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Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and  
Spanish Dictatorships

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the  
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in

Literature

by

Cindy Pinhal

Committee in charge:

Professor John Blanco, Chair  
Professor Fatima El-Tayeb  
Professor Stephanie Jed  
Professor Luis Martin-Cabrera  
Professor Pamela Radcliff

2017

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Chair

University of California, San Diego

2017

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Also, many thanks to the Hayes-Bautistas who have become my family in America and in particular, to Dr. David Hayes-Bautista of UCLA who spent many evenings listening to and engaging with me fleshing out my theoretical concepts.

This was a personal project that originated many years ago and on another continent. Hearing the stories of my father who had to emigrate to France illegally because he didn't want to be drafted to the war in Africa and "go to his death" (as he used to say). The summers spent in Portugal with the rest of my family whose conversations always ended up debating if Salazar was worse than Franco, recalling the neighbor's son who had been taken away by the PIDE never to be seen again, but always interspersed with silences as "enough was said." Growing up I was fascinated by these snippets of disconnected stories even though (or because) I had no clue who Salazar or Franco were and how big of a role they played into the emigration of my parents and many other Portuguese. Finally, as someone coming from the most socially stigmatized and racially othered part of France, this project speaks to my own experience and that of my friends, my fellow "*banlieusard(e)s*." This is for you, for the 93, never give up the fight in debunking the myth of Europe as white and Christian, we are citizens of France in our own right.

## VITA

### Education

- 2017 Ph. D in Literature  
University of California, San Diego
- 2011 C. Phil. in Literature  
University of California, San Diego
- 2011 Summer Research Award, Literature Department  
University of California, San Diego
- 2010 Summer Research Award, Literature Department  
University of California, San Diego
- 2007 M.A in Spanish  
California State University, San Marcos
- 2003 Maîtrise English Literature  
Université de Marne-la-Vallée, Paris Est 13 (France)
- 2001 Licence LLCA  
Université de Marne-la-Vallée, Paris Est 13 (France)

### Teaching Experience

- 2015 - present Part-Time Professor of Spanish, MCLL department  
California State University, Northridge
- 2007 - 2013 Teaching Assistant in French Literature, Literature Department  
University of California, San Diego
- 2007 Part-Time Faculty in French, Department of World Languages  
Palomar Community College
- 2004 - 2007 Teaching Associate in French and Spanish, Department of World  
Languages & Hispanic Literatures  
California State University, San Marcos



2003 - 2004 International Exchange Lecturer in French, Department of World  
Languages & Hispanic Literatures  
California State University, San Marcos

Research and Teaching Areas

Portuguese and Spanish Literature and Culture

Iberian dictatorships

Iberian immigration studies

Politics of memory and knowledge

(Post)colonial and decolonial studies

Psychoanalysis, race and gender theories

Film and documentary genre

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and  
Spanish Dictatorships

By

Cindy Pinhal

Doctor of Philosophy in Literature

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor John Blanco, Chair

*Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships*, explores the politics of memory surrounding the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships as well as their lasting material and discursive effects in contemporary Iberian societies. More specifically, it tends to the silenced colonial past in relation to the production of knowledge around the Salazarist and Francoist regimes. As a

transhistorical and multiterritorial study, this project articulates a decolonial epistemology on Portuguese and Spanish relations through a critical analysis of several 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century films and documentaries that provide a space inscribing the modes of (in)visibility and voicing of the Iberian dictatorships' former colonized and their descendants. From this critical approach, this dissertation posits that the particularity of the Iberian dictatorships rests on their modern colonial projects as vital for their existence and maintenance of power (unlike repressive Latin American regimes or imperial European countries). This project adds to the theory body of academic Iberian comparative studies and addresses the debates around the Portuguese and Spanish “transitology” studies offering a critique of the modes of (dis)remembrance inherent to the transition process as an exclusionary European event. Through an intersectional theoretical reading of the silenced colonial violence of the dictatorships and its effects on the descendants of the colonized, this project contends that the consolidation of race, identity and nation in Spain and Portugal are owed to their colonial subjects in Africa. It responds to the vital need to think of the former colonial subjects under dictatorial rule as forgotten European citizens or nationals in an effort to debunk the myth of Spain and Portugal as white Christian European nations. There are four chapters that comprise this study. However, the organization of these chapters does not follow a teleological framework, but rather an epistemological one. Each chapter is thematically articulated around the ethical and socio-political dimension of the films and documentaries I have selected that address ideas of foreignness, race and colonialism intersecting with social class, sexuality and immigration.

## Introduction

I have the greatest misgivings about so-called cultural interchange. This has only ever served for the Spanish to heap praise upon Portuguese writers, carrying out through this means a type of peaceful penetration that must not be encouraged ... the current crisis, in which we have helped Nationalist Spain to defeat communism, must not make us forget the immutable factors of peninsular politics.

António de Oliveira Salazar, "Instruções sobre o intercâmbio cultural com a Espanha nacionalista," May 25<sup>th</sup> 1938 (qtd. in *Salazar: A Political Biography* 202)

Salazar used to write down all his important conversations; but I never came across any documents relating to this matter [the meetings with Franco]. All that we will ever know about these meetings are the inferences that can be drawn from other documents. From some research that I carried out on the Spanish side, I was able to conclude that Franco also behaved in a similar fashion. Why?

Franco Nogueira, *Salazar*, 464 (qtd. in Rezola 2)

*Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships*, explores the Iberian dictatorships' processes of forgetting and (dis)remembering amid their consolidation and shifts toward democracy, from a transhistorical perspective. It addresses the implications of the ways they have shaped contemporary discussions on the politics of memory pertaining to these regimes, as well

as their lasting material and discursive effects in today's Portuguese and Spanish societies. More specifically, it tends to the silenced colonial past in relation to the production of knowledge around the Salazarist and Francoist regimes.

This study deconstructs traditional academic comparative approaches to the Francoist and Salazarist regimes, which have inscribed their discourses within a Western context while leaving out the role of the modern colonial project in the consolidation of the two dictatorships. It focuses on displacing and decolonizing epistemological discourses on Portuguese and Spanish relations from the "colonial eye," through a critical analysis of several 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century films and documentaries that provide a space inscribing the modes of (in)visibility and voicing of the Iberian dictatorships' former colonized and their descendants. From this critical approach, this dissertation posits that the particularity of both dictatorships rests on their modern colonial projects as vital for their existence and maintenance of power (unlike repressive Latin American regimes or imperial European countries).

Tending to the silenced colonial violence of the dictatorships and its effects on the descendants of the colonized, shifts traditional analyses of the processes of forgetting that were inherent to the transition toward modernity and democracy as an exclusionary European event. Indeed, forgetting the past of the violence of the dictatorships in the Peninsula was concomitant with forgetting the ties of the Iberian nations with their African colonies. My project presents a critique that the consolidation of race, identity and nation in Spain and Portugal are owed to their colonial subjects in Africa.

At the core of this analysis – of looking at the dictatorships from the colony – lies a new understanding (and epistemological discussion) of contemporary Iberian responses

of the nation-state toward their most “foreign” (African and North African) Other as not belonging to the nation. It does so by transhistorically anchoring the colonial Other in relation to its “ghostly” return (embodied in the Iberian nations’ contemporary “non-white” communities) through a specific selection of cultural works that in their ethical and sociopolitical dimensions carefully interrogate, register and challenge the Iberian processes of (dis)remembering the colonial past. With decolonizing the modes of forgetting the colonial ties between Africa and Iberia within a transhistorical approach of the Salazarist and Francoist regimes in mind, I present a critique of Western conceptualization of “(im)migrants” in an effort to debunk the myth of Spain and Portugal as white European Christian nations.

Thinking of “immigration,” dictatorship and democracy in Portugal and Spain from the viewpoint of the colony calls for reevaluating the status of former colonial subjects – now called “foreigners” – as forgotten European citizens or nationals. It also necessarily involves evaluating its implications regarding nationals of color, as the one cannot be considered without the other.

### **Historiography and Cultural Studies on the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships**

Historical comparative studies of Luso-Spanish relations from the Medieval era to the present time – and in particular, research on the 20<sup>th</sup> century – agree that both Iberian nations have oscillated between antagonism and indifference (Loff, De La Torre Gomez 13-14).

Portugal's attitude toward Spain has been marked by suspicion, perceiving its neighboring country as a threat of "neocolonialism" that could end Portuguese independence. Spain, on the other hand, has tended to vacillate between either silence and indifference or a certain bitterness toward Portugal. Indeed, the consolidation of the latter as a nation meant the end of the Catholic Kings of Castile's dream of establishing a European territory "*de una gran nación hispánica*" ("of a great Spanish nation"; my trans.) (De La Torre Gomez 14).<sup>1</sup> One of the manifestations of this antagonistic or indifferent peninsular position is to be found in the surprising scarcity of cultural exchange between these nations.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Habsburg line of rulers, from what is now considered Spain, held power over the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries in the Peninsula and other parts of Europe. Portugal, which was a province under the Spanish regime, claimed its independence on December 1, 1640, establishing the House of Bragança as its ruling dynasty and ending a 60-year dominion by the Spanish Habsburg. December 1 has become a symbolic celebration of Portugal's independence day. During the Salazar regime, this was instrumentalized as a political narrative of modernity, reminding the Portuguese people of the nation's self-sufficiency: "Tudo pela Nação, nada contra a Nação," became the motto of the Portuguese dictatorship. Salazar's speech of December 1, 1940, commemorating 300 years of independence, reinforced the idea of Portuguese victory in breaking away from Spanish "colonialism," marked as well by the expulsion of the Moors, thereby constituting Portugal as a Christian and free nation. See *Discursos e notas políticas*, v.3 (6 vols., Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1935-1967). Oddly, the memory of the Moorish presence and its subsequent ejection has remained absent from the Portuguese historical narrative of the nation "post-dictatorship." This could be due to the fact that there are hardly any Moroccans in Portugal, in contrast to Spain, and therefore they are not perceived as posing a "threat" to the concept of the nation. Salazar's speeches, works and diaries have now become accessible through the *Arquivo Oliveira Salazar* in Lisbon, including a website – [oliveirasalazar.org](http://oliveirasalazar.org) – that has electronically reproduced the most significant of his works.

<sup>2</sup> This scarcity exists even though publications in the Iberian nations regarding each other increased during the Salazarist and Francoist dictatorships. Official speeches, conferences and the media were used as propagandistic tools to further political interests of both countries. See Emilio de Diego García's article "La presencia portuguesa en la historiografía española: de los "cuarenta imperiales" al fin del franquismo" (129-140), *La mirada del otro: percepciones luso-españolas desde la historia*, Hipólito de la Torre

Thus, it is not accidental that the first quote opening the present study (excerpted from one of Salazar's many speeches regarding "the crisis" in Spain – meaning the Spanish Civil War) depicts Portuguese dictator Salazar's mixed position toward Spain and Iberian (cultural) interconnectedness. The assertion of Portugal helping "Nationalist Spain to defeat communism," while maintaining the importance of keeping the independence and separation of Portugal from Spain, was Salazar's typical ambivalent attitude during his regime.

Salazar made this speech in 1938, a year before Franco's troops won the conflict. The year 1938 marked a significant shift in Luso-Spanish relations, as Salazar recognized *de jure* the Francoist (Nationalist) regime (making Portugal the first country to do so) after having broken all diplomatic ties with the Spanish Second Republic within the first few months of the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

The Spanish Civil War has been widely studied from multiple perspectives: historical and cultural, national as well as international. The external role played by other European countries in Franco's victory has been the subject of a vast bibliography focusing mainly on Italy and Germany as key players that influenced the outcome of the war. However, Portugal's part in aiding the Nationalists' triumph has traditionally been overlooked or minimized, following the hegemonic argument of the Iberian nations' historical ties as having "their backs turned to one another" (Rezola 59).

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Gomez (Coord.), António José Telo (Coord.), 2001 (Editora Regional de Extremadura) as well as Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar: A Political Biography* (New York: Enigma Books, 2009-2010).



Although both countries share the same Iberian territory, possible historiographical comparisons between the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships remain a point of contention in their foundational processes as well as their progress in the direction of democracy. In her article, “Unsettling the Iberian Transitions to Democracy of the 1970s,” (n.p., n.d., n.pag. TS) renowned scholar on the history of the Spanish dictatorship and its transition towards democracy Pamela Radcliff synthesizes the problem of “transitology” studies on the Salazarist and Francoist regimes, which has generated two polarizing scholarly positions.<sup>3</sup>

On the one hand, some historiographers have constructed a “celebratory narrative” of what is known as the “third wave” of democratic transitions (1).<sup>4</sup> Scholars adhering to this viewpoint have elaborated a comparative model between Portugal and Spain, based upon the exceptional nature of both countries’ swift and peaceful transitional processes, both achieved within a few years. On the other hand, other academics have denounced such comparisons as overarching and dismissive of the peculiarities of each regime, arguing for a more reserved and qualified approach, rather than so readily offering a comparative narrative.

Cultural studies have been just as dubious of equating the Salazarist and Francoist regimes as these latter historiographical critics. This does not mean that cultural research on the Iberian dictatorships does not exist, but what little does exist leaves much to be desired. By focusing on the differences between the peninsular regimes, cultural scholars

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<sup>3</sup> I would like to thank Pamela Radcliff for sharing her article.

<sup>4</sup> Term coined by Samuel Huntington.

tend to produce a disconnected body of theory by dividing it into two separate sections – one set of works that pertain to Portugal, and another that addresses Spain.

The most recent example of this disconnection is Alison Ribeiro de Menezes and Catherine O' Leary's *Legacies of War and Dictatorship in Contemporary Portugal and Spain* (Eds., 2011). The authors rightly argue that cultural "memory studies ... must take cognizance of the divergences and shifts, fragmentary perspectives and fractured narratives, that go some way towards guarding against a master(ing) gaze" (8). Their collection of essays, following the traditional structure in cultural studies, is divided into two parts. As a way of presenting their work in a comparative manner, it is contended that "although this volume is divided into two parts, there are significant and consistent overlaps between each of them in terms of the themes discussed and the memory debates exposed" (8). However, when reading through both sections, the comparison falls short, as the focus of study and argument remains unrelated between the Portuguese and Spanish cases. These essays also do not offer a common overarching theoretical frame from which similarities could be drawn onto the Iberian regimes.

Dissenting views on effecting theoretical connections between the histories of the two dictatorships are not limited to their transitional processes toward democracy, but also extended to the consolidations of the Salazar and Francoist regimes as well as their general ideologies. The most prominent difference sustained by scholars lies in the diametrically opposed figures of the two rulers.

On the one hand, Francisco Franco ("*El Caudillo*") made his career in the colonial army legion in Morocco known as the *Africanistas*, and rose to power through a military coup against the democratically elected Second Republic. The Spanish Republican

government was overthrown in a bloody three-year civil war, followed by Franco's lifelong reign, with the Spanish dictatorship ended only upon his death in 1975.

On the other hand, Oliveira Salazar was an academic, a professor of economy at the University of Coimbra. A military dictatorship had already been established in Portugal after a 1926 coup against the First Republic, and that newly created government had selected Salazar to take the position of Minister of Finance. Salazar's duties as minister involved restoring stability to the country, as its foundering economic status threatened the viability of the military regime. After only a few months, the soon-to-be dictator decided to leave this position, as he faced resistance from the armed forces and feared growing political instability inside the regime. Salazar left the government, but continued to publicly provide financial advice for the nation.

Within two years, the military government had become more stable and the armed forces asked Salazar to return. He did so on the condition of being granted total power over the government administration (Ribeiro de Meneses 12-45). He was established as the President of the Council of Ministers in 1932, and created his New State (*Estado Novo*), drafting a new Portuguese constitution in 1933.

The 1960s saw the beginning of wars for independence in Portugal's African colonies, which led to increasing repression on the part of Salazar's administration. Salazar remained as head of state until his death in 1970, and was succeeded by Marcelo Caetano. The dictatorship briefly outlived its creator, until the so-called "Carnation Revolution" of April 25, 1974, put an end to it.

Both dictators' public personae differed quite significantly. Franco maintained control through the heavy presence and visibility of the armed forces, as well as

displaying narcissistic tendencies by overexposing himself in the spotlight. The 1964 documentary *Franco, ese hombre* is a pointed example of the latter. It is exemplified by a comical scene in which his daughter, Carmen, sits in a chair uttering celebratory words regarding Franco, while the *Caudillo* himself stands next to her, his hand resting on her chair, silently mouthing the very same words of praise that she says.

In complete contrast, the Portuguese dictator Salazar worked in the shadows and has remained something of a mystery figure in English-speaking academia, and is therefore given a marginal position in history compared to Franco, Mussolini or Hitler. Salazar was only publicly seen when his official duties demanded it, presenting himself as a humble man, dispassionate and living a saint-like personal life (Ribeiro de Meneses 181-182).<sup>5</sup> Salazar controlled his image through silencing tactics, in particular by enacting the most iron-fisted and repressive media censorship. As Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses highlights, “above all others [difficulties facing a biographer of Salazar] stands the secretive nature of the New State, wherein the flow of information was restricted”(x).

The control exerted by Salazar to ensure the secrecy of his political agenda – thereby ensuring its effectiveness – is reflected in that, even after his death, Salazar continued to control his public narrative. While the Salazar archive was sealed away from

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<sup>5</sup> However, since the Salazar archives were opened to the public, the double life Salazar carried out has come to light. While preaching that he was only married to the “patria,” Salazar had many illicit affairs, in particular with two women. The first, Maria Laura Paivas, was a married woman, and the second was a dancer traveling between Lisbon and Paris, Maria Emilia Vieira, which involved another love triangle – although she was not married. Had this “immoral” hidden life been leaked, it would have created such a scandal that it could have destroyed Salazar’s ideological government. This secret life captured the nation’s interest, and led to a television series called *A vida privada de Salazar* (2009) which recounted his relationship with French writer Catherine Garnier

public view, Salazar's last Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, was granted access to it. Nogueira consulted these archives and wrote a six-volume biography of Salazar – in close contact with Salazar himself – between 1961 and 1968. The official biography that resulted was a biased pro-Salazarist chronicle. Until Ribeiro de Meneses' 2010 biography on the dictator, only this monograph regarding his life existed.

As Ribeiro de Meneses points out, the stark contrast between the dictator's image as an academic and soft-spoken politician and the personae of his authoritarian counterparts elsewhere in Europe, "made it easier to believe the claims advanced on his behalf, since it was almost unthinkable to believe that a professor from the ancient University of Coimbra would engage willingly in the distortion of his own life story for political gain. But the very opposite was true" (xi).

I have devoted more space to describing Salazar's years in power than to Franco's. This is mainly because Salazar has been obfuscated in academic writings, having been relegated to a marginal position in historiography and presented as a benevolent authoritarian figure by comparison to his neighbor, Franco.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, one of academia's central arguments against elaborating a comparative study between both Iberian regimes, without falling into an overgeneralized account, resides in claiming that the 48-year Portuguese regime was benign (in juxtaposition to the Spanish dictatorship) because Portugal did not have a civil war. While it is true that, from a Western perspective, the overthrow of the First Republic and establishment of the military dictatorship in Portugal happened in a relatively pacific manner – it did not involve

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<sup>6</sup> To this day, there are still debates on whether to call Salazar's government authoritarian or a dictatorship.

armed conflict in the peninsula – decentering the “white’s eye” gaze upon the Portuguese dictatorship from the West reveals a different narrative.<sup>7</sup>

As I argue in my dissertation, the consolidation and maintenance of the *Estado Novo* involved a lengthy and bloody war, except that it happened in the colony rather than in the metropolis. Turning away from the “white’s eye” also involves reading historical processes “against the grain,” to use Walter Benjamin’s terminology, rather than as a linear temporality sectioned into specific dates which present their own arbitrary and problematic natures. I will further develop this differentiation.

### **Historicity and Historical Materialism**

Thus, my dissertation delves into and expands on topics within this vexed historiographical and cultural field of academic research. While researching comparative scholarly works between Spain and Portugal, the contingent element that stood out the most was that these studies framed their discussions within a western(ized) contextual narrative.<sup>8</sup> While I do not claim that my project offers a totalizing view, nor that it

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<sup>7</sup> I borrow the term “white’s eye” from John Beusterien’s work *An Eye on Race: Perspectives from Theater in Imperial Spain* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2006). In his work, Beusterien uses this metaphor as a way of analytically evaluate the processes of racialization in Medieval Spain towards Spanish Jews and Muslims through a “white” narrative of differentiation. I use the term “white’s eye” as a hermeneutic tool so as to critically think the “Western” appropriation of the narratives on dictatorships, meaning, the West, as metanarrative, looking at the West, as national narrative. In the case of the Iberian dictatorships, this has meant constructing memory within a continental European context. Thus, when I propose “decentering the white’s eye,” it means looking at the constructions and narratives of the dictatorial past from the perspective of and inscribing them within a colonial narrative. In other words, from the “Other’s eye.”

<sup>8</sup> This is not to say that non-western historical elements have been left out of cultural studies research, in particular the colonial past, but they have produced singular and non-related considerations – Portuguese colonialism in Africa during the Salazar regime has

provides “the” answer to the problem of a cultural comparative investigation on the Iberian regimes, it offers a new point of (dis)articulation. It does so by decentering the locus and focus away from the West without doing away with the specificities of each nation, and thereby proposing a true comparative analysis.

Indeed, as I expand further in this dissertation, the particularity of the Portuguese and Spanish cases is that their colonial projects in Africa were tied to the ideological construction of the dictatorships. The same cannot be said of their other European counterparts – nations whose colonial enterprises were not concurrent with an authoritarian regime – nor is it similar to Latin American dictatorships whose constructions are not rooted in colonialism.

Furthermore, another point of contention when establishing comparative studies on the Salazarist-Francoist regimes lies in its contemporary processes of remembering and their (dis)connect from their colonial past in Western and Southern Africa, for Portugal, and North Africa, for Spain. As I further expand below – and throughout my dissertation –, in terms of public and social practices, the narrative of the Portuguese dictatorship remains excluded from African colonialism and movements of independence. And, if there were to be mentions of oppression in Africa, it was to be remembered towards the white settlers. Thus, the liberation of state repression with the “Carnation Revolution” has belonged to continental as well as “white” Portugal. In

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been investigated but Franco’s ideological racial ties with the modern colonial project have remained absent or at best, liminal. The exceptions being, in history, Sebastian Balfour’s *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and The Road to The Spanish Civil War* (2002), Gustau Nerín’s *La Guerra que vino de Africa: España colonizada* (2005), and, in cultural studies, Dionisio Viscarri’s *Nacionalismo autoritario y orientalismo* (1996), which delineates the historical processes of colonialism in Morocco relative to prefascist writings, but it offers little mnemonic value within its socio-political dimension.

cultural studies, the process of excision of the colonial past from memory practices has been critiqued (de Medeiros; Sapega; Loff) but this forgotten past and studies on immigration remain disconnected from memory processes of the dictatorial-colonial past. The problem with this “temporality-limited” focus is that it forecloses cultural and political processes of racialization within a global contemporary approach to politics of memory.

In the case of Spain, the modern colonial project in North Africa remains relatively absent within the field of politics of memory, and in particular regarding its ties to ideological constructions of Francoist regime. Contemporary social practices and research on the “Arab” past of Spain, favor remembrances of the country’s Imperial past which are more obvious and visible in contemporary memory – monuments, discourses on Muslim presence, literature etc. – of Spain’s “Orient.”<sup>9</sup>

Thus, the historical processes of colonialism in Spain and Portugal, which seem different from a teleological and “white’s eye” perspective, have been another justification against developing a comparative study of both fascist regimes: Salazar’s government was concomitant with colonial occupation; Franco’s was not. Furthermore, the varied aspects of difference employed as premise to avoid comparing both Iberian dictatorships rest on notions of comparison as equivalence/ obvious or visible differences.

As has been commonly critiqued by cultural studies on memory and history, one of the debatable aspects of historiography is that it has constructed an understanding of

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<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, historiographical and cultural studies on Franco’s “hispanotropicalism” – Spain’s colonialism in Equatorial Guinea – are quite abundant. This came in striking contrast during my investigation with colonialism in Morocco whose research body is relatively limited.



historicity as specific to European modern theory and “inextricably bound up in the process of the European conquest of the globe” (Rappaport 12). Indeed, the present study stands against the notion of historicity as conceptualized within traditional historiographical research, and follows a materialist interpretation. The “onto-teleological” perception of time and history presents a linear narrative of time with the past, present and future as separated categories. Such consideration stems from the Newtonian principle of temporal delineations, which still pervade the modern common sense and western metaphysics, despite challenges to such accepted meaning. As Joan Rappaport points out in *Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretation in the Colombian Andes* (1990), this European-centered understanding of time gives way to labeling the European past as “history,” while “alien modes are called ‘myths’” (12), therefore constructing a detemporalized understanding of history that would exist as a universal umbrella, as well as deciding who can be the subject of history.

Instead of consenting to this viewpoint, a way of rethinking history that does not reproduce hegemonic powers of organizing the world is related to a materialist approach based upon Walter Benjamin’s “brush[ing] history against the grain.” Benjamin’s influence in reshaping notions of modernity, time, and the relational ties between people and objects, has been extensively studied and does not need repeating. But Benjamin’s understanding – that the task of the historian is not to reproduce the past within a continuous and coherent narrative, but rather to illuminate the history of those that have been forgotten, excluded, from the written record that belongs to the “victors” – is of particular interest for my project.

By attending to the fragments that have been erased from historicism in order to maintain the appearance of history as unfolding naturally, the historical materialist “blast[s] a specific era out of the empty homogeneous time.” In this way, the historian uncovers the “oppressed past” disrupting the “onto-teleological” continuity of time. He brings to light that temporality is made of the “now-time,” thereby reclaiming unrealized events and unfulfilled promises that could have led to a distinct present, while at the same time opening different possibilities for the future. Therefore, such materialist work understands that history is always enmeshed within relations of power and counters historicism, which has privileged material evidence as production of knowledge. This is particularly illuminating in understanding the processes of forgetting inherent to the consolidations of the Salazarist and Francoist regimes.

### **Silences Speak Louder Than Screams**

The second epigraph used to open this introduction (from Salazar’s official historical biographer, Franco Nogueira) describes the most intriguing elision from the historical record: the private meetings between Franco and Salazar, an anomaly in the personal records of both the Portuguese and Spanish dictators. Throughout the maintenance of the 1939 Iberian Pact, Franco and Salazar met both officially and personally. No record has been left from the latter conferences, leading Nogueira to make his perplexed comment that he “never came across any documents relating to” the meetings with Franco and that only “inferences ... can be drawn from other documents” (Franco Nogueira, *Salazar*, 464 (qtd. in Rezola 59) while conducting his thorough research for his biography on Salazar. Encounters between Salazar and Franco took place

from 1942 (the Seville meeting) to 1963 (the Mérida meeting). During that time a few meetings were made public, but many of their contacts happened outside of public knowledge and usually involved Salazar traveling across the Spanish border.

Nogueira's inability to discover why there is no record of these meetings has been taken up by two Portuguese historians: Ana Vicente in "Os encontros entre Salazar e Franco" in *Portugal visto pela Espanha. Correspondência diplomática 1939-1960* (1992, pp. 70-78) and the most recent study, Maria Inácia Rezola's "The Franco-Salazar Meetings: Foreign policy and Iberian relations during the Dictatorships (1942-1963)" (2008). In her article, Rezola points out that the references to the meetings in "other works are either marginal or unenlightening, if not, in fact, purely and simply absent, with the only exception being the sparse lines dedicated to the Seville meetings [in Salazar's diaries] and Franco's [highly mediatized] visit to Lisbon in 1949" (60). Indeed, the author presents that it is not only an absence within academic writings but also in Salazar's diaries and handling of the meetings. The void of written evidence in Salazar's personal records stands out as particularly odd, considering that the Portuguese dictator was well-known for keeping a detailed account of his daily activities in his journals.

One of the notable elements of these conferences was that although both Franco and Salazar traveled with their ambassadors and ministers of foreign affairs, the discussions they held were only between the two of them, thereby ensuring the complete secrecy of their contents. Of the written inferences that convey a record of these events, only one stands out pertaining to Mérida in 1960. In his diary, Salazar recounted the "shaking of the car," the "horror" that he had "of the Spanish tea and toast," and complained that he "couldn't sleep at all" because he had been given "a corner room with

two windows, and underneath these was an intersection of two cobbled streets.”

This description ends with Salazar exclaiming: “Well, gentlemen, it seemed to me that the iron wheels of every cart in Spain spent the night rolling beneath my windows. All night long! Sheer hell” (qtd. in Rezola 62). For Rezola, the little attention that has been paid to these encounters leads her to question if it is due to “a lack of information or even a lack of interest in these meetings” (59).

It seems to me that beyond questions that would lead to a conclusive answer on why this happened as well as why it has been overlooked by historiographical studies, this snippet of Salazar’s diary captures the necessary conceptualization of historical processes and knowledge within a dialectic enmeshment of the written record and its absence. What transpires from these secret meetings is that historiographical research has not simply overlooked them. But rather that the absence of record has been willfully enacted and erased, by a ruler who used silence to effect political power and controlled knowledge in an effort to maintain a linear narrative underpinning sovereign power. Thus, the omission is not only a matter of positionality from the present looking at the past – as historical interpretations of the past are considered from a present perspective – but that the construction of the memory of the Iberian regimes in Salazar’s diaries implies an inextricably entwined process of exclusion and inclusion of a past already in the making, with the present and future yet to come.

Any studies of the processes of memory or remembrance must necessarily include an understanding that absences are as productive of knowledge as the written word. As Derrida reminds us in “I have a taste for the secret” (*A taste for the Secret*), written language is haunted and thus the ghosts – the silences – are louder than screams. It is to

these silences that the present dissertation attends. It stems from an understanding that cultural works are not created in an intellectual, aseptic vacuum, but are rather constructed and transfixed by relations of power, and Salazar's diaries are not an insignificant example of this.

In this sense, the field of the politics of memory has delineated the necessary understanding that history and memory, as social practices, cannot be separated, with history on the one hand meaning objective, rational and scientific knowledge, whereas memory would be a subjective, personal experience and a filtered account, and therefore relegated to the realm of myth or fiction, treated as a second-class history (Yoneyama 27). Consequently, the present study is based upon the necessary comprehension of history and memory not as separate entities, but rather as having to be considered together as vehicles that can be manipulated for the production of knowledge – and thus of power.

### **Politics of Memory and the Western Gaze**

It is within this frame of thought that my dissertation – *Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships* – is anchored. The concept of “forgetting the forgetfulness” speaks to the silences embedded within cultural and political practices of remembering. I borrow this terminology from Lisa Yoneyama in *Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space and the Dialectics of Memory* (1999). In her study of the bombing of Hiroshima and the processes within which this traumatic event has been remembered – historical, urban, monumental, geographical – Yoneyama contends that the hegemonic global narrative appropriation of

Hiroshima within the context of WWII has “produced a forgetting of Japan’s relationship to former colonies, along with the promises and the agonies it had inflicted upon them” (4).

Indeed, the dominant Western narrative has mediated and constructed the national historiography, placing Japan in the position of victim. For Yoneyama, “Hiroshima memories have been predicated on the grave obfuscation of the pre-war Japanese empire, its colonial practices, and their consequences” (3). Such historical framing of Hiroshima has produced it as an event incorporated within the linear narrative of the homogenous empty time, which needs to be left in the past so as to ensure the nation’s reconstruction “post”-Hiroshima. Yoneyama, then, qualifies this process of remembering as “necessarily entail[ing] the forgetting of the forgetfulness,” meaning masking how the nation’s violence onto its colonies has been “deliberately and forcibly ... repressed” (32). However, attending to the oppressed pasts within a “counteramnes(t)ic remembering” (32) opens the multiple spectral temporalities that allow for a different reading of the present and possibilities for the future.

In my work, a similar process is entailed, in which the “forgetting of the forgetfulness” within the processes of memory in play at the time of transitioning toward a “post”-dictatorial regime has produced a Western national narrative.<sup>10</sup> Memory as a site

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<sup>10</sup> The word “post” has been widely debated and its political as well as epistemological implications are well known. In the case of the transition of dictatorships, it seems to me that Luis Martin-Cabrera provides the most apt representation of resisting a linear depoliticized notion of the word “post”: “I ... favor the term “post-dictatorship” in this study not simply to add another “postism” to the already long list, but because the “post” in “post-dictatorship” indexes the multiple spectral temporalities that haunt the democratic present in Chile, Argentina, and Spain. In other words, the prefix “post” here does not seal the past, but instead keeps it open to understand the multiple ways in which

of struggle between forgetting and “counteramnes(t)ic remembering” implies, therefore, comprehending forms of commemoration that are always negotiated. Indeed, the transition toward democracy in Spain and Portugal was built around a process of forgetting.

In Spain, the pact of Moncloa in 1977, also known as “*pacto del olvido*” (“pact of forgetting”), founded the democratic process on providing total impunity for any participant in Franco’s regime and legal amnesia around the Spanish victims of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship. In Portugal, contrary to what has been traditionally stated – and which I discuss in detail in chapter 3 – the transition was also marked by a process of immunity for the key players of the repressive government and forgetting. Indeed, as soon as the Revolution of 1974 happened, a narrative of forgetting the “past” of the dictatorship began to be constructed.

However, the global framing of these dictatorships as an exclusionary European “event” in order to enter the modernity of democracy concomitantly also meant a process of forgetting their ties with Portuguese colonial projects in Africa and Spanish colonial efforts in North Africa. Legally breaking away from the dictatorships implied a concurrent legal separation from the colonies. Thus, the transition to democracy of the Iberian nations involved then as well a forgetting of the colonial violence of the nation state towards its colonial subjects in Africa.<sup>11</sup> The nations’ concerns turned towards ways

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the uncanny past of the dictatorship inhabits the present” (*Radical Justice* 8). It is within this same conceptualization that I use the terms dictatorship and “post-dictatorship.

<sup>11</sup> One of the elements that have also been left out from the transitional processes was “*la marcha verde*” referring to the Moroccan troops that invaded the Sahara territory on November 6, 1975. In the last days of his reign, Franco, who had been in the process of

of handling the violence of Francoist and Salazarist regimes within the metropolis thereby constructing a hegemonic national narrative allocating as “victims” their national subjects while willing into oblivion the violence of the colonial past. Thus, following a linear narrative within the homogenous empty time, contemporary commemorations and memory debates surrounding the dictatorships remain excised from the colonial past.

### **Memory and Trauma**

In this sense, this project considers (dis)remembering performativity by examining memory as the site of struggle between forgetting and “counteramnes(t)ic remembering,” which as a social practice entails comprehending forms of commemoration as an always negotiated process between linear and “not forgetting” time through cultural practices. Evaluating processes of (dis)remembrances as an active performance allows for memory to become a site of contestations and resignifications. Therefore, this project looks as much at the material traces of colonial and nation-state violence as it does at what has fallen out of symbolization, the excess that defies any notion of temporality, and demands for new pathways of reinscription.

This is specifically the case for societies marked by past dictatorships and thus surviving a traumatic past, which the new nation-state attempts to erase or domesticate. Indeed, within “historical trauma” the sovereign power produces and is produced by trauma. In order to maintain its hegemonic position as provider of security to its citizens, it works by concealing its involvement in the production of trauma (Edkins). One of its

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decolonizing the Sahara, abandoned the Saharawis and let the Moroccan monarchy “colonize” the Sahara.



privileged forms of doing so resides in practices of commemoration, as a way of reinforcing the ideal of the nation-state.

As psychoanalytical cultural studies have established, language constructs our reality and ways of relating with others. For Lacan (and trauma studies, by extension), the powerful blow of a traumatic event breaks the social link between self and other. This excision happens when the social group turns against some of its members after they had considered themselves as belonging, thereby producing a betrayal of trust. The rupture of the dimension of otherness then makes symbolization and communication impossible. The excess that falls out of symbolization implies a struggle between social narratives in their totalizing attempts and this excess that resists meaning. This surplus, for Lacan, when a powerful blow erasing events or people opens a “*béance*” (“gap”) as an encounter with the Real and sets in motion a memory that does not forget, escapes symbolization as well as temporality, yet seeks to be inscribed through different pathways. In the case of dictatorships, and in particular the Portuguese and Spanish cases that interest us here, the Real keeps returning to the present, as the historical trauma of state violence has never been adequately addressed.

### **Reading Across the Differences**

To return to Pamela Radcliff’s analysis of “transitology” discussed above, the author concludes her study by stating that “a more developed comparative ‘Iberian Studies’ framework” would offer a way to escape the intellectual impasses in academic research, encouraging scholars in their reassessment of the Iberian transitions to “bring the Iberian counterpart back into the analysis, drawing not only on the obvious

similarities but on the striking differences, offering a fresh perspective on both cases for the next generation wrestling to come to terms with the past” (n.p., n.d., n. pag. TS). Indeed, this is what the present study aims to do, through a cultural studies comparative approach that does not propose constructing a foundational history for both nations in an attempt at finding a common origin, but rather a reading across the differences that points to the limit of contemporary Portuguese and Spanish societies in dealing with their dictatorial and colonial past.

Reading across the differences involves a comparative process that does not act as a mirror of the modes of dictatorial violence in the colonies with those in the peninsula. It also does not construct Francoist repression and that of the Salazar regime as if they were equivalent. Reading across the differences of the dictatorships concerns itself with attending to the silences and the invisibilities from the “eye of the colonies” which operates like Lacan’s Borromean Knot – colonial violence as the Real that (un)links the processes of symbolization, necessarily repressed but that returns to get inscribed.

In other words, reading across the differences implies a site of epistemological struggle constantly negotiating between forgetting and memory, invisibility and visibility, symbolization and the excess. The “eye of the colonies” as the Real allows to displace the link between colonialism, dictatorship and immigration as interconnected memories, instead of being equivalent. My understanding of reading across the differences is drawn from Lisa Lowe’s terminology, although conceptualized slightly differently. In *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (2015), Lisa Lowe delineates the genealogy of the human in relation with liberalism through a cross-continental as well as transhistorical analysis: “[i]n this book, I stress that the differentially situated histories of indigeneity, slavery,

industry, trade and immigration give rise to linked, but not identical, genealogies of liberalism. I focus on relation across differences rather than equivalence, on the convergence of asymmetries rather than the imperatives of identity” (11). For Lisa Lowe “relating” across the differences at a multiterritorial and epistemological approach involves a process that attends to the “convergence” of asymmetries “through ... specialized and temporalized processes of both differentiation and connection,” (8) rather than looking for equivalences across the modes of power relations that would replicate homogeneous liberal political narratives.

In order to avoid reproducing a homogenization of the historical and national processes relating the Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships, I follow a similar – though not equivalent – methodology through a reading across the differences involving a transcontinental as well as transhistorical approach. As stated earlier, decentering interpretations of memory and history from a Western eye involves a reassessment of the locus and focus of the consolidations of the dictatorships. It is through a delineation of what processes of remembrance of the dictatorships as social practice imply in relation to their colonial ties in Africa, that the present study offers an interterritorial linking as it tends to the “situated histories” of colonialism, war and immigration. As Viet Thanh Nguyen reminds us, immigration stories always lead us back to war stories.<sup>12</sup>

Therefore, *Forgetting the Forgetfulness: (Dis)remembering the Coloniality of the Portuguese and Spanish Dictatorships* is a transhistorical and translocal approach through which, as Lowe further argues, decolonizing history “...would not merely

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<sup>12</sup> See Viet Thanh Nguyen various interviews on this topic in <http://vietnguyen.info/category/interviews> and <http://vietnguyen.info/category/essays> I would like to thank Viet Thanh Nguyen for pointing me to these references.

substitute another national subject within the same formal master narrative [but rather] create an analytic that interrogates European coloniality, epistemology, and philosophy of history” (139). Therefore, my study focuses on the colonial past willed into oblivion that still haunts the contemporary Iberian imagination through visual representations, specifically in documentary and cinema genres. It investigates the processes of violence of the nation-state within multiterritoriality and multitemporality, as a way of understanding contemporary representations of the nation, race and identity in relation to the descendants of the colonized others. As a transhistorical and translocal work it is necessarily fragmented and incomplete, but like Benjamin’s illuminations of the repressed, it is this non-totalizing force that allows for thinking of new ways of transnational modes of relating. Through this open-endedness toward the future, it “blast[s] out of the homogeneous time” the voices and the agency of those allocated as objects of history away from the nation-state’s normative modes of organizing the world.

