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Los Angeles

Strategic Democratic Leaders and Constraint

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction  
of the requirements for the degree  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

by

Carley Danielle Nuzzo

2020

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## ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Strategic Democratic Leaders and Constraint

by

Carley Danielle Nuzzo

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2020

Professor Arthur A. Stein, Chair

How do leaders navigate foreign policy making when their preferences are at odds with their publics? The international relations and political behavior literatures present two ostensibly incompatible observations about democracies and foreign policy; the former arguing that democratic leaders are constrained in foreign policy making and the latter arguing that public opinion on foreign policy is often missing its teeth. This raises several important questions, when do democratic leaders face constraint, what does constraint look like when they do, are leaders held accountable, and if so, what does accountability look like when they are?

To answer these questions, I borrow from the audience cost logic and extend it to argue that democratic leaders will often want to insulate themselves from, rather than expose themselves to audience costs. Just as leaders tie their hands and create prospective audience costs, they can also act strategically to pursue their objectives by acting to loosen domestic constraints to broaden the range of acceptable policies, those which are not expected to result in ex post audience costs. Leaders are highly aware of and concerned with the potential for domestic backlash and are able to reduce and loosen seemingly prospective

audience costs. This thesis integrates the audience cost and political behavior arguments to cohesively demonstrate how political leaders deal with situations in which their foreign policy objectives, given international challenges and possibilities, are at odds with domestic political preferences.

I develop a theory of democratic constraint that emphasizes motivated actions by leaders to mitigate the accountability they face in foreign policy making in two ways, by adjusting contribution type and attuning rhetorical strategy. I test my theory through process tracing of seven cases of democratic countries that joined the Iraq War despite opposed publics. First I show that political opportunities and constraints embody more than just public opinion and more than just the structure of political institutions. They are multifaceted and nuanced and also include historical normative factors and the particular political context. Second, I show that political leaders are just that, they have the capacity to lead and expand (as well as contract) the constraints under which they operate. My findings suggest that the multifaceted nature of constraint allows leaders the opportunity to emphasize the more favorable factors and in some cases use those favorable factors to reduce the impact of the less favorable factors of constraint resulting in a more nuanced understanding of accountability as well.

The dissertation of Carley Danielle Nuzzo is approved.

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2020

To Garrett and Isla-  
thank you for being my everything.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1	The Theory of Loosening Tied Hands . . . . .	1
2	An Opposed Public and UK Intervention in Iraq . . . . .	16
3	Loose Constraints and War in Iraq: Australia and Poland join the US War Effort . . . . .	41
4	Of Norms, History, and Identity: Japan, Denmark, and the Netherlands en route to war in Iraq . . . . .	69
5	Accountability and the Failure to Loosen Constraints: Spain's Involvement in the Iraq War . . . . .	109
6	Conclusion . . . . .	126



## LIST OF FIGURES

1.1	Initial Constraint Space . . . . .	8
1.2	Temporary Rally Constraint Space . . . . .	8
1.3	Expanded Constraint Space . . . . .	8
2.1	Initial British Constraint Space . . . . .	27
2.2	Loosened British Constraint Space . . . . .	27
2.3	Final British Constraint Space . . . . .	37
3.1	Initial Australian Constraint Space . . . . .	50
3.2	Loosened Australian Constraint Space . . . . .	51
3.3	Final Australian Constraint Space . . . . .	53
3.4	Initial Polish Constraint Space . . . . .	63
3.5	Final Polish Constraint Space . . . . .	63
4.1	Initial Japanese Constraint Space . . . . .	79
4.2	Loosened Japanese Constraint Space . . . . .	80

4.3	Final Japanese Constraint Space . . . . .	82
4.4	Initial Danish Constraint Space . . . . .	90
4.5	Loosened Danish Constraint Space . . . . .	90
4.6	Final Danish Constraint Space . . . . .	92
4.7	Initial Dutch Constraint Space . . . . .	103
4.8	Loosened Dutch Constraint Space . . . . .	104
4.9	Dutch Constraint Space for Initial Contribution . . . . .	105
4.10	Dutch Constraint Space for Second Phase . . . . .	105
5.1	Initial Spanish Constraint Space . . . . .	116
5.2	Final Spanish Constraint Space . . . . .	120

## LIST OF TABLES

1.1	Case Selection and Contributions . . . . .	11
1.2	Factors Contributing to the Constraint Space . . . . .	11
2.1	British Constraint Space . . . . .	24
3.1	Australian Constraint Space . . . . .	47
3.2	Polish Constraint Space . . . . .	59
4.1	Japanese Constraint Space . . . . .	77
4.2	Danish Constraint Space . . . . .	87
4.3	Dutch Constraint Space . . . . .	98
5.1	Spanish Constraint Space . . . . .	115

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# CHAPTER 1

## The Theory of Loosening Tied Hands

Public opinion plays an important causal role in traditional international relations theory. There are several assertions that have been drawn from this assumption in international relations. Citizens of democracies are assumed to tend to object to becoming involved in foreign wars because they bear the burdens of war both in lives and taxes[124]. The looming threat of reelection makes politicians in a democracy weary of acting against their constituents' preferences in fear of being sanctioned by voters in the next election and therefore, they refrain from these courses of action in order to retain political power. Given the pacificity of the public and the politicians' dominant motivation to get elected, public opinion is expected to restrain the leaders of democracies from taking their country to war absent a strong popular mandate.

These general assertions became assumptions in much of the work that followed and led to an immense amount of important work that derives from the presumption that democratic foreign policy behavior is consistently constrained by relatively high leader responsiveness, which is a product of citizens' attentiveness to transparent foreign policy agendas and their ability to easily "hire and fire their leaders [193, 9]. The dominant view has thus been that democracies are inherently different in how they conduct their foreign policy because of the influence of domestic audiences [149, 150, 78, 175, 210, 203].

Further work has gone on to argue that this special character of democracies, specifically



the “transparent political processes within democracies” [203], affects which wars are selected into, conduct in war, war strategy, war success, war duration, and more [78, 193, 23, 29]. Democratic institutions “ensure that decisions are made and debated in a public manner, that information can flow freely between government and governed, and that the government does not monopolize the nation’s political discourse[203]. Their transparent nature also means democratic governments face substantial constraints and cannot conceal or mislead in international crises because the state is not a black box, but a transparent or open box into which outside actors can look for clues about the government’s motivations and constraints[203].

The idea that democratic regimes are intrinsically transparent has become widely accepted and has had far reaching effects in political science. Further, this transparency is argued to lend to the vigorous discussion of alternatives and open dissemination of information resulting in an open marketplace of ideas which is argued to “undercut fallacious claims made by leaderships about foreign threats” and make democratic leaders unable to circumvent or manipulate public opinion [193]. This public debate in which the policy arguments of leaders are subject to public scrutiny is expected to fulfill the function of gleaning deceptive, fabricated, or obfuscated foreign policy arguments.

While largely unchallenged in the international relations literature, the notion that democratic leaders are chained to the wishes of a highly engaged and strongly opinionated public is strongly challenged by an expansive literature in democratic political behavior. This literature has long established the view that public opinion is movable and responsive. Leaders can frame, or present an issue or event, in a particular way to influence public opinion by changing the images and concerns that are evoked when people form opinions. Frames are particularly effective when they resonate with entrenched values and identities to which people are deeply connected[49, 67]. Leaders can use calculated rhetoric to trigger the public’s attachment to certain identities and norms. Leaders can prime the public to weigh some dimensions of an issue more than others while forming their preferences and attitudes[129, 169].

Attitudes toward foreign policy appear to be highly susceptible to framing effects because of their complexity, because the public is notoriously uninformed about them and because emotional responses, such as national pride, are easily evoked [102, 7]. Moreover, because their knowledge of foreign affairs is so limited, their attitudes are easily manipulable by elites and in fact, the public will often defer to elites as a shortcut to formulating opinions and evaluating foreign policy [158, 55, 177, 234, 28, 14, 92, 137, 93]. This is consistent with the work on presidential use of the “bully pulpit to sell foreign policy[100]. The leader will have an incentive to use “crafted talk, strategic language based on public opinion, to convince the public to support the leader’s own preferred policy[116]. The role of political elites in framing and shaping attitudes directly challenges the function of the debate in the “open marketplace”.

The idea of the “open marketplace” is further impeded by the political behavior literature which for decades has asserted voters are ill-informed and uninterested in foreign affairs. Rather than engaging in active debate, this literature argues that the “inertial state of public attention to foreign policy is typically apathy and ignorance” [158, 212, 9]. This means foreign policy issues are less salient, or of a lesser importance, to the public. The low salience of these policies can keep them out of the public’s consciousness and therefore insulate leaders from electoral accountability.

Furthermore, a voter casting a ballot usually has multiple attitudes about the different elements of politics, including but not limited to issue stances, individual candidates, and partisanship. These attitudes vary to the degree that they conflict with each other in determining which candidate will receive the vote[222]. Stronger attitudes will have a greater effect on an individual’s candidate preference [132]. For voters to sanction leaders, i.e. change candidates based on foreign policy they would have to have a stronger attitude on foreign policy than the other issues that the new candidate holds that do not align with their own. Because foreign policy issues tend to be weak and not salient, this makes citizens less likely to change their vote preference, and thus less likely to result in the removal of leadership

from office. This is problematic for the mechanism of democratic constraint because if there is no threat of loss of power, then there is no reason to adhere to public opinion.

Although there is a long tradition of studying public opinion about the use of force[167], the increased popularity of survey experiments in international relations has launched renewed scholarship production on the topic, focusing on what the public will support, whether they rally around the flag, what affects changes in support, or which institutions and characteristics affect public opinion[8, 112]. Yet, most of this new scholarship takes for granted what the traditional literature argued made public opinion matter in democracies. Voters are expected to hold their leadership accountable. If democratic leaders choose to join a conflict despite their publics' opinion and are not held accountable, then there really isn't much importance for finding publics are *more* against conflict when  $x$  factor is present, etc. Accountability is the key factor that is supposed to set democracies apart and what has propelled the consensus of democratic distinctiveness. The constraining effects of public opinion and electoral accountability are the underlying assumptions of this entire literature and yet few ask if and how constraint and accountability actually occur.

How might we square these two ostensibly incompatible observations about democracies, that democratic leaders face constraint in foreign policy making but public opinion on foreign policy is often missing its teeth? Aggregate studies do reveal evidence of constraint, even if it is sporadic [9]. This raises several important questions, when do democratic leaders face constraint, what does constraint look like when they do, are leaders held accountable, and if so, what does accountability look like when they are?

Current discussions of constraint and accountability focus on audience costs- future costs associated with perceived policy failure [77, 78, 210, 202, 203]. The international relations literature has long embraced the idea of leaders tying their hands by making statements to increase accountability and prospectively commit to pay these ex post audience costs. Political leaders are constrained by their domestic audiences, and indeed can make use of

this by making threats that are seen as credible precisely because the leaders will absorb audience costs if they do not carry out their threats. Domestic audiences, in these models, are expected to punish leaders when they fail to deliver on their foreign policies [150, 148, 23, 232]. At face value then, we would expect to see concern over expectations of punishment by domestic audiences result in foreign policy dictated by public preferences. Critics of audience cost mechanisms argue prudent leaders hesitate to pursue policies that will elicit domestic backlash and therefore should be selective in the policies they pursue to minimize potential political costs and therefore we should not observe the punishment of accountability[211, 220, 65].

The conclusions drawn in the international relations literature about democratic accountability are compelling and have become so widely accepted that they have become assumptions upon which further work has been based. Taken in the isolation of this literature alone, these foundational presumptions do not seem problematic. The problem is revealed when the literature under review is expanded to include political behavior which introduces a seemingly opposing story of elite control. There is a need to make the audience cost story consistent with the elite control story and this dissertation aims to do just that.

I borrow from the audience cost logic and extend it to argue that democratic leaders will often want to insulate themselves from, rather than expose themselves to audience costs. Just as leaders tie their hands and create prospective audience costs, they can also act strategically to pursue their objectives by acting to loosen domestic constraints to broaden the range of acceptable policies, those which are not expected to result in ex post audience costs. Leaders are highly aware of and concerned with the potential for domestic backlash and are able to reduce and loosen seemingly prospective audience costs.

The core contribution of this thesis is integrate the audience cost and political behavior arguments to cohesively demonstrate how political leaders deal with situations in which their foreign policy objectives, given international challenges and possibilities, are at odds

with domestic political preferences. I will develop a theory of democratic constraint that emphasizes motivated actions by leaders to mitigate the accountability they face in foreign policymaking in two ways, by adjusting contribution type and attuning rhetorical strategy.

Leaders can choose a particular rhetorical strategy to minimize exposure to costs. Political leaders have the ability to explain, justify, and use rhetorical strategies such as issue framing to loosen the constraints of skeptical publics. The posturing of opposition parties largely determines whether leaders attempt to cloud the issues and differences between policy stances, or highlight the issues and prime them to increase attitude strength and strengthen ties to values and other important issues [205, 208, 235, 131]. Because leaders can choose the the rhetoric surrounding participation, they wield some power over the intensity and magnitude of public reaction they face, and therefore, domestic audiences will rarely have the power to dictate the dichotomous decision of joining a conflict or not. American politics suggests looking at dimensions of awareness[233]. In some cases, the low salience of these policies keeps them out of the public's consciousness and therefore there is no need or very little need for rhetorical strategy and political posturing. Even when the public is aware of the policy, neither the preferences of voters nor their abilities to discern the difference between policies are sophisticated enough to force a single specific policy. Voters will only notice policies when they are sufficiently far enough from their general preference (preferred policy)[10]. All policies that are not sufficiently far from the preferred policy to elicit accountability are located within what I refer to as the Constraint Space. The Constraint Space is flexible and leaders can employ strategies to shift and stretch it. In most cases, the dichotomous decision to join can be made despite a public opposed to joining by maneuvering to make the policy lie within the range of the Constraint Space.

In addition to rhetoric, there is another dimension to leadership strategy as well; not only can leaders frame their decisions in ways to minimize public constraints on their choice, they also have the option of modulating their actions. They can choose various forms of participation in a military intervention. Public opinion studies and survey experiments in

international relations, driven by the presumption that public opinion matters, have explored variation in public opinion about foreign policy issues. This line of research tends to focus on whether support varies with the aspects of the intervention, such as the level of casualties, involvement of international organizations, and length of intervention [122, 70, 83, 15, 66]. I argue the form of intervention impacts the accountability leaders face and therefore domestic politics can affect the form of intervention. For example, previous research has looked at the effect of casualties on public opinion and has drawn the conclusion that a large effect should deter leaders from engaging in conflict [166, 167, 125, 160, 20, 161, 150, 198, 22, 191, 21, 199, 23]. I argue this leap is unnecessary. A large negative public reaction to casualties should deter leaders from conflict strategies that will lead to large casualties but not necessarily deter them from conflict all together [79, 83, 70, 71, 85, 84, 64]. Leaders are aware of the large effects of certain aspects of conflict on their population's support, and will strategically avoid those aspects and choose others that minimize the costs of conflict. Different contributions vary in exposure to domestic pressures, the ease of favorable framing, and effect on salience, based on the setting each leader faces, what I will refer to as their initial Constraint Space.

Even though domestic constraints cannot dictate whether countries join conflicts, I argue this does not mean constraints do not exist but rather that it appears differently that we would expect based on traditional literature. The following is a stylized illustration of my description of constraint, and the Constraint Space. The first illustration shows the initial public preference and the leader's preference as solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the constraint range. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.


The pro-conflict policy can move into the constraint range in two ways. The first way

Figure 1.1: Initial Constraint Space




is to move and actually change public opinion to align with the leader’s preference. This is difficult and often temporary when the public has already established a set opinion on an issue. Even the strongest and most well documented “rally effect”, or tendency for the public to dramatically increase its support in the immediate aftermath of a foreign conflict, erodes sharply after the initial stage of conflict [167]. Leaders are largely aware of this fleeting support and will understand that while the current public opinion may be in favor of their policy, the latent opinion may not be.

Figure 1.2: Temporary Rally Constraint Space



They should be aware of the more stable range of policies, constraint range, that will be acceptable long term or by the next election. Despite rally effects they should still be taking steps to shift the constraint range and work within it in order to avoid punishment. With largely the same tactics as those used in attempt to actually change and move opinion itself, leaders can more feasibly move and expand the size of the constraint range to include their policies.

Figure 1.3: Expanded Constraint Space



In order to assess this phenomenon of what happens when there is a divergence of leadership and polity preferences on foreign policy, we first must unpack constraint, what it looks

like and how it functions. Constraint is expressed as leaders being restricted in policy making due to an effort to retain power. I argue that public opinion is not exogenous and not solely a function of the external situation but is also endogenous to elite posturing within the relevant institutional setting. Constraint is a function of the expectation of sanction based on public opinion, the external situation, elite posturing, and the institutional setting and the actual ability to exercise the said policy given the material and institutional context. For example, the leader may not feel constrained by the public but he may be constrained from his preferred policy in a more technical sense by the boundaries of his power institutionally or the country's capacity. The initial constraints form the Constraint Space, or a range of acceptable policies a leader can suppositionally choose without being sanctioned (the circle in the first illustration). If the leader's preferred policy lies within that range, there are no additional actions necessary and the outcome is straightforward. But things get interesting and the existing explanations get muddled when this is not the case.

I argue that successful strategies are determined by the nature of the constraint faced. Leaders will choose a rhetorical strategy and type of involvement based on the constraint they face. For example, if they are constrained by the public's aversion to casualties and fear of terrorism, they would choose a policy that would avoid casualties and would choose rhetoric that emphasized the importance of their involvement in deterring terrorism.

Accountability is manifested when the public can see a difference in their preferred policy and the one carried out by its leadership, and has the ability and chooses to sanction the government based on that discrepancy. Thus accountability is observed when constraint fails or the leader's perception of constraint is flawed. If leaders do not choose their strategies based on their constraints, they will not be successful in shifting the constraint range to include involvement. In the case that they do not shift the constraint range (or do not shift it enough) and choose a policy outside of it, this is when they will face accountability.

The Iraq War is an exceptional case to test this theory. Leading up to the Iraq invasion,



there was an unprecedented amount of public engagement about whether an invasion of Iraq should take place, and when the invasion occurred publics around the globe were aware of, held strong opinions about, and demonstrated against the conflict. Iraq provides the best case to determine how leaders navigate a divergence of preferences with their publics, because it provides several cases of democratic nations choosing to join a conflict despite not having majority support. By focusing solely on the Iraq invasion, I control for the nature of the issue, the decision to join as a coalition member in Iraq.

In this dissertation I will test the validity of my claims through process tracing of seven cases. This selection was based on my preliminary data collection of all potential country cases for the Iraq invasion. I chose all countries that participated in some capacity in Operation Iraqi Freedom, ranging from political support to full combat and everything in between. This included 52 countries excluding the United States. From there, I narrowed my selection to democracies by limiting to countries that had a polity score of 10. While it may be possible in the future to extend my theory to transitioning democracies, I felt it would be most prudent to only select full democracies in order to be confident in rejecting the null hypothesis, that democratic foreign policy is dictated by public opinion. This brought the universe of cases down to 15 countries. From here, I limited the cases to 8 by including those who contributed either more than 1000 combat troops or more than 5000 non combat troops over the course of the conflict<sup>1</sup>. This resulted in the selection of the seven cases, Australia, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom<sup>2</sup>.

I will systematically test each case. First, I will assess the initial Constraint Space of each case. Second, I will describe the strategy each leader chose to loosen the initial Constraint Space. Third, I will assess the Constraint Space after the leader employed his strategy to loosen it and then each leader's policy decision. Finally, I will address accountability, and

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<sup>1</sup>It is interesting to note that based on this selection, 6 of the 7 countries were countries that introduced the second resolution to the United Nations with the United States. The 7<sup>th</sup> is the Netherlands and I argue they were not part of this group due to the constraints they faced.

<sup>2</sup>All data is available in the appendix.

Table 1.1: Case Selection and Contributions

Country	Contribution Type	Number of Troops Deployed
Australia	combat	2400
Denmark	combat	5500
Japan	non combat	6100
Netherlands	non combat	7564
Poland	combat	13900
Spain	combat	4100
UK	combat	102000

whether it occurred, and what it looked like or how it was avoided.

To assess the nature of the constraint faced I will assess several factors. For each case they will include the factor affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor's effect.

Table 1.2: Factors Contributing to the Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms		
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History		
National Identity		
Institutional delegations of power		
Electoral system		
Opposition Party/ Parties positions		
Degree of Political Competition		
Political Environment/ Other issues		
Material Capacity		
Public Opinion		

Normative constraints can substantially confine leaders to certain narratives and therefore, certain types of policy. Threats are conceptualized as social, intersubjective conditions [24, 229, 151]. Successful construction of threat and policy through security speech acts and by explaining its relationship to identity allows leaders to have more freedom and thus loosen their constraints. But, while leaders have the ability to construct these narratives, in order for them to be impactful and accepted, they must operate within the social and political environments. These environments and the identities determine the “match” between issue framing and political culture, and the quality of this match is critical in framing options and success[73].

The nation’s normative and historical setting include alliance history, attitudes toward conflict in general, satisfaction with the nation’s global standing, satisfaction with the status quo power of the parties to the conflict, political standing with the US, affinity to international organizations, national attitudes on combating international terrorism, and national and party identities toward conflict and terrorism. Norms set expectations about what types of behavior are legitimate and which interests or identities are possible[142]. The actions and justifications of these actions that this allows can vary from one democracy to the next even within the same conflict. Framing of actions must be consistent with accepted identities. For example, national tradition and identity of non-militarism will move physical combat outside of the range of possible policies. Themes of an honored history of a shared alliance, working through international organizations, regional solidarity, etc. can all affect the constraint space and the strategies to expand them. Attachment to these identities and norms can both constrain and be used to expand constraint.

Institutional constraints determine whether there is potential for voters to hold their leader accountable. The salience and relevance of public opinion ultimately depends on whether the leader believes the opposition could mobilize the voters[128]. Thus, it is the potential for the opposition to exploit public opinion, rather than public opinion itself, that threatens accountability[82].

Institutional constraint will include elite consensus and deferral to executive on foreign policy. Institutional traditions or structures, which influence the deferral to the executive or elite consensus on foreign policy issues, affect the presence of an opposition message. The opposition party can also be constrained in its ability to present an opposition message due to its own party platform and identity. For example, if an opposition political party has a hawkish identity and a desire to preserve that party identity then they will be constrained in their ability to offer a counter policy. Whether the lack of counter communication is due to elite consensus, or opposition constraints a single message will result in the media and information dissemination reflecting the leader's policy message and then public opinion will follow[182, 235, 131]. A high level of polarization across other issues will increase the strength of partisanship on vote choice, reducing the potential for voters to hold leaders accountable on foreign policy issues. For example, Baum and Potter present the statistically insignificant effect of a foreign policy misstep, the attack on the American Embassy in Benghazi, Libya, on Obama's lead over Mitt Romney; explaining "that for voters to change candidates, they would also have had to accept changes in their preferred candidates positions on financial regulation, taxes, healthcare, gay marriage, abortion, and so on[9]. Thus, the more polarized the alternative candidates are, the more salient foreign policy will have to be to affect vote choice. This is also true of party competitiveness which affects accountability by affecting the availability of a reasonable alternative for citizens to vote for over the leader. The opposition may be presenting an alternative policy but if voters do not see them as a legitimate leadership option, then it will not affect vote choice. Deferral to the executive, polarization, party competitiveness, and party identities all affect the constraint leaders face on foreign policy issues.

Institutional constraints also determine the feasibility of the implementation of the policy and also the attention paid to the foreign policy issue. Other political issues affect the political environment which affects the constraint a leader faces on the foreign policy issue. Highly salient issues can dominate the public policy debate which can either benefit or hinder the leader's foreign policy efforts. For example, if the public and legislature is focused on

other issues, the leader may be less constrained in foreign policy, given there is a delegation of power to the executive. On the other hand, the opposite could also be true if another issue is causing turmoil that affects the necessary support for the foreign policy issue then it could make the leader more constrained.

A country's contribution to a military intervention is also constrained by its material capability. A leader will not be able to enact policy that his country is not capable of delivering. States without military power will not be able to contribute troops, and so on. This type of constraint is not movable but will not affect the leader's ability to make the dichotomous decision to join. Rather it constrains the spectrum of participation options. The most facile being political support.

Then I will test whether I observe that leaders chose strategies based on the constraints they faced. In order to reduce constraint, they should tie the strong foreign policy norms and identities to their chosen policy type and use that to increase support for their chosen policy, to confine opposition in its ability to effectively mobilize a strong alternative, to get institutional support, and neutralize any negative backlash. If the leader does this successfully, I hypothesize they will expand the Constraint Space to include their policy and will implement the policy without backlash. This can be observed in the arguments made and in their reception.

The avoidance of being held accountable should be the default observation. Domestic institutions and audiences *do* affect the policy *process* but electoral punishment is not certain if leaders stray from a precisely dictated public policy preference. Leaders act within the context of their domestic setting to loosen constraints without increasing accountability. Most leaders are highly aware of their constraints and concerned with the potential for domestic backlash, and therefore reduce accountability by taking actions toward removing or avoiding audience costs and broadening the range of acceptable policies- those which are not expected to result in ex post costs. Rational leaders given all of the information

they have choose policies that, ex ante, will not result in their removal from office or their party's removal from office. Ex post outcomes of removal result from unexpected changes to leaders' insulation calculus, which include changes to timetables, changes to expectations of "success", stochastic changes to the political environment, etc.

I will use the seven cases of the Iraq war to demonstrate how constraint functions and how democratic leaders maneuver to get as close to their preferred policy as possible while trying to avoid punishment. I divided the cases as follows, the first empirical chapter will be a detailed case study of the United Kingdom. I chose the UK for this chapter because they were the largest partner qualitatively and quantitatively, in terms of both diplomacy leading up to the conflict and in contribution during the conflict. The second empirical chapter will include case studies on Australia and Poland. The third empirical chapter will include case studies on Denmark, the Netherlands, and Japan. The fourth empirical chapter will be on Spain because it offers a strong test against my argument in favor of the traditional literature.

## CHAPTER 2

### An Opposed Public and UK Intervention in Iraq

Contrary to expectations based on the widely accepted democratic peace and subsequent international relations scholarship on regime type and conflict, Tony Blair's preferred policy was not driven by public opinion and was in fact at odds with public preferences. The United Kingdom participated in the United States' Coalition of the Willing in 2003, in a full combat role, contributing troops for the invasion and occupation. Deep domestic opposition was expressed not only by consistent solid majorities of public opinion against the war but also by record breaking public demonstrations. Moreover, Blair's divergence was not due to lack of awareness of this pressure, as he and several of his close colleagues have commented on and documented the domestic pressures he faced. Over the time leading up to the conflict, Blair found himself facing the decision between his domestic opposition and his preferred policy. In the public hearings for the Iraq Inquiry, former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Wilson described it, "I think the Prime Minister was torn over Iraq... Torn between all his instincts which were alongside the Americans, whatever that means, on the one hand, and his knowledge that a lot of people in his Cabinet and in public opinion and people in Parliament would be unhappy with that. I would guess he resolved it [in favor of his instincts]" [45]. This quote shows that neither the theories arguing absolute democratic constraint nor those arguing absolute elite persuasion can explain Blair's Iraq situation. While Lord David Plunkett, Home Secretary at the time of the Iraq War, described Blair as having "overwhelming certainty and confidence in his own judgment" and thinking "he believed he could carry the people with him", Blair never was able to do so [69]. Blair, himself, acknowledged that he was "between numerous

rocks and hard places” and described the constraints, “isolation within cabinet, let alone the PLP and large parts of the media and public opinion, was colossal”[18]. Yet, despite the constraints “in the final analysis” he “would be with the US, because it was right morally and strategically”[18]. This leads to the question, how did Blair engage in a war and escape electoral accountability without bringing the public around? The fact that Tony Blair’s preferred policy was in direct odds with public opinion provides a perfect case for analyzing how a leader can navigate foreign policy when domestic constraint is working against strategic objectives.

