Regulating Neglect: Territory, Planning, and Social Transformation in Medellín, Colombia

by

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Professor Ananya Roy, Chair
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Abstract

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This research project investigates state practices of disinvestment in the *comunas* of Medellín, Colombia, neighborhoods marked by concentrated levels of blight, violence, and poverty. The dissertation adopts the case of social urbanism, a model of urban planning intervention adopted in disinvested neighborhoods in Medellín, Colombia. Social urbanism transformed a city once known for powerful drug cartels and unspeakable violence into a city of mass transit gondolas, monumental libraries, and architectural beautification for the poorest neighborhoods. These neighborhoods, commonly known as the *comunas*, are one of the main sites of social urbanism intervention. City officials, together with architects, social scientists, and investors, launched pro-poor projects of social redistribution, turning *comunas* long dominated by armed groups into new territories of state intervention.

My dissertation research contributes to the emerging field of scholarship concerned with the politics of neglect in cities across the global south and north. Based on ethnographic and archival research, this study provides a situated account of the restructuring of social welfare policies in contested cities like Medellin. It exposes the transformation of poor areas into laboratories of experimentation for "best practice" models, participatory democracy, and pro-poor development policy. The study demonstrates how state conflicts over planning practice, an unsettled world of homegrown political rivalries, transnational planning expertise, and neoliberal poverty agendas, together inscribe the persistent neglect of the poor as an emergent model of "social" intervention. I interrogate how social interventions were framed in certain ways as political rationalities used to divide, order, and control space in order to reconfigure how poverty is regulated in the city. Medellin's *comunas*, no longer confined to the peripheries of the city or the patronage practices of politicians, was transformed into the new backbone of planning practice – an institutionally occupied state space.

For my family,
here and there

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PROLOGUE

Imagine gliding along steel cables from one station to the next, the wind gently swaying the aerial cable car from side to side. The steep grade of the mountain magnifies as the cable car proceeds with each segment of the trip. A sweeping panoramic view of the city documents a dense variety of housing settlements, churches, home-based businesses, and soccer fields tightly hugging the imposing hillside. To the east, the soft curve of the Medellín River slowly straightens from north to south along the valley floor. Dense settlements in the north of the city riddle the east and west banks of the river, making the distinction between formal and informal housing difficult to decipher from above. The final stretch of the segment closes in on neighborhood frames: a public bus making its way through a windy, single-lane, uphill road, a motorcycle with two young men racing past without helmets on, and a group of neighbors standing in front of a local market at a nearby street corner. These aerial cable cars are the first of its kind to operate as mass transit in Colombia. Far from the more commonly known gondolas that link resorts or tourist sites to urban centers, the Medellín Metro-cable provides an alternative mode of public transportation for the poor living in *comuna* neighborhoods.

Sergio Fajardo's election as municipal mayor [2004-2007] marked a formative moment in transforming how people saw the *comunas*. He introduced social urbanism, an urban model of state intervention. The city, once known for powerful drug cartels and unspeakable violence turned into a city of mass transit gondolas, monumental libraries, and architectural beautification for the poorest neighborhoods. City officials, together with architects, social scientists, and financial investors, launched pro-poor projects of social redistribution, turning *comunas* long dominated by armed groups and plagued by state disinvestment into newly defined territories of intervention. Residents of the *comunas* began to see and experience concrete signs of state investment in the form of these and other urban projects in their neighborhoods. The state's presence in the *comunas*, long identified with an institutional absence, transformed into the motor of urban development, and thus, the problems of informality, disorder, and poverty became the central pivots of state redistribution projects in Medellín. Here lies the point of departure for this study.

Medellín's Comunas

For years, Medellín's *comunas* represented the fissures of state governance. The *comunas* offer a housing solution to generational waves of internally displaced people and rural migrants, while serving as the battleground for urban militias, drug traffickers, and other armed groups struggling over the control and division of territory. Close to 2.4 million total residents inhabit the 380.2 km^2 of the city sitting 1,475 meters above sea level in a Valley of the Andes. By 1950, the city's population had spilled over from the eastern to western margin of the Medellín River and started creeping across the landscape into the broader Valley of Aburra Metropolitan Area. Medellín's administrative boundaries are based on 16 *comunas* (districts), 5 *corregimientos* (rural townships), and 249 *barrios* (neighborhoods).[1] A walk through any *comuna*, however, reveals existing milieus of communities not found on any municipal map, from emergent informal neighborhood annexations to the invisible boundaries that define the territorial strongholds of urban militias.

People use the word *comuna* to identify the social ills of Medellín – a coming together of provisional homes with the permanence of violence, poverty, and residual influences of a narcotics boom in everyday life. The *comunas* offer a label to geographically contain social problems as something located elsewhere and means to situate issues in relation to the Medellín cartel. Medellín has sixteen diverse *comunas*, yet the term is popularly used to make distinct derogatory references. The *comunas* have historically lacked the financial support and institutional presence of the state visible in other parts of the city. In a report by *Medellín Como Vamos*, northeastern *comunas* alone were estimated to house more than 25% of Medellín's population.[2] The last official census, conducted by the Administrative Department of National Statistics (DANE), took place in 2005. As a result, the most recent population counts are only estimates.


N
Corregimiento de Santa Elena
1 Popular
2 Santa Cruz
3 Manrique
4 Aranjuez
5 Castilla
6 12 de Octubre
7 Robledo
8 Villa Hermosa
9 Buenos Aires
10 La Candelaria
11 Laureles Estadio
12 La América
San Javier 13
14 El Poblado
15 Guayabal
16 Belén
Bello
Envigado
Itagüí
Corregimiento de San Cristóbal
Corregimiento de Altavista
Corregimiento de San Antonio de Prado

Map of Medellín
(By *comuna and corregimiento)*
Note. Adapted from
Favela Issues, 2010.

The *comunas* are impossible to miss. The neighborhoods stretch across the landscape and are deeply immersed in the social fabric of the city. You can see them from the Metro commuter line and from the main road linking the north to the south of the city. While I lived in the United States, I visited Medellín frequently enough to see *comunas* transform across the city. I did not grow up in Medellín, but I had family that lived in a northwestern *comuna barrio*. As a child, I remember taxi drivers were known to refuse making a trip into the heart of the *comunas*, even if an extra tip was paid. While growing up, I had seen how many *recicladores* who lived in the *comunas,* the informal collectors of cardboard, plastic, and other used items, had turned their makeshift carriages led by donkeys and horses for fast moving wood pallets with wheels. From the northwest side of the river, I witnessed how *comunas* on the northeast penetrated and spread across the mountainside each year. In the evenings, I could hear the sound of guns, and occasionally bombs, go off in the city.

My biggest surprise took place in 2007, when a giant black building, that looked like three loaves of rye bread from afar, interrupted the northeastern *comuna* landscape. I had seen the urban transformations of historic walkways and the replacement of informal vendors with state-licensed shacks in downtown, but I had never seen such a large monument in the *comunas.* The building was the *Biblioteca Parque España,* the first of five new library parks created as part of social urbanism. The architectural design of the library – black, tall, and imposing – clashed with the subdued colors and predominantly two and three story homes in the *comunas.* It was not until I began fieldwork, in 2008, that I had a chance to walk from the Medellín River to the Santo Domingo neighborhood. The metro line was already in place, but I had always seen the northeastern *comunas* from afar. I scheduled a meeting with the co-director of *Con-vivamos,* a non-profit organization in Santo Domingo. The 45-minute walk up the steep hillside placed me face to face with popular imaginaries of the *comunas.*

I could see that the library sat in stark contrast to deeply embedded depictions of the *comunas.* Colombian film *La Virgen de los Sicarios* had vividly captured the flowing rush of blood-stained streets in these poor, hillside neighborhoods in recounting the romance between a young *sicario* killer with a nihilistic writer. Pablo Escobar alone had become a central figure in films documenting the stories of his global narcotics influence, including Johnny Depp's *Blow,* and *Pablo Escobar*, *El Patron del Mal* a popular Colombian television series. I realized that I had made a mistake – choosing to take that walk in the midday heat. The streets were paved, and while they curved and weaved, the street numberings made the order easy to follow. Local businesses included home delivery of laundry machine rental and nail services alongside stand-alone grocery markets, restaurants, and office supplies. Although it was a weekday, there were a lot of people on the street. I saw the *comunas,* a monument to an embedded history of violence, together with the newly built library, a symbol to replace the memory of the state's institutional absence.

Aside from drugs and violence, though, Colombia offers a rich history as one of the oldest democracies in the Western hemisphere. Circulating discourses, in the form of images and narratives, shape the stories told of people and places, offering a glimpse of the "ownership, entitlement and familiarity" behind those with the power to write, depict, and represent (Pratt 1992). The *comunas* encapsulate the ability of the state to create both a monument and myth of violence within the social fabric of the city. In a fruitful attempt to capture the seemingly oppositional experiences of everyday life in Colombia, artists have opened new spaces of catharsis. Medellín's Fernando Botero creates massive, larger than life characters that reveal the uneven power imbalances of democracy, documenting the relationship between pervasive social structures and everyday politics on canvases and sculptures. Gabriel Garcia Marquez's introduced magical realism in Colombia. *Colombia is Passion*, a national marketing campaign, has taken up his literary inspiration to attract new waves of global tourists. The legacy of violence, while difficult to forget, remains ingrained in the dynamic interplay between urban politics and national development.

The Making of Medellín's Laboratory



MEDELLIN espera en este año de 1926

la visita de 20,000 turistas colombianos

La ciudad está situada en el centro de la república y a ella se puede venir de cualquier parte del país en pocos días.

Hay en Medellín muchos hoteles con todas las comodidades modernas; magnífico servicio de automóviles y coches, clubes sociales, entre ellos el Campestre con campos de golf y de tennis, swiming pool, billares, salones de comedor y de baile, etc., etc.

El clima de Medellín es delicioso. Hay paseos por el valle y las montañas por buenos caminos con maravillosos paisajes.

La vida social es intensa.

Venga usted a pasar unos días a Medellín. Los pasará muy agradablemente, y si usted es hombre de negocios, podrá aprovechar su paseo para ganar dinero, comprando mercancías de sus cien diversas fábricas, comprando acciones de compañías que dan grandes dividendos, comprando terrenos y casas que dan renta y aumentan de valor constantemente.

PASEO DE LA PLAYA

SMP ad
Note. Adapted from Revista *Progreso, 1926.*

As early as 1926, a group of business elites marketed Medellín as a tourist destination with good climate, modern city amenities, and a cultural hub. Civic boosterism played a powerful role in attracting economic investments and shaping urban growth. By 1946, though, a period of intense, politically embedded conflicts known as *La Violencia* began sweeping across the country. Violence heightened with the *Bogotazo* in April 1948, a moment of riots and urban disorder that began with the assassination of liberal candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in the capital of Bogotá. Violent conflicts between liberals and conservatives left the capital heavily damaged, but in terms of material losses, the ensuing cycles of violence would predominately affect and destroy rural livelihoods spread across small towns in the country's interior, in which somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 Colombians died. The president declared a national state of crisis in 1949. Medellín, in contrast to Bogotá, emerged relatively unscathed from the political conflict, while experiencing a bold and bustling process of urban transformation.

Medellín became a terminal site for rural to urban migrants seeking relief from the cyclical return of violence. Cities gained a powerful foothold in Colombia as places of opportunity. While early 20th century city beautiful movements fed into the mid-century ideal of the modern city, a combination of economic growth and economic development fostered vital signs of national progress across urban centers.



Medellín's Population *1905-2008*
Note. Adapted from *Del Miedo a la Esperanza,* 2008.

The story of urban development cannot be told without detailing the national context of internal displacement and rural migration to cities in Colombia. Armed conflict evolved and expanded across Colombia into the 1950s, embroiling guerrillas, state military, urban militias, and paramilitaries for more than five decades. The 1960s paved the way for two important processes at the national scale. First, the growth of the two largest leftist guerrilla groups – the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC) and *the Ejercito de Liberacion National* (ELN) – these developed in part by disillusioned civilians in response to eroded politics, gaining a considerable stronghold in rural areas. The government's power and authority in rural areas was weakened further with the emergence of paramilitary groups in the 1970s, which initially provided security to large landowners against guerrilla kidnapping and extortion. But by the 1980s, the paramilitaries were being identified with close collaborative ties to the state's armed forces. The paramilitaries fulfilled counterinsurgency goals with the systematic use of force and terror. Viewed through a lens of violent political objectives, the ideals of modern progress and community took form in the development of cities as an outgrowth of rural strife.

Urbanization, the second important process at the national scale, was magnified by global economic change, national policies promoting urban development, and violent displacement from rural areas. The phenomenon represented one instance of a broader global trend evident in Latin America. While in 1960 one in two Latin Americans was a peasant, predictions suggest that by 2015, four out of every five Latin Americans will live in cities (Draibe and Riesco 2007). The absorption of internally displaced and rural migrant population by cities placed new pressures on the state to deal with the demands of new urban dwellers. While a municipal planning office existed in Medellín by 1960, centralized state control limited mayoral power to raise revenues or execute projects. By the 1970s, Medellín's population growth had reached over one million inhabitants, with dense *comuna* settlements concentrated in the steeply graded slopes of the city.

State power in Colombia, organized across centralized institutions until 1991, left cities with few resources to invest in infrastructure projects. As such, urban agendas were not taken up directly by the state, but rather by business and political elites, technical experts, academics, and *comuna* residents. Elite circles dominated traditional politics and were firmly grounded in party-based loyalty and patron-client relations. Beginning in 1988, Colombian municipal mayors were elected by popular vote. Previously, appointments were for one-year terms, which could be extended to two. The 1988 reform secured two-year mayoral terms, which were extended to four years in 2002. In 1991, constitutional reform decentralized administrative powers to local government in an effort to expand democratic participation and reduce violent conflicts across Colombia. The social and political goals of constitutional reform came with the parallel narrowing of entitlement programs for the poor and support for economic liberalization (Bocarejo 2011). In cities, mayors took the reins of urban development, abiding to national laws mandating territorial ordering at the municipal scale (Eslava 2009).

By taking up Medellín as a laboratory of intervention, planners mediated the exercise of state power, while setting an urban example of progress for the nation. Cities across Colombia faced the consequences of rural migrants that saturated existing urban centers and expanded across informal settlements on riverbanks, mountainsides, and garbage dumps. In Medellín, the 21st century social urbanism experiment engaged with a long history of social rationales taken up by progressive elites to promote transformative urban planning practice. Medellín is not a capital city, and as such, the formulation of urban projects directly targeting the poor living in the *comunas* provided an exemplary use of state power. Social projects in cities contrasted to a national neo-liberal push to violently eradicate crime in rural and urban communities, led by then president Álvaro Uribe. As such, progressive urban reform in cities served to simultaneously counter right-wing social initiatives at the national scale.

While urban transformation generated a powerful progressive base in Medellín, violence and fear are intertwined with the project of social urbanism. Here, violence represents a contested confrontation between state power and rival authorities, a conflict that continues to play out across the nation. Fear, on the other hand, magnifies the unsettled concerns of planners in creating social rationales to enclose the imagined risk of the *comunas* in a global project to transform Medellín. The city's laboratory has gained the admiration of people from around the globe, but urban transformation is confounded with an alleged control and mitigation of violence, poverty, and informality. My research project is about Medellín, a city that I have spent a lot of time in while growing up, and as a fieldwork site for the past eight years. The way in which I think about the city is marked by these experiences, and especially by my own struggles and interrogation of Medellín's urban transformation. I continue to revisit Medellín in thinking and writing about the city. This is a project of rethinking history, and my position as an urban ethnographer, in relation to the urban transformation of Medellín.

CHAPTER 1
Social Urbanism's Opus

Recognizing the distinction between juridical regulation (legal), cultural regulation (collective, varying from context to context), and moral regulation (individual) gave way to formulating a hypothesis - the 'divorce between law, morality and culture: a lack of moral or cultural approval for legal obligations and cultural and/or moral approval for illegal actions.' The hypothesis permits accurately describing or interpreting the key difficulties of cohabitation.
- *Antanas Mockus,* Bogotá mayor (1995-97, 2001-03)

For the poor, the only alternative to television for their leisure time is public space. For this reason, high-quality public pedestrian space, and parks in particular, are evidence of a true democracy at work.
- *Enrique Peñalosa,* Bogotá mayor (1998-2000)

Medellín is a city of urban opportunity. As early as 1899, a group of business elite took on the role of organizing and leading the modernization of the city. The city transformed into the experimental grounds for pursuing the twin social goals of land valorization with an aggressive civic boosterism campaign. In the 1950s, the brazen international expertise of modernist architects, from Le Corbusier to Paul Wiener and Josep Luis Sert, took up Medellín as a living laboratory for combining technical proficiencies with a new vision of the city's future. The confluence of rural to urban migration, industrial decline, and civil conflict, together with the powerful interests of a potent political and business class, dramatically reconfigured the face of urban experiments in Medellín. In the 1970s, New Deal economist Lauchlin Currie envisioned a more equitable fulcrum of economic growth in Colombian cities – the building industry – and created a macroeconomic plan to draw rural migrants to urban centers with the promise of work, savings, and ultimately, housing. The social rationales of these projects gave legitimacy to these actors as historical brokers of urban knowledge, and thus, articulated innovative urban experiments.

Planners have historically reinvented organizing logics of transformation, creating solutions to pressing urban problems in Colombian cities. It is within this context that city mayors recently seized the opportunity to transform political agendas into social calls for urban change. In Bogotá, the *cultura ciudadana* (citizen culture) campaign of Antanas Mockus [1995-97, 2001-03] and the pedagogical urbanism of Enrique Peñalosa [1998-2000] took up civic culture, transportation, and public space renovation as the key sites of urban transformation. In Medellín, Sergio Fajardo [2004-07] adopted social urbanism to secure state investments in libraries, mass transit gondolas, and pedestrian walkways in the *comunas*, poor neighborhoods popularly imagined with fear. These mayors redefined the existing boundaries of violent conflict and poverty, redefining neighborhoods historically left off planning maps into new territories of social redistribution and civic change. The triad of mayors, learning and referencing each other's work, guided the making of these cities into loci of global change. As planners of the city's future, these mayors represent both the protagonists of newly articulated urban models and the brokers of technical solutions to social problems. This is the world in which the social urbanism experiment came to be.

This study uses the term "regulating neglect" to identify how social urbanism was taken up by planners in reshaping urban stigmas, poverty, and oversight in the *comunas*. The *comunas,* once neglected by the state, became the central pivot of social investments in newly defined urban territories in Medellín. I study the "state spaces" of planning practice – interrogating how social interventions are framed in certain ways as political rationalities used to divide, order, and control the spaces occupied by urban poverty. Understanding social urbanism demands a historicization of different urban experiments by planners in Medellín. This project uses history to make sense of the present. With this pursuit in mind, my study moves between the analytical categories of territory, planning, and social transformation in historically framing the regulatory spaces taken up as rationales of urban intervention. These regulatory spaces are examined as planning experiments that relationally shape state institutions and the inscription of the poor in Medellín. The development of social urbanism in the *comunas* serves as the point of entry for this study, asking: *how did the state restructure urban territory to remake social welfare in Medellín?*

My project contributes to the emerging field of scholarship concerned with the politics of neglect in cities. As such, this research examines Medellín as a paradigmatic case of urban experimentation by arguing the following: first, social urbanism provided a technical and administrative structure to advance innovative forms of state intervention; second, embedding social urbanism within a broader project of constitutional reform enabled the state to adaptively respond to urban crisis in spaces marked by disinvestment; and third, state officials constituted competing visions of the social into an innovative form of urban welfare policy. A historically situated ethnography provides an opportunity to study the reshaping of *comunas* into an innovative laboratory of social welfare in Medellín within a broader lineage of experiments with urban development.

The existence of informal housing since at least 1850 in Medellín indicates a unique urban formation – the *comunas* as a residue of state experiments with planned and unplanned development, despite existing social rationales of intervention. This historic conjuncture offers the comparative grounds to explore the depths of the social rationales taken up by planners in experimenting with the place of informality, and thus, the urban poor in the city. My interest is in how the shifting meanings of social welfare are taken up by planners in inscribing who benefits from social redistribution, the kinds of urban protections and services that are included, and the embodiment of territory in ordering *comunas* in the city. In the following sections, I outline the theoretical anchors of this project and detail the methods of research, which are followed by three empirical chapters that interrogate the makings of social urbanism. Like all interrogations, the aim is to question – to make the familiar strange. In historicizing the expansive reach of urban experiments, one discovers many unwritten stories of urban transformation and contributions of protagonists from across the globe.

The Planners of Social Urbanism

Social urbanism represents a dramatic shift in how social rationales were organized in formulating urban interventions in Medellín. In reconfiguring territory, and ultimately social welfare, planners drew from technical frameworks, in addition to a form of legitimacy secured as the local lived experts. Who, though, were these planners? I use the term planners broadly, borrowing from Isabel Hull's definition of "practitioners of civil society" to identify an elite cusp of state officials, scholars, and city residents actively involved in urban politics (Hull 1996). In Medellín, these practitioners embraced ideas of urban progress and development as the informal regulators of moral conduct, and thus, assuming responsibility over the rest of the population. These elites, however, were not always found in municipal planning offices. The practitioners are local lived experts that research the city in public and private institutions, residents organized in and outside of the *comunas,* and professionals from a range of fields. Despite the ebbs and flows of violence in the city, these protagonists of social urbanism have chosen to make Medellín their home.

As lived experts of Medellín, these residents can be further divided into two groups. First, there are the lived experts who hold professional appointments as municipal officials or contractors of the state. The second group of lived experts resides in the *comunas* and serves a dual function as the interlocutors of planning. On the one hand, these residents were active participants called upon by municipal officials to participate in planning workshops, budgeting, and imagining forums. This assembly of the public engaged *comuna* residents, while pre-configuring the conditions of their participation. *Comuna* residents had a second function as interlocutors – the guiding light for the state in these neighborhoods. In order for state officials to enter the *comunas*, they had to rely on residents to direct and deliver the message of urban transformation. As such, residents were a go-between or middleman between the state and neighborhoods in the *comunas* where institutional power was historically absent. Social urbanism, while directed at the urban poor*,* coincidentally served as an apparatus to experiment with territorializing state power in the *comunas*.

Many of Medellín's recent generation of planners lived in the city for most of their lives, some even lingering despite the raging urban conflicts between the world of illegal narcotics and the state in the 1980s and 1990s. Those with enough money or connections left to pursue educational degrees, becoming transportation engineers, sociologists, mathematicians and architects, gaining experience and knowledge from cities around the world. Many came to form Sergio Fajardo's group of friends in Medellín. These were professionals who had returned to Medellín with the intention of transforming the city they had left behind. Dennis Rodgers refers to the way in which people become central protagonists in mediating "politically imaginable solutions" to pressing social problems as a "broker's story" (1998). While the progressive ideas of these lived experts were instrumental in setting political agendas in Medellín, the urban initiatives were mediated as local brokers who used mass media, academic institutions, and even social movements to generate an innovative laboratory of social welfare in the city.

The brokers of social urbanism were a select group of Medellín's residents – educated, traveled, and employed. They were empowered citizens who took on the initiative to pose creative solutions to urban problems in a city marked by poverty, drugs, and violence. While representing Fajardo's political team, many of these lived experts publicly refuted the politicized nature of the social urbanism model. Fajardo's group of friends were not aspiring politicians seeking votes, but rather the very people afflicted by the impacts of urban crisis across the city. Social urbanism generated a movement around municipal officials holding a vested interest in participatory planning, infrastructure investments, and urban design centered on the urban poor. Municipal officials, though, identified both the privileged sites of social intervention and the potential of capitalist enterprise. The promise of social urbanism allowed planners to bring together the state and citizens as mobilized agents of social change in a political imaginary rooted in the *comunas*. These agents reconfigured territory in the city, using precise instruments to measure, analyze, and create models, while urban experts with experience from inside the *comuna* trenches raised awareness of social issues. This was how the protagonists of social urbanism excavated an unchartered territory for the state.

During interviews with the brokers of social urbanism, many of them suggested that the experiment was conceived in response to the deep urban crisis faced by Medellín in the 1990s. The global impacts of deindustrialization and economic restructuring had an effect on the city's transformation, but these planners built a story around the *comunas* as the structuring framework of social urbanism. These lived experts shared a concern for the city's future and were drawn together by personal networks in the city. Raul Fajardo, an architect, gained renown in the city in the 1950s and was well connected to business and political circles, a network inherited by his son Sergio Fajardo. A close friend referred to Raul as an "apostle of Medellín," referring to his role in shaping the city's modern development.[3] Alejandro Echeverri, Sergio Fajardo's right hand architect, completed doctoral studies in Barcelona, gaining insights and close contact with the internationally acclaimed Barcelona Model. Alonso Salazar, a sociologist, journalist, and future mayor, "led Sergio by the hand into the *comunas"* as Fajardo's secretary of government (Sierra 2012). Salazar gained fame in the city for his unrelenting concern and work with youth and the urban poor.

These networks gained even more prominence once connected to development agencies, philanthropic capital, and grassroots organizations across the globe. The protagonists of social urbanism obscured the problems of urban poverty within visionary urban plans to reconfigure territory in Medellín. The implication here is not that planners are ill intentioned, but rather that carrying out planning projects brings striking consequences. In other words, urban planning has expected, legible outcomes, as do the side effects of projects. James Ferguson adopts the term "unauthored constellation" to identify the conducive effects that serve to both expand state power and exert a depoliticizing effect (1990). In Medellín, planners spent considerable effort on organizing, managing, and executing projects. The aim of this study is not to denounce these efforts, but instead to understand how social rationales have historically served as a framework to legitimize the spatial ordering of urban poverty in the city. I seek to historically and ethnographically ground this conjuncture of urban experiments – interrogating how planning frames territory, development, and neglect in legitimizing social change – to creatively produce a framework for order in the city.

Latin American Laboratories

Urban planners played an important role in shaping the global face of Medellín's urban rebirth. The adoption of planning as an instrument to organize social interventions, however, is neither new nor unique to the city. In fact, cities across Latin America have often served as laboratories for experiments, which are taken up and transformed across global circuits of expertise. Latin American cities experienced a dramatic period of urban transformations at the turn of the early 20th century, in part due to state modernization campaigns, population growth, and rapid urbanization (Almandoz 2002, 2007). Modern urban planning ideals from Europe and the United States diffused across the Americas. Business and political elites led the experiments with urban missions extending from public hygiene and civilizing campaigns to city beautiful movements. The export of the city beautiful agenda took form globally through circuits of urban expertise (Freestone 2007). Latin American schools of architecture began to replace the dominance of the beaux-arts tradition and engineering school tradition in the 1940s, which fostered the creation of new institutional spaces to nurture planning expertise (Torre 2002).

In the mid-20th century, modernist architects diffused urban experiments to spread social transformation across new global frontiers. Foreign architects, from Jean-Claude Nicolas Forestier to Le Corbusier to Donat-Alfred Agache, traveled across Latin America creating modern city plans (Lejeune 2005). Similarly, Latin America architects, while raised in the nation's cities, imported the urban blueprint of "metropolitan technology, modernist simplicity, and innovative aesthetics" to hinterland towns (Rego 2012). Captivated by progressive ideals, modernist architects encountered an opportunity to plan new towns that symbolically harbored the nation's transformation. Centralized planning, though, presented considerable conflicts at the local scale, with particularly uneven impacts experienced in low-income communities (1968). But even the "blueprint utopias" rendered by progressive architects led to social exclusion, a dismal reality experienced in the everyday contradictions of urban ideologies (Holston 1989). The unwavering support for modernist planning, even when provincialized, led planners to move away from urban experiments resting on the power of architects and engineers to more comprehensive efforts, a vision called *urbanismo* in Latin America (Almandoz 2010).

The overemphasis on strict technical and rational definitions of planning limited the efforts of modernist architects and engineers. Rapid urbanization in the 1960s transformed many towns into cities, revealing burgeoning urban centers facing the impacts of migration, economic restructuring, and industrialization. The residual, uncontrolled growth at the margins of modernist maps acquired diverse names ranging from squatter settlements to shanties to *tugurios*. The growth of these settlements was intimately tied to processes of urbanization and industrialization in Latin America (Roberts 1978). The labels conveyed derogatory meanings, and persist, though scholars have extensively interrogated both the emergence and circulation of the myths surrounding these settlements.[4] William Mangin's early insights countered existing perceptions of these neighborhoods as places mired in poverty and chaos, instead emphasizing four valuable economic contributions: investment in housing and land improvement, labor force, enterprise, and social capital (1967). Janice Perlman argues that making strict distinctions between formal and informal, market and non-market, legal and illegal are difficult in these "marginal" settlements (Perlman 1979). The informal settlements persist and distinctions remain challenging to decipher.

Informality unearths the contradictory relations between the state and economic liberalization in Latin American cities. Alan Gilbert placed into evidence the relationship between the "slimmed down" state and the expansion of safety nets for the poor, from auto-constructed housing to informal sector employment to subsidies (1997). The trend is not altogether positive, though, and can magnify rather than diminish poverty. From the progressive left, the contradictions of economic liberalization form the basis of a unique social benefit for the urban poor in Latin America: here, the "problem" of poverty is at once a "solution." John Turner asserts that housing policy, at the hands of people, rather than the state, contributes to the more efficient self-building and self-managing of homes and communities (1976). Informal housing provides the state with a discrete, low-cost urban solution that simultaneously serves as a social welfare experiment. As such, the state is not disappearing in Latin America, but rather restructuring existing approaches to redistribution. The policy shift has already been documented in the move away from social protections targeted at the middle-income labor force (Wood and Gough 2004). The remaking of social welfare in Latin American yields an opportunity for planners to organize and address the conflicting goals of social redistribution and market innovation at the urban scale.

Latin American cities have long been the sites of innovative social reform. As strongholds of social struggle and grassroots mobilization, cities offer both a point of access to and participation in collective rights (Castells 1983). While Brazil's paradigmatic 2001 City Statute legally recognized the "right to the city" (Edésio Fernandes 2007), cities across Latin America are now global models for social reform. In Latin America, this post-neoliberal turn is attuned to both the dynamics of a liberalized global economy and the "social responsibilities of the state" (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). Colombian cities offer particularly interesting cases of the "metropolitan miracle," in which progressive city mayors have transformed both urban infrastructure and citizen culture in setting a "nationwide blueprint for governance" (Gutierrez Sanin et. al. 2009). Medellín's own "creative city" model took on new meaning when municipal mayors promoted a unique take on "bottom-up" planning – incorporating the people living in the urban margins as part of inclusionary urban design (Zamudio and Barar 2013). The creative management of urban crisis and improvement, though, are only short-term alleviations to the unwavering poverty and violence in communities housed by the urban poor (Brand and Dávila 2011). And while Medellín remains in vogue across mass media headlines, philanthropic social partnerships, and global circuits of expertise, the city remains an understudied laboratory of social welfare.

Making the Case for Historicity

Cities, taken up as centers of urban innovation and enterprise, are at the crux of knowledge transfer economies. "Fast-policy" regimes rapidly circulate and cross over jurisdictional borders as best practice models (Peck and Theodore 2010). Grounding the diffusion of policies and their mutations, though, requires interrogating and theorizing this global phenomenon (Cochrane and Ward 2012). A historically situated ethnography provides a platform to critically engage with the street-level workings of policy transfer. The purpose here is two-fold: first, widening the spectrum of "traveling technocrats," from policymakers and urban experts to include the actors who consciously embody political imaginaries in transforming policy locally, nationally, and globally (Larner and Laurie 2010); second, embracing the "transnational municipal moment" as an opportunity to examine the historical depth of circulating ideas, spaces, and policies (Saunier and Ewen 2008). Tracing urban history, however, is not limited to the municipal archive. Instead, the archive can draw from comparative infrastructure and public utilities data to international conferences to professional journals – collections extending from city offices to the World Bank to global civic exhibitions (Hietala 2012). The archives, together with a situated study of contemporary urban planning, reveal the contested spaces carved out by knowledge economies.

