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SANTA CRUZ

**TOWARD AN EMERGENT PSYCHOANALYSIS:  
THINKING DIFFERENCE THROUGH THE WORK OF VICTOR TAUSK**

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of the requirements for the degree of

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in

LITERATURE

by

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## ABSTRACT

### *Toward an Emergent Psychoanalysis: Thinking Difference through the Work of Victor Tausk*

Katie Lally

*Toward an Emergent Psychoanalysis: Thinking Difference through the Work of Victor Tausk* traces the figure of Victor Tausk through an intellectual biography to better consider his psychoanalytic and literary contributions and their enduring resonance in discussions around trauma, identity, and belonging. Tausk's work is framed in these pages both within the context of the psychoanalytic movement—particularly in Freud's school and the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society—and in that of his familial origins. Raised in a German-speaking Jewish family that navigated diverse cultural landscapes across the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Tausk's experiences of difference informed his writing and psychoanalytic practice throughout his life. His early treatise on modernism under the pseudonym Vladoje Slovačić, which critiqued nationalistic literature, highlights his progressive stance toward creative practice and identity, foreshadowing some of the most outstanding aspects of his later psychoanalytic inquiries.

This project brings in-depth biographical research together with close readings of Tausk's literary and psychoanalytic contributions, and it is thus divided into two main working parts: Chapters One, Two, and Three consider Tausk's various historical, social, and cultural milieus and his place among them; Chapters Four and Five, respectively, examine his case studies on war trauma and the networked, mutually agential, even mystical structure that animates his writing

across genres. *Toward an Emergent Psychoanalysis* thus seeks not only to re-establish Victor Tausk as a significant figure in psychoanalysis but to consider more broadly the intricate relationships between psychoanalytic theory, literature, and the socio-political contexts in which they emerge.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the culmination of many years of digging at something I did not yet know the form of. The seeds of this project were planted under the care and encouragement of Wlad Godzich, and Hunter Bivens, Kitty Millet, and Vilashini Cooppan helped me to bring it to its final fruition. There was a long period of time when the pandemic and other life events made it seem untenable that I would ever see this dissertation through to completion. Thank you to Hunter for disabusing me of that mindset and for setting me back on track with sound, thoughtful, and generous advisement many times over, to Kitty for helping me to incorporate the wealth of Jewish mystical philosophy into my readings, and to Vilashini for posing the questions that guided my research toward a wider scope of intimacy. Thank you to Wlad for bringing me into this weird field of emergent and comparative literature, and for helping me to experience the beauty of knowledge through your teaching.

Rob Tausk deserves my most profound thanks for his hospitality and for sharing his personal archives, photos, and family stories with me at exactly the right moment in my research, as I was floundering in the lacuna of Victor Tausk's burned papers. After chasing a hunch into a dead end one summer, I looked Rob up in the phone book and sent him a letter from Croatia with the silly hope that he might respond and direct me to a better library or even a single book that I had overlooked. Indeed, his own archive of family materials at his home, where he and his wife Marijke hosted me, and the further materials from Martha Tausk née Frisch's meticulously maintained archives, which Rob had only recently donated

to the IISG in Amsterdam, formed the basis of my understanding of Victor Tausk's life and provided the leads I needed for the steps yet to come. Thanks to these materials and the new paths they forged, I later returned to the Balkans to confirm the hunch I'd first had: that Victor Tausk had published modernist literary work under a pseudonym during his early years. Bringing together Victor's family history and literary publications with his psychoanalytic cases has so shaped this project, I cannot imagine what form it would otherwise have taken. I can only hope that my small contribution to the text written around Rob's grandfather Victor is worthy of his generous spirit.

Funding for this project came from several sources: I am indebted to the Andrew Vincent White and Florence Wales White Graduate Student Scholarship for Medicine & Humanities, which allowed me to relocate to Berlin and work full-time on this dissertation in that first year. Thank you also to the UCSC Literature Department, the UCSC Graduate Student Union, and the Austrian Studies Association for funding my travels to far-flung archives and conferences where my research on Victor's work could be presented, honed, and enriched.

My warmest thanks to fellow members of the ICLA Research Committee on Religions, Ethics, and Literature with whom I collaborated and met at many such conferences. Likewise, the IKKM Princeton-Weimar Summer School for Media Studies provided precious time, space, and camaraderie needed to facilitate deeper discussions of media and its entanglements, and I am grateful to have benefited there and elsewhere from discussions with colleagues including Jessica Ruffin—the only person who has ever made me excited to read Schopenhauer—and Dominik Zechner, whose insightful critiques and whose Schmähs are without

parallel. Thanks as well to the Friedrich Schlegel Graduiertenschule für literaturwissenschaftliche Studien for hosting an energizing summer conference on “Genre Trouble” and later for welcoming me as a visiting scholar for a year, during which time I was able to workshop the first chapter of this project and benefit from the advisement of Irmela Marei Krüger-Fürhoff as well as the feedback of my friend and colleague Astrid Hansen-Øst in our weekly writing group.

I received feedback on the early workings of this dissertation and the concepts I explore here in several of my courses at UC Santa Cruz. A draft of what later became Chapter Five’s analysis of Tausk’s “The Faith of the Fathers” was written in a Feminist Science Studies course led by Karen Barad, which greatly helped me to find my bearings in a more complex understanding of space-time and human relationships with and within it. My project was sustained and developed in many ways through the connections and conversations I had with dear colleagues at Santa Cruz—Rebekkah Dilts, Erin Ellison, Elana Santana, Johanna Isaacson, Shawna Vesco, Laura Martin, Tara Thomas, Cathy Thomas, Tim Willcuts, Evelien Geerts, Dylan Davis, Kara Stone, Kenan Behzat Sharpe, Whitney DeVos, Maya Gonzalez, and Chris Chitty—I am so lucky to have shared time and space with you and to have learned from you. Moreover, I would be remiss not to mention the invaluable aid that the staff of the UCSC Literature Department provided to me at crucial moments in the extension and completion of my degree, most notably Carson Dance, Janina Larenas, and Amy Tessier.

Numerous librarians and archivists facilitated my access to rare and out-of-print journals and books, personal documents, and handwritten materials over the

course of my research, particularly at the International Institute of Social History (ISSG) and the National and University Library of Zagreb. HathiTrust granted digital access to out-of-print books during the pandemic which I might otherwise not have been able to use.

This project likewise took an unexpected turn into a new language, and I was lucky to find support in its acquisition from a talented group of teachers. Hvala puno to Fatima, Dženana and other teachers at Udruženje za jezik i kulturu Lingvisti, who welcomed me so graciously in Sarajevo, helped me to kindle an intimacy with the language of Victor Tausk's early poetry, and gave me the confidence and context to venture into my own amateur translations.

Thank you to my mother and my sister, forever my first home, and to Juan, for his enduring and sustaining companionship through so many seasons and cities, for growing with me and for becoming my family all during the years I have been at work on this project.

Finally, I dedicate the completion of this dissertation to my daughter Margot, who has cast so many former abstractions into an astounding and practical clarity for me in such a short amount of time. As we encounter the world and language together, I begin to understand the gravity of setting things, words, and time into an order that was once largely theoretical. Thank you for drawing me into your world. You are my truest teacher in labor and love.

DEDICATION

*for*

MARGOT

## Introduction

Thinking difference is a way of listening to the movement, not of the concept but of that which is emerging, to what Nietzsche called the “innocence of becoming.”

Wlad Godzich, *The Culture of Literacy*

Victor Tausk is a name often elided from the history of psychoanalysis, yet the traces of his contributions can be found in some of the most prevalent areas of psychoanalytic discourse to date—topics that speak to an increasingly global consciousness, of diverse and fragmentary experiences, of trauma and a troubled sense of belonging to a group or even to one’s own self. Moreover, Tausk’s work speaks beyond the siloed confines of a purely psychoanalytic realm; recently his writings overwhelmingly appear in conversation with media studies and technology<sup>1</sup>, for the apt reason that he wrote beyond his own time, with an imaginative capacity for the emergence of new things in the psyche and in the world.

Tausk’s name and reputation are consistently overshadowed by his teacher Sigmund Freud, a man who played both mentor and foil in Tausk’s career and his later life. In attempting to bring to light Tausk’s great achievements in his writing, his rhetoric, and his work with patients, it becomes clear that no matter how much one would like to disabuse readers of a view of Tausk as only ever in context with Freud and the doomed intimacy of their relationship, it is impossible to extract his story from their dynamic, which was a deeply penetrating dialectic of Master and Student, Father and wayward Son, Tradition or Suppression and an internally fomenting Heresy. Their dynamic is a knot that tightens the more one pulls away,

and so I have attempted to loosen it thus by drawing nearer to the crux of that bond, to see what it is made of and from that place draw Tausk's own unique threads of thought out.

This dissertation is thus follows a framework similar to Tausk's own rhetorical style, tracing the edges of his life first through the story of the establishment of psychoanalysis right before Tausk entered the field, then through the story of his family of origin—particularly his father—and the communities in which Tausk first emerged as a writer and thinker, before entering Tausk's own adult life and the rich offerings of his case studies and literary writing. After drawing close to the relational and material entanglements with which Tausk wrestled in his private life, I expand into his writing from a more intimate point of view. From here, I tease out the strategies, philosophies, and genres that Tausk used in building his own unique oeuvre, which demonstrates a dialogue between literary and psychoanalytic writing in and of itself.

This dissertation is presented as an intellectual biography of a lost figure in the history of psychoanalysis and Central Eastern literature and thought, centered on Tausk's role at the nexus of psychoanalysis, philosophy, and Jewish and Eastern European tradition and modernity. As such, it is a multifaceted project of biography, intellectual history, and literary analysis that takes many turns through the material roots of psychoanalysis to understand how the literary and psychoanalysis are woven from the same cloth. Though the practice of psychoanalysis may no longer hold its former gravity in the face of current psychotherapeutic standards, Freud's work remains considerably authoritative in the disciplined study of literature and media (if not common-sense, pop-psych

understandings of human behavior, as noticed in the quotidian use of terms like “daddy issues,” “narcissism,” or “Freudian slips,” which languish in the psychic structure Freud promoted). The tenacity of psychoanalysis in such cases may appear fruitful to those at home in the economy of Freud’s grand narratives, but the prized situation of the bourgeois European family as an original site from which culture and sexuality spring and into which they are inevitably, recursively funneled not only presupposes a particular, ideal subject to then be universally re-imposed; it refuses the possibility of human experience as a continuous process of articulation. Freud’s psychoanalysis thus dooms its subjects to recursive or totalized modes of knowing that are enforced upon the in/dividual or community from an assumed authority of biological determinism. Furthermore, Freud’s framework assumes a “psychical energy model,” as British child psychiatrist and psychoanalyst John Bowlby later called it, gleaned from the nineteenth century thermodynamic models which are predicated upon closed energy systems with chronological processes of expenditure (13-14). In an attempt to legitimize his analysis as a science, Freud had sought to conform his psychological practice to that which he found to be the best science of his time; he drew his psychical model from his teacher, physiologist Ernst von Brücke, who had himself adapted the first law of thermodynamics—the conservation of energy—put forward by physicist Hermann von Helmholtz and applied it to the lives of organisms as energy systems (Bowlby 16).

An obsession with influence also played a large role in Freud’s thinking throughout his career and in his personal interactions. Freud’s desire for allegiance from his students and colleagues meant that those whose work challenged this

narrative modality or who had, so to speak, “influences” on him in any way deemed disruptive were to be expelled from his immediate circle, effectively cultivating the legacy of psychoanalysis in the master’s image and obscuring the contributions of other psychoanalysts of the time whose work hints to a way out of Freud’s bourgeois cul-de-sac and its exhaustive, chronologically contained scientific model.

Freud’s student Victor Tausk was one such analyst, and his work, though it continues to be relatively unknown to medical and literary readership alike, unfolds as new material emerges to prove its enduring relevance. As a former protégé of Freud’s whom Freud kept at an increasing distance over the course of their relationship, Tausk is reduced in most heretofore accounts to a lurid, biographical footnote mentioning either his romantic affairs or his suicide. Yet Tausk’s writing forged valuable new pathways in the largely neglected areas of ego boundaries and identity formation, essential to understanding psychic states of fragmentation such as those of schizophrenia. In contrast to Freud’s model from thermodynamic physics, Tausk’s research works through a networked and quantum approach. His work on schizophrenia (a realm of psychology into which most Viennese psychoanalysts would not tread) enters a subjective space between analyst and patient that subtly agitates the power dynamic so clearly established in Freud’s narratives, if only by supposing that such a mental state could have a logic or language of its own in the first place. His writing enters a field of imaginative experimentation that relies neither upon the physical or biological trappings nor the Eurocentric ideologies of Humanism that serve as Freud’s intellectual anchors. Regardless of the difficulties Tausk encountered during his own lifetime and the

reputation that obscured his name postmortem, his work holds a future that takes psychoanalytic inquiry—and the disciplines that follow it—out of its own recursive loop and into worlds of difference.

My project in this dissertation is accomplished in two mutually reinforcing parts, which I organize in the following way. The first half of this project, Chapters One through Three, cover in detail Tausk's biography and the textual material from which it is constituted. Chapters Four and Five then provide close readings of Tausk's most inventive case studies and one short story to consider the diversity of his work and the threads that connect it as a whole. My most obvious goal with this project is to bring Tausk out of his present quasi-obscure and thus bring to light a more comprehensive biography of Tausk as it connects with his philosophical and political contributions. Following this, I aim to prove that when the psychoanalytic approach so often applied in literary scholarship is freed from Freud's thermodynamic scientificity, it can offer much in the way of new thought to contemporary literary discussions. To reconsider psychoanalysis and that upon which it acts in terms of Tausk's contributions offers readership a technology of thought that attends to differences without assuming them to be static or teleologically oriented. Although the given systems of thought through which we as readers come to know the world may appear at first to be causally and inextricably linked, the introduction of thinkers like Tausk may not only bring new ways of reading and knowing to ongoing literary, philosophical, and political discourse, but demonstrate alternative approaches that have long been present but left unacknowledged. This is not presented as the invention of a "Tauskian theory," as I believe such an invention would in fact undergird the very

foundations I wish to trouble. It will, however, highlight the networked and agential kinds of reading that Tausk offers and encourage a practice that draws one out toward stranger subjective encounters.

Chapter One sets the scene of the Viennese psychoanalytic community at the time of Tausk's entrance to provide a context of intellectual history to this project. Beginning with an overview of cultural, historical, and medical developments that had already been incorporated into Freud's and his colleagues' thinking, I focus on four key themes of psychoanalytic discourse that would provide Tausk with his intellectual pathways in medicine: the study of the nerves and neuroses; the importance of sexuality (particularly in its early, formative stages) and its relationship with perversion, creativity, or mental retreat; the psychology of individual personalities, of groups, and the importance of mythological figures; and subconscious drives, dreams, delusions, and other partially conscious or dissociative states. This contextual survey of ideas via publications and historical analysis aims to orient and ground the reader before engaging with the interpersonal and theoretical conflicts between Tausk and Freud and their importance in the following chapters.

Chapter Two provides an early biography of Tausk, from his life with his family of origin until his entry into Freud's school in 1909. I note here Tausk's relationship with his father, Herman, and delve into Herman's biography and political writings on Jews and other minorities within the Balkans. Herman's publications and connections exposed Victor to a rich cultural milieu as well as a wide array of cultural and political material that nurtured Victor's intellectual development as a young writer, and I take time to document it here. I also consider

conflicting evidence on the family's practice of Judaism or their cultural attitude toward Jewishness and the ways in which these factors may have affected Victor's work. The Tausk family was not traditionally religious, and Victor Tausk's relationship to his own Jewishness is not unlike that of many emancipated Jews of his time—neither abashed nor religiously adherent, navigating an historically new understanding of Jewishness outside of religious Law. The majority of Tausk's writing does not stand apart as explicitly Jewish, but one may find that his guiding sensitivity to difference and alienation would have owed much to his being raised in an itinerant, German-speaking Jewish family in various parts of an empire—Žilina, Sarajevo, Zagreb, among others—that turned toward Vienna as a cultural beacon yet remained unintelligible to Vienna in their difference.

Chapter Two also brings to light early the writing that Victor Tausk published under a pseudonym, writing which both situates him in a critical role in Balkan literary modernism and brings into greater context political attitudes that would surface decades later in his psychoanalytic writing. As Vladoje Slovačić, Tausk published poetry and a literary treatise on modernism that takes to task literature created in the form of sentimental and nationalist objects. I take his vehement rejection of this corruption of literary writing as representative not only of Tausk's attitude toward literature but of his politics overall, for we see an attitude of openness to what emerges rather than what nationalist or religious doctrines say "should be" in his literary publications, an attitude that would surface in his practice in later psychoanalytic case studies. His writing under the Slovačić pseudonym is a key to understanding so much of his complex body of work, and yet it has so far only been discussed within the context and confines of

Croatian literature. This project aims to bring the writing Tausk published as Slovačić into conversation with his later psychoanalytic studies to see how he channeled this early literary approach throughout the larger body of his work.

Finally, Chapter Two attempts to assemble a picture of Tausk by way of the scraps and fragmentary reflections we have left of him through the writings of others. As Tausk requested that his papers all be burned after his death, the only documents that survive him other than his own publications are to be found in the textual traces of his interactions with others—correspondence, journal entries, and literary impressions. Thus, I turn to his father’s publications, family archives, correspondence with his wife Martha, and a roman-à-clef by Grete Meisel-Hess to reconstitute a view of Tausk from several angles that might serve as a place-marker for the lacuna of his missing papers. I end this chapter by evaluating the apparent effects of his personal and political relationships on his psychoanalytic practice and setting the scene for a discussion of his relationship with Freud.

My third chapter covers in depth the years Tausk spent as Freud’s protégé, the differences in their class orientations, and their final, irresolvable rift. In 1909, at the age of 30, Tausk contacted Sigmund Freud and returned to Vienna to work under the renowned analyst at Freud’s invitation. There, Tausk was finally able to study neurology, earning his medical degree in 1914. Among his colleagues Tausk was somewhat of an outlier in that he trained not just as a psychoanalyst but as a psychiatrist, working with patients with more extreme mental disturbances than the typical neurotic analysand. Tausk’s most compelling psychoanalytic writing would be born out of his work with patients in such states.

This chapter also works through the journal entries and correspondence of Tausk's colleague Lou Andreas-Salomé during the period of time in which she and Tausk maintained an intimate relationship and, for many years after, a long-distance friendship. As in Chapter Two, I rely upon Salomé's personal writing to get closer to Tausk's thoughts, interpersonal conflicts, and the philosophers on whom he drew when he was developing his framework as a psychoanalyst. Thanks to Salomé's journals, we find clear evidence to buttress the Nietzschean and Spinozist influences apparent in Tausk's work, and documentation of literary work and translations with which Tausk was occupied at the time. Her journals likewise provide a window into Freud's ambivalent attitude toward Tausk, as Freud confided in her his own concerns that Tausk was dangerous to his legacy.

Tausk's relationship with Freud is examined here for the extraordinary and doomed intimacy that fueled it. Freud wanted 'sons' who would carry on and disseminate his tradition, and Tausk was eager to be chosen as a scion. Freud recognized in Tausk an incredible intelligence and determination, but the speed with which Tausk metabolized and produced work frightened Freud and agitated within him a paranoia that Tausk might supersede him. Freud thus kept Tausk at a careful and increasing distance as time went on, which ultimately played some part in Tausk's sense of despair at the end of his life. Chapter Three concludes with the abrupt and overdetermined end of Tausk's life and traces the afterlife of his work. Freud's extreme ambivalence toward Tausk in life is repeated in his treatment of Tausk and his work postmortem. It seems that Freud would have liked to bury Tausk so well with his lengthy obituary that no one would turn back

to revisit him. Freud's attempts to close the door on Tausk and his work, however, were unsuccessful.

The second half of this project shifts from biographical research and the foregrounding of intellectual history into close readings of Tausk's work. In my fourth chapter, I begin my analysis with two of Tausk's war studies, "On the Psychology of the War Deserter" and "On the So-called War Psychoses." Delivered first as lectures to his colleagues and published in the same year, these studies function as twin investigations of soldiers' psychological states, and they speak to the wider social problems of a heterogenous empire that does not allow for the equal legibility of all subjects. Tausk formulates a nuanced approach to transcultural treatment in these lectures which resonates with and indeed has influenced the development of ethnopsychiatric approaches to traumatized patients several decades after his death. These studies demonstrate the political investment that Tausk brought to the treatment of his patients as they are works of advocacy for the lives of his soldier patients. This in itself makes clear a divergence from Freud philosophically and politically. I attend to Tausk's formulation of the psyche it relates to class and family, the ways in which he harnesses Freud's concepts and familial structures in the interest of this advocacy. These studies are likewise illustrative of Tausk's unique and creative divergence from Freud in that they clearly integrate his rhetorical training from his former career as a jurist and bring his stance to the forefront of his work rather than attempting to efface himself from it.

Chapter Five expands upon the rhetorical and philosophical talent Tausk displays in his war studies and considers further genres and modes of thought that

Tausk incorporated into his oeuvre. The beginning of this chapter is dedicated to Tausk's final and most popular study, "On the Emergence of the 'Influencing Apparatus' in Schizophrenia." Tausk's written treatment of his subjects follows a commitment to difference, and this is perhaps nowhere so clear as in his analysis of Fräulein Natalija A., who is presented here as a singular case study rather than offered as a contribution to a larger typology. The Influencing Apparatus as it appears in Natalija A.'s experience of herself is an organless, electrically powered double that controls her body and mind from afar, becoming increasingly inhuman as her alienation progresses. Natalija suffers, according to Tausk's reading, from weak ego boundaries, and her ability to distinguish herself from the other objects of the world is diminished to such a state that she retreats into herself as one in an early stage of infancy. Her re-emergence into the world is thwarted by those around her who would like to redirect her libidinal energy toward themselves, as it is by the tenuous global political scene in which her emergence is set. I work through Kafka's secular mysticism as a companion in Tausk's case study, bringing Natalija's apparatus together with the apparatus of Kafka's "In the Penal Colony." The mystical element that emerges in both Tausk's and Kafka's work provides a counterbalance to the insufferable oppression of the Law and the bureaucratic structures of the empire. Tausk's study of Natalija's influencing shows how psychoanalysis can engage with phenomenological difference. The study exits the confines of a Freudian system relegated to an irreversible linear structure, a system which would abandon Natalija in an unintelligible state, and instead urges us to conceive of the personal and the political as equally foundational to the development of the self. In this way, Tausk's study provides a guide for

psychoanalysis to face emergent articulations of knowledge and states of being without reducing them to the already known.

In the sections to follow, I consider the importance of a secular, literary mysticism and the use of the genre of the grotesque in Tausk's work by reading two seemingly disparate selections from his body of work, "The Faith of the Fathers" and "Husein Brko." "The Faith of the Fathers" reconnects the Jewish aspects of Tausk's biography with his psychoanalytic practice and demonstrates a profound but subtly expressed turn from Freud and the Law of tradition. Through "The Faith of the Fathers" I again trace the secular, literary mysticism that we find in Kafka, and I read Tausk in light of Kafka to highlight these findings.

Husein Brko, a fictional piece in which Tausk unites disparate aspects of Balkan lore and culture in a grotesque anti-Oedipal hero, showcases Tausk's literary work as a space for creative experimentation with concepts and material drawn from various channels of influence. I examine the use of the grotesque as a genre for engaging with difference in a way that denies the unity of the sublime and instead looks askance at unifying narratives by agitating within in the reader high and low affective responses at once. "Husein Brko," much like "The Faith of the Fathers," troubles Freudian repression and patriarchal tradition. In repression's place we find a lawlessness that defers to chance rather than fate.

This project concludes by considering where else Tausk's work has gone in recent years, and where else it can take us still, by asking what literary studies would be with or through Tausk. Tausk's case study of Natalija A. in particular has been taken up in recent discussions of media and technology, even in artistic interpretations of the "Influencing Apparatus" study. It would seem that his work

seeded openings that he could not have predicted, precisely because of the non-recursive approach he took. Here I look to the differences between the space-time framework of Freud's thinking and that of Tausk's as a key to their philosophical conflicts. The experience of space-time within a linear thermodynamic system, as in Freud's approach, is one of contiguity and cyclical chronology—an experience, in other words, culminating in totality. Tausk's framework, open to emergent forms rather than static ones, does not refuse an engagement with space but rather considers spatial relations outside of the binds of chronological or contiguous causality. Space is not to be determined by distance or geography in this case but according to interrelationships. Returning to my earlier considerations of Tausk's Jewishness and its impact on his course of thought, I will imagine this relational system in terms of Jewish anagogical exegeses in which the connections between words are formed by less apparent resemblances than the rules of everyday causality may allow, and space may shift through an anagrammatic reorganization of signifiers. By reevaluating the place of psychoanalysis in its many spheres of influence by way of Tausk, I believe that literature, attitudes toward gender and sexuality, and political being can be radically reenergized and thought into new forms and futures. The danger that Freud sensed in Tausk's work may finally be harnessed and followed into its most interesting of places.

## Chapter One: The Emergence of Psychoanalysis

The theory of repression is the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests.

Sigmund Freud, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement”

If repression has indeed been the fundamental link between power, knowledge, and sexuality since the classical age, it stands to reason that we will not be able to free ourselves from it except at a considerable cost: nothing less than a transgression of laws, a lifting of prohibitions, an irruption of speech, a reinstating of pleasure within reality, and a whole new economy in the mechanisms of power will be required.

Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*

Hamlet did not have an Oedipus Complex, but Freud certainly had a Hamlet Complex ...

Harold Bloom, *The Western Canon*

### *A Novel Practice*

The emergence of Viennese psychoanalysis at the turn of the twentieth century was in many ways the result of an encounter between the scientific discipline involved in symptomatology and diagnostic pathology on the one hand, and the creative impulses of a European artistic tradition on the other. And while its birth clearly drew on past developments from both these scientific and artistic lines, the pursuit of the two in tandem, in an attempt to benefit and illuminate the modern psyche, made psychoanalysis a novel practice—most notably for how it reframed symptomatology as a whole. The body, according to this framework, could no longer be read along earlier lines of diagnostics that sought to measure its outward presentation quantitatively or qualitatively against one standard model of health. Rather, the nervous patient could be read according to formulations

closer to a literary narration, in which the imagination offered interpretive symbols and the body's seemingly irrational behavior in fact pointed to a hidden truth in her or his experiential story.<sup>2</sup> Behind this more obvious conjunction, however, lay a third piece—one that had molded psychiatry from its first moments—that of the law. Legal discourse before and after European nation formation remained an inextricable root to the evaluation of mental health, and notably drew upon moralistic impressions of the upper classes as a key component to this process. Thus, medicine, law, and literary culture came to operate as interlinking apparatus during the moments of psychoanalysis's greatest early developments.

As readers in the twenty-first century, it is nearly impossible to disentangle Freud's legacy from his role as a colleague and his body of thought. These aspects of Freud have fused together over time to the point that his life and his work are often understood as different aspects of the same object. Tausk, however, joining Freud's school in 1909, experienced each of these aspects of his teacher distinctly. Freud's role in the world of psychoanalysis into which Tausk entered thus benefits from being traced according to each of these lines, as I present in the following pages.

In this chapter I will lay the groundwork for Victor Tausk's arrival into this realm born of science, literature, and law—three languages in which Tausk himself was fluent. By looking at psychoanalysis as it was first kindled by Freud and the scientific, literary, and legal roots upon which Freud drew, we can better understand the state of psychoanalysis as a practice and a cultural milieu by the time Tausk joined Freud's circle in 1909. Freud's practice was indeed innovative

in its approach to interpreting the human psyche akin to a literary narrative, thus shifting away from quantitative measures of symptoms against a standard model of health. Yet in spite of this innovation, Freud upheld and implemented his own standards of the normative psyche, rooted in a thermodynamic-turned-biological structure, Western myth, strict notions of gender roles and sexual practices, and bourgeois familial structures. The greatest conflicts of psychoanalysis, both from outside critiques and internally within Freud's circle, arise with regard to the assumed universality of Freud's analytic framework. Moreover, Freud's practice is tethered to a neurotic subject as it is to repression, the "corner-stone," according to Freud, "on which the whole structure of psycho-analysis rests" (*SE* 14: 16). With the trauma that arose during and following the First World War, psychoanalysis would be further pressed to grapple with psychological experiences beyond neurosis. This would highlight the ways in which the heretofore Freudian configuration of psychoanalysis and understandings of the psyche fell short, and show where others might lead it through a more culturally diverse reckoning in order for it to account for subjects outside of Freud's own time and place.

In this first decade of the twentieth century, the community of psychoanalysts established in Vienna and the discourse of their still-burgeoning practice in reading the human psyche would generally revolve around four key, often overlapping, themes: 1). the study of the nerves and neuroses; 2). the importance of sexuality (particularly in its early, formative stages) and its relationship with perversion, creativity, or mental retreat; 3). the psychology of individual personalities, of groups, and the importance of mythological figures; and 4). subconscious drives, dreams, delusions, and other partially conscious or

dissociative states. These themes were formative to psychoanalytic work to come, as Freud would later reflect on the latter half of that first decade as a watershed moment in his 1925 publication of *Selbstdarstellung: Schriften der Geschichte der Psychoanalyse* (*An Autobiographical Study* in the Standard Edition). Freud's early years in constructing his system of analysis were marked by a general sense of obscurity and isolation; Freud had no followers after parting ways with his former colleague Breuer, *Die Traumbedeutung* [*The Interpretation of Dreams*] had scarcely received reviews in technical journals after its publication, and he recounted instances of having been met with an attitude of skepticism or antagonism by colleagues who hadn't even read his work (*SE* 20: 48).<sup>3</sup> Yet over the course of that first decade, Freud would enjoy a slowly but steadily growing recognition in his field. He began to attract some students in Vienna, gained attention from Swiss colleagues by 1906, and saw the formation of the International Psychoanalytical Association by 1910, though the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society remained respectively small at only twenty-eight members in early 1909, with far fewer attending regular meetings (*SE* 20: 50; Roazen, *Brother Animal* 25). These lines of inquiry and the proposed psychic framework made available to early members would flourish in future years as the society grew.

In their treatment of ambulatory neurotic cases, Freud and those from his highly selective inner circle incorporated earlier work on bodily electricity, personal narrative, and hysteria into new formations of interpretation that were not necessarily congruent with a patient's outward appearance, as former related practices had been. Psychoanalysis in this way resisted the tendency toward

scientific racism and associations of sexual behavior (e.g.: homosexuality) with criminal predisposition that other practices of its time embraced.<sup>4</sup> This is neither to say, however, that patterns of correspondence between the body and the mind were not deduced based on the case studies of Freud and his colleagues, nor to pass facile absolutions over the early psychoanalytic community for the places in their work in which biases of race, sex, and class were still lodged. From Freud's early (albeit later renounced) interest in mesmerism<sup>5</sup> and the influence of Charcot's<sup>6</sup> hysteria ward at the Pitié-Salpêtrière, to Theodor Meynert's<sup>7</sup> studies of the brain, to Josef Breuer's work on catharsis, nervous reflexology, "the talking cure,"<sup>8</sup> and Otto Bauer's<sup>9</sup> theorization of culture, the collective of ideas and psychoanalytic notions both preceding and in circulation during the first decade of the twentieth century held a tenuous relationship between a patient's body and mind or affects. The most challenging component in the establishment of psychoanalytic theory, however, was neither its understanding of the differences between body and mind nor its attempt to find correlations between these two aspects but, rather, its perpetual flirtation with universality. Thus, the relationship between psychoanalysis and the universal, as well as its variations or points of resistance, becomes an instructive red thread when tracing the development of early psychoanalytic work. For while Freud and many of his colleagues had a vested interest in the denial of a singular expression of body and mind, Freud's work would ultimately defer to biological determinism and a pattern of culturally Eurocentric universalism that continues to confine his work today. In part due to the fact that his analyses function on a thermodynamic model that assumes a similar structure in the human psyche, in part due to his reliance upon of Western

myths (e.g. Oedipus Rex, Eros and Thanatos), Freud's work traps itself as it does its analyzed subject in a contained model that cannot account for difference. This means that the situation of the Freudian patient precedes her or him as that of the ever-guilty party. How did a practice that began with the denial of one sort of biological determinism end up the prisoner of another? Where else could this practice have led, if not to Freud's strict conclusions? By reviewing the scientific developments, publications, and notable figures present in the atmosphere of Vienna's early psychoanalytic scene, we may trace the importance of these four main themes (nerves, sexuality, individual and group psychology, and the subconscious) in order to then understand their significance when later practitioners worked either to disseminate or to challenge them. Though Freud may have taken them in one particular direction, these themes likewise served as the intellectual pathways for those who would later counter the domesticated or reductive approaches practiced by their colleagues within this discourse.

### *Nerves and Neuroses*

Nerves and neuroses were of particular importance to medical study in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The concentrated interest in neurotic disorder as articulated through Freud's and his colleagues' case studies was clearly shaped by the late nineteenth-century medical advances in neurology and psychiatry in Vienna as it was the Nancy school of hypnosis-centric psychotherapy and the hysteria ward of Jean-Martin Charcot, under whom Freud briefly studied.<sup>10</sup> In terms of scientific and mechanical development, new modes of clinical experimentation that harnessed electricity and magnets were employed

at the Pitié-Salpêtrière, as was hypnosis. Medical practices involving magnetism and electricity, of course, were not revolutionary in and of themselves; the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century physician Franz Anton Mesmer had developed his curative practices around a theory of *Lebensmagnetismus* (“Vital Magnetism,” often historically translated as “Animal Magnetism”).<sup>11</sup> The use of magnets and of electricity, however, had been revolutionized by the early twentieth century in application.<sup>12</sup> Adjacent to technologically enhanced neurological studies at this time were the medical inventions of X-rays and high-powered microscopes, which, though not inherently related to the study of the nervous system, suddenly made the human body more porous, more visible, and out of scale to the medical observer’s eye.<sup>13, 14</sup>

Freud’s foray into medical study began under the influence of both a strong attraction to the theories of Darwin and the tutelage of the renowned physiologist Ernst von Brücke. Proving himself to be exceptionally talented in anatomy, he began to work under the brain anatomist and professor of psychiatry Theodor Meynert at the Laboratory for Cerebral Anatomy in 1883, where he became well respected as a neuropathologist for his precise diagnoses (Sulloway 24). Freud’s relationship to biology seems a tenuous one. On the one hand, he excelled in biology and anatomy as a young scientist, and it served as a main departure point for his work both intellectually and practically. As Sander Gilman points out, Freud was “heir [...] to the crusading medical materialism and biophysics of his youthful heroes,” for whom “doing science meant translating behavior into biology, consciousness into neurology, random experience into objective laws” (238). Training with teachers such as Brücke, Meynert, and

Breuer, Freud “was eager to frame his concepts in terms of a proper science” and so he “borrowed and elaborated a model that had been built with these concepts by [the physicist Gustav] Fechner” (Bowlby 15). Fechner’s is a thermodynamic model of energy and entropy, a linear and irreversible tendency toward exhaustion, and it maps quite felicitously onto Freud’s model of the psyche with its libidinous and death drives. Thermodynamics can be most essentially scientifically defined as a doctrine of energy and entropy, “two quantities that are engaged in a universal competition trying to dictate the thermomechanical behavior of bodies” (Müller 5593). Whereas energy “may be called *deterministic* in that it pulls a body into potential minima offered by the body itself or by its environment, entropy tends to make a body “spread out *probabilistically* over all possible configurations” (Müller 5593).

The psychoanalytic historian Frank Sulloway argues that the comparison of the thermodynamic model to Freud’s own is too simplistic, and it does not account for the nuances of Freud’s contributions.

Several psychoanalytic writers have not been troubled by this distinction between animate and inanimate forms of the stability principle and have sought to equate Freud’s death instinct, through Fechner’s inanimate principle of absolute stability, with the second law of thermodynamics (e.g. Alexander, 1921; Bernfeld and Feitelberg, 1930; Lichtenstein, 1935; and Saul, 1958). [...]

Unfortunately, a major difficulty is that, in terms of the second law of thermodynamics, Freud’s death instinct ceases to describe a vital process, as he himself had clearly envisioned it. (Sulloway 406)

Sulloway counts three main factors that distinguish Freud’s model from a “beefed-up” version of Fechner’s, “the compulsion to repeat, the proclivity of life to restore previous states on a supposedly intellectual basis, and the overall ‘vitalistic historicism’ that inspired Freud’s thinking” (406). But in making this distinction,

Sulloway in fact elides the nuances of the thermodynamic model that could account for repetition and restoration. Helmholtz, for example, whose work is likewise fundamental to the thermodynamic model, argued that the universe “might also replenish itself” on a grander scale through the movements of celestial bodies (Rabinbach 162). Like Freud’s model, the entropy of the universe can be iterative as it is exhaustive.

Certainly, Freud sought to base his model in the seemingly sound foundations of a physical or biological science. On the other hand, Freud differed from many colleagues early on in his studies as he found the uncovering of motivations of human behavior to be far more intriguing than the medical cause of a particular mental or neurological ailment, which he believed instead to have biochemical roots (Bowlby 15). This tendency contrasted with that of early colleagues like Wagner-Jauregg who found studies of disposition to be significant (Dalzell 200).<sup>15</sup> Freud’s early use of hypnosis and later free association in his treatments veered sharply away from the practices of his early medical peers, demonstrating a more pointed interest in overarching human narratives and desires in their strange and latent compositions.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, Freud’s early fascination with hypnosis links the formative structures of his practice to Mesmer. Mesmer’s theory of the influence of tides on terrestrial bodies and the possibility of the creation of artificial tides in humans would surface in Freud’s own theories of influence and urges within his patients.

Freud’s stay with Charcot stimulated his interest in hypnosis, as Charcot had largely redeemed the practice within the medical community of France and beyond. Mesmer’s own practices had broken away from a tradition of exorcism

and had been received with intense skepticism in the medical community for nearly a century (Ellenberger 57). Regarded as scientifically unfounded and twice formally condemned by the *Académie des Sciences*, hypnotic trance was only granted thoughtful reconsideration as a medical practice after Charcot's detailed and highly lauded 1882 defense of its structure as observed in his ward (Ellenberger 90). While working at the Vienna General Hospital, Freud was awarded a six-month leave of absence on fellowship, which allowed for him to study under Charcot at the Salpêtrière from October 1885 until February 1886. The period was clearly marked by a fascination with Charcot, his ideas and practices.<sup>17</sup>

Charcot's lectures were the first to instill in Freud the belief that more than one state of consciousness could coexist within an individual and, moreover, that this could occur without one state having any apparent knowledge of the other or others.<sup>18</sup> Traces of Charcot are easy to locate in Freud's early work. For example, Freud preserved the term "*double conscience*" in the original French in his 1893 paper, "Über den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phänomene" [On the Psychological Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena] drawing from Charcot's medical vocabulary (*SE* 2: 12). He credited Charcot in his own work on the psychogenic cause of traumatic hysterical paralyses, though Freud's study was the first to distinguish between hysterical paralyses and organic paralyses, arguing that the anatomical distributions of the latter had little to no governance over the former—a discernment that his earlier talents in anatomy afforded him (Sulloway 35). However, for as much as Freud drew on Charcot's treatment of hysteria and seemed to personally revere him as a doctor, he also used Charcot's work as a

departure point for his own, contradictory theory of hysteria's source. While Charcot's methods were bold in his time, his pathological analyses were more closely aligned with the discourse of his milieu than Freud's would be; Charcot believed hysteria to be a hereditary, biological degeneration of the nerves, whereas Freud and Breuer, in their collaborative 1895 collection of studies on hysteria, would assert that the affliction was rooted in conflicts of the unconscious mind. With this crucial intervention, neurological study would pivot, in psychoanalysis, from the nervous system to the mind and its structure.

### *Turning from the Body to the Mind*

As the site of neurological study moved from the nervous body to the nervous mind, so too would attention to human sexual development drift from the patient's corporeal genitals to a figurative understanding of genital being via the narration of her or his formative sexual experiences. Freud's contribution in this early stage unmoored the mind from the body. In place of Arataeus's wandering womb and Charcot's latently degenerate mind, Freud's conception of the traumatized and sexually conflicted unconscious meant that anyone could potentially suffer from hysteria. Though it may have been somatically experienced and exhibited, hysteria occurred without a direct correlation to a biological map of the body. Sexuality would manifest, in Freud's reading, either overtly, as perversion, or discretely, as mental retreat in the form of unconscious and suppressed desire that manifested itself in other, superficially inexplicable ways.

With the 1895 publication *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud and Breuer would establish their theory of the psychic mechanism of hysterical phenomena via the

case studies of Anna O., Emmy von N., Lucie R., Katharina, and Elisabeth v. R..<sup>19</sup> Often citing the work of Charcot as well as that of a French contemporary, psychoanalyst Pierre Janet, for scientific corroboration and borrowing some of the terminology and observations Janet and Charcot had published throughout their respective writings, Freud and Breuer promoted a theory of the split between the conscious and unconscious mind that would serve as the foundation for Freud's analyses to come.<sup>20</sup> Each of the female case studies collected in this volume illustrated to the analysts the impact upon their psyches of unacknowledged trauma having to do with sexual behavior or familial care. Most importantly, Freud observed, the bodily manifestation of said trauma suggested that the mind itself was empty of anatomy and so had to express its trauma through the patient's physical body.<sup>21</sup>

"Hysteria," Freud wrote, "behaves as if anatomy did not exist or as though it had no knowledge of it" (*SE* 1: 169). This stood in contradistinction to tenets of physiology that had held so much sway in Western medicine for the centuries leading up to Freud's work. On the one hand, physiologists, having dominated the field of the study of the human body since the Renaissance, had made a clear separation between the workings of the mind and anatomy. Yet they also firmly believed that the mind and the brain's workings were essentially the selfsame cognitive system. Jean Fernel, the Renaissance physician to first coin the term "physiology," compared the difference between anatomy and physiology to that of geography and history, calling for a study of the body that paid due attention to the theater of events that had taken place: "[A]s geography should be learned well to give credibility to history, the description of the human body should be learned

well in the cause of medicine” (Fernel 179).<sup>22</sup> Physiology thus attended to the composition of the body, the role of the blood, the nervous system, digestion, respiration, and an adapted study of the humors. This attention to movement and systems in the body rather than a simple anatomical mapping of its parts may indeed seem to undergird Freud’s own approaches in psychoanalytic study. However, physiology also claimed the physical brain and its systemic activity as the seat of cognition. The brain, according to Fernel, was “the citadel and dwelling of the human mind, the abode of thoughts and reason, the wellspring and origin of movement and of every sense [...]” (Fernel 101). Here, Freud veered into radically different territory. Not only did he want to focus on the events of the psyche as opposed to those of the body, he did not find a mutually causal link between a psychic ailment like hysteria and the body’s anatomical or physiological make up. While the unconscious, Freud wrote, was “built up of a number of *agencies* or *systems* whose relations to one another are expressed in spatial terms,” this did not imply “any connection with the actual anatomy of the brain” (*SE* 20: 32). The psyche worked within its own internal grammar rather than emerging as an expression of physical conditions. For this reason, it would make perfect sense, according to a Freudian system of interpretation, to diagnose male as well as female patients with hysteria. This is exactly what Freud proceeded to do upon his return from studying under Charcot, when he was challenged by Meynert with finding a case of male hysteria. He was met with extreme skepticism and rejection from both Meynert and other conservative, elder contemporaries. He writes in his 1925 autobiographical study of one such instance.

Meynert challenged me to find some cases in Vienna similar to those which I had described and to present them before the Society. I tried to do so; but the senior physicians in whose departments I found any such cases refused to allow me to observe them or to work at them. One of them, an old surgeon, actually broke out with the exclamation: 'But, my dear sir, how can you talk such nonsense? *Hysterion (sic)* means the uterus. So how can a man be hysterical?' (SE 20: 15)

While Charcot had already introduced the concept of a male hysteria by way of traumatic hysteria, he had considered the role of trauma as one that merely activated a predisposition to hysterical illness. Trauma, among a range of other possible factors, acted as an environmental *agent provocateur*, stirring up unrest that was already latently present (Micale 498).<sup>23</sup> Freud and Breuer's 1893 paper on the Psychological Mechanism of Hysterical Phenomena, while paying obvious tribute to Charcot, marks Freud's turn away from his former master as he calls into question fundamental elements of Charcot's theoretical model. If Charcot's model allowed for acquired hysteria, then any notion of an inherited hysterical disposition would thus be undermined, even in a case in which a family shared hysterical traits. Whereas Charcot's theoretical model would claim that the delayed formation of symptoms after the shock of physical trauma was the result of a psychological incubation process having reactivated an inherited hysterical disposition, Freud and Breuer claimed the inverse. Behind all forms of hysteria, they explained, was an overarching traumatic event. For Freud this went even a step further; while Breuer considered psychic trauma the primary cause of psychopathology, Freud asserted that said trauma was one of sexual conflict.

Freud produced various examples of male hysterics (Freud's brother and himself among them) but he would later give up on the leitmotif of hysteria, characterized by traumas of childhood abuse, in favor of his myth-based Oedipus

complex, which was predicated upon the belief that unresolved sexual desire for one's parent or parents resulted in neurotic symptoms afflicting almost everyone. As Martha Noel Evans, Elaine Showalter, and Daniel Boyarin have all pointed out from their own positions of reading, hysteria was an affliction of both women and "feminized" men. The seduction theory that undergirds the manifestation of hysteria would necessarily have to account for male hysteria through an incident of male passivity, thus, feminization according to heterosexual law: "at the center of the seduction theory is a young girl seduced by the father; at the center of the Oedipus complex, there is a young boy constructing erotic fantasies about his mother" (Evans qtd. Boyarin 117). Whether or not the exchange of seduction theory for the Oedipus myth relieves psychoanalysis of a necessarily feminized male figure is still a topic of contestation. Boyarin, for example, reads Freud's act of supplanting male seduction with oedipal desire not only as one of repression but views the Oedipus model itself as a repression of homoerotic desire (129). Though Freud's early seduction theory of hysteria had been exchanged for myth by the time he had completed *The Interpretation of Dreams* at the close of the nineteenth century, various elements of that first model seem to have remained throughout his life's work. His collaborative relationship with Breuer, however, much like his other collaborative friendships with colleagues, would end shortly after their publication on hysteria.

### *Freud's Relationships and the Secret Committee*

Freud's relationships with his colleagues were marked by intensity, either in the closeness of their bond or that of the distance he took when he considered

himself betrayed, irreverently disagreed with, or otherwise influenced in a way he considered detrimental to his own thinking. Freud's early friendship with Wilhelm Fliess is representative of each of these ends of the spectrum. Fliess was an ear, nose, and throat specialist who met Freud in 1887 when he came to Vienna for postgraduate study and attended Freud's lectures on neurology at the behest of Josef Breuer. Fliess maintained a close, supportive friendship with Freud as he developed his theories of reflexive neurosis emanating from the nose (in fact, he conducted operations on Freud's nose during this time), biological cycles, and an inherent bisexuality among human beings. Letters between the two in these early years are romantic and effusive in their mutual admiration. The relationship first began to sour when, in 1895, Fliess botched an operation on a patient of Freud's.<sup>24</sup> Though Freud absolved Fliess of any wrongdoing, blaming the patient for her own "hysterical" bleeding, he referred often to the incident as represented in his anxiety dream known as "Irma's Injection" and began to see Fliess as a projection of himself that aroused dual feelings of ineptitude and envy (Grosskurth 23). Moreover, as Fliess expressed criticisms of psychoanalysis, Freud felt deeply abandoned by the friend with whom he had formerly felt a safety to openly express himself due to their mutual, unconditional admiration. Their lack of restraint in sharing with one another ideas still in their delicate, formative stages proved disastrous for Fliess when, in 1900, Freud claimed Fliess's theory of bisexuality as his own discovery, hypothesizing it to be the basis of the human psyche, and passed these ideas along to other colleagues of his, namely Swoboda and Weininger (Grosskurth 34).<sup>25</sup> Freud's response to their rift was simply to push it further toward its extreme. His deep discomfort at his dual identification with

Fliess and feeling that he had been abandoned after the loss of Fliess's once unconditional admiration resulted in his ending of the friendship after their last meeting in 1900. When recounting the friendship to later colleagues, he would describe Fliess as a paranoiac—a move that many have read as a displacement of his own guilt in lifting from Fliess's theories without giving due credit—and claimed only to have fully exorcised himself of the relationship in his interpretation of the Schreber case in 1911, believing that his analysis of Schreber's paranoia was likewise an insight into Fliess's own paranoia (Grosskurth 34-35).

A break of similar intensity would occur in 1913 between Freud and his Swiss protégé of some six years, Carl Jung. From their first meeting in 1907, Jung had resisted the kind of father-son intimacy that Freud asked of him, finding issues with the form by which one would always have to defer to the other, ever awe-struck and referential. This was followed by the disappointing revelation that Jung had had an affair with their patient Sabina Spielrein, to whom Freud admitted he was also attracted, although he absolved Jung by saying it was clearly the patient who had seduced him. Indeed, by designating Jung his intellectual heir, Freud was making the relationship one doomed to result in a rift, for the notion that he could be replaced was too frightening, and this notion was reflected in his dreams as in his interpretations of Jung's statements.<sup>26</sup> Freud feared losing his authority in the relationship as in his practice, but simultaneously saw Jung as a powerful and redemptive figure for the future of psychoanalysis. In 1910, Freud proposed the formation of the International Psychoanalytic Association, to be presided over permanently by Jung. Then 53, he had a superstitious fear of dying

at the age of 61, and he wanted most of all for the practice to succeed outside of the Jewish community. His proposal resulted in an eventual split among the psychoanalytic community, many of whom were shocked that Freud would entrust their future to a Swiss outsider, though Jung's presidency was limited to two years; Alfred Adler and his supporters resigned from the Vienna Society in 1911 (Grosskurth 41).

Freud became upset with Jung for taking off to the United States while neglecting his duties of the society, which apparently bored Jung. Jung was unpredictable, headstrong and, just as in the earlier years of their relationship, averse to occupying the role of dutiful and deferential son. He had also not changed his mind in disagreeing with Freud on the exclusively sexual basis of neurosis as Freud had once assumed he would, and Freud was deeply disturbed to hear rumors that Jung was lecturing in the United States to this effect. Freud's disappointment with Jung's resistance to fully step into the role of the son led him to insist that Jung was failing to deal with his own father-son complex and, it followed, a homosexual tendency that threatened psychosis. His act of sending Jung Daniel Paul Schreber's *Memoirs of My Nervous Illness* around this time was an apparent move to make Jung see the dangers of refusing to engage with a repressed love of the father. Moreover, this act underlined—not for the first time—that Freud's fears of being eclipsed by Fliess had been reproduced in his relationship with Jung. As with Fliess, Freud drew back his relationship with Jung. To claim that he actively severed the relationship would not be accurate, for he described the split as such to Abraham in a letter in June, 1913: "Jung ist verrückt, aber ich lege es nicht auf Trennung an, möchte ihn erst abwirtschaften lassen"

[Jung is crazy, but I am not interested in a separation, should like to let him run himself into the ground first] (*Briefwechsel* 312). Freud's approach was to create distance and discord in order to encourage the other to leave, without making moves bold enough to be traced back to a saboteur's intent on his own part. He commanded his devoted student Sandor Ferenczi and other supporters to attack Jung's theories in the newly founded *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse* [International Journal for Medical Psychoanalysis] and waited until Jung had formally broken with the psychoanalytic movement to publish his own interpretation of their philosophical differences, as well as his disagreements with Adler in "On Narcissism" (1914) and "On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement" (1914) (Grosskurth 52). Moreover, Freud's publication of *Totem and Taboo* in a series of essays from 1912 to 1913 also functioned as a veiled attack on Jung's ideas, if not an expression of Freud's own anxieties at the splintering of his once devoted society (Makari 288).<sup>27</sup>

Freud's relationships with Fliess and Jung provide readers with far more information than their superficial details. Both cases demonstrate the intensity of Freud's requests for complete and unqualified admiration, his need for control and authority in his professional relationships, his desire to sweep away the traces of outside intellectual influence in his work, and his fear of abnegation when any of these were not fully met. As a direct response to the rift between Freud and Jung, and in some respects to the apostasy of Adler and later Wilhelm Stekel, Ernest Jones proposed to Freud that they form a secret committee as a "united small body, designed like the Paladins of Charlemagne," designed in order "to guard the kingdom and policy of our master" (Freud and Jones, *Correspondence* 150). Freud

was delighted by the idea, insisting on its utmost secrecy, and proposed additional members. The first iteration of the committee, composed of Ernest Jones, Sandor Ferenczi, Otto Rank, Karl Abraham, and Hanns Sachs, first met in Vienna on May 25, 1913. Suspicion among the group was not quelled in the Secret Committee's formation. Jones cautioned Freud against Ferenczi and vice versa. At their inaugural May meeting, Ferenczi greeted Rank by asking, "I suppose you will stay loyal?" (Makari 284). Ferenczi distributed copies of his attack of Jung at the meeting, which claimed that Jung's prime interest was not in fact with psychoanalysis but in the "salvation of the Christian community" (Ferenczi qtd. in Makari 284). This effectively settled any ambiguity over Jung's allegiance among the group. Before the next meeting of the International Psychoanalytic Association, Ferenczi formed a Budapest Society in order to strengthen the Freudians by way of a voting bloc when a division between the Freudians and the Zurich contingent arose.

In his personal space, Freud poured his interest in the symbolism of relationships and alliances into physical tokens. The two rooms of Freud's study at his Vienna apartment on Berggasse 19 were filled with symbolic antiques, which he'd begun to collect in his early professional years. "My [...] old and dirty gods," he wrote to Fliess in 1889, referring to his first acquisitions, "in which you show so little interest are collaborating in [*The Interpretation of Dreams*] as paper weights" (*Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess* 363; Masson's translation).<sup>28</sup> By his death, the collection numbered some 3,000 objects, many of which depicted the heroes, gods, and other figures from antiquity that played key parts in his psychoanalytic writing—a reproduction of Ingres's *Oedipus and the Sphinx*, a

second-century BCE statuette of Eros, a carving of Thoth as a baboon, a replica bas-relief of Gradiva, Athena cast in bronze. Freud's obsession with antiquity and the collecting of artifacts went hand in hand with his sense of himself as an archeologist, excavating the layers of the human psyche to find what objects or traces of events had been buried there. This fascination with symbolic objects extended to the gifts he made to members of the newly formed secret committee; each member received an intaglio ring set with a stone whose carving depicted a figure or scene from antiquity of particular significance. To Ferenczi, he gave a ring depicting a bacchanal with three figures, likely relating to the love triangle in which Ferenczi was for many years entangled with a mother and daughter. Freud wore a ring depicting Zeus, and a ring later given to Anna Freud was carved with none other than Athena. He would give out several more over the years to new members of the committee or close friends.<sup>29</sup> Considering Freud's own wariness and the suspicion that his circle fostered, the giving of each ring would certainly symbolize Freud's benediction of the wearer as trustworthy. Though the secret nature of the Committee meant that very little regarding its practices were recorded, one can venture to guess that the form of the ring invoked both commitment, as in the giving of rings in marriage, and the wearer's own act of sealing or impressing upon the world his or her expression of Freudian psychoanalysis. Such was Freud's desire from his followers; that each would continue to mark the world according to his or her own talents, but above all according to the master's own doxa.

*Freud the Reader: Eros and Thanatos*

Considering Freud's interest in the symbolism of myth, it is here worth noting that Freud's foundational approach to pathological interpretation seems very much to be a manifestation of a time and place in which a literary tradition was valued enough to impress itself upon medical practices. His early and enduring interest in literature, and humanism generally, would have a large stake in his formulation of psychoanalysis. Freud's process of reading for the patient's repressed motivating fears and desires follows two literary frameworks common to his time: detective or crime fiction, and stories narrated by a divided protagonist or secondary first-person narrator. German-speaking readership (and, with the later advent of the televisual *Krimi*, viewership) has a richly developed history with crime narrative. Friedrich Schiller's *Der Verbrecher aus verlorener Ehre* [The Criminal of Lost Honor] (1786) and E.T.A. Hoffmann's *Das Fräulein von Scuderi* [Mademoiselle de Scuderi] (1819) are two emblematic works of German literature at the outset of the European crime fiction tradition, and many works of crime fiction in English, French, and Russian that debuted in the nineteenth century were published in German translation not long after, indicating their welcomed reception.<sup>30</sup> Though Freud notoriously kept the traces of his influences covered, his reading is in many ways analogous to the logical, measured deductions of Doyle's character Sherlock Holmes. Carlo Ginzburg and Anna Davin point to Freud's interest in the eccentric Italian art historian, Giovanni Morelli and his method of reading paintings for clues in order to test the authenticity of their ascription (10). Morelli originally published his theories in a German art history journal under a double pseudonym derived from a near-

anagram and a translation of his name, presenting the method as authored by a Russian scholar named Ivan Lermolieff and translated by a German named Johannes Schwarze (Ginzburg and Davin 7). Ginzburg and Davin connect the reasoning as well as the timing of Morelli's publications with that of Sherlock Holmes, then trace Morelli's importance to Freud around the time of his initial studies in hysteria, commenting, moreover, on the fact that Morelli, like Doyle and Freud, had been trained in medicine (12).

The gift of insight particular to a detective like Doyle's Sherlock Holmes or his American precedent, Poe's C. Auguste Dupin, is the ability to see what is hiding in plain sight. Poe famously coined the term "ratiocination" in his prototypical detective fiction,<sup>31</sup> demonstrated as Dupin's "method." Different from logical analysis, ratiocination incorporates the eighteenth-century concepts of sensibility and sense perception as a means for gathering information, attending to the sense of the self and that outside of the self as known and unknown realms that, through Dupin's method, may be modified. In order to see what the police overlook, Dupin employs the faculty of the imagination and is thus able to place himself in the role of the criminal. Poe's "The Purloined Letter" (1844) famously tells of how Dupin uses this method in order to find the eponymous letter hung from a dirty ribbon and displayed on the wall in the home of the thief. In his seminar on the story, Jacques Lacan famously reads the letter as a character whose simultaneous absence/presence encompasses the very uniqueness of the signifier itself, stating at the outset that "the repetition automatism (*Wiederholungszwang*) finds its basis in what we have called the insistence of the signifying chain" (Lacan 39). "For the signifier," explains Lacan, "is a unit in its very uniqueness,

being by nature symbol only of an absence. Which is why we cannot say of the purloined letter that, like other objects, it must be *or* not be in a particular place but that unlike them it will be *and* not be where it is, wherever it goes” (54). So, too, in Freud’s work, does the displacement of the signifier lead the subject down the path of action, or perhaps of fate. More than a literary conceit, Poe’s writing discloses a philosophical moment in which the line between the visible and the invisible is being modified, and this speaks to the world of the psyche which Freud in turn would plumb. By way of deduction and sensibility, Dupin and Holmes are able to interpret signs still invisible to the inept police, leading to the single and irrefutable cause of the results that seem, in the eyes of others, a chaotic mess.

Furthermore, their stories are framed and recounted by a secondary first-person narrator, who affectively or sympathetically models for the reader a sense of awe and discovery over the course of the great detective’s arrangement of chaos into meaning—the *fabula*, or chronology of events, arranged by *sjuzhet*, or narrative manipulation. Mirroring this process, Freud’s investigation of the neurotic mind seeks out semiotically cloaked anxieties and desires. The presumption that *fabula* will necessarily precede *sjuzhet* has been challenged, it bears noting, by literary theorists including Jonathan Cullers and Peter Brooks. Brooks summarizes Cullers’s argument as follows in *Reading for the Plot*:

In an essay called “Story and Discourse in the Analysis of Narrative,” Jonathan Culler has argument that we need to recognize that narrative proceeds according to a “double logic,” in that at certain problematic moments story events seem to be produced by the requirements of the narrative discourse, its needs of meaning, rather than vice-versa, as we normally assume. In other words, the apparently normal claim that *fabula* precedes *sjuzhet*, which is a reworking of the givens of *fabula*, must be

reversed at problematic, challenging moments of narrative, to show that *fabula* is rather produced by the requirements of *sjuzhet*: that something must have happened because of the results that we know—that, as Cynthia Chase puts it about Daniel Deronda’s Jewishness, “his origin is the effect of its effects” (28).

And though Cullers will warn that the two may not be able to work together without contradiction, Brooks is resistant to accept “narrative’s nature as a contradictory double logic” as a dead end, arguing, rather, that it “tells us something about why we have and need narrative, and how the need to plot meanings is itself productive of narrative” (28-29). These perspectives will be valuable to multidirectional readings of psychoanalytic relationships, particularly as they will appear in later chapters of this dissertation.

