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Publication Date

2016

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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Islamization and Religious Pluralism
in Democratizing Indonesia

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Sociology

by

Gustav Joseph Brown

2016

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Islamization and Religious Pluralism in Democratizing Indonesia

by

Gustav Joseph Brown

Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

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Since independence, Indonesia has gradually formalized a system of religious pluralism that grants equal recognition, rights, and protections to multiple religious groups. And Indonesian Muslims—who account for some 88 percent of the population—are often described as more tolerant of religious diversity than their co-religionists elsewhere. Yet in the eighteen years since Indonesia’s transition to democracy, religious pluralism has come under pressure from a series of developments that affect Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These include campaigns to assert the primacy of Islam relative to other faiths, “purify” the beliefs and practices of Indonesian Muslims, and Islamize the state. They also include the increasing adoption of pious dress by Muslims, which has made religious identities—and religious divisions—visible in a way they never were under Sukarno or Suharto. These developments suggest that intertwined processes of democratization, decentralization, and sociocultural

Islamization are recontextualizing questions of how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced in Indonesia.

This dissertation explores different manifestations of pressure on religious pluralism in post-transition Indonesia. After tracing the historical development of religious pluralism in Indonesia, I examine pressures emerging from and manifesting themselves in legislative challenges to religious pluralism at the level of the state; localized protests against the building of new churches; and the adoption of pious dress in everyday life. I argue that democratization, decentralization, and sociocultural Islamization are neither reinforcing nor dismantling Indonesia's system of religious pluralism. Rather, they are producing sharp and growing disparities in how pluralism is institutionalized and practiced: disparities across regions, localities, and groups. By eschewing the ideologically charged question of whether Islam is *compatible with* religious pluralism in favor of an empirical investigation of the ways Islamization generates multiple and distinctive *pressures on* religious pluralism, I endeavor to provide a nuanced portrait of a society struggling to reconcile heightened Islamic claims-making with long-standing traditions of pluralism.

The dissertation of Gustav Joseph Brown is approved.

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2016

This dissertation is dedicated to Diajeng Antin Amaril Hendratmo.

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GLOSSARY

Part 1: Indonesian and Dutch Terms¹

Abangan. Low-caste (peasant) heterodox Muslims from Java, who mix Islam with animistic practices.

Adat. Customary law

Adatrecht. Customary law formalized by the Netherlands Indies colonial regime.

Aliran. Cultural stream. Indonesian concept term for any bounded cultural group whose members are also embedded in specific and parallel sets of institutions.

Aliran sesat. Deviant sect. Term used by orthodox Muslims (and others) in Indonesia to describe heterodox sects and cults. Typically used to denote threat posed by group to social harmony.

Asas tunggal. Suharto-era policy requiring all political and social/civic organizations to declare Pancasila as their sole ideological basis. Official state recognition and subsidies often withheld from groups refusing to comply.

Baju kokok. Formal Islamic dress, as one would wear to Mosque.

Batik. Traditional Malay wax-resist dying. Though not exclusive to Java or the Javanese, *batik* is commonly associated with Java and ethnic Javanese culture.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Unity in diversity. National motto of Indonesia.

Bupati. Regent (elected official).

Cultuurstelsel. Cultivation system. Mode of resource and agricultural extraction imposed on Indies subjects (particularly on Java) by the Dutch colonial regime during the years 1830-1860. Based on *corvée* labor.

Dangdut. Style of Indonesian popular music.

Datuks. Sumatran traditional nobility.

Dienst Maleisch. Service Malay. Pidgin developed for civil servants of the Netherlands Indies.

Era Reformasi. Reform era. Term used to describe the post-transition period (1998-Present).

¹ I include a few English terms that are used in the literature to characterize aspects of the Dutch colonial regime in present-day Indonesia.

Ethical Policy. Liberalization of the Netherlands Indies, including the abolishment of the *cultuurstelsel*, during the years 1860-1908.

Foreign Oriental. Dutch colonial term for “non-indigenous”/non-European residents of the Netherlands Indies (e.g. Arabs, Chinese, or Japanese).

Gaul. Cool, trendy, or fashionable.

Gotong royong. Reciprocity or harmonious cooperation. Indonesian cultural concept. Frequently used to justify restrictions on civil liberties and independent political organization.

Goyang ngebor. Sexually suggestive “drill” dance popularized by *dangdut* singer Inul.

Indischer. Dutch colonial term for Indies subjects of mixed Indo-European parentage.

Inlander. Dutch colonial term for “indigenous” subject of the Netherlands Indies.

Kabupaten. Regency (administrative unit).

Jabodetabek. Portmanteau term for the major cities of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi).

Jaipong. Traditional Sundanese dance.

Jilboob. Term used to describe fashion trend combining a *jilbab* with revealing, form-fitting, or otherwise sexualized clothing.

Kampung. Home village.

Kebaya. Traditional Javanese dress for women, which covers the shoulders and chest with a sheer garment.

Keindonesiaan. Indonesian-ness.

Keislaman. Islam-ness.

Kejawen. Javanism. Umbrella term for heterodox Islam among Javanese. Practitioners incorporate Hindu, Buddhist, or animist rituals into their daily observance of Islam.

Kemodernan. Modern-ness.

Kerudung. Loosely worn, often sheer headscarf traditionally worn by Javanese women. Typically does not cover the widow’s peak.

Kongsi. Originally Chinese but later ethnically mixed merchant associations in the early 20th century.

Kos. Dormitory-style apartments. Popular with college students and young professionals.

Kota . City/municipality (administrative unit).

Kristenisasi. Christianization.

Kyai. Javanese title for a trained Islamic scholar or teacher. Synonymous with *alim*.

Mardijker. Dutch colonial term for descendants of freed Portuguese slaves.

Orde baru. New Order. Term used to describe Suharto's authoritarian regime (1965-1998).

Orde lama. Old Order. Term used to describe the post-independence (Sukarno) period (1945-1965)

Otonomi daerah. Regional autonomy. Two-stage decentralization process initiative enacted in 1999 and 2006.

Pancasila. The five principles. National ideology of Indonesia, which includes "belief in the one and only God." Widely viewed as providing the ideological basis of religious pluralism in Indonesia.

Pasar Melayu. Market Malay. Pidgin developed by subjects of the Netherlands Indies for trade purposes.

Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila (P4). Guidelines for Instilling Commitment to and Implementing Pancasila. Controversial indoctrination program initiated by the Suharto regime in 1978.

Pembaruan. Renewal. Civil Islamic movement within Muhammadiyah (1968). Called for the organization to abandon the idea of an Islamic state and refocus on educational and charitable works.

Peranakan. Javanized or assimilated Chinese.

Perda syariah. *Sharia* bylaws enacted at the regency/municipality or district level.

Pesantren. Islamic seminary.

Piagam Jakarta. The Jakarta Charter. Clause in the draft 1945 Constitution that obligated all Indonesian Muslims to follow *sharia* (and would have obligated the state to enforce *sharia*). Removed from final draft.

Preman. Thug or gangster.

Premanisme. Gangsterism.

Pribumi. Indonesian term for “native” Indonesians. Largely synonymous with colonial-era term “Inlander,” but with reversed polarity. Excludes Chinese and Arabs.

Priyayi. High-caste (aristocratic) heterodox Muslim Javanese, who mix Islam with Hindu and Buddhist practices.

Rust en orde. Peace and order. Policy priority for the Netherlands Indies.

Santri. Students of *pesantren*. Often used to refer to orthodox Muslims more broadly, particularly on Java.

Totok. Non-Javanized or non-assimilated Chinese.

Walikota. Mayor (elected official).

Wayang. Javanese (and Balinese) shadow puppetry based on the Hindu epics Ramayana and Muhabharata.

Part 2: Arabic Terms²

Ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah. People of the Sunnah and the Islamic community. Sometimes refers to Sunni Muslims generally, but is often used more narrowly by Indonesian traditionalists to delineate that community from Islamic modernists.

Al Dhimmi. Protected religious minorities in medieval Islamic states.

Al Khittab. People of the book. Non-Muslim monotheists. Originally limited to Jews and Christians, later expanded to include Zoroastrians and other monotheists.

Aurat. Adornment. Quranic term for the sexualized parts of the body. Defined as genitals and buttocks for men. Defined either as genitals, buttocks, and chest for women, or more expansively as everything but the hands, feet, and face.

Azzan. The Islamic call to prayer.

Dai. Sufi-influenced preachers. Proliferated in Indonesia during the 1980s and 1990s.

Dakwah. Appeal. Islamic term for proselytizing, primarily by orthodox to lapsed, heterodox, or non-pious Muslims.

Fatwa (plural: *fatwas*). Type of religious edict issued by trained *ulama* based on interpretations of *sharia*.

Fiqh. Classical Islamic jurisprudence

Hadith. Vignette about the Prophet Muhammad, his family, or companions deemed canonical by Islamic scholars.

Haj. Greater pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Performing the *haj* is considered a requirement of the faith by most orthodox Muslims.

Hajji/a. Muslim who has performed the *haj*.

Halal. Permitted (in Islam). Most commonly used in reference to dietary matters.

Haram. Forbidden (in Islam).

Hijab. Islamic headscarf. Called *jilbab* in Indonesia.

² I use the Indonesian transliteration of Arabic terms (rather than the more common transliterations used in international scholarship) in cases, such as *dakwah*, where the Arabic term has been incorporated into the Indonesian language. However, where the term has also been incorporated into the English language, such as *sharia*, I use the English transliteration.

Hudud. Medieval (Islamic) system of corporal punishments.

Ijtihad. Critical (individual) exegesis of the Quran and Sunnah.

Jihad. Struggle. Encompasses both self-improvement (*jihad* of the soul) and holy war (*jihad* of the sword).

Jihadi. Colloquial term for extremist Muslims who believe all Muslims should wage holy war against the “enemies of Islam,” however defined.

Jilbab. In Indonesia, the Islamic headscarf; outside Indonesia, a long, loosely worn cloak that covers the whole (female) body.

Jizya. Tax levied on protected non-Muslim groups in medieval Islamic states, collected in lieu of *zakat*

Khaffir. Infidel. Classically defined as non-Muslim who is not *al-Khittab*.

Madrasah. Islamic religious school. In Indonesia, *madrasah* specifically refers to Islamic day schools that incorporate general education alongside religious curriculum.

Ma'had. Islamic center.

Mahdi. Messiah (in Islam). Closely associated with the figure of Jesus (Issa).

Mawlid. Observance of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday. A popular practice across South and Southeast Asia, but considered idolatrous by many orthodox Muslims.

Mazhab. The four jurisprudential traditions of medieval Islam (*syafi'i*, *hanbali*, *hanafi*, and *maliki*).

Millet. System of social organization under the Ottoman Empire. Granted limited autonomy to religious authorities in exchange for fealty and obedience to the Ottoman state.

Musholla. Prayer room.

Muslimah. Muslim woman. Typically used more narrowly in reference to pious-practicing Muslim women.

Musuh aqidah. Enemies of the faith.

Nabi zili. Shadow representation of a prophet. Qadiani Ahmadi term for founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad.

Niqab. Black full-body covering for female Muslims, often with a face veil. Popular in the Arabian Peninsula and among *salafi* Muslims.

Salafi. Followers of the way of the Prophet's companions. Member of ultraconservative Sunni sect based in the Arabian Peninsula. Often associated with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Sharia. Divine law, as revealed in the Quran and Sunnah.

Sunnah. The way of the Prophet. Collection of *hadiths* given canonical status by Sunni scholars. Of secondary importance to the Quran in Sunni Islam.

Syafi'i. One of the four jurisprudential traditions of medieval Islam. Predominates in Indonesia.

Syekh. Sufi master or prominent figure/community leader of significant standing.

Tafsir. Religious opinion based on *ijtihad* (exegesis).

Taqiyah. Male skullcap.

Taqlid. Act of following the teachings of an expert in Islamic law

Tarekat. Sufi order.

Tasawwuf. Primarily Sufi tradition that emphasizes love, beauty, inner peace, and the purification of the heart.

Ukhuwah. Brotherhood or solidarity (in Islam).

Ulama (singular: *alim*). Trained Islamic scholars/jurists.

Umma/umat. Greater Islamic community.

Umroh. Lesser pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.

Wahhabi. Generally pejorative term for Muslims who prefer to call themselves *salafis*. The term refers to the 19th century reformer Ibn al Wahhab.

Zakat. Islamic alms.

LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS

Al-Jamā'ah al-Islāmīyyah al-Ahmadīyyah (JIA). Ahmadiyah Muslim Community. Largest international Ahmadi organization. Teaches that Mirza Ghulan Ahmad is the *mahdi* (messiah) and embodied spirit of Jesus (Issa).

Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan (AKKBB). National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief. A pro-pluralism organization.

Ansor. Youth organization of Nahdlatul Ulama.

Banser. Paramilitary arm of Ansor.

Boedi Oetomo. Early Indonesian nationalist organization, founded in 1908.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Policy-incubator modeled after the U.S. RAND Corporation. Associated with New Order generals Ali Moertopo and Benny Moerdani.

Darul Arqam/Dakwah Tabligh. Southeast Asian offshoots of the South Asian Tablighi Jama'at (Islamic) revivalist movement.

Darul Islam. Islamist insurgency in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh. Active 1949-1962.

Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII). Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam. Prominent conservative *dakwah* organization founded by Muhamed Natsir.

Ennahda. The dominant Islamist party in Tunisia.

Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam (FKUI). Advocacy Forum for the Islamic Community. "Street Islamist" group active in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region.

Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Forkami). Advocacy Forum for Indonesian Muslims. "Street Islamist" group active in Bogor.

Front Pembela Islam (FPI). Islamic Defenders' Front. "Street Islamist" group active across Indonesia.

Forum Umat Islam (FUI). Forum for the Islamic Community. Umbrella organization for "street Islamist" and likeminded radical Muslim organizations.

FURKON. Islamic Forum for the Upholding of Justice and the Constitution. "Street Islamist" group founded in 1998 to defend the regime against student-led protests. Now defunct.

Gereja Kristen Indonesia (GKI). Christian Church of Indonesia. Calvinist synod.

Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan (GKJW). East Javanese Christian Church. Calvinist synod catering to ethnic Javanese.

Gerakan 30 September (G30S). September 30th Movement. The name adopted by the short-lived 1965 *coup d'état* against Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime. Quickly put down by the military under Suharto.

Golkar. Functional Group. Institutional party of Suharto's New Order regime. Now a prominent secular-nationalist political party.

Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (HMI). Muslim Student Association.

Rabita al-Alam al-Islami. World Muslim League. A Saudi organization formed to combat "heresy" and heterodoxies within Islam, and to enhance Saudi influence among Sunni Muslims.

Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP). Batak Protestant Christian Community. Lutheran synod catering to ethnic Bataks.

Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI). All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals. State-funded professional association formed in 1990 by Suharto-lieutenant B. J. Habibie in order to promote the interests of Muslim civil servants and entrepreneurs.

Indische Partij. Indo-European Party. Briefly legal (1912-1913) political party that brought together Indies-born Dutch citizens, Indies subjects of mixed parentage, and Dutch-educated "Inlanders."

Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) and *Universities Islam Negeri (UIN)*. State-run Islamic higher education systems.

Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI). Ahmadi Community of Indonesia. Largest Ahmadi organization in Indonesia. Follows the Qadiani School, which contends that founder Mirzi Ghulam Ahmad is a shadow representation of a prophet, not a prophet himself.

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Islamic Community. Al Qaeda-linked Islamist terrorist network. Responsible for a series of deadly bombings (2000-2009).

Justice and Development Party (AKP). Dominant Islamist political party in Turkey.

Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan Gerakan Kontrarevolusioner 30 September. Action Front to Crush the Counter-Revolutionary September 30th Movement. Military-organized anti-PKI group made up of Catholic and Muslim organizations.

Komando Jihad. Terrorist group either formed or manipulated by the Suharto regime to create a pretext for a 1977 crackdown on political Islam.

Komite untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam (KISDI). Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World. Leading conservative *dakwah* organization with special focus on international (Sunni) Muslim solidarity.

Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (Komnas HAM). National Commission on Human Rights.

KOSTRAD. The Indonesian army's elite "strategic command" unit.

Laskar Jihad. Jihad Soldiers. Islamist paramilitary group formed in 2000 to defend Muslims and attack Christians in Maluku. Military involvement is widely suspected though unconfirmed.

Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial (LP3ES). Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information. Ford Foundation-funded think-tank. Gathering point for progressive-minded intellectuals during the 1980s and 1990s.

Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI). Supreme Council of Indonesian Muslims. Umbrella organization for the SI, NU, and Muhammadiyah. Dissolved by the Japanese military regime in 1943.

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Indonesian Ulama Council. State-funded council created to provide Islamic justification for government policies. Functionally autonomous from state control since transition in 1998.

Masyumi. Islamist political party formed by the Japanese military occupational regime in 1943. Main Islamist party during the 1940s and early 1950s. Banned in 1960 for association with a separatist movement.

Ministry of Religious Affairs. Bureaucratic office that regulates religious life in Indonesia.

Muhammadiyah. Indonesia's largest modernist Muslim organization.

Muslim Brotherhood. Egyptian Islamist organization and political party. Ideological forebear of PKS in Indonesia.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Largest Muslim civic organization in Indonesia, representing traditionalist (*syafi'i*) Muslims.

PAM Swakarsa. Self-security forces. Collection of *preman* groups allegedly organized by the military to defend the regime against the 1998 student-led protests. Included both Islamist and ultranationalist groups.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN). National Mandate Party. Civil Islamic political party founded by Amien Rais and associated with Muhammadiyah.

Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB). Crescent Star Party. Small Islamist party founded by ex-DDII chairman Ahmad Sumargono. Consistent advocate for the statewide imposition of *sharia*. Out of parliament since 2009.

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI). Indonesian Democracy Party. Institutional nationalist opposition party under the New Order. Renamed PDI-P in 1998.

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P). Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle. Secular-nationalist party. One of the largest political parties in Indonesia.

Partai Demokrat (PD). Democratic Party. Secular-nationalist party, founded in 2004. One of the largest political parties in Indonesia.

Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). Indonesian Communist Party. Founded in 1917 and abolished in 1966.

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). People's Awakening Party. Civil Islamic political party founded by Abdurrahman Wahid and associated with NU.

Partai Keadilan (PK). Justice Party. Muslim Brotherhood-inspired, pro-*sharia* Islamist party. In 2004, rebranded as the more moderate Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS).

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). Prosperous Justice Party. Islamist party that no longer advocates for the comprehensive imposition of *sharia*.

Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). Indonesian National Party. Formed in 1928 by Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta. The main nationalist party of the post independence period (1945-1965). Dissolved by Suharto in 1973 and replaced by the PDI.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). United Development Party. Institutional Islamic opposition party under the New Order. Now a conservative/Islamist political party.

Partai Rakyat Demokratik (PRD). People's Democratic Party. Small, left-wing party active during the 1990s.

Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI). Indonesian Socialist Party. Social democratic and nationalist party formed in 1945. Banned in 1960 for association with a separatist movement.

Pemuda Pancasila. Pancasila Youth. Ultranationalist *preman* group with ties to the military, Active in PAM Swakarsa.

Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (PBNU). Central Executive Committee of Nahdlatul Ulama.

Persekutuan Gereja-gereja di Indonesia (PGI). Indonesian Communion of Churches. Umbrella organization for mainline Protestant churches in Indonesia.

Persatuan Islam (Persis). Islamic Unity. Conservative Islamic educational foundation.

Peta. Militant (Muslim) youth group organized by the Japanese military occupational regime to resist an Allied invasion.

Republik Indonesia Serikat (RIS). United States of Indonesia. Short-lived (1949-1950) federation of former Netherlands Indies territories.

Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS). Short-lived (1949-50) separatist movement in Maluku, headed by ex-colonial army officers. After 1950, a Netherlands-based émigré organization seeking independence from Indonesia.

PRRI/Permesta. Officer-led, CIA-backed separatist rebellions against the Indonesian state (1957-1958).

Sarekat Islam (SI). Islamic Union. Political organization and trade cooperative for Islamic merchants and craftsmen. Founded in 1911; decline after 1928.

Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC). Dutch East India Company. Private Dutch mercantilist company. From 1605 to 1796, asserted political and economic hegemony over much of present-day Indonesia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their support, criticism, advice, and mentorship: Rogers Brubaker, Geoffrey Robinson, William Roy, and Michael Mann. I would also like to thank Andreas Wimmer, who has provided me with helpful guidance, advice, and feedback at various stages of the research and writing process, and the many participants of the UCLA Sociology Comparative Social Analysis Seminar.

This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Fellowship and the UCLA Lemelson Fellowship for Indonesian Studies, which allowed me to travel to Indonesia for the purposes of data collection. While in Indonesia, I was sponsored by Muhammad Hisyam of the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) in Jakarta, and was assisted in data collection by Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, for which I am grateful. I would also like to acknowledge some of the scholars and activists who helped make my time in Indonesia memorable and productive: Azyumardi Azra, Jajat Burhanudin, Yenny Wahid, Ihsan Ali-Fauzi, Sidney Jones, Syafiq Mughni, Abd A'la, and many more. Finally, I would like to thank my informants and focus group participants, who were candid and open about their views, perspectives, hopes, and fears.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Education

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Awards

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- Foreign Language and Area Studies Academic Year Fellowship, U.S. Department of Education, 2007-2009.
- Chancellor's Award, University of California, Los Angeles, 2006-2008.
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Introduction

Islam in Indonesia, the cliché goes, is both unusually diverse and tolerant of religious diversity. Though this is an oversimplification, there is nevertheless much truth to the statement. In addition to a large, heterogeneous Sunni Muslim majority, Indonesia is home to sizeable Christian, Hindu, and Buddhist minorities, smaller groups of Shia and Ahmadiyah Muslims, and various Islamic heterodoxies, including *kejawen* (Javanism), whose practitioners incorporate Hindu, Buddhist, and animist rituals into their daily observance of Islam.¹ Moreover, for complex and historically contingent reasons, the practical reality of life in this religiously diverse environment has incubated pluralistic and even relativistic outlooks on faith. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1971: 9-25) famously cited this as distinguishing Indonesian Islam from what he observed elsewhere. And U.S. President Barack Obama chose to highlight this “spirit of tolerance” in a 2010 speech given at the University of Indonesia; he characterized it as being “written into [Indonesia’s] Constitution; symbolized in mosques and churches and temples standing alongside each other; that spirit that’s embodied in [the Indonesian] people—that still lives on. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*—unity in diversity” (White House 2010).

Yet in the eighteen years since Indonesia’s transition to democracy, religious pluralism has come under pressure from a series of developments that affect Muslims and non-Muslims alike. These include campaigns to assert the primacy of Islam relative to other faiths, “purify” the beliefs and practices of Indonesian Muslims, and Islamize the state. They also include the increasing adoption of pious dress by Muslims, which has made religious identities—and religious divisions—visible in a way they never were under Sukarno or Suharto.

¹ *Kejawen* is also referred to as *kebatinan* and *agama Jawa* (religion of Java). Indonesia is also home to other heterodox traditions outside Java.

The pressures on pluralism were strikingly illustrated by a series of *fatwas* issued in 2005 by the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI).² This state funded council was initially created by Suharto to provide Islamic legitimation of government policies. In 2000, however, MUI redefined its role as providing guidance, through *fatwas* and lesser edicts, to both government and Muslim Indonesians. This did not, however, signal MUI's retreat from politics. Rather, as the 2005 *fatwas* made clear, MUI had been captured by Muslim conservatives, who were now using the organization to draw Indonesian Islam toward a more rigid, puritanical, and exclusive set of positions (Ichwan 2013: 60-3).³ This kind of Muslim conservatism was nothing

² A *fatwa* (plural: *fatwas*) is a type of religious edict issued by trained *ulama* (Islamic scholars/jurists) based on their interpretation of *sharia*, or divine law. *Fatwas* generally draw upon the Quran, Sunnah, and previous interpretations by Muslim scholars/jurists. *Fatwas* are, in modern Indonesia as in classical Sunni Islam, legally nonbinding. Instead, they are treated as instructions on how to be a good Muslim (and how not to be a bad Muslim). As such, they often carry a great deal of weight among followers of the *ulama* in question.

³ The terms "Muslim conservative" (or "conservative Islam") and "Islamist" (or "Islamism") all appear in this dissertation, but they are not used interchangeably (as they often are in journalistic discourses). Rather, I use the term Islamist to denote any activist, organization, or party that seeks to build an Islamic state or to *comprehensively* reorder society in accordance with "Islamic values." "Muslim conservative," by contrast, is used to denote the broader category of activists, organizations, and parties seeking to preserve, expand, introduce, or codify "traditional" orthodox Islamic practices as law (i.e. implement *sharia*) in a more ad hoc, situational, or symbolic fashion. Islamists, on this understanding, are by definition conservatives, though conservatives need not be Islamists.

It should also be noted that my usage differs from the Roy's (1994; 2006), where Islamism is more narrowly defined as a specifically revolutionary movement to replace Westernized postcolonial states with "authentically Islamic" institutions, and anything less comprehensive than that falls under the umbrella of Islamic conservatism (or neoconservatism). The narrow definition enables Roy to underscore the historical failure and subsequent transformation of revolutionary Islamist movements in the Middle East into aboveground or nearly aboveground sociopolitical organizations. However, this narrow definition is ill suited to analysis of political Islam in Indonesia, which has never had a popular revolutionary Islamist movement (along the lines of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), but where there are still important distinctions to draw between those who seek relatively comprehensive Islamization of state and society and those whose approach is more piecemeal or ad hoc.

In practical terms, my definition of Islamism encompasses those organizations and parties that may not (or no longer) advocate for political revolution, but who would nevertheless like to alter Indonesia's constitution to reinsert the Jakarta Charter (a clause in the draft 1945

new—it had dominated Muslim politics in the two decades after independence, and had experienced a resurgence in the 1990s. But more progressive and inclusive views on Islam’s relationship to the state were equally—if not more—prominent—during the early days of democratization.⁴ For many observers, MUI’s *fatwas* symbolized a shift in the balance of power between progressives and conservatives within the Muslim elite, and a broader “conservative turn” within Indonesian Islam (Fealy 2006; Liddle and Mujani 2007; Feillard and Madinier 2011; van Bruinessen 2013).

Constitution that would have obliged the state to enforce *sharia* for all Muslim citizens) into the Constitution, who would like to give Islam official or legal primacy over other religions, or seek to integrate a broad range of *sharia*-based laws within Indonesian state law. None of these would count as Islamism under Roy’s scheme. (And it is worth noting that my usage corresponds more closely to colloquial usage in Indonesia.) However, even given this broader usage of the term “Islamist,” I characterize MUI as “conservative,” not “Islamist.” While MUI does seek to introduce *sharia* concepts into Indonesian state law, and certainly wants Indonesian Muslims to be more conservative in their personal and public religiosity, its *sharia* advocacy is generally ad hoc. Meanwhile, the organization officially supports the idea of Indonesia as a formally pluralist state that grants equal legal rights to recognized non-Muslim minorities, and does not advocate for the comprehensive implementation of *sharia* in Indonesia. Thus the label “Islamist” seems inappropriate in this particular case.

⁴ As with “Islamist” and “conservative,” observers of Indonesian Islam often use the adjectives “liberal,” “progressive,” and “civil” interchangeably to describe Muslims who oppose *sharia* in state law, who view *sharia* as an abstract set of divine principles rather than a specific code of human laws, or who are strongly oriented toward civil and human rights. I try to avoid the term “liberal” unless specifically referring to Islamic liberalism, which is a theological movement stressing individual exegesis (*ijtihad*) of the Quran and Sunnah, the self-enforcement of religious obligations, and gender equality (including in prayer). By contrast, I use the term “Muslim progressive” to refer to Muslims who are *politically* oriented toward pluralism, civil and human rights, and social justice, but who do not necessarily follow a *theologically* liberal approach to Islam. Finally, I use the term “civil Islam” to refer to the idea that Islamic organizations and authorities should, ideally, guide policymaking, mediate political conflicts, and provide an important check on state power from the public sphere of civil society. It is worth noting that Hefner’s (2000) original formulation of civil Islam also captures elements of “progressive.” However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter Two, civic organizations do not need to be progressive in order to play these roles. Thus while Muslim progressives tend to believe in civil Islam, and while proponents of civil Islam are often politically progressive, these terms are not interchangeable.

The most controversial of MUI's 2005 *fatwa* targeted “pluralism, secularism, and liberalism.” Neither its condemnation of secularism (defined in the *fatwa* as the strict separation of religion from worldly affairs) nor its condemnation of Islamic liberalism (defined as the idea that Quran and Sunnah should be interpreted by ordinary Muslims, rather than through the teachings of trained *ulama*) was exactly surprising. However, the *fatwa*'s condemnation of pluralism shocked many Indonesians. After all, Indonesia has institutionalized a system of religious pluralism, in which the state grants equal recognition, rights, and protections to adherents of Islam, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism. And most Indonesians associate the expression religious pluralism (*pluralisme agama*) with the concepts of tolerance, co-existence, and harmony—values that are, furthermore, idealized in the nationalist imagination as quintessentially Indonesian.

The 2005 *fatwa* did not directly challenge this institutionalized system of pluralism or the related ideas of tolerance, co-existence, and harmony among religious groups. Instead, it rejected, under the rubric of “pluralism,” the “understanding that all religions are equal and hence the truth of every religion is relative,” the related belief that “no religious believer should claim that there is only one true religion,” and the notion that “all religions will enter and coexist in heaven” (MUI 2005a).⁵ It then issued several opinions:

1. Pluralism, secularism, and religious liberalism, as defined in the first section, contradict the teachings of Islam.
2. It is forbidden for Muslims to follow pluralism, secularism, and religious liberalism.
3. In the matters of faith and worship, Muslims must be exclusive, so they do not confuse Islamic faith and worship with the faith and worship of other religions.

⁵ The *fatwa* further distinguished this framing of pluralism from the concept of “plurality,” which it defined as “the fact of coexistence” among followers of multiple religions in a given area.

4. For Muslims living with followers of other religions (the plurality of religion), it is permitted for Muslims to be inclusive in social matters unrelated to faith and worship, provided these social interactions are not mutually detrimental (MUI 2005a).⁶

As MUI is only a consultative body, the edict had no legal impact on the practice of pluralism in Indonesia.⁷ Yet it was widely assumed that the *fatwa* pointed to a legislative agenda. These suspicions seemed to be confirmed by the other *fatwas* issued at the 2005 MUI congress, which prohibited Muslims from participating in interfaith prayer meetings, declared interfaith marriage forbidden to Muslims (even when a Muslim man marries a Christian or Jewish woman, which is allowed in classical Islamic jurisprudence), and called upon the government to ban the Ahmadiyah sect on the grounds that it was “outside Islam,” “heretical,” and “misleading” to orthodox Muslims (MUI 2005b). All four of these *fatwas*, moreover, sought to erect, maintain or harden religious boundaries. This suggested that MUI’s real target was indeed the core notion of “unity in diversity”—and not simply religious relativism (*relativisme agama*).

The *fatwa* against pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, however, drew fierce criticism from progressive and moderate Muslims, including prominent figures in Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the mass-membership Muslim civic organizations that hold unparalleled

⁶ In the original Indonesian: (1) “Pluralisme, Sekularisme dan Liberalisme agama sebagaimana dimaksud pada bagian pertama adalah paham yang bertentangan dengan ajaran agama Islam;” (2) “Umat Islam haram mengikuti paham Pluralisme, Sekularisme dan Liberalisme agama;” (3) “Dalam masalah aqidah dan ibadah, umat Islam wajib bersikap eksklusif, dalam arti haram mencampur-adukkan aqidah dan ibadah umat Islam dengan aqidah dan ibadah pemeluk agama lain;” and (4) “Bagi masyarakat Muslim yang tinggal bersama pemeluk agama lain (pluralitas agama), dalam masalah sosial yang tidak berkaitan dengan aqidah dan ibadah, umat Islam bersikap inklusif, dalam arti tetap melakukan pergaulan sosial dengan pemeluk agama lain sepanjang tidak saling merugikan.”

⁷ Though some local officials treat MUI *fatwas* as legally binding (Bowen 2003: 243), most civil, constitutional, and religious courts recognize that MUI *fatwas* are strictly advisory.

influence on the sociocultural practices and sociopolitical attitudes of Muslim Indonesians.⁸

These critics saw the attack on pluralism—even if the *fatwa* claimed to be concerned solely with matters of religious belief—as disingenuous and, furthermore, as an attack on Indonesian nationalism (Gillespie 2007; Assyaukanie 2009).⁹ And they successfully blocked attempts to use the advisory declarations as the basis for statewide legislation (including, even, the injunction against the widely unpopular Ahmadiyah sect).

However, while *fatwa* opponents were able to resist the challenge to religious pluralism at the level of the state, an ambitious decentralization program called *otonomi daerah* (regional autonomy) was creating new political opportunities to assert the primacy of Islam over other recognized religions, and the primacy of orthodox Islam over heterodox and minority sects within Islam, at the regional and local levels. Like other political decentralization programs, *otonomi daerah* was designed to reduce the distance between citizens and the state, improve service provision, and dampen regionalism, a real concern in a sprawling archipelago (Bertrand 2007: 592). In doing so, however, it empowered local chapters of MUI and its allies—including violent “street Islamist” groups—to push through a series of controversial *sharia*-based bylaws, restrict the rights, protections, and space afforded to religious minorities, and, in 2011, ban the

⁸ It should be noted that Ma’aruf Amin, who is a prominent conservative in NU, and Din Syamsuddin, who was at that time Chairman of Muhammadiyah, both signed the *fatwa*. As such, it is not that NU and Muhammadiyah opposed the *fatwa*, but that progressives and moderates within these organizations opposed the *fatwa*. These progressives and moderates held sufficient influence within these organizations to undercut the appeals for support issued by their representatives within MUI.

⁹ This latter cleavage played out in public debates between Din Syamsuddin and Muhammadiyah’s large and vocal progressive wing.

Ahmadiyah in several provinces, cities, and regencies (Hadiz 2004; Bush 2008; Buehler 2010; Crouch 2011).¹⁰

These episodes suggest that linked processes of democratization and decentralization are recontextualizing the old questions of “how Islamic” Indonesia is or should be—questions that are among the most vital and persistent in modern Indonesian history. Democratization has broadened freedom of speech, expression, and organization (by reducing state restrictions on political parties and organizations), and lowered the state’s capacity and willingness to resolve conflicts by force. And decentralization has expanded the opportunity structure for sociopolitical challenges to religious pluralism at the regional and local levels, while drastically lowering the likelihood of state intervention against regional and local ordinances, bylaws, and executive orders (Butt 2010).¹¹

Meanwhile, Indonesia has also been undergoing processes of *sociocultural* Islamization. This term refers to increases in private and public religiosity among Muslims. It also refers to the degree to which individuals choose to identify as Muslim in private or in public (relative to other available social identities). Indonesian Muslims are now more likely to attend religious events

¹⁰ It is important to note that *sharia* is not necessarily a specific body of law, though it is sometimes interpreted as such. And it is not the medieval system of corporal punishments; that is properly referred to as *hudud*. Rather, *sharia* refers to “divine law” that properly-trained scholars can understand through rigorous and methodological study of Islam’s holy texts. Most understandings of *sharia* are based upon classical Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and/or exegesis (*ijtihad*) by trained *ulama* (Islamic scholars). Interpretations of *sharia*, it should be noted, vary spatially, temporally and according to theological tradition. In the Indonesian context, it is generally but not exclusively associated with the *syafi’i* jurisprudential tradition, which does view *sharia* as a body of law. Many Indonesian Muslims, though, believe *sharia* to be more of an abstract concept and do not support making *sharia* the basis for Indonesian civil and criminal law (Hefner 2013a).

¹¹ Butt (2010) analyzed 500 cases of the legal review of local or regional ordinances and bylaws by central bureaucratic offices and 16 by the Indonesian Supreme Court. Butt (2010) found that local/regional ordinances and bylaws were unlikely to be reversed unless imposing undue tax burdens on citizens. As he writes: “this is so even if its content breaches fundamental principles of law including human rights, or has otherwise deleterious effects for citizens.”

(such as Quranic reading groups), wear religious clothing (such as the female headscarf), consume religious goods and services (such as *sharia* banking), perform religious pilgrimages, send their children to Islamic schools, and otherwise “act Muslim” in public than at any other time since independence (Fealy 2008; Rinaldo 2010). These sociocultural transformations are, to a significant degree, independent of the sociopolitical challenges to pluralism outlined above. Yet they are undeniably altering both the daily lives and public identities of Indonesian Muslims in ways that may impact the *practice* of religious pluralism in everyday life.

To what degree, then, are these intertwined processes of democratization, decentralization, and sociocultural Islamization producing, enabling, or recontextualizing pressures on religious pluralism in Indonesia? In what ways, with what consequences, and at what levels of social organization? What, conversely, might account for the robustness of religious pluralism in this democratizing, decentralizing, and socioculturally Islamizing society? I seek to answer these questions through the analysis of pressures on religious pluralism in historical perspective, in recent statewide political struggles over an expansive anti-pornography bill and a proposed statewide ban on the Ahmadiyah sect, in localized protests against the building of new churches, and in negotiation of pressures on Muslims to adopt pious dress in everyday life. In doing so, I seek to avoid the privileging of statewide dynamics over the local and everyday experiences of Indonesians; instead, I examine each of topics individually, but with a special focus on identifying the linkages among them. Equally, by eschewing the ideologically charged question of whether Islam is *compatible with* religious pluralism in favor of an empirical investigation of the ways Islamization generates multiple and distinctive *pressures on* religious pluralism, I endeavor to provide a nuanced portrait of a society struggling to reconcile heightened Islamic claims-making with long-standing traditions of pluralism.

This approach does not lend itself to parsimony, especially in as large and complex a society as Indonesia. Rather, Islam-based pressures on religious pluralism are variegated and diffuse; they manifest themselves in different forms and degrees in different settings. Yet variation in the form, degree, and setting of pressure on religious pluralism is not simply a function of Indonesia's size, religious diversity, or unique archipelagic geography. Instead, I will argue that this variation has emerged from several linked factors. First, I will demonstrate how long-term historical processes produced a crucial division between conservative or Islamist and "civil Islamic" or "civil pluralist" conceptions of what Islam's relationship to state and society should be. This division among politically active orthodox Muslims underlies and shapes nearly every episode of sociopolitical contention over Islam that has emerged since transition.¹² Second, I will argue that distinctive political processes in parliament both reproduce religious pluralism at the level of the state and create space for more comprehensive challenges at the regional and local levels. Third, I will illustrate, through the example of anti-church protests, how this regionalization plays out in areas marked by significantly different opportunity structures for challenges to religious pluralism. I will argue that regionalization is producing broad (and widening) disparities in how regional and local communities institutionalize Islam, practice religious pluralism, and frame the majority/minority relationship. Fourth, I will examine how the increased adoption of visual markers of piety, such as the Islamic headscarf, generates

¹² By "orthodox" I mean those whose religious views broadly correspond to traditional norms of what is "true" and "correct" in Islam. There is, of course, great variation in belief, practice, and political ideology among orthodox Sunni Muslims. But certain "truths" are constant: strict monotheism, the divine revelation of the Quran, the legitimacy of Sunnah and *sharia* (disputes over their construction and interpretation notwithstanding), belief in the Day of Judgment, Muhammad's status as the penultimate prophet, the prohibition on idols or graven images, and so forth. Heterodox Muslims, by contrast, mix orthodox beliefs and practices with those derived from other sources, or otherwise practice Islam "incorrectly" (i.e. outside existing orthodox norms).

interactional pressures on other Muslims to conform to emerging, outwardly pious norms, while visually marking non-Muslims as different and contributing, even if unintentionally, to social and institutional segregation along religious lines.

In short, I argue that democratization, decentralization, and sociocultural Islamization are neither reinforcing nor dismantling Indonesia's system of religious pluralism. Rather, they are producing sharp and growing disparities in how pluralism is institutionalized and practiced: disparities across regions, localities, and groups.

Religious Pluralism in Comparative Perspective

In the broadest sense, the term “pluralism” may describe any political or ideological system in which a diversity of interest groups, however defined, is recognized, tolerated, and afforded some degree of legitimacy (Peletz 2009: 7). In sociology and anthropology, pluralism is often used in a more specific sense, to refer to the recognition, toleration, or institutionalization of specifically *sociocultural* diversity.¹³ Furnivall (1948: 304) first introduced this concept to describe the colonial society of the Netherlands Indies, where he observed culturally distinct groups of European colonialists, Chinese and Arab merchants, descendants of freed Portuguese slaves, and native “Inlanders” (who made up the bulk of Indies subjects) living parallel to one another, and integrated only by markets and state coercion.¹⁴ Furnivall's characterization of

¹³ An alternate usage, popular among political scientists, defines pluralism as a system of representation in which “the constituent units are organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to type or scope of interest) categories which are not specially licensed, recognized, subsidized, created or otherwise controlled in leadership selection or interest articulation by the state and which do not exercise a monopoly of representational activity within their respective categories” (Schmitter 1974; 1977). This is not the usage employed in this text.

¹⁴ It should be noted that colonial-era scholars, including Furnivall, often overstated the degree of separation among social groups within colonial administrative territories (Anderson 1991: 118).

Indies society corresponds to what van den Berghe (1978: 34) calls structural pluralism, a mode of social organization in which “social structure is compartmentalized into analogous, parallel, non-complementary but distinguishable sets of institutions” (c.f. Schermerhorn 1978: 144-5).

The term *religious pluralism*, however, typically refers to a range of phenomena that are not captured by this definition. Beckford (2014: 16) distinguishes four main meanings of religious pluralism. First, religious pluralism can refer to the sheer fact of diversity in a given empirical context. Second, it may refer to ideological positions or political stances that valorize or legitimize religious diversity (c.f. Carol and Koopmans 2013). Third, it may refer to ideological positions or political stances that valorize or legitimize ethnic, religious, or cultural diversity (c.f. Esposito 2010). Finally, it may refer to everyday interactions among individuals categorized as belonging to different religious groups.

Other forms of sociocultural pluralism (e.g. ethnic) may be classified in much the same way.¹⁵ However, religious pluralism is also different in key respects from other forms of sociocultural pluralism. For one thing, religious traditions typically encompass different degrees and forms of religiosity. For another, religious claims to “restructure public life in accordance with religious principles” have no clear parallel in, say, ethnic claims making (Brubaker 2012). In cases where two or more religious groups are of roughly equal size and representation, competing claims (among religious groups) on how to structure public life may emerge (for example, Sunni and Shia). More often, however, claims to structure public life in accordance with religious principles are opposed by others—including those from the same religious tradition—who defend the separation between religion and the state (or the broader separation

¹⁵ The ideology of multiculturalism, which holds that cultural diversity has positive value and that equal recognition should be provided to all cultural groups, overlaps with the concept of sociocultural pluralism (Miller 2006; Koopmans 2013).

between religion and politics). Differing degrees and forms of religiosity, and differing views on the relation between religion and politics, are themselves a form of religious pluralism, even when the dividing line is located within rather than between religious traditions.

Crosscutting literatures on religious pluralism and *the governance of religious diversity* address the ways in which states manage forms of religious difference. Though by no means a new phenomenon, the management of religious difference takes on new importance as increases in migration, travel, urbanization, literacy, and the sophistication of information technology bring individuals from different religious traditions together in a “historically unprecedented manner” (Berger 2007: 21; c.f. Riis 1999; Casanova 2007: 76). As Giordan (2014: 8) writes:

What we can say for certain is that such religious diversity will have to be “governed” in some way by the civil authorities, and the increasingly diverse demands for the free practice of one’s religion will find a regulative principle in the State, that will try to combine the general interests of the community with the legitimate requests of acknowledgement of the “minorities” and of the individual believers.

The term “religious governance,” as Giordan uses it, refers to the regulation of religion and its relationship to the state. “Governance of religious diversity,” by extension, refers to religious governance of multiple forms of religious practice (religions, sects, cults, traditions, and so forth) (Bader 2007; Astor 2014). According to Bader (2009), the governance of religious diversity has two principal components: *external governance* (by the state) and *internal governance* (by religious authorities) (31). In other words, religious individuals are subject to regulation by two entities: the formal institutions of the state (which create, disseminate, and enforce policies) and formal religious organizations (which interpret, disseminate, and enforce religious law and custom within the boundaries set out by the state). Formal religious pluralism is thus an approach to external governance, one that recognizes some forms of religious difference as legitimate and grants rights and protections to individuals and associations across a

range of recognized and tolerated forms of religious practice. By extension, external religious governance is a broader concept than religious pluralism, enveloping both highly pluralistic and various exclusionary arrangements.

External governance varies, first and foremost, by what the state seeks to accomplish: to generally suppress *religion*, to selectively suppress or privilege particular *religions*, to generally privilege *religion*, or to adopt a stance of “relational neutrality” vis-à-vis *religions* (Bader 2007). States employ a broad repertoire of specific policies and practices in order to pursue the desired outcome. Some mechanisms are legal, such as enforcing the precedence of state law over religious law, specifying the limits of religious practices that enjoy legal protection, or granting space to religious law in proscribed domains (e.g. family or inheritance law). Others are regulatory, for example issuing zoning or licensing guidelines for houses of worship, creating national standards for religious schools, and so forth. Finally, states may grant or withhold special privileges and exemptions (e.g. taxation status, state subsidies, etc.) (Ferrari 2002: 10).

Variation in goal, practice, and outcome are both constituted by and constitutive of what may usefully be referred to as external governance *regimes*. Much of the literature on external governance regimes centers on Western European and North American cases, and for good reason. It was Europe’s early modern wars of religion, after all, that produced the concept of religion as a distinctive sphere of human existence (separable from the political, economic, or scientific), the idea of state and religious authority as wholly separable, and the practical imperative to manage Europe’s new denominational diversity (Nongbri 2015). As Joppke (2004: 239) explains, “the liberal, difference-blind state with its universal citizenship...exactly emerged as a peacemaker to a hyper-diverse society torn by religious wars in seventeenth century

Europe.”¹⁶ This is not, of course, to claim that separation of religion and politics is unique to Western Christendom. As scholars have shown, there was actually considerable separation of religious and political authority in medieval Islam (Lapidus 1975; 1992; L. C. Brown 2013: 53). Meanwhile, the degree of separation between religious and political authority that existed in medieval and early modern Christendom was limited (Bader 2003).¹⁷ But it was in post-Reformation Europe that the separation between religion and the state crystallized as a political theory on how states *should* be run.¹⁸

Despite agreement on the principle of separation between religion and the state, scholars note historical and institutional divergence among Western states in the governance of religious diversity. Martin (1978) identifies four Western European patterns of governance: (1) “total monopolies,” whether religious (e.g. Catholic, Orthodox) or anti-clerical secular (as in France); (2) “duopolies” marked by segmented pluralism, in which two blocs compete but have no real chance of asserting a monopoly (as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland); (3) “qualified pluralism,” where there is an established church but significant space given to minorities, as well as to dissent within the established church (as in Britain or Scandinavia); and (4) “complete pluralism,” where all religions, sects, cults, and traditions compete on equal footing and there is

¹⁶ Joppke (2004) is referring to the ideal type of a liberal state (as articulated in normative political theory). As Beyer (2003) notes, it is unlikely that such a state has ever actually existed in this idealized form.

¹⁷ Complete separation between religion and the state is, like the ideal liberal state, a theoretic construct that does not and never has existed in practice. Bader (2003) suggests that this idea is “based on a mythical history of the American constitutional tradition” and not grounded in historical reality.

¹⁸ As Dawson (2016) notes, Western liberal theory generally holds that freedom of religion is an individual right with collective benefits, which should ideally be distributed through a “difference blind” process.” It is, furthermore, “negatively conceived” as freedom from coercion or influence and should be safeguarded by a neutral and non-confessional state. By 1789 both the United States and Revolutionary France had enshrined forms of this principle in their respective constitutions.

no privileged group (as theorized to exist in the United States). And there are certainly distinct, state-driven institutional patterns that are unique to one or a small number of Western states. For example, France's national ideology of *laïcité* is distinctly anti-clerical, while the U.S. "marketplace" for religions is generally more open and competitive than what one finds in other Western states. Meanwhile, Nordic states provide subsidies and public recognition to religious communities, but only to those that have been officially recognized and registered as a religious community (Riis 2007: 443). In Sweden, religious communities must also demonstrate that they "contribute and confirm the fundamental values upon which the Swedish society is based" in order to be granted official recognition (and the financial benefits that entails) (Jänterä-Jareborg 2010: 674).

Each of these different governance regimes emerged to manage denominational diversity among Christians, particularly across the politically salient Protestant-Catholic divide, as well as often contentious relations between religious conservatives and secular-minded liberals and socialists (Ahlin et al 2012: 408-11). However, a half-century of international migration has produced significant non-Christian minorities in every Western state, and especially in the industrialized states of Western Europe. Much of the discourse on the integration of non-Christian minorities surrounds Europe's large and growing population of Muslims, who account for a significant proportion of Europe's overall migrant population.¹⁹ As the population of European Muslims has grown, moreover, Islam has become more conspicuous and visible in European public spaces. As Cesari (2005) notes, older generations of European Muslims typically prayed in the invisible spaces of the private home or anonymous storefront, preserving

¹⁹ Muslims account for 7.5% of the population of France, 6.0% in the Netherlands, 5.8% in Germany, and 4.6% in Sweden. Muslim immigrants to the European Union (from outside EU states) account for 39% of the overall immigrant population, as compared to 43% who are Christian (Pew 2015).

the exclusively Christian “character” of public space even as the population has diversified. Since the 1990s, however, Muslims have increasingly sought to build mosques, complete with minaret towers and, in some cases, loudspeakers amplifying the call to prayer. These mosques render the Muslim presence visible and public, and in so doing, challenge the symbolic “ownership privileges” assumed by many Europeans, whether practicing Christians or not. At the same time, European Muslims are also statistically more likely than other religious minorities to make group demands on the state, producing a view of Islam as more political and less easily integrated than other non-Christian faiths (Stratham et al 2005).

The degree to which state governance regimes structure the integration of European Muslims is hotly debated. The institutional arrangements designed to manage Christian denominational diversity are likely to create path dependencies, defining “pre-existing conditions and the political environment into which migrant religions have to find a space for their community” (Stratham et al 2005; c.f. Cesari 2004; Koenig 2007). Along those lines, Fetzer and Soper (2005) argue that the long-term institutionalization of specific church/state relationships shapes “what [individual states] view as equitable treatment for Muslim citizens and immigrants, what they consider to be reasonable and just in terms of accommodating Muslim religious practices, and how governments pursue the twin policies of recognizing the religious rights of Muslims while insuring their effective incorporation into the values of the host country...” (1). Muslim migrants, in turn, adapt to these existing governance regimes and the opportunity structures created by them, thus creating further divergence by state in patterns of integration (Laurence 2012; Burchardt and Michalowski 2015; Dawson 2016).

Yet while there is some agreement that variation among state governance regimes matters, it is important not to reify state models of external religious governance or give path

dependency undue explanatory power. Indeed, state model theories of path dependency have been criticized for lack of attention to historical variation in the actual governance of religious diversity *by* individual states (Bowen 2007). They have also been criticized for employing methodological nationalism, thereby ignoring both regional variations *within* states and commonalities *across* them (Koenig 2007; Bader 2007; Nielsen 2009). Moreover, as Ferrari (2002) and Koenig (2007) both note, Western states are by and large converging on a shared set of guiding principles as to the governance of religious diversity. These include religious freedom for individuals, the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis religions, sects, cults, and traditions, and cooperation between the state and religious civil society in education and social welfare—to which one could add space for irreligion (Eck 2002: 337).²⁰ Western states have also adopted similar stances toward the integration of sociocultural minorities (including but not limited to religious minorities) at specific points in time, such as multiculturalism in the 1990s and liberal individualism after 2001 (Joppke 2004). And empirical tests suggest that specific governance regimes (French anti-clerical, Dutch pillarized, or British multicultural) structure claims less than path dependency models imply, for example with regards the frequency or substance of Muslim group demands on the state (Stratham et al 2005).

This is not to dismiss the influence of institutional patterns on the structure of religious pluralism in individual states, but rather to argue for a more dynamic view of religious governance. In this view, external governance regimes are not static but adaptable, inconsistent in practice (across space and over time), and responsive to outside influence. By extension, so are the strategies adopted by religious citizens and organizations in reference to them. Globally, moreover, processes of international and domestic migration, economic globalization, and

²⁰ As Eck (2002: 337) notes, space for irreligion allows individuals to “shed identities they do not wish to have as dominant and all-encompassing.”

advances in information technology increasingly blur the lines between what happens within a state and outside of it, create opportunities for challenges to traditional authority, and “[put] pressure on existing forms of institutionalization of religions and their ‘management’ by the state” (Bader 2011; c.f. Bouma 1999; Banchoff 2008).²¹

Nevertheless, one can still usefully distinguish among governance regimes, broadly speaking, in terms of how selectively they recognize and cooperate with religious communities in practice (Bader 2009: 34). Similarly, one may distinguish state policies by the degree to which they use religious organizations, clerisies, or other authority structures as *corporate intermediaries* between the state and citizenry (Kymlicka 1992; Laurence 2009). This is certainly true of postcolonial states, where governance regimes are often *bricolages* of pre-colonial traditions and hierarchies, colonial-era institutional cleavage structures, and post-independence power sharing compromises, which are often explicitly or implicitly corporatist (Kymlicka and He 2005: 1-6).²²

Corporatist arrangements in postcolonial states, as in Europe, are increasingly coming under pressure: from breakdowns in the authority of traditional intermediaries; from the mass migration of people (within and across states); from newly acquired access to information technologies; and from the increasing importance of transnational religious networks. At the

²¹ Traditional regimes of religious governance, for example, may have difficulty accommodating the increasingly assertive, public, and often-transnational religiopolitical movements that have gained salience in recent decades. On the one hand, globalization “[fosters] the survival and growth of transnational religious networks and diaspora communities” (Banchoff 2008: 10). On the other, the increasing visibility of other belief systems has a relativizing effect, suggesting that “no single [belief system] is self-evidently ‘correct’” (Beyer 1994: 2). These two processes create opportunities for religiopolitical movements, such as Islamism, which offer exclusive membership in a global religious community of the religiously correct and a one-size-fits-all solution for those atomized and disaffected by globalization (Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011).

²² Schmitter (1974) defines corporatism as “a system of interest representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional arrangement for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state.”

same time, arrangements for the governance of religious diversity in many postcolonial states are challenged by domestic changes, such as the introduction of democracy or political decentralization (which often go hand-in hand). The governance of religious diversity in the 21st century is thus defined, in a significant way, by how states adapt to the new pressures and challenges emanating from these developments.

Corporatist-Pluralist Governance Regimes in Islamic History

The governance of religious diversity in most Muslim majority states has involved at least some form or degree of religious pluralism.²³ And there is a distinctive and long-standing tradition of religious corporatism in Muslim majority states, whereby religious authorities (however defined) are deployed as intermediaries between the state and its subjects or citizens. Thus one can reasonably speak of *corporatist-pluralist regimes of governance* as well represented among historical and existing Muslim majority states.

This tradition goes back to Islam's first polities: the medieval Rashidun, Ummayyad, and Abbasid Caliphates. These Muslim empires were nominally theocratic, but granted significantly more space and protection to religious minorities than in the contemporary kingdoms of Christian Europe (Cohen 1994: xix; Asad 1997; Roy 2006: 49; Emon 2012: 95-142). In exchange for an oath of fealty to the state and payment of a poll tax (*jizya*), Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians were granted the status of "protected minority" (*al dhimmi*), which allowed for

²³ This is also true of developing, postcolonial states more broadly. The Indian nationalism of Gandhi, Nehru, and the postindependence Congress Party, for example, imagines a common Indian nation marked by religious pluralism, in which the major religious groups of India should be represented in the state (van der Veer 1994: 23). Since the 1990s, however, the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist) movement has increasingly advocated for the association of nation with the belief and practice of Hinduism in ways that marginalize or exclude the country's sizeable Muslim, Sikh, Buddhist, and Christian minorities (Brass 2011).

relatively free worship and exempted practitioners from many areas of Islamic law (Esposito 1998: 336). Moreover, because medieval (Sunni) Islam lacked the centralized clerisies of contemporary Christianity, the caliphates were marked by a significantly higher degree of intra-religious diversity than found in medieval Europe. There were, of course, moments of state intolerance toward religious minorities, and the medieval caliphates were not much more accepting of “heretical” cults and sects than their Christian contemporaries. Shia Islam, which was initially a political movement and later became a “moral and religious resistance” to the Umayyad Caliphate, was subject to political repression and periodic violence during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods (Nasr 2006: 37-42; 53-58).²⁴ Even still, the caliphates were on balance highly pluralistic for their time.

The Ottoman *millet* system, established in 1456, expanded and arguably deepened the rights and protections afforded to non-Muslims. Designed to manage the Empire’s sociocultural

²⁴ Shia Muslims believe that before his death, the Prophet Muhammad had designated Ali, his son in law, to be his successor. However, Muhammad’s companions named Abu Bakar Caliph instead. Ali would eventually become the fourth caliph of the Rashidun Caliphate. But he was assassinated in the middle of a civil war with the governor of Damascus, Muawiya. After Ali’s death, Muawiya assumed power, ending the Rashidun Caliphate and establishing the Umayyad Caliphate (Nasr 2006: 36). At this point, loyalists to Ali and those who felt disenfranchised by the new political order began articulating a political-theological critique of Umayyad legitimacy, which held that the “correct” succession to Muhammad ran first through Ali and then to his son, Hussein, who was killed at the Battle of Karbala (680 c.e.).

Ali and Hussein’s followers became the Shia movement, and rejected the legitimacy of the Rashidun caliphs as well as their Umayyad successors. Consequently, they also rejected the authority of the Caliphate’s *ulama*, who were assembling the Sunnah from the sprawling collection of *hadiths* (vignettes about Muhammad and his companions, the validity of which were, at that time, matters of great debate), and codifying *sharia* within the four jurisprudential schools of Sunni Islam. Though Shia scholars agreed with their Sunni counterparts on the validity of some *hadiths*, they dismissed many others, while also accepting some that the Sunni *ulama* rejected. Thus, while the Sunni-Shia split was initially political in nature, it became theological over time (and then institutional as a hierarchical clerisy developed among Shia Muslims). Furthermore, since much of Islamic ritual is derived from *hadiths* and *fiqh* (jurisprudence), rather than being directly revealed in the Quran, the effect was to render Shia Islam visibly different from Sunni Islam (Haider 2011: 216).

diversity, the *millet* system divided the subject population into a small number of semi-autonomous and de-territorialized socioreligious bodies (Jewish, Armenian Christian, and Greek Orthodox Christian), which were granted powers of taxation and broad authority over co-religionists on religious matters. Each *millet* could, furthermore, establish religious court systems that regulated family and inheritance law (though minorities could also take cases to the Empire's *sharia* courts), and were granted the right to establish and maintain houses of worship, seminaries, and other educational institutions (Hechter 2000: 49; 74; Joseph 2009). There was no separation of religion and state; instead, the state institutionalized a discrete number of religious bodies as intermediaries between the state and its subjects, who were officially categorized by religion.

This system was far from equitable by modern standards: minorities could not build houses of worship without a license (which was often difficult to obtain), could not proselytize or otherwise recruit new adherents, and were required to wear distinctive clothing that identified their faith in public. And it is likely that Ottoman historiography has overstated the degree of *millet* authority over the Empire's non-Muslim subjects (Jennings 1978; Al-Qattan 1999). However, recognized religious minorities were granted considerable communal autonomy, rights, and protections. And despite the privileges that Muslims enjoyed in Ottoman society, authorities often refused to privilege Muslims in their disputes with non-Muslims. Indeed, as Joseph (2009) notes, the *sharia* courts—when considering disputes or conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims—often prioritized the lowering of communal tensions and strengthening of interreligious networks over the interests of Muslim complainants.

Corporatist-Pluralist Governance Regimes in Modern Muslim Majority States

A number of postcolonial Muslim majority states have institutionalized variations on the corporatist-pluralist model, demonstrating their historical links to these medieval and modern-era governance regimes. These states differ in the degree of primacy afforded to Islam, as well as the amount of space, rights, and protections afforded to religious minorities. A good deal of scholarly attention has been devoted to Lebanon, which is divided into Shia and Sunni Muslim, Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christian, and Druze ethnoreligious factions. Political scientists have been especially interested in the complex power-sharing arrangements that were designed to prevent the formation of large blocs organized along the Muslim/Christian divide (Horowitz 1985: 633-5).²⁵

However, most corporatist-pluralist governance regimes in the Muslim world are not organized around this kind of power-sharing scheme. Rather, they grant recognition, rights, and protections to minority communities but still privilege (Sunni or Shia) Islam over other religions. Turkey is officially a secular state with no legal primacy afforded to any religion, but Sunni Islam enjoys certain institutional privileges over the country's small religious minorities. The state grants wide recognition, rights, protections, and space to Jews and Christians, and guarantees freedom of religion for minority Muslim sects like the Alevis and Shia, but also refuses to grant these intra-religious minorities state recognition or provide the financial aid it gives to Sunni clergy (Yaviz 2003; Çolak 2006; Paul and Seyrek 2014). In Egypt, Coptic

²⁵ Lebanon's system has been described as *consociational*, a term coined by Lijphart (1968: 1-2) to describe societies marked by cooperation and collusion among social "pillars" (i.e. subnational communities with identifiable authority structures). Consociational systems are distinguished by (1) the proportional allocation of resources and offices among each pillar, (2) a "mutual veto" over issues of contention, and (3) a considerable degree of sociocultural autonomy for each pillar. This, Lijphart (1968) argues, ensures the system's stability (ibid 1-2; 58). Alongside Lebanon, post-2003 Iraq is frequently cited as an example of consociationalism in the Middle East.

Christians and Jews are afforded institutional religious minority status, and even receive some state funding for education. Islam remains the official state religion, though, and Egypt's post-independence rulers draw legitimacy from their association with (and defense of) the traditional religious authority of the conservative Sunni *ulama* (Dekmejian 1980; Brumberg 2002). In Malaysia, the state adopts a multiculturalist discourse and stages formal celebrations of sociocultural diversity, but in practice treats religious groups in decidedly unequal terms. It has sponsored Islamic institutions and encoded *sharia* into state law, but has not created parallel institutions for ethnoreligious minorities. Moreover, it has instituted economic preferences for Malay Muslims over others, while rhetorically declaring Malaysia to be “an Islamic state” (Siddique and Suryadinata 1981; Daniels 2005: 80-96; Ridell 2005: 162-8).

In a number of Muslim majority states, the recognition, rights, and protections afforded to religious minorities have also receded in recent decades. In 1998, Bangladesh—despite a long tradition of secularism—passed a constitutional amendment declaring Islam the official state religion (Feener 2014).²⁶ And in Pakistan, rising Sunni particularism and cascading violence against religious minorities, particularly against the Ahmadiyah, Shia, and Christians, have accompanied the country's decades-long process of state Islamization (Hassan 1985; Mehdi 2013; Feener 2014).²⁷ Similarly, in 1983 the government of Sudan declared *sharia* to be the

²⁶ Bangladesh is currently experiencing a wave of violence perpetrated by Islamists. The violence is widely believed to be a response to state-sponsored trials for atrocities committed during Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence. Several of these trials have targeted prominent Islamists. However, the targets of Islamist retribution for the trials are not agents of the state, but atheists, secularists, religious minorities, gay rights activists, and bloggers who have publicly criticized Islamism in the country (Kumar and Iyengar 2016).

²⁷ Initially, Prime Minister Zulfikar al-Bhutto (1971-77) used Islam as way to co-opt opponents to his socialist-leaning regime—declaring the Ahmadiyah sect “outside Islam,” endorsing a constitutional amendment requiring the prime minister to be a Muslim, expanding religious education in public schools, and establishing a state-funded training academy for *ulama*, *imams*, and other clerics (Hassan 1985). In 1979, his successor, General Zia al-Haq, ordered superior

national law. This declaration led to a flurry of new and highly restrictive laws, the application of “Islamic penalties” (*hudud*) to old ones, and a general degradation of the position of religious minorities in Sudanese society (Fluehr-Lobban 1990).²⁸

Corporatist-Pluralist Religious Governance in Indonesia

Since independence in 1945, Indonesia has gradually formalized a variant on the corporatist-pluralist model of religious governance outlined above. This system is predicated, through the national Pancasila (five principles) creed and state institutions like the Ministry of Religious Affairs, on the definition of Indonesia as a religious society whose nationals believe in “one true God” (*Tuhan yang maha esa*) (Menchik 2016: 71).²⁹ Yet Indonesia does not grant hegemonial privilege to Islam, as in Saudi Arabia or Malaysia; nor does Indonesia institutionalize minority religions as secondary to the religion of the majority, as in the Ottoman *millet* system or modern-day Egypt. And Indonesia does not generally allocate resources and offices proportionally among a set number of religious groups, as in consociational Lebanon. Rather, Indonesia’s Constitution enshrines freedom of religion as the right of all citizens, while recognizing six official religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism) as legal equals, granting each a bureau at the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and sponsoring religious and cultural institutions for each recognized group. The post-

court judges to review existing common laws to ensure they were in line with *sharia*; those deemed inconsistent with Islamic law were stricken from the books (ibid). Additional *sharia*-based ordinances have criminalized drinking, adultery, and false accusations of unchastity.

²⁸ This is not to say that any *sharia*-based legal code would necessarily have these effects, but rather that the strict, corporal-punishment-based *hudud* passed in Sudan did have these effects.

²⁹ Pancasila consists of (1) belief in the one and only God, (2) just and civilized humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy guided by consensus arising out of deliberations amongst representatives, and (5) social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. The original articulation of Pancasila, given in a 1945 speech, was somewhat different, but still stressed monotheism as one of the five principles.

independence state has furthermore tolerated a significant amount of difference within the recognized religious categories. However, it has also contributed to the orthodoxification of its official religious categories, and to the consequent marginalization of heterodox and “heretical” sects within Islam (Hefner 1987; 2001; Menchik 2016).³⁰

This variant on the corporatist-pluralist framework for religious governance is also distinct, both structurally and ideologically, from the Anglo-American model idealized in liberal political theory—in which rights are conferred on the individual rather than the group. While Indonesia treats its six recognized religious groups as (theoretical) equals, it also privileges group rights and protections over those granted to individual citizens, and leaves only marginal space for irreligion. All citizens, regardless of professed faith (or degree of religiosity), are required to officially associate with one of the state recognized religions. This fact then determines which family, marriage, and inheritance law code they are subject to. Interfaith and nonreligious marriages are not recognized by the state (unless performed abroad), while conversions—though legal—entail a lengthy and expensive process, and are subject to bureaucratic approval by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.³¹ Public blasphemy and insulting the beliefs or practices of a recognized faith community are strictly illegal, while religious groups that run afoul of public opinion, at either the statewide or local level, may face considerable difficulties opening a house of worship, establishing an organization, or even praying in the home.

³⁰ These processes are also evident among other religious groups. For example, Hinduism on Bali has progressively orthodoxified since independence in 1945. However, orthodoxification processes are generally much less evident among Protestant Christians (or Buddhists) than among Muslims, while it is difficult to speak of orthodoxification in the same way when discussing Catholicism, given its hierarchically structured, global church.

³¹ Proselytizing is legal, as is conversion, but the process of conversion is thoroughly bureaucratized. Bowen (2003) provides an extensive discussion of these issues with specific regard to religion and marriage law in Indonesia.

Indonesia's corporatist-pluralist governance regime has, concurrently, reinforced conceptions of the Indonesian nation as both constructed of these religious blocks and defined by their being bound together in a unified imagined community (Bowen 2003: 178-85; 246-52; Boellsdorf 2005; Azra 2013: 68-9). Jeremy Menchik (2016: 67) elaborates on this concept, which he calls "godly nationalism" and defines as:

...an imagined community bound by a common, orthodox theism and mobilized through the state in cooperation with religious organizations in society. As long as citizens believe in one of the state-sanctioned pathways to God, they become full members of civil society and receive state protection and other benefits of citizenship (67).³²

The distinctive system of religious pluralism in Indonesia, however, not only privileges group over individual rights, but also privileges established orthodoxies within the recognized religions. Since the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946, civil servants with ties to the traditionalist (*syaf'i*) Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Islamic modernist Muhammadiyah organizations have dominated its Islam bureau. This has afforded NU and Muhammadiyah a disproportionate say in how the state regulates and bureaucratizes Islam, while also granting them special access to educational funds and other perks of state sponsorship. And though both organizations have, since the early 1980s, officially disavowed the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic state, they—and by extension the Ministry—have historically been ambivalent on Islamic "heresies" and heterodoxies, and often hostile to the notion of public irreligion. Menchik (2016: 67) identifies this as a second component of godly nationalism, whereby:

...the advocacy of disbelief is actively discouraged; not only are disbelievers thought incapable of ethical behavior, they are thought to make belief in God

³² Menchik (2016) adds that "the advocacy of disbelief is actively discouraged; not only are disbelievers thought incapable of ethical behavior, they are thought to make belief in God more difficult for the rest of society by confusing true beliefs with false ones, propagating falsehoods, and undermining religious education."

more difficult for the rest of society by confusing true beliefs with false ones, propagating falsehoods, and undermining religious education.