Here, space is not dead or flat, but instead constituted through layers of interactions, distinct trajectories, and works in progress (Massey 2005). As such, the extension and organization of urban policies across space and time only clarifies the intimate relationship to anti-politics, "the reduction of public policy to questions of science and technology"

(Clarke 2012). Historicizing the social construction of space offers a way of seeing how urban planning rationales are borrowed, circulated, and transformed. Arjun Appadurai highlights a unique approach to examining how space is both occupied locally and taken up transnationally, raising a powerful challenge to "construct genealogies of the present" (1996). The task here is one of bringing history and genealogy into dialogue at a point of global connection, which simultaneously permits the study of the past with the contemporary cosmopolitan experience. Saskia Sassen's contrasting approach adopts "history as natural experiment" to identify the formation of new organizing logics and ways of ordering (2008). Space is dismissed for territory, and instead, national state articulations are employed to make visible deep, historical assemblages. Indiscriminate studies of space and territory, however, sideline the revealing attributes of spaces carved outside of grand narratives over time.

A historically situated ethnography brings together the archives with the experiences of present day planning, adopting the municipal scale as a point of reference for understanding the past in relation to the present circulation of ideas. Rather than ask why, this study asks *how* planning enables the existence of a political imaginary claiming the neutral exercise of power. Foucault's own response to challenging universal understandings was to "historicize grand abstractions (1984). His aim was not a chronological history, but of using change as an "analytic frame" for understanding the present (2003). Historicized studies of order and authority extend from the state to informal institutions, the places used to establish boundaries involving people, practices, and mechanisms (Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham 2001). Institutional change speaks to the ways in which order and power are pronounced. Walter Mignolo's own approach to history adopts "border thinking" to delink Western currents of knowledge (2012). Taken up in the realm of planning knowledge, border thinking challenges the amalgam of modernization together with liberalization in the city, a unique space to rethink the development of communities at the borders of municipal maps. Here, the project of historicizing urban experiments in Medellín begins prior to the *comunas* being taken up as object of planning intervention. To do so, I use the following three analytical categories: territory, planning, and social transformation.

Territory

This study adopts a history of territory to trace how social rationales are articulated as urban planning experiments. This type of approach analyzes how planners, broadly identified with organized groups guiding state interests in urban development, frame different techniques, models, and practices as interventions to reconfigure territory in cities. As expressed by Stuart Elden:

> Territory is, clearly, not the only form of state space, much less political space. But it remains an important one. It is precisely because territory is a limited, historically specific, and non-exclusive way of spatial ordering, that it needs to be interrogated more thoroughly (2010b).

Interrogating territory involves piecing together: 1) *political techniques,* as practices embedded within broader models of political rationality, 2) *framings of power*, as expressed by shifts in the object of intervention, and 3) *quantification methods,* as the practices and strategies used to delimit land and population. This methodological approach draws from the work of scholars studying how different framings of territory are taken up as state processes of governance (Ballvé 2012, Brown 2010). A historically situated ethnography brings together the practices, objects, and methods of planning to understand how neglect comes to delineate a state regulated territory of intervention. Here, planners mediate the contested struggle between residents, technical experts, and the state over what defines planning, in addition to the social rationales of intervention.

The ability of planners to contain territory, however, is a fiction. In executing project interventions, planning practices rupture existing systems of rule and units of political organization. The state, imagined as a container of sovereignty, civil order, and public reason, anchors planning to authoritative models of governance. While the state does not operate within institutional "containers" occupied by a single political apparatus (Agnew 1994), the project of ordering state space is one of continually remaking institutional objects and extending the reach of control. This rupture of state containers is particularly relevant to the unique shaping of territorial geographies in the post-Cold War context. The mutation of the state territorial container produced a fragile space for "Third World" countries, one of conflicting and intersecting representations of political and economic empowerment (Dean 2008). As such, the territorial state no longer represents a "claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order" (Weber 1965). The effect of spatial categories, however, is to impose dominant ways of seeing the truth, accuracy, and representation of territory.

The science of mapping deploys precise instruments and measurements in toying with the fiction of contained renderings of territory. Scientific mapping techniques are instrumental in providing a standardized system to order space, but a distinction exists between "structural" and "situated" knowledge that powerfully documents the contrasts between technical and local imaginings of place (Craib 2004). Studying these discrepant translations of maps offers novels way of conceiving of abstract space and challenging existing classification of objects, referenced locations, and framed perspectives. Both the process of containing and rupturing territory, though, involves a waged conflict over constituting selective renderings of expertise and the challenge of multiple representations shaping social spaces (Lefebvre 1991). An alternative approach to scientific mapping explores the giant of globalization. Aihwa Ong links shifting state assemblages of neoliberal experiments with citizenship and governance, while resisting the placement of any boundaries to delimit space (2006). However, the failure to develop a strong relational study between geography and organizing logics of governance leaves the formative role of agency in the abstract.

The persistence of the "territorial trap" in the realm of academia, statecraft, and the politics of everyday life continues to haunt scholars struggling with theoretically reconfiguring existing notions of territory (Brenner and Elden 2009). Despite the analytical shortcomings of territory, its historical deployment offers a unique way of studying multiple interacting systems of political organization, shedding light on the dynamic relationship between the state, capital, and development. The history of territory, however, is not meant to give preference to the local scale as the object of study. In fact, Mark Purcell alerts scholars to the problem of the "local trap" (2006). Scale is to be considered in evaluating the development of territory in relation to social transformations in cities, from citizenship and democracy to innovation and enterprise, but it only offers an entry point. Cities present unique spaces to study the organizing logics of governance that take form in both formal and informal projects (]Roy and AlSayyad 2004). The revival of liberalism in contemporary political ideologies, and in particular, the production of innovative state intervention in cities as a pivot of change provides a unique space to engage with the history of territory through planning.

Planning

Envisioned as a mechanism to promote change, the function of planning is two-fold. Modernist agendas generated a moment of crisis alongside solutions to the contradictions of incongruent orders of governance. Modernity came with a dream of urban change – classifying populations, ordering cities, and social regulation. Colonial cities provided the "experimental" testing grounds for "social" intervention, a project embedded in exercising coercive practices of colonization (Wright 1991). Social planning rationales bounded utopian visions of technological progress with the perception of a new object of rule – nature controlled by man. Nezar AlSayyad argues that colonial urbanism was an expression of dominance through institutions of knowledge, planning, and urban form (1992). Understood as depositories and sources of selective knowledge, colonial cities allowed technical experts to reproduce an "ideological screen positing an imaginary urban order" (Boyer 1986), which fully embodied the powers of hierarchal differentiation and forms of discipline. The politics of the new modern state were based on discipline and dominance, a form of power represented in "the appearance of order" in the planned city (Mitchell 1991a).

Innovative methods of classification introduced a new way of seeing the city. The commanding narratives of technical experts established powerful state rationales and assertively imposed governance, and together, a striking regulator of conduct. Patrick Joyce brilliantly chronicles the development of the 19th century city as an urban object of intervention, documenting the paradoxical regulation of space and population around a discourse of "freedom" (2003). Planners artfully combined urban intervention with the enclosure of freedom, a project implicitly based on social control. The urban "milieau of liberal government" created an experimental laboratory for the ordering of conduct (Osborne and Rose 1999). The masterful organization of classified data created emergent grids of intelligibility, cognitive maps that reorganized the city into accessible categories of comparison and units of counting. This flexible form of governance flattened the disorder and digression of the 19th century city. Mappings of populations, no longer restricted to the parameters defined by planar maps, identified populations as sites of intervention. Planning technologies diagrammed abstract space into normalized government rationalities, but were ill suited to capture the dynamic relationships and effects of state power.

These grids of intelligibility extended scientific classifications from the city to rural forests, a project which paradoxically identified control with enclosure (Scott 1999). Beyond the rural and urban frontiers, institutionalized planning extended the reach of Western economic control. Planning spread to the world of development practice as a state object of rule. Economic expansion, however, was caught between the "double movement" of market expansion and the counteracting efforts tending towards their restriction (2001). At the urban scale, planners combined technical expertise with state intervention in developing "bureaucratic practice articulated through the institutional structures of the state"

(Friedmann 1987). Here, the imaginary of "value-free" planning decisions underwent serious constraints once faced with the conflicts between market expansion and restriction. As such, planning serves as an institutional guise for the "dark side" of its spatialized powers (Flyvbjerg 2003, Yiftachel 1998). Planning is intricately tied to the project of development in the way calculative rationalities of control intensify the contradictory relations between state and society. In generating fixes to the failure of the market, planners generate contradictory social effects.

These exercises of state power through planning reveal an important point of transmission for ideas between government officials, politicians, militias, and residents – the unsettled territorialities that converge, conflict, and fortify one another at the ground level. Historicizing urban transformation goes beyond the organization principles of planning in Europe and progressive movements in the United States. Planning, and its developments at the municipal scale, offer a useful base for invoking historical junctures in reading cities' development beyond the analytical category of the nation-state (Saunier 2002). The exchange of planning ideas has long taken place across cities in the Global South and Global North. Taking up the objects of state intervention, alongside planning rationales, serves as the premise for relationally examining the process of reconfiguring territory in cities. Analyzing the changing meanings of development, economic production, and power makes clear the "constellations of spatial practices aimed at delimiting, representing, and enforcing social boundaries" (Bobrow-Strain 2007). Taken from the viewpoint of dominant elites, planning serves to both newly delimit territory and generate powerful social effects.

Social Transformation

Planning is a tool through which government spatially manages both territory and population in the interests of social transformation. The social production of space cannot be understood, however, as distinct from the capitalist dynamics of "creative destruction" (Harvey 2001). Tania Li refers to the "awkward embrace" between "capitalism and improvement" as a contested realm of governing (2007). Globally, state experiments that embed both market and social objectives vividly demonstrate the twin face of transformative policies. In the United States, Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell identify the relationship between the roll-back of the welfare state and the control of individualized behaviors as implicit to "welfare to work" schemes (2002). Market experiments take unique informal forms too. Julia Elyachar's interrogates the definition of micro-entrepreneurship to illustrate the embedding of "informal" markets in state models of development (2005). Here, the informal deeply penetrates collective understandings of everyday life used to reinvent political rationalities of control. As such, the informal, taken up by the state in the form of institutional absence, regulates social behaviors and fosters opportunities for enterprise (Fairbanks 2009). The resulting patterns of governance provide a platform to explore the broader implications of these experiments.

Experiments with social transformation are intimately linked to the spatial powers of planning, a project ensconced within the ordering of economic, political, and social knowledge. Cities, as receptors of the regulatory effects of global economic processes, can be ranked as "command and control" centers of transnational business and finance networks (Sassen 2001). These hierarchies, however, position the West as global center. By widening the scope of urban theory beyond the boundaries of Western models of planning, the notion of social transformation powerfully mutates across cities in the Global South and Global North. While the "international translation of planning" has garnered attention globally in transmitting urban ideas, space is ultimately a social construct, a relation-based creation between objects, people, and power (Watson 2009). Translation is a tool in itself for critically reexamining the many layers and directions involved in the "diffusion" of urban policy (Jacobs 2012). Despite the allure of tracing traveling ideas, the need to rethink difference and the "regulating fiction" of existing categories used to define cities persists (Robinson 2002). Planning knowledge is powerfully shaped by those *who* plan and *where*. Ultimately, ideas do not translate evenly from city to city and have ripple effects on the urban poor.

These urban effects can be read as alternative spaces of governance. African cities, taken as case evidence of "failed modernization," provide an example of urban crisis intertwined with African urbanisms relayed by ordinary people (Pieterse 2011). AbdouMaliq Simone pushes the borders of urban thinking even further, undertaking ethnographic methods in studying the persistence and survival of informality in African cities as an example of urban resistance to the "normative" stance of urban planning (2004). Beyond the African city, Faranak Miraftab proposes a radical project of resistance to hegemonic models of planning practice, adopting "insurgent planning" in decolonizing existing knowledge (2009). Resistance takes innovative forms beyond state created channels of democracy, as evidenced by mobilization of the urban poor in making a claim to "insurgent citizenship" (Holston 2008). Conflicting expressions of state power, however, present a problem space for government – here lies the importance of "informal" networks to everyday forms of state governance (Ismail 2006). State imposed categories of classification have important ramifications for how public spaces, political representations, and national communities are constituted, but it is the interplay between formal and informal that play a tacit role in rendering emergent state space.

A study of state space brings together history with the existing constructs of territory and planning in providing new analytical frameworks for understanding social transformation beyond the boundaries of formal planning. These emergent territories, however, extend beyond the domain of institutional governance. The politics of space reveals the production of reconfigured objects of rule, from the construction of the social as territory of intervention to the city as a state space that is being reworked at the margins. The spaces between formal and informal generate "both hopeful and dystopic" renditions of social transformation in cities (Bou Akar 2012). It is the very idea of constraint, order, and rules that bring the illegality of the urban poor face to face with "a means to conceive and engage in city making" (Fawaz 2009). "Ungovernability," or the seeming absence of government, results in communities experiencing "different constellations of force and consent" (Watts 2007). However, these contested geographies reveal the dynamics of a state space in which neither the inscription of truth or the exercise of power is limited to institutional government. Here lies the importance of engaging historicity with ethnography in examining the contours of social transformation – a process that took root in informal settlements in Medellín's periphery, but is now reconfiguring urban experiments globally.

A Historically Situated Ethnography

This study engages with social welfare experiments in Medellín. This city was selected as a case study because of the relationship between urban transformation and the historic lineage of rearticulated social rationales. While planners often date social urbanism to the start of Sergio Fajardo's mayoral campaign, this study draws on the historical development of the *comunas,* the focal point of interventions, to trace the reinvention of planning ideas. The historicity of this project is contained within three periods for the purpose of identifying how the social has persisted and transformed as unique urban experiments with urban welfare in Medellín. The social urbanism model took up the *comunas,* poor neighborhoods on the urban periphery, as the direct object of intervention. As such, I use urban experiments as a vehicle to examine the transformation of the *comunas* from an object at the margins of planning to the central agenda. Social urbanism set a powerful precedent for future mayoral agendas – adopting social welfare rationales as the fulcrum to reorder territory and newly occupy emergent state spaces. In order to theoretically widen and analytically deepen the study of social urbanism, I adopt a historically situated ethnography to study three preceding urban experiments.

I specifically studied the *comunas* as an object taken up by planning with the intention of interrogating how social rationales of intervention are produced and circulated. I made a distinct theoretical choice not to study the *comuna* residents as the objects of my analysis. Rather than focus on residents, I focus on historicizing the development of the *comunas* as a form of residual growth, and that for most of their existence, laid beyond the institutional maps of planners in Medellín. To that end, regulating neglect refers to how the historic coalescing of new urban experiments advanced a unique form of social welfare coupled with economic and political domination. Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman use the term "political economy of social policy" to identify the relations between new ruling elites and the inclusion or exclusion of the working class and peasants in the provision of welfare (2008). I argue that the argument also holds true for the *comunas,* a part of the informal sector not included within traditional frameworks of social welfare. And while a deviation from planning norm, *comunas* attest to the embrace of both neglect and social redistribution within the same urban space occupied by the poor.

The urban experiments are part of a historical conjuncture in Medellín. Together, they provide the grounds to comparatively examine each experiment as models of social transformation in Medellín. For the purpose of narrative, these urban experiments are examined chronologically to position the making of social urbanism as an event – the point of entry and closure for this study. An analysis of an event has a two-fold objective – studying the "productive moment in the contemporary history" of the case and the practices "structured through the institutionalization of certain political rationalities and economic concepts" (Roitman 2005). This approach captures evidence of both the street-level practices and the macro-structural conditions leading up to the introduction of the social urbanism experiment. Examining the makings of an event contains the analytical categories within a specific case, but widens the temporal and institutional boundaries to bring forth the dynamic relationships between planning theory and practice. The social urbanism event powerfully documents the everyday inscription of 'technical' and 'expert' discourse within a historical conjuncture – in this case, bringing together a lineage of planning with the unfolding of a new institutional model of social welfare.

In approaching the making of social urbanism as an event, this study brings forth Medellín as the case of research. This study takes place in one city, analyzing three historical experiments with planning to form a lineage, a point of reference documenting patterned practices, techniques, and devices used to understand the makings of social urbanism. Evidence for this research was drawn from detailed interviews with academics, architects, engineers, and planners involved in the implementation of social urbanism. These were members of Sergio Fajardo's team, including public officials, technical experts and residents who have been involved in these neighborhoods since the 1950s. I conducted 70 interviews with state officials, non-profit organizers, academics, and technical experts to approach the question of how the *comunas* came to be understood within the organizing logics of social urbanism. As participants in the making of social urbanism, whether as part of participatory input, employees of the state, or expert points of contact, I identify these actors as fundamental to the state mechanism of social intervention. In addition to interviews, I attended planning-related conferences, community forums, and academic workshops relevant to the development of the social urbanism experiment during the course of fieldwork.

I conducted archival searches in public records and private collections to understand plans, municipal documents, and planning rationales. In order to make sense of the different urban experiments that have taken place in Medellín, I bounded planning practices as specific types of experiments. In addition to social urbanism, I focus on three specific experiments: the *Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas* civic campaigns, the modernist architects technical mappings of the city, and the macro-economic policies of Lauchlin Currie. I collected plans, maps, technical documents, and legal decrees to give an analytical base to each urban experiment I identified. I restricted my search to models closely associated with at least one component of social urbanism, whether formally or informally supported by state resources. For each model, I adopted primary and secondary sources to explore how each urban experiment took up social rationales. Understanding these experiments provides important signs of the challenges and debates taking place over the politics of neglect in Medellín.

The making of social urbanism generates important questions around the coalescing of urban experiments as a historical conjuncture, specifically drawing attention to how planning was instrumental in espousing social welfare policies predicated on regulating neglect. The triangulation of information takes two forms: first, a comparative study of experiments taking place in one city, and second, a combination of archival resources and interview data to study the local state in action, adopting the making of social urbanism as a novel way to frame an event. Tracing the historical shifts of social transformation provides a way to track the reconfiguration of territory, while attesting to the contested relationship between social welfare and regulating neglect by piecing together narratives, indicators, and methods to relay the story of social urbanism. At the heart of this study is a question of how social rationales came to embody urban experiments led by the state.

In the case of Medellín, planning not only shapes the day-to-day realities of institutional governance, but the struggles that come with meeting the dual objectives of welfare provision and managing neglect. Timothy Mitchell artfully identifies the process of defining, categorizing, and ordering with a project of state reason as "enframing," a reality circulated by the technical experts and solidified as a knowledge base permeating into every life niche (1991). The social enframing of urban projects in Medellín uniquely shaped how models powerfully remapped, reimagined, and rebuilt the *comunas* as evidence of urban crisis, to central pivot of enterprise and innovation. As such, this study reveals how state experiments defined, categorized, and ordered neglect into a new urban territory of social welfare.

Medellín's Urban Laboratory as Guide

Medellín, at the forefront of urban innovation agendas, remains an understudied city. Yet, like Medellín, cities across Latin America make up the "most urbanized region in the world."[5] Studies of Latin American urban development highlight the power of administrative and discursive tools in cities, instruments used by elites to legitimize, control, and inscribe space (Gorelik 2001). Institutionalized government discourses of urban progress in Colombia similarly reflect the coercive effects of language and practices in the production of development knowledge (Escobar 1995). A study of the historical unfolding of social urbanism as a model of state intervention brings together the worlds of transnational development expertise, neo-liberal poverty agendas, and contested political rivalries as grounded, everyday institutional practices of governance. Medellín's case reveals an important crux between urban history and planning practice – an opportune space to study the mutations of social rationales in advanced liberal government.

The promise of liberal government combines social and market interests to solidify the power and authority of the state. Latin America offers a living laboratory of urban development in the twenty-first century, a medley of cities that need to be seen "as part of the solution rather than part of the problem of contemporary development in a world that is inexorably becoming urban" (Rodgers, Beall, and Kanbur 2011). Cities' development in the region identifies innovative cases of how capitalist development is being reworked at the ground-level, and in the process, exposing the ways in which the state is reconstituting spaces of governance. Regulating neglect, in the case of Medellín, addresses issues of social redistribution for the urban poor, but is founded on planning practices meant to differentiate and demarcate state spaces of intervention in the city. Caught between the generation of hope by state interventions and the reality of everyday struggles with the impacts of implementation, social urbanism offers a point of entry to studying how the contradictions of social and market objectives are articulated within urban development. Medellín, part of a network of transnational cities committed to radically restructuring the practice of urban governance, presents a case ripe for study in Latin America of how social rationales are mutated into new global forms.

Urban experiments with cities as place-based innovators have engaged cities globally in a competition for the next big idea. In cities around the world, urban calls for "smart growth" and "transit-oriented development" envelope issues of sustainability and walkability into urban discourses on the public good (Calthorpe and Fulton 2001). In the pursuit of capitalist growth, urban cities creatively coalesce multiple competing interests into unique variants of "value-free development" agendas for planners, investors, and community residents (Logan and Molotch 2007). Urban agendas render unique frameworks of reference to visualize the potential of cities as sites of economic development. Medellín's emergence as "innovative city of the year" in 2013 is only the most recent attempt to brand the city's transformation.[6] Social urbanism has been diffused as a model globally. The models protagonists, from Sergio Fajardo to a diverse team of architects and planners, travel to conferences, universities, and mayoral offices across the Global South and Global North publicizing powerful visual evidence, from pictures and maps to statistics and resident quotes, documenting the city's transformation. At the same time, resident's stories of the experience of transformation are marketed in books, news stories, and photos.

This case study examines urban experiments with social rationales in Medellín in order to map the historical coalescing of planning, understood here as ideas, practices, and tools, into reconfigured organizing logics of governance. By historicizing the urban transformation in the *comunas* of Medellín, I give analytical form to social urbanism as an event, a transformative moment in shaping the conditions of social welfare provision in the city. Rather than begin with the study of Medellín as a place bounded by administrative maps or popular imaginaries, I instead focus on historicizing urban experiments used to embed state power and social transformation at the ground level. Social urbanism offers an entry point to studying how the local state embodied incongruent visions of development into a planning experiment that reworked urban poverty from a category of neglect to a central urban agenda.

Chapter Overview

This study is organized as follows: each chapter is built around a planning experiment with social rationales, specifically as they relate to models of urban development in Medellín. In Chapter Two, I introduce three urban experiments with social rationales. First, a private member society model based on local business coalitions that organized interventions at the neighborhood scale. Second, the experiment of international architects invited to serve as experts shaping the modernist project at the city scale. Third, a New Deal macro-economist that made Colombia his home, while setting the terms for a national model of planning. I examine how each of these experiments organized planning projects. The purpose of understanding the social urbanism opus is to reveal how historically, social rationales articulated planning and how different actors took up planning to legitimize control and power in the city. This chapter sets the framework for understanding planning as conflicting layers of power and contested social domains in Medellín.

Constitutional reform in 1991 resulted in decentralizing power to local municipalities, setting new terms for how mayors could exercise control in cities. As such, Chapter Three is organized around the emergence of social urbanism as an experiment and model of urban intervention post-constitutional reform. I examine how a national-scale intervention in Medellín's urban trenches in the early 1990s set a powerful precedent for how social urbanism would unfold as mayors began experimenting with newly acquired powers after reform. While local state officials had previously identified urban politics with an opportunity for corruption, patronage, and lack of transparency, social urbanism broke from existing practice to retrench a new type of state power. Here, I interrogate the use of a specific tool, the Integral Urban Project (PUI), by exploring how this planning instrument was used in defining the terms of project interventions and rationalizing institutional objectives together with those of residents, local experts concerned with the future of their city. I explore the ordering of territory in delimiting a new state space in the *comunas,* areas historically marked by the state's institutional absence. The adoption of social urbanism as an experiment exposes the specific organizing logics used to guide the state's social rationales.

In Chapter Four, I examine the implications of social welfare as Medellín is taken up as a global model of planning. I look at how the use of neglect as a regulatory category reconfigured existing territories in the city and transformed broader discourses around urban poverty. The language around social interventions fortified the legitimacy of the state as a secure manager of investment and progressive development. Community is assumed to be an underlying motivation for participating in social projects, whether as residents, city officials, or even transnational actors, ranging from real estate interests to development experts. This chapter examines the shifting terrain of government in charting out the new boundaries of social intervention as urban projects built on incentives, promises, and visions of state redistribution. The new makings of urban welfare – highlighted here in the constituting of relations and territorial engagements called social urbanism – demonstrate how the politicized spaces of planning negotiated new terms of reference for social intervention.

While social rationales have continued to be reinvented with the mayoral agendas following Fajardo, the planning experiments persist. Chapter Five offers a concluding note – a way of reconciling this study with the historic lineage of social rationales taken up in reconfiguring neglect in the city. Through an investigation of the social, its meaning and how it has been taken up as part of planning, I take apart the framework upon which the state has constructed interventions in Medellín. It reflexively examines the point of departure of this study and returns to the social urbanism story to pose a series of questions for future research. The *comunas* transformed into a global display showcasing how the local state in Medellín encapsulated the twin goals of social welfare with the regulation of neglect. The local state, people representing the residents and victims of urban crisis, the fear of victimization and the promise of change, took on the tenets of civic spirit, architectural design, and comprehensive planning to crystallize the political opportunity at hand. Social urbanism rattled even the smallest urban cavities of the city and radically transformed everyday understandings of social welfare to redefined the meaning of regulating neglect.

CHAPTER 2
Medellín, Laboratory of the Social

> *I conceived the idea of creating a plan for Medellín at the Library of Congress, in Washington, after seeing the plan made by the French architect L'Enfant, for the capital of the United States. During my visit to Washington, I did not know that that the science of urbanism existed. Maybe it was just then becoming popular, crystallizing in books and in schools. I later learned about it, studied it, and since then, it is my hobby, my obsession, the most gratifying of my studies.*
>
> - Ricardo Olano, *Propaganda Civica*

> ***Social Urbanism = Change of Skin:*** *Social urbanism is opportunities, social inclusion, and collective construction. It means we are taking down the walls that for many years separated us, and that today, we can find each other again and make a city for all. These works, located in the places that require them because of their low quality of life indices are a clear political bet: let us construct the best for the most humble. Our buildings, parks and pedestrian walkways are modern and beautiful, here or in whatever city of the planet.*
>
> – Sergio Fajardo, Medellín mayor 2004-2007

The *comunas* – neighborhoods historically identified with violence and poverty – were transformed into the experimental sites of social welfare provision. Social urbanism altered existing planning rationales, reinventing how the state publicly showcased urban interventions in the *comunas* as efforts meant to beautify, revitalize, and reverse historic patterns of disinvestment. Planners explicitly took up the "accumulated historical social debt" of the state, a phrase coined by Sergio Fajardo and right-hand architect Alejandro Echeverri. The phrase articulated new social rationales, transforming the *comunas* from an object of neglect to the fulcrum of an urban agenda.

Social urbanism's approach combined physical design, civic responsibility, and development, creating a unique space for planners to reorganize territory in the city. Historically, the state's scant presence in the *comunas* had overlooked the neighborhoods on the steeply graded mountains of Medellín, some of which had existed for at least a century. With the advent of social urbanism, however, the deeply sedimented social rationales of planning reconfigured the peripheral territories occupied by the poor into a revolutionary center of progressive urban agendas. Planning, a project of ordering land uses, maps, and economic development zones in the city, radically transformed into a vehicle for securing social welfare provision to the urban poor. This study examines the makings of Medellín into an urban laboratory, a testing grounds for experimenting with the meaning of neglect.


Two Problems/Two Challenges
Deep social inequalities + accumulated historic social debt
<Inequalities and poverty are transmitted and multiplied)
Violence with deep roots
<Generational and cultural transmission of violence)
MEDELLÍN. THE MOST EDUCATED

Social Urbanism
Note. Adapted from A. Echeverri's presentation (2012)

Two conditions set the basis for creating social urbanism: persistent intergenerational violence, combined with deep structural inequality, a model based on making changes to the physical design of the *comunas* in order to provide benefits to the urban poor. The social urbanism story is an important one for understanding Medellín's transformation as a laboratory of urban development. Social urbanism's experiment marshals vigorous evidence of how planners historically took up the city as a laboratory in testing different social rationales of intervention. This chapter, however, begins by theoretically grounding the conflicts between state and market interests in creatively engineering social rationales. The theoretical framework provides an anchor to understanding the historical re-articulations of social rationales in relation to planning. A brief overview of the *comunas* development then follows, focusing on the northeastern neighborhoods where the first social urbanism projects took place. Finally, this chapter empirically analyzes how three groups of planners historically took up social rationales in leading diverse urban experiments in Medellín: a civic campaign, modernist maps, and a macro-economic initiative.

Each of these experiments derives from a key historical moment of planning in the city. Moreover, each represents a unique vision of what the city's improvement could look like, a project embedded in social rationales of intervention. The first experiment was a civic building initiative led by the *Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas,* a local business coalition in the early 1900s. Here, the social interests of this group were vested in securing political support and financial resources for Medellín's downtown development. Second, an experiment with urban plans in the 1940s and 1950s, in which modernist architects treated the entire city as a scientific object of intervention and rendered maps to distinguish land uses, urban perimeters, and projected zones of development. And the third, led by economist Lauchlin Currie, who crafted a comprehensive plan in spurring the twin goals of national development and economic growth in the 1970s. To that end, these three experiments provide a historical base for relationally studying two objectives of planning: first, the use of technical knowledge to create an urban science legitimizing interventions, and second, the adoption of social rationales as urban models in ordering the city. The aim of comparing three presumably uneven historical experiments is to trace the shifting terrain of social rationales, the common sense knowledge that threads across these models.

My study brings together archival research with ethnographic research in order to see how planning ideas were spatially adapted, contested, and rendered visible in the urban form. While each experiment offers a distinct scale of analysis, together they contribute to understanding the shaping of social urbanism into a global model of planning. Progressive planning agendas served as the driving force for bringing together technical, social, and market interests in formulating a vision of the collective public good, while urban projects were executed based on selective interests in the city. My claim is that the planning apparatus in Medellín was used to generate social rationales in reconfiguring urban territory. The power of planning, however, was not limited to the institutional confines of municipal government offices. Instead, enterprising groups of self-appointed urban experts replaced the seeming absence of the state in Medellín. These planners walked the thin line between public and private interests, experimenting with the compression and expansion of social rationales in regulating both welfare and capital in the city.

Ordering the City

Planning speaks to the emergence of Medellín as both a monument and myth of modern city development. The contradictory processes embedded in the city's growth, beautification, and progress are marked by struggles over who and what defines the social rationales of planning. In order to make decisions, technical experts position planning as an objective source of knowledge. It is an apparatus used to reproduce an "ideological screen positing an imaginary urban order" (Boyer 1986), which fully embodies the power to differentiate, order, and discipline populations. As such, planning is intimately tied to the project of development. Development is "seen as something that only comes about through government action; and lack of 'development' by definition, is the result of government neglect" (Ferguson 1994). Appropriating modernity as an urban front for development provided planners with an opportunity to act – a project of transforming buildings, streets, and civic culture together with the city as object of expertise, pedagogy and social engineering. In pursuing the dream of the modernist city, planners created unique methods of classification that introduced new ways of seeing space; a technical expertise framing a firm belief in man controlling nature. Seen as a project of development, modern city making produced organizing logics of governance that intentionally transformed how the city was experienced, designed, and diffused as a model of planning.

