

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Insurgent Legacy  
Fausto Reinaga and the Indian Revolution

A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements  
for the degree Master of Arts

in

Latin American Studies

by

Patrick Louis Williams Kearney

Committee in charge:

Professor Nancy Grey Postero, Chair  
Professor Christine Hunefeldt  
Professor Milos Kokotovic

2014

©  
Patrick Louis Williams Kearney  
All rights reserved.

The Thesis of Patrick Louis Williams Kearney is approved, and it is acceptable in  
quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

---

---

---

Chair

University of California, San Diego

2014

## DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the four most influential mentors in my life. Just like the Andes and Rockies Mountains that they loved so much, these four individuals imbued from natural springs of social understanding, shared cascading rivers of knowledge from myriad tributaries, and dispensed snowcapped mountains of wisdom to all who would listen.

Rodrigo Montoya Rojas

Herbert Louis Wegert

Mildred Levon Brewer Wegert

&

Juan de Dios Yapita

# EPIGRAPH



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Signature Page .....	iii
Dedication.....	iv
Epigraph .....	v
Table of Contents .....	vi
Preface .....	vii
Acknowledgements .....	ix
Abstract.....	xiv
Introduction .....	1
Chapter One -The Gales of Revolution .....	7
Chapter Two -Murder, Theft, and Genocide.....	25
Chapter Three -Fausto Reinaga, The Indian and The Cholo.....	52
Chapter Four -Citizen Mythos of the Western Horizon.....	87
Chapter Five -Violence & the <i>State of Exception</i> .....	132
Chapter Six - <i>Pacha</i> , Weaving Time through Space.....	149
Chapter Seven -Faltering Faith at Red Square, Letters for the Revolution.....	166
Chapter Eight -Katarismo and Indianismo, Deposing the Despots.....	191
Chapter Nine -Bolivian Judas, The Revolution of the Armed Forces.....	215
Chapter Ten - <i>The Amautic Revolution</i> , Countering the Transmutation.....	237
Chapter Eleven -The Vice, Apparent and Integral Extraction.....	259
Chapter Twelve -Epilogue.....	284
Bibliography .....	286

## PREFACE

Less than one week before the official academic defense of this thesis, the famous author Eduardo Galeano made a repudiation of his magnum opus *The Open Veins of Latin America*. On the forty-third anniversary of the book, his self-critique was centered on not having been trained to write political economy, and on what he claimed to be his own changing views. Whatever shortcomings the book may have had, it is my opinion that, like many authors of his capacity, stature, and fame, he is being hyper critical of himself in retrospect. Another famous author, Isabell Allende, implies that Galeano's position has not actually changed as much as he claims ("Author Changes His Mind on '70s Manifesto").

While Galeano's self-critique should be taken seriously, we should also remember why it was that he wrote his view of political economy in novel format. Not since Karl Marx's *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* had a work of political economy been written in a language that was so readily available to the masses. It is my opinion that Galeano was even more adept at this than Marx. Due to the encoded, specialized, and hyper-complicated language of academia, the process of writing political economy, political philosophy, and other related subjects in available language is seemingly impossible. Yet, Galeano took that challenge very seriously and excelled at it. In *Open Veins*, he explained his drive to do so:

I know I can be accused of sacrilege in writing about political economy in the style of a novel about love or pirates. But I confess I get a pain from reading valuable works by certain sociologists, political experts, economists, and historians who write in code. Hermetic language isn't the invariable and inevitable price of profundity. In some cases it can

simply conceal incapacity for communication raised to the category of intellectual virtue. I suspect that boredom can thus often serve to sanctify the established order, confirming that knowledge is a privilege of the elite (Ibid.; Galeano 264).

Galeano's sentiment puts into words my struggles in writing this thesis: trying to create a peer-reviewed work, in available language for a much broader audience, while at the same time taking seriously the theoretical implications across the following pages, was difficult and frustrating. Yet, I longed to write a work that neither tirelessly bores the reader, nor short-changes the important arguments and finer details of the subject matter.

I would be a fool to say that I have accomplished anything close to the work of Galeano or Marx. I simply have not. However, I beg the reader to have patience with me over the following pages. I ask this because I wrote this thesis precisely for those readers who do not hold elite positions in the ivory tower of academia. I tried very hard to define elite words, concepts, and theories and to place them in a more enjoyable, available, and understandable format. While I do not feel like I have completely succeeded, I did try my best to remove the hermetic code of supposed intellectual virtue. The sentiments within this thesis, as the reader will see, completely reject any privileges for elites. I sincerely hope that my prose accomplishes the same, at least to a degree.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would not have been the same without the help, instruction, guidance, and assistance of countless individuals. There were many generous people who guided and helped me through this process. Inevitably there are those who should be acknowledged but are not been listed here. However, I would like to take this chance to express my sincerest gratitude to the following people.

Clearly, I am indebted to the distinguished individuals listed in the dedication. If I had to describe the salient character of these four individuals in one word, I would choose 'wisdom'. The Wegerts, Herbert Louis and Mildred Levon, were known to many people as Millie and Loui. I knew them as Grandma and Grandpa. Millie and Loui never stopped sharing their eclectic knowledge of the world with me. They almost always did so by including a lesson or advisement about how to be socially responsible. Although my Grandfather died several years ago, his lessons and stories travel with me every day. My Grandmother will celebrate her ninetieth birthday a few months from now. Happy Birthday Grandma.

The great Aymara linguist Juan de Dios Yapita of Bolivia, while careful to avoid polemics and politics, opened many doors for me: doors to new ways of understanding both language and life. He also provided invaluable guidance for the linguistic explanations in Chapter Six.

The wise and brilliant Quechua scholar Rodrigo Montoya Rojas was instrumental in redirecting my ideas about Andean history while always demonstrating

the importance and finer details of Social Anthropology. He was also the first and only professor at UCSD to lecture in an undergraduate class about the historical role of Fausto Reinaga.

I could list myriad reasons why my committee members were so formative and helpful. However a few quick stories will suffice. While I have much to thank committee member Dr. Milos Kokotovic for, I would like to take this moment to thank him for one specific act of kindness. I gave a speech at the graduation ceremony for my B.A. I lost my speech notes, got nervous, and fumbled through the speech. Dr. Kokotovic, as master of ceremonies, was kind enough to reiterate what I was trying to say. He did so in a way that not only salvaged some of my dignity, but also expressed my sentiments better than I could have done during my best of performances. His advice, critiques and directions were spot-on. He is an asset to UCSD.

During one of my first classes at UCSD, purely by chance, I had the pleasure of watching Dr. Nancy Grey Postero, the committee chair, lecture about Bolivia. I wondered to myself, 'how did this professor, whom I have never met, know that I would attend this lecture and that I love Bolivia?' As there were hundreds in attendance, she obviously did not even know that I was there or who I was. However, she soon found out, and she never stopped discussing Bolivia. For those who know Dr. Postero, and probably even for those who do not, her influence will be quite obvious over the next few hundred pages. Dr. Postero must also be credited with not only recommending, but also demanding; that I "must" take classes with Rodrigo Montoya Rojas.

Committee member Dr. Christine Hunefeldt also recommended Rodrigo. I met

her a few quarters after meeting Dr. Postero. However, I was afraid to attend her classes. I knew they were intensive and difficult. I even told her as much at a school related social function. In response she kindly told me, in a soothing voice, that it was okay if I didn't attend her classes. She assured me that she completely understood. She then quickly quipped that I was a "coward" and walked away. I initially attended her classes due to my ego not being able to deal with the label of 'coward'. Poetically, I learned from her to put into check my very real cowardice in regards to the bold and tumultuous realm of History. Courage is a fine word for defining Dr. Hunefeldt and courage is what she gave to me. She sacrificed an immense amount of time in advising me for this thesis. She should also be credited with facilitating, coordinating, and otherwise making possible my introduction to Juan de Dios Yapita and my attendance at the Institute of Aymara Language and Culture (ILCA) of which Yapita is an icon.

Along with Yapita and Denise Arnold of the ILCA, I am appreciative to all of the people who assisted in making my endeavors meaningful at the ILCA and the UMSA (Universidad Mayor de San Andres). There are many people in Bolivia for whom I hold at the highest regard and with the warmest of sentiments for their support, for their friendship, and for sharing knowledge with me. If only to list a few of them, I offer a special thanks to (in no particular order) Allison Spedding, Elvira Espejo, Raúl 'Chato' Prada Alcoreza, Carlos Arellano Terrelío, Willy Pérez Villafuerte, Travis Grey, The Sandifort family, Don Beto and Doña Rosa in Consata, Julieta Paredes, Oscár Olivera and Clara Flores. I would also like to thank Felix Cárdenas for telling me of the importance of the work of Fausto Reinaga.

In the northern part of the Fifth Continent, I would like to thank (in no particular order) Alexandra Isfahani-Hammond, Devin Beaulieu, Sara Johnson, Dan Widener, Ruben Murillo, Victor Clarke Alfaro, David Serlin, Amy Kenmore, Jason Reese, Jorge Montesinos, Paula Saravia, Paul Goldstein, Rita Sanchez, Enrique Davalos, Lisa Matt, Kelly Sullivan, and Christie Earley. A special note must be made about Vince Benafante because he ironically taught me to question the trajectory of Western Civilization in a series of classes titled 'Introduction to Western Civ'.

People with amazing parents should thank them every day. I don't, but I should. My parents, Mike Kearney and Tim and Dianne Williams have been supportive of my most far-fetched endeavors. They were very supportive of this project. They are responsible for my passion for History. I thank them for their love and support.

The process of writing this thesis was made possible due to the generosity, patience, and friendship of comrade Jay Armstrong. He must be thanked profusely for putting up with my academic career and all of the stress and drama that was involved. He did so for more than a decade. I must also credit him, more than anybody, for the material support that made the entire process possible.

I would like to thank Ramiro Reinaga, the author of *Tawantinsuyu*, whose work will be discussed in later pages. I am indebted to him for friendship, for advice, for introducing me to the wonderful culinary dish of *cabeza de cordero*, and for making it easier to understand the work that I cite from him and from his father Fausto Reinaga.

The sage and wonderful Hilda Reinaga, deserves high accolades. She has

opened the doors for me to understand Fausto Reinaga's finer philosophical propositions along with the more detailed aspects of his life. It is my opinion that she was a substantial influence on Fausto. She has contributed much to contemporary Bolivian social reality. The fact that she allowed me to conduct interviews with her in Fausto's old library was an honor that I will never forget.

Both Hilda and Ramiro were instrumental, along with Constantino Lima, Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Pedro Portugal, and José Luís Savedra in understanding myriad things about Fausto Reinaga's Bolivia. All of these individuals, along with dozens of others, were more than happy to help me in my search for understanding.

I should be clear here that it was Ramiro Reinaga, Raúl Prada Alcoreza, Giorgio Agamben, and Robert Yazzi who inspired me to think about political philosophy in a different way. I have never met Giorgio Agamben, but my theory would be lost without his work. The other three were far more than generous with their time and are permanently fixated in my thoughts.

Finally, I never would have traveled the first paths of this journey if it were not for a gift given to me by my friend Elizabeth, an amazing Aymara Bolivian Academic whose last name I am ashamed to admit I do not know. As occurs sometimes in life, we have lost touch. Yet, if the bright, beautiful, and wise Elizabeth had not given me a rare original copy of Ramiro's *Tawantinsuyu*, this thesis would not have been written. In the opening pages of the book, she took the liberty of writing an inscription. She carefully wrote in flowing cursive, "Each community is a history, a philosophy of life. To know our history is to know us a little more. Affectionately for you, Patricio, from Elizabeth."

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

Insurgent Legacy  
Fausto Reinaga and the Indian Revolution

by

Patrick Louis Williams Kearney

Master of Arts in Latin American Studies

University of California, San Diego, 2014

Professor Nancy Grey Postero, Chair

The Bolivian Intellectual Fausto Reinaga produced an enormous body of literature addressing the critical themes of twentieth century Bolivia: race, nation, and colonialism. This thesis explores those works. It does so through political-anthropological, historical, ethnographic, literary, pedagogical, and language-based methods and discussions. The larger political, economic, and social contexts of Bolivia are narrated through Fausto Reinaga's biographical and literary trajectories

(1906-1994).

This thesis emphasizes, as Reinaga's work did, non-Western perspectives. It also brings to light globally formational events across the historical landscape which had previously been obscured. In doing so, this thesis contemplates the difficult subjects of governance, citizenship, race, identity, philosophy, and even academia itself. It analyzes the trajectory of the legacy of this understudied writer, which changed radically through his lifetime, and also right up to the contemporary moment.

The main argument of this thesis is that, by examining the subjective and objective realities of oppressed political subjects in Bolivia, Reinaga deconstructs the hegemony of Modern Western Democratic thought. By utilizing his own reformulations of political philosophy, what he sometimes called *Amautic thought*, he offers a way out of the violent dilemmas of Western Liberalism in the twentieth century.

Building on ideas from historical actors presented throughout the following pages, this thesis seeks to illuminate the possibilities for that alternative political philosophy in an attempt to move towards what philosopher Giorgio Agamben calls 'the beautiful day of life'.

## Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century, in a small, rural, Andean community, Fausto Reinaga was born. He was born into a world of dark intransigent racism strengthened by the oppressive residue of colonial culture. This Bolivian intellectual and radical revolutionary would become a prolific author of political philosophy. He spent his long writing career preoccupied with the oppression he saw in the Andes and elsewhere.

In the face of that oppression, Fausto Reinaga would struggle, both physically and philosophically, for the liberation of oppressed peoples. He would also struggle with his own identity. It would be a life-long struggle involving not just how he identified himself in the world, but also involving the perceptions of others. In many ways, this was connected to social perceptions and nation-building projects of the time: nation-building projects deeply rooted in the ideologies of *Modern Western Democracy*.

Throughout this work, the term *Modern Western Democracy*, as well as each of the individual terms *Modern* and *Western*, are often capitalized, distinguishing them as proper nouns. They are distinguished from the common nouns of modern, western, and democracy when they are used in the following way: When capitalized they will be referring to the ideologies, thought, and logic that are dominant today, but rooted in – and inescapably linked to – the legacies of Roman law, Greco-Judeo-Christian-Islamic thought, and the overwhelmingly *monotheistic* origins of their strictly monistic outcomes of governance in the contemporary world. For example, Modern Western

Democracy is the predominant form of government in the Western Hemisphere.

Modern Western Democracy is a type of government ideology and practice and not simply the amalgamation of those three words describing a thing. In comparison to your car being very modern, the concept of Modernity is an ideological orientation putting a heavy emphasis on technology and rationality as the sole solutions to humanity's problems, but has very deep roots in other things, as we will see in the following chapters. The direction 'to the west', or descriptions of the like, are common nouns and not capitalized. However, if we use the words West or Western, we are referring to ideas or descriptions related to the concept of Western Civilization, itself a specific ideological concept and often a proper noun. Western Civilization is, not incidentally, closely linked to Modern Western Democracies. The ideologies and concepts of classical Liberalism<sup>1</sup> and Thomas Hobbes's *total agreement of the social contract* also have intricate relationships with these terms, and will be discussed in later chapters.

This form of government proliferated in the Americas with the advent of the wars of independence from the French, Spanish, Portuguese, and British Empires. It is important to keep in mind that the majority of these contests for independence were won, or their victories were co-opted, by the regional elite and/or bourgeoisie, not the

---

<sup>1</sup> The reader should take note of the context of each use of the word Liberalism/Liberals. In this thesis it is used in several ways: 1. In the global ideological meaning, i.e. the ideas of John Locke, Adam Smith, and Thomas Jefferson, and the tenants of Modern capitalism. In this use, most of the entire political spectrum of the U.S. could be defined as Liberalism. This use will be elaborated on in a later footnote. 2. Liberals and Conservatives are used to describe the belligerents in the Federal War. In this case, these Liberals adhered to concepts of Liberalism. 3. It is not meant in the narrow U.S. definition of the word which is synonymous with Democrats, or what the U.S. calls the Left. I will instead use the term 'progressives' when discussing the fringe left of the U.S.

majority populations whom they dominated. Capital interests fueled these wars. In Republican Bolivia (1825-2010), those interests perpetuated and exacerbated forms of domination and oppression over the majority of the population.

Our narrative is Fausto Reinaga's work, his life, the people around him, and his legacy. We will consider our narrative within the trajectory of Bolivian history. We will explore the ideas and actions of Fausto Reinaga as protagonist, while his political and intellectual dissent antagonizes the powerful. We will map that legacy, which endured beyond the moment of his political decline, long after his death, and even longer before his birth.

Is it fair to question the validity of the juridical structure at the core of contemporary Modern Western Democracies? In trying to answer this question, we will ask other questions such as: how are relationships between political subjects and states produced and acted upon? Fausto went to great lengths discussing that juridical structure in the context of its structural and ideological reinforcement through history. Insights from the political philosophy of Fausto and others may offer a fresh perspective on alternatives to that of contemporary Modern Western Democracies.

In the early years of his life, he came very close to rejecting this trajectory as protagonist. At the time of Fausto's birth in 1906, the stringent racism of Republican Bolivia was not in his favor. What is even more precarious is that, once he was in possession of the opportunity, he almost became everything that he would later build a legacy fighting against. Had that happened, Bolivia would not be what it is today. For events to unfold the way that they did required multiple transformations in how Fausto would later perceive the world. It would also require the subsequent radical influence

he would engender. As we will see, transform he would.

His transformation would eventually transcend class, race, and politics. Fausto became a prolific author who many still consider an icon and even a hero. In Bolivia Fausto is cited regularly, appearing as a reference in the books of various disciplines and literary genres. The chair of Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the University of Washington Seattle, Jose Antonio Lucero, who specializes in indigenous politics, elaborates:

In the rise of contemporary indigenous movements in Latin America, indigenous leaders have acknowledged their debt to the Bolivian indigenous intellectual Fausto Reinaga (1906-1994), a major theorist of the anti-colonial and anti-Occidental ideology known as *indianismo*. His work, especially his... classic *La Revolución India* had a profound impact on the development of indigenous movements, intellectuals, and leaders including Bolivian President Evo Morales. Yet, curiously, his work remains sorely understudied (Lucero 13).<sup>2</sup>

Despite the dearth of investigations, it is clear that Fausto inspired generations of vanguard revolutionaries. His ideas, along with that inspiration, are part of larger phenomena of other possibilities. In other words, the Bolivian epic that unfolds over the following pages could serve as a lesson in formulating alternative forms of *citizen-sovereignty*, *critical-pedagogy*, and *political-praxis*.

What do we mean by these terms, and why do we need alternatives? These questions too, will be considered later on. In later chapters we will explore ideas that problematize Western concepts and can assist in discussions about alternate possibilities for governance, different from those of Modern Western Democracies. We will seek such alternatives in Bolivia, where surprisingly non-Western aspects of

---

<sup>2</sup> From the article titled “FANON IN THE ANDES: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo and the Black Atlantic”, published in the *International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies*.

empowerment for political subjects can and do alter the form of the state.

Not all readers may take a critical stance regarding Modern Western Democracy. For those of us who are influenced by and live in the shadow of their social constructions, we often hold those social constructions as a 'natural' state of affairs. This includes the intricate interconnections that those social constructions have with Roman law, and the inescapability of its use of violence, which will be expanded upon in later chapters. Are citizens actually the constituting agents of sovereign power? Are the racism, oppression, marginalization, dispossession, and other maladies that are the 'sacrifice' for 'the greater good' in the structure of Modern Western Democracies, to be considered a 'natural' state of affairs?

Throughout the history of the Bolivian Republic, these maladies were strongly connected to concepts, policies, and actions meant to negate the identities and cultures of large contingents of political subjects. As will be demonstrated, Modern Western Democracy failed and/or refused to offer citizenship to a majority of Bolivians. The links between the Modern nation-state, finance-capital, and the global elite are intricately woven into those concepts, policies, and actions. Those links have much to do with what Fausto was writing about, and what we will discuss between here and the Epilogue.

It is in Fausto's writings, and the historical context surrounding them, where we can more clearly see why insurgent rebellions resisting subjectivity were fueled, and we can better understand the rationale for rejecting the Modern Western Democratic ideals of the Bolivian Republic. We will also see more clearly why those insurgencies and their global impact have been negated and depoliticized in history books.

Such lines of inquiry will inevitably lead us to questions involving the psychological and sociological struggles of colonized and oppressed peoples. The Western concepts of *positivism* and *social-darwinism*, which will be discussed in more detail later, were central to the policy of many nation-state building projects in Modern Western Democracies. This required the sacrifice of entire peoples, or at least their identities, in order to make room for the Modern Western world. In short, being a citizen was antithetical to being 'Indian'. How this sacrifice became involved in policy and ideology, how it was enacted, and most importantly, how it was rebelled against, occupies the ideas in many of the following pages, just as it did the pages of Fausto's books.

What follows is a story about political intrigue in the heart of the Andes Mountains with the aftershocks and tectonic shifts left in the subsequent wake. It is a story about what different ways of thinking, different forms of teaching and learning, and different origins of effective civic and political organizational strategies, would mean for the future of a country plagued by military dictatorships, oligarchy, and foreign intervention. It is also a story about the political possibility of a 'beautiful day of life', which, as we will discover in later pages, is more elusive than we may think.

## Chapter One

### The Gales of Revolution

During the winter, bone-chilling winds sweep across the Andean high-plains known as *El Altiplano*. For those who brave the *Altiplano's* harsh elements, the sweeping *susurros*, or whispers, of the high-elevation gales are perennial reminders of the enduring struggles that have played out across that same vast terrain. There, from the Altiplano, the towering skyline of the mammoth Cordillera Real, or Royal Mountain Range, can be marveled at as it etches the horizon. The earth's rotation through the day changes the shadows cast by icy-white glaciers, magnificent peaks, and razor-sharp ridges that populate the Cordillera. Those mountain shadows, the high plains storm clouds, the indomitable Andean sun, the brilliant and unadulterated equatorial-constellations in the night sky, and the Moon with her cosmic radiance have cast the lighting, the visual aesthetic, and the climate control for the transcontinental theatre that is the setting for our story.

In that grandiose and formidable setting, struggles against oppression have perpetuated interminably against the monistic, messianic, and cataclysmic intercontinental invasion and occupation that began half a millennium ago.

For many in the Andes, the early spring on the altiplano is the time when the earth opens up to the sky, sun, and moon for the preliminary seeding of the cycle bringing fertilization to life in the Andean highlands. It was in the early spring of 1781, following more than three centuries of insurgency against the invasion and occupation, that Julián Apaza Nina, better known as Tupac Katari, would launch his

second siege on the colonial city of La Paz.

The city was a stronghold of Spanish Imperial power. Katari's siege was part of a coordinated pan-Andean revolutionary rebellion that included names which today ring prolifically from the tongues of Bolivians, especially the tongues of those Bolivian politicians wishing to inspire the popular imaginary. These are the names of people like Damaso Catari<sup>3</sup>, Bartolina Sisa, Gregoria Apaza, Tomás Catari, Nicolas Catari, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, Andrés Túpac Amaru, Diego Quispe, and Túpac Katari, if only to name a few. It could be said that these were the first and authentic 'Kataristas'. They will be referred to in the pages to come as the Original Kataristas.

The three years of sweeping insurgency led by the Original Kataristas, and the accompanying events, transpired during a much longer epoch of continual struggle against the crushing yoke of colonialism. It is said that two and a half centuries earlier, before the first successful foreign military attack against the southern part of the Fifth Continent<sup>4</sup>, the conquistador Francisco Pizarro drew a line on the ground with his sword. He challenged his men to choose whether or not to cross the line, and thus to choose between Panama and its poverty or Peru and its riches. These riches would require thievery, genocide, and mass murder to obtain. Historian Philip

---

<sup>3</sup> In this thesis, the sir name of Damaso, Nicolas, and Tomás, Catari, is spelled with a C, while Tupac Katari is spelled with a K. However, while I do this for the sake of distinguishing between these historical actors, and while these spellings are congruent with much of the literature on the subject, it should be noted that there is a good chance that all of these actors spelled their names with a K or a Kh, and many Bolivians would demand that spelling for them today. Fausto Reinaga and Ramiro Reinaga spelled Tomás's last name Katari. I translate this to Catari in my translations of those authors in this work.

<sup>4</sup> Fifth Continent: Referring to the geographical fact that the Americas, from Tierra del Fuego to the Bering Strait, is actually a continuous land mass, and thus one -the Fifth- Continent, therefore rejecting the application of political and economic cartography which incorrectly imagines central, northern, and southern continents of America.

Ainsworth Means gives a compelling account of this legend, which describes Pizarro, at one particularly definitive moment, as commander of his mercenary brethren.

Means writes that Pizarro,

...beholding his men, clad in rags and rheumatic from the incessant rains, preparing to leave him, he scratched a line with his sword from east to west upon the thin soil where he stood. Stepping across from the northern to the southern side of it, he curtly and hardily bade those of his men who were not fools and cowards to follow him and thus to dedicate themselves to further endeavors in the faith that rewards would come after. Thirteen... took the fateful step across the line as their leader commanded them to do (Means 22).

Means continues, "...The fainter-hearted men went back to Panama... Pizarro and the Thirteen of Fame presently built a raft and..." would begin their reconnaissance for the early stages of the invasion (Means 22-24). Once they would initiate their violent conquest, there would exist continuous rebellion and insurgency against them, and against those who would replace them. The intensity of resistance may have had its ups and downs but it was continuous.

Later, during the 1700s, rebellion escalated against the imperial occupation, which was then entering its third century of exploitative colonial appetite. Latin American Historian Steve J. Stern points out that, "Well over a hundred times during the years 1720-1790," (what he coins as the *Age of Andean Insurrection*),

...the native Andean peoples of [what is now] Peru and Bolivia, sometimes accompanied or led by dissident *castas* (mixed racial groups[by Spanish legal definition]) and whites, rose up in violent defiance of colonial authorities [who]...knowingly risked death for the right to exploit the Indian countryside (Stern 34).<sup>5</sup>

The Original Katarista insurgencies of the late eighteenth century altered

---

<sup>5</sup> From Stern's *The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: A Reappraisal*

global power relations. With the death toll reaching over one hundred thousand adding both sides, the damages done to the power of the Crown were irreversible. The Crown would be sidelined on the Iberian Peninsula due in part to the Napoleonic invasion twenty years later, and was weakened on the Fifth Continent, in large part due to a century or more of persistent insurgence. Soon, the power of the Spanish Crown would atrophy and political control of the Andes would be ripe for the picking by the Creole independence movements of the early nineteenth century. European capital also had its eye on similar fruits.

At the pinnacle of explosive revolutionary struggle for liberation by the Original Kataristas, the balance of power in the Andes was very close to completely inverting colonial power-relations in a changing world. Indeed, the Original Kataristas altered the course of world events despite their military defeat and the continuation of colonial structures. Unfortunately, most traditional and even some current historiographies of these events do not pay enough attention to both the global and domestic importance of centuries of Andean insurgence. This is not the case however in the following example.

Tawantinsuyu is the name the Inka rulers gave to the territory that the *Trece de la Fama* would later invade. *Tawantinsuyu, 5 siglos de Guerra Qheswaymara Contra España*, is what the translation of its title in English implies: it is a blow by blow recollection of the sustained 5 centuries of Quechua and Aymara warfare against Spanish colonialism by the inhabitants of the territory known as Tawantinsuyu. Its author, Ramiro Reinaga Burgoa wrote the book under the pseudonym of WANKAR in an attempt to protect him and his family from government and other reprisals. His

book title refers to the prolific and perpetual Andean rebellions and insurgence against Spanish colonialism that was characteristic of both the Colonial and Republican eras of Andean History. In sum, it catalogues the continual insurgence waged against the agents of post-invasion oppression during the previous five hundred years.

Ramiro, son of Fausto Reinaga, was an academic, an organizer, a protestor, a journalist, and a guerrilla. He would become a traveled international intellectual while in exile, escaping certain death from various Bolivian dictatorships. For some or all of these activities, he would be imprisoned and/or tortured by at least five different governments in at least three different countries. Ramiro's opinions and ideas were not always congruent with his father's. (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). As we will see in Chapter Eight, in the late 1970s Ramiro aligned himself with groups that his father critiqued. While the relationship between the two of them was often stormy, and while Ramiro would orbit in and out of Fausto's influence, there is an unmistakable connection between the two men. In my meetings and interviews with Ramiro beginning in 2011, there was always an uncanny similarity in his fluid and spoken thoughts with the written thoughts and ideas of Fausto (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

Both father and son were fierce proponents of liberation and autonomy for oppressed peoples in the Andes and elsewhere. Both Fausto and Ramiro advocated for an alleviation of the subjective and objective oppression plaguing Quechua and Aymara peoples in the Andes. This is at least one reason why the historical perspective of Ramiro's Tawantinsuyu helps to explain some of the theoretical and philosophical propositions of the following chapters. In this chapter, some

problematic characteristics of a few other perspectives will be addressed in relation to colonialism. However, it should be clear that there is no intention here to say that all other perspectives are unproductive or factually wrong. Rather, the intention is to offer insights into the subjective perspective from which Ramiro was writing, as well as the perspective of some of the audience he was writing for; primarily Quechua and Aymara peoples in the Andes.

There is also no intention to imply some kind of mono-perspective amongst Quechua and Aymara people, as QuechuaAymara is meant in the same aesthetic as Ramiro and Fausto use it. Additionally, Quechua and Aymara people are not the only indigenous political actors throughout Bolivian history. The widely diverse perspectives and peoples in Bolivia are intricately interwoven into political, economic, and social relations. The well-known Bolivian intellectual and social theorist René Zavaleta Mercado, would call this complex phenomenon of heterogeneous society, the *sociedad abigarrada*.<sup>6</sup> Zavaleta had previously, at a very young age, served as a government minister in the 1960s. Zavaleta, who found exile in Chile and Mexico during the dictatorships, is considered an important part of the Bolivian social science cannon and is useful in understanding the Bolivian historical trajectory. His concept of the *sociedad abigarrada*, elaborated on in the last footnote, is a useful concept for thinking about the subjects in the following chapters.

Therefore, by keeping in mind the complexity of the *sociedad abigarrada* that is Bolivia, it should be understood that Ramiro Reinaga's perspective is a perspective

---

<sup>6</sup> *sociedad abigarrada*: While this literally translates to 'motley society', Zavaleta instead intends this to mean what I described it as, an intricately interwoven set of political, economic, and social relations within the complex phenomenon of heterogeneous Bolivian society.

and not *the* perspective. The same could be said for this entire thesis as well as for other authors presented in the thesis. Such specific foci do not make a given perspective any less relevant. There is not one singular 'true' version of the historical moments presented in the following pages, although some accounts may be more useful and/or more accurate. The Brooklyn philosopher, poet, and radical intellectual, Lawrence Krisna Parker, is well known for his advocacy in the Stop The Violence movement, and has guest-lectured at over five hundred universities. He reminds us that,

History is an art, not a fact. And the historian, no matter how scholarly, is never exact. We are living in an **omni-event**. Keep in mind everybody's doing everything at the same time. The activity of the whole globe could never be recorded: Our linear vision is too distorted.

We think in terms of A, then B, then C, then D, then so on. We say 'this began here, that ended there', so our conversations can have something to grow on. But in reality the omni-event has no beginning or end that you can detect.

We make beginnings and endings in mass confusion so we can talk about the things we're doing, but this is all an illusion. We see reality according to the **symbols** we're using (Parker)(emphasis added).<sup>7</sup>

There is a reason for the specific foci, used in this thesis, taken from certain accounts of history. The accounts that Ramiro, Fausto, others, and myself choose to accentuate over the following chapters, serve to amplify conversations of non-Western perspectives. Could this conversation offer certain possibilities for re-thinking power relations between; states, the violence inherent in the legitimacy of those states<sup>8</sup>, and their political subjects?

---

<sup>7</sup> Citation from Meta-historical on the 2010 release: Meta-Historical.

<sup>8</sup> As will be demonstrated in Chapter Five.

In trying to answer that question, Ramiro's perspective can help in understanding colonial power relations both past and present. For Ramiro, the Original Katarista rebellions should be considered monumental. He goes as far as to claim that the Original Katarista rebellions were "...the most vast war, in extension and population, of the... Americas" (*Tawantinsuyu* 156)(translation Kearney). He declares and convincingly demonstrates that the Andean insurgents "mortally wounded" the global Spanish empire.

The larger matrix of Ramiro's book logs chronologically, page by page and year by year, a litany of the armed struggles against colonial oppression throughout the Andes. Producing a convincing thesis, Ramiro asserts that resistance and insurgence against colonial oppression has never stopped. He pairs this historical recollection with ad-infinitum denunciation of the perpetuation of colonial structures into the contemporary moment. This also demonstrates more clearly why Ramiro and many others were still involved in anti-colonial struggles at the time of publication, during the Bolivian dictatorships of the 1970s.

There are other ways to tell this story. Actually, there are many other ways to discuss these events, some far more common than Ramiro's narrative. I examine some other perspectives below. My point in doing so is to draw attention to some significant difficulties in Modern Western perspectives of events in history. In some narratives, even those recounted by respected scholars, there exists a certain kind of obfuscation. That is to say that political, economic, and social resistance can be hidden by omission and/or distraction. Sometimes this occurs through a fixation on the 'savage barbarism' of 'Indians', real or perceived.

Before turning to these other perspectives however, let us take a moment to examine the construction of narratives about **any** historical event by utilizing a metaphorical concept of *atmosphere* and *vacuum*. Academics, analysts, and news personalities often use the expression 'things don't happen in a vacuum.' What do we mean by that? I suggest that if we consider that *atmosphere* is the political, economic, and social context surrounding a historical event, and that *vacuum* is an absence of *atmosphere*, then we can contemplate the following proposition.

During any given event's inception, the information that is generated to chronicle, discuss, and debate the event is not created in a political vacuum. Those who control power relations structure the atmosphere that actually exists around any event's inception, to one degree or another. The scope and range of debate, discussion, and the distribution of knowledge regarding the event are confined to the degree in which power relations permit, or are able to control. Indeed, when events in the past are discussed in the present age, such atmosphere, since it was and is integrally related to power, continues to reinforce structures of power. In the sense we are discussing such themes in this thesis, the reinforced power structures often consist of colonial structures of inequality. Such atmosphere of discussion and debate, especially when reproduced and regularized socially, could be considered similar to the concept in which the social sciences have named *discourse*.

The common noun, discourse, simply means discussion. However, during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, building largely on the work of French theorist Michel Foucault, the social-sciences appropriated the word in order to represent complicated phenomena. The phenomena *discourse* represents are similar to the way in which the concept of

atmosphere, proposed above, manifests in the distribution of knowledge. The famous Jamaican Social theorist Stuart Hall, like Foucault, was a major influence on social theory during the twentieth century. He can help in more easily understanding the social science meaning of discourse.

Discourses are ways of talking, thinking, or representing a particular subject or topic. They produce meaningful knowledge about that subject. This knowledge influences social practices, and so has real consequences and effects. Discourses are not reducible to class-interests, but always operate in relation to power – they are part of the way power circulates and is contested. The question of whether a discourse is true or false is effective – organizing and regulating relations of power... – it is called a "regime of truth."  
 ...It produces knowledge that shapes perceptions and practice. It is part of the way in which power operates. Therefore, it has consequences for both those who employ it and those who are "subjected" to it (Hall, "The West and the Rest" 205, 225).

The reader should be advised that in this thesis, 'discourse' is often used in its social science form.<sup>9</sup>

Keeping these concepts in mind, it is also important to remember that those who create the narratives of history do not live in a political vacuum. As we will see in the following scholarly examples, what would seem so easily avoidable may not even be as recognizable as one may think.

The following examples are not wholly representative of the historiography on the subject. Rather, they exemplify discursive (the social science version of the word as an adjective) reification (strengthening through repetition) of certain power relations. In such reification, there runs the risk of a type of ubiquitous red-herring factor – that is to say, a kind of effect resulting from a hyper-subtle distraction – but

---

<sup>9</sup> For more on *discourse*, see Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish* and Stuart Hall "The West and the Rest".

connected to a much larger collective distraction. That collective distraction is no less than that of the Western social consciousness and conscience: collectively focussing on the red-herrings of history, altering the Western historical memory of the last five centuries of anti-colonial insurgent rebellion and resistance on the Fifth Continent.

In Latin American Studies, the presentation of the scale and scope of anti-colonial indigenous insurgencies are rarely, if ever, fully elaborated. The causes for this are infinitely complex. One factor is the reproduction and reification of discursive structures. This can be accidental or intentional. Another factor is the failure to recognize the permanency of colonial power systems after the departure of the empires that constructed them. Both factors will become clearer in later pages.

Let us examine one assertion that Ramiro's thesis proposes: he posits each of the Original Kataristas' efforts as a part of a coordinated panAndean insurgency that dramatically altered the course of history and was part of a multi-century insurgency that was still going on at the time of publication: 1977. In contrast, other contemporary authors like Nicholas A. Robins and Leone G. Campbell, presented narratives in 2005 and 1987 that, respectively, suggest that the actions of the insurgents were paramount to committing genocide and dismiss the coordinated nature of the Original Kataristas (Robins; Campbell).

In his 2005 book, *Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the Americas*, Nicholas A. Robins claims that he has identified

...a genre of social uprising in Latin America, that of indigenous exterminatory millennialism, through examining the links that may sometimes be found, but are not inherent, between genocide, millennialism, and nativistic movements in this region [the Fifth Continent] in the colonial and early national periods. The fact that

these movements sought to breathe new life into native-culture by largely removing foreign influences put into motion a dynamic that resulted in killing based on race and ethnicity, ascribed or otherwise. They followed a brutal logic that was clearly and consistently demonstrated by rebel actions... (Robins 2-3).

In a 2007 review of the book, published in the *Journal of American History*, Gary Clayton Anderson demonstrates why we should be concerned with Robins's suggestion.

The controversial nature of Robins's book is his use of the term 'genocidal impulse' to describe the actions, not of the Spanish conquerors, but of the Native Americans. He argues that as these wars matured, natives began to kill every Spaniard they could, thus committing genocide (Anderson 1253).

It is not that Robins is incorrect in demonstrating that across the Andes the strategies of execution of members of colonial society by the rebels were increasingly extreme in their waging of the war (Robins 118-132, 147-152). But is it fair to discursively put our focus of the conflict into terms of genocide when defining the strategy of insurgent rebels against the society who was oppressing them through force? Let us not forget that colonial society, as a collective, defined itself as superior to indigenous peoples in justifying that oppression. At that same time, colonial society actively engaged in, and/or viewed as natural, the genocide against indigenous peoples that had been occurring for hundreds of years.

While the action of genocide is not new, the word *genocide* is new to the English and Spanish languages. Its inception was in the 1940s during debates that accompanied the drafting of the various United Nations human rights documents, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, also known as the UDHR (Levy and

Sznaider, "The institutionalization of cosmopolitan morality"). The significance and definition of the word genocide today has been influenced over the last seven decades by ongoing debates among governments, scholars, courts, social movements, and NGOs (Non Government Organizations, for example Amnesty International).

Anderson warns against depending entirely on the United Nations definition of genocide and then elaborates on the problematic nature of Robins's characterization,

Many historians will have problems with Robins's thesis. ...Most historians have agreed that genocide occurs when a state attempts to destroy a particular ethnic or religious group within it, as was the case in Turkey in 1915, Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, and Cambodia and Angola in the 1970s. The question seems to be about definition: Can genocide be applied where oppressed people rebel against their oppressors? If that expansive definition were to be accepted, where would the line be drawn and would not the term genocide lose all meaning? (Anderson 1253-1254).

The biggest problem with Robins' discourse of genocide can be found in his chronology. His case studies include not only the Original Kataristas, but also the 1680 Pueblo Revolt (in what is now New Mexico) and the 1847 Caste War in the Yucatán Mexico. In his conclusion he states that **during** these conflicts "...genocide ...**became** super imposed" (Robins 164)(emphasis added). It is as if genocide had not already been superimposed, and perpetuated through social mechanisms and the State, hundreds of years earlier. It is important to point out that the context of the grand rebellion of the Original Kataristas is set almost three centuries into a long and perpetual series of transcontinental genocides being committed under many guises and by many agents. Perhaps the northern part of the Fifth Continent, from which Robins hails, discusses genocides elsewhere more often than its own because its own have become so regularized? Either way, an appropriate question to ask Robins would be:

Who was it that was committing genocide at a structural level, and what was actually being done in response to it?

In the other example, Leone G. Campbell's anthologized chapter titled "Ideology and Factionalism in the Great Rebellion"<sup>10</sup> emphasizes, as the title implies, the factional aspects of the Original Katarista struggle, as well as making the claim that the struggle was less about political demands or governance and was more about Andean cosmology.

Thus, the events of 1780 may be less the 'logical' culmination of a decade of several (66 or more) local, antifiscal revolts than the continuation of a series of messianic, nativist, neo-Inca protests (Campbell 115).

Lamenting the work of his peers, he argues,

Despite the fact that they could find no direct evidence of contact between Tomás [C]atari in Macha and Túpac Amaru Inca in Tinta, historians such as Lewin and others reported the rebellions as sequential events and attempted to join them despite the fact that the two caciques were residents of different viceroyalties, separated by a distance of 1400 kilometers, and dominated by different cultures (Aymara Quechua) (Campbell 114).

It is not my intention to contest Campbell and Robins's facts, but rather a specific discursive fixation within the texts, and the narrative which it risks reproducing. First however, there are a few notes that should be made regarding Campbell's assertions.

To begin with, a high probability for factionalism in any insurgency seems obvious. Moreover, Andean cosmology is intricately linked with Andean political and social forms of organization, making an either/or analysis problematic. Also, even if

---

<sup>10</sup> From Steve Stern's *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries*.

these leaders hadn't spoken Spanish, which they did, the history and construct of both the languages and cultures of Aymara and Quechua peoples have a complicated but parallel interconnection (Heggarty). Additionally, there were well-traveled forms of exchange across the Andes, not only during the time of these insurgencies, but for quite some time before them. Mule caravans, and before them llama caravans, had been interconnecting the Andes for thousands of years. Transcontinental communications and logistics were abundant. Despite Campbell's desire to isolate them, there is plenty of evidence of coordination between the Original Kataristas. The following examples, letters written by Dámaso Catari and Andrés Tupác Amaru, will demonstrate this.

While the Cataris were farther to the south (near Potosi) than the Amarus and Katari, this did not stop them from coordinating against various enemies. Despite the specific declarations and claims made by the different factions, they were all struggling against the same structural control: colonial oppression. This oppression occurred in many ways, including official racial social hierarchy, forced labor known as *pongeaje*, and crushing taxes and tributes (Larson). More importantly, during the three centuries of Spanish rule in the Andes, 'Indians' were officially considered as biologically, socially, and morally inferior to the Spaniards and Criollos (the white descendants of the Spaniards in the Colonies). By the time Dámaso and Andrés wrote their letters, the Crown's unjust actions were almost always a motivating factor for any given faction of the insurgent rebellion. That is to say that, while one band of rebels may have been mostly disgruntled about local taxes, or another riled-up about forced labor, and while different factions at different times supported or rejected The Crown

in declarations, they were all struggling against oppression rooted in those colonially structured inequalities and practices.

They were also literally coordinating and communicating both militarily and at an intimately personal level. Dámaso Catari, the brother of Tomás, addressed his relationship with José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (also known as Tupac Amaru II in reference to Tupac Amaru who led a large scale panAndean rebellion in the sixteenth century). Dámaso explains that Amaru (the II), who was on the other side of the Andes and to the north "...would redress their hardships, being also thankful for all their effort in advancing his cause" (Catari 208)(translation Kearney).

Andrés Túpac Amaru, who was José Gabriel's nephew, was instrumental in the inter-Original Katarista coordination. His forces went to Alto-Peru, what is present day Bolivia, to the province of Larecaja to assist with the forces of Gregoria Apaza (Túpac Katari's sister) in the military campaign there. Andrés also coordinated with contingents heading south towards what is now Argentina.

While in Buenos Aires, he wrote to Gregoria during her participation in the siege on La Paz. Excerpts of his correspondence demonstrate amorous admiration.

My dear doña Gregoria Tupac Katari... and [I am] infinitely appreciating the affectionate... in which I recognize the volition that you profess to me. ...your kind and Good company... ...the most affectionate, who I love from my heart.

Inka

(Andrés Tupac Amaru 340-344)(translation Kearney).<sup>11</sup>

These letters are only a few examples of the many existing documents that demonstrate the intricate interconnection between the Original Kataristas. One of

---

<sup>11</sup> This excerpt is from Letter AGI Buenos Aires 319 of María Eugenia del Valle de Siles's *Historia de la Rebelion de Tupac Catari*.

these leaders, Tomás Catari, also claimed to hail from royal Inka lineage. In *Tawantinsuyu* Ramiro introduces Tomás, before elaborating on the interconnections between the Original Kataristas,

Tomás Catari is a Quechua born in the locality of Macha, in the province of Chayanta, therefore the jurisdiction of La Paz and today the department of Potosí Bolivia. He demanded juridically before the authorities for the respect of the rights of Indians who were violated daily by the *corregidores*.<sup>12</sup> This accomplished nothing. He appealed to the *Audiencia* of Charcas. This didn't accomplish anything either.

The Audiencia of Charcas since the seventh of July, 1768, was no longer part of the Viceroyalty of Perú, but now instead of Buenos Aires, which was created on the same date. Tomás Catari and Tomás Achu ...went to Buenos Aires. As they were Indians, they were prohibited to ride horses. They walked, round trip, the distance of 2,500 miles. On the road, they worked in order to eat.

In Buenos Aires they were given an interview with the Viceroy José Vertiz. He was impressed by the robust personality of Catari, by their journey, and by the overwhelming evidence of their arguments. The Qheswa had convinced him with the truth. ...[While in the mean time, provincial] authorities of La Paz and Charcas had blocked all juridical possibilities for defense...

The viceroy gave them a written declaration of their rights. What is more, he ordered an investigation. With the documents, Catari and Achu once again, on foot, crossed the Argentine lowlands and the Andean ravines, back to Macha.

As soon as they returned, provincial Spanish authorities arrested Tomás Catari..." (*Tawantinsuyu* 148-149)(translation Kearney).

While provincial officials prepared their case against him, his supporters would break him out of jail. Then,

During June and July of 1779, Tomás Catari organized for war. He secretly met with José Gabriel Condorkanki[Túpac Amaru II]..., Julian Apasa[Túpac Katari]..., and other Indian leaders (ibid).

Until recently, these leaders were not considered major actors in the formation of contemporary Bolivia. It was only in the 21<sup>st</sup> century when indigenous leaders like

---

<sup>12</sup> Corregidores: A colonial Spanish administrative position, i.e. systematized administrators of exploitation.

Tomás Catari, Bartolina Sisa, and Tupac Katari would be officially recognized by the state as Bolivian heroes. Homage was only given to non-indigenous elite and bourgeois actors. Non-indigenous leaders who advocated for indigenous liberation were also obscured. This one-sided homage and recognition hardly seems fair. Bolivia, especially the Andean countryside, has always had an indigenous majority. It is unfair, especially when taking into account the global impact of indigenous rebellions and insurgencies in altering the trajectory of world affairs.

With this one-sided homage, Western perspectives of history have often picked singular moments and events to represent larger events and phenomenon. Although we can't view, analyze and discuss all of Lawrence Parker's *omni-event*, Ramiro's work shows the importance of stepping back and viewing the larger context of oppression and resistance in the Andes. It is this oppression and resistance in the Andes that flowed through the ink of Ramiro and his father Fausto's written thoughts.

## Chapter Two

### Murder, Theft, and Genocide

The Bolivian Republic was no panacea for oppression in the Andes. The advent of Modern Western Democracy in Bolivia worked out quite nicely for the elites, but not for the majority. Ethnographer, anthropologist, writer, activist, and panAndean organizer, Aureliano Turpo Choquehuanca, describe this concisely.

The Republic, emancipated from the motherland of Spain, constituted a new scenario of colonization. The invasion opened up a criminal and genocidal phase never before experimented in other parts of the world. The other colonial process, the Republicanization, is nothing more than the continuity of this process of invasion and colonization initiated by the Euro-Spaniards (Turpo 116)<sup>13</sup> (translation Kearney).

There was however, one interesting detour from, or at least a benevolent attempt at alteration of, the Republican oppression. This alternative effort was headed by nineteenth century Bolivian leader Manuel Ysidoro Belzu who, from December 1848 to August 1855, would retain the presidential palace. The palace was the cornerstone of Bolivian power struggles and would come to be known as the *Palacio Quemado* or the *Burned Palace*, because decades later it would be badly damaged by fire. As Ramiro wrote, "...Belzu is the only Bolivian president during the XIX century

---

<sup>13</sup> Turpo wrote this in a chapter titled "Socialismo o Comunitarismo del Siglo XXI" (Socialism and Comunitarianism during the XXI century) from the anthology *Historia Coyuntura y Descolonización, Katarismo e Indianismo en el proceso político del MAS en Bolivia* (Historical Conjecture and Decolonization, Katarismo and Indianismo in the political process of the MAS in Bolivia).

who didn't massacre QuechuaAymaras" (*Tawantinsuyu* 268)(translation Kearney).<sup>14</sup>

Indeed, in the oppressive continuation of colonial-structures during nineteenth-century Republican Bolivia, Belzu was a rare outlier of popular compassion. Decades later, Mariano Melgarejo Valencia, a rival caudillo and warlord, would participate in a plot to murder Belzu in the *Palacio Quemado*, effectively stealing the palace for himself with the help of his fellow prisoners and one shady underhanded pistol shot.

Who was this seemingly benevolent and martyred Belzu, of whom nary a word exits from the keyboards and English language speaking tongues of Northern academics? Who was this rogue hero, cut down in cold blood inside of the Palacio Quemado? Fausto Reinaga, Ramiro's father, in the middle of his life and during the early years of his vast book writing career, would write his fifth book, *Belzu, Precursor de la Revolución Nacional (Belzu, Percursor to the National Revolution)* published in 1953. The book was finished as an entry to a literary contest. The contest appeared in the midst of a wave of nationalist sentiment. While that sentiment was government propagated, it was also popularly engendered to a large degree. This occurred in the wake of the 1952 revolution in which Fausto had actively fought against the oligarchy.

Belzu is a good example of a non-indigenous leader who advocated for indigenous liberation, but was discursively obscured in mainstream historiography and officialdom. In the early days of the 1952 Revolution the MNR found itself in a struggle with the oligarchy. Belzu suddenly had a narrative use for those with the

---

<sup>14</sup> Almost every reference to Belzu, whether scholarly or otherwise, spells his name Isidoro. However in his official state publication, cited later in this thesis, he spelled his own name as Ysidoro. Therefore, it seems appropriate to use this spelling.

reigns of power. The contest's subject matter was that of nationalism and Manuel Ysidoro Belzu. While the mainstream would never fully give the tribute to Belzu that he was due, for a brief period surrounding the contest, the cobwebs of obscurity would be swept from the memory of Belzu. Fausto expressed his elation that, "...now 'Belzu' will enter the world of political ideas. The time will come to affirm or negate his right to triumph..." (*Belzu IX*)(translation Kearney). In order to understand Belzu and what Fausto is talking about, it is helpful to contextualize the subject matter in regards to the early Bolivian Republic, and that is precisely what he does in the prologue,

In the XIX Century, the ex-functionaries for the Spanish Crown had governed Bolivia, subject to the juridical and ethical norms of colonialism,[which were] extinguished only on paper, but vigorously vigilant within the objective reality (economy) and subjective reality (thought) of the country (*Belzu XV*)(translation Kearney).

He points out that this objective and subjective perpetuation of juridical and ethical colonial norms had continued on, even into the twentieth century, in the hands of, and for the interests of, a few elites. Fausto asserts that Bolivian history had also been manipulated in the same way by the same interests, and that bringing forth the hidden history of Belzu could provide an alternative vision, and

...bury one hundred years of falsified history. One hundred years of dogma planted in the brain and the heart of the pueblo, of the dogma that says: **Belzu, was a bossy ignorant plebeian, and Belcismo [meaning his policy/government], was a reign of exalted rifraff**<sup>15</sup> (ibid).

As Fausto demonstrated in this 1953 contest entry, the reality of the situation was quite the opposite. Belzu, who came to power only twenty three years after

---

<sup>15</sup> Translation notes: Rifraff = Chusma. The bolded text in this citation was originally typed in all capital letters for emphasis. However, in this and some other instances, the intentionality of the emphasis translates much better as bolded lowercase text.

Simón Bolívar's short reign, "...just about a century ago, mobilized the agrarian Indian masses and the masses..." from the city, in order to remove the oligarchy from power (*Belzu* XVII, XVIII). As a champion of the downtrodden, "Belzu... would be the grandest revolutionary of the XIX century" (*Belzu* 19)(translation Kearney).

Fausto points out that until Belzu, leadership and governance in Bolivia had consisted of ex-monarchist warlords fighting it out with each other, while enslaving the rest of Bolivians. Belzu and his policy, on the other hand, "...was not, and is not now, the halo of personal prestige, a vulgar doctrine, nor was it the crystallization of [the] domestic ambitions..." of strongmen who would fade away when they died, remembered only for their actions as warlords. Instead, his policy "...lives integrally in the popular memory and veneration; beating inside the conscience of the pueblo, and is the clarion of each rebellion of the multitude" (*Belzu* 53-54)(translation Kearney).

As his detractors have decried, Belzu himself may have been a warlord, a caudillo, a coup leader, and a military strongman. However, it must be emphasized that he was also, as Fausto reveals, much more than that. **Belzu was Bolivia's first Marxist.** This is demonstrated clearly by Fausto, himself an ardent Marxist at the time he wrote the book. Preparing to cite Belzu, he states,

Belzu, in 1849, twenty one years before Lenin's birth..., in the intersection of Yanacocha and Comercio Streets of La Paz, before a crowd draped in red banners, delirious from victory, pronounced this archetypal-Bolshevik socialist speech: 'COMRADES:

A mindless mob of aristocrats has arrived to be arbiter of our riches and our destinies; they ceaselessly exploit you without cessation'..."(*Belzu* 60-61)(translation Kearney).

As Belzu delivered his revolutionary oratory one block to the North of the

Palacio Quemado, things got really interesting. Deep within the Andes, deep within residual-colonial Republican Bolivia, and **way back in 1849, which was only a year after the publication of the *Communist Manifesto***, this rogue military general from that same colonial system, now President of Bolivia, gave an impassioned speech to the crowd. He spoke against the aristocracy and he spoke about the relationship between **land, labor, and capital**.

“...they shear you day and night, and you don't feel it; they accumulate monstrous fortunes with your sweat and blood, and they do not inform you. They distribute [among themselves the] lands, the honors, the employment, the dignities, leaving you with only the misery, the humiliation, the work, and guarded silence. How long will you sleep this way!? Wake up once and for all; the hour has come in which you should question the aristocrat's titles and private property's fundamentals. Are you not equal to the other Bolivians? This equality, is it not the powerful result of the equality of the human race? Why should only they administer the conditions of material, intellectual, and moral development, and not us? COMRADES: private property is the principal source of the better part of the offenses and crimes in Bolivia; it is the cause of the permanent struggle between Bolivians... no more property, no more proprietors, no more managers! Down with the Aristocrats! The land for all; enough of the exploitation... What reason is there that only... [the elites] occupy the elevated social positions? Are you not also Bolivians? FRIENDS: In the words of a great philosopher, private property is the exploitation of the weak for the strong; ...Now that the justice of men and of the times has denied you, you will make justice with your own hands” (Ibid).

After citing the speech, Fausto continues,

Lenin, forty-nine years, half a century later than Belzu (1898), spoke of a prophecy that had already been realized in Bolivia...

Belzu... was, therefore, the first man from Bolivia that had the luck of knowing 'The Communist Manifesto' of Marx and Engels. In the speech that we have transcribed above, he speaks of the abolition of private property... [and] proposes a property of the community, because that was more founded in reason. He bitterly condemns private property as the 'principal source of crimes and offenses'. ...the clear,

precise, and resounding concepts [of the speech, and] the simple language, incisive and exciting, without a doubt are flashes of inspiration taken from the brilliant document, the Communist Manifesto.

For this, and not in vain... all of the dominant classes attacked him throughout the scope of his rule, his death, and until our days, without rest, with the wrath of dragons. They have never pardoned him... To be clear, as revolutionary consciousness of the masses rises and takes shape, Belzu is more relevant every day..." (*Belzu* 61-62)(translation Kearney).

Fausto even goes as far as to declare that "...the great Belzu, in the context of world history... is nothing less than one of the precursors to the [1871] Paris Commune" (*Belzu* 56). Fausto convincingly demonstrates the similarities of the tactics and strategies of the popular movement during Belzu with those of the Paris Commune (*Belzu* 54-56). Marxism in Bolivia, perhaps because of its early introduction through *Belcismo*, has always had a distinctly different trajectory than the rest of the world.<sup>16</sup>

The oligarchy did not sit by idly while Belzu instigated his radical and revolutionary program. Fausto explains: "The reaction of the oligarchy never gave rest nor peace to Belzu." He continues that, "In an extensive territory of 3,000,000 km<sup>2</sup>, without railroads, without roads or telegraphs..." Belzu would have to defend his government against 113 supposed 'revolutions'. If looked at in detail however, these are probably more accurately described as reactionary coup attempts by different warlords.<sup>17</sup> For clarity, Fausto makes a two page footnote which lists the dates and agitators of a myriad of these attempts against the *Belcismo* (*Belzu* 57-59)(translation

---

<sup>16</sup> As will be evidenced in later pages.

<sup>17</sup> For details on the attempted coups against Belzu, also, see pages 106-174 of Nicanor Aranzaes's 1918 *Las Revoluciones de Bolivia*.

Kearney).

So, then, how did it come to be that Melgarejo would participate in the murder of Belzu?

At the end of Belzu's reign, his son in law Jorge Córdova won the elections and continued *Belcismo* policies. Córdova's inauguration was the first elected and peaceful transition of the Bolivian executive. However, Córdova was overthrown by a coup d'état in 1857 by José María Linares, the latifundista who Fausto would describe in 1953 as “feudal in flesh and bone” (*Belzu* 66). Linares, and then Melgarejo after he would assassinate Belzu, would return to the colonial habits of genocide. As a new word in 1953, Fausto was ahead of the curve in using *genocide* when recognizing structural violence, “Amongst the most ferocious Presidents who massacred the Indian, are Linares who consummated a **genocide** on the banks of Titicaca...” and “Melgarejo, who permitted the extermination of the Indians who would not resign themselves to cede their lands and be converted into colonial servants...” (*Belzu* 116)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added).