One should be wary of overstating the dichotomy between Indonesia's overtly pluralistic approach to interreligious difference and covertly homogenizing approach to intra-religious difference. Yet recognized minority religions clearly do enjoy institutional protection—and, crucially, the protection that state sponsorship affords—in a way that minority sects, groups, or tendencies *within* each recognized religion do not. This latter fact is exemplified by the decline in the practice of Java's syncretic *kejawen* traditions relative to more orthodox forms of Islamic practice, evident since the 1970s. Notably, this decline was not an outcome of deliberate state policy, but an outgrowth of policies aiming to modernize Islamic education and bring it into line with state development prerogatives (Hefner 1987; 2001; Ricklefs 2012: 25). As Hefner (2001: 185) writes:

By 1973, programs were in place to make sure that all school children received two hours of instruction in religion, its content standardized by the Ministry of Religion. Children from families not professing a recognized religion were obliged to choose one. Through this new policy, *abangan* [heterodox peasants] children who continued to identify as Muslim came to be educated according to a normative Islamic standard. That standard left no room for *Islam Jawa*.³³

These *institutional* mechanisms of orthodoxification have exerted a powerful effect on intra-religious diversity, contracting space for Islamic heterodoxy and exerting the primacy of orthodox *syafi'i* and modernist Islam. But historically speaking, as well as in daily interactions, orthodox Muslims often treat other approaches to Islam with either benevolent or ambivalent toleration. This is in some part attributable to the fact that orthodox Islam is bifurcated into two *aliran* (cultural streams).³⁴ The first of these, Islamic traditionalism, describes orthodox Muslims

³³ *Islam Jawa*, or Javanese Islam, is a synonym for *kejawen*.

³⁴ *Aliran* is an Indonesian concept term that refers to any bounded cultural group whose members are also embedded in specific and parallel sets of institutions.

who follow the *syafi'i mazhab* (one of four medieval traditions in Islamic jurisprudence), but who also permit some vestiges of syncretism as strictly cultural practices. Traditionalist scholars founded NU, which today claims 30 million members (but is thought to have some 100 million followers) (Bush 2014). The second orthodox *aliran* is Islamic modernism, a reform movement that seeks to reconcile economic and political modernization with a rationalizing theology that stresses *ijtihad* (individual exegesis of the Quran and Sunnah) over traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Graduates of Egypt's al-Azhar University brought Islamic modernism to Indonesia at the beginning of the 20th century. And Islamic modernism forms the theological basis of the Muhammadiyah organization, which claims 29 million members, many of whom follow a more urban and middle-class social profile than the NU rank and file (Kurtzman 2002: 1-27; Liddle 1996; Hefner 2000: 117).

Since the early 20th century, NU and Muhammadiyah have developed what one might describe as a polite rivalry. There is certainly competition between the two: over souls, over state funding, even over who can most accurately gauge the start of Ramadan. But there is also a lot of cooperation and like-mindedness. Furthermore, Indonesian Muslims generally see each organization as representing a legitimate approach to Islam. Many of my informants described themselves as coming from mixed NU/Muhammadiyah families, and nearly all are acquainted with members of both organizations. For intellectuals, the difference is primarily theological (i.e. whether or not a given Muslim follows the medieval *syafi'i* jurisprudential tradition), whereas the rank and file often describe the difference in terms of ritual (i.e. highlighting differences in how prayer is conducted, how religious education is structured, etc.). Cultural explanations are also prevalent. Modernists often describe NU's version of Islam as compromised by Javanese

influences, with Muhammadiyah's modernist approach described as more fundamentally Islamic. NU followers, by contrast, tend to describe their approach to Islam as the only real and authentic heir to medieval Islam, as well as more appropriate to Indonesian conditions. Muhammadiyah's brand of Islam, by contrast, is viewed as austere and "foreign"—an import from the Middle East that is less well suited to Indonesian conditions than traditionalism. Yet despite these clear differences of opinion on "correctness," nearly everyone I spoke to who claimed affiliation with these organizations recognized the other organization's approach as legitimate. Furthermore, the idea of communities or families being split between these different approaches is thoroughly normalized, producing *benevolent toleration*.

Of course, many followers of NU and Muhammadiyah view many other sects, cults, or tendencies within Islam as less legitimate (Menchik 2016). But the organizations NU and Muhammadiyah generally instruct their followers to engage the "incorrect" in polite dialogue and *dakwah* (internal proselytizing) rather than incite confrontations. This *ambivalent toleration*, though falling short of acceptance, has nevertheless created space for sects, cults, and tendencies that lie outside the mainstream: for *salafi* communities that take their cues from the Saudi clerisy; for small pockets of Shia and Ahmadi Muslims; for *sufi* orders, such as the Naqshbandis; and for various Muslim new religious movements, like Darul Arqam and Dakwah Tabligh (both offshoots of the South Asian Tablighi Jama'at revival movement) or LDII (Institute for Islamic Dakwah in Indonesia). In most—though by no means all—places and times, the existence of these groups is ambivalently tolerated by mainstream orthodox (Sunni) Muslims.

In sum, Indonesia's corporate-pluralist system of religious governance is defined by three main characteristics. First, state and society are *explicitly defined as religious*, meaning that citizens are required to affiliate with one of the six officially recognized religions. However,

there is *formal equality* among the six. Rights and protections are granted in equal measure to adherents of each faith, and citizens are free to convert from one to another if they so choose. There is space given to those who wish to practice a faith other than one of these six in private, as well as for those who choose not to be observant (many Indonesian Muslims take a casual approach to religiosity, though agnosticism and atheism are rarely admitted to in public). But all must choose a faith to associate with, and this choice structures many aspects of public and private life (including family law). Second, each recognized religion is *implicitly defined in terms of the dominant orthodoxy*, which produces long-term pressures on sects, cults, or tendencies outside the mainstream. Third, Muslim Indonesians have historically *practiced benevolent or ambivalent toleration* of non-normative sects, cults, or tendencies, as well as of irreligion.

Democratization has arguably contributed to pressures on formal equality among the six recognized religions, and on the tolerance of non-normative religious groups and practices. It has also arguably reinforced the religiosity of the state, and its orientation toward the dominant orthodoxies within each recognized religion.³⁵ That is to say, the formal system of religious pluralism, which grants equal rights and protections to Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians, has come under pressure from groups seeking to assert Islam's primacy over the other recognized religions, to limit the free practice of minority faiths in local areas, or who seek to implement restrictive laws derived from distinctly conservative interpretations of *sharia*.

³⁵ As described above, these are not new or unique to the era of democratization, but rather recontextualized by democracy. Specifically, democratization has allowed religious parties or organizations that oppose Pancasila to run for office or stage public demonstrations, decreased other state restrictions on how one can be religious in public (for example, eliminating restrictions on wearing the Islamic headscarf in public schools), and decentralized the state so that religious groups can challenge religious pluralism at multiple levels of governance.

Meanwhile, on-going processes of sociocultural Islamization may be reducing the space for irreligion, casual religion, or non-orthodox religion.

Outline of the Dissertation

Since 2004, the distinctive Indonesian system of religious pluralism discussed in the previous section has shown itself to be neither impervious to pressure nor to be crumbling under unrelenting assault. Rather, a key argument made in this dissertation is that religious pluralism in Indonesia has come under different forms and degrees of pressure. Consequently, religious pluralism displays differing levels of robustness, depending on what sense or aspect of religious pluralism is under discussion (intra- or interreligious, in policy or in practice, etc.) and on what arena or level of social organization is under examination. I have structured this dissertation to examine different aspects and manifestations of pressure on religious pluralism, while analyzing how these aspects and manifestations of pressure are linked to one another.

In Chapter One, I trace the history of religious pluralism in Indonesia from the introduction of Islam and Christianity to the archipelago to the 2004 elections. These elections marked a turning point of sorts for Indonesian democracy: the second consecutive set of parliamentary elections and the first direct election of the president.³⁶ It was also the moment at which Islam-based challenges to religious pluralism shifted from direct to more diffuse sets of pressure. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the historical evolution of religious pluralism in policy and in practice. I begin by discussing Dutch colonial policies that sought to “indigenize” Islam and the subsequent emergence of rival secular- and Islam-based conceptions of Indonesian nationalism in the early 20th century. I then examine constitutional debates over the Jakarta

³⁶ The previous three presidents, Habibie, Wahid, and Megawati, had all been chosen by parliament.

Charter—a proposed seven-word clause that would have obligated the state to enforce *sharia* as the law of the land—and the articulation of Pancasila as a pan-monotheistic alternative to the Jakarta Charter. Next, I explore contention over Islam’s role in state affairs under Sukarno (1945-65), the formation and evolution of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the broader institutionalization of discrete religious pluralism under Sukarno and Suharto (1965-1998). I then analyze how state repression of political Islam and sponsorship of sociocultural Islam in the 1970s and early 1980s, coupled with Suharto’s pivot toward conservative Islam in the late 1980s and early 1990s, created the split between civil and conservative Islam—a division that in many ways shapes the contours of contention over religious pluralism today. Finally, I examine how this division within the Muslim elite, as well as escalating sequences of religious violence, shaped both Indonesia’s “long transition” to democracy (1994-2004) and the major debates over Islam’s role in the newly democratic state (1998-2004).

In Chapter Two, I examine two pieces of legislation, debated at the level of state, with considerable potential impacts on formal religious pluralism in Indonesia. The first is a proposed 2006 law against pornography. This bill not only proposed to criminalize public nudity and possession or sale of recorded media, but also would have criminalized a wider set of personal practices, including public kissing, “suggestive” dance, and the wearing of moderately revealing clothing. However, the version that eventually became law eliminated these controversial provisions, and focused entirely on public nudity and recorded media. What’s more, the state decided not to enforce most provisions of the law itself, but rather left enforcement up to the provinces, regencies, and cities (which could then decide whether and how zealously they wanted to enforce the law). The second piece of legislation I examine is a proposed 2011 ban on the “heretical” Ahmadiyah sect. Had it been passed, this bill would have set a precedent for state-

enforced bans on many of the non-normative Islamic sects, cults, and tendencies that have traditionally been tolerated in Indonesia. However, the government neither banned the Ahmadiyah nor reaffirmed its rights. Instead, it allowed the provinces, regencies, and cities to ban (or decline to ban) the group.

I argue that these outcomes emerge from a distinctive political process that is designed to avoid, deflect, and dilute contention over religious pluralism at the level of state. I identify three interlocking elements of this process, which together explain the resilience of religious pluralism at the level of the state. The first of these is the cartel structure of parliamentary politics, which incentivizes collusion and disincentivizes direct confrontation among political parties. The second is intervention and consensus-making on the part of the Muslim civic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, both of which possess high levels of influence in statewide politics and internal incentives to dampen contention over the role of Islam in Indonesian state and society. The third is the devolution of responsibility for passing and enforcing laws to the provinces and regions. I argue that this is a deliberate strategy to ensure consensus at the level of the state, but that this strategy contributes to growing regional disparities in how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced across Indonesia.

In Chapter Three, I examine the sustained anti-church protests that, since 2004, have emerged as flashpoints in the struggle over religious pluralism in Indonesia. Indeed, these events are often cited as evidence of “creeping intolerance” in Indonesia. However, they are spatially clustered in the industrializing suburbs of Jakarta and largely absent from other industrializing zones, even from those with recent histories of anti-Christian protest and violence. I seek to account for both the emergence of the protests and their distinctive clustering in Jakarta’s industrializing suburbs.

To that end, I begin by tracing the historical emergence of anti-church protests—and the “street Islamist” groups that incite and sustain them—as a significant form of violent protest in Indonesia. I then describe how the new opportunity structures created by political decentralization facilitated the emergence of these conflict events. Next, based on interview and documentary data, I identify a series of risk factors that drive anti-church protests in metropolitan Jakarta. The first of these is the feeling that there are too many people in a given area (an outgrowth of land shortages and large-scale in-migration), which generates broad anti-migrant antipathies among locals. The second is the feeling of encroachment by migrants who are also religious outsiders, which threatens Muslim symbolic ownership of space. The third is the sense of encroachment by migrants who are also ethnic outsiders. When unpopular ethnic outsiders are also religious outsiders, these sentiments also contribute to the construction of specifically religious outsiderhood.

These sentiments are not entirely independent of political efforts to cultivate them, but they can (and often do) spring up without much prompting. However, it would be misleading to attribute sustained anti-church protests to these low-level antipathies. Rather, low-level antipathies are exploitable by the religiopolitical entrepreneurs who initiate and sustain anti-church protests. Meanwhile, a fourth risk factor—ineffective in-group policing by Muslim civic associations NU and Muhammadiyah (where local chapters are weak and fractured)—explains why the opportunity structure in Jakarta’s industrializing suburbs is favorable to anti-church protests.

After discussing how each of these risk factors contributes to anti-church protests in the industrializing suburbs of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, I then look at a counter-case, the Surabaya Metropolitan Region, where, despite a spate of church burnings in the 1990s, sustained

anti-church protests are practically non-existent. I conclude that this is because there is more open land to build on, local Christian migrants come from the same ethnic groups that already predominate in the area, and local chapters of NU and Muhammadiyah are more proactive in policing co-religionists against more radical challengers.

In Chapter Four, I assess the degree to which the gradual adoption by Muslim women of visual markers of piety, such as the Islamic headscarf, may informally pressure other Muslims to do the same, while contributing to feelings of markedness and exclusion among non-Muslims. I begin by exploring the diverse reasons Muslim women adopt the headscarf, distinguishing “proactive” from “reactive” patterns of adoption (in which the decision to wear the headscarf is clearly a response to social pressure). I then present evidence, based on interviews with Muslim Indonesians, suggesting that conformity pressures (the internalized pressure to conform to perceived norms in a given space) are far more pervasive than compliance pressures (social pressure placed on individuals in order to elicit compliance with a behavioral norm). Next I discuss limits to the social pressure to be pious. I discuss why some Muslim women choose not to adopt the headscarf and why others choose to combine the “pious” headscarf with form fitting, revealing, or otherwise “impious” dress. Finally, I consider the implications of the increasing adoption of Muslim pious dress on Muslim-Christian relations. I argue that, while there is little evidence that pious Muslims are less tolerant of Christians, growth in Muslim pious dress nevertheless erects new boundaries to everyday interactions between Muslims and Christians, not least through social and institutional segregation along religious lines.

These four analyses are based on research conducted in Indonesia in 2010-2011, when I was a Fulbright-Hays scholar based in Jakarta and Surabaya, and in two subsequent visits to Indonesia that were supported by the UCLA Lemelson Fellowship for Indonesian Studies. Each

chapter draws from a common set of data sources collected at this time, comprising primary and secondary documents, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation. As the spatial-temporal scope narrows, from Chapter One to Chapter Four, data emphasis shifts from comparative-historical and document-based data toward interview, focus group, and ethnographic data.

I collected and coded a large number of magazine, newspaper, and newswire articles from Indonesian outlets like *Kompas*, *Republika*, *The Jakarta Post*, *Jawa Pos*, *Tempo Magazine*, national news carrier *Antara*, the web portal *Detik.com*, smaller Islamic press (e.g. *Sabili*, *NooR*, *Media Dakwah*, *VOA-Islam*), and a smaller selection of foreign press known to report reliably on Indonesia. I collected and analyzed primary and secondary documents written by NGOs, civic organizations, government offices, and Indonesia specialists on the statewide political process, localized anti-church protests, and everyday experience of Muslim Indonesians. I conducted 30 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with public figures, representing a broad cross-section of Indonesian political and civil society, and more than 100 interviews with confidential informants.³⁷ And I ran 6 focus group discussions with 5-7 confidential informants each. As a condition for exemption of this study by UCLA's Office of Research Administration's Institutional Review Board, all names and potential identifying markers pertaining to confidential informants interviewed for this study have been changed.

Contributions of this Study

This dissertation seeks to contribute to two main bodies of literature. The first is the literature on Islam and religious pluralism in Indonesia. There have been a number of important

³⁷ Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, now a doctoral candidate at the University of Melbourne, assisted with a portion of document collection, interviews, and focus group discussions.

recent contributions to this literature, including Hefner's (2000) classic study of Islam and transition to democracy, Sidel's (2006) analysis of evolving patterns of Islamist violence during the 1990s and early 2000s, Feillard and Medinier's (2011) study of radicalism among Indonesian Muslims, Platzdasch's (2009) overview of Islamic political party behavior since transition, Ricklefs' (2012) wide-ranging history of Islamization and its opponents on Java since 1930, Buehler's (2010; 2013b) work on Islam, decentralization, and local politics in South Sulawesi, and Menchik's (2016) examination of tolerance and "truncated pluralism" in the post-transition period.³⁸

My contribution to this literature is distinctive in its concern with the *regionalization* of religious pluralism in Indonesia. By this I mean the on-going process through which the central state devolves responsibility for defining and enforcing religious pluralism to the provinces, regencies, and cities. I argue that this regionalization is an outgrowth of how political parties manage contention over Islam's role in state and society. Consequently, Indonesia's (Muslim majority) provinces, regencies, and cities increasingly make their own decisions about how "Islamic" regional and local law should be, whether and how to enforce national laws related to pluralism issues, and to what degree religious minorities are allowed to worship freely.

³⁸ There have also been a number of important edited volumes on Islam in Indonesia, which I draw upon in subsequent chapters. Fealy and White's (2008) collection *Expressing Islam* examines a broad range of manifestations of Indonesia's Islamic revival, from *sharia* banking and Islamic televangelism to the evolution of Islamist violence from terrorism to *premanisme* (gangsterism). Another collection, edited by Burhanudin and van Dijk (2013), explores the unique modalities of Islam as institutionalized and practiced in Indonesia, and attempts to situate Indonesian Islam within the broader Muslim world. A third collection, edited by van Bruinessen (2013), presents essays that all explore manifestations of Indonesia's "conservative turn." Finally, though not about Indonesia per se, Hefner's (2013) collection on global *sharia* politics places Indonesia's conservative movement in comparative perspective, linking developments and actors in Indonesia to those found elsewhere.

The second literature to which this dissertation seeks to contribute is the comparative literature on Islam and politics in Muslim majority states. I am especially concerned with the effects of sociocultural Islamization on religious pluralism in the context of democratization.³⁹ This question is of particular importance given the spread of democracy (Marshall and Jagers 2007; Kapstein and Converse 2008) and increasingly public forms of religious expression and organization (Casanova 1994; 2001; Stepan 2001; Fox 2006) across the globe. This is especially true of majority Muslim societies, where demands for more Islam and more democracy are often intertwined (Gao and Tessler 2005).⁴⁰

Scholarship on political Islam tends to view sociocultural Islamization as primarily interesting in the way it shapes attitudes, political preferences, and political party behavior. This perspective is an important one, given how Islamists use sociocultural Islamization as a strategy to build constituencies for their political ambitions (e.g. Roy 1994; 2013; Kandil 2012; 2014). However, a complementary body of work on Middle Eastern cases demonstrates that sociocultural Islamization has broader transformative effects on public life (Bayat 2007; Mahmood 2011; N. Brown 2013). These effects may, in turn, impact religious pluralism in ways

³⁹ This literature overlaps, to a degree, with the literature on political Islam in Muslim minority settings, such as Europe and North America. However, that literature is bound up with issues of migration and questions of how to integrate what are often deeply religious (and conservative) migrant communities into highly secularized host societies (e.g. Bowen 2007; Joppke 2009). This discussion will, instead, focus on political Islam as it manifests in Muslim majority settings, where the state is an object of contestation.

⁴⁰ Much of the study of Islam and politics, however, has taken place outside the context of democratization, because until recently there were very few Muslim majority democracies. Relatedly, this “democracy gap” has become a peculiar focus of attention, with various studies attributing the phenomenon to political conditions in the Arab world (Stepan and Robertson 2003), ideologies internal to Islam (Karatnycky 2002), or a combination of each plus low developmental conditions (Lakoff 2004). Today, though, enough Muslim majority states have institutionalized procedural democracy that focus can shift to the related issues of how the onset of democracy potentially recontextualizes existing relationships between Islam and the state, as well as between the religious majority and minorities.

not captured in the study of attitudes, political preferences, and political party behavior. This dissertation contributes to these lines of inquiry by specifying how increases in public piety among Muslims potentially reduces intra-religious diversity and stimulates interreligious patterns of marking and exclusion, even in the absence of any intent to do so.

Islam and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia

How to characterize the effects of a resurgent Islam on religious pluralism represents one of the most vexing questions for scholars of Indonesia. In their study of radicalism among Indonesian Muslims, Feillard and Madinier (2011) identify this as a central paradox of post-transition Indonesia:

The Muslim community of Indonesia seems to be tugged in opposite directions: what it clamours for in public opinion polls, it rejects at the voting urn. It comes down harshly on radicals who have strayed into politics, yet is not indifferent to the themes they develop (222).

Indeed, in the eighteen years since transition, Indonesians have largely declined to support the Islamist parties that seek (or have sought) to reassess the relationship between “mosque” and state. No Muslim party, Islamist or otherwise, has managed to win more than 13 percent of the popular vote, while the combined share going to Muslim parties (some of which are relatively liberal) has fluctuated between a high of 35 percent (in 2004) and a low of 26 percent (in 2009).⁴¹ Support for the narrower band of Islamist parties has remained static at approximately 14 percent of the vote in every parliamentary election save 2004, when the figure

⁴¹ Scholars of Indonesia generally distinguish between the broader category of “Muslim parties” and the narrower category of “Islamist parties.” Islamist parties are typically defined by Islamic state or comprehensive *sharia* advocacy. “Muslim parties,” by contrast, are defined as those led by *ulama* or other public figures that self-identify as “Islamic.” In practice, Indonesia’s two non-Islamist political parties, the PKB and PAN, are opposed to state-enforced *sharia* and align with the country’s secular-nationalist parties on most issues. But the category of “Muslim parties” would also theoretically include parties that pursued a conservative agenda (as defined above).

briefly rose to 18 percent. No party advocating for the statewide imposition of *sharia* has won seats in parliament since 2004, while several that once did have since abandoned the cause.⁴²

This stands in stark contrast to the significant levels of support for *sharia* (the abstract concept of “god’s law”), *huhud* (the medieval system of punishments derived from *sharia*), and for restrictions on minority rights found in two major public opinion surveys (PPIM 2007; LSI 2007).⁴³ Though differing somewhat in methodology, the findings were quite consistent across samples, leading many observers to conclude that the two surveys accurately gauged the attitudes of Indonesian Muslims on religiopolitical issues (Hefner 2013a).

Many responses to the LSI and PPIM surveys appear to signal the desire for an Islamic state, or at least, for one that privileges its Muslim citizens and restricts the rights and protections granted to religious minorities. These surveys showed that 65-70 percent of Indonesian Muslims supported the idea of state-enforced *sharia*, while approximately 50 percent supported the corporal punishments of the medieval *hudud*, such as lashes or amputations. What’s more, the PPIM survey found that 50-55 percent of Muslims were opposed to Christians holding public

⁴² Platzdasch (2009) cites the prioritization of voter-maximization and organizational service-provision as central to the transformation of the formerly pro-Jakarta Charter Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, PK) into the “*sharia*-friendly” Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), which now advocates for the introduction of “*sharia*-inspired” concepts into the law rather than have the state enforce *sharia* for Muslims. However, this gambit has, to date, produced intangible results at the ballot box (Liddle and Mujani 2009)

⁴³ The first of these was conducted by the Program Pascasarjana Ilmu Manajemen (Graduate Program in Management Science, PPIM) at the Universitas Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah (State Islamic University Syarif Hidayatullah, UIN), while the second was conducted by the Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI). A third survey, conducted by PPIM and Robert Hefner, surveyed more than 1,000 educators at Islamic day schools (*madrasah*) and seminaries (*pesantren*) (PPIM 2007). This survey also uncovered broad support for state-enforced *sharia*, as well as the corporal punishments of *hudud*, and pervasively negative views of religious minorities.

events or building churches in their local areas (PPIM 2007).⁴⁴ Yet 85-90 percent of respondents professed support for a democratic Indonesian state founded on the linked principles of Pancasila and pluralism (as opposed to an Islamic state or one that privileges its Muslim citizens) (PPIM 2007; LSI 2007; c.f. Feillard and Madinier 2011: 228; Hefner 2013a: 59). And 85-90 percent of respondents in the LSI survey agreed that religious laws and regulations in Indonesia must be consistent with Pancasila (LSI 2007).

These surveys thus imply that there is broad support among Indonesian Muslims for both a religiously pluralist state *and* for policies that might erode or limit pluralism in policy and practice. It is notable that each of these tendencies corresponds to a definable movement or political orientation within Indonesian political Islam.⁴⁵ Anthropologist Robert Hefner (2000) paradigmatically articulated this idea in his book *Civil Islam*, which recounted the role of Muslim reformists in the overthrow of Suharto and onset of democratic reform. For Hefner, political Islam in late Suharto-era Indonesia had fragmented into the oppositional political-ideological categories of “civil Islam” and “conservative Islam.”⁴⁶ Hefner argues that the first of these, civil Islam, is defined by a belief in greater openness, transparency, and accountability in

⁴⁴ However, the survey also found that the percentage of Muslims opposed to Christian churches in their local area had declined by about five percent since 2002.

⁴⁵ By “political Islam,” I mean those individuals, organizations, and parties who (a) self-identify, politically speaking, as Muslim, (b) base their political claims on interpretations of Islamic theology, law, or history, or (c) claim to represent the interests of Muslim citizens. Some scholars use the term “political Islam” as a synonym for Islamism, but this is often in societies where Islamism dominates this broader category of political Islam.

⁴⁶ Crosscutting these political-ideological categories is a third category, regimist Islam (Hefner 2000: 94-166). This refers to Muslims oriented toward the state, a category that included prominent civil and conservative Muslims at many points. Suharto had long sought to domesticate and depoliticize Islam, leading to the successful co-optation of many Muslims leaders and intellectuals. Thus regimist Islam was thus notable first and foremost for its political quiescence, but also for the degree to which the interests of regimist Muslims came to align with the state’s interests. Though by no means oriented toward democracy or the autonomous civil society imagined by proponents of civil Islam, regimist Muslims did, broadly speaking, accept the Pancasila state.

governance, rejection of the Islamic state ideal, acceptance of formal sociocultural pluralism as the overriding organizational principle of the Indonesian nation-state, and the desire to create a powerful, autonomous civil society in order to provide essential checks and balances on state power (ibid 12-3). In his words, civil Islam offers a “middle path between liberalism’s privatization and conservative Islam’s bully state,” a path that “passes by way of a public religion that makes itself heard through independent associations, spirited public dialogue, and the demonstrated decency of believers” (ibid 218).

Hefner’s theoretical formulation thus draws upon theories of public religion (e.g. Casanova 1994; 2001; Stepan 2001).⁴⁷ But Hefner is not, as some critics have alleged, grafting a Western construct onto a case that doesn’t fit (e.g. Sidel 2001a). Rather, Hefner uses the heuristic of public religion to describe a modernizing, pluralistically oriented understanding of Islam’s relationship to state and society, which was first formulated in the 1970s by intellectuals within Muhammadiyah and NU. Leading Muhammadiyah intellectual Nurcholish Madjid once shorthanded this viewpoint as “Islam yes, Islamic state no,” a phrase he deployed in defense of Pancasila pluralism and in rejection of the Jakarta Charter. Madjid (2008) justified this viewpoint in Islamic terms, on the basis of the “Medina Charter” between Muhammad and the city’s Jews and Christian, and on Islam’s egalitarian impulse—both of which, he argued, offered an Islamic

⁴⁷ The literature on public religion was developed as a critique of secularization theory. Drawing primarily on the Catholic states of “third wave” democratization (as well as the Protestant majority United States), proponents of public religion argue that modernization has not relegated religion to the private sphere, but rather facilitated its reformulation within the public sphere of civil society (Casanova 1994; 2001). A bargain between religious orders and state authorities—“twin tolerations” mediated through civil society—ensues, through which the state recognizes a public role for organized religion in exchange for religious organizations’ acceptance of (non-religious) state authority (Stepan 2001).

justification for Indonesia's "Pancasila pluralism." (37-58).⁴⁸ Moreover, in Madjid's (2008) view, it was incumbent upon Indonesian Muslims to reconcile the universal spirit of Islamic theology to the practical realities of life in religiously plural Indonesia, which necessitated the integration of "Islam-ness" (*keislaman*) with "Indonesian-ness" (*keindonesiaan*) and "modern-ness" (*kemodernan*) (c.f. 1981; 1992). This, in turn, underscored the need for "genuine engagement with diversity within the bond of civility" and a rejection of the Islamic state ideal (1992; c.f. Widiyanto 2013).⁴⁹

Meanwhile, intellectuals within NU were developing ideas along the same lines. This was notably the case for then-Chairman Abdurrahman Wahid, who in the 1980s began calling for a *pribumisasi* (indigenization) of Islam in Indonesia. This, he argued, entailed the rejection of globalized Islam and endorsement of Pancasila-based nationalism as an authentic reflection of the (normatively pluralistic) Indonesian approach to Islam (Wahid 1986: 181; Burhani 2013b: 33).⁵⁰ By the 1990s, advocates of these civil Islamic ideas controlled Muhammadiyah and NU, and began calling for political reform, including both democratization and state liberalization.

Hefner (2000: 129-138) juxtaposes these civil Islamic ideas with those of a second political-ideological category, conservative Islam. Though he does not precisely define the term "conservative" in *Civil Islam*, he uses it to refer to the large and heterogeneous category of activists and organizations seeking to reinsert the Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian Constitution, grant state preferences or special privileges to Indonesian Muslims, restrict the scope of religious freedoms granted to religious minorities, ban "heretical," heterodox, or

⁴⁸ This is not a unique construct to Indonesia. Modernizing, pluralist Muslim intellectuals in Turkey have made similar arguments (Kersten 2014: 24-5).

⁴⁹ I am using Widiyanto's (2013) translation.

⁵⁰ Wahid was certainly influenced by Madjid, as well as the U.S.-based scholar Fazlur Rachman, who was Madjid's mentor.

mystical sects within Islam, more tightly police the boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, or introduce *sharia*-derived laws on a more ad hoc basis.⁵¹ Hefner notes that, like civil Islam, conservative Islam experienced a resurgence in the 1990s. This was fueled primarily by state patronage and represented a sea change from the 1970s and 1980s, when the state had violently repressed any political expression of conservative Islam. Now the advocates of conservative Islam were more active, visible, and closer to the seat of power than they had been in decades, and were determined to ascend to power (Hefner 2000: 128-138; c.f. Bertrand 1996; Liddle 1996; Aspinall 2005: 33; Sidel 2006: 61-67; 132-133).⁵² Thus Hefner is quite right to portray Indonesia's political transition as representing not only the struggle between advocates of authoritarianism and democracy, but also between civil and conservative visions of Islam's relationship to state and society.

Many scholars have noted how these political-ideological categories, though sometimes differently labeled, have continued to shape Indonesian politics after transition. During the early years of democratization, confrontations between advocates of civil and conservative Islam were highly contentious. As Sidel (2006: 132-133) notes, Muslim conservatives viewed the ascension of Suharto successor B.J. Habibie as the culmination of the half century-long quest to reinsert the

⁵¹ This definition encompasses Islamism, as I have defined it above. Hefner sometimes uses the adjectives "conservative" and "Islamist" interchangeably. However, in his usage "conservative" also encompasses actors who would not fit into my definition of Islamist.

⁵² From 1987, Suharto began cultivating ties with conservative Islamic groups as an alternate base of support to the officer corps—including groups that were explicitly Christianophobic, Sinophobic, and had, during the 1970s and early 1980s, outwardly opposed the regime (Bertrand 1996; Liddle 1996; Aspinall 2005: 33). Among other things, this entailed the replacement of Christians and secular or "red and white" nationalists in the military and civil service, who were now deemed to be of uncertain loyalties, with "green" nationalists who sought to associate the state more closely with its Muslim citizens (and who were, by and large, conservative Muslims). In the military, this was largely achieved by fiat. In the civil service, however, Suharto preferred to work through the All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), a state-funded organization run by Suharto protégé and noted Muslim conservative B.J. Habibie (Hefner 2000: 128-138; Sidel 2006: 61-67).

Jakarta Charter into the Indonesian Constitution. However, Habibie could not unify the Muslim elite, which helps explain his 1999 ouster and replacement by the civil Islamic Abdurrahman Wahid (ibid 210). Yet the coalition backing Wahid was also weak and fractured, and his government collapsed after little more than a year. Meanwhile, attempts by Islamists and Muslim conservative allies to reinsert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution were debated but ultimately rejected during the constitutional reform process (1999-2002), primarily through the intervention of Muhammadiyah and NU (Mujani 2003: 77-83; Indrayana 2008: 313-6).⁵³

Scholars are, for the most part, in agreement that these events altered the structure of contention over Islam's place in state and society. Many note a post-transition convergence—in policies, interests, and constituencies—among Indonesia's political parties. Slater (2004; 2006) argues that the instability of the Habibie and Wahid eras led to the formation of a cartel system of party politics, marked by collusion among Indonesia's civil Islamic, conservative Muslim, and secular-nationalist parties. This was, in his view, tantamount to the reconstitution of the New Order "deep state" under democratic auspices. However, elite consensus now replaced coercion as the primary stability-generating mechanism, while the spoils of governance would be shared among multiple party elites (rather than held exclusively by the Suharto family and its cabal of insiders) (Slater 2004; 2006). This system, Slater argues, creates clear incentives for all parties to find consensus rather than engage in zero-sum contests.

⁵³ The debate itself was nothing new: promulgation of the Jakarta Charter had been the goal of Sukarno-era Muslim political parties, which in 1954 represented roughly 40 percent of the electorate. In 1999, however, three of the five Muslim political parties in parliament declined to support the amendment. Citing the proposed amendment as a threat to "national unity," the Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU (which had supported similar policies up to the mid-1980s) came out in opposition to the amendment, and marshaled impressive resources to block its adoption (Mujani 2003: 77-83; Indrayana 2008: 313-6). In the end, fewer than 15 percent of parliamentarians backed the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter.

Along similar lines, Platzdasch's (2009) analysis of Islamist party behavior demonstrates clear progression since 1999 toward integration into (rather than opposition to) the Pancasila state. For the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Star Party, PBB), and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), the shift has been dramatic. Platzdasch (2009: 18-32; 216-249) argues that, since 2000, these parties have shifted away from Islamic state and *sharia* advocacy and toward symbolic Islamism combined with the pragmatic acceptance of constitutional practice, Pancasila pluralism, and junior partnerships in governments run by secular nationalist parties (c.f. Buehler 2009).⁵⁴ This pragmatism stems, indelibly, from these parties' recognition of their limited influence in parliament and among Indonesian voters, and the obvious benefits (in terms of ministerial appointments, state funding, and influence) gained from joining governing coalitions. Platzdasch does not, however, argue that Indonesia's Islamist parties have transformed into advocates for civil Islam. Rather, while the shift in Islamist party behavior does reflect their acceptance of Indonesia as a multi-religious and pluralist state, the kind of pluralism envisioned by Islamists is highly truncated. Though "based on tolerance of non-Muslims," he argues, it nevertheless "bars full equality for them" (Platzdasch 2009: 329).

Looking beyond the realm of political party behavior, Menchik (2016: 3) has argued that truncated notions of pluralism (which he refers to as "tolerance without liberalism") are actually widespread across the orthodox Muslim elite, including within Muhammadiyah and NU. Menchik explains that this is a function of how Muslim elites justify tolerance and pluralism, as well as the limits they place upon each concept (ibid 136-137). Each organization, he notes,

⁵⁴ Platzdasch (2009: 216-49) provides a detailed description of each Islamist party's specific voter maximization strategies during the years 1999-2004. Also, it is worth noting that PPP was the institutional Islamic party under Suharto, and had accepted Pancasila in the mid-1980s. However, after 1998, the party returned to its previous advocacy for the "greening" of the state.

justifies religious pluralism theologically. NU stresses the Quranic concept of brotherhood or solidarity (*ukhuwah*) rather than that of protected minorities (*al dhimmi*), the latter of which assumes a dominant/subservient relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. And Muhammadiyah refers to the Quran's Surah 58 as sanctioning enmity with non-Muslims only in situations where they deliberately and explicitly oppose Islam.⁵⁵ Finally, he notes how NU and Muhammadiyah share an understanding, enacted as policy by each organization during the 1980s, that religious affiliation should have no bearing on the secular rights and protections afforded by Indonesian citizenship.

Menchik argues, correctly in my view, that some scholars have misdiagnosed these organizational policies as evidence of a liberal tendency within Muslim civil society, especially within NU (e.g. Barton 1996; Künkler 2013).⁵⁶ And it is true that the civil Islamic tradition, which Hefner envisioned as inclusive but not quite liberal, is highly influential within these organizations. But, as Menchik (2016: 67-71) suggests, Muhammadiyah and NU actually support Pancasila pluralism for reasons that, on inspection, look rather more conservative than liberal. In their view (and in Menchik's) Pancasila defines Indonesia as a community of religious believers, rendering the state non-secular. And while the state recognizes religions other than Islam, the primary criterion for state recognition is monotheism—a key element of Islamic theology. The state also provides state funding to religious organizations within of all six recognized religions. Islamic schools, mosques, and pilgrims, for example, all receive state funds, while religious education (a minimum of two hours per day) is required in state as well as private schools. For

⁵⁵ As a consequence of this interpretation of Surah 58, Muhammadiyah instructs its followers to be tolerant of non-Muslims, and to only deviate from that baseline when individuals, organizations, or states actively oppress or seek conflict with Islam.

⁵⁶ Künkler (2013) argues that support for pluralism from within NU and Muhammadiyah is part of an “emergent liberal discourse” in Indonesian Islam.

NU and Muhammadiyah, as for many Indonesian Muslims outside these organizations, this means that the Pancasila state provides “enough Islam”—obviating the need for an Islamic state (ibid 67).

However, Menchik also argues that the state deliberately cooperates with religious civil society in order to promote “orthodox theism” *within* each recognized religious category, while policing the boundaries *between* these categories (ibid 67-72). This is borne out by state restrictions on blasphemy or insulting the beliefs, symbols, or prophets of Indonesia’s official religions, making zoning decisions on new houses of worship a function of community approval, refusing to issue licenses for interfaith marriages (though legally recognizing interfaith marriages performed abroad), and bureaucratizing religious conversion.⁵⁷ As such, this bargain is the formal embodiment of tolerance without liberalism.

Of equal interest, Menchik presents data that show how tolerance (and, by extension, attitudes toward pluralism) among orthodox Muslim elites differs according to what kinds of minorities are under consideration, as well as by the organizational affiliation and regional location of the respondent. Muslims, he finds, are in general more tolerant of Christians, Hindus, and other recognized, religious non-Muslims than they are of intra-religious minorities, such as the Shia or Ahmadiyah, or the irreligious, such as communists or atheists (ibid 20). What’s more, followers of NU appear, on average, to be more tolerant than followers of Muhammadiyah, while both are more tolerant than followers of Persis (a much smaller, conservative organization). Tolerance among Muslims also varies by region and ethnicity (which crosscut one another): Muslims in West Java, for example, are significantly less likely to support the idea of a

⁵⁷ In Menchik’s (2016: 67) words, “for a godly nation to endure, it must privilege some beliefs and prosecute acts of deviance as blasphemy.”

Christian mayor or new church constructions than are their counterparts in East or Central Java (ibid 59-61).

Though tolerance and pluralism are not equivalent concepts, these findings do illuminate attitudes toward the rights and protections afforded by formal religious pluralism. For one, they show that members of mainstream Muslim organizations do not believe that these rights and protections should apply as equally to internal minorities (e.g. Ahmadiyah, Shia) as external minorities (e.g. Christians, Hindus). This, in turn, suggests that when Indonesian Muslims profess support for religious pluralism, many are thinking narrowly of pluralism among the six religious categories established by the state. Meanwhile, these findings also show that attitudes toward pluralism differ according to which organization one belongs to and also vary significantly from one region to another.

Menchik offers persuasive historical arguments for why orthodox Muslims would be more tolerant of Christians than of Ahmadi Muslims, as well as for why followers of NU would be more tolerant than followers of Muhammadiyah. Yet the explanation he provides for regional variation in attitudes toward tolerance and pluralism, path dependency, does little to explain how these politics become embedded into local law and practices, especially when they contravene the law and norms of the central state. This speaks to a general gap in the literature, which tends to view regional variation in the degree or form of sociopolitical Islamization in one of three, equally problematic ways. First, there is a general tendency, by no means limited to the study of Islam, to explain local or regional events through analysis of politics at the level of the state, as if local conditions do not matter (van Klinken 2007). Second, more specific to the study of Islam and politics in Indonesia, there is the tendency to assume that some areas are just more conservative or exclusionary than others. By opening the gates, this line of reasoning goes,

democratization and decentralization inexorably lead to specific outcomes in specific areas.⁵⁸ Even important analyses of local politics, such as Bush’s (2008) study of local *sharia* bylaws or various empirical studies of protests and violence against religious minorities (e.g. ICG 2008; Crouch 2010), make these kinds of assumptions.

Finally, there is the related tendency to give too much weight to long-term historical legacies (whether local, regional, or statewide), to the point where shorter-term political processes are obscured or subsumed. For example, Menchik (2016: 66), with some justification, criticizes those who ignore historical legacies and instead simply blame democratization and decentralization for Indonesia’s anti-Ahmadiyah politics. But the underlying rationale for this critique—that it ignores longer-term histories of exclusion in areas where the Ahmadiyah face hardships—overstates the case for path dependency.⁵⁹ Indeed, while the Ahmadiyah have certainly experienced intermittent hardships in Indonesia, in most places and at most times they have been left to their own devices (Platzdasch 2011: 3). As such, there is something fundamentally different about anti-Ahmadiyah activism of the past decade, which has produced regional and provincial bans in many but not all Muslim majority regions of Indonesia.

This dissertation offers an alternate, but in many ways complementary, view to Menchik’s analysis of pluralism and tolerance in post-1998 Indonesia. I examine how ongoing processes of democratization and decentralization alter the regional and local opportunity structure for laws and actions that transgress or violate constitutional and legal norms at the statewide level. I present evidence that the cartel structure and consensus-making political process at the level of the state has led the political elite to tolerate wide—and growing—regional disparities in how religious pluralism is formalized and practiced. I then analyze how

⁵⁸ This is the dominant way of looking at things in policy, journalistic and NGO discourses.

⁵⁹ Menchik (2016) uses the term “local genealogies.”

the altered regional and local opportunity structures, which emerge from this process, interact with regional and local conditions to produce regional and local variation in how religious pluralism is formalized and practiced. Indonesia's provinces, regencies, and cities, for example, are allowed to enforce, decline to enforce, or re-interpret national laws according to local sensibilities, as with the Law on Pornography (discussed in Chapter Two). And the provinces, regencies, and cities are allowed to pass laws that potentially violate or supersede constitutional or national law, as with regional bans on the Ahmadiyah sect (also discussed in Chapter Two). Meanwhile, several of the sustained anti-church protests discussed in Chapter Three have been legally "resolved" by court order in favor of the disputed churches, but regional authorities refuse to comply and the central state has deliberately declined to enforce the court's decision. As a result, religious pluralism begins to mean something fundamentally different depending on where you live: for example, in West Java (where the Ahmadiyah have been declared illegal, Christians often can't build churches, a significant number of bylaws regulating public behavior are *sharia*-derived, and "suggestive" dancing or showing cleavage may result in a fine or jail sentence) or in Central Java (where none of these are the case).

That democratization and decentralization might, in combination, fuel sociopolitical Islamization, intolerance, and even violence is not an uncommon notion. However, the idea that far-reaching challenges to religious pluralism are deliberately tolerated in regional politics *precisely to deflect similar challenges at the level of the state* is, to my knowledge, a novel argument in the literature. By linking this regionalization to the structure and process of politics at the statewide level, this dissertation not only makes the case *that* decentralization structures the dynamics of contention over religious pluralism in Indonesia, but explains *how* it does so.

Similarly, while many observers have written about Islam and Indonesia's growing "tolerance problem," I argue that this problem is limited to specific places where the central state refuses to intervene. This provides a complementary framework to Michael Buehler's (e.g. 2013b) work on *sharia* bylaws, which also highlights regionalized challenges to religious pluralism. This work is important in highlighting the link between local party chapters' reliance on Islamic boarding school networks for voter mobilization and the passage of *sharia* bylaws, as well as demonstrating how local politicians use *sharia* bylaws to mobilize voters and build clientalistic networks. And it is further evidence of regionalization in how religious pluralism, sociopolitically speaking, is formalized and practiced in Indonesia. By highlighting the process driving regionalization, this dissertation will show how this has come to pass.

Islam and Politics in Muslim Majority States

This dissertation also seeks to contribute to the comparative study of Islamization in democratizing, Muslim majority states. Most works within this literature, however, do not distinguish sharply between sociopolitical and sociocultural Islamization. Some scholars even question whether they are conceptually separable; they argue that, in Islam, the political and the religious cannot be separated from one another (e.g. Lewis 1988; Gellner 1983; Kedourie

1994).⁶⁰ In Gellner's (1983: 1) words:

Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, external, divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society. This model is available in writing; it is equally and symmetrically available to all literate men, and to all those willing to heed literate men. These rules are to be implemented throughout social life.

⁶⁰ Scholars working within this framework tend to conclude, on this basis, that Islam is or tends to be incompatible with political democracy, Western-style liberal democracy, or "democratic values," a typically ill-defined category of related concepts that often but not always includes religious pluralism

According to this school of thought, there is only one “authentic Islam,” which is revealed through literalist readings of Quran and Sunnah.⁶¹ Where Muslim societies fail to measure up to this ideal, they are simply not Islamic enough, or not Islamic in the right way. Notably, this view is mirrored in the writings of political Islamists, whose state-seeking political ideology combines religious literalism and the underlying belief that Islam offers a “complete and universal” political system, to be implemented by a vanguard of the faithful (Roy 1994: 36-37). But Islamists and orientalists share more than just an essentializing, dehistoricized conception of Islam.⁶² They also share the belief that the religiopolitical entrepreneurs of political Islam are the true, authentic representatives of the faith (Lewis 1990).⁶³ As a consequence, Islamists and orientalists also both believe that the more religious Muslims become, the more likely they are to adopt the Islamist perspective.

Creating constituencies through religious education and outreach has essentially been policy for Middle Eastern Islamist organizations since the 1970s (Egypt), 1980s (Turkey), or 1990s (Tunisia). Prior to that, Islamism was a revolutionary movement that sought to dismantle

⁶¹ One notes that literalist readings of religious texts are often highly selective in what they emphasize.

⁶² This juxtaposition of a Western civilization animated by “individual freedom, pluralism, and secularism” with an Islamic civilization that is either ambivalent or outright hostile to all three is, as El Fadl (2002) argues, a false dichotomy. It erases the diversity of Muslim experiences as it has been lived over time and across space, while similarly ignoring the long, torturous processes through which Western states came to embrace these concepts (struggles that are, in many cases, still ongoing) (Ismail 2004; Hashemi 2009: 16). This is especially true of religious pluralism—which, as described above, has been a prominent feature of Muslim societies since the time of Muhammad. Equally, though, the charge that Islam lacks separation between religious and political power does not stand up to the historical record. From the 10th century on (when the Seljuk Turks took control of the Abbasid Caliphate), Muslim states were marked by a rather extensive separation of religious and political power, while few Caliphs or Sultans of medieval Islam showed much interest in arbitrating doctrinal disputes (Lapidus 1975; 1992; L. C. Brown 2013: 53).

⁶³ Bernard Lewis (1990) uses the term “classical view,” but is quite clear that he views “authentic” Islam as having no separation between the religious and the political.

the colonial and Western trappings of the emerging postcolonial states—common law, republicanism, nationalism, secularization, etc.—and replace it with an “authentically Islamic” (though still modernizing) alternative (Esposito 1984: 130-151). This distinguished Islamism from various forms of traditional conservatism, which shared its fundamentalist approach to religion but not necessarily its desire to build a revolutionary Islamic state. It also led the bulk of Arab regimes, whether military-authoritarian, monarchical, or pseudo-democratic, to view Islamism—and, given its transnational aspirations, the Muslim Brotherhood in particular—as an existential threat.⁶⁴

To that end, the military-authoritarian rulers of Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia mixed suppression and co-optation: closing off opportunities for political contestation and periodically subjecting Islamists to harsh state repression, but generally allowing Islamists some space to organize. The impetus for co-optation may have been driven, in part, by fear of an outright confrontation. But these states’ military-authoritarian regimes also sought to use Islamism as a buffer against leftists, liberals, and more extreme Islamic groups (Allani 2009; Kandil 2012: 600; 2014: 82). Cut off from aboveground politics and under increasing pressure from security forces, Egyptian, Turkish, and Tunisian Islamists began to pursue a series of alternate strategies. These included the initiation of cadres into tightly bound networks of the “ideologically correct,” providing religious education for the masses, and establishing health clinics, emergency response teams, and other social welfare services among the poor. These educational and social welfare

⁶⁴ Outside Qatar, for example, the Gulf monarchies uniformly supported the Egyptian military in its conflict with the Brotherhood. This policy is a consequence of several interrelated but distinct factors: the Brotherhood’s prior emphasis on social revolution, its egalitarianism creed (which conflicts with the economic dominance of Gulf elites), its ties to Iran, its rejection of traditional religious authority, and the prevalent *salafi* view of the Brotherhood as “dangerous cultists” bent on global domination (Cole 2014).

services served to raise the profile and increase the popularity of the Islamist organizations that ran them (Roy 1994: 47; Tugal 2009: 424).

In one sense, the shift to grassroots Islamization was simply the pursuit of the same goals by different means, in the belief that sociocultural Islamization would lead to the “Islamic society” that Islamists believed could serve as a precursor to the long-desired Islamic state (Roy 1994: 79). But as Olivier Roy (1994: 76) argues, it also represented a fundamental shift in organizational priorities, “replacing a discourse on the state with a discourse on society.” Initially, at least, this represented a *shift in means* rather than aims. For the time being, Islamists abandoned their revolutionary goals of establishing a state that replicated medieval Islamic institutions (as they understood them), creating an Islamic economy, uniting the *ummah* across state borders, and so forth. In their stead, Islamists adopted a gradualist strategy, which Roy (1994: 75-78) calls neofundamentalism. This entailed accepting the basic framework of the nation-state in exchange for space to “re-Islamize” its citizenry and advocate for the integration of *sharia*-based moral legislation into state law codes. Furthermore, this neofundamentalist program, Roy (1994: 79) suggests, “takes place along two axes”:

...individual reform through preaching (*da'wa*) and the establishment of Islamized spaces, either in purely spatial terms (cities, neighborhoods) or in terms of practical considerations and networks (Islamic banks). One can prepare for the Islamic society through local militancy, associations, cooperatives, and other institutions: in this sense neofundamentalism is to Islamism what social democracy was to Marxism.

While initially strategic, Roy (2013) argues that Islamism’s shift toward neofundamentalism presaged a broader *shift in aims*: from a pan-Islamic revolutionary movement that sought to replace the institutions of nation-states with “authentically Islamic” institutions toward “Muslim democracy,” which he describes as resembling an “assertive Christian democracy” (such as in Germany). Furthermore, as Roy (2013) notes, the new

“Muslim democrats” came to “[endorse] nationalism and [recast] Islamic norms as moral and cultural values with appeal to a larger conservative constituency.”⁶⁵

These two developments—the shift in means toward neofundamentalism and the shift in aims toward Muslim democracy—have undoubtedly helped position Middle Eastern Islamist parties to succeed in the era of democratization. In Turkey, Tunisia, and abortively in Egypt, Islamist parties have proven capable of mobilizing large constituencies for political platforms that remain markedly conservative, but now also embrace democracy, accept the nation-state, recognize the rights of non-Muslim minorities in principle, are anticorruption, and emphasize socioeconomic modernization alongside more traditional issue-based *sharia* advocacy. This new “democratic Islamism” has proven so popular that it has led to Islamist parties capturing pluralities or majorities in every open vote over the past decade (Nasr 2005; Allani 2009; Gerges 2013; Cavatorta and Merone 2013).⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Islamists often make the comparison to Christian Democracy themselves. Cavatorta and Merone (2013) discuss comparisons between Ennahda and European Christian Democracy in post-Arab Spring Tunisia.

⁶⁶ The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) serves as a paradigmatic example of this process at work, shifting as it has from *sharia* advocacy to a broader-based social conservatism roughly analogous to that found in the United States (Nasr 2005). But Tunisia’s Ennahda Movement is another striking case: since the mid-1980s, Ennahda has gradually abandoned all vestiges of its revolutionary program in favor of a reformist program that mixes social conservatism with support for democracy, human rights, and cooperation with secular-nationalist parties (Allani 2009; Cavatorta and Merone 2013). And in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has shifted its position on *sharia* from an emphasis on specific rules and toward guiding principles (*masaqid*) (N. Brown 2013: 110-1; Hefner 2013b: 29-30). As far as public support for these kinds of platforms goes, attitudinal data collected by Moaddel (2013) in Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, and several other Muslim majority states lends support to the theory that “democratic Islamism” reflects the preferences of Middle Eastern publics. Among other things, Moaddel (2013: 61) found that respondents were generally less interested in *sharia* advocacy than economic modernization, more likely to identify as part of a national than global religious community, and broadly supportive of minority rights (in the abstract). The survey found that majorities in Egypt (51%), Turkey (76%), and Tunisia (72%) prefer religion and politics to be separated, while nearly four times as many Tunisians want their government to prioritize advancement in science and technology as want to prioritize the implementation of *sharia* (ibid 39). Respondents were

While important to note, the electoral fortunes of Islamist parties are not the central focus here. Rather, I am concerned with the relationship between sociocultural and sociopolitical Islamization. The literature tends to assess the sociopolitical impact of sociocultural Islamization by the degree to which it heightens support for Islamist political parties (especially if these parties moderate their platforms). However, scholarship on the dramatic shift in individual religious practices among Middle Eastern Muslims suggests that sociocultural Islamization restructures public life in significant ways that are unrelated to voting patterns or preferences.

In Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia, sociopolitical Islamization manifests itself in the growth of television preachers, informal prayer and discussion groups—even clubs in universities that make a celebration every time a woman covers her head or a man is “converted” to Islamic revivalism (Bayat 2007: 147-148; N. Brown 2013: 115). Though this growth in Muslim piety is clearly beneficial to the electoral fortunes, membership rolls, and coffers of Islamist organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, AKP, and Ennahda, much of it appears untethered to sociopolitical expressions of Islam. Indeed, as Nathan Brown (2013: 115) writes, trends toward pietism in Egypt are “so diffuse and uncoordinated that it would be misleading to call it a movement.” Similarly, Asef Bayat (2005; 2007) has argued that, while the Brotherhood seeks to

generally tolerant of non-Muslims, with majorities in Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia all agreeing that non-Muslims should be granted equal rights (ibid 82), and relatively small numbers (15-27%) agreeing that non-Muslims should be prohibited from practicing their religion (ibid 81).⁶⁶ Political democracy also fared considerably better than Islamic governance—in all surveyed countries—while approximately twice as many respondents chose to identify themselves, primarily, as members of a national rather than a global religious community (ibid 75). However, respondents displayed a significant degree of conservatism on social issues. For example, significant majorities in Egypt (77%), Turkey (69%), and Tunisia (57%) felt that criticism of Islam should not be tolerated by the state (ibid 83). And when asked to choose “the most appropriate” dress for a Muslim women, pluralities in Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia chose a variant on the headscarf that covers the neck as well as head, but leaves the face unveiled. Only 4% of Egyptians, 32% of Turks, and 15% of Tunisians chose the uncovered woman (ibid 54-5). The “democratic Islamism” described above is thus well positioned to appeal to voters holding these views.

instill *active piety* (i.e. a distinctly public piety whose adherents are committed to converting the unconverted), the bulk of Egypt's new pietism has instead been *passive* (i.e. a personalized and ad hoc piety whose adherents are generally uninterested in changing anyone else's behavior). For many Muslims, it is also distinctly consumerist, with Islam transformed into a series of products, both commercial and cultural, to be bought, sold, and traded (Boubekeur and Roy 2012: 7-9).

Arguably the most illuminating examination of the new Muslim pietism is found in Saba Mahmood's (2011: 46-47) ethnography of a women's mosque group in Cairo. Participants, she observes, spend little time discussing *sharia* in sociopolitical terms, but rather consider it as an organizing principle and guide for making the right choices in everyday life. Thus participants "seek to imbue each of the various spheres of contemporary life with a regulative sensibility that takes its cue from the Islamic theological corpus rather than from modern secular ethics (ibid 47-8). While this kind of piety may not form part of an Islamist sociopolitical project, it nevertheless may stimulate broad changes in the public sphere, from how Muslims dress and speak to norms regarding popular entertainment, and from how Muslims invest their money to "the terms by which public debate is conducted" (ibid 4).⁶⁷ These changes may, in turn, structure political preferences or policy orientations. Thus the connection between sociocultural and sociopolitical Islamization, while extant, is often indirect.

There are, however, significant gaps in this literature, which the Indonesian case may help fill. First, while Mahmood (2011), Bayat (2007), and Nathan Brown (2013) highlight transformations in the public sphere, they are primarily concerned with desecularization rather than challenges to religious pluralism. This dissertation contributes to this body of work by virtue of its focus on how increases in Muslim piety may potentially erode the space for different

⁶⁷ Mahmood is specifically referring to Egypt, but what she writes is evident in Turkey and Tunisia as well.

styles of life among Muslims and visually mark Christians (and other non-Muslims) as different. Second, in the broader comparative literature, sociocultural Islamization only features insofar as it shapes Muslim attitudes, political preferences, and political party (or state) behavior.⁶⁸ This is unsurprising, given that in Egypt, Turkey, and Tunisia, sociocultural Islamization is correlated with the electoral success of Islamist parties. But Indonesia, where divergence between the sociocultural and sociopolitical is more pronounced, may offer a clearer picture of how the adoption of Muslim piety affects the practice of religious pluralism *independent of attitudes, political preferences, and political party behavior*.

Indeed, one argument made in Chapter Four of this dissertation holds that religious choices are shaped by the choices of others in the immediate environment, and by interactional pressures generated by that context. Another argument made in Chapter Four is that the spread of piety reorients individuals to pious spaces where interactions with non-pious Muslims or non-Muslims are unlikely to occur. As noted above, Roy identified the creation of pious spaces as a central component of Islamist neofundamentalist strategies. However, Chapter Four shows how this may emerge even in the absence of such strategies. And that demonstrates sociocultural Islamization's potential to stimulate the development of parallel and separate social spaces and networks. This, in turn, may trigger feelings of markedness and exclusion among non-pious Muslims or non-Muslims—even in the absence of any attitudinal shift among pious Muslims, or any alteration in political preferences or party behavior.

⁶⁸ Mahmood (2005), by contrast, is primarily interested in how sociocultural Islamization transforms and desecularizes the public sphere. But *The Politics of Piety* is not centrally concerned with its effect on religious pluralism.

Conclusion

This dissertation analyzes the complex and often ambiguous relationship between Islamization and religious pluralism in democratizing and decentralizing Indonesia. It examines the historical formation of this relationship, the way political processes at the level of the state regionalize the institutionalization and practice of religious pluralism, why some regions are more prone to restrict the free practice of religion by minority groups than others, and how sociocultural Islamization generates interactional pressures on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to the literatures on Islam and religious pluralism in Indonesia and Islam and politics in Muslim majority states more broadly.

Chapter One

A History of Islam and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia

In this chapter, I will trace the history of religious pluralism in Indonesia since the introduction of Islam and Christianity to the archipelago. As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, religious pluralism—both formal and informal—has often flourished in the islands that, in 1945, would come to bear the name Indonesia. However, the reality of religious pluralism has, at specific moments in time, existed in tension with campaigns to more narrowly define the Islamic faith and assert its primacy over the land. During the 20th century, there were three periods in which such forces have been prominent: the 1920s, when anti-Dutch activists were divided between those who envisioned an independent Indonesia as an Islamic state and those who sought a multi-faith national state; the “Old Order” (*orde lama*) period (1945-65), when orthodox Muslims (unsuccessfully) sought to associate the state with Islam and obligate the state to enforce *sharia* for all Muslim Indonesians; and final decade of the “New Order” (*orde baru*) era (1965-98), when Suharto began cultivating a conservative Islamic base of support within the confines of the authoritarian state.

The post-transition period represents a fourth such period, in which advocates and critics of religious pluralism once again square off against one another. While the actors, issues, and dynamics of conflict are distinguishable from those of these earlier periods, contention over Islam’s role in post-transition Indonesia is indelibly shaped by these previous struggles. Thus, in order to understand how on-going processes of Islamization affect religious pluralism (as a sociopolitical construct or as a practical element of everyday life), it is necessary to map out the historical development of and historical challenges to religious pluralism.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss the manifestations and modalities of religious pluralism in the archipelago during the period (1300-1600) in which Islam and Christianity took root, followed by a discussion of how the Dutch colonial and Japanese occupational regimes structured relations among religious communities, as well as between religious communities and the state (1605-1945). Then I look at the formalization and institutionalization of Indonesia's corporatist-pluralist model for the governance of religious diversity under Sukarno (1945-65) and Suharto (1965-98), in the context of ongoing conflicts over Islam's place in Indonesian state and society. I will examine debates over the Jakarta Charter, the formation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the anti-communist violence (1965-7) enacted by religious (and other) organizations in concert with the military, the subsequent "caging" of religion within regime-controlled institutions, and the regime's pivot to conservative Islam during the final decade of its existence (1987-98). Finally, I will discuss the role of Muslim activists the New Order's fall, as well as the peculiar sociology of religion it bequeathed the fragile post-transition government.

The Crystallization and Contestation of Religious Pluralism (1300-1945)

Islam did not come to the Malay Archipelago through war or conquest, as in South Asia, North Africa, and the Balkans. Instead, it arrived on the ships and caravans of spice-seeking Muslim traders from Gujarat and the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps as early as the 7th century. Precisely how the religion took root is obscure, but archeological evidence suggests the first Muslim polities emerged in the 13th century, in present-day Aceh. By the mid-14th century, Muslim sultanates had spread across Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, coastal regions of Java and Borneo, and the southern Philippines. A second wave of Islamization in the 16th century produced additional sultanates in Sulawesi and Maluku (Ricklefs 2001: 3-6).

When Portuguese traders arrived in 1511, though, Islam was still largely confined to these coastal areas, and had not yet penetrated the thick rainforests of Borneo or the mountains of West Java, nor taken root on many Eastern islands. The Portuguese also noted the low penetration of Islam in East and Central Java, then ruled by the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit.¹ Near continuous war with the Demak and the other Islamic sultanates on Java's north coast, however, had greatly weakened the once-powerful kingdom (Reid 1993: 155; Ricklefs 2001: 22). These pressures would cause the empire to collapse in 1527, opening the Hindu-Buddhist interior of Java to sociopolitical Islamization.²

Though Majapahit's collapse presaged the spread of Islam to the interior of East and Central Java, neither Hindu-Buddhist religion nor the traditions of statecraft associated with it disappeared immediately. Rather, two distinct forms of sultanate emerged on Java: the more orthodox, "clerical" form of sultanate on the north coast, most notably in Demak; and an "imperial form" in the interior, where rulers adapted Islam to pre-existing notions of sacral kingship and the caste-based societies of Majapahit and other Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms (Woodward 1989: 58-59). By 1641, the "imperial" Sultanate of Mataram had established itself as the dominant political entity in East and Central Java.

As Geertz (1976) famously argued, the "imperial" sultanate facilitated sociocultural and even religious accommodations among Muslims and Hindu-Buddhists. Rather than embrace the

¹ The term "Hindu-Buddhist" is used to describe the pre-Islamic kingdoms (*kerajaan*) of the Malay Archipelago (and Southeast Asia more generally). Hinduism and Buddhism arrived in the archipelago at roughly the same time (the fifth century C.E.). Early kingdoms (400-700 C.E.) were often oriented toward one or the other. By the eighth century, however, the kingdoms had stopped distinguishing between the two, instead viewing Hinduism and Buddhism as "two separate paths within one system" (Kinney, Klokke, and Kievan 2003: 24).

² There is some debate over the exact date of Majapahit's collapse. Javanese sources claim the Empire fell in 1478, while Portuguese sources cite the later date. In any event, a large and powerful Hindu-Buddhist political entity existed, roughly within the geographic sphere associated with Majapahit, until 1527.

orthodox Islam of the coastal sultanates, Mataram instead adapted Islamic belief and practice to pre-existing animist and Hindu-Buddhist ritual cycles, producing the heterodox religious system that is known today as *kejawen* or *agama Jawa* (religion of Java). Backed by Mataram's political and military power, heterodox Islam soon dominated the island of Java. However, with Mataram's decline came the slow decline of *kejawen*: over the next four centuries, economic modernization and improvements in communication would contribute to the relative growth of trade-oriented orthodox Islam at Javanese heterodoxy's expense, a process that continues today (Ricklefs 1979: 100-128).

During the 16th and 17th centuries, Portuguese and Spanish trading vessels also began arriving in significant numbers, bringing soldiers and Roman Catholicism with them. Though winning some converts to the faith, particularly among animists on Ambon, Flores and Timor, a number of factors—including political rivalries between Portugal and Spain and monastic rivalries among Dominican, Franciscan, and Jesuit missions—limited the scope of Catholic missions. Missionaries also encountered resistance from the sultanates, including the heterodox and relatively pluralistic “imperial” sultanates. As Anthony Reid (1995: 178) points out, local dynasts had long been able to adapt Buddhist and Islamic theology to “enhance their own supernatural pretensions”; though Catholic missionaries in this period often tailored their appeal to local conditions, in this case they do not appear to have provided the kind of incentives that local rulers desired. Meanwhile, the Church's institutional links to expansionist Spanish and Portuguese armies aroused suspicions, further limiting the new faith's appeal.

The arrival of the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) in 1605 brought Protestantism to the archipelago, most notably Dutch Reform Calvinism. The VOC did not, however, bring missionaries in any great number, nor was it terribly interested

in spreading the “true faith” (Steenbrink 1993: 64-72). By the mid-17th century, the European presence in the Indies was still small, commercially minded, geographically concentrated in Batavia and the spice islands of Maluku, and not terribly pious (Ricklefs 2001: 30-32).³ Yet the VOC’s arrival initiated three-and-a-half centuries of European dominion over the archipelago, which would have broad consequences for the how religious pluralism would be conceived, formalized, and practiced in these territories.

The VOC’ was not, however, bent on conquest—at least not initially. Indeed, its officials tended to favor trade and accommodation with Muslim rulers when possible, though they were not averse to using military force if it appeared more efficient. Nevertheless, expanding commercial contacts and the superiority of Dutch arms led the VOC into progressively more complex webs of association with the archipelago’s Muslim polities. Local sultans often paid the VOC to dispatch foes, for a hefty price; at other times, they mobilized the *ulama* to declare *jihād* against the VOC (Taylor 2003: 144). Such efforts were generally in vain: from 1619 to 1796, the VOC gradually defeated and imposed vassalage upon the Muslim states of Java and the outer islands. The monetary cost of expansion, though, soon exceeded the Company’s revenue. Debts mounted, and the VOC slid towards bankruptcy and collapse. In 1796, the Dutch Republic nationalized the VOC and took control of its holdings.

After the brief interregnum of the Napoleonic Wars, when Britain held VOC territory and enterprises in trust, the new Kingdom of the Netherlands took over administration of the archipelago, reshaping what had previously been primarily an economic entity with state-like powers into the colonial state of the Netherlands Indies. The economic opportunities associated

³ Ricklefs (2001: 32) describes one incident in which the VOC did forcibly convert Catholics in Maluku. By contrast, the VOC appears to have been largely unconcerned with converting local Muslims.

with the new state consequently drew large numbers of Dutch adventurers to the Indies. Among the fortune-seekers, soldiers and administrators came Protestant missionaries, eager to spread the Gospel and convert the “heathens.” By the mid-19th century, Protestant missions had begun in earnest.