Conventional theorizing predicts that leaders that defy public opinion will be punished at the ballot box and therefore rational democratic leaders should be constrained from pursuing unpopular conflicts. Public opposition to the preferred policies of leaders, especially on an issue such as salient as involvement in war, poses a central challenge for leaders and constitutes the core constraint envisaged in democratic governance. There have been many studies on the case of the UK and the Iraq War. Different authors have come to starkly different conclusions in studying the same topic; public opinion, constraint, and accountability. Some say Blair was not constrained at all. Others argue Blair was constrained but acted regardless<sup>1</sup>. Blair was punished. Blair went unscathed. How can one case produce so many different conclusions about the same political forces?

I argue constraint and accountability are more nuanced than the traditional literature contends. In practice, it is rare that a leader will fully abandon his preferred policy for that of the public and it is also rare that the public’s preference will be fully moved to adopt the leader’s exact preference. Rather, the leader will act strategically within the Constraint Space. In this case, Tony Blair was able to expand the range of acceptable policies to include full military participation in the invasion of Iraq without UN backing. I argue domestic constraint is revealed through the limits placed on this manipulation and determines the strategies that will be successful in moving or widening the acceptable range.

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<sup>1</sup>Based on the traditional definition, this contradicts itself and thus could not constitute constraint



Therefore, accountability proper as it is generally defined does not seem to occur, i.e. the *rascals* are **not** *thrown out*, although it can be argued that loss of seats in parliament could signify this to a lesser degree. But more important than the trivial debate of whether the loss of seats constitutes accountability, I argue the threat of accountability does exist in this case, it appears and functions through the constraint Blair felt. But because as a rational leader, Blair chose strategies based on this constraint, he did not face the accountability generally attributed in these situations. Therefore, I do not argue that Tony Blair *defied* public opinion nor do I argue that Tony Blair was able to *change* public opinion, although he did, at times, do both. Rather, I argue that Tony Blair was aware of public opinion (and his political environment) and acted strategically based on that awareness. Obviously, in a normative sense this is a significantly less impactful role for the public in determining foreign policy in democracies but it is an important role and explains why we rarely actually observe the strict version of accountability described in the literature.

Blair did not change his policy position based on domestic constraint, but he did strategically frame and time the process, the players, and the conflict itself. It did not determine whether the UK would join the coalition, but it did determine the presentation of the Iraq policy and the politics of the policy process itself. Domestic constraint had a very large effect on what he pursued and the way he justified it leading up to the conflict. It also had a large effect on how he used his political capital with the United States. While ultimately in March 2003, he chose to pursue his preferred policy, in the months and years prior he chose strategy based on his domestic constraint to loosen the bounds of acceptable policy to insulate himself from the teeth of accountability.

I will begin my analysis by explaining the constraints and environment that Tony Blair faced leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These include historical norms and identities, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, political environment and polarization across other issues, opposition party stances and policies, public opinion, and material capacity. These constraints not only set the initial constraint range but also

determined the flexibility of that range and the strategies that could loosen it.

Foreign policy norms, attitudes, history and identities shape the way the public perceives foreign policy events and how leaders can shape those perceptions. They set expectations about what types of behavior are legitimate and which identities and narratives are acceptable, and thus which policies are possible. For the United Kingdom, some of these ideas are more entrenched than others. Long standing principles of British foreign policy include the *special relationship* with the United States, active participation in international affairs, support for international cooperation specifically support for the United Nations as an institution and for its authority, adherence to international law, promoting democratic ideals and practices, and safeguarding humanitarian protections [114].

The centrality of Britain's relationship with the U.S. originates in their shared histories, the aftermath of World War II, and the fallout from the 1956 Suez Canal invasion which signified to many the dependence of Britain on the United States. Since then, the U.K. and the U.S. have had a cooperation of intelligence services and military, and have supported each other on nuclear policy and in diplomacy. The British have prioritized transatlantic ties and have seen themselves as the link between American and European policy. As the colonial power of the U.K. declined, British foreign policy relied more heavily on its relationship with the U.S. to maintain global power and influence. This has led to a role-based social logic in security practices and behavior of the importance of the British role as partner and reliable ally to the United States. This role largely reduces constraint, as the British people and MPs have become accustomed to standing with U.S. policy. While this can reduce constraint, it is limited to policies that are in the best interest of the U.K. and not just blindly following U.S. foreign policy moves.

In the Post World War II Era, even as its imperial power declined, British foreign policy continued to exert great power influence. In 2002, 86 % of the British public supported the active participation of their country in international activities and a majority rank their own

country as the second most influential country in the world behind the United States[231]. Even as the material, economic, and military power of the U.K. decreased, it maintained its influence and soft power through the construction and maintenance of the rules-based international order established after World War II. This includes: international laws, rules, treaties, customs, and international institutions. The U.K. played a significant role in the development of these institutions and norms, and continued to play a large role in their maintenance and functions and thus has had a large interest in maintaining and supporting them. The esteemed position of the U.K. as one of the Power Five in the Security Council of the United Nations is no different. It is a pillar of British foreign policy and in 2002, 81% of British citizens wanted to strengthen the UN's role[231]. This effect on constraint runs in both directions then, it reduces constraint when upholding the authority of the United Nations and international law but sets limits for acting outside of that authority and those laws.

This strong public support for an active British role in international affairs includes the use of military force under certain conditions, specifically humanitarian missions. Overwhelming majorities showed support for missions to help starving people, enforce international law, destroy terrorist camps, free hostages, and to help with peacekeeping in war torn areas [231]. This sentiment is prevalent in many established democracies, emphasizing the adherence to the democratic and humanitarian ideals and principles that came out of the aftermath of World War II and the establishment of the new world order implemented to prevent atrocities and large scale conflict. This has generated support for and norms of involvement in humanitarian crises and in cases of wanton aggression. Yet these international norms also emphasize the importance of state sovereignty and this sets limits by requiring the case be made of the gravity of the situation.

Generally, this type of intervention is associated with autocracies. Stable democracies, such as the U.K., require a publicly shared democratic social identity and this has implications for its interactions with democratic and especially nondemocratic regimes[96]. This

democratic identity sets expectations and ingrains norms but also sets up the *autocratic other* as the antithesis of those ideals. Along with the democratic ideals that came out of World War II, so did a fear of appeasing authoritarian leaders. The history of the First Gulf War and a long record of misbehavior with a familiar autocrat in Saddam Hussein could easily tap into this democratic identity. Yet, there are still limits, especially to justify the use of force and interference in a foreign state, the case must be made that the autocrat is a pressing concern and threat.

Following September 11<sup>th</sup>, a majority of British citizens cited the three most important threats facing the country as combating international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and weapons of mass destruction [231]. Therefore, British policies believed to support combating these threats would be highly supported such as sending troops to Afghanistan in 2001. This loosens constraint for such policies, yet because of this high priority, the government will be limited in policies that are not determined to specifically address these threats or possibly make them worse. The Iraq case presents a scenario that could go either way. The government could try to highlight the relevance of the threat, but if they fail to prove the direct link it could hurt support.

Institutions also have a huge impact on the constraints leaders face. It is not opinion itself that constrains leaders but rather the potential for it to be exploited by the opposition[82]. While certain narratives can certainly determine the feasibility of exploitation, the institutional environment determines the potentiality of exploitation. The institutional environment includes the delegation of power on foreign policy, institutional structure, opposition strength and policies, and polarization across other issues.

In the United Kingdom there is traditionally a constitutional autonomy of the executive in foreign policy making as the commander in chief. Throughout its history, the decision to go to war first belonged to kings, then to the monarchs in the privy council, and finally with the prime minister and cabinet. The power to commit troops lies solely with the Government.

There is no legal role for Parliament in the decision. In practice, the Government generally allows Parliament to debate it but sets the terms of the debate and any voting generally occurs after troop commitments have already been made. The delegation of power decreases constraint as there is no constitutional role for Parliament in the decision to commit troops but politically limits the Government from pursuing highly unpopular policies with little Parliamentary support.

The structure of the electoral system also determines the level of institutional constraint a leader faces. Electoral laws are argued to be biased in favor of larger parties because more legislative seats are allocated to them than they would beget based on their actual share of the popular vote[190]. This can reduce constraint by discouraging voters to sanction leaders that act against their preferences. This decreases constraint by presenting technical obstacles to being held accountable. Yet, the British system should be more responsive to public opinion than others with a PR system of election because the expected responsiveness is based on the presumption that parties' strategy to maximize electoral gain should motivate them to the ideological middle to capture the median voter. However, in practice, parties' ideological platforms rarely map on to the median voter and sometimes miss by a large margin[184].

Moreover, polarization between parties across other issues can add to reduced constraint. When there is little overlap between parties on policy and there are stark differences across many important issues, it makes it much more difficult to sanction a leader based on a foreign policy decision when a voter would then have to vote for a candidate on which they do not agree on anything else. In the British case, voters that may have aligned with the Liberal Democrats on Iraq policy may not have acted on it due to fear of being under or unrewarded because of Britain's single member plurality system. Theoretically, Conservative position on Iraq aside, these disenchanted Labour voters could sanction the Government by voting for the Conservative party but this would be worse because it would result in the election of their least preferred choice on almost every other issue. Therefore, the salience of the foreign policy issue, the war, would have to be extremely high to change votes. Thus the limit of

the reduced constraint is extreme salience relative to all other issues.

Furthermore, to Blair's benefit, the main opposition, the Conservative party supported the intervention in Iraq and did not offer a meaningful difference from Labour. The Conservatives were traditionally the more Pro-American party and more hawkish in foreign policy thus were constrained in being blatantly opportunistic by both party platform and preference. The party that did offer an alternative, Democratic Liberals, were not seen as a credible governing alternative. The support of the Conservatives helped with the support in Parliament, the rhetoric coming from Parliament, and ultimately the vote that was held prior to the start of the war. This support gave Blair the cushion he needed going into debates and while trying to win over MPs in his own party. This support was only on the general policy and would not extend to support or blame sharing for the entire detailed policy.

Taken together, the differences between the Conservative and Labour parties on a majority of other issues, the Conservative party taking a pro-War stance on Iraq, and the minimal return on voting for the third party, allowed Tony Blair to afford to be more dismissive of the antiwar majorities but there were limits that he was aware.

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor's effect.

According to my theory, Blair and his Government should have been aware of these factors to reduce constraint and their limits, and should have chosen rhetoric and policy based on them. Traditional international relations democratic theorizing would argue that public opinion would change the leader's policy. The puzzle this project is trying to answer is prompted by the fact that this did not occur. Political behavior literature would say that the public would change and follow elite opinion. My argument is more nuanced. The

Table 2.1: British Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	moderately encouraged participation	acting within UN/IL
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms	strongly encouraged participation	equitable partner
National Identity	strongly encouraged participation	make the case of exceptionality/ peculiarity
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly encouraged participation	parliamentary debate
Degree of Political Competition	moderately encouraged participation	party divisions and opposition policy support only
Political Environment/Other Issues	weakly discouraged participation	all other factors
Public Opinion	moderately discouraged participation	all other factors

focus is not necessarily on a direct change in basic policy (join intervention or not) or a direct change in public opinion (support intervention or not). Instead, I argue the constraint of public opinion is dependent on the likelihood of being held accountable. Some of the rhetorical strategies to change opinion and those to loosen constraint can look the same. In fact, it is consistent with my theory that leaders would prefer to fully bring the public to their side. This would result in a complete narrowing of the constraint space to zero. Tony Blair may have attempted to do this but was unable to, and yet was still able to enact his preferred policy. The goal of this chapter is to illustrate how this worked.

As early as February 2002, the British government began to craft their strategy to deal with the constraints they faced. Ambassador Alan Goulty produced a note on “contingency planning in the event of military action against Iraq” which emphasized the importance of rhetorical strategy: “in the build up to any action, we would need to mount an aggressive PR campaign, emphasizing Iraq’s record of noncompliance with UNSCRs and evidence of WMD reconstitution and other crimes... Our basic message, around which further, more detailed messages could be built, might be: ‘Iraq poses a unique threat to the security and stability of

the region as well as the rest of the world” [89]. From late February 2002, Tony Blair and his foreign secretary, Jack Straw began making the case of support for U.S. policy by emphasizing the threat Saddam posed. Blair outlined both the problem and the potential to reduce it in his autobiography when he said, “The persuasion job on this seems very tough... Public opinion is fragile... the case should be obvious. Saddam’s regime is a brutal, oppressive military dictatorship. He kills his opponents, has wrecked his country’s economy and is a source of instability and danger in the region” [? ]. The decided strategy included referencing his past disregard for UN resolutions, support of terrorist organizations, and his affinity for weapons of mass destruction, all meant to tap into the concerns of the British people. Blair also attempted to amp up the threat, by tying in the fears of appeasement and inaction, implicitly connecting the situation with themes from World War II and explicitly evoking the 9/11 attacks as lessons “ that if we don’t act we will find out too late the potential for destruction”. Establishing Saddam as an autocratic other and an exceptional threat, Jack Straw argued, “The threat from Iraq is not receding. Unique among the world tyrants, Saddam has both the ruthlessness and capacity to employ weapons of mass destruction” [214]. Blair continued similarly arguing, “We know, for instance, from his own history that Saddam Hussein has mass destruction weapons and will use them [17]. He even explained his strategy by saying, “one argument worth stressing was that we “had paid a terrible price by failing to act on warnings about Al Quaida and the Taliban: “We should not make the same mistakes again ignoring warnings about the international trade in WMD and the threat this posed to us. We must educate the public [146]. Mr Blair concluded that the ultimate message was that if we care about these values of freedom, the rule of law and democracy, we should not flinch from the fight in defending them and that Britain would defend them with courage and certainty[146]. This quote highlights democratic identity and ideals, sets up Saddam as violating them, underscores the importance of British involvement and role as an ally. The initial rhetoric coming from the Government strongly emphasized the alliance with the United States and the U.K.’s role in relation to it. This is exemplified by Tony Blair’s firey speech in Texas, “We dont shirk our responsibility. It means that when America is fighting for those values, then however tough, we fight with her. No grandstanding, no



offering implausible but impractical advice from the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard not the easy choices on terrorism and WMD, or making peace in the Middle East, but working together, side by side. That is the only route I know to a stable world based on prosperity and justice for all, where freedom liberates the lives of every citizen in every corner of the globe. If the world makes the right choices now- at this time of destiny- we will get there. And Britain will be at America's side in doing it[16]<sup>2</sup>. The authority of the United Nations was also strongly emphasized. When Jack Straw was published in *The Times*, he asserted that Iraq was “persistently flout[ing] the authority of the UN Security Council and international law” and “ Britain and the United States have lead the UN's efforts to protect Iraq's neighbours from aggression and protect the world from Iraq's weapons of mass destruction” [214]. The strategy was to define the U.S. and the U.K. as partners in upholding the authority of the United Nations and protecting democratic ideals and the international order, while also defining Saddam as *the autocratic other* who was defiantly breaking international law, posing an extreme international threat, and was committing human rights violations against his own people.

The early 2002 public relations campaign was largely successful in convincing the British public of the threat posed by Saddam. By early summer 2002, 75% of British citizens cited Iraq's development of WMD as the most important threat their country faced. The acceptance of the construction of Iraq as an existential threat was successful too in shaping the debate in Parliament. Even the opposition, which in fact came from within the Labour Party and the Democratic Liberals, overwhelmingly emphasized the nondemocratic nature of the Iraqi regime and acknowledged the threat it posed. Where the rhetorical strategy was unsuccessful was in convincing the public and the opposition of the preferred policy policy being the use of force, especially without the approval of the United Nations. This is where my theory fills the gaps of the elite leadership theory. This can be explained by going back to the idea of the Constraint Space. At this point the Constraint Space has been


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<sup>2</sup>This speech was given in April 2002, which further exposes the problem with looking at public opinion studies, many of which begin after this speech was given. Studies that look at polls after the government has already began it's public strategy do not account for the confounding influence of the government's posturing

loosened by each of the normative factors, alliance/ special relationship, support of the UN and international law, an active international role, and democratic identity but the loosening allotted by each factor is bounded by the limits referred to in Table 3.1.


Military action still remained outside of the range of acceptability on the Constraint Space. This can be seen through the stylized illustrations below. The first illustration is the original constraint space. The initial British public preference and Blair’s preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.

Figure 2.1: Initial British Constraint Space



The second illustration is the constraint space after it has been loosened by the rhetorical strategy based on the factors of constraint. Public opinion has now moved closer to the Government’s preferred policy and the range of acceptable policies now includes the dichotomous choice of join or not (the first dashed line). The second dashed line represents the use of military force.

Figure 2.2: Loosened British Constraint Space



Persuading the public of the necessity of military engagement was limited by perceptions

that Britain was not an equitable partner, the lack of UN authority, the credibility of the exceptionality of the case in humanitarian and security concerns, and the Parliamentary and international debate. The Government was aware of these limitations and worked to neutralize them to bring military action within the range of acceptability. At no point did the public's disapproval change the Government's policy preference but it did affect how they pursued it. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to the limits facing the U.K. in his memo to President Bush drawing from his conversation with Jack Straw, "On Iraq, Blair will be with us should military operations be necessary. He is convinced on two points: the threat is real; and success against Saddam will yield more regional success. Aside from his foreign and defense secretaries however, Blairs Cabinet shows signs of division, and the Labour Party and the British public are unconvinced that military action is warranted now. Blair may suggest ideas on how to: (1) make a credible public case on current Iraqi threats to international peace; (2) keep Iraqs neighbors on our side; (3) handle calls for a UNSC blessing that can increase support for us in the region and with UK and European audiences; and (4) demonstrate that we have thought about the day-after" [183]. He delineated the limits facing Blair as the lack of Parliamentary support, the lack of belief in the imminence and peculiarity of the threat, and lack of UN authority, and that Blair would want to remedy them. The same points are reiterated in a July note prepared for the Prime Minister in anticipation of a Cabinet discussion on what would be "necessary for military action and UK participation including that "time will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein. There would also be a substantial effort to secure the support of Parliament. An information campaign will be needed... to give full coverage to the threat posed by Saddam Hussein, including his WMD, and the legal justification for action [180]. The limitations are clearly described and fully understood by the Government, not only that, but the Government also presents a clear strategy in dealing with these limitations.

The imminence of the Iraqi threat and the Government's credibility in making those claims was a significant problem for Blair and his cabinet throughout the period leading up

to the Iraq War. The prime minister felt that in order to gain the support of both ends of the political spectrum he needed to focus on the nature of the regime and the security threat; “the change in the security risk after 11 September was the basis for changing the regime but the nature of the regime was why ’we should be proud of having got rid of him [Saddam Hussein]” [46]. Britain’s Ambassador to the U.S., Sir Christopher Meyer said stressing the WMD danger “was a crucial to the public case against Saddam, particularly the potential linkage to terrorism as was “Saddam’s barbarism” which he saw as “an indispensable element of the case for action” [154]. The obstacle the Government faced was in convincing the public and Parliament of their preferred policy of military action. The Government’s strategy to gain support for this policy was to demonstrate “the threat [was] so serious/imminent that it [was] worth sending our troops to die for; it [was] qualitatively different from the threat posed by other proliferators” [195]. The publication of the dossier was Blair’s attempt to “set out for the public, in as accessible a way as possible, the reasons why he had become more concerned” about Iraq and was meant to ameliorate this gap of support [39]. Yet, the dossier failed to change the tide of public opinion in the way the Government had hoped it would. Only 4% said its publication influenced their opinion a great deal and only 19% said a fair amount. Only 16% said they became more favorable to military action after reading the dossier [162]. I argue that this is because the public had already been convinced about the nature of Saddam’s regime and the threats of WMD and terrorism. Blair had already loosened his constraints by priming these concerns but had hit the limit of his Constraint Space. This limit was the use of force. He had already convinced large swaths of the public that Saddam, WMD, and terrorism as the greatest threats to the country, which could be why the dossier did not move public opinion. He had already moved it as far as he could by tapping those threats. The weakness of the dossier was that it was unable to address “the legitimate question of why we were taking action now” and thus the limits of his constraint space still did not include the use of force [42].

Expanding the Constraint Space to include force was also limited by the fact that the public did not perceive the UK as an equitable partner in the Iraq policy and thus was

less receptive to it. Blair explained that he believed they were hitting the limits of the humanitarian angle because, “people suspect US motives” and “people believe we are only doing it to support the US; and they are only doing it to settle an old score. And the immediate WMD problems dont seem obviously worse than 3 years ago” [43, 41]. This problem of being tied to United States policy fared poorly for Blair because nearly 60% of British citizens disapproved of George W. Bush’s handling of the situation with Iraq and 69% believed Tony Blair was too supportive of Bush’s foreign policy [162]. Blair’s numbers closely tracked Bush’s and he knew “he would pay a political price for supporting the US on Iraq and wanted to minimize that. UK voters would be looking for signs that the UK and US were ‘equity partners in the special relationship’[183]. As late as December 2002, Alastair Campbell, Tony Blair’s director of communications, addressed the need to rebut the “poodle charge” by putting “over to the public that we are in charge of our military preparations separate from the Americans... we need a clear sense of a UK government position that is our own, it need not be at odds with the US but it should be understood to be our position, not merely an echo of theirs. Domestically we are hit by the sense that we are doing this for America, and to protect the US-UK relationships, rather than because we believe it to be the right thing for us. The Americans talk always about the threat to the US, we have to communicate better the threat and relevance to the UK”[25]. Because of Tony Blair’s large interest in securing his partnership with the United States, he was never able to simultaneously convince the public that his policy was separate from theirs.

Third, broadening the Constraint Space to include the use of force was also limited by the Parliamentary debate and the width and depth of support. Even though the formal power still laid with the Prime Minister, military action would be put to a vote prior to troops being sent and it was crucial for Blair to secure the necessary support for the use of force. Quelling parliamentary criticism was also important because the debate within Parliament would fuel media and public criticism [89]. As mentioned, the main opposition party, the Conservatives, supported military action. Yet their policy support did not extend to the Government. Tony Blair recounted the dynamic in his memoir, “Iain Duncan Smith had long been an advocate

of taking on Saddam. His view was that Saddam was a threat, he would never change and he had to be confronted. He had written a very powerful pamphlet on the issue in early 2002. Like the Thatcherite ex-ministers and followers, he was Euroskeptic but passionately in favor of the American alliance. He gave solid backing and I was really grateful for it. Whats more, unlike many of his colleagues, he wasnt a fair-weather friend, but remained of the same view even when the going got tough. It was reasonably clear fairly early on that I would need Tory votes to be sure of winning in the House of Commons, and we were already committed to a vote before the action. So I knew I would win the vote itself. But-and it was a big 'but'- the Tories were, perfectly justifiably, making it clear that if there was a 'no-confidence' motion following the vote on the conflict, then they would side with the rebels. In that case, I would bet out. Therefore I had to win well, and in a way that deterred any on my own side taking their opposition as far as agreeing they would vote against the government on a 'no-confidence' motion[18]. The Conservative support of policy only, was certainly a limitation and forced Blair to secure his own party's support. Despite sending the Foreign Office briefing paper to the Parliamentary Labour Party and Straw and Blair both publishing articles outlining the case against Iraq, "the subsequent debate on the issue in the House of Commons was described as 'sharp', with opposition to military action going 'unfortunately, well beyond the usual suspects. The large number of signatories of an Early Day Motion opposing support for US military action, 130 of whom 100 were Labour MPs, was 'significant' and 'many more did not sign' but agreed with its thrust. The MPs were seen to be reflecting overall voter opinion"[37]. The problem was once again not in convincing the audience, in this case, Parliament, that Iraq was a threat that needed to be dealt with. All sides of the debate acknowledged the threat Iraq posed, the nature of the regime, and the danger of weapons of mass destruction. Rather the Government's problem was the limits it faced in including the use of force in its Constraint Space.

Finally, widening the Constraint Space to include the use of force was also limited by the necessity of the authorization by the United Nations. Throughout the lead up to conflict, the United Nations played a determinative role in public and Parliamentary support for

the use of military force. Mentioning UN backing or the lack thereof would swing large majorities of support in favor or against military action in every poll. The importance of the UN put Blair in a dicey position; upholding the authority and credibility of the United Nations was one of the arguments for action and yet the likelihood of a UNSC authorization of force seemed doubtful. Both Blair's public audience and his Parliamentary audience forced his steadfastness to the UN narrative. Clare Short said Blair "wanted a second resolution to keep the promise, if you know what I mean. For cosmetic reasons"[69]. Sir David Manning underscored this point, telling the inquiry that he thought the domestic political position "would make it impossible for the UK to act if the US decided not to take the UN route"[38]. This was a huge constraint on UK policy and impacted the stalwart commitment to stick to the UN route and the pursuit of being perceived as doing everything to avoid war. UN authorization largely limited the Government's ability to bring military force within the Constraint Space.

It is evident that relatively early in 2002 Tony Blair was able to move participation in the Iraq coalition into his Constraint Space, yet his preferred policy of military force remained outside of the Constraint Space, unable to surpass its limits well into 2003. As expected based on my theory, Tony Blair was aware of these limitations that he faced and adjusted his strategy to account for them. He acknowledged that public opinion was moving against military action but suggested it could be brought around[40]. It is in this strategy and all of the political moves it entailed that the presence of constraint is extremely apparent. The adjusted strategy was to emphasize the issue of WMD, set the unique danger posed by Iraq, adhere to the UN route, and assert the disadvantages and flaws of other policy choices. This basic strategy was set to gain public and Parliamentary support and as it continued to play out it was adjusted to account for how the Constraint Space was loosening and where it remained facing limitations. The constraints had a huge impact on the mechanics of the policy making process. While the constraints did not determine either the dichotomous decision to join or the policy choice of military participation, it did determine the policy process leading up to its implementation[44].

In February 2003, support for Blair's preferred policy remained out of reach. Less than one in ten British voters would support war without a second resolution and Blair was warned that the Labour party's membership was "hemorrhaging by the day" because of his Iraq stance[12]. To address the lack of support from the left within his own party and the public in the aftermath of the record breaking anti-war march in London, Blair turned to the moral case for war against Saddam because he thought it was "absurd for the left to end up campaigning, effectively, for the retention of Saddam"[44]. He decided to change his focus to defending his particular policy of military force in terms of the limits it faced, "Tony [had] shifted the terms in which he [justified] military intervention. For the first time he argued that war would be preferable to sanctions because of the suffering and malnutrition that comes in the wake of sanctions[56]. The humanitarian theme was chosen in response to the largest political demonstration in history on February 15, 2003, when over a million people took to the streets in opposition to an Iraq intervention. Blair wanted to "at least give the marchers something to think about and something to put them on the defensive[26]. This was a calculated decision based on his Constraint Space to address the limits he faced in convincing the public and Parliament that the use of force was the correct policy. Addressing hostile MPs within his own party, Blair made his case, "Before we take the decision to go to war, the morality of that should weigh heavily on our conscience because innocent people, as well as the guilty, die in a war...But the alternative is to carry on with a sanctions regime which, because of the way Saddam Hussein implements it, leads to thousands of people dying needlessly in Iraq every year"[12]. Facing strong opposition to his chosen policy, Blair specifically changed the way he justified action based on the constraints he faced in order to further loosen them.

