

Toward *un estado plurinacional*: An Interview with John Beverley on Postsubaltern Studies

Isabel Gómez, Rafael Ramírez Mendoza, and Sandra Ruiz
University of California, Los Angeles

On May 17th 2013, Professor John Beverley of the University of Pittsburgh sat down with three of *Mester's* editors for a conversation around his recent work *Latinamericanism After 9/11* (2011) and the context in which he posits a new “postsubalternist” phase to the field. The interview took place the day after Professor Beverley’s talk “Regarding Latinamericanism: Is A Paradigm Shift Necessary?” hosted by Motus Sodalís and the Department of Spanish & Portuguese.

During that talk, Professor Beverley framed the question of what happens when organic and pluralistic social movements become a part of the state. Because of specific changes in the geopolitical landscape, he argues for a shift beyond the subalternist paradigm that rested on a binary divide between hegemony and the subaltern. To trace the reasoning behind his move toward a “postsubalternist” approach, he identifies a set of changing conditions that began before 9/11 but were confirmed by that event; these include the increasingly plurinational foundations of new Latin American constitutional democracies and the replacement of Latin America with the Middle East as the object of the USA’s greatest interventionist activity.

Professor Beverley’s visit happened to follow a talk and reading in our department by Mexican novelist Jorge Volpi. In evaluating his position in relation to other approaches to the field, Beverley named Volpi as prime example of an opposite paradigm, a more conservative or even “annexationist” model that seeks to embrace neoliberal policies and cultural or economic affinities with the USA. Beverley cites Volpi’s *El insomnio de Bolívar* in *Latinamericanism After 9/11* saying “Quizá la única manera de llevar a cabo el sueño de Bolívar sea dejando de lado a América Latina” (Volpi 148, cited in Beverley

14). Since his book *Against Literature* (1993) Beverley has read the production of an elite readership through literary works as a part of the conservative and reactionary axis of Latin American culture. Here at UCLA, we are pleased to have had the opportunity to hear directly from all sides of these debates.

Mester: In your most recent book, *Latinamericanism after 9/11* (2011), you introduce the paradigm of Postsubaltern Studies. Could you explain how this new positionality differs from and/or enhances Subaltern Studies?

John Beverley: Subaltern Studies flourished in the late '80s-'90s, and the project runs into a series of problems in the new century. But there was a tension from the beginning within both South Asian and Latin American Subaltern Studies between what you might call the articulation of subalternity as a problem of non-representation and the politics of the subaltern.

The first articulation is subalternity understood as discrimination, lack of significant voice. This branch was conceived primarily in the British colonial context, and Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988), of course, was the manifesto of what we might call the deconstructive mode of subalternity. Subalternity is always that which escapes hegemonic representation, even if that hegemonic representation may be popular or democratic in some way.

The other aspect of subalternity would be defined as the place from which new political challenges to the existing system would emerge. A position of inequality—almost necessarily—would generate a kind of negation. In Ranajit Guha's book, *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (1999), negation is not just a passive position outside of representation, but acts. And so the notion of the politics of a subaltern or the politics of the poor is the other dimension.

One could say—in the Latin American framework—that the subaltern does have some kind of voice with the new governments of the left. Those governments depend on the articulation of some form of hegemony—popular democratic, populist, multi-class, multi-alliance, whatever the form may take. These new conditions produce a tension in Subaltern Studies, because the binary between subalternity and hegemony no longer works effectively when the subaltern itself is now articulating a hegemonic position. Bolivia is an *estado plurinacional*.

That is a hegemonic position, whatever you want to say about it, it is a hegemonic position.

On the other hand, Subaltern Studies opened up a series of interrogations in field of the social: Women Studies, Cultural Studies, Queer Studies. I don't want to say that Subaltern Studies and everything it produced was a waste of time. So instead I conceived of a postsubalternist position that no longer depended on the dichotomy between the state and civil society, between hegemony and subalternity. In other words: it carries with it the intellectual experience and the new perspectives that had been generated around Subaltern Studies, it doesn't reject that work.

M: Alberto Moreiras has critiqued your last book with the argument that a postsubaltern paradigm fetishizes the leaders of the *marela rosada* and promote accepting their actions without criticism.¹ What do you think about this? What is your response to these critiques?

