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### Conclusions

The achievement of the Batswana in running a sixth consecutive free, fair, democratic, and peaceful election in the post-colonial period has to be recognised and appreciated in its own right and as a key element in, and indicator of, the general record of peace and progress which marks out Botswana from so many other African states. Nonetheless, the results of the 1994 contest do suggest that some qualification of the dominant-party model is necessary to encapsulate the demonstrated strength of opposition and the increased complexity of the electoral situation. To describe a ruling party which can win only just over half of the national vote as dominant might appear to be flattering, particularly when that party's vote fell by 10 per cent and that of its main rival rose by a comparable amount. At a local level, for example in Gaborone, the label of dominant-party now appears more applicable to the BNF than the BDP. Nationally, the outcome suggests the distinct possibility that the BDP could lose power in 1999.

## Estonian Parliamentary Elections, March 1995

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On 20 September 1992 Estonia held its first post-occupation elections for *Riigikogu* (parliament) and president. On 5 March 1995 *Riigikogu* election again took place, as planned, and shifted power from the right toward the center. An ethnic Russian party won seats, which helps alleviate ethnic stress. The largely symbolical president will be elected in 1996—by *Riigikogu* (unless the Constitution is amended).

### Electoral System

To allocate the 101 *Riigikogu* seats, Estonia mixes Finland, Germany, and unique divisors. It starts with Finnish-type 'quasi-list' PR (for terminology see Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) in 11 districts with magnitudes ranging from 7 to 12, for an average of 9.2. (In 1992 there were 12 districts, magnitudes 5 to 13, average 8.4.) Voters write one individual candidate's number on the ballot; they presumably are aware of her list affiliation. Candidates who receive a full simple quota are 'personally elected'. The remainders are added by party (or alliance) lists, and if full quotas materialize, the top vote-getters on the list receive 'district seats'. The seats for list remainders (fractions of quotas), however, are not allocated in districts. Unlike Finland, they are allocated on the basis of nationwide closed lists. As in Germany, allocation is compensatory, so as to restore nationwide PR, subject to a 5 per cent

threshold of votes. Odd quasi-d'Hondt divisors are used: 1, 2<sup>9</sup>, 3<sup>9</sup>, 4<sup>9</sup>, ... The power index 0.9 was slipped in so as to boost slightly the largest party's advantage.

When in 1992 a candidate was elected with a mere 51 personal votes, riding on the coattails of a highly popular one, a restriction was introduced: for district seats a minimum of 0.1 quota (i.e., about 500 votes) must be personally won. The restriction does not apply to nationwide seats, and this way an incumbent was reelected in 1995 with only 98 personal votes; he had received 427 in 1992.

This is the greatest weakness of this needlessly complex system: Voters are required to pick an individual candidate, yet the personal votes received are disregarded when allocating most of the seats. Nationwide closed lists accounted for 60 out of 101 seats in 1992 and 52 in 1995. Of the 101 candidates with the highest votes in 1992 only 56 made it to *Riigikogu* and 63 in 1995. Such discrepancy delegitimizes the system in the eyes of many voters, who feel that politicians appoint themselves regardless of election results.

### Background and Parties

In view of the rapid sociopolitical changes, an exceptional two-and-a-half years was stipulated for the first interval between elections, instead of 4 years in future. The rightist coalition government formed by Mart Laar in the wake of the 1992 election fell in October 1994, but Andres Tarand's caretaker cabinet was largely composed of incumbent ministers. Meanwhile, the party groupings and labels changed almost beyond recognition.

The major government party, Laar's Fatherland, split into three, spawning a new Rightist Party and supplying members to a new Reform Party led by Siim Kallas, head of the Bank of Estonia. The disagreements were largely personal. A junior coalition partner, radical nationalist Independence Party (ERSP), lost the core of its supporters when it made compromises inherent in government. For the 1995 election the rump ERSP joined the rump Fatherland. The other junior partner, Tarand's Moderates, lost key members to Reform Party. All these parties (or alliances) claimed to be rightist, even though the Moderates included a Social Democrat Party. They supported rapid advance toward market economy, which profited younger people and the capital city at the cost of neglecting the countryside and older people.

Outside the government coalition, the former Popular Front completed its transition into a Center Party dominated by former premier (1990-92) Edgar Savisaar. Increasingly, it stressed the plight of pensioners and renters in face of reprivatization of housing. The former Secure Home emerged in late 1994 as Coalition Party and Rural Union (KMÜ), an uneasy coalition of protectionist farm interests and market-oriented former Soviet managers become owners. The city wing was headed by former caretaker premier (1992) Tiit Vähi, the country wing by former figure-head chair of Soviet Estonia (1983-1992), Arnold Rüütel, who maintained considerable personal popularity.

KMÜ immediately began to lead in opinion polls with its ambiguous dual message of continued pro-market reform and increased protectionism and social benefits. Center and Reform parties also surpassed the 10 per cent level, and so did the Moderates, who profited from Tarand's sudden prominence as premier. Fatherland and the Rightists hovered perilously above the 5 per cent threshold. All other groupings fell below. Royalists, a happy bunch who won a surprise 8 seats in 1992, lost

incumbents to Center Party and co-opted the even weaker Greens. Estonian Citizens, ultranationalists led by a US ex-colonel, also won 8 seats in 1992 but broke up later on. Their remnants joined forces with a new radical group, Better Estonia, but failed to come to terms with another, Future Estonia, thus dooming all of them. A group led by the last leader of the Estonian Communist Party changed its name from Left Alternative in 1992 to Justice and coopted some leaders of pensioners' organizations, but it made no headway.

