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Women's resistance across space and time in Morocco and the Philippines

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Global Studies

by

Jesilyn M. Faust

Committee in charge:

Professor Paul Amar, Co-Chair

Professor Esther Lezra, Co-Chair

Professor Alison Brysk

December 2022

The dissertation of Jesilyn M. Faust is approved.

Alison Brysk

Esther Lezra, Co-Chair

Paul Amar, Co-Chair

December 2022

Women's resistance across space and time in Morocco and the Philippines

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by

Jesilyn M. Faust

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VITA OF JESILYN M. FAUST

December 2022

EDUCATION

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science, California State University, Long Beach, June 2013

Master of Arts in Spanish, California State University, Long Beach, June 2015

Doctor of Philosophy in Global Studies, University of California, Santa Barbara, December 2022 (expected)

PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Adjunct Instructor, Southern New Hampshire University, 2018-2021

Teaching Assistant, University of California Santa Barbara, 2015-2020

Teaching Assistant, California State University Long Beach, 2014-2015

PUBLICATIONS

Islamic Feminism and the Way Forward: Women's rights in Morocco, Contracting Human Rights, Edward Elgar Publishing, Edited by Alison Brysk and Michael Stohl, 2018

Marriage and the Family in Modern Iran, IBT Tauris Publishing, Edited by Janet Afary and Jesilyn Faust, 2021

The SAGE Handbook of Domestic Violence, Sage Publications, Edited by Todd K. Shackelford, "Contesting Femicide: Social Movements and the Politics of Men's Violence Against Female Intimate Partners", Alison Brysk and Jesilyn Faust, 2020

GRANTS AND AWARDS

Chiota Payne Fellowship, 2019 - 2020

Boren Fellowship, 2017 - 2018

Center for Middle East Studies Summer Research Study Award, 2016

Grad Slam Research Competition Finalist and Grant Recipient, 2016

ABSTRACT

Women's resistance across space and time in Morocco and the Philippines

By

Jesilyn M. Faust

The contemporary women's movements in the fight for liberation in Morocco and the Philippines have experienced many failures, contradictions and setbacks. The Moroccan monarchy claims to be progressive and support women's rights but there has been little progress despite massive constitutional reforms. The Philippines elected the first female president in Asia and has an active and well-organized leftist and women's rights movement but women in the Philippines still lack access to a number of basic rights. How can we explain these contradictions? How have women's movements responded? What connections do these countries share that may help us explain these contradictions. The answer lies in a global, historical, decolonial analysis. This was carried out by reading multiple archives against the grain as well as collecting interviews and oral histories. The residual structures of Spanish colonialism in the form of the (re)conquista, construction of Islam as threat, the erasure of indigenous identity, and the gendered subject of the Moro/a were first formed in the conflict between Iberian and North African forces. The residues of these structures of oppression traveled around the world to the Philippines where the Spanish re-encounter the figure of the Moro/a and carry out a new colonial project influenced by the residual structures of oppression first formed in Morocco. However, in response to these residual structures of oppression, we also find residual structures of resistance based in the practices of indigenous women. This dissertation traces a decolonized history of women's resistance, finding structures, figures, and practices of resistance in the forms of *inzi* and *kalayaan*. Both

the structures of resistance and oppression persist as residual, effective but not determinant elements as seen in the more contemporary case studies of family law, violence against women, and indigenous women's issues.

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Introduction

Our consciousnesses were thus shaped by the burden of persistent colonialisms and the euphoric promise of nationalism and self-determination.

- Jaqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty

As people of the world, we are in a time of unprecedented change which we struggle to understand particularly when it comes to the legacy of colonialism and imperialism, gender, power, social movements, and material change. Many academics and even activists have been shocked by the powerful and unprecedented protests and rebellions that have sprung up around the world in the last two decades, from the Black liberation movements in the wake of George Floyd's death to the so-called Arab Spring and February 20th movements in Morocco, to the renewal of People's Power movements in the Philippines. At both the center and the margins of these movements are women, their lives, their deaths and their power. Women's movements in Morocco and the Philippines have made huge impacts under difficult circumstances. In Morocco, we see multiple women's movements crossing different intersections of identity and oppression both incredible in their resilience but also facing structures of oppression rooted in colonialism and imperialism. In the case of Amina al-Filali, when she filed a complaint with the police, the court forced her to marry her rapist under Morocco's law 475 which allows rapists to escape prosecution by marrying their victims. Seventh months later, she committed suicide. Fadwa Laroui, 25 year old mother of two set herself on fire in protest of the oppression she experienced as a single mother. King Mohammed VI claims to be a champion of liberalism and women's rights as well as taking actions to add gender equality to the constitution yet women in Morocco have seen few

actual improvements. Meanwhile in the Philippines, women came under attack during the Duterte presidency as he threatened to shoot rebel women in the vagina during an official speech. Jennifer Laude, a trans woman was viciously murdered by an American soldier and Duterte overturned his conviction. Bai Bibyaon Ligkayan Bigkay, a more than 90 year old indigenous woman activist has threats on her life as do many women activists in the Philippines. While all these incidents have occurred within the last ten years, this is nothing new. How do we explain the failures and contradictions in the fight for women's liberation? How are women answering those failures and contradictions? The answer lies in a historical, decolonial, and global approach.

From protests and social movements to Covid-19, to the resurgence of fascism, none of these changes can be understood in isolation, instead they must be studied simultaneously in a global but also local, contemporary but also historical context. There is a long history of both persecution of women and their resistance to that persecution at the intersection of gender, class, and indigenous identity, beginning and still rooted in colonialism and imperialism. Both the structures of oppression and the structures of resistance to that oppression stretch backwards and forwards through space and time in a dialectical relationship, crisscrossing the globe at moments of historical conjuncture creating spaces where change happens. Both contemporary activists and that history are filled with answers to the question of the failures and contradictions which we will see in this dissertation by actively decolonizing the narrative and history of women's oppression and resistance. This is done through careful historical analysis, reading the archive against the grain, exploration through the concepts of *inzi* and *kalayaan* and identifying historical conjunctions and residual structures on a global scale. Though Morocco and the Philippines are far from each other

geographically, they share connected histories from the spread of Islam, colonization from the Spanish, and the contemporary present of the effect of American imperialism. By looking at these countries side by side through a decolonial, global, and interdisciplinary lens we can better understand the root causes of oppression as well as the victories of resistance.

Global studies is a field that approaches problems and situations in the world from the perspective that we are all connected to each other through a global network. There is an overall lack of research that approaches women's rights and movements research from a critical, decolonial, global, transdisciplinary perspective. This creates a gap in our understanding of how both oppression and resistance to that oppression is built as a practice and the results of those practices. This gap in understanding creates a flawed narrative which sets up the same colonial and imperial powers behind structures of oppression as the arbiters of women's rights. As countries like the United States slide backward with the overturning of *Roe v. Wade*, we must remember that for many women around the world, the US imperial power has always been a force of oppression. In order to change the narrative of women's rights and resistance we must look at the role played by colonialism through a re-reading of the archive. This dissertation begins with a re-reading of the archive and secondary historical sources to show the residual structures both of oppression and of women's resistance. By looking at the residual structures and historical conjunctures of different movements, groups, and identities, we can explain contemporary contradictions and theorize the spaces of resistance created across identity, space, and time.

Description and significance of the project

My work on this topic began with a book called *La brevísima relación de la destrucción de la Africa* or *The Brief Story of the Destruction of Africa*.¹ This little known book is a prologue or prelude to the much better known book *La brevísima relación de la destrucción de las indias*, both written by the same author, Bartolome de las Casas. In his book on Africa, las Casas explains how the methodologies and practices of Spanish colonialism in the kingdoms of Northern Africa and the Canary Islands were practices that informed the Spanish colonization of the Americas. This led me to look at how the Spanish first colonized the Philippines and again used many of those same practices and methodologies. What emerged from my initial investigation was striking. Morocco and the Philippines were intimately connected by Spanish colonialism and the ongoing (re)conquista, the ideological and physical fight against the figures of the “Moro” and “Mora”. I put (re)conquista rather than reconquista because the term itself is part of the invention and justification of structures of oppression and the term was not widely in use until the 19th century.² There has been a great deal of scholarship about how the legacy of the (re)conquista affected the Spanish colonization of the Americas and their conceptualizations of race, gender and subsequent structures of oppression.³ However, there has been little comparable scholarship on the Philippines, though the connection between Spain and the reencounter with Islam in the Philippines is often noted by historians it is not structurally analyzed with a

¹ Bartolomé De las Casas, *Brevísima Relación de La Destrucción de África* (Tecnibook Ediciones, 2016).

² Martín F. Ríos Saloma, “La Reconquista: Génesis de Un Mito Historiográfico,” *Historia y Grafía*, no. 30 (2008): 191–216.

³ Barbara Fuchs, *Mimesis and Empire: The New World, Islam, and European Identities*, vol. 40 (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Karoline P Cook, *Forbidden Passages: Muslims and Moriscos in Colonial Spanish America* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

few notable exceptions.⁴ In Morocco, the effects of Spanish colonialism both in terms of its implementation and resistance often take a back seat in the historiography to the effects of French colonialism.⁵ Though the history of French colonialism is very important, its dominance often leaves Morocco out of global conversation about Spanish colonialism and its effects. As this dissertation shows, Spain established structures of oppression first with Morocco and then spread those structures around the globe, reaching to the Philippines. This dissertation traces these residual structures of both oppression and resistance in a series of contradicting interwoven trajectories that cross back and forth across the globe which form historical conjunctures. The neoliberal imperial project, headed by the United States, and supported by oppressive domestic regimes then built upon those structures of oppression laid down in the colonial era while activists and revolutionaries built on their own structures. Women and their participation both in wider movements and women specific movements simultaneously sit at the center and at the margins in what this dissertation theorizes as spaces of *inzi* and *kalayaan*.

There has always been a practice of women's resistance to colonial oppression, not as a reaction but as a response. As decolonial feminist theorist Maria Lugones explains, "resistance is not reaction but response—thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted."⁶

⁴ Isaac Donoso, "The Philippines and Al-Andalus Linking the Edges of the Classical Islamic World," *Philippine Studies Historical & Ethnographic Viewpoints*, 2015, 247–73; Isaac Donoso, *Islamic Far East: Ethnogenesis of Philippine Islam*, 2013. Ana M. Rodríguez-Rodríguez, "Old Enemies, New Contexts: Early Modern Spanish (Re)-Writing of Islam in the Philippines," *Coloniality, Religion, and the Law in the Early Iberian World*, 2014, 137–57.

⁵ Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*, vol. 1418 (Princeton University Press, 2015).

⁶ María Lugones, *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

Women's resistance exists both inside and outside wider revolutionary and other social movements. This dissertation joins other studies which highlight the historical contributions which women have made and the spaces and structures of resistance they have created.⁷ From Sayyida al-Hurra in Morocco to Queen Taytay in the Philippines, women's resistance took on various forms including fighting back with violence. The history chapter looks at these historical figures and how just as colonial structures were built upon one another, so were structures of resistance. The chapter on the global history of residual structures of oppression and resistance weaves back and forth between Morocco and the Philippines, finding new connections through a re-reading of the archive and putting different realms into conversation with one another. These connections to the past are traced all the way up to independence and the following two chapters look at contemporary structures of resistance and the spaces created.

The chapter on Morocco begins with an analysis of women's *inzi* in the fight for Moroccan independence. *Inzi* is a Tamazight word, written ⵉⵏⵣⵉ, I learned during my interviews with indigenous women activists in Morocco. *Inzi* can be mostly directly translated into English as resistance and مقاومة in standard Arabic but the meaning of *inzi* has more connotations.⁸ *Inzi* connotes تحمل endurance of a continuous struggle, resistance that is sometimes active, sometimes passive but is always and continuously there.⁹ The concept of *inzi* is one of the theoretical constructions used to understand indigenous women's resistance to patriarchy, colonialism, and imperialism. The importance of women's *inzi* and the broken

⁷ Fatima Mernissi, *The Forgotten Queens of Islam* (U of Minnesota Press, 1997); Vina A. Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

⁸ *Dictionnaire Général de La Langue Amazighe* (Dictionnaire Général de la Langue Amazighe, 2017), <https://tal.ircam.ma/dglai/lexieam.php>.

⁹ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in February of 2020.

promises of independence lead us to the contradictions, struggles, and responses of the present day. Morocco currently has a high level of gender based violence, despite many progressive changes to the law and a purported commitment to gender equality on the part of the government. This chapter examines the reason for these contradictions looking at the historical conjunctures established in the history chapter. According to the latest survey done in 2019 by the Moroccan High Planning Commission, 57% of all women and girls surveyed had experienced some form of violence in the preceding 12 months.¹⁰ This follows an overall high pattern of gender based violence as well as other forms of gender based oppression. Many scholars, especially those not from Morocco tend to locate the root cause gender based violence in Islam or as part of “traditional values”.¹¹ However, this dissertation joins scholars such Zakia Salime, Fatima Sadiqi, the late Fatima Mernissi in challenging this narrative both through looking at the residual structures of oppression from colonial and imperial powers and how contemporary activists are resisting.¹² In the chapter on Morocco, I look at the February 20th and constitutional reform as well the case of Amina al-Filali and the fight to change article 475. My research is based on interviews with activists as well as other first and secondary sources. In both cases, I look at the residual structures of change and resistance used by activists, the different spaces of resistance formed by alliances and

¹⁰ “High Planning Commission: In Violence against Women over Past 10 Years,” Maroc.ma, December 8, 2020, <https://www.maroc.ma/en/news/high-planning-commission-violence-against-women-over-past-10-years>.

¹¹ Fatima Sadiqi, “Women and the Violence of Stereotypes in Morocco,” in *Gender and Violence in the Middle East* (Routledge, 2011), 239–48.

¹² Zakia Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*, vol. 36 (U of Minnesota Press, 2011); Fatima Sadiqi and Moha Ennaji, “The Feminization of Public Space: Women’s Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco,” *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies* 2, no. 2 (2006): 86–114; Fatima Mernissi, *Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Inquiry* (South Asia Books, 1991).

intersectional identities, and the historical conjuncture in the co-optation and repression of these movements locally, nationally and internationally.

The Philippines has a similar story, yet with many important differences. The Philippines has a strong and very active women's rights movement, had the first female president in Asia among many other seemingly feminist elements and yet they continue to face huge problems getting access to even the most basic rights. According to the Philippine Commission on Women, gender based violence is one of the worst and most pervasive problems in the Philippines, with 1 in 4 adult women experiencing violence from a husband or intimate partner during the last year.¹³ However, gender based violence is only one part of the problem. Women experience discrimination and persecution at multiple different levels of society. This connects through residual structures of oppression to past and future imperialism, colonialism, and fascism. The women who speak up and act against this system are threatened, jailed, and even killed as has been the case since the arrival of the Spanish and yet women are resilient and continue to resist. This dissertation joins scholars like Mina Roces and Carolyn Sobritchea in analyzing the complex relationships of the women's movement and different power holders and identity groups.¹⁴ This analysis focuses on the concept of *kalayaan*. *Kalayaan* has come to have many different meanings over different periods of resistance to the Spanish and the Americans including the connotations of freedom and liberty but also community as explored by groundbreaking Filipino historian Reynaldo

¹³ "Violence Against Women | Philippine Commission on Women," accessed July 27, 2022, <https://pcw.gov.ph/violence-against-women/>.

¹⁴ Carolyn I. Sobritchea, "Women's Movement in the Philippines and the Politics of Critical Collaboration with the State," *Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, 2004, 101–21; Mina Roces, *Women, Power, and Kinship Politics: Female Power in Post-War Philippines*. (Praeger Publishers, 1998).

Illeto in *Pasyon and Revolution*.¹⁵ This dissertation uses the concept of spaces of *kalayaan* to understand how Filipina women have created their own spaces of power at the intersections of different resistances, movements and moments. The right wing populist government of Rodrigo Duterte has brought a new wave of fascist repression in the Philippines against women, indigenous groups and many others. At the same time, Duterte claims to be in support of certain women's rights, defying the long time power of the Catholic church to support some kinds of reproductive health measures. Women's rights groups are carefully navigating this power dynamic, claiming victories where they can and form *kalayaan* spaces of networks and alliances to resist the oppression of the Duterte government which follows residual structures of oppression that are traced back to Spanish colonialism. In particular, the chapter on the Philippines focuses on reproductive health laws, the case of Jennifer Laude, Bai Bibyaon and the Lumad Bakwit Save our Schools, and the resistance built by Gabriela along with Muslim, indigenous, and queer groups.

Theoretical Approach

The purpose of this dissertation is to understand the space occupied, the power relationships involved, and the roles played by those involved in the oppression of women and their resistance. In order to do so, we must question the neo-liberal, realist, Western centric understanding of law, rights and power. This is the work of decolonizing our understanding and even our language around women's resistance by using the concepts of *kalayaan* and *inzi*. By crossing the boundaries of nation and region to study Morocco and the Philippines, the global and interconnected nature of oppression and resistance emerges

¹⁵ Reynaldo Clemenña Illeto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910* (Univ of Hawaii Pr, 1997).

both historically and contemporarily. The first element in that is a global history that connects Morocco and the Philippines and a framework of historical conjuncture, building on this concept from Gramsci.¹⁶ Much of the research on women's rights falls along the lines of national boundaries and into categories of identity. What my dissertation seeks to do is cross those boundaries to make connections and deepen our understanding both of gender based oppression and the strategies of resistance thereby creating a new narrative. Second, contemporary women's rights research often ignores the importance of the long legacy of colonialism and imperialism in gender based oppression and the methods of resistance to that oppression. This dissertation uses the framework of residual structures, building on the work of Raymond Williams, to analyze current contradictions, failures, successes and connect them to the history and legacy of colonialism as well as present day imperialism.¹⁷ Together these frameworks allow us to create a new global narrative of women's resistance which upends the neoliberal, hegemonic, imperialism paradigm.

This dissertation did not begin as a decolonial project. In fact, at the outset it was a much more straightforward analysis of contemporary women's movements with a small amount of historical background. However, as I traveled to Spain, Morocco, and the Philippines, interviewed activists, observed protests, read archives, I found myself increasingly aware both of my own privileged position as a white, American member of an elite academic institution and how my own perspective was entrenched in layers of colonization. In the words of Chandra Mohanty, "Western feminist writing on women in the Third World must be considered in the context of the global hegemony of Western

¹⁶ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci: Ed. and Transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith*. (International Publishers, 1971).

¹⁷ Raymond Williams, "Dominant, Residual, and Emergent," *Marxism and Literature* 1 (1977): 121–27.

scholarship.”¹⁸ I have therefore tried to root this dissertation in the concepts and structures of the places and women studied here. Many of the activists I spoke to, in particular the indigenous women, were either implicitly or explicitly engaged in the process of decolonizing their context. When I unexpectedly returned early from my research trip which was cut short by Covid-19, I also found myself in the middle of the Black Liberation uprising in the wake of George Floyd’s murder. I became deeply involved in that movement and I saw the work of Black women in my community creating their own spaces of liberation and decolonization, leading the fight for change. As I began to write my dissertation, I was desperate not only to use decoloniality as a theoretical lens but to actively engage in the process of decolonizing the narrative and the history of women’s rights, movements, and resistance. My use of the concept of decolonization comes first from the activists I worked with and their concepts of *inzi* and *Kalayaan* as well as the work of Jaqui Alexander and Chandra Mohanty, among many others.¹⁹

In the last several years, the term “decolonize” has become increasingly popular and has entered mainstream discourse with calls to “decolonize your bookshelf” or “decolonize the academy”. The term decolonize originally meant the literal process of ending colonial regimes and becoming an independent state. However, through the work of many theorists and activists, the meaning of decolonize has expanded. “Decolonization is not just a withdrawal from Empire, but an active grassroots movement at the social, economic, cultural and political levels initiating alternate cultures and solidarities.”²⁰ Following this definition,

¹⁸ Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders* (Duke University Press, 2003).

¹⁹ M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures* (Routledge, 2013).

²⁰ Kanchana Mahadevan, “Constitutional Patriotism and Political Membership: A Feminist Decolonization of Habermas and Benhabib,” *Decolonizing Feminism: Transnational Feminism and Globalization*, 2017, 119.

this dissertation looks at how women activists themselves are engaged in the work of decolonization while also employing a decolonial perspective based in historical analysis. I use the term decolonial rather than postcolonial for a few reasons. Decolonial historical analysis marks 1492 as the start of European colonial regimes.²¹ However, as this dissertation shows, the practices of colonialism started even earlier with the (re)conquista and Iberian incursion into North Africa. Second, the decolonial framework offers more potential for action and is actually used by activists. Maria Lugones argues that the work of decolonizing gender “to enact a critique of racialized, colonial, and capitalist heterosexualist gender oppression as a lived transformation of the social... a historical, peopled, subjective/intersubjective understanding of the oppressing resisting relation at the intersection of complex systems of oppression.”²² This is precisely the work of this dissertation and brings us to the indigenous concepts of *inzi* and *kalayaan*. The term *inzi* was explained to me both by an Amazigh activist I interviewed and by our translator. *Inzi* is not a widely used term, but it is a concept around which this activist theorized her own resistance. *Inzi* means resistance but it also connotes resistance in the context of a long struggle.²³ In this dissertation, *inzi* is identified as a residual structure of the unending resistance of indigenous women, sometimes active and sometimes passive, not always easily identified within Western definitions of resistance. *Kalayaan* and spaces of *kalayaan* are likewise identified as decolonial residual structures of freedom, community and the possibility for change, painfully carved out by women activists.

²¹ Gurinder K. Bhambra, “Postcolonial and Decolonial Dialogues,” *Postcolonial Studies* 17, no. 2 (2014): 115–21.

²² Maria Lugones, “Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System,” *Hypatia* 22, no. 1 (2007): 186–219.

²³ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in February of 2020.

Next, it is necessary to define a few key concepts. The concept of the “residual” comes from Raymond Williams work on power, class, and culture in the field of cultural studies. Williams argues that the residual is something that has been formed in the past but is still active in the present as an effective element.²⁴ This can be part of the dominant culture or can be alternative or oppositional. This dissertation joins Moroccan feminist theorist Zakia Salime in arguing that we can apply this concept to social movements through the idea of residual structure.²⁵ In the residual we find not simply a past to be reclaimed but a promise of future meanings, allowing us to imagine and make other futures. In conversations with a friend doing their graduate work in the chemistry department, I learned that in chemistry, residue is understood as what is left behind after certain chemical events. This residue can be a contaminant, lingering on and changing the outcome of future reactions if it remains. Sometimes, the residue is invisible and special types of light or other types of chemicals are needed to reveal its presence. Part of the promise of the residual is to find connections in unexpected places and form meanings. In this conceptualization of the residual, a decolonial framework which reads against the grain is the light needed to reveal the residual structures of oppression and resistance. This dissertations approach to reading against the grain comes from decolonial feminist philosopher, Maria Lugones, “a collaborator witnesses on the side of power, while a faithful witness witnesses against the grain of power, on the side of resistance. To witness faithfully, one must be able to sense resistance, to interpret behavior as resistant”.²⁶ I do not use the concept of witnessing but rather build on the concept through readings and interpretations. Within this framework, the

²⁴ Williams, “Dominant, Residual, and Emergent.”

²⁵ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

²⁶ Lugones, *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions*.

residue of colonialism does not determine or even explain the outcomes in all our case studies. However, the residual structures of colonialism persist, influencing and affecting the outcomes of events. In the residual as a productive space of meaning, structures of oppression are a contaminant, hurting and harming while the residual structures of resistance are emergent, constantly evolving and coming into being.

As this dissertation shows, the residue left behind by colonialism builds the structure for present day imperialism and oppression of women. Elements of culture, politics, the law and government structures provide structure for this oppression as we will explore below. This dissertation furthers the concept of the residual by applying it to the global context. The residue formed in the violence of the (re)conquista and the Spanish attempts at colonialism in Morocco clung to the ships which left Spain and traveled to the Philippines. The historical documents analyzed in chapter 2 drip with the residue of the conceptions about race, religion, power, violence and gender. Likewise, resistance to colonialism formed residue that weaves its way throughout the story of women's resistance up until the present day. This understanding of the residual is combined with Alexander and Mohanty's formulation of "legacies". "Legacies is not meant to suggest a frozen or embodied inheritance of domination and resistance, but an interested, conscious thinking and rethinking of history and historicity, a rethinking which has women's autonomy and self-determination at its core".²⁷ Following Alexander and Mohanty, this dissertation does not argue that the problems and contradictions of the contemporary women's movements in Morocco and the Philippines are a simple and direct result of Spanish colonialism and American imperialism. Instead, the

²⁷ Alexander and Mohanty, *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*.

concept of the residual is used to make visible the often ignored connections in the form of residue which lingers in culture, politics, and society.

Here we arrive at the concept of historical conjuncture from Antonio Gramsci's work on hegemony which also heavily influenced Williams. Gramsci defines conjunctures as the intersection of contradictory trajectories which can be applied in different ways to politics, economics, and other fields.²⁸ This dissertation argues that historical conjunctures are intersecting contradictory trajectories which stretch from the past into the present and by looking at how these contradictions interact we can explain some of the contradictions in the oppression of women and their resistance to that oppression. Different residual structures intersect each other at these historical conjunctures creating spaces of change. Together these concepts help us to conceptualize the spaces occupied by women fighting against oppression on multiple different parts of their identity including race and class which sit at the spaces created by the historical conjunctures formed by the residual structures of oppression and resistance.

This dissertation comes from a specifically critical, global, and decolonial perspective. Much of the previous work on women's rights analyzes the local and the global context. However, it is necessary to put the local into conversation as part of the global and part of regional and transnational dynamics. Understanding local and global historical connections is an important part of this work. The concept of residual structures helps us to understand how the local and the global are connected. This dissertation builds on the work of scholars such as CLR James and more recently Lisa Lowe who connect European colonialism across the globe and the struggle for rights. CLR James connects the

²⁸ Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci: Ed. and Transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith.*

exploitation of slaves in Haiti and the Haitian revolution with the French Revolution and the ideas behind the rights of man.²⁹ Lisa Lowe argues that though there is a great deal of separate scholarship on the issues of oppression, colonialism, and rights in different areas, little work has been done on the connections between these phenomena that were going on simultaneously in different parts of the world. By exploring the "intimacies" between European colonialism and oppression on four different continents she is able to argue for a new, more complete, genealogy of liberalism.³⁰ This dissertation builds upon the work of Lowe, James and many others, by looking at the conjunctures of Spanish, Moroccan, and Filipino history, Christian and Islamic Pacific and Mediterranean history, colonialism, and the development of residual structures of ideas and laws about women's rights and their bodies in the Philippines and Morocco.

A project with such a global scope necessarily requires a transdisciplinary approach. Transdisciplinary is used here rather than interdisciplinary because the term transdisciplinary includes the idea of a global project. Darian-Smith and McCarthy argue for a global transdisciplinary framework which allows for the study of complex issues on a global scale, across time and place, which is not Western centric but allows for a plurality of understandings and viewpoints.³¹ This ties into postcolonial theory which combines well with the ideas of the residual and conjuncture to expand on the understanding of history in the development of structures of oppression and resistance. Here we follow Fanon's argument that the colonial condition is life-in-death and that we must recognize the agency of

²⁹ Cyril Lionel Robert James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (Penguin UK, 2001).

³⁰ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Duke University Press, 2015).

³¹ Eve Darian-Smith and Philip McCarty, *Beyond Interdisciplinarity: Developing a Global Transdisciplinary Framework* (Transcience, 2016), https://www2.hu-berlin.de/transcience/Vol7_No2_1_26.pdf.

the colonized. Fanon saw race and colonialism as central for the creation of a "new man" and the decolonization of the mind.³² Both the ideas of agency and the colonial condition of life-in-death are key to thinking about how not only oppression creates residual structures but so does resistance to that oppression. The agency of the colonized subject is fundamental to understanding the resistance. Those residues of resistance are a key part of the alternative narrative of rights, oppression and resistance.

As a framework for an alternative narrative, it is useful to use Walter Mignolo's concept of "macro-narratives". He argues for the importance of local history and subaltern sources of knowledge while also emphasizing the importance of "macro-narratives" which combine multiple local histories but seek to tell a new story. However, these macro-narratives of border thinking do not claim universality.³³ In Chapter 2, we find different local histories in Spain, Morocco and the Philippines connected through residual structures of oppression and explore their historical conjunctures creating a new macro-narrative that does not claim universality and simply offers an alternative. Macro-narratives are part of Mignolo's critique of Western epistemology (and Mignolo acknowledges the problems of talking about Western as homogeneous) which has set itself as the center of modernity and therefore the center of the globalized world. The division of knowledge between epistemology and hermeneutics has "subalternized" other forms of knowledge and the concept of modernity cannot be separated from the colonial world system perpetuated by the West. As an alternative to this framework of knowledge, Mignolo proposes border thinking,

³² Frantz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Constance Farrington, *The Wretched of the Earth*, vol. 36 (Grove Press New York, 1963).

³³ Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton University Press, 2012).

a term that comes from the work of Gloria Anzaldua.³⁴ In border thinking, this places "hegemonic forms of knowledge into the perspective of the subaltern" which is not a new form of hybridity and is instead a battle for legitimacy.³⁵ By looking at residual structures of resistance to oppression and how they connect through historical conjuncture to create spaces, this dissertation contributes to that battle for legitimacy by highlighting and valuing the knowledges of resistance and not just the knowledges of oppression. This decenters the Western centric narrative of rights and progress and flips the framework on itself by centering Morocco and the Philippines.

Both Morocco and the Philippines are generally framed by different versions of the Orientalist lens. Edward Said argued that the Orient is an object that has been constructed by the West in order to assert its superiority and right to dominate. From this Orientalist perspective, Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are framed as backwards, despotic, barbaric, and devoid of freedom. This allows the West to claim a monopoly on the ideals of liberation and freedom while simultaneously justifying the Western oppression and domination.³⁶ This creates a seamless narrative in which the West can never be an oppressive force, only a liberatory one. The power to create a narrative is key to creating a culture of imperialism because the narrative determines who is "right" and who is "wrong", with those who are wrong then being subject to domination. Orientalism adds a key lens to the understanding of residual structures and historical conjunctures because it points us towards the core contradictions in the Western narrative of rights and freedom which are key to understanding the present day contradictions in women's rights. Bhaba continues the work

³⁴ Gloria Anzaldua, "Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza," 1987.

³⁵ Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*.

³⁶ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Penguin Books India, 2006).

of Said when he argues that colonial discourse is an apparatus of power that operates through the recognition and rejection of differences of race, culture, and history. Colonization causes exchanges and collision of culture, and it is in these spaces of exchange and collision that interstices emerge as an intervening space. In these interstitial spaces, hybrid ideas and cultures are created and negotiated. Bhabha sees hybridity as an identity resulting from colonization that includes both the culture of the colonized and the colonizer. He argues for a new understanding of cross-cultural relations, cultural difference which is modeled on difference as explained by Derrida.³⁷ Bhabha writes, “The borderline engagements of cultural difference may as often be consensual as conflictual; they may confound our definitions of tradition and modernity; realign the customary boundaries between the private and the public, high and low; and challenge normative expectations of development and progress”.³⁸ This is what this dissertation explores, the contradictions and realignment of boundaries within interstitial spaces. In the quote above, Bhabha highlights the importance of changing our understanding of the relationships between cultures and between self and other. It is this element, the questioning of normative relationships and boundaries that is the theoretical framework of my project. The concepts of the residual, conjunctural, and interstitial require confounding boundaries and challenging the normative. By normative, I mean those traditions of thinking that have stopped or restricted us from seeing the hybrid and diverse ways that ideas about oppression, resistance, and rights have come about. Bhabha argues that to change the narratives of history is to transform the meaning of living and being. The idea that transforming the narrative of history is key to our current understanding of living and

³⁷ Homi K. Bhabha and Professor of English and African-American Literature Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, 2012); Jacques Derrida, *Cogito and the History of Madness' in Writing and Difference*, Trans. A. Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

³⁸ Bhabha and Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*.

being speaks to the importance of the historical aspect of my project. This dissertation is what Bhaba calls an "interstitial passage between fixed identifications". I show, through both historical and contemporary analysis, that those identifications are constructed and that they are not as fixed as they might appear to be.

Though Bhaba's ideas about hybridity are foundational to postcolonial theory, there are also many postcolonial critics of hybridity and to an extent the concepts of borderthinking and hybridity clash with one another. Mignolo argues that border thinking is not simply writing about the border or border studies, rather it is thinking that has its source in the border.³⁹ While Mignolo sees border thinking as part of a grand contest for legitimacy, there can in fact be multiple forms of legitimacy and knowledge. Under the framework of decoloniality, residual structures, and historical conjuncture, Bhaba's concept of hybridity and Mignolo's concept of border thinking are no longer in conflict but are essential to each other.⁴⁰ Hybridity is by definition part of border thinking because hybridity has its source in the border which is shown in the creation of interstitial spaces formed by residual structures and historical conjuncture. It is in the interstitial spaces on the border that hybridity is possible and residual notions of rights, and the body are created because that is where contact happens. It is through combining the ideas of Bhaba and Mignolo, that I form this theoretical approach that focuses on spaces of resistance within the interstitial. The concepts of hybridity and border thinking are key to breaking down binaries, that of self and other, Oriental and Occidental, and Asia, Africa and the West. Spain and Morocco occupy a unique position in this regard because they are the two points in Europe and Africa that are the

³⁹ Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking*.

⁴⁰ Bhabha and Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*.

closest to each other. As this dissertation will show, they are very close to each other and are in many ways products of a hybrid culture but are constructed as worlds apart, on two different continents, one looking forward and one looking backward. As Achille Mbembe argues, African societies are always perceived as traditional, and this serves as justification for prejudice and discrimination. Africa is the metaphor by which the West conceptualizes itself. Here, Mbembe is continuing the work of Said and expanding on the conceptualization of Africa within this framework. Traditional African societies are seen as illogical, stagnant, and trapped in collectivity. The self-identity of the west is the opposite of all this. The African subject is part of social reality and exists through meaningful expressions and acts. We know what Africa is not, but we have no idea what it is. Mbembe asks if we can use the very structures and modes of thought that have denied the existence of Africa to analyze its existence.⁴¹ In chapter 2, we can see how Spain similarly constructed the Philippines and Filipino culture as opposed to rights and the notion of civilization when in fact the Philippines had several different of their own thriving civilization and notions of rights and gender pre Spanish contact. By examining notions of rights and resistance, which are central to European thought, through historical conjuncture and residual structure, we can see how Moroccan and Filipino culture and thought were part of the conceptualization of rights and the body.

A key concept of postcolonialism is that rights were not invented by Western civilization and then distributed out to the rest of the world. As Aime Cesaire, one of the precursors to postcolonial theory, writes, “colonization dehumanizes even the most civilized man; that colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on

⁴¹ J.-A. Mbembé, *On the Postcolony* (University of California Press, 2001).

contempt for the native and justified by that contempt inevitably tends to change him who undertakes it; that the colonizer, who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of seeing the other man as an animal, accustomed himself to treating him like an animal, and objectively tends to transform himself into an animal".⁴² One of the most dehumanizing forces in history, colonialism, cannot be given ownership over the conceptualization of rights. Such ownership is historically inaccurate, morally repugnant, and impedes effective implementation of contemporary rights. Residual structures allow us to see how the oppression of colonialism became part of the conceptualization of rights as is shown in chapter 2 and the analysis of the De las Casas texts as well as the texts on the Philippines. Rights are both a framework and a methodology for resisting power and a tool by which power can control and discipline the subject.⁴³ Women in the Philippines and Morocco continue to navigate this difficult balance which is crisscrossed by historical conjecture and both the residue of oppression and resistance connected back to the colonial era. It is absolutely key to recognize how rights frameworks can be both a tool of oppression and liberation. This critique of rights has been argued both by scholars like the postcolonial theorists mentioned below and by activists and different groups on the ground like the activists I interviewed in the Philippines and Morocco. As Samuel Moyn observes, though human rights have continued to claim to transcend politics they have in fact become a framework of politics and government that is closely connected to the nation-state.⁴⁴ These critiques are key to understanding the contradictions of the fight for women's rights.

