UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Basque Culture and Identity in Buenos Aires, Argentina

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree Master of Arts

in

Latin American Studies

by

Troy Andreas Kokinis

Committee in charge:

Professor Carlos Waisman, Chair
Professor Michael Monteon, Co-Chair
Professor Milos Kokotovic

2013

The thesis of Troy Andreas Kokinis is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

_____

_____
Co-Chair

_____
Chair

University of California, San Diego

2013

For Johnny Olmos -
A dear friend who I truly miss.

A rush and a push and the land that we stand on is ours.
It has been before so it shall be again.
And people who are uglier than you and I - they take what they need, and just leave.

Steven Patrick Morrissey

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Basque Culture and Identity in Buenos Aires, Argentina

by

Troy Andreas Kokinis

Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

University of California, San Diego, 2013

Professor Carlos Waisman, Chair
Professor Michael Monteon, Co-Chair

Argentina has received thousands of Basque migrants, admitting the highest influxes during its era of mass immigration from 1880-1940. Amongst the contemporary Basque-Argentine population, which predominately consists of later generations, many still make an effort to distinguish themselves as Basques within Argentine society. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, by using both primary and secondary sources, this

thesis traces the historical development of Basque identity in Argentina. In doing so, it examines the dominant discourses regarding the role of immigration in Argentine identity, and analyzes where the Basque immigrant fits into the debates. Next, by drawing on data gathered from surveys and ethnography, this thesis examines contemporary forms of identity expression in members of the Basque Diaspora community who actively participate in Basque culture centers in Buenos Aires. I argue that Basque identity in Argentina highlights identity components that are also emphasized in the Basque homeland: language preservation and support for independence. Moreover, in comparison to many European diaspora communities in the United States, Basques in Argentina have maintained a distinct identity, that combines "symbolic identity" with traditional forms of collective identity expression.

Chapter I:
Introduction

Diaspora communities throughout the world differ in the extent by which they preserve and practice their homeland customs in their host countries. Some, such as the Basques in Argentina, can trace their roots in the "host country" back centuries. But a notable proportion of the Basque-Argentine population actively performs and preserves their Basque identities; this activity and sentiment can be found most vividly in the over one hundred Basque culture centers throughout Argentina.

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, by using both primary and secondary sources, this thesis traces the historical development of Basque identity in Argentina. In doing so, it examines the dominant discourses used in regards to the role of immigration in Argentine identity and analyzes where the Basque immigrant fits into the debates. Next, by drawing on data gathered from surveys and ethnography, this thesis examines contemporary forms of identity expression in members of the Basque Diaspora community who actively participate in Basque culture centers in Buenos Aires.

Basque presence in the New World can be traced back to the voyage of Columbus. Since, Basques have made many contributions to the social, political and economic structures of Latin America, and Argentina is no exception. Evita Peron, Justo Jose de Urquiza, Juan Bautista Alberdi, Pedro Eugenio Aranburu, Jose Felix Uriburu, and Hipolito Yrigoyen are among some of the many national figures in Argentina that trace their ancestry to the Basque Country. After acknowledging the array of high profile Basques in Argentina, it becomes clear why many consider Basques in Argentina, and

throughout Latin America, to be members of an elite class of old wealth families and landed oligarchs.

However, regardless of the contributions that Basques have made to the development and maintenance of mainstream social and political institutions in Latin America, the Basque homeland still shares many similarities with some of Latin America's most oppressed ethnic groups, the indigenous population. Since the late nineteenth century, Basques in the homeland have recognized their conflict as an ethnic nation within the larger hegemonic state of Spain. This conflict took its most extreme form during the military dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975), in which the regime specifically targeted the Basque region in a project of national unification, nearly causing Basque language and culture to fall victim to linguistic and cultural genocide. Eventually, the resistance movements to Madrid's homogenization projects began to identify with "fourth world" solidarity movements of anti-imperialism that emphasize the struggle of indigenous culture and identity against occupying, Western institutions. But long before the development of this conflict, the Basque Country sent many immigrants to the shores of Argentina and has since maintained a close relationship with the diaspora community, through both private and institutional social networks.

I share similar criticisms with Arnd Schneider in recognizing that existing literature surrounding immigration in Argentina primarily focuses on the immigrant identity as a relic of the past and subscribes to a research paradigm that views Argentina as a "melting pot of races" (Schneider, 27). Schneider specifically recognizes that Argentina tried to ignore and forget its immigrant origins until the 1950s, declaring, "There was no need to look for specific European identities, when the attributes of status

and prestige were seen as intrinsic products of Argentine society (Schneider, 27). Furthermore, Gino Germani declares that immigrants did not necessarily "assimilate" into Argentine society, but instead Argentine society fused together immigrant cultures and identities to formulate the *new*, modernized Argentina (Germani, 173). According to Schneider, the new Argentina was seen only to consist of "different classes and interest groups," but not ethnic groups (Schneider, 26).

In the case of the Basque Diaspora in Argentina, most historical literature focuses on contributions of Basques to Argentine society, social networks within the Basque community, and the economic roles of Basques in their new homeland (Azcona 2004; Douglass and Bilbao 1975; Moya 1998). These works offer very solid impressions of how Basques developed socially and economically in Argentina, but the works fall short in providing any discourse analysis of perceptions of Basque identity, both within the Basque community itself and among fellow Argentines. In other words, the works offer a very clear understanding of what Basques were doing in Argentina as an immigrant community, but the works do not go into depth about how Basques perceived themselves, nor how Basques were perceived by those outside of their ethnic community. This is not to say that previous scholars subscribe to the "melting pot" theory, but instead they have looked at the Basque Diaspora through a lens of economic and political history rather than one of a history of mentality.

Other works focus primarily on contemporary perceptions of Basque identity in the diaspora. For example, Gloria Totoricaguena argues that the Basque diaspora community "represents the extraterritoriality of Basqueness" and is not simply a

reproduction of homeland networks, culture and culture; instead it is immigrant specific and maintained through ethnic organizations" (Totoricaguena, xiv-xv).

This thesis seeks to expand on the existing literature by offering an examination of both historical and contemporary Basque identity. Not only does it present a history of Basque identity from within the Basque Diaspora community, but it also attempts to place Basque identity in the historical development of Argentine national identity. Moreover, the thesis offers an assessment of contemporary Basque identity in Argentina based on empirical evidence from ethnographic and survey data.

The thesis is divided into three sections: First, I present a brief history of Basque identity in the homeland, where I use existing literature to develop a foundational understanding of the relevant ideological, political and cultural influences on Basque identity. Next, I trace the discourse surrounding Basque identity in Argentina to examine both how Basques recognize themselves and how they were viewed by the greater Argentine society. Finally, I examine contemporary identity in the Basque diaspora using an accepted lens of analysis for later generations of immigrant communities, "symbolic identity."

I argue that Basque identity in Argentina highlights identity components that are also emphasized in the Basque homeland: language preservation and support for independence. Moreover, in comparison to many European diaspora communities in the United States, Basques in Argentina have maintained a distinct identity, that combines "symbolic identity" with traditional forms of collective identity expression.

Chapter II:
Basque Identity in the Homeland

Before diving into the case of Basque identity in Argentina, it is important to have a basic foundational knowledge of the historical development of Basque identity in the homeland. Basque nationalism can be divided into two separate waves, which took place in the late nineteenth century and the mid twentieth century. Both waves consist of distinct characteristics that often conflict with one another. However, neither movement truly gained unanimous support among the heterogeneous Basque population, as both sought to homogenize identity in efforts to achieve statehood.

Modern Basque nationalism first developed in the late nineteenth century as a result of the Carlist Wars and intensified industrial development in the Basque region. After enduring defeat in 1876, Basques lost autonomous rule of their region that was previously granted by foral rights. Governors, or *fueros*, represented small villages throughout the Basque region, and met routinely in the town of Guernica to discuss the local political and economic climate. The loss of foral rights as a result of the wars left the future of Basque identity uncertain, as the Basque region was integrated under the political system of Castile.

At the same time, capital investment from the south flooded the Basque Country, as investors sought to take advantage of the open trade and resources available in the region. Populations in many small Basque cities began to grow, as many laborers from the south followed capital in search of the jobs created by the founding of new enterprises in the region (Payne, 53-54). Euskara, the native Basque language, began to clash with

Castilian, as many of the new workers and capitalists were not willing to learn a language that was only spoken in the Basque provinces.

By the l890s, Basque nationalism developed into a cohesive and serious political movement with the ideas of Sabino Arana. During this time, Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), designed the Basque flag, and gave a name to the Basque homeland, Euzkadi (Payne, 74). Throughout this period known as the Restoration Era, race and language were intricately discussed in intellectual circles. Some intellectuals, such as Miguel de Unamuno, saw teaching Euskara as a way to assimilate immigrant workers, which was a model used in Catalonia to assimilate new immigrants by teaching them Catalan. However, Sabino Arana remained focused on race as the most important indicator of Basque identity. Urla quotes Arana's famous pamphlet "Errores Catalanes," in which he declared:

> The Catalans want all Spaniards living in their region to speak Catalan; for us it would be ruin if the *maketos* resident in our territory spoke Euzkera.[1] Why? Because purity of race, like language, is one of the bases of the Vizcayan banner. So long as there is a good grammar and a good dictionary, language can be restored even though no one speaks it [a danger that Arana realized was facing Euskara]. Race, once lost, cannot be resuscitated (Urla, 35).

Arana saw racial purity as essential for claiming Basque identity. He declared it necessary for an individual to be born in the Basque Country, and to be able to trace Basque blood through seven generations of surnames, in order to claim Basque identity.

Arana viewed Spanish immigrants in the region as a threat to identity because of his preference for racial purity. According to Molina, "Sabino Arana believed that Basque identity was given by God and threatened by Spain, who sought to insert

[1] *Maketo* is the Basque word for a Spanish person.

Spanishness into the Basque people" (Molina, 707). He strongly opposed intermarriage with Spaniards, who he saw as the most "most vile and despicable race of Europe" (Payne, 75). He did not even recognize religious similarities between Basques and Spaniards, as he declared Spaniards to be pagans filled with mysticism and ritualism (Payne, 75). As a result of his xenophobia, Arana proposed that an independent Euzkadi would allow foreign businessmen and merchants temporary residence, but no one without Basque ancestry would be granted permission to become a naturalized citizen (Payne, 74). However, by the 1890s, the chances of preserving a pure blooded Basque race were already very slim, as the influx of migrant workers from southern Spain had already altered the social and cultural elements of the society.

Arana's racially-based discourse was common between the 1890s-1930s, as many intellectuals throughout Europe drew from Arthur de Gobineau's work *An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*, which argued that a national race carried identity in "blood" and was threatened by mixing with other races (Gobineau, 23). Outside of the Basque Country, this ideology was also popular throughout Spain among Spanish Nationalists, most notably Ramiro de Maeztu. Like other intellectuals who embraced this race-based ideology, Arana was anti-liberal. Unsurprisingly, Gobineau's thoughts were at the foundation of various forms of fascism, including Nazism.

The Basque nationalist movement coincided with other movements for independent statehood by ethnic enclaves throughout the world. Prior to 1880, nationalist movements entailed an expansion of the hegemonic, liberal state structure to integrate and acculturate ethnic minorities into the greater centralized nation-state (Hobsbawm, 30-

32). However, according to Eric Hobsbawm, late nineteenth century nationalism began to differ from the previously accepted liberal concept in two distinct ways:

> 1) *Any* body of people considering themselves a 'nation' claimed the right to self determination which meant the right to a separate sovereign independent state for their territory.
> 2) Ethnicity and language became central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criteria of potential nationhood (Hobsbawm, 102).

Hobsbawn specifically recognizes the development of Basque nationalism along these lines, declaring, "The ideological shift of Basque autonomism from the defense or restoration of ancient feudal privileges to a linguistic-racial argument was sudden" (Hobsbawm, 107).

After the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), and as a result of General Francisco Franco's assault on Basque culture, Basque identity transitioned, by the 1960s, to center around language. This ethnonationalist concept of identity, specifically the role of language, was facilitated by the rise the Basque guerrilla force, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA). Bent on separation from Spain, ETA combined language recovery with Marxist-Leninist ideas *a la* Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who saw national reconstruction as a process of creating a "new man." In the case of ETA, the "new man" was to speak Basque on an everyday level. Urla explains, "It politicized everyday language use and instantiated a pragmatic view of Basque identity in which being Basque – which for most people meant being Basque nationalist – implied speaking Basque" (Urla, 71). Faced with the reality of Spanish immigration, in which non-Basques were settling in the Basque Country, ETA's concept of the "new man" was inclusive as it did not focus on race.

ETA developed and promoted this ethno-linguistic approach to identity even during the Franco dictatorship and its prohibitions against Euskara; in return Franco

declared the provinces of Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa as traitorous (Urla, 54). Language became a way to subvert the regime's cultural hegemony in the region. According to Michel DeCerteau's "theory of the everyday," different "styles of action intervene in a field which regulates them at a first level, but they introduce into it a way of turning it to their advantage that obeys other rules and constitutes something like a second level interwoven into the first" (DeCerteau, 30). DeCerteau presents a famous narrative of navigating through a city in a manner contrary to the design by its planners, which is meant to show how everyday actions can be used to subvert the power structure without confronting it directly. These actions serve as signals, which can be read and interpreted by others. Through these signals, the recipients are shown weaknesses in the power structure and/or awakened to their own capacity to utilize the everyday as a strategy for rebellion. In their own effort to mobilize Euskara in the public sphere, ETA began to publish bilingual articles about the importance of language preservation in their magazine, *Zutik* (Urla, 62).

ETA also rallied around a working class, civic definition of identity (Urla, 62-63). According to Urla, "The debate over language became particularly acute in the sixties, as the organization pursued with greater rigor the attempt to synthesize class struggle with liberation and eventually articulate a 'civic' rather than an ethnic definition of Basque nationality" (Urla, 62). The promotion of Euskara as the primary component of a Basque civic identity has allowed southern migrants to be accepted as Basque by demonstrating patriotism and linguistic loyalty. For example, the legendary ETA militant "Txiki" was a working-class immigrant from Extremadura but accepted as Basque because of his commitment to the region's language and autonomy (Urla, 66).

As the struggle for identity moved away from Arana's racially-based definition, ETA and others eventually used language to forge Euskara Batua [Unified Euskara] in the Basque Language Society (Urla, 79). Drawn by the enlightenment position of cultural homogeneity in the nation, many militant Basque nationalists saw linguistic unity as essential for the nation-building project, and thus sought a standardized version. In this, they resemble the Irish revival of Gaelic, the Welsh revival of their language, and the Isreali success in promoting Hebrew as a center of identity.

However, the standardization of Euskara proved controversial, as Batua borrowed heavily from the Gipuzkoan dialect, which was often different from local dialects. Thus, the words being printed and taught in Batua were far different from what was used in the street. According to Urla, "Batua had multiple connotations when it entered into the public realm: it was associated with modernity, legitimacy, rationality, national unity, and, in the eyes of some, radical nationalism (Urla, 83).

The language-based concept of Basque identity eventually penetrated Basque schooling, and still does so today. According to Begoña Echeverria, schooling in Basque territories promotes an identity based on Euskara and the region's schools divide students into Euskara, Euskara-Spanish, and Spanish tracks (Echeverria, 94). This has caused students to develop conflicting perceptions of identity based on their knowledge of the language (Echeverria, 124). Joseba Arregui Aranburu, ex-Minister of Culture and Tourism for the Basque Autonomous Government, also commented that, especially in small towns, the pressure to speak and study Euskara is restricting and overbearing (Interview 3 February 2012).

The modern concept of Basque identity also carries class connotations. Kasmir argues that "radical Basque identity" combines leftist and separatist politics with the styles of punk rock (Kasmir, 39). Punk music gained popularity in the Basque region in the late 1970s, as punk entered the global stage at the same time as the end of the Franco regime and deindustrialization. As elsewhere, punk music provided an outlet for the angst and frustration of many working class youths. Kasmir claims that punk allowed working class immigrant children to 'become Basque' by combining radical politics and punk culture (Kasmir, 53). Punk remains a very popular music genre in the Basque region today and continues to play a role in gaining youth interest in the Basque political struggle.

