Representation and Repair: White Voters, Politicians of Color, and the "Great Awokening"

by

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Abstract

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Equitable representation of marginalized groups is a challenge for democratic government. Resolving this challenge often requires support from dominant group members. What motivates dominant group members to join such coalitions? This dissertation considers the case of white Democratic Americans' support for representatives of color. In so doing, it connects two recent trends in American politics: the rapid increase in racial and ethnic diversity in Congress and the leftward shift in white Democratic voters' racial attitudes sometimes referred to as the "Great Awokening."

The first paper, written in collaboration with Anna Weissman, examines white constituents' approval of their Congressional representatives as a function of these representatives' racial identities. American voters generally prefer political representatives who share their racial identity, but white voters' racial preferences have recently diverged along party lines. White Democrats now approve more highly of politicians of color than of similar white politicians, a change that has occurred over the last decade. We find that this heightened approval is associated with increasingly liberal racial attitudes among members of the Democratic party. White citizens' attitudes about historically marginalized groups are shifting, and in turn their attitudes about people from those groups who serve as political representatives are becoming more positive. This has implications for the viability of candidates of color, whom political elites have long viewed as less electable.

The second paper investigates this implication, focusing on white Democrats' support for Black Congressional candidates. A growing number of Black House members represent majority-white districts, and a meta-analysis of 33 experiments demonstrates rising support for Black candidates among white Democratic participants. Original surveys examine potential motivations for this support. White Democrats' perceptions of injustice have increased significantly over time and predict support for Black candidates in these surveys, suggesting that justice-focused appeals may be effective for increasing dominant group support for marginalized-group candidates.

The third paper investigates how gender conditions white Democrats' support for Black candidates. A meta-analysis of 10 conjoint experiments reveals that white Democrats are generally supportive of Black and/or women candidates, but white women tend to support white women candidates over

Black men candidates, whereas white men tend towards the inverse. An original survey indicates that white Democratic women's preference for women candidates is primarily policy-motivated, and signals of commitment to gender-related policies boost support for Black men candidates. With the increasing diversity of Democratic primary election fields, this project speaks to the prospects for descriptive representation of both women and people of color.

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Introduction

Minority groups in majoritarian democratic systems face many obstacles to addressing injustices committed against them. One obstacle is that they lack the ingroup votes to achieve descriptive representation, that is, having a representative who shares one's group membership, in many contests. Electing minority group members into office often requires the support of majority group voters, among whom these candidates are often disadvantaged. When and why might majority group voters support minority group candidates? This dissertation considers the case of white Americans' reactions to candidates and politicians of color in the United States, where people of color are underrepresented at every level of government (Khalid 2018; Schaeffer 2021, 2023; Zoch 2020). Disproportionately few legislative districts are majority-minority (Macagnone 2021), meaning that winning over an appreciable share of white voters remains — for the time being (Frey 2020) — a necessary condition for victory. However, past research has found that like voters in other racial groups, white voters tend to prefer candidates who share their racial identity (Gay 2002; Terkildsen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1995).

It is unclear, though, whether these findings still hold. The past decade has seen both partisan sorting on racial attitudes (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck 2019) and growing racial liberalism among white Democrats in particular (Engelhardt 2021a, 2021b; Hopkins and Washington 2020; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Schram and Fording 2021). Might white Democratic voters now be more willing, or even prefer, to support politicians of color as a result of these shifts? If so, prospective candidates of color may be able to compete more successfully than earlier research would suggest in places with majority-white constituencies, where party gatekeepers have even recently expressed skepticism about their ability to attract votes (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2022).

The central argument of this dissertation is that this is indeed the case. In Chapter 1, my coauthor Anna Weissman and I show that white Democratic constituents have become more approving of non-white Members of Congress over time, and that this shift aligns with the liberalization of this group's racial attitudes. Chapter 2 argues that this enthusiasm for politicians of color extends to voting behavior, tracing increasing support for Black candidates in hypothetical elections among white Democratic survey participants over the same period. In a series of original studies, I evaluate theorized motivations behind this support for Black candidates and argue that a desire to address racial discrimination and injustice is a significant motivator for white Democrats who prefer Black candidates. The third chapter places white Democrats' preferences about candidates' racial identities in context, considering how candidate gender interacts with race to structure voting decisions. An additional original study finds that white Democratic women prioritize voting for women over voting for Black candidates, but that Black men candidates who signal their commitment to women's issues can gain significant support from white Democratic women and men alike. In sum, the dissertation identifies — and helps to inform future campaigns that must appeal to —

a developing source of electoral support for candidates of color.

Chapter 1

As Racial Attitudes Go, So Goes Approval: Why White Democrats Favor Representatives of Color *with Anna Weissman*

Descriptive representation, that is, having a representative that shares one's ascriptive characteristics, is associated with a range of important outcomes for voters of color (e.g., Butler and Broockman 2011; Mansbridge 1999), but since white voters still compose majorities of both parties nationwide (Prokop 2021), their preference for coethnic representatives (Gay 2002; Visalvanich 2017) contributes to persistent inequity in descriptive representation. These inequities are pronounced: in a 2020 survey of federal and state legislators, the Reflective Democracy Campaign (2021) reports that while the ratio of white legislators to white Americans is roughly 3:2, ratios are much lower for Asian Americans (1:6), Latino Americans (1:6), Native Americans (1:3), and Black Americans (1:2). However, recent research finds that white Democratic voters have started to prefer representatives of color to white representatives (Weissman Forthcoming). Understanding the mechanism behind this shift is essential because it clarifies the conditions under which this preference is likely to continue, intensify, or diminish in the future — and, therefore, the reliability with which white Democrats might contribute to correcting inequity in descriptive representation.

This paper investigates potential mechanisms behind this shift. One possibility is that white Democrats' increasingly liberal racial attitudes (Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022) could motivate support for politicians of color. Alternatively, in the racially polarized environment of the late 2010s, approving highly of MCs of color could be a way of expressing one's loyalty to the Democratic party rather than a first-order preference for a non-white representative. Another possibility is that, if white Democrats have become more liberal on average, white voters' tendency to stereotype politicians of color as more liberal (Visalvanich 2017) may now work to non-white politicians' advantage.

Leveraging data from the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), we show that white Democrats have come to approve more highly of members of Congress (MCs) of color than of similar white MCs. We then use measures of Democratic identity strength, perceptions of ideological congruence with one's MC, and racial resentment to test the hypothesized mechanisms. White Democrats' enthusiasm for politicians of color does not appear to depend on strong partisan identification in recent years, nor on perceptions of ideological closeness, but rather on these voters' liberal racial attitudes. This impact of white Democrats' increasing racial liberalism should prompt a reconsideration of the significance of descriptive representation to voters, as well as of the viability of candidates of color, whom political elites still view as less electable in white constituencies (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2022).

1.1 Background

Research from the 1980s through the early 2010s indicates that whites in both parties have historically preferred white representatives (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016; Gay 2002; McDermott 1998; Nelson 2021; Visalvanich 2017). Recent work by Weissman (Forthcoming) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation replicate this pattern, but also document a reversal of white Democrats' preference in favor of politicians of color in the mid-2010s.

This shift has occurred over the same period that white Democrats, on average, have become substantially less racially resentful, partly via party sorting on racial attitudes, but also via individual attitude change (Engelhardt 2021a; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022). Although the substantive interpretation of low racial resentment is less straightforward than that of high racial resentment, it could motivate support for politicians of color through multiple mechanisms. Low racial resentment implies cognizance of racial discrimination, which could inform voters' inferences about the quality of politicians who overcome this discrimination to win elective office. Low racial resentment could also be associated with "positive" racial attitudes such as racial sympathy (Chudy 2021) and with a motivation to support politicians who will address issues affecting racial minorities. Recent research showing how low racial resentment is associated with more positive assessments of Black applicants in hiring decisions indicates the possibility that low racial resentment can translate to greater support for political candidates of color (Agadjanian et al. 2023).

However, other variables could account for both white Democrats' greater racial liberalism and their enthusiasm for representatives of color. Perhaps both result from changing party norms. Engelhardt (2021b) demonstrates that much of the shift in white Democrats' racial resentment has come in response to elite cues among those who identify most strongly with the party; perhaps expressing enthusiasm for politicians of color is increasingly perceived as a party norm as well. Another possibility is that both diminishing racial resentment and approval of politicians of color reflect increasing ideological liberalism, since racial resentment is associated with political conservatism (Carmines, Sniderman and Easter 2011) and politicians of color have long been stereotyped as more liberal (Lerman and Sadin 2016; Visalvanich 2017). Each of these possibilities carries different implications for the future trajectory of white Democrats' support for politicians of color, because each entails a different set of contingencies for this support: the continued racial liberalism of white Democratic voters, sustained party norms, or the perpetuation of perceptions, whether real or based in stereotype, that politicians of color are more liberal than white politicians.

1.2 Data and Methods

We merge pre-election CCES data with district-level data on MCs from the 110th Congress (elected 2006) to the 116th Congress (elected 2018) to evaluate how MC race is associated with approval ratings. We use CCES data from even-numbered years (election years). To account for a range of MC characteristics, we use Carnes's (2016) Congressional Leadership and Social Class (CLASS) Dataset, Daily Kos Comprehensive Congressional Guides for the 113th-116th Congresses and the Congressional Biographical Directory. We matched MC race from Carnes (2016) and Daily Kos data to the MCs in our dataset. For any MCs not included in these datasets, we coded race by hand, using membership lists for the Congressional Black and Hispanic Caucuses and politician web pages. Multi-racial MCs were coded as each racial group with which

they identify and also coded 1 for people of color. Consistent with the increasing racial diversity of the U.S. Congress (Schaeffer 2023), white CCES respondents in 2020 were about 15 percentage points more likely to have an MC of color than were white respondents in 2008. Appendix A1 presents additional descriptive statistics.

Our dependent variable is MC approval rating. The CCES asks, "Do you approve of the way each is doing their job... [Incumbent Representative's Name]," with responses that range from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve" on a five-point scale. We rescale responses from 0 to 1 so that regression coefficients represent the percentage point increase in approval per unit-change in the explanatory variable. Our main explanatory variable is MC race, coded 1 for person of color (POC) MCs and 0 for white MCs.[1]

If white Democrats' increasing racial liberalism extends to greater enthusiasm for representatives of color we should find an upward trend in relative approval of POC MCs between 2008 and 2020, and especially between 2014 and 2020, when past research (Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022) finds that racial attitudes shifted most rapidly. We estimate the following model:

$$Y_{ijt} = \alpha_j \times \text{MC Party}_{jt} + \delta_t + \sum_{t=110}^{116} \beta_t(\text{POC MC}_{jt} \times \delta_t) + \omega_1 X_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

where POC MC_{jt} is an indicator for whether an MC is a person of color. β_t can be interpreted as the estimated effect of a POC MC compared to a white MC on approval in each Congress. X_{jt} is a vector of controls for MC seniority (rescaled 0-1) and MC gender (0 for men, 1 for women).[2] $\alpha_j * \text{Party MC}_{jt}$ are *district* $\times$ *MC party* fixed effects. We include the district fixed effect to account for systematic differences between districts that elect POC MCs at any point during this period and those that do not. The MC party fixed effect restricts comparisons to white and POC MCs of the same party. This fixed effect ensures that differences are not driven by changes in the partisanship of the MC in a given district in addition to a change in the race of the MC. δ_t are *Congress* fixed effects to account for time-varying shocks. In effect, we only estimate effects in districts that change from being represented by a white Democrat to a POC Democrat, or from a white Republican to a POC Republican. Finally, ε_{ijt} is a random error term. We estimate this model separately for white Democratic and white Republican respondents.

1.3 Member Approval Over Time

We first replicate recent findings that white Democrats respond more positively to politicians of color than similar white politicians. Figure 1 plots results of this model for each year in our dataset. We estimate the model separately for white Democrats and white Republicans, including leaners.[3,4] In 2008 and 2010, consistent with Ansolabehere and Fraga (2016), we find that MCs of

[1] We perform our main analyses with "don't know," "never heard of this person," or skipped responses as 0.5, but results are robust to alternative coding schemes (see Appendix A2).

[2] We control for these variables because they are potentially time-varying characteristics of representatives that are relatively visible to constituents.

[3] Excluding leaners produces substantively identical results (Appendix A3).

[4] During this period, there were more Democratic than Republican MCs of color (Appendix A1). Consequently, our results over-represent Democratic constituents' approval of in-party MCs and Republican constituents' approval of out-party MCs. We expect this to depress estimates among Republicans, since they are more likely to disapprove of out-party representatives.

color received approval ratings that were significantly *lower* than white MCs' among their white Democratic constituents ($p < 0.01$). However, their approval ratings have since increased so that approval of POC MCs was significantly *higher* in 2018 and 2020 ($\beta_{2018} = 0.065, p < 0.01$; $\beta_{2020} = 0.072, p < 0.01$), even accounting for gender, seniority, party, and district-specific characteristics. White Republicans' relative approval of MCs of color has not moved in a consistent direction over this period.[5,6]

Figure 1.1: Effect of POC MC on MC Approval by Constituent Party & Year (White Respondents)



Note: We present estimates for the interactions between each even year and MC race (using Equation 1). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and models include CCES survey weights. Corresponding coefficients are provided in Appendix A4.

1.4 Mechanism: Racial Resentment

We now turn to investigating potential mechanisms behind this change. To assess the role of racial attitudes, we use two items in the CCES common content that measure racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders 1996): "The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors," and "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class." We combine these items into a scale ranging from 0 (low-

[5]Coding all MCs of color as a single group distinguishes between MCs who are and are not racially congruent with white constituents. In Appendix A5, we re-estimate Equation 1 for white Democrats comparing approval of white MCs to approval of Asian American, Hispanic, and Black MCs separately. All three display the same upward trend, with relative approval of all three groups significantly higher in 2020 than in 2008.

[6]Appendix A6 demonstrates that this shift is driven by high-knowledge constituents who could likely identify the race of the their MC. High knowledge is correlated with knowledge of MC race among the subset of respondents asked to identify the race of their MC in the CCES.

est resentment) to 1 (highest resentment).[7] There is less data for these analyses because these items were not included in 2008, and in 2016, they were not included in the common content but only in select modules (Agadjanian 2022). Appendix Figure A7.1 shows that racial resentment has declined among white Democratic CCES respondents while remaining fairly stable among white Republicans, as in other public opinion surveys (Engelhardt 2021b; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022). We apply survey weights supplied by the CCES designed to render these estimates representative of white Republicans and Democrats in general.

Table 1.1: MC Race, Racial Resentment, and MC Approval (White Democratic Respondents)

	MC approval	
	POC MC	Black MC
POC MC	0.131^{***} (0.023)	
POC MC x Racial Resentment	-0.257^{***} (0.027)	
Black MC		0.180^{***} (0.025)
Black MC x Resentment		-0.330^{***} (0.024)
Racial Resentment	0.113^{***} (0.015)	0.113^{***} (0.015)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y
Congressional session FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	20	7
N	52,109	48,220

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: CCES even years 2014-2020. Racial resentment is coded from 0 (low) to 1 (high). Models control for MC seniority and gender. All coefficients are presented in Appendix A8.

If the growing enthusiasm for POC MCs is part of a broader shift in white Democrats' racial attitudes, then we should find higher relative approval of POC MCs among their less-racially resentful constituents. In addition to analyzing the relationship between racial resentment and POC MC approval, we also estimate this relationship comparing only approval of Black relative to white MCs, since the racial resentment items specifically reference Black Americans and thus might correspond especially closely with approval of Black MCs. We estimate this relationship using data from 2014-2020, the years in which we find higher relative approval of POC MCs, with results presented in Table 1.1. We find a positive and strongly significant $(p < 0.001)$ relationship between POC/Black MC and relative approval, indicating that the lowest-resentment white Democratic constituents express much higher approval of their MC when they are a person of color. Further supporting this idea, the interaction between POC/Black MC and racial resentment is negative and significant $(p < 0.001)$. Racially resentful white Democratic constituents approve less highly of their MC when they are a person of color, especially when they are Black.

[7] Using racial resentment as our measure of outgroup attitudes likely underestimates the relationship between these attitudes and approval of POC MCs, since racial resentment measures attitudes specifically toward Black Americans, and we examine approval of all MCs of color (although, as we show, relative approval of POC MCs of different groups shifts in tandem). We rely on racial resentment because it is the only measure of racial attitudes that is used consistently in the CCES common content, which is a requirement for our TWFE estimation strategy.

These results demonstrate that different subgroups of white Democrats express greater enthusiasm for different MCs: corresponding with past experimental results (Agadjanian et al. 2023), the lowest-resentment constituents approve more highly of POC/Black MCs, and the highest-resentment constituents approve more highly of white MCs. In his analysis of 2010 and 2012 CCES data, Visalvanich suggests that "the bias that afflicts minority [Democratic candidates] is likely driven by the sheer number of those who hold negative racial attitudes" (2017, 636). In the intervening decade, racial attitudes have continued to structure white Democrats' approval of politicians on the basis of their race, but the distribution of those racial attitudes has changed to such an extent that bias no longer "afflicts" politicians of color, on balance.[8]

1.5 Alternative Mechanism: Party Norms

Of course, some other belief or attitude could explain both the shift in racial resentment and in relative approval of POC MCs. We investigate two plausible confounding variables: shifting party norms and ideological stereotyping of POC MCs.

Perhaps Democratic party norms have shifted in ways that influence approval of POC MCs. If stronger partisans are more motivated to conform to attitudes of other members of the party and, as hypothesized above, a group norm has developed around increasing POC representation, we would expect a growing approval premium for POC MCs among white respondents who identify as strong Democrats, but less among moderate partisans or leaners. Rather than sincere attitude shifts, the patterns we observe would be a result of the strongest partisans adhering to changing party norms.

To test the role of party norms, we use the seven-point measure of partisan identification on the CCES. Assuming that stronger identifiers are more motivated to conform to party norms, this measure provides a proxy for how much party norms are likely to matter to an individual. Table 1.2 replicates the analyses presented in Table 1.1, substituting the strength of respondents' Democratic party identification for racial resentment. We find a significant but substantively smaller interaction between MC race and Democratic identity strength relative to the interaction between MC race and racial resentment presented in Table 1.1. Column 1 indicates that the strongest partisans approved about 5 percentage points more highly of POC MCs than Democratic leaners did, and Column 2 indicates that the strongest partisans approved about 6 percentage points more highly of Black MCs than Democratic leaners did.

However, an over-time analysis of the relationship between partisan identity strength and relative approval of POC MCs reveals that these interaction effects are largely confined to past years. To visually present the relationship between partisan identification and relative approval of POC MCs over time, we re-estimate Equation 1 for white Democrats disaggregated by the strength of their partisan identification. Figure 2 presents the results. Respondents at all three levels of Democratic identification display higher approval for white MCs in 2008. Although strong Democrats lead the shift through the mid-2010s, consistent with Engelhardt's (2021b) argument that the liberalization of white Democrats' racial attitudes has been greatest among the most receptive to elite cues, by 2018, white Democrats approved more highly of POC MCs on average, regardless of

[8]In Appendix A8, we show that the relationship between racial resentment and approval of POC compared to white MCs is stable over time, ruling out the possibility that our results are a product of a strengthening relationship between racial resentment and relative approval rather than shifts in average racial resentment.

Table 1.2: Effects of POC/Black MC on MC Approval, Interacting MC Race with Strength of Democratic Identification (White Respondents)

	MC approval	
	POC MC	Black MC
POC MC	-0.057^{*} (0.027)	
POC MC x Party ID Strength	0.048^{***} (0.006)	
Black MC		-0.040 (0.036)
Black MC x Party ID Strength		0.060^{***} (0.008)
Party ID Strength	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y
Congressional session FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	20	7
N	74,710	69,299

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: CCES even years 2014-2020. Democratic ID strength is scaled from 0 (leaner) to 1 (strong Democrat). Models control for MC seniority and gender. All coefficients are presented in Appendix A8.

partisan identity strength. Although our data cannot directly speak to this possibility, it may be that the heightened salience of race during the Trump presidency, particularly in 2020 in the wake of George Floyd's murder, prompted even those Democrats who were less attuned to elite cues to update their racial attitudes. In any case, motivation to conform to party norms about supporting politicians of color, operationalized as the strength of partisan identification, does not seem to fully explain the change in white Democrats' relative approval of POC MCs in the most recent years in our dataset.

Figure 1.2: Effect of POC MC on Approval by Party Strength (White Democratic Respondents)



Note: We present estimates for the coefficient on the interactions between each even year and MC race. Separate models are shown for strong and weak Democrats and leaners. Other model specifications are identical to those presented in Figure 1. Corresponding coefficients are provided in Appendix A9.

1.6 Alternative Mechanism: Ideological Stereotyping

Ideological stereotyping could also be a confounding variable in the relationship between racial resentment and MC approval. We analyze the relationship between MC race and perceived ideological incongruence between MCs and their constituents over time. We operationalize ideological incongruence as the absolute distance between CCES respondents' self-placement on a 0-100 scale, where 0 is very liberal and 100 is very conservative, and respondents' placement of their representative on the same scale. We re-scale this difference from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the greatest incongruence and 0 indicating perfect congruence.[9]

Figure 3 plots the difference in means between POC and white MCs for perceived ideological incongruence among white Democratic respondents by MC party from 2010, the first year in which this measure is available, through 2020. Values above zero indicate greater incongruence with POC MCs ideologically (closer to white MCs) and those below the line indicate greater incongruence with white MCs (closer to POC MCs). Points close to zero suggest minimal difference between POC and white MCs in average perceived ideological incongruence. Here, Democratic MCs' race has virtually no relationship with the degree of ideological incongruence their white Democratic constituents perceive. There is a slight trend toward perceiving Republican POC MCs to be less incongruent, but the timing of this trend does not explain the greater approval of POC MCs overall in 2018, and white Democrats represented by Republican POC MCs compose a relatively small proportion of respondents (in 2020, Republican POC MCs accounted for less than 10% of all POC

[9]We rely on symbolic ideology rather than operational congruence because the CCES policy questions are inconsistent across years.

MCs). Changing perceptions of ideological congruence do not explain the upward trend in white Democrats' relative approval of POC MCs.

Figure 1.3: Difference in Means (between POC and White MCs) for Perceived Ideological Incongruence by MC Party (White Democratic Respondents)



Note: We present the difference in means (averages for POC and White MCs) for yearly perceived ideological incongruence for white Democratic respondents by MC party.

1.7 Conclusion

We demonstrate that white Democrats' leftward shift on racial issues is associated with a significant change in approval of representatives of color. Our results are not confined to the strongest Democratic identifiers — even Democratic leaners display this shift in approval — nor are they driven by white Democratic constituents perceiving greater ideological closeness with POC MCs over time.[10] Rather, we find that differences in racial resentment correspond with variation in approval of POC versus white MCs, and over-time shifts in racial resentment correspond with over-time shifts in relative approval.

Future research can address limitations of this work. For one, using ratings of current MCs limits our analysis to approval of incumbent politicians near the end of a given term (although they do account for seniority), but the experience of having a POC MC itself might affect white constituents' racial attitudes so that new candidates of color might not enjoy the same advantage that incumbents do. Chapter 2 of this dissertation builds on this work by investigating whether the temporal shift we document in approval of POC MCs parallels a shift in electoral support for POC candidates, as well as further specifying the nature of the link between racial resentment and positive reactions to politicians of color.

[10]In Appendix A10, we use MC educational attainment to further show that politician qualifications are likely not driving the relationship between MC race and approval.

This project contributes to literatures on both descriptive representation and white Democrats' leftward shift on race. The politician evaluations we observe do not align with expectations derived from most previous descriptive representation research, but correspond, in part, with changing attitudes about race. Doherty, Dowling and Miller (2022) find that Democratic party elites still perceive candidates of color to be less appealing to white Democratic voters, and our findings indicate that this conventional wisdom is out of date. While only part of the electoral picture, white Democrats' changing attitudes could contribute to the election of future legislative bodies that are more descriptively representative of the nation as a whole.

Transitional Matter

Chapter 1 analyzes approval ratings of voters' real-life Congressional representatives, an approach that maximizes external validity — these are the politicians for whom CES respondents have an opportunity to vote — but that brings with it some necessary limitations. One is that job approval, the key dependent variable in this analysis, is not the same thing as vote choice. White Democratic constituents might express approval of their representative, but nevertheless behave differently in the voting booth. Because the CCES surveys respondents in the context of the general election, any effect of race we might observe on intended vote choice using these data is overpowered by the fact that the incumbent representative's opponent is almost always of a different political party. Another limitation is that we are confined to studying only districts that have, at some point between 2008 and 2020, elected an MC of color. We can estimate changes in MC approval within these districts, but we cannot make inferences about how white voters in districts that *never* elect an MC of color would evaluate such a representative if given the chance. Additionally, although we account for theoretically important covariates including representatives' gender and seniority, racial identity is correlated with a myriad of social, economic, and political characteristics (Sen and Wasow 2016), meaning that MCs of color likely still differ from white MCs in systematic ways that could affect voters' assessments of them.

Chapter 2 shifts from studying voters' evaluations of real politicians to hypothetical ones to help to address these limitations. In this chapter, I leverage candidate choice experiments, which randomly assign characteristics (including race) to candidates for respondents to choose between. This approach allows me to observe (hypothetical) vote choice, to account for the effects of candidates' partisanship, and to measure the preferences of voters in Congressional districts that have not yet elected a representative of color. In this chapter, I argue that white Democrats' growing approval of MCs of color is mirrored in these voters' increasing tendency to select Black candidates over white opponents in survey experimental contexts over the past decade. Furthermore, the participants who are most likely to select Black candidates are those who believe that Black Americans face a great deal of discrimination, bolstering the argument that this enthusiasm for non-white representatives is motivated by a desire to address racial injustice.

Chapter 2

White Democrats' Growing Support for Black Politicians in the Era of the "Great Awokening"

There is a long history of Americans with privileged identities advocating for equality for disadvantaged groups, such as white Americans supporting abolition (Wood 2017) and male "suffragents" marching at the back of pro-suffrage parades (Kroeger 2017). Members of marginalized groups have led these political initiatives, but owing to their disproportionate social, political, and economic power, dominant group members' participation in these movements has contributed to key victories (Lee 2002). However, the motivations behind this phenomenon remain undertheorized (Radke et al. 2020). When does sympathy for marginalized groups motivate dominant group members to change their own political behavior, and why?

This paper addresses this question by examining the case of white Democrats' support for Black political candidates. Black Americans remain underrepresented in elective offices in the United States (Reflective Democracy Campaign 2021), meaning that they experience fewer of the symbolic and substantive benefits of descriptive representation (Butler and Broockman 2011; Mansbridge 1999). Majorities of both Republican and Democratic voters are white (Gramlich 2020), making the inclusion of white voters in electoral coalitions a critical element for Black candidates' success in many contests. It is therefore important to understand white voters' reactions to candidates of color and the conditions under which they vote for them.