⁴² Aimé Césaire, *Discourse on Colonialism* (NYU Press, 2000).

⁴³ Costas Douzinas, *Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (Routledge, 2007).

⁴⁴ Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia* (Harvard University Press, 2010).

Residual structures of oppression show how the nation state and (neo) colonial regimes used rights discourse to further their power and legitimize violence. The goal of the state in enacting laws to punish violence against women is order but the most ordered society is not the least violent against women.⁴⁵ This is itself a structure filled with residue of colonialism as is shown in Chapter 2 with Spanish discourses that justified colonialism with the supposed goal of saving native women when the colonists were in fact the worst perpetrators of violence against women. This residual structure sits at a historical conjuncture with the rise of right wing governments who claim to want security for women but themselves perpetuate that very violence as shown in Chapters 3 and 4. Samera Esmeir argues that under the British colonial regime in Egypt became both the giver and identifier of humanity. Therefore, juridical technology now has given itself the power to separate human life from nonhuman life and thereby designate who will be protected and who will be punished. The idea of designating human life lies at the center of both the politics of visibilization of the body and the technology of juridical humanity.⁴⁶ As Chapter 2 shows, these are two residual structures that work side-by-side in an attempt to separate law and the state from its own violence by designating which are acceptable subjects of violence and which are not. In this way the state and the law are the mediators of violence, not necessarily providing protection or carrying out violence, orchestrating the different flows of violence. As Sherene Seikaly points out, this process is legitimized and justified not only through the state but through the process of administration.⁴⁷ In the way that Seikaly questions the politically constructed

⁴⁵ Kristin Bumiller, *In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence* (Duke University Press, 2009).

⁴⁶ Samera Esmeir, *Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History* (Stanford University Press, 2012).

⁴⁷ Sherene Seikaly, *Men of Capital: Scarcity and Economy in Mandate Palestine* (Stanford University Press, 2015).

nature of basic needs, I question the politically constructed nature of women's rights and how that incorporates the idea of basic needs. Decoloniality, residual structure and historical conjuncture show the role that colonialism, imperialism, identity, culture, economics, and the rule of experts play in this construction.

Methodology

The archive:

My first methodology is archival work. I began my archival work in summer of 2016 at El archivo de las indias or The Archive of the Indies in Sevilla, Spain. I looked at the documents written by Bartolomé de las Casas as well as other colonial documents. In particular I focused on documents that spoke to the methods of colonization. These included reports from military figures, letters written from ship captains, merchant manifests, and more. I concentrated on documents that were about either the Philippines or Morocco, trying to concentrate around a similar time period. In these documents, I analyze the legal codes referenced, the justifications for occupations and the language used to refer to the people being colonized. I pay particular attention to the gendered language used, though this was rarely referenced in the documents I found. What I did find was explicit references made to the methods of colonization used in one place being translated to and used in other places. The methods of colonization used in Morocco and the Canary Islands were used in the Americas and then in the Philippines. The racial and gendered language used in different places is of particular importance.

It is also important to consider the problematic nature of the archive itself. In addition to documents directly from the archive, I also look at archives that have been put together in English, Spanish, Arabic, and French. In the case of the Philippines, I primarily

look at the *Archivo Del Bibliófilo Filipino* in Spanish, first published in 1895 and *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803* in English, first published in 1906.⁴⁸ Both these archives have served as valuable resources in this dissertation saving time on both transcription and translation. However, it is also important to consider the time and place of publication from a critical perspective. The archive can serve the needs of the state during the era in which it was written and naturalize its violence which is then reproduced in subsequent histories. It should not be treated as a simple collection of documents or facts but rather read critically.⁴⁹ It is no coincidence that the *Archivo Del Bibliófilo Filipino* was published in 1895, only one year before the official start of the Filipino war of independence from Spain. Similarly, it is no coincidence that *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803* was published in 1906 as the United States struggled to establish the Philippines as an American colony. A reading of the introduction to *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803* quickly reveals that it is not only lying in its claim to be “entirely impartial, free from any personal bias, whether political or sectarian” but is also deeply offensive and reflective of the American imperial attitude.⁵⁰ Some critics of this collection have claimed that it is part of the Leyenda Negra or Black Legend spread around Europe to exaggerate Spanish atrocities in order to delegitimize Spanish colonialism and allow other European countries to enter as colonial powers. They argue that Retana’s collection is more accurate and has less bias.⁵¹ However, I did not find evidence of exaggeration in my reading and the editors in fact seem quite sympathetic to the Spanish describing the colonized people as “barbarism, taught the forms and manners of civilized life,

⁴⁸ Wenceslao Emilio Retana, “Archivo Del Bibliófilo Filipino,” 1895; Emma Helen Blair and Alexander James Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*, vol. 1–55 (AH Clark Company, 1906).

⁴⁹ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*.

⁵⁰ Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*.

⁵¹ Gloria Cano, “Evidence for the Deliberate Distortion of the Spanish Philippine Colonial Historical Record in The Philippine Islands 1493–1898,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 39, no. 1 (2008): 1–30.

Christianized, and trained to labor by Catholic missionaries three centuries ago”.⁵² The archive in Morocco is much different from that of the Philippines. This dissertation includes sources such as De las Casas whose work is not generally included in the archive. There are many rich histories written in Arabic about the contact and wars with Spain that are included in this dissertation. However, many have conflicting accounts as they were often written over one hundred years after events. Some documents regarding the contemporary era are also still restricted by the Moroccan government. Abdallah Laroui, one of the most famous Moroccan philosophers and historians argues that many historians frame Morocco as “unfortunate” which worsens the ongoing effects of colonization.⁵³ This dissertation adopts a critical, decolonial reading of the archive that also includes the omissions and exclusions.

Interviews:

The second methodology I used was participant observation and interviews. I was able to spend over a year in Morocco and 3 months in the Philippines though my research was cut short by covid-19 when I was forced to return to the US. I spent various periods between January 2017 and March of 2020 in Rabat and Manila while also traveling around and doing interviews in other areas.

In both cases, my interviewees were very diverse ranging in age from 18-92, education levels from no formal schooling to graduate degrees, income levels from poverty to wealthy, different first languages, work experience, mothers and women without children. my interviewees and sample size certainly cannot speak to the totality of the women’s movement in the country. Indeed, because of the snowball sampling method, I only came

⁵² Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*.

⁵³ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*.

into contact with people from certain parts of society. However, the interviews and experiences shared by interviewees provide valuable insight into women's rights and activism.

I conducted semi structured open ended interviews with all of my participants. I went through the IRB process and was approved. I had a series of six questions that I started out with, in addition to some demographic questions. However, the interview questions were only a starting point. Most interviews ranged over a variety of topics including history, activism, resistance, and women's rights. Few interviews were confined solely to the questions. Most interviews lasted 2-3 hours with a few going on much longer. Below, I go into a more in depth description of my research in each country.

Morocco:

I spent a total of 13 months in Morocco with most of my time spent in the capital Rabat. While there, I attended an intensive Arabic language school for 6 months and then received private tutoring and translation help for the rest of the time. My interviews were conducted in English, French, Arabic, Tamazight, and Darija (the Moroccan dialectic of Arabic). Some interviews were done with the assistance of a translator when available while other interviews were done on my own. I conducted a total of 18 interviews with women activists from various different sectors of society. I interviewed Amazigh women, union organizers, protest participants, nonprofit workers, government affiliates, and women's rights activists. Many of my participants fell into several of these categories. I did the majority of my interviews in and around the Rabat-Sale area and Marrakesh and the surrounding area. My participant sample was thus limited to an urban perspective though many of my participants came from rural and indigenous areas and spoke about their experiences. I found

my participants through friends and other contacts I made through the school and the local university.

The Philippines:

I was in the Philippines for a total of 3 months living in the capital Manila for the majority of that time. I conducted a total of 13 interviews mainly located in Manila and Davao. My interviews were conducted in English, Tagalog, Bisaya, and Manobo languages (languages of Lumad or indigenous groups from Mindanao Island). I was lucky enough to have the assistance of a longtime friend from Davao who acted as a translator in all interviews where translation was necessary. However, we also had three way translations in some interviews, from indigenous languages to Bisaya and then my friend translating from Bisaya to English. I interviewed indigenous women, queer activists, resistance fighters, student activists, activists and organizers from Gabriela, labor organizers. Of course, most of my interviewees fell into multiple categories.

Participant Observation:

During my time in Morocco and the Philippines, I was also able to engage in participant observation in a wide variety of different circumstances. I attended protests, political demonstrations, meetings, conferences, clinics, workdays, and more. During all of these, I was able to make observations about the inner workings, dynamics, power relationships, perceptions, language of different individuals and organizations. These observations and insights are invaluable to the construction of my dissertation.

I was also able to collect a great deal of information during my participant observation. I was able to hear and see for myself without the interference and filtering of news reports or social media. I found this to be one of the most valuable parts of my research. For example, I was

able to observe the number of people at a demonstration and hear what was said. However, my understanding was also limited in many cases depending on the language used and the presence of a translator.

Conclusion:

Ultimately, this dissertation actively contributes to the decolonization of the narrative of women's rights and movements through specific historical analysis and reading the archive against the grain. Overall, I hope that my dissertation can add to the conversation about women's rights and women's movements by putting different struggles in different areas of the globe as well as different frameworks and theories into conversation with one another. I also intend this dissertation to amplify the voices and perspectives of the activists I interviewed. Many of the struggles and movements that I discuss in this dissertation have not received much media coverage or been the subject of extensive academic study. I honor those struggles and see what we can learn from them to better the lives of women everywhere.

Laying the Foundation on the Borders of Empire: Structures of oppression and resistance in Morocco and the Philippines

Morocco and the Philippines are two countries which lie at the borders of the Spanish colonial empire, seemingly separated by such a distance to make any connection, particularly before the onset of global communication technology, impossible. And yet, Morocco and the Philippines are deeply and intimately connected, not just by the experience of Spanish colonial empire but by the influence of Islam, US imperialism, the presence of diverse indigenous cultures of resistance, and more. These stories of oppression and resistance, when put side by side show historical conjuncture, the intersection of contradictory trajectories in building structures of both oppression and resistance. This chapter will answer two questions: what are the historical conjunctures in the story of resistance and empire between Morocco and the Philippines? Next, what residual structures of oppression and resistance were created surrounding gender that brought Morocco and the Philippines to the moments leading up to independence? These questions will be answered from a critical global, interdisciplinary, and decolonial perspective. First, this chapter will analyze a text written by Bartolome de las Casas entitled *La brevisima relación de la destrucción de la Africa y las islas Canarias*. This analysis shows how the methods of oppression and resistance found in the Spanish colonization of Morocco were translated to the Philippines and how the relationship continued from there. Second, this chapter explores the histories of resistance, particularly the spaces carved out by women in historical conjunctures leading up to the movements for independence as a global story from Sayyida al Hurra in Morocco to

Queen Taytay in the Philippines using histories written by feminists as well as sources from the archive and oral histories. Ultimately, this chapter shows the dialectical relationship between oppression and resistance as well as a genealogy of the broken promises of neoliberalism and the structures of contemporary imperialism far back in global history.

This story begins with the shared history of Spain and Morocco, though it would be more correct to use the terms al-Andalus and al-Maghreb since Spain and Morocco did not exist at this point of time, not as political entities, cultural identities, or unified groups. However, the foundations were being laid for what would later become Spain and Morocco and for clarity I will continue using these terms to describe the geographical areas and the people who resided within those boundaries. Foucault writes of the “history of the present”, where we begin with a contemporary problem or question and then trace its genealogy.¹ This method allows us to pull on the threads of historical conjuncture that stretch far back into the past which are all tangled up in the knot of the present. There is a great deal of literature critically examining the history of Morocco and Spain as well as some that connect that history with the subsequent effect on the Americas. However, there is little if any work that connects the Spanish and Moroccan history of conflict and exchange with the Philippines. The goal of this chapter is not to completely cover the history of Spain, Morocco, and the Philippines from their first contact into the present as that would be an enormous task which would require thousands of pages. Instead, this chapter highlights specific times, places, historical figures and communities which form the strings on the threads of the historical conjunctures. We will begin with the point that most histories of Spain and Morocco begin, in 711 with the arrival of Tariq ibn Ziyad in Gibraltar.

¹ Hubert L. Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, and Michel Foucault, “Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,” *Brighton, Harvester*, 1982.

Gibraltar derives its name from the Arabic Jabal Tariq,² meaning Tariq Mountain carrying the name of Moroccan Amazigh³ man who first conquered Gibraltar and went on to conquer much of southern Spain. This was done under the direction of Musa ibn Nusayr, who was responsible for the conquest, pacification and islamization of Morocco as well. Musa arrived in the Maghreb with few Arab troops and instead recruited the majority of his forces from among the Amazigh tribes, chief among them Tariq.⁴ It is quite clear from the historical record that both Morocco and Spain were conquered as part of the same wave and yet there is a tendency to abstract and separate these to place during this time. The historical accounts of this period are fraught with the social, political, economic, identity, and other identity based concerns of the historians who wrote those histories. The first round of histories were written by mainly Arab historians in the centuries following the conquest of Spain. One of the most influential was Abd al-Hakam, an Egyptian historian who wrote an account of the Muslim conquest of Spain and North Africa almost 200 years after events.⁵ European historians generally wrote their histories much later, some as many as a thousand years after events and yet some historians express a great deal of doubt about the efficacy of Arabic sources because of supposed tendency towards mythologizing and a reliance on an oral tradition, as if the same concerns did not exist in European sources.⁶ This is part of the Orientalist construction of history and the archive by which the Orient, and more specifically

² In Arabic (جبل طارق)

³ Though many scholars still use the term Berber, I have chosen to use the term Amazigh because that is how my interview subjects belonging to those ethnic groups identify themselves. See also Block, "Respecting Identity: Amazigh versus Berber."

⁴ Abdulwāhid Ḍhanūn Ṭāha, *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain* (Routledge, 2020).

⁵ Eliseo Vidal Beltrán and Abd al-Hakam, "Conquista de Africa Del Norte y de España," *Al Qantir: Monografías y Documentos Sobre La Historia de Tarifa*, no. 10 (2010): 4.

⁶ See Roger Collins, *The Arab Conquest of Spain, 710-797* (B. Blackwell, 1989).

in this case Morocco becomes an object that has been constructed by the West in order to assert its superiority and right to dominate. From this Orientalist perspective, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is framed as backwards, despotic, barbaric, and devoid of freedom. This allows the West to claim a monopoly on the ideals of liberation and freedom while simultaneously justifying the Western oppression and domination of the MENA.⁷ This creates a seamless narrative in which the West can never be an oppressive force, only a liberatory one. The power to create a narrative is key to creating a culture of imperialism because the narrative determines who is "right" and who is "wrong", with those who are wrong then being subject to domination.

The narrative of the conquest of Spain is quite interesting and women's bodies stand at the center, constructed as an object for negotiation, conquest, possession, and vengeance. Several histories tell the tale of a nobleman Julian who, seeking vengeance after the Visigothic King Roderic rapes his daughter, writes to Tariq asking him to invade Iberia saying to him "I am your way into al-Andalus".⁸ The truth of this account is very much in doubt with some historians including while others never mention it. Much is unclear about the identity of the characters or if they in fact existed at all. However, the narrative itself allows us to see the historical conjuncture, the lines running back and forth across the narrowest point in the Mediterranean, connecting the construction of gender in Spain and Morocco in the Mediterranean space. The concept of historical conjunctures as used here builds upon Gramsci's approach to history and his focus on conjunctures which are defined as "moments that articulate the punctual temporality of the event with longer-term forms of

⁷ Said, *Orientalism*.

⁸ Nicola Clarke, *The Muslim Conquest of Iberia: Medieval Arabic Narratives* (Routledge, 2012); Beltrán and al-Hakam, "Conquista de Africa Del Norte y de España."

historical duration”.⁹ Gramsci emphasizes the importance of geography and history in specific places and moments in time in order to pick out concepts and insights. Gramsci’s spatial historical perspective is key to the approach taken here, analyzing specific historical conjunctures whose threads extend forming the web of residual structures.

The account of Tariq and Count Julian comes from the *Cronica Seudo-Isidoriana* or *The Chronicle of Psuedo-Isidore*, written centuries later as the tides began to turn towards the Christian monarchs. The chronicle itself has a complex and fascinating history that is still the subject of debate among some historians. Most scholars agree that the text is a compilation and translation of many earlier texts, some of which were written in Arabic by Muslim authors.¹⁰ It is in this chronicle that we begin to see the construction of the residual structure of the gendered and racialized figure of the Moro/a. The chronicle quotes Tariq ibn Ziyad as saying to the nobleman Julian, “How can I trust you, since you are a Christian and I am a Maurus?”. The term Maurus has been translated simply and directly as Moor in many cases but as some scholars have highlighted the term Maurus had different and complex meanings that did not originally refer to Islam but rather to the Amazigh peoples of North Africa as is shown in an account of the so called “Berber” Amazigh uprising of 742.¹¹ Here we see different historical conjunctures in the figure of the Moro/a. First the erasure of indigenous identity, which happens through the figure of the Moro/a becoming synonymous

⁹ Stefan Kipfer and Gillian Hart, “Translating Gramsci in the Current Conjuncture,” *Gramsci: Space, Nature, Politics*, 2013, 323–43; Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci: Ed. and Transl. by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith*.

¹⁰ Ann Christys, “‘How Can I Trust You, since You Are a Christian and I Am a Moor?’ The Multiple Identities of the Chronicle of Pseudo-Isidore. *Forschungen Zur Geschichte Des Mittelalters| Texts and Identities in the Early Middle Ages*,” 2006.

¹¹ Nevill Barbour, “The Significance of the Word Maurus, with Its Derivatives Moro and Moor, and of Other Terms Used by Medieval Writers in Latin to Describe the Inhabitants of Muslim Spain,” *Biblos (Coimbra)* 46 (1970): 253.

with Islam. This was not just true of the *Cronica Seudo-Isidoriana* but of many other texts written during this time period, as previous studies have showed.¹² The timing of these texts is not coincidental but is part of an ideological battle between different powers for ideological control of the narrative of conquest and occupation and even more fundamentally between who is framed as “good” and who is framed as “evil”. The *Cronica Seudo-Isidoriana* is particularly interesting in this aspect because it contains both sides. Though the author of the Chronicle itself is clearly coming from the Christian perspective, he is translating and including different texts including at least one which was likely originally written in Arabic. It is this text that shows the exchange between Julian and Tariq in a positive light, framing Tariq the “Maurus” as rescuing the peoples of al-Andalus from cruel Visigothic rule.¹³ Here, we have the contest over narrative stretching back and forth through time and space creating spaces of historical conjuncture filled with the residual structures of racialization and colonialism.

There is much scholarly debate about the identities of the original authors but what is clear is the contrast between the Christian depictions of the Muslim conquest of Iberia, written centuries later and the Muslim authored texts written at the time. There are other examples including the *Cronica de Najera*, also written in the 12th century, and the *Chronicle of 754* which was first fully published in 1615 but written much earlier. In these texts, indigenous identity is being subverted into the idea of an ultimate enemy the figure of the Moro/a setting up the construction of Islam as threat. It is no surprise that it is also in the

¹² Robert Portass and Simon Barton, *Beyond the Reconquista: New Directions in the History of Medieval Iberia (711-1085)* (Brill, 2020).

¹³ Christys, “‘How Can I Trust You, since You Are a Christian and I Am a Moor?’ The Multiple Identities of the Chronicle of Pseudo-Isidore. *Forschungen Zur Geschichte Des Mittelalters*| Texts and Identities in the Early Middle Ages|.”

Chronicle of 754 where we see the use of the term ‘Europenses’, as noted by decolonial scholar Kwame Appiah.¹⁴ Europe thus defines itself against their own construction of the figure of the Moro/a forming structure of oppression and the justification of violence that stretches through the past into the present in a residue that traveled the globe in the ships of Spanish empire.

Spain and Morocco went through centuries of rule by different Amazigh and Arab empires from the Almoravids to the Marinids with different Sultanates and rulers loyal to different powers. There was the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa or the Battle of al-Uqab in 1212 between an Iberian alliance headed by King Alfonso VIII and the Berber Almohad Muslims headed by Caliph al-Nasir, was a turning point not just in the political relations between Spain and Islamic empires but also a social and material change to the treatment of the Other. It was then that the conceptualization of the Spanish struggle against Islam was defined in terms of (re)conquista. It is no coincidence that the majority of the Iberian histories of the initial conquest of the peninsula emerged in the lead up to 1212. As much as European powers needed to define the threats against them, they also needed to identify themselves but there was also a great deal of ambiguity. Before 1212, there was no clear decisive victor in the struggle between Catholic and Muslim forces so because territories went back and forth between their control so often there was a greater incentive to treat occupied subjects with respect.¹⁵ Because of the greater amounts of contact and interchange, there was also more nuance, reflecting the nuanced reality of identity. However, after 1212, the kingdoms of Spain, and in particular the Castilian powers, began the ideological war

¹⁴ Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Misunderstanding Cultures: Islam and the West,” *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 38, no. 4–5 (2012): 425–33.

¹⁵ Teófilo F. Ruiz, “From Heaven to Earth,” in *From Heaven to Earth* (Princeton University Press, 2016).

against Islam in earnest, the figure of the Moro/a became increasingly prevalent, solidified, and demonized. We can see this in the increasing popularity of Santiago Matamoros also known as St. James Moorslayer. As is evident in the name itself, this Saint was celebrated as the ultimate of Christian masculinity, valiantly defending the feminized figure of mother Spain as well as helpless women themselves from the violent figure of the Moro/a.¹⁶ Of course, this ideological war was accompanied by a physical one, culminating in the reconquest of Granada in 1492.

As Islamic empires lost ground in the west, they continued to expand eastward, reaching all the way to the Philippines for the first time in 1275. Like in the cases of Spain and Morocco, it must be noted that the Philippines as such did not exist at this point in time and different islands were connected at varying levels. The spread of Islam is one of the factors that increased connection between these diverse and disparate places. Here lie the roots of some of the first threads that reach across the globe connecting Morocco and the Philippines, not by way of Spain or Christianity but by way of Islam. As we decolonize the narrative, this point is very important. The globe was interconnected before the waves of European colonization and there was a great deal of global exchange. The 14th century is when Islam truly began to grow and spread not only religious influence but also brought political changes to the Philippines resulting in the formations of multiple sultanates including the Sultanate of Maguindanao and the Sultanate of Sulu. Islam continued to expand in the Philippines though it was much less orthodox with a great deal of inter marriage and continuing indigenous practices.¹⁷ As we shall see in the coming sections,

¹⁶ Erin Kathleen Rowe, *Saint and Nation: Santiago, Teresa of Avila, and Plural Identities in Early Modern Spain* (Penn State Press, 2011).

¹⁷ Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

European attempted to erase the global diversity of indigenous civilizations under the figure of the Moro/a but there was resistance in the forms of *inzi* and *kalayaan*. In the following section we will see the emergences of the spaces in their dialectical relationship with structures of oppression and we will see figures emerge, from individuals like Sayyida al Hurra, to figures like the shikha in Morocco and Babaylan in the Philippines as embodiments of women's practices of resistance.

1492: A turning point?

Much has been written about the year 1492 as a turning point in history, perhaps the most important turning point in the history of the world.¹⁸ Of course, in many ways this perspective is true and thoroughly justified. However, viewing the events of 1492 including the completion of the (re)conquista, expelling Jews and Muslims from Spain, uniting Spain under a single monarchy, and Columbus' journey to the Americas as all parts of different continuums of historical conjuncture is key to understanding the connections between not only these events but what was to come in both Morocco and the Philippines as the residual structures from the relationship between Spain and Morocco would come to the Philippines. There were also the internal struggles that connected and influenced the external ones, connecting and complicating historical conjuncture. Spain was not the only empire on the rise in the Mediterranean during the 15th century. The Portuguese were expanding onto islands off the Western coast of Africa and into territories all down the coast, including Morocco which was ruled by a weakening Wattasid dynasty. The Ottomans rise to power culminated in the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and Spain saw a looming threat and

¹⁸ See Charles C. Mann and his books entitled 1491 and 1493

both Moroccan and the Muslim Spanish people of Granada saw a potential savior from the rising tide of Christian power. The Pope himself called on Christians to support Ferdinand and Isabella in their efforts to bring all of Spain under Catholic rule and continue onwards.¹⁹ Portugal continued to attack along the Atlantic coast of Africa. Here, in the (re)conquista and in the new conquista of part of the West African coast and surrounding islands, the Spanish and Portuguese solidified the methods that would form the residual structures of colonialism in the Americas and very soon after, in the Philippines.

La brevísima relación de la destrucción de la África y las islas Canarias is a little known text by Bartolome de las Casas. In the text he details the acts of violence and subjugation carried out by the Spanish and Portuguese in their conquests of parts of the West African coast and surrounding islands. As we see in the text, the peoples of the islands and the Western coast of Africa became test subjects for the methods of Iberian empire which would soon be implemented in the Americas and then the Philippines. De las Casas writes:

“Entre otros insultos y gravísimos males y detestables injusticias, daños y escándalos de los portugueses en aquellos descubrimientos por aquellos tiempos, contra los moradores de aquellas tierras, inocentes para con ellos, fuesen moros o indios, o negros o alárabes fue uno que ahora diremos muy señalado.”²⁰

*Among other insults and very serious evils and detestable injustices, injuries and scandals of the Portuguese discoveries in those times, against the inhabitants of those lands, innocent, whether they were Moors or Indians, or Blacks or Arabs, it was one that we will now see was very important.*²¹

¹⁹ Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

²⁰ De las Casas, *Brevísima Relación de La Destrucción de África*.

²¹ Translation is my own

In this passage, De las Casas is discussing a specific invasion, which occurred in 1444, of an island off the Western coast of Africa that was home to a diverse population of people who were subsequently slaughtered and taken captive by the Portuguese ship which landed there. It was a small group of soldiers according to las Casas, only thirty men who captured 155 people in addition to killing many more who defended themselves and others who drowned. Las Casas is basing his account off of a letter written by a person who was part of the crew and congratulates himself and the men on carrying out the will of God. Throughout the text, las Casas recounts similar incidents and each time critiques both the actions of the Spanish and Portuguese as well as the logic behind those actions. It is very similar to his much better known text, *La brevisima relacion de la destruccion de las Indias* which was written based on a wealth of information and many experiences that he saw with his own eyes. Both books detail incidents of extreme violence and oppression which are connected by the colonial powers. As the Spanish and Portuguese tested their methods of subjugation on the Western coast of Africa, they established both structures of violence and of justification for that violence and oppression. It is important to note how de Las Casas objects to the use of identity as a justification for violence in this passage. In the wider context of the text, de Las Casas is responding to the massive violence of Iberian troops in the wake of the (re)conquista, justified almost exclusively through the structure of Moro/a. Moro/a was synonymous with enemy. If someone was identified as such, any violence against them could be justified as is seen in the following passage. De las Casas includes these words written about the 1444 incident:

“En fin, nuestro Señor Dios, que a todo bien da remuneración, quiso por el trabajo que tenían tomado por su servicio, aquel día alcanzasen victoria de sus enemigos y paga y galardón de sus trabajos y despendas”²²

*Finally, our Lord God, who gives remuneration to all good people, for their work and service, achieved victory over their enemies, pay, reward and provisions for their work.*²³

This short passage, whose sentiment is replicated in different forms throughout the text, gives us a few key insights into the residual structures being established. First, the divine blessing and sanction of God and the Moro/a as the ultimate enemy of God. This was a sentiment stretching back to a historical conjuncture in 1212 with the previously mentioned battle of Las Navas de Tolosa and the turning point in terms of the ideological war as part of the (re)conquista. Previously, because there was no decisive victor between Muslim and Christian forces, the level of violence was limited because it was well known that the victors of a battle one year could very well be the losers a few years down the road so there was an incentive for both sides to limit violence, destruction, and oppression. However, with the decisive victory of 1212 and the turning of the tide in favor of Iberian powers, there was no longer that incentive.²⁴ Here lies the root of the ideological justification of destruction rooted not just in the divine right given by God but also in the construction of otherness epitomized in the figure of the Moro/a. Looking at both the first and the second quote, we can see how this conception was emerging and yet still being questioned. Las Casas asserts that the people of the coastal region are innocent and undeserving of violence regardless of their

²² De las Casas, *Brevisima Relación de La Destrucción de África*.

²³ Translation is my own

²⁴ Ruiz, “From Heaven to Earth.”

identity much as he does with the indigenous peoples of the Americas in his other text. And yet, does this set las Casas as some kind of savior, as he has often been depicted?²⁵ Or is he the other face of Spanish colonialism on which the structures of the modern neoliberal project stand?

Central to answering the above questions are the Spanish anxieties about otherness, Islam, and the building of a nation. Las Casas did not write his account to just any audience, but he was writing to an audience who had requested information, Phillip II, the prince who would eventually rule both Spain and Portugal. Instead of simply producing a report, in *La destruccion de las indias*, las Casas uses different rhetorical strategies and poetic language to write what becomes a persuasive text asking the Spanish crown to change their policies. He does much the same in *La destruccion de la Africa*. Some historians have depicted it as an appeal for human rights that should be held up as the great start of the liberal project of freedom and in many ways, they are correct.²⁶ However, the other side of the project of liberal freedom in Europe is oppression, colonialism and subjugation in the rest of the world as Lisa Lowe shows in her genealogy of modern liberalism.²⁷ Las Casas' writings are a key demonstration of this concept. Though he argues against the worst horrors of Spanish colonialism in the Americas and Africa, the rapes of children, the mass murders, the beginning of a genocide that would take more lives than any genocide before or since, las Casas never argues against Spanish colonialism itself. He states that it is unjustifiable and immoral to kill innocent people, regardless of their race or religion when they have done

²⁵ Bartolomé de Las Casas, *Indian Freedom: The Cause of Bartolomé de Las Casas, 1484-1566: A Reader* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).

²⁶ Daniel R. Brunstetter, *Tensions of Modernity: Las Casas and His Legacy in the French Enlightenment* (Routledge, 2012).

²⁷ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*.

nothing against you and to do so to non-Christians means you condemn them to hell as well as deprive the church and God of the chance at a convert.²⁸ Las Casas opinions are looked at in comparison to his opponent in the debates of Valladolid, Juan Gines de Sepulveda. The rhetoric used by both las Casas and Sepulveda is reflective of multiple historical conjunctures reaching both into the past of the (re)conquista, their present in 1550, up until the present day justifications for imperialism. Sepulveda argued that indigenous people were barbarians, natural slaves and that “there is nothing more contrary to distributive justice than to grant equal rights to unequal things.”²⁹ This statement is generally reflective of the more conservative colonial imperialist ideology and is a step in the structure of the justifications for depriving indigenous women as well as men of their rights from Morocco to the Philippines. Las Casas on the other hand follows much the same logic as he does in his *La Africa* text, portraying the inhabitants of the land as innocent, docile, free of any desire to do malice or harm to anyone. He poses this question at the beginning of his *La Africa* text,

“¿Qué ley natural o divina o humana hobo entonces ni hay hoy en el mundo, por cuya auctoridad pudiesen aquéllos hacer tantos males a aquellas inocentes gentes?”³⁰

*What natural or divine or human law exists today, by whose authority, can they do so many evil things to such innocent people?*³¹

Here las Casas asserts the humanity of the people of Africa and the Canary islands just as he does of the indigenous people in the Americas. However, he only does so with the conquered Moro/a as the assumed subjects of empire. In contrast to the (re)conquista

²⁸ De las Casas, *Brevísima Relación de La Destrucción de África*.

²⁹ Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, “Tratado Sobre Las Justas Causas de La Guerra Contra Los Indios,” 1941.

³⁰ De las Casas, *Brevísima Relación de La Destrucción de África*.

³¹ My translation

portrayal of the Moro/a as the ultimate enemy, inherently evil, las Casas frames the people of the West African coast as “innocents”. However, the claim of innocence is harmful and equally a part of the mindset of colonialism and domination that would set up residual structures of oppression under the guise of humanism. By declaring people as innocent, Las Casas frames them as childlike and in need of conversion. Here we can see the more liberal side of the figure of the Moro/a as innocent, oppressed, and in need of rescue. This figure particularly of the Moro/a woman portrayed as in need of rescue would go on to justify the continued Spanish wars in North Africa and the colonization of the Philippines. As we look at las Casas’ writing through a decolonial framework, it becomes all the more problematic. Even looking at the concept of innocence itself begs the question, innocent of what? What crime would justify the slaughter of men, women and children, innocent or not? In many ways the concept of innocence actually erases the humanity of the subject, leaving only two categories, the innocent Moro/a idealized as a docile and childlike subject of empire to eventually be converted and cleansed by the blood of Christ. The innocent Moro/a is not cleansed of their sins because as an innocent, they have none. Instead, they are cleansed of their identity ethnic, religious, cultural and otherwise to remerge remade as the perfect subject of empire. Indeed, las Casas’ claims and the subsequent decision by the Castilian crown to agree to the least of his demands must be seen in the context of the early failure of Spanish colonization efforts both in the Americas and in Africa. The Taino people were almost wiped about by the Spanish because of the violence, disease, and conditions of enslavement to which they were subjected. The Spanish did not initially bring home the gold or spices that Columbus had promised, and the project of colonization seemed on the verge of failure. Las Casas liberal humanist rhetoric offers a different and more successful face of

empire. Though the Spanish crown sided with las Casas and legally curtailed the *encomienda* system, it was not really a victory for anyone besides perhaps las Casas himself.³² Here, we must return to what is going on between Spain and Morocco during this same time period to look at the residual structures, historical conjunctures, and see the emergence of women resisting Spanish empire in spaces of *inzi* and *kalayaan*.

What *La destrucccion de la Africa* shows is that Spain and Portugal were already establishing the scaffolding of the structures of domination of colonialism. The stories of women during the (re)conquista and ongoing conquista show the establishment of their own structures and spaces of resistance sitting at the intersections of multiple historical conjunctures. Here, we have the emergence of spaces of *inzi*, and figures of resistance within those spaces. As stated in the introduction, *inzi* is defined not just as resistance, but as a resistance that is continual and unending. Within spaces of *inzi*, figures emerge, some of which are embodiments of specific practices of resistance like the shikha and some are specific individuals who represent wider practices of resistance. There is no better example than Sayyida al Hurra, whose life and actions sit in the middle of the most important historical conjunctures of her time period and whose actions and life are part of Moroccan feminist discourse today. Sayyida was born in 1485³³ to her father, Moulay Ali Ibn Rashid, the emir of Chefchaouen, and her mother Lalla Zohra from Vejer de la Frontera. Ibn Rashid fought against the Spanish invasion of Granada, so it is not surprising that when the Spanish won, he decided to take his family and flee the city. Unlike what has been depicted in much of the popular literature and histories of the time period, Granada was not conquered but

³² Daniel Castro, *Another Face of Empire: Bartolomé de Las Casas, Indigenous Rights, and Ecclesiastical Imperialism* (Duke University Press, 2007).

³³ Many details of Sayyida's life including her name and her date of birth are somewhat in question, historians' estimates range from 1495-1495 for her birthdate. Other names include Sitt al-Horra, Lalla and Aicha.

actually surrendered, as conquest would have been quite difficult given the structure of the city.³⁴ Instead the Muslim population of Granada was offered very favorable terms of surrender in the Treaty of Granada, signed in 1491. In the treaty, the Castilian crown makes many generous guarantees including that all people shall be safe in their person and their property, that those wishing to leave for North Africa will be given safe passage without any tithe or tax upon them, even going so far as to forbid Christians from entering Muslim households, from insulting Muslims, and from holding any public office within Granada. Of course, none of these terms are kept and within a few years, Muslims are being wholesale expelled from Spain or forced to convert.³⁵ This included the family of Sayyida and was a move that would change her whole life just as it changed the world. The betrayal of the Muslims of Granada is another level on the scaffolding of colonialism, oppression and conquest that would appear in the Americas and very soon after in the Philippines.