The rise in Christian evangelism did not immediately lead to conflict with Islam. Missionaries generally avoided confrontation with Muslims (and Catholics), and instead focused conversion efforts on the archipelago’s “pagans” (Steenbrink 1993: 99). This was a continuation of the VOC’s policy to let Muslims be, but also actively discourage conversions from Christianity to Islam (with violence, where deemed necessary) (Steenbrink 2008: 108). Several territorially concentrated Protestant communities emerged outside Java, most notably in Maluku, North and Central Sulawesi and West Papua. For the most part, Protestants and Muslims lived side-by-side peacefully. In areas where Protestant missions produced large numbers of converts, though, conflicts with local Muslim rulers were not unknown.

The New Colonial Order

The imposition and expansion of high colonial rule fundamentally altered the political and social structure of Dutch-held territories in the Malay Archipelago.⁴ This, in turn, would

⁴ Scholars of European colonialism generally distinguish between “early,” “high,” and “post” colonial periods. Under early colonialism, colonialists were generally private opportunists and commercial ventures, such as the VOC or British East India Company. Though rapacious, expansionistic, and frequently violent, the agents of early colonialism were generally motivated by commercial interests and, as such, were typically unconcerned with imposing a legal, moral, or administrative order on colonial territories. In the high colonial period, by contrast, the colonial venture was typically coordinated and administered by the European state. Though individual colonial states (i.e. British, French, Dutch, etc.) differed in the degree to which they sought to directly rule the territories they conquered (or instead work through local intermediaries), high colonial states are generally distinguishable from their early colonial

prove deeply consequential for Muslim-Christian relations, as well as relations among groups internal to Islam. Whereas the profit-seeking VOC had not sought to transform the states and people it encountered, royal Dutch colonialism was far more invasive. And it clothed its exploitation, successively, in two contrasting but equally paternalistic moral visions of the colonial state: as “guardian” of native traditions; and as bringer of “civilization” to “backwards” natives. These contrasting moral visions each emerged from different combinations of three contemporary European ideas: (1) the pseudoscience of race, whereby Europeans ascribed biological “essences” to all people and, more often than not, ordered them in hierarchies with white Europeans in the apex position; (2) technological and bureaucratic modernization; and (3) the liberal notion of the colonial state as “caretaker” for the long-term interests of the colonized (Schmutzer 1977: 8-13; Fasseur 1994; Mrazek 2002).

During the first half century of Dutch high colonialism, the vision of the colonial state as protector of native traditions dominated. It emerged soon after the Dutch return to the archipelago, coalescing in the Dutch response to two contemporary Islamic insurgencies, both of which featured combatants who framed their rebellions as movements to advance broader, non-localized “Islamic” interests. In 1803, a war broke out in West Sumatra between two factions of the Minangkabau elite. The insurgent Padri faction was led by returning *hajjis* (Muslims who have performed the pilgrimage to Mecca). Inspired by the iconoclastic Wahhabi sect’s conquest of Mecca, the Padri faction sought to purge “un-Islamic” traditions and practices prevalent among the Minangkabau, and proposed using *sharia* as a method of combating the lawlessness and violence that was rampant at the time. The Adat faction, by contrast, fought to preserve traditional rites and customary law (*adat*), and was led by the Minangkabau royal family. The

predecessors by the degree to which they created “state-centered” administrative and legal apparatuses (Duindam et al 2013: 5).

war was largely inconclusive until 1815, when the Padri faction overran several Adat faction strongholds, and for all intents and purposes deposed the Minangkabau royal family.

As the movement spread beyond the Minangkabau highlands, the Dutch began to see Padri “fanaticism” as a threat to their dominion. The Netherlands Indies was still primarily an economic venture, and to facilitate the most efficient exploitation of resources and manpower, the state had to impose *rust en orde* (law and order). Since VOC days, Dutch authorities had exerted control indirectly, using local elites and institutions as legitimacy-bestowing intermediaries. The ascendancy of the Padri faction, however, challenged this system of indirect rule. Colonial authorities decided to intervene militarily; by 1832 the movement had been conclusively defeated and the royal family restored, albeit as quiescent regents (*bupati*) rather than autonomous rulers (Ricklefs 2001: 183-184; Hadler 2008).

An even more threatening war, from the Dutch perspective, broke out just as the British were leaving Java. Barely a year after the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 handed full authority over the colonies to the new Dutch kingdom, a Javanese prince named Diponegoro launched a revolt against the new colonial state. The Javanese Prince sought to overturn the colonial order, and openly called upon Muslims to wage *jihad* for his cause. Given that Diponegoro claimed legitimacy from the Hindu-based *wayang* mythology as well as the Quran and Sunnah, his rebellion was arguably more Javanese than Islamic. But the Dutch were rattled by the fact that Diponegoro called upon Muslims to act as Muslims against the colonial state. Their difficulty putting down the revolt, moreover, cemented and deepened colonial anxieties about the subversive potential of Islam, as well as the religion’s potential to unite otherwise disparate and only loosely connected rebellions against the colonial state (which the colonial state called “pan-

Islam”). These anxieties would, over the course of several decades, shape Dutch colonial attitudes toward Indies subjects in far-ranging and highly impactful ways.

Colonial Suppression of Islam (1830-1860)

In the aftermath of the Padri War and Diponegoro’s Rebellion, Dutch authorities pursued four complementary objectives: strengthening Dutch military control of the Indies, maximizing the economic output of Dutch holdings at a minimum of administrative cost, legitimating and preserving European dominance over colonial subjects, and containing “pan-Islam” (i.e. trans-local political appeals to Islam). As Dutch armies extended control to remote areas untouched by the VOC, colonial administrators in Batavia and The Hague instituted the so-called *cultuurstelsel* (cultivation system) in populous, formerly rebellious East and Central Java (as well as in West Java).⁵ This mode of production featured large plantations producing vast quantities of cash crops, most notably coffee, tea, and sugar (Geertz 1976: 52-81). In terms of its effect on Dutch finances, the *cultuurstelsel* was an enormous success: “debts were redeemed, taxes reduced, fortifications, waterways, and the Dutch state railway built, all on the profits forced out of the villages of Java. Ironically, the funds were also used to pay compensation to slave-owners to emancipate the slaves of Surinam (Dutch Guiana). Amsterdam again became a major world market-place for tropical produce, especially coffee and sugar” (Ricklefs 2001: 160).

The *cultuurstelsel* had a deep impact on Javanese social life. Among other things, it organized subjects into communal villages, which became the sole owners of land beyond plantations owned by Europeans, and were the primary source of *corvée* labor for the plantations. The “distinctly communitarian” social worlds of Javanese villages, marked by dense reciprocal

⁵ *Cultuurstelsel* means “cultivation system,” but it is often (erroneously) translated as the “culture system.”

ties, were also closely monitored by colonial authorities, with the movement between villagers highly restricted (Sidel 2006: 28-30). Trade among villages would be primarily conducted by “foreign Oriental” minorities, such as ethnic Chinese and Arabs.

Meanwhile, the colonial state sought to contain the alleged agents of “pan-Islam.” The Dutch viewed two groups with particular suspicion: Indies Arabs and returning *hajjis*—individuals who, by descent or by virtue of having performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, enjoyed great status among Indies Muslims. As “foreign Orientals,” Arabs were required to reside in designated cantons within major cities. *Hajjis*, though, could not simply be herded into ghettos. Instead, colonial authorities levied a hefty tax upon pilgrims and closely monitored their movements upon return. While perhaps successful in the short term, such actions also contributed to the notion, increasingly popular among orthodox Muslims, that the Dutch were irrevocably hostile to Islam (Reid 1967).

The desire to “shield” Indies subjects from Islamic subversion was ultimately self-serving, but reinforced the colonial state’s view of itself as guardian of native customs and “authentic” (i.e. pre-Islamic) culture. The Dutch had justified their responses to the Padri War and Diponegoro’s Rebellion in the name of protecting native traditions; now they recognized that the legitimacy of these traditions, if streamlined, could serve the colonial state. Thus the colonial state began crafting numerous policies aimed at preserving and strengthening customary laws and mechanisms for solving disputes (*adat*). Great intellectual resources in Leiden and other intellectual centers were dedicated to identifying, codifying and—where necessary—modifying local traditions into comprehensive *adat* judicial systems (called *adatrecht*) that could be used to prop up the elites and institutions that drew their legitimacy from *adat*, contain Islam, and

ultimately reinforce colonial dominion (Lev 1972: 10; Li 2007; Henley and Davidson 2007: 24).⁶ Through this process the Dutch also sought to clarify the role of traditional elites: in exchange for power, privileges, and Dutch military protection, traditional elites would guarantee quiescence from the villages.

The cities, by contrast, were ruled directly by colonial authorities. Here racially-based distinctions among Europeans, “foreign Orientals,” and “Inlanders” (natives) ordered social and political life, determining access to goods and services, where families could settle, and even what legal codes individuals were answerable to. The great scholar of Dutch colonialism, J.S. Furnivall (1944: 45), noted that this legal and political separation of “native” from “European” and “middleman” constituted a rupture with the pre-colonial and VOC past. Whereas these previous political orders had managed to incorporate multiple waves of in-migration, the high colonial state created a social world in which individuals within racially defined social groups—primarily European, Chinese, and Javanese/Malay—were nested in “parallel social worlds.” Each constituent group in this structurally pluralist society, moreover, occupied a different niche within the social economy of the Netherlands Indies: the Dutch as rulers, the Javanese as subjects, and Chinese as economic middlemen (ibid 46). These categories were unique to high colonialism; the VOC had made no such racial distinctions, preferring instead a legal distinction between Dutch Reformed Protestants and the Muslims, Catholics, and “pagans” they encountered (Fasseur 1994: 32).

In summary, Dutch policies enacted during this period had a profound impact on the formation of modern sociopolitical identities in the Netherlands Indies. The *cultuurstelsel*

⁶ Outside the cities, disputes were typically settled through an ad hoc mix of *adatrecht* (i.e. codified *adat*), uncodified *adat*, and Islamic law, presided over by Muslim officials (*penghulu*) who answered to the co-opted royal houses rather than directly to the colonial state (Lev 1972: 12).

isolated villages from one another, while the development of *adatrecht* created an “indigenous” alternative to Islamic law that bolstered the authority of co-opted sections of the hereditary nobility. As a result, local and class identities—particularly those distinguishing co-opted segments of the hereditary nobility from peasants and non-noble orthodox Muslims—took on new importance among the plantations of Java, Sumatra, and the Spice Islands, while the political salience of strictly religious identities declined. Meanwhile, in the cities, colonial authorities institutionalized a new racial scheme of social classification, which encouraged Indies residents to think not in terms of Muslim versus non-Muslim, but in terms of “European” versus “foreigner” versus “native.” Taken together, these policies contributed to the temporary decline of Islam as both a source of authority and social identity.

Liberalization and the Ethical Policy (1860-1908)

Several factors combined to undermine the *cultuurstelsel*, and consequently led to the replacement of conservative paternalism with a liberalizing—yet still thoroughly paternalistic—view of the colonial enterprise. Rather than caretaker of native traditions, the liberalizing view framed the colonial state as caretaker for the development of modern institutions and “civilization” in the Indies. Evolutionary notions of history, in European vogue since the publication of Darwin’s *Origin of Species* in 1859, largely informed this shift in thinking. By the dawn of the 20th Century, the idea of Indies society as a “young Netherlands” had taken root amongst both Dutch and “Inlander” intellectuals—an idea that would shape policy both the Liberal Period (1860-1901) and that of the so-called Ethical Policy (1901-1941) (Gouda 1995: 126-7).⁷

⁷ This was also the period when the Dutch conquered Bali (1908) and Aceh (1910).

The replacement of the brutal yet indirect rule of the *cultuurstelsel* period with the relatively more egalitarian yet highly invasive direct rule of the liberalizing period did not happen overnight, but rather advanced in stages. A series of crop failures and famine-related epidemics had swept across Java during the 1840s, highlighting the plight of Javanese and Sundanese *corvée* laborers. Many Dutch liberals genuinely hoped to dismantle the oppressive *cultuurstelsel*, end *corvée* labor and eventually introduce free market reforms to the colonial economy. However, it was not until the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 1848 that Dutch parliamentarians could even intervene in colonial affairs. Even then, they were reluctant to cut the Dutch treasury off from the considerable revenues it proffered. It took the muckraking 1860 novel *Max Havelaar*, with its lurid tales of the exploitation and mistreatment of Indies subjects at the hands of the colonial state and its *cultuurstelsel*, to shock the Dutch public into demanding action. By 1862, Dutch parliamentarians began eliminating compulsory *corvée* labor, beginning with the least profitable cash crops (Ricklefs 2001: 160-2). Mechanization of sugar-mills, however, spared the Dutch government the pain of sacrificing too much profit for ethical concerns (Geertz 1963: 83).

The new privatized economy altered the social structure of Indies society in several significant ways. Most significantly, the liberal parliament in The Hague introduced private property as part of its 1882 agricultural reforms. Property could only be held by “Inlanders”, but with Europeans and wealthy “foreign Orientals” granted rights to lease land for extended periods of time. This led to a massive influx of Europeans to the Indies, eager to establish themselves as autonomous plantation bosses.

It also prompted colonial authorities to initiate a massive modernization of Indies infrastructure. New railroads bifurcating the terraced rice paddies of the Javanese heartland were

among the most visible symbols of the new era, carrying 600,00 passengers annually by 1875, and up to 6 million by 1894 (Shiraishi 1990: 8). Crucially, the increasingly complex economy of the Netherlands Indies also needed to be properly accounted for, its yields quantified and the new social relationships it produced regulated. In other words, it required a new class of administrators and civil servants to ensure efficiency and the maintenance of *rust en orde* (peace and order). But there were not enough Dutch citizens willing to uproot for meager pay, and the literacy rate among Indies subjects was low, a mere 5.9 percent in Central Java by 1930. If the colonial state were to have its modern bureaucracy, it would need schools to produce modern bureaucrats. As early as 1852, colonial authorities began opening schools in Central and East Java, targeting upper class Javanese for this new form of co-optation (Ricklefs 2007: 131-3).

In this sense the new colonial regime reflected, and made good use of, a new scholarly engagement with the cultural milieu of the Indies. Utilizing a fastidious quest for “accuracy” in service of a taxonomical anthropology, a new generation of orientalists at Leiden, led by C. Snouck Hurgronje, bequeathed an immense corpus of ethnographic studies, designed to help colonial administrators and military planners design their instruments of administration and social control with greater precision and efficiency (Gouda 1995: 44-5). At the same time, these new scholars—and Snouck in particular—adopted more complex and sensitive attitudes towards the colonized “Muslims, pagans and savages” than had previously animated colonial authorities.

Snouck’s ideas would set the course of policy towards administration of colonial society for several decades. First and foremost, Snouck argued for a reappraisal of Indies Islam and its relationship to the colonial state. Snouck stressed the dualistic nature of Islam in the Netherlands Indies, simultaneously religious and political. Colonial authorities had long chosen to back traditional *adat* authority, whenever possible, to contain political Islam. Yet, because of its

inherently localized nature, Snouck saw *adat* as ill suited to combating the universalistic political Islam that Dutch colonialists feared. In his view, only “modernization” and greater association with “superior” Dutch culture could effectively marginalize Islam, preserve the Netherlands Indies, and ensure the long-term well being of its subjects (Benda 1958). At the same time, he argued that modernization necessitated adapting Dutch ideas and technology to local cultures. In a scathing critique of the colonial state written in 1904, Snouck castigated Dutch civil servants for lack of sensitivity to local cultures and traditions, specifically citing Islamic law and practice as areas of peculiar ignorance. Snouck argued for a more sensitive administration run by learned Dutch and ever-greater numbers of educated “Inlanders,” with the ultimate aim of handing over administration of the territory to them (Gouda 1995: 58-9).

Snouck’s philosophy was embedded in the Ethical Policy, instituted in 1860 and named to reflect the colonial state’s newfound emphasis on the well being of its subjects. It promised a more humane administration of the Indies, with more and better opportunities for “Inlanders.” At the same time, the Ethical Policy sought to “civilize” the backwards peoples of the Netherlands Indies—by making them more European—without offering any of the benefits of citizenship. As such, it primarily served to rationalize colonialism in an era when Dutch citizens would no longer tolerate the brutalities of the *cultuurstelsel*.

As the Dutch implemented the Ethical Policy, manpower problems emerged. The Dutch needed civil servants to train, but were encountering resistance from the co-opted local elites (such as the Javanese *priyayi*, Sumatran *datuks*, and other hereditary nobilities), who saw in the regime’s modernization program a potential threat to traditional privileges and authority (however circumscribed by the colonial state). Facing resistance, colonial authorities decided to bypass the upper echelons of the nobility and instead recruit from the often landless and

politically peripheral lower rungs of the *priyayi* and *datuk* classes. In the outer islands, Dutch officials tended to favor Protestants, and particularly those from the island of Ambon, who were deemed the most reliable—and Westernized—subset of the Indies population. Catholics also rose to positions of prominence; despite unfortunate ties to Rome, from the Dutch perspective, Catholics had often benefited from the comparably comprehensive Jesuit education system, and as such, were often the best placed individuals for recruitment by the colonial state (Sidel 2006).

There was also the question of language. There were not enough skilled teachers available to make Dutch a true administrative *lingua franca*, nor necessarily the desire. Instead, colonial authorities looked towards the simplified Malay of the markets (*pasar Melayu*) that had, since the 17th century, emerged among far-flung local administrators as an easily taught and widely understood pidgin that could be easily adapted to local languages. However, by the mid-19th century the new dialect had not been standardized, and as such, was unsuitable for use in a modern mass educational context. During the second half of the 19th century, Dutch scholars and administrators progressively standardized what they now called *Dienst Maleisch* (service Malay). The first Malay newspapers appeared in 1856, and the first Malay-Dutch dictionary in 1877. The language spread quickly in markets and colonial offices alike; notably, it also spread among Indies-born Europeans as well (Sneddon 2003: 84-97; Bosma and Raben 2008: 295).

This had the obvious effect of undermining the prospects of widespread Dutch-language education. More importantly, it created a new print-community bridging European and “Inlander” worlds. As Benedict Anderson (1991: 131-134) argues, the emergence of standardized Malay (and its diffusion across the wide breadth and considerable diversity of the Indies) meant that for the first time, literate non-Europeans from Java could communicate with fellows in Sumatra or Maluku. As a result, they now began to imagine themselves as part of a

single society, coterminous with the territorial and administrative expanse of the Dutch colony.

Islam and the Emergence of Nationalism in the Late Colonial Period (1908-1945)

Early imaginings of this community were, one notes, highly pluralistic. The nascent Malay print-community reflected the cultural diversity of the Netherlands Indies, and was explicitly inclusive of ethnic, religious, and regional difference. The emergent elite—Malay speaking and educated in Dutch-run schools—including Indies-born Europeans in Batavia and other major cities, orthodox Muslim *datuks* from Sumatra, heterodox Muslim *priyayi* from Java, and a smattering of Protestants and Catholics from the outer islands. Through organizations like Boedi Oetomo (founded in 1908), and the briefly legal Indische Partij (1912-1913), a group of intellectuals from this privileged administrative class developed notions of “Indonesia” and “Indonesian-ness” that were multi-religious, multi-ethnic, progressively more inclusive of non-privileged “Inlanders,” and which sought to remake *Dienst Maleisch*, renamed Bahasa Indonesia (Indonesian), into a language for all Indies subjects (Mrazek 2002: 33).

The early 20th century, though, was also a time of division and conflict among subjects of the Netherlands Indies, which was deeply divided by ethnicity, language, religion, and, increasingly, by political-ideological orientation. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the colonial city, typically ruled over by a relatively large European population but encompassing large *kampung*s (settlements) for various groups of “Inlanders” and “foreign Orientals.”⁸ Class and religious divisions further complicated matters, as did politically relevant cleavages within any of these categories, which separated *peranakan* (Javanized or assimilated) from *totok* (non-Javanized or non-assimilated) Chinese, European-born colonialists from Indo-European

⁸ *Kampung* literally means “home village,” but in colonial Batavia each named *kampung* was the exclusive settlement of a specific ethnic group (e.g. *kampung Melayu*, *kampung Bali*, etc.).

“Indischers,” “Mardijkers” (descendents of freed Portuguese slaves) from Javanese, and so forth.

Inequality among these urban social groups, and attempts by activists to improve the position of their group within this system, fueled increasingly bitter ethnic and religious rivalries. Impressed by the economic and technological feats of Meiji Restoration Japan, and under pressure to entice Japan into a diplomatic treaty, colonial authorities declared in 1899 that ethnic Japanese were, for all intents and purposes, “civilized” enough for inclusion in the legal category “European.” Though the decision was of little practical consequence to daily life in the Indies (there were fewer than 2,000 ethnic Japanese in the colony at the time), it provoked a contentious bid by ethnic Chinese activists to be similarly uplifted (Shiraishi and Shiraishi 1993: 3-8; Fasseur 1994: 37).

Discontent over Chinese aspirations to privilege, in turn, emerged in the city’s *kongsi*. Though originally organized as clubs for Hokkien-speaking Chinese, in many cities *kongsi* had grown into ethnically mixed business associations, where “foreign Orientals” and “Inlanders” of differing ethnic and religious backgrounds came together to discuss common concerns and issues. Among these were mounting concerns over European dominion, codified in an 1892 law that declared *all* “Inlanders” and “Orientals” to be “foreigners” in the Netherlands with no rights to Dutch citizenship or its attendant privileges (Fasseur 1994: 38).

In 1911, a Surakarta *kongsi* that had brought together Chinese and Javanese batik traders broke apart, with great violence, into ethnic factions. The exact reasons for the *kongsi*’s dissolution are unclear, but various theories suggest either Javanese resentment of Chinese exclusivism (Purdey 2006: 6) or deliberate manipulation by a colonial state fearful of a united Javanese-Chinese front (Shiraishi 1997: 187-8). Regardless, disagreement within the *kongsi* soon devolved into street fights between its Javanese and Chinese members. Two former members,

Haji Omar Said Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, left the *kongsi* to found the Sarekat Islam (SI) as a rival association for Muslim Javanese batik traders.

The SI was initially organized into local cooperatives, through which local merchants could advocate their interests with colonial authorities. Over time these cooperatives began to resemble modern trade unions, with their meetings increasingly dominated by discourses on life as powerless subjects in the Netherlands Indies. SI chapters quickly spread from the rapidly growing urban *kampungs* of Java to both the outer islands and to the rural *kampung* (McVey 2006: 8-10). By 1914, the SI claimed more than 440,000 members (Shiraishi 1997: 187).

Despite the SI's size and its advocacy on behalf of "Inlander" Muslims, the organization did not really pose a credible threat to the Netherlands Indies. Its goals were never clear, its structure never centralized, and its Islamic ideology largely left unarticulated. It was also explicitly and sometimes violently Sinophobic. This fact limited the organization's appeal in the cities and directed the resentments of its rank and file away from the colonial state and toward an unpopular and largely powerless minority (van Dijk 2002: 286; c.f. Shiraishi 1997). Because of this, Dutch authorities not only tolerated the SI's existence, but also, at times, enthusiastically supported it (McVey 2006: 11-2).

During this period Islamic modernism, a theological movement from Egypt, also made its way to the archipelago, and would prove highly influential in both theological and sociopolitical terms. Modernists, first and foremost, rejected the notion that Muslims should simply accept the teachings of the *ulama* (the concept of *taqlid*, which means to follow an expert in Islamic law) unless their teachings could stand up to the rigors of critical exegesis (*ijtihad*). Modernists furthermore viewed Islam as more template than script, a set of timeless values that could—and

should—be critically reconciled with the demands of a modern society (Kurtzman 2002: 1-27; Liddle 1996; Hefner 2000: 117).

Initially, the practical and individualistic rationality of modernism appealed to only a small number of intellectuals and merchants.⁹ This began to change in 1912, when an official for the royal court in Yogyakarta, Ahmad Dahlan, returned from religious study in Mecca to find a society that was, in his view, both deeply heretical and hopelessly backwards. Like Agus Salim, Dahlan came from a family of Central Javanese *batik* merchants; unlike Salim, Dahlan was concerned less with the interests of *Muslims* than with the state of *Islam* in the Netherlands Indies. And he was centrally concerned with reforming Islam so that it could effectively cater to the needs of a rapidly modernizing society. Dahlan sought to affect this change through education, founding the educational organization Muhammadiyah, which today claims 29 million members (Vickers 2005: 56).

Many of East and Central Java's theologically conservative *kyai* (Javanese *ulama*) shared Dahlan's distaste for the *kejawen* mysticism that was prevalent among both the Javanese nobility and peasantry, as well as his desire to propagate orthodox Islam. Yet they also felt threatened by the rapid growth of Muhammadiyah, and by modernism's direct assault on the traditional authority of the *kyai* and legitimately of the *syafi'i mazhab* (jurisprudential tradition).¹⁰ Compounding matters, after the Saudi takeover of Mecca in 1924, the Kingdom's Wahhabi clerics moved to exclude representatives from the four *mazhab* from participation in the 1926 World Islamic Conference. These developments created a distinct sense of urgency among a

⁹ Many of the latter were also active in the SI. However, the SI was not, strictly speaking, a modernist organization, nor was it centrally concerned with matters of orthodoxy and orthopraxy.

¹⁰ There are four classical schools of Sunni *fiqh* (human codes of law derived from *sharia*, the divine law revealed in the Quran and related in the Sunnah): *syafi'i*, *hanbali*, *hanafi*, and *maliki*. Most are regionalized; Indonesians overwhelmingly follow the *syafi'i* school.

group of prominent *kyai* in the East Javanese city of Jombang, who wished to both reform Islamic practice and preserve traditional *syafi'i* authority (Bush 2009: 34). In 1926, they formed Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as an association of theologically “traditionalist” religious scholars (Vickers 2005: 56-57; Bush 2009: 34-43). Today NU has approximately 30 million members, while several times that number claim to follow the organization’s teachings and proclamations. It is thus widely considered to be the largest Muslim organization in the world.

The two organizations had much in common. Despite the traditionalist label, NU—like Muhammadiyah—sought to reform the practice of Islam in the Netherlands Indies, and to root out mystic rituals it viewed as fundamentally at odds with orthodox Islam. Both emphasized social change and criticized existing class structures. Both saw educational innovation as the key method of achieving these goals, hoping to create a new generation of informed, modern *santri* (a term which literally means “students of *pesantren*” but has deep connotations of “purity”) Both organizations, initially, appealed primarily to Muslim traders and merchants, whose children made up the bulk of students at Muhammadiyah and NU schools. And both were particularly active in East and Central Java.

However, the organizations contrasted starkly from one another in crucial ways. Muhammadiyah sought to “purify” Islam of what it viewed as unnecessary (Islamic) traditionalism; indeed, the very idea of Islamic modernism was predicated on challenging the authority of the traditionalist *kyai*. NU, by contrast, was founded in part to defend the authority of the traditionalist *kyai* against this challenge. Moreover, as Geertz (1976) noted in his classic ethnography of Mojokerto (East Java) in the early 1960s, the two organizations historically diverged in their approaches to the syncretic practices that were (and are) prevalent among rural Javanese. Islamic modernism has a much more restrictive view of what counts as “Islamic,”

meaning that NU was (and remains) much more tolerant of syncretic practices, provided they do not contravene *syafi'i* orthodoxy.¹¹ Finally, NU was a vocal critic of the colonial state and its clientalistic relations with other Muslim groups—including Muhammadiyah, which relied on subsidies from the colonial government (Bush 2009: 37). In the NU view, this made Muhammadiyah an accomplice of the regime, an accusation that fueled the increasingly contentious relationship between the organizations through the 1920s.

By the 1930s, though, the Indies' major Islamic organizations (the SI, NU and Muhammadiyah) put aside their differences and formed the Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia (Supreme Council of Indonesian Muslims, MIAI). The coalition emerged, in part, as a reaction to the spread of secular nationalism beyond its traditional base of support (among urban intellectuals, *priyayi*, and religious minorities) to the Muslim middle classes and agrarian poor (Bush 2009: 41). But the MIAI also explicitly sought to counter the growing influence of communism among Muslims, which it viewed as “godless” and un-Islamic.

Notably, the embryonic Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) had initially sought to operate within the SI, in the hopes that it could steer the organization a more radical political direction.¹² Until 1921, the policy paid considerable dividends: a series of official declarations by Salim and other SI leaders clearly demonstrates the influence of socialist ideas on SI policy, while both SI and PKI leaders tried to synthesize socialist and Islamic notions of charity and welfare (McVey 2006: 96-7). By 1921, however, a conservative faction in the SI—which viewed communism as “foreign,” antithetical to Islam, and an instrument of

¹¹ This is not to claim that NU is exactly tolerant of *kejawen*. In the 1960s, for example, Javanese traditionalists were more likely to attack practices deemed “heretical” than modernists. Rather, it is to say that traditionalists have a broader understanding of what practices count as Islamic and what practices count as harmless to Islam (Geertz 1976: 152-155).

¹² The PKI was originally named the *Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging* (Indies Social Democratic Party, ISDV).

European colonialism—had won over both Salim and Tjokroaminoto. The effect was a permanent rupture between the SI and its communist allies, a watershed moment sparking a decades-long and increasingly hostile relationship between Indonesian communists and those who sought to build an Islamic society, however defined (ibid 98-104).

This rupture was also both reflective and constitutive of social polarization among Javanese *santri* and *abangan*. The term *abangan* first emerged sometime in the 19th century; literally “red” in Javanese, it was used primarily to differentiate the majority of heterodox Javanese peasants from the “white” *santri*, who were often craftsmen and traders (Ricklefs 2007: 84-6). After the split with the SI, which dominated the urban unions, PKI leaders began recruiting primarily from the “proletarianized” *abangan* peasantry. They crafted idealized visions of Javanese history and culture, repurposing the caste-structured Majapahit Empire and Islamic rebellion of Prince Diponegoro in service of historical materialism in order to appeal to *abangan* sensibilities (232-3). The PKI also drew upon *abangan* fears of the *santri*, as well as class-based resentments toward the *priyayi*-dominated secular nationalists. Despite being declared illegal in 1926 (after the collapse of an ill-conceived labor uprising), the PKI managed to greatly increase its following in rural Java during the 1930s and 1940s. This development enhanced the sense of threat among *kyai* and *santri*.

It was thus in the first half of the 20th century that several competing visions of a still-theoretical Indonesian state and society began to crystallize. The first of these, secular nationalism, imagined Indonesia as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious home for all “Inlanders”—brought together by common history within the Netherlands Indies and the emerging Indonesian language. The second, political Islam, sought to build a similar state, but in which Islam and Muslims would be given primacy over other religions and religious communities. Finally,

Indonesian communism sought to build a state that privileged its peasants and proletariat, and presented communism as a moral-ideological alternative to both political Islam and the bourgeois nationalism of the urban elites. Competition among these three contrasting visions of the post-colonial state would dominate politics until the late 1960s.

Japanese Occupation and Indonesian Revolution (1942-1946)

The defeat and dissolution of the Netherlands Indies at the hands of the Japanese military upended, and in some cases reversed, social relations in the archipelago. The racial-legal cleavage separating privileged Europeans from “foreign Orientals” and “Inlanders” were completely dismantled by the Japanese, and its former masters imprisoned and humiliated (Anderson 1972: 31). The Dutch, however, had also nurtured and privileged an administrative class of nobles and religious minorities, whom they had placed above the mass of peasants, craftsmen, and merchants and who furthermore enjoyed exclusive access to Dutch education. The Japanese decided to co-opt this urban administrative class, and even provided a limited degree of sponsorship to the secular-nationalist organizations that were increasingly popular among them.¹³ They were, however, largely kept confined to the cities. By contrast, military authorities forced rural civil servants, who had been among most attached to the colonial state, to carry out harsh extraction and compulsory labor policies servicing the Imperial war effort.

Despite weakening the administrative class as a whole, though, the Japanese occupation paradoxically created the conditions necessary for the dissemination of Indonesian nationalism

¹³ The Japanese framed their Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as an umbrella for “liberated” Asian nationalist movements. In reality, however, this construct served to rationalize the Japanese empire-building project and stave off potential German claims to Dutch and French colonial possessions in Asia (Yellen 2015).

beyond the cities (ibid 20-34).¹⁴ To begin, the Japanese organized many rural youths into militant groups (e.g. *Peta*), steeped in Japanese militarist and pan-Asian propaganda, but framed as agents of Indonesian liberation from European colonialism (ibid 18-19). Moreover, Japanese authorities even went so far as to enlist leading nationalists Sukarno and Muhammed Hatta to help organize and legitimate their efforts. Though Sukarno and Hatta appeared to play along, in reality they were using Japanese sponsorship to establish networks of nationalist revolutionaries and prepare them for the aftermath of Imperial Japan's defeat (Kahin [1952] 2003: 106-111).

The occupying Japanese also inverted the sociopolitical relationship between orthodox Muslims and everyone else. As described above, the Dutch had first sought to contain "pan-Islam" by circumscribing Islamic authority to religious matters and promoting *adat*-based alternatives. Later, the Dutch allowed for some form of Islamic engagement in politics, but only within strict limits. Japanese authorities, by contrast, deliberately placed orthodox Muslims in positions of power and authority in Indonesian villages. Though in service of the war effort (and resisted as such by some *kyai*), the MIAI expressed enthusiasm for the plan, as it presented an opportunity to build ties with rural villages and expand their support base (Ricklefs 2001: 252-254). The Japanese, however, mistrusted the urban modernists who ran MIAI. Instead, they wanted an organization that could be strictly controlled. Thus in 1943, occupational authorities dissolved the MIAI and replaced it with Masyumi, a similarly-defined umbrella organization for Indonesian Muslims, but which would be run by rural Muhammadiyah and NU leaders, who occupation authorities felt were more pliant (ibid 255).

The emergence of Masyumi, and its role in regulating rural life for the occupational authorities, expanded the reach of political Islam far beyond the urban craftsmen and traders who

¹⁴ Robinson (1995: 70-85) provides a detailed discussion of similar forces at play in Bali.

had dominated its institutions in the 1920s—particularly in the outer islands of the archipelago. However, many *abangan* in East and Central Java resented being subject to the authority of the *santri*, whom the *abangan* mistrusted as overly individualistic, trade-oriented, and urban (McVey 2006: 171).¹⁵ *Santri* authority in the rural village thus strengthened the appeal of alternatives to political Islam among the *abangan*—including, crucially, communism.

With an Allied invasion looming in 1945, Japan expanded and intensified the paramilitary training of paramilitary groups like Peta. Sukarno, Hasyim Ansari, and other key leaders of the post-independence period were tasked with overseeing the creation of the 80,000 strong Vanguard Column, subdivided into Islamic and secular wings. Ostensibly created to resist the Allies, Sukarno and his allies instead built the Vanguard Column into an embryonic army that could resist a Dutch return after the now-inevitable Japanese defeat (Taylor 2003: 320).

On August 17, 1945, Sukarno proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia, declaring its independence from both Japan and the Netherlands and instructing civil servants to cease cooperation with occupational authorities. Nationalist forces engaged in brief, though intense, warfare with Japanese units (Kahin [1952] 2003: 136-40). By September 29, British soldiers arrived. However, they did not come to aid the Republic. Instead, Britain sought to maintain law and order until the Netherlands Indies administration could be re-established (ibid 141). When Dutch soldiers did return to the Indies, bitter fighting resumed. Pressure from the United States and Britain, though, forced the Netherlands to negotiate with the Republic of Indonesia (144;

¹⁵ It is important to note that, while the tensions inherent to orthodox Islam's role in Javanese society are far and away the most important for understanding the development of religious pluralism in Indonesia, there were similar divisions both outside Java and among minority religious groups, mirroring at least some aspects of this Javanese drama in historically consequential ways. Robinson (1995: 78-81; 113) develops the Balinese case in detail, highlighting the ways in which this Hindu outpost fit within broader narratives of socioreligious cleavage.

318).¹⁶ In 1949, the Netherlands withdrew its forces, ending the military conflict. With external foes defeated, the nationalist movement's internal factions could now turn attention to questions of what the new state would look like, and in whose name it would govern.

Islam and Pluralism in Sukarno's "Old Order" Regime (1945-1967)

In 1945, when Indonesia's founders set about writing the constitution, the new state's future was anything but secure. It was, first and foremost, still under military threat from the Dutch. Moreover, in order to be viable as an alternative to the Indies regime, Indonesia would have to be seen as representative to a large and heterogeneous population spread out across the 17,000 islands of an archipelago wider than the continental United States, comprising multiple faiths and sects, dozens of languages, hundreds of named ethnic groups, and a dizzying array of class, tribal, and other localized social identities. The anti-Dutch coalition, furthermore, was anything but cohesive: the Muslim conservatives and Islamists of Masyumi, secular nationalists of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party, PNI) and Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party, PSI), and communists of the PKI all possessed different visions of what the independent state should look like. The ideal states envisioned by each party would be unacceptable to the others: a secular state unacceptable for Masyumi; an Islamic state unacceptable for heterodox and religious minority supporters of the PNI, PSI, and PKI; and a socialist state unacceptable to nearly all outside the PKI.

Constitutional debates in 1945 thus centered on constructing a state that could balance the interests and assuage the fears of each prominent member within this fractured coalition.

Masyumi, backed by Muhammadiyah and NU, sought to associate the Indonesian nation with

¹⁶ The Truman administration went so far as to make Marshall Fund assistance to the Netherlands conditional on their withdrawal from Indonesia.

Islam, a move resisted by religious minorities, heterodox Muslims, communists, and secular nationalists. But whereas PKI and PSI were avowedly secular in orientation, PNI leaders such as Sukarno, Hatta, and Supomo were open to compromise with Masyumi (Boland 1982: 20-21). Sukarno had, in fact, long believed that an ideological synthesis of nationalism, (political) Islam, and communism was necessary to ensure Indonesia's future as a unitary state (Sukarno [1926] 1970).¹⁷ On July 1, 1945, with this synthesis in mind, Sukarno outlined the ideological basis for the new state, known as Pancasila, or "five principles." These were: (1) belief in "the one and only God"¹⁸; (2) just and civilized humanity; (3) the unity of Indonesia; (4) democracy guided by consensus arising out of consultation amongst representatives; and (5) social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia. Pancasila's first article was conceived of as compromise between Masyumi's vision of an Islamic state and the various opposing views, some of which were avowedly secular and others simply opposed to Muslim domination of Indonesia. The new state, it declared, would be religious in some sense (and monotheistic), but would not draw its legitimacy from Islam nor favor its Muslim citizens.

Orthodox Muslims soon realized the futility of their position on defining nationhood and nationality in Islamic terms. But with the PNI evidently willing to meet them partway, Masyumi leaders sought to preserve a role for *sharia* in Indonesian jurisprudence. Thus, on July 22, a joint

¹⁷ In the late 1950s, Sukarno would articulate this idea as *nasakom*, a portmanteau for *nasionalisme, agama, dan komunisme* (nationalism, religion, and communism). He declared *nasakom* to be the new ideology of the Indonesian state, one that drew equally from its constituent parts and treated each as an equally valid component of Indonesian politics. A similar construct is arguably at the heart of the "Turkish-Islamic synthesis," adopted as policy after a 1980 military *coup d'état* (Yahvuz 1997). But whereas Turkey's military leaders sought to create a conservative buffer against communism. Sukarno sought to preserve the wartime coalition by integrating communism with nationalism and Islam through the (common) principle of egalitarianism. Ultimately, *nasakom* failed to bridge the increasingly irreconcilable ideological differences among Indonesia's major political parties (Emmerson 1999: 33).

¹⁸ In Indonesian: *Ketuhanan yang maha esa*.

committee agreed to insert a clause into the first of Sukarno's five points, so that it read "belief in the one and only God, with the obligation to implement *sharia* for all its adherents."¹⁹ In exchange, Masyumi dropped its insistence that Indonesia be declared an Islamic state (Hosen 2007: 62).

The clause, known as the Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*), was instantly controversial. Some of the Constitution's framers, including Hatta, were unhappy with the idea that Indonesians would be subject to different codes of law; and they were also fearful that the Jakarta Charter would convince Christians and Hindus in Eastern Indonesia, most of whom were still under Dutch military control, to reject the new state (Intan 2006: 42). Hatta and Sukarno were thus able to convince enough of the Jakarta Charter's supporters that it would be an undesirable source of division at that crucial moment, and that "belief in the one and only God" would suffice until such a time came that the Jakarta Charter could safely be reinserted into the Constitution. It soon became clear, though, that Sukarno, Hatta, and the secular-nationalist parties had no intention of doing so. Instead, they presented Pancasila as a common, integrative platform for the state's monotheistic faiths: Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism (ibid 43).²⁰ Thus Pancasila created the ideological foundation for Indonesia's formal institutional system of religious pluralism, which would develop over the next several decades.

The Formation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs

The omission of the Jakarta Charter, and consequent failure to formally link Indonesian statehood to Islam, acted as a lightning rod for orthodox Muslim dissatisfaction with the

¹⁹ In Indonesian: *Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*.

²⁰ Hinduism is often assumed to be polytheistic, due to the existence of multiple gods, but Smartism (the largest orthodox Hindu sect) sees each god as an avatar of Brahman (i.e. the "one true god").

nationalist movement. Given the strong support Masyumi commanded in Javanese cities and among Muslims in the outer islands, Sukarno and Hatta needed to placate its leaders in order to avoid a fatal rupture within the anti-Dutch coalition. In 1946, they established the Ministry of Religious Affairs (*Kementarian Agama*), which was to oversee at least some elements of Islamic religious life.²¹ The formation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, as Lev (1972: 44-45) writes, “made it possible to consolidate the entire administration of Islam into a single nationwide body controlled by Islamic groups,” promising a level of “institutional adaptability and bargaining power... which it would not otherwise have had...” And unlike contemporary institutions, such as the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Indonesian Ministry enjoyed a great deal of autonomy from central state control (Keyman 2007).

The Ministry of Religious Affairs, though, did not last long as a unified institution representing orthodox Islam; instead, it became a central site of contestation among orthodox Muslims over who controlled the bureaucratic levels of authority over Islam. In 1949, such tensions emerged between the modernist and traditionalist factions within Masyumi. NU activists, in particular, felt marginalized within the party’s decision-making process (Feith [1962] 2007: 233-234). The schism was an opportune moment for the secular-nationalist leadership. Barely a year earlier, another ill-fated rebellion had marginalized the PKI, and as a result, strengthened the hand of Masyumi within the governing coalition (Swift 1989). At the time, Masyumi was controlled by Mohammad Natsir, an uncompromising modernist hostile to communism and the *priyayi* leaders of PNI alike. As such, the situation threatened to throw Sukarno’s balancing act off course. NU’s leaders, by contrast, were seen as much more accommodating. Sukarno and the PNI therefore encouraged NU to leave Masyumi and form its

²¹ Initially, the Ministry of Religious Affairs only regulated the practice of Islam (not of Christianity or any other Indonesian religion).

own political party. NU did not require a lot of convincing, given resentments over the subordinate position of traditionalists within Masyumi (and a host of perceived slights towards the traditionalist *ulama* from Natsir and other modernists) (Bush 2009: 47-48). NU formally split from Masyumi in 1952; its reward was a near permanent hold on the Ministry of Religious Affairs through the remainder of the Sukarno period (Lev 1972: 58-60; Bush 2009: 45-46).

During this period the Ministry of Religious Affairs also transformed from an institution exclusively representing Islam and regulating Islamic practices to one that represented and regulated the religious practices of all Indonesia's official religions. This change emerged from the need, as perceived by Sukarno and his political allies, to blunt the Ministry's potential use as a tool through which to affect the orthodoxification of Indonesian Islam. From its inception, it was clear that the *ulama* intended to use it as such. During the 1940s and 1950s, for example, the Ministry sought to place legal limits on mystical practices among *abangan* practitioners of *kejawen*, which were viewed by the orthodox officials in control of the Ministry as idolatrous vestiges of paganism. In 1961, the ministry even attempted to introduce a minimum definition of religion as a system of belief possessing a holy scripture, a prophet, monotheism, and religious law, which would be inclusive of Christianity but not the archipelago's many syncretic and heterodox traditions (Intan 2006: 44-45).²²

Responding to the Ministry exceeding the boundaries of its authority (i.e. to regulate and administer the practice of specifically orthodox Islam), Sukarno declared that, by this bar, there were six officially recognized religions in Indonesia, each of which would require institutional representation within the ministry: Islam, Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism,

²² Menchik (2016) calls this stance (and corresponding set of policies) "truncated pluralism."

Buddhism, and Confucianism (Mulder 2005: 22-23; Intan 2006: 45).²³ All six religions would be granted a bureau at the Ministry, which would be tasked with regulating religious life for the titular religious group (including suzerainty over family and inheritance law). While the Ministry itself remained controlled by orthodox Muslims, it was now forced to grant equal recognition to the formally recognized minority religions, as well as formally treat the interests of each as equal to those of Muslims. Finally, the Ministry would be tasked (along with the Public Prosecutor and Ministry of the Interior) with prohibiting and dissolving “groups threatening these established religions, or the stability of society” (Mulder 2005: 24).

The reformulation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs was clearly designed to dilute the Ministry’s authority and to protect religious minorities. However, the way in which it was reformulated had significant unintended consequences. The reformed Ministry, to begin, was no less capable of initiating and enacting processes of orthodoxification. And now it was positioned as the arbiter of orthodoxy for Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and Confucians as well as Muslims. This fact would, over time, channel intra-religious conflicts over who represented each community, while universalizing the idea of the state as regulator of religious practice. And while the power to prohibit groups that threaten the established religions was intended as a warning to the entrepreneurs of orthodoxification, in practice it provided a legal basis for that very kind of action. As such, the reformulation of the Ministry inadvertently stimulated, strengthened, and legitimized campaigns to root out blasphemy, heresy, and heterodoxy, from those aimed at Javanese *kejawen* and non-normative Islamic sects like the Ahmadiyah to those aimed at Jehovah’s Witnesses and non-normative sects within the other official religious categories (Abalahin 2005: 119-142; Mulder 2005: 22-25). The transformation of the Ministry of

²³ In 1979, Suharto “de-recognized” Confucianism; President Abdurrahman Wahid would re-extend recognition to Confucianism in 2000 (Pausacker 2007).

Religious Affairs was thus an important milestone in the development of Indonesia's corporatist-pluralist religious governance regime, with its emphases on both equality among the officially recognized religions and inequality between orthodox and non-orthodox practices within each officially recognized religious category.

Region, Religion, and Rebellion

Not long after the Dutch left Indonesia, regional displeasure with the Republic (and its Javanese and West Sumatran-dominated leadership) exploded into a series of armed revolts. Some regional movements also had a palpable religious dimension—including, in at least two cases, Christian-led resistance to a Muslim-dominated central state; and in several others, Islamist- or conservative Muslim-led resistance to a secular-nationalist state. First and foremost, however, these rebellions were a response to the Republic centralizing its authority over the archipelago (and thus threatening the privileges of local elites).

The UN-mediated Renville Agreement, which in 1949 ended the Dutch occupation, replaced the Netherlands Indies with the Republik Indonesia Serikat (United States of Indonesia, RIS), comprising sixteen federal units, the largest of which was the Java-based Republic of Indonesia. Republican leaders viewed this federal arrangement with suspicion, as a source of weakness and a possible Trojan horse for a Dutch return (Kahin [1952] 2003: 444-50). Thus the Republic, with many of the federal units as willing partners, set to work undermining the RIS and establishing Indonesia as unitary state. By 1950, a new constitution officially dissolved the federation.

But some outer-island elites preferred the more decentralized arrangement of the RIS, and so took up arms against the Republic (Ricklefs 2001: 285; Bertrand 2004: 188-91). Of

particular note are the short-lived Republik Maluku Selatan (Republic of South Maluku, RMS) in 1950 and the more severe Darul Islam insurgency in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh, spanning the years 1949-62. Both, notably, had religious dimensions. The RMS was led by (mostly) Protestant former soldiers in the Netherlands colonial army (KNIL), who were eager to reassert the privilege they had enjoyed under the Dutch, and were wary of their prospects under a “Javanese” and “Muslim” republic. Darul Islam, by contrast, primarily reflected dissatisfaction in several relatively conservative regions with the Republic’s retreat on *sharia* and religiously pluralistic construction of the state.

These revolts and Indonesia’s successful military response to them had important and enduring consequences. First, they simultaneously reflected, deepened, and politicized the cleavage separating center (Java) and periphery. Second, they exacerbated religious divisions within many regions, as in Ambon, where supporters of the RMS were mostly Protestant and supporters of the Republic were mostly Muslim and Catholic (van Klinken 2001). Third, they oriented the military towards internal pacification, rather than external threat (Robinson 2002: 245-245). And finally, along with the communist-led Madiun Revolt in 1949, these rebellions produced a deep and abiding mistrust of “subversive” or “antinational” ideologies within the military, which became particularly distrustful of regionalists, communists, and Islamists (Kingsbury 2002: 15-20). Each would help shape Indonesian politics in the decades to come.

Emergent Conflicts in the Short-Lived Era of Competitive Elections (1950-1957)

The amended Constitution of 1950 re-established Indonesia as a unitary state and affirmed its status as a constitutional democracy; however, Indonesia’s first national elections did not come until 1955. Prior to that, Sukarno and Hatta apportioned parliamentary seats and cabinet

positions based upon expectations of support for each of Indonesia's major political parties. This system confined politics, for the time being, to a relatively small proportion of the population. Parliamentarians and government appointees in this period overwhelmingly drew from a small class of Western-educated, urban Revolutionaries culled from the lower rungs of the Javanese and Minang aristocracies (Feith ([1962] 2007: 108-11). Their constituents, in turn, were a "political public" made up of the civil servants, urban traders, and craftsmen who had provided the rank-and-file for political organizations in the first half of the 20th century. The appointed parliament thus reproduced all the ideological conflicts from the late Dutch and Revolutionary periods, particularly among advocates of contrasting nationalist, political Islamic, and communist visions of Indonesian state and nation.

With elections set for 1955, the major political parties set about courting voters beyond this political public. Though still sharing the goal of reinserting the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution, NU and Masyumi were also competing for the Islamic vote, with both mobilizing their considerable organizational resources in advance of the elections. The pro-*sharia* parties also faced a resurgent threat from the communists. Marginalized in Sukarno's appointed parliament, the PKI had perhaps the most to gain in the move to mass politics; having established a grassroots network of charitable concerns and political offices in villages across Java, Sumatra and Bali, they were also immediately effective (Feith [1962] 2007: 112). PKI expansion may be largely attributed to the leadership of D. N. Aidit and his lieutenant M. H. Lukman, who ascended to the Party politburo in 1951. Both had been abroad during the Madiun affair, and were thus relatively free of its taint. Aidit and Lukman focused outreach efforts on the "proletarianized" Muslim peasants of the village, rather than the small (and often religiously conservative) urban proletariat. By 1952, the Party could claim 100,000 card-carrying members;

by 1954, that number had risen to nearly 500,000 (Feith [1962] 2007: 407; Hindley 1964: 74). Unlike previous iterations of the PKI, Aidit and Lukman also sought to forge alliances with left-leaning nationalists. To that end, they cultivated close relationships with Sukarno and emphasizing common cause between PKI anti-imperialism and PNI nationalism, most notably in opposition to the continued Dutch presence in West Papua (Feith [1962] 2007: 237-240).

It was during this period that the military emerged as a political force. In the process of suppressing regionalist and other rebellions, the military had grown more and more autonomous from civilian control. In many regions of the Indonesian periphery, it was the only working institution of the central state. In such vacuums of civilian authority, military officers were able to seize lucrative extraction and cultivation enterprises left unclaimed after the Dutch retreat. Since many peripheral regions were rich in resources, the army soon possessed a sustainable source of funding outside the scope of its official budget.

Meanwhile, the fractured nature of the appointed parliament (as well as the numerous unstable cabinets installed under Sukarno) weakened civilian authority over the military. Thus the officer corps found itself in a position to reject civilian appointees, influence civilian defense policy, and even, in the case of the 1952 Ali cabinet, topple the government (Crouch [1978] 2007: 28-32). Moreover, as its influence grew, a distinct culture of military supremacy grew among the officer corps, one that stressed autonomy from civilian authority and mistrust of the political party system. Increasingly, the military viewed itself as the “true defender” of the Revolution. Yet whereas the Revolution’s other great advocate, Sukarno, saw foreign plots behind Indonesia’s many problems, the officer corps increasingly defined “enemies of the state” as fifth columnists seeking Indonesia’s destruction from within. The PKI-led Madiun revolt and the Islamist Darul Islam insurgency incubated these kinds of views, producing extreme hostility

among the officer corps toward both communism and political Islam, and a sense that each posed a tenacious, existential threat to the Revolution.²⁴

Guided Democracy (1957-1965)

The 1955 elections, rather than resolving the outstanding issues of the appointed parliament, exacerbated its underlying tensions. Masyumi and NU had hoped to control a majority of seats, a position from which they could renegotiate the relationship between Islam and the state. Instead, the elections produced a secular bloc of roughly equal size, comprising the PNI, PKI, PSI, and a smattering of smaller Christian and secular parties.²⁵ Efforts by Masyumi and NU to reintroduce the Jakarta Charter were thus doomed to failure (Hefner 2000: 43).

Meanwhile, resentment towards the Javanese-dominated elite at the political center rose once again, culminating in the linked Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and Permesta rebellions, the latter of which was dominated by Christian officers. These revolts, led by disgruntled army officers, came in response to an ambitious project led by Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution to centralize authority within the army and thus strengthen its “national” character. However, this required redeploying and thus severing regional commanders from their considerable gray market activities, prompting fierce resistance (Crouch [1978] 2007: 32-33).

Making matters worse, Sukarno—backed by the PNI and PKI— was simultaneously attempting to pressure the Netherlands into abandoning its remaining West Papua colony by

²⁴ Simultaneous hostility to communism and political Islam is not unique to Indonesia; indeed, similar ideologies have emerged, at various points in time, within the militaries of Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and many other majority-Muslim states.

²⁵ The secular PNI won 22.3 percent of the vote and the communist PKI won 16.4 percent; meanwhile, Masyumi won 20.9 percent and NU won 18.4 percent of the vote.

seizing Dutch-owned enterprises in the archipelago (and even expelling 46,000 Dutch nationals). The Dutch shipping concern KPM, which transported most inter-island commercial goods, found itself among the targets. KPM quickly abandoned Indonesia, leaving many islands completely isolated (Lev [1966] 2009: 48-50). Many in the outer islands, including the dissident officers and Masyumi supporters, blamed the PKI for pushing Sukarno toward ever more radical policies. Others blamed the president himself. Vice-President Hatta, for one, proffered his resignation in protest. As the only prominent non-Javanese in the government, Hatta's position had softened perceptions of Javanese political domination; his resignation exacerbated resentments towards Jakarta (ibid 25-6). Guerilla activity from the PRRI began soon after, though dissident officers did not formalize resistance until February 15, 1958. Their demands included Nasution's removal, Hatta's restoration as co-President, and the banning of the PKI (ibid 52).

The PRRI rebellion attracted a curious set of allies. Regional elections in 1957 had demonstrated a trend in support towards the PKI, particularly on Java.²⁶ Masyumi and the PSI, by contrast, felt increasingly marginalized at the political center. They were, however, still popular in many of the outer islands. Consequently, the two parties voiced public support for the PRRI's stated grievances, while many cadres backed the rebellions themselves (Lev [1966] 2009: 43-4; Crouch [1978] 2007: 33). It was also becoming clear that the PRRI had a number of foreign sponsors: newly-independent Malaya, rightist South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the U.S.—which had grown increasingly frustrated by Sukarno's leftward tilt and was eager discredit his PKI allies (Ricklefs 2001: 319).

Despite the considerable resources brought to bear by these allies, the army quickly put down both rebellions by August 1958. Yet the army's swift victories greatly strengthened the

²⁶ PKI support on Java rose from 20.6 percent in 1955 to 27.4 percent in 1957 (Feith [1962] 2007: 582).

political position of its chief antagonist, the PKI. The involvement of Masyumi and the PSI led to their marginalization and eventual banning, removing two of the biggest obstacles to PKI expansion. The extended PRRI affair also sidelined two of Sukarno's most prominent civilian critics, Hatta and Masyumi's Natsir (Ricklefs 2001: 320). Finally, the revelations of U.S. involvement pushed Sukarno even further towards the communists, strengthening the PKI's claim to be the party of Sukarno (Sukarno's increasingly nominal association with the PNI notwithstanding). Given Sukarno's enduring popularity, this association promised enhanced prospects for the PKI in the next election.

But a PKI victory in the upcoming elections was unacceptable to the army, which threatened to intervene. Nasution had also grown stronger as a result of the PRRI rebellion; he urged Sukarno to cancel the elections and formalize the pseudo-democratic "Guided Democracy" policy, forcing Sukarno into the role of mediator between an increasingly powerful PKI and an increasingly political military. Initially, Guided Democracy appeared to work, as Sukarno possessed considerable political capital with all of the major political factions: the PKI and radical wing of the PNI, the Muslim conservatives of NU, the conservative nationalists in the PNI, and even the officer corps. However, Sukarno was unable to effectively manage these competing interests. Under Guided Democracy, the military and PKI both grew increasingly ambitious, and increasingly hostile to one another. Meanwhile, political conservatives, most notably the Islamic conservatives within NU and the PNI, began to resent Sukarno's ties to the PKI, and were thus drawn to the army. Fatal mistakes in foreign policy and the economy weakened Sukarno's hand. This set the stage for a cataclysmic confrontation between the PKI (and its chief benefactor) and the coalition of conservative nationalists and Islamists rallying

behind the military. The outcome would fundamentally shape the structure and dynamics of Indonesian religious pluralism for decades.

Mass Violence and the End of the Old Order (1965-1967)

It was in this context that the murky events of October 1, 1965 unfolded. Early that morning, a group of mid-ranking military officers attempted to arrest seven anti-communist generals on charges of treason. Of the first six, three were executed and the others taken into custody. The seventh general, Army Chief of Staff (and Minister of Defense) Nasution, escaped.²⁷ The insurgents then took the captured generals to Halim Air Force Base, where they had set up headquarters. They stationed 2,000 loyal troops around Jakarta's Independence Square and took control of the adjacent Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) building. Shortly thereafter, RRI broadcast a statement by coup leader Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, who identified the conspirators as part of the Gerakan 30 September (September 30th Movement, G30S). Untung claimed that the group had acted to forestall a plot by the captured generals—allegedly backed by the CIA—to oust Sukarno and impose military rule. They also claimed to have placed Sukarno under their protection, and to have brought the President to Halim.

At this point, events seem to have moved quickly. PKI chief Aidit and several other high-ranking officials traveled to Halim to join Untung's group. At some point, the remaining generals held captive were shot and killed, their bodies unceremoniously dumped down a well. Untung issued a series of decrees, declaring that the "Indonesian Revolution Council" had taken control of the state, abolishing all military ranks above colonel and dissolving the government (Roosa

²⁷ His daughter was killed, however.

2006: 47-50).²⁸ Back on Independence Square, Major-General Suharto (and not Nasution) orchestrated a counter-coup, routing the poorly organized G30S troops and flooding the streets with soldiers and tanks. G30S found themselves isolated at Halim, and without many options. Untung and Aidit fled. Suharto quickly took control of the military from Nasution, effectively muzzled Sukarno, and took *de facto* control of the country. At this point he began arresting PKI leaders and organizers on charges of support for G30S, and denouncing and suppressing the Party (the PKI would be formally banned in 1966).²⁹

Theories of how and why these events occurred range from the highly dubious official version, which alleged that the coup was the first stage in a PKI general uprising, to counter-narratives alleging little to no PKI involvement whatsoever.³⁰ It is now clear that that Aidit and possibly several other PKI leaders supported or were involved in G30S; however, there is still no compelling evidence that the PKI planned a mass uprising (Roosa 2006; Wieringa 2002).³¹ In all probability, the G30S plotters and PKI leadership did not initially plan a *coup d'état*, but were simply trying to replace rightist generals judged hostile to their interests. In that they certainly misjudged the level of support within the military that they could count on in such an event, and

²⁸ It is still not entirely what the Indonesian Revolution Council was and who was involved. Roosa (2006: 47-50) provides evidence suggesting that the Indonesian Revolution Council was actually a hypothetical post-parliamentary ruling council, most of whose members were not involved in G30S and some of whom were even well-known anti-communists. Some scholars and activists say this points to a false flag operation by the military, but in light of Roosa's findings on G30S that now seems highly unlikely. It is more likely that the G30S conspirators declared the Indonesian Revolution Council in order to gain sympathy for their actions.

²⁹ Many, including Aidit, fled the capital, though most would be caught and executed soon thereafter.

³⁰ The most famous of the latter, by Benedict Anderson and Ruth McVey (1971), argues that G30S was designed primarily to alter the balance of power within the military (not society at large).

³¹ This evidence suggests that the leader of the PKI's Special Bureau, Sjam, was the closest thing the coup had to a leader (Roosa 2006: 203). However it is not likely to have involved more than a small number of PKI cadres beyond Aidit and Sjam.

underestimated the organizational capacity of reactionary forces once the conservative generals had been removed from the scene (Törnquist 1984).³²

Needless to say, the abortive coup spelled disaster for Indonesian communism. Across Indonesia, anti-communist gangs set upon any and all symbols of the PKI, destroying offices, tearing down billboards, and physically attacking cadres. In much of the archipelago, violence was limited and subsided quickly. But in regions like East Java, Bali, Aceh, and North Sumatra, civilians were mobilized *en masse* to round up and massacre the PKI rank and file.³³ The massacres had different social dynamics according to where they took place. In Surabaya, the killers were primarily poor Javanese and Madurese Muslims; alongside other targets, they disproportionately attacked ethnic Chinese traders and entrepreneurs (on the usually false charge of loyalty to communist China). In Jakarta, Medan, and elsewhere, peasants massacred much of the small, PKI-organized (but not necessarily Party-affiliated) working class. On Bali, which had the highest per capita death toll in Indonesia, PNI auxiliaries and Hindu conservatives were responsible for the bulk of the killing (Robinson 1995). In the rural province of West Kalimantan, Dayak tribesmen ethnically cleansed rural Chinese farmers in the interior; on Flores, Catholics often attacked Protestants.³⁴

In the Javanese countryside, where the largest number of killings took place, the military mobilized the youth and militant auxiliaries of the major anti-PKI parties, including Ansor, the

³² Incompetence, poor planning, and even poorer communication among plotters bedeviled the coup attempt, making the G30S “a convenient pretext for implementing a preexisting plan for the army to seize state power” (Roosa 2006: 225).

³³ It has now come to light that U.S., Australian, and British intelligence services all aided in identifying “of interest” Party officials, though on a relatively small scale in comparison to the overall number of victims. It is also worth noting that none of these allied states condemned or otherwise drew public attention to the killings. For that matter, neither did the Soviet Union, which suspected the PKI of being under Chinese sway.

³⁴ These incidents did not all happen simultaneously. The violence in West Kalimantan, for example, occurred in 1967-1968.

youth wing of NU. With the military providing logistical support, these civilian groups set upon PKI rank and file, massacring tens of thousands. NU youth butchered PKI youth and orthodox *santri* set upon heterodox *abangan*, while the killings also gave license to the settling of old and unrelated scores (Hefner 1990; Cribb 2002). Some local bands were doubtlessly proactive in seeking out victims; most, however, took their cues from the military and civilian elites. Muhammadiyah, for example, declared the killing of PKI to be a “holy obligation” (Wieringa 2002: 310). In Bali, “traditional” community and religious leaders encouraged the killings on both theological and political grounds (Robinson 1995: 299). Catholic and Muslim organizations issued joint statements from within the military-organized Kesatuan Aksi Penganjangan Gerakan Kontrarevolusioner 30 September (Action Front to Crush the Counter-Revolutionary September 30th Movement) (Wieringa 2002: 302). By contrast, where the military clearly signaled that civilians should not engage in violence, as in West Java, the killings were few and far between. Nevertheless, across Indonesia, an estimated 500,000 communists and others died, many of whom were killed by conservative Muslim, Hindu, and, to a lesser degree, Christian civilian groups mobilized by the army. Suharto assumed *de facto* control of Indonesia (he would formally assume the presidency in 1968). Sukarno, the one-time national hero of Indonesia, was put under house arrest, where he would die in 1970.

Authoritarian Pluralism: 1967-1984

Islamic conservatives, who had played central roles in Suharto’s rise and purge of the PKI, clearly saw themselves as among the victors of the 1965-1967 upheaval. After all, the chief obstacles to their goals—Sukarno and the PKI—had been removed from the chessboard in emphatic fashion, and only with their help. Consequently, there were reasonable expectations of

an expanded role in the new regime, and a more conducive political landscape for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter.

The country's new military rulers, though, were almost as suspicious of political Islam as they were of communism. Suharto himself was a Muslim, but a self-professed practitioner of *kejawen* who used mystic symbolism to rhetorically legitimate his authority (Bourchier 2010: 89). His inner circle consisted primarily of other heterodox Javanese Muslims, as well as Javanese Catholics such as Generals Ali Moertopo and Benny Moerdani—the two most influential military figures during the 1970s and 1980s. All, moreover, were ideologically committed to a distinctly rightist variant of secular nationalism, and were disdainful of both liberal democracy and political Islam (Cammack 2003).

To that end, the “New Order” regime that Suharto built sought to replace the contentious politics of the “Old Order” with a corporatist peace based on *gotong royong*, a cultural concept that literally means “reciprocity” or “harmonious cooperation,” but which had been marshaled by everyone from the Dutch to Sukarno, Masyumi, and the PKI to justify alternatives to democracy or restrictions on civil liberties and independent political organization. The *gotong royong* paradigm, as envisioned by the military, afforded little space for political Islam.

The new regime responded harshly to NU and others who demanded the new government reinstate the Jakarta Charter and implement *sharia* for all Muslim Indonesians. In 1968, Suharto unilaterally reduced NU's representation in the DPR, excluded any Muslim parliamentarians with links to Masyumi, reduced the number of Muslim cabinet ministers, and set about replacing conservative Muslims in the bureaucracy. By 1973, the regime had consolidated all Muslim political parties into the neutered opposition Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP) (Hefner 2000: 91-92). Meanwhile, the PNI and Indonesia's small

religious minority parties were consolidated into the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI). But these were not genuine political parties engaging in free and open competition; rather, they were institutional opposition parties designed to cage opposition to the regime within easily controlled institutions. Neither would be allowed to truly challenge the regime's party, Golkar (functional groups).

Sponsorship and a Split within the Islamic Political Elite during the 1970s and 1980s

For the first time, conservative Muslim voices would be excluded from decision-making at the elite political level, dashing hopes of a return to the Jakarta Charter. Predictably, many Muslim intellectuals felt disenfranchised in the New Order. Responses to that disenfranchisement varied, leading some toward collaboration with the regime, others toward political quiescence, and others still toward resistance. Among the last were a group of ex-Masyumi conservatives, who, after the 1959 dissolution of Masyumi and post-1967 persecution of Masyumi-linked figures in public universities and the civil service, decided to leave politics and form the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for the Propagation of Islam, DDII).³⁵

The purpose of DDII was, as the name implies, to practice *dakwah*—an Islamic term that literally means to “summon” or “invite” to Islam, but in practice denotes religious proselytizing. Practical understandings of *dakwah* in Indonesia tend to emphasize “correcting” the beliefs and practices of heterodox and lapsed Muslims, rather than proselytizing to non-Muslims. In DDII ideology, though, *dakwah* was a political tool used to defend Muslims against “creeping Christianization.” Thus DDII prioritized deploying its preachers to known areas of Christian

³⁵ Mohammad Natsir, the founder of Masyumi, was titular head of DDII.

missionary activity, as well as areas where “heretical” sects, such as the Shia and Ahmadiyah, were conspicuously active (Platzdasch 2009: 38; 230).³⁶ To that end, DDII would make common cause with other conservative, Masyumi-linked *dakwah* organizations, most notably the Komite untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam (Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World, KISDI) and the activist wing of the educational foundation Persatuan Islam (Islamic Unity, Persis) (Platzdasch 2009: 34). These three organizations shared personnel and the ideological goal of protecting Muslims against Christianity, heresy, and “Western” secularism.³⁷ And they shared a tactical repertoire as well—carrying on the Masyumi tradition of operating within the law to advance a social conservative and identity-political vision of “Muslim interests” (Platzdasch 2009: 38-40). Thus the *dakwah* groups would largely abandon the political sphere to concentrate efforts on building a new generation of “right-thinking” Muslims.³⁸

Though Suharto did repress political Islam, he and his inner circle viewed religion as a useful bulwark against leftists and liberals. Thus, in an echo of Snouck’s vision for the Netherlands Indies, the New Order enacted a comprehensive strategy aiming to co-opt and depoliticize Islam, offering incentives to Muslim elites and organizations if they agreed to abandon the Jakarta Charter and accept the Pancasila state.³⁹ Under the New Order, the Indonesian state actively sponsored Muslim religious, cultural, and educational organizations, with the ultimate aim of “capturing” and integrating Muslim interests into a web of corporate

³⁶ During the 1970s and 1980s, DDII evolved into “an Islamist think-tank, missionary organization and publishing house” (Woodward 2001).