This thesis will explore the extent to which formations of identity have crossed over into the Basque Diaspora in Buenos Aires. Within the "active" diaspora community, language preservation and political activism have entered into the popular discourse. Like many other Basque Diaspora communities, those in Buenos Aires have established centers that promote political and cultural identity among their members. Some of the centers date as far back as the late nineteenth century, and many centers currently receive funding from the Basque Autonomous Government. However, as I will demonstrate below, the discourse surrounding Basque identity in Argentina has not always paralleled that of the homeland.

Chapter III:
A History of Basques in Argentina

Having looked at the trajectory of Basque nationalism in Spain, it is time to look at Basque nationalism and identity in Argentina. This section, presents a short narrative of Basque settlement in Argentina beginning in the colonial era, then turns to the dominant schools of thought regarding the role of immigration in Argentine identity and analyzes where the Basque immigrant fits into the debate.

Early Basque Presence in Argentina and the Shaping of National Identity

There were twenty-three Basques who accompanied Christopher Columbus on his voyage to the New World, including his cartographer, Juan de la Cosa (Azcona, 17). After beginning their relationship with the New World in 1492, Basques who ventured to the Americas in the early days of colonial exploration were eager to spread the news of wealth and resource to friends and family in their homeland villages, creating a transnational Basque culture. In *Possible Paradises*, Jose Manuel Azcona Pastor depicts the Basque Country at the time of Columbus, in which he argues that some immediate effects of the discovery of the New World began taking place within the Basque Country:

> This situation, to a certain extent privileged and favored a traffic of very important people and merchandise from the outset. It also fueled boom activity in Basque ironworks and dockyards. The residents of Iparralde benefited from this measure since the vessels from Saint-Jean-De-Luz were registered as Bizkaian (Vizcayan) and, therefore, had the rights and privileges (and also obligations) of the Spanish Basque ships…Beginning in 1520, two American plants, beans and corn, were added to the traditional cultigens of Basque agriculture. The result for Basque culture was two new foods: *talo*, or cornbread, and *lapikoko*, a type of bean

> stew…The rural Basque population was able to increase the cultivable surface of its *baserriak*, or farmsteads, thanks to the introduction of vegetable species from America (Azcona, 20-21).

The aforementioned foods are still typical in the Basque diet today, especially *talo*. This example emphasizes the early foundations of a transnational Basque identity and culture that developed alongside the colonial project.

Azcona expands further on the effects of the Basque export market, emphasizing the new demand for iron. It expanded an existing capacity to produce armor, nails, and farming equipment. Similarly, the new demand for resources left Basques and Portuguese in fierce competition in the shipbuilding market. However, Azcona claims that the Basques were granted a near monopoly on iron with the *Recopilación de las leyes de los reynos de indias*, which ordered "that [trade ships] not be allowed to transport iron if it is not from Vizcaya" (Azcona, 21).

In *Global Vasconia*, William Douglass offers statistics supporting Basque domination of the New World markets. He claims that Basque ships made up 80 per cent of the traffic to the Americas from 1520-1580 (Douglass, 14). In *Basque Atlantic Shores*, Fernando Molina and Pedro J. Oiarzabal claim that Basques made up 70 per cent of the "hegemonic elites," while controlling 65 per cent of trade in the New World in the eighteenth century (Molina, 700). A connection can be drawn between the Basque Diaspora and their traditional role as merchants in colonial trade, as those who settled in the New World acted as trading outposts and connections for other Basque traders. This created a near monopoly for Basques. Totoricagüena claims, "Basques tended to live together in their residential arrangements, and although there were relatively fewer Basques than other ethnic groups, Basques were prominent. Many were well-known

explorers, conquerors, and commercial giants. Basques were chosen for positions of responsibility as administrators, miners, colonists, missionaries, and merchants" (Totoricagüena, 141).

The Basque network in the New World led to the founding of Buenos Aires by a Basque, Juan de Garay, in 1580. Azcona claims, "Of the ten Spaniards who accompanied Garay in founding Buenos Aires, four were natives of the Basque Country…In addition, the names of more than sixty Creoles who participated in resettling the colony show that a good number of them were descendants of the first Basque conquistadors who arrived in Río de la Plata" (Azcona, 46). Originally, Buenos Aires was settled as a strategic location for a port to connect Chile and Peru to the Atlantic.

Although the contemporary Basque Autonomous Community presents many localized cultural differences (including a complexity of language dialects which often leave people unable to understand villagers only a few miles apart), the transnational diaspora united Basques under a single identity as a way to network in the New World (Molina, 701). Euskara was given a semiotic value among members of the Diaspora. Fernando Molina and Pedro J. Oiarzabal claim:

> Basque ethnic leaders in America used local culture to create a new sense of Atlantic Basqueness, more symbolic than political, in order to accommodate the realities of the host country and avoid any potential clash between the two cultures and identities. Consequently, cultural elements of political origin, such as the *fueros*, capable of fostering strong internal cohesion in the homeland, had a more rhetorical content in America. Other elements, such as the Basque language, which was more symbolic in Europe, gained greater relevance in recreating the Basque identity in the diaspora (Molina, 709).

Totoricagüena recognizes efforts by colonial Basques to preserve language and identity that date back as early as 1607 in Mexico City, when Baltasar de Echave Orio published

his work, *Discursos de la antiguedad de la languea cantabra bascongada*, encouraging the preservation of Basque culture, and especially the language of Euskara in the New World (Totoricagüena, 142).

Aside from the well-established connections made in the Americas through mercantile efforts, the inheritance system of the stem family household, or *basseri*, acted as another strong push factor for emigration. Basques practiced a system of inheritance called primogeniture, which limited the transfer of family property to the oldest male son in the family. Douglass references a work in French done by Luis Etcheverry, which claims that rural Basque society created disenchanted *segundones* who were excluded from the family land inheritance solely because of their order of birth (Douglass, 32). Instead, younger brothers were granted a small sum of money. They were often granted far too little money to start a fortune within the Basque Country, but just enough to fund a trip overseas and test their luck in the new world. *Segundones* served as prime candidates for emigration dating as far back to the sixteenth century (Douglass, 32). This system of inheritance helped push a predominately male population abroad, seeking land ownership and an agrarian lifestyle of manual labor. Married Basque women were already accustomed to being left alone for long periods of time, as Basque males primarily worked as shepherds and fishermen. Thus, many *segundones* already had experiences facing the challenges brought on by migrating to the New World.

By 1810, Argentina gained independence from colonial Spain, and land ownership was elevated to the most influential push factor of Basque emigration to Argentina. Totoricagüena explains:

> In Europe, labor was abundant, and the population was growing. The majority of Basques migrating to the Southern Cone had rural backgrounds, and they traded the *baserri* for the *estancia* or *hacienda*. Life in rural Argentina or Uruguay was not so different from rural life in the Basque Country at this time (Totoricagüena, 162).

Douglass argues this was in sharp contrast from the former colonial emigration of administrators and merchants. The majority of the new emigrants were peasants from modest rural circumstances or unskilled urban dwellers (Douglass 16). Basques often took up socially taboo and unwanted jobs in the dairy and sheep industries located in the interior. José C. Moya claims that even impoverished gauchos disdained the work required of sheepherding (Moya, 53).

Primogeniture continued to play a very influential role in Basque migration into the latter half of the nineteenth century. Moya's data shows that three-quarters of the 812 emigrants from northern Navarre claimed to have migrated to "mejorar fortuna" [improve income] in nineteenth century notary records. He also claims that 1897 census data from the Baztan Valley in Basque Navarre shows that only 28 percent of emigrants to Buenos Aires were firstborn land inheritors of the *basseri*. Thus, the vast majority of migrants remained *segundones*, although roughly one-quarter of the migrants from Baztan were property owners in the Basque homeland (Moya, 30).

Basques in Constitutional Argentina

By the nineteenth century, two of the most influential figures shaping the Argentine immigration policy and national identity were of Basque decent: Justo Jose de Urquiza and Juan Bautista Alberdi. As the second elected President of Argentina, Justo

Jose de Urquiza recognized Basques as ideal immigrants who fit particularly well in the Argentine plan to increase European presence in the interior, especially because many Basques were already settled there. According to Douglass, Urquiza once proclaimed, "It is necessary to depopulate the Pyrenees" (Douglass, 16).

Similarly, Juan Bautista Alberdi was a leading Argentine intellectual and politician throughout the nineteenth century. In the mid-nineteenth century, Alberdi made the famous assertion, "To govern is to populate," referring to his desire to replace the existing creoles and Indians with Europeans. Born of Basque parents, Alberdi compared his father's immigration to Argentina to merely changing homes within the same country. He credited his ethnic origins for his devotion to federalism, saying that his father from Vizcaya moved to Buenos Aires "not as an immigrant but as someone who has changed his residence in his own country" (Sarramone, 216). His father "embraced" Independence because of the role Basques played in the effort and his Basque "instinct for local autonomy" (Sarramone, 216). Alberdi always praised the Basques but was less fond of others from Iberia.

Alongside Juan Bautista Alberdi, Domingo Sarmiento was also an influential intellectual who shaped Argentine identity and politics in the mid-nineteenth century. Both Alberdi and Sarmiento favored and promoted Northern European immigration. The Argentine intellectuals saw white European immigration as a way to legitimize Argentina as a modern nation. Similarly, both intellectuals were very hostile towards Spanish influence and presence in Argentina. Alberdi's anti-Spanish position was based on a worldview of struggle between civilizations, in which he believed that weaker civilizations are always overtaken by stronger ones; just as Spain had overrun the Indians,

she had made the mistake of trying to close off Spanish America from the "superior" French and British (Shumway, 138). Alberdi once sarcastically proclaimed Argentina as the "cultured and progressive Spain" (Moya, 336).

Sarmiento similarly disdained Spain and Spanish influence, as he famously called for the "De-Hispanization" of Argentina. In 1847, Sarmiento took a trip to Spain to "place Spain on trial," and he found that what was once a great and noble civilization was now dead (Shumway, 137). In the famous work *Conflicto y armonías de razas en América*, Sarmiento described Spaniards as "backwards and feudal" (Moya, 342).

Although Sarmiento disdained Spanish culture and immigrants, Miguel de Unamuno, a famous Basque philosopher, claimed Sarmiento to be his favorite Spanish writer. In his 1905 piece *La anarquía literaria*, Unamuno declared, "Sarmiento was a Spaniard who renounced Spain at every opportunity and wanted to erase the Spanish tradition from his homeland because its basic problems originated from its Spanish origins" (Unamuno, 94).

Thus, leading Argentine intellectuals looked upon Spanish immigrants and culture with contempt. But, this negative opinion was not always transferred onto Basques. Argentine immigration officials recognized Basques as desirable and Basques became interested in emigrating in response to industrialization at home. Scholars of the Basque Diaspora agree that the Industrial Revolution was a strong push factor. Moya describes the scenario, stating, "Without the hindrance of internal custom barriers, the wares of their factories displaced many of the artisan or homespun industries throughout the peninsula" (Moya, 32). The industrialization process privatized land and exploited resources that had been essential to Basque agrarian survival for millennia. Sarramone

explains that Basques wanted land and to work it according to their customs; they knew it was cheap on the other side of the ocean (Sarramone, 186). Basques and their descendants already had political influence in Argentina and the whites of the time admired the "Basque work ethic." The high demand for labor in South America coincided perfectly with the economic shift in the Basque Country, which left many rural Basques out of work and excluded from resources, searching for options to continue their rural lifestyles.

After clearing the key zones of the pampas from native Araucanian control, General Julio Argentino Roca sought to populate the interior region with European immigrants. Totoricagüena notes that Roca's plans included immigrant subsidies for Basques, and Argentina sent recruiters to gather potential migrants from the Basque Country. In many cases, the Argentine state subsidized transatlantic passages, made land grants, established facilities for free room and board, and provided transportation and employment for the new immigrants (Totoricagüena, 175). Sarramone presents recorded testimony by Basques regarding the Argentine immigration agents, "The agents come to the mountain towns; generally arriving Sundays and operating at the exit of the mass… Later a friend appears, a countryman, that explained how this man had nothing two years ago, how he marched to America where he made his fortune" (Sarramone, 193). Their chief selling point was to compare wages in one country and the other.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, Basques dominated the sheep industry of interior Argentina, and Basques from Lapurdi had a near monopoly on salting and preserving foods (Totoricagüena, 164). Many Basques made small fortunes as European demand for Argentine wool and sheep increased (Totoricagüena, 166). Totoricagüena

claims, "Migration became a business, with the specialists providing loans, dealing with legal paperwork, and providing transportation to ports, inns, and places to eat and stay while waiting for ships and transatlantic voyages (Totoricagüena, 165). The Industrial Revolution had created an inexhaustible demand for wool. Furthermore, the increased demand for Argentine sheep and wool, in turn, led to greater demand for Basques.

Chain migration to the interior created a notable Basque presence. As Moya explains, migration from the Baztan Valley to the River Plate was "both a family affair and business enterprise" (Moya, 78). He focuses on the small village of Elizondo, which had a population of 1,200 in the mid nineteenth century. After the Fort brothers left the village to Argentina, they started bringing over other members of their family. Eventually, working as immigration agents for Argentina, they expanded to recruiting immigrants from the rest of their village. Moya charts the migration trends of Elizondo by showing that from 1854-1876 there were 240 passages sold by the Fort brothers to other members of the community (Moya, 80).

Late Nineteenth Century Migration, Cultural Nationalism and Hispanidad

The nineteenth century and its Carlist Wars also intensified Basque immigration. By the late nineteenth century, the post-war condition in the Basque region was brutal, and "considerable public debt incurred" due to reconstruction of buildings and vineyards damaged in battle (Azcona, 345). Similarly, small property-owners were threatened by post-war industrial expansion that perpetuated a pattern of primitive accumulation.

Finally, many young men ventured to the Americas in an effort to evade the prospect of the military draft (Azcona, 349). All this reinforced the pull of Argentina (Azcona, 356).

Basques going to Argentina saw a multi-ethnic state model as better than the homogenizing state project of Spain. Prior to the Carlist Wars, Basques saw themselves as ethnically Basque, but civically Spanish - for Spain had respected their autonomy. Afterwards, the Basques correctly feared the cultural annihilation that would follow the military one. Molina and Oiarzabal draw relations between this trend and immigration, because in the new lands Basques could still be themselves despite the fact that their new homelands were embarking on a nation-building projects (Molina and Oiarzabal, 708). New World immigrants saw opportunities to maintain ethnic allegiance to their homeland traditions and culture, while proclaiming civic loyalty to a new host country.

Inspired by events in Spain, Basque exiles in Buenos Aires opened the first Basque culture center in 1877, called Laurak Bat. The center was opened largely in response to an uncertain future of Basque identity as a result of Carlist Wars, and only included Spanish Basque immigrants. The original constitution prohibited French Basques from its membership. Founded in protest to loss of *foral* autonomy, French Basques were seen as disconnected from Spanish Basque political life. In turn, French Basques established the Centre Basque Français in 1895 (Douglass, 105).

In 1895, Basques from the region of Navarre left Laurak Bat to form Centro Navarro (Douglass, 105). Because Navarre was split in two, containing a Basque population in the North, and a Spanish population in the South, many Navarrese have historically been ambivalent about Basque nationalism. However, the region has always remained loyal to Carlism. Similarly, a group of Basques in Buenos Aires formed Gure

Echea in 1929, which prohibited all political activity and political culture within the club (Douglass, 105). Finally, Euskal Echea was established in Buenos Aires in 1908, which served as the first official Basque language school abroad. Just as Basque nationalism was developing within Spain, many Basques in Argentina desired to separate themselves from other immigrant Spaniards (Azcona, 291). At the turn of the century, Basques began experimenting with their own concepts of identity; during this epoch, Argentines did as well.

The Argentine cultural nationalist movement developed among intellectual and political circles at the transition into the twentieth century. The movement was openly anti-immigrant and nativist, and saw Argentina's historical pursuit of Europeanism as a misguided attempt to recreate a cultural and political situation that did not exist and perhaps should not be created. Furthermore, the movement also denounced what was perceived as the "immigrant's narrow concern with material self advancement" and "their resistance to assimilation" (Rock, 276). The movement borrowed heavily from the German Romantic tradition, which viewed the nation "as an organic entity emerging naturally from the depths of history and possessing a unique personality or character" (DeLaney, 629).