Sayyida and her family were part of a wave of Granadinians who settled in the northern coast of Morocco and went about rebuilding it. Even after the disaster of 1212, Mahgribi rulers had continued to supply troops to Granada allowing it to remain as a stronghold for hundreds of years as other Muslim held territories in the Iberian peninsula were lost. There was a shared history and unbroken connection that encouraged people to settle in the northern coast of Morocco.³⁶ There were also multiple empires clashing for control of Moroccan territory and Sayyida and her family were at the intersections of resistance to this conquest and built structures of resistance. Multiple of the most respected

³⁴ Ruiz, "From Heaven to Earth."

³⁵ David Nirenberg, "Muslims in Christian Iberia, 1000–1526: Varieties of Mudejar Experience," in *The Medieval World* (Routledge, 2013), 80–96.

³⁶ Mercedes García-Arenal and Gerard Wiegers, *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain: A Mediterranean Diaspora* (LeidenBrill, 2014).

historians of this time period, coming from Morocco, Spain, and elsewhere state the importance of the structures established during this time period and by this population.³⁷ In 1437, Tetouan had been destroyed by the Portuguese invasion and siege which left the city open for settlement by escaped Andalusian Moriscos. As a means of support, these families engaged in what many call piracy as part of the resistance to Iberian efforts at conquest. If people were not directly sailing the seas, providing logistical support in the trading of stolen goods and the ransoming of hostages. This is where the tales of morisco Pirates emerge, and the legend of the Mora Pirate Queen, Sayyida al-Hurra. The label of pirate Queen is at best a romanticized station of historical fact and at worst dubious misrepresentation. There are many disputes about Sayyida al Hurra's name, the role she played in history as well as the actual facts of her life. However, it is undoubtedly true that Sayyida al-Hurra was a powerful Mora ruler who had extensive dealings with pirates in the Mediterranean, specifically with the Ottomans.³⁸ The Ottomans are also in the midst of their own rise to power and quest for territory and their maritime power, under Oruc, Turk military leader, expanded along the Maghreb coast. Oruc first conquered the city of Tlemsen and removed the Zayanid Sultan, Abu Hammu III from power. Oruc and his forces were accepted because of the unhappiness of the local population with the payment of taxes to the Spanish crown and popular religious support for the idea of holy war.³⁹ This happened in conjunction with other major events in the Ottoman world. First Selim completed the Ottoman conquest of

³⁷ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*; Mercedes García-Arenal, "The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros of Sale," in *The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain* (Brill, 2014), 286–328; Andrew C Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*, 10 (University of Chicago Press, 2010).

³⁸ Hasna Lebbady, "Women in Northern Morocco: Between the Documentary and the Imaginary," *Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics*, no. 32 (2012): 127–52.

³⁹ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*.

Syria and Egypt in 1516-1517. At the same time, the Spanish ruler Charles V began the first Spanish campaign against the Turks in Northern Africa. It was in this context that Sayyida rose to power, carving out a space of resistance in the city of Tetouan.

The nature of power and resistance in the Mediterranean was changing and constantly in flux. During this time, Tetouan functioned as an autonomous city state, flexing and exercising its own power, including making alliances and carrying out trade. This was quite different from how the rest of Morocco was functioning as the Saadians and the Wattasids fought for power, a fight that would later entangle Sayyida.⁴⁰ In 1510 Sayyida married Mohammed al-Mandri who was then the ruler of Tetouan. This cemented the alliance between Chefchaouen where her father was the governor and Tetouan which was already of great concern to the Spanish and Portuguese who correctly feared resistance. It was here that Sayyida established the structures and spaces of *inzi* among the multiple historical conjunctures that crossed from the Ottomans to Spain, to Portugal, to the Saadians, to the Wattasids and even to the Philippines as will be shown later. The expansion of Ottoman power described in the last paragraph represented both a threat and an opportunity to Sayyida. She was vehement in her desire for independence, which is reflected in histories of her life, some of which describe her as bad tempered, a well-known term used to describe women who demand their independence.⁴¹ Sayyida exercised a great deal of power and was one of the main brokers of deals between Tetouan and the Ottoman allied pirates. Rather than allow her city to be raided, she played the balance of power between Spain, Portugal and the Ottomans for the protection and independence of her city.⁴² Here we see a space of *inzi*

⁴⁰ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*.

⁴¹ Philip Gosse, *The History of Piracy* (Courier Corporation, 2012).

⁴² Mernissi, *The Forgotten Queens of Islam*.

formed by three elements, the historical conjunctures of power, the residual structures formed during the process of (re)conquista and conquista, as well as the action of those who resisted. Sayyida's actions in protecting Tetouan and insisting on independence were built on the structures of resistance of her community as a persecuted minority for hundreds of years in Spain.

After the death of her husband in 1519, Sayyida continued to build power in Tetouan by making shrewd alliances. She dealt with the rising Portuguese power in the neighboring city of Ceuta by making further alliances with Ottoman corsairs. It is during this time that most of the tales about her acting as a pirate queen emerge. There are many European sources that write of female pirates masquerading as men during this period and it becomes somewhat of an obsession that is built of the residual structure of the Mora which appears later in the Americas and the Philippines.⁴³ This structure as an effort to reconcile the framing of Mora women as in need of rescue with the reality of *inzi* and the vigorous resistance from indigenous women. In the famous Spanish novel of the siglo de oro or golden age, *Don Quijote*, the author, Miguel de Cervantes, writes of a Morisca⁴⁴ pirate, Ana Felix, who has disguised herself as an Ottoman corsair in order to escape captivity. Her story is quite interesting to juxtapose with that of Sayyida al-Hurra. In the novel, Ana Felix is about to be tried by the local viceroy for piracy and summarily executed for her participation in rebellion and resistance against the Spanish crown when she suddenly reveals that she is, in fact, a woman. She recounts that she was taken from Spain by her uncles after Muslims were expelled from Spain. She was then brought to North Africa where she lived a life of solitary

⁴³ Lizabeth Paravisini-Gebert, "Cross-Dressing on the Margins of Empire," in *Women at Sea* (Springer, 2001), 59–97.

⁴⁴ Morisca refers to a convert from Islam to Christianity

exclusion, continuing to practice her Christian faith in secret. Her suitor followed her across the Mediterranean to North Africa and she escapes and masquerades as a pirate in order to save him. In the end, Ana reunited with her father and able to resume her life in Spain under the protection of a man⁴⁵ The stories of the two women, contrasted side by side reveal the Spanish anxieties about race, religion, gender and most of all, rebellion. In Ana Felix we have the ultimate fantasy of the Mora woman, who secretly is no Mora after but is in fact a Christian. Her rebellion against the Spanish crown was no more than her efforts to escape her Moro heritage and return to a Christian land fully morally justified in its oppression of her people. If we take the colonial perspective and read this story against the grain, other possibilities emerge. Ana Felix leads a successful revolt against the Spanish, dressing as a pirate in open defiance of colonial empire and gender norms. However, she is eventually captured and on the brink of execution so, knowing the minds of her captors, she cleverly invents a story of her persecution at the hands of her Moro uncle and her secret practice of Christianity. She thereby escapes execution and regains her freedom. Of course, Ana Felix is a fictional character, but she represents a very real phenomenon. In the decolonization of her narrative, we can see the resistant spaces of *inzi* that lie not only in her story but in the stories of many women who defied gender norms and seized opportunities, just as Sayyida al Hurra did.

Returning to Sayyida's life, both the Spanish and the Portuguese attempted to continue to acquire more land in North Africa. To put it into perspective, Charles V sent 10,000 men to North Africa to try to increase Spanish possession there which was more than

⁴⁵ Miguel De Cervantes, *El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Quijote de La Mancha* (Aegitas, 2015).

fifteen times the number of men he had sent with Cortez to conquer Mexico.⁴⁶ Sayyida was able to hold on to power and reign alone for more than 20 years with the power from multiple allies. In 1539, one of her major allies and also her brother, Moulay Ibrahim, died and she began to look for new, stronger allies and she set her sights on the most powerful ruler in the land Sultan Moulay Ahmed al-Wattasid. Sayyida married the Sultan in 1541 under circumstances that had never been seen before or since. Sayyida refused to leave Tetouan, the city she had protected and defended so she insisted that the Sultan come to her in order for the wedding to take place. The Sultan conceded to her demand, left the royal palace in Fez and came to Tetouan for the wedding.⁴⁷ The idea that the Sultan would be forced to leave his capital by a woman was completely unheard of under any circumstance. This was an example of Sayyida flexing her power and resisting the patriarchal structures of the society she lived in. This was an ultimate act of *inzi*, an open defiance of patriarchal norms. Her rule was part of creating a structure of women's resistance not just to European powers but to all coercive power. However, she had joined the Wattasid dynasty just as it was coming to an end. To the south in Morocco, the Saadian dynasty began its rise, disrupting the plans of the Wattasids, the Spanish and the Ottomans. The rise of the Saadian dynasty spelled the end of Sayyida and her husband. The Saadians took Tlemsen from Ottomans in May 1550 but by winter 1551 Ottomans took it back again. The Ottomans tried to negotiate but Saadians refused, and the Ottomans took the Saadians seat of power in Fez in 1554. The Saadians retook Fez later that year, but the politics of Morocco were permanently changed because of the confrontation between Ottoman empire and another formidable Muslim

⁴⁶ Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier*.

⁴⁷ Mernissi, *The Forgotten Queens of Islam*.

opponent. Then in 1557 Ottomans assassinated Moroccan Sultan Muhammad ash-Shaykh. Lack of a strong central ruler meant a return to more localism and tribal politics. There were two main reasons for the lack of Saadians success against Iberian and Ottoman empires, the lack of financial support and the inability to transform the army into a more “modern” fighting force. Defeat by Ottoman forces drove Saadians into an alliance with the Spanish which considerably weakened any resistance. Sayyida’s life and the power she was able to exercise in the spaces of *inzi* between multiple historical conjunctures stretch through history and across geography from the past to the present and from Morocco to the Philippines.

Old Stories, New Contexts: Spain, Islam, and Indigenous resistance in the Philippines

On the other side of the world, the same conjunctures that were forming the shape of Moroccan history extended around the globe, coming from multiple directions and intersecting once again in the Philippines. First, it is necessary to emphasize that the Philippines was globally connected long before the Spanish and Portuguese arrived. Some histories state that the Spanish and Portuguese were able to find translators who spoke several languages upon their arrival indicating the international nature of the Philippine archipelago. There was a thriving trade with China and several different Sultanates both in the archipelago and further south with what is now Indonesia.⁴⁸ It is important to understand the global nature of the Philippines pre-Hispanic contact for a few reasons. First, it decolonizes the colonial narrative of “discovery” and the professed “civilizing” mission of the Spanish because the Philippines was already part of the global economy and had several different thriving civilizations. Second, it puts the Philippines into a far more accurate

⁴⁸ William Henry Scott, *Looking for the Prehispanic Filipino and Other Essays in Philippine History* (Cellar Book Shop, 1992).

historical context which is key to understanding the past and how historical conjunctures reach through time to connect with the future. This section will cover the period of initial Filipino-Hispanic contact and the construction of law and identity during this period, structures of indigenous resistance and spaces of *kalayaan* explored through the life and history of indigenous women, and the end of Spanish colonialism which was the beginning of American imperialism which will once again bring us back to Morocco. This section is based on the study of primary sources from el Archivo de las indias, located in Sevilla, Spain and digitized documents available from a few other sources as well as secondary sources from different time periods.

The unexpected encounter between Europeans and the indigenous people of the Americas, combined with the (re)conquista, produced a crisis of power, identity, and ideology. One of the many results was the treaty of Tordesillas, signed by the Spanish and Portuguese in 1494, arrogantly dividing the world between them. This included territory in Morocco which had the Portuguese expanding on the Western coast and the Spanish in the North. The treaty also covered navigation routes and since the Portuguese controlled the route to Asia via the southernmost point in Africa, the Spanish had to find another route. Ferdinand Magellan famously defected from the Portuguese crown and pledged his loyalty to King of Spain Charles V, promising that he could find a route to Asia, more specifically to the spice islands via what is now called the Strait of Magellan. It is interesting to note the context of Magellan's defection from the Portuguese. Magellan was stationed at the Portuguese garrison in the town of Azamor in Western Morocco where he was accused of abandoning his post without leave when his commanding officer changed. This was how he entered into a dispute with the King of Portugal and when the King demanded that Magellan

return to Azamor, he refused and fled to Spain where he was given ships by Charles V and subsequently left in search of a Western route to the Spice Islands.⁴⁹ This is an individual example of the historical conjunctures that stretched around the globe connecting Morocco and the Philippines. Magellan's previous encounters with figure of the Moro/a in Morocco shaped his experiences, built residual structures, and informed how he as an individual and the Spanish empire as a whole reacted upon their encounter with Islam in the Philippines.

Magellan's initial attempt at the establishment of the Spanish empire in the Philippines was a failure for him and a victory for indigenous resistance that resulted in his death. Antonio Pigafetta, an Italian explorer who accompanied Magellan to the Philippines, wrote an account entitled *Relazione del primo viaggio intorno al mondo*, which he gave to Charles V after his return.⁵⁰ It is considered to be the most accurate first-hand account of Magellan's journey and is unsurprisingly horrifying filled with murder, theft, enslavement, rape and the usual crimes of colonizing forces. It shows Magellan to be both an inept military commander and politician who was both overconfident and woefully ignorant. Magellan's strategy was simple enough, to ally himself with the ruler of the Philippines, have that leader, in this case Rajah Humabon, pledge loyalty to Spain and then help him put down any resistance. The first part of his plan went well and Rajah Humabon, mistakenly believing that Magellan had already conquered other territories, pledged loyalty to Spain, paid tribute and converted to Christianity.⁵¹ That however, is where Magellan's success ended as certain Datu's⁵², chief among them Lapu Lapu, refused to pay tribute and submit to

⁴⁹ Antonio Pigafetta and Henry Edward John Stanley, *The First Voyage Round the World, by Magellan* (Hakluyt society, 1874).

⁵⁰ Pigafetta and Stanley.

⁵¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁵² Datu is a leadership title used by various indigenous groups in the Philippines. It can be translated as chief, ruler, prince and other titles depending on the context.

Spain. Today, every child in the Philippines learns the now infamous story of the defeat of Magellan by Lapu Lapu at the battle of Macatan. The story itself is quite simple, Magellan wanted to show off Spanish military technology, so he refused assistance from local allies and went to fight with only around 45 men. When he arrived, Magellan realized he was gravely outnumbered but went on with the fight undeterred. Because of the geography of Macatan bay, Magellan was unable to use the larger cannons from the ships and was quickly defeated.⁵³ This victory on the part of the indigenous people of the Philippines was very important both practically and symbolically. On a practical level, it was a large and discouraging defeat for the Spanish that delayed further efforts at colonization until 1565 with the arrival of Miguel de Legazpi.⁵⁴ On a symbolic level, it showed everyone, both the indigenous people of the Philippines and the Spanish themselves that it was very possible for the Spanish to be defeated. This was important for indigenous peoples not just practically but also spiritually as battles were believed to have spiritual power.⁵⁵ As we will continue to see from resistance to Spanish colonization all the way to US imperialism, occupying forces consistently wrote that resistance was simply the mindset of the indigenous people of the Philippines. Lapu Lapu's victory set up the very first structure of resistance to Spanish colonialism, a spiritual and political legacy that remains important even up until the modern day.

Even though Magellan's attempt to conquer the Philippines failed, the writings from that time provides us with significant insight. In spite of what some colonial histories claim, finding Islam in Asia was not at all a shock to the Spanish. The idea that the Philippines

⁵³ Pigafetta and Stanley, *The First Voyage Round the World, by Magellan*.

⁵⁴ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁵⁵ Jose Amiel Angeles, "The Battle of Mactan and the Indigenous Discourse on War," *Philippine Studies* 55, no. 1 (2007): 3–52.

were untouched, natural, or wild were all part of the ongoing effort to justify Spanish colonialism. Pigafetta's account is very revealing as to the mindset of the Spanish and their expectations. For example, the Spanish asked the indigenous people of the Philippines if they were "moors" upon their arrival.⁵⁶ Just like in Morocco, the term Moro/a had the effect of erasing indigenous identity and homogenizing complexities and intricacies into threat. Here we have the residue of the (re)conquista, still fresh and present in the minds of the Spanish as is seen with the frequent use of the term Moor as well as the construction of threat throughout the text. The Spanish were seeking the enemy that they had constructed for themselves during the (re)conquista. The Spanish obsession with the Islamic Other in their colonies was part of a regime to justify and codify oppression. This was part of the crisis of power, identity and ideology produced by the unification of Spain and the encounter with indigenous peoples of the colonies. This crisis and its connection to Islam has been well studied in the context of the Americas. There were prevalent anxieties among Spanish conquistadors and administrators about a Muslims presence in the Americas and that influenced the conceptualization of race and the human through castas, which was the racial caste system of the Spanish empire. Incorporating the casta population into the project of the Spanish empire was essential to that empire's very survival. The eligibility of the casta population for Spanish citizenship was the subject of some debate. For example, in the text of Tierno Galvan, *Actas: 168*, the author questions the reasons behind the hesitance to grant citizenship to the African population of the empire. He asks, is it because of the Spanish hatred of the Moors? His answer is no, it is because of their brown skin which he argues is

⁵⁶ Pigafetta and Stanley, *The First Voyage Round the World, by Magellan*.

unjust since some have lighter skin than the Indians and even the Spanish.⁵⁷ There was a great deal of general anxiety and paranoia about the spread of Islam to indigenous people in the Americas. Certain ceremonies and even styles of dress were banned because they seemed to mimic Islamic practices. This was particularly prevalent in the policing of women's bodies, the way they dressed, and practiced medicine. Any heterodox interpretations of Christianity were condemned and often blamed on Islamic influence. This negative or corrupting influence was blamed for the rebellions and unrest among the indigenous population.⁵⁸ This is a clear example of the residual structures of the (re)conquista, the figure of the Moro/a, and the ongoing struggle with Islamic empires in the Mediterranean being used to justify colonialism and the violent oppression of indigenous people as well as establish their legitimacy and authority. Unlike in the America's, in the Philippines the Spanish did re-encounter Islam and with the arrival of Miguel de Legazpi in 1565, the Spanish fully implemented their regime of colonial oppression on the indigenous people of the Philippines.

Legazpi implemented the religious colonialist war on women, their bodies and their power exemplified in the figure of the Mora. He was, from the beginning of his arrival in the Philippines, obsessed with the role of native women and turning them into good Spanish subjects. Throughout his writings, Magellan is keen to establish that the indigenous people of the Philippines are not in fact innocent as argued by the liberal humanist view of las Casas but are in fact much more the guilty threat as reflected by the figure of the Moro/a constructed during the (re)conquista. However, reality is difficult to fit into these boxes and

⁵⁷ Esther Lezra, *The Colonial Art of Demonizing Others: A Global Perspective*, vol. 11 (Routledge, 2014).

⁵⁸ Cook, *Forbidden Passages: Muslims and Moriscos in Colonial Spanish America*.

we see Legazpi struggle to reconcile this binary of the good or bad subject of empire with the complex reality of the thriving and diverse civilization he encountered. Unlike his predecessor Magellan, Legazpi had a direct order from the Spanish crown not just to establish trade but to colonize the Philippines and make the inhabitants into “good Christians” in contrast to the figure of the Moro/a. Women, gender, and the family structure were key to the Spanish plans for domination of the Philippines.

Upon attempting to establish a Spanish garrison, Legazpi was shocked at the freedom women enjoyed, as his chronicler recorded, “many of the wives and daughters of the chiefs came to the camp along with the other women, and thus went through the camp, visiting with as much freedom and liberty as if all the men were their own brothers.”⁵⁹ Legazpi quickly attempted to crackdown on this freedom of movement by restricting women from entering the areas controlled by the Spanish but he was unable to enforce this rule. There were various practices that the Spanish attempted to stop including polyandry and what they called prostitution, though in many cases the practices did not fit any common definition of prostitution.⁶⁰ Some of the Spanish observed that women freely engaged in sexual activity outside of the bonds of marriage because there was no punishment for this supposed crime in the eyes of the Spanish.⁶¹ From the start, Legazpi made great efforts to bring about the Spanish Catholic ideals surrounding sexuality to the Philippines and use those to control the population. This becomes even more clear with the Spanish introduction of the concept of virginity as understood under the Catholic regime of the time. Moraga, a Spanish colonial administrator, made the following observation, “the Natives of the Pintados Islands,

⁵⁹ Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*.

⁶⁰ Sexual services in exchange for money or goods

⁶¹ Carolyn Brewer, *Holy Confrontation: Religion, Gender, and Sexuality in the Philippines, 1521-1685* (C. Brewer and the Institute of Women’s Studies, St. Scholastica’s College, 2001).

especially the women, are vicious and sensual, and their wickedness has devised lewd ways of intercourse".⁶² This was in line with overall Spanish attitudes towards women's sexuality in the Philippines as something evil and to be feared. This contrasted against the attitude observed in many indigenous groups which was casual and not focused on control. Indeed, the word virginity was not in the Tagalog language and had to be imported from Spanish.⁶³ The demonization of women's sexuality and the codification of concepts like virginity and adultery built the scaffolding of the residual structures of women's oppression. Built into the figure of the Moro/a is the construction of threat and assumption of guilt. The other side of that is the assumption of innocence and weakness, the lack of ability to resist or pose a threat. The Spanish saw power in women's defiance of Spanish gender norms and immediately moved to curtail that power.

When Legazpi arrived in Cebu, the same area where Magellan was killed, he immediately worked to negotiate a treaty with Tupas, the son of the chieftain who had initiated hostilities against Magellan. Tupas' wife played a key part in these negotiations and many gifts were given to her. Tupas' niece was the first in this group to convert to Christianity and helped to solidify the treaty, as recorded by Legazpi's chronicler.⁶⁴ By securing a woman's conversion to Christianity, control over her body was also secured, at least in theory as she was bound by the laws of Christianity rather than the customary laws of her own people. This story is similar to that of Ana Felix and shows the Spanish obsession with the conversion of women from the Mora threat to the docile subject of empire. Here, we can see the beginnings of the structures that continue to surround the oppression of and

⁶² Miguel Loarca, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, vol. 5, 50 vols. (AH Clark Company, 1906).

⁶³ Brewer, *Holy Confrontation: Religion, Gender, and Sexuality in the Philippines, 1521-1685*.

⁶⁴ Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*.

control over women's bodies. Here we must understand that conversion is the most important mechanism of Spanish colonialism.⁶⁵ As previously mentioned in the analysis of de Las Casas, conversion is the primary concern of empire when confronted with the Other. This residual structure of conversion is translated to the Philippines within the framework of the world as understood by the Spanish. In this process of translation, we can also see resistance to colonial structures and the efforts of indigenous people to both build and maintain their own structures of meaning as exemplified by the concept of *kalayaan* in building spaces of freedom, community and solidarity.⁶⁶ This can be seen in the Spanish concern with myths and storytelling among indigenous people and the cross over with legal practices culminating in the figure of the babaylan or priestess.

It is important to note that the babaylan is not necessarily female as a category assigned by Spanish colonialism but is a feminine role. The babaylan could also be a man who would feminize himself to take on the role.⁶⁷ In *Relacion de las Yslas Filipinas*, Loarca records various notes about the religious beliefs of indigenous peoples, and he is careful to note the sex of deities if they are female. He writes of the deity Lalahon who is said to hurl fire at her enemies from deep within a volcano, ending his description emphasizing "this Lalahon is a woman."⁶⁸ He also describes Lubluban, a female deity who is the "giver of laws" which is a great topic of concern for Loarca, particularly when it comes to marriage. As shown by multiple studies, Loarca distorts the story of Lubluban to fit into the Christian story of Adam and Eve. He locates the reason for evil and violence being brought into the

⁶⁵ Vicente L. Rafael, *Contracting Colonialism: Translation and Christian Conversion in Tagalog Society under Early Spanish Rule* (Duke University Press, 1993).

⁶⁶ Rafael.

⁶⁷ Grace Nono, *Babaylan Sing Back: Philippine Shamans and Voice, Gender, and Place* (Cornell University Press, 2021).

⁶⁸ Loarca, "Relation of the Filipinas Islands."

world as Lubluban's disobedience to her husband which does not match with other tellings of the story.⁶⁹ Here, the Spanish set the scaffolding of the foundation for the laws and regulations surrounding Christian marriage and the oppression of women. Lubluban is cast as a "bad" woman, reflecting the figure of the Mora, and in need of discipline and regulation from her husband and from God. The Spanish hold the keys to this discipline through conversion and Christian marriage, which is of great concern for Loarca. He writes, "Great mistakes have been made regarding the marriages formed among the natives of this country since they have become Christians, because the marriage customs once observed among the natives have not been clearly understood. Therefore, some religious join them in marriage, while others release them." Of the highest concern here is adherence to Christianity and the laws of marriage. By bringing indigenous women fully under the religious and legal control of men within the framework of the Catholic colonial hierarchy, the Spanish effectively halve the population they need to control. However, in this passage from Loarca, we can also read against the grain to reveal women's resistance and spaces of *kalayaan*. Loarca is concerned precisely because practices of Christian marriage are not being upheld and instead women are maintaining *kalayaan* practices of freedom and community. Here we can find evidence that spaces and practices of *kalayaan* are indeed resistance precisely because the Spanish treat them as a threat. By reading "against the grain"⁷⁰, we can see the residual structures of practices being maintained by indigenous women who are continuously resisting Spanish colonialism.

⁶⁹ Brewer, *Holy Confrontation: Religion, Gender, and Sexuality in the Philippines, 1521-1685*.

⁷⁰ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?," *Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of an Idea*, 1988, 21-78.

These residual structures of resistance also built themselves into practices of violent rebellion such as in the Bankaw Revolt. In this revolt, Datu Bankaw, who had previously accepted Legazpi and converted to Christianity, turned against the Spanish and together with a babaylan (priestess of animist religion), rejected Christianity and built a temple. Together, they convinced six of the surrounding communities to revolt.⁷¹ Revolts like this were extremely common and the Spanish struggled to fight them off. The largest continuous area of resistance was in the southern island of Mindanao which housed the largest “Moro” population. Though some accounts by the Spanish attempt to depict the Moro population as cruel to the other indigenous peoples, these accounts are full of contradictions. From their previous experience with fighting against Muslim powers, the Spanish tried to use conversion to Christianity as a tool to divide different indigenous groups along religious lines. This tactic was the scaffolding for the residual structures of oppression that continue to this day. However, the Spanish struggled with this tactic. Fray Domingo, Bishop of the Philippines wrote:

“they were better treated by the preachers of Mahoma (Islam) than they have been and are by the preachers of Christ. Since, through kind and gentle treatment, they received that doctrine willingly, it took root in their hearts, and so they leave it reluctantly. But this is not the case with what we preach to them, for, as it is accompanied with so much bad treatment and with so evil examples, they say “yes” with the mouth and “no” with the heart,”⁷²

⁷¹ John Leddy Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses 1565-1700* (University of Wisconsin Press, 1959).

⁷² Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*.

Here Fray Domingo mirrors many of the same concerns expressed by de Las Casas and he has the same ultimate fear, that Spanish colonial cruelty will hurt the efforts of the Spanish crown to convert and subjugate the people of the Philippines. Here we see the historical conjuncture with the Spanish fight against indigenous and Muslim resistance from Morocco to the Philippines. The Spanish propaganda of efforts to convert Muslim women in the Philippines parallel those told as part of the Reconquista. In *Historia de Mindanao y Jolo*, Combes writes about a young Muslim woman who strongly resists efforts to convert her saying, “Mora auia viuido, y Mora queria morir. (As a Mora I have lived and as a Mora I would like to die)”.⁷³ In circumstances which are not clear, she is eventually convinced to convert, which is greatly celebrated by the Spanish as both a symbolic and ideological victory building upon structures of oppression from the Philippines to Morocco. However, we again need to read against the grain to decolonize the colonial narrative. Was this young woman a true convert to Christianity or did she say the right words to save her life and afterwards return to her own religion and practices of resistance in spaces of *kalayaan*. Obviously, it is impossible to know in this exact scenario but as shown earlier in this section it was a common practice to convert and later abandon that conversion. In the Spanish construction of the Moro/a as the ultimate threat they betray the realities of effective resistance.

Spain was at a global war with Islam, internally and externally from the Philippines to Morocco. Some Spanish conquistadors even tried to assert that Muslims in the Philippines came directly from Egypt, Mecca, and Arabia. Muslims in the Philippines also reached out to the Ottoman empire asking for support in their fight against the Spanish, though they never

⁷³ Francisco Combes, *Historia de Mindanao y Jolo* (Viuda de M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1897).

received a reply.⁷⁴ In Morocco, various entities also reached out to the Ottomans during the same time period but again help was not forthcoming. It is important to understand that both structures of conquest and resistance were globally connected. At the turn of the 19th century, waves of change were coming across the globe. The Spanish empire was in decline and revolutionary movements threatened the structures of the empire with the new structure of the nation. This next section will analyze the decline of colonialism, rise of imperialism, the building of the nation, and how both residual structures of resistance and oppression were built into the nation.

Building a nation on the structures of empire

During the 18th century, Morocco underwent serious turmoil and political changes. Sidi Mohammed III, often called “the architect of modern Morocco”, came to power in 1753 following a period of unrest and civil war and he implemented a wide range of reforms designed to stabilize Morocco.⁷⁵ He was able to finally expel the Portuguese in 1769 when they finally abandoned El Jadida, the last Portuguese enclave. The Spanish however, retained their enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla though various attempts were made against them, all were ultimately costly and unsuccessful. Morocco also remained internally divided between bled al-Makhzen, the region of the King, and bled al-Siba, the region of resistance.⁷⁶ This residual structure stretching back to the (re)conquista and the defeat of Amazigh rule in Spain and North Africa would continue to shape the nature of resistance and the formation of the nation. The figure of the Moro/a is central to this because it erased and homogenized the

⁷⁴ Donoso, *Islamic Far East: Ethnogenesis of Philippine Islam*.

⁷⁵ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*.

⁷⁶ Charles André Julien, *History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, from the Arab Conquest to 1830*, vol. 2 (Routledge & K. Paul, 1970).

people of bled al-Siba through the construction of threat. Sidi Mohammed's death was followed by even more instability with his sons competing for power. After a brief period of control by Mulay al-Yazid, which further destabilized the situation, Mulay Sliman⁷⁷ took the throne in 1793 and went about consolidating power by defeating his brothers. After consolidating his power, he became increasingly worried about attacks from European powers. Rather than going on the offensive as his father had, Mulay Sliman withdrew from the international arena, closing Morocco's doors to foreign trade.⁷⁸ This only added to his internal problems, as his perceived weakness grew and profits from foreign trade dwindled. He also lost popularity because of his Wahhabi religious reforms which targeted the heterodox Islamic practices of many Amazigh groups and only increased the divide between siba and makhzen. Here we see a concrete example of the residue of the (re)conquista and the homogenization of indigenous practices being taken up the makhzen. In 1818, Mulay Sliman went into the middle Atlas Amazigh region in an attempt to collect taxes when, much to his surprise and humiliation, his Amazigh guards deserted him and he was captured.⁷⁹ Though he was freed only days later, this showed the weakness of the centralized Moroccan state and the strength of *inzi* in the form of Amazigh resistance on the eve of a new wave of European expansion.

Resistance to the ongoing encroachments by Spain in northern Morocco was ongoing by multiple different Amazigh groups also vying for their own power. Spain was undergoing its own political turmoil, both internal and external as the monarchy struggled to retain power both at home and in the colonies. As Spain saw its power dwindling in the Americas and in

⁷⁷ Also known as Sultan Sulayman

⁷⁸ Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁷⁹ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*.

the Philippines, Spanish imperial desires returned once again to focus on Morocco.

Leopoldo O'Donnell, chief of the Army of Africa argued that Spain must hold on to its Moroccan territories saying, “it is not a spirit of conquest which drives us, we are going there to purify our honor”.⁸⁰ His words are a call back to the residual structures of oppression of the (re)conquista, the idea that the war for territory in Morocco was not a war for territory at all but a war of identity, with all the backing of a thousand years of construction of the Moro/a as threat.

In fact, the Tetuan War (1859-1860) was both a war over identity and over territory, as its aftermath will show. In the justifications for this war, we see the historical conjuncture of the residual structures of oppression in the figure of the Moro/a that traveled from Morocco, through the Americas, to the Philippines returning home once again in a (re)conquista with a new face. A popular Spanish writer named Pedro Antonio de Alarcon published *Diario de un testigo de la Guerra de África*, describing his observations and experiences in the Tetuan War. His descriptions are reminiscent of the tales of (re)conquista as well as Spanish accounts of colonialism in the Philippines. Alarcon frames the arrival of Spanish soldiers as the coming of the “messiah” and he is part of converting the mosque in Tetuan into a cathedral for holding Catholic mass.⁸¹ Women are a key part of the narrative of justification for colonialism and the idea of “saving” women, both in terms of conversion and of rescuing a woman from her oppressors. Various newspaper accounts published in Spain, almost all written by men, present a picture of Moroccan women as locked away, both

⁸⁰ Itzea Goikolea-Amiano, “The Hispano-Moroccan Re-Encounter: Colonialism, Mimesis, and Power in the Spanish War on Tetouan and Its Occupation (1859-62)” (2017).

⁸¹ Pedro Antonio de Alarcón, “Diario de Un Testigo de La Guerra de África,” *Diario de Un Testigo de La Guerra de África*, 2012, 0–0.

faceless and voiceless behind screens and veils.⁸² Alarcon himself wrote, “From far away she seemed to me a graceful animal. Close up she seemed to me a charming female. In neither case could she seem a ‘woman’ to me”.⁸³ Here we have the figure of the Mora as either innocent or threat and never fully human. In this reproduction of the classic orientalist trope, we have the historical conjuncture of multiple contradictory lines, claiming that women are oppressed and need to be saved by the forces of colonialism while also marveling at the freedom that women do have and then violently taking away those freedoms. In the discourse of the colonizer, the figure of the Mora, faceless and voiceless, becomes a blank canvas on which the colonizer projects his desires for domination and his fears of being overthrown. And yet, in this space, crisscrossed by multiple contradictory historical conjunctures, women still emerge in their own spaces with their own voices of *inzi* as a constant and unending resistance.

Women played an important role in the resistance both to the Makhzen and to the encroaching danger of European colonialism. A French journalist, Gabriel Charmes wrote about Rqia bent Hadidou, a woman who was the head of an Amazigh tribe and led multiple campaigns of armed resistance both against the French and against the makhzen. Charmes is clearly conflicted throughout the text as he tries to reconcile his depictions of Moroccan women as helpless and in need of rescue with the figure of Rqia bent Hadidou leading her troops on many successful campaigns. He writes about her political and military strategies with a tone of disbelief and attempts to attribute her success to luck or mysterious forces.⁸⁴

⁸² Goikolea-Amiano, “The Hispano-Moroccan Re-Encounter: Colonialism, Mimesis, and Power in the Spanish War on Tetouan and Its Occupation (1859-62).”

⁸³ Susan Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity* (Yale University Press, 2008).

⁸⁴ Osire Glacier, “Political Women in Morocco: Then and Now,” 2012.

However, what emerges in reading this text against the grain is a leader with a coherent and sharp political and military strategy intent on taking down all the forces that oppress her people, from the French and the Spanish to the makhzen. These are the structures of resistance built on a long line of women resisting oppressive powers and passing down that tradition of resistance. This is especially clear in the case of Kharboucha also known as Hadda Al-Ghita. Kharboucha is a name that is still known and is full of meaning for many Moroccan and Amazigh women as we explore further in chapter 3. Kharboucha was one of the founders of al Aïta and a shikha⁸⁵, an Amazigh art form which combines singing, poetry, and dancing. As a shikha, Kharboucha composed and performed many poems about the injustice both of the makhzen and of colonial forces which roused her people to rise up against the forces oppressing them. One of her poetic songs begins “let us raise ourselves in a rebellion”, which is what her people did fighting against both the French and other forces that sought to oppress her tribe.⁸⁶ Kharboucha was not alone, shikhat had and continue to have a large role in the fight against oppression. The art performed by shikhat is based in struggle and allows one to step out of the traditional bounds of patriarchy.⁸⁷ Shikhat are an example of the spaces and practices of *inzi* carved out by women between conflicting and intersecting lines of patriarchy, colonialism, and imperialism all of which seek to oppress and control women and their bodies. The shikha becomes a figure that answers the Spanish construction of the Mora. The shikha is not in need of saving but she is most certainly a threat to Spanish colonialism as she uses her power to maintain her culture and rally her people to resist. As we will see in Chapter 3, the shikha herself becomes a structure of *inzi* that endures to this

⁸⁵ Also spelled chika or chiekha, shikhat is plural of shikha

⁸⁶ Glacier, “Political Women in Morocco: Then and Now.”