This case also provides an opportunity to understand the impact of recent changes in American politics. Past research indicates that like voters in other racial groups, white voters tend to prefer candidates who share their racial identity (Gay 2002; Terkildsen 1993; Sigelman et al. 1995), if they have a racial preference at all. However, recent research calls this conventional wisdom into question (Weissman Forthcoming; Chapter 1 of this dissertation). Might white Democrats now be more willing, or even prefer, to vote for Black candidates? If so, what are the motivations behind this new preference? Additionally, is electing Black politicians a means to an end or an end in itself? I use several sources of data and empirical approaches to address these questions. Table 2.1 summarizes these questions and the corresponding analyses.

The first section of the paper demonstrates that such a shift in voter preferences has indeed occurred. I begin by showing that the number of Black Members of Congress has increased most rapidly in majority-white districts. Then, a meta-analysis of candidate choice experiments conducted from 1989 through 2023 illustrates how support for Black candidates has increased among white Democratic participants over time. In the second major section, I evaluate the role of several potential motivations for this support. I conducted several original studies designed to test different motivations. I also present findings from historical surveys tracing changes in variables

Table 2.1: Summary of analyses

Question	Answer	Test	Data source
Has white Democrats' support for Black candidates increased over time?			
1. Are more Black candidates getting elected in majority-white districts?	Yes.	A. Number of Black Members of Congress representing majority-white, majority-Black, and other majority-minority	EveryPolitician; Congressional Black Caucus; Daily Kos
2. Could increasing elite support explain Black candidates' growing success?	No.	A. Campaign receipts from PACs and committees to Black and white Democratic frontrunners in majority-white districts (presented in appendix)	Federal Election Commission
3. Do individual voters select Black candidates more often now than in the recent past?	Yes.	A. Re-analysis of 28 candidate choice survey experiments + 5 new experiments	Replication files; CCES Dataverse; Lucid studies 1-4; CA voter survey
		B. Conjoint experiment varying characteristics of Black and White Democratic primary candidates	Lucid studies 1-4; CA voter survey
What motivates white Democrats' support for Black candidates?			
1. Self-interest?	No.		
Virtue signaling		A. Relationship between self-monitoring tendency and support for Black candidates	Lucid 1-2
Using race to infer ideology		B. Time trend in white Democrats' ideological self-placement	GSS
		C. Marginal effect of Black (vs white) candidate given ideological incongruence on support	Lucid 2; CA voter survey
2. Partisanship?	No.	A. Time trend in the strength of white Democrats' partisan identity	GSS
Electoral strategy		B. Relationship between Black (vs white) candidate and perceptions of electoral competitiveness	Lucid 1-2
Party norms		C. Relationship between strength of Democratic partisan identity and support for Black candidates	Lucid 1-2
3. Improving whites' group image?	No.	A. Time trend in the strength of white Democrats' racial identification	ANES
		B. Relationship between white ID strength and support for Black candidates	Lucid 2
		C. Interaction between white ID strength and white ID valence in predicting support for Black candidate	Lucid 2
4. More positive racial attitudes?	No.	A. Time trend in affect towards Black Americans among white Democrats	ANES
		B. Relationship between racial affect and support for Black candidates	CA voter survey
5. Concern about racial injustice?	Yes.	A. Time trend in white Democrats' perceptions of racial discrimination and injustice	GSS
		B. Relationship between perceptions of discrimination and injustice and support for Black candidates	Lucid 1; CA voter survey
For white Democrats, is electing Black politicians a means to an end or an end in itself?			
1. Do voters prioritize racial identity or race-related policy stances?	Some of each.	A. Support for Black candidates conditional on voters' and both candidates' positions on a federal reparations policy	Lucid 1

Note:
All studies were approved exempt from review by UC Berkeley's IRB. Lucid samples were recruited using Lucid Marketplace and restricted to non-Hispanic whites who self-identify as Democratic partisans or leaners. Round 1 was collected in March 2022, N = 469. Round 2 was collected in April 2023, N = 1,852. Round 3 was collected in May 2023, N = 254. Round 4 was collected in June 2023, N = 153. All four rounds were conducted under IRB Protocol #2022-03-15203. The California voter sample was recruited via email in August 2023 using a random sample of the state voter file provided by Political Data Intelligence. Non-Hispanic white Democratic partisans and leaners N = 543; IRB Protocol #2023-03-16197.

associated with each potential motivation over time. I theoretically argue and empirically show that a sense of responsibility to address racial injustice is the primary motivation behind white Democrats' increasing support for Black politicians, and that these voters' support for these candidates is premised on their expectations about actions they will take to address this injustice. Finally, I investigate whether white Democrats prioritize candidates' racial identities over their stances on race-related issues. Presenting results from one of the original studies conducted for this paper, I find that for white Democrats who support reparations, candidates' positions on this policy shape vote choice to a greater extent than candidate race, although both are influential. Identity is not a substitute for policy; rather, candidate race carries both symbolic and substantive significance to white Democratic voters.

2.1 Vote Choice and the Two Sides of Racialization

The literature on race and representation supplies both reasons to be skeptical that white voters would prefer Black candidates and reasons to believe this type of support might be on the rise. Historically, most research has indicated that white voters in both parties either prefer co-ethnic representatives or are indifferent between white and non-white politicians. White participants in early experimental work were less likely to support a hypothetical Black candidate than a white candidate (McDermott 1998; Terkildsen 1993; although see Sigelman et al. 1995). Many contemporary observational studies found that real Black candidates and politicians are disadvantaged among white voters (Bullock and Dunn 2003; Gay 2002; Washington 2006), although others argued that candidate race did not systematically affect vote shares (Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Pettigrew and Alston 1988). More recent research suggests that Black Congressional candidates and representatives may still be disadvantaged among their white constituents, Democrat and Republican alike (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016; Visalvanich 2017).

However, white Americans' racial attitudes have recently polarized in ways that could lead partisans to react differently to candidates of color. Party sorting has increasingly aligned with racial attitudes (Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck 2019), and racial attitudes have become more liberal among white Democrats (Engelhardt 2021a; Hopkins and Washington 2020). These dual shifts mean that on average, white Democrats are now significantly more racially liberal than they were a decade ago (Sides, Tausanovitch, and Vavreck 2023), a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the "Great Awokening" (Yglesias 2019).

This racial liberalism has significant political implications. Tesler and Sears (2010) find that low racial resentment white voters supported candidate and then President Obama not in spite of, but in part because of, his racial identity, a tendency Agadjanian et al. (2023) replicate in an experimental setting. Schram and Fording (2021) argue that the Trump presidency further mobilized these voters, pointing to low-resentment white Americans' participation in a wider range of political actions in the lead-up to the 2018 election compared to 2016.

Given that racially liberal attitudes are associated with support for candidates of color among white voters and that white Democrats have become increasingly racially liberal, perhaps white Democratic voters have become more enthusiastic about non-white representatives. Recent research supports this intuition, finding greater approval of politicians of color among white Democratic constituents (Weissman Forthcoming; Chapter 1 of this dissertation) and greater electoral support for narrowly-nominated candidates of color than similar white candidates (White et al.,

Forthcoming). This project addresses two remaining questions: Do white Democratic voters now vote for non-white candidates at higher rates than in the past? If so, is this shift in voting behavior indeed part and parcel of the "Great Awokening" in white Democrats' racial attitudes?

2.2 Black Representatives, White Districts

If the "Awokening" has increased white voters' support for Black candidates, then we should see a growing number of majority-white districts electing Black representatives. To test this implication, I compiled data on the ethnicity of Members of Congress and on their districts between 2008 and 2022.[1] Figure 2.1 plots the number of Black MCs by year, disaggregated by whether the district is majority-Black, otherwise majority-minority, or majority-white. The number of majority-white districts represented by Black MCs more than quadrupled between 2008 and 2022. The percentage of majority-white districts represented by Black MCs increased from 1.3% in 2008 to 6.2% in 2022 ($SE = 1.4$, see Appendix Table B1.1), whereas the percentages of majority-Black and other majority-minority districts represented by Black MCs did not change significantly over this period.

These statistics do not by themselves establish that white Democratic voters' responses to Black candidates have changed over time. They cannot rule out alternative explanations such as decreasing turnout among white voters (Washington 2006) or changes in candidate supply (Juenke and Shah 2016) (although the decision to run is endogenous to expectations about how voters will respond). Moreover, even districts that remain majority white have become slightly *less* white over this period, with the average share of whites in majority-white districts decreasing from 81.1% in 2008 to 76.1% in 2022. However, even after controlling for the white population share in majority-white districts, the share of majority-white districts electing a Black representative in 2020 and 2022 was significantly higher than in 2008 (see Columns 4 and 5 of Appendix Table B1.1 for these estimates). Additionally, an analysis of candidates' fundraising receipts reported in Appendix Table B1.2 does suggest that this increase in the number of Black MCs from majority-white districts is not a purely top-down phenomenon: Black Democratic frontrunners in majority-white districts do not receive greater support from PACs and party committees than white candidates in similar races. Although many factors have undoubtedly influenced Black House candidates' growing success, these findings suggest that white Democrats' voting behavior could play a role.

[1] Data from 2008-2014 are compiled from EveryPolitician.org, with Black politicians coded using the records of the Congressional Black Caucus along with news coverage of Black Members of Congress who declined to join the CBC. Data from 2016-2022 are from Daily Kos.



Figure 2.1: Number of Black MCs in majority-Black and other majority-minority vs majority-white districts, 2008-2022.

2.3 Changes in Voting Behavior

To more finely test whether individual white Democratic voters have become more supportive of Black political candidates over time, this section presents analysis of data from candidate choice experiments in which white voters select between Black and white candidates. Although experiments lack the realism and stakes of actual elections, they allow for greater isolation of the relationship between race and vote choice by removing much of the potential for confounding variables inherent in real-world data.

I gathered replication datasets from 28 studies conducted by other scholars between 1989 and 2020. I located relevant studies by searching on Google Scholar and within CCES team modules. Included studies had to (1) include a binary measure of candidate choice, (2) manipulate candidate race, and (3) record participant race and partisanship. To enable direct comparison across studies, the data were further restricted to choices between one Black and one white candidate. Additional information about each of the studies is provided in Appendix Table B2.1. I also conducted five additional conjoint studies which meet these three criteria, which are described in greater detail in the next section.



Figure 2.2: Marginal means for Black vs. white candidates by partisanship. Higher values indicate Black candidate chosen more frequently. Studies are arranged in chronological order. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Estimates in gray boxes indicate original data collection for this paper. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B2.2.

Figure 2.2 presents the marginal mean[2] of candidate race (Black versus white) from each experiment, disaggregated by respondents' partisanship (Democrat and Republican) and race (Black and white).[3] The x-axis therefore represents the proportion of the time participants selected a Black candidate over a white candidate.

Results for Black Democratic (21 studies, $N = 3,702$) and white Republican participants (27 studies, $N = 11,996$) are relatively stable over time: Point estimates for Black Democrats are nearly all greater than 0.5 and often significantly so, whereas estimates for white Republicans are nearly all less than 0.5 (although the last study in the dataset that yielded a marginal mean significantly lower than 0.5 among white Republicans was conducted in 2016).

Results for white Democrats (33 studies, $N = 20,083$) are presented in the center panel. In 1989, white Democratic voters strongly favored a hypothetical white candidate over a Black candidate. By the early 2000s, this strong preference for co-racial candidates had attenuated, and white Democrats were largely indifferent to whether a candidate is Black or white through the mid-2010s. Between 2018 and 2020, six out of the twelve studies I reanalyzed yield a significant preference for Black candidates, and four out of the five studies I conducted find a preference of a similar magnitude.

This new pattern has gone largely (although not universally, *e.g.,* J. Green, Schaffner, and Luks (2022)) unremarked-upon, perhaps because most of these studies were not designed with disaggregating participants by both race and partisanship in mind. As a result, many are under-powered for my purposes. Figure 2.3 pools the results of these studies by year to provide more reliable estimates of these three race $\times$ party groups' tendency to select Black over white candidates over time.[4] Over these years, white Democrats became significantly more likely to select Black candidates in this type of study, diverging from Republicans' and approaching Black Democrats' level of support by 2020.[5]

[2]Because this analysis is restricted to Black versus white matchups, the marginal mean is equivalent to $\frac{AMCE}{2} + 0.5$.

[3]Analysis was restricted to participant race $\times$ party combinations with at least 30 choices. Due to small sample sizes in virtually all studies, Black Republicans are omitted. These results are also presented in Appendix Table B2.1.

[4]Specifically, this figure reports marginal means for years with enough white Democratic respondents to detect a marginal mean 0.05 greater or less than 0.5 with 80% power.

[5]Appendix Table B2.4 further demonstrates that the higher degree of support for Black candidates among white Democratic respondents post-2018 is robust to controlling for differences in experimental design. Appendix Table B2.5 presents pooled marginal means for all candidate attributes presented in the four Lucid studies I conducted, along with the differences in marginal means for these attributes between Black and white candidates. The latter indicates that white Democratic participants support Black candidates with a wide array of additional characteristics at higher rates than similar white candidates.



Figure 2.3: Marginal means for Black vs. white candidates by year. Higher values indicate Black candidate chosen more frequently. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B2.3.

2.4 What Motivates White Democrats to Support Black Candidates?

White Democrats' greater support for Black candidates marks a departure from existing literature on descriptive representation preferences and, as the growing number of Black House members representing majority-white districts suggests, likely has tangible political impacts. But what motivates this support? I have hypothesized that support for Black candidates is linked to white Democrats' liberalizing racial attitudes, but other shifts in the electorate could also explain it, and other factors could confound an apparent relationship between racial attitudes and vote choice. Although these different explanations are not mutually exclusive, they do carry different implications about the extent and durability of support for Black candidates.

I evaluate five types of motivations behind white Democrats' behavior: (1) improving one's personal image through virtue-signaling, (2) shared group identity, (3) improving the image of the advantaged ingroup, (4) increasingly positive feelings towards Black Americans in general, and (5) moral beliefs that concern neither group identities nor self-interest. I adjudicate between these explanations using several types of data, including time trends in attitudes corresponding each mo-

tivation, attitudes expressed by participants in the conjoint studies I conducted, assessments of the candidates that participants were asked to provide during the conjoint module, and the degree of congruence between participants and the policy and ideological views randomly assigned to candidates. The first three of these types of data do not involve experimental manipulation and so cannot be used to make strong claims about causality. Nevertheless, they can rule against potential causal mechanisms in cases where there is no significant relationship, and provide suggestive evidence for others. Table 2.2 outlines these tests and their respective data sources.

Table 2.2: Tests of theorized motivations for supporting Black candidates

Motivation type	Test	Expected direction of relationship	Actual direction of relationship	Expectation supported?	Data
1. Self-interest					
Virtue signaling	A. Relationship between self-monitoring tendency and support for Black candidates	+	none		Lucid 1 & 2
Using race to infer ideology	B. Time trend in white Democrats' ideological self-placement	convergence	convergence	Yes	GSS
	C. Marginal effect of Black (vs white) candidate given ideological incongruence on support	none	+	No	Lucid 2 & CA voter survey
2. Partisanship	A. Time trend in the strength of white Democrats' partisan identity	+	+	Yes	GSS
Electoral strategy	B. Relationship between Black (vs white) candidate and perceptions of electoral competitiveness	+	-	No	Lucid 1 & 2
Party norms	C. Relationship between strength of partisan identity and support for Black candidates	+	none	No	Lucid 1 & 2
3. Improving whites' group image	A. Time trend in the strength of white Democrats' racial identification	+	-	No	ANES
	B. Relationship between white ID strength and support for Black candidates	+	-	No	Lucid 2
	C. Interaction between white ID strength and white ID valence in predicting support for Black candidate	+	none	No	Lucid 2
4. More positive racial attitudes	A. Time trend in affect towards Black Americans among white Democrats	+	+	Yes	ANES
	B. Relationship between racial affect and support for Black candidates	+	none	No	CA voter survey
5. Concern about racial injustice	A. Time trend in white Democrats' perceptions of racial discrimination and injustice	+	+	Yes	GSS
	B. Relationship between perceptions of discrimination and injustice and support for Black candidates	+	+	Yes	Lucid 1 & CA voter survey

Data

The details of the five conjoint studies conducted for this paper specifically, first presented in the previous section, are relevant to understanding the tests presented in this one.[6] The first four studies were fielded on Lucid Marketplace between March 2022 and June 2023 on samples of white Democrats.[7][8] In all four studies, after consenting to participate and passing two attention checks, participants viewed the profiles of two hypothetical candidates, always one Black and one white candidate randomly assigned to be Candidates A and B, and asked, "Which candidate for Congress would you support in this Democratic Primary election?" Other candidate attributes, including age, occupation, political experience, and endorsement from an interest group, were randomly assigned with equal probability, with the stipulation that the two candidates could not be endorsed by the same interest group. Each participant completed this task just once. A total of 1,510 participants across three of the studies received information about candidates' ideological "self-placement," and the remaining 1,237 received information about the candidates' stances on three policy issues: the scope of publicly-funded healthcare, the regulation of fossil fuels, and reparations.[9] Additionally, the fourth study ($N = 153$) included information about the candidates' gender.

The fifth study surveyed a random sample of the California voter file in August 2023, yielding a sample of 543 white Democratic respondents.[10] As in the Lucid studies, both candidates in the conjoint task were Democrats, but rather than voting in a hypothetical primary, participants were simply asked "Which of these profiles would you prefer to have as your representative in Congress?", since non-Democratic voters would not be likely to vote in such a primary. In this study, participants received information about candidates' age, gender, occupation, political experience, endorsement from an interest group, and ideological self-placement.

The first two Lucid studies and the California voter study also included different measures of attitudes and opinions associated with each of the motivations tested in this section, which will be described in greater detail in the proceeding subsections.[11]

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[6] In addition to the details provided here, Appendix Figure and Table B3.1 provide an example conjoint table and the full wording of the questions in these studies, respectively.

[7] Lucid Marketplace is a widely-used platform for social science research. Demographic benchmarks of a sample of Lucid participants have been shown to correspond fairly well with results from the ANES, a nationally-representative survey (Coppock and McClellan 2019), and other prominent political surveys like the CCES/CES and others run via YouGov use Lucid as part of their sampling strategy (Enns and Rothschild 2022). I use best practices to ensure data quality when working with Lucid samples, including using attention checks and screening responses for straightlining (Aronow et al. 2020).

[8] All respondents were paid for their participation, with compensation ranging from \$0.75 to \$1.25 based on the length of the survey form.

[9] I used these policies because they are issues on which Democratic candidates could plausibly disagree. Participants were also divided on these issues: with regard to healthcare, fossil fuel regulation, and reparations, 66%, 39%, and 31% of participants in the first two rounds of data collection took the most-liberal positions, respectively, and 17%, 42%, and 43% took the most-conservative positions. The remaining participants took more moderate stances or said they were not sure.

[10] Participants were offered the opportunity to enter a drawing to win one of five \$200 Amazon gift cards upon completing the survey.

[11] Appendix Table B3.2 presents demographic characteristics of the Lucid studies and the California voter study alongside benchmarks from the 2020 ANES, a nationally-representative survey. Although not perfectly representative, both samples resemble the national population of white Democrats fairly well with respect to age, gender, and strength of partisan identity. Lucid respondents had relatively low household incomes relative to the ANES benchmark, and

1. Self-interest

White Democratic voters might support Black candidates in order to enhance their personal reputations or material self-interest. This section investigates the possibilities of virtue signaling and using race as a proxy for ideological congruence.

Virtue signaling

Perhaps white Democratic voters do not actually prefer Black candidates, but appear to do so on surveys because of perceived social pressure to appear non-racist. Particularly in the survey context, social desirability bias could distort the measurement of both racial attitudes and support for Black candidates, making it essential to account for this bias when describing the relationship between these variables. Individuals motivated by personal considerations are expected to limit their behavior to highly visible actions (Radke et al. 2020).

Scholars have argued that conjoint designs mitigate social pressure (Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022), in this instance because the many candidate characteristics provided in addition to race provide respondents with many plausible reasons not to support a Black candidate. Nevertheless, to further assess the influence of social pressure on my results, I follow the common practice of measuring participants' self-monitoring tendency. I use the three-item scale developed by Berinsky and Lavine (2011). If social desirability influences participants' responses, strong self-monitors, those who are particularly attuned to social norms and motivated to conform to them, should be especially likely to select Black candidates (Terkildsen 1993). In the first round of data collection, I also asked respondents to rate the importance of voting for a person of color in the abstract in order to test whether strong self-monitors were more supportive of the notion of voting for non-white candidates without the "plausible deniability" provided by the other characteristics in the conjoint table.

Figure 2.4 presents the relationship between self-monitoring and these two outcomes.[12] The first panel illustrates that the perceived pressure to signal racial liberalism is indeed strong: High self-monitors are significantly more likely to indicate that, in the abstract, they care deeply about supporting candidates of color. However, the second panel reveals that, as suggested by Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto (2022), the format of the conjoint study relieves this pressure for high self-monitors, and they are not especially likely to select the Black candidate (Test 1A). In fact, the significant preference for Black candidates in the full sample appears to be driven primarily by low self-monitors.

More subtly, white Democrats could be motivated to answer in a particular way in order to avoid thinking of *themselves* as racist. Despite contemporary liberalization in a range of racial attitudes, "aversive racism," that is, the conflictual coexistence of "denial of personal prejudice and underlying unconscious negative feelings toward and beliefs about [B]lacks" (Dovidio and Gaertner 2004, 4), could still influence white Democrats' political behavior. To test this possibility, analysis presented in Appendix Table B4.2 examines whether completing multiple rounds of a

both the Lucid and California samples had higher average educational attainment than the ANES benchmark. Appendix Table B3.3 presents marginal means for Black candidates with white opponents in the Lucid studies as a function of participants' demographic characteristics, demonstrating that support for Black candidates is not confined to a limited subset of demographic groups.

[12]The appendices of this paper include loess regression plots corresponding with each of the linear models presented in the main text.



Figure 2.4: Self-monitoring and support for Black candidates. Bivariate OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data in right panel are from Lucid study 1; data in left panel are from Lucid studies 1 and 2. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B4.1.

conjoint task yields diminishing support for Black candidates over the course of the study. The intuition here is that earlier rounds of the conjoint provide opportunities for participants to prove, whether to the researcher or to themselves, that they are willing to support a Black candidate, making them more comfortable with selecting a white candidate in later rounds. I find no evidence of this kind of "moral credentialing" (Monin and Miller 2001) leading to reduced support for Black candidates in recent studies.

Using race to infer ideology

It is also possible that support for Black candidates is genuine but not reflective of a first-order racial preference if voters are using race to infer politicians' ideological positions (Bowen and Clark 2014; Jones 2014; Lerman and Sadin 2016; McDermott 1998; Meyer and Boyle 2021; Schneider and Bos 2011; Sigelman et al. 1995; Visalvanich 2017). Historically, scholars have argued that this tendency disadvantages Black candidates, but in light of the continued ideological sorting of U.S. political parties (Levendusky 2009), perhaps this liability is now an asset.

Examining white Democrats' ideological self-placement over time (Test 1B) provides suggestive evidence for the ideological congruence argument. As shown in Figure 2.5, the average white Democrat in 2022 was more liberal than the average white Democrat fourteen years earlier (aver-



Figure 2.5: Time trend in white Democrats' ideological self-placement, 2008-2022. General Social Survey. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

age ideological self-placement moved 10.4 percentage points towards the liberal end of the scale, $SE = 1.1$, as reported in Appendix Table B5.1).

However, other emerging evidence weighs against this interpretation. Recent research suggests that white Democrats do not perceive themselves to be more ideologically congruent with non-white Members of Congress now than they did fifteen years ago, despite approving more highly of them relative to similar white Members of Congress (Chapter 1 of this dissertation). If this dynamic extends to evaluations of hypothetical candidates, then Black candidates should fare better than white candidates even when they are equally congruent with study participants.

To adjudicate between these competing expectations, I provided explicit information about candidates' ideological positions in the conjoint profiles in two studies, allowing me to control for differences in ideological congruence between the two candidates. 1,340 participants in the second Lucid study and all 543 white Democratic participants in the California voter study received this version of the conjoint table. As shown in Appendix Table B5.2, the marginal effect of a candidate being Black compared to white on vote choice, accounting for ideological incongruence, is almost 30 percentage points ($SE = 4.2$) (Test 1C). In other words, although all candidates are penalized for perceived incongruence (-50 percentage points, $SE = 3.1$), Black candidates are penalized significantly less.

Figure 2.6 visually presents this willingness to trade off ideological representation for racial



Figure 2.6: Relative ideological congruence and support for Black compared to white candidates. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Data are from Lucid study 2 and California voter survey. Results are reported in tabular form in Appendix Table B5.3.

identity by plotting the rates at which Black candidates were selected at each level of ideological congruence with the participant relative to their competitor.[13] When the candidates are randomly assigned the same ideology, and thus are equally congruent (or incongruent) with the participant, the Black candidate was selected significantly more often — 61% of the time ($SE = 2.0$). Voters faced with modest differences between the candidates in terms of ideological congruence traded off some degree of substantive representation to support Black candidates: Black candidates fared better than white candidates in a similar position by a margin of 17 percentage points for a one scale-point difference ($SE = 3.5$) and 11 percentage points for a two scale-point difference ($SE = 4.6$). When ideological differences between the two candidates were more stark, voters were less willing to make this tradeoff and the differences in the rates with which they selected Black and white candidates are no longer statistically significant.

Why do voters make this tradeoff? One possibility is that despite explicit information about candidates' ideologies, they nevertheless continue to stereotype Black candidates as relatively liberal. Given participants' preference for candidates whose liberalism was signaled either through their policy stances or their ideological placement (see the final rows of Appendix Table B2.5), in aggregate this stereotype would confer an advantage to Black candidates. Indeed, these partic-

[13]Candidates' ideologies ranged from "somewhat conservative" to "very liberal," to provide a plausible range of ideologies for Democratic politicians. The 72 participants who received this version of the conjoint task and rated themselves as "very conservative" or "conservative" are excluded from these analyses because it is impossible for them to be ideologically congruent with the candidates. Including these participants in the analysis, as is presented in the lower section of Appendix Table B5.3, does not substantively affect the results.

ipants still rated Black candidates as more liberal than white candidates even in the Lucid study in which ideological placement was also included as an attribute in the conjoint table ($\beta = 0.024$, $SE = 0.009$, see Appendix Table B5.4). However, this difference is substantively quite small. Additionally, a handful of respondents from the California voter sample, all of whom were asked to explain their candidate preference in writing, explicitly expressed their willingness to trade off ideological congruence to support a Black candidate. For example, one wrote, "I almost selected 'somewhat liberal' because we need more liberals in government. But I selected Profile B, because we need more [B]lack representation at every level." The proportion of participants who explained their decision-making in these terms is quite small, but is nevertheless noteworthy in the context of a survey in which those who wrote anything to explain their choice generally wrote just a sentence or two. In sum, ideological stereotyping does not fully account for white Democrats' preference for Black candidates.