JB: Well, I wouldn't say I fetishize the leaders. But in the last chapter of my book I do put Gayatri Spivak in conversation with Alvaro García Linera, the vice president of Bolivia; I favor García Linera, but that's as far as I go.²

It's hard to say what to make of the critical question—I am critical all the time of things that my government does, and certainly Latin American governments do. Maybe I'm favorable to a general historical movement that seems to be occurring with these governments, and in Latin America, and in the Third World in general, the rise of China, shifting balance of power in the world. But I am not giving the governments a clean slate. Wasn't it Chávez who said about Obama, if he lived in the United States he would vote for Obama and if Obama lived in Venezuela? He would probably vote for Chávez. I would probably vote for Chávez too, but that doesn't mean I like everything either leader has done.

Perhaps one of the signs of my postsubalternist shift is that I started reading a lot of Hegel and Huntington, and geopolitical issues began to interest me in new ways. Not the old Latinamericanism of *la raza cósmica*, which was tied with elite conceptions of how Latin America was going to develop, where *mestizaje* is the ideal of Latin American culture. One commonality among cultural theories from the '90s: they were directed against a normative notion of *mestizaje* as a cultural model for Latin American modernity. (Although *mestizaje*

still comes up—but when it does it has to be redefined, especially in ways that are more attentive to indigenous questions.)

Because he is a deconstructionist and deeply ahistoricist, I don't think Alberto can quite capture that sense of a historical shift. I make the claim in the book that, while deconstruction had a role in rethinking Latin American cultural and literary theory in the '90s, because of the collapse of previous models such as *mestizaje* or *transculturación*, it seems to me tied to the defeat of the left. In Europe too—the emergence of Derrida and deconstruction seems closely tied to the impasse of the European left. And therefore it articulates itself in a mode of melancholy, in the sense that Freud means, *melancholia*. It's tied to a dead object and can't quite defect itself. That dead object is its condition of possibilities, the condition of possibilities of showing the absurdity of all hegemonic discourse. It becomes overinvested in a kind critique by itself, without negotiating with the spear of elections and political alliance that can do the job of social transformation.

M: Along the same vein, how do you evaluate the recent movements such as *los indignados* in Spain, the student movement in Chile, “Yo Soy 132” in Mexico, the Occupy Movement in the United States, along with their implications and consequences? Do you think we are seeing them as an event in the sense that Alain Badiou defines, that we are now working through new possibilities made available? Have there been any shifts in your opinion regarding these movements?

JB: No. I mean, I welcome the movements—I thought they were very exciting. We can also think of the World Social Forum as a connector for a lot of these different groups. I can't say I'm against them because they represent genuine anger and frustration and new ways of thinking about how to do politics. But I think on the whole, as with the Arab Spring, the results have been disappointing. They start well and generate a lot of enthusiasm—not just among people close to the movements, also widely throughout society. But they end up trailing off because they don't have what I would call a political perspective. Here I mean politics in a very old-fashioned, narrow sense of building parties and coalitions and getting people elected.

Instead, I think the energy of these movements is precisely to create a new sort of consciousness in civil society that would somehow bypass a political system that they consider corrupt, kind of like the Zapatistas. I do have a lot of friends who are involved in Occupy

in Pittsburgh, but the result is that there's never a political horizon. They didn't even say: "we think it would be a good idea to nationalize the banks. The banks caused this crisis, why don't we nationalize the banks and have some kind of citizens' control?" They can't even say that because there is no agreement, even if they could create a political coalition. That is the distinction, the distinction between these kinds of new social movement caused by the capitalist crisis to a large extent. It's incredible to think that fifty percent of Spanish young people are unemployed, right?

But I guess what I'm looking for shows nostalgia for the good old days of party politics, a specifically political form that could make an impact at the level of national politics. It seems Occupy raised all these questions and then disappeared—unless you argue that Occupy kept people animated about Obama and therefore prevented the youth vote from totally disappearing for Obama in this election, which some people feared it might. The Tea Party seems to have more political consequences than Occupy, but the Tea Party got candidates elected, or forced existing candidates to abide by its agenda.

M: How has Chávez's death changed the political landscape in Latin America? How do you think this particular passing influences or will influence Latin American politics or Latinamericanism?

JB: I think Chávez's death makes its own left project—to the extent that there is an interconnected left, and I do think it is. Jorge Volpi has made the point in *El insomnio de Bolívar* [2009] that there isn't really a Latin American left, one left, but instead there are many different local movements that each has a local dynamic. I think that's incorrect in some ways: there is some interconnection. Chávez, the Bolivians, and the Brazilians were the lynchpins in those interconnections; Brazilians because they were so big and Chávez because he was so inventive. He thought about new ways of using money to sponsor Latin American unity, such as developing a new television network, ALBA [Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América], different kinds of initiatives.