⁸⁷ Fatimazahrae MOUTIA, “Can the Subaltern Body Perform? Moroccan Shikhat as Living Heritage in the Virtual Era,” n.d.

day as a threat to oppressive powers and they would remain a threat to both colonialism and the makhzen.

Though the Tetuan War was a relatively brief conflict, lasting only a few months, it was a turning point for Morocco. As Spanish forces pushed further and further into Morocco's interior, the British became concerned with how this encroachment threatened to upset the balance of power and so the British brokered a peace agreement. Spain demanded the equivalent of 4 million US dollars, far more than the entire balance of the Moroccan treasury, a problem conveniently solved by private British investors who loaned the money to the Moroccan state. Here Morocco began down a path of debt to European powers which would leave the country more and more vulnerable to colonial exploitation. In response to this debt and to other forms of economic crisis, Sultan Mohammed IV implemented a series of tax reforms in the name of modernity and efficiency which had disastrous effects on the rural population. Many were forced into debt in order to pay these taxes or had to sell their land to the makhzen.⁸⁸ It was no coincidence that many of those most adversely affected were the same Amazigh groups which most heavily resisted both the makhzen and European colonialism. In a residual structure that would continue, this instituted a situation of colonialism by proxy in which the makhzen took land and economic resources from the rural and tribal areas of Morocco to pay their foreign debts. Mohammed IV was succeeded by Sultan Hassan I and concessions to European powers disguised as modernization or reform continued during his reign. Two particularly important changes were that Europeans were granted the right to purchase land in Morocco and they were also exempted from Moroccan

⁸⁸ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

law and appearing in Moroccan courts.⁸⁹ These laws paved the way for further European infiltration and exploitation of Morocco, building upon the residual structures of debt and colonialism of the past. There was also *inzi* in the form of continuous armed resistance and protest, both from the rural areas and urban unrest as economic exploitation continued to hurt the most vulnerable. This set the stage for the beginning of the 20th century and the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates.

As the makhzen grew weaker, resistance to both the makhzen itself and to the increasing encroachment of European powers thrived. There were many popular rebellions and uprisings during this time period, the most famous of which was led by Bu Himara, called El-Rogui, meaning the pretender. As his title reflects, Bu Himara claimed to be the legitimate ruler of Morocco and amassed a huge following of support.⁹⁰ Though this rebellion was eventually put down, it is an example of the serious unrest which was widespread in Moroccan society in the time period leading up to the protectorate. The Spanish characterized much of the resistance to their rule as “banditry” when it was in fact material attacks on colonial targets.⁹¹ Here, we find another example of decolonizing our conceptions of what resistance looks like. This all happened against the backdrop of the European “scramble for Africa”, as Morocco was used as a trading piece to maintain the balance of power between different European states. This culminated in Kaiser Wilhelm II’s visit to Morocco where he declared his support for Moroccan independence in front of cheering crowds. The result was the Algeiras conference where France was able to solidify its claims to Moroccan territory. Continued attacks from Amazigh tribes left the makhzen in

⁸⁹ Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay*.

⁹⁰ Ross E. Dunn, “The Bu Himara Rebellion in Northeast Morocco: Phase I,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 17, no. 1 (1981): 31–48.

⁹¹ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

an increasingly weak position until Fez itself was surrounded and the Sultan Abd al-Hafiz himself called on the French for support in 1911, agreeing to turn over control of the military and in 1912 the treaty of Fez was signed, establishing the French protectorate in Morocco with Spain agreeing to their own protectorate in the north.⁹² These conflicts and agreements did not exist in a vacuum but were part of the global struggles around colonialism. The Spanish government and military emerged from the 19th century informed by multiple defeats in their colonies and more determined than ever to gain territory in Africa. The actions they took in Morocco to put down resistance were very much built upon residual structures of oppression from countries who had just liberated themselves, foremost among them, the Philippines.

From the day Magellan set foot in the Philippines, there was always resistance and rebellion against Spanish rule, just as there was in Morocco. Much like Morocco, much of the resistance that proved the most difficult for the Spanish to suppress came from interior, indigenous held territory that simply could not be held and conquered mirroring the practices of *inzi* in Morocco and fulfilling fears of the Moro/a threat. This resistance was often characterized as banditry, the same way it was in Morocco. The connected global nature of both oppression and resistance struggles became even more clear in the late 19th century as movements for Filipino nationalism and independence began to emerge. As we examine the framework for Filipino national independence and the connections with women's indigenous resistance, it is by using the idea of residual structures of resistance, foremost among them *kalayaan*, in order to understand Filipino nationalism as part of a spectrum, building on what came before. This is in contrast to much of the previous research and writing about Filipino

⁹² Miller.

independence. Benedict Anderson, one of the foremost theorists of nationalism has written extensively about the Philippines and Filipino nationalism. He looks at the growth of liberalism among the ilustrados, a group of middle and upper class Filipinos who traveled to Spain for their education. According to Anderson, it was the ilustrados who brought resistance in the Philippines from a series of failed rebellions to a revolution and a unified national identity.⁹³ While there is a great deal of truth to this perspective, it is only one side of the story. What is forgotten in this narrative are the residual structures of resistance built on indigenous women's actions.

It is difficult to find accounts of women's actions during this time period apart from those that argue women had an auxiliary role, like the figure of Maria Clara in *Noli Me Tangere*, the novel written by Jose Rizal, whose death inspired so many revolutionaries. In the novel, Maria Clara is the love interest of the protagonist, and she is presented as the ideal Filipina. She is part of the Filipino upper class, has access to resources and education and yet she is still firmly under the oppression of the Spanish, particularly the friars. Maria Clara lives her life as a woman above reproach, following all the laws and moral codes imposed upon her by her oppressors and is undyingly loyal to the protagonist hero.⁹⁴ *Noli Me Tangere* was written in Spanish and directed towards a Spanish audience in an appeal by the ilustrados for Spain to grant the Philippines full and equal representation under the law. However, the lasting effects of *Noli Me Tangere* was much more a part of the Filipino nationalist imagination than the Spanish. The figure of Maria Clara, Catholic, pure, loyal, endlessly self-sacrificing continues to haunt both the histories of the Filipino independence

⁹³ Benedict Anderson, "The First Filipino," *London. London Review of Books* 19 (1997): 20.

⁹⁴ José Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere (Touch Me Not)* (Penguin, 2006).

movement and the present movement for women's liberation. Though set up as an example for women to follow, she ultimately did not represent the majority of women, whose voices are difficult to find in the histories. Through women were part of the resistance against imperialism from the very beginning, they were deliberately relegated to a secondary and subordinate role in the process of revolutionary nation building. Yet, in my archival research as well as my field interviews I was able to find records and echoes of women's resistance, made visible by reading against the grain. This follows the work of Reynaldo Ileto in his landmark book, *Pasyon and Revolution* where he traces the development of Filipino revolution among the masses from 1840-1910 rather than focusing on the work of the ilustrados as the source for revolution.⁹⁵ Women, and in particular working class and peasant women have been doubly erased. As this dissertation shows, women carved out their own spaces of *kalayaan* at the interstices of revolution and imperialism as part of a structure of resistance.

At the center of the official account of the revolution is the Katipunan, a secret and underground revolutionary organization who would lead the fight against Spain. On the one hand, it is possible to view the development of the Katipunan as the reaction to the Spanish shutting down the more moderate La Liga Filipina and exiling the founder Jose Rizal.⁹⁶ However, as Letizia and Renato Constantino, two other great historians of the Philippines argue, "the Katipunan emerged as the natural of the revolutionary tradition of the people, a tradition which had manifested itself in uprising after uprising throughout three centuries of Spanish rule".⁹⁷ As the natural inheritor of three centuries of resistance, the Katipunan

⁹⁵ Ileto, *Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840-1910*.

⁹⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁹⁷ Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino, *The Philippines: A Past Revisited*, vol. 1 (Renato Constantino Quezon City, 1975).

received the years of women's resistance built into a residual structure as laid out in this chapter as part of their inheritance. So, what did the Katipunan do with that inheritance? The writings of the Katipunan provide some insight. In an instructional manual entitled, *Teaching of the Katipunan*, Emilio Jacinto wrote, "Think not of woman as a thing merely to while away time but as a helper and partner in the hardships of life. Respect her in her weakness and remember the mother who brought you into this world."⁹⁸ This reflects the views of "liberal" nation building revolutions by those educated in Spain from all over the world and is ultimately a betrayal of the important role of women's resistance. The Katipunan did allow women to create their own chapter within the Katipunan, founded by Gloria de Jesus, wife of revolutionary leader Andres Bonifacio. However, membership was limited to the family members of men already in the organization. If we read this against the grain, we can see how women were able to carve out spaces of *kalayaan*, emphasizing their freedom and community even in spaces where they were not wanted or looked down upon. There are some other examples of women's participation including figures such as Trinidad Tecson who fought in 12 battles and was called babaing-lalaki (the female man).⁹⁹ This nickname indicates the deeply conflictual nature of women's involvement in the revolutionary process with the colonial residue of the Mora figure as either innocent and in need of rescue or evil for her participation in resistance. Alfred McCoy discusses the development of the Philippines armed forces and the ways in which women were excluded from the ranks after the revolution. The desire for emancipation from an emasculating colonial power results in the conflation of masculinity with nationalism and the subsequent

⁹⁸ Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *The Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (University of the Philippines Press, 2002).

⁹⁹ Christine Doran, "Women in the Philippine Revolution," *Philippine Studies* 46, no. 3 (1998): 361–75.

removal of women from the project for national liberation as equal players.¹⁰⁰ Women are therefore unacknowledged in the majority of histories and even erased by many of the same men that they fought alongside. Yet, we can still find evidence of their participation and bring that to light through reading against the grain.

The revolutionary movement was plagued by many internal problems and in fighting culminating in the secret execution of its charismatic, working class leader, Andres Bonifacio. In his stead, Emilio Aguinaldo was able to seize complete control of the revolutionary forces though he suffered many defeats. In spite of all the military setbacks, in province after province, independence was declared and Aguinaldo followed suit declaring an independent republic.¹⁰¹ However, the republic was short-lived with the arrival of American forces and the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish American war and annexed the Philippines. What the Americans found on their arrival in the Philippines reveals some clues as to women's participation in the revolution against the Spanish. According to the account of an American war correspondent, women political prisoners were found in the dungeons of the governor General upon the arrival of US troops. Some of these women had been imprisoned for over a decade. Describing one prisoner he wrote, "her crime was a hysterical assertion of her rights and her uninvited tenants were the Spaniards".¹⁰² By reading against the grain we can see that women did have meaningful if often unrecorded participation in the resistance to the Spanish by the very fact of their incarceration. This account is not an anomaly but backed up by many other mentions of women fighters and political prisoners who were freed upon the arrival of the US. In my archival research, I read

¹⁰⁰ Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (Yale University Press, 2002).

¹⁰¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

¹⁰² Murat Halstead, *The Story of the Philippines* (Our Possessions Publishing Co., 1898).

many accounts of the Philippines from American sources, many written as histories or explanatory guides, all published in the first decade of the 1900s. All of them are attempts to understand exactly the nature of America's imperial inheritance. Just as the Katipunan inherited the structures of residual resistance built up across three centuries of Spanish colonialism, the United States inherited the residual structures of oppression, built across oceans and centuries from the (re)conquista onwards. Ultimately, just as the Spanish were defeated, a new colonizing power took over and the resistance was renewed.

The United States had a vested interest in downplaying their role as colonizers while also demonizing and distancing themselves from Spanish colonialism both to the Filipino audience and for the wider world. It is necessary to understand these complexities when reading through American accounts which in the same breath condemn the Spanish and turn around and commit those same atrocities tenfold. Through a decolonial reading against the grain we can see that rather than opposing the Spanish colonial regime, it is much more correct to say that America inherited the imperial project of the unending (re)conquista and the figure of the Moro/a. Nowhere was this clearer than in the indigenous, unchristianized territories which were never truly conquered by the Spanish. The fighting between the “official” resistance army was relatively short with its leader Aguinaldo captured by the Americans in 1901 and the official end to the war declared by the US in 1902. However, that was far from the end of resistance as the US quickly learned. The resistance in the southern island of Mindanao had never stopped and it certainly would not stop for the Americans. My interview subjects from the Lumad Manobo recounted stories of their great grandmothers fighting first the Spanish and then the Americans. One indigenous leader described in depth the different methods of construction of traps used to kill invaders. She spoke of different

ways to hide in the forest and methods of surprising the enemy.¹⁰³ These stories, passed down from generation to generation, are backed up by American accounts. These accounts are full of the legacy of Spanish colonialism and the (re)conquista as can be seen in the name of the conflict, popularly called the Moro War both by American troops and historians. The figure of the Moro/a is the residual structure upon which Spanish and then American imperialism is built. Rather than actually specifically referring to an ethnic group or religious group, the term Moro/a simply refers to the resistance that cannot and will not be crushed.

American accounts of the war are often self-consciously written, with layers and layers of justifications for the atrocities done by American troops. Even in accounts that are written from an American perspective, being as sympathetic as possible to American troops, accounts of atrocities abound. Many Americans at home in the United States also became aware of the atrocities committed by US troops. Mark Twain famously wrote a number of satirical texts and songs which criticized General Wood who presided over the bloodiest massacres. Twain wrote, “The enemy numbered six hundred-including women and children-and we abolished them utterly, leaving not even a baby alive to cry for its dead mother. This is incomparably the greatest victory that was ever achieved by the Christian soldiers of the United States.”¹⁰⁴ With his use of hyperbole and religious imagery Twain directly imitates the language of Spanish colonialism as can be seen earlier in this chapter. The US would continue to build on the residual structure of Spanish colonialism with massacres, torture, surveillance, espionage in a regime of imperialist terror which would become a new layer of

¹⁰³ Interview with Lumad leader and activist. Conducted in person by author in September of 2019.

¹⁰⁴ Mark Twain, “Incident in the Philippines,” n.d.

the residual structure of oppression in the figure of the Moro/a with both local and global implications.

The US imperialist machine used every tool at its disposal in order to end the rebellion in Mindanao. From bribing local leaders, kidnapping and hostage taking, educational programs for indoctrinating children, to torture and outright massacres, the US eventually brought Mindanao under the military and administrative control of the United States, something which Spain was never able to do. Though numbers vary according to different sources, it is estimated that between three hundred thousand and one million Filipinos were killed between 1899-1913 when the US called an official end to hostilities.¹⁰⁵ In the aftermath, Filipino society became even more divided. The revolutionary period had brought with it an unprecedented unity as people from all regions, territories, religions, classes, and genders came together to defeat the Spanish. However, after the end of Spanish rule and the establishment of the US imperialist regime, many people were divided, in particular the elites and some of the middle class who stood to benefit from US rule. Some women continued their resistance while others sought to get what concessions they could from the American regime. This would build upon the foundation of Spanish cooptation and establish a divide in the Filipina feminist movement as a residual structure until the present day. An example is La Liga Femenina de La Paz, organized 1902, with the express purpose of helping America to pacify the Philippines.¹⁰⁶ This betrayal of rural and working class women by the elite is one that would be repeated again and again as we will see in upcoming chapters. This divide would be built up as a residual structure that continues to play a huge role in the Filipina

¹⁰⁵ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

¹⁰⁶ Anne Nealibo Dickson-Waiko, "A Woman's Place Is in the Struggle' Feminism and Nationalism in the Philippines," 1994.

women's movement. While many of the elite allied themselves with the American regime, women's resistance continued to build on the residual structures of resistance to Spanish colonialism. Many of the new generation of leftist men had learned from the mistakes of their revolutionary forefathers and women played a prominent role in the next wave of resistance to American rule.

While some women participated in mainstream leftist movements, many indigenous women also built their own practices of *kalayaan* within their communities, with the residual figure of the babaylan appearing frequently. Women engaged in healing, herbalism, mysticism, and other traditional indigenous practices blended sometimes with elements of Christianity or Islam to amass their own bases of power. In my archival research, I came across several accounts of women engaged in this type of power building which was also reinforced by my interviews. There has been some research on these movements, the most comprehensive study being David Sturtevant's *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840-1940*. Sturtevant's study illustrates the importance of women's participation in popular uprising that were begun either in the working class or peasantry. He notes the high levels of respect and power held by women in what he calls "folk cults".¹⁰⁷ These folk cults were an example of *kalayaan* built on the principles of freedom, community, resistance and the cultivation of indigenous practices. Through my archival research and decolonial reading of the story of one particular babaylan figure and mystical leader dubbed "Queen Taytay" by the Americans attempting to defeat her, I show how women built upon residual structures of resistance within their societies to carve out their own *kalayaan* sites of power. The primary source of information on Queen Taytay is found in a text entitled *The Philippines Past and*

¹⁰⁷ David R. Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines: 1849-1940* (Cornell University Press, 1976).

Present written by Dean Worster who served as Secretary of the Interior in the Philippines from 1901-1913. This book is mainly filled with his personal observations and recording different incidents that took place while he was in the Philippines. He writes about Queen Taytay first in connection to a cholera epidemic and blames her healing practices for increasing the spread of cholera. He assumes she is either stupid or mentally ill and thinks it will be easy to deal with her. However, he found it quite difficult to get rid of her. He tried going to the local constabulary, the judge, and church officials but they all refused or found convenient excuses to refuse to help him.

By reading against the grain, we can see the power Queen Taytay was able to build within the community, not a hard power at the point of a gun but a softer though equally strong power over hearts and minds. We also see the tendrils of Queen Taytay's power reaching into all the traditional, colonial institutions of power. When he was finally able to arrest Queen Taytay and bring her to Manila, a large delegation of her people marched to Manila and demanded her release. Again, reading against the grain, we see a large, active, and organized base of power as *kalayaan*, freedom and community. This gathering to demand Queen Taytay's release was an example of the epitome of practices and spaces of *kalayaan*. Worster was "at his wit's end" and scrambled for some type of law to help him restrict the activities of Queen Taytay. He consulted the governor general and eventually found an old Spanish law that allowed him to declare the activities of Queen Taytay illegal. However, her people were not satisfied and were ready to do battle on her behalf so Worster was forced to release her with a promise to do no more healing.¹⁰⁸ I have not been able to find any more information or research on Queen Taytay from other sources. However, while

¹⁰⁸ Dean Worster, *The Philippines Past and Present*, vol. 1, 2 vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914).

conducting my research interviews with indigenous women, several interviewees told similar stories of healing and religious women who held great power within their communities.¹⁰⁹

These women built their own power, creating *kalayaan* spaces of resistance and change.

Here we can directly see how residual practices of resistance are built upon each other from the babaylan priestesses fighting the Spanish to the resistance to American imperialism.

Worcester's use of Spanish law also shows how the United States directly made use of the residual structures of oppression under Spanish law to oppress women. Queen Taytay's case was not an isolated incident but a widespread practice across the Philippine islands.

Worster mentions her again later in the book when he is writing about the rebellious folk cults which he references as "colorums". He names Queen Taytay as an example of a colorum leader and says that there were many more like her. Again, there has been little research, particularly on the gendered aspects of the colorum uprisings. The colorums were not a unified movement but existed in many different parts of the Philippines, particularly those with a high peasant and indigenous population. While the colorums did not have a unified ideology or belief, they generally blended elements of Catholicism with indigenous religious practices and the veneration of resistance leaders, particularly Jose Rizal, as gods.¹¹⁰

Though the term colorum is not easily defined, it was a very real phenomenon that culminated in the uprising at Tayug.

Women played a large role in the Tayug uprising, not just as organizers and agitators but as fighters. The majority of the historical records agree that out of seventy fights at least fourteen were women. This force attacked the centers of imperial power and their Filipino

¹⁰⁹ Interviews conducted in 2019

¹¹⁰ Milagros C. Guerrero, "The Colorum Uprisings: 1924-1931," *Asian Studies* 5, no. 1 (1967): 65-78.

counterparts within the town including the constabulary, the landlords, and the church. The colorum force was both hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned and yet they still managed to make a stand. The following passage describes the scene as the battle drew to a close:

“Firing ceased. A young woman stepped from the building. While disbelieving troopers stared, she lifted a Philippine flag over her head. Waving the emblem slowly, her bare feet moving to its cadence, she marched across the sun-splashed plaza. When she reached the statue of Jose Rizal, Constabulary rifles shattered the hypnotic spectacle. The woman’s body crumpled beneath her banner at the monument’s base.”¹¹¹

Though this is an undoubtedly romanticized version of events, it nevertheless shows the importance of women’s leadership within peasant and working class uprisings as women were able to create spaces of *kalayaan* within these structures of oppression. The story of Tayug spread across the Philippines giving new life and encouragement to resistance from all corners, in particular the Sakdalista movement. The Sakdals became the new nationalist armed wing of the left that demanded direct and immediate independence from the United States. Together, the Sakdals and numerous peasant and indigenous uprisings put increasing pressure on the United States with women and indigenous people as key participants. This would be key as part of the resistance to the Japanese invasion and winning independence from the United States though still under their imperial shadow which is where Chapter 4 picks up.

¹¹¹ Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines: 1849-1940*.

The death of Spanish empire

For a final time in this chapter, we return to Morocco and the end of the Spanish empire. Similar to what we saw in the Philippines, as the Spanish and French protectorates were established, many of the elite betrayed those who they had fought with for the promise of benefits from the colonizing powers. Elite women formed charitable organizations aimed at promoting peace and education which allied them with colonizing powers and widened the divide between the mainstream women's rights movement and the working class and indigenous women who made up the bulk of actual *inzi* resistance. This divide incorporated elite women into the residual structure of colonialism and made them part of the unending (re)conquista in the frame of budding nationalism. As the French minister of colonial education Bouloit noted, the main purpose of European educational institutions was political and an attempt to decrease anti-colonial sentiment among the elite.¹¹² For some women this was an effective strategy while for others, they used their education, much like the *ilustrados*, to learn to speak the language of resistance in the vernacular of the colonizing powers and in some cases translate ideas back to the indigenous Moroccan resistance.

One such woman was Malika al Fassi often called the mother of the feminist movement in Morocco. She gained access to an education because of her nationalist and independence minded family and quickly became both an avid student and a prolific writer.¹¹³ She wrote frequently on the subject of women's education and liberation trying to navigate the divide between women's liberation being seen as a "Western" concept and the importance of women in building the nation. In an article published in the magazine al-

¹¹² Spencer D. Segalla, *Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956* (U of Nebraska Press, 2009).

¹¹³ Glacier, "Political Women in Morocco: Then and Now."

Maghrib she wrote “I was sad to see women’s progress called ‘Western’ and claimed that it would only lead women to separate from their religion and lose their values”.¹¹⁴ The deep irony and hypocrisy of attributing women’s progress to association with the west was not lost on the women of the time. This was the residual legacy of the (re)conquista and the figure of the Mora. By claiming the protection of “innocent” women and their efforts at conversion, the Spanish and more widely the West were able to claim “women’s rights” as their own invention, a rhetoric which was echoed by oppressive patriarchal powers in Morocco. Malika al Fassi and many women like her were doing the work of decolonizing through several different methods. In this article, al Fassi points out the many rights women have under Islam, such as rights to marital support, divorce, property and inheritance, rights which were enjoyed by few if any women in the West at the time she was writing. Al Fassi and other writers also point out the long history of indigenous resistance and the many different roles of indigenous women.¹¹⁵ Here, we see decolonization emerge as a structure of *inzi* resistance that continues to be important in the present day.

The French were adamant in their reports to Moroccan officials that they did not wish to liberate women or raise the “woman question” while simultaneously justifying their project of colonization by touting the need to liberate oppressed Moroccan women.¹¹⁶ Nowhere is this more clear than in the establishment of the penal code, where the colonizing pushed the most conservative interpretation of previous legal codes in combination with European penal codes with seriously harmful consequences for Moroccan women as we will see in the next chapter with the case of Amina al Filali. Lyautey, the head of the French

¹¹⁴ Alison Baker, *Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women* (SUNY Press, 1998).

¹¹⁵ Laura Casielles, “Malika El Fassi: Una Pionera de La Intersección Entre La Lucha Anticolonial y El Feminismo,” *Abaco: Revista de Cultura y Ciencias Sociales*, no. 100 (2019): 70–75.

¹¹⁶ Segalla, *Moroccan Soul: French Education, Colonial Ethnology, and Muslim Resistance, 1912-1956*.

colonial administration insisted that he was only respecting Moroccan legal customs backed by his slogan of “evolution not revolution”.¹¹⁷ This phrase drips with the irony of the colonial paternalist mindset that the colonized were children who needed to be shepherded into the modern era. This framework was a double bind for women who existed both within a colonial system and within a patriarchy that sought to disempower them. However, women still managed to build upon the residual structures of resistance and create their own spaces of *inzi*. Malika al Fassi would go on to be the only woman to sign the declaration of Moroccan independence and was a key part of founding secondary schools and universities for women.¹¹⁸ She would continue to play a key role in resistance to Spanish and French colonialism until its formal end in 1956. This is the more well-known and well documented side of women’s resistance and participation in Moroccan independence but there is another side to the story that centers around the resistance of indigenous women.

The Rif War from 1921-1926 was the last Spanish colonial war and the end of the Spanish empire. As the Spanish system of oppression in the Rif War show, those residual structures in the figure of the Moro/a, first set in the (re)conquista which then traveled around the globe to the Philippines and were built upon through the oppression of the indigenous population once again return to Morocco in the final death throes of the empire. Just as in the Philippines, indigenous women’s resistance played a key role and was built upon the resistance of the women who came before. We have two main sources documenting women’s resistance, the writings of Spanish soldiers and news correspondents as well as the history preserved by indigenous women in the figure of the shikha, through songs, poems and

¹¹⁷ William A. Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco* (Springer, 1995).

¹¹⁸ Glacier, “Political Women in Morocco: Then and Now.”

oral histories, both those that have been popularized and what I was able to record during my field interviews. By looking at both the sources we can see the final layers of the residual structure of Spanish colonialism that would later be taken up by US imperialism and the structures of resistance from indigenous women which created *inzi* spaces of great power.

The Rif War had a large impact on Spanish politics, identity, and culture. It was clear to many in Spain that the stakes were high in terms of Spanish identity as a global power as they stood to lose their last colony. As with the initial (re)conquista, there was an outpouring of cultural production surrounding the war both before and afterwards, continuing up to the present day. In her landmark study entitled *Disorientations: Spanish colonialism in Africa and the performance of identity*, Susan Martin-Marquez examines the complex and disorienting nature of the relationship between Spain and Morocco in the final stages of the Spanish empire. This concept of disorientation fits directly with this dissertation's examination of contradictory historical conjunctures within the Spanish colonial regimes and the *inzi* space that indigenous women's resistance is able to carve out in between. Carmen de Burgos was one of the on female Spanish correspondents to travel to Morocco and write about the war both in fictional and nonfiction works.¹¹⁹ Burgos' different depictions of Moroccan illustrate the site of power indigenous women were able to carve in places of oppression. In her writings she often bemoans the oppressed position of Moroccan women,

“Los hombres inactivos, guerreros y cazadores pasan la vida en el campo, sin tracer nada, y las pobres mujeres se deforman y envejecen prematuramente entre los rigores del clima y los duros trabajos a que se dedican”.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Gabriela Pozzi, “Carmen de Burgos and the War in Morocco,” *MLN* 115, no. 2 (2000): 188–204.

¹²⁰ Burgos

*Inactive men, warriors and hunters spend their lives in the fields, without doing anything, and the poor women deform and age prematurely between the rigors of the climate and the hard work they do.*¹²¹

Here Burgos seems sympathetic to the plight of Moroccan women, constructing them as broken and passive objects in need of saving. Here we see the residual figure of the Moro/a as either in need of saving or a violent threat. However, when Moroccan women took their power into their own hands to defend themselves from the violence of Spanish colonizers, the framing of Moroccan women quickly changes. Burgos writes of the women warriors among the Amazigh tribes as “todas feas, deformadas, negras” and describes women as cruel for beating Spanish soldiers to death with clubs.¹²² These indigenous women are only objects as victims of oppression but when they free themselves they become something entirely more dangerous, epitomized in the residual figure of the Mora .

We will end this chapter with the words and accounts of precisely such dangerous women, foremost among them Tawgrat Walt Issa N'ayt Sokhman. Her life has not been deeply studied but her legacy has been preserved through oral histories, poems and songs. Multiple Amazigh women I interviewed as part of this study referenced her not only as a historical figure but as an actively emulated example.¹²³ There is a great deal of mysticism around Tawgrat and the details of her life.¹²⁴ A French historian, Francois Reyniers, recorded some details of her life, writing that she was blind, fatherless, and illiterate. He also observed the power she commanded within her tribe, Ait Sokhman, and the power of all

¹²¹ Translation is my own

¹²² Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*.

¹²³ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020. Interview with young Amazigh woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

¹²⁴ Glacier, “Political Women in Morocco: Then and Now.”

women in the tribe as equals to men. Her poems speak to the power of women as she urges them to take up arms against colonizers, “Arise Itto, Thouda, and Izza. It is for women to go to war, now that the men have become inert.” This is the ultimate culmination of women’s resistance that killed the Spanish colonial empire.

The Persistence of *Inzi*: Understanding the contentious relationship between social movements, feminism and the Moroccan state

Since decolonization and independence, the Moroccan monarchy has publicly claimed to support women's rights while actively supporting legislation and policy that hurts women's rights and causes VAW. This contradiction is rooted in the residual structures of colonialism, the figure of the Moro/a and the ongoing effects of Western imperialism which are complexly woven into different aspects of the fight for women's rights. As a result, though Morocco has passed progressive women's rights legislation, implementation and outcomes are lacking. The state, some NGOs and other groups often place the blame on rural and indigenous communities which they frame as backward and unwilling to change. This is part of the residue of the (re)conquista and the erasure and threat construction within the figure of the Moro/a. Further, the state attempts to use alliances with women's movements to gain support domestically and internationally, especially in the face of *inzi*, continuous popular resistance to oppression as seen from anti-colonial resistance, to the February 20th movement in Morocco. This often divides women's movements, with certain elements allying themselves with power and others holding to more radical and revolutionary goals that threaten the power of the state itself. Women have often found themselves divided on opposite sides of women's rights issues both claiming to support women. How can we explain these contradictions? How do activists on the ground navigate the complex relationships and push for material change? What is the relationship between the government, the residual structures of colonialism and imperialism, and women's rights activism? We answer these questions through a decolonial historical analysis which traces

the residual structures of the (re)conquista, the figure of the Moro/a, the dialectical relationship between resistance and oppression with *inzi* and the figure of the shikha.

We look at three different case studies to answer these questions specifically looking at residual structures and the spaces of *inzi* occupied by women. First is the case of the mudawana or family law code¹ where we explore the complex legacy of colonialism and imperialism to explain how women find themselves on opposite sides both claiming to fight for liberation from oppression. This issue is traced in a historical, decolonial analysis from the fight for independence to the passage of the family law code in 2004. Specifically, we look at the historical conjunctures of women's *inzi* to both patriarchy and Western imperialism and argue that the divide among activists is rooted in the residue of Moro/a figure and the complexities of the different layers of ongoing oppression, identity and resistance. In the second case, that of Fadwa Laouri which discusses women's role in the February 20th movement and the divide over gender equality and constitutional reform we see the intersections of class and the divide between residual radical structures of resistance and more mainstream politics. In particular we look at the residual forms of women's *inzi* and the decolonial process of reclaiming the figure of the shikha as well as the residual legacy of the (re)conquista in the monarchy as sitting at a historical conjuncture. Finally, in the case of Amina al-Filali and law 475, we see a tragic death and the ongoing residue of the (re)conquista and the continual marginalization of indigenous women but we also see the hopeful possibility of decolonizing residual futures, the successful compromise and meeting of multiple different elements of the women's rights movement to create successful change

¹ Also known as the personal status code

and repeal law 475. These case studies are based on my interviews with activists, archival research, as well as historical and contemporary analysis.

Independence, Women's *Inzi* and the Family Law Code

There is perhaps no more iconic moment than the speech of Princess Achia which illustrates the contradictions and complexities of women's fight for rights and their wider participation in the independence movement. At only seventeen years old, in 1947, Princess Achia accompanied her father to Tangier where she delivered a speech that was a slight to the colonial powers and an endorsement of a larger role for women in society. Importantly for both her domestic and international audience, she gave her speech unveiled, the first female member of the Royal Family to appear unveiled publicly in more than one hundred years.² This symbolic gesture, orchestrated by her father, was a move to show that Morocco was modern, with all the ideological trappings of modernity. Taking a decolonial approach, there are many different ways to interpret this move. Was this an acceptance or rejection of the figure of the Moro/a and the (re)conquista residual frame of the gendered binary with the innocent/subject, in need of rescue or the guilty/resistant threat? We can find some answers to this question by considering the context of this speech and the act of unveiling. Not only was Princess Achia unveiled but she was dressed in modern Western style clothing, taking on the aesthetics of the colonial powers she and her father were defying. This was certainly an act of resistance and became a large and important symbol for many Moroccan women. However, this act does not fit within the framework of *inzi*, defined as the continual and unending resistance rooted in the practices, figures, and community spaces of indigenous

² Baker, *Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women*.

women. Indigenous women and their communities were the backbone of both the armed and the ideological resistance to colonial powers, as seen in the previous chapter, while past generations of the royal family had cooperated on various levels and even allied themselves with colonial powers in order to crush indigenous resistance. The figure of the “modern” “Western” “unveiled” woman did not represent the bulk of the women’s struggle or women’s resistance. This would go on to create a divide rooted not only in the legacy of the (re)conquista and the figure of the Moro/a but in the complexities of gender and the nature of resistance as well as questions of the relationship with the state.

Princess Aicha’s figure of the modern woman was in line with much of the mainstream feminist movement which began a year earlier with the founding of Akhawwat Al-Safaa' (Sisters of Purity) Association by Malika al-Fassi and a group of other Moroccan feminist women as part of the Istiqlal (independence) Party. Women participated in Moroccan independence both as part of a nationalist movement and as part of the armed resistance. Women from the social elite who had access to education represented the women’s movement while women with less economic resources participated in the armed resistance. Particularly for indigenous women, the movement for independence was part of the continuum of women’s *inzi* that stretches back hundreds of years as seen in Chapter 2. Allison Baker’s excellent study entitled *Voices of resistance: oral histories of Moroccan women*, captured a wide spectrum of different histories of women’s resistance and participation in the independence movement.³ The stories and accounts in Baker’s study fall closely in line with the interviews I conducted. Though I did not directly speak to anyone who had participated in the independence movement as much of that generation has passed

³ Baker.

away, I did speak to women who told me stories of their mothers and grandmothers. It was during one of these discussions that the concept of *inzi* first came up.⁴ *Inzi* was explained as resistance, but a resistance that is continual and unending, rooted in the practices and spaces of indigenous women. The practices of the shikhat are an example of the concept of *inzi*. In the previous chapter, we analyzed several different figures that emerge in resistance to colonialism as shikhat, singers of poetry who urged their people to fight oppressive colonial powers. As studies of the shikhat have shown, colonial powers very much recognized the power of the shikhat and sought to undermine them by associating shikhat with prostitution.⁵ Here we have the figure of the Mora and the residue of the (re)conquista with figures of women's resistance framed as guilty, deviant, and constructed as threat. There are few things more terrifying to the patriarchal and colonialist power structures than a woman who can free herself. The shikha is not in need of rescue and she holds great power to maintain *inzi* within her community through her performance of resistance in poetry, song and dance. The histories of the shikhat are now being recovered thanks to the movement to decolonize understandings of the shikhat and recover the cultural heritage and history of indigenous women's resistance in Morocco. One of my interview subjects recounted family stories of her grandfather's sister who was a great leader in their village. As she explained, her family did not use the term shikha because of its association with prostitution but that her aunt was a great performer whose songs and words of resistance had been passed down in her family as a residual inheritance of resistance.