2. Partisanship

Advantaged group political allyship could also be motivated by feelings of affinity with a superordinate group to which both the advantaged and disadvantaged groups belong (Radke et al. 2020). In the case of race and voting behavior in the United States, Democratic partisan identity is the shared identity that best fits this description, given the high rate of Democratic partisanship among Black voters (Frymer 2011). This section discusses two ways in which partisan considerations could boost support for Black candidates: electoral strategy and partisan norm-following. First, though, I take stock of the strength of white Democrats' identification with the party over time, as shown in Figure 2.7. Appendix Table B5.1 reports that the average strength of partisan identification among white Democrats did not increase significantly between 2008 and 2022 ($\beta = 0.024$ on a scale where 0 is "lean democrat", 0.5 is "mostly Democrat" and 1 is "strong Democrat," $SE = 0.021$); however, average identification strength declined from 2008 through 2014 and then increased significantly through 2022 ($\beta = 0.086$, $SE = 0.02$), and this recent increase coincides with the increase in support for Black candidates (Test 2A). As the politics of race have become even more salient within the Democratic party, it remains plausible that strong Democratic identification has become an even stronger predictor of racially liberal attitudes and behavior (Engelhardt 2021b).

Electoral strategy

Electoral strategy in primary elections represents one way in which partisan considerations could boost support for Black candidates. Some have argued that Black candidates are disadvantaged in primaries because voters perceive them to be less electable (Bateson 2020; Nelson 2021), but Stout (2020) points out that turnout among Black voters is an essential component to Democratic victories in many contests and posits that white Democratic voters may support candidates and policies they perceive Black voters to support as a means of promoting the party's competitiveness.

I measured perceptions of Black and white primary candidates' electoral competitiveness in the first two Lucid studies (Test 2B). Participants were asked to rate the candidates in the conjoint in terms of how well they expected them to perform in the general election, among swing voters, and among the Democratic base. If supporting Black candidates is a matter of electoral strategy, then



Figure 2.7: Time trend in the strength of white Democrats' partisan identification, 2008-2022. General Social Survey. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

they should be rated as more competitive in the general election and possibly as more appealing to swing voters, as well as being more appealing to the Democratic base. Contrary to this expectation, Table 2.3 reports that Black candidates were rated as *less* competitive in general elections and not especially appealing to swing voters, although they were rated as more appealing to Democratic voters. Overall, then, strategic partisan considerations do not appear to motivate support for Black candidates.[14][15]

[14]It is worth noting that this analysis cannot rule out the possibility that in some contexts, specifically, those in which mobilizing the Democratic base matters more than persuading swing voters for securing victory in a competitive general election, it could be strategic to support a Black primary candidate. To address this shortcoming, future work could investigate whether priming the importance of turning out the Democratic base is associated with greater support for Black candidates.

[15]In Appendix Table B6.1, I present a novel analysis of replication data from Manento and Testa (2022), a conjoint experiment about a hypothetical Democratic primary that varied the expected competitiveness of the general election. In this study, white Democratic voters selected Black candidates more often than white candidates across electoral contexts, but this difference is only statistically significant when the general election is expected to favor the Democratic nominee.

Table 2.3: Partisan considerations and support for Black candidates

	Dependent variable:					
	Candidate has a good chance in general election	Candidate will appeal to swing voters	Candidate will appeal to Democratic base	Black candidate selected		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Black candidate	−0.028***	−0.012	0.031***			
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)			
Mostly Democrat				−0.005		
				(0.028)		
Strong Democrat				0.044		
				(0.026)		
Biden FT					0.063	
					(0.052)	
Trump FT						−0.182**
						(0.056)
Constant	0.537***	0.496***	0.554***	0.541***	0.512***	0.581***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.041)	(0.013)
Sample	Lucid 1 + 2	Lucid 1 + 2	Lucid 1 + 2	Lucid 1 + 2	Lucid 2	Lucid 2
Observations	4,640	4,641	4,639	2,321	1,851	1,842
R^2	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.0003	0.003	0.001	0.0003	0.005

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
All variables scaled 0-1.
Standard errors for Models 1-3 clustered at respondent level.

Party norms

In another variant of the "shared partisan identity" explanation, support for Black candidates could also have less to do with voters' racial attitudes than with party norms. Voters have been shown to change their policy positions to conform to ideological norms (Groenendyk, Kimbrough, and Pickup 2021; Lenz 2013); in a racially polarized partisan environment, strong and politically-attentive partisans may be motivated to voting behavior in order to be "good" Democrats even if they have not fully internalized liberal racial attitudes. In this case, as in the case of electoral strategy discussed above, continued support for Black candidates would be contingent on external factors rather than on voters' own, more durable racial attitudes.

If motivation to conform to party norms explains support for Black candidates, then support should be greater among stronger partisans (Test 2C). However, Column 4 of Table 2.3 shows a non-significant difference in candidate support comparing moderate ($p = 0.858$) and strong Democrats ($p = 0.100$) to Democratic leaners. To assess affect towards the Democratic Party more finely, I also asked participants to rate President Biden on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, finding that this measure also does not account for Black candidate support. Warmth towards President Trump, on the other hand, is significantly negatively associated with support, implying a role for negative partisanship in explaining white Democrats' growing support for Black candidates. This

result is consistent with other research on white Democrats' reactions to Trump: Sirin, Valentino, and Villalobos (2021) find that Trump's campaign and election prompted white voters who did not support him to express higher levels of group empathy, and others have found that Trump's election led liberal white voters to identify less strongly as white (Dai et al. 2021; Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross 2021). However, given this causal relationship between racial attitudes and negative reactions to Trump, negative partisanship is not a potential confounder of the relationship between these attitudes and support for Black candidates, but rather a link in the same causal chain.

3. Improving the image of white Americans

Another set of explanations centers on the group image of whites. The moral reputation of one's social groups is linked with individual self-esteem (Branscombe et al. 1999), and "as a dominant identity, whiteness carries some hefty baggage" (Jardina 2019, 57). Engaging in political behavior that supports the interests of Black Americans is one strategy white racial liberals can use to lighten this metaphorical load (Knowles et al. 2014). However, advantaged group members with this motivation might prioritize actions that serve to advance the public status of their group rather than those that most benefit the disadvantaged outgroup, limiting the potential for outgroup-helping behavior.

Examining over-time shifts in the strength of white Democrats' racial identity (Test 3A), as shown in Figure 2.8 and Appendix Table B7.1, immediately casts this explanation into question. The findings reproduce the result that liberal white Americans have recently distanced themselves from their whiteness by expressing that being white is less important to their identity (Dai et al. 2021; Jardina, Kalmoe, and Gross 2021). If strong white identification motivated support for Black candidates, we should expect to see identification increase, not decrease.

However, scholars have argued that white identity may take multiple "forms" (Cole 2022; Croll 2007; Goren and Plaut 2012; Schildkraut 2019), with some strong identifiers espousing a "defensive" form of white identity associated with ingroup pride and anti-outgroup bias, and others espousing a "progressive" form associated with recognition of white privilege and acceptance of diversity (Croll 2007, 631). Perhaps the "form" of Democrats' white identity has shifted consequentially even as the average strength of this identity has diminished. To test this possibility, I use Cole's (2022) white identity consciousness and white identity valence scales, presented in their entirety in Appendix Table B7.2. White identity consciousness here refers to the centrality of whiteness in participants' personal and political lives, whereas white identity valence refers to the degree to which participants perceive whiteness as a source of advantage or disadvantage.

The first two panels of Figure 2.9 present bivariate relationships of white identity consciousness and valence with support for Black candidates. Consistent with related research (Petrow, Transue, and Vercellotti 2018), white identity consciousness is negatively associated with support for Black candidates (Test 3B). However, contrary to the expected outcome of Test 3C, although positive valence is associated with support for Black candidates, the relationship between consciousness and vote choice is more powerful: The rightmost panel disaggregates the relationship between valence and support for Black candidates by above- and below-median valence,[16] showing that even

[16]The median valence score in the sample was 0.68 on a 0-1 scale, indicating that most respondents endorse the idea that whiteness is a source of advantage. To test whether those who are especially supportive of this notion possess a different white identity politics, I split the data by above- and below-median valence scores rather than at the midpoint.



Figure 2.8: Time trend in white Democrats' responses to the question "How important is being white to your identity?", 2012-2020. American National Election Study. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

among participants who view whiteness as a source of great advantage, white identity consciousness is negatively associated with support for Black candidates. In other words, the tendency to select Black candidates is concentrated among weaker white identifiers, not stronger ones, regardless of the "form" of this identification, ruling against the notion that support for Black candidates could be a form of collective action to improve the image of whites as a salient ingroup.



Figure 2.9: Interactions between white ID consciousness and valence/image shame. Bivariate OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from Lucid study 2. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B7.3.

4. More positive racial attitudes

If supporting Black candidates does not serve a personal or ingroup interest, perhaps white Democrats' primary motivation is, simply put, that they like Black Americans more than they used to. Scholars have already noted the connection between diminishing racial resentment and support for Black politicians (Agadjanian et al. 2023; Tesler and Sears 2010; Tesler 2012); perhaps it is the affective component of the racial resentment scale (Kinder and Sears 1981) that explains this association.

Figure 2.10 plots how white Democrats' affect towards Black Americans has shifted between 2008 and 2020 (Test 4A). White Democrats' feeling thermometer ratings of Black Americans have significantly warmed over this period, from a low of 68 degrees on a 0-100 scale in 2012 to a high of 78.6 degrees in 2020, shifting them closer to Black Democrats than white Republicans (see Appendix Table B8.1).

The next step is to assess whether racial affect predicts support for Black candidates (Test 4B). I measured affect in two ways in the California voter sample: the standard feeling thermometer item and fear towards members of other racial groups (DeSante and Smith 2020). Figure 2.11



Figure 2.10: Racial affect by respondent race and partisanship, 2008-2020. American National Election Study. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

presents the relationships between each of these variables and selecting a Black candidate in the conjoint task. Neither is significantly associated with support for Black candidates. Scores on both of these items are, as expected, skewed towards the positive end of the scale, but even the 116 participants who rated their warmth towards Blacks at 50 degrees or cooler selected a Black candidate 56% of the time, and the 69 who "somewhat" or "strongly" agreed that they are fearful of people of other races selected a Black candidate 66% of the time. Consequently, the results of the linear regressions presented in Figure 2.11, although in the expected directions, are not statistically significant. If these more negative feelings do not preclude high levels of support for Black candidates, it seems unlikely that the modest positive shifts in white Democrats' racial affect over the last fifteen years explain the recent increase in this support.[17]

[17]In Appendix Figure B8.3, I present additional analyses demonstrating that support for Black candidates is not significantly associated with either the proportion Black or the proportion POC of a Congressional district in the California voter sample. In other words, enthusiasm for Black candidates is no greater among white Californians who select into racially diverse communities than those who live in more homogeneous ones.



Figure 2.11: Racial affect and support for Black candidates. Bivariate OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Points for Black feeling thermometer plot are 5 percentage point bins. Data are from the California voter survey. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B8.2.

5. Concern about racial injustice

Finally, support for Black candidates could reflect a moral motivation to address racial injustice. Moral values have been identified as a motivator for prejudice suppression (Monteith and Walters 1998) and support for the civil rights movement (Lee 2002; Wasow 2020); intuitively, moral considerations could also motivate the present shift in white Democrats' voting behavior. Nevertheless, a moral motivation for political action is no simple thing: an individual must perceive an injustice, feel a sense of responsibility to take action to remedy it, and identify politics as an appropriate site for such action. To investigate these three components, Figure 2.12 and Appendix Table B9.1 demonstrate the significant shift in white Democrats' perceptions of the racial status quo between 2008 and 2022 (Test 5A). White Democrats today more closely resemble Black Democrats than white Republicans in terms of the amount of racial inequality they attribute to discrimination, the degree to which they reject the notion of denying Blacks "special favors" (one of the four items on the racial resentment scale), and their belief that the government is responsible for improving Black Americans' standard of living, as measured on the General Social Survey. These three attitudes correspond with the three steps required to motivate action against a perceived moral wrong: white Democrats increasingly see inequality as the result of injustice, support actions like



Figure 2.12: Perceptions of racial injustice by respondent race and partisanship, 2008-2022. General Social Survey. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

paying reparations to make amends, and view politics as the appropriate sphere in which to take action. On each of these three items, the average response among white Democrats has not only shifted, but moved from one half of the scale to the other during the last decade.

To examine the relationships between these attitudes and support for Black candidates (Test 5B), I use variables collected in the first round of data collection on Lucid Marketplace: the amount of anti-Black discrimination respondents perceive, racial resentment,[18] and support for a federal reparations policy. The bivariate relationships between each of these variables and support for Black candidates in the conjoint experiment are depicted in Figure 2.13. All three of these variables are significantly associated with support for Black candidates in the expected directions.

Taken together, these findings suggest that white Democratic voters do so because view increasing the representation of Black Americans in elected office as a means of addressing the racial injustices of which they as a group are increasingly cognizant. Further supporting this interpretation, 52 participants in the California sample, 15% of those who selected a Black candidate and a vast majority of those who mentioned race in their open-ended explanations of their choice, in-

[18]Racial resentment is conceptualized as a "blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic" (Kinder and Sears 1981, 416). I argue that it is best placed in this section given the null results for the two more squarely affective measures presented in the preceding section and the case made by Kam and Burge (2018) that the scale is best understood as a measure of structural versus individual attributions for economic and racial disparities.



Figure 2.13: Perceptions of racial injustice and support for Black candidates. Bivariate OLS regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from Lucid study 1. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B9.2.

dicated that they were motivated at least in part by wanting to address Black underrepresentation. These results stand in contrast to the null findings when examining intergroup affect alone, underscoring the distinctiveness of moral motivations from purely affective ones. White Democrats' warming feelings towards Black Americans are not sufficient to account for their support for Black candidates; a conscious recognition of racial injustice appears to be a necessary condition for this outgroup preference.

Discussion

Table 2.2 summarizes the results of the tests presented in this section. Only the implications of the injustice-focused explanation were completely borne out by these tests: perceptions of racial injustice explains support for Black candidates better than Democratic partisan identification, white racial group identification, self-monitoring, perceptions of ideological congruence, or even positive affect towards Black Americans.

Even the cross-sectional tests with results in the expected direction that were not initially categorized as tests of the injustice motivation hint at a moral underpinning to partisan attitudes: Trump is highly symbolic of the racial politics of the Republican party. Another hint at importance

of justice-related reasoning in this section is the positive and significant relationship between recognizing white privilege and supporting Black candidates presented in the section on white ingroup identity, since perceiving racial inequity is necessary — although not sufficient (Lowery, Knowles, and Unzueta 2007) — for perceiving racial injustice.

The ideal test of moral motivations would manipulate perceptions of the fairness of the racial status quo, but perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the baseline salience of racial injustice, especially among Democratic partisans as illustrated above, designing such a manipulation is difficult in practice. Future work should continue to explore ways to increase white Americans' awareness of racial inequities, perhaps in collaboration with practitioners. Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence presented here, in the form of both time trends and cross-sectional analyses, weighs against alternative explanations and in favor of moral beliefs underpinning white Democrats' increasing positivity towards Black candidates.

2.5 Is Identity a Substitute for Policy?

I have argued that white Democrats have come to support Black political candidates more often in recent years as a result of growing awareness of ongoing racial injustice. But is electing a Black politician a means to an end or an end in itself for these voters? Is the symbolic presence of a Black officeholder their ultimate goal, or do they support Black candidates because they hope they will take action on specific issues once elected? It is important to answer this question because although descriptive representation carries both concrete and symbolic benefits for historically marginalized groups, it is by no means a substitute for policy interventions to address ongoing disparities. In the most extreme case, white voters could view the passive presence of Black politicians in office as preferable to active legislating if these voters' underlying motivation is more focused on assuaging feelings of guilt over racial disparities than on improving material outcomes for Black Americans (Chudy, Piston, and Shipper 2019; Clemons 2022). Put simply, is candidate race a substitute for or a complement to racially progressive policy positions?

Figure 2.14 plots support for Black and white candidates disaggregated by each candidate's stance on reparations — a policy that a large majority of Black Americans supports (Blazina and Cox 2022) — and by study participants' own stance on the policy. The upper panels display results for participants who supported or said they were not sure about reparations.[19] The first two panels indicate that although Black candidates fare significantly better than white candidates when the two candidates take different stances on this policy, indicating some willingness to sacrifice reparations policy to support Black candidates, participants still tended to prioritize policy over identity — when any candidate opposed reparations and their opponent supported the policy, these participants selected them less than 50% of the time, and when any candidate supported reparations and the opponent did not, they were selected more than 50% of the time. These results suggest that support for Black candidates reflects a broader commitment to racial justice among white Democratic voters. A majority of survey respondents who were at least open to the idea of a federal reparations program prioritized a liberal race-related policy over descriptive representation of Black Americans.

[19] I combine these two groups because they are about equally supportive of Black candidates (62% and 60% selected the Black candidate, respectively, a difference that is not statistically significant), and because the results of these analyses for these groups are substantively identical.

Also notably, the estimates for Black candidates in the middle two panels in the upper row are not significantly different from each other ($p = 0.622$), meaning that conditional on the white candidate's opposition to reparations, the Black candidates' stance on this policy did not matter to these participants. This suggests that voters who would like to see reparations enacted view Black descriptive representation as a "next best thing" if such a policy is completely off the table, perhaps because, as past research finds, they still view Black candidates as more likely to promote racial equity in other ways (Sigelman et al. 1995). As one participant in the California voter sample explained, "They are [both] somewhat conservative. But at least having a [B]lack man, I hope he would be more responsive/sympathetic/advocate for issues affecting [B]lack people... That hope is doing a lot of work." Black candidates' advantage disappears when both candidates support reparations, as shown in the rightmost top panel. This result further supports the interpretation that the election of Black candidates is primarily a means to a policy end for white Democratic voters; in the presence of a strong signal about the white candidates' racial liberalism, candidates' race factors significantly less into voters' decision making.

The lower panels in Figure 2.14 show that Black candidates are not systematically disadvantaged among those who oppose reparations, an important finding in itself. When the candidates' stances differ, these participants show a preference in the direction that is consistent with their policy preference (although the preference is larger and only statistically significant when the congruent candidate is white), and when the two candidates' stances are identical, there is not a significant racial preference in either direction.



Figure 2.14: Support for candidates based on candidates' race and candidates' and participants' stances on reparations. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Data are from Lucid studies 1 and 2. Results are presented in tabular form in Appendix Table B10.1.

2.6 Conclusion

This paper documents a shift in an electorally consequential subgroup of white Americans' political choices: Democratic voters have become increasingly willing to support Black political candidates, to the extent that they now select Black candidates more often than comparable white candidates. This shift likely helps to explain the growing number of Black Members of Congress who represent majority-white districts. This preference is not an artifact of social desirability pressure, nor is it motivated by electoral strategy or fully accounted for by inferences about candidates' ideological positions. Nor is support for Black candidates primarily motivated by Democratic group norms, a desire to improve the image of whites as a group, or even warming affect towards Black Americans. Rather, support for Black candidates is best predicted by white Democrats' perceptions of racial injustice and their support for political remedies. Racial identity is not a substitute for policy for these voters: on average, participants prioritized candidates' stances on reparations over their racial identities.

A central element of this project is the exploration of mechanisms behind a novel descriptive

result. This exploration is necessarily preliminary: political scientists have long noted the difficulty of identifying how causal effects, like that of race on vote choice, are transmitted (D. P. Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010; Imai et al. 2011), and D. P. Green, Ha, and Bullock (2010) argue that such identification can only be achieved through a sustained program of experimental study. This paper contributes to this difficult task by ruling out theoretically plausible mechanisms, demonstrating the lack of even a descriptive relationship between variables associated with these potential mechanisms and support for Black candidates. Future work should pursue experimental tests of the explanation that has best withstood these initial tests: perceptions of racial injustice.

This research contributes to the intergroup attitudes and voting behavior literature by linking changing attitudes to changing behavior, showing that the "Great Awokening" extends beyond attitudinal measures to candidate selection. The full extent and limitations of the "Awokening's" behavioral implications remain to be explored. Future research should also examine whether these patterns of behavior and motivation can help to explain voters' preferences with regard to other identities, such as gender, sexuality, class, and immigration status. The origins of perceptions of racial injustice and sources of variation across individuals should also be investigated further (Mo and Conn 2018).

This project also carries an important implication for practitioners: white voters no longer appear to penalize Black candidates on the basis of their race, and among white Democrats, these candidates may even have an advantage. The conventional wisdom that motivates ongoing strategic discrimination on the part of party elites, as documented by Doherty, Dowling, and Miller (2022) and suggested by the campaign funding results presented in the appendix of this paper, no longer reflects voters' preferences. These findings may be useful for crafting effective campaign appeals: Black candidates need not deemphasize racial justice in their campaigns to appeal to white Democratic voters; rather, this approach can complement an emphasis on shared values and strategic considerations.

The equitable representation of minority groups constitutes a central challenge for majoritarian political systems, especially in contexts of existing, deeply-rooted group injustice and inequality. Resolving this challenge often requires enlisting the political support of members of the dominant or advantaged group. By examining cases in which this under-theorized pattern of behavior has occurred, we can better understand the conditions under which it is likely to take place and the motivations dominant group members have when they mobilize in favor of marginalized groups. This project demonstrates the power of beliefs about injustice to shape dominant group members' political behavior over and above self-interest and beyond the group hierarchy.

Transitional Matter

Together, Chapters 1 and 2 strive to isolate the effect of politician race on evaluations and support from white Democratic voters. However, candidates possess multiple identities over which voters have preferences. In particular, a rich literature points to how gender and race intersect to affect the electoral fortunes of Black women who run for office (e.g., Gershon and Monforti 2019; Scola 2013; Smooth 2006). In addition, Weissman (Forthcoming) shows that in the same way that white Democrats have come to approve more highly of MCs of color than of similar white MCs, Democratic men have come to approve more highly of women MCs than of similar men MCs. How, then, do white Democratic voters — men and women — navigate voting decisions when both the race and the gender of the candidates under consideration vary? Chapter 3 investigates how candidate race functions to structure vote choice in such contests, which are increasingly common as the Democratic party in government becomes more diverse.

Chapter 3

The Intersectional Identity Politics of White Democrats' Voting Behavior

The U.S. House of Representatives has become markedly more diverse in terms of racial and gender representation in recent years. Most of these gains have occurred within the Congressional Democratic Caucus, which has shifted from 22% to 43% women and from 25% to 45% people of color between 2008 and 2022. (Over the same period, the Republican Caucus has shifted from 10% to 15% women and from 3% to 6% POC.) Democratic women of color have made particularly large gains, increasing their share of the CDC from 7% in 2008 to 21% in 2022, compared to men of color's increase from 18% to 24% and white women's increase from 15% to 22%. Perhaps most strikingly, Black women Representatives have virtually closed the gender gap in the Congressional Black Caucus: in 2022, there were 27 Black women in the House and 26 Black men.[1] No other group has closed this gap.

Interestingly, these gains in Black women's descriptive representation have come disproportionately from the election of Black Congresswomen in majority-white districts, as shown in Figure 3.1. Black Congressmen from majority-Black districts outnumbered Black Congresswomen more than three to one (11:3). In other majority-minority districts, however, there are exactly the same number of Black Congresswomen and Congressmen. And in majority-white districts, Black Congresswomen outnumber Black Congressmen to nearly the same ratio as men outnumber women in majority-Black districts (13:4). Black Members of Congress representing majority-white districts are significantly more likely to be women than Black MCs representing majority-Black districts in 2022 (76% compared to 21%, $SE = 15.6$ percentage points, $p = 0.001$). The greater seniority of Black men who represent majority-Black districts seems to account for a great deal of their continued greater representation in majority-Black districts[2], but even among Democratic MCs elected in 2018 (the "year of the woman") and later, there are four times as many Democratic Black Con-

[1] Senator Raphael Warnock and non-voting Delegates Eleanor Holmes Norton and Stacey Plaskett round out the CBC, bringing the total numbers to 29 women and 27 men.

[2] The median Black MC from a majority-Black district was first elected in 2011, a period of relatively great gender disparities across MC racial identities and types of districts, whereas the median Black MC from a majority-white district was first elected in 2018, a period that saw many more women elected to the House overall. (Kweisi Mfume, D-MD 7th District, first served in the House 1987-1996 and left to become president and CEO of the NAACP. He returned to the seat in 2020. His seniority is coded using the year of his first election to the House because this is the year during which voters began building familiarity with him as their Congressional representative. Coding seniority beginning with his current tenure in the House increases the median year of election for Black MCs in majority-Black districts to 2012.) Given the significant advantage of running as an incumbent in Congressional elections and the stability lent by the solidly Democratic constituencies in majority-Black districts in this sample (77% compared to 64% median Democratic vote share in majority-white districts with Black MCs), Black men's greater representation in majority-Black districts appears to be, at least in part, a holdover from an era in which all women candidates faced



Figure 3.1: Counts of Democratic Black women and men Members of Congress by district racial demographics, 2008-2022.

gresswomen as Black Congressmen in majority-white districts (8 to 2), whereas Democratic white Congresswomen outnumber white Congressmen only 24 to 21.

Recent research argues that dominant-group Democratic voters (whites and men) have come to prefer marginalized-group representatives (Black Americans and women) (Weissman Forthcoming), and the increase in the number of Black and women Democratic Members of Congress parallels these developing preferences. But the remarkable gender gap among Black Members of Congress serving in majority-white districts raises a further question: how do white Democratic voters navigate voting decisions when they must take intersecting racial and gender identities into account? Although Black and white Democratic men and women appear to share the same non-intersectional preferences, might they navigate tradeoffs between their preferred racial and gender identities differently in ways that could contribute to the reversed gender gap among Black Members of Congress in majority-white districts? This paper investigates whether white Democrats' voting behavior might contribute to this surprising pattern.

The paper proceeds with a discussion of the significance of descriptive representation in terms

steeper disadvantages.

of both race and gender. Little work in this area considers the interaction, or intersection, of these two forms of identity in shaping voters' preferences about who should represent them. Nevertheless, based on the extensive existing research on attitudes towards both politicians of color and women politicians, as well as a burgeoning literature on dominant-group voters' support for Black women candidates, I develop hypotheses about how this intersection might influence voting behavior and test them in two studies. The first, a meta-analysis of conjoint experiments comprising nearly 15,000 pairwise choices between candidates with different racial and gender identities, reveals that, consistent with non-intersectional findings that white Democratic voters prefer Black and women representatives to white and men representatives. I expand on past research by demonstrating that this set of preferences exists for both white women and white men. However, white Democratic men and women's voting behavior differs when they must select between Black men and white women candidates: white men select Black men more often, whereas white women prefer white women. White women's preference for white women in these contests, combined with white men and women's preference for Black women over Black men in head-to-head contests, contribute to significantly higher rates of success for Black women candidates than for Black men among white Democratic voters. Existing literature has called attention to the unique advantages Black women candidates have in being able to appeal to both white women and people of color, but less attention has been paid to the difficulties Black men may face when running in majority-white districts: despite white Democrats' growing enthusiasm for Black candidates overall, Black men face an uphill climb when they face women primary opponents. Both white Democrats' enthusiasm for Black women candidates and their tendency to prioritize voting for women over voting for Black men may (in tandem with institutional factors) help to explain the reversed gender gap among Black representatives of majority-white districts.