The role of the United Nations also played a huge role in Blair's policy process. Because the public and Parliament placed so much stock in UN authorization, Blair was forced to do the same. The February public demonstration made a second resolution even more necessary and it was crucial that it be timed correctly based on expectations of Parliament's response[147]. Blair was put in a difficult position because he knew "that he desperately



need[ed] the blessing of the UN if he [was] to have any chance of carrying domestic opinion with him, but since he [knew]that Bush [would] go to war whatever the UN [said], Tony's attempt to wrap himself in the UN flag [was] fatally hobbled by his inability to say that the UN [would] have the last word"[56]. In addition to public opinion, Parliament was also a concern. Blair emphasized this when he gave President Bush "a clear message about the political realities namely that we couldn't do this without a Commons vote and it was not going to be easy without a second resolution or with a resolution that was vetoed"[26].

Both Parliamentary and public opinion concerns made it necessary to craft a contingency narrative built on strong rhetoric emphasizing the importance of working through the UN and even more importantly on increasing pressure on inspections. An Iraqi refusal to comply was expected to strengthen arguments for military action[89]. Expanding on this perception, the government decided to pursue the ultimatum route because "around 80 percent in the UK supported an ultimatum and acknowledged that inspections could only work if Saddam cooperated. Yet a majority opposed action at that time. The Government believed the "only explanation" was that: "they needed to be persuaded that the US and UK would prefer peaceful disarmament if that were possible. Proving it isn't possible is the huge benefit of the ultimatum route"[48]. In pursuit of the success of this narrative, Blair said "we needed to guard against the sense that we are looking for the process to fail, rather than looking for the process to succeed; A UN discussion where the tone would be one of regret that he failed to take the chance"[25]. The message needed to be "we did not want war, but Saddam Hussein has rejected the peaceful path to disarmament[25]. They adjusted to constraint and changed the timing of the policy process, "We could stop appearing to force the pace on the war. The public will only follow us if they believe we are reluctant about conflict[56]. This constraint was evident when the British government responded to President Bush's desires to take advantage of a military window in January 2003 saying, "additional days and weeks mattered in the battle for public opinion the UK needed timeline[s] for decisions that were no earlier than March or April, not January or February[47]. They argued this was necessary because they had to convince their "public opinions that the inspection process

was serious, that it had produced serious evidence and that his was the basis for a second resolution[47]. The ultimatum route needed extra time but allowed Blair to capitalize on the “large majorities [that] believed Saddam was a threat and needs disarming [and] without the threat of action he wouldnt disarm”[26]. He believed this would allow him to loosen the constraint space to include military action, “if there is a new UN resolution or even without a resolution if we had a majority of the UNSC ie France would veto and we could still do it[26]. Jack Straw illustrated this flexible understanding of upholding the will of the UN, “I hope France and Germany support any further resolution... but if they don’t, what they’re putting at risk is the whole authority of the UN”[12]. Unfortunately for Blair, for this strategy to be fully successful it meant he needed the inspectors “to prove that Saddam [would] not cooperate and that he [was] therefore justified in going to war The ghastly dilemma he now [faced was] that without Hans Blix denouncing Saddam, there [was] little chance of getting a majority in the Security Council for military conflict and therefore even less chance of getting a majority of the British people[26].

When it was evident that the coalition would not be successful in securing a majority of Security Council votes, the U.S. and U.K. withdrew the second resolution placing the blame on the French explicitly threatening the veto. Once it was apparent action would be taken without UN inspectors finding proof of WMD and without UNSC authorization, polls revealed the expected public responses. While 74% would have supported military action had both conditions been met, just days before the invasion only 26% supported the government’s decision to go without[164]. The two strands of constraint, the necessity of force against Iraq and the authorization of the UN, saw different amounts of movement in the final days leading up to the invasion. There was a 5% swing in favor of action without proof but with UN approval, compared to only 3% with proof and without approval[164]. This suggests the public had been convinced enough that Iraq was a threat that required action even without the inspectors finding proof. This implies that attitudes had hardened toward Iraq and Saddam, which is consistent with my analysis that Blair was successful in loosening constraint based on attitudes toward Saddam and Iraq. Yet, even if the public


had been persuaded of the merits of action, they continued to qualify their support on UN approval despite the merits of the case[164]. This is also consistent with my analysis that Blair was unable to loosen the constraint ascribed by the importance placed on the UN. It then makes sense that there was a greater shift in support in the final two weeks of February than in March. The U.S., the U.K., and Spain submitted their draft resolution in the end of February 2003 and withdrew it in mid March. Given this, it would be expected that the rhetoric surrounding this submission, the push for an ultimatum for Iraq, and the accusation that Iraq was not complying with the terms of Resolution 1441 would be more successful in increasing support for action than the withdrawal of the resolution that would have given more explicit UN authorization. Ultimately, all facets of constraint, those loosened and the limitations, combined, a majority of the public was against Blair's policy.

While public opinion only moved by 4% after the withdrawal of the resolution on March 17 and remained against military action, Parliament's support did move significantly by the House of Commons vote the following day. Blair's deputy Prime Minister explained the situation at the time, "Apart from Clare and Robin, everyone understood and accepted what was happening. Although we all had worries, we tended to go along with the feeling the we were stuck with Bush. Tony couldn't walk away. We were blaming the French for backing out of supporting an invasion, but we knew the Americans would go in whatever happened, so the French didn't really matter... Our relationship with the US had always been fundamental. All British prime ministers have to decide whether were with the US or not. And Tony had decided we were. Most of us agreed with that, deep down. During the run-up to the invasion, we all had our own reservations, and we were genuinely trying to delay an actual invasion, and go the UN route, if not stop it altogether, for as long as possible. But once it was inevitable we felt the was it...My attitude was that Tony, having made up his mind, should be supported[187]. In hindsight, Prescott expressed dismay over the lack and selectivity of information given to the Cabinet and lamented that the timing of the decision "was clearly designed to endorse an almost immediate action for us to go to war"[111]. Normative judgments aside, this shows that Tony Blair's strategy worked to

secure the support of Parliament. The House of Commons motion backing the Government's position on Iraq passed by 412 to 149 votes. The revolt within the Labour party against the government, with 139 backbenchers opposing Blair's line on Iraq, was the largest ever in party history. That being said, it was a huge victory for the government. It was the first time that military action was expressly agreed to by the House of Commons in advance.

Prior to the invasion, public opinion consistently rejected the use of force against Iraq without a UN mandate secured through a second UN Security Council Resolution, yet Blair and his government took the UK to war under those exact circumstances. I argue he was able to bring the policy within the Constraint Space despite not moving actual opinion to accept the policy<sup>3</sup>.

After Parliament's affirmative vote, military action was finally inside the range of the Constraint Space. This can be seen through the stylized illustration below. As shown, public opinion did move to accepting the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition, symbolized by the first vertical dashed line. The British public preference did not move across the second vertical dashed line, accepting the use of force. Yet, the ellipse around the public preference, which symbolizes the range of acceptable policies, stretches to include Blair's preferred policy.



While Blair was only able to move public opinion slightly closer to his preference than he already had a year ago, he was able to expand the range of the Constraint Space to include his preferred policy. I argue that Blair was able to expand the Constraint Space by further

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<sup>3</sup>As predicted in the theory chapter, once troops advanced on Baghdad, public opinion did swing from 26% in favor and 63% against to 56% in favor and 32% against the Government's policy, yet this swing resolved itself by the end of the summer[164].

loosening his institutional constraints. By loosening his institutional constraints he was able to insulate himself and his choice of policy by limiting the ability of the public to hold him accountable. As discussed earlier while addressing the initial landscape of the Constraint Space, the Conservative Tory decision to support Blair, made it difficult to establish a credible opposition. By eventually securing a majority of the Labour MP support, Blair was able to avoid a 'no-confidence' motion and secure his job. The Liberal Democrats' anti-war stance was not enough to overcome their position as a lesser third party to pull significant disenchanted Labour votes.

This is largely because of the low salience of the Iraq issue by the time of the election. The low salience is not just exogenous but also endogenous to the limited opposition voices coming from within the Government. By the May 2005 election, troops were entangled in south Iraq, the Iraq insurgency was in full swing, and claims of WMDs had long been discredited, yet Iraq's salience among the general electorate was shockingly low. Iraq was ranked 14<sup>th</sup> out of 16 issues[163]. The election was dominated by healthcare, followed by education, crime, and pensions. Because of this, despite the large majorities against Blair's Iraq policy, Labour retained a majority and Blair kept his position as Prime Minister for an unprecedented third term.

Although Blair remained in office, I argue accountability did still occur but just as constraint is not as black and white as the traditional literature portrays it to be, neither is accountability. While the voters did not *throw the rascals out* at large, Labour did lose 60 MPs in that election and several of them were to the Democratic Liberals in areas with large student and Muslim populations where Iraq was much more salient. This attributed to Labour's disappointing third term after a historic majority in 1997 and a second landslide in 2001. Perhaps more so than in vote share, Blair paid the price of his policy in his legacy.

Blair was able to loosen the Constraint Space and stretched it as far as he could to include his desired policy. Blair and his government had known that "ultimately, the success of any

campaign would depend on the success and swiftness of the military action and limitation of the number of civilian casualties” [89]. The Iraq campaign was unable to achieve any of these objectives and Blair did not escape unscathed. The expectation and reality of the Iraq policy ended up being very incongruent and thus Blair’s initial strategic calculations based on his expectations of the Iraq policy outcomes were insufficient. The Iraq issue was deemed an “image issue” rather than an “issue issue” which helped keep the salience low in the 2005 election but did still hurt Blair and Labour. Blair went from the most popular post World War II Prime Minister in his first term to one of the least popular in his third term[62]. Blair preached trustworthiness when he became Prime Minister in 1997. He focused his government on securing the trust of the voters, even suggesting that the perception of mistrust would merit resignation. He enacted policies and procedures intended to build a bond between his government and the people, publishing annual reports, apologizing for mistakes made, indulging all questions at press conferences, and being careful about what promises the Government made[194]. Thus a legacy plagued by three inquiries and marred by accusations of purposely misleading the public about the threat posed by Iraq is definitely a blow to the former prime minister. The image issue proved to be lasting as Blair’s personal reputation never recovered. When Blair resigned, 77% of voters disapproved of his handling of Iraq, 55% said Iraq was his biggest mistake, and 38% said he allowed foreign policy to be dictated by the United States[165].

Ultimately, Blair was able to expand his Constraint Space to include a policy that a large majority of the public was vocally against and did not face the certain consequences that the vast majority of academic literature would accord him. Constraint determined how he positioned himself, the actions he took in policymaking and diplomacy, and the presentation and framing of the policy. The Constraint Space responded to these moves and ultimately the circumstances allowed him to pursue his Iraq policy. Blair’s strategy was based on his awareness of his constraints, his ability to maneuver around them, and his expectations of the conflict itself. We cant know if this would have been true, but Blair believed that he could not pursue his policy (or continue as Prime Minister) if he did not

secure parliamentary support. If he had not been able to release this constraint, we may have seen a change in his policy. Given the fact that he secured Parliamentary support, he expected to insulate himself from being held accountable based on his perception of how the conflict would transpire. Yet, the unexpected timeline, casualties, and the outcome of the conflict that Blair did not account for in his initial calculations lead to accountability seen through the brunt taken by his personal popularity and public trust, and also that to the party. It was not enough for the public to oust the leader that took them to an unwanted war but it is evidence that leaders cannot do whatever they want without *any* repercussions.

## CHAPTER 3

### Loose Constraints and War in Iraq: Australia and Poland join the US War Effort

Tony Blair was not the only leader to join the United States' Coalition of the Willing despite an opposing public. In this chapter I will trace how the Australian and Polish leaders navigated similar waters; domestic constraint working against their foreign policy preferences. Strategically each leader saw the benefits of joining the U.S. in Iraq, yet their participation and strategy varied. I argue this is because the chosen policy was based on each leader's Constraint Space and his ability to loosen it.

Both in casual conversation and in conventional theorizing, the Iraq War is described as a prime example of leaders taking countries of unwilling publics to an unwanted war. This obtuse description paints over the presence of constraint and misses the nuances that reveal the presence and operation of constraint in each of the decisions to participate. While each leader decided that he would make the dichotomous decision to join despite opposing publics, their policy processes, strategies, and choices all reflected constraint at work.

In this chapter, I describe the Constraint Spaces of leaders in two countries and trace their policy processes. Both Australian Prime Minister Howard and Polish Prime Minister Miller faced relatively loose Constraint Spaces compared to other democratic leaders in the Coalition but still encountered real hurdles to enacting their preferred policies. Even though



their constraints and ability to expand and shift their Constraint Spaces differed, Australian and Polish leaders both continuously adapted their strategies to their distinct constraints which allowed them to join the coalition without public support. The cases of these two powers have an important distinction from the others in that they saw their relationship with the United States as centrally important to their own security and participation as crucial to secure that relationship.

## **Australia**

Australian Prime Minister John Howard's preferred policy, to join George W. Bush's Coalition of the Willing was not driven by public opinion. In fact, John Howard faced similar public opposition as his peers, exemplified by public majorities against Australian participation and large demonstrations reported to include half a million citizens taking the streets in most of the Australian capitals. Conventional literature predicts that citizens will "throw the rascals out" that defy public opinion, and yet, when Howard and the Coalition won the election in 2004 some called it proof the Australian electorate was disengaged or worse, apathetic[144]. I argue the moral panic of those strongly opposed to the war over this apparent apathy is misplaced. Just as the UK case demonstrated, constraint and accountability are more nuanced than the traditional literature claims. In this case, John Howard was able to strategically expand his Constraint Space to include not only the dichotomous decision to join the coalition but also to participate militarily including in the initial invasion, all without the UN's blessing. While this is true, domestic constraint was still strongly present and was revealed in the limitations placed on the planning and policymaking process. Howard worked within his Constraint Space and as a rational leader chose strategies that would insulate him from facing the accountability generally attributed to defying public opinion.

I will begin my analysis by explaining the initial Constraint Space facing Australian Prime Minister John Howard leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These include

historical norms and identities, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, political environment and polarization across other issues, opposition party stances and policies, public opinion, and material capacity. These constraints not only set the initial constraint range but also determined the flexibility of that range and the strategies that could loosen it.

There were several international attitudes and norms that attributed to the initial Constraint Space facing Howard. The first was the importance of the alliance with the United States. In Australia, this alliance is often referred to as the security “insurance policy” and is the cornerstone of the country’s security strategy. Howard expressed the centrality of this relationship calling it was the keystone of the Australian national security strategy and he was “unapologetic” stating, “no nation is more important to our long term security than that of the United States” [108]. The post-9/11 environment had already heightened the Australian emphasis on the importance of the partnership between the two countries. Howard had been in Washington to meet George W. Bush for the first time and to mark the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty the day prior to the attacks. The next day, still in Washington, a shocked and emotional Howard pledged to stand by the American people [226]. Three days later he invoked the relevant provisions of the ANZUS Treaty reaffirming the strength of the alliance and committing to fighting terror alongside the United States. The public also felt the importance of the American alliance. In the 2001 Australian Election Study, 57% responded the ANZUS Treaty as “very important” for “protecting Australia’s security” [88]. The public had also been accustomed to joining American military conflicts. The first of these was the Vietnam War to which Australia sent sixty thousand troops. Australians were also aware of the benefits to the strategic relationship, one of which was the establishment of U.S. ballistic missile detection satellites on Australian soil. This obviously drastically loosened Howard’s constraint to pursue policy in line with emboldening this relationship. While support for U.S. relations was strong, there were limitations. The Australian public would support policies in line with American foreign policy as long as the policies were seen as being in the national interest as well. As tensions on the Iraq crisis heightened, 45% of the

Australian public thought the current level of AU support for the US policies was too high and 51% thought American foreign policy had a negative effect on Australia[87].

As a medium power on the world stage and a Western power in the Pacific, Australia supported the international laws, rules, customs, treaties, and institutions that constitute the western established international order. This included the United Nations. Labor and its voters were especially attached to the UN. The endorsement of the UN helped Labor Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, generate support for participation in the Gulf War in 1991. The history of this conflict set a precedent of working multilaterally. Humanitarian intervention and intervention in cases of wanton aggression had also been broadly supported in Australia. It proved to be so in the widely popular intervention in East Timor in 1999. Yet, a UNSC resolution was sought and action in East Timor was authorized which was seen as critical to Australia's approval of the intervention. This presents the obvious limit that the UN presents but also, even this highly popular intervention revealed other the limits of support in the criticism of the crisis, citing imperialist tendencies and state sovereignty.

Another highly impactful set of international attitudes and norms at the time was the threat of terrorism. Howard was strong on this issue and in the 2001 election campaign, highlighted his dedication to the war on terror and the process of asylum seekers, which the government tied to the terrorist threat[88]. While September 11<sup>th</sup> was a "defining event" for Howard, the Bali Bombings in 2002 killing 88 Australians, brought the threat closer to home for the public [106]. There was widespread support for the War on Terror, yet the transfer of this support to the Iraq conflict would be limited by the potential to take efforts away from fighting in more pressing arenas and the potential that the conflict could increase the threat of terrorist attacks on domestic soil.

Similar to the attitudes toward the threat of terrorism, the fear of the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was a strong in Australia. Australia's immediate concern was the potential for North Korea's proliferation of WMDs. While Australians

would support policies to deter states from developing these weapons, the limitations would be present in tying the action in Iraq to other threats closer to domestic soil.

In addition to norms and attitudes, Australia's Western democratic national identity interacted strongly with the Iraq crisis. Howard saw the attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup> as not just an attack on the United States but an affront to all states that maintained Western values[178]. Not only did this identity link Australia to other liberal democratic countries, but it positioned non democratic regimes as the antithesis of their basic values[200]. This democratic identity set expectations and ingrained norms but also had implications for its interactions with democratic and especially nondemocratic regimes[96]. Yet, even as this certainly loosens constraint in interactions with non democracies, the world is full of them and the case must still be made of the unique threat of the regime.

Institutions have a huge impact on the constraint leaders face and Howard was no different. As far as foreign policy delegation, in Australia, "since Federation, Parliament [had] never been consulted on a commitment to go to war and the decision to join the Iraq coalition "was no exception[221]. To prompt a difference, the institutional constraint facing Howard would have had to be extraordinary and it certainly was not. In 1996, Howard lead the Coalition, the Liberal and National Parties, to victory over Labor for the first time since 1975 and won again in 1998 and 2001. This solidified his authority among the Coalition MPs and strengthened his power in Parliament. The dominance Howard maintained over the party and the strong discipline he commanded was even referred to as "cast iron discipline... something Blair could only dream of in relation to his party"[206]. After the November 2001 election, Howard and the Coalition continued to establish a commanding lead over Labor in the polls. Because of this, there was little threat of serious challenge to the party and within the party, even less threat to the Prime Minister's position from within his cabinet or own back bench. Furthermore, since 1996, Coalition senators had always voted as a block and there was little to prompt a change in that[4]. The Coalition was also composed of two parties right of center, the Liberal and National Parties, both of which placed even higher

value on the American alliance, combating terrorism, had a greater proclivity to intervention, and placed less value on the United Nations. Together, this greatly loosened Howard's constraint.

Of course, generally the greatest threats accountability poses to leaders are not attributed to their own party but by the potential for public opinion to be exploited by the opposition[82]. In Parliament, the main opponents of the governments policy were the Labor Party, the minor parties, and the Independents. The main opposition party, the Labor Party, with a long established party platform of a strong attachment to the United Nations, argued that absent a UNSC resolution Australia should not commit troops. The minor parties and independents expressed even stronger objections to the war and some argued against the commitment of troops regardless. Yet, the constraint this posed was relatively small because of the disparities in political competitiveness. Following the November 2001 election, Howard and the Coalition maintained a heavy lead over the opposition. Even as the march to war became ever present, Howard out polled Simon Crean, Labor's leader, as the preferred PM by as much as 3 to 1[87]. Labor was constrained by appearing weak on foreign policy and defense and because of this "spectacularly failed its quasi-constitutional duty to interrogate and oppose" or present a credible counter-policy for the public[145]. While the oppositions' positions were relatively muted, there was a limit to Howard's ability to capitalize this if he were to reach for policies that were outside of the defense narratives.

The final constraint Howard faced was actual material capacity to contribute to the Coalition. Throughout the process leading up to the war and even once the war began, the war effort was limited by capacity. Australian forces and material was stretched thin which was attributed to the participation in Afghanistan, other theatres of the War on Terror, and in the Pacific. Palazzo revealed that "it was clear to those involved that manpower constraint was an issue, especially since it had been a core condition of planning for previous operations. One planner acknowledged that manpower policy was, back of mind knowledge"[178]. Ammunition stocks were also kept at such low levels and equipment so limited "that it made

the deployment of certain capabilities virtually impossible without immediate purchase of additional supplies”[178]. In this case, capacity was a factor but it was also limited by the government not wanting to increase it.

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor’s effect.

Table 3.1: Australian Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	moderately encouraged participation	acting in national interest and within UN/IL
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	strongly encouraged participation	make the case of relevance/ positive impact
National Identity	strongly encouraged participation	make the case of exceptionality/ peculiarity
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly encouraged participation	Parliament debate
Degree of Political Competition	moderately encouraged participation	defense policy orientation
Material Capacity	moderately discouraged participation	policy preference
Public Opinion	moderately discouraged participation	policy preference

This alludes to the preferred policy of Howard and his government. Howard’s preferred policy was to join the coalition and to do so militarily but to limit that contribution once those conditions were met. For Howard, providing the *right* force was “secondary to the vital requirement of it just being there[178]. Howard saw the U.S. decision to invade Iraq as a way to advance his government’s ties relationship with Washington and “thus Australia’s final, and true, prupose in joining the Coalition against Iraq was to support the United States

and, in doing so, use the war as a means to strengthen the security relationship between the two countries” [179]. It was important that the troops were deployed for the invasion of Iraq side by side with the Americans. Howard’s interest in the conflict was to secure the alliance with the Americans and due to the political requirements of the Bush administration, it only mattered that Australia was there. What Australia actually contributed militarily was less important than that they did. This realization allowed Howard to achieve his strategic incentives while reducing the necessary to expansion of the Constraint Space.

My theory argues Howard and his government should have been aware of the factors to reduce constraint and their limits, and should have chosen rhetoric and policy based on them to expand the Constraint Space to include Howard’s preferred policy. Indeed, Howard and his government did just that.

Beginning as early as June 2002, the Howard and the Coalition engaged in crafted talk to justify the government’s public stance on Iraq and future participation by framing his argument in ways that took account of the values, beliefs, norms, and priorities that made up the Constraint Space [116]. In order to achieve his preferred policy Howard and the Coalition knew they needed to espouse what was deemed “mandatory rhetoric” [178]. Howard drew on the importance of the American alliance, adherence to the United Nations, the perils of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (as well as linking it to the threats of international terrorism), and the character of the Saddam regime.

The initial rhetoric coming out of the Coalition emphasized the threat posed both specifically and broadly. Drawing on recent terrorist attacks and the support for the War on Terror, the Coalition asserted that the exigency of the Iraq crisis was a result of the lessons learned from September 11<sup>th</sup>, “The United States is clearly no longer going to allow problems to fester and threats to remain unresolved. The need to act swiftly and firmly before threats become attacks is ...clearly driving US policy and strategy. It is a position which we share, in principle” [101]. Howard knew the link needed to be made between the threat Iraq posed

and the nation's pressing security concerns as that was one of the limits they were facing in drawing support from the threat narrative. This was made explicitly by identifying WMD as a threat to the nation further heightened by the likelihood that Saddam would make his arsenal available to international terrorist organizations. Howard asserted this would increase Australia's vulnerability and "constitute a direct, undeniable and lethal threat to Australia and its people"[108]. The link was further formed by leaning on the strength of Australia's Western democratic identity by making the connection between Islamic extremism and "hostility to the values of the West, of which Australia was a part"[108]. His rhetoric stepped up when he further drove his point home by proclaiming, "Australia is a Western Nation and nothing can, will or should alter that fact[108].

Howard knew the importance of the United Nations in garnering support for deploying Australian troops to Iraq and throughout the policy process stuck to the UN narrative. Beyond desires to halt the spread of WMDs and terrorism, Howard pointed to Iraq's non-compliance with United Nations resolutions and undermining of the UN inspections process. Hoping to tap into the public's supportive attitudes for the United Nations, Howard drew attention to Saddam's disregard for the institution. Even when faced with the reality that there would not be a second resolution, Howard pivoted toward upholding the UN, by arguing that rather than circumventing the United Nations, his policy was in fact championing the UN's original position and in actuality, the countries opposed to action were the ones that were "opportunistic and inconsistent[107].

While the importance of the alliance was accepted by most, the emphasis on Australia's primary role as an alliance partner, however had to be tempered due to the public push back about Australia's strategic priorities. Many of the antiwar arguments began to take form over concerns that the Iraq policy was not in the interest of Australia but rather Australia's support to the United States reflected the foreign policy domination Australia had shed when it gained independence from Britain. Thus, similar to Blair's "poodle problem", Howard attempted to show that his government was not a puppet of the U.S. His strategy to combat




this issue was largely based on his actions rather than speech.

The rhetorical strategies were able to move Australian public opinion in favor of action being taken in response to Saddam and his regime, but Howard was unable push opinion past the limit of the active Australian engagement. While the question of whether the US should go to war was split, the commitment of Australian troops was not. On average over a majority opposed Australian forces participation in any US lead attack and even less supported under the condition that the UN did not sanction US action. The support for unauthorized deployment did not rise to more than one fifth until right before the invasion, and even then it remained at 25%.

The stylized illustrations below illustrate the Constraint Space Howard faced. The first illustration is the original constraint space. The initial Australian public preference and Howard's preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.


Figure 3.1: Initial Australian Constraint Space



The second illustration is the constraint space after it has been loosened by the rhetorical strategy based on the factors of constraint. Public opinion has now moved closer to the Government's preferred policy, in fact public opinion is now in favor of diplomatic engagement and/or action taken by others against Saddam. The range of acceptable policies now includes the dichotomous choice of join or not (the first dashed line). The second dashed

line represents the deployment of Australian forces without UN approval.