⁴ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020.

⁵ Moutia, "Can the Subaltern Body Perform? Moroccan Shikhat as Living Heritage in the Virtual Era"; Alessandra Ciucci, Desmond Hosford, and Chong J. Wojtkowski, "De-Orientalizing the 'Aita and Re-Orienting the Shikhat," *French Orientalism: Culture, Politics, and the Imagined Other*, 2010, 71–96.

Women's participation in the resistance movement was widespread, diverse and fierce. As noted by Malika al-Fassi in an interview:

“Women participated strongly in these demonstrations. They yelled nationalist slogans supporting independence and shouted out *yoyous*. They dropped flower pots from their roof terraces, and poured boiling water and oil on the soldiers. [A woman named] Manqada, for instance, was killed when she was dropping things on the soldiers from her terrace. Women's participation in these demonstrations was spontaneous; the nationalists didn't have to mobilize them.”⁶

The last point is particularly important to understand within the framework of *inzi*. Many women, particularly indigenous women, did not have to be mobilized because they were already a part of a continuous practice of resistance in *inzi*. The historical conjunctures of the independence movement itself opened up many spaces but the results of independence divided rural and indigenous women who formed some of the most important armed resistance from their urban counterparts.⁷ This divide was rooted in the experiences of resistance to earlier colonialism and the residue of the (re)conquista. As shown in Chapter 2, certain rural and indigenous groups were never fully ruled, neither by the King or any other colonial powers, though many attempts were made to complete the (re)conquista fantasy of Western European powers. However, the cause of independence from colonial powers united women from all different classes, areas, ethnicities and backgrounds under a single cause. It was a moment of great hope for women particularly because of the figure of Mohammed V. In the struggle for independence, he made many commitments to the cause

⁶ Baker, *Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women*.

⁷ Baker.

of women's rights garnering both domestic and international support.⁸ This also created a firm relationship between the women's movement and the monarchy because Mohammed V was the symbol and the rallying point for Moroccan independence.

Central to the mainstream Moroccan feminist movement at the time of independence was the idea of creating a new ideal of womanhood. Qasim Amin first popularized the term "New Woman" in his book *The Liberation of Women (Tahrir al-Mar'a)* published in 1899. This book is a seminal text on the relationship between modernity, the state, women's rights, and colonialism in MENA. Amin's position on the liberation of women is based on the presupposition of the supremacy of European society. He is completely dismissive of the "native" and expresses contempt for traditional ways of life. The woman, he argues, must be liberated in order to raise up a generation of capable modern men.⁹ Reading Amin's text against the grain through a decolonial framework, we see the residue of the (re)conquista and the figure of the Moro/a as a residual structure. In many ways, Amin's "new woman" is the figure of the Mora repackaged in the framework of nationalism. By reading against the grain, we can see that Amin's scorn of "native practices" speaks to the power of women's *inzi* practices of resistance. Amin echoes the (re)conquista framing of the resistant Mora as guilty/threat. By participating in a united national struggle for independence from colonial powers women had gained power and recognition in a key time where power and the state itself was influx. This was a subject of great anxiety for men like Amin as shown in the reflections of Malika al-Fassi,

⁸ Sadiqi and Ennaji, "The Feminization of Public Space: Women's Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco."

⁹ Leila Ahmed, "Women and Gender in Islam," in *Women and Gender in Islam* (Yale University Press, 2021); Qasim Amin, "The Liberation of Women," in *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam* (Springer, 2000), 163–81.

“there were women who were killed, who were witnesses . . . because they were there, among the men. They played a big role in the resistance. It’s not just one or two, but lots of women. There were some who threw hand grenades and bombs. They played a great role. The Moroccan woman played a very big role. And all the men recognized the contribution of women. In all the parties, they have always kept their eye on women.”¹⁰

Recovering the history of the widespread and systemic nature of women’s participation in the anti-colonial movement is part of the decolonial understanding of women’s resistance as *inzi*. Many of the histories of the Moroccan independence movement mention women only in passing, framing people like Malika al-Fassi as an exception outside of the norm. While al-Fassi and her contributions were exceptional, they were not outside of the norm in terms of the widespread and continuous practices and spaces of *inzi*. The power of women’s *inzi* is precisely what the Spanish constructed as threat in the figure of the Mora and the residue of that threat permeates Amin’s conception of the “new woman”. This is not to suggest that Amin’s stance is a simple and direct result of the residue (re)conquista. The issues of gender and independence were complex and there were many different issues. However, the residue of the (re)conquista lurks in the form of the Mora, influencing the perception of threat and ideal womanhood.

What Amin expressed in the figure of the “new woman” was part of a wider ideological wave that spread through not only MENA, but countries emerging from the colonial era around the world resulting from the residual structures of colonial oppression and the historical conjunctures of the fight for freedom from that oppression. This was

¹⁰ Baker, *Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women*.

certainly reflected by women in the Moroccan feminist movement. The Sisters of Purity argued that women were one of the pillars of progress and that was why they should receive their rights and education alongside men.¹¹ It is no coincidence that disdain for native or indigenous ways of life go hand in hand with this discourse on the new modern women. Here we see the residual structure of scientific discourses that were used during the 19th century to justify European racial dominance were also used to justify the subordinate position of women. This points to a fundamental contradiction at the heart of modernizing discourse about indigenous practices and the new modern woman. Here we can see the fundamental contradiction between women's rights being framed as a modern project that excludes rural indigenous women and yet those same women were key to resistance during independence as well as making up the majority of the population. This contradiction and exclusion of women who were not upper class, urban and educated would continue to haunt the Moroccan feminist movement to the present day creating a residual structure of oppression, epitomized in the figure of the "new woman" as a nationalist repackaging of the figure of the Mora.

As the independence movement drew to a close, many women were very hopeful about the possibilities for change. When the King was able to return to Morocco following independence, women lined the streets shouting, "With bombs and guns we have won back our King".¹² There was a great deal of joy and hope in that moment for women and for Morocco as a whole. The King did affirm that Moroccan women had the right to vote, arguing that they had always had the right to vote inherent to them.¹³ However, when it

¹¹ Baker.

¹² Baker.

¹³ Moha Ennaji, "Women and Political Participation in Morocco and North African States," in *Gender and Power* (Springer, 2016), 35–52.

came to the Family Law Code, both the King and the Istiqlal party betrayed many of the hopes of the feminist movement. The code stated that women must “to be faithful and to obey” their husbands.¹⁴ However, there were also provisions within the code which supported women’s Islamic rights and these parts of the code were celebrated by some groups. These included the right to upkeep, shelter, medical care and a woman’s right to control her own property.¹⁵ The celebration of these protections and provisions pointed to the debate about the role of feminism and Islam which would explosively resurface as women’s movements worked to have the family law code repealed while others worked to strengthen the protections of women under Islamic law. The false divide between women’s rights and protections and Islam is one of the most damaging legacies of the (re)conquista as will be explored later in this chapter. Most women’s movements, with very few exceptions, share a relationship with the state based on women’s exclusion from state power.¹⁶ Women’s activist groups are therefore uniquely inclined to work to gain access to the power of the state from which they have been fundamentally excluded. This relies on a broad definition of women movements where women are leading and organizing based on their identity and experience as women.¹⁷ In the Moroccan context it is helpful to use this definition of women’s movements precisely because of the diverse interests represented within them.

In the years following independence and the betrayal felt by many in the feminist movement, progress was static. Some women from the elite classes especially were able to

¹⁴ Article 36 of the Family Law Code

¹⁵ See article 35 of the Family Law Code

¹⁶ Bumiller, *In an Abusive State: How Neoliberalism Appropriated the Feminist Movement against Sexual Violence*.

¹⁷ Karen Beckwith, “Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique* 40, no. 1 (2007): 27–49; Sonia E. Alvarez, *Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women’s Movements in Transition Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1990).

gain access to education and professional jobs. However, these changes were simply not felt by the majority of women in Moroccan society. One woman who fought for the resistance expressed her frustration, “My husband said that once the King had returned, good things would come. And yet when our country got its independence, it was other people who benefited. Ouallah [oath], my girl! That angers us to death!”.¹⁸ In addition to this frustration, there was also a wide scale repression of the left in Morocco. Dissatisfied with many of the compromises and positions taken by the Istiqlal party, including the Family Law Code, Mehdi Ben Baraka led the split from that party to create a new and more progressive party UNFP (National Union of Popular Forces). There were other splits on the left as the Moroccan communist party re-emerged and also fought for power.¹⁹ The United States along with France together meddled in Moroccan politics, working against the left and undermining them at every turn cumulating in the murder of Ben Baraka.²⁰ The French continued to attempt to assert colonial control over Morocco with help and support from American administrations eager to gain their own influence over Morocco and push divisions that lay in the residual structures of colonialism. French feminists writing about the oppression of Moroccan women asserted that it was Islam which was the problem, reflecting the residue of the (re)conquista framing of Islam as a threat. The historical conjunctures of European framing of Islam as backward and barbaric set up the historical conjuncture that split many Moroccan women’s movements. These divides would remain important as Moroccan women moved into the next era of organizing.

¹⁸ Baker, *Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women*.

¹⁹ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

²⁰ Ronen Bergman, *Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations* (Hachette UK, 2018).

The unexpected death of Mohammed V in 1961 was a shock not only for the Moroccan people but for the Moroccan political system and brought about an era of repression led by his son Hassan II. Hassan reversed his father's policy of non-alignment with Western powers and instead moved to become closer to the West, especially to France and the United States. As part of this new alliance, Hassan worked to squash leftist resistance within Morocco and made massive arrests of UNFP members.²¹ In an attempt to pacify politically inclined women and tempt them away from the left, Hassan created the Union nationale des femmes marocaines (UNFM) in 1969 and he installed his sister Lalla Aicha as honorary president. This was set up in opposition to the more leftist group 'Union Progressiste des Femmes Marocaines' (Progressive Union of Moroccan Women).²² Moroccan women thus faced a serious dilemma of historical conjuncture with contradictory trajectories some of which reflected the residue of the (re)conquista in the construction of Islam as threat and the rejection of indigenous women's practices in the form of *inzi*. On the one hand there was the oppressive government of Hassan II backed by the West and on the other hand Western countries and feminist groups insisted that Islam was the problem and the West was the way forward. Those were also the very same countries in the case of Spain and France who were responsible for the colonial oppression in which these same women had been part of the fight for freedom. This was the space occupied by many Moroccan feminists caught between contradicting trajectories and differing ideas. Feminist activist Khnata Bennouna reflected, "I am a Moroccan palm tree from the land of this country. Thrown into the sky, I seek neither the shadow of Europe nor that of America, but I am inspired by human

²¹ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

²² Fatima Sadiqi, "The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 3 (2008): 325–37.

thought and creativity from wherever it emanates”.²³ This quote shows the conflict felt by many Moroccan feminist at the time. To push back on both their government and Western powers, Moroccan women continued to push forward with their own ideas within the difficult contexts presented to them. This included founding both 'L'Association Democratique des Femmes Marocaines' (The Democratic Association of Moroccan Women) as part of the Party of Progress and Socialism and 'L'Union de L'Action Feminine' (Female Action Union).²⁴ However, as they struggled to find sufficient support at home, many Moroccan women turned to the international arena to garner support, still followed by the residual structures of oppression and resistance which intersected with the many complexities of the Moroccan context and wider global movements.

Cooperation between international organizations and the modern feminist movement in Morocco began with the United Nations Decade for Women which took place from 1976 to 1985. The UN decade for women promoted and legitimized women's movements all over the world.²⁵ Part of the United Nations decade for women was a series of conferences at which NGOs were able to participate. For the NGOs participating in feminist movements in Morocco, the main focus was on the secularization of Family Law Code.²⁶ Those who wanted to focus on the Family Law Code argued that these laws did a great deal to entrench inequality and made it difficult to prosecute the mistreatment of women. Women were also unable to escape domestic violence because divorce was difficult for women while it was

²³ Leila Benslimane, “Khnata Bennouna: The Woman Who Was Ahead Her Time,” *Maroc Local et Nouvelles Du Monde | Nouvelles Juives Du Maroc, Dernières Nouvelles* | מרוקו גיוויש טיימס, חדשות מרוקו והעולם | *Morocco News* | أخبار المغرب (blog), November 30, 2019, <https://www.mjtnews.com/2019/11/30/khnata-bennouna-the-woman-who-was-ahead-her-time/>.

²⁴ aSadiqi, “The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement.”

²⁵ Irene Tinker and Jane Jaquette, “UN Decade for Women: Its Impact and Legacy,” *World Development* 15, no. 3 (1987): 419–27.

²⁶ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

easy for men.²⁷ Part of what the United Nations sought to do during the decade for women was to eliminate, "discriminatory customs and traditions".²⁸ This shaped historical conjuncture of the modern feminist movement in Morocco. It was perceived by many women as an attack on their rights and lifestyle.²⁹ The residual structures of wider colonialism and specifically the (re)conquista construction of Islam as threat strongly influenced this view as the UN was largely controlled by the very same powers responsible for colonialism and imperialism. Additionally, this period widened the divide between upper class and working class women as well as rural and urban women. Many women did not feel included in the feminist movement against the Family Law Code. This problem of exclusion would prove to be a fatal blow to this particular stage of the feminist movement.

The 1970s were a time of turmoil, not just for the women's movement but for Moroccan politics as a whole. There were two failed military coup attempts and the regime of Hassan II seemed to be teetering on the edge of collapse.³⁰ However, the Sahara conflict and the green march would bring about the next wave of political life in Morocco. The politics of this conflict were caught up in the ongoing imperialism of the United States and France within the context of the Cold War. The Polisario³¹ is the liberation front in the Western Sahara and began with an explicitly socialist agenda supported by Algeria, another country considered by the United States to be within the Soviet realm of influence. Though the United States publicly called for the Western Sahara's right to self-determination, they

²⁷ Lisa Hajjar, "Religion, State Power, and Domestic Violence in Muslim Societies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis," *Law & Social Inquiry* 29, no. 1 (2004): 1–38.

²⁸ Judith P Zinsser, "From Mexico to Copenhagen to Nairobi: The United Nations Decade for Women, 1975-1985," *Journal of World History* 13, no. 1 (2002): 139–68.

²⁹ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

³⁰ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

³¹ Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro

secretly worked behind the scenes with Henry Kissinger assuring Hassan II that he had the support of the United States.³² Hassan II seized on this moment and organized the Green March, a volunteer army armed with “nothing but their Qu’rans” who set out to claim Western Sahara for Morocco. Women were encouraged to be part of this march and were bussed in by the thousands.³³ Ultimately, Morocco was victorious against the Polisario and as the participants of the Green March returned home, they wanted their reward for supporting the government. However, this had been an extremely expensive venture on the part of the Moroccan government combined with already large debt burdens the Moroccan economy was in crisis. The World Bank enforced austerity measures and there were bread riots all across Morocco as working class people starved.³⁴ During this era both the Left and Islamist parties, between which there was also some cross over, experienced a resurgence as they organized working class neighborhoods to keep people fed. Many of these efforts were led by women who became increasingly organized in their practices of *inzi*, the continuous resistance whether it was against colonial powers, the United States or the mahkzen itself. As one of my interview subjects explained, rural and working class women were abandoned and ignored by both their King and the international community who claimed to help them.³⁵ For both the King and many in the international community, women were strategic objects to be picked up when useful and then discarded. This is reminiscent of the (re)conquista figure of the Mora and we find the residue not as a structure reinforcing the strategic picking up and

³² Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 11, no. 3 (2006): 275–306.

³³ Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco*.

³⁴ Jane R. Harrigan and Hamed El-Said, “The Economic Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case Study of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1983-2004,” *Review of Middle East Economics and Finance* 6, no. 2 (2010): 1–25.

³⁵ Interview with young Amazigh woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

discarding of women and their concerns. Through this decolonial framework we can understand the hostility of many working class and rural women towards international institutions as we turn toward the next era of the push for women's rights in Morocco.

The mainstream urban feminist movement was closely associated with the United Nations and UN regimes of human rights because of the 1 Million Signature Campaign. The 1 Million Signature Campaign was a 1992 movement in Morocco, led by the Union of Women's Action and sponsored by the World Bank, that asked the Moroccan government to sign on to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women or CEDAW and make changes to the law to be consistent with CEDAW.³⁶ In spite of these huge protests and the fact that Morocco did become a signatory and party to CEDAW in 1993, only cosmetic changes were made to the Moroccan law. This led to increasing unrest on the part of women activists and increasing concern on the part of international organizations that the situation of women in Morocco was not improving. Women's movements in Morocco continued to be allied with representatives of the World Bank and in 1999, together they drafted a new comprehensive plan to make women a part of the process of development and specifically mentioned marriage law. This plan of action was based on one that had been drawn up at the Beijing conference on women, convened by the United Nations in 1995.³⁷ Though NGOs were not included in the original drafting of the plan, the World Bank was able to, to a certain extent, act as a mediator for encouraging NGO participation. Because World Bank money for development projects to reduce poverty among women hinged on the cooperation of NGOs, the government was forced to include some

³⁶ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Women, Islam, and the Moroccan State: The Struggle over the Personal Status Law," *The Middle East Journal* 59, no. 3 (2005): 393–410.

³⁷ James N Sater, *Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco* (Routledge, 2007).

NGOs. The Beijing conference provided an opportunity for women to voice their concerns and a structure in which activity to take place. One of these structures was Collective 95 for Equality in the Maghreb. This was an alliance of women's organizations and researchers from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. This organization produced a set of documents called 100 steps, 100 provisions, that laid out a framework for the improvement of women's rights. This proposed framework was met mostly with silent opposition from the government of Morocco.³⁸ This is why it was historic that the World Bank acted to bring the government into conversation with NGOs and women's groups. However, it may have precisely been this involvement of the World Bank that led to the failure to pass significant reforms because of resistance from working class and Islamist women's movements.

After the death of Hassan II in 1999, women's groups and many of those other parts of Moroccan society calling for change were very hopeful about the potential of the new King Mohammed VI. The feminist movement in Morocco captured the attention of the entire world when in the year 2000, half a million women and supporting protesters took to the streets of Rabat, Morocco to again demand an a significant reform of the Family Law Code. This was something that had long been promised to the women of Morocco but reforms were coming very slowly. It seemed like the right moment with a new King and a historic victory of the socialist party. However, at the same time that this women's movement displayed a powerful show of strength the Islamist movement displayed much more powerful show in a counter protest movement that took place in Casablanca Morocco. This movement was not only composed of Islamists but also had a great deal of anti-Imperial sentiments. Some of the slogans included:

³⁸ Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl, *Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation: Implementing the Beijing Platform* (Syracuse University Press, 1997).

“Our march emerged from the people’s will; their march derives from the West’s will”; their march is international, ours is national”; ... “they are funded by the World Bank, we are self-funded”; “they represent their sponsors, we represent our people.”³⁹

These slogans make it clear that these protests were not a simple story of Islam versus feminism. Instead, these were protests about many issues, sitting at the historical conjuncture of ongoing imperialism and the continued effects of colonialism. As can be seen in the quotes above there was a particular concern over the funding of the World Bank and the perception that protestors were being bought to promote a Western agenda. Here we see the residual structures of the (re)conquista which framed Islam as the oppressor of Moroccan women while ignoring the facts of colonial oppression. We also see the residual structures of resistance and the alliance which brought Moroccan women success in their fight against colonialism and oppression. Religious fervor and the alliance of working class and rural women had led to success in fighting against colonialism many times as seen in Chapter 2.

This fight quickly became framed by Islamists as a fight for the soul of the country of Morocco, just as the fight against colonizing powers had been framed for hundreds of years. The two sides of the Moroccan women’s movement sat at a historical conjuncture of colonialism, feminism, imperialism, resistance and Islamism. It is a mistake to see this as simply Islamism vs. Feminism because that does not accurately portray the agency of women or the historical conjunctures, including the residue of the (re)conquista, that brought about these circumstances. As Salime explains, the constructed binary between Islamism and feminism is a false dichotomy.⁴⁰ Since the earliest women’s movements in MENA, women

³⁹ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

⁴⁰ Salime.

have included their religious identity to advocate for themselves as seen in Chapter 2. Female protesters were prominently featured in the protest march itself and in mobilizing and writing about protests. Some of these women saw their Islamist March as simply a different way of promoting women's rights.⁴¹ Saba Mahmood shows complex ways in which women engage with religious doctrine in her study which examines the urban Islamic piety movement in Cairo during the 1990's. Women who attend the mosque lessons taught by the *da'iya* are not simply instructed in religious doctrine, they debate, interpret, and understand it. This practice does not fit in with liberal conceptions of agency or with supporting patriarchal norms. Instead, women are creating their own space through the cultivation of religious thought.⁴² Moroccan women have been able to carve out their own spaces for advocacy both outside of and within the precepts of Islamic law but that space sat at different historical conjunctures crisscrossed with the residual structures of colonialism and imperialism.

One of the leading Islamist women's organizations said their project was "an integral part of a global mobilization to end poverty and violence against women" which fell directly in line with the goals of liberal feminist organizations.⁴³ This seems at odds with slogans quoted above which display an anti-international sentiment. The statements of the Islamist women's organization and similar statements by many other organizations proves that there was a desire by these organizations to be engaged on an international level. However, because international institutions like the World Bank are filled with the residue of past colonialism and ongoing imperialism which was actively harming working class women in

⁴¹ Sadiqi, "The Central Role of the Family Law in the Moroccan Feminist Movement."

⁴² Saba Mahmood, *Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton University Press, 2011).

⁴³ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

Morocco, their claims of support for women's rights are dismissed. This fundamental contradiction eventually caused the women's movement of 2001 in Morocco to fail to make any serious change to domestic law. However, change was right around the corner, engineered by the monarchy as a tool to solidify power and restore balance.

In 2004, King Mohammed VI introduced the new Code of the Family to the Moroccan Parliament. Learning from the mistakes of 2000, he framed this reform as being inspired by sharia law even though it closely coincided with the liberal feminist demands of only a few years earlier. This victory for Moroccan feminists needs to be understood in the context of the War on Terror. The King of Morocco was attempting to align himself with the United States as a moderate Islamic country that could help the United States. Here we again find the women's movement tangled up in historical conjunctures and the residue of the (re)conquista. In the years following 9/11, the US position as the inheritor of the (re)conquista became ever clearer. The construction of Islam as the ultimate threat to be eliminated at any cost and Muslim women as objects to be saved was the center of the US imperial project after 9/11 as has been extensively studied by many decolonial scholars and others.⁴⁴ Islamic parties in Morocco were particularly weak at the time because of lack of public support due to the 2003 Casablanca bombings. Though this was undoubtedly a victory for Moroccan feminists that they contributed to and helped to bring about through their protests in the 1990s and 2000s, the law was not passed because of an immediate demand from civil society but rather because women's rights had become a geopolitically convenient cause.⁴⁵ From a decolonial perspective beyond basic geopolitics, the King was able to use women's rights as

⁴⁴ Lila Abu-Lughod, "Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 3 (2002): 783–90.

⁴⁵ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

a tool of appeasement and alignment with the West, playing on the residue of (re)conquista fears and construction of Islam as threat, just as his father had with Princess Aicha. This was especially true for the King who was able to cement his power as a moderate leader of an Islamic country ready to become an ally for the United States. Other scholars have framed this law differently, as the victory of liberal feminists against Islamists.⁴⁶ However, this ignores the fact that the reforms passed in 2004 were framed as based in sharia law and were endorsed by the Islamist party, al-'Adala wa-l-tanmia in Morocco. It also ignores and erases indigenous women who were erased in the binary of feminism vs. Islam just as they were in the (re)conquista frame of the Moro/a. While women's rights were advanced in 2004, a much more successful and earlier version of this change would have been possible if international organizations had engaged the Moroccan feminist movement differently. Additionally, this reform has been criticized for being both limited in scope and not completely implemented. Nadia Yassine, Islamist feminist and one of the leaders of the women's section of Al Adl wal Ihsane, also called the Islamists of Justice and Spirituality, expressed her concerns in an interview with *Der Spiegel* in 2007 "Of course it's right for women to have more liberties. But what does that look like in practice? How can a woman make use of her right to divorce, for example, if she has no job after her divorce and ends up on the street?"⁴⁷ These concerns were very similar to the concerns of Amazigh women during my interviews. Many expressed a sense of dissolution and disenfranchisement, epitomized by a law that granted

⁴⁶ Sadiqi and Ennaji, "The Feminization of Public Space: Women's Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco."

⁴⁷ "Interview with Moroccan Islamist Nadia Yassine: 'Our Religion Is Friendly to Women,'" *Der Spiegel*, July 3, 2007, sec. International, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-moroccan-islamist-nadia-yassine-our-religion-is-friendly-to-women-a-492040.html>.

them rights without a means to actually use them.⁴⁸ The economic situation for many women in Morocco was becoming increasingly desperate and this was doubly true for indigenous women and women in rural areas.⁴⁹ These contradictions were also felt by many different women would prove prescient as unrest continued to grow among the majority of people and younger women who did not feel represented in the more elitist parts of the liberal feminist movement. In the following case, that of Fadwa Laouri, we find the answer to what a woman does when they have no societal support.

Fadwa Laouri and The February 20th Movement

“They destroyed my shack and called me crazy.” “Where do I go now?” “I have nowhere to go.” “I have no one but God.”⁵⁰ These were Fadwa Laouri’s last words, as heard in a cellphone recording of the incident, as she set herself aflame on February 21st, 2011, just a day after the beginning of the February 20th movements. The February 20th movement in Morocco was part of a wave of revolutionary movements that spread from Tunisia throughout North Africa and the Middle East. Much like Tunisia, Morocco’s movement was rooted in class and a general dissatisfaction with the government and was informed by the historical conjuncture of the ongoing residual structures of colonialism. However, Morocco’s February 20th movement went very differently than the Arab Spring in Tunisia or Egypt. It is called the February 20th movement because that was the first day of massive demonstrations that took place in the capital Rabat. The streets were filled with tens of

⁴⁸ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020. Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in June 2018.

⁴⁹ Harrigan and El-Said, “The Economic Impact of IMF and World Bank Programs in the Middle East and North Africa: A Case Study of Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 1983-2004.”

⁵⁰ Laila Lalami, “Fadoua Laroui: The Moroccan Mohamed Bouazizi,” February 27, 2011, <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/fadoua-laroui-moroccan-mohamed-bouazizi/>.

thousands of people lifting their voices and demanding justice. The masses not only took to the streets but deliberately claimed public space as a statement of people's power reminiscent of mass demonstrations against French and Spanish colonialism. These demonstrations were not organized by NGOs or political parties but by young people, including a large number of young women. However, they were not interested in the demands of the mainstream feminist movement in Morocco. Instead, they demanded radical and immediate change not just for women but for all parts of Moroccan society.⁵¹ This represents a significant break from the feminism of the past decades. In many ways, the young women participating in the February 20th movement were returning to *inzi*, the residual structures of resistance that had been successful in the fight for Moroccan independence.

Unlike feminist organizations that worked within the system, these young people rejected the political system that they perceived as corrupt and out of touch with the needs of the majority.⁵² There was a specific and self-conscious effort to decolonize and reclaim indigenous identity and practices of resistance as was reflected by my interviews with activists. Many of them brought up their Amazigh identity and their family histories and practices of resistance.⁵³ My interviews were mostly with younger activists, under the age of 25 though I also interviewed representatives from some of the larger women's organizations who were in an older age group. All the younger activists I spoke with about the February 20th movement mentioned their Amazigh identity. By centering their indigenous Amazigh

⁵¹ Zakia Salime, "A New Feminism? Gender Dynamics in Morocco's February 20th Movement," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 13, no. 5 (2012): 101–14.

⁵² Driss Maghraoui, "Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern Politics," *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 4 (December 2011): 679–99, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2011.630879>.

⁵³ Interview with organizer for women workers. Conducted in person by author in February 2020. Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020. Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

identity, rooted in a historical understanding of women's resistance, they were actively decolonizing the Moroccan political landscape. This presented opportunities to finally cleanse Morocco of the residue of the (re)conquista and build new futures filled with the residue of indigenous women's resistance in the form of *inzi*. One of my interview subjects recalled singing and chanting during the protests in a blend of Amazigh dialects and darija which recalled the figure of Kharboucha and the residual structures of resistance in the form of *inzi* as practiced through aita and the shikhat.⁵⁴ This rejection of mainstream political structures in favor of indigenous understandings shows the truly revolutionary potential of the February 20th movement and the youth who started it.

Youth activists were eager to separate themselves from the established political parties and alliances and instead form new relationships among themselves. One example of this is the leadership of Mouad Belghouat, known as L7a9d or El-Haqed meaning "the enraged". He wrote a song called "Barak min Elskute" which means stop the silence which came out in 2011. In the song, El-Haqed criticizes the corruption and lies of the Moroccan government. He was one of the early leaders of the protests and spoke at many rallies. His sentiments echo those of much of the younger generation in Morocco. El-Haqed was later arrested in a second song he wrote criticizing the government called "Kelb Al-Dawla" which means dogs of the state which specifically addressed police brutality. The youth were able to break free from the residual structures of colonialism and ongoing imperialism which had held social movements back for many years. These youth activists sat in a new *inzi* space and that space was terrifying to those in power.

⁵⁴ Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

King Mohammed VI knew he had to act quickly if he was to remain in power. According to my interviews, there was a feeling of chaos and confusion among the older generation while the younger generation was full of hope. “We really thought change would come quickly” said one woman who participated in the protests in Rabat.⁵⁵ It was clear to political organizations of all kinds that they had two choices, to either jump on the train of change or to be left behind. A whole range of organizations flocked to support the movement including many who were ideologically opposed to one another. These included the United Socialist Party (USP), the Marxist Democratic Way Party (DWP), Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), the Amazigh Democracy Movement, Association Democratic du Femme Marocaine (ADFM) and very significantly the Islamist Justice and Spirituality Organisation (JCO).⁵⁶ Women also joined these protests in record numbers. The women participating had various demands on both the government and Moroccan society as a whole.

However, it would be incorrect to speak of women as a monolith and there were various different factions and interests that would ultimately split the movement itself. Women were divided by race and class, urban and rural, even by religiosity. This is not to say that there were no groups or alliances that crossed these lines. As a matter of fact, most groups of factions were made of women and men from different backgrounds with a variety of interests. Many activists I interviewed that participated in the February 20th spoke of the high level of gender equality amongst organizers in the early days of the movement. One interviewee told me, “There was no man or woman, only people working together for

⁵⁵ Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in June 2018.

⁵⁶ Sammy Zeyad Badran, “Demobilising the February 20 Movement in Morocco: Regime Strategies during the Arab Spring,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 25, no. 4 (2020): 616–40.

revolutionary goals”.⁵⁷ Indeed, the organizations above working together lead by a coalition of youth from different backgrounds was an incredible achievement in and of itself the likes of which had not been seen since the independence movement. This space was crisscrossed with the residual structures of oppression and resistance stretching back to the colonial struggle. Many of the founders of the movement came from families with traditions of resistance to oppression.⁵⁸ This was supported by my findings during interviews with activists. Multiple women spoke to me of a tradition of resistance in their families and among their communities. I interviewed one woman from an Amazigh community who told me that both herself personally and her community as a whole had never stopped fighting, from the colonial struggle to oppression by the government.⁵⁹ Another woman I interviewed explained to me why Fadwa Laouri’s case was so important.

“She was a single mother struggling to feed herself and her children. Single mothers in Morocco struggle with the same issues that single mothers in many other countries face. She was stigmatized, denied access to work and a living wage, could not find childcare, was denied family support. Fadwa went to the local government office to attempt to get benefits for herself and her children. However, she was denied benefits because for single mothers in Morocco there is nothing.”⁶⁰

My interview subject was herself a single mother who explained to me that she was only able to survive because her family supported her. As she explained, the stakes for Moroccan women were extremely high and that is why so many women of different backgrounds took

⁵⁷ Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in June 2018.

⁵⁸ Adria K. Lawrence, “Repression and Activism among the Arab Spring’s First Movers: Evidence from Morocco’s February 20th Movement,” *British Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 3 (July 2017): 699–718, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000733>.

⁵⁹ Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020.

⁶⁰ Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

to the streets as part of the February 20th movement. Fadwa's protest through self-immolation was reminiscent of the protest that began the Tunisian revolution months earlier when a fishmonger set himself aflame after his fish catch was taken by the police for unpermitted sale. This extreme form of protest, resulting in a horrifyingly painful death, speaks to both the desperation and the revolutionary commitment of the subjects.

Ultimately King Mohammed VI was able to stay in power because he was able to offer the appearance of change and persuade many of the more established institutional organizations to betray their younger counterparts who had welcomed them into the movement. In a speech on March 9, 2011, the King announced that there would be major constitutional reforms in almost every area demanded by protestors. This included women's rights and the addition of gender equality, as well as recognition for Amazigh identity and culture, to the constitution. The speech almost immediately had the desired result, splitting supporters of the February 20th movement. While many mainstream women's organizations such as the ADFM, LDDF, and the UAF supported the king's project of constitutional reform, the radical grassroots leaders of the February 20 movement called for a boycott of the referendum.⁶¹ This shows that the February 20 new movement leaders were not willing to compromise their demands for the appearance of change. One of my interviewees explained, "We knew it (the constitutional reform) was nothing, from the beginning we knew it was nothing".⁶² When confronted with demands for change and images of authoritarian leaders challenged across North Africa and the Middle East, the King protected his own power structure through the promise of reform. Meanwhile, many mainstream feminist

⁶¹ Salime, "A New Feminism? Gender Dynamics in Morocco's February 20th Movement."

⁶² Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020.

organizations were eager to take advantage of the opportunity to push the King on women's rights issues as part of the reform agenda. Here, many women's groups functioned as allies, both to the Moroccan state apparatus and to the King himself.⁶³ This was seen as a huge betrayal though in many ways not a surprising one by the young activists who started the February 20 movement. For many, here was the residue of the figure of the "new woman" in the elite women who stepped on those below them in order to gain access to power from the struggle against colonialism to the struggle against the oppressive structures of patriarchal power.

The February 20th movement focused on youth participation and galvanizing support from those who felt disenfranchised and excluded from the political system. One of their primary hashtags or slogans #mamfakinch, we will not give up, shows both the past practices of *inzi* and residue of future hope. The meaning of mamfakinch seen through the residue of *inzi* of the past shows the determination of the February 20th movement not to be placated through the normal systems of power but to continue on in an unending struggle until all are free. While the goal of many feminist organizations is to achieve reform and gains for women's rights through the use of state power and the authority of the king, the February 20th movement sees that very system as the root cause of much of the inequality and injustice, a colonial inheritance perpetuated by the monarchy. Meanwhile, the Moroccan state and the King is able to use his elite feminist allies in order to stabilize his base of power and support in the name of women's rights and freedoms. In the eight years since the February 20 movement, Morocco, with King Mohammed VI at the head, has passed legislation that ostensibly strengthens women's rights in Morocco. While it is true that many of the things

⁶³ Salime, *Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco*.

that women's rights activists have called for such as the criminalization of domestic violence have been enacted into law, the implementation and enforcement of those laws remains to be seen. Meanwhile the government has been able to reap the political benefits of enacting women's rights legislation.

Inzi and the case of Amina al Filali

The suicide of a 16-year-old girl, Amina al-Filali, who had been forced to marry her rapist, sparked protests that gained international attention in March 2012. The case itself is complex and there are many conflicting reports, especially since attention was only brought to her case after her death by suicide, seven months after her marriage. According to reports from people in her village and from the victim's family, Amina was dragged into the woods at knife point and held there for 10 days while her attacker raped her. Her family then brought a case to the local police who did not arrest her accused attacker. They then brought the case before a judge who did arrest her attacker and put him in jail. Then, an agreement was reached under article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code for the victim and her attacker to be married. Article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code states,

"whomever kidnaps or manipulates or attempts to abduct or manipulate a minor whose age is less than 18 years old, without using violence or threat shall be punished by a period of imprisonment ranging between 1 to 5 years and a fine of 200 to 500 DRAMs (\$20-\$50). However, if the kidnapped or manipulated minor (female) had already reached puberty and marries the kidnapper, the kidnapper can no longer be pursued unless there is a complaint from an individual who has the right to annul the wedding."