Belzu had not forgotten his own revolution. Linares would be overthrown by yet another elite coup, and warlords continued plotting their plans of attack. By late 1864, Melgarejo would have his band of warriors in on the action, but by no means had consolidated power, despite his having claimed to do so, and despite history claiming that he had done so (Aranzaes 233-240). Control over Bolivia was factional and chaotic by early 1865. Belzu, who had recently returned from Europe, raised an army in Peru and began the march across the Altiplano to La Paz, to reclaim the Palacio Quemado and reinstate his revolution.

The showdown was set. Capital interests and the land barons had not forgotten Belzu and his terrifying threat to their property. Melgarejo was their man, but was out of town dealing with unsettled business (*Belzu* 101-102).

After he marched across Bolivia welcomed by a wave of popular support,

Belzu entered the city of La Paz on the 22 of March, 1865. The Cholos<sup>18</sup>, the Indians, and friends received him in the way they always did, as an apotheosis [deification]. He had barely been installed in the Palacio 'Quemado', when he was given the task of preparing the defense of the city; now that Melgarejo, from Oruro, was furious and countermarching...

The Indians of the highlands, all with their pututos [a trumpet made from horn] and waving their red flags; with them cheers from the raging and heroic multitude, they brought to the 'Tata Belzu'[Father Belzu], not only foodstuffs, but were also offering their own lives for the sake of the leader... (*Belzu* 103,104).

As Melgarejo marched towards La Paz, he found the countryside and its inhabitants to be especially empty and unaccommodating to his band of armed opportunists, now at the service of the aristocracy. Melgarejo had little popular support.

The 27<sup>th</sup> of March, 1865, the Cholos and Indians of La Paz, the essence and the force of Belcismo, elbow to elbow with the other social stratum of the pueblo, confronted and faced the army of Melgarejo... The battle was, long, against all odds, bloody, and ferocious. The forces of Melgarejo fell defeated... (*Belzu* 104).

Yet, despite the victory of Belzu and his support from the masses, the aristocracy

...could not remain in conformity with the defeat. To Melgarejo and six of his calvary, pretending that they were prisoners, they opened a passage permitting them to enter the palace, where the insolent presence of Melgarejo produced confusion. Confusion that was

---

<sup>18</sup> Cholo, in Bolivia, is literally referring to Mestizos (people of mixed descent). However, Mestizaje and Cholaje are difficult subjects and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three. The Cholos and Mestizos in this story were often Indigenous Bolivians who lived in the cities or towns. As Chapters Three, Seven, and Ten will demonstrate, this small footnote is not sufficient in defining what is meant by the words Cholo, Mestizo, Mestizaje, and Cholaje.

'marvelously' taken advantage of by the aristocracy, in order to stab Manuel [Y]sidoro Belzu in the back... (*Belzu* 10)

Obviously the 'stab in the back' is metaphorical, as it was a cowardly pistol shot that took down Belzu. Melgarejo, pretending to be a prisoner, saluted Belzu, tricking him into greeting him. Then either he, Agustín Morales Hernández, or Narisco Campero Leyes, all three of whom would be president in the future, gunned Belzu down with hot lead and cold malice (*Belzu* 104,105; *Historia De Bolivia* 427; O'Connor d'Arlach 24-26; Molina Céspedes).

Legend, and mainstream historiography, hold that Melgarejo then stepped out onto the balcony, faced the multitudes who were deafeningly chanting 'Long live Belzu', and declare, "Belzu has died! Who lives now!?" (*Historia De Bolivia* 427; O'Connor d'Arlach 24-26) However, Fausto argues that this notion is ridiculous. Backing up the following citation with a reference to his contemporary, Bolivian historical writer Alfredo Sanjines, Fausto explains that:

The 'Long live Belzu' was an uninterrupted thunder, an unleashed hurricane. If Melgarejo, stepping over the cadaver, had yelled [as they claim] from the balcony... The crowd would have torn him and his cavalry officers [limb from limb]; all of his regiment would have been crushed into dust. This claim... goes against science, and is against the laws that govern the psychology of the multitudes... [Once] Belzu fell, Melgarejo, instinctively like an animal, smelled and saw the danger: the exalted, drunk, and delirious multitude. Therefore, "he took off" –says Sanjinés– "from view of this scene, and turning around, leaving in a big hurry from the room, he headed towards the corridor, and continuing quickly down the stairs, he said audibly through his teeth, -Belzu has died! Who lives now!?-... Melgarejo arriving at the bottom of the stairs, grabbed his horse by the reigns, and in a hurried gallup left..." ...Melgarejo hid from the multitude, before they had noticed the death of their leader (*Belzu* 105).

With the support of the aristocracy, Melgarejo would poach the Presidency and

start a sizable campaign to dispossess communal indigenous lands from their inhabitants, in the name of the ever more sacrosanct private property. Over the following decades, the liberal and conservative elites then struggled for power. It was a struggle over territory, resources, and the state that was gained so nefariously by the elites throughout the course of the nineteenth century. With the *Belcismo* coming to a crashing halt, this would become the promise of Modern Western Democracy in Bolivia: land rustling and murder.

The end of that century would culminate in an all out civil war between the elites, known as the Federal War. Due to a string of incidences of electoral fraud, struggles over administrative control, and other irreconcilable problems amongst conservative and liberal (Federalist) elites, armed conflict ensued (Zavaleta, *Lo Nacional-Popular* 143-144). However, they were not the only ones fighting over Andean lands.

There were actually multiple conflicts occurring at the same time. In what is known as the Willka Rebellion, Aymara revolutionaries fought for what had been theirs. It is hard to forget that which has been stolen, even when euphemistically called *disentailment*.<sup>19</sup> The rebellion was known as the Willka Rebellion because of the many leaders with that same last name, including Zárate Willka (Zavaleta, *Lo Nacional-Popular* 84,148). It was actually the culmination of a much longer series of connected uprisings, beginning with armed resistance against Melgarejo's policies of genocide and land theft (Zavaleta, *Lo Nacional-Popular* 145-148). They fought for

---

<sup>19</sup> The 'disentailment acts' were how the Liberals justified their wholesale land theft. This is not irregular however, as such phenomenon are supported regularly in the Modern Western Democratic world. Well-known social theorist David Harvey calls such phenomenon *accumulation by dispossession* (Harvey).

autonomy and a new society to replace their current reality, which was based on brutal forced labor on the haciendas and in the mines.

When the Federalist war ignited, Zárata Willka was invited to make an alliance with the liberal Federalist army of General José Manuel Pando Soláres, in order to defeat the conservative elements of Republican Bolivia (Mesa, *Historia De Bolivia* 510-511). In short, the Willka Rebellion had boldly militarized and created strategic alliances in defense of serious and clearly recognizable political demands (Egan).

There was, inescapably, a strong element of race regarding these demands. That is because the elites had maintained the structure of society which strongly predicated the positions of class on the concept of race: of dominance and subservience, of hacendado and peon/*pongo*, of bosses and mine workers, of homeowner and home servant, of civilized or savage, or to think of it more essentially, of enforcer and forced.

At a critical point in both conflicts, rebels allied with Zárata Willka apprehended and reprimanded a squadron of 130 Federalist troops at the edge of the community of Mohoza. The Federalists were apprehended by a local leader, for the abusive nature of the troops towards the locals. The troops were disarmed and held at the community church. The next morning, in an unexpected turn of events that is still not fully understood, the Federalist troops would all be killed (Mesa, *Historia De Bolivia* 515).

The two forces would continue to coordinate into the following month. Therefore, what had occurred in Mohoza **was not** the specific end of the Willka-Federalist alliance. However, the event **would** become the focal point of the elites for

a post-war pan-Bolivian vilification that characterized the concept of, and people identified as, 'Indians' to mean barbarous murderous savages.

As mentioned before, racially based myths, narratives, and obfuscations continue to use characterizations of savage irrationality when discussing what were actually acts of political, economic, and social resistance on the Fifth Continent. A good example of this narrative, as applied to the Willka Rebellion, occurs within the pages of the 2010 seventh edition of *Modern Latin America* by Thomas E. Skidmore, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, here forward referred to as the *MLA Authors* for the sake of brevity.

The MLA Authors are astute enough to mention Belzu and his democratic passing of the torch. They also manage to mention Melgarejo. However, there is no focus on the continual massacre and genocide committed by Melgarejo and those who followed him. The only mention they make of it posits that “Melgarejo brutally crushed”, what they present as a seemingly isolated set of events. Additionally, instead of mentioning how Melgarejo brutally initiated those rebellions through military action, they characterize the rebellions as a response to Melgarejo's land legislation, which to their credit, they do admit was “dubious” (Skidmore et. al. 174). When they begin to speak about the Federal War they explain,

Indian lands remained a troublesome issue. Conservatives repeated the commonplace arguments that Indian community land should be broken up into individually owned plots, and governments continued the initiatives begun by Melgarejo a decade before. Many Indians were forced to sell the land they had worked. With landless Indians in their employ, hacienda owners increased both their holdings and production. Indians once again rebelled against these measures. In 1899 under the leadership of Zárata Willka, and with support from the Liberal Party [Federalists], indigenous communities of the altiplano

defeated a Conservative-led national Army (Skidmore, et. al. 175).

However, the next sentence is problematic. The MLA Authors omit any and all aspects of complicated relations within political, economic, and social resistance. Without investigating or expanding-upon what happened during or after the conservative defeat, they instead fixate on a familiar characterization. As I will argue in later paragraphs, this characterization runs the risk of reifying colonial discourses of 'savage barbarism'.

Willka then turned against his allies, massacred a detachment of Liberal soldiers, and declared a **race war** on all whites. Horrified by this development, Liberals and Conservatives quickly joined forces and defeated the rebels (Skidmore, et. al. 175)(emphasis added).

Without verifying their claim that it was Willka himself that committed the massacre,<sup>20</sup> the MLA Authors fail to explain any of the events that precipitated and surrounded the massacre. Any descriptions of the horror that Liberals and Conservatives would subsequently unleash upon “indigenous communities of the altiplano” are also absent. They do not mention the ongoing genocide or the ongoing struggle against it, but rather they mention that “Indian lands remained a troublesome issue” and were “broken up”. For the MLA Authors, it is finally (seemingly only) in 1899 when “Indians once again rebelled against these measures” (Ibid.). After the race war passage above, the next paragraph begins with a new subject and the topic is never again revisited.

These political scientists, the MLA Authors, laud their book as “...an exceptional text for undergraduate courses on contemporary Latin American history,

---

<sup>20</sup> Note the MLA Authors's use of subject-verb-object: Willka-massacred-detachment.

society, and politics” (Skidmore, et. al.).<sup>21</sup> It could be said that at such an introductory level, such details are not relevant. Yet, this is essentially an issue of pedagogy: the relationship between teacher and student. It is an issue of pedagogy because, for those undergraduates for whom the text is intended, it is precisely in those first low contact moments, those early connections with information on the subject, when students begin to formulate their conception of social relations. Therefore, at this survey level, if a text does perpetuate a discursive structure, then it is even more possible for students to not recognize the negative connotations of the reification.

Let us explore that discursive structure further. The events of the Willka Rebellion are actually under substantial debate by historians (Egan). It is important to understand that we are not saying that there weren't racial aspects to the conflict, nor are we saying that the 'race war' was imagined. There had been talk of this kind on all sides. Toward the end of the two conflicts, the description of 'race war' **was** strategically used and waged as such by the Liberal and Conservative military commanders against the Aymara revolutionaries. However, what needs to be taken into consideration is **the way** the MLA Authors focus on the Willka Rebellion: as a 'race war', devoid of context. This contextual omission, whether they know it or not, is part of a discursive structure within a colonial power-knowledge relation.

For the MLA Authors, the salient points of the context and outcomes of the Liberal-Conservative civil war, and the entire Willka Rebellion, are: Willka turned on his allies, Willka massacred Liberals, and Willka declared a race war. Because of this, the Authors have us imagining Liberals and Conservatives narrowly evading

---

<sup>21</sup> From the back cover of the book.

treachery, massacre, and 'race war' by uniting in triumph (antonym- defeat). This is the narrative that those same elites wanted the masses to remember about the last years of nineteenth century Bolivia.

What are we missing with this mono-focal fixation? Frantz Fanon was a doctor of medicine and of psychiatry but is better known for his actions as a revolutionary and a writer in the Algerian conflicts with France in the 1960s. He can help us answer this question. Fanon was highly influenced by his mentor Aimé Césaire, who spoke out against Western and colonial structures. Shortly after Césaire's death in 2008, Historian Robert D.G. Kelley would describe Césaire's influence on the anticolonial struggles of the twentieth century:

He was probably one of the most important intellectuals. He was a founding editor of *Presence Africaine*, which was a journal, which advocated independence... He was also part of a wave of writers who in the 1940s and '50s had argued that... the future of the world depended on the third world. In other words, the third world was the vanguard. The third world was the modern force that could civilize Europe. And one of his central theses in [his book] "Discourse on Colonialism" was that when you look at the impact colonialism had on the modern world, we always look at the impact on the colonized, but he says, let's look at the impact on the colonizer. Colonialism decivilized the West. It revealed its underlying barbarity. ...on the other hand, the cultures of Africa and indigenous peoples and even Asia, he argues, represented "ante-capitalism" — in other words, "ante" meaning A-N-T-E, before capitalism, and "anti" meaning opposition to capitalism ("Aime Césaire, 1913-2008").

Fanon, like his mentor Césaire, highlighted this opposition and the importance of focusing on the role of the colonizer. He also emulated much more of Césaire's sentiment. Both Césaire and Fanon's writings can be extremely helpful in discussing colonial oppression, struggle, and liberation, in relation to social psychology. Here we focus on Fanon because, as we will see in Chapter Seven, by the 1960s Fausto was

heavily influenced by Fanon.

As Fanon demonstrated so clearly in his chapter titled *Concerning Violence* in his now canonized book *Wretched of the Earth*, initiations of violence do not always begin with the wielder. This is often the case when enslaved, oppressed, imprisoned, invaded, occupied, or otherwise violated, people are regularly and systematically subjected to arbitrary and unjust violence (usually in the form of the enforcement of the violation). Fanon argues that in these situations, those violated people's violent reaction is the culpability, not necessarily of themselves, but rather of those who are systematically violating them. Furthermore, there is a kind of inevitable necessity for their violent reaction, in that it is an extension of the violence of the oppressor (*Wretched of the Earth* 27-85).

Now, with this Fanonian view of colonial oppression, we should look back to the MLA Authors and their mono-focal fixation on the 'race war'. Yes, Willka had declared a race war. But Zavaleta and others point out that Melgarejo and company had not only initiated the “race war”, but had stoked the blazing genocide to full capacity. Zavaleta cites Zárate Willka, who was now acting in the context of four decades of genocidal policy against his people, in proclaiming his demands for, “the extermination of this [white] race... and the constitution of an indigenous government” (*Lo Nacional-Popular* 147).

What comprised the social context and political terrain of those demands? Aymara revolutionaries on the Altiplano heeded Willka's call precisely because of the kind of construction of violence that Fanon identifies. Fanon is not alone in identifying such constructions. “One should not be surprised with the general military

uprising” of the Zárate Willka Rebellion “if”, as Zavaleta explains, “one takes into account the lived experiences of the period which preceded it.” Zavaleta explains that Melgarejo and the elites had initiated a system of tricks and abuses in order to actualize their ongoing land theft. He reminds us of the gravity of those accompanying violations.

The active discontent of the Indians was the direct response to the appropriation of communal lands that occurred between 1868 and 1871, the first cycle, and 1874 and 1899 [the second cycle]... The reactions [from the state] were terrifying from the very beginning. [here Zavaleta cites others] “...They say that, for example, Leonardo Antezana, the general, the ferocious hitman for Melgarejo..., assassinated around 600 Indians in San Pedro' on the 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1869. ...[And] between the second and fifth of January of 1870, the same Antezana once again ended the lives of hundreds (400 people) in Huaicho. Following Sanjinés Uriarte, the raids of the military in Huaicho, Ancoraime, and Taraco yielded a total of 2000 Indians”

This is the history of agricultural property in Bolivia (*Lo Nacional-Popular* 145-146)(translation Kearney).

With the 1865 murder of Belzu and the rise of Melgarejo, the race war's initiation/perpetuation as a genocidal land grab by the elites as the State, was characteristic of the land-rustling and murder that comprised the Liberal and Conservative legacy of Republican Bolivia: the same exanthematic<sup>22</sup> proliferation of genocidal projects, which insurgents had already fought against for three and a half centuries. Both Liberals and Conservatives had actively participated in genocidal policies against the 'savage Indians' since before the first day of the Republic. Pando was no different. In one of his most well known books, the 1970 *La Revolución India*, Fausto himself would describe the events as a 'race war', but like Zavaleta, he does so with more context than the MLA Authors.

---

<sup>22</sup> **Exanthematic**: being of or like a rash.

From the fall of 'Tata' Belzu, the Indians of Bolivia did not falter in their movement. During the governments of Linares, Achá, and Melgarejo they defended with blood and fire, the land of their 'community' (*La Revolución India* 272-273)(translation Kearney).

...and while the Conservatives in the south may have had more military success against the Quechuas of the south, thus having more capacity to dominate them,

...the Aymaras [farther north] proved to be each time more 'indomitable'. In an uninterrupted form they rebelled far and wide...  
 ...[the different factions of the elites] with full consent and full volition... moved the residence of the government of the city of Sucre to the city of La Paz; because this would serve once and for all [as a strategic] deterrent to the Aymara 'uprisings'...

The question of the capital, like the federalism of the liberal revolution, was a pose, hypocrisy, a simulation in order to cover up the agreement between Pando and Alonso [Pando's stated opponent]: 'to locate the government in La Paz, and definitively smash the uprisings of the Aymara Indian' (ibid.).

How power would be divided up between the elites still depended on the outcome of the military contest between them. Pando was outgunned, and needed to construct a strategic advantage. "Pando, in order to solve the problem of his inferiority of belicosity, threatened Alonso: '...we will arm the Indian rebellion' " (*La Revolución India* 275). Pando would then ask Willka to,

... help me with the Indians in this civil war. The whites of the south... are your enemies and are my enemies. Let us fight against them, and afterwards I will be the First President and you will be the Second President of Bolivia; and we will return to the Indian their lands, which Melgarejo snatched... I grant you the same military rank as mine... you will be 'Colonel Willka' " (Reinaga, *La Revolución India* 275)(translation Kearney).

Fausto laments that, "...intellectuals never have stopped with the lies about an event of such historical magnitude and profundity" (*La Revolución India* 276) (translation Kearney). He demonstrates the ongoing insurgency and the unspoken

political interests behind moving the capital city to La Paz. Along with other contextual details, Fausto explains the Fanonian inevitability of the ferocity of the response to Pando's invitation. He demonstrates that this opened the flood gates of ferocity against the grander oppressor, in which race was the distinguishable identification (*La Revolución India* 276-279).

Three days after the events at Mohoza, Pando would begin to realize that his alliance had backfired, and that the actual 'race war', which his predecessors had initiated decades before, was now blowing up in his face. He was experiencing a tactical situation which intelligence-analysts now call "blowback".<sup>23</sup> Trying to convince Alonso that they had bigger fish to fry than each other, (and **lying**), General Pando would ask that because of

“...The War of the Races' that has already **begun by the Indian race on their own impulse...** Let us make a force to end this Civil War and act to prevent, contain, and sterilize the Race War that the Indians have begun...” (Reinaga, *La Revolución India* 280)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added).

What the MLA Authors claim about a race war is not incorrect. However, they are inaccurate in simply labeling the last months of culminating battles known as the Willka Rebellion as the whole of the war. In actuality, it was the bloody and tragic crescendo of a half-century war: a half-century process of genocide and of prolific insurgency against it. By not recognizing the initiations of the process, by tossing aside the complexities of the tactical actions on all sides, and by omitting the revolutionary intentions of the Aymaras, the MLA Authors' focus becomes quite

---

<sup>23</sup> See for example ex-CIA analyst and longtime political science intellectual Chalmers Johnson's *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*.

narrow.

The MLA Authors's contextless focus, not the claim itself but its mono-focal construction, is the legacy of a common discourse. As historian Nancy Egan explains, “It appears the [discourse of] race war may have been [largely] constructed in the courtroom” (Egan 39).<sup>24</sup> Egan's essay details the Proceso Mohoza, a trial amongst a series of trials conducted by the Bolivian State in the years after the conflict and surrounding the murder of the Federalist troops. She describes how the trial,

...helped reinforce the characterization of the Willka Rebellion as a 'race war' and how the trial served as a site of struggle for a newly embattled government and a shifting elite racial discourse in the age of social Darwinism (Egan 1).

Egan's archival work helps demonstrate the relationship between the social situation at the turn of the century and traditional historiography about the events. The trial, she argues,

...tried and condemned hundreds of accused persons for the massacre at Mohoza of over a hundred Federalist troops in March of 1899... proved critical in later depictions of the indigenous rebellion as a 'race war'... (Egan 1).

Egan points to recent scholarly attention, emphasizing “...a pre-existing plan among indigenous leaders to take power in the country at the onset of the Federal War” (Egan 3). Therefore, what had been an organized insurgency with a revolutionary goal was completely obscured and instead predominantly characterized by the State and traditional-historiography as a 'race war', and savagery. This was a reproduction of the discourse of Social Darwinism and proliferated in the trials that condemned the defendants. It is also what helped to condemn them. In short, the

---

<sup>24</sup> From Egan's *Citizenship, Race, and Criminalization: The Proceso Mohoza, 1899-1905*.

discourse labeled them as a savage and inferior race. Social Darwinism, globally a widespread ideology at the time, considered that evolutionary stages in human development have left certain ‘races’ of men inferior to others. At that time, it was often the justification and/or rationale for social engineering policies of Modern Western Democracies in the Americas.

The defendants of the trial never had a chance. Even their defense attorneys were deeply steeped in this discourse. “One of the most novel defenses was that presented by Bautista Saavedra, one of the most well-known attorneys and elite actors in the courtroom...” (Egan 15). An intellectual and sociologist from prominent circles of power, Saavedra was well known for his positivist<sup>25</sup> and Social-Darwinist viewpoint. In other words, he was a racist who felt that non-whites, i.e. non-Europeans, were inferior races and held that science proved this. A few decades later, he would become president of Bolivia.

During the trials Saavedra would “...thoroughly argue for the consideration of the events as a 'race war' brought by the participants in the rebellion.” Egan explains that according to him,

...the fact that the events were a race war indicated that they must be treated with the same legislative consideration as the losing partisan army from Sucre. In effect, they deserved equal application of the amnesty given to all participants in the civil war.

And more importantly,

---

<sup>25</sup> Positivist, from **Positivism**: The social theory that only hard-science is a valid point of departure for understanding society and that society is governed and formulates due to physical laws. Positivists hold that these laws therefore can be used to predict social evolution as well as theorize the management of society. More often than not, this was enunciated in Social Darwinist theories about races of Men and genetic disposition for social activities and capacities: for example, Eugenics and scientific-racism.

...Saavedra hinted at an inherent criminality produced by the physicality of the defendant and that there were innate tendencies of race that produced the events of Mohoza” (Egan 15,19).

As Egan shows, fixation on savage barbarity is part of a discursive perpetuation of colonial power structures, where “...elites clearly envisioned the negation of indigenusness as a key requirement...” in their nation building process (Egan 40). Whether or not it was the intention of Robins, Campbell or the MLA Authors, the proximity of their discourse to that of the traditional elite has the discursively chilling effect of sensationalizing and depoliticizing the scope and complexity of insurgent rebellions resisting colonial subjectivity. This may not have been the intention of Robins, Campbell, or the MLA Authors. However, it was definitely the intention of the elites during and after the trial, as well as the intention of Pando and Alonzo towards the end of the war.

Historically, such discursive effects have obscured the importance of certain events and their relation to the grander scale power struggles: the importance of events like the Original Katarista insurgencies, the Willka Rebellion, and the visionary communist revolution of Belzu.

At the end of his life, René Zavaleta Mercado would write his magnum opus *Lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia (The National Popular in Bolivia)*, which would be published after his unfortunate 1984 death. In it, Zavaleta would refer to the Original Kataristas, Belzu, the Willka Rebellion, and their collective popular uprisings,

...it is here where a certain temperament was founded, which is that of the plebiscite in action. ...if the accumulation of the masses is so characteristic of Bolivian history, it is because it is inspired from this genus of initiations. After all, the syllogism of the siege of La Paz is just as linked to that of Willka in the Federal War. Apasa [Tupac

Katari] educated the masses in a sense of democracy of the multitude, of self determination, and of refusal to acquiesce that would be repeated after the war of independence, in Belzu, and in all of the essential moments” (*Lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia* 88)(translation Kearney).

Or, to borrow from what Fausto had already determined, this temperament and education “...lives integrally in the popular memory and veneration; beating inside the conscience of the pueblo, and is the clarion of each rebellion of the multitude” (*Belzu...* 53-54).

There is much debate about what is meant by the word *multitude*. There is no intention of entering such a debate in this thesis. However, a quick set of guidelines for understanding the use of the word *multitude* in this thesis is necessary. To begin with, to the extent that the following guidelines are only guidelines, the reader is urged to consider the context for each use of each author. Furthermore, each use of the word *multitude* could refer to a different multitudinous formation, once again necessitating attention to context in addition to keeping in mind the following guidelines.

Social scientists using the word *multitude* can be implying collective social movements with an organic and spontaneous, rather than institutionally organized, construction (Postero, *Now We are Citizens* 221). The way that I use the word in this thesis, can infer that, but is referring to a subtly different sentiment. I try and use the word *multitude* in a similar sense to that of Zavaleta and Fausto. In this use, we should not confuse the term *multitude* with the concept of a mob or of the masses alone. While *multitude* refers to large groups of people or the larger collective of the masses, we should consider a distinguishing qualifier: the *multitude* embodies political sentiment and goals in congruence with the demands and affirmations of those groups

and/or leaders who are voicing those goals. It is the outpouring, outcry, and action of human collectivity, with an awareness of its own political intent. The multitude is meant to signify large groups of political subjects, - in masse - representing, demanding, and/or carrying out political demands, and can often include sentiments of class or ethnic solidarity. In the sense that I use this word, those sentiments can be present but are not prerequisite. Bolivian intellectual Luís Tapia is careful to point out the differences of those class and ethnic sentiments from different uses of the word in the writing of Zavaleta. He also points out that Zavaleta can mean the masses, or the more legalistic plebescite (direct electorate). However, here in this thesis we are speaking on a more general level that encompasses, or at least does not distinguish between, those different uses (Tapia, *La Producción del Conocimiento Local* 260-266; Antezana, *La Diversidad Social en Zavaleta Mercado*; Reinaga, *Belzu*; Zavaleta, *Lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia*).

In Bolivia, the reoccurring and dominant presence of multitudinous formations is intricately connected to the temperament and education that Zavaleta and Fausto described a few paragraphs earlier. Yet, this temperament and education, and the social formations they have produced, can also become obscured. This is similar to what happens with the 'race war' narrative of the MLA Authors. Throughout Bolivian history, obfuscation as a discursive form of control has been part of a power-knowledge relation. Bolivian scholar and educator Franz Gustavo Morales Méndez illuminates this relation in his 2011 book, *Critical History of Bolivian Independence* (*Historia Crítica de la Independencia de Bolivia*).

The history of Bolivia, before and after 1825, has been woven and

interwoven with diverse matrices, positions, and group, class, and particular interests. Two hundred years of Republican life, had signified for many, for the majority, a reality that never existed. They only knew what the [elite] minorities were interested that they knew. It had been this that they called Bolivian History (Morales Méndez 11)(translation Kearney).

With that in mind, we should take a moment to consider the relationship between the educator and the educated: pedagogy. In the situation explained above, the oppressed continue to be restricted from understanding the full truth of their personal situation and history, precisely because the very critique that may facilitate that understanding was negated and erased. We will see in later chapters that this is precisely why it was necessary for indigenous Bolivians to reconsider the pedagogical relationship during the twentieth century. These reconsiderations have interesting parallels to a concept known as *critical pedagogy*. This concept is often advocated for its possibilities of constructing self-liberating capacity among the oppressed. This is accomplished in part through more equitable and critical relationship between the educated and the educator.

For Republican Bolivia, such a relationship did not and could not exist. 'Education' was an elite dominated realm and a one-way process. Not only were the interests of the elite minorities structured in their own favor, but also those interests were often foreign, and were certainly not the interests of indigenous Bolivians. They were often the interests of capital in support of the exploitation of indigenous Bolivians and their lands.

The Italian radical, intellectual, publisher, and organizer Antonio Gramsci described a similar phenomenon in Italy. Gramsci's description involves northern

Italian capital interests in regards to colonial relations of land and labor in southern Italy (upon which northern capital interests relied) during the late nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. He wrote about it while wasting away in the prison cell to which Benito Mussolini and the Fascists had confined him.

...the North concretely was an 'octopus' which enriched itself at the expense of the South, and that its economic-industrial increment was in direct proportion to the impoverishment of the economy and the agriculture of the South (Gramsci 71)(emphasis added).

Gramsci explains the discourse promoted in the north to accompany and reify these interests,

The poverty of the Mezzogiorno [Southern Italy] was historically "inexplicable" for the popular masses in the North; they did not understand that unity had not taken place on a basis of equality, but as hegemony of the North over the Mezzogiorno in a territorial version of the town-country relationship... The ordinary man from Northern Italy thought rather that, if the Mezzogiorno made no progress after having been liberated from the fetters which the Bourbon regime placed in the way of a modern development, this meant that the causes of the poverty were not external, to be sought in objective economic and political conditions, but internal, innate in the population of the South and this all the more since there was a deeply-rooted belief in the great natural wealth of the terrain. **There only remained one explanation- the organic incapacity of the inhabitants, their barbarity, their biological inferiority.** These already widespread opinions... were consolidated and **actually theorized by the sociologists of positivism,**<sup>26</sup> acquiring the strength of "scientific truth" in a period of superstition about science (Ibid.)(emphasis added).

This atmosphere of positivist discourse also permeated the dark world of intransigent-racism and residual oppressive colonial-culture into which Fausto Reinaga was born.

In Bolivia on March 7, 1906, less than a decade after the Willka Rebellion, the

---

<sup>26</sup> Here Gramsci cites in parenthesis, "(Niceforo, Sergi, Ferri, Orano, etc.)".

discourses and colonial power structures that were reinforced through the Mhoza trials, were set at full sail, with the winds of Liberalism blowing hard from a Social Darwinist direction. In the Bolivian Republic, it became socially impossible to be 'Indian'. On that same day a Quechua woman would give birth. Her name was Aleja Catari. She shielded her true identity as a descendent of the Original Kataristas, and instead used the name of Alejandra Chavarría.

Aleja had been a participant in the Willka Rebellion. She gave birth to a baby boy in Huahuamikala, a community near Macha where Tomás Catari was from. Her baby was the great, great, great grandson of Tomás **Catari**. Aleja's son, José Félix Reinaga Chavarría, would one day be known as Fausto Reinaga.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Fausto Reinaga**

#### **The Indian and The Cholo**

...on the banks of Lake Titikaka, the Indian Aleja Catari gave birth to me ...in the pueblo of Macha –Potosí–. From my mother, there runs in my veins the blood of Tomás Catari, the caudillo who began and led the campesino rebellion of 1780-81. That campesino uprising of the *raza india*, was the first [phase in the wars of] Bolivian national independence. Just like my parents, I worked since I was a kid in agriculture and in the mine. At sixteen, I learned to read (F. Reinaga, *El Sentimiento* 79; *Indianidad* 9)(translation Kearney).

If this thesis were a work of literary fiction or mythology, then Aleja's son, a descendent of Tomás Catari, the son of rebel fighters, would be the obvious candidate for instigating struggles against oppression in the Andes. Yet, in reality, it was not likely that the young Reinaga would follow the liberatory path of Catari's legacy. After beginning his formal Western education, he was directed towards what appeared to be a path of conformist assimilation. It was a path quite contradictory to the heroism and defense of QuechuaAymara anti-colonialism that his mother Aleja, his father, and his ancestor Tomás, had so vigilantly traveled. In contrast, the path of the young Reinaga would first bring him into the social fold of continuing colonial oppression. In this chapter, we will see the complicated reasons for this detour.

Fausto described the difficult transition from a life as an illiterate Quechua from the countryside to a different set of circumstances as a star student at the high

school of the Patiño<sup>27</sup> mine camp in Colquechaca,

When I turned sixteen I went to the Mestizo school, that is: the language of Spain - and thought from the West... I was from Indian Bolivia, that is to say from slave Bolivia, slave America... My classmates, my professors, the people of the house where I stayed and when I went out on the street, were my enslavers (*Indianidad* 9)(translation Kearney).

How should we consider Fausto's assertion that these people, who were obviously not subjecting him to physical bondage, were his enslavers? Answering this question requires further contemplation.

One deleterious casualty of colonialism and residual colonial structures can sometimes be observed in the following way: As Frantz Fanon suggested, the colonized subject experiences a socialization of psychological self-negation. That is to say, a negation of who one was, in exchange for a thought process and identity<sup>28</sup> perpetuated by the dominant subjective and objective forces of colonialism.<sup>29</sup> While this does not in any way constitute any kind of norm or rule, it can happen, as it did with Fausto.

Such a self-negation occurs, at least in part, due to discursive degradation of the other, by the colonizer. In social atmospheres of residual colonialism it can be social classes other than those of the colonial social stratum, who are deployed through subtle means to produce the degrading/negating discourse. Either way, when

---

<sup>27</sup> Patiño was one of the three mining families who came to control much of the capital and political power in Bolivia. The three families and their amalgamated power are often referred to as the *Rosca*.

<sup>28</sup> An individual's *identity* within and across societies, can be how one views one's self, however it is inescapably linked to how others view an individual.

<sup>29</sup> For more on this kind of social psychology, see Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*.

this does happen, the negation has the capacity to be normalized or seem logical in the mind of the colonized subject (Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy*; Memmi, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*). To be more blunt, colonial subjects can suffer the trauma of despising themselves, their communities, their phenotypical characteristics, or at least their own origins, due to the reformatory power wielded by their colonial masters.<sup>30</sup> This counterintuitively renders colonized subjects wanting to be more like the colonizer. Perhaps this could be considered as a type of sociological *Stockholm Syndrome*<sup>31</sup>, not for hostages and prisoners, but rather for colonized subjects.

How does this happen on a social level? Bolivian intellectual Javier Sanjinés, who is currently a professor at the University of Michigan, noted that,

Late-nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century nation builders were, of course, heirs and continuators of a colonial tradition that constructed its power structure around the historical antagonism between the European white and the Amerindian and black populations. As a consequence, since the eighteenth century, dominant social groups, whether Criollos or upwardly mobile Mestizos, have tended to build their self-identities as exclusively Eurocentric (Sanjinéz 54).<sup>32</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup> Masters could be quite literal, or social and institutional structures or mechanisms which replace the need for a human overseer.

<sup>31</sup> **Stockholm Syndrome:** Michael Adorjan and colleagues explain in the journal *The Sociological Quarterly*, that “Stockholm syndrome, as it was defined by one of the earliest psychiatrists interested in the condition, is a disorder whereby abductees bond with or express loyalty toward their captors in an effort to save their lives or make their ordeal more tolerable (Strentz 1980). First used in 1973 in connection with the response of a group of employees held hostage in a robbery at a Stockholm bank, the use of the term 'Stockholm syndrome' used to be restricted largely to kidnaps and hostage-taking incidents. However, since the 1970s, the term has been used in a much broader range of cases. The power imbalance argued to be an essential dimension of the syndrome and the false emotional bonds these imbalances are said to create have led some claims-makers to suggest that Stockholm syndrome occurs not only in abduction or hostage-taking cases but in a whole host of situations and conditions not immediately recognizable as manifestations of the syndrome” (Adorjan et. al. 454-455). This thesis agrees with those claims-makers, especially in regards to residual colonial relationships. The article cited in this footnote is by Michael Adorjan, Tony Christensen, Benjamin Kelly, and Dorothy Pawluch titled "Stockholm Syndrome as Vernacular Resource" from *Sociological Quarterly*.

<sup>32</sup> From “Mestizaje Upside Down: Subaltern Knowledges and the Known.”

Therefore, to participate in society, individuals would have to 'become' European.

However, this phenomenon was not solely a defense mechanism or tool of social mobility for colonized subjects. The ideologies of *Mestizaje* can be confusing because they often had specific definitions of phenotypical 'race' mixing. Sometimes this includes racial Social Darwinist connotations, but sometimes is implied with anti-racist intentions. In the Andes, *Cholaje* was a parallel way of talking about *Mestizaje*. One way to help understand these complexities is to observe the links between the ideologies of *Mestizaje/Cholaje* and *Indigenismo*. What is *Indigenismo*? For clarification, we can look to Mexican sociologist Fabiola Escárzaga, who has written various works on the theme of Fausto Reinaga and related subjects.<sup>33</sup> Escárzaga defines *Indigenismo* as,

...the ideology elaborated by mestizos expressed as a political program, governmental policy, and/or artistic current in literature and the visual arts – in countries with significant indigenous populations. From the 1920s on, [*Indigenismo*] claimed to represent the interests of the indigenous in order to integrate them in a subordinated manner through mestizo hegemony, culturally assimilating them to the mestizo nation and politically ascribing them to the mestizo construction project of the anti-oligarchic Nation-state. In short, it was to change them [the Indians] into mestizos (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 193)(translation Kearney).

One of the seemingly benign ways that concepts of *mestizaje* and *cholaje* were promulgated was through this ideology of *Indigenismo*, put forward by *Indigenistas*.

This is in part because *Indigenismo* as an ideology, while glorifying the Indian of the

---

<sup>33</sup> Many of the citations of Escárzaga in this thesis, as well as the following one, come from an article in the journal *Política y Cultura*. The article centered on an illuminating comparative analysis of the political and ideological trajectories of both Fausto and Felipe Quispe Huanca, who is a descendent of Original Katarista commander Diego Quispe. Felipe Quispe is an important historical figure who will appear in later chapters of this thesis and was influenced by Fausto.

past, advocated a supposedly inevitable assimilation to Western culture. The concepts and socio-political practices surrounding *Mestizaje* and *Cholaje* did not necessitate race mixing. For example, a Mestizo or a Cholo's status in society was heavily influenced by their social behavior. These social mechanisms placed a high pressure on people of indigenous or non-Western descent. While retaining their phenotypical characteristics and while sometimes allowed to retain some superficial cultural characteristics of their origins, they were expected to act more and more like Europeans in the nascent 'civilizations' of colonial and residual-colonial states. The necessity of race mixing reached only to the extent of phenotypical racial markers, which were only part of the racial ideology of the Latin American experience. The expectation was that those with non-Western descent would “assimilate” to hegemonic cultural and social norms and practices. *Mestizaje* and *Cholaje* are also used to define the social stratum who identify as such, due to the socio-political process.

The phenomenon that Sanjinéz described is a part of the social matrix in which the concepts of *Mestizaje and Cholaje* were prevalent. The promotion of these concepts was amplified during the rise of Modern Western Democracies, was strongly linked to the *positivism* that Antonio Gramsci described in Chapter Two, and was actively and often forcefully promoted through the state policies of nation building projects (Appelbaum et. al.).

One constructive way of considering these concepts is to review the critique that Fausto would write in later years about José Vasconcelos. Considered one of the godfathers of the Modern Western concept of *Mestizaje*, the Mexican Vasconcelos is highly lauded by leftists and radicals in the Western world. However, as we will see,

the ideas of this positivist are still bound by the limits of Modern Western thought. Fausto's critique is one part of his 1968 book *El Indio y los Escritores de América*. (*The Indian and the Authors of America*)<sup>34</sup>

Vasconcelos is often credited with popularizing the phrase 'La Raza Cósmica', or The Cosmic Race, which implies that the 'mixed' blood of the Mexican people combined to create an amazing unified national subject, or singular strain of super-citizen. Obviously this was ideological, as the reality of the country of Mexico is made up of a myriad of cultures, practices, peoples, thought processes, and phenotypes. However, after the Mexican Revolution, nation builders, steeped in Modern Western thought, yearned to demonstrate and promote a singular national ethos. These ideas, like those we saw over the last few pages, while glorifying the Indian of the past, required those identified as Indians in the present to assimilate as Mestizos. Vasconcelos, as the Mexican Secretary of Public Education heeded their call for, and vigorously promoted the concept of, La Raza Cósmica, a homologue to Bolivian concepts of Mestizaje and Chola (Knight, "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940.").

Fausto centered his fifteen-page Mexican literature review from *El Indio y los Escritores* on Vasconcelos alone.

---

<sup>34</sup> While Bolivian intellectual and editor of the periodical, *Pukara, Cultura, Sociedad y Política de los Pueblos Originarios*, Pedro Portugal Mollinedo, points to *La Revolución India* as the most important of Fausto's works, I myself note that Fausto's rarely discussed analysis of Latin American literature, *El Indio y los Escritores de América*, is his most comprehensive intellectual treatise. I agree with what Portugal told me during an interview when he explained that his position is because *La Revolución India* offered and outlined a more expansive political praxis (Portugal). My reasons for instead lauding *El Indio y los Escritores de América* is rooted in the comprehensive nature of its author-by-author analysis of Latin American literature and thus its capacity to lay bare the hegemonic trajectory of 'the sedimentation of common sense' as Antonio Gramsci explains it (Gramsci 326). Also, see Gramsci on 'The Intellectuals' (Gramsci 3-23).

José Vasconcelos... was... a Europhile to the core. He idolized the West. His Europhilia arrived at the level of delirium. ...He was convinced that Western culture was the only way to 'civilize and assimilate' the Indian...

Vasconcelos would extend over all of the Latin American countries as a visionary of executive function. He got his idea and that instant he converted his idea into act. Thanks to him, the muralism of the Mexican Revolution was born and flourished. Diego Rivera, Oroscó, and company all received ample material and moral assistance from this Secretary of Education (*El Indio y los Escritores* 117).

Fausto's concern with Vasconcelos has less to do with his fame in promoting mural and art production and more to do with the message that the murals embedded in the national consciousness of Mexico, as well as the message it embedded in the global consciousness of the Western world. Fausto would cite Lewis Hanke, presumably citing Vasconcelos, in order to contextualize the ideology of Vasconcelos and then would elaborate.

“Indigenismo, as a product of the [Mexican] Revolution, consists of the identification with the Indian, or, at least to the point of, the glorification of the Indian, especially of the Indian of the past... The movement to – incorporate the Indian in the national way of life – ... While the Indian masses effectively do not participate in the national way of life, they are looked at as an obstacle for development of the national culture and of the Modern [Nation] State.”

This is a key and riveting concept in the mind of the Latin American: “Incorporate the Indian to civilized life” (*El Indio y los Escritores* 119)(translation Kearney).

In the 1968 book, he comments on a journey he took to Mexico in 1946. In doing so, he demonstrates the objective and subjective results of these ideologies and policies.

“In Mexico they kill Indians exactly the same as they do in Brazil...” He points out that

58 years after the Mexican Revolution, there is a Bourgeoisie tamed and suckled by Yankee Imperialism. At their side is a working

class, the most debased in Latin America (*El Indio y los Escritores* 121,120)(translation Kearney).

As a result of such nation-building projects in emerging Modern Western Democracies on the Fifth Continent, the question of who could be a citizen (a concept which will be further elaborated on in the following chapter) was inescapably linked with the forceful and active negation of indigenous cultures and identities. In short, to be a citizen required the previously mentioned self-negation. When Fausto spoke metaphorically of his enslavers, he was referring to an internal crisis, one that he wrote about extensively. It was an internal crisis that mirrored and reflected these policies and social structures.

In the 1960s, the Ecuadorian intellectual G.H. Mata, who was of the same age as Fausto, wrote a biography of Fausto after visiting him in La Paz. Based on their conversations, Mata wrote,

Reinaga, the Indian Writer, is and was Indian. An Indian from Macha, cantón, from the province of Chayanta, department of Potosi, [he] was Indian and [yet], in the early days of his manhood, did not want to be (Mata 21)(translation Kearney) .

At this point, we should take pause to ask; what do Mata, Fausto, Ramiro, and Steve Stern mean when they use the word Indian? How are these uses different than the ways that agents of colonial oppression used and use the word Indian in reference to Quechua, Aymara, and other indigenous peoples? From whom, how, where, when, and why is the identification of Indian used in each particular situation? As mentioned only a few footnotes earlier, *identity* can be how one views one's self, but is inescapably linked to how others view that individual. Political, economic, and social structures also play a part in the formation, reproduction, and utilization of identity.

How do the MLA Authors use the word Indian? It is inescapably clear that they transpose the word Indian with the word Indigenous without clearly distinguishing what they mean by using the two different terms. While it was the “Indians” who “once again rebelled...” in the Willka Rebellion, it was the “...indigenous communities of the altiplano” that “defeated a Conservative-led national Army” (Skidmore, et. al. 175). In reality, the Indian rebels they speak of were one and the same as the victorious indigenous communities. Since the MLA Authors's elaboration is extremely limited, how and why they transpose these words is up to speculation. However, the following question should be asked: Could this 'civilizing' transformation of Western empowerment, which occurs over the course of only two sentences, be subconsciously linked with their previously demonstrated reification of the 'Race War' discourse? Is it possible that they have inadvertently reified the 'Race War' discourse inverted by the agents of colonial oppression?<sup>35</sup>

In the contemporary era, scholars, intellectuals, and the media will usually use the word indigenous in places where in the past the word Indian would have been used. However, as will be demonstrated later in this thesis, even my own use of the word *indigenous* could be viewed as problematic. The word Indian is a pejorative in many contexts and can be considered a loathed and dangerous word.

These meanings often become problematic for scholars. Anthropologist Nancy

---

<sup>35</sup> It should be noted that the MLA Authors also negate the existence of Indians in present day Argentina. “The Conquest of the desert in the 1870's virtually eliminated the Indian population...” (Skidmore et. al. 250). The implication of the discursive framing, that of virtual elimination, is eliding. There are, of course, Indians in present day Argentina. Once again, the MLA Authors reify the Modern Western repetition of the colonial discourse of negation of the Indian. It should also be noted here that so far in this thesis, enough evidence has been presented, if not to prove, at least to hypothesize that the MLA Authors exhibit positivist thought, whether they are conscious of it or not.

Grey Postero, who will be discussed later in this thesis, and Sociologist Leon Zamosc struggled with these difficulties when compiling their 2004 anthology *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*. To avoid confusion, they preceed the anthology, which inevitably uses the words we are discussing, by recognizing

...that there has been a long debate over terms identifying native peoples. Such terms may have profound political implications and... often reflect colonial and racist legacies... (Postero, and Zamosc 27).

Noting the lack of congruence in use among scholars and between different countries, they point out the additional reality that

...indigenous people themselves use different terms, sometimes preferring the term *indigenous* over *indio* [*Indian*], which may carry negative connotations; others reclaiming *indio* with pride (Ibid.).

For these stated reasons, they let the individual authors of each chapter in the anthology determine the meaning and tone of the words.

I agree. Rather than assign the controversial word of Indian to a forbidden quarantine of political correctness, and rather than giving a free pass to the use of the word indigenous, I assert that instead we consider the context and the user's intention with each use. What *do* I mean when I use the words indigenous or Indian? What do others mean when they use these words? ...and all of this in what contexts? I raise these points in order to pave the way for various elaborations made over the following chapters, by Fausto, Ramiro, and others about these concepts. As we will see, Fausto's perspective changed over the course of his life.

The same consideration should also be given to the labels *Mestizo* and *Cholo*, which are derived from the concepts of Mestizaje and Cholaje. It should be made clear here that, while the nation building concepts may have been rooted in racist

positivism, that does not mean that people who identify as Mestizos or Cholos are racists or positivists. It should also be emphasized here that while the words Indian/Indio, Mestizo, and Cholo, have been and can be used as pejoratives, there are many people who identify themselves positively, with pride and asseveration, with these same words. As people have organized around these identities, the categories take on different meanings. Consideration should be given to the 'who?', how?', and why?' of a word's use, along with how it is received and the overall impact of its use. Related discussions will occasionally appear throughout the following chapters.

The word Indian, and any racial epithet for that matter, can also be used in certain instances to defend against racism. It is important to understand the context a word is used in, even if it is being used as an epithet or is countered with one. Bolivian Indianista, former vice-presidential candidate, and political leader Constantino Lima was an important part of the movements that stood up to the dictatorships during the 1970s (which will be discussed more in Chapter Eight). As Constantino put it in 2013, “If someone calls me, 'shitty Indian!', what is my answer supposed to be?” Bowing his head with a demeanor alluding to servitude he asked, “Should I respond, 'no, I'm not an Indian!'?” pausing for a moment, and then looking back up with an expression of fortitude, he resolutely proclaimed, “No! The answer is 'shitty gringo!' ” (“A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”).

For Constantino, the name Indianismo came about as a bitter and abrasive statement to take ownership of the word Indian. Scholars have shown that such re-appropriations have served as an effective tool in various struggles for equality and the alleviation of oppression (Croom; Galinsky et. al.).

Words are like plants. It is just as foolish to try to banish them from the face of the earth, or to forbid them with rules, as it is to try and constrain them to one singular use or outcome. Words have the meaning that people on all sides of a conversation assign to them. That is why we must consider context and subtleties for each use as we journey through the Bolivian events in this thesis.

At this point it is helpful to return to Mata's commentary that, "Reinaga...was Indian and [yet]...did not want to be." This can help us understand what Fausto would write in the 1960's, reflecting back on the earlier years of his young adulthood,

I was convinced, in the same way as the [social concept and social class of] Cholaje [were convinced], that the Indian was a dishonor in life; to be Indian was the worst disgrace. Anything was preferable to being an Indian. The insult, 'INDIAN!', not only felt like a thundering slap right in the face, but was internalized like a live red-hot iron in my conscience, my soul, and my heart. It painfully burned my very life, when they called me Indian. It wasn't only humiliation, contempt, and sarcasm, but also a physical pain that... made me cry tears of blood. I preferred to die rather than hear the insult of INDIAN (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 19)(translation Kearney).

Therefore, the description Mata wrote was echoing Fausto, whom he had recently met. Mata's own conception of the word Indian changed after meeting Fausto. Before then, Mata's conception of what was 'Indian', although not pejorative, consisted of a utopian understanding of what an 'Indian' should be; a noble and non-Western reproduction of a past society, living in perfect harmony with nature, unchanged in a changing world (Mata). His view was still shaded in these utopian characteristics afterwards, but the following passages demonstrate the exchange with Fausto and how it changes Mata.

The exchange between Fausto and Mata, and their written commentary, can

help us to consider one small aspect of the difficult concepts of race, ethnicity, identity, and the power structures (including discourses) affecting the three. Fausto's Niece, Hilda Reinaga, can also help us to understand this exchange between Fausto and Mata.<sup>36</sup> She was Fausto's closest confidant, assistant, and copy editor. She was also present when Mata and Fausto met for the first time.

In the early 1960s, Hilda and her brother, Aniceto Reinaga, had moved with their father from the Siglo XX mine in Potosi to Fausto's house in the Killi Killi sector of La Paz. The Siglo XX mine is famous for its radical syndicalism after the 1952 revolution (see Barrios de Chungara). Aniceto, and his father had worked the mine, where Hilda attended political meetings with her brother when she was only nine years old. There at the meetings, she read political theory instead of storybooks, therefore beginning her intellectual formation at a very young age (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

Since her mother had passed away early in her life, and because their father worked often and suffered from ailing health, Aniceto acted as Hilda's father, mother, brother, teacher, and best friend. Later, Aniceto fought and died alongside Che Guevara's guerrillas in the Bolivian jungle. Comrade Harry 'Pombo' Villegas chronicled Che and Aniceto's last moments in his 1997 memoirs *Pombo, a Man of Che's Guerrilla*. On October 8<sup>th</sup> 1967, one day before Bolivian military dictator René Barrientos and the CIA gave the go ahead for Che's execution, and hours before Che's

---

<sup>36</sup> I am not sure of the actual family lineage between Fausto and Hilda. I failed to ask, but 'niece' is most probably colloquial, making Hilda a more distant relation like third cousin. I am speculating, but I think that Hilda's father was a 'brother' in spirit or step-brother, but perhaps not in familial birth connection, because in the following pages Fausto narrates the death of his direct siblings in his *El Pensamiento Amutico*.

capture,

At approximately 1:30 p.m., heavy firing began just as Che sent Ñato and Aniceto to relieve us. They were discovered moving in the ravine, and the shooting became generalized along all flanks except for the left one. Faced with this unforeseen situation, in which the army overlooked the ravine and made it very difficult to move, we decided to ask Che for instructions and sent Aniceto. The latter reached the place where the command post was situated, but did not find Che there; he had already retreated. Aniceto returned and informed Ñato of what had happened, but when he tried to get to our position, he was shot... (Pombo 268).

Aniceto's remains now rest in the mausoleum in Santa Clara, Cuba alongside his ELN comrade. Interestingly enough, that comrade, *Comandante* Che Guevara, had read Fausto's *Belzu*. Che had read it before he was famous, during his early trip around south America that was made popular in the movie *The Motorcycle Diaries* (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

Aniceto's sister Hilda Reinaga is an extremely important figure in understanding Fausto's complicated legacy. She is still active in social movements and the promotion of Fausto's books. She still resides in the same house Mata visited in Killi Killi. Part of the larger neighborhood of Via Pabón, Killi Killi and its expansive view of La Paz and Mount Illimani now serve as a popular lookout point for tourists, lovers, and myriad residents of La Paz.

The location has a considerable historical significance for at least two reasons. First, it was a strategic location for Tupac Katari's 1781 siege on La Paz. After the rebellion, and after his violent execution and dismemberment, Katari's head was savagely posted on a pike at the Killi Killi location, as a gruesome warning to those who might follow in his footsteps (Valle 323). Second, as Hilda would witness, Mata

and thousands upon thousands of others would visit Fausto at his house in Killi Killi, seeking consultation, advice, and conversation. Fausto would oblige this desire to all walks of the political and non-political spectrum (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). During a 2013 visit to the Reinaga household in Killi Killi, I asked Hilda about Mata's first visit to the same house. It was the same visit where Mata would meet Fausto and Hilda.

Before meeting Fausto, Mata himself did not believe Fausto could be a 'real Indian'. Hilda explained that the Bolivian journalist and historian Eduardo Ocampo Moscoso had put Fausto in contact with Mata, inviting the Ecuadorian to a conference in Cochabamba. From there Mata traveled to La Paz in search of Fausto. One day, Mata just showed up to the Killi Killi house, unannounced, during lunchtime. Hilda elaborated,

He was short, very white, very white, ...so then I think that Mata came to, at least a little bit, to discover the farce, of [the man] who they called Indian, but wasn't an Indian. But when he got to know Reinaga, it made an impact. ...he arrived... to see if this guy [Fausto] was putting on makeup [as an act of fraud pretending to be an Indian]. He had to look him in the eyes, and I believe that this made an impact (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

Mata tossed his suspicions aside once he really got to know Fausto. Yet Mata's suspicion that Fausto wasn't a 'real' Indian is part of a process of socialization. The processes of Cholaje and Mestizaje have strong assimilationist elements when applied as political, economic, and social policy that demand a certain set of thoughts, ideas, and perceptions from Cholos and Mestizos themselves.<sup>37</sup> This process involves all of

---

<sup>37</sup> Anthropologist Charlie Hale described a similar process in his 2006 book *Más que un Indio (More than an Indian)* regarding the “racial ambivalence” of Mestizos (Ladinos) in Guatemala

the social classes, each in different ways, and can happen in the most obtuse yet sanguine ways. Fausto would later explain that,

Minute after minute, hour after hour, day after day, Europe has planted its idols in the Mestizo brain.

The Latin American child, together with the image of his mother, begins seeing the icons of the 'Virgin Mary' and the 'sweet Jesus'. And with the music of the cradle, learns to babble the 'benediction' and the 'Sinner's Hymn'.

From his birth until death, the Latin American: speaks the language, professes the religion, thinks the thought and feels the sentiment of the Conquistador. The language of Castilla, the religion of Christ, the thought and sentiment of Europe, from shore to shore fills the mind and heart of the Mestizo (*El Pensamiento Amáutico* 16-17)(translation Kearney).

As mentioned earlier, Mestizos and Cholos were expected and socialized, both subjectively and objectively, to not be 'real' Indians. As mentioned earlier, Fausto himself rejected the identity of Indian in his early years. He was instead, encompassed by the socialization process of Cholaje.

Elaborating on the details of this process for himself, he explained that once he completed his certificates for the fourth grade in 1924,

...I arrived in Oruro... The director of Bolívar High School, Dr. Marcos Beltrán Avila, [who was a somewhat famous Bolivian intellectual and author of historical works] notified my uncle Mateo Flores and me, that I couldn't register legally in the first course of the high school. Until I could present a certificate of the sixth grade, ...I would remain as a 'conditional' student. The director and professors forgot about my 'conditional' situation beginning in January, when I was placed on the 'Honor Roll' (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 20)(translation Kearney).

Fausto won a citywide award for his scholarly high school dedication. Yet, the organizers would instead give the prize, a gold medal, to another child, even though

---

which negates the indian through seemingly egalitarian discourse while retaining their position of privilege in the power structures of racial hierarchy.

Fausto had actually won and the press had stated that he had won. Fortunately the press reports were enough to inspire his parents and their community to help him continue with his studies. A similar rip-off would occur with another prize in 1927. Even though Fausto had secured first prize once again,

They gave it to someone else, giving me only second prize. This time the injustice pained me in my soul. When I protested, they responded with the following infamy: "...the Indian wanted first prize... it was necessary to throw him out, so that he can go off behind his llamas..."

Yet again I suffered racial discrimination in the flesh. The next year I abandoned Bolívar High School of Oruro, and I went to el Colegio Junín [in Sucre], where ... [two years after graduating] I would become a professor of philosophy (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 21)(translation Kearney).

1927 was also the year that Fausto's mother, a veteran of the Willka Rebellion, would once again participate in the continual indigenous resistance against colonial oppression on the Fifth Continent.

My parents had four children: Rufina, José Félix [the name given to Fausto to protect his identity as a descendant of Catari], Tomasa, and Alberto, who was shot while serving his military service. My sisters died violently; assassinated by **gamonales**<sup>38</sup>... My mother pursued a lawsuit to no avail... For this [reason], when the occasion arrived, she took justice into her own hands.

