

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

A Decade of Hell: How Repression and Violence Shaped Local 22's Shift to Oligarchy

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by

Joshua Matthew Bingham

Committee in charge:

Professor Abigail Andrews, Chair
Professor Jeffrey Haydu
Professor Matthew Vitz

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The thesis of Joshua Matthew Bingham is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APPO	Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca
CMM	Mexican Federation of Teachers
CNTE	National Council of Education Workers
CROC	Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants
CROM	Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers
CTM	Confederation of Mexican Workers
FNSI	National Federation of Independent Unions
FSTSE	Federation of Union Workers in the Service of the State
IEEPO	State Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca
ITU	International Typographical Union
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
PNR	National Revolutionary Party
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party
SEP	Secretariat of Public Education
SME	Mexican Union of Electrical Workers
SNTE	National Union of Education Workers
UABJO	Benito Juárez Autonomous University of Oaxaca

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

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Joshua Matthew Bingham

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Professor Abigail Andrews, Chair

This investigation examines a teachers' local (local 22 of the National Union of Education Workers of Mexico (SNTE)) in the Mexican state of Oaxaca and the effects of repression on the oligarchization of local 22. Using sociologist Robert Michels' theory of oligarchization known as the "iron law of oligarchy"—which claims that any democratic organization that becomes large enough to bureaucratize will inevitably become an oligarchy—as a framework, this investigation makes the argument that external influences, specifically government repression, can force an organization to become oligarchic, thus occupying an

important, yet unexplored space within the “iron law” theory. Michels’ theory focuses on an organizations’ internal issues such as bureaucratization, centralization of power, and technical specialization of job positions as the factors that push an organization to become oligarchic without accounting for external issues faced by organizations that can also influence a shift to oligarchy. Through historical research, interviews of local 22 members, and observations carried out in Oaxaca City this investigation argues that intense government repression and violence against local 22 beginning in 2006 and continuing for the next ten years significantly affected local 22’s shift toward oligarchy, more so than the bureaucratization and centralization that took place within the local.

Introduction: A Failed Movement, Punishing Repercussions, and Oligarchy

In Oaxaca City the warning calls had been coming in throughout the day and well into the night of June 13 and 14, 2006. *Radio Universidad*, the university run radio station on the campus of Benito Juarez Autonomous University of Oaxaca (UABJO), had acted as the broadcasting site for the teachers of local 22, one of the largest teacher locals in Mexico, who used the airwaves to broadcast protest propaganda and warn other protestors throughout the city about possible danger and confrontations with the police. Reports spread that the police were planning an assault on the protesting teachers gathered in the city center. The protesters were on edge; the tension was palpable, and as the night of June 13 dragged on the protesters nervously waited, many hoping that the reports coming in on *Radio Universidad* were nothing more than unsubstantiated rumors. The teachers had occupied the *zócalo* since May 22 attempting to pressure the government to cede to their demands of higher pay, improved housing options, scholarships, and school materials for students (Stephen, 2013). 2006 was not unlike any other year for the teachers of local 22. The annual protest and sit-in in the *zócalo* had essentially become a tradition with the government usually making the necessary concessions to get the teachers back to their homes.

But in the early morning hours of June 14, thousands of teachers from the local 22 of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) occupying Oaxaca City's main square, or *zócalo* as it is locally known, arose to the vibrating pulse of helicopter rotor blades and the arrival of hundreds of police forces that had been sent in by Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz to forcibly evict them. What ensued over the next few hours could only be described as nothing less than a warzone. In the dark of night, under canopies of sprawling Indian Laurels that dot the city center, the police funneled their way into the *zócalo*, and in an act of violence that caught the teachers

off guard, laid siege to the encampment. From the circling helicopter above, tear gas rained down on the flustered teachers, and police on foot shot tear gas and pepper spray into the escaping crowds, extinguishing any hope of respite from the toxic gases. No one was spared, not even the children who were staying with their striking mothers or fathers or the elderly who were unwittingly caught up in in the violence (Daria & Santamaría, 2006). Within hours the teachers were gone and their encampment completely destroyed. A couple of blocks from the zócalo, police had breached the headquarters of local 22 and arrested various leaders of the local and destroyed the radio station that the teachers had been using as a propaganda machine and as information relay to the protesters regarding police activity in the city (Velez & Mendez, 2006). By dawn, the sun's rays illuminated the only remaining vestiges of what the striking teachers had called theirs. Tattered tarps and tents, rising smoke from the smoldering remains, and scattered belongings littered throughout the zócalo and the neighboring alameda and streets.

The government victory, however, would be short-lived. Blocks away from the zócalo the teachers regrouped, this time with the reinforcements of hundreds of sympathetic citizens. Attempting to prevent police reinforcements from arriving, the teachers began to commandeer buses and anything else they could use to construct barricades throughout the downtown area. Soon, fire and thick smoke sprang up as teachers and citizens set buses and tires ablaze and kindled the fires with whatever they could find. At approximately 10:00 a.m. and armed with what they could use as weapons—rocks, sticks, debris, makeshift Molotov cocktails—the teachers re-entered the zócalo and engaged with the police (Ortega, 2009). Outnumbered and unwilling to fight back, the police forces retreated from the zócalo and would not return. The teachers scored a major moral victory and one that would lead to the teachers' occupation of the city for the next six months.

Re-taking the zócalo and having police forces withdraw their positions infused a new sense of valor and renewed hope for the teachers and others participating in the resistance. So much so, in fact, that just a few days after the conflict in the zócalo, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) was formally created. APPO itself consisted of a coalition of people and organizations especially from local 22 and different NGO's. Collectively, APPO pushed for the resignation of Governor Ruiz—who was a member of the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)—who many in Oaxaca viewed as oppressive, corrupt, and fascist, by organizing mass protests and civil disobedience (Martinez Gonzalez & Valle Baeza, 2007). The formation of APPO resulted from a set of disparate factors that aligned in a perfect storm type of situation with local 22 being one of the principle factors. For one, resistance from local 22 had intensified to new heights. Since May 1, when the local presented the state government with its grievances, its protest activity had been high and much more aggressive. The teachers blocked access to the Oaxaca International Airport allowing no one to enter or exit, and they later blockaded the highways leading into Oaxaca City (Cronología del conflicto, 2006). Additionally, large-scale marches and sit-ins had already been taking place before the conflict in the zócalo in June. And other unions, such as the Mexican Electrical Union (SME), sent semi-trailers full of supplies and food as a token of solidarity with the teachers (Rafael, personal communication, June 29, 2017).

Locally and nationally, public sentiment toward the government had been waning due to accusations of corruption and violence especially in the wake of President Felipe Calderón's defeat of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in the presidential election by half a percentage point. The razor thin victory by Calderón had many in Mexico and abroad pointing to corruption and election fraud (Collins & Holland, 2006; Levin & Alvarez, 2009). Furthermore, instances of

government repression against citizens had exacerbated an already tenuous relationship between the two. In May 2006 in the municipality of San Salvador Atenco, in Mexico State, for example, police forces were summoned by then Governor Enrique Peña Nieto to forcibly remove flower vendors, most of whom were women, from a market. Outraged by the violent actions of the police to evict the vendors, thousands of citizens rioted in Atenco leading to a violent confrontation with police in which at least two protesters were killed, several women beaten and raped, and hundreds arrested (Gilly, 2006; Olivares, 2017). Confrontations, such as the one that took place in Atenco, heightened the public's distrust of elected leaders and law enforcement. Nowhere was this distrust and animosity more palpable than in Oaxaca. In Oaxaca, like the events in Atenco, the days following the initial repression in the zócalo were filled with widespread accusations of torture and rape committed by the police against the protestors. Teachers, allied citizens, and bystanders who were in the zócalo at the time recounted this violence that came so soon after Atenco. The events from Atenco which took place a little over a month before the conflict in Oaxaca began became a symbol of the struggle that local 22 and others embraced, and from June until November teachers and their allies maintained the struggle and successfully took control of the entire city, with Governor Ruiz and other state and local government officials nowhere to be found.

The success that local 22 enjoyed in 2006 seemed to suggest that the political and social landscape of Oaxaca was on the verge of change. Not only did the teachers' union assume control of Oaxaca for nearly six months, but they did it with an unprecedented amount of help and support from citizens, NGOs, students, organizations, and other unions. This victory showcased the enormous amounts of success local 22 had in bringing a movement together, but more significantly, it showed that a participatory democracy could exist alongside and triumph

over the corporatist, oppressive, and dictatorial political hegemony of Mexico. In 2010, for example, a non-PRI governor was elected for the first time in eighty years and other local elections throughout the state saw the defeat of PRI party candidates (Eisenstadt, 2011).

Grassroots movements soon sprouted up throughout the state and indigenous rights became an integral part of the movement for social justice. Protests and blockades from Oaxaca City to the Isthmus region of the state became commonplace. But the success and momentum of 2006 would not last long. By 2016, merely ten years after what seemed to be its pinnacle of influence, local 22 found itself on the verge of what appeared to be an existential crisis with many teachers defecting from the local only to criticize the union and call off their allegiance to its leaders. When during the height of local 22's influence mega-marches of tens of thousands of teachers would suffocate Oaxaca's avenues and downtown and bring large swaths of the city to a standstill, 2016 would see the local barely mustering a few thousand teachers to march in protest even after multiple protestors were killed by police at a protest and roadblock put on by local 22 in Nochixtlán. 2016 appeared to be the antithesis to 2006 for local 22, where in 2006 solidarity among the teachers was strong and investment in the movement was high and in 2016 there was a more general feeling of apathy and resignation. Furthermore, local 22's public image suffered, partly as a result of an aggressive media campaign by the government to smear the local, and partly as a result of the failed movement of 2006 that left many disillusioned. These observations invite new questions to be asked. For example, how could local 22, which seemed to be at the pinnacle of power, influence, and popular approval in 2006, seem to be on the verge of collapse in 2016? How could the rank and file, which historically has been extremely active and invested in nonconformity and government resistance, appear so apathetic and disinterested in pushing forward local 22's agenda?

The Role of Oligarchy Within Local 22 and General Overview of Thesis

The sociologist Robert Michels argued that any growing democratic organization inevitably converts into an oligarchy. In fact, he went so far to declare this phenomenon an “iron law” (1962). To support his theory, Michels argued that as an organization grows it will have to bureaucratize, that is, it will have to create new positions and offices within the organization to carry out the daily administrative activities required to run the organization. Specialization soon follows, where specific administrative positions are created and filled by hired employees and centralization of power comes as a result of the leadership’s increased desire to remain in their positions of power and prioritization of their own interests over those of the general membership. Furthermore, as membership grows the practice of creating delegates that represent those members is instituted, thereby eliminating the practice of true participatory democracy and drastically limiting the rank and file’s ability to participate in decisions affecting the organization. Using Michels’ theory of oligarchy, this paper defines oligarchy as an organization that contains a small cohort of elites or leaders that exercise decision-making power over the organization. As such I will apply this definition of oligarchy to local 22 in that a small group of leaders within the local wield control over administrative and tactical issues related to the daily tasks and general trajectory of the local.

This paper explores local 22’s shift from participatory democracy to oligarchy with special emphasis on the role government repression had in pushing local 22 toward more centralized control, attenuating the efficacy of democracy practiced by the rank and file and severely debilitating the local. Local 22 displays the characteristics Michels lays out in his theory of oligarchization such as bureaucratization, specialization, and centralization of power, yet in this paper these characteristics are not scrutinized to the degree repression is. One important note

regarding Michels' theory of oligarchization is the focus on the internal factors that push an organization toward oligarchy. A growing bureaucracy, centralization of power, and specialization highlight the internal changes taking place as an organization makes the transition to oligarchy. While I do not dismiss those internal factors and agree that they have contributed to the oligarchization of local 22, I look at how the external factor of government repression accelerated the shift. Throughout the paper a reference to internal and external forces will be used to reference the factors mentioned above. As will be explored in more detail, the data obtained from my interviews suggests that repression was more of the driving force behind the oligarchization of the local and to a lesser degree bureaucratization, specialization, and centralization.

Research Question

When I first arrived in Oaxaca in February 2007 all that was left were the vestiges of the conflict from the prior year. Abandoned and severely dilapidated barricades remained scattered throughout the city occupying street corners near downtown and extending out to the peripheries of the city limits. Graffiti sprayed across walls from churches to businesses, especially near the city center, communicated the tension and anger that was felt by many. One of the more memorable images painted was that of the Virgin Guadalupe. In the image she is depicted in the traditional action of praying except that she does so wearing a gas mask invoking what had been a central theme of the 2006 conflict—protesters being attacked with tear gas.

For the next four years as I lived in Oaxaca I noticed that local 22 continued to lose influence. People were more critical of the local and more vocal in their opposition to what the teachers were doing. APPO seemed to disappear, and Governor Ortiz peacefully finished his

term in office. The energy that was palpable in 2006 had been deflated and it seemed as if the momentum had reversed course. The years following continued with the same trend. I visited Oaxaca every year and noticed that local 22 continued to be active in its annual demands and protests, yet they lacked the participant vigor and dedication from years prior. On one occasion as I was riding in a bus near the city center a group of teachers boarded and subsequently commandeered it to use it as a barricade nearby. All of us passengers calmly exited the bus after the teachers politely told us what they were doing. Yet, what stood out to me during this experience was the liberty with which a few of the passengers began to criticize and verbally confront the teachers on the bus. It seemed as if the mutual relationship between the local and the citizens that had been so visible in 2006 had been severed. Notwithstanding, local 22 protested and marched and claimed its familiar spot in the zócalo year after year, yet it seemed that few were invested including many of the teachers. As I would visit the zócalo every summer during the sit-ins I noticed that the number of teachers present diminished. Even in 2016, days after at least seven protesters were killed and scores of teachers injured in Nochixtlán by federal police, the zócalo was sparsely occupied by teachers demanding justice for the violence, a far cry from the thousands that converged there after the violent removal of teachers in 2006.

The zócalo historically has acted as the main center of congregation for local 22 during times of protest. On any given summer one could travel to the zócalo and witness thousands of teachers camping out in the plaza. Tents, overhead tarps, and teacher-ran *tianguis* (markets) would dominate the landscape. Large banners denouncing the government and corruption would hang from buildings surrounding the plaza. Carefully orchestrated “mega marches,” where tens of thousands and sometimes hundreds of thousands of teachers and sympathizers would begin or end in the zócalo. By contrast, in the years following 2006 the protest activity in the zócalo had

dramatically decreased. During the summer of 2017, for example, my visit to the zócalo was uneventful. There were no large-scale protests or sit-ins. The highest amount of teacher activity was a small group of a few dozen teachers from the Isthmus region of the state who were protesting the lack of government action regarding the bloody conflict in Nochixtlán the year prior. A quick trip three blocks from the zócalo to the local 22 headquarters revealed none of the bustling activities of teachers leaving, entering, and congregating and vendors normally seen selling documentaries and literature propagandizing the teacher movement and government corruption.

Also absent were the (in)famous mega-marches that would turn Oaxaca's main avenues into overflowing pedestrian malls. This once dreaded form of protest had the effect of shutting down large swaths of Oaxaca City, effectively crippling the transportation that relies so heavily on the city's limited number of boulevards. The local continued to organize marches but on a much smaller scale. A couple thousand teachers would participate, and the effect was minimal. Yet there was still union activity.

These observations fueled a desire to understand what was happening to local 22, and when beginning to look at the history of local 22 two questions quickly became apparent: how did local 22 go from what was arguably its pinnacle of influence and power in 2006 to what appeared to be its nadir in 2016? and what events took place during that ten-year span that precipitated such a drastic shift for the local? The literature that exists on local 22 could not give me the answers, mostly because much of the literature focuses more on the events of 2006 and very little afterwards. I believed that the government violence against the protesters was partly responsible for local 22's debilitation—but it could not have been the only factor. Local 22 has endured numerous violent confrontations at the hands of the police and other government forces

and from them emerged more defiant. Such violence, in general, has had the effect of increasing union participation and defiance during the period of protest (Levi, Olson, Agnone, & Kelly, 2009). In such cases the anti-union violence galvanizes the union membership and raises public awareness to the injustices and the protest itself. This was most clearly seen in 2006 where the first acts of violence against local 22 set in motion the protest movement. The initial violence brought local 22 together with citizens and NGOs which led to the formation of APPO and a united push for Governor Ortiz's resignation.