The second study, an original conjoint experiment, seeks to understand why white Democrats make the decisions they do in these contests.[3] As Democratic primary fields become more diverse,[4] identifying the mechanisms behind dominant-group Democrats' preferences across multiple identities will be increasingly important to understanding the dynamics of candidate emergence and primary election outcomes. I examine whether these voters' decisions are explained by differences in the levels of discrimination they perceive against Black Americans and women, different stereotypes about the characteristics of candidates with different racial and gender identities, and perceptions of candidates' priorities. I find few gender differences in perceptions of relative discrimination and ratings of candidates' representativeness and leadership ability. However, providing an explicit cue that Black men candidates will prioritize women's issues reverses white women's preferences in contests between Black men and white women. Providing a cue that a white candidate will prioritize issues that affect people of color has no such effect on support for Black candidates. Taken together, these findings suggest that white Democrats' preference for Black candidates is primarily symbolic in nature, whereas white women's preference for women candidates may be more tightly tied to expectations about candidates' policy priorities.

[3]Hypotheses and tests were preregistered. The pre-analysis plan can be found at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/9D5MB. All preregistered tests are provided in Appendix C3.

[4]In 18 of 39 competitive Democratic Congressional primaries in 2024, 18 — nearly half — include at least one white woman and one man of color.

3.1 Background

Descriptive representation — that is, a representative's sharing identifying characteristics such as race or gender with their constituent (Pitkin 1972) — matters. Mansbridge (1999) theorizes that descriptive representation yields both substantive and symbolic benefits, particularly for marginalized groups. Substantively, shared identity between representative and constituent facilitates communication, particularly when citizen-state relations are burdened by historical oppression, as well as policy innovation on behalf of the marginalized group. Symbolically, the presence of marginalized-group legislators in the halls of power affects public opinion among marginalized- and dominant-group members. For the former, it can increase perceptions of political legitimacy, and for the latter, it can send a message about marginalized-group members' ability to lead.

Since Mansbridge's agenda-defining article, many scholars have empirically demonstrated descriptive representation's significance for marginalized groups. Descriptive representation is associated with greater feelings of substantive representation among Black Americans and, to a lesser extent, women. Black voters perceive Black candidates as more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities (Harris 2012; McDermott 1998; Williams 2017) and as more equipped to address racial inequality (Weaver 2012). They rate Black Members of Congress as more representative of themselves (English, Pearson, and Strolovitch 2019). There is a weaker relationship between descriptive and perceived substantive representation for women (English, Pearson, and Strolovitch 2019), but the election of women representatives is associated with "women-friendly" policies (Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009). Perhaps because of the expectation of greater responsiveness, Black constituents feel greater comfort contacting Black Congressional representatives (Gay 2002); similarly, in a study of Dutch voters, women were more likely to contact women MPs (Zonneveld 2021). Marginalized-group members' approval of their representatives is also positively correlated with descriptive representation (Ansolabehere and Fraga 2016; Costa and Schaffner 2018; Fowler, Merolla, and Sellers 2014; Lawless 2004; Tate 2001, 2003; Tate and Harsh 2005).

In addition to affecting the relationship between constituents and representatives, descriptive representation has broader effects on perceptions of political legitimacy among members of marginalized groups. Research on Black voters represented by Black politicians finds significant and positive effects on global assessments of politics, including beliefs about government legitimacy (Fowler, Merolla, and Sellers 2014), political efficacy (Gleason and Stout 2014; Stout, Tate, and Wilson 2021; West 2017), and political knowledge (Wolak and Juenke 2021). Research on women voters represented by women politicians is more mixed, with some finding null effects of descriptive representation on legitimacy, efficacy, and engagement (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Wolak 2015, 2020), but other work finding that the presence of women candidates increases political interest, engagement, and efficacy among women voters (Atkeson and Carrillo 2007; Fridkin and Kenney 2014; Jones 2014; Reingold and Harrell 2010).

Researchers have also found that whites and men value descriptive representation. Historically, white voters have preferred coethnic representatives (Block Jr 2011; Gay 2002; Sigelman et al. 1995; Terkildsen 1993; Visalvanich 2017). Research on men's preferences about the gender of their representatives yields more mixed results; although scholars have long insisted that "when women run, women win" (Lawless and Pearson 2008) and a meta-analysis of conjoint experiments recently found that both women and men participants prefer women candidates to men in aggregate (Schwarz and Coppock 2022), other research indicates that women candidates never-

theless continue to face voter bias (Anzia and Berry 2011; Mo 2015; Teele, Kalla, and Rosenbluth 2018). In addition, English, Pearson, and Strolovitch (2019) find that men perceive Congressmen as more representative of themselves than Congresswomen. In Mansbridge's (1999) account, dominant groups' collective preference for descriptive representation is self-reinforcing, since this preference creates an obstacle for marginalized-group politicians serve as exemplars challenging dominant-group beliefs about their group.

However, recent research indicates that this ingroup preference among dominant groups has shifted, particularly among Democratic partisans. In an analysis of over-time trends in Congressional representative approval, Weissman (Forthcoming) finds that over the course of the 2010s, white Democrats have come to approve more highly of MCs of color, and Democratic men to approve more highly of women MCs, whereas Republican voters do not display significant preferences on either race or gender. Complementing the meta-analysis by Schwarz and Coppock (2022), Chapter 2 of this dissertation shows in a meta-analysis of conjoint experiments that white Democrats prefer Black candidates to white candidates in studies conducted since 2017; replicating Weissman's findings, white Republicans do not display a significant racial preference. These shifting preferences are associated with declines in white/male Democrats' racial and gender prejudice (Engelhardt 2021a, 2021b; Jardina and Ollerenshaw 2022). Increasingly, dominant-group Democratic voters seem to be eschewing descriptive racial representation in favor of increasing the descriptive representation of marginalized groups, seemingly because of a desire to address group-based injustice and discrimination.

This preference for the descriptive representation of outgroups among dominant-group Democrats is a new development in public opinion, and an even newer area of research, and there are many avenues for further investigation. This paper pursues one of these avenues: how Democratic voters with different combinations of dominant and marginalized racial and gender identities navigate choices between potential representatives who themselves hold different combinations of these identities. In particular, I am interested in which marginalized identities take precedence for dominant-group voters. The existing study that comes closest to answering this question, by Gershon and Monforti (2019), examines the relationship between candidates' racial and gender identities and the traits survey participants ascribe to them in a conjoint-style pairing of two hypothetical Congressional candidates. Gershon and Monforti find little relationship between participants' identities and their assessments of candidates with different identities, but their analyses do not consider interactions between participants' race and gender, nor do they disaggregate results by partisanship. Moreover, although the data in Gershon and Monforti's analyses were collected just a decade ago, the rapidity of changes in dominant-group Democrats' outgroup attitudes suggests that more recent surveys could yield different results.

The present paper builds on this previous work in a few ways. It analyzes data collected after the shift in white/men Democrats' preference for Black/women candidates occurred in the mid-2010s. By focusing on white Democratic participants and disaggregating results by participants' gender, it considers interactions between candidates' and voters' identities that past work has not fully explored. I aim to answer two questions: First, what choices do white Democratic men women make when choosing between two candidates with different racial and gender identities? Second, insofar as these groups' choices differ from one another, what are their respective motivations?

3.2 The Gendered Nature of White Democrats' Support for Black Candidates

How do white Democratic voters factor candidate race and gender into their decision-making? Answering this question using real-world data presents multiple threats to inference. For one, structural racial and gender inequality give rise to candidate profiles that vary in myriad ways that correlate with identity (Sen and Wasow 2016). For another, the decision to run in a particular district is endogenous to expectations about how voters in that district will respond to one's candidacy, creating a biased sample of candidacies. Candidate choice conjoint experiments, which randomly manipulate characteristics of hypothetical candidates that participants select between, help to address both of these problems. Although participants can and likely do still infer any number of characteristics about candidates based on their racial and gender identities, at least the other attributes in the conjoint experiment (which generally include several that would be salient in an election, such as policy positions and experience in elected office) are randomly assigned. By fielding these surveys on nationwide (ideally nationally-representative) samples, researchers can infer how voters across a wide range of electoral contexts would respond to candidate profiles they might never see on a ballot in their district. Importantly, the aim of this study is *not* to predict how candidates with marginalized identities will fare in real-world elections. The racial wealth gap (Donoghoe, Stephens, and Perry 2024), racial and gender gaps in income (England, Levine, and Mishel 2020; Kochhar and Moslimani 2023), and differences in candidate recruitment (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2022), among other structural factors, mean that women and/or candidates of color must often overcome more hurdles simply to appear on a primary ballot. Rather, this approach focuses on voters' assessments of candidates along racial and gender lines without these constraints on candidate supply, allowing for the estimation of the effects of race, gender, and their combination on electoral support (Bansak et al. 2023; Schwarz and Coppock 2022).

Based on the non-intersectional research on voting preferences discussed in the previous section, I expect that white Democratic survey respondents, men and women alike, will prefer women to men and Black candidates to white candidates. When voters must choose between a white woman and a Black man, effectively trading off on these preferred identities, participants' choices may diverge along gender lines. The combination of white Democrats' fairly pronounced support for Black candidates in recent studies, along with Democratic voters' weaker, though still significant, preference for women candidates documented by Schwarz and Coppock (2022), leads me to expect that white men will lean slightly towards Black men candidates in this situation. However, candidate gender seems to matter more to women than to men (e.g., Lawless 2004; Schwarz and Coppock 2022), although gender has also been theorized to be a weaker basis for group consciousness than race even among women (Gay and Tate 1998). If, as Chapter 2 of this dissertation indicates, white Democrats support Black candidates because of the discrimination they perceive against Black Americans, does the desire to address this discrimination outweigh white women's desire to increase the descriptive representation of their own marginalized identity, particularly as issues like access to abortion have renewed salience? If white women prefer white women candidates over Black men, while white men are more ambivalent, white Democratic voters' preferences could help to explain the greater number of Black Congresswomen gaining election in majority-white districts. To summarize:

H1: Vote choice hypothesis. White Democratic men and women will support women candidates

over men candidates and Black candidates over white candidates. White men will prioritize voting for Black candidates over voting for women candidates. White women voters will prioritize voting for women candidates over voting for Black candidates.

To test this hypothesis, I conducted a meta-analysis of conjoint experiments that randomly and independently varied the race and gender identities of hypothetical candidates. Aggregating many studies together in a meta-analysis is particularly valuable for analyzing the effects of intersecting identities because calculating interaction effects between multiple candidate attributes and further disaggregating the results by participants' own race and gender identities requires many more observations than non-intersectional analyses of either race or gender. I located replication files for 10 candidate choice conjoint experiments conducted between 2017 and 2020. The criteria for inclusion were independently randomizing candidate race and gender, providing information about candidates' partisanship,[5] and reporting participants' own race, gender, and partisanship. Detailed information about each of the included studies, including data source, type of election, method of signaling candidate race and gender, and additional attributes included in the conjoint task, is provided in Appendix C2.1 In total, the dataset used in the present study includes 14,446 choices that white Democratic participants made between pairs of candidates with different combinations of race and gender identities.[6][7]

Figure 3.2 provides an overview of how Democratic white participants voted across pairwise comparisons of candidates with different racial and/or gender identities.[8][9]. Consistent with past research and Hypothesis 1, white Democratic voters display a preference for Black and women candidates: Overall, these participants selected Black candidates over white opponents 52% of the time ($SE = 0.005$ on a 0-1 scale) and women candidates over men opponents 53% of the time ($SE = 0.007$). Importantly, however, the effect of race is strongly gendered: Black men fare substantially better than white men (a difference of five percentage points; $SE = 0.009$), but less well than white women (a difference two percentage points, $SE = 0.009$). Black women perform significantly better than white women as well (a difference of two percentage points, $SE = 0.009$), but the gap between Black and white women is significantly smaller than that between Black and white men (difference-in-differences $p = 0.022$). The effect of gender is also conditioned by race, with white women outperforming than white men to a much greater degree (seven percentage points, $SE = 0.008$) than Black women outperforming Black men (four percentage points, $SE = 0.011$; difference-in-differences $p = 0.026$). The net effect of these contingencies is that despite

[5] I restrict analysis to experiments that explicitly state candidates' partisanship either — as part of the conjoint table or because the hypothetical election is a partisan primary — because participants could plausibly use both race and gender to infer candidates' partisanship.

[6] The dataset excludes candidate pairs with the same race and gender identities so that candidate pairs differ on at least one of these two traits.

[7] Several of the included studies varied candidate race with probabilities designed to approximate the population shares. As a result, contests that include Black candidates are relatively rarer in this sample. Because I am less interested in forecasting election outcomes in the real world than in understanding how candidates in the fullest range of hypothetical elections might perform, I weight observations in this dataset so that each dyad of candidate identities contributes equally to overall estimates, e.g., upweighting contests between Black women and Black men and downweighting contests between white women and white men.

[8] Figures present 83.4% confidence intervals as well as the conventional 95% confidence intervals. 83.4% confidence intervals are appropriate for visualizing the statistical significance of differences across groups, whereas 95% confidence intervals are appropriate for visualizing whether a single estimate differs significantly from zero. See Zigerell (2021) for a more detailed explanation of this practice.

[9] For comparison, results for white Republicans and Black Democrats are presented in Appendix C2.



Figure 3.2: Marginal means for candidates by race and gender identity among white Democratic survey participants. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.

white Democratic voters' enthusiasm for Black candidates overall, Black men candidates get the second-lowest share of votes across these 12 experiments.

Figure 3.3 disaggregates the results presented in Figure 3.2 by the gender of white Democratic participants and reveals that most of this effect is driven by women. The proportions of the time white men participants selected candidates from each of these three groups are statistically indistinguishable; white Democratic men seem to value the presence of at least one marginalized identity but do not collectively express a strong preference between marginalized racial or gender identities. This finding is noteworthy in that it makes clear that white Democratic men are emphatically *not* after descriptive representation for themselves. In contrast, white Democratic women's selections indicate a greater number of distinctions on the basis of candidates' identities. Like white men, they prefer alternatives to white men candidates, selecting the three other types of candidates significantly more often. However, they did not select Black men particularly often in absolute terms (49% of the time with a standard error of 1 percentage point) and they supported them significantly less often than either white ($\beta = -0.050$, $SE = 0.012$) or Black ($\beta = -0.077$, $SE = 0.014$) women candidates.

Taken together, these results indicate that although white Democratic men and women share preferences for Black and women candidates, they have different priorities. Insofar as candidates' identities influence their voting decisions, the men in this sample seem to be primarily focused on reducing descriptive representation of their own group — white men. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the effects of Black and woman identities are not additive among men participants; white women, Black women, and Black men all receive essentially equivalent levels of support. Women participants place a greater emphasis on gender identity in their decision-making.



Figure 3.3: Marginal means for candidates by race and gender identity among white Democratic survey men and women participants. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.

Does opponent identity matter?

Of course, voting decisions are only consequential when there are multiple candidates to choose between, and as examination of competitive 2024 Democratic Congressional primaries reveals, Democratic voters are increasingly facing decisions between candidates with different combinations of racial and gender identities. These diverse candidate pairings are an implicit feature of the analysis presented the last two figures, but explicitly specifying whom participants are voting *against* when they vote *for* a particular candidate further illuminates the tradeoffs voters make on different dimensions of identity.

Figure 3.4 presents estimates of how often white Democratic men and women select candidates with different identities as a function of their opponents' identities. The first row confirms that regardless of whom they face in an election, white men candidates do not perform well among white Democratic voters; in no instance did either white men or white women participants select white men more than 50% of the time. The second row shows that Black women candidates, on the other hand, were successful in the greatest number of contest types, garnering significantly greater than 50% of votes from white men when running against Black men candidates and from white women when running against both Black and white men. However, white Democratic voters' enthusiasm for Black women candidates is not unconditional on the identity of their opponents. White men are effectively indifferent between Black women and white women and not significantly more likely to select a Black woman than a white man opponent — indeed, as the top-left panel shows, they are the most likely to select a white man when he is running against a Black woman. White women lean towards Black women in more contests, but are not significantly more likely to



Figure 3.4: Proportion selecting candidates as a function of their and their opponents' identities. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.

select a Black woman than a white woman opponent. In total, although Black women are by no means at a disadvantage in any of these three types of contest, their advantage is greatest among white Democratic voters when they are running against Black men, a finding that may help to explain Black women's greater rates of election in majority-white districts.

Recall from the preceding section that white women voters drive much of the discrepancy between support for Black men and women candidates. The third row pinpoints a single type of contest as the one on which white men and women participants' preferences diverge: when Black men run against white women opponents. In this scenario, white men lean towards selecting the Black candidate, selecting him 52.3% of the time, whereas white women significantly prefer the white woman opponent, selecting her 54% of the time. The difference in vote shares for Black men candidates in this situation is 6.3 percentage points ($SE = 0.025$ on a 0-1 scale). The net effect of these preferences, shown in the leftmost panel of this row, is that Black men garner greater than

50% of the vote only when they are running against white men.

The final row, which presents results for white women candidates, does not present any new results — each type of contest is represented twice in this figure, once from the point of view of each candidate — but I present it here so that the reader can quickly ascertain how white women perform across a range of contest types. As with Black women, white women are most successful when running against coethnic men candidates, but they are also significantly more successful than Black men opponents as just discussed.

Discussion

Revisiting past experimental work with an eye to how race and gender interact to structure voting decisions replicates recent findings — white Democratic voters, both men and women, tend to support marginalized-group candidates, all else equal — but also complicates these findings by drawing attention to differences in how these groups of voters weight racial and gender identities. Many theoretically interesting patterns emerge from this analysis, but for the purpose of this paper I will underscore the set of results that may contribute to the reversed gender gap among Black Democratic Congressional representatives from majority-white districts: both white men and white women are significantly more supportive of Black women than of Black men candidates in head-to-head contests, and white women additionally select white women significantly more often than Black men opponents, a preference that outweighs white men's more modest support for Black men in these contests. Among white voters, this pattern of priorities means that both Black and white women receive a higher proportion of votes than Black men, both in head-to-head contests and averaging over contests with different types of opponents. Real-world factors like differences in the supply of Black men and women candidates and the ability of Black women to draw endorsements and elite support from both race- and gender-focused organizations (Smooth 2006) likely also feed into to Black women's greater success in majority-white districts, but even with these structural factors stripped away, individual white voters' choices could plausibly contribute to the reversed gender gap. Scholars like Smooth (2006) and Scola (2013) rightly point to the unique strengths of Black women in building electoral coalitions, and these findings bolster their case. However, Black women's success is only one side of the reversed gender gender gap, and these findings also call attention to a distinct disadvantage that Black men face: white Democrats' and particularly white Democratic women's, tendency to prioritize gender over race in their decision-making. This set of priorities makes it more difficult for Black men to run successfully against white women, a type of contest becoming increasingly common as the pool of Democratic primary candidates continues to diversify.

3.3 What Motivates These Diverging Priorities?

White Democratic voters could have different motivations for placing relatively greater emphasis on the representation of women versus the representation of Black Americans, with different implications for both political practitioners and scholars of identity politics. White Democrats' support for Black candidates and men Democrats' support for women candidates have both been linked to perceptions of discrimination against these groups (Weissman Forthcoming); perhaps white women voters perceive discrimination against women as the greater problem on average.

Alternatively or in addition, perhaps candidate race and gender interact to influence assumptions voters make about candidates' traits, beliefs, and priorities in ways that single-dimensional studies of candidate stereotypes have failed to predict. In other words, white Democratic voters might prefer women candidates over men candidates because they perceive women candidates as more aligned with their personal interests, pointing to a limit to their potential political "allyship" with Black Americans (Radke et al. 2020), or they might be earnestly "triaging" descriptive representation for women over descriptive representation for Black Americans, since they could reasonably believe that both groups face a degree of marginalization.

To test these competing explanations, I fielded an original survey in December 2023. Study participants were recruited using Lucid Marketplace.[10] Participation was restricted to American adults who self-identified as Democrats and the sample was stratified by race, gender, age, education, and region. The final sample included 486 white women and 461 white men.[11] Participants were paid $1.50 upon completion of the survey. The study consisted of a conjoint experiment in which participants viewed the profiles of two candidates running in a Democratic Congressional primary as well as measures of their racial and gender attitudes.[12] The race and gender of candidates in the conjoint experiment were randomly assigned with the stipulation that either their gender, race, or both must differ. In addition to indicating which candidate they would prefer to vote for, participants rated each candidate on characteristics including leadership traits, electability, ideology, and issues they believe the candidate would prioritize if elected. They were also asked to indicate the degree of discrimination they believe women and Black Americans face. Participants were also invited to explain their voting decisions in writing on the same screen in which they indicated their choice. This is a validated technique for alleviating social desirability pressure (Krupnikov, Piston, and Bauer 2016) and in addition provides qualitative insight into participants' decision-making process. I do not analyze these responses systematically, but an informal review makes clear that voters have many different reasons for the choices they make. I will quote illustrative examples throughout this section.

In addition to this main sample, I collected an additional 313 responses from white participants in which the contest in the conjoint experiment was always set to include a Black man candidate and a white woman candidate, yielding a total sample of 311 white men and 323 white women who faced this choice. Observing more decisions in this type of contest allows me to more closely examine why white Democratic men and women make different choices on average when forced to choose between candidates with different marginalized identities.

Appendix Figure C3.3 shows that, reassuringly, the patterns of candidate support across candidate and respondent types replicate the results of Study 1.[13] The purpose of the analyses presented in this section is to understand what voters read into different combinations of racial and gender identities when selecting candidates in low-information environments like party primaries. Determining the causal mechanisms behind political behavior is a notoriously difficult task (Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010), and the tests in this section do not by themselves establish any of the hypothesized explanations as causes of white Democratic participants' voting decisions. Rather, analyzing

[10]This study was approved exempt from review; UC Berkeley IRB Protocol #2023-11-16908.

[11]I also surveyed 413 Black women, and 303 Black men. Results for these participants are presented in Appendix C3.

[12]The survey instrument and an example conjoint table are provided in Appendix C3.

[13]A strong preference for alternatives to white men candidates among both men and women participants was especially apparent. In the words of one woman participant, "I am so, so, so sick of white men representing me."

the relationships between participant attitudes and perceptions and vote choice can help to rule out potential mechanisms and provide suggestive evidence for others that should be further studied using designs better suited to identifying causal relationships.

Triaging marginalization? Dominant-group Democrats' support for marginalized-group candidates is associated with perceptions of injustice against these groups (Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation; Weissman Forthcoming). Here, I test whether perceptions of group-based discrimination account for support of Black candidates, women candidates, and perhaps also candidates with different combinations of marginalized racial and gender identities. As Gay and Tate reflect, "Although most blacks report that they have been personally victimized by racism, comparatively few women feel that they have been discriminated against because of their gender, even if they have" (Gay and Tate 1998, 182–83). Perhaps white women support white women more often than Black men opponents because they perceive relatively more gender discrimination than racial discrimination in the United States, whereas other voters might perceive racial discrimination to be more prevalent. In other words, perhaps these groups of voters are making different triaging decisions in responding to multiple forms of discrimination and marginalization.

H2: Perceptions of discrimination hypothesis. Perceptions of discrimination against and underrepresentation of Black Americans/women will predict support for Black/women candidates.[14]

[14]Note that Hypothesis 2 does not include an intersectional component. I did not collect data on perceptions of discrimination against race x gender groups, but this would be an interesting avenue for future study. In this paper I explore in a preliminary way whether differences in the degree of discrimination Black Americans and women are perceived to face explain intergroup differences in voting behavior.

Table 3.1: White Democratic survey participants' support for Black and women candidates by perceptions of group discrimination

	Voted for Black candidate with white opponent		Voted for woman candidate with man opponent		Voted for Black man with white woman opponent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Racial discrimination	0.202**	0.196*			0.032		0.110
	(0.078)	(0.081)			(0.079)		(0.098)
Gender discrimination			0.146*	0.131+		−0.053	−0.091
			(0.073)	(0.076)		(0.076)	(0.093)
Participant ideology		0.030		0.011			0.013
		(0.076)		(0.074)			(0.075)
Woman participant		−0.010		0.048			−0.098*
		(0.040)		(0.042)			(0.041)
Intercept	0.379***	0.369***	0.472***	0.449***	0.463***	0.521***	0.505***
	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.075)
Num.Obs.	642	642	588	588	630	627	627

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note:
Variables are scaled from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates least discrimination/very conservative and 1 indicates greatest discrimination/very liberal.

In two separate items, I asked participants how much women and Black Americans face in the United States today, with response options ranging from "None at all" to "A great deal." The first four columns of Table 3.1 report the results of a series of OLS regressions that analyze the relationship between these perceptions of discrimination with support for Black and women candidates, respectively. The first two columns regress support for Black candidates over white opponents on perceptions of anti-Black discrimination, with the second adding controls for participant gender and ideology. The racial discrimination remains statistically and substantively significant with the inclusion of these variables, indicating that racial liberalism, rather than ideological liberalism more broadly, accounts for a significant portion of white Democrats' support for Black candidates. Similarly, perceptions of gender discrimination are significantly associated with support for women candidates over men opponents.[15] The relationship between perceptions of injustice and support for Black and women candidates appeared in participants' written explanations of their decisions as well. For example a white man who selected a Black woman candidate over a Black man opponent wrote, "I'd like to give a woman a chance to prove their knowledge," and a white woman who selected a Black man over a white woman opponent wrote, "Although I am white I would vote for candidate A. I believe in giving minorities a chance. It really blows my mind that Obama is the only [Black] president." These (and other) respondents conceived of their votes as a way to provide opportunities to marginalized outgroups.

The participants who are most likely to select select Black candidates over white candidates and women candidates over men candidates are overlapping groups — consistent with past research (Gay and Tate 1998; Harnois 2015), perceptions of racial and gender discrimination are strongly correlated (Pearson's $R = 0.560$). But what about choices between a Black man candidate and a white woman candidate? I did not preregister hypotheses about how perceptions of discrimination shape these choices, but discuss this possibility here in an exploratory way. The final three columns of Table 3.1 regress selecting Black men over white women on each type of discrimination perception using relevant observations from the original sample plus the additional sample of Black men versus white women contests. Columns 5 and 6 show that neither perceptions of racial nor gender discrimination significantly predict selecting a Black man over a white woman candidate, although the estimates are in directions consistent with these perceptions influencing how voters navigate this choice. Column 7 presents a model that includes both perceptions along with participant ideology and gender. Once again, the coefficients on racial and gender discrimination are not statistically significant but are in the expected directions, but, white women are significantly less likely to select Black men candidates even after accounting for these group attitudes. Taken together with the findings for race or gender alone, these exploratory analyses suggest that the question "who faces discrimination?" does shape white Democratic voters' decision-making in contests between dominant- and marginalized-group member candidates, voter gender is still associated with different patterns of decision-making even after accounting for how participants answer this question.