I think Chávez's death is a point of weakness that the Latin American right can exploit to try to get back in power or discredit these regimes. Because they do have a lot of contradictions, there are real dissatisfactions. In Venezuela, there are all sorts of dissatisfactions, with food, services, crime, corruption. It pushes back in the

direction that maybe we should have gone with the United States, that is a more orderly process. The Latin American middle class loves Miami, buys a lot of apartments there. Miami is a model of a city that is Latin American but not too corrupt or crime ridden. Miami instead of Caracas. Where would you rather live, Miami or Caracas?

M: Well, I'd rather live in Rio! Which brings me to my next question about Brazil. Some have criticized President Dilma Rousseff for initiating a truth commission process about the military dictatorship while an amnesty law remains in place. What is your opinion on this?

JB: I think Brazil is a big cookie in all of this, and that's a new fact in Latinamericanism, because we no longer have to think of Latinamericanism as an essentially Hispanic based project with a supplementary Portuguese-Iberian, Portuguese-African component. It used to be, when I was a student, there was Spanish-Spanish literature: I was a Golden Age Hispanist, and we had a couple of professors who did Latin American, younger guys, and they would do really canonic Latin American novels, or if they were really advanced they would do Borges or Cortázar, that would be about as far as you could go. And then, things developed in the last twenty or thirty years, Latin America came to have more weight in the American academy. Although, I think a lot of departments are still peninsular dominated departments but most departments have shifted somewhat in the direction of Latin America. In the case of my department, we just decided to get rid of peninsular completely and focus on Latin America. We had limited resources, we were being re-trenched and we said "we are good at doing Latin American, we cannot do both really well, so let's do one well." But now, we are still called the Department of Hispanic Languages and Literatures, and so Portuguese still has a supplementary position. That is going shift in the next twenty years, the supplementarity of Portuguese and Brazil is going shift, but it hasn't yet. I think Asian-Iberian Studies is the other dimension we are going to see more of, because even with Postcolonial Studies, only very few people have begun to give sustained attention to the Iberian presence in Asia. Though, if you read all those 16th century epics, like Vasco da Gama, they are all full of Asian motifs.

I like Dilma Rousseff a lot. One of the chapters in the book has to do with how you recuperate the heritage of the armed struggle in Latin America, and I'm arguing there against what I call a "paradigm

of disillusion.” That is where the recuperation of the armed struggle is done by people who either supported it or were involved in it, but now bitterly regret their involvement. The attitude is “well, that was our youth, and now we’ve grown up, we’re more mature, we have kids and businesses, we realize that was all a kind of folly—so we’ve now renounced that past and the reality principle is neo-liberalism, the market economy, democratic institutions.” That is “the paradigm of disillusion” which operates in a lot of contemporary Latin American art, literature and movies. In the third part of *Amores Perros* [2000] for example, the character El Chivo was a former guerrilla who abandoned his family and now wants to make a reconciliation.

I read a terrific interview with Dilma in *The New Yorker*, and they asked her about that: You were a guerrilla, you were tortured. Do you have any regrets? Do you renounce having been a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla? And she thought for a moment and she said: You know I wouldn’t do that now, but having done that is what made it possible for me to be who I am now. I thought that was a great answer. She didn’t renounce her past. That gets out of the neo-liberal reality principle, that as you grow up, the only thing you can be is a good market liberal.

The amnesty, I don’t know, it is a political calculation. I guess there are always pros and cons, like Bush used to say, Somebody has to be the *decisionator*. Isn’t that his phrase? The only thing I could say is that I’m glad the *decisionator* is Dilma and not some right-wing guy; she’ll try to make what she considers the most just position. The most desirable position, obviously, was that they would send all these guys to jail, and hopefully for the rest of their lives. But you know, it is a big country, and there are lots of power games. I don’t know how that works in Brazil, a country I know very little about. I assume because it is a Workers Party government and because Dilma is the kind of person she is, if they are giving amnesty it is because they felt that was politically expedient in some way. But it’s a hard call, because you’ve got to keep the army in line in some way or another, you don’t want the army running off to the United States, which they are ready to do because most of them got trained by the United States. You got to keep them in some kind of nationalist framework; maybe if you’re too hard on them they could get a little angry.