These organizing logics offer insight into how conflicting systems of order transform the science of planning into reason. One approach is studying these as laboratories of "actually existing neo-liberalism," the unstable geographies of creative destruction and privileged sites of capitalist accumulation that create new regulatory spaces, ranging from place-based marketing to workfare policies to boosterism projects (Brenner and Theodore 2002). Jamie Peck powerfully historicizes this process as the "constructions of neoliberal reason," the diverse social experiments led by the "hidden" hands of market fundamentalism (2010). The global onslaught of neo-liberal experiments places into evidence the creative engineering involved in remaking models of governance and confronting the project's contradictions in everyday life experiences. These contradictions extend beyond projects to the reproduction of ideas across time and space. Here, the distinction between neo-liberalism as political agenda and rationality of governance must be understood within a system of knowledge in which ideas are conceived, mediated, and reconstituted prior to policy execution (Schwegler 2008). At the urban scale, it is these technical struggles over knowledge that provides a structure for planners to formulate social rationales within the repository of the city.

The social production of urban reason, a project claiming scientific basis, imbues changing state-society relations with new meanings of progress and reform. From technical experts to progressive social reformers, these "authoritative arbitrators" of modernism render new spatial forms of intervention (Rabinow 1995). As urban brokers of knowledge, they define new universal truths in the face of rapidly changing conditions in cities that make the familiar seem strange. True to liberal doctrine, these brokers represent the state struggle to respond to the paradoxes of planning. Technical experts, charged with the production and circulation of urban knowledge, develop new spaces regulated by scientific rationality (Santos 1993). Yet, even the technical basis of urban expertise generates urban crisis. These urban spaces give way to what Marshall Berman refers to as the "modernism of underdevelopment," the ambiguities experienced in living the real, unequal effects of development (1983). While providing a space for regulatory structures to emerge, it is here that the state intervenes to both destroy and create new geographies of market enterprise.

Here, planning simultaneously creates an ordering mechanism and political rationality of social intervention. The project demands recontextualizing Foucauldian analytical categories to the present, in order to understand emergent modes of governmentality. Nancy Fraser identifies the process with a "historically new mode of social regulation," a framework for understanding both Fordism and governmentality (2003). Here, Foucaldian interpretations of discipline are interpreted within the global arena of economic flexibilization. Social regulation provides the architectural base for moving from modernity to new regulatory regimes. The dominance of Fordist interpretations of regulation, replaced by studies of everyday micro-economic practices, reveal the importance of examining the small, incremental shifts that reverberate across diverse facets of market-society relations. In other words, the study of social regulation must move beyond national frameworks to spatial relations at the ground level. Urban studies offers a means to relationally examine struggles over territory, ideas, and politics in the social production of cities (McCann and Ward 2010). Planning thus serves as a proxy for studying the dynamic relationships between state and market in creatively articulating new regulatory structures. Medellín's *comunas* provide a point of entry to begin this interrogation.

Managing Neglect

Urban planning in Colombia extends back to the colonial period.[7] My concern here, however, is with how 20th century practices of ordering, mapping, and managing welfare in the city gave form to the 21st century model of social urbanism. Neglect is used here to identify how different urban experiments have historically taken up social rationales in rendering state spaces of intervention. The term takes on a particularly useful meaning when understood in reference to the state's struggle to organize the informal and unplanned in the city, a process entangled with the formal logic of urban order in planning. Giving a name to identify and contain the *comunas* allowed planners to demarcate and move the urban residues of planning away from the city center. Social urbanism, on the other hand, instead addressed the "accumulated historical social debt" of the state, countering existing trends toward the exclusion of the urban poor in Medellín, while simultaneously transforming the meaning of neglect in the city. Planners, as social technicians, used urban experiments to shift neglect as a category identifying *comunas* as places of fear and state oversight to a framework for social welfare provision. The shift in thinking, however, was a response two growing trends: informality and displacement.

As early as 1850, the "first" unregulated, informal settlement appeared in the neighborhood of Loma de los Gonzalez in El Poblado, located in a southeastern neighborhood of Medellín (Coupe 1993). By 1875, on the opposite end of the city, the construction of a mental hospital in the northeast neighborhood of Aranjuez, marked the urban creeping into fringe rural farmland. Over the next decades, new building constructions generally followed formal planning patterns, and by 1919, the neighboring Manrique neighborhood included legal connections to water and electricity infrastructure (Naranjo 1992). The development of northeastern neighborhoods continued as property owners sold off peripheral farmland parcels. Development over the next decades included private, small-scale subdivisions and municipal involvement in housing projects. Despite the peripheral location from the urban core, these projects met the demand for affordable housing. Northeastern neighborhoods provided working class families with an urban housing solution that included parks, schools, churches, short blocks, and narrow streets (Ochoa 2004). Formal and informal settlements dispersed across the northeast, with the urban fringe providing a cushion for the poor, private developers, and the municipality to expand into the urban perimeter.

These urban developments embraced innovative approaches to meet the shortfalls of a municipal government with limited resources. Private developers in the early 1900s, mainly local businessmen and investors, embraced a civic spirit fueling visions of comradery in pursuing the city's modernization. In some instances, the private developers donated land and small loans to the municipality, which was then reciprocated with the provision of street lighting, electricity, and infrastructure. The construction of the *tranvia*, a streetcar line, began in 1919, and by 1921, extended into the Manrique neighborhood (Botero Herrera 1996). Many migrants to the city in the early 1930s came from coffee-producing regions and agricultural land south of Medellín affected by economic crisis. Mary Roldan identifies these migration patterns with the "historically colonial relationship" between the core of Medellín and outlying regional settlements (2002). The construction of the periphery as a site of disorder, uncivility, and lack of control extended within the confines of the city too. Urban growth interests were influential in shaping the direction of city development by using social regulation to manage resident compliance with private development interests within planned neighborhoods (Botero Herrera 1996). The construction of cultural stereotypes created distrust and misconceptions of difference anything outside of the urban core.

The problem was aggravated with the swell of migrants displaced by violence well into the 1970s, reaching Medellín from across the regional periphery. Residents settling in informal settlements creatively engineered their own access to basic services. While restrictive planning regulations denied public utilities and street infrastructure to informal housing, the growth of unplanned homes continued, increasingly dotting the steep slopes extending from the urban core (Coupe 1993). Squatters constructed homes with limited financial resources, often lacking a steady source of income, and limited or no access to state-sponsored housing solutions (Viviescas Monsalve 1985). Municipal officials unwillingness to acknowledge squatting as an alternative iteration of planning ignored their development. Rapid population influxes of rural migrants gained momentum into the 1980s and 1990s, but planners were unprepared to deal with the growth. While planning projects centered on the urban core, the growth of informal developments opened up a new part of the city for display, but these settlements remained invisible to dominant narratives of planning, despite providing a housing safety net for the poor. Historically, planners instead narrated their ability to take on the reins of urban development when the centralized state was hardly present in the city, which opened up opportunities to experiment with the reconfiguration of territory.

Civic Enterprises

Doctors, an early generation of planners in Medellín, were placed into the limelight in the late 19th century. Across the United States and Europe, progressive urban reformers were captivated by a firm belief in using new technology, social engineering, and planning to promote the public interest (Schultz and McShane 1978). In colonial and developing cities alike, doctors organized public health campaigns in raising awareness of precarious hygiene conditions in the city. The European import of the "scientific society" legitimized the role of public hygiene campaigns and influenced how urban planning and architecture were taken up in Medellín. Doctors gained fame as early and insightful urban planners, a movement led by Manuel Uribe Angel, a medical professional and hygiene advocate in Medellín. Public health concerns were instrumental in shaping diverse projects ranging from the construction of city streets to working class housing. Public health advocates represented a wave of social reform intent on regulating the environment in order to select, classify, and manage the growing problem of immigration to Latin American cities (Graham 1990). Hygiene campaigns fused questions of welfare with social control in the city. The creation of the *Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas* (SMP), a private member society in 1899, shifted the axis of planning from health to an urban experiment with modernization.

Planning was taken up as a rallying point for organizing the urban experiment. Resounding civic calls masked the private motives underlying the SMP's embrace of urban planning. A group of business, real estate, and professional member elites created the SMP to directly intervene on behalf of the social needs of residents from across the city, with projects ranging from street lights and front home facades to the canalization of creeks and building the first modern hotel of its kind (Botero Herrera 1996). The SMP's public agenda strived to promote a general sense of civic engagement and beautification, a project of modern city making in line with the private economic interests of its own members. The experiment centered on the downtown district, the projected focal point of urban development. A skilled lobbying group, the SMP shaped the decisions of the *Concejo Municipal,* the administrative unit responsible for public works projects since the late-1800s in the city, while maintaining institutional independence from the state. The *Consejo* led projects ranging from planning infrastructure and legislation to the details of architectural design and working class housing (Botero Herrera 1996). Even with the institutional authority of the *Consejo,* the SMP's *de facto* power over planning grew into the 1930s.

While entrenched in planning, the SMP experiment took lessons from well-known international service organizations, including Rotary International. The SMP's civic enterprise adapted the Rotary's vision of service to bring together the goals of modernization and social welfare. Ricardo Olano, a prominent SMP member explains:

> I want to note here a phrase that guides my civic activities: Today's chimera will be tomorrow's reality. There will undoubtedly be many nuisance men, passive and harmful beings that will tell You These Rotary men are not needed. And you will show them with acts that it's not like that, that everything can be done when there is energy, enthusiasm and love for the city (1936-40).

Urban progress, embraced as a civic-minded agenda, came to define how the SMP served the city. The SMP's civic experiment targeted urban dwellers and projects closely aligned with the Rotary's social welfare mission, channeling the benefits of service to the broader community. Even children were part of the movement. In organizing the "Week of the Child," a project dedicated to civic building among school age children, the SMP elicited financial support for programs and agencies complicit with the civic agenda (Olano 1936-

40). The SMP envisioned the city as a laboratory for experiments with civic making and source of national pride, but the scope of the private interests was limited.

The SMP's civic reform agenda publicly represented the male interests of an ascendant middle-class in Medellín, not unlike the urban experiments with civic order and class-based social regulation in Europe (Ladd 1990). Women themselves played an active role in social reform in Latin America in a post-World War I period of optimism over the potential of social improvement, women's rights, and "sanitation" of the nation (Stepan 1991). In the United States, women played a powerful role in collectively endorsing progressive political reform, social welfare, and equality in modern urban politics (Katz 1994). Across Latin America, the combination of economic restructuring and women's suffrage widened the gender spectrum of the middle class, bringing new votes into the democratic realms shaping social reform (Sanchez Korrol 1988). Progressive elite reformers actively shaped urban experiments, embodying social rationales in exercising a role as regulators of progress, moral conduct, and social responsibility. The authoritative methods of urban inscription, from calls of civic reform to promoting architectural beautification, served as the foundation for utopian visions of modernization in Latin American cities. Urban reform encapsulated liberal views of social order with aesthetic concerns, articulating an experiment that combined the SMP's authoritative political culture with a newly formulated model to regulate social welfare in the city.

SMP members adopted Medellín as an urban laboratory, coupling civic reform with market enterprise. Their service mission extended to pressuring landowners into compliance with private interests by sending polite letters suggesting cooperation with urban projects in participating with civic campaigns. In a letter written by Ricardo Olano together with SMP members Juan de la Posada and Jorge Uribe, the three write:

> We are studying the way in which to execute a large project to better and beautify the city of Medellín. It is the extension to the west and to La Playa Avenue's River. In this way, the city will have a great, beautiful central avenue that will be the most valued walkway. We need the cooperation of people that have property there. You and Dr. Enrique Mejia have one of the most extensive [properties], which would extraordinarily increase in value after creating the street. In the case of you and Mr. Mejia, we are asking for a contribution much less than truly owed since your property value is so high (Olano 1930-35).

The SMP introduced land valorization into the civic agenda by presenting landowner's with an opportunity to embrace market development. The gentle prodding by the SMP resulted in public infrastructure and beautification projects that promoted civic collaboration, tourism and an array of international planning standards (Botero Herrera 1996). The SMP letters were personalized, carefully articulating a pressing need to comply with land valorization, a project combining the private vision of a common good with calls for a livened civic spirit and the aesthetic beautification of the city in shaping a thriving downtown for all. This civic experiment positioned public and private interests as one. However, the main participants were urban landowners situated in or close to downtown areas of development.

Incentives for participating in the market were embedded at the heart of the SMP's civic campaign. Taking important insights from the work of Rotary International, the SMP furthered a civic experiment founded on ideas of entrepreneurship. The SMP adopted the service mission to legitimize the social rationales of intervention. The Rotary's own model was based on assisting young men with the first big push, providing the initial material and financial resources necessary to keep busy. Assistance was premised on an important condition – "inculcating in young men a sense of obligation and educating them on the fundamental principles of mercantile practice" (Olano 1930-35). While the work of the Rotary primarily focused on rural males, the SMP adopted these principles in its own experiment with civic enterprise. On a neighborhood visit in Medellín, Ricardo Olano, a well-known businessman and member of the SMP, saw an employee fixing the street in front of his privately owned home and asked him:

> 'Do you work in the municipality?' He said simply, 'No sir. I'm fixing the front of my house.' What a beautiful lesson for so many men that gets in the way in our cities! My house, my street, my neighborhood, my city. What beautiful and deciding words! Let us make beautiful houses our own, the streets our own, the neighborhood our own, the city our own. It's a beautiful objective in life, and it's a business (1929).

Civic campaigns transformed each resident of the city into a public member of the SMP's privatized ideas of the modern city. Members actively shaped urban interventions by effectively lobbying existing planning institutions and neighborhood residents to influence land valorization in the city. Linking the civic project to both service and market objectives set up a unique social experiment in training good men, loyal to their city and country, on how to participate.

City residents needed to be guided, whether it was the young rural man or the non-compliant landowner, to follow the SMP's urban mission. The SMP's experiment built a model of civic projects meant to provide benefits to Medellín's residents. Urban beautification provided the SMP with a tangible means of displaying markers of modern city making. In combining social rationales with market development in the city, the SMP aimed to generate a sense of security for individuals. Ricardo Olano explains:

> Urbanism is, above anything, a matter of social assistance. It seeks the health of the community, trying to dry swamps, seeing that a sewage system is built, to assure abundant and clean water. I want ours to be beautiful, ventilated, full of light. I try to get streets widened for the safety of pedestrians. Promote the construction of parks, forests, gardens, and fields for kid's games, stadiums for sports because that gives life and happiness to the community (1936-40).

Urban projects allowed the SMP to frame planning around the provision of social benefits. Yet, the social rationales were inclusive of only those compliant with the SMP's vision. Urbanism, for the SMP, centered future development in selective areas of the city, linking social welfare with the twin goals of providing service and gaining profits at the heart of civic enterprise. By providing incentives, support, and mentorship, the SMP created a structure to order and manage civic participation in the city. The SMP linked urbanism with a distinct way of life.

The members of the SMP classified the behavior of city residents as contributing or inhibiting modern urban progress. Social rationales allowed the SMP to experiment with exclusionary categories that served to publicly admonish and distance inadequate participation in the civic campaigns. These campaigns were targeted at male landowners and investors committed to the ideals of the city's progress. In rendering a vision of modern city making, the SMP instilled the idea that a lack of commitment to progress represented a refusal to participate in the betterment of community at the local and national scale. Ricardo Olano identified these men as *hombres estorbos*. He published a short piece titled "INRI" that denounced their actions:

> It was a happy idea of mine when I baptized the name "*Hombres estorbos*" with those people, numerous by the way, which obstruct progress in cities. The name was made popular and is applied very frequently in all of the country. To call an individual *Hombre estorbo* is the most offensive civic insult that can be given, cover him in dishonor, by turning him over to the disdain of his co-citizens.
>
> On the other hand, these *Hombres estorbos* don't understand their own interests. When they deny giving up land to open or widen a street or to construct a road through their land its bad business, because these works sometimes valorize their properties enormously. When they refuse to contribute to asphalting a street, they show their lack of vision in terms of business. It is already a truism that every improvement is paid with increases [over time]. Those *hombres estorbos* will end soon because they won't conform to a society that hangs on their chest a disgraceful INRI (1936-40).

The INRI acronym means "Jesus the Nazarene, King of the Jews" in Latin. It is most often found printed on crucifixes of Jesus and is not unfamiliar to residents in Medellín, a city known for its Catholic roots. Led by members of the SMP, progressive reform agendas used INRI to distinguish the *hombres estorbos* in the way of modernization. Olano, a defender of urban progress, promulgated the civic message across the city. He represented a dream of the modern city, adopting Medellín's urban laboratory to diffuse new meanings of social reform. Urban markers of progress, from urban projects to editorials, advertisements, and stories in local newspapers, were used to generate momentum around civic reform and render the city as a focal point of modernization in Colombia.

Olano went as far as organizing national conferences to expand the reach of the SMP and inculcate the message across the country. The civic campaigns, coupled with a private interest in the valorization of property, were the pivots of social rationales driving elite visions of progress. Downtown development in Medellín served as an urban display where observers could witness a model example of modern city making. The urban growth vision dominated popular imaginaries, creating an oppositional other countering the work of the SMP and supporting a backward vision of the modern city. Residents were complicit in reinforcing the civic building project. Here, an excerpt from a letter written by Medellín resident Mr. Garcia praising the efforts led by Ricardo Olano:

> Much admired don Ricardo, the humble child of the mountain who writes this letter to you suffers from envy of your saintly civism. I've observed you for a long time and always name you in conversations as an example of a true citizen (Olano 1925).

The SMP's civic logic blended the private with the public, placing city residents as the future benefactors of the urban experiment. Urban projects rested in the hands of private interests shaping neighborhood-based projects.[8] The financial resources and lobbying power of the SMP allowed members to direct planning at a time when strong, centralized government had little institutional presence at the city scale. Social welfare, taken up by the SMP, artfully entwined the public good within a project to endorse the market of urban development. Here, urban planning became a means to distinguish social welfare provision for civic and landowning participants from those unable to participate.

Social welfare, premised on land valorization gains, benefited male landowners. SMP members embraced civic campaigns in shaping the potential contribution of young men to urban development. Entrepreneurship activities were developed to stimulate the idle time of young men (Olano 1930-35). In promoting urban beautification and modern city making, the "awakening of civic spirit" and "love for the city" encapsulated two public slogans driving the work of the SMP (Olano 1936-40). The urban experiment aimed to extend the reach of the civic model to young men and the possibility of having them commit to the ideals of service, responsibility, and love for the city. In the words of Ricardo Olano:

> I'm telling you these anecdotes to say that young men need to have the idea of planning their lives inculcated, since early on fill their souls with noble ambitions and optimism, show them that no goal is reached without education, without perseverance, without work and without nobleness. Make them understand that life is very beautiful, but that only one-self can make life beautiful. Inculcate deeply the idea that life is large and noble, full of the spiritualism of service to their countrymen, of love for the city and mother country (1930-35).

The reach of planning extended to men of all ages. Michel Foucault refers to a regulatory regime as the point at which capillary power "extends itself" through its reinvention in institutions and embodied techniques of the state (1980). For the SMP, planning was not a source of centralized power, but an exercise in the social regulation of the modern subject. SMP members contributed to flexibly shaping social rationales into alignment with their own interests in managing the economic development of the nation. Men straying from the path of planning, a mechanism of collective cooperation, were negating the beauty of their life, city, and country. The collective pursuit, however, limited urban progress to men, rendering invisible the women, urban poor, and problem individuals who did not conform to the civic mold.

Medellín served as a laboratory for civic training, a model diffused by the SMP across newspapers, cultural events, and planning. The purpose was two-fold: first, creating a spatial map of civic interventions. Here, the project promulgated a form of urban order distinguishing the controlled, regulated planning of working class neighborhoods from the unregulated, aesthetic emphasis magnified and displayed as the architecture of the rich (Melo 1997). Second, replacing the state's lackluster presence at the ground level with the visibility of the SMP as broker of municipal planning decisions, serving as a powerful impetus to launch model urban experiments. Fervent followers of the civic movement served as dedicated citizens to the project. Medellín's civic model gained force and was replicated across other Colombian cities (Correa Ramirez 2009). Working class populations were controlled using civic language, while both the behavior and homes of the elite served as archetypes in directing urban development. The wide breadth of civic projects was instrumental for the SMP in shaping sociability in the city into an urban welfare experiment.

Incidentally, the urban trend towards beautification and renovation sweeping across Latin American cities embodied elements of Paris's mythic transformation. From the capital cities of Caracas to Buenos Aires, the move to regulate urban planning involved incorporating hygiene, traffic flow, and aesthetic design principles in transforming the many versions of Paris in South America (Almandoz 1999, 2002). Similarly, across the Atlantic in Vienna, a visionary push drew attention not to piecemeal interventions of single buildings, but to an "ideal city-within-a-city" in the city's center (Schorske 1998). The approach contrasted to smaller cities in Colombia, from Medellín and Pereira to Cartagena, where progressive elites embraced a combination of civic campaigns with the beautification of the city center, a local appropriation of the Parisian model. Here, elements of modern monumentality were mixed with neighborhood scale civic boosterism. Modern city planning rested on designs promulgating a sense of control, and which seen from above, added a new dimension to urban plans in the unexplored hinterlands of Latin America (Morshed 2002). The aerial view of the city gave the impression of discipline and power exercised from above.

The modern city imaginary transformed the experience of urban life. A widening of city streets and monumental beautification in Medellín only further reinforced the "illusion of modernity," a project used to destroy the historic architectural patrimony of the city in promoting urban regulation (Botero 1993). The emergence of the modern city paved the way for the "reform of private space and private consciousness" (Needell 1995), a model which gained global traction across capital and secondary cities alike. Modern city making generated dominant visions of urban progress across the country. Cities generated powerful aerial visions of modernity when seen from above, but at the ground level, residents experienced the reality of urban hierarchies and dominant narratives of civic order. Members of the SMP instilled civic boosterism with the value of local elites to shape urban agendas, with civic responsibility as the pivot of the experiment. The civic agenda gave new meaning to planning, explicitly adopting social rationales to spatially reconfigure order and hierarchy in the city.

Testing Modernist Maps

The shaping of Medellín into a modern city countered the image of a rapidly vanishing villa. As the city transformed, planners reinvented social rationales in developing new urban projects. In 1913, the SMP completed *Medellín Futuro,* the city's first urban plan in a collaborative effort with the *Consejo* and the Minas School of Engineering. Founded in 1886, the Minas School, in conjunction with the traditional business and political elite, gave technical legitimacy to planning. In 1914, Law 63 required municipal mayors to submit statistical data in compliance with a national campaign to further the modern state.[9] Engineers' ad-hoc planning functions included writing technical reports, managing public works, and urban aesthetics. Engineers wore many professional hats as directors and technical experts in the field, a position valued almost as much as the mayor himself (Gonzalez 2007). The unyielding power of engineers heavily influenced urban planning in Medellín until architecture's emergence in the 1930s as a distinct professional field.


PLANO
DE
MEDELLIN FUTURO
SEGUN EL PROYECTO DEL DOCTOR JORGE RODRIGUEZ, MODIFICADO POR LA JUNTA NOMBRADA POR LA MUNICIPALIDAD
Y LA S. DE M. P. COMPUESTA DE LOS SRES.:
BOSQUE

Medellín Futuro
Note. Adapted from Jaramillo, R.L. and Perfetti, V., *Cartografia Urbana de Medellín 1790-1950,* 1993.

SMP members foresaw the future of professional architects in Medellín and began to gain rapport with renowned international experts. Foreign architects were called upon to direct urban projects in Medellín. Here, a local magazine gently suggests to Ricardo Olano the need to bring Karl Brunner, an Austrian architect directing Bogotá's Office of Planning at the time, to Medellín (Olano 1930-35):

> In light of the success Dr. Brunner has reached in Chile and Bogotá, don't you see it in the interests of Medellín to contract the services of such an eminent urbanist? Don't you think it's necessary to revise the plans of the city? Do our working class neighborhoods follow the norms specified by the modern City-Planning? How to attend to the increasing traffic on the narrow central streets?

The international standards introduced by foreign experts gave new promise to the social rationales of the SMP. No longer confined to local private interests, planning gained prominence as a learned technical expertise. While *Medellín Futuro* marked a distinct approach to how planning would be approached in the city, the map lacked the technical eyes of a modernist architect. The plan underwent a series of revisions, as it did not include land use distinctions and only focused on downtown areas. Modernist architects, on the other hand, had an eye for the larger city-region and for solutions to the visual disorder in the city. Cities represented the "symptom and focal point of the ills of the larger economy, society, and polity," which represented both urban development and the progress of the nation (Morse, 1978). Planning had been transformed into an apparatus for shaping both economic interests and social rationales in the city.

In July 1935, Olano began negotiating the terms of Brunner's visit to Medellín. Brunner's unique perspective combined both the technical expertise and elites repute to indoctrinate important planning principles, from urban zoning, building regulations, and transportation arteries, into maps of Medellín. A letter by Olano identifies the importance of Brunner's visit:

> The coming of Dr. Brunner to Medellín and his urbanism works in the city have put into evidence, clearly, the absolute necessity that cities have of a technical direction, constant and active, for harmonious development, for cleansing and beautification. Dr. Brunner with the excellent urbanists that are in Medellín, is forming a school, a practical and technical nucleus whose actions in cities will be of great benefit. We have hope that Dr. Brunner can come to Medellín for some time to dictate a conference and give us ideas for the betterment of the city. There are between us many people sufficiently prepared to receive his learnings, among them, some youth that are eager to serve their motherland (1936-40).

Brunner introduced modernist planning principles as a new urban experiment in Medellín. While in Bogotá, Brunner had published the *Manual de Urbanismo,* a two-volume planning textbook (1939). The book was based on Brunner's global experience working in growing metropolitan cities, including a few examples from Latin America. An advocate of place-based analysis, he spent considerable effort combing through the details of the local context before creating plans. His plans wove together neighborhood centralities within broad regulatory plans for cities.

Brunner arrived in Colombia from Chile. He was part of a network of foreign architects actively exchanging modernist ideas across cities in Latin America. Architects emphasized the role of the city's transformation in creating competitive sites of regional identity (Crasemann Collins 1995). Cities were competing against one another as symbolic centers of progress, development, and beautification. While Medellín was not a capital city, architects still competed in the struggle over urban identity. Global experts came to Latin America, engaging in the "cross-fertilization" of ideas from across the Atlantic (del Real and Gyger 2013). This exchange of ideas, however, was not limited to urban experiments in regional identity. Architects played a pivotal role in using cities to express both their independence in thinking and ingenious adaptations as former Iberian colonies. Groundbreaking experiments across Latin America placed cities at the center of development agendas and architects as the source of expert knowledge.

The city held a dream of modernity that reached beyond the vision of any one city's transformation. Professional architects were foundational in Colombia, where the national agenda emphasized the importance of the field's contributions to economic development. In 1934, the creation of a Colombian Society of Architects symbolically ratified the field's professional status. As part of a movement taking hold nationally, then president Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo [1934-38] secured political support to restructure higher education.[10] Public universities transformed into satellites for fostering the nation's progress. Under Pumarejo's initiative, the *Universidad Nacional*, a public institution founded in 1867, introduced innovative fields of professional practice, including architecture. In 1936, the first department of architecture was created at the *Universidad Nacional* in Bogota. Students from the department were tasked with designing a new layout for university campuses, which until 1937, had been dispersed across Bogotá. National funding allowed the university to create its own regional centers to train local architects on modernist principles from around the globe.

In 1942, the *Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana*, a private institution, inaugurated the first school of architecture in Medellín. In 1946, the *Universidad Nacional* followed with the construction of its own department in Medellín. Together with the Minas School of Engineering, these three universities formed localized centers of modernist training. Here, Haussman served as only one reference within a series of practices, ideas, and models framing urban planning as a professional field (Gonzalez 2007). Citywide plans became the norm in demarcating, containing, and ordering the urban perimeter. The new scientific base of planning provided architects in Medellín with a measure, a means to quantify, count, and classify based on newly rendered maps of the city. Figures like Karl Brunner challenged the overtly technical and artistic components of planning, instead relying on interdisciplinary and intercontinental sources of knowledge in designing plans (Hofer and Salmona 2003). International architectural experts proactively influenced how local planners contained and delimited the boundaries of Medellín within the rendering of a modernist map. Despite the progressive influence of Brunner, urban experiments in Colombia served to formalize the use of maps as rationale tools in distinguishing the planned center from the disorder of the growing informal periphery.

A 1947 national law mandated regulatory urban plans for all municipalities in Colombia.[11] For the first time, a plan existed for Medellín that identified the entire city, rather than specific neighborhoods or individuals, as the unit of intervention. The plan marked a significant rupture from the civic experiments led by the SMP. Architects Josep L. Sert and Paul Weiner, contracted out of Town Planning Associates in New York, created the plan between 1948 and 1952. The two architects worked closely with renowned architect Le Corbusier, already at work on another regulatory plan in the city of Bogotá. Far from the civic campaign of the SMP, the modernist architects worked extensively with technical experts to create plans based on detailed methods of analysis, synthesis, and presentation (O'Byrne 2010). A cadre of "criollo" architects and engineers, local elites in Medellín, had received professional training in Europe and returned to the city to transform the practice of planning (Perfetti 1995). The urban experiment, now at the hands of architects with international expertise, shifted the responsibility over planning to technical experts at the municipal scale. By embedding rational and functional elements into aesthetic markers of progress, the modernist project served as a source of national pride.

Medellín's criollo experts were caught between a desire to rapidly transform the city and the reality of "catching up" with modernity in other Latin American, North American and European cities. From Burnham in Chicago and John Lyle in Toronto to L'Enfant in Washington D.C., architects embraced beautification and monumentality in the early 1900s, setting the City Beautiful movement as a powerful precedent in re-envisioning the face of modernity (Stelter 2000). These modern cities served as guideposts in shaping how local planners diffused foreign ideas from Medellín to Chibote in Peru, Cidade dos Motores in Brazil, and Cali in Colombia. In Medellín, Weiner and Sert's regulatory plan transformed into the dominant instrument in rendering maps of the city, a public display of both progress and the eradication of the past. Koolhaas identifies the utilitarian aims of the practice with "a theatre of progress," the pursuit of urban innovation through spatial control and domination (1978). While the development of informal settlements dismissed the urban boundaries of maps, the regulatory plan created a perception of order and progress.

Sert's preliminary sketch of Medellín's regulatory plan emphasized the "heart of the city," the civic centers in the highly dense and central downtown but no outlying growth beyond the mapped city boundaries. Together with Wiener, the two architects adopted Le Corbusier's *grille*, a method used by urbanists to communicate ideas between rational experts, government officials, and the public, to organize their data and present the plan (O'Byrne 2010). Wiener and Sert's plan did not identify outlying urban neighborhoods, some of which had existed since the early 1850s. While well aware of the global problems identified with slums and their conditions, Wiener and Sert emphasized the need for a "functional city" (O'Byrne 2010). Settlements outside of Medellín's plan boundaries were identified with improper land uses, uncontrolled speculation, and a lack of zoning law compliance (Botero Herrera 1996). On the heels of the International Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) in 1951, Wiener and Sert focused on issues of human scale, land-use regulation, and a special attention to civic centers.

