ... The leadership should never lag behind the mass movement.”²²² Challenging intellectual elitism, orderly careerism, and technocracy of the state experts, Mao proclaimed in his 1958 *Sixty Points on Working Methods*: “it is beyond any doubt that politics and economy, [and that] politics and technology must be unified.”²²³ In other words, revolutionaries must be both red and expert, combining the knowledge of the masses and cadres, not just one or the other.

Following Lenin, Mao saw the masses, and neither the party nor the state, as the creators of history and an embodiment of creativity, vigor, and initiative spirit, which were the qualities necessary for communist transformation.²²⁴ Contrary to the productive forces theory, these creativities did not sprout on their own by the mere quantitative growth of the economic base. The Communist transformation required simultaneous, interrelated, and ceaseless revolutionary movements from both the political-economic and social fronts, a contradictory combination of

²¹⁸ Mao, “Talks at Chengtu: On the Problem of Stalin,” in *Chairman Mao Talks*, 101 (10 Mar. 1958).

²¹⁹ Lüthi, Lorenz M., 2008, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 20-3. Lüthi borrowed the term revolutionary Stalinism from Tucker, *Stalin in Power*.

²²⁰ Wu, Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan, 1956-1966: Zhong-Su guanxi huiyi lu* [Ten Years of Debate, 1956-1966: Recollections of Sino-Soviet Relations], Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 12-20., quoted in Lüthi, Lorenz M., 2010, “Sino Soviet Relations during the Mao Years, 1949-1969,” in *China Learns*, 37.

²²¹ Mao, Tsetung, 1978, “A Dialectical Approach to Inner-Party Unity,” in *Selected Works*, vol. 5, 515 (18 Nov. 1957).

²²² Mao, “On the Co-Operative Transformation,” 185.

²²³ Mao, Tse-tung, 1970, “Sixty Points on Working Methods: A Draft Resolution from the Office of the Centre of the CCP,” in *Mao Papers: Anthology and Bibliography*, ed. Jerome Ch’en, London: Oxford University Press, 64 (19 Feb. 1958).

²²⁴ Mao, “Reading Notes,” 119.

both productive forces and production relations, a dialectical intercourse between economic base and ideological superstructure, things and people, machinery and consciousness. Yet, Mao discerned that even within the socialist regime, any revolutionary, especially a proletarian, subject, in fact, may be recreated by the system to assume the self-interested quality of a bourgeois class:

We can now affirm that classes do exist in socialist countries and that class struggle undoubtedly exists. Lenin said: After the victory of the revolution, because of the existence of the bourgeois remnants internally, because the petit bourgeoisie exists and continually generates a bourgeoisie, therefore the classes which have been overthrown within the country will continue to exist for a long time to come and may even attempt restoration.²²⁵

Precisely because China during the period of socialist transformation still retained three types of property (state, collective, and individual), the differentiation in the ownership system facilitated the emergence of a new bourgeoisie.²²⁶ John Bryan Starr calls this process de-proletarianization rather than just embourgeoisement because Mao thought of a proletariat as a starting point in this particular process of socialist subject formation.²²⁷ Therefore Mao argued that the basic relations among people needed to be continuously transformed to unleash the productive forces of the masses and drive the revolution forward. As their production relations were continually transformed, the masses would bring about qualitative revolutionary changes by developing new attitudes and organizational forms that could become a foundation for a communist society. Not only could the mass struggle combat the enduring bourgeois ideology, bureaucratism, elitism, and privilege in the by now socialist superstructure, it also created new social forms and political-economic innovations like co-operatives and people's communes.

Mao was gravely concerned with the question of what happened after the "communist" revolution and did not conceive the communist revolution as an end in itself.²²⁸ Hence, Mao rarely took functioning bourgeois political-economic categories for granted under the communist regime. At least during the time of writing his critiques of Soviet economics from the period of Great Leap Forward to before the Cultural Revolution, Mao regarded the people's commune as a site of socialist experimentation and struggle where many of his hypotheses were realized. Mao explicitly

²²⁵ Mao, Zedong, 1962, "Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee," (24 Sep.), quoted in Schram, Stuart R. (ed.), 1974, *Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, Talks and Letters, 1956-71*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 189

²²⁶ The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 1963, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement: The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963," *Peking Review* 6, 25 (21 Jun.): 17 (14 Jun. 1963).

²²⁷ Starr, John Bryan, 1976-1977, "Marxism and the Political Legacy of Mao Tse-Tung," *International Journal* 32, 1: Communism (Winter): 146. Starr also notes that Mao's notion of de-proletarianization substantially differed from Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslav critic of the Soviet-type communist totalitarian state. Djilas argues that socialist state bureaucracy generated a new class to administer the state-owned enterprises, namely, a managerial class, whose exploitative relationship with the worker was analogous to that of the propertied class and the worker in a capitalist system.

Djilas, Milovan, 1957, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

²²⁸ The notion of after-the-revolution (*geming hou*) denotes the ceaseless revolutionary processes after the revolution, as opposed to postrevolution, which treats the revolution as a one-time event. The concept has been prominently discussed in Cai, Xiang, 2016 [2010], *Revolution & Its Narratives: China's Socialist Literary and Cultural Imaginaries 1949-1966*, eds. and trans. Rebecca E. Karl and Xueping Zhong, Durham and London: Duke University Press.

stated that “the commune is the best organizational form for carrying out the two transitions, from the socialist (the present) to all-embracing public, and from the all-embracing public to communist ownership. In the future, when the transitions have been completed, the commune will be the basic mechanism of communist society.”²²⁹ As an organizational form against the rigid Stalinist division of labor, state “collective” ownership, and the privileging of one side of the productive forces (technical cadre, industry), the commune integrated cadres (political knowledge), technicians (technical knowledge), and workers/peasants (practical knowledge) into a single self-organized work unit. Theoretically, the commune would lead the way to “the gradual diminution and final elimination of the differences between rural and urban areas, between worker and peasant, and between mental and manual labor.”²³⁰ Mao’s problematic was to think about how the law of value, a form of ownership, commodity production, social relation, the principle of exchange, and economic distribution worked under the communist planned economy and politics-in-command. Mao maintained that these foundational political-economic questions were not answered satisfactorily by the Soviet Union and Stalin.

On the fourth and last point on dialectical materialism, both Stalin and Mao to different extents derived and recreated their understandings of materialism from a particular genealogy of Engels and Plekhanov. Ingo Elbe, a proponent of the German *neue Marx-Lektüre* (‘New Reading of Marx’), would go as far as arguing that Engelsism, rather than Marxism, was the basis for Marxist-Leninism and Dialectical and Historical Materialism of the communist party’s Marxism. In other words, the communist party’s Marxism is Engelsism.²³¹ This genealogy’s understanding of materialism arose from the examination of the dialectics of nature (*naturdialektik*), the movement of interrelated objective things in the natural world from which the history of human society can be deduced. This intellectual formulation drew insights from the natural and physical sciences of its time. Engels, and not Marx, first schematically developed the scientific “three laws of dialectics” from Hegel and articulated them in his *Dialectics of Nature*, written between 1873-1882 and published posthumously by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow in 1925. While preparing for the *Dialectics of Nature* manuscript, Engels published another polemical work *Anti-Dühring* in 1878, which also discussed the laws of dialectics. Because *Anti-Dühring*’s publication history preceded *Dialectics of Nature*, the former became the foundation for the first-generation Russian/Soviet dialecticians to develop the science of dialectics. Engel’s three laws of dialectics were (a) the law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, (b) the law of the interpenetration of opposites, and (c) the law of the negation of the negation.²³² In the Engelsian conception, these laws of dialectics meant to correspond with the laws of material nature. Engels often used chemistry to illustrate the first law: “Chemistry can be termed the science of the qualitative changes of bodies as a result of changed quantitative composition.”²³³ Water remains liquid while being heated until reaching 100 degrees Celsius, and it suddenly turns into a gas. For the second law, Engels gave an example of magnetism, which exhibits the interaction between two

²²⁹ Mao, “Concerning Economic Problems,” 134.

²³⁰ CCP, 1958, “Resolution on Questions Concerning People’s Communes,” in *Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party* (10 Dec.), quoted in Meisner.

²³¹ Elbe, Ingo, 2013, “Between Marx, Marxism and Marxisms: Ways of Reading Marx’s Theory,” *Viewpoint Magazine*. Available at: <https://viewpointmag.com/2013/10/21/between-marx-marxism-and-marxisms-ways-of-reading-marxs-theory/>.

²³² Engels, Friedrich, 1987, “Dialectics of Nature,” in *Karl Marx – Frederick Engels Collected Works*, trans. Clemens Dutt, vol. 25, New York: International Publishers, 356.

²³³ *Ibid.*, 359.

polarities of attraction and repulsion.²³⁴ Engels demonstrated the last law through the life cycle of plants. When a grain of barley falls on suitable soil, it germinates, and the grain ceases to exist. A negation of the grain occurs. Then a plant grows from the grain and finally produces more grains of barley after its fertilization. The stalk soon dies after it has ripened. Just happened is the negation of the stalk. Engels then wrote: “As a result of this negation of the negation we have once again the original grain of barley, but not as a single unit, but ten-, twenty- or thirtyfold.”²³⁵ The law of the negation of the negation here denoted the spiral development of things that turned into their opposite repeatedly and at a progressively higher level. Engelsian three laws of dialectics reinforced E. van Ree’s observation that Engels’ thought “was a curious compromise between Hegel and scientism, between dialectics as a peculiar form of ‘contradictory logic’ and dialectics as a system of evolution and interaction of forces.”²³⁶

During his lifetime, Engels, and again not Marx, started to use the term “historical materialism” to designate his and Marx’s materialist conception of history in his 1880 *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*. The coinage of the term “dialectical materialism,” never used by both Marx and Engels, was often credited to Georgi Plekhanov in his 1891 commemorative text for Hegel, which was influenced by Engel’s *Anti-Dühring*.²³⁷ The specific distinction between historical materialism and dialectical materialism, understood as the distinction between materialist studies of society-history and philosophy-science, deployed by Stalin in the 1938 *Short Course* could be traced to the heated debates among Soviet Marxist thinkers in the 1920s, particularly Nikolai Bukharin in his 1921 publication *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology*. In this book, drawing from Marx’s *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Bukharin identified historical materialism as a distinct method of study for “proletarian” or “Marxian” sociology, “the general theory of society and the laws of its evolution,” under a broader general rubric of philosophical or dialectical materialism.²³⁸ The division between historical and dialectical materialism later gained acceptance among Soviet Marxist philosophers and became canonized in Stalin’s 1938 *Short Course*:

Dialectical materialism is the world outlook of the Marxist-Leninist party. It is called dialectical materialism because its approach to the phenomena of nature, its method of studying and apprehending them, is *dialectical*, while its interpretation of the phenomena of nature, its conception of these phenomena, its theory, is *materialistic*.

Historical materialism is the extension of the principles of dialectical materialism to the study of social life, an application of the principles of dialectical materialism to the phenomena of the life of society, to the study of society and of its history.²³⁹

While Mao around the same time formally adopted Engel’s three laws of dialectics in his lectures on Dialectical Materialism and Contradiction respectively in 1937 and 1938, Stalin instead articulated four features of dialectics as opposed to metaphysics in the *Short Course*. Stalin’s four features of dialectics were (a) dialectics regards nature “as a connected and integral whole, in

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, 492.

²³⁵ Engels, Friedrich, 1987, “Anti-Dühring,” in *Karl Marx – Frederick Engels Collected Works*, vol. 25, 126.

²³⁶ van Ree, E., 2000, “Stalin as a Marxist Philosopher,” *Studies in East European Thought* 52, 4 (Dec): 273.

²³⁷ Plakhanov, 1891, “For the Sixtieth Anniversary of Hegel’s Death”

²³⁸ Bukharin, Nikolai, 1925 (1921), *Historical Materialism: A System of Sociology*, International Publishers, Intro, Ch. 3.

²³⁹ C.P.S.U.(B.), 1939 (1938), *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, New York: International Publishers,

which things, phenomena, are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other”; (b) dialectics holds that nature is “a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away”; (c) dialectics regards the process of development as a process “which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the natural result of an accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes”; and (d) dialectics holds that “internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and something developing; and that the struggle between these opposites, the struggle between the old and the new, between that is dying away and that which is being born, between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal content of the process of development, the Internal content of the transformation of quantitative changes into qualitative changes.”²⁴⁰

Stalin’s version of dialectics only explicitly retained Engel’s first law (the transformation of quantity into quality, corresponding to Stalin’s third law). The second law on the interpenetration of opposites was preserved but reduced to the principles of interconnection, interdependency, continuous movement, and internal contradiction between positive and negative sides (Stalin’s first, second, and fourth laws). The negation of the negation, Engel’s third law, was simply negated.²⁴¹ Stalin’s dynamic matters affected one another in appearance and on the surface but neither interpenetrated nor contradicted. This peculiar understanding of dialectics metamorphosed dialectics themselves into vulgar mechanistic developmentalist and biological determinist laws governing the struggle between growing and dying things, an eternal process of destruction and creation. E. van Ree perceptively characterizes Stalin’s dialectics as “a kind of biological Marxism, a Marxist ‘Darwinism,’ well adapted to an ideology of life-and-death class struggle.”²⁴² Stalin’s version of dialectics, rightly diagnosed by Georg Lukács, abolished all intermediate and mediating factors between theory and empirics and instead “establish[ed] an

²⁴⁰ C.P.S.U.(B.), *Short Course*.

²⁴¹ Herbert Marcuse points out that in the intellectual history of Soviet Marxism, the concept of negation of the negation “disappeared from the list of fundamental dialectical laws” resulted from Stalin’s omission of the concept in 1938. According to Gustav A. Wetter, Soviet philosophers revived this dialectics law of the negation of the negation through a renewed reading of Mao Zedong’s *On Contradiction* in the mid-1950s.

Marcuse, Herbert, 1961, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, New York: Vintage Books, 137.; Wetter, Gustav A., 1958, *Dialectical Materialism: A Historical and Systematic Survey of Philosophy in The Soviet Union*, New York: Praeger, 355.

Mark Sandle, following the assessments of Alfred Evans and Leszek Kołakowski, speculates that Stalin removed the negation of the negation law to “strip all the potential for revolutionary transformation from Marxism in order to defend and preserve what had been achieved and constructed so far. ... If the principle of the ‘negation of the negation’ were applied to Soviet society, then socialism, as the negation of capitalism, would in turn be negated through the development of communism. By omitting the ‘negation of the negation,’ revolution, radical change and sharp breaks in development were all precluded. Socialist society would thus develop on a harmonious, continuous, gradual basis.”

Sandle, Mark, 2007, “Soviet and Eastern Bloc Marxism,” in *Twentieth Century Marxism: A Global Introduction*, eds. Daryl Glaser and David M. Walker, London and New York: Routledge, 65.

²⁴² van Ree, “Stalin as a Marxist Philosopher,” 271.

immediate connection between the crudest factual data and the most general theoretical propositions.”²⁴³

Stalin conceived natural and social realms as one vertically continuous plane to which dialectical laws were equally extended and applied: “If the connection between the phenomena of nature and their interdependence are laws of the development of nature, it follows, too, that the connection and interdependence of the phenomena of social life are laws of the development of society, and not something accidental.”²⁴⁴ Historical materialism merely named this process of extending and applying dialectical materialist laws to the society by the “party of the proletariat,” forming an ideological basis for Stalin’s revolution from above. The qualitative difference between natural and social realms was obliterated. Stalin’s bureaucratic state transformed the laws of dialectics into undialectical dogmas and policies for governing Soviet society. A joke made among Soviet intelligentsia well captured Stalin’s instrumentalist conception of dialectics: “‘What is the difference between Hegel and Stalin?’ people asked. The answer was ‘in Hegel there are thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, in Stalin report, counter-report, and organizational measures.’”²⁴⁵ In 1963 *On the Question of Stalin*, anti-revisionist Chinese Marxists from the editorial department of *Renmin Ribao* (People’s Daily) and *Hongqi* (Red Flag) went as far as critiquing Stalin for his “depart[ure] from dialectical materialism,” falling “into metaphysics and subjectivism on certain questions,” and “divorc[ing] from reality and from the masses.”²⁴⁶

Unlike Stalin, who dogmatized dialectics into a mechanical law of eternal change without rupture, qualitative contradiction, and negation, Mao dialecticized change itself in a spiral of contradiction between temporary unity and absolute struggle in his 1938 *On Contradiction*. Rather than Engels, Plekhanov, Bukharin, or Stalin, Mao quoted Lenin’s 1914-1916 *Philosophical Notebooks*, which was Lenin’s reading of Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, to extrapolate a dialectics of what Pang Laikwan calls “open future.”²⁴⁷ Lenin’s quote reads: “The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute.”²⁴⁸ Mao relied on an

²⁴³ Lukács, Georg, 1963 (1962), “Reflections on the Cult of Stalin,” in *Marxism and Human Liberation: Essays on History, Culture, and Revolution*, ed. E. San Juan Jr., New York: Dell Pub. Co.,

²⁴⁴ C.P.S.U.(B.), *Short Course*,

²⁴⁵ Lukács, “Reflections,”

²⁴⁶ Communist Party of China, 1963, *On the Question of Stalin: Second Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, Foreign Languages Press: Peking, 2 (13 Sep. 1963).

²⁴⁷ Pang, Laikwan, 2016, “Mao’s Dialectical Materialism: Possibilities for the Future,” *Rethinking Marxism* 28, 1: 115, 120.

Besides this cast of Marxist thinkers, Nick Knight’s comprehensive intellectual historical study of Mao’s dialectical thoughts identify Chinese Marxists Li Da and Ai Siqi along with Marxist philosophical works by Shirokov, Aizenberg, and Mitin as Mao’s intellectual sources during the time Mao formulated his dialectical thoughts in written forms.

Knight, Nick, 1990, “Introduction: Soviet Marxism and the Development of Mao Zedong’s Philosophical Thought,” in *Mao Zedong on Dialectical Materialism: Writing on Philosophy, 1937*, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 30-40, 48-62.

²⁴⁸ Mao, Tse-Tung, 1965 [1937], “On Contradiction,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, vol. 1, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 341-2.

If Kevin Anderson extended his study to Mao’s reading of Lenin’s *Philosophical Notebooks*, he would argue that Hegel allows Lenin, and Mao in this genealogy, to break with vulgar or mechanistic materialism (Second International’s Marxism in Lenin’s time and “orthodox” Soviet Marxism in Mao’s time) and conceptualize human in a dialectic between subjective revolutionary consciousness and objective communist reality.

Anderson, Kevin, 1995, *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

ontology of motion, a condition of possibility for the dialectical movement, to explain the two senses of the “absolute” from Lenin’s quote. He explained that there are two states of motion in all things: relative rest and conspicuous change, which are both caused by “the struggle between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing.”²⁴⁹ “The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle,” Mao added, “constitutes the movement of opposites in all things.”²⁵⁰

In the first “daily life” scenario of relative rest, the thing is undergoing only quantitative change in a contradiction between temporary unity and absolute struggle. The absolute here means ceaseless and eternal. In the more extraordinary second scenario of conspicuous change, “the quantitative change of the first state has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change, ... a transformation of one process into another.”²⁵¹ Mao emphasized that “the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the contradiction is resolved through the second state.”²⁵² The second state thus performs both laws of qualitative leap and negation of the negation. It negates the first state and transforms into its current form, a new temporary unity of opposites. Roland Boer suggests that the absolute in the second sense means unconditional, final, and complete.²⁵³ Under the new material condition when the second state is “completely” achieved, the struggle between opposites, too, “ceaselessly” continues in new and hitherto unexperienced forms as the prior relative conditions of unity have been dissolved.²⁵⁴ The second state becomes the (completely transformed) first state once again. Even as Mao neither situated these abstract scenarios in a sociopolitical realm nor concretely experienced the “second state” as such in 1938, we could infer that the first state was any given ordinary situation of a political-economic regime, capitalist or socialist, and the second state was a revolution, either a communist or cultural revolution. We have already seen this all too clearly from Mao’s critique of Stalin’s revolution from above, which presupposes the centralized bureaucratic state as the arbiter of all contradictions while neglecting the state’s own internal contradiction and refusing mass struggles or other creative interventions. Pang’s reading of Mao’s dialectics as one of an open future captures this view that the ceaseless struggle of the masses with history (the first state) generates a new future not totally predictable from, yet fully precipitated by, the present (the second state).²⁵⁵

The Chinese Communist Revolution: Communism Meets Decolonization

One of Mao’s earliest articulations of his consciousness about the capitalist-imperialist world order was the intermediate zone thesis (*zhongjian didai*; 中间地带) in August 1946 during his conversation with a leftwing American correspondent Anna Louise Strong, while the CCP was waging a civil war with the nationalist Guomindang. This intermediate zone thesis, suggests Chen Jian, demonstrated China’s understanding of the new post-World War II world order and the

²⁴⁹ Mao, “On Contradiction,” 342.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 343.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 342.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ Boer, Roland, 2017, “From Berne to Yan’an: The Theoretical Breakthroughs of Lenin and Mao,” *Crisis and Critique*, Bolshevik Revolution: One Hundred Years After 4, 2 (Nov): 80.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ Pang, “Mao’s Dialectical Materialism,” 112-6.

position of China and the Chinese Revolution in it.²⁵⁶ This “vast” intermediate zone stretched between the United States and the Soviet Union, including “many capitalist, colonial, and semicolonial countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.” It encompassed countries under the impinging domination of American imperialism expressed through armed forces, military base settlements, and active oppression of workers. In the interview, Mao characterized the postwar order as one teeming with contradictions of US imperialism. For Mao, the Soviet-American antagonism was just “a smoke-screen put up by the US reactionaries to cover many actual contradictions immediately confronting US imperialism.” The real principal contradictions were instead the struggles between US fascist reactionaries and the American workers and democratic circles, and between US imperialism with peoples in the intermediate zone.²⁵⁷ In early 1947, a published article by Lu Dingyi, the CCP’s propaganda chief, sharpened Mao’s analytics of US imperialism’s multiple contradictions into an almost Zhdanovian line before Zhdanov declared his Two-Camp theory:

After the end of World War II, the principal contradiction in world politics exists not between the capitalist world and the socialist Soviet Union, nor between the Soviet Union and the United States, but between the democratic and anti-democratic forces in the capitalist world. More concretely speaking, the principal contradictions in today’s world are those between the American people and American reactionaries, between Britain and the United States, and between China and the United States.²⁵⁸

Lu Dingyi, with Mao’s supervision, placed a new emphasis on the contradiction between democratic and anti-democratic forces, which, if arbitrated with Zhdanov’s, would also imply the contradiction between anti-imperialist and imperialist forces. Mao’s intermediate zone thesis and Lu’s addition here demonstrated the internationalist premise of the Chinese Communist Party’s political-economic analysis.

Ideologues of the CCP conceived the Chinese Communist Revolution on October 1st, 1949 as a liberation of the Chinese society from ruling class Han chauvinism at home (semi-feudalism, ethnocentrism) and foreign imperialist domination abroad (semi-colonialism). The Chinese revolution advanced the internationalist communist forces set in motion by the Bolshevik Revolution as a revolution against capital and yet also surpassed the Bolshevik Revolution by becoming a revolution against empire, imperialism, and ethnocentrism from peasant society’s standpoint. Mao saw the Chinese communist revolution as a model for an “Eastern revolution” on a world scale. Its role was to bridge the world revolution and the worldwide course of decolonization.²⁵⁹ During a speech at the 1957 Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Mao performatively proclaimed that “the East wind,” China, the Soviet Union, and the anticolonial movements in the socialist East, “is prevailing over the West wind. ... The forces of

²⁵⁶ Chen, Jian, 2017, “The Chinese Communist Revolution and the World,” in *The Cambridge History of Communism*, vol. 2, 99.

²⁵⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (eds.), 1998, *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 45-8 (6 Aug. 1946).

²⁵⁸ Lu, Dingyi, 1946, “Explanations of Several Basic Problems Concerning the Postwar International Situation,” *Jiefang ribao* (4 Jan. 1947), quoted in Chen, “The Chinese Communist Revolution,” 99.

²⁵⁹ Mao Zedong to Stalin, 1987, in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao’s Manuscripts Since the PRC’s Formation], vol. 1, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 539-40, 556 (2 and 13 Oct. 1950), quoted in Chen, “The Chinese Communist Revolution,” 101.

socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.”²⁶⁰ To overthrow global imperialism-capitalism, Mao declared in his opening statement to the CCP’s Eighth National Congress in September 1956: “we must give active support to the national independence and liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as the peace movement and just struggles in the peace-loving countries of the world.”²⁶¹ The arrival of the New Communist China, for Mao, was not the end but the beginning of the continuous revolution both domestically and internationally, consistent with his understanding of dialectics.²⁶²

The burgeoning of CCP’s English language journals whose content promoted the successes of the PRC’s socialist reconstruction, and its undergirding Marxist-Leninist theory and Mao Zedong’s thoughts testified to this effort. Some of these publications included the CCP’s *China Pictorial* (*Zhongguo huabao*; founded in 1951), *China Reconstructs* (founded in 1952 by Song Qingling), *People’s China*, and *Peking Review*, which were circulated outside of China officially via the PRC embassy or smuggled in by pro-Beijing businessmen. Many translation efforts were also accomplished by a host of either Chinese translators who had overseas experience or overseas Chinese translators who migrated to the PRC.²⁶³ The establishment of the Foreign Languages Press in 1952 facilitated the publication and international circulation of the Chinese communist texts.²⁶⁴ Beginning its operation in December 1949, the PRC’s Central Broadcasting Station aired “Radio Beijing” to Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia as another communicative channel for amplifying the revolution, literalizing the metaphor “revolution in the air” in the same way Franz Fanon conceived “the Voice of Algeria.”²⁶⁵

Liu Shaoqi (then Vice-Chairman of the Central People’s Government) and Zhou Enlai (then Premier of the PRC) articulated this internationalist premise of the Chinese Communist Revolution on different occasions. Liu’s Chairman speech at the opening session of the first Trade Union Conference of the Asian and Australasian Countries on November 16th, 1949 in Beijing celebrated the CCP’s victory as a successful model and Mao Zedong’s armed struggle as an inevitable path for the national liberation movements in all colonial and semi-colonial countries.²⁶⁶ In this speech, Liu offered a causal argument between the emancipation of the colonies and semi-colonies (already set an example by the PRC) and the collapse of the entangled processes of Western imperialist domination and capitalist exploitation, which rested upon the oppressed peoples in other parts of the world.²⁶⁷ An Indonesian participant in this conference, Ali Harjono, suspected as an assumed name of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)’s Chairman-to-be in

²⁶⁰ Schoenhals, Michael, 1986, “Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 ‘Moscow Conference,’” *Journal of Communist Studies* 2, 2: 115. The author of this article translated from Mao Zedong, “Zai Mosike shehuizhuyi gongchangdang he gongrendang huiyi shang dejianghua (1957 nian 11 yue 18 ri)” [Speech on 18th November 1957 at the Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries in Moscow] in *Mao Zedong sixiang wansui* [Long Live Mao Zedong Thought], n.p., n.d., 10-22.

²⁶¹ Mao, Tse-Tung, 1956, “Opening Address at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” in *Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, vol. 1, Peking: Foreign Languages Press: (15 Sep. 1956).

²⁶² Chen, “The Chinese Communist Revolution,” 100.

²⁶³ Xu, Lanjun, 2014, “Translation and Internationalism,” in *Mao’s Little Red Book: A Global History*, ed. Alexander C. Cook, Berkeley: University of California Press, 76-95.

²⁶⁴ Cagdas Ungor, ‘Reaching the Distant Comrade: Chinese Communist Propaganda Abroad (1949-1976), unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Binghamton University/State University of New York (2009), 92-3

²⁶⁵ Fanon, “This Is the Voice of Algeria,” in *A Dying Colonialism*, 87

²⁶⁶ *JYLSW*, vol. 1, 161-2., quoted in Chen, “The Chinese Communist Revolution,” 100.; *Renmin ribao*, 17 Nov. 1949, 1 and 22 Nov. 1949, 1., quoted in Shen and Xia, “Leadership,” 203.

²⁶⁷ Chen, “The Chinese Communist Revolution,” 100.

exile D.N. Aidit, commented on the 1948 Madiun Affairs, a controversial communist uprising against Dutch imperialism and the national compradors, as a “righteous rebellion” by armed proletariats.²⁶⁸ Even as the PKI chose a peaceful parliamentary path after the Madiun tragedy, Ali’s speech in this conference’s context was both testifying to and bolstered by Liu’s message on the anticolonial struggles and their international connections. On a CCP CC directive issued on March 14th, 1950, Liu gave CCP an imperative to provide fraternal assistance to “the Communist parties and revolutionaries from all countries” and help “people among the oppressed peoples of Asia” to fight for liberation. This internationalist obligation was “one of the most important means to consolidate the victory of the Chinese Revolution worldwide.”²⁶⁹ In a gathering of party intelligence officials on April 1st 1950, for China to become the leader of the Asian communist world, Zhou exhorted party members to help “liberate the entire world” and specifically “the oppressed nations and brothers in the East such as Korea, Indonesian, and Vietnam to liberate themselves.” Zhou saw “the revolutionary movements of weak nations in Southeast Asia” as one strategic domain where the CCP must assist, in addition to consolidating world peace, preventing the rearming of Japan and Germany, and liberating Taiwan.²⁷⁰ Zhou’s sustained emphasis on “weak” Southeast Asian revolutionary struggles continued until the immediate period before the Cultural Revolution. In a four-party conference of the Chinese, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Indonesian communist leaders in September 1963, Zhou proclaimed that Southeast Asia had become the critical site of interconnected anti-imperialist struggles, which China had the responsibility to support.²⁷¹ Compared to the other CCP revolutionary contemporaries in the 1950s like Liu Shaoqi, Lu Dingyi, Li Weiham, Zhou Enlai’s internationalist praxis was somewhat anomalous in that it strategically oriented towards forming collective peace rather than militaristic assistance and armed struggle. Yet these different Chinese modalities of internationalism converged in their anti-imperialism. Zhou Enlai’s participation of non-communist 1954 Geneva Conference and 1955 Bandung Conference resulting in the adoption of neutralist peaceful coexistence resolutions signaled still, in Zhai Qiang’s estimation, “a code of international conduct totally different from imperialism and hegemonism.”²⁷² The Geneva talks, in particular, brought

²⁶⁸ The quote was from the Indonesian attorney general’s report against the Indonesian representatives’ participation in the “communist” World Peace Council conference.

“Surat dari Jaksa Agung kepada Perdana Menteri mengenai pelarangan uturan dari Indonesia ke Konferensi Panitia Perdamaian Dunia karena dianggap pro komunis,” November 9, 1951, no. 2028, Inventaris Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959, ANRI., quoted in Zhou, Taomo, 2019, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 58.

The suspicion of Ali Harjono as D.N. Aidit came from a *Masjumi*’s report on the PRC’s communist subversive activities as related to Indonesia.

Central Intelligence Agency, 1950, *Chinese Communist Subversive Activities Directed at Indonesia*, CIA-RDP82-00457R005700280011-4, 4 (11 Sep. 1950), Web, Accessed 14 Jun. 2020.

²⁶⁹ Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi, 1996, *Liu Shaoqi nianpu, 1898-1969* [Chronology of Liu Shaoqi, 1898-1969], vol. 2, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 245., quoted in Shen and Xia, “Leadership,” 208.

²⁷⁰ “Zhou Enlai’s Speech at the Work Conference of the Second and Fifth Bureaus of the Intelligence Department of the People’s Revolutionary Committee of the Central People’s Government,” 2008, in Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao [Zhou Enlai’s Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC], Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2008, 240-55 (1 Apr. 1950)., quoted in Zhai, “Road to Bandung,” 186.

²⁷¹ Tong, Xiaopeng, 1996, *Fengyu sishinian* [Forty Years in All Weathers], vol. 2, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 219., quoted in Zhou, Taomo, 2015, “Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965,” *China Quarterly* 221 (Mar), 213.

²⁷² Zhai, “Road to Bandung,” 190.

an end to American and French hostilities in Korea and Vietnam, which was partly successful due to communist pressures from both China and the Soviet Union.²⁷³

Sino-Soviet Split: Materiality of Warred Life and Third World Anti-Imperialism as Inter-Racial Class Struggle

There were indeed several political instances which the PRC may use to charge the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist state, and therefore widened the split, for example, the deployment of troops to Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet border conflict at Zhenbao island, and the amassing of millions of troops along China's border.²⁷⁴ Nevertheless, this dissertation contends that the fundamental difference between China and the Soviet Union that led to the Sino-Soviet split was one of historical materialist and political-economic analysis of the concrete world situation, especially on the material dynamics of the global (neo)imperialism-capitalism nexus.

Mao and the CCP initially reacted in favor of Khrushchev's secret speech made during the Soviet Union's Twentieth Party Congress because it freed the CCP from the patronizing, tutelary, and dogmatic relationship with Stalin's CPSU and Stalinism. In an extended Politburo meeting on March 24th, 1956, Mao poetically analogized Khrushchev's de-Stalinization to the breaking of the "golden hoop" [*jingu*].²⁷⁵ Radchenko explained that the motif referred to the golden hoop on the head of the Monkey King Sun Wukong in the classical Chinese literature *Journey to the West*. This hoop was monk Xuanzhang's means to discipline the Monkey King into an obedient follower. It squashed the monkey king's head as a punishment when exhibiting insubordination.²⁷⁶ The broken hoop enabled the Monkey King to break through superstitions and reinvent itself as an equal follower and disciple, possibly a comrade, of Xuanzhang. The subversion of the hierarchical relationship between the CCP and CPSU was not this analogy's intent. On another occasion, at the Chengdu Conference on March 10th, 1958, Mao described the salvaging aspect of the secret speech with a series of actions: "to remove the lid, to break down blind faith, to release the pressure, and to emancipate thought."²⁷⁷ In the 1957 conference of the World's Communist and Workers' Parties, around the planning stage for the Great Leap Forward, Mao still upheld Khrushchev's Soviet Union as the leader of world communism on the bases of revolutionary experience, economic superiority, and technological advancement, but not political relevance especially to the postcolonial world. China's backward economy was incomparable to the Soviet Union's ability to extend economic aid, provide sophisticated weaponry, and launch the first earth-orbiting satellite, Sputnik.²⁷⁸ The Monkey King, so long traveling on the same path with Xuanzhang, was about to part ways while still heading to a similar destination.

Even as the Sino-Soviet split already manifested in different realms before 1960, the theoretical battleground for the two political-economic analyses of the world first appeared around

²⁷³ Zhai, Qiang, 2000, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*, Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 49-64.; Radchenko, "The Rise and the Fall," 251.

²⁷⁴ Teng, Wei, 2019, "Third World," in *Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi*, eds. Christian Sorace, Ivan Franceschini, and Nicholas Loubere, trans. Craig A. Smith, Acton ACT: ANU Press and Verso, 282.

²⁷⁵ Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, 15., quoted in Radchenko, "The Rise and the Fall," 253.

²⁷⁶ Radchenko, "The Rise and the Fall," 253.

²⁷⁷ Mao, "Talks at Chengtu," in *Chairman Mao Talks*, 101.

²⁷⁸ Schoenhals, "Speeches," 112.; "Mao Zedong's Comments During a Conference Session," 2013, in *Nasledniki Kominterna: mezhdunarodnye soveshchaniya Predstavitelei kommunisticheskikh I rabochikh partii v Moskve (noiabr' 1957 g.)*, ed. N.G. Tomilina, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 147 (14 Nov. 1957)., quoted in Radchenko, "The Rise and the Fall," 254.

the interpretation of Lenin's political theory on the occasion of Lenin's birth anniversary on April 22nd, 1960. The Lenin Polemics, a series of Chinese diatribes against Soviet (semi)revisionism, circulated in three forms: an article in *Hongqi* titled "Long Live Leninism" drafted by the leading CCP ideologue Chen Boda, a report of CCP CC's propaganda department by Lu Dingyi, and an editorial for *Renmin Ribao* drafted by the director of China's information agency and vice-director of propaganda department Hu Qiaomu.²⁷⁹ Published on April 16th, 1960, "Long Live Leninism" returned to multiple writings of Lenin, primarily *The State and Revolution* and *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism*, to argue for the contemporary relevance of Lenin's anti-revisionist insights on class contradictions, class struggle, nationalist liberation movements, anticolonial revolution, and proletarian dictatorship. It identified Tito's notion of the "new epoch" (a world of economic co-operation and competition rather than war and peace) and Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence as a modern form of revisionism which revised Leninism and rendered it outmoded, in the same way old revisionism dismissed Marxism as outmoded.²⁸⁰ This modern revisionism, the polemic asserted, aimed to "obliterate the contradiction between the masses of people and the monopoly capitalist class in the imperialist countries, the contradiction between the peoples in the colonies and semi-colonies and the imperialist aggressors, the contradiction between the socialist system and the imperialist system, and the contradiction between the peace-loving people of the world and the warlike imperialist bloc."²⁸¹ As these contradictions still persisted, not superseded, in material reality, it was premature for the revisionists to claim that Leninism was outmoded and class struggle overcome. The document gave concrete examples from the third world and peripheral standpoint, as opposed to that of the second world's center:

Has the armed intervention led by the U.S. imperialists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America become "tranquil"? Is there "tranquility" in our Taiwan Straits when the U.S. imperialists are still occupying our country's Taiwan? Is there "tranquility" on the African continent when the people of Algeria and many other parts of Africa are subjected to armed repressions by the French, British and other imperialists? Is there any "tranquility" in Latin America when the U.S. imperialists are trying to wreck the people's revolution in Cuba by means of bombing, assassination and subversion?²⁸²

"Long Live Leninism" offered a structural critique of Tito, Khrushchev, right-wing social democrat, opportunist, and creative Marxist's modern revisionism on two grounds. First, referring to Lenin's 1916 *The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution*, the document underscored the "inherent class character of war," which undergirded a Leninist reading of Clausewitz's principle on warfare and politics, namely, imperialist war is a continuation of imperialist politics. The exploiting class in general—reactionary imperialists and capitalists—was already structurally prone to violence, war, and bellicosity. Their justification for war was not for self-defense but an unjust and aggressive invasion. Relatedly, the document insisted on the "inherent class character of violence," which distinguished emancipatory revolutionary violence from oppressive counter-revolutionary violence.²⁸³ The standing army was "the main machine of the bourgeois state power

²⁷⁹ Li Danhui and Xia Yafeng, 2008, "Competing for Leadership: Split or Détente in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1959-1961," *The International History Review* 30, 3: 552.

²⁸⁰ The Editorial Department of *Hongqi*, 1960, "Long Live Leninism! In Commemoration of the Ninetieth Anniversary of the Birth of Lenin," *Peking Review* 3, 17 (26 Apr.): 8 (16 Apr.).

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, 9.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, 16.

to wage an anti-labor war” both at home (civil war and settler colonialism) and abroad (imperialism).²⁸⁴ “In what is called peacetime,” the document contended,

the imperialists rely on armed force to deal with the oppressed classes and nations by such forms of violence as arrest, imprisonment, hard labour, massacre, and so forth, while at the same time, they are also prepared to use the most acute form of violence—war—to suppress the revolution of the people at home, to carry out plunder abroad, to overwhelm foreign competitors and to stamp out revolutions in other countries.²⁸⁵

This document suggested that a Leninist approach to the questions of war, violence, and imperialist politics was to ask “whether the bourgeoisie will accept such a peaceful transformation,” rather than “whether the proletariat is willing to carry out a peaceful transformation.” The ruling classes were already in a structural position whose historical tendency was not to relinquish power voluntarily.²⁸⁶ Peaceful coexistence would be a reality only when the capitalist-imperialist system and the exploiting classes, along with their militarist-bureaucratic machine of suppression, came to an end; otherwise, *both* war and peace were the dual tactics of imperialism to attain its aim of plunder and oppression.²⁸⁷ The struggle for peace for the communists must be a struggle to abolish all conditions of war, which is the capitalist-imperialist system, not just a struggle to cooperate (economically) with the capitalists-imperialists.²⁸⁸

In the evening of April 22nd, 1960, Otto Kuusinen, Lenin’s brother-in-arms and a member of the CPSU Presidium (a name for Politburo from 1952-1966) and the secretariat, delivered a speech “Triumphant March of Lenin’s Ideas” (*Pretvorenje v zhizn’ idej Lenina*; lit. ‘To Implement Lenin’s Ideas’) to rebut the CCP’s Lenin Polemics and accuse the CCP of splittism and sectarianism. This speech was published in *Pravda* the next day. If the CCP’s Lenin Polemics drew on the revolutionary Lenin of *the State and Revolution* and *Imperialism* to demonstrate the underlying imperialist and bourgeois presupposition of “peaceful coexistence,” Kuusinen speech utilized the diplomatic, and geopolitically strategic Lenin of the 1922 Genoa Economic Conference to validate the undogmatic and time-sensitive aspect of “peaceful coexistence.” Kuusinen’s Lenin was the Lenin during the extraordinary time when the Bolshevik government endeavored to devise its diplomatic strategies in the new post-World War One world order as the first existing communist state. Lenin made a report about the upcoming Genoa Conference in the Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P.(b) on March 27th, 1922. This report addressed the internal division of the bourgeois camp between the militant and the pacifist, and the conference’s transactional, mercantilist, diplomatic, and practical aims:

We are going to Genoa not as Communists, but as merchants. We must trade, and they must trade. We want the trade to benefit us; they want it to benefit them. The course of the issue will be determined, if only to a small degree, by the skill of our diplomats.

Insofar as we are going to Genoa as merchants it is obviously by no means a matter of indifference to us whether we shall deal with those people from the bourgeois camp who are inclined to settle the problem by war, or with those who are inclined towards pacifism,

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 14.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

even the worst kind of pacifism, which from the communist viewpoint will not stand the slightest criticism. It would be a bad merchant, indeed, if he were unable to appreciate this distinction, and, by shaping his tactics accordingly, achieve practical aims.²⁸⁹

Lenin in this report asked the Communist “merchant” to suspend the antagonism and critique, and instead negotiate with the force of economic necessity which will “make a way for itself.”²⁹⁰ Kuusinen read these directives as Lenin’s consent for Soviet diplomacy to cooperate, coexist, and compromise with moderate, sober, and pacifist fraction of the bourgeois camp. He then turned this specific interpretation into a principle of non-dogmatism of Soviet Marxism and dismissed CCP’s “dogmatism” along the process: “in order to be true to Marxism, it is not enough to repeat the old truth of the aggressive nature of imperialism. ... the time when imperialists dominated around the world will never return.”²⁹¹ In the same report, in fact, Lenin only used the Genoa conference as a preamble to a more major topic of discussion, namely, the New Economic Policy. Lenin was worried that the newborn Soviet communist state, surrounded by violent capitalist-imperialist states, would be intervened by the capitalist economy, exemplified by the Genoa conference, before it could develop a mature communist economy.²⁹² Diplomacy executed by the Communist “merchant” was a means to avoid such capitalist-imperialist intervention. In order to be true to Marxism, as “Long Live Leninism” taught us, it is not enough to quote Lenin without following the Marxist-Leninist method of “mak[ing] a concrete analysis of the concrete situation with regard to the overall class contradictions and class struggle, putting forward strictly scientific definitions, and thus bringing the essence of the epoch thoroughly to light.”²⁹³

The differences—or rather, internal contradictions—between CCP and CPSU’s political-economic analysis around the late 1950s and early 1960s were apparent, especially on the question of capitalism-imperialism’s structural tendencies. Causes of this contradiction could be attributed to the divergent socio-historical milieux out of which the two communist parties emerged, their materialist analyses of the capitalist world system, and their position within such capitalist relations, which in turn determined the different emphasis on the substance of the two parties’ primary contradiction. For the CCP, coming out of a protracted war and beginning an intense communist construction, a capitalist-imperialist was compelled by the structural imperative to be immutably violent. Hence, the war was inevitable. To achieve “peaceful coexistence,” capitalism-imperialism must first be abolished through class struggles of the masses. By contrast, the CPSU, coming out of terror and reconsolidating a communist society, conceived capitalism-imperialism as progressively decaying and internally fractionalized such that it accepted the pacifist rather than a militant method to save its violent system. War was avertible as long as the capitalists (in this context primarily represented by the US) agreed to practice disarmaments. Peaceful parliamentary and diplomatic struggles were sufficient under socialism to fulfill that condition towards “peaceful coexistence.” Little wonder then that the CPSU republished different parts of Lenin’s advice to the Soviet delegation to the Genoa economic conference from 1959 to 1964 in conjunction with

²⁸⁹ Lenin, V.I., 1965, “Eleventh Congress of the R.C.P. (B.),” in *Lenin Collected Works*, eds. David Skvirsky and George Hanna, vol. 33, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 264 (27 Mar. 1922).

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 265.

²⁹¹ *Neibu cankao*, no. 3041, 21., quoted in Li and Xia, “Competing for Leadership,” 554.

Kuusinen, Otto, 1960, *Triumphant March of Lenin’s Ideas: Speech of Otto Kuusinen at the Lenin Anniversary Meeting, Moscow, April 22nd, 1960*, London: Soviet Booklets.

²⁹² Lenin, “Eleventh Congress,” 274.

²⁹³ Hongqi, “Long Live Leninism!,” 10.

Khrushchev's turn of policy to be more "aggressive" in making peace deals with the capitalist states.²⁹⁴

Even though the CCP, along with other twelve communist parties in power, at first celebratorily endorsed the CPSU's line of peaceful coexistence manifested in the 1957 Moscow Declaration, it became acutely aware of peaceful coexistence's limits in the situations concerning China's border conflicts, which were entangled with the messy Cold War geopolitical affiliations and competitions. The optimistic CCP's "East wind," proclaimed during the same 1957 Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, could not just prevail over the West wind without struggles. The CCP realized that its preconditions for peace were utterly different from the CPSU's. Aligning itself with the decolonizing forces in the "intermediate zone," the CCP firmly conceived of the US as an immutably neocolonial-capitalist power commencing its new regime of accumulation in the post-WW2 world, succeeding the European colonial power and inheriting European military and economic resources. The People's Republic of China had two major border conflicts from 1958-1962: one in 1958 with the Republic of China (ROC)—conceived as a divided part of a supposedly unified China and as a node in the American military bases network—attempting to incorporate the ROC into the Great Leap Forward agenda (the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis)²⁹⁵ and another with India intermittently from 1959-1962 after India granted asylum to the 14th Dalai Lama in the aftermath of 1959 Tibetan uprising (the Sino-Indian War). The Soviet Union's position concerning these two border crises was to observe "neutrality." The CCP interpreted this "neutrality" as revisionist complicity in the American militaristic imperialist expansion (as evident in the nuclear bombs, the Transpacific military bases, and local US-trained counter-insurgency police networks). The CPSU, on the other hand, attributed the Chinese border disputes to aggressive nationalism.²⁹⁶ This led to the CCP's increasing reservations about the Soviet Union's commitment to combat imperialism-capitalism, its status as an ally, and its leadership position in the international communist world.²⁹⁷ The border question made the paradoxical constitution of the Chinese communist nation—a contradiction between internationalism and nationalism—apparent as both fluctuating elements mobilizing the decisions to possess territories and subdue the population into its control under the noble goal of emancipation.

Mao's initially abstract category of the "intermediate zone," whose earlier usage was confined to Asian border nations like North Vietnam or North Korea, began to concretely encapsulate remote anti-American imperialist nations in Africa and Latin America in congruence with the radicalization and repoliticization of the third world along the lines of Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and early 1960s. While the CPSU concentrated its energy on the cautionary war of attrition and peace struggles with the US without a real vision of building a communist hegemony, the CCP called for a more confrontational war of maneuver from the third world's anticolonial and anti-capitalist forces against the neo-imperialist US despite the discernible power asymmetry.

²⁹⁴ Clemens, Walter C. and Griffiths, Franklyn, 1965, *The Soviet Position in Arms Control and Disarmament: Negotiations and Propaganda, 1954-1964*, Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 83-4.

²⁹⁵ Mao, Zedong, 1958, "Talk at Beidaihe Conference (Draft Transcript)," in MacFarquhar, Roderic, Cheek, Timothy, and Wu, Eugene, 1989, *The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao: From the Hundred Flowers to the Great Leap Forward*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 402 (17 Aug.), quoted in Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 99.

²⁹⁶ Li and Xia, "Competing for Leadership," 550.

²⁹⁷ Si Fu, 1999, "Shi pengyou haishi diren—Zhonggong dui Heluxiaofu zai ZhongYin guanxi shang [Friend or Foe—the CCP with Regard to Khrushchev in Sino-Indian Relations]," in *Zhiqingzhe shuo* [Those Who Know the Facts Speak], ed. Chang Cheng, vol. 8, Zhongguo qingnian chubanshe, 57-8.; "To the Presidium of the CPSU CC," December 18, 1959, RGANI, f.2, o.1, d.415, 19-33, 43-4., quoted in Lüthi, "Sino Soviet," 42.

Unlike the CPSU that viewed the CCP as an opportunistic ultra-left committing splittism—a tension which could be exploited by capitalists and imperialists—the CCP conceived this split as a “line struggle” of the international communist movement.²⁹⁸ The CCP’s effort to build up its credential as a leader of anti-imperialism, world revolution, and international communism became salient in 1960 in the aftermath of the Lenin Polemics. This short period of “line struggle,” the making of the CCP as the world anti-imperialist communist leader, spanned from 1960 to 1966, momentarily intercepted in 1961-1962 by the catastrophic results of the Great Leap Forward and slowing down at the beginning of the cultural revolution in mid-1966. Polemical terms like “modern revisionist,” “right deviationist,” and “capitalist-roader” used by the CCP to distinguish its more radical position from the CPSU were coined around this internationalist offensive period. The Chinese Academy of Sciences and the CCP’s Liaison Department founded the Institute of West Asian and African Studies and the Institute of Latin American Studies in 1961 to research these continents. Philip Short’s biography of Saloth Sar, who was later known as Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot, records the existence of another training school for the third world, and not just Asian, communists called the Asian, African, and Latin American training center (*Yafeila peixun zhongxin*) located near the Summer Palace in Beijing in 1965.²⁹⁹ Though the information about this training center is scarce, it demonstrates the different modes of CCP’s internationalist commitment, conditioned by a specific configuration of the international communist movement at the time, from exclusively Asian continent to the tricontinental.

In May 1960, Mao retroactively refuted Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence statements made in the conference of seventeen Communist and workers’ parties from European capitalist countries held at Rome in November 1959 by suggesting that “there are guerrilla wars in Cuba, Algeria, the Philippines, and Paraguay. There is no peaceful coexistence with imperialists, only cold war coexistence.”³⁰⁰ In addition to the regular visits of W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois in 1959 and 1962,³⁰¹ two leading representatives of liberation movements from Portugal’s African colonies, Viriato da Cruz of the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Amílcar Cabral of the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), visited

²⁹⁸ Wu, *Shinian lunzhun*, 312.

²⁹⁹ Short, Philip, 2005, *Pol Pot: Anatomy of Nightmare*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 159. In the footnote, Philip states that he acquired this information from Youqin Wang of the University of Chicago (484, fn. 159).

³⁰⁰ Memo “Mao Zedong huijian Jinricheng tanhua jilu,” 21 May 1960; memo, “Mao Zedong’s jiejian Danmai gongchandang zhuxi Knude Jespersen tanhua jilu,” 28 May 1960, in CCP, International Liaison Dept., *Mao Zedong yu waibing tanhua jilu huibian*, Personal Collection of Li Danhui., quoted in Li and Xia, “Competing for Leadership,” 559.

³⁰¹ Gao, Yunxiang, 2013, “W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois in Maoist China,” *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 10, 1: 59-85.

Zhenxing Zhu’s research also highlights the role of the “old” generation of Chinese American leftists in the 1940s-1950s like Tang Mingzhao in mediating the relations between the CCP and African American activists. Zhu explains that this “old” generation was “sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party and fought against both discrimination from the white society and suppression from the internal Chinese establishment dominated by Kuomintang power.” The “young” generation refers instead to Chinese American activists in the late 1960s to the early 1970s “under the influence of the African American Civil Rights Movement and its subsequence Black Power Movement.”

Zhu, Zhenxing, 2018, “Pilgrimage for Revolutionary Spirit: African American Activists, the People’s Republic of China, and Chinese American Leftists in the Cold War – Civil Rights Era,” *同志社アメリカ研—Doshisha American Studies* 54: 25.

the PRC in August the same year, buttressing the CCP's claim to anti-imperialist and anti-racist commitments.³⁰²

The PRC signed friendship treaties as well as provided uneven rhetorical, military, and financial support to anticolonial left-leaning governments in Africa in the late 1950s to the early 1960s including, among others, Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, Sékou Touré's Guinea, Modibo Keita's Mali, Zanzibar (then combined with Tanganyika to form Julius Nyerere's Tanzania), FLN (*Front de libération nationale*; 'National Liberation Front') in Algeria, Pierre Mulele's Congo-Kinshasa Simba rebels, Eduardo Mondlane's FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação Moçambique*; 'Front for the Liberation of Mozambique') based in Tanzania, both pro-Soviet urban-oriented MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*; 'The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola') and peasant-populist oriented FNLA (*Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola*; 'The National Front for the Liberation of Angola') in Angola.³⁰³ Some of these strategic anticolonial and socialist alignments eventually fell apart. They were reconstellated with other intricate Cold War intercontinental and regional affiliations along the oscillating logics of both geopolitics and ideology. Moreover, within this period of CCP's international line struggle, from December 1963 to February 1964, Zhou Enlai embarked on a historic seven-week state visit to ten independent African countries, popularly known as "Zhou's Safari," to raise China's communist and anti-imperialist profile on the continent and strengthen the diplomatic relations.³⁰⁴

These personal relationships between the CCP and *both* African American and continental African radicals led Mao to a conjunctural understanding of black people's domestic and international struggles against US racial capitalism, neocolonialism, military-industrial complex, carceral geography, and multiple forms of oppression. In Mao's 1963 *Statement Supporting the American Negroes in Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by U.S. Imperialism*, a statement written in response to a request by an American black leader in exile Robert Williams and published only twenty days before the "March on Washington," he analyzed "the struggle of the American Negroes" as a "manifestation of sharpening class struggle and sharpening national struggle within the United States," thereby thinking class and race together. Mao noted that the Negroes were deprived of their right to vote, susceptible to state brutalities, highly unemployed, and socially segregated. "The fascist atrocities of the U.S. imperialists against the Negro people," Mao asserted, "have exposed the true nature of so-called American democracy and freedom and revealed the inner link between the reactionary policies pursued by the U.S. Government at home and its policies of aggression abroad." Mao pointed out, in other words, an inextricable connection

³⁰² Letter of MFA to party committees of Shenyang, Harbin, and Changchun on upcoming visit of delegation led by Viriato da Cruz and Amílcar Cabral, August 1960, CFMA doc. 108-00098-01, 27., quoted in Friedman, *Shadow*, 54.

³⁰³ Alden, Chris and Alves, Ana Cristina, 2008, "History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa Policy," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, 115 (Mar.): 43-58.; Haddad-Fonda, Kyle, 2014, "An Illusory Alliance: Revolutionary Legitimacy and Sino-Algerian Relations, 1958-1962," *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, 3: 338-57.; Monaville, Pedro, 2018, "Making a 'Second Vietnam': The Congolese Revolution and Its Global Connections in the 1960s," in *The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation-Building*, eds. Chen Jian, Martin Kimke, Masha Kirasirova, Mary Nolan, Marilyn Young, and Joanna Waley-Cohen, London and New York: Routledge, 106-18.; Jackson, Steven F., 1995, "Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and Mozambique, 1961-93," *The China Quarterly* 142 (Jun.): 388-422.

³⁰⁴ *Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism: A Collection of Documents, Speeches, and Press Interviews from the Visits of Chinese Leaders to Thirteen African and Asian Countries*, 1964, Peking: Foreign Languages Press.

between racism, imperialism, and capitalism, which he thought could be countered by united internationalist or third worldist racially-marked class struggle, and not just an identity struggle.³⁰⁵

On the same day that Mao replied to Robert Williams, Mao also received African visitors and made remarks calling for a common cross-racial struggle against imperialism to “attain complete and thorough national independence and liberation.” Mao affirmed his co-articulated understanding of race and class in this meeting: “The racial question is in essence a class question.” Mao ended the remarks with the CCP’s commitment to internationalism as a country successful in executing a communist revolution against capital and imperialism: “The people who have already won victory in their revolution should help those who are still struggling for liberation. This is our internationalist duty.”³⁰⁶ In another later 1968 statement *A New Storm Against Imperialism*, released as both a commemoration and analysis of the assassination of Martin Luther King, Mao contended:

The Afro-American struggle is not only a struggle waged by the exploited and oppressed Black people for freedom and emancipation; it is also a new clarion call to all the exploited and oppressed people of the United States to fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly capitalist class. It is a tremendous aid and inspiration to the struggle of the people throughout the world against U.S. imperialism and to the struggle of the Vietnamese people against U.S. imperialism. ... Racial discrimination in the United States is a product of the colonialist and imperialist system. The contradiction between the black masses in the United States and the U.S. ruling circles is a class contradiction.³⁰⁷

Mao’s conjunctural understanding of black struggle as a class and internationalist struggle laid bare a violent material linkage of the capitalist and imperialist forces that exploited and oppressed both Black people in the US and the Vietnamese abroad. According to Robin D.G. Kelley, Betsy Esch, Bill V. Mullen, and Zhenxing Zhu, the revolutionary Black internationalism of the two most prominent African-American radical militant groups in the 1960s, the Revolutionary Action Movement and the Black Panther Party, was indebted to this Maoist conjunctural understanding of class and race in opposing both racial capitalism and imperialism.³⁰⁸

In the run-up to Zhou’s “Safari” tour, the CPSU and the CCP exchanged polemical letters to clarify and debate each other’s standpoint regarding the international Communist movement throughout 1963. Of most significance were the CCP’s letter on June 14th, framed as a proposal to the communist movement as a whole against the Soviet unity-preserving, conflict-avoiding, and

³⁰⁵ Mao, Zedong, 1966, “Statement Supporting the American Negroes in Their Just Struggle Against Racial Discrimination by U.S. Imperialism,” *Peking Review* 9, 33 (12 Aug.): 12-3 (8 Aug. 1963).

Williams later published an article proclaiming that Mao’s statement was as momentous as President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863.

Havana, NCNA-English, 1963, “American Negro Leader Publishes Article on Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s Statement,” August 26., quoted in Zhu, “Pilgrimage,” 37.

³⁰⁶ Mao Zedong, 1963, “The Racial Question Is A Class Question,” in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 9 (9 Aug. 1963).

³⁰⁷ Mao, Zedong, 1968, “A New Storm Against Imperialism: Statement by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in Support of the Afro-American Struggle Against Violent Repression,” *Peking Review* 16 (19 Apr.): 5-6.

³⁰⁸ Kelley, Robin D.G., and Esch, Betsy, 1999, “Black Like Mao: Red China and Black Revolution,” *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture* 1, 4 (Fall), 18-19.; Mullen, Bill V., “By the Book: *Quotations from Chairman Mao* and the Making of Afro-Asian Radicalism, 1966-1975,” in *Mao’s Little Red Book*, 245-63.; Zhu, “Pilgrimage,” 40-4.

revisionist line, and the CPSU's response on July 14th, which for the first time took an "open letter" form and moved the terrain of the internal Sino-Soviet debate to the public. The major disagreement between the CPSU and the CCP pivoted around the question of the relationship between communist nations and capitalist-imperialist powers (exclusively the US), a question informed by their political-economic analyses and guiding their political decisions. Two international historical events embodying such a difference on this question that enabled the public Sino-Soviet polemics were the 1959 Camp David Talks and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, in addition to Soviet's neutrality to the domestic 1962 Sino-Indian border crisis. The CCP conceived the CPSU's political decisions in both historical events as an intentional attempt to cooperate with the capitalist-imperialist US. Camp David Talks—a discussion between Khrushchev and Eisenhower at Camp David about the Cold War in September 1959—encapsulated an endeavor of both Cold War superpowers, the US and the USSR, to achieve peace, which soon backfired after a shootdown of an American spy plane over Russia in May 1960.³⁰⁹ The Cuban Missile Crisis, which ended with the removal of the USSR's nuclear missiles from Cuba at the end of October 1962 and the signing of the 1963 Limited Nuclear Ban Treaty, was construed by the CCP as the USSR's submissive capitulation to the nuclear blackmail of US capitalism-imperialism.³¹⁰ The Albanian communist party's overt anti-revisionist challenge to the CPSU since the mid-1960, a welcoming circumstance for the CCP, illustrated the Sino-Soviet split at the more granular level. After the Indonesian anticommunist pogrom in 1965, we shall later see that Albania also became an anti-revisionist refuge for the pro-Beijing Indonesian left.

The CCP's *Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement* this dissertation suggests, marshaled "neo-Marxist-Leninist" critiques of Soviet idealism in its historical materialist analysis, arising from the CPSU's undialectical understanding of the global political economy and unexamined self-perception as the most advanced communist state that practically dissociated itself from the struggles on the ground in other decolonizing parts of the world. The CCP's critiques dealt with three aspects of Soviet idealism: a mystical treatment of the Soviet Union's own dogma, a denial of multiple contradictions, and a wishful view of imperialism.

First, the *Proposal* took issue with the CPSU's monopoly on the interpretation of peaceful coexistence, which in fact was borrowed from Lenin, as we have seen in detail in the discussion on the *Lenin Polemics*. The *Proposal* assessed that the CPSU "treat[s] 'peaceful coexistence' as if it were an all-inclusive, mystical book from heaven and attribute[s] to it every success of the people of the world achieve [*sic*] by struggle." Anyone who disagreed with the CPSU's "distortions of Lenin's views" was labeled as "opponents of peaceful coexistence, as people completely ignorant of Lenin and Leninism, and as heretics deserving to be burnt at the stake."³¹¹ The CCP also discussed such mystical treatment of a dogma in a subsequent polemical letter. This letter plainly identified the CPSU leaders' bad habit as one of "indiscriminately stick[ing] labels on anyone who criticizes them."³¹² Such practice of labeling, a disciplinary measure for disagreeing with the mystical book, revealed what this letter diagnosed as a "commanding" relationship between

³⁰⁹ Renmin Ribao and Honqi, 1963, "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. And Ourselves: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.," *Peking Review* 37 (13 Sep.): 12-4 (6 Sep. 1963).

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

³¹¹ CC CCP, 1963, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement: The Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Reply to the Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of March 30, 1963," *Peking Review* 25 (21 Jun.): 15 (14 Jun. 1963).

³¹² Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, "The Origin and Development," 20.

fraternal parties where there was a leading party and the led, or even worse, “a patriarchal father and his son.”³¹³

Second, the CCP reminded the CPSU that through a “concrete class analysis” of the contemporary world, one would learn that besides the sharp primary contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp, there also existed other contradictions. Considered the most acute auxiliary contradiction by the CCP was between the oppressed nations in the “intermediate zone,” resided by two-thirds of the world’s population at that time, and imperialism. The *Proposal* read: “The contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp is a contradiction between two fundamentally different social systems, socialism and capitalism. It is undoubtedly very sharp. But Marxist-Leninists must not regard the contradictions in the world as consisting solely and simply of the contradiction between the socialist camp and the imperialist camp. The international balance of forces has changed and has become increasingly favorable to socialism and to all the oppressed peoples and nations of the world, and most unfavorable to imperialism and the reactionaries of all countries.”³¹⁴ In this understanding of multiple contradictions and their interplays, the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America against imperialism conditioned the “overall importance for the whole cause of proletarian world revolution.”³¹⁵

Third, the CCP pointed out that the CPSU’s peaceful transition thesis presupposed an automatic disappearance of the primary contradiction between socialism and capitalism in the course of economic competition when the Soviet Union’s productive forces outstripped the US and an equally automatic emergence of a world without wars and a world of all-round co-operation.³¹⁶ This “subjective and groundless” thesis, the CCP then argued, proceeded from “historical idealism” as it “ignore[d] the most fundamental contradictions of capitalism” and “repudiate[d] the Marxist-Leninist teachings on class struggles.”³¹⁷ In a manner akin to Mao’s analysis of new contradictions in the communist society, the *Proposal* maintained that at the domestic level it was impossible for a socialist country to “relinquish the task laid down by Lenin of conquering ‘this contagion, this plague, this ulcer that socialism has inherited from capitalism.’”³¹⁸ The example was the different regimes of ownership in the socialist society wherein the workers’ enterprises were owned by the whole people, and the peasants’ farms were owned collectively. “Until this difference [between worker and peasant] is eliminated,” the *Proposal* contended, “it is impossible to say that society is classless or that there is no longer any need for the dictatorship of the proletariat.”³¹⁹ At the international level, as the aim of US imperialism was “to subject all the peoples and countries of the world, including its allies, to domination and enslavement by US monopoly capital,” the *Proposal* asserted that it would not “automatically lay down its arms” but rather “tries to liquidate the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations on the pretext of disarmament.”³²⁰ By reducing even further the primary contradiction between socialism and capitalism into just the US and USSR, Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence fundamentally excluded the possibilities of third world revolutionary struggles and proletarian internationalism.

³¹³ *Ibid.*

³¹⁴ CC CCP, “A Proposal,” 7.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9, 14.

These three critiques pointed to Mao's longstanding concerns about bureaucratism in the Soviet state practice and its tendency to eliminate dialectics and contradictions, or fetishize only one pair of contradictions as immutable law. The persistence of these practices evinced Khrushchev's inheritance of the Stalinist state and instrumentalist understanding of dialectics even after the claim to de-Stalinization. Mao's return to Marx and Lenin, then, could be conceived as a critique of bureaucratic Stalinism along with its Engelsian foundation and Khrushchevian variation, and a renewal of revolutionary Stalinism, which began to take its distinct Maoist form. Such Maoist critique of bureaucratism was carried over from the Soviet state to the USSR and the CPSU in the world communist system, where it functioned as a centralized, patronizing, and hierarchical bureaucratic super-state.

In response to the CCP's "neo-Marxist-Leninist" critique of Soviet idealism, the CPSU's *Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to All Party Organizations, to All Communists of the Soviet Union* justified the Soviet Union's reasons to contain contradictions when nuclearity became the real international material condition. Nuclear, understood as "a radical qualitative change in the military-technical means of waging war," centrally served as a material fix in the CPSU's political-economic understandings of the global order, nature of war, and peace struggles.³²¹ The Soviet Union took a position of what this dissertation calls a nuclear-induced biopolitical stance that prioritizes the security of the whole concrete humanity and its futurity from nuclear ruination through containing, rather than sharpening, contradictions. The *Open Letter* wrote thus:

The nuclear and rocket weapons created In the middle of this century have changed former conceptions of war. These weapons possess unprecedented destructive power. Suffice it to say that the explosion of only one powerful thermonuclear bomb surpasses the explosive force of all the ammunition used during all previous wars, including the first and the second world wars. And many thousands of such bombs have been accumulated.³²²

"Uniting all the peace forces to defend peace and save mankind from nuclear disaster," the *Open Letter* summarized, "is the primary task of the Communist parties."³²³ While it was a noble cause for the USSR to be concerned with the preservation of life overall, it gravely missed the point of CCP's resistance, which put into question what kind of life was being preserved under the dominance of capitalism-imperialism. The *Open Letter* attested to the CCP's characterization of the CPSU's reductive understanding of primary contradiction as US-USSR co-operation but with the rhetoric of merger and economic progress:

The nature and content of the world revolutionary process in our time are determined by the merger into a single stream of the struggle against imperialism waged by the peoples building socialism and communism, the revolutionary working-class movement in capitalist countries, the national-liberation movement of oppressed peoples, and general democratic movements; the decisive role in the alliance of anti-imperialist revolutionary

³²¹ Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1965 [1963], "The Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC," in *The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 502 (30 Mar. 1963).

³²² Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1965 [1963], "Open Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to All Party Organizations, to All Communists of the Soviet Union," in *The Polemic*, 541 (14 Jul. 1963).

³²³ *Ibid.*, 574.

forces belongs to the international working class and its chief creation—the socialist world system, which exerts its main influence on the development of the world socialist revolution by the power of its example, by its economic progress.

Because of this new material condition, the CPSU argued that the resistance needed to take a form of co-operation with other, possibly revolutionary, states not interested in new wars.³²⁴ The issue of mobilization against imperialism, the CPSU further contended, revolved around an anti-nuclear struggle for peace rather than a pure class struggle, which was the CPSU's explanation for the removal of missiles from Cuba.³²⁵ Rebutting the CCP's accusation of the CPSU's negligence of anti-imperialism, the *Open Letter* painstakingly emphasized the interconnection between the struggle for peace and the development of the world revolutionary movement through a war of attrition of sorts:

Fighting for peace today implies maintaining supreme vigilance, tirelessly exposing imperialist policy, keeping close watch on the war instigators' maneuvers and machinations, rousing the wrath of the peoples against those whose policy is war, enhancing the organization of the peace forces, constantly intensifying mass activity for peace, strengthening co-operation with all states not interested in new wars.

The struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence weakens the front of imperialism, isolates its most aggressive circles from the people and helps advance the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the national-liberation struggle of the peoples.³²⁶

The *Open Letter* further maintained that other antagonisms and contradictions continued as they were before because peaceful coexistence only applied to “governmental relations between socialist and capitalist states,” without extending either to “relations between antagonistic classes in capitalist states,” “the working-class struggle against the bourgeoisie,” or “the struggle of oppressed peoples against the colonialists.”³²⁷

Among many unsophisticated and sarcastic comments against the CCP's line, the most convincing rejoinder to the CCP's advocacy for a just war, in this dissertation's reading, turns on the question of “the absence of a revolutionary situation.” The CPSU considered armed struggle's timing to be of utmost strategic issue which necessitated a careful calculation and concrete situational analysis. The *Open Letter* referred exclusively to Lenin's decision on when to capture the Winter Palace and execute the October Revolution: “We know with what great care and seriousness V. I. Lenin regarded this problem, and with what political foresight and knowledge of the concrete situation he approached the question of selecting the time for a revolutionary rising. On the very eve of the October Revolution, Lenin pointed out that it would be too early to come out on October 24, and too late on October 26—everything might then be lost. Consequently, the seizure of power had to be undertaken on October 25.”³²⁸

Nevertheless, the underlying “big party” and “big country” patronizing, chauvinist tones of the document, this dissertation submits, corroborated the CCP's diagnosis of the CPSU as idealist precisely because this tone was deployed when the CPSU explained the phenomenon with

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, 554.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, 541, 547-8.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*, 554.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 555.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 568.

a ready-made propagandistic answer, construed as an “objective law.” The CPSU even admitted that it stood for “the unity and cohesion of the socialist commonwealth, of the entire world communist movement.”³²⁹ The *Open Letter* argued that because “the material power and the defense might” of the socialist countries were so strong now, to maintain that war was inevitable was to “display lack of faith in the forces of socialism, to succumb to moods of hopelessness and defeatism,” indicating “disbelief in ones [*sic*] strength, fear of imperialism.”³³⁰ The CPSU boastfully used Soviet workers’ material well-being as an indicator of socialist victory and specifically of the success of de-Stalinization:

No one can deny that the Soviet people began to live better and enjoy the benefits of socialism. Ask the worker (and there are millions of them!) who moved into a new apartment, ask the pensioner who is well provided for in his old age, the collective farmer who is now well-to-do, ask the thousands upon thousands of people who suffered unjust repressions in the period of the personality cult and to whom freedom and their good name were restored, and you will know what practical meaning the victory of the Leninist course of the 20th CPSU Congress has had for the Soviet people.³³¹

Furthermore, the CPSU argued that as the working class in the Soviet Union—a society achieving “full-scale construction of communism”—was “directly connected with the highest form of socialist property” and “more steered by decades of class struggle and revolutionary experience,” it remained “the front-rank class of society” but “not through dictatorship of the proletariat.”³³² This was, this dissertation suggests, an example of a doubly abstract conception of labor, which simply evolved along the change of categorical description of the society (advanced labor in full communism) without a convincing materialist explanation. The most unfortunate missed encounter in the actually-existing international communist movement from the mid 20th century onwards, it seems to me, is the Soviet Marxists’ oversight of Mao’s thoughts on communist contradictions and ceaseless revolution.

Anti-revisionist Third Worldist Anti-imperialism

After the polemical exchange between the CCP’s *Proposal* and the CPSU’s *Open Letter*, the CCP published a series of open letters from late 1963 to mid-1964 called the “Nine Chinese Polemics” which aimed to explain its anti-revisionist or, as this dissertation names, neo-Marxist-Leninist stance on world communist revolution and third world anti-imperialist struggles. Kang Sheng, who directed CCP’s purge campaign and internal security work dating to the Yan’an base area, presided over the “central anti-revisionist drafting group,” including more than 100 writers from the liaison and ideology departments. Chen Boda sharpened the theoretical grip. Mao reviewed and finalized the polemics.³³³ The CCP’s anti-revisionist third worldist anti-imperialism differed from Soviet revisionist anti-imperialism of the “communist metropole,” which sought co-operation with the US and emphasized the role of the Soviet Union’s economic development and financial aids in lifting the overall strength of anti-imperialist struggles in the global communist network. The CCP’s evaluation of Khrushchevism in its 1965 report of the first post-Khrushchev

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, 583 – my emphasis.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, 552.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 558-9.

³³² *Ibid.*, 562.

³³³ Wu, *Shinian lunzhan*, 505-7, 540-1., quoted in Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split*, 237.

CPSU meeting, which continued to pursue and perfect the ideal of Khrushchev's revisionism, pithily summarized Khrushchevism's essence in a formula of "four alignments with and four alignments against": "alignment with imperialism against socialism, alignment with the United States against China and the other revolutionary countries, alignment with the reactionaries everywhere against the national-liberation movements and the people's revolutions, and alignment with the Tito clique and renegades of all descriptions against all the fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties and all revolutionaries fighting imperialism."³³⁴ The CCP's "peripheral" anti-imperialism, on the other hand, combatted both American neocolonialism and Soviet modern revisionism along with "social imperialism" of the CPSU's "big party" and "big nation" social practices from the third worldist or tricontinental standpoint.