M: Shifting gears a little bit, there are other geopolitical scholarly paradigms, such as Transatlantic Studies, or Hemispheric Studies, or New American Studies, what do you think about these? How might they be in conflict or is Postsubaltern Studies a contestation to any of these other models?

JB: No, I don't think so. An egalitarian ethos, or an egalitarian imaginary, is fundamental to Subaltern Studies and Postsubalternism. Subalternity doesn't have to be in a colonial situation, but always involves cultural or social subordination. I think there's a famous definition by Ranajit Guha that subalternity is a condition of subordination for reasons of caste, class, race, sex, office, age, or any other reason. That egalitarian ethos is present and my own work has turned to try to get a better hold on the whole question of equality. I'm interested in the philosophical debates about equality, Rousseau, how equality is tied up with certain kinds of aesthetic imaginaries, the pastoral, the idea of the Golden Age. I found surprising arguments in favor of human equality in Hobbes. Hobbes says, since even the weakest of men can kill the strongest of men, therefore, all men are equal. No man should consider himself above anybody else because even a *schlump* can kill a big strong guy. All men are equal in their hostilities to each other and their capacity and desire to kill each other. I'm interested in equality, and that, in a curious way, has led me back to Golden Age literature, which is where I started my career. So I'm reading the *Quixote* a lot again, talking a lot about questions of equality in *el Quixote*. The whole question was present in some of my early criticism about the relationship between literature and inequality. [In *Against Literature*] I wrote about the way literature could, in Latin America for example as in *La ciudad letrada*, produce a caste of writing subjects who were in some ways symmetrical with the ruling subjects.

I do Atlantic Studies in this sense: if I focus on the Baroque it will include Spanish and Latin American Baroque. It seems completely artificial to say Góngora is a Spanish writer and Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz is a Latin American writer. If you're doing a Latin American course, you could include Sor Juana but, you cannot include Góngora and vice versa. I once included Sor Juana in a Baroque course, and my chair at the time, Mabel Moraña, said: You can't include that John. And I said: What do you mean I can't do that? Her poems were published in Madrid in the 1680's. But for years she was read as a Latin

American writer and the field was divided. I like that Atlantic Studies lets us consider that it's part of one big system. The one reservation I had from the beginning about Atlantic is the absence of a real consideration of the Asian and Pacific dimension.

M: Abril Trigo, for example, has mentioned that for him Transatlantic Studies is like a new Spanish imperialism?³ What do you think about that?

JB: Yes, it's become that, I'm afraid. My colleague Sara Castro-Klaren has made that argument very strongly, several times. It's a way that Spain has of re-hegemonizing the discourse. A Pacific orientation would not escape that problem either, because the Philippines could also be claimed by Spain. But, I think that Transpacific Studies is a little more complicated because the Pacific implies a relationship between Pacific-South America (México, and Peru mainly, and Chile to some extent) and the Philippines. This needs to be understood as an independent dynamic, not completely independent though, but independent of the specifically colonial-colonizing dynamic. For example, trade relations between Lima and the Philippines.

M: What do you think about Hemispheric Studies and American Studies?

JB: Well, I guess I could say I do Hemispheric Studies, every now and then I teach US Latino literature, novels like *Almanac of the Dead* [1992]. It's by an American Indian writer, Leslie Marmon Silko. It's a huge novel, set in Tucson, but it spreads out all over the United States and into Central America, into Zapatismo, into Indian territorialities. The most ambitious thing I've seen lately in U.S. Latino literature is this novel, which brings together the indigenous, working class, U.S. Latino, Black, Cuban, Central America, ultra-leftist transnational, Occupied Wall Street—it's kind of a mish-mash but in a very interesting way.

I am most interested in the situation of how U.S. Latinos will articulate themselves culturally as a group in the United States within the next century. My argument is that they are a part of Latin America because of language and cultural ties, even though most of them are here because they wanted to get out of Latin America. You want to give that the most progressive articulation possible, but of course, that necessarily would involve a redefinition of the United States. We would have to see the United States as *un estado plurinacional*, in which one

of the *plurinacional* components was a Hispanic population, which will continue to speak Spanish. On the whole, the Hispanic population in the States is bilingual where as the Anglo population is monolingual. I'm interested in that connection with Latin America. I'm also aware that it's a class question because the overwhelming majority of Hispanics in the United States are lower-middle class or working class.