³⁷ They also claimed to protect Indonesia from the specter of communism, which did not really exist in Indonesia anymore by this point, but which remained (and remains) an obsession of Masyumi-linked Islamists.

³⁸ This is not unique to Indonesia: as discussed in the introduction, conservative and Islamist groups in Egypt and Turkey, each facing similar modes of repression from military authoritarian regimes, employed similar *dakwah*-based strategies during this period.

³⁹ NU and Muhammadiyah would not officially adopt Pancasila until the 1980s.

institutions that were controlled and regulated by the state bureaucracy (Porter 2002: 75-76). In 1966, the regime made state-certified religious education compulsory for all students, including those enrolled in universities; embarked on an expansive “cultural Islam” program in ex-PKI strongholds, largely but not exclusively focused on religious indoctrination; and enlarged the Ministry of Religious Affairs by almost 60 percent (Emmerson 1978: 95; Hefner 2000: 80).

Despite Masyumi’s advocacy for the Jakarta Charter during the 1950s and 1960s, the regime found willing partners in the modernist organization Muhammadiyah for its “cultural Islam” strategy. Many Muhammadiyah cadres, by 1968, had grown weary of political struggle, as well as the general subordination of religious pursuits to political goals. Among the more conspicuous and influential of these were the young modernist intellectuals of the *pembaruan* (renewal) movement. Led by Nurcholish Madjid, *pembaruan* rejected the political goal of Islamizing the state, and instead sought a return to Muhammadiyah’s foundational mission to provide religious education and social welfare services (Hefner 2000: 96-97).⁴⁰ Though opposed to the regime in intellectual terms, the *pembaruan* faction nevertheless moved the organization toward quiescence, cooperation with the regime, and, ultimately, abandonment of the organization’s long-standing *sharia* advocacy.

NU, meanwhile, suffered as an organization in the early years of the New Order (though a number of affiliated *ulama* cooperated with the regime). In its capacity as a network of *pesantren* (Islamic seminaries) run by traditionalist *ulama*, NU found itself on the losing end of regime efforts to expand and modernize education across the archipelago. Beginning in 1967, the regime expanded religious education within public schools, reducing the need (as perceived by many parents) to send children to *pesantren* for education in Islam. Modernist *madrasahs*, which

⁴⁰ Madjid’s group would serve as the nucleus for the “civil Islamic” movement that would play a key role in the democratic transition of the 1990s.

in Indonesia are day schools run primarily by modernist organizations, also began to adopt the government curriculum for secular subjects, and agreed to limit religious education to 30 percent of curriculum. This made the *madrasah* a viable and arguably more functional alternative to the common practice of sending children to public elementary school before shipping them off to a *pesantren* for strictly religious education (Ricklefs 2012: 155).⁴¹

NU responded to these setbacks by moving closer to Muhammadiyah's pattern of organizational behavior, adopting the state curriculum and regaining state subsidies (which allowed for the modernization of the *pesantren* and greater competitiveness with public schools and *madrasahs*) (Ricklefs 2012: 157). Traditionalists also benefitted greatly from the expansion of the state-run Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies, IAIN) system. Though not officially associated with NU or traditionalist Islam, a large proportion of IAIN postgraduates came from traditionalist backgrounds. Thus the IAIN system helped introduce a generation of traditionalist scholars to "modern" education, greatly aided by a program that sent postgraduates to Western universities. This helped orient a generation of traditionalist Muslims towards the regime's socioeconomic development program (Ricklefs 2012: 157-158). But it also exposed the traditionalist intelligentsia to Western discourses on democracy, liberalism, and human rights—concepts the New Order regime implacably opposed.

Despite the convergences outlined above, Muslim intellectuals remained deeply divided on whether Muslims should (a) continue to advocate for the Jakarta Charter and the Islamic state it implies or (b) accept the Pancasila state as "sufficiently Islamic" and advocate for "Islamic interests" through other means. Muslim intellectuals were further divided on the question of

⁴¹ In Indonesia, *pesantren* refers to a boarding school run by an individual *kyai*; *madrasah* refers to an Islamic day school with a modern curriculum and administrative apparatus.

Indonesia's religious minorities, and specifically, whether they were "guests" of a "Muslim nation," or equal citizens in a pluralist one, and thus deserving of equal rights and protections.

Global trends exacerbated the division. The "third wave" of democratization that began in Portugal in 1974 exposed Indonesians to the possibilities of reform, while demonstrating how religious leaders and organizations might affect that change. Meanwhile, the global Islamic revival (fueled by Saudi petrodollars) raised the prospects of conservative grassroots campaigns to "purify" Indonesian Islam. Indonesian Muslims were also increasingly exposed to a range of Islamic social theory from the Middle East and South Asia, much of which displayed ambivalence towards democracy and minority rights. But the global Islamic revival also exposed Indonesian Muslim intellectuals to more progressive ideas, such as the Islamic neo-modernism of Pakistani-American scholar Fazlur Rahman, whose progressive vision deeply influenced a generation of Muslim intellectuals from NU and Muhammadiyah (A'la 2003).

The influence of these global discourses, coupled with the regime policy of "caging" Islam within legitimate non-governmental institutions, helped push NU and Muhammadiyah away from the pro-*sharia* positions they had adopted in the 1950s and 1960s. Meanwhile, over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the ideas of the *pembaruan* movement took hold in both organizations, evolving into what Hefner (2000: 12-13) calls "civil Islam."⁴² This shift would, in 1984-1985, culminate in the two organizations embracing Pancasila as the "final form" of the Indonesian state and abandoning the dream of the Jakarta Charter once and for all.

⁴² There is a detailed discussion of civil Islam in the introduction to this dissertation. To briefly summarize, civil Islam rejects the idea of an Islamic state and seeks to reformulate Islamic authority from within civil society. It is historically associated with the pro-democracy movement and generally associated with religious and civic pluralism. The categories "civil Islam" and "Muslim progressive" overlap to a significant degree, but are not coterminous.

The Dakwah Movement and Christianity

Statistically speaking, the late 1960s and early 1970s were a growth period for Christianity in Indonesia—almost 2 million Indonesian Muslims converted during this period (Willis 1977: 110). As Hefner (2000: 108) explains, the converts were primarily in Central and East Java, the epicenter of the 1965-1967 anti-communist pogroms. The typical convert was an *abangan* Muslim, who, as a result of previous ties to the PKI, faced continued hostility and suspicion from local *santri*.

Regardless, the conversions alarmed conservative Muslim leaders, who feared a new wave of missionary activity. Such fears were not entirely baseless. In 1967, the Suharto regime organized an interreligious conference to discuss increasingly contentious Muslim-Christian relations, which had produced a spate of church burnings in Aceh in Sulawesi. As Hefner (2000: 108-109) describes:

At the urging of Muslim delegates, the conference formulated a statement of principles affirming that “no religious community will be targeted for the dissemination of religion by another.” Although it looked at first as if all participants in the conference had agreed to the statement, the Protestant delegation ultimately balked. Later they explained that they could not accept the declaration because it is the duty of all Christians to evangelize.

The lack of agreement on interreligious proselytizing fueled conspiracy theories among conservative Muslims. As van Bruinessen (1996: 34) notes, many conservative Muslims—including Natsir and much of the DDII leadership—were convinced that there was a “master plan” to convert all nominal Muslims to Christianity. Thus the DDII sought to directly confront the agents of *kristenisasi* (Christianization), and chose to operate wherever it felt Christian missionary activity was greatest. DDII later expanded activities to include other “fronts” in the defense of Islam, such as Westernization (whose proponents, DDII alleged, included Western-educated “liberals” within the Ministry of Religious Affairs and IAIN) (Hefner 2000: 109-10).

What's more, the DDII's orientation towards conservative theology, its emphasis on a strong and defensive Muslim sociopolitical identity, and its campaigns to purify Islam of heresies, heterodoxies, and the influence of Christian missionaries made it a key recipient of Saudi patronage from the 1970s on (van Bruinessen 2002a).⁴³

Protest and Accommodation: 1972-1984

Though elements of the DDII would later align with the regime, its ideological preoccupations during the 1970s and early 1980s placed it in opposition to the regime, though only passive so. However, while small, it was by no means a fringe organization. Rather, DDII reflected broader concerns about the New Order common among conservative Muslims of that time: that it was too close to Chinese big business, too cozy with the United States (the chief sponsor of Israel), and too tolerant of *kejawen*. And in the more lurid conspiracy theories that disseminated through the conservative underground, Suharto was even said to be captive to a cabal of Catholic generals that were implacably hostile to Islam.

A series of confrontation events with the regime reinforced belief in this alleged conspiracy against Islam. First, there was the creation of the PPP as a defanged opposition party (which was never allowed to crack 30 percent of the vote). This underscored both the regime's authoritarianism and its hostility to political Islam. Second, there was the regime's attempt, in 1973, to pass an amendment to marriage law, which would have allowed for state-sanctioned

⁴³ Natsir would at one point serve as vice-chairman of the World Muslim League, an organization that, after the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis and Iranian Revolution of 1979, became a mechanism for the expansion of Saudi influence among Muslims worldwide. The World Muslim League is cited in any number of "terrorism studies" as generative of radicalism, though the purported link is typically circumstantial. In practice, the World Muslim League prefers to fund conservative organizations close in theology, practice, and worldview to the Saudi state and *ulama*. In Indonesia, these things often (but not always) correlate with hostility to pluralism and religious minorities.

interfaith marriages, and which prompted a walkout by PPP parliamentarians.⁴⁴ Finally, there was its violent response to the Malari Riots of 1974. The riots began as protests, organized by the PPP-linked Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia (Muslim Student Association, HMI), against a visit by the Japanese prime minister.⁴⁵ But a member of Suharto's inner circle, the (Muslim) General Sumitro, also encouraging rioters to direct their anger at his rival, the (Catholic) General Ali Moertopo. In response, Moertopo allegedly deployed provocateurs to manipulate the crowd toward Sinopobic street violence. This, in turn, created a pretext for the regime to violently crush the protests, and for Moertopo to sideline conservative Islam's main patron within Suharto's inner circle (Sidel 2006: 107-10; Bouchier 2014: 178).

In 1977, the regime initiated another crackdown on political Islam, this time using an extremist group, Komando Jihad, as pretext. Though Komando Jihad did exist, involved genuine radicals, and committed several acts of terrorism (including one airplane hijacking), it also appears to have been manipulated by military intelligence. Members of the organization later claimed that military intelligence had approached them about creating a "united front" against communism; in reality, it was a "false flag" operation designed to create pretext for yet another clampdown on political Islam (van Bruinessen 2002; Hadiz 2008).⁴⁶

⁴⁴ The regime eventually scrapped the proposed amendment, but nevertheless engendered hostility from conservative Muslims in the process.

⁴⁵ HMI had a long history of involvement with conservative causes, and the especially anti-communist movement prior to 1965.

⁴⁶ Members of Komando Jihad specifically claim that military intelligence approached known Islamists, including Darul Islam veterans, and encouraged them to join the organization as part of an anti-communist alliance. Then, after Komando Jihad engaged in a series of actions against its perceived enemies, the military began arresting its members for sedition. While plausible, the fact is that much of this incident remains shrouded in mystery, and these claims are consequently difficult to verify. What's more, Komando Jihad also appears to have been a legitimately radical group, which included a number of committed anti-regime activists among its membership rolls (such as the future founders of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir).

The Komando Jihad incident, as it was known in the press of the time, culminated in an extensive crackdown on Islamists, and a renewed effort by the regime to delineate approved from unapproved Islamic activity. Since 1978, the regime had expanded an ideological “upgrading” (i.e. indoctrination) program called P4.⁴⁷ By 1984, the P4 program had already “upgraded” the civil service and university student bodies, and now cast its eye on “upgrading” the *ulama*, Catholic priests, Protestant ministers, and Balinese religious officers (Weatherbee 1985). P4, however, alarmed religious leaders. Through a joint statement, Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, and Buddhist councils pleaded with Suharto to allow religious organizations to remain religious in nature. Suharto, though, rejected the idea, instead calling for all Indonesian organizations to accept Pancasila as their *asas tunggal* (sole basis) of organization (Friend 2003: 190).

For Muslim organizations, accepting the doctrine of *asas tunggal* (i.e. officially declaring Pancasila to be the “sole basis” of the organization in question) also entailed rejecting the Jakarta Charter and giving up on the goal of implementing *sharia* for Muslim Indonesians. Organizations that failed to comply would face a series of sanctions ranging from an end to state subsidies and loss of autonomy to outright banning. From all accounts, the pressure to comply was intense, and contributed to a deepening of the ideological divisions within orthodox Islam that were already evident in the 1970s. The institutional voices of Islam complied: NU in 1983, after making the decision to withdraw from the PPP; the PPP itself in 1984; and Muhammadiyah in 1985. As Ricklefs (2012: 225) argues, the principal effect of the move was to broaden and deepen collaboration between mainstream Muslim organizations and the state, including a vast increase in state sponsorship for the modernization and expansion of Islamic education run by

⁴⁷ *Pedoman, Penghayatan dan Pengalaman Pancasila* (Guidelines for Instilling Commitment to and Implementing Pancasila).

these organizations, as well as allowing more space for their efforts to socioculturally Islamize heterodox Muslims (c.f. Hefner 1987).

Meanwhile, some conservative groups continued to resist what they saw as an increasingly overbearing and hostile state. On September 12, 1984, approximately 1,500 Muslim men gathered in North Jakarta's port area of Tanjung Priok to protest the police removing anti-regime posters from the walls of the As Sa'adah mosque. Tanjung Priok was a very poor area, where longshoremen endured long hours, backbreaking labor, and stifling heat for extremely low wages. As Friend (2003) describes, "at the urging of lay preachers and street-corner demagogues, this vulnerable group found a noble and uplifting goal in the defense of Islam against the infidels, thieves, and tyrants who ran the nation in defiance of Allah's holy laws (190)." After a botched attempt by security forces to remove the poster, and the arrest of the mosque's Imam, a crowd formed to demand his release. Security forces responded with predictable violence, advancing on the protesters while blocking escape routes to the rear with armored personnel carriers and trucks. Soldiers fired on the crowd, killing anywhere from eighteen to more than a hundred protesters, depending on the source; the protest leader, a former student activist named Amir Bikri, was shot and then bayoneted (Weatherbee 1985; Friend 2003: 190-1; Hadiz 2008).

Though the Tanjung Priok protests were doubtlessly connected to the deleterious social and labor conditions of the port area, the protests more directly reflected *political* frustrations with a regime that appeared hostile to Islam, with crowds agitated, in part, by a sermon against Pancasila that was delivered on September 12 (the day of the riots) at the As Saadah mosque. Conservative Muslims felt that they had helped bring the New Order to power and had provided the muscle and done the dirty work in its crusade against communism—yet had been locked out of power. Making matters worse, they were now expected to renounce their long-held goals and

aspirations. The regime's heavy-handed response only seemed to confirm the validity of these grievances, leading a violent fringe of the conservative milieu to target several Jakarta enterprises associated with prominent ethnic Chinese and Christian Indonesians, as well as the historical Borobudur Temple in Central Java (Hadiz 2008). Suharto, in turn, vowed to "wipe out terrorism" in Indonesia.

While the Tanjung Priok massacre invited criticism from across the Muslim political spectrum, mainstream Muslim organizations continued to move closer to the regime. This was particularly notable with regards NU, whose exit from PPP and subsequent adoption of *asas tunggal* served the regime's aim to "divide-and-conquer" political Islam. By barring NU officials from association with PPP, NU created incentives for its officials to associate with the regime party Golkar (and to a lesser degree, with the institutional secular opposition party PDI). The split with the PPP also signaled to the regime that NU was no longer opposed to the Pancasila state in principle. This, in turn, encouraged bureaucrats and military officers from NU backgrounds to stop hiding or downplaying their association with the organization (Bush 2009: 81). Material rewards soon followed, including a four-fold increase in government subsidies for NU schools in its stronghold of East Java during the years 1984-1991 (Feillard 1999: 307).

This occurred at a time of a general reorientation of the organization's priorities, shifting focus and resources from providing religious services and giving "moral guidance" to the classic civil society role of providing general educational and social welfare services and building a "stable, self-sufficient, educated, and strong citizenry" (Bush 2009: 82). This, in turn, led to a flurry of activity among younger cadres. As Ricklefs (2012: 228) notes: "young activists, who helped to inspire, and were in turn further inspired by, this re-envisioning of NU as primarily a

socio-religious organization, began setting up organizations which collectively promoted a more open, tolerant and indeed modern version of Islam.”

At the center of NU’s transformation stood Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur. Wahid came from an illustrious family: he was the grandson of NU founder Hasyim Ansryari and Bisri Syansuri, the first Indonesian ulama to provide formal Islamic education for women (Barton 2002: 38-40). His father, Abdul Wahid Hasyim, was a former Minister of Religion under Sukarno. Wahid, though, did not participate in NU administration until 1978. Yet when he did join the organization’s *syuriah* (governing council), he brought with him experience as a foreign-educated scholar of Islam, journalist, university lecturer, and activist within the Lembaga Penelitian Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi Sosial (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education, and Information, LP3ES), a Ford Foundation-funded think-tank that served as a gathering point for progressive-minded intellectuals (Barton 2002: 103-112).

Wahid was deeply influenced by these experiences, as well as by the neomodernism of Nurcholish Madjid and his discipline, Ahmad Syafi Maarif, who had laid the intellectual groundwork for Muhammadiyah’s retreat from politics and subsequent transformation into social services provider and corporate partner of the state. Madjid and Maarif were both students of Fazlur Rahman, the intellectual godfather of modern Islamic liberalism, and adopted Rahman’s anti-legalistic view of Islam, in which the Qu’ran serves less as a “house for *sharia*” than as an “ethical guide for relationships between human beings” (Burhani 2013b). In Wahid they would find a kindred spirit and fellow traveler, who would oversee the implementation of the *Kembali ke Kittah 1926* (Return to the Spirit/Charter of 1926), a program developed in the previous year,

which charted NU's exit from politics, its acceptance of *asas tunggal*, and "return" to its original *raison d'être* as a socio-educational organization (Barton 1997; Bush 2009).⁴⁸

The regime welcomed Wahid's ascendency to the NU chairmanship in 1984; despite his progressive leanings, the regime saw Wahid as a "positive agent of change" and "moderate, modern Muslim leader who could bring the *umat* into the late modern age" (Barton 1997).⁴⁹ But just as the Tanjung Priok incident presaged the crystallization of a newly assertive conservative Muslim politics, so too did Wahid's ascension to the NU chairmanship presage the development of an increasingly vocal, civil Islamic critique of military authoritarianism—a critique that would eventually coalesce as a call for democratization, and which would provide an essential Islamic legitimization of religious pluralism.

The Fragmentation of the New Order: 1985-1998

By the mid-1980s, however, a clear pattern had emerged, wherein the regime provided material incentives to any Islamic organization that stayed within the non-political domains of religious services, education and social welfare, while repressing any specifically political expression of Islam—and especially those deemed hostile to Pancasila and Indonesia's formal system of religious pluralism (which, as described above, emerged from Pancasila and is viewed by Indonesians as inseparable from Pancasila). An internal split within the regime, however, would lead Suharto to seek a new power base beyond the officer corps—and specifically, with

⁴⁸ "Return" is placed in quotation marks to note that this was, strictly speaking, rhetorical. As described above, NU wasn't just returning to a previous mode of operation, but also starting several new ventures; and it wasn't quite abandoning politics either, as will be clear in the discussion of 1985-1998. It was, however, framing its action as a "return" to its foundations, and thus also framing its previous political (and especially pro-*sharia*) activism as a distraction from the organization's "true cause."

⁴⁹ *Umat* is an alternate, Indonesian transliteration of *ummah*, or "community of Muslims."

the conservative Muslims his regime had marginalized and harassed through the first twenty years of his rule.

During the late 1960s and 1970s, military power defined the New Order. But with economic growth and institutional differentiation, Suharto began relying more and more on civilian bureaucrats to set the regime's policy agenda. Meanwhile, many of the lucrative development contracts that had previously gone to military cronies now went to members of Suharto's family. The military resented being turned into an instrument for carrying out policies it had no hand in crafting, and which it did not benefit from as it had in past years (Aspinall 2005: 32-3).

Military frustrations with the perceived loss of authority crystallized around the person of General L. B. "Benny" Moerdani. During the 1970s, Moerdani had built military intelligence into a far-reaching and highly effective repressive apparatus; in 1983, he was made commander of all military forces. It was from this vantage point that, in 1987, Moerdani began publicly pressing for changes, calling for the professionalization of the military, more openness in society, and even suggesting Suharto eventually step down (Bertrand 1996).⁵⁰ Suharto clearly feared the threat Moerdani represented, but equally understood the risks of too direct a confrontation. Thus, in 1988, he installed his one-time protégé as defense minister—a prestigious position but one that limited Moerdani's direct influence within the military (Liddle 1996; Aspinall 2005: 33). Suharto then embarked on a purge of officers close to Moerdani, shifting them to unimportant positions or forcing retirement. Junior officers outside Moerdani's circles were rapidly promoted;

⁵⁰ It is widely understood that, by "professionalization," Moerdani meant "autonomy from manipulation by Suharto and other regime insiders."

those deemed “politically reliable” quickly found themselves in high-level administrative positions (Liddle 1996).⁵¹

More importantly, the power struggle between Suharto and Moerdani initiated a dramatic shift in the regime’s, and especially the military’s, relationship to orthodox (and especially conservative) Muslim groups. Moerdani represented an old guard of military officers—antidemocratic, but decidedly secular nationalist in orientation and hostile to any political manifestation of ethnic, religious, racial, or “social group” politics (lumped together in the acronym and New Order buzzword SARA). Like Suharto, many were *abangan* Muslims with affinities for *kejawen*; like Moerdani and his predecessor Ali Moertopo, a disproportionate number were Catholics. Younger officers who entered adulthood after the crises of the 1960s were less likely to fixate on communism and political Islam as existential threats to the state, and more likely to come from *santri* backgrounds. Rising stars like Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto were not Islamists by any stretch of the imagination, but they did not reflexively view Islam as something to be “caged” either. Rather, with echoes of 1965 and 1974, they saw Islam as a potential resource that, if deployed correctly, could help them supplant the military’s old guard. As Mietzner (2009: 100) describes, military leaders cultivated support among civilian groups, including conservative Muslim ones, in order to demonstrate to Suharto that they had the capacity to mobilize large numbers of civilians in support of the regime. Alliances between military officers and conservative Muslim groups expanded after Suharto’s split with Moerdani, as officers rushed to display loyalty to the regime by embracing its strategic pivot to Islam.⁵²

⁵¹ Moerdani would continue to exert influence for some time, though his power began to wane from this point forward.

⁵² As Mietzner (2009: 100) notes, the first beneficiaries of patronage from military officers were conservative modernist groups like DDII and KISDI. Other officers, however, cultivated ties with traditionalist groups, like NU’s youth organization Ansor and its paramilitary wing Banser.

The All-Indonesian Association and Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI)

Muslim activists from across the political spectrum sensed opportunity, ramping up activity in the country's three political parties and creating new organizations with more explicitly political agenda (Hefner 2000: 79-93; Sidel 2006: 61). Arguably the most important new institution, though, came from the regime itself. The Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (All-Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, ICMI) was created in 1990, ostensibly as a broad-based association to represent the interests of Muslim intellectuals and civil servants (Hefner 1993; Ramage 1995: 90-101). Suharto, though, envisioned ICMI as a mechanism through which to bring Islamic critics of the regime into the fold, while producing a generation of regime-oriented Muslim civil servants (Hefner 2000: 128-138; Aspinall 2005: 56; Sidel 2006: 61-7). That is to say, while ICMI served to entrench and expand privileges for specifically orthodox Muslims (to an unprecedented degree in post-1945 Indonesia), it was only allowed to do so because it was seen as furthering the political interests of the regime and its military-authoritarian leadership (and running counter to those of its former allies and current rivals).

Suharto's strategy of co-opting Islam by presenting himself as its champion followed from the example of Indonesia's neighbor to the north, Malaysia, where the government combined increasing sponsorship and privileging of conservative Islam with economic preferences for ethnic Malay Muslims (Siddique and Suryadinata 1982; Daniels 2005: 80-96). In Malaysia, this pivot to Islam took place alongside a massive and largely successful economic modernization program centered on the development of a domestic semiconductor industry, fused with the increasing authoritarianism of President Mahathir Mohamad. Malaysia's fusion of

Others still saw limits to Suharto's "greening" strategy, and so backed nationalist groups, like the Pemuda Pancasila.

technocratic development and top-down Islamization particularly appealed to Suharto lieutenant B. J. Habibie, who as Minister of Technology was the leading proponent of capital-heavy, state-subsidized industrialization (Hefner 2000: 133).⁵³

Habibie's capital-intensive economic ventures were economically suspect, but the notion of creating First World industry, as in Malaysia, appealed to Suharto, the self-proclaimed "Father of Development." However, the pious Habibie was also attracted to Malaysia's Islamic paternalism, and their emphasis on using state patronage to build a "pious" Muslim middle class. He created ICMI as a mechanism for enlarging the Muslim middle classes, both out of conviction and to build a base of support for the regime (Feillard and Madinier 2011: 46-7).

ICMI was not a religious organization, per se. The bulk of its leaders came from civil service backgrounds; many were decidedly uninterested in religious matters. However, civil Islamic intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, prominent NGO activist Dawam Rahardjo, and Muhammadiyah Vice-Chairman Amien Rais embraced the organization, hoping they might steer ICMI in a reformist direction (Aspinall 2005: 56-7). But Habibie kept tight control on the organization, ensuring that ICMI served (rather than undermined) the regime's goals. As Aspinall (2005: 57) writes, "in the language of Islamic neomodernism, [ICMI conservatives] argued that ICMI assisted the goal of establishing an "Islamic society" (rather than an "Islamic state") and was an extension of the Islamic renewal, which had been visible in society for over a decade." Others argued that ICMI existed to ensure that Muslims were proportionately represented in the bureaucracy and capitalist classes, while a minority claimed the organization existed to "Islamicize" or even "de-Christianize" the state.

⁵³ An engineer by training, Habibie dreamed of turning Indonesia into a leading producer of airplanes for the global market

Many of ICMI's pro-reform intellectuals also shared many aspects of this worldview—particularly the notion that a more devout society would be a more prosperous and just society. Rais also shared Habibie's concern with the welfare of Muslims in regions where they were in the minority, as well as his goal of building up a solid Muslim middle class (many of whom, presumably, would be or join Muhammadiyah). Thus it was with considerable support from ICMI's "left" wing that the organization began a campaign in regions traditionally dominated by non-Muslims to increase the representation (and political power) of local Muslims.

Though the organization did improve the prospects of Muslims in areas where they were historically underrepresented, ICMI's efforts also stimulated resentments and anxieties among non-Muslims in areas of traditional dominance, and did not come with concurrent effort to uplift non-Muslims facing similar conditions. For many Christians and other non-Muslims, ICMI's activities raised the specter of their marginalization within Indonesia.

Sinophobia and "Anti-Muslim" Conspiracies

The "greening" of Suharto's inner circle fed a convergence of religious and ethnic antipathies, coalescing on the ethnic Chinese—who, in Indonesia, are also predominantly Christian. As described above, tensions between Chinese and Muslim Indonesian traders dated back to the pre-independence days of the *kongsi* and Sarekat Islam. Though the wave of Sinophobia that gripped Indonesia in the late 1980s and worsened through the decade of the 1990s was, in nearly every way possible, the outcome of political manipulation, there was nevertheless a history and traditional set of prejudices to be tapped into.

Ethnic Chinese in late New Order Indonesia occupied a similar social-spatial position as Jews in pre-war East-Central Europe: "essential outsiders" tasked with fulfilling economic

functions locals find distasteful or are otherwise unable to engage in, yet who are simultaneously resented for economic gains gleaned from the practices; who both separate themselves and are excluded from the majority; and who, in periods of economic crisis, are politically vulnerable to scapegoating by ethnopolitical entrepreneurs (Reid 1997; Brubaker et al 2006: 103-105). Indeed, the historical segregation and economic differentiation of Chinese from *pribumi* (indigenous) Indonesians gave capital a “Chinese face,” to use the oft-quoted maxim. This, in turn, made the Chinese convenient scapegoats for “intrusions of the market economy” (Sidel 2001b: 51; c.f. Bertrand 2004: 59-65).⁵⁴

Though Suharto’s development schemes were reliant on a small number of Chinese tycoons, most Chinese suffered under the New Order. Since the 1970s, the regime had imposed credit restrictions on Chinese-Indonesian citizens. Many traditional Chinese religious and cultural expressions were also forbidden, while the government restricted the entry of Chinese Indonesians into the civil service and military. In 1979, all ethnic Chinese had to officially re-register, in order to be given new identification cards that marked their ethnicity (Bertrand 2004: 66-67).⁵⁵ These policies, which aimed to reduce the “Chinese-ness” of Chinese Indonesians, had the secondary effect of encouraging ethnic Chinese to associate more strongly with Christianity. This was a satisfactory outcome for the regime, which liked to work through established religious institutions in order to control the population. But for a subset of conservative Muslims,

⁵⁴ In Bertrand’s (2004: 59) words, anti-Chinese antipathies (and violence) “had its roots in the recurring institutionalization of exclusion,” as the Chinese were “singled out as outsiders, non-Indonesians, non-*asli*, non-*pribumi*.” This process began with the Dutch racial system, in which different “races” were given different economic roles. Two cleavages emerged: one between ‘Chinese’ and “*pribumi*,” and another between “*peranakan*” (Javanized or assimilated) and “*totok*” (non-Javanized or non-assimilated) Chinese. Throughout the post-independence period, Indonesia would adopt a series of conflicting citizenship laws, but which by and large allowed for the assimilation of *peranakan* Chinese and the exclusion of *totok* Chinese (Bertrand 2004: 59-65).

⁵⁵ Notably, they were the only group required to display these markers

who were as Christianophobic as they were Sinophobic, it created equivalence between “Chinese” and “Christian” interests.

Compounding matters, prior to the split with Moerdani, ethnic Chinese had been disproportionately represented among the small group of industrialists enriched by the New Order’s development schemes. Though not ethnic Chinese themselves, Moertopo and Moerdani had also supported the establishment of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) as a policy-incubator modeled after the U.S. RAND Corporation. The leading voices in CSIS—Hadi Soesastro and the Wanandi brothers—were all ethnic Chinese, as well as Catholics like Moerdani. Ideologically, of course, CSIS served as a mouthpiece for the military’s old guard of secular nationalists, like Moerdani, rather than any definable “Chinese” or “Catholic” interests. The charge of Catholic particularism was particularly absurd, given the extent of violence and deprivation Moerdani’s pacification campaign inflicted upon Catholic East Timor after its occupation in 1975. Nevertheless, conservative Muslims widely perceived the organization as both a vehicle for Chinese big business and the Catholic Moerdani’s political ambitions. Thus, when Suharto perceived CSIS as backing Moerdani in a 1993 power play over the vice presidency, he began mobilizing Muslim conservatives against the organization. Soon rumors spread that the organization stood at the center of a grand Chinese- and Catholic-directed conspiracy to undermine the state’s “Islamic turn.”

Fractionalization and Decay of the Regime

Indonesia’s long transition from the authoritarian New Order to political democracy and *reformasi* (reform) began with the regime’s fractionalization. Increasingly, major civilian and military figures looked to build alliances that would both improve their position in the ongoing

competition for patronage and prepare them for the long game of succession. While New Order insiders rarely aimed to reform the state, they were often willing to ally with organizations and activists who did—including those critical of the regime and military, and very much including the conservative Islamic groups the regime had repressed since 1967.

Military officers in particular began scrambling for political clients. Suharto's gambit against Moerdani had introduced multiple cleavages into the military, including one separating the old guard "1945 generation" from younger, often ambitious officers trained in military academies; and another dividing Muslim nationalist "green" and secular-nationalist "red and white" officers (Robinson 2001). Lacking sufficient power bases within the military, officers sought out activists and organizations that could provide them with a "street presence." As a result, regime critics, including Islamists, could now exchange their support for military patronage (provided, of course, that they did not go too far in their criticisms of the state). Meanwhile, by 1989 the military was involved in three distinct counterinsurgency campaigns—in East Timor, Aceh and West Papua—where individual generals built up complex, independent financial and political networks (Robinson 2001: 229).⁵⁶ Aspirant generals like Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, both of whom would figure prominently in the 1997-1998 crisis of succession, were thus able to mobilize considerable resources as they jockeyed for position.

Some regime insiders also began to see opportunity in advocating for limited reforms—a ploy, to be sure, but one that emboldened genuine critics of the regime (Mietzner 2009: 35). After a dramatic increase in student protests in 1988, "numerous intellectuals, retired military officers, and other commentators argued in the media that such protests were a sign that official

⁵⁶ This was not a break from past tradition, but rather than extension and amplification of it; the military's "territorial structure" had long allowed both the military as an institution and individual officers to build up economic and local-political interests.

institutions had become too inflexible to adequately reflect popular aspirations” (Aspinall 2005: 35). Such a thing would have been nearly unimaginable even half a decade prior; now the fragmentation of the regime and construction of multiple, rival civilian-military alliances had fundamentally altered the political opportunity structure for regime insiders and outsiders alike. There were clear incentives for insiders to embrace populism, including “Islamic populism,” while outsiders could now offer support for an insider’s aspirations—typically in the form of “street pressure”—in exchange for patronage and political protection. The new political environment, simply put, allowed for much more expansive (and emphatic) critiques of the regime than had previously been allowed, and allowed them to enter the mainstream.

“Cultural” Islamization

By 1988, the regime was in an advanced state of fragmentation. As described above, this involved both the political rehabilitation of conservative Islam and the emboldening of regime critics, including from the ideological perspective of civil Islam. At the same time, Indonesian society was growing more outwardly religious, a development facilitated by state policies that had, since 1967, demarcated religious “cultural spaces” as the exclusive domain of tolerated religious groups. As a result, by the 1980s both conservative and liberal Muslims were already heavily invested in *dakwah* and the related fields of religious education and social services. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, the “cultural spaces” granted to religion greatly expanded. This was partially attributable to NU, Muhammadiyah, and PPP accepting *asas tunggal* (signaling their acceptance of Indonesia as a secular nationalist state). Regime patronage of these favored organizations rose sharply—leaving Muhammadiyah and NU flush with capital for new schools, clinics, publications, and so forth—while the threat of suppression declined.

But the relaxing of regime controls, as well as Suharto's desire to cultivate support among Muslim conservatives, also provided opportunities for new agents of sociocultural Islamization as well. Unlike the previous generation of *dakwah* activists, who had "retreated" from formal politics but whose *raison d'être* was still highly political in nature, many of these new groups appeared genuinely uninterested by politics. The Muslim "televangelists" who emerged in the 1980s and 1990s are an important example of this emergent pietism—which was largely unconcerned with politics—and of its rising importance in Indonesian society. As Howell (2008: 40-2) describes, Muslim preachers, or *dai*, often promoted the emotive, meditative, and mystical approaches to Islam commonly associated with *tasawwuf*—a primarily Sufi tradition that emphasizes "love," "beauty," inner peace, and the "purification of the heart." Though shunned by modernist and traditionalist *ulama*, who claimed that *tasawwuf* encouraged "violations of the core doctrine of the oneness of God through excessive adulation of masters (*syekh*)," the devotional approach and self-improvement focus of televised mysticism appealed to broad segments of Indonesian Muslim society, and especially to women faced with the anomie of urban life (ibid 40).⁵⁷ The televised preachers who emerged in the 1980s and 1990s thus were able to introduce ascetic Sufi practices to the middle-classes, allowing for the integration of supererogatory prayers and fasting into the daily routines of millions of Muslims.

The rise of televised preachers both reflected and presaged a more general diffusion of authority in Islam, as well as the rise of new (and revived) interpretations of the faith. This was fueled by information technology, such as the 1988 deregulation of the state television monopoly, which allowed for private broadcast networks. Many of these new networks quickly recognized an "Islamic audience" that wasn't being catered to by public television (Barkin

⁵⁷ In this sense, the appeal of *tasawwuf* has parallels to that of yoga or Qabbalah in Western societies.

2014). Yet the rise of televised preachers was equally emblematic of Islam's heightened visibility in public life, as exemplified by the rise of Islamic modes of dress.

In the late Suharto-era period, the *jilbab* (Islamic headscarf) began to grow popular—particularly among female university students (Smith-Hefner 2007). From the university, the *jilbab* spread through the “pious middle classes” cultivated by Suharto as an alternative base of support to the military, and represented by the new, quasi-official institutions ICMI and MUI (Hefner 2000; Sidel 2006). The popularity of the *jilbab* has not abated since the onset of democratization in 1998. Rather, it has expanded greatly, a development that both reflects and helps constitute the Islamization of the public sphere (Rinaldo 2010; 2013). Similar trends are evident among men in the realm of dress and grooming (in the cultivation of untrimmed beards), albeit to a more limited degree. As with televised preachers, trends toward Islamic dress and grooming did not necessarily indicate a shift among Indonesian Muslims toward political Islam, but rather indicated an increased concern with spirituality among some, and an increased desire to be seen as spiritual among others (actualized through the public consumption of Islamic goods and services without necessarily widening or deepening religious practices) (Fealy 2008). At the same time, the rise in Islamic piety did expand the audience for Islam-based appeals for reform, particularly those that articulated these appeals in generalized moral terms (referencing Islamic egalitarianism and the “spirit” of *sharia*, speaking out against corruption and “ill-gotten gains,” or advocating the interests of the Muslim community without abrogating the interests of others). And it intensified demands for a state that did not restrict the free practice of Islam. What it did not do, however, is coalesce around a specific sociopolitical vision of Islam's relationship to state and society, as witnessed in Turkey, Tunisia, or Egypt (ever so briefly).⁵⁸

⁵⁸ These cases are discussed in detail in the introduction to this dissertation.

The Long Transition: 1994-2004

In a social context of heightened Islamic religiosity and sociocultural identification, and in a political context of regime fragmentation, it is perhaps unsurprising that Muslim actors and organizations would play prominent roles on both sides of the emerging conflict over who ran Indonesia. Before the crisis emerged at the political center, though, it began to show itself in the periphery of Eastern Indonesia and rural Java.

Conflict and Violence in the Periphery: 1994-1995

In 1994, ethnic Timorese Catholics rioted in Dili, the capital of what was then the province of East Timor. Rioters targeted market stalls owned by in-migrants, many of whom were ethnic Bugis Muslims, and as such, were both ethnically and religiously differentiated from the rioters. Contemporary observers tended to interpret the riot either as a reaction to economic encroachment by migrants or as displaced aggression towards a state viewed by many locals as a foreign occupier, and whose military had, only three years prior, massacred some 270 peaceful protesters.⁵⁹ The rioters, however, attacked mosques and *musholla* (prayer rooms) as well as merchant stalls and shops (Bertrand 2004: 94-95). A wave of anti-migrant rioting soon began to cascade across the heavily Catholic province of East Nusa Tenggara.

Most of these riots were precipitated by rumors that a Muslim (or, in a few cases, a Protestant) in-migrant had committed “host desecration” (desecration of the Holy Communion),

⁵⁹ The incident, which came to be known as the Santa Cruz massacre, was caught on camera by a British photographer and became deeply embarrassing to the Indonesian government. Robinson (2009: 66-69) argues that the Santa Cruz massacre, coming at a time of heightened international concern with human rights, represents a watershed moment in Indonesia’s relationship to its restive province.

anger at which then devolved into a more generalized attack on property associated with the migrant presence—market stalls, small shops, mosques, *musholla*, and other religious or ethnic structures (Bertrand 2004: 96-97). As such, these riots reflected two sets of crosscutting resentments: (1) deep-seated resentments on the part of local Catholics in Eastern Indonesia towards economic encroachment by ethnically and religiously differentiated “outsiders,” both in the markets and the civil service, and the perceived preference of public officials and policy for the “outsiders;” and (2) equally deep-seated resentment toward a state experienced primarily through corrupt and intermittently violent institutions, whose local representatives were disproportionately Javanese and Muslim (Bertrand 2004: 98).

In 1995, a second series of riots broke out in Central and East Java, this time targeting ethnic Chinese Protestants (and Catholics).⁶⁰ As discussed above, ethnic Chinese have long been treated as outsiders, whether by the Dutch colonial regime or the New Order. Chinese big business, however, flourished in both periods, an outgrowth of successfully mobilized networks, cultural premiums on trade and entrepreneurship (reflected, of course, in a number of other cultural traditions in Indonesia), and because ethnic Chinese were historically locked out of other avenues for advancement. Most Indonesian Chinese in 1995 were not wealthy by any stretch of the imagination; nevertheless, the overrepresentation of ethnic Chinese among the capitalist classes ethnicized resentments over the lack of socioeconomic mobility in late New Order Indonesia (Sidel 2006: 51-2).⁶¹ These sentiments were particularly acute in the Javanese countryside, where the association between “Chinese” and “Christian” meant that problems with the Chinese were interpreted as problems with Christians, and vice versa.

⁶⁰ There were anti-Chinese riots in other parts of Indonesia at the time, but they clearly cluster in these two provinces.

⁶¹ There was, as Bertrand (2004: 66) notes, “a widespread public perception held that Chinese Indonesians dominated 70% of Indonesia’s economy, despite the absence of clear evidence.”

Like the anti-migrant riots in East Timor and on Flores, anti-Chinese rioting in East and Central Java typically began with a trade dispute or rumor of a religious-based insult (the abuse of Islamic figures, desecration of the Quran, or another form of “blasphemy”). In many cases, though, these precipitating events were also preceded by the distribution of anonymous letters or leaflets framing new local churches as part of a conspiracy to undermine Islam and Christianize the area (Sidel 2006: 56). Crowds formed to express frustration at the lack of state action to counter these alleged conspiracies, after which point they typically degenerated into wholesale attacks on property, including churches popular with ethnic Chinese.⁶²

The rioting that spread across the archipelago during the years 1994-1996 was undeniably tied to economic grievances—including but not limited to contests over coveted employment in the civil service, disputes among small farmers and peddlers, as well as more structured labor disputes in larger batik and agricultural concerns. As Sidel (2006: 52-53) suggests, they also reflected “community protest against the intrusions of market and state.” But the rioting, whether anti-Chinese or anti-migrant, was also religiously ascriptive, and explicitly framed as “retribution” for some assuredly grave insult to the honor of the local religious majority and as a defense of the faith against the incursions of an aggressive rival.⁶³ It was thus undoubtedly tied to the broader political project of reimagining Indonesia as a Muslim nation, in which the interests of orthodox Muslims would be considered first and foremost above all others.

⁶² Chinese were also collateral victims in 1997 election violence in Pekalongan, Central Java and Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan (Purdey 2006: 77), as well as Makassar, South Sulawesi (Sidel 2006: 68-105)

⁶³ Ethnic and “indigenist” ascription also factored into the rioting. As I have argued elsewhere, rioters during these events tended to express these kind of mixed antipathies; in cases where rioting led to longer-term sequences of violence, these antipathies coalesced along whichever cleavage (ethnic or religious) was more deeply institutionalized locally (G. Brown 2014).

Escalating Conservative Violence and the Crystallization of Civil Islam: 1996-1997

One of the worst incidents of anti-Chinese violence occurred on October 10, 1996 in the NU stronghold of Situbondo, East Java. The riot, which claimed five lives and resulted in the destruction of more than twenty-five churches and Christian schools, followed a pattern similar to that of the riots described above: an “insult” to Islam (though in this case from a heterodox Muslim, not a Christian) and the formation of an agitated crowd, which then engaged in generalized attacks on Chinese and Christian property (Hefner 2000: 190-1). Considering both timing and location (in the East Javanese seat of NU power), the Situbondo riot appeared staged to many observers, a ploy to publicly embarrass and isolate NU’s progressive chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid.⁶⁴

Wahid’s reformist tendencies had long put him at odds with the regime, but a coexistence of sorts had emerged in the 1980s. In a widely read 1987 editorial in the national daily *Kompas*, Wahid had called for NU to play the classic civil society role of watchdog in order to ensure that the state did not abuse its powers (Wahid 1987). The appeal, though indicative of Wahid’s civil Islamic tendencies, was abstracted from any tangible criticism of the regime, as Wahid was still careful not to antagonize Suharto. By 1996, however, Wahid had become of the regime’s most vocal critics. He explicitly called for freedom of speech and rule of law by a government institutionally separated into autonomous executive, legislative, and judiciary components, both anathema to the New Order way of conducting business (Bush 2009: 91).

The growing calls for reform, both from Wahid and other regime critics—coming at a time of ethnoreligious disturbances, intra-regime factionalism, and popular disgust with the public behavior and financial dealings of Suharto’s family—evidently made Suharto feel more

⁶⁴ Andre Feillard (2000) outlines this argument in an op-ed for *The Jakarta Post*.

vulnerable than he had in years. In 1996, the powerful repressive apparatus of the regime began to mobilize against his public opponents, starting with a forced ouster of the popular leader of the institutional opposition Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI), Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of former president Sukarno, was a key ally of Wahid and was especially popular in the NU strongholds of East and Central Java (Hefner 1997).⁶⁵ Thus the operation against the PDI also set the state against the progressive NU leadership.

Military intelligence began a covert operation to force PDI to hold a national congress, advocated within the party by a faction loyal to, or at least manipulable by, the regime. The congress convened in June over the protests of Megawati supporters. Wahid accompanied Megawati to the Congress, both as a demonstration of support and to project strength in the case of military action. The congress proceeded without issue; emboldened, Megawati supporters expanded their anti-government activities, holding rallies in cities across Indonesia and establishing a “free speech forum,” in which pro-democracy NGOs and activists voiced their criticisms of the regime. Suharto, military officers, and the regime’s chief partisan within PDI, Suryadi, began issuing ominous statements about the “free speech forum,” insinuating ties to Marxism and G30S, a threadbare attempt to isolate Megawati’s PDI faction from Wahid’s NU and other Muslim allies (Eklöf 1999: 34-41; Hefner 2000: 175).⁶⁶ And on the morning of July

⁶⁵ Suharto feared that Megawati’s popularity might lead to an embarrassing electoral defeat for Golkar in the PDI strongholds of Central and East Java (Hefner 1997). PDI supporters, furthermore, had recently staged a number of large and visible rallies in the capital and elsewhere. Suharto likely concluded that a show of force was needed to demonstrate that the regime was still in control.

⁶⁶ The regime’s attempt to link the PDI of 1999 to the PKI of 1965 was strategic rather than ideological: NU had been one of the major organizations implicated in the anti-communist violence of 1965-7; Suharto and his allies thus sought to seed discontent within NU toward the alliance with the PDI (Hefner 2000: 175).

27, 1996, a combination of riot police and auxiliaries (who were suspected of being off duty soldiers) stormed PDI headquarters (Eklöf 1999: 41-2)

In the immediate aftermath of the brutal attack, which had resulted in 5 deaths, 23 disappearances, and many more injuries, NU activists feared that Wahid would be next. The regime had, after all, unsuccessfully attempted a similar palace coup against Wahid in 1994 (Hefner 2000: 172-4). NU activists with contacts within the regime brokered a rapprochement, leading to Wahid's official endorsement of Suharto in the upcoming 1997 elections. This was a purely symbolic act, given that Suharto ran unopposed, but it nevertheless signaled to the regime that Wahid intended to cut ties with Megawati and the pro-democracy movement (Bush 2009: 86-87).

The regime blamed the violence on a marginal new-left organization, the Partai Rakyat Demokratik (People's Democratic Party, PRD), which it claimed was a front for ex-PKI lurking in the shadows of the pro-democracy movement. The state further alleged that the PRD sought to use democracy as a respectable cover for a more sinister agenda, including violence against the state, the overthrow the Constitution of 1945, and the eventual banning of all religions. This conspiracy theory was tailor made for Muslim conservatives, reflecting as it did the organizational ideologies of *dakwah* groups like DDII and KISDI. But it also divided proponents of civil Islam. Nurcholish Madjid, now a member of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komite Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Komnas HAM), publicly blamed the regime for the violence, and called for Muslims to work through civil society to oppose rampant state violence. Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais, though, publicly blamed "leftists" for instigation and refused to condemn the military response (Hefner 2000: 186-7).

It was in this context that the riot in Situbondo occurred, as well as a December riot in the West Javanese town of Tasikamalaya. Unlike Situbondo, Tasikamalaya was not an NU stronghold, yet the riot curiously resulted in the arrest of several NU youth. The timing of Situbondo and Tasikamalaya are notable, coming after Wahid's public reconciliation with Suharto. Though the motivation for the arrests remains unclear (and may have occurred without coordination from Suharto), it ruined any chance of a lasting peace between the regime and Wahid, who responded by publicly accusing ICMI of instigating the riots. As Hefner (2000: 193) argues, the accusation not only crystallized NU's opposition to the New Order, but added stress to the regime's internal fault lines, placing civil Islam at the forefront of a "red and white" coalition that now also included both the pro-democracy PDI and a mix of old guard and young nationalists in the officer corps. Few of these officers were substantively oriented toward democratic reform, but rather sought allies in their internal conflict with Suharto's "green" coalition of Muslim conservatives and military officers.

The emerging reformist coalition now also included Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais. Though not as politically progressive as Wahid, Rais was at least a proponent of civil Islam. He rejected the idea of Indonesia as an Islamic state, shared Wahid view of Islamic civil society as a moral and institutional check on state power, sought political reform, and frequently called attention to public corruption (Hefner 2000: 187-200). Worse, in the eyes of the regime, he frequently called on Suharto to name a successor, and was not afraid to publicly criticize the misdeeds of the ruling family. But unlike Wahid, Rais had chosen to work with regimist Muslim conservatives in ICMI, many of whom came from Muhammadiyah families, but some of whom had deep ties to DDII and other opponents of civil Islam. That created a problem for the regime: it needed ICMI to provide a regimist counterweight to NU among Indonesian Muslims, and

acting against Rais risked turning Muhammadiyah against ICMI. As long as Wahid and NU aligned with Megawati against Suharto, the regime was stuck with the troublesome Rais.

Wahid's rapprochement with Suharto paved the way for Rais' expulsion from ICMI. Without a "threat" from NU, after all, there was no need to keep Rais within the fold (Aspinall 2005: 206-207).⁶⁷ But the regime misinterpreted Wahid's rapprochement with the regime; in reality, it was a tactical gambit designed to avoid a short-term crisis and little else. Thus a more durable alliance began to form between the civil Islamic leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah. Both would now seek to replace the corrupt, authoritarian New Order with something that better reflected the egalitarian spirit of Islam and pluralistic spirit of Pancasila. And, of course, it would need checks and balances, which only these Muslim civic organizations had the backing and moral authority to provide. Thus the civil Islamic critique, which had been developing since the 1970s, crystallized into a definable political movement to reform the state under democratic auspices.

The Asian Financial Crisis and its Aftermath: 1997-1998

By 1997, the regime was weak and divided, while its critics were more vocal, organized, and united than ever before. However, if the New Order were to lose its grip on the country, there would have to be a catalyst. That came in the form of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The crisis began with speculative attacks on the Thai baht in May of that year, and quickly escalated

⁶⁷ The catalyst for Rais' expulsion was his public critique of Suharto family dealings with the environmentally destructive Freeport mine in Irian Jaya (now West Papua). However, Rais told Aspinall (2005: 207) that Habibie had approached him and warned that if he did not leave ICMI, Suharto would target the organization.

into a general devaluation of the region's currencies.⁶⁸ By October 1997, the Indonesian rupiah had declined by more than 30 percent, forcing the government to request assistance from the IMF. Ripple effects were felt in Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States, triggering further capital flight from the affected Southeast Asian economies. Exacerbating the problem, in January 1998 analysts criticized the Indonesian government's budget for not complying with the terms of assistance established by the IMF. The rupiah plunged again, causing a panic and a run on food and other essential supplies across the archipelago.

At this point the crisis began to take on distinctly political overtones. It was abundantly clear by January 1998 that the Indonesian government lacked the capacity to halt the rupiah's freefall, and that it would need IMF help to support the currency. However, the IMF insisted that the government slash food subsidies as a condition of assistance, meaning that ordinary citizens would bear the brunt of the crisis regardless of the outcome. Indonesian students began to demonstrate against the agreement with the IMF. Suharto nevertheless signed a \$40 billion agreement with the IMF on January 15, 1998, agreeing to drastically reduce state subsidies for food, as well as oil and gas; the news caused food prices to rocket by 80 percent. Hoping to stave off wider discontent, the regime delayed implementation of the accord—causing the IMF to delay disbursement of \$3 billion in aid.

On April 8, 1998, Indonesia and the IMF reached a third accord, with the IMF withdrawing its insistence on a cut to food subsidies. But the move failed to placate the student protesters, who now expanded their list of complaints from IMF-imposed conditions for aid to the underlying mismanagement of the economy, rampant corruption among Suharto's family and the slate of recent cabinet appointments, including Habibie (viewed by critics as both "too

⁶⁸ The following account is based on the extensive timeline of the Asian Financial Crisis provided by the PBS program *Frontline* (2014).

Islamic” and a Suharto crony) as Vice-President, Chinese timber baron Mohamed “Bob” Hasan as Minister of Trade and Industry, and Suharto’s reviled daughter Tutut as Minister for Social Affairs. The students began calling for wider-ranging political reform. On May 12, 1998, soldiers fired upon student protesters at Jakarta’s Trisakti University, killing six and sparking a week of rioting in the capital.

The rioting was not, however, orchestrated by student or pro-democracy protesters. Rather, it *targeted* student and pro-democracy protesters, as well as ethnic Chinese Christians. The perpetrators were, for the most part, regime-linked auxiliaries and *preman* (thugs), who the regime frequently employed when it desired to intimidate opponents with a modicum of plausible deniability (Ryter 2001). But the regime and military’s split into “green” and “red and white” factions complicated Suharto’s ability to respond to the crisis with the formula of street violence, repression, and co-optation that had allowed him to weather similar crises in 1974 and 1984 (Sidel 2006: 109-110). The regime’s factions and personal rivals were, at this point, working at cross-purposes, and employing their own auxiliaries without coordination or even a common set of goals.

It was not for a lack of trying. With student protests growing, General Wiranto—who was both commander of the Armed Forces and one of the few figures with credibility among both “green” and “red and white” factions—sought to present a common front in defense of the regime. To that end, Wiranto allegedly created the PAM Swakarsa (self-security forces), a collection of *preman* groups tied together by interest in preserving the regime, ranging from the ultranationalist, “red and white” Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) to new groups like the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) and FURKON (Islamic Forum for the Upholding of Justice and the Constitution), which were tied to both “green” officers in the

military and, in the latter case, to regime insiders backing Habibie (Bertrand 2004: 103).⁶⁹

Though the PAM Swakarsa's constituent groups shared a common hatred for the left-leaning student protesters, as well as the civil Islamic groups that increasingly took their side, they also hated each other. What's more, these groups' individual patrons often placed their own, narrow agenda over the common goal of propping up the regime, further complicating the realization of any common goal.

Meanwhile, by January 1998, the Moerdani-linked CSIS was publicly questioning whether Suharto had the willingness or ability to implement the IMF accord, and began calling for Suharto to name a military officer to be his next vice president. The "green" faction, which backed Habibie's candidacy, subsequently began a smear campaign against the Wanandi brothers who ran CSIS, focusing on their Chinese ethnicity and Catholic faith, while intimating that the Wanandis were secretly conspiring with the most radical pro-democracy activists to overthrow the regime altogether (Sidel 2006: 113). This campaign to discredit CSIS soon transformed into a more generalized campaign to blame the Chinese for Indonesia's economic problems (Panggabean and Smith 2011). It has never been firmly established who was responsible for organizing the campaign; yet it was now abundantly clear that some conservative Muslim elements were mobilizing against the Chinese, which put them at cross-purposes with Wiranto's strategy of united, direct confrontation with the student protesters (Sidel 2006: 114). In early February 1998 MUI even "called for a *jihad nasional* (national holy struggle) against 'speculators and hoarders,' terms defined broadly enough to cover the thousands of—mostly

⁶⁹ Porter (2002) notes that Wiranto has consistently denied creating the PAM Swakarsa, but also publicly defended them, while the military and police were quick to grant the violent group permits that it routinely denied to student organizations. Though circumstantial, this is taken by many observers as evidence of a relationship.

Chinese—shopkeepers, merchants, and businessmen scattered across the archipelago” (Sidel 2006: 114).⁷⁰

A second round of small-scale rioting against ethnic Chinese soon broke out in several regions historically associated with Islamic conservatism, including Java’s northern coast, Lombok, South Sulawesi, and parts of Sumatra. Rioters attacked and looted Chinese-owned businesses, as well as several dozen Catholic and Protestant churches (Sidel 2006: 115; Purdey 2006: 100-102). Worse, in the chaotic aftermath of the Trisakti shootings, two distinct street-level conflicts converged on the capital in explosive fashion: the one pitting the regimist PAM Swakarsa against the student-led protests; and a second pitting the “Islamic” components of PAM Swakarsa against Jakarta’s ethnic Chinese. In both cases, PAM Swakarsa affiliates committed the overwhelming majority of violent acts. But the attacks on the Chinese were both more numerous and deadlier. Ultimately, however, if orchestrated to shift blame from the regime to an unpopular minority, they had the opposite effect of broadening opposition to the regime.

Civil Islam’s Role in the Fall of Suharto: 1998

The scale of violence in Jakarta, Medan, and elsewhere—with at least 1,000 deaths, nearly 200 confirmed rapes, and widespread destruction of property—led a number of prominent figures in Muslim civil society to condemn the violence and permanently break from the regime. As Bertrand (2004: 67) notes, the killings and rapes also produced a broad shift in rhetoric from

⁷⁰ This was not the only example. As Sidel (2006: 114) recounts, “in a variety of publications and public forums—including a mid-February KISDI rally before thousands of supporters at Jakarta’s Al-Azhar Mosque—calls were voiced for a struggle against the ‘traitors’ and ‘liars’ Wanandi and his ilk. Activists such as Hussein Umar, secretary general of DDII, set out across the country to spread the message beyond Jakarta. Meanwhile, both national and local government officials made clear that the definition of ‘treason’ to the Indonesian nation would be understood in religiously colored terms.”

within the political elite, toward a reaffirmation of “the inclusive values of the Indonesian nation and the place of the Chinese Indonesians as citizens and equal members.”

Abdurrahman Wahid, as chairman of NU, and Amien Rais, as chairman of Muhammadiyah, were among the most vocal critics of the anti-Chinese violence. They now openly called for Suharto’s resignation, and for the military to side with the people (Porter 2002: 205). Notably, the anti-Chinese and anti-student violence also pushed a number of long-time Suharto supporters and ICMI figures into their camp (Siegel 1998; Sidel 2006: 122-123). After a parliamentary motion demanding his resignation and closed-door discussions with military leaders, including Wiranto, Suharto finally resigned on May 21, leaving Habibie to assume the Presidency at a moment of political crisis, economic chaos, and deep uncertainty.⁷¹

Habibie lifted restrictions on political party formation—stimulating the creation of at least one hundred parties, several dozen of which were explicitly Islamic or Muslim parties. He also abandoned the P4 indoctrination program and the insistence that all parties organize “on the basis of Pancasila,” leading the institutional PPP to return to its “Islamic basis,” while allowing for the emergence of several pro-Jakarta Charter parties. Finally, Habibie filled his cabinet with ICMI personnel. To many Muslim conservatives, this was a promise fulfilled. But in truth, the new opportunities were only available to the elite few who could claim close personal ties to the new president, and whose political inclinations were more New Order than DDII (Porter 2002: 219-220). Rather than inherit the state, the great majority of Muslim conservatives were once again locked out of power.

⁷¹ There is some debate as to how causally important these discussions may have been. Shiraishi (1999: 82) argues that Wiranto’s refusal to use additional force to defend the regime led Suharto to resign; Wiranto himself, however, believes Suharto had already decided to resign (Mietzner 2009: 133).

Divisions between “green” and “red and white” factions within the military also came to a head during the early days of Habibie’s presidency. Major General Prabowo Subianto, commander of the elite KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) unit and a leading “green” general (as well as Suharto’s son-in-law), sought to replace Wiranto as Army Chief of Staff. Wiranto had been a late Suharto appointee, a “red and white” officer whose installation in early 1998 reflected Suharto’s decision to draw back from the “green” strategy (Emmerson 1999: 312). Given Habibie’s role in New Order’s pivot towards Islam, many observers expected him to replace Wiranto with Prabowo. But in the aftermath of rioting and transition, Habibie prioritized stability over other concerns. That meant choosing Wiranto, who (rightly or wrongly) was perceived as the more neutral figure (Mietzner 2009: 129).

Though Wiranto and Prabowo appeared to fall on different sides of the divide between the “red and white” and “green” factions of the officer corps, in truth the rivalry between the two generals boiled down to rival ambition (Mietzner 2009: 113).⁷² Yet the rival officers had, over the years, cultivated bases of support that did fall along these lines. As such, when Habibie picked Wiranto over Prabowo, it confirmed that the decades-long “greening” of the Indonesian military had come to a close (Crouch 2010: 22)

A Shaky Start for Democracy (1999-2004)

Habibie’s presidency may have looked like the fulfillment of an on-going “Islamic turn” in Indonesian politics (and a specifically conservative one at that), but in reality Habibie had no

⁷² This contention is supported by the fact that, since 1998, both former generals have pursued political careers as secular nationalists. In 2004, Wiranto was Golkar’s presidential candidate, coming in third, and later founded the secular-nationalist Hanura party. Prabowo now heads the secular-nationalist Gerindra (Great Indonesia) party, and was runner-up in the 2016 presidential elections.

firm base of support. As Sidel (2006: 129) argues, even within ICMI “ambitious Muslim professionals—businessmen, politicians, intellectuals, military officers—in many ways had much more in common with their Christian and secular nationalist counterparts than with the ‘professional Muslims’—*ulama* and other Islamic educators, preachers, and publicists, officials of the vast Ministry of Religious Affairs—whose faith they supposedly shared.” Thus the ascension of conservative *Muslims*, like Habibie, did not necessarily herald the ascension of conservative *Islam*.

Habibie, moreover, faced a host of political rivals. Megawati led the popular (and renamed) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle, PDI-P), which was backed by the student movement, organized labor, Indonesia’s religious minorities, and significant “red and white” nationalist factions within both the civilian and military bureaucracies. If open elections were held, her party stood to gain the largest proportion of votes; and if they were not, PDI-P possessed an unparalleled capacity for protest mobilization. Meanwhile, there were powerful rivals for leadership of Indonesia’s self-identifying Muslim voters too: the progressive Wahid, who was both chairman of NU and the newly formed Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (People’s Awakening Party, PKB); and the moderately conservative Rais, who chaired Muhammadiyah and the Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN).

Rais was of particular concern to Habibie. In the aftermath of Suharto’s resignation, the Muhammadiyah chairman had been instrumental in selling the idea of a Habibie presidency to pro-democracy activists as a genuine marker of reform. However, in a widely publicized May, 1998 interview with Australian Broadcasting Corporation radio, Rais said: “I think Habibie is expected to have a provisional government. Maybe after three or six months at the most, Habibie has to go, too” (Richburg 1998). Thus Habibie governed from a precarious political position:

forced to appeal to forces and depend on rivals with little interest in seeing him succeed; in the context of economic collapse, under punishing loan agreements from the IMF and World Bank; with the role (and allegiances) of the military still uncertain; and with the taint of association with the discredited Suharto regime upon him. And the reforms he oversaw, such as removing the humiliating Suharto-era practice of requiring ethnic Chinese to produce proof of citizenship when making official applications (for school housing, or business licenses)—while both meaningful and long overdue—cut his support among the Sinophobic fringe that had supported his presidency on the streets (Hoon 2004).

However, it was a budding crisis in Indonesia's restive province of East Timor that would largely seal Habibie's fate. With the 1974 collapse of the Salazar regime in Portugal, a left-dominated independence movement prepared to declare independence for the tiny colony of Timor Português (Portuguese Timor). With the fall of South Vietnam imminent, the move attracted the attention of Indonesia's anti-communist allies and patrons. The 1975 invasion and subsequent counter-insurgency campaign, supported to varying degrees by Australia, the U.S. and Britain, produced crop failures, mass displacement, and the abandonment of fertile land—resulting in the deaths of as much as one third of the population (Robinson 2009: 49-64).

Though largely moribund during the 1980s, the Timorese independence movement returned as the New Order fractured in the 1990s. The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre—which was caught on film—brought renewed international attention to human rights issues under Indonesian rule. In a shift from earlier policies that favored East Timor's pacification, the U.S., Australia, and allied states began pressing Suharto to improve the political and human rights situations in

the colony, which led Suharto to create Komnas HAM and initiate talks between pro-independence and pro-union Timorese (Lubis 2003 136-137; Robinson 2009: 67-68).⁷³

At the same time, a significant minority of Timorese did not want to leave Indonesia. There were clear economic incentives to stay within the Indonesian common market, and deep uncertainty in any future outside of it (especially given the provincial economy's dependence on public sector jobs). Moreover, despite different colonial histories, East and West Timorese had established meaningful ties over more than 20 years of sharing an island within Indonesia. The stage was thus set for a major conflict over independence.

Sensing opportunity, pro-independence activists took to the streets. As the demonstrations swelled, Habibie faced increasingly intense international pressure to allow a referendum on independence. But nationalists, both within the regime and among the opposition, viewed East Timor's status as an Indonesian province as non-negotiable. Habibie first proposed "special autonomy," whereupon East Timor would remain within Indonesia but with broadly expanded powers of self-rule.⁷⁴ In January 1999, however, it emerged that Habibie had agreed to hold a referendum in which Timorese would vote on "special autonomy" or independence (Ricklefs 2002: 412). In response, several anti-independence militias mobilized, and for the next six months ravaged the province. Though Indonesian officials denied it at the time, and continue to do so, many observers suspected that elements within the military had "coordinated, or at least

⁷³ Adding significant pressure on Indonesia, longtime independence activists Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta received the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize for their advocacy of nonviolent resistance to Indonesian rule.

⁷⁴ Illustrative of international pressure, in June 1998 several ambassadors from the European Union visited Dili. They were greeted by group of protesters gathered outside their hotel room, holding pro-independence placards and demanding a referendum (Ricklefs 2002: 412). The EU delegation proved sympathetic. In the context of the 1990s, the wars in Yugoslavia, and the global shift in policy norms away from Cold War *realpolitik* and toward a neo-Wilsonian frame centered on human rights protections, the EU delegation rising international support for Timorese self-determination is not difficult to understand.

condoned” militia operations (Robinson 2001: 275; c.f. Robinson 2009). In spite of the violence, or perhaps even encouraged by it, Timorese voters overwhelmingly backed independence.⁷⁵ Militia violence spiked, displacing as much as a quarter of East Timor’s population; without any options left, on September 12 Habibie acquiesced to a United Nations peacekeeping force and the *de facto* separation of East Timor from Indonesia (Ricklefs 2002: 413; Robinson 2009: 161-184; 186-198). On October 20, the upper chamber of parliament (MPR) voted to replace Habibie as president of Indonesia, effectively ending the Muslim conservative dream of remaking the state in its image.