Ricardo Rojas was one of the most influential cultural nationalists who developed significant theories of national education and national character in his 1909 book, *La restauracion nacionalista*. Rojas saw education as a way to foster nationalistic feelings among immigrant children, and saw studying history as a way to restore respect and pride in the "Hispanic roots" of Argentina, while reviving nostalgia for the Indian as well. Education, alongside the promotion of Spanish language in the streets, was viewed as a

means of developing "a true Argentine" identity (Bletz, 97). The ideas of Rojas had already succeeded in the United States, where "the educational system was transformed into a machine for political socialization" among a heterogeneous population (Hobsbawm, 280).

In *La restauracion nacionalista*, Rojas specifically criticized Argentina for lacking a "soul" and personality, and for senseless appropriation of foreign ideals that could not be replicated in the Argentine reality (DeLaney, 630). Rojas claimed European nations had already "existed spiritually" before developing as political bodies, and their "spiritual nucleus" has formed "as a consequence of a homogenous race rooted in the remote past" (DeLaney, 630-631). Instead, Rojas believed that Argentina's ability to develop a soul was delayed by the cultural and racial heterogeneity caused endless waves of migration to her shores (DeLaney, 631). Thus, he did not see Argentina as capable of mimicking the European route to state and national identity formation.

Rejecting the notion that Argentina should follow a European example, Rojas believed that Argentina's unique character was the result of mixing Indian and Spanish races, in which "the telluric forces of the Argentine soil would fuse together to form a unique single national race" (DeLaney, 632). In 1910, Rojas published *Blasón de plata*, which claimed that the three most important factors of Argentine identity were "the Argentine soil, the Indian heritage, and the Spanish heritage" (Glauert, 3). He anticipated the famous thesis of mestizaje as the "cosmic race" two decades before the Mexican intellectual, José Vasconcelos wrote it. Although Rojas found it difficult to accept the continuous arrival of Europeans to the shores of Argentina, Rojas declared that Europeans could assimilate to be Argentines because "Argentine nationality was

primarily spiritual rather than racial, and there was something about the Argentine soil which had a beneficent influence on all people and which in time would transform them into true Argentines" (Glauert, 3). Rojas strongly focused on the interior of Argentina as the birthplace of the soul of the nation. He claimed that the Argentine struggle for independence was not inspired by European liberalism. Instead, Argentine democracy was a product of the national spirit and native elements of the interior, which also played a role in the development of the cult of the gaucho; in brief, he had a "frontier" thesis of this spirit (Glauert, 4).

Eric Hobsbawm's theory of "invented tradition" provides a lens for analyzing the ideas of Ricardo Rojas. Hobsbawm declares that in the formation of the modern nation-state, new vague and unspecific traditions, based on "history as a legitimator," have been invented to formulate group cohesion and group membership (Hobsbawm, 12). He recognizes that old traditions "were specific and strongly binding social practices," but newly invented traditions engender a sense of belonging that are based primarily on symbols and sentiment as opposed to action (Hobsbawm, 10). As an example of invented tradition, the cultural nationalist movement romanticized the historical role of the interior while the urban center, specifically Buenos Aires, was obviously and rapidly transforming into the new heart of the Argentine nation-state. As the urban population boomed, few Argentines could relate to the interior, as many in Buenos Aires had never even seen the rural parts of the country. This created a symbol out of the interior, as a reference to rootedness and legacy in the country in the face of the turn of the century waves of immigration. And so, one could find gaucho shows in the capital that paralleled the "wild west" performances of "Wild Bill Cody" in major U.S. eastern cities.

The cultural nationalists romanticized the role of the interior in national identity amidst a very volatile era for the urban immigrant working class. As acknowledged by Zimmerman, "In 1895, 59 percent of the immigrants were living in urban centers; in 1914 the percentage had grown to almost 70, while 57.3 percent of the whole population was urban" (Zimmerman, 37). The turn of the century in Argentina brought intense labor struggle to Buenos Aires, and the urban immigrant proletariat was marginalized as "the criminal type" or "modern urban monster" – a product of European industrialism and transplanted to Argentina, which was identified as the threatening "other" (Zimmerman, 37).

High proportions of Italian working class immigrants that came to Argentina at the turn of the century strongly influenced the xenophobia of the Argentine cultural nationalists. The first quarter of the twentieth century brought nearly 1.4 million Italian immigrants, inspiring an infamous book release by a member of one of Argentina's elite families, Roberto Bunge. In *La Italianización de la Argentina*, Bunge claimed, "The massive arrival of crass Italians was obliterating the authentic ethno-cultural character of the country, turning it into an amorphous, coarse, and soulless horde rather than a nation…Only restrictive quotas on Italian immigration, like those in the United States, could prevent this genocidal 'new conquest" (Moya, 348). He further expressed support of immigration from Spain, explaining that "language, habits, memories and blood" make them "brothers in the race war" (Moya, 348). He continued by stating that a continual flow of "Iberian blood" will preserve the presence of "Mother Spain" because Spaniards were not "a kindred race but our own race" (Moya 349). Finchelstein comments, "For [cultural nationalists] Italians represented urbanism, political radicalism and secularism,

while Spanish immigrants such as the Basques were now equated with religious attitudes and the pastoralism of the Pampas (Finchelstein, 145).

In *Las multitudes Argentinas*, published in 1888, Jose Maria Ramos Mejia declared that Argentine history and identity came from two streams, one from the coast and one from the interior, both converging at the capital of Buenos Aires to create a "new race." He later claims that the second generation of those born in Argentina would naturally look, and become, much more civilized "because of the better food and air in Argentina" (Bletz, 68). However, the unforeseen labor unrest and social disharmony that was festering among the immigrant working class proved Ramos Mejia very wrong. The "new race" of Argentines was turning out to be a motley crew of radical labor activists and anti-statists, contrasting strongly with the version of the ideal citizen constructed by the Argentine aristocracy (Bletz, 68-70).

Two important immigration laws that approved within the decade of 1902-1912 criminalized immigrant labor activists. The Residency Law and Law of Social Defense and were passed to justify deportation of immigrants based on affinities for radical working class ideologies, specifically targeting Anarchists, Anarcho-Syndicalists, Communists, and Socialists. Similar to perceptions in Brazil and the US, ideas of organized labor were seen as un-Argentine and exotic, invading the shores of Argentina from southern Europe (Suriano, 177). In 1910, President José Figueroa Alcorta commented in an address to Congress, "The Argentine Republic receives from the old nations the individual who is seized by the affronts generated by his harsh situation there, and thus sectarianism and other social ills are transplanted here. [These] have no reasons and no propitious environment among us" (Waisman, 216). Similarly, in a 1904 letter to

the interior from the Unión Industrial Argentina, the industrialists complained about "the professional agitators, who nowadays abound in the republic. [They are] an eminently nefarious foreign element, whose influence is very efficacious because of the almost absolute freedom of action it enjoys" (Waisman, 216).

Influenced by the tense labor conflicts, Domingo Sarmiento, Argentina's major writer, changed his position on immigration by the end of the nineteenth century, and no longer viewed immigration positively. Instead, Sarmiento attributed labor conflicts to the decreasing "desirability" of immigrants, who he claimed were overshadowing "issues of racial improvement" (Bletz, 56). Sarmiento was unable to populate Argentina with his desired northern European immigrants. He felt that if Argentina were able to attract the types of immigrants he desired, the outcome would have been much different, as it would have culturally nurtured a more prosperous and stable future. Instead, Sarmiento was bothered by the unwillingness of the immigrants to assimilate. He claimed that immigrants were merely concerned with self-enrichment and materialism. In *Authoritarian Argentina*, Rock provides a quote from Sarmiento, in which he claims:

> Growing and expanding, we shall build, if we have not already built, a Tower of Babel in America, its workmen speaking all tongues, not blending together in the task of construction, but each persisting in his own…One does not construct a homeland without patriotism as its cement, nor does one build a city without citizens (Rock, 40).

He was specifically bothered by the presence of "foreign" culture centers and language schools, as he had always emphasized the importance of education in shaping an Argentine national identity.

During this era of nativist-immigrant tension, Basques began to prosper as a small entrepreneurial class in the interior. As mentioned above, by the middle of the nineteenth

century, Basques dominated the sheep industry in the interior of Argentina, and public and private migration recruiters were successfully pulling Basques to work in agriculture (Totoricagüena, 164; Douglass and Bilbao, 143). Similarly, Moya comments on the success of Basques in cattle, sheep, and dairy farming sectors of the Argentine economy. He attributes their success in small farming and dairying to the weak competition offered by other inhabitants of the pampas, specifically "the seminomadic, impoverished gauchos and peons," who did not have sufficient resources to compete with the Basques (Moya, 491).

Not only did Basques find plenty of success in sheep industry, their interior properties soared in value by the turn of the century. Douglass and Bilbao claim that in some extreme cases, land that was valued at 35 pounds per league in the 1870s was worth 35,000 pounds per league by the beginning of the twentieth century (Douglass and Bilbao, 145). This resulted in a remarkable change in social status for some Basques. The wealth accumulated in agriculture allowed Basques to venture into the newly developing industrial urban market; Basques began finding new success as *noveau riches* by the early twentieth century. "These developments laid the foundations for a number of modern Argentina's largest fortunes and secured for some Basques a prominent position in Argentina's social aristocracy" (Douglass and Bilbao, 144).

Many of the successful Basques who made their fortunes as landowners and entrepreneurs in the middle of the century began to gain influence in Argentine finance circles by the end of the nineteenth century (Douglass and Bilbao, 147). For example, during the first fifty years of operation of the *Bolsa de Comercio*, one of Argentina's most prestigious financial institutions, eleven of the firm's presidents were Basque

(Douglass and Bilbao, 147). Finally, many Basques who made rural fortunes educated their children in Buenos Aires, where they used their prestige to establish careers as urban professionals (Douglass and Bilbao, 354). Perhaps this self-selecting group was already prone to success in the Southern Cone, as the majority of Basques with administrative and professional skills in the homeland emigrated to Buenos Aires or Montevideo, as opposed to migrating to North America (Douglass and Bilbao, 355).

As a result of the success and "purity" of Basques, the cultural nationalist movement placed the Basque very close to the heart of Argentine identity. Although it is impossible to generalize to the entire Basque population of the time, many of the more distinctive characteristics taking place among the Basque population fit very well within this movement. For example, those who worked the land in the interior of the country were given a central role in Argentine identity. For this reason, Moya claims, the Basques were the favorite ethnic group among Argentine nationalist circles (Moya, 370). He declares, "Their tendency to engage in livestock raising and to settle in the pampas fit perfectly with a nostalgic, neoromantic, and antimodernist ideology that derided the materialistic cosmopolitan city and celebrated the traditions of the pastoral past (Moya, 370). Because many Basques worked the land in the interior, Rojas would have envisioned them as most closely embodying the "soul of the nation," as the soil was seen to have "telluric forces" in fomenting national identity.

Some working class Basques also settled in the greater Buenos Aires region. The two most typical occupations for urban Basques were *lecheros* [milkmen] and *saladeristas* [workers in the meat-salting plants]. Douglass and Bilbao paint a particularly vibrant picture of the mid-nineteenth century meat-salting plants in Buenos Aires:

> In the *saladeros* [meat-salting plants] the immigrant was in a thoroughly Basque environment. The Basque language was used as the vernacular. His companions, overseers, and in some cases even the owner were Basques. Old World Basque dress, including the beret, red sash, and sandals, was the order of the day. Most saladeros provided a Basque handball court where the workers played in their leisure hours (Douglass and Bilbao, 146).

Probably as a result of ethnic solidarity, during this era of heightened class tension and labor conflict, occupations primarily served by Basques were relatively tranquil compared to the rest of Buenos Aires, and were not seen as negative contributors to the "social question." Moreover many of the Basques in Buenos Aires were part of the professional, financial, and administrative classes. Therefore, they posed no problems and had little role in the nation's labor struggles.

Basques became even more central to the debate around Argentine identity as the discussion began to embrace Spanish culture and history. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, nearly all Argentine nationalists began to embrace Hispanidad in a revolt against the 'soulless cosmopolitanism' of Buenos Aires (Moya, 364). Argentine nationalists idealized a "precapitalist" and "premodern" Argentina, opposing the old "liberal elite" and new "immigrant labor activists" (Moya, 364). They viewed the first as willing to sacrifice culture for material progress and the latter as seeking a godless and anarchic global society. Both were viewed as results of cosmopolitanism and modernization. Instead, rural and agrarian culture was viewed with envy, as it was seen as more in line with traditional Spanish culture. Rojas saw a very important role for Hispanidad in Argentine identity as a component of a liberal project, but other popular intellectuals, such as Manuel Galvez, Zacarias de Vizcarra and Federico Ibarguren placed a fanatical importance on Hispanidad, and viewed Argentine identity through a lens of

Catholic nationalism. As opposed to the liberal cultural nationalist project of Rojas, the Hispanidad movement eventually developed into a platform for transnational fascism.

The Hispanidad movement recognized Argentine nationalism and Catholicism as synonymous and viewed the Roman Catholic tradition in Spanish politics as an example for Argentina in the face of mass migration and modernization. As declared in 1919 by Argentine historian Jose Leon Suarez, "To cultivate Hispanidad in our country is the best way to foment Argentinism…Nationalism without Hispanidad in our countries of America is an absurdity" (Moya, 364). While Spain was resurfacing as a cultural icon in Argentina, the Spanish state was in existential turmoil. At the turn of the century, Spain had developed into a third tier nation-state after losing its colonies and failing to keep pace with industrial modernization. However, it was faced with a cultural dilemma of modernizing, while still maintaining a unique socio-cultural identity. Spanish intellectuals like Ortega y Gasset and others of the "Generation of '98" recognized the dilemma and pushed for an industrially developed state ruled by technocrats as a solution (Ortega y Gasset, 37).

However, Spain's struggle to become an industrialized nation promoted stereotypes abroad regarding the Spanish worker and work ethic. Most Argentine elites recognized Spain as the source of "an immigrant proletariat rather than an aristocratic tradition" (Falcoff and Pike, 294). In 1915, Miguel Toledano Escalante, a Barcelona journalist who ventured numerous times to the Americas, urged Spaniards not to migrate to work in Argentina because of the poor treatment by the natives (Pike, 246). Even Argentine anarchists, who were inherently antinationalist, took part in spreading the negative discourse surrounding Spanish identity. In a 1902 issue of *El Rebelde: Periódico*

anarquista, an editorial claimed that the Catalan was an exception to a general condition among Andalusians, Aragonese, Galicians, and Castilians that left them easily duped by the bourgeoisie (Moya, 318).

The abovementioned perceptions demonstrate that the Hispanidad movement was aiming to romanticize a homogenous Hispanic identity as roots of the Argentine nation, one that was based on a glorification of Spanish social and cultural values, while public opinion regarding Spain and Spanish migrants in Argentina often carried a different tone. According to Falcoff and Pike, Argentine conservatives did not fully embrace Hispanidad until the Spanish right proved itself on the battlefield during the Spanish Civil War (Falcoff and Pike, 294). But this did not prevent the movement from becoming extremely popular and influential in intellectual and political circles throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

The term "Hispanidad" was originally used by Miguel de Unamuno to describe a turn of the century liberal cultural project among Spanish language speakers, but the word was later given its more commonly accepted meaning, in geographical and "Catholic" terms, by Zacarias de Vizcarra (Finchelstein, 270). Vizcarra, who was born in the Basque town of Abadiano, moved to Buenos Aires with his family as a child and later became a priest. Vizcarra became a respected "clericofascist intellectual" figure in the Argentine nationalist movement, and first promoted the term "Hispanidad" in an Argentine-Spanish journal (Finchelstein, 146).

Manuel Galvez, one of the first anti-liberal intellectuals among the Argentine nationalists, was primarily concerned with promoting the Romantic idea that nations were "unique entities that possessed distinctive personalities and destinies (DeLaney, 632).

Galvez saw Spanish language and Catholic religion as the most distinctive and characteristic features of a national race, and thus focused strongly on the role of Catholicism in Argentine identity (Rock, 276; DeLaney, 632). Galvez specifically identified the role of Catholicism as central to distinguishing Spaniards from Northern Europeans, as he declared that the "hard, dry and intolerant spirit" of Protestant values were not compatible the "generosity and notorious magnanimity" of Latin America's Catholic roots (DeLaney, 632). DeLaney declares that Galvez viewed Argentina as a "torch of Latin civilization," then exhausted in Europe. Thus, Argentina's historical mission was to give this race a new beginning (DeLaney, 633).