Urban planning created the perception of the city as a coherent social field of intervention – a determining "regulator of society" for not only modern subjects, but the practice of development (Rabinow 1995). Planning emerged as an instrument of both urban intervention and generator of technical fixes that responded to the incongruence of governance by reinventing the use and value of territory in the city. Modernist architects introduced their international experiences to the local context of Medellín, but these efforts were limited at the implementation phase by centralized national government. Although a municipal planning office existed by 1960, the municipal mayor had limited power to raise revenues or execute projects. A lack of consensus between technical experts over the direction of the city limited the plan. The city faced a crisis of planning priorities – conflicts at the national scale pushed migrants into urban centers, while localized visions of planning placed *comunas* in the peripheral areas outside of the city's mapped limits.


Bello
Valle muy cerrado en este sector - la ciudad propiamente dicha no puede extenderse en este dirección
Unidades residenciales
Envigado
America
Sabaneta
Zonas naturales de expansión urbana.
Terreno ondulado hacia zona de expansión
Medellín 19. Oct. 48

Sert's Preliminary 1948 Sketch
Note. Adapted from O'Byrne, M.C. *Le Corbusier en Bogota – Presiciones en torno al Plan Piloto,* 2010.


MAPA DEL MUNICIPIO DE MEDELLIN
ELABORADO POR LA SECRETARIA DE HACIENDA Y OBRAS PUBLICAS SECCION DE URBANISMO Y PLANEAMIENTO
1948
CONVENCIONES
MPIO. DE BELLO
MPIO. DE COPACABANA
MPIO. DE EBÉJICO
MPIO. DE HELICONIA
MPIO. DE ANGELÓPOLIS
MPIO. DE LA ESTRELLA
MPIO. DE ITAGUÍ
MPIO. DE ENVIGADO
MPIO. DE GUARNE
MPIO. DE SN. JERÓNIMO
MPIO. DE SN. PEDRO
REFERENCIAS

Contrast to 1948 Property and Public Works Map
(i.e. city boundary, topography, and neighboring cities)
Note. Adapted from Jaramillo, R.L. and Perfetti, V., *Cartografia Urbana de Medellín 1790-1950,* 1993.


MEDELLIN
N.M.
ROSA DE LOS VIENTOS
TOWN PLANNING ASSOCIATES
PAUL LESTER WIENER - JOSÉ LUIS SERT
33 WEST 42 STREET NEW YORK N.Y. - U.S.A.
PLAN PILOTO DE MEDELLIN
PLANO GENERAL DE COMUNICACIONES
ESTADO ACTUAL
9 (II-8)
ESCALA : 1:10.000
1 CARRETERA DEL NORTE
2 CARRETERA DEL SUR (CALI)
3 CARRETERA A ORIENTE (BOGOTA)
4 CARRETERA A OCCIDENTE (MAR)
5 AUTOPISTA EL POBLADO-ENVIGADO
6 CALLE 50. COLOMBIA
7 CALLE 30-A. CESPEDES
8 AVENIDA BOLIVARIANA
9 CALLE 44. SAN JUAN
10 CALLE 30.
11 CARRERA 86
12 JUAN DEL CORRAL
13 CARRERA 52
14 AVENIDA PRIMERO DE MAYO
15 JUNIN
16 PALACE
17 PLAZA DE BERRIO
18 PLAZA DE NUTIBARA
19 FERROCARRIL
20 ESTACION DEL FERROCARRIL
21 CAMPO DE AVIACION
LIMITE DEL AREA URBANIZABLE
Comisión Asesora Para la Cultura
Concejo de Medellín

Plano General De Comunicaciones. Estado actua *ciates. Nueva York. 31 de enero 1.950 P.P.M. Código 15.03.05.001 Plano 1 de 4.*

Wiener and Sert's Regulatory Map
(Broader urban perimeter, but legend only includes references to the "heart" of downtown)
Note. Adapted from Jaramillo, R.L. and Perfetti, V., *Cartografía Urbana de Medellín 1790-1950,* 1993.

In part eclectic, Weiner and Sert's master plan for Medellín endorsed radical changes in urban policy, but the experiment could not predict the impacts of future growth. The neighborhood unit (UV), a CIAM-based international standard used to identify the human scale in planning practice, drove the work of the two architects around four principles: habitat, work, recreation (cultivation of body and spirit), and circulation (Schnitter 2003). While the UV unit provided a rational tool to measure needs in the community and project the carrying capacity of existing urban resources, unprecedented population demands made the problems of urban poverty and infrastructure limitations difficult to address. Medellín's rapid rate of growth reached over 1 million inhabitants by the 1970s. A wave of rural migrants and internally displaced inhabited the *comunas,* but the growing concentration of the urban poor did not exist within the plans of the rational experts who created the maps.



Aerial view of northeastern *comunas*
(Density shown in c. 1950s on left and 1970s on right)
Note. Adapted from Alcaldia de Medellín
* Current transfer point to Metrocable marked with star.

While the modern metropolis was being constructed across Latin American cities, a trend emerged towards fracturing and excluding growing settlements outside of the urban center. Brasilia's own development as political capital took place parallel to the territorial reconfiguration of the Amazonian rainforest in a powerful push towards urbanization (Tavares 2013). From the high-rise *superbloques* of Caracas to progressive housing policies in Chile and Cuba, the modernist utopia created counter-territories of social difference that contested both visions of urban progress and national pride (del Real 2011). The effects of marginalization brought modernist dreams to a screeching halt. Paul Rabinow refers to the conflict between the urban norms instilled by a well-planned city and scientific regulation of reform and welfare as the project of "middling modernism" (1992). The project of ordering, delimiting, and classifying territory involved clearly demarcating what did not belong outside of it. Colonial cities across the Atlantic were no different. As the experimental testing grounds of social interventions, planning produced a full-blown exercise in coercive practices of colonization (Wright 1991).

In Medellín, the conflict between modernist visionaries and the reality of modern city life, while embedded in progressive ideals, produced powerful effects of spatial segregation. Added to this, Medellín faced an additional obstacle – the consequences of *La Violencia* in Colombia. From the 1950s and on, cities served as receptors of internally displaced populations, a result of heightened political tensions in rural areas of the country. The invention of planning universalized territory across the city, creating an urban mold of what progress should look like and who it should benefit. In the case of Medellín, the organizing logics of the planners shaping this modernist city reveal how social welfare came to be historically imprinted within new models of planning.

An Urban Growth Hypothesis

Civic boosterism, together with modernist planning in Medellín, ingrained urban beautification and technical rationales within development agendas in the city. At the national scale, however, urban experiments took a different form. Rapid population growth and economic expansion placed new pressures on cities across Colombia, as urban growth pressed against the seams of the urban perimeter. While the urban visions of modernist architects continued to permeate issues of design and technical practice, national state concerns lay with the recovery of Colombian cities in crisis. Development was no longer limited to the city's creative adaptation of resources and power, but as a national experiment within a global agenda. Colombia took central stage as part of the World Bank's first international mission led by Lauchlin Currie [1949-1953], a formative moment in setting the future course of urban development experiments. Currie first identified the problems of rural development as a World Bank surveyor in 1949, but it was not until the 1970s, that he witnessed firsthand how the problem manifested at the urban scale.

Currie had faced harsh attacks of Communist involvement back in the United States prior to the World Bank mission. As a result, he chose to stay in Colombia, making the country his home and place of work. Here, he advised five different presidents in a variety of development-related capacities. A New Deal economist by trade, Currie garnered attention for his radical approach to state building. While serving as an adviser to president Roosevelt in the United States, Currie called for a "liberal program of progressive taxes, increases in social security benefits, more public works projects and encouragement for investment (especially in home building)" (Jones 1972). He took his ideas to Colombia, where he helped create the National Department of Planning (DNP) in 1958, an administrative institution charged with national public policies, managing internal and external funding, and execution of government plans. Currie worked as chief economist of the DNP [1971-1981] and then with the Colombian Institute of Savings and Housing [1982-1993]. Currie remained in Colombia until his death in 1993.

The economist's state-making project in Colombia was implicitly an urban experiment. His comprehensive plan incorporated financial and technical assistance. The model coupled economic incentives for people living in cities with macro-structural interventions to ensure an adequate standard of living for the lower-income masses, but not the poorest of the poor. Currie's economic theories were not popular in academic circles,[12] but his leading sector strategy theory brought him to national fame in Colombia.[13] In a public address to the Academy of Political and Social Science, Currie identified how "Colombia may very well prove to be an admirable test case of what can be accomplished through the cooperation of many agencies both foreign and domestic in an integrated and coordinated program of development" (1950). The address reveals Currie's keen eye to the misalignment between planning centered on the city and planning as a project of inter-institutional cooperation. Cities provided a proxy to addressing the monumental tasks of national development (Ridler 1979). Urban experiments, organized at the national scale, mitigated the impacts and instability generated by detonative growth in cities. Currie firmly believed in the power of macroeconomic planning in securing social welfare across urban centers in Colombia.

Unplanned, informal settlements on the periphery of Colombian cities, on the other hand, concerned Currie. However, he did not identify the forced displacement of rural peasants to urban centers as the problem. Instead, he linked the problem to planning. He pointed to technical experts and scientists, specifically planners, as creating both the problems and solutions of development. Currie stated: "Bad as planning may be, it is our only hope of eventually securing some degree of dominance over our environment and we can hardly agree that planlessness is inherently superior to planning" (1974). While the informal settlements littering cheap land far from the urban center were visual eyesores, the unplanned settlements provided an affordable housing solution. Planning was intimately embedded in processes of economic restructuring, shifting population dynamics, and a reinvigorated faith in science and technology, a problem Arturo Escobar identifies with the social construction of "underdevelopment" (1988). Currie, however, saw planning as an opportunity for comprehensive development interventions.

Critics of Currie's policies identify him with promulgating "underdevelopment," a state-supported practice supporting the violent displacement of rural peasants in the name of modernization (Brittain 2005). His theory was first outlined in 1961 as *Operation Colombia*, but internal turmoil prevented the theory' application to practice. In 1971, President Misael Pastrana invited Currie to implement the theory despite strong opposition from Congress as the newly named *Plan of Four Strategies*. The macroeconomic plan required the president to exercise a wide interpretation of his constitutional powers. The plan set forth the building industry as the "leading sector" in accelerating growth in Colombia by promoting rural migration to cities, exports, and agricultural productivity (Currie 1961). The experiment placed the neighborhood unit at the center of intervention – ideally serving as a small city within the broader metropolitan region.

Currie identified the social goals of planning with the housing industry, a generator of shelter and labor force for low-income populations. The plan endorsed the stimulation of personal savings, ultimately combining increases in individual's real income with greater incentives to save towards housing (Currie 1972). The central bank played a powerful role in controlling the supply of money and directing development (Chandavarkar 1992). Currie innovatively combined personal savings within a national plan to prevent the impacts of sprawl, unemployment, slum growth, segregation, and congestion from urban growth (Currie 1980). His experiment contrasted to initiatives that did not couple planning with housing to promote employment, savings, and investments. Ciudad Kennedy, a 1961 housing project constructed in Bogotá, offered a bad model of planning (1974). The initiative, co-sponsored by the Alliance for Progress, constructed 10,223 units for 110,000 people in the first five years.[14] The project provided housing, but it offered neither employment nor any of social goals espoused by Currie's model – the desirable conditions of neighborhood life – social belonging, recreation, and communal activities.

Beyond the physical frame or building of a house, Currie conceived of good planning with addressing the basic needs of accessibility and services in neighborhoods, including opportunities for recreation and access to schools, shops and employment (Currie 1974). Currie's approach radically departed from development paradigms promoting a rescinding state rather than direct forms of intervention. The *Plan of Four Strategies* addressed the crises of industrialization, rural-urban migration, and housing by coupling economic incentives with technical development assistance (Currie 1961). His comprehensive approach to social welfare departed from dominant narratives of a ladder or piecemeal approaches to development. Instead, his concern lay with strengthening the role of the state in thinking of how to diminish the growing gap between the rich and poor. He argued:

> It is precisely because the Plan places so much stress on the improvement of the incomes of the lower income groups that it insists on the necessity of providing more and better paying jobs outside of agriculture. The difference lies not in the degree of concern with the poverty of many Colombians, wherever they happen to be, but rather in the diagnosis of the causes of that condition and the strategies designed to remedy the situation (1974).

The push-pull levers of the model assumed that underused and badly used resources could be effectively altered to shift demand and secure a more equitable social distribution. While not a typical populist politician, Currie garnered political support and mass appeal for his unique blend of state and market interests as a social rationale. Kurt Weyland argues that the "unexpected affinities" between populism and economic liberalism in Latin America emerged in the 1980s as a response to the boom and bust cycles of development policies (1996). David Harvey instead refers to the Western construction of neo-liberalism to explain the political ideology that gained traction by shrinking the social benefits of the state through deregulation and privatization (2005). Currie's plan reveals yet another interpretation that combines both of these ideas – the weaving together of social and market initiatives to stimulate the building industry promotes welfare benefits in cities and nationally.

For Currie, the reality of slum conditions in Colombian cities made clear a problem aggravated by criollo planning – a state concern long ignored and exacerbated by urban experiments with little relevance to the local context, a problem he identifies here:

> We have no urban policy except following in the footsteps of the North Americans. We are building slums and creating conditions that will result in horrible losses from traffic congestion or excessive diversion of national savings to urban transport. In a relatively few years, there will be no *sabana* (plains) of Bogotá, and a few years after that, no Valle del Cauca. We face an indefinite continuance of not quite keeping up with the demand in all public services – of too little always too late (1963).

Currie's model aimed to guarantee the responsibility of the Colombian state in securing social welfare for the urban masses rather than elites. Mounting population and economic pressures in cities, combined with the growing visibility of poverty, marked a turning point in urban experimentation. Currie was trained as an economist in a period dominated by neo-classical ideas, but his practice concerned itself with comprehensively transforming quality of life for low-income populations (1970). In the 1970s, a progressive shift in thinking placed the value of housing as a social over economic priority in development policy (Harris and Arku 2007). In the wake of World War II, Currie made an urgent call to use state investments in providing incentives to the housing industry with the aim of securing basic needs for the general population.

Currie identified planning with a two-fold purpose in Colombian cities: providing opportunities for the poor in the interests of the public good. This was the art of weaving in the particular with the general as macroeconomic policy. In Currie's model, the city operated as a site of exchange between the state and low-income populations, offering an urban laboratory to experiment with models combining market-based reforms and social welfare objectives. Rather than identify the city as the creator of loneliness, disease, or disorder, Currie identified cities with bringing together both the actors and resources necessary to reformulate the goals of comprehensive development through the art of planning. Currie identified Colombia as a model:

> It is proposed that Colombia (and other developing countries) reject the laissez-faire or North American model of urban development for three main reasons. It is too costly in the sense of calling for a wrong set of priorities in the allocation of resources, and the end result tends to intensify rather than modify undesirable social trends. We cannot blame all social ills on urbanization, but at least we can ask that the model of urbanization being followed should tend to ameliorate rather than exacerbate such ills and enhance rather than deteriorate the quality of life. It is proposed to set forth certain ideals or criteria for urban living and then consider how such ideals might be realized. Thirdly, the reader is asked to keep in mind that the task is not primarily that of planning for current sized cities, but for vastly larger ones, possibly even three times larger within seventeen years, and four times larger by the end of the century (1974).

Currie's interest in areas long neglected by planning countered the efforts of urban technical experts to create an optimum city, a difficult project no matter the expertise of North American planning models. Colombia's cities were rapidly growing and the geography and political climates of intermediate-sized cities like Medellín, Cali, and Barranquilla had turned models and predictions of urban experts on their head.

Currie's macroeconomic project targeted a structural pivot of planning – the problem of aggravating the condition of the urban poor. In creating the Colombian experiment, Currie referred to the circuit breaker effect of World War II in the United States, a shock program used to cut through existing layers of sedimented disorder and poverty:

> In short, the War took the place of a deliberate program of accelerated mobility. A pattern of 150 years was dramatically broken not by natural economic forces but by a crash program. This was truly a break-through and now we can speak with confidence of an assured take-off. A conclusive illustration is now at hand to demonstrate the superiority of the 'pull' over the 'push' factor in the mobility of labor. It points to the necessity of an external force to break the vicious circle of persistently low wages, low

> productivity, poor educational levels and a high birth rate – which is the situation in rural Colombia (1963).

While referencing the problems of the rural south in the United States, Currie imagined using the state's economic force to redirect existing patterns of planning in Colombia. He embraced post-war planning as a state-supported urban response to social welfare. From the 1950s, dominant development paradigms had emphasized the benefits of leading sector growth from export-led growth models in Latin America (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). Currie's own leading sector strategy rested on pro-market housing interventions backed by the state, a model based on accelerated urbanization and the mobility of agricultural labor to cities (Chandra 2006). The multiplier effects of housing, projected to result in wave after wave of economic growth, identified planning with the circuit-breaker effect. Here, housing offered the motor of urban development.

In light of the rapidly changing condition of cities across the globe, Currie had a critical eye towards planning and its unprojected implications. Currie combined his concern for urban aesthetics with the broader region in a "cities-within-a-city" strategy of development. In Colombia, he placed the emphasis on restricting the size of the metropolitan area rather than satellite cities that encouraged the use of cars and the absorption of agricultural areas. The "cities-within-a-city" experiment, taken from a United States model, placed the emphasis on alleviating the urban ills concentrating in a rapidly growing central core (Gakenheimer 1976). His urban experiments borrowed ideas from international architects already working in Colombian cities together with his experiences in the United States, Europe, and Singapore. He makes a reference to the global problem of city growth here:

> It is difficult to imagine Edinburgh without the Castle on the bluff that dominates the city, or Paris without the Seine and its bridges. It is not enough to have natural beauty points; they must be seized upon and made into unique and distinguished characteristics. The desecration of some of the mountainsides behind Bogotá that should provide a magnificent backdrop of the city, the recent and continuing process of hiding those mountains behind skyscrapers, and the deterioration of the waterfront in Barranquilla, are examples of a neglect of what could be great sources of civic pride and psychic satisfaction (1974).

In referring to the importance of natural beauty, Currie highlights the cities of Bogotá and Barranquilla. Currie refers to neglect on the two fronts: first, a concern for modernist architecture that hides the "distinguished characteristics" of cities, and second, a preoccupation with informal settlements concentrating on Bogotá's mountains and Barranquilla's waterfront, a phenomenon that was not unique to Colombia. Currie continues on to say:

> Examples could be multiplied from every city. It is ironical that frequently more emphasis on aesthetic consideration gives not only greater and continuing psychic satisfaction but is, in a broader sense, more economic. If

> narrow cost-accounting had prevailed in the planning and growth of Paris, it would never have reaped untold billions from being the tourist center of the world. Developing countries may learn more from European cities than from North American, though lessons may be learned from all.
>
> Urban policy in a developing country, therefore, should seek to maintain and stress the importance and worth of the individual and not let him be dwarfed by what he has created. It must seek to maintain a sense of community. It must seek to avoid the sense of overcrowding, whether in living or working conditions (1974).

At a moment of resounding neo-liberal turns on the global scale, Currie's observations speak to a conflict at the roots of planning. John Friedmann identifies the contentious engagement between the urban production of space, civil society, and power with "a continuing search to improve the practice of planning" (Friedmann 1998). It is this dilemma of choosing how to intervene that conflicts with the social goals of planning. The practice of planning, whether articulated at the city or national level, serves as a powerful conduit for social interventions. In Colombia, the heated debates between state and market interests gave new meaning to the role of civil society in shaping planning. The impacts of rural to urban migration and economic restructuring exposed existing mechanisms of ordering to the public eye. Urban beautification, modernization, and comprehensive development intervention in Colombia shifted the periphery of planning maps to the center of social agendas.

Currie's experiment circulated across the front page of newspapers and made its way to multiple city centers at a moment in which neo-liberalism secured footing as a rationality of governance globally. Jamie Peck, Nik Theodore, and Neil Brenner identify neo-liberal state-market articulations with an uneven urban landscape of state projects of privatization, prescriptive policy models, and reinvented politics (2009). Currie's own experiment rearticulated social rationales in a way that foregrounded civil society, and particularly the low-income masses, while espousing market development reform. Neo-liberal projects historically thrive on crisis, incoherence, and contradictions that solidify emergent logics of governance. Nikolas Rose identifies the mutation of social and economic rationales that purportedly protect individuals, while capitalizing on the market with "advanced liberalism" (1999). This contradictory movement between securing social welfare and protecting the market economy affirms the role of planners in regulating the rationales of urban intervention. Urban experiments mediate the contentious interplay between liberal claims of hands-off governance and state intervention, taking up social welfare in rearticulating the goals of planning.

The case of Medellín offers one example of how historically social rationales have been taken up within broader projects to reorder welfare as an urban and national territory of development. Planning histories present a unique space to study the circulation of policies, while disrupting narratives that place urban experiments as novel phenomena. Instead, identifying the "complex traffic of ideas" that shape the extensive geographies and trans-historical character of urban knowledge opens up opportunities to critically engage with existing theory (Harris and Moore 2013). While on the surface, comparisons between urban experiments in the 20th century to the innovations of 21st century social urbanism may seem sparse, tracing the lineages of urban ideas allows an entry point to understanding how the organizing logics of planning come to be configured. Together, the disjuncture in narratives, maps, and ideas help piece together the longer histories of planning experiments.

Historicizing the Present

Medellín is a planned city, from the *comunas* deeply ensconced within the urban periphery of the city to the formal designs of plans that developed alongside it. Historicizing the project of modern city building in Medellín pieces together civic boosterism, modernist ideals, and comprehensive interventions to understand today's urban puzzle. Elements of Medellín's story, though, are embedded in many cities across the Global North and Global South. It is a story of creating place, a story that Rebecca Solnit identifies with the heart of planning:

> The new architecture and urban design of segregation could be called Calvinist: they reflect a desire to live in a world of predestination rather than chance, to strip the world of its wide-open possibilities and replace them with freedom of choice in the marketplace (2000).

It is through walking cities that Solnit's spirit of "wanderlust" penetrates the deep histories embedded in the making of place. This project of historicizing how cities and people approach urban development is part of a broader story of how meanings are made. The trans-historical character of this approach, combined with studies of the transnational mutation of new forms of liberalism, helps demonstrate how ideas are spatially adapted, contested, and rendered visible in the urban form.

My own walking through the streets of Medellín allowed me to break with conventional narratives of social urbanism as a single trajectory told by the protagonists of the model. I have walked through enough neighborhoods in the city to know that if the Medellín River had eyes and ears, it would tell us a different story of urban development. The river's flow separates the eastern city from the west, and its discharge flows from the creeks in the northern and southern hillsides of the city. Its colors range from brown and orange to blue and white. Residues of industrial waste, unknown substances, and sand transform the river's hues numerous times a year. This river and its tributaries have served as a testing ground to cover, straighten, and control the circulation of water. The control of circulation can be understood as a movement to regain territory for urban development.

During fieldwork, I was introduced to Roberto Luis Jaramillo, a prominent historian of Medellín and the Antioquia region. We met on a park bench for an impromptu interview. He told me a story of the Medellín River, a story he referenced as "*la ciudad se desbordó.*" It was the story of how the city and its river had overflowed time and time again. The historian was referencing the overflow of people, homes, and neighborhoods in Medellín – this is the crux of the story for this research. His story helped me understand the Medellín River as framework for rethinking urban experiments. He used history to walk me through planners' efforts to manage, delimit, and organize the vast concentration of dense settlements housed in the *comunas.* In coming to terms with the making of social urbanism, the city underwent a series of urban experiments to redraw the territories of intervention. I had to first listen and watch the unfolding of the Medellín River as a market project of urban development in order to see how the city was organized.

Roberto offered me a conceptual device to walk through Medellín and to challenge the monuments and myths behind the city's making as a center of progressive urban ideas. Before studying social urbanism, I had to first clarify how the *comunas* were transformed from an object of state oversight to a focal point of urban agendas. I walked through Medellín by listening to municipal planning officials, retired architects, and unreferenced archives. I walked though libraries, the presidential palace, and personal collections. The approach helped me place the story of social urbanism beyond the mayoral term of Sergio Fajardo to the places where the city had overflowed – from the neatly delineated maps of *comuna* neighborhoods to the legally defined roles of municipal planning officials to a carefully articulated model of social urbanism. The process of organizing my work and line of research in the midst of fieldwork centered on bringing together the stories of past with those of the present in making sense of the organizing logics underlying urban experiments – this is where the story of social urbanism begins.

This chapter discussed the historical articulations of social rationales by examining three urban experiments with planning prior to 1991 constitutional reform, from the civic campaigns of a private member society and the technical renderings of modernist architects to a macroeconomic planning policy. Chapters 3 and 4 examine how the emergence of social urbanism took form as an event only after the constitutional decentralization of power to municipalities, dramatically reconfiguring how planners structured urban interventions. Social urbanism powerfully reinvented the state-market relationship, but the model exemplifies the various mutations advanced liberalism takes. The reconfiguration of territory in the city can be experienced by walking alongside the Medellín River, but it demands understanding the long-term range and implication of planning, which requires closely examining the narratives, tools, and visions projecting the city's future.

CHAPTER 3
The Social Urbanism Experiment

> *Between us all, we tumbled the walls that then divided the city into barrios of the north and those of the south, in order to give words an entry into a territory in which conflicts were being resolved with violence. The forums allowed the barrio communities to express and refute the label of violence and "no future" that we had imposed on them through mass media and to present the cheerful and enthusiastic face that the rest of the city did not recognize.*
>
> – Maria Emma Mejia, Introduction to *Alternativas de Futuro*

> *I always had the illusion and hope that with the poking of a needle it would be possible to cure diseases. The principle of recovering the energy from a sick or tired point by simply poking has to do with revitalizing this point and the area around it. I think we can and should apply some of the "magic" of medicine to cities. Well, many of them are sick, some even at the terminal stage. In the same way that medicine needs the interaction of a doctor and a patient, in urbanism it is necessary to make the city react. To touch an area in a way that can help it to heal and recover, creating positive reactions and in a chain.*
>
> – Jaime Lerner, Introduction to *Urban Acupuncture*

Sergio Fajardo's electoral term [2004-2007] marked a bold experiment with urban politics in Medellín. Fajardo and his team, the protagonists of social urbanism, became personally invested in integrating urban design, participatory planning, and educational campaigns in reinventing how the state approached the *comunas.* The planners spearheading the experiment centered projects on the poor living in the *comunas,* carefully detailing the motivation, methods, and implications of plans in publicly available documents. Here, social rationales were supported with human development indices and reinforced with legal decrees, which provided the technical basis to intervene in the historically neglected *comunas.* In executing projects, planners symbolically revamped *comuna* areas identified with urban disarray, from a decrepit prison to the invisible neighborhood boundaries of militias to informal housing, replacing these with monumental and beautiful urban designs. Additionally, the team engaged in lively debates with urban experts from across the globe, circulating the social urbanism model from Medellín to Monterey to Barcelona. A biting account of the city's transformation simply coined it "Medellín's Makeover."[15]



Homicide Rates in Medellín 1991-2007
(per 100,000 inhabitants)
Note. Adapted from *Del Miedo a la Esperanza,* 2008

Planners in Medellín endorsed interventions in the *comunas,* radically transforming these neighborhoods from an object of neglect to the means used to secure social welfare for the poor. The *comunas,* geographic zones juxtaposing contradicting layers of modernization and poverty, historically developed with little or no visible state intervention (Naranjo 1992). Interrogating the makings of social urbanism reveals how organizing logics were defined and rearticulated in transforming the *comunas* from a territory of neglect into one of urban intervention. Neglect has been marginally addressed within broader studies of the "codification of policy problems" (Peck 2001). Social urbanism, however, elucidates the novel use of regulation as a state technique in ordering, demarcating, and managing territory in the *comunas*. Specifically, planners in Medellín used the Integral Urban Project (PUI), an administrative tool, to render territories historically identified with state disinvestment as new sites showcasing urban transformation. This practice, though, attempted to erase popular perceptions around state oversight, violence, and poverty in the *comunas*.

Studying the restructuring of territory in the *comunas* helps make sense of how planning was used to re-entrench state power in Medellín. Social urbanism generated a new framework of intervention in the *comunas* most impacted by the state's institutional absence. While the election of Fajardo did not introduce social welfare provision in Medellín, it did signal the expansion of these benefits in a new regulatory urban form. Planners extended the institutional reach of social welfare in the form of urban projects benefiting the urban poor. *Comunas*, once at the margins of planning, were transformed into the center of social investments and urban development. By taking up social urbanism as a model, planners generated visible evidence of the state's investments in the *comunas,* garnering global support as a "best practice" model emerging from Medellín. This chapter examines the interplay between two ideas taken up by the social urbanism experiment: the **social debt** and **grassroots initiatives.** Together, these two ideas set the framework for how planners developed the social rationales of intervention targeting the *comunas*. I argue that planning underpinned new policies of social redistribution to territorialize the state's institutional power.

This chapter is organized as follows: first, a brief overview of how the social debt and grassroots initiatives were taken up by the state as urban interventions in Medellín. Second, an examination of the social rationales used by planners to define the PUI. Third, an analysis of how the social urbanism experiment generated new organizing logics for the state in restructuring the provision of social welfare. My interviews with planners are used here to document the narrations of roles, practices, and expectations as practitioners charged with implementing the model. The social urbanism experiment defined new ways of conceptualizing the *comunas*, adopting administrative tools to organize and legitimize social interventions. In doing so, planners negotiated both neighborhood politics and a constitutional mandate to create territorial ordering plans. Constitutional reform in 1991 decentralized power to municipalities, providing a new space for planners to experiment with the limits of both the law and land use in re-envisioning social rationales. Planners in Medellín, in the process of reconfiguring territory, simultaneously experimented with normative planning frameworks and the re-trenchment of state power. They were able to experiment with both by using social urbanism to appropriate the social debt and grassroots initiatives in formulating a new global model of planning.

The Roots of the Social Debt in Latin America

In 1968, the creation of the Regional Program of Employment for Latin America and the Carribean (PREALC) sparked the beginnings of a theoretical and practice-based project focused on issues of informality, a program that would extend its influence over the region during the next twenty-five years. Much of PREALC's work, from publications to ground-level projects, were organized as rational studies of the informal sector, a form of crisis that development experts responded to with structured interventions centered around two issues: long term unemployment and poverty (PREALC 1993). Mass rural to urban migration movements, magnified by a growing underemployed and unemployed labor force in cities, created national-scale crises that permeated into 1980s development agendas. The indelible mark of structural adjustment policies in Latin America dramatically shaped responses to reform. Open calls for reworking development around social rather than economic models echoed loudly in development policy circles.

A 1988 PREALC conference signaled a transformative shift in ideas from existing rational development paradigms. Presenters from multiple Latin American countries called attention to the pressing issues arising from an increasing social debt. The call urged for the need to change existing economic frameworks of development, and specifically, the pitfalls of structural adjustment policy. The firm refusal to increase external debt was a central theme of conference discussions. The Latin American presenters emphasized an alternative approach in which future investments could maximize productive labor, assure basic services, and ensure an equitable redistribution of resources (PREALC 1989). A global economic crisis, though, challenged the future of social welfare policies. PREALC's drew increasing public attention to issues of social exclusion and the impacts of debt, shifting attention to the blistering condition of visible and not so visible poverty in Latin America.

The PREALC initiatives combined ground-level projects with research data to challenge the major pitfalls of existing development theory. The conclusions: increasing external debt does not result favorably in getting Latin America out of poverty. Agricultural sector modernization does not seamlessly transform rural workers into an urban working class. Mass rural to urban migration does not to lead to full employment in cities. And a broader lesson: incorporating countries into the market does not mean a more equitable distribution of wealth or resources. The struggles of poverty, exclusion, and marginality remained as evident as before. By examining economic policy in Latin America, PREALC researchers began documenting the effects of development in the everyday lives of the people most impacted by practice-based applications of theory. The PREALC model presented a radical challenge to existing development policy at the global scale and the ideas slowly trickled into the realm of planning knowledge.