Ethnic Russian colonists continued to receive citizenship, raising the total Russian electorate from about 50,000 in 1992 to about 150,000. (No official record of ethnicity seems to be kept.) Three Russian organizations, ranging from moderate to revanchist, hammered out a coalition named 'Our Home is Estonia' (MKOE), but it remained surprisingly low in opinion polls (around 3 per cent). Most Russians seemed to base their preferences on grounds other than ethnicity. In actual election MKOE doubled its support level and won 6 seats (although it still fell far short of the proportion of Russians in the electorate). Some Russians in Estonia may try to guess at the answer preferred by pollsters rather than reveal their actual intent. Similar discrepancies could be sensed during the 1990 election and the 1991 independence referendum.

Six parties presented nationwide lists with more candidates than seats available in the *Riigikogu*. KMÜ set the record with 168 candidates, possibly reflecting difficulties in consolidating separate draft lists by its urban and rural wings. A total of some 1,200 candidates were registered by 16 groupings, plus 13 independents. Some well-known persons with no intent to serve acted as decoys, heading district lists but placing themselves at the tail end of the national lists.

The campaign was low-key. Reform Party visibly had the most money to spend. (Various business circles supposedly had their favorites, but financial sources were to be reported only after elections.) Royalists and Citizens, who submitted their lists at the last moment, saw a large proportion of their candidates eliminated because of minor errors that other parties had time to correct. The Electoral Commission may have been overly picky, but it probably did not affect the votes, except conceivably in one district where Royalists were left without a single candidate.

### The Outcome

Seven parties won seats: the six that steadily surpassed the 5 per cent threshold in opinion polls, plus the Russian MKOE. KMÜ did as well as expected, with 32.2 per cent votes and 41 seats (40.6 per cent). (See table with election results in *Electoral Studies* 14(2) p. 247.) Its hefty bonus in seats came from votes wasted on small parties, plus the effect of the modified d'Hondt divisors. The recently founded Reform Party (19 seats) propelled itself past the Center (15), and both became favourite coalition alternatives for KMÜ. Fatherland did as expected (8 seats), but Moderates (6 seats) slid, as Tarand's novelty wore off. The Rightists seemed eliminated but then made it by a cliffhanger of some 18 votes, reaching 5.0033 per cent (and 5 seats). The results are based on the Electoral Commission's final results (*Postimees*, 10 March 1995).

The 1995 election marked partial stabilization for the system as such. The number of parties represented in *Riigikogu* with at least one member dropped from 9 to 7. A theoretical model based on magnitude and assembly size (Taagepera and Shugart, 1993) predicts 5.6. Indeed, the ideologically close Reform Party, Fatherland, and Rightists could calculate that failure to consolidate cost them some

5 seats, an incentive for future cooperation. On the other hand, even the KMÜ could easily fall apart. The Laakso-Taagepera effective number of electoral parties (see Taagepera and Shugart, 1989 77-91, and Lijphart, 1994 67-72) decreased from 9.0 to 5.9 and that of legislative parties from 5.2 to 4.1—which is already comparable to Sweden 1991 (4.2) and Norway 1993 (4.0), to take some long-established PR systems in nearby countries.

Deviation from PR (Loosemore-Hanby index) decreased from 18 to 13 per cent, which is still high compared to the worldwide median of 7.5% (based on Taagepera and Shugart, 1989 106-107) and may lead to renewed popular doubts (as in 1992) of whether the system is truly democratic. The Gallagher (1991) least-squares index of deviation (Lijphart, 1994 60-62) actually increased slightly, from 7.1 to 7.4 per cent. By next election some of the parties that failed to win representation may fold or join larger parties, thus reducing the number of wasted votes and hence deviation from PR.

By one measure the party system is still far from stability. From 1992 to 1995, the shift in votes and seats between parties was huge, comparable in the Western world only to Canada's sea change of 1993. Measured like Loosemore-Hanby deviation, the picture is the following:

	Deviation (per cent)	
	from previous outcome	
	<i>votes</i>	<i>seats</i>
Estonia 1992 to 1995	54	55
Canada 1988 to 1993	42	68

Due to the workings of one-seat districts, the shift in seats was larger in Canada, but the underlying shift in votes was larger in Estonia. Part of it is misleading, though. At least 44 of the 101 incumbents ran and were re-elected, but 16 of them ran under a different party label: 8 former Fatherland deputies as Rightists or Reformists, 2 Moderates and 2 Centrists as Reformists, 2 Royalists and the sole Entrepreneur as Centrists, and the sole Green as KMÜ. The next election (presumably in 1999) may see further new party labels, but it is likely to see largely the same faces.

A coalition cabinet of KMÜ with Center Party was favored by considerations of smallest minimum winning coalitions with minimal number of parties. The KMÜ-Reform alternative was less appealing to the protectionist rural wing of the KMÜ. There was also the possibility of KMÜ breaking up under the stress of coalition talks, leading to quite different combinations. After a month of intense wrangling, a KMÜ-Center coalition materialized.

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