In effect, during the QuechuaAymara uprising of 1927, during the capture of the corregidor of Guadalupe, Julio Berdeja, my mother was at the helm. She lit the fire where the corregidor was burned...

...As a consequence, I... was left as the only child of Jenaro Reinaga and Aleja Katari..." (*El Pensamiento Amáutico* 62-63)(translation Kearney).

Despite the tragic loss of his siblings, Fausto would continue with his intellectual pursuits. Escárzaga describes those pursuits during Fausto's early

---

<sup>38</sup> **Gamonal(es)**: The inorganic and oppressive landholding/hacienda class, often controlled by foreign ambitions or at least foreign thought, concepts, and cultures. In other words, they were the Latin American equivalent to pre-civil-war plantation owners in the United States.

adulthood,

In Sucre, he studied law and worked as a professor of philosophy at the Colegio Nacional Junín. He was director of the periodical *El Tribuno*[The Tribune], the voice of the Republican Party. Starting in 1930 he participated in the university and worker struggles and converted into a Marxist. He was the university director and secretary of Culture for the Worker Federation. He was a founding member of the communist Revolutionary Left Party (PIR) (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 189)(translation Kearney).

Fausto began publishing newspaper articles where he challenged the dominant policy and ideas, albeit from within the possibilities and limits of the political spectrum of the time. For example, he spoke publicly against the Chaco War, which he considered a devastating sham; one that used the indigenous populations of Bolivia and Paraguay as cannon fodder.

The Chaco War (1932-1935), which was fought by Bolivians and Paraguayans, was actually a proxy war between the U.S. and Britain, or more accurately between two foreign petroleum companies from those two empires (Galeano 163). The Bolivian war-hawk President Daniel Salamanca, who was intricately connected to Standard Oil company and who had plunged Bolivia into the war, putting Bolivia in terrible danger. The disastrous effects of Salamanca's military adventurism at the behest of the capital interests of Standard Oil cost Bolivia a considerable amount of national territory and at least fifty thousand lives.

In rare film footage of an interview, which has been digitalized and reproduced on the Internet, Fausto recounts a May First protest in Sucre Bolivia against the oligarchy, against Salamanca, and against the Chaco War.

“There were workers from various factories, students of law, and within one year we founded the communist party.

...[The war-hawks] were almost fully at war in the Chaco, and a protest filled [the square known as 'Plaza 25 de Mayo']. ...I took the balcony of the 'Casa de la Libertad' (Unknown, "Fausto Reinaga").<sup>39</sup>

The Casa de Libertad, or the House of Liberty, is part of the Universidad Mayor Real y Pontificia San Francisco Xavier de Chuquisaca that Fausto was attending at the time. It was also the edifice in which the Bolivian Congress met for the first seventy-three years of the Republic. The University, although playing an important role in the early Bolivian Republic, was not at all free from colonial thought and social oppression. This perhaps gives insight as to why the independence movements of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century did not resolve, but rather played a part in, perpetuating the colonial relationship.

In the world of intellectual and political banter, liberty is a dominant idea. In the world of actual power relations, until brave individuals struggle to make those ideas concrete, oppression is a dominant outcome. Mata elaborates on Fausto's speech from the balcony of the House of liberty,

Reinaga embraced the [political] atmosphere of Sucre with his pacifist speech that anchored itself at the zenith of the soul of the masses of the pueblo; this pueblo of Indians, miners, and workers... walked shoulder to shoulder in the streets and plazas in front of the military... in open defiance... (Mata 32).

In the rare interview footage, Fausto continues explaining that after taking the prominent position on the balcony overlooking the plaza, he gave

...a fervent Marxist speech! ...that said that this war was of the bourgeoisie etcetera, and that the organization[s] of this pueblo were Marxist etcetera.

---

<sup>39</sup> Hilda Reinaga explains that the original was part of a MUSEF (National Museum of Ethnography and Folklore) interview. A follow up of the original film at the MUSEF has not been conducted. Such an investigation would be a rewarding study.

¡Pucha!<sup>40</sup> What a barbarous thing! So then they all [those in support of the military and police] became animated to capture me (Unknown, “Fausto Reinaga”)(translation Kearney).

But the multitude was on Fausto's side. Creating a counterbalance to the military and the police, they protected him, at least for the moment, and began to chant, “Death to the bourgeois! Long live the proletariat! Death to Salamanca (who was there...) Long live Reinaga!” (Ibid.).

Fausto's speech was given at a time when Bolivian politics were entrenched in the traditions of Bolivian elites and foreign imperial ambitions. As has been described in the previous pages, there was a time where Fausto accepted Modernity's prescription for his caste: *Mestizaje* and *Cholaje*. During the first half of the twentieth century, the acceptance of and/or transformation to one's *Mestizaje/Cholaje*, at least outwardly, was unquestionably prerequisite for participation in the Bolivian political system. Within that prescription of assimilation, Fausto chose the most radical range of the entrenched political system: Marxism. However, in those days, even struggling within the accepted political spectrum was perilous. Explaining this peril, Fausto knocks his fist briskly on the desk in front of him to enact what happened the next morning,

At 4:25 in the morning, there was a knock at the door. It was the police who had come to capture me. They took me... [to the station and put me] in a chair. [they said] “With what does this tongue know how to perturb?!” ...they took out my tongue and they cut me.(ibid)

At this point in the footage, Fausto points to a deep groove in the bottom of his tongue and states, “Here, I have the scar.”

---

<sup>40</sup> Pucha: An expression similar to saying “Holy shit!” or “Oh Man!”

Crossing through that kind of atmosphere of political entrenchment over the razor's edge of dominant power structures with a completely new political philosophy, was not even an option. Later, after the onset of the global ideological polarizations of World War II and the Cold War, it would become even more difficult for anyone to venture through that unknown territory, beyond the communist-capitalist duality of twentieth-century Western-thought, beyond its residual colonialism and imperialism, and beyond the fortification of monism in its most complex form: Modernity.

Fausto later elaborated poetically about the trajectory of the difficult mental struggle that was required in those early years in order to venture towards that unknown egress, across the thresholds guarding against his departure from such thought constraints,

The life of my thought is the palpitating history of the mind of the Indian slave; a painful, dramatic, tragic march from slavery to liberty.

My thought has not followed a direct line, nor has it been elaborated by rigid norms and intolerable backgrounds. [Instead] It has crossed immense and profound forests; Forests with dense and abysmal depths of scorpions and... rancid swamps... howling wolves, and Jackals with angry claws and fangs of murderous hatred... [but also full of] rumors of crystal clear waters and the musical songs of birds; in the end, quiet but struggling moments in the darkness of the night and the splendor of the Sun and the stars (*El Pensamiento Amautico* 51)(translation Kearney).

Despite whatever abysmal depths of oppression and hegemonic scorpions which stood in his way, by the 1940s, Fausto was crossing the first of many of these mental and intellectual thresholds. His changing thought began to be evident in his public persona. He began his literary career with a revisionist polemic challenging the classic presentation of Tawantinsuyu. While presenting this grand civilization from a Marxist perspective, his communist attachments were overt, but tempered by other

ideas; ideas not colonial, capitalist, or communist.

Fausto's first book, *Mitayos y Yanaconas* published in 1941, tackled the same subject which his son Ramiro's book tackled thirty six years later: Tawantinsuyu. Fausto would explain that the book, his first book, was "...only one part of my Bachelors degree thesis, that was written in 1934 in the Universidad de Chuquisaca, under the title of 'The Social Question in Bolivia' " (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 143). It is quite impressive that Fausto could put forth such a radical thesis in the same university in Chuquisaca where he made his speech. As an institution and as an edifice, it was a colonial stronghold that had been established by Jesuits in the seventeenth century. Fausto lauded the social structure of Tawantinsuyu while condemning the colonial conquest and, most importantly, the colonial residue in the Bolivian Republic, the same Republic to which the University was so adjunct.

Fausto's thesis did not match the worldview of Bolivian intellectuals either. His text was ahead of its time, demanding that

...it is necessary and essential to study sociologically, first the period of the Inka, and then the colonial feudalism. This is because the Republic is nothing more than a mix of the surviving elements of these two societies, and an overwhelming and lethal imperialist meddling. Therefore, Bolivia [meaning the State] has not assimilated, not even in a karaoke-esque way, those elements – Incanismo and Colonialism – in order to elaborate or sculpt their historical personality (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 9-10)(translation Kearney).

Fausto paralleled the popular intellectual trends of his time. These trends glorified the Inka past but kept it in the past (see E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, "Indian Problems, Indian Solutions"). However, Fausto implies something different. He instead synthesizes the popular ideas of the time with his own demand for the recognition of the surviving

elements. He emphasized those historical personalities and their continuity in the contemporary society of Bolivia. That was precisely what other Bolivian intellectuals had failed to do.

Citing the famous early twentieth-century Mexican educational reformer Moisés Saenz, Fausto would continue:

The Empire of Tawantinsuyu, in its economic organization and its placidity of life, had been a *Sui generis*<sup>41</sup> Empire in the world, and we can say, throughout history. “The Incas took advantage of the communist tradition of the original Ayllus [plural for Ayllu - pronounced "eye you"], and elaborated a system of social organization that has never been seen at any other time or country (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 11)(translation Kearney).

Fausto's interpretation of the Inka incorporation of Ayllu, as a dynamic and unparalleled precolombian communism, may seem audacious and can be debated elsewhere. In part, we must understand that he is not talking about Modern communism in the way we understand the word today, but rather using the word to bridge an understanding gap. This will be elaborated on in the following pages. However, our focus here should be on a different aspect of this quote. Fausto's emphasis on the Ayllu and its contemporary continuance should not be taken lightly. The dominant trends of Fausto's early twentieth century contemporaries, in the camps of both Social Darwinism and indigenismo, blatantly ignored or downplayed the contemporary functionality of the Ayllu. In other words, Fausto declared that recognizing the continuation of this ancient social structure is critical to understanding Bolivia and should be considered in policy and the makeup of the State.

The Ayllu is a kind of social organization that has a long tradition in the

---

<sup>41</sup> **Sui generis**: Latin for being characteristically unique.

Andean Region.<sup>42</sup> Throughout his archeological volume *Andean Diaspora: The Tiwanaku Colonies and the Origins of South American Empire*, archaeologist Paul S. Goldstein demonstrates how Ayllu was an integral part of the diplomatic, economic, and practical expansionism for the Tiwanaku of the first Millenium AD (Goldstein 31).

Ayllu is a system of communities linked by kinship ties including extended family, yet not necessarily in a dynastic way. This system of communities overlays a geographical span of the verticality of space. In other words, the communities are found in multiple ecological niches extending from the lowlands to the highlands, utilizing the resource diversity of the aggregate of the niches for a complex communal system of reciprocity, social exchange, and self-sufficiency. This system provides social stability and support due to the comprehensive amalgamation of all of the communities as a whole. The Ayllu phenomenon of social organization was described as 'vertical archipelago' by famous social scientist John Murra, implying that it can be thought of as a chain of communities as 'islands' transcending the geographical breadth of the Andes. Multiple Ayllus can exist in corresponding geographical spaces, which demonstrates a plurality different from systems of Modern Western Democracy. Most importantly, unlike Western organizational structures, Ayllu encompasses and integrates the organization of economic, kinship, geographic, and political activities.

Fausto's discussion of the Ayllu, which is an organizational method that is vastly different from Western capitalism and Modern communism, is the first hint that

---

<sup>42</sup> The next two paragraphs were elaborated on in my undergraduate honors thesis for the Latin American Studies Department at the University of California San Diego.

he was beginning to think outside of the box, and therefore outside of the Bolivian political spectrum. Elaborating on the Ayllu, he explained,

It is far from the primitive-tribal communism, like that of the patriarchal natural economy. It is, in contrast, a product of a large synergetic elaboration and synthesis of flourishing civilizations and cultures... (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 11)(translation Kearney).

Much of *Mitayos y Yanaconas* also echoes sentiment of the Peruvian intellectual José Carlos Mariátegui. Fausto took up "...the idea of Mariátegui regarding the parasitic characteristics of the elites, and their incapacity to lead the processes of production..."(Escárzaga, "La huella de Mariátegui en Fausto Reinaga" 10)(translation Kearney) In these early years, Fausto's perspective was strongly influenced by *Indigenismo*. Fausto's Indigenista and communist tendencies were influenced by, and parallel to, those of Mariátegui. Fausto had formed through, from, and in many cases as a result of, Indigenismo and its assimilationist concepts. Yet, he would come to ardently reject its core principles beginning in the 1960s. His thoughts, as Escárzaga points out, would change dramatically to embody what is known as "...Indianismo [which] was also defined by its confrontation of indigenismo" (Ibid.).

The Peruvian intellectual, Mariátegui, was born ten years before Fausto, but died in 1930. He and Fausto had much in common. Escárzaga explains that both Mariátegui and Fausto were

...children of humble origins, Campesino and Mestizo the Peruvian, Indian Campesino the Bolivian. Thanks to both their extraordinary intelligence and continuing perseverance, they succeeded in the ethnic and social transition through Western cultural education; the passing from manual labor to intellectual labor and accumulating a cultural capital above the average. By combining their intellectual capacities with the political concerns of the Left, they succeeded in a convergence as politicians and intellectuals and were both persecuted for their ideas

(Escárzaga, “La huella de Mariátegui en Fausto Reinaga”  
3)(translation Kearney).<sup>43</sup>

Historian Dr. Christine Hunefeldt, who studied at the University of Bonn, is a twenty-three year veteran of the University of California San Diego's Department of History and former director of the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies at the same university. In a 1993 article published by the journal *Anuario*

*Mariateguiano*<sup>44</sup>, she explains that,

In Mariátegui's formulation, the past explains the resulting present, and history is a decisive weapon in advancing political strategies for the future. This is particularly evident in his treatment of the 'Indigenous problem' and of land, in which many institutions, readings (and perhaps concrete experiences) converge in order to propose interpretations and alternatives (Hunefeldt 82)(translation Kearney).

In the 1930s and 1940s, Fausto's ideas paralleled those of Mariátegui. In the early pages of *Mitayos y Yanaconas*, the congruence of ideas between the two authors is already evident.

The Pachamama [Mother Earth] is the vital breath of the Inka Empire. 'In the Perú of the Incas', wrote Mariátegui, the principle that 'life comes from the earth', was more true than in any other community. The profound pantheistic<sup>45</sup> sentiment of the *Incario* [Inca rule/reign], held this as its reason for being, since man himself came from the bowels of the bountiful earth (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 12)(translation Kearney).

Both writers maintained correspondence, interaction, and collaboration with the

---

<sup>43</sup> *La Huella de Mariátegui en Fausto Reinaga*

<sup>44</sup> “Los negros y la esclavitud en las reflexiones de Mariátegui” (“Blacks and slavery in the reflections of Mariátegui”).

<sup>45</sup> There are multiple definitions for the word *pantheism*. In this thesis it is used to mean 'the concept of the interconnected relationship and/or divinity-manifest in all that exists in the universe/cosmos. It is not meant in the rarer use defining the acceptance of all gods. The word *pantheism* can have a broad spectrum of implications. Just like other words, it should be considered within the context of each particular use.

radical Peruvian intellectuals Luis E. Valcárcel and Guillermo Carnero Hoke.<sup>46</sup>

In his 1968 book *Nueva Teoria Para La Insurgencia (New Theory for the Insurgency)* Carnero Hoke would comment about the futility in blaming Marx or Mariátegui for the Left's lack of understanding about social constructions in the Americas. He would also discuss the necessary struggle to depart from dogmatic communist ideas. His commentary is important because Fausto, in later years, would have serious issues with the failures of the Marxists and Communists in their policy, as well as their treatment and relationship with the Indian. Carnero Hoke recollects,

When... we asserted that, **yes there had been a scientific form of socialism in Pre-America**, hundreds of years before the dramatic and cowardly Spanish Conquest, our friends, those communist comrades and the independent Leninist-Marxists, cried out to high heaven refuting our asseverations... it is not their fault that they ignore it [the evidence surrounding the claims] because neither Engels knew of it, nor did José Carlos Mariátegui have the occasion of having known, that which recently the ethnologists and historians – thanks to the new advances of science and of contemporary technology – ...have removed the veil covering the grandioseness of our PreAmerican past (Carnero Hoke 166)(translation Kearney).

With or without that science and technology, this was Fausto's departure from Mariátegui. Almost three decades earlier than Hoke's commentary above, but a decade after Mariátegui's death, Fausto asserted parallel thoughts while also making clarifications that further distinguished the uniqueness of Tawantinsuyu.

Modern communism is something distinct from the communism of the Inka. This is the first thing that those who study and explore Tawantinsuyu need to learn and understand. Different communisms are products of different experiences. They pertain to distinct historical epochs. They are constituted from the elaboration of dissimilar civilizations (*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 70)(translation Kearney).

---

<sup>46</sup> Ramiro Reinaga would also show a profound respect for Carnero Hoke, as late as 2012.(Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews)

Even when Fausto would strongly critique Mariátegui in his later books, along with all Western thinkers, he would still and always retain a personal respect for Mariátegui (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). One wonders if this was due to the deep respect Mariátegui had for the Andean pantheism referenced above, which would always remain at the core of Fausto's thought. It becomes a key concept in his formulation as a political philosopher, as well as an important argument in his later efforts to distance himself from Marxists.

In *Mitayos y Yanacunas*, Fausto is already thinking beyond dogma and even beyond Marxism.

That of the Inka, was an agrarian civilization. That of Marx and Sorel is an industrial civilization. In one, Man is subjected to nature. In the other, nature can be subjected to man. It is absurd, therefore, to put the forms and the institutions of one communism face to face with the other (*Mitayos y Yanacunas* 70).

Neither of the two authors had nice things to say about the bourgeoisie. Escárcaga elaborates,

Reinaga built from the AmerIndian Marxism of Mariátegui, from which he recuperated his diagnostic over the impotence of the middle class Mestizos in their capacity to conduct a bourgeois democratic revolution that could confront the oligarchy and construct a nation that included the Indians... (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 194)(translation kearney).

This stance instead demanded a national project with an Indian protagonist that recognized “...the ethnic and classist duality of the social subjects,” and most importantly, the incorporation of existing social organizations like Ayllu “as a basis for constructing socialism” (Ibid.).

It was with this mindset, in the late 1930s and early 1940s, when Fausto had

the opportunity to be a founding member of the MNR party (National Revolutionary Movement). Along with the rest of the nascent MNR, he would participate in the government of military President Gualberto Villaroel (1943-1946). Several of these founding MNR members would come to be the titans of Bolivian politics in the second half of the twentieth century. For example, Victor Paz Estenssoro and Hernán Siles Zuazo each served as President of the Republic multiple times. Wálter Guevara was the MNR party leader for three decades, and would pass a brief stint as acting President in the 1970s.

Shortly after the MNR's inception in 1942, Fausto and the MNR had a fortunate window of opportunity. This opportunity arose when the revolutionary government of Gualberto Villaroel government ceased power. It was perhaps the best opening for the alleviation of social oppression that was possible in the antiquated colonialism of Bolivian power structures. Similar to Belzu, Villarroel took on the small, but powerful, elite capital classes. As Escárzaga explains,

Villarroel established a paternalistic alliance with the Indian population in order to confront the mining and land holding oligarchy and abolish Indian servitude, but the process was brutally aborted (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 190)(translation Kearney).

The process was aborted when the unlucky president was hung from a light-post in Plaza Murillo. The State was lost to the oligarchy. The conservative forces of the tin barons, known as the *Rosca*, were able to reconsolidate their power. However, that was not all there was to this story. It is important to recall why this brutal end came about.

Villarroel was a career military man with a respectable record. His career

spanned the military-led socialist governments in the 1930s of David Toro and Germán Busch<sup>47</sup>, as well as the conservative governments of the Tin Barons that followed. He was a member of a semi-secret military organization called RADEPA, which is also known as the Reason of Patrimony (Razón de Patria). Having participated in the coups, which brought Toro and Busch to power, RADEPA was largely comprised of young officers who were disillusioned by the senseless loss of life and ineptitudes of national leadership during the Chaco War. They had vowed to defend Bolivia's physical borders and foster its independence at all costs. When the oligarchy had crossed beyond what RADEPA viewed as acceptable, they contemplated taking the state.

REDAPA made an alliance with the MNR, agreeing to commit a bloodless coup in December of 1943 to take the state from the autocratic hands of the aristocrats. It is a good question as to whether or not the tensions within the alliance were insurmountable. Not the least of these tensions involved the contradictions inherent in the MNR and their bourgeois aspirations. Just as it was evident in these early years of the party, the MNR would forge a longstanding reputation for claiming to represent proletarian, campesino, and indigenous constituents, while in fact implementing policies for and living the lifestyles of the bourgeoisie.

These tensions became apparent early on. Founding MNR member Carlos Montenegro is well known for being one of the foremost intellectuals of party ideology, as well as having a major influence on Paz Estenssoro. In March of 1949

---

<sup>47</sup> Both were well known for their socialist ideas, while Toro is probably most famous for nationalizing Standard Oil and Busch for ending the Chaco War.

Fausto published his second book about the short-lived Villarroel government, titled *Victor Paz Estenssoro*. Pointing to Montenegro's early problems in the first few months of the Villarroel government, due to a scandal involving rubber exports to Argentina, Fausto would condemn him as complicit in the fall of the same government.

Fausto cites Montenegro as having said, "I made this Revolution and, I am going to destroy it." He refers to and contrasts Montenegro with the Russian religious pilgrim, Grigori Rasputin. Although an advisor to the Russian Tsar, Rasputin was alleged to having inadvertently contributed to the Tsar's downfall.

Montenegro, with a paranoid persistence united with a rock solid technique, hollowed out the foundations of the Revolution that, on the 21st of July of 1946, brought the whole building down. Rasputin undermined the Tsarist order and began the Bolshevik Revolution. Montenegro dug the grave of the Villarroel regime and of the National Revolution, precipitating the counter-revolution. The monk, without even knowing it, was useful in the liberation of the Russian proletariat. Montenegro knowingly is an enemy of the liberation of the Bolivian Pueblo (*Paz Estenssoro* 25-26)(translation Kearney).

Fausto was not the only one with bitter musings about the culpability of MNR party leaders in the downfall of Villarroel. As Bolivian scholar Tomás Molina Céspedes would publish in 2006, there was in 1947 an official "Judgment of Responsibility against the ex-dignitaries of the [Villarroel] government." which was,

...against the vicepresident Julián V. Montellanos and other direct collaborators like Víctor Paz Estenssoro, ...and Dr. Hernán Siles Zuazo; for violating individual guarantees, fraud and misuse of fiscal funds, organizing secret meetings and conspiracies, and other crimes (Molina Céspedes 196)(translation Kearney).

According to Fausto, Villarroel's problems did not stop at the problematic

nature of his allies in the MNR. Antagonism towards Villarroel also stemmed from racial hatred. Fausto illustrates,

'La Paz without Indians', was the law that the Cholaje had enforced. The Constituent of Villarroel lifted this infamous racial segregation. The Indian Masses, thanks to that determination, entered and went out in La Paz for the first Indigenous Congress in America."(*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 194)(translation Kearney)

By organizing the Indigenous Congress, Villarroel had taken things too far. We must keep in mind that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Rights, and internationally agreed upon concepts of indigenous rights in general, did not yet exist. In Bolivia, Social Darwinism, masquerading as Modernity, had rendered Indigenous political subjects as less than human, savage, and as beasts of burden unless they stopped being Indians. Such a congress was an unimaginable affront to the entrenched political standards.

Chronologically, Villarroel's regime straddled the end of World War II. His policies of Indigenous conferences, socialism, nationalization of minerals and hydrocarbons, protections against foreign exploitation, and rights for workers was too much. Villarroel set too broad of an agenda for both the Bolivian and global political realities of the time (Dorn; A. Céspedes). Finding himself in one of the more multi-polarized moments in Bolivian history, Villarroel had enemies imperiling his reign from many sides, including various radical factions from the Left.

Another player in this game was Augusto Céspedes. He was a founding member of the MNR. Later, he discussed the bizarre combination of forces that conspired to hang Villarroel.

While it may be rational to explain the reaction of the Rosca against the MNR, only Freudian analysis could decipher such sadism in the Marxoides [said in quotes to negatively label the communists who] ...resolved the problem making a common front with those local leaders, subordinate [to foreign influence] (A. Céspedes, "Victor Paz y El Drama Del Poder." 73)(translation Kearney).

Fausto, with an overall sentiment that Villarroel and others should have seen this coming, ascribes a great deal of responsibility to Victor Paz Estenssoro, one of the MNR's most dominant, most resilient, and most popular leaders.

Villarroel, with a superior spirit, but as trusting as a child, had to share power with Paz Estenssoro...

The revolutionary idea and emotion of Villarroel, were buried by the 'theory and program' of Paz Estenssoro.

...Who committed treason against whom? Villarroel and his military comrades, they did not commit treason. In homage to their oath and loyalty to the Revolution, they died on the 'farol' [lamp post]. And [what about] the camarilla [the legislative house dominated by the MNR and Estenssoro]? The camarilla 'waits' for the power' [to return] (*Victor Paz Estenssoro* 61-62).

Fausto never forgave Estenssoro for abandoning Villarroel. However, it did not matter what role in the downfall of Villarroel that Estenssoro may or may not have had. The MNR's enemies were not waiting any longer. While many in the MNR were able to escape death and even made it into exile, Villarroel boldly awaited his fate in the Palacio Quemado.

The sentiment and discourse used to topple Villarroel by the communists and the Rosca was that of anti-fascism. However, this was not entirely the case, as is demonstrated by History professor Glenn J. Dorn who is a specialist in Latin American history and diplomacy. In the first chapter of his 2011 book *The Truman Administration and Bolivia, Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy*, he not only reveals that these claims were exaggerated, but also points out

that the U.S. saw MNR party members as more of a possible fascist problem than they did Villarroel and RADEPA (Dorn 27-48). The various opposition groups against Villarroel began violent protests, general strikes, and outright fighting in the streets. “Within days, both the military and the MNR had abandoned Villarroel, who now faced an insurgent mob almost alone” (Dorn 48).

The enemies of Gualberto Villarroel attacked the palace on the twenty third of July, 1946, and assassinated him. Then,

A bloody bundle, which was tossed from the balcony to Ayacucho Street, was recognized by the mob as a human form, difficult to identify due to its wounds and deformations. ...dragging the remains to the foot of a light post, situated on the sidewalk in front of the Palace.

...The hangings constituted the culminating act of the antifascist propaganda. The motto of international origin was already enunciated by José Antonio Arze in Chile to promote 'the Nuremberg Trials' defining the lynching and hanging of Villarroel and his friends like a previously rehearsed theatre closely resembling the popular sanction of Mussolini. ...[But] Mussolini had imposed a terrible dictatorship of 22 years upon his country, driving it into a devastating war. To identify his actions with Villarroel is the most ignominious mythification of the century (A. Céspedes, *El Presidente Colgado* 249-251).

The trauma was immense. Bolivians, to this day, speak of the lynching with somber reservation. Even more ignominious, but less commonly spoken of, is the tragedy accompanying these hangings. The indigenous representatives who had

...participated in the congress, and who were lodged in the presidential house, were assassinated along with the president. In this manner they aborted a government that identified with the interests of the indigenous peasantry and confronted the land holders (Escárzaga, “La huella de Mariátegui en Fausto Reinaga” 14)(translation Kearney).

The Communists and the Rosca killed the president, killed the indigenous leaders in the Palacio Quemado, and killed the many hopes for Indigenous liberation.

But it was Victor Paz Estenssoro and his friends who killed Fausto's hopes for the MNR. A few years later, in 1947, Fausto would be ejected from the party (Ibid.).

## **Chapter Four**

### **Citizen Mythos of the Western Horizon**

The rights, capacities and power wielded by different political subjects or actors in the State, and who would wield power, all swung in the balance with the hanging of Villarroel. Indeed, conditions curved drastically back to the favor of the oligarchy and their colonial reproduction. This pendulum arcs our discussion back to an important question: How are relationships between political subjects and states produced, reproduced, and acted on? Answering this question requires asking other questions.

Who are citizens, and what is citizenship? Do states grant citizenship, or do political subjects force states to cede citizenship? What are sovereignty and sovereign power? What do they have to do with political subjects, states, citizens, and concepts of citizenship? These are the kinds of concepts that this chapter endeavors to explore. Specifically, we will focus on how these relationships were produced, practiced, and altered during the age of Fausto Reinaga in the quintessential Andean state of Bolivia. The answers to these questions are very different for different moments in Fausto's life. The early twentieth century of Reinaga's youth was obviously a very different terrain of political conjuncture and power-relations in comparison to his twilight years of the 1990s.

To better understand the relationships between Bolivians and the Bolivian State, especially during the twentieth century, we turn to the work of human-rights

attorney, journalist, and philosopher turned anthropologist, Nancy Grey Postero. We will also take the unpopular route of looking at the early work of the controversial mathematician, ex-guerrilla, and social-scientist turned Bolivian Vice-President Alvaro García Linera.

These two actors, Postero and Linera<sup>48</sup>, are themselves interwoven into Bolivian history through the aforementioned vocations. While Linera's role in that history occurred more directly inside of the actual territory of Bolivia, Postero influenced scores of scholars in the U.S. Focussing on Bolivia, she would push a cutting-edge analysis of the *multiculturalism* and *neoliberalism*<sup>49</sup> of the 1990s. Her analysis would diverge from the mainstream trends of academia in the U.S. While her role may have been more visible in the U.S., she has spent much time in dialogue with

---

<sup>48</sup> Linera, is the most common reference to Vice President Alvaro García Linera. In Latin American countries, the most common practice of single name reference is to use the first of the two last names, which is the Paternal last name. Aside from the problematic nature of such patriarchal and arbitrary rules, the point of this footnote is instead to clarify that the reason this thesis refers to Alvaro García Linera as Linera, is because that is a normal reference for him in Bolivia. However, the in text citations will conform to MLA formatting guidelines, therefore reading: (García Linera)

<sup>49</sup> **Neoliberalism:** A political and economic philosophy which, although not recognizing itself by this name, is synonymous with the ideas surrounding, ‘market liberalization’, ‘free trade’, ‘privatization’, ‘capitalization’, ‘decentralization’, and other ideologies surrounding such political-economic aspirations. Postero elaborates,

“...like its classical ancestor, liberalism, privileges the individual and holds the market to be the guarantor of social good. Unlike liberalism, which saw some state interventions as necessary to facilitate citizens’ freedoms, neoliberalism... characterizes the state as inefficient, often corrupt actor that only encumbers the market’s neutral and unselfish actions.”(*Now We are Citizens* 15) **Multiculturalism:** Although not exclusive to neoliberals, there was a proliferation of the discourse of *multiculturalism* during the age of neoliberalism. In explaining the multiple definitions for multiculturalism, Postero asserts that it often “...refers to the efforts of liberal democratic governments to accept and embrace... ethnic differences...”

“Most forms of multiculturalism specifically recognize formerly marginalized groups, ensuring their individual rights as citizens, and in some cases granting collective rights as groups.”(*Now We Are Citizens* 13,14)

Multiculturalism in many cases fell short of delivering on its promises of cultural equality. Therefore, while the concept and intentions of its promoters may have been altruistic, its practice has been problematic, the world-over, during the last quarter of a century. In later chapters we will advance concepts of 'pluralism' that build on concepts of multiculturalism, but with more breadth and with a wider spectrum of possibilities.

a diverse cross section of actors in Bolivia.

Postero and Linera's published analysis during the first years of the twenty first century have many parallels. Yet, by the end of the first decade of that same century, analysis by the two intellectuals would diverge significantly. This is one of several reasons why Linera is an intriguing, if not perplexing, example of the contradictions inherent in the divergence between theory, law, and policy.

It should be noted here that in recent years, most probably due to his actions as Vice-President of Bolivia, it has become quite popular to discount **any** analysis by Linera. However, for exactly that reason, this thesis makes a point of contrasting his intellectual analysis of a decade and a half ago (described in this chapter) with that made during his political foray (described in Chapter Eleven). It will not only be demonstrated that these two epochs of Linera's analysis are different, but the theoretical and intellectual roots and reasons for his variation will also be hypothesized. Therefore, it is hoped that his detractors, along with his supporters, will have the patience to scrutinize the entirety of this text and analysis before dismissing or lauding its treatment of Linera's intellectual production.

What do we mean when we use the terms *citizen* or *citizenship*? These words have many meanings in different uses and contexts. These words could refer to all governed subjects within an area of political control, or instead could refer to a privileged class of subjects such as passport holders. That being so, *citizen* or *citizenship* could refer to a legal/procedural status, or these words could refer to emotional connections, ideological sentiments, and/or ways of thinking about oneself and others in relation to the State. That sentiment could be collective or individual.

That sentiment could be the result of nationalist and/or hegemonic ideology, but could also be the result of something else. These words could also mean both the bureaucratic guidelines for, and the lived relationship between, subjects and forces of governance.

In other words, these two words could mean a lot of different things. In this thesis, they are used in different ways and each occurrence should be considered in relation to the context in which it is used. For example, we should ask ourselves, what did the promise of Modern Western Democracy in Bolivia have to offer as parameters for *citizens* and *citizenship*? Our understanding of these words will continue to build throughout this chapter.

In her 2007 book, *Now We are Citizens, Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*, Postero discusses multiple ways of how citizenship is an ongoing political process in Bolivia, by referring "to the relation between individuals or groups and the state" and that in Bolivia "... citizenship is politically and socially constituted in two interrelated dimensions: the politics of belonging and the contest over political culture" (Postero 222-223). While the classic notion of citizenship is a question of rights and obligations given to members of polities, we should also keep in mind the larger question of who is included in political participation. Postero explains that in Bolivia this participation occurred through cultural expressions (Postero 226-228).

In an essay/chapter titled *Citizenship and Democracy in Bolivia (1900-1998)*<sup>50</sup> Linera would write that, "In all cases, citizenship is the process of production of the

---

<sup>50</sup> From both the journal *Revista Ciencia Politica* and Linera's *Potencia Plebia...* See Bibliography.

content and form of the political rights of a social structure” (García Linera 176)(translation Kearney). Years later, especially during the second Morales administration (2010-2014), Linera and the MAS would become entangled in the difficulties of that process of production. They would trap themselves in the paradox of running a Western Democratic state while attempting to govern a highly diverse citizenry, which often displays uncommon non-Western tendencies. The frustration of, and opposition to, almost every Bolivian government throughout history has been rooted in that unique citizenry, which often demonstrates an unwieldy empowerment whether the State approves or not. In this aspect, citizenship is demonstrated as a lived experience that is not dependent on the State for official recognition. The reader who keeps a close eye on the text will find this demonstrated several times throughout the following chapters. For these citizens, the Morales administration's paradox is not a paradox at all, but rather a refusal to recognize their (the citizens) sovereignty and rights to the decision making process.

Paradox or refusal, it demonstrated the administration's inability, or perhaps its unwillingness, to transition to the demands of the Bolivian citizenry. This was the unpleasant side of the MAS revolution and all that it had promised to be. This will be discussed in later chapters. However, Linera's earlier analysis of Bolivian citizen formation, which was written before he became a powerful political figure, can help to illuminate the eventual pitfalls that he would later face, if not create, during the Morales years.

By 2013 Postero would steer her analysis towards further rethinking the relationship between the state and society, raising questions regarding contradictions

between MAS discourse and state policies of developmentalism.(Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia.") By that same time, Linera the statesman had steered his analysis towards justifying those policies of developmentalism (García Linera, *Geopolítica de la Amazonía*). This would demonstrate a marked divergence between the two intellectuals, both analytically and ideologically. Yet, as already explained, in this chapter we focus on the **earlier** analyses by both actors. We do this in order to create a historical framework for understanding Bolivian events. For a more comprehensive discussion, we will fill this framework with contributions from Fausto, Zavaleta, Belzu, John Lennon, and others.

Let us keep in mind that political subjects are very real. The power wielded by states, individuals, churches, empires, corporations, and other institutions over those political subjects is very real. The responses of those political subjects, successful or failed, are also very real. Yet, while the concepts of citizens and citizenship can be very real, they can also be skewed, theoretical, propagandized, or stuck in the realm of the ethereal. While this ambiguity undoubtedly makes our discussion more complicated, it is still a productive discussion and this is one reason why it is so important to discuss the following framework.

While Linera theorizes citizenship using a more socio-historical method, the anthro-attorney comes out in Postero as she examines the relationship between citizenship as both lived personal experiences and also as a legalistic construct. For Postero, contemporary

Citizenship refers to the relation between individuals or groups and the state. That relationship depends on how each society answers the fundamental questions of belonging, such as: What rights and

obligations do members of society have vis-à-vis the state? How does the state determine what kinds of rights to afford? Who qualifies as citizens and what role do they have in determining the ways society is governed? (Postero 222).

The answers to those questions are often determined through social difference. In 2008 anthropologist James Holston, began the opening chapter of his *Insurgent Citizenship, Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil* by discussing the relationship between social difference and citizenship formation in Modern Western Democracies.

All nation-states struggle to manage the social differences they distinguish among their inhabitants. Some measures they take are drastic, like slavery, forced migration, and genocide. But most administer differences according to formulations of equality and inequality that define their citizenships. Democracies have held particular promise for more egalitarian citizenships and thus for greater justice and dignity in the organization of differences. In practice, however, most democracies experience tremendous conflict among citizens, as principle collides with prejudice over the terms of national membership and the distribution of rights (Holston 3).

As we saw with Fausto, his early life, and his 'enslavers', that conflict among citizens can be difficult, traumatic, and often tragic. Holston helps to make those conflicts clearer,

... many modern citizenships... deploy a politics of legalized differences to reduce the lives of the vast majority of *their citizens* to persistent inequality and misery. That these reduced citizens retain their personal dignity, their laughter, and their music is certainly a measure of human resilience. But it is also a strategy of rule. Anyone who has ever dined with elites and then set foot in the slums of their cities and plantations understands the deep efficacy of this politicization of daily life, which reduces conditions of living to bare minimums but nevertheless allows certain vitalities. As a strategy of domination, the deployment of these differentiated citizenships as much deprives most citizens of their physical well-being as it diminishes their standing as citizens (Holston 312).

Since difference and identity are inextricably connected, we must also keep in mind the relationship between identity and citizenship. In *Now We are Citizens* Postero explores how identity is formed, contested, and utilized by both the State and society. She explains that at least some Bolivians view their contemporary relationship with the state and other forces of power through the lens of their shared historical formation. In her particular ethnographic study, that formation manifests from Guarani warriors of the past overlaid onto present struggles, but obviously within the context of contemporary contingencies. As one of her informants reminded her “...‘but now it is in a different kind of struggle’...”(Postero 24)

Looking back to what Fausto and Zavaleta described in Chapter Two as “...a sense of democracy of the multitude, ...in all of the essential moments” that “...lives integrally in the popular memory and veneration; beating inside the conscience of the pueblo...”<sup>51</sup>, we can then understand Postero's analysis in a more profound way. On a macro level, Postero illuminates how the historical trajectory of Bolivia, and the formation of Bolivian citizenship during that trajectory, led to a nexus of multiple yet simultaneous uprisings of the masses at the end of the twentieth century. She traces different eras of citizenship from the early Republican era to the post-revolutionary period when suffrage was given to all, and then to the multitudinous era of the 1990s. A careful reading of her book portrays to the reader that by the 1990s the significance to individuals of their own historical memory of struggle then became manifest, as linked through their own actions, in a clearer understanding and greater assertion of their own citizenship. Postero and I both agree that this was also connected to a

---

<sup>51</sup> From Chapter Two (*Lo Nacional Popular en Bolivia* 88; *Belzu* 53-54)(translations Kearney)

clearer understanding of, and greater assertion of, citizen control over sovereign power.<sup>52</sup> This, in many ways, was the lifelong dream of Fausto.

What do we mean by *sovereign power* or *sovereignty*? This clarification will be extremely important in later pages when reviewing the work of Danielle Allen and Giorgio Agamben. It is also important for our ongoing clarification of *citizens* and *citizenship*. To begin with, we will anchor *sovereign power* or *sovereignty* as meaning: who has the ultimate say in governance. Who makes decisions over rights and resources? That is to say, *who is the boss*, the state or its subjects? Or, more precisely, who owns what percentage of *bossability*: the state or its subjects? I say this because, while sovereignty is often thought of as a kind of independence, power on the other hand is an inescapable factor in what constitutes that sovereignty.

A common understanding of *sovereignty* is the State's power and capacity to govern itself, free from outside influences. However, in many scholarly works, and here in this thesis, we are referring to sovereignty or sovereign power to mean the driving force in exercising or controlling governance, whether it be wielded by a state, kingdom, empire, **or** (and this is the key) by the people/subjects/citizens within the jurisdiction of those entities. The latter driving force is obviously the utopian myth of, and literal Greek root of *demos*, the concept of 'democracy', like John Lennon implied in the song *Power to the People*. Granted, by Lennon's own admission by the early 1980s, the song fell short of voicing a revolutionary expression of the popular movements of the time and would have had more salience if it had been written and released a decade earlier (Lennon, *Skywriting by Word of Mouth*).

---

<sup>52</sup> From commentary Postero made on an early 2012 review of my comments on the subject.

Still, if we focus on the basic concept of a few of the lyrics, “Power to the People... We better get on right away. Well, you get on your feet. And enter the street”, then we can surmise the sentiment that Lennon was trying to get at and that he actually did explain better, later in his career. In other words, these lyrics advocate that the individuals engage in the group struggle towards the State in order to place sovereignty in the hands of the people/subjects/citizens (Lennon, Power to the People). This could be as a group, as ‘El Pueblo’, or it could be as an individual.

For example the U.S. Government's abilities, or lack-thereof, to arrest, prosecute, torture, incarcerate, or kill Edward Snowden and Bradley Manning demonstrate issues of state sovereignty vs. individual sovereignty. The crimes or heroic acts of those individuals, depending on one's perspective, were committed in the name of and to the benefit of sovereignty for the people/subjects/citizens of the U.S. as a group. These actions also, at least temporarily, weakened the sovereignty of the U.S. Government, which explains the U.S. Government's preoccupation with these individuals. In other words, while no human is an island, their independence and 'liberty' are intricately determined by the sovereign power they and others wield as individuals or as part of a group, in constant tension with the sovereign power wielded by the State.

Therefore, when Postero and I claim that Bolivians attained a clearer understanding of, and greater assertion of, citizen control over sovereign power, we are also illustrating the intricate connection between sovereignty and citizenship. Looking back to Postero's questions about rights and obligations, the State, and the role citizens play “in determining the ways society is governed”, I suggest that how

the Bolivian masses answered those fundamental questions, is related to what Postero, Fausto, and Zavaleta inferred a few pages earlier. In other words, I suggest that how Bolivians answered those questions is related to long-term historical formations and concentrated moments of historical distinction like the Original Katarista rebellions, the Willka Rebellion, and Belzu's communist revolution.

All of these moments had an important impact on, and showed important reflections of, Bolivian social formations. However, regarding our conversation on citizenship, it is helpful to focus on Belzu for a moment. What was Belzu's concept of citizenship? As we saw from his groundbreaking communist revolution and Marx inspired speech in Chapter Two, Belzu obviously recognized that the multitudes, as political subjects, had been oppressed, mistreated, and used for the benefit of a few. He was able to utilize the capacity of the multitudes to attain his military and political victories. Belzu also demonstrated an understanding that the political subjects who comprised those multitudes were critical to his capacity to stay in power (Salmon; Manuel Y. Belzu; F. Reinaga, *Belzu*). His adherence to this knowledge goes a long way in explaining the long duration of his reign. A century before any other Republican leader would do so in Bolivia, Belzu had the lucidity to distinguish between what his contemporaries would call 'the plebeians', referring to the ancient Roman underclass, and what is now, thanks to Zavaleta, much better understood to be the many different formations of the *Bolivian multitudes* (Salmon; Zavaleta, *Lo Nacional-Popular*)<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>53</sup> Raúl Salmon, in his *Viva Belzu!* repeatedly demonstrates Belzu's characterization and recognition of the multitudes in contrast to his wife Juana Manuela Gorriti de Belzu's

Whether he did so out of an authentic connection with those multitudes or solely out of strategy, the fact remains that no other president on the Fifth Continent during the 19<sup>th</sup> century, took into consideration, and acted upon the humanity and capacity of, the majority of political subjects in their country like Manuel Ysidoro Belzu did.<sup>54</sup> However, the rights granted, grievances addressed, and alleviation of oppression, were part of the interplay between political subjects and the government of Belzu, and did not necessarily determine what qualified as citizenship in the eyes of the State.

Therefore, what did Belzu think constituted citizenship? This is important, because as we will see, he had a great deal of efficacy in his efforts for institutionalization. How was Belzu's conception different from that of his predecessors and of those who followed him? We can answer these questions by observing three documents: the 1839 Bolivian Constitution, the 1851 Bolivian Constitution, and the transcript of a speech by Belzu, given to congress a few months before he promulgated the 1851 Constitution. These documents, especially the latter, demonstrate the difficulties that existed throughout Bolivian history in reforming, let alone in revolutionizing, the entrenched political envelope.

The entrenched political envelope was much more closely adhered to by the government of José Ballivián who occupied the Palacio Quemado a few years earlier than Belzu. The 1839 Constitution, promulgated by Ballivián, reserved citizenship for

---

characterization of the masses as drunken plebeians (Salmon 45).

<sup>54</sup> This will not be debated here in this thesis, but it is safe to say that the previous statement is accurate even if only by the simple default, or ipso-facto reality, that Belzu did not actively pursue genocide or the violent oppression of labor.

the elites. Interestingly enough, Ballivián, judging by the following accounts, seemed to have a penchant for theft. During his presidency, he had counted on Belzu's loyalty and capability as a military leader. For at least one night, he would steal Belzu's wife's honor in Belzu's own bedroom, resulting in Belzu violently confronting Ballivián and costing Ballivián the loss of Belzu's loyalty. This would prompt Belzu's subsequent exile, baptizing in fire Belzu's thirst for vindication, which would culminate in no less than Belzu toppling Ballivián (Molina Céspedes, *Belzu, Quién Lo Mató* 32).

However, stealing the wives of his friends in the night was not Ballivián's only act of sequestration. Land theft was one of the ways that he would work to ensure elite power in Bolivia. Although classic and even contemporary history gives the bulk of credit for wholesale land appropriation to Melgarejo, we should observe that he was by no means the innovator of state sponsored land theft. Ballivián would enact the Ley de Enfiteusis, which was a cleverly obscure name for a law that was designed to steal and privatize indigenous territories.

Another way that Ballivián reserved citizenship for the elites was by constitutionalizing racially structured inequalities. The Spanish Empire, in all its racist and hierarchical glory, had concretely configured domestic servant work to be that of the lower racial classes. Such classes were legally defined as races of men. This legal definition was reified and elaborated upon by Ballivián's 1839 Constitution. Section Two and Section Three of this document distinguish people who are simply Bolivians, from people who are 'citizens'. The latter required a much longer list of requirements. Although not the only restriction, the best example occurs in Article 12. For 'citizens' to be able to vote, they were prohibited from being from the 'class' of

domestic servants (*Constitución Política...1839*). The most prominent way for non-Criollos to participate in the objective reality that was the Bolivian economy, in urban and cosmopolitan settings, was as a domestic servant. This structured inequality, created by the notions of liberal rights embedded in the 1839 Constitution of this Modern Western Democratic state, helped to maintain the racial “purity” of “citizens”. It was yet another offense to be chronicled in the Liberal legacy of reinforcing racism, oppression, marginalization, dispossession, and myriad social maladies.

Now, with all of this in mind, we should be careful to note that, just like Fausto in the following century, Belzu in his time was limited to the restraints and realities of the political envelope of that time. However, his concept of who could aspire to be a citizen was far broader than that of the kleptocratic Ballivián. This is evidenced in the previously mentioned 1851 speech. In the speech, he emphasizes at various junctures the importance of recognizing the multitudes. He then rails against the insufficiency of Ballivián's Constitution.

...and above all, if the same Pueblo that put me in power, that selected me, ...registered in authentic testimonies, this judgment of the insufficiency of the Constitution and its [the Pueblo's] volition to see it replaced for another more possible [to address the social reality] in Bolivia (Manuel Y. Belzu 5)(translation Kearney).

In this document, Belzu refers to citizens only as those who are legislators and members of governance. However, the speech was being addressed directly to those legislators and officials. Therefore, what is important, is less the literal description of who are citizens in his discourse (the common noun), but rather the foundation he is laying for a revolutionary new paradigm. This speech was Belzu's genius catalyst, and strategic groundwork, for a broad vision and discourse (the social science noun) of

popular institutionalization. This is profound for at least two reasons.

First, classic accounts of history give credit for the first attempts at institutionalizing the Bolivian Republic to the land-stealing Liberal, Tomás Frías, who would be president a quarter of a century later. This once again demonstrates the ongoing discursive obfuscation of non-indigenous heroes like Belzu who advocated on behalf of not just indigenous Bolivians, but the Bolivian multitudes in general.

Somehow Frías gets billed as the historical pioneer of institutionalization during the Bolivian Republic. Yet, it was Belzu who promulgated the most progressive constitution and Constitution<sup>55</sup> of his century. It was Belzu who designed the contemporary Bolivian 'escudo', or national coat of arms. It was Belzu who defended the national territorial integrity, not only more than any other president, but quite possibly as much or more than any other general. It was Belzu who designed and constructed the contemporary version of the Palacio Quemado.<sup>56</sup> Most importantly, it was Belzu who attempted to institutionally include and recognize the vast majority of Bolivians, something no other Republican leader would try to do until the 1940s.

The second reason that Belzu's vision of institutionalization is profound is related to the change he was preparing the legislators for by delivering the speech. The core of that revolutionary institutional change was none less than the 1851

---

<sup>55</sup> The reader should take note here that this thesis uses capital Cs when discussing literal documents, as in the 1851 Constitution, and a lower case cs when discussing the constitution, or what comprises -what makes up the parts of- a government, state, or political construction. This distinction will be especially important for the details of the theoretical arguments in later chapters.

<sup>56</sup> Although it would be badly burned by fire later in the century, garnering its name the 'Palacio Quemado' or burned palace. At the beginning of the twenty-first century Carlos Mesa would reconstruct the Palace very closely to Belzu's original specifications.

Bolivian Constitution that would go into effect that same year.

By promulgating the 1851 Constitution, Belzu attempted, for the first time in the Republic, and perhaps for the first time in the post-invasion Fifth Continent, the groundwork and possibility for universal suffrage. Granted, as mentioned before, Belzu was limited to the restraints and realities of the political envelope of his time. There was no way that he would get away with such a radical, revolutionary, equitable, and populous institutionalization of universal suffrage without the restraints, constraints, and prejudices of the legislators. Even still, the 1851 Constitution was a century ahead of its time. For example, Article 13 states,

Before the law in Bolivia, every man is equal to every other man, without restriction... **All are Bolivian Citizens by birth** [and] are equally admissible to all of the employment and public charges, without any other preference that their meritoriousness, or any other condition that the law establishes. (*Constitución Política...1851*)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added)

Articles 1 and 17 of Belzu's Constitution specifically prohibit not just slavery and forced labor, but even more specifically they prohibit *pongeaje*. A peculiar and brutal form of forced labor, *pongeaje* is a remnant of colonial domination. It is a system that, while feudal and brutal in reality, used a superficial veneer of petty capital relations and paternalistic tutelage for the 'savage' and 'ignorant' Indians who, in all practical senses, were trapped and bound to the land without receiving the fruits of its production or of their labor. *Pongaje* and other forms of forced labor comprised almost all of the economic production of the Bolivian Republic when Belzu tried to eliminate them.

However, the momentum of the powerful within the political spectrum

shackled even the great Belzu. He wished to end his rule in favor of calling, not just for elections, but for elections of universal suffrage (Manuel Y. Belzu 8). Despite his wishes, this would not make it into the 1851 Constitution. To clarify, the point here is not to claim that Belzu's rule and constitution were ideal. However, what is clear is that Belzu, long before any other Republican leader, understood the relationship between the multitudes, institutionalization, sovereign power, and citizenship. He also, as Ramiro pointed out, was the only Republican leader in his century to not participate in the long slow genocide that has so plagued the Fifth Continent.

One fundamental flaw that Belzu would make is that he would try to institutionalize a nation-state in the image of European thought and trends of the time. After all, his intellectual inspiration was fertilized by his vacations to Europe and by the influence of European intellectuals. This flaw has been the deficiency of every government in Bolivia since the days that Simón Bolívar himself trod upon the Andean territory, which now carries his name. Since the failures in citizenship-formation in Modern Western Democracies, especially in the semi-colonies, have everything to do with the European concept of the nation-state, this is worth discussing.

An interesting elaboration that demonstrates the nation-state paradox, a crippling shortcoming of Modern Western Democracies, can be found in Fausto's 1970 *La Revolución India*. At the beginning of the second chapter, *The National Problem*, Fausto spends almost a whole page citing Zavaleta who appears to be in turn citing, or at least responding to, Fausto. While the exact speaker is not always clear, the point is still salient. The pair explain that,

“...The successive treasons of the ...[Bolivian] oligarchy have disabled the establishment of the Nation-State. The dominant classes have dealt to foreign groups the immense riches of the Bolivian land and the fruits of the labor of the Pueblo... The ideologues of the semi-colonies are gratified by the means of great ends, through a relentlessly and meticulously narrowed universalism. This is how Bolivia is set either to the defense of Western Civilization or to the struggle for world revolution[in the Western communist sense, such as the Communist Internationals or the global revolution of Che Guevara]. One could argue quite well, the sentiment, that if the world revolution exists here, it would have to be as a Bolivian revolution – concretely: an Indian Revolution; FR – that is to say that in effect things begin in principle, and also one could affirm that, in order to defend against Western Civilization, the country should first depart from the temporal attributes of that which is called Western Civilization. The preferred alienation, however, is to talk of world revolution or Western Civilization and not of the struggle for the nation to be effectively [its true] national [character]...”

The white Mestizo Cholaje, since 1825 until 1970 has not made Bolivia a Nation; nor has it even arrived to propose theoretically the 'National Problem'. The loose concepts, the isolated ideas that have catapulted the 'great men' in a sporadic and circumstantial way, never constituted a body, a doctrine, a scientific ideology capable of demonstrating that which exists in the national conscience(*La Revolución India* 163)(translation Kearney).

Toward the end of the twentieth century, despite any such doctrine existing within the realm of the state, the power of the Bolivian national conscience pulsed with expressions of its historical trajectory and unique character. This demonstrates citizen sovereignty as opposed to state sovereignty. In other words, while the state did not recognize historical formations, the multitudes practiced and lived them. As Postero explained in 2007,

If the so-called State of '52 is dead, the collective form of organization and political action is decidedly not, as the October 2003 uprising<sup>57</sup> made all too clear. The protagonists of the insurgency were

---

57 The October 2003 uprising is known as the Gas war, which brought down the government of

trade unions, *juntas vecinales* (neighborhood associations), peasant federations, student organizations, street vendor syndicates – corporate groupings with well-established patterns of political behavior based on decades of direct negotiations with the state (Postero 217).

Obviously, assertions of citizenship happen through the trajectory of individual and group interactions with the state over time. To demonstrate this trajectory, Postero summarizes that pre-revolutionary (before 1952) citizenship in Bolivia was exclusionary to all but the dominant elite males. She then explains that Post-revolutionary Bolivia experienced a kind of citizenship modeled through syndical formations. This continued even through the dictatorships of the sixties and seventies.

Postero then focuses most of her work on the neoliberal period of the end of the twentieth and turn of the twenty-first centuries. Thus, Fausto's twilight was at the beginning of her primary focus and physical time spent in Bolivia. Although ambiguously set aside by many scholars in the north, Fausto's legacy, as we shall see in later chapters, had a sizable effect on the terrain of Postero's focus: citizenship as exercised by political subjects in Bolivia.

In 1999, which was directly in the middle of the high water mark of the neoliberal-era and six years before he would become Vice-President, Linera discussed, similarly to Postero, how citizenship had transformed across the terrain of history. He asserts that until the revolution of 1952, citizenship in Bolivia was strongly founded in the colonial *caste* system, which he calls the era of *caste citizenship*.<sup>58</sup> The rise of

---

Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, forced Lozada and others to flee the country, and derailed the plans of Enron and Semptra Energy. *Modern Western Democracy* 0, mobilized Bolivians 3.

<sup>58</sup> Both Linera and Postero omit the attempts at altering the construction of citizenship during the Belcismo. However, this is more of an error in Linera and not in Postero, as Postero's purpose and intention is not to create an all encompassing framework for the entirety of Republican history,

strong syndical formations after the 52 Revolution, functioned as a way of overcoming inherent democratic deficits in the post-revolutionary state. Linera posits this post-52 era as the era of *corporative citizenship*. The end of the dictatorships in the early 1980's was followed by a wave of neoliberal governance and policy. Linera calls these neoliberal years the era of *irresponsible citizenship*. Fausto's life spanned all of these transitions and he participated in, or even helped to instigate, many of the struggles that predicated the transitions that Linera describes.

In the era of *caste citizenship*, Linera points out that the racist, elitist, and misogynistic state did not consider the majority of the population as citizens. Because of this, the majority of Bolivians were then considered to be nothing and outside of the state (García Linera 176,177). The only realistic way to enter the state was to assimilate through Cholaje/Mestizaje. As was demonstrated in Chapter Three, this was Fausto's path in the first part of his life, but would eventually be denounced by him as a form of assimilationist control.

In scholarly works, these tricky subjects are often avoided, or at least dealt with uncomfortably, when discussing concepts of Bolivian citizenship, social movements, and politics. For example, the words Cholaje, Cholo, and Mestizaje are vacant from Linera's piece. He mentions Mestizos one time, but in a way that negates the route to citizenship that Cholaje and Mestizaje offered (Linera 179). Obviously that route **did** exist, as Fausto's early life evidenced.<sup>59</sup>

---

while that **definitely was** the intention and focus of Linera. Furthermore, this error is to be expected since the complexity and comprehensive attempts at institutionalization and inclusion by Belzu have been massively obscured by the bulk of historiography.