Returning to Freud’s particular relationship to detective fiction, we see a real cultural resonance in terms of form as in themes. As Alfred Schick writes of Freud’s literary connoisseurship, “[the] psychotherapist and the poet, the musician in the vineyard and the composer of genius, were bewitched by the theme of love and death, and likewise Eros and Thanatos were main motifs in Freud’s vision” (24). Tracing the “Viennese tendency to ruminate on the ephemeral quality and complexity of life’s mysteries” back to the Baroque era, Schick imagines that this cultural inheritance had as much to do with the formation of Freud’s and his colleagues’ perception of human existence as did their study of medicine (18). The Thanatos and Eros that Schick locates in a distinctly Viennese literary tradition serve as pillars in the reading of the minds of Freud’s analysands from very early on in his career. Although Freud would not publish *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, the book that famously showcases life instincts and death instincts as the two categorical auspices of human drive, until 1920, the vast majority of his earlier

publications grappled with sexuality on conscious and unconscious levels. His *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, published in 1905, mapped out psychosexual development from infancy into adulthood, through mental stages libidinally performed through the physical experience of the oral, the anal, the phallic, a latent phase, and finally the genital phase. Each of these phases is determined by a relationship to sex or death. In its earliest, polymorphously sexual state, the infant is not capable of distinguishing itself from the (m)other. Yet its desire for the breast, and thus a desire to incorporate the (m)other—or even the self—back into the self, Freud qualifies as a cannibalistic instinct. The second pregenital stage of development, termed the anal phase, takes place from age one to three and arises with the conflict between the pleasure of defecation and the externally imposed need for self-control that comes with toilet training. Freud qualified this as a sadistic organization of the psychosexual order due to its desire for mastery via the agency of the body’s muscles over the “erotogenic mucus membrane of the anus” which represents, more than any other organ, passive sexual desire. The third stage breeches the earlier pregenital phases into a quasi-genital phase, though Freud claimed, “it knows only one kind of genital: the male one” and for this reason it was deemed the phallic stage (*SE 7: 200*). Occurring roughly between the third and sixth years of a child’s life, this phase is defined by children’s attention to their own genitalia (by which Freud means exclusively the penis or the clitoris), libidinous attachment to the parent of the opposite sex, and fear of castration.<sup>32</sup> This phase will come in two waves for the human subject over the course of psychosexual development; the first during the aforementioned period of age two to age five, and the second during puberty, at which point, Freud

says, it will determine the final outcome of sexual life. A period of sexual latency then sets in from ages six through twelve as the superego develops, and the second wave of the phallic phase will reemerge in puberty as the final, genital phase, establishing the psychosexual being as an adult. As in the narratives of Poe and Doyle, in which clues planted early on can be traced by the discerning detective to the final revelation of the culprit-character, encounters experienced in the latent phase may resurface in the manifestation of the adult psyche. For example, as Freud writes in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* in 1905,

Experience further showed that the external influences of seduction are capable of provoking interruptions of the latency period or even its cessation, and that in this connection the sexual instinct of children proves in fact to be polymorphously perverse; it seems, moreover, that any such premature sexual activity diminishes a child's educability. (*SE* 7: 234)

An important caveat, however, must be applied to this extract: at the time of writing, Freud has not clearly distinguished between *actual* seduction or acts of sexual violence during the latent sexual period of childhood and wished for *fantasies* of seduction (Nagera 85). This muddiness of actual and imaginary events underlines Freud's analysis as a literary practice rather than one that centers the patient's therapeutic needs, and it would lead to later feminist critiques of Freud's misinterpretation or outright denial of his patients' accounts of sexual abuse.<sup>33</sup> Every one of these stages is spurred by the thanatotic or erotic drives so present in detective fiction, and Freud plays the sleuth as he attempts to root out the sources of each.

Read one way, Freud's structure implies that all sexuality is, to some degree, pathological—the scene of the proverbial crime. The repression that the superego imposes upon the ego and the id in order for the psychosexual being to

develop into an adult is a necessary evil that allows for the child's induction into a proper social order within bourgeois society by the point of adulthood. Normal sexual behavior thus cannot escape its own strain of pathology. The other layer of reading, following the grain of Freud's teaching, discloses pathology in the form of either perversion or its negative, neurosis. Perversion is characterized by the mechanism of disavowal (*Verleugnung*), a mechanism which Freud would develop in the context of childhood sexuality where it relates to castration and sexual difference, and the (male) child's disavowal of seeing the absence of the male genital.<sup>34</sup> Neurosis, on the other hand, is a struggle between the ego and the id, wherein the operative mechanism is one of repression. Under these two modes of expression may fall various forms of what Freud classifies as psychosexual "aberrations" or otherwise "deviant" behavior, including sexual inversion<sup>35</sup>, pedophilic desire or desire toward animals, fixation on sex using the mouth, anus, or other parts of the body, fetishism, foreplay fixation, a fixation of touching and looking, and sadomasochism. As the neurotic and the pervert represent opposing expressions of one another, the neurotic will envy the pervert for her freedom to express what the neurotic has buried deeply in her unconscious.

*The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1899, and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, published in 1901, both sought out the source and framework of hidden desire in the neurotic patient, establishing a of semiology—or semiotics—of the psyche according to which Freud would deepen his interpretations, uniting his earlier study of hysteria with this map of the conscious and unconscious mind in his sexual analyses.<sup>36</sup> However, Schick's observation of baroque aesthetics in particular as important or attractive to Freud

deserves some reconsideration. Though Freud may have demonstrated the uncanniness of the human psyche in many of his studies in a way that couples well with the disturbing, overladen, and somewhat unpredictable nature of the offerings from the Baroque period, his aesthetic tends overwhelming toward Victorianism. Freud's study, for example, with its "old and dirty gods" was emblematic of the Victorian rather than a baroque aesthetic—a condensed reproduction of the empire in which he lived and the history to which he subscribed, as written according to his own fantasy. This is to say that Freud valued narratives with only one possible version of history, and artistic and cultural products that reflected only the achievements of the respective upper class, either as the source of their production or their extraction from those considered less developed. Emplotment, is thus key to Freud's strategy, making the Freudian symptom a narrative problem; all stories may be different to some degree but in resolving them into types of plots, the remainders of cultural baggage begin to stand out.<sup>37</sup> Baroque art, in contrast with Freud's tendency toward a singular story and upper-class bearings, incorporates a level of mental disturbance that would have undermined these values. Though Freud's themes of sex and death are everywhere in his work, their expression remains repressed or guided by a heavy hand.

The themes of these analyses would not be unique to Freud's work. In years to follow, protégés and colleagues in the circle would likewise investigate erotic and death drives and wishes. For example, 1914 saw the publication of Theodor Reik's "Über die Wirkungen unbewußter Todeswünsche" ("On the Effect of Unconscious Death Wishes") and 1916 the publication of Lou Andreas-

Salomé's study, "'Anal' und 'Sexual'" ("'Anal' and 'Sexual'")—an article that Freud praised highly. The former considered the author's own unconscious wish for the death of his father and the sexual drive, coupled with remorse, that followed his father's death, the death wishes he harbored against his fiancée as well as her father, and the death wish he observed in his patient, also directed at his fiancée. All of these cases, he concludes, are examples of repressed sexual feelings, "welded" together with elements of the ego. Salomé's article on the other hand made theoretical headway in the circle by analyzing the anal libido as formed by child's first encounter with the dissonance between internal instinct and external pressure—the distinction between what the child is and what the child should be that leads to the early renunciation of personal pleasure. The anal libido, Salomé writes, improving upon Freud's claim of sadism, is *satanic*; it is the source of separation, abjection, and the recognition that "I and the father (the mother) are *not* one" ("ich und der Vater (die Mutter) sind *nicht* eins") ("'Anal' und 'Sexual'" 249). Salomé's contribution to the psychoanalytic understanding of libido not only impressed Freud by its novel engagement with the psychosexual stages of development but quietly inflected the work of feminist psychoanalytic theorists decades after its publication.<sup>38</sup>

Yet other colleagues of Freud's, notably including Rank and Ferenczi, would philosophically part company with him when it came to his exclusive emphasis of these two drives and the effects he believed them to have upon the patient; while Freud imagined emotions to be the instigative cause of neurosis, Rank believed that it was the very denial of emotions—and the social relationships that they implied—that caused a negative reaction in the patient, as

such denial was also the denial of desire and of creativity. These philosophical rifts do not necessarily undermine the argument that literary culture affected psychoanalytic approach but may point to a plurality of cultural representation in spite of both Freud's dominant personality and the prevalence of early society members of a relatively homogeneous socio-economic class. Moreover, while Schick's hypothesis seems astute, it becomes tricky when one attempts to pinpoint the actual literature that composed the artistic and humanistic background to Freud's thinking. Certainly, the theater and literature of Schnitzler (who had also received a doctorate in medicine), and Hofmannsthal formed an inevitable cultural topos during fin de siècle Vienna, and these authors' own incorporation of nervous disorders, sexual pathology, and dream states as themes in their work testifies to the mutually influential relationship that art and medicine had at this time. The novels of Adalbert Stifter, in contrast, which were widely read in the years of Freud's youth, model moral *Bildung* in the form of self-discipline and control of the passions—a fecund setting for the soon-to-follow interrogation of *Verdrängung* (“repression”) if ever there was one. As Carl Schorske writes in *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna*, “Political chaos was the product of personal passion; its remedy must be personal self-discipline. Only moral individuals could sustain free institutions, Stifter maintained. Because men had not acquired the moral maturity to be capable of freedom, the revolution destroyed the very freedom it aimed to realize. Stifter thus drew the lessons from the revolutionary experience in the traditional language of German humanism, of Friedrich Schiller and of Wilhelm von Humboldt” (Schorske 282). In his own writing, even Freud's explicit literary allusions are often planted without a clear source, leaving the reader to deduce the

author, to translate the epigraph, or to believe that the literary reference was included at the suggestion of “a friend” rather than at Freud’s sole discretion (Frankland 6, 20).

When relinquishing to literary allusion, Freud is drawn to epics, tragedies—Goethe’s *Faust*, Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*<sup>39</sup> and *Macbeth*, Heine’s “Deutschland,” Sophocles’ *Oedipus*, Nietzsche’s *Zarathustra*, and narratives such as Jensen’s *Gradiva* involving the confrontation between the present’s view of the past and the past’s view of the present (Frankland 6, 15, 19). Even when surreptitiously or reluctantly speaking through literary allusions relatively modern to his time, Freud was fascinated by the cult of personality and the formative power of myth. Myth in this sense functions as a basic set of schemes of emplotment, connecting the past and present in a way that feels fated. Translated into the mechanisms of symptom formation, early themes of sex and death thus feel equally fated or inevitable as the source of mental disturbance. Furthermore, when Freud takes mythic figures as the basis for universal psychosexual experience, he sets up the modern subject as analysand to reenact the plot of that figure’s own tragedy.

Of those thinkers whose writings on myth likely impacted Freud’s, none seems more prescient than Johann Jakob Bachofen, the Swiss anthropologist, jurist, and philologist whose late nineteenth-century work on Roman law at the University of Basel and later publications on matrilineal social order were foundational to scholarship of his time. Bachofen’s work sought a source to law that predated its construction, and he located that source in inscriptions, antiquated objects, and myths. From this, Bachofen proposed an ancient structure of society

he referred to as *Mutterrecht* (“mother-law”). Although many have attempted to translate or paraphrase *Mutterrecht* as “matriarchy,” Bachofen refused such phrasing, as it implied too close of a parallel to the structure of patriarchy, with the roles of women and men simply reversed. While the law of the father, *Vaterrecht*, was founded upon property, *Mutterrecht* was conversely focused on the common and its reproduction. His political stakes aside, Bachofen imprinted upon a generation of scholars the notion that the study of myth would illuminate early forms of thought. His investment in law and in the right of the maternal or paternal figure would also surface in Freud’s work, but his anthropological attention to myth as law’s precursor would be most blatantly reflected in Freud’s own attention to myths and their figures.

The mobilization of mythic figures and personalities constitutes the third great theme of burgeoning psychoanalytic theory under Freud’s direction. Freud famously uses the figure of Moses in his 1939 publication *Moses and Monotheism* to reimagine ancient Egyptian civilization and religion outside of a traditional Judaic narrative, resulting in the falsified religion of Judaism generations later, wherein the driving wish for the Messiah is in fact an expression of guilt over the repressed murder of an Egyptian Moses. This radical interpretation of the sacred Jewish figure works at least threefold by allowing Freud to analyze the cult built around a personality, the foundations of a nation through narrative, and the psychic repression that requires guilt’s expression in the form of alternative desires. Moreover, it demonstrates Freud’s use of history and myth as a two-pronged compass by which he attempts to measure the present. By looking backward, confronting the projected future of a past civilization and its resonance

or dissonance with one's present, or by considering the myths composed retroactively in a group's search for origins, Freud's investigation of mythic figures expands from an interest in sheer personality to a measurement of historically oriented identity. Again, the history toward which a figure is oriented is not one among of many, but an overarching and dominant history of all mankind, rooted in a Western bourgeois tradition. Freud's much earlier work on the Oedipus complex, published in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1899, likewise harnesses an ancient, tragic figure of the Western literary imagination for the exposition of a universalized stage of male psychosexual development, namely, the phallic stage. Both cases create an interesting, reiterative formulation in which patients continue to live out the pain and desires of the original figure, thus standardizing trauma as the ever-reopened wound in the everyday psychosexual and faith-centered lives of the modern subjects in question. This also echoes the treatment of female neurotics in Freud's other works in that the pathological subject, through this reiterative act of repression, becomes the norm; The repression of both trauma and libidinal desire functions as a necessary apparatus of defense in order for the self or the mutually identified community to continue without being constantly undone by pain and desire. Freud's solution is as universal as its supposed subject: balance regained through a functional amount of repression.<sup>40</sup>

Repression is not just a method of balancing the self in Freud's formulation. Freud found the possibility for the productive harnessing of repression in the form of sublimation, which he located as the source of artistic and scientific production.<sup>41</sup> The libido of the artist, unsatisfied through directly

sexual, instinctive means, could be converted into an artistic or literary form. “Sublimation of instinct,” explains Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents* “is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized life” (*SE* 21: 97). Thus, even beyond artistic creativity, sublimation as the productive face of repression is, according to Freud, foundational to culture and thus to the social relationships of human beings; in this regard, even scientific endeavors are a product of the “cultural frustration” of sublimation as it binds repressed energies into useful projects (*SE* 21: 97).

The everyday pathology that Freud presents to his audience provides an intriguing departure point for the discussion of dissociative states, because of how dissociation necessitates repression on a larger level by this formulation. Freud’s main investigations of dissociation focus on the repression of the libidinal self in waking life and the appearance of the subconscious in dream states. Objects of repression are to be found in Freud’s themes of sexual desire and unconscious death wishes, but the dissociative state itself also deserves consideration. Freud’s 1914 publication “On Narcissism,” working through the mythic figure of perverse self-love, illuminates a patient’s state of dissociation without foraying too far into a complete, schizoid state. In order for one to experience narcissism, one must experience one’s self as a subject and object at the same time, driven dually by a need to self-preserve and a need to self-reproduce. The subject may choose the subject’s self as the object of affection, or the subject may choose an outside object, as in the case of the mother overly invested in the welfare of her child or vice-versa, but in each case, the subject both sees its narcissistic reflection as an

outside object of beauty and feels a certain level of affinity that binds them together. This level of dissociation is also seen in Freud's 1917 analysis of "Mourning and Melancholia," in which he designates the former as a normal expression of grief in the loss of a love object and the latter a pathological response in which the subject loses her or his moorings in his or her sense of identity. Self-reproaches, in the melancholic's case, are in fact displaced reproaches against the lost love-object, and so here, too, the subject experiences both a knowledge of her or himself and a confusion in the position she or he takes. These examples serve to give a sense of the groundwork Freud set and the limits to his ventures into dissociative experience.

Freud's analysis of dissociative states is always held at a careful arm's length. It bears emphasizing that Freud, like most of his Viennese colleagues, was interested in ambulatory cases of neurosis. Although Freud performs a reading of German judge Daniel Schreber's paranoia that would contribute to the foundation of his oeuvre in the 1910 publication of "Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia paranoides)" ("Psycho-analytic Observations on an Autobiographically Recorded Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)"), his materials are pre-framed and retrospective: Schreber's own autobiographical account from 1903, written in retrospect after the patient's own recovery to a functional psychic state of being, and the medical opinion of Guido Weber, Superintendent at the Sonnenstein Asylum who first diagnosed Schreber with an incurable mental illness and thus sentenced him to a state of legal incompetency (Wallace 48). Freud's reading of Schreber's memoirs is the site at which he develops his formula on the link between unconscious

homosexual desire and the mechanism of paranoia, and its variations according to displacement, reversal, projection, or denial. “[I]t is a remarkable fact,” asserts Freud, “that the familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: ‘*I (a man) love him (a man)*’, and indeed that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such contradictions could be formulated” (*SE* 12: 63). Yet Freud admitted that he was “ignorant of the details of Schreber’s life,” and this leads critics of Freud to argue that he “based an entirely fictional pathogenesis of Schreber’s second illness on the historically incorrect premise that Schreber’s core conflict was a homosexual wish [...]” (Wallace 48-49). Eric Santner’s reading of Freud and Schreber in *My Own Private Germany* troubles not just the historical premise but the foundations of Freud’s definition of masculinity and the basis for his arguments both on feminization and paranoia. “Freud’s own argument is riddled by a fundamental inconsistency,” Santner asserts, though he disagrees with a similar claim, made by Daniel Boyarin, that Freud’s encoding of the renunciation of the fulfillment of desire as masculine, “occasioned by a submissiveness vis-à-vis a male other, whether it be the ‘great man’ Moses or the deity,” is an act of feminization which make an object “other” of the same ontological dimension as a symbolic identity (Boyarin qtd. in Santner 121). Schreber’s crisis, Santner argues, is fundamentally one of “investiture” (Santner 124).

[Schreber] discovered that his own symbolic power and authority as judge—and German man—was founded, at least in part, by the performative magic of the rites of institution, that his symbolic function was sustained by an imperative to produce a regulated series of repeat performances. It was this idiotic repetition compulsion at the heart of his symbolic function that Schreber experienced as profoundly sexualizing, as a demand to cultivate *jouissance*. That he experienced this sexualization as

feminizing and “Jewifying” suggests that at the advent of European modernity, “knowledge” of jouissance was ascribed to women and Jews, meaning that women and Jews were cursed with the task of holding the place of that which could not be directly acknowledged: that symbolic identities, are, in the final analysis, sustained by drive, by performativity-as-repetition-compulsion (Santner 124-125).

As Schreber’s access to power not only as an authority of the law but as a German man was endowed only through the performativity of institutional “rites,” essentially iterative and unstable, it would necessarily lead a compulsive relationship to these two aspects of his identity. Santner moreover draws out from Schreber’s compulsive puzzle the Jewish and feminine “others” who were forced to carry the burden of a symbolic identity of sexual pleasure within European modernity, and who thus occupy this role within the formula of Schreber’s psychological loop.

Granted, the Schreber case caused Freud to reconsider the former distinctions he had outlined between paranoia and dementia praecox<sup>42</sup>, opening to the admission that the two could be combined in any variation of proportions and thus difficult to separate from one another, but he did so from a position of relative analytic safety, wherein the patient not only was able to articulate and analyze his own experiences with madness but could assure the audience a recuperative ending, at least in 1903.<sup>43</sup> Neither Freud nor the vast majority of his circle in Vienna engaged with a hospitalized, schizophrenic patient, as such a case would seem too risky or already too far gone: a narrative spoken in a language of *Wortsalat*, without any associated meaning to be found, as Freud describes the speech in one scene from Schreber’s recollections. However, Schreber’s memoirs allowed for a delving into the *Wortsalat* mind as filtered through the intelligible,

recovered language of a skilled jurist. Thus, Freud could speculate on the significance of Schreber's cosmology of nerves, the presence of miracles, and the courts of heaven described in these memoirs in a way that ensured an imparted sense to the patient's hallucinations, much in the way that a patient recalling a dream could provide her analyst with corroborative material that would impart sense to the otherwise indecipherable language of her subconscious. Freud's analyses of Schreber's state of mind during the scenes described lead him to diagnose the narrator with a fear of emasculation and early, deeply repressed, homosexual desires that had been thrown onto the outside world. There, Freud asserts, Schreber grasps for his original objects of incestuous, homosexual desire by seeking out the figure of his brother in his physician and the figure of his father in God, ultimately experiencing such intense hallucinations that they dissociate him from his former sense of reality. Had he encountered Schreber without the mediation of time and the patient's own self-reflection, it is difficult to imagine how Freud may have read him at all.

### *Reading and the Law*

Aside from the aforementioned analyses that speak to Freud's semiotic system, the Schreber case unfolds from yet another angle vital to the understanding of psychiatric development, and one not yet mentioned in this brief treatment of the burgeoning psychoanalytic years. Schreber did not write his memoirs for the advancement of psychology; he wrote them as a legal challenge to the system that held him against his will based upon a psychiatric diagnosis. The question posed in a subtitle to the original German-language publication

reads, “Under which conditions may a person deemed mentally ill be held in a sanatorium against his express will?” (“Unter welchen Voraussetzungen darf eine für geisteskrank erachtete Person gegen ihren erklärten Willen in einer Heilanstalt festgehalten werden?”). The memoir to follow therefore asks to be read as the accomplished jurist’s evidence in his self-defense, and to in turn set the reiterative legal standard with this evidence in mind.

In order for Schreber to be able to prove himself “well,” he had to successfully dissociate from the “unwell” self, make the split and reflect its process in order to make it visible before the law. Even the casual writer of memoir may sympathize with such a dual experience of the self; the passage of time and life lived can make for an equal sense of familiarity and otherness to one’s own life story in the process of written recollection. Schreber, however, had to successfully perform his own split in order to pass as cured—not the performance of an actor but the sort of performing that the surgeon does with the knife—to form, completely, his own self into the self of the sane. But how could the insane be trusted to make the first incision?

The legal component to follow a diagnosis, the use of one term over another, could have severe consequences for patients, as was the case for Schreber. Zvi Lothane points out just how damning Schreber’s diagnosis of paranoia, rather than the recently defined dementia praecox, would be.

No diagnosis was recorded by Schreber’s first psychiatrist Flechsig whereas Sonnenstein director and forensic expert Guido Weber put down paranoia, caused by a chronic and incurable brain disorder [...]. Weber did not consider Kraepelin’s 1898 epochal differentiation between paranoia and dementia praecox, or schizophrenia. This moved Schreber to include in his book, in addition to his brilliant self-defense, an essay on forensic psychiatry entitled “In what circumstances can a person considered insane

be detained in an asylum against his declared will?" [...] This title became the future subtitle of the *Denkwürdigkeiten* but was unforgivably omitted in the English translation. Note that "detained" is associated with police activity, not with psychiatric therapy. (3)

The history of psychiatry at the time of Schreber's appeal had been developing hand in hand with forensics, being the very apparatus necessary to imprison a person on the grounds of insanity. In the decades around the turn of the century, the development of psychiatry in several European countries is evidenced by the growing number of mental asylums and the number of patients within them, and this was especially the case within Prussia. In the German-speaking world, criminology was taught alongside psychopathology, with Emil Kraepelin giving his first lecture on criminal psychology in 1882 and several other lecturers following suit soon after. Studies of the criminal mind picked up during the turn of the century, which saw the founding of the International Criminological Association, and the publication of specialist journals devoted to criminal psychology. A general biologization of criminological readings of behavior became especially striking during this time as well, painting the criminal as one biologically inclined toward deviance. The kinship between psychopathology and criminology and the increased internment that it produced would be grounds for some the strongest critiques of psychiatry during this time, in the form of patient advocacy groups and cultural critique.

Karl Kraus, known among the Vienna modernists for his acerbic cultural critiques and satire, was one such critic of psychiatry, and he likewise found psychoanalysis guilty of many of the same abuses. In 1908 Kraus published a vehement collection of essays from his one-man journal, *Die Fackel* [The Torch],

under the title *Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität* [Morality and Criminality]. In an essay titled “Gerichtspsychiatrie” (“Forensic Psychiatry”), Kraus advocates for a clear separation of sexual morals and criminal justice, calling for the decriminalization of abortion and freedom to enjoy preferred sexual practices in one’s private life (including homosexual sex, adultery, and women’s general sexual freedom). The alternative, he warned, was “not only an intolerable invasion of privacy; [laws punishing unconventional sexual behavior] also have the noxious side effects of encouraging blackmail and bribery, the corruption of the police and the victimization of prostitutes” (Timms 63). He denounced attempts on the part of forensic psychiatrists to scientifically justify the imprisonment of those considered ‘sexual deviants’, sounding an exemplary battle cry of his time against a dictatorial moralism that wished to disguise itself behind the cool, objective mask of the doctor. Forensic psychiatry was, according to Kraus in one sarcastic, extended metaphor, “the most amusing of all parlor games.” Acts of interpretation once understood to be no more than simple and nonsensical amusement were suddenly being given the gravity of science.

Sie ist von allen Gesellschafts­pielen doch das unterhaltendste. [...] Die Schriftsachverständigen—je nun, die sind wie alle Vertreter einer ernsten Wissenschaft nüchterne Gesellen. Charakter-Erraten ist längst kein Spaß mehr und Stunden ungetrübten Frohseeins verbringt man heute nur noch im Kreise der Psychiater. Die Justiz spielte früher Blindekuh, aber das Spiel der blinden Esel ist aparter. Sie werden hereingeführt, sollen den Angeklagten durchschauen und sagen j—a, wie der Ankläger es will. (Kraus 334)

Handwriting interpreters are now all representatives of a serious science of sober businessmen. Character-divination has long since lost its fun and one can now only pass hours of undisturbed pleasure in the psychiatric circle. The judiciary used to play blind man’s bluff, but the game of the blind jackasses appears even more distinct. They’re ushered in, are expected to look over the accused and say Yeee—ahh!, at the will of the prosecution.

In another short piece collected in *Sittlichkeit und Kriminalität*, Kraus compares this farce of psychiatric evaluation—and, by extension, the integrity of the court generally—to a theatrical performance in which the clumsy, asinine actors hired to play doctor have already learned their lines by heart. When one defendant is accused of sexual impropriety, “Die Gerichtspsychiater haben hier nicht nur, wie es ihre Pflicht ist, wichtige Symptome festgestellt, sondern auch, was sie für ihre Pflicht halten, wichtige Indizien geliefert” [The forensic psychiatrists have here not only determined important symptoms, as they are required to do, but also the duty they have assumed for themselves; supplied important evidence] (Kraus 335). This castigation of forensic psychiatry sketches out the condition of the sexually divergent subject in the dominant medical discourse of Kraus’s time as always already guilty and in a state of moral debt. It reflects in many ways the Nietzschean concept of guilt (*Schuld*) as an extension of a debt (*Schulden*) which the guilty party is unable to pay and which must be satisfied through the creditor’s right to inflict harm.<sup>44</sup> In criminal law, this contractual relationship assumes a whole community or all of civilization as the injured party in relation to the indebted lawbreaker.

Along these same lines, Kraus demonstrates how the sexually divergent subject, indebted and made a criminal according to the supposed injury to the laws of civilization, is made to bear the punishment of the law. Moreover, Kraus’s examples build an epistemological critique of a psychiatry that privileges its own categories and objects over individual cases. The subject’s unique experience is effaced by a psychiatric system that inscribes itself through punishment in the

reification of its own categories. In this same vein, Kraus's attitude toward Freud and the practice of psychoanalysis grew likewise critical over time. For although Freud was not a forensic psychiatrist in any practical sense, his approach to his patients necessarily positioned them as already accused, and already guilty. Moreover, Kraus believed that Freud's method of psychoanalytic therapy was no scientific breakthrough but rather a recasting of an age-old, mystified experience of confession wherein Freud assumed a dangerously all-powerful role. Neither the imposition of morality under the guise of psychiatric health, nor the psychoanalytic adjustment to a functional repression appealed to Kraus. Kraus's urgency and specificity in pointing to the legal system's use of psychiatry, rather than a generalized rejection of scientific studies of the mind, underscores the political stakes of his position.

Considered in context of French contributions to forensic psychiatry via Charcot and his student Janet, one sees a parallel development of legal authority's investment in the parameters of mental health between the two, often mutually informing, systems of forensic psychiatry and legal authority. The birth of psychiatry at the Salpêtrière arrived in the early- to mid-nineteenth century under the direction of Charcot's predecessor, Pinel, when the separation mentally ill women from convicts or the physically ill made it possible to study their mental ailments with greater exactitude and focus. Charcot's assumption of the role of director in 1862 allowed for him and his colleague Vulpian to focus their attention, further still, upon female patients with nervous disorders.

Charcot's access to the women who served as the raw material for his scientific headway is indebted to an edict issued nearly 200 years before his

arrival. On April 20, 1684, Louis XIV ordered in the *Réglement du Roi* that all “debauched women, public prostitutes, women engaged in scandalous behavior, or those who led others into prostitution would be imprisoned in the Salpêtrière by order of the king, the court, or the lieutenant of police” (Conner 179). While there, these incarcerated women would wear only coarsely spun garments and wooden clogs, eat only bread, soup, and water, and sleep on mattresses made of straw (Conner 179). They would be required to attend mass, submit to medical treatments as needed, pray and observe catechism regularly, and work (Conner 179). Those who deviated from this regimen could be punished with solitary confinement for up to six months at a time (Conner 179).

In the years of the Regency following Louis XIV’s death and into the mid-eighteenth century, the language surrounding prostitution would shift from that of sin and spiritual illness to something more corporeal, in which prostitution “came more and more to be defined as a condition, not yet pathological, or as a state of being” (Conner 181). By the time Féré had published *Dégénérescence et criminalité: essai physiologique* [Degeneration and Criminality: A physiological essay] in 1888, the prostitute in Paris had come to be seen as a vector of disease: spiritual, physical, and social. These antecedent enactments of legal, corporeal punishment upon women who had sex for a living outside of marriage prepared the scene for Charcot’s entrée.

Although his hysteria ward was not populated with the “debauched women” of earlier imprisonment, his patients were encased in the same discourse of pathological sexuality that their predecessors had been. The difference in their case was that were not considered directly culpable for their pathological

sexuality. Their bodies were no longer to be punished for their sins or crimes in an effort to either reform or destroy them, but were presented to the doctor as medical automatons, to be manipulated and observed. As Michel Foucault writes of this period in *The History of Sexuality*, the intensity of this observation was equal to that of its simultaneous “systematic blindness”:

This much is undeniable: The learned discourse on sex that was pronounced in the nineteenth century was imbued with age-old delusions, but also with systematic blindnesses: a refusal to see and to understand; but further—and this is the crucial point—a refusal concerning the very thing that was brought to light and whose formulation was urgently solicited. [...] Let Charcot’s Salpêtrière serve as an example in this regard: it was an enormous apparatus for observation, with its examinations, interrogations, and experiments, but it was also a machinery for incitement, with its public presentations, its theater of ritual crises, carefully staged with the help of ether or amyl nitrate, its interplay of dialogues, palpations, laying on of hands, postures which the doctors elicited or obliterated with a gesture or a word, its hierarchy of personnel who kept watch, organized, provoked, monitored, and reported, and who accumulated an immense pyramid of observations and dossiers. (55-56)

The patients’ unprecedented value to the authority of the ward as expressions of the hysterical illness that Charcot sought to study would not particularly encourage their return to an image of wellness, and so we see an interesting case of reiterative performance in the psych ward based on the attention of the scientific observer. Furthermore, although the authority of judgement over health and illness was clearly invoked in the relationships between Charcot and his patients, the patient was no longer the perpetrator of her psychosexual disease, to be punished by unleashing it upon the rest of society, but the object upon which the disease had fastened itself, to be protected only by giving herself more fully to the arbiter of health. The subjective and objective components of the patient were

already beginning to splinter in ways that would manifest later in the work of Charcot's pupils.

One such pupil, and a complicated contemporary of Freud's, was Pierre Janet. As previously mentioned, Freud cited Janet in his first publications, but he refrained from any later attribution of his psychoanalytic principles to Janet, and he was later accused of plagiarism (Makari 51). My purpose here in mentioning Janet is not to suggest that Freud's work is necessarily lifted from Janet's, but to reestablish the tracks of an intellectual connection that Freud—as was the case in his use of many other sources literary, medical, and otherwise—attempted to brush away. Like Freud in his early years, Janet was interested in hypnotherapy. He not only coined terms for dissociation and the subconscious in his accounting for a subject's experience of trauma but produced early notions of transference between patient and doctor (or hypnotist) similar to Freud's. Janet also notably made early headway in the theorization of trauma, describing it in terms of emotional shocks that prevent the development of an underprepared subject and instead produce *idées fixes* that distort the temporal and emotional life of the subject by returning her or him to that experience of shock (Ellenberger 777). He was greatly concerned with the impact of social life on the patient's self-formation and placed an emphasis on childhood imitation of peers that speaks to a wholly different understanding on socio-class differences than Freud's theories could permit (Craparo 124). Moreover, Janet's relationship with language and linguistic models is far from obscured. As language finds its value in its shared circulation, or as a word finds meaning only in its context, so too, believed Janet, did a subject find meaning (Ellenberger 361). Law was something to be understood in terms of a

socially formed norm, made real through its reiteration and reinforcement. Janet considered these social experiences in terms of hierarchal structures that Freud elided (Ellenberger 404). Janet's contributions would in turn go on to develop general and legal attitudes toward the culpability of one under dissociative duress. His philosophical disagreement with Freud as to whether this was a psychological lack of integration or a psychological defense mechanism would transform the ways in which the subject in a dissociative state, let alone one from within a different social circle than others within a hierarchy, could be judged.

The issue of class difference would prove to be more than a philosophical rift between rivals Freud and Janet in their treatments of trauma and subjectivity. As psychoanalysis continued to develop in Vienna, and the political situation radically shifted toward the outset and then escalation of the First World War, the notion of class in psychoanalysis would have a more vital importance than ever before. As psychoanalysis confronted war-induced trauma, which had never been treated in Freud's earlier patients, it would be pressed into a position of having to answer to experiences beyond neurosis which had generally been evaded. In many of these cases, the subject in question would not be one defendant presenting her or himself to the academy to be judged, but a whole class of people, for whom the bourgeois household was no home, Viennese Hochdeutsch barbaric, and the myths that Freud had found so foundational to Western civilization likewise unintelligible.

*Caesura: The Great War and Psychoanalysis*

When the First World War broke out in 1914, the needs and failings of psychoanalysis up until that point, and the directions into which it could yet be taken, would become clearer than ever before. Freud's practice, which had been formulated in its early years through the treatment of bourgeois, neurotic, female analysands in an out-patient setting, would now be challenged to contend with the trauma and shock of men from a variety of social and cultural backgrounds. Additionally, psychiatric treatments such as the use of electric shock on the body would be employed which remained, even after the war, ambiguous as to whether they were intended to treat the patient's neurosis or discipline the soldier as a malingerer (Eissler 72). The contrast between the fast, corporeal, and often brutal practices in psychiatric clinics and the lengthy, language-based approach of psychoanalytic therapy was thus also made clear when faced with the trauma of the First World War. Moreover, when psychoanalysis was used in the treatment of soldiers, what would the goal be? If the treatment of soldiers returned them to such a well-adjusted state that they could be sent back into combat, then was this actually a curative practice?

In this caesura of the practice and philosophy of psychoanalysis, I locate some of Victor Tausk's more profound interventions. Tausk's contributions during the war, written while he is stationed at the Eastern Front as a medical officer, draw upon each of the three pillars of psychoanalysis that I have focuses on in this chapter: medicine, literary narrative, and the law. The unique art-science fusion that bore psychoanalysis at the turn of the twentieth century diverged from traditional medical practices by focusing on the patient's subjective experience and

interpretation of symptoms, rather than solely relying on quantitative measurements. This shift was influenced by the practice's literary tradition, where imagination and symbolism played a crucial role in understanding human behavior. Furthermore, as I have taken time to substantiate with regards to the history of psychiatry in particular, evaluation of mental health was deeply intertwined with legal frameworks and moralistic impressions from the very outset. Tausk worked from within these discourses and genres to problematize the foundations of group and individual identities in a way that would make space for the radically new ways human beings would have to find themselves amid the rubble of the First World War. His oeuvre, which expands the work of psychoanalysis by imparting to it insights from law, quantum science, Jewish tradition, literary practices and modernist thinking, does not protect the "kingdom and policy of [Freud the] master," as Freud's secret committee would have it, but makes way for the directions psychoanalysis could still lead.

## Chapter Two: Between the Margins and the Center of an Empire, Early Life and Adulthood 1879-1908

Moto je toga modernoga dakle: » Svaki neka pokaže što jest, svaki ima svoje mjesto u životu, neka ga dakle ispuni sobom a ne drugima «!

The motto of this modernism is therefore: “Let each one show what he is; each one has his own place in life, let him fill it with himself and not with others!”

Vladoje Slovačić

Victor Tausk’s early life at the margins of an empire would play a formative role in his approach later on as a psychoanalyst. Indeed, the contributions he made to psychoanalysis which are formed by his early experiences of otherness constitute an ethnopsychiatric slant that set his work apart from that of among his contemporaries. I argue that the insights Tausk collects at the margins, the outposts, and edges of a dominant tradition—whether it be the culture of an empire, religious tradition, or a school of thought—source Tausk’s greatest intellectual contributions over the course of some two decades, from his teenage years in the Balkans until the end of his life in Vienna. By retracing Tausk’s early life, we bring aspects of his personal and intellectual biography out of obscurity, gather together the rich textual world to which he contributed, and illuminate political motivations and sources of insight that would show up again in his psychoanalytic work years later.

Chapter Two begins by foregrounding Victor Tausk’s early life with a discussion of his father, Herman’s life and publications, as well as their relationship, in order to get a sense of the world into which Victor was born and in

which he formed his impressions, passions, and the questions to which he dedicated his life in his various careers. I follow this discussion with an investigation of Victor's relationship to religion and authority more generally. Victor's early conflict with authority foreshadows a lifelong struggle that would surface with his father, instructors, the old guard of literary tradition, religion and law itself. Moving into his early adulthood, I look at Victor's early publications and intimate relationships to understand who Tausk was at the point of entering Freud's school by 1909.

In this chapter I delve into both personal and public aspects of Tausk's life, and the materials drawn upon for this chapter are likewise both personal and published works.<sup>45</sup> This chapter serves as a recollection of Tausk's adolescence and young adulthood by way of private family archives and correspondence, as well as via some published literary work by Victor Tausk, his father Herman Tausk, and other authors with whom Victor was closely associated. Based on the wide array of materials from which I draw, stark contributors to Victor Tausk's worldview emerge in the early itinerancy and multilingualism or multiculturalism in his family of origin, his unorthodox relationship to Judaism and his own Jewishness, his father's activity in the literary and cultural milieu of the Balkans, and the feminist writers and political activists with whom he was intimate in his young adulthood. Additionally, this chapter considers the importance of materialism as it will come up in Tausk's psychoanalytic work. In his own moments of personal psychological crisis, Tausk points to the material conditions of his life which have so much to do with his depressed psychological state, including income, security, familial ties, and work with a sense of purpose.

This chapter begins a longer analysis of the interwoven nature of literary and psychoanalytic discourse(s) through Tausk's biography and work. Early literary contributions under a Balkan nom de plume situate Tausk as a formative author of Balkan modernism and provide a literary philosophy that would carry over into his treatment of patients decades later in his work as a psychiatrist. Tausk's literary treatise on modernism and the notions of the human psyche sketched out there, which would echo through his psychoanalytic work, make clear that the influence of psychoanalysis upon literature and literary theory is not unidirectional but rather co-inflected. As I addressed in Chapter One, Freud's penchant for detective fiction and Shakespeare has been traced to his psychoanalytic framework. In Tausk's case, we see the author's renderings of the human psyche woven into his own literary material at different stages of his life. Tausk's literary cache thus allows us to track his understanding of the mind and of the human condition as he develops his impressions in genres outside of psychoanalysis. Ultimately, this chapter aims to portray Tausk according to the philosophy he promotes in his own work on modernism, as a multifaceted subject in a dialectical relationship with his literary and material environment, whom we can best understand by learning of his influences, the impressions he made on others, and the writing he produced.

*Early Family Life; Herman Tausk; Judaism and Jewishness post-Emancipation*

Born into a German-speaking Jewish family in Žilina, Slovakia in 1879, Viktor<sup>46</sup> Tausk would be the eldest of Emilie ("Milka") née Roth and Herman

Tausk's ten children. His early life was marked by constant relocation, encounters with a wide diversity of cultures, and a familial emphasis on education. His father's own political and literary interests and desire for adventure, coupled with the need to provide for his many children, meant that the Tausk family would move at least five times in the decade following Victor's birth. Additionally, Victor would attend school in his late adolescence in various other cities in Croatia. His experience of these places would have necessarily brought him into contact with different cultural, religious, and ethnic groups, including Croats, Muslim Bosnians ("Bosniaks"), Serbs, Bosnian Turks, Ashkenazi Jews such as himself, Ladino-speaking Sephardi Jews of Sarajevo, Slovaks, Romani, rural German-speaking communities of so-called "Kolonisten" ("colonists") or "Kuferaši" who had emigrated from northern Germany, and others still.<sup>47</sup> The impact of these early encounters with heterogeneous populations is recognizable in Victor's multilingualism, his knowledge of Balkan folklore and cultural and religious practices that were non-dominant in the center of the empire, and his disgust with nationalist ideologies—all of which shape his work in adulthood.

Though Herman and Victor did not have an easy father-son relationship, Herman's convictions and connections were formative to Victor's early worldview and his literary and political milieu, whether by way of Victor's acceptance or rejection of them.

Herman Tausk's first thirty years were spent in Slovakia, during a moment in which the first *Matica slovenská* (1863-1875)—an institution devoted to Slovakian culture—was established. Though relatively short-lived, the *Matica* encouraged a boom in Croat-Slovak relations and mutual translations

(Palsovicsová 9). This cultural exchange would apparently pave the way for his family's move to Croatia shortly after Victor's birth. The growing Tausk family moved throughout Southeast Europe in their early years—transience that is traced not only by Herman's publications by the fact that the birth of each child was recorded in the family's Tanakh, including the date and place: Victor in Žilina, Slovakia; Jelka and Paula in Ravna Gora, Croatia; Zorka in Koprivnica, Croatia; Mirko and Vlado in Agram (now Zagreb), Croatia; Augusta in Ravna Gora again; and Zdenko and Nada in Sarajevo, Bosnia.

Religiously, Herman Tausk's family was clearly representative of the Neolog faction that broke from Orthodox Jews in the schism in Hungarian Jewry of the late nineteenth century; they were from the western region of Slovakia, culturally assimilationist, and well-educated.<sup>48, 49</sup> Neology was defined by its liberalism, modernist ideology, and tendency toward greater cultural assimilation. While Jews in the east of Slovakia were more likely to be poor, Hassidic, Yiddish-speaking, and coming from Ukraine or Poland, Jews of western Slovakia—like the Tausks—were more likely to have attended German schools (and sometimes, Yeshivot), generally better off economically, and were more open to Central European Jewish and non-Jewish thought and, later, Magyarization (Jelinek 210). Herman was born into a very poor family—his daughter Nada notes that he ate every day in the home of another Jewish family—but Herman's father valued his son's education and still managed to send him to grammar school in Bratislava (N. Tausk 1). During Herman's early adulthood he formed a friendship with Tomáš Masaryk, later the founding father and first president of Czechoslovakia, and “a great Panslave [sic]” explains Nada Tausk; “Under the influence of Massaryk [sic]

father got to be a great Panslave [sic] too” (1). Victor himself was born right in the middle of Jewish emancipation in Slovakia, which began in 1867 when Hungarian parliament emancipated Jews as individuals (Act Seventeen) and completed in 1895 with Act Forty-Two, when Judaism was finally listed among the *religiones receptae* (“received religions”).<sup>50</sup> When the Tausk family left Slovakia, they moved so frequently, and often to such remote areas, that strong ties with any religious community would have become frayed. Already non-traditional in their practice of Judaism, their relationship to the religion of Milka’s and Herman’s childhoods transformed into something more domestic and personal, and Herman seemed to approach Jewishness as an historically oppressed identity to be politically defended without accepting it as one that primarily defined him. Thus, while theirs was not a traditionally religious household by any means, a depiction of the Tausks’ relationship with religion as completely nonpracticing elides the complexity of Jewish identity that spanned between Orthodox (or “Status Quo” / traditional groups) and secular at this time. For example, Herman read and wrote in Hebrew, which we know because he recorded the names, dates, and places of birth—in both Hebrew and German—of each child in the family Tanakh. Each child was given a Hebrew name in addition to his or her European name; Victor’s was “Ze’ev,” meaning “wolf” (see Figure 1). These markers suggest that Jewish identity was deeply ingrained into the Tausk family without being tethered to Judaism itself. This uncoupling of Jewishness from strict practices of Judaism proves to be fundamental to Victor Tausk’s own sense of self and the ways in which Jewish culture and philosophies arise in his writing. From his earliest age,

Victor Tausk understood his Jewish identity as interpretive rather than proscriptive.




Fig. 1. Tausk family Tanakh



Fig. 2. Tausk Family Portrait circa 1900. Top row (left to right): Jelka, Anka, Viktor, Milka, Herman, Zora, Paula. Bottom row: Zdenko, Augusta, Mirko, Nada

Over the course of his life, Herman Tausk worked first as a teacher then as a reporter, publisher, editor, and general correspondent for newspapers and journals whose locations of publication traced a large swath of the European continent. The venues of his German- and Croatian- or Bosnian-language publications included the *Sarajevski List* and *Bosnische Post* (Sarajevo), *Agramer Tagblatt* (Zagreb), *Pester Lloyd* (Budapest), *Neue Freie Presse* (Vienna), and *Kölnische Zeitung* (Cologne). Meanwhile, in Slovakia, he continued to publish as a correspondent for the Bratislava-based newspapers and literary journals, *Slovenské noviny*, *Národné noviny*, *Slovenské pohľady*, and *Obzor*. He later assumed the position of Chief of Press in the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian rule.

Throughout his varied career, Herman advocated for minority groups, including his own. Herman took seriously the precarity of Jews in Europe, and this is evidenced in several of his writings. While in Zagreb, Herman wrote a political essay of twenty-one pages entitled *Židovsko Pitanje* [The Jewish Question] (1889) that meditated on the tenuous security of life that Jews faced in Europe, where he saw nationalist sentiments already fomenting and, in parallel, an antisemitic tide that cast Jews as threats to these new nations. The essay outlines the danger faced by the Jews of Europe “da naime židovstvo predstavlja tako zvani mobilni kapital, koji nepozna domovine” [namely, that Jewry represents the so-called mobile capital, which knows no homeland], and the first several pages work thoroughly through examples of European hostility built up toward Jews as a population on the basis of usury, before the author reminds his audience that “over

all, Jewish wealth is the stuff of fairytales, when for one rich Jew there are thousands of poor people, who are a living illustration of the scripture, ‘By the sweat of your face you will eat your daily bread’” (7).<sup>51</sup> Tausk here seems to anticipate the argument Moishe Postone would make roughly a century later regarding the antisemitic identification of Jews with finance capital. “When one examines the specific characteristics of the power attributed to the Jews by modern anti-Semitism—abstractness, intangibility, universality, mobility—it is striking that they are all characteristics of the value dimension of the social forms analyzed by Marx,” argues Postone (108). “Moreover, this dimension—like the supposed power of the Jews—does not appear as such, rather always in the form of a material character, such as the commodity. The carrier thus has a ‘double character’—value and use value” (108). Tausk’s warning regarding the Jewish Question he sees taking hold in different areas of Europe signals thus both a foresight on his part and the insidious endurance of antisemitic beliefs that feed on this abstractness.

The “Jewish Question” was a phrase that had begun circulating in European political discourse some decades before the publication of Herman Tausk’s essay. With the advent of Jewish emancipation in European lands, and the formation of nation-states and new national identities, the presence of an internal Jewish minority was seen by some as a social problem.<sup>52</sup> The “Jewish Question” was thus a question of how to solve this “problem,” through assimilation or more violent means. “Hvala Bogu,” Herman Tausk writes of the situation in Croatia, “židovskog pitanja nas još neima. Ali ipak neće biti suvišno, ako i mi rečemo svoju o struji, koja je zadnjih godinah preotela mah u jednom dielu Evrope”

[Thank God we don't have a Jewish question yet. Nevertheless, it will not be excessive for us to give our account of the tide that has in recent years taken over in one part of Europe] (*Židovsko Pitanje* 5). The question is a matter of life and death, he assures his readers. "Pod krabuljom antisemitizma," Tausk warns, "diže se struja, koja hoće, da se povrate vremena židovskih pokoljah, koja proglašuje živode, prinoseće državi kao što svatko drugi, žrtve novca i krvi, bezpravnimi [...]" [Under the cover of Antisemitism, a current is rising which wants to bring back the time of Jewish massacres, [a current] which declares that those living, who offer to the state like everyone else sacrifices of money and blood, lawless [...]" (*Židovsko Pitanje* 14).

Herman Tausk's proposal in response to the rise of the Jewish Question is that the greatest way for the Jewish communities of Croatia and Slavonia to prepare for and prevent the arrival of a "Jewish Question" in their land was to unite their governance, assembling polls of the most intelligent Jews of Croatia and Slavonia and, through the creation of a congress, more systematically regulate the "židovska crkva" [Jewish church] (*Židovsko Pitanje* 21). Tausk's use of the phrase "Jewish church" may sound odd or paradoxical, first because a church refers specifically to a Christian place of worship and second because Tausk is not a practicing adherent to Judaism, but Tausk's phrasing connotes the networked system of the Christian church as a political model which could better provide a persecuted people with stability and security. His proposal indicates a political savviness for minority organization that surfaces later in Victor's writing and thinking.

That Herman Tausk takes up the “Jewish Question” as a Jew, and that he seems to address his response to both Jews and non-Jews alike, is quite striking, and it speaks to the political values of the home in which Victor Tausk was raised. His essay portrays an author who is emancipated but unashamed of his Jewish heritage, not adhering to religious practice but not erasing it from his cultural identity either, motivated from within a minoritized and threatened group to seek solutions by strengthening political alliances. Moreover, *Židovsko Pitanje* is not the first publication in which Herman Tausk takes up the topic of the Jewish situation within society. Two articles published in Bratislava papers in 1873 and 1874, “Ešte slovo o Izraelitoch” [Another Word on the Israelites], and “Černátoni, židia a slováci” [Černátoni, Jews, and Slovaks], present similar arguments.<sup>53, 54</sup> Although from fifteen years earlier and from within a different geographic setting and cultural milieu, these articles seem to provide the building blocks for Herman’s 1889 essay. “Another Word on the Israelites” argues that Jews had been forced into trade and usury—a position that had made them “unsympathetic” to the gentile majority—because they had been historically and systematically denied rights to any other form of material support. The author writes under a pseudonym, presumably as a non-Jew, for he refers to “bratom Izraelitom a naopak, jejich pomer k nám” [the Israelite brothers and, in turn, their relationship to us] (Rosinský 1). Much as in *Židovsko Pitanje*, Herman concedes that some Jews may abuse their position within trade, this is not particular to Jewish culture or faith; people of all groups are known to have acted in similar ways. The Jewish history of needing to provide for oneself and family in spite of medieval prejudices, unjust laws, and various oppressors, he writes, has produced an insular

group. The solution, he offers, will come in the form of equal rights and likely require generations' worth of recovery. In "Černátoni, Jews, and Slovaks" Herman Tausk takes a similarly modern, assimilationist position: he refers to himself as proud Slovak nationalist of the Jewish faith (Palsovicsová 22). These publications illustrate Herman Tausk's complex understanding of himself as an emancipated Jew and modern subject within the swiftly shifting political world of Europe, its empires and its nations. In this light, it is not difficult to understand why Herman might have found the greatest security for his family at the margins of two culturally diverse empires, eventually settling the family in Sarajevo.

Herman Tausk would maintain some formulation of his position as a "proud [...] nationalist of the Jewish faith" over the course his life, but the nation or empire would change. He was, according to his daughter, a Pan-Slav above all (N. Tausk 1). In Croatia, he was remembered as an honorary Croatian who fought for the autonomy of Croats; the newspaper for which Herman Tausk acted as editor-in-chief, the *Agramer Tageblatt*, advocated a program to protect the interests of Croatian autonomy within the framework of the Croatian-Hungarian Settlement, with its reliance on the Viennese court. In Sarajevo, he was a monarchist with an explicit appreciation for local Bosnian culture. This is not to say that Herman Tausk was insincere in any of the positions he took. Having analyzed a fair amount of his writing and biography, it seems to me that his greatest investments were in the success of his family, the autonomy and the right to thrive of minority groups, and the order and egalitarianism that a just government could establish. His belief in these political ideals, applied to the separate causes of each case, could be interpreted as fidelity to that case in

particular. For a large, mobile, ethnically Jewish family, this interpretation would certainly be to their benefit.

By the time the family moved to Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1892, Herman Tausk had become a lauded journalist, and he assumed the position of editor-in-chief for the *Bosnische Post*, the official government newspaper, for two years. Following this, he became the chief of the press office of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and continued writing for multiple newspapers and working as a translator. In 1908 he suffered the failure of another newspaper, the *Sarajevo Wochenschrift*, and in 1912 he founded a weekly cultural and literary journal, the *Südslawische Revue – Jugoslavenska smotra* (*South-Slavic Revue – Yugoslavian Revue* in German and Croatian, respectively). The review was to be a cultural meeting point in which literary and political representations of these Slavic areas of the empire could reach Vienna, and vice versa. It lasted only a brief year, but it served as the site of publication for Victor's story "Husein Brko," which I will analyze in detail in Chapter Five.

Herman Tausk's writings often portray him as a monarchist—a loyalty that seems unsurprising when considering that European Jews had historically fared better under the heterogeneous assemblage of an empire than under local and, later, national rule. A political bias toward the monarchy is even less of a surprise when we consider that this empire was a doubly sovereign one, and that the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 that took the house of Habsburg as its binding constitutional monarchy also finally made possible the emancipation of and full citizenship for Jews within the region. Jews could be employed as civil servants, attend university, own property, and they were free to move within the

region, as the Tausk family did. Certainly, his assumption of an official governmental role for the Empire in Sarajevo would underline his fidelity to its cause. And yet, Herman Tausk seems to have politically situated himself in a way that is far from one-dimensional. His history of publications and professional collaborations with others discloses sympathetic relations with Bosniaks, Croats, and (non-radical) Serbs. For example, Herman's work while editor-in-chief at the *Bosnische Post*, which earned him acclaim from his colleagues at the Muslim paper *Bošnjak*<sup>55</sup>, and his 1907 translation of Anton Hangi's book, *Die Moslim's in Bosnien-Herzegovina: Ihre Lebenwekie, Sitten und Gebräuch* [Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Ways of Life, Mores, and Customs], are testaments to these strong intercultural alliances. Tausk's preface to the translation of Hangi's book opens with a statement on the importance of understanding.

Über die Moslims in Bosnien und Herzegovina sind in europäischen Landen auch heute noch vielfach falsche, unklare und irrige Ansichten verbreitet. Aus Gründen, deren Erörterung an dieser Stelle unzulässig erscheint, hat man die Moslims uns schon in der Schule als Element dargestellt, das sich in den Rahmen der europäischen Völkerfamilie nur schwer oder gar nicht einzufügen vermag. Dadurch wurde auch in den gebildeten Kreisen ein völlig unbegründetes und unberechtigtes Vorurteil grossgezogen, welches der auf ihre sonstige Vorurteilslosigkeit so stolzen westländischen Intelligenz würdig ist. (H. Tausk in Hagni, v)

Wrong, unclear, and erroneous views are still widespread in European countries about the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For reasons whose discussion at this point seems inadmissible, the Muslims were presented to us at school as an element difficult or impossible to integrate into the framework of the European family of nations. As a result, a completely unfounded and unjustified prejudice was likewise reared within the educated circles, of which Western intelligence, so proud of its other lack of prejudice, is not worthy.

Herman Tausk's translation was executed under an awareness of those problems in the Balkans and Austria-Hungary generally that arose from ignorance of or

animosity toward cultural, ethnic, and religious differences that would later also play out in the First World War. His translation was printed only one year before the Bosnian Crisis of 1908 that heightened already present hostility between recently annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, which still held claims on those regions. This same crisis would foment the rising tide of nationalism within various areas of the Balkans that eventually led to the assassination of Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand by a young, nationalist student, the Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip. His clear and sympathetic stance on the unprejudiced acceptance of Bosnian Muslims as part of the European “family of nations” may even portray him as biased toward the Bosniak culture. Yet, this stance repeats itself in depictions of his relationships with other groups.

As one example, Herman Tausk’s political leanings within a Croatian context were defined as sympathetic to Croatian demands and aspirations, and often aligned with those early objectives of the Party of Rights (*Stranka prava*), which advocated for the autonomy of Croatia. His obituary in Sarajevo’s *Hrvatski dnevnik* commemorated him with the following:<sup>56</sup>

Tausk je rodom Slovak, a prešao je u Zagreb prije kakovih 35 godina. Tu je našao ubrzo svoju drugu domovinu te je radio na promicanju hrvatskih potreba kao da ja rodejeni Hrvat. Suragjivao je kod “Agramer Tagblatta,” te je nastojao da vanjski svijet nepristano uputi u zahtjeve i težnje Hrvata. (3-4)

Tausk was a native of Slovakia and moved to Zagreb some thirty-five years ago. There he soon found his second homeland and worked for the promotion of Croatian needs as if he were a born Croat. He collaborated with the *Agramer Tageblatt* and sought to objectively convey to the outside world the demands and aspirations of Croatians.

The obituary also points out that Herman was particularly close to lawmakers and commends his early support of the nationalist Croatian Party of Rights.<sup>57</sup>

Founders of the Party of Rights, Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik, were stark opponents of Austrian and Hungarian rule over the Balkans. Furthermore, Starčević favored Croatia's relationship with Turkey to that with Austria-Hungary, and he believed that the "purest" spirit of the Croatian people was to be found among the Bosnian Muslim nobility (Bartulin, "The Ideology of Nation and Race" 90). For Herman Tausk to sympathize with and advocate for the Party of Rights would imply a strong level of Croatian nationalism, yet that was far from a clear or singular political leaning on his part.

Understanding how Herman may have been both a monarchist and sympathetic to Croats and Muslims within the region requires some unpacking of the cultural and political shifts that had occurred shortly before the family's move to Sarajevo. When Herman assumed the position of chief of press in Sarajevo, a little over a decade had passed since the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, which had greatly restructured the Balkan region. The Serbo-Turkish war (1876-1878), which led to the Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878), had resulted in Russian forces overtaking the formerly Ottoman areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While Serbia and Montenegro—both of which neighbored Bosnia and Herzegovina and had fought against the Ottoman Empire with Russia's aid—Romania, and, to a degree, Bulgaria were recognized as sovereign principalities by the treaty, it was mandated at the 1878 Congress of Berlin that Bosnia and Herzegovina would be occupied and governed by Austria-Hungary, as European leaders were anxious at the prospect of relinquishing too much territory and control to Russia. Herman remained politically engaged in his work, but he adapted somewhat to the cultural atmosphere around him. Family photos of over

the course of his life demonstrate his regional variations of dress, for example. A photo taken during his early life in Slovakia shows him dressed in a fashionable, Western suit with bowtie and collar. Another, from his days in Sarajevo, shows him in a casual, defiant stance, a pipe cocked in the corner of his mouth, spectacles left perched on the bridge of his nose, and on his head, a fez hat typically worn by men in Bosnia and Herzegovina (of various ethnic and religious backgrounds) for centuries (See Figure 3). His writing and his work, just like his outward appearance in these images, point to a continuous flux and engagement with his cultural environment.



*Fig. 3. Photos of Herman Tausk from family archive*

Considering this context, the zeugmatic formation of Herman Tausk's publication *Südslawische Revue – Jugoslavenska smotra* provides evidence of his desire to

manifest greater mutual understanding between various groups in the area, as well as between what were largely considered the German-speaking “center” of the empire and its “peripheries.” However, Herman Tausk’s relationship to the monarchy on one hand and the Croatian and Bosniak populations on the other would have placed him at odds politically with much of the Serbian population, who constituted roughly 40% of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina at that time.<sup>58</sup> Indeed, association with Herman Tausk’s work and publications was looked down upon by Serbian nationals, as demonstrated in a conflict that arose between Milutin M. Uskoković, a Serbian author who worked with the *Revue*, and his Serbian colleagues—the Serbian Writers’ Association and the brothers Vladislav and Davorin Ribnikar, editors of the Belgrade-based newspaper *Политике* [Politics], where Uskoković also published. An editorial published in *Политике* in May of 1912 said of Uskoković’s work for the *Revue*, “To collaborate with a German-language newspaper in Bosnia that fortifies the Habsburg monarchy and defends the interests of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy there is an unforgivable sin” (“Јадници” qtd. in Bogunović 341).<sup>59</sup>

These examples illustrate it would indeed be a hard case to make, to insist that Herman Tausk’s writing, let alone his position as an official of the monarchy, was equally or authentically embracing of all groups within this region of Southeast Europe. Considering the rising tension between Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and those who represented the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the radically different visions that each group had for the future of the region based on disparate impressions of each other, such a task may very well have been a Herculean one at the time, not to mention in the decades to follow. Yet

Herman Tausk's attempts to create sites of mutual understanding through print culture consistently surface in work over the course of his lifetime.

Much of my attention has been dedicated in these last pages to Herman Tausk's literary and political work because of how fundamental it seems to have been to his son Victor's development as a thinker and writer. Victor and his father were said to have had a strained and antagonistic relationship in which Herman was a hard-working and authoritarian head of household and Victor headstrong and resistant, later claiming embarrassment at being called by his father's name (Roazen, *Brother Animal* 9-10). Herman was known to have been hard on his wife, Emilie, and to have had extramarital affairs, which probably did not help Victor's relationship with his father.<sup>60</sup> Though the personal difficulties between father and son may have found resonance in the writing he produced on father-child relationships, there are also ways in which Victor and his father were clearly aligned.<sup>61</sup> For example, Victor engaged with Serbian, Muslim, and Roma protagonists and folklore in his literary writing, and his work in law and psychoanalysis often attended to the advocacy for minority groups, just as we find in Herman Tausk's writings on Jewish and Muslim representation. Though they may have disagreed over the ideal political formation of the Slavic Balkans, Victor and Herman Tausk were each representative of their respective generational pulls toward the political formation of Southeast Europe in a way that prioritized heterogeneous cooperation and mutual understanding. Additionally, the written work of both father and son evidence similarly complex relationships to their own Jewishness and to Judaism. While Herman's break from tradition fell in line with the general sentiments of emancipated Jews of his generation, his sense of identity

re-rooting itself through political advocacy for Jews of Europe, Victor's rebellion against religion would be a more personal struggle, and it would express itself through his literary and philosophical works.


Due to the family's relocation and his own proneness for conflict with authority figures, Victor studied in quite a few areas of the Balkans during his teenage years. According to his report cards, he attended Gymnasium in Zagreb at the beginning of the 1889/90 academic year, Sarajevo at the end of that year, Rijeka (on the northern coast of the Adriatic Sea) for the academic year of 1890/91 and then Varaždin (northeast Croatia) for the 1891/92 year, where he would receive his matura degree. Over the course of his early scholastic career, he excelled in the study of languages, including Latin, Greek, Croatian, German, French, and Italian. His other grades are usually high, except in the case of religious instruction. Paul Roazen asserts in *Brother Animal* that Victor Tausk completed his schooling in Varaždin because of a row he'd started with the school master in Sarajevo, which had to do with the instruction of religion in school (10). As is the case with a lot of the biographical information in Roazen's book, the author does not provide referential evidence for this anecdote, yet research through Tausk's papers seems to corroborate the claim. Tausk's report cards demonstrate that his work in school was above average, and he often received *izvrstan* [excellent] or *pohvalan* [laudable] in the subject of religion, his lowest grade being a *dobar* [good] from his early Gymnasium year at the school in Zagreb. Curiously, however, the report card from Sarajevo bears evidence of some mischief from Tausk, who would have been eleven years old at the time. The grades are all written in the tight, dark script of the homeroom teacher, with the

signatures of various other instructors aligned neatly next to them in confirmation, but an ostentatious signature that appears to be the adolescent Tausk's own is found next to his grade in the subject of *vjeronauci* [religious studies] (see Fig. 4).

