

UC Berkeley

UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2gm2553v>

Author

Phillips, Melanie Lauren

Publication Date

2022

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection

by

Melanie L. Phillips

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Leonardo R. Arriola, Chair

Professor Sarah Anzia

Professor Pradeep Chhibber

Professor Gabriel Lenz

Professor Cecilia Mo

Spring 2022

Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection

Copyright 2022
by
Melanie L. Phillips

Abstract

Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection

by

Melanie L. Phillips

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Leonardo R. Arriola, Chair

My dissertation and book project, *Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection*, examines how the gatekeepers within political parties evaluate women and men during candidate selection processes. The existing literature largely focuses on the experiences of women who compete for office in countries with formal and transparent candidate selection processes, whether voter-based primaries in the United States or party-based mechanisms in most of Western Europe. However, the majority of women who seek elected office in democratizing countries around the world are primarily evaluated through party-controlled candidate selection processes that are often opaque and informal. Focusing on the intra-party dynamics of candidate selection, I investigate the conditions in which party gatekeepers are more likely to choose women to stand for election.

I argue that current models of candidate selection, particularly in new democracies, are misspecified because they overlook two key actors who are central to the evaluation of women candidates: the gatekeepers and the family. Party gatekeepers are the party leaders and members who choose which individuals will stand as candidates for the party in an election. In studying the candidate preferences of gatekeepers, I demonstrate that their personal experiences and characteristics affect which candidates they ultimately support during the selection process. In addition, I show that the candidate attributes gatekeepers prefer are not merely individual; they are familial. Despite the transition to multiparty elections in many countries, the personal status of individuals in many societies remains tied to the political and social influence of their families. In this context, I find that the family attributes preferred by party gatekeepers are conditioned by the gender of candidates. I demonstrate that gatekeepers evaluate men more highly for having a traditional family dynamic, thus simultaneously rewarding men who are heads of households while penalizing women who deviate from traditional expectations. I find that women are elevated in candidate selection only when their families have demonstrated partisan loyalty over the long term.

In this dissertation, I explain the origins and mechanisms for this gender-based difference in

the evaluation of family attributes, offering a corrective to existing work which has largely ignored how families (beyond childrearing and marital status) can affect a woman's political prospects. Many scholars have suggested that the key to decreasing bias against women during the candidate selection process is to include women in party positions of power. But when examining women gatekeepers, I show that they are not immune from gendered biases. Rather, I show that an individual's level of internalized sexist beliefs, measured through ambivalent sexism, determines how gatekeepers evaluate gendered attributes.

I further argue that women are disadvantaged during candidate selection because gatekeepers evaluate the qualifications of candidates in line with their gender scheme (the expected behavior and roles of their gender identity). Women are not rewarded for masculine qualifications but rather for the few feminine qualifications that gatekeepers perceive as valuable. Lastly, I show that despite gatekeepers believing that the 'ideal' candidate for both men and women is the same, meeting those qualifications, in reality, is much more difficult for women.

My research presents a valuable contribution to the study of women in politics in democratizing countries. Building on over 90 in-depth interviews with candidates, party members, parliamentarians, and activists in Zambia, I have developed two original sources of data that provide unique insights into the composition and preferences of party gatekeepers. First, I compiled the actual candidate recommendation reports produced by gatekeepers during candidate selection within Zambia's two main national parties in 2016. I analyze these reports to assess how candidate gender and attributes influence a gatekeeper's ultimate recommendation. Additionally, I conducted survey experiments among over 1,300 party members to assess how their individual characteristics and preferences affect candidate selection. I also measured gendered beliefs through an ambivalent sexism index to show that beliefs, not identity, motivate an individual's gendered perception of candidates.

To my mom, my husband, and my best friend.

Contents

Contents	ii
List of Figures	iv
List of Tables	v
1 Introduction	1
2 What was Said and About Who? The Gender Differences in Written Candidate Evaluations	8
2.1 Introduction	8
2.2 Gender and Recommendations	10
2.3 Background: Zambia 2016 General Election	13
2.4 Research Design - Data Collection and Coding	14
2.5 Candidate Recommendations: What they Say and What are they Worth? . .	16
2.6 Limitations	32
2.7 Conclusion	32
2.8 Appendix	33
3 The Recommendations of Gatekeepers: The Double Bind between Expectations and Reality for Women Candidates	36
3.1 Introduction	36
3.2 Ceteris Paribus, or Perceived to be?	38
3.3 Research Design	40
3.4 Results	43
3.5 The Double Bind	47
3.6 Conclusion	50
3.7 Appendix	52
4 Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers	83
4.1 Introduction	83
4.2 Family, Loyalty, and their Effect on Political Gatekeepers	85
4.3 Candidate Selection and the Role of Family in Zambia	91

4.4	Research Design	96
4.5	Empirical Analysis	99
4.6	The Gendered Effects of Family Attributes	101
4.7	What about Women Gatekeepers?	103
4.8	Ambivalent Sexism and Candidate Evaluations	104
4.9	Conclusion	107
5	Conclusion	118
	Bibliography	122

List of Figures

2.1	Candidate Selection Diagram	14
2.2	Average Word Count by Candidate Selection Outcome	22
2.3	Word Cloud - Men Candidates	30
2.4	Word Cloud - Women Candidates	31
3.1	Survey Sample	82
4.1	Theoretical Argument Model	88
4.2	Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - UPND	92
4.3	Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - PF	93
4.4	Average Marginal Treatment Effects	100
4.5	Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Gendered Differences	102
4.6	Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Women Gatekeepers	104
4.7	Average Marginal Interaction Effects - High Ambivalent Sexism	105
4.8	Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Low Ambivalent Sexism	106
4.2	Conjoint Attribute Table	109
4.3	Survey Sample	110
4.4	Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Full Sample	111
4.5	Average Marginal Treatment Effects - Women Gatekeepers	112
4.6	Men and Women Profiles - Women Gatekeepers	113
4.7	AMIE - High Level of Ambivalent Sexism	114
4.8	AMIE - Low Level of Ambivalent Sexism	115
4.9	Ambivalent Sexism Measure	116
4.10	Full Conjoint Marginal Means	117

List of Tables

2.1	Cross Tab Gender and position Candidate Evaluations	17
2.2	Dataset Summary	17
2.3	No Bivariate Relationships between Independent Variables and Gender	19
2.4	Are Longer Recommendations More Likely to be Recommended or Selected? . .	20
2.5	What Drives Word Count?	21
2.6	What Drives Word Count? Effects by Candidate's Gender	23
2.7	Do Recommendations Affect Endorsement or Selection?	24
2.8	Do Recommendations Affect Endorsement or Selection For MPs?	25
2.9	Top 10 Words in Candidate Evaluations by Gender	26
2.10	Does Gendered Framing Affect Recommendations? Gendered Framing and Position Interaction for Women Candidates	28
3.1	Descriptive Statistics of Candidate Survey Participants	41
3.2	Outcomes	43
3.3	Ideal Candidate Qualifications by Treatment	44
3.4	Ideal Candidate Qualifications by Respondent's Gender	48
3.5	Worry About Nominating Women because of the Influence of Their Family . . .	49
3.6	More Difficult for Women	49
3.7	Respondent Belief in Women Delaying Politics for Family	49
3.8	Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Education	52
3.9	Cross Tab on Education by Treatment of Men Respondents	53
3.10	Cross Tab on Education by Treatment of Women Respondents	53
3.11	Cross Tab on Education by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism	54
3.12	Cross Tab on Education by Treatment High Ambivalent Sexism	55
3.14	Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Experience Crosstab	56
3.13	Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Experience	56
3.15	Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment of Men Respondents	57
3.16	Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment of Women Respondents	58
3.17	Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism	59
3.18	Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment High Ambivalent Sexism	60
3.19	Treatment Effect on Recommended Sources of Support	61
3.20	Recommended Sources of Support Cross Tab	61
3.21	Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment Men Respondents	62

3.22	Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment Men Respondents	63
3.23	Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism	64
3.24	Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment High Ambivalent Sexism	65
3.25	Treatment Effect on Recommended Family Dynamic	66
3.26	Treatment Effect on Recommended Family Dynamic	66
3.27	Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment Men Respondents	67
3.28	Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment Women Respondents	68
3.29	Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism Respon- dents	69
3.30	Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism Respon- dents	70
3.31	Treatment Effect on Recommended Financial Resources	71
3.32	Treatment Effect on Recommended Money for Campaign Crosstab	72
3.33	Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment Men Respondents	73
3.34	Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment Women Respondents	74
3.35	Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism	75
3.36	Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment High Ambivalent Sexism	76
3.37	Treatment Effect on Recommended Assets Cross Tab	77
3.38	Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment Men Respondents	78
3.39	Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment Women Respondents	79
3.40	Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment Low Ambivalent Sexism Respon- dents	80
3.41	Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment High Ambivalent Sexism Respon- dents	81
4.1	Candidate Attributes	98

Acknowledgments

While the amount of work it takes to complete the type of research presented in the following pages was clear from the onset of my PhD career, what I did not know then was how many individuals would help me in its completion.

First and foremost, I must thank my dissertation chair and mentor, Leonardo Arriola. From the beginning of my time at Berkeley, Leo was a champion of my success. I cannot begin to summarize the ways in which I benefited from his guidance. My first trip to Zambia, the country I would come to do my dissertation research in was with Leo, and I had the privilege of learning how to conduct research in the field by watching an expert. He set high expectations, and sometimes even made some outlandish requests like when we rescued an owl in the Hayward Hills, but he made sure I had the skills, confidence, and support to reach all of them. He helped me understand the importance of having a mentor, and set the bar for what a mentor can and should be unreasonable high. I am truly indebted to him.

Leo, in addition to being a wonderful advisor, has also built an incredible academic community of which I am grateful to be apart of. Numerous versions of the prospectus, research design, survey instrument, and subsequent chapters were immensely improved during the Africa Research Workshop. I have learned that the strength of one's research is best improved by the questions of others, and I am glad to have grown as a scholar in that space. Thank you to everyone who participated in these meetings. Outside of Berkeley, Leo connected me with a broad network of Africanists, and I appreciate being a part of this supportive and engaging community.

In addition to an incredible chair, I was privileged to have multiple other academic role models and mentors, many of whom I am lucky enough to call co-authors. Martha C. Johnson is an incredible scholar and mentor who I was lucky to get to know in the Africa Research Workshop and then as a co-author and co-editor. If I could come close to half her productivity and organization, I would be happy and successful. Lise Rakner is a wonderful individual, and an expert in Zambian politics, who through our fieldwork trips taught me an incredible amount about qualitative research and the country. I must thank my committee members Sarah Anzia, Gabe Lenz, Cecilia Mo, and Pradeep Chhibber. Collectively, they pushed my research further and supported me during a dissertation writing period that happened to occur during a global pandemic. In graduate school, I was lucky enough to make life-long friends, Laura Jakli and Melissa Carlson, whose support was priceless through the ups and downs of graduate school. Lastly, I learned an incredible amount of diverse skills from my other co-authors. Thank you Danny Choi, Justine Davis, Karen Ferree, Lauren Honig, and Ellen Lust.

My fieldwork and survey research in Zambian would not have been successful without the assistance of many. I must thank the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research and their Director of Research and Programmmes Marja Hinfelaar. And I am immensely grateful for the rigorous work conducted by my enumerators Beauty Nalwendo, Grace Kyungupengu, Christopher Lubasi, Kalonde Siulapwa, Edgar Miyanda, Kawide Nakasamu, and my local

project manager Beverly Schicilenge. Lastly, I greatly appreciate the companionship of my two housemates that made Lusaka feel like home.

I must thank the individuals that kept the political science department afloat and who I relied upon throughout my time at Berkeley. Erin Blanton and Serena Groen have worked miracles for me throughout my time at Berkeley and are the backbone of the department. The pandemic only underscored the absolute importance of Charlotte Merriwether, whose cheery demeanor and ability to solve virtually any problem when you are in a bind I missed immensely while we were remote. As an instructor, I am indebted to Efrat Amanda Cidon and Suzanne McDermott. Lastly, to Stacey Owens, Kristine Nera, Bryana McBride, and Stephanie Alcid, who while I did not work with often I know were essential to my day-to-day life at Berkeley.

One of the highlights of my graduate career was getting the chance to work with an incredible group of undergraduate students. As an instructor, I was inspired by my students' enthusiasm, constant curiosity, and their demands for research that contributes to contemporary problems and discourse. I have to especially thank my undergraduate research assistants Ariana Dideban, Francesca Hodges, Lily Moser, and Kyle Vuong.

Outside of academia, I have to thank the many people who have loved and supported me along the way. To the Phillips family, your love and support means the world to me. I am grateful to be apart of your family and happy to add another Dr. Phillips to the roster. Alison and Sean Riley, your enthusiasm in my dreams as they constantly evolved cannot be understated, it has always invigorated me to work harder. Thank you to Michael and Nancy Ballinger who have cheered me on as I pursued this degree. To my barn family Shelbie Higginson, Carol Smith, Tami Moore, Deborah Hampton, and Karen Seaburg Morton, the time we spent in the saddle enjoying the beauty of the California hills kept me sane and grounded.

And lastly, I must thank the individuals this dissertation is dedicated to. To my mother, Trishia Thompson. I was lucky to be raised by a woman who taught me how to persevere and believe in my abilities. I never doubted that I could accomplish the work that makes up this dissertation because she always had faith in me. She raised me with the people skills and 'fake it til you make it attitude' that became my greatest asset while conducting fieldwork. I love you forever and always, and this accomplishments is as much yours as it is mine. I am proud to be your legacy.

Shortly after defending the prospectus that laid the foundation for this dissertation, I married the man of my dreams Adrian Phillips. With him by my side, I have earned a BA, MA, and now a PhD. He has been my sounding board, my editor, an unpaid research assistant, and at this point could recite the arguments throughout my written work as well as I could. The process of completing something of this magnitude comes with many highs but also lows. And in those moments, Adrian was always the light. I know, without a doubt, I would not have been able to do this without him, and I will forever be grateful. Although he did nearly blow my fieldwork budget when he discovered the pancakes at the local bakery.

And to my best friend, Chelsea Yoko Ballinger. I always have tried to do more, dream farther because you have set the precedence for what we can really achieve. Together,

we have truly 'sought the heights' and I am incredibly lucky to have had you by my side throughout this journey. Not many would have followed their best friend around the world as she conducted her research but you were always there for the adventure. You are and will always be my person, and that is one of the greatest accomplishment I have achieved over the last eight years.

*In loving memory of my grandfather George Boberg and my father Timothy Thompson, I
hope this makes you proud.*

Chapter 1

Introduction

"The nomination stage eliminates 99.96% of all the eligible people; the voters choose from only .04%."

Pesonen, 1968

In 2015, President Edgar Lungu, leader of the Zambia party the Patriotic Front (PF), claimed that his party would guarantee that 40% of the candidate's PF adopted (selected for candidacy) would be women. He even pushed other political parties to do the same. Formally announced by the party's deputy chairperson of elections, Kelvin Bwalya, this was a bold and exciting move for a country whose proportion of women in parliament had yet to rise above 20% (2016).¹ However, even from the beginning, this proclamation was unachievable. For the 2016 national assembly elections, 1,212 aspirants applied for seats in the two dominant parties. Of those, only 178 were women. Thus, from the onset, the candidate pool only contained 14% women, leaving the possibility that 40% of the candidates would be women as an entirely unrealistic ambition.

While women's representation has grown dramatically over the last few decades in some countries, in others like Zambia, we have seen stagnation in the levels of growth. In Africa, this divide is seen clearly in countries with and without electoral gender quotas (Johnson and Phillips, 2019). Rwanda, for example, has made historical gains, currently having 61% of its parliamentary seats held by women. However, this masks the reality for many countries on the continent, where equity in political office remains far out of reach. For example, the percentage of women in the legislature in Nigeria is 3%, in The Gambia is 10%, and in Malawi is 22%. Women in non-quota countries have to compete in institutions that are often to their disadvantage, such as within majoritarian electoral systems (Norris, 2000), against voters' biases (Black and Erickson, 2003), and often at the discretion of political gatekeepers (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988).

The majority of explanations for lower levels of women's representation around the world have focused on the role of voters and the experiences of women entering politics in developed

¹<https://www.lusakatimes.com/2016/02/17/pf-to-adopt-40-of-women-in-the-next-election/>

democracies, mainly in the United States and Western Europe. Yet, most women must surpass another hurdle before even facing the voters — party gatekeepers. Party gatekeepers consist of party members who control candidate selection in many electoral democracies. Parties in countries that transitioned to multiparty politics more recently still tend to select candidates for office through opaque selection processes (e.g., Chile (Siavelis, 2002), Croatia (Kasapović and Šiber, 2001), and Portugal (Leston-Bandeira and Freire, 2003).

To explain the stagnation of women’s growth in newer democracies without electoral gender quotas, we must look earlier on in the pipeline, before an election, at the role of party gatekeepers and their recruitment, recommendations, and selection practices to understand why so few women make it onto the ballot. To understand why, despite President Lungu’s call for 40% of the candidates selected in the 2016 election to be women, that their current candidate selection system and the supply of women candidates made that goal impossible.

Gendered Gatekeepers: Barriers to Women in Party-Controlled Candidate Selection provides an in-depth analysis of the nature of candidate selection in democratizing countries. I examine how the gatekeepers within political parties evaluate women and men during party-controlled candidate selection processes. In doing so, I show how women face gendered evaluations that discount feminine traits, greater obstacles in competing for political office, and expectations involving themselves and their families that collectively compound barriers that ultimately prevent the majority of women from succeeding during candidate selection.

A core contribution of this dissertation is that it provides a theoretical framework that allows us to understand how candidate qualifications exist on a spectrum of ownership, investment, and individuality. My research shows the importance of a candidate’s gender schema² when it comes to understanding how gatekeepers determine the different expectations for men and women. Further, it underscores how gatekeepers decide to reward and penalize men and women candidates. In doing so, I show that it is not merely the act of being a woman that causes inequalities during candidate selection but the limitations in conforming and the consequences of not conforming to the expectations that surround being a woman that drive women to be less likely to be selected as a political candidate.

Further, my research demonstrates that the qualities party gatekeepers look for in a candidate vary on two dimensions: (1) level of ownership and (2) level party investment. I show how candidate attributes extend past the individual to the family. Despite the transition to multiparty elections in many countries over the past three decades, the personal status of individuals in many of those societies remains tied to the political and social influence of their families. In this context, I show that the family attributes preferred by gatekeepers are conditioned by the gender of candidates. I find that gatekeepers will evaluate men more highly for having a traditional family dynamic. This reward reflects both a bonus to men who are the head of traditional households and a penalty to women who deviate from the cultural expectation of family. In contrast, women are rewarded only when their families

²Gender schema refers to the process of socialization where individuals associate behaviors, traits, and other attributes with a gender category. They then regulate their own and potentially others’ behaviors per the expectations of that gender category (Bem, 1981).

have demonstrated partisan loyalty over the long term. I connect this result to political and social dynamics in Latin America and Asia.

This dissertation provides a holistic view of candidate selection by investigating party gatekeepers in addition to candidates. Focusing on their preferences and motivations, I demonstrate that party gatekeepers are not a monolithic group. Instead, their personal experiences and characteristics affect the candidate preferences they express during the selection process. This dissertation provides a novel investigation of the composition of the party gatekeepers in Zambia. It shows how heterogeneity in demographic factors (e.g., age, education, and wealth), political characteristics (e.g., party level, political experience, and partisanship), and personal characteristics (e.g., ambivalent sexism) all affect political ideologies and preferences.

Many scholars have suggested that the key to decreasing bias against women during the candidate selection process is to include women in party positions of power. However, in this dissertation, when examining the preferences of women gatekeepers, I show that they are not immune from gendered biases. Instead of their gender, my research finds that an individual's level of internalized sexist beliefs, measured through ambivalent sexism, determines how gatekeepers evaluate gendered attributes.

Ultimately, my research concludes that current models of candidate selection are misspecified. The dominant focus on the role of voters in dampening women's political representation ignores the reality that the majority of candidates have been weeded out based on gatekeeper preferences before the election. Furthermore, the concept of the candidate as an individual ignores the reality that, in a context with strong gender roles, the family is a gendered unit that partly defines the candidate in the eyes of party gatekeepers. Lastly, solutions that focus on increasing women's numbers among decision-makers ignore the fact that women can also be gendered evaluators.

Empirical Strategy

This dissertation is rooted in a mixed-methods approach that combines extensive qualitative fieldwork with survey and experimental techniques. Methodologically, it presents a valuable contribution of new data sources: (1) examining candidate recommendation reports written during candidate selection; (2) analyzing survey experiments conducted with over 1,300 party members across Zambia; and (3) assessing qualitative evidence from over 90 interviews with candidates, party members, members of parliament, and women's groups in Zambia. The data analyzed in this dissertation was collected between 2015 and 2019 in Zambia.

The first portion of the fieldwork involved semi-structured interviews with over 90 key political actors in Zambia. This included aspirants, candidates, campaign mobilizers, party elites and gatekeepers, as well as local non-government organizations and civil society officials. In addition to interviews, I collected party records that document the candidate selection process in the field. These records contained the list of all the applicants for the 2016 candidate selection process for both dominant political parties in Zambia (The Pa-

triotic Front and The United Party for National Development). Additionally, they include candidate recommendations written for all the candidates for the PF.

The second component included a survey experiment conducted with party members in both dominant political parties across Zambia. Trained Zambian enumerators conducted the survey. 1,333 responses were collected, sampling party members in 69 districts across all ten provinces. The survey asked participants questions about their political experience, candidate preferences, measures of ambivalent sexism, and financial expectations during the multiple phases of candidate selection. In addition to the observational questions, the survey included two experimental components. The first was a vignette-based design to test the effect of a hypothetical candidate's gender on the recommendations given by party members. The second was a conjoint experiment that aimed to test the effect and strength of different candidate qualifications as attributes to understand if the benefits men and women receive are equivalent. On average, the survey took about 45 minutes.

The interviews, data collection, and the survey experiment presented in this dissertation were approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRBs) for the University of California, Berkeley (Protocol ID 2018-12-11667 and 2017-08-10185). Interviews were granted by verbal consent given both at the time of the scheduling and again at the beginning of the interview. Recordings were made only at the consent of the participant. The survey experiment relied on hypothetical candidate profiles and did not intervene in any actual political processes and therefore did not impact the political environment in Zambia. The survey instrument and the pre-analysis plan were registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP).

Overview of the Chapters

The second chapter, *What was Said and About Who?: The Gender Differences in Written Candidate Evaluations*, looks at the potential biases women face in written recommendations that PF used during the 2016 candidate selection process. A large body of research establishes how women are disadvantaged in letters of recommendation and evaluations. In politics, women face similar disadvantages rooted in their gender roles and the ways they adhere to them. Merging these two bodies of literature lays out clear expectations for how women might fare in written recommendations for political office. It suggests that women are likely to face gender bias in written recommendations from gender stereotyping or modifiers that add uncertainty to their qualifications. It further indicates that they may also be disadvantaged by the length of the evaluations.

The chapter leverages an incredibly unique set of data to test these expectations: written recommendations for candidates applying to be a candidate for local or legislative office. In total, 808 written recommendations were coded for content, then analyzed against the candidate's realized endorsement and selection outcomes. With these documents, I empirically show that the literature's expectations on recommendations and the existing biases women face in the media and voters apply to women in politics.

The chapter demonstrates that longer recommendations increase a candidate's chances of being endorsed and selected. Moreover, recommendations that highlight a candidate's

financial resources, political experience, and party history are more likely to be endorsed, and those that mention financial resources and political experience increase chances of selection. But more importantly, I argue, the benefits of specific qualifications are significant when they align with the candidate's gender schema (the expected behavior and roles of their gender identity).

The third chapter, *The Recommendations of Gatekeepers*, asks what do gatekeepers in newer democracies consider a competitive candidate, and is this different for men and women? Many suggest that the qualifications or standards political parties look for in potential candidates are different for men and women. Scholars contend that women political candidates are held to different, likely higher standards than men when vying for political office. Political parties can reinforce this inequality by institutionalizing gender biases into their candidate selection processes, whether formally or informally. Despite the fact that scholars have underlined the importance of political parties, little work has looked directly at what gatekeepers perceive as a candidate worth nominating.

To answer what gatekeepers think makes a candidate worth nominating and if this is the same for men and women, this chapter looks at the effect of a hypothetical candidate's gender on what party members consider a competitive candidate. In this experiment, respondents were asked to give the candidate advice on how to be successful when running for member of parliament in their constituency. I based the design of the recommendations on the most commonly mentioned qualifications from interviews conducted with party gatekeepers and covered education, political experience, family dynamics, financial resources, and sources of support.

The results suggest that the ideal candidate is the same regardless of the candidate's gender. Gender did not affect the nature or amount of qualifications gatekeepers believed candidates should have to be electorally successful in their constituency. Women gatekeepers, however, had higher expectations for both men and women candidates. The paper finds then that gender does affect recommendations; it is not the gender of the candidate but of the gatekeeper that is driving this result. Women gatekeepers held both men and women to significantly higher standards than men gatekeepers.

Further, while the recommendations of what candidates should do remain consistent for both men and women, actually meeting these recommendations does appear gendered. Gatekeepers highlighted that it is more difficult for women, in their opinion, to have enough money to support their campaigns, handle election violence, and tolerate the hostile language used during the campaigns. Women candidates face a double bind; while gatekeepers recommend them to strive for the same qualifications as men, the cost of achieving these qualifications is much higher for them.

The final empirical chapter, *Family Matters*, argues that to understand how women can successfully navigate candidate selection in new democracies, scholars must take a broader view of the sociological contexts in which gatekeepers choose whom to support for office. In this context, I focus on the political and sociological nature of family ties that candidates often rely upon wherever democratic politics continue to be based on personalized clientelistic relationships.