In trying to find the answers to local 22's weakening and what events influenced that weakening the literature pointed me in a different direction. Instead of focusing so much on the external factors that weakened the union, such as the repression, I found myself wanting to better understand what was going on internally for local 22. Clearly, from the interviews I conducted, many teachers were not happy, and more importantly, not participating nearly as much during marches and sit-ins. The latter proved quite shocking because local 22 historically has found effective methods to incentivize its members that participate in protest activity such as by developing a point system based off of teacher attendance at protests that determines whether or not a teacher gets transferred to a more lucrative post or favorable location. The fact that this method failed to produce large turnout suggests that this system was no longer enforced or that it lost its effectiveness and the teachers did not fear the repercussions. One of the keys to understanding the situation of local 22 was found in the interviews I conducted.

As each teacher I interviewed talked about local 22, two major themes emerged. The first was that many of the teachers I interviewed expressed concern that local 22 leadership had consolidated power and that they were in fact brokering deals with the government behind closed doors. Every interviewee that expressed this concern stated that they felt it began with the

negotiations to end the 2006 conflict. The second theme was that the trust that the rank and file had toward their leadership seemed to have eroded almost completely. Most of the teachers I interviewed expressed their displeasure with how the leadership had taken control of the union. Many felt left out of the decision-making process with their voices not being heard anymore. They felt that they had been left behind. Democracy, one of the foundational blocks of local 22, was talked about as though it had been completely undermined as teacher after teacher expressed their frustration. It appeared as if the political structure of local 22 had changed completely. The rank and file, once the motor behind local 22, felt powerless. The patterns expressed in the interviews suggested that local 22 had adopted a more oligarchical structure.

An investigation into the available literature regarding the local turned up a large body of information. Research that investigates the activism, history, and political and social influence of local 22 is plentiful. However, one issue quickly surfaced. The literature follows local 22 until the conflict of 2006. From 2007 to the present the scarcity of information is palpable. To a degree, this revelation was not surprising. The conflict of 2006, after all, was the climax of years of activism by the local. In 2006, all of the pieces came together—local 22 allied with the public and dozens of organizations, NGOs, and unions. The combined alliance became a factor too much for the government to handle, and the birth of APPO hinted that radical social change in Oaxaca was no longer on the horizon, but at the doorstep. That social change would never fully materialize. Six months after the conflict began, the government re-entered the city and assumed control. The movement was quashed and 2007 saw a business-as-usual environment.

Literature about oligarchy and previous research on local 22

The study of oligarchy in Mexico is nothing new. For decades political parties and trade unions functioned as oligarchs. President Porfirio Díaz, who ushered in the industrialization of Mexico at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was able to continuously stay in power for twenty-six years, ruling as a dictator within an oligarch. Shortly after Díaz, what is now the PRI came into power and held onto it for seventy years. Most of Mexico's biggest trade unions function as oligarchies (Handelman, 1979). Therefore, in order to understand the structure and dynamics of local 22 it is imperative to look at the role of oligarchy within organizations. In his seminal book *Political Parties*, Robert Michels lays out the argument that any democratic organization that grows large enough ultimately adopts oligarchical tendencies as a result of the organization bureaucratizing and centralizing power due to the unfeasibility of direct democracy (1962). This led Michels to famously state, "He who says organization, says oligarchy" (1962). He called this transition to oligarchy an "iron law," an inevitable process that any growing organization must succumb to. As the organization grows participatory democracy becomes much more difficult to practice, limiting the effectiveness of public assemblies. The logistics and disparate ideologies among such a large number of members makes any kind of meaningful and productive voting and decision-making a near impossibility. As the organization grows "it is impossible for the collectivity to undertake the direct settlement of all the controversies that arise" (Michels, 1962). To mitigate the problem of large membership numbers Michels argues that organizations begin appointing delegates who, in turn, represent different sections of the organization much like the parliamentary systems in place in many democratic countries. And while proponents argue that this organizational structure permits the continuity of democracy (Seidle, 2003; Laver, 1994), Michels argues that the creation of delegates leads to a

centralization of power and the creation of an elite class within the organization (Nylen, Dodd, 2003; Berberoglu, 2005). Heinrich Herkner goes so far to argue that any organization that entrusts the supervision of its affairs to the rank and file are doomed to extinction (Grusky, Miller, 1901).

Secondly, according to Michels, once an organization begins to bureaucratize it will adopt more oligarchical tendencies since the organization will begin to create new offices and departments and because a large membership will not have the capacity to make the daily decisions required to keep the organization functional (1962). While a smaller organization can effectively rely on public assemblies and direct democracy as decision-making methods, inevitably, once the organization grows large enough to where members must meet in different buildings and geographic regions it must bureaucratize and concentrate power into the hands of a few. This creation of a ruling class, or elite, within the organization then creates an atmosphere wherein those in power will desire to preserve and eventually expand their power within the organization. Michels believes this is the case because as human beings, people are subject to passions and mental and physical imperfections that will naturally contrast with the tendency of the mass (1962). In other words, no matter how committed to democracy and to the good of the organization the individual is, those beliefs succumb to a natural desire for power and self-service. These tendencies naturally are not compatible with democracy and lead to a further alienation of the leadership from the rank and file. By applying these arguments to local 22 it is better understood how much oligarchy has contributed the weakening of the local between 2006 and 2016. There is no doubt that local 22 contains oligarchic characteristics—it has a highly bureaucratized structure and the large size of local 22's membership requires it to depend on representation through delegates. However, one question this paper attempts to answer is the

extent to which bureaucratization and centralization—in relation to repression—influenced the local's shift toward oligarchy.

Mexico, and Latin America, for that matter, have a long and complicated history with oligarchy and so viewing local 22 as an example of democracy succumbing to oligarchy is nothing new. In a way, it can be expected since oligarchization is such an enduring characteristic of Mexican politics. The PRI maintained a more than seventy-year hegemony with the practice of oligarchy and corporatism, and the SNTE played a large part in perpetuating the PRI hegemony by wielding massive influence at the voter polls. Throughout the 20th century the PRI relied on unions and guilds for votes, and in exchange for party loyalty, the PRI would bestow benefits on union members, especially union leaders. It is not unheard of to hear about union leaders securing lucrative government posts or receiving generous bonuses. A very effective system of quid-pro-quo developed in an unbroken chain that lasted decades (Wuhs, 2008).

Yet, not all large organizations (even some in Mexico) have adopted oligarchic tendencies. In one of the more well-known case studies, Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) investigate the International Typographical Union (ITU) and come to the conclusion that the ITU was able to reject a shift to oligarchy due to a number of factors that Michels failed to mention. The authors look at the the founding of the union and found that contrary to the case studies done by Michels, such as with Germany's Social Democratic Party, the ITU was organized more bottom-up than top-down. The ITU formed as a result of the consolidation of many unions, all of which placed heavy emphasis on individual autonomy. This permitted the rank and file to wield significant influence within the union regarding decisions that needed to be made. Additionally, the presence of factions within the unions helped to enforce a system of checks and balances where union leaders needed to stay within the parameters set forth by the rank and file or risk

being removed from their posts (1956). The authors conclude that these two factors were essential to permit the practice of direct democracy within the union even after it consolidated and grew much larger in membership. What the authors help us to see is that Michels' theory on oligarchy is not foolproof, and that there exist factors outside of what Michels mentions that can drive a union toward or away from oligarchy. This is relevant when considering local 22 because the local displayed many of the same characteristics of the ITU.

Coming back to Mexico, Howard Handelman (1977) looks at a case study of union democracy in Mexico State. Similar to Lipset, he finds that the Mexican Union of Electrical Workers (SME) possessed many of the same characteristics as the ITU such as a strong connection to autonomy and accountability of leadership. Furthermore, the rank and file within the SME possessed similar education levels and class statuses to their ITU counterparts. The union leadership was held accountable to its members who represented different factions within the union. These factors are important to look at because local 22 shares many of the same traits as the SME. For example, the rank and file of local 22 has always maintained a strong connection to autonomy and its factious membership has tried to hold its leaders accountable. By looking at Lipset and Handelman and seeing that local 22 did not ultimately enjoy the success of the ITU and SME in maintaining a democratic organization, the argument that repression influenced local 22's shift to oligarchy seems plausible and therefore helps to better explain what took place within local 22 between 2006 and 2016.

Most of the literature that centers on local 22, however, focuses on the activism and radicalism it displays and not on the politics and structure of the local itself. For example, Lynn Stephen looks at the pivotal year of 2006 for the union. In her book *We are the Face of Oaxaca* (2013), she explores how local 22 rose to power from a dissident faction of the national teachers'

union (SNTE) to become one of the most active and radical locals in Latin America. Local 22's rich history of protests and dissent against the government prepared it for the massive social movement of 2006 that led to the creation of the APPO and control of Oaxaca for the latter half of 2006. She then looks at the relationship between local 22 and the residents of the city to better understand how that union-citizen dynamic affected the events of 2006. Similarly, Diana Denham (2008) looks at how the social movement of 2006 galvanized the public to side with the striking teachers. She looks at how local 22 was able to work with different organizations and the public to realize large-scale marches and protests. A common theme found within the literature on local 22 is a positive image of what the local has accomplished through social movements and creating positive relationships with the citizens of the state. And those that delve into the inner-workings of the local and the relationship between the rank and file and union leadership fail (consciously or subconsciously) to make the connection to oligarchy to help explain the breakdown of communication and trust between the leadership and rank and file.

Maria Cook (1996), for example, looks at the relationship between rank and file and union leadership in her book *Organizing Dissent* but focuses more on how that relationship strengthened the local instead of weakening it. Cook provides a comprehensive and convincing history of teacher unionization in Mexico. Her research provides valuable information into the political climates and negotiating that took place to form the SNTE, the CNTE, and local 22 and provides excellent context of the political social milieu surrounding the teachers' desire to unionize. Her investigation into union structures in Mexico help make sense of the turbulent politics in which these unions find themselves today. For example, she looks at the creation of the SNTE as an arm of the PRI and shows the reader that the SNTE inherited the corruption and clientelism that defined Mexican politics. This helps to put into perspective the role of the CNTE

when it formed as a faction of the SNTE. Its main goal was to provide participatory democracy and push back against the PRI, something the SNTE could never do because of its ties to the PRI.

Marco Estrada Saavedra (2016) goes even deeper into the inner-workings of local 22 to highlight that while local 22 formed out of a rejection of the corruption and clientelism so prevalent in the PRI, it inevitably adopted the very characteristics it vehemently rejected. Estrada cites factors such as corporatism, the political culture of Oaxaca, the lure of political gain for siding with the PRI, and conflicting ideologies within local 22 leadership. Through detailed research and interviews with local 22 delegates Estrada Saavedra is able to provide the reader access to this little-known aspect of the local. The literature shows how local 22 has been able to find success while navigating the turbulent currents of Mexican politics. Some of this navigating includes making compromises on established beliefs—such as a total lack of affiliation with the PRI—in order to continue existing as a legitimate and influential organization in Mexico. Local 22, for example, did adopt some corporatist tendencies as Cook (1996) and Estrada Saavedra (2016) point out. But, overwhelmingly the literature focuses on the growth and strength of local 22, highlighting its democracy, and failing to take notice or explore the factors that have contributed to local 22's debilitation. Both Stephen and Estrada Saavedra, for example, published their books well after the events of 2006, yet they do not explore the precarious state of the local.

Stephen, Cook, and Estrada Saavedra, among others, provide needed insight into union relations with the public and government which helps to highlight the many factors that have affected the direction local 22 has taken over the last decade. But the dearth of conversation centering on local 22 and its oligarchic structure highlights the narrow lens through which

scholars view the local. Thus, local 22 presents a compelling case study to analyze with Michels' theory. At 70,000 members strong, the highly bureaucratized and centralized local 22 appears to conform to Michels' "iron law," yet his theory focuses exclusively on those internal factors (membership count, bureaucracy, centralized power, specialized administrative positions) without taking into account the external factors (repression, corporatism) that can influence an organization's adoption of oligarchic tendencies.

Why local 22?

The experience of local 22 presents a compelling moment in Mexican unionism to investigate. For one, local 22 is well-known among unions in Mexico for its activism and aggressive mobilization tactics. Its ability to mobilize tens of thousands of teachers, many times on short notice, is a result of decades of protesting, winning over the loyalty of the rank and file, and the local's advanced understanding of logistics and its ability to manipulate its members. Local 22, historically, has also been one of the handful of locals in Mexico that has been able to maintain a participatory democracy among its rank and file, rejecting the almost inevitable shift that Mexican unions and locals make toward corporatism and subordination to the PRI (Penman-Lomeli, 2016). Furthermore, local 22 prides itself as one of the more progressive locals in Mexico where indigeneity is embraced and animosity, and at times hostility, toward the local and federal government is vehemently practiced. These factors have permitted local 22 to emerge as a leader within Mexican unionism.

More importantly, however, local 22 since its founding has found ways to endure government repression and emerge stronger and more unified as a result. Looking at Mexican labor history, the political and military pressure applied by the PRI has folded unions and forced

others to become loyal to the party which makes the experience of local 22 so intriguing. The local's rich history of participatory democracy has helped to keep the local grounded in its ideologies. Understanding the environment from which local 22 emerged helps to better understand the significance of the formation and struggles of local 22 throughout its history. Beginning with Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s, many unions in Mexico have been sanctioned and controlled by the PRI. As a result, corruption within unions became widespread and much of the decision-making process by unions was heavily influenced by politicians. One of the more well-known examples of this type of relationship is with the SNTE (National Union of Education Workers). Formed under the auspices of the PRI in the 1940s the SNTE quickly grew to become the largest union in Mexico and one of the largest in Latin America. It boasts a membership today of more than 1.6 million with a presence in every Mexican state (Islas, 2018). Throughout the 20th century, the PRI's ubiquitous presence across Mexico favored the party since it could use the SNTE as a political ally. In exchange for party loyalty, which included using the SNTE to influence communities to vote for PRI candidates ensuring that PRI congresspeople, senators, governors, and presidents won elections and remained in office, the PRI would bestow political favors and financial gifts to union members.

From its inception the SNTE was never democratic nor was democracy within the union ever a consideration. The PRI exercised a great deal of influence in deciding who would be the delegates and secretaries general, and major policy suggestions within the SNTE would either originate or terminate with the PRI (Estrada Saavedra, 2016). In other words, the PRI prevented the establishment of a democratic apparatus. The SNTE was strictly a top down organization with the leadership making decisions and the rank and file deferring the decision-making to the leadership. It was not until the 1960s that members within the SNTE began to publicly criticize

and organize against the PRI's control of the union and the lack of democracy (La Botz, 2016). From this movement in the 1960s emerged the much more significant opposition movement of the 1970s when a faction of the SNTE successfully formed a caucus that challenged the status quo within the union. That caucus, the CNTE (National Council of Education Workers) made democracy a central tenant of its existence. The CNTE's principal purpose was to repudiate the corporatist relationship between the SNTE and the PRI and move away from the corruption that maintained a stranglehold on the SNTE. The CNTE also desired to promote a strictly bottom up union organization where the rank and file now became the decision-makers instead of the union leadership and the PRI (La Botz, 2016).

It was just after the formation of the CNTE that local 22 emerged in Oaxaca. Drawn to the democratic and progressive ideologies of the CNTE, local 22 quickly rose in prominence and by the 1990s had established itself as one of the preeminent locals in all of Mexico. It took the charge in leading protests against the federal government, at times marching by foot the 287 miles from Oaxaca City to Mexico City in long caravans of travelers. Local 22 became a symbol of democracy and resilience through its success in establishing a bottom-up power structure giving the rank and file the decision-making power to decide on local 22 issues. Year after year, local 22 enjoyed success in winning government concessions in Oaxaca which meant salary increases for teachers, added monetary bonuses at the end of the year, and increased funding for education. It is for these reasons that when the movement of 2006 began and local 22 invested its resources in APPO and removing Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz from office that national and international attention was focused on Oaxaca and what local 22 would accomplish there. However, the defeat of the movement in 2006 opened local 22 up to increased scrutiny.

The relationship between the rank and file and the leadership became a point of concern as accusations of corruption within local 22, especially among the leadership, became an area of focus for many rank and file members (León, 2016; Estrada 2016). Accusations that the leadership had “sold out” the movement and made deals with the government to end the 2006 conflict and exonerate themselves from any future government retaliation quickly began to spread among the base and angered many—especially those teachers who had sacrificed a great deal physically, emotionally, and economically, and who struggled to maintain the barricades throughout the city, exposing themselves to intense violence. While during the 2006 conflict many within and outside local 22 believed that the movement would continue until the government conceded to the local’s and APPO’s demands, in retrospect those beliefs were based off of false assumptions many in the rank and file held regarding their leaders (Noe, personal communication, August 17, 2017). Enrique Rueda Pacheco, the Secretary General of local 22 during the conflict, was accused of accepting a bribe of \$25 million pesos from the government to end the protests (Marín, 2019), and in February of 2007, Pacheco resigned as Secretary General after 800 delegates in the state assembly of local 22 declared him a traitor to the movement (Velez, 2007). These events quickly eroded the trust the rank and file had for its leaders and many teachers in the movement accused local 22 leadership of betrayal. Furthermore, what stung the rank and file following their defeat in 2006 was the belief that they were not consulted with nor considered when local 22 leadership agreed with the government to end the protests (Paty, personal communication, August 15, 2017).