There is some debate among the Amina's family members as to why they agreed to the marriage. Her mother is quoted as saying "I had to marry her to him because I couldn't allow my daughter to have no future and stay unmarried."⁶⁴ The Moroccan Justice minister stated that this was not the case of rape, that it was a consensual relationship between two young people and that Amina al Filali had affirmed this. Unlike what the Western media portrayed in its reporting of this case the Moroccan Penal Code did not have its roots in only Islamic law but was actually largely based on the French colonial law.⁶⁵ This was not part of the Mudawana or personal status code discussed in the previous section. Seven months after she was forced to marry her rapist, Amina committed suicide by swallowing rat poison and asking her husband to walk her out into the streets of the village where she then collapsed. She was then taken to the hospital where she later died. Some witnesses say that her husband screamed at her, dragging her by the hair. Amina's case came a little over a year after another suicide by a young Moroccan woman, Fadwa Laroui. This was a young mother who set herself on fire to protests being denied government services due to her status as a single mother. This case foreshadowed Amina's suicide, showing how difficult, sometimes impossible it can be for women to survive once they have broken with tradition and gone out on their own.

In order to understand Amina's case, we must understand the different conjunctures of the residue of colonialism, her Amazigh identity, and an oppressive patriarchal government. Amina was left in a situation with very few choices. She chose to take her own

⁶⁴ Simon Allison, "Amina Filali: A Story of Rape, Suicide and the Society Searching for Its Soul," *Daily Maverick*, March 20, 2012, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-03-20-amina-filali-a-story-of-rape-suicide-and-the-society-searching-for-its-soul/>.

⁶⁵ Zakia Salime, "Arab Revolutions: Legible, Illegible Bodies," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 35, no. 3 (2015): 525–38.

way out rather than continue to suffer at the hands of her husband. There was a documentary produced about Amina al Filali's family which has since been banned in Morocco. During the documentary, one of Amina's father's wives reveals that he has been beating her. Many women I interviewed told a similar story that their awareness of gender issues was rooted in how they were treated in their home.⁶⁶ Amina was also from the same region, the Rif where the actions that began the February 20th movement took place. One of my subjects told me when she was growing up in her town, which is at the heart of the indigenous region of Morocco, there was no hospital, no university and a complete lack of infrastructure. She went on to explain that the infrastructure and the lack thereof is part of a purposeful government campaign against the indigenous people of Morocco. When she talked about women's rights issue, rather than focusing on something like child marriage or domestic violence, she had a very material understanding of women's rights focused on women's ability to own property, develop a land, and control their own financial resources. For her, changing women's material reality was key to women's rights.⁶⁷ She was echoing the sentiment that is shared by many of the other women that I talked to. Changing the level of poverty and women's access to resources was the most important thing. When women are dependent on their partners or families for care, they are unable to leave violent situations. This was almost certainly the case for Amina. This situation is a result of the divide between *bled al-Siba* and *bled al-Makhzen*, as discussed in the previous chapter, which is permeated with the residue of the (re)conquista erasure of indigenous identity in the figure of the Moro/a. Under this colonial framework, the blame appears to lie with Amina's religion and the supposed

⁶⁶ Interview with two Amazigh youth activists. Conducted in person by author in February 2020. Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020. Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

⁶⁷ Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in June 2018.

backwardness of her community rather than the oppressive and patriarchal system built on the residual legacy of colonialism which denies her access to resources and her rights.

Amina's death united Moroccan feminist from all fronts because the conflict, at least within Morocco, was not framed in terms of Islamic versus Western values. Instead, it was framed in terms of an unfair law which allowed a deep miscarriage of justice that brought about the end of the young woman's life. In an article published by Jadaliyya, Moroccan feminist activist and professor, Louba Hanna Skalli, described the situation "Demonstrations and sit-ins in other cities around the country brought together the mothers/founders of the Moroccan women's movements and the daughters of the movements. It united those who normally resent gender equality and those who fight for them, those who wear the label feminism as a badge of honor and those who shy away from it".⁶⁸ International media coverage did not follow the same pattern of a united attack against the patriarchal power structures that cause and endorse violence against women. Rather, the headlines about Amina's death and subsequent repeal of the law were full of inaccuracies filled with the residue of the (re)conquista in the forms of the erasure of indigenous identity and the construction of Islam as threat. Many news outlets inaccurately stated that Moroccan law forced Amina to marry her rapist. They also rhetorically framed the conflict as women's rights versus Islamic tradition rather than women's rights versus the patriarchal power structure. An article about Amina's case published in the Washington Post stated:

“Certainly Morocco is not alone in limiting women's personal freedoms and imposing draconian sentences on those who dare to defy them. In nearby Saudi Arabia, women are still banned from driving automobiles, lest it “spell the end of

⁶⁸ Jadaliyya- جدلية and Jadaliyya, “Young Women Demanding Justice and Dignity: By All Means Necessary,” Jadaliyya - جدلية, accessed July 30, 2022, <https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/25496>.

virginity.” And in Iran, a woman who was convicted of adultery two years ago is still slated for execution, although whether she will die by stoning or hanging remains unresolved.”⁶⁹

The idea that these countries are “nearby” or that this comparison between Iran, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia is even remotely logical, is completely laughable. The author then juxtaposes this to the current struggles for women’s rights in America saying, “we would all do well to take note of the sort of egregious injustice inflicted on girls like Amina and reassess whether we really want to be fighting over something as basic and non-controversial as The Violence Against Women Act.”⁷⁰ This article replicates the (re)conquista figure of the Mora woman who needs to be saved. It sends the message: look at these poor Arab women in their backwards country, aren’t we in America better than them? This reflects America’s inheritance of the legacy of the (re)conquista and the part played by American feminist is reinforcing those systems of oppression and imperialism. Moroccan and Amazigh activists worked to counter that narrative through decolonial and systemic analysis of the intersectional and historical nature of the oppression of Amazigh women. In a documentary about Amina’s case called 475, Nadir Bouhmouch, the director, explores the issues of media portrayal, orientalism, and the failures of mobilization.⁷¹ The documentary shows both the complexities of the case and the ways in which the international media ignored the real story in favor of the trope of a Muslim girl victimized by her own society.

⁶⁹ Delia Lloyd, “Marrying Your Rapist: A New Low in Women’s Rights in Morocco,” *Washington Post* (blog), March 21, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/post/marrying-your-rapist-a-new-low-in-womens-rights-in-morocco/2012/03/19/gIQAEC27RS_blog.html.

⁷⁰ Lloyd.

⁷¹ 475, 2013.

Unfortunately, the Western imperialist media rhetoric was also picked up by some international human rights organizations. A report about the case written by Human Rights Watch stated “The social origins of the exoneration clause in article 475 lie in the notion, prevalent in traditional milieus in Morocco, that an unmarried girl or woman who has lost her virginity – even though rape – is no longer marriageable and has dishonored her family.”⁷² The choice to locate the problem in "traditional milieus" rather than a long complex legacy of colonialism, patriarchal power structures, and unequal social and economic relationships is deeply indicative of the problematic ways that international human rights organizations engage women's social movements in Islamic countries and continue to perpetuate the residual structures of colonialism and the (re)conquista. It tells women that their culture and religion are oppressing them and this leaves them with a terrible choice between supposed freedom offered by international organizations and their own cultural identity. This disempowers women by taking the tools for their own liberation out of their hands and placing them in someone else's. This ignores the long history of women's resistance and contributions to change and points to the reason that many of my interview subjects were hesitant to identify themselves as feminists. One interview subject told me that she saw her commitment to women's rights as a given. Many women spoke about a divide in the feminist movement between the French speaking upper class and the rest of the population. One woman explained to me that there isn't a perfect translation for the word feminist in Moroccan Arabic, the closest word which is used is نسوية which literally translated roughly means “womanism”. Some women want to popularize the use of this term while other women shy away from it precisely because it can be associated with the upper class and the

⁷² “Morocco: Girl's Death Highlights Flawed Laws,” *Human Rights Watch* (blog), March 23, 2012, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/morocco-girls-death-highlights-flawed-laws>.

west. Women have found ways to have discussions about for example improving women's material conditions using the framework of Islam rather than using the framework of a Western liberal brand of feminism. Many women discussed how they could have these types of discussions accepted into the mainstream discourse and actually caused material changes in women's lives like in this case.⁷³ Amina's tragic death united women from multiple sectors, centering the double layered oppression experienced by Amazigh women. By returning to the residual indigenous roots of women's resistance, women were able to use the tools of community and the practices of *inzi*

In the end, Moroccan women were successful and in January 2014, they caused article 475 of the Moroccan Penal Code to be repealed. Rapists in Morocco can no longer escape prosecution by marrying their victims. This is the story of the success of grassroots organizing by women with disparate backgrounds and different perspectives on women's rights, Islam, feminism, and civil society. By rejecting the Western framing of Amina's case rooted in the residue of the (re)conquista and taking up the practices of *inzi*, they were able to realize the actual decolonization of Moroccan law and the residual possibilities of a liberated future.

The Fight Continues

As we have explored in this chapter, indigenous women's resistance in Morocco is characterized by *inzi*, a continual and unending practice of resistance. The practices of *inzi* are always changing and evolving as we see with the example of shikhat in the February 20th movement and active decolonization of the political landscape. Through a decolonial,

⁷³ Interview with two Amazigh youth activists. Conducted in person by author in February 2020. Interview with Amazigh woman activist. Conducted in person by author in January 2020. Interview with young woman protestor and activist. Conducted in person by author in May 2018.

global, and historical lens we have seen the connections between the residual legacy of the (re)conquista and the structures of oppression and the family law code. In Amina al Filali's case we see how Western media is filled with the legacy of the (re)conquista while Moroccan activists work to cross boundaries through practices rooted in indigenous women's resistance. There is another movement still going on in Morocco Hirak Shabeeya or Hirak Rif (the People's Movement). Mouhcine Fikri was a Moroccan fish vendor from Al Hoceima. On October 28, 2016, a policeman confiscated 500kg of swordfish that he had purchased from Al Hoceima port. Amazigh women are at the forefront of these protests, demanding change and justice for their communities in the residual structures of *inzi* that connect them to the resistance of their ancestors and the possibility of a hopeful future.

Residual Structures of Resistance and the Fight to Break Free

The Philippines has one of the most active and dynamic women's rights movements in the world. From resistance to Spanish colonialism, to US imperialism, to the Japanese occupation, to the Marcos dictatorship to Duterte, women have organized and taken up arms to resist. As we saw in Chapter 2, indigenous women's residual structures of resistance to oppression form the basis of the fight for liberation from colonialism, imperialism and patriarchy. However, in many ways Filipina women still experience some of the worst oppression both on a level of political rights and legal protections. Women have also occupied a prominent place in all aspects of Filipino political life and yet these women in prominent political positions have not however been the champions of women's rights that one might expect. We have even seen right wing authoritarian governments support women's rights legislation. How are these contemporary contradictions rooted in colonialism and imperialism? How do activists on the ground navigate the complex relationships and push for material change? What is the relationship between leftist, indigenous, and women's rights activism? Through a decolonial historical analysis, we can begin to answer some of these questions by following the legacy of the (re)conquista and the figure of the Moro/a as an American imperial inheritance. This chapter argues that, in a place with open, imperialist backed, violent oppression of women's groups and many women's and indigenous and other rights held back due to laws based in doctrines rooted in colonialism, the women's movement is not only surviving but is successfully making change building on the residual structures of indigenous women's resistance.

This resistance takes many forms, one of which is *kalayaan*, a conception of freedom and liberation based in decolonization and community as we see in the revitalization of the

figure of the babaylan. However, with an authoritarian right wing government, victories are taken where they can be found and old alliances between leftists, indigenous groups, and women's rights groups are the key. This argument is supported by my interviews with activists, archival research, as well as historical and contemporary analysis. Through historical conjuncture and residual structures, I trace the relationships between women's movements, the left, resistance to imperialism and colonialism and the state. I examine the alliances and relationships both between these groups themselves and the factors of state power. I show how indigenous women create spaces of *kalayaan* and this leads to building solidarity and resistance across different sectors of society. This begins where Chapter 2 left off, with the resistance to the Japanese occupation.

Then, the analysis turns to three contemporary case studies, the reproductive health law, the case of Jennifer Laude, and the Lumad Bakwit Save our Schools movement. Each of these cases were selected because they show a different aspect of the relationships and alliances of the women's movement. These cases are also of central importance to the women's rights movements as I learned during my interviews but have not received the attention and analysis they merit as much scholarship around women's rights in the Philippines addresses issues such as sex trafficking and migrant workers.¹ During my time in the Philippines, I was able to conduct interviews with several different groups including The Filipino Freethinkers, Gabriela, Bahaghari, and Lumad Bakwit. Many of the women I had the privilege of interviewing are incredible activists operating under the most difficult conditions, including death threats. I want to honor both their struggle and the words and experiences that they took the time to share with me. Their insights, perspectives, and

¹ Please see the literature review in the introduction for more discussion

thoughts form the basis of this work and can provide important lessons for both scholars and other activists.

The Huk Rebellion and Women's Organizing

There is a long and rich history of women's movements, resistance and rebellion throughout the history of the Philippines as addressed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Picking up where that chapter left off, we have the formation of the women's movement with the end of the Japanese occupation. Neferti Tadiar wrote in her study on the Philippine historical experience, "Crisis launches both forces: liberatory social movements and state repression".² As discussed in Chapter 2, women have always been at the forefront of resistance to imperialism in creating spaces of *kalayaan* and this remained true during the Japanese occupation. In her landmark study of women's participation in the Huk³ rebellion, Lanzona argues that women's personal and political relationships were key to the HUD rebellion and their experience as revolutionaries and activists was mediated by their gender. Remedios Gomez, commonly known as Liwayway was perhaps the most iconic female figure in the Huk Rebellion. She became popular with the media after her first capture and arrest as a political prisoner. She was known for wearing lipstick into battle and was referred to as the Filipina Joan of Arc.⁴ In the figure of Liwayway, we find contradictions that continue to be faced by many Philippine activists. She simultaneously challenges gender norms, actively participating in combat, while the core of much of the popular appeal

² Tadiar, *Things Fall Away*, 70.

³ The Huk Rebellion 1942-1954 was so named for the army that began it, Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Anti-Japanese Liberation Army).

⁴ Vina A. Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines* (Univ of Wisconsin Press, 2009).

surrounding her figure revolves around her status as a beauty queen and conformity with gender norms. Women continue to be forced to conform to the norms of gender roles and expectations inside the movement, for example doing a great deal of domestic labor. However, in spite of the many limitations on their participation, women's rights were an explicit part of the revolutionary agenda.⁵ Liwayway is still held up not only as a symbol but as the embodiment of *kalayaan* and resistance. It was during this time period that the left combined women's rights, organizations of indigenous and rural constituencies, anti-imperialism, and the fight for an independent democratic Philippines.

The Huk Rebellion has been the subject of a certain amount of dispute as far as the involvement of the Partido Komunista Pilipinas or PKP (Communist Party of the Philippines). Some historians contend that the PKP's involvement was not in fact important, or a key part of the movement.⁶ However, as Lanzona shows, the women who became involved in the rebellion almost always started as organizers and participants in the PKP. The PKP had been organizing the rural peasantry as well as city workers since the early 1900s with constant government surveillance and attempts to crush that organizing following at every moment.⁷ McCoy argues in his study on Philippine authoritarianism, that the roots can be traced back to the early crushing of leftists organizing beginning with the presidency of Manuel Quezon.⁸ During his presidency Quezon consolidated and centralized power in the executive branch while engaging in counterinsurgency and collaborating with the United

⁵ Lanzona.

⁶ See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002).

⁷ Walter Ladwig III, "When the Police Are the Problem: The Philippine Constabulary and the Huk Rebellion," in *Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents* (Oxford University Press, 2014), 19–45. For a wider discussion of the leftist organizing prior to WWII please see chapter two.

⁸ President from 1935-1944

States in their efforts to crush the left and undermine their contribution to the defeat of the Japanese.⁹ The Japanese defeat of American forces in the Philippines is regarded as one of the worst defeats in US military history, and very costly in terms of lives with over 100,000 dying between Philippine and American troops.¹⁰ The Japanese attempted to frame their victory in anti-Imperial terms “Asia for the Asians”. Japanese victory did mark the end of Western colonial domination in Asia. However, Japanese occupation brought its own brutality and the PKP were quick to engage in antifascist organizing and propaganda against the Japanese. The Huk were the only well organized and sustained armed resistance to the Japanese occupation and yet as soon as victory was clear, American troops turned on them at the first opportunity.¹¹ The women’s movement that came out of this time period was formed by experience in a successful armed revolution and subsequent betrayal by both American and Filipino government forces.

About 1 in every 10 Huk guerrillas were women in addition to those who played support roles which would mean well over 10,000 women as active participants in the organized resistance to fascism and imperialism.¹² Much of the resistance, especially in Mindanao, came out of Moro and indigenous communities. One of the many colonial residues that persists in the archive is the use of the term Moro in a way that erases indigenous identity. The Americans named the war of resistance fought against American imperialism from 1900-1913 the “Moro War” even though there were many different Muslim

⁹ Alfred W. McCoy, “Quezon’s Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianism,” *Philippine Colonial Democracy* 1, no. 1 (1989): 4–1.

¹⁰ Donald J. Young, *The Fall of the Philippines: The Desperate Struggle Against the Japanese Invasion, 1941-1942* (McFarland, 2015).

¹¹ Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017).

¹² Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines*.

and non-Muslim indigenous groups involved in the fight. As explored in Chapter 2, this is a legacy of the (re)conquista that continues to exist as an inheritance of American imperialism. This is key to understanding the basis that would go on to form the contemporary women's movements in the Philippines. Lanzona's study interviews multiple surviving Huk women fighters about their experiences. Her interviewees talk about how they were subjected firsthand to the brutalities of Japanese occupation, including rape and forced sexual slavery. This motivated women to join the Huk even though there was no direct recruitment strategy for women in the beginning. Women during the Huk Rebellion fulfilled a variety of different roles, some were fighters while others collected supplies, money, and information.¹³ Women attained leadership roles and, in those roles, advocated for the rights of women both as part of an antifascist, anti-imperialist war effort but also within the movement itself. Lanzona examines different communiques and policies of the Huk during this time period addressing gender roles, interpersonal relationships, sex, and power. These documents and Lanzona's analysis give us insight into how women were using their roles and their organizing power to advocate for themselves and their rights as part of a broader movement. Military analysis and reports give us other insight into women's resistance. Indigenous practices of healing and religious rituals often carried out by a babaylan, an indigenous priestess, were perceived as threats to military power.¹⁴ There is a long history of the figure of the babaylan and babaylan practices as central to Filipino resistance explored in Chapter 2. During the Japanese occupation these practices continued to be central to women's resistance building on residual structures of *kalayaan* stretching back to the beginning of Spanish colonialism.

¹³ Lanzona.

¹⁴ V. L. Saway, "A Narrative Report on the Problems of the Talaandig Natives of Mirayon Region under Chieftain Pascual Parente," *Memorandum to Vice-Governor Esmeraldo Cudal, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Dated 7* (1984).

In the end, the Japanese were expelled from the Philippines by a coalition of American troops and Filipino soldiers. Though the Huk forces did not receive much formal recognition of the importance of their effort, they played a decisive role in liberation.¹⁵ By the end of the war, over 1,000,000 Filipinos had died and there were serious and severe economic problems caused by the destruction during World War II. Filipino leaders were pressured by the United States into signing the Bell trade act and a military bases agreement, both of which violated the Filipino Constitution which had to be amended.¹⁶ The issues of ongoing US military occupation and imperialist economic exploitation by the United States would continue to be defining issues both in leftist revolutionary movement and the women's movement in general and the Philippines up until the present day.

The end of the Japanese occupation and Filipino independence did not mean the end of the Huk Rebellion. Like much of the rest of the world, in the aftermath of WWII, the Philippines went through a wave of anti-imperialist, anti-authoritarian, protests and movements against social and economic injustice. The armed resistance by the Huk also continued, often working hand in hand with other more "legal" movements, creating a pattern of partnership and cooperation between the armed left and the left working in the legal political realm. This pattern of partnership between forces working within the system for change and revolutionary forces attacking the system is a defining characteristic of many Filipino social movements including some women's movements as will be explored below in the case studies.

¹⁵ Young, *The Fall of the Philippines: The Desperate Struggle Against the Japanese Invasion, 1941-1942*.

¹⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

Immediately following World War II, the politics of the Philippines changed considerably from a one party system to a two-party democracy, which also resulted in the reduction of the power of the President that had built up during Quezon's time. From the Roxas to Quirino presidencies, concerns about corruption and perceptions of a weak state grew. The United States was increasingly concerned about the spread of communism and pledged additional money to the Philippines to help in economic planning.¹⁷ The public perception of weak state power was aided by the ongoing Huk rebellion. They had taken over large areas of land and given over governance to the peasant farmers in those areas. It even seemed that they were powerful enough to take over the presidential palace, though later reflections by leaders show that this was an overestimation of the power that they held at the time.¹⁸

Celia Mariano¹⁹ was the most prominent female leader at this time in the communist resistance, the only female member of the Politburo and did a great deal of organizing around the idea of the "woman question". Celia was outspoken about the issues of women's rights within the Communist Party and continually engaged in criticism of the men around her. She frequently pointed out the fundamental contradiction of communist men who were willing to break down the feudalistic, imperialist, capitalist system, and yet reproduce the patriarchal oppression in their relationships between themselves and their female comrades. Celia formed a committee of women leaders amongst her comrades that worked on gender based issues both within the party and wider society.²⁰ Leaders like Celia were key to laying the

¹⁷ Abinales and Amoroso.

¹⁸ Jesus Lava, *Memoirs of a Communist* (Published and exclusively distributed by Anvil Pub., 2002).

¹⁹ Also known as Celia Pomeroy after she married Bill Pomeroy, an American soldier who defected to the PKP and became a prominent activist and writer.

²⁰ Lanzona, *Amazons of the Huk Rebellion: Gender, Sex, and Revolution in the Philippines*.

basis of the modern feminist movement, both within the armed revolutionary movements and within the wider left. By demanding that attention be paid to the “woman question”, Celia and other women leaders like her created spaces of *kalayaan* by setting a precedent for women’s rights in the struggle against authoritarianism and imperialism. In more general terms, the Huk rebellion also trained a generation of women as organizers and revolutionaries, reinforcing the residual practices of resistance that centered indigenous women. Though much of the leadership like Celia ended up in exile, women from more rural areas and those occupying less prominent roles survived. The end of the Huk rebellion had many causes, including counterinsurgency funded by the United States, and party leaderships over estimation of their own strength. However, suffering among the peasantry and indigenous groups as well as revolutionary taxes imposed on those same suffering people also weakened the ties and bonds that people, particularly indigenous and peasant women, felt to the revolutionary movement since women were often the ones most quickly impacted.²¹ Ultimately, women in the Huk rebellion and the spaces of *kalayaan* created show a fundamental shift with in the revolutionary Filipino left that laid the foundation both for resistance during the Marcos dictatorship and for the development of the modern feminist movement.

The Marcos Dictatorship and the Resistance

Understanding the Marcos dictatorship, authoritarianism, and leftist, indigenous, and women’s resistance movements during this period is absolutely key to understanding contemporary authoritarianism and resistance. One only need look at the elections for

²¹ Ibid

president in 2022 in order to understand the importance of the relationship between the Marcos dictatorship and the Duterte government and how it continues to impact Filipino politics. Ferdinand Marcos Jr.²², the only son of dictator Ferdinand Marcos is currently president along with vice president Sara Duterte, the daughter of Roderigo Duterte.²³ Duterte himself began his own political career during this era as will be discussed below. Both Marcos' rise to power and fall expose the intersections of contemporary Philippine authoritarianism, imperialism and the resistance of the left, women, and indigenous movements.

Marcos began his political career as a senator and before that, he served in both the Philippine portion of the US Armed Forces as well as the Philippine Armed Forces. He claimed to have served in a guerrilla movement but that claim has been called into question and is largely believed to be false.²⁴ Marcos' father was drawn, quartered, and executed by a guerrilla group for his collaboration with the Japanese, perhaps planting within Marcos seeds of a deep hatred for the revolutionary left.²⁵ In his first presidential campaign, Marcos deployed many of the same tactics that have seen other authoritarian presidents rise to power. He played on Filipino people's anger at the cronyism, corruption, and politics of the elite political class in the Philippines. He ran on the campaign slogan "this nation can be great again."²⁶ What Marcos promised was a return to an era of prosperity that had actually never been seen in the Philippines, except perhaps for the landed elite. During the first few years of

²² Commonly known as Bongbong Marcos

²³ As of January 2022.

²⁴ Alfred W. McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (Yale University Press, 2002).

²⁵ Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling, *Lapham's Raiders: Guerrillas in the Philippines, 1942-1945* (University Press of Kentucky, 2014).

²⁶ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

his presidency, he did bring about the appearance of economic prosperity. However, this prosperity was both unsustainable and came at the expense of the exploitation of working-class Filipinos. Tadiar writes, "The magical aura of authoritarian modernization derives from witnessing its theatrical effects without its production, and from seeing its human power dynamics personified."²⁷ The theatrical effects were in full view, especially in the rebuilding and modernization of the capital, Manila. Massive building as well as infrastructure projects were undertaken in a great show of modernization. Marcos received millions of dollars in US aid as well as massive loans from the World Bank. These funds helped to simulate the appearance of economic prosperity that did not exist in actual fact.²⁸ Here, the alliance between the modern agents of development and imperialism on one side with authoritarianism and the oppression of the left on the other began. This alliance formed the basis of a parastatal formation²⁹ which would continue to grow during Marcos' term as president and resurge later in Filipino society. Marcos managed to be reelected to a second term as president because of the appearance of economic success. However, with the beginning of his second term as president ended that economic success and widespread popular resistance to his rule began.³⁰

As Filipino politics were plunged further into chaos by the missteps of the Marcos administration, the widespread revival of the left began. First, there was a great split within the communist and radical movement of the Philippines. Much of the older generation of the

²⁷ Tadiar, *Things Fall Away*. 154.

²⁸ Gary Hawes, "MARCOS, HIS CRONIES, AND THE PHILIPPINES FAILURE TO DEVELOP," in *Southeast Asian Capitalists* (Cornell University Press, 2018), 145–60.

²⁹ Paul Amar, *The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism* (Duke University Press, 2013). Parastatal formation is defined and discussed in the introductory chapter.

³⁰ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

PKP was scared by the persecution at the end of the Huk rebellion and afraid of attracting negative attention from the government. However, the younger generation was unfettered by these fears and they first formed Kabataan Makabayan (KM)³¹, meaning nationalist youth which was the youth arm of the PKP. Students made up the majority of KM supporters and women were very involved with these efforts from the start. They eventually split from the PKP forming the Communist Party of the Philippines or the CPP and the KM was the youth arm. The CPP employed new tactics and strategies which differed from those who had come before.³² This was a key moment because the shifts in tactics and strategies that occurred at this point in time made the left more dynamic and able to function on multiple levels. This continues to be the basis of how many movements on the left function, including women's movement as will be demonstrated in the case studies below.

First, it was no accident that the CPP was established in 1968, a year of protest, revolution, and turmoil around the world. The timing of this change reflects the increasingly international nature and connections of Filipino movements on the left. One of the primary young leaders of this movement, Jose Maria Sison³³ said in a speech

“This generation of Filipino youth is lucky to be at this point in history when US imperialism is fast weakening at all significant levels of conflict: that between capitalism and socialism; that between the capitalist class and the working class; and that between imperialism and national independence movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America.”³⁴

³¹ Formed in 1964

³² Ibid

³³ Also known by the nom de guerre Amado Guerrero whose work you will find cited both in the chapter on history and this current chapter

³⁴ Manuel Quezon, *Twenty Speeches That Moved a Nation* (Pasig, the Philippines: Anvil Publishing, 2002).

Students made up the majority of this new leftist wave and they united with indigenous people, peasants, and other worker organizations, agitating against the Marcos dictatorship. As the above quote shows, there was an important shift in thinking and organizing around the category of youth as an identity. Documents from the time show analysis of how youth were uniquely impacted by the problems of Filipino society. “The youth do not only share with their people their suffering of the iniquities of imperialism and feudalism but they are also the first to suffer from them.”³⁵ At the same time, young women were also organizing around their identity within the growing leftist student movement.

Women had their own gender specific concerns with imperialism and the misogyny in Filipino society which they saw as rooted in the feudal, US imperialist, and Spanish colonial past. In 1970, they formed their own youth women’s organization in connection with KM and the CPP, Makibaka,³⁶ headed by Lorena Barros. Makibaka created a legacy of *kalayaan* spaces and centers of power that remain important to this day. Many organizations at the time had women’s committees, or other sections that specifically addressed women’s issues as was true during the Huk Rebellion. However, Makibaka was different because women had their own space, created by them and for them to organize around gender issues in the larger fight against the Marcos regime and US imperialism. Activist Rosa Mercado who worked alongside Lorena Barros wrote, “Makibaka unleashed the pent-up energies that were bottled up inside us. It became a rallying point to break away from the traditional cultural mold of a cloying, passive, suffering Filipina and from society-induced crutches like the need to look up to a man or to prepare oneself mainly in the art of raising a home and family.”³⁷

³⁵ *Kabataang Makabayan Handbook* (Manila: Progressive Publications, 1965).

³⁶ Malayang Kilusan ng Bagong Kababaihan or Free Movement of New Women

³⁷ Rosa Mercado, “ANOTHER LOOK AT THE MAKIBAKA EXPERIENCE,” *Diliman Review*, 1968.

Organizing around gender was key to both formulating and making demands of the state and also of their male comrades. They were able to emphasize both what they had in common but also the oppression experienced by women. Lorena Barros wrote

“In addition to class oppression, however, women suffer male oppression. This second type of oppression is justified by a feudal conservatism which relegates women to the category of domestic chattel, and by a decadent bourgeois misrepresentation of women as mere pleasurable objects.”³⁸

This framework addressing the dual and intersectional nature of oppression experienced by women was key to framing the organizing approaches taken by Makibaka. They needed to be fully involved in the struggle for liberation and freedom at all points. In a pamphlet Barros wrote, “the new woman, the new Filipino, is first and foremost a militant. It is not enough for her to decorate a school window and smile encouragement at the boys marching in protest against student harassment: she must march with them.”³⁹ This was a turning point in women’s organizing in the Philippines and laid the foundation for organizations like Gabriela to come into being.

Makibaka organized their own protests, the first one being against the Binibining Pilipinas beauty pageant. Protestors stood outside with placards shouting, “Down with the commercialization of sex,” “Stop treating women as sex objects.”⁴⁰ Demonstrations quickly escalated with demonstrators throwing rocks at Pres. Marcos and his wife, and the police return killing student demonstrators. Rather than making people afraid, this crackdown by police only served to increase the number of demonstrators and support for activists. There

³⁸ Lorena Barros, “Liberated Women: I,” *The Business Viewpoint*, n.d.

³⁹ Lorena Barros, “Liberated Women: II,” *Pugadlawin*, February 1971.

⁴⁰ Mercado, “ANOTHER LOOK AT THE MAKIBAKA EXPERIENCE.”

were pitched battles in the streets with students throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails while the police openly fired at crowds of demonstrators. There was massive opposition to the Vietnam War and there were protests at the US Embassy.⁴¹ Opposition to US imperialism, the continued presence of the US military in the Philippines, and the close relationship between Marcos and the United States was at an all-time high. Momentum seemed to be building in all corners, from the women's movement, to the struggle against imperialism, to the wider resistance against Marcos.

And then came the crackdown, the imposition of martial law and overnight everything changed. Joaquin, an activist, remembering the swift change wrote "The activist scene seemed to be moving toward a culmination when we woke up one September day in 1972 and learned in shock that dear Mr. Marcos had locked us all in under martial law."⁴² Almost overnight, the left was either rounded up or forced underground. There were massive arrests and disappearances with some leaders of the women's movement among the first victims.⁴³ Makibaka went underground and some of the leaders who managed to escape, including Lorena Barros, joined the New People's Army or the NPA, the armed wing of the communist party. As Makibaka went underground, connections with the indigenous community were ever more important as it was indigenous territories that remained unconquerable just as they had been during Spanish colonialism. These became spaces of *kalayaan* where women were able to build freedom and community on the residual structures

⁴¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁴² Nick Joaquin, *Manila, My Manila: A History for the Young* (Republic of the Philippines, City of Manila, 1990).

⁴³ Rigoberto Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," *Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People's Power*, 1988, 26–69.

of indigenous women's resistance. This was the beginning of a new era of resistance and was met with harsh consequences from the dictatorship.

Barros was captured in 1973 and she along with many other women who participated in the resistance was subject to horrifying physiological, physical, and sexual torture. Tadiar argues, "the female body is only an index of the violence and oppression exerted by the new regime and its international fraternity."⁴⁴ Sexual violence was used systematically against female members of the left both to oppress and repress them in a regime of patriarchal violence under the dictatorship. Barros wrote about being held in isolation because she organized with the female prisoners of the camp. Other activists who were part of Makibaka were subject to harsher treatment. They were subjected to the same methods of violence and torture that had been first used by the Spanish and then the Americans in a residual structure of oppression stretching backwards and forwards through time. Judy Taguiwalo was another young activist who began organizing in 1968 and was a member of Makibaka. She was also captured in 1973 and subject to various forms of torture that included sexual humiliation. In her firsthand account of events, she describes how she helped organize with other women in the camp to put on a show for the soldiers and was subsequently able to escape.⁴⁵ Lorena Barros was also able to escape and both women rejoined the armed resistance in the countryside. The fighting during these days was fierce and Barros was eventually killed. According to accounts from her comrades, she died a martyr's death, refusing all medical assistance that was offered by the government army in exchange for information.⁴⁶ It is essential to understand this period of the women's movement and wider leftist resistance to

⁴⁴ Neferti XM Tadiar, *Things Fall Away* (Duke University Press, 2009).

⁴⁵ Judy Taguiwalo, *Experiences of War*, 1985.

⁴⁶ Leonard Davis, *Revolutionary Struggle in the Philippines* (Springer, 1989).

the dictatorship because the women that survived this time period, such as Judy Taguiwalo, would go on to form GABRIELA and the contemporary women's rights movement. This chapter will continue to reflect on Taguiwalo's path as a revolutionary, activist, and politician as it provides an excellent case study of the alliances, compromises, and strategic decisions made by the different women's movements on the Filipino left.

Ultimately, the Marcos dictatorship was brought to an end by a variety of factors including economics, political decisions, as well as the ongoing armed resistance. However, it was ultimately the EDSA⁴⁷ people's power revolution, sparked by the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., that sounded the death blow for the dictatorship. The decline of the dictatorship began with the same economic and political policies that had made Marcos so successful initially. The same state that successfully implemented agrarian reform using the centralized power of martial law also allowed for the creation of monopolies and international business deals that directly put money into the pockets of Marcos and his cronies. Though Marcos' economic policies were initially successful, crony capitalism and economic imperialism destroyed the benefits of much of that early success.⁴⁸ The armed resistance, both from the CPP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) also created a large drain on the army and the Filipino economy. The CPP during this time employed the tactic of "protracted people's war" and was moderately successful though nowhere near the support needed to defeat the whole of the Marcos military regime. Some women's groups, such as the Organization of Women for Freedom (KALAYAAAN; Katipunan ng Kababaihan Para sa *Kalayaan*), purposefully distanced themselves from the communist party because

⁴⁷ EDSA stands for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the famous main street in Manila which was full of demonstrators during the people's power revolution.