In this chapter, I specifically distinguish between a family status mechanism and a loyalty mechanism in identifying how family ties have gendered effects on candidate selection. The family status mechanism suggests that there are double standards on the evaluation of a candidate's family structure; how candidates conform, or not, to normative family expectations (Tamale, 2018; Clayton et al., 2019). This double standard, I argue, is consequential in candidate evaluations. I expect that women are less likely to be rewarded for conforming to normative family expectations than men while being penalized more harshly for deviating from them. By contrast, in terms of loyalty, women benefit from benign chauvinism that depicts them as more faithful and devoted than men (Bem and Lewis, 1975; Broverman et al., 1972; Bem, 1981). Women are perceived to be and are, in fact, more likely to remain loyal and expected to stay within pre-established family networks such as those based on partisanship (Clayton and Zetterberg, 2020; Thames and Rybalko, 2010; Cowley and Childs, 2003).

I evaluate the asymmetrical responses to candidates' family attributes through a candidate choice experiment that randomizes candidates' individual and family attributes. The results demonstrate that the family attributes of a candidate matter — and they matter in a gendered way. Consistent with the family status mechanism, party gatekeepers reward men for being the head of traditional households. Women candidates, however, are significantly rewarded in comparison to men for having a personal and family history of demonstrated commitment to the party, that is, the loyalty mechanism. I further show that simply changing the gender composition of the selection committee — adding more women to the committee — would not change the importance of family attributes or their gendered evaluations; it only eliminates the loyalty benefits while keeping the penalty women face for violating family norms.

Additionally, given that we expect societal biases to affect the way party gatekeepers assess men and women, I extend this investigation by examining the variation in candidate evaluations with differing levels of sexism. To do so, I use a modified version of the ambivalent sexism index, which “measures hostile sexism (HS), sexist antipathy toward women, and benevolent sexism (BS), subjectively favorable, yet patronizing, beliefs about women” (Glick and Fiske, 2001, pg. 116). I find that an individual's level of sexist beliefs conditions how they view candidate attributes such as financial resources. Gatekeepers with higher levels of ambivalent sexism reward men for gendered attributes, whereas those with lower levels reward women.

I conclude the dissertation by discussing the overarching argument connecting these three chapters: how gender norms and one's level of conformity to their gender schema ultimately affect how gatekeepers consider women as candidates and measure their electoral competitiveness. It is this that ultimately causes political parties to become one of the most prominent barriers to increasing women's representation. In doing so, I discuss the contributions the findings in this dissertation make to the fields of gender and politics, African politics, and comparative politics as a whole. In this chapter, I also highlight the limitations and the scope of generalizability of the research. I end with a discussion of future research agendas.

Implications

Collectively, the dissertation focuses on how ostensibly democratic institutions can perpetuate inequality in political opportunity and representation. This study contributes to the literature by shining a light on the black box that is the preference and behaviors of party gatekeepers. Working from this novel data source, I provide empirical support for what scholars have been pointing to for decades: party members become gatekeepers to women in politics by evaluating them differently than the men they compete against.

My research findings have implications for the nature of candidate-focused programs often promoted by development agencies and civil society groups to increase the number of women candidates around the world. The growth in women's representation in newer democracies that rely on party-controlled candidate selection will remain stagnant until academics and policy analysts modify their strategies to include party gatekeepers.

Once we include party gatekeepers in the conversations surrounding increasing women's access to political opportunities, discussions can center on how to improve candidate evaluation strategies. My research suggests that the key to decreasing barriers for women in candidate selection mechanisms is to understand gender bias functions through the evaluation of other qualifications. Specifically, we should not expect outright gender bias against women candidates but instead, predict that bias will exist in how they measure and judge the credibility of gendered qualifications. Therefore, policies that allow gatekeepers to measure a candidate's qualifications objectively will likely be the most successful in eliminating the biases I document throughout this dissertation.

More importantly, the burden for women's equity in political bodies cannot be placed solely on women candidates, party members, and elites. We cannot expect women's candidate training to be a singular solution for women when the qualifications for their candidacy, like family-based attributes, as dictated by party gatekeepers, are ultimately not entirely within their control. Further, expecting that women in positions of power will eliminate biases and barriers simply with their existence in these positions ignores the reality that women are not immune to the gender socialization that creates the gender norms and expected behaviors that women and men are evaluated against. Women in positions of political power may, in fact, be harsher evaluators, having experienced the reality of what it means and takes to be a woman in the political arena.

Chapter 2

What was Said and About Who? The Gender Differences in Written Candidate Evaluations

2.1 Introduction

What do party gatekeepers think about the women who apply to stand as elected representatives for their political party? And does it reflect the way scholars have long discussed women as outsiders in “the secret garden of politics” (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988)? Women have made impressive gains in descriptive representation toward equity in political bodies. However, in most electoral democracies, vast disparities between the proportion of men and women representatives still exist. Explanations for this have ranged from supply-side arguments that cite socio-economic inequalities (Yoon, 2004) and levels of political ambition (Lawless, 2012), to demand-side theories which highlight gender biases among voters (Mo, 2015; Anzia, 2015) and gate-keeping by political parties (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Where extensive work has documented the experience of women candidates and the role of voters to explain the gap in women’s representations, questions still remain about the ways in which party members form a barrier to women’s political opportunities.

Scholars argue that political parties act as gatekeepers by institutionalizing gender biases into political systems. This can include recruitment practices (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu, 2013; Frederick and Burrell, 2007; Sanbonmatsu, 2006; Niven, 1998; Crowder-Meyer, 2013), processes of candidate selection (Wang and Muriaas, 2019), campaign finance (Barber et al., 2016), and electoral systems (Norris, 2006). Political parties are essential to ensuring equal representation for marginalized groups (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995), yet research shows that party members have higher levels of doubt when it comes to the electability of women candidates (Sanbonmatsu, 2006). This doubt persists even when observational data shows that when women run, they win (Sanbonmatsu, 2006). One understudied way that party members can engage in the gatekeeping of women candidates is what they decide what makes

a candidate worth nominating.

A large body of research establishes how women are disadvantaged in letters of recommendation and evaluations. Women are more likely to be described in ways that align with gender stereotyping (Trix and Psenka, 2003). And men and women are both penalized when they fail to conform to the roles they are ascribed to (i.e. there gender schema which dictates the expected behavior and roles of their gender identity) (Eagly and Diekmann, 2005). This compounds for women who are described as and expected to conform to feminine roles that are at odds with the masculine archetypes of most leadership positions (Eagly, Makhijani and Klonsky, 1992). Additionally, women are more likely to have recommendations that include doubt raisers that introduce uncertainty to their qualifications (Trix and Psenka, 2003). Biases against women manifest not only in the description but in length. Women's letters are often systematically shorter than men's (Greenburg, Doyle and McClure, 1994), and this is critical as research shows that longer recommendations are often more successful (Turrentine et al., 2019).

And in politics, women face similar disadvantages rooted in their gender roles and the ways they adhere to them. In the media, research shows that women often face disparities in the type of coverage, focusing on their appearance and personal lives (Van der Pas and Aaldering, 2020), and in the quantity of coverage (Verge and Pastor, 2018; Fernandez-Garcia, 2016). From voters, studies establish that most individuals have an outright gender preference that is typically for men (Mo, 2015). This preference, many argue, is primarily driven by the ways voters associate high-level political office with masculine traits. Voters also hold women to standards assigned to them by their gender identity and punish women candidates who do not conform to them (Stalsburg, 2010; Bell and Kaufmann, 2015).

Merging these two bodies of literature lays out clear expectations for how women might fare in written recommendations for political office. It suggests that women are likely to face gender bias in written recommendations from gender stereotyping or modifiers that add uncertainty to their qualifications. It further indicates that they may also be disadvantaged by the length of the evaluations. If bias operate the same way in political networks as it does in professional and academic settings, we should be concerned about the way in which women might be disadvantaged in political systems that rely on written recommendations during candidate selection.

To test these expectations, this chapter analyzes written recommendations for local and legislative candidates in Zambia. These recommendations were written to convey candidate preferences from lower levels of the party organ to the national executive committee (NEC), which made the final decision in selecting candidates for the 2016 elections. These documents were collected in the field during 2017. In total, 808 written recommendations were coded for content, then analyzed against the candidate's realized endorsement and selection outcomes.

With the ability to analyze the actual written recommendations from the candidate selection process, Zambia as a case present a unique opportunity. As a country, Zambia broadly has many of the relevant political and demographic factors that characterize similarly situated countries: inconsistent patterns of economic growth and relatively weak parties. Further, while some countries have seen significant increases in the percentages of women holding

political office due to the adoption of gender-based quotas, Zambia does not have a quota system, and therefore, women must compete for political office without any institutional or party incentives. The findings from this study will allow us to understand better how political party members view and describe women's qualifications and competitiveness for political office in a context where information is low and where parties select their candidates through closed processes.

The results from analysing these written evaluations show that similar biases exist in written recommendations of women candidates as they do business and academia. And that these biases look similar to those we see against women in the media and among voters. Longer recommendations increase a candidate's chances of being endorsed and selected. And recommendations that highlight a candidate's financial resources, political experience, and party history are more likely to be endorsed, and those that mention financial resources and political experience increase a candidate's chances of selection.

But more importantly, I argue, the benefits of specific qualifications are significant when they align with the candidate's gender schema. And because of this, there are significant gendered differences in the way that recommendations can be written to increase a candidate's chances of endorsement or selection conditional on a candidate's gender. Financial resources, which arguably align with more masculine expectations, uniquely benefit men. In contrast, organizational ties, communal, and feminine in nature, benefit women significantly more when present in their recommendations.

This study contributes to literature by shining light on the black box that is the preference of party gatekeepers. Working from this novel data source, I show how expectations from scholars studying letters of recommendations in both business and academic settings extends to recommendations in politics. More importantly, it provides empirical support for what scholars have been pointing to for decades: party members become gatekeepers to women in politics by evaluating them differently than the men they compete against.

2.2 Gender and Recommendations

An extensive literature has established the pervasiveness and potential consequences of gender bias in written recommendations. The majority of these studies have focused on letters of recommendation in the fields of business (Tommasi, Williams and Nordstrom, 1998), psychology (Cowan and Kasen, 1984), medicine (Greenburg, Doyle and McClure, 1994), and education (Raber, 1985). These studies have focused on bias in terms of quality, gendered language and stereotyping, doubt raisers, and length. Collectively, they suggest that women are often at a disadvantage when it comes to written recommendations. The recommendations often either engage in outright bias or the confirmation of established gender roles and expectations that make women appear less qualified to the reader.

Letters of recommendation are likely to utilize gendered language or descriptions that align with the candidate's gender schema (implicit beliefs and expectations of men's and women's roles) (Crockett, 1988; Fiske and Linville, 1980). For women, this gendered lan-

guage can be disadvantageous when incorporated into recommendation letters because it is often at odds with the masculine association among leadership positions. This manifests in letters of recommendation in how writers describe candidates, reflecting the differences they perceive in men and women. Gender stereotypes are often reinforced in recommendations. Women are more likely to be characterized with communal traits that highlight nurturing or gentleness. In contrast, men are more likely to be described with leadership-based adjectives such as confidence and assertiveness (Trix and Psenka, 2003). These gender differences in descriptions can appear early in a woman's career. When looking at recommendations for college admissions, for example, young women's letters were found to include more stereotypical feminine terms and descriptions (LaCroix, 1985). And even in the evaluation of students, research has found women to be described as compassionate and sensitive in comparison to men who were described as quick-learners (Axelson et al., 2010).

In addition to being described in gendered language, men and women are likely to be evaluated against the roles they are ascribed to. Role Congruity theory underlines this expectation; it states that men and women are subject to varying norms and expectations based on their ascribed gender identity, and individuals are rewarded or penalized for the level to which they conform to them (Eagly and Diekmann, 2005). This expectation is supported when analyzing the evaluations of instructors which found that students reward women when they conform to gender expectations by undertaking time-intensive forms of emotional labor. Whereas students praise men for their technical expertise and teaching style (Gelber et al., 2022). In politics, this can manifest in the way in which we associate leadership with masculinity which can drive voters to prefer men for more powerful or authoritative positions (Eagly, Makhijani and Klonsky, 1992).

Further, women's letters include more doubt raisers, which are statements that introduce ambiguity or uncertainty (e.g. somewhat, might) (Trix and Psenka, 2003). In a study of letters of recommendation for assistant professor positions, Madera et al. (2019) show that both men and women letter writers use more doubt raisers in the letters they write for women. Consequentially, they establish that doubt raisers result in negative outcomes for both men and women. Therefore, in addition to gendered language that might convince readers that women do not have the necessary characteristics, often masculine, required for the position, women's recommendations are often weighed down further with uncertainty.

Biases can manifest not only in the description but in length. In an analysis of the letters of recommendation used to select and place students in residency training programs, Greenburg, Doyle and McClure (1994) find that the strongest letters were twice as long as the weakest letters. And research often finds that men are systematically receiving longer letters of recommendation than women (Turrentine et al., 2019). Women are disadvantaged by both what is said in their recommendations and what is not. The white space leaves room for them to be pushed aside for positions by men who systematically have more written about them.

Politicians are not exempt from these biases of description. Gender bias against women politicians in the media is extensively documented and written about. The research has coalesced mainly into two groups: one that investigates whether the quantity of coverage

women receive is equal to men, and two, whether the quality of media coverage women receive is different from that of men. Scholars on quantity are still in debate, with some concluding that women receive less (Verge and Pastor, 2018), others that the quantity of coverage is mixed, and lastly, those that believe previously women received less coverage but that this has changed over time (Fernandez-Garcia, 2016). And work that focuses exclusively on the United States concludes that while the myth of women's media inequality is pervasive its existence is not (Hayes and Lawless, 2016). However, those who study quality often agree that women receive significantly different types of coverage than men. Comparative scholars find that women's coverage often focuses on appearance or women candidates' personal lives, which can often disadvantage their political ambitions. Pulling these studies together, a recent meta-analysis by Van der Pas and Aaldering (2020), which analyzed over 75,000 meta stories across 25,000 politicians, concludes that women politicians receive more negative coverage and coverage of their appearance and personal lives than men.

One of the strongest debates in gender and politics is how and when gender affects the way candidates are evaluated. While this debate is lively, considerable evidence exists that gender stereotypes always form some sort of lens through which we view candidates (Thomas and Wilcox, 2014). Women face a catch-22 when it comes to conforming to feminine traits or expectations. Some research suggests that women must conform to feminine expectations or they will be penalized by voters (Herrnson, Lay and Stokes, 2003; Eagly and Johnson, 1990), while others show that conforming to feminine archetypes may leave doubt among voters on whether they can fulfill the masculine norms surrounding political office (Ditonto, Hamilton and Redlawsk, 2014; Dolan, Deckman and Swers, 2021).

Women politicians are they exempt from the consequences of failing to comply with gender expectations. Research shows that voters respond negatively when women politicians fail to conform to the norms that societal expectations lay out for them. One of the strongest expectations is the assumption of a traditional family. More than just being rewarded for conforming to family status expectations, women politicians are often penalized for not conforming to traditional family norms. Bell and Kaufmann (2015) find that women receive lower candidate evaluations for not conforming to gendered expectations on motherhood and children. Stalsburg (2010) shows that childless women are evaluated substantially lower than childless men and even lower than men and women with children. This preference for politicians to uphold traditional family norms is documented in established democracies like the United States (Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2017) and newer democracies like Malawi (Clayton et al., 2019).

And in areas with low information, like weakly institutionalized party systems, we should expect gender biases to be stronger. In a meta-analysis of 136 unique experiment studies, Koch, D'Mello and Sackett (2015) show that stereotyping and the effects of role congruity theory are stronger, to the disadvantage of women, in low-information environments. And that when evaluators were primarily men, the gender stereotyping was more substantial, and candidates were more likely to be penalized for deviating from gendered expectations. Taken together, this suggests that the greatest disadvantages for women will be found in newer democracies where men dominate weakly institutionalized political parties and polit-

ical networks.

To my knowledge, no current work tests gender bias against women candidates in written recommendations. This gap is likely the result from the rarity of accessing the recommendations for political candidates in what are often informal closed-door processes of candidate selection. However, we can leverage the expectations from both disparate fields to set forth a theoretical framework to understand the potential implications of gender and the consequences of gender biases in the written recommendations of candidates in Zambia. This analysis will test the following hypotheses based on the amalgamation of the theoretical expectations of these two fields:

Hypothesis 1: *As the length of the recommendations increases so will the likelihood of endorsement and selection.*

Hypothesis 2: *Men will have longer recommendations than women.*

Hypothesis 3: *Attributes that correspond to the candidate's gender schema will significantly increase their electoral outcomes.*

Hypothesis 4: *Women's recommendations will engage in gendered-framing.*

2.3 Background: Zambia 2016 General Election


The progress of women's representation in Zambia, while steadily growing in its respects, significantly lags behind many of its neighbors. Zambia is a mid-level performer as of 2016 in terms of gender equity in political representation and ranks 139 on the UN Gender Inequality Index (GII). Women over the years have called for the implementation of electoral quotas, but the reality on the ground is no one expects there to be any progress on the topic of electoral quotas in the near future.¹ In 2016, the 2015 Gender Equity and Equality Act (GEEA) was passed; however, no legislation has passed to support the provisions in the act. In sum, there is very little institutionally established to help women achieve political equity in Zambia. Therefore women must compete for political office without any institutional or party incentives. Thus, the findings from this study will allow us to understand better the likely constraints women will continue to face in expanding their representation in developing countries where parties select their candidates through closed processes.

The Candidate Selection Process

The data in this paper comes from the most recent general election in Zambia held on August 11th, 2016. Members of Parliament are elected from single-member districts at one of the 156 constituencies through a first-past-the-post system. Ward Councillors are elected at the

¹Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia 2017.

Figure 2.1: Candidate Selection Diagram



Ward level and there are over 1,000 position in the countries. Mayor is a newer position and is elected at the district level. There are two dominant political parties - the incumbent party, the Patriotic Front (PF), and the opposition party, the United Party for National Democracy (UPND). Between these two parties, they collectively hold 94% of the seats in the National Assembly.² This chapter will focus on the candidate selection practices of the two dominant political parties. Smaller parties in Zambia have significantly less demand by political aspirants and therefore did not hold full candidate selection processes in 2016.³ Both PF and UPND go through a similar candidate selection process, commonly referred to as adoption. This system was inherited from the first ruling party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP). As depicted in 2.1, selection involves committees made up of party officials at each level of the party organization to conduct interviews with potential candidates. With minor variations by province, these gatekeepers interview, score, and evaluate candidates and submit recommendations to higher levels in the party hierarchy. Ultimately, a provincial chairman presents these recommendations to the party's NEC for final selection. It is important to note that these recommendations hold no binding power, and the NEC can choose whomever they like.

2.4 Research Design - Data Collection and Coding

This chapter investigates a unique set of data collected in the field: written candidate recommendations. Before the 2016 elections, the then incumbent party, the PF, incorporated a documentation process in to their candidate selection process. Party members who make up the selection committee at the lower levels of the party branch wrote evaluations for each

²Of the 156 elected seats in 2016, PF held 89, UPND held 58, MMD held 4, FDD held 1, and independents held the remaining 14.

³Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia September 2017

political aspirant vying for the party bid for local and legislative office. These recommendations were sent to the NEC for the final nomination decision. While in the field, I was able to copy these recommendations.

These recommendations were transcribed and coded the written recommendations using undergraduate research assistants at the University of California, Berkeley. Each evaluation was individually coded following a full coding protocol to build the data set analyzed in this chapter. (The full protocol is in the appendix 2.8).

Independent Variables

Informed by over 90 interviews with political actors in Zambia, the coding protocol focused on key candidate attributes and qualifications that were consistently highlighted as positive or negative qualifications of a potential candidate. These cover financial resources, local connections, political experience, family dynamics, organizational capacity, endorsements, and candidate demographics.

A candidate's financial resources and, more importantly, ability to support their campaign are exceedingly important. Elections in Zambia and in Africa as a whole are expensive. Stressed by party members across all levels of the party structure, an essential qualification is a candidate's financial capacity. Given this, we coded whether or not the candidate recommendations discussed a candidate's financial resources both positively and negatively. We broke this down to include tangible and non-tangible assets, if the candidate gave financially to the political party, if the recommendation directly mentions the candidate's ability to finance their campaign, and whether the candidate had access or control of their financial resources.

What was more important than money to many of the party members I interviewed was whether or not the candidate was connected and well-known in the constituency they were applying to run in. The most common negative phrase used throughout the evaluations was "Not on the ground," indicating the candidate was not well known by the people at the local level. We coded if the evaluation mentions the candidates connection to the constituency, traditional authorities, church, local political party, and the candidate's ethnicity.

Logically, the political experience of a candidate is essential, and as stressed by members of the selection committee, loyalty to the party is one of the most sought-after characteristics of potential candidates. To capture this qualification, we coded both the candidate's political experience, including their political qualifications and previous experience, and the candidate's history with the PF specifically. These included both negative and positive discussions of the candidate's political experience.

Candidates, especially those applying in constituencies where the candidate has a long history, are not evaluated in isolation. In addition to their individual attributes, it is likely that their family attributes and resources may be considered as well. For example, for one candidate, the recommendation noted "that his family runs businesses within Kitwe one

being Nkana College of Education”.⁴ While this resource was not specifically the individuals, they likely benefited from their family’s resources and connections. We coded if the recommendations mentioned the candidate’s family broadly or their resources, connections, political history, and levels of support.

Lastly, candidate recommendations at the NEC stand in place often of actually knowing or interviewing the candidate. Therefore, they can convey heuristics about the candidate that would not be known otherwise to the committee. Heuristics such as the candidate’s age, gender, education, profession, family dynamic, or other attributes were included throughout the recommendations. We capture these descriptions in the final stage of the coding protocol.

Dependent Variables

In addition to the coding protocol, we added two outcome variables that can help us determine if the evaluations have any meaningful impact on the candidate selection process. We record both the endorsement and selection outcome for each candidate. Candidate recommendations or endorsements function as a way for the selection committee to indicate their preferences to the NEC. The primary way they do so in the candidate evaluations is by indicating an endorsement or the candidate’s electability. A short and seemingly effective phrase used throughout the recommendation documents is “saleable candidate”. To capture these endorsements, we code whether they suggest the candidate could win and if they recommended the candidate overall.⁵ Being endorsed makes a notable difference in a candidates chances of being selected, in fact, candidates were almost twice as likely to be selected if they were endorsed in comparison to candidates who were not.

To determine if the candidate was selected, we compared our list of candidates with the list of individuals who appeared on the ballot for the PF. It is important to note that there were cases where an individual was initially selected but then did not appear on the ballot for various reasons. In these cases, we only coded the individual who appeared on the ballot as selected.

In total, this produces a data set with 808 observations and 29 variables. As depicted in Table 2.1, we were able to confidently code the gender of the candidate and the position they applied for 780 of the aspirants (97%). The following section looks at the trends from the coded recommendations and if they vary by the candidate’s gender.

2.5 Candidate Recommendations: What they Say and What are they Worth?

To understand what candidate recommendations look like and, more importantly, if they potentially affect party endorsements and selection, I start with an investigation into the

⁴Candidate for Member of Parliament, Copperbelt Province

⁵In some cases, candidate recommendations include a ranking or a score. In these cases, this was considered a form of endorsement.

Table 2.1: Cross Tab Gender and position Candidate Evaluations

	Local Office	Legislature	Total
Women	35	90	125
Men	195	460	655
Total	230	550	780

Note: For 28 recommendations we were unable to identify either position or gender.

distribution of the data set. Presented in Table 2.2 are the descriptive statistics for the main variables utilized in this chapter's analysis. The full descriptive table for the whole data set is in the appendix.

Table 2.2: Dataset Summary

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
MP	808	0.703	0.457	0	1
Woman	780	.16	.367	0	1
Word Count	808	19.053	26.296	0	199
Selected	807	0.169	0.375	0	1
Endorsement	725	.3006	.458	0	1
Party History	735	.217	.412	0	1
Party Position	722	.123	.3289	0	1
Political Experience	719	.271	.444	0	1
Organization Ties	721	.026	.160	0	1
Financial Resources	718	.065	.247	0	1
No Connection	721	.105	.307	0	1

Note: Sample size varies due to missingness in the data that is captured when creating the binary indicators.

The majority of the candidate evaluations recorded were for candidates vying to stand as a member of parliament for PF (70%). The demand for this position reflects the value of the legislative offices. Additionally, it demonstrates the level of competition in getting selected

for one of the 156 seats. Of the 808 evaluations, we confirmed that 17% of candidates were selected and appeared on the ballot for PF.

The nature of the evaluations varied greatly. It was most common to see evaluations that contained some sort of an endorsement for the candidate. This could take the form of a recommendation: “We therefore strongly recommend . In some cases, this included a comment on placement: “1st choice”. And in others, it included a comment on the candidate’s ability to win the election: “can indeed make the party win massively”. Comments in this vein occur in 30% of the evaluations in the data set.

Following endorsements, statements surrounding the candidate’s political qualifications were most common. 27% of the evaluations highlighted a candidate’s prior political experience, 22% noted a previous history with the PF, and 12% listed that the candidate had a position within the party.

Notable was also the function of local connections. While many of the indicators in this data set were only utilized in their positive form, negative comments on a candidate’s lack of local connection occurred frequently. Statements on the candidate not being from or connected to the constituency were the most consistent negative comments throughout the recommendations. 11% of the recommendations negatively commented on the candidate’s connection to the constituency. Of the 76 candidates who had a negative comment on their connection to the constituency in their recommendation, only 8 managed to still get selected.

However, less was said about the resources often highlighted in interviews as necessary to run a campaign. Only 3% of recommendations mentioned the candidate’s organizational ties. For example, one recommendation noted the candidate “who also hails from Lunte, has an NGO which works closely with vulnerable women in the area.”⁶ Further, while party members agree that a candidate’s ability to support their campaign is a vital qualification to be selected, only 7% of recommendations commented on the candidate’s financial resources. However, when they do, they are direct about the financial requirements of being selected as a candidate and often bluntly state, “[s]he has the financial capacity to run her campaign.”⁷

The lengths of the recommendations also varied considerably. While the average word count is 19 words, they range from being empty to 199 words. However, the distribution is left-leaning, with the 25th percentile being two words and the 75th at 27 words. Two-word evaluations are common and generally either state the candidate’s rank (1st choice) or an overall endorsement (Saleable Candidate).