Br. 62

## Svjedodžba

velike gimnazije sarajevske.



*Tausk Victor iz Biline u Ugarskoj, jevrejske vjere, otaca*  
 učenik prvoga razreda, dobiva ovijem za drugi tečaj školske godine 1889/90  
 svjedodžbu prvog reda s odličkom.

Čudorednost *pohvalna*  
 Marljivost *dovoljna*

Napredak u		Potpisi učitelja
vjeronauci	<i>pohvalan</i>	<i>Tausk</i>
zemaljskom jeziku	<i>pohvalan</i>	<i>J. Smolaka</i>
latinskom jeziku	<i>pohvalan</i>	<i>Josip Novak</i>
grečkom jeziku	~ ~ ~	
njemačkom jeziku	<i>izvrstan</i>	<i>Josip Novak</i>
zemljopisu i povijesti	<i>pohvalan</i>	<i>V. Maršić</i>
matematici	<i>dovoljan</i>	
prirrodopisu, fizici	<i>pohvalan</i>	
filozofičnoj propedeutici	~ ~ ~	
prostoručnom crtanju	<i>pohvalan</i>	<i>M. Maršić</i>
krasnopisu	<i>pohvalan</i>	
gombanju	<i>dovoljan</i>	<i>Starješina</i>
pjevanju	<i>izvrstan</i>	
magjarskom jeziku	~ ~ ~	

Spoljašno lice pismenijeh radnja *uredno*  
 Broj propuštenijeh sati *5%*, i to \_\_\_\_\_ neopravdan.

U Sarajevu, dne *26. juna* 1890.

*Novak* ravnatelj      *Josip Novak* razredni starješina

O c j e n e z a						
čudorednost:	<i>pohvalna</i>	besprikladna	~ ~ ~	nije besprikladna	prikladna	~ ~ ~
marljivost:	<i>ustrajna</i>	dovoljna	~ ~ ~	neustajna	nedovoljna	~ ~ ~
napredak:	<i>izvrstan</i>	pohvalan	dovoljan	dostatan	nedovoljan	sasvim nedovoljan
spoljašno lice:	<i>lijepo</i>	razgovijetno	~ ~ ~	uredno	neuredno	~ ~ ~

Fig. 4.1. Victor Tausk report card, 1889/90




Fig. 4.2. Victor Tausk report card, 1889/90 (enlarged)

Early evidence of Tausk's conflicted relationship or disinterest with religious instruction could indicate several larger conflicts: the protest of Christianity's predominance in this instruction, a distaste for particular religious teachings in the year following the death of his brother, a general empirical attitude, or feelings of anger and criticism toward an ultimate authority figure. Whatever faith he had held until that point seems to have dissolved during this year. Many years later, Lou Andreas-Salomé would write in her journal a reflection that Tausk had shared with her on the significance of his rejection of the instruction of religion, connecting it with the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, whom they both admired:

Es war schön, was Tausk sagte: Gemeinplatz ist etwas nicht nur wegen Mangel an Geist, sondern weit mehr wegen Mangel an Leben [...] (so wenn Nietzsche sagt: « den alle Lust will Ewigkeit, will tiefe, tiefe Ewigkeit » – einerlei wie unsere sachlich-psychologische Betrachtungsweise den Lustbegriff zuergliedern mag). Das Wesentliche dabei bleibt (darüber einigten wir uns nach kürzer Debatte), daß hier aus der Ganzheit des Lebens gedacht werde, wie wir sie ohne weiteres als Lebendige in uns selbst ebenfalls repräsentieren, während die Lebensnegation mit einem Mangel an empfundener Lebendigkeit zusammenhänge, der Weltschmerz

ein *Symptom* darstelle. Das Beispiel von Tausk selbst, als Gymnasiast: wie er zur Gotteskritik kommt, berechtigt scheinbar und sachlich, doch heimlich motiviert durch Verschiebung vom Vater her, der unantastbar bleibt wie das Leben. (*In der Schule* 123-124)

Tausk put it so well: commonplaceness comes not only from a lack of spirit but far more from lack of life. [...] (as Nietzsche says: “All pleasure wants eternity, wants deep, deep eternity” – no matter how our objective psychological approach may categorize the concept of pleasure). The essential point remains (we agreed after a short debate) is that here we are thinking of the whole of life, as we ourselves readily represent it as living beings, whereas the negation of life has to do with a lack of perceived vitality, of which *Weltschmerz* is a *Symptom*. Tausk’s own example from his Gymnasium years: how he arrived at his criticism of the notion of God, apparently by objective and legitimate means, but secretly motivated by the displacement from his father, who remains inviolate as life itself.

As this passage illustrates, Tausk deduced in psychoanalytic hindsight that his atheism was a displaced severing of his relationship to his father. Yet the original relationship, “inviolable as life itself,” would come to signify an important bond of responsibility between future and past generations that he was tasked to uphold. In his adult life, as in his adolescence, defiance and critique would be readily directed toward dogmatic authority; respect would be reserved for free thinkers as well as for responsibility to the autonomy of others.

### *Victor, Vladoje*

Victor’s teenaged and early adult life was marked by the same literary and political fervor that we find in his father Herman’s work and that would likewise surface later in his psychoanalytic publications. During his later years at Gymnasium, he wrote poetry and, by way of Herman’s connections in publishing, he was already very familiar with the elite literary circle of Sarajevo. In fact, within Croatian literary discourse today, Victor Tausk’s name is associated with a

youthful modernist turn in Croatian poetry. English-language accounts of Victor's life, on the other hand, have entirely overlooked his poetic contributions, either because they were disguised by a pseudonym or because they have simply been left untranslated from Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian into German or English. That pseudonym was Vladoje Slovačić—a work of some poetic mischief in its own right. “Vlad,” a name of Old Slavic origin meaning “power” or “rule”, is adjacent to “Victor” in meaning, and the suffix of “-oje” is a pointedly Orthodox (i.e. Serbian) one. The surname “Slovačić” can be roughly translated into “child of a Slovakian.” It would thus be Victor's way of both referencing his birthplace in Žilina while assuming a suffix (-čić) that, though found in names of many ethnic and religious backgrounds in the Balkans, is a slightly more characteristically Croatian diminutive. In total, the pseudonym transforms his name into a gesture of political solidarity—or, at the very least, one of political, religious, or ethnic ambiguity—across Slavic cultural and ethnic groups. This gesture would be echoed in the content of Slovačić's published work.

Slovačić's early publications appeared in the pages of a Sarajevo-based literary journal titled *Nada: pouci, zabavi i umjetnosti* [Hope: learning, entertainment, and the arts], which was published twice monthly from 1895-1903 under the editorial purview of the poet Silvije Strahimir Kranjčević, a close friend of Herman Tausk's and a mentor highly admired by Victor. The journal was printed in both Roman and Cyrillic scripts and contained literature and art that, if at times ethnographic or orientalist, demonstrated a heterogenous sense of South-Slavic culture. Literary contributions included poetry, prose, literary reviews, sometimes travelogues, and other short reports. Art found in *Nada*'s pages ranged

from romantic paintings of woodland nymphs or woodcut prints of mushrooms and flora to scenes of life from the Middle East or North Africa and sketched portraits of South-Slavic subjects from various ethnic backgrounds. Slovačić's lyric poems "Sivo Oko" ("Grey Eye"), 1897, and "Zimsko Cvijeće" ("Winter Flowers"), 1898, were printed respectively alongside a photograph of the Serbian town Priboj, on the Lim River, and three sketches of city life in Cairo, demonstrating the wide international scope in which the journal imagined itself. (See Figure 9)

The two short lyrics poems both take elements of nature as their extended metaphors in the representation of unrequited love, and each seems to flirt with a proximity to death—characteristics that might lead one to think of romanticism rather than modernism. Form coincides with the romantic tendency; "Grey Eye" is written in three five-line stanzas of tetrameter lines rhyming in ABCCB (the ABCCB or ABBA scheme is common, incidentally, to poetry by Wordsworth as it is to Kranjčević's poetry).

СИВО ОКО	Sivo oko	Grey Eye
СИВО ОКО ! АХ ДУБОКО КО ОКЕАН СИЊИ ШТО ЈЕ СЈАЈНО, ЖАРКО, НЕПОЈМЉИВО КО СТОЛЕЋЕ НЕЖИВЉЕНО, ТДЈЕ СЕ ДАНИ ЈОШ НЕ БРОЈЕ.	Sivo oko ! Ah duboko Ko okean sinji što je Sjajno, žarko, nepojmljivo Ko stoljeće neživljeno, Gdje se dani još ne broje.	Grey eye ! Ah deep As ocean cyan, which is Splendid, burning, unfathomable As a century unlied, Where days are not yet numbered.
КАО НЕБО, ГДЈЕ СЕ СРБА ЛИК ПРИРОДЕ СВЈЕЖЕ, ЖИВЕ, ТДЈЕ СТОЛУЈУ СВЕТЕ ВИЛЕ И СВЕ ВЛАСТИ И СВЕ СИЛЕ — — СЈАЈЕ ТВОЈЕ ОЧИ СИВЕ.	Као небо, gdje se zrcа Lik prirode svježe, žive, Gdje stoluju svete vile I sve vlasti i sve sile — — Sjaje tvoje oči sive.	Like the sky, reflecting Nature's countenance, fresh, alive, Where sainted sprites are enthroned And all rulers and all forces — — Your grey eyes shining.
И ЈА ГЛЕДАМ У ТО НЕБО, ТАМО МОЈА ДУША ПЛИЈЕ И СУДБИНУ МОЈУ НОСИ : ИЛ' ЋЕ РОСОМ ДА МЕ РОСИ, ИЛ' ЋЕ МУЊОМ ДА УБИЈЕ !	I ja gledam u to nebo, Tamo moja duša plije I sudbinu moju nosi : Il' će rosom da me rosi, Il' će munjom da ubije !	And I watch that sky, Yonder, where my soul dances And my fate is borne : Either I shall be covered in dew, Or struck down by lightning !

Zimsko cvijeće	Winter Flowers
Na pendžeru* ledni cv'jeci Divni izniknuše, Meki, l'jepi, zavojiti, Ali — ne miruše.	Ice flowers on the window Magnificently springing up, Tender, lovely, winding, Alas — without a scent.
Rumen-ruža moja ljuba, Ko anđiel kad dr'jema : Ljubila bi ona mene, Ali — srca nema.	My love a blushing rose, As an angel softly sleeping, She would love me, Alas — without a heart.

\* This (now antiquated) word for window is adopted from the Ottoman language, designating this poem's lingual home in Bosnian.

“Winter Flowers,” follows an ABAB rhyme scheme (loosening to a slant rhyme in the second stanza) and, like “Grey Eye,” makes Romantic gestures to transcendent love almost attained, lifting toward an emotional peak and descending in the final line of each stanza.

образовања ни довољно вјерско осјећања. Услијед тога се у простом народу осјећају зле помисли, те се код виђених људи природно рађа жеља да што годвијем завршавају. И назаренство покушава да једном својим мјеском, водећи људе својему предлу савршенства и благодети.

Већ и само име назорине, да је и назаренство у главног хришћанство, само погрешно схваћено, које о себи држи да је права, чиста, Христова наука, те по томе једина, која спасава. Све остале вјере су криве, што су људи овако познани.

Ласкајући тако људма, да је вјера њихова крива њиховој несрећи, а не она сама, а особито привлачући у братски заградај (управо рећи право хришћанско), оне, које данашње друштво, због њихових њених учњених погрешака непре-

своја вјерска (за која доседе нико не би ни знао) и вадрасти за њих кажу или за опротној молити. Такав је обраћање највише неуспешно — „пријатеља“, касније „брат“ (кад је већ пречишћен од грјехе и крштењ); а ако је подобан да вјерно тумачи еванђеље, постаје „пророком“, старјешном назаренским. Тек пошто „пријатеља“ засведочи пред „пророцима“, да је над собом осјећвао св. Духа, да га не муче зле мисли, биће крштено (баптизирано) у три мјеста у ријеку, што значи један од „брате“ или „пророка“, уз вјеране недела на облаву; за тим се у „скупштини“ причешћује комадићем хлеба и гуглајем вина (управо као и католици). Но, како се крштење врши, чува се у тајности и од самих „пријатеља“, вјероватно да би се онама показивала да се за крштење што обилније спрема, а зар да би се простота и ништаност самога тога чина прикрила.

прати на клаузама, а „пријатељи“ и „пријатељице“ њих њих. На средњи је мјесто објери сто, да који сједи „пророци“. Богослужбоје (као и у католици) отпочиње вјером на неделама, који се вјерају, за њом долази молитва, послје чега један од „брате“ или „пророка“ тумачи еванђеље; послје тога један „брат“ одита молитву, па се служба заврши омет сложено побожном вјером. За молитву највише одређене нарочите вјерни; моли се сваки, како зна, али само један чита молитву, а сви други за то вјерне клече склопљених руку. Само „брат“ и „сестре“ поју, јер су „пречишћени“ (од грјехова), а док ова поју, доде још грађани „пријатеља“ и „пријатељице“ једну и плуку, кајући се за грјехе своје. Код назарена нема нарочитих свештеника, нити оних, што тумаче еванђеље, већу какав владе (јер свештеничку плуку, бпр. назорину „обједом“). За вјерне



Првио: Дво вароши уз ријеку Лик.

стано кроз њих њихов живот (дакле збоља посве нехришћански) вјерне и туђи их се, као оно кузних; проповиједјући умјерност, и претходни привјером у умјерену једу, пићу, ружу, свима аскетичку потребу (од које хришћанскога правила данашња хришћани одвећ отпадне); стварајући доброделима приликама ошће благари и помажући на њих, свакојерно и без интереса, употребте чланове своје, у случају њих несреће (од којег се хришћанског правила данашња хришћани такојер много удаљују); дејући на тај начин у главноме мисла несрећанима, — природно је да назаренство има чиме себи своје привући. А кад су људма олакшане и у неколико обезбјеђене главне им животне намирнице, онда је лако са натурамом појединих и глужих вјерских правила, обрета и обичаја.

Ко хоће да ступи у назаренство, мора се прије свега заједнати, да не бити потпун чојом. Ступајући у њову вјеру, мора испредом исповијести своје грјехе „мјерника“ — „брани“ или „пророцима“, ваља да је спреман вратити (ако не одмах, а оно првом вгодом) оне, што је кад било од кога неправедно узео, признати

Дејете назаренско никак не може бити крштено, јер није сјесно вјере своје.

Нарочитих првака немају, јер их сматрају као „поповске војенице“, а она првена излажу „бшовина“, а свештеника „варољом гробом“, а све хришћане и уопће назаренске „незнабошцима и поганима“. „Скупштина“ њихова — то је њихова прила, а састају се у нарочито одређеној, но обичној кући (коју често држа, и с њом и изнутра, по један од најмањих чланова), било сваки дан пред вечер, на кратку молитву или недељом на јуду; која почиње од ривако јутра да се сачињује најдуже до осам сата изутра, послје чега сваки одлази на свој рад. Послје „вечерња“ (вечерњих молитава) разготор је о општаци стварица, што се тачу, било погрета мјесне, назаренске опшине, уопће или појединих јој чланова. — „Скупштина“ је подела себа, бијело окренета без икаквих украса, сјом једног законика на зиду, који треба да опомиње вјерне, е се ваља с Богом измрити, јер смрт се ближи. С једне и друге стране су клаузе. На једној страни сједи мушкар, на другој жене. „Брат“ и „сестре“ сједи на-

богослужбена у споредној соби, одмах до „скупштине“, стоје до отворених прозора жене, које би собом довијале вјеру, како би се с њима лако могло уклониити, ако би „скупштина“ биле на сметљи.

(Иставање се)

Сиво око.

Сиво око! Ах дубоко  
 Ко окома свима што је,  
 Сјајно, зарско, немирљиво  
 Ко стојеће немиљиво,  
 Гдје се дан још не броје.  
 Као небо, гдје се зрпа  
 Лик пророке свијеће, алик,  
 Лик стојају свете виле  
 И све власти и све силе —  
 Сјаје твоје очи свие.  
 И ја гледам у те небо,  
 Тако моја душа кличе  
 И судбину моју носи:  
 Па! не росом да ме роси,  
 Па! не муљом да ме убаје!

Блаже Сивачкић.

Fig. 5. "Sivo Oko" in Nada



Kairo: Sokak.

Vidjevši ovako ljubazan snošaj među oha brata, teško bismo i vjerovali ono što nam pjesma, upletena u Hektorovićevo „Ribanje“ o braći kraljevićima pripovijeda. Gledajući gdje brat svoga rođenoga brata ubija, lako bismo pristali uz Goethe-a te se ogavnošću odvrtili od tako groznoga čina. Da vidimo!

Borba, u koju se braća Kraljevići upustiše, biće svakako dostojna samo onda, ako su motivi, koji ih u taj boj nagonu, takovi, da su vrijedni, da junaku potaknu, da se pru i bore. A koji je to motiv u našoj pjesmi?

Nije li taj motiv dostojan, da se za nj junaci, pa još braća pobiju?

U našoj se pjesmi izričkom veli, da se junaci najprije pru, a onda biju o konja. Ajde dakle da vidimo, što nam o tom uopće narodna pjesma veli; je li to motiv, iako jak, da se radi toga junaci onako kruto hvataju.

Homerovi junaci ponose se sjajnim štitom, pernatom kacigom, dugom suloom, lijepo izraženim kolima: našem je junaku nada sve konj i oružje. Svaki glavni čin u životu obavlja on na konju; on mu je vjeran pratilac od kolijevke do groba. Po gotovo ne će junak zapodjeti boja bez konja. Od kolike je vrijednosti junaku konj, neka nam posvjedoče ova mjesta narodne pjesme:

U pjesmi „Nejačak Nenad“ (Jukić I, 8.) brani majka devetero djece „na preslicu i desnicu ruku“, pa kad ih majka poohraivala:

„Jednake im pokroj haljine,  
A jednake konje kupovila.“

Eto dakle junaku je konj u najranijoj mladosti vjeran drugar.

Vuk Despot, žene svoga sina Lazu (Jukić I, 7), izlazi pred svatove i prvo mu je da razgleda konje i junake, jer bi po junaka bila teška sramota doći u svatove, a bez konja. Zato kad se ženi bane od Budima (Jukić I, 10), nalaže namet na vilajet i izdaje zapovijed:

„Kogod banu u svatove dozije,  
„A najnađe konje ni slika,  
„Da ga bane opremi lijepo  
„Sa svojijem konjem i slikom...“

U tijem je svatovima Marko Kraljević starješina. Mali Grujo, sin zeta Markova Novaka hajduka, rado bi pošao banu u svatove, da vidi

svoga daju (ujaka) Marka, ali oću jedan uvjet stavljati:

„Opremi mi ti konja „gogala“,  
Ja ću banu ići u svatove.“

I ako je Grujo „dijete malo“, ne ide ni on u svatove bez konja. Pače, kad ga bane od Budima odvraća, da ne ide za svatovima ka vodi Ribnici, jer da tamo skele čuva trideset Arapa, među kojima je i jedan, troglav Arapine“, koji jaše na vranjoj bedeviji! — — —

„Iz usti joj mavi plamen bije  
„Iz očiju munja sjevata  
„Ona ždere konja i junaka — — —“

mali se Grujo ne boji toga:

„Dok je meni Boga velikoga  
„I pociete djetice Marije  
„I „gogala“ stara babe moga.“

Eto vidimo, kako se junak narodne pjesme, pa bio baš i dijete na konju bori nekim pouzdanjem i sigurnošću. No kud i kamo mu pouzdanje i junastvo raste, kad je svoga „gogala“ baštini od oca. Zato Grujo, natjeravši svoga „gogala“ na Arape, sve ih pobubija i konje im pohvata.

Iz mnogih primjera narodne pjesme mogli bismo pouzdano reći, da junak, bijući se na konju, uspješno vojuje; konj mu je u boju sve uzdaje.


Tako u ženidi Mijata Pivića (Jukić I, 23.) Kuna Hasanaga bijući se s kaurinom Markičem na konju, drži se dosta junački;

„Al kad Kune sa konju nestade,  
„Oće glava, ode i uzglavje...“

Eto koliko junaku vrijedi konj! Zato ćemo opet s druge strane vidjeti, kako junaci svoga konja nada sve cijene i gaje. Svaki junak konja dvori, što bolje može, na njegov meće napremu što može bolju, a najobličnije, sedlo pozlaćenom“, „obu vensedniku“.

„A po čohi svilu i kadiflu,  
„A po svili tesku medvedjenu;  
„Prteže mu svilene kolane,  
„Zauzda ga uzlom pozlaćenom...“

(Švrljevo)



Kairo: Arapska kuća u Bulaku.



Kairo: Pročelje arapske kuće.

## Zimsko cvijeće.

Na pendžeru ledni cv'jerci  
Dvni izniknuše,  
Meki, l'jepi, zavojiti,  
Ali — ne miruše.

Rumen-ruža moja ljuba,  
Ko anđel kad dr'jema:  
Ljubila bi ona mene,  
Ali — srca nema.

Vindije Stenčić.

## Grafologija.

U jednoj od neumrlih svojih komedija — le Bourgeois Gentilhomme — prikazuje Molière obogaćena trgovca, koji bi htio da zataji grafičansko svoje podrijetlo i prikrije prijašnje svoje zvanje. S toga uzima kojekakve lokaje, ne bi li naučio manire prava pravcata viteza. Jedan od učitelja njegovih tumači mu što je to proza, i u čem se razlikuje od poezije. Na veliko svoje čudo i zadovoljstvo otkri iz ovog tumačenja M. Jourdaina — to je ime junaku komedije — da je već kroz četrdeset godina, otkad govori, govori u prozi a da ni ne zna za to — il fait de la prose sans le savoir.

Mi smo svi manje više, u pogledu grafologije, u položaju M. Jourdaina: mi prakticiramo grafologiju a da ni ne znamo za to.

Koliko li puta, kad dobijemo pismo od nepoznata ili bar pobliže nepoznata čovjeka, nastojimo da iz pisma zaključimo na ličnost pisca! Ako vidimo na svakoj stranici sa strane jednak prazan prostor; ako su retci ravni i jednako udaljeni jedan od drugog; ako su interpunkcije kako treba na svom mjestu; ako su slova dovoljno razliječena; zaključujemo, da je pisac čovjek koji ljubi red i da je bistra duha.

Mi ne možemo da zamislimo konfuzan duh, čije bi grafičke manifestacije bile jasne i odmjerenе.

Skrtač ima zbijeno pismo kao da ne će da gubi i najmanji prostorić papira; usuprot ne pišu rasipnici van tri četiri riječi u retku, a završeci njihovih slova sjećaju na široke geste onoga, koji daje.

Blagost, koja se u mimici odaje oblim kretanjima, pokazuje se u oblim zaokruženim pismenima. Usuprot zaključivačemo iz uglastih poteza na oporost značaja.

Nagnuto pismo odaje nježnost, uspravno jačost značaja.

Brzo, nervozno pismo izrazuje aktivnost, uzbugenost; mirno i polagano mlitavost.

Iščekana slova pripisačemo čovjeku pretenziornu, gizdelnu; ekscentričan značaj manifestirajuće se u bizarnom: priprost i otvoren u neiskštenom pismu; kod krupnih i trbušastih slova pomislismo nehotice na čovjeka bezobzirna, a možda i prostaka.

Sudeći i zaključujući ovako, mi smo u piscu prakticirali grafologiju.

Grafologija je dakle skroz empirična nauka. Videći, da između pisma i ličnosti pisca postoji stanovit odnos, nastojala je ta nauka, da te odnose fiksira u stalnim pravilima.

Kako se ta pravila ustanovljuju? Način istraživanja je različit. Jedan uzima na pr. rukopise od deseterice osoba, koje sve imaju stanovitu osebnost značaja, na pr. od deseterice

Fig. 6. „Zimsko Cvijeće“ in Nada

While the influence of Romanticism is surely present, there are glimmers of a movement toward modernism in Slovačić's situation of his poetic subject. In her analysis of „Grey Eye,“ Sibila Petlevski finds in the lyric voice of eighteen-year-old Tausk/Slovačić intonations from his mentor Kranjčević's work, specifically

for how he metaphorizes an encounter with a young woman (Petlevski reads the figure of the woman out of the synecdoche of the eye) into one with an elemental force of nature (“Zaboravljeno lice Moderne” 68). Petlevski reads the poem as drawing upon both a folkloric tradition with its animation of natural elements, and a modern tradition through its representation of the relationship between a subject and his epoch that develops through a desire for experience. She points out that, in 1897, Tausk is “još uvijek računa na mogućnost paralelnog, harmoniziranog razvoja čovjeka i društva; dapače, uvjeren je da putevi introspekcije, automatski osvjetljavaju i labirint društvenih premrežavanja” [still counting on the possibility of the parallel, harmonious development of man and society; indeed, he is convinced that paths of introspection automatically illuminate the maze of social entanglements] (“Zaboravljeno lice Moderne” 71). Considered in a pre-Yugoslavian context, poetry was not only a mode with which a young, modern European might make sense of himself in context of his milieu but also a mode for realizing the heterogeneous world to come, a world to which the name “Vladoje Slovačić” most clearly belonged. Thus, Victor’s engagement with poetry was colored by a youthful, political movement toward a utopian future, and so, as Vladoje, he wrote from within this future-oriented perspective. And yet, Petlevski observes,

Takvo pouzdanje u naturalnost socijalne dijakronije ubrzo će ga napustiti i otvoriti put skepsi i pobuni protiv autoriteta: društvenih, vjerskih, obiteljskih, i književnih, da bi se nekoliko desetljeća kasnije to bogoborstvo proširilo i na autoritete znanosti i struke. (“Zaboravljeno lice Moderne” 71).

This confidence in the naturalness of social diachronic development would soon leave him, making way for the scepticism and rebellion against authority—social, religious, familial, and literary—that would in the

decades to follow extend to blasphemies against the authorities of science and those of his professional realm.

Her observations apply equally to Vladoje Slovačić's work following this poem as they do to Victor Tausk's studies as a psychoanalyst over a decade later.

Petlevski is not the only contemporary writer among the Croatian literati to draw upon Tausk's contributions in order to enrich public understanding of Slavic literary history. Branimir Donat was the first to have published a literary analysis connecting Slovačić with Tausk. In a 2007 article, Donat examines Tausk's role as both as Freud's gifted pupil and as a literary author, making the case that Tausk is an important figure through which to trace the links between Croatian modernism and the modernism(s) of the rest of Europe. As Donat makes these connections, he focuses on the literary journal of *Mladost* that Victor Tausk organized and wrote for in his early adulthood, thus having, Donat claims, an integral role in the birth of Croatian Modernism. In 1897, at the age of 18, Tausk moved to Vienna to study law. Though geographically removed from the local literary circles that had formed some of his earliest environments of intellectual development, he remained an active participant in the Slavic literary world. In addition to publishing poetry in the pages of *Nada* around the time of this move, he was part of a student society called "Zvonimir," which Donat tells us was populated by young Croatian modernists (72). By 1898 Tausk was one of a group of Slavic students in Vienna who launched a magazine titled *Mladost: smotra za modernu književnost i umjetnost* [Youth: Revue for Modern Literature and Art] (Donat 76). Their editors and organizers were located in both Zagreb and Vienna, and the magazine had an unambiguously international orientation. During this

year, Tausk did his best to drum up funding for the magazine and continued to write under the Slovačić pseudonym. His most radical contribution during this time would be on the topic of literary modernism.

Slovačić's position on modernism was articulated in an eighteen-page pamphlet titled *Dr. Ante Tresić Pavičić* (1898), which took as its ideological counterpoint and foil the eponymous Tresić-Pavičić and his poetry. The pamphlet was ambitiously announced as the first of a long series, though it would ultimately be the only one to be published, very likely the only one to be written. Clearly, Tausk's ambitions were grand and politically oriented from the very beginning of his life in the public world of words. The opening statement of the pamphlet serves as an unofficial manifesto of Croatian modernism:

Moderno! Ta riječ danas ne karakteriše samo časovitu prolaznu pojavu u životu čovjeka i ljudi; sadržaj joj je mnogo određeniji. Moderno, to je danas pojam čovjeka na prelazu u dvadeseti vijek, na prelazu iz stoljeća pare i elektrike u vijek, koji će da riješi neriješeni do sada problem čovjeka prama čovjeku, problem muža i žene, problem individua i problem hljeba. To moderno danas vrije u svim mozgovima, titra u svim živcima, izražava se u svakom stvoru umjetničke mašte. Dali je to moderno realizam, naturalizam, simbolizam? Nijedna od ovih riječi ne odgovara potpuno sadržaju toga pojma. To je moderno produktom izmorenih mozgova i razdrtih živaca, u kojima u mjesto gigantske tvorne snage djeluje fina osjetljivost za umjetničku sadržinu svega što živi i što se kreće. To moderno, to je suština naših misli i nazora o nama i o svijetu, a poglavito o nama i o našem snošaju prama drugomu čovjeku. To moderno, to je danas čovjek, čas iskinut iz svoga okoliša, čas opet usađen u nj', čas malen, čas velik, ali uvijek čovjek.

A u umjetnosti to je moderno danas lozinkom. Sadržaj mu je, kako vidimo, vrlo težak pojam: čovjek. No taj se pojam u smislu modernoga već silno bistri.

Dokazom su tome — osim produkata tvorne umjetnosti, kojom se ovdje ne ću da bavim — djela modernih majstora na polju drame i romana, a glavni su im zastupnici literarni velikani Francuza, Nijemaca i Sjevernaka (Šveda, Norvežana, Danaca).

Moto je toga modernoga dakle: » Svaki neka pokaže što jest, svaki ima svoje mjesto u životu, neka ga dakle ispuni sobom a ne drugima «!  
(Slovačić 5)

Modern! This word today does not just characterize the hourly passage in the life of man and the collective; its content is much more specific. Modern today is the word for a man at the turn of the twentieth century, at the turn of the millennium of steam and electricity, in the ages that will solve the problem that has until now been left unresolved, of what a human being is to man, the problem of husband and wife, the problem of the individual and the problem of bread. What is modern today is that which is boiling in all brains, flickering in all nerves, that which is expressed in every creature of artistic imagination. Is this modern one of realism, naturalism, symbolism? None of these words can correspond to the full meaning of this term. This modern is a product of wearied brains and rent nerves, in which a fine sensitivity acts as the formative force of artistic content for all that lives and moves. This modern, this is the essence of our thoughts and our views of ourselves and on the world, especially when it comes to our sexual relationships with others. That which is modern is today a man, at once excluded from his environment and in the same moment embedded within it, at once both small and great, but always human.

And in the arts, the modern is a password. Its content is, as we can see, a formidable concept: man. But in the sense of the modern this concept is already very clear.

Proof of this—aside from the [visual] creative arts, which I will not deal with here—is to be found in works by modern masters in the field of drama and novels, the main representatives of whom are the literary greats from France, Germany, and Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, Denmark).

The motto of this modernism is therefore: “Let each one show what he is; each one has his own place in life, let him fill it with himself and not with others!”

Tausk’s pronouncements on modernism here illuminate three key elements that both establish him as the integral agent within Croatian modernism that Donat claims him to have been and that will also carry over into his later work in psychoanalysis. First, Tausk homes in on a crisis of identity between the individual and collective psyche that depends on material relationships rather than abstracted spiritual ones: bread, marriage, and technologies of industry, for example. At once, a person is both alienated from and embedded within these surroundings, he says. This will transfer into his psychoanalytic work in ways he cannot completely foresee in these years preceding the turn of the century,

specifically when he later engages with the psychological crises suffered from war and shifting geopolitical and national boundaries. Tausk points explicitly to the part that “dull brains and torn nerves” have played in producing the Modern moment—a reference that resounds with studies on hysteria that had been conducted and published upon by Charcot, Freud, and Breuer only a few years prior to Tausk’s missive. Considering Freud’s previously addressed disappointment in the reception of *Studies on Hysteria*, as well as the fact that we have no written evidence here of Tausk’s having yet read Freud’s work, it would be a leap to suggest that there is a direct correlation between his reference to the degradation of the brain and nerves and Freud’s early studies. However, the influence of a general study of the brain and nerves within medical circles of his time was certainly latently present. Donat, for example, makes the point that, while it is unlikely that the Zvonimir group read very much psychoanalytic literature at the time, they would have at least been aware of its themes by their exposure to such authors as Arthur Schnitzler (72). Thus, the psychoanalytic threads running through this early declaration are neither coincidental nor the individual genius of a teenaged poet, but the influence of literature that he already knew well from his studies in Vienna and across the Balkans.

Second, Tausk constructs, as Donat has already suggested, a distinct kinship between the Croatian modernists and their literary and philosophical counterparts in other areas of Europe, whom Tausk names specifically as French, German, and Scandinavian authors. This European network would be as important to the Croatian modernist movement generally as it would be to Tausk as a thinker

and an author in the coming years, for it suggests that his desire for intellectual influence and collaboration will not be shaped by the biases of patriotic lines.

Third, though Tausk's construction of this kinship is a clear statement on Croatian modernism's place in European *belles lettres*, he does not advocate for it along the ideological lines of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism would attract many of Tausk's contemporaries as a mode of existing in and interacting with the rest of the world. In the French tradition, for example, Charles Baudelaire had argued the fundamental role of cosmopolitanism in artistic modernity some years earlier. In his essay "The Painter of Modern Life" ("Le peintre de la vie moderne", 1863), Baudelaire sketches out a portrait of the ideal cosmopolitan artist, whose "interest is in the whole world; he wants to know, understand and appreciate everything that happens on the surface of our globe"—he is a "spiritual citizen of the universe" (7). More than this, Baudelaire senses in the cosmopolitan through an *electrical* charge; the true "lover of universal life enters into the crowd as if it were an immense reservoir of electrical energy," reproducing and refracting the life of others that he experiences in his *flânerie* (9). Four decades later, German sociologist Georg Simmel would incorporate the attitude toward life with which Baudelaire characterized his cosmopolitan subject into his own essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life" ("Die Großstädte und das Geistesleben," 1903), arguing that the urban metropolis had become home to "die Sitze des Kosmopolitismus" [the seat of cosmopolitanism] due to new forms of global, capitalist exchange and that the nervous overstimulation one experienced amidst this center of commerce brought about the affect and attitude of the blasé (17). Tausk's approach, however, is imbued with the diversity of his homelands. His

proclaimed motto at the end of this excerpt, “Let each one show what he is [...] let him fill [his place in life] with himself and not others!” centers localism and heterogeneity as a solution to the conflict between a concurrently experienced individualism and growing global consciousness. This high value placed upon heterogeneity as one experiences in the multilingual and multicultural empire in which Tausk grew up, the claim that each person could work from within his or her own situated experience of life without this resulting in catastrophe, would motivate the most complex and prized of Tausk’s studies in psychoanalysis in the decades to come.

Moreover, in tandem with his statement’s conflict with cosmopolitan ideals of a shared ground of understanding, Tausk’s definition of the Modern slyly tugs away at the laces of any positive definition of the human. The Modern is defined as human, and the human, he says, makes sense only in the context of the Modern. Turning to the human for further clarity, however, we are only told that it is “very difficult concept.” In this turn, Tausk empties the category of the human of any fixed ontological definition and instead turns the reader’s attention to the “proof” found in literary creative work. Tausk then exponentially reiterates the paradoxical nature of the Modern human with the motto he provides: let him fill it with himself and not with others. The human, seemingly empty of defining qualities, is still capable of filling his own place in life by way of creative production. His argument is not unlike those of later twentieth-century philosophers who would take up the figure of man-the-maker as *homo faber* (Max Scheler and Hannah Arendt, for example, and novelist Max Frisch) or the concept of *technics* that technology philosopher Bernard Stiegler uses in conceiving of the human as

always already defined by the use of exteriorized supports which shape the human individual and collective existence. Lying below the surface of his treatise, we find that Tausk's approach to the Modern and to literary theory more generally resonates with technological philosophy that would flourish in the later twentieth century. This matters as it demonstrates, again, that the philosophies from which Tausk built his analyses often boldly extended beyond the dominant attitudes of Tausk's own historical moment, and that his writing holds within it the capacity for wide and varied attitudes toward the definition of the human.

This pamphlet is a political declaration as much as it is a treatise of Modern literature, and so it follows that these statements will apply to Tausk's political worldview in his early life and, as we will see in his analyses of soldiers and schizoaffective female patients decades later, echo through his psychoanalytic work as well. Tresić–Pavičić, his work, and those poets like him, are the enemies to the future Tausk hails in this piece. And the sentimental patriotism and nationalism that Tresić–Pavičić promotes in his poetry are among the greatest offenses that he poses to the lyric tradition, Tausk argues.

Pjesnik danas u prvom redu mora da zna što je to čovjek.

A kako je kod nas? Dokle je kod nas zaseglo pitanje? Pitajmo naše pjesnike. Pitajmo naše najbolje pjesnike.

Ne bi znao kojega da spomenem. Osim Kranjčevića mi ne imamo pjesnika, koji moderno misli, koji o sebi razmišlja i kojemu je svijet onakav, kakova ga on gleda. Od mladih se barem možemo još čemu da nadamo. Inače se sve drugo valja kod nas u staroj, tromoj kaljužini partikularizma i nacijonalizmač tupi duhovi tek što pod udarcem ostana malko zatitraju, a u ostalom služe nam ko i prije sasvim dobro naša mila i draga patriotska čuvsta i naše slatke i tajinstvene hrvatske djevojčice, kojima ne treba boljih svojstava od patriotskih osjećaja i lijepih očije. Žena ne imamo, da nas ženstvom podišu i krijepe, onim ženstvom, koje osjeća i misli mozgom i srcem, pa se s toga grijemo i potičemo hrvatskom kapljicom i hrvatskom politikom, a prema tomu stvaraju se kod nas i pjesme.

Jer nas ne zanima čovjek, ne umijemo da se bavimo sami sobom, ne umijemo da ono damo, što kod nas počiva u dnu svijesti, što se same napornim mozgovnim radom iznaša na površinu: Neumijemo da u svijest prenesemo shvatanje ženstva, shvatanje samoga sebe.

Prototip toga špeciјalno hrvatskoga pjesništva, to je gosp. Dr. Tresić-Pavičić. [...] Žao mi je, što moram da Tresiću posvetim ovu knjižicu. Tresić nije zanimiva pojava, ali je na žalost važna pojava u našem literarnom životu. (Slovačić 6-7)

The poet today must first of all know what man is.

And how is it with us? To what extent have we grappled with this issue? Let us ask our poets. Let us ask our very best poets.

One would hardly know where to turn. Apart from Kranjčević, we do not have a poet who thinks in a modern way, who contemplates himself and the world to which he belongs, as he looks upon it. From the young, at least, we have more to hope for. Otherwise, all we're left with is the old, stagnant puddle of particularism and nationalism, dull spirits trembling slightly under the impact; after all, our dear patriotic senses and our sweet and mysterious Croatian girls serve us just as well as before, needing no better qualities than patriotic feelings and beautiful eyes. We have no woman to lift us up and strengthen us with womanhood, that womanhood which she feels and thinks with her brain and heart, so we are warmed up and encouraged by Croatian tears and Croatian politics, and from this, our poetry is created.

Because we are not interested in man, we are not able to deal with ourselves. We are not able to give that which rests within us at the bottom of consciousness, which only emerges through hard cerebral work: We are not able to bring into consciousness an understanding of womanhood, an understanding of ourselves.

The prototype of this especially Croatian poetry is by none other than Dr. Tresić-Pavičić. [...] I'm sorry to have to dedicate this booklet to Tresić. Tresić is not an interesting phenomenon, but unfortunately he is an important phenomenon in our literary life.

This excerpt is exemplary not only for the taste it gives of Tausk's often caustic wit (which, rest assured, is sustained throughout the entirety of the piece), but for how it centers upon the figure of the (Croatian) woman in pre-Modern poetry as an entity made absent or opaque through nationalist ideology, and then contrasts this figure with lived womanhood. Rather than plumb the depths of an authentic experience of womanhood to "lift us up and strengthen us," Tresić's poetry turns women into nationalist symbols, just as it does with landscape and natural

elements, which Tausk critiques in later pages. In an argument that seems already to speak from psychoanalytic knowledge, Tausk insists that the elision or erasure of the woman by this stylistic tendency is the very thing that prevents one from understanding man. This rhetorical turn first brings us to examine the language with which he is playing. “Čovjek” can be used particularly or universally to designate a person of male gender, a human being of any gender, or humans in general. When Tausk brings attention to the secondary gender—woman—he underlines her absence as manufactured through language. His psychoanalytic claim, however, is even more radical than his wordplay. Tausk does not position “woman” in a simple sexual binary as the antithesis to “man,” but rather seems to contend that collective and even individual consciousness is constituted of (at least) two genders, and it is warped by its disavowal of its multiple self. The reproduction of this disavowal in art and literature makes for impoverished and ignorant poetics.

Tausk suggests that, by repeatedly substituting experienced womanhood with the woman as nationalist symbol, poetry like Tresić–Pavičić’s will never be able to answer the fundamental question, “What is (a hu)man?” Moreover, the repression of womanhood is formulated in this critique not only as the repression of women in the collective of humanity, but womanhood as an integral component of the human psyche that is repressed on a personal basis. Tausk implies that in making the woman, who “rests at the bottom of consciousness,” incomprehensible, one makes one’s self incomprehensible as well. Removing womanhood from nationalist symbolism and redirecting his readers to material and intrapsychic definitions—women as a political group and “woman” as a

repressed facet of collective consciousness—Tausk outlines a feminist and heterogenous Balkan modernism.

From his childhood and adolescence in the Balkan region into his young adulthood in Vienna, Victor was infused with an appreciation for the diversity of human experience and its importance in developing political and artistic movements. In spite of what was by all accounts an eternally strained relationship between Victor and his father, Herman's prolific life as an author who was outspoken on the rights of his own religious community, and who likewise aimed to promote tolerance and acceptance of other minority groups, undoubtedly played an important part in Victor's thinking during these formative years. Victor's advocacy would take a more literal form as he completed his law degree in Vienna and returned for a few years to his homeland for professional training. Though he would ultimately leave this profession to return to the literary arts and, finally, medicine as he had initially dreamed of doing, his attention to the rights of minority groups and his often combative method of engagement would continue to develop as the years went on.

### *The Cares of a Family Man: Marriage, Divorce, and the Berlin Years*

Victor Tausk had originally wanted to study medicine but, due the lack of financial resources on the part of his family, he left Sarajevo in 1897 to study law at the University of Vienna. The following year, he met a seventeen-year-old feminist socialist by the name of Martha Frisch. As Martha described her early origins, "Vater Jude, Mutter Tschechin, Erziehung in Wien, kosmopolitisch, immerhin gewachsen mit deutschem Gedankengut" [Jewish father, Czech mother,

raised in Vienna, cosmopolitan, but brought up with a German mindset] (Martha Tausk qtd. in Dorfer 8). Her father, a self-made businessman, ran a successful press in Vienna that would expose the family to many important authors and political thinkers of their day.<sup>62</sup> She was also connected with great thinkers by way of childhood friendships (she was a close school-friend of the future nuclear physicist Lise Meitner) and familial ties (Martha was a cousin of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber by way of her paternal aunt Marie Frisch). As Martha's mother was not of Jewish descent, her father converted to the Evangelical church in order to marry. Victor Tausk would follow suit, as Martha had no intention of converting to Judaism, but he would remain firm that his conversion was in the service of the legal rights it had afforded him; neither belief in a Christian god nor personal rejection of his heritage had any part in this act (Marius Tausk 325). Martha and Victor married in 1900 and relocated to Cattaro (Kotor) in order to disguise Martha's premarital pregnancy, while Victor continued his legal training in Sarajevo. The child did not survive birth, and the period following was especially difficult for them. Their first son, Marius, was born in 1902 and their second, Victor Hugo, in 1904, after which Victor moved the family to Mostar, where he practiced as a lawyer's assistant.

During Victor's career in law, he was particularly drawn to cases in which he defended the poor. One case in particular would imprint itself on him. A young Muslim girl (there is some writing suggesting she was also mentally disabled) had killed her illegitimate child begotten of rape. Victor's defense was successful, and she was acquitted of all guilt, though the prosecutor had sought the death penalty; "Reactionary ideas, he argued, had been at fault, and these false notions had

forced her to kill her child” (Roazen 12). In 1905 he obtained a *stalum agendi*, allowing him to serve as one of the limited full-fledged lawyers. If he’d continued law, he would have been sent to Derventa, where he would have made a good living, but this was not the future the family chose. Victor was exhausted by the court system, and Martha missed her family. The couple separated around this time and returned to Vienna, in order to be close to Martha’s family, where she took up work as an accountant in her father’s press and would later move into politics.<sup>63</sup>

Victor was restless in Vienna and in 1906 he relocated to Berlin, where he earned a modest income as a journalist and art critic and privately struggled at poetry and playwriting for roughly two years. He completed a draft of “Husein Brko: Bosnische Zigeunergroteske” [Husein Brko: A Bosnian Gypsy Grotesque], which would not be published until 1912; several poems on existential topics with titles like “Zerstörung” [Destruction], “Das Erbe” [Heritage], “Ziel” [Aim], and “Die Stillen Stunden” [The Silent Hours]; translations of Serbian folk ballads; a play in four acts titled *Halbdunkel* [Twilight], which reads as closely modeled on Victor’s life; and a theatrical dialogue between a man of Tausk’s age and “the sublime Spinoza.”<sup>64</sup> A handful of these appeared in the pages of literary magazines like *Schaubühne* and *die Hilfe*, others survived in family archives.

At the beginning of 1915, on a return to Vienna from his station at the Eastern Front, Victor assembled his collection of poems and wrote,

Die hier gesammelten Gedichte sind in entscheidenden Zeiten meines Lebens entstanden und verraten meinen wirklichen Gemütszustand. Diese Zusammenstellung stellt den Abschluss einer mir früher sehr lieben und wertvollen geistigen Betätigung dar. Ich kann schon seit langer Zeit nicht

mehr in gebundener Sprache schreiben. Nun habe ich auch kein Bedürfnis mehr darnach. (*GPLS* 433)

The poems collected here were written at crucial times in my life and disclose my true state of mind. This compilation represents the conclusion of an intellectual activity that was once very dear and valuable to me. I have not been able to write in a bound language for a long time. Now I have also no need for it.

Tausk's experiences in psychoanalysis and war had severed his ties to the "bound language" of poetry, and he largely wished to put it behind him. Yet, an apparent outlier among these papers is the lyrical dialog entitled "Vom Leben und vom Wissen" [Of Life and Knowledge]. It is inspired by the seventeenth-century philosopher Baruch Spinoza and marked by a retrospective note from Tausk: "Geschrieben in Berlin, im Dezember 1907. Jedes Wort in dieser Schrift gilt mir auch heute noch. Wien, Jänner 1915" [Written in Berlin, in December 1907. Every word in this text still applies to me today. Vienna, January 1915] (*GPLS* 456). This statement supports what could be deduced from some of Tausk's later psychoanalytic texts and confirmed by Salomé's journals; that Spinoza was a guiding philosopher in Tausk's understanding of human existence.

The dialogue is set in Spinoza's homeland, on a hill in the middle of a Dutch plain, a pastoral landscape surrounding him as he sits, dressed in an elegant robe of black silk. His interlocutor is "ein Mann am Ende des dritten Jahrzehnts seines Lebens. Sein Gesicht ist jung und glatt, der Ausdruck seiner Augen wechselt zwischen überlegenem, verständemässigem Erfassen und hilflosem Suchen nach einem völlig unbegrenzten Ziel" [a man at the end of the third decade of his life. His face is young and smooth, the expression of his eyes alternates between superior, intellectual comprehension and the helpless search for

a completely limitless goal] (*GPLS* 457). The young lens grinder, expelled from the Talmud Torah Congregation of Amsterdam at the age of twenty-three on grounds of heresy, expounds in this scene on the nature of knowledge, desire, and suffering. The dialogue is written in alternating soliloquies that contract in length as the piece goes on, giving the impression of movement picking up steam, until Spinoza departs. It begins with an oration from “der Erhabene” [The Sublime One] in which he counsels “der Mensch” [The Man] to widen his gaze as one looking through a binocular, suddenly aware of everything and unhindered by boundaries of distance, physical embodiment, or perspective:

Hier ist ein Glas mit hochgeschliffnen Linsen.  
Es lässt Dich leicht vom Gipfel dieses Hügels  
Viel hundert Meilen Wege überwinden.  
Stört Dich der Strauch die Kirsche dort zu sehen?  
Und hemmt der Wald Dein Wissen um die Berge?  
Und denke nun: Dies Glas hab ich geschliffen.  
Und schaust Du durch, so dehnen sich die Grenzen  
Ganz mühelos und schonen Deiner Schritte.  
Dies Glas hab ich geschliffen, das bedenke!  
Und zwischen Grenz und Grenze stirbt der Zweifel,  
Der Blindheit war und Wand vor Deinem Augen.  
[...]  
Und dennoch weisst Du um den Schmerz  
Und um das Leid und um das dunkle Licht,  
Das Leben heisst, wo immer Menschen leben.  
Nun denke Dir die Gläser riesengross,  
Wie keines Menschen Hand sie je geschliffen.  
Sie tragen Deinen Blick bis zu den Sternen,  
Und ungehemmt, nur eines Dir erlösend  
Im Kampf um Dich: die Reinheit des Gesetzes!  
[...]  
Kannst Du es denken, wie ich es Dir sage? (*GPLS* 457-458)

Here is a glass with finely ground lenses.  
It will let you easily surmount from the top of this hill  
Paths of many hundreds of miles.  
Does the shrub disturb your view of the cherry there?  
And does the forest hinder your knowledge of the mountains?  
And now, think: I cut this glass.

And if you look through it, the borders will stretch  
 Very effortlessly and spare your steps.  
 I cut this glass, remember that!  
 And between border and frontier, doubt dies,  
 Which was blindness and a wall before your eyes.  
 [...]

And yet you know of the pain  
 And of the suffering and of the dark light,  
 Life means wherever people live.  
 Now imagine the glasses, gigantic,  
 As no human hand has ever cut.  
 They carry your gaze to the stars,  
 And uninhibited, only one thing redeems you  
 In the struggle: the purity of the law!  
 [...]

Can you imagine it, as I tell you?

The Man's response is a pained counterpoint to the Sublime One's boundlessness, but the first line he speaks works doubly to both denote his sense of separation at the same time that it references his unity with the other. Here we see that the Sublime One and the Man are in fact reflections of one another, albeit polar opposite in their experiences. The former is liberated, expansive, eloquent, endorsing of joy; the latter is burdened, contracted, pained by his words, and tormented by passions. The two speakers may thus function as personifications of Spinoza's notion of the co-constitutive mind and the body that appears in Part II of his *Ethics*, "On the Nature and Origin of the Mind." The Man responds:

Was Du auch sprichst, ich höre nur auf mich.  
 Dein Wort scheint mir in einer Welt zu fliegen  
 Wo ich nicht bin. Ich trage ein Last.  
 Nimm sie von mir, befreie meine Flügel.  
 Vielleicht folg ich Dir dann. Nimm meine Worte.  
 Sie sind die letzte Tat, die mir geblieben. (*GPLS* 458-459)

No matter what you say, I only hear myself.  
 Your word seems to me to fly in a world  
 Where I am not. I carry a heavy burden.  
 Take it from me, free my wings.  
 Then maybe I'll follow you. Take my words.

They are the last deed I have left.

He then goes on to further his counterpart's visual motif by describing it in negative:

Wo ist die Tat, die rote Tat des Herzens?  
Im Widerstreit der Wahrheit und des Wunsches  
Verlöschte ich das stille, treue Licht,  
Und schlich mit schlaugedämpften Schritten  
Ins halbe Dunkel irrender Gefühle.  
Doch kein Vergessen, nur ein trübe Erinnern  
Belastete die rotgebrannten Lider,  
Die halb gesenkt, nicht tagesmüd geschlossen,  
Ein schielend Aug mit ihrer Hülle deckten.  
Dann kam die Nacht. Es gab nichts mehr zu sehn.  
Das letzte Schamrot mischte sich ins Dunkel,  
Das letzte Licht, das mir den Rückweg wies.  
[...]  
Je mehr ich seh, je mehr beschwert den Tod.  
Und denk ich mir win Glas so riesengross  
Wie Du es denkst, für ungemessne Weiten,  
Wie soll ich denken dürfen, dass ich *bin*  
Im Angesichte dessen, was ich *sehe*? (GPLS 459-460)

Where is the deed, the red deed of the heart?  
In the conflict of truth and desire  
I put out the silent, faithful light,  
And sneaked with muffled steps  
Into the half dark of errant emotions.  
But no forgetting, only a hazy memory  
Strained the red-burned eyelids,  
Half lowered, not shut by the weariness of day,  
A squinting eye draped with her mantle.  
Then night came. There was nothing left to see.  
The last red of shame mingled with the darkness,  
The last light that showed me the way back.  
[...]  
The more I see, the more death weighs.  
And when I imagine the size of a glass  
Just as you do, for vast distances,  
How am I supposed to think that *I* am  
In the face of what I *see*?

Their dialogue weaves back and forth in this way—Spinoza offering the man solace in philosophical riddles when the man seems to flirt with a desire for self-

annihilation. “Wer bist Du, dass Du Dich verachten darfst?” [Who are you to despise yourself?], he asks the man, in a tone that reads closer to a Zen kōan than to Spinoza’s own tractates as Tausk interprets Spinoza’s monism (*GPLS* 461). Spinoza’s persona in this scene is reminiscent of what, in contemporary New Age speak, might be referred to as one’s “Higher Self.” If “the Sublime One” and “the Human” are to be interpreted as different Spinozist modalities of the same being, then this scene grants a fascinating glance into Tausk’s proto understanding of dissociative states, such as narcissism and schizophrenia, to which he would ultimately gravitate in his psychoanalytic work. Indeed, just as the love for one’s self can extend to a pathological degree in narcissism, so too can hate for one’s self extend to its extreme in the desire for self-abnegation or suicide. Spinoza’s monist notion of parallelism holds that thought and extension are different modes of understanding the same reality. This framework, transposed to the human psyche, could allow for a more cohesive view of various extensions of the self that does not default to a splintered, fragmented—in other words, *broken*—representation of the subject undergoing an experience of multiplicity.

The man in this scene—modeled, we can assume, on Tausk’s own experiences as much as his counterpart is modeled on Tausk’s interpretation of Spinoza—is an incarnation of human suffering and feels contempt for himself out of this suffering. Spinoza encourages him to embody rather than chase after brilliance, advising the man to be “wie eine reine Flamme./ Du sollst nur lodern ohne zu versengen/ Du soll’st nur leuchten ohne zu veraschen./ Aus solcher Flamme kam einst das Gesetz/ Vom Berge Sinai” [like a pure flame./ You should only burn without singeing/ You should only shine without fading./ From such a

flame once came the law/ From Mount Sinai] (*GPLS* 462). This message of careful, measured endurance reflects profoundly on one's need to resist a route that ends in self-exhaustion, "burn out," or self-extinguishment. It is a message that reflects on Tausk's own state of being at the time, as he drew upon Spinoza's work for guidance.

Victor's mental and physical health began to deteriorate after some time in Berlin. He assumed a provisional editorial position at the *Berliner Morgenzeitung* in April 1906, but his lack of steady work and continued feelings of inadequacy weighed on him and emerged as nervous depression and an ailment of the lungs. In his letters to Martha, he readily diagnosed himself as depressive, neurasthenic, and restless. In a letter dated August 17, 1907, shortly after congratulating her for taking a trip out of the city, he writes in a plaintive voice common of his letters of this period,

Ich habe in erschrecklicher Weise den Zusammenhang mit der Natur in den Menschen verloren und lebe nur noch aus zweiter Hand. Es ist die friedloseste, furchtbarste Einsamkeit, die man sich vorstellen kann. Es leidet mich nirgendwo, mein Heim ist das Kaffeehaus. (Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 17 August 1907)

I've lost, in a terrifying way, my connection with nature and people and now I live only second-hand. It is the most troubled, most dreadful loneliness that one can imagine. I find it impossible to stay anywhere, my home is the coffeehouse.

One month later, on September 29, 1907 "Meine liebe Martha! Man kann alleiner als allein sein. Man kann in einer Nervenheilantsalt sein" [My dear Martha! One can be more alone than alone. One can be in a sanatorium] (Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 29 September 1907). The sanatorium to which he referred was Ahrweiler on the Rhine, which he was able to visit in exchange for writing a few

promotional articles on the facility's behalf. His missives to Martha are soul-searching, filled a desperate longing for a purpose and a home:

Mein Heil liegt allein in einer geordneten, ökonomisch und gefühlsmässig fruchtbaren Lebensweise. Gefühlsmässig in dem Sinne der Bereicherung des Herzen durch Übung des täglichen Liebespflichten zu echten und geneigten Menschen. Ein Beruf und ein Heim. (Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 29 September 1907)

My salvation depends solely on an ordered, economically and emotionally fruitful way of life. Emotional in the sense of the enrichment of the heart through the practice of daily duties of love toward genuine and noble human beings. A vocation and a home.

The next day brought darker reflections of Tausk's despair, leading him to self-diagnoses of not only neurasthenia, as evidenced in his feeling of disconnect from nature, but of the medical ideology of an inherited predisposition for nervous illness, something that he would elsewhere work fervently to undermine.

Es ist in den 20 Monaten Berlin eine sonderbare Veränderung in mir vorgegangen. Ich habe das Naturgefühl verloren. Jetzt will ich wieder Bäume und Berge sehen lernen. Ich möchte wieder in einer kleinen Stadt leben. Aber ich bin unheilbar krank im Gemüt. Meine ganze Vergangenheit erscheint mir jetzt nicht anders als Vorbereitung zu diesem furchtbaren Zusammenbruch meiner Persönlichkeit. Und wenn ich nie an die Macht des Blutes geglaubt habe, jetzt glaube ich daran, dass der Mensch sein Schicksal von den Eltern bekommt. Trotzdem kämpfe ich noch und versuche es wieder auf's neue stark und selbstständig zu werden. Aber ich tappe nur so im Dunklen herum. Es gehört ein Führer dazu.

Der Arzt sagte mir: "Leute wie Sie gedeihen und leben brillant in gewohnten und sicheren Verhältnissen, sich und den anderen wenden zum Nutzen und zur Freude. Entrückt ihnen die gewohnte Basis, so brechen sie einfach zusammen." Erbliche Lebensuntüchtigkeit.

Der "März" hat mein Husein Brko angenommen. Wenn das Honorar da für ausreicht, komme ich zu Euch. Vielleicht bringe ich inzwischen noch etwas größeres an.

Gestern Abend arbeitete mein Kopf wieder klar und produktiv. Und ich habe 15 Seiten Metaphysik der Schauspielkunst geschrieben. Aber ich kann nicht kontinuierlich sein. Die Nerven spielen, der Kopf wird müde.

Alles in allem aber wird der Körper gesünder. Die Farbe ist gut, das Gewicht nimmt zu.

War soll nur mit den Buben werden? Ich bin trostlos. Alles ist auf das Geld gestellt, Glück und Leben.

Abend.

Was ein richtiger Neurastheniker ist, wird abends klar im Kopf.  
(Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 30 September 1907)

A peculiar change took place in me during those 20 months in Berlin. I lost my feeling for nature. I want now to learn to see trees and mountains again. I'd like to live in a small town again. But I'm incurably ill in disposition. My entire past now strikes me as nothing more than preparation for this dreadful collapse of my personality. And if I never believed in the power of the blood, well now I believe that man inherits his fate from his parents. In spite of this I continue to fight, and I'm trying to become strong and independent once more. But I'm just groping about in the dark. One needs a guide.

The doctor told me: "People like you thrive and live brilliantly in familiar and safe conditions, turning yourself and others to benefit and delight. If their familiar base is removed from them, they simply break down." Hereditary life incapacity.

*März* has accepted my "Husein Brko".<sup>65</sup> If the honorarium is enough, I'll come to you. Maybe I'll bring in something bigger in the meantime.

Last night my head worked clearly and productively again. And I wrote 15 pages of "Metaphysics of Acting". But I cannot do it continuously. The nerves play, my head grows weary.

But all in all, my body is getting healthier. My color is good, weight's increasing.

But what's to be done with the boys? I'm desolate. Everything depends on money, happiness and life.

Evening.

A real neurasthenic becomes clear in the evening.

Victor describes the beauty of the landscape, the vineyards in the surrounding area underpinned with masonry in a way that reminds him of the Dalmatian coast, the light in the evening and the light at dawn. Then, suddenly, the faces of doctors and patients: "Nur die Ärzte haben hier vernünftige Gesichter. Die Kranken sehen alle aus wie vergiftete Ratten und Maultiere. So zerstörte Gesichter." [Only the doctors here have sensible faces. The infirmed all look like poisoned rats and mules. Such destroyed faces] ((Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 30 September 1907). His writing in the five pages that follow makes similar jumps from thought to thought as it unravels on the page. Recounting his regimen —his treatments included

hydrotherapy, sleeping pills, long walks in nature, and a prescribed ration of a liter and a half of milk per day—, then “Ich möchte meine grosse Söhne gerne sehen. Es wird Zeit, dass sie einen Vater bekommen” [I’d so like to see my big boys. It’s high time for them to have a father], more regrets, worries about his ability to support them ((Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk, 30 September 1907). His handwriting deteriorates from either muscular exhaustion or haste as his thoughts pace an interior, obsessive route, acknowledging Martha as if on waking from a trance when he signs off. Tausk’s need for a connection to the world through meaningful work and relationships is attested to in these pages, as is the fact that his spiritual anguish and taxed mental health were always rooted in material struggles. The acknowledgement of material circumstances in his own struggle with melancholia signals his capacity for a sensitivity to the role of material adversity in the mental or emotional ailments of others. These letters bear witness both to his personal battle with melancholia and, by extension, the personal experiential knowledge he would bring to psychoanalysis.