⁴⁸ Paul David Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (Cornell University Press, 1998).

they felt their needs and issues were not being sufficiently addressed. Along with other groups like Kilusan ng Kababaihan Pilipina (PILIPINA, or the Philippine Women's Movement), they organized specifically for women's issues, reproductive rights, sexual violence, and more.⁴⁹ The women's movement was once again developing a distinct platform within the left which was specifically about women's rights and needs, particularly indigenous women. This work would go on to help form the basis of organizing after the end of the dictatorship.

Then on August 21, 1983, Marcos assassinated Benigno Aquino, the most prominent opposition Senator who had been living in exile in the United States. This assassination alarmed and angered Filipinos at every level of society, including the middle class and the moderate elites who had thought themselves somewhat safe. This led more than a million Filipinos to take to the street in protest. This massive movement overtook the more radical resistance from the CPP and the MNLF. As popular resistance to the dictatorship exploded, women immediately stepped in to organize, forming new coalitions and alliances. It was during this time period the GABRIELA first formed as a coalition of different women's groups and organizations. GABRIELA took a strong stance against the dictatorship and organized around the issues which affected women most. In the Filipino Women's Manifesto they argued, "Our nation is in crisis. We, the women, know because we live in crisis every day. This crisis has exacerbated the specific forms of oppression that we have to contend with as women."⁵⁰ GABRIELA united women from areas and backgrounds, not for women's rights but in resistance to the dictatorship. Women from lower economic classes

⁴⁹ Carolyn I. Sobritchea, "Women's Movement in the Philippines and the Politics of Critical Collaboration with the State," *Civil Society in Southeast Asia*, 2004, 101–21.

⁵⁰ Dorothy Friesen, "The Women's Movement in the Philippines," *NWSA Journal*, 1989, 676–88.

indigenous women, and the peasantry had long been part of the women's movement as had certain parts of the middle class. However, middle class Filipina were now also organizing against the dictatorship en masse, forming organizations such as Women for Ouster of Marcos and Boycott (WOMB).⁵¹ United by GABRIELA, women's organizations grew stronger and stronger, creating spaces of *kalayaan* emphasizing freedom and community, forming a significant base of power.

In 1986, Marcos called for snap elections in an attempt to shore up his support and legitimize his government. His main opponent was Corazon "Cory" Aquino, the widow of the assassinated senator Aquino. Though Marcos declared himself the victor in these snap elections, there was obvious electoral fraud and his "victory" was widely rejected both internationally and within the Philippines. A military coup was launched days after the election and Marcos' refusal to concede and the coup was supported by over a million Filipinos in the streets of Manila. Three days after the coup was launched, Marcos and his family, at the urging of President Nixon, fled the Philippines for the safety of the United States.⁵² Cory Aquino was then installed as president in a moment of hope for the women's movement and the left which would ultimately be left unfulfilled.

Reproductive Rights and the road from Aquino to Duterte

Here, we begin our first case study, the road to the reproductive health bill. This particular issue was selected as a case study because it illuminates many of the seemingly contradictory relationships and alliances within the women's movement. It is an issue that

⁵¹ Gary Hawes, "MARCOS, HIS CRONIES, AND THE PHILIPPINES' FAILURE TO DEVELOP," in *Southeast Asian Capitalists* (Cornell University Press, 2018), 145–60.

⁵² Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

lies at the intersection of colonial legacies, imperialism, and the struggle between the right, the left, and the moderates in the Philippines. Contradictions began with the election of Corazon Aquino, the first female president in Asia. Though this may have seemed like a great victory for the left and the women's movement to those on the outside, for the women's movement on the left and particularly indigenous women, Aquino's victory was a disaster. At the beginning though, people still held out hope. In 1989 Judy Taguiwalo wrote,

“We hoped for basic reforms. For the first year I thought that some might take place. I am now convinced that there can be no real change under the present administration.

The struggle continues. It is rather like pre-martial law days except that the military is more intractable.”⁵³

Taguiwalo's comment shows one of the primary contradictions for the women's movement during this time period. The people of the Philippines had just won a large victory over a massive and oppressive dictatorship. For a while, it seemed that everything could change, not through armed struggle but through democratic processes. The women's movement and the left were therefore presented with the question of continuing with the armed struggle or engaging in the democratic process. The answer to this turned out to be largely to simply “do both”, depending on the different sectors and interests involved. Women on the left in particular turned to the task of building a new constitution and the divisions as well as alliances that would affect the Filipino women's movement for decades to come began to form. In the decades-long fight over reproductive health, the intersections between Catholic, imperialist, anti-leftist, anti-indigenous forces and the Aquino administration and those which

⁵³ Davis, *Revolutionary Struggle in the Philippines*.

came after became clear. Yet, women still made effective change, including through alliances with the state.

The fight over gender issues and particularly reproductive health in the Philippine Constitution of 1987 proved to be a foreshadowing of the fight that would continue in the decades ahead. GABRIELA was at the forefront of this fight, along with other women's groups, pushing for a democratic constitutional process. President Aquino formed a 48 member constitutional commission which was majority male. GABRIELA formed alliances with other women's groups across the political spectrum and pushed for a specific agenda of women's issues to be included in the constitution. These issues included not just political rights, but social and economic ones ranging from maternity benefits to women's inclusion in the economic development of the Philippines.⁵⁴ Though gender equality was included in the constitution, the majority of GABRIELA's demands were ignored.⁵⁵ There was also a major blow to reproductive health included in the 1987 Constitution which recognized "right to life of the mother and the unborn from conception". This provision in the constitution shows the incredible power of the Catholic Church. The Philippine Family Code was also passed and signed into law in 1987. This law drew both on Spanish colonial roots in the penal code and on newer doctrines directly from the Catholic Church. For example, nullification of marriage on the grounds of physiological incapacity was established following the 1983 edict of Pope John Paul II.⁵⁶ The framing of the issues of family law are filled with residue of Spanish colonialism. The obsession with controlling female sexuality echoes many of the same

⁵⁴ Friesen, "The Women's Movement in the Philippines."

⁵⁵ 'recognizes the role of women in national building and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men' 1987 Constitution Art. 11, Sec 14

⁵⁶ Carolina S. Ruiz Austria, "The Church, the State and Women's Bodies in the Context of Religious Fundamentalism in the Philippines," *Reproductive Health Matters* 12, no. 24 (2004): 96–103.

concerns of Legazpi, as we explored in Chapter 2. The residue of the (re)conquista can be seen in the figure of the resistant Mora as guilty/deviant with the figure of Cory Aquino as her opposite, a converted ally of oppression, loyal to the church and active part of oppressing women. In spite of the problems with the Family Code, which were many, other parts of the code were big wins for the women's movement. Old laws regarding gender roles and the family were changed so that at the very least men and women were on legally equal standing when it came to adultery.⁵⁷ Here, we can see the compromises made and how the passage of law like the Philippine Family Code can be both a victory and a loss in a difficult political context. Aquino had a very close relationship with the church that both helped her in her rise to power and assured that she would not deviate too far from the political wishes of the church.⁵⁸ The alliance between the church and the government of the Philippines proved too strong at this point in time. It is important to understand that not only are laws surrounding reproduction rooted in colonial Spanish Catholicism as explored in the history chapter, but the legacy lives on because of the enduring power of the church. However, as we will see with the Duterte administration, that power can be broken.

Aquino opened many doors for the women's movement, in the political realm and in development leading to the NGO-ization of a large sector of the women's movement. It was not only Aquino's government which opened these doors, but as Aquino came to power at the end of the UN decade for Women, 1975-1985, there was a great deal of international development interest around funding women's issues and development projects.⁵⁹ The

⁵⁷ Myrna S. Feliciano, "Law, Gender, and the Family in the Philippines," *Law and Society Review*, 1994, 547–60.

⁵⁸ Robert L. Youngblood, "The Corazon Aquino "Miracle" and the Philippine Churches," *Asian Survey* 27, no. 12 (1987): 1240–55.

⁵⁹ Mina Rocas and Louise Edwards, *Women's Movements in Asia: Feminisms and Transnational Activism* (Routledge, 2010).

presence of foreign aid and development money caused a fundamental change in the material relationship between women's groups and the state as well as among the groups themselves. Though women's groups were not able to make many advances in terms of the constitution or passing laws to protect reproductive health, they were able to form NGOs and offer reproductive health services to women. Over the next decade, women's groups would continue to deploy a diversity of tactics, working to pass legislation, offer services through NGOs, organize the working class, and make deals in collaboration with the government under certain, sometimes questionable circumstances.

In many ways, Aquino's administration would always be beholden to the popular movement which brought it to power. The same was not true of the next president, Fidel Ramos.⁶⁰ Though Ramos was endorsed by Aquino, their tactics and politics differed significantly. Upon assuming office, Ramos declared his belief in a strong state, the importance of international economic development, and strong ties with the allies of the Filipino state.⁶¹ This agenda put Ramos directly at odds with the left and they fought him from multiple levels throughout his presidency, including through the women's movement. GABRIELA organized protests against Ramos and his policies, particularly against his Medium Development plan. This plan involved many different aspects of the economy but it was very similar to the plan being pushed all over the world in "developing" countries, liberalize trade, industrialize the nation, and globalize the economy.⁶² Women on the left had multiple objections and those objections coincided directly with the indigenous women's movement building in the Cordilleras and in the south. Women's labor exploitation and the

⁶⁰ In office 1992-1998

⁶¹ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁶² Ibid

displacement of women due to industrialization and global capitalism formed the foundation of the campaign against Ramos.⁶³ In his effort to bring in foreign investment, Ramos opened up many formerly protected areas, including indigenous land to logging and mining companies. This was devastating to indigenous communities as they were subjected to bombing and military occupations. It is easy to see the residue of the Spanish colonial empire in both the rhetoric and the tactics surrounding this oppression and occupation of the Lumad people.

Like the Spanish, the Ramos administration claimed it was occupying and selling off indigenous territory for the good of the inhabitants. In his 1996 State of the Nation address Ramos said “As your President, I enjoin everyone to exorcise the ghosts of history. Let us cast aside our fears and our hurts. Let us give peace and development a chance in the southern Philippines.”⁶⁴ He was well aware that his actions against the indigenous people of Mindanao were built on a long line of oppression in the state that had been unconquerable. The women’s movement fight against this will be discussed further below in the section on Bai Bibyaon Ligkayan Bigkay and the Lumad Bakwit Save Our Schools Network. Ramos also removed protections through the liberalization of trade, directly affecting both indigenous women and GABRIELA’s main constituency, peasant and indigenous women. Ramos’ efforts to create a large industrial manufacturing sector also largely failed which, among other factors, lead to massive waves of Filipina migrant workers heading overseas. Ramos saw the economic opportunity presented by these workers and took steps to encourage them.⁶⁵ However, GABRIELA saw this as the exploitation of women and during

⁶³ Roces and Edwards, *Women’s Movements in Asia: Feminisms and Transnational Activism*.

⁶⁴ “Fidel V. Ramos, Fifth State of the Nation Address, July 22, 1996 | GOVPH,” accessed November 9, 2022, <https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1996/07/22/fidel-v-ramos-fifth-state-of-the-nation-address-july-22-1996/>.

⁶⁵ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

this period first began to organize around migrant women worker's issues which would only become of greater importance in the years to come.

The issue of reproductive health was not central to the movement for women's rights during this time period but it was also not forgotten. Multiple women's organizations embarked on education campaigns, producing materials like Bodytalk books which sought to provide education and open up spaces for more conversations surrounding women's health. NGOs were at the forefront not only of providing education but also actual women's health services. Likhaan is just such an organization, founded in 1994 by former GABRIELA member Sylvia Estrada-Claudio. Likhaan opened clinics in lower class neighborhoods and provided healthcare services directly to women.⁶⁶ They also advocated for the passage of legislation around abortion and even made deals with congressmen in order to attempt to pass legislation. Sylvia recalls,

We rushed to support this crazy Congressman who, for reasons unfathomable to us, tabled a bill to legalize abortions and helped him craft a bill for the exemptions we thought would be a reasonable first step. The man was a typical macho warlord, by the way. He had no fear of losing his district because his family had controlled the voters there since forever. He owned a yellow Mercedes sports car and packed a 45-calibre pistol. He liked the female attention we gave him because of his bill. In fairness, though, he merely flirted with some of us. I guess it was enough that we defended him in the media, newspapers, etc. The bill never progressed, of course.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Roces and Edwards, *Women's Movements in Asia: Feminisms and Transnational Activism*.

⁶⁷ Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, "What Binds Us?," *International Campaign for Women's Right to Safe Abortion (SAWR)*.

This is an example of the compromises made by women's groups. It is important to note that such agreements come from a realist and pragmatist standpoint even while the organizations and activists themselves hold on to radical goals. Women's groups made decisions to attempt to better the lives of women, even if that meant working with corrupt and misogynist politicians. While the deal made by Likhaan in this example was unsuccessful, women in the future would make similar deals and succeed.

The armed leftist movement, the NPA reached quite a low point during the Ramos presidency, with only 6,000 members in 1994 in comparison to 25,000 in 1987.⁶⁸ There were various reasons for this fall in membership, not least among them the internal politics and problematic leadership of the CPP especially with indigenous issues. This was also part of the reason for the change in tactics among leftist organizations, including women's movements. Armed struggle did not seem like a realistic option. However, other armed struggles were more successful and grew in size. The MNLF signed a peace agreement in 1996 establishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. However, many parts of the MNLF refused to accept this peace agreement and broke off to form their own groups including Abu Sayyaf.⁶⁹ This also helped set the groundwork for the crackdown that would come.

Following the pattern of Filipino politics, Ramos was succeeded by his vice president, Jose Estrada. A former movie star, Estrada was initially popular, running on the slogan "Erap para sa Mahihirap" (Estrada for the poor) but the veneer quickly wore off. Halfway through his term, popular sentiment in the Philippines was not in favor of the state. The

⁶⁸ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁶⁹ Abinales and Amoroso.

economy was hurting, the government was spending millions on the war against the Muslim separatist movement, and the promised anti-poverty programs did not appear.⁷⁰ Additionally, Estrada developed a reputation for corruption and backdoor deals which invited comparisons with the Marcos dictatorship, a comparison which foreshadowed the end of the Estrada presidency. However, the situation was complex and could not be explained in terms of left vs. right. Estrada was opposed by a vast coalition of different groups calling for his resignation, including GABRIELA, PILIPINAS, and other leftist women's groups as well as the legal arms of the CPP. There were several different issues that united most of the left against Estrada besides the issue mentioned above. One of the most prominent was the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which allowed for the presence of US troops on Filipino soil and prevented them from being prosecuted under Filipino law. This agreement and the organizing for its repeal will be further discussed in the case of Jennifer Laude but it is important to note the VFA and the presence of US troops on Filipino soil as a key issue for both the left, indigenous people, and for the government. As a GABRIELA press release after one of their anti-Estrada demonstrations explains,

“The Estrada administration's pro-VFA stance is anti-women as this virtually endorses the sale of Filipino women and children to prostitution. This contradicts President Estrada's 'pro-people' posturing, a clear indication that he is no different from the past administrations”.⁷¹

Ultimately the majority of the left was able to unite around a popular movement to oust Estrada. This was called EDSA 2, and people gathered at the shrine of the movement that

⁷⁰ Abinales and Amoroso.

⁷¹ “Estrada's Pro-VFA Stance Is Anti-Women,”

had ousted Marcos. Communication spread quickly by text and telephone and over 1 million people massed calling for Estrada to resign which he finally did on January 20, 2001.⁷²

However, there was also a smaller contingent of people, ex-communists who had joined the Estrada administration as well as popular support from working class areas that violently clashed with the police and the military. This was called EDSA 3 by some and was quite shocking to part of the left.⁷³ It indicated not so much a split, as various splits had been happening for years, but more concerning, a disconnect between the NGOs often staffed by the middle class and sponsored by part of the elite, and the working class. Organizations like GABRIELA, PILIPINAS, and others would have to walk a careful line in the years to come, between government collaboration in attempts to pass meaningful legislation and becoming disconnected from their base.

From an outside perspective, gaining a female president may have seemed like a win for the women's movement but the administration of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010) was the complete opposite. The crackdown began almost immediately upon Arroyo taking office. There was already a great deal of concern, both nationally and internationally about the growth of groups like Abu Sayyaf in spite of the peace agreement with the MNLF. The panic over the Muslim separatists movement multiplied exponentially after 9/11 and paved the way for the US military and for fascist tactics from the Arroyo administration. In less than a year, the US sent over 93 million dollars in military aid to the Philippines in addition to over 1,000 troops.⁷⁴ This helped Arroyo solidify state power and justify her agenda. As

⁷² Carl H. Landé, "The Return of 'People Power' in the Philippines," *Journal of Democracy* 12, no. 2 (2001): 88–102.

⁷³ Abinales and Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines*.

⁷⁴ Larry Nicksch, "Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation" (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2007).

part of her right wing, religious and conservative agenda, Arroyo immediately began to attack the progress on reproductive health that had been made by NGOs but those groups continued to push back. In 2001, the first bill with “Reproductive Health” in the title was filed by Bella Angara with the support of the Reproductive Health Advocacy Network (RHAN). RHAN came together as a group of different women’s organizations, health organizations, and LGBTQ organizations including branches of GABRIELA, Likhaan, the DSWP.⁷⁵ While this type of coalition was not new, it was a space of *kalayaan*, a broadening of the women’s movement in a firm and open alliance with queer groups.

Twice more during the Arroyo administration, in 2004 and 2008 a form of the RH bill was proposed though it was not passed. Women’s groups in alliance with others continued to push forward resiliently but Arroyo firmly pushed back. Her administration passed an order through the health department banning the emergency contraceptive pill, which had been approved by the Department of Health previously due to the work of various activist groups. The women lead department attempted to reopen this issue but Pres. Arroyo and her administration continued to make moves to restrict the availability of contraception, such as categorizing the IUD as an abortifacient. On international women’s day in 2003, Arroyo announced that the government would be focusing exclusively on “natural” methods of family planning and gave over a 50,000,000 peso grant to a conservative religious organization called Couples for Christ, in order to carry out this plan.⁷⁶ From the United States to the Catholic church, we can see the alliance between the Arroyo administration

⁷⁵ Reproductive Health Advocacy Network (rhan), “Reproductive Health Advocacy Network: ATTENTION RHAN MEMBERS;,” *Reproductive Health Advocacy Network* (blog), July 3, 2008, http://reproductivehealthadvocacynetwork.blogspot.com/2008/07/attention-rhan-members_03.html.

⁷⁶ Ruiz Austria, “The Church, the State and Women’s Bodies in the Context of Religious Fundamentalism in the Philippines.”

imperialism and neocolonialism. The Spanish colonial residue of promoting marriage and conversion permeated the Arroyo administration. This was clearly identified and called out by activist groups like GABRIELA who saw the Arroyo administration as on par with the Marcos dictatorship using the tactics and prisons that had been in place since the Spanish attempted to crush the revolution.⁷⁷ Like Marcos, Arroyo used the police and the military to attempt to crush leftist opposition and her stubborn fight to hold on to power using increasing fascists methods would help bring about her eventual downfall.

On February 24, 2006, Arroyo declared a state of emergency after a coup d'état attempt. This was followed by a series of arrests of indigenous activists and leftists including Rep. Liza Maza of the GABRIELA Women's party as well as other prominent leftist leaders. This move was part of a pattern of persecution during the Arroyo administration that continued to be directed by leftists and women activists as part of a campaign of oppression. Over the next years of the Arroyo administration, there was a series of extrajudicial killings aimed at activists, even prompting a United Nations investigation. One of the prominent women activists who was also a witness in the United Nations investigation, Siche Bustamante-Gandinao was openly murdered in front of her husband and daughter. In spite of pressure from the United Nations, no one was ever charged with her death. These counter insurgency tactics are filled with the residue of US imperialism through the presence of troops, military aid, training and other forms of support.⁷⁸ As many others have pointed out, the Philippines have acted as the US testing ground for counter insurgency and anti-terrorism

⁷⁷ Carlos H. Conde, "Arroyo Legacy Tour Troubles Her Critics," *The New York Times*, May 7, 2010, sec. World, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/asia/07iht-legacy.html>.

⁷⁸ Peter M. Sales, "State Terror in the Philippines: The Alston Report, Human Rights and Counter-Insurgency under the Arroyo Administration," *Contemporary Politics* 15, no. 3 (2009): 321–36.

tactics.⁷⁹ Here we again see the legacy of the (re)conquista intersecting with the residues of resistance to Spanish and American imperialism and colonialism. US military reports and analysis commonly call the “Moro War” the first counterinsurgency operation carried out by American soldiers.⁸⁰ The figure of the Moro/a as the ultimate threat which justifies any level of violence can be seen in the bombings and open murders of activists. Repressive government forces act with US support, in an alliance between imperialism and fascism that seeks to crush revolutionary/Moro/indigenous opposition. These three groups are conflated together in what the Arroyo administration labels as the Mindanao problem which is just a relabeling of what the Spanish and then the Americans referred to as the Moro problem. The murder of Siche Bustamante-Gandinao was not an isolated incident but a pattern, reminiscent of the Marcos administration that would continue on through Duterte. Indeed, it was during the Arroyo administration that Duterte earned the nickname “The Punisher” from a Time magazine article sharing that title.⁸¹ GABRIELA, PILIPINAS, KMK and other women’s organizations did not take these attacks lying down and worked to expand their networks and alliances, creating spaces of *kalayaan*.

GABRIELA responded to the Arroyo administration in several ways. First, they organized demonstrations speaking out loudly and consistently about the human rights violations, the ongoing oppression of women workers, the problems of US imperialism and the VFA, along with many other issues. They advocated for the release of those charged

⁷⁹ Alfred McCoy, *A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation, from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Metropolitan Books, 2007).

⁸⁰ Ronald K. Edgerton, *American Datu: John J. Pershing and Counterinsurgency Warfare in the Muslim Philippines, 1899-1913* (University Press of Kentucky, 2020); William N. Holden, “The Role of Geography in Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Philippine American War, 1899–1902,” *GeoJournal* 85, no. 2 (2020): 423–37.

⁸¹ PHIL ZABRISKIE, “The Punisher,” *Time*, July 19, 2002, <http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,265480-1,00.html>.

with instigating rebellion and were eventually successful in getting those charges dropped.⁸²

GABRIELA also expanded, forming Gabriela Youth, and international Gabriela chapters that allowed the increasing number of Filipina women in the diaspora to organize for change both abroad and at home. Upon her charges being dropped, Liza Maza and other women activists and politicians continued to push the Arroyo administration on reproductive health, the VFA and other issues. Because of the US and Catholic support for the Arroyo regime there was little progress to be made on these issues. However, the Magna Carta for Women was a place where women's organizations were able to push the Arroyo administration and find a place for compromise even within such a repressive administration. The successful passage of the Magna Carta for Women demonstrates the importance of the strong relationship between NGOs as well as CSOs, politicians, and activist groups. The relationships are also often confusing since important individual actors, for example Liza Maza, are simultaneously members of all three groups. What this does is allow for both informal and formal modes of engagement at multiple levels as shown by Gay Francisco's study of the role of CSOs and the Magna Carta for Women.⁸³ As my interviews with activists will show in the following section, it is precisely these informal modes of engagement, along with public call outs, and flexible alliances that would be key to finally passing the reproductive healthcare law.

Bengino Aquino III took office in June of 2010 and with his presidency groups in favor of the RH bill saw an opportunity to get it passed at long last. In contrast to his mother Cory Aquino and Arroyo, he was much less beholden to the Catholic Church because he did

⁸² Ninotchka Rosca, "Media Silence on Major Asia Story: Philippine Congresswoman Charged with Rebellion; Women's Movement - Women's Media Center," <https://womensmediacenter.com/news-features/media-silence-on-major-asia-story-philippine-congresswoman-charged-with-reb>.

⁸³ Gay Marie Manalo Francisco, "Utilizing Informal Modes of Engagement: Civil Society, Substantive Representation of Women, and the Philippine Women's Rights Law," *Journal of Civil Society*, 2021, 1–17.

not have to rely on them for so much support during his election. While there are various reasons for this, there was a recognition during the Arroyo administration by an increasing number of people not just on the far left but also more towards the middle, that the Catholic Church wielded an undue amount of influence on Filipino politics. The church was losing public goodwill worldwide due to the sexual abuse scandals as reflected by the 2001 apology of Pope John Paul II and losing ground in the Philippines as reflected by a survey that showed only 37% of Filipinos attended mass weekly in 2013 vs. 64% in 1991.⁸⁴ The move away from the Church was reflected in the increasing number of groups pushing for secularism, exemplified by the group Filipino Freethinkers (FFT).⁸⁵ The Filipino Freethinkers started as a small, younger organization without many of the connections of the older and more established organizations. However, they quickly rose to prominence through their creative protest actions.

In 2010 the Filipino Freethinkers hosted an “Excommunication Party” with the slogan “If Supporting the RH Bill Means Excommunication, Excommunicate Me!”. This protest was the first of its kind and brought together representatives of the CSW and DSWP. It was also very popular with the public, drawing a large crowd not in spite of but precisely because of its provocative title. This type of support was very important to politicians and lawmakers, including Aquino who was threatened with excommunication over his support for the bill. Aquino was no radical champion of women’s rights but he was a shrewd politician. Rather than using the term reproductive health, Aquino used the term “Responsible Parenthood” in order to try and evade the ire of the CBCP though he was

⁸⁴ Manuel Victor J. Sapitula and Jayeel S. Cornelio, “Foreword to the Special Issue: A Religious Society? Advancing the Sociology of Religion in the Philippines,” *Philippine Sociological Review*, 2014, 1–9.

⁸⁵ Interviews with an organizer for the Filipino Free Thinkers. Conducted in person by author in August of 2020.

largely unsuccessful, for a while he tried to walk a more neutral line. However, the alliance of women's groups, secular groups, health groups and others pushed back hard and put increasing pressure on the Aquino administration. The FFT found evidence of corruption between the church and the government and organized a protest where they dressed up as bishops receiving bribes. They organized a die-in of women to shed light on the maternal mortality rate. There was a protest where women wore false bellies and masks with Aquino's face, asking Aquino what if you could become pregnant. The very next day they received a call from Aquino's chief of staff, trying to convince them that Aquino was on their side. Even though the president was in theory on their side, the FFT consistently pushed against him in order to keep up the pressure.⁸⁶ The use of the media was a key part of this strategy, and these actions consistently landed on the front pages of large news publications.

In working to pass the RH bill, it was not only secular organizations who got involved but there were even alliances made with Catholic organizations and priests in order to try to pass this bill. Though normally these groups would be on opposite sides when it came to the issue of reproductive health, women's organizations and even secular organizations like the FFT. These flexible alliances with groups ranging from politicians to religious leaders are what eventually enabled the passage of the RH bill in 2012. It was particularly effective on Aquino's administration and his actions were responsible for the eventual passage of the bill. He used different procedural rules and powers of the executive branch to push the bill forward. As one legislator put it "It gives the RH bill an added boost coming no less than PNoy (Aquino) himself. It totally changes the complexion of the bill."⁸⁷ However, the

⁸⁶ Interviews with an organizer for the Filipino Free Thinkers. Conducted in person by author in August of 2020.

⁸⁷ Jean Paul L. Zialcita, "Presidential Influence in the Legislative Process: The Passage of the RH Bill in the Philippine House of Representatives," *Philippine Social Sciences Review* 71, no. 1 (2019).

opposition on the part of the CBCP was working on their own plan. Aquino paid a high price for his support of the RH bill and spent a huge amount of his political capital on its passage.⁸⁸ The CBCP also worked to have the RH bill stalled in other ways. In 2013, the Supreme Court delayed the implementation of the RH bill and though they eventually ruled the RH bill constitutional in 2014, they struck down many key provisions of the law. The CBCP also put pressure on the agencies in charge implementing different parts of the law from the Ministry of Education to the Food and Drug Administration. As the Aquino presidency came to an end, women's groups looked around for new allies to push for the full implementation of the RH bill and found them in the next president, Rodrigo Duterte.

Finally, we reach the Duterte presidency and the heart of the puzzle of the relation between Duterte, the left, the women's movements and activists, US imperialism and Spanish Catholic colonialism. Like his American counterpart Trump, Duterte's unexpected rise to power has invited many different theories and explanations. One of the most hotly debated topics is the nature of the relationship between Duterte and the left. Some prominent Filipino academics and politicians, foremost among them Walden Bello, have dismissed the left as weak and complicit in Duterte's regime. Joseph Scalice attributes the alliance between the left and Duterte to the Stalinist politics of CPP founder Joma Sison, an argument vehemently rejected by Sison resulting in a social media war between the two.⁸⁹ Others, including some of the activists I interviewed denied any sort of relationship at all. However, I argue that the relationship between Duterte and the women's movements offer new insight

⁸⁸ Interviews with an organizer for the Filipino Free Thinkers. Conducted in person by author in August of 2020.

⁸⁹ Joseph Scalice, "First as Tragedy, Second as Farce: Marcos, Duterte and the Communist Parties of the Philippines," World Socialist Web Site, accessed January 25, 2022, <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/09/01/lect-s01.html>; See also, Joseph Scalice, "We Are Siding with Filipino Capitalists," *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia* 36, no. 1 (2021): 1–39.

into the Duterte administration. It needs to be understood in the context of the history and evolution both of the left and women's movements as explored earlier in this chapter and in the framework of the shifting and flexible alliances where one minute someone is your friend, as in the case of the RH bill and the next they are your worst enemy as is shown in the subsequent case studies.

Currently, there are very few if any people remaining on the left who would publicly express any sort of support for Duterte. However, this was not the case during his presidential campaign. From the beginning, Duterte was vehemently anti- Catholic Church, famously calling the Pope a "son of a whore". Here Duterte broke an alliance between the power of the Catholic Church stretching all the way back to Spanish colonialism. Duterte was able to harness a populist and anticolonial sentiment. In this interruption of the traditional alliances against women's rights in particular reproductive health and divorce, some women activists saw an opportunity. Before he even officially declared his bid for the presidency, Luz Ilagan, elected representative and spokesperson of the GWP stated "Duterte is not just that high profile but in his own quiet way, he supports gender development advocacy".⁹⁰ Later in his campaign, Ilagan made another statement asking for voters to support Duterte and look beyond his words and actions to the potential of what he could do for women in the future.⁹¹ Though GWP as an organization backpedaled on this statement and issued several clarifications, both the statement and the internal division over it indicate several important things. First, it shows that there was a certain amount of optimism over what Duterte could potentially do for the women's movement. He had already made strong

⁹⁰ Philippine Daily Inquirer, "Duterte Draws Support of Gender Rights Groups," INQUIRER.net, June 14, 2015, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/698277/duterte-draws-support-of-gender-rights-groups>.

⁹¹ ABS-CBN News, "Gabriela Clarifies: We Are against Womanizing," ABS-CBN News, February 29, 2016, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/halalan2016/nation/02/29/16/gabriela-clarifies-we-are-against-womanizing>.

statements in support of reproductive health, had implemented programs for the distribution of contraceptives during his time as mayor in Davao, and showed a willingness to completely disregard the opposition from the CBCP and Catholic Church more generally. Put in this light, it does not seem so out of the question for women's groups and activists to make an alliance with Duterte.

However, there was also a great deal of internal resistance to publicly expressing any sort of support for Duterte because his blatant misogyny was already clear. The GWP was far from the only group on the left to express some sort of support for Duterte during his campaign. Joma Sison, the head of the CPP discussed earlier in this chapter, made statements in support of Duterte calling him “the first Left president of the Philippines who is determined to uphold national independence, expand democracy for the people, carry out national industrialization and land reform and realize an independent foreign policy”.⁹² With the advantage of hindsight, statements like these may seem wildly out of sync with reality, it is important to remember the context not just of the presidential election but of Duterte and his relationship to the communist party. As stated earlier, Duterte was part of KM, the nationalist youth wing of the communist party founded by Sison. They came out of the same political movement and though their paths diverged it seemed as though they were moving back together. In the context of both authoritarianism and communist nationalism the roots of Duterte's category defying politics and ideology become more understandable.⁹³ The relationship, in particular between Sison as the head of the CPP and Duterte during his

⁹² Jose Sison, “Filipino Communist Rebels Support Duterte's Rift with US Policy | Opinion | TeleSUR English,” <https://www.telesurenglish.net/opinion/Filipino-Communist-Rebels-Support-Dutertes-Rift-with-US-Policy-20161025-0014.html>.

⁹³ Lisandro E. Claudio and Patricio Abinales, “Dutertismo, Maoismo, Nasyonalismo,” *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency*, 2017, 93–110.

campaign and the early years of his presidency also point to the continual presence of an ongoing problem in the left of not fully upholding and centering women's issues and concerns.

However, Duterte did come through on his promise on the RH bill in the first year of his presidency issuing an executive order mandating the implementation of the bill. This was a big win for advocates, activists, and women in the Philippines. The executive order resulted in the creation of the National Implementation Team for the RH bill which included many members of the RHAN including the FFT. Duterte also appointed women to cabinet positions, not as some kind of tokenism but women who were well respected on the left. He appointed Judy Taguiwalo as secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and Luz Ilagan as undersecretary as well as Liza Maza as National Anti-Poverty Commission chief. These were significant and controversial appointments. The hearings over Taguiwalo's appointment were fraught with accusations of radical leftism and GABRIELA advocated on Taguiwalo's behalf though ultimately her appointment was rejected. At this time, the relationship between Duterte and the women's movement was complicated. In spite of some support for Duterte from certain parts of the women's movements, there was much more opposition. Despite the progressive reproductive health Duterte implemented as Mayor of Davao, he was clearly no champion of women's rights and this was clear. However, Duterte's break with the Catholic Church and the powers of Spanish colonialism gave hope for a possible alliance that was successful in the case of the RH bill. Duterte's stance against US imperialism similarly gave hope on one of the central issues for the women's movement, the VFA and EDCA. However, as the next case study will show, Duterte not only failed to fulfill these hopes but betrayed his anti US imperialism ideals in

favor of a fascist oppression of Muslims, indigenous people, misogyny, violence and the same American imperialism he claimed to oppose.

The Murder of Jennifer Laude and the Resurrection of the Babaylan

Early on in his presidency, Duterte made international headlines when he called then US president Barack Obama “son of a bitch” during one of his speeches. This shocked both the US and the international community prompting outrage. Analysts called Duterte crazy, foul mouthed and a dictator. However, this statement was not unpopular in the Philippines where activists, especially on the left and within the women’s rights movement had been working to rid the Philippines of all US military bases and presence of US troops. The full context of Duterte’s statement provides more insight, “I am a president of a sovereign state and we have long ceased to be a colony. I do not have any master except the Filipino people, nobody but nobody. You must be respectful.” In his comments afterwards, Duterte argued that the Philippines had never received an apology from the United States for all the death and destruction caused by US imperialism, highlighting the massacre of Muslims in Mindanao by US forces.⁹⁴ This was not a one-time statement but representative of the nationalist and anti-imperialist standpoint of Duterte’s position on US-Philippine relations. During his campaign and his early presidency, it seemed that Duterte had broken another traditional alliance between the government and the US which left the opportunity for the left and specifically women’s groups to push forward the campaign against US imperialism. As previously discussed, the VFA was framed from the very beginning as a women’s rights issue. VFA opponents, GABRIELA being one of the leaders, cited violence against women,

⁹⁴ “Philippines Leader Issues Vulgar Threat to Obama,” <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-obama-son-of-a-bitch-i-will-swear-at-you/>.

rape, prostitution and other concerns. The VFA also established the Balikatan, the most prominent annual joint military exercises between the Philippines and the US. This is a prime example of the projection of US imperial power in Asia which has only grown in importance to the US military strategy in the South China Sea. In 2014, the Aquino administration signed EDCA, a direct answer to China's actions on several islands in the South China Sea.⁹⁵ GABRIELA along with other women's organizations mobilized, pushing back against this agreement on multiple levels. They petitioned the Supreme Court to have it ruled unconstitutional, they tried to pass bills through the legislature and they organized protests. Throughout this mobilization, GABRIELA directly connected US imperialism with violence against women in the Philippines.⁹⁶ Tragically, only six months later, their point would be proven true with the tragic murder of Jennifer Laude.