Other nationalists, such as Federico Ibarguren believed that Marxists, communists, and socialists were unfit to be Argentine citizens. In 1934, he commented on a Communist Party rally in Buenos Aires, declaring that the participants were "sinister looking mulattoes, Galician taxi drivers, Basque milkmen, and fanatical women" (Rock, 22). He was even more intolerant of non-Europeans and thought they should be banned from receiving Argentine citizenship (Rock, 22).

Ramiro de Maeztu, who served under the Fascist government of Primo de Rivera as the Spanish ambassador in Buenos Aires in the late 1920s, remained a permanent link between Argentine and Spanish nationalist movements (Rock, 111; Finchelstein, 146). Maeztu's famous book, *Defensa de la hispanidad*, created a spiritual connection between Spain and Latin America (Maeztu, 36-37). Moreover, his book *Hora de España* included an article, "El separatismo peninsular y hegemonia vasco-catalana," which did not accept the romanticized view of Basque and Catalan independence movements. He declared that Basque nationalism did not originate in the fields and farms, but instead developed in

Bilbao as an urban intellectual project. Maeztu viewed regional movements as obstructing national solidarity and economic strength (Blas Guerrero). But he loved the city of Bilbao and spent a lot of time there writing and publishing in local press (Blas Guerrero).

The Hispanidad movement focused its attention on the Castilian language in the Americas. In 1899, Miguel de Unamuno published an article called "El pueblo que habla espanol" in the Buenos Aires newspaper *El Sol*. The Basque philosopher wrote in depth on the relationship between Spain and the new world, and declared that no blood-based affinity existed in the two regions since this did not exist even within Spain. Language tied the areas together and the Spanish desire for land was the original motivation for the spread of that "robust Castilian intonation" (Unamuno 21-22). But Unamuno's view of linguistic common ground was not widely accepted by the anti-liberal nationalists because Spanish immigrants in Argentina, especially Buenos Aires, did not share a common language at this time. Manuel A. Zuloaga problematized the linguistic diversity of Spanish immigrants in his 1931 work, *Nuestra raza: Condicion del extranjero en la Argentina*, as he declared that Galician, Catalan, and Basque immigrants were no different than Italians because most did not learn Spanish until arriving in Argentina (Moya, 369).

Although some debate took place concerning the role of language, Basques were overwhelmingly accepted as "model Spaniards" in the Hispanidad movement. In 1939, Zacarias de Vizcarra published *Vasconia Españolísima: Datos para comprobar que vasconia es reliquia preciosa de lo más Español de España*, which claimed that Basques were "indigenous Spaniards," and the purest Spanish race in all of Spain (Vizcarra, 5). In

this work, Vizcarra claimed that many scholars and historians supported the view that Basques were what remained of an original race of inhabitants, called "iberos." These prehistoric peoples had not altered their culture as a result of foreign invasions and so had retained the "indigenous" qualities and language of "Spain." They remained the heart and soul of the Spain of today (Vizcarrra, 6, 42). As Stanley Payne notes, the Moors never conquered the Basque region during their invasion of the Iberian Peninsula (Payne, 11). Interestingly, this was also a popular argument used by those in favor of separatism during the late nineteenth century. However, Vizcarra gave new meaning to this history by instead declaring that Basques were more authentically Spanish than other groups, presumably including the Castilians.

Vizcarra used the "purity" of Euskara for his argument but was obviously not a Basque separatist. Instead, he believed that Basques should focus on maintaining their authenticity as the foundation of the Spanish state and ethnicity. He believed that using the Basque language "as a weapon against Spain had backfired and created an image of every Basque and Euskara-speaking person as a separatist (Vizcarra, 227).

In an effort to demonstrate parallels between the Spanish colonial missions in Latin America, Vizcarra even highlighted the role of Basques as the first colonizers of Spain. However, he does not focus on Basque colonial exploits in the New World; instead, he claims that the French Basque region is actually a colony of Spanish Basques from the sixth century (Vizcarra, 103).

Finally, Vizcarra closes his argument by directing attention to the New World. He views the Americas as naturally Spanish, but he recognizes that traditional Spanish culture and identity in the New World were in danger by the rise of liberalism and

cosmopolitanism in the region. All the spiritual qualities of Latin America are considered to have originated in Spain (Vizcarra, 337). He sees those in the Americas as cultural allies, who had to unite with Spain against the attack of "monroism, statism, protestantism, socialism, or a simple financial mercantilism" (Vizcarra, 344).

The place of Basques in pan-Hispanic identity went beyond the radical rhetoric of anti-liberals such as Maeztu and Vizcarra, and penetrated into the everyday for many people. Even at the height of the Carlist Wars, Basques in Argentina expressed a pan-Hispanic identity and class unity with Spanish immigrants of other regional ethnic backgrounds. In 1878, one year after Laurak Bat opened in Buenos Aires as a protest against the Spanish government's suppression of traditional liberties in the Basque homeland, members marched in a parade alongside Galician immigrants for the inauguration of the Centro Gallego; both groups sang traditional folksongs from their respective regions (Moya, 319).

However, many Basques were not receptive of the Hispanidad movement. After World War I, Basque nationalism reached another peak in popularity and this included Basques in Argentina. According to Moya, many Basque separatist pamphlets began circulating in Buenos Aires, often using Euskera (Moya, 321). Similarly, Argentines of Basque descent who did not speak Euskara resorted to more simplistic and symbolic forms of linguistic nationalism, using Basque place-names instead of the renamed Castilian versions (for example, Gasteiz instead of Vitoria). In Castilian-written pamphlets, it also became common to replace *vasco* with *bazko,* indicating the author's position on the political issue (Moya, 321). In a 1922 book, a member of the directorate of Laurak Bat commented on the state of the center, claiming that the center was

permeated with "an ambiance of frank, clearly defined, and pure Basquism, without mixtures and compromises" and denounced the *españolistas* as people with mixed-up identities and traitors to the "Euskara race" (Moya, 321). This issue of juggling Basque, Spanish and Argentine identities eventually led to many splits within the Basque community. For example, the social club Basque Nationalist Action of Argentina accused Laurak Bat of becoming too Spanish, and instead promoted the creation of an independent Basque nation-state (Azcona, 292). In contrast, a group of Basques in Buenos Aires formed Gure Echea in 1929, which prohibited all politics within the club (Douglass, 105). These difficulties did not fundamentally harm the high reputation of Basques in Argentina, especially when they were compared to the less desirable waves of Italians and Jews. Basques were never discriminated against in Argentine public policy, and it is extremely rare to find records of prejudiced sentiment towards Basques in the public sphere.

Overall, Catholic nationalists admired Basques for having adapted to new technologies without losing their traditional values (Payne, 27). Moya claims, "Their putative puritanical Catholicism, Carlist leanings, and opposition to secular political centralism matched the ultramontane and federalist proclivity of many Argentine nationalists" (Moya, 370). In 1943, Gerald Brennan eventually commented on the "reactionary modernism" of the Basques in his famous work *The Spanish Labrynth*, stating, "Though conservative in a political sense, their conservatism is that of an active commercial race such as the English, which believes in individual effort. Their Catholicism, too, is modern" (Brennan, 97). This romanticized vision of "reactionary modernization" eventually became an obsession for the Franco regime in Spain.

Basque-Argentines and the Spanish Civil War

The Spanish Civil War caused the next large wave of Basque immigration to Argentina, as thousands of Basques were displaced from their homeland and dispersed throughout Europe and the Americas. Although the war started in 1936, the Basque region fell to the Nationalists after Franco's siege of Bilbao in 1937. Immediately, Franco declared the Basque region as traitorous, and overturned the Conciertos Economicos, which were agreements between the Basque Country and Madrid that established tax remittances to the central government (Perez-Agote, 97). Francisco Franco's military regime held power for the next thirty-seven years after winning the war in 1939, and during his reign Basques were subjugated to fierce oppression.

In Argentina, two consecutive administrations continued to recognize the government of the Spanish Republic throughout the war, until its final collapse in 1939 (Falcoff and Pike, 295). The Spanish Republic also had a strong center of support in Argentina beyond its recognition by the Argentine government. Many Spanish residents and Argentine-born children of Spaniards went to fight in Spain for the Republic; some estimate that as many as five thousand Argentines volunteered to fight for the elected Republican government (Falcoff and Pike, 318). Falcoff and Pike declare, "The base of the pro-Republican sentiment was centered in Argentina's Spanish community, where Basques, Catalans, and Galicians were represented in somewhat greater proportion than in the Mother Country itself, and (with few exceptions) in the more than three hundred Spanish fraternal and mutual aid organizations that existed in Argentina in 1936" (Falcoff

and Pike, 317). For example, Emakume Abertzale Batza (United Patriotic Women) sent financial and material aid to the Basque Country during the war, and received Basque political refugees in Argentina (Totoricaguena, 71).

On the other hand, many Argentine nationalists specifically recognized the Spanish Civil War as part of a fascist project to defend and restore Western Christian values. For example, Federico Ibarguren declared that the Spanish Republic failed because liberal democracy was not compatible with Spanish traditions, and that liberals and leftists were trying to force a foreign ideology from outside Spain's borders (Callahan, 18). Many traveled to Spain during the time to report on the events abroad. For example, Gustavo Francheschi, an Argentine nationalist and Catholic priest who ventured to Spain as a representative of Argentine Catholicism, "played a central role in the Argentine denial of the massacre at Guernica" (Finchelstein, 145). For Francheschi, the communists destroyed Guernica as part of a conspiracy to win over public opinion by tarnishing the reputation of the Spanish nationalists (Falcoff and Pike, 325).

Most Argentine nationalists became specifically hostile towards Basques during the Spanish Civil War, as the region was a strong center of resistance to Franco's coup. Argentine Catholic priests often praised Franco for his role as the savior of Catholic religion and traditional Catholic values, and labeled Basques as Communists and anti-Catholic (Totoricaguena, 70). A small percentage of the Basque community in Argentina viewed Franco's takeover of Spain in much the same way. On the one year anniversary of the coup, 17 July 1937, Juan Pablo de Lojendio, a representative of the Franco regime, addressed a gathering of Basques organized by Ibarguren and Francheschi. He began by identifying himself as a fellow Basque, then introduced himself as a representative of

Franco, as well as a representative of "the liberation of the Basque provinces and the defeat of the anarcho-communist nemesis that has subjugated the region" (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 6).

Lojendio began his address by confirming that the Basque Country has been "totally and happily liberated" by General Francisco Franco (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 9). He then discussed "the Basque problem," which was identified as Basque separatism (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 15) He specifically denounced those among the Basque community abroad who believe in separatism, to which he received a welcoming applause when he argued that what had once been sentimental, innocent and noble, entered into the poison of politics that led to "this tragedy" (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 19). He continued by saying that the separatist movement wrongly emphasizes traditional cultural differences as evidence for political independence, declaring that the Basques should not have opposed the "imperial undertakings of Spain" which had after all, been the origins of their success and "historic destiny" (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 20). For him, political aspirations are artificial and false, and civilization is the aspiration to "bring together all people under a unified culture of Catholicism, and to unite all men under a common faith" (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 20-21). He acknowledged that Basques who ventured to Argentina in the nineteenth century "reconquered Argentina with the fervor and passion of Spain," and that those Basques who came to Argentina during that epoch "never were separatists!" (Ibarguren and Lojendio, 22). In a desperate attempt to capture the support of Basques abroad for Franco's fascist project, he concludes by declaring that Spain must be united, and compares the power of Spain to that of the permanence of the tree of Guernica (Ibareguren and Lojendio, 31). However, Ibarguren and Lojendio were

trying to attract a Basque-Argentine population that had become ever more hostile to Franco as the general's repression against the Basques continued.

By the end of the war, fourteen hundred Basques had migrated to Argentina to seek refuge. This migration came at a time when Argentina was tightening its immigration policy and restricting citizenship to all foreigners, as illustrated by the 1938 immigration decree passed by the Argentine government (Falcoff and Pike, 334). Totoricagüena claims that the migration occurred despite the "xenophobic and anti-immigrant legislation" because a Basque lobby succeeded in getting two decrees from President Roberto M. Ortiz permitting their entry. (Totoricagüena, 179). According to Douglass, "Most of the refugees were drawn from Euskadi's pro-nationalist intelligentsia and political establishment. They brought with them both bitterness and determination heightened by resentment over defeat" (Douglass, 106). Totoricaguena recognizes, "Forced separation from family and homeland caused an intense hatred among exiles for all things Spanish and a repugnant abhorrence for memories of Franco" (Totoricaguena, 73).

The Spanish Civil War and the Franco era re-situated the Basques within the Spanish state as a result of Franco's reign. Basques in the homeland eventually developed sophisticated networks of armed and passive resistance by the 1960s. These realities forced Basque-Argentines to evaluate their identities. Totoricaguena declares that by the late 1960s:

> Dictatorial regimes in Argentina and Uruguay supplied daily reminders to Basques in those countries of how life in the homeland continued. Worldwide attention to the Basques as an oppressed people lent credence and justification for ETA actions. However, soon media coverage focused on ETA activities themselves, not the rationale or objectives behind them,

> leading host-country populations to equate Basques with violence and terrorism – a burden that diaspora Basques everywhere had to carry…In Argentina and Uruguay, where Basques have benefitted from a positive social status, some immigrants and their descendants chose to distance themselves from political affairs and continued to associate with the organized Basque community only for cultural events (Totoricaguena, 77).

In other words, the political violence in the Basque homeland caused another schism in the Basque-Argentine community, with some giving politics a wide berth and others becoming even more overtly political. Similarly, as Franco waged his culture war in the Basque region, Euskara became a crucial symbol of Basque identity in the homeland and abroad. As Franco developed his theory and practice of cultural homogeneity, Spanish identity and Spanish nationalism became synonymous with Franquismo throughout Spain. Although many Basques recognized themselves within a pan-Hispanic identity, and many supported Hispanidad throughout the early twentieth century, Franco's Catholic nationalist project was blatantly anti-Basque. Thus, Basque identity in the latter half of the twentieth century began to embrace and reproduce the cultural and political sentiments of the separatist movement.

Basque Identity in Modern Argentina

Although Basque migration to Argentina significantly slowed in the last half of the twentieth century, strong claims to Basque identity remained. This was in part due to the relative economic decline of Argentina and Spain's economic improvement as it entered European Economic Community. Totoricagüena argues that the economic decline of Argentina in the 1950s, the dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s, and the 1982

Falklands War caused general demoralization and shame among Argentines regarding their government and society (Totoricaguena, 185). Although the Dirty War is most often remembered as a political witch hunt that resulted in the disappearance of thousands of leftist dissidents, preservation of "Western Christian" identity played a crucial role in the state terror campaign. As recognized by Marguerite Feitlowitz, a highly disproportionate number of Jews were disappeared in comparison to their size in the Argentine population. Special torture methods were reserved for Jewish prisoners, which included verbal abuse originally published in Nazi propaganda and special torture rooms with pictures of Hitler on the walls (Feitlowitz, 98-106). Thus, the Dirty War should more appropriately be viewed as both a political and racial crusade waged by the Argentine state.

During this era of transatlantic state terror, nearly sixty new Basque organizations were created throughout Argentina (Totoricaguena, 77). Interest in Basque identity was a result of the heightened political volatility and armed struggle taking place in the Basque homeland in the 1970s and 1980s during the post-Franco transition to democracy. Furthermore, Basque identity became a way to distinguish oneself from being "entirely Argentine" during the dreadful and hyper-nationalist epoch of the "Dirty War." Totoricagüena highlights responses to a survey distributed among Basque-Argentines during this era, claiming, "Only 12 percent of the surveyed (Basque) population used 'Argentinean' to identify themselves, while others used 'Argentinean-Basque,' 'Basque-Argentinean,' or 'Basque' as self-descriptors" (Totoricagüena, 185). Some Basque centers in Argentina used anti-Franco protests as a means to implicitly denounce their own repressive government, which often censored public expression (Totoricaguena, 73).

Today, Basques in Argentina hold a distinct and respected social status. In fact, in a 1995 study, Gloria Totoricaguena found that 71% of Basque-Argentines claimed to preserve their Basque identity because of pride in "the reputation of Basques as honest and hardworking people" (Totoricaguena, 130). Accounting for only about ten percent of the national population, Basques hold many prominent positions in Argentine politics and business. A strong connection remains between the Basque homeland and the pampas of Argentina. There are 102 Basque associations scattered throughout Argentina, which have roughly 18,000 members. Many of the Basque centers receive funding from the Basque Autonomous Government, which recognizes them as instrumental for maintaining contact with the homeland. The centers offer classes in Euskara, dinner socials, traditional dance lessons, jai alai competitions, *mus* card-game tournaments, and more. There are also exchange programs like Hator Hona, in which Basque youths travel to Argentina for a summer to teach Euskara at Basque culture centers. Similarly, other programs organize groups of Argentine youths to travel to the Basque Country to work on community projects, like restoring a medieval Basque castle or farmhouse, which also exposes Argentine-Basques to their ancestral roots. Regarding Basque culture centers abroad, Totoricagüena claims, "Today they function as defenders and preservers of homeland cultural identity… educating their members and the general public about the Basque Country" (Totoricagüena, 500).