### *Intimate Reflections on Tausk*

As Tausk’s own archive of papers did not survive his death, records of his correspondence such as these (faithfully preserved by Martha) can only give us his words and her silence. One wonders how she would have received such a letter from her estranged, twenty-eight-year-old husband, full of pride, dreams, despair, and promises, while she herself supported their two boys on a meager salary earned from working at her father’s press. Martha is a deafening silence in Tausk’s writing, not simply in the physical absence of her letters but in the work she made

possible when she met head on the consequences of his choice to flout material responsibilities—to turn down the financial security of a job in law or at a newspaper for the pursuit of an artist’s life or out of a fear of inadequacy. Family history remembers that Victor was put off by Martha after their seven years together because he found her too serious, without humor.<sup>66</sup> Yet her practical approach to life proved to be a vital counterpoint to the ups and downs of Victor’s career and personal life.

The list of Martha’s contributions does not end with the raising of her two sons as a working—and for the most part, single—mother. Her own political legacy is formidable, beginning most publicly in Graz in 1918, when she became the first and only woman sent to the provisional state assembly of Steiermark (otherwise known in English as Styria). From 1919 until 1927, Martha served as a representative in the Graz municipal council and the Styrian state parliament and campaigned tirelessly for the rights of female household workers and teachers. Her political and personal connections were numerous and highly esteemed. Her political life took her to Vienna, where she worked as a political councilor, then to Zurich at the invitation of the revolutionary Austrian socialist Friedrich Adler, where she worked for the SAI or Sozialistischen Arbeiter-Internationale (known in English as the LSI; Labour and Socialist International) until 1934 and also founded and edited the magazine *Frauenrecht* [Women’s Rights]. Though her publicly recognized life as a politician and political activist took off after Victor’s death, there are more than enough clues as to her political tendencies in her earlier life, as well. Her eight-page autobiography, typed up in 1952 about five years before her death, recounts in detail her father’s affiliation with local workers’

newspapers during her youth. Her childhood friendship with the Meitner family is mentioned by way of the fathers' friendship, sustained by their participation in a socio-political association. In her photos, she is always practically dressed; never corseted even on the most proper of occasions, she wears a cloth worker's cap in her earliest posed photograph with Victor, insinuating her socialist politics.

Martha's archivist tendencies (and those of her son and grandson who continued to care for these archives after her death) are to be thanked for much of the primary material that has furnished my research of Victor's life. Unfolding the countless documents from the Martha Tausk files at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam in search of a letter or a certificate with Victor's name, I had to fight the urge at many points of detouring through her socialist feminist life's work. It is my personal impression—one that, in keeping with a psychoanalytic style, I cannot prove except to say that it seems a logical if hidden past event—that it is not a coincidence that the radically feminist musings in Victor's (Vladoje's) first long-form piece were written in that same year he met Martha. Martha's staunch, practical, and apparently largely amicable presence in Victor's life even after their separation deserves due acknowledgement in the materialization of the work of Victor Tausk. I can only assume that Tausk, who was uncharacteristically open among his circle in citing contributions from colleagues or sources of his inspiration, would agree.

Over the three weeks of his stay at Ahrweiler, Tausk recorded his slight ups and heavy downs in his letters to Martha. His underlying torment was, quite explicitly, his lack of work. Tears smear the final page of one of his last, erratically scrawled letters from Ahrweiler as soon as he begins to write about their sons and

his feelings of helplessness. Though already a lawyer and an accomplished journalist and literary author, his inability to find meaningful work that would likewise support his children inflicted him with debilitating shame. He left the sanatorium in late October and returned to Berlin, then to Vienna in the fall of 1908, finding an apartment around the corner from Martha, allowing him to co-parent.<sup>67</sup> That year would mark a turning point for Victor as he found some financial stability by taking a small job at a Viennese newspaper, officially divorced from Martha on October 20, 1908, and finally entered into a realm of medical study that would give him the sense of vocational purpose he'd desperately sought for so long.

Obtaining a divorce was no small feat in Vienna in 1908, so it may go without saying that this finalization of their separation was greatly desired and required the testimony and perhaps inventions of several witnesses in order to substantiate their irreconcilable differences. Family history has it that, in order to substantiate grounds for the divorce, the couple called upon a mutual friend named Josef Wilfan to sign a document claiming he had had an affair with Martha—a necessary fiction. Yet private letters between Martha and her dear friend Zofka often reference a “tall, quiet man” of whom Martha was very fond, and Martha would years later take on the pseudonym of “Marie Wilfinger”—clues which biographer Brigitte Dorfer reads as proof that this story was more than an invention for legal purposes (Dorfer 26-27). Whatever the case, the pair needed rather extreme examples in order to be granted this legal separation. Thus, the divorce papers constitute a document that is as frustrating as it is fascinating, as salacious as it may be informative. It could be the work of extravagant artistry,

designed as a means to a legal end, or a factual account of a deeply troubled marriage that simultaneously maps a network of other important figures in the couple's milieu.

Although the official narrative of the divorce documents points to Martha's love of Wilfan as the original source of their troubles, it also lists several acts of infidelity on Victor's part. Many of the women in question are not listed by name, but one in particular, Grete Meisel-Hess, is.

5.) Im Herbst 1905 seien die Parteien auseinandergegangen. Der Trennungswerber sei nach Berlin übersiedelt. Er habe ein Verhältnis mit einer geschiedenen Frau namens Grete Meisel-Hess unterhalten. Letztere habe das unleidliche Verhältnis der Parteien zu einem Romane verarbeitet. (Trennungsbewerbung)

5.) In the autumn of 1905, the parties broke up. The [male] divorce applicant relocated to Berlin. He had a relationship with a divorced woman named Grete Meisel-Hess. The latter used the parties' insufferable relationship as material for a novel.

This affair is corroborated by correspondence between Martha and Zofka—an “intermezzo,” as Martha poetically referred to it, that began in Vienna and continued when Meisel-Hess relocated in Berlin (Dorfer 29-30).

Very fruitful results come when we consider Meisel-Hess as part of Tausk's intimate life and cultural milieu. If the story is in fact true, then the novel in question would have to have been *Die Stimme: Roman in Blättern*, published in 1907. This was Meisel-Hess's sophomore novel, which followed her breakthrough success with *Fanny Roth* in 1902. Indeed, Brigitte Dorfer confirms that Martha and Victor saw themselves as portrayed in the characters of Helene and Zdenko Dimitri Gruschk (Dorfer 29-38). While the novel is written as a work of fiction, personal correspondence of Victor's and Martha's reveals how closely it

had drawn on their own lives. Whatever had transpired over the course of Victor's "intermezzo" with Meisel-Hess, it was enough to leave her with more than enough material and acrimony to create this work and avoid him personally at all costs.<sup>68</sup>

As Martha wrote to Zofka,

Victor schimpft entsetzlich darüber. Victor schreibt: Die Grete Meisel-Hess hat einen 400 Seiten starken Roman ‚Die Stimme‘ veröffentlicht. 300 Seiten davon sind mir gewidmet, etwas 20 Dir. Eine unverschämte Arbeit, in der all Familienverhältnisse auf das gemeinste [...] geschildert sind, [...] ekelhaft und stupid. [...] Ich empfehle dir, es nicht zu lesen. (Martha Tausk qtd. in Dorfer 32)

Victor is terribly upset about it. Victor writes: Grete Meisel-Hess has published a 400-page-long novel, *Die Stimme*. 300 pages of it are dedicated to me, about 20 to you. An outrageous work, in which all family relationships are depicted in the meanest, most disgusting and stupid [of ways]. I recommend that you not read it.

Seeing the resemblance between the Tausks and the Gruschks requires the least of imagination. Their ages, temperaments, and family secrets were too close for coincidence. Even the names of the two Gruschk sons, Elias and Ludo, poetically echo the names of the Tausk boys, Marius and Hugo. Victor had confided in Meisel-Hess that their first child was lost at birth, and the inclusion of a third child in the Meisel-Hess's Gruschk family greatly incensed Martha, who first became aware of the novel when an acquaintance who had just read it asked if Martha had had three children instead of two (Dorfer 32). Thus, the only question that remains open for the sake of this analysis, when comparing the greatly unflattering portrait of Dimitri Gruschk with the man Victor Tausk, is whether Meisel-Hess's impressions disclose any truth relevant to Victor's attitudes, sensibilities, or his work.

Dr. Gruschk is an intriguing character for his highly unorthodox relationships and for his prolific work as a writer. As the main character first learns about Helene and Dimitri, she asks, “‘Er hat eine Frau?’ Eigentlich ja. Oder eigentlich nein” [“He has a wife?” Actually yes. Or actually no,] explains her friend,

Denn er war geschieden. In aller ‘Freundschaft’ hatten sie sich geschieden. Der Vater der Frau, ein Wiener Geschäftsmann, hatte sie in sein blühendes Geschäft gerufen. Da war sie mit ihren drei Kindern aus Slavonien nach Wien gekommen und führte mit großer Tüchtigkeit das Geschäft, eine Eisenwarenfabrik, weiter. [...] ‘Übrigens verkehren sie wirklich freundschaftlich miteinander und erziehen ihre Kinder. Ich glaube, er wollte frei sein.’ [...] Seit kurzer Zeit war er nun auch hier, hatte er ein Drama geschrieben, einen Roman begonnen und seine philosophischen Artikel erregten Sensation. ‘Kurzum—du mußt ihn kennen lernen.’ (Meisel-Hess, *Die Stimme* 80)

for he was divorced. They’d separated “in friendship.” The father of the woman, a Viennese businessman, called on her to work his blooming business. So, she came with her three children from Slavonia to Vienna and took over the business with great prowess [...] “In any case they get along really well with one another, raising their children. I think he’d like to be free.” [...] In the short time he’d been here, he’d already written a drama, begun a novel, and his philosophical articles were causing a sensation. “You must meet him soon.”

Upon meeting Dr. Gruschk, the narrator is struck by his thick, blond hair and shimmering gray eyes—a description echoed in Salomé’s journals when she describes her first encounter with Tausk. Helene Gruschk on the other hand is “eine junge, ernsthafte Person” [a young, serious person] who had given up her scientific studies in physics when she married Dimitri at eighteen (Meisel-Hess *Die Stimme* 84). She strikes both wonder and dread in the narrator, who is simultaneously fascinated by Helene’s rare independence and freedom as a woman and mother yet disturbed by the strange, painful and frightened look she

finds in the eyes of this emancipated woman.<sup>69</sup> As the name “Gruschk” vaguely resembles “Tausk,” so are the characters like slightly smudged sketches of Martha and Victor. Meisel-Hess took just enough poetic liberties to grant the Tausks a semblance of anonymity, but the connection would be clear enough to anyone who knew them personally. Thus, their Doppelgänger, as conjured by Meisel-Hess, provide some clues to the spiritual impressions that they may have made upon those who knew them—if not only Meisel-Hess.

*Die Stimme* [The Voice] is a novel in first-person narrative by a character whose name resembles the author's: Maja Hertz. The novel is self-reflexive, sexually outspoken, and deeply modernist in both its form and philosophies. Helga Thorson's analysis of *Die Stimme* goes so far as to argue that “through the publication of this novel, Meisel-Hess was attempting to position herself as the first modernist female writer of her time” (4). If the inclusion of a reference to Meisel-Hess's novel was meant to provoke the court into granting the Tausks a divorce, it would have been a worthy choice. A 1907 reference to Meisel-Hess in the diaries of Arthur Schnitzler, a writer whose own work provoked notable public scandal, describes *Die Stimme* as a “nicht unbegabtes aber widerliches Buch” [not untalented but revolting book] (Thorson 4). The novel follows Maja, a singer, through several romantic relationships and marriages as she searches for her own, inner voice and others who can recognize its importance. Meisel-Hess's writing of Maja often borders on proto-metafiction, creating an ironic psychological splintering in a way that both speaks to and is ahead of its time. The lines—interspersed with dashes—give the sense of one gasping for breath as she speaks. “‘Ein komisches Buch,’ würde der liebe Leser staunend und mißtrauisch sagen,

wenn das ein—Roman wäre” [‘A strange book’ [is what] the dear reader, wondering and wary, would say, if this were a—novel], the narrator reflects (Meisel-Hess qtd. in Thorson 7).

Maja’s relationship with Dimitri is portrayed as “a vampiric act that drained her of her creative lifeblood” (Thorson 7). His presence is by far the most torrential in her life’s struggle, and it is typified by scenes in which she types his dramas as he dictates them to her. Dimitri, she recounts, “diktierte mir auch oft. [...] Und ich schrieb gern für ihn, ich, die ich meine eigenen , Skripten,‘ — wenn ich eine Schriftstellerin wäre, —niemals selbst abschreiben könnte.—” [dictated to me often. [...] And I was happy to write for him, I, who, writing my own ‘scripts’—if I were a writer—could never have transcribed for myself] (Meisel-Hess qtd. in Thorson 10). He constitutes a perfect spiritual foil for Maja, provoking out of her some of the greatest of her philosophical statements.

As Thorson writes, connecting Maja’s beliefs with Meisel-Hess’s earlier publications,

Maja responds to Dimitri’s challenge as to how she would go about critiquing Otto Weininger with the words: “Am Gerippe, das seinen Bau trägt: Am Tatsachenskelett” (135). The informed reader would know that Meisel-Hess’s treatise “Weiberhaß und Weiberverachtung” was published in 1904—two years after her novel *Fanny Roth* and three years before the publication of *Die Stimme*. [...] Meisel-Hess’s arguments in “Weiberhaß und Weiberverachtung” attempted to attack Weininger’s “Tatsachenskelett” by showing that his grand and lofty theories tend to lose all ground when confronted with reality. Furthermore, Meisel-Hess’s response to Weininger zeroes in on Weininger’s own body, his internal skeletal structure that was comprised of broken joints and shaking limbs, in order to show that his ideas stemmed from the mind of a sick man. (11)

This connection not only evidences a real-life relationship that mirrored the fictional one of Meisel-Hess’s novel, but a relationship in which philosophical and

political debate on subjectivity, gender, and psychology was common. Meisel-Hess had for several years been an outspoken feminist author with a fascinating attention to the Viennese Secession movement and differentiation. At the outset of an article by Meisel-Hess published in the feminist journal, *Dokumente der Frauen* in 1900, she writes, “Das Wort unserer Zeit ist schon gefunden. Absonderung, Abfall, Spaltung — Differenzierung sind die wesentlichsten Merkmale unserer Epoche: wir stehen unter dem Zeichen der S e c e s s i o n” [The word of our time is already found. Separation, renunciation, splitting away—differentiation[s] are the essential features of our era: we stand under the sign of *Secession*] (“Jugendbewegung” 535). Aside from the rather ironic detail that the woman Tausk chose to name in corroborating the failure of his marriage was also an advocate for political philosophies of separation, I choose to focus of this passage for evidence of the ideas and writing that formed Tausk’s intimate atmosphere in the early twentieth century. As will become clear in my analysis of Tausk’s psychoanalytic studies in Chapters Four and Five, theories of differentiation were absolutely crucial to his proto-ethnopsychiatry as well as his approach to the psychoanalysis of schizophrenia and dissociation in the cases of female patients. Furthermore, if Meisel-Hess assumed that labor so typically delegated to the wives and partners of “great men”—typing Tausk’s dictated plays or journalistic reviews the way her alter-ego Maja did for Dimitri—then she is likewise to thank for the formulation of his works such as *Halbdunkel*, written in 1905, the same year that Tausk and Meisel-Hess were supposed to have begun their affair. Thus, whether Meisel-Hess played a role as a colleague or as a more intimate figure in Victor Tausk’s life, her work deserves some acknowledgement

in the formation of his own ideas, even if by way of argument. To imagine otherwise—to uphold the fantasy of the isolated genius—would not only be a folly antithetical to the philosophies of Tausk’s work, it would also flatten the richness of the artistic and scientific networks cultivated over the course of his life, and re-enact the elision of great female artists and political activists so often committed in the recollection of early twentieth-century European culture.

Tausk’s life in the decade to follow would see his energetic debut into the Viennese Circle of psychoanalysis, three years as a military doctor on the Eastern Front during World War I, a painful estrangement from Freud, and his sudden suicide in 1919. Among his last written wishes was the request that all his documents be burned, which his younger son, Victor Hugo, would honor. For this reason, aside from those papers already made public through print or in protocols of delivered speeches, the only documents that survive Victor are to be found in the minutes taken at weekly meetings of the Psychoanalytic Society and in his correspondence with and impressions upon others, including his siblings and sons, Martha Tausk, his colleagues, and intimate relationships with Meisel-Hess and, later, Lou Salomé. These deeply personal, necessarily biased reflections on Victor Tausk do not take precedence over his own work, nor can they fully define him. Rather, they demonstrate the multitude of facets a person can contain and the multitude of encounters and relationships with others that constitute the building of a subjective entity. I have tried in this chapter to bring attention to the lesser-known facets of the man known as Victor Tausk: Ze’ev, Viktor, Vladoje, perhaps even Dimitri, in order to establish the diverse collection of experiences that shaped him and his thinking. From his upbringing at the edges of an empire and

his spearheading of a young modernist philosophy in Balkan literature, his impassioned and exhausting work in the courts, his life as a father, his struggle with melancholia and his artist's desire for purpose, Victor Tausk would gravitate to the school of Sigmund Freud and pour himself into a system of analysis that offered a way to gather these passions, philosophical questions, and internal struggles toward a study of the mind. His work during this period to come would be an expression of the intensity of these many internal forces and their ability to speak to the humanity of others.

## Chapter Three: Victor Tausk's Psychoanalytic Years, 1909-1919

Was ist's mit den Analysen?  
Kann da ein Zweifel bleiben?  
Die Methode ist bewiesen  
an jenen, die sie treiben.

Daß man mit euch nur scherzte –  
welch törichter Gedanke!  
Im Gegenteil: die Ärzte  
sind Kranke.

What's up with analyses?  
Can any doubt remain?  
The method has been proven  
By those who're at the helm.

That they were only making fun –  
What a foolish thought!  
Au contraire: the sick ones  
Are the docs.

Karl Kraus, "Psychoanalyse," *Worte in Versen I-IX, 1922-1930. VII. Inschriften*

Und von allem Anfang empfand ich doch an Tausk grade all diesen Kampf als das, was mich an ihm tief berührte: den Kampf der menschlichen Kreatur. Brudertier, Du.

And from the very beginning, the struggle I perceived in Tausk was the very thing about him that touched me most deeply: the struggle of the human creature. Brother animal, you.

Lou Andreas-Salomé, 5. September 1913, *In der Schule bei Freud*

Tausk's career as a psychoanalyst in Freud's milieu is a decade dually marked by devotion and heresy. Entering Freud's school in 1909, Tausk is eager for many years to shape himself in the form of an intellectual scion of his master. As he comes into his own as an analyst, however, Tausk reprises Freud's system, as he will the religious framework of his heritage, for grappling with the ruins of the world. This first appears in Tausk's practice as a theoretical gesture, but in his wartime service it becomes even more actualized. From within the ruins of a

culturally and linguistically diverse empire and the trauma of war, Tausk draws forward from Freud's pristine science of the mind a heretical practice to be used in the service of those suffering from psychological pain.

Chapter Three investigates Tausk's development as a psychoanalyst in Freud's school, his conflicts with Freud, and his legacy in order to establish his formative and enduring importance to the field of psychoanalysis. First, I look at Tausk's entry into Freud's circle as his pupil and examine his relationship with Lou Andreas-Salomé in order to document via letters, diary entries, and meeting records the development of Tausk's psychoanalytic approach and how it relates to the wider scope of his work. While my sources may at times seem trivial or too much to do with his private affairs, I hold focus here in order to reconstitute the threads of Tausk's intellectual development as a psychoanalyst which we cannot access directly due to the posthumous loss of his papers. Building on his relationships within Freud's circle, the next section of this chapter examines the intimacy and ambivalence of Freud's relationship to Tausk as his pupil until 1914 and considers those points of tension where Tausk followed in his teacher's direction or veered into his own terrain of research or advocacy for his patients. I then chronicle Tausk's relationship to Freud and the psychoanalytic world at the end of World War I in late 1918, Tausk's mental and material struggles upon his return to Vienna, and his death by suicide in the summer of 1919 following Freud's continued distance. This chapter closes by tracing the influence of Tausk's studies through Freud's writing in concepts such as Freud's uncanny Doppelgänger or Freud's formulation of melancholia, arguing that Tausk's work was in fact clearly incorporated into some of Freud's most famous and dynamic

works in spite of Freud's tendency to dust away traces of his sources. By documenting Tausk's contributions to Freud's circle and Freud's own written work, I aim to reestablish a presence which has been largely elided throughout the dominant discourse of psychoanalysis.

### *In Freud's School*

At some point shortly after Tausk's divorce, he writes a letter to Sigmund Freud regarding one of Freud's publications. This letter so impresses Freud that he assumes Tausk is already a medical professional, and he invites Tausk to study with him. They formulate plans around the spring of 1909, and Tausk begins to mention Freud as both a future mentor and benefactor by June of that year. "Mein Schicksal wird sich entweder in den nächsten 3 Wochen oder zum Oktober entscheiden," [My fate will be decided either in the next three weeks or by October] he writes to Martha in a letter dated June fourteenth. "Es hängt alles davon ab, ob Freud mein Medizinstudium sichern kann oder nicht" [Everything depends on whether Freud can secure my medical studies or not] (Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk 14 June 1909). By the end of August, still waiting for funding, he writes, "Was jetzt kommen wird, weißt nur Freud und Gott allein" [What comes now, only Freud and God know] (Victor Tausk to Martha Tausk 31 August 1909). Based on these early comments, his relationship to Freud as a master, teacher, and benefactor had already taken hold.

In late 1909, Tausk assumes a position under the renowned analyst at Freud's invitation. He would spend the next five years dedicated to the study of neurology, earning his degree in 1914. Many of Freud's disciples at this time had,

like Tausk, left other professions to study under him. However, whether Tausk's colleagues came to Freud with a background in literary or humanistic studies or whether they arrived with some knowledge or training in medicine, their specializations revolved around neurosis and psychogenic disorders in the brain, spine, nerves, or some combination of the three (Roazen *Brother Animal* 29). Those with medical degrees who came to work with Freud were most often general practitioners or internists and even Freud himself, as a psychologist and neurologist, almost exclusively saw outpatient cases—more advanced psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia which required in-patient treatments were not within Freud's purview. Tausk was thus relatively unique in his desire to become a psychiatrist, a doctor who would specialize exclusively in the treatment of hospitalized patients diagnosed as having some form of psychosis. His most dynamic and interesting work would come from clinical studies of schizophrenia and manic depression rather than neurosis, the original target of psychoanalytic treatment that was still distinguished in Viennese practice from mental illnesses considered graver or worthy of hospitalization.

The fraught relationship between Tausk and Freud has, to date, been the basis of most biographical material written about Victor Tausk.<sup>70</sup> Historians and theorists of psychoanalysis have chosen to fixate on Tausk's suicide in 1919 as a final expression of his relationship with Freud or Freud's eventual rejection, and while it is true that Freud's distance in their later relationship deeply disturbs Tausk, the emphasis placed upon Tausk's death often overshadows the great body of work he left behind. Yet, Freud's role as foil to Tausk's story is a loop that seems to tighten the further one attempts to extract Tausk from the context of his

teacher. In this regard, I find myself in the position of reiterating the power dynamic in which Freud's shadow looms across Tausk's biography and work. Rather than ignore it, I present it here in an attempt to see Tausk amid the network of influences that shaped him and the legibility of his legacy. While Tausk greatly admires his teacher throughout their relationship, Freud holds him at a distance. Freud is wary of the speed with which Tausk works; he is even paranoid that Tausk might arrive at Freud's own ideas before he himself can. However, while the tension between them is important, specifically for how it affected Tausk's mental wellbeing and his ability to develop as a psychoanalyst and have a legacy within the tradition, I want to see how we can also understand Tausk beyond this rivalry, in terms of his contributions to psychoanalysis through ethnopsychiatric studies on war trauma, his formulations of identity and ego boundaries within the genre of psychoanalysis, and the places in his work that he reserves for the mystery of human experience.

Extracting Tausk from Freud's influence is not only a fool's errand, but it gives an artificial picture of his contributions. Thus, in the pages to follow, I will turn to the work generated out of Tausk's relationship with Freud to establish the dynamic between them, highlighting where Tausk's research was complimentary to Freud's and where it diverged. Additionally, I will look to Tausk's relationship with his colleague Lou Andreas-Salomé to trace through her detailed journals the philosophers and cultural material that Tausk immersed himself in while he was developing his approach as a psychoanalyst and psychiatrist. What new connections between this material and the human psyche did Tausk form, and how did they shape his thinking? What contributions did he make to psychoanalysis

overall, and why are they important over a century later? In the following sections, I investigate some of the nuances of psychoanalysis attributable to Tausk that are today taken for granted and uncover where Tausk takes psychoanalysis beyond Freud's framework of thought, making way for a more adaptive form of psychoanalysis that can attend to a wider range of cultural and social backgrounds.

Tausk's time in Freud's circle is marked as much by his relationship to Freud as it is his relationships with others—whether they be collaborative or based on sparring—including colleagues like Alfred Adler, Helene Deutsch, Paul Federn, Otto Rank, Sandor Ferenczi, and Lou Andreas-Salomé. Thus, Salomé's journals during the years of 1912 and 1913, which she spent in Freud's school, constitute a valuable map to Tausk's own role in the psychoanalytic circle, the collaborative insights and philosophical arguments between Salomé and Tausk that likely had bearing on his research, and his relationship with Freud as Salomé witnessed it. As with Martha's archives, Salomé's diaries fill a few of the many absences created by the burning of Victor's papers.<sup>71</sup>

Before meeting Freud, Salomé had already published a book on Nietzsche (*Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken*, 1894), ten short stories and novellas (collected in 1898 under the title *Menschenkinder*), and a study on female psychosexuality entitled *The Erotic* (1911). Freud invites Salomé to attend his school as a contributing visitor on the first of October, 1912, and she leaves Göttingen for Vienna twenty-five days later. Salomé stays in Vienna until April of 1913, during which time she attends the weekly discussions at Freud's school as well as those led by Alfred Adler, which she keeps as discreet as possible due to

tension between Freud's and Adler's circles. She records her impressions and daily interactions in a journal, detailing the personal interactions between herself and other members of the society.

The relationship between Tausk and Salomé (or "Frau Lou," as she was often called) is short but noteworthy.<sup>72</sup> While their rendezvous is in no way definitive of Tausk's life, it results in a passionate exchange of ideas that would have ripple effects in their respective thinking and publications to follow.<sup>73</sup> It is also a situation in which Tausk and Freud participate in a triangular relationship by way of a third party<sup>74</sup>; according to Salomé's journals, Freud sometimes inquires about Tausk through Salomé or confides in her his fears that Tausk is preempting his work, and conversely Freud's attention to Salomé is likely attractive to Tausk. But Salomé's presence also demands attention by Tausk scholars for the simple reason that she recorded daily goings-on to which researchers would otherwise not have access.

Salomé's very first impressions of Tausk paint him as energetic, pig-headed, and irritating. When she arrives to her first meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Tausk is there to greet her.

Kam sehr früh; nur Einer da, ein blonder, Dickschädel (Dr. Tausk). Gespräch über Buber. Irgend etwas, was er unter anderem bemerkte, weckte Widerspruch in mir, aber ich vergaß es gleich, so daß ich ihn nicht mehr aussprechen konnte. (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 18)

Came very early. Only one man was there, a blond fellow with a big head, Dr. Tausk. Conversation about Buber. Something Tausk said aroused objection in me, but I forgot it right away and never got to talk to him about it.

It is unclear whether Salomé refers here to something Tausk said regarding Buber or a comment he made during their nightly discussion. However, she does not

mention, leading one to assume that Tausk himself did not mention, that Martin Buber is a relative of his former wife, and that Tausk may have had some curious insights into Buber's work.

Buber's publications at the time are predominantly writings on Jewish Hasidic mysticism and folktales, including *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* [The Tales of Rabbi Nachman] (1906) and *Die Legende des Baal Schem* [The Legend of the Baal Shem] (1908), and he had additionally collaborated with the cultural philosopher Georg Simmel on the publication of a series of social-psychological monographs under the title of *Die Gesellschaft* (Society). But Buber's most noteworthy contributions and a common topic of conversation at the time of Tausk and Salomé's meeting are three lectures Buber had delivered between 1909 and 1910, published in 1911 under the title *Drei Reden über das Judentum* [Three Addresses on Judaism]. These addresses, which speak to the existential condition of modern Jews, are inspirational to a generation of central European Jewish youth whose parents or grandparents had worked hard to integrate themselves into an urban, cosmopolitan life, and they mark Buber's debut as a public intellectual reconstituting a relationship with a mystical tradition in a modern sense (Mendes-Flohr 83). Tausk's knowledge of Buber's work hints at both Tausk's wider knowledge of modern Jewish discourse and of the revived interest in Jewish mysticism and folklore in which Buber's contributions played a key role.<sup>75</sup> I draw this out of Salomé's notes in order to build proof of Tausk's knowledge or interest in the reprisal of Jewish mysticism in a modern, secular context. In the years to follow, mysticism and folklore would surface in Tausk's own work as guiding practices and genres for deeper inquiry, and so his

knowledge of Buber's writing in 1912 is a good indication that he was already thinking through these forms.<sup>76</sup>

Although Salomé is first struck by the impression of Tausk as an arrogant "hanger-on" to Freud, by mid-November, she seems to have come around to Tausk as a colleague. She comments on Tausk's rhetorical talents, noting that his definitions of certain key terms have been most clarifying for her. For example, she observes that, while he is an obvious devotee of Freud's, his approach is the inverse of his teacher's. "Die Vortragsweise von Tausk, von der Peripherie auf das Zentrum zugehend, also in umgekehrter Reihenfolge wie Freuds Lehren entstanden sind, ist eine vorzüglich Art, diese ungezwungen plausibel zu machen" [Tausk's way of lecturing, proceeding from the periphery to the center, thus the opposite order from that of Freud's teachings, is an excellent way to have these [teachings] easily make sense], she writes (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 36). Tausk's approach from margin to center, as Salomé summarizes it here, is a recurrent theme in the content and form of his work. Not only does he write often about subjects at the margins of an Empire, or marginalized in terms of class, gender, or mental state, but he rhetorically incorporates his attention to the margins in his style of writing and lecturing. Tausk's lecturing as Salomé describes it in the above passage would likewise develop in his later writings when he heightened his rhetorical style for effect in the defense of his patients.<sup>77</sup> Salomé's acute observation rings true throughout the course of his work to come.

The brief intimate relationship between Salomé and Tausk, which is above all intellectually provocative, is built out of a mutual recognition of one another as worthy and talented peers. At fifty-one years old, Salomé is an alluring,

accomplished woman whom Tausk would have been happy to impress. She is highly connected and endlessly charming. Her notebooks read as a “Who’s Who” of Vienna’s cultural elite, casually mentioning an evening at Arthur Schnitzler’s home, bumping into Richard Beer-Hofmann, regularly dropping in on one of Marie Lang’s salons, and, of course, many long nights with the psychoanalytic crowd at their favorite pub, the Alte Elster. Likewise, her connections with other writers such as Nietzsche, Rilke, and Paul Rée give her a network far beyond Vienna. Tausk and Salomé’s intellectual bond is formed around conversations on philosophers to whom they are both drawn, their love of the cinema, and an exchange of psychoanalytic ideas, particularly around narcissism, sadomasochism, and the anal libido (they would each write on these topics soon after their affair). Their relationship has the savored, delightful secrecy of an adolescent romance; they refer to one another playfully as “Brudertier” [“Brother animal”] and send postcards in acronym code (see Figures 7 and 9).<sup>78</sup> The singular musical composition penned by Tausk that is held in the Austrian National Library in Vienna is listed only as “L.a.s. 1f”—a cryptic title that could very well signify that it was written for Lou. He shares his translations of South Slavic folk ballads with her; she introduces his work to Rilke. Though Salomé makes it clear in her multiple parallel affairs and in her diaries that she does not plan to take her relationship with Tausk as anything more than it is—an interlude and, later, a long-distance friendship—their mutual support clearly aids them in their respective personal creative development.




Fig. 7. Handwritten note to Lou Andreas Salomé, 13 August 1913. "It's fine by me. Completely fine. D. D. i. d. R. u. d. H. A. I'll just wait to know the day, train and hour. Warmly. Tausk."




Fig. 8. Handwritten note to Lou Andreas Salomé, 25 June 1916: Tausk signs his letter, "Ich danke Dir für's Brüdertier, liebes Brüdertier / dein Tausk" [thank you for that, Brother Animal, dear Brother Animal / your Tausk]. Lou notes, "ich hatte nur geantwortet: bleib mir leben, Brudertier" [I answered with only: stay alive [for] me, Brother Animal].




Fig. 9. Hand-drawn map to Tausk's home for Lou Salomé

Salomé's and Tausk's shared interest in philosophy converges at the work of two thinkers in particular: Nietzsche and Spinoza. Salomé had a brief and tempestuous relationship with Nietzsche between the years of 1882 and 1883, and in 1894, while Nietzsche began to spend the last eleven years of his life in a mental asylum in Jena, Salomé publishes the first study to analyze the philosopher according to his work, *Nietzsche in seinen Werken*. Her analysis of Nietzsche

homes in on a duality, a “two-ness” (“Zweiheit”) that reveals itself in Dionysian and Apollonian figures:

Nietzsche’s preoccupation with and attitude toward this “two-ness” and his resistance or yielding to the idea, all determine his road to knowledge and wisdom, as well as the uniqueness of his different intellectual periods, until his duality finally became a vision and hallucination and a living reality, clouding his spirit and choking his reason. He could no longer defend himself against himself: this was the Dionysian drama that could be entitled *The Soul’s Fate* (Preface, [Genealogy of Morals] 7) as it unfolded within Nietzsche. (Andreas-Salomé, *Nietzsche* 28)

Prior to meeting Salomé, Tausk had likewise developed an interest in Nietzsche and the theme of duality in his work, which we find expressed in areas of Tausk’s literary writing as well as his psychoanalytic scholarship. On February 23, 1912, Tausk delivers a presentation to the Medical Society of Vienna entitled “Nietzsche as Psychoanalyst,” which was noted in the *Zentralblatt* by title, though without summary. Nietzsche comes up in the official minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in preceding years—Hitschmann, Federn, Winterstein, and Tausk all refer to his writing in meetings recorded during 1910 to 1911. Nietzsche’s place in psychoanalysis had already been established when Freud’s patient known as the “Rat Man” paraphrased a point from *Beyond Good and Evil* in regard to his sense of guilt and memory: “‘I did this,’ says my Memory. ‘I cannot have done this,’ says my Pride and remains inexorable. In the end—Memory yields” (*SE* 10: 184). Freud was impressed by his patient’s insight and returned to this aphorism more than once in his work, but as Freud worried that Nietzsche’s writing might resonate with his own thoughts, he avoided reading it himself, explaining that he preferred to keep his mind “unembarrassed” (*SE* 20: 60).<sup>79</sup> Nietzsche had thus become a welcome philosopher in psychoanalysis by the time

of Salomé's publication of her study and Tausk's report on Nietzsche as psychoanalyst. Arguably, however, Nietzsche's importance to Tausk's work is apparent long before Tausk's admission to Freud's inner circle. In fact, traces of Nietzsche's philosophy are to be found in Tausk's 1905 drama, *Halbdunkel*, in which his two main characters embody Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian archetypes.<sup>80</sup>

In service of psychoanalysis, Tausk develops a Nietzschean perspective in his report on November 27, 1912, to the Psychoanalytic Society, "Two Contributions to the Psychoanalysis of the Inhibition of Artistic Productivity," which approaches artistic drive and inhibition through Freud's framework of psychosexual development (*Minutes 1912-1918* 127). Discussion of his presentation leads to the conclusion that masochism and sadism are at play as different key forces in the artist's ability to create. Otto Rank points to the history of a sculptor during their meeting, stating that the artist's creative activity is "sustained mainly by sadistic impulses and changes in keeping with their vicissitudes. In life and love he is masochistic; in art he gives full play to his sadism" (*Minutes 1912-1918* 130-131). Tausk agrees enthusiastically by saying that Rank's example "parallels not only what [Tausk has] spoken about, but also what he had not said about that case." The unsaid, Tausk then clarifies in the form of a "John-the-Baptist-motif," in which a certain type of person has a "desire for prison, [which] is to be understood as a safe-guard against temptation. [...]" Masochism that has been satisfied forms a protection for creativity, for in this way going after the other sex is rejected" (*Minutes 1912-1918* 131). Artistic pursuit is, Tausk argues, not only in itself a masochistic endeavor, but masochism fuels it by

keeping the artist close to the work of art rather than fulfilled by a libidinal exchange with another person. It is worth attending to Tausk's reference to John the Baptist here as a motif for artistic masochism, for while the circle's newly initiated guest was by this time recorded in weekly attendance by her first name, Salomé's last name must certainly be provocative to the rest of the group, however conscious or unconscious, with this reference. While meeting notes show Tausk turning to ancient Greek myth, Bachofen's *Mutterrecht*, or folk beliefs of Albanians, Roma, or Croatians in the areas in which he grew up, this reference to a biblical figure—let alone one from the Christian gospel—is a distinct outlier. The unspoken half of Tausk's John-the-Baptist masochistic artist who craves prison is, of course, the sensual and sadistic Salomé who (as proxy for her mother, Herodias) craves his death. Tausk's artistically and philosophically provocative relationship to Salomé is neatly expressed with this biblical motif as a dialectical one through which they can mutually grow.

Tausk and Salomé have already individually been drawn to the theorization of sadomasochism before their first encounter, but a passion around their shared interest in sadomasochistic impulses, especially within the artistic psyche, generates important work for each of them on the topic during and after Salomé's months in Vienna. Their theoretical approaches to sadomasochism are colored by Nietzsche's theories on art and drama; Salomé, in turn, unofficially diagnosed Nietzsche as a sadomasochist in a 1913 journal entry.

Wirkliche Grausamkeit, als ein ganz spezieller Seelenprozeß, hat ihren Ursprung da, wo die natürliche naive Bosheit, Wildheit, Brutalität, wie sie Tiere zu ihren vitalisten Zwecken äußern, nicht innerhalb dieser Selbstbehauptungsdomäne bleibt, sondern sich mit der *Sexualität* « verschränkt », zu ihr hinübergreift. Dadurch geschieht das ungeheuer

Seltsame und Unheimliche, was die Grausamkeit so rätselhaft charakterisiert: daß sie nur auf das Geliebte geht und im Maße der Liebe steigt [...]

Insofern als grausame Menschen immer auch Masochisten sind, hängt das Ganze mit einer gewissen Bisexualität zusammen. Und es hat einen tiefen Sinn –. Als ich zum ersten Mal im Leben mit jemandem dies Thema besprach, war es Nietzsche (dieser Sadomasochist *an sich selber*). Und ich weiß, daß wir hinterher nicht wagten, uns anzusehen. (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 155-156)

True cruelty is a very special mental process that arises when naïve and natural mischief, savagery, and brutality, which animals exhibit for their own vital necessities, does not remain in this domain of self-preservation, but rather “entangles” with sexuality and lays hold of it. Thus, the terribly strange and uncanny comes to pass, which characterizes cruelty so enigmatically: it is only imposed on the beloved object and increases in proportion to love [...]

Insofar as cruel people are always also masochists, the whole thing is inseparable from bisexuality. And that has a deep meaning. The first time I ever discussed this subject was with Nietzsche (that sadomasochist unto himself). And I know that afterward we dared not look at each other.

Salomé’s observations on the connection between sadism and masochism in Nietzsche’s case—that he forms a complete circuit of sadism and masochism *an sich selber*—appear to base themselves in Freud’s earlier theory of sadism and masochism in “The Sexual Aberrations” in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905).<sup>81</sup> Freud separates *algolagnia* (the taking of pleasure from pain) from masochism in this essay by assigning the latter a relationship with subjection and humiliation. The sadist’s impulses, on the other hand, he traces to a male aggression in sexuality that leads to the “desire to subjugate” and “the need for overcoming the resistance to a sexual object” through force, ie: rape (*SE* 7: 157-158). Freud’s thinking here runs along the more traditional belief that sadism is the primary perversion, but that sadomasochism is ultimately one in the same phenomenon, in which both the sadistic and masochistic perversions will be present within an individual but present themselves either actively or passively

(SE 7: 159). Freud shifts his perspective somewhat by 1920 in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* when he introduces the concept of the death drive. In this revision, masochism is made the primary perversion in the form of the death drive, which can conversely be turned against the “object”/other and produce sadism.

The importance of Tausk’s and Salomé’s interest in sadomasochism is presented here as more than an example of their intellectual bond, or of their interest in Nietzsche; it also helps to trace the longer threads of inquiry that are provoked through their meeting and span through their respective oeuvres. Salomé’s theories of masochism surface, for example, in her fiction, her writing on femininity and maternalism (“Der Mensch als Weib” [The Human Being as Woman] 1899), and her closely related writing on the anal libido (“Anal und Sexual” [Anal and Sexual] 1915)—apparent precursors to Julia Kristeva’s writing on the figure of woman and abjection.<sup>82</sup> Tausk explores sadism in his research on sexuality and the ego (“Sexualität und Ich” [Sexuality and the Ego] 1912) as well as in his fiction (“Husein Brko” 1912), and masochism in his early work (“Ein Beitrag zur Psychologie des Masochismus” [A Contribution on the Psychology of Masochism] 1911). Furthermore, Tausk’s and Salomé’s investigations of sadism and masochism, much like the work of their colleague Sabina Spielrein, would clearly shape Freud’s later theory of the death instinct as it appears in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920).<sup>83</sup>

Turning to another philosopher favored by Tausk and Salomé, Spinoza, we again see how thinkers outside of their immediate psychoanalytic circle acutely influence their thinking and their writing. As already mentioned in Chapter Two,

Tausk's dramatic dialogue, "Of Life and Knowledge," gives voice to the wisdom he found in Spinoza's work during his Berlin years. Salomé's love for Spinoza began in her early intellectual years and is only reinforced when she begins to study psychoanalysis. She muses over how lovely it is "daß der einziger Denker, zu dem ich schon eine ahnende und fast anbetende innere Beziehung fast als Kind besaß, mir hier wiederbegegnet und daß er der Philosoph der Psychoanalyse ist" [that the one thinker with whom I had an intuitive and nearly adorational relationship in my childhood now meets me once again, as the philosopher of psychoanalysis] (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 69). In Tausk, she finds someone who shares this connection and she recognizes in his thinking the traces of Spinoza's philosophy. In December 1912, she writes in her journal,

Man findet gewiß nicht selten den Ausdruck für sein Inwendigstes, Eigentliches in frühen Jahren schon, und dies gilt auch für Tausk in Bezug auf Spinoza und auf den Aufsatz, den er 1907 niedergeschrieben hat. Es ist auch bezeichnend, daß er vorher Spinoza nicht in toto kannte oder las: grade von Spinoza gilt es, daß einige Seiten von ihm einen darüber belehren, ob man zu ihm gehört, während große interpretierende Werke über ihn aus den gelehrtesten Mißverständnissen heraus geschrieben sind. Denn denken wie er, heißt nicht, ein System annehmen, sondern – « denken » –.

Übrigens ist das Wort « Repräsentanz », das mir an den Mittwoch-Abenden zuerst als ein Tauskches auftauchte, ganz charakteristisch für seine innere Zugehörigkeit zu Spinoza. Denn eben dies: die leiblichen und geistigen Äußerungen als Repräsentanzen voneinander aufzufassen, das muß nur bis zu Ende gedacht sein, um Spinoza bereits zu haben. Das ist etwas anderes als systematische Parallelismus, dessen letzte Weisheit in den « Hirnlocalisationen » und ähnlichem besteht: es ist die wache innere Anschauung von der Ganzheit und Gegenwart zweier Welten für *uns*, die einander nirgends ausschließen, nirgends bedingen, weil sie *eine sind*. Es ist das philosophische Weiterschreiten über Freud hinaus, der für die eine der beiden Welten, die psychologisch erfassbare, ihre eigene, bis zu Ende geführte Methode errungen hat, wie sie der andern stets gehörte. (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 68)

It is surely not rare for a person to discover in his early years the expressed form of what is most deeply personal to himself, and this is also the case

for Tausk in relation to Spinoza and to the essay he wrote in 1907.<sup>84</sup> It is also telling that he had never known Spinoza fully nor read him in toto. It is a quality of Spinoza that a few pages by him can teach us whether we are his disciples, while great interpretative works about him are written out of the most erudite of misunderstandings. For to think like him does not mean to adopt a system but just – “to think” – .

Incidentally, the word “representation” which first came up at a Wednesday meeting as Tausk’s own, is quite characteristic of his inner affinity to Spinoza. For precisely this reason: To grasp Spinoza it is only necessary to think through to its conclusion the concept that physical and mental manifestations are representations of one another. This is something other than systematic parallelism, the ultimate wisdom of which consists in “brain localizations” and the like. It is the conscious inward contemplation of the integrity and presence of two worlds for *us*, which are nowhere mutually exclusive nor dependent, because they are *but one*. This is the philosophical step that goes beyond Freud, for Freud developed a self-appropriate and exhaustive method for one of the two worlds, the psychologically comprehensible one, as it has always belonged to the other (physical world).

As Salomé meditates on Spinoza’s resonance in Tausk’s thinking, she teases out two key values that transfer into Tausk’s work and develop in his writing as time goes on. First, she finds it noteworthy that Tausk’s reading of Spinoza is incomplete, believing that even “a few pages” of Spinoza is enough to think with, because Spinoza does not require that one enter into a total system. Indeed, we find in Tausk’s work that he is drawn to thinking in ways which remain open and adaptive. Among the many turns Tausk takes through literary, juridical, and scientific studies and genres of writing, we see this running like a guiding thread from his very early writing on modernism until his last psychoanalytic study in 1919—let thinking be an adaptive technology rather than a contained system, a set of ossified laws, his writing insists.<sup>85</sup> As Tausk is at the time of this journal entry a devoted pupil to Freud and one of his strongest defenders, this observation on Salomé’s part is significant, for it means that even when working with Freud’s system Tausk is thinking of how to take it beyond its own confines.

Second, Salomé traces Tausk's understanding of representation back to Spinoza. Here, too, she finds in Tausk a capacity for thinking beyond Freud's system and she highlights it in a very specific philosophical sense. In a recent meeting of the Psychoanalytic Society, Tausk has brought up the concept of representation as *Repräsentanz*, and this sets the concept apart from an artistic tradition of representation as we find with the term *Darstellung*. Tausk wants his colleagues to follow him through representation in a Spinozian mode, but he does not make his reference explicit and Salomé herself infers his "inner affinity" to Spinoza with his use of this term. Spinozist representation requires that one distinguish ideas from images; whereas the latter is a rendition of something experienced in the world (i.e. a painting of a landscape as a representation of the natural landscape), representation in the context of ideas holds within it the substance of the thing it understands. Thus, as Salomé summarizes Spinoza in the above excerpt, mental and physical manifestations are equally, mutually, representations of one another as they share the same substance. Freud, Salomé surmises, works disproportionately in one half of this equation by focusing on the mental, relying on the biological and physical realms to bolster the legitimacy of his science with an unequivocal precision (Andreas-Salomé *In der Schule* 187). However, when Tausk invokes *Repräsentanz*, he does so with a Spinozian understanding of a shared mind/body substance. Salomé's recognition of this difference in Tausk's approach and his ability to take a philosophical step beyond Freud would be confirmed in Tausk's later work on identity and projection.<sup>86</sup>

The inspiration that Tausk and Salomé mutually find in Spinoza is surely one of their greatest points of intellectual connection, and their passion spreads to

others in their milieu. Salomé is impressed by Tausk's Spinoza Dialog "Vom Leben und Wissen," and she sends the text to Rilke (with whom she had also had a romance for a few years, and later a long friendship), according to her letter on October 28, 1913, and Rilke's reply on December 2, 1913 (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 253). It is possible that Spinoza gives Tausk a philosophical model for his very first psychoanalytic lecture, "Epistemology and Psychoanalysis," which he presents on the 24<sup>th</sup> of November 1909 before the Vienna Psychoanalytical Society, and that this lecture has an influence on Freud's thinking (Giampieri-Deutsch 91). As Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch points out, Freud is in attendance at Tausk's lecture and, in their following meeting on December 1, Freud presents a prototype for *Leonardo da Vinci, A Memory of His Childhood* which contains one of two cases in Freud's oeuvre in which he references Spinoza by name (91-92). Thus, the interest that Salomé and Tausk shared for the philosopher compels them in their understanding of his place in psychoanalysis, and very possibly influences Freud's consideration of Spinoza as well.

Nietzsche and Spinoza each play a key role in Tausk and Salomé's intellectual and creative bond, and this is evidenced by the writing that they both produce. Seeking common ground between Nietzsche and Spinoza may at first seem a foolish task; the former famously declared the death of God, while the latter claimed that God was everything—humans and things being finite derivatives of God's substance. But Nietzsche and Spinoza are not so divorced from one another in their thinking. As Deleuze points out in his book on Spinoza, "the practical theses that made Spinozism an object of scandal [...] imply a triple denunciation: of 'consciousness,' of 'values,' and of 'sad passions.' These are the

three major resemblances with Nietzsche” (17). The two philosophers are joined in their anti-transcendent thinking, and in the distinction they draw between morality, under which actions or intentions are judged according to a transcendent or universal set of values, and ethics, by which expression can be “evaluated according to the immanent mode of existence of possibilities of life it implies” (Deleuze, *Spinoza* 101). As early scholars of psychoanalysis who had, additionally, each rejected religion in their youth, Tausk and Salomé find their analytic tools in philosophical systems that attempt to plumb the depths of human nature as it presents itself rather than as it “should be.”

For Tausk, a culturally assimilated Jew (and a Christian convert for civil purposes), the rejection of religion occurs simultaneously at a general and very particular level. On the one hand, Tausk seems to reject religion as a system entirely, and this is why he does not mind trading one religion in for another in order to obtain access to the right to marry, for example. His Jewishness is expressly uncoupled from Judaism as a practice or a faith. On a level particular to Judaism, his rejection of religion is a rejection of Law. The Law of the “Fathers” that gives Judaism its structure is, to Tausk, the religion in its essence, and his rejection of religion is thus a rejection of a totalizing paternal structure. Tausk indicates the connection between Judaism and paternal structure in several places, including a presentation at a 1913 meeting of the Psychoanalytic Society titled “Das Vaterproblem” [The Father Complex] and, a few years later, in a short study of parapraxis, “Der Glauben der Väter” [The Faith of the Fathers] (*Minutes 1912-1918* 176-178). In his study of the “father problem,” which centers on the formation of society as rooted in the figure of the father, he ends with an aside to

hypothesize a neurotic relationship between Jews and patriarchal legacy formed from an “unconscious hate for the father (which) impedes sublimation,” concurrent with “homosexual fixation that disturbs the neurotic’s love-life” (*Minutes 1912-1918* 178). This concluding comment suggests that Judaism is fundamental to his notion of and argument against the problem of fathers or father-worship. Salomé notes in a journal entry a few months earlier that Tausk has commented to her on the nearly exclusive involvement of Jews in the advancement of psychoanalytic study, arguing that

[...] es sei verständlich, daß an uralten, zerfallenden Palästen durch Mauerschäden die innere Struktur sichtbarer würde und zu Einsichten auffordere, die an schönen neuen Häusern mit glatten Fassaden verdeckt bleiben, weshalb diese nur auf Farbe und Linie betrachtet werden. (Andreas-Salomé *In der Schule* 67)

[...] it is understandable that the inner structure of ancient, crumbling palaces becomes more visible due to damage to the walls and invites insights that remain hidden in beautiful new houses with smooth facades, [which are] only considered in terms of color and line.

Tausk finds in the religion of his heritage not an enduring structure of memory but a crumbling palace, a destroyed temple that cannot be reconstituted. This move is resonant of what Walter Benjamin locates in Kafka, the “relics transmitting the doctrine” in prose forms which have a “similar relationship to doctrine as the Haggadah does to the Halakah,” yet emptied of its religious meaning (Benjamin, *Illuminations* 122). It is the very nature of its disintegration which he finds interesting and productive of the sort of insight that a newer religion like Christianity cannot afford with its neat, superficial façades of faith. In the practice of Judaism, the rubble of the temple, impossible to rebuild in its former manifestation, is followed by the tradition of the Oral Law, the Oral Torah.<sup>87</sup>

Collected into the Talmud, this Law structures how an observant Jew must conduct his or her life. Tausk, here, produces a heretical turn by suggesting that psychoanalysis, not Jewish law, is the practice by which one may engage with the ruins of the world. Following the heretical philosophy of Spinoza and, in many ways, the spirit of his contemporary Martin Buber, who inspires a generation of assimilated Jews to understand the foundations of Judaism by way of its mystical aspects rather than an adherence to the Law, Tausk approaches Judaism as a heretic by way of psychoanalysis, taking what is useful to his practice and leaving behind the faith (Mendes-Flohr 81). Psychoanalysis is Tausk's own tool for excavating the rubble of the Law, rather than a new system of Law built up to replace the old. Even as a most dedicated student or practitioner of psychoanalysis, we see Tausk using psychoanalysis as a mode for the continuous exploration of the rubble of what came before, rather than attempting to rebuild its masonry and polish its façade. This is emblematic of Tausk's use of philosophy as a whole. Though Salomé's documentation insists that Tausk provides a lacking philosophical basis through his psychological engagement with Spinoza and Nietzsche, we see that Tausk's approach is above all a practical one, rather than building out a philosophy of the mind for its own sake. Tausk is interested primarily in what philosophy can do, where it can take us and better equip us to grasp at the rubble he finds in history.

### *Devotion and Heresy*

Tausk's personal relationship with Freud between 1909 and 1919 is, according to most primary evidence, an intense and turbulent relationship between

the devoted yet headstrong student and his suspicious, ambivalent master. Salomé's diaries observe Tausk's behavior toward Freud as one of an enthusiastic devotee, while at the same time noting his distinct difference from his teacher in terms of temperament, the framing of ideas, and the topical directions in which he was headed. Tausk is impatient and impassioned; he speaks so quickly and fervently at times during the meetings of the psychoanalytic committee, Salomé notes, that he sometimes forgets a word and grabs at a lethological substitute (Andreas-Salomé *In der Schule* 118). Freud has attempted to slow Tausk down and curtail his use of Freud's unpublished concepts already for some months or years by this time. In a letter to Karl Abraham in 1911, for example, Freud expresses his deep frustrations over Tausk's attempt to consider the psychic systems of space and time as related to one another, and fears Tausk wishes to put his patent on Freud's ideas:

Dem Tausk habe ich schriftlich nahegelegt, die Andeutung über die Beziehung der beiden psychischen Systeme Raum und Zeit zurückzuziehen. Es ist eine Bemerkung, die ich im Verein fallen gelassen habe, die mir für eine spätere Arbeit wichtig ist, und die überhaupt nicht in ein Referat gehört. Die Voreiligkeit und Prioritätssucht dieses Menschen ist leider sehr groß.<sup>88</sup> (*Briefwechsel* 400)

I wrote to Tausk suggesting that he withdraw the implication about the relationship between the two psychic systems of space and time. It is a remark that I dropped in the Society, which is important to me for a later paper, and which does not belong in a review at all. Unfortunately, this person's hastiness and obsession with priority is very great.

As demonstrated in countless other relationships between Freud and his colleagues or students (Fliess, Adler, or Jung, for example), Freud's distaste and deep aversion to any hint of competition results in his severing of ties, yet he desires intellectual "sons." This is the trajectory of conflict that Freud and Tausk's

relationship would eventually take. At the onset of his psychoanalytic career, Tausk is devotedly Freudian in his ideas. As Salomé's diaries indicate, he is, even in 1912, perhaps *too* Freudian in his attempt to follow in the master's footsteps. He both desires to make himself a "son" of Freud's, she thinks, and to fully express his own ideas. This puts him in constant struggle with himself, and with Freud, she believes, by way of resistance. Tausk is locked into a state of father-son tension with his teacher.

Each episode that Salomé recounts (and all within a very short window of time, situated at the center of Freud and Tausk's eleven years together) is imbricated with the weight of various conflicting desires from both parties. When Tausk follows Freud too closely, he inadvertently drives his teacher to suspicion and defensiveness that manifests as severe critique, or he constrains himself in his work. As Salomé says of Tausk's work on masturbation, "der Tausk-Aufsatz darin ist weitaus nicht er selbst, sondern wie unterbunden" [Tausk is not at all himself in this essay but seems foiled] (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 99). Tausk's departures from Freud, however, equally garner criticism if they veer too far off in approach or subject.

Tausk's writing and ideas in their more authentic forms, as opposed to those formed under the constraint of proper Freudianism, are greatly impressive both in their clarity and philosophical ingenuity. Even Freud, in his obituary for Tausk, lauds his numerous contributions, for being "distinguished by sharp observation, sound judgement, and a particular clarity of expression" (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 63). As Roazen points out, "clarity was always Freud's highest praise," but this is not always the quality that comes forward in Tausk's

work, due to his positionality with his teacher (*Brother Animal* 63). From the vantage point that Salomé's diaries provide, one sees Tausk in a terrible bind with Freud and with himself by proxy as he attempts to write in dialog with Freud's system. When Tausk expresses something too far from Freud's teachings, Freud rejects him on the basis of what Freud believes to be lacking; when Tausk more severely constrains himself to Freud's approaches, his work either comes off as "unterbunden" [foiled] or he agitates Freud's fear of being supplanted or plagiarized in the process. Often, textual evidence suggests some mixture of all three. After a lecture on January 25, 1913, Salomé notes, "It was only through Tausk's formulations that I personally became clear about the equal significance of ego and sex, and yet Freud is now of accord." Freud is resistant to Tausk's more original formulations as he is to Salomé's enthusiasm regarding Tausk's work. When Tausk presents a study of narcissism and the inhibitions of artists, Salomé writes,

Freuds Entgegnungen waren viel strenger, als er sich sonst verhält, und dabei spricht kein Zweiter ihm je seinen Vortrag mit solcher Ehrfurcht in die Augen. Mir scheint von allen Tausk sowohl am unbedingtesten an Freud zu hängen, als auch am unbedingtesten sich unten den übrigen herauszuheben.<sup>89</sup> (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 45)

Freud's objections were more severe than usual and yet no other person presents their papers to him with such reverence in their eyes. I think Tausk is, more than anyone else, the most unconditionally devoted to Freud and at the same time the most prominently outstanding.

In that brief observation, Salomé summarizes Tausk's terrible predicament with his teacher. Tausk is alienated from himself when he espouses Freud's perspective and alienated from his teacher when he follows his own path, putting him in a dangerous dialectic with Freud.

Freud increasingly both pushes away and keeps close the devoted student; he recognizes Tausk's talent and insight and fears its capacity for overtaking his own work. This resulted in a paranoia that Tausk, so attentive to following Freud's directives, would somehow arrive at Freud's own thoughts before he could. In Salomé, Freud found a welcome confidant. Salomé was a guest in the psychoanalytic community and not an opponent in his eyes. Moreover, she was talented at carrying on various relationships at once with discretion. Few would have been able to attend both Adler's and Freud's meetings during this period without experiencing Freud's distance, but for Salomé it was not a problem. Freud disclosed more to her concerning Tausk during their private meetings than he would have to most of his circle, and she was left with a unique insight into the difficulties of their relationship:

Am *Donnerstag* war ich wiederum bei Freud, zum Nachtmal. Schon vorher, gleich im Wohnzimmer, brachte er das Gespräch auf Tausk und wir sprachen viel darüber, später nochmals in seinem Zimmer, erst gegen 1½ Uhr brachte er mich nach Hause. Freud handelt aus bester Überzeugung, wenn er so scharf gegen Tausk auftritt, daran ist nicht zu zweifeln. Aber neben diesem « Psychoanalytischen » (im Hinblick auf Tausks ursprünglich neurotische Einstellung) ist es ja auch klar, daß alle Selbständigkeit neben Freud, besonders eine aggressiv temperamentvolle, ihn in seinem forschersichen, also edelsten Egoismus unwillkürlich hetzt und schädigt, zu verfrühten Auseinandersetzungen zwingt etc. Der Wert, den ein selbständiger Kopf für die Sache hat, weist sich erst am Zukünftigen auf und das führt durch Kämpfe in der Gegenwart, die wahrscheinlich nicht vermeidlich sind. Daß Freud es als Störung empfindet und sich tief nach jener Ruhe stiller Forschung sehnt, die er bis 1905 – bis zur Gründung der « Schule » genoß, ist sicher [...]

Ich verstehe deshalb auch wohl, daß Menschen von Intelligenz und Tüchtigkeit wie Otto Rank, der ganz nur Sohn ist, für Freud das weit Wünschenswertere vorstellen. [Freud] von Rank sagt: « Warum kann es diesen reizenden Menschen nicht sechsmal anstatt einmal in unserer Vereinigung geben? » [...] <sup>90</sup> (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 97-98).

Thursday I was again at Freud's for dinner. Even before dinner, right in the living room, he turned the conversation to Tausk and we talked a lot about him; later again in his study and it was nearly half past one when he took me home. Freud acts out of his best convictions when takes such a sharp stance against Tausk, there can be no doubt about that. But aside from this "psychoanalytic" part (with regard to Tausk's original neurotic disposition), it is also clear that any independence around Freud, especially an aggressively temperamental one, incites and injures him in his noblest, most inquisitive egoism, forcing him to premature discussion, etc. The value that an independent mind has for [this analysis] will only become apparent in the future, and this leads to struggles at present which are probably unavoidable. It's clear that for Freud it's all a nuisance, and he longs for the peace of undisturbed research which he enjoyed until 1905—until the founding of his 'school' [...]

So, I understand very well indeed that men of intelligence and ability like Otto Rank, who is a son and nothing but a son, represent for Freud something far more desirable. [Freud] says of Rank: "Why can't there be six such charming men in our group instead of only one?" [...]

Tausk may be ambitious to make himself a "son," but in Freud's domestic taxonomy, Tausk is nothing if not a problem-child because of his aggressive independence. Freud's primary concern arises from his feeling of being "forced" to discuss ideas before he has fully ruminated and developed them. Tausk's impatience, Freud fears, has the capacity to swallow up and birth those things that Freud is not yet ready to put down into print, perhaps even put into words, and Salomé expresses her sympathies to Freud's self-forged position of being the leader of his school of thought when his own thoughts were best developed in private.