<sup>59</sup> However, other scholars have addressed these subjects in detail. See Marisol de La Cadena

Looking back to the logic and results of state policies linked to Vasconcelos's Raza C3smica as well as of Bolivian social structures in the age of Fausto Reinaga, we can observe the justification, as well as the outcome, of the flaws in the total agreement of the social contract in Modern Western Democracies. What do I mean by *the total agreement of the social contract*? The desire of Bolivian and Italian positivists, of Vasconcelos, and of Modern Western Democracies, to have a singular national ethos, is rooted in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes who demands *the total agreement of the social contract*. Over the next few paragraphs, this concept of Hobbes will become clearer by analyzing citizenship in the United States through the work of Danielle S. Allen.

In her book, *Talking to Strangers, Anxieties of Citizenship since Brown v. Board of Education*, Allen discusses the kinds of citizenship formed by the hateful, racist, and official policies of segregation in the United States. She struggles to find rectifications of what she sees as the incomplete redress of the civil-rights era struggles. While Allen is discussing the specifics of citizenship as it pertains to the racist barriers impeding constructive citizenship within the borders of the United States proper, she is also addressing Modern Western formations of citizenship in general. She notes that,

Optimistic public policy does indeed construct notions of the common good on the basis of differential distributions of loss and gain. The phrase 'for the good of the country' says everything fundamental about democratic decision making. Collaborative action requires sacrifice from one or another citizen at particular times, and the preposition 'for' betrays the phrase as a plea, exhortation, and finally justification (Allen

41).

Yet, Allen points out that despite how much the sacrifice "...might benefit the polity as a whole...", it is difficult to reconcile the "...fact that a regime constructed for the good of all (liberal democracy)" with the completely contradictory concept and practice of sacrificing some of that very same 'all', for that same end of overall-benefit.

Since sacrifice is ubiquitous in democratic life, and the polity often makes decisions with which one disagrees, all citizens must confront the paradox that they have been promised sovereignty and rarely feel it. Herein lies the single most difficult feature of life in democracy. **Democratic citizens are by definition empowered only to be disempowered.** As a result, democratic citizenship requires rituals to manage the psychological tension that arises from being a nearly powerless sovereign. For a long time, in this country, the solution to this paradoxical fact that most democratic citizens are, at the end of the day, relatively powerless sovereigns was the two-pronged citizenship of domination and acquiescence (Allen 41)(emphasis added).

Mentioning the atmosphere of distrust that this creates, she emphasizes the need "...to develop healthier habits for handling the problem of loss in politics, and other roads to empowerment" (Ibid.). However, throughout the book Allen struggles with this, and indeed it is part of her greater point, because the rituals of domination and acquiescence were never completely overcome or replaced.

This debility, and its comparative relationship to the subject matter of this thesis, illuminates that the citizens themselves **should** be the constituting agents of sovereignty, but are not and instead are only 'empowered to be disempowered.' Allen elaborates that since the civil rights movement, "We [U.S. citizens] have fresh aspirations and reformed institutions but, I contend, not yet new forms of citizenship"

(Allen 53).<sup>60</sup> In order to aspire to a new form of citizenship, she contends that “A full democratic politics should seek not only agreement but also the democratic treatment of continued disagreement” (Allen 63). Allen sees this kind of contestation, which is lacking in U.S. discourse and U.S. citizen participation, as an essential ritual that is necessary for that 'full democratic politics'.

She recognizes the “...widespread errors produced by liberalism’s orientation toward unanimity.”(ibid.) Allen also acknowledges that this unanimity, the total agreement of the social contract, although advanced by many intellectuals like Immanuel Kant, finds its modern incarnation with Thomas Hobbes.

Kant derived his own commitment to perfect agreement at least in part from the work of the seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, who analyzed politics by positing a state of nature out of which all human communities arise. In it life is war and famously 'nasty, brutish, and short.' Although the inhabitants of the state of nature live in distrust, and even fear, of one another, this situation somehow eventually inspires them to band together for mutual protection. The contract with one another to establish civil society, each agreeing to sacrifice to a sovereign his ability to harm the others. This absolute authority, or Leviathan, will protect them all from each other, but will also have absolute right and power to harm anyone who causes trouble for the state (Allen 64-65).

Discussing the overpowering influence of social contract theory on Modern Western juridical and legal regimes, and the role of Hobbes’s ideas on Western

---

<sup>60</sup> The plaintive caliber of citizenship in the United States and the extended U.S. Empire is due to limitations causing a narrow and difficult to control set of mechanisms. Different ‘citizens’ have different rights, but few of them can exercise anything that could be called *democratic citizenship* or *citizen sovereignty*. The powerful rule and own, while the weak step in line or are violently put in line. This is just as much, if not more, a function of finance-capital as it is a function of the U.S. government’s state monopoly over sovereign power.

The atrophied condition of U.S. citizenship that is illuminated by Allen exists in one part because the U.S. is modeled after previous empires. It exists also because the process of empire inherently generates winners and losers, which is the prerogative of power. Additionally, it exists because of phenomena that Giorgio Agamben describes in *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. This third reason, from Agamben, will be expanded upon in Chapter Five.

constructions of power, Allen proclaims, “The idea of the social contract, an original moment of total agreement, has, of course, become the standard metaphor for political legitimacy in modern liberal democracies.” She elaborates on the homogenizing nature of Hobbes's theories, “But the social contract is not the only form of total agreement in Hobbes’s account of politics.” and points out his desire that “...citizens might assimilate easily...”(Allen 65,80)

During Linera's era of *caste citizenship* in Bolivia, the vast majority of the population, while seemingly impossible for the state to assimilate, was still controlled by the state through dispossession of resources, violence, and threats of violence among other tactics used to validate the power of the state. This made it possible for most of Bolivian society to be included through exclusion.

As Fausto described in his first book,

During colonial times, the right to culture did not exist for the oppressed classes, Indians and Mestizos. Culture is a privilege of the sons of Spain or of the Criollos that breathe from Spain.(*Mitayos y Yanaconas* 115)(translation Kearney)

Linera observes that the Bolivian state that followed that colonial era was steeped in a parallel Western juridical tradition,

The republican state therefore is a state of exclusion; all of its administrative mechanisms are held back by the exaction and the dissuasion of popular uproar. The Indian is the pre-social, with its threatening unbridled horrors, hidden behind the cloak of elusive silence and humility.

...Citizenship is thus presented like an unmasked exhibition of the extirpation (García Linera 177,178)(translation Kearney).

In Chapter Two, we saw some of how this was reinforced in the Mohozo trials after the Willka Rebellion, resulting in the subsequent negation of all things Indian. With

the exception of his omission of the Mestizaje/Cholaje route to citizenship that the Bolivian republic **did** offer in limited ways, Linera's analysis in the last citation is a good explanation of how the positivism of Modern Western Democracy failed and/or refused to offer substantive citizenship to a majority of Bolivians.

An important point in Allen's commentary is her keen recognition of the homogenizing and assimilating omnipotence of the concentration of sovereignty in the hands of the state in Modern Western Democracies<sup>61</sup>, especially as manifested in the US. government: limited representative democracy and obedient citizenship laden with social-contract-theory. What may be remiss in *Talking to Strangers*, although not in a negligent way, is the more expansive search for the seed, root, or foundation of nefariousness in Modern Western juridical and legal regimes, which as will be demonstrated in Chapter Five, Giorgio Agamben so adeptly seeks.<sup>62</sup>

It is important to remember these concepts for later chapters, as we will return to similar themes when discussing the work of Agamben, state vs. citizen sovereignty(or control over sovereign power), and the use of violence by the state. We will also return to Allen's concept of *inclusion through exclusion*.

---

<sup>61</sup> I mean to infer the majority of Modern Western Democracies, whether it be Sweden, Spain, France, or the U.S. I do so because, despite differences, as we will see from Agamben in later chapters, there are more similarities than differences in the characteristics of limitation that I am describing here.

<sup>62</sup> Allen's greater argument asserts that better communication, that of *Talking to Strangers* can resolve the sickly inutile qualities of U.S. citizenship. This is where I find a divergence with Allen. Not because her point is as simple as described here, for she elaborates and explains far beyond what justice has been given in the previous paragraphs. Yet, my divergence is because she bases her assertion, at least in part, on Socratic wisdom and the concept of 'know thy self' (Allen 168). This will be deconstructed in later pages ...Socratic wisdom, not Allen's argument. Allen makes a well thought out and impressive argument that is unfortunately stuck in the conundrum of empire, in that there is a paradox in trying to reconcile social consciousness within an imperial social structure. There is no need to pour salt in the wound of the impossible escape from empire (impossible at least from within). Kudos to Allen.

Fausto was physically excluded from the geographical boundaries of the Bolivian State when the surviving members of the Villaroel administration sought exile in Argentina. As demonstrated by Villarroel's lynching, and the massacre that accompanied it, there were fatal limits as to how far one could push the political envelope at that point in Bolivian history. The empathetic president had come much too close to the precipice of radical change. Those who survived had to lay low or flee in exile. Fausto, Paz Estenssoro, Wálter Guevara, Hernán Siles Zuazo, and others found exile in Buenos Aires as guests of the popular and populist Juan Domingo Perón government.

At this point, Fausto demonstrated his atypical and intriguing propensity to become intertwined in the complexities and magnitude of global events. At the end of World War II, the business Tissen Lametal, which was a Fascist company connected to the Axis powers but located in Argentina, had been expropriated by the Perón government. While being hosted by Perón in exile from Bolivia, Fausto was able to secure employment with the ex-Nazi firm (Mata 70). Then, in April of 1948, he returned to Bolivia, now being run once again by the puppets of the capital accumulating, labor busting, coup-inciting tin barons. Enrique Hertzog Garaizabal and Mamerto Urriolagoitia, both who would lead the late 1940s authoritarianism of the tin barons at one time or another, made sure that Fausto was thrown in jail for half a year (Mata 71). Estenssoro stayed in Argentina much longer, until it was much safer to return to Bolivia.

While the rest of Estenssoro and Guevara's long political careers would be marked by a careful observation of the sensitivity of the political envelope, Fausto

would very soon began to push hard, perhaps too hard, against that political envelope. He did this by writing a strident attack against Paz Estenssoro. In 1949, without holding back for any reasons of political sensitivity, Fausto explained that in order “To know Paz Estenssoro, one must go to the origin of his prestige. Our duty, is to shed the light of truth on this moment of the life of the party [MNR]” (Paz Estenssoro 12). noting that,

...his political morality leaves much to be wished for, especially in relation to the masses. He never felt either in his spirit or his heart, the necessities or the ideals of the masses...

His political past was fertilized in this manner: He was a lawyer for Patiño, that is to say, a lawyer for the Rosca. He defended their interests and he served the King of Tin; against whom? Against the proletarian masses of the mines and against the Bolivian State.

...The fear of forming a clear and concrete program is typical in Paz Estenssoro... (*Paz Estenssoro* 16,19)(translation Kearney).

Fausto goes into great detail contrasting Estenssoro's 'program', or more accurately, the lack thereof, with the great political programs of the time, including that of the famous populist Juan Perón in Argentina, the Peruvian APRA party of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and others. This way, there is no confusion as to what an honorable and effective program would look like (*Paz Estenssoro* 20-22). Over all, the book *Paz Estenssoro* is a carefully orchestrated inventory of oversights, errors, and outright treasons committed by Estenssoro. Fausto concluded,

We have demonstrated that Paz Estenssoro has committed treason against his class, against the ideology of the Revolution, against the National Revolutionary Movement, against the organization of the party, against Villarroel, against the Army, against the proletariat, against the Indian servitude, and against the impoverished Bolivian middle class!

Paz Estenssoro... is a spirit dressed with the flesh of treason...

The truth is that the medulla of the life of Paz Estenssoro is Treason! (*Paz Estenssoro* 66)(translation Kearney).

Yet, somehow, despite not even being in the country during the 52 Revolution, Paz Estenssoro, through very carefully calculated political acumen, would become the symbol and hero of what would come to be known as *the State of 52*. His appropriation of the struggles of the multitudes for his own gain and ambition is the source of myriad polemics today, and will remain so for decades if not centuries to come.

The 1952 Bolivian Revolution undoubtedly marked a new era. Although Linera correctly notes that syndical formation in Bolivia had been building for most of the century, he posits the era of *corporative citizenship*, or citizenship of the syndicates/workers unions, as beginning with the rupture in the era of *caste citizenship* that occurred with that revolution (García Linera 181).

Despite the downfall of Fausto and his colleagues in the Villaroel fiasco, Fausto returned to Bolivia, valiantly met the call of his countrymen, and courageously led a band of revolutionaries through the hills of La Paz, fighting against the old guard as the 1952 revolution unfolded. According to his own account, Ramiro followed his father to the fighting, but Fausto sternly reprimanded him and demanded that he go back home and wait for his father. Ramiro finds a lot of humor and irony in this story because, as he explained half a century later in 2011 through much laughter, shortly after he arrived home feeling dejected that he was missing the action, a shell hit the very home that Fausto had sent him to for safety! (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews). This would not be the only explosive moment in the early years after the revolution.

For example, once Estenssoro had consolidated his power after the revolution, he would drop a metaphorical bombshell on Fausto and have him arrested. In order to regain his liberty, Fausto would have to sign a declaration claiming that the book he had written bearing Estenssoro's name was a farce and erroneous (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews). This action was a glimpse of the myriad of disingenuous, perhaps laughable, and perfidious actions that would stain the rest of Estenssoro's long political career. It is probable that this inane arrest and forced false confession were factors for future changes, eventually to become unprecedented changes, in the trajectory of Fausto's political, literary, and intellectual life. Fausto would never fill the position of a public politician again (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

Despite the farcical arrest, Fausto supported the State of 52 at first. Perhaps he did so because, as Linera points out, at this point in the political landscape the traditional power holders were sidelined, at least enough “that the masses opened the door of modern political history...” (García Linera 182) (translation Kearney).

On the other hand, old problems die hard. In education, the power of the Capital classes still reigned. Pushing for educational reform during the early years of the state of 52, Fausto declared in 1952:

The primary school, the high school, the university, the press, the radio, cinema, they all nourish a standard opinion, a standard sensationalism. They teach a call for democracy, not to the government of the majorities, of the people for the people and by the people, but to the plutocracies, to the government of a small group of the rich (*Nacionalismo Boliviano* 13)(translation Kearney).

Roadblocks in the theoretical were not the only ones he would encounter. For example, Escárzaga explains that Fausto secured a professorship at the public

university in La Paz, the famous UMSA(Universidad Mayor de San Andres).

However, this opportunity was unraveled or blocked by his adversaries in the oligarchy. From his experience with the Villaroel government and its disastrous fall,

...Reinaga formulated a radical indigenista program that proposed the integration of the Indian into Bolivian social and political life, through the democratic bourgeois National Revolution, and formulated an advanced agrarian reform program in the parliament... (Escárzaga, “Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 190) (translation Kearney).

Fausto's program was flat-out rejected by the party leadership.

He would then reformulate his proposition in his 1953 book, *Tierra y Libertad. La Revolución Nacional y el Indio (Land and Liberty, The National Revolution and the Indian)*. However, in this reformulation he proposed “...a program of agrarian revolution, not reform” (Escárzaga, “Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 190). As to be expected, this was also dismissed by the party leaders, like Estenssoro, now consolidating their power. At this point, Fausto's position was a difficult one. Despite his critiques of the MNR leadership, he was acutely aware that the MNR's post-52 control was the mark of a distinctly new epoch. It was an age filled with possibilities for a different kind of democratic citizenship.

Despite whatever weaknesses were inherent in this historical conjuncture regarding democratic citizenship, Linera points out that, “...the authentic moments of democratization are simultaneously epochs of social self realization” (García Linera 182)(translation Kearney). The gains of the 52 revolution were channeled in a way that there was a legitimacy centered strongly within syndical formation and the actions

of the masses. However, because the new formations of social interpellation<sup>63</sup> with the state were formed through syndical means, citizen participation that wasn't formulated in a syndical way was limited.

It is as if the history of labor and popular submissions quake in the memory as an unbreakable event and, in the face of power, the masses could only know themselves as a subject of resistance, of demands or commands, and almost never as a subject of decision, of actualization or exercised sovereignty. The image of those - who themselves had to construct the society of the worker - are the defendant, not the sovereign (García Linera 183)(translation Kearney).

Or as Zavaleta better clarified,

In Bolivian politics trade-union currents are over-developed and this is a result of the history of the popular movement. This is not a purely formal relation; it is virtually an integral part of the movement. [The Bolivian trotskyite, well known intellectual, and labor leader Guillermo] Lora is correct in saying that Bolivian workers hardly ever look on a union just as a union. At important moments the workers' organizations have functioned more as a kind of soviet, fulfilling the responsibilities normally the preserve of the state. Even in 1952, when dual power existed, there was not a working-class power (proletarian ideology embodied in a workers' party) on the one hand and a bourgeois power on the other. What there was were the COB (the central committee of the Bolivian trade unions) i.e. the trade-union organization on the one hand, and the bourgeois democratic party on the other. It was as if the trade unions had assumed the role of the Bolshevik party ("Bolivia-Military Nationalism and the Popular Assembly" 70).

Yet, Linera asserts that the legitimacy of the syndicates was granted from within the State. Indeed they were. The legendary Bolivian workers union known as the COB (Central Obrero Boliviano) was founded as part of the process of the 1952 Revolution. This made for a complicated situation.

... the syndicate derives its mode of action from the legitimate citizenry,

---

<sup>63</sup> ...and by interpellation with I mean *with*, not *by*, because in Bolivia, due in part to the state's lack of monopoly over sovereign power, this is a two way phenomenon. Albeit, it is not necessarily equal.

which means that it is a force that emerges from society towards the state, but at the same time whose every legal force emanates from the State to be applied to society. From that point on, to be a citizen is to be a member of a syndicate” (García Linera 185)(translation Kearney).

This new era of citizenship was not without contradictions posed from the elites and the legacy of colonialism. Syndical forms had entrenched their interpellation by and of the state, even playing a role in the construction of the state. Yet, traditional colonial structures still remained and/or seeped their way back into the normalized actions of the state. In addition, there were other forms of socio-political organization not linked to the state. These had functioned for thousands of years. One example of this is the Ayllu discussed in Chapter Three, which would play a major role in Bolivian events during the 1970s and in the pages of the upcoming Chapter Eight.

Victor Paz Estenssoro's policies and actions, or their vacancy, are detailed by Fausto in the 1949 book. This text eerily anticipated Estenssoro's policies and actions after the 1952 Revolution. As if his position in the Villarroel government were a low budget movie prequel, Estenssoro would do in the 1950s and 60s precisely the things that Fausto would denounce him for doing in the 1940s (*Paz Estenssoro*). Whether it is a case of Fausto being a visionary, or whether it is a case of old habits dying hard for Victor Paz, or whether Fausto's commentary had the auspicious coincidence of outlining what would be Estenssoro's repetitions, the 1949 book *Paz Estenssoro* reads like Victor Paz's personal playbook for the next decade and a half.

By the golden age of neoliberalism, the 1980s, Estenssoro would drop all pretenses of leftist, populist, popular, and nationalist sentiments. In those later years,

Estenssoro and his party, would come to embody the crisis that Linera describes next. The contradictions that arose from the first two epochs of citizenship that Linera discussed, eventually came into crisis. That crisis became manifest in the era of what Linera would call the era of the *irresponsible citizen*. During this era, increased voting rights, the change of more state positions to be elected instead of appointed, and a general discourse of *democracy*, were all amplified. Yet,

Paradoxically this did not result in the amplification of citizen rights, nor in the democratization of new social spaces, but rather it resulted precisely in a subtle mutilation of the social rights acquired over the previous decades. Obviously, if it is true that the elections certified the presence of the volition of individuals, from whichever social range and any social position, in the naming of presidents and national representatives, then it is not any less true that this power transmutes into a quotidian impotence when its application is constrained to the scarce minutes in which the election lasts. However, during the rest of the months or years in between elections, quite simply the voter lacks the political capacity to direct or change the decision once it has been made. In this case, we have that the time of democratic social life is compromised to a minimum expression, while the time of arbitrariness of the state is amplified in absolute terms (García Linera 184,187-188)(translation Kearney).

The strategic paradox here being that, while society as individual citizens had handed their sovereignty to the syndical formations as an alternative to sovereignty in the hands of the elites and the state, the sovereignty of individual citizens remained weak. Yet the neoliberal governments dismantled the strongest pillars of syndical sovereignty by atomizing the bases of syndical formations; selling state business, returning business friendly contracts, and other not-so-surprising liberal and neoliberal strategies (García Linera 188).

All of this created an atomization of citizen sovereignty and a renewal of the concentrations of state sovereignty. In this atmosphere, what Linera calls the “needy classes”(inferring the bourgeois classes and the elite classes), in their role as

neoliberals, became the prodigy of the old state. This new form of the state worked to reform public knowledge about the relationship between society and the state (García Linera 189). According to Linera, this accompanied a skewed idealization that borrowed from Hobbes and Montesquieu,

...in which the 'common interest' was constructed as a transaction between juridical equals, requiring individuals who are both illusorily equals and the bearers of a commercial good (the vote), [yet] ...lacking in familiar and associative loyalties in order to enact the circulation of their salable good (García Linera 190)(translation Kearney).

That salable good, as Linera points out, was no less than those individual's personal sovereignty. The neoliberal state used this card trick to gain ground in the struggle against society for control over sovereign power.

Modern citizenship is, blatantly, *an irresponsible citizenship*, in the measure that the exercise of public rights is simply a ceremony of resignation of political will, of the will to govern, in order to deposit it in the hands of a new class of private owners of the political [realm, stripping the voters of any control over that realm once they have voted]... (García Linera 191(translation Kearney).

At this point we should ask: does this sound like Allen's 'empowered to be disempowered' America? This is, as Postero discusses in *Now We are Citizens*, a question about who actually gets to make the decisions of governance (Postero, *Now We are Citizens*).

Yet, while Linera's description shows the intentions of the state and finance capital, this was not a complete hegemonic transformation of society.<sup>64</sup> Why was the neoliberal state incomplete in exercising this capacity? For that matter, what is the intellectual compass of neoliberalism? Some of its more ardent detractors argue that it

---

<sup>64</sup> Especially compared to Allen's 'empowered to be disempowered' America, considered to be the iconic example of Modern Western Democracies.

doesn't have one. However, it is not that hard to find, as we will see in the following paragraphs.

Earlier in this chapter, we analyzed José Vasconcelos's ideas in order to discuss the problems of *the total agreement of the social contract* within social theories associated with Mestizaje. In a similar way, we will now consider the problematic of *the total agreement of the social contract* within the Western economic theories of neoliberalism. This time, our analysis will be centered on Nobel Prize winning Peruvian author, political dabbler, cosmopolitan playboy, and neoliberal convert Mario Vargas Llosa. While Vargas Llosa claimed to be many different political persuasions throughout his career, we are going to see that he demonstrates quintessential characteristics of the neoliberal intellectual compass. Basically, Vargas Llosa declares that Indians have no choice but to become Modern Western subjects.

Socio-Political guru, critic of neoliberalism, and Professor of Literature at the University of California San Diego, Milos Kokotovic, has written various critiques of Vargas Llosa's work. Kokotovic explains that,

Vargas Llosa suggests that the 'preservation' of 'primitive' indigenous cultures is incompatible with the reduction of social and economic inequalities in Latin America, that somehow 'primitive' indigenous peoples stand in the way of fighting (their own) hunger and misery and must therefore be modernized (Kokotovic 448).

For Vargas Llosa, “...indigenous peoples live primitive lives in isolation from the modern world...” For example, Kokotovic demonstrates that Vargas Llosa, in a 1990 essay titled *Questions of Conquest*,

...sets up a false dichotomy by opposing Western modernization to the straw man of cultural 'preservation,' by which he means literally freezing 'primitive' indigenous cultures in time.

...indigenous culture is represented as incompatible with [M]odernity and must be sacrificed” (Kokotovic 448-450).

Why is Kokotovic's analysis important for our broader discussion? There are three reasons. First, it demonstrates the paradox of the total agreement of the social contract in what Allen explained about sacrifice for the greater good. Second, Vargas Llosa's failure is parallel to that which often occurs in development and developmentalist discourses. Yet, in the industrialized world, it is not common to critique Vargas Llosa from the progressive circles that often accompany those discourses. This is problematic because of his intellectual influence.

Indeed, one might argue that at least in the international arena, Vargas Llosa has successfully remade himself as a new kind of universal intellectual who has met the challenge of potentially democratizing new media with his authority intact, if not enhanced. Moreover, in his capacity as international cultural celebrity, he uses that authority to represent Peru to the rest of the world. Much of what large segments of the Western reading public know about Peruvian society is mediated by its most famous novelist, lending all the more weight to his essays and novels, which enjoy wide international circulation” (Kokotovic 457).

While Kokotovic is not the only one to do so, he observes that Vargas Llosa has changed his political sentiments at various points in time. Previously a Marxist and supporter of the Cuban Revolution, his pro-Western and pro-capitalist sentiments eventually brought him to the realm of neoliberalism.

This brings us to the third reason that Kokotovic's analysis is important. Some of the same characteristics that he points out about the more recent neoliberalism of Vargas Llosa have similarities with characteristics that Fausto had critiqued decades earlier about the supposed 'Marxist' Vargas Llosa.

The novelist Vargas Llosa, is a mestizo of the Colony, but located in Paris. His thought and his work act through the cannons and the

interests of the Metropolis. Vargas Llosa is a colonized intellectual who works for the West.

The Indian of Peru, his country of origin, is absent from the pen of this Cholo-white racist. With the morals of a herd of swine, Vargas Llosa spits on and kicks his Indian mother, whose blood and whose milk maintained his life inside and outside of the womb (*Poder Indio y Occidente* 121)(translation Kearney).

Why Vargas Llosa harbored sentiments of negation of the Indian in both his early and later political leanings is a good question. Whether it is just a personal lack of capacity, or whether he was destined to be a neoliberal, or perhaps it is for some other reason, it results in the same conclusion. In the end, Vargas Llosa is the ultimate expression of the neoliberal intellectual compass: Linera's *irresponsible citizen*. As Kokotovic put it, “The nuanced, flexible approach to social reality of his”, Vargas Llosa's, “youth... has hardened into a rigid, intolerant advocacy of individual freedom to the exclusion of all other values” (Kokotovic 459-460).

As if trying to prove Francis Fukuyama's theory of the end of history,<sup>65</sup> Vargas Llosa and neoliberalism have no real time for, nor do they have any genuine interest in, Indians. With the possible exception of their culinary, artisan, and musical contributions to Western Modernity, Indians must disappear themselves, not just in order to receive equality and an opportunity to participate in the omnipotent capitalist world, but even just in order to survive.

---

<sup>65</sup> Francis Fukuyama's theory of, essay titled, and book bearing a similar title to, *The End of History*, asserts that, we are at the peak of civilization: Capitalism in its current neoliberal form is the best that global human social relations will ever evolve to, and we all just have to sacrifice any differing aspirations and ideologies to this allegedly inescapable and static reality of capital dominated governance which, according to Fukuyama, will never be surmounted, or at least is what we all should be revering. As Fukuyama put it, “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” (Fukuyama). At the turn of the twenty first century, this Eurocentric marketphilial myopia was the rallying point for American capitalists, neocons, and neoliberals alike.

During the time-frame of Linera's *irresponsible citizen* and during the high water mark of neoliberalism in Bolivia, Postero explains a different yet connected phenomenon; that of another kind of citizenship rising in practice at the same time. What she explains is for the most part unique to Bolivia and departs from the characteristics of the irresponsible citizen. She explains how, beginning in the 1990's, many more actors made demands for political access as well as demands for the right to be recognized culturally, demands that are not compatible with Vargas Llosa and the neoliberal intellectual compass.

Postero first shows how Bolivian multicultural citizenship, as posited by the neoliberal state, discursively claimed to tackle, but actually perpetuated the exclusions of Liberalism. She shows how this happened through the terrain of landmark, albeit problematic, legislation called the LPP (Law of Popular Participation enacted in 1994). This law was the nexus and strategic terrain for the phenomenon that Postero describes. The law therefore afforded the aperture for a different kind of citizenship.

The phenomenon that occurred was an extraordinary transformation in the practices of citizenship in Bolivia. Postero shows how the LPP, while not delivering the citizenship it promised, **inadvertently created an atmosphere where people could develop certain practices of citizenship in order to become actors engaged with the state**, altering the model of citizenship in Bolivia. This created an unintended opening for the indigenous population (a diverse majority), as well as other marginalized Bolivians, who had been denied meaningful practices of citizenship. This, needless to say, allowed many to be able to assert a broader role in the state. **They were able to assert their own citizenship beyond the exclusionary**

**colonial/Republican model, beyond the syndical-universalistic model, beyond the narrow limitations of democratic representation, and even beyond the localized 'decentralized' neoliberal/multicultural model.** They had moved, if not beyond, at least around the era of the irresponsible citizen. We could call this *post-irresponsible citizenship*.

At the beginning of the twenty first century, different forms of Bolivian citizenship practices came together as groups and individuals making demands for expanded rights. As Postero points out, a major factor in this was that Bolivians demanded their rights as a form of accepting the citizenship outlined by the LPP. In describing this, Postero displays what could be called a Foucaultian understanding of *governmentality* (Foucault, "Governmentality"). In other words, she shows how NGO's were an integral part of the transformation of citizenship in Bolivia. They acted as a mechanism to inculcate indigenous citizens with the logic of "responsibilization". Postero argues that Indians were encouraged to participate in local governance, but only to the extent that they did not challenge the Nation State, Western logic, or capitalist frameworks. This phenomenon occurs across the Fifth Continent. In describing this phenomenon, Intellectual and activist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui coined the phrase *el Indio permitido* (*the acceptable Indian*).

Anthropologist Charles Hale elaborates on the inception and meaning of this phrase.

The phrase "Indio permitido" names a sociopolitical category, not the characteristics of anyone in particular. We borrow the phrase from Bolivian sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, who uttered it spontaneously, in exasperation, during a workshop on cultural rights and democratization in Latin America. We need a way, Rivera noted, to talk about how governments are using cultural rights to divide and domesticate indigenous movements. Our use of the word "Indio" is

meant to suggest that the aggregate effect of these measures -quite apart from the sensibilities of individual reformers- has been to perpetuate the subordination the term traditionally connotes. Multicultural reforms present novel spaces for conquering rights, and demand new skills that often give indigenous struggles a sophisticated allure. The menace resides in the accompanying, unspoken parameters: reforms have predetermined limits; benefits to a few indigenous actors are predicated on the exclusion of the rest; certain rights are to be enjoyed on the implicit condition that others will not be raised. Actual indigenous activist intellectuals who occupy the space of the Indio permitido rarely submit fully to these constraints. Still, it would be a mistake to equate the increasing indigenous presence in the corridors of power with indigenous empowerment” (Hale, “Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Era of the Indio ‘Permitido’ ” 17-18).

In Bolivia, the governmentality that Postero described was a way that the neoliberal State hoped to ‘conduct the conduct’ of social organizations trying to make them into responsible neoliberal subjects, but did it work? This did not have the expected outcome that the neoliberals had hoped for.

By the time of the historic social mobilizations of the early twenty-first century, there were myriad multi-faceted groups with an extensive array of demands. They pushed with a collective agency<sup>66</sup> in a way that asserted demands for a different kind of citizenship. Postero cites others calling this '*citizenship agency*' (Postero 226). In other words, the phenomenon of citizenship as a place where social struggle plays out, was perpetuated in part out of continued economic neglect of the poor and of indigenous groups by neoliberal policies that were enacted by the State. Postero explains how Bolivians not only addressed the State with a politics of citizenship as protagonists in the Water, Tax, and Gas Wars, and not only did so with expressions of

---

<sup>66</sup> **Agency:** an obscure word emerging in the discipline of anthropology. The word agency is used in other disciplines as well. However, other disciplines use this word differently. For example, it should not be confused with its use in sociology, in the hard sciences, or in colloquial language. The anthropological definition, which is the way we are using it here, is another way of saying individual human capacity.

individual or group identities, but also did so with an articulating principle made possible by new allegiances, identifications, and even a new State via *postmulticultural revolution* (Postero 189-215).

The recent trajectory that propelled Bolivian citizenship beyond the neoliberal model is where Postero demonstrates that Linera's *irresponsible citizenship* is not the end of the line for broader roles of Bolivian citizenship. During the half a decade following the publication of *Now We are Citizens*, and during Linera's rise to power, Bolivia would once again experience surprising transformations in forms of citizenship. Detailing her earlier described “two interrelated dimensions” of citizenship, “the politics of belonging and the contest over political culture”, Postero explains that “both have been radically challenged and transformed in Bolivia by the new form of social activism (Postero 223).

In order to understand Bolivia's early twenty first century transformations we should step back once again to remember the breadth of the historical process. We should also make clear that there are other equally valid, albeit different, descriptions of Bolivian citizenship formulation. The work of Linera and Postero are useful frameworks in understanding the unprecedented and multifaceted process of citizenship formation in the Bolivian historical process. However, once again, it must be remembered that these are only frameworks. If we look back to Lawrence Parker's advice that, “...the historian, no matter how scholarly, is never exact. ...The activity of the whole... could never be recorded: Our linear vision is too distorted.” then we can be reminded that these frameworks only, “...make beginnings and endings in mass confusion so we can talk about the things we're doing...” (Parker).

It is difficult to create a framework for what happened in Bolivia, due in part to a long string of non-consolidated or unstable governments, or more accurately due in large part to a strongly resistant population. Sinclair Thomson is an associate professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who specializes in the history and politics of the Andean region, and has done extensive work on concepts of race, ethnicity, and the colonial relationship. Referring back to the 'age of revolution' of the Original Kataristas, Thomson reminds us that

In the eighteenth century, native American peoples nourished their own ideals of liberty and self determination. While indigenous communities did not mobilize with 'democracy' as their [primary] aim, their struggles against the domination of an Old World empire brought about effective and enduring practices of communal democracy and sovereignty that differed from Western liberal principles (Sinclair Thomson, *We Alone Will Rule* 276).

The people in the territory now known as Bolivia were exemplary in such practices long before and far beyond the chronological limitations of both the 'age of revolution' and Postero's postmulticultural revolution. Since the initial invasion by the *Trece de la Fama*, the struggle for control in the Andes and the Amazon has been tenuous. Sometimes, as was the case with Spanish Viceroy Toledo<sup>67</sup> and Fascist dictator Hugo Banzer Suarez, the sovereign power of the state waxed. Sometimes, as was the case during the Original Katarista, Wilka, and Gas War rebellions, the sovereign power of the state waned to minuscule levels. However, all of the time there was resistance, in one form or another, towards the state, and towards its frequent use of the *state of exception*, a concept which we will discuss in the next chapter.

---

<sup>67</sup> Toledo, who arrived in what is now Peru towards the end of the sixteenth century, was the first effective, the most effective, and probably the most brutal Spanish 'Viceroy', or Vice-King, in the Fifth Continent.

By the time Postero's *postmulticultural revolution* had rolled around, there was already half a millennium of shared historical memory and unparalleled practices for such resistance. The culmination of which, although difficult to categorize in convenient frameworks, is nonetheless a notable stand-alone phenomenon. In other words, the unique trajectory of citizenship practices in Bolivia has no international comparative homologue. That is to say, that events in the lives of the citizenry in Bolivia are outside the bounds of, or at least different from, the discussions of citizenship amongst most international intellectuals.

That is not to say that there isn't a productive discussion about citizenship amongst international intellectuals like Giorgio Agamben, Antonio Negri, and Jürgen Habermas. I will prioritize one of these intellectuals later, but here it is important to focus on the point at hand: Bolivian citizenship has a different historical trajectory with its own unique particularities. This is more evident now than ever before. Speaking on behalf of Bolivians, Argentinean exile and international intellectual Enrique Dussel philosophizes about this phenomenon,

We are currently in the dialectic of a passage from one system to another. This cannot be posited within any European theory, nor that of Toni Negri, nor Jürgen Habermas, nor Giorgio Agamben, nor anybody because they are not *in* the situation of revolutionary change like we are. We have to make a theory of our own that justifies what we *are* experiencing (Dussel 127)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added).

Dussel's recognition is a distillation of the phenomenon that Postero describes regarding the *postmulticultural revolution*. This is not to say that the Bolivian citizenry has reached a pinnacle manifestation of any kind of ultimate utopian citizen sovereignty. However, it is discernible that citizenship in Bolivia, meaning the

practice of -not limited to the legal framework-, can have aspects of empowerment that are not meant to exist in the allocations of sovereignty of Modern Western Democracies.

By the twenty first century, Bolivia was quite practiced at engaging with alternatives to those allocations. When a citizenry can alter the form of the state, this is evident.<sup>68</sup> When citizen actions force the government to reverse policy on major issues this is evident. This phenomenon will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight with Bolivian events during the 1970s, in the following paragraphs with the Water, Tax, and Gas Wars of the early twenty first century, and in Chapter Eleven with popular actions against the second Morales administration, known as *the Gasolinazo* and *the TIPNIS affair*. All of these examples resulted in policy change, or at least policy frustration.

The Water, Tax, and Gas Wars were massive popular uprisings in the first three years of this century. They resulted in the expulsion of multiple corporations and one president from Bolivia. They forever changed the way discussions over resources occur. They also resulted in the reconfiguration of social benefits, and Constitutional change. These events became famous across the globe as iconic in the struggle against neoliberalism. These results are not acceptable outcomes in Modern Western Democracies.

That this phenomenon exists in Bolivia, conspicuously demonstrates a broader struggle over sovereign power which includes, but also goes beyond (before and after)

---

<sup>68</sup> ...and that is not to say that it was altered in any kind of utopian way, but it is undeniable that the state has been altered.

Postero's *postmulticultural revolution* and is far more unique and departed than Dussel's 'passage from one system to another' implies. Due to this phenomenon, *citizenship agency* in Bolivia occurs in ways that are intriguingly departed from the conformed representative democracy of Modern Western Democracies, and significantly departed from Allen's 'empowered to be disempowered' America.

## Chapter Five

### Violence & the State of Exception

Despite Dussel's rejection of Agamben and his peers in regards to understanding contemporary Bolivian citizenship, Agamben is still a formidable force for understanding Modern Western Democratic formations. This includes formations of citizenship in relation to imperial law and the intellectual process from which it spawned, calcifying as the iron-clad limitations of those formations.

In *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, Giorgio Agamben presents an important point with a great degree of relevance to the concepts of citizenship discussed in the previous chapter. Agamben's point is actually part of a much bigger and more intricate, yet fascinating, discussion. Looking at only an excerpt of that larger discussion, we should focus on Agamben's way of exposing the origins of Western law as dispensed by the state. He does so by unveiling it as the invalid, or at least empty, arbiter of sovereign power that it is. The following paragraphs attempt to explain only a small part of Agamben's indispensable work in order to demonstrate his conversation about sovereign power in relationship to the subjectivity of the protagonist of his book, who is no less than Man, and Man alone (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 7).

It must be noted that Agamben gives credit to Antonio Negri for delving into the difference between constituting and sovereign power. While Negri's work is not expanded upon in this thesis, it is helpful to understand that Agamben lauds the

importance of Negri's contributions to ontology<sup>69</sup> itself (see footnote for a definition of ontology)(Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 43). However, for our purposes here, we will follow Agamben's anchor to less ethereal ideas and concepts:

Until a new and coherent ontology of potentiality (beyond the steps that have been made in this direction by Spinoza, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger) has replaced the ontology founded on the primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality, a political theory freed from the aporias<sup>70</sup> of sovereignty remains unthinkable (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 44).

The difficult mixture of complexity and clarity displayed in Agamben's assertion

---

<sup>69</sup> **Ontology:** In a personal email communication with Postero, she elaborated on the concepts of *ontology* and *epistemology*, which she views as related concepts.

...ontology is the study of the nature of being and reality.... It is thinking about how things are related, and what the nature of the universe really is. So, the idea here is that we can't take things for granted but have to really question our categories of reality. Is there one reality or are there many? What is our relationship in the world and to reality? Currently, there is a lot scholarship going on about this in the indigenous world because people are suggesting that indigenous cosmovisions are not just another way to think but that they illuminate the assumptions [that] Enlightenment thinking has made invisible. So, what is the relation between nature and culture? ...or between the real and the not real? How do we know that what we are seeing is "real" and not a dream? What is reality and what is myth? Are those mountains big rocks that we can empirically verify as dirt, etc. or are they other beings?" ...**Epistemology** [then,] is related because it is asking how we know these things. That is, it gets to the nature of the knowledge process. So, that involves situating the knower somehow and thus brings up the power relations inherent in the knowing process (as Foucault would remind us). So if we are having a debate about what is reality with an indigenous person, we might have different ontological positions or understandings. But the epistemology question would ask us about the ways we know things-- and might look at the genealogy of our ways of knowing. ...[Therefore], that would point out not only that we have different perspectives or interpretations of reality, but also that each one of our ideas comes from a particular position and relationship to that knowledge. This gets to the grounds or basis of knowledge. What counts as knowing and why? [For example] 'I think that mountain is a bunch of rocks because I believe that a person can actually know things like that through observation or study.' The person who believes that mountain is a deity might have a different epistemology, arguing that you can know things through beliefs or senses. One of the main questions this gets us to is whether people can actually be objective[?] We are all always already situated so how does this affect what we can know and how we know it?"("Re: Greetings").

<sup>70</sup> Collins define Aporia as:

**Aporia** ...

1. (Literature / Rhetoric) *Rhetoric* a doubt, real or professed, about what to do or say
2. (Philosophy) *Philosophy* puzzlement occasioned by the raising of philosophical objections without any proffered solutions, esp in the works of Socrates.[from Greek, literally: a state of being at a loss] (Collins, "Aporia")(brackets SIC).

demonstrates that I myself have run the risk of oversimplifying the conversation on sovereignty. I have done so because the broader ontological discussion is too complicated and too much of a detour for the purposes in which we are using it for here, just as it almost may have been for Agamben himself.<sup>71</sup>

Because of this, it should be clarified that, while constituting/constituted power and other concepts may be touched on in the following pages, we are specifically focussing on the word/concept/lexicon of *sovereign power* or *sovereignty*. This was previously defined in Chapter Four.

Agamben leans heavily on the Latin concepts of *ban*, *exceptio*, and *bare life*. He posits that the *ban*, or the *exceptio of bare life* that it creates, (concepts to be elaborated on in the following paragraphs) permit the exclusion of certain kinds of human life from the political realm. At the same time, he asserts that such subjects, excluded and stripped of sovereign power, are included in the power structure by the very act of being excluded (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 7). If this sounds similar to Allen's recognition that citizens are 'empowered to be disempowered', it is because they are discussing similar outcomes of the same historical construction that occurred over time.

Agamben however, extends the analysis of that historical construction. Citizens can be included through exclusion because, who is out or who is in, is defined by law, or "nomos". That law is enforced through the violence of a *state of exception*

---

<sup>71</sup> Almost is the key word here. Agamben, while his language is unavailable to many readers, does succeed in his task and therefore identifies some of the most problematic historical constructions of contemporary governance today. In other words, contrary to my hesitation above, Agamben tackles the more complicated discussion, succeeds, and creates the most important scholarly analysis on the subject.

that situates those who cannot participate as being outside of the law, but still within its control. They exist as a part of the state, in that they can be controlled through force and violence, but do not have a part in the state. If the law itself must act outside of the law in order to control this balance, then the *state of exception* is justified through a legal and juridical tradition that exists as the legacy of a historically descendent rationale. Yet the state of exception is rarely talked about and exists within the law as an ethereal influence. In his 2005 book, *State of Exception*, Agamben points out that

...there is still no theory of the state of exception in public law, and jurists and theorists of public law seem to regard the problem more as a *quaestio facti* than as a genuine juridical problem (Agamben, *State of Exception* 1).

Sometimes known as the state of siege, or martial law, the state of exception can be macro or micro, but always validates the state enacting it in order to justify whatever actions are enacted through the exceptional powers granted therein. Agamben argues that the *state of exception*, the state exempting itself from laws governing violence and using violence in order to reinforce the legal regime, has become the norm in Modern Western Democracies, especially for contemporary empires such as the U.S. This is the heart of the matter we are trying to identify. Quite simply put, how can this be justified? This question is not lost on Agamben either.

If the state of exception's characteristic property is a (total or partial) suspension of the juridical order, how can such a suspension still be contained within it? How can an anomie [ethical vacuum] be inscribed within the juridical order? And if the state of exception is instead only a de facto situation, and is as such unrelated or contrary to law, how is it possible for the order to contain a lacuna [vacancy/void]

precisely where the decisive situation is concerned? And what is the meaning of this lacuna? (Agamben, *State of Exception* 23).

While the concept is confusing and evasive, there are at least two important reasons for discussing theories about the state of exception. First, as Agamben points out, "the state of exception has now become the rule" (Agamben *State of Exception* 9).

Second,

...if the law employs the exception -that is the suspension of law itself- as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, abandons the living being to law (Agamben, *State of Exception* 1).

If we can understand a few of his key terms, then Agamben is helpful in theorizing about the state of exception. In defining the concept of *Homo Sacer*, he looks back to the second century AD to employ a citation from the celebrated Roman intellectual, Sextus Pompeius Festus. Agamben explains that

...Festus, in his treatise *On the Significance of Words*, under the heading *sacer mons* preserved the memory of a figure of archaic Roman law in which the character of sacredness is tied for the first time to a human life as such. After defining the Sacred Mount that the plebians consecrated to Jove at the time of their secession, Festus adds:

“...The sacred man [homo sacer] is the one whom the people have judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that 'if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide.' This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred” (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 71).

Citing H. Bennett, Agamben points out that “...Festus's definition 'seems to deny the very thing implicit in the term'..., since while it confirms the sacredness of a person, it

authorizes (or, more precisely, renders unpunishable) his killing...” (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 72).

*Bare life*, being different from that of political life or life that has a public value, can be thought of as the permanent condition of included exclusion, stripped of political protections such as rights, citizenship, or other markers of sovereignty.

Agamben explains that

The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, *zoe/bios*, exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 8)

For example, while the detention conditions for undocumented immigrants in the U.S. may be similar to those of enemy combatants, the State does not speak of it as so. Far from being enemies, the undocumented immigrants in detention centers are for the State nothing more than nonexistent on paper. Therefore, their physical bodies lack political existence and are nothing more than bare life, living the constant exemption of the detention center, until the final physical act of exemption, deportation.

Describing the concept of *ban* Agamben explains, “The ban is the force of simultaneous attraction and repulsion that ties together the two poles of the sovereign exception; bare life and power, *homo sacer* and the sovereign” (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 110). The concept of *ban* then, is the missing justification, a virtual vacuous insubstantiality, for the law that uses the state of exception to justify itself. Yet how does this vacuousness become the actual foundation of legal formation, and also thought, in Western civilization?

Agamben explains that the relationship between the sovereign state and excluded-inclusion is based in potentiality, which is comprised of the difference between constituted and constituting power, and can be followed genealogically through history. This genealogy, expanded upon in the following paragraph, is the concrete in the foundation of Modern powers of the state/empire/governing-forces to encompass, own, and be the sole arbiters of sovereignty. This happens not only in the reificatory phenomenon of its own existence and wielding of power in concordance with the law, but also outside of the law, i.e. *the state of exception*. This state of exception is the violent omnipotent control of Modern Western Democracy.

This violence is justified and validated because its claim as proprietor of sovereign power can be traced logically and justifiably through itself, going backwards. In other words, the genealogy of the concept of the *exceptio* – which facilitates the state of exception – and the core validation of both in the law, can be traced back from the contemporary moment of U.S. Empire, back to English common law (and its contemporaries), back to enlightenment thought, back to Roman law, and back to the Greeks. Because of notable historical constructions throughout Agamben's genealogy, like constructions that begin with Aristotle, there becomes a convoluted relationship between the validity of what constitutes the power of the sovereign state and how that power was first constituted. In other words, there is an historically formed tension between, constituting power (what justifies the wielding of power now) vs. constituted power (what originally/historically justified those who wield power to do so). Agamben explains that

The relation between constituting power and constituted power is just

as complicated as the relation Aristotle establishes between potentiality and act...According to Aristotle's thought, potentiality precedes actuality and conditions it, but also seems to remain essentially subordinate to it... ..not as an alteration or destruction of potentiality in actuality but as a preservation and 'giving of the self to itself' of potentiality... (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 44,46).

This concept of 'potentiality', or self-perpetuating constitution of power, presents a perplexing question. What initial thing justified and constituted/formed that constitution/formation? In other words, what was the initial seed that gave the legitimacy of such things to the law, its force, power, and the omnipotence of sovereignty completely centered as the State, in Western Civilization?

Although he can genealogically reconstruct the edifice that sits upon and grew from that foundational seed, Agamben can't find it. It is somehow lost, disappeared, and cloaked by-and-as the *ban*. To say it another way, the law in Modern Western Democracies, at its original and core point of validation, sits on an entirely empty principle.

What Agamben does recognize however, is that this supposed 'potentiality', despite its vacant core, **is** what allows for Modern Western Democracies to exist in a permanent *state of exception*. This allows those in power to perpetually enforce the *exceptio* through violent force. This violent force then legitimates the law that breaks the law's own laws (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 54-55).

For Agamben then, humanity is paradoxically and tragically deemed to be under the thumb of an unjustly false coercion of the State through the state of exception, perhaps perpetually. This is because the *exceptio* and the resulting 'exceptio of bare life' act as a kind of geopolitical solenoid for the co-option and

control of political subjects. This could be considered as *Agamben's dilemma*.

To add to our list of terms, *Political praxis* can be defined as the actual engagement of theoretical strategy with political reality. Agamben suggests that praxis of the oppressed in Modern Western Democracies, because of the omnipotence of the state of exception, will inevitably be defeated. For example, despite its widespread and innovative *political praxis*, Occupy Wallstreet's best efforts were ultimately frustrated and deflected. That is because in the contemporary golden age of Modern Western Democracy, As Agamben put it,

...until a completely new politics—that is, a politics no longer founded on the *exceptio* of bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, and **the ‘beautiful day’ of life will be given citizenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the spectacle condemns it** (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 11)(bold emphasis added).

One goal of this thesis is to inspire the beginnings of a conversation about ideas for a political theory that offers an alternative blueprint and praxis that is different from what Agamben sees as possible. More accurately it is an alternative to fill the void in what Agamben sees as not possible, *Agamben's dilemma*. We can begin the conversation through an exercise of discussing concepts of pluralism.

Authors cited in this thesis, like Prada and myself, are talking about pluralism meaning the recognition and and integration of many political structures and practices as both a production of, and as an outcome of, the State. We also mean it as the official recognition of a plurality of ontologies, as well as the infinite plurality of the universe. However, plurality is commonly seen as a plurality of political parties within one political system, within one universalized ontology, and within one single

monistic source of origin. How different parts of Western academia understand pluralism is difficult to identify. Therefore, the search for alternatives to Agamben's Dilemma is vital and timely considering Western academia's recently piqued interest in concepts such as legal pluralism.

Why? It is imperative to explore alternative political theory because serious discussions about legal pluralism must address the juridical and historical allocations of sovereign power and the violent consequences of their monistic outcomes. Concepts of legal pluralism offer to incite a fissure in the fatuous cement of *exceptio*. Such an interest in legal pluralism offers either the possibility of becoming a Western-controlled deliberation, framed in the same formation that perpetuates the *exceptio*, or transversely, offers the possibility of humanity surviving its own violent implosion.<sup>72</sup>

As mentioned above, there is currently a piqued interest within Western academia for intellectualizing about concepts of *legal pluralism*. In places like Ecuador and Bolivia, this conversation has been going on for years and, although perhaps not in practice, it is enshrined to different degrees as Constitutional law in both countries. In 2011 however, aside from rare exceptions like Postero and Hunefeldt, in places like the University of California San Diego and California Western School of Law, such concepts were new, under- explored, tentatively dealt with, and clumsily fumbled with. To their credit, the aforementioned institutions made the effort in May of 2011 to hold a conference titled, *Legal Pluralism in Latin America, Challenges and Comparative Perspectives*.

---

<sup>72</sup> This is not to say that there is a polarization of two options here. On one hand there is a pole in the sense that Modern Western Democracy posits homogenous unity. However, on the other hand the paths stemming from concepts of plurality present a multifarious set of possibilities.

The conference took the subject seriously enough, having the insight to invite as a speaker, Navajo Nation Chief Justice Robert Yazzi, who also works for the Diné Policy Institute. Yazzi spoke about legal and juridical concepts in the Navajo Nation. Yazzi is an advocate and innovator of concepts of restorative justice, which not only have demonstrated effectiveness in social benefit, but also offer alternative paths to the violence inherent in the state of exception. Restorative justice, in contrast to punitive justice, directs the perpetrator to repay his debt not just to society, but to the very members of society who were injured. Sometimes instead of a punitive sentence, or other times in conjunction with punitive sentence, the perpetrator must do work for, pay money to, apologize to, and/or give other forms of necessary help, repayment, or retribution to the victim or victim's family. Restorative justice has a special compatibility with the Navajo legal concepts of 'horizontal justice' and 'relationship'. In an essay titled "Life Comes From it" and published in the 2005 anthology *Navajo Nation Peacemaking, Living Traditional Justice*, Yazzi elaborated.

The "horizontal" model of justice is in clear contrast to the [Western] vertical system of justice (Barkun 1968; Falk 1959). The horizontal justice model uses a horizontal line to portray equality: no person is above another. A better description of the horizontal model, and one often used by Indians to portray their thought, is a circle. In a circle, there is no right or left, nor is there a beginning or an end; every point (or person) on the line of a circle looks to the same center as the focus. The circle is the symbol of Navajo justice because it is perfect, unbroken... It conveys the image of the people gathering together for discussion....

Navajo justice is a sophisticated system of egalitarian relationships, where group solidarity takes the place of force and coercion. In it, humans are not in ranks or status classifications from top to bottom. Instead, all humans are equals and make decisions as a group. The process – which we call "peacemaking" in English – is a system of relationships where there is no need for force, coercion, or control...("Life Comes From it" 46,47)

Yazzi has made it clear to me that these concepts only get partially integrated into the Contemporary justice system. He feels that due to the intricate interrelations of the between the Navajo and the West, that Western ideas and Western law will always be something that Navajo people will have to deal with (Yazzi, Personal Interview). Yet, will see in later Chapter Ten that there are refreshing foundations for some Navajo legal concepts. However, here we should focus on Yazzis alternative possibilities for discussing the theories in this thesis.

As the conference proceeded on that second day in the Hojel Auditorium at the Copley International Conference Center, it began to be obvious that many attendees had a difficult time departing from their Western attachments to Roman legal traditions and Western liberal paradigm.<sup>73</sup> This became especially evident in the afternoon during a question and answer segment of the general session in the auditorium.

The Hojel Auditorium is a large lecture hall with dozens of international flags hanging from the high ceiling. It features quality acoustics, permanent and technologically-advanced audio-visual installations, and a steep grade from the first row of seats to the last. Because of these features, as well as the availability of many breakout rooms, it is an ideal location for large conferences hosting hundreds of people. About two thirds of the way up the rows of burgundy colored seats, Yazzi

---

<sup>73</sup> For example, [the moderator] tried to diminish an explanation by Yazzi, about differences in Diné/Navajo juridical concepts of property, by counter-arguing with an expanded explanation of rational choice resource and property regimes. The point of this footnote, and the paragraph which it addresses, is that Yazzi was amongst only a select few who were taking seriously the concept of pluralism: beyond being a quaint novelty, and actually considering concepts based in a non-Western and therefore non-monistic set of ideas.

stood up from the ranks of the audience to ask "...is pluralism a possibility, and if so, how do we get there?" He then reminded all of the attendees,

...pluralism is going to be about recognizing the rights of the earth. What do we mean by that? I mean, not too many people can accept that, you know, anything like a chair or air has life, and it can speak.(Yazzi, "Question and answer session")

This is an ontological argument he was making. It postulated a different ontology than that of the other conference attendees. What they may or may not have clued into, is that Yazzi was pointing out a completely different legal foundation and juridical framework than what the conference organizers so obviously held as a given: the dominion of Roman law and the inescapability of the *ban* and the state of exception. Yazzi's perspective was difficult for them to understand.

The unjustly false coercion of the *state of exception* can be rethought with Navajo/Diné cosmovision, replacing the *ban*, or lack of seed/validity for the *exceptio*, with the tangible elements of the earth,

...how does the right of mother earth, the right of water, the right of fire, the right of air, what do these say about life? How do they... impact our thinking? How do they impact our way of planning things? How do they impact our way of seeing things... Some people may think it's impossible, because, you know, whose paradigm are we using? Whose framework are we using to discuss pluralism? It's not Indian people. It's the non-Indian people (Yazzi, "Question and answer session").

Yazzi was right. Even at that conference, a conference reaching to consider concepts of pluralism, there remained the heavy presense of the paradigm of Western laws and/or Western academia. The paradigm of Western academia is a mainstay that has close connections with the Western juridical tradition; a tradition that is shackled to

the chain of the *exceptio* and the permanent *state of exception*.<sup>74</sup> This is not an exaggeration, nor is it presented as an unsubstantiated accusation. Western social-science itself was created in this way. It was created as a tool for powerful capital interests.

The philosophy and ideology that has overallocated sovereign power to empire and the Modern nation-state is rooted in the very same vehicle that drove finance-capital to global power. That vehicle is no less than the monopolistic-transnational colossus, which for centuries endeavored in the specific business of exploitation and enslavement of large swathes of the world. This colossus, known at times as the East India Company, secured its part in forming many of Europe's most influential thinkers. For example, in the anthology *Tensions of Empire, Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*, Uday S. Mehta concluded the chapter *Liberal Strategies of Exclusion* by asserting,

It is worth recalling that Haileybury College, where Malthus, Bentham, and so many other pioneers of social science got their start, was explicitly designed to facilitate the understanding and governing of colonial people by the East India Company (Mehta 80).<sup>75</sup>

For some expansion on this concept, we look to Raúl Prada Alcoreza. Prada is a Bolivian intellectual, university professor, prolific author of political analysis, and

---

<sup>74</sup> There is an unsettling irony here. The violence and *exceptio* in the state of exception can be observed in what is known as *the Long Walk* during the Lincoln administration. The *Long Walk* was a naked attempt at genocide, which was forced upon the Diné people in 1864. It was enacted in order to create a regime of, and was justified through a discourse of, private property. It was a discourse that is strikingly similar to [the moderator's] dressing-down of Yazzi, who [the moderator] claims as a friend.