Though East Timorese independence infuriated Indonesian nationalists and fatally weakened the Habibie regime, it was not the only source of instability during the early years of democracy. Generally speaking, the years immediately following transition were marked by degraded state power and, as a consequence, an expanded opportunity structure for violent activism by non-state actors (Bertrand 2004: 56). Alongside incidents of ethnic cleansing and revived ethno-national separatism, Indonesia experienced increasingly organized violence by Muslim and Christian extremists. During the final years of the New Order, violence had often taken the form of short, one-off riots—against Chinese Christians on Java and Sumatra, and against Muslim migrants in Eastern Indonesia. By 1996, a series of more organized, sustained campaigns of violence emerged in the Eastern and Northern peripheries. Despite a number of similarities among these cases, and—at least initially—ambiguity about how “religious” or “ethnic” any of these conflicts were, violence crystallized, in the interpretations of local actors and outside observers alike, as concretely one or the other (G. Brown 2014). Conflict definitions proved consequential, with the religiously defined violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi

⁷⁵ Of the 98.6 percent of eligible voters who cast ballots, 78.5 percent opted for independence and 21.5 percent for special autonomy within Indonesia (Ricklefs 2002: 413).

provinces drawing in distinctly different actors, and significantly greater levels of interest, than concurrent ethnic violence in West and Central Kalimantan (Davidson 2008; G. Brown 2014).

Alongside the on-going political crisis in East Timor and continuing economic deprivations, these cases of violence further eroded support for the Habibie government.⁷⁶ However, the parliamentary elections held on June 7, 1999 failed to provide any clear path to the presidency. Unsurprisingly, PDI-P came in first with 33.7 percent of the vote, followed by Golkar with 22.4 percent. After that, five Muslim parties combined for 33.7 percent of the vote (exactly equal to PDI-P's share). But the largest of these parties, Wahid's PKB, was arguably closer in political vision to PDI-P than it was to the other Muslim parties (though its 12.6 percent share of the electorate drew from a pool of NU-affiliated constituents that included socially conservative Muslims). Rais' PAN, despite its leader's clear presidential ambitions, received only 7.1 percent of the vote, while the institutional Islamist party of the New Order, PPP, managed a relatively strong showing at 10.7 percent. PDI-P thus had few options for coalition partners, while Habibie and Rais—the two other assumed presidential candidates—faced even grimmer prospects.

In the October 20, 1999 vote, the MPR opted for Wahid. It was a surprise choice, but Wahid was perhaps the only figure to command the respect of both Muslim conservatives and pro-democracy activists.⁷⁷ Wahid struck an odd pose as president: he was functionally blind, outspoken, and fond of dirty jokes. He was also the only genuine liberal among the Indonesian political elite. During his short presidency, Wahid re-instated Confucianism as an officially

⁷⁶ Indonesia's economic deprivations were the result of decades of mismanagement under Suharto, international currency speculation during the Asian Financial Crisis, and the severe conditions of IMF and World Bank loans (without which Indonesia could not hope to recover).

⁷⁷ Wahid also apparently worked to undermine Megawati's candidacy, adopting the Islamist critique of a female president and cultivating ties with Muslim conservatives and Islamists in return for their backing his candidacy (Fealy 2010).

recognized religion, removed a 1978 ban on the public display of Chinese characters, renamed the restive Irian Jaya province “Papua” in consideration of local sentiments, and openly sought to push Indonesia toward greater openness and pluralism (Ricklefs 2002: 419). But the country was in a shambles. The economic recovery that would, ultimately, validate *any* presidency failed to materialize, while separatist movements in Aceh and Papua expanded in the wake of Timorese independence and communal violence flared in several of the outer provinces. And at a more basic level, Wahid proved decidedly unsuited to state administration. He was prone to rash decisions and quick reversals, falling asleep in briefings and cabinet meetings, and spending far more time and resources on foreign travel than expected of an Indonesian president, a “pattern of leadership” that “had a debilitating effect on the entire process of government” (Fealy 2010).

The weak and divided central state found it particularly difficult to come to grips with Muslim-Christian violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. Sending elite military and police units proved little help: not only did they fail to reassert calm, reports suggest that specific units and deserters actively took sides, deepening the crises (HRW 1999; Bertrand 2002). The most egregious example of state weakness, though, came in April 2000, when then-president Aburrahman Wahid ordered police to stop the Laskar Jihad paramilitary group from landing in war-torn Maluku.⁷⁸ Laskar Jihad disregarded the prohibition, and was even allegedly supported by some elements within the military (Hasan 2006: 186). Throughout Wahid’s troubled presidency, the state struggled mightily to reassert its monopoly on legitimate violence in the war-torn provinces. The MPR summarily removed him from office on July 23, 2001, replacing him with Megawati.

⁷⁸ Laskar Jihad was created by Afghan veteran Ja’far Umar Thalib to protect Muslims in Maluku from Christian paramilitaries (though in practice it often attacked unarmed civilians), and to “defend” Indonesian territorial integrity against Moluccan separatists (though their role on the Christian side of violence is thought to be extremely limited) (Tajima 2014: 124).

Megawati's solution to the fragmented political landscape, and her own lack of support outside PDI-P, was to build a "rainbow cabinet" comprising all the major parties, including Islamists. This party cartel that produced the kind of political stability Indonesia had lacked since transition, but at a reduction of accountability, voter choice, and policy activity (Slater 2004; 2006). Still, with nearly the entire MPR inside the government, and having repaired ties between the civilian government and military (which mistrusted Wahid), Megawati was better equipped to tackle the on-going violence in Maluku and Central Sulawesi than her predecessor. In May 2001 the security forces engaged and defeated Laskar Jihad in a military operation—a signal that it would no longer tolerate paramilitary violence (Sidel 2006: 212). The government also began expending more capital on peacemaking efforts. The Malino I accords brought a ceasefire to Poso, after which a second accord—Malino II—brought an uneasy peace to Maluku.⁷⁹ In its wake, the authorities clamped down on Laskar Jihad and other militants (among both Muslim and Christians). The Malino I and II accords brought calm to Maluku and Central Sulawesi, though not before the deaths of some 10,000 Indonesians.

It was in this context that the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network, comprised primarily of Afghan veterans, radical preachers and militant *pesantren* students, began its bombing campaign against "Western interests" in Indonesia. Loosely affiliated with al Qaeda, JI sought to establish a *khilafat*, or Caliphate, across the "Muslim lands" of Southeast Asia.⁸⁰ Internally divided between "militant" and "educational" wings, by 2002 those advocating violence against the secular state and its "foreign backers" had gained the upper hand (ICG 2002). On October 12,

⁷⁹ The agreement stated that all paramilitary organizations were to disarm, that both sides would disavow the RMS, uphold the right of non-Ambonese to settle in Maluku, allow the return of refugees and agree to respect religious and ethnic diversity in the province. Thirty-five Christian and thirty-five Muslim representatives signed the document (Ambon Information Website 2002).

⁸⁰ Roughly comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Thailand, portions of Cambodia and the southern Philippines.

2002, two massive car bombs exploded in the crowded Balinese tourist district of Kuta, killing 202 and injuring hundreds more. Most of the dead were either Australian vacationers or Indonesians working in the tourism industry, including a number of Muslims. A pattern of yearly bombings would claim at least 50 more lives by the end of 2005.⁸¹

The Bali bombings provoked outrage across Indonesia. Media reports from a broad spectrum of sources, expressed shock over the loss of life, and deep concern over how the bombings might tarnish Indonesia's image as a tolerant, multi-religious society. Megawati's government, though, had received (and largely ignored) warnings from U.S., Australian, Malaysian, and Singaporean intelligence services about the potential threat for nearly a year. That decision reflected strong internal opposition to a crackdown on JI and its affiliates from Megawati's conservative and Islamist coalition partners, who felt such a move would be tantamount to joining the American-led "global war against terrorism" (which many conservatives and Islamists perceived to be a war against Islam).⁸²

The bombings eroded the basis of that support. Revulsion at the deliberate targeting of civilians, and anxiety over the threat to Indonesia's fragile economic recovery posed by the bombing campaign, had produced broad support for a crackdown, while Indonesia's passivity prior to the bombing troubled foreign donors, allies, and lending organizations. Foreign governments and news outlets, likely fed by opportunistic intelligence officials, discovered in Indonesia a bewildering array of militant groups of uncertain size and capacity. Hastily written exposes declared Indonesia a "second front" in the "global war on terror" (e.g. Abuza 2003;

⁸¹ There was one additional bombing attributed to JI, in 2009.

⁸² In September 2001, MUI allegedly suggested that, were the United States to invade Afghanistan, it would be the obligation of Indonesian Muslims to join an anti-American *jihad* (Murphy 2005: 272). And Vice-President Hamzah Haz, only days before the Bali bombings, had publicly defended JI's spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, stating: "if you want to arrest Abu Bakar Bashir, you will have to deal with me first" (Barton 2004: 61).

Ressa 2003).⁸³ Megawati subsequently revised her previously hands-off policy and initiated a long and difficult but ultimately successful crackdown on the network. Megawati's government applied both force and other means of coercive pressure, arresting major JI militants and coercing large, armed groups like Laskar Jihad to disband (Hasan 2006). The bombings, and the threat they posed to Indonesia's fragile economic recovery, though, proved fatal to President Megawati Sukarnoputri's re-election hopes.

A new government took power in 2004. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was a former general and Megawati aide who, more than his predecessors, proved able to navigate a fractured coalition comprising secular-nationalist, liberal Muslim, and conservative Muslim political parties. Moreover, he and Vice President Jusuf Kalla had personally brokered the Malino peace accords in the formerly troubled regions of Maluku and Central Sulawesi, where violence had by then had claimed some 5,000 lives. The new government proved better able to "sell" the legitimate authority of the democratic state to conservative Muslims who, while not supporting violent terrorism, had never warmed to the progressive Wahid or secular-nationalist Megawati. Notably, the Yudhoyono government was not subjected to the same suspicions, allowing it to pursue a more aggressive crackdown on Islamic terrorism and the armed militias. The year 2004 thus marks a turning point of sorts, the moment at which Islam-based challenges to the legitimacy and authority of the central state ceased to be a major threat, and the moment after which challenges to pluralism—whether interreligious or intra-religious—would become more limited, situational, localized, and even, in some cases, unintended.

⁸³ Van Klinken (2010) provides a detailed discussion of the problems posed by this body of literature (its reliance on conjecture, hearsay, testimony potentially gleaned from torture, and so forth).

Chapter Two

Offloading: How the Political Process Regionalizes Religious Pluralism

To many observers, Indonesia's transition to democracy has empowered the opponents of religious pluralism, rendering the system developed under Sukarno and Suharto weak, fragile, even obsolete (e.g. Rogers 2014). In this view, Indonesia's politics are evolving on pace with other new and majority-Muslim democracies, where its ascension marks a broader pivot toward Islamic—and away from more secular or pluralistic—framings of state and nation. The conditions that have led to state Islamization in Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, and elsewhere are evident in Indonesia as well: the rapid spread of Islamic piety; the decline of heterodox and “indigenized” forms of Islamic belief and practice; the lowering of restrictions on independent religious parties and organizations; greater social emphasis placed on religious identities; and growing access to Islamist thought and theory, such as produced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.¹

Meanwhile, since 1998, there has been a palpable uptick in Islamist and conservative Muslim political activism, with the express intent of reframing Indonesia as a “Muslim nation” animated by conservative values. Islamist and conservative activists have enjoyed some success in forwarding this agenda, particularly on the regional and local levels, where *sharia*-based bylaws and restrictions imposed on religious minorities have proliferated since 1998 (Buehler 2008; 2013a; Bush 2008; Parsons and Mietzker 2009).² And attitudinal surveys suggest a

¹ The rise of political Islamism in Turkey, Malaysia, and Egypt are discussed in the introduction to this dissertation.

² These local successes, however, cluster within a relatively small proportion of Indonesia's 34 provinces, 405 regencies (*kabupaten*), and 97 cities, and are, in most areas, both limited and *ad hoc*. Aceh, an autonomous province that has institutionalized a comprehensive form of *sharia* as provincial law, is a notable exception. More limited *sharia* bylaws cluster in West Java, Banten,

general decline in tolerance—particularly but not exclusively toward minority sects within Islam (PPIM 2007; Menchik 2016). Yet political Islam’s ongoing lack of electoral support, failure to re-insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution, and inability to push through a comprehensive program of conservative, Islam-based social legislation suggests that religious pluralism is at least somewhat resilient to these challenges at the level of the state. What accounts for this apparent robustness and what are its limits? And what explains the apparent divergence between the central state and regions in how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced?

In this chapter, I examine the process through which two contentious pieces of legislation were debated, amended, and resolved, with the aim of uncovering how religious pluralism is sustained and reproduced at the level of the state: the sweeping Anti-Pornography Bill (2006-2008), which sought to expand the legal definition of pornography to include such behaviors as public kissing, “suggestive dancing,” and baring cleavage; and a 2011 bill that sought to ban the “heretical” Ahmadiyah sect. I argue that the political process is structured in such a way as to manage and reduce the threat to religious pluralism (posed by these and similar bills) at the level of the state. Specifically, I will demonstrate how three interlocking factors drive this process. The first is the cartel structure of parliamentary politics in Indonesia, which incentivizes collusion over contention for Indonesian political parties. The second is informal but proactive consensus making by the Muslim civic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, organizations that exert a uniquely powerful influence on the political discourse at the statewide level, share personnel with nearly all of Indonesia’s major political parties, and are ideologically committed to political “moderation.” The third is political decentralization, which allows state-level authorities to “offload” responsibility to the provinces, regencies, and

South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, and—to a lesser degree—in East Java and majority-Muslim areas of Nusa Tenggara Barat.

municipalities. Offloading sustains formal religious pluralism at the level of state by channeling contention over Islam's place in state and society to the provinces, regencies, and cities, which are then left to their own devices. In doing so, offloading facilitates the *regionalization* of religious pluralism, characterized by the erosion or dismantling of religious pluralism in some areas, and the maintenance of pluralistic institutions and practices in others.

The Political Processes and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia

As discussed in Chapter One, Indonesia has institutionalized a corporatist form of religious pluralism, recognizing Islam, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism as (theoretically) equal recipients of state patronage.³ There is little state coercion as regards religiosity, and the constitution guarantees individual religious freedoms. However, many areas of daily life (education, marriage, inheritance, and so forth) are administered by a religious bureaucracy, through which institutionally embedded, orthodox representatives of the six faiths also decide what beliefs and practices do or do not receive an official stamp of approval. This system is therefore not—as in the United States—predicated on a universalizing notion of religious freedom; instead, individual religious freedoms and the privileging of embedded group orthodoxies are in direct tension (Menchik 2016).⁴

Since 1998, however, a number of bills have threatened to upend this system of corporatist pluralism. These include bills to re-insert the Jakarta Charter into the Constitution (and thus obligate the state to enforce *sharia* for all Muslim citizens), the aforementioned bills to criminalize a broad array of public behaviors as “pornographic” and ban the Ahmadiyah sect,

³ Confucianism was a state-recognized religion until 1979, and then again after 2000.

⁴ Menchik (2016) goes so far as to argue that the Indonesian state is defined by *multireligious theism*. This theory is discussed in the introduction to this dissertation.

and a bill to ban all alcohol sales in Indonesia, which is currently being debated in parliament. Legislative contention over these bills, each of which poses an Islam-based challenge to religious pluralism or to the rights and protections afforded to religious minorities, follows a distinct pattern. First a given bill is introduced in parliament (generally by Islamist parties), after which point it is allowed to proceed to committee. The committees are generally dominated by whichever of the secular-nationalist parties has the most parliamentary seats at that given moment; though ideologically committed to Pancasila pluralism, the secular-nationalist parties are often hesitant to alienate conservative voters and coalition partners, and so rarely block “Islamic” bills at the committee stage. Once approved by the committee, the bill can proceed to the parliamentary floor. There it is debated, watered-down, and resubmitted. Finally, it is either devolved to the regions or enforced according to regional rather than national standards, producing regionalization in how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced. As described above, this process has three components: (1) cartel relations among Indonesian political parties; (2) informal but proactive consensus making by Muslim civic organizations; and (3) the deliberate offloading of contention from the central state to the provinces and regions.

The Cartel Structure of Party Politics in Indonesia

Katz and Meir (1995: 17) define cartel politics by “the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-party collusion” within a system that “depends on collusion and cooperation between ostensible competitors, and on agreements which, of necessity, require the consent and cooperation of all, or almost all, relevant participants” (c.f. Katz and Meyer 2009). Competition in a cartel system is managed; parties tacitly agreeing to adhere to a set of “rules” based on “a mutual interest in organizational survival” and share the spoils of patronage (ibid 18-

19). Cartel systems are thus facilitated by compromise and consensus making, and by parties buying into the idea that everyone benefits if everyone plays by the rules. Consequently, parties grow more similar to one another, more “oriented toward agreed goals,” and less likely to engage in overt contention with one another (ibid 19).

This is, as Slater (2004; 2006) observes, an apt description of parliamentary politics in Indonesia. Indeed, the structure of political patronage in Indonesia ensures that, while presidential contests remain deeply contentious, party mobilization strategies largely eschew direct confrontation, instead leveraging highly personalized patronage networks in order to better position the party for the inevitable post-election distribution of ministries, committee chairmanships, and so forth. Historically speaking, this system emerged from the fiasco of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s 2001 impeachment, and the subsequent formation of a “rainbow coalition” among the three institutional parties of the New Order: former regime vehicle Golkar, new president Megawati’s former institutional opposition PDI-P party, and the Islamic institutional opposition party, PPP. The initial purpose of the cartel was to stabilize the political system at a moment in which democratic reversal, economic collapse, and state failure all appeared plausible. However, as Slater (2004: 64-66) argues, this also produced an arrangement where both ruling parties and coalition partners are insulated from pressure to deliver on campaign promises—an *accountability trap*, which limits political competition, hampers responses to socioeconomic crises, and allows vested parties to “dominate Indonesia’s lucrative patronage networks with political impunity.”

The Indonesian cartel system certainly does that: few large enterprises operate without government support or contracts, which are handed out by the bureaucratic offices run by representatives of a given president’s coalition of parties. There are thus powerful, material

incentives for parties to collude with whichever party controls the presidency. Further opportunities for rent seeking come from participation in parliamentary committees, control of regions and localities, and (perhaps most frequently) from informal networks linking individuals across party lines and to the country's opaque web of public/private capital interests. Thus Slater (2006: 208) concludes that "the recent behavior of Indonesia's parties, parliaments, and presidents reveals that elite politics has been characterized by too much stability rather than too little"; and, "like a cartel of private companies, this cartel of political elites has served to protect its leading members from outside competition."⁵

Be that as it may, the cartel system does also stabilize contention in such a way that both ensures a "fair hearing" for and limits the scope of challenges to religious pluralism. For example, though the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) continues to advocate for divisive, Islam-based social legislation like the Anti-Pornography Bill, the party has, since 2004, progressively drifted toward the political center, choosing collusion and its (largely financial) benefits over "too much" contention.⁶ Moreover, secular-nationalist parties have grown similarly reticent to alienate either their Islamist coalition partners or conservative Muslim voters. No party, as it happens, is popular enough to govern without coalition partners, and since 1999 each coalition

⁵ Even what, superficially, looked like competition from outside the system—such as the 2004 emergence of Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, PD), a vehicle for presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono) and rise in support for the Islamist PKS—turns out to be no such thing, as both parties were rapidly enveloped into the system. Indeed, President Yodhoyono's governing coalition not only included the insurgent PKS and PD, but Golkar, PAN, PKB, and PPP, all of which were represented in Megawati's "rainbow coalition" (Slater 2006).

⁶ The party's rise from relative obscurity in 1999 to commanding more than 7 percent of the vote in 2004 is often linked to its abandonment of *sharia*-advocacy and concurrent establishment of civic institutions (schools, charities, etc.) (e.g. Machmudi 2004). The PKS has since continued to move away from doctrinaire Islamism. The party even declared itself "open" to non-Muslims in 2009, and subsequently began fielding non-Muslim candidates in local elections across majority-Christian areas of Eastern Indonesia (Chernov Hwang 2014: 66-7). The strategy has not benefitted the party in electoral terms, despite also concurrent buildup of the support network, but it has made PKS a more generally palatable partner for future governing coalitions.

has included at least one significant Islamist party. Outright refusal to consider issues of importance to coalition partners thus potentially endangers the integrity of the coalition. Meanwhile, these parties generally treat the “Islamic vote” as one of several constituent interest groups to be pandered to (Baswedan 2004).⁷ Thus, while the system creates “too much stability,” in many respects, it also acts as a bulwark against high-stakes, zero-sum contention, and instead encourages a process of consensus making.

Consensus Making by Muslim Civic Organizations

In the early days of Indonesian democratization, Robert Hefner (2000: 12-13) argued that Indonesia’s future as a democratic and pluralist state depended on civil Islam, which he defined as an ideological movement whose adherents followed a “civil pluralist” tradition in Islam that, among other things, “[denied] the wisdom of a monolithic ‘Islamic’ state,” backed democratic reform, and “[embraced] the ideals of civil society.”⁸ The influential Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU progressively came to adopt all of these positions, with religious civil society positioned as both institutional check on state power and necessary tool through which to ensure social cohesion among the citizenry (Hefner 2000: 13-17).⁹ However, when considering the role Muslim civil society plays in structuring politics in post-transition Indonesia, it is useful to distinguish (a) the *ideological project* to build Muslim civil society in order to reinforce democracy and provide checks on state power (i.e. “civil Islam”) and (b) the *functionality* of

⁷ Baswedan (2004) characterizes Golkar in such terms, though it is an equally fundamental characteristic of PD and is intermittently true of PDI-P as well.

⁸ As discussed in previous chapters, the concept of “civil Islam” is rooted in theories of public religion, a concept that describes situations in which religious organizations retract broad-based claims on the state and instead accept positions of influence within “the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society” (Casanova’s 1994: 62; 65-66; Stepan 2001).

⁹ There is a detailed discussions of how NU and Muhammadiyah came to embrace civil Islam in Chapter One.

Muslim civil society as a mechanism through which to generate policy, frame the political discourse, and, most importantly, act as consensus makers among political actors in contention. The latter, one notes, does not require any deep ideological commitment to pluralism, though it does require autonomy from state institutions.

Political consensus making is a term often used but rarely defined in the analysis of contentious politics. Like the related notion of political brokerage, it is typically deployed to describe the process of connecting actors in contention (i.e. “bridging gaps”), the mediation of political disputes, and the building/maintenance of political coalitions (Stovel and Shaw 2012: 141-51; Marsden 1982, Fernandez and Gould 1994; Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2001: 26; Hilman 2008). Yet brokers work for commission or influence, and not all individuals or organizations that perform these duties are motivated by (or at least not solely by) this kind of clear-cut self interest. Thus the category of political consensus makers, as it is being used here, includes individuals and organizations that interject themselves into the political process and forge consensus for *any* reason. Among other things, these could be to guarantee stability in a social or political system, to ensure the regular allocation of resources, or, in the case of organizations, to bypass a source of internal tension.

Civic organizations often assume the political consensus maker’s role, particularly when state institutions are weak and there is a high potential for political polarization (Varshney 2001). In Indonesia, the Muslim organizations Muhammadiyah and NU are uniquely positioned for the role, being so influential that they can effectively “limit the ability of the state and political parties to set the agenda and mobilize Islam in certain ways” (Ufen 2009: 310). This is facilitated, in part, by *not* being too committed to liberalization (or any other ideological project). Rather, Muhammadiyah and NU are ideologically structured as “big tents,” enveloping a wide

range of political and theological inclinations—from very liberal to very conservative—and seesawing, from congress to congress, between “moderately conservative” and “moderately liberal” leaderships and policy directions (Bush and Munawar-Rachman 2014: 22-24; van Bruinessen 2011). As Eisenberg (1984: 230-235) notes, “big tent” organizations tend to embrace ideological inconsistency in messaging, a strategic move that can heighten creativity and flexibility in problem solving, facilitate interpersonal relationships, internal and external to the organization, and preserve positions of privilege within and for the organization. Moreover, as a result of this “big tent” structure, Muhammadiyah and NU members are able to occupy positions of influence in nearly every major Indonesian political party, from the Islamist PPP to the progressive Muslim PKB and all the major secular-nationalist parties.

What’s more, both organizations embrace pervasive *ideologies of moderation*, framing themselves as the true, “moderate” spirit of Indonesian Islam, and their influence as exerting a “moderating effect” on contention—whether reining in the “too liberal” or the “too conservative.” For example, the Muhammadiyah 2010-15 Program statement cites the following as “challenges” for the organization:

1. The flow of secularism-materialism attacking the world [which] becomes a big temptation and challenge for Muhammadiyah members [as they attempt] to strongly hold their commitment in Muhammadiyah life and to make Islam as a religion of *rahmatan lil-‘alamin* (pity for the entire world).
2. The radical tendency in social-political and religious [movements] producing conflict and violence becomes a challenge for Muhammadiyah in [its mission to present an] Islamic movement that brings peace, enlightenment, and pity for the entire world (Muhammadiyah 2010).¹⁰

These organizational factors—internal divisions, powerful network ties to nearly all political parties, authority among Muslims, and ideological commitments to “moderation”—

¹⁰ NU, like Muhammadiyah, portrays itself as occupying a middle ground between liberalism and radicalism, and frames that position as distinctly and “authentically” Indonesian.

combine to make NU and Muhammadiyah ideal mediators and coalition builders, urging contending parties toward compromise solutions that both sustain the cartel system and the pluralist underpinnings of the central state. Notably, successful consensus making also serves to enhance the prestige, influence, and ensure the continued centrality of these organizations to the political process.

Offloading Contention over Religious Pluralism to Lower Levels of Governance

In 1999, Indonesia embarked on an ambitious, multistage decentralization program called *otonomi daerah*, which first devolved a significant degree of legislative and executive authority the provincial, *kabupaten* (regency), and *kota* (municipal) levels; a second round, in 2005, added direct elections for mayors and regents (Horowitz 2013: 124-142). The program was by no means unique, but rather part of a global shift from centralized to decentralized models of governance and administration, observable in both the developed and developing worlds (Bardhan 2002). Indeed, as Treisman (2007: 1) writes, “along with democracy, competitive markets, and the rule of law, decentralized government has come to be seen as a cure for a remarkable range of political and social ills.”

The theory behind decentralization is simple: to shorten the distance between public service providers and private citizens, while taking advantage of local government’s ability to adapt statewide policies to local conditions (Musgrave 1983; Manor 1999: 82). However, decentralization also creates a mechanism through which central states offload responsibility for tasks it is no longer able or willing to perform—even if substate units lack adequate capacity or funding themselves (Dickovick 2011: 93). Indeed, developing states often devolve authority without first providing the necessary resources or building the requisite institutions for carrying

out those tasks; this can result in greater public corruption, rent seeking, and other negative outcomes (Fisman and Gatti 2002; Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2008). Cross-country studies have also shown that decentralization programs exacerbate regional inequalities in developing states (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra 2009), and often lead to ethnic or religious selectivity in job, contract, and other forms of benefit allocation (Horowitz 1985: 622).

Such is arguably the case with *otonomi daerah*, which was designed with the express purpose of reducing “distance” between citizens and government, increasing accountability for public officials and institutions, and streamlining Indonesia’s byzantine regulatory processes. Decentralization also seemed to fit Indonesian conditions. Because of the country’s unique archipelagic geography (in which a population of some 230 million lives scattered across 1,700 inhabited islands along an east-west axis of roughly 6000 km), Indonesians were already well accustomed to vast regional variation in social customs and cultural norms. And despite the state’s centralizing tendencies under Sukarno and Suharto, the reality of governance under such circumstances frequently necessitated compromises with local authorities and adjustments of policy and enforcement to operative local conditions (Li 2007: 365-366). In one sense, then, *otonomi daerah* simply formalized and systematized an existing and largely *ad hoc* set of administrative practices (Bertrand 2007: 592). Unsurprisingly, then, it has indeed streamlined administration and improved public service provision in a number of regions (Satriyo et al 2003).

In other areas, though, decentralization has had significant negative consequences. Hadiz (2004: 705) notes how, in areas already marked by poor service provision, decentralization has simply added “confusion about the distribution of power and authority between different levels of government”; in the worst cases, it has also led to a “tug of war” between vested interests in Jakarta and local elites, with local authorities “stuck in the middle, struggling to retain some

power and not to fall into the oblivion of political and administrative redundancy” (c.f. Buehler 2010: 280-283). Direct elections since 2005 have arguably exacerbated both rent-seeking and the weakness of local officials: without grassroots networks for voter mobilization, local candidates for office are forced to engage whomever possesses the most extensive networks in the locality—typically ethnic and religious leaders, who then demand policy favors in return. Indeed, Buehler (2013) argues that reliance on Islamic boarding school networks for voter mobilization has led mayors and regents from secular-nationalist parties to pass *sharia* bylaws at a higher rate than mayors and regents from Islamist parties. Legal complexities, for their part, have frequently bedeviled attempts for constitutional review of contentious local bylaws—particularly when framed as expressions of *sharia* or local *adat* (customary law) (Parsons and Mietzner 2009: 192).

Thus decentralization has created a dynamic in which provinces, regencies, and cities have broad leeway to interpret—and indeed deviate from—constitutional norms or policies enacted by the central government. Consequently, offloading—either by shifting responsibility for passing legislation to regional governments or by allowing regional governments to selectively enforce legislation—emerges as a potential alternative to passing or enforcing laws where both demand for passage and potential discontent are highly regionalized.¹¹

The Anti-Pornography Bill

The 2004 elections represented a post-transition high-water mark for political Islam. The major Islamist parties (PKS, PPP, and PBB) together won 18 percent of the vote—up from 14 percent in 1999, and greater than the 15 percent (2009) and 16 percent (2014) returns they would

¹¹ Indonesia is not unique in this regard: a number of current and historical states, including Nigeria, the Philippines, and pre-separation Sudan have allowed for regional variation in what laws are codified and how they are enforced (according to the religious norms of whatever faith community is in the local majority).

post in future contests. All three parties were invited to join new President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's governing coalition, through which they received high-profile cabinet positions, the parliamentary speakership, and a great deal of influence over policy.¹² Furthermore, with his own party still quite small, President Yudhoyono was forced to rely on his coalition partners for support in parliament. As a result, Indonesia's Islamist parties wielded hitherto unseen levels of political capital.

It was thus an opportune political moment to introduce an expansive and deeply divisive piece of social legislation: the Rancangan Undang Undang Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi (Proposed Law against Pornography and Pornoaction), which threatened to criminalize a far broader category of activities than just the production, distribution, and consumption of media pornography (Republic of Indonesia 2006). The 2006 Anti-Pornography Bill, as it is commonly known, was a modified version of a bill first proposed in 1999. The 1999 bill narrowly focused on a perceived lack of enforcement mechanisms vis-à-vis printed pornography (Barker 2014: 255-256).¹³ It was shelved under pressure from secular nationalists and liberal reformers, who feared the bill heralded a return to New Order-style censorship.

Not long after, though, video compact disc (VCD) pornography began surfacing in Indonesia's informal markets. The new technology lowered the cost for the distribution of film, both commercial and pirated. Professional and homemade pornographic VCD films

¹² Yudhoyono's PD and its major secular-nationalist partner, Golkar, accounted for 29 percent of the vote; the Islamist parties PKS, PPP, and PBB accounted for 18 percent; and the moderate Muslim PKB and PAN (who align with Islamists and secular-nationalists on different issues) accounted for another 17 percent.

¹³ As Barker (2014: 255-256) explains, pornography fell under the purview of the New Order-era Ministry of Information, which had the power to impose censorship restrictions or remove a media outlet's publishing license. When the Ministry of Information was eliminated as part of Reformasi, however, the state lacked bureaucratic mechanisms for enforcement of anti-pornography statutes.

consequently spread quickly among informal hawker networks, while links between informal markets and organized crime limited the police and judicial response, especially in Jakarta (Pausacker 2008; Barker 2014: 258).

The VCD “epidemic,” as perceived by conservative Muslims, was not limited to actual sex films. In the relaxed regulatory environment of post-Suharto Indonesia, several popular female singers of *dangdut* (a popular, Arabic and Bollywood-inflected form of dance music) had taken to performing suggestive dances on stage, such as Inul Daratista’s paradigmatic *goyang ngebor* (drill dance), in which the singer would turn her back to the audience and move her buttocks in a circular motion. These and other performances were distributed by VCD to adoring, mostly male and Muslim fans. Inul, who became a particular focus of conservative ire, is estimated to have sold between 3 and 10 million VCDs during the years 2000-3—an astonishing number when one considers that previous sales figures for individual *dangdut* artists peaked at 500,000 (Heryanto 2008: 16). Conservative anxieties over pornography grew, taking on the characteristics of a moral panic. Yet now, with the uptick in votes for Islamist and conservative Muslim parties during the 2004 elections (coupled with the degree to which President Yudhoyono depended upon Muslim parties for parliamentary support), some sensed an opportunity to revive the moribund draft bill.

The revised bill introduced in 2006 ignited a massive controversy upon its introduction. Images or video displaying nudity and/or sexual acts, of course, were already illegal in Indonesia, but they could be easily obtained from hawkers in the informal markets. Had the draft bill primarily aimed at strengthening enforcement mechanisms, it likely would have passed with little controversy. But the new bill greatly expanded what could be considered pornographic. The category of prohibitable acts including recordings of “erotic dance performances,” regardless of

whether nudity was involved (article 6), and recordings of adults kissing on the lips (article 7). Of greater concern were the ways the proposed law also sought to criminalize public behaviors, in often troublingly vague language, and outside commonly accepted norms of what constituted “nudity” or “sexual acts,” including prohibitions on “showing sensual body parts” (article 25) and public kissing on the lips (article 27). The law furthermore stipulated massive fines and significant jail sentences for violators (Republic of Indonesia 2006).¹⁴

Support for the proposed law, unsurprisingly, came primarily from parliament’s Islamist and conservative parties. Clearly they—and the PKS in particular—felt it was time to flex political muscle, drawing support for the bill both from other Muslim parties and from political allies, like Yudyohono’s PD, which was dependent on the PKS for support in parliament. However, the bill attracted a broad array of critics. These included representatives of tourist areas like Bali, who worried that the bill’s specification of “erotic dance,” lip kissing, and the poorly defined “showing of sensual body parts” would drive tourists away and collapse local economies still reeling from the aftereffects of the 2002 Bali Bombings (and a second attack in 2005). The critics also included Islamic liberals, political progressives, women’s rights groups, and members of Indonesia’s religious minorities, all of whom saw the bill as imposing the moral sensibilities of a conservative (Muslim) minority on all Indonesians and, as such, eroding religious pluralism. And they included educators and health service providers, who felt the law could infringe upon medical education and family planning services; and activists from local communities who feared the bill would criminalize traditional practices and dress.

¹⁴ As article 81 states, “anyone who [engages in] lip kissing while in public as referred to in Article 27, paragraph 1 (a), shall be punished with imprisonment of a minimum of 1 (one) year and not later than 5 (five) years [in jail] and/or fined at least Rp.100,000,000 (one hundred million rupiah) and at most Rp.500.000.000 (five hundred million rupiah).” This sum is roughly equivalent to \$10,000-50,000 at the 2006 exchange rate, an insurmountable sum for most Indonesians.

Open conflict of this kind is anathema to the cartel system, which depends on collusion and consensus making. This is not to say that Indonesian party relations are fissure-free. But the deepest fissures center on clashing personal ambitions, such as the decade-long feud between former presidents Megawati and Yudhoyono (sparked by Yudhoyono's 2004 decision to leave his former ally's party and challenge her for the presidency).¹⁵ Most parties try to avoid open conflict on policy, and back off quickly once it appears. Given the scope of opposition, however, the Anti-Pornography Bill threatened a major rupture. Passage, in this draft form, was sure to alienate constituents of the major secular-nationalist parties, as well as many supporters of the PKB (the largest Muslim party in parliament, and a party that often aligns with secular nationalists on policy issues). But failure to pass the bill would alienate conservative Muslims, endanger Yudhoyono's governing coalition, and potentially create a situation in which future collusion would grow difficult.

With the draft bill in peril, the Muslim civic organization Muhammadiyah interjected itself into the process, mediating a series of talks between legislators, religious leaders, and rights activists aiming to forge a compromise (*The Jakarta Post* 2006a). In a closed-door meeting with U.S. embassy officials, Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth) Chairman Muhammad Izzul Muslimin stated that Muhammadiyah had even submitted its own revised draft through a legislator on the draft committee who was also a member of the organization (U.S. Embassy to the Republic of Indonesia 2006). By contrast, the draft bill split NU, with Chairman Hasyim Muzadi in support and influential former chairman Abdurrahman Wahid in opposition.

¹⁵ More recent examples include the 2014 presidential election or the on-going leadership dispute within Golkar, all driven by clashing personal ambitions and not by coherent policy differences.

On the one hand, this internal split limited NU participation in consensus making. On the other, it added a sense of urgency from within the organization for a compromise to be found.¹⁶

In 2008, lawmakers introduced a new draft bill, retitled *Rancangan Undang Undang Pornografi* (Proposed Law on Pornography) (Republic of Indonesia 2008). The revised bill more narrowly defined pornography in terms of explicit nudity and sexual acts (excluding the contentious criminalization of lip kissing, as well as the expansively defined “erotic dance” and “showing of sensual body parts”); lowered jail sentences associated with production and consumption of pornographic goods; protected traditional cultural use of nudity and “suggestive” dress/dance; allowed for the use of nudity and sexual acts in productions for educational or health services use; and eliminated all references to “pornoaction” (the catch-all term critics feared would criminalize otherwise accepted personal behaviors, such as kissing in public, wearing traditional clothing, or performing “suggestive” dances, such as the traditional Sundanese *jaipong* or singer Inul’s *goyang ngebor*).¹⁷

Crucially, the revised bill also eliminated the proposed national mechanism of enforcement, the *Badan Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi Nasional* (National Anti-Pornography and Pornoaction Agency, BAPPN). Instead, existing national and local government agencies

¹⁶ Muzadi framed his support of the bill as a defense of political and social stability, stating: “corrupting the morals and interests of the nation is also [a form of] anarchy. So, people who damage the morale of the nation can be said to be anarchists” (NU Online 2006a).

¹⁷ Many critics still consider the Bill—even in this revised form—to be “draconian” (e.g. Pausacker 2008). One critique centers on the law’s allowance for the involvement of non-state actors in enforcement (Bellows 2011). These concerns are understandable, given the recent history of vigilantism by “street Islamist” groups. However the law itself restricts public involvement to relatively mundane, above-ground actions: reporting suspicious behavior to police, educating the public on the supposed dangers of pornography, and bringing civil lawsuits against alleged producers/distributors of pornographic materials. As in other cases, vigilantism in anti-pornography enforcement is outside the bounds of the law, but is often tolerated by weak and underfunded agents of the state. Whether anti-pornography vigilantism has increased (or decreased) since the law’s passage is unclear.

would share enforcement responsibilities (articles 17-19). Practically speaking, though, the institutional structure of decentralized Indonesia meant that national law enforcement's role would be limited to the blocking access to pornographic websites, reducing importation of pornographic goods into Indonesia, and closing down large-scale pornographic production/distribution enterprises. Day-to-day enforcement would fall to the provinces and regencies (Republic of Indonesia 2008).

The shift was significant for several reasons. First, the revised bill was much less expansive than before, and no longer sought to criminalize everyday practices. Second, with legislators and jurists clarifying that common tourist and traditional practices would be exempt from censure, the bill was much less likely to either scare off foreign visitors or sow discord in the outer provinces.¹⁸ Third, by eliminating BADDN and shifting enforcement responsibility to the provinces, regencies and municipalities, the revised bill implicitly allowed for regional variation in degree of enforcement. Indeed, several provincial governments, Bali most prominently among them, simply refused to enforce the new law. As then-governor I Made Pastika stated in early 2009:

The governor is obligated to listen to and fulfill the aspirations of the people who chose him. This is also true in the area of law enforcement...If the people reject a law, that means the law is inconsistent with the aspirations of the people. In a true democracy, the aspirations of the people are the priority. For the people of Bali, it's not only what's written but also what's moral and ethical (Creagh 2009).

Notably, neither Pastika nor any provincial authorities (inside or outside Bali) faced censure for noncompliance with the new law—a tacit admission by the central state that it would defer to the provinces, regencies, and municipalities. But the central state also refused to step in

¹⁸ Officials even confirmed that bikinis would be considered “acceptable attire on Indonesian beaches” (Agence France Press 2008).

and enforce the law itself. This, in and of itself, constituted an unspoken second dimension of the parliamentary compromise. As one PKS cadre recalled in 2011:

We were, of course, happy that the law passed. It was a major goal of [PKS] and the other Islamic parties, and already it is proving effective. Before it was quite easy to obtain pornographic materials, and now it is almost impossible—look at Glodok [a North Jakarta market district], or the black markets. Once there were so many pornographic [films] for sale. So the law is a success, even if it is weaker than what we originally proposed. Even if some regions don't want to implement it.

You have to put [the compromise] in context. We had debated this law for some years, and it was clear that certain regions would never support it—some areas, like Bali, that are dependent on Western tourism, and some areas where cultural practices are not modern, like Papua. And, yes, there were [parliamentarians] who wanted the National Police to take over enforcement in these regions, on the grounds that the law was passed for all Indonesia. But really not so many. Most, I think, did not want to continue the fight, especially those from the [secular nationalist parties], as [the debate] had put them in a difficult position. So I am sure they understood [the implications of the compromise], as we did.... Ultimately, that was acceptable for us—a way to pass the law and [maintain] good conditions.¹⁹

A representative of the PPP made an even more explicit connection to collusion:

Even among [the Muslim parties], many thought that it was good enough to enforce the law in areas where Muslims are the majority and are educated in religion. We were afraid of pushing too far...[and] that's not how Indonesian politics work—if you have no allies, you will find yourself outside....²⁰

Thus the consensus-making process that turned the 2006 Proposed Law against Pornography and Pornoaction into the much more limited 2008 Law on Pornography both reflected and served to maintain the integrity of the cartel party system. Indonesia's Muslim civic organizations, and Muhammadiyah in particular, facilitated the consensus-making process. This allowed for a narrowing compromise that simultaneously appeared “sufficiently Islamic” to conservatives, while reducing the law's punitive impact on practices widespread among liberal,

¹⁹ Interview with PKS official, Jakarta 2011.

²⁰ Interview with PPP official, Jakarta 2011.

secular, and heterodox Muslims, traditional communities, foreign visitors and expatriates, and religious minorities. Decentralization, meanwhile, allowed the central state to offload enforcement to regional governments. Offloading, in turn, allowed areas where community standards differed from the Indonesian baseline to simply ignore whatever parts of the law conflicted with those standards. This had the effect of regionalizing future contestation over the enforcement of anti-pornography statutes.

At the same time, the government *did* pass a version of the bill, however watered down, over the protests of its religious minorities, traditional communities, and rights advocates. And while some authorities chose not to enforce the bill, others decided to enforce the law as if it had been passed in its more contentious draft form. In the West Javanese capital of Bandung, for example, local authorities used the law to crack down on “sexy” (i.e. bikini-clad) and traditional *jaipong* dancing—even though the revised bill had eliminated all references to “porno-action.” The move, by a mayor from the secular-nationalist Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party, PD), attracted broad support from conservative Muslims. The sitting chairman of MUI for West Java linked the move to broader efforts to Islamize the province: “we are trying to eliminate the non-Islamic parts of West Java’s traditional culture, to make it more Islamic” (Onishu 2010). The process of contention and compromise at the level of the state thus contributed to the regionalization of Islam-based restrictions on public behavior.

The Debate over the Ahmadiyah

Beginning in 2005, Islamist and conservative Muslim organizations also began pressing the government to ban the “heretical” Ahmadiyah sect. Crucially, in this case pressure did not come primarily from Islamist and conservative Muslim political parties (though the PPP did

inject itself into the process), but from (1) violent “street Islamist” organizations like the Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) and (2) the quasi-official Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama, MUI), which since the 1980s has displayed a distinctly conservative ideological orientation.²¹ However, after a series of violent incidents (provoked by FPI and likeminded groups), debate over the legal status of the Ahmadiyah and their relationship to Islam trickled up to legislative debate. More than any other issue, these debates dominated public discourses on Islam and pluralism during the years 2005-2011.

The Ahmadiyah, or followers of the teachings of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, trace their roots to late 19th century India. There has been an Ahmadi presence in Indonesia since 1924, when a missionary team from India traveled to Yogyakarta to attend the 13th Muhammadiyah conference. In 1928, several prominent Javanese *ulama* (with close ties to both Muhammadiyah and NU) founded the precursor of today’s Jama’ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Adhmadiyah Community of Indonesia, JAI) (Budiwanti 2009: 12).

The objections of orthodox Sunni Muslims to the Ahmadiyah are theological, and center on the role attributed by the sect to its founder, Mirza Ghulan Ahmad. The largest international Ahmadi congregation, al-Jamā’ah al-Islāmīyyah al-Ahmadīyyah (Ahmadiyah Muslim Community, JIA) believes that Jesus will not return on Judgment Day, as Sunni Islam teaches,

²¹ FPI was founded in 1998 in order to oppose student protests and support the presidency of B.J. Habibie. It then evolved into a *preman* (thug or gangster) organization that combined extortion rackets with symbolic Islamism (Wilson 2006). After 2004, however, it expanded across Indonesia and became a more overtly political organization, using protests and violence to pressure local governments into adopting *sharia*-based by laws and/or restricting the activities of religious minorities. MUI, by contrast, is a state-funded but functionally autonomous consultative body that controls the lucrative *halal* food certification program and issues nonbinding *fatwas*, or religious decrees, on an array of religious issues. See Chapter One for a more detailed discussion of both organizations’ origins, and Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of how these organizations cooperate to promote anti-pluralist policies on the regional and local level.

but rather that his spirit is embodied in the person and teachings of Ahmad.²² This claim is based upon Quranic verse 61:6, which states that an “apostle” would come after the Prophet, bearing the name “Ahmad”:

And when Jesus son of Mary said, ‘O Children of Israel! Indeed I am the apostle of Allah to you, to confirm what is before me of the Torah, and to give the good news of an apostle who will come after me, whose name is Ahmad.’ Yet when he brought them manifest proofs, they said, ‘This is plain magic.’ (Surah 61: 6).

In another departure from Sunni orthodoxy, JIA Ahmadiyah do not believe that the Antichrist, or *dajjal*, will be defeated in the cataclysmic battle predicted in orthodox Sunni eschatology, but rather will be defeated peacefully, over time, by the power of Ahmad’s teachings. Finally, followers of the JIA believe that Ahmad is not just the *mahdi* of Islam, but the *promised savior of all religions*. Unlike orthodox Islamic universalism (or Christian universalism, for that matter), this framing confers at least some legitimacy on eschatology outside the Abrahamic tree, arguably including polytheistic faiths. In Ahmad’s words:

God wills that of all the souls that inhabit the different parts of the world—whether it be Europe or Asia—those who are pure should be drawn towards Unity, and that His creatures should be united in one faith (quoted in Dard 2008: xvi).²³

Each of these theological claims runs counter to Sunni orthodoxy—so much so that the JIA interpretation of Islam is arguably as different from mainstream Indonesian Islam as

²² In Ahmad’s words, “Give heed to the voice from the heavens: 'The Messiah has come! The Messiah has come!' Listen also to the words of the earth: 'The Leader of the age is here!' From the heavens doth come a shower of mighty signs, and the earth Declares that now is the appointed time. For me the two bear witness, and cry aloud, as a restless wind that won't be stilled” (Ahmad, quoted in Dard 2008: 1).

²³ As Dard (2008: xiv-xv), an Ahmadi imam, writes: “He was the Messiah for the Christians and Muslims, Krishna for the Hindus, Buddha for the Buddhists, etc. The Second Coming of all of whom was prophesied in their respective scriptures. The mission of the Promised Messiah and Mahdi was to bring about the renaissance of Islam, to bring all the followers of the various religions into the fold of Islam and to establish its supremacy over all other religions, ideologies and creeds.”

Mormonism is from mainline American Protestantism. Complicating matters, though, the largest Indonesian Ahmadi association, the Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI), is not affiliated with the JIA. Instead, it follows the schismatic Qadiani School, which contends that Ahmad is *not* the actual messiah or latter-day prophet, but rather a unique source of “wisdom” (Crouch 2009: 5). According to provincial JAI leader H. Saeful Uyun, the JAI teaches that Ahmad is *nabi zili* (shadow representation of a real prophet), thus framing Ahmad as a *special kind of teacher* rather than prophet or messiah:

It is like when we see ourselves on the mirror, the picture that reflects on the glass is not us. It is a reflection of the real one standing in front of the mirror. And so the [JAI] Ahmadi see [Ahmad] as a prophet in [a] metaphorical sense, like the reflected body on the mirror. As a prophet in [a] metaphorical sense he is acting as a silhouette of the final prophet. This means that the main role of [Ahmad] does not at all replace Muhammad as the final messenger, but rather passing on Muhammad’s teachings to the generation during and after his life. As the silhouette of the final prophet, he does not bring new [*sharia*]. Instead he carries on Islamic teachings brought by Muhammad (quoted in Budiwanti 2009: 4).

Despite the JAI’s rejection of Ahmad’s prophethood, few orthodox Muslim leaders in Indonesia accept the Ahmadiyah as legitimately Islamic (Menchik 2014: 593). Instead, much of the Indonesian debate on the Ahmadiyah has centered on whether the sect should be considered an *aliran sesat* (deviant or heretical sect) within Islam or an entirely different religion altogether. Being designated as an *aliran sesat* would mean that Ahmadi teachings would be subject to legal censure by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, or even prohibited under Indonesia’s relatively expansive blasphemy laws. Being designated as a separate religion, meanwhile, would theoretically convey the rights and protections afforded to recognized religious communities. But it would also require the Ahmadiyah to completely disavow their connection to Islam, which they are not willing to do (as Ahmadi consider themselves to be Muslims). And it would require the state to grant official recognition to the faith, which is inconceivable at this point.

Though opposition to Ahmadi teachings has existed since the sect was first introduced to Indonesia, the Ahmadiyah have not faced a persistent campaign of persecution until relatively recently. As Budiwanti (2009) notes, from the 1920s to the 1960s, orthodox Sunni leaders condemned but mostly ignore the sect. For example, the 1929 Muhammadiyah Congress issued a statement declaring Ahmadi beliefs contrary to Islam, its followers apostates, and banning their teachings from use by members of Muhammadiyah. However, neither this declaration, nor similar ones issued by NU, led to widespread persecution of Ahmadis in these organizations' Central and East Javanese heartlands (12). And in most times and places since independence, Ahmadis have been left to their own devices, and treated with a studied form of casual ambivalence (Platzdasch 2011: 3).²⁴

Things began to change in the 1970s. Flush with oil revenue, Saudi Arabia had taken to using the Rabita al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League) as a tool for expanding its influence across the Muslim world, most notably through efforts to promote the austere *salafism* of the Arabian Peninsula and eradicate “impure” beliefs and practices. At its annual conference in 1974, the World Muslim League declared the Ahmadiyah to be “a subversive movement against Islam and the Muslim world, which falsely and deceitfully claims to be an Islamic sect; who under the guise of Islam and for the sake of mundane interests contrives and plans to damage the very foundations of Islam” (Bashir 2000).²⁵ In response, the League recommended that the

²⁴ This is, of course, a matter of some debate among Indonesia scholars. Menchik (2016: 66-67) argues that there is clear historical pattern of persecution since the sect's emergence in Indonesia. However, the incidents of persecution (up to 2005) appear isolated, lending credence to Budiwanti (2009) and Platzdasch's (2011) theory of sporadic, ad hoc persecution set against a norm of casual or ambivalent toleration.

²⁵ The declaration further accused the Ahmadiyah movement of being a creation of British Imperialism, harboring “deep associations and cooperation with the anti Islamic forces” and operating schools and orphanages “wherein the people are taught and trained as to how they can be more anti Islamic in their activities” (Bashir 2000).

Ahmadiyah be confined “to their schools, institutions, and orphanages only,” “declared non-Muslims and ousted from the fold of Islam” barred from the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, “boycotted socially, economically, and culturally,” barred from marriage to orthodox Muslims, kept out of Islamic cemeteries, and “treated like other non-Muslims. The declaration further urged all Muslim majority states to impose restrictions on the Ahmadiyah, declare them to be “a non-Muslim minority,” and bar them from “any post of responsibility” (Bashir 2000).

Urging from the League aside, the 1970s were not exactly fertile ground for religious “purification” campaigns in Indonesia. However, in 1980 the quasi-official MUI issued a *fatwa* declaring the Ahmadiyah to be a “deviant sect” (*aliran sesat*), though the *fatwa* did not make any specific call for action (Olle 2009: 106). Some conservative *ulama* and Islamic organizations subsequently called on Suharto to ban the sect. Suharto declined to take action, ending political debate for the moment (Platzdasch 2011: 3-4). A year after MUI’s *fatwa*, though, the Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent a letter to Indonesia’s Ministry of Religious Affairs, strongly encouraging the office to issue an injunction against the group, both on the grounds that it deviated from accepted Islamic beliefs and practices and because the Ahmadiyah “support imperialism and Zionism” (Embassy of Saudi Arabia to the Republic of Indonesia 1981; c.f. Platzdasch 2011: 3-4). These efforts produced marginal successes only. Crouch (2009) notes that, during the years 1976-2005, 16 regencies/municipalities (out of 439) and 2 provinces (of 34) placed restrictions on Ahmadi activities (typically proselytizing or distributing pamphlets). But these successes were, as the proportions suggest, isolated and limited.

In 2005, MUI reissued its *fatwa* against the Ahmadiyah. This time the *fatwa* had three major points:

1. To “reaffirm the MUI *fatwa* of 1980 Congress II” that declared the Ahmadiyah as being “outside Islam, heretical, and misleading.”

2. To call for those who belong to Ahmadi organizations or follow Ahmadi teachings “to immediately return to the teachings of Islam...based on the Quran and hadiths.”
3. To declare that “it is incumbent upon the government to prohibit the dissemination of Ahmadiyah ideology throughout all of Indonesia, freeze the organization, and all sites of [Ahmadiyah] activity” (MUI 2005b).

This represented a broader shift in how MUI operated. Under Suharto, it existed to advise the government, anticipate and counteract potential areas of Islam-based dissent, and provide “Islamic” legitimacy to government policies; now it was actively pressuring the government to adopt policies in line with a distinctly conservative understanding of what Islam “is” and “is not,” as well as an activist conception of how religious authorities should participate in policymaking (Olle 2009: 106-107). MUI framed its statement on the “heretical” beliefs and practices of the Ahmadiyah both as a defense of orthodox Islam and a response to the potential for “anarchy” resulting from the free expression of ideas deemed “heretical” or “blasphemous” to orthodox Muslims, even using “the threat of ‘anarchy’ to create an ideological synergy with groups conducting violent attacks on heretics” (ibid 111).²⁶ Though MUI officially disapproved of violence, Olle notes that its “solution” to violence against groups like the Ahmadiyah was always “to ban the group that [has] been attacked rather than punish the attackers” (ibid 111).

An arc of violence against the Ahmadiyah began in 2006, on the tourist-friendly island of Lombok. Local authorities had actually preceded the MUI *fatwa* in banning any organized activities by or on behalf of Ahmadi congregations (Crouch 2009: 11-12). And violence against the Ahmadiyah was already more common on Lombok than elsewhere in Indonesia, a recurrent, albeit sporadic, feature during the years 1989-2006 (Kingsley 2012). But it clearly intensified after MUI’s *fatwa*. Local religious leaders, known colloquially as Tuan Guru, began stirring up anti-Ahmadi sentiment, characterizing the Ahmadiyah as “enemies of the faith” (*musuh aqidah*),

²⁶ Wilson (2008: 205) goes one step farther, calling the relationship between MUI and violent “street Islamist” organizations (and FPI in particular) *symbiotic*.

and encouraging attacks by followers on Ahmadi mosques, schools, housing complexes, and even orphanages (Budiwanti 2007: 17).²⁷

The violence—and subsequent reaction from local authorities, which seemed to legitimate the violence—provoked a strong response from pro-pluralism advocates. Former president and NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid declared that MUI should be held responsible for the violence (Budiwanti 2009: 19). And on June 1, 2008, members of the Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan (National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief, AKKBB) held a demonstration at Jakarta’s National Monument (MONAS) in defense of religious freedom on the behalf of the Ahmadiyah (and other minority groups and sects). However, in an act that shocked the Indonesia public, members of FPI attacked the protesters (Hutabarat 2008; BBC Indonesia 2008; Sutarto 2008).²⁸

The vast majority of political figures and Islamic leaders condemned the violence, and a series of arrests followed. However, the government stopped short of banning FPI, whose leader defiantly declared a “war” against the Ahmadiyah that would be fought “until our last drop of

²⁷ Attacks in the provincial capital of Mataram displaced 138 Ahmadis; a second set of attacks, in Central Lombok, displaced another 67 individuals. Since 2007 both sets of refugees have been denied the right to return to their former settlements and have instead lived under decrepit conditions in “temporary” shelters run by the military (Budiwanti 2009:18-9).

²⁸ As one eyewitness recounted, “the field coordinator...ordered us to sit down in hope that the situation would be cooling down and as a sign that we would not do any harm to them. Yet [FPI] kept marching on to us, and suddenly beat all of us with bamboo sticks of 3-4 meters long. The situation got into panic and [we] scampered in fear. Many of [the victims] were women and there were also children. Some of them were stuck in the corner and being beaten repeatedly for several times. Some others got surrounded by 3-5 person and being awfully beaten and brought to the ground. Their heads shed blood in front of their sons and beloved ones. As if that was not enough, [FPI] burned our posters and damaged the truck and sound systems that we were about to use before the incident. ‘Allahu Akbar...Allahu Akbar...(Great is God)’ they cried while doing that without even realizing that they had done something miserable and brought disgrace to the noble face of Islam. Many of [us] are Moslem too, yet [we] are suffering from the injury caused by the FPI” (Hutabarat 2008).

blood” (Mandari 2008).²⁹ Notably, just a week after the Monas incident, the government issued a Joint Ministerial Decree outlawing proselytizing by Ahmadis. However, it stopped short of banning Ahmadi organizations or criminalizing beliefs/practices (Scherpen 2013: 323).

A second violent incident, in 2011, took place in the town of Cikeusik in Banten Province. Like the Monas incident, this attack was also caught on video and widely circulated across Indonesia. Though details are hazy, most accounts suggest that a number of male Ahmadis had gathered at the home of a local resident, Parman, after which a much larger number of Sunni Muslim protesters converged on the house and attacked those inside. Six Ahmadis died in the attack (*Republika* 2011a). Like the Monas incident, Cikeusik provoked broad expressions of abhorrence against the violence from Indonesia’s political elite—and indeed from most Indonesians, regardless of how they felt about the Ahmadiyah (Saragih 2011).³⁰

Yet attention soon focused on the victims rather than the perpetrators. Quoted in the Muslim-oriented newspaper *Republika*, Banten Chief of Police Brigadier Agus Kusnadi suggested the attackers, victims, and police shared blame for the violence, citing unspecified “provocations” by local Ahmadis (*Republika* 2011b). Ahmad Zainuddin, an MP from the moderate Islamist PKS, called on the police to “process [all individuals under investigation] fairly, thoroughly, and fast...including from the Ahmadiyah” (Hidayatullah News 2011). An Indonesian court would eventually convict JAI “Chief of Security” Deden Sudjana for refusing a police order to evacuate the house and possessing dangerous weapons (*Antara* 2011a). Though

²⁹ Allies alleged a U.S.-led conspiracy against Islam, targeting FPI and other “defenders” of Islam on behalf of the Ahmadiyah (Kompas 2008a). During his 2008 trial, Munarman, the operational leader of the attack, adopted a somewhat different approach, suggesting the violence was “no [more significant] than the brawls between schoolchildren that frequently occur in Jakarta” (Kompas 2008b).

³⁰ The Indonesian Embassy in Great Britain catalogued some of the outcry against the violence from elected officials and prominent Muslim leaders (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Kingdom 2011).

twelve attackers were also convicted of assault, destruction of property, and possession of dangerous weapons, there were no murder convictions and no sentences exceeding six months, despite the killing of six Ahmadihs having been captured on video (HRW 2011a).

Of greater *political* concern, however, were potential reactions from Minister of Religion and PPP chief Suryadharma Ali, who had called for banning the sect in October 2010 (*The Jakarta Post* 2010a).³¹ This time, however, Ali declined to use his executive position to lobby for a ban, publicly stating that his position as Minister of Religious Affairs created a conflict of interest (Scherpen 2013: 327). The debate moved to the representative assembly of parliament, where the major Islamist parties (PPP, PKS, and PBB) within the governing coalition called for a ban on all Ahmadi organizations and activities. Only the opposition PDI-P opposed one, while the other parties vacillated between these positions (Platzdash 2011: 17).³²

The problem, from the perspective of the governing coalition's non-Islamist parties, was that the Indonesian constitution included the following provision: "the state will guarantee the freedom of every resident to adhere to their respective religion and to perform their religious duties in accordance with their religion and faith" (As'ad 2009: 392). Indonesia was also a signatory to multiple international treaties guaranteeing freedom of religion, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (As'ad 2009: 391) and the 2005 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Scherpen 2013: 324). Banning the Ahmadiyah would not only violate the terms of all three; it would also likely attract international condemnation and upset key trade relationships.

³¹ Ali claimed Ahmadi veneration of Ahmad was "in basic contradiction with Islam," further stating that "if that is what is called freedom of worship then that freedom has gone too far."

³² It has also come to light, through Wikileaks, that the Saudi government was actively pressuring the Indonesian government and its Muslim organizations at this time to ban the Ahmadiyah (*Republika* 2015).

Yet neither was the issue clear-cut. “Freedom of religion,” after all, is more narrowly defined in Indonesia than in Western democracies, and exists in tension with protections for (orthodox) religions against “blasphemy” (an amorphous term that some interpret to include “heretical” beliefs and non-normative practices). Consequently, outright opposition to the ban was likely to alienate “Islamic” constituents, divide the governing coalition, and upset the cartel dynamics that produce stability in the Indonesian democratic system (and provide financial benefits to its participants). As with the Anti-Pornography Bill, then, there were thus clear incentives for compromise—if such a compromise could be found.

Muhammadiyah, which played consensus maker in the case of the Anti-Pornography Bill, attempted to chart a middle path between its theological opposition to Ahmadis referring to themselves Muslim and a desire to avoid additional conflict and violence. To that end, Muhammadiyah reiterated its belief that the Ahmadiyah were a deviant sect, but stated that it would not join the movement to ban the group (*Antara* 2011a; *The Jakarta Post* 2011b). Instead, it called on the JAI to register as a new (i.e. non-Islamic) religion, similar to the Baha’i (Scherpen 2013: 340-342). Yet, as mentioned above, this was unacceptable to the Ahmadiyah and was resisted by human rights NGOs and other public advocates for minority rights, including from within Muhammadiyah. This particular compromise solution was thus dead in the water.

With Muhammadiyah opting out of further direct involvement on the issue, NU assumed the consensus-maker’s role at this crucial stage. This constituted a shift of position: the 2005 *fatwa*’s principle architect, Ma’ruf Amin, was (and is) a prominent figure within NU; and in its own 2008 *fatwa*, the organization, under then-chairman Hasyim Muzadi, had urged the government to take a “firm and consistent stand” against Ahmadiyah activities (NU 2008; c.f. Scherpen 2013: 337). However, in 2010 NU had elected a new set of leaders; Muzadi’s

replacement, Said Aqil Siradj, decided to send Masdar Farid Mas'udi to clarify the organization's case to parliament. Choosing Mas'udi was symbolic in and of itself: he was a long-time proponent of pluralism and human rights protections for religious minorities, and had even publicly criticized Muzadi's support for the ministerial decree. What's more, in his testimony, Mas'udi declared that "humans are not entitled to judge whether a person's beliefs are heretical or not." This signaled that, while NU might not approve of the Ahmadiyah, it opposed an outright ban on the sect. Instead, Mas'udi suggested Indonesian Muslims "correct [the Ahmadiyah] gently. As it is said in the Quran, invite those who understand differently from us, with *dakwah*, with good counsel. If [these] are not effective, argue politely with them. If [their] views are unchangeable, then it is already in God's hands" (*Kompas* 2011b).

Official NU policy coalesced along these lines, combining a view of Ahmadiyah teachings as outside *ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah*³³ with steadfast refusal to declare the Ahmadiyah a deviant sect, on the grounds that such a declaration would fuel violence (Scherpen 2013: 335-336). And powerful forces within NU, such as those aligned with Abdurrahman Wahid and influential Central Javanese *kyai* Ahmad Mustofa Bisri (popularly known as Gus Mus), were vociferous in opposition to the bill. At the same time, many local chapters did support restrictions on Ahmadi activities. This was even the case in East Java, where NU's paramilitary wing, Banser, had for years both protected Ahmadi congregations from violence and unilaterally imposed limits on Ahmadi proselytizing (Bush and Munaway-Rachman 2014: 29-30). A survey conducted by Menchik (2016: 20), furthermore, demonstrated that support for anti-Ahmadiyah restrictions was widespread among branch-level leaders of NU (and Muhammadiyah)—even

³³ The term *ahlus sunnah wal jama'ah* literally means "people of the Sunnah and the Islamic community." It is sometimes used to denote Sunni Islam generally, but it is also used by traditionalists, such as from NU, to delineate traditionalists (i.e. followers of the four medieval *mazhab*) from modernists.

among those who strongly believed in religious protections for non-Muslims. As liberal NU activist Ulil Abshar Abdallah stated in a 2011 interview:

There's an implicit threat in the idea of the Ahmadiyah, perhaps not to regular people, but to the people who are inculcating ideology into people. That is to say, there's an implied attack on the central tenets of Islam from the Ahmadiyah, whereas one can come to an accommodation with a Christian or a Hindu, as if there are two hermetically sealed spaces that don't necessarily overlap.³⁴

Consensus making by NU, then, did not reflect an organizational prerogative to uphold a vision of pluralism that extended to “heretical” sects within Islam. Nor, however, was it solely an attempt to preserve stability in the political system. As informants within the organization explained, NU's position reflected a desire to achieve “harmony” within the organization as well as across society at large.³⁵ To do so, it sought to balance *theological* opposition to “incorrect” Ahmadi teachings, stressed by one faction, with *political* opposition to a state-enforced ban, stressed by the other. By inserting itself into the political process, NU signaled that it wanted the government's to find a solution that would preserve and not upend the status quo in statewide-level politics—in both the delicately balanced cartel relations (which, it should be mentioned, directly involved a number of major NU personnel) and in the practice of religious pluralism.

NU's intervention had an immediate and powerful effect. Several major political parties that had initially indicated support for the ban began moving away from that position, and toward NU's. Golkar announced that it supported turning the 2008 ministerial decree outlawing Ahmadi *proselytizing* into a formal law, but would not support an *organizational* ban (Hapsari 2011). Meanwhile, the PKB—which drew primarily from NU for support—suggested replacing talk of a statewide ban with “dialogue” and perhaps even a new, “umbrella law” that could

³⁴ Interview with Ulil Abshar Abdallah, Jakarta, 2011.

³⁵ Interviews, Jakarta and Surabaya 2010-2011.

simultaneously “regulate” Ahmadi activities while preserving religious freedom and “harmony” (Scherpen 2013: 326-327). Support for an outright ban was dissolving.

As with the Anti-Pornography Bill, though, the government’s compromise solution shifted responsibility to the regions—a move that allowed conservative regions to ban the Ahmadiyah while still allowing the government to claim it had not violated any constitutional or international treaty commitments to pluralism, freedom of religion, or civil/human rights at the state level.³⁶ On February 28, 2011, a mere three weeks after the Cikeusik incident, East Java banned all religious activity by or on behalf of the Ahmadiyah, a decree that criminalized Ahmadi proselytizing, identification or formal association of mosques or schools with Ahmadi organizations or teachings, and use of electronic and social media to spread Ahmadi teachings (HRW 2011b). In March, Banten, West Java, and South Sulawesi followed suit (Crouch 2012). And by the end of 2011, 25 regencies and municipalities had also passed bylaws restricting the organizations and activities of local Ahmadiyah (Nurbaiti 2011).³⁷

It should be noted that most of Indonesia’s provinces, regencies, and cities declined to ban the Ahmadiyah. But Ahmadi congregations continue to face harassment and violence in areas where their activities were circumscribed. For example, in August, 2011, 50 members of FPI’s Makassar, South Sulawesi chapter assaulted local Ahmadis as they attended Friday prayers (*The Jakarta Post* 2011b); and in 2012, a mob in Cianjur, West Java attacked and vandalized an Ahmadi mosque, though there were no casualties (Dipa 2012).

³⁶ Parliament did, in response to Cikeusik and the Ahmadiyah debate, revive an older “religious tolerance” bill. Human rights organizations once again decried the bill as predicating “harmony” over “rights” and, as such, potentially perpetuating intolerance and the marginalization of religious minorities (McCoy 2013). But it’s unclear how seriously lawmakers took the bill—as with its previous iterations, nothing came of it. One might even conclude nothing was intended to come of it.