Chapter IV:
Contemporary Identity in the Basque Diaspora Community

The origins of the Basque community are deeply rooted in the history and culture of Argentina. As discussed in the previous chapter, Basques have been migrating to Argentina since the beginnings of the Spanish colonial era. However, waves of Basque immigrants to the Argentine shores have persisted into the early twentieth century, and have been accepting of the contemporary resurgence of Basque political and cultural revival in the homeland, which has allowed for a unique maintenance of Basque identity that persists through various generations in the diaspora community.

According to the Federación Entidades Vasco Argentinas (FEVA), approximately ten percent of Argentines have roots in the Basque Pyrenees, and some date as far back as the colonial conquest ("Nuestra Institución"). There are 102 Basque culture centers scattered throughout the country, reaching as far south as Patagonia and as far north as the Bolivian border. Data from 2007 claims that approximately 18,000 members actively participate at Basque centers throughout the whole country ("Diagnosis and Projection of the Future").

In this chapter, I examine forms of identity expression by "active members" of the Basque Diaspora in Buenos Aires. I focus solely on those who participate in Basque culture centers and attend Basque cultural events as my research sample, which is why I identify those in the sample as "active Basques." I recognize the limitations of only looking at Basques who participate in the centers and events, but I am specifically interested in the role of symbolic identity alongside traditional, collective forms of identity expression, being that Basques are an old immigrant community in Argentina.

Thus, I use Gans' "symbolic identity theory" as a template for investigating my population rather than generalizing to the entire diaspora community, like Gans.

I seek to answer two main questions: 1) What is the role, if any, of "symbolic identity," and 2) What are the key components of Basque identity? I argue that although Basque identity may contain some symbolic aspects, traditional forms of identity expression are still very relevant and have not been replaced. Instead, Basque identity in Argentina consists of three main elements: 1) Basque ancestry, 2) Support for an independent Basque nation-state, and 3) Support for the preservation of the native Basque language, Euskara.

Conceptual Framework: Symbolic Identity

Neil C. Sandberg's straight line theory claims that ethnic acculturation and assimilation are "secular trends that culminate in the eventual absorption of the ethnic group into the larger culture and general population" (Gans, 2). Based on the melting pot theory, straight line theory implies that recently migrated ethnic groups will eventually arrive at the same assimilated identity as their immigrant predecessors.

In an attempt to complement the straight line theory, Herbert Gans developed the concept of "symbolic identity" as new stage of acculturation and assimilation. Symbolic identity is defined as, "The third and fourth generation's concern with ethnic identity and its expression through symbols… for symbolic identity cannot be considered as evidence either of a third generation return or revival. Instead, it constitutes only another point in the secular trend that is drawn, implicitly, in straight-line theory" (Gans, 17). Gans insists

that there will always be tiny bumps and waves in the line, and symbolic identity is one of the reasons for this occurrence (Gans, 17).

Herbert Gans developed the concept of "symbolic identity" in an effort to explain the "revitalization" of ethnic white identity in the United States among third and fourth generations during the 1960s. Gans recognized a severe difference between the expression of identity amongst white ethnics during the sixties and that of their immigrant predecessors at the turn of the century. According to Gans:

> Identity cannot exist apart from a group, and symbols are themselves a part of culture, but ethnic identity and symbolic identity require very different ethnic cultures and organizations [from those] that existed among earlier generations. Moreover, the symbols third generations use to express their identity are more visible than the ethnic cultures and organizations of the first and second generation ethnics (Gans, 1).

For example, symbols mobilized as expressions of ethnic identities today, such as flags, food, and family crests, were not typically given any importance in the identities of earlier migrant generations. Although Gans recognizes the possibility of symbolic identity persisting beyond the third and fourth generations, he claims that symbolic identity will eventually fade away instead of remaining permanently in the identities of future white ethnic generations.

Gans recognizes two specific causes for the transition to symbolic identity: 1) the decreasing role of ethnic cultural centers, and 2) the ability to express identity as an individual rather than a group.

> My hypothesis is that in [the third] generation, people are less and less interested in their ethnic cultures and organizations – both sacred and secular – and are instead more concerned with maintaining their ethnic identity, with the feeling of being Jewish, or Italian, or Polish, and finding ways of feeling and expressing that identity in suitable ways… As ethnic cultures and organizations decline further, fewer ethnic roles are

> prescribed, thus increasing the degree to which people have freedom of role definition (Gans, 7-8).

Gans claims that a personalized feeling of identity will replace traditional forms of identities that are more strongly rooted in collective expression. He also sees the individualization of identity as unsustainable as a permanent form of identity expression.

Gans' definition of symbolic identity is problematic for multiple reasons. My criticisms are quite similar to those made by Gloria Totoricagüena in her study *Identity, Culture and Politics in the Basque Diaspora.* First, Gans trivializes symbolic identity as something that is inauthentic and unreal. This assumes that there is a "real" form of identity, and that the identities of members of a diaspora are artificial (Totoricagüena, 6). He assumes that symbols only serve a role abroad, whereas the Basque case provides evidences that symbols are also important in homeland identity expression, as one cannot walk down the streets of Zarautz or Ondarroa without encountering an ikurrina [Basque flag] at nearly every street corner. Thus, the use of Basque nationalist symbols is not a product of diaspora identity. Totoricagüena acknowledges that instead of comparing one form of identity to another, setting one of the forms as a standard, it is more appropriate to question, "How do these Basques themselves perceive of their individual identity?" (Totoricagüena, 6). Through in-depth interviewing, Totoricagüena found a similar answer to this question throughout the diaspora: "We are Basques who live outside the homeland, but that does not make us any less Basque" (Totoricagüena, xiii).

Secondly, Gans also falls short in claiming that traditional forms of culture and identity expression are no longer relevant to later generations. This is especially problematic when considering the role of Basque ethnic organizations in the diaspora.

Totoricagüena acknowledges that in Argentina, forty-eight "Basque-interest organizations" have surfaced since 1985 (Totoricagüena, 6). This statistic provides dramatic evidence against Gans' claim for an inevitable transition to a purely symbolic identity over time. However, there is an obvious difference in the role of Basque ethnic organizations. The organizations no longer play a daily role in the survival of Basque immigrants through integrating them into the host-society. Instead the primary function of the organizations is to preserve Basque culture among members of the diaspora (Totoricagüena, 124).

Methods

I utilize a mixed methods approach for my research, which includes both a survey and ethnography. The survey consists of 24 questions that were distributed to a sample of 58 participants. Twenty-two were encountered at random at the annual event "Buenos Aires celebra los vascos." Twenty-eight were contacted through language, chorus and dance classes at Euskaltzaleak, Euskal Echea and Centro Vasco Frances. Finally, eight were encountered at random through movie screenings and panels held at Asambleas del Pueblo: Amigos del Pais Vasco and Euskaltzaleak. This sample is best defined as a casual sample rather than a random sample of "active membership" or the Basque-Argentine Diaspora as a whole, and should be viewed as a tool to give numerical depth to some of the trends and themes found through ethnography.

As a result of answers provided on the survey, I have formulated an index to rank the strength of symbolic identity. The scale ranges from 0 to 6, and was compiled in

reference to Gans' theory of symbolic identity and its composition. Participants received one point on the index for answering positively to each of the following questions relating to symbolic identity expression: 1) How often do you eat Basque food at home? 2) How often do you attend Basque festivals? 3) Do you have a Basque name, last name, or nickname? 4) Do you own an ikurrina [Basque flag]? 5) Do you own a txapela [Basque beret]? 6) Do you know traditional Basque dance?

Index:

	Received 1 point	Received no point
Eats Basque food at home:	At least once a month – 43%	Less frequently than once a month – 57%
Attends Basque festivals:	At least three festivals annually – 62%	Two festivals, or less, annually – 38%
Has Basque name:	One or more Basque name – 58%	No Basque names – 42%
Ownership of ikurrina:	Owns ikurrina – 74%	Does not own ikurrina – 26%
Ownership of txapela:	Owns txapela – 64%	Does not own txapela – 36%
Basque dancing:	Can Basque dance – 43%	Cannot Basque dance – 57%

Symbolic Identity Strength:

0	4
1	8
2	1
3	14
4	10
5	11
6	10

Categories of Symbolic Identity Strength:

Strong Symbolic Identity (5-6)	21
Medium Symbolic Identity (3-4)	24
Weak Symbolic Identity (0-2)	13

Utilizing the rankings of symbolic identity based on the index scale, I have created three categories: strong, medium and weak. However, I often combine the medium and weak identity categories to serve as a new category, "not strong." The majority of my tests divide between "strong" and "not strong" categories. After establishing these categories, I am able to explore the causes and effects of symbolic

Basque identity. I have chosen my explanatory variables based on two influential works that support the symbolic identity theory: *Choosing Identities in America* by Mary C. Waters and "Symbolic Ethnicity: The future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America" by Herbert J. Gans. A set of explanatory variables are first used to test *causes* of strong symbolic identity. Later, strong symbolic identity is used as a *determinant* of a set of response variables.

My ethnographic research utilizes findings from participant observation. While living in Buenos Aires, I spent over 40 hours as a student in Basque language classes and Basque chorus at Euskaltzaleak, Euskal Echea and Centro Vasco Frances. The findings from the participant observation will be scattered throughout the results and analysis to elaborate on the quantitative data.

Results

From this point onward, I use terms such as "members of the Basque Diaspora," "Basque-Argentines" and the "Basque community" interchangeably to represent the population of my sample, active members of Basque culture centers in Buenos Aires, unless otherwise stated for the purpose of comparing "active" versus "non-active" Basques. Although the sample does not fairly represent Basques who are not active in centers, I refer to "members of the Basque diaspora who are active at Basque centers" in this manner primarily for the sake of brevity.

Determinants of Symbolic Basque Identity

I begin by presenting a few tests to examine how certain variables affect the choice to "be Basque." A few interesting connections were found between symbolic identity and social/familial networks, but the evidence is not strong enough to make any causal claims regarding the determinants of symbolic Basque identity.

Table 1: Symbolic Basque Identity and Generation

	First-generation (immigrant), Second-generation	**Third-generation, Fourth-generation, Unknown**	**N/A**	**% Dif**	**Total**
Strong	37%	35%	57%	+2%	21
Not Strong	63%	65%	43%	-2%	37
	22	29	7		n=58

Generation is not a likely cause of a strong symbolic Basque identity. There is nearly no difference between the proportion of first and second generations Basque-Argentines with strong symbolic identity and that of third, fourth, and unknown generations. In Gans' theory of symbolic identity, he claims that symbolic identity is a phenomenon that takes place in later generations (Gans, 17). This is because later generations are assumed to be more distant from the "authentic" and traditional forms of identity held by earlier generations. However, the population sample does not demonstrate any significant difference between the earlier and later generations.

Table 2: Symbolic Basque Identity and Education

	University or higher level of education	Below university level of education	% Dif	Total
Strong	37%	35%	+2%	21
Not Strong	63%	65%	-2%	37
	22	36		n=58

University (or higher) level of education is not a likely cause of strong symbolic Basque identity. Gans argues that traditional forms of ethnic identity maintenance were related to working-class status, as ethnic solidarity was synonymous with class solidarity. However, Waters claims that knowledge about one's ancestors is related to higher socioeconomic status; unlike racial identity, ethnic identity has become an option (Waters, 58). Thus, according to Waters, those with higher socioeconomic status should be more likely to preserve their ethnic identities. In this case, level of education is used as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Regardless, there is no significant relationship between the two variables.

Table 3: Symbolic Basque Identity and Travel to Basque Country

	Have visited the Basque Country	Have not visited the Basque Country	% Dif	Total
Strong	52%	20%	+32%	21
Not Strong	48%	80%	-32%	37
	33	25		n=58

Visiting the Basque Country is a likely cause of strong symbolic Basque identity. As mentioned above, symbols play a very important role in Basque identity in the homeland. Thus, it should be no surprise that individuals who have visited the region are likely to have embraced the role of symbols in identity. For example, the Basque flag was a symbol designed by Sabino Arana, the founder of Basque nationalism, to serve as a unifying symbol of the Basque Country, and Article 5 of the 1979 Statutes of Autonomy recognizes the ikurrina as the national flag of the Basque Autonomous Community (Payne, 75).

Similarly, the tree of Guernika is reproduced in cultural materials throughout the Basque Country itself to represent the traditional freedoms held by the region in the era of *fuero* autonomy. Seedlings from the tree have been planted at Basque culture centers throughout the world, such as at Laurak Bat in Buenos Aires and the Basque clubhouse in Chino, California. The imagery of the tree of Guernika also commemorates the victims of Franco's bombing campaign that leveled the city in 1937. Thus, the importance of symbols in the homeland gives perspective to the answers provided in Table 3.

Table 4: Symbolic Basque Identity and Use of Euskara with Grandparents

	Used some phrases of Euskara, a mixture of Euskara and Spanish, or only Euskara with grandparents	**Did not use any Euskara with grandparents**	**NR**	**% Dif**	**Total**
Strong	50%	33%	0	+17%	21
Not Strong	50%	66%	6%	-16%	37
	12	45	1		n=58

Use of Euskara with grandparents is a likely cause of strong symbolic Basque identity. These proportions demonstrate the important role of passing information about ethnic origin to children. As noted by Portes and Schauffler, "Those raised in contexts where large conational concentration exists will have greater probability of parental language preservation. In such instances, there will be clear economic incentive to retain proficiency in that language… The predicted outcome will be bilingualism" (Portes and Schauffler, 622). However, it is also important to recognize that only 20.7% of the sample used any words in Euskara with their grandparents. Similarly, only 12.1% of the sample called their mother and father in Euskara, "Ama" and "Aita." These low proportions also demonstrate that Euskara plays a minor role in everyday life.

Table 5: Symbolic Basque Identity and Number of Basque Friends

	Some Basque Friends, Very Few Basque Friends; No Basque Friends	**Majority Basque Friends**	**% Dif**	**Total**
Strong	33%	50%	+17%	21
Not Strong	67%	50%	-17%	37
	42	14		n=58

Having a majority of Basque friends is a likely cause of strong symbolic Basque identity. As mentioned above, cultural environment is an important determinant of transmission of culture. However, only 33% of the participants in the sample claim that the majority of their friends identify as Basques. This is likely a result of structural assimilation among Basque-Argentines. According to Gordon, structural assimilation is

defined as “large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs and institutions of host society” (Gordon, 169). In my Buenos Aires-based sample, participants are likely to have few Basque-Argentine friends because there is no geo-physical space for Basques outside of the ethnic organizations. Although it should be noted that some towns and villages in the pampas have sizable Basque populations, there are no neighborhoods in metropolitan Buenos Aires that remain predominately Basque. The geo-physical separation of the diaspora has also contributed to a lack of everyday function for Euskara. Instead, the centers serve as contact zones where members of the diaspora must actively participate in order to be exposed to Basque language and culture.

Symbolic Identity as a Determinant

Next, I evaluate symbolic identity as a determinant of other forms of identity expression and behavior. I conclude that symbolic Basque identity does affect other forms of identity expression and behavior, but not in the same ways claimed by Gans. In fact, many of my findings directly contradict those of Gans, as they prove that symbolic identity merely complements traditional forms of identity expression rather than replacing them.

Table 6: Institutional Involvement and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Not Strong	% Diff	Total
6 or more hours per week in Basque Culture Centers	48%	16%	+32%	16
Less than 6 hours per week in Basque Culture Centers	52%	84%	-32%	42
	21	37		n=58

Strength of symbolic Basque identity is an influential factor in determining weekly hours spent in Basque culture centers. Gans claims that symbolic identity allows individuals to "refrain from ethnic behavior that requires an arduous or time-consuming commitment, either to a culture that must be practiced constantly, or to organizations that demand active membership" (Gans, 8). Similarly, Waters claims:

> Part of the reason that ethnicity is so appealing to people is evident in the reasons people give to the question of *why* they "like being ethnic"... They are not like everyone else. At the same time, being ethnic gives them some sense of belonging to a collectivity. It is the best of all worlds: they can claim to be unique and special while simultaneously finding the community and conformity with others that they also crave. But that "community" is of a type that will not interfere with a person's individuality (Waters, 151).