These events showed a much different local than it was known for. Transparency, influence of the rank and file, democracy, activism—these were all qualities that local 22 embraced, and for the most part, were known for. Yet all of that was put into question after the

conflict of 2006 and in the years following. Increasing accusations of corruption, a lack of rank and file influence in local 22 issues, and an increasing centralization of power and influence in the local projected an image of the local as the very thing it had fought so hard against. By 2016, it seemed as if the only factor that differentiated local 22 from the PRI was its name. More importantly, following the 2006 conflict, local 22 began to display increased oligarchic tendencies, which seemed improbable given local 22's history of democracy and bottom-up participation. Yet, given the circumstances of how the 2006 protests ended and the actions of local 22 in the following years, the argument that local 22 became more oligarchic seems much more plausible.

Methodology of thesis

In order to find answers to my questions regarding oligarchy I conducted observations focused on the areas most heavily trafficked by local 22 such as the *zócalo* and the local's headquarters. Every summer the *zócalo* acts as ground zero for the protests. There, teachers converge and spend weeks living there. Marches either begin or end in the *zócalo*, providing a more intimate view of the logistics and organization efforts made by the rank and file and the leadership. It is also an ideal opportunity to observe the individual actions of teachers to gauge morale. Three blocks from the *zócalo* is where local 22's headquarters can be found. Aside from the teachers that constantly stream in and out of the building are the vendors outside and in the lobby, who sell pro-local 22 propaganda and paraphernalia. I arrived in Oaxaca City in June and conducted field research until August 24 which gave me ample time to visit the *zócalo*, local 22 headquarters, and different regions of the state on multiple occasions to make observations and perform interviews.

The focus of my field research centered on interviewing members of local 22 and obtaining first-hand knowledge of rank-and-file experiences. For this research project I interviewed twenty-four teachers all of whom are members of local 22. All are members of the rank and file with two of the interviewees having previously served in leadership positions for the local. Oscar was a regional representative in the Central Valleys region and Noe served as a high-ranking secretary in the city. To protect my interviewees' confidentiality and identity I have not used their real names but have inserted pseudonyms. Of the twenty-four interviewees, all but one participated in the protest movement of 2006. The one that did not was not a teacher at the time, but she did participate in the movement as a civilian assisting at various barricades.

Interviews became vital to better understand some of the components that led to the fallout experienced by the local from 2006 to the present, especially since literature on the subject was not available. Originally, my plan was to begin interviewing teachers at the *zócalo* since I knew that many of them would be there for the annual demands and protests. Due to the fact that participation in local 22 sanctioned protests is mandatory for teachers the probability of interviewing union members with differing sentiments and ideologies regarding the local would be high. I was confident that I would find teachers highly favorable of local 22, others who felt disillusioned, and everything else in between. However, during the summer of 2017 no large-scale protests were held in the *zócalo*, and it quickly became a challenge to find a sufficient number of teachers to interview.

During the following two months I relied heavily on snowball sampling with the hope that a sufficient range of teacher sentiments would be covered. This sampling method, however, allowed me to expand the geographic area of research from mainly Oaxaca City's *zócalo* and surrounding neighborhoods to different regions in the state. Not only was I able to carry out

interviews in the Oaxaca City metropolitan area, but I interviewed teachers in Juchitán de Zaragoza, Nochixtlán, and Santa Maria Tiltepec. In Juchitán, I interviewed five teachers, in Nochixtlán two, and two in Santa Maria Tiltepec. The advantage of being able to broaden the geographic range of interviewees is that I was able to see how regional cultures play a role in the makeup of the local. The interviewees in Juchitán, for example, were the most radical. Indigeneity factored in heavily in their ideologies and they regularly expressed pride in their Zapotec heritage. They saw violence as a necessary element to advance the demands of the local whereas the other interviewees viewed violence as something avoidable and viable only if all other options were exhausted. Unsurprisingly, in 2017 when protest activity was relatively quiet in Oaxaca City, the teachers in Juchitán were engaged in a three-month long blockade of the main highway that leads into the city resulting in numerous skirmishes with police forces. This broader pool of data helps to shed light on the state of local 22, not just in Oaxaca City, but beyond as well. This information became crucial when piecing together the data to help make sense of the current condition of local 22.

For example, performing the interviews gave me insight into the interviewees' perceptions of the local which in turn helped me to construct a clearer picture of the internal state of the local. I received a broad range of opinions and experiences from the interviewees. Interestingly, of the twenty-four interviewees that I spoke with, twenty of them were critical of the local and its top leadership and the other four expressed praise in what the leadership was accomplishing especially regarding the resistance to the education reforms the federal government had been attempting to carry out since 2012. The interviews, which looked at the interviewees' history with the local, their participation in protest movements, their experience in 2006, their perceptions and relationship to their leaders, and their experiences as members from

2006 to the present helped me to see that there indeed existed significant discontinuity within the local. Furthermore, the interviews revealed to me that factions within the local have led to contention among the rank and file.

This research, however, is not without its flaws. For one, the sampling size is too small to be able to come to any kind of conclusion regarding local 22 and its loss of influence and power in the years following 2006. An analysis of the interviews from the smaller sample size may not provide a comprehensive enough picture of the condition of local 22 because the entire range of opinions held by union members more likely than not is not represented in the study. Indeed, interviews are always biased and when the sampling size is as small as it was for this study incongruencies tend to appear. As a result, attempting to reconstruct an accurate history of events within local 22 was difficult. Furthermore, more interviews with union leadership are required to more accurately gauge the environment within local 22 and to substantiate or question the accusations and sentiments of rank and file members. Interviews with ex-local 22 members who now belong to local 59 (the government sanctioned local in opposition to local 22) would also provide valuable insight into the conditions that caused them to defect. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the research provides a foundation or starting point on which further research may build since studies focusing on oligarchy within local 22 are almost non-existent.

Thesis argument

When looking at politics and labor unions in Mexico two common themes tend to surface more than others—oligarchy and corporatism. Both have a rich history in Mexico and both co-exist in many cases. Perhaps this is best seen with the PRI, and it can be argued that corporatism is in the party's DNA. Its predecessor, the National Revolutionary Party (PNR), was founded in

1929 by a diverse group of leaders who immediately brought into their new party a corporatist structure (Grayson, 2011). Throughout the 20th century the PNR and subsequently the PRI have benefited from a monopoly of power, and virtually all of the major labor organizations established in Mexico are or have been in some way affiliated with the PRI (Grayson, 2011). The PRI's presence has influenced and pressured other organizations to adopt the PRI's highly oligarchic structure. Most, if not all, of the big trade unions that were formed in the 20th century under the auspices of the PRI—the national teachers union, the oil workers union, and the Confederation of Mexican Workers—are highly centralized and exhibit oligarchic characteristics. Corporatism has held an indelible mark in Mexican politics and society, helping to dictate the trajectory of the country for more than a hundred years and legitimizing the PRI's grip on power and its continued hegemony.

The SNTE is an excellent example of this, having been formed by President Ávila Camacho in 1943 as a way to bring teachers under the party and secure votes during political elections. This corporatist relationship also influenced the SNTE's oligarchical structure. A common argument that is made when talking about Mexican labor and politics is that the PRI influences organizations to become oligarchical. It could be argued that local 22's own shift to oligarchy can be attributed to the SNTE's relationship with the PRI. In fact, local 22 and the PRI have in the past established a corporatist relationship. The decade of the 1990s provides an excellent example of this when the PRI offered to hand over control of the education system to local 22 in exchange for the local's support of policies ratified by the PRI. This corporatist relationship did have a measure of influence in local 22 adopting some oligarchic tendencies, especially bureaucratization and specialization. Yet, the local was able to successfully maintain

its democracy and the rank and file still exercised significant influence over tactical decisions made by the local.

Using Michels' theory of oligarchy as a foundation, this paper argues that Michels focuses on the internal factors (centralization of power, bureaucratization, and specialization) that push an organization to adopt oligarchic tendencies, and by doing so, fails to acknowledge the external factors (repression and corporatism) that influence the oligarchization of the organization. In this light, this paper attempts to add to Michels' theory by establishing repression as an influencing factor in oligarchization by looking at the experience of local 22. What I argue, ultimately, is that internal pressure in the form of divergent ideologies among local 22 members and external pressure in the form of violent and political repression from both the federal and state government forced local 22 to become more oligarchic to preserve its existence. The government's relentless attacks against local 22 since 2006 have placed the local in a vulnerable and precarious position. Leading up to the events of 2006, for example, local 22 had weathered a multitude of government repression. Arbitrary arrests, torture, rape, and beatings have always been a part of the experience of being a local 22 member. When a teacher took to the streets in protest he or she expected to be treated in a violent manner, but the scale of repression that took place at the end of 2006 was unheard of in Oaxaca. In conjunction with the federal government, state police forces carried out an offensive that struck a new kind of fear in many of the protestors. At least twenty-two teachers were killed during the second half of 2006 with many of those coming during the government's final offensive in November to wrest control of the city from the protestors and the presence of paramilitaries patrolling the streets throughout the conflict, shooting at protestors and destroying barricades, exacerbated an already tenuous morale among the protestors.

Many in the union did not think the government would be capable of causing such atrocities and so when the killings began to mount many within the movement began to second guess the viability of continuing. Since 2006, local 22 has not been successful in rallying a large-scale movement like that of 2006. After the killings of teachers and civilians in Nochixtlán at the hands of the police in 2016 no mass protests or mega marches such as those seen in 2006 came to fruition. In fact, other than public denunciations of the crimes committed, nothing else really happened. The government's ability to create instability within the union has put pressure on the union leadership to find ways to keep the union together. By exercising a more top-down power structure within local 22 the leadership can prioritize the need to make quick decisions to government actions against them that would otherwise be bogged down if left to the rank and file to vote. Furthermore, by centralizing its power, local 22 leaders can attempt to instill order and a sense of stability and leadership to keep local 22 afloat in the face of attacks and prevent the rank and file from defecting. This, combined with the large amount of ideological and cultural diversity among the rank and file factored in to the local's shift to a more oligarchic structure.

Internally within the local it is not uncommon for infighting to take place among factions within the union. The existence of this disparity in opinions and viewpoints has pressured the union leadership to find some common ground where the differing ideologies can co-exist. Arguably, one way to do this is to create a strong centralized power structure that can act as the glue that keeps the different groups together and working toward the same goals. One factor behind the collapse of the 2006 movement was the inability of people with different ideologies to compromise and coalesce around a shared objective. Each faction was unwavering in its desire to obtain its wants such as increased protest activity, more dialogue with the government, and more

radical rebellion, even sanctioned violence against the government and its sympathizers. These factors became too much of a burden for the movement's leaders to overcome.

This internal instability within the union also opened up new opportunities for the government to put increased pressure on local 22. As will be explored, the state government dealt a heavy blow to local 22 in 2015 with the governor's decree that purged the IEEPO (State Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca) of local 22 members. Furthermore, the government's creation of a new teachers' union, local 59, to rival local 22 began to attract teachers who were promised more financial and material resources. The promises of more affordable loans with lower interest rates and larger credit for teachers to purchase homes and other needed materials has enticed many in local 22 to defect. Furthermore, the state government promises quicker approval and distribution of funds for school projects and much needed renovations—the very issues local 22 has spent years lobbying and protesting for improvements. More frequent instances of government repression, such as the 2016 conflict in Nochixtlán, and withholding teachers' paychecks further widened the fissure. While these factors help to answer the question of why and how local 22 lost its power and influence since 2006, they also help to address the factors behind the oligarchization of the local. That local 22 has had to endure and weather both endogenous and exogenous opposition shows the extent of strain placed upon the local of which the effect has been debilitating.

My focus on repression as the key factor that drove local 22 toward oligarchy intends to de-emphasize the influence of corporatism on the local. This is not to say, however, that corporatism has not contributed to the oligarchization of local 22, but that its effects were subordinate to those of repression. Corporatism began local 22's shift toward oligarchy, but repression completed the shift by pressuring local 22 leadership to restrict democratic

participation among the rank and file. While corporatism has significantly affected many trade unions in Mexico by forcing partnerships with the PRI and severely limiting the autonomy of those organizations, it is more difficult to make the argument that the same can be said of local 22. The interviews I conducted along with an investigation of the available research on local 22 and other theoretical texts and case studies of oligarchization within organizations helped me come to this conclusion, and what I wanted to then better understand was how the violence and repression pushed local 22 to adopt more oligarchic tendencies, especially given the local's long history of participatory democracy among the rank and file and tenacity in the face of government repression.

Thesis map

This paper begins by taking a historical look at the SNTE, CNTE, and local 22 to help explain the complicated and tenuous relationship all three organizations share with each other. In chapter one the history of the SNTE and the CNTE is explored. Part of this history looks at the PRI's desire to establish a teachers union in order to strengthen its own party, a move that greatly benefited the PRI by assuring its hegemony in politics for most of the 20th century. Chapter one also explores the corporatist relationship between the SNTE and the PRI and highlights the oligarchic structure that dominated both organizations. From this relationship emerged the CNTE as a repudiation of not only oligarchy, but of the PRI as well. A desire to establish a democratic union became the rallying cry of the CNTE and soon thereafter local 22.

Chapter two looks at the rise of local 22 and the factors that promoted the local's growth in membership, influence, and power. Much of the focus will be on the decade of the 1990s and up until the conflict of 2006. For the most part, those fifteen years were the most formative for

the local and it experienced most of its growth during that period. The chapter also investigates the local's success as a democratic organization, using its influence to begin to adopt social justice causes into its platform. The chapter also looks into local 22's success in establishing alliances in Oaxaca and how those relationships greatly benefited the local. As local 22 continued to grow, its influence was felt among more rural communities as teachers began to arrive at those communities and establish a rapport with community members. Similar to the way the building of alliances benefited local 22 during the 2006 conflict, so to did the relationship with rural communities as they were frequently the first segments of the population to support the local's activities. However, oligarchic tendencies within the local began long before the conflict of 2006. The existence of factions and indigeneity among the general membership pressured the leaders to maintain a level of stability within the local. The turning point for the local is the conflict of 2006 which threatened the existence of the local and pressured it to centralize its power as a way to survive.

Chapter three looks specifically at how government repression against local 22 from 2006 to 2016 became the biggest factor in pushing local 22 to become oligarchic. This is brought into conversation with Michels' theory showing how his theory does not account for the external forces that push an organization toward oligarchy. Both violent and non-violent repression are examined such as the conflicts of 2006 and 2016 and also the governor's decision to remove local 22 affiliated employees from the IEEPO and the creation of rival local 59 to incentivize local 22 members to defect. Also addressed are the education reforms of President Peña Nieto which local 22, along with the CNTE, saw as an attempt to give the government more power over labor unions with the intention of undermining labor movements.

Finally, the conclusion looks at how research on local 22 can add to the existing conversation of oligarchy and the reasons why organizations drift away from democracy. For example, large democratic unions in Mexico such as the Electrical Workers Union have faced increased pressure from the government such as when President Felipe Calderon sent the federal police to the headquarters of Central Light and Power to take possession of the property and fire the thousands of workers assigned there. The effects that move had on the organizational structure of the Electrical Union has not been studied, and it would be fitting to see whether or not the government's attack affected the democratic integrity of the union. Latin America as a whole has a long history with democratic organizations adopting oligarchical tendencies and intense government repression, and the ability to study the intersection of those two factors could possibly find that repression had a role in the oligarchical shift.

Chapter 1: The Rise of Unionism among Mexico's Teachers

Given Mexico's long history of corruption, repression, and oligarchy within politics and organizations, the fact that a teachers union as oppositional as local 22 is to the government can exist shows that the nature of corruption in organizations is not completely unavoidable. Local 22 sprang up out of a long history of conflict within the debate of unionism in the sphere of education. This chapter will look at the beginnings of that conflict and how the creation of a national teachers union sanctioned and sponsored by the ruling political party influenced the democratic ideals espoused by the dissident CNTE and the more militant local 22. It was the oligarchical structure of the national teachers union that inspired a movement composed of disillusioned teachers within the union to break away and establish a democratic and independent answer to the PRI and the SNTE.