Importantly, none of the independent variables that will be used throughout this analysis are correlated with the gender of the candidate. Depicted in Table 2.3, we can see that there is no bivariate relationship between the key independent variables and the binary indicator that captures if the recommendation was written for a woman candidate. It is important to demonstrate that going from a man’s to a woman’s does not significant increase or decrease the likelihood of having any specific qualification noted in the recommendation. Notably, while all the signs are negative besides Organization Ties (the attribute that most

⁶Candidate for Member of Parliament, Northern Province

⁷Candidate for Member of Parliament, Copperbelt Province

aligns with women's gender schema) none of the coefficients are statistically significant. The lack of significant relationships here suggest that the way gender bias works in these recommendations is far more nuanced.

Table 2.3: No Bivariate Relationships between Independent Variables and Gender

	(1) Financial Resources	(2) Party History	(3) Org. Ties	(4) Poli Exp.	(5) Endorsement	(6) Profession
Woman	-0.273 (0.450)	-0.0578 (0.246)	0.344 (0.572)	-0.193 (0.239)	-0.173 (0.228)	-0.119 (0.331)
Constant	-2.626*** (0.164)	-1.267*** (0.0982)	-3.658*** (0.262)	-0.954*** (0.0913)	-0.824*** (0.0887)	-2.041*** (0.128)
Obs	708	724	711	709	715	716

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Hypothesis One and Two: Does Word Count Matter?

The first and second hypotheses focus on the length of the written recommendations. As discussed previously, the recommendations vary significantly in length as measured by word count. The average recommendation is 19 words long, but the range is anywhere from 0 to 199 words. Hypothesis one proposes that longer recommendations are stronger, or more specifically, as you increase the word count, you will increase the likelihood of being endorsed and selected. In Table 2.4, we see that the expectation that longer recommendations are more likely to be successful holds. As shown in Model 1, increasing word count leads to a positive increase in the likelihood of being endorsed ($p < 0.000$). In Model 2, we see similar effects on being selected. Increasing the word count in a recommendation makes the likelihood that the candidate was selected by the NEC and appeared on the ballot in 2016 significantly higher ($p < 0.000$).

While there is evidence to support Hypothesis one, we do not find any evidence to support Hypothesis two: that men's recommendations would be longer than women's. Reflected in Table 2.5, we can see that the Woman coefficient, as an independent variable, has no significant correlation with the total word count in the evaluations. Further demonstrated in Figure 2.2, we plot the mean word count grouping by outcome and gender. This figure shows that the word count is significantly higher among the selected candidates than the unselected candidates. The mean word count for unselected candidates is 15.8 compared to 31.4 among the selected candidates ($p < 0.000$). However, there is no significant difference between men and women within each outcome category. Among candidates who were not selected, men had a mean word count of 16.1, and women had a mean word count of 16.4 ($p < 0.91$). Looking only at selected candidates, we again see a much higher average but no difference between men and women. The mean average for men is 32.4 words, and for

Table 2.4: Are Longer Recommendations More Likely to be Recommended or Selected?

	(1) Endorsed	(2) Selected
Word Count	0.0703*** (0.00548)	0.0190*** (0.00326)
Constant	-2.244*** (0.145)	-2.020*** (0.128)
Observations	725	795

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

women, the mean average is 29.5 ($p < 0.70$). Notably, the confidence interval for selected women is much larger, reflecting the smaller sample of selected women.

Knowing that word count matters then begs the question, what drives word count for recommendations written on candidates? In essence, every qualification mentioned innately increases the word count. Therefore this analysis is more concerned with comparing the size of the increases (relative word count increases) rather than that the effect exists. We can get an idea of what increases word count, and by how much, by looking at the model presented in table 2.5. Presented in the model is an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the count of words within the recommendation for each candidate. The independent variables are all binary indicators measuring qualifications for candidacy. The coefficient then tells us the average increase in words of the recommendation that would increase by going from 0 to 1 on each of the independent variables.

Party history, which takes a value of 1 if the evaluation mentions the candidate's history with the political party, has the largest positive effect on the average word count in the recommendation. Candidates who have a history with the party mentioned in their recommendation will, on average, have 23.2 more words than a candidate who does not. Given that the average recommendation is 19 words, this effect size is notably large. Following party history, having organizational ties (which takes a value of one if the recommendation mentions that the candidate has organizational ties) has the next largest effect increasing the recommendation by an additional 20.4 words on average. Recommendations that mention a candidate's financial resources are on average 18.8 words longer, and those that contain an endorsement are, on average, 17 words longer. Considerably lower than the previous, recommendations that mention a candidate's political experience or their profession are, on average, only 5 and 4 words longer, respectively. And interestingly, recommendations that mention a candidate's gender are not significantly different in length than those that do not.

In looking at what affects word count, we can see how a candidate's gender and the way attributes conform or not with their gender schema affect the formulation of their


Table 2.5: What Drives Word Count?

	Word Count
Woman	0.131 (1.861)
Financial Resources	18.77*** (2.990)
Organizational Ties	20.38*** (4.650)
Endorsement	17.09*** (1.839)
Political Experience	5.091** (1.985)
Gendered	9.863 (6.227)
Party History	23.21*** (2.108)
Profession	4.845** (2.314)
Constant	4.921*** (0.854)
Observations	689
Standard errors in parentheses	
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$	

recommendation. In table 2.6 we see the models for word count separated by the candidate's gender. Both men and women benefit similarly in terms of word count for mentioning party history (22.9 words for men and 24 words for women) and for having an endorsement (16.8 words for men and 16.4 words for women). However, men benefit significantly more from attributes that align with masculine characteristics. Men, who in traditional households and under conservative coverture laws are the controllers of economic resources, see an average increase of 19.2 words for mentions of financial resources and 5.8 words for mentions of their profession. While women receive no significant increase in word count for recommendations that mention financial resources or for a profession. Further, men, not women, see an increased word count for recommendations that discuss their profession (5.8 words).

Men are not just solely benefiting more for all attributes. Instead, women see increases

Figure 2.2: Average Word Count by Candidate Selection Outcome



in word count compared to men for attributes that align with their gender schema. Women receive an incredibly large increase in word count (50.1 words) for having recommendations that mention their organizational ties, aligning with the communal expectations surrounding women's behavior. Men also benefit from mentioning organization ties, but it is significantly smaller with only 13 words.

Unlike the long list of masculine qualifications that align with what party members state as key in determining if a candidate is qualified, there are significantly fewer attributes that are stereotypically feminine that directly align. If higher word counts are critical to increasing the likelihood that the candidate is recommended and then selected, as demonstrated in Table 2.4, then a possible explanation for one of the ways party gatekeepers act as a barrier for women in politics is by only rewarding women who possess the few attributes that both align with their gender schema and with the archetype of the ideal political candidate.

Hypothesis Three: Do Men and Women's Evaluation Differ?

Hypothesis three has us changing the focus of the dependent variable from word count to the outcomes of the candidate selection process: endorsement and selection. To test hypothesis three, we must first understand if the variables identified by party members as critical

Table 2.6: What Drives Word Count? Effects by Candidate's Gender

	(Men) Word Count	(Woman) Word Count
Financial Resources	19.24*** (3.179)	11.23 (8.571)
Organizational Ties	13.03* (5.224)	50.16*** (9.832)
Endorsement	16.83*** (1.967)	16.35** (5.005)
Political Experience	5.832** (2.106)	5.352 (5.743)
Party History	22.91*** (2.237)	24.06*** (5.966)
Profession	5.866* (2.477)	0.782 (6.418)
Constant	4.862*** (0.866)	5.536** (2.009)
Observations	581	108

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

correlate with receiving an endorsement or being selected as a candidate. Looking at Table 2.7, we can confirm that the majority of the variables that identify varying qualifications candidates can increase the candidate's chances of being endorsed and selected. Having financial resources mentioned in their evaluation more than triples a candidate's likelihood of getting an endorsement and doubles their likelihood of being selected. Organizational ties, the attribute that most benefited women's word counts, has no significant effect on the likelihood of receiving an endorsement or being selected. Recommendations that mention a candidate's political experience doubles their odds of endorsement but only the odds of selection by 69.3%. Recommendations that mention party history are 114% more likely to receive an endorsement but no more or less likely to be selected. Lastly, recommendations that say a candidate's profession are 124% more likely to be endorsed, but it does not affect their selection chances. Notably, whether the candidate's gender was highlighted in the recommendation did not affect the likelihood of endorsement or election, but interestingly the sign on both coefficients in negative.

To test hypothesis three, we investigate the relationship between identifiers of candidate

Table 2.7: Do Recommendations Affect Endorsement or Selection?

	(1) Endorsement	(2) Selection
Financial Resources	2.112*** (0.531)	1.053*** (0.380)
Organizational Ties	0.369 (0.701)	0.367 (0.648)
Political Experience	2.021*** (0.247)	0.693** (0.270)
Party History	1.141*** (0.277)	0.218 (0.301)
Profession	1.242*** (0.334)	-0.185 (0.340)
Gendered	-1.205 (0.943)	-1.466 (1.131)
Constant	-2.158*** (0.145)	-1.953*** (0.134)
Observations	698	701

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

qualifications and likelihood of endorsement and selection by the candidate gender. In doing so, the evidence supports hypothesis three (that men's and women's recommendations systematically differ). And again, these benefits are driven by the alignment of the attribute with the gender schema of the candidate. Presented in table 2.8 are the logit regressions for both the endorsement and selection outcome separated by the candidate's gender. Looking at Model 1, which looks at what affects the likelihood of endorsement for men candidates, we can see that men receive significant increases in their likelihood of receiving an endorsement: 212% increase for financial resources, 199% for political experience, 109% for party history, and 128% for stating their profession. Women, on the other hand, do not receive the benefit of the more masculine traits of financial resources and profession. The only attribute that increases their likelihood of endorsement for women, shown in Model 2, is political experience (197%).

Turning towards selection as an outcome, we again see confirmation that there are gendered differences across the recommendations and how they affect the candidate's odds of getting selected. In Model 3, men see a 93.4% increase when their recommendations mention

their financial resources. They also see a 78% increase if their recommendations mention their political experience. On the other hand, women see no significant effects in Model 4, positive or negative, between the characteristics of their recommendation and their likelihood of selection.

Uncovering these trends suggest that the ways men and women benefit from the qualifications listed in their recommendations are different. Men appear to benefit when their recommendations highlight traits that align with their gender schema, specifically, attributes that are considered more masculine. On the other hand, women do not benefit from more masculine characteristics. And more poignantly, women are not benefiting in equal measure as men from more feminine and gender-affirming traits. This suggests that women who do find a way to be endorsed or selected, likely have more to overcome to be selected: a reality that increases both the difficulty and cost for women to navigate through the gates of the 'secret garden of politics' Gallagher and Marsh (1988).

Table 2.8: Do Recommendations Affect Endorsement or Selection For MPs?

	(1) Men Endorsement	(2) Women Endorsement	(3) Men Selection	(4) Women Selection
Financial Resources	2.124*** (0.581)	1.480 (1.484)	0.934** (0.410)	1.360 (1.143)
Organizational Ties	0.0463 (0.763)	1.073 (1.678)	0.307 (0.730)	0.342 (1.350)
Political Experience	1.996*** (0.266)	1.973*** (0.714)	0.787*** (0.297)	0.677 (0.815)
Party History	1.099*** (0.297)	1.163 (0.755)	0.322 (0.324)	-1.233 (1.046)
Profession	1.288*** (0.365)	1.133 (0.877)	-0.244 (0.374)	-0.259 (0.955)
Constant	-2.141*** (0.159)	-2.281*** (0.376)	-2.059*** (0.154)	-1.528*** (0.290)
Observations	581	108	583	109

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Gendered variable was dropped from the analyses due no observations in model 4.

Table 2.9: Top 10 Words in Candidate Evaluations by Gender

All	Women	Men
Ground	Ground	Ground
Popular	Known	Popular
Win	Win	Win
Known	Saleable	Known
Saleable	Structures	Saleable
Current	Popular	Structures
Structures	Mrs.	Campaigns
Campaigns	Chiefs	People
People	Campaigns	Hon.
Chiefs	Women	Chiefs

Hypothesis Four: Do Women’s Evaluation Engage in Gendered-Framing?

Lastly, this analysis investigates hypothesis four: whether or not women’s evaluations engage in gendered framing. The previous analyses suggest that gender framing is occurring in women’s recommendations. However, to test it directly, we must look at the actual words used throughout the recommendations. In doing so, we see that gender becomes relevant in the choices of words that party members utilize when writing women’s recommendations. With the average word count in evaluations being only 19 words, there is very little space to describe a candidate’s viability to a selection committee that has likely never met the individual. Further, the words used to describe an individual can convey descriptors that might introduce potential biases. Therefore, this analysis proceeds to analyze word choice.

The top ten words shed light on how these biases might be introduced. Presented in Table 2.9, are the top ten words, excluding common words.⁸ We see the top ten words present in all evaluations in the first column. These can be grouped into two themes: the ability to win and sources of support. The most common words in the men’s column almost mirror this. The only actual difference is the appearance of the title hon. which is the shortened version of Honorable that proceeds the name of current members of parliament.

However, the top ten words used in women’s evaluations have a noticeable difference. Two out of the ten most common words used in women’s evaluations indicate their gender. Notice that Mr. is not present in men’s evaluations, so this is not simply a reflection of using titles in evaluations. Instead, party members only use titles to describe women who stand out as different from the general population.

⁸Words the word drop include the following: constituency, party, recommended, candidate, committee, member, candidates, well, district, chairman, choice, parliament, constituency, party, recommended, candidate, committee, member, candidates, well, district, chairman, choice, parliament, can, interviews, central, provincial, elections, election, and province))

The potential impact of the differences in word choice and the specific intent to highlight women candidates, as women, in the evaluations cannot be understated. It demonstrates an explicit intention of party members to characterize these individuals by their gender. Intentional or not, it does demonstrate that gender was important and worthy of note during candidate selection.

We can further demonstrate support for hypothesis four by looking closer at the gendered variable. This variable is coded as one if the recommendation incorporates or highlights the candidate's gender. Women's recommendations are significantly more likely to include some reference to their gender. Observationally, we saw this trend reflected above in the top ten words most used in women's recommendations. But also, statistically, 12% of women's recommendations mention their gender while only 2.5% of men's recommendations reference their gender ($p < 0.000$).

How gendered recommendations affect the likelihood of endorsement and selection is moderated by a notable characteristic: office level. Looking at the interaction effect in Table 2.10, we can see there is a significant interaction effect between the candidate running for member of parliament, over local office, and recommendations that reference the candidate's gender. To remind ourselves, in the full model in Table 2.7, gendered had a negative coefficient but was not significant in its effect on endorsement or selection. Yet, when looking at the effects by position for only women candidates, we see an interesting variation in the gendered variable. Specifically, women competing to stand as MPs receive a positive and significant increase in their chances of being endorsed by 455% if their gender is mentioned in their recommendation. Therefore, when comparing the recommendations of women who are competing for local office to those competing for member of parliament, the effect of mentioning the candidate's gender switches. Among women competing for local office, although not statistically significant, is negative on the candidate's likelihood of being endorse. Women competing for member of parliament, however, see their likelihood of being endorse quadrupled when their gender is mentioned. This suggests that potentially among elite women, how their recommendations are being gendered is more beneficial than it is for women competing for the local level.⁹

Lastly, while more observational in nature, we can look at the general assortment of words that are more commonly used in men's and women's recommendations. Utilizing a word cloud, we can map the most commonly used words and adjust the size of the words to reflect the frequency in which they are used. In a world where party gatekeepers were not engaging in gendered framing in the recommendations of men and women, we should expect these two figures to be essentially indistinguishable. However, that is not what we see when we look at Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4. In Figure 2.4, we see the most commonly used words used in women's recommendations. In this figure, we of course see the gender identifiers listed in the top ten, but also other words that align with women's gender schema, such as teacher, chairlady, and secretary, among others. Whereas in Figure 2.3, which plot the most common

⁹We could not run the same analyses for the second outcome, selection, because there are not enough observations in the sample for that model.

Table 2.10: Does Gendered Framing Affect Recommendations? Gendered Framing and Position Interaction for Women Candidates

	(1) Endorsement
Financial Resources	2.868 (1.760)
Organizational Ties	2.294 (2.214)
Political Experience	2.722*** (0.770)
Party History	1.124 (0.926)
Gendered	-4.774* (2.372)
MP	0.0341 (0.713)
Gendered $\times$ MP	4.559* (2.315)
Party Position	1.289 (1.129)
Constant	-2.372*** (0.642)
Observations	105

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

word for men looks notably different, with standouts such as incumbent, win, and prepared. The figure also suggests a deeper density in common words in men's recommendation than in women's, which is signified by the fewer words with larger sizes of central words. Again, this exercise is merely observational but adds context to our understanding of the evidence supporting hypothesis four.

Figure 2.3: Word Cloud - Men Candidates





Figure 2.4: Word Cloud - Women Candidates



2.6 Limitations

It is important to note some limitations to the data collected here. First, the data collected in the field relies on party record keeping which is unlikely to be perfect. Missing information on an aspirant's gender, while often marked by a suffix like Mr. or Mrs., was coded by a Zambian university graduate. While I am confident in the coding, it could be inaccurate. Additionally, it is currently unknown if the missing data represent candidates that received no evaluation or if none was recorded.

Second, this data and the analysis in this chapter only looked at local and legislative office recommendations. It doesn't contain recommendations for positions that potentially are more gendered. For example, women in many contexts are often more likely to be appointed to more 'feminine' minister positions like education or cabinet positions with less power or smaller budgets (Annesley, Beckwith and Franceschet, 2019). Future research could benefit from utilizing the variation in the type of position to explore whether the effects of recommendations vary with the alignment between the gender of the candidate and the perception of the position.

2.7 Conclusion

Scholars suggest that political parties form a leak in the pipeline towards equity for women in politics. While significant research has established how voters may incorporate gender bias in their evaluation of candidates, less work has looked at the individuals in control of candidate selection in newer democracies: party members.

I contribute to the study of gender in politics by combining the theoretical expectations from the literature on gender bias in letters of recommendation and evaluations with the documented obstacles women candidates experience in the media and from voters. Working from an incredibly unique data source, written recommendations for candidate selection in Zambia, I show that both the content and the length of the recommendation affect the likelihood of selection and election. And more importantly, these effects are moderated by the gender of the candidate.

The findings show that key components of what party gatekeepers they say in recommendations increases selection and election chances. Longer recommendations increase a candidate's chances of being endorsed and selected. And recommendations that highlight a candidate's financial resources, political experience, and party history are more likely to be endorsed, and those that mention financial resources and political experience are more likely to be selected.

The effects of gendered qualifications mentioned in the evaluations are not ubiquitous across genders. This chapter showed that the benefits of specific qualifications are significant when they align with the candidate's gender schema (the expected behavior and roles of their gender identity). And because of this, there are significant gendered differences in the way that recommendations can be written to increase a candidate's chances of endorsement

or selection. Financial resources, which arguably align with more masculine expectations, uniquely benefit men. In contrast, organizational ties, communal, and feminine in nature, benefit women significantly more when present in their recommendations.

What is then the role of these recommendations? These analyses suggest that not all of the content recorded in these evaluations are critical factors during candidate selection. On the extreme, this could mean that the formalization of the written recommendations was simply a bureaucratic process to ‘legitimize’ a relatively informal process. Or simply, the factors that matter at the final stage of candidate selection at the national level, in some cases, far outweighed the impact of the written recommendations. Research on how candidates’ qualifications are measured, recorded, and conveyed to party members in newer democracies should be the focus of much further research. The findings in this chapter established that women and men are considered differently during this process, and understanding the consequences and the potential remedies may give way to implementable policy solutions to support women’s chances in party-controlled candidate selection.

2.8 Appendix

Variable	Responses
[prov] Province	<i>Name of Province</i>
[dist] District	<i>Name of District</i>
[ward] Ward	<i>Name of Ward</i>
[pos] Position	<i>Listed Position</i>
[mp] MP Is the aspirant applying for the MP position	1 = yes; 0=no
[female] Female	1 = yes; 0=no
[fulleval] Please enter the full text of the evaluation here.	<i>Transcribed Evaluation</i>
[name] Aspirant Name	<i>Listed Name</i>
[fin1] Does it mention financial assets?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin2] Does it mention tangible goods that the aspirant has?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin3] Does it mention intangible (non-physical) resources that the aspirant has?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin4] Does it mention that the aspirant gave resources to the political party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin5] Does it say the candidate can finance their campaign?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin6] Do they suggest the candidate does not control their wealth (i.e. their family or spouse controls it)?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fin7] Is the mention of financial assets positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no; - 999 NA
[concon1] Does the evaluation mention anything about a connection to the constituency?	1 = yes; 0=no
[concon2] Does the evaluation mention them NOT having a connection to the constituency?	1 = yes; 0=no
[concon3] Does the evaluation mention the aspirant's connection to local traditional authorities?	1 = yes; 0=no
[concon4] Does it mention the candidate's ethnicity?	1 = yes; 0=no
[concon5] Is the mention of constituency connection positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[concon6] Does it mention that the aspirant has the support of the church?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party1] Does the evaluation mention history with the political party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party1a] If so, is the mention positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no; - 999 NA
[party2] Does the evaluation suggest that the aspirant currently holds a position in the party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party 2p] Does the evaluation suggest that the aspirant previously holds a position in the party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party3] Does it suggest the aspirant has been with the party for a long time?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party4] Does it suggest the aspirant has been with the party for a short time?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party5] Does it mention the candidate having history with another political party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party5a] If so, is the mention positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party6] Does it suggest that the candidate is dedicated/loyal to the party?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party7] Does the evaluation indicate that the aspirant is the incumbent?	1 = yes; 0=no
[party8] Is the mention of party experience positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam1] Does the evaluation mention the aspirant's family?	1 = yes; 0=no

[fam1a] If so, is the mention of family positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam2] Does the evaluation mention that their family is active in politics?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam2a] If so, is the mention positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam3] Does the evaluation mention that their family is/was a politician?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam4] Does the evaluation discuss whether the aspirant has their family's support?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam4a] If so, is the mention positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[fam5] Is the mention of family positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[org1] Does it mention organizational ties?	1 = yes; 0=no
[org2] Does it mention that the aspirant is a member of a group or organization?	1 = yes; 0=no
[org3] Is the mention of organizational ties positive or negative?	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpref1] Does it mention that they were not interviewed	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpref2] Does it comment on winnability of candidate?	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpref3] Does it suggest the candidate could not win?	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpref4] Does it mention a negative comment	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpref5] Did they recommend this candidate?	1 = yes; 0=no
[selpre6] What place?	
Were they given a percentage score?	
[asp1] Does it mention their education?	1 = yes; 0=no
[asp2] Does it mention their profession	1 = yes; 0=no
[asp2q] If so, enter the profession here.	
[asp3] Does it mention their previous position?	1 = yes; 0=no
[asp3q] If so, enter their previous profession here.	
[asp4] Does it mention their political experience?	1 = yes; 0=no
[asp4a] If so, were they previously elected?	1 = yes; 0=no
[asp4b] If so, enter the position here.	
[gen1] Does it mention the candidate's gender?	1 = yes; 0=no
[gen2] Does it mention the aspirant's age?	1 = yes; 0=no
If so, what is the age?	
[gen3] Does it mention the aspirant's marital status?	1 = yes; 0=no
[gen4] Does it mention the aspirant's children?	1 = yes; 0=no
[gen5] Please list any gendered language used in the evaluation.	

Chapter 3

The Recommendations of Gatekeepers: The Double Bind between Expectations and Reality for Women Candidates

3.1 Introduction

In 2015, Honorable Josephine Limata managed to win the seat for Member of Parliament in Luampa constituency in Western Province as an independent candidate - an incredibly difficult feat in the country that has seen the dominance of a two party majority system since the beginning of multi-party democracy in 1991. Despite clearly being a strong candidate who had the support of the voters, she was not selected as the candidate under either the incumbent party, the Patriotic Front(PF), or the opposition party, the United Party for National Development (UPND).¹ When asked about the puzzle between her clear electability and both PF and UPND's decision not to support her candidacy, she stated that "the majority of political parties don't adopt [select] women. We are undermined by men... There are plenty of women who stand, but, the way they are chosen, men are the majority who get adopted [selected]." ² Limata, and her path to political office, leads us to ask what do political gatekeepers consider a candidate worth nominating and does this differ for men and women?

A critical point in the path to political office is the interaction between party members and potential political aspirants. It is at this point in newer democratic countries, where the political parties control who appears on the ballot, not voters, that many individuals are weeded out or barred from political opportunity. Underscored by Pesonen (1968), "[t]he nomination stage eliminates 99.96% of all the eligible people; the voters choose from only

¹In 2021, UPND wins the presidency is currently the incumbent party.

²Author interview, Lusaka, Zambia, January 2017

.04% (pg. 348).” When those in charge of candidate selection engage in recruitment, recommendations, and ultimately evaluations of candidates, they determine the standards of political representatives for the country. Understanding what political party members perceive as a qualified candidate then becomes vital to understanding the quality of an elected body. Knowing how these perceptions are effected by gender is essential to understanding the disparity between men and women in politics. Yet, the qualifications deemed necessary or even how candidates are evaluated are often opaque to those not within the system and understudied in newer democracies.

Many suggest that the qualifications or standards political parties look for in potential candidates are different for men and women. Women political candidates they contend are held to different, likely higher standards, than men when vying for political office. Individual gender bias, in addition, to the inherent disadvantages that women face socio-economically, can often de facto mean that women candidates must have more qualifications to be seen as viable candidates (Pearson and McGhee, 2009). In the United States, these higher standards for women candidates can explain why observationally we see that ‘when women run they win’ (Burrell, 1994; Seltzer, Newman and Leighton, 1997): they have to be more qualified in order to be endorsed for candidacy (Anzia and Berry, 2011).