However, Basque-Argentines with higher symbolic ID are more likely to spend more time at the culture centers. Moreover, many members commented that they travel from very long distances from the interior of Buenos Aires Province to participate at the centers. For example, Sonia, a middle-aged English teacher, commutes three times a week to the study Euskara, sing in the Basque chorus, and practice traditional Basque dancing. Her journeys last over an hour each way by train. Sonia represents a significant

amount of diaspora members who demonstrate a commitment to participatory and collective forms of identity expression.

Table 7: Basque Newspapers and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Not Strong	% Dif	Total
Read Basque newspapers on at least a weekly basis	48%	32%	+16%	22
Read Basque newspapers monthly or less often	52%	68%	-16%	36
	21	37		n=58

Strength of symbolic Basque identity is an influential factor in determining frequency of reading Basque newspapers. This demonstrates that those in the sample with strong symbolic identities have a strong interest in current events taking place within the Basque homeland. Although the ghosts of the Carlist Wars and Franco era penetrate deeply into the discourse of the Basque culture centers, many individuals express great interest in current events such as Basque political prisoners and parliamentary elections. These statistics demonstrate that identity symbols have not displaced genuine interests in homeland events.

Table 8: Political Party Affiliation and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Medium	Weak	Total
Supports Basque political party	57%	33%	15%	22
Does not support Basque political party	43%	67%	85%	36
	21	24	13	n=58

Strength of symbolic Basque identity is an influential factor in determining support for a Basque political party. This demonstrates that those with strong symbolic Basque identities are more likely to have affinities for political parties in the Basque homeland. Participants solely expressed support for PNV, Bildu, or Red de Independentzia, which are all separatist parties.

Furthermore, as a participant observer in Euskara classes of different levels, I recognized an obvious difference between the political discourse of students in beginner-level courses compared to those in upper-level courses. For example, some of the beginner-level students had a difficult time understanding the difference between the Christian Democratic PNV and militant leftist nationalism, such as ETA, because they perceived separatism to be a homogenous movement. During the class, the instructor felt obligated to comment on the difference after hearing the comment, in which she clarified the historical distinction between Basque nationalism from left and right perspectives. She explained, "Not all nationalists are for armed struggle." Another first-year student commented, "How do you call a Basque person, Euskal Herria [Basque Country]" (Field Notes 4 September 2012)? These types of comments demonstrate the naiveté of many before their experiences at the centers.

On the other hand, upper-level students had no problem engaging in detailed debates surrounding the texts of Sabino Arana or the strategies of state terror utilized by the Franco regime against the Basque people and culture. The Basque centers do not seem to be obviously indoctrinating members with political ideologies, whether left or right. However, students of Euskara may be more inclined to support certain political

parties simply because of exposure through the centers and/or fellow classmates at the centers.

An obvious difference also exists in the collective political leanings of members among the centers themselves. For example, centers often labeled each other as being "too radical" or "too reactionary." Historically, political differences have caused Basque centers to splinter off from one another, and this trend seems to continue today. Perhaps political differences have strongly influenced the foundation of over 12 Basque culture centers in metropolitan Buenos Aires alone.

Within the centers, political discourse focuses on events in the Basque homeland, but domestic politics are rarely mentioned. Interestingly, politics play a very large role in Argentine identity, which is often evaluated by one's position on Peronism. As claimed by Lupu and Stokes, political partisanship in Argentina has only deepened since the transition to democracy (Lupu and Stokes, 2). However, the Basque culture centers, and their members, seem to distance themselves from openly engaging in discussion of domestic politics. In other words, being Basque does not entail certain political leanings within Argentine politics.

Table 9: Perceived Role of Euskara and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Not Strong	% Dif	Total
Agree that knowledge of Euskara makes a person "more Basque"	33%	38%	-5%	28
Disagree that knowledge of Euskara makes a person "more Basque"	67%	56%	+9%	28
No Opinion	0%	6%		2
	21	37		n = 58

Strength of symbolic Basque identity does not likely influence the perceived role of Euskara in identity. For Gans, language is viewed as a traditional form of identity expression that does not get transmitted to later generations. Thus, those with stronger symbolic identities would not likely view language as an important factor in expressing identity. However, the proportion of the sample is nearly divided evenly in their responses to the statement, "Knowledge of Euskara makes a person 'more Basque,'" This is understandable because the vast majority of the members of the Basque-Argentine community do not speak Basque, and agreement with the statement above would entail a negation of their own identities.

Within Buenos Aires, there are five sites that offer classes in Euskara – four of the sites are Basque culture centers, and the other is the University of Buenos Aires. Fliers and posters can be found throughout the city advertising Basque language courses, including on the storefronts of Basque restaurants and in the underground subway system. Some of the language courses have produced a discourse around Euskara that

implies that the language is synonymous with Basque identity. For example, Euskaltzaleak provides small fliers that claim:

> Did you know that Basque last names come from the name of the house that the family inhabits? And, that this name in Euskara describes the characteristics of the place or people that inhabit it? If you are interested in learning about the thousand year old culture and language of your ancestors, come by Euskaltzaleak – Basque Language School of Buenos Aires.

Similarly, another flier declares:

> Do you want to learn the oldest language of Europe? Do you want to speak the language of the Basque people?

There is an obvious semiotic value given to Euskara that is evident from the discourse used in the fliers. The fliers value Euskara as an icon of authentic Basque identity, and imply that Euskara was spoken by the ancestors of contemporary Basque-Argentines, although this may not have been the case.

However, Euskara is not used for everyday conversation among members of the diaspora although there are many who are highly proficient in the language. Euskara is primarily only used in conversation between students and language instructors, and sometimes between students and visitors from the Basque Country. Members of the diaspora use Euskara among themselves primarily for greetings, toasts and other more ritualistic exchanges, but Euskara does not serve a daily conversational function. In a 2012 interview, Joseba Arregui Aranburu, an ex-Minister of Culture and Tourism for the Basque Autonomous Government, declared of the role of Euskara in Argentina:

> We are not going to save the Basque language in the diaspora. The nationalism of those in the diaspora is what makes them want to learn Basque. United through race and culture in a foreign land makes them more secure and complete…The language is nothing without a core. There is no core in Argentina. The demand comes from Basque descendants,

> symbolic and folkloric preservation. The members of the diaspora left during their time, and their idea of Basque identity is stuck within that era and has yet to catch up with modern Basque identity. For that reason, they emphasize Euskara (Interview 3 February 2012).

Aranburu claims that linguistic nationalism has become an anachronism within the Basque homeland. He declares that the perception of Basque identity held by those in the diaspora is influenced by the socio-cultural climate of the Basque homeland when their ancestors left. However, most Basques migrated to Argentina during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; during this era, Basque identity was still measured by racial background. Language did not develop as central to Basque identity until the mid twentieth century, as I will explain more in depth below. However, this preference for language among members of the diaspora demonstrates a more modern concept of Basque identity than that of the era when mass emigration took place from the Basque homeland to Argentina.

Gans would most likely explain this trend by claiming, "[Symbolic identity] is characterized as a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated into everyday life" (Gans, 9). However, this position does not consider cases of involuntary transition away from homeland language in diaspora communities. Through interviewing, I encountered many members of the Basque-Argentine community who referenced a historical stigmatization of Euskara, which prevented their families from transmitting their native language. Maria claimed, "My grandmother had an inferiority complex about speaking Euskara, and I used to beg her to speak it at home. But she felt too victimized and inferior as a result of what was going on in the homeland

with Franco" (Interview 11 September 2012). Similarly, Teresa proclaimed, "Historically, there was a stigma around Euskara as a peasant language in cosmopolitan Buenos Aires" (Interview 31 August 2012).

The abovementioned linguistic circumstance is not strikingly different from the current scenario in the Basque homeland, where the mobilization of both Euskara and Castilian has turned public space into a linguistic battlefield. According to a 1996 language survey *The Continuity of Basque II*, only 22.5% of the Basque community can be classified as bilingual (Euskara and Castilian: 22%) or monolingual (Euskara only: 0.5%), and 63% of the population monolingual in Castilian only (Eusko Jaurlaritza 1996 from Urla, 131). However, many of the Basques who can speak Euskara do not actually use the language for a multiplicity of reasons, including convenience, self-image and timidness, among others.

After acknowledging the historical marginalization of Euskara in the Basque Country and Argentina, as well as the statistics regarding the role of Euskara in the Basque homeland, it would be unfair to criticize the Basque Diaspora for not incorporating Euskara into daily conversation. Although Gans recognizes the role of linguistic hegemony in the abandoning ethnic languages by immigrant communities while replacing it by that of the host country, his generalization does not account for the linguistic scenario of the Basque Country, where the relationship between language and identity has remained flexible and dynamic as a result of the historical repression of Euskara and challenges to traditional concepts of ethnic classification. Gans' generalized expectation of homeland language retention in ethnic communities abroad proves rather problematic when applying his theory of symbolic identity to the Basque Argentine

community, specifically because of the linguistic consequences of the Basque social and political conflict within the Spanish state.

Although Euskara does not serve a daily conversational function, I encountered a few interesting and creative ways in which the language was utilized, specifically in the form of music. For example, a group from Cordoba called Baietz performed two concerts in Buenos Aires during my visit. The group used Euskara for their lyrics, as they formed the group after meeting each other as colleagues in Euskara classes. During the concert, one of the members commented:

> We have been asked why we make 'Basque' music, but we see it much more complicated than that. We make music in Euskara because we love the culture and support the struggle, but we also love and appreciate being from a country with such a strong mixture of European, Afro-latino and indigenous culture. That is why we use native instruments and song forms (Field Notes, 25 August 2012).

Similarly, a chorus at Euskaltzaleak language school utilized Basque folk songs as a pedagogy for learning Euskara. Although participants did not necessarily gain a full understanding of the intricate grammar rules behind the lyrics, they memorized songs and performed them in public. As a member of the chorus, I was very nervous about my first performance with the group. However, I was reminded by a fellow member, "The objective is to sing in Euskara. That is why we do this. It is less for the artistic aspect." Someone else added, "To practice a pre-European language, we sing" (Field Notes 18 August 2012).

Finally, many Basque-Argentines recently participated in the bi-annual Korrika, which took place on 17 March 2013. First organized in 1980, the Korrika is a march/run that ventures through the historical Basque territories, and has about 600,000 participants.

The revenues generated from the race are used to promote and support schooling and other initiatives to preserve Euskara. Members of the diaspora organized a run through the streets of Buenos Aires, in which they distributed fliers to promote Basque language classes.

Table 10: Linguistic Nationalism and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Not Strong	% Dif	Total
Euskara should be learned if someone permanently moves to the Basque Country	86%	76%	+10%	46
Euskara does not need to be learned if someone moves permanently to the Basque Country	10%	19%	-9%	9
No Opinion	4%	5%		3
	21	37		n=58

Strength of symbolic identity is an influential factor in determining linguistic nationalism. However, what is more interesting is the collective emphasis on linguistic nationalism in the sample, as 79% of the sample agreed with the statement that "Euskara should be learned by someone who is moving permanently to the Basque Country." Although members of the diaspora community are split between the significance of Euskara in strengthening Basque in their own home country, they overwhelmingly agree that Euskara should be spoken by those living in the Basque homeland.

This linguistic ideology reflects an understanding of the word *euskaldun*, which is the traditional way of categorizing a Basque person. Etymologically, *euskaldun* means "one who has Euskara." This categorization is reproduced in linguistic ideology, which places value on Euskara as an essential marker of Basque identity. According to Begoña

Echeverria, schooling in Basque language propagates the notion that a Basque person is one who "has" Euskara (Echeverria, 94). This view was reinforced in a 2012 interview with ex-Minister of Culture of the Basque Autonomous Government, Joseba Arregui Aranburu, who claims that there are multiple reasons why students complete schooling in Euskara, but it is not necessarily because they want to learn the language. Instead, he recognizes the influence of societal and political pressures to speak Euskara. He declares, "The Basque Country is not a very free place. It seemed wonderful to you, looking from the outside. But, to us who grow up in the Basque Country, the societal pressure to 'be Basque' is very tolling" (Interview 3 February 2012).

The role of language in Basque schooling is reflected in the linguistic ideologies of the students in regards to their own identities. In a survey administered by Echeverria, only 15% of the students who studied in Spanish identified as Basque; whereas 79% of those who studied in Euskara identified as Basque. Similarly, 51% of students who studied in Spanish identified as "equally Spanish and Basque; only 9% of students who studied in Euskara identified as "equally Spanish and Basque" (Echeverria, 124).

The importance placed on Euskara by members of the Basque-Argentine community reflects an understanding of a very popular definition of what it means to be Basque in the homeland. However, the number of non-Basque speakers in the Basque Country is nearly three times greater than the number of those who speak the language, and the perceptions of the role of Euskara in the Basque homeland identity are frequently debated (Urla, 131).

Table 11: Independence and Symbolic Basque Identity

	Strong	Not Strong	% Dif	Total	
Agree that the Basque Country should be an independent nation-state	86%	89%	-3%	51	
Disagree that the Basque Country should be an independent nation-state	0%	3%	+3%	1	
No Opinion	3%	8%	-5%	6	
	21	37			n=58

Strength of symbolic identity is not an influential factor in determining attitude towards Basque homeland independence. However, the overwhelming majority of Argentine-Basques that participated in the survey agree that the Basque Country should be an independent nation-state.

There is an obvious connection between the Basque centers and attitudes towards homeland independence. In an interview with Teresa, a professor of Euskara at Euskaltzaleak language school, she claimed:

> The role of Euskaltzaleak is the infusion of Euskara into the Basque Diaspora. We are to defend the Basque Country, and auto-determination is based in language. The Basque Diaspora needs to have a role similar to that of the Irish Diaspora. The Basque Diaspora lacks political consciousness, and this needs to start with the youth. It is not just about pintxos and dancing. They need to start raising consciousness, and this starts with language. The centers are too scared of being affiliated with ETA, and they do not want youths to participate in conscious-based events. The theme of politics has played a devastating role in dividing the diaspora (Interview 31 August 2012).

I encountered a similar frustration in Pedro, who was not only upset with political indifference among members of the diaspora, but also felt that the centers would not politically-focused enough. He declared:

> The Basque culture centers are too focused on folkloric aspects instead of politics. I want nothing to do with folklore. I am pure politics. We had a march to the Spanish embassy this past week in protest of the maltreatment of Basque prisoners, and only one member of the culture centers came. There are more supporters of the Basque cause who have no links to the Basque Country (Interview 21 August 2012).

Although she supports independence, Maria contributed a different perspective:

> I don't think that Euskara should be something that is imposed. Independence is important, but the movement needs to be without a political agenda (Interview 11 September 2012).

In many ways, the emphasis on independence as an essential component of identity closely relates to the representations of the past that come out of the centers. Regarding historical tragedy and symbolic identity, Gans claims, "Third generations can obviously attend to the past with less emotional risk than first and second generation people who are still trying to escape it, but even so, an interest in ethnic history is a return only chronologically" (Gans, 11). He cites the recent interest in the Holocaust among Jewish Americans and the revival of the history of the Turkish massacre among the Armenian American community as examples, claiming that there was not as much attention given to these events in the years after their respective occurrences (Gans, 11). The memory of tragic events in Basque history is ever present in the Basque centers and among the Basque Diaspora community. For example, an anonymous and untitled leaflet found at two of the centers declared:

> The year 2012 presents an important challenge for the movement in favor of independence. Five hundred years ago, in 1512, with the **conquest of Nafarroa**, they took our state from us by force. Seventy-five years ago, in 1937, the fascists destroyed **Guernica with a bombardment**, a symbol of Basque freedoms. By means of massacre and death they wanted to impose fear and resignation. Analyzing the historical trajectory of the Basque people, as a current situation, for economic, cultural, social and political reasons it is clear that **the best option for Euskal Herria is**

> **independence**, just as the case with Scotland and other countries that are sharing this same path.

Throughout my visit, I recognized a countless number of references to the conquest of Navarre, Carlist Wars, Spanish Civil War and Franco dictatorship, which are all seen as pivotal events in the absorption of the Basque territory into the Spanish state.