So Hemispheric Studies seems interesting in that sense, particularly if it begins to register what I think, if my historical predictions are right, is a shift in the balance of power between the United States and Latin America. Maybe just symbolically, but I see 9/11 as a moment of a shift, almost like a millennial shift, where the United States had the upper hand for many centuries, at least five hundred years. But now, there's a slight shift and that's my explanation of why Obama's politics have been, to my way of thinking, somewhat on the reactionary side. Obama is aware of this shift, he's aware that his responsibility as an American president is to keep American power intact and not simply let the Latin Americans run, which you would have thought he would have been more inclined to do.

M: You mention that the writer Silko is an indigenous woman, but she writes in English not in an indigenous language. For you, is Translation Studies or the practice of translation productive or maybe counterproductive for a postsubaltern move? Some postcolonial thinkers, like Emily Apter, seem to be excited by the potential of translation, and work from ideas of untranslatability to promote translation zones as alternatives to war zones. And others, like Spivak, have been dismissive of translation and talked about the epistemic violence that comes from translating texts that are written in languages that are threatened. I wanted to hear what you thought about translation itself and also Translation Studies?

JB: I did at a certain time in my career write a translation, I had a writing block so I wanted to write between phases. I think one of my most influential books was a group of translations I put together under the title *The Postmodernism Debate in Latin America* [1995]. One of the purposes of the book was, of course, to bring a Latin American discussion of postmodernism to the attention of an American audience. I did it through *boundary 2*, and the journal made it into a book to bring this debate to a wider audience. That's always a problem. Americans do not know much about Latin America, even intelligent Americans,

you always have to fill them in on the story about Honduras. Honduras? Was he a good guy or a bad guy?

But even then, ideologically I felt like I agreed slightly more with the Spivak position: that translation had been tied up with colonial violence since the beginning. That la Malinche model of a translator, right? I was in an *against translation* mode for a while. Not that I would have ever made a big deal about it, but I remember going to a translation conference once, it was at Pitt [University], and I raised concerns, probably in an excessive demagogic way. My wife says that I was too demagogic about Volpi yesterday. So maybe I was too demagogic about translation, translation as an intervention in colonialism.

I think what Spivak is worried about—more than translation, it seems to me—is a kind of new writing. She is concerned about thinking, which is based on the principle of the person doing the work, being in this cosmopolitan space where different languages, cultural traditions, and histories pass through that person. What are the claims of authority such a position might have? This in a sense would be a critique of herself, as a kind of mediator in the American academy, or the global academy of different languages, social positionalities. Spivak's works with a literacy program in very poor schools in India, and she funds them with money she makes from her lectures, she goes there every now and then. Kind of like Oprah, she had that school in South Africa, right? Gayatri as a kind of Oprah. But Oprah wanted to create a school more for students like you, who would go to UCLA or Oxford. Where I think, Gayatri is more interested in schools for really poor peasants who otherwise would probably have no education at all, zero.

That question of being in a place where you still want to keep the framework of the national intact—that was one thing I was arguing yesterday. I don't think the question of U.S. Hispanics can be detached from the question of the U.S. as a nation. I do realize that the whole question of citizenship is a lot more complicated now. People are flying back to Michoacán, or the Mexican consulate here in L.A. will allow them to vote in Mexican elections. Where you are, in relation to national citizenship, is more complicated now than it used to be. But the question of Hispanics in the U.S. for the future has to be in some ways a national question. I think it would imply redefining the nation in some ways that would involve changing language prescriptions. That already happens in places like UIC [University of Illinois

at Chicago], I don't know if you have that in L.A., I've only been here a few days. If you go to Chicago, everything is bilingual, like the subways and bathrooms.

M: Those indicators of state presence are often multilingual, but education seldom has been in the US. In California it was a huge debate. I like your idea that to redefine a nation as plurinational will also require a redefinition of the languages we speak.

JB: Canadians require students to take French; I don't know how well that works. My sense is that Canadian and Australian multiculturalism is more advanced than U.S. multiculturalism. It has to do with the commonwealth structure of those two countries, which allowed alternative forms of territoriality. Since they were dependent on the king and not on private property, or a federal state, which made citizenship the main criteria. If you are a citizen you can't have alternative forms of political territoriality.

I had an ancestor who was a Virginian planter-aristocrat-writer, and he wrote one of the first histories of Virginia, "The History of Virginia 1700." Kind of a creole text, it is famous in American literature because it idealizes the Indians. The lower class people in Virginia hated Indians and wanted to kill them for that land to make farms for themselves—they would become the Jacksonians, the roots of the Democratic Party. Whereas the aristocratic planters are for the Indians, they live in a state of nature and represent the Golden Age. But eighty years later, Jefferson, who is of the same class, is thinking about the Indian problem and decides that a co-existence between indigenous peoples and a new nation-state is impossible, so they have to be gotten rid of.