<sup>75</sup> In his endnotes Mehta continues, "There are a number of suggestions on this theme in Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Similarly, Ronald Meck, *Social Science and the Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), considers a closely related suggestion focusing on the role of native Americans in the development of French and British social science" (Mehta 86).

former vice-minister now turned-dissident against the Morales/Linera/MAS government. He was also a key member of the Constituent Assembly that drafted Bolivia's current Political Constitution of the State (CPE). Interestingly enough, the Constituent Assembly convened in the Colegio Nacional Junín, where Fausto had been a professor.

The CPE, while still bathed in Western democratic concepts, is the strongest Constitutional and legal advocacy for pluralism in the Americas today. Prada, who acknowledges the conflicts between concepts of pluralism and Western academia, elaborates on the formation of academia that had preoccupied Mehta. He asserts that the formation of academia had much to do with the genealogy of Western knowledge itself.

Prada explains that a great deal of the knowledge from the ancient world, as we know that knowledge today, saw its preservation through the pre-printing-press practice of transcription. He notes that the majority of this transcription occurred in Arabian and then later Christian monasteries. The individuals who actually did the transcribing faced a dilemma. While they were,

...intending on interpreting texts, [they] are also going to opt for [specific] selections of texts. Obviously, ...they are going to come up against dimensions that they are going to question [philosophically. And in doing so,] ...they are questioning their own foundations of the monotheistic religions (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

Inferring that many of these non-conformist intellectual deviations may have been consumed by the fire that destroyed the Library of Alexandria, Prada continues,

...there are complicated themes about the Christians in respect to this tradition and in respect to the Library of Alexandria.

There is a theme! ¿Who burnt down the library of Alexandria?  
 ...The relation with ancient culture is very complicated with  
 Christianity and not only Christianity, ...[but also with all three of] the  
 traditions of the desert... (Ibid.).

Inferring that the library may have been torched for ideological intentions of  
 destroying pluralist perspectives in the ancient knowledge that had been transcribed  
 and stored at Alexandria, Prada elaborates that those monistic traditions of the desert,  
 those of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity,

...are tremendously repressive in respect to other cultures, other  
 writings... Obviously in the magnitude that they go on consolidating,  
 let's say certain accumulation, and certain reflections of those Christian  
 and Greek traditions that arrived [farther north in] Europe... (Ibid.).

If such consolidated sedimentation of traditions and accumulation occurred  
 through the nobility's monopoly on knowledge, then a genealogically traceable  
 corollary can be found today. Prada, citing Bourdieu and echoing Mehta, makes the  
 biting remark that academic titles are the modern titles of nobility. Fausto pointed out  
 a similar aspect of this phenomenon in the early 1950s.

The title of 'doctor' in a society of classes, has always been an  
 instrument of the dominant class. The cultured class that holds all the  
 riches, 'bestows doctor' to its best minds, to further establish the  
 material and intellectual exploitation of the ignorant and subjugated  
 class (*Belzu 75*)(translation Kearney).

It would be easy to diminish Chief Justice Yazzi's commentary earlier in this  
 chapter as utopian, simplistic, hippy, or idealistic. That is in fact what happens to  
 ideas like his all over the Modern Western Democratic world. That is why the  
 conference he was attending never really got to a moment of actually discussing  
 pluralism vs. monism/monotheism as far as a core concept for overarching legal  
 constructs. Perhaps the monistic nobility of academia are just as colonized as the

cultures and peoples whom they assist in dominating?

## Chapter Six

### Pacha

#### Weaving Time through Space

The monistic nobility of academia have not yet answered the following question with a definitive 'yes': Can sovereignty constitute and manifest itself from, for, and by the citizenry, instead of pervasively through violent coercion of the citizenry by omnipotent hoarding of sovereignty in the hands of empire, nation-states, and governing forces? That is, can a citizenry constitute its own sovereignty, and thus resolve Agamben's dilemma? Here, I intend to seek such an alternate constitution and manifestation, not only by problematizing Western concepts, but also by proposing what I call, *NayrİR Qallta*, *Pacha Jatha* (pronounced - \nī- 'rİR\ 'kōl-'tə\ \pach-'ə\ 'hät-'hə\).

The contemporary Andean language of Aymara, unlike English and Spanish, enjoys a multi millennia pre-Colombian history.<sup>76</sup> In Aymara, *nayra* can mean both eye or before (as in the past). *Nayriri* means first. By conjugating *nayriri* to *nayrİR* it becomes a verb that represents the action of going to the first of whatever the noun is. The Aymara verb *Qalltaña* = *Comenzar* = *To Commence* becomes a noun naming the action of its root verb. In other words, *nayrİR qallta* = to go to the first commencement. However, I suggest we think of this with the root of *nayra* as well.

---

<sup>76</sup> The following linguistic formulation would not have been possible without the assistance, guidance, and training of Bolivian intellectual Juan de Dios Yapita, one of the premier Aymara linguists of our time.

Therefore, we should think of it as 'an observed precedent of the first commencement'.

*Jatha* means seed. Of the different ways to say seed, depending on usage, Félix Layme Pairumani, in his Bilingual Aymara/Castilian Dictionary (Diccionario *Bilingüe, Aymara - Castellano*)<sup>77</sup>, describes *jatha*<sup>78</sup> as a “pollen”, or comprising “Each one of the bodies that form part of the fruit that gives origin to a...[biological organism]” (Layme Pairumani 80,463)(translation Kearney).

*Pacha* is the concept of the physical relationship between time and space. It is critical to understand that thousands of years ago Andean peoples had synchronized these two concepts of time and space in their constituent relativity. This can be thought of metaphorically, and perhaps could be proven to be (although not here), as being much like the binding energy theorized in various field theories, such as quantum field theory, in contemporary physics.

On the other hand, Western civilization, a paradigm still suffering the consequences of the limitations of Newtonian physics, and a paradigm that intellectually replaces the vacuity of the *ban* with unmerited validity of the *exceptio* (reifying its illogical perpetuation), did not discover this connection between time and space until Albert Einstein and the twentieth century. Unfortunately for Western civilization, Einstein was essentially too late to alter this disastrous reification. In fact, Western civilization instead used the discovery of this connection between time and space only a few years after Einstein’s realization in order to create the most destructive force in human history; nuclear weapons. Including and emphasizing the

---

<sup>77</sup> Printed by the CEA (Consejo Educativo Aymara).

<sup>78</sup> (and it’s synonym *muju*)

U.S. as being part of 'Europe', Fausto refers to the agglomeration of NATO countries, pointing out that,

Europe, in the Second World War, arrived at the Atomic Bomb.  
Europe with its philosophy, its religion, its science, and its power, the  
6th of August 1945 incinerated Hiroshima with the Atomic Bomb.

...From Socrates to our days, our thought is not the truth. Our  
thought is lies and assassination.

Our thought made act has arrived at the Atomic Bomb: The  
Atomic Bomb that is going to destroy the Planet Earth (*Socrates Y Yo*  
51,76)(translation Kearney).

For those who share Fausto's concern for the trajectory of Western thought and 'reason', *Nayrür Qallta, Pacha Jatha* could be considered as a conceptual seed for an alternative to the *exceptio* and the *ban*. It could be considered conceptually as the first seed of a different kind of biopower. However, it is the seed of a different kind of biopower than that which Western scholars, Foucault, and Agamben describe (although not in this thesis). Instead, it is a seed that indissolubly roots itself in the unmistakably corporeal fabric of time and space and their inseparability. It is a seed that is man, as part of that inseparability instead of as its detached master. It is a seed that then becomes the foundation for a juridical and legal construction that accepts corporeality. Much like what Yazzi pointed out, such a foundation is solid because of the concrete composition of the worldly and cosmic elements of clearly definite nature and its integrality.

Similar to Yazzi's juridical foundation, concepts that exhibit what I am calling *Nayrür Qallta, Pacha Jatha* have been and can be found in Andean thought. Perhaps for thousands of years, while at very least as early as the 1970s (as will be demonstrated in later chapters), Andean thought has conceptualized a praxis that was

liberated and mobilized, at least conceptually, for a “ ‘beautiful day’ of life”, or *suma qamaña*<sup>79</sup>; predicated on neither morbidity, violence, nor *Agamben's dilemma*.

Reinaga, while less known in intellectual circles than Agamben or Foucault, had the distinct advantage of extensive political engagement. Neither Agamben nor Foucault were legislative representatives or oppressed subjects. They did not fight in the streets as revolutionaries, nor did they inspire seemingly impossible yet successful resistance movements in their native land. Fausto, on the other hand, would fit all of these descriptions.

By the 1970s in Bolivia and the Andes, Fausto had his finger on the pulse of the cutting edge of decolonizing, philosophical, and political thought. He sought the liberation of political subjects not recognized by the state, yet who were still within the control of the state and its *state of exception*; political subjects for whom he demanded a decolonized citizenship based on non-Western concepts.

Fausto's lesser known works explore this rejection more ruminatively. For example, from 1978 to 1983 Fausto produced works like *Socrates y Yo (Socrates and I)*, *El Hombre (Man)*, *La Razón y el Indio (Reason and the Indian)*, *El Pensamiento*

---

<sup>79</sup> In defining *suma qamaña*, anthropologist Brian B. Johnson quotes and translates Javier Medina. *Suma Qamaña* is “...a deeper reflection upon the ‘human condition.’ It considers that cultural identity, the physical, mental, and spiritual ties to one’s *llacta* [people], one’s land, is of equal importance to the raw materials of life. The loss of common values, the disintegration of communal structures, and the alienation from the spiritual world can affect the individual more than the lack of physical items. . . . The struggle against poverty is more than just improving the economic base and access to public services.”(Johnson, “Decolonization and it’s Paradoxes, The (Re)envisioning of Health Policy in Bolivia” 143)

*Amautico*(*Amautic Thought*), and others.<sup>80</sup>

Fausto was keenly aware of the power of intellectual discourse. As Mehta explained, Modern academic intellectuals should be recognized as a device, “...explicitly designed to facilitate the understanding and governing of colonial people...”. For example, CILAS (the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies at the University of California), one of the sponsors of the aforementioned conference on Pluralism, has demonstrated this facilitation. CILAS facilitates the collection of social data in Latin America for the U.S. Government's Department of Defense (DOD) and National Security Agency (NSA).<sup>81</sup>

There are Greek and Christian precedents to the kind of formal formulation of imperial and colonial intellectuals who contribute to the hegemony of Roman law and European thought. For Fausto, these formulations are condemnable. Building on his critique of the Western use of Atomic science, Fausto declares that,

To think in Greco-Christian thought is not just insanity and stupidity. It is a Crime. An unforgivable crime.

In the mind of the Greek philosopher, in the mind of the Roman philosopher, in the mind of the European philosopher, God exists. God turned into reason. Reason turned into God. The philosophy of Athens in our days is reason. Reason is the 'vital breath' of all of the philosophical, religious, ethical, and political doctrines and schools of the world. Reason is the primary spark of the flint axe and the Atomic Bomb that burned Hiroshima (*Socrates Y Yo* 76)(translation Kearney).

In the opening pages of the prologue of *Socrates y Yo*, Fausto succinctly distills our

---

<sup>80</sup> The titles mentioned above had an altered theoretical trajectory, and a more philosophical subject matter in comparison to ...*FFAA* and *Como Viveremos*, even though they were published during the same time period. The latter two books will be discussed in Chapter Nine

<sup>81</sup> It should be noted here that Dr. Christine Hunefeldt from Chapter Three was no longer the director of CILAS when this facilitation was constructed.

subject matter through the seed/root philosophy of Socrates<sup>82</sup>,

The absolute is Socrates. ...Athens, Rome, Europe have established the human existence within a Socratic 'Iron norm'. Athens, Rome, Europe have embedded humanity within the canons dictated by Socrates (*Socrates y Yo 7*)(translation Kearney).

Fausto recognized that even the early empires had begun an indomitable process of colonizing the planet earth through the simple but effective concept of human status and rights to ownership for some, predicated on, and resulting in, slavery and dehumanization for all others. The slavery for all others begins not only with Socrates' philosophical naturalization of slavery but also with his personal and physical reinforcement through enactment of such a concept by selling his own mother into slavery(*Socrates y Yo 22,23*). If the *iron norm* sounds similar to Agamben's *ban & exceptio*, it is because Fausto recognized the same core problem for the trajectory of human history.

Adamant from the beginning, Fausto posits a vociferous argument. He clarifies that Socrates' self claimed moment of enlightenment had come from ethereal evidence that was more based in religious homage to Apollo than in the concrete reality of the world (*Socrates y Yo 21-23*). That foundational seed that Agamben can't find, *Agamben's dilemma*, that is somehow lost/disappeared/cloaked within the *ban*, is for Fausto the combination of the philosophical lies and violence that begins with Socrates and his inseparable root in Apollo. What is important here is that Socratic thought is founded in religion and deification. Why is that important?

---

<sup>82</sup> The reader should not trifle here. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle... we know that the tradition is unified in the minds of Western thinkers. To squabble over who was who or who said what only justifies the flawed characteristics of Western thought addressed here.

In order to answer that question, one must not skim over the few pages in *Homo Sacer...* where Agamben demonstrates how ethereality from myth turned fact of religion would come to be used: to shore up the vacuity of the *ban* and perpetuate the permanent state of exception in which we live (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 54-56).

Building from others he writes,

...the Messiah is the figure in which the great monotheistic religions sought to master the problem of law, and that in Judaism, as in Christianity or Shiite Islam, the Messiah's arrival signifies the fulfillment and the complete consummation of the Law. In monotheism, messianism thus constitutes not simply one category of religious experience among others but rather the limit concept of religious experience in general, the point in which religious experience passes beyond itself and calls itself into question insofar as it is law (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 56).

In short, the return of *the Messiah* resolves the problem of invalidity in the *ban*, or more distinctly bridges over its vacant insubstantiality as a foundation for the *exceptio* and the state of exception (Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 57,58).

If for Foucault, sovereign power and *biopower* are separate (but often co-existing) and the contemporary epoch of *biopower* began in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, then for Agamben and Reinaga they are one and began as early as the Greeks. Yet, perhaps we should consider a different genealogy. *Yes*, it was with the ethereal religiosity and violent hubris of Socrates that both powers began to mature, but their solidification and marriage with each other was at a different and very specific moment in history; the twilight of the Roman Empire.

Rome, through the powers of empire, through governing craftiness, through the world's most nefarious hegemonic praxis, and through the physical force of violence, chose to officially create the coming of the Messiah as a permanent legal encoding and

spiritual solution for the emptiness of the *ban*. By editing the Gnostic texts, they left the permanent legacy of what now closely resembles the Catholic and Protestant Bibles to reverberate millennia into the future as a codex for Roman law. This was brought into praxis through mechanisms like The Council of Rome in 382, through the edification of Christianity as the official religion earlier in the century, and through the outlawing of all other religions later in that same century.

Even though the Roman Empire would face myriad problems, which would cause its fall less than a century later, the Christian rectification of Roman law would become, just like the messiah, something eternal. It has become an integral set of codices for juridical justification of the state, the *exceptio*, and the state of exception in Western Civilization and Modern Western Democracies.

In the following example, we can see how the state of exception played out during the initial invasion of Tawantinsuyu. Philip Ainsworth Means gives us yet another compelling story about the moments before Pizarro and his men applied such messianic legal authority to the Inka Atahualpa.<sup>83</sup> Building on the work of the famed nineteenth-century archival historian William Prescott, elaborating with first hand sources from Pizarro, and backed up by a myriad other sources, Means illustrates that the conquistadors told Atahualpa “...the Pope had given his, Atahualpa's, realms to some king or other and that he, the Inca, was being bidden to become that other king's vassal.” To prove this point, they would hand Atahualpa an abridged version of the psalms as evidence of their divine mandate (the law). “...he nonchalantly dropped the holy tome upon the pavement.” The sacrilegious act of not heeding the holiness of the

---

<sup>83</sup> From: *Fall of the Inca Empire, and the Spanish Rule in Peru: 1530-1780* Published in 1932

book was his crime.

Atahualpa's rejection of the book, his rejection of the Pope, his rejection of the Pope's representatives (the Conquistadors), and his rejection of the demand to relinquish his sovereignty are what positioned him as outside of the law. While the ultimate judgment of such things in Christian doctrine is reserved for God and the messiah at the point of future return, Roman law and its eternal codex offer a placeholder of action to the Empires representing God through the church. Since the messiah wasn't back yet to settle the situation, and since the conquistadors had already conspired to initiate a slaughter anyways, they would enact the state of exception, now justified by Atahualpa's position as outside of the law. This act is a sobering example demonstrating the core of what Agamben lays bare in describing the state of exception. The Conquistadors used "the law" (the psalm book) to determine and characterize Atahualpa as outside of the law and yet at the same time beholden to the domain of the law, the King of Castile, the Pope, and Pizarro's thugs. When Atahualpa rejected this domain,

This 'sacrilege' served as an excuse for the attack upon the Inca's person which Pizarro and his officers had planned to make. In the short, sharp scuffle which ensued, with guns barking, horses prancing, and steel armor, swords, and trappings flashing in the sundown light, [Castile], represented by her handful of adventurers, rolled a proud empire in the golden dust of the plaza of Cajamarca. ...the bewildered Inca was tumbled out of his splendid litter, ...and led ...into captivity. Even then the carnage did not cease; for hundreds of unarmed or lightly armed native warriors were hacked to pieces with swords or trampled into slime by the horses without being able to deliver one effective blow... Thus did Christianity prove its superiority to the pagan faith which Atahualpa had scorned to betray (Means 32-33).

In 2013 at a noisy street-side cafe in La Paz, the Bolivian Indianista

Constantino Lima (from Chapter Three) would share his thoughts on the subject. The following commentary occurred only half an hour after he and I had discussed the encounter between Pizarro and Atahualpa. Constantino declared

Christianity, ...instead of bringing us good things, it brought us bad things. We began with a Christian invasion. They had put in the name of God, our lands. The priest... had declared them in the name of God. The theme here is that, this God is an asshole! Fuck! Who was going to comply with that!? (Constantino Lima, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

I asked Constantino, was his sentiment the same as Atahualpa's when he dropped the psalms? Constantino replied with a resounding "Sí!"

However, compliance was not necessary for Pizarro's men. The state of exception was at hand.

Following Agamben, the state of exception has perpetuated onward genealogically throughout the centuries, with the Roman legal codification continuing on to bolster sovereign power concentrated in the hands of the State in Modern Western Democracies. These democracies base legitimacy in Roman law and it's bridge across the insubstantiality of the *ban*, thus unavoidably underpinning the *exceptio* via the messiah.

This is why people traditionally place their hand on an anthology containing psalms, like the psalms the conquistadors had given Atahualpa, before testifying in U.S. courts (fortunately, one can now opt out of this). Allusions to the remaining Roman codification appear on U.S. money, on U.S. seals, on other U.S. imagery, in the words of the U.S. pledge of allegiance, and ad infinitum. While the ongoing practice of the remaining Roman codification can be subtle or hidden, it can best be

seen in the overt and obvious form of the massive subsidies given to monistic religious institutions by the U.S. government, to the tune of \$71 Billion a year (Badash). The U.S. is not alone among Modern Western Democracies in perpetuating this Roman codification. Even in contemporary Bolivia, public officials make the sign of the cross with their hands when being sworn in (a remnant of Republican legacy since this is now confrontable Constitutionally with the new CPE). This is because the act bridges over the *ban*, validating the state's violent power – power from the tectonic transmutation of Roman law in the fourth century – power that Pizarro and the Trece de la Fama used as a bridge of justification to arrive at their violent conquest.

Friedrich Nietzsche despised Immanuel Kant because Kant's political thought was rooted in the same tectonic transmutation. Nietzsche knew this, and it inspired more than a few furious passages in his highly censored *Antichrist*. Fausto was frustrated with this facet of Kant as well. In *La Razon Y el Indo*, he declares,

...his mature thought produces, '**Religion within the limits of mere reason**', where he arrives to sustain the principle: 'Everything that man believes to be able to do outside of a life of good conduct to appease God, is pure illusion and idolatry', ... (*La Razon Y el Indio* 118)(translation Kearney).

In *Socrates Y Yo*, he explores Kant's thoughts on 'reason',

For Kant, 'Reason is the end-point; the absolute, the universe, the soul, God...'

The 'categorical imperative' is literally an unconditional mandate. Thus so, Kant calls to his supreme moral law and formula in the following way: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.'

...In Kant, this 'eternal' and 'immutable' moral law, [']does not derive from experience, but rather that which is anterior to it and independent from it, a priori, thus proceeds from reason...' And reason proceeds from God (*Socrates Y Yo* 43)(translation Kearney).

Why does it matter that Nietzsche and Fausto were so frustrated with Kant for this line of reasoning? Because he embodied the illogical yet intellectual rectification of the trajectory of mankind: the unstoppable if not quietus trajectory of Roman law in Western thought. As Agamben notes, “In Kant the pure form of law as ‘being in force without significance’ appears for the first time in [M]odernity.”(Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 51)

Agamben is actually amazed with Kant’s ability to more or less predict “...the very condition that was to become familiar to the mass societies and great totalitarian states of our time.” Dually noting and tempering this amazement with Kant's core error, Agamben pronounces, “The limit and also the strength of the Kantian ethics lie precisely in having left the form of law in force as an empty principle.”(Agamben, *Homo Sacer* 52) Kant could not escape Rome’s messiah-detour bridging the *ban*.

Following Agamben, Fausto and the likeminded, Rome’s detour via the messiah is why empire, colonialism, Western thought, Western law, and the powers of Western sovereignty are – up to this very moment in time – deeply rooted in the monistic myth of religious deification and the obfuscation of said parasitic detour around it’s own absence of some kind of substantial foundation for legal and juridical regimes. This detour, the myth of divinity, is the perpetuation of, and subsequently the mortar for, the foundation of the *iron norm*. If correct, that would explain why Rome’s detour essentially guarantees that the Kants of the world can't even begin to venture into the realm of *Nayrür Qallta, Pacha Jatha*.

However, if we are to look for *Nayrür Qallta, Pacha Jatha* in non-Western concepts such as ideas from Andean thought, and if we are going to use words like

*cosmology* or *cosmovision*, then we must distinguish between esoteric/syncretic cooptations and more useful concepts of Andean cosmology. For this, we should consider an interview with Ramiro Reinaga, which was conducted by Latin American intellectual Victor Molina in the first few years of the twenty-first century.

In order to understand the context of Molina's interview with Ramiro, the following must be clarified: For decades or even centuries, hippies, new-agers, UFO seekers, theological universities like the ISEAT<sup>84</sup>, members of obscure religious sects from all over the world, and even members of mainstream religions like Catholicism, (all of whom will be henceforth collectively referred to as *New-agers et. al*) have all flocked to the Altiplano and the Andes mountains searching to validate their own beliefs through the use of contemporary and/or ancient Andean cosmology.

I argue that these efforts continually miss the point. It is a dysmorphic diminishment of the possibilities of Andean thought; bodies of knowledge that, even in the face of imperial devastation, have perpetually sustained Andean societies for thousands of years. This diminishment happens in Amazonía, the Chaco, and anywhere else throughout the Fifth Continent for that matter. What makes the phenomenon so blatant in the Andes is that the numerous and impressionable monolithic and/or large architectural ruins serve as the positively-charged ion for the negatively-charged terminal planted directly at the base of the spine of *New-agers et. al*.

That this is an electromagnetic phenomenon is perhaps an exaggeration.

---

<sup>84</sup> ISEAT- Instituto Superior Ecuémico Andino de Teología, whose mission, according to their website [iseatbolivia.org](http://iseatbolivia.org), is to "...try to respond to the theological, religious, and social formational demands of our brothers and sisters in the faith" (translation Kearney). More overtly, but less official, their mission is to define the will of Jesus in everything.

However, it is still a violation and purposeful diminution of the empirical nature of some strains of Andean thought and those who understand the concrete science and substance-based social concepts proposed from these non-western formulations.<sup>85</sup>

This walks the dangerous edge of racism. It is as if to say, ‘Indigenous peoples are too stupid to realize that their *beliefs* are actually an extension of aliens/Christ/flower power/god/etc. We know better and *we will teach them*... or at least disregard them.’ Even in more benign situations where some try and assimilate these Andean ideas into some pan-hippy-Buddhist religion, the danger is there.

We should keep this in mind for understanding the interview with Ramiro. It illuminates why it is important to distinguish between esoteric/syncretic cooptations and more useful concepts of Andean cosmology. When in the course of the interview, Victor Molina asks Ramiro about esotericism, the conversation flows as follows:

Victor Molina: “You speak much of the Cosmos. Doesn’t there exist a danger that this indigenous cosmovision will be converted by exogenous agents... into esotericism?”

Ramiro Reinaga: “It’s not a danger. It is a reality. This has already happened. ...Later the evangelical sects entered the situation. They said that the phenomenon [of unparalleled views of the night sky during the Aymara New Year celebration at Tiwanaku] represented the ‘eternal light’. Already it wasn’t the Aymara New Year but rather an apparition of the ‘eternal light’. That this had for certain drawn the monstrous face of Jehovah. This... [is a great example of] recent forms of bastardizing [our] cosmovision.

In addition, there is a bastardization by the supposed esoteric Gnosticism. From such perspective they maintain some of our words, or some of our concepts. But their agents are completely against the indigenous. They propose that the base of the Gnostics is to eliminate the ego. Additionally, they propose that this is some kind of principle.

---

<sup>85</sup> So, here when we are using words such as *empiricism* and or *science*, we are not referring dogmatically/religiously to the Baconian method, but rather another way of calculating observations of tangible evidence; the scrutiny of thought through study of cosmic reality. This will be expanded on, with the help of Hilda and Fausto, in later pages.

But never have I seen more robust egos than that within esotericism. Some of them believe it all the way to the level of gods. Or at least with a sublime authority as if to say: do not move yourself too close to those who practice dark arts. Because within them, all practice mistaken transcendence, except for that which they tell you. This demonstrates something very worrisome: they are parasites within indigenous culture" (V. Molina 130)(translation Kearney).

The problem with *New-agers et. al*, is that by deifying or mystifying Indigenous cosmovisions, they not only deny originality to the same people for their own thought, but also they reinsert the bridge over the *ban* reinforcing the *exceptio* that was transmuted in 382. This effectively becomes a trampling of scientific thought (in the cosmic sense, to be elaborated on in later chapters) and strains of Andean cosmovisions that had already been, perhaps for thousand of years, established in a form similar to *Nayrür Qallta, Pacha Jatha*. It tramples that which was established not just in theory but also in practice. Prada elaborates,

From Alaska to the Straights of Magellan, on this continent, the Fifth Continent, a continent that was not linked to the other continents, that was isolated, there had been constructed, other types of civilizations (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews)(Translation Kearney).

Citing Gunder Frank, he notes that the other continents including Asia and Africa had long traditions of capitalism and interchange with each other that date back far longer than conventional wisdom admits. On the other hand, the Fifth continent did not have this link with the others, and therefore saw a vastly different social construction. Noting that civilizations like Tawantinsuyu are incorrectly analyzed as having created a 'State', which is "...a very Western interpretation...", he asserts that systems of complementarity worked in the place of both commercial systems and governance that manifested on the other continents. He proposes that these societies were instead

based on confederations that had a complex inner working of alliances and circuits:

...and obviously these societies were constructed through alliances, through consensus, through communities, through assemblies, through rotations, through strongly collective and communitarian dimensions. So then in this, there is not a state, and obviously there is not [the driving force of the *state of*] *exception*, and instead has to do with consensus (Ibid.).

Prada's optimistic view of Tawantinsuyu may not have always been the case; after all, the Inka did gain territories through military methods and, as we will see in the following quotation, the Inka had a monopoly on sovereignty. Yet, Prada's sentiment is still valid for our conversation, especially if we consider the Tiwanaku civilization that preceeded Tawantinsuyu. The arqueological record demonstrates that Tiwanaku society was almost entirely constructed from consensus, trade and diplomacy while there is a distinct lack of arqueological evidence pointing to military conquest (Goldstein). Therefore, it is quite realistic to discuss an era of *Nayrir Qallta*, *Pacha Jatha* on the pre- Columbian Fifth Continent. This becomes even clearer if we augment these considerations with more commentary from Ainsworth Means.

...we must consider how great was the contrast between that condition [of colonial Peru] and the one which had existed under the Incas. That peerless dynasty was far more truly absolute than any Hapsburg or Bourbon ever was even at home. The Inca Empire... was not only happy in being without the money-complex and its attendant sorrows, but also in being administered through an official hierarchy based on the soundest common sense and surmounted by a verily absolute sovereign [the Sun] rightly looked up to as superior to mankind in general (Means 293).

We should keep in mind that Means is not solely pointing out the Inka's monopoly on sovereignty, but rather is inferring a deeper meaning. By "verily absolute sovereign", he is also inferring to the Sun's displacement of a need for the *ban* because it is the

actual arbiter of cosmic energy on earth (for Means the "soundest common sense").

Following Means, Prada, and Fausto, we can hypothesize that on the pre-Colombian Fifth Continent, the seed and root, not just of agricultural life, but of all life (including Man's) was inherently interconnected with the very real energy radiating from the Sun and its key positioning in the cosmic connection with the Earth.

*New-agers et. al*, not only obscure this reality, but trample its existence and possibilities right up to this very day. Even if they don't realize it, their eliding absorption of other cultures treads the waters of savagely astute racism.

## Chapter Seven

### Faltering Faith at Red Square

#### Letters for the Revolution

Racism is perpetuated by myriad difficult illusions. Often people who wield racist mechanisms in daily social reality don't even know they are doing so.

Fausto took on, and debated social reality with the great Bolivian intellectuals of his days. For example, both the venerated Bolivian intellectual Frantz Tamayo (after whom a university in La Paz was named) and the well-known Bolivian priest and journalist Juan Quirós García were Fausto's competitors in ongoing polemics. These polemics should be matters of greater study. While not detailed here, readers should be aware that this is why Fausto is referencing the intellectual-priest Quirós García in the following paragraphs. Fausto would end up publishing the polemic between them as an appendix to his *Franz Tamayo y la Revolución Boliviana* as well as on its own as *Revolución Cultura y Crítica*. As the name of the former implies, the book also critiques Franz Tamayo.

Quirós's critiques of Fausto caused a great deal of infamy for Fausto and were indicative of the many attacks against his public persona. These attacks amplified in the 1950s, and by the 1960s it had become nearly impossible for Fausto to publish any of his work. Whether or not it was the case with Quirós, Hilda asserts that many of the critiques leveled against Fausto were rooted in blatant attitudes of racism (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). In short, even the edges of the political envelope were

appalled that an Indian would level such critical attacks on the criollo and mestizo socio-political structure of Bolivian power relations.

In the 1950s Bolivian intellectual circles were dominated by the ideas of the powerful. They had a considerable amount of influence on publishers to reject Fausto's works. This was amplified further after the publication of *Belzu*. As a result he was forced to self-publish almost all of his work. The attacks did not stop at barring publication either. As Fausto would explain, his enemies would come after him with

...excessive hate. During the years 1954-1955, my haters won the entire [political] terrain and monopolized all of the publishing media. The priest Quirós had the pulpit, ...the radio, and the daily 'La Nación' at his discretion... My haters enjoyed and used 'totalitarian' powers... In the campaign 'against Reinaga', the ruinous success could not wait.

The attack of Quirós against my persona and my *Belzu* was fuel for the fire of said campaign. I felt the economic blockade tighten around me. The newly rich millionaires, the 'new Rosca', [in other words] the 'nationalist progressive bourgeoisie' had been ferocious with me. So much so that hunger arrived once again in my house. They detained me... My son and my mother, who were just a child and an old woman, were separated from me. My mother went to the 'Asylum of San Ramón'<sup>86</sup> to die on April 1<sup>st</sup>, 1955... without me being able to hear her last breath.

Mother:

On my knees I implore your forgiveness. The Revolution has separated us. Forgive me for not having reduced my bones to dust working for you. You know more than anyone that I never lived for myself. My life pertained to the struggle; the struggle for independence of our patrimony and the liberation of our class.

My prayer for you is that you are in the heavens,<sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> A retirement home in La Paz run by Catholic nuns, which even to this day is known for strictly regimented Judeo-Christian intolerance ("Amor en el asilo, amor prohibido").

<sup>87</sup> Fausto uses the word *cielos* here, and *cielo* for the last word of the next line. *Cielo(s)* can be heaven(s) or sky(skies). While Fausto is using an aesthetic of Judeo-Christian reverence in death, his meaning is anchored in the more pantheistic theme inferred at the end of the current poem and throughout his career.

You are a star on satin sky,  
 Lightly falling snow fleece white,  
 The nightingale's trill, a gleaming rose.  
 The re-embodiment of Inca princess Asfodelo.

Love of all loves was your zeal  
 For this, in I, your fledgeling swallow...  
 Your blood burns Catarina red,  
 And your soul, a longing that ignites my soul...

When you departed the boundaries of this world,  
 Tomás Catari, had he seen your ascendancy  
 Would have spoken this historical prophesy:

LIBERTY is not a thing to be outpaced,  
 From here on in life and in death,  
 Glory, stellar glory, is our race!  
 (*Franz Tamayo* 212-213) (translation Kearney).

A few years after his mother's death, Fausto had the opportunity to visit Moscow. The Russian trip, along with another journey to Machu Pichu, were defining moments for Fausto's intellectual compass.

Entirely disillusioned with his former comrades in the MNR and its leadership, Fausto had not completely given up on the sentiment and significance of the 52 Revolution. Up until this point he had also not given up on communism in the Leninist sense. After his visit to the Soviet Union, he published *El Sentimiento Mesiánico del Pueblo Ruso*, or *The Messianic Sentiment of the Russian Pueblo*.

The book demonstrated a shift in his thoughts about various communist thinkers, which began during the journey. Here, Fausto contextualizes his visit to Lenin's tomb.

The Bolivian Revolution that had armed the workers and campesinos and had brought to power workers and campesinos, who comprise half of the national government, has committed works of

audaciousness unknown in Latin America: the nationalization of the mines of Yankee imperialism, and agrarian reform, for which two and a half million campesinos were given 'land and liberty'. The pressure of the armed masses had imposed these two grand revolutionary measures. We theorists brought to the attention in the mind of the masses, ideas and experiences plucked from the pure gold of the Russian Revolution. When we had to confront the hard tasks of the Revolution, that was when we felt and understood the immensity and profundity of the Great Revolution of October and the immensity and profundity of the genius of Lenin.

I had preached this Leninist mysticism, in word and in example, throughout my dramatic life of persecutions, jails, exile, etc. As a manual laborer and as an intellectual, as a high school teacher, University professor, journalist, writer, syndical leader, and politician, I had scrutinized the problems of my patrimony through the crucible of the greatest and most luminous lesson and experience that Humanity had ever received – The Great Revolution of October... [For example,] With the firebrand of my Leninist devotion, detouring from the terror of imperialism and its national [Bolivian] lackeys, in 1944 as national representative I asked for and secured the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with socialist Russia, as well as the rupture of relations with the fascist dictator in Spain, Franco.

Now then, the reader can probably imagine the happiness I would feel in my heart, the ecstasy with which would humble my soul before the Mausoleum of Lenin in Moscow (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 80)(translation Kearney).

There in Russia, Fausto would publish in the Moscow weekly *Ogoniok*, speak on Soviet radio, and meet with Soviet intellectuals including Latin American history Professor Fasilio Ermolaer from the University of Moscow and Elena Romanova from the writer's union. Fausto was immensely impressed by his hosts, and the selections of Russian life they shared with him (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 80-85).

*Sentimiento Mesiánico*, published in 1960, is full of intriguing prose. The autobiographical account of his trip to Moscow, and the events leading up to his trip, are synthesized with the historical formation of the Soviet Union, Leninism, and communism in general. The intrigue in his story begins to build shortly after Fausto

speaks on the radio arguing favorably for the finer attributes of Moscow and its people. When visiting Lenin's tomb, going into the memorial and coming out of the memorial, he feels a grand, if not deified, reverence for Lenin. However, for a brief moment, after viewing pictures of Lenin which were displayed inside of the memorial, photos of Lenin when he was “sick, prostrated, dead...”, Fausto experienced something “rare” and “incredible”. That is, he viewed the actual embalmed and curated body of the Soviet hero.

But, the royal savior of the hungry and ignorant, the re-embodiment of Prometheus which had brought fire from the gods and given it to the Men of earth, the edifice of Russian power, the messiah of the exploited of the world, the demiurge<sup>88</sup> of peace, liberty, and unity of Men, could not die. Lenin is aeviternal<sup>89</sup> and immortal.

In this instant I awoke from my fascination. That astronomical eddy which had filled my head ceased instantly. I awoke from my trance. I saw and took note that I found myself still bathed in tears and facing Lenin.

In this moment, just like a volcano that breaks mountains of solid rock, rips trees out by their roots, and vomits fire from its crater, I felt like [my disillusionment was] making my bones crack, my entrails burn, and my soul boil in flames, sick with doubt. Just like that, I felt a faith of light and of fire, from deep within, leave me (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 88)(translation Kearney).

However, Fausto's disillusionment was fleeting and only lasted a brief moment. He left the tomb after slipping back into the same messianic trance that he had entered it with. On the disquietude of the disillusioning transition he was experiencing, and evidently witnessing, Fausto wrote,

The Russian Pueblo looks to Lenin, with unction [religious anointment for monarchs], with kneeling soul, and with their eyes welling with tears of gratitude.

---

<sup>88</sup> **Demiurge:** a Platonic-Greek monotheistic creator figure.

<sup>89</sup> **Aeviternal** = exists celestially.

My friend Irene Yonovna, waking from her extasy said: “For us, Lenin is a God...” (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 95)(translation Kearney).

On November 7<sup>th</sup> 1957, Fausto witnessed a military parade of heavy arms in Moscow's Red Square. It was at exactly

...12:00 on the dot... when the multitudinous voice of the masses that welcomed the progression increased one hundred times with sudden intensity and tonality... It was the roar of enraged lions. Thundering throats, hands applauding or clenched, shaking like flags in the middle of a battle, their feet jumping electrically. Women and men throwing shreds of their clothing.

The howl of an ocean storm; forests whistling in a hurricane; the crash of thunderbolts; earthquakes which render mountains... Men, women, and children with intense stares and clenched fists, red flaming in their soul and in their heart a crackling ember with chants, hymns, hosannas... That pueblo, at the review of their own bellicose potency, had been transfigured. In front of them gleamed a mysterious light. The intercontinental projectiles, the atomic cannons, and those that launched the Sputniks crossed in front of them. But when that giant bullet arrived and passed through the square, that rocket with atomic cargo, the delirium of the people touched the edge of paroxysm, the collective euphoria flashing and cracking like a thunderclap.

...that climactic warrior cry, appeared to me as a symbolization of the archangel Saint Michael leading the celestial forces armed with flaming weapons in defense of the 'kingdom of God'. God who, following the prophet Ghandi, “Is embodied throughout the ages – in one Pueblo or another – for the redemption of the world.” And today there were unequivocal signs that God has been incarnate in the Russian Pueblo (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 96-97)(translation Kearney).

In other words, For Fausto, the Russian Pueblo was certainly hailing divinity, but as we will see in the following paragraphs, he and Ghandi both are not speaking narrowly of the Western God. While the book chronicles only the beginnings of Fausto's distancing from communism in general, it was the definitive point of departure for said alienating journey. In the book, before and after the scene above, he chronicles his observations of Muscovite society, slowly building on a parallel between the social behavior around him and the great messianic religions, especially

Christianity. Recognizing a phenomenon with problematic caveats similar to the total agreement of social contract theory, Fausto declares,

Russian messianism is not a myth. On the contrary, it is the supreme and exalted synthesis of the messianism of the entire human history. Buda, Confucius, Zarathustra, Socrates, Jesus, all seethe in the essence of Soviet messianism...

The radiant resurrection of Jesus, in my sensibility and understanding, would seem to have been made visible and tangible in the Pueblo of Lenin. And the personal unity of Christ transfigured shimmered in the common collective unity of Russian society (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 97)(translation Kearney).

Despite his nascent disillusionment, Fausto would continue to comport himself diplomatically and would not miss any opportunities. Speaking in front of the Soviet Writers Union he hailed Soviet socialism, Moscow and Muscovite society (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 101-105).

Four days after witnessing the military parade, Fausto had the opportunity to attend a speech given by Nikita Krushchev, honoring Lenin, and thanking conference attendees. These attendees included Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh. The speech is cited heavily if not entirely in *Sentimiento Mesiánico*. Its content focussed on Soviet and communist history including statistical analysis of the development gains of the revolution (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 112, 106-137).

In the final chapter of *Sentimiento Mesiánico*, Fausto finds himself making a detailed comparison of the two Cold War empires, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. While, as always, he finds plenty to critique about the U.S., his growing disillusionment does not give the Soviet Union a free pass. For example, early in the book when chronicling his amazement of Moscow and Soviet society, Fausto cites the famous Argentine intellectual Aníbal Ponce, an intellectual whom Fausto had admired

immensely (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). He uses Ponce's praise filled commentary of Moscow to parallel his own. Yet, by the last chapter, Fausto asks concerning Ponce, “Why did he not have the valor, the intellectual valor, the revolutionary valor...[to] denounce before the world, the 'crimes of Stalin' at the same moment and time...” that he was showering Moscow with praises? (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 191)(translation Kearney).

At this point in time, Fausto concludes his work, still with a framework of the duality of the Cold War politics of the 1950s, with only the slightest inference that other political possibilities should be pursued. “ – Dear brother, if you were going to make me have to chose between the United States and Russia, I would choose, in peace with myself, Russia” (*Sentimiento Mesiánico* 198)(translation Kearney).

Despite the limitations of his polarized perspective at the time, it is in *Sentimiento Mesiánico* that Fausto also begins to reformulate his foundational concepts of political philosophy. It is the start of a more critically analysis of the cornerstones of Western thought, like Socrates and the French Revolution. As mentioned before, it was only the beginning, but it was quite certainly a milestone in his shift to later advocate and even inspire hardline Indianismo. And shift, Fausto's political philosophy eventually would. Escárzaga explains,

A central point of his discourse is the critique and distancing from Marxism, despite Reinaga having formulated his ideas from [Marx and] Indianismo having postulated as anti-marxist. This position would be assumed in general by [Indianistas]. Because the Marxists were part of the white-mestizo elites, and their organizational practices perpetuated the subordination of Indians and their political servitude, Reinaga would denounce this as political pongueaje. This rupture permitted the affirmation of Indian ideological and political autonomy, the condition of protagonist in their struggle for liberation for the Indian, and an

alternative political project of social organization that was distinct from that which the Marxists embodied (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 193)(translation Kearney).

Before discussing the rest of Fausto's transition away from the Marxists, a clarification should be made about the difference between Fausto's critiques of Marxism and Fausto's critiques of Marx. When reading the expanse of Fausto's work, one begins to see resentment towards Marxism over time. However, the critiques of Marx himself, although they are there and although they are ardent, only occur in isolated instances. For example Fausto specifically thrashes Marx in his 1978 *La Razón Y el Indio*. Yet, the critiques of Marx himself are more or less cordoned-off textually within the book and are placed to serve the greater critique of all of Western thought. In other words, Marx is far from being **the** specific target, and is only an individual target when it is necessary for critiquing the grander expanse of Western thought.

Especially in the 1970s and 1980s, at the end of each and every critique of Kant or Hegel, there are no questions as to the disdain, disregard, and disappointment that Fausto has for them. We will revisit this distaste in later chapters. However, when running across specific critiques of Marx, one is left not fully convinced of Fausto's argument. A similar observation could be made about Fausto's commentary on Nietzsche. While he may make claims that they are culpable of dastardly deeds within their writing, the reader is presented with a dilemma in whether or not to fully accept Fausto's critique. This is in part because Fausto's writing style, even in the later years, continued to emulate a Nietzschean aesthetic as well as a political logic that often leaves the reader contemplating synonyms of those ideas written by Karl Marx.

So then, while it is necessary for Fausto to critique all Western philosophers, he himself has difficulty detaching from the ideas of some of them, especially Nietzsche, Marx, and Mariátegui (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

He would however, go a long way in attempting to detach from them, reformulating his ideas from Andean non-Western inspiration. Not very long after the trip to Russia Fausto journeyed to Machu Picchu, a definitive launch pad for his Andean non-Western inspiration, where he would experience an internal formative moment of transition. Sandwiched in between the trips to Russia and Machu Picchu was also a trip to Uruguay. As Hilda explains in her biography of Fausto,

Upon his return from the USSR, he attended a Communist Congress in Montevideo, Uruguay, where the police arrested him, and seized all of the copies of *El Sentimiento Mesianico*. None of the communists attending the congress lifted a finger to help him. He would have to look to the Bolivian Embassy in Montevideo for repatriation (Hilda Reinaga, *Biografía de Fausto Reinaga* 8)(translation Kearney).

It was an unfavorable position for Fausto to be in, since the Bolivian Ambassador at the time was none other than Hernán Siles Suazo. Penniless, Fausto had no passport as it had been taken with the books. He was at the Ambassador's discretion, yet, his favor with Siles Suazo was questionable. Not only had Fausto mercilessly critiqued Siles Suazo in *Belzu*, but there had also been an unfavorable personal encounter in the past. The last time Fausto had seen Siles Suazo was uncomfortable to say the least. In the previous encounter, Siles Suazo had offered what Fausto felt were dishonest 'gifts' for his participation in the revolution. Hilda explains that according to Fausto, he had declined the 'gifts' and in response Siles Suazo "...crushed out his cigarette, got up from his chair, opened the door" motioning

Fausto to leave, “and told him, 'go fuck yourself asshole!’” (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

So, when they met again due to Fausto's predicament in Uruguay, Siles Suazo reminded Fausto of the encounter, asking if he remembered it. Fausto told the ambassador that he did and that his position remained the same. Siles Suazo responded, “Say nothing more. I am going to give you precisely, and I mean precisely, the return fare and not one penny more” (Ibid.).

While Fausto was able to return to Bolivia, his problems were not over. In addition to severe financial hardship,

...Upon his return from Uruguay, his 'crisis of conscience' that had already manifested before leaving Europe, raged on. In search of peace for 'his crisis', he would journey to Machu Picchu (Hilda Reinaga, *Biografía de Fausto Reinaga* 8)(translation Kearney).

At the time Fausto was reading a lot of work from the World War I conscientious objector Eugen Relgis, who was a humanitarian philosopher from Romania with whom Fausto had established a friendship. He was also reading work by the French intellectual Romain Rolland. Yet, no amount of heavy reading could solve his crisis. Hilda explains,

I believe that he looked to get a handle on his crisis ...he was totally disappointed... after the Revolution of 52 and the tremendous corruption that there had been. They had taken the whole world for their own benefit but had forgotten about the revolution, that was how Fausto saw it. ...and so then, he went to Machu Picchu...

In addition, there was already this question in his mind of: 'why should the Indian have to follow other doctrines in order for liberation, if he has his own principles?' So then, it was already gestating in his mind, the issue that the Indian should take power. For this he needed a political party... (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

The 1961 journey to Machu Picchu had a profound impact on Fausto. The impact of the journey would never disappear from his writing. What exactly happened to Fausto when he went to Machu Picchu? Perhaps it was the grandiose layout of the Inka engineering that filled the sails of his thoughts? Perhaps it was the awe inspiring geography of the almost vertical mountains upon which the ruins sit, above the clouds and streaming infinite hugs of lush green growth, which pushed him to reorient his ontological view? Either way, Fausto was moved enough by the precolombian civilization which built Macchu Picchu, that he would from then on fiercely advocate for an ontology primarily rooted in precolombian civilizations of the Fifth Continent. In the presense of the ruins, Fausto experienced an emotional catharsis that would drive his literary production through the following decades (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

It was after this trifecta of journeys ending with Machu Picchu when Fausto would return to La Paz and found the PIAK (The Aymara Quechua Indian Party), which would later become the PIB (Bolivian Indian Party). As we will see, this political platform played an important role in radicalizing the Indianista and Katarista protagonists, who will be discussed further in Chapter Eight.

It was in these early 1960s when Constantino Lima and Fausto Reinaga would meet for the first time. Constantino recalls being introduced by Juan Condori Urchi and Raimundo Tambo (notable Kataristas from the movements elaborated upon in the upcoming Chapter Eight in the 1970s). Constantino remembers the encounter with Fausto, “He told me, 'Constantino, I would like to speak with you, this Sunday afternoon'.” Fausto offered him dinner, and Constantino recalls that, “...as I had no

money or anything, for me this was fortunate. To have free food for the day, for me was happiness.” With this happiness, he arrived early, and the two spent the entire day conversing (and eating). It went so well that they would repeat the meeting every Sunday (Ibid.). Constantino reflects warmly that the two had gotten along

Muy Bién! With me, he had always been good. I promised,  
   'Every Sunday I will be here.'  
   'Very Good!' [Fausto replied]  
 And every Sunday I arrived there, [Constantino smiles at this  
 moment] to eat breakfast, to eat lunch, and to eat dinner.”

Yet, his intellectual appetite equaled his physical hunger. For one whole year the two would meet. Then,

When we were finishing [with the year of meetings], he told me  
 first thing,  
 'Today is the last talk okay? [pause] Constantino, finish high  
 school, and you must enter the university.'  
 I shook his hand and said smiling,  
 'Anything is possible' ” (Ibid.).

And so it was. Lima would graduate from high school and go to the university.

However, Constantino makes the assertion that it was he and his friends who were the mentors to Fausto in his Indianista thinking. He asserts that he made suggestions for changes in the way that Fausto wrote things in the 1960s. According to Constantino, he urged Fausto to be more Indianista, but the changes promised by Fausto were never realized. However, it is equally possible that Fausto was the formative mentor to Constantino. Fausto did not specifically indicate which was the case, but by now we can imagine that he would have defended his position as philosopher/teacher. No attempt shall be made here to seek a more definitive answer

for the above quandary. However, no matter how the ideas percolated, what we know for sure is that the connections between the two Indianistas eventually nurtured a strong part of the formulations that would energize the vanguards of revolutionary change across the social landscape of Bolivia.

In 1964 Fausto critiqued the Bolivian social landscape in *El Indio y El Cholaje Boliviano, Proceso a Fernando Diéz de Medina* (*The Indian and the Bolivian Cholaje, Judgement against Fernando Diéz de Medina*). This book, as the title infers, took on as an opponent another Bolivian intellectual, Fernando Diéz de Medina.

While the debate and finer contrasting differences between the two authors is only briefly discussed here, it is worthy of more detailed investigation elsewhere. However, the following citation is a small sample. Diéz de Medina, was emblematic of what Fausto found troubling about the classic left in Bolivia. It should be noted that Diéz de Medina's book, *Pachakuti*, had very little to do with the Indianista ideas that were now being advocated by Fausto, nor should Diéz de Medina's book be thought to represent the concept of Pachakuti. Referring to other ideologies embraced by Diéz de Medina, which promote the grandiose glory of all things Spanish, Fausto would exclaim,

The ancestor of the colony, according to Diéz de Medina, founded the affirmation of manhood. Except that this symbiotic Man exists only in the imagination of the author, Mr. Pachakuti. Because in the real world, the Indian continues being Indian; and the Spaniard, Spanish; and here it will remain until neither arrives at their regressive shift to Cholo. Of this anthropological process he says nothing. Because in the background of his conscience, he doesn't like the name Cholo. Because he prefers to use the terms Indo-Hispano-Mestizo, but not Cholo (*El Indio y El Cholaje Boliviano* 108)(translation Kearney).

This kind of ideology for countering racism by trying to erase words of identity, no

matter how problematic the use of those words may be, is another way of negating the other. Yet, it is a widespread practice. To this day in the North, in the U.S., millions have been convinced that if they are careful to tiptoe around words that have been used as pejoratives, then prejudice will cease to exist. Fausto knew that these kinds of 'egalitarian' strategies had devastatingly racist consequences for both the objective and subjective reality of QuechuaAymaras, as they still do today.

Refining these arguments in 1967, he again mapped the injustices, hypocrisies, and oppression embedded in Bolivian social reality with *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano*. The title of this book is, in itself, a play on words. *The Intelligentsia of Bolivian Cholaje* is the translation that probably best represents how Fausto spelled the title. Yet his meaning goes farther than that. If Fausto had instead spelled *Inteligencia*, meaning intelligence, then the title takes on the meaning *The intelligence of [the concept of and writers identifying as and advocating] Bolivian Cholaje*. The first clue to the double meaning is that the title on the inner cover of the book, as well as in many other places, is written *La "Intelligentsia" del Cholaje Boliviano*. Note the quotation marks. Within the text, both possibilities are woven into the discussion and are often framed in autobiographical accounts by Fausto. These accounts recall the pressures for Cholos to negate their Indian heritage and connections in order to participate in the intellectual realm. His counter to the logic, or "intelligence", behind the concept of Cholaje and his counter to the monopoly of the Bolivian Cholo and Criollo Intelligentsia, is Indianismo.

This book is Indianista, not Indigenista. It belongs to the silo of Indian ideology. Indigenismo is a literature produced by and for Cholismo [Cholaje].

...[Here is] My answer to the writers from the Bolivian Cholaje that say: 'Reinaga is not an Indian. He is a Cholo like the rest of us.' After the Indian Revolution of the year 1780, in which Thomás, Dámaso, and Nicolás Catari were executed in Alto Perú, their descendants stopped using this last name as a survival instinct. Juan, the son of Thomás, Changed Catari to...Chavari, later adding an R along side the other, with which the last name... changed to Chavarri. ...[Juan's] son Agustín, my maternal Grandfather, would change [the name] to Chavarría.

My uncles Felipe and Damiana, to this day, are Indians...

My mother Alejandra, an Indian who did not speak one word of Spanish, knew by memory the history of her extirpation. In the midst of infinite sorrow, crying oceans each 15 of January, (Thomás Catari was sacrificed the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1781) in her house in Santa Bárbara..., [although] grief stricken, received a type of homage from Indian caciques who would travel from 50 leagues away. My uncles, today continue to honor these obligatory traditional rites.

Regarding my Paternal last name: between Macha and Colquechaca there is the Santuario de San Lázaro, that is an Indian Community. Part of...[them] have the last name of Reinaga. Those Indians currently cultivate their lands and temporarily emigrate to the mines in Colquechaca, Potosí, Siglo XX, etc. [They] are brothers of flesh and blood to my father, who was also an illiterate Indian from San Lázaro. The Spanish last name fell upon them during colonial times, from some mercury miner who walked the mines of Aullagas, [and the] the smelters of Rosario, Palca, and Santa Margarita.

I departed from the Indian society and learned to read when I was 16. I incorporated into 'civilized' society carrying in the background of my conscience and heart, the sacred Inka Mandate: 'Ama Sulla', 'Ama Llulla', 'Ama Khella'...['Do not steal', 'Do not lie', 'Do not be lazy'] Like that in Rousseau's 'state of nature', in the innocence of Gracián's Andrenio, the Cholaje took me by the hand and led me like a blind man, through the intricacies of its social organization. With my Indian personality annulled I was Cholo-fied. And I had and felt shame of my autochthonous origins. Seizing me with the teeth and nails of the theory 'the only nobility is that of intelligentsia', I disowned the Indian, I despised the Indian... believing that Reinaga was an Indian last name, I changed to Reinag... and filed a criminal suit against a co-worker in the Law Faculty who had yelled at me calling me an 'Indian' (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 17)(translation Kearney).

If we think about this passage in the context of the state led process of, and social response to, the negation of the Indian, which we discussed in earlier chapters,

the profound difficulty of navigating these social barriers becomes clear. *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* was an unparalleled attempt to address that profound difficulty and associated tensions.

By the time of the book's writing, Fausto's arguments and formulations were highly influenced by Frantz Fanon, the revolutionary and intellectual. Fanon had written about similar tensions and difficulties regarding the African continent. Fausto drenched his personal copy of Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* in commentary annotated in the margins with multicolored pens (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

His citation of Fanon helped him to clarify and explain the evolving twentieth century colonial process of control in periphery areas. Fausto, obviously, fine-tuned this for Bolivia. One salient point of which he borrows from Fanon is the clarification of the key necessity of the colonial power, in Fausto's case the U.S., to co-opt the bourgeoisie and the military (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 219).

By 1967, the influence and salience of Fanon in Fausto's work was so profound that nine of the last ten paragraphs of Fausto's conclusion to *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* were devoted to citing large swaths of the conclusion of the revolutionary intellectual's magnum opus, *Wretched of the Earth*.

The Indianista writer, the Indigenista writer, the liberated writer today and of the coming generations, the intellectual who is concerned with MAN, as an essential and supreme value, all do not have more than one road, one exit: the Third World, of which the brilliant voice of the black Frantz Fanon spoke in this way:

“ When I search for Man in the technique and the style of Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of murders.

The human condition, plans for mankind and collaboration between men in those tasks which increase the

sum total of humanity are new problems, which demand true inventions.

Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth.

Two centuries ago, a former European colony decided to catch up with Europe. It succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster, in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity of Europe have grown to appalling dimensions...

So, comrades, let us not pay tribute to Europe by creating states, institutions and societies which draw their inspiration from her.

Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature.

...if we want humanity to advance a step further, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent, and we must make discoveries.

If we wish to live up to our peoples' expectations, we must seek the responses elsewhere than in Europe...

For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man" (*La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 235; Fanon 254-255)(translation Kearney/Constance Farrington).

And then, even the tenth paragraph, the last of the book, orbits around the citation of Fanon, making it the axis of Fausto's transformed de-colonial thought and the power that lies within the punch of his final conclusion:

This Third World, forged on the anvil of the global Indian Revolution is the Indian Revolution which in our country, burying the filth of the Bolivian Cholaje, will take the tragicomedy of this little republic, and make the glorious temple of peace, liberty, love, and work, where Man will reach his full potential.

FIN (Ibid.).

As mentioned in chapter three, and as Escárzaga explains well here, Fausto

...had been influenced by Peruvian historians like Luis E. Valcárcel, who in the decade of the 1920's proposed the reconstruction of the Inca

social organization as an alternative form of social organization. Another source of his thought were the ideologues of *negritud* like Frantz Fanon and the decolonization of Gandhi. Beginning in 1969 he would establish communication with the Peruvian Indianistas [Guillermo] Carnero Hoke and Virgilio Roel Pineda. This dialogue permitted him to assume a pan-Andean perspective and formulate a project with regional reach and access (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 194)(translation Kearney).

Yet, in a way it was more than that. It was a pan-Andean perspective with a pan-global reach and access. In the 1970s, Fausto would not only publish and be read in places like Peru and Guatemala, but also in Germany and France. It is even possible, that Fausto Reinaga, the volcano of anti-European venom, has been read more in Europe than in Latin America.