Figure 3.2: Loosened Australian Constraint Space




Unable to significantly shift public opinion, Howard was able to keep the potency of public opposition low by remaining elusive about the course of action he would take and constraining the opposition with the strong security narratives. Howard and Peter Cosgrove, the Chief of Army, wanted to stay ahead of the *CNN factor* and worked to keep a lid on any military plans that might have implications for the domestic political environment[178]. Even in January 2003, Howard insisted that a deployment of personnel to the Middle East was not a commitment to the war but rather merely an increase in diplomatic pressure; he also added that Australia would welcome a peaceful solution to the crisis[109]. This was not just a statement made to ease the public, from mid 2002 until just weeks before the war began, Howard was reluctant to commit to the Bush administration because of its potential to heighten public attention and concern. This was not a reflection of indecision on Howard's part, he knew he wanted to send Australian troops into combat as visible support for the purpose of bolstering his strategic relationship with the United States. Rather, this was a strategy to reduce the constraint he was facing. The military had been tasked with coming up with options for military contribution as early as July 2002 and while it was continually, and at times, severely handicapped by the political desire for discretion, it was always the government's plan[178]. By evading public commitment to a policy on Iraq, Howard was able to frustrate a strong counter argument by the opposition. The effectiveness of the opposition's argument would hinge on the details of the plan, particularly the possibility of committing participation without UN authorization and the deployment of troops. These were the two policy factors that had the strongest public opposition and would be the most straightforward for the opposition to capitalize on.

Aware of majority opposition to his preferred policy, Howard kept his policy underwraps which denied the opposition the ability to use that ammunition by limiting the time necessary to craft an effective counter argument. The opposition's ability to mobilize voters to hold leaders accountable determines the salience and relevance of public opinion[128]. The effect will also run in the other direction as the lack of effective and sufficient counter communication leads to a single message which will result in the media and information dissemination reflecting the leader's policy message and then public opinion will follow[182, 235, 131]. Therefore, the opposition was unable to capitalize on public opinion, but also their inability to form a sufficient counter message generated weaker latent public opposition.

Howard's obfuscation and evasion of committing publicly to his preferred policy was able to constrain his main opposition, Labor, so well because they were also constrained by two dominant foreign policy norms. Many in Parliament were very uncomfortable with the discordant developments at the United Nations Security Council and this expressed itself in tense debates. But, because Howard had not stated the policy he would pursue, this debate was unable to gain momentum in the public sphere. Labor Party was also keenly aware of the broad bipartisan support of the importance of the country's relationship with the United States and they strategically "maintained open avenues of retreat into realist support for the US in the event of unilateral action, reducing the strength of their opposition[80]. This manifested itself when in September 2002, the Labor Party voted with the government to defeat the minority parties' motion that condemned military action taken without UN authorization[1]. Similarly, on March 18 2003, despite stating reservations, when the Senate was debating the decision to participate Labor joined the Coalition in voting down an Independent amendment to have "Australian troops withdrawn immediately"[221]. Labor's constraint was apparent when, even as they stressed their unmet conditions of war without UN sanction: "evidence of a direct link between al-Qaeda, Iraq, and support for terrorism and "evidence of the expansion of Iraq's WMD capacity, they gave the caveat of their "unswerving support for the US alliance, abhorrence of the regime of Saddam Hussein, and unequivocal support for Australia's own troops *in harms way*[221].

After Parliament’s affirmative vote, deployment of Australian troops was within the range of the Constraint Space. This can be seen through the stylized illustration below. As shown, the public’s preference did not move across the second vertical dashed line which represents the deployment of Australian troops<sup>1</sup> Yet, the ellipse around the public preference, which symbolizes the range of acceptable policies, stretches to include Howard’s preferred policy.

Figure 3.3: Final Australian Constraint Space



I argue that Howard was able to expand the Constraint Space by strategically loosening his constraints by reducing the potency of public opinion. Because his preference for conflict was merely having boots on the ground, regardless of quantity or tactical value to the Coalition, Howard was able to reduce the casualties and other conflict related news that could drive negative public attention. Therefore, Howard because of the Bush administration’s political requirements and optical desires of the appearance of a multilateral intervention, Howard was able to achieve his strategic interests of securing the U.S. relationship. He was able to “offer only nice capabilities and to take steps to minimize the risk” of “possible negative effect on the domestic political environment”[178]. Howard was very strategic in modulating his actions and took great strides to choose a policy that would minimize costs that could impact the salience of the conflict. His strategy was clear when the United States identified a need for a reconnaissance battle group, and Australia responded that the deployment of this group was “manpower heavy and a costly prospect for the Howard Government”[178]. Instead, the government chose a small militarily insufficient force because it would “offer a welcome contribution to the Coalition while not compromising its domestic agenda” by greatly reducing the risk of casualties down and keeping financial costs low by depending on other allies’ material contributions[178].

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<sup>1</sup>As predicted in the theory chapter, there was a rally effect support for the war, which was up to 32% support in first week of March, then up to 51% first week of war, and finally up to 57% in April. As predicted (and as in the British case), this swing resolved itself by the end of the summer[88].

This strategic choice of policy also added to an even further reduction of institutional constraint because it limited the opposition's ability to capitalize on public opinion on Iraq. Through normative constraints and competitiveness constraints on the opposition paired with strategically attuned policy, Howard Howard was able to insulate himself and his choice of policy by limiting the ability of the public to hold him accountable.

The 2004 election proved Howard's expansion of his Constraint Space was successful. Labor was unable to capitalize on the Iraq war because they "suffered from a total lack of credibility" on the voter's two most important issues, "stopping boat people and enhancing Australia's security"<sup>2</sup>[60]. The leader of Labor, Mark Latham, recalled the reason his staffers suggested he "stay away from Iraq [because it was] not a vote switching issue, was because "For some people [Iraq] is seen as Howards greatest weakness, with his lies and sucking up to Bush. For others, [Iraq] raises questions about my foreign policy experience and belief in the American Alliance[135]. This ultimately ended up being the case, while there may have been gross change, there was not net change because "what obscured the Coalitions losses over the war were the Coalitions gains from voters concerned about defense and terrorism"[87]. Australia had suffered no casualties and the goal of affirming the strength of Australia's relationship with the United States was highly successful; one senior officer asserted the Iraq crisis lead to a "renaissance in the ANZUS relationship"[178]. This reduced the salience and any widespread negative impact of the conflict. Even though the Coalition lost the 2007 election, Iraq played a negligible role, as voters were most concerned with the government's WorkChoices program and global warming. Further, even though Labor campaigned to remove troops and only one third of voters agreed troops should remain, there was still not widespread support for "immediately which could be due to the low costs and the fact that the country still had not suffered any casualties[88].

Ultimately, there is little evidence of Howard and the Coalition being held *accountable*

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<sup>2</sup>The former, "stopping boat people", refers to refugee problems, which the government tied to terrorist threats. Therefore both issues were security in nature.

for initiating a conflict that large majorities of their democratic populace were against. Howard had strategic<sup>3</sup> incentives that drove his desire to make a meaningful contribution to George W. Bush and the United States by providing the visible support of Australian forces arriving in theater alongside the American troops. Yet, this study shows constraint played an extremely prevalent role in the shaping of the policy process strategy, both rhetorical and in the selection of when, how, and what to contribute. It shows that constraint is certainly not to be dismissed but rather works and functions in a different and more nuanced way than the traditional literature contends.

## Poland

Poland's Iraq policy stood in stark contrast to public opinion on the crisis. In fact, as the intervention and Polish participation became more likely and then as it actualized, public opinion became increasingly opposed. Strong opposition to the war and to Polish deployment was seemingly unable to constrain the government from pursuing such a policy. Moreover, Poland participated in the initial invasion, contributed ground forces involved in major combat operations, and commanded multinational forces in southern Iraq from August 2003 until withdrawal in 2008. With high opposition to the war, even for Europe, Poland was still one of only five to contribute combat ground forces, contributing significant numbers, the third most only behind the United States and the United Kingdom. This presented questions of whether the democracies of Donald Rumsfeld's proclaimed "new Europe" were inherently different and perhaps Poland's government was completely free of the shackles of public opinion[99]. I argue, this is not true but again that constraint and accountability are much more complex than the simple inferences made based on "hire and fire" logic. Polish leaders did face a Constraint Space which presented narratives that they had to work within and also institutional and political features that allowed for the loosening of the range of

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<sup>3</sup>Strategic in the security sense.

acceptable policies that would be impervious to the negative consequences attributed to accountability.

To begin the analysis of Poland decision making in the Iraq War, I will explain the initial Constraint Space. These include historical norms and identities, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, political environment and polarization across other issues, opposition party stances and policies, public opinion, and material capacity. These constraints set the initial constraint range and determined the flexibility of that range and corresponding strategies for further loosening.

Polish history played a large role in shaping normative attitudes and identities in regards to foreign policy broadly which affected attitudes on Iraq specifically. A main source of these entrenched norms was the painful history of the nation that included occupation and the experience of the manifold of atrocities under Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. According to Prizel, national identity played a significant role in the shaping of foreign policy norms and practices in Poland and other democracies previously part of the Soviet Bloc[188]. The nation's history largely impacted the association of externally identified enemies and Poland's own national identity. The importance and consciousness of the "other" made national security an utmost priority. That compounded with the sensitive geographic location of the country created a consensus among elites to set security as a primary concern.

The desire to join NATO and also lack of faith in Western Europe alone as a security guarantor naturally induced a strong motivation for a close relationship with the United States. World War II not only lead to national identity and the heightening of security issues, it also lead to Poland being "intensely insecure about its ability to defend itself and very skeptical about whether Western Europe had any interest in coming to its assistance or the ability to do so"[140]. In the early 1990s, this compounded aspiration for NATO membership and close ties to the U.S., manifested in closely aligning Polish foreign policy with American foreign policy. Attempts to prove the value of Polish cooperation to the U.S. were accepted

across parties creating a foreign policy consensus built on the understanding that the U.S. (through NATO) would ultimately be Poland's security guarantor against external threats given Poland established itself as a legitimate partner in regional security[57]. Poland offered assistance in the evacuation of American civilians during the Gulf crisis, and participated in operations in Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. Even after successfully securing NATO membership in 1999, apprehension about European security in general but also perceptions that European states were "renationalizing" their security policies and fears of potential threats from a Russian "revival" meant Polish foreign policy would continue its established Atlanticist orientation[141, 189]. Thus support for the United States was generally seen as preserving NATO rather than undermining it, while French and German actions during the Iraq crisis were viewed as threatening to the alliance. While joining Bush's Coalition of the Willing was beneficial in pursuing a more significant role internationally, there were limits present. The limits to the strong support for the U.S. was the potential to strain relations with Europe, specifically Germany and France. A major aim of all post Cold War Polish governments was to gain membership in European Union. This "Europeanization" impacted Poland's foreign and security policies and culture[74]. Seeking EU integration was a primary focus for leaders and the public and was occurring concurrently with Iraq decision process. Other limits were presented in concerns that participation would worsen or at least take away from efforts to combat terrorist threats on Polish soil and other regional threats.

Polish institutions had an intricate effect on the Constraint Space which was amplified by the political environment. Poland is a multi-party semi-presidential democracy meaning executive power is split between the popularly elected president and the government (usually a governing coalition) led by the prime minister. The President is the commander in chief and head of state but foreign policy is generally overseen by the governing coalition, in particular the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. During the lead up to the Iraq War, the main actors in foreign policy formation were Prime Minister Leszek Miller and Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz[189]. While delegation of policy cre-



ation is generally to the government, President Kwaniewski and speaker of the Sejm<sup>4</sup>, Jozef Oleksy, were also very involved in the decision to send troops to Iraq. Prime Minister Leszek Miller, Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz, and Jozef Oleksy were all members of the Democratic Left Alliance. President Kwaniewski won his first term in 1995 under the Social Democratic party, but soon after the election quit the party and became an independent from which he gained widespread popularity. Despite Kwaniewski's technically independent status, all of the main decision makers going into the Iraq War had center-left political orientation. This is important because it meant that all of the mainstream Polish political forces supported the government's policy, including both the governing left coalition and the major opposition, the right minority coalition. Opposition to the Iraq policy was only expressed by the marginalized populist parties[141]. Andrzej Lepper, the preeminent anti-establishment politician of the Self-Defense party, publicly called the action "immoral", "in violation of international law", and finally referred to the president's decision to commit troops before seeking Sejm approval as "against the constitution"[185]. He was supported by the League of Polish Families who reiterated his claims that Kwaniewski acted unconstitutionally, and also drew on the populace's fears by claiming "the war may endanger the Polish people"[186]. Yet, Lepper was also discredited by support for the war within his own party and the impact of his disagreement suffered from his party's lack of competitiveness.

Given the consensus across the major political parties on the Iraq policy, the salience of the conflict would have had to have been extremely high in order to hold the government electorally accountable. Similar to the British case, the Polish citizens were given a difficult hand to sanction their leaders on the Iraq issue. Poles that may have aligned with the Self-Defense or League of Polish Families on Iraq policy would have had a difficult time voting for these parties because of the extremely different policies they held on numerous other more important issues. The public was much more preoccupied with domestic issues and EU accession. The low competitiveness of the parties compared to the political establishment of the two parties in favor of the Iraq policy was also a large factor.

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<sup>4</sup>The speaker is referred to as the "Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland".

While capacity was mentioned as a constraint concern by some in Parliament, Poland had been increasing its capacity and the experience that it lacked did not hold leaders back in terms of contribution. Between 2000 and 2003, Poland had purchased American weapons, including forty-eight F-16 fighter jets, worth \$3.7 billion [? 216]. These purchases contributed to expanded capacity but also to broader strategic goals such as sweetening relations with the United States and modernizing the military to further the Polish role in meeting NATO goals. The war itself is also said to have contributed to Polish capacity by gaining valuable experience by working in conjunction with some of the world’s most advanced militaries[189].

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor’s effect.

Table 3.2: Polish Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	strongly encouraged participation	goal of EU integration
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	moderately encouraged participation	fall out with Europe
National Identity	strongly encouraged participation	relation to threats to the homeland
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly encouraged participation	“unconstitutional” claims
Degree of Political Competition	strongly encouraged participation	break with consensus
Political Environment /Other Issues	strongly encouraged participation	salience
Material Capacity	weakly encouraged participation	costs
Public Opinion	moderately discouraged participation	all other factors

Poland presents an interesting case in which both the president and government experienced turnover during Iraq participation. First I will examine the strategies and policy decisions of President Kwasniewski and the government lead by Prime Minister Miller. The Kwasniewski/Miller leadership faced a public adamantly opposed to conflict with Iraq. In 2002, two thirds of Poles even opposed U.S. bombing of Iraqi facilities suspected of housing weapons of mass destruction, only 37% supported preventative war against countries suspected of aiding and providing asylum to refuge organizations ,and even less supported a possible occupation of Iraq. Another major obstacle to Iraq support was that 4 out of 5 Polish respondents believed participation would increase the terror threat for Poland[189]. Yet, despite this strong public concurrence against action taken toward Iraq, the government did not attach great weight to the opposition largely because they were aware of their Constraint Space. The Constraint Space was greatly loosened by the salience factor, “Officials responsible for drafting the policy were aware of public opposition, yet they argued that average citizens were usually more concerned about immediate dangers, failing to understand how a distant war may impact their own security in the long run. Few policymakers however, engaged in extensive discussions to ‘sell’ the issue domestically, particularly in comparison to resources that were invested in past to secure support for other policies, notably Polands EU accession” [189].

While the government did not feel the need to launch the large public relations campaigns that other democratic nations did prior to the war, there were several themes the president and ministers hit in their addresses to the public. The first was justifying Poland’s participation in Iraq as driven by national security concerns. National security was both defined in terms of regional threats and global (or terrorist) attacks. The regional threat claims evoked alliance loyalty and transatlantic unity. As troops deployed, President Kwasniewski, highlighted this rationale and also tapped on the country’s attitudes based on history and identity, “Poland was abandoned by its allies...We will not be allies who abandon our friends in need, as this will guarantee that we, when in need, will not be abandoned in turn and can count on US support” [133]. President George W. Bush emphasized the Polish decisions

contributed to the strengthening of the relationship when he famously proclaimed, “I have got no better a friend in Europe today than Poland”[51]. In terms of the global threats, involvement was argued to be pursued because of the new international political challenges and spread of international terrorism because threats no longer limited by geographical proximity. The Polish officials tied both international threats and the importance of alliance relations to the third theme; Poland asserting a more active international role. In a joint statement with President Bush, Kwasniewski announced Poland and the United States would “expand cooperation between our armed services both to deepen our military-to-military relations, and in particular to promote needed transformation in our defense” to adapt and improve capabilities to face them the new threats NATO faced[173]. Being a strong NATO ally also was seen as increasing international standing and with that increased security. Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz emphasized the role participation would play in Polish status, “this is not just about the pro-American option, but also about our place in Europe that we want to determine ourselves, not to be determined by others”[141]. Finally, the Polish government made it well known to its public that a quid pro quo existed with the United States and that in return for participation in Iraq, the U.S. would bestow several Polish requests, rescinding of visa requirements and granting of Iraq contracts to Polish firms[59].

In January of 2003, Polish leadership made strong moves in support of the United States on the Iraq crisis despite vehement public opposition. President Kwasniewski declared, on his mid January visit to the United States, that Poland would support military intervention if it were deemed necessary to disarm Iraq. The government followed suit and on January 30 2003, Prime Minister Miller joined other U.S. supporting NATO countries in signing the “letter of the eight NATO countries”<sup>5</sup>. This letter staunchly expressed support for the US position on the evolving Iraq crisis and strongly advocated for a unified transatlantic stance toward Saddam[141]. At the same time, the Polish public was expressing the opposite position. Only 26% of respondents supported Poland’s signing of the “letter” and policy of solidarity

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<sup>5</sup>The “letter of the eight” included the United Kingdom, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic.

with the United States[35]. In January 2003, only 6% unconditionally supported military intervention, while 51% unconditionally opposed it[34]. In contrast to even other generally opposed democratic publics, only 37% of Poles supported war even under the conditions that inspectors found weapons of mass destruction[34].


Despite the strong public opposition, Prime Minister Miller announced Poland would participate on March 18, 2003, the day the invasion took place, after internal disagreements within the government were reconciled. This participation involved deploying a contingent of 200 soldiers which included the GROM unit, a chemical decontamination battalion and a logistical naval vessel. At this time Poland would be the third ally to commit to fight alongside the United States<sup>6</sup>. A week later, debate on the decision was held in the Sejm. While UNSC resolutions were cited as legal justification, the dominant argument for action was argued to be Poland's national interest, specifically the preservation of the transatlantic alliance. The Prime Minister called upon parliament to continue the tradition of unity on foreign policy despite sharp partisan differences. This call was answered emphatically when both the governing coalition parties and main opposition parties, the Citizens' Alliance and Law and Justice, supported the policy.

President Kwasniewski, Prime Minister Miller, and the government contributed troops to the invasion without moving public opinion. In fact, public opinion had actually grown more opposed. From January to March 2003, the number of respondents unconditionally opposed to the war grew by 10%. The fact that the public was not persuaded is not surprising given the lack of effort put in to change it. The stylized illustration below illustrates the initial Constraint Space. As in the Australian case, the initial Polish public preference and government's preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the


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<sup>6</sup>The United Kingdom and Australia were the other two countries.

dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.



While Polish public opinion was not shifted, its potential to exert power by sanctioning the government was greatly limited. This potential is depicted above by the circle around the public's preferences which signifies that anything outside of it should result in the government being held accountable. In the Polish case, the public preference, by some standards, moved away from the government's preference, and yet the range of possible policies expanded to include the government's full preferred policy. In this illustration, the first vertical line signifies the dichotomous choice of joining and the second vertical line represents the deployment of Polish forces to the invasion.



There were several reasons that this grand expansion of the Constraint Space occurred and lasted. The first was the consensus and single policy position on Iraq by all mainstream political parties. As referenced earlier in explaining the factors of the Constraint Space, Polish domestic politics were highly contentious so it would have necessitated extremely high levels of salience on the Iraq issue to cause Poles to switch their votes from a party they align with on most issues in order to reflect their position on Iraq. That combined with the fact that there was a single message from the major parties on the issue and in order to hold the leadership accountable they would have to switch to a minor party, even further reduced the impact of Iraq on the vote. This is not to say that there weren't movements in

approval. The Self-Defense party did receive a bump in approval following the decision but within a few months the rating returned to normal levels.

Second, the government addressed the main issues that would be seen as Iraq spilling over into more salient policy domains. For example, the Prime Minister addressed concerns over fallout with Europe in his address to the Sejm during the debate on the Iraq decision. He stressed Poland's commitment to a strong EU and respect for France and Germany and understanding of their contrasting positions[141]. The fear of tension with Europe was echoed by members of parliament and caused the government to engage in public relations aimed to convince them and the public that the Iraq policy was not damaging important European relationships. When Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz visited the U.S. in May 2003, he described Poland as an intermediary between the Americans and Germans[141]. This was followed by a meeting three days later in Wroclaw, Poland where Polish, German, and French leaders reiterated the previous Polish statements, underscoring mutual respect, highlighting dedication to European unity and the importance of transatlantic relations[141]. These efforts were largely based on domestic concerns and reveal the tugging of even a loose Constraint Space.

Similarly, the Polish government had to address domestic concerns about the loss of Polish life triggered by the worsening situation in Iraq and also by increasing fears of terrorism. By September 2003, 70% of Poles expressed fear of increased terror threat due to Iraq participation, this increased to 75% in November, and by May 2004, 86% [32, 33, 36]. These attitudes were highly correlated with attitudes toward Iraq with opposition increasing from 57%, to 67%, to 73%, respectively[32, 33, 36]. While there had been elite consensus on the broad decision to contribute troops, there was discord on implementation heightened by the Madrid bombings coinciding with a cluster of publicized Polish casualties. This did result in domestic pressure to reduce the size of the mission which then in turn kept the number of casualties down<sup>7</sup>, and limited the issue's ability to increase Iraq's salience.

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<sup>7</sup>From the beginning of involvement in 2003 through withdrawal, Poland suffered 23 casualties total[27].

Third, unlike most publics across the world, Polish opinion of Americans and President Bush did not suffer as a result of the war. Even with large numbers opposed to any kind of support for the American lead policy and conflict, the United States remained the most favorable of all foreign nations, 58%, and George W. Bush remained Poles' most liked foreign leader through 2003[31]. Polish leaders did not face the intense criticism that their peers did in terms of alignment with the U.S., for example, Blair's so called "poodle problem". But the positive American attitudes did have a limit. The limit was perceptions that Americans were not shirking their end of a deal to advance Poland's national interest.

The framing of the Iraq policy in terms of national interest helped Polish leaders from facing the fallout their peers did. All of the themes presented by Kwasniewski and the Miller government as reasons for the war were based on the realpolitik considerations of national interest including security, standing, and payoffs. Staying away from international law arguments, humanitarian calls, emphasis on weapons of mass destruction, etc. enabled them to avoid the backlash experienced by others when the outcomes did not match the promised expectations.

That being said, there was one area that Poles felt expectations were not met and that was in the quid pro quo with the United States. The Polish government had set the public's expectations high that the U.S. would compensate, so to speak, Poland for their participation in Iraq by granting large contracts for the rebuilding process to Polish firms, recovery of debt from the 1990 war, and even more importantly would remove visa requirements for Poles' travel to the United States. In fact, when Donald Rumsfeld announced that the Polish GROM had participated in a covert operation in conjunction with SEALs in March 2003, prior to when the leaders informed the country of military participation, most of the media coverage focused on speculation about rewards for allied support rather than focusing on it as a political blunder or act of mistrust[141]. Similarly, when a confidential Polish embassy memo to the US State Department was leaked in July 2003, exposing the Polish government's list of favors expected in exchange for troop deployment[141]. If the war had been framed



as a humanitarian or democratic crusade, this could have been a huge scandal. Instead, it merely solidified the public's expectations of payoffs rather than creating uproar[141]. Yet, as time went on and these requests were not met, Polish resentment grew and then public attitudes toward the U.S. did become more negative[59]. It is difficult to disentangle leadership preferences from domestic pressure, be it public or from other officials, because the Polish leadership had been expecting these compensations as well and therefore the U.S.'s attitude toward the requests and lack of fulfillment was a blow to all Poles. The disappointment mounted when President Kwasniewski visited the U.S. in January 2004 and pressure to lift Polish visas was fruitless. The United States bucked the Poles' approach, one State Department official said, "The Poles thought they were in a bazaar. 'We do not get enough out of it. We want this and that'"[120]. This led to tension between Kwasniewski and the U.S. He indicated publicly that he had been misled and contemplated withdrawal by the end of 2005[189].

Yet, domestic politics and the elections revealed these concerns were only cursory for the public. In May 2004, populist attitudes caused by high unemployment, inadequate healthcare, and corruption scandals led to Prime Minister Miller's resignation<sup>8</sup>[11]. His replacement was Marek Belka, former Minister of Foreign Economic Affairs of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, in late June 2004, he recommitted Poland to Iraq deployment. Then in 2005, the parliamentary and presidential elections essentially occurred concurrently. The right of center, Law and Justice party emphasized deep lustration, anti-corruption measures, and a societal return to Catholic values. Iraq, and foreign policy more generally, played a very limited role in the election, largely because the contesting parties supported Iraq policy[192]. In fact, at a time when public opposition to the war was up to 70%, Law and Justice secured an emphatic victory despite having even more hawkish Atlanticist Iraq policies than the previous government[192]. Law and Justice held both the presidency and a majority in parliament and was led by twin brothers, President Lech

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<sup>8</sup>Many of these problems were thought to have been caused or exacerbated by budget cuts enacted in order for Poland's economy to meet EU requirements prior to EU membership[11].

Kaczynski and Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski. They worked closely together, reversed the previous government's decision to withdraw from Iraq and assured the United States deployment could be extended as needed[192]. The Kaczynski brothers however were not immune to the boundaries of the constraint space and reduced the size of the deployment.

Ultimately the various leaders of Poland were not held accountable in the traditional sense for their Iraq policy despite extreme majorities against it. This was largely due to elite consensus among competitive parties and extremely low salience while the political landscape was dominated by highly controversial and pressing domestic issues. During the Kwasniewski presidency, Iraq was eclipsed by the EU referendum and then Iraq was overshadowed by domestic issues including corruption and lustration during the Kaczynski presidency. The turnover in party control reflected these other more salient issues rather than policies on Iraq. Even the 2007 election, after which the new Civic Platform government under Prime Minister Donald Tusk announced a plan to withdraw, it was gradual and the situation deemed it natural timing[189]. The leaders of Poland were able to attain their security goals without facing electoral punishment with only slight efforts made to reassure the strength of EU relations and relatively limit exposure to casualties. The success of this calculation of the Constraint Space is revealed in the fact that in 2005 when asked about the most significant developments for Poland, Iraq did not even make the list of responses and when the government finally announced withdrawal only 1% said it was significant[189].

This does not mean democratic constraint did not exist. Rather, it exemplifies the importance of all of the different factors that contribute to the Constraint Space and how that can vary the flexibility and limits of the range of acceptable policies. The factors constituting the Polish Constraint Space greatly reduced the constraint facing Polish leaders. And yet, even in this case, the leaders were not free to act without consideration of domestic concerns.