It presents a link between contemporary as well as past remembrances by putting into dialogue a variety of visual representations, as the films and documentaries studied here offer a depository for memories repressed by the workings of hegemony throughout time. Yet it also historically anchors those issued from the former colonies and their descendants as subjects, instead of objects, that enact their agency as a decentering practice by refusing to take the Western nation-state as a point of reference. It provides a historical and epistemological link for those (from Africa and North Africa respectively) who are labeled as “immigrants” in Portugal and Spain and are considered as *the* problem of these nations. For this purpose I have selected a corpus of documentary and cinema genre that are the result of my reading and interpretation of them. The visual works I

analyze specifically in this dissertation – although not limited to – offer a dialectical approach to the failed historicization of (post)coloniality. The documentaries and films I have included, which aspects to analyze and how to organize my chapters have been determined by the epistemological and ethical concepts discussed throughout this introduction. While seemingly distinct, in epochs and genre, their commonality lies in their proclivity to articulate socio-political and ethical concerns by bringing together representations of the Other that has been “forgotten” or “silenced” from hegemonic commemoration narratives that have reinforced the category of Otherness. Ideas of foreignness, race and colonialism are intersected with social class, sexuality and immigration. While the documentaries *Lisboetas* (Sergio Tréfaut) and *A Guerra* (Joaquim Furtado) indicate processes of discrimination against the Other framed within the forgotten intimacy between the colony and the metropolis which makes them a threat to the contemporary ideal of the nation; *Li Ké Terra* (Reis, Baptista and Miller) and *Los perdedores* (Driss Deiback) provide the eyes and voices of the descendants of the former colonized as a way of formulating modes of resistance against the processes of foreignness attributed by the nation to their nationals of color.

In turn, the films included in this dissertation (*Raza*, *Legión de héroes*, *Locura de amor* and *Libertarias*) point in a different way in the processes of (dis)remembering the coloniality within the Western homogeneous time. These films displace national mnemonic narratives of violence traditionally attributed to the colonial Other onto the white European. These filmic constructions allow for a reading against the grain of traditional discourses of hypersexuality and impurity attributed to the foreign that would contaminate European identity and nation. Thus, these cultural artifacts – documentary

and film – converge to form an epistemological constellation that interrogates European coloniality and its lasting material and discursive effects.

Although, by its nature, this project focuses on the politics of memory, it necessarily entails an intersectional theoretical approach. Remaining loyal to attending to the specificities of situated histories, each chapter raises its own issues. There are four chapters that comprise this study. However, the organization of these chapters does not follow a teleological framework, but rather an epistemological one, with each chapter converging toward unveiling the interlocking ways of reading the legacies of the Iberian dictatorships intertwined with the colonial.

In Chapter One, I argue that the memory constructions of the April 25, 1974, “Carnation Revolution” that ended the 48-year-long Portuguese dictatorship have been built upon the elision of its connection with the Colonial War for African independence. Such processes of (dis)remembering have been articulated around a silencing of the voices of the African independence fighters, while giving center stage to the white Portuguese soldiers as saviors from the dictatorship and victims of a lengthy and bloody conflict. I offer a critique of the ways in which cultural productions, especially in literature (which has been the privileged genre), have focused on the white settlers’ gaze, thereby appropriating the war as a Western narrative.

For that purpose, I analyze the documentary *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação* by Joaquim Furtado (2007-2013). The release of this film prompted heated reactions by reopening a national debate on Portugal’s addressing of its colonial past. The resulting rift indicates the memory of the dictatorship is still a wound in contemporary Portuguese

society. I focus on *A Guerra* not only because of its great length but specifically because it is the only documentary to this day that retraces the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship by giving a public voice to the former African independence fighters.

In this chapter I address the problematic elements of representing traumatic events such as the war and the dictatorship. Built upon the contestatory nature of representing trauma, I argue that the testimonies of the former African independence fighters allow for a counternarrative to the Portuguese dictatorship as a benevolent colonial power under the guise of “Lusotropicalism,” proposing instead that it followed a necropolitical project of extermination. I also posit that the African colonies were necessary for the survival of Portugal’s dictatorship, and I further establish the necessity of acknowledging that the end of the Salazar regime is owed to the colonized Africans – and that narratives of self-victimization of the Portuguese army and white settlers have reached an intellectual and ethical stalemate.

In Chapter Two, I also examine the concept of (dis)remembering but in another context: how Franco’s dictatorship and its concept of the Spanish “*raza*” found its roots in the dehumanizing processes of the Moroccan colonial Other. This chapter posits a reevaluation of the role of race and the modern colonial project in relation to the subsequent Spanish Civil War and Francoist regime. In order to establish this connection, I offer a multitemporal and interlocal focus by linking Francoist immediate post-Civil War films that recuperate an imperial narrative as a way to define national boundaries between Self and Other, with pre-fascist discourses as well as racial thought in relation to the Moroccan Other and colonial warfare.

I then discuss the traditional argument in academia that the Francoist ideology of *raza* was purely ideological, deconstructing such discourses by positing that it was also phenotypical. I do so by discussing a variety of cultural productions related to the question of race and empire, followed by an analysis of three specific films produced in the 1940s. The 1940s were a key decade when the “victors” needed to rewrite the history of the nation in order to assert and reassert the legitimacy of the state, and yet films from this era have been overlooked in scholarly research, being deemed frivolous and escapist. The focus on 1940s films stems from the fact that cinema was “the visualizer *par excellence*” and became the “ideological solution to the problem of “race” and its protracted debates since mid-nineteenth century” (Woods Peyró 6).

This chapter attempts to show that Francoist fascist ideology was not formed in an intellectual vacuum and was not devoid of racial thought, as has been traditionally argued. I first discuss *Raza* (Saenz de Heredia 1942) as the dictatorship’s first superproduction. Launched shortly after the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, it was intended to promote the “historically correct” version of the conflict. *Legión de héroes* (Armando Seville and Juan Fortuny) was released in 1942, at a time when Spain’s alliance with Nazi Germany was being threatened, and *Locura de amor* (Juan de Orduña) was released in 1948, one year after Franco needed to reconstitute the regime in order to remain in power (and with the hope of Spain joining the United Nations). Through the lens of haunting theory and colonial racial critical studies, this analysis traces a ghost of the Arab figure, Spain’s originary “homo sacer,” that returns throughout time as a threat to the order of the nation envisioned by Francoism.



Chapter 3 acts as the culmination of the two preceding chapters, addressing the processes of forgetting and remembering the coloniality in contemporary filmic representations. It places within a dialogue various visual productions since the early 1990s that treat African immigration in Spain and Portugal. It also elaborates a critique of cinematic tendencies to use interracial romance plots as depoliticizing and dehistoricizing the issue of immigration. As Daniela Flesler, scholar on Moroccan immigration in Spain, has argued these heteronormative interracial romances that are so popular at the box office are problematic in that they render invisible asymmetries of power relations that led to the immigrant being present in the “host” country to begin with. In other words, by focusing on the “intercultural romance” in a here-and-now temporality, these films depoliticize and dehistoricize the process of immigration from the Peninsula’s ties to its former African colonies.

In contrast, I discuss independent filmmakers’ cultural works as decolonizing modes of production that are chained to Western norms. Considering that modes of production are determined by Hollywood and European production companies, these autonomous directors’ choice to find funding from independent companies or fund themselves, breaks away from the impositions of western “neocolonial” rules. These questions are framed within Spanish and Portuguese – and generally European – ideas of the nation as raceless, while simultaneously claiming to be white and Christian. This dialectic of constructing the concept of the nation, and reproduction in cultural works, points to failed historicization of post-coloniality and post-dictatorship. Indeed, this chapter speaks to the silences “illuminated” in visual representations of those coming from Spain and Portugal’s former African colonies of the dictatorships and how they constitute

a critical divide of lasting material and discursive colonial violence under Franco and Salazar. Thus, the return of a non-temporal “Other” points toward the Iberian Peninsula’s inability to cope with its “national historical” trauma.

In response to these former colonized that return and disrupt the idea of the nation as European white Christian, the sovereign state – by placing into oblivion the colonial – has successfully created a linear homogenous narrative of a benevolent country as a “host” concerned with the welfare of its immigrants. In return, the violence experienced by those coming from the former African colonies becomes justified as the ailments of the nation fall onto them: they are *the* problem.

I then consider two visual representations, Vicente Aranda’s *Libertarias* (1996) and Sergio Tréfaut’s *Lisboetas* (2004), so as to conceptualize that memory processes are always a negotiated process between “forgetting” and “not forgetting,” which come to be translated into questions of visibility and invisibility.

In discussing Aranda’s film (the only one to this day that touches on the connection between colonial Moroccans with the Spanish Civil War), I explore how the dehumanized visualization of these characters as simple brown bodies ushers the audience toward a selective forgetting and remembering. The lack of context for the scene in which the Moroccan soldiers appear reproduces a dehistoricization of the coloniality, allocating the Other outside of history. In Tréfaut’s famous documentary on immigration in Portugal, I question the nation’s willful ascription into invisibility of its former African colonial subjects. Through this documentary analysis, I examine the question of who can be visible and who is made invisible. In other words, asking who can be seen as the subject of the nation and who cannot be seen as such, by raising the issue

of the asymmetries of immigration locus between white immigrants deemed as assimilable and non-white immigrants who are considered as naturally unassimilable.

Although Tréfaut's documentary brushes various immigrant groups, I focus on those from the *PALOP* (*Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa*; African Countries of Portuguese Official Language). I then argue that the director's representation of these men and women challenges state narratives as the camera lens on these black immigrants constitutes an encounter that is not simply in the present but rather reopening past encounters (Ahmed). I place into dialogue Tréfaut's act of filming with the response of the nation-state to repress visibilizing immigrants of color as carving a site of struggle between linear narrative and trauma narrative.

The last chapter (chapter 4) continues the discussion on the decolonizing modes of cultural productions. However, it raises a different theoretical question and concerns itself not with immigration at large, but rather with nationals of color and their relation with the nation-state. This final part addresses the responses to the silences (explored in Chapter 3) by the descendants of colonized subjects.

I analyze Driss Deiback's documentary *Los perdedores* (*The Forgotten* 2006), for Spain, and *Li Ké Terra* (creole for *Esta é minha terra*, meaning *This is My Land*) (Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista and João Miller Guerra 2010), for Portugal. Through these documentaries, I investigate modes of relating that do not reproduce asymmetries of power, by turning over the gaze and voice to Portuguese and Spanish nationals of color. In these filmic representations, the subjects perform acts that go against the nation-state's normative rules for producing obedient subjects as a form of belonging to the nation. I read these actions as transgressive – meaning, acts that go against a law, rule or code of

conduct – through which these descendants perform their agency by rejecting the state as a point of reference.

These performative choices constitute, then, a necessary ethical response to state violence that I call ethics of “transgenerational transgression.” I base my tentative theoretical concept on Lacan’s *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*. In his approach to ethics, Lacan considers that the subject becomes invested ethically, not simply as a response to the demand of the other, but as well, and even principally, as a response to oneself. This is what he terms “not ceding on the truth of desire.” Indeed, when the subject is invaded by its own conflict between the death and desire drives, the subject’s response in choosing to not cede on the truth of its desire, embodies a reply of survival so as to avoid experiencing, what Lacan names “a second death,” meaning a “psychic death.”

In this chapter, I study first Deiback’s documentary on the Moroccan survivors of the Spanish Civil War, with a particular interest in their grandchildren. *Los perdedores* (*The Forgotten* 2006) offers historicizing the presence of Moroccans on Spanish territory, thereby moving them from an abject position to subjects of history. From this perspective, anchoring the Moroccans who died during the SCW means going against the state sanctions of leaving the bodies in unnamed mass graves. The descendants, bearing the burden of memory, act against the law and unbury the dead so as to re-bury them according to proper rituals. It is in these rituals that an ethics of “transgenerational transgression” is performed.

I then consider Reis-Baptista-Miller Guerra’s *Li Ké Terra* as a manifestation of a necessary ethical response against state law consigning immigrants from Portugal’s former African colonies (and their descendant “Luso-Africans”) as the nation’s abject.

Although their response to state violence expresses itself differently from Deiback's film, "Luso-Africans" expression of agency as subjects constitute a "not ceding on the truth of desire" by creating networks of what Fatima El-Tayeb calls "translocality." By investing their desire away from the nation-state as a point of reference, the Portuguese youth of color reject normative state ascriptions of who belongs to the nation and who does not. Through these translocal acts of transgression, new possibilities of reading the present, and different modes of relating for the future are opened.

**Chapter 1. (Dis)remembering the Portuguese Dictatorship;  
(Dis)remembering Colonialism: Joaquim Furtado's *A Guerra do ultramar de  
libertação* and the Memory of the Politics of Colonialism**

The idea was to make a program that gave the real dimension of what the war was. People don't know what the Colonial War was or the Overseas' war or the liberation war. And, this is important to explain, for the Portuguese it was the colonial or Overseas' war and for the Africans it was the national liberation war. I started thinking that at a certain point, after April 25 [the Carnation Revolution],<sup>13</sup> it was deeply a theme or a question that had a central importance in the lives of thousands of people. The people that were mobilized by the then Government to go fight in Africa, the people who lived in Africa, Portuguese and Africans under the Portuguese administration and who suffered directly or indirectly from the war. A major work has never been done on this topic. Noting this very early, I thought it was a very interesting project to make when the occasion came. And that occasion was provided when I left the direction of RTP (Furtado; my trans.).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The Carnation Revolution took place on April 25, 1974, in Lisbon. It ended 48 years of dictatorship and marked the beginning of the independence of Portuguese colonies as well as the transition toward democracy in the Peninsula. The name "Carnation Revolution" came from the fact that upon hearing the news on the radio of the end of the dictatorship, the people came out in the streets and put carnations on the muzzles of the soldiers' rifles. The coup overthrowing the dictatorship was carried out by low-ranking officers in the Military Armed Forces who had grown tired of the 13 year long colonial war with little hope of success. The 1974 revolution is peculiar as it was done peacefully without use of direct violence and the population offered support. The choice of the carnation (red) flowers was symbolic as it mirrors the colors of socialism and communism, which were the anti-fascist political parties.

I also believe that the execution of toppling the dictatorship was made possible by the fact that Salazar had died in 1970. He was replaced in 1968 by Marcelo Caetano (when Salazar fell ill) who did not have the same charisma and, like many authoritarian regimes, the sustenance of repression and fear in the people is persona-centered.

<sup>14</sup> Unless indicated otherwise, the translations in this chapter are mine.

Rádio e Televisão Portuguesa, a state-owned corporation, has been the national radio and television network of Portugal since 1935. It operates two terrestrial television channels and three national radio channels, as well as several satellite and cable offerings.

Such processes of (dis)remembering have been articulated around a silencing of the voices of the colonized Africans fighting for independence, while giving center stage to the white Portuguese soldiers as saviors from the dictatorship and victims of a lengthy and bloody conflict. I offer a critique of the ways in which cultural productions have focused on the white soldiers and settlers' gaze, thereby appropriating the war as a Western narrative.

For that purpose, I analyze the documentary *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação* by Joaquim Furtado (2007-2013) which I place in discussion with other filmic productions that have tackled the topic of the Portuguese colonial wars. The release of this film came at the height of memory debates on the Salazar regime which had begun in the late 1990s. When *A Guerra* was televised, it prompted heated public reactions by reopening a national debate on Portugal's addressing of its colonial past. The resulting rift indicates the memory of the dictatorship is still a wound in contemporary Portuguese society. I focus on *A Guerra* not only because of its great length but specifically because it is the only documentary to this day that retraces the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship by giving a public voice to the former African independence fighters.

In this chapter I address the problematic elements of representing traumatic events such as the war and the dictatorship in cultural productions. Built upon the contestatory nature of representing trauma, I argue that the testimonies presented in *A Guerra* of the former African independence fighters allow for a counternarrative to the Portuguese dictatorship as a benevolent colonial power under the guise of "Lusotropicalism," proposing instead that it followed a necropolitical project of extermination. I also posit that the African colonies were necessary for the survival of Portugal's dictatorship, and I

further establish the necessity of acknowledging that the end of the Salazar regime is owed to the colonized Africans – and that narratives of self-victimization of the Portuguese army and white settlers have reached an intellectual and ethical stalemate. This, in turn, will provide the framing for my argument in chapters 3 and 4 that, in contemporary Portuguese society, black immigrants and nationals from these former colonies are to be thought of as forgotten citizens.

### **Sociopolitical Background**

The end of the dictatorship and its chaotic transition toward democracy (as I discussed in the introduction and further develop in chapter 3) was marked by a need to forget the violence of the Salazarist regime in the Peninsula and in the colonies which led to narratives of “looking towards the future.” The transitional phase saw extreme political instability within the Military Armed Forces that carried out the coup and took over power resulting in a split between its members. The MFA<sup>15</sup> had been extremely influenced by communist ideas but their inability to stabilize Portuguese economy (one of the reasons being that foreign capital withdrew its investments and another one being the loss of the colonies that were the central source of Portugal’s GDP) drew some of its members toward the more moderate and center wing parties: the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP) and the Portuguese Social Democrats (PSD).<sup>16</sup> Eventually, the Socialists won

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<sup>15</sup> Portuguese acronym for Military Armed Forces (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*).

<sup>16</sup> The withdrawal of foreign capital is to be understood within the international context of the Cold War. Having a European country led by communism was seen as a threat. This meant that it could potentially open the door for spreading to other European countries and defeat capitalism. I explain further down how and why the African colonies were vital for the Portuguese economy.



the parliamentary elections of 1976 and its leader, Mário Soares won the presidential elections at the moment that Portugal joined the European Union.<sup>17</sup> This meant developing a political discourse of consensus and adopting the neoliberal economic model of the European Union. With the 1985 Schengen agreement, flow of capital returned and Portuguese economy became stable again.

I recount this political background as it is necessary in order to understand how a culture of silence and (dis)remembering shaped the politics of memory and knowledge of Portugal. As I stated earlier consolidating democracy was motivated by a discourse of “looking towards the future.” This meant selectively remembering some details of Portugal’s dictatorship and colonialism while forgetting others. This is a period that is “assessed in terms of “silence,” maintained by some authors despite the abolition of censorship” (Kaufman and Klobuca 15). In this sense, Portugal had its own “*pacto del olvido*” (“pact of oblivion”) as Portuguese historian on Salazarist dictatorship, Manuel Loff, remarks: “victims had been asked to “forgive” what had not even been socially discussed, in order to ease up some sort of conviviality described as “normal(ized),” in which, apparently, all those who felt offended (victims and torturers together) by both dictatorship and revolution should be integrated, both periods being presented as “abnormal” moments in history” (Loff, “Coming to Terms” 92). Indeed, the socio-political movement of forgetting and silencing – the dictatorship, the revolution and colonialism – in immediate (post)dictatorship was mirrored in cultural productions (as cultural works are not created within an aseptic intellectual vacuum) and

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<sup>17</sup> Mário Soares first served as Prime Minister from 1976 onward. He was elected president in 1986 and remained at the head of Portugal until 1996.

historiographical narratives. I now turn to the cultural responses beginning with historiography.

### **Historiographical Debates and Collective (Dis)remembrance**

Like many newly established regimes following a transitional period – whether effected through direct violence or not – one of the first elements in order to justify their validity involves taking control of the narrative, meaning re-writing (or righting) history. And Portugal is no exception.

Since the 1980s, Portuguese traditional historiography has commonly produced a whitewashing of the dictatorship creating a narrative of Salazar's regime as a benevolent authoritarian, non-totalitarian and non-fascist regime.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, specifically in education, all Marxist interpretations of the dictatorship were removed and replaced by creating curricula that followed the official historiographical message. Salazar became constructed as “good” for the nation (through the perceived notion that he had restored Portuguese economy) by pitting him against the unstable military and communist's leadership in the few months following the Revolution (known as *Verão Quente* [“Hot Summer”]) as the “worse” of two evils. Their economic instability has been since then co-opted within Portuguese historiographical discourses in order to justify any contemporary difficult economic periods as inheritance of the 1974-1975 communist inadequacies (Loff).<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> To this day, classifying Salazar's regime as a dictatorship is a topic of debate.

<sup>19</sup> Specifically, “Coming to Terms with the Dictatorial Past in Portugal after 1974: Silence, Remembrance and Ambiguity.” *Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden*

However, only at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century historiographic studies have seen conflicting positions with the emergence of a battle of memories (what Loff calls “the rebellion of memory”) epistemologically and in social practices, as antifascist memories of Salazar’s dictatorship came in contact with the hegemonic revisionist and conservative historiography. The opening to the public of the Salazar’s archives which revealed the regime’s corruption, repression and manipulation – which I discussed in the introduction – produced clashes among academics, but this was short lived (Loff, “Socio-Politic Reconstructions” 2014).

However, it is noteworthy that in all the debates surrounding the “forgetting-remembering” of Salazar’s dictatorship, the issue of colonialism in its ties with the violence of the dictatorship (while being well-known in the collective conscious) remains absent. This does not only show a nation that is still divided on how to interpret its Peninsular dictatorial past but also, and more specifically it seems, a limit in addressing its colonial past that cannot be crossed. Indeed, as I discussed in the introduction, moving towards modernity and democracy was based on forgetting concomitantly the violence of the Salazar regime and its ties with the modern colonial project in Africa.

A similar separation can be seen in commemoration processes of the link between the Portuguese dictatorship and the Colonial War in Africa. While the intrinsic connection between the Carnation Revolution of April 25, 1974, and the Colonial War is commonly known in the social collective, remembrance of the wars for colonial

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*und Osten Europas: Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven.* (2010, pp.55-122), “Dictatorship and Revolution: Socio-political Reconstructions of Collective Memory in Post-Authoritarian Portugal” (2014) and “Dictatorship and Revolution: Disputes over Collective Memory in Post-Authoritarian Portugal” (co-written with Luciana Soutelo; 2016).

independence is completely excised from public commemorations of the Revolution. Indeed, as Paulo de Medeiros aptly points out in “Hauntings: Memory, fiction, and the Portuguese Colonial Wars,” the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Revolution was marked by a series of public commemorations, from traveling exhibitions to a series of lectures in Portugal and abroad. Images of soldiers in combat position on the streets of Lisbon surrounded by children; all with carnations adorning their guns have been continuously displayed in public. Yet images of the Colonial War, or any other form of discourse on the war, have been almost entirely absent from such displays, even though both the Revolution and the Colonial War were carried out by the same military.

For de Medeiros, such disconnection in public commemorations:

insists on the positive, if somewhat unexpected, role of the armed forces in putting an end to dictatorial rule within Portugal, while suppressing another, more conventional one: the army's role in prosecuting the Colonial War. Put in other terms, the revolution, inasmuch as it is seen as a factor which has enhanced national identity, has been assimilated and historicized, whereas the Colonial War, with its inherently complex and largely negative connotations, has been largely avoided (202).

Similarly, in “Remembering Empire/Forgetting the Colonies: Accretions of Memory and the Limits of Commemoration in a Lisbon neighborhood,” Ellen W. Sapega addresses the disparity of commemorative processes in the memory sites of the Belem neighborhood in Lisbon, which has long been the privileged space for the construction of monuments to the nation's five centuries of overseas expansion. Of particular interest is the *Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar*, a monument inaugurated in 1994 that commemorates the Portuguese and African soldiers who died fighting in the Colonial War, and which elicited a series of short-lived protests. Standing next to the monument

*Padrao dos descobrimentos* (“Monument to the Discoveries”) – which was erected during Salazar’s reign, emblemizing the glory of Portugal’s imperial expansion, and which remains one of the most visited and photographed site of Portuguese imperialism – the *Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar*, with a structure that mirrors Maya Lin’s Vietnam War Memorial in Washington D.C., remains ignored.

Indeed, as Sapega remarks:

Today, in fact, the *Monumento aos Combatentes do Ultramar* and the polemics surrounding it have all but been forgotten. It receives very few visitors and many residents in Lisbon seem to be unaware of its existence. Unlike Washington’s Vietnam Veterans Memorial, artifacts related to or recalling the wars are not left at this memorial, and it is rare even to find flowers deposited there. It has also been consistently omitted from guidebooks that describe the other monuments sited at Belém in great detail. This is, in effect, a site of memory that has become invisible and has been virtually ‘forgotten’ (32).

Such “forgetting” is just one of many “forgettings” of the Colonial War in the public domain and it is symptomatic of a society that refuses to remember its colonial past. It is a lasting attitude, inherited from Salazar’s dictatorship, of silencing the conflict in the colonies which makes it even more urgent to pay attention to works such as *A Guerra* that inscribe the voices of the forgotten African colonized. Up until then, iconographic documents of the war experience in the colonies have been derived from individual soldiers who participated in the war.

### **Cultural Productions on the Memory of the Colonial War**

As I discuss throughout this chapter, the memory of the dictatorship, the Carnation Revolution and transitional process towards democracy has left out the

Portuguese dictatorial violence against Africans. In terms of cultural productions, the 1980s saw the appearance of publications with historical thematic concerns focusing on the Salazar regime, the experience of the colonial war and national identity. Literature was the privileged mode of expression (and, although films and documentaries have recently emerged, it is still prevalent) with the works of famous José Saramago, António Lobo Antunes and Lídia Jorge among others.<sup>20</sup> Academic interest then has been mainly centered on discussing literature and it is only towards the end of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that research has been developing on film and documentary genre on the mnemonic representation of the colonial wars in Africa.<sup>21</sup> This is a field that has been relatively unexplored in academia and this chapter adds to this short body theory.<sup>22</sup>

In the 1980s autobiographical printed works of former soldiers who had fought in the war also emerged. These narratives were produced by white ex-combatants who felt the need to tell their experience. Indeed, in her article “Decanting the Past: Africa, Colonialism, and the New Portuguese Novel,” Isabel Ferreira Gould discusses how the

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<sup>20</sup> Specifically, Lídia Jorge’s *The Murmuring Coast* (1988), António Lobo Antunes *South of Nowhere* (1983) and José Saramago (the majority of his works but especially, *The Year of the Death of Ricardo Reis* (1984) and *All the Names* (1997).

<sup>21</sup> Academic analyses on Portuguese colonial literature are abundant, but I will cite, besides those discussed in this chapter, Ana Paula Ferreira, “Lídia Jorge’s *A costa dos Murmúrios*: history and the postmodern she-wolf, *Revista Hispanica Moderna* (1992), Ronald W. Sousa “The critique of history in Lidia Jorge’s *A Costa dos Murmúrios*, or Helen of Beira meets Luis of Troy,” *Cincinnati Romance Review* (1997) and Luis Madureira’s “The discreet seductiveness of the crumbling empire – sex, violence and colonialism in the fiction of António Lobo Antunes, *Luso-Brazilian Review* (1995).

<sup>22</sup> For a discussion on the growing body of filmic representations, see João Maria Grilo, *O cinema da não-ilusão: Histórias para o cinema português* (Lisboa: Livros Horizonte, 2006), 91. On the topic of the African context and the relative absence of reflection on the memory politics, see Richard P. Werbner, *Memory and the Postcolony: African Anthropology and the Critique of Power* (London and New York: Zed Books, 1998). See also Robert Stock’s analysis of the documentary *Regresso a Wiriyamu*, which I discuss below.

early 1980s (with the end of the dictatorship and in response to the regime's extreme censorship on publications regarding the "colonial experience") saw a boom in literature on the participation in the war from Portuguese soldiers. However, she sees a shift in the 1990s to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with the appearance of a new type of novel regarding the colonial past. The topics shifted from the soldiers' involvement in the armed conflict to the families living in the colonies.

However much significant that a literary body discussing colonialism under the Salazar years finally emerged, these manuscripts reproduce a form of forgetting as they focus on the white settler perspective leaving out the voices of the Africans.<sup>23</sup>

The narratives that have been produced addressing the colonial "experience" present a memory of white settlers being the victims of the armed independence fighters. Indeed, the narrative of Portuguese ex-combatants as perpetrators of violence has been marked by a "culture of silence" and in particular, the use of napalm on African villages has been the most obscured. This is still the case in Portuguese literature, but visual representations (and specifically documentaries as it is the genre that interests us here) that emerged in the late 1990s began to address this forgotten violent past.

Two documentaries have been produced before *A Guerra*. Felícia Cabrita and Paulo Camacho's *Regresso a Wiriyamu* ("Return to Wiriyamu" – the name of a village in Mozambique) and *Angola, 1961. O princípio do fim* ("Angola, 1961. The Beginning of the End") were issued in 1998. However, both films also reproduce a form of forgetting

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<sup>23</sup> I discuss in greater detail this problematic in the conclusion of this chapter.

as their point of focus is the voice of the white ex-soldiers or settlers while consigning to the background the African victims of colonial violence.

*Regresso a Wiriyamu* presents the massacres of Wiriyamu and other Mozambican villages focusing on the white Portuguese settlers as victims of the African independence movement UPA (*União das Populações de Angola* [United People of Angola]). *Angola, 1961. O princípio do fim* similarly leaves out the African victims of white Portuguese colonists during counter-attacks in Angola, displaying again the Portuguese as victims of the colonized. Portuguese war crimes are to this day left out of history schoolbooks and a culture of denial still prevails (Loff, “Dictatorship and Revolution”).

In his article, “Apologising for Colonial Violence. The Documentary film *Regresso a Wiriyamu*, Transitional Justice, and Portuguese-Mozambican Decolonisation,” Robert Stock discusses *Regresso a Wiriyamu* within the politics of apology. Of particular interest is the interview with the filmmaker Felícia Cabrita. The purpose of the film was to reconstruct the events of the massacre perpetrated by the Portuguese soldiers, commanded by Antonino Melo, that carried out the order of killing the inhabitants of this Mozambican village. To this day, it is remembered as one of the worst slaughters of the war (the other one being “The massacre of Chacinas” which I discuss in my analysis of *A Guerra*). The documentary was made in 1998 when nearing the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the massacre and was produced by the third largest television station (SIC, *Sociedade Independente de Comunicação*; “Independent Communication Company”).

The edited version of the film focuses on Antonino Melo, beginning with a lengthy biographical account, followed by a return to the site of the killings in



Mozambique in which Melo meets with survivors. However, even in this encounter, the focus remains on Melo and portraying his feelings of regret. The survivors remain in the background with synaptic shots.

The structure and display of images was greatly influenced by Felícia Cabrita who developed a form of empathy toward this former general. As she states in her interview to Robert Stock, Antonino Melo, who had ordered the massacre, showed regret in his retelling which came in stark contrast to the other soldiers she had interviewed. The fact that he had shown “great regret ...and wanted to...apologise [sic]” (259) made him stand out. She further states that at the moment Melo asked to apologize to a survivor in one of the scenes, she started to cry and had to turn around because she could not hold it. This was due to the emotional involvement she had developed in her journey with Melo (261).

Cabrita’s reaction to Melo and the motivation for choosing him as the center of her documentary is quite revealing in terms of whose voice is being heard. The filmmaker’s decision to focus on Melo because, as I stated above, he sounded apologetic, and thus based on the director’s personal empathy towards the most violent leader of the massacre is highly problematic on several levels, but, mainly because it depoliticizes colonial violence and perpetuates a form of impunity. This is particularly revealing in the only footage that made it into the edited version of the documentary that provides a voice of an African survivor. In this scene, a woman survivor interacts with Melo whom she remembers from the time of the massacre when she was a little girl. Her reaction is that of giving him a hug and thanking him for having spared her life. Giving center stage to this visual moment while leaving in the background the tales of the other survivors, seems to embody the epitome of depoliticizing and dehistoricizing the violence of this

slaughter – and of colonialism by extension – as it reframes this killing within a narrative of “good” and “bad” colonizers.

It presents Melo within a positive light as if sparing her life was done out of kindness thereby consigning – if only for a moment – into oblivion the structural nature of colonialism as inherently violent and that to this day, this man and other leaders of the Portuguese military, remain in total impunity.<sup>24</sup> This documentary while attempting to recuperate the silenced violence of Portuguese ex-combatants against Africans, reproduces the forgetting of the Salazar regime colonial violence as the narrative remains inscribed within a “white’s eye” perspective.

It is within this context of “silencing” the voices of the colonized Africans that we have to take into consideration the way *A Guerra* was produced. While it has its limits (which I address in this chapter), Furtado’s documentary addresses the memory of the colonial wars, from a radically opposite approach by bringing to light the political and ethical dimension of such massacres.

### **Mnemonic Motives For Making *A Guerra***

Joaquim Furtado, a very well known Portuguese journalist, answers in the epigraph opening this chapter, a journalist’s question about when he decided to produce his documentary, *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação* (“The War of Overseas of Liberation”). In his answer, Furtado points out the lack of public knowledge in Portugal

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<sup>24</sup> I discuss further down in my analysis of Furtado’s documentary that “little girls” being allowed to remain alive was a political gender-inflected conception that they could not be “violent.”

about the Colonial War fought in Africa from 1961-1974, as well as the fact that his project only became possible when he resigned from his position as director of RTP (*Rádio e Televisão de Portugal*, the Portuguese public broadcasting service). Furtado believed that he had to separate himself from his position as a producer within the state apparatus of public knowledge in order to fully invest himself in the work of recovering the nation's memory of the Colonial War.

Furtado has had a long career in various communication media (as a reporter in radio and television, and as anchor and Director of Information and Programming for RTP). He is particularly remembered for being the one who publicly announced the beginning of the Carnation Revolution on April 25, 1974. While Furtado was working as a broadcaster at the Rádio Clube Português, soldiers from the MFA (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*, the Armed Forces Movement) entered the radio station and gave him a communiqué to read which announced the commencement of the revolution and the impending end of the Portuguese dictatorship (The *Estado Novo*, or New State). Furtado returned to the nation's attention in 2007 with the release of his documentary *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação*, which earned him a very prestigious journalism prize, the 2007 Grande Prémio da Gazeta.

Shortly after its broadcast on October 16, 2007, *A Guerra* unleashed a torrent of testimonies – mostly from Portuguese veterans – opening a public space in Portugal that allowed military survivors of the Colonial War to speak for the first time, after long decades of silence.<sup>25</sup> However, the variety of heated reactions to the documentary showed

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<sup>25</sup> The survivors here only include the Portuguese military and civilians. The former independence fighters were not invited to speak by the Portuguese media.

a nation still divided over the Colonial War in Africa: on one side, those who were thankful for such a high-quality investigation in the documentary, and for the opportunity to finally talk about the Colonial War; and on the other side, those who considered Furtado's documentary inaccurate because "he was not there," reproaching him for showing too favorable a portrayal of the African participants in the independence movements, thereby minimizing the "reality" of the dimension of the violence on the part of the Africans (Vasques Rito; Furtado).

Such responses to Furtado's documentary (in light of the controversy produced by historiographical debates discussed earlier) indicate that Portuguese state narratives claiming that colonialism happened such a long time ago that it belongs to a past without present consequences are highly questionable. They also bring to light the false and problematic search for historical truth in memorial projects, and particularly the need for historical accuracy in evaluating what constitutes a valid or invalid source of historical knowledge. Such claims imply a perception of memory as positioned in an empty and aseptic void, separate from and above history or politics, rather than being a historically situated social practice that can be a medium of power.

Such claims may also stem from the false dichotomy between memory and history, in which history stands for objective, rational and scientific knowledge, whereas memory would be subjective, personal experience and a filtered account – and therefore must be relegated to the realm of myth or fiction, treated as a second-class history (Yoneyama 27). The present study stems from the necessary understanding of history and memory not as separate entities, but rather as having to be thought of together as vehicles that can be manipulated for the production of knowledge – and thus of power. This

piecing together of history, memory, knowledge and power raises the questions of how we know history, particularly how we know the past when we have not experienced it, and of both how memory can influence this knowledge of the past and how history can be used to manipulate memories of the past. This is what is at stake in Furtado's documentary.

### **Production of *A Guerra* and “Encircling” Historical Trauma**

Furtado's documentary took eight years in the making and consists of four parts. The first part (which is analyzed herein) consists of nine hour-long episodes and was released on television in 2007 and on DVD on 2008. (The second part, nine episodes totaling 11 hours' duration, was broadcast in 2009 and issued on DVD in 2010. The third part, six hour-long episodes, aired in 2010, with the fourth part – 18 episodes – televised in 2013. Neither the third nor fourth parts have yet had a DVD release.) The whole documentary follows a linear timeline of the war from its beginning in 1961 to its end in 1974.<sup>26</sup>

The first part of *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação* covers the events that led to the Colonial War, as well as the armed conflict itself. However, it stands out in that it is the only portion of the documentary that does not follow a linear sequence, with episodes that go back in time to explore Portuguese colonial practices before the war started. It is, in a sense, a “panorama” of the whole project that *A Guerra* represents.

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<sup>26</sup> Although the individual DVDs appear on websites for sale (such as the leading European retail chain “Fnac” that sells cultural and electronic products) they are marked as not available or out of stock. *Loja Público* – an online Portuguese publishing house – is set to release the whole DVD collection on May 31, 2017.

Furtado's project was made possible through the funding (of an undetermined amount) from the RTP which, being a state-owned network, is itself funded by the state, and through military archives from all over the world, with more than 200 people interviewed inside the studio and on the terrain: Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (the three fronts of the war) and Cabo Verde. The first part of the documentary is the result of 5,000 archival films from the RTP, and involved more than 300 contacts that ended up contributing some kind of information. The documentary covers a wide range of opinion, with interviews of all the "great" and "small" actors (politicians, civilians, military, and founders of the independence movements such as Joaquim Chissano (FRELIMO) or Holden Roberto (UPA/FNLA) who have together woven the history of Portuguese colonialism and the Colonial War in Africa.

Furtado also recreated dozens of maps with different scales, events in 3-D; in all, it involved hundreds of hours writing, assembling and recording sounds (Lopes; Pereira). (The same processes of creation were also used for the second, third and fourth parts). The extreme length of the documentary, along with the extensive recording material that went into its making, are the result of Furtado's aim for his project to give "the real dimension of what the war was." In other words, Furtado meant for his documentary to tell "what happened" during the war, to give the "reality" of the war.

However, the nature of such an archival project's attempt to provide a narrative of the war begs the question: to what extent can "what happened" during a war be told, considering that it is a traumatic event? How does one understand Furtado's effort, which was seemingly without any end but the impossible task of representing trauma? In *A Guerra*, Furtado does not deal with everyday memory, but rather with traumatic memory

that has been completely obliterated from the public sphere. Indeed, traumatic memory is the memory of events about which no interpretation has yet been formed. They are events that resist meaning. Traumatic events are to be understood in the sense of a rupture and belatedness.

In *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, Jenny Edkins, drawing from Lacan and Cathy Caruth's studies of trauma, identifies two main characteristics of trauma: a betrayal of trust and its belatedness:

To be called traumatic an event has to be more than a situation of utter powerlessness. It has to involve a betrayal of trust. There is an extreme menace, but what is special is where the threat of violence comes from. What we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of danger (4).

Thus, at the center of a traumatic event is the rupture between Self and Other. In the case of "historical trauma," such as a war, what is broken is precisely the dimension of otherness that makes communication and symbolization possible. Memory of traumatic events is, then, a "meaningless" memory, for trauma is never experienced as such at the time it happens.

Through her reading of Sigmund Freud's works, Cathy Caruth defines trauma in *Unclaimed Experience*, as a distressing experience which is often not known as such. Instead, a trauma comes into being once its victim experiences its effects in a belated manner: "it [trauma] is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available. This truth, in its delayed appearance and its belated address, cannot be linked only to what is known, but

also to what remains unknown in our very actions and our language” (4). In this sense, Caruth establishes trauma as a “failed experience,” an unprocessed memory-trace that returns unbidden as delayed effect, in an effort to force the mind to digest this previously unclaimed kernel of experience in “an attempt to tell us of a truth.” Thus, when survivors “remember,” their memory is not as much remembered as it is relived, for the traumatic event was never processed as “known” to begin with.

Such considerations on traumatic memory in relation with the Portuguese case and *A Guerra* beg the question of how is it possible to construct a “truthful” account of trauma within a society that refuses to remember its past? As mentioned earlier, public discussion of the Colonial War has never taken place in Portugal and whatever reflection has taken place on the war has been carried out primarily through fictional narratives. And, in spite of the fact that a number of celebrated contemporary authors have written significant novels on the war, these have only begun to be studied very recently.

By giving a voice to these “subjugated knowledges” (and in particular to the former African independence fighters whose (hi)story had never been told before), *A Guerra* performs a “not-forgetting” rather than a “remembrance” of the war. In *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, Edkins looks at forms of remembering traumatic events in political terms, arguing that some forms of remembering do not reinforce state and nationhood but rather use memory to promote change and challenge the political systems that produced violence in the first place.

Key to understanding how “memorialization as forgetting” can be challenged is Edkins’ distinction between “politics” that refers to “the routine” (the institutions constitutive of the nation-state and which follow a linear time) and “the political” which



is “the arena of innovation and revolution, ... a point at which the status quo is challenged” (xiii), which follows a different time, a time she calls “trauma time” that disrupts the linearity of time, when something happens that is unexpected and does not fit the narrative, and therefore disrupts state narratives of commemoration.