Laboratories of State Intervention

The heart of the social debt debate reveals a deeper question – how to locate the state, and specifically, its practices in the creation of innovative laboratories for development? Harsh critiques of development emerged in the 1990s. Arturo Escobar's study of the "discovery" of poverty in the third world set an important base for critically engaging with the western edifice of development (1995). James Scott extensively interrogated centralized-planning in examining a variety of social engineering utopias (1999). The development debate continues as the state persists in reinventing the rational basis of intervention. Social theorists interested in this contested arena adopt ethnographic studies to detail the messy, contradictory effects of spatial compromises made in the process, including the impacts of negotiating cultural identity and territory (Moore 2005). Aaron Bobrow-Strain's ethnographic method details how geographical and historical conjunctures reveal important linkages between political economy and social relations, inverting the focus of his study from peasants to one of vilified landed elites (2007). Joseph Gilbert and Daniel Nugent instead emphasize people's experiences with the politics of "everyday" institutions, practices, and power, a collection of essays exploring the different modalities and contradictions of state power (1994). State rationalities provide a vehicle for studying how development projects are used to order space as novel experiments with technical expertise, ideas that then permeate into everyday common sense.

State rationalities cannot be defined, however, without examining the institutional roots of ideas. Rather than study the state as an agent or entity, it can be examined as a social construct (Abrams 1988). It is relations, interventions, and decisions that help make sense of the state as an object and diffuser of ideas. In a move away from discrete classifications of the state, Bob Jessop study instead refers to the "transfer of state capacities" in securing the conditions for the market economy to function (2002). The interplay between state interventions and everyday practices of rule promote dynamic interactions of market collaboration and cooperation, a central premise for "bringing the state back in" to a more central focus of research (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). There is also the question of the formative "effect of practices" in giving the appearance of a state structure (Mitchell 1991b). The organizing logics behind state practices disclose a wide-ranging realm of institutional forms of governance. My concern is with the coalescing of ideas and practices into what Ferguson defines as the exercise of power – not a state as an actor, but the "way of tying together, multiplying, and coordinating power relations, a kind of knotting or congealing of power" (1990). This type of approach locates the authoritative power of the state not directly in institutions, but by identifying the experimental ways in which state power can exceed its own reach.

Development projects and state power together amplify the range of experiments with rationalities of governance. Understood as a laboratory, the power to define interventions creates the perception of authoritative access and claims to scientific knowledge. Robert Park's pioneering work in Chicago was formative in identifying the convenience and opportunity of the city as a "laboratory or clinic in which human nature and social processes" can be studied (1925). Tom Gieryn, on the other hand, identifies how the city oscillates between the "unadulterated reality" of the laboratory and the discovered reality of research in the field (2006). In the debate over the city as laboratory, these arguments elucidate a broader tension between the making of a social experiment and experiments with social reform. Here, planning offers a basis for producing, defining, and legitimizing urban knowledge, while creating the spaces of experimentation. City laboratories are at the crux of dynamic experiments in place-making, social welfare, and control, serving as multi-scalar laboratories of development. This production of emergent geographies is rooted in urban politics, regional setting, and spaces of experimentation, what David Livingston refers to as a "scientific subculture" (2010). As such, cities operate as both sites of knowledge acquisition and exchange, in which planners take on the project of legitimizing the scientific basis of the field.

These laboratories, however, extend beyond the institutional confines of planning and development. The moment in which state power expands reveals emergent layers of overlapping legal and illegal domains, a phenomenon that can simultaneously constrict institutional authority. In an unconventional approach to a study of development, Janet Roitman examines the regulatory power of informality to reveal the intimate ties between state and market in a "failed" African region (2005). Here, the economic framework serves as a laboratory for converging formal and informal markets, while maintaining the power of the state. The appearance of the informal and the ungovernable reveal the dynamic reworking of the market economy in state experiments with development. Even in cases where informality is reworked into newly formulated categories of rational, calculative state practices of development, the process of "incorporation" can simultaneously result in "dispossession" (Elyachar 2005). The multiple guises of state power have broad implications for the politics of development, democracy, and state-society relations. A study of social urbanism offers an opportunity to examine how the state envelops social rationales in reconfiguring the meanings of development together with neglect.

From the Social Debt to Grassroots Initiatives

The implications of state power were at the center of the social debt ideas that filtered into planning agendas in Medellín during the 1990s. At the height of an urban crisis marked by the coupling of industrial decline and a narcotics boom, the state was forced to reconfigure how it approached planning in the city. While the social debt came to dominate political agendas more than a decade after the creation of the PREALC, a series of grassroots initiatives in the 1990s set the terms for how future urban interventions would take shape in Medellín. Planners included the technical experts working in municipal planning offices, academic researchers, and consultants hired by the mayor's office to organize neighborhood-scale responses to pressing urban problems. These planners were lived experts, practitioners that embraced ideas of social reform who worked with *comuna* residents to shape social urbanism interventions. *Comuna* residents were interlocutors who worked together with state representative on two fronts: first, as a voice in state channels of participation, and second, as the messengers of social urbanism in their communities. During Fajardo's term, elites found a charismatic political leader to manage the city's transformation in conjunction with the support of *comuna* residents. As planners of social urbanism, they contributed their experiences as professionals from the public and private realm and as residents and business interests from across the city.

In the academic domain, planners were trained as university researchers. The *Universidad Nacional* offered the School of Habitat (CEHAP), a research center dedicated to studying issues of housing, equity, and urban development. The planners in CEHAP were trained to work as architects of habitat in the urban trenches of the city. As professionals with experience in the *comunas,* planners gained powerful insights and lessons on self-help, collaboration, and community. The graduates of CEHAP, however, were not design-focused architects. Instead, visionary graduating cohorts saw the possibility of urban reform that lay in the growing concentration of informal settlements in the city. For disciples of the CEHAP model, habitat not only referred to the provision or rehabilitation of a physical structure used for housing, but to addressing the specific needs of people, relations, and communities deeply embedded within the existing urban fabric of the city.[16]

CEHAP graduates worked on projects ranging from slum upgrading and post-disaster interventions to micro-action plans in neighborhoods and macro-planning agendas at the municipal scale. The School's model promulgated a hands-on approach to urban interventions located in high-risk areas, informal settlements in the neighborhoods most often overlooked by municipal planning officials. There were however, exceptions. Carlos, a CEHAP graduate, worked as the technical chair of the PRIMED, a pilot program focused on the improvement of squatter areas in Medellín. The program was formulated in 1992 and administered by the Housing and Social Development Corporation (CORVIDE), a decentralized institution at the municipal scale.[17] While various sources supported the initiative, the PRIMED program represented one component of the *Consejeria Presidencial,* a national ministry created in 1990 with emergency powers by then president César Gaviria.[18] The result – a Minister appointed in Medellín to intervene on the president's behalf. The Minister worked at the municipal scale to funnel and manage a large pool of financial resources at the height of urban crisis.

Medellín native Maria Emma Mejia led the first *Consejeria*, providing city residents with an emblematic public figure. While Maria Emma had began university studies in social communication, her interests in film and television led to her appointment as director of the Cinematographic Fomenting Company (FOCINE). Following the election of president César Gaviria,[19] Maria Emma's appointment as Minister came at a desperate moment of state intervention – a pressing need existed to humanize the state in a city where an institutional presence was absent. Her job pivoted on persuading *comuna* residents of the state's existence and resources, an ambitious urban agenda that aimed to radically reconstruct the politics of collaboration in Medellín. Maria Emma worked arduously to disrupt the inner workings of the narcotics world and patronage politics at the neighborhood scale. The centerpiece of her initiatives rested on maximizing the reach of national and international resources, rather than on securing election votes. While the *Consejeria* projects began one year before constitutional reform, which decentralized national government to sub-national units in 1991, the program lasted seven years.

Maria Emma relied on the work and life experience of a wide range of planners representing the CEHAP, *comunas,* and mass media outlets as her *Consejeria* team of intervention. The PRIMED program eventually combined its administrative and technical framework in the *comunas* under the umbrella of the *Consejeria.* Financial support from the German Financial Corporation/KFW partially subsidized the cost of the urban experiment, placing emphasis on community-scale projects. Additional resources were funneled from Colombia's national government towards housing subsidies and renovation. Funds from Medellín's municipal government were used to legalize land titles, costs of relocation for residents, and logistical support.[20] While the *Consejeria* programs were organized as part of a centralized state intervention, the execution of projects at the community scale was managed as grassroots initiatives. In other words, the Minister mediated the release of project resources, but the communities identified how and where projects would take place. In an unconventional move on the state's behalf, *comuna* residents laid direct claim to planning resources diverted to the municipal scale without ever having to step into an institutional planning office.

Approximately 50,000 *comuna* residents benefited from the PRIMED program. A US loan for $7.5 million dollars partially funded the first phase of the program.[21] The program's success later served as the condition for exonerating the debt. In the 1990s, urban interventions generally followed one of three trends in Latin America. First, project fragmentation based on sector-based interests, including institutionalized economic development rationalities. Second, a selective privileging of poor neighborhoods in the interests of political patronage or electoral votes. A third approach, taken up by the *Consejeria*, prioritized issues of violence, poverty, and informality as a central state agenda. Carlos explains the approach here:

> Since Moravia, we had an instrument called the bond – the mutual benefit bond. We constructed working-class committees in Moravia, but that is easy to say. [Neighborhood] people worked with us in reordering the neighborhood. In El Bosque, all the streets were a meter wide. One meter. And we widened all those little streets. All the streets in Carabobo. All the ones you see today in Carababo, minus 79th. We widened all of them with an agreement-based effort. There was no money in exchange. [Residents] needed to give … between all of them. In order for this street to go from one meter to three or four, which was the minimum that *Empresas Publicas de Medellín* (Public Enterprises of Medellín, EPM) gave to me. EPM told me – 'Carlos look, you go to a street, open a one-meter hole and you need a meter to connect the dirt. Get three meters and we install a sewage system.' But these streets, there's some three, four, five, six, seven, and even nine meters. All the sizes possible. We reordered the neighborhoods. That was the seed to think about the PRIMED (Interview 2011).

Carlos's training as a CEHAP graduate shaped his pragmatic approach to intervention. He led planning interventions by identifying mutual benefits with stakeholders to execute projects. In negotiating the politics of paving a much-needed street in Moravia, a *comuna* neighborhood just north of downtown, the model provided a framework to reorient existing state approaches to building basic infrastructure. Traditionally, local clientelistic politics equated infrastructure investments with securing future election votes, but the *Consejeria* instead targeted the *comunas* most impacted by urban crisis – the enclave globally identified with slums and squatter settlements.

The *Consejeria* programs were based on a broad range of social interventions, from educational partnerships and workforce development to youth centers and nutritional services. The *Fondo de Inversion Semilla,* a small grant-based program, provided residents with additional opportunities to partake in projects by creating their own proposals for urban experimentation.[22] Small business enterprise proposals from residents encouraged neighborhood scale economic development. Requests from community organizations funneled funding towards cultural and performing arts groups for youth. Other neighborhood groups formulated project-based proposals to fund facilities for recreation, including sports and community centers. An annual conference brought together practitioners from around the city to engage in dynamic discussions around experiences with the projects – a live feedback forum to evaluate the *Consejeria's* interventions.

The *Consejeria's* approach to interventions helped restore confidence in the relationship between the state and residents as partners in directing planning. The PRIMED program gained international recognition for its ability to identify issues in *comunas* and collaborate with neighborhood residents as valuable to the urban fabric of the city.[23] The depth of crisis, which had forced the president to decree an emergency intervention, dramatically shifted the response of centralized government to focusing on the imposing reach of structural problems manifesting in the city. In order for the state to rebuild its power and constitute its authority in Medellín, planners were sent to the frontlines – moving into the core of informal settlements and slowly carving out a space for intervention. The historic opportunity at hand placed planners in a critical position to reconfigure how social interventions were defined as state territories at the ground level, but the termination of presidential funds, political changes, and lackluster results ended the *Consejeria* (Dapena 2003).

Meanwhile, a second architectural strand intensely brewed at the private *Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana* (UPB). Parallel to the *Consejeria* interventions, the university hired Sergio Perez in 1993 as dean of architecture. Trained in the late 1980s as an architect at the UPB, Sergio had lived in Medellín during the intense period of urban crisis. He led many planning-related projects as a faculty member, from engaging as a technical expert in planning meetings to leading workshops with global experts both locally and abroad. As dean, Sergio's extensive urban experience led him to thinking more critically about the role of Medellín within the broader geography of the metropolitan region. While Sergio had only marginally participated in the *Consejeria,* the heart of his work took form at UPB's *Laboratorio de Arquitectura y Urbanismo* (LAUR), an urban research institute created in 1996. The laboratory took on innovative urban research and carried out a few urban projects in areas west of the Medellín River as a municipal contractor.

Alejandro Echeverri, an architect at LAUR, shared Sergio's interest in transforming Medellín. He worked at the UPB, but chose to pursue doctoral studies in Barcelona to expand the breadth of his architectural knowledge. While in Barcelona, Alejandro developed a study on the "water footprints" of Medellín, an analysis of urban creeks and surrounding settlement patterns in the city.[24] At the time, global media outlets focused attention on the innovation and success of the Barcelona model in spurring public space revitalization and neighborhood renovation.[25] Alejandro, however, spent his time researching a much less known component of the model – the types of practices used to transform informal areas – a foundational moment for thinking about the *comunas* in his hometown of Medellín (Interview 2012). He returned to Medellín in the late-1990s as a professor of architecture at the UPB. By the early 2000s, Alejandro's vision of social transformation had taken a political turn. Sergio Fajardo, an aspiring candidate to the mayoral bid in Medellín, formed a team combining Carlos Montoya's experience with the *Consejeria* and Alejandro's international expertise to define an urban agenda for reform. The first encounter between the two men took place with Carlos Mario, another architect, in a UPB cafeteria, which Carlos Montoya details here:

> Carlos Mario invited me to work at the UPB. I had never been inside the UPB and I told him. He was like 'what do you mean?' I was like – 'Why? Yeah. I'm from the *Universidad Nacional.* I have the most formidable research center in the world there. That's where CEHAP is at and that's my world. I'm really a son of the *Nacional.*'

> The *Nacional* is … it's another thing. It's not marketing. It doesn't count [everything]. The *Universidad Nacional* has another work style. I thought it was really strange … all that … and I wasn't able to adapt well. The language is different. I'm a more pragmatic person. I'm more about projects that can be done. They want to do speculative projects there. Conventional, but it doesn't matter if it doesn't get done. So I told them no (Interview 2011).

The architects, organized into camps based on university affiliations, could easily separate themselves out by the specific methods distinctive to their planning practice. Far from the hard-line concern for public space taken up by the architects at the UPB, Carlos followed a different approach. His hands-on, practice-based method addressed urban problems in the trenches of the city, a model closely aligning with the CEHAP framework of practice. CEHAP architects dedicated themselves to working with neighborhood communities at the grassroots level to better understand community dynamics and to develop unique zone-based instruments of intervention.

The tensions between the two architectural lines further fragmented approaches to urban planning in the *comunas*. The underlying challenge to how planning was organized resulted in conflicts over methodological approach – whether to work as architects in the city trenches or as experts envisioning lofty models of transformation. At the time of Fajardo's election, some of the key planners on his team were not experienced with the long history and inner workings of the social interventions led by CEHAP and the *Consejeria*.

> Carlos: So Cacho (Alejandro Echeverri) tells me … 'well, I just arrived from Barcelona and we have another line of thinking there. I found out that what needs to be done in Medellín is a betterment of the high neighborhoods [*comunas*].' I told him, 'Of course! The PRIMED has been working on it for ten years! In other words, people always think that what they do is the latest *cháchara* (latest hype) to come out in December.'
>
> Cacho: 'What?'
>
> Carlos: Yes, there's a program here called the Integral Program of Informal Neighborhood Betterment [PRIMED].' Once we started [social urbanism], it turned into [their] anecdote and I felt like there was a gap. He brought the formula that the city had already discovered. That was the result of Dr. Maria Emma's research. Imagine that. That is incredible! (Interview 2011)

The *Universidad Nacional's* and UPB's models sought urban transformation, but each offered a distinct vision for how the city could change. While the international expertise of Alejandro provided a powerful model for creating new projects in Medellín, Carlos clearly remembered the early days of grassroots initiatives organized by the state. Both models made contributions to the social urbanism, but here they represented fragmented, piecemeal approaches to intervention.

While a state-led intervention, the *Consejeria* program tolerated illegality as a condition of working in informal settlements, and thus, accepted these neighborhoods as a central part of state planning. Edesio Fernandes identifies the variable responses of the state to different types of informal, precarious, and clandestine situations with "three degrees of illegality," the contradictory relationship between progressive forms of urban law and the perils of its enforcement (1997). The argument suggests that the struggles for the right to the city can mitigate the effect of social exclusion, but the political process remains a contentious fight, in which the state continually reconfigures the terms of its own power. The state, understood as an institutional monolith, can seem to stand in opposition to the grassroots practices espoused by planners on the ground. Here, state responses to informality expose the duality of intervention. On the one hand, the *Consejeria's* acquiescence to move beyond issues of illegality as the premise for the historic exclusion of the *comunas* in planning, but on the other, the emergence of social rationales rooted in the technical and international expertise of the architects who created social urbanism.

As such, social urbanism dramatically shifted the origins of the *Consejeria* framework. The social debt and grassroots initiatives, once firmly grounded in the trenches of the *comunas*, were displaced onto a global arena of urban experiments with regulating neglect. The neglect of the *comunas,* based on patterned practices of disinvestment and disregard, turned into the core logic behind state intervention. In introducing social urbanism, planners usurped the anecdotal story of *Consejeria* interventions to engineer a new territory for what neglect would look like in the *comunas*. Urban interventions under social urbanism centered on the *comunas*. However, the key battles over informality, neglect, and governance would take place among technical experts in municipal planning offices, globally showcasing a kinder and gentler face of state intervention.

The Testing Grounds for Social Urbanism

The northeastern *comunas* formed the testing grounds of the social urbanism experiment. While debates around the social debt emerged in the 1980s, its practice in development came head to head with a push for grassroots initiatives in Medellín at the height of urban crisis in the 1990s. These two ideas coalesced into what Fajardo and his team called social urbanism. Planners assembled the *comunas* as a laboratory to experiment with testing, observing, and practicing the reconfiguration of territory. This understanding of territory draws from Stuart Elden's definition as "more than merely land, but a rendering of the emergent concept of 'space' as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled" (2010a). As such, territory, in the case of the *comunas,* refers to three forms of state power. First, the administrative power to order, define and classify space as a demarcated site of intervention. Second, the governmental power to control and manage the urban poor as a population. Third, the spatial power to plan, project and engineer social rationales of intervention – and to advance – new market projects. These three powers intersect as an emergent state space in the *comunas*.

State power was territorialised in the *comunas* as the experiment of social urbanism. The project centered on a metro-cable project, a mass transit gondola line extending from the main Metro commuter line, dramatically elevating into the slopes of the *comunas*. A proposal for a metro-cable project in the northeastern *comunas* existed prior to Fajardo's election, however. Funding had been set aside during the mayoral period of Luis Alfredo Ramos, which immediately preceded Fajardo's term, but the project was never completed. Under Fajardo's leadership, a new generation of planners turned the metro-cable project into an exercise in transforming key points of the city as diffusors of change. José Fernando Angel, an architect on the team explains:

> If you look at the network … at the library plan that we created … the five most important and most critical areas of poverty, and to a degree, of the memory of pain. I don't know if you remember the theory – where there's a library, there's a memory of pain.
>
> Monica: Like the jail…
>
> The jail where the police hardly entered. La Quintana, the creek where they threw the dead. That's where we put libraries. The libraries were the nucleus, the centroids of Integral Urban Projects. The word integral meant integral.
>
> First, it had to be next to a transportation hub. From the bus rapid transit of the Metro to the Metro-cable, to the integrated transportation system of the Valley of Aburra. You need access from the city to that place. And aside from that, it had the CEDEZOS, the Centers of Economic Development promoting local enterprise. You had the daycare, cultural center, libraries with books, computers. It was betterment of the environment, public spaces, sidewalk systems. It was knowing that in the *barrio* the oldest, youngest, children, and women had been consulted. That everyone had, in one way or the other, contributed. So the concept of integrality was fundamental. That's why [we had] the integral urban project as a strategy. The library was the nucleus and to see that in those areas … the offering of schools, daycares, and play centers widened. More kids was good. It was enough. So the relationship between the transportation systems was sine qua non (Interview 2011).

Architects formally called the process "urban acupuncture," an idea developed by architect and former mayor of Curitiba Jaime Lerner. The idea is based on an urban ecology theory in which small-scale interventions are used in critical areas of the city to create change, a process of curing, revitalizing, and creating positive chain reactions (2003). Here, the metro lines served as the base for a wider structure of intervention across multiple *comunas* that would be unified by one main community nucleus, allowing planners to address a cross-section of urban problems exacerbated in these neighborhoods.

Planners espoused the model that transportation was the backbone to urban transformation. Mass public transit in Medellín could bring benefits to the urban poor, improving "access and mobility options" that would lead to "better living conditions" in the city (Brand and Dávila 2011). This line of thinking led planners to advocate for investments in transportation infrastructure that would provide welfare to the poor. In the United States, planners embrace of the "social utility" of transportation argue for accessible networks connecting the urban poor to jobs and housing (Wachs and Taylor 1998). Across the globe, planners have adopted public transportation strategies in incorporating broader understandings of welfare reform and addressing flaws in urban policy. The rapid pace of urbanization in the Global South has aligned transportation agendas with the broader aims of economic, social, and environmental sustainability (Jenks and Burgess 2000). Cities are now the nexus between development agendas and the benefits of sustainability, and thus, social welfare provision. The global transfer of urban knowledge has launched social reform movements in cities towards a more equitable distribution of resources.

In Medellín, Sergio Fajardo became obsessed with social reform. His concern was with transforming access to mobility and inequality in the *comunas*. He began with changing the numbers that were used to identify and quantify low human development indicators in the *comunas*. His team redefined how urban acupuncture was taken up in the local context of Medellín. Clara Restrepo, *Secretaria de Bienestar Social* (Secretary of Social Welfare) during Fajardo's term, explains:

> We started to work on the theme of inequity – let's call it territorial map that was more or less a guide. It was Sergio's obsession. [We organized] Medellín according to the Human Development Index with the color green, from lightest to darkest. He said, 'I want to know what the human development indexes are like in the entire city.' And the political decision was made that we would invest where the highest indexes of poverty and inequity existed. In *comunas* 1 and 2, which is where the Metro-cable is located, that was the lowest human development index and it's where the highest investments took place … and so on and so forth in the city. For instance, Moravia is a problem zone … in all senses. The *comuna* 13. All of that continued with the election of Alonso Salazar, but then we intervened in *comunas* 8, 9, and 6 with the idea we named 'social urbanism.' But it was very clear that poverty had to be attacked in the territory and not how it was done before with sector-based programs in education, health (Interview 2011).

The map was shaded according to the human development index, a framework and international standard to structure urban interventions. The index adopted the United Nations method to measure life expectancy, education, and income. Tania Li refers to the development practice of "rendering technical" with the project of delimiting an area of intervention with the purpose of diagnosing and evaluating political responses (2007). The practice is based on creating a rationality of governance that provides a technical basis to both the problems and solutions of development. Planners in Medellín adopted the map, human development index, and urban projects in creating a representation of what was to be governed. The project was implicitly about using urban knowledge to classify, contain, and manage the *comunas*. The first metro-cable project cut west, dividing *comunas* 1 and 2 from 3 and 4, centering the first site of experimentation in the four *comunas* with the lowest human development indicators.

Comuna	Human Development Index			
	2001	2004	2005	2006
1 Popular	67,86	73,66	74,67	75,58
2 Santa Cruz	68,95	73,35	73,04	73,99
3 Manrique	71,84	73,81	75,53	76,44
4 Aranjuez	72,21	73,59	73,68	75,44
5 Castilla	76,59	78,03	78,20	78,62
6 12 de Octubre	73,02	78,19	78,07	77,76
7 Robledo	75,05	79,64	78,11	79,63
8 Villa Hermosa	73,75	75,76	76,19	77,11
9 Buenos Aires	76,01	78,95	78,78	77,97
10 La Candelaria	80,81	77,5	77,39	78,59
11 Laureles Estadio	82,47	87,48	87,03	86,42
12 La América	79,99	84,81	84,30	83,89
13 San Javier	73,69	77,50	78,50	79,50
14 El Poblado	81,46	92,69	93,63	93,17
15 Guayabal	77,79	80,36	80,56	79,18
16 Belén	79,23	81,08	82,37	83,54
Urban Medellín	74,35	79,45	80,26	80,45

Human Development Index by *Comuna* (2001-2006)
Note. Adapted from Alcaldia de Medellín.


N
1
Popular
3
Manrique
8
Villa Hermosa
9
Buenos Aires
2
Santa Cruz
Municipio
de Bello
4
Aranjuez
5
Castilla
10
La Candelaria
14
Poblado
6
Doce de Octubre
15
Guayabal
Municipio
de Envigad
7
Robledo
11
Laureles Estadio
Municipio
de Itagüi
16
Belén
12
La América
13
San Javier

Human Development Index Map
(Medellín 2004)
Note. Adapted from Alcaldia de Medellín, 2008.

Fajardo's innovative approach took the state deep into the *comunas,* not as a top-down approach, but as a broker of urban knowledge. As I explored in Chapter Two, his articulation of social urbanism was based on an existing lineage of planning, based on creating social rationales of urban intervention. Social urbanism was only the most recent experiment in articulating the model in Medellín. Sergio Fajardo received his PhD in mathematics and returned to Colombia as a professor at the *Universidad de los Andes* in Bogotá. In a 2007 *New York Times* interview, Fajardo appeared "dressed in jeans and a T-shirt, sporting three days' growth of beard and unruly hair nearly down to his shoulders, Sergio Fajardo [looked] every bit the nonconformist mathematician who spent years attaining a doctorate at the University of Wisconsin."[26] Fajardo represented a new turn in everyday politics marked by a concern for the city he had lived in – a vision shaped by deeply embedded memories of violence. His team refuted the idea that politics was based on collecting election votes. The novel approach was used by planners to identify these experts as both brokers of the political apparatus and as everyday residents afflicted by urban crisis.

In a letter expressing frustration over an article in *National Geographic Magazine* on Medellín's "urban war," Fajardo writes:

> For a long period of time, we have had to face accusations and all kinds of negative remarks regarding Medellín. We had to struggle with the label of the most violent city in the world, the city of the cartels. It is true that we had to face the narcobusiness, an unpredictable phenomenon no one could have ever foreseen.[27]

The city had reached an all-time high in homicide rates at the start of Fajardo's term. His team of practitioners worked arduously to create a new way of presenting the *comunas*, a project of rebuilding the city from the inside out. The imposing scale of urban crisis in Medellín, however, had spilled from the *comunas* across the city and filtered global perceptions of violence, poverty, and an absent state, which overshadowed any headway made. The letter continues, "I have never seen such a sensationalist ill-disposed article regarding our city, and believe me, I have seen many." More than an attack on a political agenda, Fajardo viewed the article as an attack on the city he called home.

Fajardo had expansive urban knowledge and a wide political network, which he had acquired during his lifetime in the city. His father, Raul Fajardo, a renowned architect in Medellín, had led an important wave of modernist transformation in the city during the 1950s. After teaching in Bogotá, Sergio Fajardo returned to Medellín and launched a mayoral campaign on an independent platform. Then called "Citizen Commitment," the platform was born in 1999 "when 50 leaders started to walk the streets of Medellín with a feeling of hostility towards the world of politics, a synonym of the corruption that had prevailed for decades in the country."[28] Fajardo remained with the movement until 2010, at which point it joined forces with the Green Alliance as part of a national presidential campaign. Although Fajardo's initial return to Medellín was marked by a mayoral defeat in the year 2000, he ran again in 2004 and won.

Neither Alejandro Echeverri from EAFIT University or Carlos Montoya from the *Universidad Nacional* knew Fajardo prior to the campaign, but the two came together as heads of two divisions within the institutional space of the *Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano* (Urban Development Enterprise, EDU) in Medellín. The EDU's foundation in 1994 created a municipal-level state development corporation. During Fajardo's term, the EDU took a radical turn as a decentralized state entity with expansive planning powers. Fajardo split the EDU into a business-based model with different management offices, one taken up by Echeverri as director of the EDU and another in the housing division headed up by Carlos. As part of social urbanism, the EDU targeted the *comunas* by adopting a broad definition of territory to link housing, public space, and urban design as cohesive social interventions.

Fajardo's Urban Miracle

Fajardo's election as municipal mayor marked a turning point for planning in Medellín. The social urbanism model built on the existing framework set by the *Consejeria,* bringing together the technical and lived experience of those who had worked in the trenches with a broader politicized agenda. Norelly Suarez, a member of Fajardo's team and seasoned state employee, explains:

> Sergio didn't emerge from nothing. Sergio comes from a social movement that had been coming together since the early 1990s, many from NGOs, some academics, and some from business. We had been working since then on issues, on those same issues, because there was so much violence in Medellín. Medellín had been so fertile for the mafia … for narcotrafficking. It was a very arduous job. It took a lot of years of theoretical production. After that came the seminars of *Medellín Alternativas de Futuro*, then the

> Consejeria during multiple years. Some institutions were created. The Oversight Committee for the [Municipal] Development Plan was created. All of that started to generate an important critical mass and an intellectuality concerned with social issues. Sergio arrives in Medellín and finds all this. He was coming from a critical line of thought, because he was an academic at the *Universidad de los Andes*. He had always been restless about those issues. And he finds a fertile territory there. At the same time, all of us that were here found a leader in Sergio. Those things come together and so the city project, to a large degree, was already thought out. The city project said …well, we had to work on X in conviviality, we had to work on X in education, we had to work on this … everything we said had to be done, in one way or the other, we were able to formalize it in that mayoral term (Interview 2011).

In addition to the professional experience of Fajardo's team, *comuna* residents became a powerful base for executing social urbanism projects. Residents were asked to participate in collective imagination workshops, project-based opinion surveys, and budgeting forums on future projects in their neighborhoods. While the *Consejeria* had modeled many of its initiatives on grassroots practices led from the ground-level, social urbanism instead emphasized the state institution in leading and framing urban planning interventions. Medellín was reconfigured into a "Laboratory for Good Government," an experiment with innovative technical instruments in guiding and framing the social interventions of planning practice.[29]

Medellín's laboratory, a city surrounded by imposing mountainsides, created a particularly unique set of geographic obstacles to the Euclidean bases of traditional planning practice. A vast concentration of settlements along the city's mountain ranges complicated the problem of strict compliance with land use norms even more. Members of Fajardo's team created a unique tool that would allow planners to flexibly direct urban planning in the *comunas*. Tomas Ramirez, an architect, and Laila Cardona, a lawyer working at the EDU explain:

> Laila: I'll start, but I get lost. Well, in general I don't think you need that much to explain it. The PUI, well I don't know how much you've researched, but regardless, it needs to be understood as a strategy, like a tool of intervention. That's how it starts. A tool of urban intervention, right?
>
> Tomas: That seeks to…
>
> Laila: That seeks to intervene in zones. Well, it's a little *peye* (bad) to say it like that. It's a strategy of urban intervention based on three essential components: the physical, social, and institutional. It's used to intervene in specific areas of the city where you find some concrete problems, completely defined, and that need that type of intervention, ok?
>
> Tomas: So when we talk about Integrated Urban Projects … we are talking about an intervention that doesn't just assume the physical, a series of interventions, or the city's restructuring. There's also interventions of a purely social character used to establish programs in the Development Plan. In order to function, they first need all of

> that inter-institutional framework in order to fit in line with the Plan of Government for the Municipality (Interview 2012).