The CCP's, especially Mao's, emphasis on the political-economic analysis of the given situation also necessitated Maoist anti-imperialism to be incessantly anti-dogmatic. Two most poignant CCP's anti-dogmatic formulations on the questions of anti-imperialism and internationalism came from before and after the "internationalist offensive" period, which indicated either its theoretical consistency or preemptive measure to silence critique. During a talk with visitors from Latin American Communist Parties in September 1956, Mao warned them against mechanically transplanting the "experience of Chinese revolution" to Latin American material contexts and asked them instead to integrate the Marxist-Leninist insights with their concrete conditions. In Mao's own words:

The experience of the Chinese revolution, that is, building rural base areas, encircling the cities from the countryside and finally seizing the cities, may not be wholly applicable to many of your countries, though it can serve for your reference. I beg to advise you not to transplant Chinese experience mechanically. The experience of any foreign country can serve only for reference and must not be regarded as dogma. The universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and the concrete conditions of your own countries—the two must be integrated.³³⁵

In the 1974 United Nations' Special Session on the New International Economic Order (NIEO), Deng Xiaoping's speech, with Mao's approval, licensed an opening to a critique, and even an overthrowing, of CCP when it assumed or replaced an imperialist position of either the US or USSR: "If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it."³³⁶

The CCP's polemics reached their heights in critiquing American neocolonialism, Soviet modern revisionism, and their interconnections in the fourth, eighth, and ninth polemics titled *Apologists of Neo-Colonialism*, *The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism*, and *On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World* respectively. In *Apologists*, the CCP succinctly laid out American imperialism's characteristics and techniques of

³³⁴ Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, 1965, "A Comment on the March Moscow Meeting," *Peking Review* 13 (25 Mar.), 11 (22 Mar. 1965).

³³⁵ Mao, Tse-tung, 1978, "Some Experiences in Our Party's History," in *Selected Works*, vol. 5, 326 (25 Sep. 1956).

³³⁶ Teng, Hsiao-ping, 1974, Speech by Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Teng Hsiao-ping, at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, (10 Apr.).

governance to condemn the CPSU's conscious co-operation with such an imperialist power. *Apologists* argued that rather than dominating through the direct use of brute force over certain territories similar to the older form of colonial rule, American imperialism or neocolonialism "adopt[ed] a new style of colonial rule and exploitation by relying on the agents they [had] selected and trained. ... The imperialists headed by the United States enslave[d] or control[led] the colonial countries and countries which [had] already declared their independence by organizing military blocs, setting up military bases, establishing 'federations' or 'communities,' and fostering puppet regimes." This definition of neocolonialism resonated with another contemporaneous text by Kwame Nkrumah, the 1965 *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, which asserted that "The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside."³³⁷ This shared understanding of neocolonialism as a control of an "independent country" cannot be accidental. It corresponded to the material reality common and contemporary to many anticolonial thinkers and fighters at that time. Moreover, the CCP characterized the United Nations as the apparatus of US imperialism for "interfering in the internal affairs of such countries and for subjecting them to military, economic, and cultural aggression." The US imperialist techniques to rule over other countries, the CCP identified, included engineering military coup d'état, carrying out subversion, or resorting to direct armed intervention and aggression like the old colonial powers.³³⁸

Developing further its conceptualization of modern revisionism in the Lenin Polemics, and the *Proposal*, among others, the CCP in *Proletarian Revolution* situated Khrushchev in the genealogy of Bernstein, Kautsky, Earl Browder (CPUSA's Chairman from 1934-1945), and Tito's revisionism with a more pernicious qualitative difference. The CCP saw Khrushchev as the leader of the CPSU and of the Soviet Union—the first communist state—who appropriated Leninism and "exploit[ed] his position ... to push through his revisionist line." With this immense political capital and prestige, Khrushchev "[bought] over certain bourgeoisified Communists in the international communist movement who [had] betrayed Marxism-Leninism and induce[d] them to acclaim and serve the anti-revolutionary line of the leaders of the CPSU."³³⁹ The CPSU, the document contended, betrayed proletarian internationalism by colluding with US imperialism and opposing the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples and nations.

In the previous polemical treatises, the CCP only showed that modern revisionism aimed to revise (Marxism-)Leninism through theoretical explanations about the nature of warfare and imperialism. *Phony Communism* directly exposed concrete political-economic manifestations of the residual and emerging capitalist elements in the society facilitated by a revisionist understanding of communism, refuting the CPSU's claim about its achievement of full-scale communism that transcended all contradictions. The CCP demonstrated this via an examination of two principal state communist forms: state enterprise and collective farming. The CCP pointed out

³³⁷ Nkrumah, Kwame, 2004 [1965], *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, London: Panaf Books, ix. Jean-Paul Sartre's article "Colonialism is a System" from 1956 arguably provided precedence to both Mao and Nkrumah's use of the term neocolonialism, even as in this article Sartre used the term to denote French colonial reformism rather than an external political-economic control of independent national sovereignty.

Sartre, Jean-Paul, 2001 [1964], "Colonialism as a System," in *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, trans. Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer, and Terry McWilliams, London and New York: Routledge, 9-19 (Mar.-Apr. 1956).

³³⁸ Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, 1963, *Apologists of Neo-Colonialism: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (IV)*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, (22 Oct. 1963).

³³⁹ Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, 1964, *The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchov's Revisionism: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (VIII)*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, (31 Mar. 1964).

that leading functionaries, in collaboration with other functionaries in the state departments, the police, and the judiciary, in some state-owned factories used the factories' equipment and materials to set up underground workshops for private production. Similarly, some leading collective farm functionaries speculated land rent at will, squandered public money, and swindled the collective farmers. They grabbed the land and turned socialist collective economic enterprises into private property. "Their relationship to the collective farmers," *Phony Communism* added and asked, "has likewise become that of oppressors to oppressed, of exploiters to exploited. Are not such neo-exploiters who ride on the backs of the collective farmers one-hund-red-per-cent neo-kulaks?"³⁴⁰ The CCP also mentioned that other examples of the bourgeois elements in the full-scale communist state abounded: private enterprises for private production, private contractor teams for state's construction projects or co-operative enterprises, or private hotels.

No longer just unveiling Khrushchev's revisionism, idealism, and social imperialism while situating Khrushchevism properly within the communist milieu, *Phony Communism* critiqued outright Khrushchev's rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, "state of the whole people," "party of the entire people," and "full-scale communist construction" without mass struggle and a proletarian movement as an ideology that masked the Soviet Union's real activity of restoring capitalism. Khrushchev's revisionism, this dissertation suggests, now signified less of an internal contradiction between two different understandings of communism as how the CCP conceived it in the recent past but more of a capitalist-in-becoming under the I of Marxism-Leninism. The "contradiction among the people," a contradiction between two Marxist analyses and strategies that could arguably be combined into a communist totality and could be resolved through persuasion, began to take shape as a qualitative difference between communism-in-construction and capitalism-in-restoration whose relationship was one of partisanship and moderate antagonism. *Phony Communism* called Khrushchev out for "peddling bourgeois ideology, bourgeois liberty, equality, fraternity, and humanity, inculcating bourgeois idealism and metaphysics, and the reactionary ideas of bourgeois individualism, humanism, and pacifism among the Soviet people, and debasing socialist morality" at the level of the superstructure.³⁴¹ At the material base, the document asserted that Khrushchev substituted material incentive for the socialist principle of basic needs, which in turn accelerated the polarization of and widened the economic gaps between workers, peasants, and ordinary intellectuals, and those who profited from Khrushchev's cloaked capitalist policies.³⁴² The capitalist principle of profit gradually sabotaged and replaced the socialist planned economy. Capitalist free competition undermined socialist ownership by the whole people. Capitalist management of farms supplanted the socialist agricultural planning and vitiated the socialist collective economy.³⁴³ The CCP pointed out the ironic reversal of communist progression that now "Khrushchev look[ed] to Belgrade as his Mecca," learning from the Yugoslav revisionist and bureaucratic bourgeois experience rather than a more exhaustive engagement with Marxism-Leninism, or even Maoist thoughts to wage a prolonged and unceasing struggle against capitalism-imperialism.³⁴⁴

While the Nine Polemics advanced the Chinese neo-Marxist-Leninist analytics and critique of American neocolonialism, Soviet revisionism, and the capitalism that both regimes propelled,

³⁴⁰ Renmin Ribao and Hongqi, 1964, *On Khrushchov's Phony Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (IX)*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 30-1 (14 Jul. 1964).

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 40.

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, 40-1.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 46.

Lin Biao's *Long Live the Victory of People's War!* Offered a culminating affirmative statement that answered the question "what is to be done" for anti-revisionist, third worldist, and anti-imperialist struggles. Before the mysterious plane crash in 1971 leading to his demise, Lin Biao was designated as Mao's successor. The labor of his compilation and propagation of Mao Zedong Thought materialized as the famed *Little Red Book*.³⁴⁵ This dissertation suggests *Long Live the Victory of People's War!*, published in September 1965 and unlikely to be single-authored, reads as a third world or peripheral communist manifesto. The document ended with a similar call for unified action from the "proletarians" in the capitalist-imperialist system, namely, the colonized: "All people's suffering from U.S. imperialist aggression, oppression and plunder, unite! Hold aloft the just banner of people's war and fight for the cause of world peace, national liberation, people's democracy and socialism! Victory will certainly go to the people of the world!"³⁴⁶ The theoretical crux of the *People's War* hinged on a transposition of the analytics from the CCP's anti-Japanese resistance in China's countryside to the international anti-imperialist struggles at "the rural areas of the world," encompassing Asia, Africa, and Latin America, erstwhile conceived as the "intermediate zone." The guiding question of this text cumulated from Chinese history of struggle, which made it dialectical rather than purely empiricist in approach, was "Why can the apparently weak new-born forces always triumph over the decadent forces which appear so powerful?"³⁴⁷

People's War reiterated an understanding of the Chinese revolution as a revolution against feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism, and colonialism through "the encirclement of the cities from the rural areas and the final capture of the cities," rather than beginning with "armed uprisings in the cities and then spread to the countryside" as did the October Revolution.³⁴⁸ The Chinese revolution combined national-democratic with socialist revolution into a continuous two-stage anti-imperialist revolution in the colonial or semi-colonial country, contrary to Trotsky's combined but single revolution that omitted the anticolonial valence materially specific to a nation.³⁴⁹ Echoing Mao, *People's War* said: "in the epoch since the October Revolution, anti-imperialist revolution in any colonial or semi-colonial country is no longer part of the old bourgeois, or capitalist world revolution, but is part of the new world revolution, the proletariat-socialist world revolution."³⁵⁰

This text analogized countries and peoples in Asia, Africa, and Latin America within the US imperial domain to the peasants and proletariats in the Chinese countryside, where "revolutionaries [could] maneuver freely" because of the countryside's inherent resistance to the control from both the urban centers and the imperial metropolises. *People's War* wrote thus: "In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usually begin by seizing the big cities and the main lines of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast countryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can maneuver freely. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory."³⁵¹ Vigorously growing anti-imperialist and working class struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, "the rural areas of the world," according to this analogy, were already in the process

³⁴⁵ Leese, Daniel, 2011, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 94-122.

³⁴⁶ Lin, Piao, 1965, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!: Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of Victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan," *Peking Review* 36 (3 Sep.), 30.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 22.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 24.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

of encircling North America and Western Europe, “the cities of the world.”³⁵² Though the direction of influence was unclear, Taomo Zhou suggests that Lin Biao’s “countryside of the world” thesis came from D.N. Aidit’s similar earlier proposal in his 1963 report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh National Congress of the CC PKI, made within two months after Aidit came back from the PRC.³⁵³ The CCP’s Foreign Language Press also translated and published this report. The section in question is the following:

On a world scale, Asia, Africa, and Latin America are the village of the world (*desanja dunia*), while Europe and North America are the town of the world (*kotanja dunia*). If the world revolution is to be victorious, there is no other way than for the world proletariat to give prominence to the revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, that is to say, the revolutions in the village of the world. In order to win the world revolution, the world proletariat must “go to these three continents.”³⁵⁴

The CCP’s structural justification for war and revolutionary violence in the capitalist-imperialist milieu had been a longstanding premise that can be traced back to *Long Live Leninism* and *the Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement*. Unlike those texts, however, *People’s War* was not a theoretical treatise or a rhetorical polemic. It delved into war tactics, military methods, pragmatics, and the Marxist-Leninist “secret” that enabled an apparently weak new-born force like the CCP to overcome the Japanese imperial army that appeared powerful. The keys to the triumph involved both a concrete analysis and a dialectical understanding of the situation, which in turn determined the forms of struggle in a particular scenario. The abstraction of the method and analogy was in some sense negated by the concreteness of the situation and actuality to form a dialectical loop of transformative praxis. *People’s War* wrote:

It is also very important for the revolutionaries to take full account of the enemy tactically. It is likewise impossible to win victory in a people’s war without taking full account of the enemy tactically, and without examining the concrete conditions, without being prudent and giving great attention to the study of the art of struggle, and without adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country and with regard to each concrete problem of struggle.

Dialectical and historical materialism teaches us that what is important is primarily is not that which at the given moment seems to be durable and yet is already beginning to die away, but that which is arising and developing, even though at the given moment it may not appear to be durable, for only that which is arising and developing is invincible.³⁵⁵

The logic of this analysis sanctioned an understanding of US imperialism as both strong in appearance and also more vulnerable than imperialism of the past, an argument similar to a version of crisis theory that argues for a reproductive instability of capitalism. The document contended

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ Zhou, *Migration*, 155.

³⁵⁴ Aidit, D.N., 1964, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat!*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 87 (23-26 Dec. 1963).; Aidit, D.N., 1964, *Kobarkan Semangat Banteng: Maju Terus, Pantang Mundur!*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 59.

³⁵⁵ Lin, “People’s War!,” 23.

that US imperialism “sets itself against the people of the whole world, including the people of the United States. Its human, military, material, and financial resources are far from sufficient for the realization of its ambition of dominating the whole world. US imperialism has further weakened itself by occupying so many places in the world, over-reaching itself, stretching its fingers out wide and dispersing its strength, with its rear so far away and its supply lines so long.”³⁵⁶ The tactic, then, became one of waging multiple wars unevenly in different parts of the world in a protracted and profoundly asymmetrical struggle. These multiple wars “reinforce[d] each other and merge[d] into a torrential world-wide tide of opposition to US imperialism.” The “colossus of US imperialism,” *People’s War* added, “can be split up and defeated.” It was “divisible” just like everything else.³⁵⁷

Unlike the Cold War’s ideological tripartite schemas of capitalism, communism, and underdeveloped others, Mao’s conception of the third world was based on political economy, a materialist assessment of military and financial strength with a purpose of transforming, abolishing, or overcoming imperialism-capitalism. Mao’s Three Worlds theory was a late arrivant. The term already floated around in the CCP’s discourse in the 1960s. It nonetheless took Mao 28 years from when he first enunciated the intermediate zone concept in 1946 to formally theorize his cumulative understanding of China’s postwar condition. According to Teng Wei, Mao first articulated his political-economic Three Worlds theory in a meeting with Zambian president Kenneth Kuanda on February 22nd, 1974:

I see the United States and the Soviet Union as the first world ... The United States and the Soviet Union have many nuclear bombs and are both quite wealthy. The second world, including Europe, Japan, Australia, and Canada, have fewer nuclear bombs and are not as wealthy, but remain wealthier than the third world. We are the third world, and the population of the third world is very large. Apart from Japan, all of Asia is in the third world. The entirety of Africa is in the third world, and so too in Latin America.³⁵⁸

With the approval of Mao, Deng Xiaoping expanded on Mao’s Three Worlds theory in the 1974 United Nations’ Special Session on the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The analytical basis of this Three Worlds theory consistently followed previous CCP’s explanations of the imperialism-capitalism nexus with a new addition of “hegemonism” of both the United States and the Soviet Union. In this speech, Deng situated the global situation in the Chinese idiom of “great disorder under heaven,” which necessitated all the political forces in the world to undergo “drastic division and realignment through prolonged trails of strength and struggle.”³⁵⁹ The United States and the Soviet Union constituted the first world now precisely because these two superpowers competed for world “hegemony” and brought the Asian, African, and Latin American countries in the third world under their exploitative and oppressive control. “The socialist camp

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁸ Mao, Zedong, 2013, *Mao Zedong nianpu (1949-1976)* [A Chronology of Mao Zedong (1949-1976)], vol. 6, Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 520., quoted in Teng, “Third World,” 282. Translation from the original by this citation’s author.

For the official published English translation, though less eloquent, read: Mao, Zedong, 1998, “On the Question of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds,” in *Mao Zedong on Diplomacy*, ed. and trans. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China and the Party Literature Research Center under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 454 (22 Feb. 1974).

³⁵⁹ Teng, *Speech*.

which existed for a time after World War II,” Deng wrote, “is no longer in existence” because of the emergence of social imperialism.³⁶⁰ The compromising “co-operation” discourse between the superpowers, most salient during the “I” period of the Cold War, Deng’s speech pointed out, was anathema to their irreconcilable and permanent contradiction in achieving a greater global hegemony.³⁶¹ The developed countries in between the superpowers and the developing countries that made up the second world were “reduced by a superpower to the position of dependencies under the signboard of its so-called ‘family,’” even as some of them also retained colonial relations with third world countries.³⁶²

It was the third world, having suffered the heaviest oppression, that “constitute[d] a revolutionary motive force propelling the wheel of world history and [were] the main force combating colonialism, imperialism, and particularly the superpowers.”³⁶³ Deng called for an internationalism of the third world socialist countries to “render support and assistance to oppressed countries and nations and help them develop their national economy” as an alternative to the current global imperialist-capitalist system monopolized and manipulated by the superpowers.³⁶⁴ This third world internationalism must operate alongside a practice of “self-reliance” to ascertain, in this dissertation’s own term, a form of equitable interdependence without a full surrender of sovereignty, similar to Samir Amin’s proposal of delinking.³⁶⁵ In this global constellation, Mao’s China belonged to the Third World with an internationalist commitment. The third world in this political-economic sense signified a class alliance, a solidarity of the exploited, a revolutionary force, and an immanent potential for non-imperialist, non-capitalist futures. These futures could only be achieved, to follow Mao’s logic, through a protracted struggle that united the global exploited and colonized against imperialism-capitalism.

Pre-1949 Chinese Internationalist Praxis in the Peripheral *Nanyang*: A Tension between Chinese Communist Revolution and Local Emancipation

While post-Comintern internationalism could be characterized as ossified, formal, and institutionalized, Chinese internationalism dialectically adjusted its form based on a political-economic analysis of the global dispensation and depended on a more interpersonal network both public and clandestine. The materiality of Chinese internationalism both within and outside of the PRC encompassed semi-autonomous front organizations, publications, and schools similar to that of the post-Comintern. Yet, because of the long-established practice of cross-oceanic migration and the export of able-bodied male labor from the Southeastern rural emigrant counties (*qiaoxiang*) of Guangdong and Fujian to the “periphery” of Mainland China in Southeast Asia (*nanyang*; lit. ‘southern ocean’ or ‘the south seas’), the itinerant Chinese whether from the Mainland or the “periphery” pivotally animated Chinese internationalism.³⁶⁶ This made the whole production of Chinese internationalism outside of Mainland China more aleatory and less tractable, but also more embodied and grounded, than the Soviet variation. As this dissertation focuses on Marxist intellectual history, it investigates the historically specific networked world of overseas Chinese

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ Wang, Hui, 2011, “The Politics of Imagining Asia,” in *The Politics of Imagining Asia*, ed. Theodore Hutters, trans. Matthew A. Hale, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 45-62.; Kuhn, Philip A., 2006, “Why Historians Should Study the Chinese Diaspora, and Vice-versa,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 2, 2 (Nov): 166.

between Mainland China and its peripheries in the South Seas, particularly Indonesia, pertaining to Marxist history, problematics, and understandings. In this section, I discuss the pre-1949 Chinese internationalist praxis of the CCP that also became the infrastructure for local Chinese left organizing in this section. Then I move to the post-1949 story when the CCP transitioned into a ruling communist power.

The category “Overseas Chinese” (*huaqiao*; lit. ‘Chinese sojourner’) replaced the earlier configuration of Chinese mercantile and laboring subjects abroad as wanderers, fugitives, traitors, deserters, and conspirators when the Qing state recognized their financial contributions to the “homeland” around the last quarter of the 19th century, the period of the late colonial capitalist economy.³⁶⁷ The 1909 Qing Nationality Law culminated the Qing efforts to claim the Overseas Chinese subject as China’s national citizen regardless of one’s origin of birth through the *jus sanguinis* (‘right of blood’) principle. This legitimized the Qing state’s, and later Sun Yatsen’s, use of the Chinese in colonial Southeast Asia—once the “merchants without empire” in Wang Gungwu’s description—to directly serve its own imperial and republican causes by affectively mobilizing the overseas Chinese’s loyalty and material surplus.³⁶⁸ After the Nationalist Party (*Guomindang*; GMD) established its own Overseas Bureau (*haiwaibu*) in February 1924 in Guangzhou, various members of the CCP—which was still in alliance with the GMD as a part of a broader Comintern strategy—facilitated labor-organizing efforts of migrant Chinese workers throughout Southeast Asia including in British Malaya, Burma, Siam, French Indochina, Borneo, Sumatra, and New Guinea.³⁶⁹ In 1926, Xu Suhun, a Nanyang Overseas Chinese immigrant who became a CCP member, was elected Chief Secretary of the Overseas Bureau. The Bureau then established an Overseas Chinese Movement Training Institute (*Huaqiao yundong Jiangxi suo*) in November the same year to train Overseas Chinese cadres for anti-imperialist actions overseas. Its three-month course consisted of four subjects: theory, Party affairs, contemporary affairs, and professional training. After the GMD purge of the CCP in the 1927 Shanghai Massacre, the struggles between these two parties in Southeast Asia played out in the “soft” competitions over gaining hegemony in schools, newspapers, and small businesses, to which we will return. Some CCP members managed to join the Nanyang Communist Party (established 1928) and Malayan Communist Party (established 1930) when they fled from the purge to Southeast Asia.³⁷⁰

The 1935 Comintern’s mandate for an antifascist popular front coincided with the CCP’s re-settling in the Yan’an base after the Long March, inaugurating another phase of co-operation between the CCP and the patriotic Overseas Chinese of both entrepreneurial and revolutionary classes. The Malayan Chinese Peng Shixin headed the newly established Nanyang Returned Overseas Chinese Service Mission (*Nanyang huaqiao guiguo fuwutuan*) in July 1939 to coordinate an increasing number of Overseas Chinese youth who made a journey to CCP headquarters in Yan’an to work and study.³⁷¹ Singapore, which was then a part of British Straits Settlements, arose as the hub of Overseas Chinese communist organizing and leftist literary culture in Southeast Asia

³⁶⁷ I develop this idea from the narrative provided in Peterson, Glen, 2012, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, London and New York: Routledge, 15-17.

³⁶⁸ Wang, Gungwu, 1990, “Merchants without Empire: The Hokkein Sojourning Communities,” in *The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350-1750*, ed. James D. Tracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 400-21.; Huang, Jianli, 2011, “Umbilical Ties: The Framing of Overseas Chinese as the Mother of Revolution,” in *Sun Yat-Sen, Nanyang, and the 1911 Revolution*, eds. Lee Lai To and Lee Hock Guan, Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 75-129.

³⁶⁹ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 17-18.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

when the influential non-Communist Singapore-based rubber tycoon and driving force behind the anti-Japanese Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement Tan Kah Kee (Cheng Jiageng) endorsed the CCP over the GMD after his China visit in the spring of 1940.³⁷² Hu Yuzhi, an undercover CCP journalist and translator of Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China*, came to Singapore in December the same year to strengthen the CCP's anti-Japanese war effort and at the same time serve as the chief editor of *Nanyang Siang Pau* (*Nanyang Shangbao*, trans. 'Nanyang Business Daily'), a pro-Communist Chinese language daily owned by Tan Kah Kee.³⁷³ Hu set up the Wartime Mission of Chinese Intellectuals in Singapore (*Xingzhou huaqiao wenhuajie zhanshi gongzuotuan*), headed by the renowned Chinese writer and poet Yu Dafu, who had been working in Singapore since 1938, following the outbreak of the Pacific War.³⁷⁴ The Japanese capture of Singapore in February 1942 placed an intermission to all communist activities there until the revolutionaries returned in late 1945 in the aftermath of the Pacific War. Besides Singapore, Hong Kong was another axis that linked the CCP to Chinese communities overseas, especially in Southeast Asia, after the British authorities and GMD approved the CCP's proposal to establish an Eighth Route Army liaison office in Hong Kong in 1938. The office was headed by Liao Chengzhi, who became an executive member of the CCP's Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (*Huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui*; OCAC) later in 1949. Suffering the same fate as Singapore, Hong Kong stopped on-the-ground resistance activities in December 1941 when the colony fell to Japanese forces until its re-operation in 1946.³⁷⁵

After the fall of Singapore in February 1942, Mainland Chinese overseas and overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia took refuge and organized struggles in Sumatra of current-day Indonesia. They evacuated from Singapore via small sampans. Anti-Japanese Chinese underground networks already existed and scattered across the island in various towns, like Medan, Siantar, Payakumbuh, Bukit Tinggi, Bengkalis Island, before the War. One example in North Sumatra was "Good Earth Bookstore" (*Dadi shudian*) that supplied smuggled classical Marxist texts and CCP pamphlets to the antifascist youths, and operated as a base camp for activities of local antifascist underground organizations.³⁷⁶ One of the prominent Mainland Chinese overseas activists who advocated for the liberations of both China and the Dutch East Indies from capitalist and imperialist forces together, Ba Ren or Wang Ren Shu, also retreated from Singapore to Sumatra in this journey. We will come back to Ba Ren shortly. The struggles against the Japanese occupation happened archipelago-wide but they were most concentrated in Sumatra and Java. The CCP and antifascist organizations' underground offices in both places camouflaged as pastry shops, Chinese medicine companies, soap factories, and wineries. Yang Xinrong, one of the founding members of the CCP's underground branches in Indonesia and a school principal in Jakarta, opened the "Big Unique Cake Factory" (*dabutong dangao chang*) in Jakarta in 1943 to finance the anti-Japanese efforts, a "revolutionary capitalist" model that spread to other parts of

³⁷² *Ibid.*, 19.; For Tan Kah Kee's biography, read: Yong, Ching Fatt, 1987, *Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend*, Singapore: Oxford University Press.

³⁷³ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 19.

³⁷⁴ Hu, Yuzhi, 1990, "Wo zai kangzhan shiqi de jingli" [My Experience during the War of Resistance against the Japanese], in *Nanfangju dangshi ziliao* [Historical Materials of the Southern Bureau: On the United Front], ed. Editing Group of the Historical Materials of the Southern Bureau of the CCP, Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 183-90., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 37.

³⁷⁵ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 20.

³⁷⁶ Huang, Shuhai, 2003, "Yinni Subei huaqiao douzheng gai lue" [Brief History of Anti-Japanese Struggles Among the Overseas Chinese in North Sumatra in Indonesia], in *Wang buliao de suiyue* [Times that Cannot be Forgotten], Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2-10., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 39.

the archipelago.³⁷⁷ This informal networked revolutionary infrastructure during wartime continued to serve as the quasi-organizational basis for the CCP's underground branches in Indonesia until the early 1950s.

Soon after the end of the Pacific War and the victory over the Japanese, overseas Chinese left's struggles took two different forms, which could overlap with one another, based on their affective and political affiliations: struggle against the Guomindang nationalists for China-oriented Chinese and struggle against European re-colonization for the local-oriented Chinese. They resumed activities in places they had already operated before their evacuation to Sumatra. The Chinese Democratic League (*Zhongguo minzhu tongmeng*; CDL), a political party formed in Mainland China in 1941 to mediate between the CCP and the GMD but later aligned more closely with the CCP, coordinated many post-war subversive activities of the overseas Chinese through the Southeast Asian branches it recently established. Milton Sacks characterizes the CDL's Southeast Asian apparatuses as a front organization for the CCP, comparable to the World Peace Council and other semi-autonomous internationalist organizations based in Eastern Europe that were understood loosely as post-Comintern Soviet front organizations.³⁷⁸ Secret CCP members dispatched to Southeast Asia in the late 1930s or soon after the end of the war generally constituted the CDL's leadership.³⁷⁹ The CDL branches remained active until their dissolution in 1952-1953 after the CCP changed its international relations policy—not the same with internationalism—to one of bilateral national collaboration that presupposed a sovereign state with a bounded territory. This policy reverberated the program of Wang Jiaxiang, the director of the CCP's International Liaison Department, who asserted in 1951 that there should only be one Communist Party in each sovereign country.³⁸⁰

In Singapore, Tan Kah Kee founded another pro-Communist Chinese language daily *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* in November 1946, which functioned as an informal organ paper of the Chinese Democratic League, as his own pre-war daily *Nanyang Siang Pau* shifted allegiance to the GMD. Hu Yuzhi followed Tan Kah Kee from *Nanyang Siang Pau* to *Nan Chiau Jit Pao* as a managing director. The couple, Hu Yuzhi and Shen Zijiu, a committed women's rights CCP member who was assigned to Singapore in 1941, founded two major leftwing weekly magazines: *Feng Xia* (lit. 'leeward') on literature and culture and *Xin Funü* (lit. 'new women') on women's rights. Hu Yuzhi, under the pseudonym Sha Ping, managed the former and Shen Zijiu the latter from late 1945 almost immediately after the war until June 1948 during the onset of the Malayan Emergency—the colonial term for the anti-British national liberation war. Hu was also appointed the director of the CDL's Malayan branch, which was established in September 1947.³⁸¹ Tan Kah Kee, Hu Yuzhi, Shen Zijiu, and other China-oriented Chinese returned to China prior to or immediately after the founding of the PRC. Hong Kong, another pre-war hub for political overseas Chinese, was revived as the portal for connecting the global Chinese communities in Hong Kong, Macao, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in summer of 1946 under the leadership of Fang Fang, the veteran Guangdong

³⁷⁷ Alumni Society of the Overseas Chinese School of Jimei and the Overseas Chinese University of Jimei (eds.), 2007, *Mianhuai yu jingyang: jinian Jimei qiaoxiao Yang Xinrong laoxiaozhang danchen yibai zhounian* [Celebrating the One-Hundredth Birthday of Yang Xinrong, the President of the Jimei Overseas Chinese Continuation School], Xiamen, 8., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 78.

³⁷⁸ Sacks, Milton, 1950, "The Strategy of Communism in Southeast Asia," *Pacific Affairs* 23, 3: 238.

³⁷⁹ Hara, Fujio, 2016, "Literators of the Feng Xia," *Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal* 2, 1 (Apr.): 399.

³⁸⁰ Zheng, Junyi, 2005, *Guiqiao Peng Guanhuan de wangshi jinshi* [The Past of Returned Overseas Chinese Peng Guanhan], Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe, 292, 297., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 60.

³⁸¹ Hara, "Literators," 400-1.

communist and former guerilla leader against the Japanese. The CCP's bureau in Hong Kong aimed to coordinate both a significant "united front" effort in the British colony and Chinese overseas' support for the CCP during China's Civil War.³⁸² Fang Fang was ousted from his leadership position in Guangdong in 1952 for displaying excessive leniency during the province's land reform. He then joined Liao Chengzhi and Liao's mother, He Xiangning, in leading the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in 1954.³⁸³

While in Indonesia, Yang Xinrong, the mind behind the Big Unique Cake Factory, and Wang Jiyuan launched *Sheng Huo Bao*, a CCP-affiliated Chinese-language newspaper, in Jakarta in 1945. It remained in circulation until 1959. *Sheng Huo Bao* represented a left China-oriented Chinese's and the PRC state's standpoint that advocated for the overseas Chinese's reintegration into the PRC rather than became an ethnic Chinese in Indonesian society.³⁸⁴ *Sheng Huo Bao*'s stance corresponded to a local Indonesian publishing counterpart *Sin Po (Xin Bao)*, which was founded much earlier during the late colonial period in 1910 in Jakarta. *Sin Po* published both in Chinese and *bahasa Indonesia*, or *bahasa Malayu* as it was called before the Indonesian language was codified. Ang Jan Goan (Hong Yuanyuan) and Kwee Kek Beng (Guo Keming), *peranakans*, or locally-born Chinese who adopted Indonesian citizenship and were sympathetic to Indonesian nationalism while espousing the pro-CCP politics, were *Sin Po*'s prominent directors in the 1940s to 1959 when it ceased publication. The Indonesian Chinese left, who were still pro-PRC but advocated for integration into Indonesian nationhood and fought for a non-discriminatory multiracial society, banded together around an organization called Baperki. Founded in 1954 and led by the leftist *peranakan* Siauw Giok Tjhan (Xiao Yucan), Baperki stood for *Badan Permasyarakatan Kewarganegaraan* (lit. 'Consultative Organization for Indonesian Citizenship'). Its publication *Mingguan Sadar (Juexing Zhoukan, Awakening Weekly)* was the most difficult to find in any archive because of its Chinese *and* leftist reputation before the 1965 anticommunist massacre. To get a more textured sense of how the Chinese leftist media were deployed compositely in a real social situation, we may look at Godley and Coppel's description of the freneticism of the seasonal recruitment for students to study in the PRC:

The most active (or publicized) recruitment tended to be seasonal coinciding not just with the end of the academic year in Indonesia and its beginning in the People's Republic but with periods of intense propaganda, particularly the frenetic events which inevitably climaxed on the first of October with China's «National Day». In urban centers, Chinese diplomats encouraged Beijing-oriented nationalism with films, rallies and meetings chaired by returning tourists while the embassy in Jakarta maintained very close connections with leftist schools particularly during the heady days of Zhou Enlai's visit to Bandung when many informants [of Godley and Coppel's research] say that they felt especially proud. The Chinese-language *Xin Bao*, with its long history of chauvinistic reporting, provides a particularly good record and informants speak of its influence, as well as that of the *Shenghuo Bao*, Radio Beijing, and the glossy magazines supplied by the Chinese Embassy.³⁸⁵

³⁸² Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 21.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*, 23.

³⁸⁴ Zhou, *Migration*, 83.

³⁸⁵ Godley, Michael R. and Coppel, Charles A., 1990, "The Pied Piper and the Prodigal Children: A Report on the Indonesian-Chinese Students Who Went to Mao's China," *Archipel* 39, 184-5.

The proliferation of “leftist” entrepreneurial and civic activities, including publishing and schooling, among the overseas Chinese community in Indonesia confounded even the nationalist right. *Tian Sheng Ri Bao* (*Tian Sung Yit Po*), the organ of the GMD in Indonesia, observed in 1952: “the so-called progressive elements are mostly factory-owners, entrepreneurs, rice, and fabric merchants, as well as bankers. They usually possess large amounts of capital and should be categorized as the capitalist class ... whereas those who run small businesses or belong to the working class usually align themselves with the righteous side [the Chinese Nationalist government].”³⁸⁶ These commercial, cultural, and educational bodies, in the forms of a pastry shop, a soap factory, a winery, a Chinese pharmacy, a youth league, a book club, a drama club, a basketball team, a choir, and a study group, constituted the layers of “peripheral mass organizations” (*qunzhongxing waiwei zuzhi*) enveloping the core underground CCP branches in Indonesia like an onion.³⁸⁷ Zheng Chuyun, Ba Ren’s comrade who migrated from Mainland China to Indonesia together, justified this “revolutionary capitalist” practice by arguing that ethnic Chinese capitalists in Southeast Asia were also “exploited and oppressed by the Western imperialists.” This reason alone, for Zheng, already made them eligible members of an overseas Chinese anti-imperialist patriotic united front (*huaqiao fandi aiguo tongyi zhanxian*) regardless of their class background.³⁸⁸

In terms of intellectual training, the Xin You Society in Semarang, which was active around the late 1940s distributed popular Marxist reading materials such as Ai Siqi’s *Philosophy for the Masses* (*Dazhong Zhexue*), the leftwing literary magazine *Feng Xia*, and the pro-Beijing newspaper *Wen Hui Bao* of Hong Kong.³⁸⁹ Another example was the Young Overseas Chinese Study Society (*huaqiao qingnian xuexi she*), supposedly active in the 1940s. It ran a youth reading group which discussed political texts like Mao Zedong’s *On New Democracy* and *On Coalition Government*.³⁹⁰ Another organization, the New Democratic Comrades’ Association (*xinminzhu zhuyi tongzhihui*), was a completely underground organization which recruited outstanding ethnic Chinese students with leftist inclination to work for the CCP’s cause from the late 1940s to 1952. Many of these recruits migrated to the PRC after the disbanding of the CCP’s overseas branches in 1952 and worked for the Foreign Ministry, the CCP’s International Liaison Department (ILD), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC), and research institutes as interpreters, translators, researchers, and advisors.³⁹¹

Beginning in the late 1920, the CCP’s organizing efforts in Southeast Asia happened centrally in and behind the façade of the “Red Schools,” especially in the Dutch East Indies and British Malaya. In Jakarta, high-profile CCP-infiltrated Chinese secondary institutions included Hwa Chung (*Zhonghua zhongxue*, Zhonghua Highschool; 4,277 students and 121 teachers in

³⁸⁶ “Zuoqing gongsheng renshi zhi mingyun” [The Destiny of Left-leaning Businessmen and Industrialists], *Tian Sheng Ri Bao*, 27 June, 1952., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 77.

³⁸⁷ Zhou, *Migration*, 86-7.

³⁸⁸ Zheng, Chuyun, “Lun huaqiao aiguo fandi tongyi zhanxian” [On the Overseas Chinese Patriotic, Anti-Imperialist, United Front], *Sheng Huo Bao*, January 1, 1951, in *Zheng Chuyun wenji* [Collected Works of Zheng Chuyun], 2013, ed. Zheng Binbin, Guangzhou: Shijie tushu chubans Guangdong youxian gongsi, 56., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 79.

³⁸⁹ Li Xuemin, 2013, “Ba qingchun fangxiangei zuguo he huaqiao zhengyi jinbu shiye—Zheng Manru xiansheng qingnian he zhuangnian shidai shiji shulue” [Mr. Zheng Manru Devoted His Youth to the Motherland and the Progressive and Righteous Affairs Among the Overseas Chinese], in *Sheng Huo Bao de huiyi* [Memories of Sheng Huo Bao], eds. Qian Ren and Liang Junxiang, Guangzhou: Shijie tushu chubans Guangdong youxian gongsi, 295-308., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 87.

³⁹⁰ Zhou, *Migration*, 91, 93.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 93.

1957), Pa Chung (*Bacheng zhongxue*, Jakarta Highschool; 5,102 students and 155 teachers in 1957; largest Chinese-language school in Jakarta), and Pa Hoa (*Bacheng huaqiao xuexiao*, Bahua High School; 4,300 students and 100 teachers in 1956).³⁹² Zhang Guoji, the founder of Hwa Chung along with Li Qunqiao, was Mao Zedong's schoolmate. He came to Indonesia in the 1930s to expand the CCP's network and founded Hwa Chung in 1939. After the Pacific War, Zhang returned to China to head Beijing's Preparatory School for Overseas Chinese *Huaqiao buxiao*, using the social capital he accumulated in Indonesia to connect overseas Chinese in the two countries.³⁹³ Godley and Coppel note that another unnamed Hwa Chung's administrator and a covert CCP member came to run Fujian's *Jimei zhongxue*, a predominantly overseas Chinese high school. Zhang Guoji's preparatory school in Beijing would allow students to get into a prestigious northern institution. The majority of overseas Chinese students studying in Mainland China, however, went to southern institutions and were almost certainly destined for Guangzhou (Canton)'s Jinan University (*Jinan daxue*; 3,000 overseas Chinese students in 1964), Amoy's Xiamen University (*Xiamen daxue*; 430 overseas Chinese students in 1964), or Quanzhou's Overseas Chinese University (*Huaqiao daxue*; 2,000 overseas Chinese students in 1964) in Fujian province. Xiamen University was founded by Tan Kah Kee in 1921 and since then became one of the better-known institutions for overseas Chinese. Jimei Highschool fed students directly to this university. Overseas Chinese University was newly established in 1960 for almost exclusively Indonesian Chinese.³⁹⁴

Pa Chung became more politicized after the appointment of the new principal Soeto Tjan (Situ Zan) who was the president of the pro-Beijing Federation of the Chinese General Associations (*Huaqiao zonghui*). Soeto Tjan returned to the PRC in 1960 as a deputy head of the Southeast Asia Research Institute at Jinan University.³⁹⁵ Starting as politically neutral, Pa Hoa pioneered Chinese education in Indonesia beginning from 1901. This school drifted to the left during the Indonesian Revolution and Chinese Civil War.³⁹⁶ Yang Xinrong, the leader of the CCP underground branch in Indonesia, was the principal of the lesser-known Xinhua School (*Xinhua zhongxue*; 3,200 students and over 100 teachers in 1956) from 1939-1953. It was the second-oldest Chinese-medium school after Pa Hoa.³⁹⁷ Taomo Zhou's archival research shows that in 1950 after the Republic of Indonesia reinstated the diplomatic relationship with the PRC, there were three categories of imported textbooks from the PRC to pro-Beijing schools in Indonesia. The first aimed to introduce communism to young comrades. The second mustered nationalistic pride in socialist China through texts about techno-economic achievements and nation-building efforts. Examples of the material in the second group included the PRC's maps, "Building A New Tibet," "The People's New Shanghai," and "The New Atmosphere of the Countryside in Lower Yangtze." The last promoted the PRC's political causes in unifying with the ROC and opposing American imperialism.³⁹⁸

³⁹² Godley and Coppel, "The Pied Piper," 183.; The figures are from Zhou, *Migration*, 91.

³⁹³ Godley and Coppel, "The Pied Piper," 183.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 188.; The figures are from *Ibid.*, 190.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

³⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁷ Zhou, *Migration*, 91.

³⁹⁸ "Surat dari Kejaksaan Agung kepada Presiden RI mengenai Kegiatan Politik dan Kebudayaan Orang Tionghoa sejak Adanya Kedutaan Agung RTT di Indonesia" 15 August, 1950, no. 1977, Inventaris Arsip Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Perdana Menteri Tahun 1950-1959, ANRI., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 101.

Ba Ren's Inter-Racial Working Class Struggle: A Co-Articulation of Race and Class

Among a cadre of leftist Chinese luminaries undertaking revolutionary works in *Nanyang*, given the more extensive information about and the theoretical contribution of this figure, we will focus on Ba Ren's attempt to conceptualize inter-racial working class struggle in Indonesia. The apathy of China-oriented left, both Chinese and Indonesians, towards the Indonesian revolution, not to mention an inter-racial one, made Ba Ren's propositions radical and worth examining.

Ba Ren or Wang Renshu, a literati by nature, was a member of an undercover CCP batch directly instructed by Zhou Enlai to facilitate the antifascist organizing among the Southeast Asian Chinese exclusively in Malaya.³⁹⁹ Zhou Enlai initially assigned Ba Ren to the US to develop pro-CCP Chinese language print media, but difficult circumstances in obtaining travel documents prompted Ba Ren to instead join the Malayan front in late 1941. Ba Ren taught at the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Normal College (*Nanyang huaqiao shifan xuexiao*) in Singapore before evacuating with Liu Yan or Lei Derong, his traveling companion, and other underground CCP members to Sumatra in February 1942. Ba Ren's daily interaction with Chinese and *pribumi* (a local term for "the indigenous"), coolies, and peasants during his time of refuge in several Sumatran multiracial communities deepened his understanding of inter-racial solidarity in Indonesia.

After the Japanese defeat, Ba Ren and Lei Derong remained in North Sumatra to locally support Indonesian *and* Chinese struggles during the two conveniently coinciding events, the Indonesian National Revolution and the Chinese Civil War. Ba Ren presided over the China Democratic League's branch in Medan, a North Sumatran city with a large ethnic Chinese population, presumably around late 1946 or early 1947. He also mentored youth groups, such as the Collective Study Society (*gong xue she*) and the New China Drama Club (*xin Zhongguo juyi she*). Lei Derong, on the other hand, led the Women's Society (*funü hui*). Both founded libraries with Chinese-language left-wing literature and pro-CCP magazines published in Southeast Asia such as *Feng Xia*, to which Ba Ren regularly contributed. The Dutch deported Ba Ren, accompanied by Lei Derong, in September 1947 to Hong Kong because of his sympathy with the Indonesian Revolution. In Hong Kong, he founded the Indonesia Research Group (*Yinni wenti xiaozu*) under the CCP's International Liaison Department. Its various members were left-leaning ethnic Chinese youth who worked with Ba Ren in North Sumatra. After Indonesia reestablished its diplomatic relations with the PRC, Ba Ren assumed the position of the first PRC ambassador to Indonesia in 1950. During the 1951 anticommunist raids, Ba Ren opened the PRC embassy as a sanctuary for a Chinese communist and thus violated diplomatic protocol between the two sovereignties. He was dismissed as a result in January 1952. He directed the People's Literature Publishing House back in the PRC in 1957 and faced severe persecution during the Cultural Revolution like any other Chinese with overseas connections.⁴⁰⁰

From the existing evidence that has been translated into English (almost single-handedly by Taomo Zhou) Ba Ren's first exposure to the material reality of North Sumatran labor conditions took place at a remote village on the Bengkalis Island, where he arrived after the journey away from Singapore in early 1942. From the middle of the nineteenth century onward, Sumatra had been central to the colonial plantation economy and tin mining business, which required an excessive amount of manual labor. This demand for a workforce in turn attracted poor Chinese and Indian coolie migrants along with other labor-trading or human-trafficking activities. These migrant workers settled in rural villages with the local Malays and other indigenous populations

³⁹⁹ Hara, "Literators," 424.

⁴⁰⁰ Zhou, *Migration*, 34-71.

(*pribumi*), subsisting on household crops. Ba Ren's four-month stay on the Bengkalis Island "inspired [him] to help change the fate of the working class Chinese in Indonesia."⁴⁰¹

The second exposure happened in the village of Surabeia, another distant East Sumatran suburb where Ba Ren fled the Japanese massive crackdown of the antifascist resistance in late 1943. Disguised as an unsuccessful Chinese businessman returning to farming, Ba Ren described himself as an "invader" who came to the village "where the Chinese, Javanese, and Malay peacefully coexisted." He observed this village's racial relations in his writing that "the Javanese and Malays often used some seemingly witty schemes to take advantage of a Chinese newcomer like me [Ba Ren]. But their attempts were childlike, adorably awkward and naïve. I felt like I could reach out my hands and touch their warm hearts." On the contrary, paradoxically, Ba Ren "felt like there was some distance between me [him] and the diligent Chinese peasants, the smart Chinese businessmen, and the intellectuals, no matter how friendly they were to me."⁴⁰² He noticed two major contradictions in Surabeia: first, between the diligent Chinese workers regardless of their class and the idle Javanese; and, second, between the paradise-liked Dutch-owned plantation "with meticulously maintained gardens and majestic mansions" and the decaying village "with huts trapped in rotten foliage and half-naked residents in shabby clothes."⁴⁰³ It could be extrapolated from Ba Ren's own observations that he felt he could touch the natives' warm hearts rather than the Chinese's because he sympathized and aligned with the predicament of the former. Ba Ren remarked with anger that his neighbors in Surabeia "liv[ed] on the margins of their own land forcibly occupied by foreigners," and they were "at their last gasp ... awaiting their doom."⁴⁰⁴ The visceral impression of Surabeia compelled Ba Ren to compose a poem *The Song of Indonesia* (*Yindunixiya zhi ge*), which conveyed both a rumination about his experience and an imaginative vision of liberated Indonesia he advocated for. Completed in 1952, the poem envisioned a colonial world being turned on its head through an inter-racial working class revolution, a world where we saw "the pictures of proletarian leaders on the walls of coolie laborers' dormitories all over Sumatra."⁴⁰⁵

In contrast to poor Chinese coolies in rural villages in the Bengkalis Island and Surabeia, a majority of ethnic Chinese living in the big cities belonged to middle and entrepreneurial classes. Ba Ren readily critiqued the systemic complicity of ethnic Chinese middle class and businessmen with the reactionary capitalist forces like the military and the Dutch imperialists in plundering the wealth of Indonesian labor. This reactionary alliance between the rich profiteering Chinese and both local and Dutch capitalists exacerbated the economic disparity between the property-owning class and the plundered poor, to which both the Indonesian peasants and Chinese coolies belonged:

⁴⁰¹ Zhou, *Migration*, 38.

⁴⁰² Ba Ren, 1997, "Linren men" [Neighbors], in *Ba Ren wen ji huiyilu juan* [Collected Works of Ba Ren: Memoirs], ed. Editing Committee of the Collected Works of Ba Ren, Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences, Ningbo: Ningbo chubanshe, 310., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 42.

⁴⁰³ Zhou, *Migration*, 43.

⁴⁰⁴ Ba Ren, 2001, "Yindunixiya geming guangan" [Observations and Opinions on the Indonesian Revolution], in *Ba Ren yu Yindunixiya—jinian Ba Ren (Wang Renshu) danchen 100 zhounian* [Ba Ren and Indonesia—In Memory of the 100th Birthday of Ba Ren a.k.a. Wang Renshu], ed. Zhou Nanjing, Hong Kong: Nandao chubanshe, 258., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 43.

⁴⁰⁵ Ba Ren, 1997, "Yindunixiya zhi ge" [Song of Indonesia], in *Ba Ren wen ji shige xuba juan* [Collected Works of Ba Ren: Poems, Prefaces, and Postscripts], ed. Editing Committee of the Collected Works of Ba Ren, Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences, Ningbo: Ningbo chubanshe, 320., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 43.

The Chinese have obviously become the middle class. Under the wings of the imperialists, they infiltrated the Indonesian peasant economy via usury loans, which further deepened the gulf between the Chinese and the indigenous people. ... After World War II, they were still dreaming of the good old days—they wanted to continue their comparatively well-off life under the protection of Western imperialists. ...

They cannot see that if they support the Indonesian revolution with the free capital in their hands, their businesses can be transformed to light industry, which will facilitate the peaceful coexistence of the Chinese and the indigenous groups. ... Some of them even served as pioneers for the imperialists during colonial conquest, and they did harm to the Indonesian National Revolution.⁴⁰⁶

Ba Ren's dialectical and materialist understanding of the Chinese in Indonesia enabled him to classify them based not only on class (coolie, middle class, businessman) but also political ideology. He identified three political tendencies of the Chinese in the late 1940s in North Sumatra: the "democratic and progressive" (*minzhu jinbu*) supported both the Chinese communists and Indonesian anticolonial revolution; the "reactionaries" (*fandong pai*) remained loyal to the Chinese Nationalists and condescended to the Indonesians' struggle for national independence; and the apolitical cared only "about their own economic well-being."⁴⁰⁷ The inter-racial tension between the Chinese and *pribumi*, for Ba Ren, was caused by longstanding economic structures primarily involving exploitation of the Chinese and indigenous poor by the reactionary alliance rather than primordial hostility or momentary historical accidents. Ba Ren read this tension as the working-class *pribumi*'s rebellion against the Chinese capitalists.⁴⁰⁸ In his 1947 essay on the Indonesian National Revolution, Ba Ren analogized the Chinese who dismissed Indonesian "heroic" anticolonial struggles to, quoting Engel's description, the "barbaric" Western observers who denigrated the Chinese people's anti-imperialist struggles during the Second Opium War.⁴⁰⁹ He pointed out that the Chinese and Indonesians were "comrades-in-arms in the same struggle" against Dutch imperialism.⁴¹⁰

Ba Ren's solution to this structural plundering was an inter-racial proletarian struggle which acknowledged, in Zhou's paraphrase of Ba Ren, "the shared grievances and aspirations of the oppressed working class" against capitalism and colonialism.⁴¹¹ This working class's shared condition allowed both the ethnic Chinese and the *pribumi* to overcome racial prejudice and national boundaries. Ba Ren wrote: "class struggle will break down the stone wall between different ethnic groups."⁴¹² Moreover, to redistribute the accumulated wealth of the comprador ethnic Chinese for national development, Ba Ren supported the nationalization of the ethnic Chinese's capital.⁴¹³ In *The Song of Indonesia*, Ba Ren succinctly introduced his understanding of the revolution of the oppressed masses that would generate a new world of freedom and equality:

⁴⁰⁶ Ba Ren, "Wu ge bei diaosi de kuli" [Five Coolie Laborers Who Were Hanged], in *Ba Ren yu Yindunixiya*, 120., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 47-8.

⁴⁰⁷ Ba Ren, interview by Muhammad Radjab, Siantar, Sumatra, July 14, 1947, in Radjab, Muhammad, 1949, *Tjatatatan di Sumatera* [Notes in Sumatra], Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 66., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 44.

⁴⁰⁸ Ba Ren, "Yindunixiya geming," 258., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 35.

⁴⁰⁹ Ba Ren, "Yindunixiya geming," 253-4., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 46.

⁴¹⁰ Ba Ren, "Yindunixiya geming," 254., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 46.

⁴¹¹ Zhou, *Migration*, 36.

⁴¹² Ba Ren, "Yindunixiya zhi ge," 320., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 35.

⁴¹³ Ba Ren, "Yindunixiya geming," 262-3., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 51.

Social revolution formed a new network across the boundaries of capitalist empires;
 We, as the oppressed nation and class, are connected to and echoed in this web;
 We have to fight this battle to disassemble the old system;
 So as to establish a new network that is coherent, clear, free and equal.
 Leaning toward the left will not be your fatal wound,
 Why are you afraid? Why are you hesitating?
 Only an assembly of the revolutionary masses is the solution to your disease that is beyond
 cure.⁴¹⁴

Ba Ren wrote a play entitled *Temple of Five Ancestors* (*Wu Zu Miao*), which embodied his vision of an inter-racial proletarian struggle. The New China Drama Club, under Ba Ren's mentorship, staged this play for the first time in Medan. It was subsequently performed twenty to thirty times in different locations in North Sumatra. Onstage actors adapted this Mandarin Chinese play by using Hokkien mixed with a variation of Malay spoken by ethnic Chinese peasants. Before each performance commenced, a chorus affiliated with the New China Drama Club would sing Indonesian songs to show Chinese support for the Indonesian National Revolution.⁴¹⁵ The five ancestors referred to the five Chinese laborers who revolted against the Dutch foreman at the Dutch-owned tobacco plantation in Dili (present-day Medan), which led to their death sentences in the local sultan's court. The local Chinese community leaders built and dedicated a temple to memorialize these "ancestors" of multi-ethnic struggle against imperialism. Ba Ren wrote in the foreword to the play that "The Gayos, Bataks, Malays, and Chinese were fighting a battle collectively. ... Their struggle fundamentally reflected the significance of the anti-imperialist alliance among different ethnic groups."⁴¹⁶ He interestingly conceived of Dutch colonialism, plantation economy, and the influx of foreign coolies as interruptions to the historical evolution of Sumatra into Communism.⁴¹⁷ Some leftist Chinese youths during Ba Ren's time in Sumatra already practiced his inter-racial vision. According to Taomo Zhou's account, on Labor Day in Siantar where Ba Ren based his activism after the Pacific War, for example, hundreds of ethnic Chinese students sang "L'Internationale" with musical accompaniment by the Indonesian Republican military forces, followed by speeches given by representatives from different ethnic groups: the Chinese, Indians, and *pribumi*.⁴¹⁸

The Overseas Chinese Question: From Socialist Accumulation to Socialist Subjectivation

A significant difference between pre-1949 and post-1949 PRC on its internationalist praxis in relation to the overseas Chinese bore upon a reconceptualization of the overseas Chinese itself. Prior to the PRC's founding, the CCP treated the overseas Chinese as an irreplaceable component of the patriotic popular front against Japanese Fascism and later the reactionary Nationalists. We may identify three types of overseas Chinese allies: first, the revolutionary capitalists who distributed and invested their wealth for the communist causes like Tan Kah Kee; second, the wide-ranging "left-leaning" petite bourgeoisie like the urban poor, middle peasants, students,

⁴¹⁴ Ba Ren, "Yindunxiya zhi ge," 355., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 43.

⁴¹⁵ Zhou, *Migration*, 47-9.

⁴¹⁶ Ba Ren, 1997, "Wu Zu Miao" [Temple of Five Ancestors], in *Ba Ren wen ji xiju juan* [Collected Works of Ba Ren: Plays], ed. Editing Committee of the Collected Works of Ba Ren, Zhejiang Academy of Social Sciences, Ningbo: Ningbo chubanshe, 244-5., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 47.

⁴¹⁷ Zhou, *Migration*, 47.

⁴¹⁸ Wang, Qianyu, 2008, *Zai chidao xian shang* [On the Equator], Hong Kong: Dadao chubanshe, 61., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 47.

intellectuals, literati, journalists, technocrats, and small business owners who supported the revolution with their manual and mental labor; and third, the poor Chinese coolies and peasants whose revolutionary consciousness could be lifted as was evident in Ba Ren's organizing endeavors. This classification almost resembled Mao's "bloc of four classes" typology indispensable to the "national democratic" moment of the protracted communist revolution. Once a revolution had been achieved in 1949, following the quintessential Maoist logic, new contradictions ensued. Once a "revolutionary" force during the national democratic moment of the communist revolution, pro-communist overseas Chinese spawned and embodied new kinds of contradiction.

Since 1952, the PRC handled the overseas Chinese question by strictly enforcing the Westphalian-United Nations system premised on the non-interference of individual state sovereignty. It shut down all the overseas CCP branches and recalled the underground CCP members back to serve the party-state. This marked the inward-turn of the PRC's conceptualization and reach of the overseas Chinese, creating a division of labor between the PRC state and the foreign states in dealing with the *huaqiao* population. The terrain and scale of internationalism shifted from interconnections among overseas Chinese to between fraternal communist parties and from national to anti-imperialist communist revolution in Asia and subsequently of the third world. In the PRC itself, the contradictory term "domestic overseas Chinese" (*guonei huaqiao*) was coined to name a domestic Chinese population with a "connection to foreign worlds."⁴¹⁹ Ironically, this same special feature of foreign worlds' connection or intermediation alienated the overseas Chinese both in the PRC and abroad with the increasing nationalistic suspicion of foreignness, whether real or manufactured. The new domestic overseas Chinese category encompassed three types of subjects: the *qiaojuan* or overseas Chinese family dependents (*huaqiao juanshu*) who were the stay-at-home members of remittance-sending emigrant households; *guiqiao* or returned overseas Chinese (*guiguo huaqiao*) who were former migrants and "returned" after 1949; and, lastly, the *qiaosheng* or returned overseas Chinese students (*guiguo huaqiao xuesheng*) who were ethnic Chinese youth mainly from Southeast Asia "returning" to China to pursue higher education.⁴²⁰ As Glen Peterson acutely points out, the governmental idea of "return" here was deployed to control the migrants and maintain their "outsider" status despite being conferred certain economic and social prerogatives.⁴²¹ By the 1950s, most overseas Chinese who traveled or migrated to the PRC had never seen or experienced their "imagined homeland" to begin with.

Before the CCP fully radicalized its political-economic stance and differentiated its communist praxis from the revisionist Soviet Union beginning with the 1958 Great Leap Forward onwards, two internal post-1949 CCP organs predominantly molded the rather lenient policies and discourses regarding the (domestic) overseas Chinese: the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) and local officials in the *qiaoxiong* or emigrant provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Founded in 1949, the OCAC was headed by He Xiangning (ceremonial chair), her son Liao Chengzhi (operational chair), and Fang Fang, the former Guangdong guerrilla leader. All three had developed extensive knowledge of Overseas Chinese realities and experience in pre-1949 Overseas Chinese affairs. The local *qiaoxiong* officials comprised "regionalist" (*difang zhuyi*) political figures whose affiliation and interests remained with the local than the central government, including Fang Fang himself, the East River guerilla leader Gu Dacun, and the Hainan

⁴¹⁹ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 2-3.

⁴²⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*, 3, 102-3, 130-4.

guerilla fighter Feng Baiju. These two organs represented, this dissertation suggests, a reformist approach to the overseas Chinese question which recognized and facilitated the capitalist potential of overseas Chinese remittances and investments for the development of the national and local economies.

The OCAC implemented the “preferential treatment” (*youdai*) policy for the domestic overseas Chinese in 1953. This preferential treatment entailed exclusive entitlements ranging from the right to receive and dispose freely of overseas remittances; private investment opportunities in industry, agriculture, and real estate; preferential rations of food grains and other scarce commodities; and exclusive access to consumer goods that were unavailable to the wider public.⁴²² This preferential treatment permitted the overseas Chinese’s participation in the “transition to socialism” like joining Mutual Aid Teams or Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives to be voluntary, gradual, and patient. Peterson identifies two reasons for this exceptional treatment of the overseas Chinese’s “idle funds and floating capital” as a part of, in this dissertation’s term, the PRC’s “socialist accumulation.”⁴²³ First, it funded the PRC’s planned economy and financed the state’s developmentalist program of rapid industrialization, which conveniently began in 1953 with the first Five Year Plan. One of the most high-profile industrialization projects making extensive use of the overseas Chinese money and refugee laborers was the development of overseas Chinese state farms, chiefly rubber plantations, on Hainan Island.⁴²⁴ Second, it served as the country’s primary source of foreign exchange when the US led an international embargo on trade with the PRC. As historian Zhang Shu Guang suggests, embargoing was a disciplinary technique the US deployed to wage an “economic Cold War” against China in the aftermath of the PRC’s military intervention in the Korean War.⁴²⁵ In the 1953 opening speech at the first working meeting of the Overseas Chinese Commission of Fujian Province, the province’s party secretary Zeng Jingbing even remarked that the overseas Chinese remittance agencies (*qiaopiju*) were “irreplaceable” because of their subversive capability to transfer funds to China “right under the eyes of the imperialists.”⁴²⁶

The local *qiaoxiong* officials themselves encouraged investment and remittances from the “patriotic” overseas Chinese who wanted to aid their ancestral villages and family members in the “homeland.” In the early 1950s, Guangdong and Fujian governments set up both state-run or state-private investment companies, shareholding companies, and construction corporations to promote overseas Chinese trade and attract overseas Chinese investment in industrial sectors. These overseas Chinese investments, conceived as a “foreign aid” or “free capital,” fostered economic development and, at the same time, provided income for the large remittance-dependent *Qiaojuan* population in the *qiaoxiang*.⁴²⁷

The CCP’s Marxism-Leninism represented another approach to the overseas Chinese question. Like any other complex social group, the overseas Chinese as a social category is composed of different and diverse economic classes. Zeng Jingbing, the party secretary of Fujian Province, said it best in 1953:

⁴²² *Ibid.*, 56.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*, 86-94.

⁴²⁵ Zhang, Shu Guang, 2001, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo Against China and Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1963*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

⁴²⁶ “Zeng Jingbing tongzhi zai shengwei diyici huaqiao gongzuo huiyi shang de kaimuci” [Opening Speech at the First Working Meeting of the Overseas Chinese Commission of Fujian Province by Comrade Zeng Jingbing], March 5, 1953, no.0101-001-0262, FJPA (Fujian Provincial Archives, Fuzhou), quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 196.

⁴²⁷ *Ibid.*, 77-81.

Some of our comrades think that because the overseas Chinese have been living abroad most of their lives, they probably have close relationships with the imperialists. They cannot be good people. Actually, the overseas Chinese are not all wealthy. Neither are all of them friends with imperialists. ... They belong to different [economic] classes: some are capitalists, some are intellectuals or freelancers; others are apprentices, workers, peasants, unemployed, and even beggars.⁴²⁸

This analytical modality that brought class differences of the overseas Chinese into full view came about to justify the state's solicitation of overseas Chinese capital. The CCP's generic Marxist framework for understanding the overseas Chinese rather elided class differences. Its typologization of the overseas Chinese as having a connection to foreign "capitalist" worlds constituted the overseas Chinese as a bourgeois individualist subject and a capitalist agent regardless of their class differences. This problem of the antinomy between socialist Mainland and capitalist returned overseas Chinese subjectivities arose after the CCP founded a communist state in 1949. All subcategories of domestic overseas Chinese posed a problem within a Marxist framework. The remittances *qiaojuan* received as income involved exploitative capitalist activities elsewhere. The returning *guiqiao* suffered from foreign imperialist and big bourgeois' oppression but still held on to the capitalist class interest, similar to the CCP's understanding of the petite bourgeois' ambivalence. Their ambivalence permitted political flexibility that could be swayed to either side of the communism-capitalism, and revolution-reaction continua. The *qiaosheng*, who were mostly single young men of middle- and upper-class backgrounds, in particular, had reputations for being "disobedient." Numerous archival materials testified to *qiaosheng*'s bourgeois tendency in resisting the state-led collective life.⁴²⁹ *Renmin Ribao* reports of 6 and 8 April 1960 zeroed in on the "bourgeois individualistic thought" of the *qiaosheng* who had long been exposed to and contaminated by capitalist lifestyle and bourgeois education abroad.⁴³⁰

Precisely because the CCP understood overseas Chinese as a bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie's political ambivalence was also transposed seamlessly to the overseas Chinese who permanently oscillated between two political poles. The two opposing discourses the CCP deployed to situate the overseas Chinese were between "the broad ranks of the laboring people" (*laodong renmin*), a generic denotation of the PRC's population, and the "Fifth Column," meaning a subversive capitalist enemy within.⁴³¹ Shelly Chan found evidence of a theorization of the *huaqiao* capitalists as ambivalent, using the concept of "double nature" (*shuangchong xinzhì*). One piece written by the United Front Department of the Foshan Distract Committee in 1963 said that *huaqiao* capitalists were similar to domestic capitalists but with a distinctive "double nature." On the one hand, *huaqiao* had suffered the oppression and discrimination of foreign imperialism and ethnonationalism, which necessitated them to be patriotic in combatting these injustices by allying with their ancestral nation. On the other hand, their interests as a capitalist class led them to harbor misgivings about socialism. They permanently "wander[ed]" around the intersection of two very

⁴²⁸ "Zeng Jingbing tongzhi," quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 198.

⁴²⁹ Chan, Shelly, 2014, "The Disobedient Diaspora: Overseas Chinese Students in Mao's China, 1958-66," *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 10: 220-38.

⁴³⁰ *Renmin Ribao*, 6 Apr. and 8 Apr. 1960., quoted in Godley and Coppel, "The Pied Piper," 188-9.

⁴³¹ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 22.

different social systems, socialism and capitalism, as well as to place one foot in each of two different boats at the same time.”⁴³²

While the OCAC-*qiaoxiong* line advocated for preferential treatment (*youdai*) of the overseas Chinese in exchange for their capital, the CCP demanded the overseas Chinese’s full participation in the socialist transformation, primarily of the self. Central to what this dissertation calls the socialist subjectivation or proletarianization in the CCP’s state communist framework was the transformation of the consuming subject into a producing subject cognizant of one’s own labor power as a source of value. Peterson notes this conscientious process of substituting the traditional Confucian work ethic with the Marxist labor theory of value with the following theological vocabulary: “the CCP substituted the pious Confucian view of farming as ‘root’ occupation with a Marxist glorification of labor as a hallowed social activity, overlaid with the Maoist notion of manual labor as a source of personal redemption.”⁴³³ The CCP began to critique the, to adapt Aihwa Ong’s terms but also call attention to its historical predecessor, “overseas Chinese capitalism as exception” policy of preferential treatment in 1957-1958 as a consequence of the movement against the residual and emerging rightist elements in the Chinese society called the Anti-Rightist campaign.⁴³⁴

Fang Fang, a longstanding advocate for the overseas Chinese’s *youdai*, wrote an editorial totally antithetical to his previous stance entitled “We Must Lead Guiqiao Capitalists and Intellectuals to Engage in an Ideological Transformation” in 1958. This editorial functioned as both an autocritique and a new anti-reformist policy for the overseas Chinese. Fang asserted that the “self-transformation” (*ziwo gaizao*) of the overseas Chinese would “remain a complex and long-term process.” This protracted socialist subjectification process involved engaging in manual labor, fully participating in political campaigns, and internalizing the CCP’s ideological education.⁴³⁵ Fang identified “reliance on remittances” as a particular material condition of the domestic overseas Chinese, which differentiated them from the ordinary masses in terms of their “laboring circumstances, lifestyle, and ideological situation.”⁴³⁶ The editorial critiqued the *youdai* policy for being an ideology of the *Huaqiao* capitalists and disregarding the *Huaqiao* masses. It ended by calling for a socialist transformation of the *Huaqiao* population, a thesis statement chosen for the editorial’s title.⁴³⁷ Fang pointed out in another instance that singling out the domestic overseas Chinese’s contribution only reinforced “overseas Chinese chauvinist” (*dahuaqiao zhuyi*) thinking and thus their entitlement.⁴³⁸ In her 1958 National Day message to Overseas Chinese, the ceremonial OCAC chair He Xiangning reported the gradual “progress” of *Qianjuan* and *Guiqiao*’s socialist transformation. She said they had dropped their “delicate airs” (*jiaoqi*) and adopted a

⁴³² GDPA (Guangdong Provincial Archives), 1963, no.216-1-368., quoted in Chan, “The Disobedient Diaspora,” 233.

⁴³³ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 141.

⁴³⁴ Ong, Aihwa, 2006, *Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty*, Durham: Duke University Press.

⁴³⁵ Fang Fang, 1958, “Dali Guanhe shehui zhuyi qiaowu luxian” [We Must Lead Guiqiao Capitalists and Intellectuals to Engage in an Ideological Transformation], *Xinhua buanyuekan* 22 (25 Nov.): 56-8., quoted in Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 156.

⁴³⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁷ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 156-7.

⁴³⁸ “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo huaqiao shiwuwei yuanhui Fang Fang fuzhuren dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua” [Speech by Fang Fang, the Deputy Director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission of the PRC, on the Future Direction of Overseas Chinese Affairs], February 10, 1958, no. 74-3-61, HNPA (Hainan Provincial Archives, Haikou), quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 199.

“heroic air” (*haoqi*), “kicking off their shoes, rolling up their trousers, and venturing into the fields.”⁴³⁹

For the question of the CCP’s policy toward ethnic Chinese abroad, OCAC Chair Liao Chengzhi addressed it during the OCAC plenum of November 1957. He articulated three stages of the CCP’s historical development which governed the overseas Chinese’s relations to these stages. During the first stage, the War Against Japan from 1937-49, the Chinese abroad supported China’s struggle for national independence while expressing solidarity with the local peoples in their countries of residence. The second stage of peaceful coexistence with newly independent states (1949-56) meant educating overseas Chinese to live peaceably and integrate themselves in their countries of residence while taking steps to strengthen the “patriotic unity” (*aiguo tuanjie*) of overseas Chinese and the motherland. The third and final stage had begun in 1957, characterized by the socialist transformation of the motherland. Liao noted the curious anxieties (*danxin*) of the Southeast Asian nations and other overseas Chinese countries of residence over China’s intentions toward overseas Chinese, which could be interpreted as the fear of overseas Chinese as either PRC agents or undercover communists. The CCP mitigated such anxieties by encouraging the overseas Chinese to either “adopt the nationality of their countries of residence and to become locals” (*chengwei dangdi ren*) or return to Chinese to participate in socialist construction.⁴⁴⁰

Coincidentally, at the disastrous height of the Great Leap Forward and collectivization, the Chinese minority in Indonesia suffered from the anti-Chinese government-led economic actions, which exacerbated the already existing anti-Chinese sentiment among non-Chinese Indonesians. These anti-Chinese acts in 1959-60 were directly triggered by Taipei’s aid to regional rebellions against the central government in Jakarta.⁴⁴¹ Even the repatriation cost was burdensome, especially during the time of economic difficulties, the PRC government eventually received the overseas Chinese refugees to disperse the suspicions about the overseas Chinese as China’s fifth column.⁴⁴² The PRC’s official policy was to relocate around 100,000 refugees from Indonesia of rural working class background to the overseas Chinese farms in Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan. Lands were rationed for this surplus labor force so they could build homes and grow tropical produce such as coffee, rubber, pepper, and coconuts.⁴⁴³

An Unsettled Anti-Imperialist Haven: The PRC and the Indonesian Exiles

The overseas Chinese students and laborers were not the last batch of Indonesian migration to the PRC in the 1960s. The anticommunist pogrom in 1965-66 forced hundreds of Indonesian to become political refugees in the PRC. Similar to the story of Thomas Sinuraya’s *Comite Luar Negeri PKI* (CL-PKI; the Overseas Committee of the Indonesian Communist Party) endorsed by the Soviet Union after 1965, the remaining Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members in the PRC formed *Delegasi Comite Central-PKI* (CC-PKI; Delegation of the PKI Central Committee), which was officially recognized by the CCP, around early 1966 under Jusuf Adjitorop’s leadership. Whereas pre-1965 Aidit’s PKI tactfully circumvented the Sino-Soviet split and insisted on Indonesia’s geo-historical specificities, post-Aidit PKIs fractionalized along the more intensified split that can be characterized most simply as the Maoist armed struggle versus Soviet peaceful

⁴³⁹ *Dagongbao* (Beijing) 7 June 1958., quoted in Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 159.

⁴⁴⁰ Liao, Chengzhi, “Woguo qiaowu gongzuo fazhan de sange jieduan” [], in Liao Chengzhi wenji [], ed. Zhuanji bianji bangongshi, vol. 1, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 338-44., quoted in Peterson, *Overseas Chinese*, 159.

⁴⁴¹ Zhou, *Migration*, 115-6.

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, 125.

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, 201.

resistance. The *Delegasi*'s theoretical contributions are beyond this dissertation's scope but it is of relevance to at least learn about the major *Delegasi* members' internationalist activities.