Political parties can reinforce this inequality by institutionalizing gender biases into their candidate selection processes whether formally or informally. Political parties are essential to ensuring equal representation for marginalized groups (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). However, party members express higher levels of doubt when it comes to the electability of women candidates and, in turn, are less likely to recruit them (Sanbonmatsu, 2006). Therefore, the literature consistently underscores the important role party gatekeepers play in increasing women’s representation across all electoral democracies.

Despite this underlined importance, little work has looked directly at what gatekeepers see as a candidate worth nominating. Research that has focused specifically at party gatekeepers, primarily looks at paths to political office commonly found in older democracies. The reality for candidates in most new democracies, however, is that the path to the ballot is far less institutionalized and often in the hands of a small few party members. Moreover, what gatekeepers view as a competitive candidate worth nominating is unclear. Leaving us to ask, what do gatekeepers in newer democracies look for in a competitive candidate, and is this different for men and women?

To answer this question, this chapter analyzes the responses of 1,333 party members from all ten provinces in Zambia. In a unique look at the multifaceted complexities of gatekeepers, this survey samples from party members that range from the ward to the national level. To look at the role of party gatekeepers early on in the political pipeline, the survey asks party members to make recommendations for hypothetical aspiring candidates asking for advice in standing for the upcoming 2021 election in their constituency. To see if these recommendations are gendered, the survey utilizes a vignette style experiment to vary the hypothetical aspirant’s gender. Following the introduction of the vignette, respondents were asked six questions having them recommend levels of education, political experience, family status, financial resources, and sources of support. The recommendations were based on the

most commonly mentioned qualifications from interviews conducted with party gatekeepers and covered education, political experience, family dynamics, financial resources, and sources of support.

The results suggest that the ideal candidate is the same regardless of the candidates gender. The answers given by gatekeepers who were assigned a hypothetical man to advise were not statistically different from the responses given to the hypothetical woman candidate. This suggests, ultimately, that gatekeepers did not recommend different types or amounts of qualifications to candidates in order to consider them worth nominating. Women gatekeepers, however, had higher expectations for both men and women candidates. In comparison to men gatekeepers, women in this sample were more likely to recommended candidates to have more experience, more resources, and a traditional family dynamic. The paper finds then, that gender does affect candidate selection but it is not the gender of the candidate but of the gatekeeper that is driving this result.

Further, while the recommendations of what candidates should do remain consistent for both men and women, actually meeting these recommendations does appear gendered. The survey followed the experimental component by asking participants to rate the difficulties for men and women comparatively to achieve these recommendations. Gatekeepers highlighted that it is more difficult in practice for women to have enough money to support their campaigns, handle election violence, and tolerate the negative language used during the campaigns. Of the ten aspects of campaigning that we asked gatekeepers to consider, none were deemed more difficult for men. Women candidates are stuck in a double bind, while they are recommended by gatekeepers to strive for the same qualifications as men, the cost of achieving these qualifications is much higher for them.

This paper proceeds by reviewing the current literature on the role of party gatekeepers and the effect of gender on candidate qualifications. After establishing these expectations and the importance of the gatekeepers, I will discuss the experimental design and outcome measures. I will then present the results of the experiment demonstrating the similarity in responses given by both gatekeepers recommending for a man aspirant and those for a woman. From there, I will highlight the reality that for women to achieve these recommendations may be far more difficult, before concluding with thoughts on the importance of studying the preferences of gatekeepers.

3.2 Ceteris Paribus, or Perceived to be?

The interactions between party gatekeepers and aspiring politicians are a vital component to understanding the pathway women take into politics. It is at this point in the political pipeline where we see a major stumbling point for women. In contexts where political parties still control access to political opportunity, party members are often the first point of contact with political aspirants. More than that, they often are reducing a large sample of hopefuls, to a small handful of candidates. In doing this, political parties are often referred to as the

gatekeepers to the ‘secret garden of politics’ (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988) and scholars have shown that this is often to the disadvantage of women candidates.

It is well documented that men and women who enter politics are evaluated differently. Gender is common heuristic that voters use to evaluate candidates and the stereotypes associated with each gender shades the lenses through which individuals interact and judge political hopefuls. Gender dictates how individuals expect women candidates to behave (Alexander and Andersen, 1993), what political policies they expect them to support (King and Matland, 2003), and their ability in handling different political situations (Fox and Smith, 1998). Collectively, this often results in voters having a preference for men candidates (Mo, 2015) and a belief that their more masculine traits are more ideal for political office (Rosenwasser and Dean, 1989). Further, when women fail to conform to these gendered expectations, research suggests voters further punish women candidates for deviating from the expectations (Schneider and Bos, 2014).

Gatekeepers often mirror, if not are equally susceptible, to the biases that gender heuristics often cause incorporating them into their evaluations of candidates. Party members often believe the most ideal candidate is the one most similar to themselves. In organizations dominated by men, this means women are less likely to be seen as an ideal candidate from the outset (Niven, 1998). These biases are even more disadvantageous in newer democracies. Women in newer democracies often stand out as different, their presence in politics being a relatively recent occurrence. Therefore, assumptions being made about a woman candidate, especially by party members and leaders, are that of an outsider (Judd and Park, 1988). The consequence of this, as discussed by Niven (1998) as the outgroup effect, is that there is a tendency to view an outgroup – women candidates – as less qualified than the in-group they associate themselves with.

The inequity of what is considered qualified between men and women is understood and reflected in the behaviors of women candidates. Women aspirants often perceive themselves and are perceived by others as less qualified for political office than observable data would suggest (Fulton et al., 2006). Women often recount having to accomplish more to appear equally credible, which can affect their likelihood and experiences of being recruited. Often discussed when looking at the equal election win rates between men and women (Fox and Lawless, 2010), researchers have shown that women candidates are often more qualified but are only winning at equivalent rates to their lesser qualified men companions (Anzia and Berry, 2011; Black and Erickson, 2003). From this, we know that party members often hold women candidates to higher standards or ask more of them when discussing their entry into political office. Therefore, we might expect women candidates to be asked to meet higher qualifications.³

Our understanding of how political gatekeepers evaluate candidates and what is considered qualified in newer democracies is less developed. Studies that have looked at the role of gatekeepers in women’s representation have often focused on whether or not the level of inclusivity affects women’s chance of selection. The results on this are mixed. While work

³This hypothesis was preregistered.

in Ghana by Ichino and Nathan (2016) contend that increasing the number of individuals involved in selection opens pathways for marginalized groups by decreasing the feasibility of vote-buying, work in Latin America by Hinojosa and Gurdíán (2012) contends that women candidates fare better when selection is controlled by a small few where progressive elites can push for their inclusion.

Very few of the studies demonstrating the barriers party gatekeepers pose to aspiring women have yet to actually look at the political gatekeepers themselves. Specifically, while we have studied from the aspirant side who is selected and the effects of the selection, we have not gone directly to the source - party gatekeepers - to understand the gendered nature of candidate qualifications. Because of this, we do not know how they act as moderators of women's political opportunity or how these actions are affected by gatekeeper attributes directly. Therefore, this paper takes seriously the role and evaluations of party gatekeepers in a context where party institutionalization is weak and women's presence in politics is a relatively new and rarer occurrence.

3.3 Research Design

A large contribution of this research is the unique sample it leverages in order to understand the recommendations of gatekeepers. The experiment was embedded in an in-person survey conducted with 1,339 party gatekeepers in both the PF and UPND across Zambia. Participants were told that "We are conducting a survey on political party members and candidates in Zambia. We are asking questions that can help us better understand how the candidate selection process works." The survey asked participants about their political background, experience in candidate selection, prior electoral experience, and opinions on candidate selection processes, women in politics, and campaign costs. While the survey did cover gender and included a gender treatment, we surrounded those questions in the survey instrument with other questions that gave us confidence that participants did not know that gender was the focus of the research.

The constituencies were selected to maximize variation on women's participation in 2016 candidate selection: no women applied, a woman applied but was not selected, a woman was selected but not elected, and a woman was elected. Within each province, I selected a constituency for each one of those parameters per each party based off of the list of candidates who applied during candidate selection in 2016 (this data is discussed in Chapter 2). The total sample included 69 constituencies across all ten provinces.⁴ (See table 4.3 in the Appendix for a map of where the survey was conducted).

Table 3.1 shows the overall characteristics of the individuals in the sample. The descriptive statistics provide an overview of the make-up of political elites in charge of candidate selection in Zambia. The survey sample is made up of 36% women. The age of participants ranged from 23-79 with an average age of 46.3. Only a small portion of the sample have a

⁴Strictly this would suggest there should be 80 constituencies sampled. However, in some cases all manifestations of the sample criteria did not exist for each party in each province.

university degree (12%), and the majority (81%) are married. The sample is equally made up of the lower three strata of party offices - ward, constituency, and district - with a smaller portion in the higher offices of provincial and national.

Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Candidate Survey Participants

Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max.
PF	1339	.23	.42	0	1
UPND	1339	.75	.43	0	1
Woman	1,284	.36	.48	0	1
Age	1,320	46.3	10.3	23	79
University Degree	1,339	.12	.33	0	1
Married	1339	.81	.40	0	1
Party Level	1173	2.21	1.0	1	5
<i>Ward</i>	345	.25	.43	0	1
<i>Constituency</i>	362	.27	.44	0	1
<i>District</i>	342	.26	.44	0	1
<i>Province</i>	114	.09	.28	0	1
<i>National</i>	10	.007	.09	0	1

Experimental Design

Experimentally, the survey asked participants for recommendations on what would make the candidate competitive for member of parliament in their constituency. The gender of the theoretical candidates is randomized, and the vignette primes the participants to think of how the candidate would fare in their constituency. The names used were chosen because they were common, non-tribal names seen in the 2016 aspirant records. They were piloted to ensure they had a gender effect but did not prime a specific ethnic or religious group as this would potentially compound the treatment. Following the introduction of the vignette, respondents were asked to give the candidate advice on how to be a successful candidate for member of parliament in their constituency. The recommendations were based on the most commonly mentioned qualifications from interviews conducted with party gatekeepers and covered education, political experience, family dynamics, financial resources, and sources of support. The intuition is that we should see variation in the recommendations given to men versus women candidates. Below is the question set up and the vignette read to respondents in the survey.

Question Setup:

This section shows you an individual who is considering applying to be the member of parliament in *[The participant's constituency]* for 2021. We would like for you to give them advice on how to be a better candidate to increase their chances of being selected in *[The participant's constituency]* Their last name has been removed for anonymity.

Vignette:

Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert is thinking about applying for adoption in *[The participant's constituency]* for *[The participant's Political Party]*. This is her/his first time applying for adoption for a member of parliament and she/he would like to know what you would recommend to increase her/his chances of being selected and winning the election. Please think about what type of candidate you think would be the most successful in *[The participant's constituency]*.

Following this respondents were asked six questions on what they would recommend to this potential candidate. The questions were designed to continually reinforce the gender of the hypothetical aspirant while reminding them to think of their chances in relation to the dynamics of their constituency. The recommendations were based on the most commonly mentioned qualification from interviews conducted with party gatekeepers. The questions, listed in Table 3.2, covered education, political experience, family dynamics, financial resources, and sources of support.

Table 3.2: Outcomes

Question	Responses
What level of education should Ms. Angela/Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [The participant's constituency]?	1. G12 certificate 2. Degree from a vocational school 3. University degree 4. Masters 5. Doctorate
What level of political experience should Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [The participant's constituency]? Check all	1. Mayor 2. Elected party positions 3. Ward Councillor 4. Helped in previous campaigns in <i>respondent's constituency</i>
What would be the ideal family situation for Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate in [The participant's constituency]?	1. Married w/ young children. 2. Divorced 3. Widowed w/ grown children. 4. Married w/ grown children. 5. Single w/ no children.
How much money would you advise Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert to save to fund his/her campaign for Member of Parliament in [The participant's constituency]?	1.10,000K 2. 50,000K 3. 100,000K 4. 250,000K 5. 500,000K
What assets do you think Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert needs before running for Member of Parliament in [The participant's constituency] in order to be a successful man/woman aspirant? Check all	1. More than one vehicle 2. Undeveloped Property 3. Farm 4. Commercial Property 5. Business 6. Lots of Livestock
What sources of support should Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert have in order to be a successful aspirant and candidate (respondent's constituency)? Check all	1. Voters in the constituency 2. The party 3. Members in the local party structures 4. Local church leaders 5. Local traditional authorities (i.e. chiefs and village headmen)

3.4 Results

This section reports the results of the gender treatment on the six outcome measures used in this study to evaluate how gender influences the recommendations made by party gatekeep-

ers. Collectively, they suggest that against our expectations, party gatekeepers recommend similar qualifications to both men and women candidates. However, women gatekeepers collectively set higher standards than men.

Looking at Table 3.3, we can see that what is recommended to both the hypothetical man (Albert) and hypothetical woman (Angela) are identical. Gatekeepers consider a qualified person to run for member of parliament as someone with a Grade 12 certificate who has held an elected party position and has the support of the Church. Their family dynamics should be married with young children, they should have 250,000 kwacha for campaign funds, and the most important asset they need to own is a vehicle.⁵

Table 3.3: Ideal Candidate Qualifications by Treatment

	Albert	Angela
Education	1.11 G12	1.12 G12
Political Experience Index	.48 Party Position	.47 Party Position
Sources of Support	.65 Church	.63 Church
Family Dynamic	1.44 Married with young Children	1.42 Married with young Children
Money for Campaign	3.7 250,000 Kwacha	2.7 250,000 Kwacha
Financial Assets Index	.44 Vehicle	.43 Vehicle

Each row shows the independent variable and the mean response for that outcome measured by the treatment group. Below each mean is the categorical response. Table 3.2 lists the full response options and questions. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

These findings, regardless of the null treatment effect, are incredibly illuminating on the expectations of party gatekeepers. While the 2016 Constitution put in place a requirement that all candidates for member of parliament must hold a Grade 12 certificate, it is clear that that is considered sufficient. Over 90% of participants, for both the hypothetical man and woman candidate, indicate that a Grade 12 certificate and no higher is the ideal amount of education for a candidate for member of parliament in their constituency (reported in Appendix 3.7. While a higher degree is in no way empirically or anecdotally better for the quality of a political candidate, it is interesting that despite increasing numbers of individuals going to university, we do not see recommendations for higher levels of education. A

⁵ Additional analyses and breakdowns of the results with individual models can be found in the Appendix.

potential explanation for this is that the gatekeepers themselves generally only hold a grade 12 certificate and have not gone to college. Among this sample, only 12% of the gatekeepers had a college degree (reported in Table 3.1).

Telling to the critical importance that intra-party politics plays in candidate selection, gatekeepers believe the most necessary previous political experience needed to be competitive for member of parliament is not to have held a prior government office but rather to have held an internally elected position in the party. Over 50% of participants (shown in Table

Of significant note is the importance of the Church in the perceived qualification of a candidate. We can see that respondents believe the support of the Church is far more important than the support of voters, the party, or traditional authorities. While more than 50% of the participants believe both Albert and Angela must have the support of the Church to be considered as a candidate for member of parliament, less than 25% believe that the support of the party is necessary, less than 20% believe the support of voters is necessary, and almost none (3%) believe the support of traditional authority members is required (reported in Table 3.20). Even though the backing of both the political party and voters would be essential for the candidate to be elected, political gatekeepers indicate that they prioritize the support of the Church in preparing to run for member of parliament in their constituency.

Research suggests that one of the most gendered aspects of candidate evaluation is how one considers the domestic responsibilities an individual has with respect to their family dynamic. When respondents were asked “what would be the ideal family dynamic”, they responded no differently if the hypothetical candidate was a man or a woman (see Table 3.25). The ideal candidate to 50% or more of party gatekeepers would be married with young kids. Not surprisingly, almost no gatekeepers recommend being divorced (less than 8%) or Widowed with grown children (less than 7%). Interestingly though, the family dynamic that less than 1% of gatekeepers recommend is single with no children: the family dynamic that would allow women the most independence and time. Again, this is highly in line with the family dynamics of the gatekeepers themselves, with 81% in this sample being married.

Lastly, gatekeepers were asked to recommend the financial resources, both campaign funds and economic assets, they believe necessary to be considered a good candidate for member of parliament in the respondent’s constituency. The gender of the candidate, shown in Tables 3.31 and ??, did not have a significant effect on the recommendations made about financial resources. For both men and women, gatekeepers most often recommended candidates to have 250,000 Kwacha or more saved to use as campaign funds to run for member of parliament (shown in 3.32).⁶ Notably though, almost 30% recommend that a candidate may only need 100,000 Kwacha where around 20% suggest they may need as much as 500,00 Kwacha. In terms of assets, over 70% of gatekeepers indicate owning a vehicle.

Collectively, the results suggest that, at least to these hypothetical candidates, party gatekeepers in Zambia recommended the same qualifications for men and women to be considered viable members of parliament. However, the characteristics they suggest are

⁶As of November 2021, this is about \$14,168.

illuminating to the nature of intra-party dynamics of candidate selection, the social norms on family dynamics, the political importance of the Church, and the required financial resources for candidates to be considered viable. They also demonstrate the high bar, and high cost in meeting it, that is set to be seen as a competitive candidate for member of parliament in Zambia.

Raising the Bar: Do Women Gatekeepers have different Candidate Preferences?

While the the entire body of gatekeepers in this sample did not have significantly different recommendations for the hypothetical man or woman candidate, there is the possibility that sub-groups of the gatekeeper population may be uniquely affected by the gender treatment. Specifically, it is quite plausible that we might expect for women gatekeepers to respond very differently to the gender treatment. In fact, research suggests that as we see increasing number of women party elites we should see increases in the number of women candidates (Kunovich and Paxton, 2005), the mechanism being that women political elites are more open to or select more women candidates. To investigate this possibility, the analysis will look at the interaction effect between the treatment and the gender of the respondent. In doing so, we can subset the sample to only gatekeepers who identified as a woman. We can then compare the what the ideal candidate qualifications look like for men and women gatekeepers separately.

In the case of women gatekeepers in Zambia, we see no significant effects in response to the treatment.⁷ Depicted in Table 3.4, women gatekeepers recommend the same qualifications and resources to both men (Albert) and women (Angela) candidates to be a competitive candidate for member of parliament in their constituency.

While women do not treat men and women candidates differently, they do have higher expectations of all candidates than men. Women gatekeepers expect qualified candidates to have more political experience than men. Men gatekeepers recommend Albert and Angela to have 46% of the experience index, women gatekeepers expect 51% and 52%.⁸ Notably, women gatekeepers are significantly more likely than men to recommend women candidates (Angela) to have been a ward councilor ($p < 0.044$). and to believe Albert (76% in comparison to 70%) and Angela (77% to 68%) should have an elected party position ($p < 0.009$).

Women gatekeepers are more likely than men to recommend greater amounts of support to be considered a qualified candidate. 44% of women recommend Angela to have the support of traditional authority of in comparison to only 35% men ($p = .0536$). Further, 60% of women gatekeepers recommend Angela should have the support of the church in comparison to only 48% of men ($p < 0.003$). These differences contribute to women expecting a higher support index for Angela (.67) in comparison to men (.62).

⁷There were no significant effects when interacting respondent gender and the treatment.

⁸The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant for the control ($p < 0.05$) and the treatment ($p < 0.04$).

Women gatekeepers additionally have different expectations when it comes to a successful candidate's family dynamic. Women gatekeepers are more likely to recommend both Angela and Albert to be single with young children (58% in comparison to 46%, $p=.0034$); 59% and 52% ($p < 0.05$).⁹ Lastly, women gatekeepers are more likely to recommend Angela to have commercial property (45% in comparison 37%)¹⁰ And women are more likely to recommend Albert have a vehicle (74% in comparison to 80% ($p < 0.05$)).¹¹

3.5 The Double Bind

While the experimental results suggest that overall gatekeepers make the same recommendations for qualifications achieving them is more costly for women. First, gatekeepers in the sample showed apprehension in selecting women candidates because of the lack of financial independence they often have in the family. The survey asked, *Given how important it is to fund one's campaign, some political party members suggested that they worry about nominating women because their family or husband could not financially support their campaign. Do you agree with them (7pt scale)?* When collapsing the scale, over 45% of the gatekeepers sample agreed that they worry about nominating women because of the influence their family could have on their financial ability to support their campaign (reported in Table 3.5).

During the experimental component gatekeepers agreed that the best family dynamic to have when considering candidacy was to be married with young children, however, many gatekeepers believe women should delay entering politics to prioritize family responsibilities: a clear catch-22. Respondents were asked, *Because of the difficulties of balancing work and the responsibilities for young children, many believe women should not run for office until they no longer have such responsibilities at home. Do you agree?* 314 respondents agreed (shown in Table 3.7). While the majority of the sample believe that the ideal family dynamic for men and women is to be married with young children, a large minority agree that women should choose to delay entering politics because of the difficulty of "having it all".

⁹Note: Result only significant in a single tailed test.

¹⁰Note: Result for Angela is only significant in a single tailed test.

¹¹Note: Result only significant in a single tailed test.

Table 3.4: Ideal Candidate Qualifications by Respondent's Gender

Men Gatekeepers	Albert	Angela
Education	1.1 G12	1.1 G12
Political Experience	.46 Party Position	.46 Party Position
Sources of Support	.64 Church	.62 Church
Family Dynamic	1.4 Married w/ Young Children	1.4 Married w/ Young Children
Money For Campaign	3.7 250,000 Kwacha	3.7 250,000 Kwacha
Assets	.45 Vehicle	.44 Vehicle
Women Gatekeepers	Albert	Angela
Education	1.1 G12	1.1 G12
Political Experience Index	.51 Party Position	.52 Party Position
Sources of Support	.66 Church	.67 Church
Family Dynamic	1.4 Married w/ Young Children	1.3 Married w/ Young Children
Money For Campaign	3.7 250,000 Kwacha	3.8 250,000 Kwacha
Assets	.44 Vehicle	.43 Vehicle

Each row shows the independent variable and the mean response for that outcome sorted by the treatment group. Below each mean is the categorical response. Table 3.2 lists the full response options and questions. Difference of means tests were conducted between man and woman treatment groups within women gatekeepers and within men gatekeepers. $*p < 0.1$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$

Table 3.5: Worry About Nominating Women because of the Influence of Their Family

Response	Total	Men	Women
Agree	480 (45%)	308 (48%)	149 (39%)
Disagree	591 (55%)	325 (51%)	234 (61%)

Table 3.6: More Difficult for Women

	More Difficult For Women	The Same for Women	More Difficult for Men
Having enough transport	46.64	49.65	3.71
Having enough money to support their campaign	54.76	42.54	2.71
Having the support of the local party structures	8.97	73.7	17.32
Having the support of the national party structures	10.74	74.88	14.37
Having contributed enough time to party events	23.61	52.85	23.53
Handling the negative language used during campaigns	54.1	39.95	5.95
Handling election violence	71.68	25.77	2.55
Having the support of political foot soldiers	19.1	67.98	12.92
Getting the support of local religious leaders	8.05	64.47	27.48
Getting the support of local traditional leaders	14.91	69.71	15.38

Table 3.7: Respondent Belief in Women Delaying Politics for Family

	Freq.	Percent
Strongly Agree	74	5.69
Agree	133	10.23
Somewhat Agree	107	8.23
Neither Agree or Disagree	5	0.38
Somewhat Disagree	93	7.15
Disagree	530	40.77
Strongly Disagree	358	27.54
<i>Total</i>	1,300	100.00

Gatekeepers, in addition to demonstrating concern over women's financial independence and some suggesting women should delay their political pursuits to prioritize childcare, highlight that they believe that many of the critical aspects of campaigning for political office are harder for women. Respondents were asked, *Of the things that many party members claim are necessary to be a successful candidate for Member of Parliament in [Participant's constituency], which in your opinion are more difficult, less difficult, or the same for female candidates to accomplish than male candidates in [Participant's Party]*. The results are shown in Table 3.6.

More than half of gatekeepers identify multiple aspects of campaigning to be more difficult for women. First, 55% of gatekeepers indicate that having enough money to support their campaigns is more difficult for women. This aligns with the data presented in Table 3.5 but, notably, gatekeepers did not recommend that women candidates should save more money to potentially combat this in the experiment. Second, 54% agree that handling the negative language used during campaigns is more difficult for women. And lastly, 72% of respondents believe that handling election violence is more difficult for women. Still striking but not the majority, almost half of the sample believe having enough transport is more difficult for women (47%). This gap in recommendation and reality highlights how gender compounds the barriers decreasing women's chances for success.

Gatekeepers agree that many of the key components of campaigning is just as difficult for women as it is for men. 74% and 75% agree that men and women have the same levels of difficulty for getting the support of the local and national party gatekeeper respectively. 52% agree that men and women have the same difficulty in having enough time to dedicate to party events. Having political foot soldiers, the individuals that move with you while campaigning mobilizing support the majority of gatekeepers (69%) believe men and women can acquire equally. Lastly, 65% and 70% agree that men and women have the same levels of difficulty getting the support of local religious leaders and traditional leaders respectively.

Notably, although not surprisingly, no election-related events were deemed more difficult for men. However in some categories, there exists a large minority whom believe some aspects of campaigning are more difficult for men. 27% believe men have a more difficult time getting the support of local religious leaders and 24% believe men have more difficulty having enough time for party events.

Limitations

The data is not without its limitations. It is possible that the null results are not reflective of an absence of gender bias but rather that the treatment is too weak. However, the treatment does mirror the recommendations party gatekeepers receive in Zambia for evaluation. Further, it is possible that the answers given were affected by social desirability bias. The design involved only producing one hypothetical candidate, either a man or a woman, to each respondent to attempt to not prime the respondent that gender was the main treatment. Lastly, it would be expected that the social desirability in answering the survey may also affect what they would recommend to candidates in real life creating the double bind. Further research should look more deeply into the interaction between gatekeepers and political candidates to understand how gender may or may not influence these interactions.

3.6 Conclusion

Scholars who are motivated to understand barriers to women's representation in politics have often looked at the role that party gatekeepers play. Many have argued that gatekeepers

are heavily biased against women, decreasing the number of women making it through the pipeline to political candidacy. While much of the literature has focused on women's experiences with party gatekeepers, very few have turned the table to investigate the gatekeepers and how their perception of candidate quality may be affected by a candidate's gender.