Substantive representativeness and leadership ability Alternatively, there could be differences in the characteristics participants ascribe to candidates as a function of both their race and gender. For example, voters perceive Black (Bowen and Clark (2014); Jones (2014); Lerman and Sadin

[15] In Appendix Figure C3.4, I show that the relationships between these perceptions and candidate support are identically signed among both white men and white women participants.

(2016); McDermott (1998); Meyer and Boyle (2021); Schneider and Bos (2011); Sigelman et al. (1995); Visalvanich (2017)) and women (Huddy and Terkildsen (1993); King and Matland (2003); McDermott (1998); Sanbonmatsu and Dolan (2009)) politicians to be more liberal than similar white and men politicians, respectively, with implications for the degree of substantive congruence between candidates and themselves. To my knowledge, no studies have examined differences in perceptions of candidates' ideology on the basis of both their racial and gender identities, so we do not know whether Black women are perceived to be especially liberal, and if so, whether white women or Black men are perceived as the more liberal group. There could also be differences in perceptions as a function of participants' own identities as well. In any case, for perceptions of substantive congruence to account for differences in voting behavior, we should expect the following:

H3: Self-representativeness hypothesis. Voters will rate women and Black candidates as more representative of themselves than men and white candidates. White men will rate Black men candidates as more representative of themselves than white women candidates, whereas white women will rate white women candidates as more representative of themselves than Black men candidates. These findings will appear in both qualitative ratings of representativeness and in the ideological distance participants perceive between themselves and the candidates.

The literature also identifies stereotypes about candidates' valence characteristics on the basis of both race and gender. Schneider and Bos (2011, 2014) point out that the stereotypes people apply to members of a group who seek political office differ from stereotypes applied to the group in general. They find that despite the persistence of negative stereotypes about Black Americans in general among their white participants, stereotypes of Black politicians are more positive and include being "ambitious, good speakers, passionate, and in touch with the people" (Schneider and Bos 2011, 223). Conversely, in a similar study with regard to gender, they find that women politicians are stereotyped more negatively than women in general, scoring lower in sensitivity and compassion than women in general as well as lower on leadership ability and competence than men politicians (Schneider and Bos 2014).

However, in a 2020 study, Jenke et al. (2023) find that a majority of participants rated women more favorably than men on six dimensions associated with political leadership. Although the methods of these studies differ significantly, it would be consistent with Democratic men's shift towards higher approval of women MCs that Weissman (Forthcoming) documents that voters' stereotypes of women politicians may have become more positive since Schneider and Bos collected their data. Here as well, there are no studies to my knowledge that consider how race and gender affect the stereotypes voters apply to politicians in tandem.

H4: Leadership traits hypothesis. All voters will rate women and Black candidates more positively on leadership traits than men and white candidates. White men, Black men, and Black women voters will rate Black men candidates more positively on leadership traits than white women candidates; white women voters will rate white women candidates more positively on leadership traits than Black men candidates.

To measure these assessments, I asked participants to rate candidates' ideological proximity to themselves, ranging from "much more conservative" to "much more liberal" (here presented as a folded measure where 0 indicates extreme perceived distance in either direction and 1 indicates perfect congruence); agreement with the statement "this candidate represents the interests of people like me;" and candidates' leadership traits using a modified version of the leadership sexism scale (Jenke et al. 2023), which includes assessments of candidates' kindness, honesty, likability,

Table 3.2: Candidate type and perceptions of valence characteristics

	Ratings from white men respondents	Ratings from white women respondents
	(1)	(2)
Ideological proximity		
White woman	0.045*	0.014
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Black man	0.035+	0.010
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Black woman	0.030	0.037*
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Intercept	0.771***	0.815***
	(0.014)	(0.012)
Num.Obs.	922	972
Represents people like me		
White woman	0.045+	0.004
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Black man	-0.002	-0.012
	(0.024)	(0.024)
Black woman	0.002	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.025)
Intercept	0.700***	0.686***
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	922	971
Leadership traits		
White woman	0.024*	0.020+
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Black man	0.028*	0.029*
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Black woman	0.025*	0.063***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Intercept	0.713***	0.704***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Num.Obs.	921	972

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note:
White man candidates are reference category. Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.

warmth, intelligence, and strength as a leader. Table 3.2 presents white men's and women's ratings of candidates on these three qualities. White men candidates are the reference category, so that the coefficients on candidate types indicate the difference between ratings of each type and white men.

White men's ratings of Black and/or women candidates on ideological proximity, representativeness of themselves, and leadership traits relative to white men, shown in the first column of Table 3.2, are largely in line with their voting decisions. They tend to see these candidates as more ideologically aligned with themselves and score them more highly on leadership traits, without

significant differences across candidate types besides rating white men lowest.[16] White men rate white women as marginally significantly more representative of themselves, but do not rate Black men or Black women as more representative of themselves than white men. It could be that participants interpret this item as asking about descriptive as well as substantive representation; if this is the case, then the null finding that Black candidates are perceived as no *less* representative of white men is noteworthy in itself.

These ratings align less cleanly with white women's voting decisions, shown in the second column, particularly their preference for white women candidates over Black men. White women rated white women candidates and Black men candidates identically on ideological proximity, representativeness of themselves, and leadership traits. These participants also rated white men equally with white women and Black men for ideological proximity and representativeness and Black women slightly higher for proximity and representativeness, suggesting that general substantive representation at the broadest level is not the basis by which white women participants differentiate between candidates on the basis of their racial and gender identities. These voters' significantly higher ratings of Black women compared to Black men ($\beta = 0.033$, $SE = 0.012$) and marginally significantly lower ratings of white men compared to white women on leadership traits ($\beta = -0.021$, $SE = 0.012$) are more consistent with their voting decisions, but the most theoretically interesting distinction, that between white women and Black men candidates, remains unaccounted for. Moreover, the differences that show up in this analysis are substantively quite small — both white men and white women participants rated all four types of candidates quite favorably overall — suggesting that although candidates' identities likely do influence beliefs about their politics in a broad sense, on their own these beliefs probably do not explain the relationship between identities and vote choice.

Issue priorities The null results presented in the previous section are interesting in their own right — past scholarship indicates that historically, dominant-group voters attach numerous stereotypes to marginalized-group candidates, which participants in this sample at least seem not to be doing to a great extent — but the question of what, then, explains different patterns of voting behavior between white men and white women remains unanswered. In addition to making assumptions about broad characteristics like ideological proximity and leadership ability, existing research finds that voters rely on candidates' identities to infer policy areas they are likely to pri-

[16]Recalling the finding in the last section that perceptions of discrimination are also associated with voting for marginalized-group candidates, one might infer that this relationship is driven by voters who perceive a great deal of discrimination inferring that marginalized-group candidates are of higher quality because they have overcome this discrimination. I explore this possibility in a preliminary way in two figures in Appendix C3 which display the marginal effect of candidate race or gender on each of the ratings in the leadership traits index as a function of the amount of discrimination the participant perceives against Black Americans/women. If inferences about candidate quality explained the relationship between discrimination perceptions and vote choice, then we would probably expect to see the strongest relationship between perceptions of discrimination and the most prosaic leadership traits in this index, like "smart" and "strong of a leader." Instead, I find equally large, if not larger, effects on traits like "caring" and "honest." I argue that these results should therefore be interpreted to mean that perceptions of discrimination are associated with positive attitudes towards the marginalized group rather than the basis for a cold calculation about identifying the most-skilled candidate. Reinforcing this interpretation, participants who mentioned candidates' character traits in their written explanations talked about trustworthiness, empathy, integrity, and kindness when linking traits to race and gender. Discussions of competence were almost entirely confined to references to candidates' professional backgrounds.

oritize if elected. Voters perceive politicians of color as more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities (McDermott (1998); Sigelman et al. (1995)), and women politicians as more likely to prioritize issues affecting women (Huddy and Terkildsen (1993); Lawless (2004); McDermott (1998); Sanbonmatsu (2002)). These identity-based inferences are likely to be especially influential in contexts like Congressional primaries, in which most voters have little knowledge of non-incumbent candidates (Wolak 2009). Research on Black women politicians and voters finds that racial and gender-related priorities are complements rather than substitutes, but do voters believe this to be true? Perhaps white women are hesitant to vote for Black men because they perceive them to be less likely to prioritize issues of interest to women, in part because of their gender but also because they perceive them to be focused on race-related issues.

H5: Issue priorities hypothesis. All participants will rate Black/women candidates as more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities/women. White women will rate Black men candidates as less likely to prioritize issues affecting women than white men candidates.

I asked participants about the degree to which they believed candidates would prioritize action on issues affecting racial minorities and women. The top panel of Table 3.3 presents participants' assessments of candidates on these two issue areas. White Democratic men and women perceive Black candidates to be more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities than white candidates, with little differentiation between men and women candidates within racial groups. Similarly, they perceive women candidates to be more likely to prioritize issues affecting women, with little differentiation between Black and white candidates within gender groups.[17] Importantly, participants do not seem to view holding one marginalized identity as a signal that a candidate will not attend to another marginalized identity — white women are rated as just as likely, if not more likely, to prioritize issues affecting minority groups as white men, and Black men are rated as just as likely, if not more likely, to prioritize issues affecting women as white men.

[17] Although white men do perceive white women candidates to be significantly more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities than white men candidates ($\beta = 0.051$, $SE = 0.024$).

Table 3.3: Race, gender, interest group endorsements, and perceptions of issue priorities

	Prioritizes issues affecting racial minorities		Prioritizes issues affecting women	
	White men respondents	White women respondents	White men respondents	White women respondents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Candidate type (white man is reference category)				
White woman	0.051*	0.018	0.109***	0.106***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Black man	0.118***	0.155***	0.029	-0.005
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Black woman	0.110***	0.183***	0.100***	0.132***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)
Intercept	0.635***	0.598***	0.637***	0.600***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	921	971	922	971
Candidate identities and interest group endorsements				
Civil rights group endorsement	0.110***	0.080**		
	(0.027)	(0.028)		
Black candidate	0.098***	0.149***		
	(0.020)	(0.018)		
Civil rights endorsement × Black	-0.036	0.024		
	(0.038)	(0.036)		
Reproductive rights group endorsement			0.147***	0.265***
			(0.028)	(0.024)
Woman candidate			0.092***	0.140***
			(0.020)	(0.020)
Reproductive rights endorsement × woman			-0.021	-0.076*
			(0.037)	(0.031)
Intercept	0.633***	0.590***	0.616***	0.527***
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Num.Obs.	921	971	922	971

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note:
Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.

Do perceptions of issue priorities affect vote choice, and if so, could this explain white Democrats' identity preferences? To answer this question, I designed the conjoint element of the survey to sometimes include additional information about the candidates' areas of policy emphasis in the form of interest group endorsements. If identity-based preferences are the result of using these identities to infer priorities, then these apparent preferences should shift when counter-stereotypical signals are provided about these priorities. Candidates were randomly assigned to receive an endorsement from "civil rights groups," "reproductive rights groups," "veterans' groups" (control), and "local newspapers" (control). The bottom panel of Table 3.3 confirms that white men and white women in the sample used both race/gender and interest group endorsements as signals of policy priorities. In three out of four cases, endorsements exerted greater influence over perceptions of candidates' policy priorities. I include an interaction term to investigate whether the effect of endorsements varies as a function of candidates' identities, and indeed, white women update their beliefs about men candidates' prioritization of women's issues to a greater extent when they receive a reproductive rights group endorsement, as evidenced by the negative interaction term on *endorsement* $\times$ *woman* in the fourth column. Thus, I can examine cases in which dominant-group candidates signal their commitment to marginalized groups through endorsements to test whether white Democrats' voting behavior is motivated by perceptions of issue ownership.

Table 3.4 examines the relationship between candidates' identities, endorsements, and their interaction on white Democrats' voting decisions. The top panel focuses on gender and endorsement from reproductive rights groups. The first four columns examine races between women and men in which one candidate receives a reproductive rights endorsement. White men respondents are not particularly compelled by reproductive rights groups' endorsement of a candidate, but white women are, and as Model (4) demonstrates, the effect of a candidate receiving a reproductive rights group endorsement is equal in size to the candidate being a woman (these coefficients are identical because the exact same number of respondents selected women candidates without this endorsement as men candidates with the endorsement). Models (5) and (6) analyze the effect of the reproductive rights group endorsements on the probability of selecting a Black man running against a white woman opponent. Relative to neither candidate receiving the endorsement, white women were 15.2 percentage points more likely to select the Black man candidate when he received this endorsement; in this condition, 56% of white women participants selected the Black man candidate. By contrast, white women opponents who received this endorsement did not receive significantly more votes from white women. This is consistent with the finding in Table 3.3 that white women update their beliefs about men's prioritization of women's issues to a greater degree as a result of a reproductive rights group endorsement. That this endorsement is sufficient to reverse white women's preference for white women candidates in this type of contest indicates that to a significant degree, this initial preference for white women is motivated by policy goals to a greater degree than a first-order preference for descriptive representation. Several women explicitly stated that policy motivated them above and beyond gender in their written responses; for example, a participant who selected a white man over a Black woman opponent wrote, "While I often choose a woman over a man, [candidate] A [is] a reproductive freedom advocate." This explanation makes clear that the desire for a woman representative is not entirely reducible to policy representation for this voter, but policy trumps identity when the two are in tension.[18]

[18]In Appendix C3, I show that the race of men candidates running against white women does affect the degree to which they are disadvantaged when their opponent has a reproductive rights group endorsement. Black men running

Table 3.4: Gender, race, interest group endorsements, and candidate selection

	DV: Candidate selected				DV: Black man selected	
	White men respondents		White women respondents		White men respondents	White women respondents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender and reproductive rights group endorsement						
Candidate has endorsement	0.096	0.083	0.202**	0.197**	0.061	0.152*
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.070)
Candidate is a woman		0.158+		0.197**		
		(0.082)		(0.074)		
Opponent has endorsement					-0.033	-0.005
					(0.068)	(0.065)
Intercept	0.452***	0.380***	0.399***	0.303***	0.533***	0.410***
	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.037)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Contests included	Different genders	Different genders	Different genders	Different genders	Black men vs. white women	Black men vs. white women
Num.Obs.	292	292	346	346	311	323
Race and civil rights group endorsement						
Candidate has endorsement	0.058	0.058	-0.094	-0.106	0.011	0.018
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.070)	(0.066)
Candidate is Black		0.019		0.094		
		(0.081)		(0.079)		
Opponent has endorsement					-0.037	-0.022
					(0.070)	(0.071)
Intercept	0.471***	0.462***	0.547***	0.506***	0.543***	0.442***
	(0.040)	(0.057)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Contests included	Different races	Different races	Different races	Different races	Black men vs. white women	Black men vs. white women
Num.Obs.	310	310	318	318	311	323

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Note:

Models (1)-(4) present results for contests between women and men in which one candidate received a reproductive rights endorsement (top panel) and between Black and white candidates in which one candidate received a civil rights endorsement (bottom panel). The dependent variable is whether an individual candidate was selected. Because these models include data on both candidates in each contest, they include fixed effects at the contest level. Models (5) and (6) present results for Black men running against white women. The dependent variable is whether the Black man in each contest was selected. The reference category in all six models is that neither candidate has the relevant endorsement.

The bottom panel examines the effects of candidate race and endorsement from civil rights groups on white voters' decision-making. The first four columns report the effects of race and endorsement in all contests between Black and white candidates in which one candidate received this endorsement. This analysis yields null results for white men and women alike, as do the final two models in this panel which examine the effect of this endorsement on support for Black men running against white women. This finding would seem to be in tension with the result presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that white Democrats who support reparations prioritize voting for a white candidate who supports reparations over a Black candidate who opposes the policy. This

against white women who have this endorsement received 43% of white women's votes ($SE = 4.5pp$), whereas white men running against white women who have a reproductive rights endorsement received only 19% of white women's votes ($SE = 10.3pp$). This difference is statistically significant; $p = 0.017$. Despite prioritizing signals of reproductive rights advocacy over identity-based considerations, white women do appear to trade off some degree of this advocacy to support Black candidates.

difference could be because the endorsement (or lack thereof) of a civil rights group is a weaker signal of a candidates' position on race-related issues, but this discrepancy points to an area for continued research.

To sum up, the single instance in which signaling group-based policy priorities significantly moves support for candidates — to the extent that it can reverse identity preferences — occurs among white women when reproductive rights are part of the equation. The primacy of signaling policy priorities over gender identity in this case suggests that white women's preference for women candidates is largely motivated by a desire to elect representatives who will take up issues that affect women, whereas white Democratic voters' support for Black candidates seems to be more symbolic and less closely linked to expectations about priorities a candidate will pursue if elected.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore different types of information voters might glean from candidates' racial and gender identities that could explain the relationship between these identities and voting decisions. In particular, I have sought to understand why white women prefer white women candidates over Black men candidates on average while white men more often make the opposite choice. I find that white Democratic voters' support for Black and women candidates is motivated in part by perceptions that Black Americans and women, respectively, face a great deal of discrimination; however, the difference in Democratic white men and women's support for Black men relative to Black and white women candidates is not accounted for by differences in the amount of racial and gender discrimination these voters perceive. White Democratic voters are not simply "triaging marginalization." Turning to assessments of candidates in terms of ideological proximity, subjective feelings of representativeness, and leadership traits, white men's ratings of candidates with different identities align with their voting preferences but white women's do not. White women's decision-making *is* well-accounted for once I factor in an explicit signal of candidates' policy priorities, however; white women prefer Black men candidates with the endorsement of reproductive rights groups to white women candidates without such an endorsement. This reversal, coupled with the insensitivity of white men to a signal of prioritizing women's issues and of white men and women alike to signals that a candidate will prioritize issues affecting racial minorities, leads me to argue that white Democratic women's preference for women candidates is qualitatively different from their preference for Black candidates, as well as from white Democratic men's preferences for women and candidates of color: the former is primarily motivated by the pursuit of policy change, whereas the latter is primarily symbolic in nature. As discussed above, these tests of the mechanisms behind white Democratic voters' decision-making are necessarily preliminary, but they point towards avenues for future research to better understand the conditions under which both dominant and marginalized-group voters, and perhaps most importantly, voters who belong to both dominant textit{and} marginalized groups, support candidates who themselves possess marginalized identities.

3.4 Conclusion

This paper began with a puzzle: why do Black Congresswomen outnumber Black Congressmen in majority-white districts? The two studies this paper presents point to the preferences of white Democratic voters, and particularly of white Democratic women, as part of the explanation. The findings indicate that both white Democrats' support for Black candidates and Democratic men's support for women candidates are complicated when viewed through an intersectional lens. White Democratic men and women alike are quite supportive of Black women candidates in hypothetical elections, but white women and men make significantly different choices on average when forced to choose between supporting a (white) woman candidate and a Black (man) candidate. However, exploratory analyses suggest that this tendency reflects less a first-order preference for a white woman representative than a preference for a representative who will prioritize issues affecting women, and white women reward Black men candidates for signaling this priority *more* than they reward white women candidates. White men, on the other hand, collectively express weaker preferences across candidate identities and do not significantly change their voting behavior according to signals about whether candidates will prioritize race- or gender-related issues.

The tests of hypothesized motivations behind voters' decisions in this paper are insufficient to establish causality and should be read as the first step in a sustained program of experimental research to understand the mechanisms behind voters', particularly dominant-group voters', support for marginalized-group candidates. Future work on this topic should also examine whether the dynamics identified in this research are reflected in the electoral fortunes of real-world candidates. The experimental studies presented in this paper usefully strip away constraints on the supply of comparable candidates (Juenke and Shah 2016; Lawless and Fox 2010) and the complex dynamics of campaigns (Crowder-Meyer et al. 2020) to isolate the significance voters assign to candidates' race and gender, but because of this, they should not be interpreted as prognostic of how candidates with different identities will fare in actual elections.

The contribution of this paper is to reveal counterintuitive patterns in dominant-group Democratic voters' preferences: white men prefer *virtually any other kind of candidate* to a white man, whereas white women's support for Black candidates is highly contingent on gender. Democratic party elites still believe candidates of color to be less competitive among white partisans (Doherty, Dowling, and Miller 2022), and updating this conventional wisdom and calling attention to the ways in which race and gender intersect to influence perceptions of candidates are important for promoting equity in candidate recruitment and electoral representation.

Conclusion

Marshalling evidence from both observational and experimental data, this dissertation argues that a significant shift in white Democrats' voting preferences has occurred over the last decade: these voters' support for politicians of color has increased alongside, and I have argued in large part as a result of, their growing racial liberalism. White Democratic constituents now approve more highly of Congressional representatives of color than of similar white Members of Congress, and they select Black candidates more often than otherwise-identical white candidates in survey experiments. Their support for politicians of color is associated with a greater cognizance of racial injustice. This support is not without limits, however; white Democrats weigh candidate race alongside ideological congruence, policy priorities, and other identity categories — namely, gender — in making voting decisions. Nevertheless, these findings indicate that candidates of color are not running at a disadvantage when they must build coalitions that include these voters, as is still often believed by party elites (Doherty, Dowling and Miller 2022). Thus, this dissertation makes contributions of interest to both scholars of intergroup relations and to political practitioners by identifying the conditions under which members of a dominant group — white Americans — purposefully contribute to the descriptive representation of people of color, a long-marginalized group in American politics.

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Appendix A

Chapter 1

A1. Descriptive Statistics

Table A1.1: Number of White CES Respondents by Party

	N	Dem.	Pct D	Ind./Other	Pct I	Rep.	Pct R
110th Congress	28,652	11,715	40.98	3,532	12.35	13,342	46.67
111th Congress	43,078	16,472	38.44	5,144	12.00	21,240	49.56
112th Congress	43,867	17,403	40.32	5,998	13.90	19,763	45.79
113th Congress	43,758	17,373	39.77	8,595	19.67	17,718	40.56
114th Congress	47,563	19,783	41.62	9,165	19.28	18,583	39.10
115th Congress	47,220	19,366	41.06	7,708	16.34	20,089	42.59
116th Congress	45,633	19,832	43.46	7,659	16.78	18,142	39.76

Note: We present the number of respondents in the dataset for each party in each Congress. We show the total number of respondents for each Congress, the number of Democratic respondents, the percent of Democratic respondents, the number of Independent respondents, the percent of Independent respondents, the number of Republican respondents, and the percent of Republican respondents for surveys taken during each Congress. These only include even survey years.

Table A1.2: Number of White CES Respondents by Race of MC

	Black	Pct Black	Hisp.	Pct Hisp.	Asian	Pct Asian	White	Pct White
110th Congress	1,445	5.18	569	2.10	231	0.87	26,375	92.13
111th Congress	2,070	4.98	1,051	2.59	578	1.44	39,316	91.40
112th Congress	1,964	4.70	1,430	3.47	756	1.86	39,679	90.56
113th Congress	2,380	5.71	1,635	3.99	555	1.39	39,070	89.41
114th Congress	3,054	6.79	1,964	4.47	780	1.83	41,531	87.64
115th Congress	3,227	7.30	2,273	5.26	843	2.02	40,670	86.25
116th Congress	3,892	9.16	2,388	5.82	963	2.43	38,009	83.47

Note: We present the number of respondents represented by MCs of each race in each Congress. The columns show the number and percent of respondents with Black, Asian, Hispanic, and white MCs.

Table A1.3: White Respondents with Democratic MCs in Each Racial Group

	Black D	Pct. BD	Hisp. D	Pct. HD	Asian D	Pct. AD	White D	Pct. WD
110	1,445	11.21	502	4.20	231	1.98	11,442	84.38
111	2,070	9.50	925	4.48	380	1.89	19,713	85.71
112	1,676	11.06	651	4.61	666	4.71	13,480	82.41
113	2,380	14.96	1,103	7.54	555	3.94	13,478	77.28
114	2,904	18.31	1,131	8.03	780	5.68	12,921	73.41
115	3,044	19.96	1,370	10.09	843	6.46	12,160	70.00
116	3,848	20.81	1,433	8.92	963	6.17	14,300	69.21

Note: We present the number of respondents represented by Democratic MCs of each race in each Congress. The columns show the number and percent of respondents with Black, Asian, Hispanic, and white Democratic MCs.

Table A1.4: White Respondents with Republican MCs in each Racial Group

	Black R	Pct. BR	Hisp. R	Pct. HR	Asian R	Pct. AR	White R	Pct. WR
110	0	0	67	0.44	0	0	14,933	99.10
111	0	0	126	0.64	198	1.00	19,603	97.95
112	288	1.08	779	2.88	90	0.34	26,199	95.41
113	0	0	532	2.03	0	0	25,592	97.46
114	150	0.52	833	2.81	0	0	28,610	96.05
115	183	0.63	903	3.05	0	0	28,510	95.73
116	44	0.18	955	3.85	0	0	23,709	95.32

Note: We present the number of respondents represented by Republican MCs of each race in each Congress. The columns show the number and percent of respondents with Black, Asian, Hispanic, and white Republican MCs.

Table A1.5: MC Race by Party and Congress, 2008-2020

Party	Congress	# POC MCs	# White MCs	% POC MCs
Democrat	110	63	172	26.81
Democrat	111	64	191	25.10
Democrat	112	63	130	32.64
Democrat	113	73	128	36.32
Democrat	114	74	114	39.36
Democrat	115	83	112	42.56
Democrat	116	100	134	42.74
Republican	110	4	198	1.98
Republican	111	7	173	3.89
Republican	112	12	230	4.96
Republican	113	8	226	3.42
Republican	114	12	235	4.86
Republican	115	13	227	5.42
Republican	116	11	190	5.47

Note: We present the number of MCs in the dataset in each Congress from each party and whether they are POC or white. We also show the percent of POC MCs in each Congress.

Table A1.6: MC Race by Region, 2008-2020

Region	# POC MCs	# White MCs	% POC MCs
East North Central	79	388	16.92
East South Central	14	168	7.69
Middle Atlantic	72	338	17.56
Mountain West	37	170	17.87
New England	2	148	1.33
Pacific West	143	351	28.95
South Atlantic	130	446	22.57
West North Central	22	187	10.53
West South Central	88	260	25.29

Note: We present the number of MCs in the dataset from 2008-2020 from each census region by MC race.

A2. Assessing Missingness and Alternative Codings of "Don't Know"

Table A2.1: Effect of POC MC on Missing/DK Approval Rating

	Missing or DK MC approval		
	Full sample	Democrats	Republicans
POC MC	0.025	0.022	0.036
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)
MC Seniority	-0.098^{*}	-0.084	-0.119^{*}
	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.047)
MC Gender	-0.066^{***}	-0.068^{***}	-0.059^{**}
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)
District * Party FEs	Y	Y	Y
Congress FEs	Y	Y	Y
N	299,234	121,555	128,772
R^2	0.065	0.078	0.075
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.073	0.071

$^{*}p < .05$; $^{**}p < .01$; $^{***}p < .001$

Note: We regress an alternative variable for approval, coded 1 for any missing approval value and 0 for when the approval variable does not have missing data, on POC MC and controls. We run this model on the full sample, Democratic respondents, and Republican respondents. The effects on missingness do not significantly differ based on respondent subgroups.