The North Sumatran PKI's Politburo member Jusuf Adjitorop had been undergoing medical treatment in China since June 1964. He then represented the PKI as its "delegation" head at the anniversaries of the PRC's establishment on October 1st both in 1964 (together with Tjoo Tik Tjoen and Suharyo) and 1965. His authority as the PKI's delegation head for the PRC's celebration transferred automatically to the *Delegasi*. PKI's official delegation for the October 1st celebration in 1965 comprised about 500 Indonesians.⁴⁴⁴ After the news about the military putsch on September 30th reached them in various capacities, some risked returning home and less than half of the original delegation remained in the PRC. Wikana, the once communist youth activist and then a PKI legislative member, was one of the more high profile PKI figures who decided to return to Indonesia, got arrested on arrival, and mysteriously disappeared a year later.⁴⁴⁵

Unlike the well-connected and expansive post-1965 leftist fronts in the Soviet Union and Europe made possible by the pan-European student network, the *Delegasi*'s main members came exclusively from either the original *Delegasi* or Indonesian internationalist leftists abroad convinced by the CCP's anti-revisionist line. Some members of the former category included the Sumatrans Mohamad Zaelani and Nung Cik AR from the parliamentary delegation; leftist painter Basuki Resobowi from the artists' delegation; progressive journalist Supeno from the journalists' delegation; left nationalist Sidik Kertapati; labor union activist Suparna Sastra Diredja; East Java PKI secretary Ruslan Kamaluddin; and former Semarang mayor Abdulmadjid Djojoadingrat. Notable members of the latter category were leftist diplomats and leaders of the left internationalist organizations.

Soeraedi Tahsin Sandjadirdja, Djawoto, and Sukrisno belonged to the diplomat's contingent. A former ambassador to Mali in 1965, Soeraedi stood down in 1966 and relocated to China with his family after spending the intervening period in France. Tahsin was a journalist by training. His journalism thoroughly immersed in the leftist atmosphere which included being a co-founder of the PKI's Academy of Journalism Dr. Rivai in 1964, an editor of the progressive newspaper *Bintang Timur*, a general secretary of the Union of Indonesian Journalists (PWI; *Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia*), and an Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA)'s member.⁴⁴⁶ Djawoto, another journalist with an ambassadorial duty, came from the non-communist left tradition of the Indonesian socialists and had long served as editor-in-chief of the national news agency *Antara* and the Union of Indonesian Journalists' chair before becoming an ambassador to China and Mongolia in 1964.⁴⁴⁷ He resigned from his post in 1966 and returned to his erstwhile role as secretary-general of Beijing-based Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, which he led in 1963.⁴⁴⁸ The last journalist-turned-ambassador Sukrisno quit his post in Hanoi in 1966

⁴⁴⁴ Hill, David, 2020, "Cold War Polarization, Delegated Party Authority, and Diminishing Exilic Options: Dilemma of Indonesian Political Exiles in China after 1965," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 176: 340.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 343.

⁴⁴⁶ Hill, "Cold War," 347.; Triyana, Bonnie, 2007, "Soeraedi Tahsin Sandjadirdja: Tokoh Pers Nasional Asal Banten yang Terlupakan" [Soeraedi Tahsin Sandjadirdja: The Forgotten National Journalist from Banten], *Lambung Banten: Pusat Dokumentasi Pusaka Banten*. Available at: <https://lambungbanten.wordpress.com/2007/10/20/soeraedi-tahsin-sandjadirdja-tokoh-pers-nasional-asal-banten-yang-terlupakan/>.

⁴⁴⁷ Hill, "Cold War," 343.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 346.

and moved to the PRC afterward. He established *Antara* branch in New York in 1955 and served as an ambassador to Romania in 1960 before being reassigned to North Vietnam in 1965.⁴⁴⁹

Pro-rector of the PKI's Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences Ashar Sucipto Munandar, chair of the PKI's Europe Committee and secretary of the World Federation of Trade Unions Setiati Surasto, head of the Indonesian representative of Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization in Cairo Ibrahim Isa, and member of the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association Umar Said joined the *Delegasi* after they decided to be based in China. Daughters of the PKI Politburo members Ibarruri Putri Alam or Ibarruri Sudharsono (D.N. Aidit's daughter) and Tatiana Lukman (M.H. Lukman's daughter) also chose to stay in China after 1965. Ibarruri followed her conviction by moving to Beijing from Moscow and later spent a year practicing medicine with the Burmese People's Army in Burma as a part of her revolutionary education.⁴⁵⁰ Tatiana later migrated to Cuba in 1974 and taught after receiving a degree in Spanish and French.⁴⁵¹ Sobron Aidit, D.N. Aidit's brother, had also been living and teaching Indonesian studies in Beijing since 1964, but it was unclear whether he was formally affiliated with the *Delegasi*. Having been expelled from the Soviet Union, the last eminent figure of the *Delegasi* and once a representative of the World Federation of Democratic Youth Suar Suroso arrived in Beijing in 1967. He then got resettled in Nanchang, the provincial capital of Jiangxi. Taomo Zhou and David Hill's studies verify that the CCP designated Nanchang as the Southeast Asian Communist exiles' haven where government guesthouses for political refugees were located.⁴⁵²

The *Delegasi* represented the PKI in China and at pro-Chinese international fraternal party events. Adjitorop and Munandar, for instance, attended the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Labor Party in November 1966, which was also the first international appearance of the CC-PKI delegation.⁴⁵³ Thanks to the China-Albania anti-revisionist connection and Jusuf's personal relationship with the Albanian Communist Party, the main *Delegasi*'s theoretical publication, the *Indonesian Tribune*, a monthly English-language journal, along with its publishing house Indonesia Progresif were instituted in Tirana in 1966. An Indonesian-language student organ of the Indonesian Students' Association (PPI) in Albania, *Api Pemuda Indonesia* ('Flame of Indonesian Youth'), was also published in Tirana.⁴⁵⁴ Their publications in the PRC itself included *Berita Pertimbangan* ('News for Consideration') and *Suara Rakyat Indonesia* ('Voice of the Indonesian people'). Both Radio Tirana and Radio Beijing reserved airtime for Indonesian-language broadcasting. With the relocation to Beijing of Ibrahim Isa, Indonesian representative in the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, monthly bulletins were issued by the *Organisasi Internasional Solidaritas Rakjat-Rakjat Asia-Afrika* (OISRAA; 'Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity'), attacking the anticommunist regime and promoting Mao Zedong's thought. Many English-language theoretical works by the *Delegasi* also appeared in *Peking Review* and *Afro-Asian Journalist*.⁴⁵⁵ The *Delegasi* slowly ended as its members began leaving China for the West during or after the Cultural Revolution and as they passed away. Hill

⁴⁴⁹ Santosa, Teguh, 2010, "Hanya Sahabat Bung Karno, Ayah Saya Tidak Terlibat G30S" [Just Bung Karno's Friend, My Dad Was Not Involved in the G30S], *Teguh Santosa*. Available at: <https://teguhtimur.com/2010/06/30/hanya-sahabat-bung-karno-ayah-saya-tidak-terlibat-g30s/>

⁴⁵⁰ Hill, "Indonesian," 633 fn.52.

⁴⁵¹ Hill, "Cold War," 361.

⁴⁵² Zhou, *Migration*, 260 fn.73.; Hill, David T., 2010, "Indonesia's Exiled Left as the Cold War Thaws," *RIMA: Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* 44, 1: 35.

⁴⁵³ Hill, "Cold War," 351.

⁴⁵⁴ McVey, "Indonesian Communism and China," 390 fn.43.

⁴⁵⁵ Hill, "Cold War," 353.

notes with somberness the state of the *Delegasi*'s organization: "It was leadership by default, not design. There was no mechanism for the replacement of incompetent or ill delegation members, nor for the recruitment or rejuvenation of party cadres. Exile accounts reveal the decades from 1965 to 1986 were marked by dissolution and dismay, and, ultimately, the disbanding of the leadership in exile."⁴⁵⁶

The PKI, Maoism, and Third World Futures

This part is not yet a comprehensive examination of the relationship between Maoist internationalism and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)'s Marxism-Leninism. This task cannot be undertaken until this dissertation thoroughly studies the vast compendium of PKI's theoretical works, which is the next chapter's goal. The guiding question for this preliminary and transitional part to the next chapter is rather specific to the historical material and epistemic conditions of the PKI. It asks why most leftist non-specialist on Indonesian Marxism have the impression that the PKI in the 1950s-60s was decidedly Maoist despite any affirmative evidence. I suggest that the provisional answer to this question offers us insights to link Maoist internationalism to third world internationalism, especially on Maoist internationalism's oversight of the third world's geo-historical materiality.

Many impressions about the PKI as Maoist, I surmise, come from the PKI's closer alignment to the CCP in the Sino-Soviet split. I also suspect the use of Maoism there was synecdochal, referring more colloquially to Mao's China or Mao as a person rather than Mao's praxis. This question of "which Mao"—as illuminating as the question "which Marx"—becomes more muddled after the global appropriation of Maoism from the mid-1960s onwards when global Maoism had a real abstract life of its own and differentiated itself from the CCP's Maoism. That was the period after the demise of the PKI, which is not our concern. The Maoism discussed here is still contained in the CCP form.

Because the PKI, which, I would wager, operated within the Europhilic structure, perceived and esteemed the Soviet Union as the legitimate leader of the international communist movement since its inception in 1920, its adherence to the Soviet Union never swayed. The PKI turned to the CCP only after the CPSU explicitly cooperated with the US and mistreated a "small" communist party—a key concern of "peripheral" Marxism that will come up later—like the Albanian CP in the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in October 1961. Before 1961, the CCP regarded the PKI in the 1950s as, to use Taomo Zhou's words, "unlike-minded comrades" who fluttered between the two opposing communist values: on the one hand, independence, autonomy, and equality among fraternal communist parties, and deference to CPSU's leadership, on the other.⁴⁵⁷

Opposing the CPSU's line in 1963, the PKI endorsed the CCP's programs that critiqued Soviet modern revisionism and promoted third world anti-imperialism without abandoning its commitment to peaceful parliamentary politics and revolutionary collaboration with the national bourgeoisie. The PKI's endorsement of the CCP's political-economic analyses became clear in Aidit's address to the personnel of the CCP CC cadre school during his visit to the PRC in September 1963.⁴⁵⁸ His critiques of Soviet revisionism, American imperialism, subjectivism, and

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 365-6.

⁴⁵⁷ "Recent Activities of Foreign Communist Parties," May 11, 1959, CFMA doc. 105-00980-02., quoted in Zhou, Taomo, 2015, "Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965," *The China Quarterly* 221 (Mar.): 221.

⁴⁵⁸ Aidit, D.N., 1964, *The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia: Report Delivered at the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on September 2, 1963*, Peking: Foreign Language Press.

dogmatism earned him the title “brilliant Marxist-Leninist theoretician” by Peng Zhen, the Beijing mayor and the main liaison between the CCP and the PKI.⁴⁵⁹ The PKI justified its decision not to follow the CCP’s model of peasant insurrection, guerrilla tactics, and people’s war using geo-historical reasons. D.N. Aidit, the PKI’s Chairman from 1951-1965, argued in 1955 that Indonesia’s historical unfolding did not allow the Indonesian Communists to accumulate war experience and build up the repertoire of resistance tactics, unlike the CCP during the Long March and the anti-Japanese resistance. He also pointed out the particular Indonesian geographical conditions disadvantageous for guerrilla warfare. The archipelagic terrain annulled the possibility of taking refuge at the “unruly forested borderlands,” an exemplary space for rebellious acts, and isolated Indonesia from the neighboring communist allies, which may prevent the possibility of enemy encirclement. Indonesia’s insular geography differed from inland China’s mountainous ranges and its closer proximity to the Soviet Union.⁴⁶⁰ These specific geo-historical conditions of Indonesia necessitated the PKI to practice its own Marxism in the same way pre-1917 Bolshevik and pre-1949 CCP did before their successful communist revolutions were theorized, codified, exported, and subsequently reified. Both the CPSU and CCP’s discourses and practices of different conjunctures gained traction in the PKI and none seemed to absolutely dominate PKI’s Marxist-Leninist praxes. Even if Maoism could be an intellectual infrastructure “in the air,” there was simply not enough concrete evidence to identify the PKI under Aidit’s leadership as Maoist. A turn to the more radical and “dogmatic” Maoism as a critique of Aidit’s “revisionist” peaceful stance—identified as the cause of PKI’s violent destruction—though, arose with great vibrancy after the anticommunist pogrom of 1965 both among the PKI-in-exile in the PRC and Albania, and the surviving PKI’s guerrilla cells mainly in Central Java, East Java, and North Kalimantan with South Blitar in East Java as the quasi-headquarter.

What then does Maoist internationalism or its illusion limit and enable the PKI, which I take as one of the representatives of third world Marxism and internationalism? My cursory reading of the PKI’s engagement with the differences between the Chinese and Soviet lines above suggests that the PKI partook in the intra-communist polemic insofar as its geo-historical material conditions permitted. This reading was consistent with the PKI’s indifferent response to the Stalin-Trotsky and the early Third International debates in the 1920s. The PKI’s objective was not yet a participation in the power play of the two ruling communist parties as the PKI recognized its own vulnerable political position in Indonesia and, for that matter, the world. The PKI rejected Soviet revisionism because Soviet-American co-operation precipitated anticommunist armed rebellions in Indonesia and conflicts between Indonesia and the neighboring anticommunist or pro-colonial countries, absolutely belying Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence ideology. On the other hand, the PKI did not follow the Chinese anti-revisionist call for armed struggles as its recent history of devastating defeats—both in the 1948 Madiun Affairs (comprador elites’ crackdown of the communists) and 1951 anticommunist razzias—behooved the PKI to take a non-violent route in co-operation with the national bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, this non-violent quest for restitution and accumulating more forces for anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist purposes brought the PKI closer to Mao’s political-economic and structural analysis of capitalism-imperialism nexus along with the role of third world anti-imperialist struggles in abolishing this system. The PKI aligned with the CCP here from the geo-historical rather than theoretical standpoint, though they

⁴⁵⁹ Mortimer, Rex, 1974, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 133-4.

⁴⁶⁰ Aidit, D.N., 1955, *Lahirnja PKI dan Perkembangannja* [The Birth and Growth of the PKI], Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 29-31.

were not mutually exclusive. In other words, I am staking a claim that PKI's parliamentarism should not be understood as revisionist but a concrete production conditioned by Indonesia's geo-historical reality, akin to Mao's anti-dogmatic, situational, and diagnostic mode of analysis in *On Contradiction* and *On Practice*, or even in *New Democracy*. When the CCP acknowledged the PKI as its anti-revisionist ally, it might already have conceived the PKI's peaceful path as non-revisionist or, in another possibility, it was just strategically condoning PKI's practical contradiction to gain its alliance. Either way, the PKI's antinomy between anti-revisionism (Chinese line) and peaceful resistance (Soviet line) has not been theoretically clarified either by the CCP or PKI. It is precisely here, I want to suggest, where the PKI's practical contradiction could be subsumed under the label "Maoist" by some leftist scholars and could be condoned by the CCP's theorists points to both the limit and promise of Maoist internationalism.

The Maoist "peripheral" form of internationalism—which this dissertation identifies as neo-Marxist-Leninist, third worldist, and anti-imperialist—neglected the diverse and contradictory, in this dissertation's term, geo-historical material conditions of the third world. This dissertation agrees with Enver Hoxha, the Chairman of the Albanian Communist Party and "internal" critic of Maoism, in his critical evaluation of Mao's third world as lacking a concrete class analysis. In the 1979 *Imperialism and the Revolution*, Hoxha argued:

The Chinese leadership takes no account of the fact that in the "third world" there are oppressed and oppressors, the proletariat, and the enslaved, poverty-stricken and destitute peasantry, on the one hand, and the capitalists, landowners, who exploit and fleece the people, on the other. To fail to point out this class situation in the so-called Third World, to fail to point out the antagonisms which exist, means to revise Marxism-Leninism and defend capitalism. In the countries of the so-called third world, in general, the capitalist bourgeoisie is in power. This bourgeoisie exploits the poor people in its own class interests to make the largest possible profit for itself and to keep the people in perpetual slavery and misery.⁴⁶¹

In other words, the Maoist internationalist conception of the third world was metaphysical and abstract. The third world itself, to use Mao's own terms, teemed with contradictions and cannot be taken as an anti-imperialist given. To be sure, Hoxha waged this critique of Mao's third worldism when the CCP reestablished its relations with Nixon and Kissinger during the height of the Vietnam War, whose critical register ironically paralleled the CCP when it disparaged the USSR-US co-operation.⁴⁶² Nonetheless, this dissertation maintains that Hoxha's critique of Mao's third world is valid even for the period before the CCP's rapprochement with the US.

Yet, Maoist internationalism's utopian presupposition about the anti-imperialist socialist future, conceived almost as the "objective law" or historical progression, efficaciously invigorated many other struggling anti-imperialist *and* anti-capitalist forces, especially in decolonizing Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to consolidate and press on. In Mao's conversation with a group of Indonesian Congressmen in 1964, he articulated his idea of historical development: "the Soviet Union emerged from the First World War; China and many other socialist countries came out of

⁴⁶¹ Hoxha, Enver, 1979, *Imperialism and the Revolution*, Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, 261.

⁴⁶² See: Hoxha, Enver, 1982 [1971], "It is Not Right to Receive Nixon in Beijing. We Do Not Support It: Letter to the CC of the CP of China," in *Selected Works*, vol. 4, Tirana: The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House (6 Aug. 1971).

the Second World War; and imperialism will perish in a Third World War.”⁴⁶³ This implied quite literally that, for Mao, third world anti-imperialism was the highest stage of communism that sublated its previous stages of anti-feudalism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism. In a similar vein, the conversation between China and Indonesia’s foreign ministers in 1965 addressed this same anti-imperialist future that was even more specific to one third world country. Chen Yi told Subandrio, the speculated successor of Soekarno, the following:

Ask the Soviets: What is socialism? Should it be British Labor Party’s socialism? Or the Vatican’s socialism? Or Khrushchev’s socialism? Or Lenin and Stalin’s socialism? Or Mao Zedong’s socialism? Which is it? President Sukarno firmly opposes imperialism and colonialism. Anti-imperialism and anticolonialism will become socialism in the future! If one wants to build socialism, learn from Sukarno’s socialism.⁴⁶⁴

This vision of anti-imperialism as communism’s most advanced form animated the PKI and the left nationalists to imagine Indonesia as a participant of the world revolution led by the decolonizing nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other global regions, where, according to this analysis’s logic, world imperialism was the weakest. The PKI’s joint statement with V.G. Wilcox, General Secretary of the pro-Beijing New Zealand Communist Party in June 1964, for instance, emphasized that “Blows must be continuously aimed at imperialism, and it is correct to concentrate these blows in those places where world imperialism is the weakest, in the storm centers of revolution as now exist in the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”⁴⁶⁵ Similarly, the PKI’s joint statement with Kenji Miyamoto, General Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party in September 1964, asserted: “The experiences of the people’s struggle ... in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, have proved the utter falseness of the assertion that US imperialism represented by Kennedy and Johnson is ‘sensible’ and ‘peace-loving.’”⁴⁶⁶ Maoist “peripheral” internationalism, despite or precisely because of its limits, generated new forms of third world Marxism and internationalism based on their geo-historical materialist specificities.

⁴⁶³ “Mao Zhuxi jiejian Yinni hezuo guohui yizhang Aluqi tanhua jilu” [Minutes of the Meeting between Chairman Mao and the Chairman of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly], June 9, 1964, no. 105-01336-02, CFMA., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 135.

⁴⁶⁴ “Chen Yi fuzongli tong Yinni fuzongli Subandeliyue huitan jilu” [Conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio], January 24, 1965, no.105-01910-05, CFMA., quoted in Zhou, *Migration*, 117.

⁴⁶⁵ “Joint Statement of the Communist Parties of New Zealand and Indonesia,” 1964, *Peking Review* 25 (19 Jun.): 14.

⁴⁶⁶ “Joint Statement of the Communist Parties of Japan and Indonesia,” 1964, *Peking Review* 38 (18 Sep.): 21.

Chapter 3

Third World Internationalism Beyond Bandung: Peripheral Accumulation, Circulation Struggles, and Anti-Colonial Sublation

A proliferating scholarship in transnational history and more historically-minded postcolonial studies in the past two decades celebrates the 1955 Bandung Conference (*Konferensi Asia-Afrika* in Indonesian) as the exemplary world-making force for the Global South. Specifically, this gathering of 29 African and Asian nations in Indonesia epitomizes the Afro-Asian anticolonial internationalist united front against European colonialism.⁴⁶⁷ Such a Bandung form of internationalism, this dissertation suggests, only culminates as the sum of each Afro-Asian nation-states' individual elitist nationalisms. Diplomacy, not solidarity, and international relations, not internationalism, were its concern. With this composition, Bandung third world internationalism inevitably accommodates rather than seeks an alternative to the capitalist-imperialist system. In fact, the concerns over "Soviet imperialism" or communist infiltration divided the Bandung participants, resulting in a compromise that buttressed the capitalist and imperialist world order. Many anti-imperialist, but also staunchly anticommunist, governments from the Bandung Conference later coalesced into the 1961 Non-Aligned Movement. Samir Amin, the Egyptian left internationalist, appreciates Bandung as the first "awakening of the South" leading to a collective action in the periphery, but with an important caveat: it was the first with a comprador bourgeois face.⁴⁶⁸

This chapter studies third world internationalism of a different kind, one that is more Marxist, more leftist, and staggeringly critical of the imperialism-capitalism nexus. Osmany Cienfuegos, the Tricontinental Conference's chairman, once described the legendary Moroccan left third-worldist thinker Ben Barka as a leader who "fought furiously to prevent the mystic from replacing revolutionary practice."⁴⁶⁹ The "mystic" here refers to what Cienfuegos calls the "Bandung Cult," as opposed to the third world's communist praxis that this chapter sets out to investigate. If a contemporary return to Bandung expresses a political and intellectual desire to resurrect a common national, popular, and democratic Southern front as an alternative to the Northern neoliberal crisis, this chapter contends that such a return is misguided. To quote Amin once again, the Bandung project is nothing but "dominant comprador blocs."⁴⁷⁰ Left third-worldist internationalism, this chapter proposes, offers a more robust intellectual-historical resource for thinking an alternative beyond the global capitalist-imperialist nexus. It asks scholars mesmerized by "the Bandung Cult" to be more attentive to the Bandung material, in addition to the famed

⁴⁶⁷ Authoritative studies include Tan, See Seng, and Acharya, Amitav, 2008, *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, Singapore: NUS Press.; Lee, Christopher J., 2010, *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, Athens: Ohio University Press.; Finnane, Antonia, and McDougall, Derek, 2010, *Bandung 1955: Little Histories*, Caulfield: Monash University Press.; Yoon, Duncan, 2014, "Cold War Africa and China: The Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau and the Rise of Postcolonial Literature," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California-Los Angeles.; Pham, Quynh N., and Shilliam, Robbie, 2016, *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions*, London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield.; Eslava, Luis, Fakhri, Michael, and Nesiah, Vasuki, 2017, *Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical Pasts and Pending Futures*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.; Lewis, Su Lin, and Stolte, Carolien, 2019, "Other Bandungs: Afro-Asian Internationalisms in the Early Cold War," *Journal of World History* 30, 1-2 (Jun.): 1-19.

⁴⁶⁸ Amin, Samir, 2009, "Beyond Bandung: Awakening of the South," *Pembazuka News* 455 (29 Oct.).

⁴⁶⁹ Cienfuegos, Osmany, 1967, *Ben Barka: Tricontinental Leader*, N.pl. [Havana]: OSPAAAL, 5.

⁴⁷⁰ Amin, Samir, 2017, "The Sovereign Popular Project: The Alternative to Liberal Globalization," *Journal of Labor and Society* 20 (Mar.): 19.

notion of the Bandung spirit or *semangat Bandung*, and to the subaltern—in the manner Anup Singh describes the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization as the "Peoples' Bandung."

Following Frantz Fanon and developing from Mao Zedong, the chapter shows that third-worldism is not inherently leftist but teems with contradictions. Only organized struggles of the oppressed and the exploited from the Tricontinental and other colonized zones—whom Fanon collectively calls the damned of the earth (*Les Damnés de la Terre*)—could retool third-worldism into both an anti-capitalist *and* anti-imperialist force. The chapter makes another related claim that these third world's contradictions concretely manifest the material unevenness of capitalist-imperialist development, compared to the Soviet Union and China's more abstract and idealized communist constructions of the third world based on their individual interactions with these countries.

The chapter examines this left third-worldist internationalism by tracing intellectual-historical foundations of Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), the Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity (OISRAA), and the Tricontinental Conference through conference speeches, organizational documents, and archival materials. It primarily investigates the thoughts of revolutionaries directly involved with the AAPSO, the OISRAA, and Tricontinental Conference in conversation with other canonized left third-worldist thinkers. The examined figures include Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, Ben Barka, Amílcar Cabral, Che Guevara, Sylvia Wynter, Sharaf Rashidov, Khaled Mohieddin, Felix-Roland Moumié, Sirajuddin Abbas, Maarouf al-Dawalibi, Anoushavan Arzumanyan, Soekarno, Ibrahim Isa, and Francisca Fonggidaej. Central to left third-worldism are rigorous analyses and trenchant critiques of the capitalist-imperialist nexus in its totality: national liberation and socialism against neocolonialism (politics), autocratic economy, delinking, and peripheral accumulation opposing capitalism (economy), and the creation of new man to counter systemic dehumanization (society).

Indonesian internationalists—particularly the Indonesian representative to AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat, Ibrahim Isa, and members of OISRAA, the Indonesian branch of AAPSO—produce their own left third-worldist praxis through an engagement with the Tricontinental politics based on Indonesia's geohistorical-material situation. Responding to the continuing Dutch colonization of West Papua in 1962, Isa calls upon Asian, African, Latin American, and Australian workers to disrupt Dutch imperialist logistics at the docks and airports. This dissertation reads such circulation struggles as an innovatively materialist solution that takes into account the third world's irreplaceable role in animating the imperialist lifeline. Indonesian internationalists further advance their praxis of circulation struggles, from boycotting ships and planes to liquidating foreign military bases—a material foundation for neocolonial expansion in the periphery—in the 1965 anti-base conference called Kiapma. At the Tricontinental Conference, organized after Indonesia became the one of the early revolutionary states to fall for right-wing counter-revolution, Isa perceptibly conceptualizes this phenomenon as Indonesia's new principal contradiction between the people and the reactionary army.

The chapter's subheadings highlight the most important, and probably most debatable, ideas of each section. The three sections are arranged chronologically from the 1957 AAPSO Conference to a period when the West Irian and "neocolonial" Malaysian questions were actively discussed in the OISRAA from 1960-1965, and the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, with which the chapter concludes. "Third World Internationalism beyond Bandung" begins with multiple articulations of left third-worldism and the capitalist-imperialist nexus in the 1957 AAPSO Conference, where participants discuss the third-worldist economic practice akin to what Amin calls peripheral accumulation. The open-ended question—a false binary perhaps—is whether

peripheral accumulation facilitates the postcolonial nation's transition to socialism, or it only further subsumes the postcolony into capital.

The chapter then moves to the West Irian question that forcefully exposes Indonesia's contradictory status as simultaneously a neo-colonial and an anticolonial nation. This section looks at both West Papuan and Indonesian internationalist framings of their decolonization struggles. The former appeals to Black internationalism and the Black Pacific for solidarity, whereas the latter utilizes its established prestige in the Afro-Asian network. The section follows Indonesia's role in shaping the anticolonial praxis in Afro-Asian forums, from Soekarno's conceptualization of the new world at the UN to Lekra's poetry about Lumumba distributed at the Afro-Asian Writers' meeting, AAPSO's first attempt at theorizing neocolonialism at its Council Meeting in Bandung, Isa's call for circulation struggles at the AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat meeting, and the anti-bases Kiapma Conference held in Jakarta. As mentioned earlier, this dissertation views Isa's articulation of circulation struggles, expounded during this West Irian episode, as a uniquely left third-worldist solution to capitalism-imperialism conceived as a world-system, given that the other communist options at that time were the CPSU (the Soviet Communist Party)'s peace struggles, CCP (the Chinese Communist Party)'s peasant insurgencies, and national liberation movements' guerrilla warfare.

This chapter's final section deals with the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Cuba—a peripheral country to the US that sublates communism and decolonization. It closely reads Ben Barka's political-economic formulation of left third-worldism in the 1963 AAPSO Moshi Conference, along with Amilcar Cabral and Che Guevara's iconic speeches, which provide theoretical bases for the Tricontinental Conference, in contrasted to Julius Nyerere's idealist and moralist version of third-worldism called Ujamaa. The section ends with the contestation between two Indonesian delegations at the Tricontinental that precisely manifests the third world's internal contradiction between the revolutionary and reactionary forces. The chapter then concludes with a critique of third world internationalism that defaults to the nation-state as the foundation for building anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist hegemony.

Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO): Left Third-Worldism and the Capitalist-Imperialist Nexus

AAPSO's Prehistory

An explicitly Marxist form of third-world anticolonial internationalism that gained prominence in the 1950s-1960s took an incipient organizational shape only two weeks before the famed Bandung Conference.⁴⁷¹ From April 6th to 10th, 1955, the Indian branch of the World Peace Council (WPC)—a semi-autonomous Soviet “front”—organized an Asian Conference for Relaxation of International Tension or, in short, the Conference of Asian Countries in New Delhi to discuss pro-peace agendas for Asian countries.⁴⁷² The conference originated in the discussions among the Japanese (Fukushima Yoichi, member of Japan Science Council), Indian (Rameshwari Nehru), and Chinese delegations in the 1954 WPC-sponsored World Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension in Stockholm. Ongoing neocolonial military and economic intervention in Asia—for example, the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the US military bases in the

⁴⁷¹ This section develops from the pioneering works of Caroline Stolte, Vanessa Hearman, Katherine McGregor.

⁴⁷² Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1957, *The Asian Solidarity Committee*, CIA-RDP78-00915R000700150013-4, 1, 5 (Nov.), Web, Accessed 17 Sep. 2020.

Pacific Rim territories—compelled these activists to propose an Asia-specific organizational forum. A more concrete trigger for the urgency to initiate peace and anti-nuclear movement in Asia came from an incident called Lucky Dragon 5 (*Daigo Fukuryū Maru*). This tuna fishing boat from Shizuoka, Lucky Dragon 5, carried to shore 23 Japanese crewmen who were all contaminated by the fallout from the US Castle Bravo thermonuclear weapon test at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.⁴⁷³

Issues discussed in the conference included: prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, colonialism and foreign interference in the affairs of Asian countries, the danger of military pacts and bases in Asia, admission of the People's Republic of China to "its rightful place" in the United Nations, peaceful reunification of Korea, and racial discrimination in South Africa.⁴⁷⁴ Delegates of "unofficial" capacity came from 13 countries: China, Japan, North Korea, India, Ceylon, Burma, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Soviet Union, among others.⁴⁷⁵ Indonesian delegates were missing understandably because the date was too close to the Bandung conference. After the conference, participating countries set up their own Asian Solidarity Committee to implement the New Delhi conference's resolutions. The Japanese Asian Solidarity Committee established a few months after the Delhi Conference was involved in organizing the first World Conference against A&H Bombs in Hiroshima, in which many Delhi Conference participants were invited.⁴⁷⁶ Charles Neuhauser notes that the Bandung Conference's flexible, diplomatic, and conciliatory approach presented a stark stylistic contrast to Asian Solidarity Committees' reliance on mass agitation and propaganda.⁴⁷⁷

Regardless of its different political orientation, this communist Delhi conference shared with the statist Bandung conference in that they both built upon *Panch Shila*. *Panch Shila*—first emerged from the 1954 India-China joint declaration—consisted of five Westphalian principles emphasizing state's territorial sovereignty, namely: mutual respect, non-aggression, non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.⁴⁷⁸ The Bandung conference further developed this *Panch Shila* into *Dasasila* (the Ten Principles) in its final communiqué. There were two major adjustments: *Dasasila* annexed itself to the U.N. Charter and became more explicit about the notion of race. In this document, race as a social category were not reducible to nor was it exchangeable with the nation and the people. The third principle of *Dasasila* states: "Recognition of equality among all races and all nations, big and small."⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷³ Matashichi, Ōishi, 2011, *The Day The Sun Rose in the West: Bikini, The Lucky Dragon, and I*, trans. Richard H. Minear, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

⁴⁷⁴ *Renmin Ribao* 13 Apr. 1955., quoted in Neuhauser, Charles, 1968, *Third World Politics: China and Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-1967*, Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 5.

⁴⁷⁵ "Reds Urge World to Give Up Arms: Conference Held in India Asks Ban on Experiments with Atomic Weapons," *The New York Times* 11 Apr. 1955, 5.; CIA, The Asian Solidarity Committee,

⁴⁷⁶ More details about the history of the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyōgikai or Gensuikyō in short), read: Totten, George O. and Kawakami, Tamio, 1964, "Gensuikyō and the Peace Movement in Japan," *Asian Survey* 4, 5 (May): 833-41. For the Japanese Communist Party's involvement with the Gensuikyō and the latter's internal division caused by the Sino-Soviet split, read: Murthy, P.A. Narasimha, 1964, "The Japanese Left and the Anti-Nuclear Movement," *International Studies* 5, 3 (Jan.): 281-295.

⁴⁷⁷ Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 7.

⁴⁷⁸ CIA, *The Asian Solidarity Committee*, 6.

⁴⁷⁹ Kahin, George, 1956, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

The 1957 AAPSO Conference

Gaining third-worldist prestige from nationalizing the Suez canal and winning over the Israeli, British, and French tripartite forces in the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egypt was chosen by the Asian Solidarity Committee to host an Afro-Asian anticolonial conference on December 26th, 1957.⁴⁸⁰ Four Asian Solidarity Committee's secretaries traveled to Egypt and persuaded the Egyptian President Gamel Nasser: Anup Singh (Indian National Congress member), Yang Shou (the All-China Federation of Trade Unions' Minister of Arts and Culture), Anatoly Sofranov (chief editor of the Soviet newspaper *Ogonek*), and Masaharu Hatanaka (Japan Council for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs' member).⁴⁸¹ Like other anticolonial bourgeois nationalists whose alliance with communism is at best strategic and calculated, Gamel Nasser shifted from his initial anticommunist position to cooperating with the third world and Egyptian left to raise Egypt's international profile.⁴⁸² Abou-El-Fadl notes that the conference delegation included Free Officers (Nasser's nationalist group that instigated the 1952 anti-monarch Egyptian Revolution), liberal, and recently released Marxist intellectuals. Some luminaries included Egypt's foremost man of letters Taha Hussein, celebrated novelists Nagib Mahfouz and Ihsan Abd Al-Qudus, influential journalists Muhammad Hussanein Heikal, Ahmad Bahaa' Al-Din, and Zakariyya Lutfi Gum'a, and exiled leftist Free Officer Khalid Muhyi al-Din (or Khaled Mohieddine). Nasser selected two military statesmen to keep the Conference in check: senior Free Officer Anwar Sadat as preparatory committee and conference Chair, and Yusuf Al-Siba'I as Secretary. Both Sadat, a close confidant of Nasser and former secretary of the short-lived Islamic Congress, and Al-Siba'I, a military intelligence-turned-novelist, came from right-leaning political backgrounds.⁴⁸³

The Conference organizers added the terms Afro and peoples to the Conference's name, from Asian Solidarity to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference. Anup Singh described this conference as the "Peoples' Bandung" because the participants only consisted of activists, unionists, journalists, and artists rather than political elites.⁴⁸⁴ Around 500 participants from 44 Afro-Asian countries and the Soviet Union, along with European and Latin American observers, plus a handful of American journalists, filled the University of Cairo's auditorium where the meeting took place.⁴⁸⁵ This conference subsequently founded the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity

⁴⁸⁰ Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 11.; Abou-El-Fadl, Reem, 2019, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub: Infrastructures of Solidarity and the 1957 Cairo Conference," *Journal of World History* 30, 1-2 (Jun.): 164-5, 172.

⁴⁸¹ Anis, Muhammad, 1958, *Al-Mu'tamar Al-Asiyawi Al-Ifriqi* [The Asian-African Conference], Misr: Sharikat al-I'lanat al-Sharqiyah, 198., quoted in Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's," 172.

⁴⁸² 'Abd-al-Malik, Anwar, 1968, *Egypt, Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change under Nasser*, New York: Random House, 116, 264-73.

The CIA document highlights the intermediary role of Muhammad Fuad Jalal in connecting the Afro-Asian Solidarity committees with Nasser. Jalal was a deputy speaker of the Egyptian National Assembly, a participant in the Arab People's Conference sponsored by Middle East Peace Partisans in September 1956, and later a member of the Egyptian National Committee of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization. In November 1956, at the All-India Peace Congress in Calcutta, he praised Afro-Asian solidarity on the Egyptian issue, as well as the PRC where he had recently visited.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1958, *The Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, Cairo, Egypt — Dec. 26 – Jan. 1, 1958*, CIA-RDP78-00915R000700140014-4, 4, 13, Web, Accessed 29 Dec. 2020.

⁴⁸³ Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt," 173, 186.

⁴⁸⁴ *Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference*, 1958, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 65.

⁴⁸⁵ CIA, 8.

Jack Homer reports 201 delegates from 19 African countries: Egypt (84), The Sudan (18), Algeria (12), Italian Somaliland (11), Zanzibar (10), Cameroons (6), Ethiopia (6), Tunisia (6), Uganda (5), French Somaliland (5), French West Africa (5), Ghana (5), Morocco (5), Nigeria (5), Kenya (4), Libya (4), Madagascar (4), Somalia (4),

Organization (AAPSO) and its national branches. Nasser entrusted Yusuf al-Siba'I with Permanent Secretariat's Chairman.⁴⁸⁶ Located in Cairo, the Permanent Secretariat was comprised of largely left-leaning representatives from 11 countries, including the USSR, the PRC, Japan, India, Indonesia, Uganda, Congo, Guinea, Cameroon, Algeria, and Iraq.⁴⁸⁷ Later in 1963, South Vietnam, Angola, Kenya, Tanganyika, and South Africa were added.

Left Third-Worldism

This dissertation seeks to make one point extremely clear: Third-worldism is not inherently leftist. The view that assumes every form of third-worldism as homogeneously leftist—shared among anti-imperialist nativist, undialectical postcolonialist, and third-worldist dogmatist alike—bears semblance to evolutionism and lacks historical specificity. Many left third-worldists have made this point, but among the earliest, if not also most powerful, articulations (or prophecies) came from the Martinican revolutionary, Frantz Fanon. Then the world systems Marxists like Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, and Walter Rodney, along with Fanon's contemporaries like Oliver Cox and Amílcar Cabral, developed this argument further with a clear Fanonian lineage. With the most visceral and psychologically stimulating language, Fanon describes the seamless, yet obscene, transition from colonial to national oppression and the multiple contradictions therein as the following:

The people then realize that national independence brings to light multiple realities which in some cases are divergent and conflicting. At this exact moment in the struggle, clarification is crucial as it leads the people to replace an overall undifferentiated nationalism with a social and economic consciousness. ... The prospect of a national flag or independence does not automatically result in certain segments of the population, giving up their privileges and their interests. The people realize that there are indigenous elements in their midst who, far from being at loose ends, seem to take advantage of the war to better their material situation and reinforce their burgeoning power. ... The militant who confronts the colonialist war machine with his rudimentary resources realizes that while he is demolishing colonial oppression, he is indirectly building another system of exploitation. Such a discovery is galling, painful, and sickening. It was once all so simple with the bad on one side and the good on the other. The idyllic, unreal clarity of the early days is displaced by a penumbra, which dislocated the consciousness.⁴⁸⁸

The earlier part of the passage illuminates the “divergent and conflicting” multiple realities and the “differentiated” understandings of the national condition. The middle part shows the mediating indigenous elements—whether they are the comprador, national, or petite bourgeoisies—who continue to reproduce the colonial *and* capitalist structure. The last part portrays the appalling continuity between the colonial and national regimes of exploitation and oppression. The term “penumbra” reiterates the national, and for that matter, the third world's contradictoriness as opposed to the clear Manichean world of colonization.

Togoland (2). 28 delegates from the Soviet Union represented the official communist government. The rest of the communist countries (China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam) sent 70 delegates in total.

Jack, Homer A., 1958, “The Cairo Conference,” *Africa Today* 5, 2 (Mar.-Apr.): 3-5.

⁴⁸⁶ Neuhauser, *Third World Politics*, 13.

⁴⁸⁷ CIA identifies Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, Syria rather than Uganda, Congo, Guinea, and Algeria.

⁴⁸⁸ Fanon, Frantz, 2004 [1961], *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox, New York: Grove Press,

A common approach to what this dissertation is calling third-worldism's "minimal foundational leftism" comes from an understanding of the capitalism-imperialism nexus in its totality: a racialized international division of labour between the white, exploiting, oppressing colonizer and the dark, exploited, oppressed colonized.⁴⁸⁹ This line of thought can be traced to the shared understanding, though formulated differently, among Lenin's *Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism* (1916), Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy* (1915), and Rosa Luxemburg's *Accumulation of Capital* (1913), all developed from Marx's section on "The Secret of Primitive Accumulation" in *Capital* Volume 1. It is a transposition of the general Marxist, often racialized, scheme of the capitalist-proletariat stratification onto the globe. The colonizer resembles a capitalist who exploits the colonized, who, in turn, provides the resources and labor for a capitalist. The generic third world's resistance to the capitalist metropole's formal colonization through forceful legal and physical subjection makes third-worldism leftist only at the level of the international division of labour. It is *only* in this particular sense, in a fleeting historical moment, that Benedict Anderson's type of popular nationalism can be progressive because of its anti-imperialism and vocation against the proletarianization of the South.⁴⁹⁰ James Blout goes as far as calling anti-imperialist nationalism an external class struggle for state power when a ruling class is external or "foreign."⁴⁹¹

But, third-worldism itself teems with contradictions. The third world anti-colonial—often heterosexual male, elitist, Westernized, ambiguously secularist, and lighter-skinned—radicals always became a national bourgeoisie and a capitalist state manager once they assumed national power. They habitually forsook the working class, women, the subalterns, the peasants, the ethnic minorities, the stateless, and other national *others*. Hence, it requires a laborious revolutionary work to retool third worldism into both an anti-imperialist *and* anti-capitalist hegemonic force at both international *and* local levels. Rather than a romanticized and mystified abstraction unified artificially from above, the third-worldist favorable term *people* must be treated as "always differentiated and incomplete product of political projects emerging from subaltern grounds or ... constellations of multiple political forces rooted in differentially structured social relations of (super-)exploitation and domination."⁴⁹² Developing from Gramsci and Fanon, Panagiotis Sotiris suggests that the internally-differentiated conception of the people must be attentive to its

⁴⁸⁹ My understanding of the co-constitution of racism, colonialism, and capitalism comes from what Azfar Hussain calls Fanon's political economy of racism and colonialism, which I see as contemporary to Oliver Cox's framework but preceding Cedric Robinson's racial capitalism. Reiland Rabaka's attempt to think Fanon as both a Marxist and decolonial thinker is equally helpful. The term "dark" I borrow from Vijay Prashad.

Hussain, Azfar, 2006, "Toward a Political Economy of Racism and Colonialism: A Rereading of Frantz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth*," in *Race and the Foundations of Knowledge: Cultural Amnesia in the Academy*, eds. Joseph Young and Jana Evans Braziel, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 127-44.; Rabaka, Reiland, 2011, "Revolutionary Fanonism: On Frantz Fanon's Modification of Marxism and Decolonization of Democratic Socialism," *Socialism and Democracy* 25, 1: 126-45.; Prashad, Vijay, 2008, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World*, New York and London: New Press.

⁴⁹⁰ Anderson, Benedict, 2006 [1983], *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London and New York: Verso.

⁴⁹¹ Blout, James M., 1987, *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism*, London and New Jersey: Zed Books.

⁴⁹² Ekers, Michael, Kipfer, Stefan, and Loftus, Alex, 2020, "On Articulation, Translation, and Populism: Gillian Hart's Postcolonial Marxism," *Annals of the American Association of Geographers* 110, 5: 1588.

“common condition, present and struggle” against capitalism, imperialism, and racism while delinking it from “ethnicity, origin, or common history.”⁴⁹³

We will see the third world’s contradictions manifested in the dual genealogy of the AAPSO conference and the various anti-imperialist commitments of the participating nations. Otherwise, the AAPSO conference would have been named “The First Congress of the Afro-Asian Communist Parties.”

The Soviet Afro-Asian Discourse

Sharaf Rashidov, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, wrote a prefatory essay “Great Assembly of Eastern Peoples” to a compilation of the conference speeches printed by Moscow’s press. The Central Asian origin of Rashidov was crucial for the Soviet’s mediation with the Third World. Just a year prior, to give another example, Tajik communist party’s ex-leader Bobojon Ghafurov was tasked to direct the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies founded in 1956. Tashkent, the Uzbek capital, hosted the first Afro-Asian Film Festival and the inaugural Afro-Asian Writers Congress in September and October 1958 consecutively.⁴⁹⁴

Liberated, the peoples of Asia and Africa, for Rashidov, “have become an irresistible force that must be reckoned with.”⁴⁹⁵ Rashidov likens the decolonizing and freedom-seeking “peoples” to the seasonal metaphor of spring—signifying rebirth, regeneration, vitality, and awakening—as opposed to the winter of colonialism. Rashidov’s seasonal metaphors function teleologically rather than circuitously. The blossoming spring only progresses towards the utopian summer “when Nature generously rewards the labour of man with aromatic fruits,” without cyclically repeating a new winter. Rashidov writes: “We gained the conviction that the peoples freed from the chains of colonialism cannot be shackled again, just as it is impossible in spring to bring winter back. The peoples still bearing the yoke of colonialism will inevitably gain their freedom, just as spring inevitably supersedes winter.”⁴⁹⁶ This teleological, unilinear, and stadial understanding of the seasonal metaphors illustrates the dominant temporal framework among the Party Marxists at that time with very few exceptions.

Similar to Khrushchev in his 1956 report on imperialism and decolonization to the 20th CPSU Congress, Rashidov invoked Lenin to show Soviet Communism’s long-standing commitment to the sovereignty of the “Eastern peoples.” In Rashidov’s words, “We recalled the prophetic words of Lenin who said that a time would come when the Eastern peoples would be the masters of their own destiny and when each people would take part in deciding the destinies of all mankind.”⁴⁹⁷ This notion of the Eastern peoples as their own masters—a notion which subverts the oppressive colonial master-slave relationship—invigorates innumerable speeches in the conference.

⁴⁹³ Sotiris, Panagiotis, 2017, “From the Nation to the People of a Potential New Historical Bloc: Rethinking Popular Sovereignty through Gramsci,” *International Gramsci Journal* 2, 2 Gramsci on Factory Councils / Gramsci in Today’s World: 79.

⁴⁹⁴ Djagalov, Rossen, 2020, “The Tashkent Film Festival (1968-1988) as a Contact Zone,” in *From Internationalism to Postcolonialism: Literature and Cinema Between the Second and the Third Worlds*, Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press. For further discussion of Tashkent as the showcase space for Third World visitors to the Soviet Union, see Stronski, Paul, 2010, *Tashkent: Forging of a Soviet City, 1930-1966*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 202-34.

⁴⁹⁵ *Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference*, 12.

⁴⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

While Lenin conceived the national liberation in the semi-colonies and colonies as “a thing of the future” due to their twin anti-imperialist and anti-monopoly capitalist goals, Rashidov witnessed the simultaneous unfolding of Afro-Asian emancipation in full force in the present.⁴⁹⁸ They were “of the [communist] future” for Lenin because both Western and Eastern European nationalisms during the time of his theorizing (pre-Bolshevik revolution) took imperialist and capitalist bourgeois forms. This was also the reason Lenin saw Europe as backward and Asia as advanced.⁴⁹⁹ Even in his 1919 address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, Lenin could only do as much as prophesizing about the Eastern revolutions made more viable by the Bolshevik revolution’s success. Lenin’s “prophecy” in this address—Rashidov and Khrushchev’s source—reads: “[A]ll the [awakened] Eastern peoples will participate in deciding the destiny of the whole world, so as not to be simply objects of the enrichment of others. The peoples of the East are becoming alive to the need for practical action, the need for every nation to take part in shaping the destiny of all mankind.”⁵⁰⁰

Rashidov’s essay draws a genealogy of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference from two Afro-Asian anti-colonial, anti-war, and anti-racist conferences in 1955: the Marxist revolutionary Delhi and the liberal diplomatic Bandung.⁵⁰¹ While everyone admitted Bandung as a precursor to AAPSO, only participants within the communist circuit acknowledged the Delhi conference. The former manifested through a complete endorsement of Bandung’s Ten Principles in AAPSO’s closing Cairo Declaration. Among the latter were Indian third worldist feminist organizer Rameshwari Nehru and Anup Singh, who was well-connected to the World Peace Council and, hence, the Delhi conference.⁵⁰² Besides Nehru and Singh, those who recognized the Delhi conference in their speeches included Nasser himself, and Syrian ex-National Economy Minister and professor of law Maarouf al-Dawalibi.⁵⁰³

We see here a reluctant confluence of third world anticolonialism and Sino-Soviet discourses on peace—conceived of as a critique of imperialist aggression and the thermonuclear threat—which was propagated at that time by a range of characters from the World Peace Council to Khrushchev and Zhou Enlai.⁵⁰⁴ “Delegates of the Soviet Union,” Rashidov writes, “were here as brothers in the struggle for peace.”⁵⁰⁵ He further states: “[T]he forces of the Eastern countries... now play an outstanding part in extending the Peace Zone, in fighting the decayed piratical system of imperialism...”⁵⁰⁶ Rashidov’s twofold genealogy of the conference demonstrates a very particular moment in international communism at the height of the Sino-Soviet alliance and before the PRC’s sharp militant turn during the Great Leap Forward in 1958.

The unproblematic acceptance of Bandung’s Ten Principles, which was sanctified through the UN Charter, also meant undeniable complicity with the subterranean *third* genealogy, namely, UN Northern liberal internationalism. The combination between the liberal internationalisms of

⁴⁹⁸ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], “The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 22: December 1915-July 1916, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 150-52.

⁴⁹⁹ Lenin, V.I., 1963 [1913], “Backward Europe and Advanced Asia,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 19: March-December 1913, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 99-100.

⁵⁰⁰ Lenin, V.I., 1965 [1919], “Address to The Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of The Peoples of the East,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 30: September 1919-April 1920, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 160.

⁵⁰¹ *Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference*, 12.

⁵⁰² *Ibid.*, 56, 65.

⁵⁰³ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁵⁰⁴ I discuss this issue in more detail in a chapter on Soviet internationalism.

⁵⁰⁵ *Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference*, 10.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

the South (Bandung) and the North (UN), while suppressing the leftist strand, explains third world project's later endogenous neoliberal transformation manifesting in the South Commissions (1987-90) and BRICS (2009-).⁵⁰⁷

Afro-Asian Solidarity

Within the Afro-Asian robust communist milieu, the ethos of bursting out of “bloc politics” to generate a new left and third worldist politics prevailed. This ethos affirmed the third world left's autonomy, that declared itself irreducible to Soviet proxies or Chinese satellites, even as their politics aligned.⁵⁰⁸ Though accepting the Bandung's statist framework as AAPSO's foundation, Rameshwari Nehru declared her sentiment against the bloc: “We are tired of blocs for we know that this—formation of blocs—has led the world to suffering and misery. It has solved no problem, on the contrary, it has created them and made them practically insoluble. It has given rise to suspicion, hatred, enmity, and the cold war, which has made life impossible.”⁵⁰⁹ *Pace* Nehru, this dissertation contends that it is impossible to get out of the bloc unless third worldism itself came up with a political praxis that made the bloc concept irrelevant or abolished it altogether. Al-Dawalibi, the former Syrian National Economy Minister, argued in his speech for an emancipatory and internationalist concept of solidarity that superseded the aggressive and exclusionary bloc:

We are not meeting to make our solidarity a bloc for exploitation and aggression, but a human and brotherly solidarity which will help liberate those countries of Asia and Africa that are still under the yoke of imperialism, that will establish the pillars and foundations of the independence of those countries already liberated, and work for the purpose of developing and extending the economy of all, for improving the conditions of the peoples. ...

While the solidarity and cooperation of us, the people of Asia and Africa, aim at our own good and at world peace, there are bloc whose cold aim is to strengthen political imperialism and economic exploitation, or both together. ...

In short, the peoples of Asia and Africa find themselves faced with a combination of imperialist states for the purpose of continuing the exploitation of their vast resources and preventing their liberation and solidarity. For this reason, these people feel today, more than at any other time in the past, the need for cooperation, assistance and solidarity among themselves in order to stand up to the imperialists' new assault and in order to abolish economic and social backwardness and low living standards.⁵¹⁰

Al-Dawalibi's usage of solidarity as a replacement of bloc demonstrated a stronger connection between anti-imperialism, internationalism, and a *third worldist* reconstruction of the economy of “the peoples” in a manner akin to a disembodied and redistributionist socialism, rather than an

⁵⁰⁷ Prashad, Vijay, 2012, *The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South*, London: Verso.; Clover, Joshua and Benanav, Aaron, 2014, “Can Dialectics Break BRICS?,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, 4: 743-59.; Benjamin, Bret, 2018, “Developmental Aspiration at the End of Accumulation: The New International Economic Order and the Antinomies of the Bandung Era,” *Mediations* 32, 1 (Fall): 37-70.; Shivji, Issa G., 2019, “Whiter Africa in the Global South? Lessons of Bandung and Pan-Africanism,” in *Reclaiming Africa: Scramble and Resistance in the 21st Century*, eds. Sam Moyo, Praveen Jha, and Paris Yeros, Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 257-69.

⁵⁰⁸ During its time, AAPSO was routinely accused and at times dismissed by liberals and imperialists as being too radical, too communist, or merely a Soviet/Chinese front.

⁵⁰⁹ *Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference*, 57.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 155-6.

outright anti-capitalism at the point of production. This is an extremely critical issue to leftist third worldism, to which we will return. Resonating with Rashidov earlier, Al-Dawalibi framed this transformation towards decolonizing solidarity as a progressive “move[ment] with the times ... in which the life of individuals, groups, and nations depends in great measure on effective solidarity and real cooperation.”⁵¹¹ This shows once again the utopian undercurrent of mainstream third worldism, which conceived of decolonization as an inevitable and irreversible process.

The discussions on continuing and intensifying colonial violence in the conference already questioned peaceful struggles’ privilege and viability as an exclusive means for Third World emancipation. Against Rameshwari Nehru’s vision of the non-bloc third world, ironically, these discussions foreshadowed the various unfortunate splits that happened soon after, including the Sino-Soviet split, the Bandung-Non-Aligned split, the communist-socialist feud, the rifts along the revolution-reform spectrum, and most devastatingly, the deathmatch between the communists and the anticommunists. Instances of colonial violence discussed included an ideological-territorial dispute between the PRC and Taiwan, wars causing divisions in Somaliland and Equatorial Africa, continuing colonization of Western Irian, Goa and Okinawa, American regional military blocs Baghdad Pact (Middle East), SEATO (Southeast Asia) and NATO (North Atlantic), nuclear bomb testing in the Pacific and the Sahara, Apartheid in South Africa, settler colonialism in Palestine, the Cold War partitioning of Vietnam, Korea and Yemen, and, most pertinently, the Algerian struggle against the French.

Al-Siba’I, AAPSO’s Secretary-General, offered an intriguing proposition on this war and peace dialectics in his speech. He formulated the peoples of Africa and Asia as having an agency to “impose ... peace on those who are in a position to wage war” precisely because “they themselves are the instruments which war-mongers use and the cannon fodder which they employ.”⁵¹² He contended that the colonized peoples themselves are the instruments and causes of war. For the former, Al-Siba’I implied that they are laboring bodies deployed by the colonial administration and economy to work for the metropolises’ causes. For the latter, they were the legitimate possessor of their nations’ land and raw materials that the colonizers competed with each other for plunder. He decried: “Our land and our raw materials have been and still are the spoils for which warring groups struggled, and for which we ourselves were sacrificed.”⁵¹³ Yet, Al-Siba’i’s dream of the Afro-Asian peoples imposing peace on the imperialists did not realize itself. He attributed the main impediment for world peace to the unfreedom caused by aggressive colonialism and monopolies. In his powerful plea: “We do not want war; we do not profit from it, and yet it is waged for us. It is fed by our corpses, and yet we cannot stop it. Why? Because we are not free.”⁵¹⁴ Al-Siba’I saw the solution to the colonial desire for war and monopoly in socialized international cooperation of self-ruling postcolonial countries in a platform like AAPSO. He wrote:

It is for us to dispose of our lands and resources the way we desire; we want to live for ourselves, not to die for them. We shall devote ourselves, our raw materials, and our lands to the peace and prosperity of the world, not for its destruction and annihilation. If we unite, we can shake off the yoke of monopolies, of aggressors. We can impose the price of our raw materials on them in the same way as they impose the prices of their manufactured

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁵¹² *Ibid.*, 51.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*

articles on us. Let us unite to safeguard our threatened independence, to achieve freedom for those still deprived of their independence...⁵¹⁵

The AAPSO conference's eight agenda came from the Preparatory Committee's deliberation: peoples' sovereignty, colonialism, the Algerian problem, racial discrimination, nuclear weapons, economic cooperation, cultural exchange, and women and children. Experienced and respected activists presented in their fields of specialization.⁵¹⁶ Each had its own assigned speakers whose "revolutionary" knowledge on the topic was acknowledged. This deliberative process allowed for more radical problematics relevant to the third-world left to emerge, compared to the country-report format of the Bandung Conference.

Actually-Existing Leftist Anti-Imperialisms

After reviewing the three historical forms of post-Comintern internationalist anti-imperialism from Soviet to Chinese and third world in the previous chapters, this dissertation argues that the third world's articulations of leftist anti-imperialist internationalism in the AAPSO Conference took into account the specific geo-historical material unfolding of global capitalism-imperialism. Two actually-existing leftist anti-imperialisms, on the other hand, involved different levels of abstraction.

The CPSU assigned anti-imperialism's priority as secondary to its revisionist program of averting the nuclear war through cooperation with the US, a rising neocolonial capitalist power. Besides sporadic financial aids and techno-military assistance, not one anti-imperialist struggle occupied a significant position in the CPSU's "revolutionary" war of attrition against capitalism-imperialism. Thus, anti-imperialism for the CPSU was an abstract and vacuous theoretical proposition.

In contradistinction, the CCP centered its anti-imperialism on the peripheral third world, or, in its own former parlance, the intermediate zone. Yet, the partial abstraction came from the CCP's utopian and near-monolithic understanding of anti-imperialism, approximating an intimately constructed theory or ideal type, not via colonial orientalism but through a framework of comradesly semblance. It was a prescriptive projection of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist world that the CCP wanted to see. The CCP's anti-imperialism, as a result, did not sufficiently configure the ongoing geo-historical and material realities of highly disparate and internally differentiated third world's situations.

The third world's account of leftist anti-imperialism rectified the full and semi-abstractions above by registering the material unevenness of capitalist-imperialist development. In no way unified, third-world anti-imperialist internationalism combined the unevenly developed geo-historical formations interacting and structured in the capitalism-imperialism totality. The more

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 51-2.

⁵¹⁶ These luminaries included Khaled Mohieddin (Egyptian leftist Free Officer) on peoples' sovereignty, Felix-Roland Moumié (leader of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon) and Sirajuddin Abbas (a member of the Indonesian traditionalist Muslim organization PERTI) on colonialism, Alah Hasan (representative of the Algerian National Liberation Front) on the Algerian problem, Mohammad Ahmad Mahgoub (Sudanese Foreign Minister) on racial discrimination, Kaoru Yasui (head of the Japan Council for the Prohibition of A&H Bombs) on nuclear weapons, Maarouf al-Dawalibi (former Syrian Economy Minister), Tokutaro Kitamura (former Japanese Finance Minister), and Anoushavan Arzumanyan (director of the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations) on economic cooperation, Chu Tunan (chair of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries) and Taha Hussein (Egyptian modernist writer) on cultural exchange, and Aisha Abd al-Rahman (Egyptian female writer) on women and children.

the third world itself qualitatively engages with leftist anti-imperialisms from peripheral locations, the more leftist anti-imperialisms become concretized—and universalized, as a particular universal.

Logical, Historical, and Contemporary Colonialism

Developing further largely formal and abstract anti-imperialist discussions at the Bandung Conference, many AAPSO speeches reiterated the ongoing materialist processes of capitalist exploitation and imperialist domination. This dissertation contends that this conjunctural understanding of capitalism and imperialism as co-implicated is specific, though not limited, to the AAPSO discourses, which are representative of the “leftist” strand of third-worldist internationalism. AAPSO thinkers conceived of the capitalist-imperialist conjuncture in a variety of combinations. Some emphasized one side more than the other, but both were thought together in an interconnected totality. Khaled Mohieddin (Egyptian leftist Free Officer), Felix-Roland Moumié (the leader of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon, assassinated by the French secret service agent in 1960), and Sirajuddin Abbas (a member of the Indonesian traditionalist organization PERTI) all examined different modalities of the capitalist-imperialist conjuncture in their concrete geo-historical situations, namely, Egypt, French Africa, and Indonesia under three different colonial regimes of the British, the French, and the Dutch. These three presentations deftly distilled imperialist domination’s specific logics and processes and inventoried the transition from European colonialism to American neocolonialism. As some of the speeches implied, the formal national independence did not mean an achievement of substantive freedom and sovereignty. It instead did represent a significant milestone in a protracted war against imperialism.

Indirect Recolonization: Trading Companies and Regional Pacts

Mohieddin suggested that imperialism “reflected its evil doings on the whole system of international life,” rather than just “on the countries immediately under its yoke.”⁵¹⁷ The struggles for colonies, the competition for controlling colonial markets, and the imposed customs regime for imported products—Mohieddin’s examples of the violent “evil doings” on the whole international capitalist-imperialist system—“have caused the history of the world to be written in blood and fire.”⁵¹⁸ Egypt, for example, “was for a long time nothing more than a British cotton farm labouring for Manchester and Lancashire.”⁵¹⁹ After WWII, Mohieddin analyzed that imperialism could no longer resort to its “old methods of direct conquest and military occupation in the great majority of lands” because of the ever-growing anti-imperialist nationalist resistance.⁵²⁰ In a period when erstwhile colonized countries gained independence, Mohieddin identified trading companies as proxies of imperialistic governments in depriving the wealth and resources of the newly independent states. Imperialist domination persisted at the independent state’s “certain centres and important key positions,” enabling its “return through the back door” to “compel the national movement to retrace its steps.”⁵²¹ Mohieddin presented this as a caution to the re-colonization of the Suez Canal Company, considered “an important key position” by the French and the British even after its nationalization. The colonizers could always use their remaining domination in sectors of the Company to take it over, which then provided “a pretext for returning to Egypt at

⁵¹⁷ *Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference*, 74.

⁵¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁵²⁰ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*, 79.

the appropriate moment.”⁵²² This new colonial method of latching onto “key positions” in an independent state, Mohieddin pointed out, carried on its classical operation of acquiring and possessing land and resources of others, once justified through the “beautiful and fascinating names” of civilizing mission or white man’s responsibility.⁵²³

Another imperialist method replacing a direct occupation involved a signing of unequal treaties and pacts “grant[ing] the imperialistic powers the right to establish military bases and to use civil and military aerodromes and to influence their national economy in a way advantageous to imperialism.”⁵²⁴ Mohieddin saw this imperialistic economic assistance to the independent governments through unequal treaties and pacts as a creation of political and economic dependency. The Baghdad Pact, packaged as a pact of regional security by the UK and the US, politically and militarily intervened in counteracting anti-colonial nationalist movements in the Middle East. “Acceptance of such pacts,” Muheiddin maintained, “means subordination of the national economy to the principle of war; they are also used as weapons in the present cold war.”⁵²⁵ The Eisenhower doctrine, an ostensibly US economic assistance scheme, forced the aid-receiving governments to surrender their economic interests to America and opposed every attempt at the national industrialization of their own countries. This oppressive effort confined the independent nations’ status to a raw material provider rather than an industrialized competitor. Like Egypt and Syria, those who rejected the Eisenhower doctrine were subjected to continuous American pressure and economic blockade. The acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine and the Baghdad Pact thus “signifie[d] abandoning the policy of positive neutrality, peaceful coexistence and the defence of world peace, namely, abandoning the principles of Bandung.”⁵²⁶ As a final note, Mohieddin also observed that when such “new” imperialist methods (trading company proxies, military alliances, conditional aids, and unequal treaties) did not work, the imperialists would “hysterically” resort to direct attacks like what happened in Port Said—a port adjacent to the Suez Canal where the French-British-Israeli military invasion in 1956 happened. In other words, colonialism executed its operation both through, to use Mohieddin’s words, “the backdoor” or from the inside when dealing with the compliant governments, and “hysterically” through “the front door” or from the outside when its faced resistance.⁵²⁷

Colonialism’s Destruction of Culture and Economy

Thoughts of Senegalese writer Alioune Diop and Martinican communist poet Aimé Césaire on colonialism’s destruction of indigenous culture influenced Moumié’s conception of colonialism. Moumié highlighted colonialism’s justificatory strategy in “alleging racial and cultural inferiority of the colonial peoples and refusing to see any evidence of genuine culture outside Europe and the countries which have assimilated its culture.”⁵²⁸ Moumié’s quotations of Diop and Césaire further elaborated on the totalistic, pernicious impact of colonialism on the damaged lives of peoples without culture, and hence without the creativity to remediate their own physical and spiritual lives—or resist colonialism. “Colonization,” Moumié explained:

⁵²² *Ibid.*

⁵²³ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁵²⁴ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*, 82-3.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁵²⁷ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

in itself is neither an unconscious, harmless action, a mere fortuity, nor, of course, an accident. It is not the result of a philanthropic or charitable act any more than of a civilizing mission. As Aimé Césaire put it, it is a “decisive move by the adventurer and the pirate, the wholesale grocer, and the ship-owner, the gold-digger, and the merchant, a move of greed and force with the ominous shadow, in the background, of a form of civilization which, at a certain moment of its history, finds itself compelled from within to extend the competition between its antagonistic economies to the whole world.” With regard to peoples, it amounts to what slavery is with regard to individuals.⁵²⁹

Moumié linked this totalistic understanding of colonialism’s destructiveness to its political economic motivations in the “Pan-African” resource extraction. Moumié invoked the French FIDES fund, an organization set up in 1946 to replace the 1941 Colonial “Solidarity” Fund, to expose its real material incentive. The French advertised FIDES as a charitable fund for investing in the colonies to emancipate them—a delusive colonial rhetoric for deferring national independence. On the contrary, Moumié contended that the FIDES fund perpetuated the French extractive economic system where the colonies were included as France’s overseas territories to continue the resource extraction. Moumié determined that the colonial legal inclusion of the colonies as “overseas territories” through a treaty was both the cause and consequence of (neo)colonialism, manifesting yet again a “bloc,” against which the AAPSO activists combatted.⁵³⁰ “By virtue of this treaty,” Moumié asserted, “it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the independent Afro-Asian countries to trade freely with countries inhabited by their brothers, merely because the latter are still under colonial domination.”⁵³¹

Dutch Colonialism and Indonesia’s Sea Sovereignty

Similar to Mohieddin and Moumié’s articulations of the capitalist-imperialist conjuncture in Egypt and French Africa, Abbas based his analysis on Indonesia’s extended physical experience with Dutch colonialism and its jubilant end:

[T]he Indonesian people are fully informed of the nature of imperialism, because they have been subjected to various kinds of oppression, enslavement, and colonization for more than three and a half centuries. ... [A]ll the members of the Indonesian delegation ... were born and brought up under the rule of the ominous Dutch imperialists. But we are still considered among the fortunate people because many of our fathers and forefathers were born and died during that detested [*sic*] era of imperialism.⁵³²

Abbas affirmed the Bandung anti-colonial spirit that denounced the evil of “colonialism in all its manifestations” as this spirit returned to the Indonesian incarnation: “Indonesia opposes all kinds of imperialism no matter where it comes from. The Indonesian people will fight against imperialism with all their might, in accordance with the principles that we adopted jointly at the Bandung Conference of 1955.”⁵³³ Abbas persistently framed the Indonesian anti-imperialist struggle as one of internationalism. He acknowledged “the efforts and support of the friendly

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.*, 95-6.

⁵³¹ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁵³² *Ibid.*, 104.

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

nations..., which fully realized the objects of our struggle, above all our brothers, the Afro-Asian nations...” for helping Indonesia achieve independence.⁵³⁴ He also called for Afro-Asian solidarity with Algeria, Palestine, Cyprus, Taiwan, South Arabia, the Cameroons, and the Ifni part of Spanish Sahara in modern-day Morocco, before bringing up the more controversial dispute over West Irian between postcolonial Indonesia and the Netherlands.

Abbas’s account of the Dutch obduracy in holding on to West Papua, its last colonial territory, strikingly resonated with Mohieddin’s description of colonialism’s “hysterical” mode activated when it was dying. To refer once again to Mohieddin’s visceral delineation, “when imperialism is dying, it may commit lots of stupidity, or, in a moment of folly, may throw humanity into the furnace of a world war.”⁵³⁵ While the conflict over West Papua was first resolved in 1962 through the New York Agreement with the temporary administrative transferal from the Netherlands to Indonesia, during the AAPSO conference in 1958, Abbas reported that the Dutch sent the navy to block Indonesia’s territorial waters. The situation as it unfolded was a tug-of-war over Indonesia’s sea sovereignty. The Dutch had long exploited these territorial waters to achieve its governing, commercial, and anti-subversive imperialist objectives.

Reconstructing, Regulating, and Overcoming Capitalism from the Periphery

Capitalism as the Cause of Peripheral Underdevelopment

Capitalism as a material force became a more direct object of political-economic analyses in Maarouf al-Dawalibi and Anoushavan Arzumian’s presentations on the economy, compared to Mohieddin, Moumié, and Abbas’s emphasis on colonialism. Al-Dawalibi began his speech by locating the violent and oppressive *longue-durée* history of capitalism-imperialism from the Renaissance. “Instead of the Renaissance bringing good and mercy to humanity,” Al-Dawalibi asserted, “it brought evil and suffering upon all except a group who claim privileges over others and arrogated to themselves the natural right of life and survival. They imposed upon others the duty of servitude and surrender...”⁵³⁶ Particularly in Asia and Africa, capitalism-imperialism plundered their raw materials, dumped products at the colonial markets, and imposed an apartheid regime on the local population. The telos of capitalism-imperialism, Al-Dawalibi pointed out, was to “mak[e] the economies of these two continents appendages to the economies of the dominating and imperialist countries. The imperialists were able therefore to impose their economic might over the peoples of these continents for a very long time.”⁵³⁷ The colonized, then, “remain[ed] weak and deprived of all the essential requirements of human life, chained without being able to free themselves from slavery and enslavement.”⁵³⁸ In a very brisk manner, Al-Dawalibi explained the co-constitution of capitalism and imperialism in Europe, which then developed by underdeveloping, exploiting, and oppressing Asia, Africa, and other peripheries of the world, preventing the latter from revival and remediation, independence and sovereignty.

Al-Dawalibi deployed UN statistics of per capita production in 1949 showing a vast discrepancy between the imperialist states (USA, UK, Belgium, Holland, France) and “economically backward” countries (Egypt, Syria, Iran, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Abyssinia, Indonesia) to prove the point that “the exploitation of these vast resources by the

⁵³⁴ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁵³⁵ *Ibid.*, 86.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*

imperialist states led to a lowering of the standard of living of the Asian and African peoples, and the lowering of their standard was accompanied by rising standards in the dominating countries.”⁵³⁹ In other words, to quote Fanon, “Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.”⁵⁴⁰ Again, with the means of UN statistics, Al-Dawalibi observed that the manufacturing or developed countries in the 1950s paid less than 60 percent of the manufactured materials it used to offer back in 1870 for the same amount. He inferred from this fact that “the imperialist manufacturing countries are at present more greedy and exploiting the backward countries more than they did eighty years ago, and are now paying 40 percent less, although the prices then were [already] low and unjust.”⁵⁴¹ Al-Dawalibi here articulated one of the fundamental problems of capitalism-imperialism, namely, the immiseration of the selected population—the colonized—to serve the capitalist accumulation at the imperialist centers. Disgusted and infuriated by this colonial injustice, Al-Dawalibi stated:

You will not find in the dictionaries of all languages a word that would express and describe those horrible and shameful acts—the least that can be said about them is that they are theft, robbery and a crime against the rights of the peoples of the two continents, preventing them from any advancement and progress in the field of life, sovereignty and freedom.⁵⁴²

Al-Dawalibi saw in Afro-Asian peoples “the right to assert and emphasize that these differences in prices, and this excessive exploitation down the centuries and this theft of the world of the countries made it possible for the dominating countries to accumulate capital for their industry and the prosperity of their countries,” or, in short, the right to economic sovereignty.

Like Mohieddin and Moumié, Al-Dawalibi identified aids, treaties, and pacts as neocolonial strategies to keep exploiting and dominating Asia and Africa, so that “they bec[a]me fields of destruction and death.”⁵⁴³ He suggested economic solidarity as a solution. The reason was: “it is no longer possible for any one of the nations of Asia and Africa to eliminate by itself all the evil consequences and effects of imperialist exploitation or to overcome all the obstacles that imperialism places in the way of freedom and development, or to stand alone against the combined and massive attack of the imperialist states.”⁵⁴⁴ Al-Dawalibi’s blueprint for economic solidarity involved 1) collective planning and coordinated resource sharing among Afro-Asian countries; 2) nationalization as a lawful way of ending foreign monopolies; 3) reclamation of exploited capital from the imperialists as national funds for agricultural and industrial development; 4) a higher standard of living of the workers and an improvement of labour’s production; and 5) exchange of technical knowledge.