This paper has shown that the recommendations given by party gatekeepers were the same regardless of the candidate's gender. The answers given by gatekeepers who were assigned a hypothetical man to advise were not statistically different from the responses given to the hypothetical woman candidate. This suggests, ultimately, that the gender of the candidate did not affect the nature or amount of qualifications gatekeepers believe candidates should have to be a successful candidate for member of parliament in their constituency.

While the gender of the candidate did not affect the recommended qualifications, the gender of the gatekeeper did. When comparing what was recommended to both the hypothetical man and woman candidate by men and women gatekeepers, we can see that women gatekeepers give high recommendations to candidates. In comparison to men gatekeepers, women in this sample were more likely to recommend candidates to have more experience, more resources, and a specific family dynamic.

While the recommendations of what candidates should do remain relatively ungendered, actually meeting these recommendations does appear gendered. Gatekeepers highlighted that it is more difficult for women in their opinion to have enough money to support their campaigns, handle election violence, and tolerate the negative language used during the campaigns. Women candidates are stuck in a double bind, while they are recommended by gatekeepers to strive for the same qualifications as men, the cost of achieving these qualifications is much higher for them.

This paper contends that one of the reasons why we see such a low number of women vying for candidacy in Zambia is the mismatch between the ideal qualifications held by gatekeepers and the reality of actually competing politically. The disconnect further compounds the cost for women interested in pursuing political office. It underscores the hidden barriers women face to becoming political candidates. Additionally, many of the recommendations are in disagreement with gatekeepers' beliefs on women in politics. While gatekeepers recommend men and women should save the same amount of money to fund their campaign, they also worry about nominating women candidates because they often lack financial independence from men in their households. Gatekeepers also agree that the ideal family dynamic for a candidate is to be married with young children, however, a large minority of gatekeepers believe women should delay their political pursuits to dedicate more time to their families.

The results do lend support for Niven (1998)'s original argument. Gatekeepers were more likely to recommend qualifications that most aligned with their own. Rather than working against women in this case, it created a universality across traits that were most predominant in the sample. It is possible that women no longer stand out as the outgroup, and that gatekeepers did not consider their gender when comparing the possible characteristics to themselves. The results suggest that further research is needed to understand how individuals perceive qualifications in alignment with their evaluations of themselves.

3.7 Appendix

Education

Table 3.8 shows that there is no difference in the level of education recommended to the hypothetical man and woman aspirant. The first outcome question asked respondents was what level of education do they think Ms. Angela/ Mr. Albert should have. The 2016 Constitution creates a required minimum, a Grade 12 certificate, that candidates must have to compete for Member of Parliament. Therefore, the question explored whether gatekeepers expected candidates to only have the minimum or additional levels of education and whether this varied by the gender of the aspirant. Table 3.8 shows the results from an ordered logistic regression because the education outcome is an ordered categorical variable in model one, and logistic regression with a binary outcome coded as 1 if the respondent selected a level of education above the government requirement. Both models show that the gender treatment did not affect the respondent's recommended level of education to the hypothetical aspirant.

Table 3.8: Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Education

	(1) Education (Ordinal)	(2) Education (Binary)
Gender Treatment	0.110 (0.200)	0.120 (0.200)
Constant		-2.466*** (0.149)
cut1	2.460*** (0.149)	
cut2	3.384*** (0.194)	
cut3	6.147*** (0.609)	
Observations	1324	1324

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.9: Cross Tab on Education by Treatment of Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
G12	343	399	742
	46.23	53.77	100.00
	92.20	91.51	91.83
Vocational School	17	25	42
	40.48	59.52	100.00
	4.57	5.73	5.20
University	9	12	21
	42.86	57.14	100.00
	2.42	2.75	2.60
Masters	3	0	3
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.81	0.00	0.37
Total	372	436	808
	46.04	53.96	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	4.1354	Pr = 0.247	

Table 3.10: Cross Tab on Education by Treatment of Women Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
G12	218	219	437
	49.89	50.11	100.00
	93.56	92.02	92.78
Vocational	6	8	14
	42.86	57.14	100.00
	2.58	3.36	2.97
University	9	11	20
	45.00	55.00	100.00
	3.86	4.62	4.25
Total	233	238	471
	49.47	50.53	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(2) =$	0.4350	Pr = 0.805	

Table 3.11: Cross Tab on Education by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
G12	269	297	566
	47.53	52.47	100.00
	94.06	93.10	93.55
Vocational	9	17	26
	34.62	65.38	100.00
	3.15	5.33	4.30
University	7	5	12
	58.33	41.67	100.00
	2.45	1.57	1.98
Masters	1	0	1
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.35	0.00	0.17
Total	286	319	605
	47.27	52.73	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	3.3901	Pr = 0.335	

Table 3.12: Cross Tab on Education by Treatment
 High Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
G12	308	340	648
	47.53	52.47	100.00
	90.59	89.71	90.13
Vocational	17	21	38
	44.74	55.26	100.00
	5.00	5.54	5.29
College	13	18	31
	41.94	58.06	100.00
	3.82	4.75	4.31
Masters	2	0	2
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.59	0.00	0.28
Total	340	379	719
	47.29	52.71	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	2.7003	Pr = 0.440	

Political Experience

The next outcome looked at the types of political experience that party gatekeepers might recommend an aspirant have before they stand for Member of Parliament. Gatekeepers were asked to check all, and responses have been coded into binary outcomes. Figure 3.13 presents the results from logistic regressions in Model 1-4. Additionally, I created an index measure with the sum of all the possible outcomes, normalized. The results of an OLS regression are reported in Model 5. Collectively, they all suggest that the gender treatment did not affect what type or the amount of previous political experience an aspirant should have. Interestingly, looking at the cross tab reported in 3.14 in the appendix, we see that both gatekeepers agree that both men and women aspirants should prioritize an internal party position over elected government positions.

Table 3.14: Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Experience Crosstab

	Vignette Type		Total
	Man	Woman	
Previous Campaigns	97	139	236
	41.10	58.90	100.00
	16.81	20.90	19.00
Elected Party Position	293	326	619
	47.33	52.67	100.00
	50.78	49.02	49.84
Ward Councillor	89	100	189
	47.09	52.91	100.00
	15.42	15.04	15.22
Mayor	98	100	198
	49.49	50.51	100.00
	16.98	15.04	15.94
Total	577	665	1,242
	46.46	53.54	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(3) =	3.6776	Pr = 0.298	

Table 3.13: Treatment Effect on Recommended Political Experience

	(1) Elected Party Position	(2) Campaigned	(3) Mayor	(4) Ward Councillor	(5) Experience Index
Gender Treatment	-0.119 (0.123)	0.158 (0.133)	-0.129 (0.154)	-0.0731 (0.123)	-0.00691 (0.0147)
Constant	1.019*** (0.0906)	1.199*** (0.0948)	-1.684*** (0.110)	-0.947*** (0.0891)	0.485*** (0.0108)
Observations	1339	1339	1339	1339	1339

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.15: Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment of Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Previous Campaigns	62	95	157
	39.49	60.51	100.00
	18.24	23.23	20.96
Elected Party Position	172	196	368
	46.74	53.26	100.00
	50.59	47.92	49.13
Ward Councillor	51	62	113
	45.13	54.87	100.00
	15.00	15.16	15.09
Mayor	55	56	111
	49.55	50.45	100.00
	16.18	13.69	14.82
Total	340	409	749
	45.39	54.61	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	3.2525	Pr = 0.354	

Table 3.16: Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment of Women Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Previous Campaigns	33	40	73
	45.21	54.79	100.00
	15.14	17.24	16.22
Elected Party Position	106	112	218
	48.62	51.38	100.00
	48.62	48.28	48.44
Ward Councillor	36	37	73
	49.32	50.68	100.00
	16.51	15.95	16.22
Mayor	43	43	86
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	19.72	18.53	19.11
Total	218	232	450
	48.44	51.56	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	0.4149	Pr = 0.937	

Table 3.17: Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Previous Campaigns	36	61	97
	37.11	62.89	100.00
	13.53	20.00	16.99
Elected Party Position	130	138	268
	48.51	51.49	100.00
	48.87	45.25	46.94
Ward Councillor	41	42	83
	49.40	50.60	100.00
	15.41	13.77	14.54
Mayor	59	64	123
	47.97	52.03	100.00
	22.18	20.98	21.54
Total	266	305	571
	46.58	53.42	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	4.2535	Pr = 0.235	

Table 3.18: Cross Tab on Political Experience by Treatment
 High Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Previous Campaigns	61	78	139
	43.88	56.12	100.00
	19.61	21.67	20.72
Elected Party Position	163	188	351
	46.44	53.56	100.00
	52.41	52.22	52.31
Ward Councillor	48	58	106
	45.28	54.72	100.00
	15.43	16.11	15.80
Mayor	39	36	75
	52.00	48.00	100.00
	12.54	10.00	11.18
Total	311	360	671
	46.35	53.65	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(3) =	1.3521	Pr = 0.717	

Sources of Support

In addition to political experience, gatekeepers often point to sources of support as a prerequisite for considering candidacy. The survey asked respondents to check all the sources of support they believed a candidate required to successfully stand as a candidate in their constituents. Figure 3.19 presents the results from logistic regressions in Model 1-4. Additionally, I created an index measure with the sum of all the possible outcomes, normalized. The results of an OLS regression are reported in Model 5. Again we see that gatekeepers responded similarly to both the man and woman aspirant, having no statistically significant differences in their recommendations. Looking at the data reported in 3.20, we can see that respondents believe the support of the church is far more important than the support of voters, the party, or traditional authorities.

Table 3.19: Treatment Effect on Recommended Sources of Support

	(1) Voters	(2) Political Party	(3) Traditional Authorities	(4) Church	(5) Support Index
Gender Treatment	0.141 (0.204)	-0.0625 (0.112)	-0.222 (0.122)	-0.0434 (0.110)	-0.0152 (0.0163)
Constant	2.401*** (0.145)	-0.362*** (0.0812)	1.036*** (0.0909)	0.147 (0.0802)	0.651*** (0.0119)
Observations	1339	1339	1339	1339	1339

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.20: Recommended Sources of Support Cross Tab

	Treatment		
	Man	Woman	Total
Voters	106	137	243
	43.62	56.38	100.00
	17.26	19.83	18.62
Traditional Authority	20	21	41
	48.78	51.22	100.00
	3.26	3.04	3.14
Party	152	158	310
	49.03	50.97	100.00
	24.76	22.87	23.75
Church	336	375	711
	47.26	52.74	100.00
	54.72	54.27	54.48
Total	614	691	1,305
	47.05	52.95	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00

Table 3.21: Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment
 Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Voters	67	90	157
	42.68	57.32	100.00
	18.41	20.83	19.72
Traditional Authority	11	11	22
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	3.02	2.55	2.76
Party	89	116	205
	43.41	56.59	100.00
	24.45	26.85	25.75
Church	197	215	412
	47.82	52.18	100.00
	54.12	49.77	51.76
Total	364	432	796
	45.73	54.27	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(3) =	1.9169	Pr = 0.590	

Table 3.22: Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment
 Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Voters	36	41	77
	46.75	53.25	100.00
	15.58	17.45	16.52
Traditional Authority	9	9	18
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	3.90	3.83	3.86
Party	56	40	96
	58.33	41.67	100.00
	24.24	17.02	20.60
Church	130	145	275
	47.27	52.73	100.00
	56.28	61.70	59.01
Total	231	235	466
	49.57	50.43	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(3) =	3.7755	Pr = 0.287	

Table 3.23: Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Voters	38	61	99
	38.38	61.62	100.00
	13.43	19.12	16.45
Traditional Authority	16	10	26
	61.54	38.46	100.00
	5.65	3.13	4.32
Party	80	84	164
	48.78	51.22	100.00
	28.27	26.33	27.24
Church	149	164	313
	47.60	52.40	100.00
	52.65	51.41	51.99
Total	283	319	602
	47.01	52.99	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	5.4110	Pr = 0.144	

Table 3.24: Cross Tab on Sources of Support by Treatment
 High Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Voters	68	76	144
	47.22	52.78	100.00
	20.54	20.43	20.48
Traditional Authority	4	11	15
	26.67	73.33	100.00
	1.21	2.96	2.13
Party	72	74	146
	49.32	50.68	100.00
	21.75	19.89	20.77
Church	187	211	398
	46.98	53.02	100.00
	56.50	56.72	56.61
Total	331	372	703
	47.08	52.92	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(3) =$	2.8041	Pr = 0.423	

Family Dynamic

Table 3.25 shows logistic regression results for each option. We see by looking at the data in Table 3.26 in the Appendix that respondents do have beliefs on the ideal family dynamic; the majority of respondents recommended an individual be married with young children. Almost no one, as to be expected, recommended an individual be divorced or, more surprisingly single with no children. Thinking to the double bind argued by Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017), this presents a unique dilemma for women, who when married with young children, bear the majority weight of unpaid household and childcare. Further, women face higher levels of stigma when diverting their time away from the home to pursue professional ambitions. In the following chapter, I will show how gatekeepers penalize hypothetical women candidates who deviate from the traditional family dynamic, but they do not punish men.

Table 3.25: Treatment Effect on Recommended Family Dynamic

	(1) Married Young Children	(2) Married Grown Children	(3) Divorced	(4) Single No Children	(5) Widowed Grown Children
Gender	-0.206 (0.110)	0.0528 (0.124)	-0.131 (1.002)	0.208 (0.588)	0.00365 (0.219)
Constant	0.192* (0.0803)	-1.044*** (0.0911)	-5.743*** (0.708)	-4.822*** (0.449)	-2.632*** (0.160)
Observations	1339	1339	1339	1339	1339

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3.26: Treatment Effect on Recommended Family Dynamic

Ideal Family Dynamic	Man	Woman	Total
Don't Know/ Refuse to Answer	71 39.44 11.34	109 60.56 15.29	180 100.00 13.44
Married with young Children	343 49.21 54.79	354 50.79 49.65	697 100.00 52.05
Married with grown Children	163 45.79 26.04	193 54.21 27.07	356 100.00 26.59
Divorced	2 50.00 0.32	2 50.00 0.28	4 100.00 0.30
Single No Children	5 41.67 0.80	7 58.33 0.98	12 100.00 0.90
Widowed with grown Children	42 46.67 6.71	48 53.33 6.73	90 100.00 6.72
Total	626 46.75 100.00	713 53.25 100.00	1,339 100.00 100.00

Table 3.27: Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment
 Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Don't Know	47	70	117
	40.17	59.83	100.00
	12.63	15.91	14.41
Married with Young Children	196	206	402
	48.76	51.24	100.00
	52.69	46.82	49.51
Married with Grown Children	98	126	224
	43.75	56.25	100.00
	26.34	28.64	27.59
Divorced	1	0	1
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.27	0.00	0.12
Single No Children	5	5	10
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	1.34	1.14	1.23
Widowed with Grown Children	25	33	58
	43.10	56.90	100.00
	6.72	7.50	7.14
Total	372	440	812
	45.81	54.19	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(5) =	4.7120	Pr = 0.452	

Table 3.28: Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment
 Women Respondents

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Don't Know	22	29	51
	43.14	56.86	100.00
	9.44	12.13	10.81
Married with Young Children	138	140	278
	49.64	50.36	100.00
	59.23	58.58	58.90
Married with Grown Children	56	54	110
	50.91	49.09	100.00
	24.03	22.59	23.31
Divorced	1	2	3
	33.33	66.67	100.00
	0.43	0.84	0.64
Single No Children	0	2	2
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.84	0.42
Widowed with Grown Children	16	12	28
	57.14	42.86	100.00
	6.87	5.02	5.93
Total	233	239	472
	49.36	50.64	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(5) =	3.8406	Pr = 0.573	

Table 3.29: Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism Respondents

	Gender Treatment		
	Albert	Angela	Total
Don't Know	19	27	46
	41.30	58.70	100.00
	6.64	8.44	7.59
Married with Young Children	168	169	337
	49.85	50.15	100.00
	58.74	52.81	55.61
Married with Grown Children	76	90	166
	45.78	54.22	100.00
	26.57	28.12	27.39
Divorced	1	1	2
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	0.35	0.31	0.33
Single No Children	1	3	4
	25.00	75.00	100.00
	0.35	0.94	0.66
Widowed with Grown Children	21	30	51
	41.18	58.82	100.00
	7.34	9.38	8.42
Total	286	320	606
	47.19	52.81	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(5) =$	3.2659	Pr = 0.659	

Table 3.30: Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Don't Know	52	82	134
	38.81	61.19	100.00
	15.29	20.87	18.28
Married with Young Children	175	185	360
	48.61	51.39	100.00
	51.47	47.07	49.11
Married with Grown Children	87	103	190
	45.79	54.21	100.00
	25.59	26.21	25.92
Divorced	1	1	2
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	0.29	0.25	0.27
Single No Children	4	4	8
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	1.18	1.02	1.09
Widowed with Grown Children	21	18	39
	53.85	46.15	100.00
	6.18	4.58	5.32
Total	340	393	733
	46.38	53.62	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson chi2(5) =	4.7650	Pr = 0.445	

Financial Resources

Campaign Funds

Lastly, respondents were asked to consider the financial resources an aspirant should ideally have before considering vying for member of parliament in their constituency. The first asked the amount of money they should have on hand to support their election campaign. There exist gender differences in access to financial resources and independence in the usage of family resources that may lead one to expect differences in recommendations in the amount of money an individual should have before entering candidate selection. However, none such effect occurred when priming respondents with either a man or woman aspirant. The result of the OLS regression is presented in Table 3.31 which shows a null effect. The cross

tab, shown in 3.32, shows that gatekeepers most often recommend aspirants, both men and women, to have 250,000 Kwacha or more.¹²

Table 3.31: Treatment Effect on Recommended Financial Resources

	(1) Financial Resources Continuous
Woman	0.0267 (0.0505)
Constant	3.731*** (0.0357)
Observations	1304

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Financial Assets

In addition to financial savings, candidates often have to rely on their assets for support throughout the campaign, such as a vehicle to campaign in or livestock to distribute. Therefore, respondents were asked to consider what assets are ideal for an aspirant to have before considering the candidacy. I created an index measure with the sum of all the possible outcomes, normalized. The results of an OLS regression are reported in Model 5. Collectively, they mostly suggest that the gender treatment did not affect what assets or accumulation of assets an individual should have before candidacy. A notable exception is that gatekeepers were over 7% less likely to suggest the woman aspirant needed a vehicle. Interestingly, the data suggests that the majority of the assets were not deemed necessary by the respondents (shown in Table 3.37). The only expectation to this was a vehicle which about half the sample in each treatment group believed was vital to be a successful candidate.

Survey Sample

Sample

Party gatekeepers for the survey were selected from 69 constituencies across all ten provinces. Enumerators worked through local party branches to contact members of the selection committee from UPND and PF in each selected constituency.

¹²As of November 2021, this is about \$14,168.

Table 3.32: Treatment Effect on Recommended Money for Campaign Crosstab

	Gender Treatment		
	Man	Woman	Total
10,000 Kwacha	9	13	22
	40.91	59.09	100.00
	1.47	1.88	1.69
50,000 Kwacha	35	45	80
	43.75	56.25	100.00
	5.70	6.52	6.13
1000,000 Kwacha	186	193	379
	49.08	50.92	100.00
	30.29	27.97	29.06
250,000 Kwacha	266	284	550
	48.36	51.64	100.00
	43.32	41.16	42.18
500,000 Kwacha	118	155	273
	43.22	56.78	100.00
	19.22	22.46	20.94
Total	614	690	1,304
	47.09	52.91	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	3.2920	Pr = 0.510	

Table 3.33: Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment
 Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
10,000 Kwacha	7	7	14
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	1.91	1.63	1.76
50,000 Kwacha	24	29	53
	45.28	54.72	100.00
	6.56	6.76	6.67
100,000 Kwacha	100	127	227
	44.05	55.95	100.00
	27.32	29.60	28.55
250,000 Kwacha	164	177	341
	48.09	51.91	100.00
	44.81	41.26	42.89
500,000 Kwacha	71	89	160
	44.38	55.62	100.00
	19.40	20.75	20.13
Total	366	429	795
	46.04	53.96	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	1.2190	Pr = 0.875	

Table 3.34: Cross Tab on Family Dynamic by Treatment
 Women Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
10,000 Kwacha	2	5	7
	28.57	71.43	100.00
	0.87	2.11	1.50
50,000 Kwacha	10	13	23
	43.48	56.52	100.00
	4.37	5.49	4.94
100,000 Kwacha	82	64	146
	56.16	43.84	100.00
	35.81	27.00	31.33
250,000 Kwacha	93	93	186
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	40.61	39.24	39.91
500,000 Kwacha	42	62	104
	40.38	59.62	100.00
	18.34	26.16	22.32
Total	229	237	466
	49.14	50.86	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	7.6073	Pr = 0.107	

Table 3.35: Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
10,000 Kwacha	4	7	11
	36.36	63.64	100.00
	1.41	2.20	1.83
50,000 Kwacha	18	25	43
	41.86	58.14	100.00
	6.34	7.86	7.14
100,000 Kwacha	73	81	154
	47.40	52.60	100.00
	25.70	25.47	25.58
250,000 Kwacha	123	134	257
	47.86	52.14	100.00
	43.31	42.14	42.69
500,000 Kwacha	66	71	137
	48.18	51.82	100.00
	23.24	22.33	22.76
Total	284	318	602
	47.18	52.82	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	1.1099	Pr = 0.893	

Table 3.36: Cross Tab Money For Campaign by Treatment
 High Ambivalent Sexism

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
10,000 Kwacha	5	6	11
	45.45	54.55	100.00
	1.52	1.61	1.57
50,000 Kwacha	17	20	37
	45.95	54.05	100.00
	5.15	5.38	5.27
100,000 Kwacha	113	112	225
	50.22	49.78	100.00
	34.24	30.11	32.05
250,000 Kwacha	143	150	293
	48.81	51.19	100.00
	43.33	40.32	41.74
500,000 Kwacha	52	84	136
	38.24	61.76	100.00
	15.76	22.58	19.37
Total	330	372	702
	47.01	52.99	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	5.5423	Pr = 0.236	

Table 3.37: Treatment Effect on Recommended Assets Cross Tab

Assets	Gender Treatment		
	Man	Woman	Total
Farm	0	1	1
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.15	0.08
Commercial Property	1	1	2
	50.00	50.00	100.00
	0.17	0.15	0.16
Business	69	109	178
	38.76	61.24	100.00
	11.56	16.29	14.06
Land	15	22	37
	40.54	59.46	100.00
	2.51	3.29	2.92
Livestock	38	44	82
	46.34	53.66	100.00
	6.37	6.58	6.48
Vehicle	474	492	966
	49.07	50.93	100.00
	79.40	73.54	76.30
Total	597	669	1,266
	47.16	52.84	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(5) =$	8.0187	Pr = 0.155	

Table 3.38: Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment
 Men Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Commercial Property	1	0	1
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.28	0.00	0.13
Business	42	59	101
	41.58	58.42	100.00
	11.86	14.15	13.10
Land	8	14	22
	36.36	63.64	100.00
	2.26	3.36	2.85
Livestock	25	23	48
	52.08	47.92	100.00
	7.06	5.52	6.23
Vehicle	278	321	599
	46.41	53.59	100.00
	78.53	76.98	77.69
Total	354	417	771
	45.91	54.09	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	3.5437	Pr = 0.471	

Table 3.39: Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment
 Women Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Farm	0	1	1
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.44	0.22
Commercial Property	0	1	1
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.44	0.22
Business	23	41	64
	35.94	64.06	100.00
	10.27	17.98	14.16
Land	6	5	11
	54.55	45.45	100.00
	2.68	2.19	2.43
Livestock	8	15	23
	34.78	65.22	100.00
	3.57	6.58	5.09
Vehicle	187	165	352
	53.12	46.88	100.00
	83.48	72.37	77.88
Total	224	228	452
	49.56	50.44	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(5) =$	10.6243	Pr = 0.059	


Table 3.40: Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment
 Low Ambivalent Sexism Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Farm	0	1	1
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.32	0.17
Commercial Property	1	0	1
	100.00	0.00	100.00
	0.36	0.00	0.17
Business	28	42	70
	40.00	60.00	100.00
	10.11	13.46	11.88
Land	6	3	9
	66.67	33.33	100.00
	2.17	0.96	1.53
Livestock	11	16	27
	40.74	59.26	100.00
	3.97	5.13	4.58
Vehicle	231	250	481
	48.02	51.98	100.00
	83.39	80.13	81.66
Total	277	312	589
	47.03	52.97	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(5) =$	5.4158	Pr = 0.367	

Table 3.41: Cross Tab on Financial Assets by Treatment
 High Ambivalent Sexism Respondents

	Gender Treatment		Total
	Albert	Angela	
Commercial Property	0	1	1
	0.00	100.00	100.00
	0.00	0.28	0.15
Business	41	67	108
	37.96	62.04	100.00
	12.81	18.77	15.95
Land	9	19	28
	32.14	67.86	100.00
	2.81	5.32	4.14
Livestock	27	28	55
	49.09	50.91	100.00
	8.44	7.84	8.12
Vehicle	243	242	485
	50.10	49.90	100.00
	75.94	67.79	71.64
Total	320	357	677
	47.27	52.73	100.00
	100.00	100.00	100.00
Pearson $\chi^2(4) =$	8.8552	Pr = 0.065	

Figure 3.1: Survey Sample



Chapter 4

Family Matters: Gendered Candidate Selection by Party Gatekeepers

4.1 Introduction

Women in many countries throughout the world still have low levels of descriptive representation in political office. A common explanation for the inability of many countries to reach parity in political bodies is that political parties act as gatekeepers (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Women, before appearing on the ballot, must be selected as a candidate by party gatekeepers. Existing studies of party gatekeepers largely suggest that party members replicate the biases of voters in discriminating against women (Fréchette, Maniquet and Morelli, 2008; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Niven, 1998; Bos, 2011; Sanbonmatsu, 2006), while some show that outright gender bias no longer exists (Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2017). However, in new democracies, the closed-door nature of the selection process poses a key challenge to understanding the impact of gatekeeper's preferences on women's political opportunity. Parties in countries that transitioned to multiparty politics more recently still tend to select candidates through opaque committee-based processes controlled by party members rather than open, transparent primaries (Siavelis, 2002; Kasapović and Šiber, 2001; Leston-Bandeira and Freire, 2003).