## Conclusion

For both Poland and Australia, there was widespread concern that the leaderships' decisions to militarily participate in the initial invasion of Iraq revealed serious breakdowns in expected democratic functions. Rather, the cases show that even though leaders in both countries faced relatively loose Constraint Spaces, their policy making processes highly reflected attention to the constraints they faced. First, modulating policy allowed leaders in both countries to reduce the potential for accountability through opposition competition. Prime Minister Howard evaded a commitment to his preferred policy which inhibited Labor from establishing a counter argument and in Poland there was an elite consensus on the decision to commit troops. In both countries, there was public fear of increased threat and casualties, leaders in both countries were able to reduce the potential exploitation of this sentiment by reducing exposure. Howard chose a policy that kept both financial costs and casualties extremely low which kept Iraq's salience low as well. Similarly, the Polish government reduced the size of the mission to reduce risk and also the likelihood of increasing the policy's salience.

Second, framing participation in a way that primed supportive attitudes rather than the more obvious ones associated with the conflict also reduced the potential of the opposition to seize on the policy. In Poland, framing the policy in terms of national security interests allowed them to hedge security threat fears of being involved in Iraq with the protections and benefits it could safeguard. The success of this strategy was reflected in the single message presented by both major parties on the Iraq issue. Likewise, Australia's Howard government constrained Labor by tightly tying Iraq to strong foreign policy attitudes and fears that dominantly favored his party. In Australia, these strategies lead to a wash of opposition vote stance in Parliament when Labor voted against a constraining independent motion.

## CHAPTER 4

### Of Norms, History, and Identity: Japan, Denmark, and the Netherlands en route to war in Iraq

In this chapter, I will trace how the Japanese, Dutch, and Danish leaders maneuvered domestic constraint that was at odds with their own foreign policy preferences. All three leader saw the strategic benefits of joining the coalition, and faced steep domestic barriers to doing so. I argue that in each case, the leader chose a strategy based on their particular Constraint Space that allowed for them to loosen it and secure a preferable policy.

Ultimately each leader decided that he would make the dichotomous decision to join despite opposing publics, but their policy processes, strategies, and choices all highly reflected the presence and operation of constraint throughout the policy making process. Rather than these cases being stories of tone deaf leaders dragging their opposed publics into conflicts, the Constraint Spaces shaped how and when these leaders contributed.

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen all faced relatively strong constraints. While their constraints and their ability to expand and shift their Constraint Spaces varied, all three adjusted their strategies to the particular constraints they faced and were able to join the coalition despite opposing publics. A characteristic of these three middle powers that offers an important addition to

the argument is that the preferred policies of the leaders looked much different and therefore the strategy and outcome looked different as well.

## Japan

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's preferred policy, to contribute to U.S. President Bush's Coalition of the Willing, was a decision not motivated by public preferences. Rather, like his peers, polls consistently showed that large majorities were not only against Japanese participation but also against the war in general. Despite wide public opposition, Koizumi secured authorization for what was not only Japan's first deployment without a UN mandate but what was also the largest military deployment post World War II. This marked a shift in Japanese policy that did not reflect a shift in public attitudes. Based on conventional theorizing, it would be expected that this discrepancy would be followed by Koizumi and his party being held accountable in the subsequent elections. This accountability hardly materialized the way the literature would predict and instead, Koizumi was untouched and the LDP was not more than marginally punished for Iraq Deployment or close cooperation with the Bush administration.

Yet, as has been true for the other cases thus far, constraint and accountability are more nuanced than the traditional literature claims. In this case, Koizumi was able to strategically expand his Constraint Space to include the dichotomous decision to join the coalition but the domestic constraint he faced was extremely strong and present in the decisionmaking process. It significantly constrained timing and capacity, and also placed immovable bounds on the type of action available in the Constraint Space. Koizumi was able to make a historic contribution, but he was able to do this because he worked within his Constraint Space and chose strategies that insulated him from being held accountable for enacting policy against public wishes.

I will begin my analysis by explaining the initial Constraint Space that Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi faced leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2004 Japanese contribution. These include historical norms and identities, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, political environment and polarization across other issues, opposition party stances and policies, public opinion, and material capacity. These constraints not only set the initial constraint range but also determined the flexibility of that range and the strategies that could loosen it.

History and foreign policy norms substantially affected the initial Constraint Space in Japan, arguably more than any other member of Bush's Coalition of the Willing. Japan's experience of World War II and as the first and only country to experience a nuclear bomb, left its government and its people with a strong distrust of the use of military means for any ends and with strong motivation to limit its own military power[13]. In Japan, it was widely believed that in World War II the military had seized control from the state and thrust Japan into a horrific war. In the devastating aftermath of the war, this belief evolved into a persistent culture of antimilitarism. This antimilitarism manifested in a strong suspicion of the military and severe doubt in maintaining civilian control over it. It also primed attitudes on the use of force in general shown in stable skepticism about the utility of the military instrument throughout the Japanese population[19]. This then informed the popular belief, contrary to realist thinking, that the less armed Japan was, the greater its ability would be in avoiding provoking bellicose or aggressive behavior from others[155, 156].

After its democratization and adoption of its constitution following World War II, Japan almost immediately found itself located at the edge of the Cold War. Japan became a U.S. ally in 1951 by signing the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The treaty allowed US forces to use Japanese territory and extended the U.S. nuclear umbrella to cover Japan. Yet, the treaty did not require Japan to assist the United States in the event that it were attacked. From the time the treaty went into effect, the US supported and attempted to persuade Japan to take on a greater responsibility for its own defense as well as in East Asian regional security.

For most of the Cold War and into the 1990s, Japanese antimilitarism frustrated any efforts to do more than form a small defense force, let alone go beyond Japan's borders. The public slowly began to become more comfortable with the SDF, Japan's Self-Defense Forces, participating in humanitarian and disaster relief efforts overseas yet remained suspicious of any participation in conflict zones including peacekeeping operations.

In the first Gulf War, the LDP was constrained by the fact that all other parties, those in the ruling coalition and not, opposed its bill which would have authorized noncombat rear-area logistical support by the SDF. Once the war had formally ended, Japan sent a minesweeper dispatch to the region. This action commanded an over 60% approval rating with the Japanese public[157]. The first Gulf War had two major implications for future operations. First, the strong public support of the minesweeping effort revealed the public would accept noncombat operations overseas when they were clearly humanitarian in nature and when they did not take place in the context of an active war. Second, the international negative publicity and accusations of "checkbook diplomacy" stemming from the minimal participation in the war led to a shift in newspaper editorials toward favoring a larger foreign policy role for Japan which in turn triggered a broad national discussion about Japan's role and the strained relations with the U.S[207]. As a result, fears of militarism were increasingly uncoupled from overseas SDF participation in humanitarian relief and reconstruction activities. UN peacekeeping and peace building missions engendered international appreciation and increased domestic support. From 1991 to 2000, Japanese public opposition for participation in disaster relief efforts abroad dissipated and support for humanitarian and reconstruction efforts was high and stable[157]. During the same time period, all Japanese peacekeeping missions have enjoyed 80% to over 90% of the public's support reflecting the high level of pride and appreciation developed for such operations[157].

Another strong foreign policy norm was the was importance of and support for a strong relationship with the United States. After World War II, Japan became one of the U.S.s strongest partners in East Asia. The Japanese public held the American alliance with as

much esteem as its leaders; 80% felt the US-Japanese relationship was positive which made it the highest of any bilateral relationship[? ]. These positive attitudes stemmed not only from the military protection provided by the United States but also the relationship's promotion of access to the U.S. markets and assisting in keeping Japan's military expenditures low. Since the early 1950s, Japan had adhered to the Yoshida Doctrine. The main tenets of the doctrine were to maintain an alliance with the United States, to avoid entanglement in overseas military affairs, to focus on economic activities, and to keep the size of military forces and defense expenditures low[? ]. The importance of the U.S. relationship as part of the Yoshida Doctrine was apparent in the "reluctant realism" some Japanese began to espouse leading up to the Iraq conflict, stating in order to preserve the Yoshida Doctrine, it must be slightly bent to support the invasion of Iraq in order to uphold the strength of the U.S. relationship[90].

Broad attitudes and identities that affect Japanese foreign policy attitudes include a high level of threat perception and a tendency of threat evasion. Japanese expressed a high level of concern for personal, national, and international security despite a relatively high level of internal security enjoyed by Japanese citizens including low crime rates, low immigration rates, a homogeneous society, and socioeconomic stability[224]. In the same study, 95% expressed that they were very concerned about major wars and 92% cited the same concern over the danger of WMD[2]. Seemingly unintuitively given the proximity of two large communist countries, this high threat perception increased rather than decreased after Cold War. Most, 77%, cited the increase of international tension and confrontation, as well as the insufficient capabilities of the UN as reasons for the increased concern[2]. This corresponds with the onset of the threat of nuclearization of North Korea, initiated by North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency in 1994. Yet, despite and perhaps due to these high threat perceptions, the Japanese people remained averse to conflict. In Japan, 45% of respondents referred to themselves as antimilitarist and only 8% as militarist, as compared to 9% and over 50% in the U.S. respectively[2].



It is unsurprising due to the strong antimilitarist attitudes that military capacity in Japan would be purposely kept low. In Japan, it had been an unwritten rule but customary practice that military spending was limited to less than 1% of the GDP. In addition, the funding was spent on defense relevant activities which resulted in the SDF being relatively modern in its maritime and air capabilities but extremely lacking in experience needed for combat and military offensive operations. Again, this makes sense based on the broad consensus for the purpose of the SDF. Only 12% favored increasing spending in 2003, while 45% favored decreasing defense expenditures[113].

The foreign policy history, norms, and identities strongly affected the Constraint Space Koizumi faced. The strong antimilitarist attitudes, tendency toward threat evasion, and limited capacity strongly increased constraint and placed significant bounds to Koizumi's ability to manipulate the range of acceptable policies. Yet, the gradual internationalization of SDF operations and the broad support it commanded as well as the high regard for the relationship with the U.S. afforded Koizumi some flexibility.

In addition to the foreign policy history, norms, and identities, Japan's institutions also largely affected the initial Constraint Space. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, adopted after World War II, in the *Renunciation of War* chapter states, "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized"[53]. While a literal interpretation of this article would have prohibited a Japanese defense infrastructure, the government had always interpreted it pragmatically by invoking the UN Charter's right of self defense. Thus, the SDF was created in the 1950s but was also strictly confined to its role to defend the homeland.

The institutional structure and its recent changes were also influential in the creation of

the initial Constraint Space. Japan is a parliamentary democracy in which the National Diet is a bicameral legislature composed of two houses, the lower is the House of Representatives and the upper is the House of Councilors. Prime Ministers are designated by both houses of the Diet and in practice are the the leader of the senior partner in the governing coalition. Prime Ministers are also the chairperson of their party which gives them a bulwark of power by combining that of party and government. Koizumi had an even stronger hand. He ran as a maverick politician but was also able to secure support from within the party ranks. This gave him broad appeal and a public allure not commonly attributed to Japanese politicians. This was reflected in astonishingly high approval ratings that essentially remained consistent throughout his tenure[207].

Koizumi was not only helped by his personal attributes but also by shifts in power due to the new cabinet law of 1996. Before this law was enacted the cabinet had been small which forced prime ministers to heavily rely on the ministries and bureaucracies for policy expertise. This was especially true for foreign affairs which was largely driven by the preferences of bureaucrats in Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Trade and Industry. The passage of the cabinet law gave the Prime Minister the ability to pursue his own policy goals much more efficiently[115]. The increased power of the cabinet office allowed the cabinet discretion over the presentation of one consistent message to public and media. The ability to move policy decisions into the cabinet greatly insulated policy making from critiques from competing factions within the party. This is important because while the LDP benefited from the image of a “one party dominant democracy”, the party’s internal competition and the fact that since 1989 it mostly had to rely on support from its coalition partners made the political environment more contentious than it would seem[213]. The LDP also often engaged in consensus building across parties due to domestic political norms that viewed simple majorities as insufficient to hold democratic legitimacy[197, 139]. This meant, that in practice the LDP would avoid proposals for which it would not have support from at least one opposition party[181].

That being said, the LDP's opposition was largely handicapped by an inability to differentiate their security policies from that of the ruling coalition and a lack of credibility which resulted in minimal competition. The LDP had only been out of power once since 1955 and that was in 1993 when former LDP secretary-general Ichiro Ozawa lead a coalition of numerous opposition parties to end the LDP's dominance. Within a year, the coalition collapsed and several parties joined the LDP in an alliance which brought the LDP back to power[115]. This alliance lead to coordinating policy which resulted in a similar orientation on security policy. This assimilation of policy had two effects. First, it discredited the socialist party which abandoned its traditional staunchly pacifist platform when it entered the alliance with the LDP. Second, many of the former members of Ozawa's coalition whose economic and security preferences were aligned with those of the LDP joined the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The DPJ as the main opposition party then, offered undifferentiable policies as "both were pursuing a neo-liberal policy agenda that stressed the independence and responsibility of the individual as well as the nation"[115]. The DPJ not only struggled to offer an alternative policy but also an alternative leader. Koizumi's popularity was difficult to match and the DPJ, lacked a leader that was seen as a viable alternative.

The institutional factors had a large impact on shaping the initial Constraint Space and on its flexibility. While the constitutional limits and internal political competition contributed to increased constraint, the cabinet reforms, weak position of the opposition, and Koizumi's strong personal position all greatly reduced constraint. This provided Koizumi and his cabinet an increased ability to expand the Constraint Space and thus the range of acceptable policies.

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor's effect.

Table 4.1: Japanese Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	strongly discouraged participation	strong support for American alliance
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	strongly discouraged participation	strong support for SDF and humanitarian missions
National Identity	strongly discouraged participation	North Korean threat tied to need for strong US ties
Institutional Delegations of Power	moderately discouraged participation	new elevated cabinet
Degree of Political Competition	strongly encouraged participation	democratic consensus norms
Political Environment /Other Issues	strongly encouraged participation	increased salience
Material Capacity	weakly discouraged participation	policy options
Public Opinion	strongly discouraged participation	policy options

Koizumi's priorities fundamentally shifted after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, pushing foreign policy and a strong relationship with the United States to the forefront of his governing vision. While in Texas in May 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi assured U.S. President George W. Bush that Japan would assist in Iraq as a member of his Coalition of the Willing[157]. Given the discrepancy between his preferred policy and that of the public, my theory predicts that the prime minister should have chosen rhetoric and policy based on the factors in his Constraint Space that reduce constraint and their limits. Veritably he took all factors into account, both those that limited his ability, those that allowed for expanding his range, and their limits.

The Japanese case is interesting because the cabinet seems to have largely rolled out the strategy to loosen the Constraint Space in two separately applied strategies to insulate Koizumi's premiership and the LDP from accountability. First, Koizumi modulated his actions and loosened institutional constraints. When the war first broke out and Koizumi


announced his support for the U.S. as it invaded Iraq in March 2003, this stance garnered about 34% support, just slightly higher than that for the war itself at 31%[? ]. In April 2003, 60% supported deploying the SDF to Iraq and yet not surprisingly due to the public's strong tendency for threat aversion, as the situation in Iraq deteriorated and American casualty figures grew, Japanese support diminished[227]. By June 2003, polls showed 57% thought that the invasion of Iraq had no legitimacy and by July 2003, deployment was opposed by more than half of the Japanese public[227, 224]. Yet, at this time Koizumi and his cabinet were trying to get the Iraq Reconstruction Special Measures Act through the Diet which would authorize Japanese contribution to Iraq. While public opinion did not dictate Koizumi's preferred policy, it did affect it indirectly in two ways. First, the strong public opposition in the summer of 2003 lead the previously undecided DPJ to oppose the government's bill. In order to secure the dichotomous choice of participation, Koizumi had to modulate his policy and made several policy concessions to prevent the various opposition groups from forming a majority to block authorization[157]. He did this by amending the bill to specifically prohibit the SDF from transporting weapons or ammunition and also specifically restricting SDF operations to noncombat zones. This successfully prevented a filibuster and in July 2003 Koizumi's coalition government passed the bill which authorized SDF reconstruction deployment. Second, even prior to the passage of the bill, the LDF was concerned about the effect it could have on the upcoming election in November 2003. An LDP leader emphasized the impact of casualties on increasing the salience of the Iraq policy, "If SDF personnel were killed or they killed Iraqi citizens, that will affect the election. So, the SDF should be dispatched to Iraq after the election[115]. These concerns about potential casualties, lead the government to postpone the deployment originally set for fall 2003 despite pressure from the U.S.

Koizumi and the LDP's strategy was successful in avoiding being held accountable for their Iraq policy in the November 2003 elections. By delaying the deployment, they were able to evade answering specific questions about when, how, or whether the SDF would be deployed. While the opposition parties stated their stances against Iraq deployment, they

were unable to capitalize on the issue in the election. The DJP had just worked with the LDP on security to pass the Emergency Measures Bill in May of that year. The DJP’s argument focused on tactical differences was not sufficiently distinct for the voters to ascertain the difference. At the same time, the Socialist party’s position may have gained traction if it had not been for their plummet in credibility on security issues after their disastrous position on North Korea’s abduction of Japanese citizens the year prior<sup>1</sup>. Without a credible or distinct opposition message, the government was able to keep the salience of Iraq low and refocus the election on other issues. In doing this, Koizumi’s coalition was highly successful. The Iraq War was only cited by 4% of citizens as influential to their voting decision while the economy, social security, and North Korea, were cited as the most important issues, ordered respectively<sup>2</sup>[157].

The stylized illustrations below illustrate the Constraint Space Koizumi faced. The first illustration is the initial Constraint Space. The initial Japanese public preference and Koizumi’s preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.

Figure 4.1: Initial Japanese Constraint Space




<sup>1</sup>The socialist party (JSP/SDP) had close ties with North Korea and when the North Korean government initially denied abducting Japanese citizens in 2002, the party had accepted its statement and rejected requests about the missing citizens. When North Korean leadership admitted to the abductions, the JSP/SDP’s reputations was greatly crippled[115].

<sup>2</sup>The North Korean issue was the primary security concern for 74% of respondents as opposed to 33% who answered the Middle East[121]. The high concern about North Korea’s nuclear proliferation was a wash for Iraq’s salience because it made some believe deployment was necessary to curry favor and protection from the United States, while others feared it could increase tensions and possibly provoke conflict.

The second illustration is the constraint space after it has been loosened by the policy modulating strategy based on the factors of constraint. Public opinion has not moved closer to the Government's preferred policy, but the range of acceptable policies has expanded to include the dichotomous choice to contribute or not (the first dashed line). The second dashed line represents the earlier timeline and the greater contribution.

Figure 4.2: Loosened Japanese Constraint Space



While Koizumi and his coalition survived the election by keeping Iraq's salience low and deferring deployment, Japanese public opinion was only growing less supportive of his preferred Iraq policy. The rhetorical strategy employed in the Japanese case highlights the importance of matching strategy to the specific factors contributing to each nation's Constraint Space. Japan was quite different from the cases so far in that the role of the UN and emphasizing the spread of democracy was not applicable and did not gain traction. The Japanese public was skeptical of the utility of military force in both the promotion of democracy and in the prevention of the spread of WMDs. Arguments borrowed from foreign democratic leader peers based on these tropes fell flat with the Japanese public. Similarly, unlike the other cases, the Japanese public's opposition did not stem so much from the lack of U.N. support for the war as from a strong negative feeling about war in general. In March 2003 70% of the public surveyed stated even with the U.N. authorization they would have opposed a U.S. military attack on Iraq[115]. This proved to be true when Koizumi's television address in December 2003, citing realist alliance arguments and arguing Japan's constitution's preamble required their contribution to protecting international ideals, such as "the banishment of tyranny and oppression and the promotion of international peace" failed to gain any support for the policy[157]. These arguments were not used again and I argue this is because they were not based on the factors that would loosen Japan's specific Constraint Space.

Only when the rhetoric shifted to stress the humanitarian aspects of the mission did public opinion respond. The increase in support for the expansion of the role and missions of the SDF had been slow and incremental. The expansion abroad had also been predicated on the perception that the SDF's disaster relief role had merely been internationalized[225]. Based on what governments had done prior, the Koizumi government knew support could be secured for noncombat humanitarian and reconstruction missions. When debate over Japanese deployment to Iraq began in the summer of 2003, a strategy to tap into support for the SDF and its humanitarian impact took form in the launch of a public relations campaign by the Japanese Defense Agency. This included recruitment posters featuring Morning Museum, an all girl pop group, reading "Doing ones best feels good followed by "Go! Go! Peace! in large English print[52]. This campaign was continued after deployment with the launch of a public relations campaign that focused on the actual Japanese soldiers in Iraq. This included images of SDF soldiers giving Iraqi children presents, and televised segments of the leader of the Iraq SDF contingent, Col. Masahisa Sato, surrounded by children, explaining the impact of the SDF on Iraq's reconstruction.


These strategies worked to increase support for the SDF's humanitarian and reconstruction efforts but did not expand the range of acceptability wide enough to include any kind of mission outside of the strict humanitarian and reconstruction boundaries. The government had expected the opposition to increased Iraq participation to wane just as the opposition to peacekeeping operations had in earlier preference discrepancies with the public[110]. This assumption failed to take into account the strength of the antimilitarist norms and threat evasion. On these factors of constraint, the Koizumi government had hit the boundary and could not expand the range of acceptability any further. Therefore, Koizumi and his government had to compromise. He secured his preferred preference on joining Bush's Coalition of the Willing, despite an opposed public, yet he had to settle for a reduced contribution in order to insulate himself from accountability. By emphasizing the humanitarian aspects and building on the strong positive attitudes held for the SDF's peacekeeping operations, he was able to engage despite strong opposition to troop involvement in Iraq and circumvent



igniting the strong antipathy for military solutions. In order to do this, the prime minister had to reassure the Diet and the public that the SDF would not to participate in any combat operations and would only engage in humanitarian efforts[207]. He also had to make avoiding risk and casualties a priority, even over strategic interests, like denying U.S. requests for assistance in dangerous areas[110]. Koizumi also had to deny requests to provide logistical support and stabilization, that he had previously favored as a contribution[110]. This was similar to the LDP's inability to authorize noncombat logistical support in the first Gulf War, but Koizumi was actually given more space and flexibility shown in his deployment of SDF troops to the conflict zone.

The stylized illustration below shows the final policy decision. It is a compromise between Koizumi's preference to contribute to Iraq and to remain insulated from being held accountable.

Figure 4.3: Final Japanese Constraint Space



In a statement of support for the United States's invasion of Iraq, Prime Minister Koizumi said, "If I follow public opinion, I will make a mistake. Even though the majority of citizens do not understand my decision, I have to carry out the policy which needs to be implemented[115]. While this quote may reveal a resolute commitment to the prime minister's foreign policy, strategic interests only trumped domestic constraint on the large scale decision of joining the coalition or not. At the policy level, domestic considerations and public opinion itself, constrained the government's decision making. Koizumi's ability to loosen the Constraint Space where it was possible and then choose a policy within it once it was stretched to it's limits, is the reason he and the LDP were able to enact the policy without major consequences. The only minor set back was a few seats lost in the House of Councilors election in 2004 but it did not unseat the government. By avoiding casualties and

engaging in popular humanitarian missions, the Koizumi government was able to balance the popularity of the SDP, which rose from 68% approval in 2000 to 86% approval in 2006, with the fear of possible further entanglements or danger, avoiding a high salience[224]. Koizumi remained an extremely popular prime minister. In 2005, Koizumi called for snap elections to pass legislation to privatize the postal service. The election once again was focused on domestic issues and the LDP dramatically increased its share of seats. In fact, the 2005 elections were the LDP's largest victory since 1986.

## Denmark

As was true for other democratic leaders, Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen faced widespread opposition to his preferred policy to join the United States' Coalition of the Willing. Far from being motivated by public opinion, the US-led intervention in Iraq was highly controversial and sparked large scale public protests across the country[103]. While Rasmussen was able to secure his preference on the dichotomous choice of joining or not, he did face constraints in the details and execution of that participation. I argue this is evidence of his ability to strategically expand his initial Constraint Space, his awareness of his limitations based on its boundaries, and his insulation from accountability as a result of choosing a policy based on both. Rasmussen was able to evade domestic backlash despite deploying troops against the wishes of a large majority of his populace. Yet, domestic constraint was far from irrelevant, it presented limitations in terms of what and when Rasmussen could contribute.

This analysis begins by explaining the initial Constraint Space facing Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen throughout the Iraq crisis leading up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. The factors making up this space include foreign policy history, international norms and attitudes, national identity, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, opposition party policy and competitiveness, public opinion, and material capacity. These factors

set the initial Constraint Space, determine the flexibility of that space, and prescribe the strategies available to loosen it.

History played a large role in shaping the international attitudes and interests that contributed to the initial Danish Constraint Space. On April 9, 1940, Germany's Blitzkrieg invasion overwhelmed Denmark's government and led it to adopt an official policy of cooperation toward the German occupation. This time was very painful for the Danish people and the resistance is viewed as having saved Denmark's honor[61]. Following its liberation, Denmark was a founding member of the United Nations. During the Cold War, participation in UN peacekeeping operations played an important and primary role in Danish foreign policy. Denmark participated in 9 of 13 peacekeeping and observer missions and peacekeeping was prominent in foreign policy[117]. While, Denmark was a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, its armed forces were limited in their participation and were not allowed to use force beyond self defense[118]. Even with the high value placed on UN peacekeeping operations, national defense and security took priority and commitments would not be made if they were deemed to negatively impact national defense and alliance relations[117]. This history created a strong affection for the United Nations but also normalized the use of force for humanitarian purposes and to uphold Western values. This sentiment continues to be so ingrained that the Danish Ministry of Defence even states, "military capabilities can contribute to the prevention of conflicts and war as well as further democratic values and respect for basic human rights" [58].

After the Cold War ended and the immediate security threat posed by the Soviet Union ceased, Denmark's military went through a transformation from invasion defense to an expeditionary force structure. This shift was largely driven by the desire to move away from the role as a "footnote country in NATO operations by participating more actively and directly[134]. This move was first initiated by deploying a naval vessel to take part in the UN imposed naval embargo of the Persian Gulf against Iraq, rather than only contributing humanitarian and medical support. The successful military deployments in Croatia and

Bosnia that followed in the early 1990s changed Danes perception of their role in international politics and identity in foreign policy. The new identity led to a strong domestic consensus around the “Post Cold War foreign policy doctrine known as *active internationalism*” [117]. This conditioned the public to support Denmark taking on an active international role especially in crises involving humanitarian concerns and threats to democratic values.

The importance of the Danish relationship with the United States hits on two of these important policies, security and a sense of shared values. The American security guarantee provided to Denmark through NATO is vitally important to Danish national security. Ultimately, Denmark viewed its greatest security interest was its relationship with the United States and that strengthening that relationship equals strengthens its own national security. Shared values have also driven the primacy of the US relationship. After the Cold War, Danish governments all agreed “they [had] an obligation to do their part in helping the USA to protect and promote the liberal world order that the USA established after the Second World War” [119]. Denmark is unique in that they saw United States’ policy as the champion of the liberal world order as opposed to bestowing that duty on the international institutions themselves, such as the United Nations.

Taken together the history, international norms and attitudes, and national identity shaped the Constraint Space presenting opportunities for its expansion and also limitations to that expansion. The experience with Nazi occupation reduced constraint by contributing to attitudes against nondemocratic and tyrannic rule. The supremacy placed on national security and the strong association between national security guarantees and support for U.S. policies also greatly reduced constraint. Yet, the strong history of working through the United Nations presented strong limits to these factors abilities to expand the Constraint Space. The move to a less defense-focused foreign policy to a more internationalist one certainly reduced constraint, yet the recentness of this shift and the limited scope of contributions greatly limited the effect. A strong national identity as a western liberal democratic country and the accepted aim of using foreign policy to spread those values largely loosened

the space, yet the tradition of and desire to uphold international law presented limitations.