Peripheral Accumulation and Delinking

In the perspective of value-form Marxism—a German-based Marxist critique of capitalism that this dissertation views as most committed to anti- and post-capitalist praxes in the *North* now—Al-Dawalibi’s proposal for a remedial, reconstructive, and redistributive inter-continental economy of the ex-colonies may yet be another third worldist variation of capitalist reproduction

⁵³⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁵⁴⁰ Fanon, *The Wretched*, 58.

⁵⁴¹ *Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference*, 152.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*, 153.

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*, 158.

⁵⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

of abstract wage labor and, hence, value, rather than an abolition of or a transition away from it. This indeed is the case. Al-Dawalibi's economic solidarity is a subsumption of the third world into capital. An argument proposing anything *less* than value-form Marxism's commitment to abolish value only contributes to the further production, valorization, accumulation, and fetishization of surplus value everywhere, exacerbating the international racialized division of labor between the exploiting and exploited countries. However, this dissertation wagers that value-form Marxism's solution makes sense only if the problem is solely capitalism in its logical, tendential, or categorical form. In other words, this solution does not work as smoothly for *historical* capitalism. It should be clear from the AAPSO presentations such that we do not have to bring in the world-systems, feminist, black, settler-colonial, decolonial, ecosocialist, or other Marxist strands concerning historical capitalism in its global totality to make a point that capitalism develops by folding the non-capitalist outside into its centralized circuit. One primary form this enfolded outside takes is a colony or a periphery, as distinguished from other forms that may range from nature to the rural, the domestic, slavery, peasantry, and social reproductive labor.

This capitalist inclusion, operated from the metropolitan center, subordinates the peripheral colonized outside to the colonizer's needs. It is one mechanism in the process of capital accumulation on a world scale. The process of subsumption into capitalism-colonialism continues even after formal decolonization, which is why decolonization and anti-capitalism are a struggle and a movement, not a given. As Rosa Luxemburg points out, global capital accumulation requires militarism as its executor.⁵⁴⁵ This explains the violent subjugation of colonies to forcefully open their markets, plunder their resources, and exploit their manpower. The colonizers unevenly develop the colonies only to the extent that it serves the metropolitan interests.

Walter Rodney's political-economic study of colonial Africa, among others, contends that the finances of colonial "development" actually came from the colonial exploitation's surplus. The colonizers concealed their surplus' material source by framing colonial development as their own charitable moral acts. But these developmental acts, as Rodney masterfully shows, stunted and captured value creation in the colony. They only minimally enhanced the material wellbeing of the colonial subjects just enough to provide manual labor for the metropolises. Less was invested in innovation, technology, and education. During the economic crisis, the colonial governments may desperately abandon their subjects to malnourishment and leave the lands to famine, letting their "means of production" deteriorate. The paradoxical colonial developmental logic saw the colony as both an indispensable site of capitalist accumulation and a competitive threat. It hence chose to "underdevelop" the colonies in a way most profitable to the metropolises and just adequate for the selected populations' social reproduction.⁵⁴⁶ For the unprivileged sectors in the colony, colonialism simply oppressed them. It calculatingly maintained the colonial "backwardness" to block the periphery's growth. In a different formulation by Enrique Dussel that captures the capitalist-imperialist paradox, capital both transcends and maximizes the distance between the metropole and the colony.⁵⁴⁷ Distance-transcending applies to moments of exploitation or extraction, while distance-minimization to oppression.

⁵⁴⁵ Luxemburg, Rosa, 2015 [1913], *The Accumulation of Capital*, trans. Agnes Schwarzschild, Mansfield Centre, CT: Martino Publishing, 439.

⁵⁴⁶ Rodney, Walter, 2018 [1972], *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London and New York: Verso, Ch. 6.

⁵⁴⁷ Dussel, Enrique, 1985, *Philosophy of Liberation*, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky, Eugene, OR.: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 16-21.

The colonial government often left their colonies with massive debts, war debris, and other damaging consequences of underdevelopment. Not only did the postcolonial states possess underdeveloped productive forces, but the existing ones (i.e., the export sector) only benefitted their erstwhile colonizers.⁵⁴⁸ Postcolonial national economies were in a dependent relationship with the external capitalist-imperialist forces, working according to the centers' law of capitalist accumulation.⁵⁴⁹ The international alliance between dominant monopoly capital and its subordinate allies in the periphery continued to submit the postcolony to center-dominated capitalism.⁵⁵⁰

Hence, the postcolonial states' starting point was one of deficiency, subordination, and alienation—a ground minus rather than a ground zero. These postcolonial states often responded to their deficient beginnings with remediation, reconstruction, and redistribution. This is where this dissertation intervenes to defend the third world's early and ephemeral accumulation of a surplus in *historical* capitalism for anti-colonial struggle, self-enrichment, healing, and collective flourishing. It concurs with this episode of surplus accumulation as long as the postcolonial state spends this material surplus directly on increasing collective social wealth and the people's living standards. Collective social wealth here includes knowledge, education, environment, and technology.

Samir Amin calls this moment of capitalist accumulation “peripheral accumulation.” It entails an accumulation sufficient for the circulation of mass consumption—not luxury—goods and socially reproductive necessities. In other words, peripheral accumulation registers a production of surplus that helps create a self-reproducible society in the aftermath of colonial subjugation and destruction. Agriculture, which was intentionally “underdeveloped” by the colonial government, Amin contends, “must overcome its historic backwardness.” This agricultural progress can generate a food surplus and potentially finance industrialization “to guarantee national independence.”⁵⁵¹ The industry must be put in the service of the poor urban masses rather than global capital.⁵⁵² Taking into consideration the episode of peripheral accumulation just described, Amin makes a provocative argument that “the movement for national liberation in the periphery constitutes first a moment in the socialist transformation of the world and only later a phase in capitalist development.”⁵⁵³ For Amin, that socialist transformation refers specifically to the use of surplus for augmenting collective social wealth, and concurrently a class struggle of the popular against the compradors.

This dissertation elaborates on this moment of postcolonial reconstruction, or to use Amin's term, peripheral accumulation, to explain its remedial use of capitalist surplus for social purposes rather than for purely capitalism's sake. It argues against the leftist scholarship that dismisses this moment too quickly as a postcolonial failure to resist and transform the capitalist structure. This dissertation therefore explains and defends the logic of Al-Dawalibi's solution to neocolonial exploitation and domination. As Amin again points out, a reading attentive to the postcolony's historical material conditions and anti-colonial politics needs to understand the national liberation movement's contradictory nature. It is both an expression of capitalist

⁵⁴⁸ Samir, Amin, 1974, “Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model,” *Review of African Political Economy* 1 (Aug.-Nov.): 12-3.

⁵⁴⁹ Samir, Amin, 1980, *Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Crisis*, trans. Susan Kaplow, New York: Monthly Review Press, 136.

⁵⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 145.

⁵⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*, 146.

development and the crisis of capitalism.⁵⁵⁴ The AAPSO acutely captures and expresses this contradiction. Being an embodiment of capitalist contradiction makes the third world an unstable and flexible site of capitalist development. For Amin, this instability endows the third world with exorbitant revolutionary possibilities.⁵⁵⁵ With that said, this dissertation recognizes that historically-specific capitalist accumulation based on self-mediating value, capitalist state, labor-power, and abstract time would not be sufficient to transform labor in a way that enriches rather than impoverishes individuals. As agreeable solutions to post-capitalist transformations are far from being settled, this dissertation leaves this question open for further scrutiny.

Al-Dawalibi's economic solidarity blueprint charts a more internationalist effort to regulate, if not abolish, capitalism. It proposes a collaboration among Afro-Asian nations on resource- and knowledge-sharing akin to an internationalist "mutual aid."⁵⁵⁶ This collaboration happens immanently within the neoimperialist order. If pushed to the most radical end, the other proposal on nationalization aims for no less than the restructuring of the unequal and uneven capitalist system. It reclaims and reappropriates resources and labor from foreign monopolies that dominate the postcolonial national economy. Simultaneously, it also regulates and reduces the export flow corresponding to the level of socially necessary imports (necessities insufficiently produced by the nation's productive forces).

At the national level, nationalization leads to what Amin calls an autocentric economy.⁵⁵⁷ Autocentric economy—one mode of political-economic decolonization—subordinates external capitalist relations to domestic needs, as opposed to a dependent economy, which adjusts internal needs to external imperatives. This autocentric economy ought to have a national foundation and popular content. At the international level, the regulation of exports may lead to a more equal international division of labor and equitable global interdependence rather than a relationship of dependency between the dominant and the dominated. Amin identifies disengagement as the absolute precondition for autocentric economy and collective action in the periphery.⁵⁵⁸ When the autocentric economy organizes its own "system of criteria for the rationality of economic choices based on a law of value" independent of the center's dominating law of capitalist value, it then embarks on a process Amin calls delinking.⁵⁵⁹ Delinking entails a collective struggle against capitalism-imperialism and a radical post-capitalist imagination. It requires both domestic support and internationalist cooperation, specifically an autocentric national-popular economy and third world solidarity.⁵⁶⁰ We may read Al-Dawalibi's blueprint in Amin's political-economic frame as providing a precondition for delinking and a prefiguration of a post-capitalist world.

Amin's delinking bears a close resemblance to Lenin and Trotsky's notion of the weakest link—the "most backward and economically weakest of all the imperialist states" where an uneven global imperialist circuit can be broken. According to this explanation, the proletariat of the most backward imperialist country, namely, Tsarist Russia, becomes the first anti-capitalist force to seize state power.⁵⁶¹ When we think of Lenin and Trotsky together with Amin, we can further conceptualize the third world itself as the weak link in the post-war capitalist-imperialist system,

⁵⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 146-7.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁵⁵⁹ Amin, Samir, 1987, "A Note on the Concept of Delinking," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 10, 3: 436.

⁵⁶⁰ Amin, Samir, 1990, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World*, London: Zed Books.

⁵⁶¹ Trotsky, Leon, 1957 [1936], *Third International After Lenin*, trans. John G. Wright, New York: Pioneer Publishers, 56.

where delinking is more viable. This viability comes from the narrower power and material differentials between the capitalists-imperialists and their opponents in the periphery.

Bandung Economic Principles and the Socialist Aid

Arzumanian, another presenter on the economy, spoke from the Soviet standpoint before the split with the CCP. This standpoint designated a communist state as already in the midst of delinking and building an alternative world political-economic system. Similar to Al-Dawalibi, Arzumanian started his speech by reproaching imperialism. Whereas Al-Dawalibi emphasized imperialism's infliction of miseries and imposition of servitude on the colonies, Arzumanian charged imperialism for severing the existing pre-colonial Afro-Asian connections. Rather than unifying the colonies, imperialist logistical infrastructures like railways and seaports, Arzumanian argued, aimed "to extract the wealth of those countries without hindrance."⁵⁶² Transcolonial connectivity and internationalization of world economic ties thus only served the capitalist-imperialist interests. "The imperialists," Arzumanian contended, "did all they could to prevent development of industry and complex economies in the Afro-Asian countries, which would have enabled them to maintain and expand economic relations with each other"⁵⁶³ This capitalist-imperialist world economy presupposed an "unequal and predatory ... economic relations between various countries."⁵⁶⁴ Arzumanian observed that the post-war national liberation struggles "br[oke] up of the old structure of world economic ties based on inequality and violence." They replaced the old unequal colonial structure with "new relations and new principles of the international division of labour which lead to complete equality of all nations."⁵⁶⁵

Arzumanian's Soviet standpoint entered when discussing a postcolonial economic solution to colonial exploitation. Earlier, we conceptualize industrialization in the postcolony as a reclamation of extracted resources and reconstruction of the nation's productive forces. The Soviet Union, which represented an official communist view of national economic reconstruction, shared this logic. The Soviet Union was, by that time, a practitioner and an advocate of industrialization as a means to achieving economic sovereignty. Arzumanian wrote: "The imperialists go on pushing forward all sorts of plans, designed to retain the capital and technique in their hands and restrict the role of underdeveloped countries to suppliers of raw materials and cheap labor."⁵⁶⁶ Industrialization provided a solution to this reduction of the postcolony to "raw materials and cheap labour" because "it ensure[d] a stable and most rapid growth of income per head of the population and maximum production per unit of investments and also per unit of labor expended."⁵⁶⁷ This rationale rested on the idea that industrialization, an intensification of labour-power, and labor-saving technology would enhance the nation's productivity to the point of economic independence. "It is only by expanding the manufacturing industry," Arzumanian pointed out, "that labour productivity and the national income can be raised to such a level as will make it possible to develop all branches of the economy, including agriculture."⁵⁶⁸ Consistent with his concern about relations, Arzumanian understood the postcolonial industrial development as

⁵⁶² *Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference*, 173.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 174.

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

laying “a firm basis for developing ties between [the postcolonial nations] on new economic principles, and lead[ing] to a sharp increase of trade inside the Afro-Asian group... ”⁵⁶⁹

Arzumanian then identified two potential problems with the “struggle” of the “underdeveloped countries” to establish their manufacturing industry: markets and capital investments. The deployment of the term struggle here pointed to the real hostility that the industrialized colonizer countries directed towards the emerging third world. The colonizers only told their ex-colonies that the colonies’ economic problems were “insoluble” without the colonizers’ intervention.⁵⁷⁰ Arzumanian emphasized throughout that the third world’s solution to industrialization—an economic independence—ought to be based on new non-colonial principles. On the question of markets in the periphery, which was very much dependent on the metropole’s economy, Arzumanian argued that the “technical re-equipment of the entire economy” would increase the whole productive capacity, and hence widen the demands for the industrialized products. Arzumanian encouraged close economic cooperation and mutual trade relations among the third world nations based on “the Bandung principles of equality, mutual benefit, and non-interference in one another’s internal affairs.”⁵⁷¹

For the question of capital investments, Arzumanian began by denouncing robbery and plunder as the colonial approach to capital accumulation. By rejecting colonialism, Arzumanian insisted, “the Afro-Asian countries cannot enter on the path of colonial plunder.”⁵⁷² Arzumanian presented the following alternatives: nationalization, state enterprise, taxing foreign capital and big landlords, regulation of foreign trade, ban on luxury goods import, and Afro-Asian economic cooperation. He added that the specifically socialist mode of accumulation, as practiced by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, involved “the abolishment of private ownership of the means of production, which is replaced by public, state ownership.”⁵⁷³ Arzumanian revealed the American neoimperialist antipathy to the postcolony’s industrialization effort that led to its hypocritical accusation of the postcolonial state’s violation of private property principles:

The U.S. government can exact up to 50 percent of the profits of the joint-stock companies to spend these sums on arms drive, and nobody regards it as a violation of the principles of private ownership. But when a number of public personalities living in the former colonies and belonging to different parties propose to introduce a high tax on the profits of the foreign monopolies, big landowners, and the other big proprietors and use the sums so collected for raising the living standards in their countries through industrialization, this, for some strange reason, is regarded as a violation of the principles of private property.⁵⁷⁴

The phenomena described in this passage dovetailed well with the earlier AAPSO expositions of neocolonialism. American neoimperialism itself built up the state, or more precisely, empire’s capacity to replace European colonialism in dominating the globe. The suppression of the postcolony’s nationalization through physical and discursive means made up the neocolonial anti-third world strategy.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 177-8.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 178.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, 179.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 180-1.

Arzumanian ended his speech with the timely question of foreign aid, again from the Soviet standpoint. He evaluated that, in the post-war milieu, “the highly developed capitalist countries no longer have the monopoly of equipment, machinery, credits, or scientific and technical experience.”⁵⁷⁵ Socialist countries produced enough economic surplus and technical knowledge to assist the third world in developing its autocentric economy. This occurred through the principle of cooperation rather than subordination. Yet, one cannot romanticize: subordination may still happen via consent rather than pure coercion. Forging a “mutually profitable” financial relation with the Soviet Union, Arzumanian suggested, made “the imperialists reconsider their policy of retarding the independent economic development of the underdeveloped countries” and made “them restrain their craving and agree to certain concessions.”⁵⁷⁶ It redefined power relations on a world scale. Arzumanian also reminded the audience that financial aid from capitalist countries was neither “a favor” nor “a real aid” but, echoing Rodney earlier, “an insignificant reimbursement of the debts incurred as a result of colonial exploitation in the course of decades and centuries.”⁵⁷⁷ He referred to the capitalist financial aid as “the gift of the Danae,” namely, the Trojan horse that will later destroy the recipient.⁵⁷⁸

Unconditionality and Bandung principles of equality and mutual benefit underlaid the Soviet’s principles of aid to the postcolonial nations. “The Soviet Union,” Arzumanian claimed, “holds that the underdeveloped countries are entitled to assistance without any conditions—military or political, economic or social—that is to say, such assistance should be rendered in conformity with the Bandung principles.”⁵⁷⁹ Arzumanian particularly attributed the foundation of these international economic relations and comradely cooperation with the third world to the socialist system. Peace, disarmament, and humanity’s survival, rather than war, motivated the socialist financial aid. Arzumanian wrote: “The U.S.S.R. has proposed to the Western powers competition with a view to aiding the underdeveloped countries and facilitating further progress in the life of mankind and not to producing greater quantities of weapons of destruction.”⁵⁸⁰ This starkly contrasted to capitalism which was “replete with examples when advanced powers strangled the incipient industry in backward countries.”⁵⁸¹ Arzumanian pointed out that for the capitalist aid, “military considerations play an extremely negative part” because it brought the aid recipient countries into the war circuit.⁵⁸² Its principle was an unequal exchange, favoring the capitalists-imperialists. Capitalist aid controls the domestic affairs and promotes private enterprise rather than economic independence and public welfare.⁵⁸³ It fostered dependency as opposed to delinking. The AAPSO thinkers above—Mohieddin, Moumié, Abbas, al-Dawalibi, and Arzumanian—all from their specific geo-historical situation, analyzed the mechanisms and maneuvers of the capitalist-imperialist nexus in its totality, constituting what this dissertation calls the left third-worldist mode of theorizing. This left third-worldist mode of theorizing—one may provisionally call Tricontinental or peripheral Marxism, in short—differs from other third-worldist analyses that only discuss imperialism-in-itself without taking into account the capitalist

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 182-3.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 183-4.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 185.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*, 186.

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*, 186-7.

imperative that necessitates imperialism or, as Amin puts it, accumulation and Apartheid on a world scale, in the first place.⁵⁸⁴

West Irian: The Third-Worldist Contradiction of Neocolonialism and Decolonization

Since the Dutch “transferred” sovereignty to Indonesia in late 1949, Indonesia’s pivot to anti-colonial internationalism centered on West Irian’s decolonization. The political entity Indonesians in the 1950s called West Irian referred to the Dutch colony of Netherlands New Guinea or West New Guinea located at the western region of today New Guinea island. The Dutch laid claim to the south and western coast of the island in 1828. They separated the administration of Netherlands New Guinea (West Irian or West Papua) from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) because of the two colonies’ different functions. The former served as a shipping outpost and a site for incarcerating Indonesian nationalists. The latter had the prestige for being the Dutch empire’s crown where its natural resources, labor, and market animated this empire’s life.⁵⁸⁵

Neocolonialism: The “Papuan Negroes” and Bandung’s Blindness

Based on critical accounts of pro-West Papuan independence scholars like Pieter Drooglever, C.L.M. Penders, and David Webster, West Papuan nationalists insisted on West Papua’s administrative autonomy from the Dutch East Indies and later Indonesia. According to West Papuan freedom fighter Agus Alue Alua, the Papuan National Congress, consisted of highly educated and respected West Papuan political elites, declared its independence from the Dutch in December 1961.⁵⁸⁶ Sanctioned by the Dutch colonial administration, the congress released a manifesto asserting the West Papuan peoples’ right to sovereignty as an independent West Papuan state. The Dutch, however, only recognized this flag-raising ceremony as an exhibition of a desire for autonomy but not a declaration of independence.⁵⁸⁷

Indonesian nationalists and third worldists united in their anti-imperialist nationalism to claim the region they called West Irian as a legitimate Indonesian territory. This had been Indonesia’s official line on West Papua internationally acknowledged first and foremost in the Bandung conference. Using an anti-imperialist rhetoric, they hit two birds with one stone by conceiving West Papuan pro-independence elites as pro-Dutch and hence denouncing their flag-raising ceremony as a manifestation of Dutch neocolonialism and an extension of Dutch liberal politics.⁵⁸⁸ In effect, this rejected both West Papuan sovereignty and Dutch neocolonialism. Just a couple of weeks after this flag-raising ceremony, Indonesian President Soekarno launched operation Trikora (‘the People’s Triple Command’) to “liberate” West Papua from Dutch neocolonialism on the bases of Indonesian “unity” and decolonization.⁵⁸⁹ As the championed center of third worldism, Indonesia deployed the rhetoric of Afro-Asian solidarity and

⁵⁸⁴ Amin, Samir, 2010, *The Law of Worldwide Value*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 53.

⁵⁸⁵ Kluge, Emma, 2020, “West Papua and the International History of Decolonization, 1961-69,” *The International History Review* 42, 6: 1157.

⁵⁸⁶ Alua, Agus Alue, 2006, *Papua Barat dari Pangkuan ke Pangkuan: Suatu Ikhtisar Kronologis*, Jayapura: Sekretariat Presidium Dewan Papua dan Biro Penelitian STFT Fajar Timur, 43., quoted in Viartasiwi, Nino, 2018, “The Politics of History in West Papua – Indonesia Conflict,” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 26, 1: 151.

⁵⁸⁷ Kluge, “West Papua,” 1158.

⁵⁸⁸ Swan, Quito, 2018, “Blinded by Bandung? Illuminating West Papua, Senegal, and the Black Pacific,” *Radical History Review* 131 (May): 64.

⁵⁸⁹ Drooglever, Pieter, 2009, *An Act of Free Choice: Decolonisation and the Right to Self-Determination in West Papua*, trans. Theresa Stanton, Maria van Yperen and Marijoliijn de Jager, Oxford: Oneworld, 438.

anticolonialism to support the Indonesian “corporation” or “re-colonization” of West Papua through the discourse of West Papua’s return to the motherland.

West Papuan leaders, such as Nicholas Jouwe, took their campaign to both the United Nations and the “Negro Brothers and Sisters,” namely Black people in Africa and the diaspora, to win support for West Papuan independence.⁵⁹⁰ They appealed to the latter by situating themselves in the Pan-African and civil rights struggles while at the same time identifying with a sense of black consciousness.⁵⁹¹ Jouwe’s 1965 political pamphlet written during his exile in the Netherlands, for example, deployed the rhetoric of Pan-African fraternity, Black internationalism, the Black Pacific or Melanesia, decolonial as well as civil rights struggles.⁵⁹² Jouwe carefully constructed the West Papuan subjectivity as “Papuan Negroes” in the Pacific, opposing the Indonesian oppressors:

Brothers and sisters in Africa,

Do you know, that the island of New Guinea, the largest in the world after Greenland and situated in the Pacific, is inhabited by 3 million negroes?

Have you, Brothers and Sisters in Africa, ever thought of these negroes, especially of the 1 million Papuan Negroes, who live in the Western half of this large island and who are engaged in a grim fight for their FREEDOM against their oppressors, the INDONESIANS?

The methods the Indonesians use to destroy both the RIGHTS and the FUTURE of your brothers and sisters in Western New Guinea [West Papua] are revealed hereafter, in the memorandum to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa.

Brothers and Sisters in Africa,

DO NOT ALLOW A NEGRO NATION TO BE EXPATRIATED FROM THE EARTH [sp.]

PLEASE, BE ACTIVE AND HELP US!

WE ARE IN BAD NEED OF YOUR SUCCOR!⁵⁹³

While West Papuan campaign attracted some politically moderate African countries of the French-dominated Brazzaville group like Upper Volta and Dahomey, it could not outcompete the Indonesian campaign of “freeing” Papua from the Dutch, which captivated the majority of the decolonizing Afro-Asian nations.⁵⁹⁴ West Papua suffered from the condition of being both a postcolonial “latecomer” to the international anticolonial struggle and a victim of the contradictory postcolonial masculinist nationalism that may easily slip into a racialized colonial power. This condition left West Papua with little decolonial option, among which was petitioning through the United Nations.⁵⁹⁵ Yet, Indonesia succeeded in lobbying both the Afro-Asian leaders—especially the more socialist Casablanca group in Africa—and the US to pressure the Netherlands into signing the New York Agreement in August 1962. This agreement resulted in the formal handover

⁵⁹⁰ Swan, “Blinded by Bandung,” 66.

⁵⁹¹ Kluge, “West Papua,” 1160-1.

⁵⁹² For a cursory discussion of the Black Pacific and Melanesia, read: Swan, “Blinded by Bandung,” 60-2.

⁵⁹³ Original emphasis. Jouwe, Nicholas, “A Negro Race is Being Murdered,” S-0099-0001-05, UN Archives., quoted in Kluge, “West Papua,” 1166.

⁵⁹⁴ Drooglever, *An Act of Free Choice*, 579.

⁵⁹⁵ Kluge, “West Papua,” 1163.

of the West Papuan territory to Indonesia in May 1963.⁵⁹⁶ It triggered West Papuan protests against both the Indonesian control and the Dutch betrayal.⁵⁹⁷ In a memo of provocative conversation in 1967, it reported that the West Papuan leaders had become “completely disillusioned” of any hope that Afro-Asian bloc would challenge Indonesian anticolonial pretense since it was “blinded by the 1955 meeting at Bandung.”⁵⁹⁸

West Papuan independence struggles formally continued until 1969, when the Indonesian government executed the notorious Act of Free Choice, a referendum for self-determination in West Papua. Acrimoniously re-named as the Act of *No Choice*, the Act’s critical accounts exposed the overall gruesomeness of the voting process that involved anything but freedom: the voters were locked in a room and surrounded by the Indonesian military and in the presence of high-ranking Indonesian officials. Voting at gunpoint, West Papuans unsurprisingly favored remaining as a province of the Indonesian Republic.⁵⁹⁹

Decolonization: Anti-Imperialist Cartographies and Circulation Struggles

Since the Bandung conference, Indonesia had been capitalizing on the remaining Dutch colony of West Papua to show its third world allies a shared condition of neocolonialism. We have already seen a version of this in Sirajuddin Abbas’s AAPSO presentation in the earlier section that discussed the Dutch’s cunning use of the territorial waters’ ambivalent legal status to block the Indonesian navy from entering West Papua. This particular figure of the sea as the site of anti-colonial subversion and contestation over sovereignty persisted in the subsequent Indonesian speeches regarding West Papua. Before getting to the Indonesian discussion of the West Papuan question proper, we must first get a sense of the Afro-Asian organizational terrain in which these Indonesian activists navigated.

After Bandung: Indonesian Milieu of Leftist Third Worldist Solidarity

Delhi, Bandung, and AAPSO conferences subsequently spawned various Afro-Asian permanent bureaus and conferences based on specific social interests. Indonesia actively participated in the consolidation and expansion of this internationalist third worldist project. This dissertation charts these bureaus and conferences covering only the period that witnessed Indonesian involvement, which ended around 1965 due to the anticommunist putsch.

Among the significant bureaus included the Afro-Asian Writers’ Bureau (Rivai Apin and Hersri Setiawan as Indonesian representatives; held conferences in Tashkent [1958], Cairo [1962], and Beijing [1966]; and published a journal *The Call*), the Afro-Asian Economists’ Bureau (Ridwan Basyar; Algiers [1965]), and the unrealized Afro-Asian Workers’ Bureau (Achadiat; Jakarta [1964]) in Colombo, Ceylon; the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Bureau in Jakarta, Indonesia, then relocated to Beijing, the PRC (Joesoef Isak and Djawoto; Jakarta [1963]); and the Afro-Asian Jurists’ Bureau in Conakry, Guinea (Wijanto SH; Conakry [1962]).⁶⁰⁰ Others were conferences without an organizational basis: the Afro-Asian Students’ Conference (Bandung [1956]), the Afro-Asian Film Festival (Tashkent [1958], Cairo [1960], and Jakarta [1964]), the Afro-Asian Youths’ Conference (Cairo [1959]), the Afro-Asian Women’s Conference (Cairo [1961]), the Second Afro-

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1159.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁸ “Memo of Conversation,” 12 December 1967, NACP., quoted in Swan, “Blinded by Bandung,” 68

⁵⁹⁹ Kluge, “West Papua,” 1168.; Swan, “Blinded by Bandung,” 67-9.

⁶⁰⁰ Setiawan, Hersri, 2014, *Kisah KPAA dan Seanteronya dan Genderang Maut Semangat Bandung*, Arus Bawah 2.0

Asian Congress of Pediatrics (Jakarta [1964]; the first was called the All-Asian Congress of Pediatrics held at New Delhi [1961]), and the Afro-Asian Islamic Conference (Bandung [1965]).

Following the Second AAPSO conference's resolutions at Conakry in April 1960, the Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity (*Organisasi Indonesia untuk Setiakawan Rakjat-rakjat Asia-Afrika*; OISRAA) was formed in June 1960. It shared an office on Raden Saleh road in Jakarta with the Indonesian Peace Committee (*Komite Perdamaian Indonesia*; KPI), indicating an intimate connection between these two "leftist" internationalist organizations. OISRAA's executive council consisted of eight foreign affairs specialists from Indonesian political parties and house of representatives: 1) Sirajuddin Abbas from the Islamic Education Movement Party (Perti), 2) H. Anwar Tjokroaminoto from the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), 3) Sunito from the People's Representative Council (DPR-GR), 4) E.M. Mansur from the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), 5) Zainul Arifin from the traditionalist Islam Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU), 6) Utami Suryadarma from the Indonesian Peace Council (KPI), 7) Njoto from the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and 8) Soedibjo from the mass organization National Front (FN). The executive council appointed Ibrahim Isa, who was already an Indonesian representative to AAPSO's permanent secretariat in Cairo, as the general secretary and Utami Suryadarma as the head of the women's department.

Other thirty-eight Indonesians of diverse ethnic, regional, organizational, and occupational backgrounds with extraordinary international careers and nationalist credentials comprised OISRAA's General Council. For instance, Indonesian Peace Committee's General Secretary Suroso, Union of Indonesian Journalists (PWI)'s General Secretary Soeraedi Tahsin, Trade Union Federation (SOBSI)'s deputy head Ruslan Widjajasastra, Maluku provincial governor Moh. Padang, Congress of Indonesian Women (Kowani)'s chairwoman Hurustiati Subandrio, Islamic Education Movement Party (Perti)'s head of women's affairs Sjamsiah Abbas, national radio broadcasting (RRI)'s music composer Amir Pasaribu, national news agency (Antara)'s editor-in-chief Djawoto, Unified Movement of Students (CGMI)'s head of education Ir. Sukasimir, Communist Party (PKI)'s Eurasian head of foreign affairs Bintang Suradi, leftist Institute for People's Culture (Lekra)'s head Rivai Apin, Museum of National Awakening's director Sudjipto, Eurasian anthropologist J.B. Ave, and famed writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer.⁶⁰¹

Anti-Imperialist Cartographies

After the Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity (OISRAA)'s establishment in June 1960, Indonesia became more active in reimagining global cartography through third world's anticolonial struggles. Such anticolonial re-mapping of the world allowed Indonesia to immediately display solidarity with other third world struggles and advance any causes for making that decolonial world into reality. President Soekarno, known at that point for being sympathetic to the Indonesian Communist Party and one of third worldism's architects, further magnified this conviction for the decolonized world in his only speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 1960 entitled "To Build the World Anew." Soekarno extensively discussed the anticolonial struggles in West Irian (West Papua), Congo, and Algeria

⁶⁰¹ The rest of the OISRAA's general council included Radjid St. Radja Mas, Amin Iskandar, Munaf, Sofjan Siradj, Dahlia, Sumarmo, Sidik Kertapati, Han Tik-djin, Sjahbudin Latif, Kamid Kartadinata, Nj. Sudiro, Nj. Arudji Kartawinata, Sudjono, Ir. Suroto, M. Datuk, Suwardi, Suharti, Drs. Surachman, Djody Gondokusumo, A. Madjid, Fatchan, Dr. Ir. Amir Dt. Mangiang, K.H. Rusli A Wahid, and Iswojo Kusnadi.

"Organisasi Indonesia utk Setiakawan Rakjat2 Asia-Afrika (OISRAA)," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggaldaej Papers, IISH (15 Jun. 1960).

before questioning the United Nation's imbrication in the Cold War, its dismissal of the colonial question, and its problematic inheritance of the Western state system. He contended that the once and currently colonized ought to build a new world because the "[Western] world we know," one that the United Nations inherited, was premised on the world-destroying, violent imperialist impulse:

Can you wonder that so many of us look at this Organization, which is also a product of the Western State system, with a question in our eyes? ... We have been inspired by the words of Lincoln and of Lenin, by the deeds of Washington and by the deeds of Garibaldi. ... But we are determined that our nations, and the world as a whole, shall not be the play thing of one small corner of the world.

We do not seek to defend the world we know: we seek to build a new world. We seek to build a world sane and secure. We seek to build a world in which all may live in peace. We seek to build a world of justice and prosperity for all men. We seek to build a world in which humanity can achieve its full stature.⁶⁰²

Soekarno's "new world" beyond colonialism immensely resonated with the Indonesian internationalists who were engaged participants in the blossoming Afro-Asian exchanges. The Indonesian delegations for the Emergency Meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau in Tokyo and Council Meeting of Asian-African Peoples' Solidarity in Bandung in March and April 1961 respectively distributed copies of the literary booklet *We All are Lumumba* to the attendees. As suggested in the dedication page, Lumumba, the candescent symbol of a steadfast anticolonial revolutionary, infinitely multiplied and inspired the "we"—"Asian-African fighters for national independence"—to carry his commitment forward.⁶⁰³

Lekra, the leftist cultural institute, published the booklet. The Eurasian, Bintang Suradi, translated from Indonesian into English four poems by S. Anantaguna, Hr. Bandaharo, Njoto, and Sitor Situmorang, and one short letter to Pauline Lumumba by Sugiarti Siswadi. Leftist visual artist Basuki Resobowo designed the cover featuring a shirtless man in a combatting posture with two hands shackled. Like many cultural productions of the Indonesian left, the booklet concluded with a drawn image of a gliding dove, signifying peace that had been advocated by the international communist movement. Among the five texts, Sitor Situmorang's *patrice lumumba* (every poem's title is stylistically typed in lower-case) stood out, for it connected the CIA-backed assassination of Lumumba in Congo with other anti-colonial revolutions in Asia and Africa. This poem particularly maps out the cartography of struggles manifesting as both topographical terrains and revolutionary locales.

patrice lumumba

I

The white-skinned henchman swung into action
And put an end to a fighter's life
There in the Congo

II

Gun against gun
Sword against sword
Revenge against ferocity !

⁶⁰² Sukarno, 1960, "To Build the World Anew," *President Sukarno's Address Before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on Friday September 30, 1960*, Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 36.

⁶⁰³ *We All are Lumumba*, trans. Bintang Suradi, Djakarta: League of People's Culture (Lekra), 3.

The old plot enacted again !

Come on !

He gave his life the black hero
For a free Africa,
A free Asia, a free World
Murdered in a trap

Burn down wipe out !
The fangs and brains of the imperialists
From the soil of Asia-Africa !
Stand by !

Hi youth of the world
Youth champion has been slain
But this is not the last time

Make ready thousands of valleys of death
Mountains, forests, sand and seas !
Graves for the colonialists !
Today Algeria, yesterday Dien Bien Phu,
tomorrow West Irian !

Just see
The colonialists have not yet been crushed
Lumumba, lumumba has perished !
Peoples of Asia and Africa
Kindle for ever the fire of the Revolution
Demand defence !
Demand life !

Remember
Jamilah ! Monginsidi !
Remember
Freedom, freedom
Freedom until death !
Patrice Lumumba
To you revolutionary tribute we give !⁶⁰⁴

Beware !

In the first few stanzas, we encounter the familiar binary trope of murderous white colonizer versus black anticolonial martyr that irrigates most anticolonial writings. The poem assigns to Lumumba the meaning of Afro-Asian solidarity against colonialism. It articulates the geographical terrains of “mountains, forests, sand and seas,” where many guerilla warfare transpire, as the “graves for the colonialists.” West Irian, at that time only a prophetic site of anticolonial resistance, ascends proleptically to an equal rank with other world-historical struggles in Dien Bien Phu and Algeria that witness the West’s resounding defeat. Besides Lumumba, the poem invokes two other brown anticolonial martyrs: Algerian female revolutionary Jamilah Bouhired, who bombed a café in Algiers during the Algerian War, and Indonesian freedom fighter from South Sulawesi Robert Wolter Mongisidi (a spelling variation of Monginsidi), who resisted Dutch re-colonization during the Indonesian revolution. Apart from this poem, Jamilah also had other incarnations in Indonesian revolutionary art; for example, Lekra musician Mochtar Embut composed a song with Jamilah’s name in commemoration of her brave acts and as a dedication to Afro-Asian solidarity.⁶⁰⁵ While Lumumba and Jamilah register the complementarity of two genders in global anticolonial struggles, Mongisidi serves a more locally specific function. He provides the “regional” precedence of an anticipated decolonizing event that will have taken place in West Irian.

Neocolonialism and Its Critiques

The AAPSO’s 3rd council meeting in Bandung, where the *Lumumba* booklet was circulated, on April 10th-14th, 1961, was the first time for Indonesia to host any AAPSO functions.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-2.

⁶⁰⁵ Setiawan, Andri, 2020, “Djemali Bouhired Srikandi Aljazair,” *Historia* (9 May). Available at: <https://historia.id/politik/articles/djamila-bouhired-srikandi-aljazair-6an42>

The organizers chose Bandung to proclaim “AAPSO’s faithful adherence to and development of the principles of the Bandung Conference.”⁶⁰⁶ AAPSO’s Secretary-General Jusuf Al-Siba’i used the term “pilgrimage” (*ziarah*) to express AAPSO’s return to Bandung.⁶⁰⁷ The conference accommodated 200 participants from 53 countries. Sunito from the People’s Representative Council led the 32-member Indonesian delegation.⁶⁰⁸

At the general level, this council meeting’s significance rested on the introduction of the neocolonialism analytics. The majority of the discussion was spent on clarifying neocolonialism’s characteristics, manifestations, personifications, and oppositions. As the local host, Indonesia had the privilege of putting its own concern, namely, West Irian or West Papua, on the agenda. The discussion resulted in unanimous support for the “return” of the Dutch-occupied “Indonesian province” of West Irian. This proposition presupposed that the separated, or, in the language of this document, Balkanized West Irian province already belonged to the Indonesian whole and must be readily returned to its motherland once the Dutch surrendered.

This dissertation argues that the coterminous discussions of neocolonialism and West Irian in this particular AAPSO council meeting provided Indonesia an executable direction for its approach to the neocolonial question. This direction did not apply to just West Irian but also Indonesia’s subsequent confrontation with “neocolonial” Malaysia and its withdrawal from the UN. Such a confluence forcefully demonstrated the dialectical unity of general theory (neocolonialism) and particular practice (West Irian).

Soekarno asserted in his opening speech for the council meeting that Indonesia “is not fully independent yet” (*belum merdeka penuh*) both in its politics and economy. He adamantly insisted that it was wrong to assume the death of colonialism and imperialism. Imperialist forces, he emphasized, worked hand in hand with one another as “international imperialism” to continue the colonial oppression and capitalist exploitation. This international imperialism necessitated an equally international opposition, which, for Soekarno, referred to the Afro-Asian solidarity with an increasing Latin American involvement.⁶⁰⁹ He reminded the audience that the by now ubiquitous slogan Bandung spirit (*semangat Bandung*) also meant the force or strength (*kekuatan*) of Bandung that contained material efficacy to affect the material world, just like this current Afro-Asian assembly.⁶¹⁰

“The Eradication of Colonialism and Struggles against Neocolonialism” was the name of the subcommittee discussing neocolonialism. It defined neocolonialism as a new form of imperialism, especially US imperialism, which recognized political independence of formally postcolonial countries but still exercised “indirect and subtle forms of control” (*penguasaan jang*

⁶⁰⁶ *Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)*, 1969, The Hague: International Documentation and Information Centre, 17.

⁶⁰⁷ Permanent Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity, 1961, *Setia Kawan Rakjat2 Asia-Afrika: Dokumen2 dari Sidang Dewan Setiakawan Rakjat2 Asia-Afrika, di Bandung, 10-13 April 1961*, Djakarta: Jajasan Trikarya, 18. The author can only locate the Indonesian translation of the conference proceedings; therefore, the author back-translates Indonesian into English when quoting from the text.

⁶⁰⁸ The whole Indonesian delegation—many from the OISRRAA, included Nj.Arudji Kartawinata, Asmara Hari, Mr. A. Astrawinata, Bintang Suradi, Dr.Busono Wiwoho, Djawoto, Faisal Abudan, Nj.Francisca Fanggidaej, A.M. Hanafi, Nj.Dr.Hurustiati Subandrio Manai Sophian, E.M. Mansur, S. Munaf, Njoto, Nunung Kasnadi, Dr.O Hong Djie, Nj.Priono, Nj.H.Ratu Aminah Hidajat, Ir.Sakirman, Sjarif Sulaiman, Ir.Setiadi, Siauw Giok Tjhan, K.H.Sirajuddin Abbas, Sudharnoto, Sudjito, Sukirman, Suroso, Moh.Thoha Ma’ruf, Ds.Urip Hartojo, Nj.Utama Surjadarma, Wasid Suwanto.

⁶⁰⁹ Permanent Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity, *Setia Kawan Rakjat2 Asia-Afrika*, 12-3.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

tidak langsung serta halus) in the political, economic, social, military, and technical spheres.⁶¹¹ Neocolonialism eliminated the substance of real independence (*hakekat kemerdekaan sedjati*) from independence itself via unequal treaties, setting up puppet governments, or fabricating a multi-national constitution that, in fact, glossed over racial differences.⁶¹² It suffocated (*mentjekik*) the people's liberation movements that struggled towards independence, peace, and progress.⁶¹³

The subcommittee identified eleven manifestations and six personifications of neocolonialism, along with nine approaches to oppose it. According to this subcommittee, neocolonialism manifested in the following forms: 1) a puppet government, 2) imperialist regroupings of countries, 3) Balkanization, 4) an imperialist subversion of anticolonial nationalist governments, 5) a destruction of national unity, 6) an establishment of military bases, 7) an economic infiltration through investments, loans, financial aid, or technical assistance, 8) monetary dependency (*ketergantungan langsung dalam hal keuangan*), 9) retention of property sieged during the colonial period, 10) integration of Afro-Asian countries into colonial economic blocs while retaining their underdevelopment, and 11) direct oppression including arrest and assassination as in the cases of Patrice Lumumba (Congo), Félix-Roland Moumié (Cameroon), and Inejiro Asanuma (Japan).⁶¹⁴ This list distributed political and economic manifestations of neocolonialism almost equally, attributing seven to the former (#1-6, #11) and four to the latter (#7-10).

For the personifications of neocolonialism, in which the document designated with the term “agent” (*agen*), they consisted of 1) colonial embassies and missions acting as the pulsing center for espionage and pressuring against national governments; 2) foreign assistance and assistance from the United Nations that further plunged and sabotaged national development; 3) colonial military personnel, police, or Afro-Asian commissioners loyal to erstwhile colonial masters; 4) representatives from imperialist countries under the guise of religion, morality, culture, trade unions, youth organizations, philanthropists, and peace corps; 5) slandering propaganda from imperialist media, i.e., radio, the press, or literature; 6) Afro-Asian puppet governments manipulated by the imperialists to undermine other Afro-Asian countries' sovereignty and ideals.⁶¹⁵ By identifying neocolonial personifications in this way, Soekarno's Indonesia—being consistent with its anticolonial ideal—devised a foreign policy that aimed to liquidate all forms of neocolonialism. This anticolonial foreign policy led to a phenomenon called “confrontation” (*konfrontasi*) with the “neocolonial puppet state” of Malaysia (1963-1966) in the aftermath of the Brunei Revolt (1962) and a withdrawal from multiple “neocolonial” international organizations like the Olympics (1964) and the United Nations (1965).

The last list offered nine approaches for combatting neocolonialism: 1) condemning the Balkanization of Congo, Mauritania, North Rhodesia, Buganda (tribal kingdom in current-day Uganda), Korea, Palestine, Vietnam, and West Irian; 2) condemning the colonial federations that persisted after independence; 3) inviting every Afro-Asian-Latin American country to assist in the ongoing independence movements; 4) urging all independent Afro-Asian countries to liquidate the remaining colonial and foreign military bases and armies; 5) mobilizing the masses' opinions to condemn enemies of true independence and neocolonial agents; 6) condemning conditional material assistance; 7) strengthening Afro-Asian economic, social, and cultural cooperation; 8)

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁶¹² *Ibid.*, 37-8.

⁶¹³ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

⁶¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

deploring neutral and passive independent Afro-Asian countries whose passivity made them complicit with neocolonialism; 9) initiating Afro-Asian economic cooperation on commerce, banking, insurance, transportation, and telecommunication to forestall the “penetration of imperialist economy.”⁶¹⁶ These suggestions leaned towards Afro-Asian cooperation and diplomatic maneuvers rather than militancy. It reflected the Soviet nonbelligerent—rather than Chinese confrontational—orientation of AAPSO in the milieu of escalating Sino-Soviet split.

This same subcommittee on neocolonialism also published a resolution on West Irian, moving from a general framework to a specific neocolonial situation. The Indonesian delegation argued that the continuing Dutch occupation of the “Indonesian province” of West Irian assumed five neocolonial characteristics. First, it savagely murdered the Balim valley people in West Irian who refused to carry out forced labor. Second, it suppressed people’s anticolonial resistance. Third, an enlargement of the Dutch armed forces in this province posed a concrete threat to Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the world in general. Fourth, it attempted to establish the neocolonial *Nederland Nieuw Guinea* administrative council. Fifth and lastly, its false propaganda to separate West Irian from Indonesia only aims to strengthen Dutch colonialism.⁶¹⁷

Agreeing that Dutch colonialism threatened world peace and violated human rights, the AAPSO subcommittee released five resolutions for the West Irian question in the name of Afro-Asian solidarity. First, the subcommittee demanded an immediate withdrawal of the Dutch colonial troops from West Irian. Second, it condemned all forms of assistance from political blocs like NATO and SEATO that fortified the Dutch colonial rule. Third, it supported the “unconditional return” (*pengembalian tak bersyarat*) of the Indonesian province of West Irian to Indonesia, along with all the efforts that the Indonesian government marshaled against Dutch military “provocation” (*provokasi*). Fourth, it urged the peace-loving Afro-Asian people and governments to prohibit the Dutch colonizers from using airfields, seaports, and munitions belonging to Afro-Asian countries. Fifth and lastly, it called on the Afro-Asian people worldwide to put up an equal fight against the Dutch colonizers’ efforts in defending their occupation of West Irian.⁶¹⁸

Ibrahim Isa: The Indonesian Internationalist

No Indonesian internationalists were compelled by their position to generate discourse on the West Irian question to the third-worldist communities than Ibrahim Isa. Ibrahim Isa (1930-2016) represented Indonesia at the permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization at Cairo since 1960 until the Suharto government revoked his Indonesian passport in 1966. He lived in exile in the PRC, then moved to the Netherlands in the 1980s. He had no records of formal affiliation with any Indonesian political parties, even as he was very close to some key Communist figures like PKI’s Vice-Chairman Njoto.⁶¹⁹ Isa’s self-enlistment to the People’s Security Army (Tentara Keamanan Rakjat)—an embryo of what later became the Indonesian Armed Force—to fight against the post-War Dutch forces demonstrated his heightened sense of anticolonial nationalism.⁶²⁰ Isa worked as both a teacher at the Sulawesi regional association school, KRIS (Kebaktian Rakjat Indonesia Sulawesi; ‘Devotion of the Indonesian People of

⁶¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 43-5.

⁶¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 50-1.

⁶¹⁹ Isa, Ibrahim, 2011, *Bui Tanpa Jerajak Besi: Pikiran Seorang Eksil Indonesia di Luar Negeri*, Jakarta: Klik Books, xxx.

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*, xxi-xxiii.

Sulawesi'), in Jakarta and KRIS foundation's General Secretary.⁶²¹ As an educator-activist with firsthand knowledge of youth struggles, Isa was selected by the Indonesian Peace Committee (Komite Perdamaian Indonesia; KPI) in August 1952 to attend the World Federation of Democratic Youth's Preparatory Meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark.⁶²² After this internationalist debut, Isa became more involved with the Indonesian Peace Committee as its executive. The returning Indonesian youths from the East Berlin youth festival established this Indonesian Peace Committee in 1951 to further coordinate with other internationalist peace events. Working at the KPI allowed Isa to get acquainted with other Indonesian peace activists like leftist educator Prijono, nationalist engineering professor Purbodiningrat, and Indonesian military wife association's founder Ratu Aminah Hidajat.⁶²³

Isa thought of his mission in Cairo as a conjoining of the national campaign to liberate West Papua with larger Afro-Asian anticolonial struggles for independence. In his memoir, Isa narrated that he executed this plan to connect a national concern with the third-worldist project in two ways. First, he established contacts with Afro-Arab struggle organizations and raised awareness about the West Irian question among them and within the AAPSO secretariat. Second, he researched the reach of Dutch "propaganda" on West Irian as a separate political entity independent of Indonesia, and opposed this Dutch "propaganda" with the Indonesian nationalist narrative of a unified Indonesia.⁶²⁴ The irony of this all was that neither the Netherlands nor Indonesia acknowledged West Papua sovereignty in this battle between two modes of colonization. The former legitimized its colonial extraction through the moralistic rhetoric of civilizing the primitives, while the latter advanced the discourses of anticolonialism and national unification.

At the friendship gathering (*pertemuan silaturahmi*) organized by the Indonesian embassy in Cairo in the summer of 1961, Isa had a conversation with Cairo's "old face" (*muka-muka "lama"*) about the liberation of West Irian. Indonesian ambassador to Egypt Sanusi Hardjadinata from the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) initiated this event for the Indonesians in Egypt, particularly the Muslim students at Al-Azhar University, to socialize. This *old face* Isa mentioned referred to Saleh Bawazir, the trilingual Middle Eastern correspondence of the Indonesian national news agency Antara. As Indonesian of Arab descent, Bawazir was fluent in Indonesian, Arabic, and English.⁶²⁵ Around early 1960, Isa recalled, Soekarno uttered the phrase "before the rooster crowed in [1960], West Irian would already be at the motherland's lap" (*Sebelum ayam jantan berkokok pada tahun [1960], Irian Barat sudah berada di pangkuan Ibu Pertiwi*).⁶²⁶ Regarding Soekarno's utterance, Bawazir told Isa that he felt annoyed (*jengkel*) when some of his fellow Egyptian reporters teased him by questioning the credibility of this speech. They asked with a ridiculing tone: "The rooster has already crowed several times, but West Irian is still under Dutch control. How many more times does the rooster have to crow!"⁶²⁷ Bawazir "counter-attacked" (*serangan balas*) with a response: "I guarantee in front of you all that West Irian will be liberated before the Palestinians are liberated from Israel's domination and occupation."⁶²⁸ Regardless of Bawazir's hot temper, what appeared as his impulsive statement became true. West Irian became

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*, xxiv-xxv.

⁶²² *Ibid.*, xxviii.

⁶²³ *Ibid.*, xxv-xxvi.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*, 196-7.

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*, 192-3.

⁶²⁶ *Ibid.*, 194.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid.*, 195.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid.*, 196.

liberated from the Dutch a few years after and it was no other than Ibrahim Isa who industriously mustered third-world solidarity to pressure the Dutch from outside Indonesia.

West Irian Question and Circulation Struggles

Geographies of Indonesia as an archipelagic colony and the Netherlands as a seafaring empire meant that the ocean was their primary economic and military contact zones. This, in turn, necessitated the ocean along with all the logistical operations and transportation networks related to it to be sites of anticolonial subversion and colonial counterinsurgency, involving in what scholars like Deborah Cowen and Joshua Clover call circulation struggles.⁶²⁹ Circulation struggles register acts of resistance aiming to disrupt the coordinated, yet overstretched and vulnerable, circuits of imperialist networked infrastructure and capitalist supply-chain—specifically at their concentrated key sites or “chokepoints.” Cowen argues that disruption does not merely bring things to a halt or a constraint as ascribed by the word’s dictionary definition, but it also “signal[s] a creative destruction that brings new possibilities into the world” through different articulations of struggle.⁶³⁰ In the colonial situation, imperialist dispersed and uneven spatial networks generated heterogeneous relations of rule and brought oppressed people into different social relations. Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker’s *The Many-headed Hydra* indexes exactly the violent imperial cartographies’ surprising consequences that lead to creative solidarities. They write: “Sailors, pilots, felons, lovers, translators, musicians, mobile workers of all kinds made new and unexpected connections, which variously appeared to be accidental, contingent, transient, even miraculous.”⁶³¹ Such ephemeral solidarities may become a materialist force for other alternative futurities beyond the world ruled by capitalism, imperialism, and racism.

On the night of January 8, 1962, AAPSO’s Permanent Secretariat called a public meeting devoted to supporting the Indonesian struggle for West Irian liberation from Dutch colonization, featuring Isa as the presenter. This speech, as we shall see, most forcefully exhibited a discursive episode of the third-worldist circulation struggles against neocolonialism. Actualizing his self-understanding of the mission in Cairo, Isa’s speech connected the West Irian question to the concrete Afro-Arab struggles at large. The speech’s title, “The Liberation of West Irian and Imperialist Manoeuvres in the Middle East,” highlighted the idea of maneuvers key to the imperialist logistics.⁶³² Isa started his speech by referring to the Indonesian peoples’ solidarity with Egypt during the 1956 tripartite British-French-Israeli aggression; Indonesian activists organized mass demonstrations and public meetings condemning the aggression and set fire to the British embassy in Jakarta.⁶³³

Isa then described different executions of Dutch neocolonialism that remind us of the list of neocolonial manifestations in the Bandung AAPSO meeting. These executions included: its coup d’état attempt in Bandung after the formal recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, its cooperation with the regional comprador elite to overthrow the Indonesian government, its

⁶²⁹ Cowen, Deborah, 2014, *The Deadly Life of Logistics: Mapping Violence in Global Trade*, Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press.; Clover, Joshua, 2016, *Riot, Strike, Riot: The New Era of Uprisings*, New York: Verso.

⁶³⁰ Cowen, Deborah, 2014, “Disrupting Distribution: Subversion, the Social Factory, and the ‘State’ of Supply Chains,” *Viewpoint Magazine*. Available at: <http://viewpointmag.com/2014/10/29/disrupting-distribution-subversion-the-social-factory-and-the-state-of-supply-chains/>

⁶³¹ Linebaugh, Peter, and Rediker, Marcus, 2001, *The Many-headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*, Boston: Beacon Press, 6.

⁶³² Issa, Ibrahim, 1962, “The Liberation of West Irian and Imperialist Manoeuvres in the Middle East,” in *Statements and Appeals of the Permanent Secretariat*, Cairo, U.A.R.: Madkour Press, 9 (8 Jan.).

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, 10.

endeavor to create a secessionist puppet regime like Moïse Tshombe's secessionist State of Katanga (part of current-day Congo), and the Dutch-US alliance in supporting forces undermining the Indonesian unity.⁶³⁴ Dutch neocolonialism, Isa argued, worked hand in hand with other remaining and emerging colonial powers, particularly the US, as well as their economic blocs—a phenomenon Soekarno earlier called “international imperialism.” Isa further showed the material linkage created by US imperialism in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, connecting the West Irian issue to Zionist Israel:

It is no secret that in all these activities the Dutch colonialists rely mainly on US imperialism. We definitely know that without the support of SEATO [Southeast Asian Treaty Organization] headed by the US imperialists, the Dutch imperialists cannot stay one day longer in West Irian and carry on their subversion and aggression against Indonesia; and that also Zionist Israel could not have existed without the support and supply of the imperialists, mainly the US imperialists.⁶³⁵

In addition to Soekarno's international imperialism thesis, Isa robustly explained two political-economic motivations of this transimperial cooperation. First, Washington regarded West Irian as “a potential bridge-head in the Far East,” a prime spot for US penetration into Southeast Asia, and hence for also establishing military bases. Second, US big businesses aimed to extract rich natural resources in West Irian from minerals to gold, iron, oil, uranium, and non-ferrous metals. Isa recorded that in 1962, Wall Street conglomerates held 60% shares of the Netherlands Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij; The Dutch Parliament likewise granted a joint US-Dutch company a 75-year concession to mine diverse minerals in West Irian. “This [US-Dutch cooperation] is indeed not very strange,” Isa added, as “today US imperialism is the ringleader of all reactionaries in the world.”⁶³⁶

The UN, according to Isa, accommodated rather than provided an alternative for Dutch and US neoimperialisms. Just like the Korean war before it, the imperialist powers “us[ed] the UN as their tool to continue domination over West Irian and many other colonies and territories under the UN Trusteeship or protectorate.”⁶³⁷ In particular, the Dutch-US cooperation justified their occupation of West Irian by cunningly exploiting the UN rationality of “the so-called ‘right of self-determination.’” This “imperialist dirty plot,” as Isa called it, provided a pretext for “transfer[ring] Dutch domination over West Irian to a joint exploitation of imperialist powers headed by the US” under the UN's guise.⁶³⁸

At this point of the speech, Isa quoted AAPSO's solidarity statement on West Papua released a month earlier to reference its cogent analysis and oppositional strategies. This statement articulated one among many geohistorically-specific left third-worldist approaches to anticolonialism:

At the present moment the Dutch colonialists, strongly supported by the US and other imperialists are concentrating their efforts to liquidate physically the national

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 11-2.

⁶³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-3.

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 13-4.

⁶³⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶³⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

liberation movement in West Irian and further to establish a puppet state of the so-called “state of Papua.” At the same time Dutch military reinforcement is flowing to West Irian.

Experience repeatedly shows that the colonialists and imperialists will never voluntarily give up their colonies and exploitation. They will not understand the aspiration of the peoples to be free unless they are forced to do so. Therefore, the Permanent Secretariat ... wholeheartedly welcomes and strongly supports the preparation and mobilization of the peoples of Indonesia to hoist the Indonesian “Red and White Flag” in West Irian and liberate this territory from colonial domination. The liberation of this territory from imperialists’ yoke will eliminate another hot bed of war and thus promote peace and security in this area.

The Permanent Secretariat calls ... especially upon the peoples and the workers in the harbours and aerodromes of Asian and African countries to boycott any Dutch ship and aeroplane used to transport troops, reinforcements, and military equipment [*sic*] to West Irian.⁶³⁹

This dissertation finds these passages illuminating for left third-worldism in two respects. First, its terse analysis of imperialism-capitalism’s structural tendencies closely resembled that of the CCP (The Chinese Communist Party). In the foundational episode of the intellectual Sino-Soviet split called the Lenin Polemics in 1960, the CCP conceived of imperialism-capitalism as compelled by the structural imperative to be immutably violent. The ruling imperialists-capitalists thus would not relinquish their possessions and powers voluntarily. Consequently, the oppressed and exploited masses must abolish the imperialist-capitalist system—the originary cause of war—to achieve a more lasting peace. The CPSU (The Soviet Communist Party), on the other hand, understood imperialism-capitalism as progressively decaying and internally fractionalized. As long as the imperialists-capitalists agreed to remain noncombative, parliamentary and diplomatic struggles provided sufficient conditions for achieving world peace.

Clearly, the AAPSO statements characterized imperialism as structurally violent and motivated by power and profit. The Dutch-US transimperial alliance was “liquidat[ing] physically the national liberation in West Irian” and “establish[ing] a puppet state.” As “imperialists will never voluntarily give up their colonies and exploitation,” they needed to be “forced” to understand the peoples’ aspiration for freedom. Understanding that imperialist existence triggered war and threatened peace, this passage linked the liberation from imperialism in one world’s region to an elimination of one war possibility, bringing the world one micro-step closer to “peace” in the CCP’s sense.

Second, different than the more Soviet-oriented AAPSO’s 1961 resolutions regarding resistance to neocolonialism based on diplomatic maneuvers, this AAPSO solidarity statement called on Afro-Asian peoples and workers for circulation struggles. Circulation struggles, manifested here through a boycott form, meant to disrupt and interrupt the chokepoints in the imperialist war-logistical network like the harbors and aerodromes. This dissertation reads AAPSO and Isa’s proposal for circulation struggles as an innovatively materialist solution resulting from, to borrow from the CCP’s 1965 *People’s War*, “examining the concrete conditions” and “adopting appropriate forms of struggle in the concrete practice of the revolution in each country.”⁶⁴⁰ The *People’s War* text—a manifesto of and a manual for third world’s anticolonial left struggle—

⁶³⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁶⁴⁰ Lin, “People’s War!” 23.

analyzed the expansive US imperialism as “over-reaching itself” and “dispersing its strength, with its rear so far away and its supply lines so long.”⁶⁴¹

Offering a macro-analysis of global imperialism-capitalism, *People's War* contended that waging coordinated multiple wars against US imperialism at its different key sites would split up and significantly weaken this imperialist whole. It used a similar language of network, circulation, and link shared among leftist analyses of global imperialism-capitalism, including those of Lenin, Trotsky, and Amin. *People's War's* solution of multiple wars, Amin's delinking, and AAPSO and Isa's boycotting all operate on the same dialectical logic: striking the uneven imperialist-capitalist system that *appears* invincible at its vulnerable joints.

Isa's discursive ultimatum for anticolonial circulation struggles culminated after his citation of the AAPSO's solidarity statement. He single-handedly mapped out every single node in the violent imperial cartographies where Asian, African, Latin American, and Australian workers could disrupt the Dutch-US imperialist lifeline and capitalist flow:

[O]n behalf of the Indonesian people: I call upon the workers of Port Said, Suez Canal, Cairo Airport, Beirut Airport, Damascus, Casablanca [Morocco], Tunis, Baghdad, Bahrein, Dharan [Saudi Arabia], Karachi [Pakistan], Bombay, New Delhi, Colombo, Rangoon, Bangkok Tokyo, Tokobana [modern day Yokohama, Japan], Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and other workers of airports and harbours in all Asian and African countries; I call upon the workers in the Panama Canal and other Latin American countries; I also call upon the workers and the people of Australia who have demonstrated their solidarity during the national liberation war with the Indonesian people; I call upon all, all these brave workers and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and Australia to boycott any Dutch ships and aeroplanes used to transport reinforcements and military equipment to West Irian. I call upon these brothers in the event of war between Indonesia and Dutch imperialism, to boycott every Dutch ship passing through their countries.⁶⁴²

The preceding anticolonial boycott of the Dutch and British ships at Australian ports from transporting counter-insurgent weapons to Indonesia exemplifies one transient episode of cross-racial solidarity and workers' internationalism. Even as this 1945-46 boycott, known as the “black-banning,” may not contribute decisively to actual battles in the Indonesian revolution, it undoubtedly delayed acts of colonial subjugation and gave more time for the anticolonial forces to counter. As marginally presented by leftwing Australian journalist Rupert Lockwood and centrally highlighted by historian Heather Goodall, migrant Indian seamen of a Muslim majority undertook the real political spadework in this boycott.⁶⁴³ Indonesian seamen initiated and called for a general boycott; the Indian crews, along with unidentified numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese seamen, carried it on in solidarity with the Indonesian anticolonial cause.⁶⁴⁴

Foreign-owned shipping companies, which oversaw most of the shipping in Australian ports, imported these migrant labor chiefly from Hindustani.⁶⁴⁵ Many Indian workers were already active members of the Indian Seafarers' Union in Bombay or Calcutta. Later, during the course of

⁶⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁶⁴² Issa, “The Liberation,” 17-8.

⁶⁴³ Lockwood, Rupert, 1982, *Black Armada: Australia and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1942-49*, Sydney: Hale & Iremonger.; Goodall, Heather, 2019, *Beyond Borders: Indians, Australians, and the Indonesian Revolution, 1939 to 1950*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

⁶⁴⁴ Goodall, *Beyond Borders*, 164.

⁶⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 168.

this boycott, they formed the Indian Seamen's Union in Australia.⁶⁴⁶ The Seamen's Union of Australia only facilitated—not executed or commanded—the boycott as its range of control covered just the English-speaking crews of the local shipping routes.⁶⁴⁷ The Australian unionists provided shelter and support for strikers and prevented police action against deserters and mutineers. Only Indian activists who spoke major Hindustani languages of the Indian seamen like Hindi, Urdu, Goanese, or Bengali could lead this organized disruption.⁶⁴⁸ Archival records reported that over 200 Indian crews walked off their ships, and another 1,000 remained on board in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane but refused to sail. The boycott held up over 180,000 tons of arms and supplies being sent to the Dutch.⁶⁴⁹

Just in 1960, two years before Isa's West Papuan speech, another praxis of Afro-Asian solidarity and workers' internationalism transpired as the Dutch dispatched a Colossus-class aircraft carrier Hr.Hs. *Karel Doorman* to "show the flag" in West Papua. Egyptian workers pledged to forbid Dutch battleships from entering the Suez Canal to support the Indonesian fight against Dutch neocolonialism.⁶⁵⁰ To avoid the Suez Canal, the Dutch instead sailed around the Horn of Africa and docked at Fremantle Harbour in Western Australia before voyaging to Hollandia (present-day Jayapura, the capital city of the Indonesian province of Papua). *Karel Doorman*, again, met with an Australian seamen's strike at Fremantle Harbour and was forced to anchor on its own without tugboats.⁶⁵¹

The calls for circulation struggles and third world peoples' solidarity could be read as an actionable resistance to the asymmetrical and aggressive imperialist-capitalist encirclement of the countries refusing to accept this oppressive world order. Colonial underdevelopment and postcolonial dependency already put the peripheral countries at productive and technological disadvantages. Then, one strategy was to avoid the impossible battle of productive and technological strength and instead to resort to other arenas of contestation like those of circulation struggles. Though incapable of guaranteeing non-imperialist and post-capitalist futures, circulation struggles warrant that imperialism and capitalism can never achieve absolute domination. It was only within this context that Isa could optimistically announce the following:

Even though Indonesia is surrounded and encircled by aggressive military pacts as the SEATO [Southeast Asia], ANZUS [Australia and New Zealand], and proposed NEATO [Japan and South Korea], by aggressive military bases in Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and the Philippines, by the 7th and 5th US Fleets in the Pacific and South China Sea, which are supporting the Dutch, we are not afraid and resolutely determined to liberate West Irian and carry on our anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist struggle for complete national independence. ...

We are strong, because our struggle is just and supported by all Asian, African, and Latin American peoples and all freedom-loving forces the world over.⁶⁵²

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 159.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 155.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 165.

⁶⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁶⁵⁰ Isa, *Bui*, 201.

⁶⁵¹ "The High Sea: Flying Dutchman," 1960, *Time Magazine* (19 Sep.). Available at: <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,826623,00.html>

⁶⁵² Issa, "The Liberation," 20.

Towards the end of his speech, Isa moved from the particular Indonesian case of the Dutch-US imperialist cooperation to US neoimperialism in general. “The imperialists’ plots and manoeuvres and conspiracies and aggression,” Isa contended, “are not only directed against Indonesia.”⁶⁵³ In line with historical-materialist analyses of the imperialist logistical networks and circulation struggles, Isa reported that US imperialism also intervened in Cuba, South Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, Laos, Taiwan, and Congo. In the Middle East itself, Isa mentioned a more specific British-US transimperial alliance in subverting the anticolonial nationalist governments. Isa highlighted Israel’s role in the region that served as one of “the imperialist stooge[s]” because its existence contributed to the transimperial vigor. The Dutch, for example, Isa pointed out, strongly supported the arming of Israel. Its troops benefitted from the Israeli military training.⁶⁵⁴

Scant records of other OISRAA (Indonesian branch of AAPSO) internationalist activities indicate that besides West Irian, OISRAA had particular concerns for struggles in Palestine (against Israel), Algeria (against France), South Vietnam (against the US), and South Africa (against Apartheid). Isa emphasized in one of his blog posts that the Indonesian delegation sympathized with the Palestinians when they attended the 3rd AAPSO’s executive committee meeting in Gaza (at that time under the United Arab Republic’s administration) in December 1961. Led by Sunito and followed by Surajuddin Abbas, E.M. Mansur, Bintang Suradi, and Ibrahim Isa, the Indonesian delegation visited Palestinian refugees at their tents in Gaza. Isa commented, “how great are their suffering and sacrifice.”⁶⁵⁵ For the latter three, Isa noted that OISRAA established representative offices for the Algerian National Liberation Front (or Front de liberation nationale; FLN), Viet Cong (or the National Liberation Front of Southern Vietnam; NLF), and the African National Congress (ANC) in Jakarta.⁶⁵⁶ Seasoned Algerian diplomat and former Arab League’s Undersecretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi started his career as an FLN representative to Indonesia from 1956-1961 during the height of the Algerian War in search of diplomatic support.⁶⁵⁷

Kiapma: The American Imperialist Militarism

Indonesian articulation of circulation struggles against capitalism and neocolonialism, as shown in the previous section, prompts an exigent call for liquidating the foreign military bases—a material foundation for neocolonial expansion in the periphery. While the Dutch handed over

⁶⁵³ *Ibid.*, 18-9.

⁶⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

⁶⁵⁵ Isa, Ibrahim, 2014, “Menjelang Pengumuman KPU, 22 Juli 2014: Pernyataan Jokowi — Indonesia Sokong Palestina,” *Ibrahim Isa Blogspot* (11 Jul.). Available at: <http://ibrahimisa.blogspot.com/2014/07/>

⁶⁵⁶ Isa, Ibrahim, 2014, “Wawancara dengan Mukhti — Sekitar OISRAA,” *Ibrahim Isa Blogspot* (7 Apr.). Available at: <http://ibrahimisa.blogspot.com/2014/07/>.

It should be noted that even as Indonesian internationalists rhetorically supported the South African anti-apartheid movement, the idea of apartheid did not take hold within the Indonesian struggle against racism. As Kumiko Makino’s research shows, one among a few major anti-apartheid movements in Asia motivated by leftist third worldism was the Japan Anti-Apartheid Committee (JAAC). JAAC was concerned with a Japan-specific apartheid issue of “honorary whites.” The first Japanese anti-apartheid group (not named JAAC at that time) was formed in 1964 in the wake of a meeting between the Japanese delegation—in particular the later first leader of the JAAC Kanjiro Noma—and the ANC representatives at the 3rd AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, in early 1963.

Makino, Kumiko, 2018, “Travelling for Solidarity: Japanese Activists in the Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement,” in *Migration and Agency in a Globalizing World*, eds. Scarlett Cornelissen and Yoichi Mine, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 247-70.; Makino, Kumiko, 2019, “Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Japan,” in *A Global History of Anti-Apartheid: “Forward to Freedom” in South Africa*, eds. Anna Konieczna and Rob Skinner, Palgrave Macmillan: London, 265-87.

⁶⁵⁷ Anwar, Rosihan, 2010, *Napak Tilas ke Belanda: 60 Tahun Perjalanan Wartawan KMB 1949*, Jakarta: Kompas, 95.

West Papuan territory to Indonesia in 1963 following the New York Agreement, the ongoing neocolonial aggression and its military bases continued to menace the Indonesian fragile nation-building project. President Soekarno, the master of the acronym, coined the synthetic term *nekolim* from *neokolonialisme* (neocolonialism), *kolonialisme* (colonialism), and *imperialisme* (imperialism) to describe the composite phenomena of persisting European imperialism and developing American neocolonialism.

The primary territorial and ideological regional dispute between Indonesia and its neighbors after 1963 concerned Kalimantan or Borneo island's northern area in an incident called Konfrontasi ('confrontation'; 1963-66). Indonesia conceived of Konfrontasi as a contestation between the Malaysian puppet state of British neocolonialism and the Indonesian anticolonial third-worldist state. Caught in a seemingly unending war situation, in 1965, OISRAA took the initiative to organize an International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases or as Indonesians called Kiapma (*Konferensi Internasional Anti Pangkalan Militer Asing*) at Hotel Indonesia in Jakarta from October 17th to 20th.

Headed by OISRAA's chairwoman Utami Suryadarma and People's Representative Council's speaker Arudji Kartawinata, Kiapma welcomed around 110 delegates from 52 countries as well as representatives from the Japanese Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo), Afro-Asian Journalists' Association (AAJA), Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, and the AAPSO itself.⁶⁵⁸ Besides Indonesia, the organizing presidium included delegates from eight other countries: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Japan, Tanzania, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Panama, France, and New Zealand. Haiti represented French-speaking delegations and Tanzania English-speaking delegations.⁶⁵⁹

As unbelievable as it sounds, OISRAA organized this conference amidst an extremely dangerous phase of the anticommunist putsch. The military implemented a strict 12-hour curfew and suspended any political activities they deemed "left-leaning" regardless of the communist affiliation.⁶⁶⁰ Chinese Hsinhua News Agency's detailed description of the conference's nerve-

⁶⁵⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 204, RRR7 (21 Oct.).

Among several external messages sent to the conference, a taped message by the well-known anti-US imperialist British philosopher and devoted peace activist Bertrand Russell was arresting. Russell later became a vocal critic of the American intervention in the 1965 Indonesian communist massacre and a supporter of Ibrahim Isa's third-worldist delegation as a legitimate Indonesian representative in the 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Cuba. Russell recounted in an introduction to the pamphlet entitled "American Murder Uber Alles" that two representatives of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation attended a conference in Jakarta on his behalf in October 1965, presumably Kiapma. Russell described that during the conference, the US Seventh Fleet—the most extensive American base in Southeast Asia at the time, located at the southernmost point of the Philippines' southernmost island—was ordered "on alert" in Indonesian waters. Another document reveals that Russell's two close associates could be the Russell Foundation's director Chris Farley and Russell's personal secretary and American leftist Ralph Schoenman.