In order for the PUI to fit within existing plans, the tool dismissed the existing administrative boundaries of the *comunas.* Instead the PUI offered a conceptual tool to re-define territory and overlay a new map based on social rationales of intervention. Project sites, determined by a PUI-based methodology, created a unique approach to geo-referencing how municipal government re-appropriated space. Vandergeest and Peluso identify state attempts to spatially administer rights and power with territoriality (1995). By asserting control over an area, the state controlled people, activities, and relationships. The EDU classified the area of intervention, defined the methodology, and provided the expertise to legitimize a novel approach to planning.

The adoption of the PUI transformed how planners reconfigured territory in at least three ways. First, planners reframed the focus of planning, transforming the historic neglect of the *comunas* into the rationale for social intervention. The makers of social urbanism learned valuable lessons from the *Consejeria,* but here, projects were framed as a political agenda with an explicit methodology of intervention. The institutional base of social urbanism was reinforced with technical studies, publications, and international conferences, a process that legitimized the expansion of the model into new territories of experimentation in the city. Defining territory, understood here as a form of spatial control, revealed how planning could effectively secure state space in the *comunas* by adopting social rationales. For years, the state's oversight in the *comunas* left communities to self-organize resources, infrastructure, and planning. Grassroots initiatives at the neighborhood scale were instrumental to mitigating the impacts of the social debt in the *comunas.* While the urban crisis in Medellín jolted the national government to implement the *Consejeria* as an emergency measure*,* the program's abrupt end fragmented the social pursuit.

The idea of practicing urban acupuncture offered a holistic alternative to treating the most critical areas in the city. The adoption of the PUI as a tool did not cure all of the existing problems in the *comunas,* but it did aim to deal with the "neurological" centers (Hernandez 2012). These centers operated as the structural framework for the PUI – here, the northeastern *comunas* were prized with both the lowest human development indicators and the territorial base of *Consejeria* interventions, and as such, the test site for the social urbanism experiment. Tomas, a key informant on social urbanism*,* explains:

> You could say that the PUI received a lot of influence from other programs in other parts of the world. *Favela Barrio*, the PRIMED. PRIMED was an [urban] action, a program before the PUI. You could say that the PRIMED is the father of the PUI (Interview 2012).

The PRIMED had directed slum upgrading programs in the 1990s organized as a direct, self-help model. The interventions were scattered, but operated at the neighborhood scale. The PUI, on the other hand, identified specific targets of intervention. For instance, the human development indicator and existing metro–based transportation infrastructure. These areas were then transformed into a mapped overlay, a territory defined by the PUI methodology for social experimentation. The technical experts working in the EDU created the PUI to regulate planning, and thus neglect, in the *comunas* – the method allowed municipal officials to define how territory would be understood and appropriated as a state space of intervention.

> Tomas: The northeast PUI is a pilot project. You couldn't even talk about a northeast methodology or a PUI methodology, because that's where the learning took place. Lets say that that was the laboratory. We talked about a type of planning from the social … where people could say what they needed and those interventions were done in the territory, but they were very exact. They were exact. It's starting to weave … the acupuncture that the PUI started to make … starting to build a much larger structure of those type of ideas (Interview 2012).


PUI Projects
(background: transportation network)
Note. Adapted from Alcaldia de Medellín, 2008.

PUI NORORIENTAL
PUI comuna Nororiental
Línea K metrocable
Metroplus etapa 3
PUI Moravia
Metroplus etapa 1
PUI MORAVIA
Metroplus etapa 3
Metroplus etapa 2
Línea metrocable San Javier
PUI comuna 13
PUI COMUNA 13
2004-2007
PROYECTOS URBANOS INTEGRALES
PUI-contra la exclusión y la desigualdad

The EDU experts used the PUI to reconfigure territory in the *comunas,* and thus, how the state addressed and defined the impacts of neglect – a problem Sergio Fajardo publicly defined as a historical social debt. The emergent model encapsulated neighborhood betterment, open channels of community participation, and engaged the state's institutional presence in the *comunas*.

> Tomas: As I was telling you, we have four stages. I have it written here somewhere. A total of four stages and nineteen phases. There's a first stage of recognizing the city, which is an already completed phase in the sense that the zones of intervention were already detected and the generic [component] in all of the methodology. In other words, once it's detected, [the question remains] how to act and where. There is another diagnostic phase that's a diagnosis of the social-physical, ok? It's where the recognition of each detected territory takes place in the first phase. So we have the diagnosis of the physical and social, which is where the social technicians intervene … the communicators. It's really nice, because the PUI has evolved a lot in terms of that exactly. Lets say that the different units … the different technical coordinators … different disciplines have come together based on the needs of the territories (Interview 2012).

Unlike the direct, self-help practices used to direct projects in the PRIMED model, the PUI model helped articulate interventions according to the existing transportation infrastructure. The human development index provided a standardized measure to globally compare conditions in the *comunas*, while metro-based infrastructure provided the spinal form of interventions. In other words, social urbanism did incorporate valuable lessons from the *Consejeria,* but the final objective was integrating existing transportation networks to the social urbanism model.

The second way in which the PUI's adoption reconfigured territory involved the institutionalization of planning outside of the municipal planning office. Social urbanism emerged parallel to the creation of a new institutional home for state planning practice. Fajardo organized the urban interventions of social urbanism through the EDU, a decentralized development corporation responsible for executing the PUI projects. The agency turned into the project-based coordinator and administrator for state planning projects during Fajardo's mayoral term. Alejandro Echeverri served as the director of the organization, while Carlos Montoya served as the head of the EDU's housing division. The organizational restructuring of the EDU allowed the corporation to act on behalf of the state without any direct political ties to a mayoral agenda.

> Tomas: So what happens with the EDU is that it gets organized in that moment, which according to the Mayor's office meant having a series of management offices, ok? The EDU… no, sorry … there are a series of management offices that act on determined components or determined actions that the Mayor's office wants to put to work. So the PUI management offices have a series of zonal directors that act specifically over the zones of intervention. Those zonal directors are in charge of coordinating, a technical area, a social area, and communications. That's it (Interview 2012).

Planning, as taken up by the EDU, meant forming administrative offices to manage projects at each site of intervention. The move separated state planning at the municipal scale into two distinct offices: the normative, technical-based conformity with regulations designated to the municipal planning office and the innovative, flexible, PUI model of intervention in the hands of the EDU. The EDU operated as a decentralized agency to specifically execute plans, a position that allowed the institution to contract out development projects from the state. During Fajardo's term, the EDU came to operate as the *de facto* planner in special cases where executing plans required malleable tools of implementation. The EDU held a privileged position – the agency could adjust its projects as either an urban contractor to the state or as an independent contractor.

Social urbanism transformed the traditional base of *comuna* politics. Traditional clientalist practices, closely tied to the Junta de Accion Comunal (JAC), a neighborhood-scale political organization,[30] gave planners working with Fajardo an ideology to work against. Fajardo framed his campaign convinced of the ablity to construct politics outside the vaccum of voter-based clientalism. The moment was ripe – an urban crisis affecting residents across Medellín penetrated deep into the urban core. Constitutional reform had set new terms for social reform by placing state power at the hands of local municipalities. Social urbanism offered planners an opportunity to innovatively define the model and method of urban intervention in Medellín.

> Tomas: The participatory design, community participation, etc. is an inheritence of the PRIMED. It has various functions: first, well on principle, it's about giving the city back to its citizens, right? Like saying you have obligations, but you also have rights, right? So you become responsible. Lets say for your own surroundings and once you become responsible for your own surroundings, you take care of it. And once you take care of it, you are the owner of it. And once you are the owner of it, you are the owner of a part of the city. It's a …lets say, strategy and mechanism of … how would you say … of appropriation. To give back to those people that were always there. Well, that had a supremely basic and fragile presence of the state in those sectors of the city. To have them feel a part of [the city] again. It's an issue of appropration (Interview 2012).

The "giving back" to city residents rested on a condition, an urban acupuncture type intervention followed by a chain reaction. Each social urbanism intervention was followed by the instillment of civic responsibility, from securing construction workers for projects, to informal pacts with urban militias to ensuring safe neighborhoods, to residents showing state officials their capacity to behave as good citizens. Instilling the ideas of co-responsibility into urban narratives of intervention extends back to at least the days of the SMP. Fajardo's political turn marked a distinct rupture from the existing focus of planning. He placed the key emphasis on urban interventions as a state responsibility to fix the social debt tied to returns from neighborhood residents in the form of citizen pacts.[31] A citizen pact created a verbal contract linking the rights of urban residents to a parallel set of responsibilities. Tomas explains the clear dichotomy between the experiences of existing city residents and the *comuna* residents now getting access to the city.

> Here, [we] always try to include unskilled laborers as construction personnel. Its the idea of raising a column and taking care of the column that I made,

> right? It's an issue of all of us constructing, right? So it's really important and its fundamentally related to appropriation… with giving back the things that the city never gave to me … with feeling part of a whole comunity that's…well, a complete city (Interview 2012).

The state at the municipal scale gave the city back to *comuna* residents – the same people that had been part of the city, created communities, and built their homes for generations. In the making of social urbanism, state interventions aligned with a broader movement to reconstruct the existing layout of the city and the people living it. Disciplined technical experts went out to the field with manuals in hand to guide planning. The use of print and electronic media, combined with pedagogical campaigns, guided how technical experts unfolded social interventions as citizen pacts in the field. The EDU experts canvased across *comuna* neighborhoods, diffusing the edicts embedded within the social urbanism model and defining the new territorialisation of state spaces. Support for social interventions rapidly spread as part of civic-based change, bringing together the EDU experts, municipal officials, and residents as planners in participatory forums.

Platoons of EDU officials, an educated, professional elite, set into place an alternative model of planning for *comuna* residents. The division of planning into two institutions, one based on normative regulation and the other contracted for managing projects, provided the state with a malleable decentralized institution to reconfigure the terms of social interventions. Projects didn't always work as planned, as noted by Clara Restrepo at a municipal council meeting and PUI debate:

> This is why we want to get to the bottom of the problem in *comuna* 13 that makes her so particular. We want to clearly define projects there, because even though the Mayor's office has an intervention, it's insufficient and needs to go much deeper. The chronology of events has a logic. *Comuna* 13 has a PUI and a PUI manager was assigned. And he himself developed the evaluation we are permanently carrying out with them with **their** leaders. We get together every two weeks with a representative group [from the *comuna*]. We have identified that the PUI management [office] is not enough, that's its too much of physical [design] management. Even though the PUI constructed facilities for health, education … it's concentrated on the physical issue and urban development, but these leaders are looking for something that the PUI management does not have (2007).

EDU officials moved into the *comunas,* reorganizing territory and the state spaces of intervention. The project was swift. Three fundamental principles guided the work of the EDU in managing social urbanism: community participation, co-responsibility, and beautification. However, the contracting out of state powers reconstituted the nature of social redistribution policies. As noted by Clara Restrepo, who had firmly supported the articulation of social rationales during Fajardo's term, the PUI had serious limitations at the neighborhood scale. With the advent of social urbanism as a state model of planning, the historic neglect around issues of poverty and informality turned into another institution's responsibility. The PUI cornered the social interventions of the state within newly defined urban territories, but the authoritative reach of its management practices and powerful call for civic responsibility extended beyond its control.

Third, planners adopted the PUI with the aim to transform how municipal government approached the limits of normative law. EDU experts embodied the powers of the state in managing interventions, a space uniquely appropriated by a decentralized contractor to creatively define the normative compliance of planning. The PUI adhered to social objectives structured as constitutional mandates. These included, but were not limited to, citizen participation, territorial ordering plans, housing, and security. While the PUI is not formally regulated by the constitution, the EDU interpreted the PUI to count as an "urban action," a legal reference to a territorial ordering plan.[32] The PUI reference to the legal framework is vague. While constitutional law requires structured, coherent, final plans, the feat is seemingly impossible in the case of the *comunas*.

> Tomas: Finally, what regulates the PUI are the plans of government, the municipal development plan. Yes, the PUI's are immersed in the municipal development plan. In the end, I don't know if it sounds bad, but the [Municipal] Council does not know much about the norm … I mean, its in their head – the PUI is not regulated juridically, but they understand that the action has coherence and there's an accompaniment and that's why it happens (Interview 2012).

Creating coherent plans with enough foresight to predict growth and development in the *comunas* is a difficult task, especially considering the existing normative framework. The PUI method emerged in response to the limitations of constitutional law and the geographical constraints of the *comunas*. EDU experts created the PUI as a tool to approach phased-planning interventions*,* a mechanism used to incorporate the model into Fajardo's mayoral plan, which outlined the key goals of his four-year term. Fajardo's plan legitimized the work of the EDU in using a PUI to select, contain, and manage the *comuna* areas identified with intervention. The unique position allowed the EDU to plan using the PUI, an unregulated planning instrument. While constitutional Law 388 of 1997 sets clear mandates for territorial ordering plans at the municipal scale and the types of technical instruments available, the EDU chose to go with the PUI for implementation, not subjecting its planning practices to the established normative framework.

For the EDU, the implementation stage of projects rested on visually showing projects in a way that gathered approval and would envision change, but not the law. Medellín's Municipal Council had the power to deter or obstruct plans, but as Tomas seemed to indicate, the lack of knowledge around the norm prevented council members from critically questioning the projects. Few understood the intricacies of a normative framework.

> Tomas: Look, if you begin by framing the PUI within Law 388, for instance, and you frame it as a macro-project, you have to develop it in one single *totazo* (boom). Generally, there isn't *totazo* money to make a PUI. There are projects that become unfeasible halfway through because of technical issues, social issues … because of issues around buying lots. So in the end, it gives

> the flexibility of not having a strict structure tying down … that things have to be like that. But it does have general guidelines. And in the process of that, development of certain projects of mobility, environmental and housing resources … (Interview 2012).

In the end, the EDU believed that so long as council members and the general public benefited from the imagery presented of future urban transformation, the reality of planning practice was secondary. The EDU experts embodied the power of the state to structure interventions in areas long neglected by the state, transforming the conditions of urban crisis and social exclusion into a gateway for creatively exploring the limitations of the law. Social urbanism adopted the PUI as the foundation for urban experiments in the *comunas*. The *comunas* showcased the ability of the state to transform historically overlooked neighborhoods in the city. On the surface, the project ruptured existing patterns of neglect in the *comunas* and exposed a city long invisible to many people in the city. The work of bringing back the state, however, was firmly grounded in a deep restructuring of social interventions, a project embedded in innovative practices of conditionally-based assistance, the contracting out of state power, and a reinterpretation of national law.

By bringing together the historical lessons of planning with an innovative take on the social debt and grassroots initiatives, the PUI enabled the state to reterritorialize its power. The state's historical absence in the *comunas* transformed from an obstacle to the motor of urban development. The status of informal settlements took on new meaning depending on who was framing urban planning. For the SMP and the modernist architects, these peripheral settlements were of tangential concern to planning centered within the boundaries of the city. In the case of macro-economic planning, informal settlements were a justification for intervention. By the 1990s, the informal classification allowed *comuna* residents to establish land use rights. But by 2004, informality allowed the state to reclaim land for the purpose of social urbanism interventions, in addition to allowing planners to experiment with a self-made technical instrument. The PUI had no juridical definition. The coming together of these experiments, understood here in relation to the coming of the social urbanism event*,* helps us better understand the uses of informality as a formal organizing logic of governance. In other words, there is an intimate relationship between informality and state institutions.

This is the convergence of legality and extra-legality in the same process. This is what Ananya Roy terms as a strategy of "informality from above" (2009). Informality is embedded within the institutional structure of the state. It is a way of conceptualizing the state's claim to a newfound interest in the *comunas*, an object of neglect transformed into one of social regulation. The practice is articulated in a history that allowed the *comunas* to persist as illegal settlements, while strategically rendering urban plans around these neighborhoods as if they didn't exist. The concept offers a way to expand the meaning of informality to include the practices, instruments, and meanings used by the state to regulate the unplanned. Social urbanism reconfigured territory in making the *comunas* center of a new global model of planning. The history of territory, in the case of Medellín, demonstrates how cities remain prime sites to forge territory in ways that demarcate urban stigma, poverty, and informality and then reproduce these as narratives of social rationales. On the surface, the project ruptured existing patterns of social exclusion and exposed a city long invisible to many people. In the process, it reveals the adoption of the *comunas* as an urban laboratory of policy experimentation with "best practice" models of urban beautification, participatory democracy, and pro-poor development.

Degrees of Everyday Illegality

Surrounding the debates around how to intervene in the *comunas* is a question of the preciseness of planning. In a piece on exactitude, Italo Calvino writes:

> For the ancient Egyptians, exactitude was symbolized by a feather that served as a weight on scales used for the weighing of souls. This light feather was called Maat, goddess of the scales. The hieroglyph for Maat also stood for a unit of length – the 33 centimeters of the standard brick – and the fundamental note of the flute (1988).

The methodology of the PUI set an organized framework for carrying out projects under the social urbanism model. An approach was laid out, interventions were scaled, and responsibilities were assigned accordingly. The PUI symbolized order in the *comunas*. A book laying out the PUI methodology represented a standard that could be taken anywhere in the world for duplication. At home, the image of aerial gondolas, libraries, and parks in the *comunas* revealed the crucial element of intervention – a newly appropriated state space.

The opportunity to interview planners that had worked in Medellín from the early 1990s until the making of social urbanism provided a window to hear their stories. These were public officials and state contractors, planners who had lived most of their lives in Medellín. Some lived in the middle and high-income neighborhoods in the south of the city. While a few had moved on to new private or non-profit institutions, many continued to work with the state as contractors, sometimes coordinating efforts and at other times, leading new initiatives. Medellín was their home. The eruption of urban crisis altered how people experienced and related to the city, a position that clouded individual perceptions of what it meant to work with the state.

My own understanding of planning in Medellín was only clarified by listening to how people working and living in the city narrated their own experiences. One story particularly struck me. I had scheduled an interview with Sam, an economist. Another interviewer had recommended I talk to him based on his experience working as a contractor to the municipality and the EDU. He had been trained in a small, technical university. Sam told me that he had not been raised with the local elites that he worked with, many of whom had been educated in big name universities, held leadership positions in state institutions, and traveled globally to network with other experts in the field.

He had worked hard to gain his professional title and position. Everyday was an internal struggle between fitting in with his colleagues and planning for residents he closely identified with. From drinking spoiled *agua de panela* (brown sugar tea),[33] beans, and *sancocho* (traditional soup),[34] to drinking beer and having a smoke, this was all part of collaborating with residents from the *comunas*. For *comuna* residents, these traditional foods were low cost and high calorie. It was not part of the job, but for Sam, it was a way of sharing with the people he worked with.

While working in a *comuna* in the northeast of the city, he had met Miguel, a member of a locally armed militia. He had given Miguel a job hoping that the militia would stop asking for a monthly extortion of 500-600 million pesos a month[35], rotating the requests from one state official to the next. Miguel was grateful for his official job and a steady flow of income. He wore thick gold chains to show his new status in the neighborhood and offered Sam young girls to demonstrate his gratitude. Sam had a close relationship to him – he called him a friend. One day, Sam was on his way to the neighborhood with a team of international reporters to document Miguel's transformation from militia member to city employee. Early in the day, the two had arranged to meet around two, but by five Miguel was dead. Someone believed Sam was an informant to the state and rumor had it that he had been killed as a result.

The new state spaces in the *comunas* secured presence of the state, but were filled with stories of hope together with the memory of death. While the stories of urban transformation made headlines across the globe, death was greeted with silence by the state. State representatives mediated the emergent state spaces in the *comunas*, but local authorities continued to challenge the powerful narratives of the state. Sam recalled working in another neighborhood where locals had been employed to carry out construction projects, all as part of an informal agreement with the leader of a local militia that controlled the area. Construction materials started to disappear from the worksite and Sam had to personally talk to the Alfonso, the leader. Little Runt, who was a young member of the gang sat next to Alfonso at the meeting with Sam. As Sam detailed the story, Little Runt started to sweat profusely. Shortly after, Little Runt was murdered.

Sergio Fajardo allegedly knew of the happenings, but it was part of the everyday work of the state. Providing jobs in exchange for security. Adapting existing understanding of the law to newly render territory. Paying extortion money. The thin line between informality and illegality muddled state practices of social intervention. The *comunas* epitomized a state residue – historically patterned practices of oversight and exclusion. Who or what defines illicit behavior, irregular settlement plans, or unlawfulness becomes increasingly murky when the state is setting a new standard of social intervention. It is not that the state's work easily falls into clear-cut chicanery or an institutional Robin Hood, but rather that state practices and rationalities continually creep into the grey areas of the law. At times, informality operates as a convenient category to displace existing neighborhood residents. In other instances, it serves as the launching board for new types of intervention. Illegality can be overlooked, so long as the state secures the benefit of security or resources in a community. The grey areas of constitutional law are not far from the unspoken agreements between the state and locally armed militias controlling the *comunas*. The complicity of the state, however, is necessary to manage and administer projects in the *comunas*.

Medellín symbolizes innovation. For technical experts working in the field, the city now represents the fruits of their arduous labor. The state's interest in the *comunas*, however, is firmly grounded in a silenced struggle marked by patterns of exclusionary planning immersing alongside the neglect of state illegality. This process, however, has a longer history. Chapter Two examined the trajectories of social rationales as these were re-invented by planning practitioners in civic campaigns, modernist maps, and comprehensive planning initiatives. Social urbanism broke from previous planning practices by charting out new territories of state intervention in the *comunas,* a process explored in this chapter. The following chapter examines how social urban reconfigured planning in envisioning urban transformation in Medellín for a global audience. Rather than focus on social urbanism as a series of micro-projects, Chapter Four examines how the model within a macro-movement, a contested debate over social welfare at the global scale. Here, the model created innovative urban projects, while packaging incentives, promises, and visions of social redistribution as a global model of planning.

CHAPTER 4
Urban Dreams of Welfare

> *Antioqueños have historically thought of themselves as a culturally distinct group of no-nonsense, driven, industrious, devout and efficient individualists of Medellín, the region's capital, as the urban embodiment of regional identity and pride. The city's better off inhabitants boast of the efficient and incorrupt management of municipal services; of sewage, water and electricity coverage for 95% of the urban population; a 24 hour number for pothole repair; the most successful municipal tax assessment and collection system in Latin America; excellent phone service; and Colombia's only Metro.*
>
> - Mary Roldán, Prepared for 1997 LASA meeting

> *The city of Medellín represents the determination of a country that wants to get ahead and that has regained confidence. Martyred in previous decades by the black landscape of terrorism, it now lives a plenary process of development and wants to transform itself into the safest city on the continent … Medellín now lives an air of confidence; it knows that its prosperity is inside social harmony, an ethic of respecting the law. This city has lived a true process of transformation, where aside from the achievements in education and security, social urbanism, cultural expressions, economic development, and competitiveness have been given priority. All of it has consolidated citizen participation and deepened democracy.*
>
> - *Álvaro Uribe,* Opening to *Medellín: Transformacion de una Ciudad*

Medellín moved from notorious drug capital of the world, a gilded haven for drug traffickers in the 1980s, on the eve of industrial decline and rapid economic restructuring, to being crowned, in 2013, Citibank's "Most Innovative City of the Year." Embedded at the heart of Medellín's transformation, though, is a longer history of the city's emergence as a laboratory of social welfare. Planners in Medellín redefined who benefits and how social welfare is redistributed. The poor are now front and center of a new urban agenda in Medellín. In facing the combined pressures of urban disorder and battles over state authority in the *comunas,* planners appropriated the unique space of poverty to deploy social rationales of intervention. To that end, Medellín experienced an urban makeover and branding as a global model of progressive planning. The language around social interventions fortified the legitimacy of the state as manager in securing investments in the *comunas* and guiding the city's development. By reinventing the meaning of poverty in the *comunas,* planners powerfully reorganized the social as a territory of state intervention.

Planners strategically shifted the focus from the *comunas* as urban problem to a place housing the solution – in other words, the residues of poverty and violence were transformed into a global model of social redistribution – building momentum around participatory democracy, beautification, and political transparency as the formula to transformation. The spirit of urban reform was embedded in an ardent cultural belief that as *paisas,*[36] fervent regionalism and entrepreneurship would break down any barrier to the city's progress. While planners worked tirelessly to implement social urbanism in Medellín, residents identified then-president Álvaro Uribe with the organization of *Operacion Orion* in 2002, a military offensive targeting violence and poverty in the city's *comuna* 13 (Angarita Cañas et. al. 2008). Then president Álvaro Uribe steered away from a clear-cut definition of neo-liberalism to avoid political defamation, instead claiming: "Colombia needs a state that will guarantee social benefits so that the country can overcome social exclusion" (2007). An intensive, large-scale program of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating armed actors into the local workforce, community projects, and education ensued in Medellín (Rozema 2008). Despite a public campaign of social benefits, residents associated the urban interventions with state violence. Once elected, mayor Fajardo became personally invested in taking a stand against powerful global neo-liberal trends towards the state-sponsored criminalization and penalization of poverty.

Garnering support around social urbanism served as the primary impetus for bringing residents together from across Medellín as one community with a mutual interest in the city's revival. Loïc Wacquant coined "advanced marginality" to identify elite efforts at social and political reform adopted in "preventing or containing the 'disorders' within and around expanding enclaves of urban decline and abandonment" (2007). Fueled by the coupling of rising inequality and economic prosperity, the state took the opportunity to restructure social welfare provision in Medellín. The protagonists of social urbanism targeted the very effects of stigma and alienation that identified the *comunas* as an urban blemish. Participatory budgeting was introduced during Fajardo's term, beginning with a total budget of $59,990,000 Colombian *pesos*.[37] By 2010-2011, the northeastern *comunas* (1-4) were managing the largest disbursements in the city.



Comuna/Corregimiento	Assigned Budget 2010	Assigned Budget 2011
1 - Popular	$ 8.381.000	$ 8.939.000
2 - Santa Cruz	$ 7.694.000	$ 8.038.000
3 - Manrique	$ 7.581.000	$ 7.973.000
4 - Aranjuez	$ 7.079.000	$ 7.399.000
5 - Castilla	$ 5.796.000	$ 6.173.000
6 - Doce de Octubre	$ 7.695.000	$ 8.066.000
7 - Robledo	$6.848.000	$7.315.000
8 - Villa Hermosa	$6.858.000	$7.331.000
9 - Buenos Aires	$ 5.788.000	$ 6.110.000
10 - La Candelaria	$ 4.150.000	$ 4.442.000
11 - Laureles - Estadio	$ 3.617.000	$ 3.879.000
12 - La América	$ 4.334.000	$ 4.620.000
13 - San Javier	$ 7.014.000	$ 7.243.000
14 - El Poblado	$ 3.676.000	$ 3.917.000
15 - Guayabal	$ 4.942.000	$ 5.186.000
16 - Belén	$ 4.867.000	$ 5.369.000
50 - San Sebastián de Palmitas	$ 2.218.000	$ 2.821.000
60 - San Cristóbal	$ 3.550.000	$ 4.014.000
70 - Altavista	$ 2.824.000	$ 3.195.000
80 - San Antonio de Prado	$ 4.979.000	$ 5.587.000
90 - Santa Elena	$ 2.109.000	$ 2.383.000
Total 2010: $112.000.000		
Total 2011: $120.000.000		

Assigned Participatory Budget*
(By *Comuna* 2010-2011)
Note. Adapted from *Medellín en Cifras 1,* April 2011, Observatorio de Politicas Publicas de la Alcaldia de Medellin.
*All values in Colombian pesos.

The state shuffled existing perceptions of the *comunas* to reveal the new promise of Medellín's future – an inclusionary city bounded together by civic culture and beautiful urban designs. Residents from across the city embraced the opportunity to participate in shaping local development. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of voters in *barrio* and *vereda* assemblies progressively increased from 36,352 to 103,653 people.[38] Rather than invoke traditional notions of politics, Fajardo used the *comunas* to document how planning had transformed the central pillar of governance from a framework based on collecting votes to providing social welfare for the poor in the city.

At the heart of planning lay deeply embedded conflicts between market-oriented and social welfare goals. The ability of planning to encompass development in calls for urban intervention serves as a powerful generator for transformation in Medellín, but further amplifies the struggles of the state over when and how to intervene. Ananya Roy defines the conflict between public and market interests as a political space of contradictions, a site where planners "seek to reconcile the freedom to profit with moral sentiments and restraint" (2008). Here, the moral exercise of planning supercedes the politicized call for social redistribution. The *comunas* were the state object of intervention – a visible enclave of disorder within the city – and the possibility to transform social rationales into malleable territories on the urban periphery. In the process, planners openly aligned social urbanism with urban calls from sustainability and innovation to civic education and monumental beautification. Social urbanism provided planners with a platform to conceptualize the public interest, despite the deep historical chasms created by planning in the *comunas*.

This chapter begins by examining the contradictory practices of social urbanism within a renewed phase of liberal experimentation in Medellín. Here, social urbanism represents a unique historical and political space occupying geographies of both poverty and urban renovation. Planners struggled between a movement to secure market expansion and a countermovement to protect citizens from the very effects of the market. As such, the case of social urbanism offers more than the latest rendition of progressive calls of urban reform. The model is not just a response to the neo-liberal retrenchment of austerity and roll-back of the state. Social urbanism speaks to the mutations of social rationales of state intervention in the liberal remaking of urban welfare. Whether understood as part of a broader historical lineage of planning experiments, from private business coalitions to the pipeline dreams of modernist architects to comprehensive macroeconomic plans, liberal ideas continue to filter the how planning is appropriated in regulating neglect.

The focus of this chapter continues to be on the social urbanism experiment, but the picture is widened here to examine the broader implications of the model's global reach. Social urbanism provided the state with a unique platform to challenge the existing configuration of territory in the *comunas*, and the poverty structured within it. Medellín offered a laboratory for social welfare, in which neglect was used to order, classify, and configure space. This chapter traces the transformation of understandings of social welfare in order to foreground how the urban came to take central stage in Medellín in reshaping state policies of redistribution. While the welfare state in Latin America is not new, Medellín's case documents how historically neglected neighborhoods in the city transformed social rationales into globally regulated territories of planning. The reworking of the developmental state into an explicitly urban agenda projected a vision of benefits for the poor, while globally marketing the city's transformation.

Latin American Liberalism

The role of the state in poverty alleviation, in the ideal of classical liberalism, is based on taking a stance of wide neutrality, limiting the how, when, and what justifies intervention. Possessive individualists shared the belief that state interventions rest faithfully on the market's ability to stimulate narrow visions of liberty, individualism, and democratic representation (Macpherson 2011). The allure of the market works ideal is based on the conclusion that poverty can be contained, managed, and controlled. At the turn of the 19th century, Latin American republics envisioned political equality, and as such, were bent on securing individual liberty together with the rule of law (Adelman and Centeno 2002). Political struggles to define Latin American liberalism, however, had taken a definitive turn towards free market ideology by the end of the century. Moral labels were used to rigidly classify race, class, and gender within detrimental policies, practices, and social rationales. Mitchell Dean describes the liberal transformation in modes of governance in the 19th century as the "constitution of poverty," a historic transformation of the pauper into a distinguishable label of (1991). This development conveys the wide reach of common sense liberal ideology, a powerful source of social regulation identifying social inequalities with a personal responsibility to change conditions of individuals.