A month later during Salomé's stay, Freud's suspicions have only heightened. Tausk gives a presentation on the "Father Complex" (later recorded in the protocol as "The Father Problem", which greatly agitated Freud's fear of having his ideas usurped, and results in his outright rejection of Tausk's work:

Nachdem Tausk den « Vaterproblem » vortrag nachmittags in intensiver Hast beendet, fuhren wir zur Vereinigung; ich ging allein voraus, von Freud auf der Straße abgewartet, und mit ihm zusammen hinauf. Dann seine Unruhe (bei der Annäherung an seine Gedanken) und schriftliche Anfrage während des Vortrags (Papierchen mir zuschiebend): « Weiß er schon alles? » Ich schrieb zurück « Natürlich nichts » – [...]. [Freud] lehnte [Tausk] ab, weil die psychoanalytische Anwendung auf Neurose (die jedoch geflissentlich aus geschaltet geblieben war) fehle und weil der Bezug auf das Matriarchat nach Bachofen die Auffassung einseitig gemacht habe.

*Freitag* Abend bei Freud eingeladen. Frage sprach schon vor dem Nachtmal und dann später viel und bereitwillig über die ganze Tausk-Frage. Zuletzt sprach er sehr gut und weich. (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 119-120).

In the afternoon after Tausk had finished the lecture on “The Father Problem” in great haste, we drove to the meeting; I went ahead on my own and walked with Freud, who was waiting for me in the street. He was restless (due to the closeness of the ideas to his own), slipping me a piece of paper during the lecture with the question: “Does he know it all already?” I wrote back: “Of course not, nothing at all” [...]. [Freud] rejected [Tausk] because the paper was deficient in the application of psychoanalysis to neurosis (which had in fact been deliberately excluded) and because Tausk’s reference to Bachofen’s views on matriarchy made the interpretation one-sided.

Invited to Freud’s Friday evening. Before dinner, and then again later, Freud talked readily and at length about the problem of Tausk. At the end he spoke kindly and gently.

Freud’s rejection here seems to come from two directions; he attacks Tausk’s work on the basis of the author’s careful, intentional decision to exclude certain material on neurosis (Tausk was already drifting toward other areas of psychological disturbance), and he equally attacks Tausk for his citation of Bachofen. Freud himself is often guilty of doing the exact inverse on both accounts; he focuses exclusively on neurosis, and he often makes it difficult to trace his ideas back to any source outside of the raw material of myth or a patient’s psyche (although he certainly had a multitude of influences).<sup>91</sup>

What Salomé does not make clear in the above anecdote, and what seems crucial to note, is that Freud has at this very moment published *Totem and Taboo*

in four separate parts. By the time of Tausk's presentation on March 12 of 1913, Freud has just published his last two chapters in the February 1913 volume of *Imago*, in which he briefly cites Bachofen's *Mutterrecht* (1861), the hypothetical lunar-agricultural phase of human development, characterized by fertility goddess worship, the emergence of law, and mystery cults, which was presumed to have been replaced by the patriarchal organization of the family. Tausk's presentation is thus a direct response to Freud's final *Totem and Taboo* chapters, and Freud is likely disturbed by how quickly Tausk has taken in the concepts and produced something new in response—thoughts that Freud believed were in fact *Freud's own*. Moreover, Freud was known to have suspected in his pupils a subconscious desire to overthrow him, and Tausk's discussion of the social repression of murder between fathers and sons would have put him ill at ease. The protocol recorded from Tausk's presentation ends with the following.

Der Vater hat die Kultur geschaffen. Die Sozietät ruht auf dem Vaterkomplex, der so weit reicht als die Homosexualität. Er ist die Form, in der sich die Homosexualität ausleben kann und in die sie sich fügen muß. Ein großer Mann ist der, der den Vater überwunden hat. Der Narzißmus steht insofern mit dem Vaterkomplex in Zusammenhang, als die Befreiung des Sohnes von einer gelungenen Identifizierung mit dem Vater ausgeht. (GPLS 66)

The father created culture. Society rests on the father complex, which extends as far as homosexuality. It is the form in which homosexuality can live itself out and into which it must fit. A great man is one who has overcome his father. Narcissism is related to the father complex in that the liberation of the son is based on a successful identification with the father.

Tausk's "great man" is exactly who Freud would recognize as an "outlaw," as he describes it in "'Civilized' Sexual Morality" five years prior; "The man who, in consequence of his unyielding constitution, cannot fall in with his suppression of instinct, becomes a 'criminal,' an 'outlaw,' in the face of society—unless his social

position or his exceptional capacities enable him to impose himself as a great man, a ‘hero’” (*SE* 9: 187). This fundamental philosophical rift encapsulates perhaps the greatest difference between Freud’s and Tausk’s thinking, and certainly the source of many of Freud’s worries. If Tausk’s reversal of the order of Plato and Aristotle in his previous presentation irritated Freud (who assumed it was a parapraxis revealing Tausk’s desire to supplant him), then this conclusion certainly would have given Freud further pause.

In addition to his paranoia that Tausk would preemptively arrive at Freud’s own thoughts before Freud could, Freud is constantly plagued by the fear of plagiarism. He is suspicious in nature, but his worries sometimes go beyond the boundaries of suspicion into superstition. This is demonstrated in his obsession with numerology, which he self-diagnoses in “The Psychopathology of Everyday Life” as “a tendency to superstition.” This tendency extends to a fear of telepathy or “thought-transference” that he carries throughout his career. Freud’s attraction to the structures of secret societies and the occult, as I have discussed in Chapter One in context of his gifting of intaglio rings to those in his closest circle, seems, in light of his superstitions, a method of establishing some control over the threat of the unknown. Yet even within his own carefully selected group, he remains plagued by the fear that his thoughts are being read by others close to him. In one episode recounted by his biographer Ernst Jones, Freud’s students present him with a medallion commemorating his fiftieth birthday, inscribed with a line from Sophocles’s *Oedipus Tyrannus*: “Who divined the famed riddle [of the Sphinx] and was a man most mighty.” Unbeknownst to the students, Freud had years earlier fantasized that this very line would be the inscription for his bust at the

University of Vienna. “When Freud read the inscription,” Jones recounts, “he became pale and agitated and in a strangled voice demanded to know who had thought of it” (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 171).

Freud’s superstitious nature—if not downright paranoia—is one of the driving factors in his increasingly ambivalent relationship with Tausk; Freud imposed distance while keeping his pupil close enough to still observe Tausk’s behavior or guard himself against the betrayal he feared. Their relationship, leading up to the onset of the First World War, might best be observed in the scene Salomé describes of the 1913 congress at Munich. Having recently lost Jung as his chosen intellectual heir, Freud is visibly distressed and confides in Salomé that Tausk might be his best replacement. Yet, he held him warily at a distance:

Freud war ganz wie immer, aber er verhielt nur mit Mühe die tiefe Bewegung die in ihm war [nach diesem kürzlichen Bruch mit Jung]; und nirgend wo anders hätte ich sitzen mögen als nur so dicht bei ihm. Infolgedessen saß auch Tausk ganz nahe, obwohl Freud auch jetzt ihn sichtlich ablehnte, wenn schon, wie [Freud] selber zugab, Tausk in der neuen Situation der rechte Mann war (« gescheit und gefährlich » sagte Freud, « bellen und beißen kann er »). (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 191)

Freud was the same as ever, but it was only with difficulty that he restrained his deep emotion [after this recent break with Jung]; and there was nowhere else I would have preferred to sit than right by his side. As a result, Tausk also sat very close by, despite the fact that Freud obviously rejected him now, even though [Freud] himself admitted that in this new situation Tausk was the right man (“clever and dangerous,” said Freud, “he can bark and bite”).

Only a day later, Salomé refers to a long, confidential conversation “über die seltsame Fälle der Gedankenübertragung, die [Freud] entschieden quälen” [on those strange instances of thought transference which certainly torment [Freud]] (Andreas-Salomé 192). Although Freud refers to a patient, Salomé indicates that the real torment is affectively his own.

Salomé sees in Tausk the struggle of one forever doomed to get in his own way by attempting to follow Freud too closely. She is perceptive of this tendency in Tausk's work; as we see, he over-enthusiastically cites Freud even as his work makes great philosophical and practical departures from Freud's systems. Salomé sees Tausk's strength in his philosophical insights, which she poses as the natural antithesis to Freud's attraction to an exhaustive biological system:

Die psychoanalytische Denkmethode enthält ja innerhalb der Psychologie ihre Denkmöglichkeiten, und so gut wie sie jenseits davon, im Biologischen und Physikalischen, viel einseitiger, eindeutiger exakt wird, so muß sie umgekehrt auch nach der anderen Richtung, der philosophischen, Auswege lassen über ihr Gebiet fort.

Am gefährlichsten wird es jedoch bei solchen Psychoanalytikern, die dieser ihrer Methode *praktisch selber* bedürfen: nur so verstehe ich es, wie Tausk, ein von Haus aus philosophischer Kopf, ihn sich sozusagen abgeschlagen hat, anstatt ihn wenigstens feiertags zu benutzen. Wo er synthetisch denkt, « überdenkt » er sich sofort mit schlechtem Gewissen, den um Grunde denkt er immer nur seine *eigne* praktische Analyse und darum *nie* syntetisch, darum aber der Psychoanalyse gegenüber *sowohl* zu kritiklos wie (per Widerstand) *allzu* kritisch: dies dann auf Freud wälzend.

Mir erscheint daher auch jetzt erst Tausks Beziehung zu Freud in ihrer ganzen Tragik: ich begreife nämlich, daß er *stets* in dieselben Probleme und Lösungsversuche geraten wird, die Freud grade bearbeitet – daß dies kein Zufall ist, sondern das ebenso gewaltsame « Sich-zum-Sohn-machen » wie auch « Den-Vater-dafür-hassen ». Wie durch Gedankenübertragung wird ihn stets dasselbe beschäftigen wie Freud, er wird nie den einen Schritt zur Seite gehn, der ihm Raum schaffen würde. Das *schien* so sehr an den Verhältnissen zu liegen, aber es liegt zuletzt an ihm. (Andreas-Salomé *In der Schule* 187-188).

The psychoanalytic method of thinking retains its own possibilities for thought within psychology. Beyond this, in the biological and physical realms, it becomes much more one-sided and unambiguously precise; conversely, it must grant free passage beyond its territory in the other direction, that of philosophy.

The greatest danger, however, is in the case of those psychoanalysts who are *themselves* in *practical* need of their own method: that is the only way I can understand how Tausk, endowed by nature with a philosophical head, has so to speak cut it off instead of using it, at least on holidays. When he thinks synthetically, he immediately “overthinks” with a guilty conscience, for basically he always thinks of his *own* practical analysis alone and therefore *never* synthetically; thus, his position regarding

psychoanalysis is *simultaneously* too uncritical and (through resistance) *all too* critical. This is then laid at Freud's door.

Only now do I see the whole tragedy of Tausk's relation with Freud: I realize now that he will always run into the same problems, the same attempts at solutions, that Freud is working on – this is no accident, but the equally violent “making himself a *son*” as it is “hating the father for it.” As if by a thought transference he will always be preoccupied by the same thing as Freud, never taking the one step to the side that would make room for himself. That *seemed* to depend so much on the situation, but ultimately it is his own doing.

While Salomé has precious insights into the inner workings of Tausk and Freud's relationship, particularly in terms of the bind that Tausk finds himself in and the heavily laden Father-Son undertones of their troubled relationship, she is wrong in her assessment of Tausk's being doomed to tackle the same problems and the same attempts at a solution with which Freud preoccupies himself. This is, to be certain, Tausk's greatest obstacle, yet in the period that follows his studies under Freud, he develops some of the most authentic and innovative work of his career.

Ultimately, Tausk's studies with Freud would conclude a year later in 1914. This is terribly ill-timed for the prospect of Tausk's professional advancement in the field; the very year in which he would have been establishing his own practice, Archduke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated in Tausk's former home of Sarajevo, sparking the flames of the First World War. Tausk is called to serve the Austro-Hungarian Army in August of 1915 after which he was quickly made an *Oberarzt* (equivalent to a first lieutenant doctor). He is stationed in Lublin, Rzeszów, and Belgrade for the duration of the war, though he is able to return now and then to Vienna, and he attends the 1918 International Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest when the Association began to resume their meetings.

During this period, Tausk begins to invest his psychoanalysis in service of the advocacy for peasant-class conscripted soldiers who are systemically discriminated against in the Austro-Hungarian army, treated as idiots and even criminals for reasons that ultimately had to do with their language, level of education, and socio-economic class. Tausk's studies on war deserters and war "psychoses" are formulated, published, and publicly delivered quickly at this time, demonstrating the fact that his studies are not simple academic exercises but rather political actions. This remains one of the greatest differences between Tausk and Freud; Freud is interested in developing "a basis for a very grave philosophy," "not primarily a heal-all," as he explains to his patient Hilda Doolittle (qtd. in LaForgue 308). The therapeutic process, the betterment of his patients, is "negligible or unimportant" (Ferenczi xiii). As Freud later explains to the young psychoanalyst Edoardo Weiss in 1922, "only a few patients are worth the time we spend on them, so that we are not allowed to have a therapeutic attitude, but we must be glad to have learned something in every case" (qtd. in Roazen, *Edoardo Weiss* 101). While Tausk may have followed in his master's footsteps in that he, too, is preoccupied with a philosophy rooted in the crypt of the human mind, his political vigor and interest in the defense of minoritized and oppressed populations propels his most notable work during these last years of his life.

### *Returning from War*

Little record remains of whatever personal interactions Tausk and Freud have during the following four years of war. Near the end of the war, Tausk attends the International Psychoanalytic Congress in Budapest (September 28-29,

1918) and presents a paper there entitled “Psychoanalyse der Urteilsfunktion” [Psychoanalysis of the Function of Judgement]. Tausk, for reasons unknown, is ill during the conference and must leave the room to vomit at one point during the day. Freud reads this as a psychosomatic expression of neurosis and a generally unwell psyche.<sup>92</sup> Though Freud’s sons are serving in the military and corresponding with him fairly regularly, Freud has not had the experience of working with those traumatized by war the way that Tausk has for over three years by the time of their meeting in Budapest. This is a key difference in their relationships to psychological suffering and those afflicted by it. Tausk’s urgency with the publication of his wartime studies (which I analyze in depth in Chapter Four) signals that his priority was in the practice of psychoanalysis as a tool to defend and empower human subjects under crisis. Moreover, much of the work produced during his years as a military officer explicitly accounts for cultural and class differences in his analysis of patients and their relationships to their social and political environments. This, too, breaks from the presumed purity of a science that Freud attempts to construct with his psychoanalytic framework, demonstrating the practice’s shift and necessarily adaptive nature under Tausk’s application. Tausk is likewise marked by his practice as a medical officer during this time. By way of his service at the Eastern Front, he is exposed to and embodying trauma that his colleagues in Vienna only understand at a remove. Freud’s clinically removed judgements of Tausk’s behavior lack the foundations of embodiment that Tausk’s practice imparted.

Ironically, the 1918 Budapest conference, held just two months before armistice was signed and the First World War effectively ended, is a moment in

which Freud and his colleagues begin in earnest to discuss the democratization and application of psychoanalysis for outpatient soldiers and the uses of psychoanalysis to treat combat trauma. Freud gives an address, “Wege der Psychoanalytischen Therapie” [Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy] in which he advocates for free and accessible clinics, where “the large-scale application of our therapy will compel us to alloy the pure gold of analysis freely with the copper of direct suggestion” (*SE* 17:168; Strachey’s translation). Indeed, the Berlin Psychoanalytic Polyclinic and the Vienna Ambulatorium are later formed based on the vision Freud offers in his address, that “the conscience of society will awake and remind it that the poorest man should have just as much right to assistance for his mind as he now has to life-saving [...] surgery” (*SE* 17:167; Strachey’s translation). The German psychoanalyst Ernst Simmel is likewise a key guest at the conference, and gives an address based on his experience of the application of psychoanalysis in the treatment of war neuroses. Simmel’s 1918 monograph *Kriegsneurosen und „Psychisches Trauma“* [*War Neurosis and Psychic Trauma*] had caught Freud’s attention, and his contributions to the psychoanalytic study and treatment of war neuroses are striking. “Clearly Simmel’s psycho-cathartic treatment was gentler and less dangerous than the various methods of active treatment,” allows Paul Lerner (174). But with Simmel’s psycho-cathartic treatment, many of his patients

were not considered merely ‘capable of work,’ but were discharged from the hospital as able to return to the field. [...] Simmel’s ostensibly more human and ethically sound procedure was potentially of greater service to the war effort and ultimately more life-threatening to patients than the often opprobrious methods of active treatment. This dilemma dramatizes what Freud later called the ‘insoluble conflict’ between the universalistic-

humanitarian aims of medical practice and the particularistic-national demands of the state. (Lerner 171)

Simmel's approach may have been successful in terms of its application of Freud's science, yet its use in the betterment of his patients is not so clear.

While this congress in particular is remembered as a turning point during which psychoanalysis began to address psychological ailments inflicted by war, Tausk is one of the few presenters that day who has been working at the warfront. Freud and most of Tausk's colleagues have continued their practice of psychoanalysis within the confines of bourgeois society, in which the war looms but is not physically present in the way it is for Tausk and his patients. Tausk's illness at the conference likely reflects the toll the war has taken on him physically and mentally. But within a month, Tausk's time as a military doctor would come to an end. On the fourth of November, 1918, as Austria-Hungary concludes its armistice with the allies at Villa Giusti, Tausk writes to Martha, "Jetzt ist wohl auch für mich der Krieg zu Ende" [I guess this is the end of the war for me, too]. He is returning to Vienna, and sends along the address of the guesthouse he will call home while reestablishing himself and setting up his practice.

Readjusting to life in Vienna is difficult for Tausk for a number of reasons both obvious and opaque. In Belgrade, Tausk had lived with a wealthy widow named Kosa Lazarević. They were engaged for a time, and Tausk had entertained plans to continue working in Belgrade, going so far as to enroll his sons in school there during his last year. But when the war ends and Tausk returns to Vienna, his former life with Kosa seems untenable. His greatest wish is to become a *Dozent* at a Viennese university, teaching psychoanalysis. In spite of his wish to start his life

again in Vienna, the city feels cruel, combative, and defeated. He writes to Lou

Salomé in Göttingen on November 17, 1918:

Liebe Lou, ich bin wieder hier und will nach 4 Jahren von neuem anfangen. Die Verhältnisse sind aber ganz undurchsichtig es ist nicht abzusehen, wann der Anfang beginnen wird. Die letzten Wochen waren sehr bewegt, es war eine Reise durch Schmutz, Grausamkeit und Lüge, als was sich plötzlich alles entpuppt hatte, was 4 Jahre Milieu, Kameradschaft, ärztliche Tätigkeit hieß. Ich war nicht überrascht, musste aber unvermutet in einen Kampf einspringen, den zu vermeiden mir bisher gelungen war. Auch sonst kam das Ende, wie ich es vorausgesehen habe. In Deutschland muss es trotz alledem besser und anständiger zugehen. Hier lebt man bigott, aber ohne Glauben. Wir wissen nicht einmal, dass wir besiegt sind. Aber die Hungersnot zu betrügen sind wir unablässig beschäftigt. Jeder ist einsam und gierig.

Freud ist in Sorge um einen Sohn, der nicht zurückgekehrt ist.<sup>93</sup> Ich habe meine Buben einstweilen geborgen. Ob ich müde oder alt geworden bin, kann ich nicht unterscheiden. Abwarten. Dich sähe ich gern wieder nach alledem. Wie ist es Dir ergangen?

Herzlichen Gruss.

Tausk

Dear Lou, I'm back and I want to start over after four years. But the circumstances are completely opaque, it is not foreseeable when the beginning will begin. The last weeks were very emotional, it was a journey through dirt, cruelty, and lies, as what everything had suddenly turned out to be, what 4 years of milieu, comradeship, medical activity meant. I was not surprised, but I had to jump unexpectedly into combat, which I had managed to avoid so far. Besides that, the end came, as I had foreseen it. In spite of it all, things must be better and more decent in Germany. Here everyone lives piously, but without faith. We don't even know that we are defeated. But to fool starvation we are constantly keeping busy. Everyone is lonely and greedy.

Freud is worried about a son who has not returned. I've recovered my boys for now. I can't tell if I'm tired or old. We'll see. I'd like to see you again after all this. How have you been?

Warm regards.

Tausk

A large part of Tausk's attempt to resume the life he'd left in Vienna and continue his professional advancement seems again to depend upon his relationship to Freud. Tausk had long wished to be analyzed by Freud and within a month of

returning to Vienna, he approaches his professor and asks him to take him on. But, for reasons left unknown, Freud refuses Tausk as a patient and instead sent him to his student Helene Deutsch, whom Freud was at the time also analyzing. Tausk is by this point in his career much more of an accomplished analyst than Deutsch, and this move on Freud's part was likely difficult for him. Wanting to be recognized, read, made legible by his teacher seems a plain and simple desire of Tausk's from the very beginning of their relationship. It would also be symbolic of his status within the psychoanalytic community; Freud's acceptance of him as a patient would have functioned as a sort of benediction. Instead, a triangle echoing the Tausk-Salomé-Freud relationship soon develops: Tausk lies on Deutsch's couch six days a week for analysis, and Deutsch is in turn analyzed by Freud six days a week. Tausk grieves Freud's rejection of him during his sessions, and Deutsch, preoccupied with her discussions with Tausk, replays these revelations during her sessions with Freud. For all of Freud's purported worries of being too close to Tausk, this bizarre structure of his own making seems, if anything, a way to keep an eye on the student who makes him too uncomfortable to take onto his own couch. The situation soon grows to be too much for Freud; Deutsch's analysis of Tausk is terminated, soon to be followed by Freud's termination of analysis with Deutsch for a patient he found more interesting (who would famously be known as "the Wolf Man" in Freud's case studies) (Smith 131).

Based on these events, Freud's suspicion of Tausk has, if anything, only intensified by the end of the war. Around the time of their concatenated analysis, Freud confides in Deutsch that it gives him an "uncanny" impression to have Tausk present at the meetings of the Psychoanalytic Society; Tausk might be able

to take one of Freud's ideas and develop it before Freud was done with it and, Freud fears, come to believe that ideas of Freud's were Tausk's own (Roazen, *Helene Deutsch* 175). "Years later," writes Roazen in his biography of Deutsch, "Helene made the point that at times Freud may have only considered an idea in his mind, but seeing it in print he would conclude that someone had stolen it" (176). Throughout his psychoanalytic career, Tausk works quickly and intensively, citing Freud and his colleagues generously, while he struggles to be recognized by a professor who ruminates over ideas for years, as one gestating a pearl, until whatever trace of alien input that had once had something to do with its creation could be plausibly dismissed. Freud cites outside sources sparingly and with utmost intent. "Rank once jokingly remarked that Freud distributed references to other analysts' writings on the same principle as the Emperor distributed decorations, according to the mood and fancy of the moment," recounts Ernest Jones (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 193). With a few references here and there in Freud's work to Tausk's discoveries (the majority coming in the form of footnotes in revised editions of earlier works), perhaps the greatest decoration Freud would bestow upon Victor Tausk would come in the form of his obituary—the longest Freud would write for any one person.

On January 22 of 1919, Tausk writes to Freud, thanking him profusely for his having sent two new patients to Tausk's struggling practice, and offering his diagnoses of each in a line or two. Tausk mentions courses he has been offering, which have "merkwürdigerweise bisher noch keine einzige Anmeldung" [strangely, not a single enrollment to date], but he does his best to maintain an air of optimism and composure, concluding that "Es sieht also alles sehr

zuversichtlich aus und ich werde, wenn die Existenz nur etwas billiger wird, meinen Standard of life halten können” [it all looks very confident and I will be able to maintain my standard of living if existence just gets a little cheaper]. For the next six months, Tausk struggles to develop his practice. He keeps an office on Alser Straße, around the corner from the Altes Gemeines Krankenhaus, where he previously worked as a medical student. Freud sometimes sends him a patient or two, but these clients barely keep his practice afloat. He begins a relationship with one of his few patients, Hilde Löwi, and the two are engaged to be married when she becomes pregnant.

On the second of July, 1919, Tausk writes to Freud to excuse his keeping distant and not attending their weekly meeting: “Ich bin mit der Lösung meiner entscheidenden Lebensangelegenheiten beschäftigt” [I am preoccupied with solving the decisive issues of my life]. Soon, he said, he would again be free to visit Freud with a minimum of neurosis. This letter is followed, the next day, with Tausk’s suicide note.<sup>94</sup>

Tausk’s suicide note to Freud empties itself of any direct motive. “Ich habe keine Melancholie,” he assures Freud in this letter, scribbled quickly in the early morning of July third, “meine Selbstmord ist die gesündeste, anständigste Tat meines verfehlten Lebens. Ich klage niemand an, mein Herz ist frei von Groll, ich sterbe nur etwas früher, als ich eines natürlichen Totes gestorben wäre” [I have no melancholia, my suicide is the healthiest and most decent act of my failed life. I have no accusations against anyone, my heart is free of resentment, I’m only dying somewhat earlier than I would have of a natural death]. He praises Freud highly, thanking him and adding that he will “gehe aus von dem Leben mit der

Überzeugung, dass ich einer von denen war, die Eroberungsgang einer der grössten Menschensideen überlebt habe" [take leave of this life with the conviction that I was one of those who witnessed the triumph of one of the greatest ideas of humankind]. He sends his warm wishes to the International Psychoanalytic Association and ends his note by wishing Freud a long life.




Fig. 10. Handwritten suicide note to Sigmund Freud, 3 July 1919

This final wish to Freud privately echoes their shared Jewish heritage, as it is traditional to wish a mourner a long life—*chayim aruchim* חיים ארוכים (Levine 145). Tausk thus quietly calls in Freud to mourn him with this phrase.

The eerie absence of any account of Tausk’s motives for choosing this death is perhaps clearer from a perspective interior to Freud’s circle. Tausk seems to assume that Freud will already know, better than anyone, his motives and the state of his psyche. Roazen analyzes Tausk in this letter as surreptitiously

aggressive. By demonstrating to Freud his gentle and tender wishes to all but himself, Tausk is, Roazen claims, boasting to Freud that Freud is wrong; rather than wanting to kill his intellectual father, as Freud has often suspected, Tausk demonstrates that he loves Freud and only wants to kill himself. But the fact that he writes to Freud at all, Roazen claims, is an act of planting the blame with him (*Brother Animal* 129). As Salomé eerily observed in her journal entry six years prior, Tausk has cut his head off instead of using it and laid it at Freud's door (Andreas-Salomé, *In der Schule* 188).

Freud treats Tausk's death as a delayed reaction to the war, and refers to it, both in his obituary and in personal correspondence, as such.<sup>95</sup> But some who are close to Tausk and Freud think differently. One of Tausk's dearest colleagues, Paul Federn, writes the day of Tausk's death, "I am certain that being destitute and unable to borrow money for enough to eat was but the last push. The motivation was Freud's turning away from him" (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 153). Tausk was troubled, no doubt, wrote Federn, and had become increasingly unhappy and mean toward his colleagues. Federn himself had felt affronted by Tausk's behavior toward him. Moreover, he believes that Tausk had driven away his own patients "apparently in order to demonstrate the uselessness of the method, out of rancour against Freud. The methodological rigor with which Freud teaches makes people hard and alienates them from their fellow men; he who cannot love is defenseless against failure" (qtd. in Roazen *Brother Animal* 153). Freud's rejection, Federn concludes, was too unbearable for a man "of his sensitivity of mind" (qtd. in Roazen *Brother Animal* 153).

With such an array of factors and opinions to consider, the Freudian concept of overdetermination may be most applicable when we look at Tausk's tragic ending. Overdetermination, as Freud develops it in his practice of dream analysis, refers to the capacity for an object or event to be produced by and thus to represent multiple causes or meanings at once, from the most obvious or mundane to the most deeply repressed.<sup>96</sup> An overdetermined act is an act replete with meaning, demanding to be read. Of the many ways Tausk's suicide can be and has been determined to indicate his mental illness and war trauma, his impoverished material circumstances, his experience of rejection by Freud, or his relationships with others both personal and professional, we can say with certainty that he died by overdetermination. Tausk ended his life by shooting and hanging himself at once, in effect overdetermining himself to death. Beyond the passive aggression Roazen reads in Tausk's note or the acts of sabotage that Federn sees as implicitly directed toward Freud, Tausk left his life by weaponizing one of Freud's greatest concepts in a material form. Read me, his death demands. For once, Freud does not deny the request.

### *After Life*

The length and depth of Freud's obituary for Tausk seems eerie considering how resistant Freud is to acknowledging Tausk's accomplishments, much less incorporating Tausk's ideas into his own work or promoting them among his students and colleagues. There are a handful of instances in which Freud cites Tausk, which I will review in the following pages. But the Lethan oblivion into which Tausk's work seems to disappear, in places where the work of

colleagues like Rank and Ferenczi blossoms, indicates a general taboo among Freud's followers in touching Tausk's work. The obituary he wrote for Tausk thus seems to be an attempt to write the final sentence on Tausk's life's work rather than to keep his memory alive.

Freud's obituary praises Tausk as a philosophical thinker as well as a medical professional, and notes Tausk's bend toward justice during the war, writing, "It is also greatly to his honor that during the war he threw himself wholeheartedly, and with complete disregard of the consequences, into exposing the numerous abuses which so many doctors unfortunately tolerated in silence or for which they even shared the responsibility." Freud's compliments toward Tausk at times venture into veiled admonishments, but over all the memory he puts into print is one of a highly accomplished and talented thinker:

Sein Bedürfnis nach philosophischer Fundierung und erkenntnistheoretischer Klarheit zwang ihn, die so schwierigen Probleme in ihrer ganzen Tiefe und umfassenden Bedeutung zu erfassen, aber auch bewältigen zu wollen. In seinem ungestümen Forscherdrang ist er vielleicht manchmal in dieser Richtung zu weit gegangen; vielleicht war es auch noch nicht an der Zeit, der im Werden begriffenen Wissenschaft der Psychoanalyse eine allgemeinere Grundlage dieser Art zu geben. Die psychoanalytische Betrachtung philosophischer Probleme, für die Tausk eine besondere Begabung bewies, verspricht immer mehr fruchtbar zu werden; eine der letzten Arbeiten des Verstorbenen, über die Psychoanalyse der Urteilsfunktion die — bisher noch unveröffentlicht — auf dem letzten psychoanalytischen Kongreß in Budapest von ihm vorgetragen wurde, beweist diese Richtung seines Interesses.

Neben seiner philosophischen Begabung und Neigung zeigte Tausk auch ganz hervorragende medizinisch-psychologische Fähigkeiten und hatte auch auf diesem Gebiete schöne Leistungen aufzuweisen. Seine klinische Tätigkeit, der wir wertvolle Untersuchungen über verschiedene Psychosen (Melancholie, Schizophrenie) verdanken, berechtigte zu den schönsten Hoffnungen und gab ihm die Anwartschaft auf eine Dozentur, um die er in Bewerbung stand.

Ein ganz besonderes Verdienst um die Psychoanalyse hat sich Dr.

Tausk, der über eine glänzende Rednergabe verfügte, durch die Abhaltung von Vortragskursen erworben, in denen er, mehrere Jahre hindurch, zahlreiche Zuhörer beiderlei Geschlechtes in die Grundlagen und Probleme der Psychoanalyse einführte. Seine Zuhörer wußten die pädagogische Geschicklichkeit und Klarheit seiner Vorträge ebenso zu bewundern wie die Tiefe, mit der er einzelne Themata behandelte.

Alle, die den Verstorbenen näher kannten, schätzten seinen lautereren Charakter, seine Ehrlichkeit gegen sich und andere und seine vornehme Natur, die ein Bestreben nach dem Vollendeten und Edlen auszeichnete. Sein leidenschaftliches Temperament äußerte sich in scharfer, manchmal überscharfer Kritik, die sich aber mit einer glänzenden Darstellungsgabe verband. Diese persönlichen Eigenartigkeiten hatten für viele eine große Anziehung, mögen aber auch manche abgestoßen haben. Keiner jedoch konnte sich dem Eindruck entziehen, daß er einen bedeutenden Menschen vor sich habe.

Was ihm die Psychoanalyse — bis zum letzten Augenblick — bedeutet hat, davon zeugen hinterlassene Briefe, in denen er sich rückhaltlos zu ihr bekennt und die Hoffnung auf ihre Anerkennung in nicht allzu ferner Zeit ausspricht. Der allzu früh unserer Wissenschaft und dem Wiener Kreise Entrissene hat gewiß dazu beigetragen, daß dieses Ziel erreicht werde. In der Geschichte der Psychoanalyse und ihrer ersten Kämpfe ist ihm ein ehrenvolles Andenken sicher. (“Victor Tausk” 226-227)

His strong need to establish things on a philosophical foundation and to achieve epistemological clarity compelled him to formulate, and seek as well to master, the whole profundity and comprehensive meaning of the very difficult problems involved. Perhaps he sometimes went too far in this direction, in his impetuous urge for investigation. Perhaps the time was not yet ripe for laying such general foundations as these for the young science of psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic consideration of philosophical problems, for which Tausk showed special aptitude, promises to become more and more fruitful. One of his last works, on the psychoanalysis of the function of judgement, which was delivered at the Budapest Congress and has not yet been published, gives evidence of this direction taken by his interest.

In addition to his gift for philosophy and attraction towards it, Tausk possessed a quite exceptional medico-psychological capacity and produced some excellent work in that field too. His clinical activities, to which we owe valuable investigations into various psychoses (e.g. melancholia and schizophrenia) justified the fairest hopes and gave him the prospective appointment to a University Lectureship for which he had applied.

Psychoanalysis was particularly indebted to Dr. Tausk, who was a brilliant speaker, for the courses of lectures which he gave over a period of

many years to large audiences of both sexes and in which he introduced them to the principles and problems of psychoanalysis. His audiences were able to admire the clarity and didactic skill of his lectures no less than the profundity with which he handled individual topics.

All those who knew him well valued his straightforward character, his honesty towards himself and towards others and the superiority of a nature which was distinguished by a striving for nobility and perfection. His passionate temperament found expression in sharp, and sometimes too sharp, criticisms, which however were combined with a brilliant gift for exposition. These personal qualities exercised a great attraction on many people, and some, too, may have been repelled by them. No one, however, could escape the impression that here was a man of importance.

How much psychoanalysis meant for him – even up to his last moments – is shown by letters which he left behind, in which he expressed his unreserved belief in it and his hope that it will find recognition at a not too distant date. There is no doubt that this man, of whom our science and his friends in Vienna have been prematurely robbed, has contributed to that aim. He is sure of an honorable memory in the history of psychoanalysis and its earliest struggles.

This obituary reads as effulgent and even tender and sentimental at times—uncharacteristically so for Freud. It would seem that Freud is deeply grieved by Tausk's suicide and perhaps by how it reflects on the course of their interpersonal relationship. So, it is strange to read in a letter Freud wrote to Salomé in the week following Tausk's death.

Poor Tausk, whom you distinguished a while with your friendship, put an end to his life on July 3. [...] I confess I do not miss him; I had long taken him to be useless, indeed a threat to the future. I had a chance to cast a few glances into the substructure on which his proud sublimations rested; and would long since have dropped him had *you* not so boosted him in my esteem. Of course I was ready anyhow to do what I could for him, only I have been quite powerless of late given the degeneration of all relations in Vienna. I never failed to recognize his significant gift, but it was prevented from being translated into correspondingly valuable achievements. (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 139)

Perhaps Freud's "confession" to Salomé in this letter, and the degradation of Tausk's life's work that follows, is most reflective of Freud's own feelings toward Salomé and the friendship that she had with Tausk—it would be impossible to

know for certain. However, the disdain encapsulated here for the late Tausk and his work, and its contrast with the obituary Freud penned nearly simultaneously, gives some perspective as to why Tausk's work suddenly drifted away from the community's consciousness, at least in explicit terms.

This is not to say that Freud fully excludes Tausk from his references, but they are few and far between. Of the roughly six references that Freud makes to Tausk's work in his own publications, all but two are footnotes added to earlier works in their subsequent editions.<sup>97</sup> The two moments in which Freud openly and originally draws upon Tausk in the formulation of his interpretations appear in a footnote to "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917), in which he acknowledges Tausk's contribution on the topic of severance and recompenses, and in a substantial engagement with Tausk's study of schizophrenia in "The Unconscious" (1915). This acknowledgement of Tausk's work on schizophrenia is especially important, first of all in that Freud's direct reference indicates how groundbreaking the work was for its time, and furthermore because it provides evidence that Tausk had been formulating his study of schizophrenia for the majority of his military service on the Eastern Front; his most famous study on the "Influencing Apparatus" was drafted in an early form by January 6<sup>th</sup>, 1918, when he presented it before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. It was published posthumously a year later in the fifth volume of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für ärztliche Psychoanalyse*, which contained, in addition, both Freud's obituary for Tausk and Helene Deutsch's response to some of Tausk's ideas, "Ein kasuistischer Beitrag zur Kenntniss des Mechanismus der Regression bei Schizophrenie" [A

casuistic contribution to understanding the mechanism of regression in schizophrenia], encapsulating the ambivalence of Tausk's legacy.

In spite of Freud's resistance to Tausk's contributions, Tausk's impact on his professor's work is substantial—perhaps most so in places where acknowledgement was never made. Consider, for example, two of Freud's publications that followed Tausk's death: "Das Unheimlich" [The Uncanny] (1919) and "Jenseits des Lustprinzips" [Beyond the Pleasure Principle] (1920). In the autumn of the year Tausk died, Freud published his essay "The Uncanny," a deeply linguistic analysis of the concept—*Heim*=home; *heimlich*=secret, hidden—and that which, he argues, it discloses of the human psyche. Freud engages with the concept of the uncanny first put forward by Ernst Jentsch and builds from it a psychological theory of the unconscious mind's recognition of repressed desires. He buttresses this with repetition-compulsion and the uncanny figure of the *Doppelgänger*, which he credits to the prolific work of Otto Rank on doubles. Then, he connects the impulse to create one's own double with an early narcissistic tendency in children to project multiple selves, in order to ensure their immortality. Freud writes,

[T]he "double" was originally an insurance against destruction of ego, an "energetic denial of the power of death," as Rank says; and probably the "immortal" soul was the first "double" of the body. This invention of doubling as a preservation against extinction has its counterpart in the language of dreams, which is fond of representing castration by doubling or multiplication of the genital symbol; the same desire spurred on the ancient Egyptians to the art of making images of the dead in some lasting material. Such ideas, however, have sprung from the soil of unbounded self-love, from the primary narcissism which holds sway in the mind of the child as in that of primitive man; and when this stage has been left behind the double takes on a different aspect. From having been an assurance of immortality, he becomes the ghastly harbinger of death. (*SE* 17: 235)

The uncanny is a repetition of experience that occurs during adulthood, and reminds us of repressed childhood experiences, unconscious desires, or the psychic experiences of “primitive man.” But the double, or *Doppelgänger*, embodies a nexus of these tropes. It confronts the “I” (the ego) with the “it” (id) which “I” am not—repressed compulsions and desire—yet also the “it” from which “I” come, if one is to rearrange Freud’s oft-quoted formulation, “Wo es war, soll ich werden” (“Where it [id] was, shall I [ego] become”).<sup>98</sup> The *Doppelgänger* also threatens negation of the self by demonstrating the self’s redundancy, lack of unity, and lack of self-knowledge. It is a shadow to the self whose power lies precisely in its familiarity.

In order to understand what Freud meant when he told Helene Deutsch that Tausk’s presence at the meetings of the Psychoanalytic Society gave him an “uncanny” impression, we can rely upon the definitions Freud himself provides in this work. Considering the length of time Freud often liked to commit to a project before publishing it, it is certain that he had been at work on this particular piece for some months or years. Freud’s fear of Tausk’s usurping his original ideas through telepathy or by some other capacity paints Tausk as a *Doppelgänger*. Tausk walked for much of his professional life in Freud’s shadow, and he did it too well. The places where Tausk’s work ventures outside of imitation of Freud or adherence to his system, including Tausk’s own study on an uncanny double, do not garner from Freud the same praise or attention as Rank’s work. Yet Tausk’s presence in Freud’s formulation of the Uncanny is impossible to shake, both because of the writing he had already contributed on the topic and because of who

he was to Freud. In this same way, Tausk silently emerges in Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," in which Freud develops what is now called the death instinct. Freud relies heavily in the first portion of this study on war trauma, which we know Tausk had both experienced first-hand and treated before the war was over. Moreover, Tausk's earlier work on masochism and melancholia find great resonance in Freud's conclusions on the origin of the death instinct. But Tausk also looms in this study as an unacknowledged presence as one who succumbed to the death instinct in the year that Freud discovered it. The death instinct makes one uncanny to himself by "disuniting" an organism and thus establishing instinctual conflict. These are conflicts of which Tausk was well aware. "Wer bist Du, dass Du Dich verachten darfst?" [Who are you, that you may despise yourself] asks Tausk's monist sage, Spinoza, in the scene he penned twelve years before his death (*GPLS* 461). The riddle once meant to remind one of one's unity could no longer, in 1919, function as such. Instead, Tausk notes for himself nihilism as the remedy for the condemnation of life. His final act of suicide ripples through the work of his teacher most profoundly in places where it is left unmentioned. Freud's work on the death drive and his deeply ambivalent reactions to Tausk's death demonstrate that Tausk had a chilling impact on Freud's thinking, no matter how much Freud claimed not to miss him.

In this chapter, I have sought to establish the importance of Tausk's milieu during his psychoanalytic career, the intellectual and emotional connections he forged, and the ripple effects he had in the work of those who knew him. In doing so, I have also reviewed many of his personal struggles. My intent in this case has not been to dwell on the suffering of a great thinker for the sake of crude drama,

but to thoroughly illustrate the places from which his personal, emotional self would have been able to grapple with the suffering and even psychologically divergent experiences of others. In the chapter to follow, I look closely at the case studies on war trauma that Tausk published during his time at the Eastern Front, tracing the more pronounced turn he takes in these pieces from theoretical musing into political advocacy and a reparative practice. While Tausk's studies often explicitly bow to Freud or tactically draw upon his precedent work for authority, his later work in particular simultaneously disrupts the ground upon which Freud wished to build his intellectual estate. Freud identifies a frightening allure in Tausk's theory of death and the uncanny, an aspect that must be repressed in order for the tradition to continue. That Tausk does not have a tether to the Freudian tradition signals a heretical turn on his part, and Freud does his best to bury this heresy with Tausk in the text of his obituary. In the end, Freud's assessment that Tausk was "clever and dangerous" to the school of psychoanalysis may have been the truest and most flattering epithet the esteemed professor ever bestowed.

## Chapter Four: Tausk's Wartime Studies: Advocacy, Trauma, and an Ethnopsychiatric Turn

“Ach so,” sagte K. und nickte, “die Bücher sind wohl Gesetzbücher und es gehört zu der Art dieses Gerichtswesens, daß man nicht nur unschuldig, sondern auch unwissend verurteilt wird.”

“I see,” said K, and nodded, “the books must be lawbooks, and it's characteristic of this judicial system that a man is condemned not only when he's innocent but also in ignorance.”

Franz Kafka, *Der Prozeß*

Der Psychoanalytiker ist ein Beichtvater, den es gelüstet, auch die Sünden der Väter abzuhören.

The psychoanalyst is a confessor who also craves eavesdropping on the sins of the fathers.

Karl Kraus, *Nachts: [Aphorismen]*

In the caesura of psychoanalysis cast by the First World War, the practice became more clearly bifurcated between outpatient treatment of neurotic cases on the one hand, and inpatient, psychotic or severely traumatized ones on the other. This difference was also cast clearly upon lines of class and gender, with many of the young soldiers conscripted to the battlefield from the far reaches of the Empire being male and often coming from working and peasant classes, whereas so much of the Freudian analysis in the years preceding the war was conducted upon patients of a bourgeois background who were often female or otherwise feminized subjects. In this period of wartime, Tausk's case studies turn to the less-explored subjects, peasant-class men of non-dominant lingual and cultural backgrounds, as he employs psychoanalysis in the defense and preservation of his patients' lives.

The pressure created by the circumstances of war reveals in Tausk's work a prioritization of the practice of psychoanalysis toward the betterment of the patient over the refinement of psychoanalysis as a science or an art for its own sake.

In the following chapter, I consider Tausk's early ethnopsychiatric tendencies and the ways in which he harnessed psychoanalysis in the service of not only better understanding trauma born of war but in politically advocating for traumatized soldiers. Tausk develops his work rhetorically in these cases to advocate for his patients who have been made illegible by psychiatry as they have by the empire more generally, which prizes upper-class cultural standards and evaluates all parties accordingly. These studies are innovative within psychoanalysis of Tausk's time in that they consider the material conditions of the patients in question, a cornerstone of trauma theory that arises decades later.

Tausk's work can be characterized by the room it gave to differences of class, language, forms of psychological disturbance, and other elements of identity. Identity as a psychological concept is indeed one of Tausk's greatest contributions to the field of psychoanalysis, and it shines through in his later work. In these war studies, Tausk focuses on the inability of the afflicted soldier-patients to identify with a larger fraternal group. Reading his studies in chronological order, we can track Tausk's movement from themes common to Freud's circle—masturbation and childhood sexuality, for example—into less-charted (perhaps less-chartable) realms of delirium and psychosis—brought on first by alcoholism, then by the trauma of war. This thematic path tells the story of his work's development from that of Freud's pupil into an exploratory mode its

own, as it likewise reflects the historical events that so affected him as an analyst. In this chapter, I consider two such instances in which Tausk develops an approach distinct to himself, when he analyzes psychologically disordered soldiers during the First World War, “Zur Psychologie des Deserteurs” [On the Psychology of the Deserter] (1916) and “Diagnostische Erörterungen auf Grund der Zustandbilder der sogenannten Kriegspsychosen” [Diagnostic Considerations Based on the Mental States of the So-called War Psychoses] (1916). Tausk’s publications on war “psychoses,” which he recuperates and recasts as neuroses, both signal his political divergence from Freud and demonstrate Tausk’s proto-ethnopsychiatric tendency. These writings place Tausk in conversation with trauma theory and the ethno- or transcultural-psychiatrists of the 20th century who centered cultural difference in their analyses.

The field of ethnopsychiatry, also known as cultural, cross-cultural, or transcultural psychiatry, emerged as a branch of psychiatry in the mid-20th century in two parallel forms. Originally, transcultural psychiatry was born out of an Anglo-American line of study, the first program for transcultural psychiatric studies being established at McGill University in 1955 by Eric Wittkower, an immunologist and psychoanalyst working in psychosomatic medicine, and the anthropologist Jacob Fried (Delille 170). Wittkower’s team introduced terms from epidemiology (e.g. “incidence” and “prevalence”), and “conceived of culture as a series of variations” which could be evaluated according to epidemiological understandings of the relationship between the culture of a population and its mental health (Delille 172). In the French tradition, the debut of *ethnopsychiatrie* is generally attributed to the psychoanalyst-anthropologist Georges Devereux,

though the term was first coined by the Haitian psychiatrist Louis Mars (Cerea 300). Considered as dual parts of a more general field of study and treatment, these two lines each developed out of a need to better comprehend and respond to the suffering of those “in contexts that confound the alien qualities of psychopathology with the strangeness of the cultural ‘other’” (Kirmayer 1).

The field of ethnopsychiatry has been motivated chiefly by questions of the relativity or universality of psychopathology and how to provide services to ethnically diverse populations, as well as more recent critiques of psychiatric theory in the context of globalization. In France, these questions were heavily influenced by French postcolonial developments taking place at the time of ethnopsychiatry’s formation, particularly work born out of the struggles for Algerian and Haitian independence, and the Pan-African movement. Critiques from Octave Mannoni in Madagascar and of Frantz Fanon in Algeria of the colonial origins of psychopathology thus figure heavily into ethnopsychiatry’s discourse, and they demonstrate a line of continuity between colonial and ethnopsychiatry (Fassin 229).

Colonial psychiatry, which precedes ethnopsychiatry and is likewise woven throughout its history, can be understood as “a historiographical category within which historians of medicine, psychiatry, or imperialism may contextualize the imposition of Western categories of “normal” psychology and deviance, race, and difference, as well as greater attention paid to the lived experience of colonialism and the politics of resistance” (Mahone 1379). The early, exoticizing practices of comparative psychiatry (“Vergleichende Psychiatrie”) as we find in Emil Kraepelin’s work from trips to Java and North America did not account for

social and cultural differences that could allow a nuanced and diverse analysis of mental illness. Rather, Kraepelin's universalism placed irreducible differences into a developmental hierarchy that upheld racist theories of biological degeneration (Engstrom and Crozier 274-175).

The critiques that colonial psychiatry has garnered summarize many of the same problems I have located within the tradition of Freudian psychoanalysis in its original formulation. Indeed, Freudian psychoanalysis has played a considerable role in essentializing accounts of cultural difference long into the 20th century. Yet from within Freud's framework, Tausk demonstrates a knowledge of cultural diversity and uses it to widen the psychoanalytic scope.

Although I focus here on Tausk's war studies as examples of his ethnopsychiatric slant, we also find evidence of Tausk discussing psychoanalysis transculturally earlier in his studies with Freud. In minutes from a 1910 meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, for example, Tausk argues against a presentation by Adler on lies in neurosis by bringing up counterexamples in Albanian language and cultural practices to disprove Adler's argument's supposed universality. Tausk's early life, as is thoroughly documented in Chapter Two, not only exposed him to diverse cultural populations but embedded within him an attitude of suspicion toward universal doctrines and norms.

Considering Tausk as an early ethnopsychiatrist also makes way for more nuanced applications of psychoanalysis within literary reading. For if we are to take Freud's system of psychoanalysis, sealed in his own tripartite formula as Deleuze and Guatarri once described it, "the Oedipal, neurotic one: daddy-mommy-me," and apply it outside of his time and place, we find ourselves part of

an inherently colonial process (Deleuze and Guattari 25). This can be at best limiting, at worst disastrous, to the reading of world literature that wants to go beyond a colonial scope. Tausk gives us a psychoanalysis which carries within it a place for the political, a place for the language or familial configurations outside of the bourgeois family, an opening into non-pathological otherness by looking to the boundaries and borders of one's own identity as it co-forms with others'. His work on the psychological effects of war is one area that navigates a clear path of issue for Freud's contained economy into other worlds.

The First World War erupted only a month after Tausk completed his medical studies, and by 1915, he was stationed as an army psychiatrist in Lublin, Congress Poland. The work Tausk generated while in military service displays innovative analysis and rhetoric, and a politically sympathetic stake in the lives of his patients. In his two case studies of war-related psychopathologies, published and delivered orally within a year of one another, Tausk uses his psychoanalytic training to defend the psychological state of his battlefield patients. In his first study on 'so-called war psychoses,' Tausk challenges a common diagnosis by offering multiple cases he has personally encountered on the battlefield, recuperating them into an altogether different diagnosis that consequently casts the patients' reactions to war as healthy rather psychotic. He investigates war desertion along seven different lines, including anxiety and obsession, hysterical or epileptic disturbances, and fear of punishment, citing Freud's theories on the father-son relationship in order to reframe the relationship of deserter to authority. Each of these studies marks the new doctor's investment in bringing legibility to difference. Although he certainly continues to laud Freud in his work and to draw

enthusiastically upon Freud's structures, he does so in the service of challenging both the culturally colonialist worldview of his upper-class audience and the law that favors their forms of thought. By imparting a sort of analysis often reserved for wealthier, cosmopolitan Austrians upon peasant-class men of various languages and cultural backgrounds, Tausk leverages his specialized knowledge to bring these men out of the categories of "criminal" or "psychotic" and into a realm from which they might be heard.

*"Diagnostic Considerations Concerning Symptomatology of the So-Called War Psychoses"*

In an address first given at the Second Conference of Medical Officers in Lublin, Congress Poland, January 1916, Tausk challenged the foundations of psychiatric medicine upon which the authority of his medical colleagues and, in this respect, the greater authority of the Austro-Hungarian Army was able to function. "Eine Weile lang," his study begins,

Besonders in der ersten Hälfte des Krieges, haben die Autoren die Bezeichnung „*Kriegspsychose*“ ganz unbedenklich angewendet. Die einen gebrauchten sie vielleicht nur in der Erwartung, daß die infolge der Kriegserlebnisse entstandenen geistigen Störungen spezifische klinische Merkmale tragen werden; andere wieder wendeten die Bezeichnung ohne besondere theoretische Voraussetzungen an und ohne sich dafür besonderes verantwortlich zu fühlen. In der letzten Zeit habe ich den Eindruck gewonnen, daß die Mehrheit der Autoren sich dafür entschieden hat, den Ausdruck „*Kriegspsychose*“ nur als Bezeichnung des *Anlasses* der Erkrankung zu gebrauchen. Selbstverständlich ist davon abzusehen, daß der Krieg oder ein bestimmtes Kreisereignis den *Vorstellungsinhalt* der gestörten Geistesproduktion bildet, sofern dieser Inhalt in einer schon bekannten Form der geistigen Störungen aufgearbeitet erscheint. (*GPLS* 219)

For quite a while, particularly during the first half of the war, authors have used the term "*war psychosis*" quite indiscriminately. Some did so perhaps

in the expectation that mental disturbances arising out of war experiences would show specific clinical characteristics; others used it without any particular sense of responsibility. Recently I have gotten the impression that the majority of authors have chosen to use the term "war psychosis" only to describe the *onset* of the disease. It's obviously irrelevant that the war or a particular wartime event provides the *ideational content* of the disturbed mental production, in so far as such content is worked up into a mental disturbance of an already familiar type.

What use is a psychological diagnosis, Tausk demands of his audience, if it is only a label for the superficial presentation of a mental disturbance and takes into account neither the conceptual content of the disturbance nor the material of patient's environment. (Indeed, there is a use, but it is not in the service of the patient—Tausk hints at this here but he will not make it explicitly political until the conclusion his second study.) Whether the medical authors who use the label of "war psychosis" do so because they believe the imposed diagnostic standards accurately fit the mental disturbances arising from war or, irresponsibly, they use the label simply because it is already there, their choice to ignore the context of war is Tausk's prime point of accusation.

Coming from a psychoanalyst trained by Freud, this argument should be astounding, for although the term was not yet in use, Tausk is effectively sketching out a theory of psychological trauma in this intervention. Traditionally, psychoanalysis prioritizes intrapsychic conflict whereas trauma theory looks first to events in the external world; some of the most well-known experts of trauma theory argue that Freud intentionally de-emphasized sources of conflict or abuse from outside the patient's psyche (Alford 43). Thus, the fact that Tausk asks his colleagues to situate the diagnosis of the "psychotic" soldier within the material

framework of the battlefield is radical to the practice of psychoanalysis, as it is to his the field of psychiatry.

Tausk was fairly outstanding among his colleagues in the psychiatric field as well insofar as he used his claim to the authority of psychiatry in defense of the patients rather than as a tool of the military apparatus for the discipline and punishment of the soldiers. The brutal mistreatment of soldier-patients by psychiatric professionals is often epitomized in the findings of the 1920 trial of Wagner-Jauregg, who had subjected his wartime patients to treatment by electric currents.<sup>99</sup> Austrian Parliament set up an investigating committee at this trial, and Sigmund Freud was called upon to report as a scientific expert, for which he produced “Memorandum on the Electrical Treatment of War Neurotics.” “On account of its singularity,” writes historian Hans-Georg Hofer, “the Austrian Wagner-Jauregg trial is an important event in the history of psychiatry” (Hofer 50-51).

In no other post-wartime country [did] eminent psychiatrists [...] face charges or even official investigation into their wartime activities. In Vienna, the electrotreatment of war neuroses became a hotly debated topic not only within the medical community, but also within public and political spheres. This intensity of interest may reflect a unique phenomenon in the Habsburg organization of military psychiatry, whereby the treatment of war neuroses was centralized in the capital of the empire. (The situation was quite different in Germany, where the treatment of the war neuroses was carried out in special neurosis stations situated throughout the country.) [...] By the end of the war, an estimated 120,000 soldiers were being treated for war neuroses in Vienna alone [...] and] the so-called *Kriegszitterer* were ever present as a visible, and somewhat disturbing way of life. (Hofer 51-52)

Not only did the presence of tens of thousands of shellshocked soldiers in the capital of the monarchy make present for the Viennese the mental and physical

tolls of the war, but it undermined a patriotic fantasy of masculinity that had prevailed in 1914. At the outset of the war,

the psychiatric community endorsed the positive effects that the coming war would have upon the mental health of the empire. Based on the discourses of neurasthenia, or nervousness, a disease that was identified as a central, albeit undesirable feature of modern manliness, many psychiatrists had imagined war as a once-in-a-lifetime chance to vanquish the new nervousness of modern life and regain lost masculinity. (Hofer 52)

Instead, the war revealed the effects of physical and mental trauma on a greater scale than had ever been witnessed, and in turn the brutal measures taken by medical professionals to either discipline or heal the soldier-patients suffering from these traumas. It remained unclear during the trial of Wagner-Jauregg whether practices like electrotherapy were indeed meant to punish the malingering soldier or treat the neurotic patient but, in either case, Freud argued, the practice was too cruel (Eissler 72). The trial also revealed at times a doubling down on many brutal psychiatric practices and an overall resistance to psychoanalysis. As psychiatrist Otto Pötzl famously retorted, “With psychoanalysis we cannot achieve in two years what faradization can do in two hours or isolation in two weeks” (qtd. in Eissler 94). These being the professional impressions of psychiatric treatments in retrospect of their postwar fall-out, we may imagine how doggedly Tausk’s psychiatric colleagues clung to them at the point of his address in 1916.

In his study of war neuroses, Tausk frees the very formulations of psychoanalysis from a Freudian discipline by implementing them in his diagnoses of these soldiers by insisting that talk therapy rather than corporeal punishment (or psychically painful treatments like hydro- or electro-therapy) can be used. The

challenge, he points out, is in a lack of understanding of the soldiers' mother tongues and cultures of origin.

Die Schwierigkeiten, die sich in der Diagnose in gewissen, und zwar sehr zahlreichen Fällen, entgegenstellten, ließen sich auf zwei Hauptmomente reduzieren: zunächst war es die Unkenntnis oder mangelhafte Kenntnis der Sprache und der sprachlichen Nuancen der Kranken, die aus allen Sprachgruppen der Monarchie stammten, und zweitens das spezifische Lebensmilieu des Einzelnen, die soziale und kulturelle Eigentümlichkeit des Niveaus, auf dem sich das Leben des Kranken bis zum Kriege abgewickelt hatte. (*GPLS* 220)

The difficulties encountered in diagnosing certain cases, which were very numerous, could be reduced to two main factors: firstly, ignorance or lack of knowledge of the language and linguistic nuances of the patients, who came from all language groups of the Monarchy, and secondly, the specific living environment of the individual, the social and cultural peculiarity of the level at which the patient's life had been conducted until the war.

Tausk's movement from this point, having charged his colleagues with both ignorance and irresponsibility in their sweeping diagnoses of so-called war psychoses is not only to attend to the differences of language, and the antebellum social and cultural milieu of the individual patient, but to rescue the patient from the superficial, dismissive, and homogenizing category of psychosis by individually psychoanalyzing a series of irreducible cases. This series of readings of medical cases which, he says rather acerbically, are examples of "war psychoses" "insofern sie eben aus Anlaß des Krieges ausgebrochen sind" [to the extent that they were occasioned by the war], offers a multilayered defense of Tausk's patients (*GPLS* 223). Not only does he challenge the bourgeois lingual and cultural knowledge upon which peasant men from all outposts of the empire have been diagnosed as psychologically and emotionally ill by men from the empire's cultural center, he challenges the divisions of class so clearly practiced in that diagnosis of war psychosis by treating these cases with a system of analysis

that had heretofore, in the Viennese Circle, been overwhelmingly used for upper-class, educated, city-dwelling patients. The symptoms of his patients, he argues, could not originate in the subconscious and he suggests, therefore, that they are *normal* reactions to war, not psychotic ones. Rather than quarantining these cases to the realm of unintelligible psychosis, he finds them at an intersection of melancholia and neurosis, additionally arguing that the latter is not an ailment particular to upper or educated classes and implying that such specialized education and cultural particularity may actually do more to separate analyst from an analysand of a different class experience. While appealing to biased representations of these young, eastern men as “primitive,” “feeble-minded,” or childlike in his address to the medical community, he nevertheless manages to undermine the very standards by which these biases are formed by moving beyond the primacy of a singular, imposed language—*Hochdeutsch*—or the standards of comportment particular to bourgeois Viennese class and culture.

Multilingualism and the acknowledgment of the effects that the added factor of a third party—the interpreter—would bring to analysis were his greatest aides in analysis, he affirms:

Eine bessere Orientierung in den vielen fremden Sprachen, hauptsächlich aber die Anpassung an die sehr unangenehme und unzuverlässige Examination mit Hilfe des Dolmetschers bewirkten, daß viele neue und unverständliche Erscheinungen alsbald nichts mehr Problematisches boten. (GPLS 220)

Better orientation in the many foreign languages, and in particular adaptation to the uncomfortable and unreliable process of examining patients with the aid of an interpreter, soon resulted in many apparently new and incomprehensible phenomena turning out not to be problematic at all.