This intense recollection of the past is a result of the repression suffered by Basques over the past century. As recognized by Patrick O'Connell:

> Collective memory, like individual memory, is vital to the ways in which marginal cultures attempt to subvert the dominant culture that has historically repressed them. The dialectic between the past and the present – moving toward the future – allows for a narrative exploration of the past that rejects a positivistic treatment of truth and history. Hence, memory provides a forum for shaping recovery that, in turn, develops a new relationship with the past (O'Connell, 499).

For Basque-Argentines, recollection of the past contains both individual and collective elements. Many members of the diaspora are able to recall stories repression suffered by their ancestors during the Spanish Civil War and Franco eras. This epoch is also frequently represented through films shown at the Basque culture centers, which establishes a historical and ideological current for collective memory. For example, in one of the films presented, called *Euskal Herria: Libres contra nuestra historia*, the narrator claims, "We want to be free from the officially written history that is dominant" (Ikuska Media). The film connects the historical narrative with the contemporary struggle for Basque; one interviewee claims, "It is our patrimony and we cannot forget it. We must save it. The most important is that we do not forget that we are Basques, and without Euskara we would be nothing" (Ikuska Media).

Gans would claim that Basque independence simply serves as another symbol of ethnicity because of its perceived value as the old country or homeland. He claims, "Transforming [the homeland] into a symbol leaves out its domestic and foreign problems that could become sources of conflict… For example most American Jews who support Israel pay little attention to its purely domestic policies; they are concerned with its preservation as a state and a Jewish homeland, and see the country mainly as a Zionist symbol" (Gans, 11). Benedict Anderson expands by claiming that long-distance participation in conflicts does not leave an individual vulnerable to the same risks as those within the homeland (Anderson, 13). After all, Basque-Argentines are not affected by the political, economic, and social consequences of a transition to an independent nation-state. For example, the recent 2012 elections have resulted in the first time that separatist parties, Bildu and PNV, have held the majority of seats in Basque parliament, as they carried 58% of the votes (Tremlett and Carrell). The proportion of support for independence in the Basque homeland is notably smaller than that of members in the Argentine-Basque community.

However, members of the Basque Diaspora are not disconnected and detached from homeland politics and events. During my time in Buenos Aires, the local group Asambleas del Pueblo held a talk with a representative of the socialist Basque union, LAB, who was visiting Buenos Aires for a conference. The representative discussed the effects of the Spanish crisis in the Basque Country to an audience of approximately forty people, and the role of trade unionism in Basque nationalism. During my two month visit, two demonstrations in support of amnesty for Basque political prisoners took place in front of the Spanish embassy. The demonstrations occurred in August 2012, when judges

were ruling on whether to allow the terminally ill prisoner Josu Uribetxebarria to return home under low surveillance. These acts of solidarity illustrate a sincere commitment to current struggles in the Basque homeland among many members of the Basque community, beyond merely a symbol.

According to Zlatko Skrbis, long-distance nationalism can manifest in a variety of different fashions. In his study of the Balkan diaspora during the volatile conflicts of the 1990s, solidarity with the homeland struggle was a reoccurring unifying theme amongst members of the different diasporas of the region. One Croatian respondent claimed, "The war unified a lot of different Croatian groupings… My cousin actually said he feels guilty that he is not fighting over there. I could say the same thing, except I know it takes more than just guns to fight the war" (Skrbis, 21). Although the Basque Country is not currently engaged in armed political conflict, a similar sentiment exists in the Basque Diaspora concerning their role as ideological supporters.

The independence sentiment penetrates into many ceremonies and events of the Basque-Argentine community. For example, during a dance recital of traditional Basque dance at the center Laurak Bat, the traditionally-dressed dancers entered the room to the song "Eusko Gudariak" ["Basque Soldiers"] while waving a large Basque flag, and the audience of roughly 100 spectators sang along in Euskara (Field Notes 11 August 2012). The song was originally written in 1932, by José Maria Garate, as a battle hymn for the Basque Republican Army during the Spanish Civil War ("Eusko Gudariak"). Paul Connerton claims historical memory manifests in commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices, stating, "We are likely to find [social memory] in commemorative ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only in so far as they are

performative; performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit; habit cannot be thought without a notion of bodily automatisms" (Connerton, 4-5).

Solidarity and support for the political struggle in the Basque homeland is not a new trend among members of the Basque Diaspora. As mentioned prior, members of the diaspora organized with the Argentine government to form the Comité Pro Inmigración Vasca, which facilitated the entry of 1400 pro-independence Basque refugees into Argentina in 1936 (Totoricagüena, 179; Douglass, 106). Instead, support for independence among the diaspora community is simply a continuation of an identity component that has been strengthening over the past century in the Basque homeland and abroad.

Discussion

Before I further elaborate on my analysis of the data, I must acknowledge the limitations of the sample due to its size and non-representative nature. The sample size is obviously too small to make any swooping generalizations of the Basque Diaspora as a whole. However, I consciously decided to *not* rely too heavily on quantitative data. Instead, the numbers are meant to provide a simple statistical framework that is more deeply explained by some of the more potent the qualitative data. I also recognize that symbolic identity can be explained through a wide variety of indicators. But the indicators I selected were based on some of the most commonly recognized symbols and cultural qualities of the Basque Country, as seen from both inside and outside the region.

My sample also does not represent those who identify as Basque, but do not participate in collective activities and organizations. It is problematic to infer that those Basques who do not participate in the centers carry the same sentiments as those who do participate. However, these people are very difficult to encounter as a researcher with a limited amount of time and resources.

In furthering my analysis of Basque identity in Argentina, there is no obvious connection between strong symbolic identity and the factors claimed to be significant in Gans' theory. Gans stretches his theory too far by erasing the role of ethnic organizations and collective ethnic identity in later generations; instead he places too much weight on the transition to symbolic identity as a replacement. According to Gans, 50 percent of my sample should not be participating as active members in the culture centers, and instead should have moved on to symbolic identity expression (see Table 1). In comparing my results to the main claims of Gans, I demonstrate that symbolic identity has not replaced other forms of identity expression, but instead a strong symbolic Basque identity is likely to determine other forms of identity expression. In other words, the two concepts of ethnic identity expression complement one another, and they allow for an even greater flexibility of what it means to "be Basque."

Perhaps members of the Basque culture centers do not transition to a symbolic identity for structural reasons. After all, Gans does not stretch his theory outside of the United States, but as a nation of "white ethnic" immigrants from Europe, Argentina shares a similar makeup to that of the United States. A comparative investigation of "white ethnic" identity expression in both Argentina and the United States would allow for a better idea of structural similarities and differences. Moreover, I argue that

regardless of structural influences, ethnic identity expression differs among ethnic enclaves, and individuals within ethnic enclaves, which does not allow for a generalizing theory. I elaborate further on the specifics of the Basque case in the final section of this thesis.

Gans is correct when claiming that ethnicity has taken on a new importance among diasporic populations with early twentieth century roots. He claims:

> Ethnic identity is not a new, or third generation phenomenon, for ethnics have always had an ethnic identity, but in the past it was largely taken for granted, since it was anchored to groups and roles, and was rarely a matter of choice. When people lived in an ethnic neighborhood, worked with fellow ethnics, and voted for ethnic politicians, there was little need to be concerned with identity except during conflict with other ethnic groups. Also, the everyday roles people played were often defined for them by others as ethnic. Being a dry-goods merchant was often a Jewish role; restaurant owners were assumed to be Greek; and bartenders Jewish…The third generation has grown up without assigned roles or groups that anchor ethnicity, so that identity can no longer be taken for granted (Gans, 8).

However, this struggle to preserve ethnic identity among later generations cannot be confined to a simple set of explanations and one simple outcome, symbolic identity. In other words, although third and later generations have a choice to identify as ethnic, this does not mean that ethnic identity expression will only be expressed symbolically. Instead, each case should be examined and analyzed individually to accurately explain the homeland and diasporic factors influencing ethnic identity expression. In the Basque case, the social and political situation in the homeland plays an obvious role in structuring the main components of identity.

As mentioned above, for many of those in later generations Basque identity remains a choice. As claimed by Waters:

> The reality is that white ethnics have a lot more choice and room for maneuver than they themselves think they do. The situation is very different for members of racial minorities, whose lives are strongly influenced by their race or national origin regardless of how much they may choose not to identify themselves in ethnic or racial terms (Waters, 157).

For example, Basque-Argentines can flow between both identities much easier than Bolivian-Argentines or Chinese-Argentines because they are no longer recognized as "the other" by greater Argentine society. And as recognized above, Basques have an overwhelmingly positive reputation.

Although there is a significant relationship between those who were exposed to Euskara by their grandparents and strong symbolic identity, this does not mean that they were confined to the role of being Basque. The scenario would be much different if these individuals were brought up only speaking Euskara and consequently spoke Spanish with an accent, such as the case with many Chicanos who grow up speaking Spanish only in their households. Instead, their experiences with Euskara come from personal and isolated interactions with relatives that do not carry over into the everyday; thus causing a self-perceived concept of identity rather than one based on how they are recognized by their peers. According to E.R. Barkan, one of the final stages of assimilation occurs when "nominal cultural ties are maintained with countries of origin yet primary identity rests with the core society" (McDermott and Samson, 251).

Finally, Gans argues that symbolic identity is a diaspora phenomenon, and assumes that symbols do not play a role in the identities of emigrant sending communities. He states, "The symbols third generation ethnics use to express their identity are more visible than the ethnic cultures and organizations of the first and second

generation ethnics" (Gans, 1). However, the contentious political situation in the Basque homeland has created a hyper nationalist environment in the homeland, in which symbols such as flags, traditional clothing and lauburus (a four-sided Basque pagan symbol) have been incorporated into everyday ethnic identity. The role of symbols in the Basque homeland demonstrates that Gans' assumption cannot be generalized to all emigrant sending communities.

Moving beyond Symbolic Identity

Gans' theory fails to explain ethnic identity in later generations while also limiting itself to a specific type of identity that can be interpreted as being "inauthentic" and artificial. Therefore, it is necessary to move away from symbolic identity as a default for later generations in migrant communities. Instead, symbolic identity also has the potential to strengthen traditional forms of identity expression, and therefore serves as a complement. After acknowledging that symbolic identity theory does not universally explain identity in older immigrant communities, I refocus the duration of this essay to explaining some of the key traits of collective Basque identity expressions. I argue that active Basque identity in Argentina consists of three main elements: 1) support for an independent Basque nation-state, and 2) support for the preservation of the native Basque language, Euskara, and 3) Basque ancestry. Basques-Argentines have combined the historic and modern concepts of Basque identity to establish a unique form of identity expression of their own.

Regarding separatism, 87.9% of the sample responded that they agree with the statement that the "Basque Country should be an independent nation-state." As mentioned above, 2012 election results demonstrated that roughly 58% of the population in the Basque homeland supports independence. Preference for Basque nationalism is a continuation of the modern transformation that was founded in the late nineteenth century – which stresses "the nationalism that aspired to form or capture states rather than the 'nations' of already existing states" (Hobsbawm, 101).

The strong support for independence may be explained by the tendency of immigrant communities to feel a special relationship to their ancestor's birthplace or imagined homeland abroad. Raanan Rein comments on the role of Zionism in the Jewish community, and claims, "Being Zionist in Argentina has nothing to do with the State of Israel. More often, it was one of the strategies espoused by Jews in order to become Argentines. Like every other immigrant community, Jews in Argentina and Brazil need to have their *Madre Patria*" (Rein, 13). In other words, as country of immigrants, Argentina emphasizes and encourages affinities with a mother country. The fact that Basque-Argentines do not have a homeland nation-state, may lead Basque-Argentines to adopt separatist positions.

Another interesting trend within the Argentine Basque Diaspora is that 79.3 percent of the sample responded that they agree that people who move to the Basque Country should speak Euskara. Although Basques seem to agree on the importance of preserving of Euskara in the Basque homeland, they do not see language as an essential component for identifying as Basques themselves. In a 2004 study conducted Gloria Totoricagüena, Basque-Argentines were proposed with the statement, "To be considered

a Basque, a person should speak the Basque language," in a survey. Only 24 percent of the participants "strongly agreed or agreed," 8 percent of the participants had "no opinion," and 68 percent of the participants "strongly disagreed or disagreed" (Totoricagüena, 112). As acknowledged by Totoricagüena, "Basques in these diaspora countries no longer consider [Euskara] of such importance. Because so many of them do not speak Euskara, they would not want to eliminate themselves from their own category" (Totoricagüena, 135). After all only 16 percent of the sample of the Basque Argentine community reported to speak Euskara fluently or conversationally (Totoricagüena, 135). But this linguistic ideology seems to apply solely to the role of language in the diaspora, as Basque-Argentines still see linguistic assimilation as essential for living in the Basque homeland.

This trend of linguistic nationalism among the diaspora can be seen as a result of the push to preserve Euskara in the Basque homeland that has been developing since the 1960s. It also demonstrates the modern change in attitudes regarding identity inspired by the discourse of ETA. As recognized by Kasmir:

> The student authors of ETA declared it a "revolutionary organization" that rejected PNV's Catholicism, its anti-immigrant chauvinism, and its racialized Basqueness. For ETA, Basqueness resided not in race but in culture and language, in an "ethnolinguistic perception of Basque identity." ETA further distinguished itself from PNV through an ideology of *ekintza* (activism); its early activism focused on cultural and linguistic revival (Kasmir, 48).

Furthermore, Begoña Echeverria declares:

> The Basque community envisioned by Arana was one based on common descent… Once could not "earn" admission to the community; those of non-Basque descent were excluded from it. This primordial definition was replaced with a linguistic definition with the rise of ETA… The socialist-nationalist faction of ETA framed their struggle in class terms… While it

> continued to distance itself from immigrants who spoke only Spanish and who supported all-Spanish parties, it welcomed those who learned euskera. Thus, once it rejected descent as the defining criteria of Basque identity, ETA ultimately replaced it with language (Echeverria, 88).

The revival of Euskara towards the end of the Franco regime allowed Basques to use language as a form of everyday resistance to the dictatorship, in which they were playing within the rules of the regime while also denouncing its legitimacy (DeCerteau, 8). It would be farfetched and untrue to label approximately 79 percent of my sample as ETA-sympathizers, but the effect of ETA on identity discourse remains undeniable, as their revolutionary perception of Basqueness has given rise to a unique and popular concept of Basque identity.

As a complement to the two previous components, 12.1 percent of the sample claimed to have no Basque ancestry. Although these respondents participate at Basque culture centers and Basque cultural events, they claim to have no familial connection to the Basque Country. As mentioned above, contemporary Basque identity no longer emphasizes bloodline as an essential component to claiming Basque ethnicity. Instead, discourse surrounding Basque identity in the homeland is more focused on support of the Basque political struggle and embracing of Euskara as the spoken language. For example, Sharryn Kasmir presents a public confrontation of Basque identity that took place during the 1991 mayoral campaign in Mondragón. She describes the situation below:

> Txema [a radical Basque nationalist of working-class and immigrant background] yelled at a PSE councilman *"Español!"*, even though the councilman is ethnically Basque, the child of two Basque parents. In response, the councilman shouted *"Más vasco qué tú!"* ["More Basque than you!"] to which several people drinking at the radical-nationalist bar responded with sarcastic laughter (Kasmir, 41).

This example provides vivid evidence that Basque identity can be acquired rather than attained through birth, and that it is closely related to political and linguistic ideology.

But, contrary to the popular discourse on identity in the Basque homeland, the majority of Basque-Argentines still see ancestral background as fundamental to Basque identity, which Gloria Totoricagüena demonstrates in her 2002 study. When proposed with the statement, "A person must have Basque ancestors to be a Basque," 62 percent of the participants "strongly agreed or agreed," 8 percent of the participants had "no opinion," and 29 percent of the participants "strongly disagreed or disagreed" (Totoricagüena, 111). Although the majority of Basque-Argentines still view Basque identity as ancestrally based, a sizable proportion of participants without Basque ancestry demonstrates a broader interest in Basque culture and politics among Argentines. For example, at one of the centers, the language instructor was of Italian ancestry, but spoke Euskara fluently. Similarly, some of the students who participated in Euskara classes and Euskal Dantza were of Mexican, Italian, and Ukrainian decent, respectively. All three gained interest in Basque culture while attending Euskal Echea, an esteemed private high school established in 1905 by Basque immigrants that still offers classes in Euskara. One student described Euskal Echea as, "The high school used to be majority Basque, something like ninety percent, but today it has developed into a prestigious private institution and has students from all backgrounds (Field Notes 18 August 2012).