The market ideal powerfully stretched from Europe to Latin America in the 20th century. Cycles of economic prosperity across Latin America introduced a more statist approach to economic management alongside the welfare state. In the wake of world economic crisis, Keynes political legacy in the 1930s emphasized a state "managerial philosophy," an entrepreneur pursuing interventions it saw fit for an all-encompassing public good (Skidelsky 1988). Many bold experiments in social engineering emerged in response, making room in the field of development for social welfare experiments in the post-war period. While extensive and generous to formal sector workers, the welfare state left out a large fraction of the poor. At the national scale in Latin America, the emphasis was placed on economic export growth, building on the resources of each country to generate surpluses in capital. Commodity specialization was not always a guarantee of profits, though, and location, access to cheap or free labor, and conditions of political stability affected market dominance (Bulmer-Thomas 2003). The combination of market economy, state power and technological innovation fostered regional conditions of economic disaster, violence, and community erosion. Álvaro Vargas Llosa refers to the "mirage" of Latin American liberalism as an "ideological confusion" (2002), a thwarted attempt at reform across the continent.

Latin America's contemporary version of the liberal creed was influenced by the ideas of Raul Prebisch, an Argentine economist. His welfare vision was shaped in response to a global vision of inequity, a model advocating for import substitution industrialization (ISI). The model is outlined in his manifesto *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (1950). Prebisch raised awareness of the inequities of center-periphery relations between industrial and developing economies, setting a key agenda for an "activist state to address asymmetric power relationships across and between regions of the world economy" (Dosman 2012). The manifesto's robust effect welcomed a new generation of the Latin American welfare state. In Latin American countries with a highly mobilized labor movement, social welfare benefits expanded at the time of ISI (Segura-Ubiergo 2012). In this moment of transition, fluctuating between closed and open market economies, development policy perplexed and contradicted strict constructions of liberal ideas in Latin America. The "lasting legacy of Prebisch" was his grounded, reflexive approach to engaging critically with the inward experience of development (Ricupero 2004). Prebisch's insight was groundbreaking, but largely forgotten in development practice. External vulnerability was nowhere on the agenda for Latin American development in the 1980s (Birdsall 2012). Instead, the emphasis was placed on protecting national industries, and conversely, setting barriers to external competitors.

Harsh critiques of Prebisch emphasize ISI's "failure" in the form of slow economic growth, recurrent economic crises, and political instability (Dornbusch 1993). These critiques fail to acknowledge the benefits of a bigger "bundle of industrial and social policies," the deep historical roots and wide temporal boundaries of an economic process that takes time to manifest as benefits (Silva 2007). ISI fostered unprecedented economic growth in Latin America for about two decades, albeit not in the 1950s. The relationship between economic growth, conflict management, and the forceful undertaking of macroeconomic adjustments became much clearer in the 1970s and into the 1980s as a response to surviving the economic turmoil of the world economy (Rodrik 1998). The effects of economic crisis, from government deficits and an oil crisis to the Mexican default of 1982 and rapidly growing interest rates created significant points of discordance and weakness for the purpose of developing coherent state interventions. Economic restructuring, however, rarely takes place parallel to institutional restructuring. In the drastic push to cut expenditures, Latin American countries reduced investments in social welfare.

Latin American countries witnessed, in the course of a few years, Chile's market driven policies of adjustment and openness, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rapid growth of the East Asian tigers. These events were enough to encourage policymakers to shift the focus of development toward domestic adjustment and market-driven policy reform. The East Asian tigers demonstrated that market-driven reform promoted and sustained development, a "combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural change" at both the domestic and international scale" (Castells 1992). Market-driven objectives, while not the guiding force of state intervention, offer a means to both compete and survive in the world economy. Though, as Haggard and Kaufman duly point, contrasting evidence from the "political economy of social policy" show that, across Eastern Europe and Latin America, development had taken a turn by the 1980s (2008). While an urban bias clearly permeated in the Latin American case, even the middle and working class enjoyed a blanket of social protections.

The Latin American developmental state ingeniously integrated social protections as state interventions, despite evidence of the contrary across the globe. In keeping with the "kind" face of development, the state protected its "embedded autonomy" by working with private sector initiatives, while maintaining autonomy by asserting preferences key to the developmental state's success (Evans 1995). The language around human capital, from education and social cohesion to skills formation and centralized control, generated comprehensive models that enmeshed economic objectives as part of social programs. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, for instance, a wide-breadth state intervention, was later replaced by a leaner version with the Washington Consensus. These models were built around surviving and competing in the world economy, despite their distinct approaches to social intervention. While the ideas behind the developmental state gained global traction, these resisted the temptation to address informality, an issue magnified by the rapid pace of urbanization.

The City, Diffuser of Change

By the end of the 20th century, the language of neo-liberalism had engulfed the theoretical paradigms anchoring Latin American development. Social urbanism espoused a hybrid form of developmentalism in urban rationales of intervention. The model's makers suggested that cities could serve as promulgators of market-driven agendas and that state interventions would serve as the foundation of social redistribution. Medellín's case exposes a double movement in the remaking of social welfare. Karl Polanyi rightly referred to the market economy as the choice "institutional gadget" of liberal rule, and here, planning represents the "double movement of rule," the continuous struggles between expanding markets and the counteracting efforts tending towards their restriction (2001). Munck takes Polanyi a step further, raising a challenge to emergent "projects of social self-protection," calling attention to the role of spatial analysis in rethinking both welfare and the potential of "regional planning" (2006). Understood as the dual study of local and global processes, a spatial analysis can generate a more profound analysis of counter-movement trends, in which the developmental state can be understood as one form of contestation to market-driven policy.

Here, cities provide vivid evidence of how the contradictory logics of capital manifest globally as expressions of uneven development, including urban centers of privileged wealth and power alongside dramatic patterns of devalued capital, surplus population, and scarce resources (Smith 2008). It is in these spaces that neo-liberal experiments, whether understood as reactions to state intervention or as dominant narratives of market management, creatively engineer models of governance. The case of Latin America brings forth the many iterations of Polanyi's "double movement," including the case of Evo Morales' turn towards decommodification in Bolivia (Silva 2009). In the face of mass anti-neoliberal protests expressing discontent over the effects of highly asymmetrical patterns of spatial enclosure, managed difference, and disciplined market exchange, these calls represent demands for social protection. While Silva's study brings case-based insight from social mobilizations in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, Colombia brings an unexplored case of a double movement, in which neo-liberal political leadership at the national scale was not replaced.

Social urbanism developed in the shadow of president Álvaro Uribe's two electoral terms [2002-2010]. The national plan for "democratic security" consolidated the intense "militarization of the state," a project based more on coercion than consensus (Hawkins 2009). Between 2002 and 2006, at least one third of the senate and congress had ties to right-wing paramilitaries (Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos 2013). The collaborative relationship between politicians and paramilitaries powerfully influenced the distribution of election votes, and thus, the political system. For some supporters of Uribe, the 2010 election of Juan Manuel Santos, his successor, meant the "coming of *uribisimo* without Uribe" (Posada-Carbó 2011). The newly elected Santos, though, quickly marked his own political terrain, re-centering Uribe's right-wing neo-liberal agenda. Santos reaffirmed friendly relations with his Venezuelan neighbor, while distancing the close-knit alliance with the United States (Weisbrot 2011). The problem of forced displacement of populations – mostly *campesinos* (farmers), Afro-Colombians, and indigenous – persisted, however. And despite the efforts by Santos to negotiate an end to the armed conflict in Colombia, the evolution of the war into a more flexible and decentralized form instead redefined the meaning of "prospects for peace" (Richani 2013). Meanwhile, municipal mayors gained global prominence for implementing urban policies that challenged neo-liberal strategies of national governance.

Mayors took up the contentious terrain of urban politics to address the national afflictions with crime, violence, and drugs. These charismatic municipal leaders garnered the support of the masses in dramatically remaking politics in two ways. First, the traditional realm of social welfare provision was expanded into a spatial benefit managed by urban planners. By targeting the *comunas* as a territorialized site of social rights and state protections, planners were able to secure the city as a haven for investment. Second, poverty and violence were transformed from local issues into transnational opportunities for market innovation. In an interesting take on Polanyi's idea, planners first reconciled social welfare benefits to then introduce market interests. Gosta Esping-Anderson famously categorized three basic types of welfare, adopting variations of a European model to structure how inequality, solidarity, and social justice took form as social policy (1990). In Latin America, social rights are linked to gender, work, basic needs, race/ethnicity, and investments in education (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003). Social urbanism, though, demonstrated the contribution of urban planning to welfare provision, especially given that the welfare state introduced in Latin America during the ISI period did not reach the urban poor. While this concept is unexplored by existing typologies of welfare, the phenomenon is of particular importance given the regional trends of political decentralization.

The Urban Welfare Package

Planners in Medellín adopted social interventions to manage territories in which state authority was contested or rivaled. Urban planners appropriated the unique space of decentralization, building on constitutional reform in 1991, to bring together the projects of reordering territory and social welfare at the city scale. The ratification of Law 388 in 1997 provided a framework to integrate and organize planning regulations around nationally mandated territorial ordering plans at the municipal scale. Law 388 required all municipalities to comply with regulations based on population size, but the project of territorial ordering centered on urban centers with 100,000 or more inhabitants. While municipalities are autonomous in terms of how they structure a basic territorial ordering plan (PBOT), the municipal power of planners is limited by national planning laws and metropolitan governmental authorities. [39] [40] In line with Law 388's mandates, a basic territorial ordering plan was created in 1999 for Medellín.[41] By 2006, Medellín's PBOT was modified to explicitly account for housing density, public space, mobility, and infrastructure requirements.[42] Municipal planners led the PBOT initiative, structuring the organizational framework used to direct municipal land use and development.

Medellín, a city acting as interceptor and disseminator of internally displaced people, faced the challenge of urban growth rapidly outpacing the rhythm of planned development. In the eyes of the planners leading social urbanism, the city offered and packaged a key set of welfare provisions. Norelly Suarez identifies the phenomenon as such:

> It's just that everyone arrives here. Every year, it's 35,000 families or 35,000 people. It's [actually] people. The pueblos of Antioquia have [populations of] 6,000 – 10,000 people. Each year, [the total population of] four pueblos arrive here. The *campo* (farmland) is empty because there aren't opportunities there, and well, the violence too. The city has excessive social pressure. The displaced have very good [social] offers here. They arrive and the next day they have an identification card, priority health, priority education, this or that subsidy. So [they say] let's go to Medellín and they come in heaps. A family arrives … and since they are people that are used to living in shacks in the campo … for them, a shack there or a shack here … the one here is better because this one has the Metro around the corner, it has all the [necessary] conditions for children. Even if [the shack] is on the verge of collapsing. That's the big risk that people are running here, but the conditions of life are very different (Interview 2011).

Medellín's *comunas* came under the constitutional scrutiny of territorial ordering plans. *Comunas* were neighborhoods mired by violence and poverty, but held the promise of the implicit benefits of living in the city. Rather than create new barriers of entry to settle in the *comunas*, planners created an instrument to instead manage the types of provisions the state could offer in these neighborhoods.

While social urbanism did not provide a comprehensive welfare package in itself, the model adopted the *comunas* as a base to frame social interventions. Urban planners organized physical interventions in the *comunas* to supplement the existing provision of benefits and incentives for the poor. For instance, residents relocated from the *comunas* to public housing projects in rural areas located just outside Medellín's urban perimeter were eligible for a 50% discount on the housing tax.[43] By the year 2012, public housing residents classified as internally displaced were eligible for an additional ten year housing tax exemption.[44] While Fajardo's term ended in 2004, the continued support for these types of incentives signals how the state incorporated these as spatialized benefits. In the case of Medellín, the tax exemption offers internally displaced populations a comprehensive set of benefits once they settle in the city.[45] National scale reform is appropriated at the local scale as part of a welfare benefit intertwined with urban development. The recharacterization of spatial policy as an "active social policy" makes an argument for how the spatial fix can produce a wide interpretation of welfare objectives (Raco 2008).

By incorporating social welfare benefits and territorial ordering within constitutional reform, urban poverty was transformed into the gateway for progressive urban reform. Income-based subsidy programs, in addition to protecting universal access to water, placed the burden of tariffs on higher income residents, while providing subsidies to lower-income neighborhoods.[46] A similar program with geographical targets mitigated the high costs that could inhibit access to electricity in poor neighborhoods.[47] Here, the classification as the urban poor allows *comuna* residents to access these services in the city. Subsidy programs extend beyond the realm of infrastructure to the general population, from education to pension programs. One of the broadest pro-poor initiatives is a Colombian health insurance program that subsidizes the costs of medical care, a program directly targeting the poor and largely financed through taxes (Trujillo, Portillo and Vernon 2005). While the initiative made a powerful entry into the subsidized health insurance market across rural and urban areas of the country, institutional inefficiencies, poor data management, and bureaucratic delays in resources have frayed the efforts (Plaza, Barona, and Hearst 2001). While more than half of the targeted population initially enrolled in the program, the quality of service and declining health indicators point to the need to more carefully scrutinize pro-poor interventions.

By structuring urban interventions to target the poor in the *comunas,* planners in Medellín instituted territory as the base for social redistribution. As such, planners redefined how social urbanism packaged these protections as targeted welfare provisions that combined physical design, participation, and state benefits in these neighborhoods. Take for instance, the international success of library parks and their privileged location as transit hubs in the *comunas*. These parks serve as multi-function cultural centers, open spaces, workforce development offices, and computer labs. This was a direct, state-led effort to build and invest in historically neglected neighborhoods. In referencing the global challenge of poverty, Jeffrey Sachs refers to a "ladder of development," a conceptual tool used to address the basic needs of the poorest in breaking out of the "poverty trap" (2006). In the case of Medellín, the basic needs extended to accessible public transit, beautified community spaces, and the placement of informality as part of the state agenda in the city. The benefits of social welfare provision were primarily targeted at the urban poor in the *comunas*, the test site of social urbanism, but the project had spillover effects to residents across the city.

Social urbanism set a unique framework for leading a remarkable period of urban transformation. While planners publicly lauded their dream for Medellín's future, conflicting visions of what represented change existed. Zoraida, a former planner director with experience in the public and private realms, relates her experience of the three cities that exist in Medellín:

> There are three cities. The city of the public that fortunately is making positive strides. It is this city that has recognized and bettered public space, mobility … in other words, it's the city of the public that is making positive strides, the library parks, the Poblado Boulevard, the linear parks, the Castilla Boulevards, the new schools built with quality architecture – that is the city of the public. It's making positive strides because they are very good quality projects that have really generated transformations in the places they have been created (Interview 2012).

This public city brought to fruition visions of the city's progress – from the renovation of public space to innovations in mass public transit at the ground level. The transformations, however, made part of a marketing campaign to brand the city globally as a locus of pro-poor development and opportunity for investment. Despite the positive strides made in securing social redistribution in the city, the heavy hand of the private city marked the active retrenchment of market-driven policies in Medellín. Zoraida continues by explaining the function of Medellín's second city:

> The city of the private is regulated by land speculation, only by land speculation and high profitability. Here, the construction sector does not accept a profit below a lottery win. In other words, they want it to be like

> winning the lottery, because you can make urbanism in any city of the world, for instance, high density and low height [areas]. That doesn't mean that there can't be urbanism in towers too. There can also be urbanism of towers, but it's just that we can't. It's just that in Medellín, growth is explosive. It's accelerated, explosive, predatory. So that's emerging, and well, I think that the process is so accelerated, that we are destroying Medellín very quickly. That's the city of the private, even with the city of the public … this is the city of the private, where the city is a business that is regulated by speculation. In other words, where it's understood that any piece of land is not a piece of land to live on, it's not a good to use, but a good to exchange. It's a business (Interview 2012).

Zoraida's concern reflects a deep-seated concern with the potential repercussions of private investments in future development. The public and private support for real estate assumed that the free hand of the market, enveloped in social rationales, would best protect the laws, decrees, and rights embedded within the constitution. In this case, ensuring a market for real estate development in Medellín was a proxy to securing the well-being of the poor living in the *comunas*.

The public and the private coexisted as an urban enterprise, but as Zoraida points out, yet another city existed in Medellín. The city of survival. This is the city that social urbanism built a framework of intervention on, which allowed planners to direct how state investments in the *comunas* were realigned to target urban problems.

> And the city of survival, which is another city. This is where the poverty belts are. Where the private sector does not enter, because it would have to buy 5,000 little houses. 5,000 shanties. Or the municipality would have to sweep the 5,000 shanties so that the private sector could urbanize there. The city of survival, which the municipality is dealing with, but at a rhythm it can't keep up with. So it's the PUI, the housing rehabilitation programs … what they did in Moravia, in Juan Bobo, what they've done in many places. And well yes, they are assisting with an integral component, which is also wonderful. That concept of the PUI is brilliant to me. That's what I think of this new phase of development that I see. I see that the scale is tipping more to the positive than the negative, but with an alarming tendency – the occupancy of land without order or quality. Fajardo had the political will to place the city as an issue. What does it mean to put the city as an issue? Other mayors built streets or schools, but here, at this moment, the city as a social space. The importance of the city, the transformation of the city, the importance of social urbanism's focus on these issues to recognizing that the urban realm generates conditions for welfare (Interview 2012).

Medellín's three cities folded together into a global model of planning innovation called social urbanism. A new face of the city was revealed. Initially thought to be long lost to the ills of violence, economic, and social crisis, the city instead welcomed welfare reform initiatives as part of urban renovation. While espousing a vision of urban beautification, Fajardo's political will played a central role in setting the terms for how the city would coordinate social redistribution goals. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven Wilkinson define clientelism with the "direct exchange" of votes for goods, services, and employment (2007). Medellín's city of survival, a central axis of urban transformation, generated permanent benefits to entire neighborhoods rather than specific individuals. Fajardo's urban agenda in the *comunas* could not be rescinded, but rather created a nucleus in the *comunas* to multiply the positive social benefits of redistribution. His concern was with creating an entry point to the *comunas*, a state space for planning interventions. Here, Fajardo's refusal to succumb to clientelism distorted the existing relationship dynamics between politicians and poor residents in the *comunas*. By reworking territory in the *comunas,* social urbanism transformed the traditional spaces, practices, and networks of politics in the city.

Social urbanism transformed the face of welfare in the *comunas*. In the process, the state took steps toward a more expansive reconfiguration of territory. In beautifying the city, particularly in emphasizing the *comunas* as a motor of development*,* the state redefined its legitimacy as the manager of institutional resources and power. By revamping how planning was structured in Medellín, the makers of social urbanism rebuilt the city, civic subject, and welfare as a territory of intervention. David Escobar, an engineer, advocate, and protagonist of the social urbanism explains:

> It's not simply a state intervention that arrives like a protective father who decides what is needed and what to do. It's constructed. There is a theory about who constructs the city and planners, but constructions takes place together with people. It's social, because of the way it is appropriated. In other words, because of the way it's lived. How spaces are lived. The library has a neighborhood council. It's social, because the projects have groups of citizens that help take care of them. I'd say, well, it's also social, because it coordinates state interventions in what have traditionally been social areas beyond infrastructure around a territory to elevate the social indicators of that population. Let me explain myself – it creates a form of local state organization so the population can coordinate, rather than the state dispatching each [as a division] (Interview 2012).

Fajardo's team embraced the power of planning, appropriating the space of constitutionally mandated territorial ordering plans with one central aim. The decentralized state, represented by the mayor and his team, had an opportunity to construct social rationales as a territorialized space to address both welfare and market innovation in the *comunas*. Seen as a territorial ordering process, planning established order and control in making the state legible (Asher and Ojeda 2009). In doing so, the state unfolded a series of models, techniques, and practices for delimiting the new boundaries of state space.

Social urbanism transformed urban welfare for the poorest in the interests of the collective good. As a city mired in conflict, the social provided an entry point to reworking the crux of the problem in the territories of the *comunas*. The model brought together the local development strategies of civic boosterism and monumental architecture with constitutionally protected rights at the national scale as part of spatializing welfare policy in the city. Participatory democracy took on new meaning. The community afflicted by violence in Medellín, from the elites that took on political roles to the poor organized around grassroots efforts, whose combined needs seemed strikingly at odds, came to work as one. Fajardo's team represented the lived experience of city residents and professionals alike. Residents were caught between the shared memory and experience of violence, but together created a new language for rebuilding social interventions in the *comunas*.

Social Welfare's Double-Movement

Medellín experienced a moment of urban transition. Planners brought together the institutional presence, power, and resources of the state in carving out a new social experiment in Medellín. The experiment was based on project-based interventions that combined housing, transportation, and education within a comprehensive planning initiative to diffuse change in the *comunas*. Zoraida raised critiques of social urbanism, but yet acknowledged the merits of the model.

> If you have such great results, like the ones Medellín has had … it reinforces the hypothesis, because you have good results. You see, for instance, how the quality of life betters in the *comunas* with the Metrocable and how the quality of life betters over in Juan Bobo, right? And the Library Park in Belen and everything (Interview 2012).

The visible benefits of social urbanism at the ground level beautified city edifications and replaced makeshift housing and urban disorder, bringing an architectural perspective to innovative strategies of community and economic development. Beyond addressing the visible issues of poverty in the *comunas,* though, planners negotiated the terms of social welfare at a much broader scale. Rather than solely target poverty as an identifiable group of people, social urbanism created an intervention targeting the residues of urban crisis in the *comunas* – an approach meant to offer a slew of benefits to residents across Medellín.

The *comuna* symbolized what happens when state patterns of historic disinvestment disproportionately impact a community. In Medellín, the *comunas* housed generational waves of internally displaced people and the urban poor in addition to being the contested grounds of armed groups struggling over the control of territory. Addressing the issue of social and economic crisis meant shifting the crux of state interventions from the planned city to the *comunas* in driving urban development. Planning interventions were in part funded with monies from the *Empresas Publicas de Medellín* (Public Enteprises of Medellín, EPM), the municipal public utilities company. Federico Restrepo, municipal planning director during Fajardo's term and current CEO of EPM, notes the importance of the company's contributions to Medellín's transformation:

> It's 30% [of investment]. EPM has known how to defend its own entity. Other cities in Colombia didn't know how to or went bankrupt or are now in the private sector. What happened is EPM's value as a motor of city development. In other words, if we didn't have EPM … well, we'd only accomplish 40% or 50% of what we've really done. And that's important to highlight (Interview 2012).

EPM played a powerful role in framing welfare outcomes in the city. The legally binding agreement was based on one key stipulation –30% of EPM's annual earnings go to the mayor's office for the purpose of social investments in Medellín.[48] Planners captured the traditional source of taxpayer's revenue and supplemented this with EPM's 30% financial boost in order to fund the projects of social urbanism.



YEAR	STANDARD CONTRIBUTION	SURPLUS CONTRIBUTION	TOTAL
2004	169.294	156.974	326.268
2005	222.182	130.000	352.182
2006	254.620	66.117	320.737
2007	295.848	93.464	389.312
Values in Millions of Pesos			1'388.499

EPM Contributions to Social Projects in Medellín
Note. Adapted from *Del miedo a la esperanza,* 2008, Secretaria de Hacienda.

While EPM was created in 1955, it was only in 1997 that it was turned into an industrial and commercial enterprise of the state. Then-mayor Sergio Naranjo raised powerful arguments to convert EPM into a mixed enterprise, a move that would have privatized the provision of public utilities, but the Municipal Council did not acquiesce.[49] EPM maintains considerable flexibility in exploring opportunities for growth in the telecommunications and energy sectors, in the interests of ensuring its global competitive character.[50] The development strategy of EPM has now centered on building the largest hydroelectric in Colombia together with an expansion on two fronts: expanding the quality and efficiency of access to water for low-income groups, and second, broadening the international energy market.[51] The elected mayor of Medellín serves as the board president of EPM, but the former remains autonomous from the latter. EPM's investments are based on corporate social responsibility objectives, including extending public utilities to rural areas and the urban periphery, pro-poor payment options, and a college fund. In this way, the social responsibility investments fund the training of responsible, educated, and law-abiding consumers as part of a mutually enforcing enterprise-society benefit.[52]

EPM did not lead the most recent wave of transformation in Medellín, but its financial contributions were instrumental to reconfiguring social redistribution in the *comunas*. Federico Restrepo explains the strategy here:

> Once we had everything established we'd say … ok, we have X amount of money. Then the sources of the money — EPM can give us X, we'll get X from taxes…Colombia is one of the countries with most autonomy in Latin America. It is not a federal state. The municipalities and departments, but especially the municipalities, have a lot of autonomy. Resources are dependent on what is transferred from the nation and from the pool of territory taxes – property, industry and commerce. In other words, the industries that generate income … well, on top of that income, local and national taxes are paid, like the IVA (value added tax), rent, and all those are used so that the state apparatus works, but there's also a transfer of resources to different municipalities (Interview 2012).

The territorial management and organization of social welfare opened a unique space for collaboration between state and market interests. Territory was linked to the payment of municipal and national property taxes. Planners used land to create a juncture between state rents and social redistribution. Here, municipal planners held the power to direct and classify land uses, order territory, and structure social interventions in the interests of heightening land valorization.



Minimum Land Value Growth
(per m², 1993-2009)
Note. Adapted from *Medellín en Cifras 1,* April 2011, Estudio Valor del Suelo Lonja de Propiedad Raiz de Medellín - Antioquia



N
Castilla
Santa Cruz
Doce de Octubre
Popular
Corregimiento de San Cristóbal
Robledo
Aranjuez
Manrique
Villa Herm
San Javier
La América
La Candelaria
Laureles Estadio
Buenos Aires
Belén
Guayabal
Corregimiento de Altavista
El Poblado
Pesos/M²
240.000 - 300.000
310.000 - 600.000
610.000 - 1.000.000
1.100.000 - 1.500.000
1.600.000 - 2.000.000
2.100.000 - 3.000.000
220000 - 350000
350001 - 650000
650001 - 1100000
1100001 - 2500000
2500001 - 5000000

Land Values
(per m², 2009)
Note. Adapted from *Medellín en Cifras 1,* April 2011, Estudio Valor del Suelo. Lonja de Propiedad Raiz de Medellín - Antioquia

This relationship to EPM suggests two things: 1) urban interventions may only be possible when significant subsidies are available, either from local public enterprises or central government transfers; 2) the social welfare benefits of planning in the *comunas* resulted in additional land use value benefits across Medellín. In the period of Fajardo's term [2004-2007], land use values soared in predominantly middle and high-income neighborhoods of the city. This was not gentrification within *comuna* neighborhoods, but the effects of urban valorization. Innovative models of governance, based on institutional fixes that bridge technology, participation, and resources, with parts of the state apparatus, is what Eric Swyngedouw calls "governance-beyond-the-state" (2005). While articulating participatory democracy, the meaning of political citizenship is simultaneously being redefined. Social urbanism incorporated the construction industry as direct, yet silent benefactors of urban projects in poor neighborhoods. Property values in the city magnified as investors from around the globe witnessed the making of Medellín into a model city.

While planners directed the transformation of the *comunas* with the help of EPM funds, a second pedagogical strand was embedded as part of social interventions. The project was framed around the principles of civic responsibility, based on instilling the idea of personal investment in the state's urban interventions. José Fernando Angel, an architect that helped develop social urbanism explains:

> It's not formal academic education. No, it is not kids from elementary, then high school, than higher education. Instead, education ends up being a pedadogical strategy, across all fields, at the moment of creating a participatory project in a barrio popular (comunas), because of participatory budgeting. The sole act of having someone explain the bills, **how** the project will be taken up technically, **why** the architects and the engineers believe the bridge or the walkway or the multiple sports field. The youth of the barrios participate in these projects, the moms, kids … those meetings generate conversation, training, a lot of community building … more than anything, these are pedagogical (Interview 2011).

Civic campaigns have long been a component of urban interventions in Medellín, but the cultural component extended the reach of the *cultural ciudadana* (citizen culture) concept introduced by Antanas Mockus from Bogotá to Medellín's *comunas*. Social urbanism intertwined public-private investments and civic campaigns as instrumental components in changing the existing culture that identified the state with clientelism, disinvestment, and social exclusion.

The lesson of responsibility stood at the center of the urban agenda used to remake social welfare. Social urbanism created monumental buildings and programs that transformed the face of poverty in Medellín, but it placed education as key instrument in civic responsibility. José Fernando Angel explains:

> Pedagogy is … let's not talk about it as a cross-curricular theme … that turned into something commonplace. It is a methodology in all political processes when you are going to tackle a zonal development plan. All the experts participate and explain to the community. The community explains

> all their needs. They call the experts over to the creek that comes out and that brings problems from the other barrio where the water and everything … there is a gigantic remaining pedagogical balance. That concept is very Mockusian. Besides, it is not Fajardo's. Antanas Mockus invtented it during his first mayoral term. It is vital that in Colombian politics, all public works, all social processes … have to be explicit. And that's how they are done outdoors, with accountability, participatory budgets, with participatory planning, with participatory execution. Many of the youth learn about locksmithing, learn about construction, learn topography … it is creating a gigantic balance ... And that kid that now has schooling, well aside from that, he participate in this and liked construction … he's going to be a future technician or architect or urban anthropologist (Interview 2011).

This paradox of governance, in which opportunities to participatory democracy expand, but the very nature of citizenship is transformed, has been explored in Bogotá as the contradiction between a push for the "right to the city" and the push back of civic monitoring in public spaces (Berney 2011). Manuel Castells describes how grassroots advocates of rights-based movements have challenged state-inscribed values and classifications of territory (1983). However, the underlying question of the social contract suggests the need for "deeper, spatialised forms of political and political economy analysis" (Hickey 2009). The case of social urbanism suggests the need to complicate existing "right to the city" based arguments. There is a story here about the reinvention of the state in innovatively shaping democratic participation, politics, and welfare. Members of Fajardo's team built on their experience and connections to non-profits in the city in legitimizing the social rationales of the interventions. This "relational view of the shadow state" offers a different perspective on government (Trudeau 2008). In legitimizing social rationales, planners constructed innovative arrangements from within and outside of state institutions.

This was a key moment marking progress and urban transition. In looking to the past, these lived experts were envisioning a future for themselves and imagining how the cross-institutional sharing of resources and experiences could transform the city. Social urbanism does not represent the weakening of the state, but rather the re-articulation of organizing logics of governance with the twin goals of social welfare and market expansion. It is in this context that we see both the neglect and embrace of informality as a rationale of state intervention. The *comunas* served as a target of state intervention – on the one hand, for how poverty could be managed in the city, and on the other, how the state would transform existing practices of intervention. By framing social urbanism as a social welfare model, the state redefined the models, practices, and territories of planning. José Fernando Angel explains Fajardo's approach in the *comunas*:

> So Sergio gained trust. Honestly, he succeeded in not frivolously losing resources – the end of the *diezmo* (levy) comission – the culture of 15% to contracters. Of giving contracts to the *juntas de accion comunal* (community action councils) via leaders that were the guarantors [of safety]. Before, [the councils] would win a contract because they collected some votes, but their construction work was bad. There was no strict fiscal accountability. A lot of

> money was lost to inefficiency and ended up as small populist corruption. In big corruption, a lot of money was lost. We calculated [losses] … about 15% of what the executed budget cost in the four years that Sergio Fajardo was mayor. That's what the cost of the city's physical transformation cost. The libraries plus the schools plus the public spaces. All of that cost money. It's just that most of the monies from public budgets are already assigned to the maintenance of road maintenance, to pay teachers, to pay the police, public street lights, in all those non-negotiable things. You have, well whoever is mayor, has to pay the police, the teachers, covering holes, who knows what else … but a margin is left over. Lets call it free disposition [funds]. It was discretionary. It went to comissions or inefficiency or sumptuary works or to the social organism (Interview 2011).