However, the “politics” and the “political” do not exist independently – they define and constitute each other in a dialectical relationship, thereby making practices of memory a site of struggle. By presenting a tension between linear and trauma time, between the “politics” and the “political,” where each is constitutive of the other, Edkins leads us to rethink practices of remembrance of trauma: where memory is not to be thought in opposition to forgetting, where forms of memorialization for a nation do not necessarily imply depoliticization by trying to make sense of traumatic events, by reinscribing them within linear narratives. Instead, Edkins proposes an alternative: “that of *encircling the trauma*. ... We cannot remember it as something that took place in time, because this would neutralize it. All we can do is ‘to *encircle* again and again the site’ of the trauma, ‘to *mark* it in its very impossibility” (15).

Thus, forms of memorialization that follow a “not forgetting” (rather than remembering) process, that go against what Lisa Yoneyama called “forgetting the forgetfulness,” can challenge linear state narratives of commemoration. It is this particular idea of memory as a social practice lying within a “not forgetting” and “forgetting” tension that the present chapter attempts to unveil. This analysis aims at disentangling Furtado’s documentary as a site of struggle between the political and the politics, between encircling the trauma and forgetting the trauma.

## The Colonies as Vital Source for Dictatorial Sustenance

*A Guerra* becomes a site of memory which steers away from “the nation’s celebrations,” reproducing the state narrative of Portugal on colonialism in Africa as being unique because it was a “light” colonialism: Portugal underlining that the “African-Portuguese” were treated as Portuguese, with the same rights and considerations as any others. Portugal’s discourse of light colonialism came under scrutiny in the 1950s as the International Labor Organization (ILO) sent envoys to investigate the working conditions of the colonized and reporting that conditions were close to slavery.

Indeed, while claiming unity and a civilizing mission in the colonies, Portugal continued its forced labor practices there until the beginning of the war for colonial independence. By the 1960s, Portugal – with a GDP of \$760 per capita, ranking as one of the poorest countries in Europe, and with a 40% rate of illiteracy and 31% of the population still working in agriculture (while the most highly qualified workforce emigrated to countries with better economies, such as France or Germany) – relied heavily on the revenues from the colonies to remain sovereign. This fact echoed a 1963 statement from Salazar to Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Nogueira: “I wish this country poor but independent; and I do not wish it colonized by American capital” (Maxwell 79). Overall, the African colonies created earnings of 5% of Portugal’s GNP, enabling Portugal to maintain a positive economic trade balance (without the colonies, it would have had a negative trade balance).

With the interwar economic depression of the 1930s and Salazar’s appointment by the military to repair Portugal’s failing economy, the colonies were key to keeping the

Portuguese economy afloat. As Salazar drafted his policy for the *Estado Novo*, colonial autonomy became limited and measures to reduce debt in the metropolis through sanctioned colonial budgets were passed in order to generate revenue by any means possible (Havik). Raw materials and the cotton and textile industry provided an important source of wealth to Portugal, like many other imperial powers at the time (Pitcher). However, most recent research has pointed to the tax system in Portuguese colonies, especially tax on the natives, as the most profitable resource, highlighting one of the main reasons Portugal could not let go of its colonies.

In 1920, the native tax and the hut tax were passed, which required every African male in the colonies to carry a work passbook. It also established a system where, to supplement income, colonial administrators would provide workers to private employers. District officers (*chefe do posto*) would request a certain number of natives for labor from the chiefs of villages (*soba*), and if the chiefs did not comply, the police would come and take the natives to work by force. Colonial administrators, district officers and chiefs of villages received a commission on each worker. Portugal also gained by interterritorial taxing neighboring colonies, which would have to pay for the use of the railroads or port Lourenço Marques in Angola (Spruyt).

While the profitability of the taxation system in the Portuguese colonies is only now being investigated, the evidence clearly shows the Portuguese government and economic elite in the metropolis and the colonies had every interest in maintaining forced labor, while claiming the right to the colonies as a “civilizing” mission. Furtado’s work brings to light the hypocrisy of Portugal’s political discourses surrounding “light” colonialism that still prevail to this day. It does so by providing a site of memory of the

politics of colonialism following a dialectical tension between a “not forgetting” and a “forgetting the forgetfulness” process, thereby challenging state narratives of remembering.

If there was anything particular and unique about Portuguese colonialism in Africa, it was not because it was “light,” but because it was enmeshed with the politics of the dictatorship as *A Guerra* brings to consideration. It is this particular link that the present study attempts to unveil. I will first consider Furtado’s documentary as performing a “not-forgetting” of how Portuguese colonialism in Africa helped maintain Salazar’s dictatorship, and how the beginning of the Colonial War unleashed “necropolitics.”

### **Countering Sanitized Images of the War**

The opening of *A Guerra* is marked by a return to a site of death as Furtado takes his viewers to the last standoff between African independence fighters and the Portuguese military in Guinea. The viewers are set to watch a strange dialogue between a Portuguese and a Guinean official remembering how after an ambush orchestrated by the *Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné* (PAIGC/African Party for the Independence of Guinea) there were several dead. The dialogue between the two military men is followed by Joaquim Furtado’s voiceover stating that the military did not yet know that the war was over or virtually over, since the Carnation Revolution had already happened in Portugal: “A war that had begun 13 years earlier...” followed by the opening credits. From the beginning, Furtado highlights the manipulation of knowledge about the war by

the Portuguese state, presenting the documentary as an attempt to unveil the politics of silencing the war.

Returning to sites of death to frame interviews with military survivors is a technique Furtado uses on other occasions as a way of disrupting the linear narrative of the war produced by, and inherited from, the dictatorship. By counterposing newsreel archival footage of Salazar giving public speeches stating that the war is over only three months after the beginning of the war, or of journalists interviewing military men during the war writing letters to their families at a café, along with contemporary survivors' testimonies and in particular those taking place at former battle sites, Furtado's documentary performs a "not forgetting."

Furtado interviews former fighters at the sites of battles, constructing a counter-representation to the sanitized images of the war framed within a "sanitized" environment (such as a café in which smiling soldiers are interviewed, telling journalists everything is going well, thereby projecting a sense of "normalcy" onto the war as part of the dictatorship's attempt to silence the war). This makes the war present, rather than banishing it to some distant past. This can be seen when Furtado interviews four former military Portuguese men and two former independence Angolan fighters at the very site where they fought each other in Nambuango, reminiscing about the deathly encounter of "*Operação Viriato*" ("Viriato Operation").

The Portuguese and the Angolans are first interviewed separately, then eventually meet, greeting each other – and yet the Portuguese and Angolans are shown standing at a distance from each other, as a spectral recollection of their time as enemies during the war. The exchange between the men revolves around the battle of Nambuango and which

strategies were used on each side before battle, presenting them trying to find similarities. The Portuguese recall that before going on attacks they prayed, to which the Angolans respond that they did as well. One of the Portuguese men tells the Angolans, as he shakes their hands, that they are the same because he is a Methodist, and so they have the same God: “...*somos irmãos*” (“we are brothers”).

However, this attempt at finding similarities and smoothing over the atrocities of the past is disrupted as one of the Angolans tells the Portuguese man shaking his hand that he is a Catholic but fought on the side of the Protestants, and then the other Angolan intervenes: “He could not have a voice at the time” – at this moment, the Angolan’s speech becomes unintelligible and subtitles are shown to translate what the Angolan says: “*Na altura, não podia ter voz... Não podia manifestar-se como católico para evitar confusão... que pudesse haver contacto com os portugueses.*” (“At the time, he could not have a voice. He could not have made himself known as Catholic to avoid confusion that he could have contact with the Portuguese”). There is a gap between what is said by the Angolan and the subtitles, as the words “he was African” – uttered in between both statements of “He could not have a voice at the time” – are left out.

This unexpected interruption, in which language becomes unintelligible, manifests the irruption of trauma time within narrative time. The encounter between the former fighters becomes a mis-encounter, as the irruption or interruption in the continuity of the dialogue marks the locus of a catastrophic past that enters the present. The utterances “he could not have a voice,” “he was African” disrupt, fall out of what is being talked about: memories of the war in which everything is discussed except for the casualties, the violence of the war. They are remarks that fall out as no response is given

to them. They refer to “the death zone that no one wants to hear” (Edkins). For what is meant behind “he could not have a voice ... he was African” is the racialized division at the core of the war that made any possible link with an “Other” impossible.

Thus, the union of memories Furtado attempted to show in bringing these men together (as his voiceover explains “...esta reportagem juntou-os juntando memorias muitas afastadas...” [“this documentary brought them together, uniting memories of a distant past”]) become unlinked. As explained at the beginning of this chapter, these are not memories of an “everyday” past, but rather traumatic memories, and when giving speech to these memories they are not so much remembered as they are relived. It is in this revival of the catastrophe, the unlinking moment that a seemingly possible “Otherness” is revealed to be impossible. This unlinking is to be thought in terms of the irruption of the Real, which Lacan defined as:

...that which knows neither name nor image and “always returns to the same place” outside of symbolization. The Real is the “impossible”, that which “doesn’t stop not being written.” It irrupts where the oppositions that structure our common reality – inside and outside, before and after – no longer function, where the guarantees of legitimacy that underlie the social link are flouted. ... Thus, by definition, the irruption of the Real makes all otherness impossible (Davoine and Gaudillière 15).

Therefore, at the moment that the Angolan states “he was African,” the Real enters the dialogue, turning the former officers into the catastrophic event themselves. For it is the whole history of Portuguese colonialism which irrupts into the present.

### **The Colony as “Necropolitics”**

In his article, “Necropolitics,” Achille Mbembe investigates the relationship between sovereignty and death in Palestine and South Africa. Mbembe draws from theories of sovereignty in the work of Hegel and Georges Bataille, as well as Giorgio Agamben's account of “bare life” and “the state of exception.” Mbembe develops his theory of “necropolitics” as complementing and complicating Western theories of “biopower.”

Following Michel Foucault's argument in *Society Must Be Defended* that race figures “prominently in the calculus of biopower”(17), Mbembe proceeds to examine how slavery is crucial to an understanding of modern terror. More importantly, Mbembe argues that “the colony represents the site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law ... and where “peace” is more likely to take on the face of a “war without end”” (23). For Mbembe, colonialism organized the world as divided between “the human world” and the “savage world.” Indeed, with the colonial state of exception, the native is represented as “another form of animal life” (24), who shares no human bond with the conqueror. The sovereign power of the colonizer is thus defined by their capacity to subject, control and even kill the colonized.

Mbembe's concern is “those figures of sovereignty whose central project is not the struggle for autonomy but the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations” (14). Mbembe explains why biopower, as the power over life itself, should also be thought of in terms of the state of exception in examining the relationship between politics and death. Biopower is fundamentally about classifying populations into categories that are deemed worth saving



and those subjected to dying (or killing). Building from Foucault, Mbembe puts racism at the center of biopower:

Indeed, in Foucault's terms, racism is above all a technology aimed at permitting the exercise of biopower, "that old sovereign right of death." In the economy of biopower, the function of racism is to regulate the distribution of death and to make possible the murderous functions of the state. It is, he says, 'the condition for the acceptability of putting to death' (17).

Mbembe then explores how this modernization of power, which became fully realized in the Holocaust during WWII, developed through the slave-plantation system and colonialism. The industrialization of killing occurred through the link of biopower, exception, and racism. The population being put to death are then subhuman rather than enemies or criminals in Schmittian terms. A similar dehumanization occurs regarding space in which colonies, like frontiers, are always already spaces of exception wherein there are not people, but "savages" (24).

In the following sections I will read Furtado's "encircling of trauma" as expository of the *Estado Novo*'s colonial stance as "necropolitics," which took different forms: the Manichean world of colonialism, Lusotropicalism, and the creation of a "suicidal state."

The attacks of March 15, 1961, that marked the beginning of the Angolans' fight for their independence were the culmination of several responses to the violence of colonialism. The sixth episode of the documentary, entitled "The Wars before the War," recalls the massacres of Pidjiguiti in Guinea in 1959 and of Mueda in Mozambique in 1960. Furtado brings to light that prior to the attacks on March 15, 1961, the colonized had made attempts to negotiate their working conditions and independence with the chief

of post and governor, who were in charge of legal and economic matters in the colonies. What becomes apparent in the three examples studied here is that “necropolitics” in the colony was fully in motion before the war had begun. The Portuguese state clearly divided the colonizers as those with the right to live and the colonized as those with the right to die.

The sailors of Pidjiguiti went on a strike to ask for a raise in their pay. In response, their chief of post sent military officers who started shooting at them. Some of the sailors managed to escape to their boats, but the death toll was 52-53 (there was never an official number reported). In Mozambique, the cause for the massacre of Mueda was related to the cultivation of cotton. As a former activist for FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; The Liberation Front of Mozambique) tells the camera:

...the administrator or chief of post would send people to go produce cotton in parts where you could not grow cotton and they were receiving a percentage on production. When you could not grow cotton you would go talk to the administrator or chief of post, and they would hit you or take you to jail, and for that reason a lot of the Mozambicans would emigrate to Rhodesia, South Africa, or Tanzania.

A voiceover of Furtado follows, saying FRELIMO was constituted as a result of the cotton workers wanting better working conditions.

As a result of the immigration to the neighboring country Tanzania (Mueda is located north of Mozambique at the border with Tanzania) and the growing discontent of his “workers,” the governor of Mueda (Teixeira da Silva) called for all the workers in Mueda to come to the “*praça*” (the square in front of his house) on March 16, 1959. However, the governor had asked the military to come to the meeting as well, saying that nothing was going to happen, and it was just a security measure. As Furtado recalls in his

voiceover: “They (the governor and the chief of post) were not aware of the degree of discontent of the people who came to the meeting with ‘*catanas*’ (machetes), but the chief of post did not think much of it, because it was their working tools. They (the workers) also had a flag on which it was written “UHURU,” which in Swahili means ‘independence.’”

This is followed by an interview with the chief of post of Mueda, Manuel Godinho, who says that when the time came for raising the Portuguese flag, nobody obeyed. The people said they had not come to see the flag raised. This is, in turn, followed by an interview with General Alberto Chipande (FRELIMO, political activist in 1960):

...the governor came in and said that they are going to improve things, increase their pay, give them better working conditions and change forced labor, but the people said, ‘We didn't come to hear that, you've been saying those exact words for a very long time. Today we want you to talk with the people that came from Talaica (Tanzania).’ The governor agreed, and offered them to come inside to talk.

The talk was supposed to be about the independence of the country. However, as Chipande recalls over a 3-D image reconstructing the events:

when they came out of the governor's house, the governor said that they [the independence movement representatives from Tanzania] had spoken disrespectfully [*falaram mal*] and he told them to go to the veranda. At that moment, a military jeep came around, and the people started rebelling: walking inside the walls of the governor's house, getting close to the steps that led into the governor's house (they had never been that close to the governor) and they started taking the rocks that were laid around the flag post, throwing them at the governor, the chief of post. The governor, so sure of being respected, started walking down the stairs, saying nothing bad is going on, and one of the people took out a knife, going to strike at him.

Godinho tells the camera he pushed aside the governor and was the one that got stabbed, and he shot and killed his assailant. Then the military arrived and started shooting.

To understand the people's reaction to the arrival of the military jeep, Furtado provides historical instances throughout the documentary where political dissenters were systematically taken to jail. That is what the jeep represented for the people: that the representatives of the independence movements from Tanzania would be taken to jail. The chief of post's testimony is followed by a succession of interviews where the number of dead is debated: with Chipande saying there were hundreds, contradicted by Godinho saying there were 14, and then others are interviewed that allege 30 or 50 dead. A picture from a history book of Mozambique is shown, citing Chipande's name and stating 600 Mozambicans were killed. This dispute over the number killed by the military clearly shows a struggle of "memory-truthfulness" in the production of knowledge of the politics of colonialism, where not only peaceful requests for independence from the colonized were ignored by the Portuguese government, but they ultimately resulted in massacres of the colonized.

A similar situation is projected in the seventh episode, entitled "The Year that Marked History." Workers in Angola (in Baixa do Cassanje) were dissatisfied with the way cotton was cultivated and produced to benefit only the Portuguese government, as cotton could only be sold to a specific company that had been set up by the *Estado Novo*. In January of 1961, workers destroyed supermarkets, post offices and shops, but never attacked European civilians. The Portuguese government responded by sending in the *Forças Armadas* ("Armed Forces"), the third and fourth companies of the *Caçadores*

*Especiais* and the Portuguese Air Force, resulting in an undetermined number of deaths. A former UPA activist adds that even to this day there are still mass graves.

Linking these three massacres with images of black corpses piled upon each other, Furtado provides a memory-trace for the dead colonized – the Portuguese government did not even bother to count its casualties, thereby making sure that no memory of those events would be left. It also shows a dichotomy between the so-called “violence” of the colonized – who “dared” to destroy property or “speak disrespectfully” because they asked for independence – and the armed military violence of the Portuguese government to kill any threat that would change the exploitative conditions of colonialism.

### **The Manichean World of Colonialism and “Myth-making” Processes**

By historically situating the attacks of March 15, 1961, that began “the war of overseas of liberation” within the context of colonialism, Furtado underlines the violence of the Portuguese government – which led the colonized to respond to such violence with violence, as the only way to gain their independence. The response of March 15, 1961 was well organized, as Holden Roberto recalls in the first episode. After the massacre of the Angolans in Baixa do Cassanje, a lot of Angolans started emigrating to the northern neighboring country Congo, where they formed their plans to fight as they met with members of independence movements that already existed in Congo.

Furtado then illustrates the flow of migration from Angola to Congo with a map on the screen, showing the viewer how Angolans would come and go, propagating revolutionary ideas at church so that no suspicion would be raised. We are shown a

transnational network of solidarity “from below,” where the rebellion from the colonized was clearly a political response to the organized violence of colonialism. Holden Roberto recalls his encounters with Franz Fanon in Congo, and remembers telling him: “...the Portuguese are never going to give you independence. You have to rebel in the farms to show that there is forced labor. ... I reached the conclusion that it [the rebellion] was not an action, it was a reaction; that people reacted, and their reaction was uncontrollable.”

From the very first episode, Furtado juxtaposes interviews with the former colonized and the former colonizers, constructing throughout the documentary the Manichean world of colonialism and the dichotomy between colonialism remaining unquestioned by the former colonizers even as they decry the violence of the colonized as unjust. As Adriano Moreira, (Minister of Overseas in 1961-1962) condemns: “...it was a crime against humanity, the dimension of the violence... we made mistakes, but it did not compare to the violence of the other side... children could be killed by being thrown against the wall because they would die more quickly... everything white was destroyed.” This is juxtaposed with the testimony of Jose Mateus Lelo, a UPA activist: “...the first to be killed were the bosses... since we were irritated from all that time of being oppressed, there was not that feeling of pity anymore, because it is not a little thing to be dominated for 500 years ... we used machetes because this was all we had, machetes, sticks and rocks.”

Therefore what Furtado shows us is exactly what Franz Fanon described in *Les damnés de la terre* (*The Wretched of the Earth*) where the Manichean world of colonialism based on the negation of the humanity of the colonized can only be overcome through violence: “...il [manicheanism] l’animalise. ... Le colonisé sait tout cela et rit un

*bon coup chaque fois qu'il se découvre animal dans les paroles de l'autre. Car il sait qu'il n'est pas un animal. Et précisément, dans le même temps qu'il découvre son humanité, il commence à fourbir ses armes pour la faire triompher.* (“...it [manicheanism] turns them into animals. The colonized know all that and roar with laughter every time they hear themselves called an animal by the other. For they know they are not animals. And at the very moment when they discover their humanity, they begin to sharpen their weapons to secure its victory”; Philcox 34).

That is to say that in colonialism and its racism, what is being negated is the colonized “otherness,” his ethical life. There is no recognition of the Other for being different (which would imply that the colonized is “human,” but with opposed human values), but rather his existence is produced as bare life: “*Toute colonie tend à devenir une immense basse-cour, un immense camp de concentration où la seule loi est celle du couteau. ... Vivre c'est ne pas mourir.*” (“Every colony tends to become a huge barnyard, a huge concentration camp where the only law is that of the knife. ... To live means not to die”; Philcox 234). Colonialism, just like Nazism, produces the colonized as bare life, as “derealized Others,” as “non-beings,” and in this sense the fight for independence does not include overcoming the “master-slave” relationship, but becoming “other” by asserting their humanity which can only be done through violence: “*Pour le colonisé, la vie ne peut que surgir que du cadavre en décomposition du colon.*” (“For the colonized, life can only rise out of the colonizer’s decaying corpse”; Philcox 234). For life, in its ethical sense, to become realized, it has to go through the violence carried out by the colonized, which is nothing more than a response to the violence of colonialism.

What Fanon offers here, and what Furtado's documentary underlines by "disentangling" the memories of the former colonized and colonizers, is a critique of the colonizers' pleas for nonviolence at the moment of decolonization. This obviously means that the criteria for non-violence invoked by the colonizers require the absence of the transformation of power relations. Such demand presupposes that justice for the colonized means injustice for the colonizers, as Adriano Moreira's interview highlights. Therefore the colonizers' claims for a just transformation toward a postcolonial situation maintains the status quo, and such claims come from the fact that their right to colonization is not called into question from an ethical dimension within the debate over the process of decolonization. However in the case of Portugal, decolonization was never an option, and the right for colonization became the platform for "myth-making" processes.

Throughout the documentary, Furtado resorts to archival newsreel footage, speeches, newspaper clips and various interviews to present the interconnectedness between the politics of colonialism and the politics of the dictatorship. The first episode recalls that a letter was sent from the U.S. to the Portuguese Minister of Defense warning the Portuguese government of the attack being prepared in Angola for March 15, 1961. However this telegram was ignored by the Portuguese government, which thought it was another strategy from the U.S. to force Portugal to get out of its colonies.

This dialectical tension between the U.S. acting as a decolonizing voice, while countering the decolonizing process from the colonized, and Portugal ignoring the warning from the U.S. and viewing the U.S. as a danger for the country, highlights the "un-questioning" of colonialism in ethical terms and the "unjustification" of the



colonized's actions to gain independence. These positions came to constitute the politics of the Portuguese "colonial dictatorship" as well as the politics that pervaded the debates over the process of Portuguese decolonization in the U.N.

Archival newsreel of debates in the U.N. assembly are shown in the first episode. The Portuguese ambassador responds to U.S. and U.N. pressure on Portugal to decolonize with the use of pictures of dead bodies to show the violence of the Angolans, stating "...they are terrorists, they rape and mutilate our women," as a way to justify the continuing Portuguese presence in the colonies and to negate decolonization, as the Portuguese were being the victims of unjust violence.

But this strategy was not the first used by Portugal to maintain its colonies at any cost. Furtado takes up the various "myth-making" processes created by the Portuguese dictatorship in several episodes of his documentary, while deconstructing the "nation-memory" creation of colonialism as a "light" colonialism at the same time. Through the juxtaposition of interviews of Adriano Moreira, General Almeida Bruno and Manuel Cruz Alegre (a merchant in Angola), Furtado brings to light that to this day, the myth of a "light" colonialism still persists.

The interview subjects are shown stating that Portuguese colonialism had nothing to do with Belgian colonialism, which was cruel; that the Portuguese had a very different relationship with "blacks," which was "less harsh" as they mixed with "blacks," that they had children with "black women" and that the "indigenous" of Angola had nothing to do with the "indigenous" of Congo, and that the possibility of a rebellion was unimaginable. These interviews show the myth of the African as infantilized, and that the African was naturally kind because of a "kind" colonialism. Such false beliefs stem from the adoption

of the Brazilian ideologue Gilberto Freyre's "miscegenation" or "Lusotropicalism" theory by Portugal in the 1950s, when the U.S. and the U.N. first began pressuring Portugal to decolonize.<sup>27</sup>

### **Lusotropicalism**

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Portuguese dictatorship stressed the "purity" of the Portuguese race by emphasizing the inferiority of Blacks and the superiority of European civilization. However, a change in its political discourse on colonialism came with the creation of the United Nations and its charter of 1945; anti-colonial conferences of Third World countries (especially in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1954); the abolishment of the Colonial Act and the change in colonial denominations from "colonies" and "empire" to "provinces" and "overseas;" and the creation of a rhetoric of the pluricontinental and pluriracial nature of the nation.

In 1951, Portugal invited scholar Gilberto Freyre to travel in the colonies – the same year the dictatorship established the 1951 constitution, revoking the colonial act of

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<sup>27</sup> Lusotropicalism was an argument crafted by Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre and later adopted with modifications by the Salazar regime. Lusotropicalism posited that the Portuguese were benevolent colonizers. They were, according to lusotropicalist discourse, not racist but in fact especially adept at living peacefully with and among the colonized. As Cristiana Bastos observes, Gilberto Freyre's theory of lusotropicalism "was consolidated after his 1951-2 tour of the Portuguese colonies sponsored by the Salazar regime ... Earlier, in his socio-anthropological study of the Brazilian north-east, *Casa Grande e Senzala* (1933), Freyre had pre-interpreted the history of Brazilian society by crediting the Portuguese colonizers with a special facility for miscegenation" (24). As Bastos notes in Freyre's definition of lusotropicalism, the "inter-racial eroticism was replaced [in the Salazarist government] by notions of Christian fraternity resulting in a 'multi-racial and pluri-continental' nation" (24). In adopting Freyre's concept, the regime had to ignore "the evidence of conflict, racism and nationalist movements" (24).

1930 that had tried to refresh colonialism with the above-mentioned changes (Vale de Almeida). Freyre's observations became useful to Portuguese diplomacy between the Bandung Conference and Portugal's acceptance as a member of the United Nations a year later, in 1955. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, legitimization of colonialism could no longer be done with arguments of political-economic interest and sovereignty claims, but increasingly with "socio-anthropological" arguments that were marked by a strong mythical character.

In *An Earth-Colored Sea: "Race," Culture, and the Politics of Identity in the Postcolonial Portuguese-Speaking World*, Miguel Vale de Almeida offers a genealogy of the concept of Freyre's "Lusotropicalism" and how it was adapted to the Portuguese colonies in Africa. In his work, Vale de Almeida presents Freyre's "Lusotropicalism" as a mythical discourse with scientific pretensions based on the supposed disposition of the Portuguese to engage in "hybrid and slave-based" colonization of the tropical lands. Using quotes from Freyre's numerous accounts from his journey in the African colonies, Vale de Almeida delineates the main points of Freyre's theory that was used by Portugal:

This disposition is supposedly explained by the Portuguese ethnic and cultural past as an "undefined" people. This lack of definition (i.e., "racial" and cultural purity) amounts to a "balance of antagonisms", and Portuguese "plasticity," based on *aclimatibilidade, mobilidade e miscibilidade* (adaptation to different climates, mobility, and the ability to mingle/miscegenate), was the strategy for compensating demographic weakness, thus building a colonial system based on the patriarchal and slave owning family (76).

Indeed such notions of *aclimatibilidade, mobilidade e miscibilidade* allowed for Portugal to define itself as no longer European but rather African, and where the colonized were no longer called as such but rather as Portuguese: African Portuguese.

It was in the academic field, however, that the doctrine was more influential. Adriano Moreira introduced Freyre's ideas in his course on overseas politics at the *Instituto Superior de Estudos Ultramarinos* (School of Overseas Studies). He was supported by the acceptance of the Lusotropicalist model by influential scholars such as geographer Orlando Ribeiro, anthropologist Jorge Dias, and human ecologist Almerindo Lessa (50). Lusotropicalist discourse became a political tool through Adriano Moreira as he became Minister of the Overseas between 1960 and 1962.<sup>28</sup> One of the first measures that Moreira implemented was the revocation of the Native Status Laws under humanitarian grounds.

During a speech as minister, in 1961, on the Native Status Laws (which separated citizens from natives and prescribed forced labor), Moreira stated that:

We want to make it clear to the commonwealth of nations our national decision to pursue a policy of multiracial integration, without which there will be neither peace nor civilization in Black Africa ... it is a policy whose benefits are proven by the largest country of the future, Brazil... (Moreira 1961: 10-11, qtd. in Vale de Almeida 59)

Since the main rationale for the Status Laws lies in the respect for the private lives of the several ethnic groups, we conclude that it is opportune to revise those laws, so that it is clearly understood by all that the Portuguese people lives under a political law that is equal for everyone,

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<sup>28</sup> Adriano Moreira held a degree in law and started working at the Colonial School in 1948. In 1954 he finished his thesis on "the Overseas Prison Problem." He was a member of the Portuguese delegation to the UN between 1957 in 1959; a member of the Chamber of Corporations; Dean of the Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas Ultramarinas; Under-Secretary of Overseas Administration, and Minister of the Overseas in 1960-62. He was a founding member and director of the Centro de Estudos Políticos of the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar. He was president of the Lisbon Geographical Society in 1964. He was exiled in Brazil for some time after the restoration of democracy in 1974. After his return to Portugal he was president of CDS (the right-wing Christian Democratic Party) and a member of Parliament. He works on international politics in a military institute focused on issues of national defense.

with no racial, religious or cultural privilege. (Moreira 1958: 14, qtd. in Vale de Almeida 59)

It is thus in terms of universal human rights that Lusotropicalist discourse entered the legal realm for governing the colonies, once the Colonial War erupted. It is not coincidental that so many factors – the renaming of the colonies as “provinces,” the abolition of the Colonial Act and the Native Status Laws, the adoption of Lusotropicalism as a political doctrine to justify the *Estado Novo*’s propaganda that Portuguese Africa would one day be a “racial democracy” like Brazil – coincided with the fomenting of liberation movements in the colonies. In this sense, Adriano Moreira held a key position in justifying the pursuit of colonialism in Africa and even in legitimating the killing of the colonized.

Through the use of Lusotropicalism in the legal realm, Moreira opened a space for brutality and humanitarianism to coexist on the same plane. “...colonial reformers, who often made their arguments on humanitarian grounds, faced the task of supporting the colonial project and its economic goals while also finding ways of explaining and refining daily colonial brutalities as a part of civilized legal and political practice.” (Von Joeden-Forgey 62). Such a colonial conundrum of “violent humanitarianism” and the mythical Lusotropicalist ideology of self-representation is shown in Furtado’s fifth episode entitled, “*As colónias e as províncias*” (“The Colonies and the Provinces”).

The episode begins with a series of interviews that highlight the dissonance between the official Portuguese discourse on race relations in the colonies and its actual practices there. Furtado begins his “interview entanglement” with a Portuguese man stating that as far as he knows there was no animosity between whites and blacks;

followed by Manuel Santos Lima (MPLA 1961/63 Angola): "...it was hard staying indifferent when you would see a person receiving 100 'palmadas' [hits on the hands with a tool made of wood and round spikes] and the skin would break bleeding;" to which Edgar Nasi Pereira (Civil Servant in Mozambique 1968/1974) testifies: "corporal punishment existed, even I administered it."

This interview is followed by interviews with two women, who state that "the Portuguese never respected the blacks, and that the government of Salazar said that we are all Portuguese. So if we are all Portuguese, why is there a difference?" This question is followed by an interview with a Portuguese archbishop, who states that the purpose of colonialism was to elevate the colonized from barbarity to become part of a civilized nation like Portugal. To which is counterposed an interview with João Cesar Correia (UPA activist): "...a lot of work, a lot of beatings and very little money, [imitating a 'conversation' that would happen between a boss and his 'employee'] "are you listening?," "yes sir," "then we are done. Go to work," "what? The work is not finished?! Pumba! Pumba! Pumba!" [with his hands making the gesture of someone being hit]. "We were massacred, maltreated."

By presenting memories that exist outside the official histories of the perpetrators and their ideologies, we get a better sense of how a policy of genocide – necropolitics – is historically connected to other forms of political violence. In fact, such an approach in considering precursors to the "war-genocide" can help us understand how it can develop out of long-term social processes linked to the infliction of institutionalized and often normalized human rights abuses.

Beginning the episode by interlocking different testimonies about colonial practices, Furtado creates a macrocosm of race relations in the colonies. He also materializes for viewers the “memory-entanglement” of “forgetting the forgetfulness” (the violence and racism) and of a “not forgetting” that constitutes his documentary’s production of knowledge of the politics of colonialism. As can be seen in Furtado’s fifth episode, there is no “memory-trace” of the corporal punishments practiced by the Portuguese and of racial inequalities. It is only through interviews with the former colonized that these memories can be recovered.

However, there were numerous documentaries produced that replicated the official Portuguese discourse of a pluricontinental and pluriracial nation. This can be seen through archival newsreel footage of a BBC documentary about the city of Luanda in Angola, with the reporter’s voiceover: “...this is the example of a multiracial society in Africa but that is called Portugal – not Portugal in Europe, but Portugal in Africa, and all of the people here are Portuguese.” The statement is made with jolly music playing over footage of three little boys sitting and smiling on a bench together, two white boys with one black boy in the middle. The documentary emphasizes the “Portuguese-African” multiracial society, as opposed to apartheid in South Africa. Such documentaries, however, were staged, as Furtado reveals.

In an interview, a former colonizer confesses that a café was being filmed and things changed once the cameras were running. The boss would talk nicely to his black waiter, saying, “Would you please, sir, bring water to this table?” But once the cameras were turned off, the boss would say, “Oh, blackie, go get water,” kicking him. These uses of the media became an international propaganda tool to justify the Portuguese presence

in the colonies, as both Portuguese and foreign news agencies were invited to the colonies to film the “happy multiracial relations” in “African Portugal.” Furtado further emphasizes the staging of documentary footage in the colonies with an archival newsreel of a Portuguese reporter asking questions about the situation in Angola after the war started. The footage shows a mixed group of people where the whites willingly answer his questions, but when he turns to one of the few black men present, the young man does not answer. Instead, he starts to walk away, still facing the camera, with an expression of fear on his face. This last image of the newsreel leaves us wondering what caused such fear in this young Angolan, when supposedly all were equal? What needed to be silenced and why?

### **Necropower Through Social Death**

Furtado unveils the memory that needed to be silenced so that Portugal could continue justifying its presence in the colonies to the U.N., bringing to the fore the political dimension of “memory-race-violence.” The change in the status of the colonies to provinces was accompanied by a change in the social structure, which was effected through establishing divisions between “colonials,” “assimilated,” and “indigenous.” According to official political discourse, the “indigenous” could climb the social ladder through education. However such a possibility existed only in discourse and very rarely in practice. Even then, if the “indigenous” became “assimilated,” structural racism continued to exist.

As General Hama Thai (ex-fighter FRELIMO, Mozambique) recalls:



...there were two of us, me and a Portuguese woman, and she was making double the salary that I was making. She had not even completed the fourth year of school but I was more advanced, I was more qualified than her but I was paid less. So I went to see my superior and asked why I am making less money, I am Portuguese, on my ID card it says I am Portuguese but my superior said, well, but you are black, I mean it is written that you have the Portuguese citizenship but that does not change anything, do you have any doubts that you are black? I said no and he said well then that is it, she is white then she has to earn more than you.

Education, according to the official Portuguese discourse, was the way to climb the social ladder. But as Furtado recalls, schools were built where there was a substantial white population, and even then the whites went to school but the blacks would go to school in the missions. So from early on, African kids were taught what their place was in society. Furtado further adds – over archival images of the city of Luanda and its periphery – that in Angola, the “civilized/assimilated” amounted to 60,000 people for a population of over four million people, and in Mozambique and Guinea, the percentage was even less. Only a few people were given Portuguese citizenship that would enable them to climb the social ladder.

The cities’ structure was clearly organized around race: most Africans lived in the periphery of the cities. The big hypocrisy of Portuguese colonialism was the idea that color did not matter, that there was a harmonious life between whites, mulattoes and blacks. But the reality was that society was structured according to the color of the skin: everyone knew where their place was, and where not to go.

What is evidenced through such practices is already a form of necropower, which Orlando Patterson called “social death.” In *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*, Patterson argues that slavery is unique in its imposition of social death. Based on

his comparative study of over 180 separate slave societies around the world, Patterson argues that a distinguishing characteristic of slavery in comparison to other forms of forced labor is the social death of the slave. Social death is defined as the alienation or exclusion of the slave from the community at large, justified by the general unworthiness of the slave. Social death may be accomplished through law, such as through the lack of legal recognition of a slave's genealogical relationships, but it may also be produced through repetitive practices, rituals, and symbols denoting unworthiness and, ultimately, social banishment. Thus, through the corporal punishments, the educational system that maintained socioeconomic divide, a “Lusotropicalist” discourse that helped hiding the colonized as ‘homo sacer’ which the state necessarily produced in order to maintain the ‘social reality’ of it being a peaceable state, is revealed that Portuguese colonialism rested on an effective implementation of necropower for “the law of political power always works best when it is invisible” (Eagleton 33).

Indeed, as part of the Portuguese “civilizing” mission, the Africans had to learn how to speak proper Portuguese and were forbidden to speak their native language, which was called “dog language,” testifies an Angolan woman. Different ID cards were issued, depending on whether you were categorized as “indigenous” or “assimilated.” For a native to become “assimilated,” it meant being economically self-sufficient – as General Hama Thai recounts:

...you would not only have to be able to pass the exams of your fourth year in school but you also had to pay for a legal document [a picture of the document is shown on the screen], have four witnesses and you had to pay 20 *escudos* [a substantial amount at the time] for each witness to prove that you no longer practiced the ‘indigenous’ customs and that would mean that you would become white and no longer could be associated with the ‘indigenous.

The interviews with former “assimilated” individuals, along with Furtado’s voiceover, depict a racial system aimed at maintaining the dichotomy in power relations between “whites” and “blacks” through educational, geographical, and economic barriers.

Such racial practices were not the only ones, though. Slavery-like practices continued to be a reality until the independence of the colonies, as (for one example) the colonized that were sent to jail had to pay back their dues through forced labor (this is how roads and railroads were built). In rural areas, employers would hire men with a contract promising payment at the end of the contracted period; sometimes the men under contract would be gone for anywhere from a couple months to up to two years, and would come back with very little to no pay at all.

Propaganda was also used in the production of knowledge about the Colonial War. Even though Furtado’s documentary is entitled *The War of Overseas of Liberation* and this event is remembered as a war, it was not a war. Rather, it was a genocide, as on the Angolan side you had civilians fighting with their working tools (machetes) and sticks and rocks – and on the Portuguese side, a well-trained military force with cavalry, navy and air force. However, Portuguese propaganda portrayed only the violence of the Angolans and treated the Portuguese as victims. Furtado therefore provides a site of memory for the Angolan, Mozambican and Guinean dead and survivors of the Portuguese military violence. As a former journalist recalls, the dictatorship did not allow Portuguese journalists to film combat and Angolan casualties. The only archival “memory-trace” is that of American reporters who interviewed civilian survivors of a napalm attack.

Furtado constructs this site of memory through interviews and images in 3-D that reconstruct the events, showing how what started first as a fight between the military and the rebels slowly became a genocide. As Jacques Dos Santos tells the camera: "...there were spectacles of massacres, it turned into Roman circuses, people were hung upside down and finished with sticks, people were hung just to see if in the final act the person would ejaculate."

This erased memory of the genocide is brought back to life as Furtado focuses on two main characters in the Colonial War: Captain Mendonça and Fernando Robles (who refused to talk to the camera). These two military men are shown in Furtado's documentary as representing the beginning of genocide with the installation of peremptory military tribunals. A particular case is recalled in the third episode entitled "Massacres contra chacinas" in which the 50 inhabitants of a village were summarily judged and killed on the spot when pro-independence literature was found in their settlement. A former soldier testifies that after telegrams were sent from the Portuguese government to the heads of the companies fighting on the frontline – stating that from Negage (a city in Angola) onward, every form of life in the territory had to be eliminated – the enemy became anyone, including children.

### **Manufacturing War Machines**

Furtado shows that parallel to the genocide, in Portugal a "necropolitics" was also developed for any man turning 18 years old. In an interview, a former soldier recalls that going to the war meant going to die. Returning to Mbembe's "Necropolitics," one specific component of necropower is the "power formation that combined the

characteristics of the racist state, the murderous state, and the suicidal state” (17).

Although these elements are considered within Foucault’s analysis of the Nazi state as the most complete example of the right to kill, I would say that with the beginning of the war, the Portuguese state came to fulfill all paradigms of the right to kill, just as the Nazi state had. Indeed, as we have developed throughout this chapter, the *Estado Novo*’s colonial necropolitics was that of a racist and murderous state against its colonized, but with its drafting policy of Portuguese men, it became suicidal as well.

In addition to building a bridge between “biopolitics” (based on the principle of “letting live and letting die”) and “necropolitics” (solely based on the “manufacturing” of death), Mbembe argues that “necropower” is manifest in militia economies, where war machines (for example, militias or rebel movements) control populations by forcibly containing or displacing unarmed populations. Mbembe, taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of “war machines,” explains that:

War machines are made up of segments of armed men that picked up or merge with one another depending on the tasks to be carried out in the circumstances. ... The state may, of its own doing, transform itself into a war machine. It may, moreover, appropriate to itself an existing war machine or help to create one. War machines function by borrowing from regular armies while incorporating new elements well adapted to the principle of segmentation and deterritorialization (32).