Table A2.2: Effect of POC MC on MC Approval with 'Don't Know' as Median, Mean, and NA

	Median Democrats	NA Democrats	Mean Democrats	Median Republicans	NA Republicans	Mean Republicans
POC MC	0.021	0.037*	0.022	0.001	−0.016	0.002
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.015)
MC Seniority	0.012	0.038	0.009	−0.021	−0.058*	−0.025
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)
MC Gender	0.020+	0.028*	0.018	−0.003	−0.017	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congress FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	86	86	86	86	86	86
N	119,390	97,540	119,390	126,473	106,052	126,473
R^2	0.348	0.429	0.346	0.333	0.406	0.334
Adjusted R^2	0.345	0.425	0.343	0.329	0.402	0.331

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01

Note: We regress different versions of the approval variable on the indicator for POC MC. We include 'District x MC party' and 'Congress' fixed effects and controls for MC seniority and MC gender with standard errors clustered at the congressional district level for weighted CCES data from even years between 2008 and 2020. Models 1 and 4 use the main approval variable. Models 2 and 5 use a variable where 'Don't know' responses are coded as NA. Models 3 and 6 use an approval variable where 'Don't know' responses are coded as the mean of approval.

A3. Inclusion vs. Exclusion of Party Leaners

Table A3.1: Effect of POC MC on MC Approval With and Without Party Leaners

	MC approval			
	Leaners Democrats	No Leaners Democrats	Leaners Republicans	No Leaners Republicans
POC MC	0.055*	0.071**	0.003	−0.024
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.027)
MC Seniority	−0.013	−0.011	−0.040	−0.025
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)
MC Gender	−0.007	−0.016	−0.001	−0.004
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
Congress FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	38	38	38	38
N	74,783	56,518	73,158	53,751

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01

Note: We regress MC approval on the indicator for POC MC. The models include 'District x MC Party' and 'Congress' fixed effects and controls for MC seniority and MC gender. Standard errors are clustered at the congressional district level for weighted CCES data for even years from 2008-2020. The dependent variable is MC approval, re-scaled from 0 to 1. Respondents are grouped as Democrats with Democratic leaners, Democratics excluding leaners, Republicans with Republican leaners, and Republicans excluding leaners.

A4. Effects on Approval by Year

Table A4.1: Effect of POC MC on MC Approval by Year

	Democratic respondents	Republican respondents
Effect of White MC given...		
year = 2010	-0.019^{**}	-0.038^{***}
	(0.006)	(0.007)
year = 2012	-0.013^{+}	-0.022^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.006)
year = 2014	-0.028^{***}	-0.026^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.006)
year = 2016	-0.028^{***}	-0.057^{***}
	(0.007)	(0.007)
year = 2018	-0.061^{***}	-0.019^{**}
	(0.009)	(0.006)
year = 2020	-0.069^{***}	-0.026^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.006)
MC Seniority	0.015	−0.025
	(0.020)	(0.020)
MC Gender	0.018	−0.004
	(0.011)	(0.010)
Effect of POC MC given...		
year = 2008	-0.052^{**}	0.010
	(0.019)	(0.021)
year = 2010	-0.047^{**}	-0.058^{**}
	(0.018)	(0.021)
year = 2012	−0.021	0.009
	(0.018)	(0.017)
year = 2014	0.017	0.014
	(0.016)	(0.018)
year = 2016	0.006	0.055^{**}
	(0.015)	(0.018)
year = 2018	0.065^{***}	0.008
	(0.015)	(0.019)
year = 2020	0.072^{***}	−0.017
	(0.016)	(0.021)
District * Party FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	86	86
N	119,225	126,320

$^{+}p < 0.1$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$

Note: This table corresponds to Figure 1 in the paper. We regress MC Approval on the interaction between even survey years and an indicator for MC race, coded as white (0) or POC (1), for Democratic and Republican white respondents separately. The models include 'District x MC Party' fixed effects and controls for MC seniority and MC gender. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All models include CCES survey weights.

A5. Effects on Approval by Race and Year

Table A5.1: Effect of MC Race on MC Approval by Year (Democratic Respondents)

	Black MC	Hispanic MC	Asian MC
Effect of Black/Hispanic/Asian MC given...			
year = 2008	−0.032		
	(0.027)		
year = 2010	−0.040		
	(0.029)		
year = 2012	−0.004		
	(0.025)		
year = 2014	0.021		
	(0.024)		
year = 2016	0.010		
	(0.022)		
year = 2018	0.080***		
	(0.021)		
year = 2020	0.082***		
	(0.021)		
year = 2008		−0.089*	
		(0.038)	
year = 2010		−0.067*	
		(0.034)	
year = 2012		−0.062	
		(0.038)	
year = 2014		−0.002	
		(0.033)	
year = 2016		−0.017	
		(0.028)	
year = 2018		0.034	
		(0.029)	
year = 2020		0.039	
		(0.029)	
year = 2008			−0.047*
			(0.023)
year = 2010			−0.034
			(0.022)
year = 2012			−0.008
			(0.035)
year = 2014			0.019
			(0.030)
year = 2016			−0.005
			(0.024)
year = 2018			0.084**
			(0.027)
year = 2020			0.077*
			(0.036)
District * Party FEs	Y	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	35	39	18
N	112,454	108,864	106,247

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Figure A5.1: Effect of MC Race on MC Approval by Year (Democratic Respondents)



Note: This figure and the above table correspond to Equation 1 in the paper and replicate Figure 1 in the paper, but here we disaggregate POC MC into distinct racial groups for MCs.

A6. Political Knowledge and Identification of MC Race

The interpretation of our results relies on the assumption that respondents are able to correctly identify the race of their MCs. If constituents do not know the race of their MCs, then another MC characteristic could be driving the over-time effects on approval. To account for this possibility, we assess whether the effects of POC MCs on approval are isolated to only constituents who are more likely to identify the race of their MCs. Ideally, we would ask respondents whether they know the race of their representatives, but the CCES only asks this of a limited set of respondents. Therefore, we proxy for knowledge of race with other knowledge measures asked in all years in our dataset, such as identification of majority parties in the House and Senate, the respondents' MC's party, and the respondents' Senators' parties. More knowledgeable constituents are more likely to know characteristics of their MC like race as well. The ability to correctly identify MC race, using responses from years in which MC racial perception was asked in the CCES, is positively correlated with knowledge of an MC's party.

Figure A6.1: Marginal Effect of POC MC on MC Approval by Year and Knowledge Level (White Democratic Respondents)



Note: We regress MC Approval on an indicator for POC MC interacted with year for respondent knowledge subsets using a knowledge index measure. This index includes identification of majority parties in the House and Senate, the respondents' MC's party, and the respondents' Senators' parties. Low knowledge are below the median knowledge level, and high knowledge are at or above the median. The pattern in increasing approval for POC MCs over time is strongest among high-knowledge respondents.

We present the marginal effects of the POC MC indicator on MC approval in each year with white Democratic respondents split by their knowledge level, using a knowledge index (0-1) that includes identification of majority parties in the House and Senate, the respondents' MC's party,

and the respondents' Senators' parties. The year-by-year effects are concentrated among high-knowledge respondents. In other words, increasing approval of POC MCs is occurring mainly among white Democratic constituents who have more knowledge about their MCs. Therefore, we can infer that the effect of MC race is driven by constituents who know the race of their MCs.

Below, we also include a table presenting the effects among high and low knowledge respondents in each year, but here knowledge is just split by those who can identify the party of their MC and those who cannot. Again, we find the same pattern that the trend is stronger among high knowledge respondents.

Table A6.1: Effects of POC MC on MC Approval by Year and Knowledge Level (White Democrats)

	Low Knowledge	High Knowledge
White MC | 2010	−0.010	−0.038***
	(0.007)	(0.009)
White MC | 2012	−0.012	−0.027**
	(0.007)	(0.009)
White MC | 2014	−0.011	−0.049***
	(0.007)	(0.009)
White MC | 2016	−0.010	−0.052***
	(0.007)	(0.009)
White MC | 2018	0.009	−0.118***
	(0.007)	(0.009)
White MC | 2020	0.002	−0.136***
	(0.009)	(0.010)
MC Seniority	0.021	0.064*
	(0.018)	(0.030)
MC Gender	0.027**	−0.002
	(0.009)	(0.017)
POC MC | 2008	−0.019	−0.070**
	(0.021)	(0.025)
POC MC | 2010	−0.034+	−0.050*
	(0.020)	(0.022)
POC MC | 2012	0.020	−0.052*
	(0.015)	(0.023)
POC MC | 2014	0.017	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.021)
POC MC | 2016	0.009	−0.00003
	(0.015)	(0.015)
POC MC | 2018	0.027*	0.050**
	(0.013)	(0.017)
POC MC | 2020	0.024	0.040*
	(0.015)	(0.019)
District * Party FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	83	86
N	66,466	52,498

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: Using the same model specifications as in Figure 1, we present the effect of having a POC MC on MC approval over time, but here we split the sample into high- and low-knowledge respondents. High-knowledge respondents were able to identify the party of their MC and low-knowledge respondents could not.

We also explore whether the relationship between attitudes towards POC MCs, racial resentment, and approval differ by knowledge levels. Again, the relationship is strongest among high knowledge individuals.

Table A6.2: Effect of POC MC on MC Approval, Interacting MC Race with Racial Resentment for High and Low Knowledge Respondents (White Respondents)

	High Knowledge	Low Knowledge
POC MC	0.065^{**}	0.040^{*}
	(0.023)	(0.018)
POC MC x Racial Resentment	-0.185^{***}	-0.074^{**}
	(0.028)	(0.023)
Racial Resentment	0.248^{***}	-0.098^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.009)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y
Congressional session FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	18	20
N	23,585	28,378

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: Using the same model specifications as in Table 1.1, we present the effect of having a POC MC interacted with racial resentment on MC approval, but we split the sample into high- and low-knowledge respondents.

Finally, while exploring these patterns with measures of constituents' perceptions of MC race would be preferable, there are not enough respondents who answered the question about racial identification of MCs to run the same analyses.[1] However, we do include a table to show the high rates at which respondents were able to identify the race of their MCs when they responded to this question. Constituents asked this question appear to not be guessing their MC race, but rather identifying MC race correctly more often than not (far better than a coin flip).

Table A6.3: Percentage of respondents who correctly identify their MC's Race (split by MC race)

MC Race	Pct. respondents who identify correctly
Asian	36.36
Black	72.61
Hispanic	64.86
White	87.56

[1]The CCES codebooks have separate values for skipped responses and whether a respondent was not asked, but when the data are downloaded, these values are not coded separately, so we include skipped responses in our understanding of not asked.

A7. Racial Resentment and Ideology Over Time

Figure A7.1: Average Racial Resentment Over Time by Respondent Party (White Respondents)



Note: We present average levels of racial resentment over time among Democratic and Republican respondents, using our 0-1 racial resentment index.

Figure A7.2: Average Ideology Over Time



Note: We present the average self-placed ideology among Democratic and Republican respondents to the CCES over time.

A8. Effect of POC/Black MC on Approval and by Racial Resentment

Table A8.1: Effects of POC/Black MC on MC Approval, Interacting MC Race with Racial Resentment (White Democratic Respondents)

	MC approval	
	POC MC	Black MC
POC MC	0.133***	
	(0.023)	
POC MC x Racial Resentment	−0.257***	
	(0.027)	
Black MC		0.163***
		(0.027)
Black MC x Resentment		−0.333***
		(0.024)
Racial Resentment	0.113***	0.112***
	(0.015)	(0.015)
MC Seniority	−0.021	−0.034
	(0.033)	(0.037)
MC Gender	−0.003	−0.009
	(0.018)	(0.021)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y
Congressional session FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	20	8
N	52,079	48,548

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: We present the full set of coefficients, including those on controls, for the models presented in Table 1.1 in the main paper.

Table A8.2: Effects of POC/Black MC on MC Approval, Interacting MC Race with Strength of Democratic identification (White Respondents)

	MC approval	
	POC MC	Black MC
POC MC	-0.057^{*} (0.027)	
POC MC x Party ID Strength	0.048^{***} (0.006)	
Black MC		-0.040 (0.036)
Black MC x Party ID Strength		0.060^{***} (0.008)
Party ID Strength	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)
MC Seniority	-0.014 (0.031)	0.006 (0.034)
MC Gender	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.023)
District * MC Party FEs	Y	Y
Congressional session FEs	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	20	7
N	74,710	69,299

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: We present the full set of coefficients, including those on controls, for the models presented in Table 1.2 in the main paper.

Table A8.3: Effect of Lagged and Led MC Race on MC Approval

	Democratic Respondents	Republican Respondents
POC MC 2-yr Lag	0.009	0.042**
	(0.015)	(0.013)
POC MC 1-yr Lag	−0.025	−0.030
	(0.020)	(0.022)
POC MC = 1	0.009	0.015
	(0.021)	(0.020)
POC MC 1-yr Lead	−0.012	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.012)
POC MC 2-yr Lead	0.022	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.019)
MC Seniority	0.011	−0.001
	(0.032)	(0.034)
MC Gender	0.006	0.017
	(0.022)	(0.027)
Congress FE	X	X
MC Party x Dist FE	X	X
N	52,138	53,578

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

Note: We present models regressing MC approval on one and two-year lag and lead versions of the POC MC indicator. We include 'District x MC Party' and 'Congress' fixed effects and add controls for MC seniority and MC gender with standard errors clustered at the congressional district level for weighted CCES data from even years between 2008 and 2020. To interpret the estimates in Table A8.1 as causal, the assumption of parallel trends must be satisfied, but this assumption is not directly testable. Instead, we perform a placebo test with lag and lead versions of the POC MC variable. A limited number of estimates are statistically significant in this table. We are unconcerned with the significant effect because 1) we should expect that around one in 20 estimates is significant by chance, and 2) lags might be significant if there is continuous treatment, like an MC remaining in office. This table lends support to the assumption of parallel trends.

Figure A8.1: Relationship Between Racial Resentment and Approval by Year for White Democrats with POC and White Democratic MCs



Note: The figure displays the relationship between racial resentment and approval of POC and white Democratic MCs in each year in our data. This relationship is stable over time, indicating that the shift in relative approval of POC MCs is a result of shifts in the average level of racial resentment among white Democrats rather than a increasingly strong relationship between racial resentment and relative approval of POC compared to white MCs.

Figure A8.2: Relationship Between Average Change in Racial Resentment and Average Change in Approval for White Democrats with POC and White Democratic MCs



Note: The figure displays the relationship between the average change in racial resentment and average change in approval of POC and white Democratic MCs. We take the mean of the change between each pair of years (e.g., 2012 to 2014, 2014 to 2016, etc.) for both approval and racial resentment to compare how the change is associated for both POC and White Democractic MCs. Available upon request are Z-test results showing significant differences between approval ratings for POC and White MCs at both the high and low resentment levels. This demonstrates that decreasing resentment is associated with increasing approval for POC MCs. Increasing resentment is associated with decreasing approval. We removed an outlier POC MC point from Alaska (maintained POC MC for all Congresses included here).

A9. Partisan Strength

Table A9.1: Effects of POC MC on MC Approval by Year and Party Strength

	Lean Democrat	Weak Democrat	Strong Democrat
White MC | 2010	-0.024^{*}	-0.020^{+}	-0.018^{*}
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.008)
White MC | 2012	0.004	-0.007	-0.022^{*}
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
White MC | 2014	-0.022^{+}	-0.010	-0.039^{***}
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)
White MC | 2016	-0.020^{+}	-0.027^{*}	-0.031^{***}
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)
White MC | 2018	-0.060^{***}	-0.035^{**}	-0.071^{***}
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.009)
White MC | 2020	-0.058^{***}	-0.053^{***}	-0.077^{***}
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.010)
MC Seniority	0.016	0.050^{+}	-0.008
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.023)
MC Gender	0.018	0.003	0.020^{+}
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
POC MC | 2008	-0.067^{*}	-0.061	-0.057^{*}
	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.023)
POC MC | 2010	-0.048	-0.039^{+}	-0.049^{*}
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.022)
POC MC | 2012	-0.027	-0.014	0.001
	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.021)
POC MC | 2014	-0.012	0.002	0.037^{+}
	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.019)
POC MC | 2016	-0.024	0.004	0.020
	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.018)
POC MC | 2018	0.072^{**}	0.046^{*}	0.057^{**}
	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.017)
POC MC | 2020	0.061^{**}	0.054^{**}	0.071^{***}
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.019)
District * Party FEs	Y	Y	Y
No. districts w MC race change	85	86	86
N	28,910	28,946	61,534

+p < 0.1; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

Note: This table correspondents to Figure 4 in the paper. We regress MC Approval on the interaction between even survey years and the indicator for POC MC. We subset the data using a measure of self-proclaimed partisan strength for white Democrats. The measure includes partisan leaners, weak partisans, and strong partisans. The models include 'District x MC Party' fixed effects and controls for MC seniority and MC gender. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All models include CCES survey weights.

A10. Education Difference Between White and POC MCs Over Time

Figure A10.1: Educational Difference of POC vs. White MCs Over Time



Note: Another possible explanation for increasing approval of POC MCs could be that these MCs are more effective legislators, and therefore constituents approve more highly of them because of their effectiveness in office. This would be consistent with the Jackie Robinson theory of female legislators' effectiveness (seee Anzia and Berry 2011): if POC are discriminated against during elections or even expect discrimination, only the most qualified POC run and win office. Therefore, POC MCs will be more qualified than than their white colleagues, and this should translate into greater effectiveness in office as well. For this theory to explain our results, POC MCs would need to be getting consistently more effective, or more qualified, over time. However, we find no significant changes over time in POC MCs' educational backgrounds, a commonly-used measure of qualification for office-holders, presented visually above, nor does the average educational attainment of POC MCs relative to white MCs change during this period. We collected MC education from Carnes (2016) and by hand, using MC websites, Wikipedia, campaign websites, and news articles.

Appendix B

Chapter 2

B1. Growth in number of Black House members

Table B1.1: Proportion of majority-white U.S. House districts with a Black Representative by year, controlling for voting age population percent white

	Dependent variable:				
	Black representative			Pct. white	
	Majority-white districts	Majority-Black districts	Other majority-minority districts	Majority-white districts	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
2010	0.005 (0.013)	0.055 (0.087)	0.035 (0.102)	0.003 (0.013)	−0.006 (0.008)
2012	0.014 (0.013)	0.098 (0.087)	−0.072 (0.097)	0.007 (0.013)	−0.026** (0.009)
2014	0.009 (0.013)	0.140 (0.088)	−0.057 (0.093)	0.0003 (0.013)	−0.031*** (0.009)
2016	0.013 (0.014)	0.102 (0.086)	−0.127 (0.090)	0.004 (0.013)	−0.031*** (0.009)
2018	0.034* (0.014)	0.094 (0.088)	−0.120 (0.089)	0.024 (0.013)	−0.036*** (0.009)
2020	0.046*** (0.014)	0.094 (0.088)	−0.120 (0.089)	0.034* (0.013)	−0.041*** (0.009)
2022	0.048*** (0.014)	0.119 (0.098)	−0.058 (0.088)	0.034* (0.013)	−0.050*** (0.009)
Pct. white				−0.282*** (0.029)	
Constant	0.013 (0.009)	0.815*** (0.059)	0.333*** (0.073)	0.243*** (0.025)	0.811*** (0.006)
Observations	2,829	178	476	2,829	2,829
R^2	0.009	0.019	0.013	0.042	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.007	−0.021	−0.002	0.039	0.017

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Reference category is 2008. Percent white scaled 0-1.

Candidate race and elite fundraising

I extended a dataset compiled by Sorensen and Chen (2022) that includes the campaign receipts from the top Democratic and top Republican vote-getter in each Congressional election.

Sorensen and Chen's dataset includes elections from 2010 to 2018; to cover the 2020 and 2022 elections, I gathered FEC data; Daily Kos data on general election candidates; and supplementary information on candidates from Ballotpedia, Project VoteSmart, the 2019 ACS, and biographies on candidates' and MCs' professional websites. For the purpose of this analysis, I restricted the dataset to Black and white Democratic candidates in majority-white districts. The quantity of interest is the marginal effect of a candidate being Black compared to white on campaign receipts.

Table B1.2: PAC and other committee receipts from Black and white Democratic frontrunners in majority-white Congressional districts, 2010-2022.

	Dependent variable:	
	Receipts from PACs and committees	
	(1)	(2)
2012	−159.503*** (33.310)	66.605** (20.218)
2014	−152.423*** (38.272)	64.413** (21.349)
2016	−160.830*** (38.092)	68.621** (22.299)
2018	−151.280*** (37.012)	96.500*** (25.823)
2020	96.404 (52.722)	444.495*** (94.742)
2022	162.831 (91.289)	517.824*** (131.411)
Female		−16.584 (28.690)
Folded Cook index		559.341*** (30.092)
Incumbent		648.266*** (56.307)
Open seat		48.722** (17.635)
District pct. college		−130.927 (148.985)
District HH income		356.002* (146.193)
District pct. non-Hispanic white		−82.606 (65.722)
Seniority		119.071 (244.597)
Leadership		318.065*** (69.743)
Committee chair		77.765 (70.009)
Prior elected office		84.790*** (19.438)
2010 | Black	−309.351*** (65.112)	−33.186 (55.670)
2012 | Black	−109.834 (68.978)	−30.927 (35.652)
2014 | Black	−140.549 (76.838)	−28.190 (33.297)
2016 | Black	−66.873 (81.933)	−38.568 (51.621)
2018 | Black	−45.409 (68.291)	−10.012 (34.429)
2020 | Black	−267.838** (87.913)	−97.604* (46.556)
2022 | Black	−456.293*** (102.982)	−216.547** (77.334)
Constant	494.210*** (29.873)	−230.496* (95.546)
Observations	1,760	1,759
R^2	0.048	0.520
Adjusted R^2	0.041	0.513

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Data are from the Federal Election Commission, Daily Kos, Ballotpedia, Project VoteSmart, the 2019 ACS, and candidates' and MCs' professional websites. Omitted category is white male challengers to incumbents without prior elected experience. Outcome is scaled in thousands of dollars. All independent variables scaled 0-1.

B2. Candidate choice experiment meta-analysis

Table B2.1: Features of conjoint experiments included in meta-analysis

Study	Year	Label	Attributes	N Black Dems	N white Dems	N white Reps	N conjoint rounds	Signal of race	Election
McDermott 1998	1989	LA Times	Birthplace, occupational status, marital status, number of children	81	414	232	1	Only Black candidate verbally identified	Presidential
Weaver 2012	2004	KN	Race and issue stances on economic growth, health care, education, public safety, and the environment		256	253	1	Photograph	Senate
Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014	2012	MTurk	Religion, college education, profession, annual income, racial/ethnic background, age		57		6	Listed in conjoint table	Presidential
Hopkins 2014	2013	GfK	Party affiliation, issue position (reduce taxes, improve schools, reduce crime, improve health care, reduce government spending, reduce global warming), issue position (restrict/protect abortion access, restrict/allow same-sex marriage, protect/restrict gun ownership/access), religion, annual income, race/ethnicity, gender		178	219	7	Listed in conjoint table	President, governor, mayor
Carnes and Lupu 2016	2015	YouGov	Gender, education, party, race, occupational background	35	141	120	1	Listed in conjoint table	City council, state legislature, mayor, governor
Sances 2018	2016	Facebook	Race, policy position on taxes, lives in respondent's neighborhood, experience in local government		76	93	1	Listed in conjoint table	Mayoral
Kirkland and Coppock 2018	2016	MTurk	Party (50% of profiles), gender, race, age, job experience, political experience	36	345	172	5	Listed in conjoint table	Unspecified
Lemi 2021	2016	Qualtrics	Race (includes multi-racial candidates; all candidates with Black included in racial identity coded as Black; "white" coded as non-Hispanic white only), gender, party, ideology, political experience	138	67	40	10	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional
Mummolo, Peterson and Westwood 2021	2016	Research Now/SSI	Partisanship, issue positions, gender, race	266	1766	1287	7	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional

Table B2.1: Features of conjoint experiments included in meta-analysis *(continued)*

Study	Year	Label	Attributes	N Black Dems	N white Dems	N white Reps	N conjoint rounds	Signal of race	Election
Leeper and Robison 2020	2016	SSI	Age, race, sex, religion, occupation, party, military service, education, positions on TPP, deploying ground troops to combat ISIS, cap and trade, increase taxes on those making >$250k, path to citizenship	42	261	225	5	Listed in conjoint table	Presidential
Ono and Burden 2019	2016	SSI 2	Gender, race, age, marital status, experience in public office, personality trait, party, policy stances, polling information	158	415	449	10	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional
Peterson 2017	2016	SSI 3	Partisanship and education (always); abortion stance, gender, family status, race, age, spending on government services, profession, military service (number and type of pieces of information randomly assigned)	58	124	236	3	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional
Dowling 2019	2016	YouGov	Name (gender and race), occupation, marital status, political experience, number of children, years lived in district, military experience, position on political compromise, description of moral values, policy position on food stamps, paid family leave, abortion, or gun laws	108	431	440	8	Name of candidate	Party primary election for seat in state legislature
Henderson, Dancey and Sheagley 2019; Theodoridis 2019	2016	YouGov 2	Gender, race, religion, occupation, personality trait, endorsement, priorities if elected	146	556	560	8 (Yale) /4 (UCM)	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Kirkland and Coppock 2018	2016	YouGov 3	Party (50% of profiles), gender, race, age, job experience, political experience	45	215	208	5	Listed in conjoint table	Unspecified
Atkeson and Hamel 2020	2017	MTurk	Occupation, race, gender, incumbency status, party affiliation	23	170	104	3	Listed in conjoint table	School board
Magni and Reynolds 2021	2018	Cint	Sexual orientation, gender, race, religion, education, age, health, political experience	102	204	408	5	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional
Funck and McCabe 2022	2018	Lucid	News coverage, party, gender, race, profession, religion, age, abortion stance, government spending stance, immigration stance (all except news coverage, party, and race randomly assigned to be shown or not)	44	150	159	3	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional

Table B2.1: Features of conjoint experiments included in meta-analysis *(continued)*

Study	Year	Label	Attributes	N Black Dems	N white Dems	N white Reps	N conjoint rounds	Signal of race	Election
Costa 2021	2018	Lucid 2	Gender, race, latest tweet (about out-party, border security, or Medicare for all), responsiveness to constituent mail	20	354	254	6	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional
Harden 2020	2018	YouGov	Religion, education, occupation, military service, gender, race, party, priority if elected	177	740	833	5	Listed in conjoint table	State legislators
Manento and Testa 2021	2019	MTurk	Age, gender, race, district competitiveness, occupation, previous political experience, ideology, endorsements	48	586	303	5	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Agadjanian et al. 2023	2019	Qualtrics	Race, age, years of relevant experience, writing sample, strength of references, gender, institution granting graduate degree, strength of communication skills		1886	2121	10	Listed in conjoint table	Municipality chief executive (hiring decision)
Green et al. 2022	2019	YouGov	Gender, age, race, healthcare policy, environmental policy, focus on moderates/base, establishment/outsider background	573	2188	68	5	Listed in conjoint table	Democratic presidential primary
Clayton 2020	2019	YouGov 2	Positions on judicial deference, impartial investigations, compromise, and ballot access; gender, race, partisanship, tax policy, discrimination a problem	201	728	559	8	Name of candidate	Unspecified
Khanna 2019	2019	YouGov 3	Age, race, gender, job title, social class, home region	803	2809		Unspecified	Listed in conjoint table	Democratic presidential primary
Henderson and Goggin 2022	2020	YouGov	Gender, race, religion, occupation, priorities if elected	118	431	420	6	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Harden and Layman 2022	2020	YouGov 2	Traumatic event response overseen as mayor (type of event, number dead, cost, identity of victims, action in response to event); party; gender; race	50	183	191	5	Listed in conjoint table	Senate
Harden and Layman 2022	2020	YouGov 3	Age, race, sex, occupation, party, influence	222	691	735	5	Listed in conjoint table	State legislative

Table B2.1: Features of conjoint experiments included in meta-analysis *(continued)*

Study	Year	Label	Attributes	N Black Dems	N white Dems	N white Reps	N conjoint rounds	Signal of race	Election
Lucid 1	2022	Lucid	Age, race, occupation, political experience, endorsement, policy positions on healthcare, fossil fuels, and reparations		469		1	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Lucid 2	2023	Lucid	Age, race, occupation, political experience, endorsement, policy positions on healthcare, fossil fuels, and reparations (1/3 of sample) or ideological self-placement (2/3 of sample)		1852		1	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Lucid 3	2023	Lucid 2	Age, race, occupation, political experience, endorsement, ideological self-placement		254		1	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
Lucid 4	2023	Lucid 3	Age, race, gender, occupation, political experience, endorsement, policy positions on healthcare, fossil fuels, and reparations		153		1	Listed in conjoint table	Congressional primary
California voter survey	2023	CA voter file	Age, race, gender, occupation, political experience, endorsement, ideological self-placement	69	808	213	1	Listed in conjoint table	Indicate preferred Congressional representative

Table B2.2: Marginal means for Black candidates with white opponents by partisanship and race of respondents.