The more difficult challenge lay in the cultural myopia developed by having trained in a university hospital in a large city “an einem relativ hochkultivierten Krankenmaterial[...]; die primitivsten Formen der einzelnen Geisteskrankheiten sind dort nicht zu finden” [with relatively sophisticated patients[...]; the most primitive forms of the individual mental diseases were not to be found among them] (*GPLS* 220). His description of Ruthenian peasants at the Eastern Front that follows is ungracious at best: “Man muß die Erfahrung gemacht haben, wie wenig mitteilbar und wie wenig zur Mitteilung psychischer Bewegungen diese Menschen auch in normaler Verfassung befähigt sind, damit man die Schwierigkeiten der differentialdiagnostischen Aufgabe bei diesen Fällen mitfühlen könne” [It is necessary to experience how little communicative power and how little ability to communicate the goings-on of the mind these people have, even in normal conditions, in order to be able to sympathize with the difficulties of making a differential diagnosis in these cases] he emphasizes, gesturing to the example of a Ruthenian peasant,

von dessen geistigem Interessekreis und von dessen Lebensanschauung sich ein Mensch von unserer Kultur nur beschreibende Worte, keine mit verstehendem Gefühl begleitete Vorstellungen machen kann. Dies war der Grund, warum mir eine Anzahl Fälle von Schizophrenie eine ganze Zeitlang unzugänglich erschienen ist. Eine Reihe dieser Kranken bot das merkwürdige Bild eines euphorischen Schwachsinnigen mit dem läppischen Gehaben eines manisch erregten, dummen Kindes von 5 bis 6 Jahren. Was bei diesen Kranken als „Vorbeireden“ imponierte, konnte ebenso gut Nichtverstehen, Stumpsinn oder läppische Bosheit. (*GPLS* 220)

whose intellectual interests and outlook on life someone from our culture could only describe in words but not enter into with any emotional understanding. It was for this reason that a number of cases of schizophrenia seemed for some time inaccessible to me. Many of these patients presented the curious picture of euphoric feeble-mindedness with the foolish affectations of a manically excited, silly child of 5 or 6. What

so impressed me as “talking past [the issue]” could just as well have been [a sign of] nonunderstanding, dull-mindedness, or foolish malice.<sup>100</sup>

Tausk’s defense of the peasant soldier is inextricably fraught with a classist diagnosis of the patient’s mind as that of a child. Yet, I find it important to note that Tausk is careful in his language to associate these qualities with the context of the patient’s material circumstances rather than a genetic disposition—the latter being a commonly accepted eugenicist discourse of the time that would continue into other explicitly racist ideologies and practices in the years to follow Tausk’s death (Gausemeier 150). Considered on its own, Tausk’s assessment of feeble-mindedness is colonial and disparaging and, wherever this piece takes us, the fact of its infantilization of the peasant’s psyche cannot be dismissed. However, there remains the possibility to simultaneously view the argument in the context of the audience of upper-class doctors and military officials to whom Tausk speaks, for whom the peasant has not previously (not *even* at the level of a child) factored into an intelligible mental framework. Additionally, it plants the notion here, to be developed more explicitly later on, that these soldiers can be factored into the *oikonomia* of the wider Empire as a kind of mixed family and cared for as extended family members.<sup>101</sup> Tausk’s aim is to resituate the problem as one of cultural illiteracy on the part of the doctor rather than mental illness on the part of the patient. In so doing, Tausk quietly undermines the monolingual basis upon which psychiatrists of his kind relied, staging a gulf between Austrian doctors’ understanding of the psyche and the psychological experience of the peasant.

With the monolingual basis corrupted, how is one then to diagnose the so-called “*functionellen Geistesstörungen*” [functional mental disturbances] of anxiety, obsessional neuroses, neurasthenia, or hysteria (*GPLS 222*)? Many of Tausk’s colleagues had simply deduced that these afflictions did not occur among peasants and unskilled workmen but rather exclusively among “*Gehirnarbeiter und die Angehörigen der oberen Stände*” [brain workers and members of upper classes] (*GPLS 222*).<sup>102</sup> Tausk argues, however, that he has witnessed just as many cases of hysteria in the former group as he has among the latter, pointing to its various manifestations in the form of a “*Tic, als konvulsivischer Anfall mit Arc de cercle, als Ausnahmszustand*” [tic, as a convulsive fit with *arc de cercle*, [or] as an extreme mental state] (*GPLS 222*). The presentation of symptoms is offered as an example of how a doctor of another cultural and lingual background might draw upon his senses to better understand his patients’ ailments.

As part of the practice of transcultural psychoanalytic treatment that he develops in this case, Tausk can more effectively understand his patients by giving primacy to sexuality rather than to the valuation of intelligence. He argues,

Es kommt ja bei diesen Krankheiten nicht auf die Bildung des Intellektes, sondern auf das Schicksal des Sexualtriebes an (*Freud*), und die Bedingungen für die Störungsmöglichkeiten dieser Triebentwicklung sind in viel primitiven Verhältnissen zu suchen als im Mangel an Bildung. Anderenfalls wären die großen Hysterien der bäuerlichen Massen im Mittelalter nicht zu erklären. Und zudem ist die Hysterie bei Bauern von jeglicher Kultur auch in unserer Zeit eine längst bekannte Tatsache. (*GPLS 222*)

In the case of these diseases, it is not the training of the intellect, but [what Freud calls] the fate of the sexual instinct that is relevant and, when instinctual development has been disturbed, the sources of the disturbance have to be sought out among conditions far more primitive than lack of education. Otherwise, the outbreaks of mass hysteria among the peasant masses in the Middle Ages would be inexplicable. And besides, it is a well-

known fact that hysteria occurs in our own time among peasants of all cultures.

Hysteria, which finds its root in sexual disturbance rather than intellectual disturbance, is a commonplace disease. Yet, he laments, his colleagues have made the suffering of peasant-class patients even more opaque through a series of negligent behaviors: Some use a metaphor or a comparative description of a psychical disturbance and (falsely) designate it the cause or essential content of a symptom; others may rationalize away symptoms as occurring independently and without a conscious connection to other concurrent symptoms; still others look for a specific organic cause of illness and completely disregard the individual symptoms in these psychoses (*GPLS* 223). These approaches to treatment are all exemplary of systems of reading which are unable to account for unprecedented difference as it arises, instead channeling what comes up into the model of what is already known. Tausk's response to this problem is to bring his audience's attention specifically to a list of unique cases that do not fit into the current diagnostic system, and to stay with these cases long enough to sense their difference.

In the latter half of his address, Tausk relates each of these cases narratively, allowing for their individual traits to come forward while emphasizing their shared display of fully developed melancholia that is coexistent with an equally full-developed paranoia. The first patient he introduces is a poor shoemaker from northern Bohemia, experiencing severe depression as a result of his guilt around masturbation and dishonesty (i.e. secretly drinking away money he makes instead of setting it aside for his wife and children). The patient believed

he would be punished for his sins, had attempted suicide, and seemed to still be contemplating ending his life at the time of Tausk's meeting him. In addition, he presented all the symptoms of paranoia, having "merkte seit einiger Zeit, daß überall eine Feindschaft gegen ihn besteht" [noticed for some time that he was the object of general hostility], hearing whispered remarks about him, and seeing people spit in front of him on the street (*GPLS* 224). He was also preoccupied with a small boil on his stomach, which Tausk connects with Freud's criteria for the diagnosis of paranoia, in which hypochondria plays a large role.

The second case Tausk offers for comparison is notably from a contrasting social class: "ein adeliger Offizier, der ein sehr skrupelloses, ausschweifendes Leben geführt und einige verfahrenere Menschenschicksale zu verantworten hat" [an officer of aristocratic birth, who had led a very unscrupulous, debauched life and was responsible for the miserable fates of many others] (*GPLS* 224). Tausk suspects that the officer's "sins" were the results of hypomanic phases that alternated with melancholic phases—what would today likely be diagnosed as a bipolar disorder. Tausk meets the patient during a deeply melancholic phase, and notes "ein komplettes System von Beachtungs- und Beziehungsideen [...] mit einem ausgesprochenen Widerstand gegen die Idee, sich zu bessern, und mit der steten Bereitschaft, andere zu verdächtigen" [a complete system of ideas of reference and delusions of being watched [...] with a pronounced resistance to the idea of improvement, and a constant readiness to suspect others] (*GPLS* 224).

The three cases to follow include Leopold K., a thirty-year-old infantryman and unskilled workman with no previous history of disease, known to be a brave and dependable soldier; Salomon H., a twenty-year-old soldier; and

Franz S., a fifty-year-old sergeant and railway official. Each of these cases—while pointedly representing a spectrum of ages, occupations and social classes, and cultural origins within the monarchy according to the personal details Tausk plants in his descriptions—display shared couplings of paranoia and melancholia. Their illness manifests in compulsively damning words and actions, deep self-reproach and suicide attempts with feelings of persecution, or the tendency to make connections of meaning out of seemingly random things, especially through lingual signifiers. In the case of Franz S., Tausk emphasizes in a footnote that the patient's spontaneous translation of the presentation of words (*Wortvorstellung*) into the presentation of things (*Sachvorstellung*) during a moment of lucidity makes abundantly clear just how vital Freud's teachings, especially dream interpretation, are to the understanding of this sort of illness (*GPLS* 241). Without the psychoanalytic component of interpretation, Tausk asserts, there is no way through to psychopathology.

Through his narrative strategy, Tausk preserves the differences in his patients' experiences to argue that this ailment affects men of lower, working classes as easily as it does those of the middle, civil classes and the aristocracy. In order to hold the attention of his audience long enough to persuade them of his findings, his rhetoric stretches into a place of suspense. Tausk's narrative structure in these case studies is quite literary in design, resembling Freud's beloved genre of the detective story: He explains the crux of the problem at which point he intends to intervene, attempting in his language to make his audience sympathetic to the case. He presents the material at the front, allowing the reader to follow him through his unfolding of one curious detail or symptom after another, like one

reading a mystery. This structure is very much his own creative approach rather than an adaptation modelled after Freud, as we will remember from Salomé's comment, "Tausk's way of lecturing, proceeding from the periphery to the center, thus the opposite order from that of Freud's teachings, is an excellent way to have these [teachings] easily make sense" (*In der Schule* 36-37). His presentation of the material is repeated through a collection of cases, building in suspense. Finally, he asks the difficult question—as if to give them time to puzzle over it—"Wie sind diese Fälle klinisch zu benennen?" [How are these cases to be clinically designated?], before offering his own conclusions: it is paranoia-*cum*-melancholia that plagues these men. This is "kein einfacher Mischzustand," rather, "die Symptome bestehen nebeneinander in plastischer Dimension" [no simple mixed condition [...] the symptoms coexist in a plastic dimension] (*GPLS* 228).

Paranoia coupled with melancholia, Tausk reminds his audience, is far from a universal ailment, occurring only in a notable number of cases. The question thus follows: how does the ailment come about? When reliant upon the current clinical views and practices of Tausk's audience, the path to an answer is blocked; the methods of the status quo can serve to state that which is observed, metaphorizing the symptoms into the category of a previously known ailment, within which category the patients read as nonsensical, criminal, and psychotic. Aided by the structures and terminology of psychoanalysis, Tausk illustrates that the patient's libidinal detachment from real love objects in the outside world (other soldiers, a mother, a wife, a sweetheart) as brought on during the circumstances of war agitate the men in these cases into a dual state of paranoia and melancholia.

Tausk's concluding remarks turn to a final case, which at first seems an odd non sequitur: an example of what Tausk terms "Vereinsamungsneurose" [solitude neurosis] (*GPLS* 238). In fact, the case condenses the greatest struggles of one simultaneously experiencing both the self-reproach and ego-diminishment of melancholia and the persecution and ego-excess of paranoia. Moreover, it returns his audience from the world of Freud's psychoanalysis to the material world of the soldier with additional perspective intact. The story is of a young Czech among a group of Hungarians. It is a typical story in that it originates in those who find themselves, he says, among comrades speaking a language in which they cannot communicate:

Er hat plötzlich bemerkt, daß er von den Ungarn verdächtigt und verfolgt wird. Er hört, daß sie ihn einen Verräter und einen Spion nennen, man will ihn aus dem Weg räumen, vergiften, hinrichten. Oftmals glauben die Kranken, daß sie schon zum Tode verurteilt sind. Sie sind sich gewöhnlich keiner bösen Absicht bewußt, nur geben sie oft zu, daß sie zu der Zeit, als sie sich plötzlich angefeindet sahen, besonders schwere Arbeit gehabt hatten oder daß damals in großer Sorge waren, will sie vom Hause lange kleine Nachricht bekommen und deswegen Heimweh hatten.

In vielen Fällen läuft diese Psychose mit der Änderung des Milieus ab. Sobald der Mann zum Beispiel wieder unter Konnationalen ist oder sich im Spital betreut und gepflegt sieht, fühlt er sich nicht mehr verfolgt. Die Psychoanalyse läßt uns in diesem Zustandsbild mit Rücksicht auf seinen Anlaß und das Milieu seines Entstehens unschwer die Reaktion auf den verdrängten Wunsch, sich den Schwierigkeiten und Gefahren des Dienstes zu entziehen, erkennen. (*GPLS* 238)

Suddenly he noticed that the Hungarians were suspicious of him and persecuting him. He heard them saying he was a traitor and a spy; they wanted to get rid of him, kill, poison, or execute him. Often patients believe that they have been sentenced to death. Generally they are not aware of any bad intentions, but often admit that at the time when they first had this sense of being surrounded by hostility they had been doing exceptionally heavy work, or there had been talk of imminent war perils, or they were worried because they had not heard from home for a long time and were homesick for that reason.

In many cases, this psychosis clears up with a change of environment. As soon as one is, for example, being looked after and cared

for again by co-nationals or in the hospital, he no longer feels persecuted. Psychoanalysis enables us to easily recognize in this clinical picture, with due consideration to its cause and the milieu of its emergence, the reaction to the repressed desire to escape the difficulties and dangers of [military] service.

After a tour through the intricacies of libidinal attachment, its suppression, its loss, and the pathologies this can manifest, such a return to the material world of the soldier would be experienced by the audience with mental relief. Tausk's conclusion at this point is so plain and straightforward in describing, in superficial terms, the experience of the alienated soldier, that those newly initiated to the processes of psychoanalysis might wonder how it simply cleared up. The answer is planted in the last line of the extract above; psychoanalysis can account for the complexity of the situation in which these men find themselves. Tausk's final words are used to directly reprimand the state of war psychiatry. It is not equipped to diagnose these cases of so-called "war psychosis" because it cannot explain the mechanism of individual symptoms as originating in the unconscious. It cannot account for or understand infantilism, self-love or self-esteem. Only psychoanalysis allows us this clearing in what has formerly been treated as an unintelligible or criminal mind.

*"On the Psychology of the War Deserter"*

Tausk continued to apply psychoanalysis in the service of lower-class soldiers as his time at the Eastern Front went on. His rhetoric, too, shifts from the more contemplative voice that we encounter in "The Faith of the Fathers," a short study of parapraxis published in 1916, into a one with the persuasive and urgent

qualities of a trained jurist, as he advocates for his patients.<sup>103</sup> In March 1917, Tausk delivered a second address at the ninth Medical Officers Seminar, this time in Belgrade, on the psychology of the war deserter.<sup>104</sup> Building upon his arguments in the previous study of war psychosis, Tausk directs his attention in this address to the defense of the war deserter. He breaks the deserter-type into eight categories of psychopathology, rather than reiterating the type's status as a singular legal category of the military, which would be used to identify a type of criminal. In this piece as in the previous address, Tausk reads a variety of deserters according to the psychosexual and familial structures of Freudian psychoanalysis. His juridical training and the legal stakes of consequence, however, come to the forefront of this study, as he plays both doctor and legal advocate at once. He offers, quite sympathetically,

Der Deserteur will sich ja einer Pflicht und einer Not, die allen seinen Brüdern auferlegt ist, entziehen, er allein will heil aus der furchtbaren Verwüstung entkommen, die die Welt überzogen hat, und Sie fragen sich unmutig, mit welchem Recht er sein eigenes Wohl vor allen Anderen in Sicherheit bringen dürfte. Sie finden seinen Wunsch eigen süchtig und feig. Ich will Ihnen das Recht zu einer solchen Kritik des Fahnenflüchtlings nicht absprechen. Ich will im daß Verlaufe meiner Ausführungen sogar ausdrücklich beweisen, daß diese Kritik den psychologischen Sachverhalt in einem gewissen Sinne durchaus trifft. Ich habe aber dennoch die Absicht, Sie zu bewegen. Ihr Urteil, das eine Verurteilung bedeutet, durch eine Erkenntnis zu ersetzen, in der mancher allgemeine menschliche Wert verborgen liegt, der dem Vaterlande von größerem Nutzen sein könnte als die Verteilung einiger Deserteure. (*GPLS* 171)

The deserter wants to escape a duty and a necessity imposed on all his brothers; he alone wants to safely escape from the terrible devastation that has engulfed the world, and you wonder in disbelief what right he has to protect his own well-being before all others. You find his desire selfish and cowardly. I do not wish to deny you your right to an opinion. In the course of what I have to say I shall even show that there is a sense in which this critique is in perfect harmony with [the deserter's] psychological situation. Nevertheless, I shall try to persuade you to replace your opinion, which is

equivalent to a condemnation, by an insight in which is a great deal of universal human value is hidden, which could be of greater value to the country than the killing off of a few deserters.

Tausk's talent as a rhetorician here shines through his work. While suspending direct conflict by verbally allowing the audience to hold fast to their opinions, massaging their patriotism and stoking curiosity with the promise of practical and "universal human value," he discretely removes the object of reproach, dissecting it with his doctor's authority into a variety of new medical types that cannot be so easily apprehended once returned to the audience. Simultaneously, he attends to the legal doctrine, reminding them of the standards according to which one must be found guilty:

§1 des Strafgesetzes sagt, daß zu einem Verbrechen böser Vorsatz erforderlich sei. Die Formulierung ist bestrickend einfach und beruhigt sicher auch die gewissenhaftesten und demütigsten Menschen. Aber schon im nächsten Paragraphen kommt der Psychologe auf eine Vermutung, die ihn in lebhafteste Unruhe versetzt, eine Unruhe, die er bis zur letzten Zeile des Strafgesetzes nicht mehr los werden soll.

Böser Vorsatz wird nicht angenommen, sagt das Gesetz nämlich weiter, wenn der Täter zur Zeit der Begehung der Tat der Vernunft ganz beraubt hat, oder die Tat im Zustande der Sinnesverrückung begangen hat, oder im Zustande der Volltrunkenheit, wenn er sich den Rausch nicht etwa eigens zum Zwecke der Begehung dieser Tat zugezogen hat; oder aber im Zustande „gerechter Notwehr“. (*GPLS* 174)

Paragraph I of the penal code says that crime requires malicious intent. This statement has an appealing simplicity and is certainly calculated to reassure even the most conscientious and least assuming. The next paragraphs, however, cause the psychologist a lively disquiet, which remains with him to the end.

Malice cannot be presumed, the law goes on, if the perpetrator was wholly deprived of reason at the time of committing the act, or committed the act in a state of sensorial disorientation, or complete intoxication (unless he became intoxicated specifically for the purpose of committing the act), or in the state of "just self-defense."

From this, Tausk demonstrates, legal terminology allows for two psychologically distinct factors that exclude guilt: the deprivation of a person's senses and power

of judgement which in turn deprives them of the ability to form intent, or justifiable self-defense in which intent is formed but it is not qualified as malicious. It thus follows, Tausk continues, that the law has already assumed a very definite view of good and of evil. Moreover, he points out, when it comes to the law's treatment of homosexual love, we see the hypocrisy and highly selective practices of legal assignment of guilt writ large:

Die Kommentare zur Notwehrbestimmung lassen uns erkennen, daß diese Bestimmung psychologisch in die Kategorie des „unwiderstehlichen Zwanges“ gehört, (– die beiden Begriffe decken sich nicht, sie schneiden einander nur –), und an anderen Stellen erfahren wir, daß „unwiderstehlicher Zwang“ bei der Wahrung „gerechten“ eigenen oder fremden Interesses vorliege. Dann erfahren wir wieder, daß beim Interesse anderer Personen, dessen Verteidigung als unwiderstehlicher Zwang gilt und die Schuld ausschließt, das Interesse geliebter Personen eine bevorzugte Stellung einnimmt. Daß aber andererseits eine solche schuldausschließende Liebe doch nur zu gewissen Personen, zu nächsten Verwandten oder legitimen Liebespartnern, zugelassen wird, daß also der Jurist auch über die Möglichkeiten der Liebesbedingungen und -Wirkungen sicheren Bescheid weiß. Daß die homosexuelle Liebe nicht nur nicht als Schuldausschließungsgrund unter dem Gesichtspunkt des unwiderstehlichen Zwanges, sondern sogar als Schuld an und für sich bestraft wird, ist Ihnen ja bekannt. Sie sehen, der Jurist greift mit merkwürdigen Voraussetzungen und Erfolgen in das Räderwerk der Natur. (GPLS 174-175)

The commentaries on justified self-defense make it clear that the psychological category to which it belongs is that of “irresistible compulsion” (these two concepts do not coincide, they only intersect) and elsewhere we learn that “irresistible compulsion” applies to the safeguarding of the “legitimate” interests of oneself or of others. Then again we learn that among those the defense of whose interests constitutes “irresistible compulsion” and excludes guilt, the interest of loved ones occupies a preferential position. On the one hand, such exculpating love can only be admissible in relation to specific persons—close relatives or legitimate love partners—which is to say that the jurist claims a complete knowledge of love's conditions and effects. As you are already aware, homosexual love is not only *not* considered a reason for exclusion of guilt on grounds of irresistible compulsion, but is even punished as a guilt in and of itself. As you can see, the jurist intervenes in the wheelwork of nature with strange assumptions and achieves [equally] strange results.

This paragraph is a prime example of the radical work of psychoanalysis and sexology during this point in time. While, from a century's hindsight, the attitudes of early psychoanalysis toward homosexuality may often feel disappointing or pathologizing due to Freud's biological stance on nonreproductive sex as anomalous or perverse, the "Schuld" (guilt) to which Tausk refers had been much earlier formulated as both a moral and legal transgression, to be contented with in the churches and the courts.<sup>105</sup> Psychoanalysts like Tausk turn to homosexual love with curiosity rather than criminal and moral accusations. As one particularly educated in the discourses of law as in medicine, Tausk is uniquely able to point out the failings of the law's approach to homosexuality in the places where psychoanalysis had conversely made strides. These contradictions are confusing, Tausk asserts, particularly to the historically-minded psychologist, for whom the concept of evil is not so fixed (*GPLS* 175). The psychologist will wonder about the *etiology* of these legal stipulations, asking why and in which cases the law adapts or adopts a more lenient stance. One example he offers is that the law will take into account the age of an offender when meting out punishment; the young are treated as if their age leaves them less capable of the psychic act of intent than their elder counterparts. In fact, Tausk argues, very young children are capable of intent. Elementary school teachers, after all, discipline and punish school children based on the very assumption that they act with intent. It should thus follow, he argues, that ignorance of the law cannot be invoked in the exoneration of a child because it does not protect an adult in the same situation. Likewise, children are knowledgeable of and capable of malice—a proclivity which, if anything, generally decreases with age. The only real factor that leads to a general legal

leniency when it comes to the young, he concludes, is a personal love for one's own children or the desire to keep precious one's own childhood, preserving it in a notion of innocence. With this point, Tausk reveals the realm of law, supposedly dispassionate and unbiased, to be as libidinal as the most primary of human urges.

Tausk continues his elaboration on the topic of childhood innocence long enough that his audience may be somewhat loosened from their original orientation by way of emotional attachment and the expected discomfort that comes in questioning the innocence of one's own children or childhood. This is a rhetorical strategy that he developed in his earlier address, circling in toward his argument from the edges of his material. His talent at this rhetorical style is most honed in case studies presented during the war, not only for the accumulation of practice but for the urgency with which he employs it. Once he has unfolded several examples of the differential treatment allocated for children, the logical fallacies upon which this treatment is based and the psychological or affective drives that in fact sustain this practice, Tausk returns to the discussion of war deserters, asking that his audience please hold onto "den Eindruck des Wirrsals, das in den Beziehungen auch dieser einfachen Psychologie zum Gesetz herrscht" [the impression of the confusion that exists in the relations between even this simple psychology and the law] (*GPLS* 177). He will build upon the emotional agitation and consideration of the figure of the child in extremely creative ways from this point onward. In effect, he will use psychoanalysis to reintroduce the war deserter as an extended family member deserving of care.

Working back toward the war deserters by way of few typical stereotypes, Tausk stages his case for their inclusion into a newly configured *oikonomia*,

factoring them into the Empire as a great household, the management of their needs, their place among others, and their care. Before having taken on the role of psychiatrically evaluating deserters, Tausk claims, he imagined them to be defiant and cowardly. His actual observations as a clinician told a completely different story. These men were “Opfer einer irrsinnigen, besinnungslosen Angst [...], die kein Zurück weiß und das Vorwärts nicht sieht, sondern hört, und deren Heldentum im Überdauern eines unbegreiflichen Martyriums liegt” [victims of an irrational, mindless fear that knows no way to go back and sees no way forward, but can only hear, and whose heroism lies in the endurance of an inconceivable torment] (*GPLS* 179). Over time with these deserters, three curious points emerged from his observations that drove him to undertake a full psychological study. First, it emerged that those who desert are not fit for combatant units and often left while on guard or labor duties, not at the front. Second, they often endured worse hardship in desertion (i.e. living in the forest in the cold of winter, starving, or crossing vast areas on foot at great peril) than they would have in military duty. Third, roughly half of those he saw gave the impression of being “feeble-minded”—one extreme case in particular had a microcephalic brain, which the pathologists discovered after the deserter had been executed and autopsied. The singular impression carried away from the multiplicity of encounters with these soldiers (who were charged for desertion and often executed as a result), was that of “Elend, geknicktes Elend” [wretchedness, utter wretchedness] (*GPLS* 179). He defends the psychological state of his battlefield patients by investigating war desertion along lines of anxiety and obsession, hysterical or epileptic disturbances, and fear of punishment, deftly tying in the

emotional tenor of fraught childhood innocence with which he began by citing Freud's theories on the father-son relationship in order to reframe the relationship of deserter to authority.

Tausk's application of Freud here is one of the more lucid and accessible explanations of psychoanalysis that one might find. Stringing together the most central pieces of Freud's work, he reinvents them in application to subjects who had previously never who before factored into Freud's analysis because of their low social class and lingual difference. As he must summarize and make appealing the framework of psychoanalysis to a room of physicians very likely hostile to Freud's work, he explains,

Die große Entdeckung *Freuds*, die im Grunde den wesentlichen Inhalt der Psychoanalyse vorstellt, lautet: *Der Mensch stammt aus seiner Kindheit*. Ich bitte Sie, diesen Gemeinplatz als blutige Neuheit der Psychologie anzunehmen. Denn faßt ihn der allergrößte Teil der lesenden Menschen auf, die Gelehrten mitinbegriffen. Man kann diesem Teil der Menschheit nichts Neuere und Befremdenderes sagen, als daß ihre würdigen Persönlichkeiten aus Resten ihres Kindlebens bestünden, die teils unverändert, teils nach bestimmten Gesetzen verändert, zu ihrem gegenwärtigen, anscheinend erwachsenen Bild, zusammengetreten sind. (GPLS 184)

Freud's great discovery, and in the end the essential principle of psychoanalysis, is that *the child is father of the man*. I ask you to accept this common truism as an astounding novelty in psychology. For this is how it is understood by the vast majority of literate people, scholars included. This portion of humanity cannot be told anything newer and more disconcerting than that their dignified personalities consist of the residues of their infantile lives, which, partly unchanged, partly changed in accordance with certain laws, come together to constitute their present, apparently adult image.

This is followed by a psychological portrait of the child, according to Freud's pleasure and reality principles. The child, though instinctual, has the outstanding ability to postpone or renounce the satisfaction of his wishes. The pleasure

principle is inherent to the child, and this reality principle is only received through instruction. As soon as the child grasps at the moon, Tausk offers in an example, he learns that the moon is unobtainable in the real world.<sup>106</sup> Likewise, when the child wants to dominate his siblings, he must learn that he has no more right to do this than they do to him, at which point, Tausk says, he must either give up the desire to dominate his peers or transmute that desire into a form of acceptable social competition. Psychoanalytically, the child thus sublimates his crude, tyrannical desires and acquires a well of mental pleasure to take the place of the pleasure of domestic tyranny that has since dried up (*GPLS* 185). Tausk moves from an overview instruction on the pleasure and reality principles to the Oedipus complex, and the fixation that develops when the child cannot escape infantile wishes and objects of desire. In terms of the deserters, Tausk argues, they are “an dem alten Wunsch, dem Zwang der Familie zu entfliehen, fixiert” [fixated on the old wish to escape family compulsions] (*GPLS* 187). This early childhood conflict with the family—introduced first in terms of early sibling rivalry and secondly in terms of the son’s struggle with the father—becomes Tausk’s most fecund basis of argument in the defense of the deserter along psychoanalytic lines.

Tausk’s ultimate argument, that the deserter’s psychological conflict is *familial* at heart, builds upon the “brothers in arms” topos much as it does Freud’s novel theories of the psycho-sexual subject. By animating the commonplace understanding of fraternal bonds born of military service, remixing it with Freud’s more scandalous theories of familial relation and desires, Tausk advocates for the deserter as an outcast relative. He calls on his audience to accept these deserters, often of classes and cultural backgrounds with which the doctors would not

associate themselves, as brothers or even as sons. Thus, he recasts the net of Freud's familial structure to encompass an empire.

Let us briefly consider Tausk's psycho-political intervention here in conversation with Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, published four years later in 1921. Freud's monograph looks at how social psychology is concerned with the psychology of the individual. Libido, or eros, forms the ties which hold groups together, Freud argues.

The nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists [...] in sexual love with sexual union as its aim. But we do not separate from this—what in any case has a share in the name 'love'—on the one hand, self-love, and on the other, love for parents and children, friendship and love for humanity in general, and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas. [...] psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities [...]. (*SE* 18: 90)

The mass empowers the individual through an “intensification of affect,” replacing the “whole of human society, which is the wielder of authority, whose punishments the individual fears” and who would otherwise inhibit him (*SE* 18: 84-85). In a larger group, the individual is mutually moved by and stimulates emotion in others, allowing the mass to act upon unleashed desires.

The first kind of mass that Freud identifies, based on his interpretation of Le Bon, is a temporary entity, “formed of heterogeneous elements which for a moment are combined”—the second, more enduring kind of mass Freud locates in two artificial groups: the church and the army (Le Bon qtd. in Freud, *SE* 18: 73; *SE* 18: 93). Within these enduring groups, Freud gives primary attention to the father figure rather than to brother figures (as Tausk does). “[T]he commander-in-chief,” writes Freud, “is a father who loves all soldiers equally, and for that reason [the soldiers] are comrades among themselves” (*SE* 18: 94). Brotherhood, for

Freud, is the *result* of a proper, egalitarian libidinal relationship to the father. It is not accessed without him. Freud concludes that the defining characteristic of a mass is when a group of individuals have substituted their ego ideal with the same singular object and thus identify with one another. The father is the proper object that fills the place of the individual ego.

The main difference that comes across when comparing Tausk's earlier study of soldiers and the breakdown of their bonds with Freud's theorization of the group ego is that Tausk works first through fraternal bonds and reaches then toward the father figure(s) to establish and strengthen libidinal structures of care. He is able to achieve this because his approach is not beholden to a linear chronology. Freud, on the other hand, tells us that the proper place of the father as commander-in-chief and the balanced libidinal relationships of each soldier-son to this father is what allows the *oikonomia* to function without breakdown.

Tausk is additionally working from the point of post-breakdown, as point at which the individual and the group have already failed to connect, resulting in desertion. The deserter has suffered from a state of inconceivable torment which has made it impossible by the point of his desertion to connect with the group, and he has likely already been separated from the fraternal unit by being placed on guard or in a labor capacity (*GPLS* 179). Identification with the group via libidinal ties as Freud later theorizes has already been foreclosed to the deserter.

A second site for contextualizing Tausk's report here with Freud's post-war work on soldiers' ailments is to be found in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), where Freud develops his concepts of the pleasure principle and the death drive and addresses concerns of traumatic and war neuroses, "facilitated by a conflict in

the ego” (*SE* 18: 33). Freud builds upon the biological-thermodynamic model via Fechner in his development of the death instinct (*SE* 18: 8). Not only is it a biological fact, he asserts, that “everything living dies for *internal* reasons—becomes inorganic once again—then we shall be compelled to say that ‘*the aim of all life is death*’,” but also within the psychic system, “*protection against stimuli* is an almost more important function for the living organism than *reception of stimuli*” (*SE* 18: 38, 30). The death instinct, in conflict with the life instinct of the libido, is according to Freud the drive by which organic life seeks to reduce overstimulation and regain equilibrium.

The study was far from a simple intellectual exercise for Tausk; he was using his expertise in medicine to advocate for the lives of men condemned to death by firing squad for the crime of desertion or inability to engage in acts of violence. His writing here is explicit in its stakes and surges with emotion. In this address, he takes direct issue with the psychological principles assumed by the courts on the standards of medical professionals, whom he accuses of idealism and lacking sympathy, and he builds his case against measures taken toward deserters with the problem of the law’s lagging (in respect to human perspective and ways of life) and the fatal lack of understanding on the parts of cosmopolitan intellectuals toward peasant-class soldiers from various parts of the empire, who, even on a fully conscious level, may not have understood the terms of conscription that others took for granted. His survey concludes that this variety of sorts of deserters must be understood from a psychoanalytic position acknowledging that the unconscious, while expressing the desires of the conscious, cannot be held accountable according to the same rules of law, which

are facile and outdated in their understanding of the mental as synonymous with consciousness. His method of reading brings the material lives of his patients back into touch with their psychic landscapes to give a fuller perspective of them as humans.

Of the several political and psychoanalytic contributions that Tausk presents in his twin studies of the so-called war psychoses and war deserters, the attention to the unity of failure and refusal found in the concept of *Versagen* is among the most lingually and conceptually profound. *Versagen* commonly means “failure,” “malfunction,” or “breakdown,” but it more literally means “refusal,” “renunciation” or “denial.” *Versagen* often appears in language around faulty machinery—“ein technisches Versagen”—while a *Versager* (either a person or a thing) is a loser, a failure, a dud. Tausk’s conception of psychological ailments often incorporated *Versagen* as a key component. Salomé noticed this well before his military service, writing in 1913 that while Tausk’s conception of neurosis was essentially Freudian, “doch betont Tausk als beim Ausbruch der Neurose unumgänglich notwendig den *Versager* im Ichgebiet, im sozialen Gebiet, worauf Zuflucht gesucht werde im Sexuellen und, wenn dies disharmonisch befunden werde, die Erkrankung sich manifestiere” [Tausk emphasizes the *Failure* in the realm of the ego, in the social realm, as inevitably necessary to the outbreak of neurosis; refuge is sought out in sexuality and, if it’s found to be disharmonious, the disease will manifest itself] (*In der Schule* 80). Failure was long at the core of neurosis in Tausk’s psycho-sexual framework.<sup>107</sup> In service of his war studies, this neurotic failure transforms psychotic opacity into a legible ailment; war deserters shift from cowardly criminal, refusing to uphold the terms of their conscription,

into brothers and children whose education in the renunciation and postponement of primal desires has failed.<sup>108</sup> The true failure, in Tausk's opinion, is plain: it is the failure of society toward these men.

“Unsere Deserteure” [Our deserters], Tausk concludes, subtly demonstrating an obligation or relationship through this adopted possessive adjective, “sind durch ihren Infantilismus asozial mit Rücksicht auf das gemeinsame Schicksal, welches die menschliche Gesellschaft jetzt in diesem Kriege getroffen hat” [are, through their infantilism, asocial in respect to the shared fate that all of humanity has to contend with in this war] (*GPLS* 197). They had not fully entered the social order, thus they cannot be antisocial in the criminal or pathological sense. There is, Tausk assures his colleagues, a group of people in this war who are insatiably fixated on the satisfying of their own selfish desires (*GPLS* 198). These people are, unlike the deserters, truly antisocial in their behavior—they are the *Kriegswuchserer*—the war profiteers. Should the army still crave an enemy, Tausk presents them with nothing less than an invitation to class warfare against those who profit from misery.

## Chapter Five: Identity, Mysticism, and the Grotesque

[The] space of refusal, where one can say no to the colonizer, no to the downpresser, is located in the margins. And one can only say no, speak the voice of resistance, because there exists a counter language.

bell hooks, "Choosing the Margin as a Space of Radical Openness"

Das katatone Symptom, die negativistische Starre des Schizophrenen, ist nichts anderes als eine Absage an die Außenwelt, in "Organsprache" ausgedrückt.

The catatonic symptom, the negativistic rigidity of the schizophrenic, is nothing other than a renunciation of the outer world, expressed in "Organ-Language."

Victor Tausk, "Über die Entstehung des 'Beeinflussungsapparates' in der Schizophrenie"

As Walter Benjamin suggests, "the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a concept of history that is in keeping with this insight." And the state of emergency is also always a state of *emergence*.

Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*

Tausk's work returns again and again to the problem of identity, troubling not just its foundations but the very physical model of the universe upon which, in Freud's framework, identity is predicated. In this chapter, I examine how Tausk struggles with the puzzle of identity over his career, teasing it out through a variety of genres to get closer to the quantum model he most clearly articulates in his final study.

I have taken time in previous chapters to establish Tausk's proficiency in genres and discourses outside of psychoanalysis in order to biographically and textually ground my claims that Tausk's writing can take literary theory out of Freud's contained economy. In Chapter Two, I traced his contributions to Balkan literary modernism by way of his pseudonym, Vladoje Slovačić. In Chapter Four,

I examined how Tausk incorporated juridical rhetoric into his psychoanalytic writing on traumatic responses of soldiers during war time, bringing a political urgency to these case studies as he delivered them to his peers in medical audiences. The following chapter begins with Tausk's most well-known case study, "Über die Entstehung des 'Beeinflussungsapparates' in der Schizophrenie" [On the Emergence of the "Influencing Apparatus" in Schizophrenia], to understand the networked and mutually agential approach that Tausk brings to psychoanalysis. I then trace this theme back through two earlier pieces of writing—one short psychoanalytic study and one work of fiction.

In these three selections of mutually inflected literary and psychoanalytic writing, I consider the importance of a networked worldview that simultaneously preserves individual uniqueness alongside Tausk's use of the genre of the grotesque and philosophies from Jewish mysticism. These selections are representative of a wide scope of Tausk's work, spanning over a decade in his development as a writer and demonstrating his ability to investigate the same philosophical problem of identity under widely different generic forms.<sup>109</sup> In harnessing the genre of the grotesque and in developing upon a secular, literary mysticism that resonates with that which we find in Kafka, Tausk demonstrates the profundity of a body of work in which literary and psychoanalytic genres co-inform one another. His oeuvre can thus be read as a study in itself of the dialogue between literature and psychoanalysis, as I intend to read it here.

I begin this chapter with Tausk's most well-known case study on the "Influencing Apparatus," written and published at the end of his life in 1919. This study more than any other highlights the networks and mutually agential approach

Tausk brings to psychoanalysis, and the direction he was headed in his thinking following his experiences of the war. I take this case as my departure point for considering a wider scope of Tausk's work and its creative interventions both in terms of genre and attitude, as it encapsulates the quantum, entangled scientific model upon which Tausk drew.

I follow this with Tausk's short case study of parapraxis, "Der Glauben der Väter" [The Faith of the Fathers] (1916) to see how he draws upon a uniquely Jewish experience in both the material and the philosophical practice of his writing. The anecdote at the crux of the story, which arises from an experience of Antisemitism and draws from it a mystical moment of revelation, brings us in touch with the role of the son outside of a patriarchal legacy and religious Law. The final example of Tausk's work that I turn to in this chapter likewise follows a non-traditional son, in the form of an anti-Oedipal, grotesque figure from Tausk's literary publication "Hsein Brko" (1912). The choice to include this among my selections from Tausk's publications, while perhaps idiosyncratic, has everything to do with its figuration into Tausk's anti-authoritarian approach in thinking and writing. Additionally, as a South-Slavic tale published in Tausk's father's bilingual literary review, "Husein Brko" brings us back in touch with the Balkan modernism that laid the groundwork for Tausk's later writing. Moreover, by looking at this anti-authoritarian approach as Tausk develops it simultaneously through his literary and psychoanalytic writings, we see how profoundly the two genres inform one another, and thus how potent one genre can be in unlocking the puzzles of another. As a varied triptych representing the most exploratory of Tausk's oeuvre, these pieces reveal a networked, mystical, and agential

worldview, one in which difference is preserved and leads the way to new modes of understanding the problem of identity.

“On the Emergence of the ‘Influencing Apparatus’ in Schizophrenia” remains Tausk’s most widely known psychoanalytic contribution to date: a weird and entangled view of a schizophrenic woman in war-torn Europe, attempting to find herself.<sup>110</sup> This study, drafted near the end of the First World War, brings together some of the strongest and most valuable themes in Tausk’s body of work—difference, identity formation, the mystical—in a way that crystalizes his greatest philosophical contributions, and perhaps for this reason it continues to have a pull on readers over a century later. In addition to his attention to these themes, Tausk offers a new psychoanalytic understanding of ego boundaries and object-finding as they relate to subjective emergence. The study of the “Influencing Apparatus” examines a young woman named Natalija A, whose schizoid state of mind leads her to experience herself as controlled by an uncanny and organless double in a formulation that pre-empts discoveries in quantum mechanics by nearly a century, namely, the discovery of entanglement. Thus, we find that in place of the thermodynamic system which structured Freud’s analytic framework, the case of Natalija and her Influencing Apparatus employs modes from physics in service of the emergence of the unknown. Here Tausk sketches out his theory of weak ego boundaries and their relationship to the schizoid psyche. Tausk’s commitment to difference shines through in this study; a great creative intervention on the part of the analyst-author comes from his interest in preserving the uniqueness of the patient’s case—an approach that is not to be found in other literature within his circle. Tausk admits that Natalija’s remains the

only case of its kind he has come upon thus far, and though he draws upon other experiences with schizophrenic patients, he does not attempt to classify it with former cases in order to build out a type. In essence, Tausk refuses to integrate the uniqueness of Natalija's case into an epistemology. His approach allows the reader a glimpse of psychoanalysis as an adaptive technology rather than a prefabricated system into which cases are filed. Natalija's case study describes a woman's own struggle with embodiment in a world that does not give her space to emerge as a complete individual. With Tausk's offering of psychoanalysis here as an adaptive technology, I argue, Natalija's emergence as and by way of the Influencing Apparatus provides a view into how psychoanalysis can attend to a more varied process of subjective becoming in a dis-unified world.

At the time this study was conducted, the relationship between Freud and Tausk was at its most distant and strained, and Tausk's independence of thought emerges here more clearly than in his pre-war studies. He speaks through staples of Freud's language and theory in keeping with the discourse of the international psychoanalytic community—just as he harnessed the specialized language of law and medicine when addressing his medical colleagues from the battlefield—yet both the matter (schizophrenia) and approach (a single-case study) of the “Influencing Apparatus” paper greatly deviate from Freud's work. We can see this contrast when noting that the structure of the Influencing Apparatus is akin to structures from within quantum physics rather than the biological systems of organisms, or a linear, thermodynamic process of exhaustion.

The thermodynamic model was for several decades the accepted scientific model of the physical universe, and this had great consequences for the material

relationship of the body to labor. The body's fatigue, Helmholtz made clear, was "a particular instance of entropy" (Rabinbach 48). Anson Rabinbach centers the shift toward the thermodynamic model and its relationship to the human body in *The Human Motor*, in which he argues,

The great discoveries of nineteenth-century physics led [...] not only to the assumption of universal energy, but also to the inevitability of decline, dissolution, and exhaustion. Accompanying the discovery of energy conservation and entropy was the endemic disorder of fatigue—the most evident and persistent reminder of the body's intractable resistance to unlimited progress and productivity. Fatigue became the permanent nemesis of an industrializing Europe. (3-4)

Labor was transformed via thermodynamic discoveries into *labor power*, "emphasizing the expenditure and deployment of energy as opposed to human will, moral purpose, or even technical skill," and thus creating a kind of mechanical work, an *Arbeitskraft* "entirely indifferent to the nature of its material form" (Rabinbach 4). This is the sort of labor that would be needed not only to power the industrialization of Europe but ostensibly the military efforts during the First World War as well. In light of the textual and historical examples examined already in Chapter Four of this dissertation, the dialectical model of a thermodynamic *Arbeitskraft* and an ever-present anxiety regarding its depletion make even clearer the various brutal attempts to "jolt" said labor power—in the form of the soldier's body, riddled with the *Versagen* of shellshock, mental illness, or acts of desertion—back into service.

While Freud would remain a prisoner of nineteenth-century biological science adapted from Helmholtz's and Fechner's work in thermodynamics, Tausk ventures in this study into a new area of the physical sciences, which were seeing more development in his lifetime than they had in all the time since Newton.<sup>111</sup> At

this time, Max Planck had already implicitly acknowledged the ability for light to behave as both a particle and a wave when he published on quanta of radiant energy (e.g. light) at the turn of the century, and Einstein made it more explicit in his 1905 publication on wave-particle duality.<sup>112, 113</sup> This understanding of energy was incredibly disruptive to the philosophical pillars of physics; until nearly the end of the nineteenth century, physicists had worked on a model of energy in a constant, liquid flow.<sup>114</sup>

By the mid-1800's, earlier aether theories gave way to the thermodynamic model put forward by Helmholtz, who “observed that the second law of thermodynamics indicated that all energy ultimately ‘dissipated’—its flow was essentially irreversible and tended toward inertia” (Rabinbach 162). But as Rabinbach points out, when Helmholtz was faced with new conclusions drawn about the heat death of the universe, even the “pessimistic prognosis” of ultimate inertia or exhaustion was of little consequence of him—“through the movements of the planets and nebulae, he maintained that the universe might also replenish itself” (162). Thus, the flow of energy could be seen as constant and recursive in the wider scheme of the universe even as it was linear, irreversible, and exhaustive the lifespans of particular bodies. Human understandings of the physical universe would then be radically reorganized in the twentieth century by the notion that energy not only was *not* a liquid but that it behaved according to two different forms at once and, moreover, seemed to alter that form depending on observation.<sup>115, 116</sup> For Tausk, it would likewise necessarily reorganize approaches to the psychic systems of energy that Freud had imagined according to fluid conduction, which Freud had drawn from Helmholtz's thermodynamic model by

way of Brücke's biology (Bowlby 16). When Tausk approached Freud's system of conduction, his understanding would already be one that metaphorized fluid as a stand-in for electricity, and so findings to do with fragmented or dualistic energetic behavior would connect with the schizophrenic psyche in a way that Freud's system could not allow. Tausk's study on the "Influencing Apparatus" makes possible a discourse of the schizophrenic experience within psychoanalysis by expanding into a quantum realm, allowing for the acknowledgement of multiple states of being at once or within the same subject.

The open approach is mirrored in Tausk's choice of language (i.e. *Apparat*), which supports the subject's experience of parallelism rather than redirecting it into a unified identity, even as the author investigates the libidinous value of the apparatus. The English-speaking world will know this study by the title of "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia," as it was translated by Dorian Feigenbaum in 1933. Feigenbaum's aid in bringing Tausk to a wider audience is of great merit.<sup>117</sup> However, I argue that Feigenbaum's translation of the title elides two of the most important philosophical components of Tausk's study; not only does Feigenbaum's translation effectively turn "Entstehung" [Emergence] into "Ursprung" [Origin], but it substitutes the apparatus with a machine.<sup>118</sup> Though these may seem petty matters of one translator's opinion over another, I contend that the shifting of these terms contorts Tausk's intervention into a Freudian epistemological format, when the case study is in fact something that breaks away from epistemology. After all, an apparatus is a complex assemblage of parts, tools, or means by which a thing is accomplished or produced. Tellingly, *Apparat* can be used to describe a political

system just as easily as it can an organic system of the body, and Natalija's case is impacted materially by both such contexts. We could define a machine as a much simpler unit, in contrast to the apparatus, which implies a bringing together of disparate pieces toward a new goal. This act of bringing together is reflected both in Natalija's own struggle for self-identification (and, ultimately, subject-formation) as it is in the political background that colors her everyday life. And while "origin" implies an absolute beginning or source—be it temporal, material, or spatial—"emergence" signals a transition in form or perceptibility of something that very likely has *already been* (or elsewhere is), just not—as Kafka once jested of hope—for us.<sup>119</sup> Tausk's study contains within its very title the acknowledgement of the schizophrenic patient's own world, which opens itself at times to the analyst's perception but neither begins nor ends with the analyst. In short, the case study of the "Influencing Apparatus" gives space for the psychoanalyst to encounter the previously unencountered—the schizoid state—without turning it into a machine.

### *Identity and the Boundaries of the Ego*

Before venturing into further analysis, it is important to note the points that have already been made regarding Tausk's contributions with this study. In his books on the historiography of psychoanalysis, Tausk biographer Paul Roazen makes the repeated argument that Tausk was influential to his contemporaries as well as future generations of psychoanalysts according to two main contributions: first, Tausk proposed that weak ego boundaries—and *not* narcissism—were at the root of psychosis; second, he was the first to introduce the concept of "identity"

into psychoanalysis. I second the argument that Tausk's work on ego boundaries paves the way for that of analysts whose names are today most quickly and commonly associated with this field: Melanie Klein and Erik Erikson, for example. And although Tausk's colleague and friend Paul Federn was rightly lauded for his work on ego boundaries, he too was preceded by Tausk on this front.<sup>120</sup> Yet Tausk's role in the psychoanalytic treatment of psychosis and the understanding of identity remained, for decades, virtually unknown, even to those whose work may have been very clearly influenced by these theoretical and practical innovations. In his *Historiography of Psychoanalysis* Roazen writes,

I can remember Erikson's teasing me about Tausk, referring to him as "St. Tausk," as if I were about to engage in an idealization of Tausk's life. It turned out that Erikson, who had coined the notion of the "identity crisis," was unaware that Tausk had been the first in psychoanalysis to introduce the concept of identity. In his autobiographical reflection Erikson did acknowledge that Paul Federn's special ego psychology had been an important influence on Erikson's own work. But Erikson was unaware that Federn, an intimate friend of Tausk's, credited Tausk with having originated the concept of "ego boundaries," for example, among other of Tausk's innovations. (46-47)

As Roazen shows us, Tausk's concepts of identity and ego boundaries have rippled through the work of those psychoanalytic thinkers most associated with these concepts, even if they themselves were unaware. By reading Tausk directly instead of at a second or third remove, we can get a clearer picture of the ways in which his work broke new ground and how it might be better suited to literary discourses of postcoloniality or other states of being. Rather than treating psychotics as pathological narcissists, Tausk saw them as lacking ego boundaries.<sup>121</sup> In his view, the problem to be addressed was thus one of ego weakness rather than excess; the solution, it follows, would come in aiding the

patient in strengthening the patient's sense of self rather than punishing or constraining the supposed excess of ego. The precedent with which Tausk's approach conflicts had been set by Freud in his 1914 essay, "Zur Einführung des Narzißmus" [On Narcissism], widely understood to be his definitive introduction to narcissism, in which Freud refers to all psychoses, and especially schizophrenia, as "narzisstische Neurose" [narcissistic neurosis]. Federn developed a model of ego psychology used to treat psychotic patients; Erikson theorized on the importance of the development of ego identity through social interaction during adolescence. Melanie Klein's work would also coincide with Tausk's in multiple praxes and theoretical approaches. Like Tausk, Klein turned to her own children in her analysis of the child psyche (Klein was distinct, however, in her choice to focus on much earlier phases of childhood development—often between the fourth and sixth month of life).<sup>122</sup> More importantly, Klein's theory of object relations, particularly when it comes to the discussion of projective identification, resonates with Tausk's later study of the "Influencing Apparatus" in that it details a formative connection between the subject and perceived outside object, just as Tausk recognizes in his patient Natalija A. These examples of trace connections between Tausk's work on ego boundaries and identity and that of other analysts are by no means presented as a comprehensive list, but rather serve as evidence of the points of issue through which Tausk's analyses affected others.

Later analysts who considered the experiences of migration and exile from a psychoanalytic perspective would also draw upon Tausk's introduction of identity. Léon and Rebeca Grinberg, analysts and authors of one of the first comprehensive psychoanalytic studies of migration and exile, pointed specifically

to Tausk in their understanding of “identity,” indicating that the concept was not Freudian in origin:

[Tausk] maintained that just as a child discovers objects and his own self, so an adult in his struggle for self-preservation frequently repeats the experience of “finding himself” and “feeling himself.” The immigrant in his struggle for self-preservation need to hold onto various elements of his native environment (familiar objects, music, memories, and dreams representing different aspects of his native land) in order to be able to feel like himself.

In all his writings, Freud only once used the term *identity* (1926), and he gave it a psychosocial connotation. In a speech in which he tried to explain his connection to Judaism, he spoke of ‘obscure emotional forces’ that were ‘all the more powerful the less easily articulable they were’ and of ‘the clear consciousness of an *inner identity* based not on race or religion but on an *aptitude common to a group* to live in opposition to an free of the prejudices that undermine the use of the intellect’ (our emphasis). Thus, Freud refers to something in one’s core, one’s interior, that is crucial to the internal cohesion of a group. (Grinberg and Grinberg 129-130)

The Grinbergs’ application of Tausk’s work to transcultural psychological experiences is a propitious move. Though they refer in this case to his analysis of schizophrenia, I argue that his work in adjacent studies is prototypical for what are today the areas of *ethnopsychiatrie* in the French tradition and transcultural psychiatry in the Anglo-American world. Tausk’s concept of identity fits so felicitously into the psychoanalytic discussion of migration and exile precisely because his work was, from the beginning, attentive to migratory experiences, heteronormative social groups, and the defense of minoritized classes. But, if we are to accept that identity is Tausk’s own contribution to psychoanalysis, the question that naturally follows is, where did Tausk himself come up with it? The answer would have something to do with his knowledge of classical philology and legal training (as well as his early experiences of migration and even his knowledge of military documentation). Identity might not have struck Freud’s

circle in its earlier days as a crucial topic of psycho-social formation, but it plays a fundamental role in the courtroom. A party cannot accuse or be accused, defend or be defended, agree upon or dissolve a contract, or be held accountable for their actions if they cannot first be identified. Tausk may have wearied of his work in the court after those first years in Mostar, but his juridical training certainly stayed with him; the inclusion of identity in his understanding of psychological development being a key example.

The concept of identity is so pervasive that its presence could too easily be taken for granted. From identity politics, to identity crises, biometric documentation, or the myriad issues of identity that arose with the introduction of new banking technologies and the Internet of Things (e.g.: identity theft) and the systems designed to track or protect online identities (e.g.: identity provider (IDP), self-sovereign identity (SSI))—not to mention much longer histories of systems of identification for subjects or citizens under monarchies and states, or military identification systems for prisoners and personnel—we of the early twenty-first century are awash in the complex and omnipresent concept of identity.<sup>123, 124</sup> Yet such discourses were far less prevalent during Tausk’s time. In order to grasp “identity” at its point of entry into psychoanalysis therefore, let us consider the word itself.

Identity/ *Identität* comes from the Latin word, *idem*: *id* (it) + demonstrative suffix *-dem* “the same (as already mentioned).” *Idem* is a translation from the Greek word *taftótis*, a word which shares its root with tautology, signifying a demonstrative redundancy: self-sameness. Identity in ancient Greece was predicated upon the very material “symbol,” which facilitated legal agreements.

“To those travelling abroad, symbola offered protection from sylē (summary seizure of property) and other forms of harassment” (Hopper and Millett). The term symbol, or *symbolon*, is derived from the ancient Greek verb *symbollein*, “meaning ‘to throw together, bring together, put together,’ also ‘to collect’ and ‘to compare’ (...) ‘*symbolon*’ was at first literally related to a ‘drawing together’” (Ladner 223). A contract was kept and controlled by a symbol as a means of recognition which was often manifested in the form of broken shards of pottery which, when rejoined “were called symbola and had the function of tallies” (Ladner 223). In this case, a piece of a clay pot would be broken in two, and each fragment would be given as a token to the parties under agreement, proving each one’s identity when the two parts were joined together. Thus, identity was proved in the arrangement of fragments into a larger form, and the boundaries at which those fragments met.

Tausk’s introduction of the term and the concept of identity into psychoanalysis makes sense in that he was also of the vanguard when it came to the psychoanalysis of schizoid subjectivity. He brings up *Identität* in the fourth section of his work on Natalija A. and the Influencing Apparatus, as he describes tracing the patient’s schizoid projection of her own body back to an early developmental stage in which an infant’s own body is the goal of object-finding. Identity, in Tausk’s formulation, is a recognition of the reconstruction that must be done, of the boundaries that must be made manifest, in gathering one’s psyche together and understanding one’s body and one’s mind as integral pieces of one’s self rather than as menacing, alien objects. Because the treatment of psychosis with psychoanalysis was hardly heard of before this final study of Tausk’s, it

should thus not be surprising that such a conception of identity did not emerge in Freud's or another colleague's analysis of a *neurotic* patient. In contrast to Freud, Tausk was interested in the betterment of his patients rather than the exploration of their psyches for psychoanalysis's own sake. "Tausk felt that if a therapist could lend some strength to the psychotic's ego, his ability to distinguish between his self and the outside world would return," observes Roazen in *Brother Animal* (187). "The boundaries of the ego could then expand, and the patient could better separate inner feelings from outer realities. This notion was Tausk's original formulation and it was designed to emphasize that ego defects lay beyond schizophrenia" (*Brother Animal* 187). The double contribution of identity and the formation of ego boundaries, distinct but linked at the nexus of their formation, were among Tausk's greatest achievements, and this was reliant upon his investment in the patient's developing autonomy.

*"On the Emergence of the 'Influencing Apparatus' in Schizophrenia"*

The "Influencing Apparatus" case study is, to summarize in purely psychoanalytic terms, a study of weak ego boundaries. Indeed, it is the study through which Tausk explicitly traces the link between weak ego boundaries and schizophrenia. Without the ability to distinguish between one's self and (an)other, inside and outside, past and present, the psyche exists in an infantile state of "angeborenen Narzißmus" [innate narcissism] that knows no separation of the ego from any other object (*GPLS* 269). All sensation/s, all body/bodies, all of time and space are the same unified entity, so that everything "happens" to the infant from her own body. From this developmental stage, the infant-psyche must first identify

with the body as an object, then discover the body as an object in the world in the process of *Objektfindung* in order to enter the world herself. In Natalija's case, Tausk highlights the process of projection as a step toward finding one's self as an embodied object in the world.

In literary terms, the Influencing Apparatus as a phenomenon sets up a tension between the writing and the written, process and signifiers. Natalija's process of projection is akin to a process of writing in this figurative way, and in a literal, material way as well as she communicates throughout her analytic sessions through writing. In the case study of the "Influencing Apparatus," we find Natalija's predicament deeply resonant of Kafka's "In the Penal Colony," in which the body of the accused is the site upon which the Symbolic is directly inscribed into "the Real of bare life" (Gailus 300). She is attempting not to become written, hollowed of her own signifying under the totalizing script of the machinations of those in power.

The details that Tausk provides at the outset of the case study evidence material circumstances from both the patient's life and the sessions held between analyst and analysand which are helpful to keep in mind. Fräulein Natalija A. is a thirty-one year old former student of philosophy, who has been completely deaf for many years due to a malignant, chronic infection of the middle ear; she thus communicates with others solely through writing. Of note in this introduction is the fact that Natalija's body has already been *physically* presented to us as having trouble with boundaries, since the inflammation of her middle ear as Tausk describes it would lead to a perforated membrane and presumably present as a chronic drainage of puss.<sup>125</sup> The result of this is that her ability to hear the outside

world has been completely foreclosed, and she has retreated into a system of writing, which would therefore be the mode of communication by which Tausk and Natalija conducted their sessions.<sup>126</sup> The act of writing, rather than the spoken language of “talk therapy,” and the role it may play in the formation of this case study is never directly addressed by the author. Yet we can sense its presence throughout the study as Tausk has planted it here at the very beginning.

Furthermore, several paragraphs later, Tausk refers to another open site of inflammation on the patient’s body—a Lupus sore on her nose. Thus, we come to understand that Natalija suffers not from a common ear infection but from an autoimmune disease, in which her body quite literally attacks its own organs. As in the case of her deafness, Tausk does not present a reading of the physical disease as it might co-relate to the patient’s mental state but, like the political backdrop of her case and the reliance upon written communication, we understand it to be part of the material of her life and the uniqueness of her circumstances. The body is not metaphorized, but it is allowed to speak. This speech arrives through all sorts of somatic disturbance, even to the extent of catatonia, which Tausk pointedly terms an *Organsprache*—a language of the organs through an act of refusal (*GPLS* 263).

Natalija experiences her schizoid state in the form of an apparatus that duplicates and controls both her body and mind, resembling something of an electrically articulated doppelgänger. This displaced doppelgänger has been in the hands of sinister men, her persecutors, who use it to influence and harm her, making her body and her mind other than her own.

Sie berichtet, daß sie seit 6 ½ Jahren unter dem Einfluß eines elektrischen Apparates steht, der in Berlin erzeugt wird, trotzdem er von der Polizei verboten wurde. Er hat die Gestalt eines menschlichen Körpers, u. zw. die Gestalt der Kranken. Aber nicht ganz genau.[...] Der Rumpf hat die Form eines Deckels, wie ein gewöhnlicher Sargdeckel, mit Samt oder Plüsch überzogen. [...] Den Kopf sieht sie nicht—sie sagt: weiß sie nicht genau. Sie weiß nicht, ob ihr Apparat ihren Kopf trägt. [...]

Wie man den Apparat handhabt, weiß sie nicht deutlich, auch nicht, wie er mit ihr verbunden ist. Irgendwie telepathisch. Das Wichtigste ist: man manipuliert an dem Apparat auf irgend eine Weise, und alles, was an dem Apparat geschieht, vollzieht sich tatsächlich an ihr. (*GPLS 255-256*)

She reports that for 6 ½ years she has been under the influence of an electrical apparatus produced in Berlin, although it has been prohibited by the police. It has the form of a human body, indeed, the patient's own form, though not exactly. [...] The torso has the form of a lid, like the lid of a common coffin, and is lined with silk or velvet. [...] She cannot see the head—she says that she is not sure about it. She does not know whether the machine bears her own head. [...]

She does not know how exactly the apparatus is operated, nor how it is connected to her. Telepathically, somehow. Most important is this: it is being manipulated by someone in a certain manner, and everything that happens to it is also performed on her.

Natalija's entanglement with this Influencing Apparatus results in her experience of pain when someone strikes the apparatus on the corresponding body part, the emergence of a lupus sore on her nose that was first created on the nose of the apparatus, or sexual sensations that first arise with the stimulation of the apparatus and later all-together disappear when the apparatus somehow loses its genitalia (*GPLS 256*).

Nun hat aber der Apparat seit einiger Zeit keine Genitalien mehr. Wie und warum die weggekommen sind, kann sie nicht sagen. Jedenfalls aber hat sie selbst, seit der Apparat keine Genitalien mehr hat, auch keine geschlechtlichen Empfindungen mehr. (*GPLS 256*)

But now the apparatus has had no genitals for quite a while. How and why they disappeared she cannot say. In any case, now that the apparatus no longer has genitals, she likewise no longer has any genital feeling.