Jennifer Laude was a transpinay⁹⁷ woman brutally murdered by US soldier Joseph Pemberton on October 11, 2014. This murder immediately sparked national outrage as pictures were released and horrifying details of the murder came to light. GABRIELA and other women's organizations quickly mobilized, along with Bahaghari and queer rights organizations. At the beginning, the demand was simple for Pemberton to be arrested, kept in Filipino custody and tried under Philippine jurisdiction in the Philippines. Her funeral was held on October 24 and Akbayan representative Bello spoke, calling Laude ““simbolo ng bansang inaapi (symbol of an oppressed nation).”⁹⁸ Indeed, Laude became a symbol that sat

⁹⁵ Elanor Albert, “The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance,” accessed March 18, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/background/usa-philippines-defense-alliance>.

⁹⁶ Interviews with GABRIELA organizers. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

⁹⁷ From my interviews with LGBT+ organizations, this is the preferred term used by trans Filipina women, including Laude herself

⁹⁸ “Jennifer Laude, Symbol of ‘oppressed’ Nation, Laid to Rest,” *RAPPLER* (blog), October 24, 2014, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/72948-jennifer-laude-laid-rest/>.

at the intersection of the forces of oppression within the Philippines from US imperialism, to the ideas about gender and sexuality imported by Spanish colonialism, classism, and transmisogyny. In the documentary film *Call Her Ganda*, transpinay activist Naomi Fontanos draws clear connection between the oppression of transwomen in the Philippines and Spanish colonialism. She recalls the figure of the babaylan as a feminine role of great power that could be taken on by anyone who chose to inhabit the feminine.⁹⁹ In the tragic death of Jennifer Laude, the babaylan is resurrected as a decolonial symbol that breaks down the gender binary and calls her people to action against oppression in a residual structure of resistance. Laude's story, not only her death but her life, reflected the residue of the ongoing oppression of Filipina women and the connection with American imperialism.

Laude lived in Olongapo, the town nearest to Subic Bay where the Baliktan took place every year. Laude worked in prostitution, the work she was engaged in at the time of her murder, a market created by the presence of US troops and the special economic zone in Subic bay. The names of US military bases, especially Subic, in the Philippines have become “infamous bywords for licentiousness for their off-base ‘entertainment’ economies and patterns of military sexual violence.”¹⁰⁰ Thus, a state of exception is carved out where the most oppressed members of society can be hyper exploited. Prostitution in this zone is not the same as “sex work” because of the classed and racialized nature of the work within and exploitative system.¹⁰¹ Activists have pointed out the residual parallels between the exploitation of Filipinas and the exploitation of the Philippines as a whole. On the micro

⁹⁹ *Call Her Ganda*, 2018; Curran Nault, “Documenting the Dead: Call Her Ganda and the Trans Activist Afterlife of Jennifer Laude,” *Transgender Studies Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (2021): 24–57.

¹⁰⁰ Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez, *Securing Paradise: Tourism and Militarism in Hawai'i and the Philippines* (Duke University Press, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822395942>.

¹⁰¹ Zachary Frial, “Transgender, Transnational, Transpinay: Jennifer Laude and Trans Necropolitics in the Philippines” (Honors thesis, Georgetown University, 2018).

level individual women are exploited and on the macro level the Philippines herself is exploited by the United States. As activists explained during my interviews, for many years, there have been countless reports of violence against women that have gone ignored both in Subic Bay but also in the Philippines as a whole. This is doubly true for transpinay women who are at even greater risk of violence. However, Laude's case broke this cycle.¹⁰² Protests were organized and thousands of people came out to demand justice. There was a viral social media campaign calling for #JusticeforJennifer and #JunktheVFA. The relationships formed between LGBT+ organizations and women's organizations in spaces of *kalayaan* during the previous decades of working together on issues from reproductive health to lesbian rights allowed the establishment of powerful, decolonial, *kalayaan* coalitions that would continue to push the fight for justice for Jennifer Laude forward for years to come.

There was little doubt about guilt in the Pemberton case due to the overwhelming evidence, both photographic and biological. However, Pemberton still entered a plea of not guilty and argued that he felt "raped" by Laude because Laude had not disclosed that she was trans. Though Pemberton was convicted, the charge was downgraded from murder to homicide and Jennifer's transpinay identity was cited by the judge as the reason for the downgrade of the charges.¹⁰³ This showed how transpinay lives were devalued, not just by the forces of US imperialism but within Filipino courts permeated with the residue of Spanish colonialism and the gender binary. The decision reflected the transphobia and discrimination rampant not just within the judicial system but in society. LGTB+ groups, women's organizations, and the wider left renewed calls for protection under the law in the

¹⁰² Interviews with two LGBT+ organizers. Conducted in person by author in September of 2019.

¹⁰³ "Pemberton Guilty of Homicide," *RAPPLER* (blog), December 1, 2015, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/114533-pemberton-ruling-jennifer-laude/>.

form of SOGIE, a bill which forbid discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. There was also a new wave of demands to #JunkVFA, especially as Duterte assumed office since this was one of the promises made on the campaign trail. Duterte showed sympathy for the Laude case even going so far as to make personal donations to the Laude family.¹⁰⁴ The Laude case was a chance for Duterte to show if he was serious about acting to end US imperialism in the Philippines. However, as his actions would prove, Duterte was invested in the web of misogyny, transphobia and imperialism.

Duterte was not long in office before he angered many people in the Philippines by moving forward with the burial of former dictator Ferdinand Marcos in the official “Hero’s Cemetery”. Though Marcos died in 1989 in Hawaii, his family and many other pro Marcus political leaders in the Philippines wanted him buried with full honors at the hero’s cemetery. However, activists on the left as well, many people in the Philippines saw this as a slap in the face to all of those who suffered and died under the Marcos regime. Six different petitions were filed in the Supreme Court to attempt to stop the burial but they were unsuccessful.¹⁰⁵ The Duterte administration attempted to do a surprise burial and get it done quickly, without protest, but organizations on the left, waned, and quickly mobilized in protest. Gabriella in particular organized a series of protests that connected the Marcos regime with violence against women with slogans like “#NEVERFORGET women victims of martial law.”¹⁰⁶ Duterte also made headlines multiple times for his “rape jokes”. Not only did he make jokes over the rape of women committed by Filipino soldiers in Marawi city, jokes about raping the Ms. Universe pageant contestant, as well as jokes about an Australian missionary who

¹⁰⁴ Interviews with two LGBT+ organizers. Conducted in person by author in September of 2019.

¹⁰⁵ Nicole Curato, *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presidency* (Cornell University Press, 2017).

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with GABRIELA organizers. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

was raped, saying he would've liked to go 1st, he and his administration defended these comments, insisting that Filipino people understood his humor.¹⁰⁷ For activists in Gabriela, the statements were not jokes, rather they were part of a campaign of state misogyny and violence, perpetuating the residual violence of Spanish colonialism against women that directly resulted in an increase in violence against women.¹⁰⁸ Again, there were protests and those on the left who had been cooperating with the Duterte administration began to drop off one by one. It is important to understand that Gabriela and many leftist organizations never stopped being critical of Duterte. Though there was cooperation with his administration, especially early on, it was made very clear both in my interviews and the protest actions as well as social media campaigns by Gabriela and others that the Duterte administration remained squarely under fire by women's groups. Women's groups also remained under fire from the Duterte administration. Not only did Duterte endorse state violence but also the imperial violence of the United States in the case of Jennifer Laude.

Like with many other issues of concern to the left and to women's rights movements, Duterte claimed to be sympathetic to the Laude case, even going so far as to make donations to her family. During the time I did my interviews some hope still lingered that he would cancel or at least modify both EDCA and the VFA. In February of 2020, Duterte announced that he would cancel the VFA and make good on his promise of asserting Filipino sovereignty. GABRIELA celebrated this move while remaining critical of future possibilities of new agreements with the US or other militaries.¹⁰⁹ GABRIELA's caution and suspicion on this issue were proven to be correct as Duterte suspended the cancellation of the

¹⁰⁷ "Filipinos Get Duterte's Rape Jokes, an Aide Says," *Time*, July 17, 2017, <https://time.com/4860432/rodrigo-duterte-rape-joke-miss-universe/>.

¹⁰⁸ Interviews with GABRIELA organizers. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

¹⁰⁹ Feb 13, 2020 statement by GWP Rep. Brosas

VFA in June of the same year and began to make moves on the Laude case. In September of 2020, Duterte issued a full pardon for Pemberton, betraying not only the Laude family but any and all promises of asserting Filipino sovereignty and independence from the United States. Once again, GABRIELA, Bahaghari, and other organizations mobilized in protest as well as continuing to push forward the SOGIE bill and explicitly include Laude's case as part of the legislation. The fight continues on even now with the SOGIE bill, the longest running bill in Senate interpolation in Filipino history.¹¹⁰ The alliance between organizations like women's organizations like GABRIELA and LGBT+ organizations like Bahagari have been strengthened greatly under the Duterte administration. This is not because of any sort of support from Duterte but rather the opposite, their bonds have strengthened because of the persecution and betrayals they have endured. This can be seen in all the effective mass mobilizations and the drive to continue pushing legislation forward. In spite of all this, their efforts to change the law have not been able to triumph against the forces of US imperialism, the transphobia of the residual Catholic colonial legacy, and the misogyny of Duterte.

Bai Bibyaon Ligkayan Bigkay and *Kalayaan* as a structure of resistance

As discussed in Chapter 2, indigenous women have long been at the center of resistance to colonialism, imperialism, and misogyny. This remains true as Bai Bibyaon Ligkayan Bigkay¹¹¹ and the Lumad Save our Schools network in alliance with GABRIELA and other women's rights organizations lead the fight against Duterte's oppression of the Lumad people in their ancestral homelands. Bai Bibiyaon is the only female chieftain in her

¹¹⁰ "4 Myths about SOGIE Equality Bill Debunked," accessed March 20, 2022, <https://www.cnnphilippines.com/lifestyle/2021/7/21/myths-about-sogie-equality-bill-debunked.html>.

¹¹¹ Bai is an honorific given to respected women and Bibyaon is her title as chieftain of her tribe

tribe's history and she has been a leader and advocate for all indigenous people of the Philippines. She is also a pioneer of indigenous women's rights and she founded the "Sabokahan to mo Lumad Kamalitanan" (Confederation of Lumad Women). When I met and subsequently interviewed Bai Bibyaon in 2019, she was living at the UP Diliman campus along with another woman leader and about 75 Lumad students who were sheltering there. They were at the UP Diliman campus because of the systematic persecution from the government, designed to displace Lumad people from their lands. As Bai Bibyaon explained, indigenous women are at the forefront of the movement for indigenous rights because they must be, in order to protect themselves, their communities, and their children. Like indigenous women in other places, including in the United States, Lumad and other indigenous women experience a higher rate of murder, rape, and disappearance. According to the testimonies of Bai Bibyaon and other women leaders, this has only increased since the Duterte administration came into power.

When I spoke with Bai Bibyaon it was clear she was accustomed to telling her life story which was in large part a story of resistance. Bai Bibyaon recounted how she rose to power through her role as tagahusay, a leader who mediates conflict and brings about peace in her community. For Bai Bibyaon, peacemaking in her community was a practice of resistance that stretched back to the days of Spanish colonialism when the Spanish would try and divide indigenous communities through alliance making and conversion. Bai Bibyaon worked to build spaces of freedom and community which epitomize the residual structure of resistance in the form of *kalayaan*. Bai Bibyaon recounted how she participated in armed movements against mining and logging companies as well as government forces since the 1970s. She spoke of their most successful armed resistance which took place during the

1990s against the mining and logging operations of Alcantara and Sons. Bai Bibyaon explained that they used indigenous methods of warfare that had been successful against the Spanish, Americans, and the Japanese. She described setting traps and destroying machinery. Bai Bibyaon described the importance of the trees in the Pantaron range which hold a religious spiritual significance. These trees are also integral to the eco system as they are the only type of tree where certain species of bird's nest. The trees themselves are part of the residual structures of *kalayaan*, spiritually connecting Bai Bibyaon and her community to the resistance of their ancestors.

I was fortunate enough to interview Bai Bibyaon and Bai Shuan because an activist who was part of Bahaghari was also completing her Master degree at the UP Diliman campus where Bai Bibyaon was running a Lumad Bakwit school along with Bai Shuan and Ruis Valle, representative of the Save Our Schools Network. The term bakwit itself is an excellent example of how the residue of the structures of American imperialism and Spanish colonialism permeate the struggle of the present. As Filipino scholar J.J Canuday explains, the term bakwit comes from a vernacularization of the English term evacuate as American imperial forces displaced Lumad people from their land.¹¹² Bakwit itself is a residual structure of oppression that has been experienced by the Lumad many times over. However, here we can also see that is the dialectical relationship between resistance and oppression, Lumad leaders like Bai Bibiyaon have also taken their bakwit and turned it into a space of *kalayaan* in the form of the Lumad Bakwit schools. There is very little academic research available about Bai Bibiyaon but one recently published study discusses the problem of

¹¹² Jose Jowel Canuday, *Bakwit: The Power of the Displaced* (Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009); Jose Jowel Canuday, "Conceptualising Postcolonial Displacement Beyond Aid and Protection," in *The Handbook of Displacement* (Springer, 2020), 157–69.

discussing the dispossession of the Lumad as if they were passive subjects with no agency. They argue that the Lumad and Bai Bibiyaon have been able to engage in place and community making through the creation of Bakwit Lumad schools, particularly through the practice of mogogoroy. In an interview with one of the students at the same school I visited she stated, “Here [during mogogoroy], we talk about our culture, which we will never forget. We repeat how and what our elders say so that these will not be forgotten. This adds to our strength and forges our consciousness; how we, as children and youths, will continue with the struggle.”¹¹³ Here we can see how the Lumad Bakwit schools are spaces of *kalayaan*, creating freedom and community through deliberately preserving the history and practices of resistance and training the next generation of resistance leaders.

Bai Bibiyaon along with other indigenous women has also led the way in creating communities of *kalayaan* through alliances and coalition building. Just as with other parts of the women's rights movements, at first it seemed that Duterte would be an ally to the Lumad cause. As mayor of Davao, Duterte had passed some progressive policies in order to help shelter and protect Lumad communities. Duterte traces his heritage back to a different indigenous group which is also from Mindanao and so was also seen as part of the indigenous community to a certain extent or at the very least sympathetic.¹¹⁴ After the clashes with the military, Duterte offered shelter to Lumad people in Davao and can even be seen holding a sign with the #StopLumadKillings slogan which was organized as a campaign by the Save Our Schools network, GABRIELA, and other left groups.¹¹⁵ However, upon

¹¹³ Clod Marlan Krister Yambao et al., “‘I Am the Land and I Am Their Witness’: Placemaking amid Displacement among Lumads in the Philippines,” *Critical Asian Studies*, 2022, 1–23.

¹¹⁴ Curato, *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency*.

¹¹⁵ “Duterte: ‘Stop Lumad Killings,’” *RAPPLER* (blog), September 16, 2015, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/106132-duterte-stop-lumad-killings/>.

assuming office Duterte once again betrayed the Lumad and engaged in a campaign of “red tagging” that would result in the murders, arrests, and displacements of thousands of Lumad people, the majority of whom were women and children.

Red tagging is the practice of labeling groups, associations, activists, politicians, individuals and even schools as communist and therefore justifying their murder, disappearance, rape, destruction, or other tactic of government oppression. It is not a new phenomenon in the Philippines but it has become distinctly worse during the Duterte administration, used against groups on the left, indigenous groups, women’s rights groups but also journalists, teachers, and lawyers. The practice of red tagging is filled with the residue of the (re)conquista and the construction of the Moro/a as threat. Just as the Spanish labeled all resistance to their regime as part of the Moro/a threat, the Duterte government has done the same in Mindanao lumping in various leftist groups, women’s rights organizations, Muslim resistance movements and other as terroristic threats. The labels of red and terrorist have allowed the Duterte regime to justify any and all levels of violence against any resistance, even in the form of small and peaceful schools. This culminated in the declaration of martial law in the entirety of Mindanao under proclamation 216. I traveled to Mindanao where I met teachers with the Save Our Schools network. I did not conduct any formal interviews because I was afraid of putting the teachers and activists in danger. I observed the dedication of the teachers and their commitment to an explicitly indigenous and decolonial teaching environment. They were creating spaces of *kalayaan* filled with residues of past resistance and hope for the future under the most difficult of circumstances with their very lives under threat. The 2020 report from the United Nations corroborates the testimony of Bai Bibiyaon and other indigenous leaders, showing intense red tagging of

activists and in four cases showing deaths directly connected to red tagging.¹¹⁶ Bai Bibiyaon told me she had a price of fifty thousand dollars on her head. Lumad schools have also been shut down because of red tagging with the government accusing teachers at Lumad schools of teaching violent extremism to their students. There have been many rapes and murders of indigenous women justified by red tagging whether by the military, the police, or members of the public.¹¹⁷ GABRIELA, along with other women's rights have also been victims of red tagging again resulting everything from surveillance to disappearances, sexual assaults, and murder.

This was one of the main issues discussed during my interviews with Gabriela members. Gabriela itself, both the political and civil society organizations are under heavy surveillance. People have been followed, volunteers and workers received text threats including rape and murder, if they go on radio programs, bomb threats will be called in. The chapters outside of Manila are experiencing even more persecution and violence than the headquarters. A Bohol team doing community outreach was followed by the armed forces. Gabriela cannot gather or hold formal meetings in Mindanao due to martial law. There are Gabriela members in jail on trumped up charges including illegal possession of firearms, arson, etc. They are arrested under warrants with false names or blank names and members are kidnapped by the armed forces. For example, the current general secretary Ms. Joms Salvador was charged with perjury and the vice chair also faced charges. There is discrimination against Gabriela for access to resources and funds and they are under

¹¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights*, Official Records (United Nations General Assembly) (UN, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.18356/d9bf1c42-en>.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with Bai Bibyaon, Bai Shaun, and members of Save Our Schools networks. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

investigation by the securities and exchange commission.¹¹⁸ This persecution is measurably different from previous administrations but it is also not new. The leftist women's movement has always had an oppositional relationship to the state and has endured persecution while at the same time making strategic alliances and cooperating with the state on certain issues. The Duterte administration differs from previous administrations in that he openly endorses the violence of the state against women, as exemplified by his comment about shooting "rebel" women in the vagina. This comment was made during a speech to former communist soldiers in Malacañang and highlights the real and present danger of red tagging. This remark came horrifyingly true in the death of Cindy Tirado who was murdered in 2019 by the Filipino military and was shot in the genitals.¹¹⁹ My interviews both with Lumad leaders, activists from GABRIELA and other groups consistently spoke of a regime of terror implemented by the Duterte government and the military in order to crush any and all opposition to what has clearly become a fascist regime.

I recently learned of the tragic and horrific murder of one of the teachers I met, Chad Booc who was killed along with four others in what is being called the New Bataan Massacre. The government claimed that Chad, along with other teachers and healthcare workers were part of an NPA attack on government forces.¹²⁰ This horrifying massacre of young activists is the fulfillment of the Duterte structures of oppression, conflating all struggle under the label of terroristic threats and justifying any violence in a campaign marked by the residue of Spanish colonialism and the (re)conquista. In the dialectical

¹¹⁸ Interviews with GABRIELA organizers. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

¹¹⁹ GABRIELA Los Angeles, "GABRIELA LA Condemns the Killing and Desecration of Cindy Tirado," GABRIELA - LA, April 22, 2019, <https://www.gabrielala.org/post/gabriela-la-condemns-the-killing-and-desecration-of-cindy-tirado>.

¹²⁰ "SOS Network Wants CHR to Probe New Bataan 5 Killing | Cebu Daily News," accessed November 9, 2022, <https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/429415/sos-network-advocates-call-chr-to-probe-new-bataan-5>.

relationship between resistance and oppression, new spaces of *kalayaan* resistance are forming in the broad coalition of groups calling for justice for Chad and his fellow martyrs.

Conclusion:

Even in the most horrifying tragedy, spaces of resistance persist stretching backward through time connecting the first blow struck against Spanish colonizers with the possibility of a more hopeful future. This chapter has demonstrated that the women's movement in the Philippines is above all resilient, creating structures of resistance and spaces of *kalayaan* under even the worst conditions. From the Japanese occupation, through the Marcos dictatorship, and the transition to a more liberal though imperfect democracy, women's groups have worked tirelessly to advance the causes of women's rights and improving material conditions for women. The structures of *kalayaan* made between different allied women's groups, secular, indigenous, and LGBT+ have been key to maintaining an active movement pushing for specific changes not just through the government but from society as a whole. Women's movements have also been adept at forming strategic relationships with the state, resulting in legislative victories like the passage of the RH bill during the Aquino administration and its implementation under Duterte. The oppressive forces of the domestic state, US imperialism and the Spanish catholic residue form a triangle of oppressive power which is difficult to defeat and yet women's groups with their own oppositional structures of resistance have made significant progress. Even in the cases of Jennifer Laude and the Lumad indigenous movement where the desired outcome is not achieved on a political level, there is still resistance and that resistance is absolutely key to the struggle. As a member of GABRIELA told me, "as long as we have our voices, we can never lose."

Decolonized pasts to liberated futures: the residual possibilities of *inzi* and *kalayaan*

As I finished my interviews with Bai Bibiyaon, I felt a range of emotions. I was honored to have spoken with such an amazing leader and activist, ashamed of my ignorance about the struggles of her and her people and horrified by the stories of violence and oppression she had recounted. Bai Bibiyaon must have seen this in my face because she grabbed my arm and began to attach a bracelet around my wrist and speak to me about *paglaum*. During all of our conversations, Bai Bibiyaon and Bai Shuan had been working on beaded jewelry that has significance for their tribe. Bai Bibiyaon explained to me the significance of the jewelry in preserving their culture through traditional forms of art and bodily decoration. Bai Bibiyaon always wore her tribal regalia as an act of decolonizing resistance and she gave me the bracelet thanking me for bringing awareness to their struggle and asking me not to forget them. She emphasized the importance of *paglaum*, a Cebuano word which connotes optimism and a hopeful attitude about the future. She explained to me that an attitude of *pagluam* is key for any resistance against the powers of oppression. She pointed around the large room, filled with young students relaxing and studying after their studies rooted in the decolonizing practices of their ancestors. Bai Bibiyaon told me that those children were the hope for the future, grounded in the practices of resistance that stretched back centuries and they were the reason for *pagluam*.¹ My interviews with Bai Bibiyaon changed the course of my research and led me to rethink much of my previous research and frameworks. I realized how very much of my research was still rooted in a colonized framework and understanding of history and I embarked on a journey to change

¹ Interviews with Bai Bibiyaon, Bai Shaun, and members of Save Our Schools networks. Conducted in person by author in September and October of 2019.

that by uprooting the decolonized frameworks through a decolonial framework of reading against the grain and instead grounding my theoretical approach in indigenous concepts and practices.

We now return to the original research questions: How do we explain the failures and contradictions in the fight for women's liberation? How are women answering those failures and contradictions? In many of the failures and contradictions in the fight for women's liberation, we find the residue of colonialism, not as a simple or complete explanation but as an "effective element".² The concept of the residual allows us to find connections that are often hidden, ignored, and dismissed. In chemistry, residue is what remains after a chemical reaction and can act as a contaminant, with the possibility of altering future chemical reactions. This is precisely how this dissertation understands the residual structures of colonialism, though they may only be small elements within the complex and multifaceted structures and narratives within the fight for women's liberation, they remain important objects of analysis and impediments to change. By reading against the grain, connecting many different archives and global histories, different residual structures emerge. We see the (re)conquista, not as the Spanish retaking their land but as an ongoing project of domination and oppression constructed in the figure of the Moro/a. There are many different elements that this dissertation explores in the figure of the Moro/a including the construction of Islam as threat, the erasure of indigenous identity, the gendered body of the Mora and the binary of the woman as innocent and in need of rescue and conversion or guilty, resistant, and unconquerable. All of these elements act as contaminants, not determining the failures and

² Williams, "Dominant, Residual, and Emergent."

contradictions of the fight for women's liberation but nevertheless remaining as an effective element.

On the opposite side of the residual structures of oppression, we find the residual structures of resistance. In the dialectical relationship between resistance and oppression we find that just as there are residual structures of oppression there are residual structures of resistance. This resistance is “not reaction but response—thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted.”³ In a dialectical understanding of the residue of resistance to colonial oppression, all resistance carries residual elements of indigenous practices of resistance because it is indigenous people who were attacked and therefore began the fight back against colonial oppression. The concept of the residual is a key part of the decolonial history presented in this dissertation because it allows us to see the elements of indigenous resistance in the frameworks of *inzi* and *kalayaan*. *Inzi* and *kalayaan* emerge as structures of resistance against colonial oppression that persist as effective elements. Rather than contaminating, *inzi* and *kalayaan* do the opposite, uplifting, informing, reinforcing women's resistance movements in the fight for liberation. *Inzi* and *kalayaan* first emerge as themes and within those themes, certain practices and figures emerge beginning in chapter two.

The chapter on history is the longest in this dissertation for good reason as it attempts to span three different continents and well over a thousand years of history. Contained within is a global decolonial analysis spanning multiple languages and cultures which relies on the practice of reading against the grain to uncover structures of colonial oppression and resistance to that oppression. The largest residual structure identified is the framework of the

³ Lugones, *Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes: Theorizing Coalition against Multiple Oppressions*.

(re)conquista itself, explored through the figure of the Moro/a and the gendered binary of guilt/threat and innocence/subject. Contained within the Moro/a figure is the homogenization of threats to empire and the erasure of indigenous identity and practices. In the dialectical relationship between oppression and resistance, we see figures and spaces of resistance emerge, *inzi* and the shikha in Morocco and *kalayaan* and the babaylan in the Philippines. We also see individual figures of resistance in spaces of *inzi* and *kalayaan* with Sayyida al-Hurra in Morocco and Queen Taytay in the Philippines. Many different women and moments are highlighted as part of the important work of decolonizing the narrative of colonialism, resistance and women.

In the Philippines we see the US self-consciously inherit the legacy of the (re)conquista in the first modern counterinsurgency operation in what unironically came to be known as the Moro War. This war set the stage for the oppression and persecution of any and all forms of resistance on the island of Mindanao. At the same time, the Spanish colonial empire fought till the bitter end in Morocco, desperately trying to reclaim its honor in the ongoing (re)conquista, deepening the divide between *bled al-makhzen* and *bled al-siba* as indigenous women fought both against colonial powers and the monarchs who were their allies. As the tide turned towards independence, Morocco was able to unite and by reading against the grain we see the residual structures of the indigenous women who took up arms and fought as well as the songs, poetry and cultural formations through which women urged their people to fight. Here we see the practice of *inzi*, a continual and unending resistance against oppression that takes on many different forms.

We see various figures emerge during this time including the young Princess Aicha, unveiled, dressed in Western clothing and demanding liberation for Morocco. However, in

the figure of Princess Aicha, we see the residual contamination of the figure of the Mora as Princess Aicha rejects tradition in favor of the West in a contradiction which rejects and betrays the indigenous and working class women most involved in the fight for liberation. The King also betrays the women's movement in a contradiction as he enshrined the family law code in the name of tradition and the French penal code in modernizing, both of which have the result of perpetuating oppressive structures contaminated with the residue of colonialism the figure of the Moro/a. The case of the mudawanna or family law code continues the decolonial and historical analysis of women's resistance. This case shows both the power of the structures of *inzi* as continuous and unending resistance constantly pushing from different points as well as other complexities of context and geopolitics. We explore the divides in the women's movement and the rhetoric surrounding Islamism, the West, international organizations and other elements. We find the residue of the (re)conquista in framing of Islam as threat and the subsequent backlash from Islamist and working class women who rejected that framework. The reform of the family law code is finally passed in 2004 both because the continuous and unending resistance and organizing from multiple women's movements as well as the context of 9/11 and the Casablanca bombings as the monarchy tried to position itself closer to the West as an ally rather than a threat to American imperialism. In the Fadwa Laouri and the February 20th movement we again find *inzi* as resistance that is unending even unto the point of death in protest by self-immolation. We see a self-conscious, decolonial revival of Amazigh identity and a reclaiming of the practices and poetry of resistance. There are great moments of unity, hope, liberation and freedom in the spaces of *inzi* created. However, the old divisions reared their heads as the King offered major constitutional reforms in exchange for keeping the monarchy alive. The youth who

started the February 20th Movement, many of whom were young women with Amazigh heritage were not deceived or persuaded by this empty offer but many of the mainstream feminist organization run by elite and upper class women betrayed them, urging the people to accept the constitutional reforms. Though these were major wins on paper, they were not followed by material change. In the last case we have Amina al-Filali, a young Amazigh woman forced to marry her rapist. Amina tragically committed suicide in an act which united women from multiple sectors in practices to *inzi* to demand immediate change to the penal code. We see the residue of the (re)conquista in how the international media portrayed this case in their framing of Islam as threat when the penal code was actually based in French colonial law. Ultimately, women were able to unite and permanently repeal law 475 in a show of the power of *inzi* resistance and building community.

As we return to the Philippines in Chapter 4 we further explore the residual structures of resistance in the concept of *kalayaan*, meaning freedom and liberation with the connotations of community building. The decolonial and historical analysis of women's resistance continues with the Huk rebellion, Filipino independence, and the Marcos dictatorship. The residue of *kalayaan* is present in every one of these fights as women create spaces of freedom and community. However, with the end of the Marcos dictatorship and the election of Cory Aquino we find the strong residue of Spanish colonialism in the form of the Catholic church and the deeply conservative laws surrounding women and their bodies. The women's movement fought tirelessly forming community based coalitions which are examples of spaces of *kalayaan*. In the end, the reproductive healthcare law was finally passed and implemented under the Duterte administration, not as a show of his support for women's rights but as a rejection of the Catholic Church. Again, we see the residue of

Spanish colonialism and US imperialism not as an explanation but as an element which has influenced events. In the case of Jennifer Laude, a transpinay woman murdered by a US soldier, we find multiple spaces of *kalayaan* as different forces unite to demand the end of the VFA and justice for Jennifer Laude. In her death, Jennifer is resurrected as a babaylan, a feminine priestess who exists outside of the categories of binary gender and leads her people in revolt. This use of the figure of the babaylan is part of a conscious effort on the part of activists to decolonize the concept of gender and create spaces of freedom and community based on the residue of indigenous resistance. Last, we have the case of Bai Bibiyaon and the Lumad Bakwit Save Our School Network. Bai Bibiyaon herself is the embodiment of indigenous practices of resistance as a leader, teacher, and symbol of liberation. The Lumad Bakwit Save Our Schools network actively engages in the process of decolonization and the preservation of residual practices of resistance in the ultimate example of spaces of *kalayaan*. Bai Bibiyaon continues her resistance in an unending practice based on the principles of liberation, community, and hope.

The massive scope of this dissertation, spanning over a thousand years, multiple continents, archives and topics necessarily means that a great deal of information and context has been left out. Each chapter in this dissertation could be the subject of a book or even multiple books. However, the broad scope was necessary in order to make the global connections which are hidden by the boundaries of discipline, language and time. These possibilities are opened up in the field of Global Studies, allowing us to decolonize our understandings of the past in order to imagine a liberated future. This dissertation hopes to join the work of scholars like Lisa Lowe and Paul Amar who paved the way for critical

global analysis that crosses disciplinary and national boundaries.⁴ Beginning with the de Las Casas text, *La brevisima relacion de la destruccion de la Africa*, many of the case studies and archives were selected precisely because they have received so little attention from academic circles.⁵ The la Africa text is so ignored by academia that it has not even been translated into English. The struggles of Amazigh women like Amina al-Filali and the resistance of women like Bai Bibiyaon have been doubly ignored by academics and this dissertation has brought them into the field of Global Studies where their stories rightfully belong.

So much additional study is needed on these topics. My research was limited by many things including time, money, language skills, access, perspective and the Covid-19 pandemic, just to name a few. My original intention was to include Mexico in this analysis as another site of Spanish colonialism where the figure of the Moro/a appeared as a residual and was changed by the Spanish encounter with indigenous people. Legazpi spent time in Mexico as a colonial administrator before going to the Philippines, carrying with him the residue of the (re)conquista. Though I was not able to include Mexico in this formulation of the project, I hope to include it in my future research. There are many other elements which also merit further study. I did not include any analysis of the Bangsamoro National Liberation Movement. During the time I was in the Philippines there was a massive crackdown and heightened level of violence under martial law in Mindanao that I did not feel comfortable interviewing activists or even raising the subject for fear of endangering people. Overall, my interviews were limited by a fear of endangering activists which is why the

⁴ Paul Amar, *The Security Archipelago: Human-Security States, Sexuality Politics, and the End of Neoliberalism* (Duke University Press, 2013); Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*.

⁵ De las Casas, *Brevisima Relación de La Destrucción de África*.

majority of my interview subjects go unnamed with the exception of those that are already outspoken public figure like Bai Bibiyaon. There are elements of the concepts of *inzi* and *kalayaan* which I did not include, primarily the spiritual elements of indigenous women's activism. While I touch on that topic, it merits much more research. In Morocco, many Amazigh activists consider not just the Spanish and French as oppressive colonial powers but also Arab conquest. Though this was not included in my analysis, it certainly merits further research. I hope to return both to the Philippines and to Morocco for more directed interviews with activists and collect further oral histories.

Though this dissertation has done some analysis on the gendered legacy of the (re)conquista, there is much to further explore. There is some excellent work on femininity, masculinity and Spanish colonialism which is briefly mentioned in this dissertation.⁶ The gendered figure of the Moro/a both in terms of femininity, masculinity and the construction of the gender binary merits further research. There are also multiple intersections between the construction of gender, the construction of race, and the figure of the Moro/a. Though I was unable to spend much time on this topic, it is an important one with a huge amount of archival evidence available. Further work is also needed to decolonize the archive by reading against the grain.

Lastly, I will share my final reflections on residual futures and the radical possibilities of *inzi* and *kalayaan*. In March of 2020, I was still carrying out research in Morocco was I was interrupted, as was the rest of the world, by the Covid-19 pandemic and forced to return

⁶ Vicente L. Rafael, *White Love and Other Events in Filipino History* (Duke University Press, 2014); Erin L. Murphy, "Women's Anti-Imperialism, 'The White Man's Burden,' and the Philippine-American War: Theorizing Masculinist Ambivalence in Protest," *Gender & Society* 23, no. 2 (2009): 244–70; Barbara Fuchs, *Exotic Nation: Maurophilia and the Construction of Early Modern Spain* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Martin-Márquez, *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*.

early. I found myself living in my hometown when the murder of George Floyd sparked as massive movement for Black Liberation, with protests, riots, and uprising, the likes of which had not been seen for at least 50 years. I became deeply involved in these protests, learning so much from the Black activists in my community. I was arrested four times, doxxed by white supremacists and I experienced a tiny taste of the persecution and fear that so many activists have lived with all over the world. I frequently found myself reflecting on the parallels, connections, and replications, both of structures of resistance and oppression. I saw so many expressions of solidarity between Black activists, Indigenous activists, Filipino activists and Muslim activists, of course with people occupying multiple of those categories. I also saw the strong leadership of Black women emerge as the foundation of this revolutionary movement, just as I had seen in Morocco and the Philippines. I thought a lot about how much all these different groups could learn from and strengthen each other and how interconnected the structures of their oppression. This is ultimately what lead me to a global, decolonial, historical framework focused on the concept of the residual. The residual offers us the possibility of understanding the deeply connected nature of oppression and a possible basis for building global solidarity in an effort to decolonize our future.

As the nature of oppression grows ever more global so must our resistance. The specters of fascism, environmental disaster, capitalist exploitation, and many more, loom large over our society. The possibilities of unending, continuous, resistance, freedom, liberation and community in the forms of *inzi* and *kalayaan* can offer us hope. As a member of GABRIELA told me after she had been arrested, “as long as we have our voices, we can never lose.”

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