Understanding how women can successfully navigate candidate selection in new democracies requires taking a broader view of the sociological contexts in which gatekeepers choose whom to support for office. In this context, I focus on the political and sociological nature of family ties that candidates often rely upon wherever democratic politics continue to be based on personalized clientelistic relationships. Political parties are typically built through networks dominated by men that are unreceptive to outsiders, namely, women who are not connected to those networks (O'Brien, 2015). As a result, women, more than men, often need to leverage their families' political connections to get the name recognition, support, and resources necessary to compete electorally (Folke, Rickne and Smith, 2020). This is especially the case in countries where citizens prioritize traditional family roles (Baturu and

Gray, 2018). Women who do have politically relevant family connections are more likely to access political positions and opportunities closed off to the majority of women (Richter, 1990).

While women can use family ties as a gateway into elite political networks, I argue that parties also use those familial ties as a heuristic for a candidate's qualifications. Political families provide access to formal and informal advantages (Feinstein, 2010; Asako et al., 2014; Smith, 2012). They also allow party gatekeepers to infer the qualities of a candidate based on the success of their family as a whole, assuming that qualifications like resources, education, and training will be similar among those within the family (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2017). These family connections matter more to women who are at an inherent disadvantage. Folke, Rickne and Smith (2020) show that women can make up for gender-based disadvantages by having dynastic family ties during candidate selection.

To extend our understanding of how party gatekeepers consider family ties in candidate selection, I explain how the family attributes of candidates shape their perceived strengths and weaknesses. I specifically distinguish between a family status mechanism and a loyalty mechanism in identifying how family ties have gendered effects in candidate selection. The family status mechanism suggests that there are double standards on the evaluation of a candidate's family structure; how candidates conform, or not, to normative family expectations (Tamale, 2018; Clayton et al., 2019). This double standard, I argue, is consequential in candidate evaluations. I expect that women are less likely to be rewarded for conforming to normative family expectations than men, while also being penalized more harshly for deviating from them. By contrast, in terms of loyalty, women benefit from the benign chauvinism that depicts them as more faithful and devoted than men (Bem and Lewis, 1975; Broverman et al., 1972; Bem, 1981). Women are perceived to be and are, in fact, more likely to remain loyal and expected to stay within pre-established family networks such as those based on partisanship (Clayton and Zetterberg, 2020; Thames and Rybalko, 2010; Cowley and Childs, 2003). In this respect, party gatekeepers are more likely to reward women for having a family history of partisan loyalty.

I evaluate the asymmetrical responses to candidates' family attributes through a candidate choice experiment conducted in Zambia, which has regularly held multiparty elections since 1991. Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in Zambia involving over 90 interviews with party gatekeepers, politicians, and candidates, I developed a survey experiment that randomizes candidates' individual and family attributes. I conducted the survey experiment among 1,333 party members who make up the gatekeepers of the two major parties, the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party of National Development (UPND).

The results demonstrate that the family attributes of a candidate matter — and they matter in a gendered way. Consistent with the family status mechanism, party gatekeepers reward men for being the head of traditional households. This reward reflects both a bonus to men who are married with children and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family. Women candidates, however, are significantly rewarded in comparison to men for having a personal and family history of demonstrated commitment to the party, that is, the loyalty mechanism. I further show that simply changing the gender composition of the

selection committee — by adding more women — would not change the importance of family attributes or their gendered evaluations; it only eliminates the loyalty benefits women see while keeping the penalty women face for violating family norms.

Additionally, given that we expect societal biases to affect the way party gatekeepers assess men and women, I extend this investigation by examining the variation in candidate evaluations with differing levels of sexism. To do so, I use a modified version of the ambivalent sexism index, which “measures hostile sexism (HS), sexist antipathy toward women, and benevolent sexism (BS), subjectively favorable, yet patronizing, beliefs about women” (Glick and Fiske, 2001, pg. 116). I find that an individual’s level of sexist beliefs conditions how they view candidate attributes such as financial resources. Party gatekeepers with higher levels of ambivalent sexism reward men for gendered attributes, whereas those with lower levels reward women. Further, I find women gatekeepers, on average, have a higher score on the ambivalent sexism index than men. Breaking this down, I show that men are more likely to have stronger measures of hostile sexism whereas women have more benevolent sexism.

The findings presented here contribute to studies of political gender bias by refining our understanding of the importance of family as a candidate attribute that party gatekeepers evaluate. The current literature studies candidate selection by focusing almost exclusively on individual attributes. The political importance of family has not been systematically included in experimental studies of candidate choice even though the family remains a critical political actor that shapes important electoral outcomes. This study provides the first step demonstrating that the benefits a candidate derives from having a political family are ultimately moderated by their gender. Further, this suggests that, while some studies contend that women face no outright gender bias, the bias may exist if it lays outside the context of the individual. Lastly, it suggests that the recommendation to simply increase women’s presence on selection committee in order to decrease gender bias may not in fact be the solution it appears to be.

The paper proceeds by providing an in-depth discussion of the theoretical framework arguing that family attributes affect candidate evaluations and are asymmetrically considered for men and women candidates. From there, the paper presents Zambia as a case and highlights qualitative support for the importance of family in candidate selection using interviews and internal party records. Following the research design, I present the results of the survey experiment. To conclude, I discuss the implications and contributions of this work.

4.2 Family, Loyalty, and their Effect on Political Gatekeepers

The conventional approach to understanding women’s entry into politics is to assume that their prospects are critically shaped by their gender. Gender affects candidate evaluations because it is used as a heuristic to infer individual attributes. For example, women candidates are often assumed to be more compassionate and honest whereas men are viewed to be

stronger leaders who are decisive and competent (Alexander and Andersen, 1993; Huddy and Terkildsen, 1993). Gender stereotypes extend past candidate characteristics into candidate policy preferences: women are expected to be interested in “feminine issues” such as childcare and women’s issues, whereas men are focused on more “masculine” topics such as economic development and national defense (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Alexander and Andersen, 1993; King and Matland, 2003; Lawless, 2004; Paul and Smith, 2008). Arguably, the way gender is used to infer a candidate’s ability may have greater impact (Fox and Smith, 1998; Mo, 2015). Lawless (2004) and Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister (2016) show that women in the post 9/11 era receive less support due to voters’ belief that they are not suited to deal with a terrorist crisis.

However, the empirical evidence is mixed on the extent to which gender actually conditions candidate selection or vote choice. A meta-analysis of 67 candidate choice studies by Schwarz and Coppock (2021) shows that women on average receive a 2% gender bonus. Comparatively, for example, in both Brazil and Japan, scholars find a pro-women bias among citizens using choice experiments (Aguilar, Cunow and Desposato, 2015; Kage, Rosenbluth and Tanaka, 2019). There appears to be an overall bonus, or at least not a clear negative effect on women candidates based solely on their gender. Both Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) in the United States and Clayton et al. (2019) in Malawi have shown that voters have a baseline preference to women, *ceteris paribus*. Nevertheless, even in their studies, the researchers find that voters still favor candidates that have traditional household backgrounds – a social reality that disproportionately burdens women who must try to conform to the ‘ideal’ candidate.

In most electoral democracies, however, the responsibility of candidate selection falls on the party gatekeepers, not voters. The search for the ‘ideal candidate’ is rooted in both formal and informal party rules that are substantially structured by gender and has been shown to favor men (Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). Drawing from feminist institutionalist scholarship, we understand that men and women are evaluated under different rules and expectations (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). Party gatekeepers in newer democracies are often men, putting women at an outright disadvantage. And women in emerging democracies stand out as different due to their presence in politics being a relatively recent occurrence. Party members and leaders may therefore be expected to treat them as an outsider (Judd and Park, 1988). Niven (1998) suggests there is a tendency to view an outgroup (i.e., women) as less qualified than the in-group one associates themselves with.

Given the importance of party gatekeepers in candidate selection, the literature also debates whether their make-up is a barrier to women’s entry. Some contend that the more exclusive the selection committee is, that is the fewer individuals involved in the candidate selection process, the less bias women have to contend with increasing their chances at selection. Hinojosa and Gurdíán (2012), examining Chile and Mexico, conclude that women candidates fair better in more centralized and exclusive candidate selection systems. Alternatively, others show that widening the criteria for inclusion and increasing the number of party members in the process can increase the opportunities for women and other marginalized groups. Party-controlled primaries, especially in newer democracies with poorer party

members, are often wrought with patronage and clientilistic expectations on behalf of party gatekeepers (Kitschelt, 2000). By increasing the number of individuals involved ultimately undercuts the potential for vote-buying. For example, Ichino and Nathan (2016) show that by increasing the number of party gatekeepers, Ghana's National Democratic Congress party significantly reduced barriers to women during candidate selection.

Gendered Family Qualifications in Gatekeeper Evaluations


The conflicting findings on the role of gender, the make-up of the selection gatekeepers, and how it shapes women's success in making it onto a ballot may be due to fundamental misspecification of the candidate selection model. In this respect, I note that families are almost entirely left out of most empirical studies of gender and candidate choice even though their connections, resources, and support, play a vital role in political careers across the world. Political families provide access to both formal and informal political networks, career, and electoral advantages (Feinstein, 2010; Smith, 2012; Smith and Martin, 2017). Further, family ties are more influential in weakly institutionalized environments (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003), and they are important in determining benefits from political control during periods of transition or uncertainty (Vilas, 1992).

When evaluating women and men as candidates, the party gatekeepers embodies the tension between partisan interests and societal biases. In seeking to act in the interest of the party by selecting the most electable candidate they must make assumptions about the individuals on the basis of imperfect or biased information. In this respect, a person's gender becomes one of the most easily accessible heuristics that party gatekeepers might be expected to infer candidate qualifications. In contexts where traditional cultural norms dominate and a clear distinction between the archetype of an 'ideal' man and 'ideal' woman exists, the interpretations associated with the gender heuristic will be rooted in how one conforms, or not, to their expected gender role. This suggests then that men and women candidates can be rewarded or penalized asymmetrically for possessing similar traits depending on how they align with their expected behavior.

Pushing this logic further, I extend our current understanding of how gender heuristics operate by conceptualizing the family as a candidate attribute – an attribute that operates differently for women and men. My claim is that party gatekeepers understand candidate's qualifications as going beyond the individual; they involve the family. In a context where civil societies are weak or individual resources are limited due to underdevelopment, political resources are often held within traditional family structures. I claim that a candidate's ability to pull from these resources, both tangible and intangible, is perceived differently depending on one's gender. Men are believed to have easier access to more masculine or patriarchal resources such as financial resources, whereas women can claim credit for those resources perceived to align with a woman's more subservient position in the household. As depicted in Figure 4.1, when a candidate presents both individual and family attributes to a party gatekeeper, gender norms and stereotypes associated with those attributes will condition the evaluation given to the office seeker. I expect gatekeepers are more likely to value women

who demonstrate family political loyalty because stereotypes portrays them as more loyal. Patriarchal norms also make it less likely for a woman to move out of this family network. I expect men to benefit from the value placed on being the head of a traditional household; a reward that works to also punish women who deviate from this norm. This ultimately results in asymmetrical evaluations of similar qualifications depending on whether the candidate is a man or woman.

Figure 4.1: Theoretical Argument Model



The manner in which families become embedded in politics varies considerably around the world. In some cases, political dynasties are so encompassing of the political elite that they form a dynastic democracy, such as in the Philippines, where more than half of the elected legislators and governors have a relative who has held political office (Querubin, N.d.). In others, one family, like the Nehru-Gandhi family in India, can rise to control the dominant political party and hold the executive for decades (Mitra, 1988). Political families can be more localized, as tends to be the case in Thailand (Kongkirati, 2016). Families do not have to hold elected office but can act as political financiers. The Koch family in the United States exerts financial and political influence while never actually appearing on a ballot (Confessore, 2015). Common across these variations is a shared set of family ties that allows them to exert candidate's political influence.

Given the primacy of the family in many countries, party gatekeepers should be expected to evaluate more than just the individual candidate but the candidate's family as well. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2017) show that party gatekeepers use dynastic ties to infer the qualities of a candidate based on the success of their family members. Gatekeepers are not unbiased evaluators; they bring expectations of family norms and hierarchies into their evaluations. For this reason, research recently has begun to show that having a political family affects women and men differently during candidate selection. Folke, Rickne and Smith (2020) show with data from Ireland and Sweden that dynastic ties are significantly more important for women when it comes to candidate selection. Women, they show, must rely on the reputational clout from family ties in low-information environments when they

are newcomers. Gatekeepers then can be expected to consider a candidate's family when evaluating them. This expectation leads to my first hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: *Party gatekeepers will consider family attributes when evaluating candidates.*

The effects of family connections are not necessarily symmetrical across men and women. The family remains a gendered unit in most countries. Norms that restrict women to the home and private sphere are a defining feature of many patriarchal cultures (Khan, 2017; Bleck and Michelitch, 2018). Women from patrilineal ethnic groups in Africa, for example, are more likely to experience domestic violence and have less autonomy in the home (Lowes, 2017). Marriage is itself often a gendered institution that puts women in subordinate positions within the family unit, and women's household bargaining positions can significantly affect their ability to participate politically (Chhibber, 2002). The effects of these gender dynamics extend into political behavior. In India, research comparing groups whose norms dictate wealth inheritance through the male line (patrilineal) or the female line (matrilineal) show that the gender gap in political engagement is conditioned on wealth inequalities (Brule and Gaikwad, N.d.).

Acknowledging that the party gatekeepers evaluate a candidate's family attributes, and that the family is a gendered unit, we must understand how gender conditions the interpretations of a candidate's family. We need to understand whether these interpretations benefit or harm the individual's chances during candidate selection. I argue there is a loyalty mechanism in which women benefit politically from their family's political history. And there is a separate family status mechanism through which the demonstration of a traditional family dynamic creates political benefits principally for men.

I hypothesize that women are rewarded by party gatekeepers for being from a politically active and connected family. Women are perceived to be more likely to remain within pre-established family networks such as political parties. Bem and Lewis (1975) early on identified that gender stereotypes dictate that women are expected to be and/or associated with being more loyal, dependable, and trustworthy. These theoretical expectations have held in reality with recent work showing that women are more likely to have higher levels of party discipline than men. In Ukraine, Thames and Rybalko (2010) find that women are more loyal to their parties than men. Cowley and Childs (2003)'s study in Britain shows that newer women MPs are less likely to go against party lines than men. Even in contexts where partisanship is heavily polarized, as in the United States, party identification has been shown to have a stronger effect on women legislators' voting decisions than men's (Kenski, 2007). These findings are consistent when looking at both institutionalized and weakly institutionalized party systems in Africa. Clayton and Zetterberg (2020), using a survey of over 800 parliamentarians from seventeen African legislatures, show that women report significantly higher levels of party discipline. Party gatekeepers prefer women who they know will not challenge party elites, and therefore, will look for candidates who can signal party loyalty (Hassim, 2003). Drawing on these previous findings, I expect that party gatekeepers will be more likely to reward women for their family political loyalties than men during candidate evaluations.

Hypothesis 2: *Party gatekeepers reward women candidates more than men for familial political loyalty.*

I hypothesize that men, on the other hand, are rewarded for being the head of traditional households. The reward reflects both a bonus to men and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family. Borrowing from role congruity theory, which underlines that men and women are subjected to varying norms and expectations based on their ascribed gender roles, there are different parameters for the ‘ideal’ candidate’s family status depending on the candidate’s gender (Eagly and Diekmann, 2005). As a result, women face backlash for deviating from cultural expectations of their prescribed gender (Jussim, Coleman and Lerch, 1987). This double standard in the rewards for family dynamics is typically reflected in gender pay gaps in which men with families earn more than women with families (Polachek and Xiang, 2009). Voters, research shows, follow role congruity theory: they prefer candidates that demonstrate traditional family profiles. This preference has been documented in established democracies like the United States (Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth, 2017) and in newer democracies like Malawi (Clayton et al., 2019). More than just being rewarded for conforming to family status expectations, women politicians are often penalized for not conforming to traditional family norms. Stalsburg (2010) shows that childless women are evaluated substantially lower than childless men, and lower than men and women with children. Bell and Kaufmann (2015) find that women receive lower candidate evaluations for not conforming to gendered expectations on motherhood and children. In the United States, men are far less likely to report that they believe having children makes it more difficult to run for office (Lawless and Fox, 2005). The unbalanced effects of family dynamics likely contribute to the reality that women politicians, those who have been successful in candidate selection, are more likely to enter politics after their childbearing years (Dodson, 1997; Thomas, 2002). Therefore, when considering gendered differences in candidate evaluations, we should expect to see men and women rewarded and penalized differentially for conforming to norms of family dynamics.

Hypothesis 3: *Party gatekeepers reward men for demonstrating traditional family status while punishing women who deviate from the norm.*

Extending the logic of my argument, I contend that we must consider the extent to which individual gatekeepers vary in the degree to which they believe in gender stereotypes and how they perceive women overall. Importantly, sexist attitudes can manifest themselves in multiple ways. As posited by Glick and Fiske (2001), individuals can hold both hostile and benevolent gender biases. Both of these manifestations, encapsulated in notions of ambivalent sexism, can create barriers to women during candidate selection, with hostile and benevolent gender biases hurting their overall evaluations. It is likely that individuals with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will view candidate attributes through a gendered lens, weighing more heavily on perceived gender norms and expectations which place women at a disadvantage. We should expect that party gatekeepers with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will have gendered biases in favor of men.

Hypothesis 4: *Party gatekeepers with higher levels of ambivalent sexism will have gender biases that favor men, particularly for family attributes.*

Women candidates are often at an inherent disadvantage in many democratizing societies because family dynamics and party loyalty present two costly and largely immutable attributes through which they are evaluated. In contrast to commonly cited political qualifications, loyalty and political history are significantly harder to hedge largely because they require a dedication of time. Election cycles typically encompass four to five years, and party loyalty is built over multiple cycles. Moreover, in systems where political parties are weakly institutionalized, it is a risky investment. Unlike financial resources given to parties or communities, party loyalty is sticky and cannot be easily transferred when changing political parties nor can it be given to multiple political parties at once. Additionally, the nature of family status, especially in context with developing countries with strong patriarchal norms, is not always at a women's discretion. As a result, we see women rewarded and penalized for costly attributes largely out of their control, creating barriers for representation that need to be incorporated into candidate selection models.

4.3 Candidate Selection and the Role of Family in Zambia

Candidate selection in Zambia is widely perceived as creating hurdles for women's representation. The process is a closed-door affair that relies on rounds of interviews at each level of the party structure. The interviews culminate in the selection of the candidate by the National Executive Committee (for a more in-depth discussion see Wang and Muriaas (2019)).¹ In 2016, the two dominant parties, the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND), held candidate selection processes in each of the 156 constituencies for members of parliament.² Given the electoral system in Zambia, plurality single-member districts, candidate selection in party strongholds is the de facto election. For example, in Southern Province, where UPND is overwhelmingly popular, the party candidate is essentially guaranteed the seat.

The party gatekeepers in the PF and the UPND is mostly made up by men, and they are selected through intra-party elections. Political power in both parties is centralized in a national executive committee. Each party has branches at the ward, constituency, district, and provincial levels across the country. The party gatekeepers included in candidate selection are titled members of the party who are elected by the members of the level below at national party conventions. These titled positions, such as Vice Chair, form the local political organ in the area and are the decision-making members during the candidate selection process. Each level has around 24 members who can participate in the selection process. While there are specific positions held aside for women, such as Chairlady and Vice Chair-


¹Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; 2016, 2017, and 2019

²Other smaller parties, like former incumbent party Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and Forum for Democracy and Development, did not have enough aspirants to hold official candidate selection proceedings and party bids went to any party members interested in standing on their party tickets.³

lady, the majority of the remaining positions are held by are men. There are no intra-party quotas or measures to increase women's representation in these positions.


Candidate selection for members of parliament begins with individuals applying at the ward level for the constituency they would like to stand in and paying an adoption fee (typically around 2,000 Kwacha or \$100 to \$250). In the 2016 candidate selection process, there were low levels of women aspirants from the start. From the records collected in the field in 2017 from the UPND and PF party headquarters, I estimate that there were 1,212 applicants for positions on the ballot among the two dominant parties: 646 for the PF and 566 for the UPND. Of those, only 178 were women across both parties. Thus, from the onset, the aspirant pool only contained 14% women candidates. This was not a party specific problem, but rather the general trend across both parties. The PF had 102 women applicants, accounting for 15% of their applicant pool; UPND had 77 women applicants, making up 13% of their applicants. The constituency-level distribution for each party is mapped in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3, where constituencies marked in grey are areas that had at least one woman apply for consideration.⁴ These 178 women would go on to be interviewed by elected party members at the ward, constituency, district, and provincial levels. Interviews are conducted by titled party members and typically contained topics of political support, campaign resources, and party history.

Figure 4.2: Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - UPND



⁴Note: the maps are based on pre-2016 constituency lines but are mostly accurate.

Figure 4.3: Women and the 2016 Candidate Selection Process - PF



Final candidate selection is done by the national executive committee. Provincial chairman from the ten provinces come to present their preferred candidates, along with written recommendations from each constituency, to the national executive committee. The national executive committee is not obligated to select the preferred candidate, and can even impose a candidate who did not attend an interview. These decisions are often justified by the argument that the national executive committee collected information through a secret investigation. Of the 178 women who applied for adoption in 2016, only 56 women ended up being selected by either of the two parties: PF adopted 28 (16%) women and UPND 27 (19%). The constituencies in which women were selected are represented by horizontal lines in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3.

It should be noted that voter preferences only come into play after the pool of 178 politically ambitious women is whittled down into 56 candidates. Largely determined by what party ticket they were on, 25 women were elected in the 2016 election – 13 under PF and 12 under UPND.⁵ Women in parliament now account for 17% of all MPs.

⁵It is important to note that this number has fluctuated due to changes in seats caused by death and by-elections

Family, Loyalty, and Candidacy in Zambia

Political loyalty is a valuable and sought-after attribute in Zambia. Intra-party conflict and defection are common, causing instability within political parties. In the 2016 elections, 71 of the 432 candidates for parliament defected from another party (Arriola et al., 2021). Consistent across all my interviews, both men and women aspirants are expected to have shown some sort of dedication to the party to be selected as a candidate. In Zambia, party loyalty is shown through either time spent campaigning, mobilizing on behalf of the party, having served as an elected party member, or having financially contributed to the party organs.

In interviews I conducted across the country, the party gatekeepers of both parties stressed the importance of party loyalty and noted how this attribute was especially important for aspiring woman candidates. Women, in line with gender stereotypes, are praised for their inherent and expected party loyalty. In this respect, Zambian party gatekeepers recognize the gendered nature of party loyalty. In one interview, a long time serving party member told me that “more women are loyal to the party than men. It’s very rare that you find a woman who’s not loyal.”⁶ This is a notable characteristic that is often pointed out when discussing sitting women MPs and their qualifications. When asking the selection committee in Katuba constituency why they supported Member of Parliament Patricia Mwashingwele, they all agreed it was partly driven by her “loyalty to the party”.⁷

Loyalty extends past the individual to the history of the family. Common across many developing party systems, politics can be controlled by local brokers who often keep power within the family. Zambia is no exception. It is common to see politicians with connections to powerful movers among the independence movement or for families to hold multiple positions within the same constituency. These positions often overlap with the control of local traditional authorities. While both men and women benefit from connections to political families, women are more likely to stay within the political affiliation of their family in Zambia because of the constraints women face financially and socially. For example, while Mulenga Sata, the son of former President Michael Sata was able to defect from his father’s political party; the PF to the opposition party, UPND,⁸ Sylvia Masebo was ultimately forced to divorce her husband when attempting to defect from the former ruling party.⁹

Politics is expensive and women often rely on their families’ support to fund their campaigns. The cost of elections is especially burdensome to women, as noted by the chairlady of the national executive committee for UPND: “The only excuse I buy for women is that we don’t have funds. The politics in Africa require you to have money. And in the opposition, it’s worse, where it’s not funded by the government. It’s worse. That’s one big fear that women have...I don’t have the money. So why should I go for it?”¹⁰ Even women who are

⁶ Author Interview, Remote; 2020

⁷ Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; September 28, 2017

⁸ Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 27th 2017

⁹ Author Interview, Chongwe, Zambia; January 2017

¹⁰ Author Interview, Lusaka, Zambia; November 6th, 2017

electorally successful in Zambia highlighted their reliance on family resources. Member of Parliament Attractor Chisanga noted how much her family pitched in during the campaign: “There’s one sister of mine, she donated hundreds of t-shirts and caps, another sister of mine donated vehicles and fuel and food, and another sister of mine donated some money as well... the family was very supportive”.¹¹

The necessity of family support is asymmetric in Zambia, where women must negotiate their political ambitions with relatives in ways which men do not. Member of Parliament Olipa Phiri discussed her husband’s reticence: “My husband at first was on the negative side that, no, you know when women become politicians full time, they start misbehaving ... [he] thinks that [it] will denounce our name.”¹² This household bargaining that takes place when women express political ambitions is gendered asymmetrically: “when a woman says I am going to run ... almost all of them will be told by their husbands you can’t do that or their family will be like why... While if a man runs, the family will say, yeah, you should.”¹³

Party gatekeepers in Zambia value loyalty among women aspirants and recognize that coming from a political family sends a strong signal that they are likely to stay in the political party and have the support to run a successful campaign. The manner in which the candidate selection committee evaluated one woman for a seat on the former ruling party ticket in Kafue constituency exemplifies this perspective. Because she was the granddaughter of one of the first members of parliament, the candidate selection committee viewed her as; “riding on the name of the grandfather.”¹⁴ While not enough to guarantee adoption, this candidate’s family lineage is a political asset that also shapes views about her access to the necessary resources. Her family’s political history creates a patriarchal political path for her as an aspirant.