Elaborating beyond the quantitative data, I noticed that within Basque identity, there is a strong historical memory current that penetrates both collective and individual identities. Basques seek to differentiate themselves from Spanish identity after the atrocities that took place during the Franco era. Argentina's close historical and cultural

ties with Spain have left Basques feeling victimized, as the Basques have a different relationship with the Spanish state as a result of Franco's attempts at systematic cultural genocide. Recognition of Spain as a unified whole remains reminiscent of discourse used in the Franco era, in which the multiplicity of identities within the Spanish state were not recognized. After Franco nearly accomplished erasure of Basque language and culture, vibrant and committed efforts for preservation have sought to give meaning to "being Basque" beyond a museum-like heritage. As recognized by Urla, many of these efforts come from the grassroots, and utilize the everyday as a medium for awareness and participation (Urla, 18).

By negating the Spanish identity, Basques also distinguish themselves as a unique ethnic group within Argentina. As the second largest immigrant group in Argentina, Spanish identity has been historically appropriated by the Argentine state, which has stripped "being Spanish" of cultural uniqueness in Argentine society. In the case of Italo-Argentines, the largest immigrant group, Arnd Schneider argues, "In being Italian or of Italian descent there is no need to maintain a symbolic boundary towards other *porteños*," as nearly all Argentines are said to have Italian backgrounds (Schneider, 240). He specifically comments on the difficulty of maintaining "Italian style" in Buenos Aires since the middle and upper classes in Argentina appropriate Italian and European influences (Schneider, 240). Thus, Italo-Argentines rarely claim space within Buenos Aires as Italian influence saturates the city, whereas Basques do not have the same amount of cultural influence so they rely on the centers to distinguish themselves as an immigrant enclave. In this way, symbols are very useful in order to maintain uniqueness.

Basque-Argentines share similar concepts of identities to those of Irish-Americans. With comparable roots in nineteenth century independence movements, Trumpener argues that early claims to Celtic identity were appeals to "solidarity, community, and heterogeneity in the face of British/English cultural and linguistic homogenization" (McCarthy and Hague, 390). According to Byron, contemporary Irish-American identity remains based on a "demonization of the English," which has "a powerful effect in shaping a sense of self; a history and biography that is simultaneously defined by having one's origins in the British Isles but being emphatically not Anglo-Saxon but rather a different, purer, nobler, and more primordial 'race' of Celts" (McCarthy and Hague, 391). McCarthy and Hague argue that Celtic-ness provides a way for whites in the United States to claim an ethnic identity associated with resistance to state oppression, while still retaining the benefits of "white privilege" (McCarthy and Hague, 387). Similarly, Basque-Argentines associate with an identity based on resistance to neo-colonialism and cultural homogeneity. Basques do not risk being marginalized as "the other" by highlighting their ethnic origins within Argentine society because they are widely recognized as some of the early settlers in Argentina, and remain highly respected. On the contrary, other ethnic enclaves, such as Argentine Jews, have historically suffered from the "tension between ethnicity and nation," and have struggled with the pressure to be "unmistakably Argentine" (Rein, 12). Historically, Jews took greater social risks by strongly identifying as Jewish, as they would not be able to maintain their "white privilege" after distinguishing themselves as an "other." A fitting example of this is found in the violent events of "Tragic Week" of 1919, when Argentine nationalist groups targeted Jewish immigrants for the involvement in the labor

movement. Moreover, Jews were reminded during the Dirty War that their whiteness can be structurally reinvented to distinguish them as an "other," which is a risk that Basques did not run during that infamous era.

Although I have attempted to provide a thorough answer for what it means to actively "be Basque" in Argentina, I have not yet offered a clear explanation for why individuals still retain Basque identities. Totoricaguena seeks to provide a rational explanation, as she demonstrated that 71 percent of the survey participants chose to preserve Basque identity because of the reputation of Basques as being hard working (Totoricaguena, 130). Similarly, in a study of the Italian community in Buenos Aires, Schneider claims that Italo-Argentines maintain their ethnic identities after the reversal of positions of Argentina and Italy, as Argentina has devolved into "the third world" and Italy has developed into a top industrial nation (Schneider, 26). However, these explanations are far too narrow and rational to explain the cultural and political attitudes of members of the Basque diaspora.

There is no generalizing reason for explaining why individuals in the Basque-Argentine Diaspora preserve their homeland identities. Moreover, I would feel that I am doing a disservice to my research population by not acknowledging the intricacies of their motives for choosing to retain their respective Basque identities. However, a reoccurring theme surfaced throughout the research that seems to explain a major component behind identity preservation: feeling.

The complexity of Basque identity in Argentina is expressed in the responses of interviewees in the documental *Guk* by Nuria Vilalta. In one chapter of the film, Vilalta asks numerous members of the Argentine diaspora "What does it meant to be Basque?"

The responses she receives reflect the variations of Basque identity, and the role of feeling in identifying as Basque. But, nearly all responses acknowledge that identity is a choice. For example, one interviewee declared, "I do not have a Basque last name within the first sixteen last names of mine. My ancestors are from 1780 in Argentina. In reality, one chooses what one wants to be." Another participant claimed, "To be Basque is to feel Basque. Someone said that one is Basque if one wants to be Basque, or one feels Basque." Finally, one interviewee responded in Euskara, "Someone who speaks Euskara is Basque, and that is what I will always believe, but I know very clearly that I am Argentine."

As mentioned above, Gans recognizes that later generations are concerned with "feeling" as well, in which he declares that later generations focus on "finding ways of feeling and expressing [ethnic] identity in suitable ways" (Gans, 7-8). However, Gans focuses on the importance of feeling or belonging to a group, which then becomes expressed through common symbols. But the role of "feeling" goes much deeper into personal and familial experiences, as referenced above in regards to the role of historical memory. This collective history of ethnic endangerment provides a common sentimental feeling, and transcends the need to use symbols as a sole way to express ethnic solidarity.

Choosing Basque identity requires a far more complex of an explanation than simply rational choice. In examining my sample responses, 38 percent of the sample held university degrees, which demonstrates that Basque identity does not simply imply a connection to class and economic advancement. Moreover, those who participate in the centers come from mixed socio-economic backgrounds, and convene at the Basque cultural centers from many different parts of the greater Buenos Aires region. Similarly,

there are many more culture centers located throughout all of Argentina that were not part of this study; many of them are located in poorer rural areas. This displays the diversity of backgrounds that identify as Basque, which demonstrates that “Basque-ness” does not indicate exclusivity or social status.

Chapter V:
Conclusion

This investigation bagan by examining historical discourse on Basque identity, and has finished with a clearer notion of contemporary Basque identity. Although this research has merely started to brush a very large surface, it is a good starting point for further investigations in two specific areas: the role of historical memory and the role of Basque centers. I strongly suggest a further in-depth investigation of the role of historical memory in choosing Basque identity, specifically focusing on the Spanish Civil War and Franco-era repression. My investigation has softly scratched the surface of the theme, but it can be pursued at a much deeper level with qualitative and ethnographic methods.

I also suggest a comparative study of the "active" and "non-active" members of the diaspora by using a similar survey format. To what extent do non-active members still identify as Basque, and how do they perform this identity? Perhaps non-active members express their identities symbolically, or perhaps they simply identify as unhyphenated Argentines. Moreover, by using a sample that represents two different populations within the diaspora, one can gain a better grasp on the extent to which the ideological patterns found in this study are influenced by the centers.

Members of Basque culture centers in Buenos Aires express identity in a manner that aligns with a particular perspective of identity that originated in the Basque homeland – one that developed in the mid-twentieth century and that is based on political and linguistic nationalism. Arguably, the Basque culture centers play a significant role in fomenting the ideological and sentimental unity among those who identify as Basques, as they serve as physical spaces for members of the Diaspora to share and debate what it

means to be Basque. However, separatist and nationalist discourse from the Basque homeland has had a noteworthy effect on the physical and ideological manifestations of Basque identity in the Basque culture centers of Buenos Aires.

References Cited

Azcona, P. J. M. (2004). *Possible Paradises: Basque Emigration to Latin America*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Anderson, Benedict. (1991). *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso.

Andres, Blas Guerrero. (1993). "La ambigüedad nacionalista de Ramiro de Maeztu." *Working Papers*, No 71. Institut de Ciéncies Politiques i Socials.

Bletz, M. E.. (2010). *Immigration and Acculturation in Brazil and Argentina 1890-1929.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Brennan, Gerald. (1967). *The Spanish Labrynth*. London: Cambridge University Press.

Callahan, Conrey Lee. (2008). "The Impact of the Spanish Civil War on Argentine Nationalist Intellectual Thought." Dissertation. Vanderbilt University.

Calvo Perez, Julio. (2004). *Contacto interlinguistico e intercultural en el mundo hispano*. Volume 2. Valencia, Spain: Universidad de Valencia.

Clark, Robert. (1979). *The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond*. Reno: University of Nevada Press

.

Connerton, Paul. (1989). *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

DeCerteau, Michel. (1984). *The Practice of Everyday Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

DeLaney, Jean H. and Jeane H. DeLaney. (2002). "Imagining 'El Ser Argentino': Cultural Nationalism and Romantic Concepts of Nationhood in Early Twentieth-Century Argentina." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol 34, No. 3. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Douglass, W. A. (2006). *Global Vasconia: Essays on the Basque Diaspora*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Douglass, W. A. (1971). "Rural Exodus in Two Spanish Basque Villages: A Cultural Explanation." *American Anthropologist, 73*(5), pp. 1100-1114.

Douglass, W. A., & Bilbao, J. (1975). *Amerikanuak : Basques in the New World*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Echeverria, Begoña. (2000). "Basque Schooling: What is it Good For?" Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego.

Echeverria, Begoña. (2003). Schooling, Language, and Ethnic Identity in the Basque Autonomous Community. *Anthropology & Education Quarterly, 34*(4), pp. 351-372.

"Eusko Gudariak." *Auñamendi Eusko Entzilopedia*. Usurubil, Gipuzkoa: Eusko Ikaskuntzaren Euskomedia Fundazioa.

FEVA. (2007). "Diagnosis and Projection of the Future." *Fourth Congress on Basque Communities*. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

FEVA. (2012). "Nuestra Institución." *Federación de Entidades Vasco Argentinas*. Buenos Aires, Argentina. fevaonline.org.arg/FrontEnd/Institucion.aspx

Falcoff, Mark and Frederick B. Pike. (1982). *The Spanish Civil War, 1936-39: American Hemispheric Perspectives*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Feitlowitz, Marguerite. (1998). *A Lexicon of Terror: Argentina and the Legacies of Torture*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Finchelstein, Federico. (2010). *Transatlantic Fascism: Ideology, Violence, and the Sacred in Argentina and Italy, 1919-1945*. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Gal, Susan and Judith T. Irvine. (1995). "The Boundaries of Languages and Disciplines: How Ideologies Construct Difference." *Social Research*, 62:4.

Gans, Herbert J. (1979). "Symbolic Ethnicity: The future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2:1, 1-20.

Gans, Herbert J. (1997). "Toward a Reconciliation of 'Assimilation' and 'Pluralism': The Interplay of Acculturation and Ethnic Retention." *International Migration Review*, Vol. 31, No. 4. New York: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.

Gardner, Nick. (2000). "Basque Education in the Basque Autonomous Community." Vitoria-Gasteiz, Spain: Eusko Jaurlaritza.

Glauert, Earl T. (1963). "Ricardo Rojas and the Emergence of Argentine Cultural Nationalism." *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 43, No. 1. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Gobineau, Arthur de. (1915). *An Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Gordon, Milton M. (1964). *Assimilation in American Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ibarguren, Federico and Juan Pablo de Lojendio. (1937). *Discursos a los vascos de America*. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Ikuska Media. *Euskal Herria: Libres Contra Nuestra Historia.*

"Joseba Arregui Aranburu." Interview 3 February 2012. University of California, San Diego.

Kasmir, Sharryn. (2002). "More Basque than You: Class, Youth, and Identity in an Industrial Basque Town." *Identities*. New York: Hofstra Press. 9:1, 39-68.

Lupu, Noam and Susan C. Stokes. (2007). "Political Identities in Argentina's Interrupted Democracy" presented at Elections and Political Identities in New Democracies. New Haven, CT: Yale University.

Maeztu, Ramiro. (1941). *Defensa de la hispanidad*. Madrid, Spain: Grafica Universal.

McCarthy, James and Euan Hague. (2004). "Race, Nation, and Nature: The Cultural Politics of 'Celtic' Identification in the American West." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 94: 2. Taylor and Francis, LTD.

McDermott, Monica and Frank L. Samson. (2005). "White Racial and Ethnic Identity in the United States." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 31. Annual Reviews.

Molina, Fernando and Pedro J. Oiarzabal. (2009). "Basque Atlantic shores: ethnicity, the nation-state and the diaspora in Europe and America (1808—98)." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 32:4, 698-715.

Moya, Jose. (1998). *Cousins and Strangers: Spanish Immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930.* Berkeley: University of California.

O' Connell, Patrick. (2001). "The Recuperation of Immigrant Identity: Remembering with a Purpose in Argentina." *Revista Hispanica Moderna*, 54:2. University of Pennsylvania Press.

Ortega y Gasset, Jose. (1930). *The Revolt of the Masses*. South Bend, IN: Notre Dame Press.

Payne, Stanley G. (1975). *Basque Nationalism*. Reno, Nevada: University of Nevada Press.

Perez-Agote, Alfonso. (2006). *The Social Roots of Basque Nationalism*. Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press.

Pike, Frederick B. (1971). Hispanismo, 1898-1936. South Bend, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Portes, Alejandro and Richard Schauffler. (1994). "Language and the Second Generation: Billingualism Yesterday and Today." *International Migration Review*, Vol. 28, No. 4. New York: Center for Migration Studies.

Preston, Paul. (2012). *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

Rein, Raanan. (2010). *Argentine Jews or Jewish Argentines? Essays on Ethnicity, Identity, and Diaspora*. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.

Rock, David. (1993). *Authoritarian Argentina*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rock, David. (1987). "Intelectual Precursors of Conservative Nationalism in Argentina, 1900-1927." *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 67, No. 2. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Sarramone, Alberto. (1995). *Los Abuelo Vascos en el Rio de la Plata*. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Biblos Azul.

Schneider, Arnd. (2000). *Futures Lost: Nostalgia and Identity among Italian Immigrants in Argentina*. Bern, Switzerland: Peter Lang.

Schulman, Sam. (1948). Juan Bautista Alberdi and His Influence on Immigration Policy in the Argentine Constitution of 1853. *The Americas*, Vol. 5, No. 1.

Shumway, Nicolas. (1991). *The Invention of Argentina*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Suriano, Juan. (2010). *Paradoxes of Utopia: Anarchist Culture and Politics in Buenos Aires 1890-1910*, translated by Chuck Morse. Oakland, CA: AK Press.

Totoricagüena, G. P. (2005). *Basque Diaspora: Migration and Transnational Identity*. Reno: Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada.

Tremlett, Giles and Severin Carrell. (12 October 2012). "Pro-Independence Parties Win Basque Country Elections in Spain." *UK Guardian*. Guardian News and Media Limited.

Unamuno, Miguel de. (1899). “El pueblo que habla español.” *El Sol*. Buenos Aires.

Unamuno, Miguel de. (1905). “Domingo Fuastino Sarmiento.” *La anarquia literaria*. Madrid, Spain

Urla, Jacqueline. (2012). *Reclaiming Basque: Language, Nation, and Cultural Activism*. Reno: University of Nevada Press.

Vilalta, Nuria. (2012). *Guk, nosotros*.

Vizcarra, Zacarias. (1939). *Vasconia Españolísima: Datos para comprobar que vasconia es reliquia preciosa de lo más Español de España*. San Sebastian, Spain: Editorial España.

Waisman, Carlos. (1987). *The Reversal of Development in Argentina*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Waters, Mary C. (1990). *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Williams, J Allen Jr. and Suzanne T. Ortega. (1990). “Dimensions of Ethnic Assimilation: An Empirical Appraisal of Gordon’s Typology.” *Sociology Department, Faculty Publications*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska.

Zimmerman, Eduardo A. (1992). “Racial Ideas and Social Reform: Argentina, 1890-1916.” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol. 72, No. 1. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press.