Russell, Bertrand, 1967, "American Murder Uber Alles," in *The Silent Slaughter: The Role of the United States in the Indonesian Massacre*, New York: Youth Against War and Fascism, 3 (28 Jul. 1966). Available at: <https://www.workers.org/wp-content/uploads/TheSilentSlaughter.pdf>; Tate, Ernest and Hearse, Phil, 2016, "The Building of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and Its Consequences for the British Left," *Crisis and Revolt: Incorporating Marxsite* (17 Feb.): 3. Available at: <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/UCPI0000034082.pdf>.

⁶⁵⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 201, RRR9 (18 Oct.).

⁶⁶⁰ A Secret Cable from the US Ambassador to Indonesia Jones to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, quoted in Scalice, Joseph, 2017, "Crisis of Revolutionary Leadership: Martial Law and the Communist Parties of the

wracking atmosphere is worth quoting in full since it ironically represented the transimperial military alliance between local Indonesian and British-American armies Kiapma so resolved to counter:

An atmosphere of terror prevailed both inside and outside the conference when it was in session. Fully armed soldiers constantly patrolled around the meeting hall. On its opening day, tanks and armoured cars were seen there with guns trained on the meeting hall and armed troops were posted on each floor of the hotels where the delegates were lodged. Police vans whined past the meeting hall time and again in search for progressives. Plain-clothes men were active inside the conference hall keeping a wary eye on the delegates as well as the working personnel. A number of Indonesian working personnel suddenly disappeared one after another when the conference was in session. It was later confirmed that they had been arrested. The foreign delegates could neither make telephone calls nor send out telegraph messages and had to stay in the hotels at night because of the curfew. All this aroused strong discontent and indignation from the delegates.

To bring the conference under their control and sabotage it, the Indonesian Right-wing forces raised the outrageous demand that the conference be indefinitely postponed and that the Indonesian organizing committee “purge” itself of progressive forces. On the last day of the conference, the Right-wing forces organized an anticommunist, anti-China “demonstration” by hooligans who, in the name of demonstrating in support of the conference, shouted such reactionary slogans as “Dissolve the Indonesian Communist Party!” and “Sever diplomatic relations with China!” They even ordered a group of hooligans to try to get into the conference hall to make trouble.⁶⁶¹

Yet, precisely because of these reactionary measures, gung-ho foreign delegations, according to Kartawinata’s report, were “even more determined to ensure the success of Kiapma which [was] proof again for Nekolim that progressive revolutionary peoples in the world continue[d] to be fired by the spirit of struggle to destroy Nekolim.”⁶⁶² The delegates of various countries, including the spectacular 58-member Japanese delegation, made statements supporting Kiapma organizers and protested against Indonesian military intervention in the conference.⁶⁶³

In the organizers’ opening speeches, Suryadarma stressed the imperialist military bases’ obstructiveness to the national freedom movement and world peace, while Kartawinata particularly focused on US imperialism’s military provocations in Indochina and Southeast Asia generally.⁶⁶⁴ The speech by Subchan Z.E., a young anticommunist Indonesian delegate to Kiapma from the traditionalist Islam party Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), made a timely connection between anti-base activism and Indonesia’s regional affairs. He asserted that the “foreign military base in the form of the British project of Malaysia, which is encircling Indonesia, has caused cruel sufferings which are directly felt by the Indonesian people struggling in the border region, especially in

Philippines, 1959-1974,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 256.; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 201, RRR12 (18 Oct.).

⁶⁶¹ Hsinhua News Agency, 1965, “For Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases,” *Peking Review* 45 (5 Nov.): 17.

⁶⁶² Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 201, RRR12 (18 Oct.).

⁶⁶³ Hsinhua News Agency, “For Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases,” 17.

⁶⁶⁴ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 201, RRR4 (18 Oct.).

Kalimantan Utara [North Kalimantan] itself.”⁶⁶⁵ Subchan’s political orientation and other delegates of Subchan’s profile in Kiapma—anti-imperialist but also anticommunist—hardens this dissertation’s conviction to distinguish leftist anti-imperialism from other reactionary forms of anti-imperialism. Ansor, the Muslim NU party’s youth wing, also held an anti-base rally at Taman Suropati in Jakarta on October 20th in support of Kiapma’s resolutions.⁶⁶⁶ The rally mainly demanded the liquidation of British military bases in Singapore, Malaya, and North Kalimantan, which constituted a source of territorial and ideological tension in Southeast Asia.⁶⁶⁷

Soekarno’s keynote address proposed that anti-base activism was inextricably connected to what he called “lifeline of imperialism,” denoting a logistical and oppressive network that made imperialism possible: from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Indian Ocean, the strait of Malacca, Singapore, and Japan.⁶⁶⁸ This version of the imperialist lifeline assumed Western European primacy. Imperialism’s life indeed presupposed the colonized’s death. Soekarno hastened to qualify that “along this lifeline of imperialism, imperialism made the people oppressed, poor, dependent, losing their liberty and independence, sucking their blood, making kingdom people ... just coolies.”⁶⁶⁹ The last coolie reference registered a process of colonial subjugation, which subordinated colonial subjects into coolies or manual laborers. In the same speech, Soekarno remarked that Dutch colonialism turned various pre-colonial “Indonesian” kingdoms into “a nation of coolies and a coolie among nations.”⁶⁷⁰ He analyzed that foreign military bases—i.e., Gibraltar, Malta, Iskandariah (Alexandria), Aden, Singapore, Okinawa, Hongkong, Ogasawara—scattered across this lifeline to both maintain the imperialist domination and contain the colonized.⁶⁷¹ At the end of the speech, Soekarno began to develop a novel interpretation, at least in the third-worldist public discourse, of the foreign bases as “foreign mental bases,” signifying the pro-imperialist mindset that the colonized had emulated or been fabricated by the colonial ideological apparatuses, an argument similar to the canonical Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s *Decolonising the Mind* published 20 years later. The notion of the ‘base’ in Soekarno’s ‘mental base’ demonstrated his profound understanding of both the materiality (as in base versus superstructure) and militancy (as in a military base) of the imperialist ideal that always needed a host, a body—that is, a human—to launch its offensive acts. In Soekarno’s own definition, foreign mental bases referred to “stooges, tools, persons, men, women, who are defending imperialism. Men and women who are trying to make our people love imperialism.”⁶⁷² By calling for the liquidation of the dual material-mental bases, Soekarno demanded no less than an abolition of the imperialist system, or what he called *nekolim*, itself, inverting this imperialist lifeline into its “death line.”⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁵ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 203, RRR3 (20 Oct.).

⁶⁶⁶ Mizhuari, Nur, 1965 “Essay on Kiapma,” *PC* (Dec.), quoted in Scalice, “Crisis,” 256.

⁶⁶⁷ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1965, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 204, RRR5 (21 Oct.).

⁶⁶⁸ Setiyono, Budi, and Triyana, Bonnie (eds.), 2014, “Amanat PJM Presiden Soekarno pada Pembukaan Konferensi Internasional Anti Pangkalan Militer Asing (KIAPMA), di Hotel Indonesia, Jakarta, 17 Oktober 1965,” in *Revolusi Belum Selesai: Kumpulan Pidato Presiden Soekarno 30 September 1965-Pelengkap Nawaksara*, Jakarta: PT Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 60.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁶⁷² *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁷³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, No. 204, RRR7 (21 Oct.).

Many Kiapma delegates' speeches reprehended American military bases and neocolonial intervention for turning their countries into an imperialist proxy, thus showing a struggle against imperialism from within. Both representatives from the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF or Viet Cong) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) were united in exposing the US imperialist aggression and crimes.⁶⁷⁴ An unexpected collaboration between the Korean Democratic People's Republic (North Korea) and Japan denounced US imperialism and reactionaries in their nations for masterminding the Japan-Republic of Korea basic treaty, which aimed to reintroduce Japanese military forces into South Korea and rigged up a Northeast Asia military alliance. The Japanese delegate also remorsefully pointed out that US imperialist militarism both "encroached upon Japan's independence and sovereignty, and made use of Japan as an important base for its aggression against Vietnam and other Asian countries."⁶⁷⁵ For South Asia, the delegates from Pakistan and Kashmir Revolutionary Council denounced Indian reactionaries for collaborating with imperialism and "pressing ahead with their expansionist and aggressive policy."⁶⁷⁶

Kiapma's resolutions reflected the global situation of ongoing imperialist militarism in different world regions. In Southeast Asia, Kiapma pointed out the transimperial connection between the British, the French, the Dutch, and the US, rendered visible by their mutual assistance in strengthening Malaysian troops in the Konfrontasi and supporting American armies in the Vietnam War. The report of the resolutions discussed particularly on the ripple effects of the UK's Malaysia project on American neocolonialism and the imperialist lifeline:

The [British project of Malaysia], with its military bases and armed strength, plays an important supporting role in the US aggressive activity against the people of Vietnam, constitutes an integral part of the lifeline of imperialism, and is Britain's contribution to the US general strategy to dominate the world. ... Britain's military bases and armed forces are a serious threat to national independence, national freedom, peace, and security of the peoples of Southeast Asia in general, and of the peoples of Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, and North Kalimantan in particular.⁶⁷⁷

Regarding Vietnam, Kiapma condemned the US on two grounds. The first ground addressed US aggression that violated the 1954 Geneva Agreement to invade Vietnam but was cloaked by President Johnson's "sly" unconditional diplomatic talks. The second protested against the violent uses of napalm bombs, poison gas, and chemical poisons, causing long-term health and environmental damages.⁶⁷⁸ Besides Southeast Asia, Kiapma passed resolutions on a range of issues from Kashmiri and Palestinian self-determination to the liquidation of Portuguese military bases in Africa, anti-racial discrimination in South and Southeast Africa, the Zimbabwean struggle against the British Ian Smith regime, the Japanese-South Korean resistance against the US-controlled Northeast Asian military alliance, and the West German struggle against NATO bases. It also supported independence movements across three continents: Mozambique, Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Congo Leopoldville, Puerto Rico, Panama, Cuba, Mauritania, and

⁶⁷⁴ Hsinhua News Agency, "For Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases," 18.

⁶⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁶⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷⁷ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, No. 204, RRR6 (21 Oct.).

⁶⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Dominica.⁶⁷⁹ From here, we follow Indonesian representative to AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat Ibrahim Isa, Prague-based journalist Suhardjo, and Beijing-based communist Willy Hariandja who attended the Kiapma conference to the 1966 Tricontinental Conference—OISRAA's last official political activity overseas.⁶⁸⁰

“Against the Bandung Cult”: The Tricontinental and Peripheral Sublation of Third World Internationalism

AAPSO's Lineage of the Tricontinental

The 1966 Tricontinental Conference or the Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America—remembered as one of the largest leftist internationalist gatherings in history—was a culmination of sustained AAPSO's organizing dating back to 1959. In the aftermath of the celebratory 1959 Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro, then the Prime Minister of Cuba, sent Che Guevara to Cairo to meet with Nasser and first AAPSO Conference's chair Anwar al-Sadat, leading to Cuban participation in future Afro-Asian conferences.⁶⁸¹ Participants of AAPSO's sub-meetings in Bandung (April 1961) and Gaza (December 1961) proposed to organize “the solidarity of the peoples of these three continents [Asia, Africa, and Latin America] which had already existed,” a proposal warmly welcomed by both meetings' members.⁶⁸² Through the Cuban delegation attending the 1963 third AAPSO conference at Moshi (Tanganyika, part of present-day Tanzania), Castro approved and affirmed Havana's status as the designated Tricontinental Conference's venue.⁶⁸³

Deliberations in AAPSO's Sixth Solidarity Council Session in Algiers in March 1964 between Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)'s chief spokesperson Mhamed Yazid, Moroccan revolutionary theoretician Mehdi Ben Barka, Cuban ambassador to Algeria Jorge Segueria, and AAPSO's Secretary-General Yusuf Al-Siba'i resulted in a formation of the Tricontinental Conference's International Preparatory Committee (IPC) chaired by Mehdi Ben Barka.⁶⁸⁴ After Barka's abduction and murder in Paris in October 1965, presumably orchestrated by the CIA, the chairmanship was transferred to Communist Party of Cuba (PCC)'s head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Cuban Minister of Construction, Osmany Cienfuegos. Latin American representatives in this committee illustrated the region's geographic division and politico-economic features, as explained in the AAPSO report: “Mexico being north to Latin America, Guatemala in Central America, Venezuela in the north of the continent, Uruguay in the heart of South America, Chile in the far South, and Cuba on the Caribbean.”⁶⁸⁵ The Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (OSPAAAL; Organización de

⁶⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, RRR6-7.

⁶⁸⁰ This information came from “Laporan Mengenai Masalah2 Pokok jang Belum Diselesaikan jang Dihadapi Fraksi di Konperensi Havana,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Faggidaej Papers, IISH, 4.

⁶⁸¹ Mahler, Anne Garland, 2018, *From the Tricontinental to the Global South: Race, Radicalism, and Transnational Solidarity*, Durhan and London: Duke University Press, 73.

⁶⁸² AAPSO, 1963, “On the Convocation of An Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference,” in *Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement: Principles, Structure, Friendly Organisations*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, 74-6.

⁶⁸³ AAPSO, 1963, “Special Resolution on the Three-Continent Conference,” in *The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference: Moshi, Tanganyika February, 4-11, 1963*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, 110.

⁶⁸⁴ AAPSO, 1965, “Report of the Secretary General,” in *The Winneba Conference: Ghana, May 1965*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity, 100-101, 112-16.

⁶⁸⁵ AAPSO, *The Winneba Conference*, 115.

Solidaridad de los Pueblos de África, Asia y América Latina), a new political body separate from AAPSO, was founded in Havana after the Tricontinental Conference to coordinate and strengthen the militant third-worldist solidarity and joint struggle against imperialism.⁶⁸⁶ The Latin American delegations also instituted their own regional Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS; Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad).

Ben Barka and Left Third-Worldist Analysis of Neo-Imperialism

Described by Cienfuegos as “against those in Africa and Asia who preferred the ‘Bandung Cult’” and “[f]ighting] furiously to prevent the mystic from replacing revolutionary practice,” Ben Barka was the theoretical powerhouse behind the Tricontinental Conference. The Moroccan government exiled Barka in 1963 while being the leader of the leftwing National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), prompting him to be an internationalist organizer unbounded by national territories. With almost a hagiographical language preserved for a bygone redeemer, Cienfuegos saw Barka as the Tricontinental thinker who “called for Afro-Asian-Latin American solidarity in his energetic speech at the Moshi Conference [the third AAPSO conference] held at the foot of Kilimanjaro,” for Barka was “moved ... by principles and spurred on by an unvarnished reality that required the militant unity of the exploited.”⁶⁸⁷

This Barka’s speech presented a sharp contrast to Tanganyikan democratic socialist President Julius Nyerere’s speech in the same conference, registering left third-worldist differences along the lines of revolutionary and reformist, radical and moderate, militant and diplomatic, or communist praxis and the mystical “Bandung Cult.” While this chapter favors Barka’s line of left third-worldism that would make its way to the Tricontinental Conference, it presents the conceptual disparity between Nyerere and Barka on left third-worldism here to demonstrate aspects of idealist and moralist left third-worldism against which Barka argued.

In April 1962, a year before his Moshi speech, Nyerere published an essay called *Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism* as a pamphlet for his political party Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). In this essay, Nyerere offered an idealist definition of socialism as “an attitude of mind” and explained his nativist theory of African socialism based on indigenous familial and communitarian ethos called Ujamaa or ‘familyhood.’⁶⁸⁸ For Nyerere, Ujamaa denotes a socialism that is collectively distributive, guaranteeing that “those who sow reap a fair share of what they sow” in relation to the whole society—rather than acquisitive, namely, concerning with “gaining power and prestige.”⁶⁸⁹ Nyerere’s conceptualization of Ujamaa—a culturalist and moralist variation of anti-colonial socialism—sought to “regain [African] former attitude of mind,” as much as oppose “doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.”⁶⁹⁰ African socialism, Nyerere claimed, “did not start from the existence of conflicting ‘classes’ in society,” but was instead founded on an “extended family” practicing communal ownership.⁶⁹¹ Because Africans already lived in a consensus-

⁶⁸⁶ International Preparatory Committee, “In the Country of the Conference,” 9.

⁶⁸⁷ Cienfuegos, *Ben Barka*, 5-6.

⁶⁸⁸ Nyerere, Julius K., 1968 [1962], “Ujamaa—The Basis of African Socialism,” in *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism*, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1.

⁶⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁶⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁶⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

oriented collective society, then, in Nyerere's logic, to be or not to be a socialist was a matter of "attitude" rather than class struggle.⁶⁹²

Nyerere's inaugural address at Moshi for the third AAPSO conference extended this moralist, as opposed to political-economic, line of thinking to the international level. Nyerere critiqued actually-existing socialism for "us[ing] wealth for capitalist purposes—that is, for the acquisition of power and prestige."⁶⁹³ Like Mao, Nyerere observed a new contradiction in the socialist countries. He analyzed that "the socialist countries themselves, considered as "individuals" in the larger society of nations, are now committing the same crime [using political ideology to gain power and prestige] as was committed by the capitalists before."⁶⁹⁴ The becoming-capitalist of the rich socialist countries suggested, for Nyerere, that there would be "an inevitable clash between the rich and the poor" at the international plane where capitalist and socialist countries were on both sides of the conflict.⁶⁹⁵

Yet, unlike Mao, Nyerere understood this contradiction in a way that is emphatically moralist (conceiving of domination as a crime), individualistic (treating socialist countries as an individual), and empiricist (understanding rich and poor quantitatively in their appearances). By conceptualizing socialism as *also* actually-existing *but* in mind, Nyerere's logical conclusion would be to change the minds of both capitalist and socialist countries to distribute wealth until poverty was entirely banished. In this speech, however, Nyerere left his conclusion open for this gathering, where "peoples from predominantly poor and uncommitted nations" assembled to discuss the issue of "international 'class struggle.'"⁶⁹⁶ Nyerere's stance on socialism and the third world approximated the Non-Aligned Movement's capitulationist line—a movement founded in 1961 to seek an elitist alternative from both capitalism and communism—rather than thinking of ways to liberate the oppressed poor by abolishing capitalism and imperialism based on the historically determined relations of production.

Even as sharing some analytics with Nyerere on new postcolonial contradictions, Ben Barka's speech entitled *Some Aspects of the Liberation Struggles* deployed a more Marxist framework to conceptualize the world's capitalist-imperialist nexus and championed mass struggles as the revolutionary, internationalist solution to this exploitative and oppressive system.

Barka started his speech by laying out a problem of reflux within AAPSO that was "manifested through temporary failures or disappointments." This reflux phenomenon "might delay the liquidation of the colonial system, reinforce neo-colonialism under its various forms and infringe upon the struggle for genuine liberation and the economic and social emancipation of our peoples."⁶⁹⁷ At the beginning of his speech, Barka immediately critiqued the organizational paralysis caused by neocolonial offensive and a general tendency of conferences that did not translate discursive analysis into revolutionary practice. Barka's stinging paragraph could remind

⁶⁹² See a similar critical reading and explication of Nyerere's "diatribe" against Marx in Shivji, Issa G., 2017, "Mwalimu and Marx in Contestation: Dialogue or Diatribe?" *Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy* 6, 2: 198-214. Shivji situates Nyerere's Marxism within the "utopian" or petty-bourgeois socialism in the lineage of Robert Owen, Saint Simon, Charles Fourier, and, in his opinion, Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela.

⁶⁹³ AAPSO, "Address of President Julius Nyerere at the Inaugural Session of the Conference," in *The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference*, 13.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 13-4.

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶⁹⁷ Barka, Ben El Sayed Mehdi, 1963, "Some Aspects of the Liberation Struggles," *The Afro-Asian Bulletin* 5, 1-4 (Jan.-Apr.): 13-4.

revolutionaries both during his time and today about the insufficiency of speech acts without accompanying more-than-speech actions:

It serves nothing to lament the tragic death of our companion Lumumba or the dissolution of his party. Also, it is not enough to denounce the degeneration of such or such political or syndical leader, of such or such king or minister, who after having contributed to the national struggle, betrays the ideals which he could have for some time represented to serve neo-imperialist manoeuvres and sacrifice the vital interests of his people, in the same of some provisional, real, or hypothetical advantages.⁶⁹⁸

Barka was not a fundamentalist third-worldist who advocated for fanatical mass actions. In fact, he called for a sober scientific analysis “on the basis of precise and complete information,” that went “beyond the stage of spontaneous action and improvisation.”⁶⁹⁹ As tactics of the capitalists and the imperialists became subtler, Barka quoted Nyerere’s warning in his inaugural address that “we [AAPSO participants] must not ‘be duped by other people.’”⁷⁰⁰ He set minimal analytical requirements for AAPSO militants and leaders to be capable of clarifying and distinguishing an array of political orientations:

Thus our militants and our leaders will, on the ideological point of view, be better armed to face the enemy and its allies, even in the most subtle forms of their actions. They will be able to establish a clear and precise demarcation line between supporters of independence and national sovereignty and supporters of popular promotion from one part and those of domination, exploitation, and regression on the other part. They would know how to put an end to mystifications, to spell out [the] order for an efficient action of liberation and edification, to deflate the false ideologies of neo-liberalism, so-called socialisms, and other “isms” artificially created, and which are multiplying and diversifying in an actual state of confusion.⁷⁰¹

Barka identified neocolonialism as the third world’s major problematic that necessitated a “constant work of investigation and clarification.”⁷⁰² In this speech, he focused on the element of “nominal” or “fake independence” as one of the neocolonial mechanisms and maneuvers. Reading through the political-economic lens, Barka suggested that “fake independence”—for example, Algeria, Guinea, Moroccan, and South Korea—manifested “the expression of serious change in the structure of Western capitalism. ... [A] growing ‘liberalism’ appeared simultaneously with the modernization and Americanization of European capitalism.”⁷⁰³ In other words, a new cycle of capitalist accumulation led to a different mode of imperialist governance and greater subsumption of the independent postcolony into capitalism. Due to this imperialist governing technique of granting “fake independence,” Barka asserted that “the time when the accession to independence was progressive is over now. Only the political and economic content of this independence bears

⁶⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 14-5.

⁷⁰² *Ibid.*, 15.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.*

or does not bear a progressive meaning.”⁷⁰⁴ Postcolonial statemen might fluctuate between expressing the national-popular will or being the stooges of imperialist interests.⁷⁰⁵

With “fake independence,” Barka analyzed, the colonizers already calculated the method of transferring political power from the ruling colonial government to “an heir (individual or a group of interests) capable of ensuring them the teleguided conduct of the affairs of the new state, above all maintaining the continuity of economic power to the benefit of the metropolis.”⁷⁰⁶ Barka pointed out that the intermediary solution of “negotiations that end[ed] by compromise relating to the balance of powers of the two partners” also did not guarantee that the people would eventually possess political power. The neo-colonizers always sought a way to secure their power. Barka gave out exceptional examples of China, Vietnam, and Cuba where “the result [of transferring political power] is not always subject to the desire of colonizers.”⁷⁰⁷ Yet, to guarantee independence, Barka contended, political power must be transferred to the “authentic representatives of the national revolution of the country.”⁷⁰⁸ He insisted that the national revolution once achieved must “lay hands on the machinery of the colonial state, so as to place it at the service of the people.”⁷⁰⁹ To further maintain the people’s political power and prevent it from neocolonial appropriation, a revolutionary state “must be immune against the risks of degeneration after the accession to power, to remain vigilant to the manoeuvres of imperialism and its allies in the interior and be ready to answer back any aggressor ...”⁷¹⁰ Barka here argued for “genuine” independence where political power belonged to the national-popular forces rather than the imperialists-capitalists.

Even as Barka advocated for the abolition of imperialism-capitalism, he did not have ready-made answers for how to carry out that aspiration. His concrete solution always involved mass struggles, particularly “raising [consciousness of the] masses to the level of their historical tasks.”⁷¹¹ He demanded AAPSO participants “speak frankly and openly to our masses so as to avoid disillusiones resulting from a faked quietness. It is imperative to promote and develop in them a feeling of vigilance which would always alert them to the manoeuvres of imperialism without closing our eyes to our own mistakes and weaknesses.”⁷¹² Besides developing the masses’ sensitivity to neocolonial maneuvers, Barka asserted that Afro-Asian leaders needed to “build up in [the masses] the revolutionary potential so that at the right time they might accede to power,” operationalizing a kind of prefigurative politics.⁷¹³

Barka’s clearly expressed his left third-worldist line—an intellectual lineage underlying the AAPSO and the Tricontinental that this chapter has been reconstructing—in the speech’s conclusive paragraphs: “It is in the common struggle of our popular organizations against all forms of colonial, capitalist, and feudalism exploitations that we will develop this common consciousness and will establish new international relations in the service of man.”⁷¹⁴ As this chapter argues earlier, third-worldism is not inherently leftist. Barka’s emphasis on a common struggle of the

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁷¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

⁷¹³ *Ibid.*

⁷¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 18.

popular accentuates this point that it requires an organized effort to make third-worldism anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist.

Within Barka's left third-worldist analytical frame, Nyerere's Ujamaa totally suffered from the "reflux" mentioned earlier in the speech and a lack of sufficient political-economic insight to understand capitalism as a cause of systemic inequality rather than about individual distribution of wealth. Barka's speech, in a way, was also a struggle to remake Nyerere's socialism-without-material-class-struggle into an anti-capitalist one.

Barka's notion of "new international relations in the service of man"—an anticolonial humanism common to left third-worldist thinkers—resonated with Fanon's closing speech at the 1960 second AAPSO conference in Conakry, Guinea, which Barka also attended. Fanon's aphoristic sentences went as follows:

They [the European colonizers] have tried to make the world against us and without us.

Well, this enormous vacuum we [anti-colonial Africans and Asians] shall fill together. We shall together enlarge humanity, that is Man. We shall together build Man and the human mind, modify the soil, the trees, the mountains, and the rivers.⁷¹⁵

Though Fanon did not speak explicitly about "international relations," it was implied through the idea of Afro-Asian collaboration in filling the "enormous vacuum" of the Eurocentric world. While Fanon was concerned with enlarging, inventing, and rebuilding Man beyond what Fanon's contemporary Sylvia Wynter calls the "over-represented Man" defined by white colonizers' "ethnoclass norm," Barka seemed to already assume a renewed Fanonian man in his formulation.⁷¹⁶ The Tricontinental Conference that was going to be held three years later under Barka's initial supervision actualized such aspiration to establish "new international relations in the service of man." We need to also note that Fanon's planetary imagination of this new world also encompassed nature—the earth's material condition—and human-nature relations, not just about anthropocentric humanity and human's social relations. This line of argument laid the foundation for Nathan Hare's 1970 essay "Black Ecology" that attributes the cause of linked anti-Black racism and ecological devastation to capitalist white supremacy.⁷¹⁷

We now move from two famous articulations of third-worldism in the 1963 Moshi conference between the idealist, democratic socialist Nyerere, and materialist, Marxist Barka to Barka's Tricontinental press conference in September 1965 in Havana, just a month before his abduction in Paris.

The Tricontinental as the Peripheral Sublation of Communism and Decolonization

Barka groundbreakingly conceptualized the Tricontinental Conference as a combination of "two great contemporary trends of world revolution," namely, the Bolshevik communist revolution and national liberation.⁷¹⁸ Cuba was chosen as the host precisely because "the Cuban Revolution

⁷¹⁵ Fanon, Frantz, 1960, "Speech Delivered at the Closing Session by Dr. Fanon in the Name of Africa," in *Ind Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, Conakry—11-15 April, 1960*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Organization for the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity, 122.

⁷¹⁶ Wynter, Sylvia, 2003, "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument," *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3 3 (Fall): 257-337.

⁷¹⁷ Hare Nathan, 1970, "Black Ecology," *The Black Scholar* 1, 6 Black Cities: Colonies or City State? (Apr.): 2-8.

⁷¹⁸ Cienfuegos, *Ben Barka*, 11.

is the accomplishment of the fusion of these two trends.”⁷¹⁹ Though the Cuban Revolution was not the first and only fusion of communism and decolonization (see the Chinese Communist Revolution in the previous chapter), this dissertation suggests that, more pertinently, it was the first peripheral nation to do so outside of Soviet and Chinese immediate spheres of influence—two semi-peripheral countries that achieved communist revolution.⁷²⁰ Instead, Cuba was the US’ periphery! Rather than being subsumed into the US capitalist-imperialist system, Cuba revolutionized against it!⁷²¹ Its existence categorically embodied the spirit of “autonomous” left third-worldism that other peripheral communist countries like North Vietnam, North Korea, Soviet Eastern Bloc, and Albania could not fulfill. The threat of Cuba and the Tricontinental to the US could be best grasped from the US Senate Subcommittee’s report on the conference:

It is humiliating enough to have the international communist conspiracy seize control of a country only 90 miles from American shores, and maintain itself in power despite all the pressures we have thus far brought to bear. It becomes a thousand times as humiliating when that country is transformed into a headquarter for international revolutionary subversion while the OAS [Organization of American States] and the mighty United States of America look on, helpless and apparently incapable of any decisive action.⁷²²

Barka incontestably determined US imperialism, or as the Tricontinental attendees called Yankee imperialism, to be the current manifestation of capitalism-imperialism in the post-war cycle of capitalist accumulation and domination. The Vietnam War—a concrete case of US imperialist aggression and capitalist consolidation—gained the highest traction in Barka’s press conference and the Conference itself because of its immediate relevance. Regardless of multiple anti-imperialist battlefronts at that time, Barka boldly asserted that “The struggle against imperialism is only one: In Vietnam, in Congo, in the Dominican Republic, the aggression takes different forms, but it is always US imperialism that unleashed the aggression.”⁷²³ To counter this colossus of US imperialism, he called for “a clear, precise, and organized,” rather than spontaneous, expression of solidarity.⁷²⁴ Fidel Castro, in the presence of Barka, totally endorsed all Barka’s points without any addition, demonstrating Barka’s precision and comprehensiveness in capturing left third-worldist concerns of the time.⁷²⁵

Barka’s death only steeled the determination of the Tricontinental organizers and participants. Environed by portraits of revolutionaries of the three continents—Ho Chi Minh, Patrice Lumumba, and Augusto César Sandino—as well as deceased Cuban independence fighters

⁷¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁰ Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1990, “Marx, Marxism-Leninism, and Socialist Experiences in the Modern World-System,” *Thesis Eleven* 27: 44.

⁷²¹ Celebratory accounts of the Cuban Revolution by post-MacCarthyist and post-Stalinist American left, see: Mills, Charles Wright, 1960, *Listen, Yankee: The Revolution in Cuba*, New York: McGraw-Hill.; Baran, Paul, 1961, *Reflections on the Cuban Revolution*, New York: Monthly Review Press.; Huberman, Leo and Sweezy, Paul, 1960, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, New York: Monthly Review Press.

⁷²² *The Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin American Peoples: A Staff Study*, 1966, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 32.

⁷²³ Cienfuegos, *Ben Barka*, 12.

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ Castro, Fidel, 1965, “Speech Given During the 5th Anniversary Celebrations of the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution,” 28 Sep., quoted from Barcia, Manuel, 2009, “‘Locking Horns with the Northern Empires’: Anti-American Imperialism at the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana,” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 7, 3: 209.

José Martí, Antonio Maceo Grajales, and Camilo Cienfuegos, Castro's speech at the Tricontinental's closing session dedicated the Conference's success to the sacrifices of anticolonial activists.⁷²⁶ He stated: "Ben Barka (applause) was a decisive factor, with his constancy, his personal work, in the organization of this first Tricontinental Conference. ... [T]he results of this conference demonstrate that Ben Barka's blood will not shed in vain."⁷²⁷ Castro then linked Barka to other cases of American, particularly CIA, neocolonial offensive against the interconnected anti-systemic struggles in the third world: "[T]he Ben Barka crime—his assassination, like Lumumba's assassination, like Aidit's murder, like Sandino's assassination—that with none of its barbarous acts can imperialism contain the victorious march, the final liberation of the peoples!"⁷²⁸

The 1966 Tricontinental Conference

Only two days after the seventh anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, on January 3rd-15th, 1966, Havana hosted the Tricontinental Conference that "surpass[ed] in sheer numbers of participants any of the seven congresses of the Third Communist International held from 1919 to 1935."⁷²⁹ This made it one of the largest international revolutionary meetings in history. More than 500 delegates and around 270 observers from anti-imperialist, revolutionary, and socialist organizations of over 80 countries gathered at Habana Libre Hotel in the vibrant cultural district of Vedado.⁷³⁰ The Conference drew by now legendary anticolonial thinkers and leaders (titles according to the Tricontinental's delegation list then) like Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Chilean socialist senator Salvador Allende, Portuguese Guinean African Party for Independence's Secretary-General Amílcar Cabral, Guatemalan United Guerrilla Front (FAR)'s leader Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, East Pakistani National Awami Party's President Maulana Bashani, United Arab Republic Egyptian Peace Council's Secretary General Khalid Muhyi al-Din (or Khaled Mohieddine), African-American civil rights leader in exile Robert F. Williams, and French theorist of third world guerrilla warfare Régis Debray.

Besides Osmany Cienfuegos, who chaired the International Preparatory Committee after Barka, the local Cuban committee involved in conference preparations and planning included the Minister of Education of the Revolution, Armando Hart, as organizing secretary, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Raúl Roa, as the Conference's Chairman. The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution organized seminars and mural exhibitions. Young activists from the Young Communist Union, the High School Students Union, the University Students Federation, and the Pioneers Union participated in the pre-conference programs and study groups. The Schools for Revolutionary Instruction supplied guides and attaches. The Cuba Trade Union Center arranged entertainers to perform songs and dances from each participating country.⁷³¹

Women took an active part in the preparation. Led by a feminist and chemical engineer, Vilma Espín de Castro, along with Asela de Los Santos, the Federation of Cuban Women organized the Women Workers' Conference as well as vocational workshops, sports events, children's parties, parades, and simultaneous chess matches. Examples of vocational workshops

⁷²⁶ Mahler, *From the Tricontinental*, 71.

⁷²⁷ Castro, Fidel, 1966, "Text of Fidel Castro Speech to Closing Session," Castro Speech Database, University of Texas (17 Jan.). Available at: <http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/castro/db/1966/19660216.html>.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁹ Saney, Isaac, 2019, "Dreaming Revolution: Tricontinentalism, Anti-Imperialism, and Third World Rebellion," in *Routledge Handbook of South-South Relations*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Patricia Daley, Oxon and New York: Routledge.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷³¹ *The Tricontinental Conference*, 9-10.

were women's fashion, fruit and timber tree planting, and vegetable harvesting. The organizers also set aside an occasion to celebrate women's "thousands of hours" of volunteer work.⁷³² In the Conference, de Castro and de Los Santos were joined by other women activists like Costa Rican People's Vanguard Party's women's front leader Luisa González Gutiérrez and Union of South African African National Congress (ANC)'s women's section leader Florence Mophosho.

Assembling many militant anti-imperialist figures when their struggles were in great momentum gave out an impression that the Tricontinental was "at the apex of the coming world revolution."⁷³³ Two of the three most iconic "Tricontinental" struggles—Cuban (Latin America) and Algerian (Africa)—just succeeded while the third Vietnamese heroic resistance against US neocolonialism (Asia) was intensifying. Guerilla struggles in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, along with national liberation struggles in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, sent out the revolutionary ripple effect throughout the globe. Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM)—the Black Panther Party's predecessor and first US revolutionary black nationalist group to synthesize the thought of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Malcolm X—challenged the US imperialist beast right within its belly.⁷³⁴

The Tricontinental Conference had four main agendas: 1) the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; 2) concrete struggles against imperialism in the three continents; 3) anti-imperialist solidarity in economic, social, and cultural fields; and 4) Tricontinental political and institutional unification.⁷³⁵ The official Cuban newspaper *Granma* best synthesized the ethos of the Tricontinental Conference:

The strategy of the revolutionary movements in their struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and especially against Yankee imperialism—[the] principal enemy of peoples—calls for closer military ties and solidarity between the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the working class, the progressive forces of the capitalistic countries of Europe and the United States, and the Socialist camp.⁷³⁶

Tricontinental's Theoretical Bases: Cabral's Neocolonial Anatomy and Guevara's Multiple Viet Nams

Among all the speeches delivered in the Conference, two iconic statements enjoyed wider circulation outside the Conference as they captured and expressed the Tricontinental's theoretical gist: Amílcar Cabral's "The Weapon of Theory" and Che Guevara's "Create Two, Three ... Many Viet Nams—That is the Watchword." Both argued for the continuing struggle, even after formal independence, to achieve socialist rule by the oppressed people. While Cabral offered a refined political-economic analysis of the national liberation struggle against neocolonialism, Guevara distilled a Vietnamese guerrilla model for the third world to reproduce in their own specific geohistorical conditions.

Theory, for Cabral, fundamentally constituted the revolutionary praxis of and for the oppressed. While the title, "The Weapon of Theory," suggests an unequivocal interpretation of theory's usefulness as a combatting tool, this dissertation claims instead that Cabral deployed this

⁷³² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷³³ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁴ Mullen, Bill V., 2004, "Transnational Correspondence: Robert F. Williams, Detroit, and the Bandung Era," in *Afro-Orientalism*, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 73-112.

⁷³⁵ *The Tricontinental Conference*, 13-14.

⁷³⁶ *Ibid.*

title to elucidate a doubleness of (Marxist) theory that both questions its own Eurocentric assumptions and clarifies the complex geohistorical situation. The theoretical weapon was valuable because it enabled both modes of thinking—interrogative and analytical—so critical to any revolutionary movements. In this vein, “The Weapon” has a two-pronged argument.

First, Cabral deployed modes of production as a Marxist framing device to refute the Eurocentric and racist assumptions that history begins with the development of archetypal “classes,” i.e., capitalist and proletariat, and ends with the teleological accomplishment of “class struggle.” This assumption led to two subsequent historical-philosophical propositions: certain societies without archetypal classes had no history, and historical development stopped once certain societies eliminated the archetypal classes. Reading history dialectically through the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations within a mode of production, Cabral asserted that various societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, even without colonialism, always already lived in historicity as they developed productive forces in a certain mode of production. “It therefore seems permissible,” Cabral contended, “to conclude that the level of productive forces, the essential determinant of the content and form of class struggle, is the true and permanent motive force of history.”⁷³⁷ He continued: “If we accept this conclusion, ... we can see that the existence of history before the class struggle is safeguarded, and we thus avoid for some human groups in our countries (and perhaps in our continent) the sad position of being peoples without history.”⁷³⁸

Arriving at the same conclusion as Mao’s ceaseless revolution, Cabral explained that history continued despite the formal disappearance of class struggle or of classes themselves. Cabral wrote: this conclusion “gives to these peoples who, like the people of Cuba, are building socialism the agreeable certainty that they will not cease to have a history when they complete the process of elimination of the phenomenon of class and class struggle within their socio-economic whole.”⁷³⁹ Dissimilar to Mao and hence fallen into the orthodox Marxist domain, however, Cabral did not couch this continuing history as an emergence of new and the persistence of old contradictions (including classes), not to mention the struggles to resolve them. He conceived of class as historically specific to capitalism—which is not orthodox, to be sure—but he thought that class, just like any other capitalist categories like labor or the bourgeois state, would wither away merely by replacing the bourgeois government with a vanguard party or the proletariat. What remained as history-maker, for Cabral, was man who “can never free himself from the burden of his needs, both of hand and brain, which are the basis of the development of productive forces,” in a society without classes.⁷⁴⁰

Second, Cabral analyzed the national liberation struggle against neocolonialism through Marxist political economy. He admitted that “one of the greatest weaknesses ... of our struggle against imperialism” concerned the “ideological deficiency,” in the sense of the “ignorance of the historical reality which these movements aspire to transform.”⁷⁴¹ (Marxist) theory, then, became a weapon to “eliminate this deficiency.”⁷⁴²

Following Lenin, he defined imperialism as “the worldwide expression of profit motive and the ever-increasing accumulation of *surplus value* by monopoly financial capital, [centered]

⁷³⁷ Cabral, Amílcar, 1979 [1966], “The Weapon of Theory,” in *Unity and Struggle: Speeches and Writings of Amílcar*, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 125.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁷⁴² *Ibid.*, 123.

in two regions of the world; first in Europe, and, later, in North America.”⁷⁴³ In the same Marxist vein, Cabral identified the essential characteristic of imperialist domination as the “denial of the historical process of the dominated people, by means of violent usurpation of the freedom of the process of development of the national productive forces.”⁷⁴⁴ Through capitalism’s surplus-value accumulation process, Cabral argued that imperialism “was a historical necessity” resulting from “the development of productive forces and the transformations of the mode of production.”⁷⁴⁵ A twist to this historical necessity argument was that Cabral saw “the national liberation of peoples, the destruction of capitalism, and the advent of socialism” as a necessary part of historical progression as well.⁷⁴⁶

Cabral scrupulously dissected neocolonialism’s anatomy—the core Tricontinental’s problematic—to distinguish it from classic colonialism. He saw through the mystification of neocolonial domination that “create[d] the illusion that the historical process [wa]s returning to its normal evolution,” where the latter can be witnessed from the dynamism of domestic social activities previously paralyzed during classic colonialism.⁷⁴⁷ The national state, a form of political power, composed of “native elements,” reinforced this illusion. Cabral exposed this neocolonial mystification by shifting our attention to “the subjection of the native ‘ruling’ class to the ruling class of the dominating country,” which, in fact, “limits or holds back the full development of the national productive forces.”⁷⁴⁸ Here, Cabral outlined an inchoate variation of dependency theory that we could also see in Samir Amin in the first section. Because of this economic dependence and the restriction on national productive forces, Cabral submitted, “the native pseudo-bourgeoisie, however strongly nationalist, ... cannot freely guide the development of the productive forces.” “In brief,” he concluded, “it cannot be a national bourgeoisie.”⁷⁴⁹

As neocolonialism’s inverse, Cabral conceptualized national liberation as “the phenomenon in which a socio-economic whole rejects the denial of its historical process.”⁷⁵⁰ We can see that Cabral theorized the contradiction between neocolonialism and national liberation as “negation of the negation,” using the Engelsian topos from his third law of dialectics. This “negation of the negation” also entailed reappropriative gestures of “regain[ing] ... the historical personality of that people, [and] return[ing] [the people] to history through the destruction of the imperialist domination to which they were subjected.”⁷⁵¹ With this logic, Cabral insisted that “national liberation exists when, and only when, the national productive forces have been completely freed from all and any kind of foreign domination.”⁷⁵² Cabral’s theorization of the national liberation struggle as the development of the national productive forces, it is clear, still followed the orthodox Marxist paradigm. Yet, it by far provided a materialist corrective to other explanations of nationalism based on rights, language, or affect, as well as to the whole Eurocentric Marxist universe that dismissed the nation entirely as a mystifying bourgeois ideology.

Cabral distinguished classic colonialism from neocolonialism through two more axes: the societal structure and the struggle’s prospects. Colonial society’s horizontal structure allowed for

⁷⁴³ *Ibid.*, 127. Original emphasis.

⁷⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 129-30.

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁷⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁷⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*

“the creation of a broad front of unity and struggle” of the popular masses led by a revolutionary vanguard.⁷⁵³ The national struggle against classic colonialism, for Cabral, could lead to a national revolution where “the nation gains its independence and theoretically adopts the economic structure it finds most attractive.”⁷⁵⁴ In contradistinction, neocolonial “native” society’s vertical structure “aggravate[s] the contradictions within that society and make[s] difficult, if not impossible, the creation of as broad a united front as in the colonial case.”⁷⁵⁵ As has been conceptualized earlier in this chapter, this situation resembles what this dissertation, following Fanon and developed from Mao, sees as third world’s internal contradictions, a contradiction within the postcolonial society, rather than merely between an interior native/self and the exterior foreigner/other.

For Cabral, the “national liberation” solution to the battle against the comprador bourgeoisie and the native ruling class involved the working class’ alliances and a socialist solution, rather than a united nationalist solution. Cabral emphasized that the working class—the popular vanguard of the national liberation struggle—must “all[y] itself firmly with the other exploited strata, the peasants in general (farm laborers, tenants, sharecroppers, and patty farm-owners) and the nationalist petty bourgeoisie.”⁷⁵⁶ Solving the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie problem—a class Cabral deemed impossible in the neocolonial situation—he instructed them to “commit *suicide* as a class to be restored to life in the condition of revolutionary workers.”⁷⁵⁷ This alternative, Cabral remarked, allowed the petty bourgeoisie, a class once capable of uniting the anti-colonial national forces, to “completely identify with the deepest aspirations of the people to which he belong[ed].”⁷⁵⁸

In a formula similar to Luxemburg’s barbarism or socialism, the two only possible paths for an independent nation in Cabral’s theorization were “to return to imperialist domination (neocolonialism, capitalism, State capitalism), or to take the socialist road.”⁷⁵⁹ The latter registered “the destruction of the capitalist structure implanted in the national soil by imperialism.”⁷⁶⁰ In this formulation, socialism became both a logical and a historical necessity as the negation of neocolonialism.

Prefaced with “we do not think we shall shock this assembly by stating that the only effective way of completely and definitely fulfilling the aspirations of the peoples,” Cabral’s “un-shocking” solution to neocolonialism was indeed armed struggle, resonating with other guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, Cuba, and elsewhere during that time.⁷⁶¹ Even as most national liberation movements did not explicitly cite Maoist ideas, Maoist praxes—particularly Maoist insurrectional tactics like armed struggle and peasant insurgency—prevailed in left third-worldist struggles. As this dissertation’s previous chapter argues, Maoist internationalism provided a soft anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist structure for the third-world liberation movements based on their geo-historical materialist specificities.

Though Guevara commanded his last guerrilla war in the Bolivian mountains during the Conference, he sent the famed message, “Create Two, Three, ... Many Viet Nams,” to the

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 132.

⁷⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 133,

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 134.

Tricontinental. This essay, which has been taken up as nearly synonymous with the Conference's motto itself, appeared in the Tricontinental Special Supplement a year later. After giving an overview of the American neocolonial offensive on many third world locations, Guevara arrived at the same conclusion with Cabral: "the indigenous bourgeoisie have lost all their capacity to oppose imperialism—if they ever had any—and are only dragged along behind it like a caboose. There are no other alternatives. Either a socialist revolutionary or a caricature of revolution."⁷⁶² In Guevara's vision, the ultimate path to the revolution meant the "total destruction of imperialism by means of eliminating its strongest bulwark: the imperialist domination of the United States of North America."⁷⁶³ One tactic to achieve this goal, for Guevara, was to gradually liberate the peoples, "involving the enemy [US] in a difficult struggle outside his terrain, destroying his bases of support, that is, his dependent territories."⁷⁶⁴

"It is absolutely correct to avoid any needless sacrifice," Guevara reiterated, "but we can have no illusions ... that freedom can be won without a fight."⁷⁶⁵ Guevara framed the motive of this warfare as survival amidst the violent repression. "We are being pushed into this struggle," he wrote.⁷⁶⁶ Guevara envisioned this battling scenario as "a long, bloody struggle in which the front will be in guerrilla refuges in the cities, in the homes of the combatants ..., among the massacred peasant population, in the towns or cities destroyed by the enemy's bombs."⁷⁶⁷

"Representing the aspirations and hopes for victory of all the world's disinherited," Vietnam, in Guevara's revolutionary scheme, epitomized the third-world liberation struggle.⁷⁶⁸ Guevara intransigently appealed to the third world revolutionary movements to "share [Vietnam's] fate ... and join [Vietnam] in death or in victory," rather than just "wish[ing] the victim success."⁷⁶⁹ Guevara continued: "Vietnam teaches us this with its permanent lesson in heroism, its tragic daily lesson of struggle and death in order to gain the final victory."⁷⁷⁰ Guevara's memorable soliloquy about the prospects of multiple Vietnams that became the essay's title went as follows:

How close and bright would the future appear if two, three, many Vietnams flowered on the face of the globe, with their quota of death and their immense tragedies, with their daily heroism, with their repeated blows against imperialism, forcing it to disperse its forces under the lash of the growing hatred of the peoples of the world!⁷⁷¹

The virtue of Vietnam—Guevara's synecdoche for third world liberation struggle—was worthy of ceaseless reproductions. Its multiplicity meant steps closer to the elimination of the American neocolonial empire. This ideal of multiple Vietnams witnessed its momentary actualization in the Tricontinental Conference itself. After the speeches by National Liberation Front of South

⁷⁶² Guevara, Che, 1967, "Create Two, Three, ... Many Viet Nams—That is the Watchword," in *Tricontinental Special Supplement*, Havana: Executive Secretariat of the OSPAAAL, 11. I have amended the translation in accordance with Guevara, Che, 1967, "Vietnam and the World Struggle for Freedom (Message to the Tricontinental)," Richard W. Slatta's Teaching Documents for HI216-601 Latin America since 1826, North Carolina State University. Available at: <https://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/slatta/hi216/documents/chetricontinent.htm>.

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁷⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.

⁷⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 24.

Vietnam (Viet Cong)’s Central Committee member Nguyen Van Tien and (North) Vietnam Federation of Trade Unions’ Vice President Tran Danh Tuyen, Dominican delegate Cayetano Rodríguez del Prado vowed to convert the Dominican Republic into “the Vietnam of Latin America.”⁷⁷²

Indonesia between Third World Left Solidarity and Rightist Counter-Revolution

Nowhere, in the context of the Tricontinental Conference, had the third world’s internal contradictions—a question on which both Cabral and Guevara ruminated—been manifested as sharply as the Indonesian case. It was a tale of three internal contradictions between the revolutionary and reactionary Indonesian delegations (a third world’s contradiction), neo-Marxist-Leninist and modern revisionist communist lines (an international communism’s contradiction), and national liberation and peaceful co-existence paths (a modern revisionism’s contradiction).

After the G30S/PKI on September 30th, 1965, an event in which the US-involved anticommunist military framed the communists as the perpetrator of national violence, Indonesia underwent a gruesome period of communist purge and a transition from the center-left Soekarno to far-right Suharto government. Only Indonesian leftists abroad survived the carnage and mass incarceration while striving to build an internationalist alliance with other communist countries, progressive governments, left organizations, and radical liberation movements.

For this Conference, the tension erupted when the Indonesian government—whose daily operations were nearly taken over by the military while still having Soekarno as the figurehead—sent an official delegation led by Brig.General Latief Hendraningrat to Havana.⁷⁷³ The other delegates in Latief’s group were Harsono Tjokroaminoto, Toha Maruf, Kabhat Sudomo, Lt.Col. Dr.Slamet, and Suroso. This “delegasi Djenderal” (General’s delegation), as Ibrahim Isa called it, clashed with Isa’s own delegation whose members had long been organizing within the Afro-Asian leftist circuit, including Francisca Fanggidaej (Women’s International Democratic Federation), Umar Said (Afro-Asian Journalist Association), Willy Hariandja (based in Beijing), Suhardjo (based in Prague), Sugiri (World Federation of Trade Unions), and Margono (World Federation of Democratic Youth).⁷⁷⁴ Though representing the Afro-Asian Conference of Jurists from Conakry, S.H. Wijanto, Vice Dean of Universitas Airlangga’s Faculty of Law, also *de facto* joined Isa’s delegation.⁷⁷⁵

Latief’s delegation registered with the International Preparatory Committee (IPC) through the Indonesian government and brought with them official statements from President Soekarno

⁷⁷² *The Tricontinental Conference*, 22-3.

⁷⁷³ An interesting fact was that in an “update” about the Indonesian situation sent through a telegram from the Cuban Embassy in Jakarta to Havana, it listed a possible transitional government in January 1966 if Soekarno fell due to whatever reasons. Nasution or Sultan Hemangkubuwono IX were Presidential candidates; Ruslan Abdulgani would be Vice President; Adam Malik would replace Subandrio as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Fanggidaej, Francisca, “Laporan Tentang Hubungan dengan Partai Kuba,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 10.

⁷⁷⁴ This list is from the Indonesian Consulate in Havana with an order to revoke passports from Isa’s delegation’s members. “Salinan Kawat Rahasia dari Deparlu,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (12 Jan. 1966).

The Senate Subcommittee’s study listed two more names: Soodhartono and Edy Soonardji. *The Tricontinental Conference*, 55.

⁷⁷⁵ Telegram message from chargés d’affaires ad interim Muhamad Hatta to Indonesian Ambassador to Cuba A.M. Hanafi, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (7 Jan. 1966).

and OISRAA's Chairwoman Utami Surjadarma.⁷⁷⁶ Isa's delegation, on the other hand, provided the IPC evidence that exposed Latief's delegation's neocolonial and reactionary makeup: a published interview with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)'s Vice Chairman Njoto, the calls to support President Soekarno's revolutionary projects, and advocacy statement from British philosopher and peace activist Bertrand Russell on the military's suppression of the left in Indonesia.⁷⁷⁷ Isa also informed the IPC about the enormous pressure forced upon OISRAA, particularly on "free" non-communist leftist officers like Utami, Munaf, and Suroso, by the military-controlled Ministry of Foreign Affairs to acknowledge and legitimize Latief's delegation.⁷⁷⁸

For Isa's delegation was already active within the Tricontinental circuit, and the Afro-Asian network before that, the IPC's ultimate judgment about Isa's delegation as the only legitimate Indonesian delegation came to no surprise. Yet, the process behind this decision illustrated another more segmented internal contradiction, now not between the left and the right within the third world, but among the two lefts—the contradiction among the people! Francisca Fanggidaej, a transnational feminist in Isa's delegation, described the IPC as dominated by the Remo group, abbreviated from *revisionis modern*, or the Soviet modern revisionist line. In the mid-60s PKI's lexicon, Remo was opposed to ML, shortened from *Marxis-Leninis*, or the Chinese Marxist-Leninist line, with which the PKI bore a strong affiliation in later years.⁷⁷⁹ As argued in the previous chapter, this dissertation calls the Chinese line after the Sino-Soviet split *neo-Marxism-Leninism* (or neo-ML). This term helps to distinguish the Chinese communists' effort in re-engaging with Marxism-Leninism in the post-split anti-revisionist milieu from classic Marxism-Leninism that emerged out of Lenin's rejection of the Second International's line.

To convince the IPC to officially recognize Isa's delegation's legitimacy, Fanggidaej succeeded in connecting Isa's delegation with IPC's Organizing Secretary Armando Hart and Cuban revolutionary cultural institution Casa de Las Américas' Director Haydée Santamaría, a revolutionary couple whom she contacted to request a PKI's 45th-anniversary congratulatory message back in May 1965.⁷⁸⁰ Hart assigned the Southeast Asia and Oceania division's director from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eduardo Delgado, to follow the case through. Unable to decide on his own, Delgado brought the case back to the IPC, making it a full circle.⁷⁸¹

Characterizing the Caban hosts as wishy-washy (*'plintat-plintut'*) and two-faced (*'dua-wajah'*), Fanggidaej analyzed that the main reason for the Cuban hosts' and IPC's hesitation in recognizing Isa's delegation concerned the Cuban ambivalent position in the international communist movement. The Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), on the one hand, elected to stay loyal to the Soviet or Remo camp, leading it to accept Latief's delegation in the first place. During the Sino-Soviet split, we need to be reminded that what was more significant than ideological

⁷⁷⁶ Isa, Ibrahim, "Pokok2 Laporan Delegasi Indonesia ke Konferensi Tiga Kontinen di Havana," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 1.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ Utami Surjadarma's correspondence with Ibrahim Isa, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (22 Dec. 1965). Surjadarma reported quite pithily that "Sungguh banyak jang "menggondeli" saja!" ('Tremendously many are 'controlling' me!'). In this letter, she apologized to Isa for sending Suroso in her stead in Latief's delegation to privately cooperate with Isa as she felt "sangat berat" ('extremely heavy or difficult') to leave Indonesia during such a perilous situation. She was worried that OISRAA and Kiapma, a new bureau founded and named after the Kiapma Conference, will be retooled and disbanded sooner or later.

⁷⁷⁹ Fanggidaej, "Laporan Tentang Hubungan dengan Partai Kuba," 1.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

consistency was the anti-Chinese alliance, sometimes regardless of the ally's political orientation (in this case, Latief as the Remo's bet against the Chinese-oriented PKI). Yet, as the PCC aimed to emerge globally as the third-worldist communist vanguard, it could not ignore Isa's delegation's potential to undermine this reputation.⁷⁸² This have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too attitude resulted in awkward arrangements for both Isa's and Latief's delegations. For example, the IPC offered Isa's delegation rooms at the main conference venue, Hotel Habana Libre, where official delegations stayed. In contrast, it sent Latief's delegation to Hotel Riviera, reserved for cultural performers and entertainers.⁷⁸³ From the side of Latief's delegation, Suroso, the Indonesian Peace Committee's General Secretary and Surjadarma's representative to cooperate with Isa—a double agent, in other words—approached AAPSO's Secretary-General and acquaintance Jusuf Al-Siba'i but without positive results.⁷⁸⁴

In spite of the complicated Sino-Soviet feud presupposing the IPC's sectarian politics, the Committee ultimately adhered to the Tricontinental's, as well as the Communist Party of Cuba's, commitment to supporting a national left movement against neocolonial and reactionary forces. Fanggidaej's memorandum read this scenario as an even more subdivided internal contradiction within the Remo group between Cuban and Soviet Remo. The reason the former was not fully subsumed into the latter, for Fanggidaej, indicated that the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) still retained the militant anticolonial element from the 26th of July Movement, a revolutionary organization and political party led by Fidel Castro before morphing into the PCC.⁷⁸⁵

Before the IPC passed an official judgment on the Indonesian delegation question, Isa made three attempts to reconcile with Latief on certain conditions: Latief ought to explicitly condemn US imperialism, denounce the Indonesian rightist military to support President Soekarno, and accept Isa as the delegation's head, all of which were declined by Latief. Exercising the Indonesian state authority, Latief got an order from the Indonesian government for the Indonesian Consulate in Havana to revoke passports from members of Isa's delegation. Eduardo Delgado, the Southeast Asian region's director, unhesitatingly stepped in to grant them Cuban passports.⁷⁸⁶ The two delegations observed a temporary ceasefire during the Indonesian Night (*Malam Indonesia*) organized on January 6th by (unidentified) Indonesian Women's Group (kaum Wanita Indonesia), led by the wife of A.M. Hanafi, radical nationalist Indonesian Ambassador to Cuba, Sukendah Hanafi, and the Indonesian Embassy in Havana. Vilma Espín de Castro graced the gathering as a representative from both the Cuban government and the Federation of Cuban Women. Indeed, this anti-colonial cultural night cannot end without dancing Lenso—Minahasan and Moluccan regional folk dance promoted by Soekarno as an alternative to "Western" rock and roll—along the song *Mari Kita Bersuka Ria* ('Be Cheerful'), commissioned and believed to be composed by Soekarno himself.⁷⁸⁷

After the conference, Isa, Fanggidaej, Said, and Hariandja fled to Canton (present-day Guangzhou), where the head of the exiled PKI in the PRC, Jusuf Adjitorop, met and accompanied

⁷⁸² *Ibid.*, 3-5.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁸⁴ Suroso's Correspondence with Jusuf Al-Siba'i, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (1 Jan. 1966).

⁷⁸⁵ Fanggidaej, "Laporan Tentang Hubungan dengan Partai Kuba," 5.

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.; Isa's correspondence with Afro-Asian Journalist Association's Chairman Djatowo, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (nd.).

⁷⁸⁷ Antara, 1966, "'Malam Indonesia' di Habana," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (6 Jan.); Farram, Steven, 2014, "*Ganyang!* Indonesian Popular Songs from the Confrontation Era, 1963-1966," *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde* 170, 1 (Jan.): 1-24.

them to Beijing.⁷⁸⁸ Fanggidaej entrusted her comrade in Prague, the PKI's Europe Committee's Chair and the World Federation of Trade Unions' Secretary, Setiati Surasto, with the mid-coordinating task between the Communist Party of Cuba and the surviving PKI in Europe and China.⁷⁸⁹ Not long after, Surasto also moved to China and joined Adjitorop's faction.

Series of accusations against Isa's delegation ensued when Latief left Havana and raised this issue in the Indonesian parliamentary meeting. Isa reported about the demonstrations in Jakarta shouting the slogan "hanging Isa" (*'gantung Isa'*), as well as other rallies in front of the Cuban Embassy in Jakarta yelling "severing diplomatic ties with Cuba" (*'putusan hubungan diplomatic dgn Kuba'*) and "Cuba is no ally" (*'Kuba tidak bersahabat'*).⁷⁹⁰ Parliamentary minutes from the session on the Tricontinental Conference described Isa's delegation as "sham" (*palsu*), "adventurist" (*petualang2*), "counter-revolutionary" (*kontra-revolusi*), "unpatriotic" (*non-patriotik*), and, most perniciously, part of the "30th September Movement" (*'Gerakan 30 September'*), a ploy used by the military as a pretext to murder the communists.⁷⁹¹ The most dramatic—and, quite witting—depiction of Isa's delegation from the right that connected Isa's revolutionary activity to the guerilla method, emblematic of the Tricontinental struggles, came from Veterans' Legion's Head H.Moh Moenasir: "a political guerrilla demeaning (*mentjemarkan*) Indonesian state and nation in the diplomatic field."⁷⁹²

Both issues of the ideological struggle to represent Indonesia abroad and Indonesian rightist counter-revolution ranked high in Fidel Castro's priorities. In his Tricontinental's closing address, Castro reported that Cuba's commitment to maintaining "a position of principle, objective, just ... jeopardized Cuban relations with some countries, as was the case with Indonesia, due to the fact that ... the Cuban delegation rejected the official delegation from Indonesia."⁷⁹³ Leftist internationalist solidarity based on shared anti-colonial and socialist commitment triumphed over Westphalian international relations. Castro also shared tragic news about the mass murder of the Indonesian communists and the assassination of the PKI's Chairman D.N. Aidit, which was at that time unconfirmed even among the surviving Indonesian communists' inner circle:

One is a concern which affects us all in the face of the events in Indonesia, confronted with the reports reaching us from Indonesia that more than 100,000 revolutionary militant individuals have been savagely assassinated, with the report that Aidit and some other Communist Party leaders in Indonesia have been assassinated. We would like to register our reproach, our protest, and our solidarity with the Indonesian revolutionaries, today persecuted by militarist reaction, frightened by Yankee imperialism.⁷⁹⁴

⁷⁸⁸ Antara, 1966, "Gerombolan Ibrahim Isa Disinjalir di Peking," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (26 Jan. 1966).

⁷⁸⁹ Francisca Fanggidaej's correspondence with Jusuf Adjiorop and Mohamad Zaelani, ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH (nd.).

⁷⁹⁰ Isa, "Pokok2 Laporan Delegasi Indonesia," 2.

⁷⁹¹ "Pernyataan Pendapat Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Rojong Tentang Konperensi Pertama Rakjat AAA," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 1 (11 Feb. 1966).

⁷⁹² Antara, 1966, "Peristiwa Chianat Ibrahim Isa CS di Habana Suatu Bukti Gerilja Politik "Gestapu"/PKI Dibidang Diplomatik," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 1 (13 Jan.).

⁷⁹³ Castro, "Text of Fidel Castro Speech to Closing Session."

⁷⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

During Isa's delegation's meeting with Castro after the Conference, Castro revealed that he received the Indonesian information from Soviet delegation's head Sharaf Rashidov, who was, in turn, briefed by the Soviet embassy in Jakarta. As the information came from the Remo faction, PKI-oriented figures like Isa or Fanggidaej, who aligned with China by default, were suspicious of not only the accuracy but also the Soviet delegate's intent.⁷⁹⁵ Sectarian politics aside, the anticommunist massacre in Indonesia, for Castro as well as other participants, indicated a new extent of the neocolonial, or "Yankee imperialist," offensive. Later, this anticommunist *and* anti-third-worldist milestone—a symmetrical opposite of left third-worldist struggle against the capitalist-imperialist nexus—became a codeword, "Jakarta is Coming" or "*Djakarta se acerca*" in Spanish, for American neocolonial aggression in Latin America.⁷⁹⁶

Discourses about Indonesia in Latief's and Isa's speeches could not have been more different. Whereas the former entirely transferred preconceived third-worldist discourse on Indonesia as one central node in liquidating foreign military bases from the Kiapma to Tricontinental Conference, the latter zeroed in on the rightist counter-revolution in Indonesia.

Though Latief did not have a chance to present his speech at the conference, the draft of his undelivered remarks appeared in the archive. It was clear from the rhetoric and content that Latief could not have written this statement on his own and might helplessly rely instead on OISRAA ghostwriter(s). For example, the speech addressed the audience as "comrades-in-arms" or described American intervention in Indonesian politics as "crimes."⁷⁹⁷ Imagining that the speech, primarily about anti-military bases, would be read aloud by Latief, a general benefitting from the US-involved military takeover, made this whole piece ironic, plastic, and eerie. The speech's first part started by congratulating Cuba for defying Yankee imperialism, then moving to supporting Vietnam's struggles, condemning US imperialism, and ending with the call for the Tricontinental participants to advance militant anti-colonial struggles. In the second part, the speech discussed the military bases' function in supporting imperialist aggression, using an example of Indonesia's struggle against the British neocolonial project of "Malaysia," conceived as "one huge military base."⁷⁹⁸ The presence of military bases within a country, like the Guantanamo base in Cuba, wrote the statement, "means 'the domination' of that country itself, political[ly], economical[ly], social[ly], cultural[ly], and moral[ly]."⁷⁹⁹ The final section elaborated on Soekarno's idea of the New Emerging Forces or Nefos, coinciding with Indonesia's official foreign policy, that challenged the old established order's imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism (or Nekolim in the Soekarnoist terminology).⁸⁰⁰

Latief's speech made a cursory jab at the G30S incident as follows:

In spite of the temporary internal political upheaval, as a consequence of a recent abortive conspiracy movement of contra-revolutionaries against the leadership of President Sukarno, which is now entering the last stages of its solution, Indonesia still maintains its

⁷⁹⁵ Fanggidaej, "Laporan Tentang Hubungan dengan Partai Kuba," 9.

⁷⁹⁶ Bevins, Vincent, 2020, *The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade & The Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World*, New York: Public Affairs.; For the poem composed from a perspective of a guilty American resident who meditates on living in a murderer country, see: Scott, Peter Dale, 1989, *Coming to Jakarta: A Poem about Terror*, New York: New Directions Pub. Corp.

⁷⁹⁷ "General Statement by the Chief Delegate of the Indonesian Delegation to the Tricontinental Conference, Latief Hendraningrat," ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 1-2.

⁷⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

foreign policy as before, active and independent in her attempts to unite and consolidate the New Emerging Forces all over the world in direct confrontation against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.⁸⁰¹

Given that the communist murder still went on for the whole year (not “temporary”), this statement, even written from OISRAA’s non-communist left perspective, grossly swept the issue of violent reactionary offensive under the rug and over-optimistically presented the situation as increasingly under Soekarno’s control. Isa’s address, in this dissertation’s estimation, provided a sharper comprehension of a new principal contradiction governing the Indonesian situation, namely, the “Indonesian people’s struggle against military fascist dictatorship.”⁸⁰² This situational analysis, in a way, served as a geohistorical-materialist critique of Latief’s third-world abstractionism that failed to discern the social differences of the “people,” one that is similar to Hoxha’s critique of Maoist metaphysical conception of the third world examined in the previous chapter.

The Isa-Latief clash at the Conference, in Isa’s view, expressed a micro manifestation of this principal contradiction. The defeat of Latief meant both the loss of the right, and in extension, the Remo faction in this short-lived match.⁸⁰³ Isa’s report went as far as saying: “It was in this conference that the Indonesian military fascist dictatorship, at that time entering its 4th month of sanguinary rule over the country, suffered its first and major defeat in an international forum.”⁸⁰⁴

Like Latief’s ghost-written speech, Isa discussed the Tricontinental-related issues in the first section, from the struggles against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism to the specific struggle against US imperialism in Vietnam. On these topics, Isa elaborated on two particular points. First, he dispelled the illusion about a possible change in imperialism’s nature. Instead, Isa insisted on imperialism’s structural belligerent predisposition, reminding us of his stance on imperialism back in his 1962 AAPSO’s statement about Papua examined earlier in this chapter, which was also analogous to the CCP’s interpretation in the 1960 Lenin Polemics. He wrote: “The aggressive nature of US imperialism will never change. Like a ferocious beast of prey, it will attack and devour people whether they are provoked or not.” This characteristic led Isa to conclude that “there is no alternative. Fight, liquidate it, or be liquidated sooner or later. A showdown is inevitable.”⁸⁰⁵

Second, he saw Vietnam’s “people’s war” as one, if not only, historically proven model in combatting US domination and aggression: “The people of Vietnam, mastering all kinds of tactics and art of people’s war, are giving mortal blows to the US imperialists, no matter how many troops they have sent and are going to send to South Vietnam. Their policy of escalation and peace hoax and again escalation has been fully exposed before the masses and peoples of the world.”⁸⁰⁶ A distinction to note is that “people’s war” for Võ Nguyên Giáp, the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)’s commander, and Lin Biao, the Chinese military strategist whose works we investigated in earlier sections, had slightly different meanings, even as both published a treatise under the same name within the same Marxist-Leninist tradition. While Lin Biao’s 1965 *People’s War* conversed with global victims of US imperialism using the dialectical rhetoric of the quantitatively

⁸⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁸⁰² “Tricontinental Conference,” 1968 [1966], in *Indonesian Tribune* 2, 2: 33.

⁸⁰³ Isa, “Pokok2 Laporan Delegasi Indonesia,” 2.

⁸⁰⁴ “Tricontinental Conference,” 33.

⁸⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁸⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

innumerable weak waging multiple wars against the qualitatively concentrated strong, Giáp's 1962 *People's War* referred to a guerilla army consisted of every people in a country under the vanguard party's proletarian leadership and a literal absorption of enemy's technology. In Giáp's words:

Therefore the history of the armed struggle and the building up of the armed forces in Viet Nam is that of a small nation subject to colonial rule and having neither a vast territory nor a large population, which, though lacking a regular army at the beginning, had to rise against the aggressive forces of an imperialist power, and triumphed over them in the end, liberating half of the country and enabling it to embark on the socialist path. As for the military policy of the vanguard Party of the Vietnamese working class, it is an application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of the war of liberation in a colonial country. ...

[It] was not possible for them [the French colonizers] to understand a fundamental and decisive fact: this fact was that the Vietnamese army, though very weak materially was a people's army. This fact is that the war in Viet Nam was not only the opposition of two armies. In provoking hostilities, the aggressive colonialists had alienated a whole nation. And, indeed, the whole Vietnamese nation, the entire Vietnamese people rose against them.⁸⁰⁷

The speech's latter part dealt exclusively with the new principal contradiction that governed the post-G30S Indonesian society. Isa interpreted the incident using the language of white terror, whose long political lineage could be traced to the French Revolution's opposition, to signify the concerted effort of the right—namely, Indonesian reactionaries and US imperialists—in suppressing the left. As Isa remained close to the Chinese orbit, his usage of white terror likely referred to the 1927 Shanghai massacre, another famous white terror, where the Nationalist Party Guomindang, led by Chiang Kai-shek, carried out a full-scale purge of the Chinese Communist Party. Isa's report wrote thus: "He pointed to the monstrous white terror unleashed by the Indonesian reactionaries, who, in collusion with and instigated by US imperialism, were making frantic attempts to usurp state power. He told the conference of the beastful atrocities perpetrated by the Indonesian right-wing forces in implementing their terrorist and racist activities against the people."⁸⁰⁸

Like Barka and Castro, Isa connected the massacre of the left in Indonesia to the global expansion of US neocolonialism as a common problem for the Tricontinental countries: "US imperialism and its accomplices were well aware that a united, strong, and progressive Indonesia was a great danger to them, and that's why they were doing they can to suppress the popular movement. The present outrage and counter-revolutionary actions and violence against the patriotic forces of our country and the anticommunist campaign is part and parcel of these imperialist schemes."⁸⁰⁹ And similar to Cabral and Guevara, Isa called for the third world people to "make a choice. To side with the revolutionaries or with the rightists," in this particular anti-dialectical scenario described in Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* where reconciliation and

⁸⁰⁷ Giáp, Võ Nguyên, 1962, *People's War, People's Army: The Viet Công Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries*, New York: Praeger, 41c, 42-3.

⁸⁰⁸ "Tricontinental Conference," 34.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

compromise with the colonizers meant the annihilation of the racialized and the colonized.⁸¹⁰ Of course, the Indonesian Communist Party tragically experienced this annihilation firsthand.

The Nation-State: Ceaseless Revolution or Abolition?

Third world internationalism, expressed through the Afro-Asian/AAPSO or the Tricontinental/OSPAAAL forms in this chapter, maybe actually-existing praxes closest to a Marxism that takes into account political economy and uneven material effects of imperialism from the colonized's vantage point. If Soviet and Chinese Marxisms in the long sixties deal with the Stalinist legacy of orthodoxy and dogmatism by (re)turning to humanism and dialectics respectively, third-world Marxism resorts to geohistorical materialism. This strand of Marxism, then, more than other kinds of Marxism, almost corresponds to the international working class itself in its material basis, considering that third world peoples are the working-class for the first world exploiter through an international division of labour that inherits and perpetuates the colonial structure.

Yet, as this chapter has been arguing, third world internationalism consist of multiple contradictions and require ceaseless organized struggles to resolve these contradictions in a quest to build a post-capitalist *and* post-imperialist society. Isa's struggle against Latief as a micro representative of the Indonesian people's struggle in solidarity with the Tricontinental nations against the US-involved right-wing fascist regime was a case in point. Another fundamental third world internationalism's problem concerns a defaulting to the nation-state as the foundation for building anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist hegemony and solidarity. Though the nation-state provides an emancipatory alternative to the colonial and the feudal state and may conduct what Samir Amin calls peripheral accumulation for quasi-socialist purposes, it reaps surplus value through the usual capitalist mechanisms, namely, the exploitation of labor and the expropriation of land.