Institutions also immensely shaped the Constraint Space Rasmussen faced in making his policy decision about the 2003 Iraq War. Unlike the other cases so far, the Danish Constitution explicitly delegates the power to deploy soldiers to Parliament. The government cannot decide to deploy forces in circumstances that involve the use of force against foreign states without the consent of the Danish Parliament. Even though there is this specified use of force condition for the necessity of Parliamentary approval, in practice Parliament's consent is sought in all cases where there is a possibility that Danish troops will have to use force to complete their tasks[58]. This approval comes in the form of the passage of a Parliamentary Resolution. This increased the constraint the Prime Minister faced and limited his ability to loosen it. While this is all true, since the end of the Cold War, all international deployments had been supported by large majorities in Parliament[117]. The government and the Foreign Policy Committee also maintained diplomatic relations and thus an information asymmetry over the rest of Parliament giving them a certain level of discretion.

The institutional constraint posed by a Parliamentary vote was further reduced by the strength of Anders Fogh Rasmussen and his government. The election prior to Iraq involvement, in November 2001, was historic in that it was the first time that the Social Democrats did not win the most seats since 1924 and was also the first time since the beginning of the modern democratic system in 1901 that the right leaning parties held an outright majority in the parliament[138]. The election marked a major shift in Danish elections by placing in power a coalition led by Rasmussen's center right party, Venstre, and composed of other right wing parties such as the Conservative People's Party and the Danish People's Party. A key issue that drove this shift was the increased salience of immigration issues largely propelled by concerns amplified by the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks[138]. The success of this victory and Rasmussen's impressive polling reduced constraint in policy making, but this was limited by the necessity to get the Coalition on board and vote for his policy.

Finally, as a smaller country, capacity constraints are inherently present. Despite capacity limitations, this factor did not impact the government's preferred policy. The main reasons for joining the coalition were symbolic and because of modest American expectations, any amount of Danish force contribution was well received[120]. Correspondingly, Denmark did wish to be part of the U.S.'s planning or policy making and therefore did not need to make a materially meaningful force contribution. Therefore, capacity did not act as a constraint in Rasmussen carrying out his preferred policy.

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor's effect.

Table 4.2: Danish Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	weakly encouraged participation	acting in national security interest and within UN/IL
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	moderately encouraged participation	make the case of humanitarian impact, use of force concerns, relevance
National Identity	strongly encouraged participation	make the case of exceptionality/ peculiarity
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly discouraged participation	large role of cabinet
Degree of Political Competition	strongly discouraged participation	high public support for the alliance, peacekeeping and reconstruction
Political Environment /Other Issues	strongly encouraged participation	holding the Coalition together
Material Capacity	weakly discouraged participation	policy preference/ low U.S. expectation of contribution
Public Opinion	moderately discouraged participation	all other factors

Prime Minister Rasmussen's preferred policy was to join the coalition and for the contribution to include the deployment of forces. The Prime Minister sought to ensure that Denmark be part of "the select club of countries having *special relations* with the USA" [215]. He felt ideologically inspired by George W. Bush and aligned Danish foreign and security policy even more closely after September 11<sup>th</sup>. He felt it was ultimately in his country's strategic interest to do so and even referred to Denmark as "Americas largest and smallest ally" [168]. Therefore a show of visible ardent support was his preferred policy in Iraq.

According to my theory, Anders Fogh Rasmussen should have understood the boundaries of his initial Constraint Space and known the factors that were capable of expanding it and their limits. His strategy should have been chosen based on its ability to expand the Constraint Space to include his preferred policy.

Even though the deployment of troops was not approved by parliament until almost a year later, leaked classified documents revealed the government had decided and assured the U.S. of its participation in early 2002 [218]. In public and in statements to parliament, the prime minister insisted participation was undecided until the vote on March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2003 [218]. This allotted him time to expand his Constraint Space. To secure this preferred policy, the Prime Minister engaged in crafted talk aimed at tapping into the prominent values and history of the country. Unlike other coalition countries, the Danish government focused less rhetoric on the benefits of strengthening the U.S. relationship and instead pivoted to the stronger value attitudes justifying participation "with a reference to humanitarian need, liberal ideals and narrow Danish security interests" [120]. They highlighted those values and that this policy was consistent with them by stating that "supporting democracy and womens rights" and fighting for Danish values and security overseas in order to not fight the threat later on Danish soil had long been the central theme of Danish foreign policy [120]. The Prime Minister tapped this further stating, "I understand that many people are opposed to war. For war is terrible. But sometimes war is necessary in order to secure freedom and peace It is an unpleasant decision. But it is necessary, because it is about important

values. It is about freedom and democracy. It is about credibility. It is about stopping a ruthless dictators dangerous and cruel regime[61]. In one statement he recalled the country's identity as a Western democratic nation, its desire to uphold the values of the liberal order, and juxtaposed that identity and those values with Saddam and his regime. To drive home this point further, he later alluded to the painful occupation in his country's history by highlighting the similarities between Saddam's regime and that of the Nazis. Drawing on the strong resonance of the historical narrative, he knew the "high stakes rhetoric" comparing the decision to participate in Iraq and the Danish resistance against Nazi occupation would "deeply resonate with the people of Denmark"[61]. Tying it back to the established foreign policy norm of fighting for values, he proclaimed, "We cannot and do not want to look tacitly on, while people are oppressed in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, or Iraq. Our past obliges us to do what we can to spread freedom, peace, and security that we ourselves have the benefit of, to other regions of the world[61]."

The country's strong affiliation with United Nations and the lack of authorization was a heavy limitation facing the deployment of troops. But as mentioned in the quote above, the government attempted to turn the limitation on its head by focusing on upholding the UN's "credibility", the enforcement of the liberal order, and the security interests of the country. Denmark also had a history of making military contributions to controversial US-led operations conducted without UN mandates, including Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 1998 and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999[94]. These both had support across parties in Parliament. Therefore, it was not unheard of for Parliament to approve deployments without a majority of public support. While the major opposition parties were against the war, they were constrained by the fact that they had supported and placed such a high value on the alliance, and also by the public's support for peacekeeping and reconstruction.


The stylized illustrations below illustrate the Constraint Space Rasmussen faced. The first illustration is the original Constraint Space<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup>As in previous illustrations, the initial public preference and the leader's preference are solid points on




Figure 4.4: Initial Danish Constraint Space



The second illustration is the constraint space after it has been loosened by the rhetorical strategy based on the factors of constraint. Public opinion has moved slightly closer to the Government's preferred policy, but the greater change has been made to the width of the Constraint Space. The rhetoric may not have changed opinion much per se, but it limited the opposition's ability to establish a strong public counter argument. The range of acceptable policies now includes the dichotomous choice of join or not (the first dashed line). The second dashed line represents the deployment of non-combat forces without UN approval.

Figure 4.5: Loosened Danish Constraint Space



One day after the US-led coalition began its attack on Iraq, the Danish Parliament passed Resolution B118 which sent a submarine and a corvette to the US invasion and then sent troops to take part in occupation after Baghdad had fallen[103]. The Danish armed forces were expected to contribute to the security of Danish reconstruction efforts in the Basra area but were not authorized for offensive warfare. Parliament's vote to participate in Iraq was extremely close and was solely based on a meager eleven vote majority (61 in favor, 50 against).

Denmark's case is interesting and unique because the Constraint Space expanded more and thus increased the insulation of the leadership after the initial deployment. This can be

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
the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.

attributed to the careful strategy of the prime minister and his government. The Parliamentary Resolution said that the “rationale was to contribute to the removal of the threat to international peace and security in the region and the military intervention must be accompanied by substantial Danish humanitarian contribution as well as reconstruction effort” [103]. The contribution to the military intervention was just on the edge of the range of acceptability. The leadership knew this and therefore looked to minimize the contribution to the intervention, which could be attributed to the constraint from public opposition. The Bush administration had requested a brigade headquarters of 800 personnel and expressed “deep disappointment” when Denmark turned it down “due to a lack of parliamentary support” [104]. Yet, because Denmark’s small contribution did not make a military difference regardless, the political values of the visibility of any Danish participation was satisfactory to Washington and thus achieved Rasmussen’s policy goal.

Furthermore, the strategic rhetoric priming the strong political consensus around humanitarian missions and reconstruction continued even after securing Parliament’s approval. For example, on March 21, 2003, when the Prime Minister addressed the nation stating that “Parliament has today given its consent to Denmark’s participating in the international coalition to the disarming of Saddam Hussein and the liberation of the Iraqi people” he used the word *befrielse* for liberation which denotes *Befrielsen*, the celebration of the day Denmark was liberated from German occupation [61]. As the war moved into its occupation phases, the rhetoric began to take root. The political consensus of support for active intervention was reestablished and after two months, a majority of the public flipped from opposing to supportive of the government’s policy. I attribute this to the shift from the intervention, which Danish public was not comfortable with, to the occupation and reconstruction which looked a lot more like the humanitarian missions it was accustomed to supporting. Public opinion polls taken in March and April 2003, revealed 35-46% supporting and 42-56% opposing participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. By October, 77% of the public supported the deployment of 500 troops participating in the post war stabilization and peace operation with only 22% opposing. Within this time period the conflict had gone from the least to

greatest public support for any military operation since 1990[117, 103].

Figure 4.6: Final Danish Constraint Space



Large majorities of parliament continued authorization of Danish involvement in Iraq with a battalion-size ground force under British command in Basra from May 2003 to August 2007 along with 645 million for humanitarian aid and reconstruction<sup>4</sup> [103]. The public support continued despite unprecedented casualties. Rasmussen’s own insulation from accountability for the initial involvement, and that of his Venstre-led Coalition, is evidenced by the fact that the Coalition was reelected twice during involvement and lasted through the end of involvement in 2007. The Coalition did not lose power until 2011. The prime minister was able to achieve his international strategic goals and remain in power. The Bush administration held Denmark up “as a shining example of how to be a constructive friend and ally to the USA” and no doubt thanks in part to his support, Anders Fogh Rasmussen later served as the Secretary General of NATO from 2009-2014[97, 168].

The Danish government may have acted outside of the public’s preference during the initial stages of the Iraq conflict, but was able to bring the public even closer in the later stages. This case is intriguing because it provides an example of latent opinion *following the leader*[137]. It sheds more light on how leaders can evade being held accountable by acting strategically based on their domestic Constraint Space when making foreign policies that are, at least initially, at odds with public preferences.

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<sup>4</sup>Authorized by Parliament Resolutions B89 passed in June 2005, B63 passed in January 2006, and B139 passed in May 2006.

## The Netherlands

Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende and his government's preferred policy stood in stark contrast to public opinion on the Iraq war. In the Netherlands, there was widespread opposition to participation of any kind in the Iraq war. In February 2003, the largest antiwar demonstration in decades occurred in Amsterdam, as tens of thousands of people took to the streets to publicly display their strong opposition to the war. Even for those who were not physically demonstrating, a great majority of the population supported the demonstration[76]. Despite this strong public consensus in opposing the war, the Netherlands were placed on the U.S.'s list of coalition members in March 2003. Yet, domestic constraint was highly evident in how, what and when the government contributed. Because Prime Minister Balkenende was attuned to the constraints he faced, he was able to insulate himself from being held accountable for his dichotomous decision to join without public consent.

The case of the Netherlands is especially enlightening because the Constraint Space facing Prime Minister Balkenende had attributes of all of the cases examined so far, but also introduced very unique implications of the state of the domestic political environment on the effect of each factor. These factors include foreign policy history and norms, international norms, national identity, institutional structure, institutional norms and delegations of power, opposition/other party policy and competitiveness, public opinion, and material capacity. The initial Constraint Space and its flexibility is set by these factors which also define the strategies to potentially loosen it.

The history of World War II largely shaped the foreign policy and security attitudes of the Dutch people which in turn shaped the initial Constraint Space. Despite its stated neutrality, the Netherlands were invaded by and occupied by Nazi Germany from 1940 to 1945. Germanys demands of its occupied territories lead to starvation, lack of fuel, repression and extermination of Jewish population. This largely formed Dutch attitudes that it was in their national interest to prevent and safeguard itself against the European major powers

forming a coalition that could turn on the Netherlands. The protection against this threat was assured by the security and nuclear guarantees of a strong alliance with the United States.

The centrality of the relationship with the United States was evident in Cold War conflicts, national perceptions of identity, and military organization. The Netherlands prided itself on its identity as a “loyal ally” to the United States throughout the Cold War. In order to be able to actively join U.S. military operations by deploying combat forces, the Netherlands implemented reforms of the armed forces to greater facilitate this type of participation. The penchant to maintain a close and strong relationship with the United States, even over European allies when presented the choice, continued after the Cold War. Based on the ingrained fear of continental conflict, this alignment was a logical derivative.

That being said, there were limitations to stalwart support of the United States’s foreign policy agenda and that were presented by other strong established norms and history that contribute to attitudes on and pursuit of national interests. In spite of its size, the Netherlands is a prominent economic power as the world’s seventh largest exporting country. Thanks also in part to its geographical location, the Netherlands is home to the main port in Europe. Combined the Netherlands plays an important role in international trade and has a significant stake in global stability. The Netherlands has a history of actively participating in international organizations to active participation in magnify its power and influence internationally. The preferred venue for security issues, economics, and global issues have been NATO, the EU, and the UN, respectively. The Netherlands preference for NATO over the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy, further shows the transatlantic emphasis and real politik considerations with the U.S. as key. The norm of actively promoting its power and influence lead to national identities as an internationalist, multilateralist, active participant in international organizations. In fact, Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution even states that the government should promote international legal order, implying “a general willingness to intervene at an early stage in crisis situations in other parts of the world,

preferably under the auspices of the UN”[5]. Obviously the proactive position on threats to international stability and legal order loosen the initial Constraint range in some ways but also presented significant constraints of its own. The Netherlands’ established record supporting the United Nations and participating in UN international peacekeeping missions also reflected the importance of the rule of law, peace, democracy, and human rights which has deep roots in Dutch culture and traditions. While these attitudes could contribute to loosened constraints, they also affected the attitudes toward operations that were unauthorized by the United Nations Security Council or deemed illegal. While the government tried to draw on the recent history of Gulf War participation, the clear UN mandate allowed it to meet both commitments to strong support for U.S. policies and to the UN.

Taken together, the normative, historical, and identity factors both placed barriers and created opportunities for the expansion of the Constraint Space. The history of World War II, the national identity as a “loyal ally”, military orientation toward active deployment as a junior partner, security strongly tied to transatlantic protection, and strong internationalist attitudes all loosen the Constraint Space. The strong ties to international organizations and a history of boosting the Netherlands’ international power and influence through them, including NATO, the UN, and the EU, present possible limitations if those organizations are perceived to be condemning or even just not supportive of the action. The importance of democracy, peace, law, and human rights could all loosen constraints but could also present limitations, depending on the perception of the conflict’s adherence to or inconsistency with international law, ensuring international peace, and protecting human rights. These limits would be doubly so in the event that they are seen as undermining these institutions and/or ideals.

The institutions arguably had the greatest influence on Balkenende’s Constraint Space. Similar to the U.K. and Australia, Parliamentary consent is not formally or constitutionally required to make the decision to deploy troops abroad. Yet, because of the government’s constitutional duty to *inform* Parliament of these decisions in cases when the country is not

acting in immediate self-defense, in practice this had given Parliament a de facto veto on join a military expedition. It can also debate any issue and question relevant ministers at any time. Foreign and defense policy is not immune to these actions which can largely shape public perception of and opinion on the government's actions.

The institutional structure of the Dutch government also highly influences domestic constraint in foreign policy making. The Netherlands is a multiparty parliamentary democracy which results in constraint in all decision making including foreign and defense policy. The country is always run by a coalition government due to the lack of a dominant political party. This means cabinets are usually composed of ministers from a minimum of two or three different parties. The balance of competing interests results in delicate and complex negotiations. Not only does this increase transaction costs and inefficiency in the cabinet but it also lends to a less predictable and dependable bases of support. At the same time, parties in the coalition are not rash with defection. The difficulty in building a coalition means citizens may punish parties for threatening or dismantling it. Because of this possibility of electoral retribution, issues that ordinary members are less well versed on, like foreign policy, tend to be safer from defection.

However destruction of the coalition does occur and in fact, in October 2002 the government's cabinet had offer its resignation. This was unrelated to the Iraq crisis but nevertheless greatly impacted the policy process around it. The May 2002 elections brought a new populist party, Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) which garnered significant support for its policies including an anti-Islam platform. It's leader and founder, Pim Fortuyn was murdered by Volkert van der G, an extremist animal-rights militant, nine days before the election[201]. The elections brought this new and inexperienced party without its leader into Parliament. And because no majority coalition could be formed without its inclusion, the LPF joined the new right leaning governing coalition. Internal fighting within the LPF and with other governing parties lead to the dismantling of the coalition which ultimately culminated in the resignation of the cabinet in October 2002. Constitutionally, no major decisions could be

made by the cabinet until after the January 2003 elections and practically, the majority it held was slim and precarious regardless. It would be difficult to secure support for any new position, almost impossible for a controversial one such as Iraq policy. In the 2003 elections, the LPF lost 18 of its 26 seats. Balkenende's CDA won the largest number of seats, adding one additional seat and securing his position as prime minister. Yet, the CDA and VVD's major early lead in the polls was cut by PvdA, the Labour party, which gained 19 seats. This gave the CDA, ideologically right of center, and the PvdA, ideologically left of center, the greatest number of seats at 28.6% and 27.3%, respectively[170]. A left-leaning party holding so many seats constrained CDA leadership in Iraq policy but the PvdA was also constrained by the desire to be included in the new ruling coalition.

Further, capacity constraints are present in all of the Netherlands' military contributions. As mentioned above, the Netherlands had decided it did not want to inhibit its ability to provide combat forces by compartmentalizing its military to purely a peacekeeping role internationally. Instead, the Dutch organized their small multipurpose military in a way that would allow for fighting alongside larger coalition partners. This established humble expectations for both Dutch leaders and for the U.S. in regards to contribution size and military impact. Yet, it reinforced expectations for some type of material support of manpower. The Netherlands faced less capacity constraints as far as its economic and industrial might, which set greater rebuilding and humanitarian aid expectations, reinforced by its reputation for contributing to a relatively large share of international development aid. Therefore, the constraints placed on Balkenende based on capacity must be assessed based on his preferences for contribution. His preference was clearly to contribute militarily in some way to the initial invasion and also to supporting stabilization after, but contributing significant combat forces was never part of his expectation or preferred policy.

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change



the direction of that factor’s effect.

Table 4.3: Dutch Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	weakly encouraged participation	consistency with national interest
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	moderately encouraged participation	strong support for IOs/IL
National Identity	moderately encouraged participation	consistency with values
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly discouraged participation	coalition building incentives
Degree of Political Competition	strongly discouraged participation	high public support for the alliance, peacekeeping and reconstruction
Political Environment /Other Issues	moderately discouraged participation	holding the Coalition together and opposition split
Material Capacity	weakly discouraged participation	policy preference/ U.S. expectation
Public Opinion	moderately discouraged participation	all other factors

Prime Minister Balkenende knew the initial Constraint Space did not include his preferred policy which was to publicly support the United States as a member of its “Coalition of the Willing”. As my theory predicts, he took great strides to strategically loosen his constraints to include the dichotomous decision to join. The government, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began promulgating what became known as the “corpus theory” even before the domestic political upheaval of the failure of the cabinet. This theory was first presented to Parliament in September 2002, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that the use of force was already legally justified through the “corpus of resolutions” [201]. They argued that noncompliance with past UN resolutions including Iraq’s obligation to disarm and cooperate with inspections sufficiently provided the necessary legal backing for armed intervention. Minister of Foreign Affairs De Hoop Scheffer described this policy in

a September 2002 letter he sent to Parliament, stating “military action should preferably obtain the desired political support by means of a new Security Council resolution. The standpoint of the Dutch government, however, must not, in advance, be made dependent upon a possible veto within the UN Security Council against military intervention. A new resolution is, from a strict, legal viewpoint, not necessary for military action. The existing Security Council resolutions, which are being violated by Iraq, offer, in principle, sufficient basis[201]. Rather than being purely the government’s legal opinion, I argue this was a strategic policy move. In fact, a memo sent by the ministry’s own department of legal advice described the government’s legal position as having a “legally thin” basis[176]. The memo never actually reached the Minister, but instead was halted by Secretary-General Majoor stating the legal discussion was “closed for the moment”[176]. This addresses the constraint factors in several ways and sets the framing of the Iraq debate. First, the Dutch government is arguably smarter than its other democratic counterparts that hinged support on a new mandate from the UN and then were forced to pivot. Thus the Dutch government was able to hedge their bets, if a new resolution materialized that would further help them but if it didn’t their final case would not be made inconsistent with their original arguments. Second, the government appealed to the high regard of upholding international law and the authority of the United Nations by setting the defense of previous resolutions as doing so and inaction as the contrary. They also emphasized international law as the primary *casus belli* irregardless of the actual presence of WMD. Again, many states tried to adopt this approach later but it seemed more disingenuous after failing to secure the approval they had sought. Perhaps the especially strong esteem and importance placed on respect for international law in the Netherlands enabled the government to engage in this rhetoric more so than their peers. Third, the “corpus of resolutions” rhetoric allowed the government to argue the uniqueness of the Iraq situation, and thus answer the *Why Iraq?* question that plagued all contributing leaders. In the same letter to parliament, De Hoop Scheffer explained that Iraq’s behavior established a cause for military intervention by stating, “the government regards the continual refusal of Iraq to unconditionally admit UN weapon inspectors as unacceptable. Admittedly, Iraq claims to have no more WMD in its possession but it is up to Iraq to prove

this by cooperating with the inspection regime imposed by the international community” [201]. This rhetorical strategy distinguished Iraq and Saddam from other nondemocratic leaders with objectionable ruling practices and attempts at proliferating, by underscoring the cause for war as Iraq’s illegal actions, i.e. flagrant noncompliance with inspections and disregard for binding UNSC resolutions.

The Parliamentary debate held the next day, on September 5<sup>th</sup>, the Foreign Minister reiterated the government’s stance. He doubled down on the statement in his letter that “when eventually, pressure is shown to be insufficient, I do not exclude in advance that military action, with the aim of enforcing compliance with the relevant SC resolutions, can come up for discussion. Such military action could acquire the desired political support, both inside and outside the region, by a new SC resolution. The government regards such a resolution to be desirable[201]. Regarding a motion submitted by members of Parliament, Koenders of the Labour party and De Graaf of the Social Liberal party, that requested the government seek a Security Council resolution, De Hoop Scheffer said the government’s position of ‘desirable but not necessary had been adopted because otherwise the government would have allow[ed] itself, in advance, to be deprived of the instrument and the argument to go a step further if it so decided” [201]. This argument was successful and the motion failed to secure a majority of support. While the initial Constraint Space had very strong institutional constraints, the arguments strategically made based on normative and value based factors, was able to loosen them, at least to some extent.

In the months that followed, the government maintained its rhetorical strategy despite its difficult position of authority given the resignation of the cabinet and upcoming elections in January. In November 2002, while announcing the impending adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441 and the proximal initiation of weapons inspections, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed that “[a]s soon as it is apparent that Iraq is not cooperating with the implementation of the resolution, the Security Council shall meet to discuss the situation and the necessity of taking new steps. Military action is explicitly an option[68].

After the official adoption of Resolution 1441 in December, Prime Minister Balkenende announced that the Netherlands would give its support to the United States if the crisis were to culminate in a war. Balkenende's dedication of support in December was consistent with his preferred policy. A memo to the cabinet by the Netherlands ambassador to the UN, revealed the reasons driving this decision were based not on domestic concerns but on international strategic ones, especially that the Netherlands could not "afford to stand aside when its most important ally went to war and for a cause that the Netherlands felt was justified" [105]. It was agreed that the Netherlands should support the Americans and the war regardless of the Security Council outcome. Further, it was also believed that the United Nations could get on board later and that the Netherlands' participation could assist in that as well.

Far from being driven by public opinion, the decision to support the Americans was starkly at odds with aggregate opinion. Aware of the low support reflected in national opinion polls, the government understood it needed to come up with a "communications strategy and formed a task force given the assignment of "sell[ing] participation in the war to the public" [68]. The strategy was based on persuading the public that Saddam had been undermining the United Nations and stringing the world along since the Gulf War with no intention of compliance. The emphasis would be on international law and order, focusing on Saddam's noncompliance rather than the presence of weapons of mass destruction. This rhetoric was in line with the large majority of Dutch citizen who believed that Saddam was a threat to international peace and security. Large majorities also believed Iraq possessed WMDs and thought that they were not cooperating with inspections. The lack of emphasis on the importance of this stance for the transatlantic relationship was also smart because there was a widespread distrust of US motives and Bush's credibility [81, 75]. While polls posing questions that inquired about general support for the war showed large majorities were against it, more specific questions revealed flexibility and space for strategic moves to loosen the Constraint Space. While only 11% said they supported a US initiated unilateral war, as early as June 2002 only a small minority, 18%, said they opposed any war at all [75].

It is important to mention that in Balkenende's announcement of support in December he did not specifically mention the type of support that would be offered. On November 15<sup>th</sup>, U.S. officials held confidential consultations with the Dutch government in regards to possible military contributions[105]. While the Balkenende government was constitutionally constrained in making major policy decisions prior to the election, in January 2003, just weeks before the election the government agreed to send three Patriot units to Turkey to help defend it in the case that war broke out and intensify to affect Turkey. The debate in Parliament was split with most leftist parties voting against this action but the PvdA initially did not because it didn't want to prematurely ruin its chances to be included in the new governing coalition after the looming election. Yet, when Germany, France, and Belgium blocked this action from being conducted under the auspices NATO, the PvdA revoked its support. The government deemed this action as just fulfilling international alliance obligations, and therefore asserted parliamentary approval was not actually necessary and authorized the units. The combination of a split and inconsistent opposition to this policy and established attitudes supporting indirect participation<sup>5</sup>, resulted in a 65% public approval rating of the decision to send the Patriot missiles to Turkey[75]. Thus the institutional constraints were loosened by the opposition's inability to establish an effective counterargument.


In March 2003, with the rescindment of the second resolution and the war looming, De Hoop Scheffer informed Cabinet that excluding Syria, every member of the Security Council agreed Iraq was not sufficiently cooperating. The Minister of Justice juxtaposed making a decision based on "the inability of the Security Council to arrive at a unanimous decision" with what the Prime Minister recalled "had always been the position of the Dutch government that a violation by Iraq [meant] the agreed cease-fire would be made invalid"[201]. He was correct, the Dutch government also repeatedly invoked the material breach by Iraq of its obligations to disarm and cooperate with the inspections as a self-sufficient legal basis for the lawfulness of armed intervention.

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<sup>5</sup>51% of Dutch respondents said they would support indirect participation in the war in December 2002 [75]

This strategy was closely aligned with public opinion. Superficially it would seem this analysis is inaccurate as only 12% of the public believed that U.S. intervention in Iraq without UN authorization was either absolutely or rather justified<sup>6</sup>. Yet, 49% believed U.S. military intervention was either absolutely or rather justified if the Iraqi regime was not cooperating with inspections and 75% believed Iraq was not cooperating sufficiently[81]. The arguments made by the Dutch government hit on key pockets of support.