Laying the seeds for a National Teachers' Union

During the Porfiriato of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, President Porfirio Diaz engaged in an intense campaign to industrialize Mexico. Massive infrastructure projects, such as railroad sought to connect the scattered cities and towns from Baja California to Chiapas to Yucatan. This new-found interconnection between the large Mexican territory allowed for the proliferation of large-scale manufacturing of goods. Steel, cement, textiles, paper, and glass soon began making their way into consumers' homes throughout the country (Haber, 1989). Coupled with Mexico's entrance into industrialization was a perceived sense of stability both economical and political. Diaz's nearly thirty-five-year occupation of power lent to that perception. While Diaz's dictatorship ultimately led to the second Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910 it was

influential in establishing the conditions required to transition the Mexican nation from a primarily agricultural and rural one to a more urbanized and modern society (Evens, 2012). This new identity allowed for a dramatic increase in population over the following decades (especially after the revolution).

Believing that an industrialized and entrepreneurial Mexico would require a larger educated workforce Diaz made education, especially higher education and the sciences, a focus of his presidency. Two of his ministers of public instruction, Joaquín Baranda and Justo Sierra, were largely responsible for the expansion of normal schools throughout the country. At normal schools, students were taught and groomed to be the next generation of educators at all levels. This new influx of credentialed teachers accompanied a large expansion of school construction, and primary, secondary, and preparatory schools were built all across Mexico (Andrade, 1996). Furthermore, institutions of higher education were created and other extant institutions were reorganized. Justo Sierra, for example, became influential in establishing the National School of Higher Education in 1910, and he successfully reorganized the National University of Mexico from its predecessor, the Royal and Pontifical University of Mexico. These changes in the educational system, along with the creation of the rural Schools of Rudimentary Instruction, opened up public education to a large portion of the Mexican population.

Yet the expansion of education among Mexican citizens also brought new problems. One major issue was funding. While Diaz invested in education, his focus was more on universities and other institutions of higher learning. Primary and secondary schools did not receive significant attention and state budgets were highly devoid of funds to funnel toward education costs. As a result, educational inequalities proliferated across the country with more urban schools such as those in Mexico City receiving a disproportionate amount of government

funding compared to their rural counterparts. Education funding in the southern states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz, and Tabasco was dismal at best, and this led to an increase in teacher discontent (Henderson, 2000). In the south teachers began to come together with the hope of unionizing. Yet under the Diaz regime the teachers stood little chance of success. Vehemently opposed to any kind of unionization, Diaz cultivated a government indifferent and at times repressive against labor movements (Olmedo, 2007). As a result, the teachers could only form informal organizations that were largely clandestine. These small and scattered groups remained powerless and found support primarily from anarchists which served to only increase Diaz's distrust of unions and organizations that pushed back against his reforms (Olmedo, 2007). With the teachers' inability to unionize, education remained highly fragmented and geography continued to influence education funding. It was not until the revolution and the immediate decades following that teachers would make significant strides in unionization and government recognition.

The revolution changed the way in which education was viewed in Mexico. Whereas before it was seen more as a privilege granted to the middle and upper-class population and largely provided by the Catholic church, the revolution shifted the onus of education back on the government, as envisioned by an earlier president, Benito Juarez, and made the common people the focus of education. Education was to be secular and free and available to all regardless of class and ethnicity (La Botz, 2016). To a degree, this is what Diaz desired and attempted to implement, but the revolution sought to rectify his and previous administrations' failures regarding the execution of free and indiscriminate education. While the role and availability of education increased under Diaz, the revolution introduced a new era of education expansion. Holding true to the ideals of the revolution, President Álvaro Obregón, the first to lead the

country in the aftermath of the war, created the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP) in 1921. This would be the first time that a cabinet position would be created to specifically oversee education and counsel with the president over education affairs. The creation of the SEP signaled to the country and especially to the teachers that the government was ready to make education a priority and that educators would be an influential voice in deciding the future of education in Mexico.

Furthermore, the appointment of Jose Vasconcelos, a leftist revolutionary, philosopher, and future author of the controversial book *The Cosmic Race*—which presents an argument to eradicate indigeneity by amalgamating all races into a new “cosmic race” (Miller, 2004)—as the first secretary of the SEP sent a message that the government was in some regards ready to distance itself more from the elite and bourgeois class and focus on the needs of the people of Mexico. Vasconcelos immediately began working to expand schools, libraries, and the fine arts in order to increase public literacy (McCarthy, 2005). He saw ignorance as a stumbling block to Mexico’s progress as a world power and strove to establish a new common Mexican identity that would transcend all races and ethnicities. He saw teachers as missionaries disseminating truth and hope to the uneducated (La Botz, 2016). Consequently, Vasconcelos advocated for *mestizaje* which sought to do away with indigeneity and elevate Spanish heritage (Manrique, 2016). However, Vasconcelos’ campaign to increase literacy and further involve teachers helped to empower the teachers and their desire to become better represented through unionization.

Yet, the prospect of unionization seemed to elude educators even with Obregón’s reforms at the beginning of his presidency. This partly had to do with Diaz’s dislike of labor unions in general and oppression against those that tried to unionize. Under the Diaz regime any such movement was quashed, and the period during the revolution shifted the focus away from labor

reform and rights. It was not until Obregón created the Department of Labor that the prospect of unionizing became a reality (Krauze, 1998). The powerful Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM) was influential in paving the way for labor reform during and after Obregón's presidency. A conglomerate of labor unions, the CROM was founded during the waning years of the revolution in 1918 and was influential in electing Obregón to the presidency. Out of an act of quid-quo-pro Obregón recognized the CROM and bestowed a significant amount of power to the confederation such as allowing it to dominate the federal labor department (Suarez-Potts, 2012). Thrusting the CROM into a position of power at the national level redefined the place and influence of labor unions and paved the way for a proliferation of national movements to unionize. Especially during the 1930s, 40s, and 50s a large increase in labor unions occurred. Organizations such as the Federation of Union Workers in the Service of the State (FSTSE), Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (CROC), and National Federation of Independent Unions (FNSI), among others, were created. It is not surprising that the national teachers' union (SNTE) was founded during this time period as well.

With a growing presence of teachers throughout the country and the reality that they represented a growing social force, the necessity to unionize was never stronger. Teachers were struggling with unstable job security and low wages and in their current fragmented state with fractured and disparate unions a consolidation seemed to be the only answer. With Obregón's creation of both a department of education and another of labor, educators took advantage of the situation before them and during the presidency of Plutarco Calles created the National Confederation of Teachers in 1926 and the National Confederation of Education Workers in 1928 (Olivé, 2000). For the first time teachers were represented on a national level and their demands were heard in Mexico City. Both unions were effective in consolidating teacher

representation in order to amplify its effect on national legislation. And both aided in finally promoting teachers' movements to strike and protest. However, both unions also insufficiently covered all of Mexico's teachers, and the existence of both unions inevitably created conflict between the two. The Communist Party of Mexico, for example, placed its support behind the National Confederation of Education Workers while the National Confederation of Teachers more closely aligned with the federal government (Hamilton, 2014). Furthermore, urban educators had more access to union membership and activity and many of their rural counterparts were left on the outside looking in.

The weaknesses of both unions showed how much more needed to be done to promote unified teacher unionization. But the two unions also hinted at the power that a united teachers' movement could wield on the national level, especially for the newly created National Revolutionary Party (PNR), the predecessor to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which in the 1930s was riding a wave of popularity that solidified its place at the apex of Mexican politics for the next seventy years. The party saw teachers as a vehicle to ensure PNR/PRI dominance in state and federal elections, and politicians moved quickly to form that relationship.

Creation of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE)

While the National Confederation of Teachers and the National Confederation of Education Workers highlighted the deficiencies in the unionization of teachers, regional unions continued to exist state by state. Having had success in creating and maintaining regional teachers unions throughout the country, teachers and union leaders continued to look for ways to consolidate into one large union. The regional unions lacked the power to influence any type of legislation on the federal level while enjoying minimal success at the state level. The teachers

unions in Oaxaca, for example, succeeded in concessions that provided an extremely modest stipend to children whose families reported financial needs (McNamara, 2012). Yet, the desire to affect laws at the federal level seemed too elusive for the hundreds of teachers unions. The thought of a national teachers union that would wield the influence and power necessary to affect federal laws regarding education and labor became a source of motivation especially in the years following the revolution when more populist leaders such as Lázaro Cárdenas would lead the country.

It was not until 1932, nearly fifteen years removed from the end of the revolution, that the seeds of the first true national teachers union would be planted. The creation of the Mexican Federation of Teachers (CMM) became the first concerted effort to represent all of the teachers in Mexico. For the next nine years the CMM along with the PNR/PRI worked to consolidate the many regional teachers unions into one national syndicate (Espinosa, 1982). From its inception the CMM strongly identified with the SEP and elements of corporatism began to infiltrate within that relationship. The PNR/PRI quickly fomented a strong relationship with the CMM and became a catalyst to the transition of the CMM to the SNTE in 1943. Nowhere was this seen more than during the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas.

An extremely popular figure and a populist, Cárdenas focused his presidency on fulfilling the ideals of the revolution. Land, labor, and education reforms defined his presidency. Agrarian reform was mostly accomplished as Cárdenas returned large swaths of lands to communities and indigenous peoples to be used as *ejidos*—plots of land shared by the community. Both the petroleum and railroad industries were nationalized, and more power was given to unions. Cárdenas, for example, was sympathetic to the working class and saw the importance of recognizing and addressing teachers' needs. When Cárdenas nationalized the petroleum industry

in 1938 and created the state-run petroleum company Pemex, many believed that the creation of a more centralized national teachers union was inevitable since Cárdenas had undertaken an aggressive campaign to promote unionization throughout Mexico. As a self-identified socialist Cárdenas attempted to forge relationships with unions to help guarantee his party's place in power and establish what would become the hegemony of the PRI. Cárdenas also saw education as a vehicle through which he and his party could establish legitimacy. He undertook efforts to further minimize the influence of the Catholic church in education, and he sought to further expand education to Mexico's indigenous population, two moves that many educators agreed with. A strong relationship with the teachers unions was key to realizing these efforts and Cárdenas took steps to further centralize and consolidate the CMM and other teachers' unions (Cook, 1996). He began to host "Unity Congresses" where the different teachers unions representatives would come together to talk about the issues they faced. Cárdenas hoped that these congresses would help the unions see that their struggles were shared and that the notion of joining together to form a single union would be the best option to address their struggles (Cook, 1996).

When Cárdenas handed over power to incoming president Manuel Camacho in 1940, the teachers' movement to unionize had gained a great deal of momentum, and in 1943 Camacho finally placed the last piece to the puzzle and created the SNTE. Decades of work and hundreds of teachers unions were required for this moment to come to pass. Finally, teachers throughout Mexico were represented by the same organization. And although Camacho's accomplishment in creating the SNTE appeared to stem from a genuine altruism on his part to defend and empower teachers, undoubtedly, an element of selfishness and manipulation existed. Camacho knew, along with Cárdenas and previous presidents that a strong relationship, and a coercive one, with

a consolidated teachers union would all but guarantee electoral victories for the PNR/PRI in the foreseeable future. Teachers were largely seen as cogs in the party machine and they could be used to procure votes and to persuade the public to vote the party into power election after election (Britton, 1979).

In exchange for union loyalty the PNR/PRI would provide important posts and positions of power for union leaders, and the party would provide liberally to the rank and file in the form of increased wages, improved health care, easier and favorable access to loans, and the ability to advance within the union (Roett, 1995). This corporatist relationship based itself on a strict etiquette of quid-pro-quo politics. This would help to ensure the PNR/PRI's political dominance until the year 2000.

From its inception, the SNTE has existed as a highly centralized and oligarchic union. Functioning essentially as a puppet to the PNR/PRI the SNTE has always been highly bureaucratized and union decision making has almost always taken place at the politician level. Practices of public assemblies among teachers and the representation of teachers in the form of union delegates has merely existed as a symbolic gesture of what a democratic union represents. These factors help to show how far the union has come since its beginnings when so much was focused on teachers' rights and educational equality. The growing corporatist system between the government and the SNTE would begin to stir the flames of dissent within the union and large numbers of union members would begin to more vocally and actively voice concerns and indifference. Since the PRI relied so heavily on the SNTE for votes and its influence in getting the public to vote for PRI candidates the party needed to address these concerns being raised by the membership. Unfortunately, the PRI failed to act and the dissent movement within the SNTE continued to strengthen.

Rise of the CNTE

Growing agitation and indifference to the organizational structure of the SNTE by rank and file members soon made it clear that the model of governance exercised by the PRI and SNTE leadership could not be sustained without alienating a portion of the union base. Ideals of participatory democracy and leadership accountability enforced through bottom-up union organization became areas of concern for rank and file members and soon forums and unofficial assemblies were being held to address these concerns. Armed with a desire to strip the union of its oligarchic structure and corrupt leaders, many in the union base began entertaining the notion of forming a new union to challenge the SNTE and delegitimize it (La Botz, 1988). They grew tired of the corporatist relationship the union shared with the PRI and the union's powerlessness in promoting change within the sphere of education without having to consult with the PRI.

Yet those that desired to break away from the SNTE understood the complexity and near impossibility of achieving such an action. For one, the PRI controlled the finances that flowed through the SNTE. If the union wanted to invest in any way in education or in its union members it would have to go through the PRI. The party functioned as a gate-keeper and used this power in a very manipulative way. If dissident members created a new union the PRI could suffocate and crush it from the beginning simply by withholding money. Furthermore, any dissent on such a large scale would have ultimately been met with the wrath of the PRI. The party had invested too much to allow a fissure to appear within the union and the PRI had already shown and established its willingness to defer to violence and repression as a way to keep the union in line (Cook, 1996). Although the genesis of the PRI was grounded in socialist and leftist ideologies, as Mexico continued to modernize and integrate itself into the global economy an increasing influence of conservatism made its way into Mexican politics. The proliferation of neoliberalism

in the 1980s quickly made its way into Mexico as the government aggressively began to privatize the economy. Free trade and increased foreign investment brought newfound profits and the expansion of communications had a strong effect in speeding up the westernization of Mexican society. Mexico began to experience a new economic relationship with the United States in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), massive influx of foreign capital which translated into increased wealth for the PRI and its politicians (Johnston, 2005). Any threat to the stability of the SNTE and its relationship with the PRI was seen as a surefire way of compromising these advances and putting in jeopardy the system of hegemony constructed by the PRI.

Yet those in the union who felt that radical change was necessary continued to press forward with the desire to form a faction within the union and a delicate balance had to be made if they were to be successful. The dissident teachers understood the PRI's power, but also knew that the PRI desired stability above all and would make some concessions in order to maintain that stability. The PRI understood its role and knew that it could keep the new dissident union in check through repression and financial austerity. Teachers from the more leftist and indigenous southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero led the charge in breaking away from the SNTE (Stephen, 2013). The role of indigeneity played a major part in the southern rebellion. The pre-Hispanic practices of public assemblies and *usos y costumbres* which literally translates as uses and customs, a form of government in which communities enjoy political autonomy, were essentially romanticized and seen as the ultimate display of true democracy where every voice and every vote count. This was the antithesis of the organization of the SNTE which elected delegates that represented the different regions of the union in union assemblies. And even there,

the delegates many times failed to vote in favor of their constituents, instead deferring to what the union leaders and PRI overseers desired.

As more rank and file members desired to break away from the system of the SNTE, official forums and assemblies were held in Chiapas in 1979 to decide whether or not to establish a union faction. By way of consensus, the National Coordinating Committee of Education Workers (CNTE) was founded. This body would still remain under the auspices of the SNTE and the PRI, but its formation highlighted the chasm that existed within the union from which it broke away. The formation of the CNTE was a direct rejection of the status quo and served as a statement to the SNTE and PRI that the top-down organization of the union, lack of democracy, and centralization of power would not be tolerated. Furthermore, the CNTE signaled that growing unrest within the union would eventually serve as a stumbling block to the PRI's position of power.

Soon after Chiapas, new locals were formed in the surrounding states of Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Michoacán where thousands of teachers joined the CNTE in open rebellion of the SNTE-PRI apparatus. Once formed, the CNTE immediately began to focus on funneling power through the rank and file members. Instead of a top-down structure the union would rotate it horizontally so that the decision-making power was shared among the lowest members to the highest-ranking leaders. This newfound autonomy and democracy within the union allowed the CNTE to begin to push back against the PRI and the SNTE and build “mass mobilizations, strikes, and political struggle” (La Botz, 1988). Soon, the union appeared to be a foil to everything the SNTE and PRI wanted to accomplish. The PRI essentially was powerless to react to the dissident nature of the CNTE mainly because its base was located in the politically and socially unstable southern part of Mexico. Any retaliation by the PRI may have been met with

widescale opposition by not only the CNTE and its sympathizers but also the citizens who were growing to become critical of the party. The dissident movement quickly strengthened in momentum, and the rapid rise in membership posed a serious threat to the SNTE's ability to leverage sanctions or push back against the CNTE. What made the situation more frustrating for the SNTE leadership was that the CNTE was technically under its jurisdiction. The CNTE was like a rebellious child that could not be disciplined.