³⁷ As mentioned above, this is a significant, albeit still relatively small proportion of Indonesia’s 34 provinces, 405 regencies (*kabupaten*), and 97 cities.

Conclusion

Debates over the Anti-Pornography Bill and the proposed statewide ban on the Ahmadiyah sect reveal a distinctly patterned political process for managing contention on issues that are perceived to threaten Indonesia's system of religious pluralism. Because post-transition Indonesia's judicial and enforcement apparatuses are demonstrably weak, the stakes of contention over such issues are extremely high. However, Indonesia's political parties are rather more likely to engage in compromise and consensus making than zero-sum, all-or-nothing contention on matters of policy (even when the chances for success are relatively high, or where there are opportunities to expand support relative to the larger secular-nationalist parties). This is because contentious legislation poses a risk to the overall system of cartel relations, which are maintained by reciprocity and ensure a wide distribution of patronage among partners. Thus even the most hardline parties seated in parliament—the Islamists on the one hand, and the secular-nationalist PDI-P on the other—are willing to participate in the process.

At moments when the system is at risk, however, the powerful civic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah are likely to act as consensus makers by drawing the contending parties toward compromise solutions. The reasons how and why they are able to perform this role are complex and variegated. To begin, their membership rolls crosscut with those of all the major parties, giving them unusually high levels of influence over policymakers. What's more, both embrace the rhetoric of "moderate Islam," a highly normative term, but one that nevertheless signals a preference for middle positions and aversion to "extreme" views. And certainly both understand that successful brokerage both reflects and enhances their prestige and influence—affirming their centrality to the political process. Perhaps most importantly, NU and

Muhammadiyah contain their own internal contradictions and factional disputes, meaning that internal organizational solidarity is also threatened by contentious legislation on pluralism issues. This turns consensus making into an act of self-preservation. Unfortunately, it also places pressure on regional and local chapters of these organizations, which then face similar crisis.

Finally, political elites at both the party political and civic organizational levels use decentralization as a mechanism through which to offload responsibility for maintaining the institutions and practices of religious pluralism. Offloading comes in two forms: either the central state devolves authority for passing laws to the provinces, regencies, and cities or the central state allows for authorities at these lower levels of governance to selectively enforce national laws. This operates as a safety valve, allowing for regions with sharply divergent interests or prevailing sociocultural values to chart their own paths, even when they are at odds with central state policies and legal constructions. And most parties seem perfectly content with regionalization as a compromise outcome. For example, Fealy (2016: 122) describes how, in 2012, the JAI requested help from the PKB in opposing provincial and regional bans on the sect.³⁸

Offloading clearly licenses patterns of exclusion on the regional and local levels. As described above, some regional governments have interpreted the 2008 Law on Pornography to include the public behaviors deliberately taken out of the compromise draft. And while Islamist and conservative Muslim parties did not get the statewide ban on the Ahmadiyah they were seeking, neither did the central government censure or challenge those provinces, regencies, and cities that did ban the Ahmadiyah. These are areas where, most often, conservative parties are strongest. At the same time, steadfast opponents did manage to hold off two proposed laws that,

³⁸ According to Fealy, representatives of the JAI invoked the name of Abdurrahman Wahid and the party's history of championing religious pluralism, but to no avail.

problems with the compromise aside, would have created precedent for a broader assault on religious pluralism as defined in Indonesian law and political norms. And in some provinces, such as Jakarta, the central government *did* bring pressure to bear on behalf of the Ahmadiyah (*Tempo* 2011a).³⁹ But for the most part, the government and Indonesia's major political parties all tacitly accepted a scheme that allows regional governments to place radically different limits on religious pluralism in exchange for preserving the system as practiced at the level of the state.

Yet the worst fears related to both the Anti-Pornography Bill and the proposed ban on the Ahmadiyah have not come to pass. Public behaviors like kissing have not been criminalized, while traditional ethnocultural dancing and dress continue to be practiced without incident in most areas of Indonesia. Even in conservative West Java, arrests for "pornographic behavior" are more rare than one might assume. And while the situation for the Ahmadiyah remains dire in areas that have passed comprehensive bans, the issue has largely receded into the background of Indonesian politics. Moreover, as with *sharia* bylaws, the aggregate of local authorities that have passed comprehensive bans on the Ahmadiyah represent a relatively small proportion of Indonesia's 34 provinces, 405 regencies, and 97 cities.

Nevertheless, a key effect of the political process detailed herein has been to accelerate the *regionalization of religious pluralism*, marked by increasing variation in how religious pluralism is institutionalized and practiced across Indonesia. What remains at the center is what Menchik (2016) refers to as truncated pluralism. Menchik characterizes truncated pluralism as a key feature of post-transition Indonesia. Specifically, he observes that, while Indonesia preserves the rights and protections afforded to its recognized religious groups, it is increasingly restrictive

³⁹ Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security Djoko Suyanto allegedly dissuaded Jakarta governor Fauzi Bowo from issuing a ban on the grounds that "there can be no bylaw or governor regulation or any kind of regulation in this country that violates the constitution," though, as stated above, other regions were not brought to court for passing such laws.

of deviance within each of these categories. Moreover, he argues that this is the result of some fifty years of state policies privileging orthodox practitioners, part of a deliberate state strategy to provide enough Islam to stave off campaigns to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state. The regionalization of religious pluralism reflects another set of conflict-management strategies on the part of the central state, with equally ambiguous effects for the practice of religious pluralism. It upholds and preserves rights and equal protections at the level of the state, but abdicates responsibility for what happens to them in the regions.

More generally, the regionalization of religious pluralism suggests that decentralization has fundamentally ambivalent consequences for pluralism and its underlying rights and protections. Decentralization's potential to fuel regionalism, from autonomy movements to armed separatism, is widely acknowledged (e.g. Brancati 2006). But this study suggests it may have farther-reaching effects on pluralism, insofar as democratizing states allow regions to reconfigure rights and protections in order to deflect, contain, or manage challenges at the center. This heightens the importance of local conditions and regional variation in understanding the nature and limits of challenges to pluralism (whether religious or not) in democratizing and decentralizing societies. In policy terms, it also suggests that the clear boundaries and hierarchical mechanisms of law enforcement found in consolidated federal systems should be in place before actual transfers of power occur. In Indonesia there are institutions with the potential to fulfill this role, such as the national police and Constitutional Court; but without the political will to adhere to and enforce national standards, it is likely that regional variation in the institutionalization and practice of religious pluralism will continue to grow in the coming years.

Chapter Three

Can I Pray Here? Why Anti-Church Protests Cluster in Jakarta's Industrializing Suburbs

In 2001, officials from the Gereja Kristen Indonesia (Christian Church of Indonesia, GKI) foundation, a Protestant network linking Calvinist congregations in West and East Java, decided to build a church in the city of Bogor's newly established Taman Yasmin housing complex. With relatively inexpensive real estate, reliable train service to the capital, and a booming garment industry, Bogor had become one of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region's fastest-growing cities. The existing GKI church—a 60-year old institution located in the city center—could no longer accommodate the crowds it attracted for services. There was too little space in the pews and parking facilities were woefully insufficient, causing traffic jams and disrupting public transportation for local residents (Ali-Fauzi et al 2011: 84-85). A new institution was needed for Taman Yasmin's Christian population, many of whom had relocated to Bogor from other parts of Indonesia.

In line with regulations in place at the time, GKI began collecting signatures from local residents indicating support for (or at least, lack of opposition to) the planned construction. As a prerequisite, GKI also agreed to let other Christians residing in Taman Yasmin use the church for services (ibid 85-86). By January 2006, GKI had obtained permission from the relevant officials, the regional police and military commanders, and, crucially, the mayor of Bogor. By July of that year, GKI had obtained permission from the relevant bureaucratic offices as well (ibid 87-88). A month later, GKI held a groundbreaking event, which was attended by local officials from the Department of Religion and the regional police and military commanders; a representative of the mayor's office read a letter written by the mayor congratulating the congregation.¹

¹ Interview with Bona Singalingging (spokesman for GKI Taman Yasmin), Jakarta 2011.

In February 2008, citing protests from local Muslims, the City of Bogor suspended GKI Taman Yasmin's permit, halting construction, and ordering an immediate cessation of religious services on the premises (ibid 88). The group leading the protests called itself Forkami, a portmanteau standing for Forum Komunikasi Muslim Indonesia (Advocacy Forum for Indonesian Muslims). In one violent episode, masked assailants set upon congregants and an advisor to GKI, who was also a prominent local figure in the Muslim civic organization Nahdlatul Ulama. Local police responded by arresting a church congregant (ibid 90).

GKI officials appealed the church's closure to the Administrative Court in Bandung, which in September 2008 ruled against the City of Bogor and ordered that the church be opened, a ruling that held up on appeal. Construction resumed in January 2010, but was met with further protests from Forkami. Soon after, the mayor's office unilaterally "sealed" the church, effectively closing it off from congregants. Church officials appealed to the Constitutional Court, Indonesia's highest legal body, which ruled that the City of Bogor had acted illegally. Though the situation appeared resolved at this point, Forkami activists—coordinating with a larger group of street-level Islamist activists, the Forum Umat Islam (Forum for the Islamic Community, FUI)—successfully petitioned the Bogor District Court to discount 10 signatures originally collected by GKI in 2002, leading the city to suspend the church's permit (Khouw 2011). As of writing, the case remains unresolved, and the church closed off from congregants.

Other congregations in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region have suffered similar fates, including several cases centered on the Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (HKBP) network, which is an ethnic Batak and Lutheran church whose liturgy is performed in both the Indonesian and Toba Batak languages. A particularly high-profile protest cycle, targeting the proposed HKBP Filadelfia church, emerged in a fast-industrializing neighborhood of what was initially

Kabupaten Bekasi (Bekasi Regency) but is now part of the Kota Bekasi (Municipality of Bekasi).² HKBP first established the congregation in 2000 in response to large-scale in-migration of Bataks working in the garment and other industries. In 2003, church officials were able to purchase a small plot of land that was legally permissible to be used as a house of worship. Local residents, however, soon began complaining of loud singing, traffic jams, and other public nuisances. In April 2006, the HKBP Filadelfia leadership, under pressure, agreed to seek an alternate location for the church (Ali-Fauzi et al 2011: 97-99).

HKBP purchased a second plot of land in nearby Jelajen Raya, one of the semi-official *kampungs* (home villages) found scattered across Indonesian cities.³ Church officials collected

² Regencies and municipalities are parallel administrative units, located on the same level of governance. Unlike counties and cities in the United States, their administrative borders do not overlap with one another.

³ The term *kampung* is most frequently used to refer to one's village of origin. However, during the colonial period, "Inlanders" who moved to the cities organized "ethnic villages" that recreated the look, feel, and social structures of their home regions. As cities expanded, urban *kampungs* became neighborhoods with village-like features. These urban *kampungs* do not necessarily constitute a distinct level of social organization in a well-established hierarchy of authority, nor are they ubiquitous in the urban ecology. Rather, they are best described as residential cooperatives where residents enter into informal, reciprocal power-sharing arrangements over common spaces and areas of mutual interest, which crosscut official, formal authority structures (Silas 1993).

Social life in the urban *kampung* attempts, as much as possible, to replicate certain features of the rural village: low traffic, narrow streets and thick familial and social ties among inhabitants. And *kampung* residents, like those of rural villages, go to school together, eat together, and pray together. Befitting their roots in the rural village, urban *kampungs* are traditionally organized as residential areas for specific, named ethnic populations. Though the ethnic homogeneity of the urban *kampung* has declined with since the 1940s, many *kampungs* are still associated with a named ethnic population, which continue to supply most decision-makers for the *kampung* (Surjomihardjo 1977: 73).

In most Indonesian cities, urban *kampungs* represent a relatively small share of land, but a relatively larger proportion of the urban population. Urban *kampungs* range in the quality of life they offer residents. The majority in Indonesia's industrialized cities, however, suffer from overcrowding, with densities rising as high as 100,000 persons/km², and all the consequent environmental problems: improper waste disposal, degraded water quality, high levels of infectious disease, and poor distribution of public services to inhabitants (McCarthy 2003; Pacione 2009).

the requisite signatures from the local community, as well as the blessing of the *kepala kampung* (village head), who stated that a majority of the village's 13,000 residents supported the church (ibid 100). Nevertheless, in December 2009 the Bupati (regent) issued a decree halting construction and banning religious activities on church grounds, citing security issues arising from anti-church protests. Local police "sealed" the church, boarding its windows and padlocking its doors. In response, congregants began holding services outside. Protesters routinely disturbed services, on one occasion pelting congregants with rotten eggs and animal feces (ibid 100-102).

The protesters called themselves the Forum Komunikasi Umat Islam (Advocacy Forum for the Islamic Community, FKUI). Like Bogor's Forkami, FKUI was an organization specifically created to oppose the disputed church. But HKBP Filadelfia had also attracted the attention of the national Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI). On August 8, 2010, hundreds of FPI members allegedly descended upon services being held outside church grounds, assaulting congregants and, according to informants, even chasing some into their homes.⁴ On September 12, 2010, several FPI members set upon two pastors as they walked to Sunday services, stabbing one and beating the other (*The Jakarta Post* 2010b; Maryana and Muhammad 2010). Occurring a day after the Muslim holy day of Idul Fitri, the stabbings ignited a firestorm of indignation from Muslims as well as Christians. Banser, the "youth brigade" of the mainline Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), even bussed cadres in to guard the congregation, though because of the organization's weakness locally, the protection would only

⁴ FPI officially denies the organization's involvement in the incident (Suprihadi 2010).

be short-term.⁵ HKBP Filadelfia continues to face regular harassment, intimidation, and intermittent violence from protesters.

Situating Indonesia's Anti-Church Protests

Neither GKI Taman Yasmin nor HKBP Filadelfia fits the classic profile of the church burning, in which houses of worship are targeted in premeditated arson attacks or in the course of rioting. Rather, these are cases of sustained, long-term, and intermittently violent protest, in which protesters deploy the *threat* of violence to pressure authorities into blocking, closing, or moving the church in question. Though organized by religiopolitical entrepreneurs, anti-church protests draw upon a view of Christians as outsiders in local communities, with the disputed churches framed as symbols of outsider encroachment. To that end, the goal of anti-church protests is not only to stop construction of a given church, but also to assert Muslim symbolic ownership of local spaces.⁶

In Indonesia as elsewhere, spaces are commonly assumed to “belong” to specific and often culturally bounded groups: nations, citizens, taxpayers, ethnic groups, religious communities, tribes, gangs, clans, and so forth (Gupta and Ferguson 1992).⁷ And houses of worship are among the most enduring symbols of the ownership of space (Hull et al 1994). In one sense, Indonesia’s anti-church protests are part of a global, “nativist” reaction against newly arrived (or newly visible) faiths in local communities, whose presence may be viewed as

⁵ Interview with Nusron Wahid, Jakarta 2011.

⁶ Another goal is to enhance the prestige of the organizations that instigate these protest cycles. As Tarrow (2011: 13-14) argues, long protest cycles stimulates mobilization, lowers the perceived cost of participation in protest events, and facilitates the formation of coalitions with like-minded organizations (ibid 13-14).

⁷ Though, as Gupta and Ferguson (1992) note, these assumptions are often deeply problematic from an analytical perspective.

endangering that sense of ownership.⁸ Manifestations of this global phenomenon include protest and violence targeting minority houses of worship across the Muslim world, anti-Muslim and anti-Christian actions enacted by Hindus in India, the near-comprehensive destruction of mosques by Christians in the Central African Republic, and several high-profile (albeit rarely violent) anti-mosque protests in the West. For the religiopolitical entrepreneurs who manufacture them, these conflict events are “microclashes of civilization”: local zoning disputes cast as “battles” within the imagined war between those who believe correctly and those who do not.⁹ Unsurprisingly, then, much of the rhetoric involved in Indonesian anti-church protests mirrors that found in non-Indonesian cases. Western opponents of proposed mosques, for example, claim that these mosques are outposts of a global movement to impose Islam and Islamic values on societies framed either as secular-humanistic or Judeo-Christian in orientation (depending on who is doing the framing). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, churches are similarly portrayed as forward bases for the Westernization, Christianization, and secularization of Muslim Indonesians.

In another sense, Indonesia’s anti-church protests are symptomatic of both democratization generally and the specific experience of democratization in Indonesia. As Snyder (2000) observes, the fluid and contestable political environment of new democracy provides incentives for escalating conflicts among ethnic, religious, or similarly bounded groups that can be much more difficult to resolve than under consolidated democratic or stable

⁸ Nativism is often associated with nationalist opposition to international migration. However, Weiner (1978: 269-296) provides a detailed discussion of regional nativism as directed to internal migrants in India.

⁹ The term “religiopolitical entrepreneurs” is derived from Brubaker’s (2004) concept of the ethnopolitical entrepreneur.

authoritarian regimes.¹⁰ This is certainly true of Indonesian anti-church protests, several of which remain ongoing more than a decade after their emergence, even after court rulings in the churches' favor.¹¹ This situation is attributable, in part, to the weakness of law enforcement that Indonesia shares with other democratizing states.¹² But it is also an outgrowth of the regionalization of religious pluralism discussed in Chapter Two, whereby the central state allows wide variation in how provincial and regional governments interpret and enforce religious pluralism.¹³ Anti-church protests, as a form of anti-pluralist politics, are thus tolerated by state-level political actors, provided these protests are contained within local spaces and do not directly challenge the religious pluralist framing of the state *at the level of the state*.

Yet sustained anti-church protests are also highly localized, and thus contingent upon distinctly local conditions. Most churches in Indonesia are built and used without issue, including those without proper license for operation. Equally, most incidents involving churches do not involve sustained protest cycles, but rather low-level extortion, intimidation, arson, or vandalism (MMS 2009; Wahid Institute 2009). Sustained anti-church protests thus represent a distinct subset of the overall population of anti-church incidents.¹⁴ And while there is no dataset that comprehensively shows the distribution of sustained anti-church protests across Indonesia,

¹⁰ Horowitz (1991) and Lijphart, Rogowski, and Weaver (1993) similarly argue that the reduction of the state's repressive capacity—a frequent outgrowth of democratization—lowers disincentives associated with hardline political behavior.

¹¹ For example, in 2010 the Constitutional Court ruled in GKI Taman Yasmin's favor and ordered the City of Bogor to open the church to parishioners; however, the City refused to comply.

¹² This contrasts with how law enforcement resolves disputes in both consolidated democracies (enforcing court order) and stable authoritarian regimes (applying force or coercion directed from outside the legal process).

¹³ The regionalization of religious pluralism is identified in Chapter Two as an outgrowth of political decentralization and the structure of political process at the statewide level.

¹⁴ The Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS) in Yogyakarta has identified 12 cases of sustained anti-church protests during the period 2004-2011, out of a total 108 reported incidents involving churches (Ali-Fauzi et al 2011).

anecdotal evidence collected by scholars and NGOs suggests that sustained anti-church protests cluster in a very specific geographic space: Jakarta's fast-industrializing suburbs of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (Crouch 2007; MMS 2009; Ali-Fauzi et al 2009; Wahid Institute 2009; Ali-Fauzi et al 2011).¹⁵ What explains the emergence of sustained anti-church protests as a form of localized contention over religious pluralism? And what factors might explain their apparent clustering in Jakarta's industrializing suburbs?

This chapter has two principal aims. The first of these is to trace the historical emergence of sustained anti-church protests in Indonesia. I situate these events in the macropolitical context of democratization, decentralization, and the emergent political process described in Chapter Two. The political process has limited direct challenges to the religious pluralism at the level of the state by creating opportunities for direct challenges to religious pluralism at the regional and local levels. I then describe the emergence of "street Islamist" organizations as the political force driving anti-church protests in local communities. The second aim of this chapter is to explain why anti-church protests appear to cluster in Jakarta's industrializing suburbs of Bekasi, Depok, Tangerang, and Bogor. Based on interview, focus group, and documentary data, I identify a series of localized risk factors that explain (1) how Christian outsiderhood is constructed in these local communities and (2) how religiopolitical entrepreneurs are able to initiate and sustain anti-church protests in the industrializing suburbs of the Jakarta Metropolitan. I then examine how the absence of these conditions inhibits anti-church protests in analogous zones of Surabaya, which

¹⁵ This is not to say that sustained anti-church protests do not or cannot occur outside these areas. Nor is it to say that churches the only houses of worship that are or might be targeted by protests. For example, a mosque Kupang, West Timor has experienced an ongoing protest cycle with at least some features in common with the better-known GKI Taman Yasmin and HKBP Ciketing cases (HRW 2013). However, it is clear that a disproportionate number of disputed houses of worship are located in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, and that nearly all of these are Protestant churches.

is Indonesia's second largest metropolitan area. Based on this comparison, I argue that sustained anti-church protests are much less likely where these localized risk factors are not (or are only weakly) present, as in the Surabaya Metropolitan Region.

Local Risk Factors for the Initiation and Sustainment of Anti-Church Protests

I have identified four local risk factors that help explain why there is a favorable opportunity structure for sustained anti-church protests in the industrializing suburbs of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region. The first three of these risk factors, identified in the course of interviews and focus group discussions, all speak to how local residents make sense of anti-church protests and why they think proposed churches potentially constitute a problem in their communities. Taken together, these widely held sentiments illuminate how local Muslims come to view Christians as outsiders their communities, and how churches become lightning rods for broader grievances related to a perceived loss of ownership over local spaces.

The first risk factor, and the first element in the construction of Christian outsiderhood, is the sense that there are *too many people living in a local area*. Sociologists have long noted how crowding can negatively affect the health, psychology, and social well being of urban residents (Fischer et al 1975; Baldassare 1979). In the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, the influx of migrants seeking work in garment and other factories, coupled with the appropriation of agricultural land for industrial development, means that more and more people are living in communities that are now essentially fenced in. Perceptions of crowding, meanwhile, can stimulate low-level conflicts over noise pollution, traffic, and who gets to use limited public spaces (and for what purposes). And locals commonly cite potential traffic and noise problems as a rationale for opposition to the proposed churches.

The second risk factor, and the second element in the construction of Christian outsiderhood, is the *sense of encroachment by (Christian) religious outsiders in a local area*. This sentiment is strongly related to Evangelical and Pentecostal proselytizing in local communities, in tandem with the heightened visibility of Christian churches, prayer groups, organizations, schools, and preachers in certain local areas, such as the Jakarta suburbs of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi (an area referred to as “Bodetabek”). Though Evangelical and Pentecostal groups do nearly all the proselytizing (among Christians as well as among Muslims), institutional differences in how Sunni Islam and Protestant Christianity are internally segmented means that Indonesian Muslims often don’t recognize differences between Christian congregations.¹⁶ Resentments over Evangelical and Pentecostal proselytizing thus have the potential to carry over to Christians more generally. As a consequence, even churches that do not proselytize to Muslims, such as GKI Taman Yasmin and HKBP Filadelfia, can stimulate Muslim anxieties over their symbolic ownership of space.

The third risk factor, and the final element in the construction of Christian outsiderhood, is the *sense of encroachment by ethnic outsiders in a local area*. Where Christian in-migrants come from ethnic groups stereotyped as *kasar* (rough), as Bataks and some other migrants groups are, ethnic and religious antipathies have to potential to combine; everyday disputes in the marketplace or *kampungs*, which might otherwise be coded as “ethnic,” may feed into anti-Christian sentiments (ICG 2010). These kinds of mixed antipathies have to potential to carry over to Christians who aren’t members of the disliked ethnic group as well, as happened in the

¹⁶ Sunni Islam, like Protestant Christianity, is not organized hierarchically; but neither is it organized into congregations. Rather, there are unorganized or thinly organized theological/orthopraxic “schools,” such as traditionalist *syafi’i*, Islamic modernist, or *salafi*. Individual mosques may be associated with one of these schools, but they do not cater exclusively to their adherents; they offer prayer services to all Muslims living or working in the area.

1999-2004 Maluku and Poso conflicts (Van Klinken 2007; G. Brown 2014). Conversely, if members of an unpopular ethnic group seek to open an ethnic church, such as members of the Batak HKBP, the church can attract opposition for its association with Batak-ness as much as for its association with Christianity. Thus growing numbers of (or heightened visibility among) in-migrants marked as ethnic outsiders may accelerate the construction of Christian outsiderhood and, as a result, stimulate anti-church protests.

The fourth, and arguably most important, risk factor does not relate to the construction of Christian outsiderhood in local communities, but rather to the presence or lack of institutional mechanisms preventing anti-church protests. This final risk factor is *the absence or ineffectiveness of social “policing” by religious civic organizations and other community leaders*. As mentioned above, new democracies often lack the capacity to physically police local communities against the onset of ethnic or religious conflict. Under such conditions, civic organizations, community leaders, and traditional brokers often step in to anticipate, marginalize, and sanction conflict entrepreneurs—the set of activities referred to as social policing (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Brubaker and Laitin 1998).¹⁷

Varshney’s (2001) landmark study on ethnic rioting in urban India, by linking the frequency of rioting with the degree of Hindu/Muslim cooperation within local civic organizations, highlights the specific role civil society can play in mediating conflicts that arise.¹⁸ In Indonesia, however, the exclusively Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and

¹⁷ Vested elites, according to this framework, have clear incentives to police the in-group against conflict with the out-group—not only as an end in itself, but as a means of maintaining their position of authority against militant challengers. Inter-group conflict, by contrast, emerges from a breakdown in their authority, which in turn limits the ability of vested elites to mete out sanctions.

¹⁸ Varshney (2002) links the frequency of outbreaks and certain compositional features in civil society, with riots more common in cities where civic organizations are divided by ethno-

NU have long played role of social police among Muslims. And they maintain good relations with counterpart Christian organizations, such as the Catholic Church and Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI); these relationship facilitate policing and mediation.¹⁹ Yet the capacity of Muhammadiyah and NU local chapters to engage in social policing is not uniform. In some areas, internal lines of ideological cleavage (separating progressive from conservative factions), uneven distributions of prestige (across local chapters), and uneven distributions of authority over local chapters and affiliated personnel may all hamper the capacity of local chapters to engage in social policing. Where local chapters are ideologically conservative, fractured, have low prestige in the community, or refuse to follow the dictates of the organizations' national leadership, their capacity for social policing is likely to be much less effective. This, in turn, produces opportunities for challenges to their authority within local

religious affiliation (i.e. Hindu/Muslim) than in cities where civic organizations draw from and possess cultural/social capital within both communities (which empowers them to both deal with conflict entrepreneurs effectively defuse conflict). Based on these findings, Varshney theorizes that the degree of "ethnic integration" in civil society plays a central role in the incidence and distribution of conflict events more generally.

¹⁹ As discussed in Chapter One, this role dates to the New Order, which created autonomous "space" for Muhammadiyah and NU to engage in non-political activities (such as education, charity, and religious services) in exchange for a degree of corporate "capture" and assistance in limiting the forms and degrees of Muslim contention over the secular national state (Porter 2002: 42-44). Though relations with the regime were frequently strained, these corporate relationships helped steer Muhammadiyah and NU away from politics and towards an institutional logic of civil society (Barton 1997; Hefner 2000; Bush 2009; Jung 2014).

However, the social policing role also served these organizations' self-interests, solidifying their vast influence and authority in shaping Muslim life. Today each organization boasts some 30 million registered members (and many more Indonesian Muslims claim to follow NU's teachings). Muhammadiyah and NU leaders are overrepresented in the Ministry of Religion and its local offices, in the Islamic court system (which focuses primarily on family and inheritance law), in religious education, as well as the growing number of schools that offer religious education alongside general education, in community hospitals and health clinics, and other social welfare services. Membership in Muhammadiyah and NU crosscuts that of nearly all political parties, while members of each are well-represented in the security forces, the civil service, and the professions. Furthermore, their leaders are also nearly always *hajjis* and *hajjas* (i.e. Muslims who have performed the *haji*), a status that conveys a great deal of prestige on individuals, especially in rural areas.

communities. Regional variations in the willingness and effectiveness of specifically Muslim civic organizations to engage in in-group policing may thus help explain the clustering of church controversies in specific areas. If Christian in-migrants are poorly integrated into existing institutions, it is also more difficult for institutionally embedded Christian elites to police co-religionists from engaging in behaviors that inflame local Muslim opinion.²⁰

Brief Note on Case Selection and Methodology

This chapter first examines the clustering of sustained anti-church protests in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region (JMR), and then looks at the Surabaya Metropolitan Region (where similar anti-church protests have not emerged) in order to answer broader questions on how the regionalization of religious pluralism plays out in Indonesian communities. I chose the Surabaya Metropolitan Region (SMR) as the negative case because Surabaya is the most comparable metropolitan region to Jakarta in terms of population, level of industrialization, rate of in-migration, and so forth.²¹ Furthermore, there is ample precedent for anti-Christian violence in the SMR; during the 1990s, metropolitan Surabaya experienced many more attacks on churches than metropolitan Jakarta.²² These incidents were not, of course, sustained anti-church protests, but rather classic “church burnings” that took place in the course of more generalized anti-Christian

²⁰ There are, of course, other factors to consider beyond the four identified here: poor governance, weak law enforcement, the presence of radical organizations or ideologies, and unclear boundaries of authority in the wake of political decentralization, to name a few. But these factors are also present in areas that do not have sustained anti-church protests.

²¹ It is, however, important to note that Jakarta is some three times the size of Surabaya, and is unique as both the political and financial capital of Indonesia.

²² Between 1992 and 1997, as many as 145 churches across Indonesia were “demolished, burned down or otherwise forced to close” (Sidel 2006: 73-74). A number of churches in Surabaya were targeted during this period, including 10 on the 9th of June 1996. Another 24 incidents occurred along the East Java in October of that year (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 1999; Bertrand 2004: 100).

(and anti-Chinese) rioting (Sidel 2006: 97-105). Though not analogous to Jakarta's sustained anti-church protests, these incidents demonstrate the potential for anti-Christian activity in the Surabaya Metropolitan Region.

In constructing these regional case studies, I draw primarily upon interview and focus group data conducted during a year of fieldwork in metropolitan Jakarta and Surabaya, supplemented by primary and secondary documents. Interviews were conducted with both public figures and private individuals, with the latter drawn from diverse ethnic, religious, and class backgrounds, and from both the cities and industrializing suburbs of each metropolitan area. Separate focus groups were held for Christians and Muslims, in order to create a "safe space" for discussion; additional focus group discussions mixed Christian and Muslim participants. In order to protect the confidentiality of sources, all names and potential identifying markers of private interviewees have been changed.

I adopted this methodological approach because it is an efficient path to identifying the risk factors driving variation among local areas where there is historical precedent for anti-Christian conflict events. In adopting Varshney's (2001) comparative method on ethnoreligious rioting in India, Panggabean and Smith (2011) note that using a negative case to evaluate a positive case is both an effective way of highlighting drivers of regional variation (which can be obscured in state-structural analyses) and a suitable response to the limitations of working in "data-poor" environments like Indonesia. Laitin (1995) similarly notes how qualitative comparisons can uncover general processes that may be applicable beyond the cases at hand. I use this research design to explain the localization of sustained anti-church protests in Indonesia, while potentially uncovering ways to identify and anticipate the risk of similar events outside the specific areas under study.

I. “Street Islamism” and the Emergence of Anti-Church Protests

Until 2004, sustained anti-church protests were rare and diffuse; after 2004, they began to proliferate. The timing is not coincidental: as described in Chapter One, the year 2004 was a very specific and significant point in Indonesia’s on-going democratization process—the year of its second consecutive competitive parliamentary election and first direct presidential election. It was also a critical point for the central state’s confrontation with those radical Islamists who directly challenged the religious pluralist framing of the state through large-scale violence against civilians. During the tail end of Suharto’s New Order regime and the early post-transition period (1994-2004), Islamist violence in Indonesia traced an arc from short-term riots to paramilitary violence to terrorism against perceived “Western interests” (Sidel 2006).²³ By the end of 2004, however, the state had largely met these challenges, by dismantling the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, initiating peace talks with quasi-Islamist separatists in Aceh, and clamping down on Muslim and Christian paramilitaries in the outer provinces. Yet at that very same moment, the multi-tiered decentralization process known as *otonomi daerah* (regional autonomy) created new, smaller-scale opportunities for Islamist groups to challenge religious pluralism in local communities.²⁴ That includes Islamist groups willing to deploy violence as part

²³ Sidel (2006) attributes this evolution to a narrowing of the band of Muslims willing to engage in violence and the radicalization of the remainder.

²⁴ By not clearly delineating the lines of authority between local and state-level offices, *otonomi daerah* has created exploitable confusion over the distribution of authority among Indonesia’s six levels of official governance, its multitude of bureaucratic offices, and various chapters and divisions of law enforcement. A second round of decentralization, which in 2005 introduced direct elections for *bupati* and *walikota*, arguably exacerbated these issues (Hill 2009: 232). As mentioned above, without extensive grassroots party networks, aspirants for these offices are forced to turn to whatever organizations or local figures possess the networks they lack—including, in some cases, Islamist and Muslim conservative groups that ask for patronage and policy influence in return (Buehler 2010).

of their tactical repertoire, as long as the challenges remain localized and the level and frequency of violence contained to safely “ignorable” levels. The post-2004 targeting of local churches very much fits within the parameters of this new opportunity structure.

Anti-church protests have thus also heralded the rise of a different kind of Islamist organization to national prominence. Unlike the *jihadi* groups that proliferated in the late 1990s, these “street Islamists” operate primarily in gang or mob form, organizes among the working classes, and employ street protest and crowd violence to achieve political goals, while simultaneously engaging in more traditional gang activities, such as extortion (van Bruinessen 2002; Wilson 2008). Street Islamist groups are rooted in the New Order, which during its 33 year rule had organized, trained and deployed thousands of auxiliaries to intimidate rivals and clamp down on protests (Wilson 2005).²⁵ After the fall of the New Order regime, the services of these auxiliaries, or *preman*, could be bought and sold for cheap (Ryter 2001: 154-5). Loosely organized bands of *preman*—many now claiming to represent ethnic or religious communities—established themselves in Indonesian city centers, extorting protection money from local businesses and renting out “muscle” to political parties and others. But few were active in post-transition politics.

The Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front, FPI), however, would emerge after 2004 as a significant force in politics, albeit from the streets of Indonesian cities and towns.²⁶ FPI was formed in August 1998 by Habib Rizieq Syihab. As described in Chapter One, the group was initially part of General Wiranto’s PAM Swakarska, an umbrella organization for *preman*

²⁵ During the 1998 crisis, the military had as many as 30,000 of these auxiliaries mobilized into a militia designed to confront and counter student and pro-democracy protesters (Wilson 2005).

²⁶ The group first came to national (and international) attention when it threatened to forcibly deport American expatriates after September 11, 2001 and to send fighters to Afghanistan, but it did not make good on either threat (Wilson 2006).

groups opposed to the 1998 student protests. And during the early days of Indonesian democratization, it vocally supported Suharto's lieutenant and successor B.J. Habibie (who conservative Muslims generally saw as their patron within the regime) against his secular nationalist and "civil Islamic" rivals. After Habibie's electoral defeat in 1999, FPI turned its attention to the streets, harassing businesses suspected of serving alcohol during the fasting month of Ramadan and, in a more classic mode of *premanisme* (gangsterism), running protection and other extortion schemes (van Bruinessen 2002; Woodward 2010: 218; Hasan 2011).²⁷

FPI's heritage, as part of the "unseen apparatus" of the New Order, has informed its behavior since these early days. Though both ideologically radical and prone to violence, the group is also fairly pragmatic. In this sense FPI contrasts with the *jihadis* confronting the state during "long transition." FPI is, at most, intermittently violent and is more likely to target property than persons. What's more, the group typically justifies its actions in legalistic terms, and makes a show of cooperation with security forces (even if that cooperation is decidedly selective). However, FPI can be unpredictable, particularly in how it balances its "ideological" and "economic" activities

At times, FPI often appears more interested in extortion than religion or politics. As the owner of a popular, European-style bar related to me in an interview:

They came to the restaurant, you know, during the fasting time. The main one—the leader—he told us we couldn't serve wine, because it's *haram*. He didn't ask me about any pork, which we also serve, or beer. Just wine. I said, well, most of our clientele are expats...they're not Muslim and they're not bothering anybody. He said okay, it's fine. Just don't serve it in a glass cup, so any Muslims won't know it's wine. Then he asked me for a donation. I gave him a million [rupiah,

²⁷ *Premanisme* describes the range of activities engaged in by the kind of criminal thugs-for-hire deployed with some regularity by the New Order: from running extortion and protection rackets to roughing up left-wingers and brawling with rival *preman* groups.

about \$75USD at 2010 exchange rates], so that there's no more trouble. He just...smiled and said thank you. Then they left.²⁸

At other times, though, ideological concerns trump economic opportunities. In 2005, for example, a group of Jakarta-based entrepreneurs sought to bring *Playboy* magazine to Indonesia. Though the magazine's content would be significantly toned down for local sensibilities (including foregoing nudity), the venture nevertheless drew the attention of FPI. Publisher Ponti Carolus Pandean suggested a compromise, as the following U.S. embassy cable illustrates:

Ponti...sought to head off likely opposition by FPI by meeting with FPI Chairman Habib Rizieq. Ponti said he first met with Rizieq in December at the Hilton Hotel in order to interview Rizieq for the magazine. On that occasion, Ponti paid Rizieq approximately 1,500 USD, ostensibly as compensation for the interview. As the controversy over publication of *Playboy* intensified, Ponti again met with Rizieq during the Idul Adha holiday and provided Rizieq with 40 million Rupiah (approximately 4,000 USD), ostensibly as a gift on the occasion of the holiday. Ponti noted that, predictably, many lower-level FPI figures came to his office to request smaller handouts of approximately 50 USD. These efforts appeared to keep FPI quiet in the run-up to the magazine's launching; however, FPI-led sweepings²⁹ of *Playboy* began within days [of launch] and on April 12, FPI thugs vandalized the building housing [*Playboy*'s] Jakarta office (Embassy of the United States of America to the Republic of Indonesia 2006).

Post-2004: FPI, the Anti-Apostasy Movement, and Anti-Church Protests.

Prior to 2004, FPI was primarily active in central Jakarta. However, the group had become a nuisance to both city authorities and local business interests. Moreover, in the wake of the 2002 Bali Bombings, FPI came under intense pressure from the national security forces,

²⁸ Interview with bar owner, Jakarta 2010. Such negotiations are common. In June 2005, the *New Straits Times* reported that a group of FPI activists interrupted a transgender beauty pageant in Jakarta: "after 20 minutes of tense negotiations, the show continued, though organizers agreed to finish early in deference to the group, which has a history of vandalizing entertainment centers it considers un-Islamic" (Brummitt 2005). See also: recent cases from East Java (Neumann 2012).

²⁹ "Sweeping" refers to a form of moral vigilantism, in which large groups of men confront businesses or merchants suspected of vice (e.g. serving alcohol during Ramadan, selling pornography, hosting gambling, etc.). The aim, ostensibly, is to root out the objectionable practice within a given neighborhood; but times it more a vehicle for extortion. "Sweeping" is most commonly, but not exclusively, associated with street Islamist groups like FPI.

which did not want the group's activities in the capital to scare off foreign investors. Thus, in late 2002, Rizieq announced a temporary "freeze" of operations (Nafik and Unidjaja 2002). FPI resumed activity in February 2003, but with an eye towards shifting resources outside the city center.³⁰

The December 26, 2004 tsunami, which killed more than 130,000 Indonesians, provided an opportunity. Rizieq led 200 volunteers to disaster areas in Aceh, where they primarily buried and provided last rites to the dead (Wilson 2006). Though FPI failed to establish a planned permanent presence in Aceh, the group did demonstrate the logistical ability to operate beyond Jakarta. Its participation in rebuilding Aceh also helped FPI raise its stature among Indonesian Islamists and conservative Muslims, as well as improve its image with the government and security forces.

Though FPI continued to confront purveyors of "vice" and extort local businesses in areas where it operated, it also began to focus on other target behaviors that Islamists and Muslim conservatives viewed as contributing to Muslim apostasy: "blasphemy" by individual Muslims (and non-Muslims); "heresy" by non-Sunni Muslim sects; proselytizing by Christians; and secularization in general. This new focus facilitated alliances between FPI and *ex-jihadis*, who were now returning home from sectarian conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi (ICG 2010; G. Brown 2014). As informants within the organization described, the new focus also brought FPI into alignment with older, more established *dakwah* organizations, such as the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Council for the Propagation of Islam in Indonesia, DDII) and Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas dengan Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for

³⁰ Interviews with FPI officials: Jakarta and Surabaya, 2010-2011.

Solidarity with the Muslim World, KISDI).³¹ Relative to FPI, DDII and KISDI represent a more mainstream face of conservative Islam, and my informants within these organizations categorically stated that they do not support FPI's methods.³² At the same time, DDII and KISDI have for decades opposed Christian proselytizing, Muslim apostasy, and the spread of Western cultural norms—all of which, these organizations assert, point to a broader conspiracy to “Christianize” Indonesia.³³ Thus DDII and KISDI, while publicly disavowing violence, nevertheless tend to blame FPI's victims for inciting the violence.

FPI concurrently began to cultivate a direct relationship with the state-supported Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council, MUI), a relationship Wilson (2008: 205) describes as “symbiotic” and mutually reinforcing. MUI was originally a consultative body created by the Suharto regime in order to “capture” Islam, provide religious legitimacy to state projects, and run services like *halal* certification (Ramage 1995; Hefner 2000; Gillespie 2007; Hasan 2011). Since the 1980s, though, MUI has promoted a distinctly conservative moral agenda. Through a series of *fatwas*, it has attempted to clarify and harden both inter- and intra-religious boundaries: in a 1980 *fatwa* against inter-religious marriage, framed as a response to *kristenisasi* (Yasin 2009); in a 1981 *fatwa* warning Muslims against attending Christmas celebrations, also framed as a response to *kristenisasi* (Hosen 2004); in a 2005 injunction against “pornography,” which was widely viewed by non-Muslims and minority sects within Islam as a direct assault on freedom of religion (Wilson 2008); and in a 2005 *fatwa* against “secularism, liberalism and pluralism” aimed primarily at non-conservative Muslims (Gillespie 2007).

³¹ Interviews with FPI officials: Jakarta 2010-2011.

³² Interviews with DDII and KISDI officials: Jakarta 2010-2012.

³³ For historical background on Indonesian *dakwah* groups, see Chapter One.

Decentralization provided MUI with the political opportunity to promote so-called *sharia* bylaws based on its *fatwas*. During the years 1999-2007, 52 regencies and municipalities (out of 439 total) passed 78 *sharia* bylaws, regulating female dress, vice, and other issues considered central to conservative Islamic morality. Many were passed under pressure: FPI would unilaterally enforce MUI's *fatwas* on the streets, at which point MUI could cite violence (by FPI) as proof that "anarchy" would prevail until its *fatwas* were treated as law (Wilson 2008: 205).³⁴ Meanwhile, supporting MUI provided FPI with "official channels denied them by voters" (Feillard and Madinier 2011: 257). Yet, after a flurry of activity in the early-to-mid-2000s, and several scandals related to the enforcement of *sharia* bylaws, the opportunity structure for passing *sharia* bylaws in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region contracted; this pushed FPI into other areas of activity (Bush 2008).³⁵

Shift to Churches

As the movement to pass *sharia* bylaws in the JMR lost steam, FPI and allied "anti-apostasy" groups have pivoted to "defending communities" against the spread of Christianity and "heretical" forms of Islam, such as those propagated by Shia and Ahmadi minorities. In targeting

³⁴ Olle (2009: 101) discusses similar framings of violence against the "heretical" Ahmadiyah sect at the regional and local levels.

³⁵ *Sharia* bylaws continue to proliferate in other parts of Indonesia. In the JMR, however, their passage does appear to have slowed, while local governments often prefer to avoid conflict with local residents who oppose the bylaws by leaving them on the books but only weakly (or not) enforcing them. When local governments have tried to enforce the more controversial *sharia* bylaws, there is often major pushback from citizens. For example, in a much publicized 2006 case, pregnant mother and waitress Lilis Lindrawati was arrested in Tangerang, apparently, for being out after 8pm wearing makeup, jeans, and no *jilbab* while waiting to catch a bus home (Perlez, 2006). The police charged that, in doing so, she had violated the city's *sharia* bylaw on prostitution and "lewd behavior." The case became a national scandal, discrediting the idea of *sharia* bylaws in the eyes of many Indonesians.

churches for protest, FPI and other street Islamists have tapped into broader anxieties among conservative Muslims over Christian proselytizing and the alleged Westernization of Indonesia.

Anti-church protesters typically frame their efforts in legalistic terms, as unilateral enforcement of various laws and ministerial decrees related to the building and use of houses of worship.³⁶ The first of these, Joint Decision/Instruction no. 1/1969 on the building and use of houses of worship, was issued by the Minister of Internal Affairs in 1969, and gave mayors and regents the authority to grant or deny building permits for proposed houses of worship based on whether the proposed house of worship would disturb peace and order (Aritonang 2008: 853; Crouch 2010).³⁷

The ministerial decree emerged at a time of great anxiety over Christian proselytizing among conservative Muslims. These anxieties, in turn, were rooted in the anti-communist violence that brought Suharto to power during the years 1965-1967, after which almost 2 million Indonesian Muslims converted to Christianity (Willis 1977: 110). The converts were primarily heterodox (*abangan*) Muslims with ties to the Indonesian Communist Party seeking protection from a repressive and virulently anti-communist state; they were not orthodox (*santri*) Muslims attracted to Christianity for religious reasons (Hefner 2000: 108). However, the conversions alarmed conservative Muslim leaders, who feared a new wave of missionary activity.

Churches in Indonesia, which had emerged from the anti-communist violence largely unscathed, became occasional targets of violence by conservative Muslims; notable incidents occurred in Aceh, Sulawesi, and Java (Mujiburrahman 2006: 57; Crouch 2010). The government

³⁶ In Indonesia, a ministerial decree is not strictly speaking a law. Consequently, police and the judiciary are not required to enforce ministerial decrees, as they would be required to enforce laws passed in parliament or regional assemblies. In practice, however, ministerial decrees are often enforced as if they were laws.

³⁷ It also required applicants to receive the informal blessing of local religious leaders.

hastily convened Muslim and Christian leaders for an inter-faith conference, but failed to reach an agreement when Muslim leaders insisted that Christians agree to a full cessation of proselytizing (Hefner 2000: 108-109).³⁸ The impasse led the passage of Joint Decision/Instruction no. 1/1969. A second ministerial decree, issued in 1978, further clarified that worshippers could not use private homes for religious services.

After 1998, there was a broad consensus that the ministerial decrees should be replaced by a law passed in parliament, but little consensus as to what they should be replaced with. Reformers, religious minorities, and advocates of “civil Islam” sought to loosen the burden on minority congregations, for whom obtaining permission to build houses of worship was often quite difficult; while conservatives tied to *dakwah* groups like DDII and KISDI sought to maintain the existing restrictions.³⁹ Two draft bills debated in parliament sought to encompass both sets of concerns, combining New Order-style emphasis on maintaining social control and “harmony” with severe penalties for attacks on houses of worship or their congregations (Crouch 2010). However, neither came to a vote. With the failure of these two draft bills, the bureaucracy issued a revised Joint Ministerial Decree in 2006, which stipulated that proposed houses of worship must meet four requirements prior to obtaining permits:

1. A list of at least 90 congregants who would use the proposed house of worship
2. The written agreement of at least 60 local residents in the area where the proposed house of worship would be built.
3. Written approval from the local chapter of the Department of Religious Affairs (ex Ministry of Religion)

³⁸ This incident is discussed in greater detail in Chapter One.

³⁹ *Dakwah* groups like DDII and KISDI have long argued that Indonesia is experiencing an “epidemic” of new church construction. And a 2010 survey by the Department of Religious Affairs does note a 154 percent increase in the number of churches during the period 1977-2004, as compared to a 64 percent increase in the number of mosques (Amri and Adam 2010). There are, of course, more than 7.5 times as many mosques as churches in Indonesia, meaning that the absolute number of new mosques far outstrips the number of new churches. Nevertheless, anti-apostasy groups, including FPI, cite this survey as evidence of “on-going Christianization.”

4. Recommendation from a local, inter-faith committee of religious officials from both the regency/city and province, called the Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama (Forum for Harmony among Religious Communities, FKUB)

Rather than make it easier for religious minorities to build houses of worship, Joint Ministerial Decrees No. 8 & 9 of 2006 on places of worship has created new obstacles (collecting 60 signatures from local residents in particular can be difficult to obtain).⁴⁰ As a result, many Christians have continued to worship in private homes, creating or exacerbating tensions with Muslim neighbors (Seo 2013: 70-72).

The decree has also emboldened “anti-apostasy” coalitions, which as mentioned above include *dakwah* organizations like DDII and KISDI, street Islamists like FPI, and *ex-jihadis*, such as those within the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Mujahidin, MMI), an advocacy group founded by the noted extremist Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. While they often do not see eye-to-eye on tactics, these organizations do share an ideologically negative view of churches in traditionally Muslim areas, and often do not differentiate between Christians who proselytize and those who do not (Fealy 2004: 148-149).⁴¹ Allies located on the conservative edge of the Muslim mainstream, furthermore, can provide a form of “cover” for more extreme forms of protest, stressing the expansion of Christianity as the “root cause” of discord and pressuring local authorities to close, halt, or move controversial churches rather than confront protesters.

II. Explaining the Incidence and Distribution of Anti-Church Protests in Indonesia

As described above, anti-church protests after 2004 are not just notable for their heightened frequency, but for their spatial concentration in the outlying cities of the Jakarta

⁴⁰ Interviews with church congregants in Jakarta and Surabaya, 2010-2011; focus group discussion with Christians from the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, Jakarta 2011.

⁴¹ DDII, for example, advocates aboveground legal action and grassroots *dakwah*, rather than violent protest, as solutions to *kristenisasi*

Metropolitan Region (JMR) (ICG 2010; Ali-Fauzi et al 2011).⁴² In this section I will illustrate how these areas exhibit a peculiar combination of risk factors that, taken together, account for this concentration and the relative lack of sustained anti-church protests in the Surabaya Metropolitan Region (SMR). The first three risk factors—the sense that there are (1) too many people, (2) too many religious outsiders, and (3) too many ethnic outsiders in a given area—combine to explain how local Christians seeking a place to worship becomes transformed into a symbol of outsiderhood and is reconstituted as a threat to Muslim locals’ symbolic ownership of the space, which religiopolitical entrepreneurs purposively exploit. The fourth—weak or ineffective social policing by Muslim civic organizations and other community leaders—explains why it’s easier to initiate and sustain anti-church protests in some areas than others.

The Sense of Encroachment by Migrant Outsiders

Indonesia’s sustained anti-church protests cluster in what are alternately labeled the industrializing suburbs or outlying cities of the capital region. Specifically, these are the cities of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi, which together with Jakarta comprise the widely used portmanteau Jabodetabek. The term signifies the growing together of distinct settlements possessing separate administrations: five cities and three autonomous *kabupaten*, falling under the jurisdiction of three provinces (Bogor, Depok and Bekasi within West Java, Tangerang within Banten, and the autonomous province DKI Jakarta) (Hudullah and Firman 2011). Since the 1980s, population and density have risen faster in these areas than in the capital proper; by

⁴² As mentioned above, ICG (2010), Ali-Fauzi et al (2011) and other research teams have established that, while brief anti-church protests or church burnings occurred elsewhere, nearly all sustained anti-church protests have occurred in the industrializing outer regions of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region. Ali-Fauzi et al (2011) identify 12 such cases located in these areas, several of which, as of writing, remain unresolved after a decade of protest.

2000, it was estimated that a majority of the metropolitan area's residents (12.8 of the 22.5 million) now lived in the JMR's outlying cities and districts (BPS DKI Jakarta 2010).⁴³

The population boom has been fueled by industrial development. Though tertiary sectors (finance, commerce and the service industries) remain concentrated in the capital, the outlying cities and districts now account for nearly 60 percent of secondary manufacturing—up from 24 percent in the early 1980s. This has been particularly apparent in industries driven by foreign direct investment (FDI), with the result that by 2009, 87.3 percent of FDI invested in secondary sectors was located in “Bodetabek” (i.e. Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi) rather than DKI Jakarta (Hudalah and Firman 2011).⁴⁴

Factories in Bodetabek are primarily located on industrial “estates,” or areas specifically zoned for industry. In recent years, though, developers have been pursuing integrated production and residential developments, or “towns,” located within Bodetabek (Hudalah and Firman 2011). Both industrial “estates” and “towns” act as magnets for in-migration. During the years 1995-2000, it is estimated that 1.35 million Indonesians moved to the JMR, with Bodetabek experiencing unusually high rates of population growth (Firman 2009).⁴⁵

The sharp growth in both manufacturing and population in Bodetabek has placed an increased premium on ever-smaller parcels of land in the most densely populated and strategically situated residential areas. Local politicians and landowners often collaborate to

⁴³ As Hudallah and Firman (2011) describe, the outlying cities of the JRM are a “post-suburbia,” definable by the expansion of urbanization to a continuous belt of “low-density urban spatial forms, which are structurally fragmented, economically specialized, and socially segregated [by class, ethnicity, and religion].”

⁴⁴ Industrialized garment and textile production for export is the largest industry, though the outlying cities are also home to electronics, chemical, automotive, plastics and other industrial production centers.

⁴⁵ The national population growth rate is 1.49 percent; Bekasi's is 3.44, Tangerang's 3.02 and Depok's 4.25 percent (BPS 2001).

requisition land settled by the poor and working-class and sell it to Jakarta-based developers for transformation into industrial and middle-class residential developments. Indeed, this process has been ongoing for several decades; in the early 1990s, industrial “estates” alone displaced as many as 16,500 Bekasi residents from their homes (Firman and Dharmapatni 1994; Firman 2004). As in China and India, land requisition for “special economic zones” have led to or exacerbated a host of environmental and social problems, including rising social tensions among citizens (Hoshoud 1997; Ding 2007; Steinberg 2007; Raghuram et al 2009).

Longer-term trends in land-use clearly favor both middle-class housing developments and industrial “estates” and “towns” over the urban *kampungs* settled by the poor and working classes. Figures cited by Hakim (2009: 72) show that, during the years 1985-2000, land use for “planned housing” in the JMR increased by 93.2 percent and 58.9 percent for industrial development. This largely came at the expense of agricultural land, which declined by 46.9 percent during the same period; but it also came at the expense of land used for urban *kampungs*, which only increased by 14.0 percent (well below the rate of population growth). Thus the influx of migrants puts additional crowding pressures on the already crowded *kampungs*. As one resident of a Bekasi *kampung* noted: “there’s no more room, but they [migrants] keep coming.”⁴⁶

The relationship of crowding to anti-church protests, it should be noted, is often not straightforward. Some sites of anti-church protest are located in crowded *kampungs*, while others (such as GKI Taman Yasmin) are located in relatively spacious middle-class housing developments. Yet many of the local Muslims who are involved in (or sympathetic to) these the protests actually live in the adjacent *kampungs* that the middle-class housing developments (along with industrial estates) are fencing in, lending an element of class conflict to the

⁴⁶ Interview with Bekasi resident, 2011.

protests.⁴⁷ But middle-class residents of these cities also complain about the effects of rapid immigration, despite living in relatively uncrowded conditions. For example, resident of Cinere (a neighborhood of Depok and the site of a second anti-HKBP protest cycle) described a rush hour commute to Central Jakarta that had nearly doubled since 2004, from one hour to two.⁴⁸ Complaints about aggressive motorcyclists (whose riders are nearly always working-class), private van transports (*angkot*) run by ethnic gangs (who cater to the working classes), and a simple lack of infrastructure are common. And they are particularly acute whenever there is a special, traffic-generating event, such as a wedding party or political demonstration, or the regular observance of religious rites, such as Muslim Friday prayers or Sunday church services. As another Depok resident remarked, “I moved here to get away from the crowds and traffic in Jakarta, but now they’ve followed me.”⁴⁹

The Sense of Encroachment by (Christian) Religious Outsiders

Antipathy toward new residents can, under certain conditions, take on specifically religious overtones. Christian proselytizers are the most common driver of local resentments. This is especially so when proselytizers grow more numerous or visible in tandem with Christian in-migration. Indeed, both Christian and Muslim proselytizers (i.e. missionaries and *dakwah* groups) are unusually active in Jakarta’s outlying cities, the area shorthanded as Bodetabek. In a 2010 report, ICG (2010) linked the city of Bekasi’s anti-church protests (and more generalized “tolerance problems”) on competition between these groups, as well as on aggressive proselytizing by Evangelical and Pentecostal groups tied to U.S.-based missionary organizations,

⁴⁷ Interviews and focus group discussions with JMR residents, 2010-2011.

⁴⁸ Interview with Depok resident #1, 2012.

⁴⁹ Interview with Depok resident #2, 2012.

such as The Joshua Project and Campus Crusade for Christ. A PGI official interviewed by ICG suggested Evangelical groups were specifically concentrating resources on converting Muslims in “Bodetabek,” and expressed concern with the way their proselytizing exposes mainline Christians to Muslim hostility. And many of these groups are unregistered, making it difficult for either the state or other Christian organizations to influence their behavior.⁵⁰

“Church planting” is a particularly controversial method of proselytizing by Evangelical groups. In this mode, a would-be pastor establishes his congregation through conversion of non-Christians or internal conversion of mainline Christians, who are thus “born again.” The pastor then attempts to establish a church, often unlicensed, on the site of his mission (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008: 876-867). Church planting is a high prestige activity within Evangelical circles, with informants linking the practice to guarantees of “heavenly ascent.” Both Muslim and mainline Christian informants complained to me about the rapid spread of “planted” churches in migrant centers. As a Muslim informant from Tangerang related:

There is a church one, maybe two kilometers away. My Christian friend, he goes there with his family. Now, though, we have so many new people here—Bataks, Javanese, Betawi....Some are also Christians, but they don’t like the church, so they have a new [Evangelical] one closer to the *kampung*. It’s not really supposed to be a church, I think. They are always praying in there and causing problems with traffic. Even my friend doesn’t like it, because they are always telling him to stop going to the old church.⁵¹

Evangelical and Pentecostal groups operating in Bodetabek also engage in splashy, provocative actions that cause friction with local Muslims, such as food drives for the poor—

⁵⁰ An informant within the Ministry of Religious Affairs claimed that there are some 30 known but unregistered Evangelical and Pentecostal groups active in the JMR. Interview with Ministry of Religious Affairs official, 2010.

⁵¹ Interview with Tangerang resident #1, 2011.

ostensibly as charity, but which are effectively conversion events.⁵² In some cases, Evangelical groups even use Arabic in advertisements, with the clear intention of duping Muslims into attending events they might otherwise avoid. A Muslim informant from Depok described one such incident:

One day I saw posters all over my *kampung*. “Come to this event,” they said. “We will have food and *dangdut* singers. I saw writing in Arabic and thought it must be the local [Muslim] youth. So I went to the place, and there were many people there. I don’t know how many—maybe a hundred. A man passed out small books. They had Arabic writing on them. But when I looked inside, it was about [Jesus]. Not as a prophet, but in the Christian way...I felt ashamed when I realized [this]....⁵³

Revival gatherings, where new Christians are welcomed to the faith and lapsed Christians are “born again,” are another key “marketing event” among Evangelicals, and have at times also attracted negative attention from Muslims. According to Aritonang and Steenbrink (2008: 894-895), “such occasions are usually filled with altar calls, calling the participants to strengthen their commitment and to dedicate their life to serve Christ, to confess their sin, or even to repent and accept Jesus as their Savior and then to be Christian, and not infrequently accompanied by divine healing. Besides the traditional Christians, not few of the participants are new Christians recruited through such occasions.” A *Time* reporter observed one such gathering:

Permission to hold the meeting was only granted after the organizers put up a sign forbidding Muslims from entering. Nevertheless, among the line of sick and suffering hoping to be healed was an elderly Muslim man who others said was blind. After fervent prayers from worshippers in the driving rain, he suddenly blinked and gazed at the gathered crowd. “A Muslim who can now see,” said pastor Jason Balompapueng, tears rising in his eyes. “It is a miracle.” The faithful urged the tottering man onstage to bear witness to his regained sight. As the man clambered up the stairs, he removed his *peci*, an Indonesian fez-like hat often associated with Islam. A visiting minister from Jakarta blessed him. Another soul

⁵² Aritonang and Steenbrink (2008: 894) present writings of Indonesian Evangelicals link the two activities through the belief that sin is the root of social ills, such as poverty with “the gospel of Jesus Christ” as the only solution to the problem of sin.

⁵³ Interview with Depok resident #3, 2011.

was saved, the Christian pastor rejoiced. Tomorrow, he vowed, there would be more (Beech 2010).

The sheer number and density of Christian institutions in local areas can become viewed as a problem, from the perspective of some locals. Indeed, both Christian and Muslim informants complained about the rapid spread of houses of worship, often unlicensed, in migrant centers. As a Muslim informant from Tangerang related:

Well, of course we have Christians here. There is a [PGI] church one, maybe two kilometers away. My Christian friend, he goes there with his family. Now, though, we have so many new people here...Bataks, Javanese, Betawi...even Chinese, yes? Some are also Christians, but they don't like the church, so they have a new [Pentecostal] one closer to the *kampung*. It's not really supposed to be a church, I think, because it's where the shops are. They are always praying in there and causing problems with traffic. Even my friend doesn't like it, because they are always telling him to stop going to the old church.⁵⁴

The Sense of Encroachment by Ethnic Outsiders

Concerns over ethnic outsiders are widespread in these communities as well. Bataks, who constitute a significant percentage of outer island migration to the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, appear to be seen as particularly problematic by many local residents of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Bataks are routinely stereotyped as argumentative, loud, rude, and aggressive in business dealings—indeed, as one civil servant bluntly told ICG: “people just don't like Bataks.”⁵⁵ And though not all Bataks are Christians, Batak Christians are among the most highly visible migrant groups in many neighborhoods of Jakarta's industrializing suburbs.

Informant testimony suggests these kinds of “mixed-antipathy problems” are particularly common in mixed Batak-Betawi *kampungs*. As one informant, who is also a Batak Christian, but a longtime resident of Bekasi, told me:

⁵⁴ Interview with Tangerang resident #2, 2011.

⁵⁵ Interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta 2010

In my *kampung*, most Christians are Bataks like me. But I have lived here a long time, and know how things are done. Many new Bataks come from Sumatra, and they treat [our] *kampung* like a village back home. They eat pork, even dog sometimes, and this offends [some Muslims]. They have loud parties, and maybe if someone complains, they invite them to join, but the Muslims won't come in because it's not *halal*. Bataks don't get to be village chief and this makes some of them angry, so maybe they refuse to cooperate on other matters. I am often involved in settling disputes, because I know my Muslim neighbors from long ago, but I am a Christian and a Batak, and sometimes they even think I am not impartial.⁵⁶

A Betawi Muslim from another mixed *kampung* suggested that the problems faced by Batak Christians in “Bodetabek” derive from differences in norms relating to noise and the use of public space:

We have many Bataks living here. Yes, I know many of them. Our children go to [elementary] school together, and sometimes we share a meal at the *warung* [informal eatery]. Most of the time, things are fine, but when they have a party, it is so loud, you know? No one can sleep. You tell them to be quiet, but they don't listen and just tell you to go away. Then on Sundays they have a church service in one of the houses. It's okay, I think, but they sing so loud we can't even hear *azzan* [Muslim call to prayer] in our own *kampung*.⁵⁷

This is an example of how the intersection of crowding and in-migration can transmogrify into questions of symbolic ownership, with the church or informal prayer space at its center. Protestants, meanwhile, often complain about double standards in the *kampung*. As one Batak informant related:

Because our [Batak] church is so far away, we have to pray together in someone's home. We try to be quiet and respectful of the [local] Muslims, but we have to sing our hymns. It is part of our religion—like *azzan* [the call to prayer] is for them. And we hear [*azzan*] five times a day, from three mosques. We sing once, on Sundays. And they use loudspeakers, you know?⁵⁸

Another informant, a Batak Christian from South Tangerang, described a conversation he had with a Muslim friend about the difference between churches and mosques:

⁵⁶ Interview with Bekasi resident #1, 2010.

⁵⁷ Interview with Bekasi resident #2, 2010.

⁵⁸ Interview with Bekasi resident #3, 2011.

My friend, he is Betawi and Muslim. We have known each other a long time, but still he does not understand why [Batak Christians] have to pray at home. One time he asked me why we don't go to the nearby church. [But] we like to sing the hymns in our own language, and you can't do that in the PGI church. He said okay, and told me he understood, but others in the *kampung* do not. He said they don't like the way we Bataks are always making noise, and don't want to hear Christian songs when they are praying.⁵⁹

As described above, the simple question of “why do they need another church” can drive opposition to churches, while ethnic churches can pose problems when the ethnic group in question is locally unpopular, as Bataks often are. However, as the preceding statements illustrate, the specific need for ethnic churches is also not well understood by many Muslims, whose services are conducted in classical Arabic. This serves as another potential driver of resentments toward new church construction, as well as to informal services held in the home.

Civil Society and In-Group Policing

The preceding three risk factors are all low-level antipathies used by religiopolitical entrepreneurs to construct Christian outsiderhood in local communities. In other words, these antipathies are preconditions of anti-church protests, which aid religiopolitical entrepreneurs in the mobilization of anti-Christian sentiment. By contrast, the relative presence and effectiveness of social policing by vested Muslim elites shapes opportunities for inciting and sustaining anti-church protests in local communities. Where social policing is ineffective, anti-church protests are both more likely to occur and more difficult to dislodge.

As described above, social policing in Indonesia is largely the purview of monoreligious organizations, such as the Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU or the Christian PGI and Catholic Church, as well as of informal leaders and brokers, such as local *kyai* or

⁵⁹ Interview with South Tangerang resident #1, 2011.

preachers, many of whom are also affiliated with these organizations.⁶⁰ However, all face challenges from newer (or newly arrived) rival organizations, as well as from insurgents inside these organizations, over who represents or speaks for the community of believers.

One common, localized form of challenge to Muhammadiyah and NU centers on the mosque. It begins when a new actor enters the institution as worshipper, and begins participating in religious activities. After establishing his *bona fides*, the new actor begins lobbying for positions of responsibility, lobbies to bring in guest speakers, and invites outside backers to join activities. As his network within the mosque grows, he begins replacing written materials distributed to worshippers after Friday services (deemed “too liberal” or “incorrect”) with his own, “correct” materials.⁶¹ Finally, he works to replace the mosque leadership. In Islamic scholar Abd A’la’s words: “if he is successful in this, then the mosque is his. If he fails, then he simply builds a new one, and from there he rails against the ‘false teachings’ of his former fellows.”⁶² Officials from NU and Muhammadiyah confirm that mosque officials are constantly on guard against such coups.

Street Islamists like FPI, FUI, and Forkami, meanwhile, represent another form of challenge to NU and Muhammadiyah over who really represents “Muslim interests.” A Muhammadiyah informant who lives in Bekasi described how a local FPI cadre once accused him of being “too willing to talk to the Christians,” further noting that FPI “go around telling local Muslims that the traditional groups cannot stop *kristenisasi* (Christianization).”⁶³ An NU informant recalls specific slights aimed at his organization: “I have heard them defaming Gus

⁶⁰ *Kyai* is a Javanese term for *alim*.

⁶¹ Interviews: Abd A’la, Azyumardi Azra, Syafiq Mughni and other informants, Jakarta and Surabaya 2010-2011.

⁶² Interview with Abd A’la, Surabaya 2010.

⁶³ Interview with Muhammadiyah cadre, Jakarta 2011.