The stylized illustrations below illustrate the Constraint Space Balkenende faced. The first illustration is the initial Constraint Space<sup>7</sup>.



The second illustration is the constraint space after it had been loosened by the rhetorical strategy based on the factors of constraint. Public opinion moved closer to the Government’s preferred policy. The range of acceptable policies now includes the dichotomous choice of join or not (the first dashed line) which in this case is to offer political support and indirect material support because this contribution was sufficient for the U.S. to place the Netherlands on the official list of the “Coalition of the Willing”. The second dashed line represents *more* direct Dutch participation in the invasion without UN approval.


The second dashed line and the placement of Balkenende’s preference are difficult to

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<sup>6</sup>68% believed it would be absolutely or rather justified with UN authorization.

<sup>7</sup>As in previous illustrations, the initial public preference and the leader’s preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.


Figure 4.8: Loosened Dutch Constraint Space



illustrate in the simplified diagram. The details of Balkenende and the CDA’s preference makes the representation of the second dashed line slightly more complicated than direct Dutch participation in the invasion without UN approval. If Balkenende’s party had wanted full military participation, this would have been a clear example of domestic constraint. Publicly Balkenende did emphasize the contribution as political support and highlighted the absence of troop deployments to theater in Iraq, “The government of the Netherlands is not neutral in its judgement. Put before the choice Saddam Hussein or Bush and Blair it does not hesitate to choose the latter. Hence the political support. A second choice relates to an active military contribution to the eventual action of the United States and the United Kingdom. The government has not chosen to do so, based on the conviction that such a far-reaching decision should be based on as broad as possible societal and parliamentary support[68]. The March Parliamentary vote on supporting the war, revealed the right leaning parties wanted full military support, the left leaning parties were opposed to any support, the CDA wanted to replace American troops elsewhere, and the PvdA begrudgingly agreed to political support despite being against the war because it wanted to be part of the cabinet negotiations with the CDA. The chosen policy seemed to be a political compromise due to institutional constraints and was stated as explicitly dictated by public opinion because of lack of UNSC authorization, “The absence of a further SC resolution has consequences for national support [draagvlak] for further Dutch involvement. Consequently, the Netherlands will not give an active military contribution with respect to Iraq” [68]. Yet, the Netherlands *did* provide host-nation support by allowing the use of airspace and providing access and assistance to rail transports through Netherlands, provided some logistical support to American efforts Afghanistan, and as previously mentioned Patriot defense missiles were deployed to Turkey[201]. This contribution was not starkly different from the contribution to the Gulf War which had had a clear UN mandate, to which the Netherlands had initially sent Naval


units to the Persian Gulf, Patriot air defense missiles to Israel (in much the same way they did in 2003 to Turkey), and troops later to maintain peace and security. This contribution was also satisfactory enough for the Netherlands to be listed as a coalition member by the United States. Therefore, the government was able to secure its preferred policy with only 32% of the public in favor of supporting the war passively as the Netherlands did[75]. It was able to do this by strategically emphasizing the policy it *was not* pursuing, military participation in the invasion, which attracted the most negative attention both from opposition parties and the public<sup>8</sup>. This strategy was successful in that support for the government's policy after the vote rose to 47%[75].

Figure 4.9: Dutch Constraint Space for Initial Contribution



Like the Danish government, the Dutch government knew participation in the second phase of the war would be much more popular and easy to secure. In fact, participation in the stabilization effort had strong stable support, with 66% of respondents supporting the deployment of peacekeeping forces and 73% in favor of supporting rebuilding efforts<sup>9</sup>.

Figure 4.10: Dutch Constraint Space for Second Phase



The Security Council passed Resolution 1483 in May 2003 which legitimized the stabilization force and welcomed the participation of third countries“willingness of other States

<sup>8</sup>Only 18% supported military participation while 71% of respondents opposed it[75]

<sup>9</sup>These polls taken in April and March, respectively



to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority[68]. Following the resolution, the Dutch government deployed a contingent of 1100 to the southern province of Al-Muthanna to maintain stability and security beginning in August 2003. Public support continued to increase for the policy through the end of 2003. Despite growing parliamentary criticism throughout 2004, it was not until the end of the year that even half of Dutch public opinion felt the mission to Iraq had been unjustified and even less, 36% supported immediate withdrawal[75]. The strong public rejection of the Iraq war was significantly concentrated on the initial phase of the war. But because in just a few months, the war shifted to stabilization which had strong normative attitudes and identity attachments, public opinion on Iraq flipped and the public's focus shifted as well. The Balkenende cabinet withdrew troops in 2005 and remained in power until 2006. Due to the split of the opposition, the strong attitudes toward peacekeeping and rebuilding efforts, and a focus on the stabilization policy (rather than the initial policy) of the government, the Balkenende government was insulated from being held accountable.

This case shows that even in a very highly constrained scenario, democratic leaders can loosen their constraints enough to secure a dichotomous decision to join a coalition by modulating the type of policy they pursue. This ultimately epitomizes the grey area attribute of domestic constraint. Public opinion was unable to keep the Netherlands out of Iraq, yet a broader picture of domestic constraint (which includes public opinion and the pressures it has on the government and the opposition) was strong and forced a particular type of policy.

## **Conclusion**

There are several overarching findings from the three cases examined in this chapter. The first is the importance of using rhetorical strategy and issue framing to confine and immobilize the opposition. In all three cases at the time of the initial affirmative decision to become a

coalition member, public support for such a policy was very low. Yet, in all three cases the opposition was debilitated in its capacity to activate public opinion leading to a loosened Constraint Space and a reduction in likelihood of being held accountable. In Denmark, Rasmussen's government strongly linked the case for participation in Iraq to entrenched values and history which made it very difficult for his opposition to situate itself against. In the Netherlands, the desire to be included in concurrent cabinet negotiations kept the opposition from taking a hard line against Balkenende's policy. In Japan, Koizumi modulated both the substance of his actions by reducing risk and exposure of troops and modified the timing to eliminate the opposition's ability to make Iraq an election issue.

Second, the political needs of the United States outweighed the military or material needs which allowed leaders of coalition countries a greater freedom in attuning their policy choices to be most favorable to them based on the Constraint Space they faced. Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende chose a contribution to the initial invasion that flew under the radar and allowed him to avoid strong backlash. Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen chose to reduce the size and the domain of the military contribution restricting a small force to humanitarian and security duties. Prime Minister Koizumi began with political support and then after major hostilities ended he contributed noncombat troops whose exposure and mission were greatly restricted even within humanitarian duties. In the Netherlands, these strategies lead to a wash of opposition vote stance in Parliament because the PvdA voted for the Balkenende's policy and the other opposition parties were split. In Denmark, Rasmussen secured the necessary official authorization from Parliament, albeit by a narrow margin. In Japan, the opposition's position lacked both distinction and credibility.

Finally, in the Japanese, Danish and Dutch cases, the strong attachments and entrenched values associated with humanitarian efforts and peacekeeping insulated the leaders from their unpopular decisions in the invasion period because of the bulwark of support for the policies in the reconstruction period. The wide popular support for the peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts supplanted Iraq attitudes which *after the fact* loosened the Constraint

Range and minimized the prospect of accountability.

## CHAPTER 5

### **Accountability and the Failure to Loosen Constraints: Spain's Involvement in the Iraq War**

Thus far, the cases have all demonstrated how democratic leaders have adjusted their policy strategies to their respective Constraint Spaces and their abilities to loosen them. In each case, the leader used rhetoric and chosen policy based specifically on their particular constraints in order to join the coalition despite opposing publics. Spain presents an important case for my theory because a cursory reading of the case makes it appear like the traditional literature explains Spain's outcome. This is because it seems that Prime Minister Jos Mara Aznar was "fired" (technically his party) for pursuing a foreign policy at odds with public opinion. Yet, the traditional literature's assertions about high leader responsiveness to domestic pressures and often leader capitulation to public opinion due to the looming threat of reelection, are markedly missing from the narrative. The case presents a lot of questions and in order to answer them, I will explain the initial Constraint Space Aznar faced, detail the actions he took, compare to previous cases, and ultimately explain why this did not lead to policy insulation.

The theory presented in this dissertation does not say that leaders will never be held accountable but rather that there are strategies that can be employed to reduce the likelihood of facing accountability. This thesis emphasizes the idea that leaders' hands are to some extent tied by domestic constraint but those ties, referred to as a Constraint Space,

can be loosened. I argue that in order to loosen their hands, leaders must attune policy formation strategies to the particular constraints they face within their Constraint Space. For a higher likelihood of insulation, leaders must eventually choose a policy that lies within the Constraint Space.

The extent of the impact of the Iraq policy on the 2004 elections is debated but what is extremely apparent is that the Spanish leader did not adjust his Iraq policy strategy to the particular constraints faced within his Constraint Space in order to insulate himself from accountability for joining the coalition despite a largely opposed public. To begin to illustrate this, I will first explain the initial Constraint Space that Spanish Prime Minister Aznar faced leading up to the 2003 invasion. These include foreign policy history, norms and identities, institutional norms and delegations of power, institutional structure, political environment and polarization across other issues, opposition party stances and policies, public opinion, and material capacity. These factors of constraint established the initial Constraint Space but also determined the flexibility of that range and the strategies that could loosen it.

Unlike many of U.S.'s other democratic coalition partners in cases thus far, Spain's relationship with the United States and the public's perception of those ties was not one of a long embedded supportive alliance. Initially following World War II, Truman had supported UN resolutions to bar Franco's Spain, cut off full diplomatic ties, and excluded Spain from the Marshall Plan. Yet, just a few years later, pressures of the Cold War and alleged impending Soviet threat caused the U.S. to change course and in exchange for military bases on Spanish soil, the U.S. signed the Pact of Madrid, a mutual defense treaty that included \$1.4 billion in military and economic aid. The U.S. also helped usher in the acceptance of Spanish membership at the UN. Many believe this integral support and influx of funds given to the Franco regime by the U.S. constituted integral backing in that helped him maintain power. The Cold War support for Franco, and the fact that the U.S. had remained neutral in the fascist regime's uprising against the Spanish Republic in the 1930s, lead to a general distrust of U.S. motives. Subsequently, foreign policy after the transition to democracy was

strongly oriented in favor of European ties, especially allying with France and Germany[98]. Aznar and his Popular party brought sweeping policy changes including prioritizing U.S. relations. The shift was largely based on aspirations and concerns about Spain's role in an enlarging EU. These concerns were reflected in a new stance toward the EU that put more emphasis on economic deregulation and relations with the U.S. and less on social European integration. An RIE poll in November 2002 showed that a majority of the Spanish electorate did not agree with the government. A large majority, 62% of Spanish respondents expressed "that Europe should adopt a more independent position from the US"[98]. These numbers are even more telling because they were the highest reported compared to 60%, 59%, 51% and 47% in France, Italy, Germany, and the UK, respectively. Generally a nation marked by consensual politics, this position and view change created great divisions in Spain[230]. On the other hand, strong cultural ties and desired economic relations with Latin America and the strength of the region's links to United States affirms the importance of transatlantic interests[98].

Broad attitudes, identities, and lack thereof highly influenced the Constraint Space Aznar faced. First, while Aznar and some in his Popular Party wanted bring Spain out of middle power status and become a major international player, most in the Spanish electorate did not. In February 2003, on the brink of the Iraq invasion, an RIE survey asked Spaniards to rank their country's influence and power in the world, 0 (low) to 10 (high) and the mean response was 4.3. This contrasted starkly with their counterparts in the U.S., Germany, the U.K., France, China, and Russia who responded 8.8, 6.6, 6.5, 6.2, 6.1, and 5.8, respectively. Even more telling, only 22% of Spanish respondents thought additional resources should be dedicated to increasing Spain's international standing and global influence[98]. This reflects that the Spanish population acknowledged and was content with their middle power status.

In addition to the intersubjective acceptance of middle power identity in foreign relations, peace values and culture were widespread and deeply rooted in Spain. This culture began with the neutralism of the Franco regime and was reinforced in the transition to democracy

through which the rejection of violence and military intervention was the dominant discourse. With the memory of the civil war ever present in Spanish collective memory, political elites coalesced to form a consensus against anything other than peaceful methods to secure the transition[123]. Domestic policy post transition reflected the acceptance of peaceful methods of conflict resolution in dealing with the Basque country and political terrorism. It is also evident through movements against the use of nuclear power, for a referendum against Spain's membership in NATO, for removal of military service conscription, and for educational initiatives for peaceful conflict resolution as an alternative to military intervention[123]. About 75% of the Spanish population expressed that they felt there was "no value or ideal to justify war, even in cases of necessity" and 66% identified as doves meaning they "economic power is more important than the military and in any case reject the use of war" [63, 3]. All of these movements and positions fostered a collective identity among the Spanish people based on placing a high value on peace.

That being said, the more recent experiences with terrorism and immigration strongly affected the Constraint Space as well. Since Spain's transition to democracy, terrorism had become a deep and ever present threat largely due to attacks from the Basque separatist group, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). When Aznar and his party took control of the government in 1996, they emphasized and dedicated strong efforts to provide "safety against terrorism"[196]. This included efforts to challenge and undermine the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) which held power in the regional government of the Basque country because of alleged ties to the ETA[98]. In May 2001, the U.S. and Spain signed a joint declaration to fight terrorism together. Aznar emphasized action must be coordinated between the two countries both against international terrorist groups like the Islamists and domestic ones like the ETA[230]. The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and Bush's declaration of a global war on terror lead Bush to further accept Aznar's link between Spain's fight with the ETA and the broader fight. This acceptance resulted in support and legitimization from the United States and the United Kingdom and further isolation of the ETA. This strategy of tying the global war on terror to the ETA was also part of a wider electoral strategy. Because the Popular party

had focused so heavily on safety and prioritizing terrorism it made sense to want to ally with the U.S., which had set the threat of terrorism as the utmost priority. In his own words, Aznar said his staunch support of the U.S. and its policies “was strategically good for Spain and stemmed from a basic sense of political reciprocity- you cannot ask a friend for help and then later, when that same friend asks you for something, say no”[126]. One way this reciprocity materialized was through the inclusion of Batasuna, commonly perceived as the ETA’s political branch, in the U.S. list of terrorist groups[98]. Most Spaniards viewed the ETA as illegitimate but when Aznar declared Batasuna illegal and seized its assets, this was seen by some as extreme. There was concern over banning a political party that generally garnered around 10% of the vote in the Basque country and which had received 20% in the 1999 elections, yet the main opposition party, PSOE, supported the move[98]. Support in this case may have given Aznar the belief that he could possibly secure PSOE support for his Iraq policy as well if he emphasized the terrorism link sufficiently.

Further, geographic concerns also drew Spain diplomatically closer to U.S. policy. First, the threat of instability posed by illegal immigration and drug trafficking from North West Africa to southern Spain brought the threat of Islamic fundamentalism closer to home. Spain was concerned it would bear the initial blow of Islamic fundamentalism and the threats associated with its potential spread which could be heightened due to the immigration and drug conflicts. Second, despite Spain and Morocco playing central roles in the Barcelona Process, the goal of which was to develop dialogue between cultures, crisis developed between the two countries in July 2002 when Moroccan soldiers occupied Perejil. When the EU was unable to mediate a resolution, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was able to settle the dispute. The strong U.S./ Moroccan relations were seen as a compelling benefit to further secure U.S. relations.

Beyond, history, cultural identity, and foreign policy norms, institutions also strongly affected the initial Constraint Space. According to the Spanish Constitution, the Government which consists of the President, Vice President and other ministers when appropriate,



has authority to conduct foreign policy, civil and military administration and defense of the State[54]. This delegated foreign policy making authority to Aznar and his Government. While parliament could and did engage in a discussion over Iraq, it was symbolic and did not constitute a formal debate[217]. This loosened constraints formally but the opposition had the ability to put pressure on the government through the discussion.

The strength of Aznar's Popular Party and the competitiveness of the opposition are large factors for institutional constraints. When Aznar and his party won in 1996, it was the first time in since democratization that a center right party ruled Spain and ended thirteen years of rule by the Socialist party. Aznar won reelection handily in 2000 but there were several changes to the political environment that strengthened the competition and reduced the Popular Party's upper hand. First, inadequate handling of an oil spill on Spain's northern coast presented the first crack in the party's competitive advantage. This and other disillusionments with the Popular Party made political configurations of power such that the PSOE benefited from aligning with the United Left Party (IU) and the social movements against the war[123]. While protests for peace had long been normalized as a form of political expression, similar demonstrations against the Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan had only found political support from the IU. The visibility of antiwar issues and the extent of mobilization in the population had always been highly dependent on the political environment and support from major political parties. By providing voters with alternative policy choices, the PSOE and its leader, Rodriguez Zapatero, increased the potential for opinions on Iraq to go into voting calculations. Further, garnering support from major institutional actors was reflected in the press coverage of the antiwar demonstrations which were framed as legitimate and propelled by ethical motives based on "moral and civic duty that went beyond partisan confrontation"[123]. The support of the press and the major opposition parties amplified the salience of the Iraq issue. The potential for Iraq to actually impact voting decisions was further strengthened by the fact that partisan voting in Spain was weakened due to issue voting issues deemed to have important moral attributes, increasing electoral volatility and decreasing the size of guaranteed base support[123].

The table below compiles the assessment of the different constraints and shows each of the factors affecting the Constraint Space, the strength of the effect it could have on loosening or tightening the Constraint Space, and the potential elements that could limit or change the direction of that factor's effect.


Table 5.1: Spanish Constraint Space

Factor	Strength of Effect	Counter Element(s)
International Attitudes and Norms	strongly discouraged participation	support for humanitarian efforts
Domestic Foreign Policy Norms and History	strongly discouraged participation	terrorism and immigration concerns
National Identity	strongly discouraged participation	humanitarian concerns
Institutional Delegations of Power	strongly encouraged participation	Parliament discussion
Degree of Political Competition	strongly discouraged participation	salience
Political Environment /Other Issues	weakly encouraged participation	salience
Public Opinion	strongly discouraged participation	salience

From the outset, Aznar who had always placed a high value on prioritizing U.S. relations, stood with U.S. policy and his stance was further magnified by Spain holding a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council during the crisis. Aznar's aspiration to envisage Spain as a major player on the international stage paired with his ambitious motives to tie Spanish domestic terrorism to the global war on terror guided his Iraq policy preferences. After decades of left oriented governments, Aznar and the Popular Party held greatly different views from their predecessors. While originally largely popular, their values had not become entrenched in society broadly, and the more aggressive and trans-Atlantic focused foreign policy was especially divisive.

Aznar’s Iraq policy was starkly at odds with public opinion in Spain. Spanish opposition to the war was consistently among the highest in all of Europe, including nations whose leaders did not join the coalition. At its height, over 90% of Spaniards were against the war[196]. Over two million people participated in the anti-war protests in Madrid and Barcelona, along with citizens in 57 other cities and every provincial capital in the nation, making it the largest demonstration in Europe[98]. Further, 25% of the Spanish population over the age of 16 participated in the demonstrations in some capacity[30]. Only 2% of the Spanish population supported a unilateral attack by the United States[172]. The size of Spanish opposition is especially apparent when compared to other European countries. Spanish citizens were consistently the most opposed to the war. In Spain, over 60% expressed absolute opposition compared to the second highest, Italy at 33% and Europe as a whole at 26%[3]. The same pattern is true under the conditions of a UN mandate, while 60% of Europeans expressed they would support it, 65% of Spaniards said they would still be against an attack backed by the UN[3].

The factors of the Constraint Space previously mentioned only intensified the public sentiment against the Government’s preferred policy. The stylized illustration below illustrates the initial Constraint Space Aznar faced. The initial Spanish public preference and Aznar’s preference are solid points on the horizontal line. The horizontal line represents a spectrum of policies, from left to right, the most negative policy to the most supportive policy, respectively. The circle around the public preference symbolizes the range of policies that are not expected to result in punishment. The vertical dashed line symbolizes the dichotomous choice of joining the coalition. Everything to the left of the dashed line is not joining and everything to the right is joining.



Aznar and his government knew their preferred policy was not aligned with public opinion. Leading up to the invasion of Iraq, Aznar acknowledged the immense opposition he faced could result in punishment at the ballot box but responded to questions about the polls, “I cannot exchange security for votes.. I cannot kneel down to a threat because of comfort or convenience” [127]. He echoed the same sentiment to *Le Monde* in early 2004, “credible leaders cannot be influenced by the flow of public opinion... to run a country, there are two prerequisites: decisiveness and conviction. Leaders cannot be swayed by every wind or float like a cork drifting with the tide. Those who are carried away by wind or tide, they cannot be called leaders but vane. I for each decision, each reform taken by my government, I have never been swayed by the wind of time. I have always been at the forefront” [3]. Minister Palacios went as far as to say “government policies should be solely designed based on the responsibility the leaders have taken (internationally) and never on public opinion polls” [3]. It is not the purpose of this work to determine if it was the case that Aznar’s preferences were so strong that he did not care about the electoral consequences for his party (as he had already announced that he would not be seeking reelection) or if he thought he could escape unscathed. Rather, it is important to look at the factors of constraint and determine if the actions taken were similar to his democratic leader counterparts in an attempt to insulate themselves from accountability when choosing policy at odds with public preference.

Looking at the factors of constraint facing Aznar, there were strategies available to loosen the Constraint Space and perhaps even move public opinion closer to his desired policy. While the Spanish public was widely against the use of force broadly, over the years, opinion had softened to contributions toward multinational humanitarian missions. The past also informed how these constraints could be loosened. First, participation in the first Gulf War was limited to sending ships to enforce UN sanctions and efforts were coordinated through the European Council. Even under these conditions, the public was divided in its support but the policy secured broad support from the major political parties limiting the threat of electoral punishment [204]. Support for humanitarian interventions in coordination with Europe and under the auspices of the UN is once again demonstrated through public opinion

on Spanish participation under NATO in the former Yugoslavia. A majority thought UN authorization should have been granted, yet 57% still found the invasion justified because of the human rights violations in Kosovo[3]. This shows the possible frames, rhetoric, and type of involvement available to Aznar dictated by the Constraint Space.

While Aznar, like other democratic leaders in the coalition, emphasized the importance of securing UN authorization to the United States, compared to his counterparts he was much less strategic and maneuvered extremely minimally, showing little attempt to move his preferred policy into a range of acceptable policies. Given the fact that unlike the democratic publics in many of the other cases, a majority support in Spain would not be secured with UN approval alone, Aznar and his Government should have been tapping into other public sentiments and adjusting their strategy even prior to the withdrawal of the second resolution.


The main arguments used by the Spanish government for joining the coalition were not based on the constraints it faced and therefore did little to loosen them. The first justification for involvement was one used by many leaders in the coalition. This was the threat of Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, and ties to the terrorist organizations responsible for 9/11. When asked whether the development of weapons of mass destruction would justify intervention, 67%, 49%, 57% and 54% responded affirmatively in the UK, Italy, Germany, and France, respectively. In Spain, only 19% expressed that response, which was less than half of Europe's average. Similarly, when asked whether 9/11 was a very important justification, publics in the UK, Italy, Germany, and France agreed at rates of 55%, 45%, 44%, and 47%, respectively. Again, in Spain this was significantly lower at just 18% in agreement[3]. Frames and rhetorical strategies focused on these claims garnered much less support in Spain which is unsurprising due to the lack of faith in the use of force to remedy crises and the distrust of the United States.

Other limitations presented themselves again in the lackluster public reception of justi-

fications based on the importance of U.S. relations and increasing Spanish prestige. Part of Aznar's own reason for joining the coalition was his desire to increase Spanish standing internationally by bolstering ties with the United States. Again, based on the analysis of the Spanish intersubjective identity, the public did not necessarily care about improving international status and was not inclined to do so by cozying up to the United States. Aznar's declaration at the Azores meeting that "the solidarity between Europe and the U.S. has always been, is, and should continue to be, a great European commitment; and today's Europe could not be understood without that commitment" was more apt to his counterparts' constraint spaces that included emphatic public support and high regard for the alliance with U.S. but in Spain this fell flat [126].

The justification used by the Spanish government that probably had the greatest potential to influence the Constraint Space was the emphasis on safety and terrorism. Safety had been the priority of the Popular Party and generally referenced keeping the nation united both economically and socially and protecting it from independent advocates, specifically the Basque terrorists[196]. Aznar attempted to make the argument that the international effort to eradicate terrorism and make the globe safer was intrinsically tied to the local terror in Spain. Essentially, Aznar believed the Spanish fight with the ETA justified involvement in Iraq but he was unable to get the public to make the same leap in logic. He explained his attempts at using this rationale to bridge the public's sentiments, "Believe me when I say that I will continue to explain that the Government's position is, exactly, the one we should keep: the best for their safety, the best for peace"[3]. This quote does show an appeal to use positive factors of the Constraint Space, such as the public's peace values and want for safety. One problem was the orientation toward peace was not just a moral platitude but also delineated expectations for how to handle problems. The use of military force was still not seen as a credible resolution to the problem. The Spanish public was risk averse and the perceived degree of danger and violence in Iraq was very high and Aznar did not try to downplay the exposure to risk but rather emphasized that Spanish soldiers were exposed to "very dangerous" situations[72].

Despite not conforming to rhetoric that would loosen the Constraint Space, there were several events that expanded it. First, when the Government consented to a parliamentary discussion on Iraq, the Socialists abstained and the Popular Party comfortable won the vote with the support of the Catalan Nationalists[217]. While this may have just been symbolic because the Socialists had made their position clear, for the public it still resonated as a visual of support for Government policy. Next, on 18 March 2003 on the eve of the invasion, Aznar did acquiesce moderately by modulating policy in his announcement that Spain would not be sending combat troops[86]. Public approval of the government’s position did increase from 11% in February 2003 to 20% in April 2003[3]. While it was a bump in support, this very slight rally still did not provide significant support and like the other (larger) rallies seen in Australia, the UK, and others, these shifts in opinion resolve themselves after a few months. Therefore, Aznar’s policy never moved into the acceptable range. The stylized illustration below shows public’s preference did not move across the vertical dashed line which represents the dichotomous decision to join. The ellipse around the public preference, which symbolizes the range of acceptable policies, stretches slightly but does not include Aznar’s preferred policy.



Despite modulating initially, following George W. Bush’s declared “end to major combat operations”, the Spanish government sent a more expansive combat force to Iraq. Beginning in July 2003, Spain took on a leading role in Iraq as Spanish troops lead the Brigada Hispanoamericana consisting of Spanish soldiers and troops from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. On 11 November 2003, Spanish forces suffered five casualties in an ambush bringing the total killed in action to 11[27]. As the illustration above lays out, the dichotomous decision to join the coalition still remained outside of the range

of acceptable policies. This places the policy choice of a combat role glaringly outside of any potential public “blindspot”, meaning that this policy was sufficiently far enough from voters’ preference for them to notice the discrepancy which *could* elicit the accountability mechanism[10].