Luís Valcarcel wrote the prologue for Fausto's venomous *La Revolución India*.

He asserts that

We must construct a new semantic that permits us to be more truthful in naming human creations: to replace the 'Empire', for example, with the 'Great Community' or the *behetría* [a patriarchal kind of Spanish señorial social structure] with our AYLLU, etc. A total revision of our history books is essential (*La Revolución India* 11)(translation Kearney).

Valcarcel advocates that such a revision is necessary for both Colonial times, “...in which all reference to the life of the Indian pueblo has been covered up, but also...” in Republican times, during which the concept of “Emancipation” was really just a juridical euphemism for “concession[s] of liberty”.

...never did we Peruvians or Andeans passively accept foreign domination, ...[evidenced by] the many Indian uprisings from Manco II all the way to Tupac Amaru, Katari, Pumakawa, Willka, Atusparia... (Ibid.).

Valcarcel also advocates for the recognition of the Andean understanding of

*Pacha* as well as other Andean concepts, in order to be part of the new semantic and teachings that should,

...consolidate the Indian conscience on reclaimed rights and the supreme ideal of building, on the granite foundation of Andean Culture, the just society for which we all struggle (Ibid.).

Without a doubt, these Peruvian Indianistas shared and even influenced Fausto's perspective.

On the other hand, by the 1970s, Fausto was declaring that Mariátegui had lost his dominant place in his thoughts. While Mariátegui himself had advocated for the Comintern to look more closely at the unique nature of Peruvian society, he was in the end unable to grasp the extent, breadth, and plurality of Peruvian culture and society. As Hunefeldt explains, “The ignorance (and even prejudice) about the Black population, in Mariátegui, goes as far as the negation of Black culture.” She shows how Mariátegui, with the ambiguous and arbitrary habits of many dogmatic Marxists, had simplistically generalized, not just the Black population, but other segments of the cultural fabric of Peru. For example, “For Mariátegui, Blacks, Mulatos, and Mestizos can only be vindicated in the crystallization of a class consciousness...” She then reminds those who choose to think like Mariátegui should “...remember that **multiplicity is also a possibility for the political...**”(Hunefeldt 82-88)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added)

While Hunefeldt was discussing Mariátegui's writings about Blacks, Mulatos, and Mestizos, Fausto recognized the same kind of assimilationist thought regarding Mariátegui's writings about Indians. He declared, “Mariátegui is a racist. ...the treason of Cane of our time. ...on his knees laying incense at the feet of the West...”

(*Poder Indio y Occidente* 102) While Fausto may never have been able to escape Mariátegui's influence on him, his opinion of the long deceased Peruvian had obviously diminished.

Whether or not he could truly disconnect from Mariátegui's thought, he was changing and radicalizing. The ideas of Fanon, Malcolm X, and Stokely Carmichael had taken the place of many of Fausto's older influences. However, this would not be the case with Valcarcel and Carnero Hoke. They would remain influential. As already demonstrated, Valcarcel would write the prologue for *La Revolución India*. Fausto would borrow the concept of 'Two Bolivias' from Carnero Hoke.

The radical Carnero Hoke had used the concept of 'Two Perus' to describe Peru. As Escárzaga adeptly explains, Fausto's concept of 'Two Bolivias' asserted

...the existence of two irreconcilable Bolivias, that of the Europeanized Mestizo and that of the Indian or Autochthonous Kolla<sup>90</sup>, that of the oppressors and that of the oppressed, locked in permanent confrontation. The parasitism of the Criollo elites, and of the mestizos subordinated to them, was incapable of developing capitalism and incapable of constructing a state and a sovereign nation in the face of foreign domination. This domination included the Indians. He instead asserts the potential and the right of the Indians to construct their own nation, Kollasuyo. He argues that the alternative society should be founded in the possibility of recuperating and actualizing the system[s] of social organization that the Inkas had accomplished before the arrival of the Spanish Conquistadors. [In this he proposes] the reconstruction of Tawantinsuyo, a form of endogenous<sup>91</sup> socialism, more adequate for the local conditions and the indigenous majority and also the persistence of the forms of communitarian production, which had been taken for granted by the socialist project formulated by the Western Marxist perspective of the Criollo marxists of the Andean countries (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 194)(translation

<sup>90</sup> **Kolla:** A Bolivian term often used for highland Aymara or Quechua people. Sometimes this word is used in earnest, and other times derogatorily.

<sup>91</sup> **Endogenous:** originating from within. Antonym to **exogenous**. For example, Bolivian anti-imperialists reject the exogenous control by foreign capital and foreign influence and instead prefer endogenous control over the State and the economy by Bolivians.

Kearney).

The biggest difference between Fausto's 'Two Bolivias' and Carnero Hoke's 'Two Peru' is that "...Reinaga gave the exercise more depth and a different solution to this division, in that both Bolivias were not separated but in constant interaction in the same space." While Carnero Hoke had proposed the integration of the two irreconcilable worlds, Fausto instead demanded the return of the Indian. Discarding the concept of "...self determination as a mechanism of inclusion for the Indian in the Mestizo nation," Fausto's concept instead demanded "...the replacement of Cholo Bolivia with Indian Bolivia" (Ibid.).

Paradoxically, even during the Bolivian dictatorships, a discourse of democracy proliferated. In Bolivia since the Revolution of 52, there has been, at least theoretically, universal suffrage. In *La Revolución India*, Fausto struggles with the paradoxical structures of colonial oppression which continued despite the advent of universal suffrage, a universal suffrage that he himself had fought for (*La Revolución India* 337). By this time for Fausto, nation building concepts of cholaje, mestizaje, and other homogenizing nationalisms were an assimilationist veil for the reproduction of Western thought, practices and political dominance. Fausto would lament that

The Indian can be found in the ranks of the MNR, of the PRIN, of the PRA, of the PDC, of the PSD, of the MPC, of the FSB, of the POR, and... the (PCB). Whichever sector, whichever political parties of the white mestizo cholaje, [all] want and intend on domesticating the Indian. Thanks to the Indian vote, the white-mestizos continue mounted over the neck of the Indian (*La Revolución India* 339,338)(translation Kearney).

Who did democracy benefit? Was democratic citizenship in Bolivia at that time only to be as constitutive as those political parties? Or, would Bolivians

demonstrate other capabilities of citizen sovereignty? The latter two questions will be answered in the 1970s of the next chapter. At the beginning of that decade, Fausto's position was clear regarding whom democracy was benefitting.

Bolivia suffers the consequences of the stupidity of its founders. ...in place of structuring an economically and ideologically strong social class that was capable and responsible, they opted instead for their petty vision of things. A vision originating with the advent of military caudillismo. Instead of being a bourgeoisie, they were servant ruffians to Melgarejo, Morales, Daza, etc. ...with their eyes fixed on the white Metropolis of Europe and the United States: a country that breathes an atmosphere of pettiness, a country fascinated with riches that others bring, and a country where the waste of opulence is left out like alms (*La Revolución India* 183)(translation Kearney).

Fausto and the Indianistas rightfully recognized the problematic nature of the traditional parties and their polarized twentieth-century right-left paradigm. As we have seen already, this paradigm often perpetuated the colonial negation of Indian and indigenous identities as well as anything that wasn't a replica of European thought. It was strategically and ideologically important for the Indianistas to reject those parties and that paradigm. However, in our analysis, that does not mean we can completely dismiss these topics. We must first take into consideration where and how those parties and that paradigm are situated in the historical landscape that constructed the contemporary political moment.

In the twenty-first century, Indianismo and Katarismo have seen a renewed momentum, both genuine and appropriated. Obviously there are appropriations and co-options in any political moment. However, this thesis does not expand upon that intriguing concept. On the other hand, those Indianistas who are considered to not be appropriators should be kept in mind. Contemporary Indianistas have fine-tuned,

reformulated, and advanced their discussions on politics, struggle, and philosophy. In the present, Aymara intellectual, sociologist, professor, and prolific social theory writer Pablo Mamani Ramirez is highlighted by several of the older Indianistas and Kataristas, as well as by scholars, to be what we might call a 'genuine' or non-appropriated discussant of Indianismo (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Raúl Prada Alcoreza, Personal Interviews; Juan Condori Urchi, Personal Conversation; José Luís Savedra, Personal Interviews; Jaime Apaza Chuquimia, Personal Interview).

Although he was only one year old in 1971, Pablo Mamani Ramirez knew Fausto towards the end of Reinaga's life in the early 1990s. He also would later come to know many of the Indianistas who had been active in the 60s and 70s. Here Mamani Ramirez can assist us in understanding how we might take into consideration the parties and polarization in the last few paragraphs.

From the left we can learn some concepts, certain histories, for a critical lesson about reality. From Liberalism one could learn its twisted form of staying within the topic of a Western model of society. ...I read them as a method of knowing about various things, but they are not my preferred form of observation (Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

Instead he describes his political leanings as a reflection “of the new articulation between Katarismo and Indianismo.” Here we can clearly see the influence of Fausto. This hybrid concept should not be confused with the conflation of Katarismo and Indianismo demonstrated by the MAS in Chapter Eleven and critiqued by Constantino Lima in the next chapter. What Mamani Ramirez describes is the contemporary ontological proposal for a more effective political positioning and praxis, and not a description of the historical trajectory.

Albeit, his thoughts on the left are clear.

The left is so colonial, and even racist, in Bolivia, just like Liberalism itself. The idea of Liberalism – that the aperture of society, the idea of the liberty of the individual – in these [neo-colonial] countries, it does not accomplish this (Ibid.).

In 21<sup>st</sup> century Bolivia, it is not uncommon to reject polarized right-left, liberal-conservative contexts, nor is it rare to consider such constructs of politics as a less than preferred form of observation. However, at the beginning of the 1970s, the political envelope had not yet been ripped open by the serrated edges of Indianismo and Katarismo. The polarized paradigm was stronger than ever, and the traditional parties were organizing. They organized to the benefit of the elites, the bourgeoisie, and even the most brutal of dictators.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **Katarismo and Indianismo**

#### **Deposing the Despots**

The traditional political parties were not the only ones organizing. In the early 1970s Indianismo and Katarismo began to address social reality by demanding alternative pedagogies and enacting effective praxis focused around resisting the oppression of dictatorship. All the while, they struggled against continued colonial structures. According to Escárzaga, these movements flourished,

...at the end of the sixties, when groups of Aymara students in La Paz, who were from rural zones of the department of La Paz, formed various organizations in order to collectively represent and defend their interests from the conditions of exclusion and discrimination brought up by and confronted by the Indianista ideas of Fausto Reinaga ("Comunidad Indígena y Revolución" 196)(translation Kearney).

By 1978, the International Secretariat of the IWGIA would call these movements "...the political view- point on which one of the strongest Indian liberation movements of our time is built in the face of indescribable suffering and human sacrifice" (International Secretariat of the IWGIA). While the Tiwanaku Manifesto does not stand alone in the struggles against dictatorship in the Andes, nor does it stand alone in the activities, proclamations and resistance of the Indianistas and Kataristas, it does serve as a solid example for what we are trying to understand here. The 1973 Tiwanaku Manifesto is an iconic and foundational example of Katarista thought. This can be partially demonstrated through the opening paragraphs of the

introduction.

"A nation which oppresses another nation cannot be free" the Inca Yupanqui told the Spaniards. We, Quechua and Aymara peasants, together with the people of other indigenous cultures in this country, say the same. We feel exploited economically and oppressed both culturally and politically.

In Bolivia there has been no cultural integration, but rather a superimposition and domination that have made us remain in the lowest and most exploited stratum of the pyramid. Bolivia is going and has gone through terrible frustrations. One of these, perhaps the most widely felt of all, is the lack of real participation of Quechua and Aymara peasants in the economic, political and social life of the country. We think that without radical change in this aspect it will be absolutely impossible to create national unity and a balanced and dynamic economic development which could be proper and suited for our reality and needs.

Bolivia is entering a new stage in her political life, one of its outstanding features being the awakening of a peasant consciousness. Now that we are approaching another pre-election period we are again going to see professional politicians addressing themselves to the peasants in order to woo them for their votes, and once again they do so with deceptions and by giving false promises. Our peasantry should have real political participation and not a fictitious one. No party will be able to build up this country on fraud and on the exploitation of the peasants. Being peasants ourselves and far from any motivation derived from party politics, we only care for the liberation of our people and wish to express in this document the thoughts that we find are essential regarding the economic, political and social set-up of this country ("Tiwanaku Manifesto")(translation Kjeld K. Lings).

The document proposed a plan for addressing the cultural, historical, economic, organizational, and educational structures of inequalities in Bolivia.

Katarismo and Indianismo played definitive roles in the drafting and dissemination of the document. There is much confusion about the relation between Katarismo and Indianismo. The difference between the two wasn't so clear in the 1970s either. This was in part because there were Indianistas who participated in Katarismo and the Manifesto. In 2010 Constantino Lima described this confusion.

For many reasons, I would like to clarify the terms Katarista and Indianista. The communitarian Indianismo of Ayllus, please, is an ideology; a political ideology that should not be confused with Katarismo. Katarismo can be a political movement, it can be a political instrument of Indianismo, it can be a political party personified, it can be these things and this is very different. It appears that there is some confusion: Katarista Indianismo. I believe that we still have much to learn... ("Socialismo o Comunitarismo del Siglo XXI" 67)(translation Kearney).

Constantino is right. There is much confusion and conflation regarding the two, even among scholars. His implication, that there can be Indianista Katarismo but that Katarista Indianismo is less plausible, implies that there are limits to Katarismo in relation to Indianismo. However, he is also correct that for Indianistas to participate in Katarismo did and does happen.

Despite the fact that there were Indianistas like Constantino who did not participate in the Tiwanaku Manifesto and similar activities, for reasons of Indianista Ideology, there were plenty who did participate. More importantly, the Manifesto was a historic document in that it was the expression of a strategically articulated set of demands with real possibilities for inciting change.

Reverberating across Bolivia from its focal point on the Altiplano, the Tiwanaku Manifesto became not just a political statement or academic thesis, but the manual for a political struggle of epic proportions. It is a prime example, although only one of many, in explaining the dynamic nature of not just Katarista ideology, but also the efficacy of declaring an alternative pedagogy and praxis with the intention of altering objective and subjective conditions. Therefore, the Tiwanaku Manifesto, and documents like it, were not just a part of political discourse and literature, but rather reflected the ethos of the actors who were involved in lasting revolutionary change.

Some of the most radical documents of the time, far more radical than the Tiwanaku Manifesto, included Fausto's *Tesis India (Indian Thesis)*, Fausto's *Manifiesto del Partido Indio de Bolivia (The Manifesto of the Bolivian Indian Party)*, and the Manifesto that Fausto will read later in this chapter at the Sixth Congress of the CNTCB (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers).

Although this thesis falls short of doing so, these three documents deserve much more investigation and focus, for at least three reasons. First, comparative studies should be conducted to determine which ideas in these documents are present in contemporary Bolivian political discourse and the 2010 Bolivian Political Constitution of the State. Second, there are conflicting reports about the influence of other Indianistas on Fausto when writing these documents. Constantino goes as far as to claim that he and others actually wrote the entirety of the third document, Fausto's Manifesto at the Sixth Congress of the CNTCB, and asserts that Fausto lauded their work by declaring that changes were unnecessary (“A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”; Constantino Lima, Personal Interviews). Third, there are many similarities between these three documents. Those similarities should be studiously compared, and should also be compared with the political discourse, critical pedagogy, and political praxis of the Kataristas as well as other groups during the 1970s. These investigations alone would make for a fine PhD dissertation.

In the twenty-first century, the pedagogy demanded by Fausto, by Indianistas, by Kataristas, by the Tiwanaku Manifesto, and by other documents and actors, would percolate into Bolivian law and civil society. Earlier, in the 1970s, that pedagogy was intricately linked to their harrowing struggles against dictatorship.

The 1970s Katarista praxis, and the conjuncture in which it was enacted, is described well in Javier Hurtado's *El Katarismo*. More than anything, his work demonstrates, in no uncertain terms, how the movements and their ideologies were both a pedagogical tool to confront the hegemony of Western knowledge and power as well as an effective praxis in confronting the authoritarianism of the dictatorships. Here it should be noted that Hurtado discusses the Kataristas as a broad group. In other words, he does not get too caught up in distinguishing between the different factions or between Kataristas and Indianistas. That is not to say that he doesn't discuss the differences. However, unlike some present day critics, Hurtado does not allow the discussion of factionalism to obscure the efficacy of the actions of the various groups. Unlike what Robins did with the Original Kataristas, Hurtado focusses more on the concrete actions and gains, which the myriad of movements within the Katarista and Indianista spectrum had accomplished.

Hurtado demonstrates the strategies, community actions, and practices that led to the most important resistance to the Bolivian dictatorships of the 1970s. While the movements that formed the resistance were pan-Bolivian, Hurtado is keen to point out that, "It was the central Aymara Altiplano and concretely the province of Aroma which came to be the epicenter of the peasant movements of the..." 1970s (Hurtado 228).

As we will see in the following pages, the odds were stacked in favor of military General and Dictator Hugo Suárez Banzer, whose August 1971 military coup had the strongest parts of the most destructive arbiters of power on their side. Within forty-eight hours of the coup, Fausto received unwanted visitors.

...they arrived in Aranjuez<sup>92</sup>, they dragged him out of bed, and they gave him a beating. They broke, or somehow injured his back in a way that he couldn't even get in a vehicle or sit down, so, he suffered immensely (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

The dictatorial regime of Banzer was one of the longest lasting continuous single-leader governments in Bolivia (1971 to 1978).<sup>93</sup> Leaning heavily on the state of exception, Banzer's reign was oppressive, violent, and brutal. This brutality was not the only similarity with the dictatorships of other countries in the region. The biggest similarity was overt U.S. involvement.

The coup was also a response to the international conjuncture. In the Southern Cone the rise of labor and popular movements had placed North American interests in danger. In response, the U.S. pushed for the expansion of the National Security Doctrine, that in 1964 began with Brazil. The Banzer coup in effect counted on the economic and military help of the North American and Brazilian governments (Hurtado 57)(translation Kearney).

However, rock-solid proof of Hurtado's claim is quite new. As Robert P. Baird points out in a special report on some declassified documents, it was only recently that these facts became undeniable. A quarter of a century after Hurtado made his observation, declassified U.S. State Department documents would prove him right.<sup>94</sup> Evidence would surface showing not only that Washington and the CIA were directly connected to Banzer's bloody coup, but also, thanks to declassification in the twenty-

---

<sup>92</sup> **Aranjuez:** A neighborhood in La Paz where Fausto had a small piece of property. The property had been obtained as an exchange for a machine gun.

<sup>93</sup> However, Belzú and Andrés de Santa Cruz in the nineteenth century, as well as Evo Morales in the twenty-first, occupied the Palacio Quemado for equally as long (or longer).

<sup>94</sup> Baird writes in a footnote, "In July 2009 the State Department Released volume E-10 of Foreign Relations of the United States 1968-1972, but withheld the Bolivia chapter until declassification could be completed. The Bolivia documents were released sometime between March 1 of this year...and now[2010]" (Baird).

first century, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger would finally get caught with their fingers in the coup d'état-plot cookie-pot. Baird explains,

...the Nixon Administration, acting with the full knowledge of the State Department, authorized nearly half a million dollars—‘coup money,’ ...  
...that they knew would be used to over throw [President] Torres.  
(Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson [said]: ‘what we are actually organizing is a coup in itself, isn’t it?’)

The same day that the coup began in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, an NSC staffer reported to Kissinger that the CIA had transferred money to two high-ranking members of the opposition... (Baird).<sup>95</sup>

So, here, we can see the state of exception in a very obvious Imperial use. In previous months Kissinger and Nixon engaged in the following banter,

Kissinger: We are having a major problem in Bolivia, too. And—

Nixon: I got that. Connally mentioned that. What do you want to do about that?

Kissinger: I’ve told [CIA Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas] Karamessines to crank up an operation, post-haste. Even the Ambassador there, who’s been a softy, is now saying that we must start playing with the military there or the thing is going to go down the drain.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: That’s due in on Monday.

Nixon: What does Karamessines think we need? A coup? (Ibid).

General Hugo Suárez Banzer was a School of the Americas alumni and Washington attaché. Banzer, Alexis Johnson, Nixon, Kissinger, the Bolivian Elite, and even parts of Bolivia's inept Bourgeoisie had organized the overthrow of Juan José Torres González and the famous Popular Assembly. That they had done so in the

---

<sup>95</sup> The previous paragraph and the next build on text from my undergraduate honors thesis for the Latin American Studies Department at the University of California San Diego.

name of anti-communism, did not change the Imperial construct of their use of the state of exception.

Torres would take exile in Argentina, but would not escape the state of exception that was hot on his heels. As J. Patrice McSherry would reveal in a 1999 article in the journal *Social Justice*, it was there in Argentina that the U.S. would coordinate the assassination of Torres via "Phase III" of Operation Condor (McSherry).

Torres's short ten-month reign was predicated on the events of the previous six years. In 1964 Vice President René Barrientos decided to abandon democratic rule for that of dictatorship, overthrowing Paz Estenssoro. At that moment the political conjuncture was a complex matrix of struggles between, and alliances among, the bourgeoisie who had just lost their chance at power, the military now in charge of the State, the campesino syndicates composing a large swath of the population, the elites still licking their wounds from their losses in '52, and a strong labor sector. None of these were mutually exclusive from each other, but all had different interests. All of these experienced division among their own interests.

Barrientos had maneuvered quickly, in order to create an uneasy but effective pact with the campesino unions. It was uneasy, because the leadership was coopted and/or fabricated by the regime. This uneasy pact, known as the Military Peasant Pact, was used by Barrientos as a kind of political shock-absorber against organized labor, especially the mining sector. However, Barrientos and his helicopter would take their last and fatal flight in 1969. In the famous book *Open Veins of Latin America*, writing with the panache he is so well known for, the famous Uruguayan

intellectual Eduardo Galeano describes the scene.

Barrientos's helicopter had tangled fatally with telegraph wires in the Arque ravine. Human imagination could not have conceived of a more perfect death. The helicopter was a personal gift from the Gulf Oil [company]; the telegraph wires belong[ed] to the state. Burned up along with Barrientos were two suitcases full of money he was taking to distribute among the peasants, as well as some machine-guns which began spraying bullets around the flaming helicopter, preventing anyone from coming to the rescue as the dictator was roasted alive (Galeano 163-164).

As a result of Barrientos's vacancy, another coup d'état took place. General Alfredo Ovando Candia, who had been a student of Fausto's back in Sucre (Chapter Three), became head of state. Ovando Candia had requested that Fausto participate in conferences of the state, and it was there where Torres would come into contact with Fausto's ideas (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). Then, in 1970, there was a bloody right wing putsch against Ovando Candia. A few years later, in a 1972 *New Left Review* article, Zavaleta described the scenario.

On 7 October 1970 President Ovando was overthrown by a triumvirate representing the three branches of the armed forces, headed by General Miranda. Then, in a remarkable political action, General Torres proclaimed resistance to this junta, called on the workers, and made himself President ("Bolivia-Military Nationalism and the Popular Assembly" 63).

Torres would allow the country to take a sharp turn to the Left by providing for the convocation of the now famous Popular Assembly. This was probably the impetus that led Alexis Johnson, Nixon, Kissinger, et.al, to be so resolute in their intervention. There were definitely strong communist influences in the Popular Assembly. However, despite these influences, a significant influence on the Torres regime and the Popular Assembly came from the Kataristas. The radical edge of Katarismo, like

Fausto and Constantino, were now ardently denouncing both communism and capitalism.

In order to understand this complicated set of circumstances, it is helpful to refer once again to Zavaleta. When writing the following commentary in 1972, he was concerned with the Left's relationship with the Torres regime. He was also concerned with how Torres grappled with the army's bad reputation from previous regimes.

The Torres regime was not a coherent systematic creation of the Left. But it presented a good opportunity for them. Torres himself had a confused personal record. His politics were empirical and boiled down to two rigidly adhered-to conceptions — nationalism and loyalty to the army as an institution. To understand him it is particularly important to understand the institutional loyalty of officers of his kind...

For a long time Torres had been a close disciple of Ovando, who was then head of the military 'institutionalists', their political strategist, and the originator of the plan for the army's political return. Why did Torres then become a populist? The answer involves the wider social trend of the radicalization of the petty bourgeoisie... because of the way in which the political consciousness of the middle sectors relates to the army. The officer class, although part of a separate bureaucracy, still forms part of the middle sectors, or at least it most readily identifies with them. When Torres became the restorer of the army's position after Ovando, he followed the interests of that institution. But after the 1964 Restoration the army became extremely unpopular, and Torres, in defense of the interests of the army, decided to become a populist. 'We were not even able to get on to the buses,' he said, when trying to justify to officers the army's swing to the Left, the nationalizations, and the concessions to the workers. For Torres to get what he wanted the officers had to be able to board buses without encountering the hatred of the people. While the military restorers wanted to destroy their popular opponents, the military nationalists like Torres wanted to seduce them ("Bolivia-Military Nationalism and the Popular Assembly" 64).

Therefore, Torres used the Popular Assembly along with other methods, to enact such seduction, giving a constitutive aspect to broad swaths of society. The workers and

campesinos took him up on the offer, participating in large numbers. This in turn granted a constitutive aspect to parts of society, which had been barred from participation in the past.

With all of that in mind, it is fair to say that even the '52 Revolution, which was won by the multitude comprised of campesinos, miners, factory workers, and other urban sectors, was not as constitutive a moment. '52 was quickly co-opted and usurped by bourgeois elements and acquiesced to foreign capital and U.S. Imperialism. This happened despite the fact that the latter had nothing to do with fighting and winning the revolution.

Therefore, the Torres government of 1971 was a unique moment. It was one of the first times in the history of the Bolivian Republic that large amounts of the population actually held a kind of representational control of the state. Before this, the elites, the military, and the bourgeoisie (often claiming to represent the masses) struggled for the controls of the State among themselves.

This historical set of events is rarely understood by scholars from the North. The standard description of events is that, for a brief moment, there was the Popular Assembly which constituted the participation of the broad political spectrum of Bolivia. In actuality, the Popular Assembly was only a part, albeit a big part, of the constitutive deliberation that was going on at the time. Another large facet of what was constituting power struggles and influencing the decisions of Torres, consisted of the campesino confederations, assemblies, and congresses like the Sixth Congress of the CNTCB (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers) (Zavaleta; Hurtado).

Therefore, it would be erroneous to only focus on the Popular Assembly and its characteristics of being a soviet style assembly of the proletariat. It is true that the Assembly was constructed similar to a soviet and that labor held a great deal of power in the Torres government. However, the situation as a whole is more accurately described as a balance between the labor-led Popular Assembly, the Campesino and Katarista federations and assemblies, and the Military. Torres balanced all of this while trying to keep the fascists and the right at bay. Because of this, Zavaleta would label Torres as a Bonapartist, after Napoleon the Third who used a diplomacy-based balance of similar forces to consolidate his power in mid-19<sup>th</sup> century France (Zavaleta, *El Poder Dual*; Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*).

The Bonapartist position of Torres was intricately entwined with the Katarista political ascent. They did not always have the same objectives as the radical labor leaders who now had an unprecedented amount of say in Bolivian politics. At the same time, the Bolivian bourgeoisie, through the MNR and other parties, weighed in heavily on the anti-communist side of things, especially those who were allied with Victor Paz Estenssoro. These bourgeoisie elements often did not have the same objectives as the Kataristas. During this time, the Kataristas actually acted as centrists in navigating their own political ascent in this environment (Hurtado 50). Doing so put them in a favorable position in regards to Torres who was trying to balance this broad political spectrum. Hurtado declares that they were "...without a doubt, the most important federation..." (Hurtado 50).

The Kataristas had attained a high level of participation in national politics in a relatively short amount of time. This broad political role of the Kataristas enabled

them to align at a national level with, and even proliferate throughout the ranks of, the labor movement. Hurtado elaborates:

The Bolivian indigenous campesino movement that comprises the national majority, has in the seventies reincorporated itself back into the active struggle of the Bolivian labor and popular movement and its most important component for its wide base, at the level of organization and articulation of its political project, is the Tupaj Katari movement (Hurtado 219)(translation Kearney).

On August 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1971, Fausto delivered his manifesto to the Sixth Congress of the CNTCB (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers). (Hurtado 50). This was a threshold moment for Fausto. Unlike in his earlier political life, this time he spoke in front of a large deliberative body that included considerable QuechuaAymara representation, which had a stake in determining the balance of sovereign power.

It was also the apogee of Fausto's personal influence on the state. For Ramiro, there was no doubt that his father Fausto had a substantial influence on Torres (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews).<sup>96</sup> Fausto would later cite Torres as declaring

...the Bolivian Revolution, should it be Bolivian, will come from within us, will be guided by our people and give its fruits to the men of this land. Not any other country, not any other people, can tell us what we should do or where we should arrive. We cannot lose the character of the country and we cannot forget our pueblo. Bolivia is an Indian country, an Indian pueblo, an Indian Nation; here the Revolution must be an Indian Revolution!

Long live the Indian Revolution!

Long live Indian power! (*FFAA* 19).

Fausto's influence on the Torres regime, that is to say Fausto's influence on the political terrain and reality of the time, was much larger than history wants to

---

<sup>96</sup> Hilda and Fausto asserted the same (F. Reinaga, ...*FFAA*; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

remember.

Fausto was also a key figure in the formation of Katarismo. His writings, like *La Revolución India* offered a voice of consciousness to the Bolivian masses. As an iconic and widespread influence on Bolivian campesino movements, he inspired Kataristas for generations to come (Hurtado 32,47, 231; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Ramiro Reinaga Personal Interviews; Escárzaga; Lucero). Many of them were radicalized in Fausto's PIB (Bolivian Indian Party) and other organizations influenced by Fausto, "...and they had all read his works, which up through today are their source of inspiration" (Hurtado 230).

Reinaga did not just inspire action, but rather an alternative way of looking at knowledge and being in the world. The credit for the rise in consciousness should also be given to the multitudinous members of the various movements. However, the claims that outsiders actually manipulated this change of consciousness is denounced by Hurtado: "... it must be said that this indigenismo or Indianismo of the Indians was not a manipulation orchestrated from outside, as many of the adversaries of the movement claim" (Hurtado 231).

The CNTCB (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers) congress where Fausto read his manifesto is where Felipe Quispe Huanca would meet him. Quispe would also meet "...the Aymara leaders Raimundo Tambo,<sup>97</sup> Constantino Lima, and Jenaro Flores Santos" (Comunidad Indígena y Revolución" 200). Later, at the turn of the twenty first century, Quispe would become a predominant, effective,

---

<sup>97</sup> In 2013, Constantino Lima would state, "One of my best friends was Raimundo Tambo, and he was the most faithful militant" whose 1975 death tragically ended the life of a leader seen by many as a great hope for Katarismo.

and famous syndical leader who played a large part in the defeat and ouster of Neoliberal Bolivian President, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Quispe is a descendent of the Katari military commander Diego Quispe, with whom Andrés Túpac Amaru had coordinated. Felipe Quispe Huanca was labeled by the Banzer regime as a communist threat and was forced to go into hiding (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 200; Andrés Tupac Amaru 340-344).<sup>98</sup>

Hilda explains that, “in effect, Jenaro Flores was his [Fausto’s] follower. He learned Indianismo here [at the house in Killi Killi]. But when he went to the Congress of Potosi, where he was named Executive Secretary of the [CNTCB],” he (Flores) and the PIB leadership were arrested as a result of the Banzer coup. Fortunately Flores and others escaped. He fled to Peru and from there to Cuba, where Flores adopted a more classical communist stance, shying away from his earlier attachments to the empowerment of Indianismo (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

Fausto was not as lucky as Flores or Quispe. Still suffering from the crippling injuries doled out by Banzer's thugs, he was picked up by the regime in 1972 and thrown in jail. Hilda, as well as Ramiro's mother (Fausto's ex-wife), and others were imprisoned. While he was eventually able to pull enough strings for a release, his injuries and jailing are emblematic of the myriad mounting difficulties facing the aging Don Fausto Reinaga.

The oppressive tactics of the Banzer regime required that all of the opposition reformulate their strategies. By 1973 and the advent of the Tiwanaku Manifesto,

---

<sup>98</sup> Andrés, the Quechua from lower Peru communicated with Alférez Real Diego Quispe regarding military concerns, “...con este achaque no se me quedan soldados allá, sino que sin excepción vengán primero a una tan importante empresa que es para su muy alivio de ellos.” (Andrés Tupac Amaru 340-344)

...the articulation of two different ideological expressions within the movement began to define Katarista principles: the Indianista current that postulated the Indian as a subject, prioritized the ethnic aspect over the classist... [While] the classist [current] postulated the Campesino[the indigenous peasant] as the subject, combining the vision of class and ethnicity, utilizing the Campesino concept more, but specifically emphasizing their cultural character. They [the latter] were aided by progressive sectors of the Bolivian church (Escárzaga, “Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 197)(emphasis added).

The Tiwanaku Manifesto of the Kataristas stated a comprehensive array of demands that question standard practices, not just of Bolivia, but of Modern Western Democracies, developmentalism, and supposed 'conventional wisdom'. Interestingly enough, the die-hard Indianistas, even today, dismiss this document as being too Western (see eg. “A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”; Constantino Lima, Personal Interviews). Despite their critique, and although it may not have gone near as far as they would have liked, the document was groundbreaking in questioning Western hegemony. When addressing rural education, the Tiwanaku Manifesto first breaks down these conventional ways of thinking, showing their results for what they were.

We face two extremely serious problems in rural education. One is that of curriculum content and the other is the serious shortage of financial resources. ...the rural school system has never been based on our own cultural values; the curricula have been prepared by government officials and reflect ideas and methods imported from other countries. Rural education has been a new form (the most subtle) of domination and immobilization (“Tiwanaku Manifesto”)(translation Kjeld K. Lings).

Hurtado points out that this document and others “...demonstrate the level of education and politicization of the advanced stratum of the campesino leadership.” and that, “...the movement began to have its own dynamic and demonstrated an important

degree of social and political autonomy." He notes that the most lucid of these leaders never lost their connection with the campesinos (Hurtado 74)(translation Kearney).

The Tiwanaku Manifesto continues:

Rural teacher training is nothing but a brainwashing system for the future teachers in these areas. The education given bears no relation to every-day reality, both in terms of the things taught and the methods used by the teachers. It is not only the language which has nothing to do with our daily life but also the history, heroes, ideals and values conveyed ("Tiwanaku Manifesto").

These demands carry a similar sentiment as those of Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. In other words, this **is** critical pedagogy. A key tenant for Fausto, Indianismo, and Katarismo, is the advocacy of Andean culture. In the case of the Bolivian highlands, what this meant for political practice is not given near enough credit for the events of the 1970s. One example of the role Andean culture played in the efficacy of the campesino movement of the time can be demonstrated with the community organizational practice of Ayllu that was described in Chapter Three.

Hurtado explains that in large parts of the Altiplano,

...like in the province of Aroma or in the provinces of Oruru, where the presence of the hacienda was less and the Aymara community survived with more force, the influence of the MNR was more superficial. The Aymara have a relatively large degree of autonomy from the state. ...the Aymara communities had better organizational reserves to reemerge with (Hurtado 229)(translation Kearney).

He explains that these strongholds of highland organizational capacity were able to do so "...because they conserved the organizational structure of the Aymara community: the Ayllu.", being sure to point out that this is a pre-Inka practice that coordinated resistance throughout both Colonial and Republican times (Ibid.).

On the other hand, many campesino syndicates of the valleys like Cochabamba

had a different formational aspect to their resistance, as they were closer to a labor syndicate type of structure. Yet, they were still influenced by Katarismo and were not a force to be trifled with. "In 1974, with the blockades in Tolata, Epizana, and Melga, the valley[s] appeared as the new Vanguard of campesino struggles" (Hurtado 228)(translation Kearney).

The Cochabamba Valley was the site of one of Banzer's bloodiest massacres, which saw soldiers machine-gunning defenseless crowds in the town of Tolata as well as enacting ariel bombardment in what Escárzaga calls "...a cruel repression of the Indian mobilizations" ("Comunidad Indígena y Revolución" 197). Killing more than 80, it proved to be a terrible tactical mistake on the part of the regime. Hurtado points out that this action drove the largest wedge between the campesinos and the State since the early 1950s. He also implies that if the syndical organization had been utilizing a more Andean process, instead of traditional methods of the Left, the damage of the massacre could have been mitigated. "However," Hurtado points out, as far as the regimes goals were concerned,

...the repression didn't do anything but fortify the response of the campesino sectors who would question, each time with more vigor, the political servitude of the Military Peasant Pact (Hurtado 65,66)(translation Kearney).

In the waning days of the Banzer regime, Constantino Lima returned from exile and formed the MITKA, the Tupaj Katari Indian Movement, along with Luciano Tapia and Jaime Apaza (Hurtado 93). Fausto's son Ramiro was also involved. Escárzaga points out that Felipe Quispe was a part of this formation as well.

In 1975 [Quispe] would incorporate himself into the group which would later form the MITKA, invited by Jaime Apaza, who was a

proponent of armed struggle, and they had contact with the National Liberation Army(ELN)<sup>99</sup>. In 1977 along with Jaime Apaza, he would work in Indianista politics in the Aymara communities of the department of La Paz, from Radio San Gabriel. That same year, he participated in the redaction of the MITKA Manifesto... (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 200)(translation Kearney).

This faction represented the more radically Andean and Altiplano currents of Katarismo. While factionalism has its problematic aspects, the split did provide for a clearer forum for the radicals like Ramiro, Quispe, and others. That is to say, it would allow them to more freely enunciate their Indianista influences.

Escarzaga summarizes: “By 1978 the two approaches that had emerged were consolidated and expressed in two divergent political paths...” There was the MITKA, and on the other hand there was the MRTK(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari, or the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Katari) which would take a more moderate and electoral route(“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 198). The MITKA would distribute the MITKA Manifesto, or the Proclamation of the Tupac Katari Indian Movement, which declared:

...inspired by the moral values that we inherited from our ancient cultures, with their communal spirit... ...we declare that the atrocious massacre of Tolata shall not go unpunished; the noble blood of our brothers and sisters has not been shed in vain. Instead, it will turn the wheel of history...

Now the wolves are disguising themselves as lambs in order to continue their fascist policies, aided by U.S. imperialism. They try to cast a cloak of oblivion over the numerous political assassinations, massacres, and persecutions. Thousands of people live in exile ("Proclamation of the 'Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari, MITKA").

The document continues with a long list of serious grievances, and then articulates,

---

<sup>99</sup> The remnants of, and/or those inspired by, Che Guevara's earlier Guerrilla group in Bolivia.

...the political Constitution of the nation has been violated by means of the State Security Act... ...the Foreign Capital Investment Act, etcetera.

As a result of all this, the human rights of **citizens** have been trampled down, and the domination of U.S. capitalism and imperialism has become even more noticeable (Ibid.).

Across the spectrum of factions, Katarista organizational capacity and elevated political consciousness resulted in a strikingly effective praxis. For example, It was with the second Tiwanaku Manifesto, in 1977, that the Kataristas would publicly confront the Banzer regime. "They were the first national syndical organization to come out publicly against the Banzer regime, and in contrast to the other parties, their message was clear and convincing" (Hurtado 73)(translation Kearney).

This is especially profound when keeping the following in mind. In times of severe repressive-state-apparatus (RSA), organizations and people who normally stick by their convictions will often side instead with the most obvious antagonist to their causes: the State. The MNR was a prime example of this. Victor Paz Estenssoro, as well as many from the MNR leadership, ended up supporting Banzer right alongside the official fascist party, the FSB. If politics makes for strange bedfellows, then the *state of exception* makes for myriad of inexplicable political bedroom antics. By 1977 Jenaro Flores, as head of the centrist Katarista leadership, declared:

The FSB and MNR are official parties, actually co-governors, co-traitors, and co-national- sellouts; restorers of the patronal and latifundista system; for this, they are enemies of the campesinos and of the Bolivian people in general (Hurtado 73)(translation Kearney).

In 1977 along with going public, Hurtado points out that the MRTK and other Katarista leadership reinstated the CNTCB (National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers), which was, as we saw earlier in this chapter, a major player in the

Torres government. This was a major blow to Banzer, who had set up a puppet regime of government officials acting as syndical leaders. By reinstating the CNTCB, Katarista leadership declared the puppet leadership as null and moved to reinstate the authentic leadership that had been elected 19 days before the Banzer coup in 1971. Hurtado declares that reinstating the CNTCB in this way was a legalistic feat that delegitimized the spurious shadow syndicates that had been created as a form of social management by the Banzer regime (Hurtado 73).

Decades later Banzer was interviewed by future Bolivian president Carlos Mesa (2003-2005) during Mesa's previous capacity as a historian and television personality. When Mesa asked the ex-general why he stepped down from his dictatorial position, he declared, "Seven years is sufficient in order to satisfy one's self" (*Bolivia Siglo XX, Banzer Las Paradojas*)(translation Kearney). But, what really caused Banzer's decline? Was dictatorial satisfaction the true motivator behind his relinquishment of the State?

The MLA Authors imply that the Carter administration in the U.S. was the driving impetus for Banzer's departure (Skidmore et al. 179). When I asked Raúl Prada, who himself was an active part of the resistance to the dictatorships of the 1970s, about the role of the Carter administration, he replied, "...there is not an important role. That is to say, their role was discursive, detached, and external." He points out that while it is too much of a simplification to give credit to one set of actors for resistance to the dictatorships of the 1970s, the link between the Left and the Kataristas should be heavily emphasized (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney). For example, The Kataristas were involved in the nationwide hunger

strikes, which were also a major pressure on the Banzer dictatorship.

While not a Katarista, Bolivian C.H. Domitilia Chungara was a well-known feminist and labor organizer and was one of the key organizers in the hunger strikes. It is worthy of contemplating how political atmosphere shapes the lived experiences of political subjects. For example, the similarities between Chungara and Hilda Reinaga are uncanny: They both grew up at the Siglo XX mine at about the same time. They both began to attend radical meetings at an early age. They both lost their mothers at an early age, and they both had fathers who worked in the mine. However, Chungara's ideological trajectory, while often struggling for Campesinos, was mostly labor centric, and did not express Katarista or especially did not express Indianista sentiments. As Hilda would point out, the hunger strikes were only a partial factor in Banzer's departure, as the strikes occurred after the bulk of the major strategic resistance and the writing was already on the wall, "...the people were already fed up and it was clear they would support no more" (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). This is not meant to diminish the importance of the hunger strikes, but rather to enunciate the dependence of the Left on the Kataristas.

It is clear that whatever factors had caused the dictator's departure from the Palacio Quemado, they had little to do with Banzer's personal satisfaction or whatever altruistic intentions that the Carter administration may have had. In short, the real factors were largely endogenous to Bolivia, of which the biggest contingent was the efficacy of Katarista praxis driven by demands for and an enactment of critical pedagogy.

Inevitably, the Kataristas would still have to utilize some classic Leftist

political tactics like alliances with parties antagonistic to their cause. Hurtado explains why such pragmatic alliances were necessary. He points out that especially from 1977 onward, the Campesino movement took an even more active role in resistance, including joining in the struggle with other popular movements against the common enemy: the State.

Outside of electoral politics, the position of confrontation towards the state could be made from an independent stance, "but, in the elections they had to confront an enemy whose military and finance apparatus was powerful and this required political alliances that made possible better conditions for the confrontation" (Hurtado 225)(translation Kearney). When Banzer reached his supposed moment of self satisfaction he called for elections. The UDP, or Democratic Popular Union, was an alliance of parties and organizations spearheaded by the leftist MIR (Revolutionary Leftist Movement). It was comprised of the labor and popular sectors along with the campesino movement and the bourgeoisie. Electorally, the UDP was the only possibility for a unified front against the regime's candidate, Juan Pereda Asbún. At the time however, Prada disagreed with this unified front.

"In those days I was the *coordinador* of CIPCA in Coripata," Prada would recall. He was also at one time an advisor to Flores, and was not in agreement with Jenaro Flores' about the alliance with the UDP. "I was critical of the MNR and the Left. In those days, I didn't agree because of my radical position. ...[Flores] was not in agreement with [me]. I got along very well with [the Kataristas] but they... took a pragmatic position." Now, in retrospect, Prada is much more amicable to the position Flores took, acknowledging the necessity for their political pragmatism (Raúl Prada,

Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

In the end, the alliance didn't matter, even when the UDP won the election. Asbún refused to accept the results and opted for an armed solution. This sparked a string of military takeovers, and failed discourses about 'returning' to democracy. These rapid government turnovers would plague the Bolivian State and its political subjects until the early 1980s.

Perhaps the UDP alliance was also too much for Fausto's strict principles? The aspirations of the MIR and the rest of the Left were quite contradictory even to many Katarista principles, let alone those of the Indianistas. As we will see in the next chapter, it is clear from much of Fausto's writing that he thought of these kinds of alliances as only strengthening the control of the elite and the bourgeoisie over the Bolivian masses. Fausto was a strict father. His lessons for Ramiro were decisive and often had a didactic sense of uncompromising principle (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews). Did this same rigorous attitude also distance him from the Kataristas and Indianistas, for whom he had been such an immense influence?

## **Chapter Nine**

### **Bolivian Judas**

#### **The Revolution of the Armed Forces**

By 1980, Fausto did not seem to share the opinion of Hurtado that Katarismo in its organizational forms was flourishing, or was even a good thing. Fausto walked the radical side of Indianismo. However, Fausto even seemed to be distancing himself from the most radical of Indianistas. At least that is the surface perception of the message in a small green book that he published during the reign of, and written in a voice directed towards, the armed forces of the General Luis García Meza Tejada dictatorship (1980-1981).

As mentioned earlier, after the fall of Banzer there were several attempts at both failed dictatorship and extra-failed democracy, which were spearheaded by the elites and the bourgeoisie. The García Meza dictatorship followed yet another attempted "transition to democracy" under the leadership of President Lidia Gueiler Tejada. Bolivia's first woman president, Gueiler was appointed constitutionally by the Senate and was expected to arrange for public elections. She was also General Meza's cousin. How it happened, that one cousin was overthrown by the other with a violent military coup, is a complicated matter. Meza promptly enacted a fiercely repressive state apparatus (RSA).

The little green book is arguably the most cryptic and confusing of Fausto's writings. In March of 1981 Ediciones Comunidad Amáutica Mundial (i.e. Fausto

himself) published 3000 copies of this small, thin, army-green book, with a main text body of only 75 pages, bearing Fausto's name as author. It was titled, *Bolivia y la Revolución de las Fuerzas Armadas (Bolivia and the Revolution of the Armed Forces*, here forward referred to as ...*FFAA*). This book was published eight long months into the Meza regime; a regime where political dissidence was punished with death, torture, disappearance, prison, or exile.

The book is justifiably critiqued. The 'Ideology' and 'Program' listed in the last chapter, although parallel to his other writings at the time, has odd variances. His assertions include discussion and use of violence that are altered from how he normally used them in most of his work. These uses are confusing and easily critiqued or condemned depending on how one interprets the context. It is my opinion that the context is difficult to know, considering the cryptic nature of the book. The reasons for this are understudied and deserve more attention than that which is given here. While it is clear that the book should not be considered at face value, this chapter is not an apology for the book. If one more opinion could be added, I would say it was an extremely poor choice of words on Fausto's part. It was seventy-five pages full of poorly chosen words, which as we will see, blew up in his face.

In short, I do not intend to propose a full defense of ...*FFAA* here. However, I do propose an argument about the characterization of Fausto's s 'support' for García Meza. I also assert that due to the context discussed in this chapter, the weight of this one particular book, written late into the Meza regime, should not be overemphasized, in regards to the macro analysis of Fausto's writing.

The Meza coup occurred in a situation deeply affected by a proliferation of

Operation Condor friendly dictatorships in the region. Prada asserts that the Brazilian and Argentine dictatorships meddled in Bolivian affairs in support of the Meza coup, detailing the

...very obvious conspiracy against the UDP... What is more, it was the most conservative military sectors that were most involved in Operation Condor. Because in reality those who participated directly in the coup d'etat were the Argentine military. The Argentine Military, [elements of which] arrived here, are those who acted... I saw them. Not only this, but they had tortured people. ¡Claro! ...The relation; Banzer, Operation Condor, the Dirty War in Argentina, the death of Torres, these are links that have already been established. ...It was officers of the armed forces of Argentina, which kidnapped Torres. They picked him up and they killed him (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews) (translation Kearney).

He points out that similar elements probably murdered the popular Bolivian socialist Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz. García Meza blames the death of Quiroga on Banzer (Molina Céspedes, *Testimonio* 49).

“Banzer was awful!” reflects Hilda. She asserts that Banzer was far worse than García Meza (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). She has a good argument, since Banzer was also actively part of the oppression that occurred during García Meza, who also agrees that Banzer was worse. Banzer was not the only notoriously brutal participant. García Meza supports Prada's claims about the participation of the armed forces of Argentina (Molina Céspedes, *Testimonio* 49). Twenty years later, in an interview by Tomás Molina Céspedes, he would euphemistically referred to his bloody coup as a 'change within the national policy'. He states that

The plan to make change within the national policy was born in the Commando School and Military Command of Cochabamba just after war-games with Argentine officials (*Testimonio* 43,49)(translation Kearney).

This was the conjuncture of circumstances that existed when Fausto published *...FFAA*. In this uncharacteristic book, Fausto had no love for organized labor and railed against Bolivian communism in general. He also condemns specific individuals and institutions like communist labor leader Juan Lechín and the COB (Reinaga, *...FFAA* 88,89). Lechín is still seen by many sectors of Bolivia's labor movement as iconic hero, but many hate him as well. While Lechín and Fausto had known each other for a long time, Hilda describes the interaction between them as, “a cordial friendship between thorns.” Torres didn't trust Lechín, or at least his capacity to control the COB. Hilda also asserts that when Lechín asked Torres for arms in defense of the soon to coup fascists, Torres responded, “You want weapons to defend me, or to commit a coup against me?” (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews) (translation Kearney). Lechín was also paternalistic in a degrading way towards Indians during meetings and conferences (Hurtado 85-86; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). This was unacceptable activity as far as Fausto was concerned. In the footnotes of *...FFAA* Fausto characterizes Lechín as enriching himself while leaving the COB with scraps, amongst other accusations (*...FFAA* 89).

However, in the sixth congress of the COB, the Kataristas effectively handed power back to Juan Lechín. While this seems counterintuitive, Hurtado speculates that this move could have been an act of reciprocity for Lechín's earlier act of having assisted the entrance of the Kataristas into the COB (Hurtado 214,215).

This entrance into the COB is perhaps why Hurtado views Katarismo of this time as quite dynamic and active. During the aftershocks of the García Meza coup, Katarismo, with Jenaro Flores at the reins, took over the high leadership of the COB in

its clandestine form (Hurtado 202-204). Flores, the Kataristas, and the COB had to go underground during the Meza regime, which had no love for either the COB or Flores. Meza later shared his thoughts about Flores:

Those Bolivians like one Jenaro Flores or like others that have sold out to the COB, **already should not exist** (Hurtado 205)(translation Kearney)(emphasis added).

During the Meza regime, Jenaro Flores was arguably the most important person in Katarismo (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews; Hurtado). The regime later shot Flores, leaving him paralyzed to live out the rest of his life in a wheelchair. The ardent anti-communist stance of both the regime and the U.S. made it easy to vilify the syndical structure and communist stance of the COB. The regime saw the COB as a staunch enemy. The same anti-communist atmosphere is also what made Fausto's book so palatable to regime members. Fausto, by this time, was finished with the elites, the bourgeoisie, and mestizos, whether they be capitalist, Christian, or communist.

So then, what was going on with this little green army book that seemingly defended one of the most repressive military governments in Bolivian history?

Fausto's personal thoughts on the subject are hard to know. At the time, there were undeniably tensions between Ramiro and Fausto, between Indianismo and Katarismo, and between Katarismo and Fausto. However, there were undeniable tensions in all parts of Bolivian society at the time. Some of the biggest tensions and contradictions existed directly within the García Meza regime and its complicated interconnections with vast swaths of the political spectrum. The ex-dictator would assert that those who actually supported his regime included a large list of historical

actors,

Almost all of them. Now they [claim that they] don't know me, beginning with Franz Ondarza and Guillermo Furtún who were intermediaries for Banzer.

...Banzer enabled the coup of 80 out of desperation to stop the legal judgements [for human rights abuses during his dictatorship] and to be President yet again, objectives that he accomplished.

[President Lidia]... Gueiler practically begged us to enact the coup. She said, 'I am going to give you the government, just give me until the elections.' Everything that Mrs. Gueiler said afterwards is a lie, because she, more than anyone, was one of the enablers who produced the process of 80. This is because she was a kind of sandwich between that which Paz Estenssoro would say on one hand, and what Siles Zuazo would say on the other. ...she was conspiring with us, the same as Ardaya... She was informed of everything that was going on...

...Dr. Paz Estenssoro... told us...'Look, I'm a democrat, I always have been... but why shouldn't I give you the green light, and the support of my party, so that you can begin to rule the country which needs a heavy hand.'

...Within this situation, we were assisted by the ADN and the MNR, by both parties, and that [also] includes those on the left. For example, the famous Loyola Guzmán was who brought us information from all of the Leftist sectors (Molina Céspedes, *Testimonio* 23-24,74,25,53-54,24)(translation Kearney).

It is difficult to know how much of this collaboration he is telling the truth about, but it is clear that the García Meza regime was not solely the unilateral single-minded narco-state that it is billed as. While it **was** heavily focussed on narcotics production, it was also rife with complicated interconnections to the rest of the political spectrum. For example, ex DEA undercover agent Michael Levine asserts that the CIA enabled the coup and even hindered a DEA investigation, of narcotraffickers he had arrested, in order to support the regime (Levine, *The Big White Lie*). More people and groups than care to admit 'supported' the regime during this difficult time that is considered to be Bolivia's most repressive state apparatus (RSA). Therefore, it is hard to say which public statements and actions by anyone were restricted, edited, encoded, coerced,

initiated from fear, and/or with intentions of personal agendas.

...*FFAA*, if skimmed, can certainly appear to be a defense of the Garcia Meza regime. For example, Juan Manuel Poma Laura, an ardent Marxist, demonstrates such a face value reading. He does so in his *Fausto Reynaga o La Frustración del Programa Indio* (*Fausto Reinaga or the Frustration of the Indian Program*) which was published in El Alto, the high plains city surrounding La Paz. When Poma Laura discusses this subject, it is with a focussed frustration towards Fausto for 'supporting' Meza.

This position of support does indeed appear to be a very odd position for Fausto Reinaga, the great champion of Indian liberation. With a more careful reading, the perplexing complexity of ...*FFAA* expands, but also illuminates clues about Fausto's intentions. It is one of his shortest books. One section of the endnotes seems to have less to do with the annotated selection of text and more to do with the dispute between Ramiro Reinaga and the CISA.<sup>100</sup> In the correspondence, Ramiro wrote disparaging commentary about Constantino Lima and his dealings with the international bourgeoisie.<sup>101</sup>

These factors could have contributed to Fausto's distancing himself from even the most radical of his own Indianista allies. It is also clear that Katarismo and Indianismo had their separate trajectories. While Fausto influenced the many factions of Katarismo, he did not consider himself to be a Katarista (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). Prada comments that it is no surprise that Fausto would have problems

---

<sup>100</sup> CISA - a group that would come to publish later editions of Ramiro's most well known book.

<sup>101</sup> Ramiro and the CISA's correspondence appears in the back of Fausto's (...*FFAA* 92).

with the way that Katarismo went because the mainstream Kataristas were highly influenced by the left and communist thought (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews). They were also highly influenced by Christianity, the monistic foundation that bridges the *ban* in the Western justification of state control over sovereignty and use of the state of exception: the iron norm.

Wild and fanciful speculation are incited by the book ...*FFAA*. For example, it begs the questions, 'what is the possibility that he was coerced to write it? Perhaps somebody else wrote it? Perhaps this book is the visual remains of the crossfire of several of Ramiro and Fausto's political struggles, with others or with each-other?' While any one of these scenarios would not be out of the realm of possibility, the evidence does not directly support these speculations.

The purpose of stating such speculations is solely to demonstrate the peculiar nature of the text. It is certainly cryptic and mysterious, and leads to such wild speculations. However, rather than dismissing the text as an odd outlier, it would be preferable to illustrate the broader question of: 'Why did Fausto write his little green army book?'

Fausto was certainly frustrated with the attempted, but failed and disastrously unstable, process of democratization with the likes of Walter Guevara, Lidia Gueiler, Hernán Siles Zuazo, etc. at the helm. We know that Fausto had shown dislike for Guevara, Siles Zuazo, Estenssoro, and their disconcerting attachments to the bourgeoisie and the elites, as far back as the 1940s (*Paz Estenssoro*). Perhaps Fausto suspected that these agents of the bourgeoisie would show more of the same utilization and disregard for all things Indian, just as they always had, and just as they would do

years later, in all of Estenssoro's and Siles Zuazo's presidencies.

It is safe to say that Fausto did not hold the same hope for a Bolivian transition to democracy that the more traditional left held. His misgivings were not unfounded. No Bolivian president would take the presidential palace with more than 33% of the electorate for another quarter of a century. There would not be fair voter registration for almost the same amount of time. Furthermore, the 'return to democracy' would have disastrous economic effects for Bolivian miners and campesinos, a large majority who were QuechuaAymara. These cuts were part of social spending austerity programs (known as Structural Adjustment Programs or SAPs) that were demanded through loan conditionalities by the international banks financing the 'democratic' State of the 80s and 90s. This 'return of democracy' would accompany the golden age of neoliberalism in Bolivia, which was disastrous for the majority (Farthing and Kohl).

For Fausto, just like for Antonio Gramsci, the reality of the State was always there. How to take control of it or manipulate it, depended on the context of each moment that they were writing about it. At this conjuncture, Fausto was suspicious of the interests behind supposed *democratic* efforts, but also feared a tactical paradox in armed struggle. The most prevalent Katarista and Indianista strains advocated exactly those two paths: electoral efforts or armed struggle. During Garcia Meza, many resistance leaders and groups advocated armed resistance. This was going on in other countries as well. Fausto, when approached by the Peruvian Shining Path, rejected their call for armed insurrection and warned them that their efforts would result in a genocidal slaughter of Indians, which is what would later occur (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). Fausto instead meant *revolution* in a grander manner. As

Escárzaga explains, even as early as *La Revolución India*, Fausto was advocating something far more comprehensive than armed insurrection.