Much like the missing or invisible head of the apparatus, the mystery of the suddenly missing genitals where the patient once experienced unwanted sexual stimuli signals that there has been an increased bifurcation between the patient and the apparatus. She is unable to locate her body's genitals because she is becoming them (*GPLS* 278). As for her other organs, they too undergo a process of transformation during the patient's sessions with the analyst, becoming utilities of torture. The interior of the hollow and coffin-like apparatus consists of electric batteries in the form of human internal organs, signaling that the organs themselves *power* the device of her torment. Whoever utilizes the apparatus to torture her causes all kinds of terrible things to happen to her own body and mind, she reports: slime produced in her nose, foul odors, dreams, thoughts, and feelings. These unwanted disturbing stimuli intrude upon her in moments when she is attempting to mentally constitute herself with language, i.e. "beim Denken, Reden und Schreiben" [while she is thinking, talking, and writing] (*GPLS* 256). The apparatus is thus, increasingly, in the position of the writer; Natalija is unable to write herself into a cohesive form.

Despite her deafness, Natalija explains that she has learned all of this through overheard conversations (which Tausk diagnoses as auditory hallucinations), and furthermore she has learned of her torment's source; the man who uses the apparatus to persecute her is a spurned, jealous suitor, a university professor. Tausk does not mention whether the professor was Natalija's own teacher during her erstwhile studies in philosophy, yet the designation of the tormentor-suitor as a professor indicates that his role in the university, the site of epistemology, and what we might call the "life of the mind" is just as essential to

Natalija's crisis as the man's unwanted sexual advances have been. Her crisis is equally sexual and a crisis of language, once again underlining the joint libidinal nature of the two.

Very soon after she'd rejected his advances, Natalija sensed that the professor had been trying to establish a friendship between his sister-in-law, Natalija, and her mother—the obvious goal being to use his influence to bring her around to him (*GPLS* 257). When this didn't work, he resorted to using Influencing Apparatus, not only on her but also on her mother, friends, and physicians, deluding and confusing them into misdiagnosing her with false ailments and thinking that they had her best interest at heart when in fact they were each being manipulated by their own respective Influencing Apparatus, causing her to be effectively alienated from them. All the while, the Influencing Apparatus in Natalija's own form becomes less and less human in appearance as time went on, seemingly paralleling the increased pronouncement of Natalija's own sense of alienation.<sup>127</sup>

The schizophrenic symptom of the loss of ego boundaries is here at the core of Natalija's crisis, Tausk argues. Lost ego boundaries mean that the patient is unable to constitute herself, gather herself up, or furthermore protect herself from others. Beyond porous, the patient is diffuse.

Es handelt sich um das Symptom, daß die Kranken darüber klagen, alle Leute wüßten ihre Gedanken, ihre Gedanken seien nicht in ihrem Kopf eingeschlossen, sondern grenzenlos in der Welt, so daß sie sich zugleich in allen Köpfen der Menschen abspielen. (*GPLS* 261)

This symptom is such that [the patient] complains that everyone knows [her] thoughts, that [her] thoughts are not enclosed in [her] own head, but rather spread unfettered across the world, so that they may play out in the minds of all people at once.

This symptom Tausk readily connects to an infantile stage of development in thinking, in which the child believes the parent to know, like an omniscient god, whether the child is lying. Conversely, Tausk points out that the child would be just as likely to believe that she is capable of *receiving* outside thoughts and emotional or physical feelings by this logic. The will toward secrecy, of having one's own private knowledge, Tausk argues by extension, is a pivotal childhood development of the boundaries of the ego that, we can assume, works in the opposite direction to defend against outside influence.

Secrets are beyond what we'd simply call "information," instead, they constitute "intelligence"—gathered information which can be used to wield power as under the clandestine process of espionage. In her experience of herself, Natalija is not the keeper of her own secrets. Rather, the apparatus, "von *mystischer Beschaffenheit*" [of a *mystical* composition] secrets her from herself (*GPLS* 246, emphasis my own). The hollowed body that so resembles a coffin is indeed a crypt. Her own intelligence, which we know to be quite developed as Tausk has mentioned her studies in philosophy, is likewise kept secret from her, as she increasingly can no longer form or write her own thoughts due to the influence of the apparatus and the professor who controls it—the authority figure of epistemology itself. Let us stay with the mystery to see what light it sheds on Natalija's case.

Earliest references to μυστικός (*mystikós*) mean "secretive," from the verb μύειν (*myein*), to close the eyes or mouth, as an initiate does around secret rites. This is furthermore also a practice that one may undertake to seal off the senses

and enter a mystical state. Consider, for example, the kabbalistic tradition of the Jewish mystic Abraham Abulafia, who warned that “the ordinary day-to-day life of human beings, their perception of the sensible world, fills and impregnates the mind with a multitude of sensible forms or images (called, in the language of mediaeval philosophers, ‘natural forms’)” (Scholem, *Major Trends* 131-132). As the mind “creates for itself, out of this natural function, a certain mode of existence which bears the stamp of finiteness,” Abulafia sought out an absolute object to meditate upon and free him of the forms impressed upon his sensory perception (he found this object in the Hebrew alphabet) (Scholem *Major Trends* 132). Mysticism is a practice of renouncing the natural forms of the world and receding into a private state. Thus, the presence of a mystical quality relates, in Natalija’s experience, to the nefarious secrecy of the creation and use of the Influencing Apparatus as it does to her being sealed off from verbal communication with others. Yet she is able for a time to communicate her experiences through writing, until the state of her schizophrenia results in her belief that the analyst, too, is under the influence of her persecutor and she retreats from written communication with him as well. At this point, we can say that she is no longer writing but being written by the apparatus. Tausk must depart from here to write the case study on the emergence of the apparatus, rather than the emergence of Natalija A., which is yet to be seen.

Tausk’s mysticism in this case study is a secular, literary mysticism, the closest example of which we may find routed through Franz Kafka’s fiction. It bears stating that no influence in either direction between Kafka and Tausk is presumed here, indeed there is no reason to believe they read each other at all. The

points of resonance in their work, rather, signal to this reader a wider and more interesting possibility; that they each were able to arrive at questions of the Law, the psyche, and the mysticism behind language and writing through their shared knowledge and experiences as Jews within culturally heterogenous outposts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; authors who were born only four years apart, and who both studied and practiced law and wrote literary pieces. Tausk's literary work is of course different in most formal respects from Kafka's, and Kafka did not undertake any formal psychoanalytic or psychiatric studies. Yet the shared topoi of their lived experiences and of their written work help to make legible traces in Tausk's studies of the same secular and even heretical sort of Jewish mysticism that we find in Kafka's work.<sup>128</sup> Moreover, the connections that Walter Benjamin found between Kafka's narrative structure and a new, quantum scientific model of the universe is illuminating here when we bring it together with Tausk's own quantum model of the psyche. This quantum model is made clear in a letter to Gershom Scholem, dated June 12, 1938, in which Benjamin writes,

Kafkas Werk ist eine Ellipse, deren weit auseinanderliegende Brennpunkte von der mystischen Erfahrung (die vor allem die Erfahrung der Tradition ist) einerseits, von der Erfahrung des modernen Großstadtmenschen andererseits, bestimmt sind. (...) Ich spreche einerseits vom modernen Staatsbürger, der sich einer unübersehbaren Beamtenapparatur ausgeliefert weiß, deren Funktion von Instanzen gesteuert wird, die den ausführenden Organen selber, geschweige dem von ihnen behandelten ungenau bleiben. (*Briefwechsel* 269-270)

Kafka's work is an ellipse with foci that are far apart and are determined, on the one hand, by mystical experience (in particular, the experience of tradition\*) and, on the other, by the experience of the modern big-city dweller. In speaking of the experience of the modern big-city dweller, I have a variety of things in mind. On the one hand, I think of the modern citizen who knows that he is at the mercy of a vast apparatus of officialdom whose functioning is directed by authorities that remain nebulous to the executive organs, let alone the people they deal with. [...] I

am speaking also of the contemporary of today's physicists. If one reads the following passage from Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World*, one can virtually hear Kafka speak.<sup>129</sup>

Benjamin then presents for Scholem an extract of Eddington's text in which the author narrates standing at the threshold of a door, about to enter a room, considering each physical act of "shov[ing] against an atmosphere" with his body, "landing on a plank travelling at twenty miles a second round the sun [...] whilst hanging from a round planet, head outward in space." Eddington removes the substance of substance, the ground from beneath his feet, writing that "the plank has no solidity of substance. To step on it is like stepping on a swarm of flies." All of nature, every moment in which one does not slip through the swarm, he dares, is a "rare coincidence. [...] Verily, it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a scientific man to pass through a door." Whether it be "a barn door or a church door, it might be wiser that he should consent to be an ordinary man and walk in rather than wait till all the difficulties involved in a really scientific ingress are resolved," Eddington muses, still standing by his threshold (Eddington qtd. in Benjamin, *Illuminations* 141-142).

Benjamin can find no other passage in all of literature that so bears the stamp of Kafka. Indeed, Kafka's work is filled with doors which, as Andreas Gailus observes, "structure the parabolic and mythic space of his narratives. Opened and shut, locked and unlocked, peeped through and barricaded, they cease to be ordinary doors and become instead architectural elements in a theater of the unsayable" (295). But Benjamin also homes in on the very quantum structure of Eddington's passage that seems so impressed with Kafka and, moreover, he insists that the most incredible part is that "this most recent world of experience was

conveyed to [Kafka] precisely by this mystical tradition” (Benjamin, *Illuminations* 142). Kafka has preemptively sensed his way into Eddington’s quantum world by way of his own mystical tradition, heretically embodied in the secular texts of his fiction. This is how Benjamin draws the two together in a non-linear fashion; they resonate with the same sense of experience. This is the same resonance we can find in Tausk’s work—secular, mystical, quantum, strange, intimately and mutually inflected.

Kafka proves a worthy companion to reading Tausk in this regard, for in this case we find a second writing apparatus that appears in Kafka’s story, “In der Strafkolonie” [In the Penal Colony] (1919), which was published, coincidentally, in the same year as Tausk’s study of the “Influencing Apparatus,” and the same year as Tausk’s death.

“Es ist ein eigentümlicher Apparat” [It’s quite a peculiar apparatus], begins Kafka’s story, in the voice of the Officer who devotedly tends to a device designed to slowly and methodically write the human body to death (3). The act of writing in the eponymous penal colony is an execution of judgement in which the sentence and the punishment are delivered as one. Under the judicial process passed down from the officer’s Old Commander, the hallowed architect of the apparatus, the accused subject is always already guilty—*der Verurteilte*, the Condemned, the irreparably judged. As Gailus emphasizes in his reading of the story, “the officer’s principle obscures the semantic difference between *Anschuldigung* (accusation) and *Schuld* (guilt): to be *angeschuldigt* is to be *schuldig*, to be accused it to be guilty” (Gailus 297). No trial or defense are necessary in the logic of the apparatus, only submission to the inscription of its

law, which occurs over the process of 12 hours by increasingly deep puncture wounds from a system of needles upon the condemned man's body. The officer describes the process to the travelling researcher, who has come to observe the workings of the apparatus, as such.

Wie still wird dann aber der Mann um die sechste Stunde! Verstand geht dem Blödesten auf. Um die Augen beginnt es. Von hier aus verbreitet es sich. Ein Anblick, der einen verführen könnte, sich mit unter die Egge zu legen. Es geschieht ja weiter nichts, der Mann fängt bloß an, die Schrift zu entziffern, er spitzt den Mund, als horche er. Sie haben gesehen, es ist nicht leicht, die Schrift mit den Augen zu entziffern; unser Mann entziffert sie aber mit seinen Wunden. Es ist allerdings viel Arbeit; er braucht sechs Stunden zu ihrer Vollendung. Dann aber spießt ihn die Egge vollständig auf und wirft ihn in die Grube, wo er auf das Blutwasser und die Watte niederklatscht. Dann ist das Gericht zu Ende, und wir, ich und der Soldat, scharren ihn ein. (Kafka 15)

But how quiet the man becomes during the sixth hour! Understanding dawns on even the stupidest among them. It begins around the eyes. From here it spreads out. A sight that could tempt you to lie down beneath the harrow yourself. But nothing else happens, the man merely begins to decipher the writing, pursing his mouth as if intently listening. You saw for yourself, it's not easy to decipher the writing with your eyes, but our man deciphers it with his wounds. It's a great deal of labor, to be sure; he needs a full six hours before reaching the climax. But then the harrow spears him through and through and tosses him into the ditch, where he splats down upon the bloody water and the cotton wadding. Then the judgement is complete, and we, the soldier and I, scabble to bury him.

Halfway through the process of inscription, the condemned is meant to reach a sort of religious epiphany by way of the torture. It is the moment in which the condemned learns to read through his wounds, fully inscribed by the Law. The Traveler is there to observe the apparatus in a moment when many are beginning to question the Old Law. Indeed, when he finally witnesses the apparatus in action, it fails spectacularly. The Officer himself enters the apparatus with the knowledge that the Traveler's report will likely mean the end of the Old Law, and so, as the "einzig Vertreter, gleichzeitig der einzige Vertreter des Erbes des alten

Kommandanten,” [sole representative, and simultaneously the sole representative of the legacy of the Old Commander] the Officer submits himself to its final sentencing—*Be Just* (Kafka 18). However, when the Officer enters the apparatus, it does not deliver to him the same epiphany that it brought to those condemned before him; it breaks down and becomes a simple, murderous machine, stabbing instead of writing, making a bloody mess of the Officer’s body. The turning point between the unity that came with the Old Law and the disunity of new interpretation, new forms of communication and writing, has been reached. In essence, Kafka’s story demonstrates how the commonality of understanding in which the Law was unquestionably true, a time in which the apparatus of the written word revealed total truth, no longer exists.

Walter Benjamin writes that, in the world of Kafka, “the father is the one who punishes; guilt attracts him as it does the court officials. There is much to indicate that the world of the officials and the world of the fathers are the same to Kafka” (*Illuminations* 113). Much like the Fathers with whom Herr A. contends as a self-professed Son in “The Faith of the Fathers,” the Officer and the apparatus of “In the Penal Colony” represent a patriarchal legacy of ultimate Law that, speaking as a message across a vast distance, meets its final point of failure as it inscribes the Law to *Be Just*. Justice enacted upon justice breaks down the apparatus of the Law and the final old guard who submits himself to it. A unified and unquestionable truth of the Law finds no home in the present world, the story seems to say. In place of the Law, Kafka—and Benjamin in his reading of Kafka—offers secular Jewish mystical tradition. In “the vast apparatus of officialdom” of the city, Benjamin finds the same mechanisms of the Officer’s

corporeal punishment, and Kafka's "*complementary* world" of tradition, "interlaced with angels," counterbalances it. Scholem emphasizes in a footnote to Benjamin's text that, when Benjamin references the "experience of tradition," he references the technical term of "kabbalah," which literally means "tradition" (*Briefwechsel* 273). This is a tradition without enforcers, however, a private and secret tradition taken up within one's own inner world. In contrast to the overdetermined world of memory that Bloom locates for us in normative Judaism, the tradition of kabbalah is an adaptive technology, inexhaustible in its act of creation. This is why Kafka's writing, as a secular version of this mystical tradition, is so famously elusive when it comes to interpretation. Proliferating from the realm of the mystical, it can continue to exist in an indeterminate state.

The resonances between Kafka's story and Tausk's case study with their respective, uncanny apparatuses have led me to seek out Kafka's "*complementary* world" as a counterpoint to Natalija's torture. And indeed, it seems that Tausk would agree, Natalija's greatest need is the need for her own secrecy and mystery—a building up of the ego boundaries that would draw inward her mind's own language, which she experiences as scattered across the world, playing out in the minds of others. In the case of the schizophrenic who experiences a loss or lack of ego boundaries, the patient has regressed to a point of development where the boundaries between the self and the outside world are, to her perception, nonexistent. (Even further regression is possible, Tausk observes, and that as the state of catatonia. But even the catatonic patient communicates, he tells us, by way of her "Absage an die Außenwelt, in 'Organsprache' ausgedrückt" [renunciation of the outer world, expressed in "Organ-Language"] (*GPLS* 271). The

developmental stage from which to progress here, in tandem with finding one's self as an object in the world, is that of identification (*GPLS* 263). Identification in this case is a libidinal process, a fundamental and organic will to live that attaches the subject to her own body, and in tandem the subject can begin to *find* her body as an object.<sup>130</sup> Tausk uses two German words for object, the Latin-derived "Objekt" and the calque German "Gegenstand," emphasizing the action embedded etymologically in the word: literally, to throw up against. Pushed forward, the *object* becomes *project*, and indeed this is the next stage of development. The projection of one's own body, much like an infant groping for her feet and hands, is necessary for the subject to find herself, putting together the pieces of her body part by part until she has constituted it into a found form (*GPLS* 267). The analyst's role in providing aid to the patient would thus be in helping her to strengthen these boundaries of ego, of identifying herself, even cathecting to herself as a way of uniting the self's seemingly disparate, parallel forms. Natalija has already experienced her own projection as hostile to herself because of how it is handled by persons who, Tausk notes, demand the transfer of her libido to themselves—suitsors, physicians, etc. (*GPLS* 275). Outside interference in her libidinal cathecting to her own body has stunted her own emergence and empowered a projection that she cannot recognize or find herself in. Her retreat is into a space of indeterminacy, and as her experience of the Influencing Apparatus eventually leads her to believe that her analyst is likewise under its influence, she retreats from the author of the study, too.

This retreat mirrors, in a superficial way, Freud's reading of Schreber's case. But as we will remember from Freud's analysis of Schreber's memoirs,

Freud from the outset accepts the diagnosis of paranoia (and thus, the sentence of mental incompetency) that Schreber's psychiatrist Weber attaches to Schreber. His reading of Schreber's state at a vast remove, his treatment of the case is one of an armchair reader rather than a doctor with a patient, and Freud used the details of Schreber's life to adhere a preformulated theory of homosexual desire and repression (Wallace 49). Tausk's reading of Natalija imparts a presence and an openness to her own mental state's emergence that Freud's reading of Schreber forecloses.

Considering both her state of mind and her state as a political subject in the world, approaching Natalija as one would approach her Freudian doppelgänger, Dora—another a bright young woman being sexually advanced upon by an older man she doesn't want, the woman-as-hysterical-figure, a product of Freud's own overdetermination—falls flat. Natalija is indeterminate in her psychic development as she is in her political development, and we can see how the ongoing war figures into her case.<sup>131</sup> The geopolitical turmoil in the background of this study is made less apparent than in Tausk's studies of soldiers, but his inclusion of the name "Natalija" indicates the importance of the war as it plays a role in her anxiety over who she is and who she has the potential of becoming—that is, her own *Entstehung* as a political subject in the world.<sup>132</sup> All insights Tausk presents in this study are thus inflected with the patient's relationship with her political milieu. Her social formation is far from relegated to a closed economy of the immediate family; though the family's influence is fundamental, it occurs in tandem with the outside world. As her psychic state is one of retreat from determinacy or libidinal cathexis, so too is the political formation of

Natalija's world indeterminate at the time these sessions would have taken place. Her home of Serbia, occupied by both Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian forces of the Central Powers by 1917, would seem rather mysterious and indeterminate in its projected future.<sup>133</sup> How then is an individual to determine how she will emerge as a subject? Her experience involves both the real and that which is not yet known, and the only manifestation of her subjectivity, thus, must be one that accounts for the unknown as a complementary point of gravity that balances the material experience of her political and sexual becoming rather than overloading her with further demands to cathect to what is.

Roazen rightly defends Tausk's psychiatric work against Freud's portrayal when he writes, "[a]lthough in his obituary Freud downplayed Tausk's clinical experience, Tausk's enduring contribution had been to psychiatry, not to the philosophic foundations of psychoanalysis. [...] Tausk's training with hospitalized cases set him apart from other psychoanalysts of his day" (*Brother Animal* 175). As Tausk was one of the only psychoanalysts of his generation to engage with schizophrenic patients, his theory of ego boundaries and their development was truly groundbreaking for both psychiatry and psychoanalytic notions of identity. His study of the "Influencing Apparatus" in schizophrenia and of Natalija's experience in particular offers an early look into the potential for psychoanalysis to engage with phenomenological difference without exiling it to the realm of barbarism. Tausk's study of Natalija opens a door from the contained Freudian bourgeois family out into the politeia of the world, from an exhaustive, irreversible model of energy to one which operates in a networked and mutually agential way. Like Eddington's excerpt which so fascinated Benjamin and bore the

stamp of Kafka's mysticism, the door remains open, the swarm of atoms which constitute the ground on the other side of the threshold waiting to catch the step of those who pass through in the most incredible of coincidences. Tausk urges us to conceive of the personal and the political as equally foundational to the development of the self in this coincidental universe. The bold, young voice of Vladoje Slovačić, who raised his fist in a rallying cry for a modern subjectivity which is "vrije u svim mozgovima, titra u svim živcima, izražava se u svakom stvoru umjetničke mašte" [boiling in all brains, flickering in all nerves, that which is expressed in every creature of artistic imagination] still rings through the war-wearied analysis of the middle-aged psychiatrist Victor Tausk: "Svaki neka pokaže što jest, svaki ima svoje mjesto u životu, neka ga dakle ispuni sobom a ne drugima!" [Let each one show what he is; each one has his own place in life, let him fill it with himself and not with others!] (Slovačić 5). In his single-case study, Tausk urges us toward the importance of human particularity, of the preservation of mystery even in the charting of the human psyche, and the unique self-sameness that defines identity. Let Natalija find herself, her place amidst the rubble of her world, he seems to tell us. Let her fill it with herself and not others.

*"The Faith of the Fathers"*

As we draw backward chronologically through Tausk's work, let us keep in mind his "Influencing Apparatus" study and the quantum, mystical model of the universe and the psyche he builds out there, to see what insights it draws from his deceptively simple study of parapraxis. When does particularity and difference, we might ask, become exceptionalism and persecution? In the relating of a scene

of Antisemitism and the reflections to follow, the question becomes, why parapraxis now?

In 1916, Tausk contributed a few short examples of parapraxis to the International Psychoanalytic Association's journal, the *International Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, under the title "Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens" [On the Psychopathology of Everyday Life].<sup>134</sup> The third of these examples, a page-long anecdote titled "Der Glauben der Väter" [The Faith of the Fathers], is an autobiographically inspired scene in which Tausk reflects on one's situation in his particular time and place as a Jew by birth, and the Antisemitism with which one must in that case contend.<sup>135</sup> The parapraxis involves the accidental disclosure of the family's Jewish heritage when a host with whom they are staying makes antisemitic remarks. The scene is introduced with the narrator, "Herr A.," explaining his conversion from Judaism to Christianity—a detail which should sound familiar as we have already encountered it in Chapter Two by way of Tausk's biography.

"Da meine Braut Christin war," erzählte Herr A., "und sich nicht zum Judentum übertreten wollte, mußte ich selbst vom Judentum zum Christentum übertreten, um sie heiraten zu können. Ich wechselte die Konfession nicht ohne inneren Widerstand, aber das Ziel schien den Konfessionswechsel zu rechtfertigen, und dies umso mehr, als ich nur eine äußere Zugehörigkeit zum Judentum, keine religiöse Überzeugung, da ich eine solche nicht besaß, abzulegen hatte. Ich habe mich trotzdem später immer zum Judentum bekannt und wenige meiner Bekannten wissen, dass ich getauft bin.

Aus dieser Ehe entstammen zwei Söhne, die christlich getauft wurden. Als die Knaben entsprechend herangewachsen waren, erfuhren sie von ihrer jüdische Abstammung, damit sie sich nicht, durch antisemitische Einflüsse der Schule bestimmt, aus diesem überflüssigen Grunde gegen den Vater kehrten." (*GPLS* 167)

"As my fiancée was a Christian," explained Mr. A., "and did not want to be converted to Judaism, I myself had to change from Jewish creed to

Christianity in order to be able to marry her. I did so not without inner resistance, but the purpose seemed to justify the change of religion, especially since I had only to shed an external tie with Jewry, not a religious conviction, which I did not have. I have always, however, avowed my Jewishness and very few of my acquaintances know I have been baptized.

From this marriage I have two sons who were baptized in the Christian church. When the boys had reached the proper age, they were told about their Jewish descent, so that antisemitic influences at school would not needlessly turn them against their father.”

Two elements stand out from this excerpt which will come into play as Herr A. next recounts the episode of antisemitic threat. First is that he emphasizes, in spite of his conversion, that he has always avowed his Jewishness. The narrator’s prescient detail that he taught the boys about their Jewish heritage in order to prevent them from being influenced by the Antisemitism they might encounter at school, which would, he feared, turn them against their father, soon encounters a fateful moment of development. Herr A. and the boys, then of elementary-school age, are spending a short summer holiday lodging with a teacher’s family. One day, while sitting with their “übrigens freundlichen” [incidentally very friendly] hosts and enjoying refreshments, the lady of the house, who knows nothing of her guests’ heritage, makes “einige recht scharfe Ausfälle gegen die Juden” [some quite sharp attacks against the Jews] (*GPLS* 167). Herr A. is torn between wanting, on the one hand, to demonstrate for his sons an example of “Mut der Überzeugung” [courage of convictions], and fear of what unsavory disputes might follow such a declaration on the other (*GPLS* 167). Moreover, he worries that announcing his Jewishness might result in their having to leave the good lodging they’d found, spoiling the already short leisure time he had with his boys, if the hosts were to suddenly change their attitude toward them. These conflicting

desires—each attending to the well-being of his sons—results in Herr A.’s  
parapraxis.

Da ich jedoch erwarten durfte, daß meine Knaben in freimütiger Weise und unbefangen die folgenschwere Wahrheit verraten würden, wenn sie noch länger dem Gespräch beiwohnten, wollte ich sie aus der Gesellschaft entfernen, indem ich sie in den Garten schickte.

“Geht in die Garten, *Juden*—“ sagte ich und korrigierte schnell: “*Jungen*”. Womit ich also durch eine Fehlleistung meinem “Mut der Überzeugung” zum Ausdruck verhalf. Die anderen hatten zwar aus diesem Versprechen keine Konsequenzen gezogen, weil sie ihm keine Bedeutung zumaßen, ich aber mußte die Lehre ziehen, daß der “Glauben der Väter” sich nicht ungestraft verleugnen läßt, wenn man ein Sohn ist und Söhne hat. (*GPLS* 168)

Since I could expect that my boys would openly and unselfconsciously reveal the consequential truth if they witnessed the conversation any longer, I wanted to remove them from present company by sending them out into the garden.

“Go out into the garden, *Jews* —” I said, and quickly corrected, “*Boys*.” Thus, by way of a slip, I gave expression to my “courage of conviction.” Although the others had not drawn any conclusions from this pledge because they did not attribute any meaning to it, I had to learn the lesson that the “faith of the fathers” cannot be disavowed with impunity when one is a son and has sons.

Here ends Herr A.’s narrative, as he places himself in a concatenation of sons and fathers, having learned “the lesson” in the home of the antisemitic teacher’s family. But whom has he been instructed by? Are we to presume that the Antisemite can teach Herr A. or his children anything in this moment? No; the teacher’s home is not the source of the instruction but a cipher for learning that comes from another place. The teaching arrives as a *deus ex machina* that instructs Herr A. through his own voice. Is it thus the voice of the fathers, the patriarchs of Judaism speaking through Herr A. to teach him this lesson, to correct his attempt to shed the religion as a petty, “external tie to Jewry”? Again, the answer is no. What we find instead in Herr A.’s story is an opening into a relationship with

language that does not defer to tradition in order to find its meaning. Thus, meaning itself becomes unmoored, multivalent, and newly agential.

Let us consider the different levels of interpretation that the text offers us. The phrase “daß der ‘Glauben der Väter’ sich nicht ungestraft verleugnen läßt” works in more than one way to convey a turn away from tradition, even as the superficial meaning of the words ironically implies a correction *toward* tradition. I have translated this phrase in the paragraph above to read at its most direct level—that the “faith of the fathers” cannot be disavowed with impunity. Yet here we sense the power within the phrase when we can read “the fathers” as everyday (Jewish) fathers such as Herr A., or as hinting allegorically at the greater fathers—the patriarchs of Judaism. The valence that dually contains both “fathers” and “fathers” already begins to chip away at the foundation of a singular meaning and thus the reliability of a singular *arbiter* of meaning or of tradition more generally. But there is more beyond this. Most literally, Herr A. “*mußte* die Lehre ziehen” [*was compelled* to draw out the lesson] that the faith of the fathers “sich nicht ungestraft verleugnen *läßt*” [does not *allow* itself to be disavowed without punishment] (*GPLS* 168, my emphasis). Read at this level, the faith of the fathers is granted a higher degree of agency, working upon and through the speaker to decide what shall be said or withheld, and what earns a punishment. This level of interpretation brings us in touch with the scene as a moral lesson rather than a quotidian slip of the tongue, and so it invokes for Herr A. the morals of Jewish patriarchs rather than the rules or punishments of everyday fathers. Here he inhabits the role of the son even as he has sons because he cannot inhabit the role of the Jewish patriarch, the moral instructor. But Tausk does not leave the lesson

in a moral cul-de-sac; there is an even further—one could say mystical—meaning hidden in this study.

When we consider that “sich verleugnen lassen” can mean not just to deny oneself but to *say one is not there*, we see the “faith of the fathers” acting very strange indeed. Judaism, we can say, reassembling the language that Herr A. has provided, “hat sich verleugnen lassen”—has given instructions to say it was not there, when in fact it was in hiding all along. This cannot go unpunished, Herr A. has learned, when one is a son and has sons. But who, specifically, is to be punished, and by whom? The sons or the fathers, or Judaism itself? Unlike the moral interpretation which implies a unidirectional punishment from the patriarch to the wayward Jewish son, the mystical valence of this reading gives way to a multidirectional interaction between Herr A. and Judaism itself. It would seem that the punishment for hiding lies in its reverse, in being revealed, yet the revelation occurs only to and within the speaker, Herr. A.—neither the antisemitic hosts nor the children drew any meaning from his “pledge” or slip of the tongue (*Versprechen*), and so they are not aware of any role they may play in this punishment. Herr A. is thus the sole witness to a spoken religious revelation, and his case study becomes the written testimony to the revealed secret. Judaism, here, in its mystical form, is in a dynamic state of ever-hiding and ever-revealing itself through its sons, necessarily both unchanging in its truth and taking on new forms in each revelation.

Herr A.’s insistence on ending his story with the qualifier, “when one is a son and has sons” is likewise important to the openness of Jewish interpretation. As I have noted, the arrangement of Herr A.’s place and his duty in this line of

fathers and sons does not follow a traditional deferral to the patriarchs. Although Tausk's study is titled "The Faith of the Fathers," and although the initial reason Herr A. gives for discussing his Jewish heritage with his sons is that he does not want them to turn against their father—a Freudian turn—Herr A. ends by counting himself as a son among sons rather than, for example, the father two sons.

Certainly, the roles of fathers and sons have a heavy precedent in psychoanalysis by way of the Oedipus myth, and Tausk was deeply familiar with the construct. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Tausk delivered a short presentation on the "Father Complex" in 1913, in which he built upon Freud's Oedipus Complex and considered the necessary place of homosexuality and narcissism in the successful, nonviolent relationship between a father and son. Tausk's Father Complex notes the taboo against patricide that is not mutually reflected in a taboo against the murder of sons, precisely because of how society is built upon the existence of the father. Yet, he concludes, "Ein großer Mann ist der, der den Vater überwunden hat" [a great man is he who has overcome his father] (*GPLS* 66). Freud's Oedipus complex would tell us that resolution comes from the son's identification with his father, but not the supplanting of the father as Tausk proposes. Herr A.'s narrative is, therefore, not based upon the Oedipal structure that Freud uses to make sense of the relationship between fathers and sons, but upon Tausk's earlier concept of the Father Complex and, I argue, a mystical formulation which Tausk draws from Judaism. Tausk wrests, in this move, Jewishness from the tradition that is supposed to set its boundaries, encode its law.

The mystical lesson is a key to understanding the aspects of Tausk's approach to psychoanalysis that I wish to draw out, for it demonstrates both a non-

chronological relationship to time, and a rereading (or even a rewriting) of Jewish law. Indeed, a non-chronological mode of rereading would necessarily imply a reorganization of the text one reads, which is itself a mode of rewriting. Tausk knew this well, as one journal entry from Salomé recounts an argument they had over the reorganization of language.

Tausk und ich stritten über den Alphabetvergleich: er sagte, wenn man ihm die Buchstaben in nochmals neuer Schichtung zeigen wollte (wie sie etwa beim ersten Alphabetlernen und freien Wortlesen sich verschieden zu schichten scheinen), so würde er auf eine solche Erfahrung eingehen. Aber sie ist nicht denkbar. Er vergißt, daß Vergleich nur für logische Formulierungen gültig ist: für das Formulierbare kommt kein neuer Sinn mehr aus den Buchstaben, aber so gewiß sie gar nichts sind als Hilfsmittel für einen erst aus ihnen zu deutenden Sinn, so gewiß auch das logisch Erfäßliche. Die Entformung von Buchstabe und Sinn ist überwunden im deutenden Menschen, und so auch die zwischen dem einzelnen logisch-empirisch Vorliegenden und seiner Deutung im Gesamtwesen des Menschen. (*In der Schule* 186)

Tausk and I argued about the alphabet comparison: he said that if you wanted to show him the letters in a new arrangement (as they appear to be arranged differently when first learning the alphabet and reading words freely), he would respond to such an experience. But it is not conceivable. He forgets that the comparison is only valid for logical formulations: for that which can be formulated, no new meaning comes from the letters, but as surely as they are nothing but aids for a meaning to be interpreted from them, so too is the logically comprehensible. The deformation of letter and sense is overcome in the interpreting human being, and thus also between the singular logical-empirical present and its interpretation in human nature overall.

What Salomé fails to understand in her conflict with Tausk over the nature of reading, and what her record of their disagreement so valuably shows, is that Tausk gives power to arrangement such as we find in Jewish mystical practices. Reassembling Law is a heretical practice, and so we find in Tausk's study a secular, heretical mysticism which mutually activates the agency among parties who would, in a linear reading, be passing down tradition.<sup>136</sup> Rather than deferring

to the predecessors, the origins, as with the study of the “Influencing Apparatus,” emergence takes over. Herr A.’s primary struggle throughout the encounter related in this study is in navigating the preservation of his sons. He wants to demonstrate for them courage of his convictions—his use of scare quotes brings extra attention to the phrase, demanding a second read so that “convictions” works doubly to mean both “principles” and his literal Jewish heritage—thereby protecting his sons from absorbing any shame or hatred toward themselves or their father from the woman’s antisemitic remarks. At the same time, we know, he fears depriving his sons of pleasure or, worse, endangering them by revealing their family’s Jewishness. The “convictions,” as principles, would require a sacrifice of that which they are meant to protect: the “convictions” which are religious heritage, materialized in the two sons. The polarized impulses conflict with one another in practice, resulting in the verbal slippage, though they are equally rooted in Herr A.’s interest in the sons’ well-being. His interest in the preservation of his sons, therefore, is made inextricable from the preservation of his “fathers,” i.e. the religious tradition he had renounced in order to marry but the trace of which he says he carried without shame. The faith of the fathers speaks up through him—an oral lesson. Herr A. demonstrates his “convictions” therefore as a Jewishness without traditional Judaism, a knowledge of the fathers while identifying himself as a son, a knowledge of the oral lesson that is not written down. Read within the context of Judaism, the very context that Herr A. gives us, the oral lesson becomes the oral law, otherwise known as the Oral Torah. Herr A.’s lesson is, I would argue, not Talmudic in any traditional sense, but deeply so in the same literary-mystical sense that would inform Kafka’s writing. The routes that Kafka traced in

his mystic practice of fiction overlap and cross paths with Tausk's own puzzling over the human psyche. "What is Talmud if not a message from a distance?" Kafka muses roughly a decade after Herr A.'s slip (Kafka qtd. in Bloom, *The Strong Light* 12). The experience of this vast distance is an experience of faith, and it is a faith which temporalizes one's relationship to his or her network of others. For Kafka, writes Harold Bloom, "there is no written Torah but only an oral one. However, Kafka has no one to tell him what this Oral Torah is. He substitutes his own writing therefore for the Oral Torah not made available to him" (*The Strong Light* 11-12). In this same way, we see Tausk's figure of Herr A. receiving a message from a great distance in the *Versprechen* of his own voice, and simultaneously supplanting the tradition of the fathers with the stories of the sons.

A world totally fraught with meaning is a world overdetermined by memory and thus demanding everywhere for interpretation. "There can be sense in everything," Bloom points out, "only if everything is already in the past and there never again can be anything wholly new. That is certainly the world of the great normative rabbis of the second century of the Common Era, and it has been the world of most Jews ever since" (*The Strong Light* 10). When the object of interpretation is taken out of tradition, it is emptied of its *sense*. It is allowed to navigate the weird, unmoored from the traditional definition and the law. In order words, it invites the reader who follows it to consider *nonsense* as equally valuable and worthy of interpretation. Nonsense, in its truest form, is a denial of the aesthetic categories by which one is trained to understand the world. We can find the state of non-sense most potently in the realm of the mystic, yet the

retrieval of tools from this realm through which we can understand literature proves challenging. As Kitty Millet writes on the challenge found at the intersection of Jewish kabbalah and literature, “the very underpinnings of traditional aesthetic experience, the exhibition of the work of art, are undermined by kabbalistic phenomena because these phenomena cannot materialize their hiddenness for the human faculties” (3). In the places in which literature and psychoanalysis intersect, however, the nonsensible/nonsensical world would present as a world of psychosis. The nonsense of a displaced object of analysis in an overdetermined world cannot point to anything but a pathology, and so it becomes the *Wortsalat* of Schreber’s psychosis under the Freudian reader’s eye. Tausk provides us with clues on how to read the nonsensible object in spite of its lack of traditional context or determination, by witnessing it as revelation. Yet the revelation itself retreats from significance. Coincidentally, such revelation is exactly what Gershom Scholem locates in Kafka, as he defines for Benjamin in a letter from the fall of 1934.

Du fragst, was ich unter dem “Nichts der Offenbarung” verstehe? Ich verstehe darunter einen Stand, in dem sie bedeutungsleer erscheint, in dem sie zwar noch sich behauptet, in dem sie *gilt*, aber nicht *bedeutet*. Wo der Reichtum der Bedeutung wegfällt und das Ercheinende, wie auf einen Nullpunkt eigenen Gehalts reduziert, dennoch verschwindet (und die Offenbarung ist etwas Erscheinendes), da tritt sein Nichts vor.  
(*Briefwechsel* 175)

You ask what I understand by the “nothingness of revelation”? I understand by it a state in which revelation appears to be without meaning, in which it still asserts itself, in which it *has validity* but does not *signify*. A state in which the richness of meaning falls away and what is in the process of appearing (for revelation is such a process) still does not disappear, even though it is reduced to the zero point of its own content.

In his definition of the “revelation of nothingness,” Scholem is expounding on the mystical concept of *zimzum* from Lurianic kabbalah.<sup>137</sup> The constriction and withdrawal of *zimzum* is the initial stage of existence, a negative revelation, forming an empty space from which all else may emerge. Tausk makes such space in his readings for the emergence of the unknown, and he does not attempt to force it into a singular state of signification upon its emergence.

It is curious, in the context of this tension between the mystical nonsense and neurotic overdetermination, that “The Faith of the Fathers” is one of the few works by Tausk that Freud openly cites, when he includes it as an example of self-betrayal with a harmless outcome in the sixth edition of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (SE 6: 92). Freud’s inclusion of Tausk’s example as a *Versprechen*, a slip of the tongue, signals his tacit approval of this case as one of neurotic repression, in which denial (*Verneinung*) plays the active role. Yet Tausk’s case study harnesses the language of a wholly different kind of denial—disavowal—(*Verleugnung*) which does not so much repress as it attempts to transmute itself. The *Verleugnung* of Judaism in Herr A.’s story agitates the entire recounting into a multidirectional interaction between the “sons” and the “fathers” there, and it signals that the case extends beyond simple repression.

*Verleugnung* is set up by Freud as a first step toward psychosis, for it represses reality rather than the id; in contrast, the neurotic’s act of denial or negation, *Verneinung*, acknowledges but does not accept what has been repressed (SE 19: 235-236).<sup>138</sup> Freud makes this distinction clear when he writes that “neurosis does not disavow the reality, it only ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it” (SE 19:184). By Freud’s own standards of measurement, it

seems he would have judged the denial present in “The Faith of the Fathers” as a matter of (corrected) psychosis, had he taken seriously the language Tausk employs. Yet the labeling of such as psychotic elides the literary-mystical aspect of the account that sets Tausk’s approach apart from Freud’s. This is why I argue that, in order to read Tausk’s work more fully and benefit from his insights, both psychoanalytic and literary frameworks are needed at once.

As we read Tausk in the companionship of the great literary-mystic (and fellow jurist) Franz Kafka, we find a resonance outside of Freud’s overdetermined world that can help assemble the seemingly incongruent parts of psychoanalysis and mysticism together into a richer narrative. Kafka’s work is replete with failure in form and content—he is a master of demonstrating just how productive failure and refusal can be. From the self-denial made into an art in “Ein Hungerkünstler” [A Hunger Artist], to refusal of entry in “Vor dem Gesetz” [Before the Law], the mechanical failure of “In der Strafkolonie” [In the Penal Colony], or the bureaucratic impasses of *Der Prozeß* [The Trial], failure or resistance serves as an agitating kernel which produces the work of fiction. Kafka’s own stories “fail” by denying interpretation. Indeed, Benjamin emphasizes Kafka’s failure as chief among the author’s talents. In his June 12, 1938 letter to Gershom Scholem, Benjamin writes,

Um Kafka’s Figur in ihrer Reinheit und in ihrer eigentümlichen Schönheit Gerecht zu werden, darf man das Eine nie aus dem Auge lassen: es ist die von einem Gescheiterten. Die Umstände dieses Scheiterns sind mannigfache. Man möchte sagen: war er des endlichen Mißlings erst einmal sicher, so gelang ihm unterwegs alles wie im Traum. Nichts denkwürdiger als die Inbrust, mit der Kafka sein Scheitern unterstrichen hat. (*Briefwechsel* 273)

To do justice to the figure of Kafka in its purity and its peculiar beauty, one must never lose sight of one thing: it is the purity and the beauty of a failure. The circumstances of this failure are manifold. One might say: once he was certain of eventual failure, everything worked out for him along the way as if in a dream. Nothing is more memorable than the fervor with which Kafka emphasized his failure.

This reading greatly perplexes Scholem, who sees Kafka's work as successful in its form, responding in a letter on November 6, 1938,

Du scheinst doch etwas Unerwartenes und Verblüffenes unter diesem Scheitern zu verstehen, da doch die einfache Wahrheit [ist] daß das Scheitern der Gegenstand von Bemühungen war, die doch, wenn erfolgreich, natürlich scheitern. Nicht das kannst Du doch gemeint haben. (*Briefwechsel* 285-286)

You really seem to understand this failure as something unexpected and baffling, whereas the simple truth is that failure was the object of efforts which, if they are to succeed, naturally fail. Certainly, this can't be what you meant.

But Benjamin finds Kafka's productive failure in the very form of the writing itself. Though the form of Kafka's tales often seems to be that of *aggadah*, the non-legal narrative parables in classical rabbinic literature, his stories are emptied of the moral that would accompany *aggadah* and join it with *halakah*, Jewish law. As Kitty Millet defines it for us, "[t]he halakhah preserves the particularity of Jews by identifying the boundaries they are prohibited from crossing. The *aggadah* illustrates a new imagination of those boundaries so that story is bound to renewing the Law's relevance in Judaism" (12). Kafka tells us there is no written law, no torah but the oral torah, yet the oral torah itself is inaccessible as such—the message from a great distance—and so it can only be accessed through its replacement: in writing. Writing is thus a necessary act of failure, the Derridean supplement *par excellence* that helps the mystical to emerge.<sup>139</sup> Taking Tausk's

case study of fathers and sons in light of Kafka's literary mysticism, failure becomes a creative mode of production. The failure of the faith of the fathers materializes in the failure of the son as *Versprechen* (and secondarily as Tausk's written case study, the failure as supplement). Tausk would further develop the multidimensional and productive sort of failure glimpsed in this case study in the aspect of *Versagen* found in his "Influencing Apparatus" study three years later. Failure as a malfunction, the breakdown of machinery, but also as a refusal, an act of withholding. Failure and resistance are joined through the various aspects of *Verneinung* (denial), *Verleugnung* (disavowal), *Versprechen* (verbal slippage), and *Versagen* (malfunction). Rather than foreclosing the path to interpretation, these points of resistance or breakdown proliferate multidirectional paths of meaning, of being in many states at once, the non-sense of indeterminacy.

### *"Husein Brko" and Uses of the Grotesque*

In the previous section I have argued that Tausk's psychoanalysis opens up to richer interpretations when read through a mystical-literary lens. Tausk worked through a variety of written forms throughout his career, and his literary and psychoanalytic writing present as mutual sites of development, each allowing different modes of exploring the same object. With this in mind, I want to consider the relationship between these two sites of writing now in the other direction, by reading a work of Tausk's fiction as a site in which he toys with mystical capacities of language, thinks outside of Oedipal taboos and relationships, and harnesses the genre of the grotesque as a vehicle for multivalent affect. For this, I turn further back in Tausk's bibliography to a short story which explores the same

themes of networked agency and mysticism that we find in the two case studies already covered in this chapter.

Tausk's "Husein Brko. Bosnische Zigeunergroteske" [Husein Brko. A Bosnian Gypsy Grotesque] (1912), published in his father's literary review in four installments, assembles elements of South Slavic folk ballads together with the canonical genre of the Grotesque for an oddly anti-Oedipal tale. It follows the life of the eponymous bandit Husein from supernatural conception to ignoble death at the hands of his would-be father.

It is unclear whether "Husein Brko" was originally an anti-Oedipus story, but it certainly became one. Tausk had completed a draft of Husein Brko around 1906, as he mentions the possibility of publishing it in *März* to Martha in a letter at that time. Lack of archival artifacts make it hard to say whether he rewrote this story in relationship to his psychoanalytic training as he bored himself deeper into Freud's matrix during the following six years, but the fact that Tausk finally published it in 1912 after having such an intimate knowledge of Freud's analytical system tells us that "Husein" cannot be extracted from a conversation in which Freud's teachings are present. While it shares an eerie amount of plot points with the story of Oedipus, "Husein Brko" offers a vastly different cultural relationship to the hierarchical order than that of the Greek tragedy. Fate does not dictate the arc of Husein's life; he is a wild actor among many others in the realm of the story. Moreover, the taboos of patricide and incest that propel the conflict of the Oedipus myth are inverted and unraveled in Husein's case, becoming details in the rendering of a grotesque character rather than fatal flaws that bring about some resolution.

The genre of the Grotesque, which Tausk takes up in telling this tale, gives the author a wide and varied field in which to explore themes of death and comedy. “Grotesque,” which takes its name from the Italian *grotta*, cave, first referred to extravagant aesthetic elements of ancient Roman cave paintings discovered in subterranean ruins during the 16<sup>th</sup> century. By the time Tausk uses the term in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, it has come to connote a fantastical genre that brings together death and comedy through lowly figures who can arouse in the reader affective ambivalence.<sup>140</sup> The Grotesque, according to Friedrich Schlegel, plays “mit wunderlichen Versetzungen von Form und Materie, liebt den Schein des Zufälligen und Seltsamen, und kokettiert gleichsam mit unbedingter Willkür” [with whimsical displacements of form and matter, loves the appearance of the coincidental and strange, and flirts, so to speak, with unconditional arbitrariness] (63-64). Victor Hugo, one author most notable for his grotesque forms and figures and an early theorist of the genre, drew upon the grotesque as a creative counterpoint to the artificial purity of the sublime.<sup>141</sup> Mikhail Bakhtin’s writing on the grotesque body draws out the inseparable system of death and renewal, the continuous state of metamorphosis and transformation inherent to the genre, and demonstrates how the grotesque body fuses with its surrounding world (311). The grotesque, exaggerated and strange, lowly and fascinating, humorous and filled with death is a genre of dynamic hybridity. Harold Bloom writes that the mode of the Grotesque is astonishment, “though it is tinged with distaste, unlike the transcendent astonishment induced by the Sublime” (*The Grotesque* xv). Furthermore, Bloom helps us to consider the precedence the genre holds in the context of psychoanalysis, as he traces the Grotesque as an internalized form of

the literary quest-romance, which he connects with Freud, “a great literary artist [and] theoretician of modern quest-romance” (*The Grotesque* xv). Tausk plays in this realm, mixing darkness with pleasure, humor with terror, human with animal and supernatural, to tell a grotesque folktale that, if one is to read it as part and parcel of the psychoanalytic canon, reinvents the psychosexual relationships to transgression and paternal hierarchical order that Freud defined through his use of the Oedipus myth.

Husein’s story is itself a grotesque creation as an amalgam of lingual, cultural, and religious or magical components. Though written in German, the story draws upon the Bosnian language of Tausk’s adolescent home, including many bits of Ottoman (Turkish) language common to the area in which it is set. References to traditional Muslim observance mingle with characters’ practices of dark magic and an animistic relationship to the natural world, not to mention an overall attitude of lawlessness.<sup>142</sup> In fact, the character of Husein himself is modeled on a lawless figure from Balkan history and folklore known as the *hajduk*, a free-agent bandit that emerged in rural regions of Southeast Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries through conflicts of Christian landlords and Ottoman conquerors.<sup>143</sup> Hajduk ballads share common themes of freedom, cruelty, and orphanhood; the hajduk’s family consists of his band, as far as it lasts, and of his weapons. The heroes of most of the ballad-cycles are not famous men from history but anonymous peasants, for whom death is the equivalent of marriage (Hobsbawm 75-77). The topoi of the hajduk ballad are picked up by Tausk in his conceiving of Husein Brko, but Tausk’s hajduk is exceptional in that he is culturally antithetical to the traditional hajduk. The hajduk

figure as Tausk would have known him from South-Slavic ballads was a defender of the Christian frontier against Ottoman invaders, yet Tausk's antihero of Husein is culturally more Ottoman than Christian. Considered with an Ottoman context, Husein again does not fit the mold, for within the Ottoman Empire he is also a minority (a "gypsy"). This contradictory assemblage of parts which Tausk uses for Husein Brko makes for a character and a story that cannot be seized as a prefabricated type and thus evades a simple or singular reading. Husein Brko, both grotesque in figural composition and grotesque in terms of the "unconditional arbitrariness" that Schlegel claims as definitive of the genre, explores the key Freudian themes of sexuality and death and taboos of incest and patricide in a realm unleashed from a Freudian framework.

From the opening scene, Tausk mingles human characters with natural and supernatural forces and places the parentage of the unborn Husein in the realm of the unknown—the mystical, the un-fathered and indeterminate. The antihero of the story is conceived by a woman named Durača in a gypsy encampment. Durača is unsure who has fathered Husein, which forbodes great trouble.

Wenn es doch vom wilden Salko wäre! Aber der Wunsch war zu nichts nütze. Am Ende war er es doch nicht. Und das Kind muss doch jemand Vater nennen können, sonst plagen es die bösen Geister und es kann nicht wachsen. (*GPLS* 403)

If only the child had been fathered by wild Salko! But the desire was of no use. In the end it was not him. And a child must be able to name someone (as his) father, otherwise he will be plagued by evil spirits and will not be able to grow.

The act of the (yet unborn) son already needing to name a father in order to live is a curious recursive practice of self-actualization. Father and son emerge in this dynamic as mutually formative roles, yet Tausk de-forms the relationship in the

same movement by showing that they can detach from each other and hook onto someone or something else. In order for the child to name a father, Durača summons one for him retroactively, and replaces his body with a part of her own in order to appease the evil spirits that would otherwise plague Husein. One stormy night, she takes a knife with her into the woods and cuts off her left breast,

...dass das Blut in einem warmen Rieselstrom herunterrann, und [sie] rief dazu in the schwarze, stöhnende Wildnis des Waldes.

Da begann es von allen Seiten zu wimmern und zu winseln, zu pfeifen und zu heulen, der Himmel öffnete sich, als ob er die Erde verschlingen wollte (...und) stürzte ein feuriger Wolf hervor.

Es war geglückt. Die bösen Geister hatten das Opfer angenommen.  
(*GPLS* 403)

...that the blood ran down in a warm rivulet, and [she] cried out into the black, moaning wilderness of the forest.

Then it began to whimper and whine on all sides, to whistle and howl, the sky opened up as if it wanted to devour the earth [...and] a fiery wolf rushed forth.

It was successful. The evil spirits had accepted the sacrifice.

As Durača gives her flesh as an offering to the evil spirits, her voice and the voice of the forest meet one another in a shared howling, blending the human with her natural surroundings in a grotesque union that ushers forth Husein's post-facto, supernatural father in the form of a fiery wolf. Tausk ironically inverts a trope of myth and folklore with Durača's act of retroactive begetting of a child. As he knew, the Croatian word for "engaging in intercourse" is synonymous with "deceiving," and a deceitful deity is often one who impregnates a young woman and leaves her.<sup>144</sup> Though Husein's father before the invocation of the fiery wolf remains a mystery, Durača is neither seduced nor deceived but rather bends the mystery to serve her needs. Durača gives birth to Husein not long afterward, who

acquires the epithet of “Brko,” meaning “moustachioed” as he is born with a faint mustache on his upper lip.

The child thrives almost supernaturally, “like a mushroom on the forest floor” (“gedieh wie ein Pilz im Waldboden”). By age three Husein wrestles poisonous vipers. By age five he has acquired the nickname “ljožder” (“fox-eater”) for killing and eating a fox with his bare teeth. From the earliest age, Husein is grotesque and superhuman in nature, and as he grows into the formative psychosexual years of latency and then young adulthood, he becomes even more dangerous. The language that forms his world, too, takes on an unbridled potency.

When Durača dies during her attempt to renew her spell, her corpse, marked by the scar in place of her left breast and the bloody wound in place of the right, reveals her terrible secret—these are clear signs of the presence of a demon. The seven-year-old Husein is forced to take part in the debasement of Durača’s corpse, when a member of the clan grabs his head:

“Du Hundesohn, sagte ein alter Zigeuner, und zerrte den kleinen Husein am Ohre zur Leiche seiner Mutter hin, da spuck‘ oder ich reiße dir den Kopf ab.” (GPLS 405)

“Hey you son of a bitch, said an old gypsy, and dragged little Husein by his ear to the corpse of his mother, Spit on it, or I’ll tear your head off.”

The man’s invocation of a common insult, *Hundesohn* (literally, “son of a dog”) is here brought forward into ironic and grotesque relief. In Husein’s case, *Hundesohn* is a literal reference to his parentage, and a potent one at that; the source of his strength lies in his ability to name his father, and a dog—the firey wolf—fills that role. As the other clan member attempts to degrade him, a repressed and revealed truth ushers forth in the man’s speech which ironically

empowers Husein by naming his father in the man's attempted insult. Husein's fate is not being pronounced upon him. Rather, his grotesque nature announces itself in the man's threats. *Hundesohn* is not simply a slip of an individual's tongue that betrays the speaker's own repressed desire, but a revelation of a mystical relationship, in which language is bound with the matter of other things. Much like in Tausk's example of the parapraxis of Herr A., language here speaks through the character as a mystical, poetic force rather than a tool to be commanded.

As Husein enters the psychosexual genital stage in the following scene, we see him engaged in an almost comedic series of incestuous entanglements. The incestuous nature of these relationships is not hidden from Husein; there is neither any apparent taboo nor moment of revelation that would characterize incest as a fatal flaw. The lack of law against incest is mirrored by other acts of lawlessness. Following Durača's death, Husein is taken in by a forty-year-old clam member named Šara who also secretly bears the mark of the firey wolf on her breasts. He steals meat for her in the surrounding villages and she cares for him lovingly, and when he reaches the age of twelve this ersatz mother begins to practice incest with Husein. They live "wie Mann und Weib" [as man and wife] for a couple of years until Husein tires of her and goes to live with the fifteen-year-old Mejra, whom Šara poisons out of jealousy. Šara is imprisoned for life and soon replaced in Husein's bed by her daughter, Haska.

Entanglements of incest continue to form the fabric of Husein's early adulthood. As Husein lives with Šara as her husband, her own daughter, Haska, lives with wild Salko—the man Durača once had hoped to be the true father of

Husein. When Salko runs off, Haska comes to live with Husein. Husein has now carried on a relationship with both the former wife of his potential father and with her mother, his ersatz-mother. None of these relationships cause the antihero any distress; he only seems more empowered by their incestuous overlapping. Husein likewise seems to have no fidelity to any member of his clan; the community returns from Šara's sentencing to find that Husein has stolen their amassed loot from its hiding place and disappeared into the night.

The author's outright rejection of the oedipal foundation of society that so engrossed Freud is established here early on as a cultural counterpoint to the bourgeois social order. Rather than law or the taboo of patricide, the story offers a world organized by customs and rituals. If anything, it seems Tausk builds out his own concept of the Father Complex, which I have already discussed in the previous section of this chapter. As Tausk noted in his lecture on the Father Complex, delivered roughly a year after the publication of "Husein",

Nicht alle Kulturen kommt der Vater als Machtfaktor in Betracht. Es wird zunächst die Institution des Matriarchats besprochen, die Bachofen aus rechtlichen, religiösen, mythologischen Quellen, aus Kult, Symbolik und Sitte erschlossen habe. Die Institution des Patriarchats sei dem direkt konträr, was am Beispiel des römischen Patriarchats gezeigt wird. (*GPLS* 65)

The father is not considered a factor of power in all cultures. First of all, the institution of matriarchy is discussed, which Bachofen derived from legal, religious, and mythological sources, from ritual, symbolism and customs. The institution of patriarchy is (according to Bachofen) directly contrary to this, which is shown using the example of the Roman patriarchy.

Tausk points to matriarchal structures as precedent and fundamental to patriarchy, which is in contrast not a universal given across cultures (65). And indeed, we can trace this supplantation in Husein's own personal psychosexual arc. Here, we see

the factor of power begins with mother-centric rituals of magic, which Tausk located in Bachofen's work, and transfers to its counterpoint, male dominance, as Husein grows into his adult male self. Yet through the bandit figure Tausk offers a cultural example of patriarchy without the Freudian repression that keeps the structure of the bourgeois family—and indeed, according to Freud, the fundamental aspects of society and culture itself—intact.<sup>145</sup> Tausk indulgently explores the figure of the outlaw “who cannot fall in with [the] suppression of instinct” and who so troubled Freud, and he plumbs the depths of this instinct to see what stories might bring (*SE* 9: 187).

In the scenes to follow, Tausk continues to toy with cultural taboos, building in intensity into a final act of murder. The second chapter moves from the taboo of incest into the taboo of homoeroticism and homosexuality, depicted in an episode between Husein and a delicate-framed adolescent in a woodchopper's hut in the forest. Petar Grgurić, a poor, young woodcutter, who has stayed home that day to fix the midday porridge for his comrades, is often made the target of the lumberjacks' most gruesome jokes. Because of his small body and effeminate appearance, they physically and verbally abuse him and give him the nickname of *Pitscho* (presumably this stems from the Ottoman “piç” meaning “bastard”). As Petar tends to the porridge for the men, he drafts a letter to his father asking for enough money to be able to return home. He pauses and places the “grossen Zimmermansstift” (“large carpenter's pencil”) in his mouth and slowly chews it. When Husein Brko enters, he is a fully grown, highly sexual, and frighteningly animalistic man:

Vor der Türe standen zwei menschliche Beine, und im Zimmer am oberen Rand der Türoffnung, war ein ungeheurer, schwarz-brauner Kopf zu sehen. Aus diesem Kopfe schauten zwei Augen so dunkel, so glänzend, daß man denken konnte, es seien schwarzen Flammen. Über zwei erdbraunen, dicken Lippen hing ein kohl-schwarzer Schnurrbart herunter wie zwei schwarze Schlangen. Oben auf dem Kopfe saß ein dunkelroter Fes, ganz in den Nacken geschoben. Da öffnete sich der Mund in diesem Kopfe, und zwischen zwei Reihen weißer, glänzender Raubtierzähnen ergoss sich, wie aus einem tiefen Schacht hervor, ein breites, dröhnendes ‚Merhaba‘ ins Zimmer. (*GPLS* 409)

Before the door stood two human legs, and in the room at the top of the doorway one could see an enormous black-brown head. From this head peer out two eyes so dark, so shining, that one might mistake them for black flames. Over two earth-brown, thick lips hung a coal-black moustache. Parted to each side like two black snakes. Atop his head sat a dark red fez, pushed all the way back to his neck. There the mouth in this head opened, and between two rows of white, shining predator-teeth a wide, roaring ‘Merhaba’<sup>146</sup> poured into the room, as if from a deep shaft.

A sexually charged conversation between the two takes place. Husein claims he has been chased by an ox day and night and would like to rest. He takes a seat, complaining of the holes in his shoes and the destitution in which he’s lived, then fixes his eyes upon Petar, saying, “Nun meine Lieber, jetzt verstehen wir uns hoffentlich” [Now, my dear, hopefully we understand one another] (*GPLS* 411). Indeed, Petar understands that Husein will take whatever he likes. Husein’s gaze drifts about the small hut and lands upon a piece of curing meat hanging from the ceiling just between them.

“Hm”, meinte er, indem er die Faust auf das hochgezogene Knie legte und den Zeigefinger gegen die Decke streckte, “ich bin hungrig, was ist das für ein Fleisch?”

“Schweinernes.”

“Schade, das darf ich nicht essen. Ich bin ein Moslem.” (*GPLS* 412)

“Hm,” he said, resting his fist on his raised knee and stretching his index finger toward the ceiling, “I’m hungry. What kind of meat is that?”

“Pork.”

“That’s a shame. I’m not allowed to eat it. I’m a Muslim.”

This exchange is particularly strange as it factors into Husein's tale. Although it is historically accurate that many Sinti and Roma converted to Islam under the Ottoman Empire for political benefits, it is far from in the nature of a grotesque tale to adhere to historical accuracy. After all, Husein's early life has already been marked by demonic practices, pedophilia and incest, all far more extreme than the *haram* of a bite of salt-pork. Tausk therefore has inserted this strange detail of Husein's belief system as an objective correlative for the obscenity he cannot write: the temptation and proscription of sodomy with delicate, young Petar. Instead, after Husein has thoroughly terrified his victim, he lets Petar go running into the night. He robs the small hut of all valuable possessions and disappears.