Within the first years of its existence, the CNTE began to organize mass demonstrations comprised of tens of thousands of education workers who marched against the leadership of the SNTE (La Botz, 1988). In the Southern states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Morelos, teachers of the CNTE would stage sit-ins and march the hundreds of miles to Mexico City to protest for better teaching conditions and wage increases, areas that were neglected for years by the SNTE. Soon enough, the CNTE turned its attention to the PRI and began protesting against the regime (Hathaway, 2000). As marches and protesting activity increased the PRI began to view the CNTE as a legitimate threat to its hegemony. Marches staged in Mexico City would grab the attention of the media where anti-PRI propaganda would be disseminated over the air waves by the striking teachers. It was not long before the party began to answer back with violence and repression. Allegations of abductions, beatings, intimidation, and threats began to surface, and it was not uncommon for CNTE leaders to emerge from political meetings only to be greeted by PRI hired goons (Hathaway, 2000).

As a result, the CNTE began to temper down its protesting somewhat. However, in states such as Oaxaca and Chiapas it seemed as if the government repression boiled the teachers' blood even more. Locals of the CNTE soon began to adopt more extreme forms of protesting. Instead of sit-ins and public occupations of the *zócalo* teachers would set up blockades on major avenues

and highways and vandalize government buildings (Estrada, 2016). Trying to keep the more radical locals under control, the CNTE would send delegates to those states and scold the locals for their actions, claiming that what they were doing was hurting the image of the CNTE (Cook, 1996). But the attempts by the CNTE to reign in the more radical arm of their union proved unfruitful, especially in Oaxaca and Chiapas where the seeds of radicalism had long ago been planted.

Local 22 Leads the Charge

Local 22 of the SNTE has existed in Oaxaca since 1980 when the CNTE was expanded there from Chiapas. Beginning with its inception, the local 22 has fought aggressively for teachers' rights and for the defense of public education during a time when the federal government pushed for the privatization of public schools and the globalization of Mexico (de la Luz, 2015). Indigenous struggles and an indifferent local government have empowered local 22, and it now has become regarded as the most radical local within the union. For decades, local 22 has vehemently protested government corruption, repression, and hypocrisy through large scale marches throughout the city, vandalism, and violence against the government and its sympathizers. While Marxist ideologies are not anything new within the union, the presence of anarchists and other far left organizations and individuals have had an impact on local 22's politics and patience with the government. But arguably, nothing has had as much of an impact on local 22's ideologies as indigeneity and the state's rich history of indigenous conquest.

Stories of the Zapotec's inability to be conquered by Hernán Cortés have reached the status of folklore and the romantic and violent tale of the relationship between the Zapotecs and Mixtecs told every summer during the state's Guelaguetza festival captivates those that listen.

These histories undoubtedly have influenced Oaxaca's culture as one of stubborn and confrontational people. Local 22 fits this description well. For the last three decades the teachers of local 22 have gone on strike every May in Oaxaca City to demand improvements in education funding ranging from increased infrastructure spending to increased salaries. The length of the strikes fluctuates every year from a few weeks to a few months. During this time the teachers setup an encampment in the zócalo of Oaxaca where the large open plaza is dominated by a kaleidoscope of colored tarps and tents. From there, members of the local coordinate their subsequent actions. For the most part, the state government does not hesitate in conceding to some demands in order to get the teachers back in the classrooms. This is done mainly to avoid any escalation of social unrest as local 22 is known for its ability to coordinate collective action on a large scale and at a moment's notice. Mega marches, marches comprised of tens of thousands of teachers, are a tool used by the union to bring parts of Oaxaca City to a complete standstill while thousands of teachers and supporters fill one of the handful of principle avenues, snarling traffic and leaving thousands of people stranded as transportation services come to a halt.

One of the effects stemming from local 22's active resistance is the mercurial relationship the state government has with the union. At times the union has enjoyed a mostly positive and proactive relationship with the government such as during the governorship of Heladio Ramirez who negotiated with local 22 to give the union more control over the State Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca (IEEPO). This allowed for the infiltration of union members into the government body and increased local 22's power over the administration of education in Oaxaca. Soon after opening up the IEEPO to local 22 the union began to exercise control over who could get hired and fired in administration and teaching. The local also exercised control over teacher

logistics determining where teachers were to teach and implementing a system whereby teacher loyalty to local 22 would be rewarded with placement in coveted school locations or administrative positions. Local 22 also controlled the curriculum taught in classrooms. The union's rise to power within the IEEPO quickly established the legitimacy and reality of local 22's footprint on education throughout the state (Estrada, 2016).

The governorship of Jose Murat at the turn of the millennium continued the tradition established in the 90s of the state government conceding to many of the demands of local 22. Where Ramirez conceded the IEEPO to the local in the mid-90s, Murat's concessions included the resignation of the director of the IEEPO (Braunstein, 2008), essentially opening up a path for a complete local 22 takeover of the IEEPO. Once the position of director was occupied by a member of local 22 the union could make changes to teachers' salaries and bonuses. Even today, Oaxaca teachers enjoy some of the most liberal benefits of all teachers in the country. Local 22 teachers and administrators are among the highest paid in the country and enjoy additional benefits such as easy access to loan programs and well-paid end of year bonuses called *aguinaldos* (Hugo, 2015; Briseño, 2016). These accomplishments coupled with local 22's progressive organizational model where participatory democracy is practiced as much as possible and leaders are held accountable due to a more bottom-up distribution of power have strengthened the local's reputation throughout Mexico and influences other union locals to follow its example.

However, the positive relationship experienced by local 22 in the 90s through the beginning of the 2000s would come crashing down as more antagonistic governors pushed back against the union through threats and repression. The year 2006, which will be more closely examined later on will highlight this shift in policy and treatment of the union. The blow dealt to

the union in 2006 was so severe that it has yet to fully recover. Leading up to 2006, however, local 22 appeared to occupy the pinnacle of influence and power in Oaxaca. And anytime local 22 made a move it seemed like the rest of Mexico tuned in to see what local 22 would do.

Chapter 2: The Rise of Local 22

Introduction

If there was a turning point or watershed moment for local 22 that moment would be the summer of 2006. The years of protesting and challenging the government in the 1980s, 90s, and at the turn of the millennium ultimately prepared the local for the ultimate test, to see whether or not the leadership and the rank and file would be ready for the endurance required to maintain a movement and oust a government. As mentioned in the previous chapter, local 22's rise to prominence and power was swift and very real. But that rise came at a cost to the local as a result of the values established at its founding. Participatory democracy emerged as the foundation on which local 22 was established. It represented everything the SNTE was not. Oligarchy, corruption, clientelism, corporatism, etc. defined the SNTE and the PRI's stranglehold on the union pushed many within to fight back. Furthermore, Oaxaca's affinity for democracy comes from its DNA. For centuries, indigenous peoples in the state have participated in a system of *usos y costumbres*, a rule of law that relies on democratic participation through public assemblies. In communities that practice *usos y costumbres*, local leadership is selected by the community members on the condition of unanimity, community projects are decided, and a relatively large amount of political autonomy is granted to the community (Canedo Vásquez, 2008). *Usos y costumbres* served as a model for local 22 to follow.

It is for these reasons that local 22's shift to oligarchy came unexpectedly to many. In 2006 it appeared that local 22 and the protest movement would finally usher in a democracy where the citizens—those not belonging to the elite class—would control the politics of the state. To a certain degree the movement accomplished this objective. In 2010, the first non-PRI

candidate was elected governor in more than eighty years (Wilkinson, Ellingwood, 2010). The election was seen as an historic moment for democracy, however, even with a new party in power the government pressure placed on local 22 continued to increase along with the local's shift to oligarchy. What has not been discussed much is that while local 22 continued to gain influence and power in Oaxaca politics during the 1990s and 2000s it was beginning to shift to a more oligarchic structure while still maintaining its democracy among the base. However, this shift toward oligarchy did not have the effect of undermining the values of the local. Public assemblies were still very effective, and the rank and file enjoyed large amounts of administrative and political responsibilities (Stephen, 2013). But the increasing growth of the local in the form of membership forced it to centralize certain administrative functions and bureaucratize. Yet it still was not a true oligarchy in the sense that the leadership centralized its power. After all, the rank and file still enjoyed a relatively functional democratic structure where it still exercised its authority in deciding many issues facing the local.

Local 22's embrace of participatory democracy and the aggressive style in which it pushed back against external opposition caught the attention of unions and locals throughout Mexico, and later on, throughout Latin America. Aggressively resisting and repudiating decades of corporatist and oligarchic structure between the PRI and the SNTE local 22 began to win over sympathy from NGOs in Oaxaca and throughout Mexico. Human rights groups and indigenous rights groups saw local 22 as a vehicle through which social activism and change could be wrought (Larson, 2015). And local 22 did not hesitate to take advantage of these new alliances since doing so would only increase the local's influence in the region. Several factors allowed for and facilitated the growth of local 22 into a regional, and then, national influence. This chapter will look at some of those factors and investigate how they propelled local 22 to its pinnacle of

power and precipitated its demoralizing fall. Furthermore, this chapter will look at how internal factors, such as a growing membership base, began the local's shift to oligarchy and that external factors in the form of government repression forced the local to centralize power into the hands of the leadership, effectively removing the bottom-up organization it enjoyed.

From CNTE to local 22: a rise to state and national prominence

I argue that the following factors influenced the growth of local 22 in both membership and political power: the practice of participatory democracy, aggressive resistance to the status quo of government-union relations, and an increased focus on cultivating positive relations between teachers and community members. When the CNTE was formed in Chiapas in 1979 many teachers' sentiments towards the ruling PRI party and the SNTE had reached historic lows. The common practices of corporatism and cronyism could no longer be tolerated especially by the more progressive and indigenous teachers of the union (Limage, 2013). As such the Chiapas movement spread and Oaxaca become fertile ground for its proliferation within the SNTE. Many leaders knew within the growing faction that democracy was to be the key to separation from the SNTE. Having a union based on participatory democratic values could in no way be compatible with the system already in place and would, from its foundation, become antithetical to the nature of unionism in Mexico. The movement would chafe against the grain of decades of state sanctioned and sponsored unionism.

The biggest obstacle to realizing the creation of the CNTE and especially its growth during the 1980s and 90s was the political structural apparatus in place. The PRI has been referred to as a "perfect dictatorship" (Sheppard, 2016) because it had carefully orchestrated a rule of continuous power that covered more than 70 years through a system of intimidation,

violence, corruption, and manipulation masked under a façade of democracy. On top of its aggressive nature, the PRI flourished under a highly centralized, oligarchic, and extremely bureaucratic apparatus. For decades the PRI sanctioned the SNTE and essentially adopted it into the party machine utilizing the union's influence on voters and party loyalty. One of the most significant explanations behind the success of the PRI is the influence of the SNTE in mobilizing its base and creating grassroots movements crucial in electing PRI candidates across the country. By placing itself in opposition to the SNTE, the CNTE essentially placed itself in opposition to the PRI as well, for the relationship between the SNTE and PRI had become so intertwined that by certain standards they could not be distinguished from one another. PRI leaders had become SNTE leaders and vice versa (Saavedra, 2016). This created much friction for the CNTE and manifested itself through years of government repression and intimidation.

Therefore, when the CNTE surfaced with an ideology rooted in direct democracy, the PRI and to an extent the SNTE would not stand by idly. Yet it was the clarion call of the CNTE that direct democracy would be the foundation of its platform and that audacity and rebellious attitude would begin to galvanize many and make membership within the CNTE an enticing option. The ideology of direct democracy took root in Oaxaca where subsequently local 22 formed. The advantage in Oaxaca is the large indigenous population and legacy. Unique to Oaxaca is the practice of *usos y costumbres*, a system in which municipalities practice their own autonomy independent from the state government through a system of public assemblies and rotating leadership (Anaya, 2006). A pre-Columbian form of governing in Mexico, Oaxaca's long history of practicing *usos y costumbres* became imbued in the fabric of Oaxacan culture and way of life. Therefore, the practice of participatory democracy within local 22 seemed like a natural fit since it would be a continuation of the practice into the sphere of unionism and

education in which communities had a strong interest. Local 22 placed a heavy interest in *usos y costumbres* and its membership practiced it within the local (Muñoz, 2005) which helped to increase the local's popularity among not only the indigenous communities of the state but also the poor, working class, and progressive populations. One of the teachers I interviewed, Isabel, talked about the role *usos y costumbres* played in legitimizing the local with fellow Oaxacans and that it led to an increase in exposure with various NGOs and social justice organizations throughout the state which led to the local allying with some of these groups to push for social reformation in areas such as women's and indigenous' rights.

This increased contact with those outside the local helped to strengthen its political power because it could count on other groups and organizations to support the local during moments of protest. Nowhere can this be seen more than with the relationship between local 22 and citizens of the different communities throughout the state. For example, with the formation of the CNTE, unionized teachers in Oaxaca quickly consolidated to enter CNTE membership which meant that the majority of Oaxaca's tens of thousands of teachers now belonged to the newly formed local 22 of the CNTE. This became a significant advantage because almost instantly the CNTE had members in hundreds of municipalities in Oaxaca with communities being exposed to the local's ideologies via the teachers. Another advantage that the CNTE exploited was the opportunity to build a rapport with community members and more importantly, the parents of students. The union leadership saw this as a crucial step in legitimizing the local's influence in both social and political matters because if the local could gain the support and confidence of the people then it would be better situated when protest activity and any kind of resistance against the government took place. Interviews I conducted of teachers highlight this argument and most of them talk about being sent to remote towns and villages where the teacher was really the only connection

with the outside world. One teacher, Rafael, spoke about how he was sent to an isolated community in the Mixteca region of the state about a six-hour drive from Oaxaca City. Many of the children spoke broken Spanish because their parents and others in the community only spoke their indigenous dialect. Rafael, who is from the city, said that the community quickly accepted and respected him as an authority figure. The parents looked up to Rafael because they saw him as someone who would educate their children and give them the opportunity to transcend poverty. Rafael's experience is not unique among teachers sent out to work and live in rural and poor communities. That link the teacher formed with the community helped to create a special bond with parents and other community members. As parents formed a positive perception of the teacher helping their children they also formed a positive perception of local 22.

The state's indigenous population, to which so many of the rural communities belonged, benefited greatly from local 22's presence. Historically a marginalized and repressed people, indigenous communities found an ally in local 22 who empathized with the discrimination and poverty they faced. For example, prior to the 2006 conflict when local 22 presented the government with its list of demands, included was "a proposal to mitigate poverty in Oaxaca's indigenous communities" (Eisenstadt, 2011). More recently local 22 has pushed for the inclusion of curriculum that teaches indigenous languages, a stronger focus on indigeneity, and the importance of indigenous culture in Mexican history (Rosen-Long, Mayorga, Cox, 2016). As a result of defending and promoting indigenous rights local 22 has enjoyed a strong relationship with indigenous communities and a large ally in its fight against the government. Local 22 has also been involved in protesting projects such as mines that would displace indigenous communities and place many others in harm's way due to the probability of contamination (Cencos XXII, 2018), dams such as the proposed dam in the community of Paso de la Reina that

would displace the entire community (Tinajero, 2018), and wind farms in the isthmus region of the state that have displaced indigenous farmers (Sección XXII y ong's, 2012). That local 22 has been able to support such protests and invest resources into movements outside of education shows how much it has grown over the past two decades. This increased influence and presence has allowed the local to be more confrontational and aggressive in its demands to the government. As the 1990s came to a close, for example, local 22 enjoyed a decade of winning government concessions after it had engaged in large-scale protests, marches, and blockades throughout the city. By the time of the protest movement of 2006, both the government and the local had settled into an annual routine of the local presenting its demands and the government making concessions to the majority of them in order to avoid retaliation from the local (Stephen, 2013).

Isidro, one of the teachers I interviewed talked about local 22's success in pressuring the government for concessions.