Dur, calling him a liberal or a Chinese, even saying that he was born a Christian—which... is not true.”⁶⁴ When asked, an FPI informant denied that the group engaged in these kinds of smear campaigns, but also made it clear that FPI views Muhammadiyah and NU as “blind” to the effects of *kristenisasi*.⁶⁵

In many local areas, heightened competition and outbidding have weakened Muhammadiyah and NU to the point where they can no longer adequately perform the social policing role. According to NU activist Ulil Abshar Abdallah:

If you go to the ground, you’ll see [they cannot] stop provocation from outside. Because what happens—the pattern for attacking churches—is very typical. People around churches communities, they can live together peacefully for years. Then groups come in, provoking people who live there and making noises, making trouble out of the situation. This is the pattern for almost all problems churches are having today. Civil society is not strong enough to prevent provocations from outside. This is the situation that has been exploited so cleverly by Islamists.⁶⁶

The relationship between policing and protest is thus reflexive, and the failure to perform social policing further degrades the capacity of NU and Muhammadiyah chapters to do so in the future. However, NU and Muhammadiyah officials make clear that they are indeed confronting conservative and Islamist challengers, a category that includes street Islamists, *salafi* sects, and the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced PKS.⁶⁷ In doing so, NU seeks to protect elements of Javanese and Sundanese culture that these groups seek to eradicate, including traditional practices like the *slametan* (a communal feast that is also a residual vestige of Java’s pre-Islamic Hindu-Buddhist era, and which NU tolerates as longstanding cultural practice, though does not

⁶⁴ Interview with NU cadre, Jakarta 2010. Gus Dur is a popular nickname for former Indonesian president and NU chairman Abdurrahman Wahid.

⁶⁵ Interview with FPI cadre, Jakarta 2012.

⁶⁶ Interview with Ulil Abshar Abdallah, Jakarta 2011.

⁶⁷ Interviews with NU and Muhammadiyah officials, Jakarta and Surabaya 2010-2011.

endorse as a religious practice) (Wahid 2009: 189-91).⁶⁸ Muhammadiyah, by contrast, opposes its Islamist and conservative challengers on the principle of organizational solidarity and a sense of threat to its influence in Indonesian society. A 2006 statement of organizational policy illustrates this point neatly, clearly stating that all members must share the organization's beliefs and agenda, aid the organization against infiltration by challengers who do not, and maintain organizational discipline in the face of such challenges:

The Muhammadiyah and all its members, leaders, charity-based businesses, autonomous organizations, divisions, foundations, branches, offices, organizational structures and all its organizational elements *must be free from sharing the beliefs, mission, and/or agenda of other parties that either directly or indirectly, in an open or veiled manner, might undermine or destroy the Muhammadiyah organization.*

All mass media associated with the Muhammadiyah Organization are requested to promote the teachings, mission, and interests of Muhammadiyah, and to serve as tools for socializing the views, policies, decrees and activities of Muhammadiyah *so as to assist the Organization's members to distance themselves and become free from the views, mission and agenda of other organizations and movements.* All leaders of the Organization, and of all Muhammadiyah councils, foundations, autonomous organizations and charitable businesses, are instructed to maintain organizational discipline, "clean up" their ranks, and strengthen the Muhammadiyah's ideology and mission... (Muhammadiyah 2006).⁶⁹

The two organizations also face distinct, albeit related, organizational problems that impact their social policing capacity in areas like Bodetabek. Muhammadiyah is the more centrally organized of the two: it runs far-reaching networks of schools, hospitals, clinics, and social welfare charities, and counts among its members a large cross-section of the Indonesian political and religious elites. Muhammadiyah is officially pro-pluralism, has disavowed the organization's previously held ambitions to establish an Islamic state (or, barring that, to require

⁶⁸ The majority of Indonesians in West Java and Banten are Sundanese; the majority in East and Central Java are Javanese.

⁶⁹ My emphasis. The statement also prohibits the use of Muhammadiyah facilities to promote the agenda or views of political parties (a thinly-veiled reference to the PKS, which Muhammadiyah sees as threatening its primacy among modernist Muslims).

all Indonesian Muslims to follow *sharia*), and often advocates for the rights of religious minorities. Yet it is also divided by an internal cleavage separating those whose vision of religious pluralism is expansive and far-reaching from a more “puritan” faction, whose advocates would prefer a more truncated pluralism that privileges orthodox Sunni Islam (through blasphemy laws, restrictions on minority houses of worship in majority Muslim regions, anti-heretical legislation, and so forth) (Feillard and Madinier 2011: 241-7; Menchik 2014).⁷⁰

The progressive/conservative split within Muhammadiyah is reflected in the organization’s complex relationship with Christians and Christianity. As Burhani (2011) argues, the organization balances its opposition to Christian proselytizing with tolerance of mainline Christians, who do not generally proselytize to Muslims, and cooperation with organizations like the Indonesian Communion of Churches (PGI). What’s more, a series of *tafsir* (scholarly exegeses of the Quran and Sunnah) published in 1998 and subsequently adopted as official policy encourages members and local chapters to help non-Muslims fulfill *their* religious obligations. For example, since 2005 the organization has encouraged local chapters to offer Muhammadiyah spaces for Christmas worship, provided that Muhammadiyah personnel do not participate in Christian rites. Nevertheless, many within the organization view churches outside PGI or the Catholic Church with trepidation, and in interviews expressed sympathy with campaigns to limit church growth and Christian proselytizing in “Muslim communities” (i.e. “Muslim owned” spaces).

Muhammadiyah, furthermore, shares history and personnel with the *dakwah* organizations DDII and KISDI, which as mentioned above take a harder line on churches. This

⁷⁰ Also cited in interviews with Syafiq Mughni, Saiful Mujani, Abdul Munir, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, and Jajat Burhanudin, 2011.

has created a source of internal tension within the organization.⁷¹ Indeed it was striking how often the DDII and FPI members I interviewed in metropolitan Jakarta referred to their Muhammadiyah backgrounds, while several claimed that their organizations enjoyed considerable support within local Muhammadiyah chapters. And there was a general consensus among informants (both within and outside Muhammadiyah) that local chapters in Bodetabek are significantly more conservative than those in other parts of Java (including the capital itself). As a result, local Muhammadiyah officials are often hesitant to confront street Islamists: some because they, as “puritans,” sympathize with the aims (if not the tactics) of the protesters; others because they, as “pluralists” lack the internal support for such a confrontation; and others still because a confrontation would expose this rift and weaken the organization. Each, in turn, raises the cost of confrontation and incentivizes “retreat.”⁷²

NU’s comparably looser structure presents a different set of problems. Part of this is due to differences in size. Though official numbers show membership in the two organizations as roughly similar (29 million for Muhammadiyah and approximately 30 million for NU), a 2010 survey revealed that while only 7.9 percent of Indonesian Muslims claimed affiliation with Muhammadiyah, a full 49 percent claimed association with NU (Bush 2014).⁷³ Compounding matters, NU is not only a modern civic organization (like Muhammadiyah), but also a looser

⁷¹ Former chairman Din Syamsuddin in some ways embodies this tension. For example, he made the Christmas offer and has called upon the government to protect the rights of the GKI Taman Yasmin congregation, and is active in interfaith congresses (Wardany 2012).⁷¹ Yet he is also the former chairman of DDII, an organization that is hostile to Christianity (Olle 2009: 99).

⁷² Interviews with Muhammadiyah officials, Jakarta and Surabaya 2010-2011.

⁷³ These survey results, if extrapolated to the 2010 population, correspond to 16 million affiliated with Muhammadiyah and 100 million for NU.

network of independent Islamic scholars (*ulama* or, among Javanese, *kyai*) tied together by adherence to traditionalist *syafi'i* jurisprudence.⁷⁴

NU Center (PBNU), located in Jakarta, is a highly bureaucratized organization that allocates resources to educational institutions, clinics, and charitable enterprises in a manner similar to Muhammadiyah. Yet while it has considerable authority over *those* enterprises, PBNU lacks the organizational tools to impose a common vision or behavior on the *ulama*. This is due to a deeply ingrained culture of the “charismatic *kyai*,” local religious leaders with large followings in a territorially delimited area who run a *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) and command great respect and moral authority among the lesser *ulama* and broader Muslim community.⁷⁵ Though affiliated with NU, *pesantren* typically operate with minimal oversight by the organization, in effect rendering them autonomous.

During the time of Abdurrahman Wahid’s chairmanship, bureaucratic and charismatic authority briefly merged, allowing Wahid to steer NU in a more concretely pluralistic, pro-democratic, and politically progressive direction (Bush 2009). But since Wahid’s chairmanship, the ideological fractures within NU have grown more severe, with PBNU vacillating between “moderately progressive” (1999-2004; 2010-2015) and “moderately conservative” (2004-2010) policy directions (Bush and Munawar-Rachman 2014: 22-24; van Bruinessen 2011). Moreover, though the current (post-2010) leadership is strongly supportive of pluralism and minority rights, its lack of charismatic authority has rendered PBNU unable to impose a set of common practices on the *ulama*. And as it happens, individual *alim* are often more strongly influenced by personalized networks within NU (some of which are deeply conservative) than by PBNU

⁷⁴ Interview with Jajat Burhanudin, Tangerang 2011.

⁷⁵ Interviews with NU officials, Jakarta 2010-2011.

policies.⁷⁶ Indeed, officials interviewed for this research expressed a combination of frustration and fatalism with regards the autonomy of the *ulama*—particularly in areas like Bodetabek.

A survey conducted in 2008 among *ulama* in West Java underscores the way in which this lack of institutional power can feed into poor Muslim-Christian relations, in which 81 percent of respondents claimed affiliation with NU and 86 percent opposed the building of new churches in their local areas (Bandung 2008). Research conducted by Burhanudin and the Center for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) further suggests that individual NU members oppose churches as a way to gain standing in the community as an Islamic leader, and piece together the following necessary to become a recognized *alim*. This gambit, one notes, is functionally identical to church planting among Evangelical Christians. “Behind the attacks on churches,” Burnahudin told me in an interview, “you find individual competition among those who want to become *ulama*.”

The end result of this is unwillingness, in Muhammadiyah’s case, and inability, in NU’s, to police either Muslim communities or their own rank-and-file members in the precise areas where anti-church protests predominate. The weakness of Muslim civil society thus creates opportunities for religiopolitical entrepreneurs to instigate and sustain anti-church protest cycles.

Why Metropolitan Jakarta and not Metropolitan Surabaya?

Metropolitan Surabaya presents a compelling counter-case to metropolitan Jakarta. Though it is also a rapidly industrializing and urbanizing destination for in-migration, anti-church protests are largely absent from its outlying cities and districts. There are ample reasons, however, to view the Surabaya Metropolitan Region as a plausible site of anti-church protests.

⁷⁶ It is notable that NU’s leading conservative, Ma’ruf Amin, is the principle architect of MUI’s *fatwas* against secularism, liberalism and pluralism, as well as Indonesia’s anti-pornography bill.

After all, a significant proportion of Muslims in metropolitan Surabaya are conservative-to-Islamist in orientation, conservative social policies have proven popular in provincial and local government (e.g. banning the Ahmadiyah in East Java province or Surabaya mayor Tri Rismaharani's anti-vice campaigns), and the area has a significant history of anti-church (and more generalized anti-Christian) violence, most recently in the 1990s. The comparative absence of sustained anti-church protests in metropolitan Surabaya, I argue, is explained by three factors. The first is more physical space to build on relative to population, leading to fewer tensions related to crowding or encroachment on "owned" space. The second is "insider in-migration," which is to say, in-migration that is largely made up of the same religious groups (faiths, congregations, schools, sects, etc.) and ethnic groups that already predominate in the area. "Insider" migrants are more likely to funnel into existing institutions and informal power structures. This, in turn, produces fewer opportunities for proselytizing Christian and Muslim *dakwah* groups, lower demand for ethnic churches that don't already exist in the area, and better communication between Christian and Muslim community leaders. Finally, the greater willingness and higher capacity of Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU to police local communities against anti-Christian activities greatly constricts the opportunities for religiopolitical entrepreneurs to incite anti-church protests, and provides Christians with a powerful set of allies among local Muslims.

More Physical Space, Less Crowding

The Surabaya Metropolitan Region (SMR) is, like Jakarta, a primary locus of economically driven in-migration. It contains similar industrializing zones to those of the JMR; like Jakarta's industrializing suburbs, they are generally located to the west, south, and east of a

large and densely populated urban center—areas referred to by the portmanteau Gerbangkertosusila, which comprises the cities Gresik, Bankalan, Mojokerto, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, and Lamongan. Surabaya has, moreover, long served as Indonesia's second center of industrial production: in 2001 it was not only the second largest producer of industrial goods, but the only other area of Indonesia where manufacturing accounted for more than a quarter of GDP (Firman 2000). Industrial growth in Surabaya has traditionally been less contingent on FDI, but the past decade has seen an uptick in capital-investment, and a consequent increase in in-migration

Yet this uptick in investment, industrial employment, and (as a consequence) in-migration has taken place in a space marked by better infrastructure, lower population density, and, crucially, more strategically-located tracts of open land. Residential development has thus pushed outwards, with a larger proportion enveloping rural and unused land tracts (as opposed to encroaching upon space already used for residential purposes). This has resulted in better social and economic integration of new residential settlements and industrial developments with the existing rural economy (Firman 2004). The effects are immediately and starkly apparent to observers: whereas new factories and middle-class housing tracts abut and encroach upon strategically located urban *kampung*s in the outlying cities and districts of the JMR, they are generally built upon new ground in the SMR in such a way as to both preserve the spatial integrity of urban *kampung*s and allow for more spatial expansion of the *kampung* as its population grows.

Thus the residential crowding issues found in cities like Bekasi or Bogor are less pronounced in Sidoarjo or West Surabaya, where there is relatively more space to build out.

With more space, there is both a lower premium on any given plot of land and fewer of the low-level ethnic and religious conflicts that help create favorable conditions for anti-church protests.

Insider In-Migration

Christians do not experience outsiderhood in the SRM to the degree that they often do in the industrializing suburbs of the JMR. Informant testimony suggests this is strongly related to the religious and ethnic composition of in-migration.⁷⁷ Indeed, whereas Muslim and Christian migrants to the JMR are widely dispersed among dozens of ethnic groups from across the Indonesian littoral, migration to the SMR is more regional. Muslim migrants are relatively more likely to be Javanese and Madurese, and Christian migrants are relatively more likely to be ethnic Javanese or Chinese—the exact groups already established in the area (BPS 2000; Deb and Seck 2009).⁷⁸

Under different circumstances, this might stimulate competition and conflict across religious or ethnic lines, as it has in other recent Indonesian cases (e.g. in Maluku) (Bertrand 2004; G. Brown 2014). However, informants in the SMR described how the regularity and predictability of interactions with migrants from “known” religious and ethnic groups allow them to resolve the kind of low-level disputes that stimulate a blending of religious and ethnic resentments in the JMR. Several Muslim informants in Surabaya explained how tolerance in their neighborhoods emerged from strong social ties between Muslims and Christians:

[Muslims and Christians] know each other here—as neighbors and friends since a long time ago. If there is a problem, like if kids are fighting, then we know who to

⁷⁷ Interviews, Surabaya 2010-2011.

⁷⁸ Only 10 percent of migrants to East Java come from other provinces (with Central Javanese migrants constituting the largest subset at 3 percent). By contrast, 26 percent of migrants to DKI Jakarta and 30 percent of migrants to West Java come from outside provinces (Deb and Seck 2009: 32).

talk to. I see the priest outside his house every evening and I know all the other parents. They are people you can trust. They will take care of it, believe me.⁷⁹

Other informants described how ethnic ties to locals (linguistic, cultural, regional, and in some cases familial) also eased their integration into specifically religious institutions, organizations, and informal networks. “I’m Javanese,” one informant from Sidoarjo explained. “So I go to the Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan (East Javanese Christian Church). It’s the same one as we have in Jember. All the Javanese [Christians] I know here go to this church too, so it was an easy decision for me.”⁸⁰

Thus the influx of migrants, rather than weakening the authority of existing religious institutions and organizations, instead appears to augment the authority of existing religious institutions and organizations. This is especially true of Muhammadiyah and NU, but it is also true of Christian organizations like PGI and the ethnic Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan network. This, in turn, preserves their ability to mediate disputes and police religious communities, while the simplified ethnic dynamic leads to more reliability in inter-group communication and a higher likelihood of successful brokerage in the conflict situations that arise.

“Policed” Communities

In contrast to their weakness in “Bodetabek,” both Muhammadiyah and NU demonstrate both capacity and willingness to police co-religionists in the SMR. Syafiq Mughni, chairman of Muhammadiyah in East Java, described in detail efforts by the organization to police its membership against Islamist groups like FPI:

We have a policy—any leaders or workers at a Muhammadiyah institution can only have one loyalty, and that’s to Muhammadiyah. FPI, you know, is very big

⁷⁹ Interview with Surabaya resident, 2010.

⁸⁰ Interview with Sidoarjo resident, 2011. Jember is another city in East Java.

in Jakarta and we see that they want to establish [themselves] in East Java as well. Let me also tell you this is an issue where Muhammadiyah and NU agree 100 percent—we don't want FPI here, so if we find out one of our members or employees is also a member of FPI, we give them a choice: you can be FPI or you can be Muhammadiyah, but you cannot be both.⁸¹

[Islamist groups] want to change Muhammadiyah's mission from within our institutions—from being a social, religious organization to a politically partial organization. And once these recruits are good and militant members [of Islamist organizations]...they will grow to dislike—even hate—Muhammadiyah. This kind of dual loyalty, of course, is not something we can tolerate. Of course we have lost some people, but by letting them choose, we have managed to cleanse most of our membership of [dual] loyalties...Unfortunately, we have been less successful in other provinces, like West Java.⁸²

Whereas Muhammadiyah's efforts to police its rank-and-file membership reflect a heightened willingness to use the organizational tools at its disposal, NU's ability to engage in social policing reflects the presence of an entirely different toolkit. As mentioned above, PBNU has a difficult time imposing a common vision and mode of behavior on the autonomous *ulama* in the outlying cities of the JMR, where NU-affiliated *ulama* have been linked to several anti-Church protests. In both East and Central Java, however, this institutional weakness is countermanded by the authority of charismatic *kyai* tied to former President Wahid (and commanding large networks of *pesantren* graduates), such as K.H. Mustofa Bisri (Gus Mus), former Indonesian Vice President and NU Chairman K.H. Achmad Hasyim Muzadi, and K.H. Gus Yusuf Chudlori, all of whom share Wahid's progressive vision of interreligious relations.⁸³ In East Java, NU's authority over local communities is further enhanced by the continued

⁸¹ According to Mughni, the organization has adopted similar policies with regards non-violent Islamist groups like PKS and Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

⁸² Interview with Syafiq Mughni, Surabaya 2011.

⁸³ Interview with Yusuf Chudlori, Yogyakarta 2011. Muzadi, as noted in Chapter Two, is a social conservative that, as NU chairman, supported legal restrictions on the allegedly "deviant" Ahmadiyah sect. Nevertheless, he has been an outspoken supporter of equal rights and protections for Christians and other non-Muslims in Indonesia—including disputed churches, such as HKBP Filadelfia and GKI Taman Yasmin (*The Jakarta Post* 2010c).

prestige associated with Wahid's family—several of whom are prominent human rights activists—and by a density of NU institutions that, informants relate, instills traditionalist Muslims with a degree of loyalty to the organization not found in other parts of Indonesia.⁸⁴

What's more, NU's youth brigade, Anzor, is active in the *kampungs* of the SMR. Anzor flags were ever-present in many of the *kampungs* I visited, presenting a sharp contrast to the *kampungs* of greater Jakarta, where the flags of *preman* groups (FPI, FUI, various ethnic Betawi street organizations, and the ultranationalist Pemuda Pancasila) often predominate.⁸⁵ Anzor—and in particular, its paramilitary subdivision Banser—has its own history of violence, but is now firmly committed to implementing Wahid's vision of interreligious pluralism at the street level.⁸⁶ In an interview, Anzor chief Nusron Wahid related to me why this was an important value for the organization to uphold:

As Muslims we believe our religion is the best, that it is the truth. But we also realize that this country was not just made for Muslims, but Christians, Hindus, [and others]. This is the NU tradition...it is also the tradition of Indonesia, of Pancasila. And of course, Islamic tradition as well, because Christians are *al-Khitab* [People of the Book]. So when some of these [radicals] went after the Yasmin church in Bogor, I sent our forces there. In East Java, there is no need [for this kind of action], because we are so strong. The local Muslims join us to protect the churches if we need to.⁸⁷

Anzor and Banser have, in recent years, taken a hard line against FPI and related groups. In 2008, after FPI leader Habib Rizieq made disparaging comments about Abdurrahman Wahid, Banser divisions in a number of East Javanese cities and towns set upon local FPI offices, forcing their abandonment and exacting a rare public apology from Rizieq (Alimi 2012). More

⁸⁴ Interviews with NU officials, Surabaya 2011.

⁸⁵ This, of course, applies to *kampungs* that have not experienced church controversies as well as those that have.

⁸⁶ As noted in Chapter One, Anzor takes a somewhat (albeit not entirely) different stance on intra-religious minorities, such as the Ahmadiyah and Shia.

⁸⁷ Interview with Nusron Wahid, Jakarta 2011.

recently, Banser has called upon provincial authorities to ban and expel the group from East Java on the grounds that they “cause anarchy,” while demanding the provincial chapter of NU purge its mosques and *musholla* (Fatkhurrohman 2012).

Conclusion

Indonesia’s anti-church protests are outgrowths of on-going democratization and decentralization processes, the central government’s toleration of challenges to religious pluralism (provided they are locally contained), and the opportunity structure created by the gaps and fissures in state authority that emerge from these conditions. They are also, like European and North American anti-mosque protests, directly related to questions of symbolic ownership of space in areas that were once religiously homogeneous, but are now religiously and ethnically diverse. And they are clearly products of both intra- and inter-group competition among Sunni Muslim and Protestant Christian organizations.

These factors do not, however, explain why anti-church protests cluster in the outlying cities of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region. To explain this clustering, I have identified a series of risk factors which raise the likelihood that anti-church protests will emerge and be sustained over time, and which are all found in Jakarta’s industrializing suburbs. The sense that there are too many people in a local area stimulates low-level antipathies toward newcomers, while the influx of religious and ethnic “outsiders” creates or exacerbates the feeling among “Jabotabek” locals that their symbolic ownership of space is at risk. With the right catalyst, such as religiopolitical entrepreneurship by street Islamist groups, these risk factors have the potential to coalesce as opposition to new Christian churches, including churches whose congregations do not proselytize to Muslims. Meanwhile, weak or absent social policing by Muslim civic

organizations (and, to a more limited extent, by their Christian counterparts) creates a favorable opportunity structure for inciting and sustaining anti-church protests over time.

By contrast, in the industrializing suburbs of the Surabaya Metropolitan Region, there is more physical space to build without encroaching on existing communities, and in-migrants are more likely to come from the same religious and ethnic groups that predominate locally. Consequently, they are more likely to be funneled into existing institutions (such as churches, mosques, or organizations), to share social norms related to the use of space, and to have ties to locals (including community leaders). Finally, SMR chapters of the Muslim civic organizations Muhammadiyah and NU display greater capacity and willingness to police co-religionists against the groups that incite anti-church protests.

This chapter thus provides empirical support for Latin and Fearon's (1996) "in-group policing" model. It further suggests, contra Varshney (2001), that reliable, high-capacity organizations that draw primarily from the majority in-group may be as well (or better) positioned to anticipate, avoid, and resolve conflict than organizations drawing from multiple ethnic or religious communities. Comparatively speaking, these cases also suggest that there are specific incentives and disincentives driving the degree to which civic organizations police the relevant in-group. A high capacity organization or chapter engages in policing, in part, to stave off challenges by rival organizations that seek to weaken its authority and legitimacy. But a low capacity organization or chapter does not engage in policing, because confrontation from a position of weakness would only further erode an already precarious position. Though exclusively Muslim, the metropolitan Surabaya chapters of NU and Muhammadiyah have lowered the probability of Muslim/Christian conflict by cultivating close relations with Christian organizations and actively anticipating challenges from intra-religious rivals; and by assertively

policing their memberships and local communities against the religiopolitical entrepreneurs of conflict. In the outlying cities of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region, by contrast, no religious civic organization appears willing or capable to play the same role. And, of course, the relationship between policing and protest is reflexive: effective policing raises the capacity to engage in policing, while ineffective policing lowers that capacity.

This chapter also provides evidence for a series of linked propositions set forth in Chapter Two: (1) that, in post-*otonomi daerah* Indonesia, the most serious challenges to religious pluralism are enacted on the regional and local level; (2) that these challenges are, for the most part, limited to a discrete number of regions and local areas marked by favorable opportunity structures for challenging religious pluralism and embedded, politically moderate Muslim elites; and (3) that the central state tolerates these challenges, provided that they are contained within and to these areas, as part of a “bargain” through which it limits direct challenges to religious pluralism at the level of the state. Thus anti-church protests are a concrete example of the regionalization of religious pluralism, which as described in Chapter Two is an outgrowth of the political process that has emerged from the intersection of democratization, decentralization, and contestation over Islam’s place in state and society.

The framework of regionalization also suggests that anti-church protests are distinctly local events. After all, the vast majority of Christians worship without issue—even in areas, like metropolitan Surabaya, with significant histories of anti-Christian violence. Structural conditions, political processes, and key decisions made by political actors located at the level of state are primarily interesting in how they facilitate this regionalization and localization. Religious tolerance issues, like anti-church protests, are in turn a consequence of how regionalization and localization have been enacted, and how regionalization and localization

manifest once they are filtered through local conditions and processes, as well as the agency of local political actors.

Finally, given that anti-church protests are a fundamentally localized phenomenon, the “risk model” presented in this chapter may help Indonesian authorities and civic groups identify future sites of anti-church protest before they emerge. Though anti-church protests have, to date, clustered in Bodetabek, their functionality as a vehicle for manipulating the political cycle raises the likelihood that they will emerge elsewhere. Indeed, Buehler’s (2008; 2013b) research on *sharia* bylaws and machine politics in South Sulawesi shows an uptick in activity among the street Islamist and allied conservative groups that have incited anti-church protests in metropolitan Jakarta, as well as a weak response from Muslim civil society. This suggests that South Sulawesi might be a likely candidate for future anti-church protests.⁸⁸ Strengthening the capacity of Muslim civil society in such areas could reduce that risk.

Eventually, however, the Indonesian government needs to find a political solution to anti-church protests. This would likely entail clarifying the distribution of authority under *otonomi daerah*, creating effective enforcement mechanisms for judicial rulings, issuing clearer guidelines for the construction of churches and mosques that depend less on manipulable notions of “community approval” and more on demographic considerations (e.g. the ratio of houses of worship to the number of adherents in a given area, etc.), and restricting new church/mosque construction to pre-specified, non-residential zones that can handle increases in traffic and noise—and making sure these restrictions apply equally to all religious institutions.

⁸⁸ While sustained anti-church protests have not (yet) emerged in South Sulawesi, unknown assailants threw Molotov cocktails at five Makassar churches over the course of a single week in 2013 (Hajramurmi 2013).

Chapter Four

Interactional Pressures on Pluralism in Everyday Life

The discussion up to this point has centered on sociopolitical challenges to religious pluralism in Indonesia. Since the 1970s, Indonesia has also experienced rapid growth in *sociocultural* expressions of Islam, by which I mean growth in public and personal religiosity, social identification as Muslim, and consumption of “Islamic” goods and services. This phenomenon is not unique to Indonesia, or even to Islam. Rather, Indonesia is one site of a global religious revival that is particularly visible among Muslims, in part because of the stress placed on visual markers of piety (e.g. dress and grooming) by Islamic revivalists, and in part because of the concurrent rise of Islamist and conservative Muslim political actors in the Middle East, South Asia, and among European Muslims.¹

The female headscarf, called *hijab* internationally and *jilbab* in Indonesia, has attracted particular scholarly attention—arguably more than any other sociocultural manifestation of the Islamic revival.² Many studies stress the headscarf’s sociopolitical foundations: as an emblem of patriarchy and gender inequality (Joppke 2009); as a mechanism for the hardening of social boundaries (Roy 1996: 76; 2006: 61); or as a symbol of resistance to globalization, Westernization, or secular modernity (Göle 1996: 1-5; El Guindi 1999). In contrast to these sociopolitical framings, ethnographers observe both how the practice is often driven by self-protective concerns (Smith-Hefner 2007) and how Muslim women use Islamic piety as a conduit to self-actualization, empowerment, and engagement in public life (Deeb 2006; Mahmood 2011; Rinaldo 2013a; 2013b).

¹ For a more detailed discussion of these linkages in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia, see the introduction to this dissertation.

² In other societies, the term *jilbab* is narrowly used in reference to a more expansive form of Islamic dress.

Despite this scholarly interest (and vigorous debate) on the meaning and significance of the Islamic headscarf, the potential effects of the headscarf's adoption on those who do not adopt the practice remain underexplored. To what degree does adoption of the Islamic headscarf produce interactive pressures on other Muslims to conform to emerging pious standards? To the degree that such pressures exist, what are its modalities, manifestations, and limits? And how does the spread of visual piety among Muslims affect non-Muslim Indonesians?

I situate these questions within a theoretical framework drawn from two bodies of literature. First, I examine findings from social psychological experiments on interactive pressures. Here one can distinguish *compliance pressures* (pressures imposed on the individual by others in the immediate social environment) from *conformity pressures* (internalized pressures to conform to whatever is perceived as normative in the immediate social environment). I then consider a complementary literature on *thresholds* for taking particular actions. This literature suggests that the number of individuals adopting a particular practice or behavior in the immediate environment affects the propensity of others to do so. Next, drawing on extensive interview data, I discuss various forms of *proactive* and *reactive* piety in Indonesia in order to show how the spread of markers of visible piety, such as the *jilbab*, produces conformity pressures on Muslim women who have not adopted the practice. I then explore how some uncovered women resist conformity pressures, and how others respond to these pressures by *informalizing* piety. Finally, I discuss how the spread of visible piety among Muslims may contribute to feelings of exclusion and “markedness” among non-Muslims, even without widespread prejudice or concerted efforts to marginalize.

Brief Note on Methodology and Data

As with Chapter Three, the evidence presented in this chapter is primarily interview-based. There are many advantages to this approach. Interview data allows me to relate how Indonesians understand and interpret the issues at hand, and to present those understandings and interpretations in rich detail. Relatedly, interview data is useful in limiting the imposition of meanings that deviate from the actual experiences and insider knowledge of my subjects. And it would be difficult to explore questions of how social change contextualizes individual choices, at the level of detail I provide in this chapter, using alternate methodologies.

On the other hand, the interview-based approach has some drawbacks. My results are not generalizable to the degree that responses to a survey of sufficient size and randomness would be. And because my interviews were limited to Indonesian Muslims and Christians from the Jakarta and Surabaya metropolitan regions, there is a bias in my data toward urban experiences. Finally, throughout the data collection process, I had to remain aware how my status as a male foreigner of unknown religious affiliation and religiosity might impact responses to my questions.³ Nevertheless, I was struck by how candid and open most interview subjects were.

Throughout the interview process, I strove to maximize the usefulness of the data I collected and minimize biased responses. I selected my interview subjects using the purposive and snowball sampling methods so that they would represent a broad range of urban society. I asked my subjects both open-ended and targeted questions, often approaching the same topics from different angles, in order to account for positive response biases, shyness, and other issues that frequently emerge in interviews. And I collected far more interview data than I have presented in this chapter. This helped me identify patterns and filter out unreliable responses.

³ I deliberately avoided questions on my own religiosity so as not to bias responses.

Just as importantly, throughout this chapter I have worked to strike a balance between presenting and interpreting the thoughts and observations of my subjects.

Jilbab: the Rhetoric of Choice and Reality of Pressure

The Islamic headscarf is generally associated with Muslim piety, but the practice is a matter of considerable debate and contrasting interpretation. The Quran itself contains no direct reference to covering the head. Rather, it instructs both men and women to “lower their gaze” and “guard their private parts” for the purpose of (sexual) modesty, and urges women to “draw their veils over their bosoms, and not...reveal their *aurat* (adornment)” to men who are not close relatives (Surah 24: 30-31).⁴ Orthodox conceptions of the female *aurat* as including hair and scalp (or more expansively as all but the face, palms of one’s hands, and soles of one’s feet) derive from the Sunnah, or “righteous path.”⁵ This sprawling collection of sayings and vignettes (*hadiths*), attributed to the Prophet, his wives, and companions, is the second most important religious text in Sunni Islam.⁶ However, the fragmented nature of authority in Sunni Islam, coupled with lingering questions related to interpretation, authenticity, and relative importance of individual *hadiths*, has produced a broad range of positions on what, exactly, it means to dress

⁴ Women are also instructed to cover their body (albeit without any specification as to which parts) in order to avoid “trouble” (i.e. harassment) from men (Surah 33: 59).

⁵ The meaning of *aurat* is a matter of debate and interpretation among Muslims. For men, it is generally interpreted as comprising the buttocks and genitalia, and thus men are instructed to cover the body from navel to knees when in public. For women, however, interpretations range from the entire body to just the buttocks, genitalia, and breasts (including visible cleavage). A prevalent view in Indonesia holds that female *aurat* includes hair, arms, and legs, but not face, hands, or feet. But many Indonesian Muslims interpret it differently (either in more or less restrictive terms). There are also different standards according to circumstance. For example, it is generally accepted that women should cover their entire bodies (though not their faces) when in prayer.

⁶ As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, Shia Islam does not draw upon the Sunnah and has a different set of criteria for evaluating *hadiths*.

piously. Interpretations range from the tent-like *niqab* favored by Indonesia's small pockets of *salafi* Muslims to the dramatically-patterned, high-fashion headscarves worn by cosmopolitan women in Jakarta or Surabaya, often in a relaxed style above the widow's peak, alongside makeup, jewelry and designer clothing.⁷ And, of course, many observant Muslim women feel no obligation to cover their heads.

Nonetheless, it's clear that increasingly large numbers of Indonesian Muslim women have adopted the *jilbab*. Exact figures are not known, but Smith-Hefner (2007) estimated that at Yogyakarta's prestigious Gadjadara University, the percentage rose from less than 3 percent of the female student population in 1970 to over 60 percent by 2002. Meanwhile, a 2010 survey found that 26 percent of Muslim women age 20-34 in Jakarta wear the *jilbab* on a daily basis—a figure that is likely much higher outside this cosmopolitan center (Utomo et al 2015). The same survey, moreover, found that wearing the *jilbab* correlated weakly with political attitudes and party affiliation, but more strongly with other markers of religiosity and sociocultural identification, marking it as a primarily sociocultural practice. This is in line with findings unearthed in studies of Muslim piety outside Indonesia, such as Mahmood's (2011) ethnography of a women's Quranic study group in Egypt.

In Indonesia, the *jilbab* is embedded firmly within a *rhetoric of choice*, which holds that no one should be compelled to adopt the practice. The pervasiveness of this rhetoric of choice is borne out by public opinion data; for example, a 2012 Pew survey found that 79% of Indonesian women believe that it is a woman's right to choose whether or not she covers her head in public (Pew 2013). And it is borne out in law, as Muslim dress is only regulated in a small number of

⁷ Esposito (2011: 106) and Stillman and Stillman (2003: 142-143) note that face veil has its origins outside Islam—first among the Persian and Byzantine upper classes, and only among Arabs several generations after Muhammed's death, when it became symbol of wealth and high status.

distinctly conservative enclaves.⁸ Notably, this rhetoric of choice is pervasive among both Islamic modernists (who follow the pattern of reform initiated by Egyptian theologian Muhammad Abduh in the 19th century) and traditionalist *syafi'i* Muslims (who follow the *syafi'i* approach to Islamic jurisprudence).

Both the modernist Muhammadiyah and traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organizations officially adopt the rhetoric of choice as policy. As I have emphasized throughout the dissertation, these organizations play a powerful role in shaping Indonesian discourses on Islam (Ufen 2009: 310). Thus, by adopting the rhetoric of choice, Muhammadiyah and NU help normalize this view on the *jilbab*. For example, in a series of *fatwas* on the *jilbab*, Muhammadiyah advises women to cover their “nakedness” and avoid tight or transparent clothing, as well as clothing that exposes cleavage. They are further advised to cover their heads, but the act is non-compulsory, and framed as symbolic of one’s devotion to Islam (Muhammadiyah 2012).⁹ The organization discourages the veiling of the face; in the words of former Secretary of the Majelis Dikdasmen (Educational Assembly) Abdul Muti, “women should show their faces, it’s important for social reactions” (Kristianasen 2010). Though NU has refrained from issuing official opinion on the *jilbab*, the organization nevertheless approaches the *jilbab* in similar terms, as something the individual should adopt if she wishes to symbolize her dedication to Islam.¹⁰

⁸ In the Autonomous Province of Aceh, adult women are required to wear the *jilbab* under nearly all circumstances, while a small proportion of regencies and municipalities outside Aceh have also passed *sharia* bylaws requiring women to cover their heads under specific circumstances (e.g. to attend school, as a requirement of holding public office in the city or regency, as a prerequisite for receiving welfare services or as a condition of receiving salary for work done on Friday, the Muslim day or prayer) (Parker 2005; Warburton 2007)

⁹ “Hukum Wanita Tidak Jilbab” (law for women who do not wear the *jilbab*).

¹⁰ Though it is pervasive in Indonesia, there are small groups of Muslims who reject the rhetoric of choice. Most are followers of what may variously be labeled “fundamentalist” or “Arabized”

Moreover, it is often Islamic leaders who oppose proposals to regulate Muslim dress or otherwise impinge upon a woman's choice. In 2009, for example, the Chief of Police for East Java issued a "suggestion" that all female Muslim police officers cover their heads while on duty in order to "set an example" for the community. A spokesperson for the East Java Police claimed that *jilbabs* would not be not compulsory, but nevertheless "expected" all female officers to comply within days (*The Jakarta Post* 2009). Muslim civic and political figures responded harshly. Syafiq Mughni, the regional chairman of Muhammadiyah, suggested that a mandatory or even strongly suggested decree could make non-Muslim policewomen feel excluded, to the general detriment of interfaith relations (*Detik Surabaya* 2009). Meanwhile, a local MP from the Islamist Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), while lauding the police chief's intentions, also expressed concern that women would wear *jilbabs* for fear of punishment or disfavor rather than as a symbolic act of faith (Sugiharto 2009).

The Reality of Pressure

The fact that the rhetoric of choice is pervasive in Indonesia does not mean that Indonesian Muslim women actually possess unconstrained choices. Rather, they may still be subject to a host of *social* or *interactional pressures* to dress and act piously. In social psychological accounts, interactional pressures generally come in two forms: (a) the enforcement of norms or practices within a group, eliciting *compliance*; or (b) the internalized urge to look or act like others in the social environment, producing *conformity*. The simplest form of compliance

versions of Islam, where outward piety is expressed in a way that more closely resembles those found in certain areas of the Middle East and South Asia, and in which "obligation" is stressed over "choice." Though Islamic "fundamentalism" is far from monolithic (in Indonesia, as elsewhere), Muslims who may be described in such terms typically take a more rigid view of pious dress than most Indonesian Muslims. Many require adherents to wear full-body robes, such as the *niqab*, and, in some cases, face veils as well.

pressure involves formal regulations (such as law) or threat of sanction (such as loss of membership in an organization). However, social groups and authority figures often ensure compliance with behavioral norms through more subtly coercive means, such as forcing individuals to undergo rituals of commitment. In one common ritual, members of a group are encouraged to verbally pledge that they will adopt or forego a given behavior; the simple act of verbalizing commitment proving sufficient to elicit compliance from most (if not all) individuals (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994).

Pressure may equally be indirect and covert; it may be experienced as a pervasive urge to conform, and propelled less by anxiety over formal sanctions than perceived disapproval from within the peer group (Hollinger and Clark 1982). Social psychologists have observed a marked tendency of individuals to model their behavior from whatever is perceived to be the dominant example of others in their social environment, a tendency that is decidedly more pronounced when the behavior in question is publicly visible (Rind and Benjamin 1994; Posner and Rasmussen 1999; Whatley et al 1999). Such conformity pressures are often non-conscious or “ambient”—an outcome of “priming” by verbal or visual cues that are subtle enough that the individuals does not even register their influence. The simple act of introducing words or symbols associated with conformity, for example, has been demonstrated in experimental settings to produce actual conformity (Epley and Gilovich 1999).

One strand of the literature on priming and conformity examines the influence of specifically religious cues. Their introduction in controlled experimental settings has been shown to elicit a range of effects on individuals with at least marginal religious affiliation. Individuals are shown to behave more honestly (Randolph-Seng and Neilsen 2007), engage in more prosocial behavior (Shariff and Norenzayan 2007), and be more willing to cooperate (Ahmed

and Salas 2008) after priming with religious cues. At the same time, individuals under the influence of religious cues appear more submissive to authority (Saroglou, Corneille, and van Cappellen 2009), while displaying more social prejudices (Johnson, Rowatt, and LaBouff 2010; Ritter and Preston 2011) and a heightened tendency toward social conformity (van Cappellen, Corneille, Cols, and Saroglou 2011).

Simply being in the presence of religious symbols, moreover, is shown to activate these behavioral patterns. In one study, LaBouff et al (2012) found that passing by religious structures heightened the likelihood that individuals would profess religiosity, while Weisbuch-Remington et al (2005: 1207) found that priming practicing U.S. Christians with both positive and negative symbols of their faith—placed visibly but “outside of their conscious awareness”—stimulated significant cardiovascular responses. Thus we can expect the sheer visibility of the headscarf, as an emblem of piety and “correct practice,” to exert a priming effect on many Muslim women, thus stimulating conformity pressures.

Threshold Models of Social Pressure

Scholars working within a rational choice paradigm, meanwhile, have come to a complementary conclusion: that individuals make choices based what other people in their immediate social environment are doing, *and in what numbers* (Schelling 1971; 1978; 2006; Granovetter 1978; Granovetter and Soon 1983; Kuran 1998). The formal model is quite simple: an individual is given two alternate choices (choices A and B) with equal costs and benefits associated with each; but as more individuals choose A over B, the perceived benefits associated with choice A rise while those associated with choice B decline (while costs decline for A and rise for B). As Granovetter (1978) explains, every individual will have a different “threshold”

point—the unknown number of adoptees in the social environment necessary for that individual to choose A over B. The number may be low for risk-takers, but high for “conservatives” or social conformists, who do not want to stand out or be marked as different from the operative norm. Yet as the number of adoptees rises, it becomes easier to choose A over B, as B is increasingly marked as nonconformist. Thus each choice of A over B contributes to reaching the threshold number for other individuals, thus making *their* choice of A over B more likely; and such choices can aggregate to produce large-scale social change.¹¹

In a related study on the strength of ethnic identification, Kuran (1998) examines how seemingly innocuous decisions at the individual level, once adopted by a critical mass of individuals within a social category, can aggregate to large-scale *ethnification*. Previously banal activities (such as what one eats, the color of clothing one wears or the kind of entertainment one consumes) take on new, ethnic (or religious) symbolism after passing a threshold point of adoption. This imbues the activity with an “ethnic value” that it previously lacked. To illustrate, consider a multireligious space in which visible cross wearing among Christians begins to rise. According to Kuran, the cross would then become a relatively more important symbol of “Christian-ness”—something Christians *expect* of other Christians, and increasingly associate with “being a good Christian.” This, in turn, would act as an incentive for other Christians to adopt the practice, while raising the perceived cost of not wearing a cross (and thus appearing to be a “bad Christian”), effects that compound with every additional adoptee. Furthermore, by making religious identity more visible and central, the growth in cross wearing would then have the potential to stimulate feelings of in-group solidarity, reinforce social divisions, and reduce both the frequency and depth of interactions across religious lines (ibid 625).

¹¹ Granovetter (1978) uses the example of riot participation to illustrate this point. Under normal circumstances, few individuals would be inclined to join a riot.

It is easy to see how these theories apply to the case of Islamic headscarves. When, under Suharto, few Indonesian women covered their heads (and were, in fact, restricted from doing so in many public settings), the practice was conspicuous. It was something that marked you as out of step with prevalent norms. But as the *jilbab* spread, the degree of markedness associated with the practice lessened, thus lowering the cost barrier for adoption. This, in turn, generated sociopolitical pressure for the state to remove its restrictions on wearing the *jilbab* in schools, in bureaucratic offices, and among police officers, all of which lowered the perceived cost of wearing a *jilbab* ever further. Thus over time barriers to the *jilbab* crumbled and the practice became normalized. Today, while the *jilbab* is still by no means universal among Indonesian Muslim women, in many social settings it very nearly is. And this, not Indonesia as a whole, is where interactional pressures emanate from. A university student, for example, is far more likely to make choices based on what predominates among her classmates than what may or may not be prevalent on an island 2,000 kilometers away.

The central implications of these threshold models are thus as follows. First, the degree of conformity pressures Muslim women feel are likely to be directly related to the proportion of other Muslim women in their immediate social environment who have already adopted the *jilbab*. And second, while individual decisions to adopt the *jilbab* may not reflect any desire to affect large-scale social change, they may produce large-scale social change in the aggregate. Heightened adoption of specific religious *signifiers*, such as female headscarves, are thus predicted to heighten the *significance* individuals associate with both the signifier and the mode of social categorization it signifies. Consequently, this is likely to stimulate feelings of in-group solidarity among adoptees and intensify the conformity pressures felt by Muslims who have not yet adopted the practice.

Heightened orientation toward religious practice or the religious in-group may also stimulate *processes of social segregation*. For many Muslim women, donning a headscarf is not just a symbolic marker of piety, but of a broader commitment to living a pious life (or, at least, outwardly appearing to do so). Typically this also entails the use of “pious spaces”: religious schools, Quranic study groups, shops or markets catering to specifically Islamic goods, cafes or hotels that don’t serve alcohol, and so forth. After all, orthodox piety—in Islam, as in other religions—is experienced as a series of prescriptions, proscriptions, and periodized commitments.¹² It details the things you have to do at certain times in certain places, typically in the exclusive company of co-religionists. And it identifies the things one should avoid, which are typically located in physical spaces marked as profane, secular, or impious. Physical orientation toward pious spaces (and away from profane spaces) by no means indicates commitment to an exclusivist or exclusionary worldview. But as time spent within such spaces increases, so potentially do barriers against social interaction with those outside the relevant category (i.e. non-Muslims or non-pious-practicing Muslims).

Modes of Piety and Pressure

Informant testimony by and large supports the proposition that, while Indonesian Muslim women idealize pious dress and habit as the outcome of clear, conscious, and personal *choices* (the aforementioned “rhetoric of choice”), these choices are shaped by various pressures emanating from the social environment. While the modalities, forms, and degrees of these pressures vary tremendously from individual to individual, it is nevertheless useful to distinguish two broad approaches to the adoption of pious dress. The first of these, *proactive piety*, is

¹² This is especially true of orthopraxic religions or forms of religiosity, a category that includes orthodox variants of Sunni and Shia Islam, Judaism, and Theravada Buddhism.

voluntaristic and reflects clear understandings of what piety “is” and how a pious individual “should” act. And it is often tied to concrete ideological stances on Islam’s “correct” relationship to the individual, state, and society. By contrast, *reactive piety* entails the adoption of pious practices, such as the *jilbab*, primarily in reference to normative expectations—whether externally signaled or internalized by the subject. Each, in turn, generates different bands of social pressure on Muslim women. The proactively pious are much more likely to exert compliance pressures on other Muslims, while conformity pressures emerge primarily from reactive piety by sheer dint of numbers.¹³

¹³ Not all approaches to piety fit neatly into one of these categories. For example, some women wear the *jilbab* in public in order to reduce the frequency and severity of sexual harassment—equivalent, for some, to self-defense training (Parker 2005). Informants attest that Indonesian men are less likely to make public advances on a woman who is clearly signaling her Islamic religiosity (because pious women are more generally considered “off-limits” according to prevalent norms). Aisyah, for example, works at a Starbucks ten kilometers from her West Jakarta home. Her commute requires her to take the private MetroMini bus and *ojek* (unlicensed moped taxi service). During rush hour, it can take her more than two hours to get home. She told me that there are many young men on the MetroMini, and that there was a rash of harassment incidents a few years ago: “I used to wear my hair down and put lots of makeup on, but I was always getting trouble for it—rude comments and even once a teenage boy grabbed my breast. I was so shocked, but no one said anything about it, because he had his friends there and [the other passengers] were scared. So I started putting on a *jilbab* before I left for work.” In the urban environs of Jakarta and Surabaya, this type of harassment is usually experienced by women of working-class and lower middle-class socio-economic backgrounds, who are not only reliant on public transportation, but on the cheapest and most crime-ridden forms of public transportation (i.e. no-frills mini-buses, vans, and informal motorcycle taxis). Without other transportation options, the *jilbab* can be attractive as a low-cost remedy. Dian, like Aisyah, began wearing a *jilbab* on her daily commute by mini-bus after enduring several years of sexual harassment by young men. She describes removing it every day upon arrival at the office, like one might remove a motorcycle helmet or jacket. “I feel bad about that sometimes,” she said. “Like maybe I should be more into it.” But for her visible piety serves a primarily protective purpose—which is, one recalls, even suggested in the Quran. However, as she told me, “I don’t always need protection.” Interviews with Aisyah and Dian, 2011.

Proactive Piety

This category encompasses Muslims whose adoption of visible piety markers, such as the *jilbab*, emerges from the conscious decision to look and act pious and a relatively clear understanding of what adoption will accomplish for them. Consequently, while not immune to the effects of social pressure, the proactively pious typically play the role of transmitter rather than receiver of pressure. This can occur in a number of different ways, and to different degrees as well.

Within the relatively broad category of the proactively pious, one can further distinguish between an individualizing and devotional orientation, focused on the spiritual health and well-being of the individual practitioner, and a collectivist and political orientation, focused on heightening in-group solidarity and hardening the social boundaries of the *ummah* (community of believing and practicing Muslims). Each of these approaches is rooted in the political fragmentation of Islam under the New Order, as described in Chapter One. To briefly summarize, by the early 1970s, the coalition of Muslim political forces—which had at one point claimed 40 percent of the electorate and sought to codify *sharia* as state law for Muslim Indonesians—had splintered into smaller and rival camps: a largely quiescent and co-opted elite; a small, nascent civil Islamic movement that called for the authoritarian New Order regime to enact democratic reforms (Hefner 2000; Mujani 2007; Mujani and Liddle 2009; Liddle and Mujani 2007; 2013); and the conservative, anti-pluralist *dakwah* movement, which largely retreated from political contention and instead used *dakwah* (internal proselytizing) to “defend” Muslims from a perceived onslaught of secularist, Christian, and heretical influences (Liddle 2007; Feillard and Madinier 2011; van Bruinessen 2013). Though diametrically opposed on most issues, these two streams of opposition made common cause against state restrictions on the

jilbab, for example in state schools and the civil service. This marks the practice as a resonant, albeit low-level form of resistance to authoritarianism (Arimbi 2009: 71-2).

At the same time, each did so for fundamentally different reasons. Adherents of civil Islam tended to view restrictions on an individual's ability to act on their religious conscience negatively, reflecting a view of piety as both devotional (in terms of what aim it serves) and individualized (in terms of whose responsibility it is to uphold). For Muslim conservatives in the *dakwah* movement, by contrast, state restrictions on the *jilbab* violated the principle of "correct guidance," through which a paternalistic, Muslim-oriented state should safeguard the boundaries and "interests" of its Muslim citizenry. In its absence, however, the right teachers and organizations would need to serve in its stead, with visible markers of piety (like the *jilbab*) further serving to demarcate (a) Muslims from non-Muslims; and (b) "true" Muslims from nominal, secularized, or heterodox Muslims.

Over the past 45 years, these differences have coalesced into the individualizing and collectivizing approaches to proactive piety that are observable today.¹⁴ These approaches remain closely related to but are not exactly coterminous with the sociopolitical categories "civil Islam" and "Muslim conservative." In my interviews, I found that Muslims who employed the language of spiritual growth and self-improvement also viewed piety as a spiritual and moral toolkit designed to help individual navigate their daily lives. Muslim women who professed these views were also among the most ardent believers in the rhetoric of choice, and reacted negatively to the idea of compliance pressures (exerted to make others act piously). Coercion, I was

¹⁴ Not all Muslims who adopt one of these approaches recognize the connection to these sociopolitical ideologies. Nevertheless, what is important to note is how these distinctly political viewpoints have produced different approaches to sociocultural Islamization. They may, in many individuals, correspond to sociopolitical outlooks, especially among those with a collectivizing outlook. For others, however, the affinity may be less clear.

frequently told, is forbidden in Islam.¹⁵ Yuli, a 25-year old teacher at a Muhammadiyah school in Surabaya, articulated this view neatly:

In the Quran women are instructed to cover their *aurat*. Of course Muslims do not agree what this word means—here in Indonesia we have different standards from many people in Arabia or Afghanistan. We also do not believe that anyone should be forced to wear it, and in fact we are right. The Quran says ‘there is no compulsion in religion,’ so it is forbidden. The decision to wear *jilbab* must come from the heart. It should come only when you are ready.¹⁶

When I pointed out that the school required girls to cover their heads, she responded:

Yes, but only for the school day. They are children and this is a place of Islamic learning, so it is permissible. They must decide for themselves if they continue wearing it after [the school day is over].

In the course of my interviews, I discovered that such views were common among urban Muslims educated through NU and Muhammadiyah secondary schools, and particularly among those who matriculated to the IAIN/UIN state Islamic university systems (which are incubators for the civil Islamic view of Islam’s engagement in public life). Nur, a 21 year-old Islamic university student majoring in *tafsir* (methodological exegesis), echoed these sentiments. She explained that she was raised in a Muhammadiyah family and attended a Muhammadiyah elementary school before entering the public school system for junior and senior high school. She told me that she considers herself to be “very religious,” and that she has worn a *jilbab* since she was 12 years old. “Before it was fashionable,” she said. Nur further explained her views on the meaning of the *jilbab*:

It is a sign of devotion. If you adopt the *jilbab*—I mean, if you do it from the heart—then you are promising Allah that you will follow the Quran and Sunnah and live your life with good intentions.¹⁷

¹⁵ Based on the Quranic dictum “there is no compulsion in religion: rectitude has become distinct from error.” (Surah 2: 256).

¹⁶ Interview with Yuli, 2011.

¹⁷ Interview with Nur, 2010.

Notably, Muslims who display individualizing and devotional tendencies also tend to reject the notion of a link personal piety and political inclinations. When I asked Yuli if her political inclinations have shifted since adopting the *jilbab*, for example, she responded by arguing that Islam should remain above the vulgarities of politics:

I could vote for PKS, maybe, or PAN—these parties both claim [to reflect the values of] modernist Islam, and I was raised in this tradition. But for me the most pressing concern is corruption, so I vote for whoever is the least corrupt, and I am sad to say it is not always the Muslim parties. Actually, I am even more concerned about corruption among the Muslim parties. Our religion teaches us to be fair in trade, to earn our money cleanly, and so politics is naturally dangerous—especially here in Indonesia [laughs]. I would rather our [Muslim leaders] concentrated on being good Muslims and good examples for other Muslims. Everything can follow from there.

Another informant, who voted for the PKS in the 2009 legislation elections, described feelings of disappointment with their performance as junior partners in then-president Susilo Bambang Yodhoyono's governing coalition, particularly with regards a corruption scandal surrounding improprieties in the importation of beef from the United States and Australia:¹⁸

You would think that as Muslims, I mean, as people who claim to speak for Muslims, that they would be incorruptible. But this is not the case in Indonesia. There is corruption everywhere and it is...very tempting—even for [pious] Muslims. If you want to stay clean, you have to stay out of politics. So I won't vote for PKS again.¹⁹

This stance on the mixing of Islam and politics (as a potential minefield of impurities and temptations) generally reinforces a depoliticized and devotional view of Islam's proper place in state and society. By contrast, other Muslims approach the visible symbols of piety in explicitly political and collectivist terms. In this view, the headscarf becomes a potent mechanism for maintaining and policing boundaries, whether between Muslim and non-Muslim or between "correct" and "incorrect" Muslims. Muslims oriented toward such collectivist modes of piety are

¹⁸ Setuningsih (2013) describes this scandal in detail.

¹⁹ Interview with PKS voter #1, 2011.

often, though not always, attracted to conservative and Islamist political organizations. These organizations not only stress the importance in-group solidarity and boundary maintenance, but also frame personal piety as an appropriate means through which to (eventually) establish the “correct” political consciousness among Indonesian Muslims.

Indeed, studies conducted among European and North America Muslims often stress how headscarves (and more extensive “veiled” forms of dress) can harden the social boundary separating “Muslim” from “Christian,” while noting that the practice in some cases reflects a conscious and explicit rejection of Western liberalism, secularism, and sexualized femininity (Killian 2003; Hamdan 2007; Shirazi and Mishra 2010; Wagner et al 2012). In Europe and North America, this is often understood (by practitioners and observers alike) as a form of resistance to hegemonic secular and Christian-normative cultures. Though Indonesia is approximately 88 percent Muslim, conservatives often view Islamic ideas and norms as occupying a similarly subservient position relative to (what they perceive of as) secular or Christian-derived norms, including human rights, nationalism, and democracy. A smaller number, often tied to the *dakwah* movement, perceive actual conspiracies—hatched in the West and enacted by domestic interlocutors—to undermine Islam’s position in Indonesian society and move Indonesia closer to a Western model that is imagined, paradoxically, as both secular *and* Christian. For Muslims possessed of such ideas, markers of visible piety, like the *jilbab*, serve as firewalls, protecting the faithful against “infiltration.”

Several informants explicitly linked the *jilbab* to the cause of defending Islam and Muslims from what they see as negative Western influences. Ria, a 40-year old housewife and member of the international organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HTI), told me that Muslim women should reject “American” forms of dress like tight jeans, high heels

and makeup—not because they are immodest or sexualized, but because they are tools of “global Christianization”:

I am, of course, a religious person. I wear a *jilbab*, as you can see, and have done so since I was a young girl. I always pray five times a day, unless it is not possible.²⁰ I try to embody Islamic values inside and out. So for me, the *jilbab* is like a protection for Muslim women, a way for us to avoid temptation from the non-believers and live as good Muslims. And by doing so, we are showing them that we reject their ideas and influences.²¹

A related string of informant testimony positioned the *jilbab* or more elaborate, Arabized forms of dress as correctives to “un-Islamic” or “incorrectly Islamic” practices. I met Najwa, a 34-year old teller at a *sharia* bank, at a Surabaya café. Though she did not cover her face with a veil, she wore a loose, tan dress purchased at the city’s Arab market, which covered all but the fingers and palms of her hand, alongside an expansive headscarf. “Indonesians have always been bad Muslims,” she told me:

We are so far from Mecca and Medina [Islam’s Holy Cities] and so our Islam has been mixed with other things—animism, influences from other religions, wrong practices that Muslims follow because they are told to follow them. Even today you see all these women who wear a *jilbab* but the rest is wrong. Now, of course, there is no excuse for such ignorance. We can know better, we can find out the correct way to do things. This is how a real *muslimah* dresses and it is important [to dress correctly].²²

Ani, a 19-year old university student and member of a PKS-linked study group, elaborated on this framing. “It is quite simple,” she told me:

The *jilbab* is a requirement for Muslim women. It is required because women should be modest and men should be free from temptation. But it is also required so that we can know each other, and so we can know who of all these people are not Muslims. It is important for many reasons, that we can see Muslims setting a good example. This will help the uneducated Muslims resist the pull of

²⁰ According to orthodox Sunni belief, Muslims may skip formal prayer if travel or illness prevents it. Female Muslims are also asked to abstain from prayer if menstruating.

²¹ Interview with Ria, 2011. It is likely that Ria also believes that Western-style dress is immodest and sexualized, but she chose to dress their American-ness and supposed “Christian-ness” in our conversation.

²² Interview with Najwa, 2011.

Christianity and other temptations—drinking, gambling and so on. If every Muslim is dressed like a Muslim, then it will be impossible to do these things without the whole community knowing. And maybe Muslims would think [less] like Westerners.²³

Other Islamist organizations—including many of the “street Islamist” groups discussed in Chapter Three—do not emphasize theology to the same degree as PKS or HTI, rendering dress as little more than a superficial identity marker (Wilson 2006). For some rank-and-file members, commitment to Islamic piety may be less important than conveying “hardness” in tough urban environments. I met two members of one such group, the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), in a Jakarta neighborhood where the group is active. Each wore the white *taqiyah* (skullcap), matching *baju koko* (“Muslim” dress), untrimmed goatee, and dark sunglasses favored by many in the organization. As the first described:

I was just a *preman*, you know, a Betawi guy with long hair looking for trouble. But a lot of the tough guys in the neighborhood were getting into Islamic groups a few years back, so I gave it a look. Some friends of mine were already in FPI. “Come on,” they said. “The real action’s here.” At first I didn’t want to cut my hair [laughs]. But I kept getting into trouble with the police and sometimes with the other groups around here, like PP, some Ambonese guys, all kinds of trouble. I looked at FPI and they were so organized. No one messed with them. Eventually I said “okay, I’ll join you,” but I still didn’t want to cut my hair [laughs].²⁴

Later in the conversation, the second FPI member described the malleable boundary between this organization and the ethnic Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR), which is active in the same area and recruits from the same pool of young Muslim and Betawi men:

You know, we are Muslims and they are Betawis, but they are also Muslim and we are...mostly Betawis too. Sometimes we cooperate and sometimes we fight. A couple guys came over from there not too long ago, and sometimes we lose a few and see them later [down the street] at the [FBR] post. It’s not so different, really. Just the clothes you know? [Laughs].²⁵

²³ Interview with Ani, 2011. The term *bule* actually means “white person,” though she uses the term as a contextual stand-in for “Westerner.”

²⁴ Interview with FPI member #1, 2011.

²⁵ Interview with FPI member #2, 2011.

“Conversion” as Conduit to Proactive Piety

Proactive piety, regardless of which form it takes, has its roots in the intersection of resistance to Suharto’s New Order and the global religious revival. This intersection shaped the sociopolitical civil Islamic and conservative *dakwah* movements that emerged in the 1970s. With regards to the former, during the last two decades of the regime, the *jilbab* in particular spread among female university students, and notably among those involved in the pro-democracy movement (Smith-Hefner 2007). For many women in the movement, it initially served as a self-protective mechanism, marking women protesters as protected within the semi-autonomous zone of Islam, and as a result, untouchable by regimist thugs and auxiliaries. However, the *jilbab* came to symbolize a specifically Muslim form of resistance to state authoritarianism. This, in turn, helped orient a number of Muslim women toward (or strengthen an existing orientation toward) individualizing and devotional views of Muslim piety.

Around the same time, conservative “study groups” like Jemaah Tarbiyah (a precursor to the PKS) emerged in Indonesian universities—not, one notes, in the Islamic university system, but rather on elite secular campuses like Universitas Indonesia (UI) and Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB). Influenced by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, Jemaah Tarbiyah and similar study groups promoted both ritual “purity” on an individual level and political engagement in service of Islamist goals. From the university, the *jilbab* spread through the “pious middle classes” cultivated by Suharto as an alternative base of support to the military (Hefner 2000; Sidel 2006).

Machmudi (2008: 44) describes how such Islamic study groups, and Jemaah Tarbiyah in particular, have come to dominate Muslim life at many Indonesian universities:

Jemaah Tarbiyah proved itself able to channel enthusiastic Muslim students in the state universities by providing religious training and outreach programs. Since the

1990s, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have succeeded in gaining control of intra campus student organisations. They have organised Islamic programs and activities for students based in small prayer rooms in campuses and have founded a Forum for Islamic Studies in many faculties. In order to organize Islamic activities among the universities in Java and the Outer Islands, they also began to control the Forum for Coordinating Campus Predication, *Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* (FSLDK). Subsequently, through student general elections, they have been able to take over the central leadership of student senate organisations at the faculty and university level.

Religious pilgrimage is another common conduit for proactive piety. Muslims generally aspire to perform the *haji* once in a lifetime. Successful completion of the pilgrimage—by all accounts an arduous and physically taxing endeavor—conveys high status upon individual Muslims. Male *hajjis* and female *hajjas* describe a broadening of religious commitment and lessened attraction to worldly concerns, as well as the new obligation to symbolize Islamic values for children and young adults.²⁶

Middle-class Muslims, moreover, increasingly participate in packaged *umroh* (i.e. lesser pilgrimage) tours. *Umroh* tours vary in content and purpose, from ascetic to high-luxury, where time is divided between visits to holy sites and nearby Jeddah’s upscale malls and gold markets. The more ascetic tours in particular can have a transformative effect on participants, as participants seek to sustain the feelings of “wisdom” and “contentment” experienced in the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.

Several individuals I spoke with described performing *umroh* in the face of personal tragedy—the sickness or death of a loved one, in particular. Arti participated in an *umroh* tour after the death of her husband:

We had met in high school and got married not long after graduation. A whole life together, and then he contracted lung cancer. There I was, alone now in our house, my children grown, and everything I saw reminded me of him. I turned to Allah

²⁶ In candid moments, though, some describe the feeling as difficult to sustain in the face of professional and family life.

for answers. I went to the local mosque, but—I don't know why, I just didn't find the answers there. Then a friend told me about her *umroh*, and I decided to go myself.

I remember sitting in the Prophet's Mosque.²⁷ It was a hot day. There were not so many people inside, and there was a cool breeze. I had not slept well for weeks, out of sadness, really. Suddenly, a powerful feeling of peace came over me, like I could see clearly for the first time [since his death]. I could see that it was just his time [to go], that I would join him one day. I could not help it, but I began to cry. I cried until there were no tears left. And I knew then that I would have to...seek Allah's guidance.²⁸

Performing the *hajj* and, to a lesser degree, *umroh*, can act as a catalyst for broader changes in outlook and lifestyle. Informants uniformly described the pilgrimages as deeply fulfilling, but differed in how it altered their outlook. Most claimed to feel more pious as a result of participation, while the sense of being Muslim also took on new importance for most participants (relative to other social identities). And nearly all felt a heightened sense of obligation to providing a “good example” for younger Muslims and those “not fortunate enough” to make the pilgrimage themselves. What's more, many participants told me that, upon return, they sought out organizations, informal groups, and preachers whose understandings of what it means to be Muslim matched their own, newly transformed understandings. Several informants, it should be noted, described transformations in their sociopolitical outlook, with some embracing the conservative social agenda of political Islam, while others were inspired to perform charity and seek social justice. But in general the *hajj* and *umroh* participants I spoke to framed the experience in devotional terms, as life changing experiences that they hoped would make them better Muslims and better people.

Not all Indonesians have access to religious pilgrimages, however. Access to the *hajj* benefits from state subsidy programs, though it still presents greater financial barriers for the

²⁷ Al-Masjid al-Nabawi, an iconic, green-domed mosque attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.

²⁸ Interview with Arti, 2013.

poor and working class than it does the middle classes. Meanwhile, few poor and working class Indonesians can afford *umroh* tours. Over the past two decades, though, a growing number of working-class Indonesians have found employment as guest workers abroad, with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states among the most common destinations. Male migrants often find work in the energy and construction industries, while female migrants typically find employment as domestic workers.

Transmission of piety is a frequent ancillary effect of temporary economic migration to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Female migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are subject to broad but more diffuse religious and sociocultural influences than their male counterparts, stemming in large part from disparities in the nature of work. Whereas male migrant workers are likely to live in compounds outside residential areas, female migrant workers are typically employed as domestic workers, though a small number may also find employment as nurses or in other professional capacities. Living inside the home of a Saudi and Gulf family, female migrant workers are required to adopt local customs of dress and, in many cases, to follow local religious routines. Some continue these practices past the end date of employment, or adopt modes of dress that are relatively strict by Indonesian standards.

Even when migrants attend local mosques, lack of competence in colloquial Arabic limits exposure to local norms. However, as informants related, Indonesians who have studied in local *salafi* seminaries (and who are looking for followers) will approach migrant workers after Friday services with literature in the Indonesian language and invite them to study sessions and other events, first steps in an internal conversion process. A male informant, Bambang, described in detail his internal conversion. He recalled that as a teenager and young adult, he drank, listened to heavy metal and gambled. Yet after the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 destroyed his family's

meager savings, he was forced to take a job at an oil refinery in Saudi Arabia, where he lived a spartan lifestyle and send remittances home. Uprooted, apart from his family and friends for the first time in his life, and without recourse to his usual pastimes, Bambang began attending mosque more regularly. Under the influence of Saudi-trained Indonesian preachers active within the guest worker community, Bambang began adapting to local norms, most notably by donning the Arabic *thawb*, ceasing to shave and performing the *hajj*, which allowed him to wear the *haji*'s white *taqiyah*. In his words:

In Saudi Arabia they follow the religion of the Prophet. Not like here, where you can basically live the life of a *khaffir* (infidel) and still call yourself a Muslim. Some people in Indonesia, they say they are Muslim but they worship graves, say 'Merry Christmas' [to Christians] and [other] things that are *haram*. But a true Muslim must be righteous, inside and out. Some [Indonesian Muslims] dress like Westerners²⁹ and care more about money than religion. We try to talk to these people, to put them on the correct path, but the forces against Islam are powerful.³⁰

An ex-migrant laborer who now works for an NGO focused on international migrants described this interaction as typical:

I don't know how often it happens, but it does happen. There is a set format. The migrant workers are often lonely, bored, and missing their families. A friendly face, a social invitation, and something to pass the time—it can be an effective combination. For the *salafiya*, it's a form of *dakwah*. They think the rest of us aren't doing it right, that we are too superstitious, that the Indonesian traditions, like the *slametan*³¹ or *Mawlid*³² are [forms of] idolatry. In their mindset, the "impure" Islam of the typical migrant worker is almost more dangerous than Christianity, which makes—you might say, correcting the bad behavior—makes it just as important as bringing someone new into Islam. So they are concentrating their efforts on this kind of conversion—of Muslims to the real Islam, as they see it.³³

²⁹ Bambang also uses the term "*bule*."