Members of the selection committee not only evaluate the candidate’s public profile, but also strongly consider their private life as a factor in their candidate selection. Women, valued for their loyalty, are also strongly expected to be the primary caretakers in the home. In Zambia, where Christianity as the official religion dictates traditional family norms, men’s and women’s roles are culturally ingrained. Women face an impossible double-bind: they either fulfill the cultural expectation of having a family, where domestic responsibilities and household bargaining puts stringent limitations on their resources to commit to politics, or they do not conform and face backlash from party gatekeepers. “[T]hose who are married...they are respected differently but if you are single, you are a woman, it’s also another challenge because even the people would open up, how are going to run, how are you going to represent us, you don’t have a child, you don’t have a husband, how are you going to do it.”¹⁵

¹¹ Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 26, 2017

¹² Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 26, 2017

¹³ Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; September 30, 2017

¹⁴ Author Interview; Remote 2020

¹⁵ Author Interview; October 17 2017

The asymmetrical gendered nature of family status in Zambia affects how party gatekeepers evaluate an candidates's family status differentially. For men undergoing candidate selection, family status can contribute to their qualifications. By demonstrating they can support a family and successfully fulfill the role as head of household, men in Zambia receive praise. "One of the core, one of the major things which people look [at] is ... how do you keep your family, if you take care of your family, they'll say [he] is a responsible person. If he's taking care of his family, he is able to take care of us as voters. That really matter."¹⁶.

The socio-cultural environment of Zambia, which mirrors many developing democracies in the Global South, presents a landscape where candidate evaluation is gendered. Both individual and family attributes are considered by party gatekeepers, and women face an inherent disadvantage in the clientelistic systems that value immutable and costly attributes from its women aspirants. Consequently, the majority of the prominent women politicians in Zambia who have made it through the candidate selection process can be connected to politically active families. Former Vice President Inonge Wina, the first woman to hold the position, was married to the late Arthur Wina, an independence leader and government minister (Thobhani, 1974). Member of Parliament Given Katuta was the daughter of a political father who only ended up contesting her seat after her brother died before an election (Zimba, 2016). The father of Chushi Kasanda, Member of Parliament for Chisamba constituency, was MP for that same seat and her grandfather was MP and Minister for UNIP (the independence party) (Kuyela, 2016).

4.4 Research Design

The challenge to understanding the preferences of party gatekeepers is that many attributes come together to form the qualifications of a candidate. To separate the effects of both individual and family-based attributes on candidate evaluation, I utilize a single profile conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2013). A notable benefit of conjoint designs, as (Clayton et al., 2019) notes is its resilience against social desirability bias; the presence of numerous varying attributes make it unlikely for the participant or enumerator to isolate individual factors in their responses. However, in line with current critiques on the potential biases of inference resulting from relying on the AMCE (Scott F Abramson, Working Paper; Bansak et al., 2020), this analysis acknowledges and interprets the results as the average effect rather than the majority. In the context of candidate selection, where a strong preference among one party gatekeeper may have a disproportional effect, the design's potential weakness mirrors the reality of candidate preferences during selection, making it the most appropriate choice. Further, recent methodological discussion has surrounded debates about whether we should utilize AMCEs or rather marginal means Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020). Given the nature of the experimental design in this study with all the attributes except one (gender) having true controls for the reference group category, thereby avoiding the potential pitfalls of arbitrary reference group selection

¹⁶Author Interview; Remote 2020

highlighted by Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2020), I contend that the AMCE is the most informative and appropriate measure. For robustness sake, the marginal means have been provided in the Appendix.

Experimentally, the survey utilizes a vignette design to present candidate recommendations. These candidate recommendations are based on actual recommendations that each level of the party structure writes and submits to the province and the national executive committee after interviewing candidates during the candidate selection period (these recommendations were analyzed in Chapter 2). The hypothetical recommendations vary the gender of the candidate, the financial capacity, and the organizational capacity of the candidate. Additionally, the experiment varies marital status and party endorsement. The full conjoint attribute table can be found in the Appendix ???. After hearing the description of the candidate, participants scored the candidate and provided recommendations on what the candidate needs to do to be selected as the candidate for their constituency. Since the sample is made of party members who serve on the selection committee, each participant is familiar with the task being asked.

Zambian enumerators, recruited from the University of Zambia, conducted the surveys on tablets. The surveys ask participants questions to gauge political experience, candidate preferences, measures of ambivalent sexism, and financial expectations during the multiple phases of candidate selection. On average, the survey took about 45 minutes. The survey instrument and the pre-analysis plan were registered with Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP).¹⁷

Candidate Attributes

The experimental attributes were developed to mirror candidate recommendations collected in the field from the PF.¹⁸ The attributes were identified from these records in collaboration with interviews conducted with party gatekeepers and aspirants. Critical to the design of the experiment were the levels of attributes. First, the experiment includes the individual and family attributes of the candidate. This makes up the first dimension of the two-by-two in Table 4.1. For example, an aspirant may personally have a business, or their family may have a business. Both, I argue, would be considered when evaluating the candidate's ability to support a campaign.

The second stratification is the level of investment of the attribute by the candidate or their family. This makes up the second factor in the two-by-two in Table 4.1. A candidate may have the resource (capacity) or they could have used the resource for the party (invested). For example, a candidate could have a strong network by being a member of a local organization (they have organizational capacity) or they could have used their network to mobilize election support for the party (they invested their organizational capacity). Uncommon to the study of candidate evaluation, the design also included a negative qualification

¹⁷Design was registered with EGAP. The Pre-Analysis plan can be found in the appendix.

¹⁸This data set includes 808 written recommendations on aspirants for member of parliament and ward councillor for the 2016 election.

for each of the attributes. Candidate evaluations found in the field often included negative aspects about a candidate, and it is important to understand how this information is considered in line with positive information. The baseline for the attributes was no mention of a specific attribute, in the survey, this attribute just did not appear for the enumerator to read.¹⁹

Table 4.1: Candidate Attributes

	Capacity	Invested
Personal:	candidate attributes specific to the individual	candidate level of investment in party
Family:	candidate attributes from their family	family level of investment in party

The first critical aspect about an aspirant was their financial resources. Member of Parliament Pililia Jere states this explicitly: “for one to win a political position in this country you have to have money.”²⁰ And Member of Parliament Salatiel Tembo points out that this becomes an insurmountable barrier during candidate selection: “you are not considered because you don’t have the money.”²¹ The experimental design included two measures of a candidate’s financial resources: both their capacity and level of investment. For example, personal financial capacity referred to an indicator of wealth and invested financial capacity to a measure of how a candidate has used wealth to the benefit of the party.

The second candidate criterion typically considered is their organizational capacity. Essential to a candidate’s profile is how connected they are to the constituency. One of the most common negatives used in the aspirant records from the PF was “Not on the Ground”, signaling that the candidate was not known or connected to the area. The experimental design included two measures of a candidate’s organizational capacity, mirroring the financial capacity attributes. Personal organizational capacity referred to the candidate’s local connections within the constituency (being an influential member of a local organization). Invested organizational capacity reflected how local ties were utilized for elections - mobilizing campaign support.

In addition to the capacities of the candidate, the design includes an endorsement. Ariola, Choi and Gichohi (2017) show that endorsements have a large impact on support for candidates. In Zambia, the candidate selection process relies on members of the selection committee campaigning for certain candidates. Among the records of candidate evaluations from the PF, it was common to see some notes on whether or not the candidate could deliver the seat. Therefore, the design included four levels of endorsements.

Lastly, the study included a description of the candidate’s family status. Since the project was focused on the controlling of assets, it was important to understand if women who were single or married were evaluated differently. The gender of the candidate was presented with

¹⁹This reflects the blank recommendations seen in the data set analyzed in Chapter 2.

²⁰Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 30, 2017

²¹Author Interview, Lusaka Zambia; October 27, 2017

a non-tribal gendered names which were taken from the list of aspirants from 2016 and tested prior to the study.


These six candidate attributes combine into a hypothetical candidate profile, mirroring the candidate recommendations from the 2016 candidate selection process. The experimental design was ideal as the recommendations often included numerous attributes, both in positive and negative formulations. For example, in the actual aspirant recommendation shown below, the description offers positive financial capacity and organizational capacity details, but includes a negative endorsement.

“He qualifies to stand since he is a strong member of the party (PF) and being a businessman he is very well known in Mpika. The only drawback is that he is still very new in politics, but when groomed properly he can make a strong candidate in the future elections. A stable and eager to learn politics member of Patriotic Front party in Mpika.” Actual candidate recommendation for Abraham Kasonde MP Aspirant Mpika Constituency

4.5 Empirical Analysis

The experiment is analyzed following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013) by calculating the average marginal component effect (AMCE) and the average component interaction effect (ACIE). I use the fully non-parametric linear regression estimator presented in Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2013), and clustered standard errors derived at the respondent level. The survey presented participants with 6 profiles and asked them to score each candidate on a 7pt scale. The 7pt outcome has been scaled to represent the percentage increase or decrease in candidate score.

Figure 4.4: Average Marginal Treatment Effects



There is support for Hypothesis 1: Party selectorates do weigh family attributes when evaluating candidates. Figure 4.4 presents the AMCE from the full sample. The figure shows the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the unconditional AMCEs with standard errors clustered at the respondent level.²² Figure 4.4 shows that the effect size is often of the same magnitude for both family and individual attributes. For example, while individually owning businesses increases a candidate's evaluation on average by 4%, having a family that owns businesses also increases a candidate's evaluation on average by 3%. Statistically, these two effect sizes are indistinguishable.

Some of the largest effects in the recommendations come from negative attributes. Often not included in studies of individual preferences on candidates, we see that negative comments in a candidate endorsement can have the largest impact on the overall evaluation. From this analysis, we can see that a candidate can be severely weakened by having financial challenges with individuals - decreasing a candidate score by 23% on average. Having financial challenges with the political party also decreases a candidate evaluation by 21% on average.

²²Attribute levels have been collapsed. variation in the quantity of a capacity was used to give variation in hypothetical candidates across profiles. Findings are robust regardless.

The results suggest that gender alone does not affect a candidate's score. This is in line with many of the findings in the literature that find a marginal but significant positive effect for the "woman" attribute. Often, as it is shown in this study and many others (Schwarz and Coppock, 2021; Schwarz, Hunt and Coppock, 2018), in conjoint experiments we may find a positive effect for being a woman when the context, in reality, is at odds, as suggested by the double bind in Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) or the paradox of family expectations in Clayton et al. (2019).

The findings for the family dynamic description have effects as would be expected in the context of Zambia, where traditional family norms are salient. In Zambia, there is a significantly high rate of marriage. For example, in this sample 82% of the participants are married. Candidates therefore received significant increases in their candidate evaluation for being married or married with kids. Candidates were penalized for being divorced, while being widowed had no effect.

Regardless of the nature of the endorsement, any comment on the ability to win the seat has a positive effect. Further study is required to understand the impact of endorsement statements on gatekeepers preferences. While it was expected that the negative attribute, requiring tremendous work to win the seat, would have negatively impacted the overall evaluation, the results suggest that the treatment was unclear.

It is important to comment on the nature of marginal effect sizes. First, the effect sizes are in line with the majority of factorial studies that look at gender. Schwarz and Coppock (2021) show with a meta-analysis of 67 experiments that the effect of being a woman rather than a man is 2% increase in vote choice. Second, in the context of candidate selection where numerous candidates are competing for a single seat, the small effects in candidate score could be all the difference when it comes to being chosen. In Zambia, only one candidate can be recommended per seat by the provincial chairman. Decisions often come down to very small differences in candidates. Therefore, while an effect size may be relatively small, they tell us much about what is important for gatekeeper's evaluations during selection processes in newer democracies.


4.6 The Gendered Effects of Family Attributes

Core to this paper is the claim that men and women are evaluated differently for the same attributes, namely family-based attributes. We therefore must look at the gendered difference of each attribute. Following the analytical approach seen in Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2017) and Clayton et al. (2019), I calculate the gendered difference which takes the treatment effect if the candidate was a woman minus if they were a man (interaction effect between the gender attribute and the remaining attributes) to find whether the attribute was evaluated differently across the two genders. Positive coefficients show that an attribute has a gender gap in favor of women, and negative coefficients show a gender gap that favors men.

The results presented in Figure 4.5, which graphs the average marginal interaction effect (AMIE) with a 95% confidence, support my central claims in Hypothesis 2. I find party

gatekeepers reward women candidates more than men for familial political loyalty. While both men and women are rewarded for individual invested loyalty (shown in Figure 4.4 in the Appendix), women receive a 4% bonus in comparison to men for having a family that has mobilized in elections, that is, the loyalty mechanism.

Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Gendered Differences



Corroborating Hypothesis 3, the results show that party gatekeepers reward men for demonstrating traditional family status while punishing women who deviate from the norm. The gendered effect for married with two kids results in a 3% bonus for candidates who are men in comparison to women. Additionally, women are penalized severely for being divorced, resulting in a 4% bonus for men.

While this study finds notable gendered effects, it also highlights some null effects where we might expect to find gendered differences. Individual and family financial attributes (invested or not) appear to have no gendered effects: they increase and decrease both men's and women's evaluations indistinguishably. This is especially interesting given that women in newer democracies are in a more vulnerable place financially. Additionally, men and women receive similar evaluations for their local connections. While men are often more likely to be political brokers, and dominate local traditional authorities this appears to have no effect on the evaluation by party gatekeepers on aspirant's local connections.

However, it is important to note that while we find no gendered difference in this analysis, many of these attributes, in reality, are much more difficult for women to obtain or control in the first place as shown in Chapter 3. For example, women often face much larger obstacles

in obtaining financial independence and/or success in many countries. Women in Latin America and Africa significantly have less access to and ownership of land (Doss, Grown and Deere, 2008). In addition to land, women are less likely to own or inherit productive forms of livestock (Dillon and Quiñones, 2011; McPeak, Little and Doss, 2011). Obtaining similar levels of the attributes that party gatekeepers evaluate men and women equivalently is often more costly for women, posing a barrier regardless.


What needs to be considered here is that the attributes which party gatekeepers do evaluate men and women differently tend to be immutable by nature. One's family and their political history are not an individual's choice. Nor can political history be built quickly if an individual decides to enter politics. Therefore, women candidates, regardless if they recognize this political advantage, are limited in their ability to act on it: it simply exists as an attribute that is evaluated when they seek office. Further, in new democracies where traditional norms prevail an individual's family dynamic, and whether they remain "not-divorced" is often out of a women's control. What this tells us is that women's descriptive representation will not change by focusing on candidate trainings and increasing the supply of women candidates. We must also look towards training party gatekeepers to eliminate the gendered differences in evaluation practices.

4.7 What about Women Gatekeepers?

Many scholars have suggested that the key to decreasing bias against women during the candidate selection process is to include women in party positions of power (Niven, 1998; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993; Kittilson, 2001). The logic contends that the out-group effect, when a political body dominated by men view women as less qualified, is dampened by women joining selection committees (Niven, 1998). Women gatekeepers are also expected to actively work to recruit, often changing internal party policies to promote such ideals (Lovenduski and Norris, 1993). Evidence for such claims has been found when studying European (Kittilson, 2001) and Canadian political parties (Cheng and Tavits, 2011).

I assess this common expectation by comparing the women and men gatekeepers in the sample. The results suggest caution in relying on women in political positions to eliminate gender bias in recruitment strategies. Looking at the full conjoint results (Appendix 4.5), I do not find that women have any gender preference. I find that women gatekeepers, however, do engage in similar gendered interpretations of a candidate's family status. Figure 4.6 calculates the gendered difference which takes the treatment effect if the candidate was a woman minus if they were a man (interaction effect between the gender attribute and the remaining attributes) to find whether the attribute was evaluated differently for men and women aspirants when evaluated only by women gatekeepers. (The point estimates for both the men's and women's profiles can be seen in Figure 4.6 in the Appendix.) Women gatekeepers punish women more severely than men gatekeepers when deviating from the traditional family expectations by being divorced. Women aspirants lose 5% in overall candidate evaluation for being divorced in comparison to divorced men. Women gatekeepers, while punishing

Figure 4.6: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Women Gatekeepers



women candidates more severely, do not appear to reward women for demonstrating family political loyalty. As shown in Figure 4.6, there are no significant gendered differences on any other variable other than the aspirant being divorced. Women gatekeepers, unlike the whole selection committee, do not reward women for having politically active families: they do not respond to the loyalty mechanism.


4.8 Ambivalent Sexism and Candidate Evaluations

Rather than focusing on a gatekeeper's gender, I suggest that understanding an individual's underlying level of ambivalent sexism may provide insight on candidate selection dynamics. Here, I show that sociological gender expectations condition how party gatekeepers evaluate candidates. To examine this, I use a modified version of the ambivalent sexism, which "measures hostile sexism, sexist antipathy toward women, and benevolent sexism, subjectively favorable, yet patronizing, beliefs about women" (Glick and Fiske, 2001, pg. 116).²³ I then created an index measure that captures both hostile and benevolent sexist view. And divided

²³The measure was modified to be appropriate to the Zambian context. The full measure can be found in Figure 4.9 in the Appendix.

the sample using a dichotomous category of those who fell above and below the mean of the index: those with high levels of ambivalent sexism and those with low levels of benevolent sexism.


Figure 4.7: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - High Ambivalent Sexism



Supporting hypothesis 4, individuals with high levels of ambivalent sexism, shown in Figure 4.7, are more likely to engage in gendered evaluations that negatively impact women's chances during candidate selection. These individuals are particularly focused on the financial status of the candidate and their family – a 'masculine' characteristic. Comparing the AMIE for men and women profiles, shown in Figure 4.7 in the Appendix, party gatekeepers reward men far more than women who have financially sponsored the party, resulting in a 4% bonus in their candidate score. Further, they do not reward women at all for having a family who has financially sponsored a party, where they do reward men, resulting in a 5% bonus for men.

Conversely, individuals with low levels of ambivalent sexism, shown in Figure 4.8, I find are more likely to engage in gendered evaluations that positively impact women's chances during candidate selection. Again, we see gendered evaluations of a candidate's personal and familial invested financial capacity. However, these individuals reward women far more for having personally financially sponsored the party, and for having family that sponsored the party. This results in an overall 7% bonus for women's candidate evaluations.

Figure 4.8: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Low Ambivalent Sexism



By looking at the levels of ambivalent sexism held by both men and women gatekeepers, we discover another reason for why simply increasing the amount of women on the selection committee may not increase women's access. Women in this sample hold significantly higher levels of sexist beliefs than men. Contrary to expectation, women selectorates in Zambia, I find, have an average ambivalent sexism index of 4.6 out of 6. Men, on the other hand, had an average of 4.4.²⁴ Breaking the index into its two components, benevolent²⁵ and hostile sexism²⁶, we see that women hold significantly stronger benevolent sexist views with an average 3.2 (out of 4) in comparison to men who have an average of 2.8.²⁷ Men, on the other hand, score significantly higher than women on hostile sexism with an average of 1.5 (out of 2) in comparison to women with an average of 1.3.²⁸ Both men and women have internalized gendered beliefs that ultimately affect the way they view and evaluate men and women candidates. Women are not immune from these beliefs, and understanding the sociological foundations of how gender is used as a heuristic will further our understanding

²⁴The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant ($p=0.011$).

²⁵Includes the following questions: Women should be cherished and protected by men; Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives; Women are more virtuous and good than men; and No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has a wife.

²⁶Includes the following questions: Women are too easily offended. ; and Most women do not appreciate all the things men do for them.

²⁷The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant ($p=0.000$).

²⁸ The difference of means based on two-tailed tests is statistically significant ($p=0.000$).

of the complexities of barriers women face when vying for candidacy.

4.9 Conclusion

Drawing on a unique experimental study of the candidate preferences of party gatekeepers, I argue that current models of candidate selection are misspecified. Candidates are not solely judged by their individual attributes; they are evaluated based on family resources that are perceived in gendered ways. The conflicting findings from the literature on the role of gender in women's electoral success may be due to the failure to account for these additional attributes. I argue that both parties and voters consider family attributes alongside individual attributes when they evaluate candidates. Further, the evaluation of family attributes is in accordance with gender norms and stereotypes. Party gatekeepers reward men in candidate selection for having a traditional family dynamic: this reward reflects both a bonus to men who are married with children and a penalty to women who deviate from the traditional family by being divorced. Conversely, with gender expectations and social norms dictating gender stereotypes that imbue women with perceived traits of loyalties, trustworthiness, and dependability, party gatekeepers reward them over men for the political loyalties of their families.

In advancing the literature, this study contends that to truly understand the gendered nature in which party gatekeepers scrutinize women, and how it differs from men, we must include the unbalanced nature of the influence of the family unit in women's lives around the world. One of the most notable benefits of political families is the collection of resources across generations (Solon, 1992), but women do not benefit equally due to inequalities in inheritance laws, social norms, and I add the perception of access on the behalf of party gatekeepers. Women and their ability to compete in elections are heavily moderated by the support and resources of their families.

This study provides a unique look into a group of understudied political actors: the party gatekeepers – whose opinions and actions ultimately shape women's representation in new democracies. A common policy recommendation for increasing the number of women in decision-making bodies, like party gatekeepers, should decrease the biases of those looking for entry. However, this study suggests caution on this recommendation. Women are not immune to gender biases and have their own embedded biases to contend with. Women gatekeepers, while punishing women candidates more severely, do not appear to reward women for demonstrating family political loyalty. Furthermore, when looking at the degree to which individuals hold sexist beliefs, I find that women score significantly higher on the ambivalent sexism measure than men in the sample. Therefore, the solution to decreasing biases against women may not be as simple as increasing the number of women on selection committees. But rather must lie in training gatekeepers on unbiased evaluation techniques and strategies to root out implicit gender biases that ultimately affect the institutionalization of democracies around the world.

Appendix

Project IRB Approval and Information on Participants Consent

The interviews, data collection, and the survey experiment presented in the paper were all approved by the Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) for the University of California, Berkeley (Protocol ID 2018-12-11667 and 2017-08-10185). Interviews were granted by verbal consent given both at the time of the scheduling and again at the beginning of the interview. Recordings were made only at the consent of the participant. The survey experiment relied on hypothetical candidate profiles and did not intervene in any actual political processes, and therefore did not have an impact on the political environment in Zambia. Participants were not compensated for their voluntary participation in this project, however, any costs the participant might accrue in order to participate, such as travel, were reimbursed.

Experimental Design


Figure 4.2: Conjoint Attribute Table

Attributes	Attribute levels
Personal Financial Capacity	[Blank] Their family has a successful business Their family has multiple successful businesses They own a successful business They own multiple successful businesses Has financial challenges with other individuals
Invested Financial Capacity	[Blank] Their family has financially sponsored the party Their family has financially sponsored the party and constituency They have personally financially sponsored party They have personally financially sponsored party and constituency Has financial challenges with the party
Personal Organizational Capacity	[Blank] Family is a leading member in an influential local organization Family is a leading member in many influential local organizations They are a leading member in an influential local organization They are a leading member in many influential local organizations Does not have any connections in the constituency
Invested Organizational Capacity	[Blank] Family has mobilized support for one election campaign Family has mobilized support for many election campaigns They have personally mobilized support for one election campaign They have personally mobilized support for many election campaigns Has not assisted with party mobilization or party events
Marital Status	[Blank] Married Married with two young kids Divorced Widowed
Endorsement	[Blank] Can deliver us the seat With some work can deliver us the seat With a tremendous amount of work, they might deliver us the seat
Gender	Woman Man

Sample

Gatekeepers for the survey were selected from 69 constituencies across all ten provinces. Enumerators worked through local party branches to contact party members from UPND and PF in each selected constituency.

Figure 4.3: Survey Sample



Additional Analyses

Figure 4.4: Average Marginal Interaction Effects - Full Sample




Figure 4.5: Average Marginal Treatment Effects - Women Gatekeepers




Figure 4.6: Men and Women Profiles - Women Gatekeepers




Figure 4.7: AMIE - High Level of Ambivalent Sexism





Figure 4.8: AMIE - Low Level of Ambivalent Sexism




Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement. Enumerator: Please read each individually

[illegible]

Full Conjoint - Marginal Means

Figure 4.10: Full Conjoint Marginal Means



Chapter 5

Conclusion

Summary of the Argument

This dissertation investigates a commonly cited but understudied barrier for women in politics, party gatekeepers. More than simply highlighting that women face discrimination based on their gender, it examines when and how these gender biases manifest in candidate evaluations. In doing so, it gives a holistic explanation of why in some countries, despite an increasing supply of women candidates and decreasing gender biases amongst voters, women's descriptive growth in political bodies has stagnated.

The biases that women face from party gatekeepers manifest in accordance with their gender schema. Gender schema dictate the norms, behaviors, and expectations that individuals who are sorted into specific gender categories, like man or woman, are expected to conform with. Broadly then, we see that gatekeepers reward women for attributes that align with gender expectations or stereotypes. In politics, however, this ultimately means that women are not receiving credit for qualifications deemed outside of their gender schema (i.e. masculine attributes). This is especially costly when some of the most necessary qualifications, and the elected position in general, society codes as masculine.

The chapters in this dissertation demonstrate empirically the multiple ways that gender affects the evaluations of party gatekeepers during candidate selection. In chapter 2, I showed how gender affects the written recommendations of candidates for local and legislative offices and how it relates to candidate selection outcomes. Longer recommendations do, in fact, increase a candidate's chances of being endorsed and selected. In my sample, women were not more or less likely to receive longer recommendations. In analyzing the effects of recommendations on the electoral outcomes (length, the likelihood of endorsement, and selection), men benefited from more masculine qualifications discussed in their recommendations (i.e., financial and professional qualifications). On the other hand, women did not benefit equally from masculine qualifications but from attributes that aligned with feminine stereotypes (community-based qualifications). This chapter gives insight into how party gatekeepers think about men and women candidates and how they translate these perceptions into thoughts on who makes the best candidate. It further connected these perceptions

to realized electoral outcomes to show the power behind gatekeepers' views on candidates.