Before Ortiz (Governor during the protest movement of 2006) we were able to intimidate the governor by threatening to shut schools down, march, block off the city center, and create an atmosphere of chaos. We had more than 60,000 teachers and the governor didn't want to have to deal with all of the problems we could create in the city. So when we presented our demands we would occupy the zócalo for a few days, maybe a week or two, before we would go back to our homes and communities because we received concessions to enough of the demands we presented...The governor couldn't fight back against us because we also had many allies that would support us had the government answered us with repression or sanctions...That's what happened in 2006, Ortiz attacked us and we answered back with APPO.

Isidro's account helps to highlight local 22's success in creating alliances and establishing itself as a formidable presence for the government to go against. His mention of APPO highlights this. When local 22 presented its demands and Governor Ortiz responded with repression the local joined with organizations throughout Oaxaca and Mexico and in a matter of days created the

APPO which successfully took control of all functions of Oaxaca City for nearly six months. The national and international response to the conflict highlighted the prominence of local 22 that unions and organizations not only in Mexico but abroad expressed their support and solidarity with local 22.

Arguably, what solidified local 22's climb to influence and cemented its power in local politics was its success in establishing its members throughout the different administration levels of the IEEPO (State Institute of Public Education of Oaxaca). In 1992, then Governor Heladio Ramirez was trying to restructure the PRI's image which had become tainted with accusations of corruption from previous governors. In the decade before Ramirez was sworn in as governor, Oaxaca had seen five different governors lead the state (Corro, 2014). Ramirez, who is from the Mixteca region of Oaxaca, relied on his populist ideologies and sympathies to rebuild alliances in the state. One of his groups of focus was the indigenous population, and the other was the teachers. In the late eighties the federal government pushed forward with a plan to decentralize education throughout the country which was met with stiff resistance by teachers unions. In Oaxaca, local 22 staged protests and pressured the state government to not decentralize since the fear of decentralization was the loss of influence held by the local. Ramirez, a member of the PRI, found himself in a precarious situation. He was to maintain his loyalty to the PRI, which was the party in power at the time, all the while not alienating his Oaxacan constituents. Local 22 made it known to Ramirez that they were ready to mobilize in any way to prevent decentralization from taking place and Ramirez's support of indigeneity conflicted with decentralization of education which would arguably further alienate indigenous children by decreasing their chances of obtaining an education. One of the more formidable fears associated with decentralization was decreased government oversight of education and the proliferation of

the privatization of education, an issue that has resurfaced in the last decade with a new wave of education reforms signed into law by President Peña Nieto. Ramirez made a compromise. To prevent the union from mobilizing against decentralization, Ramirez created the IEEPO which would act as the administrative branch that would oversee education in the state.

When local 22 signed the “Minuta de 1992” (Bill of 1992) with Governor Ramirez, the bill established a partnership with the state government that allowed for the local to occupy the IEEPO and establish an indelible mark that would become a fixture in Oaxaca politics up through the present (Puma, 2016). This new partnership gave local 22 the opportunity to fill the IEEPO with loyal union members who quickly took over important administrative positions that controlled nearly every aspect of education in the state. By the end of the decade, local 22 had control over what teachers were hired, where they were placed, who was fired, what educational curriculum to introduce, and the distribution of resources to the different schools throughout the state. Essentially, the only area out of reach for local 22 was control over funding. The government relinquished some control over how the IEEPO functioned and local 22’s changes to curriculum, for example, went uncontested (Saavedra, 2016). As a result, local 22’s political power strengthened dramatically. But this also placed local 22 in an inseparable relationship, and a corporatist one, with the government where the local’s decisions were now not entirely autonomous.

Doubtless, this corporatist relationship influenced local 22 to adopt some oligarchic tendencies, especially bureaucratization and specialization. The government had handed over the entire apparatus that oversaw education in the state to local 22, and it was forced to fill hundreds of administrative positions. Furthermore, as local 22’s presence and influence in the IEEPO increased, it began to centralize more power into the hands of the top administrators of the

IEEPO. Yet, as local 22 continued to grow in the IEEPO and move toward a more centralized leadership structure, the local did not relinquish its practice of democracy, and the rank and file continued to wield influence. Local 22's success in occupying the IEEPO was no small feat and its effects have been felt ever since (Stephen, 2013). By controlling the state's education apparatus local 22 found itself with much more negotiating power. At times, the state government had its arms tied behind its back unable to resist local 22's demands. But the takeover of the IEEPO in a way forced local 22 to adopt oligarchic tendencies by drastically increasing the administrative responsibilities of the local, which, along with a growing membership, pressured the local to bureaucratize in order to maintain efficiency.

The beginnings of oligarchy

While founded on strong principles of democracy, factors within the union pressured it to begin a slow shift toward oligarchy. Indigeneity, for example, has historically played a significant role within local 22, and the disparate cultures and ideologies that it injects into the local should help to maintain the local's democratic tendencies. Social scientists have argued in favor of this when looking at oligarchization within organizations. One of the more well-known studies is that of Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) who looked at the International Typographical Union (ITU) and how it seemingly defied Michels' Iron Law in that it never quite become completely oligarchical. One of the factors that the authors studied was how the existence of factions within the ITU helped to keep the leadership in check by challenging the leadership anytime a faction felt that the leadership was overstepping the power it possessed. Anytime a faction felt that the leadership was beginning to undermine the democratic values in any way the faction would call out the leadership and hold it accountable (1956).

Much like the ITU, the existence of factions within local 22 has historically helped it to remain democratic. Oaxaca's diverse and rich history grounded in indigeneity ensures a more varied presence of ideologies within the local, and a broad gamut of beliefs can be found among the membership of the local. Teachers that identify as indigenous and especially if they come from indigenous communities will bring ideologies such as *usos y costumbres* with them into the local (Sorroza, Danielson, 2013), and many hold the belief that a community's fate lies in the hands of its members. An integral element of *usos y costumbres* is the public assembly where members of the community come together to vote on issues within the community. There are no delegates or representatives in these public assemblies. Each member of the community has a say and consensus is required in order for a project to be realized or a decision to be made. Activities such as the *tequio*, where members of a neighborhood or community work together to accomplish a neighborhood or community project such as digging a well, paving a road, installing street lights, or performing maintenance of a school, originate from indigenous practices. The purpose of the *tequio* is to establish accountability among the members of the community, to serve the needs of the community, and to create an atmosphere of solidarity and shared experience that would strengthen community bonds. The large-scale protests put on by local 22 can be compared to a *tequio* in that all the members of the community (local 22 membership) work together on a shared goal. Participation at the marches, for example, creates a sense of solidarity among the members and the fact that members are required to participate in the marches mirrors the level of accountability seen at the *tequio*. The *ejido*—an area of land that is shared and farmed by a community of which no one person owns—also originates from indigenous practices and it is this belief in the collective that indigenous teachers have brought

with them into the local. Collective action forms the base of indigenous culture in Oaxaca, and to an extent, the base of local 22 culture.

Indeed, so influential has been indigeneity within local 22 that many of its practices have been adopted from indigenous beliefs. The public assembly became one of the defining characteristics of the local and the closest replication of a participatory democracy. Each delegation within the local has held public assemblies to ensure that every teacher that wants to be heard is heard and that every teacher casts a direct vote to determine policy and union action. Delegations are afforded individual autonomy and allowed to make collective decisions to determine actions for their respective jurisdictions. The prevalence of local 22 members that identify as indigenous has influenced the union through votes in public assemblies to take up such issues as distributing literature in different dialects, establishing programs in schools to teach indigenous languages such as Zapotec, Mixtec, and Mixe as a way to fight back against the government's push to provide all teaching in Spanish, and to recognize and advocate for indigenous rights (Stephen, 2013). All of this has helped to maintain and disseminate the local's progressive ideologies.

While indigeneity has had a significant influence on local 22 it has not held a monopoly on ideologies. A thriving population of anarchists, communists, Marxists, capitalists, and Priistas (members loyal to the PRI) have co-existed and found ways to work together on shared goals. No doubt these disparate ideologies facilitate conflict within the local, but historically those conflicts have been superseded by broader educational and social issues. These factions of ideologies within the local historically have functioned much like those of the ITU in that they have helped to prevent major corruption from overtaking the local by holding the leadership accountable for its actions especially during elections. Union leaders have more or less been kept

in check. Ironically, however, this diversity of ideologies which has historically helped to keep local 22 democratic has more recently become one of the characteristics that has pushed the local toward oligarchy.

This seems to be case especially following the conflict of 2006 where government repression and political pressure significantly weakened the local. Data from the interviews I conducted support this argument. For example, one of the teachers I interviewed, Victor, talks about how the instability within the local pressured the leadership to tighten its grip on power.

Well, I would say that the leadership needed to focus on maintaining the existence of the syndicate after everything that happened in 2006. The union was hurt. APPO fell apart and the union invested a lot of resources into it. The government continued to attack, and the union was barely surviving. One of the reasons APPO fell apart was because no consensus could ever be made on how to move forward. A lot of that had to do with the many different ideologies present within the union and the leadership couldn't risk the same catastrophe to happen within [local] 22.

Victor's argument is intriguing in that it looks at how conflict can shift priorities. It would be understandable that local 22 leadership would do all in its power to limit the freedom of the different factions within the local because the last thing the local needs is for conflict in ideologies to further destabilize an already weakened local. Additionally, the difficult situation that local 22 was placed in during the government repression may very well have prevented the rank and file from even engaging in debate regarding different ideologies and which ones would be most beneficial to the local. Either way, the fact is that local 22 leadership assumed a great deal of control over the local without receiving opposition from the rank and file for its actions, whereas historically, this would not have been the case.

Although indigeneity and factions played a role after 2006 in the oligarchization of local 22, it was in the 1990s when local 22 began to plant the seeds that would allow the local to shift toward oligarchy. The decade of the eighty's, which began with the formation of the CNTE and

subsequently local 22, was then followed by quick growth of local 22 since the local became the only established representation the teachers had in Oaxaca. As a result, membership increased dramatically and local 22 grew throughout the state. Not only was its presence made in the capital, but also in the Isthmus, Mixteca, and Cañada regions, along with the coast. Enthusiasm for the movement caught on quickly, and soon local 22 became a model of resistance and democracy within the CNTE for other locals to emulate. As the SNTE continued to receive criticism due to its relationship with the PRI, local 22 led protests against both organizations in Oaxaca and Mexico City. But as the eighties came to a close local 22 was looking at the next phase of its growth. In order for the local to wield the influence and clout that it would later on be known for it needed to significantly alter the dynamics of power in Oaxaca and the local's relationship it had with the state government.

As explored thus far, many factors contributed to the growth of local 22 and distinguished it from most of the other locals within the CNTE. While local 22 experienced significant success in acquiring many of its demands, its rapid growth and aggressive style of mobilizations pressured the local to maintain tight control over its operations resulting in the practice of some of the very issues the local and CNTE had fought so hard to reject. An oligarchic structure and corruption began to seep into the local bringing with it new challenges not so much from without but from within. The biggest manifestation of this is the toll the shift has taken on the rank and file. The level of trust that the base has towards the leadership has withered since 2006 according to the interviews I conducted. Noe, a former regional local 22 leader who served in that position after 2006 had this to say regarding the relationship. "I became disillusioned with the leaders during my service as a regional delegate. I saw how the leadership put their interests first—and what were those interests? They wanted to remain in their current

positions and they did what was necessary to accomplish it. There is no doubt that the leadership is negotiating with the government behind our backs, making deals to ensure that they remain in power” (personal communication, 2016). These feelings of disillusionment and betrayal are not limited to Noe. Other interviewees expressed similar opinions highlighting a feeling of disconnection between the leadership and the rank and file.

Another factor that helped to plant the seeds of oligarchy was the structure of public assemblies and how it could hinder the allocation and provision of resources the local had to distribute. This was especially true in the 1980s and 1990s when public assemblies were more democratic. The organization of local 22 is as follows: the state of Oaxaca is divided into sectors and within those sectors are delegations. There are thirty-seven sectors in Oaxaca state and various delegations within each sector. Each delegation participates in assemblies where all union members of that delegation participate and vote on different measures and discuss different needs. Many delegations consist of a few hundred members. Each delegation elects representatives that attend a state level congress of local 22. It is at this congress that final decisions are voted on and taken to union leadership for action (Stephen, 2013). These meetings can be tedious. Many times, public assemblies of delegations would run into the early morning hours of the following day. But such has been the sacrifice the teachers have been willing to make to ensure that their democracy functions correctly.

Diego, one of the teachers I interviewed, talked about an assembly he attended with his delegation that lasted for three days. Oscar, another teacher I interviewed who was voted to be secretary general on a committee that represented his delegation talked about congress assemblies that would last for hours ending many times at four or five in the morning. While union members feel that these assemblies provide an opportunity for all to speak their minds the

process can be quite cumbersome and physically taxing. Many times, emotions run high and enemies are made within the union. Yet this complicated structure of representation makes participatory democracy as authentic as possible for the tens of thousands of union members in Oaxaca. Many of the teachers I interviewed expressed confidence in this structure of representation and that they felt their voices were heard and taken into account. In this way the most pressing needs of each delegation was consulted and brought forth to the governing body of the local. This helped to keep the attention of union leadership from skewing more toward urban delegations and leaving the needs of the more rural teachers unattended which is exactly what had taken place on the state and federal levels.

The tradeoff by having this type of system is that the process of implementing changes or allocating resources becomes increasingly bogged down because there are so many different interests at play. Historically, local 22 has been a strictly bottom-up organization in that the rank-and-file wielded control over decisions made by the local and the practice of *usos y costumbres* was used as a model for governing. The leadership existed to merely realize those decisions made by the local's base (Cook, 1996). But as local 22 grew in both membership and political power, the ability to more efficiently manage the local's decisions became more of a priority and the leadership needed to find a way to streamline some of the more pressing issues facing the union. One way to do this was to increase the union's focus on mobilization and protests against the government. Noe, one of the teachers interviewed has this to say regarding the centralization of power in the union.

Leading up to the movement of 2006 the union had invested more focus and resources into anti-government mobilizations. It seemed that the scale and frequency of protest activity increased especially under the governorship of Ruiz [Ortiz]. Instead of occupying the *zócalo* and organizing marches we were also shutting down major avenues and supermarkets really trying to cripple the infrastructure that kept Oaxaca moving. Participating in this brought us teachers closer together and created a stronger sense of

comradery and shared purpose. We felt that we had taken on a larger cause meant to change the social structures in place...At assemblies it was easier to talk about mobilizations against Ruiz and it seemed that the different delegations felt the same way... We aligned more with what the union leadership desired regarding the removal of Ruiz and an increased presence of resistance.

By focusing on mobilizing against the government through more aggressive methods of protest to acquire concessions the leadership was able to strengthen the level of trust felt by the rank and file and increase morale which was very strong up until the end of the 2006 conflict. Essentially, the rank and file felt that their interests were the leadership's interests.

It appeared that the strategy Noe mentioned paid off because it became much easier for the leadership to make decisions for the rank and file without directly consulting with them which was seen more conspicuously at the negotiating table with the state government. But as the local's rank and file placed more confidence in its leadership it became much easier for the leaders to pursue their own interests because of the high level of trust they enjoyed from the rank and file. It was uncommon for the rank and file to hold the leadership accountable for its actions because they felt that whatever the leadership decided to do was in the best interest of the union. In retrospect, some of the teachers I interviewed feel that the leadership used the protests against Ortiz to deceive the rank and file in order to provide a cover through which they could prioritize their interests at the expense of the rank and file.

For all of the strength and progress local 22 made leading up to the movement of 2006 much of it was wiped out by the end of the year. The movement exposed fissures and negative sentiments within the union that had up to that point not made themselves manifest in any significant ways. There had always been teachers within the local that voiced displeasure with the direction the local had taken. They felt that the core beliefs of local 22 had been undermined and that the union leadership had crossed the line and taken too much power for themselves

leaving little to the base. Many of these concerns failed to transcend the delegation assemblies. The union leadership carefully organized and manipulated groups within the local that intimidated and silenced detractors. After the collapse of the movement of 2006 there was too much opposition and disillusion within the local that there was no way to silence it. Furthermore, the collapse of the movement helped to expose the degree to which local 22 had become centralized and oligarchic.

What these events help to show is the underlying power struggle taking place within the local. This can be seen in 2006 and subsequent years where the actions of local 22 were decided on by the leadership, many times leaving the rank and file in the dark. A more complicated structure of bureaucracy such as the creation of sectors, delegations, and delegation representatives that assist the state-level congress allows for a lot of voted on issues to become lost in the vacuum of the bureaucracy. Yet, the structure in place does support the argument that the union only centralized and bureaucratized to the extent necessary to function more efficiently. Arguably, the leadership was still invested in providing as authentic of a participatory democratic experience as possible for the rank and file. Contrary to what has been explained, I believe that the centralization of power and bureaucratization are not the main factors behind local 22's shift to a more absolute oligarchy—the reason being that the local still displayed a significant amount of democracy and accountability of the leadership throughout the 1990s even as the local began to adopt oligarchic tendencies. It seems more realistic that the factors behind the local's shift to oligarchy point toward the increased repression against the union by the government. This factor, which will be explored more in-depth next chapter, contributed more to the shift to oligarchy than anything else because the effectiveness and existence of the union depended on weathering government pressure and maintaining its legitimacy.