³⁰ Interview with "Bambang," 2011.

³¹ A communal, ritualized feast popular among rural Javanese Muslims and tolerated by NU as a cultural practice.

³² Celebration of the Prophet's birthday, a common practice among Sunni Muslims across the world, but opposed by *salafis* and many modernists.

³³ Interview with NGO worker, 2011.

Another important “pilgrimage” track involves talented (predominantly male) *santri* traveling to Middle Eastern Islamic universities and seminaries, such as Egypt’s al-Azhar University, as well as institutions dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. As Machmudi (2008: 30) describes, the returning graduates of Egyptian and other Middle Eastern institutions often “became actively involved in predication, preferring neither to become government employees nor to return to their old Islamic institutions (*pesantren*) to teach. They remained independent and set up their own Islamic institutions, called *ma’had*, in urban centers where they became involved in providing informal religious instruction to students in their surrounds.” Study at foreign institutions carries with it significant cultural cachet; as such, many individuals seek out theological instruction from those who have these kinds of credentials. This too emerges as an internal conversion process.

Reactive Piety

Though many Indonesian Muslim women are proactively pious in the manner described above, others adopt the *jilbab* primarily in reaction to social pressure. The pressure itself may be overt or covert, while the reaction may be conscious or nonconscious. Informant testimony, however, suggests that it is conformity pressures (i.e. the internalized desire to act “normal”) rather than compliance pressures (i.e. the external threat of sanctions for not acting “normal”) that largely drive reactive piety. Indeed many informants describe how shifting perceptions of the social environment contextualize the decision to adopt pious dress and habit. The spread of pious practices thus acts as an incentive for their adoption, heightening the perceived benefits of conformity, as well as perceived costs of nonconformity.

Compliance pressures, however, do exist—particularly in local areas where *sharia* bylaws are both on the books and enforced. Ami, who is a postgraduate at UIN now working at a human rights-oriented NGO, explained how compliance pressures affect Muslims in her hometown of Tangerang (a suburb of Jakarta that has passed a number of *sharia* bylaws, and where there have been several incidents involving harassment of women by auxiliary police employed by the municipality to enforce them). As she explained:

Traditionally the people of Tangerang have been Muslims, and often very conservative Muslims as well. Perhaps more than is normal in Indonesia....Then on top of that, you have a lot of people moving in—Chinese and other Christians, Javanese, who don't always follow Islam in the same way, rich people who live a Western lifestyle. For some Muslims, the change is frightening, and it also comes with a feeling of economic marginalization. It is easy to spread rumors among scared people, like about Christianization. Or just to say that we need to defend [our] traditions. This is how we got the *sharia* laws in Tangerang....

In practice, well, there is some variability in how the laws are enforced, but I can tell you that [they aim] to separate the moral people from the immoral ones, and that this...has less to do with how we behave and more to do with the appearance. Does a girl wear a *jilbab*? How tight are her clothes? Is she out late at night without a husband or brother? To a Muslim whose view of Islam is very simple, these indicate deeper immoralities, but many uncovered women are quite religious, and if you look around the mall, you see skinny jeans everywhere—it's just the style today. And if a woman is out late, perhaps she keeps long hours at her job. Even so, there is a climate of judgment that can lead women to make decisions out of fear that they should only make out of [religious] devotion. Then the more women who do that, the harder it is [for others].³⁴

A second form of compliance pressure emanates from Muslim organizations and their codes of conduct for employees and rank-and-file members. As a mid-level official from NU's headquarters in Jakarta described:

Officially, no, we don't require [women to wear] the *jilbab*. We strongly recommend it, in line with Islamic principles, though we do not require it. It may, however, be difficult to obtain certain jobs if you are not projecting a good image, from the organization's point of view.³⁵

³⁴ Interview with Ami, 2012.

³⁵ Interview with NU member #1, Jakarta 2011.

Dress codes are often more strictly policed in specifically marked “pious spaces.” As the principle of a Muhammadiyah school in East Java told me:

Students and teachers are all required to dress according to uniform requirements. That means, yes, all women must cover their heads. But you have to understand, by itself this is no guarantee of piety—it is in fact not quite a religious act. It may inspire that, and that is our goal—to inspire greater devotion to Islam. At the same time, we are very aware that some will take the *jilbab* off after the school day ends.³⁶

Indah, a 43-year old civil servant active in Muhammadiyah’s women’s auxiliary, Aisyah, explained that compliance pressures from formal organizations can be difficult to avoid:

I have always been dedicated to Muhammadiyah—both my parents are Muhammadiyah, and I was educated in Muhammadiyah schools. When I met my husband, it was through a mutual friend we both knew from within the organization. You could say I am very proud of my Muhammadiyah background, and it felt natural for me to become active in Aisyah and Muhammadiyah both.

At that time, though, I liked to wear my hair out, paint my nails and do all those things. “Okay,” I was told. “You are not young anymore. You are married—you are a Muhammadiyah woman now. You must represent our values for the younger generation.” There was a lot of this, and being a part of the organization was very important to me, so after some discussions with my husband, I decided to wear this *jilbab*.³⁷

Compliance pressures may also be brought to bear in daily interactions. In an editorial, journalist Dian Kuswandini described one such incident:

One day, a male friend tagged me on a note in Facebook; it’s about a conversation between a non-Muslim man and an Islamic cleric. The man asks: “Why does Islam oblige Muslim women to wear *hijab*?” In answering the question, the cleric takes out two candies; unwraps one of them and throws them both onto the floor. He asks: “If you have to choose, which candy will you pick?” The man answers: “Of course I’ll take the wrapped one, because it’s the clean one.” The cleric goes, “Indeed. In Islam, we protect our women through *hijab*.”

Feeling disturbed with that degrading analogy, I sent him a message. “Do you suggest that non-*hijabi* Muslim women are dirty? And how come you compare women with candies?” This guy replied, “Don’t take it to your heart. Just

³⁶ Interview with Muhammadiyah school principle, Surabaya 2010.

³⁷ Interview with Indah, 2013.

understand that wearing *hijab* is an obligation in Islam, and shouldn't be compromised." (Kuswandini 2012).

The *salafi* migrants described above are also likely, upon return to Indonesia, to engage in *dakwah* efforts, at times with financial support from wealthy Gulf patrons or religious institutions. For example, some will open a *pesantren* or mosque with the goal of building a following (Hassan 2002, van Bruinessen 2013).³⁸ At other times, they aggressively preach to the "unconverted," using connections to Saudi Arabia (the birthplace of Islam) as a marker of religious authority and authenticity. As one informant related:

There aren't many of them. But they often have a lot of influence. In Bekasi, *wahhabis*³⁹ often only marry each other, or if they marry locals, they bring them into exclusive communities—where only *wahhabis* live. Sure there aren't many of them, but when they do something, it's always *keras* [aggressive, hard]. "You can't do this or you will be like a *khaffir*." Things like that. That's the only communication they have with locals, shaming them. And a lot of locals, they don't know much about Islam, so they see these guys who look like they are from [Saudi] Arabia and are, you know, influenced to think they know best for Islam. So sometimes they go along with it.⁴⁰

Conformity Pressure as Conduit to Reactive Piety

Though compliance pressures, such as those described above, are typically overt and coercive, informant testimony suggests that conformity pressures are far more pervasive. The fear of being "outsider," or "of dubious morality" is a powerful incentive for adoption, especially among teenagers and young adults. And this fear is roughly proportional to the *jilbab*'s rate of

³⁸ *Salafis*, of course, are not a homogeneous group, and some *salafi* communities, rather than seek "converts," choose to separate themselves from mainstream Muslims (ICG 2004).

³⁹ *Wahhabi* is sometimes used as a synonym for *salafi*. At other times, it is used as a pejorative term: *salafi* means "follower of the companions of the Prophet," whereas *wahhabi* means "follower of Ibn al-Wahhab," a 19th century reformer from the Arabian peninsula. This usage implies that the individual in question owes allegiance to Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁰ Interview with Bekasi resident #1, 2011.

adoption in a given social setting. One young woman, Effi, explained how the simple fear of being different structured her choices:

I began wearing [a *jilbab*] in high school, because it was required at the school I attended. But I would take it off after, when I was with my friends. Now I don't take it off so much. If you do—you know, take it off—and another student sees you out at the mall, they will assume you are up to no good. Especially if you are with a boy. Maybe they tell their friends and a rumor starts. So I don't take it off so much anymore.⁴¹

Though covered women may not constitute a majority in Indonesia, in specific social settings they may be, and under such conditions conformity pressures can be intense. Lia, a 27-year old administrative assistant at a financial services company, did not wear a *jilbab* when we met. However, she told me that she had done so for several years, and portrayed her choice to as an effect of seeing many of her classmates don the *jilbab* in these terms:

In high school it was still not so common. Some girls wore *jilbab*, yes, but I never felt any need to do it. Then, at UI, suddenly it was like everyone was doing it. You can't imagine, as a young woman, what that feels like, to see everyone do something. The urge to go along was pretty strong.⁴²

Along similar lines, Mia—a primary school teacher from South Jakarta, who also does not wear a *jilbab*—described the pressure she feels when she is among other women who do:

There is definitely an urge to follow along. I mean, no one is telling you “do this or else.” But, okay, if you see a lot of people around being good Muslims outside, and you are a good Muslim too, inside, then naturally you wonder if you should do it too.⁴³

Though intensely felt, this kind of intensely can dissipate or even reverse after transitioning from one social environment to another. When I interviewed Lia, for example, she wore a women's business suit with a skirt rather than pants, and as mentioned did not cover her

⁴¹ Interview with Effi, 2010.

⁴² Interview with Lia, 2013.

⁴³ Interview with Mia, 2014.

head. She told me that she had stopped wearing the *jilbab* after a few months at her current job, where dress codes generally follow global norms for the financial services industry. Though she did not explicitly articulate the decision as such, Lia provided an example of how, in urban Indonesia, women are subject to multiple, competing pressures related to dress and norms of femininity.

While Lia and Mia both felt conformity pressures intensely, others described pressure more as a shift in perception of what choices are available at a given moment. Putri, a clerical worker in Jakarta who attended a Muhammadiyah high school, told me that she had started off removing her *jilbab* at the end of the school day, but then at some point just started leaving it on:

Why I did decide to wear it? I guess I never really thought about it much, in the beginning. I think I just suddenly felt like it was something I should do. Maybe I was watching a lot of other girls do it, the ones like me—you know, good girls. I was already pretty religious, so wearing a *jilbab* after school didn't really change me all that much. I guess now I think about it a bit more, what it means, as a Muslim. But I didn't really consider it all that much at that time.⁴⁴

Unlike Putri, Ratih was educated in a secular state school and then attended a technical university, at which point she also began wearing a *jilbab*:

It's hard to say why I decided to wear a *jilbab*. I was attending university at the time and it just started to feel right.⁴⁵

I then asked her if many of the other students were starting to wear *jilbabs* at the same time:

Oh yes—and if I am honest, it is possible this influenced my decision. But I don't remember ever thinking: "I should do this because everyone else is too." It was an easy decision, though. I never really thought about taking it off.

Diah, who does not wear a *jilbab* but who was educated in a school where it quickly became the norm, described how popular culture reinforces such perceptions:

⁴⁴ Interview with Putri, 2011.

⁴⁵ Interview with Ratih, 2012.

[Some] years ago everyone got really into *sinetron* [Indonesian soap operas aimed at teenagers and young adults]. You have two kinds of programs, the ones aimed at Muslims and the ones aimed at everybody—you could say more secular, I guess. At first I was just watching the normal ones, but then at my school this one Muslim show was the most popular, and I wanted to know what everyone was talking about, so I started to watch that instead. For me it was always boring, but I think at this time there were a lot of people on TV making a point of looking more religious. And the heroine of this show, she is independent and strong because of her religious beliefs. So it made the decision to put on a *jilbab* easier for them.⁴⁶

Taken together, these experiences underscore the different ways conformity pressures manifest in the daily lives of Muslim women. Some women feel that pressure overtly and intensely, and understand their decisions as reactions to that pressure. For others, however, donning the *jilbab* just seems like a good thing to do when so many others are already doing it. This is also a type of conformity pressure, though one that is ambient and even, in many cases, unrecognized as pressure. It is also important to note that Effi, Lia, Putri, Ratih, and Diah all linked conformity pressures to the experience of being either a high school or university student.⁴⁷ Several of these informants further noted a connection between their choices and school policies. Effi and Putri, who were students at Islamic schools where *jilbabs* were required during school hours, described how that policy forced them to decide every day whether to keep it on or take it off. At some point, the latter became more difficult than the former. Thus school policy, though still recognizing the rhetoric of choice, nevertheless structures that choice in significant ways.

⁴⁶ Interview with Diah, 2011.

⁴⁷ This is not surprising, given how teenagers and young adults experience conformity pressures more generally (Pasupathi 1999).

Resisting Pressure and Informalizing Piety

Many urban Muslim women choose not to wear the *jilbab*, including women who self-identify as religious. As Dinda, a clerical worker from Jakarta, put it:

I think, compared to the United States or Europe, Indonesia is a really religious society. Not just Muslims, but everyone. You are supposed to be religious, to believe in and also practice your religion. But Indonesia is also not like Saudi Arabia. No one is telling you what to do. Or if they do, you don't actually have to listen. I cover my body when I pray and cover my head if I am at a funeral. In my daily life, though, I dress like a Westerner, and this is also considered normal. Yes, there are people who might look at me and conclude that I must be a bad Muslim, but it is easy to ignore these kinds of people. Half my friends wear *jilbab* and not one cares if I do or don't.

Or as Intan, a recent university graduate in Surabaya, explained:

Pressure? I don't know if I feel *pressured* to wear a *jilbab*. It's more like "oh, look—here's this thing, and everyone's doing it now. Maybe I should do it too." This is a normal way to think about life, especially when you are young. For a lot of people I know, that's all it ever is.

Occasionally informants would explicitly cited individual freedoms and feminism as informing the decision not to wear the *jilbab*:

Why do I need these men—and yes, it is almost always men—telling me what to do? In Indonesia, women are treated as equals. We are not stupid and we can make decisions for ourselves. I mean, this is why we rejected the New Order—to have choices in life. If it is to wear a *jilbab*, then that is fine. But it has to come from inside yourself and not because some old man tells you how everyone will look down on you if you show your hair.

Notably, several non-covered women I interviewed described the practice in strikingly similar terms to the proactively pious. Covering the head, they told me, should symbolize a broader commitment—an act that is meaningless without a monastic level of observance. As such, they described themselves as “not yet ready.” Others suggested the *jilbab* was not compulsory, provided one's heart were in the right place (*baik hati*), and professed they were unlikely to ever adopt the practice. In general, though, non-covered women were often quick to

reject the more casual approaches to the *jilbab* that are growing in popularity across Indonesia (and which are discussed in some detail below).

Informalizing the Jilbab

While some Muslim women resist or brush off the pressure to wear a *jilbab*, others respond to pressure by *informalizing* the practice.⁴⁸ For example, as Intan mentioned, some Muslim women do not wear the *jilbab* in their daily lives, but do so on a situational basis. I met Ani and Rahma through a former co-worker of theirs. They are in their mid-twenties and work for the Jakarta branch of a European investment bank. They are also graduates of the prestigious al-Azhar Islamic school, a modernist institution catering to the children of Jakarta's upper and middle class. In the course of our conversation, both addressed the notion of "situational covering":

ANI: At al-Azhar you have to wear it during the school day. This is common practice for Islamic schools. But al-Azhar is not a *pesantren* [traditional Islamic boarding school], where you are living there and have to respect the rules at all times. We would go home at the end of the day, and most of the girls did not keep their *jilbab* on after that.

RAHMA: [Nods.] And there are other places and times where all women are expected to cover their head, even if you do not wear a *jilbab* regularly—at the mosque or a funeral, for example. I remember it used to be that few women in my family wore a *jilbab* outside these special occasions. Now, maybe in the last five years, most of my aunts are wearing *jilbabs* all the time. When my grandfather passed away, I had a *kerudung* over my head, like so [demonstrates putting a scarf loosely over the head, with bangs showing].⁴⁹ I think all of them, each of my aunts, came up to me and said something like: "oh it suits you—it really does. And you have such a good heart too." As if to say, what a shame that you show your hair instead of that! [Laughs.]

⁴⁸ Wouters (1986) describes informalization as "processes [in which] more and more of the dominant modes of social conduct, symbolizing institutionalized power relations, come to be ignored and attached, with the result that the standards of social conduct change towards greater leniency, variety and differentiation."

⁴⁹ The *kerudung* is sometimes distinguished from the *jilbab* (e.g. Arimbi 2009: 71).

Another common way of informalizing the *jilbab* involves the deployment of Islamic headscarves as an element of fashion. This is an almost inevitable consequence of Islam's ongoing commodification, and consequent transformation of Islamic piety into a mode of consumption (Fealy 2008). Since 1998, a dizzying array of magazines, newspaper columns, and blogs have emerged, catering to a specific demand for "fashionable piety."⁵⁰ The website for the Hijabers Community Jakarta, an opt-in club for colorfully dressed and predominantly young Muslim women in the capital, serves as an illustrative example.⁵¹ For members, "Hijaber" is not only a label for the pious Muslim female, but an affirmative social identity, like "goth" or "hipster," for the like-dressed. The club sponsors lectures on Islamic finance and how to prepare for the fasting month of Ramadan alongside speaking engagements for fashion designers, partnerships with local boutiques and retailers, and events catering to other needs of urban women, such as entrepreneurship and lactation workshops.

Other Muslim women integrate the *jilbab* into fashion repertoires that otherwise clash with the orthodox ideal of the desexualized, "modest" Muslim woman. Covered women with painted nails, makeup, high heels, and form-fitting jeans have become a common sight in urban areas, where Muslim women come under pressure to conform with both Islamic and globalized notions of femininity (i.e. "how women should look and act"). The style, variously described as *fongki* (funky), *gaul* (cool), *disko*, or *café*, pairs a simple headscarf tied around the chin and worn above the brow to form-fitting clothing, high-heeled shoes and other accoutrements of modern

⁵⁰ Such trends are not unique to Indonesia, but rather emblematic of an emerging global marketplace for Muslim fashion—one the Indonesian Ministry of Industry has specifically targeted for development—and other commodities. According to the industry web portal fibre2fashion, the Indonesian Ministry of Industry is seeking to turn Indonesia into a major export hub for Muslim garments; it is furthermore specifically targeting the European market, valued at an estimated \$1.5 billion (Fibre2Fashion 2012).

⁵¹ Hijabers Community Jakarta (<http://hijaberscommunityjakarta.blogspot.com/>)

(secular) femininity (Smith-Hefner 2007). For 20-year old Sara, the *gaul* style functions as a way to balance the conformity pressure to look pious with equally powerful conformity pressures to emulate secular, Western-derived norms:

You see all these beautiful women—on TV, on posters, everywhere. I feel that I should cover my head, because that’s what my religion says I should do. But where does it say that I can’t be beautiful too? I like how I feel when I have makeup on, you know, when I have my nails done. It’s part of who I am and [others] shouldn’t try to shame me for it.

I mean, pick up a copy of *Muslimah Girl* [a popular magazine aimed at hip, *jilbab*-wearing women] and you see all these women who are both modest and beautiful. It shows that you do not have to choose, that the choice itself is a false one. Of course this was a big influence on me, because I’m someone who values beauty. And this is a great thing about Indonesia, that in our Islam, the way we believe and practice Islam, it is okay to be modest and still feel like a woman. It is not strict like in some Arab countries. I mean, go to a mall here in Surabaya and you see so many Muslim women who look like [the magazine] models.⁵²

Informalization thus often serves as a mechanism for integrating piety into one’s daily life, while maintaining individuality, choice, and a connection to (Western-driven) global culture in a context of Islamic piety.⁵³ Unsurprisingly, however, the approach has attracted a great deal of criticism. Some refer to informalized *jilbab*, pejoratively, as “jilboob,” a reference to the juxtaposition between a mode of dress designed to de-sexualize and the accentuation of breast and buttock shape through form-fitting clothing. According to critics, the effect is to sexualize piety. Some Muslim women, of course, see the various attempts to render the *jilbab* fashionable or cool as vulgar. “[The *jilbab*] is beautiful,” Nur told me. “But it’s not supposed to be beautiful before all else. It has to mean something deeper or it’s just a cloth.” For those sharing Nur’s perspective, the *jilbab* represents an Islamic rebuke not only to the alleged hypersexualization of the female body in Western fashion, but to “permissive” traditions among Indonesian ethnic

⁵² Interview with Sara, 2011.

⁵³ One informant described her *gaul* approach as allowing her to “stay true to myself.”

cultures, such as the *kebaya*, which is typically form fitting.⁵⁴ However, the most intense criticism of recombination approaches tends to come from men. According to Nazaruddin, a member of the Islamist organization HTI:

This style they call “jilboob,” it is a form of pornography. In fact, it is worse, because it mocks something that is required of women in our religion.⁵⁵

HTI is, of course, a committed Islamist organization, distinctly outside the mainstream of Muslim opinion (and even, for that matter, conservative Muslim opinion). However, the style has provoked a broader reaction among conservative Muslims, to the point where MUI issued a *fatwa* against the so-called “jilboob” style. Then-Vice Chairman Ma’aruf Amin was quoted as saying:

The MUI already has a *fatwa* against pornography. But that [also] means that you should not show the shape of the body by wearing a *jilbab*, but with tight clothing (*The Jakarta Globe* 2014).

The conservative critique, as articulated by Amin, centers on the potential of form fitting clothing on outwardly pious Muslim women to “invite negative things from the opposite sex,” as well as setting a “bad example” for children (*Republika* 2014). However, not all critics are from Muslim conservatives, or are based on conservative moral arguments. Hijabers Community Jakarta Chairperson Syifa Fauziya, for example, criticizes the “jilboob” style as an impediment to female self-actualization through outward piety. By following “appropriate norms” (such as pairing a *jilbab* with long, flowing dress), she argues, women will not only “look more beautiful,” but will find their behavior, faith and inner-peace “enhanced” (*Republika* 2014). Others, who

⁵⁴ As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the most widely panned elements of the initial 2006 draft of the Anti-Pornography Bill was its reclassification of the *kebaya* as “pornographic.” The *kebaya* itself has long been a site of moral contestation; judges at a 1972 beauty pageant, for example, declared that the winning garment should be one that symbolizes “nobility” rather than “sex appeal” (Pausacker 2015: 275).

⁵⁵ Interview with Nazaruddin, 2014.

also do not necessarily follow a conservative worldview, nevertheless criticize Muslim women who use the *jilbab* as a tool for flirtation. As one female high school student recounted:

For a while it was like all the [attractive] guys were going for girls with *jilbab* and skinny jeans. They call it “jilboob” now, as a kind of joke, but it’s really popular. Girls can feign modesty but still be really flirty—I guess you would say [they are] teasing the guys. Some [guys] go crazy for that, so more girls do it.⁵⁶

Notably, many uncovered Muslim women share these views, framing the issue as one of authenticity (with informalized approaches framed as “inauthentic”). For example:

I was always taught that wearing the *jilbab* shows a strong commitment to Islamic traditions, kind of like when men enroll in a *pesantren* and begin to wear *baju koko*, or when someone returns from the *hajj* and wears white. It’s not supposed to be easy and it’s certainly not supposed to be sexy. But that’s how a lot of people approach it today. I don’t think that’s appropriate—you are either committed to the whole idea or you should just wait until you are ready. If you are not ready—even if you will never be ready—then you should just live your life and not pretend you are something else.⁵⁷

And as writer Julia Suryakusuma opined in a 2014 editorial:

For me, *jilbab* all too often stands for little more than the superficialization of Islamic precepts, the hypocrisy of many Muslims (both men and women), and even the idolizing of a rule that may not even be a rule at all (Suryakusuma 2014).

Yet for some uncovered women, the budding controversies over how pious women wear their *jilbabs* actually serves to relieve the social pressure they feel. According to Dewi, a 27-year old graphic designer:

At one point there were all these people urging me to show my Islamic faith, for example, to wear a *jilbab*. Now, though, I think they are afraid that women will do it wrong, so it’s like “maybe it’s better if you just dress nicely and be a good person, and choose it when you are ready.” Maybe they think if it is chosen too quickly, you know, without enough thought—reflection, I mean. If a girl doesn’t give it enough reflection, she will make these compromises that they are so scared of. I actually think they are right—all this pushing women to wear *jilbab*, it’s

⁵⁶ Interview with high school student #1, 2013.

⁵⁷ Interview with uncovered woman #1, 2013.

having the wrong effect, and it would be better to let women just come to it themselves. Of course they know this but will never actually say it.⁵⁸

How the *Jilbab* Affects Muslim-Christian Interactions

While non-Muslims are not directly affected by the compliance and conformity pressures outlined above, the rise of pious dress among Muslims has the potential to “mark” non-Muslims as different in new or heightened ways, stimulate parallel processes of increased solidarity and group boundedness, and contribute to increased social and institutional segregation. In this section I will examine whether and to what degree the rise in visible forms of Muslim piety contributes to these processes.

Of Indonesia’s religious minorities, Christians have the most complex and, at times, difficult relationship to the Muslim majority. Though Indonesian Muslims often express neutral or positive views of Christianity in the abstract, they are often ambivalent toward the practice of Christianity in local communities.⁵⁹ A significant minority of Muslims interviewed for this project rationalized this by claiming that Christians are required (by their faith) to convert Muslims to Christianity. When queried on the source of this information, some related personal experiences with Evangelical or Pentecostal proselytizing; however, more cited Muslim sources: conservative Muslim media (e.g. *Media Dakwah*, *Sabili*, *VOA-Islam*), grassroots activism by anti-Christian or *dakwah* organizations, or, most commonly, word-of-mouth.

Christians, for their part, often interpret increased outward piety as a sign or harbinger of the (perceived) growth of intolerance and “radicalism.” This is especially so for conspicuously visible forms of male piety. Stefanus, a 65-year old Javanese Catholic living in North Jakarta,

⁵⁸ Interview with Dewi, 2014.

⁵⁹ This featured in my interview and focus group discussion data, but has also been noted by Menchik (2016) and in public opinion surveys (e.g. PPIM 2007).

recounted a recent controversy over the use of a local church, one that briefly attracted the class of professional Muslim protester groups typified by the FPI and other Islamic “mass organizations.” Because the congregation draws heavily from a nearby Naval base, the controversy was short-lived; the protesters allegedly withdrew after military officers made it clear that their continued presence would be problematic. Nevertheless, Stefanus recalled the protesters in terms that assert equivalence between their politics and outward piety:

They were, you know, Muslims. I mean, they were very Muslim⁶⁰, dressed in white clothes, with beards, like Arabs. I knew at once that they were radicals, not like the regular Muslims in our country.⁶¹

Another informant, who requested strict anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject, described a commute to work at an American-owned café in the Kemang neighborhood of Jakarta, an area home to both a large Western expatriate community and conservative Muslim Betawis:

Everyday to get to Kemang, I have to walk through [a Betawi area adjacent to Kemang]. I put my cross inside the shirt, but sometimes when I pass the white mosque, I see the bearded men outside and it’s like they can see it anyways, like they know. [Well,] they probably don’t really know I’m a Christian. Maybe they just think I’m a Muslim girl who isn’t religious, and that’s bad enough [laughs]. But they stare at me and the eyes aren’t friendly.⁶²

However, Christian informants described using a similar set of visual cues to sort Muslim women into “likely hostile” and “not-hostile” categories. As Maria, an office manager from Jakarta, described:

You can tell a lot from how a woman—a Muslim woman—wears her *jilbab*. Is it above the bangs, so you can see some hair, or is it tight around the face? Is it a pattern, maybe *batik* even, or is it plain? And what does she wear with it--does

⁶⁰ The Indonesian term “*Muslim banget*” literally means “very Muslim,” but has connotations of “enthusiastically” or “extremely” that are not captured in the literal translation.

⁶¹ Interview with Stefanus, 2011.

⁶² Interview with Christian #1, 2011.

she dress like an Arab or does she wear makeup or skinny jeans, like Indonesian girls?

I don't see them as all the same. If I meet a girl and she is trying to be beautiful, to look like a regular Indonesian girl, then I know we still have much in common. But the ones who are so serious, they want to pretend we are not there. Maybe they are friendly at first, but then they only want to talk to each other.

Stereotyping of this kind provides a simple (though, of course, highly imprecise) tool for navigating a complex social world as members of a distinct and intermittently at-risk minority.

Those who view the social field in such terms are often quick to distinguish between “Indonesian” and “Arab” modes of Islamic belief and practice, with the latter pegged as corrosive of Christian-Muslim relations. According to another informant from the Jakarta area:

There has always been a big difference between Islam in Indonesia and abroad. Islam came here by trade, not warfare, and it has always been tolerant—of the Hindus and Buddhists and, of course, of the Christians too. Not like in Pakistan or Iraq, as you can see on the news. But many foreign ideas are now coming to Indonesia, and some young people get influenced by this. It's two kinds of influences, really—one from America and the West, you know, music, movies and all that. The other is from [Saudi] Arabia, and this is the foreign kind of religion—extremism, really. So the young people, they are turning their back on the traditional way of doing things, and either way we get blamed for it.

Marking this distinction between “Indonesian” and “Arab” Islam, however problematic it may be, helps Christians make sense of a changing social environment, one in which individual relationships with Muslims may still be strong, but which—at the aggregate—feels less hospitable to the open and public practice of Christianity.⁶³

⁶³ Other Muslims have also noted a cultural “Arabization” in Indonesia (and linked it to rising intolerance of non-Muslims), so the charge is not baseless (e.g. Wahid 2009). Meanwhile, many of Indonesia's most explicitly anti-Christian organizations also tout their links to the Middle East and deride “Indonesianized” approaches to Islam as inauthentic. The inverse is, of course, also true—that Christian groups aggressively proselytizing among Muslims are often linked to American or other international organizations, as ICG (2010) notes.

Segregation and Marking

Christian informants also frequently expressed feelings of social isolation in settings where the visibly pious predominate among Muslims. This reflects concerns that the practice visibly marks them as “outsiders.”⁶⁴ To understand Christian anxieties about marking, consider that, prior to 1998, religious identity was not visible to the degree it is today. There were, of course, ways to differentiate a Christian from a Muslim: names, daily habits (such as when and where one would pray), or the use of Arabic terms like *inshalloh* (God willing) and *bismillah* (in the name of God) in everyday discourse. But these markers of difference were relatively subtle and required some attention to uncover. As the *jilbab* and other visual markers of Muslim-ness become more widely adopted, however, many Christians begin to feel marked as different, as if they too now wear their religion on their sleeves (albeit without choice). As Karina, a Catholic and university student from Jakarta, explained, the effect can be alienating:

Some of my friends wear the *jilbab*. So what? They are still my friends. We still talk and laugh about the same things—about boys, even. I respect that they follow God, as I do, even if we worship differently. But...sometimes, yeah, I’m in a class and all the girls wear *jilbabs* and I can’t tell them apart. And I sit there and my hair is out. I wonder, what do they say about me afterward? Not my friends, but other people—the ones who don’t know me. Do they know I’m Catholic? Do they care? I often wonder if they are talking about me behind my back.⁶⁵

Febri, another student at the same university, and a member of a local GKI church, described heightened feelings of exclusion:

⁶⁴ A concept imported from linguistics into the social sciences, markedness refers to the definition of terms against a reference category. Linguistic marking often distinguishes deviant behavior (e.g. dishonesty, impoliteness, intolerance) from what’s considered normative (e.g. honesty, politeness, tolerance). In social sciences, marked categories are those that deviate (in some culturally or politically salient way) from an unmarked reference category (Brubaker et al 2006: 212-213). In a static scheme, “black” in the United States is marked in reference to “white,” while in Indonesia, “Christian” is marked in reference to “Muslim.”

⁶⁵ Interview with Karina, 2011.

I've always had Muslim friends; I have always been comfortable with Muslims. I mean, you have to be if you live in Indonesia. And being Christian, we know how things can go wrong in that relationship—with the Muslim Indonesians. So we still work hard to avoid conflict, to make friends and be good neighbors. To fit in and not create controversy.

But it can be hard sometimes. My second year of university I lived in a *kos*.⁶⁶ There were, I think, thirty of us girls there. Most were Muslim, but you couldn't tell them from the Christians. I liked it there, so I renewed the contract. But then a lot of the girls I knew graduated or moved on. There were all these new residents on my floor, and they all knew each other from before. They wore *jilbabs*—and not the pretty kind, but the one that's just plain.

I thought nothing of it, but then the Ibu Kos [female resident advisor] approached me. She said they'd asked her to move me to another floor, because they didn't want to share a kitchen with [someone] who might drink and cook pork. I was insulted—I do not drink and I think I've only eaten pork once or twice in my life. I wouldn't even know where to buy it!

At first I refused but then the pressure was too much and so I left my room, which had been my home for more than a year. They put me on the first floor where there were more Christians, but my window now looks right out to the street instead of the garden. It is noisy and smells like gasoline during the day. The Ibu Kos tried to apologize to me but I had nothing to say to her. If I see those girls around I pretend they are not there.⁶⁷

As feelings of isolation, markedness, and exclusion rise, the urge to engage in parallel processes of solidarity making grow. In the words of another female Christian informant:

I don't try to pick my friends by religion, but when you feel like an outsider, you look for the ones who are the same as you. For me, that's people I know from GMKI [Indonesian Christian Students Association]. I go to church more—all my friends do. And I wear a cross now too, even though I never did before.⁶⁸

As it happens, most covered women (and pious dressing men) that I interviewed expressed positive views of Christian acquaintances, and at least a value-neutral attitude toward Christianity as a religion. As one covered woman from Surabaya explained:

⁶⁶ (*Rumah*) *Kos* refers to dormitory-style living arrangements in a private building.

⁶⁷ Interview with Febri, 2011.

⁶⁸ Interview with Christian #2, 2011.

We are used to Christianity and Pancasila recognizes it as a good religion for Indonesians. Because of this, we are comfortable with it, and Christians. Even in Malaysia, where I lived for a few years, it's different than in Indonesia. It's much harder to be Christian there, I think.⁶⁹

Or in the words of another piously dressed Muslim informant:

Of course I think Islam is best, this is why I'm Muslim [laughs]. But it's up to you. Maybe you like Christianity better. Okay, that's fine too.⁷⁰

The sense of Indonesia as a tolerant, open society permeates the bulk of Muslim informant testimony (including some who voice the opinion that Indonesia is *too* tolerant). The relativism expressed by the latter informant is less common; however, it is still more common, including among orthodox Muslims, than one might assume. Several Muslim informants—in Surabaya particularly—exhibited pride in the Christian presence in their urban *kampung*. They insisted that I see the local churches and told me that toleration of Christianity is an intrinsic quality of Indonesian Islam. Among these is Hasyim, a 31-year old high school teacher from Surabaya. In many ways, Hasyim embodies the image of the new piety movement: he describes himself as “more religious than most” and cultivates an untrimmed goatee, while his wife wears a *jilbab*. Both are *pesantren*-educated and choose to keep their savings in a *sharia* bank. He explained that tolerance in his neighborhood is a consequence of strong social ties between Muslims and Christians in this multireligious space:

[Muslims and Christians] know each other here—as neighbors and friends since a long time ago. If there is a problem, like if kids are fighting, then we know who to talk to. I see the priest outside his house every evening and I know all the other parents. They are good, trustworthy people. They will take care of it, believe me. And if someone from outside tries to come [into our *kampung*], looking to make trouble, well, we don't tolerate that either. You won't find any FPI here [laughs].⁷¹

⁶⁹ Interview with Surabaya Muslim #1, 2010.

⁷⁰ Interview with Jakarta Muslim #1, 2011.

⁷¹ Interview with Hasyim, 2011.

Christians, for their part, are often quick to stress tolerance and acceptance from Muslims with whom they are personally acquainted. And I found this to be the case even among Christians who voice concerns about growing Islamic piety. Many Christian informants told me that they have remained close with Muslim friends and acquaintances even after they have adopted pious dress. The anonymous informant who expressed feelings of fear when passing a mosque also had this to say about two coworkers who wear *jilbabs*:

No, nothing is different between us. But we've already worked together a long time, so why would it be? We still laugh together and talk about all kinds of things.

Clara, a 46-year old Christian from a middle-class neighborhood in South Jakarta, related the following anecdote:

Some years ago my husband and I were sent to Houston to work in the office there. We met quite a few Indonesians in Houston, all working in oil and gas, as well as their families. As expatriates, it is quite easy to make friends, and you don't care so much about the things that could make it difficult at home, like ethnicity or religion. It was a nice life, I think, for all of us. So when we returned to Indonesia, a few of us started an *arisan* as a way to keep up the friendships.

I don't remember anyone wearing a *jilbab* in Houston, but back in Jakarta a few started to [wear it]. Maybe I was bit nervous, you know, thinking that it might affect our friendship, especially now that we were in a different environment. I remember I spoke to my friend about it. She is a very religious Muslim herself, but we were close since the beginning, so I felt as if I could bring this up with her. She just laughed at the idea, like it was the silliest thing she ever heard. "Clara," she said. "You will always be my friend."⁷²

Beyond the realm of close acquaintance, however, the growth in Muslim (and Christian) piety can have the effect of erecting boundaries to frequent, meaningful interaction across religious lines. This can happen even among those who believe in pluralism as an ideal or accept it as "the Indonesian way of doing things." Piety, after all, entails commitment; it requires individuals to spend more of their time in specifically religious spaces and engaging with

⁷² Interview with Clara, 2012.

specifically religious materials, shifting focus inward, so to speak, and thus limiting the scope, frequency and intensity of cross-faith interactions. This, in turn, potentially limits the reliability and veracity of information about individuals outside the in-group, while ensuring that a greater proportion of information about the out-group will come from within religious networks.

One theme among Muslim informant testimony—evident among both pious and non-pious practicing Muslims—is to downplay or be unaware of the difficulties Christians and other non-Muslims may face in their daily lives. The physical attacks and legal stumbling blocks faced by some proposed new churches, for example, are of deep concern to Christians, and often cited by Christians, as well as by Muslim progressives, as evidence of “growing intolerance” and decaying protections for religious minorities (Wahid Institute 2009; Tampubolon 2010). Yet Muslims are often quick to point out that these events are isolated or unrepresentative. This is certainly true, if one takes the geographic and demographic extent of Indonesia into account, and the sheer number of churches whose construction and use are accepted or tolerated by Muslims. But to Christians, this type of reaction minimizes the significance of the issue, reinforcing feelings of marginalization. In Stefanus’ words:

There are always some Muslims speaking out against intolerance, but it is a very predictable group—the same few voices every time. The others, well, they often tell us that we shouldn’t take a group like FPI as representative of Islam in Indonesia. But we already know this! We have no real power in Indonesia, so we are lucky that most Muslims are good hearted. All we ask is that they see how we are treated, to understand how hard it can be sometimes—for us as Christians. And this is not always forthcoming, even from the tolerant ones.

A lack of interaction across religious lines can deepen this sense of being at cross-purposes. Indeed, a number of Muslim informants did note that their newfound piety has altered the way in which they interact with Christians, at times making such interactions uncomfortable:

I have always known Christians—in school, in the area where I grew up. Most are fine. You can talk to them, okay, as long as you avoid religious topics. But there

is always a fear there, and I think when, as a Muslim, you make the choice to dedicate yourself to Islam, you grow more sensitive about these kinds of things. You begin to ask yourself, for example, if I am to shake [a Christian's] hand, do I have to ask if she has [handled] pork first? And if I try to avoid it, does she think I am rude? Many Muslims prefer just to keep to themselves. Not me. I am okay about it, but you have to understand this is how many people think about it.⁷³

Nur expressed similar sentiments:

One thing that bothers me is...I don't believe it's right for Muslims to say "Merry Christmas," because then we are celebrating the birth of Jesus [as the son of god]—and this is a heresy for Muslims. But in Indonesian, we don't have a colloquial name for [the holiday], like "*lebaran*" [Idul Fitra and/or Idul Adha]. I worry that I will seem rude, so I guess I just avoid it.⁷⁴

This is one example of how heightened piety can alter daily interactions between Muslims and Christians. At other times, heightened piety leads to social and institutional segregation. I meet two students at Universitas Indonesia (University of Indonesia, UI), Maria and Shinta, both of whom come from Bekasi, a suburb of Jakarta that is majority Muslim but has a sizable Protestant minority, and is notable for a number of high-profile Church controversies (discussed in Chapter Four). Maria is Catholic and Javanese; she is a recent high school graduate and a new student at UI. She comes from an area of Bekasi that abuts the heavily Chinese and Protestant neighborhood Kelapa Gading. Shinta is Muslim and comes from an adjacent neighborhood of Bekasi. The two women explain that they met at the university, and became friends in large part because of their common place of origin. Yet they also related parallel stories of social segregation deriving from heightened religiosity:

MARIA: It was tough for me growing up, because in my elementary school all the Chinese girls were Christian and all the *pribumi* girls were Muslim—I am the only Catholic. You know, everyone was nice, but for me, I had to work harder to be accepted into friendship groups. Most of my friends were Muslim, actually. I don't think anyone cared that I was a Catholic, except maybe they might ask if I

⁷³ Interview with unnamed Muslim #1, 2011.

⁷⁴ In 1981 MUI issued a *fatwa* instructing Muslims not to wish Christians *selamat hari Natal* (Merry Christmas) or participate in religious Christmas rituals (Munjid 2013).

ate pork. “No,” I’d say. “No way.” Because I knew it was supposed to be bad, and I was too young to know that the rule is only for the Muslims. I mean, we never ate pork at home—there’s no pork in Javanese food. So how was I to know? [laughs.]

Anyways, things started changing a bit when I entered SMP [junior high school]—the Muslim girls started wearing long skirts and *jilbab*. Not all of them, but it was like the good girls did this and the bad girls didn’t, you know? Here at UI it’s not like that, but remember I come from a different kind of place. So I don’t know, maybe no one even thought about it, but even so my Muslim friends started drifting away from me, and then a lot of the Chinese girls I’d known went to the [Protestant] Christian schools in Kelapa Gading. I started to spend all my free time with other Catholics I knew from church. Then I asked my parents to send me to the Catholic high school. I had maybe one or two Muslim friends from Bekasi that I still saw after that.

SHINTA: Yes, I agree, it is all true. But for me, in my experience, it is more complicated, because I am also a Muslim. As you can see, I choose not to wear a *jilbab*, though I [am] very religious. There was a lot of pressure to look religious and to participate in religious activities—study groups, watching Islamic films in our free time, you know. I did some of that, and made some friends that way. But I always had to explain why I didn’t put on a *jilbab*. Sometimes I felt guilty that I didn’t, though as I grew older I became more confident in my decision.

I did have Christian friends too, since we were young. Maybe at that time people didn’t think so much about what religion you follow. I prefer it that way, if I am honest. But we had a lot of new Christians move in to my complex, and some of them were getting my friends to spend more time at Church. So I didn’t see them as much. We’d still go to the mall sometimes, but not as much as before. And because of that, I spent more time with other Muslim girls. I didn’t have anything against anyone, it just happened that way.⁷⁵

Pious dress can thus create invisible barriers to inter-religious interaction—even for those who desire such interactions and are reflective about the Muslim-Christian relationship in Indonesia. As another informant described:

Would I like to know some more Christians? Yes, of course—it would be interesting to speak to them about Nabi Issa [Jesus], I think. Islam teaches us that Christianity is a good path, a righteous path. But of course there are differences as well. We don’t believe Nabi Issa is the Son of God, or that such a thing is even possible. Still, I think there are many conflicts between Muslims and Christians in this country—misunderstandings, really, because our religion tells us to be kind

⁷⁵ Interview with Maria and Shinta, 2012.

and just with the *al-Khittab*.⁷⁶ So I would like to talk...about these things. But where am I supposed to meet these Christians? How do I start the conversation?⁷⁷

The implication is that Muslim piety is experienced as a set of commitments to do particular things at particular times and places: attend Friday prayers at the mosque, pray five times daily, study recitation of the Quran, and, for modernists especially, to read and discuss *tafsir*—an experience not unlike Bible study for Evangelical Christians. These practices not only take time, but also shape or reshape social networks. This process may contribute to the hardening of social boundaries, even in the absence of any concerted effort or desire to do so.⁷⁸

Yet individuals can and do transgress these boundaries with some regularity. Dimas, a student at IAIN Sunan Ampel in Surabaya, relates an illustrative anecdote from his home island of Madura, a region known for its religious conservatism:

So many Muslims [are afraid] to meet [with non-Muslims]. But my first experience was in high school—there was a class with the younger brother of a Pastor, and no one wanted to hang out with him...I decided to befriend him, and it turned out good as long as we did not go into questions of [which religion is better]. I was even once invited to the church to worship, and I joined. Why? Because I respect Jesus as the Prophet Jesus, because Jesus is [in our] history too. In Islam we must respect the previous prophets. So I respect everything to do with Jesus or with Jewish groups.

So I followed this [principle], thank Allah, and have already been to the church twice. At that time—the first time—the pastor was reading verses of *Philippians* that spoke of fulfillment in life. I was very interested in the spirit of the pastor's sermon—I wanted to learn the lesson. But it did not diminish my faith of Islam.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ In traditional Islam, Christians are designated as *al-Khittab* (People of the Book), those non-Muslims afforded special rights and protections in early/medieval Islam, and who are also considered to be followers of Allah.

⁷⁷ Interview with unnamed Muslim #2, 2011.

⁷⁸ There are, of course, also concerted efforts to do so. As one informant from Surabaya related: “most of the Muslim community in Indonesia is frightened by [the threat of] Christianization. In part this fear has been fomented by radical Islamic groups. Because they promote [awareness of and opposition to] Christianization issues, they don't want anyone to associate with non-Muslims or foreigners coming to Indonesia. They tell people, as in Madura, ‘those are infidels, you should be afraid of becoming infidels like them.’”

⁷⁹ Interview with Dimas, 2011.

In the course of our conversation, I ask the university students Maria and Shinta about the difference between their lives in Bekasi and at UI:

SHINTA: The same [social segregation by religion] happens here—and, you know, some students are very militant about their views. But there are so many people who attend UI—from everywhere. All kinds of people, really. Even *bules* [white foreigners].

MARIA: [Laughs.] We are living in the central city now. There are choices, more than in Bekasi. Maybe you come with some friends you know from home, but just as well you make friends here, and they can be anyone.

Though Maria and Shinta both distinguish between the “open” culture of Jakarta and the more restrictive, collectivist dynamic at play in Bekasi, their optimism on Muslim-Christian relations is neither unique nor limited to residents of the capital. Even those Christians who vocalize feelings of pressure in their daily lives as a result of Indonesia’s on-going sociocultural Islamization note a broader basis of acceptance among Indonesian Muslims, and a limit to trends toward sociocultural Islamization. As one Christian informant explained:

It could be a problem for us if all Muslim girls wore the *jilbab*—then we would be exposed, like wearing special clothes, except we are the only ones not wearing the special clothes [laughs]. But I’m confident this will not happen. As long as there are shampoo commercials with beautiful women, young girls will want to show their hair to the world. This is something natural, I think. If they allowed it in Iran or [Saudi] Arabia, many would do it there too.⁸⁰

Or in the words of another:

You only see the bad headlines, like when a church is being protested. And of course you think everything is bad, right? Well, it’s just not like that. Not usually. Most people I know are okay with me if I’m Christian, as long as I am a good Christian. Nobody I know thinks about those [bad] things much.⁸¹

Conclusion

⁸⁰ Interview with unnamed Christian #3, 2011.

⁸¹ Interview with unnamed Christian #4, 2012.

The evidence presented above shows that the experience of social pressure to “look pious” differs among various subsets of Indonesian Muslim women. For a committed subset of visibly pious Muslim women, there is very little pressure at all. Rather, the *jilbab* serves as a symbol of individual devotion to Islam. Alternatively, it serves to mark sociopolitical identification as a “correct practicing” Muslim in a way that produces solidarity with others inside that category, while hardening the social boundaries with non-pious-practicing Muslims and non-Muslims.

Each of these proactive approaches to piety corresponds to a specific understanding of piety’s purpose: to empower the individual toward spiritual embitterment, self-actualization, and aid in a personal *jihad* (struggle) against anomie, corruption, and sin; or to demarcate the “correct” from the “incorrect,” while pushing society towards a more general orientation toward Muslim social identification and “correct” practices. As such, each approach correlates strongly, albeit imprecisely, with broadly sociopolitical understandings of Islam’s proper place in state and society (defined herein as civil Islamic and conservative). And they correlate with specific stances toward religious pluralism as well. Those whose approaches to piety are primarily individualized and devotional are more likely to express positive views of religious pluralism and religious minorities, while the very idea of individualized religiosity tacitly legitimizes the idea that there are (and should be) multiple approaches to Islam. Meanwhile, those whose approach to pious dress reflects a concern with boundary maintenance and imposing correct practices are generally ambivalent, if not outright hostile, to that idea.⁸²

Other Muslim women, however, adopt the *jilbab* more as a response to social pressure. In some cases, they are responding to external compliance pressures; more frequently, they are

⁸² On the other hand, some informants within this category were neutral to positive on Christianity.

responding to the internalized pressure to conform to perceived norms in the social environment. And conformity pressures grow with the number of adoptees in the surroundings. This is not to claim that reactive piety is solely instrumental, or that it cannot also be (or become) devotional or solidarity-oriented. The distinction between proactive and reactive piety is not always sharp in practice.

At the same time, the concept of reactive piety captures the reality that few decisions are made in a void. The choices one perceives as available, as well as the meanings and values associated with specific behaviors, are deeply shaped by what other people are doing. The conformity pressures that shape individual choices, moreover, are frequently experienced as *ambient*, as background elements of the social environment that individuals only perceive when they stop to think about them. And as with other social trends, many Muslim women adopt the *jilbab* only after many others in their immediate social environment do so—producing large-scale effects at the aggregate level.

Yet the picture that emerges from informant testimony is not simply one of growing visible piety. As adoption of the *jilbab* spreads, the ways it is practiced and the meanings ascribed to it fragment and multiply. The *gaul* or “jilboob” styles may be looked down upon by some orthodox Muslims, but they represent an attempt to negotiating competing norms of femininity. The growth of the *jilbab* thus isn’t just an example of the “Islamization” of Indonesia, but is arguably also producing the domestication of an Islamic practice—a long-held tradition in Indonesia.

Finally, the heightened piety among Muslims—visualized through dress—does appear to contribute to feelings of markedness and social segregation among non-Muslims. Christians describe greater difficulties in communicating and socializing with visibly pious Muslims, while

both Christians and Muslims describe shrinking social spaces in which the two interact (and their replacement with exclusive, “pious spaces”). At the same time, both describe individual relations that cross this religious boundary in positive terms, and express positive views of other religions. Thus one concludes that the rise in visible piety, while not fueling intolerance *per se*, is nevertheless constricting the everyday pluralism of interaction that has been taken for granted in Indonesian urban centers since independence.

Conclusion

In this dissertation I have analyzed pressures on religious pluralism in historical perspective, in statewide politics, in regional and local politics, and in everyday life. In Chapter One, I detailed the emergence and crystallization of religious pluralism in Indonesia, both as a set of formal institutional relationships and as a set of everyday practices. When Islam arrived in the 13th century (through trade rather than conquest), local elites on Java incorporated the new faith into existing belief systems and cosmologies. This produced two Islamic heterodox traditions: the aristocratic syncretism of the *priyayi* and the peasant syncretism of the *abangan*. Along with the more orthodox *santri*, these social categories would retain religious and political relevance well into the 20th century. And though a source of conflict at several moments in history, the trifurcation of Islam on Java contributed to sociopolitical and sociocultural understandings of Islam as flexible, adaptable, and internally diverse.

Christianity came to the archipelago in the 16th century by way of European colonialism. However, the Dutch prioritized political stability, low cost administration, and efficient resource extraction over Christianization, and so discouraged missionaries from proselytizing to local Muslims. Christian missionaries instead focused their attention on the archipelago's animistic and residual Hindu-Buddhist communities, as well as on the ethnic Chinese. This introduced regional and ethnic dynamics to Muslim-Christian relations, with Christians territorially concentrated in Maluku, North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, and the outer islands; ethnically concentrated among Ambonese, Bataks, Dayaks, and Chinese; and, on populous Java, overrepresented in the towns and cities (relative to the countryside).

In pursuit of political stability at low cost, Dutch authorities chose to co-opt the hereditary Muslim elites of Java, Sumatra, and the outer islands, preserving their traditional

privileges and leaving the European presence thin outside the cities and plantations. At the same time, colonial authorities feared Islam's potential to unify regionalized and localized opposition to European dominion. This fear led colonial authorities to repress political expressions of Islam, while sponsoring the development of ethnoregional law (*adat*), institutions, and social identities as alternatives. On Java, these policies deepened the split between the orthodox *santri* and the heterodox *priyayi* and *abangan*, while contributing to similar divisions between *adat* traditionalists and orthodox Muslims elsewhere. As a consequence, when "Inlanders" began forming independent political organizations in the early 20th century, they were largely divided according to these social categories.

With independence in 1945, political parties run by Javanese *priyayi* (PNI and PSI), *santri* (Masyumi and later NU), and *abangan* (PKI) came into open conflict over the question of how "Islamic" the new state should be. Muslim conservatives wanted the state to obligate all Muslims to follow *sharia*, which all other parties opposed. As a compromise solution, the 1945 Constitution required all Indonesians to believe in "one true God" (one of Pancasila's five principles), but left out any mention of Islam or *sharia*. In order to placate disaffected orthodox Muslims, the state created the Ministry of Religious Affairs as an instrument through which to regulate Islamic religious life. But after a confrontation over the Ministry's efforts to "convert" heterodox Muslims, Sukarno instructed the Ministry to represent Indonesia's six recognized faiths (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese Confucianism) equally. The principle long-term effect of this policy was to formalize and institutionalize a corporatist-pluralist regime for the governance of religious diversity.

After seizing power in 1965, Suharto's military-backed regime pursued a dual strategy vis-à-vis Islam. On the one hand, the new regime co-opted Muslim leaders where possible,

provided financial support for Islamic education and religious institutions, and encouraged Indonesians to associate more closely with orthodox versions of the (now five) recognized religions. On the other hand, it suppressed independent political expressions of Islam. These policies had the effect of splitting the Islamic elite into a conservative faction that still supported the Islamic state cause (and which was increasingly hostile to Christianity) and a civil Islamic faction that rejected the idea of an Islamic state, embraced religious pluralism, and sought to reformulate Islamic authority within civil society. Initially, the Suharto regime kept its distance from both factions. But a power struggle during the 1980s led Suharto to cultivate support among Muslim conservatives. Meanwhile, civil Islamic Muslims were moving away from the regime and toward the pro-democracy movement. During the political crisis of 1997-1998, advocates for civil Islam openly called for democratic reform.

Transition brought multi-party elections to Indonesia for the first time in more than forty years. Parties organized along civil Islamic and conservative or Islamist lines proliferated. Neither form of political Islam, however, fared well in the 1999 parliamentary elections. They continue to struggle in statewide elections, where Indonesian voters have shown a clear and consistent preference for secular-nationalist parties and presidential candidates. Nonetheless, both civil Islamic and conservative or Islamist political parties have been a part of every governing coalition since 1999.

As described in Chapter Two, the instability and chaos that accompanied then-President Abdurrahman Wahid's impeachment in 2001 led his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to create a political coalition that included all sitting parties. This "rainbow cabinet" even included Islamists who had vociferously opposed the prospect of a Megawati presidency. More importantly, it created the precedent for *cartel relations* among Indonesia's political parties,

through which each party shares the spoils associated with being on the inside in exchange for helping maintain the system.¹

The cartel system in statewide politics has not eliminated Islam-based challenges to religious pluralism at the level of the state. Rather, it has created incentives for all parties to find compromise solutions that preserve the governing coalition and the broader cartel system of politics. Chapter Two examines how this process unfolded for two contentious pieces of legislation: a proposed 2006 ban on pornography and “pornographic” public behavior and a proposed 2011 bill that would have banned the minority Ahmadiyah sect, which is viewed as heretical by many orthodox Muslims. Islamists and Muslim conservatives in both cases introduced bills that were nonstarters for many secular nationalists and civil Islamic Muslims in parliament. In order to avoid endangering cartel relations, political moderates allowed the bills to come to the floor for debate and amendment. At crucial moments, the civic organizations NU and Muhammadiyah stepped in to perform *consensus making*, helping actors in contention accept or at least acquiesce to compromise solutions.

In the case of the anti-pornography bill, that solution was, first, to remove the contentious references to public behavior and, second, to leave the bulk of enforcement to provincial and regional authorities. Various provinces, regions, and municipalities then interpreted the bill as they saw fit, with conservative West Java enforcing rejected elements of the draft bill and tourism-reliant Bali publicly refusing to enforce the law at all. In the case of the proposed ban on the Ahmadiyah, the central state declined to issue a ban, but also signaled that it would allow

¹ All cabinets during the years 2001-2014 were organized as cartels. The 2014 election initially appeared as if it might end this practice, with President Joko Widodo’s minority coalition comprised of two parties (the secular-nationalist PDI-P and civil Islamic PKB) and accounting for a mere 38 percent of parliamentary seats. By 2016, however, nearly all opposition parties had entered the governing coalition, which now accounts for 80 percent of parliamentarians and all sitting parties save two (secular-nationalist Gerindra and the Islamist PKS) (Brummitt 2016).

provinces and regions to chart their own path on the controversial sect. In both cases, the central state *offloaded* responsibility for setting the limits to religious pluralism. This, in turn, was made possible by *decentralization*, which granted unprecedented powers to lower levels of governance, but left the distribution of authority among levels of governance unclear.

The central state's recourse to offloading has, on the one hand, protected religious pluralism from Islam-based challenges at the level of the state. But it has also *regionalized* the institutionalization and practice of religious pluralism. Some regional and local governments have passed highly restrictive *sharia* bylaws, banned the Ahmadiyah, interpreted pornography so broadly as to include "suggestive" dance and other personal behaviors, and generally oriented the (regional) state toward the ideological preferences of conservative Islam and the interests of conservative Muslims.² Other regions and localities have reaffirmed or reinforced the norms of Pancasila pluralism, in some cases even refusing to enforce national laws perceived as contrary to these norms. The central state, meanwhile, has largely declined to elicit compliance from either category of regions and localities.

There are many potential flashpoints over Islam and religious pluralism at the regional and local levels. In Chapter Three, I examined one such area of contestation: the building and use of Christian churches in majority-Muslim neighborhoods. A number of proposed churches have, in recent years, become epicenters of protest incited by "street Islamist" groups. These events do not fit the classic profile of the church burning, but are instead sustained, long-term protest cycles. Several remain unresolved to this day. And nearly all of these sustained anti-church protests are located in the fast-industrializing suburbs of the Jakarta Metropolitan Region.

² The Autonomous Province of Aceh has taken this to an extreme, institutionalizing a highly restrictive and punitive variant on the medieval *hudud*. However, because of its status as an autonomous province, it is a special case.

I also sought to answer the question of why sustained anti-church protests cluster in these areas, while they are largely absent from other fast-industrializing areas of Indonesia, including those where churches have been targeted by violence in the past and where street Islamist groups are present and active. But initiating and sustaining anti-church protest cycles requires a degree of support or sympathy in local communities. Drawing upon interview data, I illustrated how local Muslims in the Jakarta Metropolitan Region come to view the disputed churches as communal problems. What I found is that local Muslims see churches as symbolizing a sense of encroachment from three crosscutting categories of outsiders, each of which is viewed as endangering locals' symbolic ownership of their communities.

The first of these is the sense of encroachment by outsider migrants coming into working- and lower middle-class neighborhoods. These areas are already boxed in by new residential and commercial developments. With little room to grow, crowding becomes an issue, and migrants (rather than developers) are frequently blamed for traffic, noise, and other daily nuisances. The second of these is the sense of encroachment by migrants who are also specifically religious outsiders (primarily Christians). The large-scale movement of Christians to Jakarta's industrializing suburbs renders Christianity more visible than it previously was in these areas. And I also found that aggressive proselytizing by Evangelicals and Pentecostals, who target both (mainline) Christians and Muslims, fuels resentments toward Christians more broadly. The third of these is the sense of encroachment by migrants who are not only religious outsiders, but ethnic outsiders as well. Informants often complained specifically about Bataks, many of whom are also Christians. Bataks are routinely stereotyped as rude, loud, aggressive in trade, and quick to anger. Unsurprisingly, several churches that have been targeted by protesters are either Batak

ethnic churches or cater to local Bataks. And local Muslims (as well as some Christians) often connect protests targeting these churches to ill feelings toward “rude” Batak newcomers.

It is important to note that these low-level antipathies do not, by themselves, produce anti-church protests. Rather, the religiopolitical entrepreneurs who incite anti-church protests draw upon these low-level antipathies to build support for their actions in local communities. Being able to do so also depends on the stance taken by Indonesia’s large and powerful civic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah. These organizations have, since the days of the New Order, aided the state in the prevention and management of inter-group conflict by engaging in social or in-group policing. However, in areas where anti-church protests have emerged, I found that local chapters of NU and Muhammadiyah engaged in very little in-group policing. This has created opportunities for street Islamist and other radical groups that may not exist in areas where NU and Muhammadiyah do engage in policing.

I then looked at a counter-case—the industrializing suburbs of Surabaya—where sustained anti-church protests are largely absent. I found that, because there is more space to build out on, crowding does not impact working- and lower middle-class neighborhoods in metropolitan Surabaya as it does in metropolitan Jakarta. Consequently, there is less crowding-related tension with migrants. Moreover, because migration to Surabaya is more regional than migration to Jakarta, migrants tend to come from the same religious and ethnic groups that already predominate in these communities. This means that Christian migrants are more likely to use existing churches than seek new ones, and to follow established norms of public behavior (in local areas). Though disputes and negative stereotyping certainly exist in these communities, local Muslims stressed expressed a higher level of comfort with Christian in-migrants than I found among Muslims in Jakarta’s industrializing suburbs. What’s more, I found that the

provincial, regional, and local chapters of NU and Muhammadiyah are proactive in policing local communities against conflict entrepreneurs, leaving little space and few opportunities for the incitement of anti-church protests. Taken together, these factors contribute to a much less favorable opportunity structure for the incitement and sustaining of anti-church protests than found in Jakarta's industrializing suburbs.

In Chapter Four, I shifted focus from *sociopolitical* challenges to formal religious pluralism and related practices of religious toleration, to the *interactional* pressures generated by the sociocultural Islamization of everyday life. Drawing on interview data collected among Muslim women in metropolitan Jakarta and Surabaya, I explored how the gradual adoption of the *jilbab* by Muslim women informally pressures other Muslim women to adopt the practice. This is notable because, in Indonesia, there is a pervasive rhetoric of choice, which holds that individuals should not be coerced into pious practices. Rather, the *jilbab* is supposed to be a conscious individual decision that reflects deep thought on the meaning of the practice. And many Muslim women do cover their heads in order to symbolize a deeper commitment to Islam, or to emphasize a heightened social identification as Muslim. However, for other Muslim women, the decision is strongly informed by social pressure to conform to emergent norms of piety in the immediate social environment.³ In other words, the more women who wear the *jilbab* in the immediate social environment, the higher the pressure to adopt the practice. Oftentimes these pressures are ambient—part of the background noise of social life.

From interviews with Christians, I was also able to assess how the spread of visual markers of piety among Indonesian Muslims contributes to feelings of markedness and exclusion among Christians. I did not find a connection between Muslim piety and intolerance toward

³ A third group of Muslim women cover their heads in order to avoid harassment and unwanted sexual advances.

Christians. Rather, interviews conducted with Muslims and Christians revealed that the adoption of pious dress can contribute to social and institutional segregation along religious lines even when there is no intent to for it to do so. Feelings of markedness and exclusion, in turn, emerge primarily from this social and institutional segregation.

Regionalization and the Future of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia

In this dissertation, I have argued that linked processes of democratization, decentralization, and Islamization have led to sharp and growing regional disparities in how pluralism is institutionalized and practiced in Indonesia. The evidence presented in this dissertation certainly bears out that thesis. In order to preserve coalitions among parties with vastly different ideological orientations, political actors at the level of the state offload the most contentious challenges to religious pluralism to lower levels of governance. This preserves religious pluralism as a legal precept and organizing principle of the state, but at a cost of allowing regions to ignore, subvert, or contradict national laws and norms. And the central state's disinclination to involve itself in regional disputes—including those pertaining to controversial churches—creates space for broader transgressions against minority rights. For pluralism advocates, this is reasonable cause for concern.

From another perspective, though, offloading protects religious pluralism at the level of the state and in regions where religious minorities, heterodox Muslims, or advocates for civil Islam predominate. In other words, preserving religious pluralism at the level of the state may have little impact on residents of Bogor or West Sumatra, but it is quite meaningful for residents of Surabaya or Bali. Furthermore, even if the central state does not involve itself in regional

disputes now, preserving the pluralistic framework at the level of the state gives it the flexibility to do so if and when it so chooses.

Equally, it is important not to overstate the incidence of religious conflict or assaults on pluralism in Indonesia. Biases toward bad news reporting amplify the “presence” of conflict events, leading to an overestimation of their incidence and distribution (and underestimation of peaceful coexistence).⁴ Without question, the negative outcomes for religious pluralism described herein—the emergence of aggressive, street-level campaigns to limit minority rights and protections; decreased space for non-normative or non-pious modes of religiosity among Muslims; the imposition of conservative Islamic moral codes on those who do not choose to follow them; and the erection of barriers to interreligious interactions—are real issues to be addressed. But they are neither universal nor ever-present. Rather, they are regionalized.

Furthermore, despite legitimate concerns about growing intolerance in Indonesia, a clear majority of the Indonesians who I interviewed displayed highly tolerant attitudes—especially towards non-Muslims—and a great deal of faith in Pancasila pluralism. By contrast, only a small minority expressed the desire for Indonesia to become an Islamic state. Also noteworthy, residents of highly conservative areas, such as Bogor or Bekasi, often expressed satisfaction with the degree to which Islam is institutionalized by the state. In context, this suggests that allowing regions to chart their own path really does reduce pressure on the central state.

Moreover, because offloading works as a low-cost solution to the issue of contention over religious pluralism, the central state is likely to continue offloading contentious issues to the provinces and regions. For example, a bill to prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol was introduced in 2013 by the Islamist PPP and PKS parties, but has come under severe criticism

⁴ Scholarship that samples on the dependent variable also contributes to this process (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

from religious minorities, secularists, political liberals, business groups, and (some) advocates of civil Islam (Ramadhani 2016). Seeking compromise, parliamentarians have amended the bill to exclude hotels and tourist areas, but these moves have so far failed to resolve the issue. The framework of regionalization outlined herein suggests one of two outcomes: either the central state will pass an even weaker version of the bill (and then leave enforcement up to the discretion of the provinces and regions) or it will offload the issue altogether and let the provinces and regions choose whether to prohibit alcohol themselves.

When faced with episodes of conflict and violence, however, the central state will eventually have to intervene to protect minorities who are not adequately protected by regional authorities. The most obvious way to do this is by enforcing the primacy of national over regional law when one contradicts the other. In the case of GKI Taman Yasmin, the national police could enforce the Constitutional Court's decision against the City of Bogor and in favor of the church congregation. This would go a long way toward demonstrating the state's commitment to protecting religious minorities, including Muslims in Eastern Indonesia (who in some cases also face difficulties building houses of worship).

Indonesia would also benefit from a clarification of what is protected under national law and what is up to the discretion of the provinces and regions, as well as issue clearer guidelines on how regional and local governments are to interpret and enforce national law. This would also entail clarifying the penalties for noncompliance, and applying them consistently. The end result would be to strengthen the institutions of the central state without recentralizing the state. In turn this would allow the state to more effectively manage the regionalization of religious pluralism.

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