At the beginning of the war in Angola, the “war machines” developed were composed of trained military personnel. These were replaced later with civilians who were armed but had no official training. As Salazar sent men to go fight in the colonies, the Colonial War became the site of “necropolitics.” Indeed, as Salazar rallied the nation in one of his speeches in 1964, this “necropolitics” became overt, as he ended his speech with the following words: “...soldiers and the navy, victorious or dead!”

What we see in Salazar's Portugal is the construction of the dictatorship as a racist state, a murderous state and a suicidal state. As Furtado comments on the Portuguese media's proliferation of images of boats sailing to war in the colonies with crowds cheering at the departing men: "...what [the boats] represented at first, the glory, became a symbol of death." Portuguese propaganda sent images of happy patriotic soldiers, but as a former soldier recalls: "...we had no idea what to expect over there." The dictatorship turned into a "manufacture" of bodies subjected to death in a "war without end."

Such "necropolitics" is understandable, as the colonies were the only pillar maintaining the dictatorship. Salazar came to power as the Minister of Finance in 1928, urged to take the office to fix the crumbling economy and save the newly established military dictatorship only two years after the coup d'état. However, as shown in the documentary, Salazar was in charge of all the different areas of the government. In a speech Salazar was to give to a crowd gathered in Lisbon in "*Praça do comercio*" (The Square of Commerce) he is introduced as the minister, as the president of the Council of Overseas, as a doctor [he had earned a diploma in economics], as the head of the military, etc. Salazar had accepted his office under the condition that all powers be relinquished to him so that he could fix the economy, and the first thing he had done was to establish a new constitution based on the Colonial Act of 1930 (Ferro).

As shown throughout the various episodes of the documentary, the colonies were very profitable for Portugal, a semi-peripheral country in Europe with a crumbling economy. Angola was the number one producer of coffee, and even during time of war, the state's main interest was maintaining production of coffee and cotton. In the 1950s it also meant the beginning of a politics of settlements in the colonies, where Portuguese

were called to emigrate to the colonies with offers of a house and six acres of land. Up until the end of the war, soldiers were told that once the war was over, they would be able to go live in the colonies with their families. What is highlighted in Furtado's documentary is that independence for the colonies would mean the end of Salazar and the dictatorship, and that was never an option.

### ***A Guerra: A Portuguese Narrative?***

What kind of knowledge of the "war" is the audience left with in Furtado's documentary? In the filmmaker's attempt at giving the "real dimension" of the war, the distinction between perpetrator and victim becomes blurred, and remembering the Colonial War ends up being inscribed solely within the Portuguese national narrative by still presenting the trauma of Portuguese veterans as equivalent to the trauma of the colonized who had suffered years of colonialism. As Dominick La Capra has argued in *Writing History, Writing Trauma*, we need "to prevent the indiscriminate generalization of historical trauma into the idea of the wound culture and that everyone is somehow a victim (or for that matter, a survivor)." He affirms that "historical trauma is specific; and not everyone is subject to it or entitled to the subject position associated with it" (77-78).

Thus, powerful images of veterans reliving traumatic memory may promote the "forgetting" of other victims, and threaten to supplant historical analysis. It is telling, for instance, that the same archival newsreel of dead black bodies used to frame the narrative of the violence of the attacks by the former independence fighters at the beginning of the first episode is later used to complement the testimonies on the massacres committed by the Portuguese against Africans. It is difficult to think of why Furtado used such trope,

although one can consider the fact that images of the war are scarce. Yet Furtado himself perpetuates a “forgetting the forgetfulness,” while attempting to recuperate those “subjugated knowledges” – which illuminates the idea that remembrances always entail a dialectical tension between remembering and forgetting.

In this sense it is essential to evaluate the memory Furtado is showing the audience as mediated by power and as mediation of power, that memory is not only shaped by political meaning but also shapes political meaning. Indeed, the fact that the Portuguese media never invited the former independence fighters to speak raises questions as to who can bear testimony and who can be mourned. Furthermore it is important to notice that in any encounters arranged by Furtado between the former independence fighters and the Portuguese veterans, the former independence fighters appear in their military attire whereas the Portuguese veterans are dressed as civilians. Even though former independence fighters are given a space to publicly speak for the first time, such a distinction (re)produces a representation of the black “Other” as a threat.

Another element that presents Furtado’s documentary as reinforcing the patriarchal system at the root of the colonial enterprise itself is the exclusion of African women’s testimonies on their participation in the war. While space is given for the testimony of the former “*madrinhas de guerra*” (“godmothers of the war”), black women are left out. The only exception is at the beginning of the eighth episode, in which women are interviewed with the title of commander and/or fighter shown next to their names, but their testimony presents them as pseudo-mothers to the soldiers that were about to die. The rest of the episode is oddly devoted to the machinery used during combat. And



contrary to the structure of other episodes, the introductory images in this one bear no connection whatsoever with the rest of the content developed in the episode.

In contrast, the seventh episode of the first part and the last episode of the third part of *A Guerra* are almost exclusively devoted to the actions of the “*madrinhas*,” with newsreel footage and interviews with former participants in the “*madrinhas*” movement. Such a discrepancy leads us to think of memories’ determination by historical and contemporary social experiences as being inflected by gender. In this sense, Furtado reproduces colonial constructions of black women as representable within the domestic realm exclusively. This echoes the testimonies of several former Portuguese officials who, when asked if women were targets, responded that only men and children were deemed suspicious. By leaving out the participation of women in the independence movements, Furtado reappropriates the ideology of violence equating male gender only, with the women being in need of “saving from brown men” (Spivak).

While it is important to show that the face of the war was not exclusively masculine, by leaving out African women while including Portuguese-born women Furtado not only performs a “forgetting” but reinforces the colonial ideology of the *Estado Novo*. Indeed, the “*madrinhas de Guerra*” was a section of the *Movimento Nacional Feminino* (Feminine National Movement) created by Cecilia Supico Pinto, wife of Luis Supico Pinto, former minister of Economy of Salazar, his adviser, president of Camara Corporativa and administrator of the great African companies. The purpose of the “*madrinhas da Guerra*” was to give moral and social support to the Portuguese soldiers and their families financed by the state (Espírito, Ribeiro). Thus, by presenting a non-critical and almost celebratory portrayal of the “*madrinhas*” and the MNF, Furtado

relegates to oblivion any contestatory power in terms of gender against disremembering the Colonial War.

## **Conclusion**

The present study calls for the need to look at memory and practices of remembrance within their social, historical and political contexts. It also brings out the need to question the nature of memory, as a concept that is not straightforward, but as a relational process always entangled in the exercise of power and always accompanied by elements of repression. By emphasizing the ‘not forgetting’ and ‘forgetting the forgetfulness’ process at play within Furtado’s *A Guerra do ultramar de libertação*, this study has addressed questions of how, why and from which position the memories “of the war” are remembered so as to unveil relations of power within the production of knowledge about the politics of colonialism

Furthermore, by historically situating the *Estado Novo* of Salazar within colonialism, my study has also established the link between the existence of the colonies and the existence of the dictatorship. Even though Furtado’s documentary has enabled the Portuguese to speak publicly about colonialism, the discussion about the “victims” of Salazar’s dictatorship remains exclusively white citizens of the metropolis. The connection between the dictatorship and colonialism made by this analysis creates an understanding that the “victims” of Salazar were Portuguese and African (although without reproducing a victimology discourse). The point is to underline that the current practices of remembrance that arose in Portugal from the documentary, even in the

formation of associations contestatory to the nation-state narrative, reproduce a suppression of the memory of the former colonized.

Interestingly enough, even in Portuguese literature – which has been the exclusive realm of countering amnesia surrounding the Colonial War of Independence – the perspective of the liberation fighters remains absent. Which is not to say that there are no African characters present in these fictional works, but when they are included they remain secondary, and thus stories of the conflict in the colonies remain white Portuguese narratives. Such positioning has been explained by many studies as being related to the fact that Portuguese writers have been directly or indirectly implicated in the war, feeling, as Paulo de Medeiros aptly pointed out, “themselves trapped by the war,” and invested with the question of authenticity, precluding speaking the experience of the African. These authors accept, with some reason, the possibility that for a Portuguese writer to speak for the African would be reproducing a form of oppression. As they view experience as grounds for authority, authenticity and memory, speaking for the Other would perform a kind of “ventriloquism” instead of promoting understanding.

Although it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, as I am interested in aporetic processes of “disremembering-not forgetting” the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, it is worth mentioning that the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship remain absent from memory processes in the former African colonies. As Patrick Chabal notes in his introduction to *The Postcolonial Literature of Lusophone Africa*, the first and most useful overview of the African literatures in Portuguese since independence, “...the fourth factor which distinguishes the modern history of Portuguese-speaking Africa from

that of most of the non-Portuguese colonies is the character of its nationalism and, in Angola and Mozambique, the impact on society of the Civil War.” He adds:

...the impact which continued civil war and independence have had on Angolan and Mozambican society cannot be minimized. Although contemporary Angolan and Mozambican literature is rarely explicit about the conflict which has ravaged these two countries, it is the ever-present backdrop against which all writers and indeed all citizens have had to live. It is too early to say how literature will eventually assimilate the experience of civil war. (qtd in de Medeiros, “Hauntings” 218)

Indeed, the historical effects of the independence of African colonies are quite different from those of Portugal. For if independence was successfully gained in those territories it was not followed by peace, and to speak of war in terms of memory for “postcolonial” Lusophone Africa would therefore be erroneous.

I encountered a similar positioning when researching the former liberation fighters’ reactions to Furtado’s documentary. The documentary was broadcast in the former Portuguese colonies, and all the episodes of *A Guerra* can be found streaming on a Mozambican website. However, where Furtado’s documentary unleashed a torrent of testimonies and news articles regarding the war and its impact in Portugal, this was not the case for the PALOP (African Countries of Official Portuguese Language). The only space offering Mozambicans’ reactions to the documentary is in the commentaries section on the website that streams it. Confirming Chabal’s analysis of postcolonial Lusophone African literature, the users’ comments reflect on the authenticity of the depiction of the war in the documentary, and on the present political situation in Mozambique. Any mention of the Colonial War and the Portuguese dictatorship, along with their impact, is entirely absent.

## Chapter 2. (Dis)remembering the Spanish Civil War: Colonial Ghosts

*Sin África no me puedo explicar a mí mismo.*  
Francisco Franco

*Vamos a redimir a los del otro lado; vamos a imponerles nuestra civilización, ya que no quieren por las buenas, por las malas, venciendoles de la misma manera que vencimos a los moros, cuando se resistían a aceptar nuestras carreteras, nuestros médicos y nuestras vacunas, nuestra civilización en una palabra.*  
General Yagüe, April, 1938 (qtd. in Nerín, 208)

### Introduction

This chapter delves into and expands on recent scholarly interest connected to the complex relations between Spanish colonialism in North Africa, nation, and identity. It posits a reevaluation of the role of race and the modern colonial project in relation to the Civil War and Francoist biopolitical regime. Foucault has elaborated the concept of biopolitics within the foundation and maintenance of the sovereign state. For him, the emergence of modernity was parallel to the moment that life became the center of politics. The difference between *zoe*, as natural life or “bare life,” as Giorgio Agamben puts it, and *bios* as the political “animal” were instrumentalized by the sovereign state so as to collapse both meanings. In this sense, biopolitics absorbs bodies as political objects over which the modern state can decide whether to “let live” or “make die.” This change in modes of ruling is pivotal as it is what made the Holocaust possible, thereby symbolizing the most extreme form of the state legally becoming both a protector of life and enactor of death. By abstracting human life within the realm of politics, the sovereign power can produce bare life and will its death without it being legally considered a

homicide. This is particularly relevant for the Francoist dictatorship – and any dictatorships at large – as its construction and maintenance implied suspending the legal apparatus thereby sanctioning the destruction of lives within total impunity. One of the most representative aspects in its ideology lay in the instrumentalization of discourses on health and its corruption to the *raza* as a way of justifying the extermination of political dissent. I refer to this Francoist sovereign tactic in my analysis further down that, as carriers of the “red gene,” the Marxist women called “rojas” were imprisoned due to their potential “degeneration” of the purity of *raza*.

While the previous chapter focused on the processes of (dis)remembering the colonial war in relation to the Portuguese dictatorship, and how the Salazar regime developed and maintained its power based on necropolitics in the colony, this chapter also examines the concept of (dis)remembering, but in another context: how the biopolitics of Franco’s dictatorship and its concept of the Spanish *raza* found its roots in the dehumanizing processes of the Moroccan Other.

In order to establish this connection, this chapter looks at pre-fascist discourses and racial thought in relation to the Moroccan Other and colonial warfare (in particular, Franco’s perception of such encounter). It establishes a dialogue with Francoist films from the immediate post-Spanish Civil War period that recuperate an imperial narrative as a way to define national boundaries between Self and Other. While this chapter discusses a variety of cultural productions related to the question of race and empire, I will specifically analyze three films produced in the 1940s – a key decade when the “victors” needed to rewrite the history of the nation in order to assert and reassert the

legitimacy of the state.

*Raza*, released in 1942, was the dictatorship's first superproduction. Launched shortly after the Spanish Civil War, it was intended to promote the "historically correct" version of the conflict. *Legión de héroes* also opened in theatres in 1942, at a time when Spain's alliance with Nazi Germany was being threatened, and *Locura de amor* premiered in 1948, one year after Franco needed to reconstitute the regime in order to remain in power and with the hope of Spain joining the UN.

Francoist films of the 1940s have received limited attention, as they have generally been considered frivolous and escapist. However, as Jo Labanyi argues in her study of religious films of the 1940s;

it is a mistake to suppose that cultural production under dictatorship is a straightforward mirror of a monolithic State ideology. This is the case for two reasons: first, because films can allow identifications that work against the grain; and second, because the ideology of even the most repressive State contains its own internal contradictions ("Internalisations" 22),

thus emphasizing the importance of examining the sociopolitical context of film production used to reach the masses.

For Eva Woods Peyró, cinema under Franco came to be "the visualizer *par excellence*" producing a "spectator-citizen" (17). While the regime used various cultural fields (architecture, painting, literature) to promote a Francoist vision of the world, cinema became the "ideological solution to the problem of "race" and its protracted debates since mid-nineteenth century" (Woods Peyró 6). It was through films that racial ideas were to be displayed.

This chapter attempts to show that Francoist fascist ideology was not formed in an intellectual vacuum, nor devoid of racial thought, as has been traditionally argued. Through the lens of haunting theory and colonial racial critical studies, this analysis traces a ghost of the Arab figure, Spain's originary "*homo sacer*," that returns throughout time as a threat to the order of the nation envisioned by Francoism.<sup>29</sup> The "Moor" was not simply used in Francoist discourse as a way to cause fear on the Republican side during the Civil War, as is usually claimed. Rather, this idea was employed as a biopolitical tool using lives that were disposable and instrumentalized in the consolidation of fascist racial thought.

### **Racial Slippages in the Civil War**

In a radio address at the pinnacle of the Spanish Civil War, General Yagüe – one of Franco's fellow officers that fomented the overthrow of the democratically elected Republican government – asserted in the quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter, that the Spanish *Africanistas* would "emancipate those on the other side [the "reds"], imposing on them our civilization ... defeating them the same way we defeated the Moors, when they resisted accepting our roads, our doctors and our vaccines, our

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<sup>29</sup> In his discussion of "Sacred Life," Agamben posits the "*homo sacer*" as "the originary figure of life taken into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the political dimension was first constituted" (83). The "Arab" invasion of 711AD and exclusion in 1492 from Spain, when Spain constituted itself as a nation, places the "Moor" as the originary "*homo sacer*" of Spain. For Susan Martín-Márquez, the legal ban of the "Moor" from Spain leads her to claim 1492 as the "first wave of nation-building" as ideas of exclusion and inclusion in the Spanish "imagined community" had to be negotiated along racial lines. See *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*, pp. 12-18.



civilization, in a word.”<sup>30</sup> Here, Yagüe blatantly equated the Republicans (the “reds”) to the colonized Moroccans (the “Moors”). He argued both that the Spanish Civil War was a clash of civilizations – or rather of civilization against barbarity, in order to free Spain from the savages’ stronghold – and that the conflict was one of a colonizing force on the racialized other “Moorish-reds.”

The construction of alterity of the Republicans as barbaric and with similar characteristics as the colonized Moroccans was not exceptional in the Nationalists’ narrative; rather, it underpinned the entire Spanish Civil War. The colonizing war waged on the Republicans came to be, as Yagüe’s speech suggests, the ultimate episode in a sequence of colonial violence in which, “*por las malas*,” the latest enemy of Spain needed to be annihilated. Indeed, as Michael Richards, in his study of fascist ideology, posited “during and after the Civil War, Falangists, who played a leading role in the repression, considered themselves a ‘colonizing force’” (Richards 27). It was customary for the *Africanistas* to present Republicans, during and before the Civil War, as “hordes,” a word used to name Asians and Africans, therefore allocating “the reds” to the category of colonized beings.

Indeed, *Africanistas* viewed the regions in the peninsula working toward secession from Spain (in particular Catalonia’s) under the umbrella of the Second Republic, as a threat (Balfour, Nerín).<sup>31</sup> This was framed within *Africanistas*’ discourses

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<sup>30</sup> I use indiscriminately the terms “*Africanistas*” and “Nationalists” to refer to Franco’s army. I use the word “the reds” to refer to Republicans in context to emphasize their biopolitical subjection as the nation’s other.

<sup>31</sup> The *Africanista* ideologies of race were brought “home” to the peninsula against Republicans. In *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War*,

equating Catalanism to Moroccan enemies: “*la presencia de rifeños en España. Los rifeños, donde quiera que se presenten deben ser aplastados*” (“Riffian presence in Spain. The Riffians, wherever they show up they must be crushed”; my trans.; qtd. in Nerín 205). Similarly, the 1934 miners’ strike in Asturias that had been violently repressed by the Legion – traditionally historically considered as the “dress rehearsal” for the Civil War (Richards) – was declared by Franco as a “*guerra de frontera*” against “*todas las fuerzas que atacan la civilización para sustituirla por la barbarie*” (“border war” against “all the forces that attack civilization in order to replace it with barbarity”; my trans.; qtd. in Nerín 208).

Furthermore, during the Civil War, Franco’s army made use of documentary footage as war propaganda – a continuation of the (in)famous NODOs (*Noticiarios y Documentales*/News and Documentaries, state-controlled Francoist newsreels) that emerged during the Riffian Wars in Morocco – furthering the alterity of the Republicans. A particular strong example is found in the most racially charged documentary *España heroica* (1938), with the voiceover calling Republicans “*chusma roja*” (“red scum”; my trans.), an expression denoting a lower life form. These words are heard over newsreel images of masses, shown in opposition to footage presenting the Nationalists as individuals, thereby further derealizing (dehumanizing) Republicans.

The “*chusma roja*” analogy of Republicans as racialized Other is echoed in Michael Richards’ study of the 1940 *Calendario of the Sección Femenina* (63). In these

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Sebastian Balfour has shown how the attitudes and practices developed during the course of the Riffian conflict were essential to the formulation of the Rebels’ “crusade” that culminated in the coup d’état, plotted out by the *Africanistas* and launched from Morocco on July 17, 1936 and the ensuing civil war of 1936-39.

photographs, Republicans are presented with orientalized features. The coalescing of racial phenotypes evident in these photographs gestures toward Nationalists' construction of Republicans as Spain's Other in terms of a return of the colonial enemy on Spanish territory. It is evocative of Derrida's specter as "the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other" ("Specters" 10), characteristic of an apparition, a ghost that never returns as the same: it changes and returns as Other.

I will return to and further develop later in this chapter the idea of Derrida's "specter" and "haunting" as key concepts to understand slippages of racial visualizations in the immediate postwar films, and provide an intersectional reading of "haunting," race, and cinema as fundamental elements of the Francoist modern biopolitical project. But for now, it bears saying that these are just a few examples from an oceanic bibliography on what could be called a "genealogy" of racialization of the Republicans through the lens of the "Moroccan-Moor," Spain's original Other. The slippage between the physicality of the Republicans, the Moroccans and the Moors opens multiple temporalities on processes of othering making the figure of the "Moroccan-Moor" as central to the development of the Republicans as racialized Others that had invaded Spain.

These observations coincide with Aimé Césaire's argument in *Discours sur le Colonialisme (Discourse on Colonialism)* that the Holocaust was simply the ultimate expression of violence that had already been exerted in the colonies. Césaire concludes that the only exceptional quality of Nazism was that the mechanisms of extermination that had previously been practiced on the colonized were instead applied to European populations. Likewise, Spanish fascism against "the reds" is to be understood as the

culmination of a long process of systemic dehumanization of populations in the colonies. In other words, to go back to Yagüe's discourse, the imposition of the Nationalists' civilization on the Reds had to be done at whatever cost, just like what had been done to the "Moors." Therefore, the repression of the Spanish Civil War – and its aftermath – is not to be understood as an exceptional act of irrationality, but rather an extension of the Spanish modern colonial project as an internal colonization.<sup>32</sup>

### **Spanish Fascism as Spiritual Race**

Michael Ugarte in "The Question of Race in the Spanish Civil War" (2007) has pointed out that "racial and ethnic conflicts and tensions have received little attention in the otherwise multilayered social and literary historiography of the Spanish Civil War," but that "race in all its complexity, both as a real marker of human existence and as a construction, played an immensely important role in the war" (109). Similarly, Jo

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<sup>32</sup> My argument that the origin of the Spanish Civil War, as an extension of the Spanish colonial violence in northern Morocco, is further supported by the recent release (non published) in February of 2017 of *Camino hacia la tierra olvidada: Guerra civil y represión en el Protectorado Español de Marruecos, 1936-1945* by historians Félix Ramos Toscano and Pedro Fera Vázquez. More than 250 summary killings were perpetrated by Franco's troops before the attack against Spain. Mass graves containing remnants of Republicans and Moroccans who refused to be drafted to participate in the war have been uncovered, among other forms of mass murders that were to be extended to the eradication of Republicans in Spain. This discovery is only recent due to the difficulty of accessing archives whether in Spain or Morocco that remain sealed to the public or displaced. Ramos Toscano and Fera Vázquez's book contains testimonies which would be of great value for further research. However, I have not been able to have access to it as it has not been made available yet. See further information on *Camino hacia la tierra olvidada*, María Serrano's article "Guerra civil española ¿en Marruecos?" <http://www.publico.es/politica/guerra-civil-espanola-marruecos.html>  
I thank Luis Martín-Cabrera for pointing out this article to me.

Labanyi has noted that compared to studies of Latin America, there is a lack of a body of cultural theory in Spain on issues of heterogeneity, race and cultural imperialism which is “possibly because race is an issue still only reluctantly acknowledged, and because the cultural heterogeneity legitimized by regional autonomy has tended to construct a homogeneous identity of local culture,” and as such represents “a Francoist successful legacy of seeing others as being without rather than within.” (“Introduction to Cultural Studies” 4).<sup>33</sup> Considering the key role that the *Africanistas* (African colonial troops) played in the onset of the military coup against the Second Republic, it is noteworthy that a detailed study of race as a backdrop for the Civil War has yet to appear.

The racial ideas held by Franco’s Nationalists during the coup were motivated by the loss of the last American colonies – Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, during the Spanish-American War of 1898 – turning their desire to restore Spain’s “glorious” national past onto the North African colonial project. It is my intent to delineate in this chapter a discursive and filmic analysis of Franco’s racial constructions based on a representational hate of the Moroccan Other, before and after the Civil War, that came to be mapped out onto the Republican enemy. Racial discourse in Spain was not formed in an intellectual vacuum, and I argue that old ideas of empire haunted the nation and showed what needed to be done: the anti-Republican imaginary was founded in the

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<sup>33</sup> Lack of a critical body on race is however not only limited to Spain but rather an issue that affects academic discussions on race in continental Europe at large. Fatima El-Tayeb offers a pointed critique of European “racelessness” as “the ideology of “racelessness” is the process by which racial thinking and its effects are made invisible. Race, at times, seems to exist anywhere but in Europe.” (xvii) *European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational Europe*.

experience of colonization and racial thought. While the boundary between Self and Other (Spaniard and Moroccan; white and brown) could be contained within the African colonies, there was no escaping the threat of contamination with the Republicans, the “internal Other,” “the Riffians of Spain.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, race operated as the symptom, origin and solution to the “degenerate” state of Franco’s time.<sup>35</sup>

This is not to say that race has not been addressed at all in research work related to Spain. The question of race in Spain has been vastly studied in regards to the Middle Ages and theories of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood). However, the modern era has been traditionally devoid of discussions of race until recently, with the emergence of a relatively small body of theory in response to immigration flows from North and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean, in the 1990s. While scholars have rightly framed their discussions within the racialized social practices and continuation of coloniality, the focus of their analysis remains on works of immigration

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<sup>34</sup> I use the term “brown” in reference to cultural representations of Moroccans during the Spanish Civil War. As part of propaganda to justify their position – Moroccan soldiers mainly fought for the Nationalists – a cultural war was also happening between Nationalists and Republicans. Each side used racial visualizations: the Republicans represented Moroccans with black African traits, while the Nationalists portrayed them as white. In reality, the soldiers that joined the *Africanistas*, came from the Rif, a northern region of Morocco. This part of the country is mainly inhabited by Berbers who come from a mixed racial religious background: Islam, Christianity and they have fair skin more akin to European phenotypical attributes.

<sup>35</sup> Scott Boehm makes a compelling argument to qualify the Spanish Civil War as ‘genocide’. This comes in parallel to the Argentine judge, María Romilda Servini de Cubría, ongoing investigation on Franco’s crimes as human rights crimes. See, “Specters of Genocide: Mass Graves, Horror Film, and Impunity in Post-Dictatorship Spain.” While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation, this chapter lays out the groundwork of race in relation to the Spanish Civil War that would allow for a reading of the extermination of Republicans as genocide.

genre from the 1990s onward. The problem with this “temporality-limited” focus is that it excises cultural and political processes of racialization from modernity.<sup>36</sup>

Adding to this problematic, in the field of academic research on the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s *raza*, race has traditionally been considered as a spiritual and cultural process rather than a biological or scientific one, thereby marking Spanish fascism as different from its other European counterparts – in particular, from Nazism. Indeed, one of the most prominent scholars on the Francoist regime, Cristina Moreiras-Menor, has studied the “*espíritu de la raza*,” positing that “there is a significant difference between the racism of Germany and that of Italian and Spanish fascism. While the first is largely a biological racism based on the superiority of the Aryan race, the other two share a cultural racism based on tradition and national imaginaries” (n129).

In connection to Etienne Balibar’s “cultural racism,” Moreiras-Menor delineates in her work that the idea of race came into crisis after the loss of the last American colonies in 1898, leading philosophers, authors and anthropologists – what came to be known as “the generation of ‘98” – to argue that Spain was sick, suffering from a “degeneration” of the race, as a direct consequence of its loss of spirit and national soul linked to the loss of empire.

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<sup>36</sup> This is an issue that has been receiving attention however since the late 2000s by a limited group of authors and this dissertation is adding to this field in addressing the racialization processes that were fundamental to making possible the ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Civil War. See the works of Jo Labanyi, Eva Woods Peyró on the figure of the gypsy, Lisa Surwilo and Susan Martin-Marquez that specifically focus on the question of modernity and race, although without directly addressing the Civil War.

It is in these texts on the Spanish *raza* as “the national spirit, or the notion of *hispanidad*” (124) that, according to traditional studies, the founding notions of the fascist ideology, and the practice of the Spanish Falange, and therefore, the ideology which provoked the 1936 coup against the Second Republic and which would sustain the ideological apparatus of Franco during his reign, are to be found as a “*pensamiento reaccionario*” (264). This leads Moreiras-Menor to point out that “the *franquista* project to regenerate the race is racist in that it believed blindly in the spiritual superiority of the Spanish race” (126). In this sense, *raza* has been traditionally viewed in terms of spirituality, *patria* and culture at the exclusion of its biological or racial aspect.

### **Spanish Fascism as Non-racist**

This is indeed not surprising, as Spanish fascism presented itself as a “racism without race,” or even as a non-racist fascism. As Paul Preston comments, the fascist party (Falange) founder, Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, is noted for his writings being devoid of racist comments (“Franco” 418). Other members of the Falange continued to disavow any racist ideas as late as in the 1970s, stating that “Spanish fascism differentiated itself from Nazism by having no racist policies which would, in a country as racially mixed and as Catholic as Spain, have been nonsense” (Dioniso Ridruejo, qtd in “The blood of Spain: an Oral History of the Spanish Civil War” 315). Ernesto Giménez Caballero, writer and Falangist propagandist, claimed in 1932: “Hitlerism is acquiring renewed vigor because of its myth of blood purity... If Spain one day decides to institute a *Fiesta de la Raza*, it will be precisely in the opposite sense of the German



idea. We deny the purity of our race, admitting that the foundation of our genius is the fusion of races” (“*Genio de España*” 92). Referring to the mixture of the Spanish race was readily used to deny any racist ideology or even any scientific notion of race in relation to Spanish fascism, preferring instead to conceptualize it as a “religiously-coded” fascism.

This was done in a desire to claim Spanish exceptionalism. Such claims were based on using Nazism as the point of reference for race and racism as fixed concepts of “blood purity,” thereby disavowing as racial or racist any Spanish ideological thought and/or practice on race as an inclusive process of the “fusion” of the races. This was not exceptional to Spanish fascism and the subsequent ideology of the dictatorship. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Salazar regime employed the same argument of the Portuguese being a mixed race through the use of “Lusotropicalism,” thereby at once delegitimizing the violent racist process of colonialism and legitimizing the regime’s continued control of the colonies.

Inclusive racism does not preclude racist practices. As Foucault demonstrated, race operates to structure society, and racism or race based on a supposedly natural order of difference and hierarchy always implies the mechanism of discriminating who gets to be included and who does not (and in its most fully realized form, who gets to live and who gets to die). In the case of Spain, Nationalist rhetoric on *raza* worked to incorporate resistant elements of society into the state, while at the same time stigmatizing them by constructing them as Other.

The construction of Spanish fascism as lacking racism was based on a long-standing narrative of the Spanish colonial penchant for racial mixing. As Jo Labanyi has

demonstrated in her analysis of the early Francoist missionary films and *folklóricas* (“Internalizations” and “Race”), defining Spanish spiritual mission of colonialism in terms of miscegenation and incorporation as uniquely “Spanish” was a technique to at once define and subjugate internal Others (the Roma, the lower classes, and peripheral nationalisms), as well as colonial Others, such as Africans and Latin Americans. Such rhetoric of miscegenation belies Spain’s colonial construction dating back to the pre-modern era through *hispanismo*, which had the stated purpose of elevating the “lower races” through heterosexual crossing.

### **Pre-fascist Racial Thought and the Modern Colonial Experience**

When looking at the modern colonial experience in North Africa, discourses of “mixing of the races” did not emerge until the preparations for the Spanish Civil War under the idea of the “blood brotherhood.” Indeed, the idea of a “religiously-coded” fascism and *raza* as *hispanidad* which has permeated traditional analysis on the Civil War and its aftermath (positing Spanish fascism as “unique”) is opposed and debunked by narratives of colonial warfare in North Africa. In those narratives, race operates as racial (not simply spiritual), and in particular as racial differentiation based on an asymmetrical relationship of power in which whiteness is posited as superior to brownness.

The modern colonial project in North Africa was framed within discourses of hate and racial differentiation, as evidenced through Franco’s writings as a columnist for the review *Africa* and the chronicle of his war experience in Morocco published in *Diario de*

*una bandera* (1922).<sup>37</sup> Even then, “the blood brotherhood” (referring to male bonding within the context of warfare due to sharing a “blood” history dating back to the “invasion” of Spain in 711 AD by the “Moors”) was elaborated as a political tool to create the Republicans as enemies of Moroccans, and to enlist Moroccan troops on the side of the Nationalists when they were planning their coup against the Second Republic.<sup>38</sup>

As demonstrated by Dionisio Viscarri’s study of three key figures – Franco, Ernesto Giménez Caballero, Luys Santa Marina – in the pre-fascist ideology developed in the modern colonial project, Spain’s other “institución docente” (“academic institution”; my trans.; 25), the relationship that transpires between the Spanish military and Moroccan Other in these authors’ war narratives (in particular, Franco’s *Diario de una bandera*) is one of asymmetry. The Spanish soldiers are either portrayed as benevolent paternalistic figures to their “little *moro* brother,” or as superior bearers of civilization in need of destroying the savage “*moro*” enemy. To take Viscarri’s observations on the pre-fascist narrative one step further, a close reading of Franco’s *Diario de una bandera* reveals that the “blood brotherhood” ideology is nonexistent. Instead, through Franco’s

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<sup>37</sup> Gustau Nerín offers a discussion of Franco’s articles in *Africa*. See *La guerra que vino de Africa*.

<sup>38</sup> Historian María Rosa de Madariaga has shown how massive conscription of Moroccan soldiers was necessary to ensure the *Africanistas*’ victory in Spain. Local leaders were bribed into encouraging their men to enlist en masse, and the relatively generous salaries offered by the *Africanistas* combined with a recent history of poor harvests created a powerful economic incentive. Madariaga notes the irony of Franco’s speech to Moroccans in early 1937 promising “when the roses of victory bloom, we will grant you the best flowers,” ultimately receiving at the end of the war “thorns” as the majority were sent back to Morocco without compensation and without independence (344). Those that remained on Spanish territory were left with pensions of a negligible amount, *Los moros que trajo Franco*.

narrative of his experience in the Colonial War, racial thought is constructed that clearly posits what is white as human and non-white as non-human.

*Diario de una bandera* has five existing editions (by year): the original in 1922, 1939 (published in the last months of the Civil War), 1956 and (posthumous to Franco's death) 1976 and 1986. In later editions, the episodes of most violence carried out against the Moroccan colonized have been removed. In editions from 1956 onward, the preface differs, with a message aimed at framing *Diario's* narrative within the sociopolitical context of its publication date. The 1939 edition is the first with erased excerpts of violence against Moroccans, to fit the narrative of the "blood brotherhood." The 1956 edition contains a preface by Francoist journalist Manuel Aznar Zubigaray intended to explain Morocco's independence from Spain. The 1976 and 1986 editions have prefaces relating to the death of Franco and the post-fascist transition period.

The continuously changing editions of *Diario de una bandera* at key historical moments of the nation clearly indicate a politicization and ideological instrumentalization of this work. While I do not claim that Franco's *Diario* can be classified as art, it is worthwhile to closely analyze this narrative, which has traditionally been dismissed as irrelevant by the majority of research on the Spanish Civil War. When reading the first few pages of *Diario de una bandera*, such an oversight seems both obvious and reasonable: it has almost no aesthetic value, with a writing style that is dry and almost boring.<sup>39</sup> But it is worth paying attention to the passages erased from later editions, as

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<sup>39</sup> For the survivors of Franco's violence and their descendants, there are other obvious reasons as to why such text would not be read or given attention.

those excerpts are where we find the *Africanistas*' dehumanizing processes of a racialized Other that came to be later mapped out onto the Republicans. These passages also clearly show that *raza* was not a spiritual construct, but rather a phenotypical and biological construction of race in which whiteness is posited as superior to brownness.

*Diario de una bandera* is divided into two major parts, each further divided into sections with titles referring to the geographical locations of military actions in Morocco from October of 1920 to May of 1922 (“*Operaciones en Beni-Lait*,” “*Operaciones en Gomara*,” “*En Dríus...*”). Throughout the text, the reader is taken into a space of death. All the geographical descriptions are interspersed with random mentions of death and killings described in such a disaffected manner that it would be easy to miss them. And yet, the words chosen to describe each death catch the reader’s attention, inadvertently detaining the reading process with what seems to make no sense: the irruption of death in the middle of an anecdotal narrative.

However, Franco does not relate all deaths equally. The colonial setting depicted in *Diario de una bandera* is a Manichean world divided between who counts as human and who does not. When mentioning the deaths of his fellow soldiers, Franco names them and describes them with affect. This is evidenced, for instance, in the description of his “*fiel ayudante*” who “...*desde la guerrilla dos soldados conducen su cuerpo inanimado y con dolor, veo separarse de mi lado para siempre al fiel y querido Barón de Misena*” (“faithful adjutant” who “...from the guerilla armed forces two soldiers carry his inanimate body and with pain, I see the faithful and loved Barón de Misena separated

from my side forever”; my trans.; 189).<sup>40</sup> This naming and expression of affect is accompanied by detailed physical descriptions of the soldiers, providing a humanizing portrait of the military. Furthermore, the record of the death of Spanish military is often followed by exclamations glorifying the sacrifice for death, such as, “*¡Así mueren los legionarios por España!*” (“This is how the legionnaires die for Spain!”; my trans.; 140) , eerily echoing the Nationalists’ motto of “*Novios de la muerte*” (“grooms of death”) that was to be used during the Spanish Civil War.

In opposition, Franco’s descriptions refer to Moroccans as “*moros*” or “*el enemigo*.”<sup>41</sup> They are neither named nor described physically, but rather referred to as an amorphous group whose attributes (in contrast to the epic qualities of the Spanish military) are cruelty, betrayal and superstition. As Judith Butler argues, one of the basic strategies of warfare is to dehumanize the enemy, and in doing so, effecting a systematic erasure of those who do not qualify as fully human (*Precarious Life*). The fact that Moroccans are exclusively referred to as “*moro*” as an identity marker dehistoricizes the Other of the modern colonial project, placing them as objects of history rather than as subjects whose point of reference for existing is Spain. Indeed, the term “*moro*” was used for the Arabs living in Spain from 711 AD until their expulsion in 1492. Calling Moroccans “*moros*” thus not only denies the historical actuality of the Moroccan

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<sup>40</sup> I use the 1922 edition for my analysis.

<sup>41</sup> As I pointed out earlier in the footnote n.5, heterogeneous and multicultural communities constituted the Rif area under Spanish control. Thus, the appellation ‘*moro*’ does not only dehistoricizes Riffians but also carries islamophobic connotations. As historian Eloy Martín Corrales points out, to this day the surname “Matamoros” (“Moor Killer”) exists in Spain while the idea of having a family name such as “Matajudíos” (“Jew Killer”) would be unimaginable.

population outside of the advent of Spain as a nation, but it also makes the category of “*moro*” a real category, positing a binary opposition of identity between the savage and the civilized. These binary identities were concretized within the context of a colonial worldview that explicitly sought to exterminate an entire group of people.

It is this type of dehumanizing process that is constructed in Franco’s narrative, displaying a racial ideology of white superiority over brownness that founded Spanish fascist ideology. In “Hidden in Plain Sight: Atrocity Concealment in German Political Culture before the First World War,” Elisa Von Joeden-Forgey argues that the creation of a legal category “of radical alterity” (54) for the native populations by German officials in the colonies planted the ideological dehumanizing practices that were to become more fully developed with Nazism. A similar – though not equivalent – observation could be made for the legal adjudication of Spanish military violence in the colonies and its relation to the development of Spanish fascism. The Moroccan military actions were described as criminal acts to which the *Africanistas* had the right to administer “a los criminales el castigo más ejemplar que hayan visto las generaciones” (“to criminals the most exemplary punishment seen in generations”; my trans.; Viscarri 140). As noted in Viscarri’s commentary, the use of terms that belong to the jurisprudence realm (“criminals,” “punishment”) enabled legal justification for the violent acts and killings to be perpetrated by the *Africanistas* against the colonized (141).<sup>42</sup> The right to kill was not

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<sup>42</sup> Although there was no official law issued as in the case of Germany, the *Africanistas*’ appropriation of legal language to frame their actions as retaliation against “criminals” presents the seeds of Spanish fascist ideology similar use of legal language to justify their attack on the Second Republic.

limited, though, to Moroccan military men. Rather, it was extended to civilians – women and children – placing a whole population into a category of “radical alterity” viewed as “*el enemigo*,” or a centuries-old “*moro*” to be defeated.

The passages erased from *Diario de una bandera*’s post-1922 editions indicate a process of systematic erasure of those deemed “barbaric” who stubbornly refuse to accept the civilization brought by Spain. As Franco exclaims in one of those passages: “*Es inexplicable lo refractario de estas gentes a la civilización; estos poblados de Beni-bu-Ifrur, en contacto con nosotros más de veinte años, no han salido de su estado de barbarie*” (“It is unexplainable how recalcitrant these people are to civilization; these villages of Beni-bu-Ifrur, in contact with us for more than twenty years, have not left their state of barbarity”; my trans.; 179). The words used to refer to the Moroccans clearly highlight the allocation of the colonized to a lower life form that need to enter civilization, which when placed along with the other erased passages, weaves a narrative of genocidal warfare instead of a military one.