Chapter 3: Violence, Repression, and a Shift to Oligarchy

Introduction

As explored in the previous chapter, local 22 clearly shifted from a purely democratic organization—where before the rank and file possessed significant influence in the trajectory of the local—to a more centralized and bureaucratic structure where the leadership apparatus had undertaken a larger share of the decision-making responsibilities. Some of the most important decisions facing the local: distribution of funds, allocation of resources, drafting a list of requests to present to the government, when to strike, where to strike, how long to strike, etc. now rested in the hands of the secretary general and his administration (Saavedra, 2016).

But while local 22 fits within Michels' theory of oligarchization, the forces behind the local's shift to oligarchy do not match up cleanly with Michels' argument. Yes, local 22 has become a behemoth, claiming more than 80,000 members in Oaxaca alone, and yes, as a result it has had to bureaucratize and centralize in order to more effectively operate with such a large membership, but this does not necessarily mean that centralization and bureaucratization led to the strong oligarchic structure within local 22 today. As mentioned, in the decades of the 80s and 90s when the local had a membership in the tens of thousands, rank and file members enjoyed a great amount of influence and decision-making power within the union. My interviews with teachers show that it was not the secretary general who decided when to strike, but the rank and file let the secretary general know that they were going to strike, and they let the Secretary General know what they needed from the local to carry out their decision. It was not the Secretary General and his administration that created a list of demands to present to the governor but the rank and file who then handed the list to the Secretary General to be presented to the

governor. The Secretary General merely acted as the union representative. The local effectively functioned as a bottom-up organization where democracy ensured that the rank and file decided on the actions and procedures of the local (Saavedra, 2016). Local 22's ability to maintain democracy notwithstanding a large membership number attests to its resilience and tenacity in maintaining its core beliefs.

Political pressure and government repression as the explanation for oligarchy in local 22

Very little research exists on the influence of external factors that influence an organization to become oligarchic. Most have to do with internal variables. One of the most relevant studies that looks at external factors affecting organizational trajectories comes from Ash and Zald (1966) who look at how movement organizations respond to “the ebb and flow of the sentiment of the larger society” and how the movement organization's relations with other movement organizations influences whether or not the organization becomes more conservative and oligarchical. Their study directly challenges Michels' and Weber's model that argues that the internal factors that lead to organizational maintenance always push toward conservatism and oligarchy. But the authors stop short of suggesting that society and other movement organizations influence an organization enough to become oligarchic. Instead, they focus on external influences on the existence of the organization and whether or not those influences lead to conservatism. However, the Ash and Zald study provides a good starting point when looking at local 22.

What makes local 22 unique is that it possesses most of the characteristics Lipset and Handelman found in their research of successfully democratic unions who, according to Michels' theory, should have become oligarchic but did not. Local 22 is made up of a highly educated

membership where conflicting ideologies are very much alive creating factions within the local. Autonomy has been the foundation on which the local came into being and participatory democracy existed as an absolute truth that formed the identity of the local. Yet, local 22 did not follow the same trajectory as the ITU and the SME. It shifted more toward oligarchy and quite rapidly, especially in the 2000s. What this chapter attempts to look at is the factors that precipitated the local's shift to become more oligarchic. The reason for this is that local 22's experience seems to be unique since it does not quite fit within the framework Michels offers. While Michels argues that internal factors such as organizational growth, the need for specialized positions within the organization, bureaucratization, and the need for professional leadership push an organization toward oligarchy, the experience in Oaxaca suggests that external factors more than internal ones pushed local 22 toward oligarchy. Government repression and political pressure applied to the local created a situation in which the local needed to consolidate power in order to survive. In fact, I argue that the repression (both violent and non-violent) instilled a sense of fear among local 22 members which then led to decreased participation in local 22 movements and pushed the leaders to assume more control over the local. The aim of this chapter is to further explore this phenomenon and explain how it influenced the oligarchization of local 22.

It is not surprising that the local's shift to oligarchy began in haste following the conflict of 2006. The government repression inflicted on the teachers that year was unprecedented. Officially, nearly two dozen teachers were killed from June to November, and unofficially many more casualties went unreported. The government, with the help of federal entities, brought an atmosphere of terror and violence that would haunt many of the protestors for years after the events. It was not just the physical violence but also the emotional and psychological violence

that destabilized the movement and brought it to an end. Teachers witnessing riot police beating and raping women, arresting peaceful protestors and sending them off to maximum security prisons, the emergence of the death squads (police and other vigilantes) that patrolled the streets at night and fired at teachers keeping watch over the barricades or occupying the radio stations, led many teachers to question their involvement in the movement and in the union itself.

Macrina, who was present at one of the radio stations in the city that she and other teachers were using to broadcast propaganda detailed an experience she had one night with the death squads:

We were outside the radio station, me and a few other teachers, keeping watch while the broadcast was going out over the airwaves. It was night and the neighborhood we were in, which was next to a large field on one side and a university campus on the other, was quiet. It must have been around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. when we heard a vehicle approaching quickly. As it turned the corner we knew that it wasn't one of ours because it was a large SUV and none of the teachers or protestors drove anything like that. Before we really had any time to react I heard gunshots and the car drove away as fast as it came. I heard a lot of yelling and realized that one of the teachers was shot. He was laying on the ground and had a hard time breathing right. One of the other teachers with us ran inside the radio station to let everyone know what happened, since one of the functions of the radio was to broadcast any movements the police or any sympathizers were making to alert the other protestors.

Macrina's experience was nothing out of the ordinary. Many teachers and others involved in the protests related similar accounts of violence and injustices (Stephen, 2013). Mirna, another teacher present during the conflict of 2006 related her fears and those of her coworkers as they witnessed the brutality of the police against the protestors.

The reports continued to circulate that a barricade was attacked in some part of the city one night and teachers getting shot at in another. Soon enough I talked with teachers who wouldn't stay outside after dark anymore. They would instead go home or stay indoors with a friend or sympathizer until the morning. I wouldn't be outside at night and I remember talking with other teachers, questioning our role in the conflict. We wondered if it wouldn't be better to be done with movement. It didn't seem worth it to stay in the union if it meant more of the violence we were experiencing.

The long months of repression were effective in shaking many of the teachers' faith in the movement and causing them to question whether or not activism within local 22 was worth it anymore. The government's decision to use repression to weaken the union was effective in this sense, and the tactic was used again in 2016 when federal police shot at protestors in Nochixtlán, about an hour north-west of Oaxaca City, killing at least eight. These events exposed a precarious reality for the local in that membership commitment was wavering and the state government engaged in an overt campaign to severely weaken the local. A strong centralized leadership was needed to manage the situation, maintain some type of order, and maximize damage control.

While violence functioned as the most extreme form of repression that threatened the local, the government also resorted to non-violent forms of pressure to destabilize local 22. Not more than a month after the end of the 2006 conflict, the SNTE, in cooperation with the PRI, created a new teachers union in the state. Local 59 was formed as a direct challenger to local 22. One of its main objectives was to precipitate a large number of defections from local 22 to local 59. To do this, the plan was simple. The state government would give preferential treatment to local 59 and provide it with the funding and resources that local 22 demanded for every year and claimed to not get. Although local 22 had become much more well known for its political influence and protests, at its core it concerns itself with education and every year that the local presents its demands to the government the majority of the demands call for funding for students and schools. As a result, this has led to violent conflicts between the two locals as local 22 accuses 59 of being a puppet of the PRI and 59 accusing 22 of systemic corruption (Garcia, 2017; Cruz, 2018). Roberto, the director of an NGO in Oaxaca that has worked with local 22 and local 59 explained the tense relationship:

What I noticed as I worked with each local is that local 59 would largely avoid the red tape that has always plagued local 22. It's not like local 22 just fills out a form and solicits financial help from the government and within a reasonable amount of time the grant or whatever financial aid is available to use. The process is cumbersome in many regards. Sometimes, years go by without receiving a cent of the solicited amount and that is part of the reason for the protests every year. Local 59, on the other hand, seems to not experience the same red tape and snail-paced response to petitions. Quite quickly, relatively speaking, does the government respond to the requests of local 59.

And as predicted, this has created a wedge between the two locals that continues to divide them.

The prospect of more financial support, more stable pay, and a quicker response by the government has been effective in luring teachers over from local 22. Paty, an elementary school teacher in the Isthmus region of Oaxaca talked about being recruited to join local 59 and how some of her colleagues left local 22. "I had some friends from [local] 22 that made the switch to [local] 59. They mentioned to me how the local is treated well by the government because the funding requests it solicits are quickly answered. They talked to me of teachers in the more rural parts of the states who had more access to resources the students could use. This was all foreign to me given my experience in [local] 22 where it was a struggle to get approval for more paper in the classroom. Everything was a struggle and we were forced to mobilize as a result."

It is clear that the tactics employed by both local 59 and the government function to sow instability and factions within local 22 with the intention of debilitating it. This may sound somewhat counterintuitive given Michels' and others' argument that factions help to prevent an organization from becoming oligarchic. Without empirical data it is hard to see whether or not this is the case, but interviews suggest that this has been effective to a degree. By recruiting teachers to defect to local 59 the government has created a dilemma that local 22 leadership has struggled to resolve.

As mentioned in chapter two, local 22 may have precipitated its shift to oligarchy or at least planted the seeds to do so with the co-signing of the 1992 bill with Governor Ramirez. In the bill the state government opened the way for local 22 to occupy many of the highest-level administrative posts in the IEEPO, essentially giving local 22 control over many facets of education in the state. There are two reasons why this partnership arguably influenced local 22's initial shift toward oligarchy. The first is that it opened up a new expansion of administrative responsibilities that necessitated a more bureaucratic structure to be able to carry out the newly obtained responsibilities. Hundreds of administrators were needed to staff the IEEPO in a full-time occupation. The other reason stems from the purging of local 22 members from the IEEPO, which perhaps crippled local 22 more than the repression of 2006.

During the 2006 conflict, local 22 along with other organizations in the state demanded for the resignation of Governor Ortiz from office. When it was clear that Ortiz was not going anywhere the local decided that it would use the gubernatorial election in 2010 to oust him—a tall order at the time since the PRI had continuously ruled Oaxaca for more than seventy years. However, Ortiz's dismal approval ratings and the debacle that was the 2006 conflict proved too much for the PRI to overcome, and for the first time in seven decades a non-PRI candidate won the election. Gabino Cue won the support of the local since he was seen as the competitor to the PRI and he promised a transparent and more understanding and mutual relationship with local 22. He promised to sit at the negotiating table and work out a solution that would satisfy both parties (Saavedra, 2016).

Yet, in 2012 with the election of the PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto to the presidency, a renewed focus on education reform took hold and the CNTE and local 22 saw this as a direct attack on the union's legitimacy. For one, local 22 saw the reform as a way for the government to

take control of the union by deciding which teachers remain and which are fired. By enforcing a test that all teachers would have to take in order to measure teacher aptitude, the government would be forcing the local to give up some of its power. Furthermore, many within the union saw the reforms as a euphemism for an attack on organized labor and an assault to break up the CNTE and local 22 since the government would be re-taking control of key aspects of education such as the dismissal of teachers. Cue largely avoided involvement in the conflict and did little if anything to prevent the administration of the education reforms in Oaxaca. The union decried the reforms as an all-out assault on teachers, that it would lead to a labor shortage in schools and be detrimental to the educational opportunities of rural students who were predominately poor and indigenous (Levinson, 2014).

Local 22 voiced opposition that the reforms were meant to eradicate the local and replace it with non-unionized teachers working under a largely privatized education system (Cencos XXII, 2015). As a result, massive resistance to the reforms became the rallying cry. Large-scale mobilizations in the form of marches, sit-ins , and blockades became commonplace and Oaxaca was one of the only states to not implement the reforms when they rolled out across the country. The government threatened to fire thousands of teachers in Oaxaca for failure to comply to the reforms, but local 22 merely dug its heels in deeper.

Yet the education reforms were merely a precursor to what would really shake up local 22 and leave it discombobulated for the foreseeable future. Governor Cue's decision to purge the IEEPO of local 22 in 2016 and replace it with employees from local 59 and others more sympathetic to the government dealt a blow to local 22 that nearly crippled it. My interview with Oscar highlights the chaos and the powerlessness of the union in rectifying the situation that transpired. He talked of losing his job at the IEEPO along with hundreds of other workers and

not being contacted by the union for days afterwards. For many of his colleagues reintegration into the education system afterwards was unattainable and they eventually found work in other fields. Local 22 was never able to respond to Cue's actions which was a significant departure from other moments when the local reacted with massive mobilizations and protests. It seemed that the local's hands were tied behind its back, leadership was limited in what it could do, and feelings of betrayal grew among the rank-and-file. About this same time other teachers reported that their paychecks were held. One teacher, Lupita, was directly affected and talked about her experience:

I went to the offices to retrieve my check and I was told that there were no checks to give. The government had held back the checks and wasn't paying us because of a discrepancy on our teaching license that said we were not titled to teach. I figured that the union would take care of the issue by clarifying the discrepancy. But days turned into weeks, and weeks turned into months, and more than a year went by without receiving a paycheck even though I was still working. Some of my colleagues couldn't continue working so long without pay and so they quit their jobs and found work in something else. After about a year and a half I was finally able to receive my checks, but not after countless paperwork and visits to government offices. I feel like the union let us down. But I do believe that it helped us as much as it could, the problem was that it was also trying to navigate the effects of Cue's actions.

The government waged an all-out assault on local 22 and it enjoyed a significant amount of success. In 2016 the police successfully obtained a warrant for the arrest of Ruben Nunez, Secretary General of local 22, for corruption charges (Graham, Barrera, and de Jesus, 2016). Coupled with the violence in Nochixtlán that same year, local 22 faced a situation that called into question its viability as a labor organization. The relentless attacks it suffered at the hands of the government placed a strain among the rank-and-file.

While political pressure had an effect on the local's shift to oligarchy, government repression magnified that effect. Historically, government repression was nothing new to the local, and it used the repression to emerge more unified and defiant, but the scale of government

repression against Local 22 had not been seen on this level before 2006. What differentiated 2006 from prior years was the brutality and violence that led to numerous deaths and the jailing and torture of hundreds more. All of the teachers I interviewed recalled with vivid detail police beating unarmed teachers—some of them mothers in front of their children, setting fire to teachers' belongings, ransacking the teachers' possessions in the zócalo, shooting at retreating protestors, and rounding up teachers and arresting them en masse. Divina, who was at the zócalo the morning the first attack took place described the carnage she witnessed.

There was so much commotion and smoke from the tear gas the police were shooting at us. They came in and quickly surrounded us, setting fire to our encampment. I remember seeing police with their batons beating men and women as they tried to run away. Others were dragged away in handcuffs. Teachers were running in every direction with many of them trying to escape and find refuge at the union offices. The zócalo looked like it had been bombed. There was trash and debris everywhere and smoke from the fires filled the air.

Many of those teachers arrested were sent off to maximum security prisons in other parts of the country and were not heard from for months (Aibar, 2008). Throughout the occupation of Oaxaca from June to November paramilitary groups known as death squads by the teachers and other protestors would patrol the city streets firing at protestors, destroy barricades and terrorize those on the streets who appeared to be sympathetic to the movement. One interviewee, Macrina, recalled how one of these death squads began to shoot at a small radio station she and other teachers were broadcasting from. One of the men with her was shot and killed. The constant terror demoralized a portion of the movement and many teachers and others involved in the conflict refused to leave their homes.

After the 2006 conflict ended the sense of fear continued as vivid memories of the violence haunted protestors. Teachers refused to participate in subsequent marches out of a fear of being attacked and the level of impunity with which the military and police acted demoralized

the movement and deflated any significant plans to continue mobilizing (Pansters, 2012). Isabel, another teacher interviewed, highlighted the psychological effects of this issue:

After the violence of 2006 we were fearful of what the government could do to us. We saw people killed and we heard about hundreds of other teachers who were beaten severely. There are other teachers I know who have disappeared. I nor anybody else has heard from them. Many were taken by helicopters and sent off to prisons far from Oaxaca. Reports of women being raped by police created a sense of fear especially since I myself am a woman and I decided along with others that we would not go out in opposition to the government.