His program is radical, but does not rest fundamentally in armed struggle, which he considered would be, in the short run, a genocide of the Indian population, and for that, he didn't convoke or promote an uprising or an Indian Insurrection. On the contrary, he projected for the short run, the possibility of establishing a pact with the military that reached the presidency of the country and that assumed the promise of fulfilling Indian demands. This idea was probably founded in the experience of the government of Gualberto Villaruel and in the verification of the weakness of the indigenous organizations to reach, in the present conditions, the political autonomy that Reinaga advocated (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 196)(translation Kearney).

She suggests that this is why, “...Reinaga was close to the *golpista* presidents like Ovando and Torres...” and this “...would be an argument of disqualification of Reinaga by the militants of the parties on the Left...”(Ibid.).<sup>102</sup> It is still today an argument for disqualification of Reinaga among intellectuals, not the least of whom are Katarista intellectuals (“A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”).

At the time of the first printing of *...FFAA*, Meza held tight control of state forces. One of the disjointed aspects of the book consists of an open letter signed by dozens of European intellectuals. This letter, which appears in the introduction, is asking for the return of 14,000 of Fausto's books that were confiscated from his personal library by a previous dictatorship. Fausto was looking for compensation.

How are we to think about all of these oddities? Perhaps they can be clarified to a degree. On page 57 of *...FFAA*, Fausto vaguely accuses more than half a dozen

---

<sup>102</sup> Although it must be pointed out, in an anecdote of bitter irony, that by the end of the 1970s, Fausto was harshly criticizing his former student Alfredo Ovando Candía as an impostor with little regard for Indian lives (*Como Viviremos* 62; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). It should also be mentioned, that Fausto's critique of Candía had begun as early as 1960 for Candía's having attended, supported, and written in support of anticommunist conferences (*Sentimiento Mesianico* 190).

organizations, many of them Katarista, of being communist and Christian traps for the

...Indian multitudes; burying forever the carnivalesque comedy of: dressing up in the poncho and lluchu, receiving the staff of power and claiming oneself 'Leader of the Campesinos', to sign the Military Peasant Pact, the same as did every president from 1953 to 1980 (...*FFAA* 57)(translation Kearney).

The accused include none less than the MITKA, the MINK'A, the MRTK, and the CISA. All Katarista and/or Indianista organizations, all struggling for liberation of the same people Fausto wished liberation for. The ranks of these organizations were filled with people influenced by Fausto.

Perhaps Fausto's uncharacteristic frustration, a frustration with the very institutions that he had inspired in a foundational way, had to do with the fact that most of the Katarista factions would have to use pragmatic political alliances whether it be with the Walter Guevara transitional government, with the COB, with the UDP, or with others. Fausto was certainly against this.

However, by making this accusation, he is being characteristically sage. To begin with, the passage is written like a riddle. This riddle is the first clue that the book is a metaphorical attempt to create fissures in the Euro-colonial constructions of the military, while at the same time avoiding death, torture, imprisonment, etc.

The presidents who dressed up like campesinos were no doubt viewed as carnivalesque pageantry in reality, not because of the outfits, but rather because non-Indian presidents were using them for political manipulation. Yet, Fausto viewed cultural practices as a matter of ancestral importance. What is more, in the syntax of the passage, it sounds like the organizations specifically are trying to be the presidents. It should be mentioned that several of the organizations that he was accusing had fully

broken with the Military Peasant Pact, and would indeed run their own presidential candidates before and after García Meza.

In most of Fausto's works of this period, he is no longer writing for the ivory tower of academia, no longer seeking to engage the political classes, nor is he writing to the dearth of Bolivian intellectualism to which he had previously hoped to augment. Instead, he was speaking to oppressed QuechuaAymara Bolivians. In ...*FFAA*, Fausto is speaking in a voice that is directed to the indigenous members of the armed forces. He is inviting them, almost teasing them, to join the 'Indian Revolution' which he is once again referring to with multiple meanings.

These multiple entendres are a facet of Fausto's metaphorical aesthetic at its height. Yet, due to the aesthetic's ambiguity, it is easy to misunderstand. It was a useful, and perhaps life saving, tactic. However, in retrospect, the aesthetic created as much debility as it did illumination. Due to the passage of time, Reading ...*FFAA* now in the present day removes the reader from the horror, chaos, and the fear-based state of exception, which now must all be imagined. These days, the city of La Paz lives up to its name, 'The Peace', much more than it did in the days of García Meza and the terror that accompanied his regime. So, while reading it now it seems ever so ambiguous, Fausto's aesthetic was at the time an illuminating attempt at utilizing language to engage a deadly situation.

This facet of Fausto's aesthetic limits the scope of who receives his message, as well as how it is received. To understand this word puzzle, it is critical to understand that Bolivia has compulsory military service and therefore, many members of the armed forces **were** his normal audience. This was in combination with the undeniable

fact that due to its creation through such means, the military was also the mechanism of the state of exception. Tension and contradiction were inevitable. Fausto repetitively refers to the 'revolution of the armed forces of 1980', i.e. the García Meza Coup. So, here are the clues for the missing pieces of Fausto's word puzzle: It is clear that he is calling the soldiers revolutionaries. It is not completely clear what chronological tense he is using. However, it is strongly inferred that he is referring to the present soldiers **about a future time**.

Echoing shades of Nietzsche, as was characteristic of much of his writing, Fausto calls for a revolutionary Bolivian hero to save Bolivia from Socratic thought. However, Fausto's calls cast a different tone and tune off of the mountain canyons and ridges of La Paz than those of Nietzsche. As Hilda put it, Fausto's call for the reader to take up the role of protagonist is “completely different” than Nietzsche's *Übermensch* (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interview). What he is calling for is the conscience of the reader to break free from the hegemonic conformity to, of, and with the state of exception and its inevitably violent outcomes. Fausto demands that soldiers recognize the reality around them and that, "the Revolutionary thought of the Armed Forces cannot be any other thought besides Amautic thought" (...*FFAA* 71)(translation Kearney).

What is Amautic thought? Fausto would discuss concepts of Indian thought (Pensamiento Indio), Amautic thought (Pensamiento Amautico), and Cosmic thought (Pensamiento Cósmico). For Fausto, these concepts were infinitely interrelated and in his books they were all iterations of the pantheistic foundation, which was present since *Mitayos y Yanaconas*. Fausto viewed our observed cosmic and natural reality as

a guideline for ethics. Therefore, the *iron norm's* rejection of man's place in nature was for Fausto a rejection of those very cosmos and nature which Indian/Amautic/Cosmic thought was to observe. These concepts will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten, where it will become clearer why Amautic thought is antithetical to the *iron norm* and the actions of the García Meza.

Even Fausto's most incendiary writing did not advocate the kinds of human rights abuses committed by the regime. Fausto's hope for Amautic thought filling the ranks of the military must be a futuristic hope, because there was nothing that matched his writings on Amautic thought which could have justified the regimes actions at the time. The regime committed abuses that required some kind of dissociative tendencies, were detached from any observation of lived reality, and were the norm for the García Meza regime.

A key insight to where Fausto stands, however, comes from another theme from the book, one that is much more literal, comprehensible, and obvious. As we saw in Chapter Three, in the 1940s, Fausto had participated in the Villaroel government. His book, *Paz Estenssoro* of the same decade, demonstrated his respect for the progressive minded leader who was so brutally hanged (*Paz Estenssoro*).

In the 1981 ...*FFAA*, Fausto would reprint a small section of another book, his 1956 *Franz Tamayo y la Revolución Boliviana*. The reprinted segment, titled *Prayer for Villaroel*, is unchanged from its 1956 version. It is a sincere homage to Villaroel, abundant with flowing praise for the hanged president and critique of the 'imbeciles' in the MNR who disgraced his legacy (*Franz Tamayo* 63-64; ...*FFAA* 42- 43).

In the newer 1981 book, and twenty pages later, Fausto would declare,

The destiny of the Armed Forces is crucial!  
 If there is no treason to the revolution, then there will be no hanging post of Villarroel for the Armed Forces. But if the Armed Forces do not make the Revolution, the Revolution Amáutica, then communism will sing victory over the dead body of Bolivia (...*FFAA* 65).

This was obviously referencing the fact that, as mentioned in Chapter Three, there were communist elements, which conspired with the elite to hang Villarroel.

As previously mentioned, Fausto had been condemning communism, capitalism, Christianity, and Western thought in general. Yet, for García Meza to adhere to Fausto's ultimatum, and avoid being brutally hanged, he would have to complete the Amautic Revolution. After reading Chapter Ten, we can all debate intellectually about what exactly is the Amautic Revolution. However, nobody is going to debate that Amautic thought, Fausto, or the Kataristas and the mobilized campesino movement, advocated anything close to resembling the activities of García Meza and his dissociative narco-trafficking state of exception.

Without question, ...*FFAA* is a cryptic warning and an open threat to the Meza regime:

Revolution, or the hanging post of Villarroel!  
 To be or not to be!" (Ibid.)

Let us not forget that in the same book, Fausto would declare that Torres, who Nixon and Kissinger had considered such a dangerous threat, was "...the President of the Republic ... who launched the grandest Indian proclamation of America" (...*FFAA* 40). We should revisit Fausto's earlier citation of Torres,

Bolivia is an Indian country... here the Revolution must be an Indian Revolution!

Long live the Indian Revolution!

Long live Indian power!

Taking into consideration all of the factors presented throughout this chapter, I am compelled to conclude that Fausto did not write this book 'in support' of the García Meza dictatorship as his detractors so dismissively claim. The book is instead a representation of the multifarious and tragically brutal trajectory of events that Fausto and Bolivians were experiencing and living at the time. Fausto was trying to navigate un-passably stormy waters in a sea of violent political chaos.

We will never know what Fausto would have said today in retrospect about the book. We cannot know exactly what he was thinking when he wrote it. What we do know is that he was speaking more to the soldiers themselves than to the regime. We also know that the book outright threatens Meza, and even the rest of the armed forces, with hanging, which is certainly not a gesture of support. We know that the book demonstrates the same admiration for Torres and Villaroel that he had for them in the past. These were not figures embraced by the foundations of the regime: conservative Bolivia, the Argentine military, the CIA, and Operation Condor.

What we also know, are Hilda Reinaga's thoughts on the subject:

They say that he had supported García Meza with a book... But it wasn't a support for García Meza. No.

From 1962 until 1980 when García Meza happened, almost twenty years had passed. And Fausto viewed, with a lot of bitterness, that the leaders who had heard him talk didn't serve anything except for their own personal appetites. So then he thought – and as when he went to the conferences of the State, he saw the young officials, and he saw the troops... he always saw that the troops were Indians and the officials whites, not only their skin, but also their thought – and so then he said, 'the armed Indian was **there**, but without their own thought.'<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> In a 1980 response to the abuses of the regime, Jenaro Flores and Simón Quispe would distribute a proclamation calling for the nonviolence of Aymara/Quechua in the military. They would implore upon parents of soldiers to make sure their children did the right thing and not fire upon innocents when ordered by military leaders. The proclamation resolved to, "Order our children who are in the

So then, when García Meza assumed power, García Meza had read – had some influence from – Reinaga's books, but they never spoke one word to each other. Never. ...Many visitors arrived here [in this house]... There was a Colonel, Rico Toro.<sup>104</sup> And Rico Toro must have influenced García Meza maybe (or who had written the speeches I don't know), but the issue is that when he took the presidency, he repeated one phrase of Reinaga, '...El hombre es que debe ser.' [Man is what he should be] something like that.

And [along those same lines, during] the first months of the government of García Meza, the United States didn't recognize it. Because, every government that arrived, or each coup that had occurred, the United States had recognized. But they didn't recognize it. So then García Meza, still influenced in the first few months by Reinaga's books I imagine, went to the countryside and preached to the Indians. He would say to them,

“Why do we need the United States to recognize us? We have our potato, our Chuñu<sup>105</sup>, we make our own food. And as for clothes, we have our women who make them from llama wool. What do we need the United States for?”

So then, Reinaga said, “It could be that this one will take up Amautic thought, and perhaps actually lift the pueblo to its liberation.” For this he had to write this book, but extra fast (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

The story about García Meza talking about chuñu, is used to characterize Fausto as having sold out to Garcia Meza for because of his comments about chuñu (“A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”). Was Fausto a sellout? Hilda strongly rejects this notion. The book

---

military never to shoot against their parents, campesino brothers, miners, and workers" (Hurtado 205)(translation Kearney). Bolivia has a long history of Indians being used as cannon fodder, and being used to kill more Indians. In this we can see that the proclamation was not simply a political stunt or a slogan, but rather, once again, an active and necessary praxis built on critical pedagogy. It is also a paralell objective to what Fausto is trying to do in this citation.

<sup>104</sup> Faustino Rico Toro, was at that time the head of Bolivian Army intelligence. Later, during the George H.W. Bush administration in the U.S., he would be in charge of UMOPAR - an anti-drug police with close to one thousand members. However, he would resign during a scandal alleging his participation in the narcotics trafficking activities of the García Meza regime's state run cocaine industry (Painter).

<sup>105</sup> **Chuñu** – A freeze dried potato (a technology developed in the Andes thousands of years ago).

...wasn't in support of García Meza, but rather, [in defense of] his own words: Fausto's own words, Fausto's own thought.

There was this on one hand, and on the other, he had to change the mentality of the young officials who were commanding this multitude of Indians. They abused them and whatever else, but they taught them how to use arms. So then, this was the reason for this book's contents.

It isn't like he sold out to García Meza. Nor is there, – *Bueno*, if he had sold out he would have occupied a position in the palace of the government, something they didn't put [on the table] – nor did he know García Meza” (Ibid.).

When I asked Hilda if Fausto accepted any money from García Meza she answered a resolute “No.” Hilda's assertion is congruent with what others have declared: no, there hadn't been some kind of money in exchange for collaboration with or support of the dictatorship or to pay Fausto to say certain things.

However, Fausto did receive money from the Bolivian Government during the García Meza regime. He would finally get compensation for the sequestered books mentioned earlier. Hilda explains that Rico Toro, at the urging of Fernando Bautista, (both who knew Fausto), had obtained a signature from Meza. Yet if money was given to Fausto due to García Meza's signature, then how can the previous paragraph be correct? The following paragraphs will explain.

The document Meza signed was a resolution that had been circulating long before the Meza coup. It had previously arrived on the desk of at least one other president, Lidia Gueiler, but without receiving a signature (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). The request had also been made in letters by Fausto and English sociologist Patrick Knight, addressed to Banzer himself, as early as 1972 (*El Pensamiento Amautico* 152-155). The order demanded the repayment of Fausto's books, but required a presidential signature in order to get it.

...Fernando Bautista called Don Fausto on the telephone and told him, “Hermano, they have signed the resolution, they are going to pay you. But not all of it” (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

Fausto didn't believe they were going to pay him, but it was true. He was paid the partial payment. “But it wasn't because García Meza was showing appreciation, or anything of the sort. It was an administrative and normal thing” (Ibid.). This was not the act of a sellout, but rather the completion of a long and frustrated bureaucratic process, which unfortunately came to fruition at the most inopportune time. It would be unfair and unjust not to recognize that, by accepting the compensation, Fausto finally received some justice for the very painful loss of his library, the epicenter of his life's work.

There are other aspects of this complicated situation that also made Fausto's position seem ambiguous. Hilda continued:

It is true that there had been rogues within the government of García Meza. Just like in all the governments, the rogues are not lacking, and so there had been a pair of rogues: two brothers who said they were writers who utilized the discourse of Reinaga for some pamphlets of support that they signed, but put in Reinaga's thought. For this they say that Reinaga had supported García Meza.

No. The intention of Reinaga: he looked for the openings to enter with his thought so that things would change. This was his proposition (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

One thing is certain. Fausto's complicated, if not cryptic, declarations and position existed **before** the García Meza regime existed. This is a key piece of information that is rarely discussed, if ever. Thirteen months before writing ...*FFAA*, and four months before the García Meza coup, Fausto had published the book *¿Como*

*Viveremos? (How Will We Live?)*.<sup>106</sup> One key element discussed by the book involves the complexities of living in a military-run country when the conscripts are a majority Indians. Fausto published *¿Como Viveremos?* during the farcical 'democratic transition' of President Lidia Gueiler Tejada. Gueiler's government was rife with the same familiar colonial oppression of the Indigenous masses that the bourgeoisie had always been so quick to apply.

In response to the many failed armed struggles from without, in response to the tragicomedy that was the bourgeois 'democratic transition', and in response to the precarious chaos that swirled through the present political atmosphere like heavy diesel exhaust, Fausto tried to show that the Military Peasant Pact was far more entrenched and far more complicated than the political demagoguery touting an 'either or' solution had claimed. He demanded that the CNTCB,

...should be against the Military Peasant Pact initiated in Tarabuco; but at the same time has the responsibility of studying and resolving the problem of the **Indian in uniform**, the problem of the Indian conscript who fills the barracks of Bolivia, the problem of the campesino conscript who is the yeast, the troops, of the Armed Forces of the Republic (*Como Viviremos* 63-64)(translation Kearney).

For Fausto, armed resistance and revolution was just as impractical as it was dangerous, as had been proven again and again for two decades. He continued with the only kind of pragmatism that had actually worked in the long history of the Bolivian Republic. He continued with a pragmatism that had been the constituting power of Belzu's potent multitudinous forces, had been the constituting power of the defeat delivered by Willka for Pando's benefit, the constituting power of Villaroel's

---

<sup>106</sup> This book was also published under the titles *Que Hacer? (What To Do?)* and *Reinagismo*.

attempt at recognizing the Bolivian indigenous reality, and the constituting power of Torres and his Katarista alliance. Fausto would ask,

How can power be captured, how can power be conquered without the army[?] The Indian in uniform who fills the barracks must make the Bolivian Army an INDIAN ARMY; he must INDIANIZE the Bolivian Army. The Bolivian Army must be an Indian Army. The Armed Forces, **in the face of the present reality that the country lives**, has on the one hand, the imperative responsibility to Indianize itself and embrace itself in fraternal unity with the Indian in uniform. On the other hand, it has the imperative responsibility to share the means of the governance of the nation with the Indian. To do the contrary is to foment the atomization of the Indian family, is to give free reign to the work of the drawing-and-quartering of the Indian pueblo and enter it into the hands of the COB which utilizes the Indian worse than Barrientos. The COB will pit Indian against Indian. It already has. It has formed an 'Independent Campesino Federation' that is pitted against the CNTCB. ...[It] is the armed Cain of the COB, which will be positioned against the CNTCB. The COB and mestizo communism is preparing war between this 'Independent Federation' and the CNTCB.

The Congress of Potosi, in order to avoid this war between Indians, must make the INDIAN-MILITARY UNITY.

As a consequence, the Armed Forces and the CNTCB, for the intransigent defense of the Revolution, should endorse a TREATY OF MILITARY-INDIAN UNITY with the following conditions: a) The armed Forces and the Bolivian Indian will build one singular anti-imperialist and anti-communist political force; b) The Indian and the Armed Forces will share the mechanisms of the Government...; and c) With the Indianization of the Armed Forces, Indians and Military officers will have the only power: Indian Power!! (*Como Viviremos* 63-64)(translation Kearney)(bold emphasis added; capitalization sic).

It is important to understand that in Bolivia the army has played a profound role in educating, uniformizing, and turning indigenous political subjects into Western citizens. Military conscripts tend to come from the most disadvantaged sectors of society (Gill, "Creating Citizens"). This is still the case with the Morales/Linera/MAS government, which has focused enormous discursive attention towards reforming, or even 'de-colonizing' the military (the results of which are not discussed in this thesis).

The chronology of when *Como Viveremos* was published clearly demonstrates that if anybody was selling out or appropriating the ideas and actions of anybody, it was García Meza stealing and appropriating Fausto's intellectual position and not the other way around. However, the world remembers it differently, and thus Fausto has been inaccurately painted, perhaps forever, as the Bolivian Judas.

While the book ...*FFAA* was not the end of the line for his ideas, it was the political, social, and public death of Fausto Reinaga as an intellectual persona during the remaining years of his life. His detractors would point to the book to destroy his reputation, marginalizing him for this his alleged support of one of Bolivia's most brutal and complicated dictatorships. As a result, this cast a shadow over Fausto's twilight years. As Escárzaga describes,

He lived his final years in political marginalization and disenchantment, with a view that his ideas had been vanquished by the dominant tendency within the Indian organizations to subordinate themselves to the mestizo and neoliberal political projects (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 196)(translation Kearney).

Hilda explains that during the last years of his life, Fausto

...was really sick, and I imagine that he was really disappointed as well. And it is because of this that his thought traveled more in the direction of talking increasingly about humanity and not just the Indian. Including arriving at saying that 'Be it an Indian, be it a Gringo, be it a Mestizo, be it whomever takes up Amautic thought, that is who will be the savior of humanity.' Already he wasn't centering on the Indian as *soma*, but as thought (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

## Chapter Ten

### *The Amautic Revolution*

#### Countering the Transmutation

“The Socratic Imperative is LIE AND KILL”

-Fausto Reinaga<sup>107</sup>

Socratic thought in its inception was a state of mind. Later, it was synthesized by the Romans through their revised versions of the Gnostic texts as a legal construct. That construct is now/today the foundation of state power in Modern Western Democracies. Eventually, sometime around the fifteenth century, this synthesis began to support a concept of soma, the phenotypical characteristics of an individual's physical biological body, as the basis for biological racism as part of colonial-imperial power structures. Over the last 500 years, those power structures would be integral to the colonial racialization of individuals and groups on the Fifth Continent identified as Indian. It is undeniable that we are burdened with this legacy of racialization in the contemporary moment.

Because of this, philosophically we must ask: is it possible for one to be Indian in thought, philosophy, and actions, independent of skin color or phenotypical characteristics? This question characterizes the final stages of Fausto's philosophical inquiries. While his political influence and reputation were by this time smoldering in the ashes of neoliberal Bolivia, his writings that followed offered a redemptive set of

---

<sup>107</sup> (Reinaga, Socrates y Yo 47)(translation Kearney)

possibilities. Raising inquiries into those possibilities, Fausto made his final literary transition, with perhaps his most profound, albeit less bellicose, contribution to the legacy that his existence relayed. For Fausto, Indian/Amautic/Cosmic thought was the offered the possibility of countering the *iron norm*. Once again, we should ask, what is Amautic thought? Defining this concept is part of the objective of this chapter. However, the reader is asked to build on their understanding of the concept as it appears and reappears throughout this chapter.

These later and more macro-philosophical inquiries led Fausto to focus his 1983 *Socrates y Yo* largely on a genealogy of Western thought. **More acutely**, in *Socrates y Yo* he recognized similar phenomenon that were described by Agamben sixteen years later. As mentioned before, his genealogy begins with Socrates as the initiate of his (Socrates's) own *iron norm*. The Socratic *iron norm*, although not termed as the *exceptio* or *the state of exception*, can be seen as a homologue. For Fausto, the *iron norm* is a seminal part of the foundation of European/Western thought.

Fausto takes the genealogy step further back. He points out that Socrates not only received his credibility from the cult of Apollo and the Oracle, but also received his grand wisdom from within his own imagination. It comes from within his own imagination, not as much because of ‘know thy self’ as is our colloquial assumption, but rather because of a religiously motivated and religiously mandated moment of supposed spiritual epiphany. Fausto reminds the reader that Socrates heard a demon who promised to guide him in his own philosophy and wisdom. In front of an entire army, Socrates enacted the reception of his epiphany,

Around him, the calm was absolute. But inside of him, in his interior, the voice had been left for him alone to hear. It was the sound of something new. It was **el daimon** [sic], the supernatural being, the good demon, the personal demon for Socrates, that surged from the unfathomable depths (*Socrates Y Yo* 24-28)(translation Kearney).

This was the self that Socrates came to know. This was the self that would come to constitute the philosophy of the *iron norm*. This was the self to be known as it traveled through the genealogy:

From the luminous Athens of [the 5th century bc greek woman and partner of Pericles named] Aspacia to our days, the 'apple' of philosophical fauna 'does not fall far from the tree' in respect to Socrates.

Socrates engendered Plato, Plato to Aristotle, Aristotle to Descartes, Descartes to Kant, Kant to Hegel, Hegel to... (*Socrates y Yo* 31)(translation Kearney).

Fausto laments how this philosophical sedimentation has corrupted human concepts of science. However, he is not rejecting science. It is really the European and Western thought that bathed over science to which he takes issue. Fausto is just fine with science, and this is why parallels between the Amautic imperative and the Socratic imperative can be observed.

However, Fausto is using the word *science* in a sage way that forces us to yet again think about his intention. He means *science* in at least two different ways. This linguistic back-flip helps Fausto demonstrate part of the grand divergence between the Socratic imperative and the Amautic imperative in a way that can be understood by the very people he is hoping to reach: the oppressed multitudes of indigenous peoples on the Fifth continent.

### **What is Science?**

Science is truth.

What is truth?

The truth is life.  
 What is life?  
 Life is man.  
 What is man?  
 Man is earth.  
 Earth that thinks.

### **What is Philosophy?**

Philosophy is knowledge.  
 Philosophy is to know.  
 To know what?  
 To know:  
 What am I? Who made me? What for?  
 What am I?  
 I am earth; earth that thinks.  
 Who made me?  
 The cosmos made me.  
 For what?  
 For thought; thought turned knowledge.  
 Conscious of what?  
 Conscious of the cosmos.

### **Socratic Imperative**

Socrates, the Socratic imperative affirms:  
 God made man.  
 God is life.  
 Philosophy is the conscious of science.  
 Philosophy comes from God.  
 The truth is divine.

### **Amáutic Imperative**

Replicating Sócrates, the Amáutic imperative replies:  
 God did not make man.<sup>108</sup>  
 Man made God.  
 God is not life.  
 Man is life.  
 Philosophy is not the conscious of science.  
 Science is the conscious of philosophy.  
 Philosophy does not come from God.  
 Philosophy comes from man.  
 The truth is not divine.

---

<sup>108</sup> In the first edition, this line was not indented. However, this appears to be the publisher's error and not Fausto's original intention. Whichever is the case, I take the liberty of indenting in the translation.

The truth is human.  
 God is not the truth.  
 Man is the truth.  
 (Ibid.).

He asserts that philosophy based in the Socratic imperative renders the observer unable to practice a science rooted in conscious observation. He demands that science and its conscious root must be comprised of a realized conscious of the cosmos, obviously rejecting any kind of divine revelation as acceptable for tangible evidence or theoretical formulation. A key element to this composition demands the understanding that man is of, and one with, the planet earth (*Socrates Y Yo* 71-78). This is the pantheist logic base from Fausto's *Mitayos Y Yanaconas*. This key element is why Western thought cannot be conscious. Since Western science is a manifestation of man through monistic divinity, and since man is separate from and dominates nature, the monism of the Socratic imperative prohibits what the Amautic imperative makes patently obvious from a pantheistic viewpoint: Man is of and from the planet earth and the cosmos which contain it. For Fausto, Man must accept this reality philosophically, and thus Man must calculate his observations from within that acceptance if he is to ever be conscious of that same planet earth.

Instead of rejecting the gains of science, Fausto asserts that science is a miracle of sorts in that, the human brain that thinks science - being of the complexity of so many neurons that it is -has a cosmic capacity. He alludes that this miracle is actually a result of the evolutionary process. Yet he leaves it open as to if it is the science that the human thinks that is a miracle, or if the actual corporeal cosmic reality (constituting the human mind that thought up and calculated the science) that is the

miracle. Either way it is clear that he means science as a discipline is not a divine miracle, but rather science as the phenomenon of human thought is a cosmic miracle (*Socrates y Yo* 73).

Hilda gives us further insights into Fausto's thoughts on science: For Fausto,

Science, is nothing more than the truth.

...[on the other hand, regarding] technological science:

During the age of the Inka in Tawantinsuyu there had been science. But it was a science that was 'human' if you want to say it that way, not like now. For example, technology is now damaging humanity. It is a massive production, [whereas the Inka technologies] did not. So then science has been transgressed by the West. What technical science needs to do, although there have been advances, ...[is to construct] a matured science, a science that doesn't do harm to human beings but rather is at the service of humanity. Yet, what Western [technological science] does is damage. In the name of humanity it damages (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

Fausto asserts that on the twentieth of July 1969, thanks to science (assumedly as both a discipline and a cosmic reality), Man had the capacity for the first time to discover himself and Earth. Since man could literally view Earth and himself for the first time, the moon landing for Fausto was a moment of possible epiphany for science. It was a moment of possible escape from its Western and Socratic limitations and illusions. Furthermore, he asserts that due to this realization, the corruption of science via Western folly and the Socratic method should eventually disappear concluding that it is the responsibility of Man himself to make sure that science in the cosmic sense triumphs in the mind of Man over the Socratic *iron norm* (*Socrates y Yo* 73-75).

When discussing Fausto's vision of the relationship between science and cosmivision, Raúl Prada describes the antecedents of such a vision. He notes the

similarities between Andean cosmovisions and twenty first century Modern science at its farthest reaches, such as Quantum Physics. “...This conception that right now in a certain way is woven into, derives and arrives at contemporary science” which includes Relativity and Quantum Physics, “...comes very close to the imaginary of the indigenous cosmovisions, and this is what is interesting.” Prada continues

...so then... if you return to what today is reclaimed by a science that is born from... the quantum vision and of theories of complexity, you are returning again to a pluralist form of thinking (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews).

From this perspective, the pluralism of Prada and other Bolivian pluralists has strong links with pantheist concepts of thought. In the same way, the departure from Newtonian and Classical Physics that have been made by Quantum Field Theory, along with other field-theories that have built on Einstein's Relativity, demonstrate the very root of the flaws of monistic frameworks. However, most of Western science even today is still struggling to depart from its own thought, and in practice is more than ever making nature secondary-to, and separate from, Man.

Hilda says,

This always brings me to say that Fausto was a visionary. It wasn't even a question because he had already presented [ideas much like Quantum Physics, even though] he had never even read or seen anything about Quantum Physics (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

Hilda theorizes the probability that there had already been such a way of thinking in the pre-Colombian Fifth Continent, largely due to the integral and all encompassing nature of (and nature in) pantheist philosophy, “a philosophy of life” before the invasion (Ibid.). For Prada, Fausto, Hilda, myself, and for many of the

pluralists, the struggles for decolonization, liberation, and revolution have everything to do with a struggle between ideas: a struggle that Western thought has imposed on the mind's cosmic connection. This struggle, in many ways is a struggle for the survival of pantheist perspectives.

The field of law is one of the primary places this struggle plays out. A few comments by Robert Yazzi are appropriate in demonstrating what we might call a *paradigmatic paradox* when trying to conceive pluralism in legal structures.

The negative outcome derived from Western law, as the dominant law, is that people believe that. And people many not understand what that means, but is shure makes a lot of sense... [from within that paradigm, but] the American Law is a law of Man. It is a Man made law. So you put it in disposition: then you look at what the indigenous people, the Navajo people, have understood as a law from time immemorable, many many years back. ...there is a clear understanding that the world is about natural law. That the natural law has come out of the understanding for water, for air, for pollen, for the fire: These are the ingredients to make life. Life meaning, these elements have life... So if we were to take this forth (and we have) and develop a paradigm, a framework, to say 'anytime we have a problem, we are going to use these elements as a system, as a paradigm.' To say 'in it there is a relationship, in it there is life, in it there is a capacity to think. And in this life, this paradigm, there is an ability, to not only think, but to plan things. No matter how impossible something might be, you have different dimensions to understanding what the problem is really about. The dimensions come from the people who are involved, the community (Yazzi, Personal Interview).

Yazzi's comments have many similarities with the pantheism of Fausto's writing.

Fausto also warned against the paradox of monistic paradigmatic dominance. As we will see in the following example, he was desperately concerned with the outcome of the dominant paradigm and Man's insistence on dominance over nature.

As stated earlier, Fausto would discuss concepts of Indian thought (Pensamiento Indio), Amautic thought (Pensamiento Amautico), and Cosmic thought

(Pensamiento Cósmico). While this pantheistic sentiment appeared in his earliest writings, we can consider Pensamiento Cósmico as the final manifestation of his thoughts on life in his final years and his final books. Discussing this epoch of Fausto's writing, Pablo Mamani Ramirez notes that Fausto was overtly preoccupied with the global bellicosity of the World Wars, the Cold War, and the atomic bomb. He frames Fausto's philosophical thoughts in the later years as being concerned with the possible extinction of the human being. Fausto's pensamiento cósmico positioned Indian cosmovisions as alternative models for society and as possibilities for avoiding that extinction. Mamani Ramirez elaborates:

...I consider pensamiento cosmico as a type of global elaboration of the idea ...that Man himself is in danger of extinction. ...it led him to ask, what can the Indian offer the world in this bellicose context? The Indian can make the Pensamiento Cósmico, a thought in which Man returns to think in the relation: 'World-Us'. Because this is a rupture from what happens with Western Man. Western Man no longer thinks of the world, but rather of right-here... with God in everything... and the world belonging to him.

And Fausto in this terrain, enters there with a grand proposition, saying 'Okay, that is fine, but here is an alternative proposition to this which knows of the self-annihilation of its own existence. The Indian offers an exit for the world, for the universe we could say, through life.' Of life, truth, and the light... [illuminating] from [Fausto's] position in the world, all weighed from his colonized world: everything which he wrote in *La Revolución India*, which are the internal elements of the political, as we still live today (Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

At least as early as the 1970s, and continuing through to his death decades later, Fausto was adamant about the necessity for an Indian revolution in order to rectify the colonized internal elements of the political conjuncture. But what kind of revolution is he advocating for if, as Escárzaga and Hilda pointed out earlier, armed revolution is out of the question? In order to understand what he is imploring we must

understand Fausto's more philosophical description of what it means to be Indian. In *El Pensamiento Amautico*, Fausto would reprint from *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano*:

WHAT IS THE INDIAN?

"The Indian is the thorough conception of the Cosmos. [Existing] As an entity within the conjuncture of participants in all of the events of the Cosmos. [The Indian] Is solidarity not only with their own, but rather with all of the beings and elements of nature. For the Indian, the Sun more than their God is their father, because it is beneficial with all of the beings, animals, and plants. The Earth, water, air, fire, the mountain, which are their brothers more than they are gods, already are the elements that come together to raise life" (*El Pensamiento Amautico* 20; *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano* 17)(translation Kearney).

For Fausto, with an open mind, proper investigation, and meditation, anyone can live the privilege of being Indian, but only through purposefully thoughtful existence. This implies a lived practice that doesn't necessarily imply some kind of repetition of past traditions, but rather a harmony of understanding of the reality of the cosmos, or the previously mentioned realization of cosmic science. He wrote:

*El pensamiento Indio* is an integrated vision of the Universe... Tawantinsuyu never had what alternatively dominated in the West, what is the geocentric perspective... what is the ethnocentric perspective of the Universe... what is the individual perspective... ; we repeat that in any of these perspectives Western thought has always moved, very far, obviously, from *el pensamiento Indio*, which sees the Universe as an infinite and dazzling unity (*El Pensamiento Amáutico* 20-21,152)(translation Kearney)(*emphasis added*).

Fausto has no intention of implying that there is a comprehensive discipline of how to be an Indian or how to attain a precise understanding of what had been *el pensamiento Indio* or *el pensamiento amáutico* in the past. He is keenly aware of, and very clearly warns the reader that, such concepts, have been devastated by the sins of

the European invasion and occupation of the Americas (*El Pensamiento Amáutico* 22). It is up to the Amáutico thinker, he who thinks as an Indian, to recognize and discover the cosmos while freeing himself from the corruption of the Socratic *iron norm*.

Obviously, we have seen only a brief glimpse of Fausto's Amautic imperative. He dedicated most of the last decade of his career to expanding upon the Amautic imperative and its possibilities for divergence from the Socratic *iron norm*. Yet, I suspect that not enough of this expansion made it into his writings. In these last years, the crushing combination of circumstances, illness, and disillusionment, did not lend a hand to the writing process, and it shows in his production. The books are few, have very little content, and seem to infer things that he didn't quite finish saying. The writing process had always been difficult. Hilda remembers, "Every book had its story. One of the books where he had agonized, suffered, cried, and is [also] covered in **my** tears, was *La Revolución India*" which had been a decade long process (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews). In other words, for Fausto and Hilda, the writing process never had the opportunity of total focus or the scholarly glamour that some would like to ascribe to it.

Regarding the contrast and similarities between Agamben and Fausto, it must be kept in mind that within these specific examples, while one is more focused on science/thought and the other on law, there is a critical link. Whether it is Fausto's Socratic demon or Agamben's Roman messiah, both authors describe and declare that the myth of divinity causes a massive transmutation that becomes the embodiment of the violence of Western Civilization.

If these authors are correct, then the myth of divinity **is** what constitutes both the *iron norm* and the *ban*.

Following Agamben, indispensable for the bridge over the *ban*, is the virtual requisite (or required virtuality) of original violence (at least until the messiah shows up). Following Agamben and observations that we ourselves can make of our contemporary twenty-first century lived reality, the *state of exception* acts in place of the original act of violence that forced the *exceptio*'s twisted birth into the world of Men. Following Agamben and Fausto, the original act of violence, along with the original foundation of sovereign power in Western civilization, is invalid, and therefore must be perpetually revalidated through the *state of exception* and the *iron norm*. This is why those citizen actions in Modern Western Democracies that threaten the State's monopoly over sovereignty are often exposed to violence. Yet, following these authors, as has been demonstrated in the previous pages, the justification for this revalidation is rooted within the myth of divinity.

That this violence is seminal from the myth of divinity, thus constituting the *iron norm* and stitching up the *ban*, must then be considered in relation to the great monotheistic religions; religions that both Agamben and Fausto pointed to as troublesome sources of the problem at hand; religious codification that is determinate in much of the configuration of Western knowledge, law, and academic nobility. This codification reverberates deep into Modern and Postmodern times.

In contrast, pluralist approaches were the axis around which many of the key Constituent Assembly delegates used to orbit the foundational draft of the 2010 Constitution. Whether or not such concepts were watered down in the final document,

and whether or not such concepts have yet to be incorporated into how the state conducts itself, pluralism is still a fresh detour from the myth of divinity and monistic thought. Prada, who was one of those key delegates, elaborates,

What are we proposing in this? We propose a pluralist way of thinking that definitively opposes monistic thinking. Obviously Monistic thinking is the thinking of the monotheistic religions that have made the base of Christianity and obviously of Western culture and Modernity. They make the base and also sustain the imaginary of the state. So then these monotheistic religions are constructing the 'one', the transcendent unity of the creator (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews) (translation Kearney).

At this point we should remember Allen's commentary about the "...widespread errors produced by liberalism's orientation toward unanimity", the overpowering influence of social contract theory on Western juridical and legal regimes, and Hobbes desire that "...citizens might assimilate easily..."

It is not surprising that the effect of social contract theory gains its force from homogenized mono-focal unanimity. Prada explains that the monotheistic religions,

...are neither able to think of the imminent nor the plural, or that is to say the dimension of the plural or simultaneous alternatives... ...they are not able to think of this. Why not? Because they are for sure going to be profoundly reprimanded. ...These religions are militaristic religions that are going to reprimand other alternatives of thinking and other links with the cosmic forces that are in other forms of thinking (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews) (translation Kearney).

Prada points out the conflict between monistic thought and indigenous cosmovisions on the Fifth Continent. He also notes that monistic thought was strong in the formation of the Modern nation-state and also other oppressive patriarchal social situations. Prada sees the monotheistic religions as patriarchal and leading to the reinforcement of patriarchal societies and states. Therefore, despite the global

transition from feudalism, Modern Western states are still bathed in patriarchal domination.<sup>109</sup>

Examples of such monistic patriarchal domination can be found bathed in the blood of Deuteronomy:

When you draw near to a town to fight against it, offer it terms of peace. If it accepts your terms of peace and surrenders to you, then all the people in it shall serve you at forced labor. If it does not submit to you peacefully, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God gives it into your hand, you shall put all its males to the sword. You may, however take as your booty the women, the children, livestock, and everything else in the town, all its spoil. You may enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord your God has given you. Thus you shall treat all the towns that are very far from you, which are not towns of the nations here. But as for the towns of these peoples that the Lord your God is giving you as an inheritance, you must not let anything that breathes remain alive. You shall annihilate them... just as the Lord your God has commanded... (*The New Oxford Annotated Bible with Acrophya*, Deuteronomy 20:10-17)

For humanity to ever regain Agamben's lost 'beautiful day of life', such monism and its patriarchy must be rejected.

As can be seen from the previous pages, I am not alone in proposing that the very structure of law, which delegates sovereignty to the state, which delegates sovereignty to political subjects, and which codifies the mechanisms in which humanity is governed, could improve greatly if tailored from a pluralist/pantheist fabric. We propose nothing less than the urgent necessity to shake off the monistic chains that bind Roman law through Hobbes, Hegel, Smith, Jefferson, and the narrow scope of Modern Western Democratic thought.

For example, we must take into consideration what this narrow scope had to do

---

<sup>109</sup> This could go a long way in explaining why dominator cultures and societies are so ever-present and why non-patriarchal societies have been pushed to the fringes.

with the relationship between those who identify or are identified as Indian and the 'mestizo classes'. Pablo Mamani Ramirez can help us to think about this.

...there has always been a very problematic and complex trajectory in the neo-colonial countries like Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, or Peru. Because this boundary, that is an ethnic boundary, and furthermore that comprises diffuse boundaries, is always a corporeal separation between certain [people] and 'others'. Even though, symbolically, in specific moments there is considered to be a conjunction. But this functions in certain moments: moments like soccer games where certain boundaries disappear, [or] cultural moments where the Criollos arrive at indigenous events where these boundaries disappear. But the walls always rise back up between certain [people] and 'others'.

It is a grand problem, which one can't understand [solely] from a discourse of 'class'. Nor can it be understood from [solely] a discourse of nationality. So then I include a theoretical route, which I once said, that 'one must understand with two legs [stances.]' In a condition of classes, one lives oppression in two forms. In as much as one is as a class [for example] as a miner, and in as much as one is original-indigenous: living two types of domination. And from the side of the idea of nationalities, one lives the same, because one wants to pertain to a civilizing system that is different, and is also an Indian campesino. And so this is what marks the difference between other groups.

So, how are you going to understand our grand complexity if you are not going to look from a perspective of class and ethnicity? I don't know how it works out theoretically, but it appears to me as a great proposition to look from the perspective of ethnicity and class. Obviously this frontier is a huge conceptually methodological project. But, how can we look at [this, when for example] even in the Aymara world there is a condition of classes that is made in relation to other sectors of the same Aymara world? But, [then again] that has a distinctly different root than [the situation of] Pueblos and dominant classes. Already they are not confronted as classes, but as Pueblo.

...We are Pueblo. We also have class-consciousness, but also the territorial historical-political condition of Pueblo, [which] submerges us immensely (there is data [demonstrating this]). And we can confront the 'other' from the same position, such as in language, symbolic elements, territoriality, politics, cultural elements... they make it so that we more or less make a difference between us.

So then I believe that this is a more proper view, which puts forth a perspective that one can understand.

[In short,] I don't live from the Left (Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

The arguments and proposals throughout this thesis should not be thought of as solutions for problems of race, ethnicity, identity, and the power structures (including discourses) affecting the three. Instead, the intent is to broaden the conversation and discussion on such subjects. How did the individuals in the preceding pages discuss these subjects?

One of these subjects, racism, was recurring over the last few hundred pages. What is racist? In response to accusations that Fausto was a racist, Hilda asserts, “He wasn't a racist. He was always against racism.” Acknowledging that the language in books like *La Revolución India* was incredibly incendiary, she explains that there was also an anti-racist proposal in this. Fausto's goal was to “Put the Indian on the March.” He did so by utilizing such language to help those suffering subjectivity, and for the Indian, “to awake from their lethargy.” By blatantly putting the subject of race at the forefront, individuals could see better their own slavery. She believes that Fausto felt many people received this message, and this is why he then broadened his discussion on racism to a more philosophical level in later books like *Socrates y Yo* (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews.)(translation Kearney).

Yet, even in the 1960s, Fausto had clearly elaborated on the difference between his aesthetic and racism.

Our proposition over the problem of liberation for the Indian, is not racist nor anti-Marxist. Our maladies cast a shadow over our mind and our egoistic illness that moves within our heart. Because our Indianista credo is a categorical imperative of the liberation of the Indian, and with him, Man: the king of Creation.

On the other hand, racism is something inherent to the West. ...Because race is not an implicit quality of the human being which distinguishes and differentiates from other human beings. Race is not a scientific judgement, but is a prejudice adhered to the mental structure

of the Western Man, with propositions of use, dominion, and power. Europe in its conquests of continents, pueblos, and cultures, has lifted and imposed its arms and its techniques, its principles and its prejudices, its gods and its language; in short, its civilization and its culture...

The West, in order to accomplish its ends, had invented and maintained racism. Racism is the child of the West, not of the realm of the Inka. The Indian is not, and cannot be racist. His hatred towards the white, is the cry of his chained liberty, the cry of his right to be Man and not monster. His hatred towards the white is the voice of the reconquest of his Indian Patrimony, today enslaved and martyred for the status-seeking white-cholo criminality. The hatred of the Indian towards the white is the voice of the justice of three and a half million Men, against half a million white cholos who oppress, exploit, and assassinate the Indian...

To study the driving forces of racism and of culture is to ask the question of reciprocal action. If culture is the conjunction of mental and physical behaviors, born from the encounter between Man and nature and with his fellow Man, then we should say that racism is truly a cultural element (*Escritores*, 227)(translation Kearney).

Fausto outlines that while the vulgar racism of the past, based on biological distinctions, appears to have dissipated, it has not disappeared but instead changed form. He points to the European wars of the twentieth century. These wars created a new coloniality based on an advanced system of racism that was not necessarily based on skin color or phenotype, the biggest example being Nazi Germany. He writes,

It is necessary to look at the level of culture for the consequences of this [kind of] racism.

Racism, as we have seen, is no more than an element of a far more vast conjunction: that of the systematized oppression of a pueblo. How does a people that oppresses act? Here we return to encounter certain constants.

We witness the destruction of cultural values, of modalities of existence. Language, dress, and techniques are devalued. How to take into account these constants?

...In reality, the nations that wage colonial war are not worried about confronting cultures. War is a gigantic commercial business, and all perspectives should be in relation to this criterion. Slavery, in the most rigorous sentiment, of the autochthonous population is its first necessity.

In order to do so, it must modify the system of reference. The expropriation, plundering, raiding, and assassination as objectives are duplicated in the sacking of cultural schemes, or at least, are conditions of the sacking. The cultural panorama is divided, the values circumvented, erased, and emptied (*Escritores*, 230)(translation Kearney).

Fausto was inescapably a product of, and at the same time a victim of, this process. Hilda feels that regarding Fausto's self concept of identity, he only partially succeeded in abandoning his Mestizaje. For example, he would never abandon his Western medical doctors, “having more confidence in his Europeanized doctors.”

The Anthropologist and Jesuit priest Xaviér Albó, who was a major influence on Katarismo (although in a different way than Fausto), knew Fausto on a close and personal basis. Hilda, who knows Albó very well, explained that he would visit the house in Killi Killi often. Much like G.H. Mata, he was suspicious of whether Fausto was a 'real Indian'. The priest would go into the countryside, including to Macha, to do his own investigative research on Fausto's identity. He then would return to the house. Hilda points at the door and exclaims, “Here I was, watching him walk through this door, and he spoke in Quechua to Reinaga. ...'Very well then, you had always been an Indian.' But now [today] Albó says that [Fausto] is a Mestizo and not an Indian.” However, Hilda assures us that, “in the end, he was an Indian” (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews).

The most popular explanation of the origin of the word Indian is that Columbus, when arriving in the Americas, thought he had reached India. Ramiro disagrees and asserts that while the word was coined by Europeans, that it originates as the “first people in the eyes of God” as in Indios = En Dios (In [the eyes of] God)

(Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews). This was, after all, the sentiment behind De Las Casas' plea to the Spanish King that the Indians not be subjected to slavery. However, arguing over the origin of the word to justify its current usage is a red herring. Hilda reminds that, “either way, they called us Indians.” For Hilda and for Fausto, until a day of substantial liberation arrives, the Indian has full rights to utilize the name Indian, as proprietary terrain (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Fausto Reinaga, *El Indio y la Razón*; Fausto Reinaga, *La Revolución India*)(translation Kearney).

Indianista Jaime Apaza, from the movements of the 1970s, asserts that the word Indian was no more than a description of “those who provided food” for the ruling classes. For him it should be clear that Aymaras are “Aymaras who call themselves 'Jaqui’” (pronounced 'ha key'). But, when he and others used the words Indian and Indianista, it was “...to use the word Indian as a weapon!” (Jaime Apaza, Personal Interviews).

There can be a lot of complexity in a word. It should be clear by now that the word Indian should not be automatically and arbitrarily replaced with the word indigenous solely for reasons of political correctness. The word indigenous can be just as dangerous, misused, manipulated, and appropriated as the word Indian. During the governments of Evo, Linera, and the MAS, Ramiro Reinaga would share his thoughts on the use of the word indigenous.

The most colonial word that there is right now is the word 'indigenous'. Because, to begin with, it is not a noun, not a name, it is an adjective. We are all indigenous. In a parody we celebrate 'The day of the Indian'. It couldn't be seen as 'The day of the Indigenous' because it would be ridiculous. It would be 'The day of the Human Being'. For this it is the

word that the colonialism of the current government uses... My father never used the word indigenous (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

For Ramiro, Fausto, Constantino, Jaime Apaza, and others, the word Indian is not just proprietary terrain, but a terrain to be fought and died over. To eliminate the word is to eliminate the people it described, positively as self-identity or pejoratively. Yet, for Fausto, the conquest of the word should be an aperture of escape from racism and Western thought,

The Indian is not the color of the skin; is not the color of the dermis...

The Indian in essence, in the substance of being, is thought. Communal thought and the shared knowledge of love...

The blonde Aryan, the white Latino, ...the mestizo of whatever color, the mongol, the black, [or] the gringo, who thinks, feels, and acts amautically, cosmically, are INDIANS of the foremost kind (*Pensamiento Amáutico* 21)(translation Kearney).

Indianismo was a vehicle for that aperture. Yet, for Fausto, for Hilda, for Ramiro, for Pedro Portugal, and for Constantino Lima, the Katarismo of the CIPCA and the efforts of the priests like Albó and other Christians, were part of an effort to deflect, divert, and defeat Indianismo. It was a return to European thought and the West. Or as Hilda put it, they acted "...to pull the brakes on Indian Governance" (Fausto Reinaga, ...*FFAA*; Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews; Pedro Portugal, Personal Interview; Constantino Lima, Personal Interviews).

Constantino asserts that this effort was prevalent with the MRTK-L, the members of which would eventually return so far to the status quo, that they would even ally with the neoliberals. Regarding the influence of the priests and the church

on them, Constantino elaborates:

...because the priests like Xaviér Albó, ...had guided them, had financed them, ...they had direct influence.

I spoke of this with Jenaro [Flores], face to face, both of us sitting down. And I told him, "Why do you lift the banner of *leftist/revolutionary*, what is this? You don't want to reconstitute Kollasuyu<sup>110</sup> one day?" I kept going on and on, until tears were streaming from my eyes because I wanted so much to convince him.

But, he told me very clearly, "Constantino, what can I do? The priests have us constructing no more than the universal" (Constantino Lima, Personal Interviews).

According to Constantino, Flores explained to him that the priests, the methodists, and the NGO's, because of their material support, had "trapped" the MRTK-L and the movement at large within the paradigm of Leftist/revolutionary. Flores then recommended that maybe Constantino should journey to the United States looking for funds from groups and individuals sympathetic to his cause. He would and, as mentioned earlier, Ramiro and Fausto would condemn him for it (Ibid.; Fausto Reinaga, ...*FFAA*).

This is an appropriate moment to once again think back to Belzu. *Belcismo* was not only constrained by the limits of the political envelope of the time, but also embraced Western thought. Despite the revolutionary nature of the 1851 Constitution, there were at least two hubristic returns to the status quo: First, Belzu's 1851 Constitution institutionalized the Catholic Church. Second, it placed all sovereignty in the hands of the State. Could the first have been just as damaging for similar reasons to the *Belcismo* as it was to the Indianistas and Kataristas? The second, viewing society as being formed by the State instead of the State being formed by society, is

---

<sup>110</sup> Kollasuyu: the eastern realm of Tawantinsuyu, encompassing the Altiplano.

also committed by Hegel and Linera in the following chapter.

In Bolivia, although tumultuous and not always successful, it is clear that social actors like the Indianistas, Kataristas, and the multitudes were instrumental in altering the State: driving the demands and gains of the State's sociopolitical construction.

## **Chapter Eleven**

### **The Vice**

#### **Apparent and Integral Extraction**

Indianista thought, Katarista praxis, critical pedagogy, postmulticultural revolution, and myriad other unique aspects of Bolivian sociopolitical constructions, ushered the country into the twenty first century. Just like the demands and gains of the Tiwanaku Manifesto, as well as the *citizenship agency* described by Postero, Bolivians once again excelled at revolutionary struggle against oppression in the Water, Tax, and Gas wars of that new century. It was this extraordinary background and revolutionary struggle on which Evo Morales, Alvaro García Linera, and the MAS seized the State in 2006.

The MAS government would deliver on a promise to enact Constitutional change, and would lead the most stable, most redistributive, and most economically successful Republican Bolivian State in decades, if not ever. They would also succeed in alienating and angering large portions of their own base. Some of the ways in which this happened will be demonstrated in the following pages through the examples of *The TIPNIS Affair* and the *The Gasolinazo*.

Only two of many possible examples, these events show the power of citizen sovereignty in Bolivia. These events also illuminate a fundamental difference between the elected political imaginary that was Evo/Linera/MAS and the reality of their policy. Just like anywhere else in the voting world, the hope of campaigns can

never be reconciled with the pragmatics of governance.

What was the *Gasolinazo*? Despite the major role of hydrocarbon exports in the Bolivian economy, the country is an importer of gasoline and diesel. In late 2010, under a technically rational but highly unpopular policy maneuver, the Morales government announced that it would remove longstanding subsidies on gasoline and diesel. These were subsidies that had been implemented during the Banzer regime.

The MAS implemented this policy during the holidays, increasing prices more than seventy percent, right in the middle of many people's holiday vacations. To put this into perspective, the prices were now close to the level of prices in the U.S., but in a country where the average annual income is less than two thousand dollars a year. Transportation drivers and vendors, taking advantage of the situation, immediately raised their prices to levels that were far higher than the subsidy removal had affected their goods and services. The price hikes due to this kind of 'aprovechando' (taking advantage) were also blamed on the MAS. Around the same time, the increase in prices of food, due to global increases and a severe drought in Bolivia, were also blamed on the MAS.

The MAS should have seen this coming, but for some reason ignored it. They implemented the subsidy removal all at one moment and over the holiday when families would still have to drive home. The timing did not help this strategic disaster. Whether or not it was bad policy, it was definitely bad for MAS popularity.

Massive protests, mobilization, blockades and general agitation ignited. All of this sparked an already simmering, but now incendiary, political debate about the relationship between the newly Constituted (but not yet constituted) Plurinational

State of Bolivia and the segments of society that had, at great cost, fought to create it. The salient point for our purposes here is that these actions of the multitudes of Bolivian political subjects, without a doubt, led to the rapid repeal of the government's policy. This doesn't happen in Allen's 'empowered to be disempowered America'. This is a fine example of the extraordinary nature of citizen sovereignty in Bolivia. We can also observe this phenomenon in the following example.

An emblematic dispute, which has expansively altered the contemporary political moment, is known as the *TIPNIS Affair*. The important phenomenon to recognize in the dispute is similar to, but much more expansive than, that in the Gasolinazo. The *TIPNIS Affair* should not be considered significant because the MAS made bad policy decisions and then responded inappropriately to the political conjuncture and the actions of the multitude. While the MAS did do those things to one degree or another, the TIPNIS Affair is significant for a reason far more profound. It emblematically demonstrated the unique characteristics of what were identified in earlier pages as *the Conscience and Clarion of the Multitude*, *the Postmulticultural Revolution*, and *post-irresponsible citizenship*.

*The TIPNIS affair* is centered on a road construction project that was to literally divide in half a protected environmental area (called TIPNIS) that was also congruent with government recognized indigenous territories. The segments of the road on either side of the contested area were completed, and the government was poised to start paving the final section. What complicated the matter was that since the 1960s the government had promoted a policy of moving migrant agriculturalists from the highlands into an overlapping area. The migrants, who are coca farmers,

support the road along with the government. The road project was also favored by the government of Brazil, a powerful construction company from Brazil, finance capital at large, and the international road-network development project known as the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) (McNeish, "Extraction, Protest, and Indigeneity in Bolivia"; Postero, "Protecting Mother Earth in Bolivia").

However, many of the indigenous communities declare that the road is a violation of their sovereign control over their territory. This was also an issue of Constitutional law. The territory, the environment, and the protected status were all protected by the Constitution in several of ways. However, the most clear Constitutional protection that was violated by the State's road project was the *Consulta Previa* (Prior Consultation). Article 30,II-15 of the Bolivian Constitution states,

Within the framework of the unity of the State and in accordance with this Constitution the original peoples, campesinos, and indigenous nations and pueblos enjoy the following rights: [which include] ...15. To be consulted through the appropriate procedures, and in particular through their representative institutions, each time that legislative or administrative measures are anticipated to affect them. Within this framework, they will be respected and guaranteed the right of obligatory consulta previa [prior consultation] conducted by the state, with good faith and conduct, in respect to the exploitation of the non-renewable<sup>111</sup> resources in the territory in which they inhabit (Nueva Constitución Política del Estado)(translation Kearney).

The Bolivian Constitution's Consulta Previa is in line with international law as well. It isn't surprising that Bolivia's neighbors, including Brazil, Peru, and Colombia, have

---

<sup>111</sup> It could be argued that non-renewable resources are not at stake. However, we should observe that not only is the section of jungle to be paved over unable to renew itself through a maintained asphalt road, but the inevitable extraction of hardwoods does not enjoy a regime of sustainability and therefore is non-renewable. More acutely, the road plan is inextricably linked to hydrocarbon extraction projects.

violated this consideration in many cases as well (Schilling-Vacaflor). However, it is somewhat surprising that the Morales administration did not do so for such a sensitive political project (they did however enact a 'post' consultation later in response to massive unrest). Anthropologist Almut Schilling-Vacaflor explains that regionally, "Compared to most other Andean and Latin American states – except Colombia – Bolivia has a rather rich experience in carrying out prior consultations" (Schilling-Vacaflor 203).