	Black candidate selected					
Study	Black Democratic respondents	N	White Democratic respondents	N	White Republican respondents	N
1989 LA Times	0.531 (0.056)	81	0.309*** (0.023)	414	0.349** (0.031)	232
2004 KN			0.441 (0.031)	256	0.534 (0.031)	253
2012 MTurk			0.52 (0.071)	50		
2013 GFK			0.53 (0.039)	168	0.424 (0.035)	205
2015 YouGov			0.598* (0.049)	102	0.529 (0.054)	87
2016 Facebook			0.573 (0.057)	75	0.44 (0.052)	91
2016 MTurk	0.6 (0.112)	44	0.545 (0.037)	279	0.536 (0.055)	185
2016 Qualtrics	0.667*** (0.04)	138	0.418 (0.061)	67	0.375 (0.078)	40
2016 Research Now/SSI	0.589** (0.03)	270	0.461 (0.014)	1346	0.402*** (0.012)	1784
2016 SSI	0.5 (0.082)	38	0.505 (0.035)	204	0.463 (0.034)	216
2016 SSI 2	0.57 (0.04)	158	0.482 (0.025)	415	0.465 (0.024)	449
2016 SSI 3			0.468 (0.064)	62	0.436 (0.046)	117
2016 YouGov	0.581 (0.048)	105	0.505 (0.024)	420	0.433 (0.024)	430
2016 YouGov 2	0.616** (0.04)	269	0.484 (0.021)	1007	0.471 (0.021)	966
2016 YouGov 3	0.583 (0.103)	44	0.587 (0.052)	279	0.426 (0.049)	185
2017 MTurk			0.494 (0.038)	170	0.452 (0.049)	104
2018 Cint	0.569 (0.07)	51	0.541 (0.041)	146	0.475 (0.035)	204
2018 Lucid	0.5 (0.076)	44	0.413 (0.04)	150	0.497 (0.04)	159
2018 Lucid 2	0.667** (0.052)	84	0.484 (0.031)	254	0.477 (0.027)	354
2018 YouGov	0.626*** (0.037)	174	0.553** (0.018)	730	0.485 (0.018)	814
2019 MTurk	0.771*** (0.061)	48	0.565** (0.02)	586	0.488 (0.029)	303
2019 Qualtrics			0.552*** (0.011)	1886	0.517 (0.011)	2121
2019 YouGov	0.619*** (0.02)	565	0.51 (0.011)	2170	0.485 (0.062)	66
2019 YouGov 2	0.443 (0.035)	201	0.49 (0.019)	728	0.479 (0.021)	559
2019 YouGov 3	0.725*** (0.017)	803	0.558*** (0.01)	2809		
2020 YouGov	0.576 (0.046)	269	0.524 (0.024)	1007	0.479 (0.024)	966
2020 YouGov 2	0.583 (0.072)	48	0.596** (0.036)	183	0.466 (0.036)	189
2020 YouGov 3	0.67*** (0.032)	221	0.584*** (0.019)	683	0.483 (0.018)	748
2022 Lucid			0.554* (0.023)	469		
2023 CA voter file	0.638 (0.071)	47	0.63*** (0.021)	543	0.503 (0.039)	169
2023 Lucid			0.559*** (0.011)	1999		
2023 Lucid 2			0.498 (0.03)	273		
2023 Lucid 3			0.595* (0.04)	153		

Note:
$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. P-values for rates of support indicate significance of difference from 0.5.

Table B2.3: Marginal means for Black candidates with white opponents by partisanship and race of respondents by year.

	Black candidate selected					
Year	Black Democratic respondents	N	White Democratic respondents	N	White Republican respondents	N
2016	0.599*** (0.016)	1066	0.485 (0.009)	4154	0.431*** (0.008)	4463
2018	0.614*** (0.026)	353	0.522 (0.014)	1280	0.483 (0.013)	1531
2019	0.655*** (0.012)	1617	0.538*** (0.006)	8179	0.506 (0.009)	3049
2020	0.633*** (0.024)	538	0.566*** (0.014)	1873	0.479 (0.014)	1903
2023			0.569*** (0.009)	2968		

Note:
$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. P-values for rates of support indicate significance of difference from 0.5.

Table B2.4: Conjoint design and support for Black candidates.

Design attribute	Black candidate selected
Branch of government	
Legislative	0.025 (0.029)
Executive	-0.026 (0.028)
Level of government	
State	-0.011 (0.033)
National	-0.06 (0.03)
Local	0.04 (0.037)
Candidate partisanship	
Republican	-0.094** (0.019)
Independent	0.13*** (0.025)
Democrat	0.071*** (0.017)
Etc.	
Number of candidate attributes	0.042 (0.027)
Both candidates same party	0.004 (0.011)
2018 and later	0.032*** (0.009)

Note:
$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. This table presents results from a single multivariate OLS regression model. Data are from studies included in meta-analysis conducted between 2018 and 2020, N = 16,250.

Table B2.5:]

Marginal means from original conjoint studies.

Attribute	Marginal mean	Black MM - white MM
Race (N=3,289)		
White	0.433*** (0.009)	
Black	0.567*** (0.009)	
Gender (N=714)		
Man	0.448* (0.012)	0.279*** (0.036)
Woman	0.556*** (0.013)	0.213*** (0.037)
Age (N=3,289)		
58	0.471 (0.013)	0.152*** (0.028)
47	0.497 (0.012)	0.136*** (0.027)
44	0.507 (0.013)	0.092** (0.028)
50	0.509 (0.013)	0.145*** (0.028)
55	0.514 (0.012)	0.146*** (0.027)
Occupation (N=3,008)		
Activist	0.478 (0.014)	0.109*** (0.031)
High school teacher	0.48 (0.014)	0.109*** (0.031)
Business executive	0.494 (0.015)	0.096** (0.032)
Lawyer	0.504 (0.015)	0.167*** (0.031)
Doctor	0.517 (0.014)	0.13*** (0.031)
College professor	0.523 (0.015)	0.124*** (0.032)
Political experience (N=3,289)		
No prior political experience	0.436*** (0.012)	0.14*** (0.027)
School Board Member	0.48 (0.013)	0.185*** (0.027)
Mayor of a small city	0.523 (0.012)	0.17*** (0.027)
State Legislator	0.53* (0.013)	0.08** (0.028)
Mayor of a large city	0.531* (0.012)	0.1*** (0.027)
Endorsement (N=3,289)		
Color of Change	0.457 (0.012)	0.125*** (0.025)
Black Lives Matter	0.476 (0.012)	0.108*** (0.025)
Common Cause	0.526* (0.012)	0.152*** (0.024)
Americans for Democratic Action	0.538** (0.012)	0.15*** (0.024)
Publicly funded healthcare (N=1,237)		
Elderly, poor, and disabled	0.387*** (0.014)	0.118*** (0.034)
Those who choose	0.517 (0.014)	0.221*** (0.035)
All Americans	0.59*** (0.014)	0.073* (0.033)
Fossil fuels (N=1,237)		
Tax fossil fuels	0.479 (0.014)	0.164*** (0.034)
Promote alternatives	0.509 (0.013)	0.156*** (0.033)
Ban fossil fuels	0.512 (0.015)	0.093** (0.036)
Reparations (N=1,237)		
Oppose	0.481 (0.01)	0.187*** (0.028)
Support	0.52* (0.01)	0.09** (0.029)
Candidate self-placement (N=2,052)		
Somewhat conservative	0.367*** (0.015)	0.103** (0.033)
Moderate	0.524 (0.016)	0.119*** (0.035)
Very liberal	0.525 (0.016)	0.147*** (0.035)
Somewhat liberal	0.54** (0.016)	0.129*** (0.035)
Liberal	0.545** (0.015)	0.149*** (0.034)

Note:
$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. P-values for rates of support indicate significance of difference from 0.5. Data are from Lucid studies 1-4 and the California voter survey. Ns indicate the number of participants presented with each attribute; each participate selected between one Black and one white candidate. There were 3,289 participants total. Ns for some characteristics are smaller because not all traits were presented in all studies. Candidate gender was presented only in Lucid Study 4. Occupation was presented to all participants, but a programming error resulted in a failure to record half of the randomly-assigned occupations in the California voter survey. Stances on healthcare, fossil fuel regulation, and reparations were presented in Lucid Study 1, 1/3 of the sample in Lucid Study 2, and Lucid Study 4. Ideological self-placement was presented in place of these policy stances in the remaining 2/3 of the sample in Lucid Study 2, Lucid Study 3, and the California voter survey.

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Age	50	55
Gender	Male	Male
Race	White	Black
Current job	College professor	College professor
Prior elected experience	Big-city Mayor	State Legislator
Endorsement	Black Lives Matter	Common Cause
Supports government healthcare for	All Americans	Americans who choose it over private health plans
Position on climate change	Impose a tax on using fossil fuels, reducing economic growth by 3%	Promote the use of renewable energy but allow continued use of fossil fuels
Position on reparations	Oppose	Oppose

Figure B3.1: Example conjoint table

B3. Original conjoint studies

Table B3.1: Wording of questions in original studies

Variable	Item
Explanatory variables	
Self-monitoring	When you are with other people, how often do you put on a show to impress or entertain them? *(Never, Once in a while, Some of the time, Most of the time, Always)* When you are in a group of people, how often are you the center of attention? *(Never, Once in a while, Some of the time, Most of the time, Always)* How good or poor of an actor would you be? *(Poor, Fair, Good, Excellent)*
Ideological self-placement	How would you describe your political views? *(Strongly conservative, Somewhat conservative, Moderate, Somewhat liberal, Strongly liberal)*
Ideological congruence with candidates	If you had to guess, how would you say Candidate [A/B]'s political views compare to your own? *(Much more conservative, Somewhat more conservative, Slightly more conservative, About the same, Slightly more liberal, Somewhat more liberal, Much more liberal)*
Strength of partisan identity	How would you describe your political party identification? *(Strong Republican, Mostly Republican, Lean Republican, Independent/other political affiliation, Lean Democrat, Mostly Democrat, Strong Democrat)*
White identity consciousness	*See Table H1 for all items in scale*
White identity valence	*See Table H1 for all items in scale*
Black feeling thermometer	Please rate how you feel about these groups using the feeling thermometer. (Black Americans) *(0-100 scale)*
Fear of people of other races	I often find myself fearful of people of other races. *(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)*
Perceptions of anti-Black discrimination	How much discrimination do you think each of the following groups face in the United States today? [Black Americans] *(A great deal, Quite a bit, A moderate amount, Only a little, Not at all)*
Racial resentment	Irish, Italian, and Jewish ethnicities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors. *(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)* Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class. *(Strongly agree, Somewhat agree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat disagree, Strongly disagree)*

Support for reparations	Do you think the United States federal government should or should not pay reparations for slavery and racial discrimination by making cash payments to the descendants of enslaved people? *(Should pay reparations, Should not pay reparations, Don't know)*
Dependent variables	
Candidate choice	Which candidate for Congress would you support in this Democratic Primary election? *(Candidate A, Candidate B)* Which of these profiles would you prefer to have as your representative in Congress? *(Candidate A, Candidate B)*
Importance of voting for people of color	When considering whom to support in political campaigns, how important is each of the following candidate qualities to you? [Is a person of color] *(Not at all important, Slightly important, Moderately important, Very important, Extremely important)*
Ideological placement of candidates	If you had to guess, how would you describe Candidate [A/B]'s political views in general? *(Strongly conservative, Somewhat conservative, Moderate, Somewhat liberal, Very liberal)*
Ratings of candidate's competitiveness	Please indicate how well you feel each phrase describes Candidate [A/B]. [Has a good chance of winning in the general election] *(Not well at all, Slightly well, Moderately well, Very well, Extremely well)* Please indicate how well you feel each phrase describes Candidate [A/B]. [Would perform well with swing voters] *(Not well at all, Slightly well, Moderately well, Very well, Extremely well)* Please indicate how well you feel each phrase describes Candidate [A/B]. [Would perform well with loyal Democratic voters] *(Not well at all, Slightly well, Moderately well, Very well, Extremely well)*

Table B3.2: Demographic characteristics in Lucid and CA voter samples compared to 2020 ANES.

	% of white Democratic respondents		
Demographics	Lucid samples	CA voter sample	ANES 2020
Age			
18-29	15	22	17
30-39	24	18	18
40-49	10	14	15
50-64	21	18	25
65+	31	27	26
Gender			
Female	55	57	55
Male	45	43	45
Household income			
$24,999 or less	19	8	8
$25k-$54,999	29	13	13
$55k-$79,999	23	14	19
$80k-$149,999	21	32	32
$150k or more	8	34	27
Education			
Less than HS	1	0	18
High school	14	3	22
Some college	31	19	25
Bachelor's degree	29	38	30
Post-secondary degree	24	39	4
Strength of Democratic identity			
Lean Democrat	23	20	28
Democrat	31	24	23
Strong Democrat	46	56	49

Note:
ANES data includes pre-election weights.

Table B3.3: Demographic characteristics and support for Black candidates among white Democrats.

	Black candidate selected				
Participant demographics	Age marginal means	Gender marginal means	Income marginal means	Education marginal means	Multivariate OLS regression coefficients
Age					
18-29	0.608*** (0.025)				
30-39	0.487 (0.019)				-0.12 (0.033)
40-49	0.508 (0.031)				-0.105 (0.041)
50-64	0.57*** (0.021)				-0.036 (0.034)
65+	0.582*** (0.017)				-0.024 (0.032)
Gender					
Male		0.54** (0.014)			
Female		0.564*** (0.013)			0.016 (0.02)
Household income					
$24,999 or less			0.575*** (0.022)		
$25k-$54,999			0.569*** (0.018)		-0.008 (0.029)
$55k-$79,999			0.544* (0.02)		-0.016 (0.032)
$80k-$149,999			0.535 (0.021)		-0.024 (0.032)
$150k or more			0.517 (0.035)		-0.038 (0.043)
Education					
Less than HS				0.588 (0.085)	
High school				0.548 (0.025)	-0.064 (0.093)
Some college				0.563*** (0.017)	-0.049 (0.091)
Bachelor's degree				0.546** (0.018)	-0.044 (0.092)
Post-secondary degree				0.552** (0.019)	-0.033 (0.093)
(Intercept)					0.659*** (0.093)
N	2717	2717	2644	2713	2640

Note:
$*p<0.05$; $**p<0.01$; $***p<0.001$. P-values for columns 1-4 indicate significance of difference from 0.5; p-values for column 5 indicate significance of difference from 0. Data are from Lucid studies 1-4.

B4. Virtue signaling

Table B4.1: Self-monitoring and importance of voting for POC/rate of selecting Black candidate

	Dependent variable:	
	Important to vote for POC	Black candidate selected
	(1)	(2)
Self-monitoring index	0.540^{***} (0.059)	-0.156^{***} (0.043)
Constant	0.187^{***} (0.022)	0.603^{***} (0.016)
Sample	Lucid 1	Lucid 1 + 2
Observations	469	2,467
R^2	0.153	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.151	0.005

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
All variables scaled 0-1.



Figure B4.1: Self-monitoring and support for Black candidates. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data in right panel are from Lucid study 1; data in left panel are from Lucid studies 1 and 2.

Table B4.2: Black vs. white conjoint round number and support for Black candidates in re-analyzed experiments conducted 2018-2020.

	Dependent variable:	
	Black candidate selected	
	(1)	(2)
# choice	−0.004 (0.009)	
First choice		0.541*** (0.041)
Second choice		0.506*** (0.041)
Third choice		0.523*** (0.041)
Fourth choice		0.468*** (0.041)
Fifth choice		0.538*** (0.040)
Constant	0.530*** (0.041)	
Observations	1,519	1,519
Log Likelihood	−1,102.094	−1,105.951
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,212.188	2,225.901
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	2,233.491	2,263.182
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	
	Models include study random effects.	

B5. Using race as a proxy for ideology

Table B5.1: Shifts in ideology and Democratic identity strength among white Democrats

	Dependent variable:		
	Ideology (2008-2022)	Democratic ID strength (2008-2022)	Democratic ID strength (2014-2022)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2022	-0.104^{***} (0.011)	0.024 (0.021)	0.086^{***} (0.020)
Constant	0.415^{***} (0.008)	0.530^{***} (0.016)	0.467^{***} (0.015)
Observations	1,549	1,576	1,661
R^2	0.059	0.001	0.011
Adjusted R^2	0.058	0.0002	0.011

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Data are from the General Social Survey. Ideology and Democratic ID scaled from 0 (extremely liberal/lean Democrat) to 1 (extremely conservative/strong Democrat). Data weighted using person post-stratification weights.

Table B5.2: Marginal effect of ideological incongruence on proportion selecting Black candidate

	Dependent variable:
	Black candidate selected
Absolute ideological distance	-0.498^{***} (0.031)
Absolute ideological distance | Black candidate	0.295^{***} (0.042)
Constant	0.632^{***} (0.010)
Observations	3,626
R^2	0.059
Adjusted R^2	0.058

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Data are from Lucid study 2 and the California voter survey. Absolute ideological distance scaled from 0 (perfect congruence) to 1 (maximum incongruence). Standard errors clustered at participant level.

Table B5.3: Rates of support for Black and white candidates in conjoint task by ideological congruence with the participant relative to their opponent.

Relative congruence	Rate of support for Black candidates	N	Rate of support for white candidates	N	Black - white difference
Results presented in paper					
-1.00	0.25 (0.105)	10	0.154 (0.13)	13	0.096 (0.149)
-0.75	0.268* (0.056)	71	0.222** (0.055)	74	0.045 (0.072)
-0.50	0.347** (0.034)	199	0.241*** (0.034)	197	0.106* (0.046)
-0.25	0.448 (0.025)	362	0.277*** (0.025)	362	0.171*** (0.035)
0.00	0.609*** (0.02)	533	0.391*** (0.02)	533	0.219*** (0.03)
0.25	0.723*** (0.025)	362	0.552* (0.025)	362	0.171*** (0.035)
0.50	0.759*** (0.034)	197	0.653*** (0.034)	199	0.106* (0.046)
0.75	0.778*** (0.055)	74	0.732*** (0.056)	71	0.045 (0.072)
1.00	0.846** (0.13)	13	0.75* (0.105)	10	0.096 (0.149)
Results including "conservative" and "very conservative" participants					
-1.00	0.238 (0.103)	21	0.214 (0.126)	14	0.024 (0.149)
-0.75	0.263** (0.054)	76	0.259** (0.052)	83	0.004 (0.071)
-0.50	0.348** (0.033)	210	0.242*** (0.033)	209	0.106* (0.045)
-0.25	0.449 (0.025)	373	0.285*** (0.025)	373	0.163*** (0.035)
0.00	0.607*** (0.02)	542	0.393*** (0.02)	542	0.213*** (0.03)
0.25	0.715*** (0.025)	373	0.551* (0.025)	373	0.163*** (0.035)
0.50	0.758*** (0.033)	209	0.652*** (0.033)	210	0.106* (0.045)
0.75	0.741*** (0.052)	83	0.737*** (0.054)	76	0.004 (0.071)
1.00	0.786* (0.126)	14	0.762* (0.103)	21	0.024 (0.149)

Note:

$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. P-values for rates of support indicate significance of difference from 0.5. Congruence is scaled from -1 (opponent is perfectly congruent and candidate is as far as possible from the participant) to 1 (candidate is perfectly congruent and opponent is as far as possible from the participant). Data are from Lucid study 2 and the California voter survey.

Table B5.4: Candidate race and ideological self-placement and participants' perceptions of ideological congruence

	Dependent variable:	
	Participant's placement of candidate relative to self	Participant's rating of how well candidate represents them
	(1)	(2)
Black candidate	0.024^{**} (0.009)	-0.021 (0.012)
Moderate	0.163^{***} (0.014)	0.148^{***} (0.018)
Somewhat liberal	0.239^{***} (0.014)	0.168^{***} (0.018)
Liberal	0.291^{***} (0.014)	0.190^{***} (0.018)
Very liberal	0.368^{***} (0.014)	0.169^{***} (0.018)
Constant	0.293^{***} (0.011)	0.359^{***} (0.014)
Observations	2,367	2,373
R^2	0.260	0.058
Adjusted R^2	0.259	0.056

Note: $^{*}p<0.05$; $^{**}p<0.01$; $^{***}p<0.001$
Data are from Lucid study 2. First DV is participant's placement of candidate relative to themselves where 0 = much more conservative and 1 = much more liberal. Reference categories are white candidate and candidate is "somewhat conservative." Standard errors clustered at respondent level.

B6. Partisanship and support for Black candidates

Table B6.1: Support for Black vs white Democratic primary candidates conditional on general election competitiveness, white Democratic respondents only.

	Black candidate selected
General election will likely be a tossup	0.532 (0.036)
This district leans towards Democrats in general elections	0.582* (0.034)
This district solidly favors Democrats in general elections	0.579* (0.036)
N	586

Note:
This table presents results of a bivariate OLS regression model. $*p<0.05$; $**p<0.01$; $***p<0.001$. P-values indicate significance of difference from 0.5. Data are from Manento and Testa (2022).



Figure B6.1: Support for Black candidates as predicted by Democratic party ID strength and feeling thermometer ratings of Presidents Biden and Trump. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from Lucid study 2.

B7. White identity and support for Black candidates

Table B7.1: Time trend in white Democrats' responses to the question "How important is being white to your identity?", 2012-2020

	Dependent variable:
	Importance of being white to identity
2016	-0.064^{***} (0.011)
2020	-0.146^{***} (0.010)
Constant	0.435^{***} (0.007)
Observations	5,224
R^2	0.042
Adjusted R^2	0.041

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Dependent variable is scaled from 0 (not at all important) to 1 (extremely important). Reference year is 2012. Data are from the American National Election Study. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

Table B7.2: White identity consciousness and identity valence items

	Mean	Standard deviation	N
White identity consciousness ($\alpha = 0.81$)			
How important is being white to your identity? (not important — extremely important)	0.397	0.336	2000
How much would you say that whites in this country have little in common with one another? (nothing at all — a great deal)	0.497	0.238	2000
How often do you think of yourself as being white? (never — almost always)	0.491	0.314	2000
How much would you say that being white factors into your political decision making? (not at all — a great deal)	0.245	0.302	2000
How much do you think that what happens genereally to the white people in this country will have something to do with your life? (not at all — a great deal)	0.396	0.289	2000
White identity valence ($\alpha = 0.78$)			
Part I:			
"Please indicate the extent to which you think being white has affected your life in the following areas, from making things much harder (0) to making things much easier (1):"			
Doing well in school	0.647	0.208	1999
Getting a job	0.695	0.231	1999
Interactions with the government like police, politicians, etc.	0.743	0.225	1999
How you're treated by strangers	0.719	0.225	1999
Part II:			
"Please tell us how strongly you agree (1) or disagree (0) with the following statements:"			
Whites in this country generally find their experiences and shared history to be positively reflected in school textbooks and classroom materials.	0.703	0.255	2000
Through no fault of their own, whites in this country are economically losing ground now compared to in the past. (reverse-scaled)	0.574	0.292	1999
Whites in this country have a great deal of political power and the government is responsive to the needs of white people.	0.687	0.262	2000
In recent years, whites in this country have been losing the respect and status that they are owed by society. (reverse-scaled)	0.663	0.301	1999

Note:
Data are from Lucid Study 2.

Table B7.3: White identity consciousness and valence and support for Black candidates

	Dependent variable:				
	Black candidate selected				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
White ID consciousness	-0.360^{***}			0.005	-0.296^{***}
	(0.051)			(0.215)	(0.080)
White ID valence (continuous)		0.271^{***}		0.571^{***}	
		(0.071)		(0.142)	
Above-median valence			0.080^{***}		0.177^{***}
			(0.023)		(0.047)
Consciousness * valence (continuous)				-0.566	
				(0.298)	
Consciousness * above-median valence					-0.173
					(0.104)
Constant	0.706^{***}	0.375^{***}	0.519^{***}	0.328^{***}	0.628^{***}
	(0.024)	(0.050)	(0.017)	(0.099)	(0.034)
Observations	1,852	1,852	1,852	1,852	1,852
R^2	0.026	0.008	0.007	0.040	0.039
Adjusted R^2	0.026	0.007	0.006	0.039	0.038
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001				
	All variables scaled 0-1.				



Figure B7.1: Interactions between white ID consciousness and valence/image shame. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from Lucid study 2.

B8. Racial affect and support for Black candidates

Table B8.1: Feeling thermometer ratings of Black Americans by participant race and partisanship, 2008-2020.

	Dependent variable:		
	Feeling thermometer rating		
	White Democrats	Black Democrats	White Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)
2012	-0.048^{***} (0.012)	-0.023 (0.014)	-0.053^{***} (0.011)
2016	0.020 (0.012)	-0.015 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.012)
2020	0.066^{***} (0.011)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.018 (0.011)
Constant	0.713^{***} (0.010)	0.886^{***} (0.012)	0.665^{***} (0.010)
Observations	3,459	1,713	4,196
R^2	0.052	0.003	0.020
Adjusted R^2	0.052	0.001	0.019

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Feeling thermometer is scaled from 0 (coldest) to 1 (warmest). Data are from the American National Election Study. Models are estimated using person post-stratification weights.