In Chapter 3, I tested how gender affects the recommendations party gatekeepers make to aspiring candidates in their constituency. I show that the ideal candidate is the same regardless of the candidate's gender. Gatekeepers recommend the same financial, political, and social qualifications to men and women. However, when looking at the reality in which candidates must compete, women have a much harder time reaching those qualifications. Party gatekeepers recognize this double bind and factor it into their evaluations of candidates. Women gatekeepers reflect this disadvantage by holding men and women candidates to higher qualifications than men gatekeepers.

In Chapter 4, I demonstrate how gender affects how party gatekeepers score men and women candidates. While being a woman was not a direct benefit or detriment to a candidate, the gender of the candidate did affect how the gatekeepers evaluated other traits. Gatekeepers reward men and women for attributes that more directly align with their gender, and thereby gatekeepers deem those qualifications as more credible. Further, this chapter shows that gatekeepers evaluated candidates based on individual and family attributes. In this chapter, I also demonstrated how the gatekeepers' gendered beliefs, not their gender identity, affect how they evaluate candidates in relation to the candidate's gender. Gatekeepers with higher ambivalent sexism rewarded men for gendered attributes, whereas those with lower levels rewarded women.

Theoretical and Methodological Contributions

My research concludes that current candidate selection models are misspecified, and I make multiple theoretical and methodological contributions. The first is that to understand why women are not making it into political offices, scholars must look earlier on in the pipeline. Rather than focusing on the election stage, where in many countries the outcome has largely been decided by partisan identification, we need to look at the interaction between women and party gatekeepers at the nomination stage. The majority of women with political ambition are facing the most significant gendered barriers at this point in their pathways to political office. Methodologically this suggests that future research needs to focus on both the informal and formal processes that candidates must undergo to be considered and ultimately selected for political office. This stage is far more challenging to study from a research perspective. Unlike elections, where official records clearly define the individuals involved and their realized outcomes, studying the nomination stage, especially when it is party-controlled, requires scholars to measure an often informal process creatively.

To study the nomination stage, I suggest that research needs to prioritize understanding the preferences and behaviors of party gatekeepers over voters. While voters ultimately make the final decision when it comes to whom they wish represents them, gatekeepers weed out the majority of women before voters get to have a say. Ultimately, I contend that how party gatekeepers respond to women and measure their qualification and competitiveness is far more consequential. Additionally, a large and diverse body of literature already studies how voters view and respond to women as candidates. If we truly want to understand what holds

women back, and hopefully propose policy to support women's political ambitions, we need to better understand this critical stage of the electoral process.

The second priority is that researchers need to broaden the attributes that we define as being part of a candidate. A robust literature focuses observationally and experimentally on the numerous aspects of candidates and how they might affect vote choice. However, as I did in this dissertation, we need to focus on the political and sociological nature of family ties that candidates often rely upon when competing for public office. For observational data, we need to collect data about the candidate and their family to understand the drivers and deterrents of their electoral outcomes fully. Experimentally, we need to include family attributes in our treatments and designs. Without doing such, I contend, our conclusions about the effects of gender are incomplete.

The third priority is that we need to stop relying on policy recommendations that rest solely on putting women into positions with decision-making authority. To do so ignores the reality that women face the same experience of socialization that ingrain gender norms and expectations. Women are potentially more likely aware of the difficulties women candidates might face and thereby evaluate them with this in mind. Instead, I propose we look at an individual's level of ambivalent sexism to predict how they may act as supporters of women's political ambitions. Moving more broadly away from general sexism measures that are most commonly based exclusively on hostile forms, ambivalent sexism gives researchers a much more holistic measure and, as I show, more accurately predicts which candidates will treat women candidates more favorably.

Generalizability of the Argument

While the theory presented in this dissertation is rooted in qualitative fieldwork and tested empirically with data from Zambia, the argument is broadly generalizable. It is not necessarily that the findings discussed in this dissertation are unique to Africa or even to newer democracies. However, the strength of these effects is likely moderated by a country's level of political institutionalization, the strength of their traditional gender norms, and the level of inclusivity and transparency in their candidate selection mechanisms.

The effects outlined in this dissertation are likely stronger in areas with weaker levels of political institutionalization. Women, in these contexts, must engage with a higher degree of uncertainty when entering the nomination stage. Additionally, the lack of transparency that comes with lower levels of political institutionalization likely makes room for gender to have an outright effect on evaluation and selection decisions.

Women in electoral democracies throughout the world must compete within societies that have strict gender schema that establishes gender norms and expectations; norms and expectations that influence how party gatekeepers measure a women's political qualifications and competitiveness. Additionally, in some form, gender-based socioeconomic inequalities exist in all electoral democracies. These disparities make women's ability to meet the qualifications necessary to compete for political office more difficult. Moreover, women in countries

where gender schema and people's expected adherence to them are stronger, women are more likely to face barriers in evaluations when vying for political office.

Lastly, in countries where voters are directly in control of candidate selection through primaries, the role of party gatekeepers will be diminished. Nevertheless, how voters evaluate women within and against these gendered expectations will still occur, and political parties will still play a role in how candidates navigate this reality.

Limitations and Future Research

The data in this research, especially in Chapter 2, is reliant on party documents. Therefore, the accuracy of the results is dependent on the precision of their record keeping. It is unlikely that this is without some error, however, the error reflects the reality in which political candidates must navigate weakly institutionalized party structures. Future research could potentially avoid this weakness by collecting aspirant records during candidate selection rather than retrospectively as I did.

Additionally, as with all experimental data there is a possibility that there could be weakness in the design. One, it is possible that the gender treatments were not strong enough to truly capture the gender bias effects. Yet, the gender treatment mirrored the way gender is incorporated during candidate selection. Additionally, there is the possibility that participants responded to questions because of social desirability bias. However, numerous strategies were implemented to try to decrease this possibility. Future research should try to replicate the findings in this study in order to determine the validity of the design.

The single country focus of the dissertation, while allowing for a deep investigation into the candidate selection process in Zambia, does not allow for any cross-country comparisons. Future research would be compelling if it could compare how party gatekeepers evaluate women candidates in multiple countries. Research of this vein would be able to tell us how universal the effects are and could potentially highlight factors that moderate or mitigate these biases against women.

This research took a snapshot of one brief electoral period. Therefore, it makes no arguments on the temporal effects or change of the findings over time. I plan to continue my research in Zambia, which will inevitably add temporal variation to the findings. However, more than just my research, scholars of gender and politics should continue to take seriously how we expect women's access to political opportunities to change over time. Ultimately, we should challenge the assumption that this change will always be positive and linear.

Bibliography

- Aguilar, Rosario, Saul Cunow and Scott Desposato. 2015. "Choice sets, gender, and candidate choice in Brazil." *Electoral Studies* 39:230–242.
- Alexander, Deborah and Kristi Andersen. 1993. "Gender as a Factor in the Attribution of Leadership Traits." *Political Research Quarterly* 46(3):527–545.
- Annesley, Claire, Karen Beckwith and Susan Franceschet. 2019. *Cabinets, ministers, and gender*. Oxford University Press.
- Anzia, Sarah F. 2015. "The underrepresentation of women in elective office." *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource* pp. 1–14.
- Anzia, Sarah F and Christopher R Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson effect: why do congresswomen outperform congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):478–493.
- Arriola, Leonardo R, Donghyun Danny Choi, Justine M Davis, Melanie L Phillips and Lise Rakner. 2021. "Paying to party: Candidate resources and party switching in new democracies." *Party Politics* p. 1354068821989563.
- Arriola, Leonardo R, Donghyun Danny Choi and Matthew Gichohi. 2017. "Political endorsements and cross-ethnic voting in Africa." *Draft*. URL: http://cpd.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ACG_Endorsement-1.pdf.
- Asako, Yasushi, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi and Michiko Ueda. 2014. "Dynastic politicians: Theory and evidence from Japan." *Waseda University Organization for Japan-US Studies Working Paper* (201201).
- Axelson, Rick D., Catherine M. Solow, Kristi J. Ferguson and Michael B. Cohen. 2010. "Assessing Implicit Gender Bias in Medical Student Performance Evaluations." *Evaluation & the Health Professions* 33(3):365–385. PMID: 20801977.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.1177/0163278710375097>

- Bansak, Kirk, Jens Hainmueller, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2020. "Using conjoint experiments to analyze elections: The essential role of the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE)." *Available at SSRN 3588941* .
- Barber, Michael, Daniel M Butler, Jessica Preece et al. 2016. "Gender inequalities in campaign finance." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 11(2):219–48.
- Baturo, Alexander and Julia Gray. 2018. "When do family ties matter? The duration of female suffrage and women's path to high political office." *Political Research Quarterly* 71(3):695–709.
- Bell, Melissa A and Karen M Kaufmann. 2015. "The electoral consequences of marriage and motherhood: How gender traits influence voter evaluations of female candidates." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 36(1):1–21.
- Bem, Sandra L. 1981. "Bem sex role inventory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* .
- Bem, Sandra L and Steven A Lewis. 1975. "Sex role adaptability: One consequence of psychological androgyny." *Journal of personality and Social Psychology* 31(4):634.
- Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2017. "The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence." *Journal of Economic Growth* 22(2):123–144.
- Black, Jerome H and Lynda Erickson. 2003. "Women candidates and voter bias: do women politicians need to be better?" *Electoral Studies* 22(1):81–100.
- Bleck, Jaimie and Kristin Michelitch. 2018. "Is women's empowerment associated with political knowledge and opinions? Evidence from rural Mali." *World Development* 106:299–323.
- Bos, Angela L. 2011. "Out of control: Delegates' information sources and perceptions of female candidates." *Political Communication* 28(1):87–109.
- Broverman, Inge K, Susan Raymond Vogel, Donald M Broverman, Frank E Clarkson and Paul S Rosenkrantz. 1972. "Sex-Role Stereotypes: A Current Appraisal 1." *Journal of Social issues* 28(2):59–78.
- Brule, Rachel and Nikhar Gaikwad. N.d. "Culture, capital and the political economy gender gap: Evidence from Meghalaya's matrilineal tribes." .
- Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. "Family firms." *The journal of finance* 58(5):2167–2201.
- Burrell, Barbara. 1994. Women in American Politics. In *Developments in American Politics* 2. Springer pp. 325–334.

- Carroll, Susan J and Kira Sanbonmatsu. 2013. *More women can run: Gender and pathways to the state legislatures*. Oxford University Press.
- Cheng, Christine and Margit Tavits. 2011. "Informal influences in selecting female political candidates." *Political Research Quarterly* 64(2):460–471.
- Chhibber, Pradeep. 2002. "Why are some women politically active? The household, public space, and political participation in India." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43(3-5):409–429.
- Clayton, Amanda, Amanda Lea Robinson, Martha C Johnson and Ragnhild Muriaas. 2019. "(How) Do Voters Discriminate Against Women Candidates? Experimental and Qualitative Evidence From Malawi." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(3-4):601–630.
- Clayton, Amanda and Pär Zetterberg. 2020. "Gender and Party Discipline: Evidence from Africa's Emerging Party Systems."
- Confessore, Nicholas. 2015. "Koch brothers' budget of \$889 million for 2016 is on par with both parties' spending." *The New York Times* 26.
- Cowan, Gloria and Jill H Kasen. 1984. "Form of reference: Sex differences in letters of recommendation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46(3):636.
- Cowley, Philip and Sarah Childs. 2003. "Too spineless to rebel? New Labour's women MPs." *British Journal of Political Science* pp. 345–365.
- Crockett, W. H. 1988. *Schemas, affect, and communication*. Lawrence Erlbaum Association.
- Crowder-Meyer, Melody. 2013. "Gendered recruitment without trying: how local party recruiters affect women's representation." *Politics Gender* 9(4):390–413.
- Dillon, Andrew and Esteban J Quiñones. 2011. "Gender differentiated asset dynamics in Northern Nigeria."
- Ditonto, Tessa M, Allison J Hamilton and David P Redlawsk. 2014. "Gender stereotypes, information search, and voting behavior in political campaigns." *Political Behavior* 36(2):335–358.
- Dodson, Debra L. 1997. "Change and continuity in the relationship between private responsibilities and public officeholding: The more things change, the more they stay the same." *Policy Studies Journal* 25(4):569–584.
- Dolan, Julie, Melissa M Deckman and Michele L Swers. 2021. *Women and politics: Paths to power and political influence*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Doss, Cheryl, Caren Grown and Carmen Diana Deere. 2008. *Gender and asset ownership: a guide to collecting individual-level data*. The World Bank.

- Eagly, Alice H and Amanda B Diekmann. 2005. "What is the problem? Prejudice as an attitude-in-context." *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport* pp. 19–35.
- Eagly, Alice H and Blair T Johnson. 1990. "Gender and leadership style: A meta-analysis." *Psychological bulletin* 108(2):233.
- Eagly, Alice H, Mona G Makhijani and Bruce G Klonsky. 1992. "Gender and the evaluation of leaders: A meta-analysis." *Psychological bulletin* 111(1):3.
- Feinstein, Brian D. 2010. "The dynasty advantage: Family ties in congressional elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35(4):571–598.
- Fernandez-Garcia, N ria. 2016. "Framing gender and women politicians representation: print media coverage of spanish women ministers." *CECS-Publicações/eBooks* pp. 141–160.
- Fiske, Susan T and Patricia W Linville. 1980. "What does the schema concept buy us?" *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 6(4):543–557.
- Folke, Olle, Johanna Karin Rickne and Daniel M Smith. 2020. "Gender and Dynastic Political Selection." *Available at SSRN 2985230* .
- Fox, Richard L and Eric RAN Smith. 1998. "The role of candidate sex in voter decision-making." *Political Psychology* 19(2):405–419.
- Fox, Richard L and Jennifer L Lawless. 2010. "If only they'd ask: Gender, recruitment, and political ambition." *The Journal of Politics* 72(2):310–326.
- Frederick, Brian and Barbara Burrell. 2007. Political Windows of Opportunity: Recruitment Pools, Gender Politics and Congressional Open Seats. In *annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans*.
- Fr chette, Guillaume R, Francois Maniquet and Massimo Morelli. 2008. "Incumbents' interests and gender quotas." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):891–909.
- Fulton, Sarah A, Cherie D Maestas, L Sandy Maisel and Walter J Stone. 2006. "The sense of a woman: Gender, ambition, and the decision to run for congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 59(2):235–248.
- Gallagher, Michael and Michael Marsh. 1988. *Candidate selection in comparative perspective: The secret garden of politics*. Vol. 18 Sage Publications Ltd.
- Gelber, Katharine, Katie Brennan, David Duriesmith and Ellyse Fenton. 2022. "Gendered mundanities: gender bias in student evaluations of teaching in political science." *Australian Journal of Political Science* pp. 1–22.
- Glick, Peter and Susan T Fiske. 2001. Ambivalent sexism. In *Advances in experimental social psychology*. Vol. 33 Elsevier pp. 115–188.

- Greenburg, A Gerson, Jennifer Doyle and DK McClure. 1994. "Letters of recommendation for surgical residencies: what they say and what they mean." *Journal of Surgical Research* 56(2):192–198.
- Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. "Causal inference in conjoint analysis: Understanding multidimensional choices via stated preference experiments." *Political Analysis* 22(1):1–30.
- Hassim, Shireen. 2003. "Representation, participation and democratic effectiveness: Feminist challenges to representative democracy in South Africa."
- Hayes, Danny and Jennifer L Lawless. 2016. *Women on the run: Gender, media, and political campaigns in a polarized era*. Cambridge University Press.
- Herrnson, Paul S, J Celeste Lay and Atiya Kai Stokes. 2003. "Women running "as women": Candidate gender, campaign issues, and voter-targeting strategies." *The Journal of Politics* 65(1):244–255.
- Hinojosa, Magda and Ana Vijil Gurdián. 2012. "Alternate paths to power? Women's political representation in Nicaragua." *Latin American Politics and Society* 54(4):61–88.
- Holman, Mirya R, Jennifer L Merolla and Elizabeth J Zechmeister. 2016. "Terrorist threat, male stereotypes, and candidate evaluations." *Political Research Quarterly* 69(1):134–147.
- Huddy, Leonie and Nayda Terkildsen. 1993. "Gender stereotypes and the perception of male and female candidates." *American journal of political science* pp. 119–147.
- Ichino, Nahomi and Noah L Nathan. 2016. "Democratizing the party: The effects of primary election reforms in Ghana."
- Iversen, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. "The political economy of gender: Explaining cross-national variation in the gender division of labor and the gender voting gap." *American Journal of Political Science* 50(1):1–19.
- Johnson, Martha C and Melanie L Phillips. 2019. Gender politics. In *Routledge Handbook of Democratization in Africa*. Routledge pp. 302–316.
- Judd, Charles M and Bernadette Park. 1988. "Out-group homogeneity: Judgments of variability at the individual and group levels." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 54(5):778.
- Jussim, Lee, Lerita M Coleman and Lauren Lerch. 1987. "The nature of stereotypes: A comparison and integration of three theories." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 52(3):536.

- Kage, Rieko, Frances M. Rosenbluth and Seiki Tanaka. 2019. "What Explains Low Female Political Representation? Evidence from Survey Experiments in Japan." *Politics and Gender* 15(2):285–309.
- Kasapović, Mirjana and Ivan Šiber. 2001. "Electoral policy and the determinants of electoral behaviour in Croatia (1990-2000)." *Central European Political Science Review* 2(3):112–139.
- Kenski, Kate M. 2007. "Gender and time of voting decision: decision certainty during the 2000 presidential campaign." *Journal of Political Marketing* 6(1):1–22.
- Khan, Sarah. 2017. "Personal is Political: Prospects for Women's Substantive Representation in Pakistan."
- King, David C and Richard E Matland. 2003. "Sex and the grand old party: An experimental investigation of the effect of candidate sex on support for a Republican candidate." *American Politics Research* 31(6):595–612.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities." *Comparative political studies* 33(6-7):845–879.
- Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2001. *Challenging the organization, changing the rules: Women, parties, and change in Western Europe, 1975 to 1997*. University of California, Irvine.
- Koch, Amanda J, Susan D D'Mello and Paul R Sackett. 2015. "A meta-analysis of gender stereotypes and bias in experimental simulations of employment decision making." *Journal of Applied Psychology* 100(1):128.
- Kongkirati, Prajak. 2016. "Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand: Dynastic power, party machine and ideological politics." *South East Asia Research* 24(3):386–406.
URL: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967828X16659570>
- Kunovich, Sheri and Pamela Paxton. 2005. "Pathways to power: The role of political parties in women's national political representation." *American journal of sociology* 111(2):505–552.
- Kuyela, Teddy. 2016.
URL: <http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/kasanda-chisambas-1st-female-mp/>
- LaCroix, Patricia P. 1985. "Sex in Recs: Gender Bias in Recommendation Writing." *Journal of College Admissions* 109:24–26.
- Lawless, Jennifer L. 2004. "Women, war, and winning elections: Gender stereotyping in the post-September 11th era." *Political Research Quarterly* 57(3):479–490.

- Lawless, Jennifer L. 2012. *Becoming a candidate: Political ambition and the decision to run for office*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lawless, Jennifer L and Richard L Fox. 2005. *It takes a candidate: Why women don't run for office*. Cambridge University Press.
- Leeper, Thomas J, Sara B Hobolt and James Tilley. 2020. "Measuring subgroup preferences in conjoint experiments." *Political Analysis* 28(2):207–221.
- Leston-Bandeira, Cristina and André Freire. 2003. "Internalising the lessons of stable democracy: the Portuguese Parliament." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 9(2):56–84.
- Lovenduski, Joni and Pippa Norris. 1993. *Gender and party politics*. Sage.
- Lowes, Sara. 2017. "Matrilineal kinship and spousal cooperation: Evidence from the matrilineal belt." *Unpublished manuscript*. URL: https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/slowes/files/lowes_matrilineal.pdf.
- Madera, Juan M, Michelle R Hebl, Heather Dial, Randi Martin and Virginia Valian. 2019. "Raising doubt in letters of recommendation for academia: Gender differences and their impact." *Journal of Business and Psychology* 34(3):287–303.
- McPeak, John G, Peter D Little and Cheryl R Doss. 2011. *Risk and social change in an African rural economy: livelihoods in pastoralist communities*. Vol. 7 Routledge.
- Mitra, Subrata K. 1988. "India: dynastic rule or the democratisation of power?" *Third World Quarterly* 10(1):129–159.
- Mo, Cecilia Hyunjung. 2015. "The Consequences of Explicit and Implicit Gender Attitudes and Candidate Quality in the Calculations of Voters." *Political Behavior* 37(2):357–395. URL: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-014-9274-4>
- Niven, David. 1998. "Party elites and women candidates: The shape of bias." *Women Politics* 19(2):57–80.
- Norris, Pippa. 2000. "Women's representation and electoral systems." *The International Encyclopedia of Elections* 348:51.
- Norris, Pippa. 2006. "The impact of electoral reform on women's representation." *Acta política* 41(2):197–213.
- Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political recruitment: Gender, race and class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge University Press.
- O'Brien, Diana Z. 2015. "Rising to the top: Gender, political performance, and party leadership in parliamentary democracies." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):1022–1039.

- Paul, David and Jessi L Smith. 2008. "Subtle sexism? Examining vote preferences when women run against men for the presidency." *Journal of Women, Politics Policy* 29(4):451–476.
- Pearson, Kathryn and Eric McGhee. 2009. "Why women should win more often than men: Reassessing gender bias in US House elections." *Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota* .
- Pesonen, Pertti. 1968. *An election in Finland: Party activities and voter reactions*. Yale University Press.
- Polachek, Solomon W and Jeff Xiang. 2009. "The gender pay gap across countries: A human capital approach."
- Querubin, Pablo. N.d. Political reform and elite persistence: Term limits and political dynasties in the Philippines. In *APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper*.
- Raber, Gloria Ann Beers. 1985. Source of Letters of Recommendation and Subsequent Teaching Performance of First-Year Teachers (Reference, Certification, Employment Selection Devices, Rating Scales) PhD thesis University of Georgia.
- Richter, Linda K. 1990. "Exploring theories of female leadership in South and Southeast Asia." *Pacific Affairs* pp. 524–540.
- Rosenwasser, Shirley Miller and Norma G Dean. 1989. "Gender role and political office: Effects of perceived masculinity/femininity of candidate and political office." *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 13(1):77–85.
- Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. "Do parties know that "women win"? Party leader beliefs about women's electoral chances." *Politics Gender* 2(4):431–450.
- Schneider, Monica C and Angela L Bos. 2014. "Measuring stereotypes of female politicians." *Political psychology* 35(2):245–266.
- Schwarz, Susanne and Alexander Coppock. 2021. "What Have We Learned About Gender From Candidate Choice Experiments? A Meta-analysis of 67 Factorial Survey Experiments." *The Journal of Politics* 0(ja):null.
URL: <https://doi.org/10.1086/7116290>
- Schwarz, Susanne, William Hunt and Alexander Coppock. 2018. "What have we learned about gender from candidate choice experiments? A meta-analysis of 30 factorial survey experiments." *Unpublished manuscript* .
- Scott F Abramson, Korhan Koçak, Asya Magazinnik. Working Paper. "What Do We Learn About Voter Preferences From Conjoint Experiments?"

- Seltzer, Richard A, Jody Newman and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. 1997. *Sex as a political variable: Women as candidates and voters in US elections*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Siavelis, Peter. 2002. "The hidden logic of candidate selection for Chilean parliamentary elections." *Comparative Politics* pp. 419–438.
- Smith, Daniel M and Shane Martin. 2017. "Political dynasties and the selection of cabinet ministers." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 42(1):131–165.
- Smith, Daniel Markham. 2012. *Succeeding in politics: dynasties in democracies* Thesis.
- Solon, Gary. 1992. "Intergenerational income mobility in the United States." *The American Economic Review* pp. 393–408.
- Stalsburg, Brittany L. 2010. "Voting for mom: The political consequences of being a parent for male and female candidates." *Politics & Gender* 6(3):373.
- Tamale, Sylvia. 2018. *When hens begin to crow: Gender and parliamentary politics in Uganda*. Routledge.
- Teele, Dawn, Joshua Kalla and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 2017. "The ties that double bind: social roles and women's underrepresentation in politics." *Available at SSRN 2971732* .
- Thames, Frank C and Mikhail Rybalko. 2010. "Gender and Legislative Behavior in Post-Communist Ukraine." *Journal of East European and Asian Studies*, *Forthcoming* .
- Thobhani, Akbarali. 1974.
- Thomas, Sue. 2002. "The personal is the political: Antecedents of gendered choices of elected representatives." *Sex Roles* 47(7):343–353.
- Thomas, Sue and Clyde Wilcox. 2014. *Women and elective office: Past, present, and future*. Oxford University Press.
- Tommasi, George W, Karen B Williams and Cynthia R Nordstrom. 1998. "Letters of recommendation: What information captures HR professionals' attention?" *Journal of Business and Psychology* 13(1):5–18.
- Trix, Frances and Carolyn Psenka. 2003. "Exploring the color of glass: Letters of recommendation for female and male medical faculty." *Discourse & Society* 14(2):191–220.
- Turrentine, Florence E, Caitlin N Dreisbach, Amanda R St Ivany, John B Hanks and Anneke T Schroen. 2019. "Influence of gender on surgical residency applicants' recommendation letters." *Journal of the American College of Surgeons* 228(4):356–365.
- Van der Pas, Daphne Joanna and Loes Aaldering. 2020. "Gender differences in political media coverage: A meta-analysis." *Journal of Communication* 70(1):114–143.

- Verge, Tània and Raquel Pastor. 2018. "Women's political firsts and symbolic representation." *Journal of Women, Politics & Policy* 39(1):26–50.
- Vilas, Carlos M. 1992. "Family affairs: class, lineage and politics in contemporary Nicaragua." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24(2):309–341.
- Wang, Vibeke and Ragnhild Louise Muriaas. 2019. "Candidate selection and informal soft quotas for women: gender imbalance in political recruitment in Zambia." *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 7(2):401–411.
- Yoon, Mi Yung. 2004. "Explaining Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 29(3):447–468.
- Zimba, Jack. 2016.
URL: <http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/katuta-miracle-child-born-to-rule/>