One of the passages erased from editions after 1922 nonchalantly recalls the death of a Moroccan girl lying unconscious in the middle of the street: “...*en el camino encontramos varios moros muertos; una joven y bonita mora yace tendida en tierra; sus vestiduras blancas tienen sobre el corazón una enorme mancha roja; su frente todavía conserva calor*” (“...on the way we found several dead Moors; a young and pretty Moorish woman lies stretched out on the ground; her white clothing has on the heart a huge red stain; her forehead remains warm still”; my trans.; 157). Two other excerpts reveal a complete disregard for Moroccans as human life: in one, Franco relates (with a humorous tone) how one of his soldiers with a taste for “*razzia*” complained that he was



not able to successfully kidnap a Moroccan girl that he had run into outside of camp; in another, one of Franco's soldiers executes a "*moro*" found hiding behind a rock and cuts off his ear to keep it as a trophy. The "Moor's" supplications for the Spaniards to spare his life are recounted mockingly by Franco, who concludes the passage by stating: "...*no es la primera hazaña del joven legionario*" ("... it is not the first great deed of the young legionnaire"; my trans.; 177).

These passages gesture toward the realization of death as law, granting the *Africanistas*' legitimacy as bearers of civilization built upon the bodies they killed. Such violent processes are not exclusive to Spain's modern colonial project in Morocco, but those passages later censored by Franco bring the reader into Spain's fascist worldview, in which an Other who does not qualify as human needs to be exterminated for not accepting European civilization. Furthermore, the erased passages are the only ones with reference to Moroccan women/girls – they are only referenced as "*la joven*" or "*la joven mora*."

The Spanish military's disregard for the feminine Other body – viewed as either an Object to be taken when alive or dismissed when losing its value in death – indicates what could be considered preconditions for genocide, when the marginalized and stigmatized are allocated as disposable. As Raphael Lemkin (the "founder" of genocide studies) argues, genocide is a colonial practice: "...a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves" (qtd. in "Hidden Genocides" 8) For Lemkin, the purpose of genocidal practices is to destroy the Other's identity as a group, in order to impose the oppressor's identity on the survivors. In this sense, the purpose is to eliminate

the group, rather than the individuals that make up the group. While a detailed discussion of genocide is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting the germination of “identity cleansing” in pre-fascist thought, based on the colonial experience of the key players in the Spanish Civil War. Franco’s *Diario de una bandera* opens up a world in which identities exist within a binary dynamic: white, humanized Europeans versus brown, dehumanized savages, upon whom the white identity needs to be imposed.

*Diario* ends with an episode in which a soldier, looking for his brother’s dead body, approaches Franco to tell him he came from Cuba to enact revenge for his country. This last episode closes the circle of the colonial experience as a haunting, in which the defeat in Cuba needs to be avenged in the colonial project in Morocco. It bears pointing out that the overall tone of *Diario de una bandera* is one that glorifies the Spanish troops – and yet, as Sebastian Balfour asserts in his analysis of the origins of the Spanish colonial project in North Africa, the Spanish defeat in the Battle of Annual (in Morocco, in 1921) was a “national tragedy on a much greater scale than any other military defeat suffered by Spain, including the war of 1898” (70). The defeat at Annual was so disastrous (between 8,000 and 12,000 Spanish soldiers died) that it took on mythical qualities. The country quickly became divided between antiwar sentiment among the majority of the population – in particular due to the draft of the working class – and the military, upper-class colonialist interests, and the mass media, which launched a campaign between 1909 and 1927 (along with colonial cinema) to reactivate the old myths of the bloodthirsty and savage Arab that needed to be destroyed if civilization and Spanish masculinity were to be saved (Woods Peyró, Martin Corrales and Nerín).

The colonial motif thus found its way through an instrumentalization of cultural apparatuses as a leitmotif that haunted fascist ideology, functioning as the point of origin – and solution – for ordering the nation, as we will see in the films discussed in the next section.

### **Francoist Cinema and Racial Ideas Displayed**

The figure of the “Moor” as racialized Other was at the center of the advent of cinema, with both silent film and the NODOs that were used in support of the Rif War. The practice of racial division in the colonies and its cultural projection was a tactic continued during and after the Spanish Civil War, with the figure of the “Moor” at its center. The study of visual representations of empire in the Francoist imaginary has been centered around folkloric musicals displaying a cross-class romance between a Moroccan (or hybrid) woman and two Moroccan men. It has traditionally been claimed that the 1940s saw an end to the colonial theme in relation to the Spanish Civil War, with a return to pre-modern imperial times through narratives of the reconquest of Arab Spain or the Christian-era feudal consolidation of the nation. Contrary to that, I see a shift in post-Civil War cinema (and throughout the 1940s, by extension) in which the colonial experience remains a leitmotif in films that narrate war stories. Film genre during the two decades post war is traditionally divided between three genres: “*cine cruzada*,” or Civil War films, “*cine de sacerdotes*,” religious films and “*folklóricos*,” the folklore musicals. However the colonial trope transcends such division thereby making race and the ghost of Empire at the center of Francoist propaganda.

Indeed, the 1940s produced such a highly heterogeneous cinematographic body that claims on specific thematic representations belonging to a neatly delimited timeline prove problematic.

However, the 1940s do indicate a shift in which the focus is no longer about transposing national issues in colonial territory, with actors portraying Moroccans or homosocial bonding in colonial warfare, but rather displaying racial tensions related to Spanish territory through the ghost of the “Moor.” In these films, the construction of national identity within the peninsula is intimately tied to the construction of the nation as an imperial power, displayed through racial representations as articulating that national-imperial identity.

The following films in my analysis show that at a time when fascist ideology needed (re)consolidation, colonial racial representations helped show what needed to be done to restore boundaries seen as crossed or threatened. In *Raza* the colonial ghost returns as a meta-narrative constructing the racial division between Nationalists and Republicans along “racially-coded” lines. In the case of *Legión de heroes* and *Locura de amor*, we see a return to the idea of a romance narrative embedded within the matrix of war between a “*mora*” and a Spanish military. However, this cross-racial romance is never fully realized, making miscegenation impossible and non-desirable, as the foreign female element gets “domesticated” in order to restore proper boundaries of race, gender and sexuality.

### ***Raza* and Colonial Haunting**

The film *Raza* (Saenz de Heredia, 1942, based on the novel written by Franco under the pen name “Jaime de Andrade”) has been vastly studied in research on the Spanish Civil War, traditionally from the angle of a spiritual unification of the various historical groups into one homogenous, Catholic race-nation as the conceptualization of a hegemonic national identity. However through the lens of empire, and in particular of colonial conquest and race differentiation from the “Moor,” the conflict narrated in *Raza* takes on a haunting characteristic of destroying a racialized Other as a compulsion to repeat.

*Raza* was designed with the propagandistic purpose of rewriting history and restoring boundaries seen as crossed or threatened by the defunct Second Republic. The film follows the growth of four siblings over three key historical moments that structure the film narrative: 1898, in which the siblings’ father dies in combat during the Spanish-American War; 1928, in which the male protagonist representing Franco is shot at the end of the Rif War; and 1936, the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. The filmic structure offers a cyclical movement in which the same event returns in an uncanny manner, familiar and yet different. As Freud suggests in his essay, the uncanny is easily produced by repetition but also “when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full function of the thing it symbolizes” (“The Uncanny” 244). For Freud, the uncanny is the “*unheimlich*” (the unhomely) – which, when referring to the nation whose borders are threatened by an internal enemy such as the Republicans of the Spanish Civil War, or by the external figure of the “Moor,” threatens collapsing distinct notions of Self and Other.

Indeed, the “*heimlich*” (homely) has two differing meanings: “that which is familiar and congenial” and “...that which is concealed and kept out of sight” (375). “*Heimlich*,” as noted by Priscilla Wald, also means “the native,” so the notion of “home” comes to mean the nation, and the “*unheimlich*” is to be understood as an estrangement from the “home-nation” – a momentary recognition that the foreign resides at the center of the familiar, and therefore “the discovery that ‘home’ is not what or where we think it is, and that we, by extension, are not who or what we think we are” (Wald 7). Jesse Alemán’s analysis of the uncanny in his essay “The Other Home: Mexico, the United States, and the Gothic History of Conquest” on 19<sup>th</sup> century narratives pointing to the ghost of Mexico within North American borders, leads him to understand the “uncanny” in terms of a burial to emphasize the idea that the presence of the Other in the nation is “that which is concealed and kept out of sight” but always “felt as a haunting history that must be excavated. ... “In-ter” Americanism understands that the nations of the western hemisphere already contain within (“intra”) their borders national Others whose formative presence is subsequently buried (interred) but nonetheless felt and often expressed through gothic discourse” (511).

The same idea of a buried Other formative of the nation whose “haunting history ... must be excavated” can be perceived with Spain, in terms of race and empire. Indeed, the very first images of *Raza*, even before the opening credits, are those of majestic sailing boats reminiscing of empire. These images marking the film’s point of origin, coupled with the opening scenes of film narrative in which the father, Captain Pedro Churruca, tells his four young children a heroic version of the *Almogavares* – Christian

soldiers from the 13th and 14th centuries who fought during the *Reconquista* – point to the hidden past that made the nation estranged (“unhomely”) as the *Almogavares’* battles of the *Reconquista* necessarily imply fighting for Christianity against the Muslim “Moor.”

This hidden or “buried” enemy formative of the Spanish nation – as 1492 marks the advent of the Spanish Christian nation with the expulsion of the last “Moors” – that remains unnamed and yet whose presence is excavated through the story telling of the *Almogavares*, takes on the dimension of the uncanny as the originary threat to the nation which returns throughout time visually represented in *Raza’s* historical markers of a “*Reconquista*” narrative.

For Scott Boehm, the scene of the father recounting the legend of the *Almogavares* to his children, positions the son, Jose – the cinematic embodiment of Franco – as representing the *Almogavare* spirit throughout the film while “[glorifying] the 1936 coup and depict[ing] the Spanish Civil War as a heroic struggle of epic proportions that confirmed Spanish racial superiority over the anti-Spanish *rojos*” (256). Therefore, this foundational scene presents at the core of the conflict depicted in *Raza* a fight for the Spanish race, not as a spiritual endeavor, but rather as a racialized conflict dating back to the *Almogavares’* times. The father/son lineage – emphasized by the vertical visual positioning of the father on top sitting with the son at his feet – constructs them as inheritors of the *Almogavare* spirit according to which fighting a racialized Other in order to restore the boundaries of white Christianity turns into a transgenerational duty. Like Derrida’s specter, which “comes by coming back [*revenant*] ... a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again” (“Specters” 10), the “Moor” appears in

Spanish history through repetition, through his feared and expected return. However, a ghost never returns as the same in “the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other” (“Specters” 10). Thus, the ghost changes and returns as Other, thereby constructing *Raza*’s narrative as an expected and yet to be feared ghost story of the “Moorish” enemy of the *Almogavares* – the saviors of the Spanish nation – returning through the colonial Other and eventually as the Republican Other.

Framing *Raza* within a series of repeated “*Reconquistas*” constructs the anti-Republican imaginary within the experience of colonization and racial thought. The last “*Reconquista*” episode of 1936 thus comes to be interpreted as a mastery narrative over a racialized Other. The two failed colonial enterprises (of 1898, with the loss of Cuba, and of the disastrous defeat at Annual) were still fresh in the memory of the Spanish population at the time evoked by *Raza*’s 1928 episode in Morocco. They had been lived as national traumas by Francoist troops and were projected on the screen as what Freud calls “a fixation” on the trauma (“Moses” 72-76). Indeed, for Freud “[traumas] are not strictly limited to what the subject himself has really experienced... [certain] reactions only become intelligible phylogenetically by their connection with the experience of earlier generations” (98-99) and for these events to enter “archaic heritage” they need to be “important enough, or repeated enough, or both ... what is certainly of decisive importance ... is the awakening of the forgotten memory trace by a recent real repetition of the event” (101).

Thus, the last episode of colonial conquest of 1936, with the threat of “losing” Spain to the Republicans coming after two colonial failures, became this Freudian “recent



real repetition of the event.” For Freud, the compulsion to repeat was one of the principles that enabled him to understand traumatic neurosis that brought his patients back again and again to reenactments of the traumatic event without being evocative of a desire or wish fulfillment. Freud uses the particular example of a child who would throw away his toys to later find them, and then repeat the cycle over and over again. Freud came to the conclusion that this reenactment was not driven by the pleasure principle, but rather by a need for mastery.<sup>43</sup>

The repetition to play symbolized the child’s abandonment from his mother, in which in the initial event the child had a passive role. The repetitive game of throwing away his toys, so as to regain them, brought the child into an active role and therefore mastery of the outcome. It is in this sense that I see the portrayal of the Spanish Civil War in *Raza*. This compulsion to repeat ends, in this case, with a successful colonial outcome that concludes with a happy fascist ending, including actual footage of Franco’s troops parading in Madrid in 1939. These final images display Franco’s fictional character Jose leading his troops – including Moroccans – in a vertical visualization, and the mother answering her son by telling him that what they are seeing is “*raza*.” The cycle of colonial conquest has been closed and fascism prevails, restoring racial boundaries that had been threatened by a ghostly Other.

### ***Legión de héroes, Locura de amor: Fascism as “Virile” White Politics***

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<sup>43</sup> I am drawing the principle of the compulsion to repeat, although in a different context and purpose, from Daniela Flesler’s use in terms of identity and the nation for immigrants in contemporary Spain. See *Return of the Moor*.

Restoring boundaries of the *raza* through the instrumentalization of colonial ideology also implied controlling sexuality. Intersections of social class and race with sexuality are a critical commonplace in colonial studies. As demonstrated by Ann Laura Stoler in *Race and the Education of Desire*, the construction of modern European identity as white and bourgeois occurred both in the colony as well as in the metropolis. Thus, “whiteness” meant the control of sexuality and morals as part of a broader program of racial purity. For Stoler, “...[c]olonial discourses of sexuality were productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of them” (176) which leads her to conclude that social class, race and sexuality were not simply enmeshed but rather “coded” by each other (7). The case of Spain was no different from its other European imperial counterparts however much it tried to present its colonialism as “unique.”

As previously stated, the late 19th century and early 20th century saw Spain undergo a national identity crisis with the loss of its colonies in 1898 and the defeat at Annual in 1921. Not only did these events mark the end of Spain having any pretensions to being an imperial world power, but with Cuba and Puerto Rico having been legally defined as provinces of Spain (thus, regions of the peninsula), their loss exacerbated the fears of dissolution of the nation-state through the regions’ growing demands for autonomy.

These losses – real and imagined – happened within the context of “positivism,” and led to a pathologization of Spain’s national problem: Spain was suffering from a severe illness, “a tumor” and was in need of an “iron surgeon” (Richards 150). The turn of the twentieth century saw the emergence of discourses on the “health” of the race

mirroring the birth of the eugenics movement. Officials saw Spain's race as "degenerating," and it became a national obsession to find measures to "regenerate." The colony and the female body became sites through which the *raza* could flourish once again. According to Mary Nash, the "regeneration" of the race through the control of the female body came to be part of the imperial design of Franco's regime, as "racial heritage, biological patrimony and the belief in the superiority of the Spanish race introduced race hygiene into Francoist discourse" (746). Women's health and their bodies as potential breeders bore the responsibility of maintaining "whiteness" and purity of mind and body, as "contamination" of either would be harmful. It was believed that women had an innate religious devotion: this was a woman's gift to the family and the race (Richards 64).

Francoist ideology viewed women as policing the morals of men and society: "Their purity was a brake on men's moral corruption, but their bodies were the source of dirt and contamination" (Richards 52). Those who did not conform to the fascists' highly conservative ideal, especially prostitutes, or those women considered "Marxists," were considered harmful to society and their behavior was pathologized as overly sexual and mentally ill. Thus, Francoist construction of race "coded" with sexuality, and social class took on a scientific element. The "contaminated" female body came to be the source of systematic repression, as part of the studies of Franco's psychiatrist Antonio Vallejo-Nájera, in order to find the "red gene."

Women labeled as "*rojas*" were to be imprisoned, including those that did not participate in the Civil War but were related to suspected "deviant" families and sent to prison as punishment. In those prisons, known now as "Franco's prisons," scientific tests

were performed to locate the “red gene” through torture, public humiliation and the now infamous practice of “the castor oil purge.” The “red” woman came to be a target precisely because she was seen as the inherent figure of deviance and degeneration who subverted the model of ideal woman as mother and wife. The ostensible scientific purpose was to maintain the purity of the race through the purging of the “red gene” that would allow the settling of “unruly” elements seen as contaminated and deviant.

It is within this context of systemic repression of the female “red” body that the following 1940s films are to be read. While the “*republicanas*” did not find specular representation in film, the threat of the contamination of the race was to be displayed through the cross-racial romance representing the domestication of “unsettled” elements of the population with the racialized heroine figuring the “natives” who need to be “civilized.”

The same year that *Raza* was released saw the production of *Legión de heroes* by Helios Films and directed by Armando Seville and Juan Fortuny. Little is known about this film. This is probably due to the fact that at the time of its release it was eclipsed by *Raza* as yet another film on the colonial experience, and because *Legión de heroes* does not fit the traditional and neat division of cinema genre allocated by academic research. It contains the colonial element of “*cine cruzada*,” but also displays a heterosexual and cross-racial romance, with exotic musical performance that is typical of folkloric musicals. Furthermore, this film articulates a character dynamic that is not present in other 1940s films, through the cross-racial representation of the feminine as an inherently flawed element that need to be settled, thereby projecting a biological and scientific

perception of race.<sup>44</sup> It is because this film does not fit traditional film narrative that I am interested in its ideological articulation of Franco's racial ideas of abjection and perversion in a post-Civil War context of heightened anxieties around gender, sexuality, race, and nation.

The idea of fascism as a "virile" politics promising the restoration of masculine privilege and authority is mirrored in the two female characters, the blonde Spaniard Elma and the dark Moroccan Irene, rather than the homosocial bonding of the military experience. The film centers around a love triangle between Elma, Irene and the "legionario" Ricardo Sandoval. However, this romance could be called a love "quadrangle," as the *patria* for which Ricardo dies comes to embody the bride that he chooses (again, a reminder of the "*novios de la muerte*"). Eventually, neither woman is constructed as desirable enough for the romance to become fully realized, as both contain elements seen as a threat to the purity of the race and nation: Irene, through her racial othering, and Elma, through her "perverted" moral values.

The opening credits show a dedication to "*la patria*" and to the memory of fallen soldiers, followed by a statement that the exterior scenes were filmed in the Sahara. The framing of *Legión de heroes* thus follows an *Africanista* cinematic tone, placing its audience in the geographical space of the colony. However, the narrative of the film focuses on the white settler society, inside which the Moroccan Other is seen as an intruder, symbolically displacing the film's territory within a European context.

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<sup>44</sup> Post-civil war films with two heroines typically display the "bad" one and the "good" one. However, in *Legión de heroes* both female characters are representative of the threat to the Spanish race.

*Legión de heroes* opens with a scene in which the main European characters – Luis, an *Africanista* officer, and his blonde sister blonde Elma – are shown in a close up, driving in a convertible with the top down. Elma complains about the heat, to which Luis apologizes and reassures her it will pass. She continues on to state that she feels hotter than him, and the siblings have a back-and-forth exchange that ends with Elma slapping Luis and stuffing the banana she had been eating in his face. (Luis, as a gentleman, does not react.) Their conversation shifts to Elma telling him he needs to be friends with her boyfriend Ricardo Sandoval, one of his fellow officers, and that she needs a man for herself when he is off in combat. Luis tries unsuccessfully, despite her interruptions, to explain to her the importance of the values of serving the *patria*. The scene ends with Luis telling Elma it is useless to carry on the conversation, as she will never understand. This opening exchange sets the stage by presenting Elma as “unruly” and lacking in moral values, while Luis can be seen as an object of desire: Elma is temperamental, cold and selfish, while Luis embodies the values of fascist virility and is in need of a woman devoted to his military duties.

Throughout the film, Elma is presented as inherently flawed for lacking the devotion to the family and the *patria* that the ideal woman was to embody in Francoist times. The whiteness (reinforced by the white clothes she wears throughout the film) that posits her as a possible object of desire is not enough, as her lack of patriotic character and submission leads to the undoing of her relationship with Ricardo. After a hard battle in which his “*teniente coronel*” (“Lieutenant Colonel”) Luis gets wounded, Ricardo returns to camp and meets with Elma, who had been anxiously looking for him. The pair argue again, with Elma complaining that there is always something between them – his

comrades, the desert – to which Ricardo replies that she needs to understand, ending the relationship.

The third element of this romance, the character of Irene, is introduced as intruding into the white space represented by Ricardo's and Elma's relationship. In the first scene in which Irene appears, Ricardo and Elma are walking together in nature when suddenly a horse soars between the pair, separating them. The horse stops a few feet away from the white couple and Irene is shown as mastering her horse and apologizing for his behavior. A conflict ensues between Irene and Elma, as the blonde woman orders the dark-haired one to formally apologize and tells her that "a girl like her" should not talk back to her. Frustrated by Ricardo's refusal to side with her, Elma leaves and the "*legionario*" and Irene decide to walk back together. The conflict between Elma and Irene comes to symbolize the threat of brownness over the superiority of whiteness as Irene dissolves the union of the white couple. In the following scenes that place Ricardo and Irene together, Irene comes to be constructed as an object of desire in spite of her "Moorish" attributes.

The character of Irene comes to display a hybridity that makes her at once desirable and to be feared. Irene is dark-haired, but her skin is white, thereby making her passable as a Spaniard – coming in stark contrast with the film's male Moroccan characters that are dark-skinned. She has spent two years in Spain, converted to Christianity and displays the ideal Francoist values of devotion to the *patria* as she and Ricardo connect when she shows understanding of his devotion to war. Irene's fabrication as an object of desire lies in her assimilation to white European Christian values, and yet it is this passing that makes her a threat to the purity of the race.

The notion of hybridity as both a source of desire and fear in relation to Spanish representations of identity and the nation is discussed by Susan Martin-Márquez in *Disorientations: Spanish Colonialism in Africa and the Performance of Identity*. Martin-Márquez reevaluates Said's theory of Orientalism (which left out the case of Spain), pointing out the ambivalent positioning of Spain as an Orientalizing and Orientalized nation: orientalizing toward its African colonies and locating the Orient (namely North Africa) as "over there" – Orientalized by its northern European counterparts who, with the resurgence of Spain's *Andalusi* past in the 19th century, likened the Iberian nation to the Orient.<sup>45</sup> The slippage between outside and inside of the Orient comes to be a source of anxiety over definitions of nation and identity for Spain.

As Martin-Márquez explains, "...[while] some of the Spanish elite reveled in self-exoticization, others responded anxiously by projecting their "own" alterity onto the "usual suspects" in Africa and the Middle East – but also onto other Spaniards" (8). Martin-Márquez continues, "...[the] dynamic resembles a Möbius strip, calling into question the possibility of any location 'outside' Orientalist discourse. For Spaniards, this positioning on both 'sides' of Orientalism – as simultaneously 'self' and 'other' – may bring about a profound sense of 'disorientation'" (9).

This "disorientation" – Spain's impossibility of orienting the Orient, where the Self is threatened by the Other as Self – underscores the nation's relation to the modern colonial project and its colonized Other within narratives of incorporation and exclusion.

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<sup>45</sup> Views on Spain as "uncivilized" were framed by European exoticized travel accounts that located "Africa begins in the Pyrenees" (Alexandre Dumas) or Victor Hugo's comment that "Spain is in the Orient."



Irene embodies this “disorientation” as her hypervisibility as “Moorish-white” provides insight into ways in which race and gender are played out as submissive and assimilable, while simultaneously intriguing and desirable. However, the romance between Irene and Ricardo remains hidden and incomplete, as Ricardo chooses death and resolves the anxiety/threat of hybridity (and miscegenation) that could contaminate the purity of the race. The superiority of the white male European identity of Spain remains pure and “orientalizing,” as the Orient is allocated to an “over there” aspect in the female representation.

The ultimate rejection of both women offers an understanding that Spanish identity could only be defined through the reaffirmation of a masculine, bounded, and white individual, who should be infused with the innate sense of devotion to the *patria*, thereby foregrounding a “virile” politics. As explained earlier, in Franco’s psychiatrist Vallejo-Nájera’s studies framing the theoretical construction of race coded by sexuality, the perception of the female body as bearer of the seeds of the nation renders heterosexual desire impossible in this story. This is because both Elma and Irene carry an inherent flaw that could contaminate the purity of the white Francoist race embodied in the male character Ricardo, and both women come to form one vision of the Spanish woman as the “unruly.”

At a time when the majority of Spanish cinema audience was made up of women and the lower class, “...the two sectors of the population that most suffered under Francoism and who would consequently have identified readily with characters labeled as “alien...” (Labanyi, “Internalisations” 33) *Legión de heroes* sent a message to its “unruly” female audience in need of domestication. The film represented both female

characters as threatening elements to the order of the nation, and so as inherently undesirable. Yet the last scene shows Irene and Elma holding hands at Ricardo's funeral, projecting the promise of a possible "redemption" of these flawed elements of society only through submitting and assimilating to the Francoist model of ideal woman as mother and wife of the *patria*.

The perceived threat of a "Moorish" Other upon Spanish territory as a contamination to a white male Spanish race continued into the late 1940s. Juan de Orduña's *Locura de amor* (1948), based on the 19th century play by Manuel Tamayo y Baus, was produced by the dictatorship's propagandistic film production CIFESA. The film portrays the Spanish race as exclusively white European, as the Arab female character comes to be excised from the Spanish nation. In this case, desire for the "unsettled" feminine element is constructed as foreign (the nation does not desire this element), perverted and to be annihilated if the nation is to remain pure. Where in *Legión de heroes* the foreign is constructed as potentially desirable by the Spanish nation, in *Locura de amor* it is positioned as a source of perversion and abjection.

*Locura de amor* was produced one year after Franco redefined his regime from a military authoritarian model to a monarchy. This was done in an attempt to guarantee Franco's stay in power after the fall of Nazism in 1945 and after the U.N. rejected Spain's pursuit of membership. The 1947 law of succession established Spain as a Catholic monarchy led by the *caudillo* Francisco Franco. Thus, Spanish cinema came to reflect such structural and ideological changes, to prove Spain's "Europeanness" and "orienting the Orient" in an effort to eventually being incorporated into the U.N.

The film revisits the historical figure of Queen Juana “*la loca*” of Castile in a romance plot framed within a historical background. The film follows several flashbacks as a means of understanding the Queen’s madness, which is to be found in the jealousy provoked by her husband, King Philip I “the Handsome” of Castile (originally from Belgium). The romance is built around a series of unrequited love: Juana longs for her husband, her husband longs for the Moorish woman Aldara, Aldara longs for Captain Alvar, and Alvar longs in a platonic manner for the Queen Juana. The romantic plot offers the feminine symbol of Spain, Juana, being assaulted by foreign threats: the King manipulated by his Flemish advisor in order to take power away from Juana, and the vengeful “*mora*,” Aldara, who tries to kill the Queen. The character of Captain Alvar represents Francoist values of restoring the nation’s boundaries as he convinces Aldara not to kill the Queen.

Typical of cinema under Franco’s dictatorship, the film reproduces a binary construction of “good” and “bad” elements for the nation. Indeed, most films post immediate civil war such as *Raza*, *Rojo y Negro* or *Porque te vi llorar*, presented the Marxist/Republicans as “evil” and “deviant” while the Nationalists were “good” and the saviors of the nation. A similar trope is used in *Locura de amor* in which the two female characters embody opposing values – the Queen as the “ideal” woman and Aldara as “divergent” and a threat to the nation – and the two male protagonists symbolize as well the dichotomy between “good” and “bad” – King Philip I as “perverted” and Captain Alvar representing the nation’s hero.

I now turn to my analysis of these binary filmic constructions in *Locura de amor* within Francoist ideological constructions of the nation in terms of race, health and sexuality.

The threat posed by the racialized Other's presence on Spanish territory, the anxiety that unmask the notion of hybridity, is visible in the Moroccan female character, but her position is resolved through her docile agreement to withdraw back to Morocco in an expression of successful colonization. The role of Aldara moves from "*mora enemiga*" to "*mora amiga*"<sup>46</sup> in the film by acquiescing to Captain Alvar's authority. Where Irene embodies a certain level of desire in Francoist terms in *Legión de heroes*, Aldara does not, or at least her construction as an object of desire is an expression of an excess in need of control.

Here, race is coded by sexuality as both foreign characters (the King and Aldara) represent threats to the purity of the race through their excess of sexuality. Indeed, as Ann Laura Stoler argues in her study of racial constructions through sexuality in the colonies, "sexual control was more than a "social enactment" ... [and] of gender subordination and colonial authority, ... [but rather an issue of] how sexual control figured in the construction of racial boundaries per se" (346). Thus, the Flemish King's desire for the racialized female Other is presented as a perverted desire as it threatens the safety of the nation. In turn, Aldara's sexuality is viewed as a threat for it is her sexuality seen as desirable by the foreign European elements in Spain that allows her to get close to the Queen and enact her vengeance. The presence of Aldara on Spanish territory appears as an invasion into white Christian space as revenge from old times. Her encounter with the

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<sup>46</sup> I borrow this term from Susan Martin-Márquez.

Queen in which she reveals her motives is presented as a transgenerational drive from the daughter of “King Zagal” who “swore on the Quran vengeance on Isabel and her descendants.” The ghost of the invading “Moor” of 711 AD returns on Spanish territory through the female body.

Aldara’s construction as a threat to the boundaries of the nation is thus not only through her potential hybridity, as her white skin allows her to pass for one of the Queen’s court members, but mostly through her sexualized body displayed throughout the film as an excess that permeates borders. This represents what Anne McClintock calls “porno-tropics:”

Renaissance travelers found an eager and lascivious audience for their spicy tales, so that, long before the Era of Victorian imperialism, Africa and the Americas had become what can be called a porno-tropics for the European imagination – a fantastic magic lantern of the mind onto which Europe projected its forbidden sexual desires and fears. ... Within this porno-tropic tradition, women figured as the epitome as sexual aberration and excess. Folklore saw them, even more than men, as given to a lascivious venery so promiscuous as to border on the bestial (22).

Through the lust-filled eyes of the King, and of the camera showing her revealing tight clothing, Aldara’s body gets inscribed within an imaginary of savagery, bestiality and hypersexualization, proceeding from a “porno-tropical” tradition that accompanied the colonial project. Aldara’s character brings forth the repetition of the colonial imaginary that constructs the racialized female Other with an excess of sexuality. This “excess” is what makes her an object of desire as well as a threat, due to the impossibility of controlling this “excess.” This “excess” in Aldara leads to a gendered and sexual trope articulated around fantasies of perversion and abjection of Francoist fascism deployed against their political enemies.

The King's desire to possess and colonize Aldara's body is constructed as a "foreign" perversion, in opposition to Captain Alvar's disgust toward Aldara. Captain Alvar, as the embodiment of Francoist values, is desired by Aldara, but her "excess" of sexuality (which could render her desirable to male Europeans) turns into abjection when it comes to the Spanish nation. Julia Kristeva first theorized the concept of the abject in *Powers of Horror*. The "abject" etymologically means "cast away" or "thrown away," and for Kristeva, the abject "*est apparenté à la perversion. ... L'abject est pervers car il n'abandonne ni n'assume un interdit, une règle ou une loi ; mais les détourne, fourvoie, corrompt ; s'en sert, en use, pour mieux les dénier*" (23) ("is related to perversion. ... The abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a rule or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them, the better to deny them"; Roudiez 15). The representation of the abject crosses "*des catégories dichotomiques du Pur et de l'Impur, de l'Interdit et du Péché, de la Morale et de l'Immoral*" (23) ("dichotomous categories of Pure and Impure, of Prohibition and Sin, of Morality and Immorality"; Roudiez 16). The abject is that which dissolves boundaries, limits, laws. Revisiting Lacan's theory of the Mirror stage and the Real, according to Kristeva, the abject has to do with the Real: the abject is the moment when the structures of meaning collapse and the boundaries between Self and Other disappear, producing horror. Thus Aldara's hybrid racialization coded through her sexuality as a threat to the limits of the nation, allocates her into an abject position.

In contrast, the white Catholic woman, Queen Juana, is constructed as desirable. But, her appeal does not lie in her sexuality. Rather, the absence of visual markers as an

object and subject of sexual desire (in particular through her austere clothing and make-up, coming in stark contrast with Aldara's costumes) reflects Francoist ideological construction of the "ideal" woman as abnegated and therefore desirable.

As a National-Catholic centered dictatorship, the idea of the family became instrumentalized as a tool to enact power. In particular, the women were the "glue" of the family in their exclusive roles as mothers "regenerating" the nation. Their duty was "to serve the *patria* with abnegation through dedication of the self to the common good. This was the central tenet of 'true Catholic womanhood'" (Radcliff and Enders, *Constructing Spanish Womanhood* 52). Indeed, as I explained earlier on the concepts of "degeneration" and "regeneration" of *raza* through the control of female bodies as exclusively bearers of the seeds of the *patria*, the health of the nation depended on the ideal of the Spanish white Catholic woman as a mother. Her desire was to be invested in her devotion and protective role of the morality and purity of Spain. Stoler, in "Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of Race and Sexual Morality in Twentieth-Century Colonial Cultures," connects the responsibility of white women with ensuring the morality of male patriotism: "European colonial women were urged to oversee their "moral protection," to develop their "natural" inclination toward French society, to turn them into "partisans of French ideas and influence" instead of revolutionaries" (361).

Although the author discusses the role of European women in the Dutch, French and British empires, the same principle can be applied to Francoist ideal of the woman as protector of the values of Spanish men and by extension, the fatherland. In this sense, Queen Juana's descent into madness takes a symbolic dimension as men were considered

more susceptible to moral turpitude than women who were thus, held responsible for the immoral states of men (Stoler).<sup>47</sup> The Queen's failure to resolve King Philip I's lust towards Aldara – contaminating the white purity of race – comes to be read as failure of regenerating the health of the nation. The maintenance in power of a deviant and stained ruler “degenerating” the Spanish *raza* is transferred over into the degenerating mental health of the Queen. Although this in no means signifies that she is responsible for her own failure, as Francoist ideology glorified the grandeur of 16<sup>th</sup> century imperialist Spain and in particular of the Queen of Castile. But rather that the invasion of foreign elements in sexual terms lowers the superiority or divine mission of women as protectors of morality, thereby her madness is not expressed as something inherent to the “Queen-nation” but the effect of racial contamination from the “outside” degenerating the health of the nation.

Thus, the fulfillment of saving the morality and health of the nation from the foreign deviant threats comes to be performed through Captain Alvar's character who embodies the control of sexuality. In her analysis of pathology, race and sexuality, Sander Gilman argues that coding race with sexuality is not only in an effort to control the other seen as hypersexual, but also to construct the self as controlling one's own sexuality and, thus being pure.

One major category with which pathology is often associated is human sexuality. The sexual dimension of human experience is one of those most commonly divided into the “normal” and the “deviant,” the “good” and the “bad.” Human sexuality, given its strong biological bias, not unnaturally is often perceived as out of the control of the self. Since fantasy is an innate part of human sexuality, it is not only the biological

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<sup>47</sup> Although the male “savior” character in Francoist cinema is the one exception as I discuss below.



but also the psychological which can be understood as out of control. For a secure definition of self, sexuality and the loss of control associated with it must be projected onto the Other. ... fantasies of potency [are projected onto the Other] as hypersexuality. ... Sexual norms become modes of control. Thus deviation, either in the nature of the sexual act or in its perceived purpose, becomes “disease” or its theological equivalent, “sin.” ... Group identity thereby serves as a means of defining the “healthy,” that which belongs to the group and “protect” those in it, as well as its antithesis, the outsider, the Other ( *Difference and Pathology* 24-25).

Sexuality defined as being “out of control of the self” which threatens the binary construction of “normal” and “deviant,” needs to be repressed within the Self and projected onto the Other. This outward movement of sexuality as divider of inside and outside becomes a mode of control for “group identity.” In other words, controlling one’s sexuality means belonging to the nation and hypersexuality associated with the Other places them as outsiders. Therefore, Captain Alvar’s asexual love towards the Queen – in her embodiment of the nation – and his impermeability to Aldara’s temptation allows for reestablishing the boundedness of Spain as white Catholic European.

Aldara’s invisible otherness through her skin color that can make her pass as white European, and thus easily blur the limits between self and other, symbolizes the anxiety of Spain’s “disorientation” as an “Orientalizing” and “Orientalized” nation. Thus, in order to resolve this blurring of whiteness and “Arabness” and restore the boundaries of the nation, the Other needs to be Orientalized through her sexuality. Her otherness becomes visible through her sexual representation. Indeed, her lascivious thick wavy hair, make up and tight, revealing clothing, construct her as a sexual being (the antithesis of Francoist white Catholic woman). In order to distinguish the Self from the Other, sexuality as “deviance” needs to be controlled. In this sense, her hypersexuality is not only to be controlled through regulating her body but also through controlling the Self

male sexual urge. Like the “ideal” woman of Spain as abnegated and a mother, the “ideal” Spanish man only desires the *patria* (again, a reminder of the “*novios de la muerte*”). Spain as a white and healthy race is saved by white “virile” fascism (embodied in Captain Alvar) who restores the boundaries of the nation through sexual constraint.

Aldara’s position as abject through sexual control is particularly revealing in the last scene. The film ends with a fight scene in which Captain Alvar, defending the Queen, is about to engage in combat with the King’s manipulative assistant. Aldara appears in the shadows, throwing a dagger at the King’s Flemish advisor, thereby killing the foreign threat and saving the Spanish soldier, the Queen remaining unharmed. Aldara emerges from the darkness, revealing herself to the Captain, and both agree to make a pact of eternal friendship as Aldara consents to leave Spain and return to Morocco. Aldara is thus literally “cast away.” Her excess of sexuality that produces horror in Captain Alvar throughout the film – as he expresses disgust and even physical anger in the scene in which Aldara is about to get close to the Queen and dissolve the boundaries of the nation – comes under control. For the first time in the film, the female Other appears covered, wearing pants; the threat of her sexualized body has been neutralized.

The sexual threat suggested by this perverse foreign female body pinned in opposition to the virtue of the Spanish male figure allows for a reading of Spanish fascism as summoning a vision of a racialized Spanish civilization through the colonial, where white (male) identity would find a sense of unity and boundedness once Spanish mastery over the “Arab” female body was reasserted. Through Aldara’s submission and withdrawal from the country, the idea of a gentle and docile native subject symbolically

affirmed racial mastery and control in the service of restoration of Spanish civilization. Franco's Spain was white and heterosexual, bound by the celebration of masculine virility and "proper" gender roles.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter suggests that contrary to traditional analysis on "race" in relation to Spanish fascism, the phenotypical and biological dimensions of race underscored Franco's biopolitical project. Through the modern colonial project as documented in Franco's war narrative *Diario de una bandera*, the notion of "blood brotherhood" was the exception to the rule of a racial differentiation of hate and dehumanizing processes placing whiteness as superior to brownness. The threat of the loss of the nation and boundaries of identity through the end of colonialism in the Americas in 1898, the disaster of Annual in 1921 and the establishment of the Second Republic in 1931, led to a national crisis fearing the "degeneration" of the Spanish race.

Franco and his fellow *Africanista* officers, fresh from their colonial experience in Morocco, approached their attack on the Republicans as an "internal colonization." This slippage took on racial tones as displayed through the 1940s cinema in which the foreign element threatening the nation and in need of domestication took on the form of the "Moor." Cinema, as the propagandistic tool "par excellence" of Franco's regime, was haunted by empire and as such showed the nation what needed to be done.

As I have demonstrated in my film analysis restoring the boundaries of the nation lied in controlling race, sexuality and health of the "foreign" female elements: either in

their racial otherness or in their lack of moral values. In a post-civil war context of heightened anxieties around gender, sexuality, race and the nation, Franco's eugenics program to extract the "red gene" sought to regenerate the Spanish race that had been seen as threatened by the Other within. The role of women and their bodies then came to be framed within discourses of health and abnegation as the "ideal" woman, belonging to the nation, lied in her motherhood giving birth to a new healthy Spain. Thus, the heterosexual romances studied in this chapter display Franco's racial ideas of abjection and perversion threatening the nation. It also presented ultimately fascist ideology as a "virile" politics promising the restoration of masculine privilege and authority.

These ideological racial displays on screen contained real consequences for the immediate post-civil war society. Indeed, to return to Jo Labanyi's study on 1940s movies viewers, the majority of Spanish cinema audience was made up of women and lower-class, "the two sectors of the population that most suffered under Francoism and who would consequently have identified readily with characters labeled as "alien" ("Internalisations" 33). Indeed, the women Labanyi refers to were those that had most suffered during the war, those labeled as "*rojas*," and thus, through filmic representation of female characters as threatening elements to the order of the nation, it sent a message to its "unruly" female audience in need of domestication as inherently undesirable.