Worse still, in continuing to maximize the national profit, the nation-state alienates, oppresses, "colonizes," and abandons as surplus population the racialized and subaltern national others, for example, the black Papuans, unpaid women reproductive labor, or even more problematically, the Chinese-Indonesians, in the case of Indonesia. Fanon already warns us that unless the national government permanently cedes its power back to the people or dissolves itself to renew its revolutionary potential, the nation-state will keep devolving. With great foresight and insight, Fanon describes Ivory Coast's devolving nationalism, which could be stretched as a general supposition for the nation-state and nationalism: "We have switched from nationalism to ultranationalism, chauvinism, and racism. ... There is a constant pendulum motion between African unity, which sinks deeper and deeper into oblivion, and a depressing return to the most heinous and virulent type of chauvinism."⁸¹¹ In the Indonesian case vis-à-vis West Papua, we even witness a phenomenon that could be called neoimperialist nationalism.

Either the nation-state keeps revolutionizing itself against capitalism and imperialism by resolving its social and economic contradictions and further intimating a sort of collective flourishing or, alternatively, as a core locus of capitalist reproduction, it could be abolished to allow the exploited 99% to globally cooperate without the nation-state's mediation. The options may not be limited to just national liberation or neoimperialism as the Tricontinental thinkers—Barka, Castro, Cabral, Guevara, or Isa—contended. Whereas the former involves a sustained

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.*; I borrow the reading of Fanon's *On Violence* as anti-dialectical from Sekyi-Otu, Ato, 1996, *Fanon's Dialectic of Experience*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

⁸¹¹ Fanon, *The Wretched*, 103, 105.

working class' organizing within the capitalist structure, the latter's post-national internationalist infrastructure remains too embryonic and unstable to assess its prospects. Whatever the case may be, a more rigorous analysis of internationalism as actualized at the peripheral-national level—an oxymoronic phenomenon of national internationalism—would enable us to understand the geohistorical particularities necessary for resolving the national question.

Chapter 4

Indonesian Minor-Communist Internationalism: Postcolonial Leninism and Decolonial Communism

This chapter examines the two least studied periods of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia; PKI) under D.N. Aidit's leadership (1951-1965): the pre-Aidit (1947-1951) and the late Aidit (1963-1965) periods. Foundational scholarship on the topic by Donald Hindley and Rex Mortimer do not treat these two periods sufficiently to make a definitive conclusion, like what this chapter does, about the Leninist basis of Aidit's PKI.⁸¹² This chapter refutes the common claim about the PKI as primarily Maoist which has been proven only through associative and formal, but never substantive, resonances.⁸¹³ Through closely investigating the PKI's theoretical texts and revolutionary practices at the periods when the PKI was most conceptually articulate, this chapter demonstrates a strong Leninist continuity from the pre-Aidit period, when the Aidit's faction called itself Sajak Leninis ('the Leninist Wing') to internally oppose the old leadership's reformism, to the late Aidit period, when the PKI was forging the anti-revisionist and decolonial minor-communist internationalism. This Leninism was not a mere replication of the original but a newly generated praxis that this dissertation calls postcolonial Leninism—a Leninism that takes into accounts the combined and uneven development in the postcolony. Postcolonial Leninism, this chapter argues, then provided both theoretical and practical foundations for minor-communist internationalism's double critiques of Stalinist dogmatism and Khrushchevian revisionism.

This scholarship is the first in the Anglophone scholarship to both utilize materials on the Sajak Leninis that have been circulating more widely within the Indonesian exile community and conceptualize the PKI's Leninism. Two main reasons that earlier scholarship have not done so are the following. First, the resources on the topic are scarce, though not in the same way with other materials from the longer span of Aidit's period that suffered from the state's anticommunist crackdown. After the Aidit's Sajak Leninis won over the reformist leadership in the PKI, Aidit and his main collaborators, known in the PKI's official historiography as the quadrumvirate (*caturtunggal*), censored these materials themselves to prevent the exposure of the party's multiple ideological lines. Following the suggestions from Musso, a long-term Indonesian Comintern member and an ex-PKI Politburo, Sajak Leninis was convinced that the party would survive only by unifying the party through one ideological line imposed by the leadership. Survivors of the anticommunist genocide, however, were not only followers of Aidit. The exile community consisted of multi-generational Indonesian communists. This phenomenon enabled them, specifically the reading group organized around the archivist Samardji in the Netherlands, to approach Aidit period from a longer historical perspective and recover more fully the transitional events leading up to the rise of Aidit's faction. Second, this analysis requires a comprehensive knowledge of different strands of Marxism(-Leninism) to discern both subtle and apparent

⁸¹² Hindley, Donald, 1966, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963*, Berkeley: University of California Press.; Mortimer, Rex, 1974, *Indonesian Communist under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press. The only classic piece of scholarship that deals with the post-1965 "Maoists" in detail but does not make a theoretical observations about "Maoism" per se is Van der Kroef, Justus M., 1977, "The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives," Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 3, Baltimore: The Maryland International Law School.

⁸¹³ This is too widespread in all scholarship on the postwar PKI but most rampant in the derivative scholarship of non-PKI specialists who do not read Indonesian materials. Most notably: Lovell, Julia, 2019, *Maoism: A Global History*, London: The Bodley Head.

contradictions among them. Without some familiarity with Marxism, it is easy to see all the ideological strands from Leninist to Maoist, Stalinist, Trotskyist, and even social democratic as one and the same, which I see as a conceptual limitation of much scholarship on the PKI.

While the PKI focused on rebuilding the party domestically throughout the 1950s, Aidit's leadership positioned the party as a descendent of the Bolshevik Revolution and therefore contributing to the momentum of the global revolution. Only in the 1960s, after the party's domestic concerns had been settled, did the PKI ventured globally to form what this dissertation sees in hindsight as a minor-communist internationalism comprising the peripheral radical nationalist and communist parties of North Kalimantan, Malaya, North Korea, and Albania. Minor-communist internationalism shared the same ideological commitments to anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-revisionism, whose lineage can be drawn to the original Leninist Third International that critiqued the Second International's colonial apologetics and reformism. This minor-communist internationalism likewise aimed to "decolonize" from Soviet big-country chauvinism and commandism. Though there are bilateral studies of the PKI's relationship to the other national parties above, this dissertation is the first to connect all of them while highlighting their different emphases: the political formation of the people's Malaya (for North Kalimantan and Malaya), economic self-reliance (North Korea), and global anti-revisionist ideology (Albania).

This chapter starts by reconstructing the PKI's history in the postwar period with the aim of recovering the multiple Marxist strands within the party that had been actively "cleaned up" by the party's official historiography. As an intellectual-historical dissertation, this part is needed not just because there is no definitive study of this period, but it also shows Sjahrir's gradual process of contestation with other ideological lines that ended in its victorious "internal coup." It then moves to discuss the three aspects of Leninism with which Sjahrir engaged to combat reformism: the vanguard party, revolutionary parliamentarism, and the Third International. Lastly, the chapter analyzes three fundamental circuits within minor-communist internationalism from Southeast Asia to North Korea, and Albania.

Dying Colonialism and Competing Leftisms: The PKI in the late 1940s

The liminal period between the Indonesian declaration of independence from the Japanese occupation in 1945 and the Dutch "transfer of sovereignty" to Indonesia in 1949 could be best characterized by Gramsci's notion of interregnum—"the old is dying and the new cannot be born." It is already visible from the description of the year's main event. Both Asian and European imperial powers, one Fascist and another liberal, competed to possess Indonesian sovereignty and resources.⁸¹⁴ After the Japanese surrendered in the Second World War, the Dutch—with its fresh experience of defeat and shame by the mighty Japanese navy in the War's Southeast Asian theater—returned to its "East Indies" jewel that was too precious for its economy to relinquish. The desperate endeavor of this, to use Fanon's word, "dying colonial" force to re-colonize Indonesia even after losing it recently demonstrated the Dutch's political and financial crisis. On the other side of the battlefield, disunited Indonesian independent movements divided along many political commitments and possibilities emerging from such a messy interregnum and along the limits imposed by the continuing war condition.

⁸¹⁴ Amir Sjarifuddin, an Indonesian leftist, has long used "Eastern Fascist" to describe the intruding Japanese Fascist army into Indonesia. In the anti-fascist Gerindo's meeting (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia; 'Indonesian People's Movement'), Amir stated: "Not just Fascist dangers from the West, but also the Eastern Fascist — Dai Nippon — which we directly confront is currently menacing Indonesian independence struggle."

Aidit, D.N., 1947, "Bahaja American Minded," *Soeara Boeroeh* 31, 2 (5 Jul.), 6.

Suffering from multiple crackdowns and state suppression, the weak and small PKI was hardly the dominant leftist movement during this period. The colonial government outlawed the PKI after its failed insurrection-attempt in 1926 and exiled many party members to Boven Digoel detention camp in West Papua. Sporadic efforts to rebuild the PKI into an antifascist popular front from 1935 to 1945 (1935 under the leadership of Pamudji and 1943 under Widarta) only garnered meager mass support for the party.⁸¹⁵ After the 1945 declaration of independence, political groupings claiming to practice Marxist-Leninist ideology amounted to five: the legal PKI known as PKI Bintaran (under Moh. Jusuf when first emerged then taken over by Sardjono in 1946), the illegal or underground PKI (under Amir Sjarifuddin and Tan Ling Djie), the Socialist Party or Partai Sosialis (PS; under Amir Sjarifuddin; not to be confused with the Indonesian Socialist Party under Sjahrir), the Indonesian Labor Party or Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI; under Setiadjudi), and the Indonesian Socialist Youth or Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo; under Ruslan Widjajasastra and Wikana).⁸¹⁶ To different degrees, these five Marxist-Leninist organizations collaborated in the anti-Dutch war under the names Sajap Kiri (the Left Wing) in 1946 and People's Democratic Front (Front Demokrasi Rakyat; FDR) in 1948. Later they fused into a unified PKI under D.N. Aidit's leadership in 1951.

Marxism-Leninism did not define the whole political spectrum of the Indonesian left in this period or after. However, this dissertation mainly focuses on its Marxist-Leninist strand because of its tragic fate. Other forms of Indonesian leftism eventually cooperated with other *anticommunist* powers to crush their Marxist-Leninist PKI archenemy in the most opportunistic manner. Scholars working on Indonesian communism and defending the non-PKI leftist groups using cliched post-structuralist “non-totalizing” and “different” vocabularies without addressing their malicious anticommunist complicity should examine their own incomplete knowledge of communist history. This is exactly what Njoto, PKI's Second Vice-Chairman, warned against the self-contradictory and inconsistent logic of leftists who rejected the historical materialist analysis. Njoto succinctly characterized these leftists—usually labelled as revisionist, opportunist, or renegade—in two ways: first, “it accepts what it rejected in the past, though objective conditions remain essentially the same”; and second, “its policy is to make everything non-political, divorced from politics.”⁸¹⁷ The Indonesian anti-PKI left did not just survive the communist killings in 1965-66. They participated in and benefitted from the pogrom. They, rightly, bemoaned the PKI's censorship (not a violent purge) of different leftist expressions deviating from the “party line,”

⁸¹⁵ Samardji, 2004, “Catatan Dari Bincang-Bincang tanggal 28 Juni 2004,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 3-6.

Samardji was a reporter and editor of the rubric on children's education in the party papers *Harian Rakjat*. He was sent by the Indonesia-China Friendship Institute (*Lembaga Persahabatan Indonesia-Cina*) to study the children's educational system in Beijing. He set up the Indonesian Documentation Association (*Perkumpulan Dokumentasi Indonesia*; Perdoi) to collective archives and documentations on the 1965-66 tragedy that countered the New Order version of history.

Saptari, Ratna, “Persecution through Denial of Citizenship: Indonesians in Forced Exile post 1965,” in *The International People's Tribunal for 1965 and the Indonesian Genocide*, eds. Saskia E. Wieringa, Jess Melvin, and Annie Pohlman, London and New York: Routledge, 118, 128.

⁸¹⁶ Samardji, [n.d.], “Bahan Studi Sejarah PKI untuk Kalangan Sendiri,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Fanggidaej Papers, IISH, 1-2.

⁸¹⁷ Njoto, 1965, *Strive for the Victory of the Indonesian Revolution With the Weapon of Dialectical and Historical Materialism: A Speech at the Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences on June 3, 1964*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 13.; Njoto, 1964, “Dengan Sendjata MDH Memenangkan Rev. Indo,” no. 379, RA.66, Inventaris Arsip Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) 1963-1967, ANRI, 7.

dramatizing their political victimhood. Yet, they could also conveniently depoliticize the communist killings when the situation served their purposes.

During the immediate postwar period, leftist groups that had a more radical anti-imperialist policy and probably attracted more popular support than the fractured PKI were coalitions created by and around Tan Malaka: Persatuan Perdjjuangan (Struggle Front; PP) in 1946 and Gerakan Revolusi Rakjat (People's Revolutionary Movement; GRR) in 1948. Almost all radical anti-imperialist nationalist organizations in Java joined the PP except the PKI. The term *perdjjuangan* or 'struggle' in the movement's name meant to contrast with the more compromised *diplomasi* or 'diplomatic' policy of other pro-independence groups, including the pre-1948 PKI, that prioritized peaceful negotiation over a direct physical confrontation with the Dutch troops.⁸¹⁸ In accordance with the confrontational *perdjjuangan* policy, nothing fitted PP's slogan than "Merdeka 100%" or '100% independence.' Later in 1948 Tan Malaka founded another leftist party called Partai Moerba shortened from *Moesjawarah Rakjat Banyak* (Deliberation of Common People), a merger of GRR's different constituents, that embodied Tan's political thought rather than the strictly Marxism-Leninism of the PKI. Sukarni, a revolutionary youth leader and Tan Malaka's devotee, led the party until his death in 1971.

I propose that we read Tan Malaka as a third worldist Marxist interested in creatively indigenizing Marxism so as to analyze the specific Indonesian situation.⁸¹⁹ Many sources on Tan Malaka identify him and his strand as a national communist or leftwing nationalist as opposed to a Marxist-Leninist communist. Some pit Tan Malaka's Trotskyism against PKI's Stalinism. This dissertation sees some truth in these characterizations of Tan Malaka but it thinks third world, rather than national, Marxism more accurately aligns with Tan Malaka's political and epistemological projects. Without relying on existing (Soviet) Marxist analytical categories, Tan Malaka often syncretized contradictory analytical elements together to produce his vernacular version of Marxism.⁸²⁰ His 1943 magisterial, yet also most cryptic, treatise *Madilog* brought materialism, dialectics, and logic together into a "uniquely Indonesian" system of thought he hoped the Indonesian proletariat (*proletar Indonesia*) would be able to understand as compared to direct Marxist vocabularies.⁸²¹ Moerba, the name of his political party, offered another example of Tan's indigenizing tendency. He coined Moerba (common people) to distinguish Indonesian proletariat emerging from a colonized milieu that formed their double anti-colonial and working class consciousness from European proletariat that might not be necessarily anti-colonial.⁸²² This thinking habit, which the PKI determined eclectic, made Tan Malaka much more autonomous from the world communist movement and particularly Stalin's Soviet Union. Unlike the PKI, Moerba's constitution distanced itself from "Western proletariat" and the Soviet Union. It mentioned nothing of the Soviet and Chinese state Marxist lineage that drew from Marx to Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. The PKI's accusation of Tan Malaka as a Trotskyist renegade was directed at this demeanor,

⁸¹⁸ Jarvis, Helen, 1987, "Tan Malaka: Revolutionary or Renegade?" *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 19, 1: 51.

⁸¹⁹ Read more on third world Marxism in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

⁸²⁰ Oliver Crawford's dissertation on Tan Malaka greatly emphasizes on Tan Malaka's syncretism and localization of political concepts. His argues "Tan Malaka's political thought represents not an absolute absorption of Marxist ideas to a purely Indonesian and Islamic idiom, but the synthesis of these bodies of thought into a novel vision of politics."

Crawford, Oliver, 2018, "The Political Thought of Tan Malaka," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cambridge, 11.

⁸²¹ Malaka, Tan, *Madilog*.

⁸²² Malaka, Tan, *Murba Constitution*. CIA doc, 8.

though, in this dissertation's estimation, it had more to do with Tan Malaka's autonomy from the PKI and the Soviet Union rather than any consistent Trotskyist praxis.⁸²³ In other words, Tan Malaka's Trotskyism was a political charge rather than a substantive doctrinal difference.

Whereas Tan Malaka and Partai Moerba's Trotskyism was questionable, the Indonesian left managed to spawn a principled Trotskyist. Ibnu Parna (x-1965), a prominent Indonesian Trotskyist and Tan Malaka's follower, sought an alternative to PKI's strategic compromise with the capitalist state and Moerba's lack of engagement with Marxist-Leninist theories. He was associated with both the PKI-related Pesindo and Tan Malaka-related GRR. He developed his own Semarang-based youth movement founded in 1946 into Partai Acoma, shortened from Angkatan Communis Moeda (Young Communist Force) in 1952. Despite being affiliated to the Trotskyist Fourth International in late 1950s, Ibnu Parna and Partai Acoma remained an extremely marginal Marxist-Leninist communist party in Indonesia throughout the postwar decades. Following Trotsky's critique of Stalin's (mis)instrumentalization of Marxism, Acoma held a critical view of PKI's overreliance on the degenerate Soviet Union and inadequate emphasis on the workers' struggle.⁸²⁴

Postwar PKI's Three Constituents: Old Cracks, Returnees, and Homegrown

PKI's apparent reformist orientation and compromising comportment in its handling of Dutch recolonization during 1945-1948 prompted a rectification from the more radical yet minor faction within the party. Compared to Tan Malaka's PP, GRR, Moerba, Ibnu Parna's Acoma, and other non-Marxist radical nationalist groups, the pre-1948 PKI and its FDR coalition anachronistically misperceived the Dutch as a potential anti-Fascist ally against the Fascist nationalist bourgeoisie. Therefore the PKI sought a strategic compromise with the hypothetically progressive faction of the imperialist power, totally missing the new postwar context of the European financial crisis which necessitated the Netherlands' desperate quest for resources. The "home-grown" quadrumvirate—D.N. Aidit, M.H. Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman—who formed the PKI's new leadership in 1951 belonged to that radical "Leninist wing" (Sajap Leninis) of the party. (The dissertation directly translates the term quadrumvirate from Indonesian *caturtunggal*.)⁸²⁵ They strongly disagreed with both the older generation members who they thought did not have a sophisticated analysis of the unfolding situation and the Europe-trained members who lacked specific knowledge of Indonesian material history.

The former group, which one commentator endearingly regarded as "old cracks," consisted of two PKI generations from 1926 and 1935. The 1926 generation consisted of PKI members who had been exiled after their failed insurrection-attempt in 1926. After being subjected to strenuous labor and Malaria-prone environment at Boven Digoel camp until the Japanese occupation, these "Digoelists" (named after the Boven Digoel camp) found sanctuary in Australia. They joined in multi-racial local worker organizing in Australia and called their own group PKI SIBAR or Serikat

⁸²³ See: Central Komite PKI, 1950, "Trotskyisme di Indonesia," ARCH01961, Box 357-360 Typoscripten van door Morriën vertaalde artikelen/teksten met betrekking tot Indonesië en in het bijzonder de PKI. 1950-1953, Archief Joop Morriën, IISH, 1-3 (29 Dec.).

⁸²⁴ Partai Acoma, 1959, "Thesis of October 1959: Torch for the People's Struggle in the Context of "Back to the Constitution" of 1945," ARCH01467, Box 11 4th International, Partition 3659-4, Uncatalogued Folder, Fritjof Tichelman Collections, IISH, 9-10.

As far as the writer knows, Indonesian Trotskyism is a serious research agenda of two scholars: Australian scholar of Pramoedya, Max Lane, and Canadian Ted Sprague of Marxist Internet Archive.

⁸²⁵ Samardji, "Bahan Studi," 14..

Indonesia Baroe (Association of a New Indonesia).⁸²⁶ When returning to Indonesia in 1946, Sardjono, SIBAR's leader, took over the legal PKI's leadership from Moh.Jusuf. While the 1926 generation was eradicated from the political scene in the Netherland East Indies, Musso, a self-exiled politburo member who successfully found refuge in the Soviet Union, made an extremely secretive trip to Surabaya to train new elite PKI members in 1935. Though there were survivors, the majority of the 1935 generation, among them Pamudji and Widarta mentioned earlier, joined the anti-fascist militia against the Japanese and lost their lives before they could establish any intellectual influence on the party. These older members would consider themselves *rakjat jelata* or 'common people' rather than intelligentsia, unlike the "returnees" and the "homegrown" generation.

The Europe-trained members, known also as Groep Holland or the "returnees," came of political age in the Netherlands where they were privileged to have Western liberal education. Dutch leftwing anti-nazi activism influenced their political awakening.

Different from the "old cracks" and the "returnees" who spent most of their life before the independence war outside of Indonesian political centers (the former in Boven Digoel and Australia; the latter in the Netherlands), the "homegrown" quadrumvirate experienced firsthand organizing and struggle against Japanese, Dutch, and local comprador forces. Thus, they had the great advantage of knowing the local concrete situation, and were gifted with the wisdom of many revolutionary organizers on the ground—both radical nationalist and communist. They represented what Communist Party of Australia (CPA)'s secretary-general L.L. Sharkey called the party's "new forces" or "locally produced" young cadres who would lead the party in a new direction after the Second World War. According to surviving PKI journalist Soerjono, Sharkey's idea of *the new forces* was in circulation among the quadrumvirate's supporters around late 1940s. Soerjono himself was recommended Sharkey's writings by Sudisman, one member of the quadrumvirate.⁸²⁷

In the quadrumvirate's minds, however, knowing local concrete situations was not enough without some Marxist-Leninist theoretical guidance verified by the revolutionary success of the Soviet Union. Aidit emphasized in his 1948 appeal for the party to be a better theoretician that "only a party that masters revolutionary theory could lead the revolutionary mass movement."⁸²⁸ This humble statement assumed that the masses were already revolutionary and the vanguardist party needed to find adequate theoretical expression for and analysis of these Indonesian revolutionaries. For Aidit, theory embodied the "experience of the world proletarian movements," and was "a summary of revolutionary movement's experience."⁸²⁹ He further described theory as a "torch" (*suluh*), a "guideline" (*pedoman*), and a "weapon" (*sendjata*) for the PKI. Using a similar idiom as Amilcar Cabral's *the weapon of theory*, Aidit found Marxisme-Leninism to be "an extremely powerful weapon in the hands of the class-conscious proletariat in every country entering into the arena of anti-capitalist struggle" (*"sedjata jang berkuasa sekali didalam tangan kaum buruh jang mempunyai kesedaran klas disemua negeri jang memasuki gelanggang perdjungan melawan kapital"*).⁸³⁰ Bound as it was to the political complexities of a local Indonesian situation, the quadrumvirate was described by Soerjono to be "extremely isolated from international developments during the Second World War" and "yet ... unable to formulate their

⁸²⁶ Poeze, Harry A., 2012, "From Foe to Partner to Foe Again: The Strange Alliance of the Dutch Authorities and Digoel Exile in Australia, 1943-1945," *Indonesia* 94 (Oct): 57-84.

⁸²⁷ Soerjono, "On Musso's Return," 66.

⁸²⁸ Aidit, D.N., 1948, "Menguasai Teori: Menudju Partai Kuat," *Bintang Merah* 53-54 (3 Jan.).

⁸²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸³⁰ *Ibid.*

experience theoretically.”⁸³¹ Like other communists of this “homegrown” generation, the quadrumvirate’s knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theories came from fragmentary and unsystematic sources: the Digoelists’ smuggled pamphlets published by Australian Communists, Dutch Communist Party’s books brought back to Indonesian by Groep Holland, pop-up temporary Marxist training course by radical nationalists at *Marx House* in Madiun, Jogjakarta, and Solo, and other spontaneous flash lessons (*latihan kilat*) by theoretical members.⁸³² When the situation was extremely local and internationalist solidarity was nearly impossible, the PKI began to have a grasp of abstract internationalism through the exchange of these theory books from comrades in Australia and the Netherlands.

Musso’s Big Correction: From Anti-Fascist Popular Front to Anti-Imperialist United Front

Then came Musso—the same Musso that infiltrated the Indies in 1935 to train new PKI cadres. Having taken refuge in and worked for the Soviet Union for two decades, Musso brought with him an aura of acknowledged communist authority to dictate the party’s “correct” line. He landed in Surabaya in 1948 with Soeripno, a leftist who just succeeded in establishing a diplomatic relation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union. The party politburo instantly offered Musso the PKI’s chairmanship. The timing of Musso’s return coincided with the PKI’s quiet internal reconfiguration spearheaded by the Sajap Leninis or the quadrumvirate. The signing of the 1947 Renville Agreement with the Dutch by communist Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin resulting in a compromised sovereignty—the only time a PKI member assumed a powerful position in the Republic—triggered such a radicalization. The PKI’s more radical members critiqued Amir’s actions and took a full swing towards an anticolonial offensive, moving the party’s position closer to GRR’s *perjuangan* (struggle). Amir commented to Soerjono, the leftist journalist mentioned in the previous paragraph, that “the arrival of *oude heer* [old man] Musso means a *versnelling* [speeding up] of a [radicalizing] process which was already developing among us.”⁸³³ Amir accepted his mistake and resigned.⁸³⁴ Moh.Hatta, a modernist Muslim technocrat, assumed a new government with an explicitly anticommunist and comprador orientation, intensifying the communist resistance.

Musso also came with a plan. The plan resulted from his discussion with Soeripno in Prague while assessing ways to liberate Indonesia from the Renville Agreement.⁸³⁵ The document, *Djalan Baroe* or ‘New Road’ otherwise known as “Musso’s Big Correction” (*Koreksi Besar Musso*), became the PKI’s new ideological and organizational guideline after the Politburo’s ratification in a 1948 August meeting.⁸³⁶ Jacques Leclerc, a historian of the PKI, suggests that Musso’s mission was to unify the PKI, re-establishing continuity with its lost revolutionary past, and prevent other leftist groups from inheriting that revolutionary legacy.⁸³⁷ In *Djalan Baroe*, Musso laid out two major problems of the PKI’s framework since the end of the Second World

⁸³¹ Soerjono, “On Musso’s Return,” 66.

⁸³² Ibid., ; More on Marx House in “Balai Pendidikan “Marx” [Marx House],” 1946, *Bintang Merah* 10, 2 (15 Sep.).

⁸³³ Ibid., 61.

⁸³⁴ The PKI’s internal history fully acknowledged this mistake.

Latif, Busjarie, 2014, *Manuskrip Sejarah 45 Tahun PKI [1920-1965]*, Bandung: Ultimus, 257.

⁸³⁵ Soeripno, 1949, “Mengapa Kami Kalah,” *Mutiara* 1, 2 (15 May).

⁸³⁶ Gondo Pratomo, 2002, *Kejadian-Kejadian Penting Menjelang Peristiwa Madiun dan Jatuhnya Republik Indonesia ke Dalam Jebakan Nekolim (1945-1949)*, facebook post Andreas JW (19 Oct.).

⁸³⁷ Leclerc, Jacques, *Aliran Komunis: Sejarah dan Penjara*, 67.

War. First, he clarified that the idea of anti-fascist popular front practiced during the interwar and the WW2 was outdated. The Indonesian Communist Party needed not to be subordinate under the “Dutch Commonwealth” as a “uni-verband” (‘united association’) with the Dutch Communist Party (CPN) to combat fascism.⁸³⁸ Indonesian communists must rather struggle in a united front against imperialism for national independence as a part of the global anti-imperialist, proletarian revolution.

Second, following Zhdanov’s two-camp theory, Musso explained that the contradiction between US-British imperialism and Soviet anti-imperialism primarily determined the postwar world’s situation. Musso elevated the Soviet Union’s status to the exemplary anti-imperialist model for being a vanguard in anti-American efforts. He likewise convinced the readers that the Soviet Union’s military power and technological advancement could possibly tip the balance in the battle of two camps. Therefore, Musso encouraged the PKI to “not overexaggerate the Netherlands’ power and its imperialist allies [US, UK, Australia] and playdown the Indonesian revolution’s power and other anti-imperialist groups.”⁸³⁹ Musso concluded that the PKI’s principal mistakes since WW2 concerned the deficient understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and the inability to closely link theory and practice, as evident from meager worker and peasant organizing. The document ended: “A theory not related to the masses cannot become a force; conversely, a theory tightly connected to the masses forms an all-powerful force.” [*Teori jang tidak dihubungkan dengan massa tidak dapat merupakan kekuatan, akan tetapi sebaliknya jang berhubungan erat dengan massa merupakan kekuatan jang mahahebat.*]⁸⁴⁰ Producing or recalibrating theory from the masses was key.

Two Indonesias: Communist and Anticommunist

After Musso’s return, a complicated and historically unsettled set of events led to the execution of many communist leaders in what historians call the Madiun Affair. The Indonesian Republican Army during Hatta’s government shot dead Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Sardjono, Soeripno, and other important communist figures.

Just hours prior to the Affair’s eruption on September 19, 1948, Indonesian President Soekarno delivered a radio speech “Kepada Bangsaaku” (‘To My Nation’) that essentially pointed to the possibility of double, if not multiple, Indonesias. Though acknowledging these different possibilities, they were treated as antagonistic and incompatible. Building on a long anticommunist lineage from both colonialism and feudalism/bourgeois elitism, Soekarno’s speech framed the PKI as the nation’s insurgent, threat, and rebel—the betrayer of the revolution. On top of being a domestic betrayer, non-communists around that time associated the PKI with external Soviet influence, hence a double betrayal. “There are two choices,” Soekarno alleged, “follow Musso and his PKI who will bring the hopes of Indonesia Merdeka [independence] to bankruptcy or follow Soekarno-Hatta who with God’s permission and help will lead the Republic of Indonesia to become an independent Indonesia. ... Let us join together to wipe out these insurgents.”⁸⁴¹ By bringing God into the mix, non-communists also condemned the PKI’s atheism. Equally fiery, Musso replied “Soekarno-Hatta, slaves of the Japanese and Americans! Traitors must die!”⁸⁴² While Musso saw the FDR’s insurrectional activity in Madiun as full of potential for becoming a

⁸³⁸ Musso, *Djalan Baroe*.

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid.,

⁸⁴¹ Hering, Bob, *Marxism a la Aidit*, 119.

⁸⁴² Kahin, *Nationalism*, p. 294, quoting from *Front Nasional*, 20 September 1948

popular self-governing collective freed from imperialist and bourgeois rule, Soekarno plainly accused the PKI for dividing Indonesia.

Like other major communist crackdowns, Madiun dialectically served as both an indication of the party's failed compromise strategy and a new, often more radical or militant, cycle of struggle. By 1948, the putatively bourgeois "betrayal" and imperialist assault had occurred enough times to have become a pattern. As Jacques Leclerc writes, "Madiun [was] a repetition of Shanghai. [T]he Dutch aggression [was] a repetition of the Japanese attack."⁸⁴³ Shanghai here, which became a repeated trope of bourgeois betrayal in (anti)communist history, referred to the 1927 Shanghai massacre where the bourgeois nationalists turned against and murdered their communist allies in the united front coalition. Leclerc's study further adds: Pesindo (communist youths) troops in East Java and Priangan of West Java called themselves Mao Zedong Brigades and wanted to unite as a Red Army.⁸⁴⁴

But Madiun was also a stigma for the then PKI's "young unsophisticated leadership," as Bob Hering, historian of the PKI, evaluated it.⁸⁴⁵ The new "homegrown" leadership felt compelled to rebuild an even stronger, theoretically-informed, and more unified party in the aftermath of the Madiun tragedy and all the divisiveness that had accumulated since the Japanese Occupation. As Aidit remarked in his prescient analysis of communist-phobia among the imperialist powers and their bourgeois supporters from Dutch to Japan and the US in 1947, "the more [communism] was suppressed, the more fertile it grew. Every murder of a communist means adding a hero to the communist ranks." [*Makin [komunisme] ditindas makin subur tumbuhnja. Tiap pembunuhan terhadap orang komunis berarti tambahnja pahlawan dalam barisan kaum komunis.*]⁸⁴⁶ They needed to also prove against all the anticommunist accusations mobilized to justifiably crush the communists during the Madiun Affair.

Two, Three, Many Lenins: The PKI's Return to Lenin in the Post-War Period

A big question that ran behind the minds of the more radical Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*; thereafter PKI) members in the immediate postwar period (1945-1949) was: why did their party leadership compromise with Dutch-American imperialists and local compradors. An auto-critical party document titled *Djalan Baroe* or 'the New Road' in 1948 identified the party's main weakness as a lack of theoretical understanding to correct own political mistakes. Those radical PKI members disagreeing with their postwar leadership coalesced under the epithet "Sajap Leninis" or 'the Leninist Wing' to directly challenge the party's leading faction that they derogatorily named "Sajap Reformis" or 'the Reformist Wing.' The Leninist Wing did not invoke Lenin just for ornamental purposes. By reconstructing and building up the party through these radical Leninist forms, the Leninist Wing expelled the Reformist leadership, became the politburo in 1951, and gradually consolidated the party throughout the 1950s.

This section argues that the Indonesian Leninist Wing in the late 1940s to early 1950s—the milieu of decolonization and the era of late Stalin—returned to Lenin's multiple theoretical writings from both pre- and post-seizure (1917) periods to combat the party's political weaknesses on three particular issues. From them the Sajap Leninis derived these radical alternatives: the vanguard party as opposed to the social democratic party, left parliamentarism as opposed to bourgeois parliamentarism, and anti-imperialism as opposed to imperialist apologism. While the

⁸⁴³ Leclerc, Jacques, Aidit and the Problem of the Party in 1950, *Kabar Sebarang*, 104.

⁸⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁵ Hering, Bob, *Marxism a la Aidit*, 122.

⁸⁴⁶ Aidit, "Bahaja American Minded," 6.

PKI learned from pre-1917 Lenin a dialectical method of dealing with reformism and prefigurative politics, post-1917 Lenin revealed to them the contradictory process of communist reconstruction. As a non-ruling communist party, the PKI also learned from Lenin as a processual temporality. By positioning itself in the Leninist temporal frame, the PKI operated within the protracted process of “communist becoming.” Therefore the PKI’s return to Lenin is not merely a mechanical reproduction of Leninism in the Indonesian conjuncture but a serious engagement with Lenin’s thoughts to invent a new communist praxis.

Sajap Leninis

Bintang Merah, the PKI’s theory papers, translated and published several of Lenin’s works during 1946-1948, including *The Teaching of Karl Marx* to *The State, State and Revolution, What is to be Done?* and miscellaneous writings on the Russian peasants and the Comintern. It also frequently discussed the history of the Bolshevik Revolution within which Lenin played an irreplaceable role. *Soeara Boeroeh*, organ of the Indonesian Labor Party (Partai Buruh Indonesia), published a column explaining Bolshevism, or in Indonesian vernacular *Bolsjewisme*, as early as mid-1946.⁸⁴⁷ Not just Lenin’s texts, but also commentaries on Lenin and Bolshevism occupied the pages of *Bintang Merah*, *Soeara Boeroeh*, and *Pesindo* (communist youths)’s monthly *Revolusioner*. Worth mentioning is the translation and summary of Lenin’s wife Nadezhda Krupskaya’s 1933 *How Lenin Studied Marx*. This small column in *Bintang Merah* taught that Lenin’s method of reading Marx which was anything but dogmatic. These recommended methods of study—to use Krupskaya’s description, “forged in the fire of the revolution”—included writing marginalia, studying oppositional interpretations, looking at the source of Marx’s thought, comparing Marx’s analysis of a similar situation, supplementing Marxism with new ideas and propositions, and lastly converting it to action.⁸⁴⁸ The translation ended by encouraging re-reading Marx especially at the difficult turning points of the revolution, not for the sake of reading but for Marx’s “content and explanation.”⁸⁴⁹

In Aidit’s listing of required subjects for all Indonesian communists in early 1948, the Foundation of Leninism (*Dasar-dasar Leninisme*) stood out as one of the two most significant analytical systems; the other was Marxist political economy (*ekonomi politik Marxis*). While Marxist political economy enabled a better understanding of both capitalism’s exploitative process and anti-capitalist struggles, the Foundation of Leninism supplied the needed revolutionary theory and tactics.⁸⁵⁰ In Aidit’s speech on Lenin and Indonesia (1960), delivered for a commemoration of the 90th anniversary of Lenin’s birth, he conceptualized Leninism as “Marxism in the era of imperialism and the proletarian revolution.” For the PKI, Leninism had a universal purchase irreducible to Marxism with Soviet characteristics.⁸⁵¹

Thus, the radical faction within the postwar PKI called themselves the Leninist wing (Sajap Leninis). The Leninist wing comprised mainly of four members that became the PKI’s politburo in 1951: the Chairman D.N. Aidit, Vice-Chairmen Njoto and M.H.Lukman, and Sudisman. While it is hard to pinpoint when they started calling themselves Leninist exactly, we may speculate that they came to this identification around early 1947 when Aidit was chosen into the PKI’s politburo

⁸⁴⁷ “Bolsjewisme,” 1946, *Soeara Boeroeh* 2 (Jul.), 2.

⁸⁴⁸ Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 1933 (?), “How Lenin Studied Marx,” *Labour Monthly Pamphlet* 2, Available at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/krupskaya/works/howleninstudiedmarx.htm>.

⁸⁴⁹ ‘Oelhakim, Loekman, 1946, “Tjara Lenin Mempelajari Marxisme,” *Bintang Merah* 13, 2 (Nov.).

⁸⁵⁰ Aidit, “Menguasai Teori.”

⁸⁵¹ Aidit, D.N., 1960, *Lenin dan Indonesia*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 15.

during the party Fourth Congress in Solo. As the Fourth Congress aimed to clean up the organization after older exiled members returned to Indonesia, its organizational resolution was to overhaul the disarrayed party into an organized Marxist-Leninist vanguard party (*partai pelopor*).⁸⁵² The Leninist wing was either born from or slightly preexisted and influenced this resolution. Not until after the Madiun Affair did this Leninist wing emerge explicitly in opposition to the “reformist wing” (Sajap Reformis) consisting of PKI leaders such as Tan Ling Djie and Ngadiman Hardjosubroto who resisted implementing Musso’s *Djalan Baroe*. In 1949, these two Madiun survivors had automatically assumed leadership down the line in the politburo after everyone above them in Musso’s PKI was killed.⁸⁵³ While Tan Ling Djie and Ngadiman regrouped at Godean street in the wartime center Djogjakarta, which gave them the name *Grup Godean*, Aidit and other Leninist wing’s members re-established the Bolshevized PKI at Kernolong street in the new capital Djakarta, making them a *Grup Kernolong*. As an internal coup to the *Grup Godean* of sorts, *Grup Kernolong* refused to follow *Grup Godean*’s directives, dismissing it for not executing Musso’s *Djalan Baroe* and condemning its opportunism.⁸⁵⁴

Lenin I: Vanguardism

For the PKI during its postwar reconstructive period, Lenin’s idea of a vanguard party was immensely attractive. Arriving at the same conclusion with *Djalan Baroe* even before Musso’s return, the PKI’s young force determined that the proletarian revolution in Indonesia needed a disciplined, organized, and unified party as a leader. They realized that without a vanguard party, both the communist agenda and interests of workers and peasants would always be subordinate to an abstract bourgeois nationalism. In November 1947, a month after the 30th year anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, we begin to see Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto—the quadrumvirate’s three members—projected the Bolshevik party as a desired organizational and political model in their *Bintang Merah* writings. Aidit briefly laid out the winning conditions for the October Revolution, one of which included presence of Bolshevik party, whose organizing experience Aidit claimed had been tested by history.⁸⁵⁵ Lukman stressed the advancing of Marxist-Leninist knowledge within the party (in the same paragraph, he referred to Mao for a Marxist method of study).⁸⁵⁶ Njoto conceived of the October Revolution as the anti-capitalist model for other socialist revolutions in the colonies like Indonesia.⁸⁵⁷

When the Leninist wing was consolidating power in 1950, emerging from their underground organizing after Madiun, its first publications unsurprisingly pertained to the party’s Bolshevization. One of these documents, *Partai Type Baru*, identified the Leninist Party (*Partai Leninisme*) as a party of a new type that the PKI sought to be. This new Leninist party would replace the current reformist social-democratic party form the PKI inherited from the postwar period.⁸⁵⁸ Drawing from pre-1917 Lenin’s *Where to Begin* (1901), *What is to be Done* (1902), *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* (1904), and *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic*

⁸⁵² Daroesman, Maroeto, 1947, “Partai Marxis-Leninis,” *Bintang Merah* 19, 2 (15 Jan.).

⁸⁵³ Gondoprato, [n.d.], “Sidang Godean: Penyusunan Kembali Pimpinan Sentral PKI Untuk Meneruskan Pelaksanaan Resolusi ‘Jalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia’,” ARCH04303, Uncatalogued Document, Francisca Faggidaej Papers, IISH, 23-8.

⁸⁵⁴ Soepeno, 1982, *Indonesia—Sejarah Singkat Gerakan Rakyat untuk Kebebasan*, 315-7.; Aidit, D.N., 1954, Tentang Tan Ling Djie-ism, *Bintang Merah* 9, 2-3 (Feb.-Mar.).

⁸⁵⁵ Aidit in November 1947 issue of *Bintang Merah* from Latif, *Manuskrip*, 264.

⁸⁵⁶ Lukman in November 1947 issue of *Bintang Merah* from Latif, *Manuskrip*, 264-5.

⁸⁵⁷ Njoto in November 1947 issue of *Bintang Merah* from Latif, *Manuskrip*, 265-6.

⁸⁵⁸ Sekretariat CC PKI, 1950, *Partai Type Baru*, Djokjakarta: Sekretariat CC PKI, 2.

Revolution (1905), the document argued for the significance of a vanguard party that could lead the proletariat and peasants to a creation of a communist society. *Partai Type Baru* also emphasized the party's democratic tradition that promoted collective deliberation among members from every rank and file, as opposed to the commonly practiced hierarchical system of gods (*sistem dewa* or *sistim bapa*) in which the leader knew best.⁸⁵⁹

Strikingly, although this document cited Stalin for the communist party's new revolutionary commitments, it did not follow Stalin's "socialism in one country" dictate. Rather, the document obligated a collaboration with proletariats in the neighboring countries and independence movements from semi-colonial or colonial nations.⁸⁶⁰ In other words, the PKI understood its struggle against capitalism and imperialism as internationalist from the get go.

Echoing Lenin's own understanding of vanguardism, the PKI understood that a vanguard party was meant to actively prepare for revolution and risk at the most strategic moment to cause a revolutionary rupture. As Georg Lukacs' reading of Lenin aptly puts it, the party is "simultaneously and equally—both producer and product, both precondition and result of the revolutionary mass-movement."⁸⁶¹ A vanguard party rejects two automatic temporal logics: fatalist and accidental. The revolution neither explodes at its own proper matured time (fatalistically) nor simply emerges spontaneously (accidentally).⁸⁶² Prefiguration and coordination are two constitutive elements of the Leninist revolution. Vanguardists simply cannot wait for the ripe conditions. They create them. Stathis Kouvelakis hence calls this Leninist praxis a "vital decision" rather than a "waiting game."⁸⁶³ Contra automatic and passive modalities, vanguardism intervenes in both the objective and subjective revolutionary conditions. The vanguardist party actively manufactures the revolutionary milieu (objective condition) and recreates itself into a leading role that did not previously exist (subjective condition).

The parallels between the situation analyzed by these pre-1917 texts and the PKI in the late 1940s could not be more striking. Lenin concretely evaluated the party's reformist tendency, decadent professionalization, loss of youthful fervor, deficient Marxist analysis, and simply lack of revolutionary leadership in *What is to be Done*. Such reformism among the party's leadership sharply contrasted with the proletarian advancement—exactly the same point the PKI's quadrumvirate made in the years 1947 to 1951. Here is how Lenin characterized the moment of opportunism he called the "third period":

This was a period of disunity, dissolution, and vacillation. ... But it was only the leaders who wandered about separately and drew back; the movement itself continued to grow, and it advanced with enormous strides. The proletarian struggle spread to new strata of the workers and extended to the whole of Russia, at the same time indirectly stimulating the revival of the democratic spirit among the students and among other sections of the population. The political consciousness of the leaders, however, capitulated before the breadth and power of the spontaneous upsurge; among the Social-Democrats, another type had become dominant—the type of functionaries, trained almost exclusively on "legal Marxist" literature, which proved to be all the more inadequate the more the spontaneity

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 1-2.

⁸⁶¹ Lukács, Georg, 1997, *Lenin: A Study in the Unity of His Thought*, London: Verso, 25.

⁸⁶² Lenin, V.I., *Revolution at the Gates*.

⁸⁶³ Kouvelakis, Stathis, 2007, "Lenin as a Reader of Hegel: Hypotheses for a Reading of Lenin's Notebooks on Hegel's *The Science of Logic*," in *Lenin Reloaded: Towards a Politics of Truth*, eds. Sebastian Budgen, Stathis Kouvelakis, and Slavoj Žižek, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 195.

of the masses demanded political consciousness on the part of the leaders. The leaders not only lagged behind in regard to theory ... and practice..., but they sought to justify their backwardness by all manner of high-flown arguments.⁸⁶⁴

Lenin's answer to "what is to be done" was crisp: "put an end to the third period." The vanguard party needed to keep creating favorable conditions for the proletarian revolution, not be contented with the reformist successes, or, more suitably, recesses. Lenin imagined that the fourth period would be the era of "militant Marxism," and he actualized his prophecy into the Bolshevik Revolution.⁸⁶⁵ In *Two Tactics*, the question Lenin deemed most relevant to this opportunist period—even as he admitted its challenge to the opportunists' fear of losing their bourgeois "allies"—was: "dare we win?"⁸⁶⁶ As he summarized the core of vanguardism, "greater dangers threaten the ship of our Party in stormy times than in periods of the smooth "sailing" of liberal progress ... whoever can deliberately prefer smooth sailing and the path of safe "opposition" in the present revolutionary situation had better abandon Social-Democratic work for a while, had better wait until the revolution is over... ." ⁸⁶⁷ The PKI's Leninist wing mobilized a similar metric used by Lenin in these pre-1917 texts to accuse the old leadership's reformism and opportunism.

Partai Type Baru was concerned with one issue that Lenin was not: imperialist exploitation of the party's factionalization. PKI's experience with the Dutch and Americans in the independence war made its new leadership especially cautious about the disadvantage of in-party splits. While Lenin treated the party's factions as different strands that could be brought back together, the PKI thought that factionalization (*fraksi*) absolutely hindered the party's progress towards the proletarian revolution.⁸⁶⁸ Different than Lenin during the Tsarist Empire, the PKI had to deal with another powerful external force like imperialism. Thus the PKI's stakes for intra party factionalization were perhaps higher. It could not afford to lose the order and line of command, which already caused their downfall in the past. Given also the strong anticommunist current in Indonesia since the colonial period, the PKI's fear was very justified.

How opportunist and reformist was the "old" leadership in Djogjakarta that the Leninist Wing opposed? This is a version of the same question that this dissertation posed earlier about the PKI's polemic against Tan Malaka's Trotskyism. This dissertation thinks that the task at hand is not to prove whether x is y, but *how* x is y according to the PKI in relation to the normative understanding of the term. By doing so, we further understand the localized PKI's logic and not just critique the PKI for misunderstanding or deviating from the category's more generalized, normative usage. We shall undertake this task by investigating the sole analytical document issued by the short-lived 1949 PKI under Tan Ling Djie and Ngadiman (or *Grup Godean*)'s leadership.

Issued in September 1949, *The Republic of the United States of Indonesia that Is Not Semi-Colonial (R.I.S. Jang Bukan Setengah Djadjahan)* identified economic crisis as the cause of imperialism. It further explained that because of the economic crisis, imperialists colonized to expand markets and seek further purchasing capacity from the colonies through brute force and anticommunist propaganda. The document then stated that the Dutch still controlled Indonesia (in September 1949) in areas of politics, military, economy, and finance. The Americans and the Dutch also cooperated to occupy Surabaya as their navy base. Thus the resolutions included: no

⁸⁶⁴ Lenin, V.I., *What is to be Done?*

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁶ Lenin, V.I., *Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*,

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁸ Sekretariat CC PKI, *Partai Type Baru*, 17.

foreign troops, no foreign military bases, and the liberation of the Indonesian government from foreign influences. It pointed out the significance of fully executing all the anti-imperialist demands codified in the Indonesian Republic's constitution, particularly the nationalization of the industries and the democratic participation in the government. The people's power (*kekuatan rakjat*), as the document put it, was the absolute requirement for preventing this looming semicolonial threat.⁸⁶⁹

Even though this document was never specifically mentioned by the Leninist wing as evidence of the *Grup Godean*'s reformism, it is noteworthy that references to workers and peasants were totally missing from it, and were replaced instead by the idea of people's power (*kekuatan rakjat*). Rather than proletarian struggle (Leninist wing's solution), armed insurrection (carried out at Mt. Merapi-Merbabu by other post-Madiun communists), or pushing the working class's agenda in the parliament (post-1951 PKI's praxis), the statement merely supported a constitutional struggle. Despite all its radical anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist demands—which to be sure represented something different from the pre-*Djalan Baroe* PKI—the 1949 PKI still brushed the proletarian agenda aside.

A comparison with Aidit's own condensed analysis of capitalism-imperialism in his 1948 essay *Bersatu dan Harus Berlawan* (*Unify and Fight!*) would allow us to see a difference in word choice and a selection of concrete analytical details. In this document, Aidit appeared to follow the Soviet line of analysis advanced by Zhdanov and Musso about the US as the new post-war imperialist leader. Aidit used all strong language to describe the goal of US imperialism—to “destroy the People's Republic, transforming the People's Republic into just a Republic or a puppet state where its hands and feet upholding [US] hegemony through Wallstreet's direct supervision” (*membinasakan Republik Rakjat, untuk menjadikan Republik Rakjat suatu Republik atau Negara 'boneka' dimana kaki-tangannya memegang hegemoni dengan pengawasan langsung dari Wallstreet.*)⁸⁷⁰ Other political entities which were already US's “hands and feet” were the UN, the Dutch, Indonesian right liquidators (*likuidator kanan*), and lastly Australia, the newcomer. Though Aidit did not pinpoint economic crisis as the primary imperialist incentive as did the 1949 PKI's document, his analytical frame assumed the capitalist empire's propensity for violence, aggression, and war. This assumption meant that even without economic crisis, the capitalist empire would nonetheless continue to build its hegemony through both military might (army) and economic discipline (Wall Street). Aidit then harshly criticized the left extremists (*esktremis kiri*) for “silently sabotaging the national front” by cooperating with the rightwing government to “bust the workers' and peasants' mass movement.”⁸⁷¹ It is extremely clear here that even as he might not imagine armed insurrection as the only solution, he never lost sight of the proletarian interests. Aidit's *Unify and Fight* is reminiscent of Lenin's *Two Tactics* wherein Lenin had struggled with the reformists and the communist revolution to-come. There Lenin had showed the possibility of proletarian struggle or the struggle for the proletarian cause (even though not fully by the proletariat) during the democratic revolution. The paragraph deserves a quotation in full:

The democratic revolution is a bourgeois revolution. The slogan of a Black Redistribution, or “land and liberty”—this most widespread slogan of the peasant masses, down trodden and ignorant, yet passionately yearning for light and happiness—is a bourgeois slogan. But

⁸⁶⁹ Politburo PKI, 1949, “R.I.S. Jang Bukan Setengah Djadjahan,” no. 233, RA.66, Inventaris Arsip Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) 1963-1967, ANRI, 1-2.

⁸⁷⁰ Aidit, D.N., 1948, “Bersatu Dan Harus Berlawan,” *Buruh* 4, 180 (16 Aug.).

⁸⁷¹ *Ibid.*

we Marxists should know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry, than the path of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress. We must not forget that there is not, nor can there be, at present time, any other means of bringing Socialism nearer, than complete political liberty, than a democratic republic, than the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. As the representatives of the advanced and only revolutionary class, revolutionary without reservations, doubts or looking back, we must present to the whole of the people, as widely, as boldly and with the utmost initiative possible, the tasks of the democratic revolution. To degrade these tasks in theory means making a travesty of Marxism, distorting it in philistine fashion, while in practical politics it means delivering the cause of the revolution into the hands of the bourgeoisie, which will inevitably recoil from the task of consistently carrying out the revolution. The difficulties that lie on the road to the complete victory of the revolution are very great. *No one will be able to blame the representatives of the proletariat if, having done everything in their power, their efforts are defeated by the resistance of the reaction, the treachery of the bourgeoisie and the ignorance of the masses. But everybody and class-conscious proletariat above all, will condemn Social-Democracy if it curtails the revolutionary energy of the democratic revolution and dampens revolutionary ardour because it is afraid to win, because it is actuated by the consideration: lest the bourgeoisie recoil.*⁸⁷²

Closely following Lenin's vanguardism, Aidit even declared that the PKI under his leadership was not only in form (organized as a Bolshevik party) but also in content (leading the proletarian revolution).⁸⁷³ Lacking in Aidit's analysis was a more materialist concept of labor power, or just labor, in the capitalist-imperialist production. Hence the relations between economic crisis and imperialism in the document was couched merely as an issue of market expansion—a problem of circulation and consumption instead of production. Aidit's PKI, the notion of vanguardism, and, more generally, Party Marxism or what we know as "Marxism-Leninism" (Stalinism is its most exaggerated form) all share this fundamental problematic as they do not adequately take labor, labor power, and value production into account.⁸⁷⁴ Without a more rigorous account of value production, vanguardism would lead, as it were, to mechanical materialism and party-state totalitarianism.⁸⁷⁵

Lenin II: Parliamentarism—or a Gramscian Vanguard

Though known for being more radical and anti-reformist, the PKI's Leninist wing nevertheless pursued a peaceful statist path as their line of struggle rather than militant insurrections or guerilla warfare. The question that so far no Indonesian communist scholarship has been able to answer satisfactorily is why did the Aidit's PKI conceive of its parliamentary line as revolutionary and not reformist. As we have already seen from the previous section, the Leninist Wing or *Grup Kernolong* distinguished itself from Reformist Wing or *Grup Godean*'s legalism and opportunism by centering on, rather than marginalizing, workers and peasants. But this answer alone is not comprehensive enough to explain how Aidit's peaceful parliamentarism was non-

⁸⁷² Lenin, *Two Tactics*. Italics mine.

⁸⁷³ Aidit, D.N., 1961, *Peladjaran Dari Sedjarah PKI*, 2nd ed., Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 48-51.

⁸⁷⁴ More about Party Marxism and its Engelsian genealogy, see: chapter 2 of this dissertation.

⁸⁷⁵ See Moishe Postone and Kevin Anderson.

reformist. For this we need the larger Marxist paradigm of “communist becoming” that links parliamentarism to the other presuppositions and strategies of Aidit’s PKI.

The foremost issue to be clarified is that Aidit’s PKI did consider militancy to be an option but actively rejected it for a more peaceful and democratic method. On November 26, 1949, only six weeks after the founding of the PRC, the World Federation of Trade Union organized the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries in Beijing. Several Indonesian labour union representatives attended this conference. Two of them in particular were key links to the *Grup Godean* PKI, who tasked the whole Indonesian delegation for studying the CCP’s idea of *New Democracy*. These two figures were the All-Indonesian Federation of Workers’ Organizations or SOBSI’s chairman, Njono, and Railway Workers’ Union’s leader and PKI politburo member, Gondoprato.⁸⁷⁶ Gondoprato received an additional mandate to remain in Beijing as PKI’s representative in the PRC. After the conference, Njono, Gondoprato, along with the rest of the Indonesian delegation and newly arrived PKI representatives from Prague and Java attended a special study group on the Chinese Revolution. The study group unanimously determined that the Chinese line of militant peasant insurrection was appropriate for Indonesia which shared a semi-feudal and semi-colonial condition with the PRC. However, when the study group showed Musso’s *Djalan Baroe* to the CCP instructors, they thought there was an insufficient explanation of the *strijdwijze* or the ‘battle style’ extremely crucial for the CCP’s militant strategy.

While the Indonesian labor union delegation was still in Beijing, the Leninist Wing’s “internal coup” against the Reformist Wing occurred in Indonesia. Not only did the Leninist Wing reject the Chinese militant line being disseminated by Njono and subjected him to autocriticism when he returned to Indonesia, it also replaced the China-oriented Gondoprato with the pro-Aidit Iskandar Subekti from the communist youth organization Pemuda Rakyat.⁸⁷⁷ Representing Indonesia at the World Youth Festival in Berlin, Iskandar switched with Gondoprato after he completed his duty in September 1951.

Aidit group’s recognition and eventual rejection of militancy begs the question: on what basis could Aidit’s PKI refuse militancy—understood in the Marxist-Leninist framework as a more radical and revolutionary praxis—and still accuse Grup Godean’s of reformism.

This dissertation suggests that the quadrumvirate’s inclination for peace and parliamentarism differs from the immediate postwar PKI’s penchant for the *diplomasi* or diplomatic (compromised) path. An antifacist popular front concept formed the basis of the PKI’s *diplomasi* policy which aimed to unify both the metropolitan and colonized working class to combat fascist forces. This concept no longer worked in the battle for independence when the Dutch were now the antagonist of Indonesian independence fighters. I propose that the quadrumvirate’s peaceful parliamentarian line was premised on partial Leninist readings of the political situation and the PKI’s own immediate history of defeat. There was no one official and definitive explanation of why Aidit’s PKI understood its parliamentarism as revolutionary. This dissertation takes a cue from the Leninist inclination of Aidit’s faction to further interpret and extrapolate the PKI’s interpretation of Leninism. Just like the previous section, this section is concerned with the PKI’s vernacular logic rather than making an assessment from a pre-determined normative position.

From the local historical-material perspective, this dissertation suggests that Aidit’s peace was a strategic retreat similar to Lenin after the bourgeois counter-revolution in 1907 and the CCP

⁸⁷⁶ Gondoprato, “Sidang Godean,” 27.

⁸⁷⁷ Samardji, “Bahan Studi,” 16..

after the white terror in 1927.⁸⁷⁸ In other words, Aidit's parliamentarism was a strategic, and expectantly temporary, reformism by necessity, not by choice—a reformism dialectically related to the concrete historical totality rather than any abstract reformism. Anticommunism and communist-phobia (*komunisto-fobi*) in Indonesia, inherited from Dutch colonialism and Japanese fascism, became a historical-material condition for the PKI to not further “provoke” and be “provoked” by the anticommunist enemy.⁸⁷⁹ Both the 1948 Madiun Affair and 1951 Sukiman's raid tremendously vitiated the already weak and small PKI. The former led to the brutal slaughter of the communist leaders and the latter referred to the state-sanctioned crackdown on the communist party, occurred only eight months after the quadrumvirate began to rebuild the party.⁸⁸⁰ Aidit reported that many PKI members felt panicked (*panik*) when the Sukiman's raid first happened because they were reminded of reactionaries' cruelty during the Madiun Affair and thought the raid could have become “the Second Madiun.”⁸⁸¹

Without the long-term war experience and the military manpower of the Bolsheviks or the CCP's Red Army, Aidit's PKI was constrained by an aggressive anticommunist milieu to follow a peaceful path for its own survival and regeneration. In Aidit's words, the PKI sought a parliamentary way to guarantee its rights to live or exist (*hak hidup*).⁸⁸² It is not clear that Lenin or Mao would have disapproved of the PKI's strategic retreat. Lenin, in particular, had sometimes emphasized the slow temporality of prefigurative politics. Among many factors, he attributed the Bolshevik's achievement to “prolonged effort and hard-won experience.”⁸⁸³ In *Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, Lenin specifically cautioned “leftwing communists” against adventurism and dogmatism, in favor of dialectical, situational attention to objective conditions when dealing with reformist forms like the parliament. He offered the following comparison for communists to discern the difference between revolutionary and reactionary compromise:

There are different kinds of compromises. One must be able to analyze the situation and the concrete conditions of each compromise, or of each variety of compromise. One must learn to distinguish between a man who has given up his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to lessen the evil they can do and to facilitate their capture and execution, and a man who gives his money and fire-arms to bandits so as to share in the loot.⁸⁸⁴

In other words, during the time when the communists are weak in the balance of forces, they may need to compromise to both palliate (rather than sharpen) the contradictions and create conditions for survival into the revolutionary future. This so-called revolutionary compromise is opposed to the reactionary compromise that betrays the oppressed by joining the oppressor.

Though seemingly opposed, local historical-material conditions of anticommunism actually converged with a prevailing optimistic mood in the international communist world that worked to justify Aidit's peaceful line. This euphoria was caused by the belief that the Soviet Union had superior military and technological power than the US in the postwar battle between

⁸⁷⁸ Lenin, “Revolution and Counter-Revolution.”; Mao, “Why is That Red Political Power can Exist in China?”

⁸⁷⁹ Latif, *Manuskrip*, 383.

⁸⁸⁰ Aidit, D.N., 1955, *Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 44.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁸⁸² Latif, *Manuskrip*, 395.

⁸⁸³ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1920], “‘Left-Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder,” in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 31: , Moscow: Progress Publishers.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

two antagonistic camps. In this two-camp analytics, Stalin's Soviet Union represented "peace," as opposed to the nuclear power-possessing America that bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki and initiated the Korean War. In that period, Soviet spokesmen even maintained that the existence of the Soviet Union alone made possible the rise of "people's democracy"—a form of *left* democracy the Soviet Union promoted as the political model for Eastern Europe and the Third World.⁸⁸⁵ We will return to people's democracy shortly.

Consequently, the assessment of the Soviet Union in Musso's *Djalan Baroe* confirmed this left optimism. Insofar as Indonesian communist leaders were convinced they were on the global winning side, they might have been convinced too that violent confrontational methods in domestic affairs could be put on hold. After all, there was some room for hegemonic contestation in this protracted war. Aidit's PKI were not yet on an all-losing side, which could have turned their strategy into a Manichean one where the battle became wholly carnal and zero-sum, as per Fanon's description of the Algerian War in *The Wretched of the Earth*. In his 1952 speech *Menempuh Jalan Rakjat* (Taking the People's Way), Aidit adopted Stalin's discourse of peace from the two-camp theory and selectively endorsed elements of Soviet people's democracy.⁸⁸⁶ In the specific context of Indonesian history, Aidit's parliamentarism reflected Stalin's peace premised on an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist opposition to American aggression. Mao and the CCP at the time also shared this understanding of peace. Mao's salvaging of revolutionary Stalinism after Khrushchev's de-Stalinization showed the CCP's commitment to this concept. Stalin's peace was different from Khrushchev's *reformist* peaceful co-existence in that the latter promoted a strategic compromise, if not explicit cooperation, with the US.⁸⁸⁷ Lastly, Aidit's parliamentarism must neither be confused with Tito's Bernsteinian evolutionism as, this dissertation shows, the PKI did not entirely abandon extra-parliamentary struggles.⁸⁸⁸

I argue that this complex global and local historical-material matrix compelled Aidit's PKI to use peaceful parliamentary means for simultaneously creating proletarian hegemony while struggling to survive from hostile anticommunism.

Seeing that the violent path would place the party at a further disadvantage, Aidit's PKI elected to engage with a different kind of war: a prefigurative war of position against the continuing racialized bourgeois and colonial reaction—phrased in a Gramscian framework as "passive revolution." I suggest that Aidit's political war of position (parliamentarism) was dialectically inseparable from the military war of maneuver (insurrection) and that the two together constituted the PKI's totalistic revolutionary scheme. As Parry Anderson shows, the Bolshevik revolution would not have been possible without the social-democratic hegemony-building strategy from the late 1890s to 1917.⁸⁸⁹ The victory of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry required the integration of hegemonic struggle with insurrectionary struggle.⁸⁹⁰

The form of the PKI as an electoral communist party might confound readers of Antonio Gramsci and Ranajit Guha. Gramsci theorized that war of position was an appropriate strategy in the context of the society where the state exercised power through domination as well as hegemony—when political struggle was matter of negotiating "the trench systems of modern

⁸⁸⁵ Rosa, Ruth Amende, 1949, "The Soviet Theory of 'People's Democracy'," *World Politics* 1, 4 (Jul.): 494.

⁸⁸⁶ Aidit, D.N., 1952, *Menempuh Jalan Rakjat*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 18-20, 22-4.

⁸⁸⁷ More about the ideological basis of the Sino-Soviet split, see: chapter 2 of this dissertation.

⁸⁸⁸ More on Tito's Bukharinite evolutionism, see: Rosa, "The Soviet Theory," 497.

⁸⁸⁹ Anderson, Perry, 1976-77, "The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci," *New Left Review* 100 (Nov./Jan.): 5-

⁸⁹⁰ Egan, Daniel, 2013, "Rethinking War of Maneuver/War of Position: Gramsci and the Military Metaphor," *Critical Sociology* 40, 4: 535.

warfare.”⁸⁹¹ Gramsci opposed society in the West, where this was the case, to society in the East (referring to Russia) where the civil society was still gelatinous and hence relatively unencroached by state and/or civil hegemony. Guha took Gramsci’s characterization of the Eastern society to explain both British Indian colonial and postcolonial Indian bourgeois state’s “dominance without hegemony.”⁸⁹² The Indonesian Republic was clearly not a developed Western state (Gramsci). However, I would also add that neither was it a purely coercive colonial or bourgeois state that exercised “dominance without hegemony” (Guha).

From the Indonesian communists’ perspective, anticommunism was sufficiently pervasive to be hegemonic. This dissertation, hence, suggests that despite the Indonesian civil society’s embryonic nature, anticommunism provided one dominant form of hegemonic state *and* civil control. The cooperation between the colonial state and anticommunist armed force, reactionary militia, fundamentalist Muslims, wealthy landlords, and organized thug groups formed this state-civil hegemonic bloc. All anticommunist mobilizations in Indonesia yielded tightened state control. The correlated phenomena of anticommunist mobilizations and tightened state control recurred throughout the country’s long anticommunist history—from the 1926-27 colonial crackdown of the PKI in Java and Sumatra, the 1943 Japanese fascist murder of the communist paramilitary, to the 1948 Republican army’s execution of communist leaders, and finally the 1965-66 armed forces’ anticommunist genocide. *Pace* Gramsci and Guha, anticommunist hegemony in Indonesia explains that war of position could be an equally legitimate line of struggle in the “postcolonial” society (against Gramsci) where the nation’s sovereignty resides with the nation’s people rather than with the colonizers (against Guha).

Rather than a simpler enmity between the colonized local and the colonizing foreign in the colonial situation, postcolonial contradictions are internally worked out, to use Mao’s words, “among the people.” Everyone is already horizontally calibrated as “local” in the *national* framework. Unless the civil war or “the war among family members” (typified by the Indic epic known throughout Indonesia as *Bharatayuddha*) are expected, a war of position that rearranges the society’s internal composition would keep the fraternal bloodshed to the minimum. Aidit’s PKI likewise saw its communist struggle as already situated within the state, not outside of it. The communists in the postcolonial state were necessitated to deal with the postcolony’s internal contradictions after all. Therefore, one of its stated goal was to create a change in (state’s) balance of forces (“perubahanimbangan kekuatan”), non-antagonistically converting what Aidit later called the anti-people forces (*anti-rakjat*) like the imperialist, landlord class, and comprador bourgeoisie into pro-people forces (*pro-rakjat*).⁸⁹³

War of position as a strategy fulfills another theoretical and practical function pertinent to the “postcolonial” society’s persistent coloniality: it allows for the liquidation of the colonial residues and the resistance against neocolonial power in other realms not directly related to the armed forces like finance and culture.

Whether in Lenin or Gramsci, war of position is never equal and cannot be reduced to mere reformism. Opposing both councilist direct democracy and Stalinist statism, Nicos Poulantzas, a Greek Marxist legal philosopher in Paris, defends the reformism of the left parliamentary parties in a historical phenomenon called Eurocommunism as a structural reality entirely distinct from

⁸⁹¹ Gramsci, Antonio, *Prison Notebooks*, 235, 238, 244.

⁸⁹² Guha, Ranajit, 1997, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India*, Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

⁸⁹³ Latif, *Manuskrip*, 426, 435.

classical revisionism.⁸⁹⁴ His defense presupposes an impossibility of a communist party being outside state power, which only “leav[es] the field open for statism.”⁸⁹⁵ This dissertation suggests that in the Indonesian context we ought to read Poulantzas’ reformism-of-a-special-type or left parliamentarism in a Maoist frame—as a protracted war that incrementally transforms and abolishes the societal oppressive structure over time through a working class, mass movement.

Both coercive *and* hegemonic anticommunism as the historical-material force compelled Aidit’s PKI to take a parliamentary path in the atmosphere of international communism’s optimism.

The parliament, in the war of position’s framework, thus, was never an end in itself. This dissertation suggests that when parliamentarism was not determined as an end in itself—in other words, not reformism—it is ought to be positioned in the protracted process of “communist becoming.” In this framework of communist becoming that presupposes a long, protracted flow of temporality, we could understand revolutionary transformation as a continuous process of accumulating revolutionary forces and constructing a proletarian hegemony punctuated by, rather than culminating in, the rupture of revolution, or revolutions.⁸⁹⁶ This interpretation is in line with Gramsci’s thought that stressed the importance of the subaltern proletariat “leading” the allied class *both* before assuming power *and* when it is in power: “There can and there must be a “political hegemony” even before assuming government power, and in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony one must not count solely on the power and material force that is given by government.”⁸⁹⁷

While Gramsci’s Modern Prince may most exemplify this prefigurative aspect of communist becoming against the bourgeois “passive revolution,” the concept itself does not explicitly engage with the state apparatuses like the parliament. Lenin and Mao, the two revolutionaries who had their names attached to the state communist ideology (Marxism-Leninism and Marxism-Leninism-Maoism), would have much more to say about the state as they have seized the state yet without the success in abolishing it. Gramsci, on the other hand, theorized about the political party from *within* the oppressive state (the prison), hence there was already a sense of prefiguring a party and a communism *beyond* the state. In this way, Gramsci’s Modern Prince could be as illuminating as Lenin’s vanguardism for understanding the PKI’s parliamentarism.⁸⁹⁸ While assuming the vanguardist role, Aidit’s PKI, this dissertation argues, was simultaneously experimenting with the possibilities unleashed by the new postcolonial Indonesian conjunctures—a praxis similar to Gramsci’s prescription of the Modern Prince. Among these new configurations was the representative democratic form, namely the parliament, that allowed “native” political parties to participate in self-rule for the first time, compared to the Dutch-controlled Volksraad (People’s Council) during the colonial era.

⁸⁹⁴ Haider, Asad, 2018, “Party and Strategy in Postwar European Marxist Theory,” Ph.D. Dissertation, UC Santa Cruz, 119-31.

⁸⁹⁵ Poulantzas, Nicos, 1978, *State, Power, Socialism*, trans. Patrick Camiller, London: New Left Books, 153.

⁸⁹⁶ Comrade Amil, 2013 “Towards the War of Position: Gramsci in Continuity and Rupture with Marxism-Leninism,” *Uprising* 4: 30.

⁸⁹⁷ Gramsci, Antonio, 1971, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, eds. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart: §44.

⁸⁹⁸ The author thanks John Roosa for pointing out the conceptual connection between Aidit’s PKI and Gramsci along with some limits of Euro-American scholarship on Gramsci. More on this point, read: Roosa, John, 2020, *Buried Histories: The Anticommunist Massacres of 1965-1966 in Indonesia*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 31-4.

Peter Thomas, an authority on interpreting Gramsci, defines the Modern Prince as a reconfiguration of the concept of the political party into “the institutional summation of a “concrete fantasy” that constitutively exceeds any attempt to formalize its expansive dynamic.”⁸⁹⁹ Gramsci stresses that the Modern Prince, to build up on Thomas’ exegesis, particularly exceeds the political party’s “expansive dynamic” on two fronts: the formation of a national-popular collective will and intellectual and moral reform.⁹⁰⁰ The Modern Prince hence coordinates the subaltern peoples into a hegemonic force or a new historical bloc that both resists the current capitalist, imperialist, and racist order and initiates a construction of a socialist order (Thomas’ “concrete fantasy”).⁹⁰¹ As Gramsci puts it, “the parties are the elaborators of new integral and all-encompassing intellectualities and the crucibles where the unification of theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place.”⁹⁰² Here is where Lenin’s pedagogical vanguardism and Gramsci’s experimental Modern Prince collide as two different emphases of prefigurative communist politics. While vanguardism creates a hegemony for an eventual seizure and abolition of the state (war of movement), the Modern Prince’s hegemony perpetually experiments to invent the post-capitalist, post-imperialist unknown for the subaltern’s “integral autonomy” and self-government (war of position).⁹⁰³ A few Gramscian scholars like Thomas himself and Panagiotis Sotiris agree in characterizing the Modern Prince as a “compositional party”—a concrete, provisional condensation of relations of force that continuously modify its molecular composition as a collective organism (a full integration between the vanguard party and the subaltern people) and as an expansive revolutionary process-in-the-movement.⁹⁰⁴ Sotiris goes as far as claiming that the Modern Prince is “the political form of a modern United Front.”⁹⁰⁵

Aidit’s people’s democracy—an ambiguous term in the history of non-Soviet communist parties during late Stalin—straddled two modes of prefigurative politics (Lenin’s vanguardism and Gramsci’s Modern Prince). This may be partly attributed to the anticommunist atmosphere that restricted much of the party’s political experiments. An articulation of the party that registered its own defeat, heteronomy, and constraints as state captives might be more accurately grasping PKI’s activities in terms that fall outside Lenin’s vanguardism with which the PKI is usually identified. In other words, this dissertation suggests that Gramsci might be the PKI’s missed conceptual interlocutor in that the PKI already operationalized Gramsci’s prescription of the Modern Prince in practice. In this sense, we may conceptualize Aidit’s parliamentarism as the Prince out of prison or, to combine Lenin’s concept with Gramsci’s, a Gramscian vanguard.