The act of sodomy left unwritten in Chapter Two of the grotesque finds its realization in the following chapter, where Tausk uses his grotesque character to explore sadism and slaughter. In a *Kafana*—a Bosnian coffee house—Husein notices a fat, rich, and guileless man named Jovo Popović, preparing for a journey with a large sum of money. As Jovo leaves, drunk in *rakia*, to saddle his horse, the barkeep warns, “Du bist bei Geld, Gazda Jovo, hüte dich vor den Wölfen” [You have money on you, Gazda Jovo. Beware the wolves] (*GPLS* 416). Husein, the Wolf incarnate, pursues his victim by approaching him first as a friend. But when his hand grips Jovo's, and Husein coldly comments, “Du hast eine fette Hand” [You have a fattened hand], Jovo feels only the cold of iron or reptilian blood in his predator's grip (*GPLS* 420). Husein strangles the man with pathologically cold precision and pleasure. Neither the death nor the agony of his victim stirs Husein. It seems that the mass of flesh only fascinates him. Jovo slumps in front of him,

and Husein repeats comparisons between Jovo and a pig as he rifles through his victim's belongings and money. "Fingerdick Speck" [finger-thick bacon] he says, fondling Jovo's belly, before cutting into the warm flesh (*GPLS* 423). Husein's comparison of Jovo with bacon or a fattened pig echoes the revulsion and temptation of the flesh found in the scene between Husein and the young woodcutter. The sexual transgression in which Husein did not indulge when he met young Petar is consummated instead in the body of Jovo and his murder. The scene is graphic and sadistic, as if Tausk were testing the limits of his own grotesque experiment by pushing it into the realm of horror through the pathological mind of the murderer. Following the murder, Husein flees across the border and hides himself in the woods by making contact with others camped out there, learning by a campfire that a bounty has been placed on his head. There sits Wild Salko, who recognizes Husein as Durača's son, though Husein denies it.

"Den Husein Brko aus Bosnien. Hast du nichts von ihm gehört?"  
"Nichts. Wie sollte ich von ihm gehört haben?" Husein wusste nun, dass hier keines Bleibens für ihn war.  
"Es sind hundert Dukaten auf seinen Kopf gesetzt", sagte der junge Bursche.  
"Fünfzig", korrigierte Salko. (*GPLS* 428)

"Husein Brko from Bosnia. You haven't heard of him?"  
"Nothing. Why should I have heard of him?" Husein knew now that this was no place for him to stay.  
"One hundred ducats have been placed on his head," said the young fellow.  
"Fifty," corrected Salko.

As the people of the camp make their way to bed, Salko invites Husein to sleep in his tent. It is already too cold to sleep outside under the bare trees and freezing wind so Husein can find no good reason to turn the old man down. He must crawl

on all fours to enter Salko's tent. In the blink of an eye, Salko brings a hatchet whistling through the air.

Dann warf er das breite Zimmermansbeil beiseite und wischte sich mit dem Ärmel das Gesicht ab, denn es war ganz nass vom Blutstrahl, der aus dem Halse Huseins aufgespritzt war. Dann nahm er Huseins Kopf und trug ihn auf die Beledija<sup>147</sup> nach Prizrend.<sup>148</sup> Dafür bekam er zwanzig Dukaten. Soviel waren nämlich auf den Kopf des Husein Brko ausgeschrieben. (GPLS 428)

Then he threw aside the broad carpenter's axe and wiped his face with his sleeve, for it was all wet from the stream of blood that had spurted from Husein's neck. Then he took Husein's head and carried it to the *Beledija* in Prizren. For this he received twenty ducats, for that was in fact the bounty that had been placed on Husein Brko's head.

The swift conclusion of Husein's story brings together the high and the low, the gruesome and comedic, that we can expect of the grotesque genre. It ends on a punchline; Husein's head, born in the hands of his would-be father, is worth a measly twenty ducats. More than this, it inverts many of the functional tropes of the Oedipal narrative. Husein is murdered by the father figure, and with intention. Salko is no pawn of fate, and he, like Husein, regrets nothing in his actions. In place of a grand scheme of meaning, Tausk offers gore, comedy, and dumb chance.

Tausk never offered the story of Husein Brko as an explicitly psychoanalytic text, yet it pulsates with many of the fundamental questions that preoccupied him and his colleagues in psychoanalysis: sexual and social taboos. Husein's "unconditional arbitrariness" activates his violent tale and gives the reader a view of these taboos totally unleashed from a repressive framework, as if to follow them to their most grotesque conclusion. Moreover, the matter of Husein's world, magically inflected and filled with turns of surprise even in the

ignoble death of the antihero, displays a networked and agential world in which power is diffuse and dangerous, aleatory and fickle. Power is not conducted in a single direction, reifying patriarchal structures, but rather emerges and disappears or is wrested into the hands of another in ways which feel both resonant and simultaneously unpredictable. The twist ending in which Husein is murdered by his would-be father, for example, all for the trivial sum of twenty ducats, is resonant with the interwoven incestuous ties of Husein's early life story, but it is not presented as a fated act as one finds in *Oedipus Rex*. Chance has the final say in Husein's empowerment and demise.

In the parapraxes of "The Faith of our Fathers" that illuminate one's obligations to one's ancestors and the filicide of "Husein Brko," Tausk's writings on folklore and faith accomplish a reversal of order from the Freudian narrative of repression. In repression's stead, and in the stead of the thermodynamic model of drive and eventual exhaustion, we find a horde of mutually interactive agents over time and space. Furthermore, Tausk experiments with a practice of heretical (re)writing through the reversal of order. In a quantum model of explanation, we can read into the open and relational or entangled narrative world of Husein without tracing him solely according to the model of detective plot so dear to Freud. Reading Husein's life according to the great mystery of chance and coincidence that Benjamin brings out of Eddington, the text shifts from a story of criminal pursuit to a space of unpredictability. Tausk harnesses the genre of the grotesque to marry the high and low that encounter each other in an unpredictable universe. The grotto of the grotesque in this case might as well be a crypt of mystery. The "unconditional arbitrariness" that Schlegel locates in the grotesque

and which animates Husein's tale is just as present in Eddington's physical model of the universe. Read together under the sign of entanglement, each of the selections I have provided in this chapter demonstrates identity as a deeply troubled project rather than a fixation. Tausk's greatest contribution is in bringing this trouble to light.

The three pieces presented in this final chapter form a constellation which maps for us the grander scheme of Tausk's philosophical project. His reorganization of temporal relationships and the order of reading, constituting new meaning and new loci of agency, is a heretical practice like to the "experience of tradition" that Benjamin draws out of Kafka's work. This practice underlines the difference between Freud's bourgeois modernism and Tausk's, which relies instead upon different Jewish and Balkan lines. Tausk's is thus a tradition which breaks with tradition, shoving against the framework of a narrative and scientific mode which would have us believe that the life force animating the world as we experience it is unidirectional and deterministic. As I have presented by way of the study of the "Influencing Apparatus," "The Faith of the Fathers" and "Husein Brko," Tausk builds upon the anti-authoritarian struggle of his early Balkan modernist treatise by drawing that same stance together with a heretical Jewish tradition and with his legal understanding of identity, forming a networked and vibrant philosophical model with which to encounter the emergence of the self and others. His model presents us with an emergent psychoanalysis, one which does not apprehend human subjects with a knowledge of that which precedes them, but allows us to think through difference and makes way for what may still come.



## Coda

From December of 2018 through January of 2019, an exhibition titled *The Influencing Machine* ran at the neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst (nGbK) in Berlin. The group show, composed of twenty works of art, interpreted the theme as drawn from Victor Tausk's final case study by setting it in conversation with "a series of famous bots (...) understood as socio-technical phenomena" to examine "the automation and datafication of our life worlds and work environments" (*The Influencing Machine (2018)*). The artists involved considered Tausk's study and the phenomenon of the Influencing Apparatus in terms of recent hearings on Cambridge Analytica's data harvesting, the interface of the screen and click-bait compulsions, selfies, Alan Turing, AI-technologies, nonhuman creativity, hypnosis, and the renegotiation of time and affective or physical labor under late-stage capitalism, among other interpretations. By reimagining the Influencing Apparatus in terms of the "socio-material ecologies" between these bots and human actors, the exhibition highlighted the very ways in which Tausk's study presents the Influencing Apparatus as inextricable from the same social and material system as the patient's self (*The Influencing Machine (2018)*). One century after Tausk wrote his study of the "Influencing Apparatus," the work constructed in conversation with this study was thinking through some of the most pressing issues of data privacy, labor, and notions of the human and technology in contemporary discourse. Tausk's Influencing Apparatus is an interesting figure, explains curator Tahani Nadim, "weil sie auf ein relevantes Muster im Narrativ eines technologischen Determinismus verweist, in dem Technologie

für unsere Unzulänglichkeiten bis hin zur Zerstörung der Demokratie verantwortlich gemacht wird” [because it points to a relevant pattern in the narrative of technological determinism, in which technology is held responsible for our shortcomings, including the destruction of democracy] (75-76). In the case of the curated show, many of the artists considered technology as a projected boogeyman embodying nefarious or destructive human acts or desires. As Natalija A.’s own *Influencing Apparatus* embodied the persecution she experienced due to human acts and desires, the case study provides a form through which to critically analyze further examples in which machinery, bots, or other technologies in our own human images become both modes for influencing groups or individuals as they are receptacles for our anxieties. Looking at the apparatus as a projection of the human libido, through which the group or individual encounters themselves, Tausk makes way in his case study for engagement of a different scope in these contemporary philosophical interrogations of technology that proves fruitful beyond his historical moment.

As the curators and artists who put together *The Influencing Machine* demonstrate, Tausk’s final study has become popular in the last decade among those interrogating technology and media because of how open his text remains. Yet among those picking up Tausk’s study are many who continue to read it according to the Feigenbaum translation, in which the menace of the machine or machinery supplants and overshadows the nuances of Tausk’s apparatus. The risk in such a reading is that the machine becomes a fetishistic object, whereas Tausk’s apparatus reminds us of how the human patient and the *Influencing Apparatus* used to persecute her are not simply connected here and there—they are the same

fabric, encountering itself. Tausk's final study is uniquely powerful in its resistance to the construction of a typology and its simultaneous adaptive and open form. It urges readers to consider today the emergence of other influencing apparatuses; the things we use to project, find, and assemble ourselves into something that can engage with the world in which we find it; technologies we use to (re)connect to ourselves, or to communities. In a world in which our own images proliferate and become increasingly alien to us through artificial enhancements, or through artificial intelligence and the data collection that goes hand-in-hand with it, the possibilities for affective and political manipulation that exist when so much personal information is exposed shakes the very understanding and mechanisms in place for identifying ourselves.

Tausk's "Influencing Apparatus" study and the concepts of identity and ego boundaries that he offers there is called upon to make sense of a profound complex of modern anxieties, but it is only one piece of the boon that Tausk's oeuvre offers us. Set together in the context of the other works I have collected in this dissertation, Tausk's final study takes shape in a greater conversation on intercultural understanding, the mystical offerings of literary writing, and the preservation of difference. While his study of the "Influencing Apparatus" is so often harnessed as an object of evidence of techno-anxieties to be placed in conversation with modernist literature or media, his body of writing itself houses within it a deep knowledge of modernism and literary writing.

What is the quality of Tausk's thinking that allows him to speak beyond his time, to technologies that had not yet been invented at the time of his writing? It is precisely his attention to the emergence of things as they present themselves rather

than a fixation on the origin of that which we witness, the key component elided by Feigenbaum's translation, that makes it so. Tausk's openness to emergence is what allows Freud's closed system to be reconfigured into an adaptive technology.

## ENDNOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Andrew Gaedtke's *Modernism and the Machinery of Madness* (2017), for example, situates Tausk's 1919 study of the "Influencing Apparatus" in schizophrenia at the intersection of modernism and modern psychiatry, taking it as the departure point for his investigation of modernist literature. Among still other recent examples, consider *The Technical Delusion* (2019) as well as "On the Origins of the Influencing Machine" (2011) by Jeffrey Sconce; "Schizophrenic Techniques" (2012) by Orit Halpern; and the recent art exhibition *The Influencing Machine* (2018-2019), held at the neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst (nGbK) in Berlin.

<sup>2</sup> The masculine subject has generally assumed a default role in generic and non-gender-specific grammatical contexts, and thus the male norm has often subsumed the space in such contexts that may have been occupied by female or otherwise-gendered subjective positions. In the context of psychoanalysis, we encounter a formulation of the human psyche that is at once deferential to masculine subjectivity, authority, and knowledge, while at the same time building said knowledge from the material of female or feminized patients. The attention to the gender of pronouns chosen here is thus pointed to reflect this paradoxical and interlocking formulation—one which will be further explored in the pages to come.

<sup>3</sup> Josef Breuer (1842-1925) was already a highly esteemed internist and teacher at the time he began his collaboration with his junior colleague from the laboratories at the University of Vienna, Sigmund Freud. Breuer first sparked Freud's interest in hysteria and hypnosis when discussing a young patient later known by the pseudonym of Anna O., whose story and treatment would serve as the basis of their joint study on hysteria. Breuer employed a technique of hypnosis in the treatment of Anna O., which years later Freud would see used in Paris and Nancy by Charcot and Bernheim. Freud and Breuer collaborated on a series of studies, compiled and published as *Studies in Hysteria* in 1895, but they parted ways soon after when Breuer was no longer willing to probe the intimate emotional lives of his patients, and Freud wanted to delve further into this exploration (Millon 255-256).

<sup>4</sup> Freud's attitude toward homosexuality has generated much discussion that cannot be reproduced here in full. What I find noteworthy for the sake of this introduction is the following: Homosexuality had already undergone plenty of scrutiny and some defense from moral, legal, and biological standpoints before Freud's entrance into the debate. Whereas there was a very strong pull in public European (as well as British and Anglo-American) discourse of the 19th century toward the treatment of homosexuality as a biological disease, Freud's school of psychoanalysis had a significant role in the repudiation of this stance. For example, Austro-German psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing argued in *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1886) that homosexuality/bisexuality was a degenerative

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disorder originating in the biological development of a fetus that later resulted in the “sexual inversion” of the brain, but the popularity of his stance was superseded by contributions from British sexologist Havelock Ellis, who made the case in *Sexual Inversion* (1897) that homosexuality was inborn and neither immoral nor pathological, and Sigmund Freud, who maintained that homosexuality was not pathological and, furthermore, that it was not a biological matter. Freud’s theory of human sexuality relied on an innately bisexual human subject who would develop homosexual or heterosexual desires based upon their experiences, primarily with parental figures. As proof of his stance on homosexuality, Freud’s 1935 letter to an American mother, first published when reprinted in the *American Journal of Psychiatry* in 1951 is often cited: “Homosexuality is assuredly no advantage, but it is nothing to be ashamed of, no vice, no degradation, it cannot be classified as an illness; we consider it to be a variation of the sexual function produced by a certain arrest of sexual development. Many highly respectable individuals of ancient and modern times have been homosexuals, several of the greatest men among them (Plato, Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci, etc.). It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime, and cruelty too [...]

“If [your son] is unhappy, neurotic, torn by conflicts, inhibited in his social life, analysis may bring him harmony, peace of mind, full efficiency whether he remains a homosexual or gets changed [...].”

On the topic of scientific racism, it may be noted that Ellis, while defending orientations and practices deemed either sexually inverted or sexually perverse, based on the argument that these were biologically natural and thus not immoral, would also defend practices and philosophies of eugenics popular of his time with upon same biological basis. In *The Task of Social Hygiene* (1912), for example, where Ellis writes in the chapter “Immorality and the Law,” “There are very many English people who think that the fact that homosexuality is disgusting to most people is a reason for punishing it with extreme severity. Yet disgust is a matter of taste, we cannot properly impart it into our laws; a disgusting person is not necessarily a criminal person, or we shall have to enact that many inmates of our hospitals and lunatic asylums be hanged” (272). He also writes in another chapter, “Eugenics and Love,” that “Eventually, it seems evident, a general system, whether private or public, whereby all personal fact, biological and mental, normal and morbid, are duly systematically registered, must become inevitable if we are to have a real guide as to those persons who are most fit, or most unfit, to carry on the race” and that the new eugenic ideal was “the reasoned manifestation of a natural instinct [... and] will be absorbed into the conscience of the community [...].” (200, 207-208). His biological basis for the explanation or defense of human behavior, thus, may be read in contrast to Freud’s psychological basis for the study of that same behavior.

<sup>5</sup> Franz Anton Mesmer (1734-1815) brought forward the concepts of the unconscious and of animal magnetism and believed that many forms of illness were the result of universal magnetic imbalances. His therapeutic treatments involved the use of magnets for conducting the fluids in his patients’ bodies, and a

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form of hypnosis for bringing his patients in a trance (Millon 245-252). Freud was interested in his early years of practice in hypnosis and in 1889 was visiting Prof. Hippolyte Bernheim (1837-1919) at Nancy with “the idea of perfecting [his] hypnotic technique” (*SE* 20: 17).

<sup>6</sup> Jean-Martin Charcot (1825-1893) is considered by many to be the father of clinical neurology. His studies conducted at the Salpêtrière form the foundation of nineteenth-century understandings of hysteria (Millon 210-211).

<sup>7</sup> Theodor Meynert (1833-1892) was a professor of psychiatry at the University of Vienna School of Medicine, where Freud studied as his pupil. He worked primarily on the anatomy and pathologies of the brain, including speech defects (Millon 211; Seitelbereger 1).

<sup>8</sup> The talking cure or “chimney sweeping” were inventions developed in Breuer’s therapeutic sessions with patient Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim).

<sup>9</sup> Otto Bauer (1881-1938) was an Austromarxist who published his book on national personal autonomy, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* in 1907. It proposes the disjoining of territory from nation, which he defined instead by the association of individuals (Bauer 696).

<sup>10</sup> Obersteiner, for example, Krafft-Ebing, Meynert, and Freud’s internist colleague and early classmate, Wagner-Jauregg.

<sup>11</sup> One of Mesmer’s earliest and most curious cases was that of Maria Theresia Paradis, whom he quasi-successfully treated for blindness with magnetic therapy in 1775, after she’d been treated by Vienna’s best physicians with electric therapy, which had also been practiced at the time. She was said to have endured some 3,000 electric shocks by the time Mesmer came to treat her.

The “success” of Maria Theresia Paradis’s recovery is hard to objectively gage when considering a variety of her story’s details. She had been reportedly blind since the age of three, yet developed talents for dance, needlework, and music so much so that she acquired some fame and was granted the protection of Empress Maria Theresa. Kempelen, a famous maker of automatons, had built her a machine with which she was able to write. Mesmer was apparently able to cure her blindness, but she claimed only to be able to see when in his presence. He ended the treatments after a disagreement with the family, resulting in her ultimate loss of vision, though she went on to pursue a musical career. Mesmer maintained it may have been in her best interest to remain blind, given the fame and monetary support that her blindness had attracted to her as an artist and musician. Henri Ellenberger’s *The Discovery of the Unconscious* details the episode (60-61).

<sup>12</sup> This revolution came both in scientifically proven and less legitimate forms. To be sure, the nineteenth century saw a rash of quackery reliant upon purported electromagnetic health aids, particularly in the United States (Basford

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1264).

<sup>13</sup> Aside the use of pharmacology, treatments in Charcot's practice included metallotherapy, the application of cautery irons, suspension apparatus, ovary compression devices, vibratory chairs and helmets, solenoids, hydrotherapy, and electroshock therapy (Didi-Huberman 91).

<sup>14</sup> Wilhelm Röntgen discovered X-rays in 1895 and printed his wife's hand upon a photographic plate that same year. In 1904, the first commercial microscope to harness ultraviolet fluorescence was released by Zeiss, doubly surpassing the theoretical limit for visible light microscopes of 2000 angstroms that had been achieved only four years prior.

<sup>15</sup> While Wagner-Jauregg did not completely subscribe to the commonly held belief of his time that mental illnesses were the result of degeneration and hereditarily sourced, disposition remained an important factor to his criteria of psychological evaluation. It must also be noted that Wagner-Jauregg later took the idea of degeneration to its extreme, advocating for forced sterilization of the mentally ill and criminal in 1935 and aligning with the Nazi Party shortly after the annexation of Austria in 1938. He was an advocate for eugenics and applied to join the NSDAP—he was denied membership because first wife was Jewish.

<sup>16</sup> Freud would use hypnosis until 1896, at which point he abandoned it for free association as he began to construct his practice of psychoanalysis. Free association was in fact a joint invention by Freud and his patient the Baroness Fanny Moser (known as "Emmy von N" in Freud's treatment), who got tired of being interrupted by Freud's constant interpretations and demanded that he let her ramble wherever her thoughts would take the session (Quinodoz 14, 17).

<sup>17</sup> In a letter to his then-fiancée, Martha Bernays, dated 27 January, 1886, Freud describes earning the favor of "the Master," and its effect on the direction of his work. In spite of Freud's discomfort and self-consciousness that resulted from his lack of fluency in French, he recounts to Martha a hard-won moment in which Charcot placed him in charge of a patient whom Charcot found intriguing, and the respect of Charcot's assistant and his other colleagues that immediately followed:

"I am now the only foreigner at Charcot's. Today [...] I had the chance of making a certain impression on him. He was talking about a patient, and while the others were laughing, I just said, 'Vous parlez de ce cas dans vos leçons' and quoted a few words of his. This seems to have pleased him, for an hour later he said to his assistant, 'Vous allez prendre cette observation avec M. Freud,' [...]. Needless to say, I had no objection. [...]"

So the day was spent entirely in the Salpêtrière. From 4 to 7 pm we were busy with the patient. During the interrogation I jotted down the answers of the man, who is from the south of France and incapable of concentrating on anything

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for more than a moment or of organizing his statements. [...] As a result of this work I have decided to abandon my own paper on brain anatomy. In any case my slides are not sufficient enough to allow me to solve certain problems and I am full of ideas and projects which I intend to work out and turn into decent papers when I get to Vienna” (*Letters of Sigmund Freud 197-200*).

Freud’s letters during his time at the Salpêtrière disclose more than one turning point in his thinking, but the moment above is notable as a representative snapshot of his discarding of anatomy in favor of lingual investigation and observation. He was, during this time, also “working on his book” as he mentions to Martha, and so the same movement from anatomy to a language-based interrogation of the psyche can be traced in his publication of “On Aphasia,” which came out five years later, as well as later studies that built upon the notion of lost, forgotten, or repressed language. Freud very quickly began to translate Charcot’s lectures into German, finding great value in Charcot’s demonstrations concerning hysteria and particularly hypnotism.

<sup>18</sup> Later, in the summer of 1889, he wrote of observing Bernheim in Nancy: “I received the profoundest impression of the possibility that there could be powerful mental processes which nevertheless remain hidden from the consciousness of men” (*SE 20: 17*).

<sup>19</sup> All but one case study, that Anna O., would be attributed solely to Freud. Anna O., however, was and still remains the most famous of the cases and relies heavily on Breuer’s insights.

<sup>20</sup> Several terms and ideas in Freud’s and Breuer’s repertoire are borrowed from Janet, including the “theory of hysterical phenomena” in the *Introductory Lectures* (1917) (*SE 16: 257*); following Janet’s example in taking “the splitting of the mind and dissociation of the personality as the centre of [their] position” in *Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (1909) (*SE 11: 22*); the term “*idées fixes*” in “A Short Account of Psycho-Analysis” (1923); and the Janet’s “function of reality,” which Freud builds upon but counterposes with his “reality principle.” Furthermore, Janet insisted that the term “psychoanalysis” was a truncated version of his “psychological analysis” (Fitzgerald 359).

<sup>21</sup> This was also an observation of Janet’s—one of several points of overlap between his work and Freud’s earlier publications. A scandal would arise between Freud and Janet in 1913 at the Congress of Medicine in London in which the latter would accuse the former essentially of plagiarism. While it is true that Freud’s first book owes much to his French colleague’s advancements and language, and moreover that Freud notoriously obscured his sources across his publications, there did remain key philosophical differences between the two, including the fact that Janet found dissociation to be a fundamentally cognitive weakness, while Freud regarded it as a defense mechanism. See Henri Ellenberger’s *The Discovery of the Unconscious* for a comprehensive overview of Freud and Janet’s conflicts

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(344).

<sup>22</sup> Original, in Latin, reads “Itaque vt ad historiae fidem Geographia, sic ad rem medicam corporis humani descriptio pernoscenda” and is found in the Peroration of *De Nat. Parte Med.*.

<sup>23</sup> Charcot’s chosen term is laden with political connotations of the time. An agent provocateur, also known as a double agent, often works with local law enforcement by infiltrating a revolutionary or terrorist group and provoking them into committing criminal acts. It was commonly associated in Charcot’s time with the nineteenth-century proto-criminologist Eugène François Vidocq as well as with actions taken during the Russian Revolution.

<sup>24</sup> Emma Eckstein came to Freud for the treatment of her neurosis, and she was known to have difficult, painful periods. Fliess travelled to Vienna to operate on a blockage in her nose, removing some of her turbinate bone. After he left, however, Eckstein continued to hemorrhage and expel foul-smelling puss from her nose. When a second surgeon, Rosanes, was called in to insert a drain, it was discovered that Fliess had left at least half a meter of gauze in her nose after operating. Freud recounted this to Fliess in a letter dated March 8, 1895, before assuring him that no one blamed Fliess for the mishap (*Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess* 116).

<sup>25</sup> Hermann Swoboda, a Viennese professor of law and philosophy, helped the young philosophy student Otto Weininger develop his infamous monograph, *Geschlecht und Charakter*, over a few years’ worth of correspondence, during which time Swoboda introduced Weininger to several of Freud’s theories. Weininger presented a draft of *Geschlecht und Charakter* to Freud in 1901 in hopes that he might recommend it for publication. Freud was unimpressed and instead recommended that Weininger should instead conduct more research and gain empirical evidence for his claims. Nevertheless, Weininger published the book, known for its antisemitic and misogynist philosophy, in 1903.

<sup>26</sup> In one such famous incident in 1909, Freud interpreted Jung’s interest in the discovery of mummified human remains preserved in the peat bogs of northern Germany as a repressed death wish on Jung’s part toward his mentor. Freud’s interpretation was so frightening that it resulted in him fainting on the spot, whereupon Jung carried him to a nearby sofa (Grosskurth 41).

<sup>27</sup> George Makari reads *Totem and Taboo* as a roman a clef that represents Freud’s psychoanalytic community. In this way, the crescendo of the final essay, penned in 1913, which sees civilization as originating from the slaying of the father, is also a statement on the final rift Freud had with Jung.

<sup>28</sup> “Meine von Dir so wenig anerkannten alten und dreckigen Götter beteiligen sich als Manuskriptbeschwerer an der Arbeit.”

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<sup>29</sup> Among the several rings that Freud gifted over the years, Anna Freud received an intaglio of Athena on carnelian (and confessed in a letter to her father that she was tempted to give it to Salomé for helping her), Eva Rosenfeld received one in 1930 for her 38<sup>th</sup> birthday of Nike on obsidian, and Ernst Simmel received one of a pastoral scene on a blue stone (Rolnik).

<sup>30</sup> For example, Edgar Allen Poe's "The Murders in the Rue Morgue" (1841), Eugene Sue's *The Mysteries of Paris* (1842-1843), Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's first of the Sherlock Holmes stories, "A Study in Scarlet" (1887), and Fyodor Dostoyevsky's *Crime and Punishment* (1866) were all translated into German in 1890, 1843, 1894, and 1882, respectively.

<sup>31</sup> Though the term "detective fiction" had not yet entered common parlance, Poe can be considered the progenitor of the detective story. The only work prior to Poe's writing to follow a similar process of reasoning is Voltaire's novella *Zadig ou la destinée* (1747), which makes use of an early Persian tale with a style of ratiocination, "The Three Princes of Serendip."

<sup>32</sup> Freud demonstrates his deference to biology when defending his qualification of this phase as male for both genders when he explains that "[a]ccording to [Karl] Abraham, it has a biological prototype in the embryo's undifferentiated genital disposition, which is the same for both sexes" (*SE* 7: 200).

<sup>33</sup> See Florence Rush's theory of the "Freudian Cover-Up" *Rape: The First Sourcebook for Women by New York Radical Feminists*.

<sup>34</sup> See Freud's "The Infantile Genital Organization" (1923).

<sup>35</sup> The Freudian diagnosis denoting homosexuality, with the foundational belief that homosexual desire was caused by an early inversion of the parental love-object. It should be noted that Freud also promoted the belief that all human beings (and many non-human beings) were inherently bisexual or "psychical hermaphrodites" to some degree. He also makes a point in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* to argue that he does not see any value or scientific proof in the attribution of inversion to degeneracy—an important distinction between his work and the standards set by his teachers and peers at this time. Homosexuality was not a physical disease, in other words, but an orientation—albeit it deviant in Freud's classification—to do with the psyche.

<sup>36</sup> Although the two terms are today often treated as interchangeable, I mean here to draw attention to the fact that semiology was first a medical term and practice—that of reading the body for disease according to an assembly of symptoms. This type of reading takes as its basis the dichotomy of subjective and objective perception. Semiotics on the other hand is a wider study of meaning, its forms, and processes. Early semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce refused semiological subject/object dualism by locating the perception of signs in a three-

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part equation between sign, mind, and object. Jan Broekman points out that, in the time of the French linguist Émile Littré (famous for having written the *Dictionnaire de la langue française* in during the mid- to late- 19<sup>th</sup> century), semiology also had a military valence (155).

<sup>37</sup> The term was first introduced by Hayden White in his work *Metahistory*, in which White argued that history is a literary artefact; the historian uses literary strategies to “emplot” events in a particular narrative order.

<sup>38</sup> Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection, for example, seems to have been influenced by Salomé’s study.

<sup>39</sup> Harold Bloom argues that Freud in fact first relied upon the dramatic paradigm of *Hamlet*, and that Oedipus was “hauled in by Freud and grafted onto Hamlet largely to cover up an obligation to Shakespeare” (Bloom, *The Western Canon* 377). Freud acknowledges *Hamlet* in *The Interpretation of Dreams* as having “its roots in the same soil as Oedipus Rex,” but argues that “the changed treatment of the same material reveals the whole difference in the mental life of these two widely separated epochs of civilization: the secular advance of repression in the emotional life of mankind.” Whereas in Oedipus Rex, “the child’s wishful phantasy that underlies it is brought into the open and realized as it would be in a dream,” this phantasy remains repressed in Hamlet (*SE* 4:264).

<sup>40</sup> This is precisely the aspect of psychoanalysis which Adorno will attack in *Minima Moralia*, as a method of accommodating subjects to an unlivable world. His thirty-eighth aphorism begins, “Psycho-analysis likes to give itself credit for returning to human beings their capacity for enjoyment, since this latter is disrupted by neurotic sickness. As if the mere term “capacity for enjoyment,” assuming the thing even exists, did not suffice to degrade such in the worst possible way. As if a happiness, which is due to the speculation on happiness, would not be the opposite of happiness, a further trespass of institutionally planned modes of conduct into the ever-shrinking domain of experience” (Adorno 62).

<sup>41</sup> Examples of Freud’s theory of artistic production by way of sublimation can be found in his essays “Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood,” “Dostoyevsky and Parricide,” and “Delusion and Dream in Jensen's Gradiva.”

<sup>42</sup> Dementia praecox, meaning precocious dementia or precocious madness, is a disused psychiatric diagnosis referring to the onset of madness in young adulthood. It is the precursor to what is today understood as schizophrenia. The term was popularized by Emil Kraepelin in the 1890s, in textbook descriptions of the condition. Eugen Bleuler then introduced the term “schizophrenia” in 1908, in a lecture at German Psychiatric Association in Berlin, arguing that the mental illness was not a form of dementia but was characterized, rather, by the splitting of

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the psyche. He further published on this in 1911 with *Dementia praecox, oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien*.

<sup>43</sup> Schreber resumed an independent life after his 1902 release from the asylum and the publication of his memoirs, but he was re-hospitalized in 1907 after the death of his mother and died, still under hospitalization, four years later.

<sup>44</sup> See *Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift*, first published 1887.

<sup>45</sup> The primary materials upon which I draw in this chapter are by and large the result of three main sources. Above all, I am indebted to Rob Tausk, grandson of Victor Tausk, who opened his home in the Netherlands and his personal archive of family materials to me early on in my research of this project. Family photographs included as figures in this chapter are from Rob Tausk's personal archive. Rob also passed along the bachelor's thesis of Kristína Palsovicsová, which contributed to my knowledge of Herman Tausk. Furthermore, at the time of my visit in 2017, Rob had recently donated a large number of materials to the archive of Martha Frisch Tausk at the IISG, the International Institute of Social History, in Amsterdam. This donation was so recently made that it had not yet been registered, and I would not have found it if not again for Rob Tausk's help.

My visit to follow at the IISG produced the second trove of primary documents which are sourced in this chapter (as well as Chapter Three), thanks to Martha Tausk's meticulous care and preservation of family documents and correspondence with Victor. There I learned to decipher Victor's handwriting and how it changed according to emotion, his nicknames and inside jokes with his children, the various addresses he could be located at, and discussions of money and making ends meet. Materials reviewed there also led me to seek out Grete Meisel-Heß's novel for further background on Victor's life and milieu.

The third source of archival materials came two years later, after I had come across the discussion of Tausk as Slovačić in a text on Croatian modernism. In Croatia, at the National and University Library of Zagreb, I was able to access Tausk's treatise on modernism (under the Slovačić pseudonym), several volumes of *Nada* with Slovačić's poetry, Herman Tausk's *Židovsko Pitanje*, and other early handwritten works by Slovačić which have not ultimately factored into this dissertation. Attending an intensive Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language course in Sarajevo soon after my visit to these archives, I have boldly attempted my own translations of Tausk's early poetry in the pages to follow.

This chapter is the result of the bulk of my "archive fever" in my research of Tausk's life and work. As with most products of archival research, it has been as much a process of paring away all that has fascinated me but does not belong to this project as it has been an immersion into these archives.

<sup>46</sup> The spelling of Victor's name was adapted according to where he lived.

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In Slovakia, Bosnia, and Croatia, his name was spelled with a K. Upon his move to the German-speaking world, he began to spell his name “Victor.” This is the same in his father’s case, who published under “Herman” and “Hermann” according to his audience. For the sake of continuity, I will refer to Victor throughout the rest of this account by the German spelling of his name, which is the name under which he published the bulk of his work. I will in turn refer to his father by the Slavic spelling of his name, “Herman,” as this is the name under which he published the works I cite in this chapter.

<sup>47</sup> *Kuferaši* is a Bosnian term developed from the German word for suitcase, “Koffer.”

<sup>48</sup> Slovakia was considered part of “Northern Hungary” under the Austro-Hungarian empire, and there was a considerable amount of cultural circulation between Jewish communities of Slovakian and Hungarian cities.

<sup>49</sup> Paul Roazen’s biographical gloss of Victor’s life in *Brother Animal* claims that his “German-speaking family was technically Jewish, but completely nonpracticing” (8). This seems an under-nuanced portrayal not only of the family’s relationship to Judaism but of Slovakian Jewish history before the twentieth century.

<sup>50</sup> The hierarchy of religions according to legal standing at this time was divided into categories of *received*, *recognized*, and *tolerated*. Only received religions benefited from protection of the state.

<sup>51</sup> Here Tausk quotes Bereshit / Genesis 3:19, a scripture shared by both Jews and Christians to make his point through a common topos.

<sup>52</sup> The phrase first arose in context of the controversy over Jewish naturalization in England in 1753-1754, but became more common a century later, particularly in German-speaking countries. See *The "Jewish Question" in German-Speaking Countries, 1848-1914: A Bibliography*, edited by Rena A. Auerbach, for a comprehensive overview.

<sup>53</sup> Tausk is responding to an earlier publication authored by Černátoni which accuses Jews of not being able to properly integrate. The Černátoni in question may be the political journalist Lajos Csernátony, founding editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Ellenőr*.

<sup>54</sup> According to Ján Jankovič, these were authored by Herman Tausk, though they were published under the pseudonym Rosinský (244). The continuity of topics and arguments between these articles and Herman Tausk’s later essay supports Jankovič’s research. However, Jankovič also falsely lists Victor’s pseudonym, Slovačić, among Herman’s and so attributes Slovačić’s publications to Herman Tausk. Ján Vladimír Ormis additionally lists nine different pseudonyms and initials under Herman Tausk’s publishing names, including

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Rosinský but not including Slovačić (314).

<sup>55</sup> Under Tausk's editorial purview, the *Post* managed to attract the laudations of *Bošnjak*, which congratulated Tausk by name on the *Post*'s tenth anniversary, writing that the German-language paper had "been founded to counter all the false news [spread around] the world about the [Bosnian] homeland" (Betke 100).

<sup>56</sup> "Croatian Daily"—it was published between 1908 and 1916 and was considered the most important Croatian newspaper in Bosnia during its time. Its subheading read, "za interese bosansko-hercegovačkih Hrvata" [for the interests of Bosnian Croats].

<sup>57</sup> *Stranka prava*, the Party of Rights, was founded in 1861 and ended in 1929. Generally speaking, it called for Croatian autonomy, freedom from Austro-Hungarian rule, and a political unity between Croats and Orthodox Serbs. The values and biases of its political aims continue to be contested, especially when considering the far-right and fascist groups that later claimed the Party of Rights to be an ideological predecessor, e.g. the Ustaše (See Bartulin, *The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia* 33). However, the party of 1861-1929 was a historically separate party from the far-right, ethno-nationalist Croatian Party of Rights founded in 1990 known as *Hrvatska stranka prava* or, simply, HSP, even if HSP claims to directly draw upon the legacy of the earlier *Stranka prava*.

<sup>58</sup> This, according to the 1910 census, the figures of which only indicated religious background; Eastern Orthodox (43.5%) were exclusively Serbs, Muslims (32.5%) were Bosniaks, Roman Catholics (30%) were primarily Croats (Donia 64).

<sup>59</sup> The original in Cyrillic reads, "Сарађивати у листу који у Босни, на немачком језику, тежи да учврсти хабсбуршку монархију и да брани тамо интересе аустроугарске монархије, грех је, коме нема опроштаја."

<sup>60</sup> This is depicted at the outset of Petlevski's novel, *Bilo nam je take lijepo!*

<sup>61</sup> For example, see my discussion of Tausk's "The Father Complex" in Chapter Three and "The Faith of Our Fathers" in Chapter Five.

<sup>62</sup> Moriz Frisch's publishing house, *Vörwarts (Forward)*, published much political material by Social Democrats like himself, including the first issue of Karl Kraus's *Die Fackel*.

<sup>63</sup> Martha Tausk became officially involved with the Social Democratic Party of Austria in 1911, and by 1918—even before women achieved the right to vote—she was elected as a member of the Styrian Provisional Provincial Assembly (see Brigitte Dorfer's *Die Lebensreise der Martha Tausk*).

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<sup>64</sup> The play focuses on the struggles of a struggling artist in his mid-twenties who has quit his job as a jurist after a breakdown. He is estranged from his wife, Maria, has various conflicts with his father-in-law, and has two young sons, Hans and Hugo. The protagonist's name, Wolfgang, is a private echo of Tausk's Hebrew name, Ze'ev, meaning "Wolf."

<sup>65</sup> Published copies of *März: Halbmonatsschrift für deutsche Kultur* in the months and years following this letter contained no such story by Victor, and to date the only known publication of "Husein Brko" was in 1912, in Victor's father's review. This note, however, is evidence that the piece underwent several years' worth of development and editing, and that it was of considerable importance to Tausk, which I will touch upon in later analysis.

<sup>66</sup> This is according to a personal conversation with Rob Tausk.

<sup>67</sup> Their official divorce papers list Victor's residence as Erndtgasse 9 and Martha's as Wallrißstraße 7.

<sup>68</sup> Martha recounts to Zofka in one letter that Victor was livid when, upon spotting Meisel-Hess in a coffee house, the author buried her face in a newspaper so as not to have to greet him (Dorfer 30).

<sup>69</sup> "Der Blick dieser Augen, unter solcher Stirn, war mir seltsam und schmerzlich: dieser arme verschreckte Blick. Doppelt bange wirkte er, da er hier an einer Frau von ganz selbständiger Persönlichkeit zu finden war, an einer Emanzipierten eigentlich, nicht etwa an einem hilflosen, schwächlichen, anlehnungsbedürftigen kleinen Frauenzimmer" (Meisel-Hess 84-85).

<sup>70</sup> For example, biographical writings on Tausk by Roazen, Eissler, and Kanzer.

<sup>71</sup> Tausk requested upon his death that his papers be burned, which his younger son dutifully attended to. See my discussion of this in Chapter Two.

<sup>72</sup> Minutes from the meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society begin by recording her presence as "Lou Andreas-Salomé" but soon shift to "Frau Lou" or simply, "Lou."

<sup>73</sup> Roazen's treatment of Salomé and Tausk's relationship as a key to unlocking Tausk's identity seemed to draw irritation from Tausk's son, Marius, who wrote in his 1973 recollections of his father, "It was on one of those [Sundays] that we met Lou Andreas-Salomé, who has lately, all of a sudden, become what seems to be a key figure in my father's life" (Marius Tausk 329).

<sup>74</sup> Over the course of their relationship, Freud increasingly liked to keep Tausk both close enough to monitor and at a wide enough distance that he could be assured Tausk was not preempting his ideas. The use of a third party helped

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Freud maintain this closeness and distance at once. Another notable triangular relationship later in Tausk's life would be that between Freud, Tausk, and Helene Deutsch, when Freud discontinued psychoanalysis sessions with Tausk and passed him over to Deutsch, who had regular analysis sessions with Freud at the time.

<sup>75</sup> As mentioned in Chapter Two, Tausk's father had contributed to this discourse in earlier publications.

<sup>76</sup> See Chapter Five in which I analyze two of Tausk's publications for the frameworks of mysticism and folklore.

<sup>77</sup> See my discussion of this in Chapter Four.

<sup>78</sup> It was the perverse choice of biographer Paul Roazen to appropriate this private pet name between Salomé and Tausk as the title of his book on Tausk and Freud.

<sup>79</sup> The extended quote reads, "I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. Nietzsche, another philosopher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psycho-analysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed."

<sup>80</sup> Were one able to access the writing Tausk references in his letter to Martha from Ahrweiler on the metaphysics of acting, one may have found further such traces.

<sup>81</sup> However, as Deleuze points out in *Coldness and Cruelty*, "The sadomasochistic entity was not invented by Freud; we find it in the work of Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis and Féré" (38).

<sup>82</sup> Additionally, many of Salomé's stories and novellas collected in *Menschenkinder* (1899) provide ample examples of these traits in mother figures.

<sup>83</sup> Spielrein's 1912 study titled "Die Destruktion als Ursache des Werdens" [Destruction as the Cause of Coming Into Being] likewise appears to have been incorporated into Freud's thoughts on sadomasochistic impulses.

<sup>84</sup> Salomé refers here to Tausk's dramatic scene, "Vom Leben und Wissen," which is covered in Chapter Two.

<sup>85</sup> See Chapters Two and Five, respectively

<sup>86</sup> See Chapters Four and Five for Tausk's case studies on war psychoses and the schizophrenic "Influencing Apparatus," both of which deal directly with issues of identity and projection.

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<sup>87</sup> Oral Torah consists of the traditional rabbinic teachings believed to have been passed down orally in tandem with the written law, the Pentateuch. When the destruction of the second temple in the early common era threatened the possibility that this tradition of oral instruction could continue, these teachings were encoded into writing known as the Mishnah which, together with the commentaries and teachings of the Gemara recorded a few centuries later, form the essential components of the Talmud. The Talmud (literally translating to “teaching” or “study”) provides the record of rabbinic debates of interpretation of the written, Mosaic law, and structures how an observant Jew must conduct his or her life.

<sup>88</sup> The editor notes in a footnote that Freud is most likely referring to Tausk’s report delivered at the weekly meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society on 18 October 1911, and Tausk later removed the offending detail when his study was later published in 1914 (Abraham and Freud, *Briefwechsel* 396).

<sup>89</sup> In a 1915 letter to Salomé, Freud disparaged, “I know your concern with Tausk’s work helped familiarize you with the subject of narcissism. But his constructions were totally unintelligible to me” (qtd. in Roazen, *Brother Animal* 63).

<sup>90</sup> Ironically, Rank would decades later turn critical of Freud’s system of psychoanalysis, lambasting psychoanalysis as the “worst enemy of the soul [...] kill[ing] what it analyzed,” and recounting that Freud and his disciples had become pontifical and dogmatic, couching their theories in a sterile, medical language (qtd. in Szasz 38).

<sup>91</sup> In those cases in which Freud ostensibly engages with psychosis, he only does so on the basis of his belief that the illness is a neurotic disorder. Freud considered dementia praecox (what is now called schizophrenia) a “narcissistic neurosis.” (See “The Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest” and “Introductory Lectures” in volumes 13, 15, and 16 of the Standard Edition.) Moreover, his material, as in the Schreber case, did not necessarily come from his own interactions with patients.

<sup>92</sup> Freud maintained a negative impression of Tausk’s mental condition based on his illness that day, for he wrote to Karl Abraham three days after Tausk’s suicide, July 6, 1919, “Tausk shot himself a few days ago. You remember his behavior at the congress” (*Briefwechsel* 400).

<sup>93</sup> All three of Freud’s sons—(Jean) Martin, Ernst, and Oliver—served in the war effort. Though Martin had been taken prisoner for a period of the war, this is most likely in reference to Oliver, who was discharged at the beginning of December, 1918.

<sup>94</sup> Tausk also drafted letters to his recent fiancée, Hilde Löwi, and to Martha

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but wrote a personal note to Freud asking him to look after Tausk's sons and fiancée.

<sup>95</sup> See Freud's letter to Oskar Pfister, 13 July 1919, and letter to Salomé, 1 August 1919, both quoted in Roazen's *Brother Animal*, 138-139.

<sup>96</sup> The first published appearance of the term *überdeterminiert* [overdetermined] appears in the theoretical section by Breuer in his and Freud's *Studies in Hysteria* (1895) (See footnote in *SE* 2: 212).

<sup>97</sup> A revised edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* includes references to Tausk's study of childhood sexuality as well as the meanings of colors and clothing, and a revised edition *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* references Tausk's short studies "The Faith of our Fathers," "Traveling in the Wrong Direction," and "Ibsen the Druggist" as examples of parapraxes.

<sup>98</sup> This famous phrase appears in the forward to Freud's 1933 revision of *Introduction to Psychoanalysis*.

<sup>99</sup> Julius Wagner-Jauregg, whom I have mentioned in Chapter One in context of Freud and their differing attitudes on disposition, was the director of the Clinic for Psychiatry and Nervous Diseases in Vienna where, incidentally, Tausk worked during his years in Vienna preceding the war.

<sup>100</sup> *Vorbeireden*, or talking at cross purposes, could be in many cases a calculated, rhetorical demonstration of disregard for one's interlocutor.

<sup>101</sup> The word "economy" can be traced back to the Greek *oikonomia*, composed of the words *oikos* (home) and *nemein* (management and dispensation). *Oikonomia* in its classical sense is thus a matter of household management, but when considered in the terms of greater political estates, we see the transition of the management of a private household as applicable to a wider political realm.

<sup>102</sup> Tausk cites Laudenheimer-Alsbach in particular in this case.

<sup>103</sup> See Chapter Five for a discussion of "The Faith of the Fathers."

<sup>104</sup> This study was written and published in 1916, around the same time as the earlier address. It is very possible that the two were conceived of as a pair and published separately.

<sup>105</sup> "Freud may well provide an accurate account of the link between perversion and nonreproductive sex," observes Jerome Neu, citing Freud's essay on infantile sexuality, "[I]f a child has a sexual life at all it is bound to be the perverse kind; for, except for a few obscure hints, children are without what makes sexuality into the reproductive function. On the other hand, the abandonment of the reproductive function is the common feature of all

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perversions. [...T]he breach and turning-point in the development of sexual life lies in its becoming subordinate to the purposed of reproduction.” (*The Cambridge Companion to Freud*, 187-188)

<sup>106</sup> The German word for child, “das Kind,” is notably a neuter noun. The child’s lingual designation as neither male nor female plays an important role in the conceiving of the child as prepubescent. In translation and in paraphrasing, I have defaulted to the use of male pronouns in order to avoid the objectification of a subject that would be implied with the use of the pronoun “it.” This is, however, not intended as a universalization of the male gender but rather an acknowledgment of the fact that Tausk is *only* referring to male subjects in his study of war deserters.

<sup>107</sup> Further attention to different understandings of failure will be given in Chapter Five in my discussions of “The Faith of the Fathers” and the study of the “Influencing Apparatus”

<sup>108</sup> “Bei manchen Kindern versagt diese Erziehung zum Verzicht und Aufschub, die Kinder bleiben an den Kinderwünschen unbewußt hängen“ (*GPLS* 186).

<sup>109</sup> Although the publication date given here for Husein Brko in 1912, we know that Tausk had already completed a version of it in 1906 based his on letters to Martha.

<sup>110</sup> The study was published posthumously, in the same volume of the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* as Freud’s obituary for Tausk.

<sup>111</sup> Seventeenth-century physicist and mathematician Isaac Newton established the basic principles of modern physics with his three laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation.

<sup>112</sup> Planck’s contribution of quantum theory would earn him the Nobel Prize in 1918. First demonstrated in “Ueber das Gesetz der Energieverteilung im Normalspectrum” (“On the Law of Distribution of Energy in the Normal Spectrum”) (1901) Planck’s constant ( $h$ ) is a fundamental physical constant that forms the foundation to quantum mechanics. It describes the behavior of particles and waves at the atomic level, in particular the relationship between a photon’s energy and its frequency, and a matter wave and the momentum of the associated particle.

<sup>113</sup> See Einstein’s Albert “Über einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des Lichtes betreffenden heuristischen Gesichtspunkt” (1905).

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<sup>114</sup> Aether theories of the nineteenth century proposed that an undetectable and all-permeating universal substance transmitted electromagnetic waves such as light. See Kenneth Schaffner's *Nineteenth-century Aether Theories* (1972).

<sup>115</sup> Planck began in 1900 to develop his theory that radiant energy is emitted not in a continuous flow but in discrete packets known as quanta, and he refined it over the following decade (Lemons 127).

<sup>116</sup> A year after the publication of Tausk's "Influencing Apparatus" study, a group of physicists including Niels Bohr would develop the Copenhagen Interpretation, which states that a quantum particle does not exist in one state or another (i.e. as a wave or a particle) but in all states simultaneously, and that the observer forces the particle into a different observable state each time, so that it appears erratic. This is also widely understood as the "observer effect." Planck would argue against the notion that observer and observed were intimately linked, however, insisting that the universe was an objective entity independent of (the effects of) observation. See Faye's "Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics" for a comprehensive overview.

<sup>117</sup> Feigenbaum's translation of Tausk's dense and tricky language (which possibly would have undergone further refinement if not for his untimely death) is done with much finesse and personal care, as the translator ends his short preface by explaining that his motivation for translating the work was born of admiration for Tausk and a desire to fill the Tausk-shaped lacuna in English-language psychoanalysis. "The translator, a classmate in the last year of clinical studies at the University of Vienna, enjoyed a brief period of friendship with him before the war separated them, and—at the time devoted to Kraepelinian psychiatry—was to no small degree attracted to psychoanalysis by Tausk's enthusiasm and by his brilliant presentation of the Freudian theory. The translation, undertaken to fill a gap in the psychoanalytic literature available in English, serves in a measure to discharge a debt of gratitude to the author. D. F." Clearly, Feigenbaum's efforts were rewarded, as this study remains the most well-known of all Tausk's writing, especially in the English-speaking world, where it is cited in contemporary Media Studies as often as it appears likewise in conversations of psychoanalysis.

I find it additionally interesting that Feigenbaum mentions his erstwhile devotion to Kraepelin (who, among other things, introduced *Volkspsychiatrie* and the DSM to the world) as a sideways explanation for his interest in Tausk. This would imply that Feigenbaum, too, saw an ethnopsychiatric thread running through Tausk's work.

<sup>118</sup> Tausk does use the term *Maschine* at time to describe the functioning of the apparatus when defining the phenomenon, but he overwhelmingly tends toward the use of the term *Apparat*. The fact that he chooses *Apparat* for the titular description of the phenomenon is a directive that I take seriously in the reading of this study.

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Additionally, my (non-comprehensive) comparison of Feigenbaum's translation with the original German-language text has led me to note that Feigenbaum includes a few mistranslations of "false-friend" terms (e.g. he translates "Reden" [speaking] as "reading," "Starre" [rigidity] as "stare"), signaling that one must proceed with caution when reading his translation overall.

<sup>119</sup> In Max Brod's well-known recollection of a conversation with the author, Brod asked if there was "hope outside this manifestation of the world that we know." "Oh, plenty of hope," quipped Kafka with a smile, "an infinite amount of hope—but not for us." (Brod and Kafka qtd. in Benjamin, *Selected Writings* 798)

<sup>120</sup> See Bertram Lewin's 1950 obituary for Paul Federn (296).

<sup>121</sup> Tausk directly invokes the concept of narcissism in terms of ego development, which I will later discuss as it arises in these case studies, but he does not treat it as a pathological condition.

<sup>122</sup> Tausk's 1913 study, "Zur Psychologie der Kindersexualität" [On the Psychology of Childhood Sexuality] was based on his eldest son, Marius. This is not stated in the study itself (Tausk uses the pseudonym "Fritz" for the ten-year-old subject), but has been confirmed in Marius's memoir as well as in personal conversations with Rob Tausk.

<sup>123</sup> This term "identity politics" was coined in a 1977 statement by the Black feminist lesbian organization known as the Combahee River Collective, in which the authors write, "Our politics evolve from a healthy love for ourselves, our sisters and our community which allows us to continue our struggle and work. This focusing upon our own oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics. We believe that the most profound and potentially most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression."

<sup>124</sup> As earlier noted, this term is attributed to the work of Erik Erikson.

<sup>125</sup> The condition is described as "böartige Mittelohreiterung"; today it would likely be classified as chronic suppurative otitis media (CSOM), an inflammation that often leads to a perforated tympanic membrane with chronic discharge from the ear.

<sup>126</sup> Sign language, for example, was likely not an option for the patient. Although sign language had made great headway in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries in various parts of Europe, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw several setbacks with the emphasis on Oralism, i.e., deaf children were pressured to communicate through speech, and signing was frowned up. See *Unsichtbare Geschichte(n) sichtbar machen* (2024), edited by Anja Werner and Marion Schmidt.

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<sup>127</sup> Whereas her apparatus-doppelgänger is first described to Tausk as having moving limbs, for example, by her third session of analysis, she describes only a sarcophagus-like shell onto which limbs and other body parts are drawn.

<sup>128</sup> Chief among those who have located a secular or heretical mysticism in Kafka's work are Gershom Scholem and Walter Benjamin. Scholem, the preeminent scholar of Jewish mysticism, wrote that he "found in Kafka the most perfect and unsurpassed expression of this fine line (between religion and nihilism), an expression which, as a secular statement of the Kabbalistic world-feeling in a modern spirit, seemed to me to wrap Kafka's writings in the halo of the canonical" (qtd. in Biale 75).

<sup>129</sup> I rely here upon Harry Zohn's translation except for one key word—I have kept "Apparat" intact as "apparatus" rather than using Zohn's "machinery," for reasons that will be obvious to the argument of this dissertation (*Illuminations* 141).

<sup>130</sup> Tausk emphasizes the importance of *Objectwahl* [object-choice] and *Objectfindung* [object-finding] and the distinction between them. "Ein Object wird vom Intellekt gefunden, von der Libido gewählt" [An object is found by the intellect and chosen by the libido] (*GPLS* 267).

<sup>131</sup> Natalija A.'s study likely took place in Belgrade during the year 1917 or 1918—an estimate I cannot prove with total precision, but propose according to Tausk's footnotes, which mention two publications from 1917 and 1918 that appeared during or directly after the writing of this article, a reference to another patient (Josef H.) to whom Tausk attended at the Belgrade neurological-psychiatric ward, and the fact that Tausk did not return from the Eastern Front until November of 1918.

<sup>132</sup> Whether or not the name is an alias chosen by the author (Tausk, after all, put care into the crafting of his own pseudonym in his earlier years, as I mention in Chapter Two), it should be of interest that the name Natalija is one with both a markedly Slavic spelling and of great cultural significance to Serbia at the turn of the century. At thirty-one in 1917, Natalija A. would have been born during the reign of Queen Natalija Obrenović, wife of Milan I, King of Serbia. The name thus demonstrates a clear connection to Belgrade. Without mentioning anything of her religion or cultural background, Tausk nevertheless drops this clue in understanding her situation as a political subject of Southeast Europe.

<sup>133</sup> The Central Powers in World War One consisted of the German Empire, the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria. They were otherwise known as the Quadruple Alliance, and fought and were eventually defeated by the Allied Powers of France, Great Britain, and Russia.

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<sup>134</sup> Two of the three examples were included in Freud's 1919 revision of *Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens*.

<sup>135</sup> If these details seem familiar, it's because they have already come up in my biographical gloss of Tausk's life in Chapter Two. Tausk refers to the scene as recounted by a "Herr A." in his study and, in any other case, I would not presume that the study is one of self-disclosure. This presumption has tempted some to make unfounded claims regarding Tausk's psychological state (Mark Kanzer, for example, hypothesizes that the twenty-three-year-old student of romance languages in Tausk's study on alcoholic delirium is, in fact, Tausk—Marius Tausk dismisses this as quite impossible). "The Faith of the Fathers", however, is cited in depth in Marius Tausk's short essay "Victor Tausk as Seen By His Son," when explaining Victor's reasons for conversion. Marius elides the narrator of "Herr A." completely, counting the words as his father's own. As Marius would have been present for the incident at the center of this study, I read his inclusion of the study in his father's biography as confirmation of its reflection upon Tausk's own life.

An additional biographical note is thus warranted here with regards to the author's biographical presence in this study: The study was published in the *International Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, vol. 4, issue 1916/1917, and Victor's father Herman had only recently died in March of 1916. This study thus seems even more quietly imbued with Victor's own personal struggle with his relationship to his father and his heritage as a Jewish son.

<sup>136</sup> When I invoke the term "heretical," I am relying upon Kitty Millet's formulation of the heresy of kabbalistic tradition's migration into a secular literature from *Kabbalah and Literature*. "Although kabbalistic aesthetic experience offers new access points to Judaic epistemology, meant to preserve the tradition, not to destroy it, its migration into literature, culminating with Kafka, creates the coordinates for a modern Jewish subject beyond *halakhah's* boundaries [...] To produce this path, *aggadah* must mimic literature. Scholem posits this other path as a consequence of the heretical kabbalah's first eruption in modernity [...]" (7).

<sup>137</sup> Isaac Luria (1534-1572) was a Jewish mystic in the Safed community. He defined the initial stage in the emergence of existence "as a negative one: the withdrawal of the infinite divine *ein sof* from a certain 'place' in order to bring about 'empty space' in which the process of creation could proceed. The Lurianic mystics call this process *zimzum* (constriction) [...]" From Joseph Dan's *Kabbalah: A Very Short Introduction*, page 74.

<sup>138</sup> *Verleugnung* is, additionally, the mechanism by which Freud characterizes perversion. He develops this in "The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido" (1923), in the context of childhood sexuality where it relates to

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castration and sexual differences, and the (male) child's disavowal of seeing the absence of the male genital.

<sup>139</sup> "If supplementarity is a necessarily indefinite process," Derrida writes, "writing is the supplement *par excellence* since it proposes itself as the supplement of the supplement, sign of a sign, *taking the place of* a speech already significant: it displaces the *proper place* of the sentence, the unique time of the sentence pronounced *hic et nunc* by an irreplaceable subject, and in return enervates the voice. It marks the place of the initial doubling," writes Derrida in *Of Grammatology* (281).

<sup>140</sup> See Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*; Wolfgang Kayser's "Versuch einer Wesensbestimmung des Grotesken."

<sup>141</sup> In the preface to *Cromwell*, Victor Hugo writes that poetry of a new society would take "a step which, like the upheaval of an earthquake, will change the whole face of the intellectual world. It will set about doing as nature does, mingling in its creations—but without confounding them—darkness and light, the grotesque and the sublime; in other words, the body and the soul, the beast and the intellect" (363).

<sup>142</sup> Islam seemingly has no bearing on the structure of Husein's life until he laments that he not allowed to eat cured pork, presumably due to halal dietary restrictions. It seems thus that Husein's identity as a Muslim is piecemeal and experienced as an ethnic detail more than it is a religious one. It is an accurate representation of a "gypsy" character of this general time and place to be Muslim; by and large the population of Roma in Bosnia following the expansion of the Ottoman Empire into the Balkans were Xoraxane Roma (see *Gypsies in the Ottoman Empire* by Elena Marushiakova and Veselin Popov, page 55)

<sup>143</sup> Over the years of Christian landlords and Turkish conquerors, many peasants were expelled from their lands or fled serfdom, leading to a "military strata sprung from free peasantry" writes historian Eric Hobsbawm in *Bandits* (70). Some fancied themselves as Robin Hood robber-liberators and avengers, others accepted land "from the emperor or tsar or other prince against the obligation to maintain arms and horse, and to fight the Turk under chieftains of their own choosing, and thus became the guardians of the military frontier, a sort of rank-and-file knighthood [...] Nevertheless, they were essentially free—as such superior to and contemptuous of servile peasants [...]."

<sup>144</sup> Tausk brings this up in discussion on 19 October, 1910 with the Psychoanalytic Society. See *Minutes 1910-1911*.

<sup>145</sup> "At the conclusion, then, of this exceedingly condensed inquiry," Freud writes at the end of *Totem and Taboo*, "I should like to insist that its outcome

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shows that the beginnings of religion, morals, society and art converge in the Oedipus complex” (*SE* 13: 159)

<sup>146</sup> Ottoman Turkish greeting meaning “hello” or “welcome”.

<sup>147</sup> The Ottoman title for the municipal building of the Prizren authorities.

<sup>148</sup> A large city in present-day Kosovo.

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