But the Australians and the Canadians—even though there are horrible stories there too, indigenous children brought to schools to be educated to be white kids—they seem to have preserved the notion that you can have a territoriality that is multi. The king allows it, that is precisely what kings do, for the Scots or the Chippewa.

M: How do you see your scholarship in relationship to a legacy of Latinamericanism written from within Latin America by thinkers including Ángel Rama, Roberto Fernández Retamar, Antonio Cornejo Polar?

JB: I see myself as very much in that line. The only difference is that my name is John Beverley and their name is Ángel Rama, and that's a

big difference. For a long time—when I was more enthusiastic about the Cuban Revolution than I am now—I wanted to publish in the Cuban cultural journal, *Casa de las Américas*, but I couldn't. Now I can publish in it a lot, but back then they would say: No, we can't publish you, John. We like your work, but we can't publish a gringo. That's a kind of cultural taboo in some ways.

But my generation and not just of Americans versus Latin-Americans marks a key shift from the thinking about culture of the generation of Rama, Retamar, Antônio Candido, Roberto Schwarz in this sense that they were concerned with the problem of coloniality in Latin American culture. Their solution for that was, I think the model was [José María] Arguedas' in a way, the Peruvian Arguedas, Borges too in a different way: a writer who is able to synthesize a specifically Latin American perspective—a specifically Latin American sense of history, time, media, visual circumstances, language. Arguedas had that famous debate with himself about whether to write in Quechua or in Spanish, and solved that by saying: I'm going to write in Spanish but I'm going to inflect my Spanish with Quechua, the form of life of Quechua would somehow or another be present in the kind of Spanish I write. That was the solution of transculturation that Rama wrote so eloquently. I would say that my own work and the work of my generation in general, or at least the part of it that I am in touch with, Subaltern Studies, both reject that transculturation is the solution to cultural difference and put more attention on the question of heterogeneity. The question of heterogeneity can have different registers, including the questions of indigenous literature and Cultural Studies, looking at cultural productions happening below the level of what we would consider literature, such as television, film, or popular music.

Notes

1. "If Beverley wants to call his position 'postsubalternist,' and if he wants to make of it his principled reason for support of Latin American *mareas rosadas* governments, I will hold on to my subalternism and very much refuse principled support in that respect to the populist leaders, just as much as I may withhold it from the neoliberals or the conservatives. If I am Plato to the Sophists, then it seems to me Beverley might be a Sophist who has always already assumed that his students are foolish children who must be guided with tall tales and whatever scary stories one can invent so that they sleep

comfortably in the night and keep quiet while the parents do their work.” 227. (Moreiras, Alberto. “The Fatality of (My) Subalternism: A Response to John Beverley.” *CR: The New Centennial Review* 12.2 (2012): 217-46)

2. “Spivak and García Linera are talking about the same thing here: the social groups left out or only partially incorporated (“excluded from decision making”; “below the attempted reversals of capital logic”) by the postcolonial nation-state’s project of modernization and secularization—and in similar ways. That is, the ‘subaltern.’ Yet the logic of their arguments is strikingly different. In Spivak, the subaltern is a ‘space’ or ‘habitat’ that is outside of the nationalist articulation of the postcolonial state and the sphere of politics or trade union struggle—that is, outside of (or below) hegemony. The subaltern cannot speak. The task of the critical intellectual is to represent, or ‘read,’ to use Spivak’s own term, this constitutive dilemma, and to lend one’s solidarity in what is essentially an ethical gesture. For García Linera, by contrast, the very logic of the demands of the social movements or ‘popular groupings’ lead them ‘necessarily’—his own characterization—to pose the question of ‘a radical transformation of the dominant state form.’ Whether those demands take an electoral or an insurrectionary form (García Linera allows for both), they must create a new form of hegemony. The subaltern can not only speak, it can and should govern, and its form of government will be a ‘buen gobierno.’” (119-20) Beverley, John. *Latinamericanism After 9/11*. Durham: Duke UP, 2011.

3. Trigo, Abril. “Los estudios transatlánticos y la geopolítica del neo-hispanismo”. *Cuadernos de Literatura* 16.31 (2012): 16-45.