However, even under the most repressive regimes such as dictatorships, films as language (cinematic language) escape total control and thus are not unidimensional and straightforward ideological reflections. As Labanyi explains, "films can allow identifications that work against the grain; and ... the ideology of even the most

repressive State contains its own internal contradictions” (“Internalisations” 22). Particularly, in Spain, production companies were privately owned and it was common to have 1940s cinema directed by men who had previously worked under the Republic and even, produced propagandistic Communist films during the Spanish Civil War. Juan de Orduña is one of the most representative examples. His specialty was the detailed mise-en-scene of historical epics with papier mâché and neoclassical images to reconstruct the Imperial glory of Spain. However, he was also privately known to be homosexual. For Labanyi the director’s identity as diametrically opposed to Francoist values translates into conflicting meanings on the screen between the scripted language – reflecting the regime’s ideology – and the visual language that allowed for resisting interpretations.

### **Chapter 3. (Dis)remembering Immigrant Others: Failed Historicization of Coloniality in Post-dictatorship's Visual Representations**

*We don't have this big problem of racism in our society.*

Pedro Calado, Portugal's High Commissioner for Migration (qtd. in 'They hate Black people' BBC News, 2015).

#### **Introduction**

This chapter is the culmination of the two previous chapters. The present section addresses existing contemporary cinematic representations – or lack thereof – of immigrants from Portugal and Spain's onetime African colonies, and opens a conversation on the ethical aspect of visual responses on direct African descendants as acts of “transgenerational transgression.” This portion of the dissertation places within a dialogue various filmic and documentary productions since the early 1990s that treat African immigration in Spain and Portugal.

While elaborating a critique of cinematic tendencies to use interracial romance plot as performing depoliticizing of the issue of immigration, this chapter focuses on a detailed analysis of two works: Vicente Aranda's *Libertarias (Freedom Fighters)*, along with Sergio Tréfaut's *Lisboetas (The Lisboners)*. It also segues into my concluding analysis of transgenerational descendants of former colonized subjects in Driss Deiback's *Los perdedores (The Forgotten, 2006)* and Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista, João Miller

Guerra's *Li Ké Terra*.<sup>48</sup> Although I include Tréfaut, Deiback and Reis-Baptista-Miller Guerra's works in my discussion of independent filmmaking documentary modalities, I separate the first from the other two, as they address two different theoretical questions toward African immigrants in Spain and Portugal.

Through the study of Aranda and Tréfaut's creations placed within a broad discussion of film and documentary genre, I posit that Portuguese and Spanish visual constructions are indicative of a failed historicization of (post)-coloniality and post-dictatorship. This chapter speaks to the silences "illuminated" in visual representations of people coming from Spain and Portugal's former African colonies under their dictatorships, and how they constitute a critical divide of lasting material and discursive colonial violence under Franco and Salazar. This repetition through a timeless "Other" points toward the Iberian Peninsula's inability to cope with its "national historical" trauma.

The obscuring of the modern colonial project memory in the Iberian dictatorships reveals the problematic of Spain and Portugal's contemporary difficulty in coming to terms with their dictatorial and colonial past. In this dissertation, I have already established that the colonial entanglement within the national narrative of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships is to be read as a trauma in the construction of the nation. I

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<sup>48</sup> In this chapter I anchor what is called "immigration" within the (de)historicization of coloniality. From the lens of the colonial ties between Africa and Iberia and its processes of forgetting, I present a critique of Western conceptualization of "(im)migrants." Therefore thinking of "immigration" in Portugal and Spain from the colony calls for reevaluating the status of former colonial subjects as forgotten citizens or nationals. It also necessarily involves evaluating its implications regarding nationals of color, as the one cannot be thought without the other.

argued that the end of the Portuguese dictatorship cannot be excised from the independence wars in Africa, and toward that end dismantled traditional arguments of a “bloodless” conflict. For Spain, I showed the loss of Morocco as haunting the Francoist idea of the nation, and questions of race producing anxiety over the consolidation of Spain as a white European country.

As demonstrated in this dissertation, the particularity of the Portuguese and Spanish cases is that the colonial project in Africa is tied to the ideological construction of the dictatorship. As I contended in the introduction, the same cannot be said of their other European counterparts, whose colonial enterprise was not concurrent with an authoritarian regime, nor is it similar to Latin American dictatorships, whose constructions are not rooted in colonialism.

Based on my analysis of the two previous chapters, it can be concluded that the forgetting of the former colonized in regenerating the nation reveals Portugal and Spain’s problematic over the demarcation of national belonging and ability to process its colonial past. As argued by scholars on African and North African immigration in Spain, “[t]oday, the responses to Moroccan immigration are still determined by that anxiety,” and the same can be said about Portugal toward African immigrants (Flesler 9).

The transition toward democracy was not a smooth process for either Iberian country, and it was tied to the end of colonialism in Africa – in the case of Spain, Franco’s death also meant the end of colonialism in Africa, as Western Sahara (the last Spanish colony) received its independence on November 6, 1975. With entrance into the European Union, Portugal and Spain became receivers of immigration from its former



colonies as well. The visibility of “non-whites” in the Peninsula saw the creation of visual representations over national negotiations of a Portuguese and Spanish identity as distinguished from an African one, constructing being “Spanish” or “Portuguese” as a white, modern and democratic subjectivity.

The majority of scholarly responses to films addressing these issues have focused on questions of multiculturalism and identity politics in relation to the nation. However, the present chapter attempts to go beyond such theoretical interests by looking at the politics of knowledge through the material and discursive effects of the silencing of colonialism and how these effects manifest themselves as a return of a repressed colonial past.

### **Forgetting the dictatorships, forgetting African colonialism**

The movement toward democracy and integration into the European Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s reversed the flow of migration for Portugal and Spain, as the countries went from sending migrants outward to receiving migrants themselves. In the case of Spain, the first wave<sup>49</sup> of arriving immigrants was composed of Europeans (mostly retirees) and Latin Americans (mostly political refugees). These groups were generally perceived as being “culturally close” to Spaniards. The late 1980s and 1990s saw a second wave of immigrants arrive from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. They were seen as “foreign” and were received with suspicion, as they were without close cultural, religious, or linguistic ties to Spain (Flesler, Rodriguez). It is the consensus

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<sup>49</sup> I use the term “wave” for a lack of better word, although it is highly problematic, for it dehumanizes and deindividualizes immigrants.

among scholars that, while Latin Americans have been the object of discrimination as the coined pejorative term of “*sudaca*” indicates, their Catholicism, skin tone and linguistic affiliation have rendered them more acceptable and “adaptable” to Spanish culture. Research indicates that Moroccans, in particular, have been the most “othered,” and the group that has been the object of most violence due to their perceived inability to integrate because they belong to a different cultural tradition: non-Catholic and non-white.

In Portugal, the first wave of immigration came from the PALOP (*Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa* [African Countries with Portuguese as Official Language])<sup>50</sup> in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the advent of colonial independence<sup>51</sup>. The second wave – with the boom in construction and consequently, the increasing need for immigrant labor – saw the demographic growth of Brazilians in Portugal, with the arrival of less-skilled workers turning the middle-/upper-class group into a lower-working-class community<sup>52</sup>. The third wave was composed of Eastern Europeans (mostly from the

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<sup>50</sup> Also known as Community of Countries with Portuguese Language (CPLP). In this dissertation, I use the Portuguese acronym of PALOP.

<sup>51</sup> Although immigration from the Cape Verde islands can be dated back to the 1960s when the African colonies under the umbrella of “lusotropicalism,” as analyzed in chapter one, they were still considered Portuguese ultramarine provinces. Their inhabitants were considered as “assimilated” Africans and were allowed to work in the metropolis’ construction and manufacturing industries. The Cape Verdeans still constitute the largest minority group within the descendants of the PALOP community.

It is also noteworthy to point out that the presence of black Africans in Portugal, and the Iberian Peninsula by extension, can be traced back to the Roman, Moorish, and Medieval Christian times. See historian Isabel Castro Henriques’ study through traces of sculpture, poetry and iconography as evidence of black African presence in the Iberian pre-medieval and medieval period: *A herança africana em Portugal* (2009).

<sup>52</sup> Emigration from Brazil to Portugal was also due to the economic crisis that beset Brazil during the 1980s. Brazil’s economic plight worsened in the 1990s, following

Ukraine, Romania, Moldova and Russia) in the 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the USSR unification (Peixoto, Fonseca). Although the populations from the PALOP historically have the closest ties with Portugal, they have been the most marginalized group of immigrants. As Hugo Martinez and Nuno Dias aptly point out:

The cultural heritage of the colonial empire that, as it must be emphasized, ended only in 1974, is one of the persistent factors of feelings of racial and ethnic prejudice among the Portuguese population, directed especially toward Africans (Hugo Martinez de Seabre and Nuno Dias, 30 qtd. in Knudson, 35).

This is indicative of a dichotomy within national historical memory processes. Contemporary peninsular exclusionary reactions to the African and Moroccan communities (for being the most foreign) collide with the recent historical past of colonialism in Africa as a marker of national belonging during the dictatorships. For scholars on contemporary immigration from Africa in Iberia, racial violence against these immigrants points to an anxiety over the definition of the nation.<sup>53</sup> This anxiety emerges as the flow of “non-white” bodies to the metropolis represent reminders of the nation’s past as being more African than European. For these authors, the national anxiety felt toward African and Moroccan immigrants is related to the fact that unlike Latin

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President Fernando Collor de Mello’s implementation of two disastrous neoliberal policies in an attempt to modernize Brazil’s economy. For a discussion on the turning of Brazil from a country of immigration to emigration during that time period, see Nadia Lie’s essay “Reverse Migration in Brazilian Transnational Cinema: *Um pasaporte húngaro* and *Rapsódia Armênia*” in *Migration Lusophone Cinema*, Cacilda Rêgo and Marcus Brasileiro (Eds.), 2014.

<sup>53</sup> Daniela Flesler, Susan Martin-Marquez for Spain, and Emily Knudson-Vilaseca for Spain and Portugal.

Americans who can be placed within the category of former “colonized,” Moroccans (and Africans for Portugal) cannot be fixed in their place of otherness.<sup>54</sup>

As I have discussed in my previous chapters, the relationship between the legitimacy of the Iberian dictatorships and their modern colonial project has been marked by an ambivalence in tracing definite boundaries between self and other. Thus, the problem is not that “they are different, but that *they are not different enough*” (Flesler 196). With the “arrival” of immigrants from the former African and North African colonies, it is not simply that the external other has become the internal other, as is the case with Latin Americans to Spain and Portugal or with other former imperial powers dealing with immigration, such as France or the U.K. The specificity of the history between the metropolis and its former colonies (in Africa for Portugal and in Morocco for Spain) makes it that the “returned” symbolize the lack of boundary between the external and internal other that haunts the Iberian national imaginary. In this sense, the need to place Moroccans and Africans as the most “foreign,” at the limit dividing the legibility and illegibility of the nation as European, stems from their “abject” position that needs to be repressed.

As I discussed in chapter 2, Francoist films represented the Moroccan as the abject: that which produces horror because it upsets the limits between Self and Other (Kristeva), and which therefore must be cast away so as to maintain those limits – in this case, the ideal of Spain as white masculinity. Contemporary negative reactions of

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<sup>54</sup> Scholars refer to the imaginary of the Arabic “invasion” of Spain in 711 AD as constructing Moroccans as “colonizers,” thereby placing them in the ambivalent position of “colonized” and “colonizers.”

exclusion toward these specific “others” – at the physical level, and also at the epistemological level, as I develop further down in my documentary analysis – are to be read as a response to the horror produced by their embodiment of a past ambivalent identity between African and European.

The rejection of these foreign bodies has been translated into physical violence toward African communities in Portugal and Moroccans in Spain.<sup>55</sup> It bears remembering the infamous case of El Ejido, Almería, in February of 2000 as “the worst collective attack against Moroccans in Spain” (Flesler 84). This case of violence against Muslim immigrants was marked by three-day-long violent protests against Moroccans that resulted in harassment, Moroccan-owned shops destroyed, Moroccan homes vandalized and mosques burned down. These attacks came after a Spanish woman died on February 5, 2000, of a knife wound that had been inflicted by a mentally ill Moroccan man. The perpetrator was arrested and detained, but this incident led the woman’s neighbors to begin protesting the “lack of security” in El Ejido (Flesler 84). Institutions opposing racism, and several NGOs, became the target of violence during the protests as well.

This violence was accompanied by slogans that were evocative of Arabic presence in the peninsula in medieval times, such as, “Moor hunting” or “Death to the Moor!” which, as Daniela Flesler observes, recall “Moroccans’ transformation into ghosts of the past” (84-85). However, the lack of response from the state and the police to

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<sup>55</sup> This is not to say that other immigrant communities have not been the object of racial prejudice but it remains true that Moroccans in Spain and Africans in Portugal are stigmatized as “the problem” of immigration and have been the most violently targeted. For a cultural studies analysis on othering processes of Latin Americans in Spain, see Ileana Rodriguez and Josebe Martinez’s (Coords.) *Postcolonialidades históricas: (in)visibilidades hispanoamericanas/colonialismos ibéricos* (2008).

these attacks illustrates that this type of violence is not simply a minority of people acting out of the ordinary, but rather stems from an institutionalized racism against Moroccans.

El Ejido's mayor's response – Juan Enciso from the conservative (and Falangist-derived) Partido Popular – that “[w]e are Africa's door, and it is impossible to control all these people who illegally enter” (Constela and Torregrosa, 4 qtd. in Flesler 84) echoes the ancestral need for Spain to defend itself against the “invading Moors” and justifies contemporary violence against Muslim immigrants.

In the case of Portugal, several incidents of violence against black youth – in particular from the police – indicate institutionalized racism against the country's “African immigrant” community as well. The presence of what is known in Portugal as the Rapid Intervention Team (the equivalent of heavily armed military police) in the suburbs on the margins of Lisbon that house primarily immigrants from the PALOP, is evocative of Portugal as a police state.

Since 2001, the police have killed 14 black young men (BBC News, 2015). When a policeman shot a 14-year-old boy in the head at point blank range in the Lisbon neighborhood of Cova da Moura in 2009, it sparked indignation from the community and an investigation into the action ensued. The policeman was indicted for negligent manslaughter, but was acquitted. This is not surprising, as judicial prosecution into police killings remains absent in Portugal.

To return to the quote opening this chapter, Pedro Calado, Portugal's High Commissioner for Migration, stated (in response to the numerous incidents of police violence in Cova da Moura): “We don't have this big problem of racism in our society.

... I have this clear perception that what happened in Cova da Moura is not the general situation of the country. This was an exception.” (BBC News, 2015) Calado then referred to the MIPEX (Migrant Integration Policy Index) – a global ranking study of countries that have successful integration of migrants – pointing out that Portugal came in second (behind Sweden) and that unlike the U.K. or France, Portugal has not had riots, “there’s little anti-immigrant political rhetoric in Portugal” (BBC News, 2015).<sup>56</sup>

Calado’s reaction pointing to the exceptionalism of Portugal in terms of racial violence, and by extension racism, is not unique. Denial of racism is a common trope used by governments throughout Europe, as transnational feminist scholar Fatima El-Tayeb pointedly argued that “[r]ace, at times, seems to exist anywhere but in Europe” (xvii). The idea of “racelessness” that is prevalent throughout continental Europe is defined by El-Tayeb as the process of rendering racism and race as invisible (xvii). This process is evoked in Calado’s arguments turning on its head the exceptionalism of

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<sup>56</sup> For a critical analysis of the MIPEX, see Carlos Miguel Correia Lopes’ 2014 study “Portugal’s Policy on Immigrant Integration: A Success Story?” in *Bridging Europe*, vol. 6.

[http://www.bridgingeurope.net/uploads/8/1/7/1/8171506/working\\_paper\\_on\\_portugal\\_migration\\_policy\\_carloslopes\\_august.pdf](http://www.bridgingeurope.net/uploads/8/1/7/1/8171506/working_paper_on_portugal_migration_policy_carloslopes_august.pdf)

The fact that Portugal has no clear constitutional definition of “racist discrimination” further highlights the unreliability of government data on living conditions of “non-whites” in Portugal. It also makes “hate crimes” based on race difficult to be processed judicially as such. This was evidenced in the 1995 murder of a twenty-five-year-old Cape Verdean by a group of skinheads in Portugal. Only in August of 1999 the first law (law 134/99) was passed prohibiting “discrimination perpetrated by individuals or groups – public or private – in the exercise of economic, cultural and social rights.” However at the constitutional level, legislation on race still remains at best blurry or white-washed. ([http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/legal\\_research/national\\_legal\\_measures/Portugal/Portugal\\_SR.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/legal_research/national_legal_measures/Portugal/Portugal_SR.pdf))

In November of 2016, SOS Racismo presented a claim to the UN to legally qualify racism as a crime in Portugal, after the Portuguese government refused to do so.

Portugal – and Europe – as an inclusive color-blind multiculturalism that posits itself as benevolent and benign in comparison to the U.S. model.<sup>57</sup>

Many cultural studies scholars on immigration have pointed to the intimacy between racism and multiculturalism. While it is more obvious to connect racism with politics that have a platform of nationalist essentialism, researchers have demonstrated that multiculturalism often works as covert racism in order to maintain the preservation of the nation-state. As Stephen Castles argues in *Ethnicity and Globalization: From Migrant Worker to Transnational Citizen*, “multiculturalism may be seen as a new and more sophisticated form of racism in the way in which it legitimates the power of the dominant group to proclaim and manage hierarchies of acceptable and unacceptable difference” (173, qtd. in Knudson 61).

This nation-state selective amnesia or denial of racism – not only in Portugal but also in Spain, under the pretense of “*convivencia*,”<sup>58</sup> – is further enabled by the absence of accurate demographic data on Europe’s “non-white” nationals and citizens by focusing rather on the status of immigrant or immigration. The lack of data results from the fact that ethnic or racial counts of the census are prohibited by the European Union.<sup>59</sup> There

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<sup>57</sup> Although it is beyond the purpose of this dissertation, see the brilliant work of Fatima El-Tayeb on debunking the myth of whiteness and color-blind multiculturalism in continental Europe.

<sup>58</sup> “*Convivencia*” (“coexistence”) refers to the Arab presence cohabiting with Christians in al-Andalus during medieval times. This has become idealized and instrumentalized in contemporary ideological discourses on Moroccan immigrants as a way to promote Spain’s propensity for positive multiculturalism.

<sup>59</sup> Although these prohibitions were intended to be anti-discriminatory in the wake of WWII – as a way of eliminating Nazi practices of biometrics registries from administrative management – they have ironically reconfigured new forms of racialized discriminations. See *Europe in Black and White: Immigration, Race and Identity in the*



is no accurately reliable known number of how many Africans or Moroccans are present in the Peninsula.

Furthermore, due to the absence of “ethnicity” as a concept in Portugal and Spain, “non-whites” are referred to as “immigrants of first generation” or “second generation” or “N<sup>th</sup> generation children of immigrants,” regardless of their birth country or citizenship. Terminologies that are common in the U.S. (of “African-American” or “Mexican-American,” for instance) are nonexistent in Europe, thereby placing national belonging on a binary divide based on the imaginary ideological construction of Europe as Christian and white. Such values symbolize the progressive and democratic Western world in opposition to the “backwardness” of Africa or Muslim countries.

It bears remembering that the transition toward democracy in Spain and Portugal was built around a process of forgetting. In Spain, the pacts of Moncloa in 1977, known as *pacto del olvido* (“pact of forgetting”), founded the democratic process on providing total immunity for any Francoist and legal amnesia toward the victims of the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent dictatorship. Parallel to the end of the Spanish dictatorship, the death of Franco marked the end of colonialism in Africa with the withdrawal of troops from Western Sahara on November 16, 1975. The transition to democracy involved a forgetting of Spanish colonialism in Africa as well, as the nation’s concerns turned toward ways of handling the violence of the Francoist regime within the metropolis.

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“*Old*” *Continent*, Manuela Ribeiro Sanches (Ed.) for a discussion on the problematic of census in Europe, in particular Chapter 8 “Technologies of Othering: Blacks Masculinities in the Carceral Zones of European Whiteness,” 125-141.

The case of Portugal is not as straightforward. Political scientists have traditionally focused on the consolidation of the Portuguese democracy as a clean-cut process. However, recent historians and cultural studies theorists have pointed out that this traditional narrative leaves out the state of crisis that followed the Revolution, thereby overlooking the uncertainty and lack of direction of the transition period. Indeed, as political historian António Costa Pinto aptly noted: “the ‘reaction to the past’ was much stronger in Portugal than in the other southern European transitions” (“Political Purges” 308).

The transition was marked by an erasure of official documents; swift short-lived purges that targeted the economic elite but left key political figures of the dictatorship standing with total impunity; and an unstable political climate following the Revolution, known as *Verão Quente* (“Hot Summer”), during which the communist parties newly in power failed to gather support from the industrial and economic elites and led Portugal to the brink of implosion. Thus, as the Revolution happened, a process of forgetting the past concurrently began: not only through veiled immunity from repercussions, but also through the independence of the African colonies. Cutting out the colonies from the Portuguese state also meant cutting them out of the national memory, as the national focus became centered on the metropolis itself. As I pointed out in my first chapter, the immediate result of the Revolution saw the construction of a national narrative and memory process of forgetting the dictatorship and the Colonial Wars.

The undertaking of forgetting the transition toward democracy thus coincided with the change of Portugal and Spain from senders to receivers of migrants, with full

consolidation in the 1980s as the newly democratic Iberian regimes entered the U.N: the final seal of “whiteness” for Portugal and Spain.<sup>60</sup> In order to mark their Europeanness, Spain and Portugal created laws regulating the status of foreigners. In the case of Spain, the *Ley de extranjería* was implemented in 1985 as a way to control the flow of immigrants, restricting family reunification and access to other citizens’ rights (Ortega Pérez). This was primarily targeted toward the North African and Sub-Saharan waves of migration.

While Portugal’s law to regulate foreigners’ status (*Lei de estrangeiros*) was passed in 1993, the 1974 independence of the African colonies saw the creation of “Bilateral Accords” between Portugal and the newly independent African countries. One of the consequences was that “immigrant” populations arriving from the former African colonies would no longer have a Portuguese nationality.<sup>61</sup> As Emily Knudson-Vilaseca

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<sup>60</sup> The Schengen agreement, signed in 1985, consisted of a weakening of internal EU frontiers while strengthening external borders. This was done in order to facilitate the flow of goods, capital and people within the Schengen space.

<sup>61</sup> On May 29 of 2015 the Portuguese parliament amended the Nationality Law, which was approved by the president on July of 2015. It grants citizenship to those born abroad who are second-degree descendants of Portuguese citizens that have not lost their citizenship. However there are several requirements, which make the process to apply for citizenship and for it to be granted by the Government extremely difficult and at most nearly impossible. Initially, the amendment stipulated that those eligible to register at the Civil Registry needed to have an “effective link to Portugal” (meaning sufficient knowledge of Portuguese and evidence of regular contact with the Portuguese territory) which would allow them to be attributed citizenship. However, new wording was added to the amendment (Article 1, n.1, paragraph d). In addition to the requirements above, the candidates’ second degree ascendant who has not lost their citizenship has to be of direct line. Also, the applicant must be of Portuguese origin, submit a declaration that they want to be Portuguese and once these requirements are met, they have to register their birth in the Portuguese civil registry. Once those applying for citizenship have passed these stages, their effective ties (sufficient knowledge of Portuguese and regular contact with the territory) must be approved by the Government after it has evaluated the relevance of

aply remarks, the presence of communities from the PALOP in Portugal is a reminder of the country's defeat as a colonial power. Portugal's placement of this specific group at the margins – at the external border by becoming “illegals” and at the internal border by living on the outskirts of Lisbon – expresses a desire “to create distance from their colonial past, to forget or ignore their recent colonial history” (45). The *Lei de estrangeiros* was specifically designed to “rein in” the growing number of “illegal” immigrants from the PALOP. This law did not come as an immigration policy, but was rather perceived as “relevant to the issue of post-colonial transition” (Knudson-Vilaseca 52).

Thus, it can be said that Portugal and Spain's transitions toward neo-liberal democracies and into the E.U. were marked by a desire to break from their past as dictatorships and concomitantly with their colonial ties to Africa and North Africa. The laws implemented in the completion of the transitional process came as an effort to forget and smooth over not simply both countries' traumatic past as fascist regimes, but rather how their fascist ideologies were built around the modern colonial project in Africa and Morocco.

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these ties and under the condition that the applicants do not have a criminal record. See the SEF website and Patricia Jeronimo's “Portugal Grants Citizenship to Grandchildren of Portuguese Citizens” at the *European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship*, [eudo-citizenship.edu](http://eudo-citizenship.edu)

If anything, the belatedness of Portugal legislatively addressing legal modes of granting citizenship to grandchildren of former colonized people indicates a prevalent denial of Portuguese society dealing with its colonial past and maintaining the idea that Portugal does not have a problem of race/racism as stated by the High Commissioner for Migration at the beginning of this chapter.

### Cultural responses to immigration

With the growing visibility of “non-white” populations in the Peninsula, cultural representations in cinema produced a variety of stories centering on African and North African immigrants’ lives.<sup>62</sup> However, these representations did not occur until the 1990s – and the late 1990s-early 2000s for Portugal – producing a relatively small filmic body when compared to France or the U.K. Peninsular scholarly attention paid toward works of the immigration genre is relatively recent as well. In Spain, a theoretical body of study on race and identity politics began to emerge in the late 1990s, addressing immigrant cultural representations in general, but it was not until the turn of the 21st century that scholarly works specifically addressing the issue of Moroccan immigration began to appear.

Scant attention has been given to the presence of Africans and their descendants in Portugal within cultural productions – in literature and film genre<sup>63</sup> – while there has

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<sup>62</sup> In Spain, the end of the 1960s saw a decline in film and literature related to the African colonies and their relationship to Spanish racial identity – except for Juan Goytisolo’s novels *Reivindicación del conde don Julián* (1970), *Juan sin tierra* (1975), and *Makbara* (1981), which tackle national and racial constructions of identity.

Portuguese cinema was not used as a propagandistic tool for the colonial experience. Only two films were produced that praised Portuguese colonization in Africa: *The May Revolution* and *Spell of the Empire (Feitiço do Império)*, 1940. Patricia Vieira, in her analysis of *Estado Novo* cinema, attributes the lack of colonial cinema to the fact that “both films had little success at the box office, an outcome which probably discouraged the regime from investing in this type of cinema” (7). It can also be said, though, that the invisibility of films on Portugal’s colonial experience in Africa is reflective of Salazar’s personality – unlike Franco, he maintained his control in the shadows. As discussed in my first chapter, one of Salazar’s strategies to remain in power was exerted through rendering invisible any form of conflict related to colonialism.

<sup>63</sup> The exception being the works of writers Lidia Jorge – with her famous novel *The Murmuring Coast* (1995) – and António Lobo Antunes. However, these works leave out

been a comparatively significant number of documentaries and cinema on Eastern Europeans, as well as Brazilian immigrants. Only at the cusp of the 21st century did films and documentaries on Africans emerge. This has led to a late – since 2010<sup>64</sup> – and quite limited academic theoretical corpus centering on immigration and race related to this specific migrant community.

Films in Spain on Moroccan and Sub-Saharan immigrants – such as *Las cartas de Alou* (*Letters from Alou*, Montxo Armendáriz, 1990), *Saïd* (Llorenç Soler, 1998) or *Susanna* (Antonio Chavarrías, 1996) to name a few – vary from depicting their arrival to the “host” country and the racism they encounter, to portraying their daily lives at work and the home. These films negotiate the difficulties immigrants encounter through the lens of interracial heterosexual romance. In her study of film on Moroccan immigrants, Daniela Flesler offers a pointed critique of such representative strategies in her 2004 article “New Racism, Intercultural Romance, and the Immigration Question in Contemporary Spanish Cinema,” which she later further investigated in her book, *Return of the Moor*.

Drawing from feminist theories that have critiqued the romance genre as justifying subjugating women while remaining highly popular with audiences, Flesler argues that in the case of immigration cinema, the interracial romance “adds extra

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the experience of Africans, focusing rather on the “white’s eye” and voice, as argued in my first chapter.

<sup>64</sup> Except for the work of Emily Knudson-Vilaseca’s dissertation in 2007, *Embodying the Un/Home: African Immigration to Spain and Portugal*.

“excitement” to this commercial formula” (134). The immigrant, usually male,<sup>65</sup> serves the purpose of galvanizing the idealized nationalism of Spain as progressive, with whites cast in a positive light and immigrants seen as being the problem. The North African or Sub-Saharan immigrant character is projected within the national fantasy of two extremes: exoticism bordering on eroticism, or dangerous and degrading to the utopian “white” European identity.

Daniela Flesler aptly points out that Spanish filmic representations of Latin American immigrants address the difficulties and hardships of living within the “host” country through interracial romances and that these mostly have a happy ending, with the Latin American female working out her relationship with the white Spanish male. This is not the case for interracial heterosexual romances with Moroccans, which always end up in failure due to the immigrant either being deported or killed, thereby avoiding any “contamination” and keeping the only successful mixing “interwhite”:

In all the films, Spanish males intervene as protectors of a hegemonic sexual order in which Spanish women should not attempt to choose any other but a Spanish male as a sexual or romantic partner. This intervention often functions as a complement or as a substitute for the Spanish state’s policing of its immigration laws. Unfortunately, all the films sanction this policing, allowing one obstacle or another to precipitate the end of the romance, and in so doing, they unwittingly endorse the belief in the relationship’s impossibility (134).

The impossible interracial heterosexual mixing seems to echo Francoist colonial cinema explored in my last chapter. These 1940s filmic representations of the threat of “contamination,” embodied by Moroccan women that needed to be expelled in order to

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<sup>65</sup> Interestingly, immigration cinema on Latin Americans tends to portray women characters. This is not the case for films on Moroccans.

maintain the purity of white masculinity, seem to have found their legacy in contemporary films – the only difference being that now the threat lies in male characters.

Furthermore, these heteronormative interracial romances that are so popular at the box office are problematic – as argued by Flesler and Luis Martín-Cabrera, among others – in that they render invisible asymmetries of power relations that led to the immigrant being present in the “host” country to begin with. In other words, by focusing on the “intercultural romance” in a here-and-now temporality, these films depoliticize and dehistoricize the process of immigration from the Peninsula’s ties to its former African colonies.<sup>66</sup> This is evocative of what Sara Ahmed’s denounces as failed historicization of post-coloniality and which this chapter attempts to address by historically anchoring the “non-white” nationals of Spain and Portugal.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> The film *Palmeras en la nieve* (*Palm Trees in the Snow*, 2015) is the only contemporary commercial film that does address Spain’s colonialism in Equatorial Guinea. However, it is again highly problematic, in that it also resorts to an impossible heterosexual interracial romance positing colonialism as having good and bad characteristics because there were good and bad colonizers. This obviously reiterates the narrative of Spanish exceptional colonialism as “benevolent.” While this film tries to levy a critique of colonialism, it utterly fails by presenting a romance story disconnecting Spanish colonialism from the Francoist dictatorship, and leaving out the fact that its main character – a grand-daughter of a colonizer, who initiates a trip to Guinea to uncover her grandfather’s past – is a descendant of a Francoist sympathizer (Republican males obviously having been either killed or jailed during the dictatorship).

<sup>67</sup> Sara Ahmed evidences the problematic of “post-colonialism,” arguing that it is impossible to locate it within temporal distinctions or teleological continuations between past and present: “It is in this very precise sense that I understand post-colonialism as a failed historicity: it re-examines the centrality of colonialism to a past that henceforth cannot be understood as a totality, or as a shared history. It is the very argument that colonialism is central to the historical constitution of modernity (an apparently simple argument, but one that must nevertheless be repeated) that also suggests history is not the



The same strategies and critique are to be denoted in Portuguese cinema of African immigrants. There are few Portuguese filmmakers that have produced national motion pictures with immigrant main characters from the PALOP. Similar to Spanish feature films, the hardships of the immigrants and their descendants are mediated or resolved through interracial heterosexual romance. Films such as, *Zona J (District J*, Lionel Vieira, 1998), *A esperança está onde menos se espera (Hope is Where It is Least Expected* Joaquim Leitão, 2009) or *Tabu* (Miguel Gomes, 2012) attempt to offer a critique of racism in Portugal by portraying the impossibility of integration of African migrants and Afro-Portuguese through intercultural romance.<sup>68</sup> While these films focus on identity negotiation and language barriers, they remain depoliticized by naturalizing asymmetries of power within intercultural “post-colonial” romance storylines.

In terms of documentary representation, as it is the genre that I am exploring in this chapter and the next, there are even fewer productions that have been realized. In terms of Spain and its Moroccan immigrants, documentaries are nonexistent, except for *En construcción (Under Construction* José Luis Guerín, 2001), which has a small section on a Moroccan construction worker. However, even this documentary does not take the experience of Moroccans in Spain as its focus.<sup>69</sup>

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continuous line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous encounters between nations, culture, others and other others.” *Strange Encounters*, 11.

<sup>68</sup> Although “Afro-Portuguese” is a “non-sense” within Portugal’s identity lexicon, I use this term as it is commonly employed in literature to refer to Portuguese nationals of African descent.

<sup>69</sup> The genre of predilection for depictions of Moroccan immigrants is literature. The only documentary to my knowledge that focuses on Moroccans in Spain is Driss Deiback’s *Los perdedores [The Forgotten]* (2006), which I discuss in this chapter. To the best of my knowledge, this documentary has not received scholarly attention so far. The fragile

There are more documentaries on African immigrants and Afro-Portuguese in Portugal but they still remain limited and, when directed by “white” Portuguese, interviews of these migrants remain marginalized, favoring the discourse of “white” officials.<sup>70</sup> Representations of African immigrants in documentaries can be dated back to Pedro Costa’s “Fontainhas” trilogy<sup>71</sup> – *Ossos (Bones, 1997)*, *No Quarto da Vanda (In Vanda’s Room, 2000)*, *Juventude em Marcha (Colossal Youth, 2006)*. These documentaries produced by white Portuguese tend to be aesthetically oriented akin to “cinéma d’auteur” which carries its own problematic, as I discuss below.

Considering the topics and modalities of Portuguese and Spanish films on immigrants from their former colonies, it is not surprising that the vast majority of theoretical investigation on immigration cinema has focused on questions of identity politics and multiculturalism, referencing the common trope of Etienne Balibar’s “neo-racism.” However, my interest is focused not on “immigration” in general from the former colonies, but rather on the descendants of those that participated in the modern colonial project tied to the Iberian dictatorships – meaning “non-white” nationals – and so I am led to going beyond identity politics and issues of multiculturalism. The failed

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situation of Saharawi refugees in Algeria has been depicted, however, in the documentary *Hijos de las nubes, la última colonia [Sons of the Clouds]* (Javier Bardem, 2012), but this does not constitute as addressing the situation of Moroccan immigration in Spain.

<sup>70</sup> See, for instance, the acclaimed documentary series made for television *Portugal: Um retrato social* (2007) [*Portugal: A Social Portrait*], directed by Joana Pontes. This series devotes a part on the issue of immigration entitled *Nós e os outros [Us and the Others]*. Ironically, the voices of Africans and Afro-Portuguese are left to the side, focusing instead on the voice of experts (social workers, teachers or lawyers).

<sup>71</sup> Fontainhas is a low-income neighborhood in Lisbon, mainly housing Cape Verdeans.

historicization of post-coloniality as evidenced in the filmic strategies exposed above points to a gap at the material and epistemological level.

The exclusion of the colonial ties between Iberia and Africa projected in these films, and paralleled by a legal erasure of such connections during the transition period, as I discussed at the beginning of the chapter, draw my interest into this silencing process and how it gets projected onto the “newer” generations embodying that colonial past that needs to be repressed by Spanish and Portuguese societies. In particular, the documentaries I analyze on these descendants address the ways they negotiate their relation with the nation-state that do not involve intercultural romance. Although Sergio Tréfaut’s *Lisboetas* does not focus on the descendants of the colonized Others tied to the dictatorship, I use it as a starting point in order to explore the state’s consigning into invisibility and oblivion those who are reminders of its colonial past.

### **Documentary modalities**

Before going into the discussion of the documentaries themselves, I would like to explain why I chose these features. As stated earlier, Spanish documentaries that focus on Moroccan immigration are nonexistent, except for *Los perdedores* (*The Forgotten*, Driss Deiback, 2006) which I am discussing here – and analyze in my next chapter – and which has not previously received scholarly attention, to the best of my knowledge. The two other documentaries I examine in this chapter are the Portuguese Sérgio Tréfaut’s *Lisboetas* (*Lisboners*, 2004) and *Li Ké Terra* (creole for *Esta é minha terra*, meaning *This is My Land*, Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista and João Miller Guerra, 2010).

Most research on Portuguese documentaries of African immigrants have focused on Pedro Costa's trilogy on Fontainhas mentioned earlier – *Ossos* (*Bones*, 1997), *No Quarto da Vanda* (*In Vanda's Room*, 2000), *Juventude em Marcha* (*Colossal Youth*, 2006). The privileged attention given to this series seems to stem from the fact that until *Lisboetas*, Costa's work was the only documentary on such topics that was not created for television. However, only the last part, *Juventude em Marcha*, focuses on African immigration, as the overall project was to depict the marginalized poor – the second part focuses on a heroin-addicted white woman named Vanda – in the neighborhood of Fontainhas, where the housing estate was about to be demolished by the city.

The particularity – and problematic – of this documentary is that it does not seek to give a voice to immigrants, but rather to provide them with an image: “*é uma maneira deles ter uma imagem. Pode ser boa o má.*” (“it’s a way for them to have an image. It can be good or bad;” Costa, qtd. in Knudson-Vilaseca 254). Indeed, Costa is more interested in developing an aesthetic narrative than addressing the topic of immigration itself. Costa's trilogy has been classified as a “docudrama,” a hybrid between documentary and cinema. The film *Juventude em Marcha* focuses on the daily life of one immigrant (Ventura) seen inside his home, and is shot in black and white. The visual quality is highly textured, with plays on light – the protagonist is shot in half-light most of the time – giving it a cinematic dimension. As I posited earlier, Costa's trilogy is more akin to “*cinéma d’auteur*,”<sup>72</sup> as it focuses on achieving the director's aesthetic vision rather than

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<sup>72</sup> “*Cinéma d’auteur*” or “*film d’auteur*” is a term created in the 1950s by French film critiques in the cinema review *Cahiers du cinéma*. In one of the articles, François Truffaut defined this concept as using cinema in a manner of representing filmmakers’

on offering a critical view of immigration or reflecting the daily hardships of the poor.

Similar to intercultural romances in film, Costa's trilogy depoliticizes the issue of immigration.

The twenty-first century has seen digital advances in filming that have opened up the resources for documentary production to filmmakers with an alternative or "radical" point of view. As I discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the particularity of documentary is not simply an asymmetry of high and low culture – with high being literature – but rather, it displaces a hegemonic narrative and teleological understanding of history. As Bill Nichols presents in his analysis of the documentary mode:

Documentary as a concept or practice occupies no fixed territory. It mobilizes no finite inventory of techniques, addresses no set number of issues, and adopts no completely known taxonomy of forms, styles, or modes. The term *documentary* must itself be constructed in much the same manner as the world we know and share. Documentary film practice is the site of contestation and change. Of greater importance than the ontological finality of a definition ... [documentary] locates and addresses important questions, those that remain unsettled from the past and those posed by the present (12).

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aesthetic choices, instead of creating movies as cultural works unto themselves ascribed to a specific story or genre. The idea of "*film d'auteur*" was to produce a form of cinema that would steer away from the Hollywood format. Ironically, the founders of this film wave have relied on major film companies to finance and distribute their works. Truffaut, Jean-Luc Godard and André Téchiné, among others, have all worked with the leading French production company, Gaumont. The main element in aesthetics-centered movies is that visual language does not rely on the storyline, but is instead constructed through the form and visual structure of the film. This process is akin to the theoretical concept of structuralism – which was concomitant with the apogee of *cinéma d'auteur* in the 1960s – according to which meaning is derived from the structure of a text, rather than its content or external modes of production. In other words, the point of film d'auteur is to represent the author's aesthetic vision producing a work that thinks about itself. It is in this sense that I consider aesthetic cinema as depoliticizing. It primarily focuses on the author's individual vision, thereby producing works that keep the status quo unchanged.

The documentary, as a genre, allows for historical and epistemological contestations that are not so readily available through other media, due to its fluidity and lack of “fixed territory.” Nichols further argues that in contrast to cinema, which needs to follow a storyline or representative logic, documentaries “can sustain far more gaps, fissures, cracks, and jumps ... [in which] [p]eople and places can appear in a manner that would be disturbingly intermittent in fiction” (19). These gaps and disjunctions that are able to erupt in the representation, that disturb the logic and yet do not destroy the container embodied by the documentary, make this specific genre best suited to register the gaps in history that have been smoothed over by hegemonic powers.