That being said, it was not a given that the Popular Party would lose the 2004 election. The theory argues by choosing policies within the Constraint Space, democratic leaders can attempt to insulate themselves from *potential* accountability not *certain* electoral punishment. In fact, there were many indicators that after May 2003, despite minimal support for Aznar’s Iraq policy, it’s salience had dropped significantly[123]. The limited likely impact was reinforced by polls that revealed only 17% of Spaniards said the policy would change their vote and that the issue fell in significantly behind in importance to unemployment and terrorism[172]. But Aznar’s decision to choose policy outside of the Constraint Space allowed the potential for his Iraq policy to be a wedge issue in an election. This was exemplified when the importance and potency of the Iraq issue rebounded with the Madrid attacks on 11 March 2004.

Three days before the national election, ten bombs on four commuter trains at three different stations across the capital comprised the coordinated attacks that killed 191 people and wounded close to 2000. The government both suggested and directly told the public that the ETA could be behind the attacks[196]. When it was revealed that, in actuality, Al Qaeda was behind the attacks, the public widely blamed the government for the attacks as a result of Spain’s involvement in Iraq[3]. In fact, 64% of Spaniards said they believed the bombings would not have occurred if Spain had not joined the coalition[3]. Al Qaeda’s responsibility hurt the Popular Party in three ways. First, the attacks were widely seen as retaliation for the government’s Iraq policy which brought the distant conflict home, thus increasing salience. The opposition parties jumped at the opportunity to fuel this connection by painting Aznar, his party, and his already widely unpopular Iraq policy as directly to blame for the tragedy[3]. Second, the Popular Party had strongly emphasized the theme



of safety, especially from terrorism, in their platform. The attacks largely discredited their ability to claim this strength and even made them look weak on the safety value. Third, the Popular Party initially placing blame on the ETA was perceived as purposely trying to deceive the public in a way that benefited them politically. The Government suffered a major loss of credibility as they were seen as attempting to contrive the realities of the crisis to their ideological position.

Whether the attacks are considered a stochastic event or directly related to the policy, the lack of insulation based on all of the factors of the Constraint Space and that Aznar chose a policy that was clearly outside of it, made the ensuing election prime for accountability. As previously mentioned, Aznar had long before announced he would not be seeking reelection and the party tried to distance themselves from Iraq. This was epitomized when the Prime Minister designate, Mariano Rajoy, referred to “Aznar, you and your war” [230]. Ultimately this effort was in vain, as Rajoy had been the spokesperson for the highly criticized handling of the Prestige oil crisis and his vice president had been the government’s spokesperson for the Madrid terrorist attacks [196]. While 30% of voters claimed the bombings influenced their choice, an even greater effect was seen from increasing voter turnout [3, 123]. Post election studies showed that the Popular Party lost a portion of the more volatile young vote, but most of the votes gained by the Socialist Party came from those who usually abstained from voting and first time voters [123]. The numbers reflect that the PP was able to maintain most of its voting base but the PSOE added over 3 million additional votes compared to the previous election [196]. While some argue this large mobilization may have had more to do with citizens feeling deliberately misled about the attacks than the Iraq war policy itself, the PP’s Iraq policy put them on the losing side regardless. The 2004 general elections had the greatest voter turnout since democratization and handed the Popular Party the worst defeat in 22 years for a sitting government.

PSOE’s newly elected Prime Minister Zapatero withdrew troops from Iraq on 18 April 2004. He explained his reasoning as being motivated by the fact that it was the “will of the

electorate, reflected by 75-80% of the Spanish voting public” and that “it is important to respond to the aspirations of the majority, the general feeling of the public and society” [219]. While this is a nice sentiment, the policy also aligned to his party’s benefit in the political configuration of power and with the party’s foreign policy preferences. Within a month, Zapatero was working on repairing the country’s relationship with Germany and France and refocusing on a Europe centered foreign policy. Under Zapatero, Spain’s foreign policy remained active. The Government strongly supported the development of Security and Defense Policy in the EU and contributed military troops to nine humanitarian missions.

The stark contrast between the criticism for Iraq participation and the support for these following interventions under Zapatero highlight the possibility that similar loosening strategies that were available to Aznar as well. The key components of the policy that brought it into the Constraint Space, were the humanitarian aspect, UN approval, alignment with other major European partners’ policies, and limited exposure to threat. The other aspects seem to be secondary to the type of intervention. Polls showed that even with UN authorization, military involvement would not be supported by a majority of Spaniards. This goes back to the strong attitudes, norms, and identities around peace values. This is similar to the constraints faced by Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi. His appeals to the UN, the promotion of democracy, preventing the spread of WMDs, etc. were unable to move a public that was skeptical of the utility of military force to achieve any of these goals. Only when he shifted his rhetoric to stress the humanitarian aspects of the mission did public opinion respond. In addition, Koizumi had to modulate both his policy choices and timing, to insulate himself and his party from electoral competition. Similarly, Australian Prime Minister John Howard faced a public with a comparable aversion to casualties. To abate this constraint, Howard modulated his policy choices. Likewise, Polish Prime Minister Miller’s public also had concerns about fall out with major players in Europe over Iraq participation. He addressed these concerns and sought to alleviate them by engaging the government in a public relations campaign that included high profile meetings with German and French leaders that underscored the continued strength of these important relations. Finally, all of

the cases analyzed showed the leaders attempted to either gain opposition support or limit the opposition's ability to establish a strong public counter argument.

In sum, in the Spanish case there was accountability because the leader did not choose his strategies based on his constraints and was unsuccessful in shifting the Constraint Space to include the chosen policy. This is even more apparent when comparing the Constraint Spaces of the different cases and their chosen strategies and policies. For example, Spain had the strongest factors of constraint across the board. Spain only had one factor that encouraged participation which was the political environment and the salience of the Iraq issue. This was only weakly encouraging because of its vulnerability to changing circumstances. Next, compared to the other countries that contributed combat troops Spain faced much higher normative and institutional constraints. Given the fact that the UK, Poland, and Australia all faced significantly looser Constraint Spaces, it makes sense that these were the countries that contributed to the initial invasion. While Denmark had much more conducive normative factors for reducing constraint, the initial constraint space featured strongly discouraging institutional factors similar to Spain. But Denmark used those encouraging normative factors to loosen institutional constraints by gaining Parliamentary approval and limiting the contribution. In addition, Spain had even stronger discouraging factors compared to the cases that did not contribute combat troops, the Netherlands and Japan. The Netherlands faced strong institutional constraints but had more encouraging normative factors while Japan faced strong normative constraints but more encouraging institutional factors. Both of these states' leaders modulated their actions, adjusted their timing, and focused their rhetoric to avoid accountability, specifically emphasizing the humanitarian contribution. Aznar, on the other hand, faced both strongly discouraging normative and institutional factors. Unlike Japan and the Netherlands, Spain contributed more than political support in March and then sent combat troops. Under these particular constraint conditions, Aznar's modulation was not enough. In addition to having the strongest combination of constraints, Spain also had the most consistently low public support regardless of conditions. I argued in the theory chapter that accountability is observed when constraint fails or the leader's perception of

constraint is flawed. Aznar's strategy and policy were not aligned with his constraints, he was unable to include his policy within the acceptable range, and thus opened himself and his party up to accountability.

## CHAPTER 6

### Conclusion

This dissertation has sought to reveal the complex nature of democratic constraint in foreign policymaking. Domestic politics *do* affect the policy *process*. While I argue against the assertion that electoral punishment is certain if leaders stray from a precisely dictated public policy preference, leaders do act within the context of their domestic setting, or what I refer to as their Constraint Space, to loosen constraints without increasing accountability. Leaders are highly aware of and concerned with the potential for domestic backlash but can reduce accountability by taking specific actions based on their particular constraints.

An explanation for the foreign policy of states has to deal with both the objectives of political leaders given the challenges and possibilities posed by the policies of other nations and how these conjoin with domestic political constraints and the requisites of maintaining political power. In all of the cases analyzed, the governments decided to join the U.S. coalition despite their nation's majority opinion and in each cases the political leaders had both reasons for doing so and an ability to avoid the costs of such a choice. My work extends the logic of audience cost theory to argue that democratic leaders have the ability to strategically reduce constraint and insulate themselves from rather than expose themselves to accountability.

The core contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate the ways in which political leaders deal with public opinion opposed to their foreign policy preferences. First, political opportu-

nities and constraints embody more than just public opinion and more than just the structure of political institutions. They also include historical normative factors and the particular political context. Second, political leaders are just that, they have the capacity to lead and expand (as well as contract) the constraints under which they operate. The multifaceted nature of constraint allows leaders the opportunity to emphasize the more favorable factors and in some cases use those favorable factors to reduce the impact of the less favorable factors of constraint. Denmark, Australia, the UK and the Netherlands demonstrated leaders using a favorable factor, such as highly entrenched values, identities and norms to limit the opposition which weakened institutional constraints. In Japan, lack of a credible opposition and elite consensus limited the potency of the normative factors and threat concerns. And in Poland, favorable concerns about the political context were used to reframe the more constraining ones.

Further, in addition to facing multifaceted constraints, leaders also have a wide spectrum of policy options to achieve their desired ends. Generally, leaders are thought to make the dichotomous choice, to engage or not, which then translates into adhering to public preference or not and then finally being held accountable or not. This thesis shows that this is thinking is much too simplistic. Leaders were aware of the large effects of certain aspects of conflict on their population's support, and strategically avoided those aspects and choose others that minimize the costs of conflict. Different contributions vary in exposure to domestic pressures, the ease of favorable framing, and effect on salience, based on the Constraint Space each leader faced. For example, despite contributing combat troops Australia, Poland, and Denmark reduced the size of their missions and exposure to threat in order to reduce casualties and lessen the potential of triggering accountability. In the UK, significant efforts were taken to clearly show that the country (and the United States) had gone through all appropriate steps in an attempt to find either a peaceful solution or one authorized by the United Nations. Similarly, the Netherlands and Japan chose humanitarian contributions which allowed them to join the coalition while also securing public support by priming strong supportive factors of the Constraint Space.

All of the moving pieces come together to cohesively to answer the question presented at the beginning of this thesis: *How do leaders navigate foreign policymaking when their preferences are at odds with their publics?*. The first null hypothesis was that leaders either capitulate to their public's desired policy or face electoral consequences. The second null hypothesis was that leaders do not take domestic constraint into account when making foreign policy decisions. As I have outlined above, my argument was much more nuanced. I argued that leaders are aware of the complex nature of constraint and the specific factors of constraint that make up what I refer to as their Constraint Spaces. These spaces are also not fixed and leaders are capable of strategically maneuvering within these spaces to loosen constraints and insulate themselves from accountability by attuning the policy process and policy itself to the particular Constraint Space they face. In each case I assessed the factors of the initial Constraint Space for each country. The flexibility of the space was determined by the strength of each factor and the cumulative strength of the culmination of factors. This only provided the potential to expand the Constraint Space which depended on the leader choosing a strategy and policy based on favorable factors to do so. The outcome of each case demonstrates how all of these different continuums come together.

In assessing the cases together, even a rather rudimentary comparison across cases reveals several simple patterns. First, if you split the encouraging and discouraging factors, the cases that were heavier on the encouraging factors compared to discouraging factors all contributed combat troops; the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, and Denmark. For cases that were heavier on discouraging factors compared to encouraging ones, the Netherlands and Japan did not contribute combat troops and Spain did. Patterns for additional strategy within the groups are clear as well. Poland was the most heavily tilted toward strongly encouraging and thus had to put the least effort into expanding the Constraint Space. Australia and the UK were relatively similar but perhaps the greater backlash seen in the UK was because Australia modulated policy more by reducing the size and exposure of troop contributions. Danish factors, while more concentrated toward encouraging, were spread out more evenly which corresponded to their absence from the initial invasion. Likewise, Japan was more

heavily slanted toward strongly discouraging compared to the Netherlands which corresponds with intensely attuned rhetorical strategy and further additional reduction of risk for the humanitarian contribution. Even through this blunt example it is obvious that, based on Spain’s constraints and in comparison to the strategies of other democratic leaders, Spain did not choose a policy strategy based the Constraint Space and therefore the observation of accountability is not surprising.

The table below is merely to provide a visual of the simple comparison of Constraint Spaces described above. To be clear, in each case, each factor was not equally weighted. The variables of constraint, strategy, and accountability are all continuous and not discrete. The complexity and nuance of my variables and the inability for numerical analysis to convey this was a driving determinant of my methodological choice to conduct process tracing. But for a very simplistic comparison for this concluding chapter, I have provided the visual below.

Comparing Constraint Spaces

Case	Strongly Encouraging	Moderately Encouraging	Weakly Encouraging	Weakly Discouraging	Moderately Discouraging	Strongly Discouraging
United Kingdom	3	2	0	1	1	0
Australia	3	2	0	0	2	0
Poland	5	1	1	0	1	0
Denmark	2	1	1	1	1	0
Netherlands	0	2	1	1	2	2
Japan	2	0	0	1	1	4
Spain	1	0	0	1	0	5



As alluded to above and demonstrated throughout the dissertation, some factors of constraint mattered more in some cases than in others and different strategies were used and varied in success based on the weight assigned to each constraint. The importance of institutional constraints, specifically political competition, cannot be understated. Leaders that held a strong competitive advantage over the opposition, secured opposition support reflected in elite consensus, or limited or stifled a sufficiently different counter policy had significantly more flexible Constraint Spaces despite other factors. This is not to say the other factors did not matter, in fact, in many cases leaders used the other factors to loosen the competition factor and in other cases the other factors required the leaders to modulate their actions in order to reduce the competition factor. For example, in Poland, there was elite consensus between the two major parties on foreign policy and the minor parties offered very little competition to the major parties. This reduced the potential of the Iraq policy becoming a vote changing issue especially once the Polish government made strategic moves to reduce casualties and its impact on European relations. While Tony Blair had support from the opposition for his Iraq policy, he had to secure support within his own party because the Conservative support did not extend to a no confidence vote. In order to reduce opposition within his own party and secure a consensus between the two major parties on the Iraq policy, he emphasized the great lengths taken to go the UN route and most importantly to secure MP support, stressed the importance of the alliance and going with the United States. Conservative Tory support and a majority of Labour's support lead to an absence of any credible opposition on the Iraq policy. In Australia, Howard's main opposition, the Labor party's ability to present a strong counter policy was already constrained by a broad opinion that it was weak on foreign policy and then further constrained by the fact that Howard's rhetorical strategy based on strong security narratives and the importance of the alliance had moved the public closer to accepting the dichotomous decision to join. This made Labor's window of meaningful opposition fairly small as it depended on participation without UN authorization and the deployment of troops. Howard strategically aware of this, purposely evaded a commitment to any particular course of action until right before deployment which paired with the strong broad normative support for the alliance

squashed any possible mobilization of opposition. Similarly, in Denmark, Rasmussen had to secure Parliamentary approval for his policy and in order to do so, despite strong public opposition, he used the strong attachment to democratic identity, the nation's foreign policy history, and the importance of the alliance to reduce the opposition's ability to present a strong and differentiable counter. In Japan, Koizumi also had to modulate the content and timing of his Iraq deployments in order to secure support in the Diet and to delay potential causalities and any increased salience they might have brought until after the election. In the Netherlands, the unique constraints posed by the coalition government initially presented very strong institutional barriers to joining, but emphasis on normative factors and values for participation along with specific policy modulation to fit precise narratives stymied the establishment of an effective counter.

The competitiveness of the opposition and the presentation of a strong clearly differentiated counter policy were such important determinants of the Constraint Space because this determines the impact of public opinion. Without a suitable alternative, holding leaders accountable is not possible. Other scholars have argued that opinion itself does not constraint leaders but instead leaders are constrained by the potential for the opposition to take advantage of public opinion[82]. Generally, the literature has treated this potential for exploitation as fixed and thus the level of constraint as fixed. Rather, these cases show that leaders are supremely aware of the dynamic between public opinion and the opposition. Knowing accountability is linked to the opposition's ability to capitalize on public opinion, leader's strategically maneuver in attempt to lock the opposition into the least dangerous position. In most of these cases, public opinion did not move significantly in favor of Iraq policies but rather leaders were able to stretch the width of the Constraint Spaces from their original boundaries to include policies more favorable to each leader's preferences by limiting accountability by limiting the opposition.

Now, for cases that had strong normative constraints working against contributing, strategies and rhetoric based on these factors was extremely important. What the cases in Japan,

the Netherlands, and Denmark show is that successful strategies based on these norms and identities not only insulated leaders long term but actually generated support for the policies because they now aligned with the very entrenched values that had previously constricted the Constraint Space. At the time of deployment for each of these countries, insulation within the Constraint Space was very tentative. The leaders were aware of this and in all three cases ramped up rhetorical posturing and public relations in what I call the second phase of policy strategy. These leaders also chose contributions that could be framed as humanitarian duties and stabilization efforts. These policies, specifically the frames placed on them through purposeful strategy, now aligned with strong normative values, attitudes, and identities rather than contradicting them.

This was not necessary in the U.K., Poland, and Australia, which all had relatively positive normative factors, but in all three cases public support for Iraq dropped dramatically more as time went on and as the situation deteriorated than it did in Japan, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The latter three cases had unfavorable initial normative constraints that required more “give” on policy to fit narratives and limit opposition but also more effort toward actually shaping public opinion through rhetorical strategy. Because Japan, the Netherlands, and Denmark had stiffer Constraint Spaces, seen through stronger discouraging normative and institutional factors, these countries could not afford to only focus on provisionally shifting the Constraint Space but continued to engage in efforts to move public opinion and more concretely insulate themselves from accountability. Therefore, I would argue these cases show that public opinion is more important the stronger the other factors of constraint are. The less discouraging and more encouraging the factors of constraint are, the less aligned policy will need to be with public opinion. Ironically, public opinion is more likely to “follow the leader” when non-opinion factors are constraining enough to force policy to more closely align with deeply held normative values. Thus, public opinion is more likely to follow the leader when the leader leans closer to public opinion.

In addition to multifaceted constraints and a spectrum of policy strategies and choices,

accountability is also not binary but continuous as well. In general, political leaders did not pay for ignoring public opinion. This was true even when the war did not go as expected and the policy was largely a failure. Simply put, there is little evidence that ignoring public opinion results in accountability through electoral punishment. That is not to say that there is no impact. I alluded to this when I mentioned the U.K.'s outcome. In the U.K. chapter, I discuss assessing whether Blair and his party were held accountable. If accountability is measured dichotomously, then most would say no but that is also missing a lot about how Iraq policy impacted Labour's stronghold on power, and Blair's reputation and legacy. Blair chose his policy based on expectations of the duration, success, and casualties of the conflict which did not insulate him completely from the actual outcomes of duration, success, and casualties. Of course had the war gone as expected there certainly would not have been any price to pay and even as disastrously as it went, the cost was exceedingly lower than traditional literature would have us believe to be automatic regardless of time lines and circumstances.

The case that does present an outcome of electoral accountability illustrates how important a leader's strategic moves based on the specific factors of the Constraint Space are in insulating that leader. Spain had both strong institutional constraints and strongly discouraging normative constraints. Based on the findings above by comparing the other cases, Aznar should have acted strategically to minimize the potential for the opposition to exploit the extremely negative public opinion toward his preferred policy. Aznar and his government continuously used justifications based on their own rationale for the policy rather than those that aligned with favorable foreign policy norms, identities, and concerns. As a result, he never curbed the strength of his main opposition's counter policy let alone secure their support. And he also never moved public opinion closer to his preferred policy. Spain's Constraint Space should have prompted the same second phase of strategy that other cases with less flexible Constraint Spaces did, but Aznar actually moved further from public opinion in this phase. It was clear that Aznar was aware of his constraints but did not act to loosen them. Even given this blatant disregard for all forms of constraint including public

opinion, it was still not inevitable that Aznar and the Popular Party would face electoral accountability. In fact, it seemed unlikely until a major and exceptional event, the Madrid bombings, forced the salience of the issue to skyrocket and **even then** scholars are still hesitant in assigning a causal link between the Iraq policy and the electoral outcome. This has huge implications for audience costs and any literature that argues or is built upon the ideas of the distinctness of democratic policy making based on the assumptions of accountability.

The idea that constraints are fixed, that politicians are aware of them and avoid them is prevalent throughout democratic theorizing not just in international relations. The presumption is that these constraints exist but we only observe them when politicians push against them. Political scientists, pundits, and politicians themselves express the existence of certain constraints that must be avoided. In American politics, this is exemplified through the famous and now colloquially quoted statement by former U.S. House Speaker Tip O’Neil referring to Social Security as the “third rail, touch it and you die”[143]. Whether it be running against social benefits or for raising taxes there is an assumption that leaders are highly aware of the certain punishment of pushing against these constraints and therefore avoid them. Audience costs furthers this logic arguing that leaders are highly aware of the correspondence of constraints and punishment and strategically make threats to generate the former and the potential for the later[77, 78, 210, 202, 203]. This is done to cement the credibility of threats because it is assumed that politicians know that once threats are made they become constraints that result in the unavoidable consequence of punishment for failing to follow through. The prevalent conclusion across these examples is that we never observe accountability because when leaders are aware of constraints they avoid them. My thesis demonstrates very clearly that politicians **do** challenge constraints. The cases undeniably show that leaders are highly aware of constraints but rather than capitulate, they treat them strategically and as malleable. I also argue the observation of accountability is rare but that it is a product of leaders using their skill and awareness of multiple constraints that are more or less binding to limit or altogether remove the threat of punishment.

The theory and findings of this paper in regards to democratic constraint, leaders' roles, and policy requires a reassessment of how we think about democratic foreign policy but the cases also provide findings beyond just what I set out to assess. First, this work also suggests a rethinking of alliances and coalition warfare. Typically scholars ask why states engage in a direct war and not why they join as secondary actors in a war. The theoretical implications of this thesis have extensive import due to the ever increasing prevalence of coalition warfare[152]. Every war the US entered in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries was a coalition war, sometimes the US joining others, sometimes others joining the US. In the case of the First World War, the US joined others late in the war, and others joined in the wake of the US joining. My argument helps explain the decision of secondary states to join, specifically addressing how democracies choose to join. As this paper has emphasized, democratic governments and how they conduct themselves in foreign affairs have garnered much political attention and a large academic literature. This thesis adds to that important literature but also incorporates coalition warfare, the most common type of conflict engagement for democracies.

Furthermore, this work sheds light on the foreign policy interests and behaviors of middle powers. Most of international relations is built on the role of great powers with a lot of that focusing on the United States. Indeed, a conventional argument is that states will pass the buck when they can be free riders on the actions of a great power[50]. This is classically described as the "exploitation of the great by the small" because those who benefit the most and have the greatest means will bear proportionately more of the costs[174]. But in the case of the Iraq war, middle powers joined the superpower in a war in Iraq despite their nation's majority opinion and without major security organizations. Rather than using domestic politics or the lack of formal authorization (by the UN or NATO) as an excuse not to take part, leaders found solidarity with a major ally to be so important that they used their political skill to loosen constraints to join the United States. Obviously, the security of middle powers is bound up with their allies. In almost every case, leaders alluded to security from the U.S. as a reason for participation. But this alone is not enough as some allies did

not join the coalition. For many it was also a chance to play a role in international affairs and gain prestige on the world stage as a partner of the United States. I presented evidence that this was motivation for all of the cases but especially so for the United Kingdom and Spain. Interestingly, the presence of coercion from the United States is largely missing. Despite the U.S. position as a hegemon, the dismal public support for the war made it necessary for the allies to strategically reconcile participation with domestic constraints[171]. In addition, the U.S.'s main reason for pursuing a coalition was not burden sharing but legitimacy and there is a trade off between coercion and legitimacy[171]. Instead of coercion from the United States, what the cases show is actually the opposite; the middle powers dictated their level of participation and exposure to risk based on their domestic needs to insulate themselves from accountability for joining the U.S.'s unpopular war. While usually the literature on outside options and resources focus on how they amplify the power of the state that holds them, in this case the options and resources of the United States along with the need for legitimacy allowed its smaller partners more power over their own policies[95, 223]. This flexibility may have ultimately lead to the inclusion of more allied partners in the coalition because it gave leaders the ability to develop strategies and policies based on their own Constraint Spaces.

This thesis also speaks to debates across the literature that argue over the role and importance of international law. Some work on international law also argues the importance of domestic publics in enforcing or pressuring their governments to uphold international commitments[209]. While originally applied to upholding human rights agreements within their own borders, this concept has been extended to more generally arguing that domestic audiences care about international law. Skeptics argue that international law reflects existing power and interests but that states can use international law instrumentally to do what they would have done regardless [153]. In regards to the discrete decision of the coalition to invade Iraq, international law and institutions were unable to stop action. But like the function of domestic constraint on democratic leaders, international law did shape the policy *process*. It altered the interests, perceptions of legitimacy, frames and rhetoric available to leaders and their oppositions alike[6]. That being said the importance and impact of this

was determined by the extent that the public and also the opposition in each case attached value and importance to international law. For example, ties to the United Nations and the socialization and acculturation of international legal norms and standards were much stronger in the Netherlands than in Poland. Therefore, the role of this rhetoric in “determining the range of options available to decision makers” was not consistent across cases but varied drastically dependent on the degree of importance assigned to it in that country by both the public and elites just like any other set of foreign policy norms, attitudes, or identities[130]. In the cases where it mattered more, it both restricted options for leaders and allowed for instrumental use by the same leaders. For example, while leaders were constrained by the failure to secure a second resolution, they also attempted to pivot their position as upholding the authority of the United Nations. The instrumental tactics were most successful when the Dutch government hedged their bets on strong attachments to the United Nations by presenting the Corpus Theory which argued that the use of force was already justified due to noncompliance with previous UN Resolutions. Ultimately, most cases showed leaders felt domestic pressure to go “the UN route”. But when the second resolution failed, only states that were strongly constrained by institutional and normative factors modulated. Even in these cases, they still joined the coalition and then the May 2003 UN Resolution legitimizing stabilization forces garnered support for their Iraq policies.

Additionally, in this chapter I have highlighted the importance of institutional constraints as strongly impacting the insulation of leaders. The organization of domestic politics has been argued to affect cooperation and support for international institutions, policy decisions, and behavior toward international commitments[159, 91, 136]. What I add in this thesis is once again nuance. In general these domestic institutional and organizational features are fixed, taken alone, and seen as determinative. While I agree that institutional factors are incredibly influential, the effects of various institutional factors can be heightened or reduced by their interaction with each other, norms, attitudes, values, and identities. Further, the particular question this thesis asks is focused on the nature of democracies, or a subset of organizations of domestic politics. The theory’s application can be expanded to other regime



types because it allows for a continuous conception of constraints, including institutional ones. The strength or weakness of different factors of normative, historical, contextual, and institutional constraint on foreign policy making can all be accounted for in the Constraint Space. Public opinion can easily be defined as the opinion of the relevant domestic audience that has the ability to punish the leader. There is no reason the model could not be applied to all regime types and in fact, the model could be used to make informed and nuanced comparisons across them. My extension of the audience cost logic to strategic insulation can be just as reasonably applied to autocratic regimes which have been argued to be able to generate their own international credibility through audience costs by way of domestic constraints[228]. Moving forward this work could be expanded beyond the confines of full democracies and be applied across regime types.

As always, there is more work to be done and questions to be explored. However, the implications of this dissertation encourage a renewed understanding of domestic constraint, accountability, democratic distinctiveness, middle powers, alliances and coalition warfare to continue that work.

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