Not only were planners battling the disinvestment of the state in the *comunas,* but the precedent of clientelism, the dynamic expectations set of the state-community relationship by previous politicians. Fajardo replaced the 15% of the *diezmo* commission, the cost of informal handouts to generate votes, with 15% towards a state-led transformation of the *comunas*. Planners reconfigured the state spaces in the *comunas*, pushing the existing boundaries that had prevented state entry without the expectation of a political exchange for votes. Social urbanism provided an opportunity to redefine existing cultural politics and the emergent reach of the developmental state at the urban scale.

Despite the avid embrace of non-traditional politics, Fajardo's team still encountered the problem of urban politicking in rethinking the direction of transformation. While the social urbanism model aimed to construct an image of the state at the service of the community, *comuna* residents remained embedded in the dynamics of historical practices. Norelly notes the persistence of the problem:

> This man [Luis Perez, the previous mayor] promised to get rid of *pico y placa* (license plate-based travel restriction), to get rid of photo tickets, to give the MetroPlus to [private] transportation organizations. Whatever it is they wanted. To change the PBOT for the construction [industry] however they want. What I mean is that everything that is disorder there in the *comunas*, well the communities are easily bought with money, with *sancochos* (traditional soup), with *aguardiente* (local liquor) … so it is really difficult. I've told Sergio many times, the subject of narcotrafficking is a cancer that caused us a lot of harm, and aside from that, since it affects all of the paisa culture, it's not easy to change, because it's a cultural problem (Interview 2011).

In rebuilding the city, the state had to confront the ghosts of the past. The state had to battle a historical legacy of disinvestment and a overreliance on clientelist relationships. Fajardo's team was not composed of your usual politicians. Their urban efforts were not based on securing votes. The state itself had to rebuild existing frameworks for redressing residents cooperation and participation in projects – the urban benefits of social redistribution.

The remaking of social welfare placed urban poverty and market expansion side by side. On the one hand, planners transformed the face of the city, building on civic campaigns and a beautification to further social policy. On the other, state restructuring involved reworking government, bringing together the social objectives of public and private actors, to rearticulate development objectives at the urban scale. Moreover, in rebuilding how the poor accessed and experienced life in the city, the political elites of the city subsumed the idea of the social as a territorially protected constitutional right. In the process, these lived experts reconstituted citizenship as both a pedagogical exercise in democratic participation and elite vision of the city's future. The dynamic interplay between the two heads of welfare redefined neglect in the *comunas,* while underpinning the idea that poverty needs to be beautified, but it is the state that creates the rationales of intervention and residents who need to be trained as responsible citizens.

Mutating Social Urbanism

Social urbanism challenged the existing conditions of Medellín's political vacuum. Planners made an explicit call not to cater to corruption, centering the urban agenda on the democratic ideals of transparency, participation, and representation. Urban laboratories, as in the case of Medellín, serve as unique platforms to study the reinvention of government and how, in the process, the double movement gains traction as a social intervention. To better understand the "programmatic character of governmentality," Miller and Rose identify how techniques and mechanisms are used to imagine, frame, and implement government objectives in regulating both territory and populations (1990). Here, local elites take up the role of the state in "a blow to the machine from the inside" (Pasotti 2010). Social urbanism was a direct reaction to histories of machine politics in the city, a way of dramatically turning away from clientelism as the structure of state interventions in the *comunas*.

The rollback of the state and the introduction of fiscal austerity measures at the national scale in Colombia, once coupled with the embrace of social rationales in furthering urban interventions, signals how the claim to "non-politics" of local ruling elites was used to appropriate welfare as a regulatory space. Foucault suggests that liberalism is profoundly woven into the "art of governing" — a way of doing things to curb the excess of government (2003). In redefining state rationalities of intervention, territory and the types of practices used to extend its institutional reach were restructured. Changing the face of poverty in the *comunas* only heightened and reinforced the power of planning in reconfiguring the provision of welfare, and in the process, the conditions of political citizenship for the poorest *comuna* residents. While the public discourse on social urbanism centered on progressive planning approaches towards inclusion, economic development, and beautification, the city functioned as an object to be globally marketed as a model of poverty management. Social urbanism was about giving back to city residents, but it rested on an implicit commitment to proving the success of the program to an international community of development experts. Six years after the end of Fajardo's term, the model continues to gain fame as planners in Medellín continually reinvent the social rationales of intervention.

In promoting broad principles of innovation, from inclusive urban policies to fomenting institutional enterprise to attracting global capital to the city, Fajardo's team instituted pedagogical training based on the social urbanism experiment. From internships and summer courses sponsored by EAFIT, the institutional home for social urbanism, the model used to fix the social debt in the *comunas* became the centerpiece of planning. Students from around the world were invited to learn first hand from the social urbanism team.

Module 1 – Urban Development		
	1) Theory-based Classes	
		a)Social Urbanism: Intervention model that simultaneously encompasses physical transformation, social intervention, institutional management and community participation.
		b) Integral Urban Projects (PUI): Development strategy for locations with problems .
	2) Field trips and visits	
		a) PUI: Northeastern Area
		b) PUI: Comuna 13
		c) Carabobo Walkway and Downtown Plan
		d) Public Space and Equipaments
Module 2 - Society		
	1) Theory-based Classes	
		a) Local Public Policy
		b) Government and the City
		c) Inter-Institutional Coordination and Citizen Participation
		d) Safety and Co-existence
Module 3 – Environment		
	1) Process of Occupying and Transforming City Spaces	
	2) Threats and Risks in the Aburrá Valley	
Module 4 – Workshop		
	1) City Management: Sustainability and Social Inclusion	

Social Urbanism Summer School Modules
Note. Adapted from *Escuela de Verano*, 2012, EAFIT.



MEDELLíN,
URBANISMO SOCIAL

Exposition créée par le Pavillon de l'Arsenal
en partenariat avec la Municipalité de Medellín,
l'Agence Française de Développement,
et l'Atelier parisien d'urbanisme

Ill. Complejo Acuatico, Medellin - Paisajes Emergentes architectes

PAVILLON de l'ARSENAL

Social Urbanism Exhibit
Note. Adapted from
Pavillon de l'Arsenal. 2012.

The summer school integrated four modules in a 40-hour course, in which students from China to Mexico gathered at EAFIT university to meet and learn from the makers of social urbanism.[53] As an urban school model, the modules brought together theory with practice-based experience, in addition to site visits, in training planners from around the world. Pedagogical opportunities opened a channel for planners to replicate the model, but for those interested in the details of the urban formula, a thick book laying out the pieces of the PUI method was prepared for patent.

The replication of the model persists in conferences that bring together international experts to discuss innovative approaches to planning. Social urbanism made its way to Paris as a museum exhibition in 2011 sponsored by France's Development Agency, where some experts believe it can be used in post-colonial

African cities to spur urban transformation (Hernandez 2012).[54] State interventions in the *comunas* are now linked to a global audience observing the response of poor residents to urban interventions. The fate of *comuna* residents does not rest on votes, but rather on participating in state-developed social rationales of economic development, tourism, and investment. Social urbanism symbolizes the urban rebirth of a city reinventing existing perceptions of Medellín across the globe.

Poverty, though, is being managed, rather than alleviated. While poverty and homicide rates have dropped within the urban boundaries of Medellín, residents living in the *corregimientos* just outside of the city face heightened levels of urban conflict.[55] While the city is at the heart of a transnational circuit of urban conferences, travel, and investment, the provision of social welfare is being reworked as a regulatory space.


Chart Contrasting Social Investments with Homicide Rates 2004-2013
Note. Adapted from "Inversion Social en Medellín no logra parar las balas" 2013, German Jimenez Morales *El Colombiano.*

In reconciling how the poor are governed, the state faces a contentious struggle over what is meant by the social and how community comes to be defined in urban development. Contrary to neo-liberal dynamics existing at the national level, planners in Medellín created a distinct developmental project, an urban dream of detonation, as expressed by social urbanism architect José Fernando Angel:

> The project we dreamed up was a detonating project. It was a model that could be replicated and propogated. In other words, at the moment you attend to the most critical places … and with intermediate results you get accessibility of tourism, the security you give to people, lowering greatly the rates of violent deaths and injuries from intrafamily violence … its a very

> interesting contemporary pedagogical strategy … I would say that … you can't pretend that a model be replicated exactly (Interview 2011).

The social urbanism team rearticulated how planners intervened in the *comunas*. By harnessing the power of poverty as a rationale of intervention in the *comunas,* the state staked out a new urban space to guide the "command and control" functions of the city. In transforming the social rationales of intervention, territory underwent change as a politicized space of negotiation and contention. Here, the territorial reconfiguration of the *comunas* placed Medellín on a global grid of model planning practices, and while not a global city at the center of international financial and business, the model did create a new frontier for capitalist expansion.

Fajardo is a global symbol. He traveled to Monterey, Mexico, in 2009 to meet the city's mayor and showcased social urbanism as a model to alleviate violence while beautifying the city. Social urbanism even made its was into a 2012 TED talk, in which Alejandro Echeverri, Fajardo's right hand architect, broadcasted the model globally across a live webcast. The model has its merits, but violence, inter-*comuna* displacement, and poverty persist in the *comunas*. Fajardo is one of many mayors immersed in a global conversation on the city, cross-referencing ideas in developing the "new" locus of global change. The entrepreneurial turn in cities has introduced innovative ideas of "urban renaissance," the creative marketing, securitizing, and reinvention of urban spaces and civilizing projects (Helms, Atkinson, and MacLeod 2007). Both community and participation continue to play a central role in these projects across the globe as reinvented social rationales.

Despite the seemingly "fast" travel of social policy, place and history matter. The transnational exchange of ideas has been analyzed as a contemporary process, but requires looking back to understand how social rationales continue to be reworked at the global scale. Understood as a globally embedded process, social rationales extend beyond the limiting scope of the state provision or redistribution of benefits as financial handouts or subsidies. By examining how the social is historically entrenched in local politics, development agendas, and the transnational exchange of ideas, the process exposes a new layer of the state. The ordering of territory, as experienced and grounded in everyday relations to place, has variable links to both economic restructuring and social welfare. Social welfare reform in Medellín points to alternative ways of identifying how the control of territory is intertwined with and economic development. The creative reworking of territory offers a new way of thinking and experiencing an emergent space for "rewarding regulation" (2013). Here, the state together with key stakeholders, reformulated the grounds of what is meant by social welfare. This project, however, was not only constructed with *comuna* residents, but a global audience of experts, investors, and leaders from around the world.

Liberal ideas continue to counter intuitively play on the "death of the social" (Rose 1996), a novel space used to rethink and reinvent government. The social persists as a framing device for state intervention, used by government officials, communities, non-profits, and entrepreneurs alike, together formulating the emergent platforms for competing, calculative rationalities of liberal control. The regulatory experiments of planners in Medellín have appropriated the developmental state at the urban scale and reconfigured how technical experts impact and shape planning globally. While the process can be understood as the most recent iteration of an "institutional fix" (Peck and Tickell 1994), long-term economic growth and sustainability remains a concern. Urban development policies in cities demonstrate how spatial policy becomes concerned with spatial fixes. Embedding economic and social needs as part of an institutional objective are probably not what Polanyi envisioned as the pushback by bottom-up, enlightened reactionaries. But this is the place where market meets society as the twin face of social rationales.

The Belly of the Beast

Comuna residents are at the heart of the social urbanism marketing. Books and pamphlets published by the Mayor's Office document their stories, experiences, and examples of transformation. The stories of residents highlight how state investments in neighborhoods have generated opportunities for entrepreneurship, homeownership, and education. Children are shown playing in parks, reading in libraries, and taking part in planning workshops. Library parks serve as monuments to the urban transformation, housing theatres, public spaces, and employment centers within their urban layout. In narrating the story of urban transformation, the emphasis is often on the speed of change. Yet, Gabriel Garcia Marquez reminds us that:

> *Humanity, like armies in the field, advances at the speed of the slowest.*[56]

The stories of everyday conflict and tensions with the state are not always relayed at rapid speed. This is no longer a reference to the contentious landscape that the *comunas* were historically known for, but to the public platforms in which city residents engage with the state in disputes over the benefits of social welfare and how they are redistributed. These are not the stories of a swift state, but of a bureaucratic lethargy.

I interviewed a state official who took me to a Municipal council meeting, where I was introduced to a network of residents from across the *comunas*. This is where I met Carla. She had three teenage kids and a husband who she hardly saw. Carla and her family had been internally displaced from San Cristobal, a neighboring *corregimiento* of Medellín. Their displaced status allowed them to petition for subsidized housing and grant money, in addition to low-income health insurance. They were offered a public housing unit in a complex called *Pajarito.* The problem was that other internally displaced residents had also been moved to the complex, alongside poor urban dwellers from Medellín. In *Pajarito,* young men could unsuspectingly become the target of rival militias that were a few doors down or just a floor away.

Carla's son was not in a militia, but shortly after their move, became a target for rival groups in *Pajarito*. The family had to leave the unit and move into a single room in a family member's house. As for the grant money, it never arrived on time. Carla and her husband had chosen to split up to make ends meet. While she worked in a home-based business, he would leave for days to sell merchandise in cities across the region. The low-income health insurance, though, had also become an issue. Since moving to *Pajarito*, the family no longer lived in the *estrato 1 o 2* (low-income neighborhood) to qualify, but rather in *estrato 3* (low to medium income) public housing.[57] This was not a unique case. On a visit to a community meeting with twenty people in *Pajarito*, I had fifteen people come up to me to explain the same health insurance issue. I was there to listen to their claims, but had limited information to help. Public housing residents had tired of going to state offices to ask for help and often felt like nobody had a clear answer. Instead, many residents filed *tutelas* (writ for protection of fundamental rights) to juridically stake their claims to social rights. While urban planning projects have expanded the realm of social benefits for the poor in the city, there remains a question of how to protect the social rights of transient citizens.

While social urbanism has projected a global image of urban transformation, the poor living in the *corregimientos* just outside of Medellín are facing the uneven impacts of urban development. The institutional fix has managed to once again push poverty to the margins. Carla's story places into evidence the inner workings of neoliberal reform in the progressive city of Medellín. Across Latin America, welfare states are undergoing significant experimentation. New programs, such as the Bolsa Familia program initiated by Brazil's left-of-center Worker's Party, have brought new recipients into the reach of the welfare state, but welfare experiments have implications that extend beyond the urban realm.

At the municipal scale, progressive mayors have taken up urban experiments in transforming who benefits from social welfare and where. The urban initiative has extended its reach beyond the working class to include the informal sector in cities, but global praises of the model need to dig a little deeper. The poor living in the city are the prime benefactors of the urban project, but in the process, planners are redefining how the state manages the objectives and implications of social redistribution.

CHAPTER 5
The Urban Cure

Vengeance. Mauricio Faciolince was not your typical elected public official. He was a trained architect with extensive experience in appointed government roles. During Fajardo's term, he served as director of Medellín's Municipal System of Prevention and Disaster Attention (SIMPAD). Then went from director of the Metropolitan Area of the Valley of Aburra (AMVA) during Alonso Salazar's term to Secretary of Government for Anibal Gaviria, until his resignation in 2012.

In 2011, I saw him give a public presentation to over 500 people detailing the urban transformations he was leading in the *Cerro Volador*, a dilapidated hill in Medellín that was being revitalized for recreational activities. His techno-savvy personality shined in the public spotlight. He wore a construction helmet and paraded across the podium, using a movie screen to ingeniously step into the *Cerro Volador* location. Mauricio's "living" presentation used state of the art technology to transform the auditorium into his own teletransporter. While spending some time working in Chile, Mauricio had gained most of his experience as an urban professional in Medellín. His technical expertise, combined with his novel embrace of media and local networks, made him stand out as a public figure. Curiously, he identified vengeance during the presentation as the rationale for the work he and others were leading in transforming the city.

> *This week has been one of those times in which the work done that has been constructed in the last eight years in Medellín is highly exalted. They wanted to know why we were doing something for our city. I would say that a lot of us, a lot of us who are here today, who were pulled by the hair from the private sector, from other institutions, from social organizations…we had one main reason. Vengeance. We are getting vengeance from a city we had to live in. We are getting vengeance from a city full of bombs, full of corruption, full of narcotrafficking. A story that sometimes it seems we have forgotten. A story, that when we go back, seems that memory has erased. A story that only existed on the front-page news as deaths, bombs, and Pablo Escobar. Today, Medellín is known outside and is recognized for different things. We are invited … our mayor … our mayors from the Valley of Aburra … to meet and share experiences. To tell them what we did and to tell us they feel proud of the place of Medellín.*

Mauricio's reference to violence suggests that the legacy of Pablo Escobar, as demonstrated in the persistence of urban militias, continues to shadow everyday life in Medellín. For him, the act of transforming the city signified an act of state vengeance – the ability to retaliate against popular imaginaries that placed Medellín as a city in rapid decline.

Mauricio represents the face of many technical experts working across all levels of urban government in Medellín, moving seamlessly between public and private sector initiatives. Their wide range of professional titles, from engineers and social workers to architects and lawyers, represent a tightly knit network of academics, business investors, and public figures. While not all of them are high tech experts, together, their vision represents a long-term investment in the city they live in, rather than a limited publicly elected term. Conferences and public meetings, project brochures and videos, in addition to the praise given by the international community, validate and positively reinforce the work of these protagonists spearheading Medellín's transformation. The dynamism and energy of these planners helped introduce state institutions as important vehicles of urban transformation in the *comunas*.

Here, social urbanism' protagonists, faced with the conditions of urban crisis, mobilized to lead the city's transformation as lived experts indebted to changing the course of social welfare in the city. Planners deemed their work in Medellín as an "urban miracle." These experts brought forth a common terrain of reference in addressing urban poverty in the city – the *comunas*. No longer identified as the heartland of the narcotics world, the planners shifted away from an oppositional stance to embracing the *comunas* as the center of an urban agenda. Given the rapidly shifting conditions of the city, planners struggled to rationally calculate the costs and benefits of urban intervention. The *comunas* entertained the possibility of reconfiguring territory in defining the mutual interests of the poor and the state. The calculations were instead anchored in concerns over the potential costs, or risks, of the *comunas* development. Progressive elites, in taking up the reins of the state, struggled with changing categories of democracy, informality, development, social welfare, and poverty.

The Implications of Medellín's Case

Social urbanism gained global fame for firing up the city's transformation. Planners used the model to reconfigure the poorest *comunas* into revitalized public spaces, mass transit gondolas, and monumental architecture. The *comunas* represent a vast territory within Medellín and governing authorities in these communities range from grassroots organizations to urban militias, groups extending their control beyond the administrative boundaries defined by the state. Municipal officials used planning to carve out new territories of social transformation, taking areas once identified with violence and poverty as sites of experimentation for a new repertoire of state interventions. The state restructuring of territory in Medellín developed as a response to the deep urban crisis faced by the city's residents in the 1990s. The global economic effects of deindustrialization and economic restructuring, combined with constitutional reform in Colombia, dramatically reconfigured how the state reconstituted the spatial face of social transformation in the city.

The model's implementation revolutionalized the "political economy of social policy" by extending benefits to the urban poor in three ways. First, planners reinvented the social framings of a technical and administrative structure used to advance innovative forms of state intervention in *comunas* where the state had appeared absent. From civic boosterism to modernist maps to macro-economic housing interventions, the *social urbanism* trajectory represents the makings of a social order, an organizing logic of governance used to delimit and manage territory in the city. Second, the project of reconfiguring territory in the *comunas* reconstituted understandings of constitutional reform, poverty, and urban crisis at the municipal scale. The *comunas* redesign was deeply ingrained in a historically divisive project over who belongs in the city, how urban citizens should behave, and what kinds of benefits the city should provide. Third, the entangled relationship between planners and *comuna* residents redefined the provision of social welfare, extending its reach to the informal sector and to benefits in the form of urban design. These three interrelated struggles played out in urban arenas across Medellín, from the *comunas* to the municipal planning office to international planning conferences, in mediating a rearticulated story of social reform.

Social urbanism speaks to Medellín's urban laboratory, but more broadly, to state experiments with carving out new institutional spaces. Colombia's constitutional reform in 1991 inscribed cities as the authoritative guides of territorial ordering. In decentralizing power to the local scale, cities were charged with delimiting space into organizing units based on use and value. Cities, transformed into living laboratories, became a pivot for organizing and managing social welfare. Planners were the central protagonists in giving spatial form to the social rationales outlined in the constitution, creating new tools combining urban interventions with social redistribution. As such, planners in Medellín introduced investments together with expert knowledge as powerful tools in framing the terms of social intervention. Here, urban poverty was not taken off the table, but rather grandly taken up as a global model for social transformation. In cities across the Global South and the Global North, Medellín now offers an innovative contribution to urban development policy.

Medellín's contribution rests on the ability to use the city's case to engage in global discussions on the changing politics of poverty management, social welfare, and urban policy diffusion. The particularities of the case reveal the nuances of everyday decision-making and the broader implications of thinking about planning and poverty in cities. Historicizing the case provides an anchor for situating the makings of social urbanism within a wider arch of urban experiments with social welfare. A triangulation of archival and ethnographic evidence documents how the project of ordering and managing difference, which moved between patterned practices of neglect to a planned, organized form of social regulation, emerged in Medellín. Social urbanism speaks to the emerging field of scholarship concerned with the neglect as an organizing logic of governance, a category applied by the state through planning to reorder territory. The purpose of a historically situated ethnography is to provide a relational study of how planning powerfully reshaped state space, social welfare, and poverty in the *comunas*.

The Importance of History

Fajardo's "group of friends" in Medellín imposed a new way of delimiting territory and legitimizing state spaces in the *comunas,* but the political movement went beyond the boundaries of the city. In 2010, former mayors of Bogota Enrique Peñalosa and Medellín's Sergio Fajardo, together with other center progressives, joined as the Green Alliance, a political movement supporting the election of Antanas Mockus as president. Colombia's "green wave" gained momentum across cities, generating hope among youth in remaking national politics and raising a powerful challenge to traditional political parties. The political phenomenon lost steam though – during mid-year elections, Mockus lost to presidential incumbent Juan Manuel Santos with a difference of 6 million votes. In 2011, Fajardo returned to the polls under the "green" party as candidate for governor of Antioquia. He won and made a promise – to replicate the Medellín model at the departmental scale.

Historicizing the project of transformation, however, reveals the dynamic interplays between calls of development and the reinvention of social rationales taken up by planners. In the 1990s, planners in Medellín partnered with the national government and international funders to lead neighborhood-level improvement programs countering the effects of the social debt. As we have seen, the ability of planners to transform the urban poor into the fulcrum of urban agendas rested on the makings of poverty in Medellín into an object of state neglect. By 2004, the protagonists of social urbanism worked together to radically change the face of the *comunas*, working with Fajardo to negotiate the politics of poverty in spaces where the state had appeared absent. Medellín transformed into a powerful model for planning imaginaries, a globally circulated representation of urban transformation and symbol of the nation's progress. Urban planners on the fast track to the city's revival countered depictions of a country torn apart by violence. The existing administrative boundaries of the *comunas*, which neatly delimited homicide rates and quality of life indices, were redefined into hubs of state intervention. The powerful effect of urban design, combined with investments and the presence of a cadre of city officials, transformed existing representations of the state as subservient authority to competing political powers.

In 2011, I interviewed David Escobar, a trained engineer and private secretary to Fajardo who envisioned and directed the "management model" behind social urbanism. He had a confident demeanor and had no qualms identifying the limitations of the model, despite being one of its most active proponents. The "social" function of the model, he explained, was about "where the interventions were needed most" and the "type of population benefiting." This was the motor driving the project –building "the most lovely and the most beautiful for the most humble." He made an explicit distinction between the projects of *social urbanism* and those of building avenues or bridges in financial centers or tourist hubs in the city, which were also completed during Fajardo's mayoral term. And while David was no stranger to the state's battle with the "Goliath" of narco-trafficking, he was personally invested in winning even with the state as underdog.

David was a city official and a resident of Medellín. He navigated the conflicting spaces of social transformation from state offices, but his interests lay with the people most afflicted by the urban crisis – the residents of the *comunas*. While serving as a broker of social transformation, he clearly separated out the meanings of "social" urbanism for the poor from that which provided benefits for other city residents. The waging battle over state space is exemplified in David's own struggles to mediate and shape urban decision-making. This is not to say that *comuna* residents had no agency, but rather that the state had been taken up by planners in challenging existing political authorities in the *comunas*. It was the state entry point to ordering and managing territory contested territory in the city. At times, *comunas* residents resisted planning projects. The urban "acupuncture" projects took place in selective neighborhoods of the city with a vision of extending the state's reach even further with time. Social urbanism came to fruition at a moment when planners purposely shifted existing categories to align grassroots social movements with market innovation, garnering support from "below" and "above," to transform the city.

In creatively reinventing social rationales in Medellín, planners garnered state resources and power in the ambitious push to change the city. While targeting social welfare provision for the urban poor in Medellín, social urbanism's "urban cure" developed as a coping mechanism for the state. Planners undoubtedly basked in social rationales that promoted their own vision of what poverty in the city should look like. From the civic project led by the SMP to the modernist dreams of architects to a macro-economic development plan, planners struggled to find their place between building monuments or myths of progress in the city. The story, as detailed here through urban experiments, was a means to coping with the impacts of Medellín's transformation, from burgeoning town to industrial city to drug capital of the world. The historical conjuncture documents the transformation of Medellín from a laboratory of urban crisis to a "best practice model," a project deeply rooted in the urban experiments of diverse planning practitioners in the city.

A Pinnacle Moment

The 2014 World Urban Forum was a pinnacle moment for Medellín. Joseph Stiglitz's visit spell bounded the city as the news spread across social media feeds, highlighting the former World Bank economist's "surprise" at the colorfulness of homes, the monumental scale of the library, and the mass transit gondola in the Santo Domingo Savio *comuna* neighborhood. The news flurry, which lasted for days, reminded me of a meeting I had with Tomas, an urban expert that detailed the PUI instrument used to frame *comuna* interventions in Chapter Three.

Tomas explained to me that you "wouldn't find housing in the PUI" even though it was technically part of the project. Juan Bobo, a housing project situated west of Santo Domingo Savio was not considered part of the PUI "even though it had habitat and housing components." Every PUI had five components: environment, public space, infrastructure, housing, and mobility. Although housing was within the public framing of the PUI, the project was executed independently. As noted by Tomas, an "integral project without housing," as in the case of Juan Bobo, "does not make sense." Yet, the social urbanism model gained momentum around the globe for integrating all five components. Latin American cities continue to serve as laboratories for urban experiments with social welfare. Urban innovation and enterprise, coupled with visions of poverty alleviation, permeate emergent social rationales.

The *comunas*, once the blemish of the city, are now a global model for planners from around the world. Informal settlements were the entry point for the state to rethink urban governance. While informality has been identified as a coping strategy for the poor (Auyero 2009), here I make the case that informality is used by the state to cope with failure and crisis. Medellín has gained fame globally as a city with resilience, innovation, and entrepreneurial.[58] In the end, the changes may seem small and superficial. However, there is an argument to be made for the role of planners in taking on the local state to mobilize against corrupt politicians and existing neo-liberal trends as everyday "lived experts." Eduardo Silva identifies the changing dynamics with "contentious politics" in Latin America, "a flexible tool that permits a shift in focus to the common denominators of diverse movements, protest groups, actions, and objectives" (2009). Here, the elites were mathematicians, philosophers, and architects that had mobilized and appropriated the unique regulatory space of welfare to enter a non-traditional role as politicians. This was a direct response not only to national state grievances with militarized interventions and narcotics rule in their own city, but to the effects of global economic restructuring.

While planning diffuses across the Americas, and expands its reach globally, the urban mission continues to change. Public hygiene and civic campaigns have not lost their force, but are now ensconced within new experiments caught between the "double movement" of market expansion and the counteracting efforts tending towards their restriction. Planning continues to be intimately tied to the project of development, toying with new calculative rationalities that employ social "fixes" to the market, and that continue intensifying the contradictory relations between state and society. These effects are reminders that even innovative planning has a dark underside and the power to shape the city can also do harm. Cities are built on changing, unstable social relations. We have examined how in just one city the social rationales of urban intervention dramatically transformed, while progressively generating new ways to order and delimit territory. Medellín's case challenges us to look more closely at innovative urban projects. On the one hand, it forces us to examine both the details and implications of rapidly ascending urban models to global fame. On the other, it forces us to rethink the relationship between governance and informality as a central function of cities across the Global South and Global North. The diffusion of urban policies, taken without critically historicizing *how* global models frame the objects of intervention, as in the *comunas,* create false binaries between the planned and unplanned.

As evidenced in the dynamic transformation of the *comunas* in Medellín*,* informality goes hand in glove with urban planning. Studies that treat informality as a feature of only developing cities, and as a separate process from "formal" organizing logics of governance, fail to acknowledge *how* the circulation of ideas extends far beyond the urban perimeter of the South. The makings of state space at the urban margins, drawing from both history and contemporary cases, reveals the importance of seeing the city from the periphery in seeing the wider arc supporting social rationales. Once transformed into everyday forms of knowledge, social reform reveals itself through state created channels of participatory democracy, pro-poor development, and urban transformation. Social welfare acquiesces to a muddled promise of urban progress, rather than to the planning protagonists interrogating the categories change is premised on.

In thinking about planning practice and policy, the tendency to create strict dichotomies between legal and illegal, formal and informal, global north and global south, can severely limit how we think about the future of cities. It forces us, as planners and policymakers, to rethink politics, planning expertise, and neoliberal poverty agendas in constructing emergent rationalities of "social" intervention**.**

As the brokers of urban knowledge, planners need to ask bolder questions about how to approach the restructuring of territory in formulating the social rationales of intervention. Moreover, the implications of who or what defines social welfare, the unplanned, and the illicit in redefining the new terms of reference for urban interventions.

Urban dynamics across Colombia continue to change. In Bogotá, the most recent progressive mayor, Gustavo Petro, was a leftist former guerilla. He was ousted, and again reinstated in 2014. Not for corruption, but for failure to comply with legally bounding contractual procedures. While supporters cry out of a right-wing plot, Petro's removal from office has stalled a progressive leftwing agenda. In Medellín, the election of Anibal Gaviria as mayor continued the legacy of urban projects in guiding social transformation, but has instead placed the emphasis on public housing. He has faced two colossal challenges during his term: first, the 2013 collapse of a high-tower residential building in wealthy sector of the city, which tragically killed eleven people, and second, the partial closure of the Metro in 2014 as a result of a significant deterioration on the riverbank's surrounding the commuter main rail line. Medellín's rising stardom is showing cracks even at its center. Progressive party politics, too, generate unstable and changing categories of social transformation.

“Only the living, cognizant of this history, who understand the principles of those who struggled for and against the ‘embellishment’ of that spot, can truly disinter the mysteries that lie entombed there and thereby rescue that rich experience from the deathly silence of the tomb and transform it into the beginning of the cradle.”

- David Harvey (1979)

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[33] A hot beverage infusion of hardened molasses, generally offered to guests upon arriving at a home.

[34] Traditional main soup dish that is generally served in Medellín with chicken, potatoes, yucca, plantain, and corn cob.

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