Many of the teachers I interviewed spoke of the violence they witnessed and how it deterred them from participating in further mobilizations. They felt that the local and the CNTE were incapable of offering any protection for its members. This fear of violence was further intensified in subsequent years with the state's reorganization of the IEEPO and with the violence that took place in Nochixtlán in 2016.

Given Local 22's weakened state following the conflict of 2006 the government exploited a fissure intended to further debilitate the union. Gabino Cue, the governor of Oaxaca that succeeded Ulises Ruiz, became the first non-PRI governor in Oaxaca in eighty years. Much of his success in winning the governorship in 2010 can be traced back to the conflict of 2006. Citizens who felt betrayed by the police violence and Ruiz's corruption along with various unions throughout the state made their displeasure known at the polls. Cue won on a platform that promised a break from the status quo. He denounced the violence of 2006 and blamed Ruiz for precipitating it (Correa-Cabrera, 2013), promising to hold a tribunal to charge Ruiz of corruption. Cue also assured the teachers that he would establish a friendlier and more transparent relationship with them in order to address the many issues facing education and the lack of funding for schools and teachers (Saavedra, 2016). The change in regime signaled a new

era of promise for the teachers and Local 22. One interviewee, Roberto, expressed hope as he recalled the election of 2010.

As an organizer and director of an NGO we felt a lot of what the teachers were feeling after the events of 2006. We thought if the government could be so brutal with teachers then it could certainly do the same to us, if not more. At least the teachers have the union. We don't have any legal structure or presence that we can rely on for help. We were much more reserved and careful when we participated in events that were critical of any aspect of the government... When 2010 came and Cue was seen as the foil to the PRI we did what we could to help him get elected. There was a feeling of hope and it seemed that courage was starting to come back.

The excitement that began to spring up was quickly doused when in 2015 Gabino Cue signed an executive order to reorganize the IEEPO with the intention of purging it of workers who belonged to local 22. The decree or *decretazo* as it is known among teachers was another violent moment coming after the events of 2006. Oscar, one of the teachers I interviewed held an administrative position in the IEEPO and was present the day he and other Local 22 members were forced out of their offices and out onto the street.

He described the scene as similar to what happened in the *zócalo* nearly four years earlier. The state police arrived and surrounded the entrance to the building. Armed with machine guns and military style vehicles the scene brought back haunting memories. Oscar talked about how the police entered the building and began searching for local 22 members by name. They had a list of the names and began to call them off one by one and escorted them outside. The workers had no time and were not given permission to grab their belongings. They had to leave everything behind and being escorted on each side by armed police officers walked out the front door never to step foot inside the IEEPO again. On top of being expelled from the IEEPO local 22 members lost their jobs. Oscar recalled how he walked outside the IEEPO that

day without employment and was not sure what to do. He and other administrators immediately contacted their union representatives to let them know what had happened.

After we contacted the union they assured us that they would send a representative to be with us and that the union would get back to us about what they know and what steps to take. Many of us waited outside the IEEPO with police units guarding the entrance with guns to prevent us from going back in. The whole scene was frightening, and I had no idea what to expect...A representative from the union never came that day. In fact, I didn't hear back from the union for four days. When I did hear from the union there was not much said that I didn't already know. I wanted some assurances more than anything that the union was going to get my job back or at least transfer me to a new sector. They told me that they were in contact with the government and that the situation would be taken care of and my job restored...That never happened. Communication from union leadership was minimal. I did find employment again as an administrator at a primary school which the union did help me get. But many of my coworkers from the IEEPO have yet to be transferred to work in other sectors. We are talking about two years ago and many friends who by profession are teachers have not set foot in a classroom. Many of them have found jobs in other fields outside of teaching (Oscar, personal communication, August 7, 2017).

Oscar and many other teachers felt like their leaders were indifferent to their struggles or were powerless to do anything to rectify their predicament. The effects of the IEEPO restructuring were twofold. First, on a structural level it greatly debilitated the union because the government went after and seized the union's most powerful asset. No longer was local 22 the gatekeeper to public education in the state. The administrators in charge of school curriculum, logistics of teacher placement, and offering employment to teachers and terminating others were removed and new administrators hand-chosen by the government who were highly critical of local 22 replaced them. Second, the response of local 22 to the decree created a sense of betrayal in the eyes of those administrators and teachers removed from the IEEPO. Oscar, along with others believed that the interests of the union were somewhere else and that the leadership really was not worried about dozens of members being intimidated by the government and losing their jobs. Others that believed the union lacked the influence and power necessary to pressure the

government to reverse its actions began to lose faith in local 22 and became wary to anything the leadership wanted to do.

Then, in 2016, another moment of brutal violence swept over the union in the city of Nochixtlán. As protest activity once again began to pick up especially surrounding the new government reforms to teaching, teachers in this city about an hour north of Oaxaca City set up a blockade on the highway leading to Oaxaca. The blockade had existed for a few days before police forces were sent down from Mexico City to clear up the highway and many residents of Nochixtlán, who were not teachers but supported them, were present at the blockade. One of the teachers present at the blockade recounts her experience witnessing the carnage that took place once the police arrived.

We all knew that the police were coming from Mexico [City] from rumors and others relaying information about what they were seeing in Puebla. We gathered as many teachers and others willing to help out as possible and made preparations for their arrival. As the convoy of police approached some of us began to create distractions by setting tires on fire at the main entrance to Nochixtlán. Hundreds of police officers in riot gear began to form. As the tension escalated people started to say that shots were fired by the police. Protestors then began to set fire to vehicles located at the entrance to the city. There were some semi-trucks and buses that were used to create a barricade between us and the police. People were yelling and running from every direction and the whole scene was of chaos. Those that were injured by bullets or tear gas were taken into the city to be treated at homes and the church since the hospital would not accept any of the injured protestors. My principle responsibility during the conflict was to remove the cannisters of tear gas as soon as they were fired our way. I remember running out with my face covered in rags and grabbing the cannisters and throwing them back toward the police (Sol, personal communication, August 13, 2017).

Once again, like in 2006, protestors were killed, and the police used the violence to suppress the movement. Some of the protestors present in Nochixtlán were also present during the moments of police violence in the zócalo in 2006. But the response of the union after the events of Nochixtlán differed drastically from its response to the violence of 2006, and this difference highlights the state in which the union found itself. When the police violently removed the

teachers from the zócalo in 2006 the reaction of the union was swift and aggressive. Tens of thousands of teachers assembled at the request of Local 22 to march into the city. These mega-marches took place on various occasions in June 2006. The union publicly denounced the violence and vowed that justice would be sought for the victims. Local 22 also turned to the public for help in mobilizing the movement, which came relatively easy since the local had established a positive relationship with communities throughout the state. But 2016 saw a different response from the local. While the union did condemn the violence publicly, there was not much action taken. There were no mega-marches. There were no pleas to the public like in 2006 for support in fighting against the government. In fact, there was not much of anything. During my time spent in Oaxaca during the summer of 2016 I did not see the same effort on the part of the union to demand justice as it did ten years earlier. The zócalo was not full of protesting teachers and it seemed that the atmosphere was one of resignation. This is not to say that there was no protesting that took place in the wake of Nochixtlán. While scattered, some of the most intense protesting took place in the Isthmus region of the state where individual delegations such as those in Juchitán de Zaragoza setup barricades and blocked off access to the major highway leading into Juchitán from Oaxaca. These isolated instances of protest highlight the precarious state of the union at that time since it appeared that the leadership had lost some measure of control over the actions of its base, highlighting the polarization felt within the union.

And it was not just violence that tempered the union. Administratively, some decisions made by the leadership of local 22 during the movement of 2006, for example, intensified a growing dissatisfaction among teachers. When local 22 went to the negotiating table in November of 2006 many within the movement felt that the momentum was in their favor and they wanted the conflict to continue. They felt that the movement would pressure the federal

government enough that it would have to acquiesce to the local's demands that Ruiz be removed from office and tried in court for murder and corruption. Instead, when the leadership of local 22 met with federal and state officials a truce was reached and the movement ended. The federal government sent police forces to Oaxaca and forcefully removed the protestors from the zócalo and Ruiz returned to govern the state (Eisenstadt, 2011). By reaching a deal behind closed doors, especially since the negotiation took place without the teachers' consent and contrary to many of the teachers' wishes, a feeling of betrayal grew among union members. "Many of us felt hurt by the delegates when we found out that they had met with the government and decided to end the movement. There was so much momentum on our side with APPO and other organizations behind us. For almost six months we had control of the city, there were no police, we ran our own Guelaguetza [festival]. So for them to end the movement like that felt like a stab in the back and many of us lost respect and a desire to fight" (Oscar, personal communication, August 7, 2017).

After the movement of 2006, local 22 experienced a period of weakening that stretched over the following ten years. It seemed that the leadership was viewed with much more scrutiny and a lack of faith in their motives pushed many teachers to not participate in subsequent marches and protests. While interviewing Divina, one of the teachers heavily invested in the 2006 conflict, she told me that even the threat of union sanctions against teachers who refused to participate in marches and sit-ins was not effective. Many of the rank and file did not care and rumors and accusations of corruption among the leadership spread quickly. Many believed that the union leaders made deals with the government to exonerate themselves of any further prosecution. When Enrique Rueda Pacheco, the leader of Local 22 during the conflict of 2006, suddenly resigned from his post in 2007 and disappeared from the public eye many within the

union believed the government had bought him off and sent him to live overseas (Agudo Sanchiz, 2014).

All of the characteristics displayed in this chapter align with Michels' theory on oligarchy. The centralization of power enforced by the leaders of local 22 led to an increased focus on maintaining their positions of power and a decreased focus on the needs of the rank and file. This is why Oscar and so many others felt forgotten after their traumatic experience being removed from the IEEPO and fired from their positions. But the repression shows just how significant it can be in shaping the trajectory of an organization. Repression against local 22 set off a series of changes that ultimately forced the leaders to assume more control over the local.

Conclusion

My purpose in bringing up these examples is to highlight the argument that external factors, more so than internal ones, pushed local 22 to become oligarchic. Government repression, especially, has influenced the local's shift to oligarchy. Two of the principle reasons for why an organization may shift to oligarchy is to achieve an increase in effectiveness and efficiency in running the operations of the organization. If the organization's members are less invested in the union or indifferent to its leadership then there is a decrease in solidarity and efficiency because the rank-and-file feels less invested and less motivated to fight for union causes. The leadership has to work harder to maintain the support of the base. This is the case with local 22. The pressure the government applied to the local disrupted its ability to operate at an effective level. The leadership needed to focus on surviving the onslaught of government attacks and one way to do this was to consolidate power to increase efficiency and maintain control. It is much easier to make decisions in a conference room than it is to hold public

assemblies and wait for the voice of the rank-and-file to tell the leadership what actions to take. This becomes extremely impractical when there is an oppositional force that applies near-constant pressure on the union and important decisions regarding how to respond to that pressure must be made on a consistent and urgent basis. What these events help to show is the underlying power struggle taking place within local 22. As the local tried to weather repression and political struggles, the need to centralize its control became more apparent. This can be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 conflict and subsequent years where the actions of Local 22 were decided on by the leadership, many times leaving the rank and file unaware of the decisions being made until much later. While influential, the centralization of power and bureaucratization of local 22 are not the main factors behind its shift to oligarchy, and it becomes increasingly clear that the factors behind the local's shift to oligarchy point toward the increased repression.

Conclusion: Why Repression Matters and the Future of Local 22

The experience of local 22 helps to explain the role of repression as an influencing force behind the local's shift to oligarchy. As the local continued to endure both political and physical attacks by the government it experienced an increased shift toward more centralization where the rank and file did not experience the same amount of decision-making power it historically enjoyed. By the end of the 2006 conflict, for example, the rank and file felt left out when local 22 announced an end to the occupation of Oaxaca City, and as the years carried on, the leadership exercised more control over decision-making and expressed less concern for the rank and file. As a result, by the time of the Nochixtlán massacre in 2016, many in the rank and file felt disillusioned with their leaders and morale was at historic lows which helps explain why teacher participation in protests was so dismal. Not even the threat of union sanctions could dissuade the teachers from failing to participate in local 22 sponsored activities.

What happened in Oaxaca is important when looking at the forces that push an organization to become oligarchic because it adds another factor to what Michels and others have argued. In most cases Michels' iron law holds true, the larger an organization—even a democratic one—grows the more it has to centralize power and bureaucratize in order to streamline the day-to-day operational decisions that need to be made. If not, then the organization cannot sustain itself for long and eventually the organization will become paralyzed, collapse, or fracture. Historically, one of the effects of bureaucratization and the centralization of power on a democratic organization is a weakening of its democracy. However, this is not true in all cases such as was explored with the Electrical Workers Union (SME) in Mexico. The SME is a very large union, yet it has successfully held competitive elections for

decades and the rank and file enjoy a great amount of power. Furthermore, the rank and file have been successful in maintaining a check on the union leadership, not allowing it to overreach its authority. Local 22 shares many of the same characteristics of the SME, and like the SME, local 22 was able to resist a shift to oligarchy for many years. What differentiates the two organizations is government repression. SME has not faced the level of violence that local 22 has. The brutal repression of 2006 and the political and economic government attacks against the local since then have been more than the local can weather, and it has had to adopt an oligarchic structure to be able to continue existing.

This experience shows us that to be able to better understand Michels' theory of oligarchy the understanding of what factors make an organization become oligarchic needs to expand. Attention needs to be given to the external pressures placed on an organization, not just the internal ones. The example in Oaxaca exemplifies this with the government repression against local 22 and the repression's effects on the local's organization. By adding to Michels' theory researchers will have more tools to understand how seemingly bottom-up and democratic organizations become oligarchic, when, like local 22, bureaucracy, centralization of power, and even corporatist relationships do not explain the oligarchization of the organization. Currently, many bottom-up structured labor unions face increasing violence and repression from state actors, and an investigation into the effects of repression on the oligarchization of unions could provide new insight into the study of anti-union violence, union organization, and union-state relations.

The repression local 22 experienced in 2006 and in following years is not unique to Oaxaca, nor to Mexico. Latin America has a long history of government repression against trade unions and more liberal organizations. Caudillos and dictators from Argentina to Chile to

Mexico violently dealt with liberal trade unions and silenced many of their leaders. Since Mexico's economic liberalization beginning in the 1980s, presidents have exercised less patience in dealing with antagonistic unions. In 2009, for example, Mexican president Felipe Calderón ordered members of the military and police to forcefully seize the properties of *Luz y Fuerza del Centro* (Central Light and Power), a power company in central Mexico that provides power to the Mexico City region. Most of the 44,000 members of *Luz y Fuerza* belong to the SME, which in addition to being one of the more democratic unions in Mexico, is also one of the most independent and resistant to the government (Miller, 2009). The government seizure of *Luz y Fuerza* property and assets has been the boldest move yet by the government against the SME, and like local 22, threatens the very existence of the union. The night the military seized the properties, President Calderón signed a decree to liquidate the company, fire its 44,000 workers, and turn the assets over to the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), the state-owned electricity utility. As of now no research has been done to investigate whether or not the organizational structure of SME was affected by the attack against *Luz y Fuerza*. Local 22's experience with repression can help to establish a framework to see if SME follows a similar path of diminishing democracy and increasing oligarchy. Given all of the repression trade unions suffer from their respective governments it is surprising that more focus has not been placed on how repression affects the organizational structure of the repressed organizations.

Time will tell whether or not local 22 re-establishes its presence and influence in Oaxaca. In 2016, local 22's future seemed bleak, yet in the last two years the local has begun to show flashes of its former powerful self. Protest activity has begun to ramp up, bringing with it larger crowds of teachers participating (Briseño, 2018). The zócalo is beginning to fill with teachers again during the summer sit-ins, but with the new laws governing education workers, it is much

easier for the government to fire teachers found protesting, and since local 22 no longer controls the IEEPO its hands are essentially tied to prevent any kind of government sanctions against its members. Yet the government defiance that so well defined local 22 has started to resurface with the local not only staging protests and marches throughout the city but also setting up roadblocks throughout the state (Cruz, 2017). Much like in the past, local 22 will be testing the government's patience and resilience to rebellion. Historically, local 22 has been one of the most tenacious and resilient locals in Mexico, withstanding repression and attacks not only from the government, but from other organizations and unions as well. One lingering question now is if the scars of 2006 have permanently crippled local 22 or if they will strengthen the teachers' resiliency and embolden them as they once more go against the government. After all, the government has not been able, as of yet, to eradicate local 22, and as long as the spark of rebellion is not extinguished, Oaxaca will continue to be an ideological battleground with local 22 at the vanguard of non-conformity.

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