If we look back to the footnote in Chapter Four, distinguishing between Constitution with a big C and constitution with a little c, when talking about the makeup of the State, then we can see more clearly how this distinction plays out in practice. The Constitution, the political document, had specific restrictions blocking the State's road project. Yet, this was not what stopped the State from finishing the road. The State maneuvered around their Constitutional obligations and was intent on moving forward with the project. Yet, any political Constitution is deflated if it is not relevant to the lived political constitution, with a little c. What constituted and drove socio-political reality during the TIPNIS Affair was a clear demonstration of citizen sovereignty in controlling the State. The State was Constitutionally bound to conduct an obligatory prior consultation and failed to do so until the project, and the protest, were both in full swing. They were, however, constitutionally bound to halt the project. The residents of the TIPNIS were not the only ones to act. By the middle of 2011, other interests had joined the opposition to the road. Communities within TIPNIS allied with other indigenous communities to begin a march from the lowlands, reminiscent of several other famous marches that had also advocated indigenous

rights.

From the very beginning, a discourse of pantheism surrounded the conflict in both social and environmental terms. It was easy to define the interconnected characteristics of nature because the road literally cut through the middle of the protected bio-diversity area. But the discourse surrounding the march went far beyond this division, and voiced the danger being posed to Bolivians in general with the damage to incur should the road project be enacted.

The diverse nature of the marchers is an important characterization of the TIPNIS Affair that should be emphasized. The marchers had walked across the lowlands and into the Andes Mountains, crossing the high Andean pass in order to arrive in La Paz. Although beginning with the most directly affected groups, it was not long before the march amplified. It was a national issue which everyone was watching, long before the march even arrived in La Paz. The diversity of different indigenous political groups, classical political groups, and also other sectors of society involved in the protest, was immense.<sup>112</sup>

There was undoubtedly the involvement of NGOs, and other forms of international support. However, the broad cross sections of Bolivia's *sociedad abigarrada*, which became intimately caught up in the now pan-national and global debate, cannot be underestimated. This phenomenon amplified on October 19<sup>th</sup> 2011 when the march arrived in La Paz, where the marchers received a huge welcome.

---

<sup>112</sup> The reason for the lack of citations for the conversation over the TIPNIS Affair is because I was living in LaPaz at the time, interacting with public figures, attending government seminars and presentations, as well as attending protests and marches. Needless to say, I made sure to join the multitudes greeting of the marchers when they arrived, and followed their trajectory to Plaza San Francisco.

The State would declare that this outpouring of support was the result of the political Right, of capital interests, of NGOs, and of imperialists, taking advantage of a situation that they had very little or nothing to do with. While such groups did join the march and even made a strong showing, they were no more constitutive of the march than they are of Bolivia. In other words, everybody came to that party. Once such groups got involved with the march, a strange thing happened.

It was a strange thing indeed. Here was an indigenous march, which was nothing new for Bolivia (this was the eighth of its size and kind in the past two decades alone). They showed up in multitudinous form in La Paz, also nothing new for Bolivia. However, that such a large spectrum of society showed up to the march or discussed it empathetically, this was something extraordinary. What is more, they all picked up the pantheistic discourse of the marchers. Many who supported the marchers carried banners reading 'We are all TIPNIS'. This sentiment, of the integral and important interconnection of nature to all of Bolivia and all of life, became common, and even sometimes ardent, discourse (in both meanings of the word). In this way, they all **did** have something to do with it, no matter how ambiguous or disingenuous it may have been.

They were coming from everywhere. They came from the ranks of the COB to the ADN, from the highlands to the lowlands, from the rich to the poor, from Europeanized Californiaphiles to Urban Aymaras, from all of the supposedly impassible dichotomies and positions of polarization that were alleged to make Bolivia's political-struggles untenable and overly-utopianistic.

First, thousands filled Plaza Murrillo in front of the Palacio Quemado. It was

standing room only. The leaders and organizers of the march then made their way, through oceans of supporters, to a position between the Palacio Quemado and the lamppost where Villarroel was hanged. As thousands continued to flood the plaza, the adjacent streets began to swell with the non-stop arrival of Bolivians, Bolivians, and more Bolivians. When the State refused to give them an audience, the leaders and organizers, now part of a massive motorcade-procession drenched in the sea of marchers, spectators, supporters, and the rhythm of social imperative, proceeded. They poured down the steep Andean city's streets to the enormous Plaza San Francisco at the core of the city. For hours the arrival of parades of people, swelling the streets was a non-stop river of both, social protest and social plurality.

Those who showed up to the March could be labeled as *the multitude* in perhaps one of the most expansive and inclusive senses of the word. And they all took on the discourse. This discourse would not go away. The residual of pantheist discourse would not recede when the floods of people went back to their homes in the following weeks. It is spray painted on the walls of the city, cleverly positioned in the language of legislation, commonly chattered in conversations at cafés, and opportunistically appropriated by all sectors of society. In the city of La Paz, it is so commonly evident to the observer that it illusorily appears to attain 'hegemonic' levels.

What would this have meant for Fausto? Fausto, having died in the nineteen-nineties, sadly did not get to witness the first decade of the twenty-first century. He would not witness the decade where Bolivian society finally got to have constructive conversations about both the constitution and The Constitution of the state. Both aspects of these conversations would valorize and de-stigmatize many different

identities for Bolivians. That is not to say that oppression and racism had disappeared, but rather, there is a noticeable alleviation of racial tensions in many situations. Even since 2003, the composition of public interactions has changed dramatically.<sup>113</sup>

Bolivia would forge its own unique path in preparation for the global uncertainties of the twenty-first century. As Hilda reminds us,

*La Revolución India* was published... over 40 years ago. What Reinaga wrote has not been applied exactly, but it has served these uprisings of the Pueblos. Not only here. It is at a continental level. ...little by little, he had influenced the rising of the Indian...

I believe that what Reinaga said, ....all that he wrote forty years ago, it is happening ...his books are just as current today as they were forty years ago. So then... he says that these bellows from the Andes, as thought going out [in the world], will save humanity. And this will have to happen. And a little bit of this is occurring. Because, one day Reinaga also said, ...'the day that an Indian is in the Palacio Quemado, is the day that Bolivia will be known at a global level. ...so many laughed, and now it is happening (Hilda Reinaga, Personal Interviews)(translation Kearney).

Obviously, Fausto's writings must be considered within their historical context.

What was the social situation when he wrote them? How is that different from now?

What was the face of oppression then, and how has it transformed in the current moment? Pablo Mamani Ramirez elaborates,

With what perspective are we going to look at the new reality – the new realities but also the new regressions – of neo-colonialism? That is to say that there are new realities [in the contemporary moment] with a new regression to neo-colonialism. Now, there is a new and immense set of paradoxes and complexities that [such regressions] return to produce.

In this sentiment, many ideas of Fausto Reinaga are going to return, or have returned, in discussion. Although [this will occur] in certain contexts. Once again, during the age of Reinaga, the majority of

---

<sup>113</sup> Observed over the time period of 2003-2013, during personal experiences in Bolivia over the same time period. This has happened through pan media discursive shifts, in Bolivia's daily discourse (in both the common and proper noun form of the word), and in public and private conferences and meetings.

the Indian population was rural, and that [rurality] expressed the oppressed Indian populace. Today the Indian populace is more urban<sup>114</sup> than rural. So then, in this urban space, there are also other elements that constitute society, no?

But these sectors of society, are already less miserable than those of which he had written... This opens up new detours before a new society, but at the same time, with new neo-colonial forms of the political and of power (Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Personal Interview)(translation Kearney).

Mamani Ramirez warns that we should not use Fausto “as a mold” for thinking about society now, but rather that his work should be considered within this new social context. Speaking of that new context, he reminds us that Evo Morales and Álvaro García Linera, “...are not Indianista or Katarista. ...In no way can Álvaro be Indianista. Not even a little bit: not in his social origin, nor in his ideological position.” He continues that while Evo may have had Katarista and Indianista influences, his ideological position has always been closer to the syndicalism of the state of 52. Furthermore, Evo

...is ideologically lost. It is a paradox that a man with such historic magnitude, as they claim today, would want to kiss the feet of 'Papa Francisco' [the pope], Carlos Messi [a famous soccer player], and Fidel Castro. ...this strategy strips one of political ethic (Ibid.).

Evo Morales, Linera, and the MAS have managed to control the government for one quite popular administration during the last years of the Bolivian Republic, and one not so popular administration in the first five years of the Plurinational State of Bolivia. Linera not only admires Hegel, but looks to Hegelian thought for much of his theoretical justification in his actions as a powerful actor within the Bolivian state. Therefore, it is no stretch of the imagination to complete Fausto's genealogy as

---

<sup>114</sup> Although not addressed here, this points out the important question of continually changing ideas and realities in urban indigenous communities.

"Socrates engendered Plato, Plato to Aristotle, Aristotle to Descartes, Descartes to Kant, Kant to Hegel, Hegel to..." Linera.

Eduardo Galeano points out that Hegel "...spoke of Latin America's physical and spiritual impotence and said the Indians died when Europe merely breathed on them" (Galeano 41). The pestilence of Europe five centuries ago is not in question. It killed millions on the Fifth Continent even before the conquistadores could arrive to join in the slaughter begun by their own plagues. However, Galeano is pointing out a more subtle sentiment in Hegel's commentary: that Hegel fatalistically dismisses the capacity of Indians, and even their humanity.

Linera, in his prodigious governing role, looks to Hegel for analytical compass. This puts Linera in a contradictory situation. He himself was a 'Katarista' guerrilla in the 1990s when a small group of traditional leftists who had allied with Felipe Quispe's more radical contingent. Despite the benign nature of this guerrilla movement, both Linera and Quispe went to jail for this activity. Yet, in the twenty first century, Quispe critiques Linera's participation as a young boy's pathetic endeavor in fanciful adventure. And while Linera would later claim to be inspired by Fausto, his writings and actions are very far from Quispe and Katarismo and even farther from Fausto and Indianismo. In other words, Linera is inescapably Hegelian.

I cannot say what Fausto would have thought about Linera's political personality, had he lived into the twenty-first century. However, by 2011 his son Ramiro found Linera's affinity for Hegel, along with many of Linera's other characteristics, to be outright disturbing (Ramiro Reinaga, Personal Interviews). On the other hand, what Fausto Reinaga and Karl Marx thought about Hegel is clear.

In a chapter titled “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General”, from his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx would declare that, "There is a double error in Hegel" and then he would "...demonstrate in detail Hegel’s one-sidedness and limitations"(Marx 175, 177) Marx's critique is quite integral, with a detailed review that focusses especially on Hegel's *Phänomenologie*. This in itself should be sufficient evidence that Linera's affinity for Hegel is problematic. However, for the task at hand, there are a couple of key points to which close attention should be paid. Giving some tempered credit to Feuerbach, who Marx asserts is "...the only one who has a *serious, critical* attitude to the Hegelian dialectic...", he agrees that

Hegel sets out from the estrangement of substance (in logic, from the infinite, the abstractly universal) – from the absolute and fixed abstraction; which means, put popularly, that he sets out from religion and theology (Marx 172).

He goes into quite some detail examining the flaws of Hegel's *Phänomenologie*. One of Marx's key realizations shows that the root of Hegel's flaw is quite similar to the problem Agamben had with the *ban* and Kant. Marx explains that

In Hegel, therefore, the negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true essence, effected precisely through negation of the pseudo-essence. With him the negation of the negation is the confirmation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial; or it is the denial of this pseudo-essence as an objective being dwelling outside [M]an and independent of him, and its transformation into the subject (Marx 185).

To put the last passage in context, Marx made this elaboration after declaring "There can therefore no longer be any question about an act of accommodation on Hegel’s part *vis-à-vis* religion, the state, etc., since this lie is the lie of his principle" (Marx 185). Marx too, was frustrated by the illogical root of divinity in Western knowledge

and power.<sup>115</sup> This presents an intriguing question: would it have served Belzu better if he had read Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* along with the *Communist Manifesto*?

Hegel receives no mercy from Fausto. For Fausto, the same error that Marx illuminates above is more of a lifetime curse for Hegel and his overly celebrated career. In his 1982 *La Podredumbre Criminal Del Pensamiento Europeo (The Criminal Putrefaction of European Thought)* he would express similar sentiments,

...it had been well known to Hegel that all authority is rooted in religion; for this reason it was the grand objective of his life to fuse, in the most intimate manner, the state with religion, that is to say, re-founding both in a great unity whose parts were organically embodied (*La Podredumbre* 28)(translation Kearney).

As we will see in the following paragraphs, with the help of Prada and with analysis of Linera, the fusion pointed out by Marx and Fausto, conscious or not, is a contributing factor in the outcomes of Linera's thought, as well as his actions.

Within the Constituent Assembly, of which Prada was an influential member, there existed a strong intellectual movement to organically re-found the Bolivian state with the concept of multiethnic coexistence through pluralism, and therefore curbing monism. Unlike Belzu, they actually barred monotheism as a root of law and the state, even if it was only in Constitutional text (*Nueva Constitución Política del Estado*). Much of this did arrive in the form of Constitutional text with the dawn of The Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2010. However, as we will see in the following

---

<sup>115</sup> Perhaps this is why, in *La Razón Y El Indio*, when it comes time to indite Marx for his participation in Western thought, Fausto is, to a degree, a bit kinder with his critique of Marx than he is with his critique of Marxists or Marx's predecessors (*La Razon Y El Indio* 132-136).

paragraphs, it didn't necessarily remain in the minds and actions of those elected to govern Bolivia.

During the election of 2009 and the months afterward, the elected imaginary meant many different things for many different people. One of many aspects of the elected imaginary among intellectuals, politicians, and especially Marxists, was the concept of the *Apparent vs. Integral state*. This concept, with roots in the works of Gramsci and Marx, was made popular by René Zavaleta Mercado in his earlier works such as *El Poder Dual (The Dual Power)*. In this work the concept is specifically trying to explain the differences between states like Bolivia and Peru during the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, contrasting them to more Modernized states like Chile.

Yet it was in Zavaleta's *Lo Nacional-Popular en Bolivia (The National Popular in Bolivia)* where he grants his readers the most useful analysis of Bolivian social relations. The book was published posthumously, as he had not finished it when he died. Responding to the work of Sylvia Rivera Cusicanqui, Fausto, and others, Zavaleta's *Lo Nacional-Popular* gives a much greater consideration to the plurality of social formulations in Bolivia. Finally, someone was heeding Fausto's calls in *Mitayos Y Yanaconas* to acknowledge the complexity and often non-Western constructs of the Bolivian social structure! Much of the intent of the pluralists at the Constituent Assembly was to more justly acknowledge those characteristics of complexity and often non-Western tendencies of Bolivian society.

While the Constitutional process restrained much of the intent of the pluralists, their mark was none-the-less made on the new Constitution and the concepts behind the new State to which its inauguration christened. The inaugural day of The

Plurinational State of Bolivia marked the end of The Republic of Bolivia and the installation of the new CPE as the law of the land. On that day, Linera performed an historic speech. He has orated many speeches, and for those who are familiar with them, some of them are more memorable than others. This one, given in January of 2010, was unique in many ways.

Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa, and Guatemalen Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú were among the many notable icons and functionaries who were present for this inaugural speech. They were there to mark the birth of the new State. The pivotal concept for the speech, the theoretical glue that bound it together, was the concept of the *Apparent vs. Integral State*.

At the beginning of the speech, Linera summarizes the concept of the *Apparent State* without straying too much from Zavaleta's sentiment,

It was the great Bolivian thinker, René Zavaleta Mercado, who coined a concept very important for understanding Bolivia: the concept of the *Apparent State*. Zavaleta, who was from Oruro [Bolivia], said that the Apparent State, Illusory as it was, is that which does not succeed in condensing the totality of the society; only representing one privileged piece of it, it does not represent the territoriality of the state, and only represents a few isolated fragments of the patrimonial territory. For Zavaleta, an Apparent State is that which does not succeed in incorporating the habits, culture, forms of political organization of the society, and instead only articulates certain political habits, leaving to the margins other social sectors, regions, territories, and political practices (García Linera, *Del Estado Aparente*)(translation Kearney).

Linera then outlines some more specific details of Bolivian history, demonstrating the Apparent State. Linera then builds on Gramsci and, still accurately within Zavaleta's sentiment, looks to Gramsci to define the *Integral State*.

What is the State that we want to construct? Permit me to again recall some powerful ideas of Antonio Gramsci... who spoke of the *Integral*

*State.* Gramsci said that the *Integral State* is that in which there is a correspondence between civil society, citizens, regions, workers, social classes, and their state political representation... The Gramscian Integral State is completely contrary to the *Apparent State* that we had here during the past 180 years, and is precisely the construction of a state articulator for the diversity of nationalities, geography, culture and class which we Bolivians have proposed to build from below, cemented in the pillars of government of social movements, plurinationality, democratic autonomy, and economic sovereignty (*Ibid.*).

At this point in the speech, Linera begins to transpose the concept of the Integral State with the new institution of the Plurinational State, inferring that somehow the Plurinational State, on its first day of inception, *is* the Integral State. Later in the speech, Linera backs up from this inference, acknowledging that the Social Movements must have control of the State before there can be an Integral State and that this will take time. However, by this point it is too late, he has already made the strong implication that the new government – the new State, that is to say he and the Morales administration – crosses the threshold into the realization of the Integral State, or is at least the arbiter of that threshold (*Ibid.*).

We cannot ask Gramsci, Marx, or Zavaleta because they are all dead now, but it is not a stretch of the imagination to suppose that they would have viewed Linera's speech as an hubristic, if not an inaccurate, use of their concepts of the Apparent/Integral State. While we don't know for sure what these thinkers would have said about Linera, we can look to Prada's thoughts on Linera's use of the concept.

Prada, who is now a dissident and a former statesman, knows Linera on a much more personal basis. Prada had worked as a viceminister in the government during the first Morales administration. However, he had known Linera for long before that. The two, who were close friends, were part of the *Comuna*, which holds its own place

in the popular memory of politics in La Paz. The *Comuna*, is a well known group of a broad-spectrum leftist intellectuals who, to use a colloquial expression while at the same time to speak literally, wrote the book(s) on late-twentieth century Bolivian social-science. Currently, Prada's stance is in stark opposition to Linera: as a dissident critiquing the government from a pluralist/Constitutionalist perspective.

Having been Linera's friend, having been a member of the Constituent Assembly that wrote the 2010 Constitution, and having been co-members with Linera in the *Comuna*, Prada knows his political opposition well. He also understands in a uniquely thorough way, the theoretical foundation of the famous, and now also infamous, Alvaro García Linera. After viewing a video recording of the speech, he commented:

I believe that Alvaro makes a use of Zavaleta: a use that is perhaps not appropriate for Zavaleta. Because it doesn't have a comprehension of, we could say, the *meanings* in Zavaleta when he is saying the *Apparent State*. ...So I believe it is a political use of the term. Because in reality in a Marxist connotation of *apparent formations*, there are many meanings.

One of them obviously, is from Marx who was always critical of the State. ...In reality, he [Marx] inverts – if we could say it that way – not Hegel's dialectic, [but rather he] ...inverts Hegel's conclusion. [For Marx,] liberty does not come from the state. The realization of liberty is the volition of the state. This is what he ends up saying in his critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state.

So then, Marx always had an anti-state position. Including in the *Communist Manifesto* in clearly proposing... abolishing the state and to construct an association of productive citizens (Raúl Prada, Personal Interviews).

By 2013, Linera had quite obviously gone down a different path than Marx, a different path than Prada, and a different path than most of his colleagues in the *Comuna*. He instead would defend a statist position, drenched in the philosophical

roots of Modern Western Democracy. This would include publishing a book in 2012 that somehow tried to, all at the same time, propose, govern... and elevate the authority of the State (his State) in order to construct a theoretical and governmental hierarchy of *developmentalist industrial extraction*. How can a book accomplish all of those things? Simple. He and the Morales administration had the State, and the book mirrored and defended his policy in government. Linera's book is titled, *Geopolítica de la Amazonía: Poder hacendal-Patrimonial y Acumulación Capitalista (Geopolitics of the Amazon: Patrimonial Hacienda Power and Capitalist Accumulation)*. In it, as will be discussed over the next several paragraphs, we can see the outcome of at least three concepts discussed at different moments in this thesis.

First, just like Hobbes and Hegel but unlike Marx, Linera holds the State as the arbiter of sovereign power. Second, we can see the return to his Hegelian attachments. Finally, the third concept from Chapter Four is that by 2013 there was a vast divergence in thought and analysis between Linera and Postero.

As has already been demonstrated, a decade before, the two intellectuals had carefully focussed on trying to build a framework outlining the formation and meaning of citizenship in Bolivia. Yet, in the contemporary moment, the divergence between their intellectual analyses had become so vast that Postero would critique Linera's analysis in a review article about Linera's *Geopolítica de la Amazonía*. She would launch her critique as co-author to the erudite and radical anthropologist Devin Beaulieu.

The review, titled “The Politics of Extractivism”, was published in the bimonthly e-journal *Against The Current*. They explain that Linera's book, the “third

in a trilogy of books” is used to “counter the mounting criticism.” By the time of publication of Linera's book, criticism was building like storm clouds and rolling thunder. Critics far and wide would levy attacks against a government that was making claims to be an authentic representation of Bolivia's indigenous and Indian constitution (with a little c). Beaulieu and Postero explain that

...Linera's theoretical acuity shines... as he rightly points out that indigeneity is not as simple as people often assume. Indigenous people do not only live in communal lands, and many people in the cities and in zones of colonization also self-identify as indigenous. The literature on the TIPNIS controversy initially, at least, tended to oppose lowland peoples to the coca-growers, characterizing the TIPNIS communities as authentically indigenous....

Yet García Linera substitutes this essentialist regional dichotomy with his own dualism, executing a cunning inversion. García Linera argues that 'in the Amazon, it is not the indigenous peoples who have taken control of territorial power, as occurred years ago in the highlands and valleys where agrarian unions and communities performed the role of indigenous micro-states with a territorial presence, and in reality were the material foundation for the construction of the present Plurinational State.'

In contrast to the virtuous highlanders, the oppressed lowland indigenous people are portrayed here as the passive victims of patrimonial-hacienda power ... and foreign corporations... Without any apparent agency to defend their lands or their livelihoods, they can only be saved by the State” (Beaulieu and Postero).

The two authors take issue with the fact that such a “statist argument completely denies the existence of lowland indigenous resistance against domination...” For example, in Linera's book “There is no mention of their critical role in the recent Constituent Assembly...” Noting that this is a completely different position than Linera had advocated only four years earlier, they are also concerned that this stance “...reduces the lowlands peoples to the status of children, a sad reprise of the tropes of [patriarchal] colonialism” (Beaulieu and Postero).

While pointing out the “...fact that the state is not advancing anything close to indigenous hegemony, Aymara or otherwise” they argue as their “crucial point” that for Linera “all indigenous demands must be subsumed to the state and to the hegemony of its continued capitalist development model.” Linera's argument is centered on the sovereign power of the State in which he claims will be bolstered by the road construction.

...Linera envisions this sovereign aim as a Hegelian synthesis: “with the highway, *the real geography and the ideal geography of the State* (present in maps and treaties) tend to coincide” (emphasis in [Linera's] original...)

It is telling – and deeply troubling – that Gracia Linera justifies the MAS government's actions by invoking colonial plans. Yet perhaps more troubling is [his] continued return to dualistic argumentation [, that is so emblematic of Modern Western thought, in order] to silence opposition. Declaring that the Bolivian state will take sole responsibility for protecting Mother Earth, he asserts: “We will never accept the principle of shared sovereignty in any piece of Bolivian territory. Whoever at this point is opposed to the presence of the state in the Amazon is in fact defending the presence in it of the United States. There is no in-between position...” (Beaulieu, and Postero).

This 'logic' of Linera dispossesses some of the same Bolivians, who he claims to be struggling for, of their own sovereignty. “Apparently, the state will not share the Amazon even with the indigenous peoples who live there” (Ibid.).

Linera's analytical transposition during his service as an agent of the state, and its cause, are debatable topics. Perhaps it was the isolation caused by the type of security involved in such a position? Perhaps it could be attributed to the old adage regarding power and its capacity for changing a person? Perhaps it is a kind of unavoidable *lèse-majesté* back to the Colonial order? Perhaps his analytical detour is not as important or as much of a deviation as I have implied? However, theory is the

least concrete in the complex matrix of theory-law-policy-outcome.

Theoretical analysis of Evo, Linera, and the MAS should look at the institutional effects of their governance, as well as the concrete outcomes of their policy. More importantly, such analysis should look at how interactions between the state and political subjects occurred. As Postero, and even Linera, had said, **citizenship** is an ongoing political process in Bolivia, especially in "...the relation between individuals or groups and the state" and is a "... process of production of the content and form of the political rights of a social structure." As we were able to see over the last few hundred pages, in Bolivia citizenship is also a process of making change in governance whether the state is in agreement or not.

In contemporary investigations, the institutional results of the first two Morales administrations should be considered in at least two ways. First, how did they alter institutions? Second, how did their policies weaken or strengthen those institutions? On a bureaucratic level, it is widely agreed that the MAS had a difficult time actually enacting policy that could reform, let alone revolutionize the bureaucratic mechanisms of the state (Kohl, "A Work in Progress" 107,112).

The legal Constitutional change, with a big C as the CPE, is undeniably immense. Yet, MAS policy often risked damaging the legitimacy and institutionalization of constitutional change, with a little c, as the constituting nature of that relationship between the State and political subjects. The MAS policy risked this damage by violating the same Constitution (CPE) that they had helped to promulgate. One good example of this was their failure to adhere to the CPE's guidelines for the Consulta Previa in the TIPNIS Affair.

However, beyond the efforts already laid out in the previous pages, the analysis of the MAS, their 'process of change', and the still blatantly colonial bureaucracy that they control, will have to wait for another time. On the other hand, we should recognize what Escárzaga explains here:

The Indianista and Katarista approaches have been partially incorporated in the New Constitution... and in the official discourse of the Morales Government, in formulations like *el Vivir bien* and the Plurinational State, but have not been fully realized (“Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 188).

Similar to what Constantino Lima pointed out in Chapter Eight and what Pablo Mamani Ramirez clarified earlier in this chapter, Escárzaga also makes sure to “...mark the distance between *Indianismo-Katarismo* and the official discourse of the Morales government” (Ibid.). She does so because the MAS government does not. The government was not the only actor to meld and conflate the concepts of the two movements in an appropriative co-opting way. Conservative movements, moderates, the State, and religious elements often refer to the two synonymously, despite very clear historical distinctions. On the other hand, there are very few Indianistas who make such a conflation (“A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku”). As we saw earlier, Pablo Mamani Ramirez sees the two in conversation as a possibility of hybridity, but in a different way – as a proposal for praxis – which is not the conflation we are cautioning against here.

Escárzaga, by making this distinction regarding the MAS, also demonstrates that the government and community leaders would formulate a discourse that unifies the two propositions as if Katarismo and Indianismo historically had held one set of unified political ideas rather than two distinct yet intricately intertwined intellectual

and social trajectories. This assists in her “...analysis of the relation between the 'indigenous' government of Morales and the Indian sectors which brought him to power” (Escárzaga 188)(translation Kearney).

The 'authenticity' of Indigenous and Indian identity politics by the Morales administration are being debated and questioned by scholars, intellectuals and others. This includes Nancy Postero, Devin Beaulieu, Raúl Prada, Pablo Mamani Ramirez, Constantino Lima, and myriad others. Yet, there is far less question about those Indigenous and Indian multitudes who brought the administration to power.

In the present day, it is popular to dispute the claim made in the last sentence. Such disputes are nothing more than Modern Western discourse perpetuating the legacy of colonialism. The claim should be taken seriously, whether or not the administration adhered to the demands of those movements who brought them to power. Along with much of the administration's base, the more radical edge of those movements would clearly break away from the administration. Escárzaga explains,

The questioning of the policy of the Morales government on the part of radical Aymara intellectuals nucleated in Indianismo-Katarismo, began with the second presidential administration in 2010... The government having now triumphed over the political right, promulgating the new Constitution and initiated their new administration. Diverse indigenous sectors initiated the questioning of the limited access of applied measures as well as the difference between those measures and that which was projected and demanded by the anti-neoliberal mobilizations of the previous era [2000-2005]. In particular, the efforts of the Morales government to consider as an objective, the mestizo nation-state, which is completely estranged from the Indianista-Katarista project of constructing an Indian government. They also questioned the limited process of nationalization of natural resources and the lack of development of industrialization processes for adding value to the processes of extraction. Instead [the government] applied an extractivist policy to the benefit of transnational companies in place of defending natural resources and recognizing the right of the

indigenous populations to make decisions over their use (Escárzaga, “Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 208)(translation Kearney).

As mentioned in Chapter Three, this is just a brief demonstration of how Evo, Linera, and the MAS would become entangled in the difficulties of what Linera himself had in 1999 called, the “process of production of the content and form of the political rights of social structure” (García Linera 176)(translation Kearney).

It is clear that this entanglement did not provide for the implementation of the proposals set forth by the protagonists of the previous chapters. However, that does not mean they have failed or faded into the past. Despite the lack of their radical proposals in being implemented, Indianismo

...continues as a background of a possible horizon and future, that are still there, to be recuperated in the moments of exhaustion of more conciliatory Indian political models, when these [models] end in the treason of the expectations of the majority of the bases which decidedly struggle for the transformation of society (Escárzaga, “Comunidad Indígena y Revolución” 210)(translation Kearney).

How would Fausto have viewed Evo, MAS, and Linera's entanglement in the difficulties of the process of political production? This is, obviously, a trick question. Fausto would have responded differently at different times in his life. A younger Fausto might have been an ardent MASista, or at least throughout much of the first administration. Perhaps Fausto of the Sixties and the Seventies may have supported one of the many social movements or dissident groups which have come to be so prevalent in critiquing Linera's transgression. It seems likely that Fausto in his last days of pain, illness, and disillusionment would have critiqued most of the political spectrum. However, what the macro Fausto, the grander pulse of Fausto, which was present from Mitayos y Yanacunas all the way through Socrates y Yo and La

Revolución Amautica, is the Fausto we should be asking about. It is a shame that Zavaleta and Fausto did not get to continue their conversations. It is this author's opinion that Linera would have been a subject of hundreds of pages between them, just like he is for Prada. Of the Bolivian multitudes and their condition of oppression in the first part of the twenty-first century, it is probable that Fausto would have been pleased, albeit always with a critical eye.

Legacies are legacies because there is no end point. Nor is there such a thing as an “arrival” at a perfect social reality. However, Fausto Reinaga's Bolivia has traveled a long path, full of possibilities, deep into the distant horizon of the political.

## Chapter Twelve

### Epilogue

The vista and horizon of Republican Bolivia, which has been our set and setting over the last eleven chapters, has been showered with colonial racism and shadowed by the cloudy storm of the violence inherent to the *state of exception*. Despite being drenched in oppression, the legacies of those eight decades and the dozens before them have been formidably constructed by the thundering rebellion, electric resistance, and '*soplo vital*' of our protagonists. In the strong Altiplano winds that swept through that stormy set and setting, Fausto Reinaga, right down to his last days, walked in an eighty eight-year long hard rain.

The world's greatest frontier for a political philosophy that may some day liberate Agamben's 'beautiful day of life' through “a new and coherent ontology of potentiality” is swirling in the Altiplano winds of Tawantinsuyu. Illuminating the possibilities for rethinking the foundations of sovereignty beyond that of the *ban* and the *Iron norm*, these vibrant gales of ideas owe much to the struggles and praxis of the Indianistas and Kataristas. It owes perhaps even more to the grander collective of the Bolivian multitudes. The radical and pantheist ideas of Fausto Reinaga's Amautic thought, of declarations like the Tiwanaku Manifesto, and of the generations of vanguard revolutionaries inspired by them, were an important chapter in the long history of resistance against the invasion of, and Western impositions on, the Fifth Continent.

Along with many more in Bolivia, Fausto Reinaga crossed the threshold

beyond the mediocrity so profoundly demonstrated in the Modern bourgeois trappings of Western acculturation. Despite his defamed political death after writing ...*FFAA*, crossing this threshold enabled this extraordinary citizen to leave a lasting mark on Bolivian citizen sovereignty. Fausto's physical death was also haunted with disillusionment and isolation. Yet, while one's personal life may be comprised of bitter torrents of cold hard rain, legacies on the other hand, blaze through the peaks and valleys of history with the unstoppable glow of indomitability.

University of Essex professor of sociology, anthropologist, and director of the university's Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Andrew Canessa, goes as far as to assert that Fausto Reinaga was "...the most influential Bolivian indigenous intellectual of the twentieth century... who for more than two decades was virtually the sole torch bearer for Indian rights..." (Canessa 9, 246). In actuality however, Fausto is only one individual in millions. For at least five hundred years, the conscience and clarion of the Bolivian multitude carried, guarded, fought and died for this glorious torch.

Agamben's 'beautiful day of life' may be more elusive than we prefer. Yet, the aftershocks and tectonic shifts, left in the subsequent wake of events strewn across the Bolivian historical landscape, offer us many intriguing possibilities. It is clear that this five hundred year tide has cleared the path for possibilities far beyond Allen's 'empowered to be disempowered' America. If *Agamben's dilemma* posited those possibilities as out of reach, Fausto and the Bolivian multitudes instead participated in a long tradition, a legacy, which has again and again cleared the view to that same beautiful day of life.

## Bibliography

- Adorjan, Michael, Tony Christensen, Benjamin Kelly, and Dorothy Pawluch. "Stockholm Syndrome as Vernacular Resource." *Sociological Quarterly*. LV..1 (2012): 454-474. Print.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *State of Exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. Print.
- Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Print.
- Allen, Danielle S. *Talking to Strangers*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. Print.
- Anderson, Gary Clayton. "Book Reviews: Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the Americas. By Nicholas A. Robins." *Journal of American History*. 93.4 Mar. (2007): 1253-1254. Print.
- Amaru, Andrés Tupac. "Carta de Andrés Tupac Amaru a Alférez Real Diego Quispe." Letter AGI Buenos Aires 319 of *Historia de la Rebelion de Tupac Catari*. Ed. María Eugenia del Valle de Siles. La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Don Bosco, 1990. 340-344. Print.
- Amaru, Andrés Tupac. "Carta de Andrés Tupac Amaru a Gregoria Apaza. ." Letter AGI Buenos Aires 319 of *Historia de la Rebelion de Tupac Catari*. Ed. María Eugenia del Valle de Siles. La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Don Bosco, 1990. 340-344. Print.
- Antezana, J L. H. *La Diversidad Social En Zavaleta Mercado*. La Paz: CEBEM, Centro Boliviano de Estudios Multidisciplinarios, 1991. Print.
- Apaza Chuquimia, Jaime. Personal Interviews. August, 2013.
- "Aporia." Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged. 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003. HarperCollins Publishers 20 Nov. 2013  
<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/aporia>
- Appelbaum, Nancy P, Anne S. Macpherson, and Karin A. Roseblatt. *Race and Nation in Modern Latin America*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2003. Print.
- Aranzaes, Nicanor. *Las Revoluciones De Bolivia*. La Paz, Bolivia: Casa editora talleres gráficos "La Prensa", 1918. Print.

- Asamblea Constituyente & Bolivian Senate. Bolivia. *Nueva Constitución Política del Estado*. La Paz Bolivia: 2008/09
- Badash, David. "America Spends \$71 Billion Annually Subsidizing Tax-Exempt Religion." New Civil Rights Movement. 18 Jun 2012: . Web. 14 May. 2014. <<http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/america-spends-71-billion-annually-subsidizing-tax-exempt-religion/politics/2012/06/18/41665>>.
- Baird, Robert P. "Exclusive: the U.S. Paid Money to Support Hugo Banzer's 1971 coup in Bolivia." digital emunction 30 MAY 2010: n. pag. Web. 10 Jul 2010. <[http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article\\_60082.shtml](http://axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/Article_60082.shtml)>.
- Barrios de Chungara, Domitila, and Moema Viezzer. *Let Me Speak!: Testimony of Domitila, a Woman of the Bolivian Mines*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978. Print.
- Bautista S., Rafael. "El 18 Brumario del Kananchiri." *Bolpress*. 27 Sept 2011: n. page. Web. 31 Jan. 2013. <<http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2011092711>>.
- Beaulieu, Devin, and Nancy Grey Postero. "The Politics of Extractivism." *Against the Current*. 167 (2013): n. page. Web. 10 Nov. 2013. <<http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/4032>>.
- Belzu, Manuel Y. *Constitución Política De La República Boliviana Sancionada Por La Convención Nacional Reunida En 1851*. La Paz de Ayacucho: Impr. de Sucre, 1851. Print.
- Belzu, Manuel Y. *Mensaje Del Presidente Constitucional De Bolivia a La Convención Nacional Reunida*. La Paz: Impr. Pacena, 1851. Print.
- Campbell, Leon G.. "Ideology and Factionalism during the Great Rebellion, 1780-1782." Trans. *ArrayResistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. Print.
- Canessa, Andrew. *Intimate Indigeneities: Race, Sex, and History in the Small Spaces of Andean Life*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. Print.
- Carnero Hoke, Guillermo. *Nueva Teoría Para La Insurgencia*. Lima: Editorial Amerindia, 1968. Print.
- Catari, Dámaso. "Dámaso Catari Expresses his Loyalty to Tupac Amaru ." Letter 113 of *The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, An Anthology of*

- Sources*. Ed. Ward Stavig and Ed. Ella Schmidt. 1st. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing company, Inc., 2008. 208. Print.
- Cárdenas, Felix. Personal conversation. 2010.
- Carlos Mesa, G C. D, Osario M. Espinoza, and Ximena Valdivia. *Bolivia Siglo XX: Banzer, Las Paradojas De La Historia*. La Paz, Bolivia: Plano Medio, 2009.
- Céspedes, Augusto. *El Presidente Colgado: Historia Boliviana*. Buenos Aires: Editorial J. Alvarez, 1966. Print.
- Céspedes, Augusto. "Victor Paz y El Drama Del Poder." Trans. Array *Victor Paz Estenssoro, Testimonios de sus Contemporaneos*. . 1st. Cochabamba: Editora Opinion S.A., 2001. 71-78. Print.
- Condori Urchi, Juan. Personal Conversation. August 2, 2013.
- Constitución Política De La República Boliviana. Sucre*: Imprenta de la ciudad Sucre, 1839. Print.
- Croom, Adam M. "Slurs." *Language Sciences*. 33.3 (2011): 343-358. Print.
- De la Cadena, Marisol . *Indigenous Mestizos: The Politics of Race and Culture in Cuzco, Peru, 1919-1991*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000. Print.
- Dorn, Glenn J. *The Truman Administration and Bolivia: Making the World Safe for Liberal Constitutional Oligarchy*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. Print.
- Dussel, Enrique. "El Pueblo, lo Popular y el Populismo." *Pensando el Mundo desde Bolivia*. Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Bolivia, La Paz. 26 Mar 2008. Keynote.
- Egan, Nancy E. "Citizenship, Race, and Criminalization: The Proceso Mohoza, 1899-1905" (September 17, 2007). Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies. CILAS Working Papers. Paper 24. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cilas/papers/24>
- Escárzaga, Fabiola. "Comunidad Indígena y Revolución en Bolivia: El Pensamiento Endianista Katarista de Fausto Reinaga y Felipe Quispe." *Política y Cultura*. Primavera.37 (2012): 185-210. Print.
- Escárzaga, Fabiola. "La Huella de Mariátegui en Fausto Reinaga." *Revista América Latina*. 13 n. Print.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Black Skin, White Masks*. 1967. Print.

- Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth: Pref. by Jean-Paul Sartre*. Transl. by Constance Farrington. New York: Grove Press, 1963. Print.
- Farthing, Linda, and Benjamin Kohl. "'Less Than Fully Satisfactory Development Outcomes' International Financial Institutions and Social Unrest in Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives* 36.3 (2009): 59-78.
- Foucault, Michel. "Governmentality." *The Foucault Effect*. Ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991. Print.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Print.
- Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Continuum, 2000. Print.
- Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *National Interest*. Summer. (1989) Print.
- Galeano, Eduardo H. *Open Veins Of Latin America, Five Centuries Of The Pillage Of A Continent*. New York: Monthly Review Pr, 1997. Print.
- Galinsky, AD, CS Wang, JA Whitson, EM Anicich, K Hugenberg, and GV Bodenhausen. "The Reappropriation of Stigmatizing Labels: the Reciprocal Relationship between Power and Self-Labeling." *Psychological Science*. 24.10 (2013): 2020-9. Print.
- García Linera, Alvaro. "Ciudadanía y Democracia en Bolivia (1900-1998)." *Revista Ciencia Política*. Año IV No. 4. June (1999): 173-193. Print.
- García Linera, Alvaro. "Ciudadanía y Democracia en Bolivia (1900-1998)." Trans. Array *La Potencia Plebeya, Acción colectiva e identidades indígenas obreras y populares en Bolivia*. . 2nd Bolivian ed. La Paz: Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales / Instituto Internacional de Integración del Convenio Andrés Bello, 2010. Print.
- García Linera, Alvaro. "Del Estado Aparente al Estado Integral, La Construcción democrática del socialismo comunitario." Acto de Posesión Presidencial. Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. Bolivia, La Paz. 22 Jan 2010. Address.
- García, Linera, Alvaro. *Geopolítica De La Amazonía: Poder Hacendal-Patrimonial Y Acumulación Capitalista*. La Paz: Vicepresidencia del Estado, Presidencia de la Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional, 2012. Print.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *Prison Notebooks, Selections From the Prison Notebooks*. 'Ed'.

- Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. New York: International Publishers, 2005, first published 1971. Print.
- Goldstein, Paul S. *Andean Diaspora: The Tiwanaku Colonies and the Origins of South American Empire*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005. Print.
- Gotkowitz, Laura. *A Revolution For Our Rights*. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2007.
- Hale, Charles R. *Más Que Un Indio =: More Than an Indian : Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala*. Santa Fe, N.M: School of American Research Press, 2006. Print.
- Hale, Charles. "Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the era of the 'Indio Permitido'." *NACLA Report on the Americas* September October: 16-37. Print.
- Hall, Stuart. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power." *Trans. Array Modernity: An introduction to Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996. Print.
- Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. *Empire*. 1st. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press, 2000. Print.
- Harvey, David. "The 'New' Imperialism: Accumulation by Dispossession." *Socialist Register*. 40. (2004): 63-87. Print.
- Heggarty, Paul. "Linguistics for Archaeologists: a Case-study in the Andes." *Cambridge Archaeological Journal*. 18.1 (2008): 35-56. Print.
- Holston, James. *Insurgent Citizenship, Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil*. 1st. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Print.
- Hunefeldt, Christine. "Los negros y la esclavitud en las reflexiones de Mariátegui." *Anuario Mariáteguiano*. V.5 (1993): 82-88. Print.
- Hurtado Mercado, Javier. *El Katarismo*. 1st ed. La Paz: Hisbol, 1986. Print.
- International Secretariat of the IWGIA, . "Introduction." *Trans. Array The Indian Liberation and Social Rights Movement in Kollasuyu (Bolivia)*. . 1st. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1978. Print.
- Johnson, Brian. "Decolonization and Its Paradoxes The (Re)envisioning of Health Policy in Bolivia." *Latin American Perspectives*. 37.3 (May 2010): 138-159. Print.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire*.

- New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000. Print.
- Kelley, Robin D.G., guest. "Aime Cesaire, 1913-2008: Remembering the Life and Legacy of the Black Pride Poet and Anti-Colonial Activist." Correspondant. Amy Goodman, Prod. Sam Alcott, and Mike Burke. Democracy Now!: Pacifica, New York, 21 Apr 2008. Television.
- Knight, Alan. "Racism, Revolution, and Indigenismo: Mexico, 1910-1940." Trans. Array *The Idea of Race in Latin America*. . 1st. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990. 71-113. Print.
- Kohl, Benjamin. "Bolivia under Morales A Work in Progress." *Latin American Perspectives* 37.3 (2010): 107-122.
- Kuenzli, E. Gabrielle. "Indian Problems, Indian Solutions: Incantations of Nation in Early Twentieth Century Bolivia". *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 8.2 (2013): 122-139.
- Larson, Brooke. *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Print.
- Layme Pairumani, Félix. *Diccionario Bilingüe, Aymara - Castellano*. 3rd. La Paz Bolivia: Consejo Educativo Aymara (CEA)), 2004. Print.
- Lennon, John. *Power to the People*. , 1971. Musical score.
- Lennon, John. *Skywriting by Word of Mouth, and Other Writings, Including the Ballad of John and Yoko*. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. Print.
- Levine, Michael, and Laura Kavanau-Levine. *The Big White Lie, The Deep Cover Operation That Exposed the Cia Sabotage of the Drug War : an Undercover Odyssey*. New York, NY: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1994. Print.
- Levy, Daniel, and Natan Sznaider. "The institutionalization of cosmopolitan morality: The Holocaust and human rights." *Journal of Human Rights* 3.2 (2004): 143-157.
- Lima, Constantino. Personal Interview. August 9, 2013.
- Lucero, Jose Antonio. "FANON IN THE ANDES: Fausto Reinaga, Indianismo and the Black Atlantic." *International Journal of Critical Indigenous Studies*. 1.1 (2008): 13-22. Print.
- Mamani Ramirez, Pablo. Personal Interview. August 2013

- Mata, G. Humberto. *Fausto Reinaga Kaymari Jatunk'a*. 1st ed. La Paz: Ediciones PIB/Imprenta y Librería Renovación Ltda., 1968. Print.
- McNeish, John-Andrew. "Extraction, Protest and Indigeneity in Bolivia: The TIPNIS Effect." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 8.2 (2013): 221-242.
- McSherry, J. Patrice. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-America System." *Social Justice*. 26.4 Winter (1999): 144. Print.
- Means, Philip Ainsworth. *Fall of the Inca Empire, and the Spanish Rule in Peru: 1530-1780*. 1st. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932. Print.
- Mehta, Uday S.. "Liberal Strategies of Exclusion." Trans. Array *Tensions of Empire, Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. Ann Laura Stoler and Frederick Cooper. 1st. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Ex:59-86. Print.
- Memmi, Albert. *The Colonizer and The Colonized*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991. Print.
- Mesa Gisbert, Carlos D., Teresa Gisbert, and José De Mesa. *Historia De Bolivia*. 4th ed. La Paz: Editorial Gisbert y CIA S.A., 2001. Print.
- Molina Céspedes, Tomás. *Testimonio De Un Dictador: Habla García Meza*. Cochabamba, Bolivia: Gráfica "J.V.", 2006. Print.
- Molina, Victor. "Dos Mundos Opuestos. Entrevista de Victor Molina con Ramiro Reynaga." *Sabiduría, Poder y Comprensión: América se repiensa desde sus orígenes*. 'Comp'. Roberto Arturo Arcila. Bogotá: UNESCO, 2002. Print.
- Morales Méndez, Franz Gustavo. *Historia Crítica de la Independencia de Bolivia*. 1st ed. Cochabamba: Talleres Gráficos "Kipus", 2011. Print.
- Marx, Karl. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. 1st ed. New York: International Publishers Co., 1964. Print
- Marx, Karl. *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York: Mondial, 2005. Print.
- Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. *Manifest Der Kommunistischen Partei: Veröffentlicht Im Februar 1848*. London: Gedruckt in der Office der "Bildungs-Gesellschaft für Arbeiter" von J.E. Burghard, 1848.
- Molina Céspedes, T. *Belzu, Quién Lo Mató?* Cochabamba, Bolivia: T. Molina Céspedes, 2001. Print.
- Molina Céspedes, T. *Testimonio De Un Dictador: Habla García Meza*. Cochabamba,

- Bolivia: Gráfica "J.V.", 2006. Print
- Museo Nacional de Etnografía y Folklore, ed. "A Los 40 Años Del Manifiesto De Tiwanaku". La Paz: Fundación para el Desarrollo y Conocimiento Andino Pukara, unpublished. 30-31 Jul, 2013. Conference.
- Nandy, Ashis. *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*. Delhi: Oxford, 1983. Print.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich W, and E Haldeman-Julius. *The Antichrist*. Girard, Kan: Haldeman-Julius, 1930. Print.
- O'Connor d'Arlach, Tomás. *Dichos y Hechos del General Melgarejo*. La Paz: Ediciones Puerta del Sol, 197?. Print.
- Diéz de Medina, Fernando. *Pachakuti y Otras Páginas Polémicas*. 1st. La Paz: Imp. y Editorial ARTISTICA Otero & Calderon , 1948. Print.
- Painter, James. "US Bolivians Fall Out Over Drugs." *Christian Science Monitor* 18 Mar 1991, n. pag. Web. 13 May. 2013.  
<<http://www.csmonitor.com/1991/0318/18041.html>>.
- Parker, Lawrence Krisna (KRS-One), and True-Master. *Meta-historical*. S.l.: s.n., 2010. Sound recording.
- Poma Laura, Juan Manuel. *Fausto Reynaga o la Frustración del Programa Indio*. La Paz: Textos Marxistas, 2011. Print.
- Portugal Mollinedo, Pedro. Personal Interview. March 2013.
- Postero, Nancy Grey. "Re: Greetings from Bolivia." Message to Patrick L.W. Kearney. 22 Jul 2013. E-mail.
- Postero, Nancy Grey. *Now We Are Citizens, Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural Bolivia*. 1st. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006. Print.
- Postero, Nancy Grey. "Protecting Mother Earth in Bolivia: Discourse and Deeds in the Morales Administration." Trans. *Array Amazonia, Environment and the Law in Amazonia*. . 1st. Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2013. 78-93. Print.
- Postero, Nancy Grey, and León Zamosc. *The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America*. Brighton [England: Sussex Academic Press, 2004. Print.
- Postero, Nancy Grey. "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia." *Latin American Research Review*. (2010): 59-78. Print.

- Prada Alcoreza, Raúl. Personal Interviews. March 2012, March/July/August, 2013
- "Proclamation of 'Movimiento Indio Tupac Katari, MITKA" Trans. Array *The Indian Liberation and Social Rights Movement in Kollasuyu (Bolivia)*. . 1st. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1978. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Belzú, Precursor De La Revolución Nacional*. La Paz: Ed. Rumbo sindical, 1953. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Bolivia Y La Revolución De Las FF. AA*. La Paz: Ediciones Comunidad Amáutica Mundial, 1981. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *¿Como Viviremos?*. 1st. La Paz: Ediciones: Comunidad Amáutica Mundial (CAM), 1980. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *El Hombre*. 1st ed. La Paz: Editora Urquizo S.A., 1981. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *El Indio y El Cholaje Boliviano*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. La Paz: Imprenta Y Librería 'Renovación' Ltda., 1964. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *El Indio y los Escritores de América*. 1st. La Paz: Ediciones PIB(Partido Indio de Bolivia) La Editorial Don Bosco, 1968. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *El Pensamiento Amautico*. 1st ed. La Paz: Litografías e Imprentas Unidas S.A., 1978. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *El Sentimiento Mesiánico del Pueblo Ruso*. 1st. La Paz: Ediciones SER(Sindicato de Escritores Revolucionarios)-Los Talleres Graficos Gutenberg, 1960. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Franz Tamayo y la Revolución Boliviana*. 1st ed. La Paz: Editorial Casegural, 1957. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Indianidad*. 1st. La Paz: Litografías e Imprentas Unidas S.A., 1978. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *La Intelligentsia del Cholaje Boliviano*. 1st ed. La Paz: Imprenta y Librería Renovación Ltda., 1967. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *La Podredumbre Criminal Del Pensamiento Europeo*. 1st ed. La Paz: Imprenta y Librería Renovación Ltda., 1982. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *La Razon y el Indio*. 1st ed. La Paz: Litografías e Imprentas Unidas S.A., 1978. Print.

- Reinaga, Fausto. *La Revolución India*. 2nd ed. El Alto: Ediciones Fundación Amaútica Fausto Reinaga/Imp. Movil Graf, 2001. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Manifiesto Del Partido Indio De Bolivia*. 1st ed. La Paz: Ediciones PIB, 1970. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Mitayos Y Yanaconas*. Oruro, Bolivia: s.n, 1941. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Nacionalismo Boliviano*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. La Paz, Bolivia: Rumbo Sindical, 1952. Print
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Poder Indio Y Occidente*. 1st ed. La Paz: Ediciones PIB, 1974. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Qué Hacer?* 1<sup>st</sup> ed. La Paz: Ediciones Comunidad Amáutica Mundial, 1980. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Reinagismo*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. La Paz: Ediciones Comunidad Amáutica Mundial, 1980. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Socrates y Yo*. 1st ed. La Paz: Editora Urquizo S.A., 1983. Print.
- Reinaga, Fausto. *Victor Paz Estenssoro*. 1st ed. La Paz: Editorial "La Paz", ca.1949. Print.
- Reinaga, Hilda, Personal Interviews. March, July-August 2013
- Reinaga, Hilda. "Biografía de Fausto Reinaga." Fundación Amautica Fausto Reinaga. Mar 2012: n. Print.
- Reinaga Burgoa, Ramiro. *Tawantinsuyu, 5 siglos de Guerra Qheswaymara Contra España*. 1st. Chukiapu Kollasuyu: Centro De Coordinación Y Promoción Campesina MINK'A, 1978. Print.
- Reinaga Burgoa, Ramiro, Personal Interviews. Aug 2011 through Feb 2012
- Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia. "Anthropolgoy and Society in the Andes, Themes and Issues." *Critique of Anthropology*. 13.77 (1993): 77-96. Print.
- Robins, Nicholas A. *Native Insurgencies and the Genocidal Impulse in the Americas*. 1<sup>st</sup> ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. Print.
- Rohter, Larry. "Author Changes His Mind on '70s Manifesto, Eduardo Galeano disavows his book *The Open Veins*". *The New York Times*. 23 May, 2014. WEB 27 May 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/books/eduardo->

[galeano-disavows-his-book-the-open-veins.html?emc=eta1&\\_r=0](http://galeano-disavows-his-book-the-open-veins.html?emc=eta1&_r=0)

Salmón, Raúl. *Viva Belzu!* La Paz: Ediciones Teatro Social, 1962. Print.

Sanjinéz C., Javier. "Mestizaje Upside Down: Subaltern Knowledges and the Known." *Nepantla: Views from South*. 3.1 (2002): 39-60. Print.

Savedra, José Luis. Personal Interviews. August, 2013.

Schilling-Vacaflor, Almut. "Prior Consultations in Plurinational Bolivia: Democracy, Rights and Real Life Experiences." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies*. 9.2 (2013): 202-220. Print.

Second National Congress of the CSUTCB, First. "The Confederated Union of Peasant Workers of Bolivia, Political manifesto 1983." Letter/Appendix 7 of *Oppressed but not Defeated, Peasant Struggles among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980*. Ed. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. 1st English ed. Geneva: United nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1987. 189-205. Print.

Skidmore, Thomas E., Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. *Modern Latin America*. 7. New York : Oxford Univ Pr, 2010. Print.

Stern, Steve J. "The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: A Reappraisal." Trans. *Array Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*. Steve J. Stern. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. Print.

Tapia, Luis. *La Producción del Conocimiento Local, Historia y política en la obra de René Zavaleta*. 1st. La Paz: Muela del Diablo Editores, 2002. Print.

*The New Oxford Annotated Bible with Acrophya*. College. New York: Oxford University, 1994. Print.

Thomson, Sinclair. "Was There Race in Colonial Latin America? Identifying Selves and Others in the insurgent Andes." Trans. *Array Histories of Race and Racism, The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times to the Present*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011. 72-91. Print.

"Tiwanaku Manifesto" Trans. *Array The Indian Liberation and Social Rights Movement in Kollasuyu (Bolivia)*. . 1st. Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1978. Print.

Turpo, Aureliano. "Socialismo o Comunitarismo del Siglo XXI." Trans. *Array Historia Coyuntura y Descolonización, Katarismo e Indianismo en el proceso politico del MAS en Bolivia*. La Paz: Periodico Pukara, 2010. Print.

- Unknown, dir. *Fausto Reinaga*. Dir. Unknown. Youtube - ElWillka, 2008. Web. 14 Nov 2012. <<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0YjjpoyPc4>>.
- Vaca, Mary, dir. "Amor en el asilo, amor prohibido." *UNA VOZ INDEPENDIENTE*. BBC Mundo: Bolivia, 28 Jul 2009. Web. 16 Oct 2013. <[http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/cultura\\_sociedad/2009/07/090727\\_1936\\_ancianos\\_enamorados\\_irm.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/cultura_sociedad/2009/07/090727_1936_ancianos_enamorados_irm.shtml)>.
- Valle, de S. M. E. *Historia De La Rebelión De Tupac Catari, 1781-1782*. La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Don Bosco, 1990. Print.
- Villegas, Harry 'Pombo'. *Pombo: A Man of Che's Guerrilla : with Che Guevara in Bolivia, 1966-68*. New York: Pathfinder, 1997. Print.
- Yapita, Juan de Dios. Personal and institutional instruction from. 2008 through 2013.
- Yapita, Juan de Dios, and J.T. Van der Noordaa. *La Dinámica Aymara, Conjugación de Verbos*. La Paz: 2008.
- Yazzi, Robert. "Question and answer session". Legal Pluralism in Latin America. Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies at the University of California San Diego and the Center for Creative Problem Solving at California Western School of Law. Hojel Auditorium, Institute of the Americas University of California, San Diego, San Diego, Ca.. 06May2011. Address.
- Yazzi, Robert. Personal Interview. Aug 2012
- Yazzi, Robert. "Life Comes From it". Trans Array Ed. Nielsen, Marianne O, and James W. Zion. *Navajo Nation Peacemaking: Living Traditional Justice*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2005. Print.
- Zavaleta Mercado, René. "Bolivia-Military Nationalism and the Popular Assembly." *New Left Review*. I.73 (1972): 63-82. Print.
- Zavaleta Mercado, René. *El Poder Dual*. 3rd. ed. Cochabamba: Editorial LOS AMIGOS DEL LIBRO, 1987. Print.
- Zavaleta Mercado, René. *Lo Nacional-Popular en Bolivia*. 1st ed. Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno editores, sa de cv, 1986. Print.