While “docudramas” such as Costa’s trilogy that are interested in aesthetic representation fail to question the workings of power, the twenty-first century documentaries discussed here offer a compelling political argument against the hegemonic narrative surrounding Iberian colonialism in Africa and its legacy. *Lisboetas*, *Los perdedores* and *Li Ké Terra* represent a shift in production and approaches in the use of cameras that reflect what Samira Makhmalbaf calls “the digital revolution” where “the emerging technological democracy ...” “reduces the technical aspect of film making to a minimum and ... instead, [maximizes] the centrality of the film maker,” with the result that “political and financial hurdles can no longer thwart the effervescence of this thriving art” (373-375).

The particularity of the documentaries analyzed here is that they are produced by independent filmmakers that have not received state funding – Reis, Baptista and Miller

Guerra have funded themselves<sup>73</sup> – while providing the foreigner’s gaze through the foreigner’s perspective. Indeed, while these documentaries are produced in Spain and Portugal, the directors are of foreign descent. Sergio Tréfaut is a foreigner that has lived in Portugal for many years, Driss Deiback is a Spanish Muslim of Moroccan descent, and while Reis, Batista and Miller Guerra are Portuguese, they gave the camera to the two Cape Verdean youths portrayed in the documentary so that they could film themselves, and later incorporated some of that footage within the documentary.

These documentaries do not use voiceover: the authorial voice is constructed by the “immigrant” interviewees. The visual depictions presented come in stark contrast with Joaquim Furtado’s *A Guerra*, which I analyzed in my first chapter. As I contended, however much *A Guerra* was innovative in being the first documentary to give a public space for the African independence fighters’ voices, it was problematic. Furtado’s representation was highly narrativized with an intent to reconstruct “what happened,” and was filmed by a journalist financed by RTP, the major state-sponsored media institution in Portugal. Thus, the means of production were dependent on the state’s influence and it translated into giving an account of all the participants – the “great” and “small” actors from “both” sides in the colonial war – in an effort to provide a narrative for the trauma of “all.”

The documentaries examined here are made by independent filmmakers who are not interested in providing an “objective” account trying to make sense of the reality of

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<sup>73</sup> *Lisboetas* was funded by Atalante Filmes, which is devoted to independent cinema and European films; Driss Deiback had to receive funding from organizations outside of Spain and the producers Filipa Reis and Nuno Batista’s own company “Vende-Se Filmes” provided the funding.

their subjects. In an interview about documentary production, Sergio Tréfaut stated he does not write an outline, as he believes that:

*o documentário não se escreve. Sou contra as imposições do mercado francês da escrita de documentário, em que as televisões aprovam os documentários segundo um guião (com cena 1, cena 2, cena 3). Isso, para mim, não faz sentido nenhum. O documentário é um projecto de pesquisa, é um projecto em que se tenta descobrir algo através de alguma coisa, e, pouco a pouco, vamos sendo confrontados com os impasses e as dificuldades dessa tentativa. (“you do not write a documentary. I am against the impositions of the French market on writing documentaries, in that televisions approve documentaries based on a script (with scene 1, scene 2, scene 3). This, for me, does not make any sense. A documentary is a project of investigation, it’s a project in which you try to discover something through something, and, little by little, we are being confronted with the impasses and difficulties of such endeavor”)* (Jorge Jácome, *Entrevistas com realizadores*; my trans.).

Tréfaut’s approach to making documentaries is revealing of this “new” generation of independent filmmakers whose desire is to explore the inconsistencies and “impasses” in a way to break from dependency on cultural markets and engage in a “decolonizing” process similar to Samira Makhmalbaf’s concept of “digital revolution.” As stated in various interviews, these authors’ position toward documentary making is political, akin to “third cinema.”

The concept of “third cinema” or “*cine acción*” (“cine action”) was developed by Octavio Getino and Pino Solanas in *Cine, cultura y colonización*, as a way of addressing Argentinian filmmaking and dismantling the neocolonial vision of Western film industry: “*el cine revolucionario [que] no es fundamentalmente aquel que ilustra y documenta o fija pasivamente una situación, sino el que intenta incidir en ella ya sea como elemento impulsor o rectificador*” (76). (“the revolutionary cinema is not fundamentally that which



illustrates and documents or passively fixates a situation, but rather that which tries to have an impact on it [the situation] either as a driving or rectifying element”; my trans.; 76).

For Solanas and Getino, if Argentina wants to create its own culture and if cinema is constitutive of that culture, it must steer away from neocolonial culture and produce by its own means a cinema that can be revolutionary. In this sense, film genre performs a decolonizing act. This can be transposed onto the documentaries studied here, in their effort to challenge hegemonic views imposed by the state and disrupt “business as usual,” for a lack of better expression, by making visible what the state and society do not want to see. Keeping in mind the political dimension of the features I chose to study, I will now turn to the film and documentary discussion itself, beginning with Vicente Aranda’s *Libertarias (Freedom fighters)*, followed by Sérgio Tréfaut’s *Lisboetas*, as starting points toward understanding the invisibility and liminal position enforced by the state upon those “immigrants” arriving from Portugal and Spain’s former African colonies.

### **Epistemological violence and failed historicization**

The participation of Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War has remained left out of contemporary cultural representations on the memory of the Spanish Civil War. The only film that slightly touches Moroccan representation during that era is in Vicente Aranda’s 1996 *Libertarias*. This is one of the few films that portrays the participation of women on the front during the Spanish Civil War. It focuses on six women (played by Ana Belén and Victoria Abril, among others) who take up arms, portraying their desire to break free

from a male-dominated conflict. The opening scenes depict a church taken over by the militia and the nuns running away. One of the nuns, María, finds refuge in a brothel, which is irrupted by the five main female characters dressed in military attire and carrying rifles. Their purpose there is to free the prostitutes; they also find María, who decides to join them. The film then focuses on the struggles, friendship and victories of these women in a heteronormative conflict. For this reason, researchers have investigated the role of women during the Spanish Civil War in this film.<sup>74</sup>

One of the last scenes presents the participation of Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War. However, their appearance onscreen is very short and is depicted as a scene of extreme brutality and rape. This scene is highly problematic for various reasons, one being that it follows a “presentist” model. We do not know why the Moroccans were there; they are not historically anchored (let alone given character dimension other than as “attacking bodies”).

In this particular sequence, the women reach an abandoned barn to rest. In the most graphic scene of the film, one of the women (the former nun María) goes inside and suddenly hears one of her comrades screaming, followed by male grunts. María sees her friend’s hands grasping the bars of a barred window, and as she walks toward it, the camera zooms in on the hands. Then a brown male hand holding a knife slits her friend’s wrists. The next scene shows a group of men dressed in foreign attire, evoking traditional Arabic representations, surrounding the barn to attack the women. They do not talk to the

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<sup>74</sup> See in particular Magí Grussel’s study on the historical discrepancies of women’s participation compared to the film’s portrayal, “*Libertarias: La Utopía durante la Guerra Civil española no fue solo cosa de hombres.*” *Film-Historia*, Vol. VI, No.3 (1996): 295-300.

women, and once they arrive on site, they say nothing amongst themselves. (They are, however, shown exchanging a few words in Arabic as they come down from the hills, but their speech is not translated). The camera only portrays their bodies “attacking” the women and sexually violating them. The brown men<sup>75</sup> are eventually stopped by the Nationalists, who have occupied the zone, before María can be further assaulted. We finally understand these Arabic men are mercenaries fighting under the command of the Nationalists – Franco’s forces. One of the Nationalist officers enters the barn and whips away the Arabic soldiers, who disappear from the movie without ever being mentioned again.

This is the most violent scene of the whole film, yet despite (or because) of this, it is left without context and/or relational sequence with the rest of the film. The introduction of the Moroccan mercenaries in the film omits any historical context, leaving the viewer to play a guessing game to figure out their ethnicity: these brown men are definitely Arabic-looking, and are probably Moroccan, but we are not sure. We also do not know why they appear at this particular moment in the film, or what function they serve in the film other than portraying a moment of extreme “brown man onto white woman” violence and barbarity. Such filmic strategy illustrates snippets of violence that usher toward a presence and an absence: it is titillating, not explicating. They evoke what

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<sup>75</sup> I am using the term “brown men” or Arab instead of Moroccan as a way of referencing the lack of historical anchoring of the film, and because the audience of such a commercial film would not know that they are specifically Moroccan unless they are familiar with the history of Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War. This is more than likely the case, as Moroccan soldiers taking part in the SCW has remained completely absent from historical memory, including within the *Ley de la memoria* honoring the memory of Republicans – which had remained itself erased or smoothed over within hegemonic processes of commemoration.

Nicole Guidotti called “utterances of unspeakable violence” that “materialize, hail and deny violence all at once” (*Unspeakable Violence: Remapping U.S. and Mexican National Imaginaries* 5).

Although Guidotti addresses the forgetting of epistemologic and physical violence on gendered Native Americans in the U.S-Mexico border from the 19th to the 20th century, her theoretical framework can apply to the forgetting and dehistoricizing processes of Moroccans during the Spanish Civil War – as well as pre- and post-SCW. For the author, such utterances, with their lack of detail and narrative context, “may be understood as a way of instructing us to forget.” These snippets of violence against the male gendered and racialized bodies demonstrate a double movement in their being extraordinary but also being normalized by being left without a context that would question such representations. Thus, what we see in these films is “epistemic violence, a production of knowledge that selectively forgets and remembers some details while forgetting others” (24).

The destructive capacity of violence is taken out of its historical context and held up as nothing more than evidence of natural and normalized barbarity of brown male bodies. In this sense, cultural productions that construct visual representations of “non-whites,” and in the case of Spain “Arabs,” as inherently brutal and dehumanized savages, come to effect real life consequences. It is through these “utterances of unspeakable violence” that contemporary violence against Muslim immigrants are justified, as in the example of El Ejido described earlier, within epistemological discourses of the nation having to defend itself from the threatening Other.

### **Transhistorical state betrayal and dehumanizing processes**

Sergio Tréfaut's *Lisboetas* has traditionally been considered as a documentary on Eastern European immigrants in Portugal. This is not surprising, as the majority of the documentary focuses on their experience. However, the first close-ups of *Lisboetas* focus on African immigrants from the former Portuguese colonies. This segment of the film is even more salient because the African population disappears from visibility as the documentary unfolds, pointing to a limit.

*Lisboetas* received the award for best film upon its projection at the Indie Lisboa 2004 film festival and became the most watched documentary on immigration in Portugal.<sup>76</sup> It was created as a sequel to a 2003 exhibition held in Paris at Parc de la Villette that displayed visual representations of the various congregations in Lisbon. The synopsis on the flyer for the film reads as follows:

*Lisboetas* is a secret window into new realities: ways of living, labour market, rights, religious cults, identities. It is a journey to an unknown city, the places where we have never been and that have always been here. *Lisboetas* is a picture from inside. The word is given to newcomers. *Lisboetas* is not a dogmatic film, but it raises many troubling issues because it is difficult to assess how much has changed and can still change.

*Lisboetas* is presented as a reflection of the demographic change in Lisbon due to recent immigration. It is no surprise, then, that research addressing this feature has

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<sup>76</sup> Indie Lisboa is a prominent International Independent Film Festival.

focused on questions of multiculturalism and the nation.<sup>77</sup> It has also focused on the portrayal of Eastern Europeans while leaving aside investigating the presence, albeit brief, of African immigrants in the documentary – with the exception of Paulo de Medeiros who mentions the film’s problematic of “notoriously avoid[ing] portraying migrants from the former Portuguese African colonies (the only African community shown is from Nigeria)” (de Meideros 217) which has no historical ties to Portugal. For Joanna Passos, this absence is partly due to the fact that African immigration has been acknowledged since 1974 and immigrants from Eastern Europe are more recent. This is a problematic statement as scholars – myself included – have argued and demonstrated that Portugal has not contended with its colonial past in Africa, which is evident in its treatment of Africans as invisible.

*Lisboetas* does not follow a logically sequential order. It is comprised instead of vignettes that focus on thematic blocks: legalization, the labor market, healthcare, religions, education, rights and integration. These sections intertwine to create a window into the lives and struggles of immigrants in Portugal. However, when watching the documentary, it seems that the flow of the storyline is interrupted and that instead of one

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<sup>77</sup> See Joanna Passos’ 2008 article “Lisbon, *Lisboetas* and Portugal: Immigrants’ Stories and Hosts’ Prejudice” *AfroEuropa* 2, 3 (2008); Chapter One of *In Permanent Transit: Discourses and Maps of the Intercultural Experience*, Eds. Clara Sarmiento with Sara Brusaca and Silvia Sousa (2012): “Representations of Cultural Identities in Contemporary Audiovisual Narratives,” Gabriela Borges (3-14); Paulo de Medeiros’ analysis titled “Impure Islands: Europe and a Post-Imperial Polity” (207-222) in *Islanded Identities: Constructions of Postcolonial Cultural Insularity* (2011); Verena Berger’s “Voices Against the Silence: Polyglot Documentary Films from Spain and Portugal,” (211-228) in *Polyglot Cinema: Migration and Transcultural Narration in France, Italy, Portugal and Spain*, Eds. Verena Berger and Miya Komori (2010).

documentary there are two. As I stated at the beginning of this section, the first close-ups are those of mainly African immigrants. These shots are filmed inside the building of the SEF (*Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras*) [Immigration and Borders Service], which would be similar to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. This thematic section, on the regularizing process of immigrants, is extremely short (only nine minutes long; 00:04:03-00:13:27) and this is the only time that Africans are shown except, as I mentioned above, toward the end when a Nigerian community is depicted inside a church having a service in English. As Sergio Tréfaut explains in an interview to the *Cine Club Santarem*, he and his team were given a permit by the SEF to film for three days, but when they came back on the second day they were told that they were not allowed to enter the building because the cameras made the immigrants feel uncomfortable.<sup>78</sup>

When looking at the shots taken inside this state institution, the viewer is positioned face to face with the immigrants, while the public servants are not shown on camera and only their voices are heard. The close-ups on the faces of immigrants as they appear to struggle with understanding and expressing themselves in Portuguese – which is ironic, in that it points to the failure of Salazar’s “lusotropicalism” – forces the audience to engage with and emotionally connect with those that do not belong to the nation. These faces that fill out the screen produce an effect of spilling out and invading the living space of the viewer, disrupting the safety or comfort zone of the distance between the gaze of the audience and the gaze of the documentary’s subjects. Tréfaut’s

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<sup>78</sup> “Realidades Invisíveis,” *Cine Club Santarem*.  
[https://cineclubesantarem.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/di\\_viagemaportugal.pdf](https://cineclubesantarem.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/di_viagemaportugal.pdf) Accessed May 22 2017.

choice of zooming in the immigrants' "non-white" faces, while leaving out of the frame the "white" faces of the civil servants, inverts the workings of the nation-state hegemony: those that are usually visible, as constitutive of the nation and enactors of state control, are rendered invisible, and those that are consigned to invisibility by the state become visible.

Scholars point out the documentary's movement from dehumanization of immigrants to their becoming humanized by the end of the film. These researchers compare the first scene of the documentary – showing a Brazilian immigrant inside an abattoir handling the carcasses of dead cows and pigs – to the last scene in a maternity ward in which a Russian immigrant gives birth and names her child. However, it seems to me the footage inside the SEF is more compelling to the dehumanizing processes of immigrants, in particular of those coming from the Portuguese former colonies.

As a regulating state agency of the lives of immigrants, deciding whether they can move from being illegal to legal, the SEF is a space in which immigrants' rights are suspended, and therefore the distinction between biological life and political life collapses. This is evocative of Agamben's argument of the *zones d'attente* in French airports as structures of the camp being the norm instead of the exception of the rule of law. These areas are "an apparently innocuous space in which the normal order is de facto suspended and in which whether or not the atrocities are committed depends not on law but the civility and ethical sense of the police who temporarily act as sovereign" (*Homo Sacer* 174). The same can be said of the public servants of the SEF, who enact state power based on their evaluation of the situation.



As Nick Vaughan-Williams argues in his study of Agamben's theory of the camp, "Agamben's central thesis, that the structure of the camp is the 'hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we live,' calls for a reconsideration of what and where borders in contemporary political life might be" ("Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben and the 'NOMOS' of Contemporary Political Life" 149). Thus, the SEF can be seen as another form of the border in which entrance into the nation depends on whether or not state workers approve the immigrants' legalization.

It becomes evident then that the immigration services banned Tréfaut and his team from filming despite the permit they had been granted by the very same institution. The presence of their cameras unveiled the inner workings of hegemonic power that are usually hidden from the public eye. The lenses registered the difficulties and impasses that immigrants face, not only linguistically but also as they are shown being rejected time and again, either because they had forgotten a document or brought the original instead of photocopies, or even because they had left the country for more than three months to visit their families. These interactions demonstrate the impassivity of the immigration representatives while the immigrants have to demonstrate that they are not a fraud.<sup>79</sup> This asymmetry of power relations speaks against the state hegemonic narrative

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<sup>79</sup> In her blog entry entitled "Bogus," Sara Ahmed discusses the "bogus asylum seeker" in the following terms: "You have to demonstrate that you are not passing for what you are not (that you are what you claim to be) in order to take up residence within a nation or to receive any benefits. *The effort to establish that you are not a fraud has life consequences*: a system becomes a hammer directed against those who are perpetually being rendered dubious because of their origins, because their bodies, their story, their papers, are not in the right place." This can be applied as well to the process of legalization of illegal immigrants presented here. ("Bogus," blog *feministkilljoys*. Posted on October 27, 2016, in *feministkilljoy.com*)

of a benevolent multiculturalism or denial of institutional racism, as seen with Portugal's High Commissioner for Migration's statement above.

The pretext used by the SEF to forbid entrance of the cameras in the name of the immigrants' sake – in other words, the state institution presents itself as an organization that welcomes diversity and works as a protector of the immigrants' well-being – is evocative of Sara Ahmed's critique of institutional racism as institutional injury. In Ahmed's theoretical blog (titled "Progressive Racism") on the incongruities of institutions that portray themselves as progressive and diversity inclusive, the author aptly expands her argument:

When diversity is a viewing point, a way of picturing the organization, racism is unseen. Racism is heard as an accusation that threatens the organization's reputation as diversity led. Racism is heard as a potentially injurious to the organization, as what could damage and hurt the organization. In other words, institutional racism *becomes an institutional injury*. When institutional racism is talked about as an "accusation" then it becomes personalised, as if the institution is "the one" who is suffering a blow to its reputation. Those who speak about racism thus become the blow, the cause of injury.

Although Sara Ahmed speaks against the university system, the same statement can be said about the SEF's handling of Tréfaut's filming as threatening "the organization's reputation as diversity led." By rendering visible the immigration services' space as the "hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we live" (to return to Vaughan's quote of Agamben and my argument of the biopolitical earlier), the institutional racism at play within the (de)regulating processing of immigrants' statuses gets co-opted. The problem then becomes Tréfaut and his team wounding the benevolent work of the institution.

This interdiction by a state institution begs the following questions: how are we to understand the state consigning illegal immigrants to invisibility, in particular those coming from its former African colonies? In which ways is the camera's encounter with Portugal's black immigrants reflective of encounters that "are not simply in the present," but rather as encounters that "[reopen] past encounters?" Or to use Sara Ahmed's wording, in which way is the institutional silencing of these specific immigrants from symbolization in order to present itself as "progressive multiculturalism" to be read as a mark of transhistorical state betrayal? For after all, as historian Manuel Loff reminds us, the Portuguese democracy is owed to the Africans, who are the "true liberators of the Portuguese" ("Coming to Terms" 121).

The Salazarian regime of violence in the African colonies, allocating its colonized Others to a social death under the umbrella of "lusotropicalism" as a benevolent and inclusive colonialism, is repeated under the blanket of a benevolent immigration system while also committing the descendants of the African colonized to a social death. The limit of representation in the documentary of those that embody as a return of the silenced history of Portugal's former colonies, points to the edge to which Portugal is able to sustain the visibility of these specific immigrants and consequently of its colonial past. The encounters with the Other, defined by Sara Ahmed as reopening past encounters, pose the question of historicity. The nation-state's inability to inscribe the bodies of its former colonized subjects historically, in modes of seeing, points toward its failed historicization of coloniality.

## Conclusion

This chapter proposes a reevaluation of “immigration” discourses and epistemological processes that do not use the trope of interracial heteronormative romance as a solution to the “problem” of immigrants in Spain and Portugal. It inscribes itself within scholarly evaluation of contemporary films that use such filmic strategies as depoliticizing the issue of immigration by smoothing over intercultural asymmetries of power.

I have also put into question why immigrants from the former African colonies have been framed as *the* problem of the nation, and in which ways extreme violence toward the African and Moroccan communities is to be read as a consequence of processes of forgetting Spain’s and Portugal’s colonial past. As nations that have been incorporated into the European Union, Portugal and Spain have constructed themselves as western white Christian nations, following the same myth of their counterpart European countries at large.

One of the processes of myth creation has been the removal of legal ties with the “non-white” annexed continent of the peninsula at the moment when Spain and Portugal were changing from dictatorial regimes to democracies. For the colonial subjects, this meant losing their position as Iberian citizens or nationals, becoming the most “other” and threatening the whiteness of the nation. For Spain and Portugal, the presence of immigrants of color from their former African colonies embodies the return of this repressed past that must constantly be stifled.

Cultural productions, then, are to be understood as constructed within relations of power, and therefore as sites that are always negotiated and contested. However, this is a process that does not belong to conservative views only. Vicente Aranda, who is considered libertarian, or even leftist, ironically reproduces such selective “forgetting-remembering” in his film *Libertarias* that emblemizes this “normalized” epistemic violence.

As producers of epistemic knowledge, the films discussed here reflect this constant negotiation of selectively choosing what can be visible and what must remain invisible. And yet at the same time, they open counter ways of understanding, as they are visual languages and thus always constituted by the excess that falls out of symbolization, yet returns through other pathways of reinscription.

It bears noting that this does not mean that people of color remain in a passive position, as objects of national constructions allocating who belongs to the nation and in which ways this is made (im)possible. As in any hegemonic process, “normalized” national narratives are not the product of an imposition of power from above, but rather a negotiation by the dominant classes to gain the consent of the people through cultural means. This, in turn, enables resistance from below through the use of counter-hegemonic cultural social acts. I explore this process in my next chapter.

#### Chapter 4. Ethics of “Transgenerational Transgression” in Driss Deiback’s *Los perdedores* and Filipa Reis, Nuno Baptista, João Miller Guerra’s *Li Ké Terra*

*Lo triste de esta situación es que somos nosotros los musulmanes españoles en primer lugar, porque no tenemos otro sitio donde podamos ser enterrados, los que reclamamos este derecho, ¿es que acaso no somos los musulmanes españoles iguales que cualquier otro ciudadano? Por lo tanto se nos vuelve a repetir la triste historia de estos primeros musulmanes que fueron utilizados de manera vil y a nosotros se nos vuelve a discriminar de nuevo otra vez, haciéndose los que no tienen memoria ni conocen la historia para nada. (“The sad thing is that it is we Spanish Muslims who demand this right – because we have nowhere else to be buried – aren’t we equal to any other citizen in Spain? The sad story of these first Muslims, used in such a vile manner, is being repeated. Again we are being discriminated by people who pretend not [to have memory and not] to know this story at all.”; 01:14:40).<sup>80</sup>*

Zakaria Maza, Coordinator of Granada’s mosque (qtd. in Deibak’s *Los perdedores*)

#### Introduction

The present chapter continues the discussion from the previous section on cultural modes of decolonization. While the former segment looked at the politics of knowledge in its discursive and material effects of silencing Portugal and Spain’s colonial past, this concluding part explores the responses to these silences by the descendants of colonized subjects.

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<sup>80</sup> I have added “not to have memory” in the translation as it is a key element in the original citation in Spanish.

As I stated previously, decolonizing and historicizing the episteme “(im)migration” means understanding that the processes of forgetting at play in the peninsula’s colonial past position “(im)migrants” as forgotten citizens or nationals. Which, in turn, calls for studying the youths of color in Spain and Portugal in relation to the issue of immigration, as one cannot go without the other. Feminist scholar Fatima El-Tayeb rightly argues for connecting studies on racialized minorities with the problematic term of migrant, so as to understand the epistemological narratives of exclusion towards any “non-white” present inside European territory:

Key to the ability to define minority populations as nonmembers of the nation is the racialized European understanding of the concept of “(im)migrant,” which contrary to the U.S. use of the term implies a strictly temporary presence ... but at the same time indicates a permanent state across generations. That is, whoever is identified as racial or religious Other is necessarily conceptualized as a migrant, that is, as originating outside of Europe, even if this origin is two, three, or more generations removed (180).

European nations’ identity construction as white Christian states produces a binary definition of who belongs to the nation and who does not. One of these exclusionary processes is effected through silencing the Portuguese and Spanish colonial past – which is the argument of this dissertation. In my study of Vicente Aranda’s *Libertarias* and Sergio Tréfaut’s *Lisboetas*, I have focused on how Spain and Portugal’s former colonized subjects are seen. In this chapter, I investigate the ways in which their descendants see and voice their own position within Portuguese and Spanish contemporary society. Here, the Other is not simply an abject/object of history, but rather performs his or her own agency into becoming a subject of the nation. As a result, the

two documentaries analyzed presently come in stark contrast with the visual productions addressed in the previous chapter.

I begin with Driss Deiback's documentary on the Moroccan survivors of the Spanish Civil War, with a particular interest in their grandchildren. *Los perdedores* (*The Forgotten*, 2006) historicizes the presence of Moroccans on Spanish territory, moving them from an abject position to a position as subjects of history. From this perspective, anchoring the Moroccans who died during the SCW means going against the state sanctions of leaving their bodies in nameless mass graves. The Moroccans' descendants, bearing the burden of memory, act against the law and unbury the dead in order to re-bury them with the proper rituals. This specific representation in Deiback's documentary leads me to read these acts against state law as performing an ethics of "transgenerational transgression" in which performing transgressive acts becomes a question of survival.<sup>81</sup>

I elaborate my theory, specifically but not only, on Jacques Lacan's definition of an ethics of psychoanalysis as "not ceding on the truth of desire." In *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*, Lacan considers that the subject becomes invested ethically, not simply as a response to the demand of the other but also (and even principally) as a response to oneself. This is what he terms "not ceding on the truth of desire." When the subject is invaded by its own conflict between the death and desire drives, the subject's response in choosing to not cede on the truth of its desire embodies a reply of survival so as to avoid

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<sup>81</sup> Although the meaning is obvious, I refer to "transgression" as an act that goes against a law, rule or code of conduct.



experiencing, what Lacan names “a second death,” meaning a “psychic death.” I go into further detail about this in my analysis of *Los perdedores*.

I then consider Reis-Baptista-Miller Guerra’s *Li Ké Terra* as a manifestation of this life-asserting act against state laws that consign immigrants from Portugal’s African colonies and their “Luso-African” descendants as the nation’s abject. Although their response to state violence expresses itself differently, “Luso-Africans”’ expression of agency as subjects constitute a “not ceding on the truth of desire” by creating networks of what Fatima El-Tayeb’s calls “translocality,” thereby rejecting normative state ascriptions of who belongs to the nation and who does not.

### **Burial as ethics of transgenerational transgression in Driss Deiback’s *Los perdedores***

*...me encontré que no están enfadados; debe de ser cosa del Islam, que les dice que todo está escrito, pero yo sí estoy cabreado porque la Ley de la Memoria Histórica que aprobaron en España está recordando errores, pero no el que se hizo con este pueblo, ... se les tiene olvidados incluso del lado económico pese a que se les debe una barbaridad ... en la actualidad se reconoce la nacionalidad a los nietos, incluso de aquellos que participaron en las brigadas internacionales, pero creo que hay en un pacto entre todos los partidos de España para no sacar a relucir esta parte de la historia, imposible casi de encontrar en las hemerotecas, pese a que los marroquíes-españoles eran campesinos, no fascistas, obligados y a la fuerza (“...I found that they were not angry; it must be an Islam thing, which tells them that everything is written, but I am furious because the *Historical Memory Law* which was approved in Spain is remembering errors, but not what was done with this people, ... they are forgotten even at the economic level in spite of being owed an atrocity ... currently the grandchildren have the nationality, including of those that participated in the International Brigades, but I believe that there is a pact among all the [political] parties in Spain so as to not bring up this part of history, it is almost impossible to find in the newspaper and periodicals libraries, in spite of the fact that the Spanish-Moroccans were farmers, not fascists, mandated and by force [to join the war]”; my trans.; Driss Deiback, interview in *El Faro de Vigo*)*

In the above statements on what motivated Deiback to make the documentary *Los perdedores* (*The Forgotten*, 2006)], the director explains in interviews that the generations of silence and absence of memory surrounding the participation of Moroccans in the Spanish Civil War, including the process of memory recuperation of the *Ley de la Memoria Histórica*, created an anger in him and propelled him to recover this silenced part of Spain's history, to give these men the possibility of inscribing their past and their memories.

Deiback's documentary was met with great success when it was released in 2006, receiving several prestigious awards: three for best documentary in France, Pamplona and the international festival of Madrid "*El ojo cojo*"; two for best director. The documentary came to fruition despite working with a small budget of 450,000 Euros, while receiving no funding from any Spanish institution. It was a German-Spanish production, with funding was provided by in part by Cataluña, the program Media Europeo, and Morocco. Deiback is himself from Melilla, and the filming covered both Melilla (where he found the Moroccan survivors he interviewed) and Spain. It is a one-of-a-kind documentary on this topic, because it does not simply compile historical facts but provides a public sphere for these voices to be inscribed, and not only examines the time period of the Spanish Civil War but also the silences that have affected generations of the Moroccan community in its relation with Spain throughout time.

Although the documentary is about recovering the memory of the 100,000 Moroccan soldiers that participated in the war, its structure reveals that what is called "The Moroccan participation in the Spanish Civil War" is a misnomer, in that it opens up

multiple temporalities – not only the duration of the war – and affects not only the survivors but also their descendants, which is of particular interest in the present study. The “testimony-memory” constructed in *Los perdedores* is one of transgenerational memory that comes at odds with the official hegemonic memory of these Moroccans portrayed through the archival newsreels of the Franco era (most often referred to as “Moros,” a term used to refer to the Arabs or Muslims of the eighth century that were expelled in 1492, and which has stayed in use to this day to refer to Moroccans).

Before going into the documentary analysis, it seems necessary to address the fact that because these descendants are grandchildren, meaning they were born after the Francoist dictatorship and the SCW – and the same principle is to be applied to the descendants of Africans in *Li Ké Terra* who did not live the Salazar dictatorship – we cannot talk of post-memory, but rather of working through the silenced screams from their elders that have been disconnected from their own experience and creation as subjects. In this sense, I agree with Luis Martín-Cabrera’s argument (in his study of documentaries on younger generations who did not experience the state violence of Spain and the Southern Cone’s dictatorships) that Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “post-memory” on the children of Holocaust survivors is inadequate to express the experience of the grandchildren of trauma survivors:

The fact that the majority of these filmmakers were born after the traumatic events that they describe in their documentaries does not imply that they are in the same situation as the children of Holocaust survivors. In fact, rather than being overwhelmed and dominated by the traumatic narratives of their elders, these filmmakers are responding to the noisy silence created by the lack of a social link between the previous generations and their own. [...] To be born after the disasters of the war and the dictatorship implies a higher degree of mediation and also an

active or passive inheritance of the silence and pain of others within oneself. In this respect, it is important to notice that the films of these new generations are not an act of charity toward the victims of historical traumas, but rather a collective necessity based on the ethical imperative to confront the unsaid, the frozen time and words of trauma (132).<sup>82</sup>

The grandchildren of those who experienced the violence of the dictatorships have inherited the silences as well as the broken link of families separated due to state violence, and whose knowledge of past violence is therefore built upon “dead speech” and consequently highly fragmented. While Luis Martín-Cabrera refers to the work of Davoine and Gaudillière in understanding transgenerational transmission of trauma, the production of the films studied here and the acts of the grandchildren in response to state violence offer a different approach.

The descendants of the Moroccan and African colonized subjects do not consider themselves victims or inheritors of trauma, but their actions, and their negotiations of being in relation to the nation State, are a matter of survival. In democratic states that have inheritors – and descendants – of the Salazar and Francoist regimes in power, the grandchildren’s responses act as a defense of their own survival, to counter psychic death and in the face of transgenerational state violence reproduced onto the descendants’ own lived experience. I elaborate this principle further down in my documentary analysis of *Los perdedores* and *Li Ké Terra*.

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<sup>82</sup> It seems even more notable to make this distinction as, while the Holocaust became widely discussed and incorporated within (trans)national collective memories, the violence of colonialism – as well as Salazar and Franco’s dictatorships – have been overwhelmingly marked by silence.

The present study offers to anchor the historicity of Moroccan survivors of the Spanish Civil War as subjects. This is accomplished by looking at how Driss Deiback's documentary on the testimony of the silenced memory of Moroccan survivors produces a "not-forgetting" and allows for challenging national narratives in the politics of knowledge of Spain's "Other." What becomes clear, through the testimonies of the survivors and their descendants, is that the stories told form a memory of betrayal.

I would like to go beyond questions of identity representations and look at what kind of memory is presented in the documentary. How is a silenced memory transmitted through generations? Of particular interest is how the type of memory presented in this documentary demands a response: in which ways does a memory of the state's betrayal of a community demand an answer that defies the law of the state, and leads to acts of transgression as an ethical response? How are the descendants' response as documented in the film –defying the law by disinterring the dead from mass graves and then reburying them according to proper rites – to be read as acts of an ethics that does not take the state as a point of reference, and by doing so, performs an ethics of transgenerational transgression?

Before going into the analysis of the descendants' acts of transgression, it seems necessary to clarify that Deiback's documentary does not confront its audience with everyday memory, but with traumatic memory that has been obliterated from the public sphere, a memory that is the manifestation of an erasure in the historical social link between Spain and North Africa – a memory that is manifested through its silence yet still demands to be inscribed, returning through the generations and breaking any notion

of time and “Otherness.” Although I have elaborated the importance of trauma and traumatic memory in the documentary genre in my first chapter, it bears referring to it again as a way of understanding the notion of betrayal relative to a “not ceding on the truth” as constitutive to Lacan’s ethics, which I explore in detail in a later passage.

To understand the “untimeliness” and social dimension of the traumatic memories in Deiback’s documentary, we have to understand the notion of trauma in relation to the Lacanian Real. In *History Beyond Trauma: Whereof One Cannot Speak, Thereof One Cannot Stay Silent*, Françoise Davoine and Jean-Max Gaudillière look at cases of “madness” in transgenerational trauma patients in relation to Lacan’s conception of the Real (44-45). As I have stated in my first chapter, Lacan posited the structure of the unconscious as language structured by the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real; where the unconscious is to be found within the Real, not as repressed speech, but as a “*béance*” (“gap”) – an irruption within the guaranties of speech – the negative force of the Real.

The best illustration of the irruption of the Real is Lacan’s use of the “Borromean Knot,” where the Real is to be understood in its relation of being linked with the Symbolic and the Imaginary as three interlocking rings, but the “knotting is such that: “if you cut one, all three are set free” ... Knotted to the two other orders, the Symbolic and the Imaginary, the register of the Real will be retained here in connection with its effects of unlinking,” with the Symbolic “rupture of ... the social link ... of the foundation of the subject of speech and of history,” with the Imaginary “disorganization of the orientation points ... and hence of the function that allows for relations of specular identification: the body image, which presides over the boundaries of the “me” (45-46).

It is in this sense that trauma – traumatic memory – is to be understood; trauma as bordering with the Real. When a powerful blow erasing events or people opens this “béance” (49), it sets in motion a memory that does not forget, that escapes symbolization and seeks to be inscribed through different pathways. For Lacan, this “not forgetting” is relative to the Real “*qui revient toujours à la même place, à la même place où le sujet en tant qu’il cogite, où le sujet en tant que rêve cogitant ne le rencontre pas*” (49) (“the real is that which always comes back to the same place – to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the *res cogitans*, does not meet it”; Sheridan; 49), that is experienced belatedly. It is a failed encounter that returns unbidden, that imposes the presence of uninscribed catastrophes, that breaks any possible link with an “Other,” escapes history, defying time and oblivion.

Deiback’s documentary brings together official testimonies (historians such as Rosa María de Madariaga, Josep Sole Sabate and the novelist Juan Goytisolo) and individual testimonies (the survivors, the widows, and the grandchildren) juxtaposed to and overlapped with Francoist archival newsreel from the Spanish Civil War. The documentary begins with a series of newsreel images of the Spanish Civil War, with well-ordered Moroccan troops marching to war with a voice over stating “*verdaderos torrentes humanos por propio impulso acuden a las intervenciones y oficinas de reclutamiento ni deba propaganda, voluntarios, nada más por mandato del corazón*” (“authentic human rivers, arriving of their own volition...to the recruitment meetings and offices. No levy, no propaganda. All volunteers! Moved to go by their own hearts!”; 00:09:42-00:09:54).

However, these newsreels are imbricated with the testimonies, which come in opposition and tell a different story. They are followed by Spanish Civil War historian Rosa María de Madariaga, who is shown stating that not only the fathers or those soldiers were recruited, but also youth and others who were forced into the draft from age 16 to 60 years old.<sup>83</sup> Similarly, the sanitized images of the war are intercalated by the testimonies of the Moroccan survivors challenging the official state narrative, as the same question recurs in their interviews: who would want to go to their death? And the same message: we were not told about the war, we were forced to go.

Through the expression of their fears in combat, the image of a ferocious, naturally violent “Moro” – part of the state narrative – is deconstructed (strikingly opposite to the Falangist idealization of death with the self-proclaimed “*novios de la muerte*”). In these testimonies it becomes clear that “these history’s stories” unveil a system in which the Moroccans were subjected as biopolitical weapons whose lives were disposable (they often refer to themselves as “*carne de cañón*” [“cannon fodder”]). Listening to the survivors’ testimonies, the audience hears and views a wound marked by a deep sense of betrayal, manifested through tears as one of the interviewees remembers the death of his brother: “*Me siento completamente olvidado, 100% de todo lo que esperamos, cada uno en España dice, vete ya, vete moro, nos han tratado de moro, mira que somos hijos de España, hemos defendido a la patria, hemos sufrido, derramado sangre... “vete moro”*”) (“I feel totally forgotten, 100% of all that we hoped for, everyone in Spain says, “Go away, you Moor!” they call us “Moors.” But we’re sons of Spain,

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<sup>83</sup> Historian Josep Solé i Sabaté adds further that adulthood was at 21 or 25 and that the recruiters falsified the Moroccans’ dates of birth (*Los perdedores* 00:10:36-00:10:55).



we've defended the Motherland, we've suffered, shed blood... "Get lost, Moor!";  
00:25:12-00:25:45).

The history of betrayal irrupts in this feeling of being forgotten. Indeed, Deiback does not confront his audience with everyday memory but rather traumatic memory that has been obliterated from the public sphere. It is a memory that is manifest of an erasure in the historical social link between Spain and North Africa, a memory that is manifested through its silences but still demands to be inscribed. Of particular interest is Jenny Edkins' definition of trauma as:

an event [which] has to be more than a situation of utter powerlessness. It has to involve a betrayal of trust. ... What we call trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of danger (4).

For the Moroccan survivors who participated in the war and trusted the Francoist regime narrative of the "brotherhood" between Spaniards and Moroccans as discussed in chapter 2, this trust was broken once they realized that they were only "Moors" and had been used as "cannon fodder." Therefore, at the center of a traumatic event is the rupture between self and other through a betrayal. When it is narrated, through the tears of the interviewee about his brother's death, it is relived rather as it irrupts and interrupts linear time telling the story of betrayal. The stories of the survivors bring us back to history: history's stories of war and betrayal that have been erased and which return, demanding to be acknowledged, defying time and oblivion.

Deiback's documentary follows a triptych structure that can be divided into sections that separate and link the "survivors (grandfathers)," the "widows" and the "grandchildren." Each part represents different moments of the "history of betrayal," but they do not function as establishing a linear narrative. Instead, they reconstruct the social link by bridging different generations. Each section acts as repetition of the same trauma – the same betrayal (by the powers supposed to protect them, the Francoist regime for the Moroccan survivors and the post-dictatorship democratic state of Portugal for the African descendants)<sup>84</sup> by following the same visual structure: testimonies imbricated with official narratives, preceded by silent shots of the faces of the survivors, then the widows, then the contemporary generation – the grandchildren.

The last section is evocative of this transgenerational link, as it takes us to the sites of the mass graves and another story of betrayal (transgenerationally, that of the democratic state in relation to the descendants who bear the responsibility to remember).

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<sup>84</sup> The consideration of Moroccans who participated in the war as being betrayed by Franco has been studied by historian María Rosa de Madariaga in *Los moros que trajo Franco...: La intervención de tropas coloniales en la guerra civil española* (Barcelona: Ediciones Martínez Roca, 2002). She points out that Moroccans who had been promised by Franco, in one of his flowery discourses, that by joining forces they would receive roses, they were given thorns instead (344). Indeed, the reason why Moroccans fought alongside the Nationalists is mainly due to the disastrous drought that year – and most Moroccan "soldiers" were farmers who had never handled a rifle. Thus, they found themselves without a way of feeding their families, and were told that by joining the war they would receive pay and food. Furthermore, Franco had promised them that it would be an "easy" and short conflict and it would give them the opportunity to get united with and remain in the peninsula. Therefore, Moroccan survivors have an ambiguous position: they are neither victims nor perpetrators. They are somewhere in between. Clearly, the victims – in its commonly accepted terminology – were the Republicans. But with Spain's colonial past in Morocco (and the unfulfilled promises of Franco) as well as the ways in which recruiting of Moroccan men was done, it places these soldiers within an intermediary and ambiguous position.