The PKI’s posited people’s democracy as a transitional form of government that worked toward an abolition of Indonesia’s “semi-feudal, semi-colonial” status. Similar to Lenin and Mao’s writings on democracy, the PKI understood both the people and democracy not as homogeneous abstractions but as classed, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist.⁹⁰⁶ Aidit’s PKI attributed to semi-

⁸⁹⁹ Thomas, Peter, 2015, “Gramsci’s Machiavellian Metaphor: Restaging *the Prince*,” in *The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language*, eds. Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfino, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 453

⁹⁰⁰ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, 132-3, Q13, §1.

⁹⁰¹ Thomas, Peter, 2020, “Toward the Modern Prince,” in *Gramsci in the World*, eds. Roberto M. Dainotto and Fredric Jameson, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 32.

⁹⁰² Gramsci, *Selections*, 335, Q11, §12, translation modified, quoted in Sotiris, Panagiotis, 2018, “Gramsci and the Challenges for the Left: The Historical Bloc as a Strategic Concept,” *Science & Society* 82, 1 (Jan.): 116.

⁹⁰³ Sotiris, Panagiotis, 2020, “Gramsci and Althusser Encountering Machiavelli: Hegemony and/as New Practice of Politics,” *Jus Cogens* (Nov.): 20.

⁹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 31.; Sotiris, “Gramsci and Althusser,” 16.

⁹⁰⁵ Sotiris, “From the Nation to the People,” 82.

⁹⁰⁶ Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

feudalism and semi-colonialism the cause of Indonesia's destitution (*keadaan melarat*), backwardness (*terbelakang*), and degeneration (*pincang*). The PKI theorized foreign capital (*kapital asing*) as the foundational linkage between feudal lords (*tuan-tuan feodal*), compradors (*komprador*), and imperialism:

Imperialist role and the feudal remnants will not be liquidated in Indonesia as long as the state power in the country is held by the feudal lords and compradors who are closely connected with foreign capital because they want to retain the imperialist yoke (*penindasan imperialis*) and feudal remnants in the country.⁹⁰⁷

Multiple and interlocking forms of oppression—capitalism, imperialism, feudalism, (and anticommunism)—necessitated the PKI to advance an equally compositional subject of opposition: the people. People's democracy, for Aidit's PKI, then literally signified the form of people's government as a compositional opposition to their multiple oppression, united as a capitalist, bourgeois state (*negara borjuis*).⁹⁰⁸

Aidit's PKI inherited a classed understanding of democracy and the people from Lenin, particularly the *State and Revolution* text. In there, Lenin defined democracy as "a state which recognizes the subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e. an organization for the systematic use of force by one class against another, by one section of the population against another."⁹⁰⁹ This definition flipped the perverse reality of capitalist-imperialist domination in which the minority (capitalists and colonizers) ruled over the majority (workers and the colonized people). It revealed rather than concealed the partisan nature of a concept. Lenin was clear that this act of "subordination" involved a "systematic use of force," which was different than violence or aggression. For Lenin, since capitalism already crippled workers' power, proletarian participation in bourgeois and imperialist democracy allowed a certain practice of collective self-rule and the prefiguration of an impending revolution.⁹¹⁰ Lenin acknowledged that while democracy was a "state machine," at a certain stage of its development, democracy "welds together the [proletarian] class that wages a revolutionary struggle against capitalism ... and enables it to crush, smash to atoms, wipe off the face of the earth the bourgeois, even the republican-bourgeois, state machine, the standing army, the police and the bureaucracy..."⁹¹¹ "Here 'quantity turns into quality,'" Lenin further wrote, and "such a degree of democracy implies overstepping the boundaries of bourgeois society and beginning its socialist organization."⁹¹² Despite many contradictory moments along its growth, wherein Lenin advocated for a vanguardist intervention in sharpening them, the democratic struggle, however, could never substitute for an "economic revolution"⁹¹³

Likewise for the classed conception of the people, Lenin equated the people with the oppressed majority, which in a Marxist-Leninist context referred to the laboring masses of workers

⁹⁰⁷ Aidit, D.N., 1953, *Menuju Indonesia Baru*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 36.

⁹⁰⁸ Latif, *Manuskrip*, 446.

⁹⁰⁹ Lenin, *State and Revolution*, 461.

⁹¹⁰ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], "Reply to P.Kievsky (Y.Pyatakov)," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 23: August 1916-March 1917, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 25.; Nimtz, August H., 2014, *Lenin's Electoral Strategy from 1907 to the October Revolution of 1917: The Ballot, The Streets—or Both*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

⁹¹¹ Lenin, *State and Revolution*.

⁹¹² *Ibid.*

⁹¹³ Lenin, "Reply to P.Kievsky," 25.; Pateman, Joe, 2020, "V.I. Lenin on Democracy," *International Critical Thought* 10, 4: 546-7.

and peasants. As Roland Boer explains, the opposite of democracy was not autocracy or dictatorship but the classes of the old aristocracy and bourgeoisie.⁹¹⁴

Whereas Lenin deployed the term the dictatorship of the proletariat, the PKI modified the term into people's democratic dictatorship (*diktator demokrasi rakyat*) in its 1952 *Menempuh Djalan Rakyat* (Taking the People's Way) without a clear allusion to Mao, likely the first user of this term in his 1949 *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*. In the Chinese case, the shift from Mao's 1940 *New Democracy* to 1949 *People's Democratic Dictatorship* signified the movement from a pre-seizure united front's battle against the reactionaries to a post-seizure partisan rule of the majority over their reactionary class enemies. Stated differently, the former concerned the relations among the people, while the latter grappled with the people's class enemy. The usage of dictatorship here was to, again, visibilize the concealed oppressiveness of the bourgeois rule. Lenin argued, and Mao concurred, that the bourgeoisie had always been practicing dictatorship or totalitarianism of one class, namely the bourgeoisie, over the proletariat and the rest of the people, falsely representing bourgeois rule as pure and universal democracy.⁹¹⁵ For Mao, and likewise Aidit's PKI, the classed understanding of people became a foundational category for revolutionary mobilization because it carried both senses of national belonging and a recognition of equal humanity not yet established during the periods of colonialism and imperialist occupation.

Aidit's PKI defined the people's democratic dictatorship plainly as "the people's dictatorship over the people's enemies," not "the dictatorship of an individual," (*diktator perseorangan*), "the dictatorship of the party," (*diktator Partai*) or "a dictatorship of the minority over the majority" (*diktator golongan kecil atas golongan besar*). In this system, the people enjoyed the rights to free speech, association, assembly, and voting. Aidit further explained that the people's democratic dictatorship combined both the democracy for the people (*demokrasi bagi Rakyat*) and dictatorship over the reactionaries (*diktator terhadap kaum reaksioner*).⁹¹⁶

A concrete form of the people's democratic dictatorship manifested more clearly in the 1953 PKI's Program as a united national front, formed on the basis of the "alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class."⁹¹⁷ This united national front aimed to fuse anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces for securing the national independence. The PKI pushed and facilitated the working class, as a revolutionary leader, to "raise its tasks on a broader scale and higher level," including "the struggle of the peasantry for the land, the struggle of the intelligentsia for its vital rights, the struggle of the national bourgeoisie against foreign competition, the struggle of the whole Indonesian people for national independence and democratic liberties."⁹¹⁸ Here, like its understanding of the people earlier, the PKI already advanced a compositional conception of the working class irreducible to the economic questions of labor and wages alone. This compositional working class interconnected with the struggles of the other strata of the multiply oppressed peoples whose politics were also anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, and to a certain extent, anti-capitalist. "The people can count victory only when," the PKI's Program wrote, "the working

⁹¹⁴ Boer, Roland, 2014, "Socialist Democracy with Chinese Characteristics," *Crisis & Critique*, eds. Henrik Jøker Bjerre and Agon Hamza 1, 1: Democracy and Revolution, 49.

⁹¹⁵ Lenin, V.I., 1974 [1918], "'Democracy' and Dictatorship," in *Lenin Collected Works*, vol. 28: July 1918–March 1919, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 370.; Mao, Tse-tung, 1949, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship: In Commemoration of the Twenty-eight Anniversary of the Communist Party of China," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, (30 Jun.).

⁹¹⁶ Aidit, D.N., 1952, *Menempuh Djalan Rakyat*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 15-6.

⁹¹⁷ Agitprop Department of the Communist Party of Indonesia, 1953, *Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia*.

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

class of Indonesia becomes an independent, conscious, politically mature, and organized force capable of heading the struggle of the whole people, only when the people will see in the working class their leader.”⁹¹⁹

Even though Aidit’s PKI did not explicitly express it this way, parliamentarism was only one formal and democratic form for coordinating the working masses and actualizing the PKI’s prefigurative politics. This dissertation sees no clear-cut boundary that the PKI made between parliamentarism (indirect democracy) and extra-parliamentary struggles or workers’ formations like local village cells (more direct democracy). The latter was a local counterpart to the commune or council—radical democratic forms that did not travel to Indonesia to the extent of my knowledge. Hence, the PKI always stressed that “its work in Parliament [is] not ... the main work of the Party and the Parliamentary struggle not as the only form of struggle.”⁹²⁰ The PKI’s proletarian *realpolitik* went beyond the parliament in that it also organized the workers and peasants for an insurrection when the military and social conditions were met. The parliament was only one means to achieve communist ends, and in the postwar situation, it served as the PKI’s sanctioned excuse to organize workers. Here, we see exactly the PKI’s role as a Gramscian vanguard which organized the subaltern working class both inside and outside the parliament in a protracted war of position. The former fulfilled the role of Gramscian Modern Prince and the latter Leninist vanguard. But both were united in their prefigurative politics of laying the necessary groundwork for the revolution from below (*persiapan revolusi dari bawah*).⁹²¹

Within the war of position framework that this dissertation argues Aidit’s PKI operationalized, the PKI already chose and experimented with the most advanced available political praxis in the capitalist system that brought the party closest to the communist form. Rather than engaging solely with *early pre-seizure* Lenin and Mao’s writings on parliamentary democracy, the PKI calibrated those communist parliamentary experiments with both thinkers’ *transitional* texts from pre-seizure to post-seizure like Lenin’s *State and Revolution* and Mao’s *People’s Democracy Dictatorship*. The PKI utilized its spatio-temporal prerogative as a latecomer at the periphery to *combine* the lessons from its communist predecessors and produce the most advanced political form to experiment with in the specific Indonesian geohistorical-material situation. It became a communist vanguard in the semi-feudal, semi-colonial society, pushing this society’s overall political boundary into a less exploitative-oppressive direction. Hence, it maneuvered at the edge between actual capitalist and prefigurative communist realms, struggling to traverse from the former to the latter in the protracted process of communist becoming.

Only through this explanation can we make sense of the PKI’s self-description of the revolution it aimed to accomplish as “bourgeois democratic revolution of a new type” (*revolusi borjuis demokratis type baru*) in the times of imperialism (*zaman imperialisme*) and world proletarian revolution (*zaman revolusi proletar dunia*).⁹²² Imperialism had proletarianized the whole colonized nation into world capitalism’s natural resources and cheap labor to be extracted and exploited. Dialectically, the Soviet Union and China had set the revolutionary precedence for global anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist proletarian revolution. The latter enabled a radicalization of world’s working class, which assumed the generalized status of the compositional “people” in the postcolonial nations due to the former’s proletarianization of the colonies. The Leninist Wing’s

⁹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹²¹ Latif, *Manuskrip*, 411.

⁹²² Partai Komunis Indonesia, 1954, “Konstitusi Partai Komunis Indonesia,” *Bintang Merah* 9, 2-3 (Feb./Mar.).

“bourgeois democratic revolution of a new type,” then, encompassed both “peripheral” bourgeoisie and compositional people whose politics were anti-feudal, anti-imperialist, and, to a certain extent, anti-capitalist. Because the working class led this bourgeois democratic revolution, the bourgeois and democratic designators only denoted an *emphasis* in an overall protracted communist and proletarian revolution, not a stage. When positioned in a war of position, protracted war, and communist becoming frameworks, this bourgeois democratic revolution was *new* to the extent that it was neither a reformist end in itself nor a mechanistic understanding of a revolutionary “stage” but rather a permanent reconfiguration of the interconnected societal elements and an active prefiguration of the postcapitalist, postimperialist future in the present. At least in theory, it was, after all, a proletariat-led bourgeois democratic revolution and a *transitional* one at that. In 1947, Aidit already theorized his version of democracy as “third democracy” (*demokrasi ketiga*) spawned from an “underdeveloped”—or peripheral!—condition (*paling belakangan*), no longer bourgeois but not yet proletarian.⁹²³ Hence, in the PKI’s understanding of the revolution, multiple and contradicting temporalities (feudal, imperialist, bourgeois and proletarian) collapsed and overlaid each other in the extended and vanishing contemporary—so emblematic of a peripheral society subject to capitalist formal subsumption, rather than real subsumption.⁹²⁴

Aidit’s PKI did not conceive interconnected multiplicity only in terms of time. Aidit also thought of the PKI’s multiple struggles in terms of a combination of three spaces engendering different methods of resistance—the parliament, cities (for workers’ strike), and rural areas (for peasants’ insurrection).⁹²⁵ At times the PKI’s historical account framed these combined struggles as a revolution from above (parliament) and from below (workers and peasants’ organizing).⁹²⁶ This point about a combination of spaces and methods—as well as temporalities—bolsters the argument that the Leninist Wing’s parliamentarianism was not a pure reformism, revisionism, or legalism in the same way with the Reformist Wing. Aidit even celebrated the PKI’s capability of combining bourgeois democracy with anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist people or working class as *meerterlijke toepassing* or ‘a masterful application’ of Marxism-Leninism.⁹²⁷

Both phenomena of multiplicity and combination, convincingly explained through the analytical frames of Marx’s formal subsumption and Trotsky’s combined and uneven development, specifically index capitalism’s contradictoriness at the periphery. They demonstrate a different movement of peripheral dialectics connected to but distinguished from the capitalist-imperialist centers because of the accumulated magnitude of multiple oppression.

As a conventional Marxist-Leninist party, Aidit’s PKI could have manifested a variation of postcolonial Stalinism, creolizing Stalin’s reductionist and mechanical understanding of Marxism (i.e. people’s democracy, statism, stadialism, etc.) with Indonesia’s postcolonial material

⁹²³ Aidit, D.N., 1947, “Demokrasi Ketiga,” *Soeara Boeroeh* (1 May).

⁹²⁴ Menozzi, Filippo, 2021, “Marxism in Plural Times: Decolonizing Subsumption,” *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society* 33, 1: 111-33.

The Comintern’s Second Congress in 1920 even arrived at a conclusion of subsuming the national-revolutionary and bourgeois-democratic designations into national-democratic to stress that “under proletarian leadership it was possible to skip the ‘capitalist stage of development’ and proceed directly from the national revolution to the socialist revolution.”

Redfern, Neil, 2017, “The Comintern and Imperialism: A Balance Sheet,” *Journal of Labor and Society* 20: 48.

⁹²⁵ Latif, *Manuskrip*, 393, 406.

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 397.

⁹²⁷ Aidit, “Demokrasi Ketiga.”

reality. Contrary to this conclusion, this dissertation shows that Aidit's PKI engaged with Lenin, Mao, and obliquely Gramsci to invent a new communist praxis within peripheral limits and under the anticommunist constraints that resembled actually-circulating revolutionary forms but with a totally different composition. Valentino Gerratana notes that this "continuous extension and critical revision" of Lenin is a *Leninist* method of rescuing Lenin from Stalin's bastardization of his predecessor.⁹²⁸ On the question of (combined) form, Lenin encouraged communists to be dialectical through and through by mastering all forms rather than choosing between the old and the new:

Right doctrinairism persisted in recognizing only the old forms, and became utterly bankrupt, for it did not notice the new content. Left doctrinairism persists in the unconditional repudiation of certain old forms, failing to see that *the new content is forcing its way through all and sundry forms, that it is our duty as Communists to master all forms, to learn how, with the maximum rapidity, to supplement one form with another, to substitute one for another, and to adapt our tactics to any such change that does not come from our class or from our efforts.*⁹²⁹

Reformulated in this dissertation's terms, Aidit PKI's new praxis was the dualist approaches to a war of position strategy, namely, organizing the working class both within and outside the parliament to prepare for the revolution-to-come and prefiguring the communist future in the present through the worker-centric conception of people's democracy.

The quadrumvirate's consolidation of the party and its line of struggle appeared to be quite absolute from early on such that the quadrumvirate stopped using the Leninist Wing moniker for self-description around 1951. By 1951 when Aidit and his Sajap Leninist collaborators assumed leadership, the Leninist Wing simply became the PKI and successfully took the party over from the Reformist Wing. As we have seen that Aidit's PKI was obsessed with party's unity and intra-party order due to the reasonable fear of anticommunist assault, the politburo usually marginalized members who advocated for different line of struggle except for one rare case of Alimin, the surviving founding member of the PKI who shared the same generational background with Moesso.

One major lingering question for the PKI's parliamentarian line is whether it had a theory of capitalist crisis concretely grounded in political economy and geohistorical materialism. The basis of this question arises from a customary reading of Gramsci and Guha on the weakness of both the state and civil society in the East. Even as the state developed a relatively strong coercive force in the East such that both Gramsci and Guha were convinced of the Eastern state's domination over the civil society, there could still be a possibility for a war of maneuver (the revolution!) already impossible in the West. The Eastern state was after all a peripheral state and could never achieve the advanced capitalist status because the capitalist world-system structurally underdeveloped and exploited the periphery—a permanent interregnum, as it were. Within this analytical frame, we might ask: when the state's coercive force adequately weakened—whether through the collective oppositional effort of the oppressed working peoples with the vanguard's facilitation, the endogenous capitalist structural crisis, or a combination of both—would the PKI

⁹²⁸ Gerratana, Valentino, 1977, "Stalin, Lenin, and 'Leninism'," trans. Patrick Camiller, *New Left Review* 103 (May/Jun.): 71.

⁹²⁹ Lenin, "'Left-Wing' Communism." My emphasis.

take a chance to radicalize and execute a more insurrectionary line of struggle at the point of production?

Lenin III: The Third International

Besides the Bolshevik party and left parliamentary forms, the PKI's Leninist Wing returned to Lenin for an unapologetic anti-imperialism. Though Aidit's PKI did not exactly articulate its understanding of anti-imperialism in this way, this dissertation suggests that the PKI's Leninist anti-imperialism was best captured by the anti-reformist spirit of the Third International or the Comintern in the international communist context. Only by thinking the Leninist Wing's anti-imperialism through what the Third International represented could we grasp the dual aspects of its politics that tied anti-imperialism to anti-reformism. This interpretive frame illuminates the parallelism between the Third International's critique of the Second International's pro-colonialism and reformism and the Leninist Wing's critique of the Reformist Wing.⁹³⁰

Aidit's PKI attributed the generic international cause of the PKI's birth to the October Revolution. As noted earlier, to celebrate the 30th year anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1947, the PKI's Vice Chairman Njoto championed the October Revolution as the communist revolutionary model for Indonesia.⁹³¹ Seven years later, in the Bolshevik Revolution's 37th anniversary, Njoto gave another speech dedicated to the global consequences of the October Revolution for the national liberation of and the socialist revolution in the colonies. He wrote that the October victory enlivened (*djiwai*) and inspired (*semangati*) the Indonesian communists.⁹³² In Aidit's 1955 text about the history of the PKI, he followed Mao's lead from 1949 *Retrospective of the Revolutionary Struggle* that saw the October Revolution as an awakening "instrument for foreseeing (*meramalkan*) a nation's future and considering anew one's own problems."⁹³³ Aidit then connected the Indonesian independence—which is also anti-colonial—struggle to the anticapitalist struggle of the global proletariat inaugurated by the Soviet Union and followed by China. He wrote: "Indonesian progressives and the revolutionary masses of the Indonesian people, precisely at the right time, joined in strengthening the new revolutionary front opposing world imperialism. With this, the struggle for Indonesian independence became an inseparable part of the struggle of the proletariat of the world to smash capitalism."⁹³⁴

Connecting the Bolshevik Revolution to the rest of the colonized world, the Leninist Wing particularly pivoted on Lenin's de-Europeanized account of Eastern communism. In the same 1955 *Birth and Growth of the PKI*, Aidit referred to Lenin's 1919 address to the Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, specifically a passage which exhorted "Eastern Communists" to "adapt ... to specific conditions such as do not exist in the European countries."⁹³⁵ This passage made a strong call for Eastern Communists to be situational and analytical rather than dogmatic as they were figuring out their historical material conditions in an unevenly developed

⁹³⁰ For an intellectual history of growing opportunism and reformism in the Second International, read: Riddell, John, 2022, "Debates in the Second International," *John Riddell: Marxist Essays and Commentary* (3 Apr.). Available at: <https://johnriddell.com/2022/04/03/debates-in-the-second-international/>.

⁹³¹ Njoto in November 1947 issue of *Bintang Merah* from Latif, *Manuskrip*, 265-6.

⁹³² Njoto, 1954, *Revolusi Sosialis Oktober dan Pengaruhnya atas Gerakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia: Pidato untuk Memperingati Ulangtahun Revolusi Oktober*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 14.

⁹³³ Aidit, D.N., 1955, *Lahirnya PKI dan Perkembangannya (1920-1955)*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 10.

⁹³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 10-11.; Lenin, V.I., 1965 [1919], "Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of The Peoples of the East," in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 30: September 1919-April 1920, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 151-62.

capitalist system. “Such are the problems whose solution you will not find in any communist book,” Lenin reiterated.; “You will have to tackle that problem and solve it through your own independent experience.”⁹³⁶

In Lenin’s speech itself, he emphasized the “greater and newer” task faced by Eastern Communists. After the Bolshevik’s victory, Lenin warned, “the socialist revolution which is impending for the whole world will not be merely the victory of the proletariat of each country over its own bourgeoisie. ... [A]ll countries are armed against their domestic Bolshevism and ... their one thought is how to defeat Bolshevism at home.”⁹³⁷ In other words, the Bolshevik Revolution in the Soviet Union had also radicalized international imperialism into a more coordinated system. Lenin then wrote:

Hence, the socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie-no, it will be a struggle of all the imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism.⁹³⁸

From Lenin’s perspective, rather than an account of the globalized October Revolution as presented by the PKI, we get instead an account of the interconnected struggle of the colonized against international imperialism. This revolutionary vision of bridging the struggles of the colonized fueled the Comintern during Lenin’s supervision.⁹³⁹ Later when Soekarno coined the term *nekolim* to capture the entangled phenomena of neocolonialism (*neokolonialisme*), colonialism (*kolonialisme*) and imperialism (*imperialisme*), Aidit explicitly credited Lenin’s writings on Eastern Communism that allowed him to ground *nekolim* on a Marxist understanding.⁹⁴⁰

Within the same framework of Eastern Communism, Lenin had an even more specific account of the rise of Asia that the PKI pursued. In *Towards New Indonesia (Menuju Indonesia Baru)* from 1953, Aidit quoted Lenin from his 1913 *The Awakening of Asia* stating that “world capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia have finally awaken (*membangunkan*) Asian countries.”⁹⁴¹ For the PKI, this statement registering the revolutionary capability of the colonized legitimated their struggles. In the sentence following the Lenin quote, Aidit immediately convoked the oppressed Indonesian working class to organize and struggle after a long period of inactivity, unaware of their leadership role in the revolution due to colonial and capitalist suppression: “the classes that are most oppressed (*tertindas*) and insulted (*terhina*) in Indonesia awake, organize themselves, and struggle.”⁹⁴²

⁹³⁶ Lenin, “Address to the Second All-Russia Congress.”

⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹³⁹ *Ibid.* Lenin stated specifically in the speech about the role of the Third International and the potential revolutions in the colonies: “That is a difficult and specific task, but a very thankful one, because masses that have taken no part in the struggle up to now are being drawn into it, and also because the organization of communist cells in the East gives you an opportunity to maintain the closest contact with the Third International. You must find specific forms for this alliance of the foremost proletarians of the world with the laboring and exploited masses of the East whose conditions are in many cases medieval.”

⁹⁴⁰ Sudisman, 1964 [1963], 43 *Tahun Menempa Kesabaran, Ketjintaan, dan Kegemasan Revolusioner*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 11.

⁹⁴¹ Aidit, D.N., 1953, *Menuju Indonesia Baru*, Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 10.; Lenin, V.I., 1977 [1913], “The Awakening of Asia,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 19, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 86.

⁹⁴² Aidit, *Menuju*, 10.

Knowing that Lenin referred extensively to the case of revolutionary democratic protest in the Dutch East Indies, it was to no surprise that Aidit exalted this text to one of the PKI's main anti-imperialist canons. The legitimating aspect of Lenin (or other global communist figures like Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Mao, for that matter) for Aidit was great enough that he needed to highlight Lenin's deep knowledge about Indonesia. In his 1960 *Lenin and Indonesia* speech, Aidit stressed that in *The Awakening of Asia*, "Indonesia not only constituted one of the proofs of the truth of Lenin's conclusion, but also contributed material which led Lenin to arrive at this conclusion."⁹⁴³ Aidit further pointed out in the same text that Lenin read Multatuli's *Max Havelaar* that exposed the barbarism of colonial life in Indonesia to prepare for writing *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism*.⁹⁴⁴

Despite its problematic Russocentric diffusionism (the spread of Russian revolutionary democratic movement to the recently awaken Asian countries), *The Awakening of Asia* offered a compelling analysis of the material conditions for the awakening of anticolonial consciousness in the Indies, with partial reference to the Dutch Marxist Willem van Ravesteijn. The text exhibited Lenin's thoughts about the emergence of Asia as a legible political entity that according to Sanjay Seth could be traced back to his writing in 1908 *Inflammable Material in World Politics*.⁹⁴⁵ Three conditions that enabled the revolutionary movement in the Indies, according to Lenin, were: the rise of Islamic nationalist movement, the emergence of local enlightened intelligentsia, and the revolutionary exchange between mainland and Indonesian Chinese. While the 1905 movement in Russia provided a revolutionary democratic model for Asian societies, Lenin paradoxically accredited capitalism for developing the productive forces capable of resisting imperialism and capitalism to begin with. Because of world capitalism, "hundreds of millions of the downtrodden and benighted have awakened from medieval stagnation to a new life and are rising to fight for elementary human rights and democracy."⁹⁴⁶

Though operating within the persisting orientalist and teleological frameworks, Lenin was among the first Marxists who transformed the understanding of Asiatic productive force from Marx's Asiatic mode of production—which was passive and belonged to the "medieval stagnation" but not quite feudal in the European sense, to the awakened Asiatic subject who actively made world history but also not in the same full capacity as the advanced Western subject.⁹⁴⁷ While Marx exceptionalized Asia, Lenin incorporated it as a semi-developed entity. Besides history-making capacity, Lenin's conception of Asia was active in another sense. Wang Hui contends that reading against Confucian homogeneity and primordialism, Lenin's Asia

⁹⁴³ Aidit, *Lenin dan Indonesia*, 25.

⁹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 21-2.

⁹⁴⁵ Seth, Sanjay, "Lenin's Reformulation of Marxism: The Colonial Question as a National Question," *History of Political Thought* 13, 1 (Spring): 112.

⁹⁴⁶ Lenin, "The Awakening," 86.

⁹⁴⁷ More rigorous textual interpretation of Marx's Asiatic mode of production as based on communal property, which makes it not exactly feudal, see: Tőkei, Ferenc, 1982, "Some Contentious Issues in the Interpretation of the Asiatic Mode of Production," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 12, 3: 294-303.

Tamás Krausz explains the stakes of Hungarian sinologist and philosopher Ferenc Tőkei's reconstruction of the Asiatic mode of production as countering the elimination and reduction of this concept into "Asiatic feudalism" during the Stalinist period.

Krausz, Tamás, 2020, "Lenin on Global History and the Global Historiography on Lenin," in *Russian Studies HU*, ed. Gyula Szvák, Budapest: Alapítvány az Orosz Nyelvért és Kultúráért, 25.

registers rather a shared political condition accommodating the independence of multiple sovereign Asian nations.⁹⁴⁸

Seth notes that leading up to Lenin's theorization of imperialism from 1914 to 1917, "[Asia] no longer received accidental and episodic attention; it was incorporated into the dominant concerns and concepts of this period. ... It came to be regarded as structural and necessary."⁹⁴⁹ Only at this point in the theory of "official Marxism" or Marxism-Leninism that despite underdeveloped, Asia, and the East more generally, became constitutive of the reproduction of global capitalism through imperialist incorporation and capitalist subsumption. Because of this new inclusive treatment of Asia, Lenin could also reconceptualize capitalism as not exclusively European but as an interconnected global material totality. The anticolonial nationalist struggles in the colonies, therefore, deeply amplified the struggles of the "advanced proletariats" in the metropolises. As early as when Lenin wrote *The Awakening of Asia*, he stated: "But the proletariat of the European countries and the young democracy of Asia, fully confident of its strength and with abiding faith in the masses, are advancing to take the place of this decadent and moribund bourgeoisie."⁹⁵⁰ Just as Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart Schram put it, Lenin was a mediation between Marxism and the non-European world.⁹⁵¹

The PKI's return to Lenin for his double anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movements meant also a return to the polemical basis of Lenin's conceptualizations that resonated with the PKI's own: anti-reformism. Throughout this section of the chapter, I argue that the PKI's Leninist Wing opposed the reformist tendencies of the preceding leadership that became known as the Reformist Wing in the party via an engagement with Lenin's multiple writings. In this way, my dissertation draws a parallelism between Lenin's Third International critique of the Second International's imperialism and reformism and the Leninist Wing's comparable critique of the Reformist Wing.

In 1952 *Menempuh Djalan Rakjat* (Taking the People's Way), Aidit discussed the pervasiveness of opportunism among the political groups broadly identifying with the left. In one specific passage, he expressed the aspiration for the PKI to be free from opportunist malaise, "that is—the malaise from the Second International," an aspiration coming from a lesson that "has been taught by Lenin and his party."⁹⁵² Aidit quoted Lenin from his 1916 *The "Disarmament" Slogan* to exhibit the inextricable connection between anti-imperialism and the struggle against opportunism: "Struggle against imperialism is merely an empty slogan (*semboyan kosong*) if it is not accompanied by the struggle against opportunism."⁹⁵³ In this text, Lenin critiqued the policy of disarmament as opportunist and reformist for not understanding the constitutive violence of the capitalist and imperialist oppressors. He pointed out the distinction in the original German terms between disarmament (*abrüstung*) and disarming (*entwaffnung*).⁹⁵⁴ The former denoted the general reduction of armaments that missed the point about systemic violence (pacifism), whereas the latter meant the abolition of all militarist systems (abolitionism). The former was opportunist

⁹⁴⁸ Hui, Wang, 2007, "The Politics of Imagining Asia: A Genealogical Analysis," trans. Matthew A. Hale, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 8, 1: 10-11.

⁹⁴⁹ Seth, "Lenin's Reformulation," 114.

⁹⁵⁰ Lenin, "The Awakening," 86.

⁹⁵¹ Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène, and Schram, Stuart, 1969, *Marxism and Asia: An Introduction with Readings*, London: Allen Lane, 4.

⁹⁵² Aidit, *Menempuh*, 12.

⁹⁵³ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁹⁵⁴ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], "The 'Disarmament' Slogan," in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 23, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 95.

and reformist because it distracted the workers from the revolutionary struggle and abandoned class struggle entirely. For Lenin, revolutionaries ought to aim for the latter definition. He suggested a new slogan: “arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie.”⁹⁵⁵ Lenin was also clear that he did not mean to oppose the fight for reforms. The opposition was rather placed against reformism.⁹⁵⁶ For example, parliamentarism, a subject from the previous section, could be utilized for revolutionary purposes to prepare for the impending revolution and prefigure the communist future in the present, rather than serving the capitalist and imperialist interests. Again, Lenin taught us to be a good situated historical materialist.

Opposing reformism and opportunism was one theme that wholly suffused Aidit’s recounting of the PKI’s history. In the 1955 *Birth and Growth of the PKI*, Aidit identified three spheres of the PKI’s weakness in its early years: ideological, political, and organizational. Respectively, the issues were: the lack of Marxist-Leninist theoretical education, opportunist infiltrations, and an absence of a good method in collective leadership.⁹⁵⁷ It is not hard to notice from this formulation that in Aidit’s mind, one way to solve the opportunism problem would be a more rigorous Marxist-Leninist education. Hence, Musso’s 1948 “New Road” resolution that became the party guideline was understood by Aidit as “a merciless verdict (*hukuman jang tidak mengenal ampun*) against opportunism inside and outside the Party. ... [It was] the first important step towards building a Party of the Lenin and Stalin type.”⁹⁵⁸ *Sajap Leninis* hence turned to Lenin for both political content and form: the former being anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, and the latter anti-reformism.

Interpreters of Lenin’s internationalism like Sanjay Seth and Alex Callinicos point out that Lenin developed his conception of anti-imperialism against Bukharinism, and anti-reformism against Kautskyism. While the former’s ultraleftism renounced all forms of nationalism as obsolete, the latter’s social democracy dismissed imperialism as an aberration. Lenin responded to both through two different but interconnected threads in his writings: the national self-determination thread or an analysis of anti-imperialism for Bukharinism, and the imperialist capitalism thread or an analysis of imperialism for Kautskyism.

Opposing Bukharinism, Lenin argued that nationalism of the oppressed nationalities, unlike chauvinistic nationalism of the oppressors, was revolutionary. Hence, the communists ought to support the right to self-determination of the colonized. Kevin Anderson acutely summarizes Lenin’s theory of imperialism as an oppositional dialectics between national liberation movements and imperialism.⁹⁵⁹ In Lenin’s system, as the Eastern nations were subsumed into capitalism in its imperialist stage as backward and oppressed nations, their national struggles were necessarily directed against imperialism. This anti-imperialism—which was also anti-capitalism as it targeted exploitative imperialist nations—made nationalism of the oppressed progressive and revolutionary.⁹⁶⁰ Jamil Khader calls this Bukharinite tendency a “Eurocentric proletarian messianism.”⁹⁶¹ Rosa Luxemburg’s *The Junius Pamphlet*, against which Lenin fiercely

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 100-101.

⁹⁵⁷ Aidit, *Lahirnja PKI*, 17.

⁹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁹⁵⁹ Anderson, Kevin, 1995, *Lenin, Hegel, and Western Marxism: A Critical Study*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 132.

⁹⁶⁰ Lenin, 1964 [1916], “The Junius Pamphlet,” in *Lenin*, vol. 22, 312.

⁹⁶¹ Khader, Jamil, “Žižek’s Infidelity: Lenin, The National Question, and the Postcolonial Legacy of Revolutionary Internationalism,” in *Žižek Now: Current Perspectives in Žižek Studies*, eds. Jamil Khader and Molly Anne Rothenberg, Cambridge and Malden: Polity, 167.

polemized, demonstrated this Eurocentric presupposition clearly: “Only the English, the French, the Belgian, the German, the Russian, the Italian workers together, can lead the army of the exploited and oppressed. And when the time comes they alone can call capitalism to account for centuries of crime committed against primitive peoples; they alone can avenge its work of destruction over a whole world.”⁹⁶² Underlying Lenin’s critiques of white worker supremacy and purist renunciation of anticolonial nationalism were the political concern about building trust for working-class internationalism.⁹⁶³ “Repudiation of the right to self-determination or to secession,” Lenin asserted, “inevitably means, in practice, support for the privileges of the dominant nation.”⁹⁶⁴ By supporting national self-determination, the working class from the metropolises also broke with the dominant bourgeois nationalism within the empire and forged international proletarian solidarity with the working class from the colonies.

While Bukharinism neglected anticolonial nationalism, Kautskyism was worse in that it entirely rejected the idea of revolutionary transformation and simply bypassed both national and colonial questions while calling itself a “Marxist.” Following J.A. Hobson’s liberal account of imperialism, it thought of imperialism as an aberration disconnected from the long development of capitalism in decay, thereby conceiving imperialism as a second-order issue via frameworks of “policy” and “preference.”⁹⁶⁵ Kautsky coined the term “ultra-imperialism” to capture his reformist idea about pacific transnational capitalism established by a joint cartel among imperialist powers to divide and dominate the world together in peace.⁹⁶⁶ Whereas Lenin took issue with Bukharinism’s dogmatic understanding of nationalism, it was a whole reformist view of the capitalist totality that Lenin contested Kautskyism. Kautskyist conception of capitalism was simplistic: capitalism became self-corrective and would gradually reform itself because industrialism, the main feature of British and hence global capitalism, had already been destroyed in the late 19th century. Not only Lenin rectified Kautskyism by rigorously proving that capitalism had irreversibly developed into an *imperialist* epoch driven by *finance* rather than industrial capital, he also demonstrated that such unacknowledged colonial superprofits made Kautskyist reformism possible in the first place. Let us quote Lenin at length from his 1916 *Imperialism and the Split in Socialism*:

[M]onopoly yields *superprofits*, i.e., a surplus of profits over and above the capitalist profits that are normal and customary all over the world. The capitalist *can* devote a part (and not a small one, at that!) of these superprofits to bribe *their own* workers, to create something like an alliance ... between the workers of the given nation and their capitalists *against* the other countries. ...

⁹⁶² Luxemburg, Rosa, 2004 [1916], “The Junius Pamphlet: The Crisis in German Social Democracy,” in *The Rosa Luxemburg Reader*, eds. Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson, New York: Monthly Review Press, 340.

⁹⁶³ Löwy, Michael, 1976, “Marxists and the National Question,” *New Left Review* 96 (Mar/Apr): 98.

As Virdee notes, chauvinist nationalism in the imperialist cores may very well take racist forms: anti-Semitic, anti-Indian, and anti-Irish during Lenin’s day.

Virdee, Satnam, 2017, “The Second Sight of Racialised Outsiders in the Imperialist Cores,” *Third World Quarterly* 38, 11: 2396-410.

⁹⁶⁴ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1914], “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 20: December 1913-August 1914, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 425.

⁹⁶⁵ Callinicos, Alex, 2018, “Lenin and Imperialism,” in *The Palgrave Handbook of Leninist Political Philosophy*, eds. Tom Rockmore and Norman Levine, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 466-7.; Hobson, J.A., 2018 [1902], *Imperialism: A Study*, Routledge: London.

⁹⁶⁶ Kautsky, Karl, 1970 [1914] “Ultra-Imperialism,” *New Left Review* 59: 41-6.

Imperialism *is* monopoly capitalism. Every cartel, trust, syndicate, every giant bank *is* a monopoly. Superprofits have not disappeared; they still remain. The exploitation of *all* other countries by one privileged, financially wealthy country remains and has become more intense. ...

This, in fact, is the economic and political essence of imperialism, the profound contradictions of which Kautsky glosses over instead of exposing. ...

The last third of the nineteenth century saw the transition to the new, imperialist era. Finance capital *not* of one, but of several, though very few, Great Powers enjoys a monopoly. ... The monopoly of modern finance capital is being frantically challenged; the era of imperialist wars has begun. ... *[E]very* imperialist “Great” Power can and does bribe *smaller* state (than in England in 1848-68) of the “labour aristocracy.” ... Now a “*bourgeois labour party*” is *inevitable* and typical in *all* imperialist countries; but in view of the desperate struggle they are waging for the division of spoils, it is improbable that such a party can prevail for long in a number of countries.⁹⁶⁷

Lenin started this essay by asking: “Is there any connection between imperialism and the monstrous and disgusting victory opportunism (in the form of social-chauvinism) has gained over the labour movement in Europe?”⁹⁶⁸ In the quoted paragraphs, which were Lenin’s answer to the posed question, he showed that capitalism used colonial superprofits to subjectify labor into one that was chauvinist (blindly supporting one’s own nation’s exploitation of others) and bourgeois (allying oneself with the capitalist oppressors rather than the oppressed colonized workers). Kautskyist analysis missed all the contradictions in the new cycle of capitalist accumulation, which, in turn, justified the imperialist apologism of the reformists. Lenin specifically indicated that Kautsky’s analytical problems arose from his “divorc[ing] [of] imperialist politics from imperialist economics, ... monopoly in politics from monopoly in economics” such that it “pave[s] way for his vulgar bourgeois reformism, such as ‘disarmament,’ ‘ultra-imperialism,’ and similar nonsense.”⁹⁶⁹ What Lenin meant was Kautsky only attended to the superficial political form of imperialism (in terms of policy and preference) without examining its economic capitalist basis. For Lenin, capitalism in the imperialist epoch was both political and economic. The former entailed the subjection of both the working class in the metropole and the colonized peoples in the colony. The latter denoted exploitation of labor and extraction of resources at both domestic and international levels. Both phenomena led to a capitalist competition between empires which Lenin understood as “inter-imperial rivalry” to create more surplus for fear of the falling profits typical of capitalist development.⁹⁷⁰ Kautsky’s atomistic approach resulted in an obscuring of

⁹⁶⁷ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], “Imperialism and the Split in Socialism,” in *Lenin*, vol. 23, 114-6. Italics in original.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 105.

⁹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 107.

⁹⁷⁰ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1917], “Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism,” in *Lenin*, vol. 22, 265-76. Some of the latest uptakes of Leninist approach to the capitalist-imperialist nexus, which made his ideas still relevant to the present, include: Weiniger, Patrick, 2015, “Understanding Imperialism: A Reply to Sam King,” *Marxist Left Review* 9 (Summer). Available at: <https://marxistleftreview.org/articles/understanding-imperialism-a-reply-to-sam-king/>; Hung, Ho-Fung, 2021, “Rereading Lenin’s Imperialism at the Time of US-China Rivalry,” *Spectre* (10 Dec.). Available at: <https://spectrejournal.com/rereading-lenins-imperialism-at-the-time-of-us-china-rivalry/>.

contradictions in capitalism and, ultimately, what Anthony Pahnke calls “depolicization” (of Marxism), which left deep structural problems like capitalism and state power unquestioned.⁹⁷¹

As a systematic response to Kautskyist atomism, Lenin started with the presupposition that there was no “pure” capitalism when thinking with Marxist dialectics:

All this, which is common knowledge, has been unblushingly distorted by Kautsky to justify the opportunists. There are no “pure” phenomena, nor can there be, either in nature or in society—that is what Marxist dialectics teaches us, for dialectics shows that the very concept of purity indicates a certain narrowness, a one-sidedness of human cognition, which cannot embrace an object in all its totality and complexity. There is no “pure” capitalism in the world, nor can there be; what we always find is *admixtures* either of feudalism, philistinism, or something else.⁹⁷²

Here, Lenin advanced an understanding of capitalism as a combined totality and a complex structure constituted by a multiple determinations. Even as Lenin did not reference imperialism explicitly in this quote, throughout Lenin’s contestation with Kautskyism, Lenin had been trying to prove that capitalism and imperialism could not be analyzed separately as the former was predicated on the latter (capitalist reproduction required imperialist expansion).

On the same dialectical argument against purity, now directing toward Bukharinism, Lenin contended that the revolution against capital, especially in the imperialist context, cannot be pure and homogeneous either: “Whoever expects a ‘pure’ social revolution will never live to see it. Such a person pays lip-service to revolution without understanding what revolution is.”⁹⁷³ Lenin went on to say the “dialectics of history” demonstrated that “small nations, powerless as an *independent* factor in the struggle against imperialism, play a *part* as one of the ferments, one of the bacilli, which help the real anti-imperialist force, the socialist proletariat, to make its appearance on the scene.”⁹⁷⁴ The point for communists was not to seek for the ideal proletarian revolution to join or support, but rather was “to utilize *every* popular movement against *every single* disaster *imperialism* brings in order to intensify and extend the crisis.”⁹⁷⁵ All social struggles were an opportunity for revolutionary transformation. This was the same framework for the Bolshevik Revolution that occurred a year after this statement was published in that the communist vanguards must intervene in both objective (intensify the existing crisis) and subjective (act in the crisis) revolutionary conditions.

Lenin time and again emphasized on this point of there was no pure social revolution; it consisted many oppressed components. Yet, if we understood capitalism as a totality that unevenly developed the world as Lenin argued, then these social revolutions would objectively confront capital despite their remaining bourgeois prejudices. The communists must take it on themselves to direct the course of the revolution to socialism:

The socialist revolution in Europe *cannot* be anything other than an outburst of mass struggle on the part of all and sundry oppressed and discontented elements.

⁹⁷¹ Pahnke, Anthony, 2021, “Regrounding Critical Theory: Lenin on Imperialism, Nationalism, and Strategy,” *International Studies Review* 23: 194.

⁹⁷² Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], “The Collapse of the Second International,” in *Lenin: Collected Works*, vol. 21: August 1914–December 1915, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 236. Italics in original.

⁹⁷³ Lenin, V.I., 1964 [1916], “The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up,” in *Lenin*, vol. 22, 356.

⁹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 357. Italics in original.

⁹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

Inevitably, sections of the petty bourgeoisie and of the backward workers will participate in it—without such participation, *mass struggle is impossible*, without it no revolution is possible—and just as inevitably will they bring into the movement their prejudices, their reactionary fantasies, their weaknesses and errors. But *objectively* they will attack *capital*, and the class-conscious vanguard of the revolution, the advanced proletariat, expressing this objective truth of a variegated and discordant, motley and outwardly fragmented, mass struggle, will be able to unite and direct it, capture power, seize the banks, expropriate the trusts which all hate (though for difficult reasons!), and introduce other dictatorial measures which in their totality will amount to the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the victory of socialism, which, however, will by no means immediately “purge” itself of petty-bourgeois slag.⁹⁷⁶

In this formulation, Lenin left open the episode of the bourgeois persistence after the socialist revolution as the socialist victory did not mean an automatic “purge” of the remaining bourgeois elements. To connect to this dissertation’s previous chapters, Marxists of the post-Lenin generation further took up this issue of persistent and emerging contradictions in two ways. First, Mao came up with the notion of “ceaseless revolution” to capture the new contradiction between socialist and bourgeois elements after the communist revolution. Second, left Third-Worldists like Fanon, Cabral, Barka, and Amin advanced the notion of national liberation to overcome the postcolony’s internal contradiction between the anticolonial bourgeois regime and the anticapitalist “people.” This dissertation has shown that these two lines of thinking are partially indebted to Lenin’s thoughts. While the former developed a dialectical reading of contradictions from reading Lenin’s *Philosophical Notebooks*, the latter benefitted from Lenin’s pioneering conceptualization of capitalism and imperialism as co-constituted. Not least, it was Lenin who first thought about the question of national self-determination within the Marxist-Leninist or party Marxist tradition that emboldened thinkers like Mao, Cabral, Aidit, and many before and contemporary to them.

Both Bukharinite (Eurocentric) and Kautskyist (reformist) tendencies in the Second International prompted Lenin to break with it and found a new Third International (Comintern) based on what Lenin deemed a more accurate understanding of the international revolutionary conditions in March 1919. In no way as systematic as the account reconstructed above, Aidit’s PKI drew primarily from Lenin to not just think about the triple struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and reformism in a local context, but it attempted to link these Indonesian revolutionary endeavors to international communism via Lenin. This was an extraordinary feat given that Sajap Leninis consolidated its power during the late Stalin period.

As opposed to Stalin who promoted the idea of socialism in one country and enforced the global communist hierarchy, Aidit’s PKI turned to Lenin’s notions of Eastern Communism or awakening Asia to brandish its global revolutionary relevance. Even as Aidit’s PKI was extremely devoted to following Stalin’s advice on the united front rather than being so vanguardist such that it would alienate the masses, the party nevertheless felt obligated to obliterate opportunism that may arise from cooperating with both the national and comprador bourgeoisie.⁹⁷⁷ Because of the tight relations between capitalists from the metropole and comprador bourgeoisie in the colony, Lenin’s anti-reformism in the international communist context provided a corrective to an over-

⁹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 356. Italics in original.

⁹⁷⁷ Efimova, Larisa M., 2011, “Stalin and the New Program for the Communist Party of Indonesia,” *Indonesia* 91 (Apr.): 131-63.

reliance on Stalinist policy for the decolonizing world. Whether or not it was the intention of Aidit's PKI, this dissertation reads Sajap Lenin's turn to Lenin as a critical intra-Marxist gesture of resisting Stalinism's total domination and circumventing its policies that had been proved to harm revolutionary movements elsewhere.

Lenin's clear cut division of capitalist epochs between the current imperialist and the preceding industrial, however, led also to his understanding of awakening Asia and the rise of Eastern communism as new, yet primitive, phenomena in imperialist capitalism that needed to catch up with advanced capitalist countries. When the PKI too passively accepted this rigid periodization, it contributed to the strong tendency in official communism to think about development in stages just like how Aidit's PKI was convinced that they must go through the bourgeois democratic phase first before moving on to socialism. Lenin's periodization neglected the fact that the exploitation of the colonies already happened concurrently with industrialization and throughout the history of capitalist expansion. Likewise it did not consider the "combined" aspect in the notion of combined and uneven development that enabled different parts of the colonized world to skip stages just like the Bolshevik and Chinese Revolutions did. Aidit's PKI itself already held a strong supposition that they lived in a revolutionary time and that revolutions were very much a possibility given the triumphs of both the Soviet Union and China in the postwar period. This temporal aspect of the revolution—a revolutionary optimism—must be paired with a better geohistorical analysis of Indonesia's subsumption into capitalism that will enable the PKI to come up with better strategies not constrained by stages of capitalist development. The previous section attempted to explain parliamentarism as a composite and combined phenomenon to show that the PKI was already affected by uneven capitalist development. Yet, Aidit's PKI itself did not have a sufficiently robust reflection on this phenomenon so as to the party can clearly articulate a theoretical stance on it. This dissertation sees that one of the contributing factors may come from the stadialism ingrained in many Marxist-Leninist concepts around that time.

Minor Inter-Communist Relations: Decolonizing the Communist "Republic"

When the PKI began to feel alienated from the international communist movement—particularly by the Soviet Union's unilateral and not fraternal decisions on both questions of Stalin and Albania in the Congress—in the early 1960s, it questioned this hierarchical modality of internationalism practiced in the movement. The PKI partially returned to no one other than Lenin for a more horizontal account of leftist internationalism based on comradely connection and mutual support between interdependent communist parties. Only communist and radical nationalist parties occupying a "minor" position within the leftist circuit, where Moscow and Beijing were the centers, like North Kalimantan, Malaya, North Korea, and Albania, had a sustained engagement with the PKI in shaping what this dissertation calls "minor-communist internationalism." Because this horizontal form of internationalism first emerged to oppose Soviet big-country chauvinism and its compromise with neocolonial America, its theoretical core registered anti-imperialism against both the Soviet Union and the US from the periphery. While the antagonistic relation with the latter was absolute, the contradiction with the former posed a more complicated issue. It was not just about the Soviet Union itself exerting its commandism in a modality similar to a centralized rule but also about its revisionism that generally downplayed the imperialism question. Minor-communist internationalism, then, made central the twined agendas of anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism. It likewise accentuated the "independence" or "self-reliance" principle for the minor communists upheld in a dialectical relationship with communist internationalism. A return to the Leninist sources enabled minor-communist internationalists to overcome Stalinist dogmatism and

Khrushchevian revisionism, creating a new revolutionary praxis that corroborated their aspirational position of ideological independence.

The PKI's Politicization in the 1960s: The Sino-Soviet Split and Left Third-Worldism

While the PKI focused on surviving and reviving the party for almost an entire decade in the 1950s, it began to develop stronger opinions of and make itself more visible in the international communist movement only in the early 1960s as a communist party from the periphery. The global events that prompted the PKI's politicization in the international realm, this dissertation argues, were the Sino-Soviet split and the rise of decolonizing left third-worldism.

As Donald Hindley notes, even as the PKI and its multiple affiliated organizations were aware of left internationalist activities (as evident in this dissertation's every chapter), it did not assume a particularly active role in building an internationalist circuit based on its ideological commitment and peripheral positionality until late 1961.⁹⁷⁸ Khrushchev's public denunciation of Albania in the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress (October 17th-31st, 1961), in addition to his total rejection of Stalin, incited Aidit in his speech upon returning from the Congress to question the kind of communist internationalism that Khrushchev and the CPSU animated.⁹⁷⁹ In this speech, Aidit explicated the dual domestic and international aspects of the Stalin question. Whereas the former was the Soviet Union's prerogatives to "do whatever they wish with their former leader, Stalin," the latter must be the "right" reserved for international communist parties to "evaluate Stalin as an international figure."⁹⁸⁰ Aidit even characterized the "international" Stalin, as opposed to the "domestic" Stalin, as a "lighthouse" whose works and speeches "are still useful to Eastern countries."⁹⁸¹

The PKI refused to join Khrushchev and his allies in criticizing the Albanian Workers' Party, whose position became increasingly closer to the CCP, in the 1961 Congress on a rationale that each Communist Party has a right to complete freedom in determining its own policies.⁹⁸² Communist parties disagreeing with Khrushchev's decision interpreted this unilateral action as a "big power chauvinism" that interfered in internal affairs of another party without seeing other parties as equal.⁹⁸³ The PKI began to explicitly oppose Soviet policies in favor of the CCP during the Sino-Indian border crisis in July 1962. The PKI's daily *Harian Rakjat* disputed the Soviet ambivalence to take side with China, a fraternal communist state, in this conflict even as the Soviet Union knew too well that India was both a bourgeois and comprador state.⁹⁸⁴ From early 1963 onwards, Aidit's writings started to implicate Khrushchev's Soviet Union in his critical takes on the ills of modern revisionism and right opportunism.⁹⁸⁵ When publishing on the communist comments on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the PKI almost only highlighted opinions from pro-Beijing parties like Japan, New Zealand, and Vietnam.⁹⁸⁶ In 1963 alone, Albanian communist leaders visited Indonesia twice in April and November.

⁹⁷⁸ Hindley, Donald, 1964, "The Indonesian Communist Party and the Conflict in the International Communist Movement," *The China Quarterly* 19 (Jul.-Sep.): 99.

⁹⁷⁹ Aidit, D.N., 1961, *Harian Rakjat* (15 Dec.). [From Hindley, 99]

⁹⁸⁰ *Ibid.* (15, 16, and 21 Dec.). Also PKI, 1959, "Stalin 80 Tahun," *Bendera Buruh* (22 Dec.).

⁹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, (16 and 21 Dec.)

⁹⁸² Aidit, D.N., 1962, *Harian Rakjat* (2 Jan.). [From Hindley, 101]

⁹⁸³ Scalapino, Robert A., 1963, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 41, 2 (Jan.): 337.

⁹⁸⁴ PKI, 1962, *Harian Rakjat*. [From Hindley, 102].

⁹⁸⁵ Hindley, "The Indonesian Communist Party," 104-5, 111.

⁹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 105.

Whereas the PKI subtly sided with the CCP in the Sino-Soviet split, its official discourse approached this split more cautiously by formulating the PKI as having an “independent attitude” in this dispute. Aidit emphasized that the attitude is that of independence and not neutrality because of the PKI’s active role in solving this contradiction.⁹⁸⁷ In a 1963 interview with the Associated Press, Aidit stated that for the occurring communist rift, the PKI was not just a cockfight’s spectator (*penonton adu-ajam*) but taking a firm standing on our own (*berdiri diatas pendiriannya sendiri*) we became an active participant (*peserta jang aktif*).⁹⁸⁸ Positioned itself also as a learner, the PKI used the polemics as a real-life lesson, what Aidit called “a University of Marxism-Leninism,” on how to make a logical and critical communist judgment.⁹⁸⁹ In Aidit’s 1965 interview with the *Peking Review*, he emphasized the pedagogical merit of the polemics, then admitted that “Had it not been for the open polemics, we might to this day still fail to really understand what modern revisionism is and consequently have no understanding of genuine Marxism-Leninism. And what is more, if the open polemics had not taken place, we might have become revisionists without ourselves knowing it.”⁹⁹⁰ This self-described “independent” and “active” stance as well as the pedagogical relation with the split, read from the PKI’s own words, should once and for all dismantle the Cold War’s unproductive tropes of “a deceived pawn,” “a mindless tool,” or “an agent” frequently used to refute the agency of the peripheral communists.

While the PKI distanced itself from the CPSU, whom it saw as cooperating with the neoimperial power like the US, the PKI grew closer not to just the CCP but also the national liberation movements in the third world. At times, the PKI deployed the idiom of “countryside of the world,” claimed to be used first by Aidit then taken up by the CCP, to describe the liberation movements from the three continents. The countryside of the world, in Aidit’s analysis, was the imperialists’ “place of weakness” where they were “being fought with all possible strength” by the Tricontinental proletariat.⁹⁹¹ Aidit’s Politburo Report in December 1963 identified the most international basic contradiction as an antinomy between socialism and imperialism, which could be linked to another basic contradiction between the oppressed nations and the imperialists.⁹⁹² When the PKI understood international contradiction in this way, it tied socialism (or anti-capitalism) to anti-imperialism which irrigated many of the left national liberation movements. Aidit stated clearly that “the proletariat of the entire world should give joyous welcome to the continued ascent and ripening of the revolutionary situation in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. ... [T]hese three continents have become the arena of the most basic contradiction in the world, the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism.”⁹⁹³ After this quote, consistent with the PKI’s Leninist tendency, Aidit made what this dissertation perceives as a stunning move of critically evaluating Stalin’s parochial communist policy via Lenin’s internationalism. The Lenin reference from *The National Liberation Movement in the East* went as follows: “the interests of

⁹⁸⁷ Aidit, D.N., 1963. *Harian Rakjat* (10 Sep.). [From Hindley, 106]

⁹⁸⁸ Aidit, D.N., 1963, “Wawancara Tertulis Ketua CCPKI D.N. Aidit dengan Koresponden Associated Press, Karsten Prager, Djakarta, 9 Mei 1963,” no. 391, RA. 66, Inventaris Arsip Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) 1963-1967, ANRI, 3.

⁹⁸⁹ Aidit, D.N., 1964, *Set Afire the Banteng Spirit! Ever Forward, No Retreat! Political Report to the Second Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia, Djakarta 23rd-26th December, 1963*, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 113.

⁹⁹⁰ Aidit, D.N., 1965, “Open Polemics Are Helpful, They Must Not Be Discontinued: D.N. Aidit on Current International Problems,” *Peking Review* 35: 23 (27 Aug.).

⁹⁹¹ Aidit, “Set Afire,” 87-8.

⁹⁹² Aidit, D.N., 1964, “Kobarkan Semangat Banteng! Madju Terus, Pantang Mundur,” *Harian Rakjat* (1 Jan.).

⁹⁹³ *Ibid.*,

the proletarian struggle in one country must be subordinated to the interests of the struggle on a world scale.”⁹⁹⁴ Not only did Aidit critique Stalin’s Socialism in One Country policy through this quote which reinforced his idea about the right to evaluate international Stalin earlier, but he also demonstrated the PKI’s independent attitude in making sense of global communism by neither citing the living Chinese nor Soviet communist leaders.

In a related context of third world’s anti-imperialism, Aidit cited Lenin from the same *Eastern National Liberation* text to underscore the specific historical-material conditions of each country whose anti-imperialist and national liberation struggles must be tackled creatively by the communist parties. Lenin reiterated that the Eastern Communists’ problems were “problems the solution of which you will not find in any communist book, but which you will find in the common struggle that Russia has begun. You will tackle these problems and solve them by your own independent experience.”⁹⁹⁵ Aidit used this quote to stress that communist parties, particularly those from the “East,” needed creativity to make a dialectical leap between global Marxism-Leninism and local concrete revolutionary conditions. By redefining the Khrushchevian discourse of “creative adaptation” of Marxism-Leninism—which meant a return to Soviet humanism for Khrushchev—through Lenin, Aidit once again resisted the Soviet past and present imperatives (Stalin and Khrushchev) by coming up with a new praxis from re-reading the source of Soviet Marxism (Lenin).

Aidit explained three reasons why the existence of imperialism limited the socialist economic construction in the same 1963 Politburo Report. First, imperialism coerced a decolonizing nation to spend on security rather than the abundant production of goods and products. Second, independent postcolonial nations were obliged to assist socialist revolutions elsewhere in smashing international capitalism. Third, imperialist states still exerted military and ideological influence over the world.⁹⁹⁶ Aidit asked a rhetorical question in the report: “how can we talk of building communism while active bourgeois elements still exist within the socialist states?”⁹⁹⁷ The question clearly demonstrated the understanding of imperialism as equally bourgeois and, hence, capitalist.

Aidit’s understanding of inter-communist relations was one based on horizontal connection and mutual support between fraternal communist parties. His 1961 speech defending the Albanians’ freedom specifically highlighted the “freedom and equal rights for all Communist Parties” and emphasized that it was not issues of “autonomy” and “polycentrism” when every party was truly equal.⁹⁹⁸ Robert Scalapino calls this understanding “a commonwealth theory of bloc relations” and speculates that the democratic tendency of some communist parties opposing big power chauvinism might be traceable to Mao’s democratic centralism.⁹⁹⁹ In Aidit’s 1963 Politburo Report, he added that the PKI’s free and independent policy rejected “the egoism of the larger states” and commandism “on the part of any state or any party.”¹⁰⁰⁰ This dissertation reads Aidit’s interpretation of the communist world as unmistakably aspirational rather than descriptive, projecting what Marx speculated as “a realm of freedom” onto the present by dissolving all the existing contradictions. Aidit viewed the contradictions between the communist parties as a

⁹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁵ Aidit, D.N., 1964, “Lenin and the Revolution of the Oppressed Nations,” *Review of Indonesia* 7, 5-7 (May-Jul.): 21.

⁹⁹⁶ Aidit, “Kobarkan Semangat,” (1 Jan.).

⁹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹⁸ *Ibid.* (2 Jan.)

⁹⁹⁹ Scalapino, “Moscow,” 338, 340.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Aidit, “Kobarkan Semangat Benteng!” [Hindley 113-4].

conflict within a family in the way Mao understood a temporary “non-antagonistic contradiction” that can be easily corrected through a dialectical exchange. This perception of contradiction sustained Aidit’s account of horizontal communist fraternity.¹⁰⁰¹ Aidit qualified his explanation of freedom and equal rights by stating that “we do not live in a “kingdom” or a “republic” of Communist Parties in which there is strong pressure from the central “government.””¹⁰⁰² While Aidit rejected the characterization of the communist world as a “republic” at the normative level (how communism should be), this dissertation sees that the actually-existing communist world at that time exactly resembled a hierarchical republic where many communist parties competed to be a leader. Rather than just rejecting the notion of the “republic,” this dissertation contends that it is more productive to understand Aidit’s praxis as decolonizing the communist “republic.”¹⁰⁰³ While the former only exhibits the tension between two modes of understanding the inter-communist relations (equal rights versus centralized republic), the latter captures the active process of building anew the horizontal anti-imperialist connection between minor communist parties akin to what this dissertation sees as a global united front against imperialism, for which Aidit had advocated.

To understand how the PKI in the 1960s decolonized the communist “republic” and built anew what this dissertation terms minor communist internationalism, this section examines three fundamental circuits within this novel constellation: Southeast Asia, North Korea (as a part of left Third-Worldism), and Albania (as the Chinese ally in the Sino-Soviet split).

Southeast Asian Internationalism: Regional Revolution against Neocolonial “Malaysia” and US Neoimperialism

Aidit’s three-month tour to five major communist countries—Cuba, East Germany, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea—from July to September 1963 prompted him to realize two geohistorically specific points about internationalism: the importance of Southeast Asian internationalism and a shared condition of minor communist parties. In the September 1963 speech upon his return to Indonesia from the five-country trip called “The International Communist Movement and the Southeast Asian Revolution” (*Gerakan Komunis Internasional dan Revolusi Asia Tenggara*), Aidit announced that Southeast Asia had become the center of world’s

¹⁰⁰¹ Aidit, 1962, *Untuk Demokrasi, Persatuan, dan Mobilisasi*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 51.

¹⁰⁰² Aidit, 1962. *Harian Rakjat* (2 Jan.). [From Hindley, 101]

¹⁰⁰³ I first got the idea of “decolonization” in the context studied here from Donald Hindley’s conclusion about the PKI’s stance vis-à-vis the international communist movement in the early 1960s:

The leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party are products not only Marxism-Leninism but also of their more immediate environment, the Indonesian struggle for complete independence and for material well-being. The principles they uphold for the international Communist movement and the criticisms they have levelled at the Soviet Communist Party suggest a “decolonization” struggle that has been extended to the Communist movement. Indonesia’s Communists are demanding complete independence for each Communist Party, a voice equal to any other Party in decisions affecting the Communist movement, and unstinting self-sacrifice on the part of the already-victorious parties for those fraternal parties struggling to win power or to consolidate victory. As the battle line against imperialism has stabilized in Europe, the Indonesian Communists are demanding that the entire international Communist movement concentrate its endeavors on accelerating the retreat of imperialism and the victory of the Communist Parties in the underdeveloped countries.

Hindley, “The Indonesian Communist Party,” 118.

contradictions and that North Korea must become a model for building socialism.¹⁰⁰⁴ I will focus only on Southeast Asia here and return to the North Korea issue in the next section.

In the speech, Aidit highlighted that Southeast Asia, “where the sound of gunfire has not stopped since the end of World War II,” presented the most acute anti-imperialist struggle. “We,” Aidit proclaimed, “are in the forefront of the struggle against world imperialism.” He substantiated his claim by pointing to the existence of a socialist country in the region (Vietnam), numerous large-scale revolutionary mass movements, influential communist parties like those of Indonesia and Burma, and armed struggles in Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and Malaya. Following the Leninist formula, Aidit concluded with the analysis that both objective (ripening revolutionary situation) and subjective (existence of Marxist-Leninist parties) conditions for combatting imperialism and capitalism were favorable in Southeast Asia.¹⁰⁰⁵

The Politburo Report in December 1963 developed the idea of the Southeast Asian revolution further. Aidit situated Southeast Asia as one center of the main contradiction between imperialism and socialism. The imperialist former strived to turn Southeast Asia into “a region of neo-colonialism” and “a military base” for “attack[ing] socialism” and “prevent[ing] the influence of the socialist revolution from spreading from the North to the South.”¹⁰⁰⁶ Big imperialists (the USA, the UK, West Germany, and Japan), small imperialists (Portugal and the Netherlands), and reactionary powers constituted the imperialist faction.¹⁰⁰⁷ Besides imperialism, the PKI identified three more “demons” (a metaphor for oppressive forces) to be overthrown: feudalism, comprador capitalism, and bureaucratic capitalism (*kapitalist birokrat* in Indonesian, which was acronized into *kabir*). The socialist latter, on the other hand, continued to consolidate, surge forward, and become riper.¹⁰⁰⁸

Because “all types of experience of class struggle exist in Southeast Asia,” the document suggested in a voice assuming a Southeast Asian vanguardist position, “the peoples and Communist Parties in Southeast Asia must make use of all forms of struggle, armed struggle as well as non-armed struggle, parliamentary struggle as well as non-parliamentary struggle, and so on.”¹⁰⁰⁹ This point about utilizing all heterogeneous forms of struggle was Lenin’s in his theorization of struggle in a specific milieu of imperialism-cum-capitalism. It is not surprising that two paragraphs later, the PKI asserted that “Indonesia’s role is very important indeed in the struggle for national independence in Southeast Asia.”¹⁰¹⁰ After a decade of reconstructing the party, the PKI came to see itself as a vanguard of the Southeast Asian revolution. Sudisman, a member of the quadrumvirate that made Aidit’s politburo, commemorated the first communist uprising in Indonesian history—the 1926 Prambanan revolt—as one major milestone of the Southeast Asian revolution imbued with world-historical significance.¹⁰¹¹

Particularly during the confrontation with Malaysia, the PKI actively formed a new regional internationalism from below. This report already prescribed the importance of this novel formation: “The struggle of one oppressed nation must have close links with that of the others.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Aidit, D.N., 1963, “Gerakan Komunis Internasional dan Revolusi Asia Tenggara,” *Harian Rakjat* (4-5 Oct.).

¹⁰⁰⁵ Aidit, D.N., 1963, “Making a Momentous Choice,” *Peking Review* 41: 18 (11 Oct.).

¹⁰⁰⁶ Aidit, “Set Afire,” 95.

¹⁰⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 96.

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 97.

¹⁰¹¹ Sudisman, 1964, *43 Tahun Menempa Kesabaran, Ketjintaan, dan Kegemasan Revolusioner*, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 11.

The revolutionary solidarity between these nations must be strengthened.”¹⁰¹² Understanding capitalism and imperialism as a globally interlinked seriality (what this dissertation suggests as the fourth form of Sixties Marxism in addition to Soviet peace struggle, Chinese peasant insurrection, and national liberation movement’s guerrilla warfare), the document stressed that “the collapse of the imperialist fortress in this region will constitute a mighty tidal wave overrunning imperialism.”¹⁰¹³ The usage of a fortress and a tidal wave as metaphors suggest the idea of interlinkage. The document then connected it all back to Indonesia, making a point that the imminent victory of the Indonesian revolution “will signify a mighty breakthrough in the fortress of imperialism”—a speculative revolutionary success that greatly threatened US neoimperialism.¹⁰¹⁴ To fully realize the Southeast Asian revolution, the PKI urged other Southeast Asian communist parties to build the broadest united national front between the people, workers, and peasants.¹⁰¹⁵

The most immediate historical phenomenon prompting the PKI’s advocacy for the Southeast Asian revolution was its opposition to the “neocolonial” Malaysia beginning from late 1961 that would become officially known as Confrontation or *Konfrontasi* (1963-66).¹⁰¹⁶ This was not a one-sided frenetic creation. When Malayan premier Tunku Abdul Rahman proposed the idea of the federation of Malaysia on May 27, 1961, he saw the Malaysian state as an anticommunist bulwark in the South China Sea area consisting of the scattered territories of Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (or North Borneo). The *Konfrontasi* was a central hinge that linked several of the late PKI’s ideas together from anti-revisionism (the CCP’s position in the Sino-Soviet split) to third world solidarity, global proletarian revolution, struggle against the trans-imperialism of the US and the UK, and Southeast Asian internationalism. In the post-five country tour speech, Aidit made a call to “take the road to revolution against Malaysia” as a part of combatting imperialism and strengthening the liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (or in the PKI’s parlance *Negara A-A-A* ‘the countries of *Asia*, *Afrika*, and *Amerika Latin*’).¹⁰¹⁷ The food crisis, famine, and stagnation that occurred throughout early 1964 bolstered the PKI to further justify the economic aspect of *Konfrontasi*’s anti-imperialism: a self-sustained national economy not depending on or captured by the encircling imperialist agents.¹⁰¹⁸

The inter-communist cooperation between the PKI and Malay radical leftists and communists had precedents traceable to the mid-1940s via transnational figures like Alimin, Mokhtaruddin Lasso, and Tan Malaka from the Indonesian side and Abdullah C.D. (a member of the Malayan Communist Party or MCP who was appointed Chairman in 1988), Ahmad Boestamam (leader of the socialist Party Ra’ajat), Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob (President of the left nationalist Youth Union Kesatuan Melayu Muda or KMM), and Eu Chooi Yup (MCP leader in Singapore) from the Malayan side.¹⁰¹⁹ This dissertation focuses only on the 1960s when the PKI

¹⁰¹² Aidit, “Set Afire,” 97.

¹⁰¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹⁰¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁶ CC PKI, 1962, *Strengthen National Unity and Communist Unity: Documents of the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia*, Djakarta, December 1961, Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan.

¹⁰¹⁷ Aidit, “Gerakan Komunis.”

¹⁰¹⁸ Van der Kroef, Justus, 1965, “Indonesian Communism’s Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia,” *International Journal* 20, 2: 198. This dissertation’s author strongly disagrees with Van der Kroef’s characterization of the PKI as expansionist in the *Konfrontasi* context.

¹⁰¹⁹ Hara, Fujio, 2010, “The Malayan Communist Party and the Indonesian Communist Party: Features of Co-operation,” *Journal of Chinese Overseas* 6: 220-33.

framed the issue of Malaysia through praxes of anti-imperialism, left third-worldism, and Southeast Asian internationalism.

The most exhaustive articulation of the PKI's understanding of the "Malaysia" question came from Aidit's 1963 Politburo Report. In the middle of 1963, the concept of Malaysia as a neocolonial state was already commonplace in Indonesia's discourse on international affairs thanks to the "revolutionary diplomacy" (read: anticolonial) of both President Soekarno and his confidant in the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs Subandrio. In this document, the PKI instead showed that it already discerned the coloniality of Malaysia in its predecessor, the state of Malaya, understood as "the result of a compromise between British imperialism and the Malayan reactionaries for the purpose of crushing the progressive movement in Malaya."¹⁰²⁰ This "neocolonial" Malaya then "has been given a new cloak" as Malaysia. Tunku Abdul Rahman was caricatured as "Britain's number one comprador in Southeast Asia."¹⁰²¹ The PKI's political-economic reading of Malaya and Malaysia illustrated the cooperation between metropolitan (British) and comprador (Malayan) bourgeoisies in subduing the anticapitalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-feudal movements in the colony, a reading similar to other fellow third-worldists like Samir Amin, Ben Barka, and Ibrahim Isa in the previous chapter.

PKI's political-economic reading of Malaysia in the Politburo Report centered on trans-imperial relations in maritime Southeast Asia. On the most empirical level, it pointed out the inter-imperial rivalry between empires in Southeast Asia, namely, British imperialism in Malaysia and US imperialism in the Philippines.¹⁰²² But at deeper levels, the Report discussed multiple contradictions and strategic cooperations between different imperialist forces. First, it mentioned that the Philippines' claim to Sabah (a territory in Northeast Borneo), backed up by the US, created a conflict with the UK-supported Malaya. Yet, when the interests of the empires converged, trans-imperial rivalry morphed into strategic cooperation in the case of Malaysia.