Table B8.2: White Democrats' racial affect and support for Black candidates

	Dependent variable:	
	Black candidate selected	
	(1)	(2)
Black feeling thermometer	0.199 (0.108)	
Fearful of people of other races		-0.136 (0.088)
Constant	0.477^{***} (0.088)	0.655^{***} (0.027)
Sample	CA voters	CA voters
Observations	519	527
R^2	0.007	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.003

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Independent variables and support for Black candidates scaled from 0-1.



Figure B8.1: Racial affect and support for Black candidates. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from the California voter survey.



Figure B8.2: Support for Black candidates by district population proportion Black and POC. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Data are from the California voter survey.

B9. Perceptions of racial injustice and support for Black candidates

Table B9.1: White Democrats' racial attitudes, 2008-2022

	Dependent variable:								
	Inequality is mainly due to discrimination			Blacks should work their way up without special favors			Government has special obligation to improve living conditions of Blacks		
	White Democrats	Black Democrats	White Republicans	White Democrats	Black Democrats	White Republicans	White Democrats	Black Democrats	White Republicans
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
2010	0.024	0.087	−0.008	−0.039	−0.002	0.020	0.002	−0.035	−0.001
	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.018)
2012	0.030	−0.039	−0.013	−0.045*	0.005	0.013	−0.026	−0.067*	−0.042*
	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.019)
2014	0.060	0.070	−0.027	−0.062**	−0.046	−0.003	−0.018	0.003	−0.011
	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.028)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.017)
2016	0.153***	0.081	0.006	−0.173***	−0.036	−0.026	0.134***	0.053	0.038*
	(0.030)	(0.051)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.040)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.017)
2018	0.223***	0.160**	0.022	−0.218***	−0.172***	−0.063***	0.146***	0.079*	0.067***
	(0.033)	(0.051)	(0.028)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.017)
2021	0.422***	0.316***	−0.019	−0.361***	−0.219***	−0.049**	0.261***	0.189***	0.005
	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.037)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.016)
2022	0.392***	0.224***	0.026	−0.372***	−0.132***	−0.103***	0.240***	0.080*	0.019
	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.016)
Constant	0.392***	0.530***	0.212***	0.730***	0.605***	0.818***	0.398***	0.632***	0.216***
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.013)
Observations	3,811	1,409	3,659	4,180	1,532	4,045	4,158	1,452	4,002
R^2	0.111	0.062	0.002	0.160	0.051	0.026	0.121	0.072	0.012
Adjusted R^2	0.109	0.057	−0.0001	0.158	0.047	0.024	0.120	0.067	0.011

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Data are from the General Social Survey. Reference year is 2008. Dependent variables are scaled from 0-1, with 0 indicating greater racial conservatism and 1 indicating greater racial liberalism. Data are weighted using person post-stratification weights.

Table B9.2: White Democrats' perceptions of racial injustice and support for Black candidates

	Dependent variable:		
	Black candidate selected		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Perceived anti-Black discrimination	0.359^{***} (0.087)		
Anti "special favors" for Blacks		-0.166^{***} (0.047)	
Support for reparations			0.120^{*} (0.052)
Constant	0.285^{***} (0.069)	0.646^{***} (0.022)	0.497^{***} (0.034)
Sample	Lucid 1	Lucid 1 + CA voters	Lucid
Observations	462	996	469
R^2	0.035	0.012	0.011
Adjusted R^2	0.033	0.011	0.009
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001		
	Independent variables and support for Black candidates scaled from 0-1.		



Figure B9.1: Perceptions of racial injustice and support for Black candidates. Bivariate loess regression with 95% confidence intervals. Points represent unique values on x-axis weighted by number of participants. Data are from Lucid study 1.

B10. Reparations policy and support for Black candidates

Table B10.1: Support for candidates based on race and stances on reparations

Candidate stances (this candidate/opponent)	Rate of support for Black candidates	N	Rate of support for white candidates	N	Black minus white difference
Respondent supports reparations or does not know					
Oppose/support	0.463 (0.041)	149	0.247*** (0.034)	162	0.216*** (0.053)
Support/oppose	0.753*** (0.034)	162	0.537 (0.041)	149	0.216*** (0.053)
Oppose/oppose	0.69*** (0.037)	155	0.31*** (0.037)	155	0.381*** (0.053)
Support/support	0.54 (0.041)	150	0.46 (0.041)	150	0.08 (0.058)
Respondent opposes reparations					
Oppose/support	0.564 (0.046)	117	0.626** (0.047)	107	-0.062 (0.066)
Support/oppose	0.374 (0.047)	107	0.436 (0.046)	117	-0.062 (0.066)
Oppose/oppose	0.54 (0.045)	126	0.46 (0.045)	126	0.079 (0.063)
Support/support	0.517 (0.046)	118	0.483 (0.046)	118	0.034 (0.065)

Note:
$*p < 0.05$; $**p < 0.01$; $***p < 0.001$. P-values for rates of support indicate significance of difference from 0.5. Data are from Lucid Studies 1 and 2.

Appendix C

Chapter 3

C1. Black Members of Congress

Figure C1.1 plots the number of freshmen Black Democratic House members by year, color-coded according to the racial and gender identities of the MC who held the seat before them. Black women are more likely than Black men to succeed white representatives, particularly white men. Black women succeeded 13 white MCs in total (11 men and 2 women) over this period, whereas Black men succeeded 6 white MCs (5 men and 1 woman). Black women and men were equally likely to succeed Black representatives (10 each; 6 men/4 women for men and 7 men/3 women for women). The other four Black men MCs represented in this plot came to office either by succeeding another person of color or through the creation of a new district, and one Black woman succeeded another POC. In sum, the modal path to office for Black women has been succeeding



Figure C1.1: Counts of new Black Democratic MCs by identity of predecessor.

white men, whereas the modal path to office for Black men has been succeeding other Black men. There is more description to do here in terms of the partisanship of these MCs' predecessors and the nature of the election (whether MCs ran as challengers or the seat was open), but this preliminary survey of Black MCs' paths to office backs up the experimental findings that (1) Black women fare relatively better in whiter places, and (2) Black men succeed women MCs relatively rarely.

C2. Meta-analysis

Note that there are more white women participants than white men participants in many of the studies included in the meta-analysis. Overall, the sample analyzed in the main figures in this paper was 55.8% women. This is actually a slight underestimate of the share of white Democratic voters who are women; according to the 2020 CCES, roughly 57.3% of self-identified Democrats and Democratic leaners were women.

Table C2.1: Features of conjoint experiments included in meta-analysis

Authors	Year published	Platform	Year conducted	N white Dem. men choices	N white Dem. women choices	N Black Dem. men choices	N Black Dem. women choices	Election type	Candidate traits included
Atkeson and Hamel	2020	MTurk	2017	137	225	20	30	School board	Race, gender, occupation, incumbency status, partisanship
Costa	2021	Lucid	2018	215	293	84	99	Congressional	Race, gender, news coverage, partisanship, occupation, religion, age, policy stances (abortion, government spending, immigration)
Harden	2020	YouGov	2018	562	938	99	267	State legislative	Race, gender, religion, education, occupation, military service, partisanship, priority if elected
Carey et al.	2022	YouGov	2019	838	1000	213	285	Unspecified	Race, gender, partisanship, positions on election integrity, policy stance (tax policy), discrimination a problem
Green, Schaffner and Luks	2022	YouGov	2019	2519	3274	502	998	Democratic presidential primary	Race, gender, age, policy (healthcare, environment), focus on moderates/base, establishment/outsider background
Manento and Testa	2022	MTurk	2019	931	810	66	94	Congressional primary	Race, gender, age, occupation, previous political experience, ideology, endorsements, district competitiveness
Hassell and Visalvanich	2024	Lucid	2020	944	664	303	256	Congressional primary	Race, gender, age, previous political experience, ideology, personableness, speaking ability
Harden and Layman	2022	YouGov	2020	140	192	48	53	Senate	Race, gender, partisanship, traumatic event response overseen as mayor (type of event, number dead, cost, identity of victims, action in response to event)
Harden and Layman	2022	YouGov	2020	654	798	177	256	State legislative	Race, gender, age, occupation, partisanship, influence
Henderson and Goggin	2022	YouGov	2020	275	384	60	125	Congressional primary	Race, gender, religion, occupation, priorities if elected

Table C2.2: White Democrats' and white Democratic men and women's support for candidates with different racial and gender identities in a meta analysis of 10 conjoint experiments. (Results presented in Figures 2 and 3.)

	Share voting for each candidate type across pairwise contests		
	Figure 2	Figure 3	
	White Democrats	White Dem. men	White Dem. women
White men candidates	0.445	0.452	0.440
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
White women candidates	0.517	0.505	0.528
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Black men candidates	0.495	0.516	0.478
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Black women candidates	0.537	0.517	0.554
	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Num.Obs.	22930	10458	12472

Note:
Models include study random effects. Analysis is weighted to evenly balance contest types within each study.

Table C2.3: White Democrats' and white Democratic men and women's support for candidates with different racial and gender identities in a meta analysis of 10 conjoint experiments, disaggregated by the identity of the candidate's opponent. (Results presented in Figure 4.)

	Share voting for each candidate type across pairwise contests		
	White Democrats	White Dem. men	White Dem. women
White men running against...			
white women	0.432	0.440	0.429
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Black men	0.432	0.428	0.437
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Black women	0.456	0.470	0.448
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.022)
Num.Obs.	7003	3144	3859
Black women running against...			
white men	0.536	0.520	0.549
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)
white women	0.514	0.503	0.524
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Black men	0.563	0.531	0.590
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.017)
Num.Obs.	4521	2079	2442
Black men running against...			
white men	0.565	0.568	0.562
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.018)
white women	0.493	0.522	0.464
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Black women	0.439	0.471	0.411
	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	4506	2066	2440
White women running against...			
white men	0.559	0.548	0.569
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Black men	0.509	0.478	0.538
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Black women	0.481	0.489	0.475
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Num.Obs.	6900	3169	3731

Note:
Models include study random effects. Analysis is weighted to evenly balance contest types within each study.



Figure C2.1: Marginal means for candidates by race and gender identity among Black and white Democratic and white Republican survey participants. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.



Figure C2.2: Marginal means for candidates by race and gender identity among Black and white Democratic and white Republican survey participants. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.



Figure C2.3: Proportion of Black Democrats, white Democrats, and white Republicans selecting candidates as a function of their and their opponents' identities. Models include study random effects. Narrow error bars are 95% confidence intervals and wide error bars are 83.4% confidence intervals.

C3. Original conjoint study

Instrument

1. Conjoint task

    a) On the next few screens, you will be shown information about two hypothetical candidates for Congress running head-to-head in a Democratic primary election. We want to see how people evaluate the candidates, and if they would be willing to support similar candidates if given the chance. We will ask you a few questions about these candidates. Please read their profiles carefully. (End of page)
    b) First, here are both Democratic Congressional Primary candidates' profiles: [conjoint table; see example below]
    c) Which candidate for Congress would you support in this election? [Candidate A, Candidate B]
    d) If you would like, you can use this space to explain your choice in a sentence or two. (End of page)
    e) Now, we will ask you a few more questions about each of these candidates. First, we will ask you about Candidate A. (End of page)
    f) Here is the profile of Candidate A once again: [first column of conjoint table] If you had to guess, how would you describe Candidate A's political views in general? [Very conservative, Conservative, Somewhat conservative, Moderate, Somewhat liberal, Liberal, Very liberal] (End of page)
    g) Here is the profile of Candidate A once again: [first column of conjoint table] If you had to guess, how [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE] would you describe this candidate to be? (all traits presented in random order) [Extremely [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Very [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Moderately [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Slightly [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Not at all [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE]] (End of page)
    h) Here is the profile of Candidate A once again: [first column of conjoint table] Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: [Strongly disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Strongly agree]
        - This candidate has the skills necessary to be effective in Congress.
        - This candidate represents the interests of people like me.
        - This candidate would prioritize action on issues affecting women.
        - This candidate would prioritize action on issues affecting racial minorities.
        - This candidate has a good chance of winning the general election. (End of page)
    i) Now, we will ask you about Candidate B. (Items f-h)

2. Ideal candidate

    a) We are interested in the kinds of qualities people want to see in their representatives in Congress. We will now ask you some questions about your ideal Congressional representative. (Items not used in these analyses)

b) How [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE] would you describe your ideal Congressional representative to be? [Extremely [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Very [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Moderately [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Slightly [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE], Not at all [STRONG OF A LEADER, SMART, HONEST, CARING, MEAN, LIKABLE]] (End of page)

3. Political attitudes

a) Finally, we have a few questions about your political opinions (End of page)

b) Generally speaking, how would you describe your political views? [Very conservative, Conservative, Somewhat conservative, Moderate, Somewhat liberal, Liberal, Very liberal]

c) How well do you think the interests of each of the following groups are represented by the United States government? [Not well at all, Slightly well, Moderately well, Very well, Extremely well, Don't know]

- Women
- Men
- African Americans
- Whites

d) How much discrimination do you think each of the following groups faces in the United States today? [A great deal, Quite a bit, A moderate amount, Only a little, None at all, Don't know]

- Women
- Men
- African Americans
- Whites

	Candidate A	Candidate B
Party	Democrat	Democrat
Age	44	50
Gender	Woman	Man
Race	White	Black
Most recent professional experience	Doctor	High school teacher
Most recent political experience	Mayor of a small city	State Legislator
Endorsement	Civil rights groups	Major area newspapers
Priority if elected	Raise taxes on those making more than $250,000 a year	Strengthen gun control through commonsense restrictions

Figure C3.1: Example conjoint table

Table C3.1: Main sample demographics

	White men (%)	White women (%)	Black men (%)	Black women (%)
Age group				
18-29	19.52	25.93	26.82	30.83
30-39	31.24	23.05	21.52	17.72
40-49	7.16	5.56	7.95	10.92
50-64	14.53	16.26	24.17	25.00
65+	27.55	29.22	19.54	15.53
Education				
High school or less	17.14	17.70	30.46	27.67
Some college/vocational school	32.10	33.54	29.14	28.40
Bachelor's degree	22.34	26.13	27.15	28.88
Advanced degree	27.98	22.43	12.25	14.81
Missing education	0.43	0.21	0.99	0.24
Household income				
Less than $25,000	14.97	24.07	29.47	36.17
$25,000-$49,999	18.66	18.31	23.18	22.33
$50,000-$74,999	20.61	24.07	17.22	19.17
$75,000-$99,999	17.35	10.29	9.93	6.80
$100,000-$149,999	19.31	11.73	9.27	5.10
$200,000 or more	0.87	1.03	1.99	0.49
Missing household income	8.24	10.49	8.94	9.95
Ideology				
Very conservative	8.46	2.47	6.62	4.61
Conservative	6.72	2.47	10.93	6.80
Somewhat conservative	4.99	4.32	7.28	7.52
Moderate	19.31	24.28	31.46	37.62
Somewhat liberal	15.62	18.72	14.24	11.65
Liberal	22.78	29.22	16.23	17.23
Very liberal	22.13	18.52	13.25	14.56
Region				
Midwest	23.43	24.28	20.20	25.24
Northeast	23.64	25.31	26.82	25.49
South	26.68	27.37	35.10	31.80
West	26.03	22.63	17.55	17.48
Missing region	0.22	0.41	0.33	

Table C3.2: Black men vs. white women candidates sample demographics

	White men (%)	White women (%)	Black men (%)	Black women (%)
Age group				
18-29	20.58	26.32	36.26	35.29
30-39	27.65	22.29	25.27	25.49
40-49	11.25	5.26	2.20	3.92
50-64	14.15	16.41	19.78	19.61
65+	26.37	29.72	16.48	15.69
Education				
High school or less	19.94	17.34	28.57	25.49
Some college/vocational school	31.51	32.20	27.47	30.39
Bachelor's degree	24.12	25.08	27.47	32.35
Advanced degree	23.47	25.08	15.38	10.78
Missing education	0.96	0.31	1.10	0.98
Household income				
Less than $25,000	16.40	23.53	23.08	31.37
$25,000-$49,999	12.54	20.12	21.98	28.43
$50,000-$74,999	22.51	22.91	23.08	18.63
$75,000-$99,999	18.65	12.69	7.69	4.90
$100,000-$149,999	16.72	12.38	9.89	6.86
$200,000 or more	3.22	0.62	5.49	
Missing household income	9.97	7.74	8.79	9.80
Ideology				
Very conservative	9.00	2.79	3.30	6.86
Conservative	5.14	1.86	6.59	5.88
Somewhat conservative	4.82	3.41	3.30	8.82
Moderate	26.05	21.98	39.56	37.25
Somewhat liberal	15.76	22.60	8.79	11.76
Liberal	19.94	27.55	19.78	17.65
Very liberal	19.29	19.81	18.68	11.76
Regon				
Midwest	26.37	26.93	21.98	28.43
Northeast	20.26	24.46	31.87	32.35
South	26.05	24.15	26.37	14.71
West	27.33	24.15	19.78	24.51
Missing region		0.31		

Pre-registered hypotheses and tests

1. Vote choice

    a) All voters will support women candidates over men candidates and Black candidates over white candidates.

        - **Test:** marginal means by race and gender separately
        - **Results:** presented in Figure C2.

    b) White men, Black men, and Black women voters will prioritize voting for Black candidates over voting for women candidates. White women voters will prioritize voting for women candidates over voting for Black candidates.

        - **Test:** marginal means by race and gender together
        - **Results:** presented in Figure C3.

2. Self-representativeness

    a) All participants will rate women and Black candidates as more representative of themselves and closer to them ideologically than men and white candidates.

        - **Tests:**
            - represents me $\sim$ candidate race
            - ideological proximity $\sim$ candidate race
            - represents me $\sim$ candidate gender
            - ideological proximity $\sim$ candidate gender
        - **Results:** presented in Table C3.

    b) White men, Black men, and Black women voters will rate Black men candidates as more representative of themselves and closer to themselves ideologically than white women candidates; white women voters will rate white women candidates as more representative of themselves and closer to themselves ideologically than Black men candidates.

        - **Tests:**
            - represents me $\sim$ candidate race $\times$ candidate gender
            - ideological proximity $\sim$ candidate race $\times$ candidate gender
        - **Results:** presented in Table C4. (Results for white participants also presented in Table 2.)

3. Valence characteristics

    a) All voters will rate women and Black candidates more positively on leadership traits than men and white candidates.

        - **Tests:**
            - leadership traits $\sim$ candidate race
            - leadership traits $\sim$ candidate gender
        - **Results:** presented in Table C3.

b) White men, Black men, and Black women voters will rate Black men candidates more positively on leadership traits than white women candidates; white women voters will rate white women candidates more positively on leadership traits than Black men candidates.

- **Test:** leadership traits $\sim$ candidate race $\times$ candidate gender
- **Results:** presented in Table C4. (Results for white participants also presented in Table 2.)

4. Issue priorities

a) All participants will rate Black/women candidates as more likely to prioritize issues affecting racial minorities/women.

b) White women will rate Black men candidates as less likely to prioritize issues affecting women than white men candidates.

- **Test for (a) and (b):** Rating of issue priority $\sim$ candidate race and/or gender
- **Results:** presented in Tables C5 (a) and C6 (b).

5. Self- vs. other-representation

a) Perceptions of discrimination against and underrepresentation of Black Americans/women will predict support for Black/women candidates after controlling for perceptions of self-representativeness among Black and white, women and men participants.

- **Deviation from pre-analysis plan:** After pre-registering this hypothesis, I realized that perceptions of self-representativeness are measured post-treatment and that it is therefore inappropriate to condition on this assessment of candidates. Accordingly, the presentation of results for white men and women presented in Table 4 does not control for perceptions of self-representativeness.
- **Tests:**
  - Voted for Black candidate $\sim$ Perceptions of anti-Black discrimination
  - Voted for woman candidate $\sim$ Perceptions of anti-women discrimination
  - Voted for Black candidate $\sim$ Perceptions of Black underrepresentation
  - Voted for woman candidate $\sim$ Perceptions of underrepresentation of women
- **Results:** presented in Table C7.

Table C3.3: Candidate type and perceptions of valence characteristics

	Ratings from white men respondents		Ratings from white women respondents		Ratings from Black men respondents		Ratings from Black women respondents	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ideological proximity								
Man	0.791		0.810		0.780		0.802	
	(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
Woman	0.808		0.835		0.810		0.804	
	(0.010)		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.010)	
White		0.793		0.818		0.778		0.786
		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.010)
Black		0.807		0.826		0.812		0.818
		(0.010)		(0.008)		(0.011)		(0.010)
Num.Obs.	1070	1070	1122	1122	744	744	939	939
Represents people like me								
Man	0.705		0.679		0.697		0.663	
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.014)	
Woman	0.718		0.698		0.702		0.685	
	(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.014)	
White		0.720		0.685		0.651		0.624
		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.014)
Black		0.701		0.691		0.749		0.719
		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.013)
Num.Obs.	1070	1070	1121	1121	744	744	939	939
Leadership traits								
Man	0.728		0.720		0.734		0.731	
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
Woman	0.741		0.738		0.756		0.758	
	(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)	
White		0.726		0.713		0.722		0.711
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Black		0.743		0.745		0.769		0.775
		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Num.Obs.	1068	1068	1122	1122	743	743	940	940

Note:
Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.

Table C3.4: Candidate type and perceptions of valence characteristics

	Ratings from white men respondents	Ratings from white women respondents	Ratings from Black men respondents	Ratings from Black women respondents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideological proximity				
White man	0.774	0.810	0.760	0.795
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)
White woman	0.814	0.826	0.797	0.777
	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Black man	0.813	0.810	0.801	0.808
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Black woman	0.802	0.844	0.823	0.827
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Num.Obs.	1070	1122	744	939
Represents people like me				
White man	0.707	0.684	0.639	0.626
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)
White woman	0.733	0.686	0.664	0.623
	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Black man	0.701	0.674	0.755	0.699
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Black woman	0.701	0.711	0.742	0.738
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Num.Obs.	1070	1121	744	939
Leadership traits				
White man	0.715	0.706	0.707	0.704
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
White woman	0.739	0.720	0.736	0.718
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Black man	0.743	0.733	0.761	0.757
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Black woman	0.743	0.758	0.778	0.792
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Num.Obs.	1068	1122	743	940

Note:
Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.

Table C3.5: Race, gender, and perceptions of issue priorities

	Ratings of candidates							
	White men respondents		White women respondents		Black men respondents		Black women respondents	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Candidate will prioritize issues affecting racial minorities								
Man	0.699		0.701		0.670		0.677	
	(0.012)		(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.013)	
Woman	0.715		0.695		0.686		0.686	
	(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.011)		(0.013)	
White		0.668		0.623		0.606		0.611
		(0.012)		(0.015)		(0.011)		(0.014)
Black		0.751		0.776		0.753		0.746
		(0.012)		(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.012)
Num.Obs.	1069	1069	743	743	1121	1121	940	940
Candidate will prioritize issues affecting women								
Man	0.660		0.647		0.596		0.610	
	(0.012)		(0.014)		(0.012)		(0.014)	
Woman	0.737		0.708		0.711		0.732	
	(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.011)		(0.013)	
White		0.693		0.657		0.647		0.645
		(0.011)		(0.014)		(0.011)		(0.014)
Black		0.703		0.699		0.660		0.696
		(0.011)		(0.015)		(0.011)		(0.014)
Num.Obs.	1070	1070	744	744	1121	1121	940	940

Note:
Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.

Table C3.6: Race, gender, and perceptions of issue priorities

	Ratings of candidates			
	White men respondents	White women respondents	Black men respondents	Black women respondents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Candidate will prioritize issues affecting racial minorities				
White man	0.653	0.595	0.626	0.614
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)
White woman	0.685	0.615	0.620	0.608
	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Black man	0.755	0.741	0.779	0.738
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Black woman	0.747	0.766	0.773	0.753
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Num.Obs.	1069	1121	743	940
Candidate will prioritize issues affecting women				
White man	0.649	0.593	0.625	0.586
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)
White woman	0.742	0.697	0.689	0.708
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Black man	0.673	0.600	0.670	0.634
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Black woman	0.732	0.727	0.728	0.753
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.018)
Num.Obs.	1070	1121	744	940

Note:
Standard errors are clustered at the participant level.



Figure C3.2: Marginal means for all attributes in conjoint experiment by participant race and gender.



Figure C3.3: Marginal means for candidates by race and gender identity among white Democratic survey participants in Lucid study.

Table C3.7: Lucid survey participants' support for Black and women candidates by perceptions of group discrimination and underrepresentation.

	Voted for a Black candidate with a white opponent (upper panel) or a woman candidate with a man opponent (lower panel)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anti-Black discrimination and Black underrepresentation								
Discrimination	0.306**		0.083		0.388**		0.138	
	(0.105)		(0.117)		(0.128)		(0.133)	
Underrepresentation		-0.137		-0.006		-0.068		-0.047
		(0.088)		(0.104)		(0.097)		(0.089)
Intercept	0.310***	0.588***	0.467***	0.536***	0.352**	0.694***	0.540***	0.677***
	(0.080)	(0.047)	(0.094)	(0.043)	(0.109)	(0.053)	(0.118)	(0.041)
Num.Obs.	324	321	318	311	202	200	275	269
Anti-woman discrimination and underrepresentation of women								
Discrimination	0.226*		0.166		0.237+		0.121	
	(0.099)		(0.110)		(0.121)		(0.106)	
Underrepresentation		-0.209*		-0.040		0.020		-0.020
		(0.086)		(0.099)		(0.102)		(0.088)
Intercept	0.389***	0.620***	0.413***	0.544***	0.511***	0.651***	0.574***	0.671***
	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.081)	(0.042)	(0.086)	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.046)
Num.Obs.	323	324	320	314	200	201	275	267

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note:
Variables are scaled from 0 to 1.



Figure C3.4: Perceptions of discrimination and support for marginalized-group candidates by race and gender among Democratic survey respondents.



Figure C3.5: Perceptions of racial discrimination and ratings of Black candidates



Figure C3.6: Perceptions of gender discrimination and ratings of women candidates

Table C3.8: White Democratic survey participants' support for men candidates with white women opponents by race of men candidates and reproductive rights endorsements.

	Voted for man		
	Man has repro rights endorsement	White woman has repro rights endorsement	Neither has repro rights endorsement
White men respondents			
Black	0.098	0.100	0.038
	(0.122)	(0.111)	(0.097)
Intercept	0.455***	0.385***	0.484***
	(0.107)	(0.098)	(0.090)
Num.Obs.	98	121	236
White women respondents			
Black	-0.080	0.248*	-0.027
	(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.085)
Intercept	0.667***	0.185*	0.425***
	(0.101)	(0.092)	(0.078)
Num.Obs.	116	140	241

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$