The duty of honoring the dead falls to the descendants, as the state refuses to take responsibility for these bodies and refuses even to legalize these burial sites, preferring to turn them into for-profit sites: they are threatened with destruction by being turned into a golf course.<sup>85</sup> The audience is taken to the repetition of betrayal, as we are taken to the abandoned cemeteries unrecognized by the state and to the testimony of the coordinator of the Taquwa mosque, Zakaria Maza who has been taking care of his elders' dead bodies, states that

*nos empezamos a encontrar con las dificultades por un lado porque la legalidad de este cementerio no se contemplaba, es decir por un lado el ayuntamiento de Granada decía que era el estado español que le correspondía la responsabilidad y el estado español que el ayuntamiento, aun así nosotros los seguimos enterrando aquí sin legalizar ... Seguimos todavía olvidados, marginados y discriminados como lo fueron los excombatientes que están enterrados aquí mismo. (“we began to face difficulties on the one hand because the legality of this cemetery was not considered, that is to say that on the one hand the local government of Granada said that it was the responsibility of the Spanish state and the Spanish state that it was the local governments [responsibility], even then we continue burying them here without it being legal ... We continue to be forgotten, marginalized and discriminated against just like the excombatants who are buried right here”;* my trans.; 01:12:24-01:15:00).

A few remarks arise from Zakaria Maza's statement as repository of that forgotten memory: what makes some descendants take action in the public sphere, while others remain private? And what makes some grandchildren stubbornly continue to act, no matter how harsh the consequences when such acts are outside the law? The betrayal

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<sup>85</sup> This is the case over mass graves of Republicans, as well. However, as Deiback mentioned in the epigraph above, Moroccans have been left out of the process of recovery from the *Ley de memoria histórica*. This is mainly due to the fact that the grandchildren of Republicans perceive the Moroccan soldiers who participated in the SCW as perpetrators equal to the Nationalists.

from the state, which prohibits such rites and refuses to legalize these cemeteries, attests to Judith Butler's ethics of precarity on the dichotomy between who gets to be mourned and who does not. For Butler, this asymmetry gestures toward the absence of public grieving as a systematic erasure of those who do not qualify as fully human, an erasure that makes violence invisible to us and which convinces us that "there never was a human, there never was a life, and no murder has therefore ever taken place" (*Precarious Life* 147).<sup>86</sup> In this sense, the state prohibition on mourning reproduces the original violence by asymmetrically placing lives that can be grieved and those that cannot, resulting from the fact that they are considered less than human – which is at stake in this history of transgenerational betrayal. For Butler, the constitution of our Self is related with the Other, who demands to be acknowledged. This implies a dynamic of a demand and response, which, in the survivor's answer to the dead, becomes ethically invested.

Traditional theoretical approaches to the concept of ethics, whether by Levinas, Žižek or Butler (to name some of the most prominent authors on this topic) have posited that the subject becomes ethically invested by responding to the Other. Specifically, Cathy Caruth, referencing Lacan, offers what she calls an ethics of the Real by

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<sup>86</sup> Mari Ruti offers a compelling juxtapositional reading between Butler's ethics and the Lacanian ethics in *Between Levinas and Lacan: Self, Other, Ethics*, which has inspired my own interpretation of Lacan's ethics of psychoanalysis as a transgenerational transgression. However, Ruti uses her distinction to consider everyday life actions and transfer it over to queer theory, and she qualifies these ethical undertakings as "acting out," which can be read as a survival response against the possibility of madness. But, according to psychoanalysis, the best answer is symbolization within language, circling the traumatic events, because "acting out" tends to lead to repetition. To me, Lacanian ethics calls for a different interpretation when dealing with trauma as it means a conflict between life and death, and life-asserting actions are manifestations of the symbolic order, thus becoming a conscious choice.

interpreting Freud's "dream of the burning child." In *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History*, Caruth proposes an encounter with the Lacanian Real as an ethical encounter for the survivor (the one who transmits the story of the dead), where the dream of the burning child is to be understood in terms of an address and a response. The words of the child serve as the constitution of the Real within the burning dream – the Real becomes manifest in a demand. But a call requires an answer. It is in the figure of the answer, of the response, that the father becomes invested ethically: "It is precisely the dead child, the child in its irreducible inaccessibility and otherness, who says to the father: *wake up, leave me, survive; survive to tell the story of my burning....*"(105). Significantly, the mission of the father is not simply to "tell the story" of the child's death, but also to recognize his own role within the structure of that death: "His [the father's] survival must no longer be understood, in other words, merely as an accidental living beyond the child, but rather as a mode of existence determined by the impossible structure of the response" (100). Caruth thus posits all living as surviving. She suggests that to be alive is always to already be implicated in the deaths of others, and that "waking" is to bear witness within an always incomplete and impossible structure of response, to "pass on" to others what it means to survive and to not have awakened in time; to be responsible for the other.

Lacan's own development of ethics implicated within the Real takes on a different dimension relative to the idea of one's own survival when specifically related to betrayal, as is the case in Deiback's documentary. Lacanian ethics as realized in his *Ethics of Psychoanalysis* implies a dynamic between the subject's own death drive and desire, the

life-asserting drive. Using the narration of Antigone's burial of her brother despite the law forbidding such act – what he calls “the master's morality” – Lacan elaborates an understanding of ethics when death invades the subject's reality, in which responding to the other leads to a second death: a psychic death. In other words, rejecting our sense of Being through the other's demand would imply a betrayal to ourselves. For Lacan, the submission of our being to the desire of the other implies a betrayal, in the sense that it would drive to a ceding on the truth of our desire:

What I call “giving ground relative to one's desire” is always accompanied in the destiny of the subject by some betrayal – you will observe it in every case and should note its importance. Either the subject betrays his own way, betrays himself, and the result is significant for him, or more simply, he tolerates the fact that someone with whom he has more or less vowed to do something betrays his hope and doesn't do for him what their pact entailed (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis* 321).

Lacan's interpretation of betrayal is related to an ethics that suggests not ceding on the truth of desire inherent to the construction of the subject and can illuminate how transgenerational betrayal leads to acts of transgression as a necessary ethics – where in Butler, for instance, we are subjected to the demand of the Other and to the life of power, in Lacan, the very constitution of the subject in moments of irruption of the Real lead to the subject's agency away from its subjection to power. Indeed, Lacan sees the relationship of the desire drive and the realm of goods, meaning the morality of the ruling social order, as antagonistic. For the author, the realm of goods is the birth of power which “*dresse une muraille puissante sur la voie de notre désir*” (“erects a powerful wall on the path of our desire”; Porter 270). As Mari Ruti reminds us, for Lacan an ethics of psychoanalysis stemmed from a need to steer away from people's inability to get out

of their subjection to the master's morality, so disconnected "from the truth of their desire that they were willing to sacrifice this desire for the sake of social conformity and that they were, furthermore, willing to do so to the point of self-betrayal" (Ch. 4).<sup>87</sup>

Such a betrayal results in the "reassertion of the status quo," sending the subject back to the service of goods. In this case, the service of goods would entail obeying the prohibition of the state, so as to maintain the status quo. The betrayal relative to the construction of desire (given that desire, for Lacan, is the "metonymy of our being") would lead to a psychic death, "the second death," that destroys the subject's sense of agency in its life-asserting drive. As Lacan states: "Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting us not only from guilt but also from all kinds of inner catastrophes" (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis* 319). Consequently, relating these remarks with Deiback's documentary, for a community that has only known betrayal from the powers supposed to protect them, "doing things in the name of the good" would lead to another betrayal, even a self-betrayal for the descendants in this case, and the demand of the Real here is one of speaking to and honoring the truth of desire, which belongs to the subject's own Real – not simply the traumatic death of the other that demands the survivor's response – in answering the desire that defies normative conventional rules.

The Real considered as depository of the conflict between *eros* and *thanatos*, between life that unites and death that separates,<sup>88</sup> in the case of trauma in which death

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<sup>87</sup> I am using the Kindle version of Mari Ruti's book.

<sup>88</sup> I thank Luis Martín-Cabrera for pointing this out to me when I first shared my idea of an ethics of transgenerational transgression.

invades everything and the subject being confronted with so much death – through the negative force of the Real unlinking the Symbolic and Imaginary – there is a desire that can emerge. In this intimate relation between death and life, the life-asserting drive of desire surfaces through the expression of a “No!” or “Enough!”<sup>89</sup> as a mechanism of fundamental survival and which in itself produces another unlinking with the Symbolic order – for we are still in the function of the Real.

Here, the Symbolic order is that which relates to ways of symbolizing traumas or grief according to society’s normative processes; that is, what is considered acceptable or logical/reasonable, which is destructive in that it leads to acts which can put the subject’s life at risk but which constitute a response to a fundamental life-asserting desire or “drive.” This necessity to perform acts circling the trauma, despite possible death at the hands of the state for not obeying what is considered as acceptable grieving – meaning the law that only allows for private grieving – is illustrated by the Moroccan descendants who defy the law by unburying and re-burying their ancestors’ bodies. It is not simply an answer to the Other, but also an answer to our Self: when the death drive invades the psychic life of the subject, a choice must be made so that the subject can regain its agency, even if it means transgressing the law.

In *Li Ké Terra*, the same principle of an ethics of transgenerational transgression can be elaborated. The two protagonists of the documentary, transgress the law in order to retain their agency, although this transgression manifests itself differently and a “not

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<sup>89</sup> Mari Ruti uses the expressions “No!, Enough!, or Fuck you!” referring to the concept of separation from the big Other (Ch. 8). I find these interjections apt when dealing with trauma and the Real.



ceding on the truth” of our desire comes to be investing one’s desire away from the state and norms of capitalist consumerism as acceptable normative subject formation within the nation. Instead, the two characters turn their desire, as life-asserting force, toward mutual recognition and modes of existing that act as a way of reclaiming one’s own subject construction away from the state’s proscription/allocation of these “black nationals” as the nation’s abject.

### **“Translocality” as ethics of transgenerational transgression in *Li Ké Terra***

*Li Ké Terra*, produced by Filipa Reis, João Miller Guerra and Nuno Baptista, is to the best of my knowledge the only Portuguese documentary not made for television on the descendants of African immigrants that were born or raised in Portugal. This “new generation,” hegemonically misnamed “second generation” immigrants, has received the appellation of “*novos luso-africanos*” (“new Luso-Africans”). This term was coined by Portuguese sociologist Fernando Luís Machado to represent this specific group of people who were born in Portugal but who do not necessarily have Portuguese citizenship.

This documentary was selected at various international independent film festivals and received several awards. At the renowned DocLisboa of 2010, *Li Ké Terra* was bestowed “Best Portuguese Feature Film” award and the “Special Jury Mention” at MiradasDoc in 2011. Filipa Reis and João Miller Guerra in particular, who own their own film production “Vende-se filmes” to finance their work, are known for their feature films on immigrants. Among other films, they have realized *Fora da Vida* (Best Portuguese Short Film IndieLisboa 2015), *Bela Vista* (Best International Short Film

FIDOCs 2013 and Honorable Mention MiradasDoc 2013), *Cama de Gato* (Best Portuguese Short Film IndieLisboa 2012 and Revelation Prize at Luso-Brazilian Film Festival Santa Maria da Feira 2012).

Additionally, their films have been presented at international festivals such as Cinéma du Réel, IDFA, DokLeipzig, Bordocs, ForumdocBH, Festival dei Popoli, Olhar de Cinema, Janela Internacional de Cinema do Recife, FIDBA, Dok.Fest, Molodist, Parnu, and others. Their approach to these various features follows, throughout their work, what could be classified as “observational cinema.” In an interview about their 2013 documentary *Bela Vista*, the filmmakers explain their way of documenting the lives of immigrants as:

[c]omeçar pelo documentário, também foi uma estratégia de aproximação ao bairro, uma forma de legitimar a nossa presença. ... Para nós é muito importante eu haja sempre uma partilha e nunca um aproveitamento das situações. Talvez por isso seja impossível que não fique uma relação que dura. Ainda hoje mantemos um contacto regular com as pessoas que retratamos nos nossos filmes.”(Cinemaville, interview by Daniela Guerra, 2013) (“beginning with the documentary, was also a strategy of approaching the neighborhood, a way of legitimizing our presence. ... For us it is very important to always share and never take advantage of situations. Maybe this is why it is impossible to not have a relationship that lasts. Even to this day we keep regular contact with the people we portray in our films; my trans.).

*Li Ké Terra* came to see the light in a similar vein. The producers already had a deep knowledge of the neighborhood, Casal da Boba (Lisbon), and its inhabitants that are documented, after having worked there for two years and offering filmmaking workshops for the youth. Reis and Miller Guerra had received funding from the Gulbenkian Foundation in 2007 as part of “*Projecto Geração*” to interview a number of the Casal da Boba’s inhabitants relative to their daily lives and aspirations. For the film directors, the

most gratifying outcome of *Li Ké Terra* was its projection within schools and having an impact at the institutional level (*Diario de noticias*).

*Li Ké Terra* focuses on the lives of two “Luso-Africans,” descendants of Cape Verdean grandparents, named Ruben and Miguel. Ruben, although born in Portugal, is shown struggling with the Portuguese administration to receive his citizenship. Miguel, who has Portuguese citizenship, has difficulties in school and questions his identity as either Portuguese or Cape Verdean.<sup>90</sup>

The documentary’s opening and closing sequences center on the two friends in their neighborhood. The first image shows Ruben and Miguel talking about the difference between calling their romantic interests *dama* or *namorada* (“lady” or “girlfriend”) as they walk on a dirt road with the camera facing them, giving the impression the youths are walking toward the viewer. The next shot in the sequence is of the Casal da Boba, where they live. This opening sequence suggests the two protagonists moving toward their neighborhood.

The last sequence of the feature focuses on the buildings and the cars coming and going in the neighborhood; in other words, the liveliness of Casal da Boba: Ruben is shown playing soccer with friends within an enclosed fenced space inside the housing projects, while Miguel appears in a different segment walking the dirt roads while talking to his friend. Ruben’s voice is heard over the final images, framing him within a voiceover, consolidating the protagonists as the authorial voice of the documentary.

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<sup>90</sup> See footnote n. 14 in Chapter 3 in which I discuss the problematic of receiving Portuguese citizenship.

The neighborhood of Casal da Boba comes to play a significant role in the documentary's construction. Throughout the feature, Ruben and Miguel are shown moving from their district to the center of the city in which the buildings of Casal da Boba posit a limit separating both worlds. The projects of Casal da Boba were part of the Portuguese state program, *Programa Especial de Realojamento* (PER), with the purpose of relocating part of the population living in precarious conditions and offering them better housing. Casal da Boba is located at Lisbon's city limits, away from the metropolitan center, and has a mainly Cape Verdean community. Its position in Lisbon's geography is typical of such a development: all the neighborhoods housing Africans and their descendants are separated from the rest of the city by being located on Lisbon's outskirts. This situation is reminiscent of the distribution of towns in Africa during colonial times, thereby replicating in contemporary urban planning the separation once found between the white settler population and the colonized African communities.

As I argued in my first chapter on "lusotropicalism" as necropolitics, the colonized "African-Portuguese" were placed in the position of social death. A similar construction can be said of their descendants here, as they are displaced from the center and "life" of the city, without access to its entertainment and business center. Many scenes of Casal da Boba are shot from a distance, with the two small figures of Ruben and Miguel shown walking dirt paths constructed in a zigzag shape and framed by grey concrete buildings. This particular vision of the district gives the impression the two friends are ghosts navigating a labyrinth. The limited environment to which the state consigns them is evocative of Achille Mbembe's "death worlds." These zones are worlds

of slow, living death, and the living dead in them are separated from the center of the city that contains life and vitality that is available for the white Portuguese. For Mbembe, these “death worlds” operate within modern societies, creating unique forms of subjection of certain populations as they are neglected by the state, producing death for them and life for others (“Necropolitics” 40).

Although the critic discusses this concept in relation to colonialism, occupation and war, the principle of “death worlds” can be applied to the construction of the housing projects in Lisbon as “postcolonial” modes of subjecting bodies to a slow death and state of living dead. It is usually exhibited in more subtle forms, going unseen – although perhaps this is what makes it more effective – housing is visually rendered throughout the documentary as a mass of warehouses enclosing bodies. The encircling buildings are designed to slowly wear away the life force of its inhabitants and consign them to a bleak existence. This is particularly striking when, at the end of *Li Ké Terra*, Ruben’s voiceover addresses his condition within Portuguese society as “living dead”:

sometimes, I go for a walk, I see something I’d like to buy or something like that, then I start thinking: a guy [referring to himself] doesn’t work, how does he manage to get money to buy the things he wants? What’s the easiest way? If you don’t have any documents and therefore a way to work, what’s the easiest way? To steal or do some kind of shit. But no! In my head everything is under control. ... That’s not what I want for me, so I’d rather not being able to buy that stuff, I’d rather stay cool, not buy that stuff and stay as I am without money. Sometimes I might want to have money, I stay cool. I’m not doing anything to get money, I stay cool. If I had my record stained ... then, I would never get my papers (Campos Forte 00:57:59-00:59:12).

This passage points to the particularity of becoming a subject of the nation through the ability to have access to capitalist consumerism, which ties into citizenship

and the labor market. Indeed, citizenship, labor and consumerism are intertwined, and if one of them unlocks, it makes the other two impossible – in a function similar to the Real in Lacan’s image of the “Borromean Knot” – making it a matter of life and death, with real consequences for those that do not have access to participating within the nation as they fall outside the established normative processes of subject construction. Ruben’s words also address the fact that resorting to criminality comes as a response to state violence that consigns those without papers and financial power to a position of social death.

Ruben’s comment regarding how he negotiates his position within the Portuguese nation outside the law reveals his abjection as one of the living dead. The nineteen-year-old man finds the solution by having “everything under control” in his head. He would prefer to “not buy that stuff” and “stay cool,” which he repeats three times.

The original Portuguese expression used by Ruben is *fico na minha*. Although it is translated as “I stay cool,” this phrase literally means not participating or interfering in the matters of others outside of oneself. This expression connotes a lack of movement or speech as one remains silent and also a rupture of the social link as one keeps to oneself. In this sense the expression of *fico na minha* acts as the irruption of the Lacanian Real that renders the social link impossible and places Ruben within the realm of death, his own death. He exists, in a sense, in an in-between state: a frozen state of being where his survival is dependent upon the “master’s morality” and submitting to “the realm of goods.” However, his physical survival entails a psychic death, as Lacan tells us in his *Ethics of Psychoanalysis*: “Doing things in the name of the good, and even more in the

name of the good of the other, is something that is far from protecting ... from all kinds of inner catastrophes” (*Ethics of Psychoanalysis* 319). In submitting to the law of the state, Ruben cedes “on the truth of [his] desire,” meaning he loses his agency for the sake of social conformity (and safety), leading him to self-betrayal. To assert his life force – to act on his desire “drive” and assert his agency – would mean transgressing the law, which would imply a different type of death through incarceration, which is another space of social death.

Another possibility is revealed through Ruben’s resounding “No!” in the quote above, one that neither subjugates him to the rule of the state nor condemns him to criminality. In that “no” Ruben states that he prefers “being without money,” not participating in the capitalist consumerist society, as well as refusing to remain in the abject position – of criminality – consigned by the state for those that are deemed as undesirable. Thus, when the young “Luso-African” states that he chooses to “*fic[ar] na minha*,” that choice also takes on a different meaning, a third way of existing that does not involve the only binary options for those “undesirables” offered by the hegemonic powers.

This third way transgresses the role or code of conduct of the norms of the nation in which subject construction is rendered possible through consumerism or hegemonic judicial law. This other option of being, in which desire is not invested in the nation’s normative processes and prohibitions, then becomes an ethical response of survival based on a “not ceding on the truth of desire” that consequently does not lead to the subject’s psychic death nor physical death.

Throughout the documentary, Ruben and Miguel are depicted (in their interactions with each other within Casal da Boba) as performing their agency away from the “realm of the goods” by enacting a “not ceding on the truth of [their] desire.” The film’s movement of both youths within the center of the city and its outskirts in Casal da Boba presents two different – and differing – ways of being. In the center of Lisbon, Ruben and Miguel are linked with the white population. But this connection performs an unlinking of the social order constitutive of the subject, thereby placing both young men in an abject position. Indeed, according to Lacan, the subject is constructed through speech and thus symbolization.

Psychoanalytical cultural studies have posited that language is never individual or ontological, but rather social and political. Thus, the social order is produced in symbolic terms, through language, and consequently the subject is formed through its interaction with the social order/bond. In this sense subject construction is rendered possible through its linking with the social realm which exists within relations of power. The impossibility of Ruben and Miguel becoming subjects is evidenced in the scenes filmed at the center of the city, wherein their interactions with white authority figures places them within an asymmetrical power relationship.

In one scene, Ruben is shown inside a center trying to regulate his legal status and find employment. The camera shot frames him sitting on a chair before a window, behind which is the civil servant, a white woman. The civil servant holds the power of speech, as she assertively asks Ruben several questions and he timidly answers her. The civil



servant ends the conversation, dismissing the young “Luso-African” whose irregular situation in the nation prohibits him from finding employment.

The scenes in the heart of Lisbon portray Miguel at school, where he is seen struggling to find interest and a sense of belonging. One scene stands out in its oddity: After class, one of Miguel’s professors – a white woman – asks him to come talk to her in private. The documentary’s audience might assume that she would talk to him about his grades or maybe absences, expected topics between professor and student. Instead, she reproaches him for coming to school with dirty fingernails again, adding that he had been warned about that. The unexpected comment about Miguel’s hygiene stands out in its surprising effect on the viewer that would not associate education with matters of public health. However, the intersection of hygiene, race and the nation were part of the modern colonial project.<sup>91</sup>

The ideal of “whiteness” meant purity, hygiene and cleanliness. Colonial racial discourses were then implemented through measures of public health as modes of spatial governance determining selectively who could belong and who could not belong to the (white) civic body. The reproduction of hygiene concerns in a public school – a state institution – is thus to be understood within this colonial historical framework as a legacy of modes and spaces of control deciding who belongs to the nation and who cannot.

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<sup>91</sup> This was also performed during Nazi Germany with their national and hygiene programs. See also Timothy Burke’s pointed study of the development of soap use during British colonial occupation of Zimbabwe and its intersections with hygiene, commodification of consumption and race in *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (Duke University Press, 1996).

Miguel's "dirty nails" places him outside the nation's civic body and allocates him in an abject position: his lack of cleanliness produces him as undesirable.

In scenes portraying both youths in the city center, they are depicted as receivers of language, in an asymmetrical power relationship in which the subject producer of language is wielded by white authority figures. The spaces they occupy are related to the Portuguese state, which comes in contrast with their appropriation of the district Casal da Boba steering away from state power. The segments in Casal da Boba present Miguel and Ruben able to enact their agency through mutual recognition. One of the transitional scenes from the heart of Lisbon to its outskirts in Casal da Boba displays Miguel holding a camera and filming. The young "Luso-African" is shown handling a camera to film himself and his peers, challenging the dominating gaze of hegemonic powers through the "white's eye" looking down onto the black subject.

This technique displaces the inner workings of hegemony within film, as Makhmalbaf observes that first world's others "have ... been at the receiving end of cinema as an art form. The history of cinema begins with wealthy and powerful nations making films not just about themselves but also about others. This is a slanted relation of power" (*Digital Revolution* 377). Having those "others" that have been traditionally constructed by the white gaze within neocolonial modes of subject production take control of the camera inverts and displaces the inner workings of hegemonic power. Gaze

as a mode of objectification transgresses hegemonic normative rules of who can be seen, and by whom, within the consolidation of racial and national belonging.<sup>92</sup>

An inversion, or rather displacement, of white state power also occurs in the sections depicting Miguel and Ruben interacting with each other and their friends from the district. As stated earlier, Casal da Boba being constructed by the state to house “non-white” bodies operates as a “death world.” The graffiti signs stating “Boba” on several buildings, the moments when the youth from Casal da Boba get together to create hip hop or play soccer – all the scenes pertaining to their neighborhood present free movement and speech for “Luso-Africans.” In these clips, the youth reappropriate the space of the state that allocates them to invisibility and abjection by making it their own.

Throughout the documentary, Miguel and Ruben are presented as coming from disconnected families: Miguel who is raised by his grandmother since being abandoned by his mother and incarcerated father; and Ruben, whose parents remain invisible, implying limited interaction. In this context, the social order of the familial link is broken, and it is through their mutual interests (hip hop, soccer, etc.) that social order is reestablished and speech (as constitutive of the subject construction) is made possible.

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<sup>92</sup> In *Practices of Space*, Michel de Certeau proposes a “panoptic practice” in which the eye (in relation to space division) becomes a form of control that can transform foreign elements into objects. bell hooks argues as well of the asymmetrical relationship between the white gaze (who can see) and the African American (who cannot see) subjugated into objectification: “An effective strategy of white supremacist terror and dehumanization during slavery centered around white control of the black gaze. Black slaves, later manumitted servants, could be brutally punished for looking, for appearing to observe the whites that they were serving, as only a subject can observe, or see” (*Killing Rage: Ending Racism*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995 35).

Their movement from being the “undesirable” abject to “desiring” subjects occurs within their refusal to participate within capitalist consumerism and state order, preferring constructing their own reality at its margin, within their neighborhood, through acts of life assertion. In this sense, Ruben and Miguel are not portrayed as resorting to ethnic essentialisms – even though they question their identity – and the nation-state as specular identity realization. Their desire “drive” is then diverted from the state and the laws of the market to be invested in modes of mutual recognition establishing a link with an Other. This way of being, that is “disloyal” to the nation, is emblematic of their refusal of “ceding on the truth of [their] desire” and in these acts of “translocal” solidarity they become ethically invested.

The concept of translocal actions based on “translocality” – mutual recognition away from the nation – has been coined and established by Fatima El-Tayeb in her study of European minority youths, *European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postcolonial Europe*. Indeed, for the author, in a “postcolonial” European order based on binary constructions of the nation or ethnic essentialisms, the

minority youths – misfits within the strict identity ascriptions characterizing contemporary Europe, not meeting the criteria of “authentic Europeanness” nor being authentic migrants since they never in fact migrated – circumvent the complicated question of national belonging by producing a localized, multicentered, horizontal community, in which a strong identification with cities or neighborhoods, perceived as spaces both created by and transcending national and ethnic limits, combines with a larger diasporic perspective (xxxvii).

Thus, identity formation and the possibility of agency is steered away from the nation, the “master’s morality,” and displaces – or “queers” – hegemonic state narratives

on belonging and modes of existence. By not taking the nation as a point of reference and instead creating “the local, the city or neighborhood ... [as] an alternative public space, ... [European minority youths] replac[e] national allegiances and instead creat[e] border-crossing translocal networks” (7). Of particular interest for El-Tayeb is the hip-hop community that enables the creation of “a common language” defying “their structural silencing in mainstream debates” and which is “based on common interests and experiences rather than shared ethnic or national origin” (7). In this sense, the reappropriation of Casal da Boba by the “Luso-Africans” through modes of specular identification based on common interests and language lead to acts of “disloyalty” to the nation. Their refusal to “cede” to the normative rules – as Ruben’s resounding “No!” evokes – of capitalism, nation and labor market, marks a refusal of self-betrayal as a psychic death by submitting to the law and invests them ethically by honoring the truth of desire and in doing so perform transgressive modes of subject construction.

The national binary construction of who belongs and who does not (meaning who can be the subject and who becomes the abject of the nation) comes to be deconstructed by these minority youths. In order to retain their agency, to “steer away from the master’s morality” – to use Lacan’s wording – and from their subjection to power, the two protagonists of the documentary invest their desire away from the state and norms – as what is logical/acceptable within society – in terms of subject formation within the nation. It is through their mutual recognitions performed within their neighborhood as the site of subject formation that it becomes an ethical act of transgenerational transgression,

as the youths reestablish the social link disrupted by the nation-state outside of Casal da Boba.

### **Conclusion**

In short, subject constructions always imply relations of power constantly negotiated. However, the nationals of color studied here – the Muslim descendants for Spain and Luso-Africans for Portugal – evidence a third way of existing that does not reproduce a vertical correlation, imposed by the state onto its civic body, but rather a horizontal form of relating. Whether it is through the Muslim descendants' acts of burial or the black youths' refusal to adapt to the nation state's dictating norms of belonging, their performances of transgenerational transgression create communities that can voice and render visible within public spaces – which belong to the state – their desire away from sovereignty as a point of reference. At the same time, reappropriating national spaces and making them their own by doing away with the rules of the state – “the master's morality” – opens up possibilities of effecting changes at the national level.

The peculiar position in which these youths of color in the peninsula and continental Europe at large find themselves – labeled as “(im)migrants” instead of second- or third- generation citizens, as El-Tayeb points out – begs us to critically think about the modes in which citizenship is allocated and constructed. Indeed, while they build ways of relating away from the nation, these subjects of color do not reproduce a binary construction of belonging: either in or out of the nation. As in the documentaries analyzed in this section, the interviewed claim their citizenship. But they refuse the

nation-state ascription of citizenship as a “becoming” white Christian, thereby falling into a process of assimilation – a form of cultural neocolonialism.

As Angolan sociologist and journalist João Paulo N’Ganga argued in his controversial book, *Preto no branco* (“Black in White,” 1995, and published while a student at the University of Porto), Luso-Africans’ contestatory attitudes perform a “black consciousness” which refuses to become white – as colonialism previously forced their elders to do. They claim their blackness as citizenship.

In return, European societies’ responses towards contestations of identity, race and the nation by these youths co-opt these claims so as to depoliticize them and allocate these minorities as the problem again. By voicing their discontent, they are the ones responsible for not being included, because they reject all the opportunities offered to them by European countries through refusing to accept the rules of the nation. Furthermore, since this dissent stems from them being subjects of agency – instead of remaining passive – as agents, they have the choice to either stay and remain silent or leave. Once again, the status quo and the myth of Europe as white and Christian are preserved.

## Conclusion

Throughout this project I have traced the processes of memory and forgetting tied to narratives of the consolidation of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, as well as their transition processes toward democracy. I have focused specifically on the silenced colonial past in relation to the production of knowledge around the Salazarist and Francoist regimes. The particularity of both dictatorships rests on their modern colonial projects as vital for their existence and maintenance in power, unlike Latin American repressive regimes or Imperial European countries. It has been my intention to displace and decolonize epistemological discourses on Portuguese and Spanish relations through the lenses of the “colonial eye,” thereby elaborating a comparative analysis without reproducing an overarching approach.

As a transhistorical project, this study remains necessarily incomplete and fragmentary. And yet it is precisely from its resistance to a teleological and concluding process that it derives its strength. It refuses to consider colonialism and dictatorships within specific temporal delineations that would imply a “before” and “after.”

Rather, it places colonialism at the center of the historical construction of dictatorship, democracy and contemporary immigration. However, this does not imply a continuation throughout the time of colonialism toward “post”-colonialism nor from dictatorship to “post”-dictatorship. Such a process would suggest that until the West came into contact with Africa, the people who became colonized did not exist, nor did they have a history prior to that encounter.



This is why I prefer using instead the term “coloniality.” This nominal distinction could be considered a minor detail, another banal critique of “-ism,” but it seems to me that epistemologically, it offers an understanding of a different – and differing – temporality from Western constructions of history and their lasting material and discursive effects in allocating the binaries of history/myth, subject/object, self/other and human/nonhuman. Coloniality, as Sara Ahmed defined this term, “suggests [that] history is not the continuous line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous encounters between nations, culture, others and other others” (*Strange Encounters* 11). By tending to the (dis)remembering processes of coloniality within the traditional academic and socio-political narratives of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships, this project has argued for anchoring the peninsula’s former colonized and their descendants as subjects of history, as “non-foreigners” existing outside of time, but rather as forgotten citizens or nationals of the peninsula, thereby decentering the binary differences of who belongs to the nation and who does not that are central to the maintenance of the myth of Europe as white Christian.

At a time when we currently see the global resurgence of nationalism and right-wing parties with platforms based mainly around discourses of excluding “non-whites” from the nation, it seems even more urgent to think of new modes of resistance and relating that do not take the nation as a point of reference.<sup>93</sup> The transhistorical nature of my project allows for such conceptualization (as I developed in chapter 4) through an

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<sup>93</sup> Although Spain and Portugal are the exception in Europe, as they have not seen an increase in extreme right-wing parties, they cannot be thought in isolation from Europe and the debates on nation, identity and immigration in their political and ethical dimensions.

ethics of transgenerational transgression. In this endeavor, my dissertation has concerned itself with the ethical and sociopolitical dimensions of cultural productions that interrogate the failed historicization of the Other from hegemonic narratives of memory that have reinforced the category of Otherness. The organization of my chapters has followed a dialectical approach for this purpose. They have evaluated film genre as unveiling the complicity of racial asymmetries of power and knowledge in consolidating ideological and real borders between the peninsula and the (ex)colonies in order to police the Other. At the same time, it has emphasized the political potential of visual productions to debunk (artificial) frontiers and fixed notions of Otherness and nationality.

However, the present analysis does not pretend to give an exhaustive and definite evaluation of the political issues at play within Portugal and Spain's mediation of memory through cultural practices or even within the Peninsula's historical relation with its former colonies. The present study calls for the need to look at memory and acts of remembrance within their social, historical and political contexts. It also brings out the need to question the nature of memory, as a concept that is not straightforward, but as a relational process always entangled in the exercise of power and always accompanied by elements of repression – especially in the case of societies such as Spain and Portugal that have been marked by dictatorships, and thus by a traumatic past that has been attempted to be erased or domesticated.

By emphasizing “not forgetting” and “forgetting the forgetfulness” as a decolonizing process at play within the variety of documentary films, this study has addressed questions of how, why, for whom and from which position the construction of

the Other and coloniality is (dis)remembered so as to unveil relations of power within the production of knowledge about Salazar and Franco's regimes as colonial dictatorships. It is within this light that the nation-state's smoothing over of traumatic events through "positive" commemorations can be challenged.

In the particular cases of the Portuguese and Spanish dictatorships being inflected by the modern colonial project in Africa and North Africa, challenging the nation-state's mnemonic narrative implies addressing two layers of forgetting. As I discussed in chapter 3, the transitional process toward democracy in Portugal and Spain meant forgetting the violence of the dictatorships along with their colonial ties. To briefly recall the transition periods, Spain implemented its democracy with the pacts of Moncloa in 1977, popularly known as well as *pacto del olvido* ("pact of forgetting"), providing total impunity for any Francoist participant and legal amnesia around the victims of the Spanish Civil War and its subsequent dictatorship. At the same time, the death of Franco ended Spanish colonialism in Africa. However, the colonial aspect of the Francoist regime was concomitantly forgotten along with the Spanish victims of the dictatorship.

In Portugal, the urgency of the Carnation Revolution to establish a break from the repressive regime saw an immediate construction of a national narrative and memory process of forgetting the dictatorship and the colonial wars. The Revolution meant veiled impunity for the key political players of the regime not only by consigning the past to oblivion but also through the independence of the African colonies. Cutting out the colonies from the Portuguese state also meant excising them from the national memory as the focus became centered on the metropolis itself.

The turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century saw counteramnes(t)ic social organizations in Spain and Portugal arising to claim the acknowledgment of the victims of Salazar and Franco's repressive governments. In Spain, the Law of Historical Memory was passed in 2007, which has legally enforced recognition of the Republicans as victims of the dictatorship and issued economic compensation (although quite minimal) for the survivors. This law came about because of the efforts of social organizations created by descendants of Republicans, who took it upon themselves to excavate unmarked mass graves within which their ancestors had been buried.<sup>94</sup>

In Portugal, the movement *Não Apaguem a Memória* ("Don't Erase Memory") was born from a civic protest in October 5, 2005, against the transformation of the former national headquarters of the PIDE/DGS (*Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado*, renamed *Direção-Geral de Segurança* in 1969) into a private condominium. The spontaneous mobilization turned into an organized association in May of 2008, becoming *Associação Movimento Cívico Não Apaguem a Memória* (NAM; "Association of the Civic Movement Don't Erase Memory"). In June of 2008, after initiating a petition that

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<sup>94</sup> In March of 2000, journalist Emilio Silva went to the province of León to find the remnants of his grandfather, who had been executed by the Nationalists and buried in a mass grave. In León, the inhabitants helped him locate the grave in which he found his grandfather's bones, along with the remains of several other bodies. This is not to say that Silva was the first or only one to try to locate his ancestor's remains, but he (along with Santiago Macías) formed an organization (Association for the Recovery of Historical Memory) to bring public awareness to the need to uncover their grandfathers' or great-uncles' dead bodies piled in mass graves. The ARHM excavations brought significant media attention to the subject and led to the formation of many other grassroots associations to exhume mass graves as well. I also see these acts as an ethics of transgenerational transgression, as the grandchildren, like the grandchildren of Moroccan ex-combatants studied in chapter 4, decided to unbury the dead, despite it being outside the law.

received five thousand signatures, NAM managed to have a Parliamentary Resolution approved which links State institutions to the duty of preserving the memory of the *Estado Novo*'s crimes and resistance movements to the dictatorship.<sup>95</sup>

However, as I stated earlier, counter-hegemonic practices of remembrance in Spain and Portugal involve addressing two sets of forgotten memories that are inevitably linked and yet still remain separated. While the ARHM and NAM combat the silenced violence of the Francoist and Salazarist regimes in the Peninsula, these processes perform at the same time another forgetting. Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter 4, while the *Ley de la memoria histórica* was implemented in order to have publicly acknowledged the crimes of the Francoist regime against the Republicans, it leaves out the colonial violence perpetrated by the Nationalists. Similarly, the efforts in Portugal to preserve the memory of Portuguese anti-fascism exclude remembering the *Estado Novo*'s atrocities against its colonized subjects. Thus, the colonial memory of Spain and Portugal remains the forgotten of the forgetting, in other words, embodies "forgetting the forgetfulness."

Contemporary processes of challenging the multi-layered traumatic pasts of the Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships that have been forgotten lead to questioning in which ways these two memories – of the peninsular violence and of the colonial violence – and their lasting material and discursive effects can be honored without reproducing asymmetrical relations of power.

While direct social action is important and necessary to effect change within the nation, it seems to me that defiance can be produced through indirect action, such as

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<sup>95</sup> See <http://maismemoria.org/mm/home/quem-somos/>

artistic and intellectual productions. Indeed, cultural works in their sociopolitical and ethical potential constitute in themselves objects and matters of social intervention demarcating a space of their own within which and through which social problems can be negotiated, deconstructed and resignified. In the case of the politics of memory in relation to the Portuguese and Spanish colonial dictatorships, which interest us here, film genre (and culture by extension) allows for providing such articulation as alternative modes of addressing silenced memories from multiple perspectives through its fluidity of visual language and multiform. And so, as sites that can displace narratives and fixed temporalities, they have the potential to offer a space within which multiple memories can be inscribed without reproducing asymmetries of power, which can be evidenced in the case of Spain and Portugal and the limits in addressing their colonial and dictatorial past.

However, this is not to say that all visual representations (and cultural productions at large) offer the possibility of circling the gaps and disjunctions that have fallen out of symbolization. But tending to the productions opposed to state-sponsored accounts and modes of production offers alternative ways of rethinking the past, present and future. Indeed, the “new” generations of independent filmmakers in the peninsula that have grown within shared spaces of multiple ethnicities do not simply create works that reflect/record social reality as objects of contemplation (acting as a mirror), but that rather perform, engage and produce social action.

As the committed authors studied in this dissertation, the descendants of colonizer and colonized do not reproduce the mastering white gaze onto the Other and do not

smooth over racial asymmetries of power within their pieces, but rather offer a possibility for envisioning a transgenerational ethics of intercultural connections through shared similar concerns and modes of representation. The authorial voice then goes beyond what could be considered in intercultural projects between whites and non-whites as white guilt based on sentimentality and paternalism. Through the direct implication between the descendants as subjects of agency that turn away from the nation-state as a point of reference, they establish affective links that invest them ethically in interrogating, negotiating and resignifying the place of history, memory and multiple agencies in subject construction that can break the silence surrounding the myth of Europe as white Christian. It is my hope as well – although it is a hope that is somewhat utopian or idealist – that as engaged and ethically invested scholars, our intellectual work of excavating the silences and absences from the record of the nation-state's violence can construct alternative modes of envisioning the future which translate into concrete social change honoring the “forgotten from forgetting.”

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