Therefore, second, the PKI concluded that the greatest enemy in the whole Malaysia situation, regardless of the Philippines' claim to Sabah, was American imperialism because of its interest in turning the whole region into neocolony. The PKI wrote: "American imperialism also has a great interest in preserving "Malaysia" as a form of neocolonialism. Thus the struggle against "Malaysia" is a struggle not only against British imperialism but also directly against US imperialism."¹⁰²³ Aidit's speech in the PKI's 44th anniversary the following year (1964) highlighted the Indonesian contribution to "the common struggle of the Southeast Asian people" in challenging both British and American imperialism through the confrontation with Malaysia.¹⁰²⁴ An understanding of the Malaysian plan as a "joint production" between "US imperialist and British colonialist" circulated among the left third-worldists. Dagongbao, a pro-CCP Chinese paper, jokingly called Malaysia *Mei lai Dongya*, which means "America comes to [South] East Asia" to precisely play on the American involvement in the neocolonial creation of Malaysia.¹⁰²⁵ In one rare occasion, an assignment of a divisive country to different camps could happen to arouse

¹⁰²⁰ Aidit, "Set Afire," 32.

¹⁰²¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰²² *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰²³ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁰²⁴ Aidit, D.N., 1964, "Be Good and Still Better Communists," *Review of Indonesia* 7, 5-7 (May-Jul.): 14.

¹⁰²⁵ *Dagongbao*, 1964 (27 Mar.), quoted in Dahana, A., 2002, "China's Role in Indonesia's "Crush Malaysia" Campaign," *Makara, Sosial Humaniora* 6, 2 (Dec.): 61.

political solidarity. At a mass rally in Pyongyang in September 1963, Aidit managed to accuse the “revisionist” Yugoslavia of supporting “the imperialist scheme of Malaysia.”¹⁰²⁶

Because the PKI conceived of “Malaysia” as a concrete manifestation of imperial expansion, not just simply a territorial national space, Aidit told *Peking Review* after Singapore withdrew from “Malaysia” in 1965 that the confrontation would continue as long as the military bases—the material condition of imperialist expansion—still existed. “Indonesia’s confrontation,” Aidit asserted, “is not directed at the name “Malaysia” but at the imperialist military bases in Malaya, Singapore, and North Kalimantan.”¹⁰²⁷

The PKI’s political-economic reading went beyond a reductive politicism that left the analysis of capitalism behind. Following Lenin’s understanding of imperialism and capitalist monopoly, it understood that the immediate imperialist encirclement of Indonesia—“Malaysia” and Singapore to the West, the Philippines to the North, Australia to the South, and the US navy bases in the Pacific to the East—put the country into the “stranglehold of the monopoly capitalists and their compradors” in the neighboring countries.¹⁰²⁸ By implementing the crush “Malaysia” operation, Indonesia could be freed—or delinked!—from monopoly capitalists and “establish direct relations with the consumers of its exports and the producers of its imports” directly instead of the capitalist-imperialist mediation. The Report used the term “new possibilities” that would emerge after successfully undoing the monopolistic capitalist flow to the comprador countries like “Malaysia” and Singapore. The usage of “new possibilities” was consistent with the PKI’s aspiration to build a new internationalism from below as it transformed the capitalist-imperialist world system and simultaneously decolonized the communist world. The PKI emphasized that “this change is important in the context of the country’s efforts to solve the food and clothing difficulties”—a logic similar to Amin’s peripheral accumulation that would ensure the postcolony’s self-reproduction and collective social wealth.¹⁰²⁹

Besides trans-imperial relations, the PKI also observed the transition of one imperialist regime of accumulation to the other through the decline of the British empire and the emergence of the American empire. “The British imperialists of today,” the PKI contended, “are not the British imperialists of yore who had full confidence in their own strength.”¹⁰³⁰ According to the PKI, this British decline manifested in the retreat “to their last line of defence in Southeast Asia, “Malaysia,”” after suffering the insecurity about their position in Hongkong and their inability to force Brunei into the Malaysian confederation.¹⁰³¹ The PKI determined that the Dutch in West Irian “did not constitute such a serious threat to the struggle of the peoples and to peace in Southeast Asia by comparison with the position of the British “Malaysia” today.”¹⁰³² By comparison, Malaysia was another “sovereign” territory, presenting a different magnitude of consideration altogether.

Because the PKI situated the “Malaysia” question in the larger, interlinked imperialist-capitalist world system, it emphasized the international significance of this issue:

¹⁰²⁶ *The Straits Times*, 1963 (14 Oct.), from Van der Kroef, Justus, 1967, *Communism in Malaysia and Singapore: A Contemporary Survey*, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 216-7.

¹⁰²⁷ Aidit, “Open Polemics,” *Peking Review* 35: 24 (27 Aug.).

¹⁰²⁸ Aidit, “Set Afire,” 38.

¹⁰²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁰ *Ibid.* 34.

¹⁰³¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹⁰³² *Ibid.*, 42.

The question of “Malaysia” is not only an issue for the peoples in the territories of “Malaysia” and in Indonesia, but it is also an issue for the people throughout the whole of Southeast Asia, and it cannot be considered as something that stands isolated from the struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism. This is why it is indeed appropriate for the struggle of the Indonesian people against “Malaysia” to be helped by the forces of anti-imperialism throughout the world.¹⁰³³

The PKI explained that the contradiction between the global anti-imperialists (the Indonesian side) and the transimperialists (the “Malaysian” side) was so primary such that it “cannot be settled at the negotiating table” but “must be settled through confrontation in all fields.”¹⁰³⁴ This was a stance consonant with both Lenin and the CCP’s reading of Lenin regarding the violent structural tendency of imperialism-capitalism. Only when the imperialists “have been powerfully stormed,” will they “have been compelled to beat a retreat” and hold negotiations to “accept their surrender.”¹⁰³⁵ When the PRC President Liu Shaoqi visited Jakarta in April 1963, he praised Indonesia as “an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole” for its *Konfrontasi* with Malaysia.¹⁰³⁶

The PKI was not alone in fighting against the idea of Malaysia and what this idea represented, namely, neocolonialism, comprador’s capitalism, feudalism, and anti-Chinese racism (some might consider this a counterpart of Malay supremacism or “pribumism”). Though carrying different political commitments, a range of radical groups from different areas within the “Malaysian” plan also unevenly organized to combat it, including the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), the Chinese-dominated urban proletarian party Malayan Socialist Front, and the Malay-dominated rural peasant party Party Ra’ajat from within Malaya, Barisan Sosialis from Singapore, Clandestine Communist Organization (CCO) and the United People’s Party (SUPP) from Sarawak (a territory known under the epithet “Chinese Cuba”), United Pasok Momogun Organization (UPMO) from Sabah (North Borneo), and lastly Party Rakyat Brunei (PRB) from Brunei. Even though scholars have pointed out that the role of A.M. Azahari in leading the North Kalimantan National Army (Tentara Nasional Kalimantan Utara, TNKU) to implement the failed 1962 Brunei Revolt might be more accidental and circumstantial, the PKI almost solely promoted the struggles of both the TNKU and A.M. Azahari in this regional anti-Malaysia campaign.¹⁰³⁷ The Politburo Report listed the recognition of “the Unitary State of North Kalimantan with its North Kalimantan National Army, under the leadership of Prime Minister Azahari as the only legal power in the territory” as one “the most urgent thing[s] in this political confrontation.”¹⁰³⁸

¹⁰³³ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁰³⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

¹⁰³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁶ Sulaiman, Yohanes, 2016, “Not So Strange Bedfellows: Indonesia-North Korea Relationship in the 1960s,” *Dong-A Yeongu* 35, 2: 335.

¹⁰³⁷ Hussainmiya, B.A., 2021, “‘So Near Yet so Far’ Shaikh A.M. Azahari and 1962,” in *Continuity and Change in Brunei Darussalam*, eds. Victor T. King and Stephen C. Druce, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 21-45.

¹⁰³⁸ Aidit, “Set Afire,” 43-4.

John O. Sutter notes that in November 1961, not long after Tunku Abdul Rahman broached the Malaysian Federation concept, Ahmad Boestamam (leader of Party Ra’ajat), Ishak bin Haji Mohamed (leader of the Malayan Socialist Front), and A.M. Azahari (head of the Party Rakyat Brunei) visited Djakarta and met Aidit through a Partindo (Indonesian left-nationalist party) leader. In this meeting, Aidit urged Boestamam, who already favored the idea of Indonesia Raya (‘Greater Indonesia’) to call the conference of socialist parties of the Five “Malaysian” territories (Malayan, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei) in Kuala Lumpur the next year to push through anti-Malaysia resolutions.

After the failed revolt, in late 1962, Azahari took asylum in Indonesia, where he was aided in setting up an overseas Unitary Government of North Kalimantan. Indonesia was likewise a safe haven for Chinese communist guerillas from Sarawak and the MCP activists from Singapore who fled police arrest to Indonesia after their subversive activities.¹⁰³⁹ Ibrahim Yaacob, ex-president of the left-nationalist Malay youth union, also lived in exile in Jakarta since 1945 (and died in exile in Jakarta in 1979).¹⁰⁴⁰ He headed the Malaya Independence Movement or Kesatuan Malay Merdeka (KEMAM) which supported the armed struggles of the Malayan and North Kalimantan people against the establishment of Malaysia, in cooperation with Indonesia and other Afro-Asian countries.¹⁰⁴¹ Starting when Azahari arrived, Indonesia broadcasted “The Voice of the Freedom Fighters of North Kalimantan” to British Borneo from a transmitter near Pontianak, a vibrant port city located at West Kalimantan, therefore a settlement on Kalimantan closest to the Malay peninsular.¹⁰⁴²

“North Kalimantan” or “Kalimantan Utara (Kaltara)” —conceived as an anti-imperialist nation-in-formation—then served as the PKI’s concrete internationalist alliance in the war against “Malaysia.” On December 8, 1963, the Indonesian government held a meeting at the National Front Building in Jakarta to commemorate the first anniversary of the proclamation of independence of the North Kalimantan Unitary State. Representatives from different political groups in Indonesia attended, including the National Front Central Board’s General Secretary Sudibjo, Committee for Solidarity with the North Kalimantan Unitary State’s member A.M. Hanafi, nationalist party member Hardi, religious group member Achmad Sjaichu, and D.N. Aidit. H.M. Mangol represented North Kalimantan in this meeting. Aidit’s speech reiterated the interconnected themes of Southeast Asian internationalism and left third-worldism: “The North Kalimantan Revolution is another proof that South East Asia is one of the central points of contradiction now existing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”¹⁰⁴³ The left-leaning Indonesian Youth Front and the World Federation of Democratic Youth organized an International Youth Solidarity Meeting to support North Kalimantan independence and oppose neocolonial Malaysia on January 23-26, 1964 in Jakarta. This time, Aidit foregrounded the US neoimperialist maneuvers in Southeast Asia more than the previous speech. He expounded the transgressive and intrusive aspects of the American Seventh Fleet, known as the “Tonkin Gulf Yacht Club,” operating in the Pacific and then sailing to the Indonesian waters. In his words:

What are all these many warships being sent to these regions if not in order to reinforce their aggression and intervention, if not in order to threaten the independence of the countries in this area? It is self-evident that they have not come here for a pleasure cruise, for a picnic, or for a holiday, but that, in addition to reinforcing their aggression and

Sutter, John O., 1966, “Two Faces of *Konfrontasi*: “Crush Malaysia” and the *Gestapu*,” *Asian Survey* 6, 10 (Oct.): 525.

¹⁰³⁹ Van der Kroef, Justus, 1964, “Singapore’s Communist Fronts,” *Problems of Communism* 5, 9 (Sep.-Oct.): 61.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Murba Indonesia, 2011, “Biografi Singkat Ibrahim Yaacob (IBHY) alias Iskandar Kamel,” *Kaum Murba Indonesia* (25 Oct.). Available at: <http://arie-widodo.blogspot.com/2012/10/biografi-singkat-ibrahim-yaacob-ibhy.html>

¹⁰⁴¹ Yaakop, Rizal, 2010, “The Indonesian Confrontation: Political and Military Magnitudes,” *SSRN* (11 Oct.): 11. Available at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1690607>.

¹⁰⁴² *Indonesian Involvement in Eastern Malaysia*, 1964, Kuala Lumpur: Department of Information, 80-3.

¹⁰⁴³ Aidit, D.N., 1964, “North Kalimantan Revolution will Definitely Win,” *Review of Indonesia* 7, 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.): 8.

intervention in South Vietnam and Laos, they are coming here also in order to intimidate, threaten and exert pressure on Indonesia which follows a policy of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and anti-neo-colonialism, to make it bow to and comply with their neo-colonial wishes and interests. It is not a coincidence that this Seventh Fleet has been sent to South East Asian waters and to the Indonesian Ocean just at the time when the Republic of Indonesia is resolutely waging a campaign to crush “Malaysia,” at the time when the influence of US imperialist forces in the Republic of Indonesia are in a state of retreat and becoming weaker.¹⁰⁴⁴

The statement above understood the fleet almost literally as the material manifestation of American imperialist expansion encroaching upon Southeast Asian sovereignties—oceanic, territorial, and aerial.

Similar to the West Irian question that became Indonesia’s left third-worldist rallying point from 1960 to 1963 when it was partially resolved, the Indonesian left’s campaign for North Kalimantan liberation began to circulate within the Afro-Asian circuit around 1963, systematically replacing the West Irian issue. At the 1963 third Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, the new Sino-Indonesian Alliance managed to pass a resolution extending formal recognition to Azahari’s Revolutionary Government of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan and condemning Britain for its suppression of Azahari’s attempted coup in Brunei.¹⁰⁴⁵ On May 11, 1965, concurrent with the fourth AAPSO Conference in Winneba, Ghana, the PKI held the Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum where one of the reports revolved around ways to make the “Malaysia” issue legible and relevant to the Afro-Asian community. The PKI drew analogies between Malaysia and other comprador states, and Tunku Abdul Rahman and other imperialist “lackeys”:

We need to provide the people of the African countries with more facts so that they can clearly see that “Malaysia” is the twin brother of the “Central African Federation,” of “Israel,” and of the “South Arabian Federation” that Tengku Abdulrachman is the same as Tsombe, just imperialist lackeys and henchmen who, as Bung Karno said in his speech on the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary celebrations of the Bandung Conference, are “non-Asian Asians” and “non-African Africans.”¹⁰⁴⁶

The PKI’s Fourth Plenum also demonstrated the shared oppressive condition perpetuated by multiple imperialist forces—West German, American, and British—in both Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The “Malaysia” issue hence resonated with Israel (American instrument) and South Arabian Federation (British comprador state):

The peoples of the Arab countries are under the constant threat of aggression and intervention by the imperialists. Israel is being used by the neocolonialist plotter under US

¹⁰⁴⁴ Aidit, D.N., 1964, “Forward to Crush Imperialism, Colonialism, and Neo-Colonialism!” *Review of Indonesia* 7, 1-2 (Jan.-Feb.): 13-4.

¹⁰⁴⁵ AAPSO, 1963, “Special Resolutions,” in *The Third Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Conference: Moshi, Tanganyika February, 4-11, 1963*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation, 74.; Van der Kroef, *Communism*, 220. The North Kalimantan representatives in Moshi included Abdullah Salim Mohamed (head) and Machmoud.

¹⁰⁴⁶ PKI, 1965, “Step Up the Revolutionary Offensive in All Fields,” ARCH01961, Box 373, Archief Joop Morriën, IISH, 48 (11 May).

command as an instrument and base for their aggression against the national liberation movements of the Arab peoples. ... Just recently, the West German neo-fascists have even reinforced Israel by supplying it with war equipment. In such a situation, Indonesia should express solidarity with the Arab states and peoples against the intrigues of the American and West German imperialists. We fully support the Palestine Arabs in their struggle against Israel for the restoration of their fatherland, Arab Palestine. In the same way, the United Arab Republic and the other Arab countries should express their solidarity with the peoples of Malaya, North Kalimantan, and Indonesia in their struggle against “Malaysia”

The people of Aden, South Yemen, and Oman are waging a continuous fight with arms in hand against the British colonialists and the “South Arabian Federation,” Britain’s “Malaysia” in the Arab world which is perpetrating [sic] brutal oppression of the people who are struggle for their national independence.¹⁰⁴⁷

At the 1965 Winneba Conference (May 9-16), the participants encouraged two anti-Malayan forces—Malayan People’s Socialist Front and Singapore’s Barisan Sosialis—to join when they had “form[ed] a Solidarity Committee that group[ed] together all Malayan forces (including Singapore) struggling for complete national independence.”¹⁰⁴⁸ Its resolutions denounced Malaysia for allowing “the maintenance of British military bases and troops” and actively “helping US imperialism in the latter’s aggressive crimes in Vietnam by sending arms and training puppet officers.” The conference also pointed out the magnitude of British troops in “Malaysia” that was five times greater than “Malaysian” troops, a number larger even than British troops in Europe. To remove the stigma of “white troops,” the Resolutions went on, Malaysian Prime Minister made plans with the imperialist masters to replace some white with African troops. “Kuala Lumpur regime of the Abdul Rahman clique,” the Resolutions concluded, “has thus proved itself to be a puppet regime as shameless as the regime at Saigon or Leopoldville, and as cunning as the regime in control of Israel,” demonstrating the neoimperialist connection among the postcolonial nations similar to what the PKI did at the Fourth Plenum.¹⁰⁴⁹ For North Kalimantan, the Resolution condemned British colonialism, supported the North Kalimantan struggle along with the Indonesian assistance, and demanded the imperialists to withdraw from North Kalimantan.¹⁰⁵⁰

The last scenario of Indonesian left internationalism on the “Malaysia” question before the PKI’s annihilation (beginning October 1965) concerned the establishment of the Representative Office of the Malayan National Liberation League in Indonesia (the ROI of the MNLL) on June 2, 1965, a month after the concurrent PKI’s Fourth Plenum and the Winneba Conference. Located at Jalan Paseban in Jakarta, the ROI consisted of four MCP (Malayan Communist Party) members who were assigned directly by MCP’s Chairman Musa Ahmad: President Ibrahim Mohamad (MCP leader in China since 1957 after the end of the Emergency), Deputy President Eu Chooi Yip (Secretary of MCP’s South Malayan Bureau in Indonesia since 1963), Secretary Abdullah Sudin (MCP representative in Indonesia and founder of Malayan Youth Association in Indonesia [Persatuan Pemuda Malaya di Indonesia; P2MI]), and general member Shamsiah Fakeh (Ibrahim

¹⁰⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 49.

¹⁰⁴⁸ AAPSO, 1965, “Resolutions on Organisational Questions,” in *The Winneba Conference: Ghana, May 1965*, Cairo: The Permanent Secretariat of the Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity, 311-2.

¹⁰⁴⁹ AAPSO, “Malaysia,” in *The Winneba Conference*, 262.

¹⁰⁵⁰ AAPSO, “North Kalimantan,” in *The Winneba Conference*, 269-70. The North Kalimantan representatives at the Winneba Conference included Lay Choon (head), Jais Abbas, Sueb Same, Lirin Mering, and Mochtar.

Mohamad's wife and a broadcaster for the Malay section of Beijing Radio). Sudin's organization, P2MI, was already publishing a monthly magazine, *Tanah Air* ('home country'), whose circulation among Malay youths in Indonesia was around 300.¹⁰⁵¹ The Office was short-lived, lasting only four months until all four members were arrested *en bloc* on November 17, 1965 for their hypothetical association with the PKI.¹⁰⁵² The Suharto government released them a year later on November 1966.¹⁰⁵³ They all fled to China, where they were warmly welcomed by Chinese comrades sharing the sense of anticolonial internationalism.

According to Eu Chooi Yip's memoir, the MNLL's Representative Office was modeled after the Representative Office of the South Vietnam National Liberation Front (presumably the one established in Jakarta by the Indonesian Organization for Afro-Asian People's Solidarity [OISRAA]), functioning like a small-scale embassy.¹⁰⁵⁴ The ROI aimed to expand the MCP's influence abroad and form the co-operate organizations (*badan kerjasama*) among Malays living in Indonesia.¹⁰⁵⁵ Shamsiah Fakeh's memoir and the PKI's account indicated that both Ibrahim Mohamad and Shamsiah Fakeh (written Sjamsiah Faqih in the PKI's document) arrived at the Kemayoran airport in Jakarta from China via Vietnam on February 18, 1965. The Indonesian Peace Committee's Secretary-General, Suroso, arranged their trip.¹⁰⁵⁶ The PKI's account noted that they came as guests of the OISRAA and Afro-Asian Journalists' Association. Njoto—PKI's Second Vice-Chairman and Co-Chairman of OISRAA—and Sudin, who had already organized underground in Indonesia, welcomed them at the airport.¹⁰⁵⁷ During its brief active period, its members accompanied the PKI to several international conferences, including the World Peace Conference in Helsinki and the Second Afro-Asian Conference's Preparatory Meeting in Algiers in June, the 11th World Conference for Prohibiting Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs in Tokyo in August (attended by Ibrahim and Shamsiah), and the International Conference for the Liquidation of Foreign Military Bases or Kiapma in Jakarta in October.¹⁰⁵⁸ Both Eu and Shamsiah's memoirs strongly suggested that compelling and articulate resolutions about the "Malaysia" question at the Winneba Conference may come from Ibrahim and Eu whose names were not listed on the Conference proceedings but otherwise attended as observers.¹⁰⁵⁹

The shared commitment to Southeast Asian internationalism between the PKI and the MCP (represented by the ROI) exhibited in the ROI's event to commemorate the 17th anniversary of the launching of the anti-British armed struggle on June 20, 1965 (the Malayan Emergency or the Anti-British National Liberation War started on June 1948). The PKI Youth Chorus sang Malayan revolutionary songs during the event. Aidit's speech, marking the end of the event, emphasized the contributions of "Malayan people's past and present struggle" to "Indonesian people's struggle to crush "Malaysia," a product of the new colonialists."¹⁰⁶⁰ Aidit contended that "a free, fully independent and peaceful Malaya will emerge" as a replacement of the "bankrupted "Malaysia,"" demonstrating the contestation between two versions of Malayness—the reactionary "Malaysia"

¹⁰⁵¹ Hara, "The Malayan Communist Party," 236.

¹⁰⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵³ *Ibid.*, 237. Information from Eu Chooi Yip's memoir.

¹⁰⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 233.

¹⁰⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 233-4.

¹⁰⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 235.

¹⁰⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 230, 235.; PKI, 1965, "Two Leaders of the League of the Malayan National Liberation Visit Indonesia," *Review of Indonesia* 9, 2 (Feb.): 22.

¹⁰⁵⁸ More details about the last conference in Chapter 3.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Hara, "The Malayan Communist Party," 234-5.

¹⁰⁶⁰ *People's Daily*, 1965 (22 Jun.), quoted in Hara, "The Malayan Communist Party," 245.

and the revolutionary new “Malaya.”¹⁰⁶¹ The speech ended with the call for both Indonesian and Malayan revolutionaries to unite in “oppos[ing] the common enemy, the old and new colonialists headed by the US imperialists.”¹⁰⁶² This call for unity reiterated one ideological basis of Southeast Asian internationalism that aimed to oppose the transimperial alliance, likewise international in its scope. Eu witnessed that the participants shouted “Long Live Aidit!” after Aidit concluded the speech.¹⁰⁶³

Besides forging Southeast Asian internationalism with the PKI, the ROI also managed to connect with other prominent anti-“Malaysia” activists residing in Indonesia as political refugees. Right before the G30S (the event providing a pretext for the PKI’s murder) on September 29, the ROI formed the Co-operating Organization for Genuine Independence of Malaya (Badan Kerjasama untuk Kemerdekaan Sejati Malaya) with Ibrahim Yaacob’s organization. They held a dinner reception to inaugurate this success. The honorary attendee was Oei Tjoe Tat, a Chinese-Indonesian left-nationalist serving in Soekarno’s cabinet as Minister of State. Shamsiah also noted that in the same year, the ROI members met A.M.Azahari who sought political asylum in Indonesia, but there was no record of their political exchanges.¹⁰⁶⁴

Eu explicitly pinpointed Ibrahim Yaacob, whose political allegiance with the communists had long been dubious, as a betrayer who reported the ROI to the police and accused the Representative Office of “being communists and agents of the PKI” and “supporting the PKI ... in the coup.”¹⁰⁶⁵ Even as the ROI members defended their innocence against all accusations, they were nonetheless jailed for one year. After their release in November 1966, the four of them all fled to Beijing via Phnom Penh and Guangzhou.¹⁰⁶⁶

During their imprisonment, the MNLL’s Central Committee issued an appeal for a release of the ROI members in *Malayan Monitor*, the organ of the MNLL in Beijing, on December 5, 1965. The PRC’s *People’s Daily* reprinted this statement on December 31. This appeal framed the situation as the undertaking of the “Indonesian rightist clique”—the same description shared among left Third-Worldists like Ibrahim Isa in the previous chapter and Indonesian Afro-Asianists closely affiliated with the PRC—“in collusion with such betrayers of Malaya as Ibrahim Yaacob.”¹⁰⁶⁷ As this statement emphasized the ROI’s legitimacy supported by Soekarno’s government and the Indonesian people, it characterized this act of arrest as a double betrayal, first by Ibrahim Yaacob as a betrayer of Malaya, and second by the Indonesian rightists against “the Indonesian people’s wish and the Indonesian government’s declared policy.”¹⁰⁶⁸ The ideas of betrayal and treachery once again suggest the multiple conceptions of a nation, among which the most primary antinomic pairs are revolutionary and reactionary, leftwing and rightwing, or anticolonial and neocolonial—specifically in this case referring to Soekarno and Suharto, and the people’s Malaya and Tunku’s Malaysia.

Five months after the ROI’s arrest, the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity (chaired by Liao Cheng-chih) issued another appeal for a release of the ROI members on April 27, 1966. Possibly sharpened by the left third-worldist analyses of the Indonesian situation offered in the Afro-Asian Journalists Association held a few days earlier (April 20-24), this time the

¹⁰⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶² *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶³ *Ibid.*, 235.

¹⁰⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 236.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 237.

¹⁰⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶⁷ *People’s Daily*, 1965 (31 Dec.), quoted in Hara, “The Malayan Communist Party,” 239.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

statement specifically highlighted the connection between US imperialism and the Indonesian right opposing Afro-Asian anti-imperialism and the Indonesian people:

Their fascist acts against progressives have shown their ferocious feature as the agents of US imperialism. These actions are diametrically opposed to the common interests of the Asian and African people's unity against imperialism, and also opposed to the will of the Indonesian people and the policies proclaimed by the Indonesian Government itself.¹⁰⁶⁹

Once arrived in China, the ROI members joined a large cadre of pro-PRC Malaysian and Indonesian exiles who already organized or moved there after the anticommunist massacre to assemble nothing short of a revolutionary base. Among the most active Southeast Asian radicals fleeing to the PRC around that period included the Indian-Singaporean leader of the Malayan National Liberation League (MNLL)'s Beijing Mission, P.V. Sarma, the Indonesian representative of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific Regions, Willy Hariandja, and the Afro-Asian Journalists Association's Secretary-General, Djawoto.¹⁰⁷⁰ The Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity provided support for many these Southeast Asian internationalist events.¹⁰⁷¹ Since Indonesia eventually became a "neocolonial" reactionary country itself, the PRC provided a material condition for articulating a Southeast Asian internationalism against the now twin neocolonial governments of Tunku Rachman and Suharto.

North Korea's Minor Internationalist Critique: Delinking and Decolonization

Aidit praised North Korea profusely upon his return from the five-country trip, announcing that "it is (North) Korea that must be the example of how Socialism ought to be built."¹⁰⁷² Aidit's main reason for looking up to North Korea as a model was its correct independent economic policy of "standing fully on their own two feet, of relying completely on their own resources."¹⁰⁷³ Aidit was likewise impressed by the unification of North Korea's economic construction and Marxist-Leninist political education. This policy called Juche (or chuch'e), literally translated as 'master of one's body,' articulated both the North Korean description of and aspiration for sovereign autonomy in all realms, particularly the political and the economic.¹⁰⁷⁴ Juche's despised opposite was *sadejuui*, 'serving the great external power.'¹⁰⁷⁵ Though not explicitly stated, North Korean Juche policy, rather than a Stalinist (Soviet) or Maoist (Chinese) rhetoric, inspired Aidit to coin the term "Banteng spirit" or a spirit of a 'wild bull' to encourage Indonesians to likewise stand on

¹⁰⁶⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1966, *Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts*, No. 81, BBB3 (28 Apr.).

¹⁰⁷⁰ More about P.V. Sarma in Wah, Yeo Kim, 1994, "Joining the Communist Underground: The Conversation of English-Educated Radicals to Communism in Singapore, June 1948-January 1951," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 67, 1: 39.; "A.A.J.A. Secretariat Meets in Peking," 1966, *Peking Review* 9, 18: 12-3, 16-8 (29 Apr.).

¹⁰⁷¹ Van der Kroef, *Communism in Malaysia*, 228.

¹⁰⁷² Aidit, "Gerakan Komunis Internasional," *Harian Rakjat* (4-5 Oct.).

¹⁰⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷⁴ Song, Jiyoung, 2011, *Human Rights Discourse in North Korea: Post-Colonial, Marxist, and Confucian Perspectives*, New York: Routledge, 123.; Young, Benjamin R., 2021, *Guns, Guerillas, and The Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 3.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Cumings, Bruce and Kim, Ilpyong, 1973, *Political Organization, Nationalism, and Self-Reliance in North Korea: An Interpretation*, Paper at the 1973 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

their two feet and resolutely uphold the revolutionary fervor. Aidit first referred to the Banteng spirit in the speech he waxed lyrical about North Korea. The Banteng spirit's features resembled that of Juche. Aidit emphasized that the PKI's banteng was "a red banteng, a Communist banteng, a Marxist-Leninist banteng" that resisted the enemies of the people, imperialists, landlords, modern revisionism, and modern dogmatism.¹⁰⁷⁶ Both Banteng spirit and Juche embodied the aspiration towards revolutionary mastery at both the national (communist reconstruction) and international levels (independence amidst the Sino-Soviet split).

In the speech Aidit gave at the mass meeting in Pyongyang during his five-country trip called "Lasting Friendship between the Indonesian People and the Korean People," he consistently praised North Korea for abling to build the industrial economic base. Looking at this achievement through the world-systemic lenses consistent with the "left Third-Worldist" approach argued in the previous chapter, Aidit saw the North Korean establishment of an industrial base contributing to the liberation of "entire socialist camp," "the international communist movement," and "the people of Asia and Africa."¹⁰⁷⁷

Delivered during the height of both the Sino-Soviet split and, as this dissertation suggests, the formation of minor communist internationalism, Aidit emphatically discussed the "independent stand" deemed constitutive of this internationalism. Similar to his defense of the Albanian Workers' Party in 1961, he stressed that an independent stand "is not the same thing as an attitude of neutrality or vacillation." It was instead a creative stand that strengthened the unity of both the party and the international communist movement.¹⁰⁷⁸ Without this independence, Aidit contended, a communist party would resemble either an unthinking bureaucracy or a buffalo "whose nose is on a lead so as to be easily led from one place to another."¹⁰⁷⁹ Even as it was not clear whether Aidit made any subtle critique of the CCP in this explanation of the independent stance, this dissertation suggests that Aidit was explicit in his critical evaluation of the CPSU. As explained earlier, Aidit performed a double denial of two Soviet Marxist concepts, and, hence, accepted neither of them in their conventional understandings: Stalin's instrumentalist bureaucracy (dogmatism) and Khrushchev's humanist creativity (revisionism).

Aidit argued that this independent stand provided a, in this dissertation's term, "decolonial" corrective to the vertical structure of the "communist republics" by cultivating the genuine ethos of openness that "accept[s] the opinions of other parties, after having considered them as a whole and after these opinions have been welded with the creative abilities and skills of the proletariat of that country itself."¹⁰⁸⁰ In other words, it rejected commandism and authoritarian tendencies so detrimental to the international communist movement. In the PKI's practice, this decolonial stand involved a close "listen[ing] to the opinions of fraternal Parties with open hearts and open minds" and being "prepared to accept them if they conform to the requirements of the Indonesian Revolution and [if they] lead to strengthen the international Communist [sic] movement."¹⁰⁸¹ Of course, Aidit would not lay bare his independent stand so meticulously to the North Korean audience if he did not see them as his minor-communist ally. This minor-communist formation opposed both American neocolonialism and communist commandism—a decolonization of both the capitalist and communist worlds from the periphery.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Aidit, "Gerakan Komunis Internasional," *Harian Rakjat* (4-5 Oct.).

¹⁰⁷⁷ Aidit, D.N., 1963, "CPI and the International Communist Movement," *Review of Indonesia* 6: 25.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸¹ *Ibid.*

This dissertation claims that this is one generative way to understand the, somewhat counter-intuitive, contribution of the independent stand (North Korean Juche and Indonesian Banteng spirit) to the international communist movement aiming to cultivate horizontal fraternal solidarity rather than the two extremes of isolationism and polycentric autonomy.¹⁰⁸²

North Korea's anti-revisionist critiques of the CPSU shared remarkable similarities with the PKI's own. Similar to the PKI, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) became more intensely politicized to oppose the Soviet Union on the ground of the Soviet cooperation with American neocolonialism during the Sino-Indian border crisis and the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962-63, rather than solely on the Stalin question.¹⁰⁸³ Though North Korea did not make a public announcement about the Soviet denunciation of Albania, diplomatic records noted North Korea's positive impression of Albania in the latter half of 1961.¹⁰⁸⁴ The combination of both the Soviet commandism (the Albanian case) and neocolonial cooperation (the Sino-Indian and Cuban cases), in addition to the dissent against revisionism, led North Korea to reject the Soviet line and develop the independent or self-reliant stand synchronically with the PKI from 1962 onwards. Haggard observes that the KWP's critique particularly attended to the Soviet Union's relation with the Asian, and occasionally Afro-Asian, communities parties. Issues of North Korean critique included paternalistic attitude, big-power chauvinism, and even "racial bias" in policies.¹⁰⁸⁵

Indonesia occupied a unique position in the history of North Korean international relations. Indonesian President Soekarno was one of the first two non-communist chiefs of state who visited North Korea in 1964 (another being Malian President Birahim Boubacar Keïta). Premier Kim Il-Sung's first official trip to a non-Communist country since North Korea's establishment was Indonesia in 1965. Soekarno's visit to North Korea in November 1964 resulted in a joint communique formalizing Pyongyang's "undivided support and military solidarity" for Indonesia's "struggle against [the] 'British neo-colonialist project of Malaysia.'" ¹⁰⁸⁶ The North Korean representatives from the Supreme People's Assembly who traveled to Jakarta to establish diplomatic relations and prepare for Soekarno's visit in April 1964 relayed a message from Kim Il-Sung that hinged on the anti-"Malaysia" campaign: "I am convinced that the anti-Malaysia struggle waged by the Indonesian people under your [Soekarno's] leadership will be greatly conducive to the preservation of peace in Asia and in the world."¹⁰⁸⁷ North Korea was recruited into Indonesia's left Third-Worldist politics. Then in April 1965, on the occasion of commemorating the Bandung Conference's 10th anniversary, Kim Il Sung, along with his son and successor Kim Jong Il visited Indonesia. Kim Il Sung gave a famous speech on Juche and self-reliance at the communist Aliarcham Academy of Social Sciences (*Akademi Ilmu Social Aliarcham* or AISA). If Aidit had a more leftist interpretation of Kim Il-Sung as the spirit of Red Banteng, Soekarno also had an official left-nationalist policy modeling after Juche called

¹⁰⁸² Brian Myers historicizes the meaning of Juche into three different periods: the nationalization of Marxism-Leninism (Marksū-Leninjuūi ūi ch'angjojōk chōgyong) in 1955, the need for self-reliance (charyōk kaengsaeng) in 1965, and the humanist conception of a masterful man in the early 1970s.

Myers, Brian, 2008, "Ideology as Smokescreen: North Korea's Juche Thought," *Acta Koreana* 11, 3 (Dec.): 169-70.

¹⁰⁸³ Haggard, M.T., 1965, "North Korea's International Position," *Asian Survey* 5, 8 (Aug.): 379-80.

¹⁰⁸⁴ Stock, Thomas, 2019, "North Korea's Marxism-Leninism: Fraternal Criticisms and the Development of North Korean Ideology in the 1960s," *Journal of Korean Studies* 24, 1 (Mar.): 134.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Haggard, "North Korea," 381.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Sulaiman, "Not So Strange Bedfellows," 336.; Simon, Sheldon W., 1969, *The Broken Triangle: Peking, Djakarta, and the PKI*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 60.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Young, *Guns*, 23.

berdikari, literally translated as ‘standing on own’s feet.’ Because Soekarno’s *berdikari* did not have the same Marxist tenor, I suggest that it bore closer resemblance to other anti-colonial, non-cooperative, and protectionist ideas such as Gandhi’s *swadeshi*, an idea that preoccupied Soekarno since the 1930s.¹⁰⁸⁸ Benjamin Young characterizes Juche discourse as “a joint anti-colonial vernacular” between Soekarno (this dissertation hastens to add Aidit here) and Kim Il Sung which boosted the latter’s “prestige in the Third World as a revolutionary theorist.”¹⁰⁸⁹

Kim Il Sung’s 1965 speech in Indonesia, titled “On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” offered a sustained political-economic discussion of communist self-reliance under the twin milieus of the Sino-Soviet split and minor-communist internationalism. This dissertation reads the main concern of this document as developing the “minor-communist,” as opposed to metropolitan communist, account of self-reliance to the fullest extent. As argued above, Kim Il-Sung’s account of self-reliance, consistent with that of Aidit, presupposed a horizontal fraternal connection between minor communist parties rather than the two extremes of isolationism and polycentric autonomy.

The end goal of this speech was the achievement of the Korean liberatory unification between communist North Korea and democratic South Korea, whose shared enemy was American imperialism. Mere nationalism, whether of one or two Koreas, would not be adequate to oppose the globally dominant American imperialism, and hence internationalism became an imperative. Building socialism in the North and decolonizing from the US in the South were two “closely related” revolutionary tasks leading to “the ultimate victory of the Korean revolution as a whole.”¹⁰⁹⁰ This was a textbook case of a struggle to achieve a combined and uneven revolution in two countries that were separated by the Cold War circumstances: “[T]he situations in North and South Korea contradict with each other and the revolutions in both parts of Korea are in different stages of development. The revolutionary tasks in North and South Korea at the present stage, therefore, cannot but differ from each other, although the Korean revolution is an integral whole.”¹⁰⁹¹

The speech discussed three main issues in the process of North Korean socialist construction: heavy industry, Juche in the meaning of self-reliance, and the South Korean revolution. What makes the North Korean discussion of the heavy industrial development than the CCP is a great emphasis on industrialization as constitutive of decolonization, not from one but two authorities. First, because of Japanese imperialist capital before Korean independence, “the development of the national industry was restricted to the last degree” leaving “only a few industries producing raw materials and semi-finished goods”—a “how Japan underdeveloped Korea” argument of sorts.¹⁰⁹² Kim Il-Sung was not reserved for characterizing this phenomenon as Korea’s inherited “colonial industry” that, through economic development plans, was turned into an “independent modern heavy industry.”¹⁰⁹³

Second, prohibited by the “revisionists” from developing the machine-building industry and encouraged only to produce minerals and raw materials, North Korea was forced into the

¹⁰⁸⁸ Soekarno, 1964 [1933], “Swadeshi dan Masa-Actie di Indonesia,” in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, vol.1, Djakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dikawah Bendera Revolusi, 121-57.

¹⁰⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Kim, Il-Sung, 1968 [1965], *On Socialist Construction and the South Korean Revolution in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1-2.

¹⁰⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁰⁹² *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁰⁹³ *Ibid.*, 22-3.

socialist “international division of labor.”¹⁰⁹⁴ This led to an unsustainable dependence on the Soviet economic aid. Haggard observes that there was not a single direct reference to the Soviet aid and the condition of dependency in this speech.¹⁰⁹⁵ Only in passing did the speech mention that “it goes without saying that those who did not approve of the development of the machine-building industry in our country could not help us.”¹⁰⁹⁶ It instead accentuated the Korean people’s efforts and struggled to develop the productive forces, in defiance of violent subordination to the international division of labor.

Kim Il-Sung’s extensive discussion of Juche covered the main three realms of the society: “independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy, and self-defense in national defence.”¹⁰⁹⁷ He situated the establishment of Juche squarely in the communist milieu by emphasizing that it was “the principle of solving for oneself all the problems of the revolution and construction in conformity with the actual conditions at home, and mainly by one’s own effort.”¹⁰⁹⁸ In a similar way that the CCP became more politicized against the CPSU’s modern revisionism in the aftermath of the 1960 Lenin polemics and advanced a neo-Marxist-Leninist line as a response, Juche was a name for North Korean neo-Marxism-Leninism. Kim Il-Sung stated emphatically that one major political incentive in his creation of Juche came from opposition to modern revisionism (others being dogmatism [mechanical repetition] and flunkeyism [colonial subordination]).¹⁰⁹⁹

In the economic sphere, Kim Il-Sung stressed the mobilization of domestic resources in the process of socialist construction. Kim first clarified that Juche was not against all kinds of aid but rather a prioritization of self-effort. “Support and encouragement from outside should be regarded as secondary.”¹¹⁰⁰ As shown above, Kim highlighted the Korean people’s inexhaustible creative efforts in “grasping their destinies in their own hands” and “build[ing] a new life.”¹¹⁰¹ Then he proceeded to explain that Juche did not oppose economic cooperation either but rather a rejection of “big-power chauvinist tendency to restraining the independent and comprehensive development of the economy of other countries and ... to placing their economy under one’s own control, by using the pretext of “economic cooperation” and “international division of labor.””¹¹⁰² It was here that Kim made an explicit connection between two Soviet forms of control in the economy (financial aid and the international division of labor) and politics (big-power chauvinism and commandism). He made an important remark about the linkage between economic and political independence thus: “Economic independence is an indispensable requisite for the building of an independent state, rich, strong, and enlightened.”¹¹⁰³ In this way, Kim immediately demonstrated that underlying political-economic basis of self-reliance that necessitated double emancipatory processes.

To use the terms deployed within this dissertation’s peripheral Marxist framework, the double emancipatory processes proposed by Juche entailed a delinking from the Soviet-led international division of labor and decolonization from communist hierarchy toward cooperation

¹⁰⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Haggard, “North Korea,” 379.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Kim, *On Socialist*, 25.

¹⁰⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁰⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 44.

¹¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 43.

based on “the principles of complete equality and mutual benefit”—praxes of minor-communist internationalism argued throughout this chapter.¹¹⁰⁴

The last section of the speech was dedicated to the South Korean revolution against American imperialism, connecting to the theme of Korean independence that ran through the speech. Kim identified the multiple tenets of American colonization of South Korea that turned the country into a “puppet state”: colonial enslavement and military aggression (political), and colonial plunder and imperialist monopoly (economic).¹¹⁰⁵ Kim called for an abolition of the US imperialist colonial rule and troops in South Korea as a condition to achieve freedom, liberation, and eventually the unification of the “fatherland.”¹¹⁰⁶ Kim also emphasized the North Korean support in “waging a stubborn struggle to carry out the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal democratic revolution in South Korea by mobilizing all its patriotic, democratic forces.”¹¹⁰⁷ The speech valorized several iterations of South Korean working class and people struggles that contributed to the decolonization of South Korea, for example, the general strike in September 1946, the anti-US national-salvation struggle in February 1948, mutiny at Ryosu in October 1948, and the April Popular Uprising overthrowing Syngman Rhee puppet government in 1960.

In Kim’s analysis, one international implication of the South Korean decolonization was the dismantling of the American military base that acted “as a bridgehead for attack on the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples’ Republic and aggression on the Asian continent.”¹¹⁰⁸ This, Kim suggested, would lead to the isolation and weakening of US imperialism—an analysis of US imperialism as an extended linkage shared among the left Third-Worldists in the 1950s-60s. Kim concluded his speech by calling forward solidarity with decolonizing peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America but particularly with “the entire Asian people ... to drive the US imperialists out of Asia.”¹¹⁰⁹ The mutual support between the Korean Workers’ Party and the Indonesian Communist Party in the revolutionary struggle of each would contribute “to the common struggle of the Asian people.”¹¹¹⁰

Though there was no evidence of the PKI’s reflection on Kim Il-Sung’s speech or Juche, this dissertation surmises what the PKI would think as their key takeaways would include the transition from Indonesia’s current South Korean situation (national democratic revolution) into North Korean communism, anti-colonial industrialization, and the interconnected issues of delinking and decolonization.

The PKI was nothing short of a prophetic when it saw the greater relevance of North Korea as the model for socialist construction (in the Third World) compared to China. In addition to the critique of Soviet revisionism apparent around the mid-1960s, during the early years of the Cultural

¹¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

Paul de Groot, Chairman of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, explicitly advocated for the notion of independence of the communist party in Kim Il-Sung’s 1966 speech. Thomas Stock notes that de Groot’s impetus was to call into question the Soviet Union’s commandism and intervention of domestic politics, similar to Kim and Aidit. In Stock’s archives, they only suggested that de Groot’s re-emphasis on the Dutch “national element” and communist independence arose as a response to “the entrenchment of imperialism in Europe.” This dissertation suspects that the mass murder of the Indonesian Communist Party, one closest ally of the Dutch Communist Party, might trigger de Groot to turn to the “minor-communist” concerns which erstwhile only pertained to the postcolony.

Stock, “North Korea,” 141-2.

¹¹⁰⁵ Kim, *On Socialist*, 52-7.

¹¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 57.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Revolution from 1966-69, Kim Il-Sung began to defy the axiom that China became the center of world revolution.¹¹¹¹ Despite the unfortunate turn of events that morphed North Korean minor-communist self-reliance into another isolated dictatorial regime, for a certain period in the late 1960s to early 1970s, North Korea's resistance to the communist centers in Moscow and Shanghai justifiably attracted left Third-Worldist revolutionaries in Mexico (Mexican Movement for Revolutionary Action), Sri Lanka (People's Liberation Front), and Oakland, California (the Black Panther Party).¹¹¹²

Albanian Global Anti-Revisionism: Minor-Communist Internationalist Connections

Khrushchev's denunciation of the Albanian Workers' Party in the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress (October 1961) marked a turning point for the PKI's independent position in global inter-communist relations. The PKI's sympathy for a minor communist country like Albania eventually led to a more official contact between the two communist parties in 1964. On November 29 that year, the PKI sent a delegation headed by Sidartojo, a member of the PKI Central Committee, to Tirana on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Liberation of Albania from fascism. Following the anticommunist massacre of 1965-66, Tirana became one of the major refugee sites for the PKI's pro-Beijing members formally established after the speech of the surviving PKI politburo's member Jusuf Adjitorop in the 5th Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party in November 1966.

Sidartojo's speech, which was likely to have been written collectively by the PKI's foreign affairs department and approved by Aidit, highlighted the independent stand of the Albanian Workers' Party—a salient theme for PKI's minor-communist internationalism in the early 1960s. The speech started by referring to the Albanian revolutionary tradition of “heroic struggle in fighting domination and oppression of foreign aggressors,” framing Albania in the history of independence struggle from the get-go.¹¹¹³ The Albanian difference with North Korea in the PKI's account lay in the former's strong development of anti-revisionism, whereas the latter, as the previous section shows, placed emphasis on economic self-reliance:

But the heroic Albanian People who cannot be intimidated by the imperialists and the *modern revisionists* have united more closely around the Party of Labour of Albania [Albanian Workers' Party] and worked hard with a spirit of self-reliance to overcome all obstacles and difficulties towards their ultimate goal. All the intrigues and the manoeuvres of imperialists and the *modern revisionists* have ended in shameful failures in the face of the heroic and never surrendering Albanian people.¹¹¹⁴

Unlike the praise for Juche's communist reconstruction, which then positioned North Korea as the socialist camp's “industrial economic base,” the PKI emphasized the Albanian “heroic struggle against the greatest treachery of the modern revisionists against Marxism-Leninism and against the vital interests of the people.”¹¹¹⁵ This heroic struggle earned Albania's socialist prestige as the

¹¹¹¹ Young, Benjamin R., 2015, “Juche in the United States: The Black Panther Party's Relations with North Korea, 1969-1971,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 13, 12 (Mar.): 10.

¹¹¹² Young, *Guns*, Chapter 2.

¹¹¹³ CC PKI, 1965 [1964], “PLA Continuously Defending the Purity of Marxism-Leninism,” *Review of Indonesia* 2, 9 (Feb.): 10.

¹¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

defender of the Marxist-Leninist theory against the revisionists.¹¹¹⁶ To demonstrate the global implications of anti-revisionism within the international communist movement, the speech briefly mentioned the victory of the “progressive” over “hypocrite” nations like India and Yugoslavia in the Third World.¹¹¹⁷ In this way, the PKI made a double critique of revisionism at the center (Soviet Union) and its third world allies (India and Yugoslavia), framing the fight against revisionism as another important contradiction within the anti-imperialist milieu.

It was not just about superpower politics of the Soviet Union, the US, and China, but also how this contradiction between revisionism and anti-revisionism manifested in the third world as imperialism and anti-imperialism. Jusuf Adjitorop’s speech in 1966 at the Fifth Congress of the Albanian Workers’ Party reiterated these two overlapping contradictions:

Therefore, the struggle against imperialism headed by the United States and the struggle against internal reactionaries, who are the enemies of the people who fight for their liberation, are inseparable from the struggle against modern revisionism. Therefore, for the Marxist-Leninists of the whole world, there is no middle road between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism.¹¹¹⁸

Situating these two overlapping contradictions (revisionism and/as imperialism) in the Indonesian conjuncture, Adjitorop offered a structural explanation of the “30 September” event leading to the mass murder against Indonesian communists in 1965-66. He theorized it as a “diabolic scheme” of the imperialists of the US and Japan and the modern revisionists that came to the aid of the fascist military dictatorship of the rightwing generals Suharto and Nasution.¹¹¹⁹ In other words, this was a theory of trans-imperialist counter-revolution bringing into an alliance the imperialists, modern revisionists, and militaristic fascists.

Despite the difference between North Korean and Albanian communist construction as seen through the PKI’s perspective, the two parties sharing the name “Workers’ Party” (a name indicating the proto-industrial workers rather than industrial proletariats for the “Communist Party”) united in their commitment to Stalinization. Their common material condition as impoverished, small communist nations emerging out of the liberation war (Japan for North Korea and Yugoslavia for Albania) and peripheral to big communist countries (the PRC for North Korea and the Soviet Union for Albania) contributed to the two parties’ shared understanding of socialist decolonization and economic self-reliance—a horizontal fraternity this section calls minor-communist internationalism.¹¹²⁰

In the wake of Khrushchev’s speech in February 1956, Enver Hoxha (Albanian Workers’ Party’s Chairman) met with Kim Il-Sung in Pyongyang on September 7 *en route* to Beijing for the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Hoxha’s memoir *The Khrushchevite*—written in a pure paranoid mode due to the global triumph of revisionism—noticed early on the shared anti-revisionist concerns between the two parties, though with a subtle caveat on the

¹¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹⁸ Adjitorop, Jusuf, 1966, “Congratulatory Speech by Comrade Yousouf Adjitorop, Head of the Delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia,” in *Communist and Workers’ Parties and Marxist-Leninist Groups Greet the Fifth Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania*, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House: Tirana, 53-4.

¹¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹¹²⁰ A comprehensive historical account of developing Tirana-Pyongyang comradeship in the 1960s, read: Mëhilli, Elidor, 2015, “States of Insecurity,” *The International History Review* 37, 5: 1037-58.

possibility of revisionist contamination: “the revisionist wasp had begun to implant its poisonous sting there, too.”¹¹²¹ During the Tirana Party Conference in April 1956 where party members openly criticized the leadership—a Conference that has been highly concealed in the official Albanian historiography—Hoxha defended both the CCP and the Korean Workers’ Party that the two parties, similar to the Albanian Workers’ Party against having anything to revise.¹¹²²

While North Korean anti-revisionism was fortified after Khrushchev’s cooperation with the US in 1962-63, Albania had more immediate intertwined ideological and geopolitical reasons to reinforce an anti-revisionist stance. Since Albania gained independence through opposition to Yugoslavia’s Balkan annexation plan with the help of Stalin, the Khrushchev-Tito rapprochement in May 1955 not only reversed Stalin’s denunciation of Tito as a revisionist renegade but also shook the dual foundations of the Albanian regime: “fanatical hostility against Yugoslavia” and “Stalinism to the bitter end.”¹¹²³ Additionally, Hoxha was also convinced that Yugoslavia was intimately involved in the Soviet decision to invade of Hungary in October-November 1956.¹¹²⁴ Thus, Yugoslavia and its repaired relationship with Khrushchev politicized Hoxha to solidify what had become Albanian anti-revisionism. Elidor Mëhilli notes that Hoxha embraced Mao’s teachings and China’s example for the first time when he referenced Mao’s support for the Albanian Workers’ Party’s “Marxist-Leninist line” at the plenum on October 22 in Tirana.¹¹²⁵ Mëhilli, again, interpreted this Albanian embrace of Mao to signify “an opportunity to continue the Stalinist experiment.”¹¹²⁶ Only a couple of weeks later, in Politburo discussions, Hoxha foresaw the severe consequences of the Albanian allegiance to anti-revisionism. He chose to trade the fraternity with the revisionists with the ideological commitment: “Even if we are left all alone. We will surely not be left alone for long if we wage a just war in defense of principles.”¹¹²⁷ Albania surely did not wait for long as its commitment to principles birthed a minor-communist internationalism against revisionism that this chapter traces.

There is a through line in this dissertation arguing that the deeper ideological basis of anti-revisionism was Leninism (the CCP’s Lenin Polemics and “neo-Marxism-Leninism,” Left Third-Worldism’s Leninist conception of imperialism, and the PKI’s multiple Lenins). In this list, the Party Marxists (the CCP and the PKI), in particular, returned to Lenin for an anti-imperialist, proletarian, and dialectical Marxism that could become an alternative to Stalin’s bureaucratic-mechanical Marxism and Khrushchev’s humanist-absolutist Marxism—both severely anti-dialectical. However, the Party Marxists did not renounce Stalinism entirely because that was what gave them the party form and legitimacy in the first place. In the previous chapters, it is more clear for the CCP than the PKI or the Korean Workers’ Party on the process of what this dissertation

¹¹²¹ Hoxha, Enver, 1980, *The Khrushchevites*, Tirana: The Institutes of Marxist-Leninist Studies at the CC of the PLA, 177-8.

¹¹²² Mëhilli, Elidor, 2011, “Defying De-Stalinization: Albania’s 1956,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, 4 (Fall): 23. More on the Tirana Conference in Brisku, Inxhi, 2021, “Leftist Dissent Against State Socialism in Albania: How the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Influenced the Left-wing Dissent in Albania,” *Contradictions: A Journal of Critical Thought* 5, 2: 87-106. For the opposition to Kim Il-Sung’s leadership in the wake of Khrushchev’s speech, read: Person, James F., 2006, “‘We Need Help from Outside’: The North Korean Opposition Movement of 1956,” Cold War International History Project Working Paper, 52 (Aug).

¹¹²³ Fejtö, François, 1963, “La deviazione Albanese,” *Comunità* 107: 25., quoted from Mëhilli, “Defying,” 6, fn. 9.

¹¹²⁴ Mëhilli, “Defying,” 42-52.

¹¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 53.

¹¹²⁶ Mëhilli, Elidor, 2017, *From Stalin to Mao: Albania and the Socialist World*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 8.

¹¹²⁷ Mëhilli, “Defying,” 46.

calls a dialecticization of Stalinism from bureaucratic into revolutionary Stalinism. The latter two parties, which emerged and re-emerged much later than the CCP and hence was only exposed to late Stalinism, were more concerned with the independent evaluation of Stalin as a global communist leader than directly engaging with Stalinism as a version of Marxism.

Though sufficiently engaging with Lenin, as will be shown shortly, the Albanian Workers' Party's anti-revisionism most approximates a peripheral Stalinism of sorts compared to the three anti-revisionist parties above that did not explicitly identify themselves as Stalinist.¹¹²⁸ François Fejtö calls Albania "the Stalinist avant-garde" in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe.¹¹²⁹ As introduced earlier, Hoxha synthesized Mao into the Albanian Marxist-Leninist theoretical system because he saw Mao as a Stalinist (not an entirely wrongheaded evaluation though chapter 2 of this dissertation assesses Mao as both revising and overcoming Stalinism). Rather than a variant of imposed totalitarianism or another version of communism-gone-bad, Sofokli Meksi contends that Albanian Stalinism inherits and practices the revolutionary dictatorship of the minority (whether the party, the masses, or the proletariat in the communist tradition) albeit extreme and unforgivably violent.¹¹³⁰

It would be a grave mistake to simply equate Albanian Stalinism to Soviet Stalinism. According to Hoxha, this analogy was precisely what Khrushchev aimed at doing in the 1961 Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress. Hoxha claimed that by analogizing "Albanian Stalinism" to the "'epoch of the Stalinist crimes' in the Soviet Union," Khrushchev created the "'atmosphere' he needed at the Congress and in the world public opinion to make his slanders [against Albanian criticism of himself] more credible."¹¹³¹ In fact, a consolidation of Albanian Stalinism, this dissertation suggests, occurred as a consequence of Khrushchev's ignorance of Yugoslavia as Albania's former colonizer, and the overall question of imperialism. Stalinism, differently oblivious to imperialism no less, when reformulated with the specific Albanian historical material conditions, served as alternatives in two interconnected ways: anti-colonial (to Yugoslavia) and anti-revisionist (to Khrushchev). As anti-revisionists increasingly perceived Yugoslavia as revisionist and the Soviet Union as big-power chauvinist by the mid-1960s, these two political bases of Albanian Stalinism tended to merge seamlessly. It is in these anti-colonial and anti-revisionist senses that this dissertation sees Albanian Stalinism as a kind of peripheral Stalinism, rather than a mechanical replication of Soviet Stalinism.

It was precisely this political difference between Albanian Stalinism and Khrushchevian Marxism on the intertwined questions of imperialism and revisionism that led Hoxha to present a scathing critique of Khrushchevian Marxism in the Meeting of the 81 Communist Parties in Moscow in November 1960.¹¹³² The title of Hoxha's speech, "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Marxist Stand of

¹¹²⁸ Mëhilli makes a similar observation about the peripheral dynamics of Albanian anti-revisionism and the opposition to de-Stalinization.

Mëhilli, "States," 1038.

¹¹²⁹ Fejtö, "La deviazione Albanese" 25., quoted from Mëhilli, "Defying," 35.

¹¹³⁰ Meksi, Sofokli, 2015, "Modernization of Albanian Totalitarian Nature—Pattern's Survey of Modernity in Ideology and Practice of the Stalinist State in Albania," *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 6, 2 (Mar.): 506-11.

¹¹³¹ Hoxha, "Speech in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party of Labor of Albania and the 44th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution."

¹¹³² For a fuller treatment of the Soviet-Albanian relations in 1960-1961 leading up to the Sino-Soviet split, read: Marku, Ylber, 2020, "Communist Relations in Crisis: The End of Soviet-Albanian Relations, and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1961," *The International History Review* 42, 4: 813-32.

Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!" was self-explanatory. Hoxha's embrace of Mao as a continuation of the Stalinist line opposing Khrushchevian revisionism back in 1956 culminated in an official pronouncement of the Albanian sympathy to the CCP rather than the CPSU, exposing the Sino-Soviet tension in the international communist movement that later became the Sino-Soviet split.

Besides the critiques of Yugoslavian imperialism and Khrushchevian revisionism that have been laid out above, there were other three relevant points that Hoxha made in this speech. First, Albania repeatedly emphasized its "small country" status that constantly had to protect itself against external enemies throughout history. The subtext of this message was that Albania would not succumb easily to the Soviet Union's imposed policy of de-Stalinization. Hoxha rejected Khrushchev's accusation of the Albanian Workers' Party as committing a crime—a crime that "we had the courage to oppose openly at an international communist meeting (and not in the marketplace) the unjust action of Comrade Khrushchev" and that "we are a small Party of a small and poor country which ... should merely applaud and approve but express no opinion of its own."¹¹³³ The Albanian consciousness of its small and poor conditions, in fact, contributes to this dissertation's argument about Albania's peripherality. Second, Hoxha argued, in the same way the CPP did, that a Leninist form of peaceful coexistence provided a better framework for understanding of peace as the abolition of imperialism and capitalism. "In our persistent struggle to establish Leninist peaceful coexistence while making no concessions of principle to imperialism," Hoxha stated, "we should further promote the class struggle in capitalist countries as well as the national-liberation movement of the people of colonial and dependent countries."¹¹³⁴ Third, and this is a point continued by the PKI shortly later, Hoxha distinguished the international Stalin belonging to "the entire communist world" and "all workers of the world" from domestic Stalin of the Soviet Union.¹¹³⁵

Albania was the only Warsaw Pact member defying the Soviet Union after the failed Hungarian upheaval.¹¹³⁶ Because of this, in the 1961 Twenty-Second Soviet Party Congress, Khrushchev retaliated Hoxha by attacking the Albanian party at length and denouncing it in public, prompting solidarity from the PKI along with around 30 other communist representatives and solidifying the anti-revisionist sentiment in the international communist movement. In response to Khrushchev's attack, Hoxha famously declared in November after the 1961 Congress that "the Albanian people and the Party of Labor will survive on grass—if necessary—rather than sell themselves for thirty silverlings, because they prefer to die standing and honorably rather than live with shame and on their knees."¹¹³⁷ This theme of "standing" on one's feet refusing to submit to external powers was shared among all the minor communist parties studied in this section: PKI's Banteng spirit and North Korea's Juche.

Hoxha's speech in the 20th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party and concurrently 44th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution on November 1961, delivered only a week after the CPSU's Twenty-Second Congress, demonstrated most incisively the Leninist foundation of Albanian anti-revisionism. Despite embodying, to use this dissertation's term, "peripheral Stalinist" form, Albanian anti-revisionism distilled revolutionary and global Stalinism from its

¹¹³³ Hoxha, Enver, 1972 [1960], "Reject the Revisionist Theses of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Marxist Stand of Khrushchev's Group! Uphold Marxism-Leninism!" in *The Party of Labor of Albania in Battle with Modern Revisionism*, "Tirana: 'Naim Frasheri' Publishing House.

¹¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹³⁶ Marku, "Communist Relations," 823.

¹¹³⁷ Mëhilli, *From Stalin*, 202.

dictatorial and domestic counterpart through the help of no one other than Lenin! Mao and the CCP made a similar move but were less concerned with Stalinism and its global implications because what Mao had revised from Stalin then developed into Maoism, with its particular conceptions of contradiction and ceaseless revolution totally unbeknownst to any form of Stalinism.

Besides the usual politician (using political rhetoric to polemicize with the opponent) and historicist (referring to historical occurrences to expose the errors in the opponent's position) critiques of Khrushchev, this speech discussed at length the intellectual foundation of Stalinism claimed to be entirely missed by Khrushchev's hasty dismissal of Stalin. We may call this an ideological critique of Khrushchevian Marxism. Hoxha defended Stalin for his residual Leninism rather than condoning his violence or cult of personality—a position which should put the anti-revisionists in a non-antagonistic, yet contradictory, relationship with the Khrushchevians rather than entirely oppositional. On Stalin's irredeemable qualities, the anti-revisionists and the Khrushchevites were actually not as different as they were portrayed to be. Let us read Hoxha's defense of Stalin in full to see how he constructed this revolutionary and international Stalin:

According to the viewpoint of our Party, J.V. Stalin, in his entire theoretical and practical activity, has been and remains one of the most distinguished leaders and personalities not only of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but also of the international communist and workers' movement, one of the most ardent defenders and greatest theoreticians of Marxism-Leninism. His great historic merit lies in the fact that for many years in succession he had been a loyal disciple and determined comrade-in-arms of V.I. Lenin in the struggle for the overthrow of Tzarism and the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution; while following Lenin's death, heading the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he faithfully defended Leninism against the rabid attacks by the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinovievites, and other enemies and routed them ideologically and politically. J.V. Stalin, as the main leader of the Party, made a great contribution to the successful direction of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union and the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascism; he further developed Marxism-Leninism in a series of important questions of the Soviet socialist society and the construction of socialism and communism; he made a valuable contribution to the consolidation of the socialist camp and the international communist movement, as well as to the exposure of modern revisionism in the person of Tito's revisionist traitorous group. By thus appraising J.V. Stalin's activity, there is no doubt that the errors he may have committed during the last years of his life were partial and they cannot serve as a criterion to make a general evaluation of J.V. Stalin's person and his activity. In the general evaluation of J.V. Stalin's activity, in the foreground stand his great merits, his fight for the defense of Leninism, his struggle for the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union, his struggle for the creation and consolidation of the socialist camp, for the strengthening of the unity of the international communist and workers' movement; his consistent fight against imperialism; his policy for the defence of peace and the peaceful coexistence. They constitute his main characteristic feature as a leader and as a communist. Such has been and remains the firm position of the Party of Labor of Albania relating to the evaluation of J.V. Stalin's work.¹¹³⁸

¹¹³⁸ Hoxha, "Speech."

From this lengthy statement, Hoxha related Stalin to Lenin in two prominent ways. First, more biographically, Stalin was both “a loyal disciple” and “determined comrade-in-arms” of Lenin. Despite its straitjacket and simple argumentation that ignored the ideological tension between these two figures, it conveyed a sense that Stalin might have inherited and internalized some aspects of Leninism into himself. Pushing this proposition further to its logical conclusion, Khrushchev’s renunciation of Stalin meant a rejection of Soviet Marxism’s own foundation, hence Marxism-Leninism itself—in other words, an ideological suicide. Second, ideologically, Stalin defended Leninism against its other intellectual oppositions. Through this commitment to Leninism, Stalin, in Hoxha’s construction, became an anti-fascist, internationalist, anti-revisionist, and anti-imperialist—qualities that appeared to be lacking in Khrushchev. Hoxha vividly characterized Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization as an act of “uncrown[ing] Leninism,” laying the ground for “revis[ing] Marxism-Leninism and spread[ing] his opportunist views.”¹¹³⁹ Interestingly, and this is to prove the continuation between Stalin and Leninism, Hoxha utilized Stalin as a theorist of reformist appropriation. In this context, Hoxha referred to Stalin’s preclusion of Trotskyism’s substitution of Leninism as the ideological basis of the party.¹¹⁴⁰ In Stalin’s words quoted by Hoxha: “While he [Trotsky] needs the discredit of Leninism to smuggle in Trotskyism as the ‘only’ ‘proletarian’ ideology (don’t take it for a joke). All this is certain (yes, certainly), done under the banner of Leninism, so that the procedure of this smuggling should be carried out ‘without any damage at all.’” This was indeed intended to parallel Albanian Stalinism’s preemption of Khrushchevian revisionism’s replacement of Leninism.

Peripheral Dialectics and Minor-Communist Internationalist Solidarity

Solidarity for peripheral Marxists always comes from unlikely places as it requires other Marxists embodying and constituted by similar material conditions to comprehend the specific dialectics in the periphery. While the news about anticommunist mass murder in Indonesia made its way to the main CPSU and CCP media, a geohistorical-material analysis on the event either was done by exiled Indonesians themselves or discussed the specific Indonesian condition very minimally when undertaken by non-Indonesians. Indeed, the previous information was given to sharpen a point that a thorough analysis of and internationalist solidarity with Indonesia comes exclusively from a peripheral location: Albania.

Hoxha analyzed the Indonesian genocide of 1965-66 in an article, “The Fascist Coup in Indonesia and the Lessons Communists Draw from It,” published in the Albanian organ *Zëri i Popullit*. One of the opening paragraphs announced gallantly: “The Albanian people and communists express their internationalist solidarity with the Indonesian communists, victims of the fascist terror.”¹¹⁴¹ It is an analysis containing three methodological points that show the dialectical dynamic in peripheral Marxist-Leninist thought linking the part and the whole—as well as the overlapping analytical frames between Left Third-Worldism in the previous chapter and Minor Communism in this chapter. These three methodological points are non-linear and conjunctural conceptions of time-space, an active and contestatory approach to the revolution-reaction dialectics, and anti-revisionist internationalism.

¹¹³⁹ Ibid., page number.

¹¹⁴⁰ Ibid., page number.

¹¹⁴¹ Hoxha, Enver, 1966, “The Fascist Coup in Indonesia and the Lessons Communists Draw from It,” *Zëri i popullit* (11 May): page number 18. Read more of Tirana’s “internationalist effort” in Marku, Ylber, 2021, “Stories from the International Communist Movement: the Chinese Front in Europe and the Limits of the Anti-Revisionist Struggle,” *Cold War History* 21, 2: 139-57.

First, regarding the time-space of the analysis, Hoxha discussed non-linear and conjunctural premises of the global revolution. Advancing “through triumphs and setbacks,” Hoxha asserted, “the revolution never goes straight ahead.”¹¹⁴² These “temporary setbacks” enabled revolutionaries to intensify the remaining revolutionary forces for a qualitative leap to a greater level. Hoxha also contended that “the events in Indonesia are not an isolated phenomenon.” Using macro-analytical language similar to the Left Third-Worldists, Hoxha understood the Indonesian phenomenon as “links of a single chain,” specifically as “a component part of the assault of international reaction against the communist movement and the peoples’ liberation struggle.”¹¹⁴³ Hoxha elucidated the interconnected networks of trans-imperialism, international reaction, and global revisionism by linking “aggressive activity of US imperialism in Vietnam” to “the bloody imperialist intervention in San Domingo and throughout Latin America, with the organization of counter-revolutionary coups against several new states in Africa,” and the Khrushchevite revisionists’ “sabotag[ing] of the peoples’ national liberation struggle, with the active support they are giving US imperialism and all the various reactionaries.”¹¹⁴⁴

Second, concerning the dialectics between reactionary offensive and revolutionary prefiguration, Hoxha analyzed both transformative forces as active and contestatory, rather than automatic and static. The smashing and liquidation of the PKI must be understood as the bourgeoisie and reaction’s “last card,” which was to “set the armed forces in motion,” as a consequence of “the mounting prestige and strength of the communist party and the revolutionary movement of the masses.”¹¹⁴⁵ The opportunists and revisionists actively transmogrified revolutionary communist parties “into parties of social reform, into appendages and assistants of the reactionary bourgeoisie.”¹¹⁴⁶

Because of the reactionaries’ constant appropriation, Hoxha asserted that the revolutionaries needed to equally “take effective measures to prepare for the revolution” including “the education of the communists and the masses in a militant revolutionary spirit” to “concrete preparations to cope with the counter-revolutionary violence of reaction through the revolutionary armed struggle of the popular masses.”¹¹⁴⁷ In addition, revolutionaries ought to “fight courageously against opportunism and its most hideous manifestations—Khrushchevite and Titoite modern revisionism.”¹¹⁴⁸ It was not enough to just “reject the opportunist illusions about the peaceful road” or “to recognize that the only way to seize power is the revolutionary way of armed struggle.”¹¹⁴⁹ In other words, Hoxha argued for a prefigurative approach to the revolution that necessitated an active and constant struggle to create the revolutionary conditions within the expanded milieu of “communist becoming.” It was neither revisionist nor dogmatist but deeply attentive to the shifting material conditions in one’s revolutionary conjuncture.

Lastly, on internationalism, Hoxha returned to Lenin to contend that Marxist-Leninist internationalism must be forged “against the enemies of the proletariat and the peoples, against the capitalists, imperialists, and their allies, against reactionary bourgeoisie, against variants of its ideology”—“one of which at the present time is modern revisionism, headed by Soviet

¹¹⁴² Hoxha, “The Fascist Coup,” 19.

¹¹⁴³ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 24.

revisionism.”¹¹⁵⁰ Not only did Soviet revisionism betray the Leninist basis of revolutionary internationalism, the Khrushchevites also “wanted the whole [international communist] movement to be dependent on them and under their leadership.”¹¹⁵¹ In this formulation, Hoxha both reclaimed the revolutionary form of internationalism from Khrushchev’s revisionist counterpart and at the same time decolonized, to use this dissertation’s terms, “the Communist republics” from Soviet commandism. Hoxha suggested that a more substantive conception of internationalism must account for both party’s independence and basic Marxist-Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism, not treating them as separate as this would lead to pure subjectivism and pure objectivism. While each party had the independence to determine its own line and policy, they must work out “a common line and a common stand on the most fundamental issues” like the struggle against capitalism, imperialism, and modern revisionism.¹¹⁵²

Against the logical predictions in Marx’s *Capital*, as Gramsci forcefully notes, actually-existing proletarian revolutions erupted in the periphery: the Soviet Union and China to the UK and Germany, then all the imperialist peripheries to the empires that combined anti-colonial with anti-capitalist struggles.¹¹⁵³ In the “Long Sixties,” when the Soviet communist center relinquished its Leninist foundations for a more reformist approach with capitalism—a similar reformism of both the Second International and Social Democrats that Lenin painstakingly opposed—it was again the peripheries, now of the Soviet Union, that preserved and advanced the Leninist revolutionary praxes by forming an anti-revisionist minor-communist internationalism contesting both Khrushchev’s revisionism—and internally residual Stalin’s dogmatism.

As a non-ruling communist party, the PKI was central to the formation of minor-communist internationalism both in the Southeast Asian region and abroad with North Korea and Albania. The peripheries have constantly been the revolutionary locus outside of theory. If one wills, “peripheral revolution” is a law rather than an exception. In order to understand the revolutionary process in the periphery that contends with the interlocking forces of capitalism, imperialism, and racism, this dissertation demonstrates that the key is to work through the contradictions generated by these multiple oppressions in a processual movement of peripheral dialectics. It enables us to locate a new and more just world generated from within the peripheral ruination left and still impaired by capitalist exploitation, imperialist subjugation, and racial oppression.

¹¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹¹⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵³ Gramsci, Antonio, [1977] 1917, “The Revolution Against ‘Capital,’” in *Antonio Gramsci: Selections from Political Writings, 1910-1920*, ed. Quintin Hoare, New York: International Publishers, 34-7.

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